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S/C/M/149  
 
24 June 2022 
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Council for Trade in Services    
 
 
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 16 MAY  2022 
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
The Council for Trade in Services held a meeting on 16 May 2022, chaired by  Ambassador Long of 
Cambodia . The agenda was contained in document WTO/AIR/CTS/ 30. 
The agenda was a dopted . 
Many delegations  congratulated the Chairman on his election.  
The representative  of Ukraine  said that , before the Members began the substantive discussion of 
the meeting, she wished to recall  that it had been  nearly  3 months of a full -scale, unprovoked , and 
unjustified war launched by Russia against Ukraine , when the Ukrainian people  continue d to defend 
the unity and independence of their country, values, economic and trade rights and the possibility 
of prosperity an d development for all.  
 
In a bro ader context, the destabilization of world markets, another surge in inflation, shutdown s of 
enterprises due to the loss of supply chains, one of the biggest migration crises since World War II 
and worsening expectations of economic agents  had already been witnessed . 
 
In a more specific context, Russia 's blatant invasion ha d a direct impact on trade in services. It was 
necessary to emphasize  that the significant loss caused by Russia 's actions to the transport services 
market , including air transportation and maritime shipping, by destroying transport routes, bridges, 
and other infrastructure, as well as blocking all Ukrainian seaports along with ships that were already 
loaded with agricultural products for export, ha d put man y countries on the edge of a food crisis.  
 
The insurance services market in Ukraine had been  marked by more than a 50% drop in revenues. 
A quarter of the companies ha d offices in the regions affected by the Russian aggression, although 
the majority of insu rance companies were able to continue to operate under a limited mode.  
 
In addition, Russia 's armed aggression against Ukraine had had direct consequences for Ukrainian 
business. About half of small and medium -sized enterprises ha d completely or partially ceased their 
activities since the beginning of the war  and the majority of th ose enterprises represented either 
services suppliers or service s consumers.  
 
She further noted that  on 16 May 2022 , Ukraine had  marked the 14th anniversary of its WTO 
Membership, which mean t that for 14 years , until Russia 's aggression , WTO Members ha d been 
benefi tting from Ukraine 's liberal commitments in trade in services. And at that juncture, Ukraine 
could not  guarantee the necessary leve l of implementation of its specific commitments with regard 
to the large scope of services sub -sectors and modes of supply.  
 
As Russian acts of aggression against Ukraine and its sovereignty undermine d the very purpose of 
the work in the WTO, Ukraine  firmly believe d that ignoring them would only lead them to chaos, 
mistrust and to questioning of the importance and relevance of international institutions.  
 
Thus, Ukraine  believe d that Russia ha d no right to take part in the exchanges and decision -making 
processes within the WTO. The representative called on Members to continue undertaking actions 
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat 's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  necessary to counter Russia 's aggression and deprive th at Member of benefits deriving from its WTO 
Membership.  
 
The representative  of the United States  thanked Ukraine for its statement and reiterated the United 
States ' strong support for Ukraine.  
 
His delegation condemn ed Russia 's premeditated and unprovoked attack on Ukraine , and equally  
condemned  Belarus ' regime for aiding Russia 's war of aggression.  He called u pon Russia to 
immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and refrain from any further unlawful threat or 
use of force against any UN member state. 
 
The WTO was predicated on certain values, among th ose that a fair and just international order was 
one built on rules, reciprocity, and transparency.  The actions of Russia were incompatible with the 
rules-based system that Members had built and worked to improve.  
 
Russia 's conduct in perpetrating a war of aggression against Ukraine undermine d the rights of 
Ukraine in the WTO  and was fundamentally incompatible with the values and principles of the  
Organization . 
 
The representative  of the United Kingdom  thank ed Ukraine for  its powerful statement  and 
congratulated Ukraine  on its WTO anniversary . It was regrett able that Ukraine 's WTO anniversary 
had to be marked at such tragic times.  The Ukrainian delegation  had already underlined why it could 
not continue as if it was business as usual in the Council  and across the WTO .  
 
Russia 's unprovoked, premeditated attack on Ukraine was an egregious violation of international law 
and the UN Charter, and, as Ukraine ha d highlighted, it had a devastating impact on global trade in 
services.  
 
The U nited Kingdom,  together with its international  partners , stood united in condemning the 
Russian Government 's reprehensible actions.  Russia must urgently de -escalate and withdraw its 
troops. It must be held accountable and must stop undermining democracy, global stability, and 
international law.  
 
The representative of the European Union  thanked  Ukraine for its statement  and condemned Russia's 
illegal and unjustified invasion and aggression against Ukraine, an independent and sovereign 
European country.  
 
Her delegation said that f or the previous 82 days the world  had witnessed the Russian army attacking 
Ukraine, killing and torturing civilians and destroying infrastructure, through actions that were 
outside the civilised world order.  
 
While carrying out th ose horrific attacks, R ussia had spread  disinformation and talk ed about the 
importance of peace and the importance of abiding by international rules , as had been heard in other 
WTO meetings. Th at was just another proof of the complete disrespect that Russia demonstrate d 
for international law and  for the loss of lives and suffering that it had caused.  
 
As long as Russia continue d with its illegal invasion while sitting with other Members  in the meetings 
of the WTO , an Organization that was based on the rule of law, the European Union  would continu e 
to condemn Russia 's actions and the unimaginable cost and suffering that R ussia had caused in 
Ukraine. The European Union would  also continue to speak about the disruptions that R ussia's 
actions had brought on the global economy, trade, peace , and stabil ity. 
 
Her delegation said that outside the WTO meeting rooms, the European Union would continue to 
fully support Ukraine, through its assistance to Ukraine 's economy, military , and people. In addition,  
the European Union, together with its international partners would  continue to sanction Russia with 
the aim to curb Russia 's ability to finance and continue its aggression.  
 
The representative of Canada thanke d Ukraine for  updating the Council on Trade in Services on the 
negative impact the v iolation of Ukrainian sovereignty by Russian soldiers and munitions had on its 
ability to participate in the work of the WTO.  
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  That illegal invasion ha d engendered a large -scale humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. It ha d senselessly 
brought disruption, displac ement, suffering and death to innocent people inside Ukraine 's sovereign 
borders.  
 
Canada strongly condemn ed Russia 's unjustifiable and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and st ood 
with the brave people of Ukraine as they continue d to fight for their freedom . Canada had  sincere 
thoughts  for victims of all ages.  
 
The invasion of Ukraine ha d also sent a shockwave through the global economy , one that ha d directly 
implicated every Member represented in the Council that day .  
 
Globally, the price of essential commo dities, including oil and gas, staple foods, and critical minerals 
had skyrocketed, threatening  food security across the world. There was no doubt that th e 
destabilization ha d had an impact on all economies, including and not least the developing and Least  
Developed  Countries.  Canada w ould continue to hold Russian leadership accountable .  
 
Canada  called  on Russia  to abandon t he path of war and return to good -faith diplomacy. Th at was  
the best, and only means, for addressing what was an urgent humanitarian emergency, a growing 
threat to global food security, and a threat Russia alone ha d created to the very core of rules -based 
institutions.   
 
The representative of Australia  thanke d Ukraine for its statement. Ukraine ha d outlined compellingly 
how relevant, and incompatible, Russia 's unprovoked, unjust , and illegal invasion of Ukraine had 
been with the values and work of the Council  on Trade in Services  and the WTO. 
 
Australia condemn ed Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the strongest possible terms.  
 
Russia 's actions violate d Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity , constitute d a gross violation 
of international law, including the United Nations Charter , and threaten ed the rules -based 
international order.  
 
Australia support ed the collective action by the international community to impose far -reaching 
economic sanctions and trade measures to inflict heavy costs on Russia and those who bore 
respo nsibility . 
 
The representative of Norwa y thanked Ukraine for its statement.  Norway conde mned, in the 
strongest possible terms, the unprecedented military aggression of the Russian Federation against 
Ukraine. The representative express ed Norway 's concern for the severe destruction and human 
suffering that that  illegal act of aggression was causing.  
 
By its unprovoked, unjustified , and premeditated military actions, the Russian Federation had grossly 
violat ed international law, the core principles on which the international rule -based order was built 
and the fundamental principles of the UN Charter that ha d prevailed since World War  II. It was an 
attack on what the UN, the WTO, and Geneva , as the capital of mu ltilateralism, st ood for. Norway 
expressed  its full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  
 
The representative of Iceland  thanked  Ukraine for its statement . Iceland condemn ed, in the 
strongest possible terms , the brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable attack by Russia on Ukraine.  
 
Iceland reiterate d its support for Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.  
Russia´s invasion was a flagrant violation of international law – including the UN Charter – and was 
a grave threat to the multilateral system and the international rules -based order upon which th e 
WTO was founded.  
 
Iceland  called  on Russia to cease its aggression and remove its forces immediately from the territory 
of Ukraine.  
 
The repr esentative of Japan  said that Russia 's aggression against Ukraine clearly infringe d upon 
Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity , and was a grave violation of the UN Charter, which 
prohibit ed the use of force. Furthermore, it was an attempt to unil aterally change the status quo by 
force and was totally unacceptable. It was an extremely serious situation that ha d shaken the very S/C/M/149  
 
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  foundations of the international order, including Asia. Japan condemn ed Russia 's actions in the 
strongest terms.  
 
