RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/145  
 
22 May 2023 
(23-3496) Page: 1/106 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
3 AND 4 APRIL  2023 
CHAIRPERSON: MR  ETIENNE OUDOT DE DAINVILLE  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/24 and WTO/AIR/CTG/24/Rev.1 ; the proposed agenda for the meeting was 
circulated in document  G/C/W/827 . 
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  4 
2   STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  1A OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.30)  ................................ .................  4 
3   MEMBERS' NON -RESPONSIVENESS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY OTHER MEMBERS – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES (SEE ANNEX  1) ................................ ......................  6 
4   MEMBERS' NON -NOTIFICATIONS OF ITEMS PURSUANT TO CERTAIN 
WTO  AGREEMENTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES (SEE ANNEX  2) .....................  7 
5   APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR 
TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  10 
6   CANADA – REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE WAIVER FOR THE CARIBBEAN 
INITIATIVE: CARIBCAN (G/C/W/826)  ................................ ................................ ..........  11 
7   MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS: FUNCTIONING OF THE CTG AND ITS  
SUBSIDIARY BODIES AND WTO  RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC (G/L/1464, G/L/1467, 
G/C/W/824/REV.1, JOB/CTG/19/REV.2, JOB/CTG/20, JOB/CTG/21/REV.1, 
JOB/CTG/23) – STATUS REPORT FROM THE CHAIRPERSON  ................................ ..........  12 
8   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA,  
COLOM BIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, 
PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  ..............  20 
9   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  ................................ ........................  30 
10   UNITED KINGDO M – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  .................  31 
11   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  ..........  32 
12   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM CANADA; THE EUROPEAN 
UNION; INDONESIA; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, 
KINMEN AND MATSU ; AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ...........  33 
13   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM  
JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 35 
14   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  ...............  37 
15   UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES 
MEASURES OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ...... 38 G/C/M/145  
 
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  16   UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ...... 40 
17   EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..........  41 
18   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 41 
19   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM – REQUEST  
FROM CHINA, INDONESIA, AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .........  41 
20   EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES – REQUEST FROM 
INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................  49 
21   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 51 
22   UNITED KINGDOM – UK ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FOREST RISK COMMODITIES – 
REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ...........................  53 
23   UNITED STATES, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS AGREEMENT  
ON CHIP EXPORT RESTRICTIONS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ...........  54 
24   UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 55 
25   CHINA  – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION  
REGULATIONS (CSAR) – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, 
AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............................  56 
26   INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 60 
27   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  ............................  62 
28   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  .....................  66 
29   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........................  67 
30   PAKISTAN – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AND DISCRIMINATO RY TREATMENT ON 
FOODSTUFFS AND CONSUMER GOODS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ..........  68 
31   AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .............  68 
32   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING ANNEXES  II 
AND V TO REGULATION (EC) NO.  396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL AS REGARDS MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS FOR CLOT HIANIDIN AND 
THIAMETHOXAM IN OR ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 74 
33   CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR  REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED 
STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  80 
34   CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANS PARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY 
POINT OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............................  83 
35   EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION MEASURE, BASED ON EGYPTIAN STANDARD 
ES 4249/2014 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HALAL FOOD ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC 
SHARIA – REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ....... 86 G/C/M/145  
 
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  36   INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE  
CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONS IGNMENT – REQUEST  
FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ............................  88 
37   MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE UNDER MEXICAN OFFICIAL 
STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018, "CHEESE NAMES, SPECIFICATIONS, 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, AND TEST METHODS," PUBLISHED  
ON 31  JANUARY  2019 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ....... 91 
38   PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING 
REQUIREMENTS – REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  ..........................  91 
39   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,  
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN  
IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  ...... 92 
40   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 93 
41   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ..... 95 
42   CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD FOR OFFICE 
DEVICES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ................................ .................  97 
43   CHINA – DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW – 
REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 98 
44   UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY ARRANGEMENTS ON STEEL AND/OR 
ALUMINUM – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ .............  99 
45   UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND REST RICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ...........................  100  
46   INDIA – IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT P OLICY THROUGH 
QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS (QCOS) IN VARIOUS SECTORS –  
REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ .................  102  
47   EGYPT – MANDATORY USE OF LETTER OF CREDIT AS PAYMENT CONDITION FOR 
IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ .....................  103  
48   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION 
(EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .... 103  
49   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 104  
49.1   Report of Event "Who Notices Notifications? A Conversation With the Private Sector  
at the WTO"  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  104 
49.2   Tentative Annual Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods 
(JOB/CTG/22) and Evolving Tentative Calendar of Formal Meetings  of WTO  Bodies for 2023 
(WT/INF/231/Rev.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 105 
49.3   E-Agenda  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  105 
49.4   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ .............................  106 
50   ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF TH E COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ..................  106  
 
 
The Chairperson  observed that, given the long agenda, it would be preferable for Member s to keep 
their interventions short, if possible. He invited those Member s that were planning to su bmit longer 
written statements for incorporation into the meeting's minutes to expressly indicate their intention 
to do so when taking the floor. To ensure transparency in the preparation of the minutes, the 
Secretariat would only reflect what had been sai d at the meeting, except in those cases where a 
Member  had explicitly indicated that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
 
The delegate of the United States  wished  to provide a brief report , under "Other Business ", on the 
previou s weeks' event on notifications and the private sector.  
 G/C/M/145  
 
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  The Chairperson  also informed delegations that, under agenda item "Other Business ", he would 
comment on the Tentative Annual Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in 
Goods ( JOB/CTG/22) and the Evolving Tentative Calendar of Formal Meetings of WTO  Bodies for 
2023 ( WT/INF/231/Rev.1 ). He also wished to comment on the use of eAgenda in the Council . And 
he would conclude, as was customary, by  the date for the Council's  next meeting.  
 
The agenda was so agreed. 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism1, the CTG was to be kept informed of Member s' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the Council that six  RTAs had been notified to the 
CRTA , as followed:  
• Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ( CPTPP ), Goods – 
Entry into Force for Chile (WT/REG395/N/4); 
 
• Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ( CPTPP ), Goods – 
Entry into Force for Malaysia ( WT/REG395/N/3); 
 
• Free Trade Agreement between Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway and the United Kingdom, 
Goods – Entry into Force for Iceland ( WT/REG459/N/2); 
 
• Free Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom, Norway and Iceland, Goods 
(WT/REG430/N/2) – Notification of Termination ; 
 
• Free Trade Agreement between Türkiye and the Kingdom of Denmark, Goods 
(WT/REG466/N/1); and 
 
• Free Trade Agreement between Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway and the United Kingdom, 
Goods ( WT/REG459/N/1/Add.1). 
 
1.2.  The Council took note  of the information provided.  
2  STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER T HE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  1A OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT ( G/L/223/REV.30 ) 
2.1.  The Chairperson  drew Member s' attention to document  G/L/223/Rev.30  containing the status 
of notifications under the provisions of the Agreements in Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement. The 
first page of thi s report described the discussions by Member s that had led to its current format, the 
most recent of which had taken place in 2018, with a view to reflecting the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. The new revision of the report by the Secretariat described the status of notifications as 
of 31 December  2022.  
2.2.  In a related matter, the Chairperson also drew Members' attention to the Notifications Portal, 
available in notifications.wto.org  for which the Secretariat had  released a Beta version at the 
beginning of last year. The Notifications Portal sought to consolidate, under a single system, all 
general information concerning notifications and the information for the agreements on trade in 
goods summarized and presente d following the template of document  series G/L/223/ -. 
2.3.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
2.4.  The European Union  is pleased that all Member s attach great importance to transparency as a 
fundamental pillar of the WTO, as confirmed by previous discussions on notifications.  The 
develo pment of document  G/L/223  came out of a report (document  G/L/112 ) in 1996 of the 
so-called "Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures " established by the Marrakesh 
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16 , WT/L/671 , and G/C/M/88 . G/C/M/145  
 
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  Decision on Notification Procedures. As part of its report, the Group brought to the attention of the 
CTG a number of overall observations.  
2.5.  As part of these, the Group not ably emphasi zed the importance of two  topics : (i) improvement 
in the rate of compliance with notification obligations ; and (ii) the need for assistance in this regard 
to some developing country Member s (para graph  16). The report recogni zed that "the key to 
improved rates of compliance, at least with respect to certain developing country Member s, [is] 
extensive and carefully focused technical assistance in a number of forms ". Interestingly, the report 
goes on highlighting what it considered were th e best means of providing this assistance: 
(i) intensive training to inform Member s of their obligations; (ii)  guidance in setting up systems in 
the domestic administration to channel the obligations and the responses; and (iii)  a practical 
handbook to pro vide detailed information on the preparation of notifications (para graph  17). 
2.6.  These considerations have led to concrete actions. Document  G/L/223  is now one of the 
resources available, providing Member s with information on their notification record and where they 
stand. Other tools have been developed,  such as the recently updated Notification Handbook and 
the newly developed Notification Portal. These practical tools, as well as the many technical 
assistance and capacity -building activities, are very valuable to inform and promote domestic efforts 
in support of transparency.  
2.7.  We heard , however , in previous discussions on notifications that challenges persist , in 
particular for a number of developing countries and LDCs. We recogni ze that a number of challenges 
remain and are multifaceted. As part of effor ts to address these, the EU would support Member s 
discussing how submitting notifications could be better facilitated, through for example better use 
of online tools, technical assistance, as well as updating or streamlining obligations as appropriate.  
2.8.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
2.9.  The United States always finds the data included in document  G/L/223  to be very informative.  
The report is a valuable resource to understand notification obligations and the status of notifications 
across CTG  bodies.  Yet it can be a bit challen ging to sort through the report, and the format has 
remained mostly unchanged since its inception in 1996.  The Friends of Transparency has proposed 
a review of document  G/L/223  and enhancements that could be made to the report relating to the 
factual presentation of information on Member s' notification  compliance.  
2.10.  Since the new WTO  Notification Portal will contain much of the information included in 
document  G/L/223 , but will also include updates on a real -time basis, should the Committee consider 
distinct ways to enhance the usability of this report , which offers an annual snapshot of notification 
activity?  For example, might there be a way to include factual narratives about the status of Member  
notificati ons for the specific CTG  bodies?  Or could the report benefit from the inclusion of some 
charts or graphs to help identify trends regarding notification status?  The Committee on Agriculture 
reports include a column indicating the Member 's percentage complia nce with each obligation. Could 
this be done for other obligations where annual or periodic reporting is required?  Could a narrative 
acknowledge changes over time, such as an increase or decline in notifications from the previous 
year?  These are some ideas  that might be worth exploring.  
2.11.  Missing, late and incomplete notifications continue to be a concern across CTG  bodies. We 
need to think about even minor, technical -level changes in the workings of the WTO that can 
contribute to more timely and complete not ifications.  
2.12.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
2.13.  Australia also notes that the format of document  G/L/223  is largely unchanged since 1996 
and we see benefit in an informal discussion within this Council for Members to consider how the 
document could be modernized and perhaps made more use ful for Members. We also note, of course, 
the Notification Portal, and some inherent benefits of that portal in real -time reporting compared to 
document  G/L/223 . But we would certainly support ongoing discussions in this space.  
2.14.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  3  MEMBERS' NON -RESPONSIVENESS T O QUESTIONS POSED BY OTHER MEMBERS – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES (SEE ANNEX  1) 
3.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of the 
United States.  
3.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
3.3.  The United States is raising this issue before the Council to identify certain Member s' 
non-responsiveness to questions posed by other Member s. These have been outstanding issues on 
the agendas of the identified bodies for some ti me. In fact, there are dedicated parts of the agendas 
of those bodies specifically for unanswered questions.  And we are now raising them up to the Council 
as a normal administrative matter.  As indicated in Annex  1, there are a series of questions that have  
been outstanding in the identified subsidiary bodies for some time, without response.  To be clear, 
this is not about the quality of a response or any other substantive issue in the questions themselves, 
but simply there being no response at all to the que stions being posed.  
3.4.  The one  exception to this is the India item from the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, 
where India did identify in the response identified in the Annex that it would provide a response at 
a future date, but, after two  years, h as yet to do so . The United States and India have cooperatively 
discussed this issue in the past and we stand ready to further consult with India if necessary.  
3.5.  The United States stands willing to consult and/or work with all of the other Member s identified  
in the Annex, so that those Member s can provide the necessary responses.  As the United States has 
demonstrated many times over in the various subsidiary bodies, we are happy to work with Member s 
with such routine committee business and in exploring ways t o improve the question -and-answer 
process going forward.  
3.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
3.7.  The Russian Federation is glad that the issue of unanswered questions was raised in this CTG. 
We share the view that transparency is of  utmost importance to the Organization. It is detrimental 
for the WTO if questions, including those asked in writing, remain unanswered. Specific examples of 
non-responsiveness include those that f ollow. The US did not respond to Russia's written questions  
submitted in the Committee on Agriculture in October  2022 and March  2023 regarding import duties 
in excess of the bound rates and restrictions on agricultural and agriculture -related services . 
Similarly, no answers were provided to Russia's questions rais ed in October  2022 in the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on the semi -annual report of the United States, as well 
as on recent discriminatory subsidies, subsidy policies, and measures of the United States , not to 
mention 330  timely submi tted questions that the US left unanswered during its Trade Policy Review 
held in December  2022.  The list of developed WTO  Members that do not respond to questions from 
WTO Members is not limited to the US. During the SPS  Committee meeting in November  2022, Japan 
did not respond to Russia on the issue of approved procedures for poultry products. 
Forty-four advance written questions were left unanswered by Japan during its Trade Policy Review 
held in March  2023. Written questions to the EU , dated 8  October  2021, circulated in 
document  G/MA/W/172  and document  G/C/W/800  on the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism also remain unanswered. Moreover, questions posed to the EU during the Committee on 
Market Access meeting in March and October  2022 on this same topic, as well as in t he Committee 
on Technical Barriers to Trade, on the elements of the Green Deal, were left unaddressed. Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States , consistently ignore awkward written quest ions in the Committee on Agriculture regarding 
their unilateral measures that affect trade in agriculture. These are some of the recent instances of 
Members' non -responsiveness to questions posed by other Members. We are of the view that, in the 
field of t ransparency, the US, as well as the other WTO  Members mentioned in this intervention, has 
to lead by example by responding to the questions posed by other delegations, including Russia.  
3.8.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
3.9.  India will make a state ment common to Agenda Items 3 and 4.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  3.10.  India's  belief is that the WTO  Member s act as per their best capacities to comply with the 
various notification obligations of this Organization. National circumstances may guide specific 
positions, which is only natura l for such a dynamic domain as international trade. Specifically on the 
concern s raised by the US on India 's responses on the questions raised for the Working Party on 
State Trad ing Enterprises, we had already mentioned that we were examining these questio ns and 
awaiting the release of our updated National Trade Policy.  
3.11.  More broadly, transparency brought about by complying to the notification obligations must 
permeate all parts of this Organization. For example , in the Council for Trade in Services meeting of 
March  2023, my delegation put in focus cherry -picking of the idea of notification obligations.  To 
quote from the statement delivered in that meeting:  "The compliance ﬁgures mentioned in the 
Secretariat 's compilation 'Overview of notiﬁcations made under relevant GATS  provisions ' continue 
to be of concern and we have in the past drawn attention by the developed Member s in general, and 
in particular, the dismal record in notifications of some prominent developed Member s, who also 
hold top ranks in trade in global commercial services.  Under discussions on WTO  reforms, India 
recogni zes the need for open, inclusive and tra nsparent functioning of the Organization. The 
submission made by India and others on strengthening the WTO to promote development and 
inclusivit y, the communication  WT/GC/W/778 /Rev.5 of which India is a co -sponsor, highlights the 
need for meeting the transparency obligations as enshrined in the GATS. These notiﬁcations are 
essential for Member s to understand the full implications of the commitments mad e by the Member s 
including entry related measures affecting existing mode  4 commitments of Member s." 
3.12.  India hopes that Member s will take a comprehensive view of these issues, which may help 
them in better appreciating the genuine concerns of other Member s when it comes to addressing 
similar WTO  commitments.  
3.13.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
3.14.  Switzerland thank s the United States for introducing this agenda item  and wishes to recall 
the mandate from MC12 to improve the functioning of the WTO, including its deliberative function.  
Although there are technical and organizational ways to improve the functioning of the committees, 
it is first and foremost Member s' responsibility to foster constructive deliberations.  It is expected 
that Member s engage in good faith in the discussions during and between committee meetings. This 
requires Member s to answer questions that are posed to them.  The process of questions and answers 
contribute s to creating common understanding about each and every  Member 's trade policy 
measures and is conducive to rebuilding trust among Member s. We therefore encourage all Member s 
to improve their responsiveness to questions posed by other Member s as a way to improve the 
deliberative  function of this Organization.  
3.15.  The delega te of the United States  indicated the following:  
3.16.  The United States wishes to respond to a few of the items. With regard to Russia, for reasons 
obvious to us all, we will not be responding to any of the points made by Russia. With regard to 
India, we take n ote of your comments, and as we said in our comments, we have always had a 
cooperative approach to these questions, and we look forward to continuing that. And we thank 
Switzerland for their intervention.  
3.17.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Committee take no te of the statements made.  
3.18.  The Council so agreed . 
4  MEMBERS' NON -NOTIFICATIONS OF ITEMS PURSUANT TO CERTAIN WTO  AGREEMENTS 
– REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES (SEE ANNEX  2) 
4.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of the 
United States.  
4.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
4.3.  Similarly to the previous agenda item, the United States is bringing this agenda item to the 
Council to identify certain Member s' non-notifications of items pursuant to certain WTO  Agreements.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  This non -notification issue has been raised in the identified s ubsidiary bodies for several years now . 
In fact, this issue has probably been raised in the subsidiary bodies longer than most of the specific 
trade concerns (STCs) on today's agenda have been in place, and so  and we are now raising this up 
to the Council as a normal administrative matter.  
4.4.  As the United States has stated in past meetings, we appreciate the Chairs ' and Secretariat 's 
attempts in the relevant subsidiary bodies to get Member s to make their respective notifications, 
and we have noticed that an i ncreasing number of Member s have done so.  However, as indicated in 
Annex  2, there remain a number of countries that have not yet made their respective notifications.  
In reviewing the list, the United States notes that nearly every Member  in question has in formed the 
WTO, through the TPR  process , whether it does or does not have the requisite obligation item in 
place. In other words, most WTO  Member s have already informed the WTO of their status, albeit in 
another forum.  As other Member s have demonstrated in  the past, the notification is not overly 
burdensome and, for most Member s, will likely result in a nil notification.  
4.5.  The United States , therefore, continue s to encourage all of the outstanding Member s who have 
yet to make their respective notifications to  review their individual situations and make the applicable 
notification.  As many of these notifications have been outstanding for over 25  years, if Member s 
have questions about their notification obligations, they should approach the Secretariat for guida nce 
about how to meet the requirements under the applicable WTO  Agreements . Alternatively, if for 
some reason a Member  is unable to reach out to the Secretariat, Member s can reach out to other 
Member s for guidance and/or assistance . We have all been in a p osition of having to do a 
WTO notification for the first  time at one time or another, so we should all be sympathetic to the 
challenges certain obligations may face . Speaking solely for the United States, as many Member s in 
the referenced subsidiary bodies can attest to, including LDCs and those with small delegations, we 
stand ready to help in any way we can and have indeed helped many Member s with their applicable 
notifications.  The ball is now in your court as to next steps.  
4.6.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
4.7.  The United Kingdom is g rateful to the United States for raising the issue . Member s know well 
that the UK – like so many others – shares  the US ' passion for the underlying principles of 
transparency and resolution of trade concerns . Taking steps under relevant obligations on 
transparency , and moving towards fixing STCs , really delivers value to the real -world stakeholders, 
and we must all be fully invested. Tuning to this particular item, the United Kingdom  noted that 
many of the Member s listed in Annexes  1 and 2 are LDCs. The UK recogni zes that several Member s 
listed are dealing with domestic and humanitarian issues that constrain the reso urce available , 
including, but not limited to, civil war or natural disasters.  
4.8.  Moving from the contents of this proposal, and into the issue more broadly, the United Kingdom 
would like to take this opportunity to thank LDC  partners for their recent constru ctive engagement 
and interactions with our Delegation on transparency notification s. We reiterate that the 
UK welcomes the LDCs language  in paragraph  8 of document  JOB/GC/223/Rev.1 , which correctly 
underlines  that notifications are the backbone of the WTO . It notes  that we all need to work on 
compliance , and that message certainly feels to the UK like a shared view across the Member ship. 
4.9.  As part of that, the United Kingdom  will continue the ongoing conversation on how development 
assistance ought to be usefully prioriti zed to help those partners to meet their  competing obligations. 
The United Kingdom  will continue to provide technical assistance and capacity -building to help 
partners meet their obligations , and we look forward to continuing this conversation on 
transparency.  
4.10.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the  following:  
4.11.  Japan believes that the notifications by the CTG's subsidiary committees are important from 
the perspective of ensuring transparency and monitoring of the implementation of the Agreement, 
as well as improving the functioning of the CTG  and its  subsidiary committees. We would like to 
point out that Members have to redouble their efforts on this, while also taking into account the 
capacities of developing Members, as well as LDC  Members.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  4.12.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
4.13.  Switzer land would like to limit itself to echoing the importance of transparency and of 
respecting notification obligations. This is a prerequisite and a necessary condition for an effective 
monitoring of trade policies.  
4.14.  The delegate of Angola  indicated the follo wing:  
4.15.  Angola takes careful note of the comments made by the United States, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom, and we will certainly continue to work to change the situation.  
4.16.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
4.17.  Nepal wishes to thank the United States for raising its concerns regarding the notification 
under paragraph  25.2 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement and paragraph  1 of the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article  XVII of the GATT  1994 ( State Trading Enterprises ). 
The messages have been communicated to Capital for necessary action. Nepal  will update the 
Council as soon as it has receive d the relevant information from Capital.  
4.18.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
4.19.  Bangladesh thanks the United States for i ts interest in raising this issue. Bangladesh has 
already notified under Article  25.11 of the SCM  Agreement and has been working on the others listed 
by the US. This message has already been conveyed to competent colleagues and we will revert to 
the Counci l in due course.  
4.20.  The delegate of Niger  indicated the following:  
4.21.  On this agenda item, Niger would like to thank the United States for having raised the issue. 
We take note of the notifications that are lacking with regard to our delegation. We have transfer red 
them to Capital,  and we will be reacting in due course.  
4.22.  The delegate of Sierra Leone  indicated the following:  
Sierra Leone thanks the United States for raising this concern. Sierra Leone is currently consulting 
with Capital and will revert to the Counc il as soon as possible.  
4.23.  The delegate of Mozambique  indicated the following:  
4.24.  Mozambique  has taken note of the points raised by the United States  about the obligations of 
Member s regarding notifications pursuant to the Anti-Dumping , Safeguards, and SCM  Agreement 
within the principle of transparency. We are working with Capital and will inform the Secretariat 
about this issue as soon as possible.  We also thank  the United Kingdom and Japan for  their 
comments and proposals.  
4.25.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
4.26.  The United States thanks the United Kingdom, Japan, and Switzerland for their comments  
and takes note  of them . The US also  welcomes the interventions of  Angola, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique, and reiterates  that if any assistance is required by these 
Members,  they should please see the Secretariat or go to a nother  Member to discuss the issue.  
4.27.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  5  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRA DE 
IN GOODS  
5.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
5.2.  The Council will recall that , at its informal meeting held on the previous Friday, 31  March, I 
reported to you on the progress made in appointing officers to the subsidiary bodies of the Council 
for Trade in Goods for 2023 . My intention today was to give you a list of names of chairpe rsons  for 
the Council's subsidiary bodies for your approval, as per the list communicated to the Membership 
in my email of 28  March . However, as was said on Friday, I regret to inform you that we have not 
reached a consensus  around this list of names . Ther efore, I will continue my consultations with my 
colleagues in the Council for Trade in Services  (CTS) . Nonetheless, I would like this morning to do 
what I did last Friday, but in formal mode , and go over the different stages of the process so that 
you unde rstand what we have done so far.  
5.3.  We began our work in appointing the officers to the subsidiary bodies with a joint 
communication, together with the Chairperson of the CTS, on 21  December  2022, and we outlined 
in that communication the formal steps of the appointments process , in accordance with the 
Guidelines of this Organization to be found in document  WT/L/510 , as well as the document setting 
out specific measures for appointments, document  JOB/GC/22 . We also referred in this 
communication from 21  December to some important points in the gui delines ; for instance, the fact 
that a chair should above all be a person who has the capacity and availability to take on their 
particular responsibilities , or the fact that appointments should be acceptable to all Members and 
not just to the regions or g roups that proposed them.  
5.4.  In this same communication, we informed  Members that , mindful of the importance of having 
a seamless and effective process for the nomination of chairs of the Tier  2 bodies under the Council's 
responsibility, we had invited the Re gional Group Coordinators to a meeting on 6  December  2022, 
where we discussed the preparatory work that could be useful prior to the launch of the formal 
consultations, while remaining fully in conformity with the guidelines and specific measures.  
5.5.  Turning to 2023, at the General Council's meeting of 21  February, the Chairperson of the 
General Council, Ambassador Didier Chambovey, encouraged the Chairperson of the CTS, and 
myself, as Chairperson of the CTG, to launch the process of Tier  2 nominations. He als o encouraged 
Members to demonstrate the same flexibility and pragmatism in the Tier  2 process as they had done 
for the process for the appointment of Tier  1 chairpersons.  
5.6.  Responding to this invitation, on 28  February  2023, the Chairperson of the CTS and my self 
announced our intention to launch the official procedure for the nomination of chairpersons for the 
subsidiary bodies of the CTS and the CTG, and that, as foreseen in document  JOB/GC/22 , we would 
begin the exercise by meeting with the Group Coordinators. In addition, to ensure the utmost 
transparency and inclusivity in the  process, we invited those Members not belonging to any regional 
group to contact us in case of need. Accordingly, I met with one  such delegation on 17  March.  
5.7.  The Chairperson of the CTS and myself  met with the coordinators of the four regional groups 
on 9,  15, and 24 March, which resulted in a provisional list of names. We subsequently met again 
on 31 March, the previous Friday. To ensure the utmost transparency and inclusivity in the process, 
on 24  March , I conveyed the provisional list of names to Members  not belonging to a ny regional 
group , for their comments, if any.  
5.8.  On 28  March,  I communicated the list of names to Members for their consideration at this 
meeting. Unfortunately, I regret to have to inform you that there is no consensus on this provisional  
list of names. Last Friday, 31  March, I met again with the Group Coordinators to discuss the issue, 
and I remain in contact with the delegations concerned to explore any possible solutions. I will 
engage in intensive consultations in this regard, and info rm the Council of any developments at the 
earliest opportunity. I think that we will be able to arrive at a solution quickly.  I would like now to 
give the floor to any Member wishing to make a statement. Would any Member wish to take the 
floor?  This does n ot appear to be the case.  
5.9.  Therefore, as the outgoing Chairperson, and as the person responsible for this process , I will 
continue my consultations with a view to obtaining approval of the list of names that I had previously G/C/M/145  
 
