WT/L/1179  
4 December  2023 
(23-8206) Page: 1/4 
General Council  
14 and 15 December 2023  Original:  Spanish  
 
  
CUBA – ARTICLE XV:6 OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994  
REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA UNDER THE DECISION OF 23  NOVEMBER  2021 
(WT/L/1128 ) 
The following communication, dated 30  November  2023, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of Cuba.  
 
_______________  
 
 
1  PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE REQUEST  
1.1.  Pursuant to the provisions of Article IX:4 of the Agreement Establishing the World Tr ade 
Organization (WTO), the Government of the Republic of Cuba hereby submits its second annual 
report on the waiver extension granted under the Decision of 23  November  2021 ( WT/L/1128 ). This 
waiver extension was initially granted to Cuba under the Decision of 14  October  1996 ( WT/L/182 ) 
in relation to Article  XV:6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT  1994).  
1.2.  The waiver providing relief from the provisions of paragraph 6 of the above -mentioned Article 
was granted to the Government of Cuba under the Decision of 7  August  1964, and successively 
extended on 18  October  19961, 20 December  20012, 15 December  20063, 14 December  20124, 
7 December  20165 and 23  November  20216. 
1.3.  The circumstances that justified the waiver extension granted in 2021 have continued to 
worsen. This applies, in particular, to the economic, trade and financial blockade measures that the 
Government of the United States of America continues to impose on Cuba, which have been 
aggravated by the impact of the SARS CoV -2 (COVID -19) pandemic, the global economic and 
financial crisis caused by this disease, and other international conflicts.  
1.4.  The new Democrat administration that entered the White House in January  2021 has continued 
to apply the 243 measures imposed by the previous admin istration. The actions announced in May 
2022, while welcomed as positive, have been of limited benefit to the Cuban people. As a result, the 
country's economic and social conditions have continued to decline, without in any way reflecting  
the efforts and s acrifice made by Cuba to advance its development.  
1.5.  The following set of existing measures continue to form  the basis for the hostilities, and their 
impact at the international level acts as a deterrent to relations with Cuba:  
• On 17  April 2019, the Secretar y of State issued a statement announcing the full activation 
of Title III of the Helms -Burton Act as of 2  May 2019.  
 
1 WT/L/182 . 
2 WT/L/440 . 
3 WT/L/678 . 
4 WT/L/850 . 
5 WT/L/1003 . 
6 WT/L/1 128. WT/L/1179  
 
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  • On 4  June 2019, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a policy of 
refusing travel licences for passenger transport (cruise s hips), recreational vessels and 
private aircraft.  
• On 23  October  2020, OFAC banned persons under US jurisdiction from processing 
remittances to and from Cuba that involve entities included on the Department of State's 
Cuba Restricted List, thereby directly impacting remittances sent through FINCIMEX and 
the AIS.  
• On 1 January  2021, the Department of State added the Banco Financiero Internacional 
S.A. to the Cuba Restricted List.  
• On 11  January  2021, Cuba was added to the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.  
1.6.  The policy of economic and financial persecution has continued to intensify against 
third-country banks and firms, thus generating greater obstacles for the Cuban bank in its 
international operations. The central aspects of this situation are the considerable fines imposed on 
major European Banks, the implementation of Title III of the Helms -Burton Act and Cuba's inclusion, 
once again, on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. This last measure, as well as being illegal and 
unjustified, continues to be widely cr iticized and rejected by the international community, as 
reflected in the UN's overwhelming vote against the blockade policy in November  2022. In addition, 
the Government of Colombia has asked the United States Government on several occasions to 
remove Cub a from the list7, and numerous world leaders have spoken out against this illegal and 
absurd decision at various international events.  
1.7.  The use of US currency continues to be banned in the country's external commercial and 
financial operations, which gener ates substantial losses on account of changes in the exchange rates 
between the US dollar and the currencies of third countries in which receipts and payments are 
executed, as well as other additional costs.  
1.8.  In 2022, the tightening of the blockade in the financial sphere reflected similar figures to the 
previous year, adding to the strain accumulated over time. More than 260 actions were involved , 
relating to more than 100 foreign banks. The most significant of these actions, in terms of impact 
and frequen cy, include the refusal to open bank accounts and close existing ones; the reversal of 
transfers and the cancellation of other banking operations; the cancellation of SWIFT Relationship 
Management Application (RMA) keys; the cancellation of correspondent a greements; and the refusal 
to open and notify letters of credit.  
1.9.  Despite Cuba having been put back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, the country 
continues to fulfil its obligations as part of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America 
(GAFILAT ), where the results achieved show that, to date, Cuba is among the countries that have 
obtained the best results at the global level, reflecting its context and actual situation. Cuba's aim 
to become fully integrated into the international network of coun tries seeking to combat money 
laundering, the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has thus 
been achieved.  
2  JUSTIFICATION  
2.1.  The rigid and hostile blockade policy against Cuba continues to be the main impediment to the 
country's economic development, by hampering the performance of all sectors of its domestic 
economy, substantially increasing economic costs and impeding access to external financial flows, 
and obstructing essential imports, mainly food, medicines and fuel.  
 