In additi on, it ha d come to light that a series of cruel and inhumane acts by Russia had taken place 
not only in Bucha, near K yiv, but also in various parts of Ukraine. The killing of a large number of  
innocent civilians was a serious violation of international humanitarian law and constitute d 
unforgivable war crimes, and Russia must be held strictly accountable for its atrocities.  
 
Japan would  continue to stand by Ukraine and the Ukrainian people and w ould work with the 
international community, including the G7, to improve the situation.  
 
The representative of Albania  thanked  Ukraine for  sharing  with the Council the  consequences of the 
Russian occupation in Ukraine, including the direct impact on several aspects o f trade in s ervices.  
 
That was  a brutal violation of international law, the UN Charter, fundamental principles of 
international peace and security , and the multilateral global trading and the rules -based system on 
which WTO was based.  
 
In that context , in which  one W TO Member ha d attacked another  WTO Member bringing along 
terrible destruction, loss of innocent lives, a huge humanitarian crisis, atrocities and horrible war 
crimes, Albania condemn ed, in the strongest possible terms , the aggression of the Russian 
Federat ion on Ukraine , which was an unprovoked, premeditated attack against a sovereign 
democratic state and posed the highest  threat to security and peace Europe -wide.  
 
Albania suppor ted the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally 
recognized borders.  The implication s for the WTO had been triggered by Russia , and the measures 
taken by several Members in response  had been introduced  to protect the ir essen tial security 
interest s in view of the conflict , which was a Europe-wide threat. The measures taken directly in 
response to the Russian invasion  were fully aligned with the rights and obligations of WTO Members.  
 
Albania consider ed that the only way out o f the conflict was for the Russian Federation to urgently 
stop the military aggression and immediately withdraw its troops.   
 
The representative of the Republic of Moldova , jointly  with like -minded partners,  strongly 
condemn ed the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Moldova  reiterate d its support and solidarity 
with the Ukrainian people during th ose very difficult times.  
 
Moldova expresse d its serious concerns about  the impact of war in Ukraine  on local population s' 
welfare , as wel l as o n their national economies. Due to geographical proximity, Moldova 's economy 
was also among those seriously affected by disturbances in supply chains and global markets  due 
to the complete  stop of exports and imports from  and to the CIS region and du e to the high spikes 
of commodities and services prices as a result of th e war.  
  
Moldova was determined to further offer all the necessary support to the people of Ukraine fleeing 
the war. 
 
The representative  of Switzerland  thank ed Ukraine for its statement and was concerned to see the 
developments that  that delegation ha d recounted . Switzerland condemned Russia 's military 
aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. Th at military attack was a flagrant  
violation of international law, particularly of the prohibition of resorting to force and the principle of 
territorial integrity of a State. Switzerland  called on Russia to de escalate  the military aggression , 
cease hostilities , and immediately withdraw its troops from Uk rainian territory.   
 
The representative of the Republic of Korea  wished to echo the previous speakers on the situation 
in Ukraine and their evaluation o f that situation and its impacts. The Korean Government strongly  
condemn ed Russia 's armed invasion of Ukraine as a violation of the principles of the UN Charter. 
The use of force that cause d innocent casualties c ould not  be justified under any circumstance s. 
Ukraine 's sovereignty, territorial integrity , and political independence must b e respected. The 
Republic of Korea  share d the deep concerns of the international community over the unfolding 
humanitarian situation in Ukraine.  
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  In addition to a humanitarian disaster, Russia 's invasion was disrupting the global trad ing system , 
including  for services.  The service sector, travel industry, transportation services, communication 
services and so forth ha d been seriously damaged by the invasion. The way to put an end to that 
disruption was obviously the immediate cessation of Russia 's military action in Ukraine.  
 
The representative of the Russian Federation  said that her delegation was forced to state that the 
same Members of the WTO systematically violate d the normal work of th e Organization and 
completely ignore d the rules of procedur e. She emphasized that i t was not clear under which agenda 
item they had made their statements, which , in addition , went beyond the mandate of the Council, 
as well as the WTO as a whole.  
 
Russia  would  not waste the time of the Council responding to those  alarmist claims regarding the 
crisis in Ukraine , but nevertheless had to make some comments.  
 
Even the most general analysis of the situation that was taking  place in the world show ed that all 
attempts to accuse Russia of economic problems, global instabi lity and disruptions of global value 
chains not only had  no real grounds but also look ed primarily as part of an anti -Russian propaganda 
campaign.  
 
It was clear even to laymen that only rejection of unilateral restrictive measures introduced by 
certain Mem bers against WTO law could lift tensions off transportation -related, logistical, and 
financial aspects, ensure unimpeded deliveries and stability of global value chains  and food market s.  
 
Russia ha d not reduced the stocks of food that it  produced . It was  Western states who had put under 
pressure the well -being of the world  economy and who were able to prevent hunger and food 
shortages, no matter how hard they tr ied to prove the opposite and shift the blame on Russia.  
 
As for wheat, which, according to Ukraine, c ould not  be exported because of Russia , the meaning of 
it was unclear to her delegation . Every day, the Western media cheerfully talk ed about successful 
arms supplie s to Ukraine, to the conflict zone. Th at meant that transport and lo gistics corridors to 
Ukraine were working perfectly. But if supply chains work ed for weapons, then such channels c ould 
be used for agricultural goods, in the same  way. 
 
The WTO ha d proved to be an Organization that was primarily guided by economic consider ations 
and solid legal standards. Regrettably, an ever -increasing pressure for its politicization ha d already 
brought numerous inefficiencies and threaten ed the existence of the Organization as a whole. 
Political conflicts, including military ones, were happening in many parts of the world.  However, if 
the WTO t ook on the role of the UN or similar dedicated agencies and start ed tackling all those 
conflicts, it would  very soon lose its role as a universal regulator of global trade.  
 