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  circulated. Accordingly, I invit e all Members to do all in their power to reach a consensus on a list of 
names as soon as possible , especially  given that, in the absence of  chairs to preside over the 
subsidiary bodies of this Council , all our work will be blocked . This is a particularly important 
consideration in 2023 , as we prepare for MC13 . 
5.10.  Therefore, I suggest that we suspend  this agenda item and request the incoming Chairperson 
of this Council, once the appointments process has been finalized, to reconvene our meeting to 
address this agenda item only. In this regard, I recall that such a procedure was followed two  years 
before, when the Council faced a similar situation.  
5.11.  I propose that the Council take note of my statement and proceed as proposed.  
5.12.  The Council so agreed . 
6  CANADA – REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE WAIVER FOR THE CARIBBEAN 
INITIATIVE: CARIBCAN ( G/C/W/826 ) 
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Canada.  
6.2.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.3.  Canada is seeking a waiver from our most-favoured -nation ( MFN) obligations on our 
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff (CARIBCAN) tariff preference program . The 
CARIBCAN  preference program has provided economic and trade development assistance to 
eighteen  Commonwealth Caribbean countries and territories in the Caribbean region since 1986.  
This program is established in Canada 's Customs Tariff and Canada has sought periodical renewal 
of this waiver since its inception in 1986 . As a condition of the current and past waivers, Canada 
provides an annual report of trade data to the WTO  General Council and remains open for 
consultations with any interested Member  regarding any difficulty or matter that may arise as a 
result of tariff preferences of the CARIBCAN  program. As proposed in this document, Canada will 
continue to do this.  
6.4.  The delegate of Barbados  indicated the following:  
6.5.  Barbados thanks Canada for submittin g its waiver request in document  G/C/W/826  and for its 
continued economic and trade development technical assistance to Barbados and other 
Commonwea lth Caribbean countries. Over the years, the Programme has been a positive contributor 
to our trade and export earnings, improved our trade and economic development prospects and has 
led to new investment opportunities for Barbados and the CARICOM  Region.  We look forward to our 
continued engagement with Canada and with other Member s and to advancing the draft decision to 
the General Council.  
6.6.  The delegate of Trinidad and Tobago  indicated the following:  
6.7.  The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago su pports the request by Canada for 
the renewal of the CARIBCAN  waiver until 31 December  2033. The CARIBCAN  arrangement supports 
Trinidad and Tobago 's goals for export growth and diversification, and creates positive spill-over 
effects on other development goals , including economic transformation, and poverty and 
unemployment reduction.  
6.8.  Since 2016, exports to Canada have risen from TT D 405 million to TT D 786 million in 2021.  
Additionally, in 2021, Trinidad and Tobago was the lar gest exporter to Canada among the 
CARIBCAN  beneficiaries , with 98% of its exports to Canada receiving duty -free access. Accordingly, 
CARIBCAN has been a very useful mechanism in supporting the export growth and diversification 
goals of Trinidad and Tobago.  
6.9.  The Government has identified key sectors for growth and diversification of the domestic 
economy. Among these sectors is the manufacturing sector, which is largely focused on food and 
beverages. A large number of products from within this sector are exported to Canada under the G/C/M/145  
 
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  CARIBCAN  arrangement. It is therefore a policy goal for Trinidad and Tobago to achieve greater 
utilization of existing market access offered under CARIBCAN.  
6.10.  It should be noted that CARIBCAN  preferences are not only a critical development tool for 
Trinidad and Tobago, but for all CARICOM  member  States. These economies have sought to diversify 
their productive base as a means of economic recovery and stabilization in  the 
post-COVID -19 context.  
6.11.  In conclusion, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago reiterates its support for the 
continuation of the CARIBCAN  arrangement and , as such, would like to strongly encourage 
WTO Member s to also support the Canadian request for the  extension of the CARIBCAN  waiver until 
31 December  2033.  
6.12.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made , and approve , 
and forward to the General Council for adoption, Canada's request for a waiver as set out in 
document  G/C/W/826 . 
6.13.  The Council so agreed . 
7  MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS: FUNCTIONING OF THE CTG AND ITS SUBSIDIARY 
BODIES AND WTO  RESPONSE TO THE PAN DEMIC ( G/L/1464 , G/L/1467 , 
G/C/W/824/REV.1 , JOB/CTG/19/REV.2 , JOB/CTG/20 , JOB/CTG/21/REV.1 , 
JOB/CTG/23)  – STATUS REPORT FROM THE CHAIRPERSON  
7.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
7.2.  I would now like to report to the Council on the status of work we have undertaken on 
MC12  Implementation Matters since our last formal meeting , held on 24 -25 November  2022. It is 
not my intention to have an in -depth discussion of these issues or repeat the discussions we had 
last week, but simply to provide a report for the record.  
7.3.  As announced at that meeting, the CTG convened an informal session on the WTO 's Digital 
Tools on 9 and 12  December  2022, in hybrid mode. The session's programme is contained in 
document  ICN/CTG/6 . The first  day was dedi cated to presentations, which were recorded and shared 
with all delegations. A follow -up session was organi zed to accommodate participants in different 
time zones, providing them another opportunity to pose questions and interact with the speakers. 
The Sec retariat presented the WTO's digital tools of a horizontal nature, Committee -specific digital 
tools, and ongoing planning for future projects. Almost 120  participants attended the information 
session, in person and through Zoom. The discussions held in thi s session have fed into exchanges 
on improving the functioning of WTO  Committees in the context of MC12  implementation matters 
relating to the work of the CTG.  
7.4.  This year, the CTG has held three  informal meetings to discuss CTG -related 
MC12  implementation m atters.  
7.5.  The first informal meeting was held on 31  January (as convened through 
document  ICN/CTG/7 ) and provided an opportunity for the Chairpersons  of the CTG's subsidiary 
bodies to introduce their reports concerning the current functioning of the Committees and the 
response to the Pandemic. An updated list of those reports and their document symbols is available 
in JOB/CTG/19/Rev.2 . Following a request from Members, I requested the Secretariat to prepare a 
summary or similar document that would assist them in comparing the information contained  in the 
various reports on current functioning. At the meeting, the Secretariat presented the comparative 
matrix it had prepared, as circulated in document  G/C/W/824 . Following additional requests for 
additional information, in particular the number of Secretariat staff working on the various 
CTG subsidiary bodies, a revised version of the matrix was circulated on 14  February in 
document  G/C/W/824/Rev.1 . In response to the many requests to improve the transparency in our 
process and to try to ensure the participation of LDCs and the smaller delegations, I circulated my 
closing statements in documents  JOB/CTG/20  and ICN/CTG/7/Add.1 . 
7.6.  The second  informal meeting  of this year was held on 27  February (as convened throu gh 
document  ICN/CTG/8 ), and was organized in two  parts: (i)  the current functioning of the CTG  itself; G/C/M/145  
 
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  and (ii)  the WTO  response to the COVID -19 pandemic. After the meeting, I circulated 
documents  ICN/CTG/8/Suppl.1  and JOB/CTG/23  on 2 March, suggesting next steps, and giving 
Members until 7  March to comment on them.  
7.7.  The third informal meeting  took place on 31  March, where Members were asked to react to 
the "Preliminary List of Issues Proposed for Discussion ", contained in the Annex to the Convening 
Notice in document  ICN/CTG/9 . At that meeting, the Council discussed the issues on the preliminary 
list, with some issues grouped to enable a better flow of the discussion.  
7.8.  I think that you will all agree with me in saying  that the meeting was extremely positive, and 
that Members engaged in detailed exchanges on various questions. We ran out of time to discuss 
the response to the pandemic , but I think that we have succeeded in considerably advancing the 
discussions on the better functioning of the CTG. It was a very constructive meeting.  
7.9.  With the assistance of the Secretariat , I prepared a document that indicates "next steps ", which 
I had me ntioned during the Council's informal meeting . This document was emailed to you earlier.  
The table of next steps was circulated this morning in document  JOB/CTG/27 . 
7.10.  I wish to draw your attention, in particular , to three  questions on which it had been suggested 
that we could perhaps take formal decisions at this meeting, namely : 
– Number  2.1: fix a deadline for agenda items of 15 days before the date of the meeting;  
 
– Number  3.a: request the Secretariat to divide the agenda as concerns trade concerns 
such that the new concerns can be discussed first;  and 
 
– Number  4.d: instruct the Secretariat to integrate the CTG  data in the Trade Concerns 
Database.  
 
7.11.  The document lists concrete next steps and is in the process of being translated.  
7.12.  Having given the floor to Members , and with a view to providing you more time to examine 
the document, I propose to suspend this agenda item with a view to resuming our discussions , and 
the possible adoption of the three  decisions just indicated, in the afternoon of tomorrow , Tuesday . 
Does any delegation wish to take the floor? Is this way of proceeding agr eeable? Certainly, t here 
are no surprises in the document. And it includes the three  points that I have just mentioned.  
7.13.  In this case, I propose that the Council suspend this agenda item before returning to it on 
Tuesday, 4  April.  
7.14.  The Council so agreed . 
7.15.  At the resumption of this item on Day  2, between Agenda Items  48 and 49 , the Chairperson  
indicated the following:  
7.16.  We will n ow resume the discussion on the MC12  implementation matters. that we postponed 
from yesterday under Agenda Item  7, and in particular on the functioning of the Council for Trade 
in Goods and its subsidiary bodies.  
7.17.  You will recall that yesterday we circulate d document  JOB/CTG/27 , included also under the 
document symbol  ICN/CTG/9/Suppl.1 , a document prepared under my responsibility, in which I 
propose the next steps following our informal meeting of last Friday, 31  March  2023. This document 
contains three  columns, taking up to a large extent the li st of points that we reviewed on Friday, 
distinguishing those points in relation to which a further discussion appeared necessary, those for 
which a request for preparatory work by the Secretariat was made, and those for which a consensus 
emerged among a s ignificant number of Members, and it is on these last points that I should like to 
return now.  
7.18.  You recall that we had identified essentially three  points on which there was an emerging 
consensus among Members last Friday: (i)  the deadline for registering C TG agenda items, which is 
currently 10  calendar days, whereas it had been proposed during the discussion to pull this back to G/C/M/145  
 
- 14 - 
 
  15 days, as in the TBT  Committee; (ii)  to distinguish between new and previously raised trade 
concerns by first  addressing new tra de concerns, followed by previously raised trade concerns; in 
this regard, it had been proposed in the table to maintain the order in which the agenda items had 
been raised within the two  categories of new and previously raised trade concerns, beginning wi th 
the new concerns; and (iii)  the request that the Secretariat integrate the CTG's trade concerns with 
the Trade Concerns Database.  
7.19.  Accordingly, I proposed in document  JOB/CTG/27  a written formulation of these 
three  recommendations. I propose now to open the floor, inviting you to react to the totality of the 
document and the accompanying table, confirming or reacting to the three  concrete proposals th at 
could be adopted at the present meeting of the Council, and executed as of the Council's next 
meeting.  
7.20.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.21.  The European Union thanks you and the Secretariat for the very detailed and high -quality 
table which was produced over the weekend. Concerning your proposals on the three  concrete next 
steps, we remain in favour, as per our discussion of last Friday. On the table itself, we have just 
one remark, or suggestion, which links to point  4, concerning  IT tools, and point  4.B in particular, 
which links to maintaining virtual participation in meetings. Further discussion will be required, but 
based on our perception from Friday, there was nevertheless a large consensus for maintaining this 
option. Perhap s these are rather linked to the second  column, namely actions to be taken by the 
Secretariat, because I think that there were still comments linked to a differentiated participation 
for committees, but it is perhaps here that we need some response from th e Secretariat. So perhaps 
something that should fall rather under the second than the first  column.  
7.22.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.23.  We would like to thank you and the Secretariat for preparing the chart and for facilitating 
discussion of this today. In addition to what is being proposed by the Chair regarding the ordering 
of the STCs, we would like to add that the items under each section, old and new, also be 
alphabetized for ordering purposes. We believe that putting these items  in alphabetical order 
facilitates review of the items by capital -based experts and may even encourage online attendance 
by those experts as they will have a better sense of when in the agenda the items will come up, 
rather than waiting all day for scatter ed items throughout the meeting. We got the sense from 
Friday's meeting that there was some receptivity to this idea, and we would like to add this now for 
consideration by Members.  
7.24.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
7.25.  We would like to express our thanks to the Chair and Secretariat for the weekend work to 
prepare the table. We like the way that the table has been set out, with the three  categories, 
including things to keep discussing, actions that can be taken now or off the back of Friday, and 
then the ideas for today. For what it  is worth, we think that the ideas so far sound good from our 
perspective. We did just have one  substantive question, but it is more around the second  column, 
about things that can be taken forward by the Ch airperson and Secretariat, and that is on the 
deadlines document. We had some discussion on Friday about how these can be helpful to informally 
lay out the steps, including on when eAgenda opens. On moving forward, subject to what we agree 
today, it would be great to send out a consolidated list to Members, also copying the Chairs of the 
subsidiary bodies, simply because it was such a helpful discussion on Friday and advancing and 
pragmatically agreeing on some of these items is welcome and would be helpful . Such a 
communication would be a helpful compilation of what we have done and send a positive signal to 
other bodies as they conduct the same exercise on their own ways of working.  
7.26.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
7.27.  We would like to thank the Secretariat for its work in compiling and condensing, in a very 
appropriate manner, the discussions that were held at the informal meeting. We believe that this 
discussion is on a good path, we perceive it very positively, and we  would like to register Ecuador's 
support to the three  proposals that we are reviewing today in order that they may be adopted by 
the Council. We would also like to continue this dialogue because we believe we can do even more. G/C/M/145  
 
- 15 - 
 
  We would therefore like to r equest the support of all Members to continue this work, and to produce 
results that we believe will benefit all of us who are in this Council.  
7.28.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
7.29.  We would like to join others in thanking you , Chair, and the Secretariat , for the support 
provided to us in all these discussions, and for your work in compiling the discussions in this 
document. Argentina would like to support an immediate action from this Council on the three  points 
we highlighted. On behalf of th e co-proponents of document  JOB/CTG/21 , we would like to share 
our satisfaction with the discussions held , and for the conclusions.  
7.30.  Following up on th e statement by the United Kingdom, we would like to propose, if this is 
agreeable to all, to go one step further . That is, not only to inform the subsidiary bodies of the 
result s of our discussions, but also , on the basis of the consensus that emerged in t he discussions 
held last Friday, to suggest a list of points , which  in our statements we noted as being of importance , 
to discuss in subsidiary bodies. We present this as a suggestion to simplify discussions, as reflected 
and circulated this morning in roo m document  RD/CTG/19 , where we focused on the points that we 
had identified as being of interest to subsidiary bodies. These are points  1.a.1,  1.b, 2.a, 2.c, 3.a, 
3.b, and 3.c. If possible, in addition to the report, we would like to request that a suggestion be 
added that subsidiary bodies should take these points into consideration  in particular . 
7.31.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the followin g: 
7.32.  I would like to echo the comments of other Members in thanking the Chair and Secretariat 
for their hard work in putting together this list. I believe that these three  items certainly are for early 
harvest; they are low -hanging fruit that we can harvest right away. They could be adjustments to 
the improvements that we are seeking for this Council. However, I would like to remind the Council 
that another item that seemed to receive great support, and consensus, is 3 .d, the possible 
introduction of an annotated agenda. We had a lengthy discussion, and this issue was brought by 
Hong Kong, China, in a previous meeting, and it seemed to receive great support. It could be another 
low-hanging fruit that could be introduced right away. Certainly, as noted her e, it should be on a 
trial basis. But I wonder, in fact, if this could also be implemented immediately, along with the other 
three  points.  
7.33.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
7.34.  Just to react to Thailand's question, we had placed it in the middle column because, if I recall 
our discussion on Friday correctly, there had been an emerging consensus among Members on the 
principle of an annotated agenda. However, Members wanted first of all to see, given that there 
were various types of annotated agenda being used in different committees, a model prepared by 
the Secretariat before agreeing to it; this was the reason for including it in the second  column.  
7.35.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
7.36.  I would like to join other colleagues in thanking you and  the Secretariat for your work on this 
document. I would also like to commend us all for the discussion on Friday. It was a very constructive 
and useful discussion. And it was a long discussion, but a good one. And we are making progress, 
and this is very positive. I would like to add our support for an early harvest of the three  items in 
the final column, as they are written there. I take note of the US  suggestion on alphabetization of 
agenda items, and as some of us are at the top of the alphabet, and oth ers at the bottom, and we 
all also have time zone differences that keep colleagues awake, so I support the general concept of 
improving engagement by capital -based colleagues, but I think that we need to have a longer 
conversation about whether this would be effective in that regard. But Australia is open for that 
conversation in the future.  
7.37.  The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
7.38.  I would like to join all previous speakers  in thanking you and the Secretariat for putting 
together this very useful tab le, and to confirm Norway's support for the three  measures proposed 
for adoption  at this meeting.  It was also helpful to hear Australia's comments, as I had also G/C/M/145  
 