7 The Donald Trump administration used as an argument for putting Cuba back on the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list, the request that the Government of Colombia had made to the Government of Cuba for the 
extradition  of various members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) living in Cuba, which did not correspond 
to Cuba's commitments as a guarantor of these negotiations.  WT/L/1179  
 
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  2.2.  Consequently, the country's efforts to integrate into the world trading system are being made 
under particularly difficult conditions, as a result of a policy that contradicts the principle of free 
trade.  
2.3.  The blockade legislation also prohibits loans to Cu ba by multilateral and regional financial 
organizations, thereby denying the country access to sources of long -term financing under 
favourable conditions and forcing it to resort to short -term loans with high interest rates and supplier 
financing on a much  less flexible basis than credit from financial institutions and official sources.  
2.4.  The blockade is a blatant violation of international law and the principles of free trade and 
navigation enshrined in numerous international legal instruments, including the  rules of the WTO. It 
runs counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, while constituting an 
infringement of a sovereign State's right to peace, development and security.  
2.5.  The main laws that remain in force and allow the blockade t o continue are the following:  
• The Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), originally enacted as a wartime measure in 1917 
to restrict trade with nations that were considered hostile. It was on this law that the first 
regulations of the 1962 blockade against Cub a were based. In September  2015, arguing 
foreign policy interests, President Obama renewed this Act, which constitutes the 
cornerstone of the laws and regulations governing the blockade, for one more year.  
• The Foreign Assistance Act, enacted by the United States Congress in September  1961, 
authorizing the President of the United States to establish and maintain "a total embargo 
on trade between the United States and Cuba". It also prohibits the granting of any aid to 
the Government of Cuba.  
• The Export Admin istration Act (EAA), adopted in 1979, which empowers the President to 
control, in general, exports and re -exports of goods and technology, in particular those 
that are considered detrimental to the national security of the United States.  
• The Cuban Democrac y Act (CDA), better known as the "Torricelli Act", signed by President 
Bush Senior in October  1992, reinforcing the economic measures against Cuba and 
providing a legal basis for the extraterritoriality of the blockade. Among other restrictions, 
it prohibi ts subsidiaries of North American companies in third countries from doing 
business with Cuba or Cuban nationals, and prohibits the entry into North  American 
territory, for a period of 180  days, of ships from third countries that have touched port in 
Cuba.  
• The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, commonly known as the 
"Helms -Burton Act", approved by President Clinton in March  1996. Its essential aim is to 
impede and discourage foreign investment and to internationalize the blockade against  
Cuba. It codifies the provisions of the blockade, limiting the President's prerogatives to 
suspend the policy and broadening its extraterritorial scope. It denies entry into the United 
States of directors of foreign companies (and their family members) th at invest in 
"confiscated" property in Cuba and provides for the possibility of filing legal action against 
them in the  US courts.  
• The Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which regulate the exceptions to the Export 
Administration Act or those that are  authorized under licences issued by the Bureau of 
Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce. They come under the Trading With 
the Enemy Act and the Export Administration Act.  
2.6.  This body of legislation, applied over six decades, has caused severe economic damage to Cuba 
estimated at 153,197  million dollars at current prices, and amounting to 1,391,111,000 dollars by 
the end of February  2022, taking into account the depreciation of the dollar against the value of gold 
in the international market.  
2.7.  Moreover, the economic, commercial and financial siege that has been kept in place unchanged 
by all the US  administrations since 1961 imposes extraterritorial restrictions on Cuba that also affect 
other WTO Members.  WT/L/1179  
 