1  ITEM A: NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE S V:7 AND VII:4 OF THE GATS  
1.1.  With regard to the notifications made pursuant to Article V:7 (Economic Integration), the 
Chairman  drew the Council 's attention to the communication s received from: Australia, 
Brunei  Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Viet 
Nam (S/C/N/920/ADD.1); and Iceland, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland 
(S/C/N/1101).  
1.2.  Regarding the notification obligation s under the G ATS, t he represe ntative of India stated that 
Article III:3 required Members to "promptly and at least annually inform the Council for Trade in 
Services of the introduction of any new , or any changes to existing laws , regulations or 
administrative guidelines which signific antly affect trade in services covered by its specific 
commitments under this Agreement ". Therefore , regular notification s of entry -related measures 
affecting existing mode 4 commitments of Members were required in order to understand  the full 
implications  of the commitments  that had been made .  
1.3.  However, as the informal Note prepared by the Secretariat for the previous meeting of the CTS 
illustrated, some prominent developed Members , who also h eld top ranks in global commercial 
services trade , had a dismal record in notifications under the GATS , with as low as two notifications 
in the past  26 years. Also o verall , the number of notifications by developed Members was low. She 
reiterate d India's reque st that developed Members  lead by example in submitting comprehensive, 
timely, and accurate notification s.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  1.4.  The Chair man suggested that the Council take note of the notification s and the statement made  
and that the agreements notified be referred to the Co mmittee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA) for consideration.   
1.5.  It was so agreed . 
1.6.  While on the subject of the CRTA , the Chairman  drew delegations ' attention to the fact that, at 
its meeting scheduled for 27-28 June, the CRTA was scheduled to consider four regional trade 
agreements that cover ed services trade.  The agreements in question were: (a) the Free Trade 
Agreement between the Gulf Cooperation C ouncil member states and Singapore; (ii) the Association 
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Chile; (iii) the Agreement on Trade Continuity between 
the United Kingdom and Canada; and (iv) the Association Agreement between the European Union 
and Centra l America, (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama).   He 
trusted that th at information w ould be of interest to delegations  and suggest ed that the Council take 
note of the statement  he had  made.  
1.7.  It was so agreed . 
1.8.  With regard to notifications made pursuant to Article VII:4 (Recognition), the Chairman  drew 
delegations ' attention to the communications received from the Russian Federation, in documents 
S/C/N/1099 and 1100.  He suggested that the Council take note of the notifications  made.  
1.9.  It was so agreed . 
2  ITEM B: OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE LDC SERVICES WAIVER  
2.1.  The Chairman  recall ed that, at the March  meeting, the LDC Group had called on Members to 
explore how the Waiver preferences might be complemented and how LDC participation in global 
services trade might be increased.  The LDC Group had also recalled the services -related 
recommendations put forward in the LDC Trade Ministers Declaration for MC12, as well as the 
elements contained in the General Council draft outc ome document for the Ministerial.  A number of 
delegations had also intervened to stress the importance of the Waiver.  
2.2.  The representative of Bangladesh  speaking on behalf of the LDC Group, recall ed that the Group 
was focused on the wording it had proposed the MC12 outcome document , which reflect ed the results 
of the work in the CTS on the LDC Services Waiver.   
2.3.  That was the text that the LDC Group  had first put forward from the LDC Minister 's MC12 
Declaration in 2021 , in paragraph 1.2.1.  Those elements were aimed  at improv ing the 
implementation of the letter and spirit of the LDC Services Waiver Decisions and notifications of 
preferential treatment accorded to LDC services suppliers by WTO Members to that date. 
2.4.  The LDC Group ha d negotiated last  year on the outcome document (RD/GC/17/Rev.2) to 
incorporate  as much as possible from its Ministers ' declaration. After difficult negotiations , the 
wording in that p aragraph had been successfully achieved . Paragraph 14 stated : "The LDC Group  
reaffir med its decision at the Tenth Ministerial Conference in Nairobi on the implementation of 
preferential treatment in favour of services and service suppliers of least -developed countries and 
increas ed LDC participation in services trade, and instruct ed the Council  for Trade in Services to 
review and promote the operationalization of the Waiver including to explore improvements in LDC 
services export data; to review information on LDC services suppliers and consumers of LDC services 
in preference providing Member ma rkets;  and to assess best practices in facilitating the use of the 
preferences.   On th at matter, the Group  instruct ed the General Council to report to its next session 
on progress. "  
2.5.  The LDC Group thank ed Members for their support of th at text. In addition, the Group asked 
that Members continue to support th at paragraph for Minister s' agreement at MC12.  The LDC Group  
looked forward to further work in the CTS after MC12 in th at regard.  
2.6.  The Chairman  suggeste d that the Council take note of the statement  made and said that it 
would revert to that item at its next meeting.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  2.7.  It was so agreed.  
3  ITEM C: WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
3.1.  The Chairman  said that, at the previous  meeting, several Members had called for the 
reinvigoration of the Work Programme, and some  had urged that discussions focus on the 
development dimension. A suggestion had also been put forward that Members should consider how 
to increase the participation of women from developing countries in e -commerce.   
3.2.  Several Members  had reiterated their position that the continuation of the Work Programme 
was linked to the extension of the Mor atorium and had called for both to be prolonged at MC12.  
Some Members  had also shared their experience s and domestic initiatives in the digital sphere.   
3.3.  The representative of India said that her delegation  had consistently been a proponent of 
strengthenin g the multilateral work under the non -negotiating and exp loratory  1998 Work 
Programme on Electronic Commerce.  That was all the more important in the context of the 
pandemic , which ha d exposed the existing and widening digital divide.  
3.4.  She recalled that , in November 2021, her delegation , South Africa, and Indonesia had 
presented  a communication , contain ed in document WT/GC/W/838 /Rev.2 , on the need to rejuvenate 
the Work Programme , which acknowledge d the importance of the work under the Work Programme 
in examining  trade -related issue s relating to global electronic commerce , taking into account the 
economic, financial , and development need s of developing countries.  
3.5.  She recalled that her delegation had previously noted that developing countries , including 
LDCs, faced challenges in the form ulation  of national poli cy and regulatory  responses to support 
their increas ing participation in the digital economy.  In that regard, she underlined the usefulness 
of having deliberations  on the challenges face d uniquely by developing Members , including LDCs , to 
build a more inclusive digital economy.  
3.6.  India had been working on creating the requisite  technology infrastructure , an enabling 
regulatory framework  and a vibrant start -up eco -system  leveraging its technology  prowess , skilled 
workforce,  and spirit of entrepreneurship. The public digital infrastructur al assets which India had 
created  had unleashed the power of productivity in the economy.  
3.7.  In that regard, she highlighted two important a reas of e -commerce that India ha d embarked 
upon:  first, financial inclusion and payments – in 2021 , 40% of all real -time payments around the 
world were made in India.  In March 2022, Indians had made more than 5 billion  transactions on 
Unified Payment s Interface (UPI) . In the financial year 2021 -2022, the value of payments made by 
India's UPI was more than 1 trillion.  That system had not been in existence  until 2016, but in a 
period of just 6 years it ha d led to nationwide financial inclusion, mobile payment regulation, and 
transformed business -to-business and business -to-consumer payment s.   
3.8.  She pointed out that international payment processes had been in existence in countries for 
several decade s, but none of them could release those animal spirits  in the econom y, not because 
they were not capable of doing so, but because they had no incentive  to innovate in the Indian 
context.  She noted that, when it had been left to a few international p layers, India had seen fewer 
than 50 million credit cards issued in several decades . But the home -grown  financial inclusion  in 
India had achieved more in 6 years than  had been achieved  in those several decades. Second, India 
had just launched a pilot on open network s for digital commerce, wh ich enable d small sellers to 
participate in e -commerce on fair terms , without leaving them to the vagaries of platforms and 
aggregator oligopolies.    
3.9.  It was evident that large e-commerce platforms ha d been at the receiving end of penalties  and 
investigatio ns in several countries , including in the developed world.  India's approach had been  to 
create a nationwide platform which enable d digital commerce for MSMEs.  
3.10.   Her delegation remained  open and eager to work on the rejuvenation of the Work Programme 
and work with all like -minded Members to drive a constructive outcome in a space which would 
fundamentally influence how the world would operate  in the future . She urged all Members for their 
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  3.11.   The rep resentative of China thank ed India for its statement and for sharing its experience . 
His delegation  support ed the continuation of in -depth discussions on e -commerce under the WTO 
framework.  He said that it was known  that e-commerce ha d provided unprecedent ed development 
opportunities for developing Members.   In the context of the pandemic, e -commerce  had facilitated 
trade flows between Members and  promoted the continued recovery of domestic consumption.    
3.12.   He shared an example of  how China had been providing develop ment opportunities to sellers 
from outside China to sell their products in China through e -commerce . The fourth Brand and Quality 
Online Shopping Festival and Quality African Products Online Shopping Festival had been held from 
28 April to 12 May that year , hosted by the Ministry of Commerce and other Chinese Ministries.  That 
Festival was an online shopping promotion for African goods in China.   Through live-streaming  events 
featuring participants ranging from Ambassador s to African live -selling anchors, signature products 
from 23 African countries, including Ethiopian coffee, Rwandan chilli sauce and Kenyan black tea, 
were on display and  had been  sold in China.  The online shopping festival not only provided more 
diversif ied options to Chinese consumers but also promoted the import of African goods.  
3.13.   China w ould try its best to help more developing Members get on the train of e -commerce 
development and  share the dividends of global e -commerce.  
3.14.   The representative of Egypt  briefly shared Egypt 's experience and its initiatives for digital 
transformation and e -commerce, as the Egyptian Government, represented by the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology (MCIT), in coordination with the concerned authorities, 
sought to build a digital Egypt and reach an Egyptian society that would deal digitally in all aspects 
of life.  
3.15.   Digital services in Government institutions were aimed to enhance the performance of 
Ministries and other Government agencies, raise the quality a nd efficiency of services provided, 
improve the work environment,  and provide support for the decision -making process and finding 
solutions to issues of interest to society.  
3.16.   The strategic view of digital transformation in Egypt aimed to improve the citize ns' quality of 
life, by improving their living conditions and providing multiple electronic services; transform into a 
digitally interconnected Government, by linking Government digital systems and improving work 
within the Government 's administrative institu tions to work efficiently and effectively; and enhance 
the values of transparency, accountability and monitoring through interaction and partnership 
between the various elements of society.  
3.17.   Additionally, Egypt sought to carry out structural reforms in that  sector; some steps had been 
already taken with the establishment of the National Payments Council, the Supreme Council for 
Cyber Security, and the establishment of the Supreme Council for Digital Transformation.  
3.18.   The launching of the ICT strategy as part o f the Sustainable Development 's Vision 2030 had 
supported the development of the ICT sector and contributed to digital economic growth through 
initiatives that encouraged a number of aspects, including e -commerce, e -governance, electronics 
design, digital manufacturing and the development of human resources.  
3.19.   Regarding e -commerce, the Egyptian Government aimed to strengthen the e -commerce 
system and advance the strategy of financial inclusion and digital transformation by providing 
appropriate infrastructure  and legislation to encourage e -commerce and attract more investments 
in this important sector, including, follow -up on the implementation of the national strategy for e -
commerce, which had been launched in December 2017 in cooperation with UNCTAD. The str ategy 
included a set of recommendations that support decision -making policies in the main aspects of e -
commerce and contribute to overcoming the challenges faced by e -commerce in Egypt.  
3.20.   There was ongoing work to develop national legislations supporting el ectronic commerce and 
establish a number of electronic platforms to enhance trade exchange with countries that had trade 
agreements with Egypt.  
3.21.   The Egyptian market included the largest number of internet users in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Therefore, Egypt hoped to achieve ever greater progress in the field of digital 
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  related to e -commerce implementation, which included setting effective tax systems for electronic 
transactions, regulating the informal market for e -commerce, raising awareness of the importance 
of e-commerce and its mechanisms, en hancing the information and communication technology 
infrastructure, building skills and providing the necessary financial and technical support.  
3.22.   The representative of Switzerland  thanked Members who had taken the floor for their 
interventions and said tha t he had noted with interest the ongoing  activities to support  digital 
capability  under the Work Programme , as well as other informative exchanges which had taken place 
since the last extension of the Moratorium and the Work Programme.  
3.23.   The current global trade context require d increased  predictability and transparency  for both, 
business  and consumer s. Switzerland was convinced that Members should work to consolidate the 
existing framework on e-commerce and maintain the few rules which were in place.   
3.24.   Switz erland recognize d the importance of the Work Programme , particularly for developing 
Members.  He highlighted  that the development of trade in services within each domestic market and 
having minimum rules in place in the area of international digital trade, such as the Moratorium , 
were completely compatible.  That was illustrated by  the interesting  example of the Member who had 
been able to develop a digital payment system while the Moratorium was in place.  
3.25.   Furthermore, he recalled  that Switzerland, with  Canada and 63 other co -sponsors , were 
supporting a draft decision to extend  the Work Programme and the Moratorium at the upcoming 
Ministerial  Conference . He called on all those Members  who so wished to join the draft Ministerial 
Decision .  
3.26.   The Chairman  said that the discussion had been rich. He suggested that the Council take note 
of the statements made and said that the Council would revert to this item at its next meeting.  
3.27.   It was s o agreed . 
4  ITEM D: UPDATE OF THE SECRETARIAT BACKGROUND NOTE ON MODE 4 – REQUESTED 
BY INDIA  
4.1.  The Chairman  indicated that that item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of India.  
4.2.  The representative of India reiterated India's request for the update of Secretariat Background 
Notes on mode 4.  India's position on th at issue was well documented . In addition,  India also 
supported the suggestion of the U nited States to work on inter -model linkages .   
4.3.  Her delegation recalled  that, at the previous Council  meeting , the US delegation had offered to 
consult intersessionally  with India  to see if they could resolve the i mpasse  and agree  on an 
acceptable  solution.  India appreciated th at gestu re. Both delegations ha d met intersessionally  to 
explore ways to move forward, and both sides continue d to remain engage d on that issue.  
4.4.  The representative of Bangladesh  thanked India for its proposal.  His delegation supported the 
proposal for updated Notes by the Secretariat , to bett er understand the current situation and 
commitments by Members.  Bangladesh also supported the suggestion from the delegation of the 
United States on the preparation of a separate Secretariat Note on the interlinkages among the 
modes of supply.  He welcome d the discussion between India and the U nited States on that issue as 
proposed by the U nited States at the CTS meeting in March. He looked  forward to engaging with 
Members on th at important topic.  
4.5.  The representative of the United States  thanked India for its statement and for noting that 
their two delegations had had a productive meeting inters essionally .   
4.6.  He confirmed that they had a better  understanding of their respective positions on th e proposal 
and while they had not reach ed an ag reement during that meeting , the United States was committed 
to cont inuing  that work and discussion s with India and other WTO Members to advance on that  
issue.   S/C/M/149  
 