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  understood that the US  additional proposal would mean that STCs would be grouped after Member,  
or group of Members. I do not think that we have any strong views on that.  
7.39.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.40.  First, I would like to thank Argentina for putting together document  RD/CTG/19 . We would 
support these ideas being shared with the subsidiary bodies, but ask that the ideas be shared strictly 
for the consideration of the subsidiary bodies. And our thanks also to Australia for their comment on 
our suggestion of alphabetization of agenda items. We would be happy to discuss this further.  
7.41.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.42.  Indeed, thanks to you, Chair, and to Roy and the Secretariat team, for pulling this together 
over the weekend. I would add Canada's support to the three  items in the third  column. They all 
make sense. I sense that there is a good amount of support for them, which is positive. I would also 
like to agree with the EU on the remo te participation aspect. I think that there still was support for 
that. Perhaps it is the middle instead of the final column – perhaps something to consider.  
7.43.  In addition, our thanks to Argentina for pulling together those items. They make sense to me. 
I would also agree that it should be information that we are sharing with the subsidiary bodies, 
including the changes that we are making here today, or discussing, at least, and possibly agreeing 
to, in terms of what actions we have taken here in the CTG. It would then be up to us, or our 
colleagues, in those subsidiary bodies to carry the conversation forward also there, and to decide in 
the subsidiary bodies what is appropriate for them.  
7.44.  On the alphabetization suggestion, I would like to discuss this further  as well. I have a vague 
recollection – perhaps it was during the pandemic – of a meeting where all of the STCs were 
alphabetized, which was an approach that still had its challenges, as I recall, even though no concern 
was raised against Canada on that oc casion. Perhaps we would have to go through it one more time 
to get a better sense of exactly how that might facilitate the discussion or change anything at all. 
Further discussion would be a good thing, I think. And I do look forward to the further discus sion, 
given that there are a lot of items in the middle column that the Secretariat will be preparing for us, 
which we greatly appreciate.  
7.45.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
7.46.  Paraguay would like to thank Argentina for introducing document  RD/CTG/19 . We note that 
there is considerable support for it to be sent to the subsidiary bodies for their consideration, as is 
the intention of the document. Paraguay has always noted that the intention sought is that the 
debate we are having at the Council and in the subsidiary bodies follow s a structure. Keeping in 
mind that each subsidiary body has its own characteristics , and as such, each wou ld decide which 
issues they wish ed to pursue , and which not, and to further report to this Council on the areas where 
they could make progress , and which not, and why.  
7.47.  Paraguay also agrees with Canada's suggestion that, as and when the Council agrees on 
certain points, to inform the subsidiary bodies in order to inform their discussions, and to serve as 
a guide in their discussion to see what can be adopted and what not.  
7.48.  Paraguay is also of the view of the European Union on maintaining remote participation of 
meetings, which we would add to the three  points that we consider could be adopted today following 
consensus on these issues.  
7.49.  Regarding the suggestion from the United States on listing the trade concerns in alphabetical 
order, as Australia and Canada did, we also recall a meeting where this was tried, and  where  the 
experience was not positive. There was some backlash from the Members in the room at the time. 
Also, Members with many trade concerns on the agenda required a big effort to respond to each. In  
our experience, in every committee we cover, except in the Committee on Agriculture , where 
matters are grouped by topic , and then by alphabetical order, the order on the agenda always follows 
a first  come  first served rule. We believe  that this is also a positive incentive for delegations to place 
their items on the agenda as early as possible, which ensures their items will be placed earlier on 
the agenda, too. For our Capital, it is easier to follow issues in this manner, given the level of interest G/C/M/145  
 
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  we have on matters discussed in this Council. We could try this one  more time, on a trial basis, but 
an adoption today would require further discussion.  
7.50.  The delegate of the Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
7.51.  The Dominican Republic would like to thank you, Chair, and the Secretariat, for this summary 
document. We agree with the three  elements that have been presented for adoption. We also share 
the question of the Euro pean Union and Canada on the status of virtual participation in meetings. 
We would like to understand if the format will change, and if not, we would like to suggest that it be 
included as approved for consensus. This helps capital -based delegates , but als o Geneva -based 
delegates, because sometimes we need to follow meetings from our offices. It also provides us with 
important flexibility when we need to move from one organization to another , or one  meeting to 
another. It is therefore important for us that it is maintained. We also hope that the elements you 
have suggested are also approved today.  
7.52.  The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
7.53.  Thanks to you, Chair, and the Secretariat, for this excellent document, which we support. Just 
one sugges tion concerns Item  4.h about a WTO  digital tools overview session. I would suggest 
moving this to the middle column because I think we have consensus on holding this at least once 
per year. What needs to be discussed is whether we need to hold more such se ssions, as suggested 
by Australia, if I recall correctly. So I would suggest moving this item to the middle column.  
7.54.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
7.55.  Uruguay would also like to thank you, Chair, and the Secretariat for the document , and 
Memb ers for the efforts made in these discussions. We also agree with the points identified in 
document  JOB/CTG/27 . With regard to the suggestion of the U nited States on listing the trade 
concerns , we note their suggestion as to criteria on the order in which items are placed on the 
agenda, but at the same time it is interesting to recall  that this was already tried, as noted by Canada 
and Paraguay, and as the latter delegations shared their doubts on its effectiveness, it would be 
worth discussing this issue further. Uruguay also thanks Argentina for its room document , and 
support s the statements made in that regard, namely that this Council may inform the subsidiary 
bodies of the progress it has made , for their consideration.  
7.56.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
7.57.  I would also like to join previous speakers in thanking you, Chair, and the Secretariat, for 
their hard work. We also support the three  items in the third  column to be implemented as soon as 
possible. And regarding the ideas proposed by some Members today, we would like to express our 
support to the suggestions made by Argentina and the European Union. Regarding the US  proposal 
on alphabeti zation, we also think we need further discussions on this to see how it could work for 
the CTG.  
7.58.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
7.59.  First of all, I would like to thank you and the Secretariat for the hard work that went into 
crafting this docum ent over the weekend. Brazil would also like to support the three  items that you 
mentioned. I think that they enjoy a broad consensus. Brazil also supports the proposal that was 
tabled by Argentina on behalf of the other co -sponsors. We believe that this w ould be very useful 
not only in the CTG, but also in its subsidiary bodies. Regarding some of the proposals that were 
made here, in particular on the alphabetization of agenda items, we believe that we should have 
more discussions.  
7.60.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
7.61.  Colombia would like to thank the Chair, the Secretariat , and Members , for the work being 
done, and for the discussions we have had. Colombia would also like to thank Argentina for its 
detailed presentation of what we have called "low -hanging fruits". We would also like to note that 
we hope that we can present this basket of mature fruits to the subsidiary bodies in order to 
materiali ze the work and discussions we have had here.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  7.62.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated t he following:  
7.63.  This is a request more about organization and transparency in that there have been in the 
CTG different steps taken by different subsidiary bodies, so you have some that have written out 
requesting written input, in this case closed, some tha t still have the case open for written input, 
some that have had similar discussions in formal meetings, some that are scheduling informal 
meetings off the back of that, and so on. And this has been great, and we have been really interested 
in all of these  discussions. But it has been hard to keep track of what is happening because of so 
many committees. So, Chair, if you will be sending out a list of outcomes of today's CTG, it would 
be really helpful if there is some way simply to track for each subsidiar y body any upcoming or 
current discussions, with opportunities for inputs, to help us organize ourselves in terms of such an 
overview.  
7.64.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.65.  I just wanted to return to the idea of virtual participation. We are not questioning, whatsoever, 
the usefulness of virtual participation. However, we would recall that there were some budgetary 
concerns mentioned in junction with this idea on Friday, so we would ask, for this reason, that it 
remain in the first  column for now.  
7.66.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.67.  If we are going to keep it there, this is okay, but can we then make it clear that this is the 
reason, essentially that, "The discussion of this item showed broad support for continuation, but 
there remain questions around the budget", or words to that effect that would be cross -cutting, to 
go back to one of the US's earlier baskets, so just to make sure that this is clearly indicated.  
7.68.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
7.69.  Thanks to all of you f or your comments. On the EU  proposal concerning online participation, 
having heard the most recent interventions, I propose to proceed as suggested by Canada, namely,  
to leave it in column  one with an indication as to why it remains in that column, namely that it is a 
horizontal question that does not depend on the Council alone. My recommendation for my successor 
will be not to ask you again about this because, a priori, there is a consensus in the Council for 
continuing to use this tool. It depends now on  the global political decision of the Organization.  
7.70.  On the proposed decision on the examination of trade concerns, beginning with the new 
concerns, I propose to remove the last phrase from the wording indicated in the table, where we 
recall the current rule, which is the examination of trade concerns on a first come first served basis, 
and to postpone for future discussion to see whether or not it is important to adopt an alphabetical 
order of trade concerns, or some other type of presentation. I n other words, for adoption today we 
will keep only the new rule indicating that in future we will examine first the new trade concerns, 
followed by previously raised concerns.  
7.71.  On the proposals of Argentina, I have understood from Members' comments their w ish not to 
be too prescriptive in relation to the CTG's subsidiary bodies because it is up to each committee to 
take the necessary decisions concerning its approach to its work based on its particularities and 
constraints. In this regard, I recall that I r ecently met with the outgoing Chairpersons of the CTG's 
subsidiary bodies to explain to them where we were in our CTG  discussions, notably in relation to 
our meeting of end -February, and to recommend to them, within their respective committees, to 
continue  this work on better functioning, and to pass the torch, as it were, to the incoming 
chairpersons.  
7.72.  Thus, I propose to circulate after this meeting a new communication, by way of information, 
to the outgoing Chairpersons of the CTG's subsidiary bodies, in w hich we can certainly include an 
updated table concerning our discussions from today, which will be more or less the table before 
you now, but completed in light of our discussions today, and with an introductory text that could 
be more exact in terms of t he different points that attracted most consensus last Friday, which are 
those largely figuring in the document proposed today by Argentina. However, I will try to avoid 
having a list because there could be confusion due to having too many list s and docume nts. G/C/M/145  
 
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  7.73.  On the proposition of Hong Kong, China, to transfer the annual session on digital tools to the 
middle column, I am entirely prepared to do so, there is just the issue of budgetary impact, but I 
think this would not be case as it is a matter of present ing the existing digital tools and organizing 
a meeting.  
7.74.  Finally, the proposition of the United Kingdom of a document specifying deadlines to be 
respected for the different documents to submit in relation to future meetings, a point that I have 
not clearly  understood because I was in the process of changing interpretation language.  
7.75.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
7.76.  This is a reflection of different conversations and emails have gone out across a lot of bodies 
on this same functioni ng issue at the same time, and so it would be useful to see, in one place, for 
each subsidiary body, what steps they have taken, and when, and any future steps coming up. So, 
for example, in terms of the committees I cover, one of them has had two  informal  discussions, and 
they have requested input in writing, and the deadline for that was Friday. Another committee I 
cover had an initial discussion a few weeks ago, and is planning an informal meeting. Other 
committees are yet to discuss this, or yet to requ est input in writing. Thus, we just need something 
that collates what steps have been taken by each committee, and to indicate any deadlines for 
written submissions or planned and scheduled meetings that are coming up, just to help us prepare, 
and to be su re that we are not missing any opportunities to input.  
7.77.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.78.  On a point of clarification on the proposal from Hong Kong, China, and again, no objections 
on face value to WTO  digital trade overview sessio ns, my question is just, if we are still asking 
ourselves how many times it makes sense for us to hold this per year, and if there are maybe 
budgetary implications, why would we move that from the column in which it is now?  
7.79.  The Chairperson  indicated the fo llowing:  
7.80.  In our discussion on Friday we had specified that it would be one  annual cross -cutting session, 
but we can of course leave it in the first  column.  
7.81.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.82.  On both of those points, on the UK's suggestion, thi s sounds to me like a tracking document 
that the Chair of the CTG should have in its pocket so that he knows what the subsidiary bodies are 
doing, and when they are doing it, in respect of better functioning. This seems like a fairly simple 
Secretariat doc ument just keeping track of what each of the subsidiary bodies is doing, or not doing.  
7.83.  On the US  discussion, I am not sure that it matters either way, which column, and if I recall 
correctly, I am not sure if there are budgetary implications for this, even  perhaps for the recording 
of the session. I think, in essence, it is something we want to discuss at a next informal meeting, in 
the sense of when it might happen again, and what can be done to improve it, perhaps, if there is 
anyone who wants to reflect on how the past session went, but at the end of the day it actually is 
an action to be taken by the Secretariat and the Chairperson to organize those sessions. I do not 
think it  is an issue, and I agree with Hong Kong, China, that it is something that we h ave asked for. 
I guess it  is more a question of the portrayal or representation in the table.  
7.84.  The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
7.85.  I agree with Canada concerning Item  4.h. I am okay with placing it in either column, but just 
like virtu al participation, I think we may specify that the reason of keeping it there is that there is a 
budgetary consideration there.  
7.86.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
7.87.  In this case, I suggest that we keep point 4.b on virtual participation but indicating t he reason, 
namely cross -cutting or eventual budgetary constraint.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  7.88.  I think we are agreed on starting with new trade concerns in the examination of trade 
concerns, and not specifying the order of examination within each category, which is retained for 
future  discussion.  
7.89.  I also propose to move to the middle column the suggestion to have an annual information 
session on digital tools, provided by the Secretariat.  
7.90.  And finally, if you agree, I will send a communication/information note to the Chairpersons of 
the subsidiary bodies on the status of our work. I am a little less comfortable about asking for a 
document that groups everything and instructs them what to do. It is true that the Council already 
envisaged to have reports from the Chairpersons of the subsidi ary bodies, which should be submitted 
to the CTG so they can be considered at November 's meeting. And in effect, a certain number of 
chairs of subsidiary bodies have already begun preparing certain reports. But I will turn to 
Ambassador Abdulhamid to see h ow he would like to proceed in this regard. By contrast, I will send 
a communication , as outgoing Chairperson , that will reflect the current status of discussions from 
today and indicate the overview and sequence of relevant documents concerning the CTG.  
7.91.  Finally, I note that there is an agreement on the proposed text for the three  issues as 
contained in JOB/CTG/27  and modified today: an extension to 15  calendar days for requesting the 
inclusion of an agenda item2, separating the trade concerns in new and previously raised3, and on 
including CTG  trade concerns in the Trade Concerns Database.4 
7.92.  I propose that the Council take note of the statements made, and proceed as proposed . 
7.93.  The Council so agreed .5 
8  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND URUGUAY ( G/C/W/767/REV.1 ) 
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay.  
8.2.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
8.3.  I would like to begin by noting that non -tariff barriers faced by agricultural products getting 
into the European Union are numerous and diverse, as ca n be appreciated by today's agenda, which 
includes not only this, but also several other trade concerns that are related. However, my statement 
will focus on the current problems concerning maximum residue levels (MRLs). My delegation would 
like to reitera te its trade and systemic concern regarding the MRLs for plant protection products in 
the European Union to the limit of detection  (LOD) on the basis of scientific uncertainty. We are also 
of the view that the EU is failing to comply with its obligations u nder Articles  5.1 and 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement in the decisions that are the subject of this major trade concern, which is of the 
 
2 The Council agreed to the f ollowing: " Members wishing to propose the inclusion of an agenda item for 
a formal meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods should, no less than fifteen  calendar days prior to the date 
of the meeting, either include it in the eAgenda or inform the Secreta riat in writing of their intention. If the 
deadline falls on a non -working day, it will be moved to the previous business day."  
3 The Council agreed to the following: " The Secretariat is instructed to include a new subsection in the 
agenda to separate them  and place them before previously raised trade concerns."  
4 The Council agreed to the following: "The Secretariat is instructed to integrate the CTG  data on trade 
concerns into the Trade Concerns Database, subject to budgetary constraints. As the project p rogresses, the 
Secretariat will consult with Members on potential adjustments, such as how to link trade concerns raised at 
the CTG with STCs raised in other bodies."  
5 The outgoing Chairperson prepared a revised document describing the current Status of W ork 
Following the Formal Meeting of 3 -4 April 2023, which was circulated in document  JOB/CTG/28 , and sent a 
communication to the Chairpersons of the CTG's subsidiary bodies (See  JOB/CTG/29 ). At the request of 
Members, the Secretariat has informed Members by email of the dates on which the CTG's subsidiary bodies 
have been discussing improvement to their functioning.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  utmost importance for several Members of this Organization , and which has been raised in the 
SPS Committee and the Committee on Market Access.  
8.4.  Furthermore, the routine use of emergency authorizations by European producers for many of 
these substances is not only discriminatory, but also compromises the high level of protection that 
the EU claims its consumers enjoy, an d which is the reason it cites for being unable to grant transition 
periods necessary for the adaptation and adjustment of production systems in third  countries, whose 
trade is being affected by these measures. I am sure that, in her answer, our colleague from the 
European Union will state that trade has not been affected , and that the export values into the 
EU market of those Members raising this concern have in fact increased. However, we believe that 
we should measure the quantities and not the values, w hich have been affected by inflation and are 
not representative of the impact on trade. We should also look into the concrete impact of the 
measures on a concrete product from my country, which is being affected by these measures.  
8.5.  In Paraguay's case, for e xample, our rice exports to the EU are being affected principally owing 
to residues of tricyclazole, a substance whose MRLs were reduced to 0.01 under 
Regulation  (EU) No. 2017/983. It is important to recall that the previous limit was 1 under 
Regulation (E C) No. 149/2008, and that the decision not to renew the substance was taken on the 
basis of scientific uncertainty because, according to the EFSA  report, data gaps were identified that 
prevented a risk assessment from being carried out. An import tolerance  application was submitted 
in 2018 and has just been recommended for approval by EFSA in December  2022, four  years and 
eight months after its submission. Its future is uncertain since several EU  member States have 
declared their opposition to the approval of import tolerances on principle ; that is, independently of 
whether the science support the importation and safe use of the substance. Even if the import 
tolerance is approved – and we hope that it will be – the lack of an appropriate five -year transition  
period, which we have been requesting for five  years, has affected our rice exports to the EU on at 
least nine  occasions since the new MRLs were applied, a situation that could have been avoided with 
appropriate transition periods. This is just one exampl e of how these restrictions are real and not 
theoretical.  
8.6.  The import tolerance proposal was possible thanks to the Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) 
submitted by another Member and collaboration with one of the producers of the substance. 
However, we note  that the EU's current system does not allow direct engagement with 
third countries without the producers of the substance as intermediaries, and that the comments 
made by the EU's trading partners are not taken into account when making decisions. The exer cise 
of notifying the Committees thus becomes a mere formality, with no possibility for any real impact 
on decision -making that would affect our countries' producers. An example includes situations where 
the opportunity to submit comments is given one  day, and the voting on the measure takes place 
the following day. It is difficult to believe that comment periods of less than 24  hours can properly 
take into account the comments by other Members  in this process.  
8.7.  Therefore, in cases of scientific uncertainty,  we request the EU: (i)  to grant appropriate 
transition periods that would allow trade to continue while maintaining an appropriate level of 
protection for consumer health; (ii)  to give trading partners the opportunity for the producer of the 
substance to engage in EFSA  assessment processes sooner , and in an independent manner; and 
(iii) to make decisions based on risk rather than hazard.  
8.8.  Similarly, we request the European Union  to clarify the scope of the European Court of Justice 
ruling regarding emergenc y authorizations for applications other than treated seeds and products 
other than neonicotinoids as directly referred to therein. While European farmers continue to benefit 
from these derogations to ensure their competitiveness, and while no flexibility i s granted to 
third countries wishing to export to the EU, the measures implemented by the Commission will 
continue to be interpreted not as protecting consumers, but as protecting the competitiveness of 
European agriculture.  
8.9.  We further recall that my deleg ation, together with the delegations of Colombia, Ecuador,  and 
Guatemala, submitted specific questions to the Commission and EU  member States during the most 
recent SPS  Committee meeting in November, and that we are still awaiting replies.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  8.10.  The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
8.11.  Peru wishes to reiterate its support for this trade concern regarding the implementation of 
non-tariff barriers by the European Union, which in practice are unjustified barriers restricting trade 
in agricultural products.  As we have mentioned on a number of occasions in the SPS  Committee, 
Peru considers that the approach used by the European Union for assessing any maximum residue 
limit for pesticides  results in such limits being more restrictive than necessary and does not  take 
into account the provisions of the SPS  Agreement.  Moreover, we are concerned about the European 
Union's initiatives to take into consideration environmental aspects as a factor for future pesticide 
risk assessments, despite the fact that there is no technical basis for such a policy.  
8.12.  Furthermore, non -tariff barriers do not only refer to MRLs for pesticides, since the European 
Union is also establishing maximum levels for contaminants that deviate from those established 
under the Codex Alimentarius, as  in the case of cocoa derivatives. Regarding other foods, Peru has 
also approached the European Union bilaterally to request information on the process for the 
adoption of new MRLs for contaminants and expressed the need for adequate time -frames for their 
implementation, given that mitigation measures vary and are effective after a subsequent extended 
period of implementation.  
8.13.  We once again request that the European Union take into consideration the concerns raised 
in this Council and the SPS  Committee to e nsure that its policies are aligned with the provisions of 
the SPS  Agreement, and to avoid any further unnecessary disruptions to trade.  
8.14.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
8.15.  Brazil regrets that, since this issue was first  raised, nearly two  years ago, not only has the 
European Union not provided adequate answers to the many concerns raised by a large number of 
WTO Members, but it has also continued to adopt non -tariff barriers (NTBs) that lack scientific 
evidence and further imbalance trade in ag ricultural goods. Brazil therefore makes reference to its 
previous statements on this topic, as all Brazil's concerns remain valid.6 
8.16.  In addition, Brazil notes that the European Union has claimed that the measures being 
questioned have not prevented it fro m being a large importer of agricultural goods, nowhere in the 
GATT does it say that being a large importer of agricultural goods enables a WTO  Member to adopt 
discriminatory policies or to go against the basic principles of the SPS  Agreement. Secondly, su ch 
imports simply reflect the reality that other regions of the world can produce more effectively and 
more sustainably than the EU without the thousands of euros of subsidies per farmer. But while 
enabling a more efficient allocation of production and pro moting the rise of living standards through 
trade are key goals of this Organization, WTO  Members have never had a level playing field in the 
trade in agricultural goods, and the reform mandated by Article  20 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) is a clea r indication of that. Besides, the scientific principle, enshrined in the SPS  Agreement 
and materialized through risk analysis, exists for a reason, namely, to establish a balance between 
the principle of protection of life and human and animal health, and  the guarantee that the market 
access conditions negotiated multilaterally are not undermined by unjustified NTB  measures.  
8.17.  However, after nearly 30  years, the European Union has not engaged meaningfully in 
redressing the imbalance in its favour in the AoA and is constantly imposing prohibitions based on 
the hazard approach and/or recourse to Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement, despite contrary technical 
advice from renowned institutions. This not only tilts the balance towards protectionism, but also 
undermin es the capacity of developing countries to raise living standards in rural areas. It is thus 
worrying that 25  years after its adoption, the interpretation that is being given to the SPS  Agreement 
is moving away from the purposes that guided the negotiation s during the Uruguay Round. It is also 
worrying that Brazil has to bring debates of this nature to the CTG in a context in which it has been 
following with concern the legislative projects that try to create new non -tariff barriers under the 
guise of envir onmental protection measures.  
8.18.  Additionally, Brazil would like to note that it is still waiting for adequate answers regarding 
the compatibility with WTO  law of the publication by the European Union of more than 
2,600  emergency authorizations by its member States of substances under review since 2017, many 
 