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  2.8.  For Cuba, 2022 was a very difficult and co mplex year, characterized by severe economic and 
financial tensions : the continuation of the US blockade of  Cuba; the rising costs of the impact of 
catastrophic weather events on the island; the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in 
February 20 22, which had an adverse effect on food and energy prices, exacerbating inflationary 
pressures that were already noticeable in 2021; the tightening of international financial conditions 
to reduce inflation, which reached unprecedented levels in most econom ies; and the persistence of 
the COVID -19 pandemic, which brought additional costs for the country due to the need to maintain 
disease control levels.  
2.9.  The host of difficulties mentioned above prevent the signing of a special exchange agreement 
with WTO  Memb ers. 
2.10.   In the midst of this adverse scenario , the economy expanded by an annual rate of 1.8% in 
2022, thereby sustaining the trajectory of gradual recovery following growth of 1.3% in 2021. While  
moderate, this result signifies a halt in the downturn seen in 2019 (0.2%) and 2020 (10.9%). This 
increase was underpinned by the positive performance of the tertiary sec tor, which experienced 
growth of 3.1% and accounted for 88.5% of total GDP. 
2.11.   In 2022, tourism continued on its path to recovery after 2020 and 2021, despite falling short 
of projected growth forecasts.  
2.12.   Economic measures continued to be taken to promote work  in the non -state sector. By the 
end of the year, 1,609,700 people were involved in this type of work, an increase of 7.4% compared 
to 2020. Work in this sector is expected to continue to increase as activities included in the new 
forms of non -state manage ment expand.  
2.13.   In 2021, the creation of micro, small and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) led to new actors 
entering the economy. Such enterprises are wealth -generating sources that can help increase 
production and services. These entities continued to grow throughout 2022.  
2.14.   In 2022, the country made progress regarding the following economic and social aspects:  
• The average monthly wage of workers increased by 9.5% in nominal terms; however, real 
wages were affected by high inflation in the country. In terms o f employment, the number 
of employed people fell by 7.2%  in the state sector , while it increased by 7.4% in the 
economy's non -state sector.  
• While the infant mortality rate at birth and the under -five mortality rate per 1,000 live 
births rose in 2022 due to  the effects and complexity of COVID -19, which unfortunately 
also affected the paediatric population, these rates remain low compared to those of other 
Latin American and Caribbean countries.  
• Total registration at the start of the 2021/2022 academic year s tood at 2,029,498 students 
for all types of education (pre -school, primary and secondary education, special education, 
higher education, vocational and skills training and adult education) – an increase of 0.6% 
from the previous year.  
• In the 2021/2022 aca demic year, 404,055 students graduated from all levels of education, 
an increase of 9.3% over the previous school year.  
2.15.   All the above factors show that the particular circumstances that gave rise to the extension 
approved on 23  November  2021 of the waiver  extension granted to Cuba under the Decision of 
7 December  2016 continue to exist. Cuba confirms its willingness to comply with the principles laid 
down in the General  Agreement.  
 
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