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  4.7.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
4.8.  It was so agreed . 
5  ITEM E: CYBERSECURITY MEASURES OF CHINA AND VIET NAM – REQUESTED BY JAPAN 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
5.1.   The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegations of Japan and the United States.  
5.2.  The representative of Japan  said that, as pointed out in previous Council meetings, his 
delegation had concerns regarding  the Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law, and the Personal 
Information Protection Law of China that it was not clear "who" could transfer "what" data and "how" 
to transfer across borders. Those Laws lacked a clear definition of the data whose transfer  was 
regulated, and they were vague in terms of concrete procedures for cross -border data transfer.  
5.3.  The Cybersecurity Law and the Data Security Law required "important information 
infrastructure operators " to store "personal information " and "important dat a" domestically, and to 
pass a "security assessment " at the time of cross -border transfer. However, what "important 
information infrastructure " and "important data " meant was not clear, and foreign service providers 
doing business in China were forced to c onsider that they would be subject to restrictions when 
transferring data across borders.  
5.4.  In that regard, the Japanese Government had submitted public comments on the Guidelines 
for Identification of Important Data in March, but those Guidelines were also  extremely broad and 
abstract in terms of the items listed as identifying elements of "important data ''.  
5.5.  Furthermore, Article 21 of the Data Security Law defined "national core data " as "data 
pertaining to national security, the lifeblood of the national economy, important national life, and 
vital public interests ", and it stipulated that "a stricter management system shall be implemented ". 
However, the Law did not provide more concrete definitions or more specific information about the 
management system.  
5.6.  Japan expressed its concerns that the ambiguity in the definition of those terms and the scope 
of the measures left room for arbitrary regulation by the authorities, which would increase the cost 
of foreign business activities and would risk unjustly under mining their legitimate interests. Japan 
requested that China clarify the definitions of "important data " and "core data " as well as the actual 
implementation of those Laws and Guidelines.  
5.7.  As for the security assessment, those Laws did not specify concrete  procedures for such an 
assessment. Foreign businesses feared that the authorities might request internal information or 
trade secrets of foreign service providers related to cross -border data during the security 
assessment. Japan requested that China esta blish fair and clear assessment criteria and ensure 
operational transparency.  
5.8.  In terms of the transparency of procedures, the Government of Japan noted China 's efforts to 
obtain broad opinions both domestically and from other countries in the form of publi c comments. 
However, Japan expressed its concern that, in reality, the relevant Laws and Regulations were still 
being developed without addressing the concerns expressed by many countries, including Japan. His 
delegation reiterated its request to China to ensure its laws and regulations were consistent with the 
GATS and avoided discriminatory measures, both in form and substance, against foreign service 
providers.  
5.9.  With regard to Viet Nam 's measures, Japan noted that Viet Nam continued to review the 
subordin ate Laws of the Cybersecurity Law and the draft Decree on the Protection of Personal 
Information and would appreciate an update from Viet Nam as the current version of the Decree had 
not yet been published. Japan asked Viet Nam to ensure that a transparent  process would be in 
place concerning the coming into force of the Decree.  
5.10.   In particular, Article 21 of the draft Decree on the Protection of Personal Data defined 
requirements for the cross -border transfer of personal data. Japan expressed its concern th at those S/C/M/149  
 