6 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  6.61-6.66.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  of which presented the same arguments as delegations from other WTO  Members in the SPS and 
TBT Committees, while others simply do not offer any justification and yet were approved.  
8.19.  As a final comment, Braz il stresses that the world is facing an acute food security crisis, which 
will become even more challenging in the next decades as the world's population grows. It is thus 
imperative to have in place incentives and policies that support agriculture in thos e areas that, 
blessed with a favourable climate for agriculture, can increase output in a sustainable manner. 
Unfortunately, EU  policies in this area are not pulling in the direction WTO  Members need in order 
to support the poorest in developing countries and increase food security worldwide.  
8.20.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
8.21.  As my delegation has already said in statements before the Committees on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and on Technical Barriers to Trade, Ecuador yet again finds it necessary to 
support this trade concern.  We find it regrettable that the discussion on this issue has stalled, further 
increasing the economic uncertainty caused by the impact of the European Union's non -tariff 
barriers, mainly on small - and medium -scale farmers whose production is intended to serve the 
markets of European Union member States.  
8.22.  In discussions on improving how this Council functions, the treatment of trade concerns has 
been identified as one of the issues that requires further analysis. We  agree that the purpose of this 
analysis should be to generate a genuine exchange between Members to deal pragmatically, through 
concrete decisions, with the substantive matters raised in this forum.  
8.23.  We would briefly like to recall the five  objections and arguments underpinning the shared 
trade concern of the Members that have raised the issue under this agenda item: (i)  the adoption of 
measures without scientific evidence; (ii)  the failure to observe international standards; (iii)  the 
failure to comply wit h the requirements established in the SPS  Agreement; (iv)  the suspension of 
MRLs that are beyond the levels recommended by the Codex Alimentarius; and (v)  the lack of 
reasonable transition  periods where such periods are proved necessary.  
8.24.  The new maximum le vels have already led to the rejection of fruit exported from Ecuador to 
European markets. It is expected that, as new plant protection products become "unauthorized " and 
their residue limits are reduced to 0.01  ppm, this trend of rejecting products will i ncrease. The 
five elements that we have mentioned in support of our claim have not been adequately addressed 
or have received only partial answers and explanations. The fifth  point, although not the only one, 
is crucial: trading partners need at least five  years to adapt their agricultural practices and put in 
place processes that allow the use of substitutes.  
8.25.  Taking the view that these concerns could form the basis for constructive dialogue with all 
trade partners with an interest in this matter, within the framework of this trade concern, we also 
refer to the queries raised by my delegation and other countries  at the meeting in November last 
year regarding assessments of the impact on tropical developing Members  and on small - and 
medium -scale farmers from such Members . 
8.26.  The lack of authorized substances has a direct impact on market access for typical Andean 
and tropical fruits, which, being minor crops, have few defined residue limits for approved 
substances.  Many of these products are exported in the necessary volumes thanks to the cooperative 
work of small family farms, for which a change in the MRL can mean l arge losses. Agreeing on a 
transition period before implementing a measure, and implementing through programmes that 
facilitate the replacement of products with new ones, has a special socioeconomic and sustainable 
development dimension.  
8.27.  Farmers in the Eur opean Union opt for emergency authorizations, some of which last for years 
thanks to the possibility of consecutive renewals, while no similar mechanism exists for their trading 
partners. Equivalent treatment would not only address the socioeconomic and su stainable 
development dimension that I mentioned , but also ensure consistent, non -discriminatory treatment.  
8.28.  To conclude, Ecuador renews its willingness to engage in a constructive exchange to find a 
definitive solution to this issue that addresses the conc erns of the European Union and its trading 
partners, in the spirit that governs the functioning of the WTO: namely, to lay the foundations for G/C/M/145  
 
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  understandings that facilitate a global trade that is free of unilateral barriers and in compliance with 
applicab le rules and regulations. Only a frank and committed dialogue will enable us to achieve this 
objective and consolidate trade freedoms for all Members.  
8.29.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
8.30.  Uruguay maintains its trade and systemic concern regarding the general approach taken by 
the European Union in its regulatory decisions linked to sanitary and phytosanitary matters, and the 
way in which it interacts with other European agricultural policy instruments, such as subsidies and 
tariffs, to re strict access to the European market, thus preventing producers in third  countries from 
competing with their European counterparts on equal terms, in line with the views expressed by 
other delegations.  
8.31.  We are particularly concerned at the adoption of an ap proach whereby it has been decided to 
reduce the MRLs for a growing list of active substances, used at different stages of the production 
process of a wide range of agricultural products, to levels lower than those agreed in the Codex, and 
even the detecti on level, without a full risk assessment necessarily being carried out to justify such 
a departure based on conclusive scientific evidence.  
8.32.  In our view, any determination in that regard, particularly when it deviates from 
internationally accepted standards  and harmonization efforts in multilateral forums such as the 
Codex, must necessarily be based on a full scientific risk assessment and conclusive scientific 
evidence, in accordance with the SPS  Agreement. This is essential to maintain the effective balanc e 
that must exist between the right of Members to pursue their legitimate objectives and the need to 
avoid creating unnecessary barriers to trade.  
8.33.  Uruguay agrees with other Members that the issue of derogation regimes, including the 
existence and practical  implementation of emergency authorizations, seem to show tensions 
between the domestic policies of EU  member States and the aim of protecting health at the 
Community level, as well as trade -related situations that could potentially be discriminatory vis -à-vis 
third parties. In this connection, we would be interested to know how the EU  intends to consider 
emergency authorizations for substances subject to restrictions at the Community level in the light 
of the recent judg ement  of 19 January  2023 of the Cour t of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
which considers such authorizations to be illegal in certain cases. Uruguay is also concerned that 
adequate transition periods are not being granted to make the necessary adjustments to production 
and to ensure th at the products concerned comply with the amended MRLs.  
8.34.  Lastly, Uruguay once again urges the European Union to reconsider the direction of its 
regulatory approach with a view to avoiding the unjustified proliferation of barriers to international 
trade in a gricultural products, bearing in mind its WTO  obligations and the socio -economic 
consequences that these policies may have on its trading partners, especially developing and least -
developed countries.  
8.35.  The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
8.36.  Costa Rica wishes to thank the European Union for its willingness to maintain a constructive 
dialogue with Costa Rica and other interested Members on our concerns regarding the EU's 
regulatory focus on the establishment of MRLs. Having said that, Costa Rica m aintains the same 
concerns and the same requests it has made on previous occasions in this Council, which have been 
elaborated on by the delegations that took the floor before us. For this reason, so as not to repeat 
ourselves, we will refer to the minutes  of the previous meeting.7 
8.37.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
8.38.  Panama echoes the comments of the delegations that preceded me on the European Union's 
approach to the various trade concerns that we, the co -sponsoring Members, have raised in thi s and 
other forums. Panama reiterates its systematic trade concern relating to the increasing 
implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products. The reduction of MRLs without 
sufficient scientific evidence restricts access to essential substan ces for agricultural production, 
 
7 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  6.23-6.28.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  particularly in countries with a tropical climate, such as Panama. Panama believes that the EU's set 
of policies and practices carries the risk of nullifying and undermining the legitimate rights of 
WTO Members that are sig natories to the A oA and to the SPS Agreement . 
8.39.  Panama agrees with the European Union's goal of supporting the global transition to more 
sustainable world agri -food systems, but these must be based on building solutions designed and 
implemented through dialo gue mechanisms and multilateral cooperation frameworks. We note with 
regret that no progress has been observed to date. We urge the EU to listen to the legitimate 
concerns of dozens of WTO  Members. In view of the above, Panama requests the EU to align its 
MRLs with the limits established under the Codex Alimentarius, or to consider less trade -restrictive 
alternatives, and not to accord less favourable treatment to our farmers than that accorded to 
European farmers through the frequent use of emergency autho rizations. We believe that a 
constructive, serious, and ongoing dialogue, in conjunction with mutually agreed technical 
assistance, will enable us to find solutions beneficial to all parties.  
8.40.  The delegate of  the Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
8.41.  The Dominican Republic wishes to reiterate its statement made at the last formal meeting of 
the Council for Trade in Goods, held on 24 -25 November  2022, as follows:  
8.42.  The Dominican Republic welcomes the inclusion of this matter on the Committee's agenda 
and, for the sake of brevity, we refer to our statement made at the last meeting of the Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  
8.43.  We share the European Union's concern regarding the protection of human and animal health 
and measures to protect the envi ronment. However, we are concerned about the systemic and 
commercial impact that the measures to reduce MRLs may have on our  exports, given that this type 
of regulation has a direct socio -economic impact on the Dominican Republic, particularly affecting 
agricultural producers, who tend to be the most vulnerable populations in LDCs and in developing 
countries, and who are directly hit by the socio -economic consequences of these restrictions on 
international trade.  
8.44.  The Dominican Republic considers that any me asure applied by the European Union must be 
prepared in accordance with the rules agreed at the WTO. The draft regulation on MRLs submitted 
by the European Union must take into account the scientific evidence generated from studies in 
experimental animals,  as well as epidemiological studies on exposed populations, to clearly establish 
disruption as an effect, thereby eliminating the presumption of adverse effects.  
8.45.  We therefore invite the European Union to comply with the Codex Alimentarius by 
reconsidering the implementation of these measures.  In addition, the Dominican Republic wishes to 
reiterate its delegation's statement made at the last meeting of the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, where we expressed particular concern about the possi ble modification of 
MRLs for imazalil, which is a key product for fruits such as bananas and mangoes.  
8.46.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.47.  As noted in its previous interventions on this subject, Canada emphasizes the need for 
transparency and predictability in international trade. An important aspect in achieving this is 
regulatory frameworks that have been developed based on scientific data and risk analysis, and 
which have taken into account the comments of trading partners so that they may achieve desired 
outcomes while facilitating trade where this is feasible and appropriate.  
8.48.  In accordance with WTO  obligations, Canada recognizes the right of Members to regulate in 
the public interest and to apply the food safety measures deemed necessary to protect human 
health. However, such measures must be implemented in a transparent manner that does not 
unjustifiably restrict international trade.  
8.49.  The European Union is the world 's leading agricultural and forest products importer and 
therefore plays an important role in ensuring a predictable and open trade environment . Today, 
Canada  would like to comment on two  particular policy initiatives where the E U's approach is more G/C/M/145  
 
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  trade restrictive than necessary and could result in increased uncertainty, higher compliance costs 
for importers and exporters, and further complicate international supply chains . 
8.50.  The first  issue is the European Union's  proposal on de forestation -free supply chains . While 
Canada share 's the EU 's objective of preventing global deforestation, the compliance mechanisms 
that have been proposed within the EU's draft legislation, including the use of plot -of-land-based 
traceability, will resu lt in increased costs and administrative burden for countries exporting to the 
EU market. As the legislative process for this regulation is well under  way and moving rapidly, it is 
imperative for the EU to seriously take into account the concerns of its trading partners, and to 
ensure that any new regulation to help curb global deforestation does not unnecessarily impact 
trade.  
8.51.  The second  issue relates to the series of measures that support the E uropean Union's 
approach to regulating pesticides . Canada is p articularly concerned with the apparent strategy to 
restrict the use of important plant protection products through the reduction of M RLs, and most 
recently on the basis of environmental concerns rather than dietary risk, which could lead to 
significant ba rriers to trade. Canada urges the EU to consider dietary risk when setting MRLs, as all 
countries should have the ability to use plant protection products that are appropriate to their 
particular circumstances and needs without unnecessarily jeopardizing a ccess to trade. Canada 
urges the EU to consider pollen, nectar and floral residues for pollinator exposure in its risk 
assessment. The current EU  approach is also problematic as European farmers still have the ability 
to use some of these plant protection products on an annual basis through emergency 
authorizations. Canada notes that EU  member  States have authorized numerous emergency 
derogations to allow plant protection products to be placed on the EU  market that are banned for 
use in the EU, and therefore not eligible for use by exporters wishing to trade with the EU. There 
are many examples of emergency derogations being granted for individual EU member  States for 
multiple years, which may indicate th ere is a legitimate case for the use of such products. Frequent 
use of emergency authorizations in the context of the EU 's current approach to plant protection 
renewals creates an unfair playing field between domestic and imported products.  
8.52.  Canada also recalls that the European Union  has stated that it will be changing how requests 
for import tolerances are established, including taking into account certain environmental impacts 
in the country of origin. Canadian growers and exporters have ye t to be assured of the real -world 
feasibility, commercial viability and compliance with international obligations of the EU 's proposed 
approach . Consequently, Canada once again requests that the EU consider maintaining MRLs for 
substances that do not pose unacceptable dietary risks to European consumers, as this would be the 
only means by which consumers would be exposed to these products.  
8.53.  For example, Canada is concerned by the E uropean Union's decision to adopt legislation to 
lower the MRLs for clothianid in and thiamethoxam to the Limit of Quantification (LOQ) based on 
perceived environmental concerns rather than protection of consumer health . Additionally, this 
legislation does not take into account successful risk mitigation measures which have been take n by 
exporting countries or residues in pollinator relevant matrices such as pollen and/or nectar. This 
type of policy and rationale restricts trade and appears to be the EU 's attempt at levelling the playing 
field for regulations they have imposed upon th eir own agricultural producers. If a pesticide does 
not have dietary concerns and poses no risks to EU  consumers, the EU should maintain the MRLs or 
harmonize with Codex.  
8.54.  Lastly, Canada requests the European Union  to take into account the timelines necessa ry for 
practical decision -making by farmers and producers, as well as the time and effort required to bring 
products to market, particularly for commodities with long shelf lives. Transition periods should 
therefore be appropriate to the circumstances and product type, and should allow commodities to 
clear channels of trade where no dietary risks of concern to consumers have been identified.  
8.55.  In conclusion, Canada hopes that the reiteration of its concerns will emphasize the importance 
that Canada, and many WTO Member s, attribute to seeking enhanced transparency and 
predictability for trade, particularly in a context where such trade can contribute to global food 
security and supply.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  8.56.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
8.57.  The United States  joins Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay in again raising concerns regarding 
the European Union 's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products.  
8.58.  As the United States has noted in the past, the European Union  continues to lower many 
pesticide Maximum Residue Levels, or MRLs, to trade -restrictive levels without clear scientific 
justification or measurable benefit to human health . This hazard -based approac h to pesticide 
regulation may lead to trade barriers that threaten the security of global food systems.  
8.59.  Further, the European Union  enforces newly reduced pesticide MRLs at the point of production 
for domestic goods, but at the point of importation for imp orted goods . This difference in the way 
that domestic and imported goods are treated causes trade inefficiencies and disruptions for products 
destined for the EU  market and results in an unfair advantage for EU  producers, especially for those 
that produce products with long shelf lives.  
8.60.  The United States  remain s concerned that it appears as though the European Union  is 
following a similar approach with its new veterinary drug legislation through prohibitions on the use 
of antimicrobials that are not conside red medically important for human health.  Like other Member s, 
the US has shared its concerns in the SPS  Committee that these prescriptive restrictions, which do 
not appear to be based on completed risk assessments, will apply to foreign producers exporting 
animals and animal products to the EU.  
8.61.  Given the E uropean Union's position as one of the largest importers in the world, EU  polices 
affect production practices in third  countries, as producers must choose between adopting European 
production prac tices or to abandoning trade with the EU.  The United States again requests that any 
EU measure allow flexibility to trading partners to meet the EU  level of protection in a manner that 
is appropriate to the needs of farmers and producers within the exporti ng countries ' own domestic 
context.  In light of recent calls for coordinated action to ensure predictable trade flow and support 
international food security, the international community should be working together to support 
science -based measures that prom ote a safe and sustainable food supply, and the United States 
calls on the European Union to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutually beneficial 
approaches.  
8.62.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.63.  Australia has raised or suppo rted a number of STCs relating to the E uropean Union's 
implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products, including at the most recent SPS and 
TBT Committee meetings. Australia remains concerned that the EU 's application of its health and 
environmental standards to imported agriculture and agri -food products in many aspects does not 
facilitate trade and is not conducive to achieving productive and sustainable outcomes in the 
agriculture sector.  
8.64.  For imported agricultural products, the E uropean Union's regulatory approach to agricultural 
inputs, production requirements, and specific measures targeted at protecting the environment has 
impacted third -country producers ' ability to access the EU  market. These concerns include the EU 's 
recent attempts to set M RLs for certain pesticides in order to achieve environmental outcomes in 
third countries.  
8.65.  Australia does not consider that MRLs are an appropriate nor efficient tool to achieve 
environmental outcomes. Third  country national authorities are indeed t he best decision maker to 
ensure that pesticide application is undertaken in a safe, responsible , and sustainable manner in 
each country, and in accordance with their unique environment.  
8.66.  Australia also maintains concerns over the unfair competitive advanta ge provided to 
EU producers in applying EU  domestic production requirements to imports, without allowing for the 
recognition of third -country systems that achieve equivalent outcomes. EU  producers are subsidi zed 
to implement the EU  production requirements , and if they are unable to maintain productivity and 
profitability, then only EU  producers can access EU  exemptions from certain regulatory 
requirements, such as emergency authori zations for the use of plant protection products (PPPs). G/C/M/145  
 
- 28 - 
 
  This cr eates a two -tiered system, with imported products subject to more stringent regulatory 
conditions than domestically  produced products.  
8.67.  Australia recogni zes the right of WTO  Member s to regulate agricultural imports in a manner 
that protects animal, plant an d human health and the environment. However, Member s are also 
bound by WTO  obligations, particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments 
and ensuring that measures are no more trade -restrictive than necessary. In order to ensure the 
free flow of agricultural trade without unnecessary regulatory burden, Australia maintains its request 
that the EU apply international standards and best practice for regulating imported agricultural 
products.  
8.68.  Australia thank s the European Union for its ong oing engagement on these long -running 
issues.  
8.69.  The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
8.70.  We regret having once again to place this concern on the agenda. The concern is centred on 
the MRL  changes made by the European Union. It is being raised becau se, despite having expressed 
our concern several years ago, none of our requests have been heard.  
8.71.  With regard to the impact on trade, we have started to see border rejections. Allow me to 
recall that the export of non -traditional products depends on small producers. When the EU rejects 
what it sees as a small quantity of goods, for Guatemala this represents the work of many small 
producers. We hear about the EU's promotion of rural development and bilateral and regional trade 
with its trading partners, but this type of measure runs counter to that objective.  
8.72.  It is projected that, from 2024/25, most sectors will run out of alternatives and options for 
rotation. We recall that our producers do not receive the internal support that the EU grants to its 
agricult ural producers, so the impact on our trade is real and felt directly by small producers, leading 
to crop losses.  
8.73.  A five -year transition period has been requested.  This time -period was chosen because 
producers need to carry out tests in the field before and  after a substance is used. The transition 
from one  substance to another requires a reasonable period of time to measure the effectiveness of 
the new substance during various environmental cycles over the year.  In addition, producers need 
to rotate substan ces to prevent resistance, which is being made more difficult by the lack of 
alternatives on the market. Producers are seeking certainty as regards when MRLs will be modified, 
as each crop involves different production stages and thus a different applicati on of substances.  
8.74.  We understand that a health -based approach is the priority. However, this approach is only 
applied to third  countries and not to European producers. If it is a health concern that has led to the 
EU's MRL  reduction, we fail to understand h ow European producers enjoy the flexibility to continue 
using the substance with emergency authorizations that apply for 120  days and can be renewed an 
unlimited number of times by each member State. Meanwhile, third -country producers lack the same 
flexibility with regard to this rule.  European agricultural producers and producers from tropical 
countries all face challenges linked to climate change, pests and humidity, yet they are treated 
differently.  
8.75.  We ask the European Union to hold frank discussi ons that enable commercial solutions to be 
sought with a view to ensuring that trade is not hindered more than necessary,  and that similar 
treatment is granted. We are open to dialogue, but dialogue that leads to real results.  
8.76.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
8.77.  We remain concerned about the European Union's overall hazard regime, which is evident 
mainly in the pesticides policy that establishes technical and health regulations that are more 
restrictive than necessary. Colombia has also stated  that the measure may be discriminatory when 
selecting the substances to be reviewed, when allowing the involvement of stakeholders, when 
establishing criteria such as how a food product is consumed, and in disregarding the different 
geographical and clima tic conditions of countries, especially in tropical areas, and, last but not least, G/C/M/145  
 
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  when establishing different exemption regimes for European and foreign producers. Today, we wish 
to reiterate all of these arguments and our previous statements.  
8.78.  Colombia w ould like to express its agreement with the legitimate objective pursued by the 
European pesticides regime. However, I would like to ask the European Union: Why not establish 
longer transition periods for substances that are in the process of approval? Why  not avoid regulatory 
action during production if the pesticide residue does not exceed the authorized level at the time of 
application? Why not maintain existing MRLs while import tolerance applications are being reviewed 
and until a full risk assessment has been completed, or why not consider third country data earlier 
in the European Union's process for renewals and approvals? Is it not possible to work together to 
give our producers of goods imported into the European Union an outlet? My producers are r unning 
out of solutions, and these are avenues that do not involve a change of policy but offer a way out.  
8.79.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
8.80.  India shares the concerns raised by Member s on the European Union 's application of non -tariff 
barriers on agricultural products. The document  G/C/W/767  dates back to July  2019.  That these 
issues are still being discussed more than three  years later demonstrate s the serious concerns the 
EU's trading partners have on the approach adopted by the EU.  
8.81.  The European Union's unilateral mea sures are increasingly undermining regulatory principles 
and are not founded on internationally agreed risk analysis principles. They do not take into account 
alternative approaches to meeting regulatory objectives. In implementing its SPS  measures , as wel l 
as the new approach to use TBT  measures for environmental reasons, the EU seems to impose its 
own domestic regulatory approach onto its trading partners. India observe s with concern that this 
is becoming a wider trend , as also seen under the European Gre en Deal  related regulations.  
8.82.  India has also raised similar concerns in other bodies like the Committee on Agriculture, the 
Committee on Market Access, the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures , and the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
8.83.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
8.84.  Japan acknowledge s that the European Union is working to take specific measures that are 
already under  way, including the lowering of MRLs to protect pollinator insects and the introduction 
of deforesta tion-free product rules in order to ensure that the EU  health and environmental 
standards apply to imported agricultural, livestock and fishery products within the framework of a 
mirror clause.  
8.85.  However, in order to build a sustainable food system, it is ne cessary not only to address 
agricultural products imported into the European Union,  but also agricultural products produced 
around the world. To that end, it is important for each country to work on building a sustainable 
food system that takes into accoun t its own climate and other factors. Japan is  of the view that 
EU health and environmental standards should not be uniformly applied to imported goods, but the 
efforts of each country should be respected.  
8.86.  The European Commission's report on the "Applicatio n of EU  health and environmental 
standards to imported agricultural and agri -food products " has stated that the European Union will 
continue to make efforts at the multilateral level to obtain a global consensus on internationally 
agreed standards. If the EU introduces such a new approach, Japan would like to request that it 
ensure that the measures are consistent with WTO  Agreements , and that it hold international 
discussions on this topic.  
8.87.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.88.  The Eu ropean Union takes good note of the various comments by WTO  Member s. The 
EU provided detailed replies to these concerns at the previous CTG  meetings. The EU's  previous 
statements remain valid in their entirety.  
8.89.  The European Union has engaged extensively, including on the basis of the questions raised 
in this Council and the SPS and TBT  Committees.  The EU has also engaged bilaterally. Recently, on G/C/M/145  
 
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  17 March, a pl urilateral meeting took place in Geneva which allowed for a frank technical discussion.  
The EU has also organi zed information sessions and provided detailed information through various 
communications . The EU  refers in particular to document  G/SPS/GEN/1494/Rev.2 , circulated in 
July 2021, which provided an overview of the ongoing review of MRLs of pesticides in the EU . 
Importantly, it described t he review process , as well as how non -EU countries could actively 
contribute to it.  The EU remains open to engage in further discussions on how Members can work 
together to facilitate the trade of agricultural products treated with PPPs. 
8.90.  The European Union  continues to provide technical assistance to developing countries and 
LDCs in improving SPS  capacity and market access, directly or through other international 
organi zations and partnerships, such as the WTO -hosted Standards and Trade Development Facility  
(STDF).  The EU emphasize s our common interest in ensuring that pesticide residues are not present 
at levels presenting an unacceptable risk to human health.  
8.91.  On emergency authori zations, according to a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice 
(case  C-162/21), EU  member  States can no longer  grant emergency authori zations for any outdoor 
use of thiamethoxam or clothianidin, whether these are for coating seeds for outdoor sowing or for 
any other outdoor uses such as foliar spraying ; nor can they grant emergency authori zations for the 
sowing of seeds that have already been coated with either of these substances.  Furthermore, the 
Commission is considering the implications of the judg ement  for the granting of other emergency 
authorizations , including  for other substances or for substances that have not been approved or 
have not been renewed in the EU because of risks to human/animal health or the environment.  
8.92.  Finally, based on the outcome of the 2021  UN Food Systems Summit , and considering the 
Stockta king Moment next July, the European Union  believe s that we have a shared interest in making 
our food systems sustainable by tackling the issue of toxic active substances and protecting our 
citizens ' health with appropriate measures.  
8.93.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
9  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Uruguay.  
9.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
9.3.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate its position on, and its trade and systemic concerns about, the 
issue of unilateral modifications of concessions in the form of European Union tariff rate quotas under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 following Bre xit, in particular with respect to the fact that they are 
not necessary and that there is no legal basis under the WTO  Agreements for proceeding in that 
manner.  
9.4.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate is dissatisfaction given that the European Union has not as yet 
shown any willingness to consider even its more modest and reasonable requests, despite the injury 
studies submitted in a timely fashion, and the particular importance and sensitivity for Uruguay of 
the market access conditions and concessions being discussed . 
9.5.  Once again, Uruguay reaffirms its willingness to find a mutually agreed solution, for which the 
European Union will need to recognize Uruguay's specific conditions and needs, and demonstrate 
the necessary political will to reach an agreement.  
9.6.  Lastly, wit hout prejudice to the bilaterally agreed commitments between the European Union 
and the United Kingdom, Uruguay once again requests that the European Union unequivocally 
remove the United Kingdom from the potential users of its tariff rate quotas in its WT O Schedule of 
concessions. At the same time, Uruguay continues to wait for the European Union to proceed with 
the downward adjustment of its final bound aggregate measurement of support (AMS)  entitlements 
in its Schedule of concessions, in line with the an nouncements made.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  9.7.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
9.8.  Paraguay would like to reiterate its systemic concern over the lack of change regarding the 
European Union's  TRQ commitments , as well as the proposed reduction of total bound AMS following 
the exit of the UK from the European Union.  Recently, in the Comm ittee on Agriculture , the EU once 
again introduced a notification, in  the series  MA/1, instead of actually  adjusting their Schedule of 
concessions  as they should have done. This issue subsequently met with a number of questions in 
that recent Committee.  
9.9.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
9.10.  Brazil has been co -sponsoring this agenda item for years due to the assessment that the 
proposed splitting  of the EU -28 TRQ commitments would undermine the current level of market 
access enjoyed by Brazilian companies and producers in the EU and UK  markets, and that 
compensation was therefore due. Concerning the UK's scheduling, Brazil has entered into an 
agreement with the UK and the EU . However , Brazil stresses that the methodology used for those 
negotiations do not represent, and should not be construed as, a precedent for future negotiations.  
9.11.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
9.12.  The European Union  is negotiating with its WTO  partners in full respect of the provisions laid 
down in Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 as regards the modification of its Schedule.  Furthermore, 
the EU has been open to discuss with WTO  partners its proposed TRQ apportionment. Whenever 
WTO partners presented valid data and arguments justifying a modification of the proposed 
TRQ volumes, the EU has been open to meet such requests.  WTO partners have also asked the EU 
to exclude the United Kingdom  from access to its WTO  erga omnes  TRQs (and vice  versa). The EU 
has fully met this request , as laid down in Article  33 of the EU -UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.  
9.13.  The European Union's efforts to seek mutually agreed solutions with its WTO  partners have 
given very good results. The EU is pleased to report excellent progress achieved so far with 
agreements formally signed with nine  partners, initialled with another two  partners , and 
negotiations close to reaching an agreement with the majority of the other partners . 
9.14.  The European Union  welcomes the increased engagement of many WTO  Member s and 
remains fully committed to continu ing these negotiations and consultations and to bring ing them to 
a succes sful close before the end of the negotiation period (set up now for 1  July 2023) . 
9.15.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
10  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Uruguay.  
10.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
10.3.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate once again its position and concerns regarding the United 
Kingdom's claim of a substantial bound total AMS of GBP  4,949.3  million; the proposed currency 
conversion in the draft schedule of concessions of that Member , and its consequences for the levels 
of domestic support commitments and access to the proposed markets; and the United  Kingdom's 
intention to replicate the right to invoke the special agricultural safeguard for all the products set 
out in the European Union's Schedule and under the same criteria and conditions.  
10.4.  With regard to the ongoing Article  XXVIII process, Uruguay re affirms its willingness to 
continue working with the United Kingdom with a view to reaching a mutually advantageous 
agreement, which will allow that Member to have an independent schedule of concessions formally 
established in the WTO, while safeguarding Uruguay's legitimate rights and interests.  G/C/M/145  
 
- 32 - 
 
  10.5.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
10.6.  The United Kingdom would like to thank Uruguay for its interest on this agenda item today , 
and all Member s who have engaged on this issue.  The United King dom refers Member s to 
document  G/L/1386/Add.3 , which was circulated by the Secretariat on 2  December  2022. The 
document outlines that the UK has n ow extended the timelines under Article  XXVIII:3 of the 
GATT  1994 by six months , until 1 July 2023. In this time , the UK aims to address the small number 
of remaining technical concerns raised.  To this end, t he UK is engaged in bilateral discussions with 
Uruguay and is open to continuing this bilateral dialogue.  
10.7.  Regarding the technical points made, the United Kingdom  would like to refer Member s to the 
previous statements made in this Council, and at the Committee on Market Access, which set out 
the UK's  position on these issues. The UK  would also like to note that , following technical level 
engagement, many Member s who once initially held similar concerns have since received sufficient 
reassurances to enable them to remove their objections.  
10.8.  The United Kingdom would like to reiterate its thanks to all Member, including Uruguay, who 
have engaged constructively on matters  relating to its Goods Schedule in this process. In line with 
WTO practice, the UK will further update Members as it continues towards concluding this process.  
10.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
11  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
New Zealand and Uruguay.  
11.2.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
11.3.  New Zealand continues to raise this item in the Council for Trade in Goods and refer s the 
European Union  to its previous statements on this matter.  New Zealand has  considered the EU 's 
response on this matter . However, we still see a conflict in the European Commission 's approach to 
protecting the cheese names "Danbo " and "Havarti ", for which there are existing CODEX  standards, 
and the integrity of the standards setting system that promotes reliability and consistency in 
international trade rules, which we would expect the EU to support.  
11.4.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
11.5.  Uruguay regrets placing this item on the agenda once again and wishes to refer to its previous 
statements, w hile reaffirming its trade and systemic concerns at the European Union's decision to 
register the term "Danbo " as a protected geographical indication, despite objections by several 
Members.  In systemic terms, it is worrying that recognized international st andards are disregarded, 
raising doubts about their integrity and the value of international harmonization efforts undertaken 
in the Codex. It is unclear what the point and significance are of multilaterally agreeing a Codex 
standard, only for the use of t his term to later become an exclusive privilege of certain producers.  
11.6.  As Uruguay has noted for a long time, Danbo refers to a cheese manufacturing technique 
covered by Codex Standard  264, which lays down the characteristics, form of production , and 
labelli ng of this type of cheese. This standard establishes that Danbo is the name that can be applied 
to food that conforms to the standard , and that the product's country of origin, which is clarified as 
meaning the country of manufacture, must be declared on t he label. This Codex standard is 
commonly interpreted as Members' recognition of Danbo as a generic term for a product that may 
be produced in a variety of locations so long as the requirements established under the standard are 
satisfied.  
11.7.  In trade terms, the creation of unnecessary barriers to the marketing of this type of cheese 
in the European Union,  and the impact this has when extended to third  markets through the 
conclusion of trade agreements , is a matter of concern. This situation also creates uncer tainty in 
terms of the legitimate expectations of small -scale producers, who acquired rich cultural knowledge , G/C/M/145  
 
- 33 - 
 
  in areas including cheese production , through Danish cooperation programmes, to access 
international cheese markets.  
11.8.  Uruguay is of the view that the registration of the term "Danbo " as a protected geographical 
indication is not only inconsistent with that historical policy of cooperation, but also constitutes a 
precedent for the establishment of a de facto monopoly over a Codex standard.  Despite th e time 
that has elapsed and the faits accomplis  that fail to take into account these legitimate trade and 
systemic concerns, Uruguay will keep this item on the agenda.  
11.9.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.10.   The European Union  takes note of the concerns expressed by New Zealand and Uruguay.  
The European Union has provided detailed replies to these concerns at previous CTG  meetings. We 
have no new development to report. Without repeating its previous statements in full, the EU would 
like to underline that its previous statements remain unchanged. In particular:  
11.11.   The European Union has consistently said that the fact that a GI  name is subject to a specific 
Codex Alimentarius standard or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa Co nvention does not imply 
that the name should be considered as a common or generic term.  Generic status in the European 
EU can only be assessed with regard to the perception of the consumers on the EU  territory. In the 
EU, the relevant public is comprised m ainly of the reasonably well -informed member s of the public 
and/or customers who may purchase the product or a like product.  
11.12.   Regulation (EU) No . 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 
as well as subsequent delegated and implementing acts, were notified to the WTO under the 
TBT Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the TBT  Agreement ( for example, provisions 
related to technical standards, definitions , and labelling issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual 
property rights (in particular, elements related to the substantive protection of geographical 
indications) are part of the notified measures, those are not relevant for TBT  purposes.  
11.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
12  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TY RES – REQUEST FROM CANADA; THE EUROPEAN 
UNION; INDONESIA; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN 
AND MATSU; AND THAILAND  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Canada; the European Union;  Indonesia; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu; and Thailand.  
12.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
12.3.  Indonesia has once more voiced its disapproval to India because it has  not yet received a 
satisfactory response or explanation addressing the subject of restricting tyre imports from India. 
Indonesian tyre exports to India have so far been prevented from reaching the Indian market.  The 
policy of restricting tyre imports and the  policy of charging a marking charge for the use of the 
Indian Standard Mark (IS  Mark) on t yre products exported to third  countries, respectively, are 
something that Indonesia intends to ask India for more clarification on.  
12.4.  India has asked importers to sub mit separate electronic mail (email) declarations addressing 
import limits for specific types and size categories of t yres that can be produced locally in India as 
part of the aforementioned tyre import restriction policy. The FTDR  Act of 1992 imposes crim inal 
penalties for violations of the registration requirements of warehouses where imported tyres are 
kept, therefore importers must abide by them as well.  
12.5.  Indonesia believes that the ban on Indian tyre imports is discriminatory because it only applies 
to a small number of WTO  Member s who could pose a threat to domestic Indian tyre producers. This 
selective application allows the intended policy to potentially run counter to the WTO  principle of 
non-discrimination. In addition, Indonesia believes that the p olicy of restricting imports of Indian 
tyres has severely hampered the availability of Indonesian tyre goods in the Indian market, G/C/M/145  
 
- 34 - 
 
  particularly given the large range of tyre sizes that can be produced in India, one of the world's 
major tyre producers.  
12.6.  The imposition of a marking fee on tyre products marked with the Indian Standard (IS)  Mark 
is something that Indonesia also plans to seek India to clarify. According to Indonesia, the application 
of IS Mark marking fees on tyre products that will be exported t o third  countries can burden the 
country's tyre industry and erect needless trade barriers.  
12.7.  India has also previously declared that the tyre import restrictions regime and the 
enforcement of IS  Mark marking fees are examples of non -automatic licensing proc edures. Actually, 
in accordance with Article  3.2 of the Agreement on Import Licensing  Procedures , the non -automatic 
import licensing procedures used by WTO  Member s must match the breadth and duration of the 
customary import licensing procedures. Also, the non-automatic import licensing process should  not 
obstruct trade or add to the administrative burden for import licensing applicants. Furthermore, 
based on Article  3.3 of the Agreement on Import Licensing  Procedures , WTO  Member s who 
implement non -automatic import licensing procedures that are intended other than for applying 
quantitative restrictions are required to provide information regarding the basis of the import 
licensing procedures.  
12.8.  Indonesia implores the Indian government to give informati on on the scope and schedule for 
implementing the policy restricting tyre imports , as well as additional justification for the execution 
of the aforementioned policy.  
12.9.  Indonesia also requested that India review its import restrictions on tyre products right  away 
to ensure compliance with its obligations under the TBT  Agreement, Import Licensing Agreement, 
Article  XI of the GATT  1994 regarding the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, and the 
WTO's t ransparency and non-discrimination principles.  
12.10.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
12.11.   The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu has consistently 
expressed its concerns regarding India 's licensing regime on the importation of pneumatic tyres 
under Notification No . 12/2015 -2020. This notification amended the import regulation of certain 
pneumatic tyres from "Free" to "Restricted ". We remain disappointed that India has not adjusted or 
revoked its existing measures, nor clarified the criteria for granting licen ces, or explained the reasons 
for its refusals . 
12.12.   According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India 's statistics, the quantity of our 
tyre export s to India from 2020 to 2022 sharply decreased , by 50% , compared to the export s in 
2019. This clearly indicates that the measure has significantly hampered our tyre products ' access 
to the Indian market, resulting in substantial adverse effects on trade.  
12.13.   We urge India to abide by the relevant provisions of the WTO  Agreement on Import  Licensing 
Procedures , which specifically require that the import licen sing measures shall neither restrict nor 
distort trade, and that India publishes complete information about the import licen ce application  
procedure , ensuring transparency so that forei gn manufacturers are able to understand the criteria 
for licen ce approval and the detailed reasons for potential licen ce rejections.  
12.14.   It is evident that India 's measures have resulted in a quantitative restriction on tyre imports. 
We request India to provid e a WTO -consistent justification for its restrictive measure. Otherwise, we 
strongly urge India to ensure that all import licen ce applications, which fully comply with the required 
quality standard for tyre products, are granted without any quota limitatio ns at all.  
12.15.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
12.16.   Canada would like to reiterate its concerns with India 's non -automatic import licensing 
system, which effectively imposes quotas on imports of t yres. These concerns have previously been 
expressed b y a number of Member s in various WTO  bodies, including this Council . Canada once 
again calls on India to eliminate this quantitative import restriction in accordance with its 
WTO obligations.  G/C/M/145  
 
- 35 - 
 
  12.17.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
12.18.   The European Union  reiterates its concerns relating to the long -standing issue of India 's 
import policy on tyres. We have provided details on multiple occasions in various bodies of the WTO, 
including this Council, the Market Access Committee, the TBT  Committe e, the Import Licensing 
Committee, and the TRIMs  Committee.  
12.19.   Stakeholders in the European Union  continue to be negatively impacted by this measure. 
The EU continues to urge India to reconsider and eliminate any implicit or explicit quantitative or 
other res trictions on the import of replacement tyres. The EU remains of the view that these 
restrictions are contrary to WTO  rules.  
12.20.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
12.21.   Like previous  speakers, Thailand would like to reiterate the concern that it has raised 
numerous times in past meetings of the Committee on Import Licensing, the Committee on Market 
Access, and the Council for Trade in Goods regarding India 's import policies on tyres t hat has still 
considerably affected Thailand 's exports of the products to India, and  which has aggravated over 
time. 
12.22.   Let me provide some statistical background. In 2021, the exports of car tyres from Thailand 
to India declined by 40% compared to 2019 , before this restrictive measure was implemented. In 
2022, however, the rate of decline was even more staggering , where the exports fell by 57% 
compared to the same period of 2019.  Also, Thailand  regret s to say that it has yet to receive any 
response from India  regarding the request s for information it has made since October  2022. 
Therefore, Thailand would like to reiterate its request once again that India provide the following 
information as soon as possible : (i) information on the administration of the restri ctions, including 
the time -frame or period for processing application s; (ii) information on the import licen ces granted 
to Thailand over the recent period ; and (iii)  information on the distribution of such licen ces among 
supplying countries.  
12.23.   The delegate o f India indicated the following:  
12.24.   India would  like to thank the various Member s for their continued interest in this issue. India 
would  also like to refer to its response provided in previous meetings of the Council for Trade in 
Goods, the Committee on Market Access , and the Committee on Import Licensing. India would  like 
to reiterate that its non-automatic licensing requirements for tyres are administered in a man ner 
consistent with the rules of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, including with respect 
to the time -frames for the grant of import licences.  The Capital continues to examine the points 
raised by the interested Member s. 
12.25.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
13  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND 
THAILAND  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Japan and Thailand.  
13.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the follow ing: 
13.3.  Japan continues to express its concerns that India's import ban on air conditioners , including 
refrigerants, introduced in October  2020, is a measure that unreasonably imposes a restructuring of 
corporate supply chains. Japan is seriously concerned th at this measure is likely to constitute an 
import ban that is inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, as well as Article  2.1 of the 
TRIMs  Agreement.  
13.4.  India responded in the previous  CTG meeting  that the measure was consistent with its 
obligations under the Montreal Protocol.  However, Japan consider s this import ban to be superfluous 
and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that use refrigerants. Furthermore, 
these air co nditioners are not subject to India's reduction, elimination obligations under the Montreal G/C/M/145  
 