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  requirements were overly restrictive compared to international standards. The Article also stipulated 
the obligation to store data domestically, and foreign businesses might be treated less favourably 
than domestic businesses in Viet Nam depending  on its actual implementation. Japan, therefore, 
reiterated its request to make the relevant Law and the Decree consistent with the GATS.  
5.11.   The representative of the United States  recalled his delegation 's concerns raised in the Council 
that various Chinese measures, initially in connection with China 's Cybersecurity Law but more 
recently also in connection with China 's Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law, 
restricted cross -border data flows and required localisation of data.  
5.12.   For example,  the United States did not believe that China should seek to require any Chinese 
government security assessment for transfers of "important data ", however that term would be 
understood and defined. The United States continued to have serious concerns that China 's focus on 
"important data " would result in new restrictions and burdens on a broad range of companies, 
including with regard to the processing of commercial data that those companies sought to use in 
the ordinary course of business.  
5.13.   With respect to Viet Nam, the representative indi cated that his delegation 's concerns 
remained the same as at the March meeting. He said that there had not been much time between 
the Council 's meetings for any progress to be reported.  
5.14.   The representative of the European Union  supported the statements of J apan and the 
United  States. She recalled her delegation 's concerns about the cybersecurity measures in China 
and their implementation that had been raised in previous meetings.  
5.15.   China 's Cybersecurity Law included requirements and special obligations that c oncerned 
critical information infrastructure protection, as well as data localisation and a cross -border data 
transfer security assessment, a classified cybersecurity protection scheme, and a comprehensive 
certification and testing scheme for critical netw ork equipment and specialised network security 
products.  
5.16.   The Cybersecurity Law was accompanied by a large number of supporting laws, regulations, 
and standards, most of which applied across all sectors. That created a labyrinth of unclear and 
questionable,  from a WTO compliance perspective, requirements that foreign companies were asked 
to fulfil.  
5.17.   The European Union reiterated its request that China address the concerns that the European 
Union and other Members had consistently raised.  
5.18.   Turning to the Vietna mese cybersecurity measures, the European Union reiterated its 
concerns regarding what seemed to be data localisation and local presence requirements contained 
in the Law and questioned their compatibility with Viet Nam 's GATS commitments.  
5.19.   The Law had ent ered into force in 2019 but there was still no clarity on many important 
aspects due to the lack of its implementing decree. The European Union, therefore, reiterated its 
request for transparency and invited Viet Nam to inform Members of the planned date f or adoption 
as well as to share the draft Decree for consultation before its adoption.  
5.20.   The representative of Australia  said that the pandemic had underscored the importance of 
digital trade and technologies in supporting and enhancing business operations across every sector. 
However, the benefits of digital trade could not be fully realised or shared by businesses without the 
cross-border flow of data.  
5.21.   The free flow of data was essential for global trade. It underpinned almost every international 
transacti on and was vital to ensuring that businesses could make the most of the digital economy. 
Because of that, it was important that permissive rules apply to cross -border data flows but those 
had to strike the right balance with other legitimate policy objecti ves, such as the protection of 
privacy, data, and consumers.  
5.22.   Australia continued to have concerns regarding China 's Cybersecurity Law and reiterated the 
statement it had made at the meeting of the Council of March 2022.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  5.23.   Australia had made submissions to th e Chinese Government as part of public consultations 
on its cybersecurity framework, including the Personal Information Protection Law and the Data 
Security Law, which had been passed in 2021. As set out in its submissions, Australia welcomed a 
number of r evisions to both those draft Laws. Nonetheless, many of the concerns raised by the 
Australian Government had not been addressed in the final versions of the Laws.  
5.24.   Like other Members, Australia had ongoing concerns with China 's cybersecurity regime, 
particu larly around extra -territoriality, trade retaliation, data localisation requirements, large 
compliance costs for firms and the overall scope of the legislation.  
5.25.   Australia remained concerned that measures under China 's cybersecurity regime had the 
potential  to create inconsistencies with WTO rules. The representative noted that any measure or 
countermeasure taken under that regime should only be applied consistently with China 's WTO 
obligations.  
5.26.   Australia also remained concerned about the lack of clarity whe n it came to definitions, 
jurisdiction and a number of other fundamental elements. China 's cybersecurity measures could be 
applied in an inconsistent, arbitrary manner, and might adversely impact foreign businesses 
operating in China.  
5.27.   A transparent and st able regulatory environment was something all foreign investors wanted 
to see in China, and China 's changes to its cybersecurity arrangements risked undermining 
confidence.  
5.28.   Australia continued to urge China to take into account the concerns of businesses and 
Members in the implementation of those measures and development of future measures. Australia 
looked forward to continuing to work closely with China on those issues.  
5.29.   In relation to Viet Nam, Australia was encouraged by Viet Nam 's interest in developing 
regulations to protect personal information and to support the development of the digital economy 
more broadly. However, the representative reemphasised the concerns that his delegation had 
previously raised in the Council about el ements of the draft Decree on Personal Data Protection.  
5.30.   Australia looked forward to continuing to work with Viet Nam on that Law and related 
measures and ensuring that any new rules were business -friendly and consistent with their shared 
commitments on di gital trade. Australia encouraged Viet Nam to share a revised draft of the Decree 
to assist with that effort.  
5.31.   The representative of Canada  indicated that, similar to the interventions of other Members, 
her delegation continued to have concerns about the cy bersecurity -related measures being adopted 
or implemented by China and Viet Nam.  
5.32.   In particular, Canada was concerned that requirements to store information locally could be 
considered a violation of the Members ' GATS commitments, either under the GATS Ann ex on 
Telecommunications (Article 5 (c)), or their services schedules, for example, under mode 1 for 
computer and related services.  
5.33.   As has been noted in previous meetings, Canada remained unclear as to how China and 
Viet Nam considered such measures to co mply with their existing WTO commitments. Therefore, it 
welcomed the opportunity to further discuss those issues in the Council and encouraged both 
delegations to explore ways to address the concerns raised by their trading partners.  
5.34.   The representative of China  thanked Members who had taken the floor for their continued 
interest in China 's regulatory measures related to cybersecurity. China had already responded in 
detail to Members ' remarks and questions at several previous meetings.  
5.35.   As emphasised before,  China 's cybersecurity -related measures were based on national 
conditions and had taken into account various international practices. The relevant legal authorities 
had widely solicited public opinions and advice in the process. Relevant laws and regulatio ns were 
aimed at guaranteeing cybersecurity, data security and protection of personal information, as well 
as addressing the development needs of the digital economy.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  5.36.   The representative noted that the legislation was not intended to hinder cross -border dat a 
flows, nor to restrict international trade, but to support and encourage the flow and application of 
data.  
5.37.   China had always abided by international rules and earnestly fulfilled its WTO commitments. 
In contrast, China noticed that some Members had adopt ed restrictive measures to suppress Chinese 
enterprises and limit normal trade with the excuse of cybersecurity or national security. Finally, 
China reiterated its willingness to work closely with other Members to promote the healthy 
development of the glo bal digital economy.  
5.38.   The representative of Viet Nam  thanked the concerned Members for their continued interest 
in Viet Nam 's Cybersecurity Law and the legislative drafting process for the Decree to implement 
that Law. As his delegation had explained repeat edly, Viet Nam 's process for the Decree had been 
transparent, and all stakeholders ' comments had been reviewed by the Drafting Committee and 
submitted to the Government for consideration. The consideration continued.  
5.39.   Concerning the draft Decree on Personal  Data Protection, Viet Nam reiterated that it shared 
the same objective, as many other Members, of properly protecting personal information in the 
context of digital transformation. Viet Nam 's legislative process for that Decree was fully open and 
transpar ent. 
5.40.   Following the public comment process, the draft Decree had been continuously reviewed by 
the Drafting Committee, as mandated by the Government and the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly of Viet Nam, taking into consideration comments received  from both domestic 
and foreign stakeholders.  
5.41.   The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
5.42.   It was so agreed . 
6  ITEM F: 5G -RELATED MEASURES OF AUSTRALIA – REQUESTED BY CHINA  
6.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to t he agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of China.  
6.2.  The representative of China  recalled that his delegation had raised strong concerns regarding 
Australia 's 5G-related measures at several previous Council meetings, but the related issues h ad yet 
to be effectively addressed.  
6.3.  Without any factual evidence and transparent processes, Australia had implemented a series 
of measures to prohibit Chinese companies from providing relevant services. Those measures 
severely restricted Chinese services suppliers ' usual business operations in Australia and were 
inconsistent with WTO rules, particularly the MFN and transparency principles of the GATS, as well 
as Australia 's GATS commitments.  
6.4.  China strongly opposed the above -mentioned measures and urged Aus tralia to rectify the 
discriminatory practices as soon as possible and provide further clarifications on the relevant 
restrictive measures. China hoped that Australia would live up to its WTO obligations and create a 
fair, just, and predictable business en vironment for all enterprises, including Chinese ones.  
6.5.  The representative of Australia  noted China 's statement. China had first raised that issue 
elsewhere in the WTO in late 2018. Since that time, Australia had engaged constructively and in 
good faith wit h China to explain the rationale for its position. Australia reiterated that its position on 
5G networks was country -agnostic, transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory, and fully WTO 
consistent.  
6.6.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the s tatements made.  
6.7.  It was so agreed . S/C/M/149  
 
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  7  ITEM G: MEASURES OF THE UNITED STATES RESTRICTING TRADE IN SERVICES – 
REQUESTED BY CHINA  
7.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of China.  
7.2.  The repre sentative of China  recalled that his delegation had expressed its concerns about the 
US trade -restrictive measures at previous Council meetings. However, unfortunately, the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) investigation on TikTo k was still ongoing and 
the US Government still required a security risk review on Chinese apps and services.  
7.3.  In addition, the United States had decided to revoke China Telecom 's, China Unicom 's, Pacific 
Networks ' and ComNet 's domestic and international authority in the United States pursuant to 
Section 214 of its Communications Act, citing national security concerns.  
7.4.  Furthermore, it was reported that the United States was conducting information and 
communications technology and services (ICTS) reviews to assess the so -called risks posed to 
national security. The cloud computing services provided by Chinese e -commerce companies, such 
as Alibaba, fell into the scope of those reviews. Those reviews might eventually result in pro hibiting 
Americans inside and outside the United States from using cloud services provided by the relevant 
Chinese companies. China was seriously concerned by those reviews.  
7.5.  Through the above -mentioned measures, the United States had repeatedly abused the concept 
of national security, misused national power and suppressed particular Chinese companies without 
any factual basis. Those measures had an obviously restrictive impact on trade in services and were 
not consistent with the WTO principle of equal trea tment.  
7.6.  Meanwhile, those measures had adversely affected the business operations and investment 
activities of Chinese enterprises in the United States. They had also undermined the legitimate rights 
and interests of Chinese enterprises as well as US consume rs. Those measures had disrupted the 
normal market order and violated international trade rules.  
7.7.  China hoped that the United States would comply with WTO rules and fulfil its GATS 
commitments, stop its unreasonable suppression of Chinese enterprises, trea t Chinese enterprises 
in a fair and just manner, and avoid politicising economic and trade issues. China urged the United 
States to create a fair and competitive business environment for services suppliers from all over the 
world, including Chinese ones.  
7.8.  The representative of the United States  stressed that the United States had one of the most 
open services markets in the world. His delegation would review China 's comments. He recalled that 
the United States had stated in previous meetings of the Council that the actions cited by China had 
been taken by the United States to protect the US national security.  
7.9.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
7.10.   It was so agreed . 
8  ITEM H: MEASURES OF INDIA RESTRICTING TRADE IN SERV ICES – REQUESTED BY 
CHINA  
8.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of China.  
8.2.  The representative of China  said that, since June 2020, India had banned many applications 
with a Chinese background in the name of national security. Since then, India had added more apps 
to the ban list. So far, more than 200 Chinese apps had been banned.  
8.3.  Those measures had a seriously adverse impact on Chinese enterprises ' business activities in 
India. The y had undermined the legitimate interests of Chinese enterprises and violated the basic 
principles of the WTO as well as India 's GATS commitments. China reiterated its serious concerns 
and urged India to stop its discriminatory measures against Chinese ent erprises, and create an open, S/C/M/149  
 