- 36 - 
 
  Protocol, or the regulation for freon gas causing ozone layer depletion under India’s domestic 
regulation.  
13.5.  India stated in the previous  CTG meeting that "we have sh ared with Japan the intention and 
status of this measure and would like to draw your attention to the notification to the Import 
Licensing Committee ( G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 )". However, India has not responded to the written 
questions, and it is difficult to say whether India has fully explained the situation . Japan expect s a 
sincere and prompt response from India, including a response to the written qu estions Japan 
submitted in September  2020. Japan would also like to clarify the purpose of the reference to the 
notification to the Import Licensing Committee ( G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 ) in the context of the issue of 
the import restrictions in question.  
13.6.  In addition, as Japan  mentioned in the past, with regard to the IS  Mark certification system 
based on the Quality Control Orders for air conditioners and  their parts, which has been extended 
to October  2023, and i n order to prevent delays in the certification procedure for imported products, 
Japan would like to ask that the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) conduct smooth overseas factory 
inspections, or th at India consider alternative procedures for certification other than overseas factory 
inspection. If it is difficult to do so, Japan  would like to ask India to extend the date to implement 
the measures.  
13.7.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
13.8.  Thailand would like to echo Japan 's concerns regarding India 's import prohibition on air 
conditioners containing refrigerants. Despite our intervention on numerous occasions in various 
WTO bodies , and our esteemed Indian delegate 's statement that our concerns were conveyed to 
New Delhi for analysis, yet four  months have passed,  and we have heard absolutely nothing from 
India. In the meantime, Thai exports of air  conditioners to India continue to be subject to this highly 
restrictive import measure, whi ch is clearly inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.  
13.9.  According to India, the ban at issue serves to protect the stratospheric ozone layer within the 
meaning of the Montreal Protocol, and is, therefore, justified under the exceptions in Article  XX of 
the GATT  1994. Like India, Thailand is dedicated to protecting the stratospheric ozone layer, as 
required by the Montreal Protocol. Thailand, however, fails to see any rational connection between 
India's ban and the objective of protecting the ozone la yer. 
13.10.   India's Notification No.  41/2015 -2020 merely lists two  HS codes for air  conditioners that are 
subject to India 's import prohibition if they contain refrigerants. The notification in question does 
not specify the types of prohibited refrigerants, or, f or instance, explain whether these are the 
ozone -depleting substances listed in the Montreal Protocol ; nor does the notification refer to India's 
legislation on the protection of the stratospheric ozone layer. There is thus no clear nexus between 
this meas ure and India 's obligations under the Montreal Protocol, as required under Articles  XX(b) 
or XX(g) of the GATT  1994. 
13.11.   Moreover, India 's Ozone Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) Rules, read together 
with their 2014  Amendment, provide for many exce ptions for India 's domestic products that contain 
ozone -depleting substances, including air conditioners. This suggests that India fails to apply its 
import ban "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption " within the 
meaning of Article  XX(g) of the GATT  1994, and instead applies its ban "in a manner that constitutes 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail " within the meaning the chapeau of Article  XX of the GATT  1994. Thailand has provided many 
examples of these exceptions for India 's domestic products during the previous meeting s of the 
Committee on Market Access , on 19  October  2022, and the Council for Trade in Goods , on 
24 November  2022.  
13.12.   Last but not least, Thailand has also found that India 's notification to the Committee on 
Import Licensing in document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21  is at o dds with this import restriction of air  
conditioner s with refrigerant. According to the notification, the importation of hydrofluorocarbons  is 
allowed given that a non -automatic import licen ce is granted. Ironically, if the same substance is 
contained in a n air conditioner, the importation of the air conditioner into India will be banned. 
Thailand requests India to provide as soon as possible an explanation of this self -contradictory and 
discriminatory action.  G/C/M/145  
 
- 37 - 
 
  13.13.   Given the inconsistency of India's prohibition on air conditioners with Article  XI:1, and that 
the measure cannot be justified under Articles  XX(b) or XX(g) of the GATT  1994, as well as its 
self-contradiction in relation to India's own import licensing regime on hydrofluorocarbons, Thailand 
asserts tha t India should immediately amend or repeal this import prohibition on air conditioners 
with refrigerant.  
13.14.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
13.15.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by previous speakers regarding India 's 
import restriction s on air conditioners.  Korea believes that the measure appears to be inconsistent 
with WTO  rules, particularly Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, thereby creating an unnecessary obstacle 
to trade. Korea requests that India resolve the issu e in a timely manner. Korea  stand s ready to 
further engage with India.  
13.16.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
13.17.   India would  like to thank the delegations of Japan, Thailand,  and the Republic of Korea for 
their continued interest in this issue. My delegation has already shared details of these measures, 
the intent and ongoing developments with the delegations.  India would  also like to attract attention 
to the notification in document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21  made by India to the Committee on Import 
Licensing under Article  5.1-5.4. This notification clearly spells out the details of the restricted import 
policy for hydrofluorocarbons, which are rel evant to this agenda.  
13.18.   In the recently concluded Trade Policy Review of Japan, we had highlighted that Japanese 
firms enjoyed strong market  share in this segment in India, including in the most recent three  years , 
and that it was unfortunate that this issue  continues to be raised in the CTG and other bodies.  The 
issue of inspection procedures raised by Japan has been addressed in the previous meeting of the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
13.19.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
14  NEPAL – IMPORT  BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Thailand.  
14.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
14.3.  Thailand would like to reiterate its concern over the Nepali government's measure prohibit ing 
imports of caffeinated mixed energy drinks and flavoured  synthetic drinks from Thailand since 2019.  
That said, Thailand would like to convey its sympathy to the p eople of Nepal who are facing one of 
the most difficult economic hardships of the country , which have understandably forced the 
government of Nepal to adopt the trade -restrictive measures.  
14.4.  Thailand would like to remind Nepal that WTO  Member s facing balance -of-payment s 
difficult ies may apply import restrictions , subject to the provisions under Article  XII of the 
GATT  1994, provided that they do not exceed those necessary, are progressively relaxed, and are 
maintained only to the extent that the conditions st ill justify their application. That said, Thailand 
takes note of Nepal 's notification of this measure in document  G/MA/QR/N/NPL/1 , dated 
11 October 2022. However, Nepal has yet to provide any justification and other related details of 
such measure. Thailand  urges Nepal to do so as soon as possible.  
14.5.  Thailand would also like to remind Nepal of the provisions under  Article  6 of the Understanding 
on the Balance -of-Payments Provisions of the GATT  1994, where "[A] Member  applying new 
restrictive import measures taken for Balance -of-Payments purposes shall enter into consultations 
with the Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions within four  months of the adoption of such 
measures ", and Article  9 of the Understanding , where "[A] Member  shall notify to the General 
Council the introduction of or any changes in the application of restrictive import measures taken 
for Balance -of-Payments purposes ". Thailand  urges Nepal to respect and follow th ese provisions 
without delay.  G/C/M/145  
 
- 38 - 
 
  14.6.  Finally, Thailand would also encourage Nepal to provide an update on its balance -of-payments 
situation , and how such trade  restrictive measures could help alleviate the problem.  
14.7.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
14.8.  Nepal would like to thank Thailand for its statement and continued interest in its trade policy 
measure s and notes that this concern has also been raised in the Committee on Market Access 
(CMA). Accordingly, Nepal wishes to refer to its earlier statements delivered at the meetings of the 
CMA held in October  2022, and at the Council's meeting held in July  2022, in response to the concern 
raised today, while noting that Nepal is still facing challenges in its balance of payments.  
14.9.  Nepal's export -import ratio of trade in goods was 1:2.5 in 2004/2005, when Nepal became a 
WTO Member; it has widened and reached 1:1 5.3 in 2017/2018; and the export -import ratio was 
more than 1:10 in the year 2022, which has been placing huge pressure on its balance of payments. 
The Government of Nepal is assessing the measure periodically in view of the pressure on its balance 
of paym ents. In this regard, Nepal has made some progress, which has been notified through 
document  G/MA/QR/N/NPL/1 , on 11  October  2022. Once again, Ne pal would like to inform Members 
that the measure was not intended to impact any area in particular. I would also like to assure 
Members that I will update them as soon as I receive a further progress report from Capital. Finally, 
Nepal wishes to resolve t his matter at the bilateral level.  
14.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES MEASURES 
OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China.  
15.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
15.3.  China  would like to refer to the statement it made in previous meeting s of the Council.  China 
has been following this issue ver y closely. We take note that last Friday, the US  Treasury Department 
and the Internal Revenue Service ( IRS) released proposed guidance on the new clean vehicle 
provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act.  According to the press release of the U S Treasury 
Department, beginning in 2024, an eligible clean vehicle may not contain any battery components 
that are manufactured by a foreign entity of concern , and beginning in 2025 , an eligible clean vehicle 
may not contain any critical minerals that were extracted, p rocessed, or recycled by a foreign entity 
of concern. The US  Treasury and the IRS will issue subsequent guidance on this provision.  
15.4.  China remains deeply concerned with the discriminatory aspect of these measures. We believe 
that subsidies to address climat e change should be non -discriminatory and consistent with 
WTO rules.  We urge the United States to eliminate discriminatory and distorting subsidies in the 
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)  that are not in line with WTO  rules.  
15.5.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
15.6.  The Russian Federation would like to thank China for raising this concern.  In August  2022, 
the United States enacted the so -called Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). According to the estimates of 
the US  Congress, the IRA imp lies support to the domestic US economy worth over USD 369 billion 
during the next ten  years.  
15.7.  The IRA contains various tax incentive program mes for domestic manufacturers and energy 
suppliers. Specifically, pursuant to this Act, the USD 7,500 tax credit fo r an electric vehicle stipulates 
the following conditions: (i)  the electric vehicle has to be assembled in North America; 
(ii) components for a vehicle battery shall originate in the United States, Canada, or Mexico; and 
(iii) the so-called "critical " raw materials used for manufacturing a vehicle battery shall originate in 
North America and the territory of US  FTA partners.  Besides  these conditions , the IRA provides 
additional support for the use of renewable energy facilities with the use of US -made iron and steel.  G/C/M/145  
 
- 39 - 
 
  15.8.  Obviously, these measures discriminate against a wide range of products originating from 
non-eligible WTO  Members and undermine global trade in goods over the entire supply chain. The 
law aims to exclude products from certain WTO  Members from participating  in said supply chains, 
provok ing international trade fragmentation as well as destabiliz ing trade and investment flows.  
What makes the law even worse is that , in order administratively to choose with whom to trade , the 
US Administration aims to conclude bilateral arrangements , in the form of special raw materials 
pacts , with a number of WTO  Members , which would extend to such Members the status of an 
FTA partner , making their products eligible for US  tax credits.  
15.9.  The IRA is  yet another US  initiative that explicitly violates WTO rules, in particular  those 
concerning most -favoured -nation and national treatment, provisions of the Agreement on 
Trade -Related Investment Measures , and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing M easures. 
Members taking such steps are neglect ing the  fundamental principles of the WTO , despite the ir 
words in favour of preserving the multilateral system.  
15.10.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
15.11.   Switzerland welcomes the efforts of the United States  to combat inflation by means of 
environmental measures as we recognize that promoting clean energy and transportation 
technologies may contribute to environmental objectives.  Trade policy can make a very important 
contribution to solving climate c hange and other global environmental challenges and trade policy 
must be part of the solution . That said, Switzerland reiterates its concerns regarding the potential 
discriminatory aspects of the measure against imported like products. In our view, environ mental 
measures by means of trade policy instruments must be non -discriminatory and in compliance with 
WTO rules, which also ensures that such measures deploy their positive environmental impacts to 
the greatest possible extent.  
15.12.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
15.13.   We all share an urgent need to increase investments in clean energy technologies to 
seriously combat the climate crisis, as well as to address supply chain issues.  The Inflation Reduction 
Act signed by President Biden is a key tool for the United States to meet these critical objectives.  
15.14.   The transportation sector is the highest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United 
States, and we will not meet our Paris commitments and other climate goals without bold action to 
promote major new investments in clean energy technology, especially incentives for electric vehicle 
production and their adoption . The Act provides clean vehicle tax incentives to encourage a rapid 
transition to clean transport . It ensures we can create mor e diverse and robust supply chains and 
promote the domestic adoption of clean vehicles.  In addition to the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit for new 
clean vehicles purchased, the Inflation Reduction Act also provides for a Commercial Clean Vehicle 
Credit and a Prev iously -Owned Clean Vehicle Credit . These provisions create tax credits for certain 
eligible light, medium and heavy -duty clean vehicles purchased by businesses, and, for used clean 
vehicles . Final assembly, battery and critical mineral requirements do not apply to these credits.  We 
believe these vehicles will account for a significant share of the total clean vehicle purchases in the 
future and our Congressional Budget Office estimates these vehicles will receive roughly 40 % of 
overall Clean Vehicle Tax Credit funding.  
15.15.   We are in the early stages of developing the regulations for this program . We are considering 
input from all stakeholders as the Department of Treasury moves forward with its public process in 
implementing these credits as required by the legi slation . We note that several of our trading 
partners already have taken advantage of the opportunity to participate in our transparent process, 
and that there will be future opportunities to engage in this process.  
15.16.   We would note that many of our trading p artners, including China, have also prioritized 
investment in EV  technologies, and taken a range of domestic measures to support zero  emission 
vehicles.  
15.17.   In discussions regarding electric vehicle measures, the starting point should be the 
importance of work ing to achieve our overall climate, supply chain, and related goals in parallel – 
and to do so in a way that we can maintain support from our stakeholders . This includes, for example, 
our shared goal in ensuring we achieve the Paris commitments.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  15.18.   The Counci l took note  of the statements made.  
16  UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the reque st of 
China.  
16.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
16.3.  China  continue s to express its serious concerns over the disruptive and discriminatory 
measures taken by the United States regarding the semiconductor industry.  We take note that the 
United States Department of Commerce recently issued a Notice of Funding Opportunity 
CHIPS  Incentive Program – Commercial Fab rication Facilities. We believe some measures in this 
notice may violate WTO  rules and severely distort the market.  
16.4.  The notice sets the prioritization and selection factors for selecting applications for funding. 
One factor is to strength en the intent to u se domestically produced iron, steel, and construction 
materials. This may result in local content subsidies that are not consistent with the SCM  Agreement.  
16.5.  The notice also indicates that an applicant must demonstrate how the requested 
CHIPS  Incentives wil l incentivize the applicant to make investments in the United States that would 
not occur in the absence of the CHIPS  Incentives. This gives us the impression that the applicant 's 
investment decisions may not be based on market orientation , and commercial interests and logic, 
because those investments would not occur without the CHIPS  Incentives.  
16.6.  In addition, the CHIPS and Science Act restricts recipients of the funds from constructing new 
or expanding existing leading -edge and advanced technology facilitie s in foreign countries of concern 
for 10  years. The proposed thresholds for the above -mentioned restriction are USD 100,000 or a 
5% increase in a facility's production capacity. In China's  view, this means that , if the recipients get 
the CHIP S incentive fu nds, they are not allowed to expand their investment in advanced 
semiconductor facilities in China by more than USD 100,000 , or increase the ir production capacity 
by 5%.  
16.7.  We believe that this  is typical "Cold War mentality ", a "zero-sum game ", and "trade bullying ". 
The measures taken by the United States have severely undermined the global semiconductor 
industry chain, violated the market principles that the US has always been advocating, disrupted the 
normal order of international trade and investme nt, and negatively affected the rules -based 
multilateral trading system.  China calls on the WTO to strengthen the monitoring of the relevant 
measures that may violate WTO  rules.  
16.8.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
16.9.  The CHIPS  Act consi sts of three  distinctive initiatives : (i) large-scale investments in leading 
edge logic and memory manufacturing clusters ; (ii) expansion of manu facturing  capacity for mature 
and current generation chips , new and specialty technologies ; and (iii) initiativ es to strengthen and 
advance US leadership in research and development . A successful CHIPS  program will respond to 
market signals, fill market gaps, and reduce investment risks to attract significant market capital. 
On the topic of market distortions, the contemplated support is consistent with US law and 
international commitments. The Subsidies Agreement does not have obligations with regard to 
restrictions on eligibility  of entities receiving government support. The US Departmen t of Commerce 
will implemen t certain restrictions to ensure that those who receive CHIP funds cannot compromise 
national security. Those nat ional security restrictions are described in more detail in the Act. Entities 
can choose whether or not to apply for incentives through the CHI PS program, and thus must be 
subject to national security limitations. We would also note that China itself has a semiconductor 
program called the National IC  Fund. It was started in 2014, but has never been notified. Moreover, 
China has refused to make pu blic certain implementing measures of the IC  Fund. Beyond the 
national program, China also has numerous programs at the central and sub -central levels of 
government in the form of government guidance funds, none of which have been notified.  
16.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  17  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China.  
17.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
17.3.  China regrets to raise this issue again. To date, Sweden has not yet provided any credible 
explanations and evidence to prove that the 5G  products of Huawei and  ZTE pose so -called "national 
security " threats to Sweden.  These two  companies have always been operating legally in Sweden,  
for more than 20  years , and have gained a good business reputation in Sweden . China urges Sweden 
to comply with the WTO's rules, an d to provide a fair, transparent , and non -discriminatory 
environment for Chinese companies to operate in Sweden.  
17.4.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.5.  The European Union  notes that the matter raised by China in relation to the Swedish 
5G spectrum auction is under legal proceedings under the bilateral investment agreement between 
Sweden and China.  In light of these ongoing proceedings, the EU will not enter into details on  this 
issue in the Council today.  
17.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
18  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request  of 
China.  
18.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
18.3.  China continues to raise this concern with regard to Australian restrictions on relevant Chinese 
5G products.  To date, Australia has not provided its reasonable rationale on these measures.  We 
believe these discriminatory measures are inconsistent with the WTO's rules. We urge Australia to 
bring its measures in to line with the WTO rules, and provide a fair, transparent , and 
non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies to operate in Australia.  
18.4.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
18.5.  Australia notes China 's statement.  Since China first raised this issue in the WTO in late 2018, 
Australia has engaged constructively with China to explain the rationale for its position on 
5G networks.  As Australia has previously stated, its position on 5G  networks is country -agnostic, 
transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory , and fully WTO  consistent. Australia also notes that 
other WTO  Member s have made similar decisions in their nation al interest on equipment for national 
5G networks.  
18.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
19  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA, INDONESIA, AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had bee n included on the agenda at the request of 
China, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation.  
19.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
19.3.  China believes that to effectively respond to climate change, realize the global sustainable 
development goals, and buil d a community with a shared future for mankind, Member s need to 
earnestly implement the goals, principles , and requirements of the United Nations Framework G/C/M/145  
 