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  fair, and non -discriminatory business environment for services suppliers from all WTO Members, 
including Chinese ones.  
8.4.  The representative of India said that, as underscored at previous Council meetings, India was 
committed to upholding its obligations at the WTO. India valued, and was committed to protecting, 
the democratic rights of its citizens, including access to goods and services, while reserving the right 
to take measures to ensure the protection of privacy, data securit y and national security. India firmly 
believed that the measures raised under that agenda item were fully consistent with its GATS 
commitments.  
8.5.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
8.6.  It was so agreed . 
9  ITEM I: KINGDOM OF S AUDI ARABIA MINISTER OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT DECISION 112203 REGARDING LOCALIZATION OF CUSTOMER SERVICES – 
REQUESTED BY THE UNITED STATES  
9.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of the United States.  
9.2.  The representative of the United States  said that the short amount of time between the 
Council 's meetings had been a disadvantage. As mentioned at the previous meeting, his delegation 
had had good intersessional meeting s with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and appreciated all the 
information that had been shared.  
9.3.  The United States was still working to gain an understanding of how the measure was operating 
in practice, whether further clarification was needed, and how that c ould be made public. It would 
continue to work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and hoped to resolve that issue soon.  
9.4.  The Chairman indicated that the Council had been originally planned for mid -June but had to 
be rescheduled because of MC12, and that day w as the only possible date to hold a meeting of the 
Council.  
9.5.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  thanked the United States for its statement. 
She reiterated her delegation 's statements on 1 July 2021, 22 October 2021 and 11 March 2022 in 
the C TS meetings, which had clarified all concerns regarding the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Development Decision No. 112203 for the "Tawtin " of "Tele-Working " in Customer Services 
within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
9.6.  In the previous CTS meeting, the US delegation had explained that it was still gaining an 
understanding of how the measure operated in practice, and whether a need for further clarification 
existed, including whether a public clarification was needed.  
9.7.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had cond ucted various meetings with the US delegation to the 
WTO, capital -based officials, and the private sector to ensure that they gained a full and correct 
understanding of the Decision and how it was implemented in practice. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
had no t received any official complaints regarding its implementation from any private sector 
company operating in the Kingdom.  
9.8.  In addition, both the Decision and its Procedural Guide were publicly available, easily accessible 
and, as noted in the previous CTS s tatements, provided enough clarifications and assurances to all 
stakeholders about the Decision and how it was implemented.  
9.9.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia urged the United States to withdraw its concern, given the fact 
that there were no grounds for the raise d concern.  
9.10.   The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
9.11.   It was so agreed . S/C/M/149  
 
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  10  ITEM J: ALBANIA, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, ICELAND, JAPAN, 
LIECHTENSTEIN, MONTENEGRO, NEW ZEALAND, NORTH MACEDONIA, NORWAY, 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SINGAPORE, SWITZERLAND, UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED 
STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUESTED 
BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
10.1.   The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request  of the delegation of the Russian Federation.  
10.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  drew the attention of all WTO Members to the 
inadmissibility of unilateral trade -restrictive measures introduced or announced by Albania, 
Australia, Canada, the Euro pean Union, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, 
North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States against the Russian Federation.  
10.3.   Those measures not only contradicted WTO rules and those Members ' specific commitments, 
but also disrupted international trade flows, broke global supply chains, and led to an increase in 
energy costs and food prices.  
10.4.   Russian services were deeply integrated into many value -added and supply chains. In t hat 
all-out economic war against the Russian Federation, most of the economies would be struck by 
collateral damage, including the authors of the restrictions, as well as those uninvolved.  
10.5.   Moreover, the unilateral coercive measures disproportionally affec ted low -income developing 
countries and LDCs. Higher prices threatened livelihoods, discouraged investment, and contributed 
to widening trade deficits. The danger for many developing countries and LDCs that were heavily 
reliant on fuel and food imports was  most profound.  
10.6.   As an example, logistics chains were broken due to international cargo -carrying companies 
refusing to operate with Russian consignments under the threat to be penalised by the sanctions. 
Due to the unavailability of traditional itineraries,  many carriers were forced to take longer routes, 
which increased their lead times and fuel costs.  
10.7.   The container shipping carrying capacity was being affected and freight rates continued to 
grow, which led to the rise in prices. For instance, according to  the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, the global supply gap resulting from limited shipments could push up 
international food and feed prices by 8 to 22% above their already elevated levels.  
10.8.   The representative indicated that, for t he sake of time, she would not specify all measures in 
detail. However, she drew Members ' attention to some of them, which, in her delegation 's view, 
represented a vast and outright violation of the GATS rules.  
10.9.   The European Union, the United States, the U nited Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein had frozen assets of Russian service providers in almost all 
services sectors. Most of those Members had also imposed prohibitions and restrictions on suppliers 
of high -tech products and technologies to the Russian Federation, as well as restrictions on their 
maintenance services.  
10.10.   The European Union, Liechtenstein, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States had also introdu ced financial, currency and investment 
restrictions, restrictions on transactions with securities and money market instruments as well as 
restrictions on issuing loans and credits.  
10.11.   Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the U nited Kingdom 
and the United States had applied restrictions and prohibitions on air transport services and maritime 
transport services by closing the air space and seaports. The European Union had also imposed 
restrictions on road transport services.  
10.12.   Canada, the European Union, Liechtenstein, the United Kingdom and the United States had 
introduced prohibitions and restrictions in the field of communication services by prohibiting the 
broadcasting of certain Russian mass media.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  10.13.   The Russian Federation believ ed that those measures were inconsistent with a number of 
WTO rules, including the MFN principle and the specific commitments of those Members. It called on 
those Members that had not joined the unilateral trade -restrictive measures against the Russian 
Federation to take note that the above -mentioned measures negatively affected their trade and 
interests.  
10.14.   The Russian Federation expressed its concern about the attempt to replace the system of 
global economic governance with unilateral restrictive measures of  extraterritorial scope. Despite 
different pretexts for such destructive policies, they actually put at serious risk the prospects for 
global economic growth and disproportionally hit developing countries. Being of a complex nature, 
they already had system ic negative implications on global value chains, international markets, and 
the stability of the price level.  
10.15.   In that context, the Russian Federation called on its partners to restore the smooth 
functioning of the international economic institutions and t heir legal frameworks in an open and non -
discriminatory manner. It urged those Members to immediately lift unilateral trade -restrictive 
measures, including those with extraterritorial implications, and stop coercing other Members to 
follow suit.  
10.16.   The repres entative of the United States  indicated that the intervention by the sponsor of 
that agenda item did not deserve a specific response. The United States condemned Russia 's 
premeditated and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The US measures addressing the threa t to the 
national security and foreign policy of the United States were fully consistent with its WTO rights 
and obligations.  
10.17.   The United States expressed its strong support for Ukraine during that difficult time and was 
deeply impressed with the quiet hero ism of the Ukrainian people and the courage of their armed 
forces and their leaders. That was in contrast to the barbaric acts committed by Russia 's armed 
forces who had killed, tormented, and stolen from innocent Ukrainians since the start of the invasion . 
10.18.   The United States was proud to stand among the Members listed under that agenda item, 
as it demonstrated the effectiveness of a group of countries to take action to confront a menace to 
the international community. The representative was pleased to reite rate the United States ' resolve 
to impose economic pressure measures on the Russian Federation.  
10.19.   The United States and its partners ' collective efforts had resulted in the world 's major 
financial and economic centres acting in concert to sever Vladimir Put in's access to the international 
economy, including to international capital. It expected those efforts to have a debilitating impact 
on Russia 's economy and hamstring the Russian Government 's ability to fund its invasion.  
10.20.   If the sponsor of that agenda ite m was unhappy with the effects that those measures had 
on the Russian economy, she could pin the blame on Vladimir Putin and perhaps take those concerns 
up with Moscow. However, if the Council was to examine truly tragic "unilateral trade -restrictive 
measu res" affecting services, it should not ignore the real victims.  
10.21.   When Vladimir Putin had commenced the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he had 
unleashed actions that unilaterally restricted Ukraine 's supply of services in the most devastating 
and long -lasting way possible. The World Bank had estimated that the Ukrainian economy would 
contract by 45% in 2022 due to Russia 's invasion.  
10.22.   Although the full scope of the damage the Russian Federation had inflicted on Ukraine 's 
services suppliers was not yet kn own, it already included the following: regarding transport services, 
the Russian Federation had blocked access to the Black Sea, and cargo trains faced many logistical 
hurdles, including damaged and destroyed rail lines and bridges, and truck transit had been stymied 
by damage of 23,000 kilometres of roads and 277 bridges.  
10.23.   Regarding communication services as well as computer and related services, the Russian 
invasion had damaged or destroyed up to 30% of Ukraine 's infrastructure at a cost of USD 100 
billion. There were also recent reports that the Russian Federation had caused a "near-total internet 
blackout " in the Kherson region of Ukraine.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  10.24.   In education services, since the beginning of the invasion, the Russian Federation had 
destroyed or damaged 120 educational facilities, including 83 schools, 22 kindergartens, nine 
specialised schools, five universities, and one scientific centre. In fact, in the previous week, the 
Russian Federation had bombed a school in Bilohorivka where 90 people had taken shelt er and 
dozens were feared dead.  
10.25.   Regarding tourism and travel -related services, the Russian Federation had destroyed at least 
twelve Ukrainian airports, and over 100 cultural sites and had put an end to Ukraine 's previously 
vibrant tourism industry. In Marc h, a Russian airstrike against Chernihiv had caused the complete 
destruction of the historic Hotel Ukraine.  
10.26.   The representative indicated that there were countless other examples. His delegation 
would, to the extent necessary, continue to apply sanctions a nd use its trade tools to confront that 
threat. He appreciated having the opportunity at that meeting to hear about measures that other 
Members were taking against the Russian Federation. The representative would report those 
measures back to his Capital t o make sure that the United States was doing all that it could to 
impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin 's regime for that unjustifiable war, 
and for the swift and effective recovery of Ukraine 's economy and to securing its economic and 
energy security.  
10.27.   The representative of Canada  indicated that the illegal invasion of Ukraine by the Russian 
Federation was a flagrant violation of international law, with present and future humanitarian, 
environmental and economic consequences that extended far beyond the Ukrainian borders. At the 
same time, it was important to be aware of the scale of the situation in Ukraine. The situation 
continued to be most concerning, and all should be worried and alarmed.  
10.28.   According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), those eleven 
weeks  of violence and terror, in addition to the victims, had forced more than six million Ukrainians 
to leave their country. As of 11 May, more than 4.8 million jobs had been lost in Ukraine, according 
to the International Labour Organization (ILO). For those still in the country, over 1.4 million people 
did not have access to water, and 4.6 million had limited access. According to the United Nations, 
more than 108 attacks against health centres had been recorded. Those were just some numbers 
published by diffe rent international organisations on the situation on the ground.  
10.29.   On the global stage, rising energy prices and constraints on the supply of key goods and 
services inputs had caused major disruptions to global value chains. The economic cost of 
fragmented g lobal value chains would grow increasingly untenable. It would particularly affect those 
regional economies in close proximity to the crisis, or most heavily dependent on critical inputs from 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation.  
10.30.   The consequences of Russia 's actions in Ukraine would also pervade services trade, which 
played a growing and increasingly vital role in the health of the international economy. For example, 
in the transport services sector, Russian missiles and warships created insurmountable securi ty 
concerns that complicated and obstructed trade routes. That was leading to massive disruptions in 
container shipping and air transport services, among others. The resultant slowed goods trade would 
have an equal impact on the supporting services or serv ices inputs to commodities and manufactured 
exports.  
10.31.   Other services sectors had also been greatly affected by that illegal war. The illegal actions 
perpetrated by the Russian Federation did not only imperil key critical sectors of the economy but 
the globa l services economy as a whole. The economic consequences of the Russian aggression 
reverberated through the already fragile global trading system. They threatened the world 's 
precarious recovery from the COVID -19 pandemic and sustainable development.  
10.32.   As wi th the devastating humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, responsibility for the far -reaching 
economic costs of that illegal invasion rested solely in the hands of the Russian leadership. What the 
Russian Federation had done could not and would not be normalised.   
10.33.   Canada rejected any suggestion that measures it had applied against the Russian Federation 
were inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Canada was acting to protect its essential security 
interests, which were inextricably linked to a rules -based internat ional environment. It would S/C/M/149  
 