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  Convention on Climate Change  (UNFCCC)  and the Paris Agreement, reduce barriers, and promote 
trade an d investment liberalization.  
19.4.  Regarding the European Union 's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ), there seems 
to be no scientific basis for its implementation. Many studies have pointed out that the EU -Emission 
Trading System (ETS)  does not lead to carbon leakage, and that the CBAM makes little contribution 
to the reduction of global emission s. We believe that the CBAM 's purpose  is not to eliminate the 
so-called "carbon leakage ", but to protect European companies from competition.  
19.5.  For developing Member s, the European Union's CBAM will impose a huge burden on the 
exporters of developing Member s, as they lack the capacity and funding to collect the carbon 
emission data of their products. In the past, developed Members exported their e missions by 
outsourcing carbon -intensive production to developing Members. Now, with the advantage of owning 
and controlling green technology, developed Members are promoting production "reshoring".  This 
will negatively affect the economic green transition  of developing Member s. 
19.6.  The European Union's unilateral CBAM deviates from the basic principles of " Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities" and "Nationally Determined Contribution 
Arrangements" of the UNFCC C and the Paris Ag reement. In addition, it may not be in line with the 
basic WTO  principle of non -discrimination. China is willing to enhance its engagement with the 
European Union  on the EU's CBAM, and hope s that the EU will actively participate in the thematic 
sessions re lating to CBAM.  
19.7.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
19.8.  Indonesia again voice s its objections to the European Union regarding the approval of the 
CBAM proposal. We are of the view that the proposed CBAM  policy is discriminatory since it violates 
the WTO's most -favourite-nation (MFN) and national treatment standards.  
19.9.  Indonesia is aware that the European Union's CBAM will make reference to the EU-ETS, where 
each sector has a free allowances cap, while discussing the national treatment conce pt. As a result, 
local EU  goods will be subject to lower fees than goods from elsewhere. Indonesia has yet to receive 
clarification on when and how the reduction in allowances will be implemented, despite the European 
Union's pledge to gradually eliminate free allowances in all sectors.  
19.10.   Regarding the MFN  concept, Indonesia is aware that not all WTO  Member s have developed 
carbon markets and accounting systems, particularly those that do not use the ETS  program me. As 
a result, the method used to establish car bon prices will vary depending on the WTO  Member . In 
Indonesia's view , the classification of WTO  Member s with low or high objectives for reducing 
emissions for calculating carbon prices is likewise not based on specific standards.  
19.11.   Indonesia believes that the European Union's CBAM may result in increased costs for 
manufacturers outside of the EU, in addition to import tariffs in accordance with the Schedule of 
Concessions of the EU with regard to Article  II of the GATT  1994. Indonesia request s further 
clarification from the EU regarding its plans to expand the product sector covered by its CBAM.  
19.12.   The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris 
Agreement discuss the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Re spective 
Capabilities (CBDR -RC), which Indonesia remind s the European Union should apply to all 
environmental policies, including the EU's CBAM. According to the CBDR -RC principle, developing 
nations have fundamentally different responsibilities, capacitie s, and obligations than do developed 
nations. The CBDR -RC principle is crucial for the EU to follow as a guide so that it is in conformity 
with the principles of fair trade and equity in respect to the SDGs.  Indonesia is of the view that any 
environmental rules should  also not be imposed , since they would create another non -tariff trade 
barrier that would encourage protectionism.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  19.13.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
19.14.   Brazil would like to join others in this request. Brazil also refers to its previous statements 
on the topic8 and remains concerned about different aspects of the E uropean Union's CBAM that 
involve unilateral trade measures resulting in unnecessary and discrim inatory  negative impacts on 
international trade. We would like to reiterate our request for further explanations on the CBAM 's 
consistency with the principles of non -discrimination and national treatment  of several points raised 
by Brazil  in earlier meetings. In particular, we have been informed that European producers are 
receiving free allowances on their ETS while the CBAM is being phased in. Could the European Union 
clarify how taxing imports from third  countries , while exempting your own producers from the same 
tax, could be consistent with the core rules of the WTO. 
19.15.   We also recall that trade -related environmental  measures must be designed and applied in 
a way that is harmonious and mutually supportive with the multi lateral  environmental agreements, 
including  the UN FCCC and the Paris Agr eement , where the EU has agreed to t ake into account the 
principle of Common but Differentiated  Responsibilities  and Respective Capabilities . Historical  
responsibilities means that countries that industrialized  first, benefiting from cheap and more  
polluting  energy sources , should bear a large r brunt of the cost of emissions reductions. We call on 
the EU to fulfil that commitment and avoid measures that attempt to impose specific standards and 
decarbonization  strategies on other economies.  
19.16.   The EU is not only a major trading partner for Brazil , but also a Member with which we share 
perspectives on the importance of preserving the multilateral trading system and achieving a 
sustainable future in a decarbonized economy. Brazil remains committed to working together with 
the EU an d other Members at the WTO, and the UNFCCC, to achieve  our common goals of sustainable 
development and effective solutions to c limate change. The delegation of Brazil regrets that the EU 
continues to pursue the issue without due dialogue with all potential ly affected parties, when 
concrete concerns persist that such a measure, whether in its design or its application, could violate 
the obligations undertaken by the EU under WTO  Agreements , and in relevant instruments in the 
environmental field, in particula r the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.  
19.17.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
19.18.   The Republic of Korea recognizes that climate change is one of the most pressing issues that 
all WTO  Member s should continue to jointly focus on, with a vi ew to finding effective ways to tackle  
it. Yet Korea has concerns that, unlike its original intent, the E uropean Union's CBAM may impose 
an excessive administrative burden on exporters, while treating them less favourably  than the 
EU-based businesses subje ct to the EU 's ETS. To address the se concerns, Korea believes that it is 
essential to promote a common understanding on the design of relevant international standards 
through sufficient discussions in international forums . In an effort to implement the rules targeting 
this global common chal lenge, an inclusive approach would be more effective than requiring trading 
partners to comply with specific standards, such as the methodology for calculating the emissions 
of products.  Korea will continue to closely engage with the EU to resolve our conc erns. 
19.19.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
19.20.   Paraguay continues to support this systemic trade concern. In this regard, we would like to 
refer to our statement delivered at the Council's previous meeting9, which we request to be included 
in the  minutes in its entirety, as follows:  
19.21.   As Paraguay has covered its concerns regarding other elements under the Green Deal that 
affect trade in agricultural products, on this occasion Paraguay will focus on the C BAM. Regarding 
 
8 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  40.18 -40.19, and document  G/C/M/143 , paragraphs  41.2-41.22.  
9 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  24.51 -24.55, under Agenda Item  24, "European Union – European 
Green Deal (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and Deforestation Free Commodities) – Request From 
Brazil and Indonesi a). G/C/M/145  
 
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  the CBAM, Paraguay reiterates i ts systemic interest in this concern and requests that its prior 
statements are reflected in the minutes of today's meeting.10 
19.22.   Paraguay requests the European Union, once more, to share information on whether they 
are planning a lowering of tariffs for impo rted products that contain a lower carbon footprint, and 
whether they are considering increasing tariffs for products with a higher carbon footprint than that 
of EU products, as there should be a mechanism to recognize positive contributions and lower carb on 
footprints, and not just a penalty for producers who pollute more than European companies.  
19.23.   Paraguay also reiterates that responsibilities are common but differentiated, and must be 
taken into account, and that these mechanisms should be negotiated and n ot unilaterally imposed, 
so that they actually fulfil their objectives – which may be shared. But the policy tools are criticized 
due to the manner in which they are built, designed, and implemented, lending themselves to 
protectionism and trade distortion s. 
19.24.   Briefly, regarding commodities free of deforestation, Paraguay wishes to make reference to 
its statement delivered under Agenda Item  611, but to add that there is an intrinsic discrimination in 
the design of the measure, even if according to the Europea n Union it applies in the same way to its 
producers. This discrimination exists from the moment production of some of these commodities 
does not take place in European territory, and that the EU only has 3% of its native forests, and 
thus the same conditio ns do not apply as to those with a higher percentage of native forests. 
Therefore, we are being penalized for our conservation and preservation efforts, and for providing 
eco-systemic services for years, and continuing to do so, when Europe has eliminated 97% of its 
native forests.  
19.25.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
19.26.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statements on this issue made during the previous 
meetings of the CTG, CMA, and the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE). In December  2022, 
the Parliament and the Council of the European Union  reached a final agreement on the text of the 
regulation on the CBAM. The legal act will cover a wide range of products, such as cement, chemicals 
and mineral fertilizers, iron, steel and products thereof, aluminium,  and even hydrogen. It seems 
that this legislative initiative pursues strictly economic goals contrary to declarations of tackling 
climate change issues.  Apart from the obvious violations of the WTO  rules, the EU's  CBAM will  have 
a negative impact on global trade and has nothing to do with achieving any environmental goals.  In 
this context , we would like to make the following points.  
19.27.   First, the European Union has stated on various occasions that the CBAM aims at a reduction 
in the so -called carbon leakages. No international organization, neither the WTO nor those under 
the auspices of the United Nations, has confirmed the link between the leakages and globally 
determined climate goals. In fact, the whole concept of prevention of the so -called carbon leakage 
is an intention to localize capacities in the EU  territory, especially  those that are European but have 
been moved outside the EU. Thus, the EU's legislative act merely pursues economic purposes rather 
than the declared purpose of tackling climate change.  
19.28.   Second, the scope of products is questionable. For instance, there is no doubt that the 
inclusion of hydrogen in the regulation aims to secure foreign investments in the EU’s  companies in 
renewable hydrogen, decreasing the c ompetitiveness of other such kinds of energy sources, in 
particular  those  derived from natural gas, methane , and so on. Along with that, we can see that iron 
ores have also been added , which are primary raw materials for the manufacturing of steel products . 
Obviously, this has been done in order to protect the domestic production of recycled steel products. 
 
10 Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 7 and 8  July 2022, document  G/C/M/143 , 
paragraphs  16.42 –16.43: "The delegate of Paraguay indicated the following: Paraguay wishes to reiterate its 
interest in this trade concern and requests that its previous statements be placed on record. In addition, Paraguay 
again requests information from the European Union on whether it plans a tariff reduction for imported products 
with a lower carbon footprint, and how it plans an increase  for those with a higher footprint. Paraguay believes 
that incentives are just as important as penalties in measures such as these, and that common but differentiated 
responsibilities should also be taken into account. " Footnote: "Document  G/C/M/142 , paragraphs  36.24 -36.25. " 
11 Paragraphs  8.2-8.9. G/C/M/145  
 
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  Thus, the provisions of the CBAM aim at discrimination not only against goods, but production 
methods as well.  
19.29.   Third, the CBAM is supposed to mirror the EU -ETS for importers of the covered products. 
However, the EU -ETS implies financial contribution measures. The EU  State Aid Guidelines provide 
compensation for the reduction of indirect GHG  emissions. In other words, national authorities 
provide  financial support to companies if they consume alternative energy resources produced within 
the EU. Bearing this in mind, a fair question arises: does the EU plan to reimburse the costs 
connected with the reduction of carbon footprint of imported products , as in the case of domestic 
manufacturers?  
19.30.   Finally, there is a lack of understanding of how to ensure the uninterrupted implementation 
of this mechanism after it enters into force. It is no secret that currently there are no globally 
harmonized standards for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) , and the calculation of 
GHG emissions , carbon footprint, and so on . This topic has become one of the most widely discussed 
here at the WTO. The Secretariat prepared an outstanding survey last December , and held a forum 
dedicated to this situation this March , where all the participants admitted that there were no common 
standards in this field , while the EU regulation, albeit in a limited form, enters into force in 
October  2023. Taking this into  account, the EU's CBAM will surely create unnecessary obstacles for 
international trade , increasing administrative and transaction costs.  
19.31.   Summing up, the Russian Federation  would like to note that there is no coherence between 
any global agreement on tack ling climate change, the WTO  rules, and this particular regulation. 
Unfortunately, the European Union chooses to ignore this fact, which will cause greater problems 
than those already being faced by the global community.  
19.32.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated t he following:  
19.33.   Türkiye  welcome s increased efforts at the global level to mitigate the impacts of climate 
change and deem s it important to discuss how cooperation at the WTO could help facilitate the 
transformation to environmentally sustainable economic gro wth globally, in an inclusive and just 
manner.  As voiced by many Member s, in this process, it is of the utmost importance to keep climate 
mitigation efforts built on constructive cooperation so that a strong global response to the challenges 
can be generat ed. As such, we are closely following the ongoing legislative processes under the 
European Green Deal and the CBAM, and continue a cooperative bilateral dialogue with the EU on 
these issues.  Türkiye would also like to take the opportunity provided by this multilateral platform 
to share some of our considerations regarding the CBAM while the European Commission is 
solidifying the implementation aspects of the transition period.  
19.34.   The most crucial issue with regard to the EU's CBAM is to make sure that it is de signed and 
applied in a non -discriminat ory way; that is , that it is not more burdensome than necessary to 
achieve its objectives , meaning without putting the importers and imported goods at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to their counterparts in the EU. For this aim to be achieved, there might be 
some stumbling blocks in the design of the CBAM, some of which we would like  to indicate here . 
19.35.   The first of these is the difference between the scope of the EU -ETS and that of the CBAM. 
As you may know, while CBAM applies to products identified by CN  codes, the ETS applies to 
installations identified in terms of their activity/production process, subject to minimum capacity or 
total rated thermal input thresholds. Therefore, it is possible that some producers of CBAM  goods 
will be covered by the CBAM  regulation even though they would be exempt from EU -ETS if they were 
EU producers.  
19.36.   A second  issue is related to the treatment of precursors. We are not aware of a requirement 
brought under the E U-ETS on EU  producers to obtain and report the embedded emissions of the 
precursors they use. In our view, for any precursor identified for CBAM  goods, both the EU  producers 
and third  country producers using these precursors in their production processes s hould be subject 
to the same MRV requirements.  
19.37.   On the other hand, in the EU -ETS, due to such practices as over -allocation of free allowances 
and the EU  companies ' ability to trade allowances , the state aid provided by member  States with 
regard to CO 2 costs related to electricity use, as well as funding opportunities through the G/C/M/145  
 
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  Modernization and Innovation Funds, it seems to us that the EU  producers would be given a 
competitive advantage against third  country producers. Hence, remedies to address these 
imbalances should be sought.  
19.38.   This brings  me to my last point: Türkiye believe s that the allocation of CBAM  revenues to 
the financing of green transformation projects of developing countries and LDCs would also be more 
in line with the climate change mitigation  objectives underlying the draft regulation. In this process, 
ensuring access by developing countries and LDCs to critical technologies will also be key to 
inclusivity and overall success.  
19.39.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
19.40.   India wishes to make a consolidated statement on this subject, given that there are several 
items on the agenda  that broadly cover the European Union's  measures relating to the European 
Green Deal.  India has raised its concerns on the proposed European Uni on measures under the 
CBAM, Deforestation -Free Commodities , and other Green Deal proposals in various forums. Most 
recently, India submitted a paper , document  JOB/TE/78 , to the Committee on Trade and 
Environment, which pointed out that we are witnessing potential trade fragmentation if Member s 
continue to take unilateral trade measures which apply extra -territorially. We also urged the need 
to act i n accordance with the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 
Capabilities (CBDR -RC), as well as honouring the nationally determined contributions (NDCs).  
19.41.   We remain concerned about the idea of "leakage ". This turns the princ iple of comparative 
advantages – the bedrock of international trade development – on its head. Today , the EU has talked 
about carbon leakage, but in the same vein, the EU or any other Member  may seek to make an 
adjustment of any input parameter to trade in  the name of leakage, but in effect seeking 
protectionism to nullify the comparative trade advantages of its trading partners.  
19.42.   We welcome the EU's proposal to conduct technical sessions on both the CBAM and 
deforestation proposals during the upcoming Trade  and Environment Week in June. However, we 
remain opposed to the very principles on which the EU is basing its spate of new green legislation.  
19.43.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
19.44.   Climate change is one of the most important issues. Countries must  raise their ambitions 
and policy efforts to achieve carbon neutrality worldwide by 2050, while at the same time ensuring 
a level  playing field and preventing carbon leakage. Therefore, policy coordination is important for 
the production and introduction o f products with low carbon intensity.  
19.45.   When discussing policy coordination, each country has been making reduction efforts in the 
past according to their own circumstances, such as energy resource constraints and the industrial 
environment, and in principle , the focus should be on "carbon intensity " as the "result " of such 
reduction efforts.  
19.46.   In other words, if the "carbon intensity " of a country or sector is low, this would be the result 
of the country or sector having taken sufficient measures, so that there are no problems in terms of 
the level playing field or carbon leakage. In this regard, the EU's CBAM is designed to charge at the 
border based on the level of specific policy , such as an explicit carbon price at the present stage. In 
this case, even if the product has the same actual carbon intensity , and does not cause any carbon 
leakage, taxation will occur due to the explicit difference in carbon price.  
19.47.   In this respect, the environmental objective itself cannot be justified from the viewpoint of 
preventing carbon leakage, but sufficient consideration is required from the viewpoint of ensuring 
fair, competitive conditions. In addition to the above -mentioned institutional design issues, it is a 
prerequisite that this measure be designed consistently w ith the WTO  rules, as has been repeatedly 
stated.  
19.48.   As we note that the CBAM was provisionally agreed among EU  member  States  at the end of 
last year, we would like to request that the EU consult with its member States sufficiently , through 
conducting an expe rt meeting on methods for measuring CO 2 emissions of products. We hope that G/C/M/145  
 
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  the EU will not introduce the CBAM without it first ensuring sufficient international understanding, 
otherwise this could potentially lead to international trade disputes.  
19.49.   The dele gate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
19.50.   Thailand would like to join the co -sponsors  and previous speakers in expressing its concern 
over the European Union's CBAM. Thailand fully recognizes and shares the firm commitment of the 
international community to  addressing the pressing global issue of climate change. At the same time 
that we rise to this global challenge, we also think it important to ensure that international rules and 
principles, including those under the WTO and the UNFCCC, are respected.  
19.51.   According to the existing CBAM  regulation, some could argue that the EU 's CBAM treats 
products made in the EU differently from like products imported into the EU from other 
WTO Member s that employ different process es and production methods , or different emission 
reduction schemes , from those of the EU. How would the EU reconci le the current 
EU CBAM  regulations with the WTO 's basic principle of non -discrimination enshrined in the 
GATT  1994's most -favoured -nation and national treatment obligations?  
19.52.   Moreover, Thailand firmly believes that such a global problem as climate change is  best 
addressed by multilateral cooperation , and that a measure such as CBAM should be thoroughly 
discussed in a multilateral setting before being implemented to ensure that it is WTO -consistent and 
in line with the principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities " 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. However, as stated by several Member s before 
me, the EU 's CBAM is a unilateral action by the EU that is applied extra -territorially , and in arguably 
a punitive m anner. How would the EU reconcile its CBA M regulations with the principles of 
collaborative spirit, supportive multilateral cooperation, and mutual respect to socio -economic 
differences and historical emissions among Member s, firmly established in the inte rnational 
community in tackling the climate change that is facing us today ? 
19.53.   The above observations are, of course, non -exhaustive. We also recognize that the proposed 
regulation is still to be finalized, given the ongoing internal process of the EU. While we look forward 
to receiving an update on the EU 's CBAM  regulations from the EU, we urge the EU to seriously 
consider the compatibility of its CBAM with the WTO  rules, and the well -established practices in the 
international community for fighting against climate change , and modify the regulations accordingly.  
19.54.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
19.55.   The proposed C BAM by the European Union has raised concerns over its compatibility with 
WTO principles , and its potential discriminatory and protective nature. This was expressed by several 
other Members today. The CBAM is designed to impose a border tax on imports from ce rtain 
companies in countries with weaker climate policies as a means of addressing carbon leakage and 
ensuring a level playing field for domestic producers. However, this approach could have adverse 
effects on developing countries' economies, particularly with regard to their exports. It could also 
eventually lead to erosion of current preferential arrangements between the EU and the exporting 
country.  
19.56.   The CBAM is a unilateral action by the EU rather than a cooperative approach, which goes 
against the spiri t of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC recognizes the need for collective action , and 
international cooperation , to address climate change and achieve sustainable development, and the 
EU's CBAM should be designed in a way that is consistent with this objective, and s hould take account 
the CBDR  principle.  
19.57.   The CBAM will increase the cost of exporting to the EU  market for developing countries, 
leading to less competitive pricing and a disadvantageous position vis -à-vis domestic producers 
within the EU. For instance, the proposed CBAM  tariff of EUR 20 per tonne of carbon emitted could 
lead to an additional cost of EUR 200 per unit of a product with a carbon footprint of 10  tonnes per 
unit for the exporting country. This increase in cost for manufactured products outside th e EU market 
could lead to decreased export revenues for the exporting country, potentially undermining their 
economic development.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  19.58.   Therefore, the CBAM  policy could be seen as discriminatory and protectionist, going against 
the principles of the WTO. The po licy targets imports from countries based on their climate policies 
and could therefore be interpreted as discriminatory, with the potential to undermine free trade. The 
potential advantage given to domestic producers in the EU  market.  Furthermore, t he EU's proposed 
CBAM could increase the administrative burden on developing country Member s in several ways.  
19.59.   Firstly, developing countries may need to invest significant resources and time to comply 
with the requirements of the CBAM. The policy aims to track th e carbon content of imported goods 
and impose a border tax on products from countries with weaker climate policies, which may require 
developing countries to collect and provide detailed data on the carbon content of their exports to 
the EU  market. This co uld create a significant administrative burden for developing countries, 
particularly those with limited technical and financial resources.  
19.60.   Secondly, the implementation of the CBAM may require developing countries to establish 
new administrative structures  and capacity to track and report on the carbon content of their 
exports. This could require significant investments in infrastructure and training, which may not be 
feasible for many developing countries, particularly those with limited financial resource s. 
19.61.   Thirdly, the administrative burden of the CBAM may disproportionately affect small and 
medium -sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries, which may not have the resources and 
capacity to comply with the requirements of the policy. This could resul t in a loss of market access 
and competitiveness for these SMEs, which could harm their economic development and reduce the 
potential benefits of international trade.  
19.62.   In light of these concerns, it is crucial to assess the potential economic impact of the CBAM 
on developing countries , and explore alternatives that could  reconcile climate change mitigation with 
economic development and still remain consistent with the WTO  rulebook. We request the EU to 
share with us the details of its methodology for measuri ng CO 2 emissions.  
19.63.   The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
19.64.   Kazakhstan again reiterates its position as expressed at the last meeting of the CTG and 
continues to follow developments around the EU's CBAM. Kazakhstan  urges the EU to fully consider 
the CBAM's compatibility w ith the  WTO's rules and reg ulations  and to e nsure that any such regulation 
does not create obstacles to trade.  
19.65.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
19.66.   The European Union  appreciates the interest of its partners in this important issue and would 
like to thank them for their commen ts. The co -legislators reached a provisional agreement on the 
CBAM in December  2022. The agreement still requires the formal approval of the EU  Council and the 
European Parliament in order to become law. Our expectation is that the process should be finali zed 
by early May  2023.  
19.67.   There is an urgency to tackl ing climate change, and we can only do this by scaling up global 
ambition. Only by taking ambitious actions will it be possible to halt global warming and keep the 
1.5°C  Paris Agreement goal within reach , while lessening the economic, social, and environmental  
impact of climate change. Keeping the temperature increase below 1.5°C is still within reach if 
countries scale up their global ambition.  
19.68.   The EU has stepped up its climate ambition, fully translating the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement into legislation. The EU invites its partners to share a comparable level of ambition.  The 
introduction of a CBAM to address the risk of carbon leakage is an integral part of that 
implementation and ambition.  The C BAM is a purely climate -oriented environmental policy tool. It 
will be applied in a non -discriminatory and even -handed manner in full compliance with WTO  rules 
and other international obligations.  
19.69.   The CBAM does not target third  countries. It is addressed t o companies as it applies to goods 
from certain carbon -intensive sectors and takes into consideration the application of carbon pricing 
systems by third  countries (opening possibilities for reduction or non -payment of the CBAM  charge) G/C/M/145  
 