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  continue to work closely with like -minded partners to promote peace and security for all States and 
their citizens.  
10.34.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated that that item would not be on the 
agenda of that meeting if it were not for Russia 's illegal invasion of Ukraine.  
10.35.   The representative was pleased that the Russian Federation had put that item on the agenda 
as that gave Members the opportunity to counter Russia 's blatant disinformation. She echoed some 
of the points  made by the United States and Canada.  
10.36.   The blame for the crises highlighted by the Russian Federation lay with one WTO Member, 
and one WTO Member only: the Russian Federation. It was the Russian Federation that had 
destroyed transport routes and infrastruc ture that was having an impact on global goods and 
services trade.  
10.37.   It was as a result of the Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and airports that small businesses 
were unable to import the goods and services that they required. It was as a result of Russia 's illegal 
actions that suppliers had been prevented from providing services to consumers around the globe.  
10.38.   Russia 's invasion had severe consequences on Ukraine 's ability to participate in goods, 
services, and procurement trade. That was all to the detrime nt of Ukraine and the rest of the world.  
10.39.   While Russia continued to violate international law, human rights and multiple commitments 
to peace and security, the United Kingdom would work with its allies and partners across the 
multilateral system to condemn  Russia 's appalling actions and to take all action necessary to isolate 
the Russian Federation on the international stage and to cripple Putin 's war machine.  
10.40.   The measures of the United Kingdom were very clear and in direct response to Russia 's 
invasion. A ll action the United Kingdom was taking was fully in line with its rights and obligations as 
a WTO Member.  
10.41.   The representative of the European Union  indicated that the WTO Member that had 
requested that agenda item, the Russian Federation, had launched an i llegal, unprovoked and 
unjustified invasion of Ukraine, blatantly violating international law and the rules -based international 
order. Its consequences had already extended beyond Ukraine 's borders.  
10.42.   The Russian army continued its attacks in Ukraine for mor e than 80 days, destroying 
Ukrainian cities, villages and infrastructure; and most importantly, killing and torturing civilians or 
making them flee to safety to other countries.  
10.43.   Beyond the devastating impact on the Ukrainian people and economy, the Russian  war 
negatively affected global trade in different sectors, including services, and posed a direct threat to 
the European and international security order.  
10.44.   Despite all that, the Russian Federation requested the attention of the Council to complain 
about th e targeted measures, only taken in response to its illegal and unjustifiable war, that a 
number of WTO Members had imposed.  
10.45.   To set the record straight in light of the disinformation campaign of the Russian Federation, 
the European Union wished to make the following points. First, in a transparent manner, the 
European Union had issued a Joint Statement, together with other partners, concerning the trade 
measures that were adopted towards the Russian Federation, including measures that denied the 
Russian Fede ration the benefits which the WTO Agreement provided, such as the benefit of the Most -
Favoured Nation treatment.  
10.46.   Second, the European Union considered the measures taken necessary to protect its 
essential security interests within the meaning of the appli cable security exceptions of the WTO 
Agreement. Their purpose was to restore peace and security, in full respect of Ukraine 's territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. Those 
measures were therefore f ully consistent with WTO rules.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  10.47.   Third, the restrictions were primarily directed at the Russian Government, the financial 
sector, and the economic elites with the objective to curb Russia 's abilities to finance and continue 
with their illegal war, and to st op the unprecedented disruptions that the Russian war caused on the 
global economy and trade.  
10.48.   The European Union called on the Russian Federation to immediately stop its military 
aggression in Ukraine, which was the only way to stop the humanitarian and s ecurity crisis.  
10.49.   The representative reiterated her delegation 's full support for Ukraine and its people. The 
European Union remained committed to helping Ukraine to fight that war and cope with the economic 
and trade consequences of Russia 's aggression. It  would seek to facilitate access and transit for 
imports from Ukraine to its market; and encouraged Members to do likewise, including by eliminating 
tariffs and other restrictions on imports, facilitating the use of infrastructure and facilitating customs 
procedures in a manner commensurate with their capacity and consistent with WTO rules.  
10.50.   The European Union would continue to provide its support for the Ukrainian military that was 
fighting heroically against the invasion of the Russian Federation and to p rovide humanitarian aid to 
alleviate the suffering of Ukrainian civilians by securing their access to basic goods and services.  
10.51.   The representative of Japan  said that Russia 's aggression against Ukraine, a sovereign state, 
was an attempt to unilaterally cha nge the status quo by force and was an act that had shaken the 
very foundations of the international order. That was a clear violation of international law and was 
totally unacceptable.  
10.52.   Japan strongly condemned Russia 's actions. It was, therefore, to be expected that the 
international community, including Japan, imposed sanctions against Russia 's aggression.  
10.53.   Japan would continue to stand by Ukraine and the Ukrainian people and take appropriate 
measures in cooperation with the internationa l community, including the G7, to improve the 
situation, in line with the G7 Leaders ' Statement of 8 May 2022.  
10.54.   The representative of Norway  reiterated that her delegation condemned, in the strongest 
possible terms, Russia 's unprovoked and illegal attack on  Ukraine.  
10.55.   Russia 's war against Ukraine was causing death, destruction, and human suffering on a 
horrendous scale. Russia 's war was causing price hikes on energy, commodities, and food, harming 
poor and vulnerable people across the world.  
10.56.   Russia 's war was a blatant violation of international law. Russia 's war was a direct threat to 
the rules -based world order, of which the WTO was an integral part.  
10.57.   The measures taken by Norway as a reaction to Russia 's unprovoked military actions were 
fully consistent with  its WTO rights and obligations. The Russian Federation through its despicable 
actions had lost the moral right to point its finger at others.  
10.58.   The representative of Iceland  said that his delegation once again condemned in the strongest 
possible terms the i llegal invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The aggression by the 
Russian Federation was causing widespread destruction and unspeakable suffering to the Ukrainian 
people.  
10.59.   Members had learned at that meeting more about the grave economic consequen ces that 
invasion was causing for Ukrainian service providers – consequences that were reverberating far 
beyond Ukrainian borders.  
10.60.   Economic measures implemented by Iceland against the Russian Federation – in 
coordination with its partners – were aimed at r estoring peace and security. Iceland deemed them 
necessary to protect its essential security interests and fully consistent with relevant exceptions of 
the WTO Agreement.  S/C/M/149  
 
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  10.61.   Those measures would stay in place as long as the Russian Federation continued its b rutal 
aggression against the Ukrainian people and its undermining of the international rules -based order, 
including the multilateral trading system.  
10.62.   The representative of New Zealand  joined other Members in condemning, in the strongest 
possible terms, the Russian Federation 's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine. New Zealand 
strongly supported Ukraine in opposing Russia 's act of aggression. The attacks were causing 
widespread humanitarian consequences and resulted in the senseless deaths of innocent  people.  
10.63.   New Zealand supported collective action by the international community to denounce the 
egregious and unlawful actions taken by the Russian Federation, and censure those in the Russian 
Federation who bore responsibility for them.  
10.64.   In that regard, New Zealand had joined the international community in applying sanctions 
as a means to limit the Putin regime 's ability to continue the war in Ukraine and to influence people 
with power in the Russian Federation to break their support for the invasion.  
10.65.   Sanctions were applied to designated individuals, entities, assets, and services. That 
targeted action was a direct response to Russia 's illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine and was 
intended to limit Russia 's ability to finance and equip the war.  
10.66.   It was Russ ia's illegal war in Ukraine that had caused widespread humanitarian 
consequences and resulted in the senseless deaths of innocent people and widespread economic 
harm. The international community had to respond to that crisis together and take active steps to 
promote open and transparent trade.  
10.67.   The representative of Australia  reiterated that Russia 's actions violated Ukraine 's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, constituted a gross violation of international law, including the United 
Nations Charter, and threatened the rules -based international order.  
10.68.   Australia supported the statements made by other Members that responsibility laid solely 
with the Russian Federation for what was currently happening to global services trade, including the 
negative effects for developing and Least -Developed Countries, and that nowhere would the effects 
be more acute or long -lasting than in Ukraine itself.  
10.69.   Any services -related trade measures taken by Australia were exclusively attributable to 
Russia 's illegal invasion of Ukr aine. The measures were commensurate and justified given Russia 's 
unprecedented illegal actions, and to the extent that they were covered by Australia 's GATS 
obligations, GATS -consistent.  
10.70.   Australia would continue to work with its partners to impose far -reaching economic sanctions 
and trade measures to inflict heavy costs on the Russian Federation and those responsible.  
10.71.   The representative of Singapore  said that his delegation 's position on Russia 's invasion of 
Ukraine was firmly grounded on its staunch supp ort for international law and the UN Charter, which 
prohibited acts of aggression against a sovereign state. Singapore 's specific sanction measures were 
fully consistent with its WTO rights and obligations.  
10.72.   The representative of Switzerland , while taking note of the intervention of the Russian 
Federation, recalled its statement at the beginning of the meeting. Switzerland highlighted the 
considerable disruption of trade in services and the disastrous effects on many sectors caused by 
Russia 's milita ry aggression against Ukraine.  
10.73.   In view of that military aggression, Switzerland had taken a number of economic measures. 
Those measures were exceptional and had been taken precisely because of Russia 's violation of 
international law. The representative str essed that the measures in question were according to 
international law, including WTO law.  
10.74.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  said that Russia 's invasion of Ukraine was having 
devastating impacts on world trade, including trade in services of Ukr aine. As mentioned previously, S/C/M/149  
 
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  the travel industry, transportation services, communication services and so on had been seriously 
damaged by the invasion.  
10.75.   Measures by the Republic of Korea were based on WTO rules. The Republic of Korea believed 
that it was  essential to focus on the very origin of the sharply aggravating situation in global supply 
chains in many areas, including services. The only way to end all that was the termination of Russia 's 
military action in Ukraine.  
10.76.   The representative of Albania  indicated that, following Russia 's intervention on that point 
and reiterating his delegation 's previous intervention, the implications for the WTO, that the Russian 
Federation was accusing other Members of, were triggered by the Russian Federation itself. 
Obviously, as that grave situation was ongoing there could not be any more business as usual.  
10.77.   Furthermore, in the context of WTO, there was not any political discourse that was impeding 
the substantive discussion on WTO issues, but quite the contrary, as it  was the Russian war that had 
shadowed the WTO issues.  
10.78.   The measures taken by Albania, in close cooperation with its partner countries, were directly 
in response to protecting essential security interests and against the threat, which was a European -
wide th reat. Those measures were fully in line with Albania 's rights and obligations as a WTO 
Member.  
10.79.   Albania considered that the only way out of that conflict was for the Russian Federation to 
urgently stop the military aggression and immediately withdraw its tr oops. As Albania stood in full 
solidarity with the people of Ukraine, it called on the Russian Federation to live up to its responsibility 
to maintain international peace and security.  
10.80.   The representative of the Russian Federation  asked Members to stop playing sustainable 
suppliers of fake news and to concentrate on sustainable supply chains, at least in the WTO if they 
were really worried about it.  
10.81.   The goal of the Russian military operation was the denazification and demilitarisa tion of 
Ukraine, and not the targeting of civilians. All the tales, like those mentioned at that meeting, were 
disinformation. It was the Ukrainian army and Government who blocked the exit of civilians from 
besieged cities, blocked humanitarian corridors a nd used civilian infrastructure to hide Ukrainian 
fighters. The civilian population was used as a shield by the Ukrainians to prevent Russian 
advancement. In reality, the Russian army did not attack the civilian population.  
10.82.   Fake news against the Russian Fe deration was used for two purposes. The first was anti -
Russian propaganda. The second was that Governments attempted to justify to their taxpayers why 
they directed so many funds to fight the Russian Federation, instead of helping their own population.  
10.83.   It was not a secret that there was a very clear temporal connection between the staged 
scenes in Ukraine, in which Russian soldiers were falsely accused of some actions, and the 
announcement of a new package of anti -Russian sanctions. Such misinformation hel ped Western 
countries to manipulate public opinion.  
10.84.   The WTO was for Members to act according to certain rules and norms, not for declaring the 
violation of those rules because some Members did not like the actions of another Member. Such 
logic was very amb iguous, where Members would say "I fulfil my obligations towards you if I like 
you. But I will not give economic access to my market, because you are not my ally ".  
10.85.   The representative said that that was a very slippery and dangerous slope for the multilate ral 
trading system. Firstly, that approach created great risk for opportunistic behaviour, and secondly, 
while that day some Members did not like the Russian Federation, the following day it might be 
another Member, and so on. The rules did not work that w ay. Then they would not be rules, but 
selective benefits. With such an approach, one returned to the era of colonial governance.  
10.86.   The result of such actions would be a fragmentation of the world economic system. 
Decoupling from key suppliers would lead to g lobal trade turbulence and welfare reduction. However, 
the costs would be carried by all parties, not just by the Russian Federation. Members ' taxpayers S/C/M/149  
 
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  had already felt that through a deficit of goods and inflation. Building political blocks against someo ne 
was a rather expensive pleasure and definitely contrary to the spirit of the WTO.  
10.87.   The representative of Ukraine  wished to take the floor as everything that had been said 
under that agenda item was directly related to the consequences of the Russian mil itary aggression 
against Ukraine.  
10.88.   She would not dignify the Russian Federation with a response to its statement as it consisted 
of propaganda and lies. The facts spoke for themselves, and the whole world had seen the real face 
of the Russian Federation in  Bucha and other destroyed Ukrainian villages and cities.  
10.89.   The representative thanked the Members that had expressed their full support for Ukraine 
for their strong response to the invasion and the measures taken for security reasons.  
10.90.   Ukraine emphasised on ce more that Russia 's invasion of Ukraine undermined the established 
work of the multilateral trading system, hindered the development of and people 's welfare in 
developing and Least -Developed Countries, as well as impaired the proper functioning of 
intern ational organisations, in particular the WTO.  
10.91.   Ukraine, therefore, asked all WTO Members to stand together and take action to protect the 
main principles the work of the WTO was based on and to safeguard the hard -earned 
accomplishments, goals, and gains of Members ' common work, as well as their proper development.  
10.92.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated that her delegation was not offended 
by the words of the Ukrainian colleague. She believed that the Ukrainian delegate had been simply 
over-inspired by her country 's success in the Eurovision Song Contest 2022 during the previous 
weekend.  
10.93.   The representative said that the Ukrainian delegate was trying to arrange something like a 
show and to repeat the success of her compatriots. Unfortunately, t he Council did not give prizes, 
even if the diplomat 's performance deserved an Oscar. Therefore, Members should stop deviating 
from the agenda of the meeting and return to their routine discussions in strict accordance with the 
rules of procedure.  
10.94.   The Chairman suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
10.95.   It was so agreed . 
11  ITEM K: OTHER BUSINESS  
11.1.   No issue was raised under that agenda item.  
11.2.   The meeting  was adjourned . 
_________