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  and the carbon footpr int of individual producers (the CBAM will be charged according to the actual 
emissions of imported goods).  
19.70.   The CBAM  Regulation will enter into force in October  2023, with a two -year transitional 
period where importers will have to report their emissions but will not have any financial obligations. 
It will then be gradually phased in over nine  years, from 2026 to 2034, when the CBAM will be fully 
operational. The phase -in of the border adjustment will be mirrored by a phase -out of free 
allowances  in the EU -ETS for the sectors covered under the CBAM. It is to be noted that the rate of 
reduction of free allowances will be low in the first  years, which will correspond to a low and 
proportionate border adjustment.  
19.71.   The European Union has been engaging , and will continue to engage , with its trading 
partners and international organi zations to inform and, where possible, assist with the 
implementation of the measure.  
19.72.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
20  EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODIT IES – REQUEST FROM 
INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia and the Russian Federation.  
20.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
20.3.  Indonesia opposes the  European Union's acceptance of the  Deforestation -Free Commodities  
(DFC) proposal  to impose mandatory due diligence on six  items, namely soybeans, cattle, palm oil, 
wood, cocoa, and coffee, which are thought to have a possible impact on deforestation.  We are of 
the view that the anticipated DFC  proposal may potentially give native products from the European 
Union treatment distinct from that given to  imported goods. Indonesia believes that the mandated 
due diligence system has the potential to develop by stealth into a trade barrier.  
20.4.  Indonesia is also concerned that this DFC  proposal may infringe upon the legal sovereignty of 
other WTO  Member s and the rights of poor nations to pursue development, given that the European 
Union has developed rules that it cannot compel other WTO  Members to adopt . 
20.5.  Indonesia requests the European Union to provide further information on the criteria used to 
choose the commodities covered by the DFC, the expansion of the list of commodities covered by 
the DFC, as well as the sp ecifics of the required due diligence system.  
20.6.  Indonesia reiterate s that the CBDR -RC principle, which differentiates between developed and 
developing nations, should have been taken into account by the European Union while creating and 
implementing its upcoming DFC  proposals.  
20.7.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
20.8.  The Russian Federation reiterates its position regarding this issue, which was stated during 
previous meetings of the CTE, the CMA, and the CTG. The main institutions of the European Union 
reached an agreement on the regulation on deforestation -free commod ities last December.  In this 
regard, we would like to make several points.  
20.9.  First, as previously stated, the regulation is a de facto quantitative restriction measure , 
discriminating products by their origin , and is incompatible with Art icle XI and Art icle I of the 
GATT  1994. Despite the fact that this particular legal act establishes the concept of the mechanism 
to be imposed, there are no doubts it will have a severe impact on trade across  a wide range of 
agricultural products and products derived against the background of the current food security crisis.  
20.10.   Second, there is a lack of clarity regarding the implementation of the measure, namely, how 
the European Union  is going to classify countries of origin depending on the situation with 
deforestation, how a nd on what basis it is going to determine whether human rights are violated or G/C/M/145  
 
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  not, what specific requirements are supposed to apply to due diligence expertise , and so on. There 
are many questions to this regulation and to how it is supposed to work.  
20.11.   Third, the number of unilateral measures taken by the European Union  under the 
environmental pretext is growing. Such measures ignore WTO  rules and discussions at the United 
Nations, making all potential international arrangements in the field of combating comm on 
challenges, as well as the work itself at the global level , pointless.  To conclude, the Russian 
Federation urges the European Union to fully respect the WTO  rules and international climate 
agreements when developing and implementing its trade policy tools.  
20.12.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
20.13.   Brazil would like to join Indonesia and the Russian Federation in this request. Brazil refers 
to its previous statements on this issue.12 It remains concerned  over various aspects of this 
legislation that are discriminatory in nature and result in  an unnecessar ily negative impact on 
international trade. Such legislation does not contribute to the goal of reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation.  
20.14.   Deforestation is a multifaceted issue that should be tackled through comprehensive public 
policies ; different illegal activities linked to deforestation must be halted , and alternative means of 
livelihood be made available to the millions of people that live near forests. Sustainable production 
practices must be fostered and scaled  up. By acting as an obstacle to economic development, trade 
restrictions actually reinforc e some o f the dynamics that led to deforestation . They also reduce a 
government's capacity to deal with this issue.  
20.15.   The proposed European regulations are heavily skewed towards punishment and 
disengagement, by excluding from the EU  market any producer susp ected to have links to 
deforestation, with no flexibility or margin for remedial or  compensatory actions , such as 
reforestation. Once cut off , producers will no longer have an incentive to improve their practices , 
and will probably not have the means for d oing so  either . We are particularly concerned about the  
proposed counter -benchmarking system with its tiered classification.  
20.16.   First, th at system will provide different treatment for producing countries  in unilateral 
decisions and subjective criteria. Secon d, by mandating and enha nced scrutiny of the products 
originating from high -risk countries, it penalizes sustainable producers in those countries. Third, it 
creates a significant incentive for trade diversion, as operators interested in escaping administrative 
and financial burdens related to the due diligence system will tend to merely switch to other sources.  
20.17.   In our view, the benchmarking system has discriminatory aspects and could severely limit 
and distor t trade. Brazil has a track record  of being constructive  in both trade and environmental 
regimes. We are committed to address ing deforestation correctly . In our national determined 
contributions to the Paris Agreement, Brazil has confirmed that it is striving to end illegal 
deforestation in the  Amazon by 2028.  Therefore , we reiterate that the EU will find in Brazil a strong 
and committed partner in the promotion of sustainable  development. We urge the EU to duly 
consider the many concerns we have expressed in adopting a constructive approach, to the benefit 
of both regimes , and especially of small producers in the developing world.  
20.18.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
20.19.   We refer to our previous statements in this Council13 and would like to note the following 
points . First,  the EU  deforestation project does not take into account the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilit ies, nor the European Union's historical responsibility towards  
deforestation . Second, i t does not include or consider equivalent mechanisms to recogni ze each 
country's  national efforts to fight against deforestation. This issue was also the subject of questions 
in the recent Committee on Agriculture, which have not received a n adequate  response  from the 
European Union . 
 
12 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  24.2-24.19.  
13 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  24.51 -24.55.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  20.20.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
20.21.   The proposed regulation to prevent deforestation and forest degradation, as declared by the 
European Union , aims to reduce the EU's share of global deforestation by diverting consum ption to 
products that do not promote deforestation.  In this sense, with the draft legislation, companies that 
use the products in scope of regulation as input in production , or that trade these products , are 
obliged to notify (due diligence) to show that the products are produced in a way that does not cause 
deforestation, at the stage of entry of the relevant products into the EU  market. The legislation 
envisages grouping countries according to the risk of deforestation and tries to ensure that supply 
chains are designed in a way that does not encourage deforestation.  
20.22.   In this context, we believe it is important that the technical requirements of the proposed 
regulation , like certification or verification , which third -country operators will face when they place 
these products on the EU  market , should be the same as for EU operators. In this regard, it is critical 
that no additional administrative burden should be placed on third  countries.  
20.23.   Besides, in order  for a regulation to serve its purpose , but without preventing the trade of 
any product, Türkiye believes that possible extensions in scope of the legislation should be 
determined on the basis of solid data showing that the products covered are indeed the biggest 
contributors to global deforestation.  
20.24.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.25.   The main driver of deforestation and forest degradation is the expansion of agricultural land, 
linked in particular to the production of a series of c ommodities of which  the European Union is a 
major consumer.  Seven commodities —beef, wood, palm oil, soya, coffee, cocoa, and rubber —as 
well as some of their derived products, such as leather, furniture, printed products, or chocolate, 
are included in the s cope of the draft regulation. These commodities have been selected objectively, 
based on the best available scientific data. They are the commodities through which the EU has a 
bigger impact on the world 's forests in terms of deforestation and forest degra dation.  
20.26.   The regulation will introduce mandatory due diligence rules for operators who place th ese 
commodities and their derived products on the EU  market or export from it.  Only products that are 
both deforestation -free and legal according to the laws of t he country of origin will be allowed on 
the EU  market.  The regulation will apply equally to commodities produced inside and outside the EU. 
It relies on concepts developed at the international level, and specifically on the work of the FAO, to 
define what is to be considered a "forest " or "deforestation " under the Regulation.  There will be no 
ban on any country or any commodity. All countries, including those considered to be at high risk of 
deforestation, will be able to continue to sell their commodities on the EU  market, provided that the 
operators who place them there can demonstrate that those commodities are deforestation -free and 
legal.  
20.27.   The regulation is an environmental measure that complements global or multilateral action. 
It is developed in compli ance with the European Union's  international commitments, including its 
trade agreements and WTO  requirements.  The regulation is an opportunity to enhance trade in 
deforestation -free products and boost opportunities for sustainable actors around the globe.  
20.28.   As highlighted in the Regulation, close cooperation with partner countries will be of 
paramount importance for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Regulation. We will use partnerships 
and cooperation mechanisms to support countries to address deforest ation and forest degradation 
where a specific need has been detected and where there is a demand to cooperate.  
20.29.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
21  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
21.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  21.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
21.3.  The Russian Federation wishes to express its deep concerns in respect of the Green  Deal and 
its implementing legislation , and w e reiterate the statements on this topic made during previous 
meetings of the WTO 's working bodies.  This time we would like to draw attention to the new 
initiatives recently issued under the umbrella of this str ategy.  
21.4.  In 2022 , the European Commission published a proposal for a Directive on corporate 
sustainability due diligence. This draft regulation covers two  groups of companies in the EU. The 
first group consists of around 9 ,400 companies , with more than 500  employees and more than 
EUR 150 million in net turnover worldwide. Given the description of this group, all industries are 
included in its scope. The second  group consists of economic operators with more than 
250 employees and more than EUR  40 million  in net turnover that are involved in the manufacturing 
of raw materials, agricultural  products , fish products, and so on . 
21.5.  The companies will be obliged to do due diligence expertise on compliance of their suppliers 
with the international agreements on climate c hange and human rights. In other words, the 
European enterprises are to determine whether their trade partners ' business practices are 
consistent with international law.  The measure does not set specific requirements for products to be 
supplied to the EU  market , like other elements of the Green Deal, but there is no doubt that such 
legislation will force companies to review their supply chains. This situation is harmful to international 
trade and will affect the interests of many Members.  
21.6.  Another measure I  would like to highlight is the new proposal on packaging and packaging 
waste, which is nothing more but another attempt by the European Commission to adapt the 
currently applied private standards of the enterprises that are major consumers of plastic pack aging.  
During the meeting s of the TBT  and CTE  Committee s, the Russian delegation listed the regulation's 
potential deviations from international rules. In brief, the measure is inconsistent with the 
TBT Agreement due to the fact that the provisions of the European draft legal document set 
requirements which are not compliant with international standards , and which will definitely create 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  
21.7.  The Russian delegation would like to urge the European Union  one more time t o respect the 
WTO rules and international agreements in the field of environmental protection.  
21.8.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
21.9.  Uruguay agrees with several of the points raised in the statements of various delegations, 
including those of Br azil, Argentina and Paraguay, under the different agenda items on policies within 
the European Green Deal framework.  Uruguay shares the objectives of combating climate change 
and protecting the environment, as reflected in the commitments that it has made under the 
multilateral agreements on the matter, including the Paris Agreement, and the policies adopted to 
comply with those agreements.  
21.10.   However, Uruguay remains concerned at the European Union's attempts to impose the view 
that there is only one single m odel of production and sustainable development that should be 
emulated worldwide, without taking into account the local characteristics and specific conditions of 
different countries and regions, the realities of their production systems and their relative  
contributions to the problems that need to be addressed.  The excessively restrictive effects that the 
practical implementation of several of the strategies and policies announced in the European Green 
Deal, such as those mentioned under previous agenda it ems, may have on international trade and 
production beyond the borders of the European Union, as well as the possible inconsistencies 
between those strategies and policies and WTO  rules, are also cause for concern.  
21.11.   In view of the above, Uruguay urges the E uropean Union to ensure the compatibility of its 
trade and environmental measures with its commitments and obligations under the 
WTO Agreements and multilateral environmental agreements.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  21.12.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.13.   We thank Uruguay for its statement and refer to our statements just delivered on the CBAM 
and deforestation . As to the Russian Federation, we refer to the statement that we will deliver on 
trade measures taken vis -à-vis the Russian Federation under  Agenda I tem 31, where we will notably 
stress our expectation that the rules -based international order be respected . 
21.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
22  UNITED KINGDOM – UK ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FOREST RISK COMMODITIES – 
REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
22.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
22.3.  Indonesia is aware that the United Kingdom has implemented regulations banning the 
importation of goods that may contribute to deforestation. Business actors in the UK must perform 
due diligence, or information gathering, risk assessment, and mitigation, in order to demonstrate 
that imported goods are not the result of deforestation.  
22.4.  The prohibition of imported c ommodities is contrary to Article  XI of the GATT  1994, which 
deals with the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, as well as Article  XX of the 
GATT  1994, regarding the General Exception , which stipulates that WTO  Member s are allowed to 
apply re strictive policies, as long as the intended policies aim to protect human safety or health, 
animals, or plants, but must prove the existence of a legitimate objective, and the most important 
thing is that the implemented policies must not be more restrictive than necessary.  
22.5.  Indonesia is also of the opinion that the aforementioned policy , which was implemented 
unilaterally by the British government,  may be arbitrary and result in various interpretations of 
Article  XX of the GATT  1994 regarding the G eneral Exception, including in terms of identifying the 
forestry products covered by the policy. In Indonesia's view, the  UK Environmental Act  has the 
potential to divert trade to other WTO  Member s who do not have significant forestry obligations.  
22.6.  Indonesi a request s the United Kingdom to provide  additional clarification regarding the 
scientific data that served as the foundation for its policy formulation, the range of forestry 
commodities, as well as the most recent changes to the UK  Environmental Act and the Due Diligence 
on Forest Risk Commodities policy.  
22.7.  Indonesia realizes the importance of WTO  Member s' commitment  to making every effort to 
protect the environment. However, every policy implemented by WTO  Member s must also be in 
accordance with WTO  provis ions and principles, so as not to have a negative impact on market 
access for the products of other WTO  Member s, and not hinder international trade. In addition, the 
intended environment -related policies should also comply with the Common but Differentiate d 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC) principles, which regulate the differences in 
obligations and responsibilities between developed and developing countries.  
22.8.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
22.9.  Brazil shares the U nited Kingdom 's objective of protecting ecosystems and eradicating 
deforestation. However, Brazil believes that collaborative initiatives between producer and consumer 
countries based on dissemination of best production practices and a multilateral partnership would 
be far more successful than unilateral restrictive measures. Brazil notes th e definition of the scope 
of application of the secondary legislation proposed by the UK is discriminatory , as it would require 
measures almost exclu sively from developing countries with tropical climates.  
22.10.   Brazil also raises concerns about  the definition of forests used in the Environmental Act, 
which reportedly omits an essential aspect of the multilaterally agreed definition, creating a situation 
of conceptual uncertainty  that could lead to arbitrariness in the implementation of the due diligence 
process. The due diligence process will be highly costly and could have the same effect as a G/C/M/145  
 
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  prohibit ive tariff on products imported from countries  discrimin ated against under th e scope of the 
legislation. The cost will be disproporti onally higher for small and low -income producers, which could 
increase poverty levels and related social problems in developing countries.  
22.11.   Brazil believes that improving the sustainab ility of international agricultural trade  should be 
a result of a multilateral partnership, with developed countries supporting developing countries to 
achieve this goal. Brazil also notes that the increased cost of due diligence and the technical  
difficulties of its implementation will vary greatly , depending on which regulation is adopted.  The 
above -mentioned costs will be disproportionally higher for small and low -income producers if the 
burden of due diligence were passed on to them by importer s in the United Kingdom, which could 
have negative social and environmental impacts on developing countries. Therefore, Brazil asks that 
the contributions by the Brazilian government and the Brazilian associations receive adequate 
attention and considerati on in the implementation of the secondary legislation proposed by the 
United Kingdom.  
22.12.   Brazil believes that the conciliation and compilation efforts undertaken by Brazil with the 
United Kingdom, including the Forest , Agriculture and Commodities Trade Dialogue, is the way 
forward , rather than implementing trade restrictive measures which will hardly help to solve the 
problem.  
22.13.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
22.14.   We remain concerned with the way environmental  measures are being implemented by the 
United Kingdom. We continue to study the various proposals and urge the UK to not undertake trade 
restrictive measures while citing environmental objectives.  
22.15.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
22.16.   The United Kingdom thanks Indonesia, Brazil, and India  for their continued interest on the 
due diligence provisions as set out in the UK 's Environment Act 2021.  The UK wants to reduce the 
negative impact of its global footprint, including making an active  contribution to the commitments 
made at COP27, working in partnership with others to help address the global challenges on the 
environment, climate change , and biodiversity loss.  
22.17.   The proposed due diligence measures will make it illegal for large businesse s operating in 
the UK to use key forest risk commodities produced on land illegally occupied or used. Businesses in 
scope will also be required to undertake a due diligence exercise on their supply chains and to report 
on this exercise annually.  The measur es are designed to support the ongoing global, national, and 
local efforts to protect forests and other ecosystems . The core of our approach is that of partnership. 
Our aim is to work with producer countries and support their efforts to uphold their laws a nd 
strengthen environmental protection.  
22.18.   The UK introduced the Environment Act following a public consultation in 2020 and led a 
further consultation on the implementation of these regulations in 2021 -22. We thank those 
Member s who contributed to those cons ultations.  
22.19.   As the UK continues to work on implementing the Environment Act 's provisions, we will 
ensure Member s are updated on relevant developments and that measures comply with our 
international obligations. The UK is happy to continue engaging with interested Member s, as it 
finalizes the measure.  
22.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  UNITED STATES, JAPA N, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS AGREEMENT ON 
CHIP EXPORT RESTRICTIONS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  23.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
23.3.  According to me dia reports and a statement made by a relevant enterprise, the United States , 
Japan,  and the Netherlands have reached an agreement on restricting exports of advanced 
chip-manufacturing equipment to China.  However, we have not yet seen any  information regar ding 
the agreement mentioned by the media  as it has not yet been  published by the relevant 
governments. We are deeply concerned with this non -transparent practice. We would like to ask the 
US, Japan,  and the Netherlands,  whether the agreement exists. And if the agreement exists, should 
such an important agreement relating to export restriction s not be notified to the WTO and reviewed 
by the relevant Member s? Is it because the relevant Member s are clear that the agreement may 
violate WTO  rules that they keep its contents undisclosed?  
23.4.  In addition, there is reason to believe that the agreement has been  made under pressure of 
economic coercion from the United States, as it hurts not only the interests of Chinese companies, 
but also the interests of other parties to the agreement, including the companies of Japan and the 
Netherlands. The agreement is contrary to the WTO principles of openness and transparency, and 
undermines  the authority and effectiveness of the WTO rules.  We request the relevant Member s to 
notify the agreement and follow -up measures to the WTO, and to call on the WTO to strengthen the 
monitoring of these measures.  
23.5.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated  the following:  
23.6.  The United States takes issue with the agenda item description as put forward by China. As 
we have stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues rela ted to national security , including export 
controls.  
23.7.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
23.8.  On chip export restrictions, Japan has long been conducting strict export control based on the 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act in a manner consistent  with the WTO  Agreement from the 
perspective of maintaining international peace and security. We will continue to take action in 
accordance with the above policy.  
23.9.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.10.   The European Union  takes issue with the description of the agenda point by China, as a 
factual matter. Moreover, the type of measures regulated by the GATT are those adopted by 
individual Member s. The EU 's statement therefore relates to the latter only . 
23.11.   The matter raised by China needs rephrasing: it seems to concern planned national export 
control measures relating to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment announced by the 
Dutch government on 8 March. The national regulatory process is still ongo ing, and the measure is 
expected to be published in a ministerial order before the summer.  
23.12.   The announced measure falls under the dual use and export control framework of the 
European Union. This framework allows EU  member  States to impose additional nation al export 
controls based on essential security interests.  Any such export restriction will be adopted, in the 
same way as all existing restrictions of this type, in full conformity with WTO  rules. Most notably, 
the GATT 1994  permits Member s to take action which they consider necessary for the protection of 
their essential security interests relating to traffic in goods carried on directly or indirectly for 
supplying military forces.  
23.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
24  UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 T ARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  24.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
24.3.  China is deeply concerned that the United States has imp osed Section  301 tariffs on China's 
USD 360 billion exports to the United States for more than four years, and  has extended them again , 
even if the WTO  dispute settlement panel had ruled that these measures were inconsistent with 
WTO rules. The Section  301 tariffs imposed by the United States on certain goods from China not 
only seriously violate the WTO  rules, but they also fail to serve the interests either of Chinese or of 
American enterprises and people. According to the US  ITC's report, the cost of Section  301 tariffs is 
almost entirely borne by US  importers, making it more expensive for U S companies to purchase 
goods.  The Section  301 tariffs also undermine the stability and security of the global supply chain 
and contribute to high inflation  in the US.  China  urges the United States to correct its wrong practices 
and remove all Section  301 tariffs imposed on Chinese products as soon as possible.  
24.4.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
24.5.  China 's decision to continue to raise th is matter in this and other WTO  committees has been 
a pointless waste of WTO  resources, given that China has already unilaterally imposed the only 
remedy that the WTO  Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) could potentially authorize: the suspension of 
WTO concessi ons. 
24.6.  China has already applied tariff measures to imports from the United States in excess of its 
WTO commitments for the explicit purpose of retaliating against the measures for which it now seeks 
legal findings . We understand that , from July  2018 to Sept ember  2019, China imposed four  rounds 
of tariffs , ranging from 2.5% to 30% , in retaliation against US  Section  301 tariffs, which covered 
approximately 71% ( USD 109 billion) of 2017  imports into China from the United States.  
24.7.  China, of course, did so without obtaining the authorization from the DSB pursuant to the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding . China does not dispute the fact that it has already imposed 
retaliatory tariff measures in response to the US  measures at issue . Nor does China dispute that 
these retaliatory measures remain in effect.  We urge China to be mindful of the Committee 's and 
Member s' time and resources when raising matters in committee meetings in the future.  With 
respect to the dispute United States — Tariff Measures  on Certain Goo ds from China (DS543), the 
United States  already provided it s views in a meeting of the D SB. 
24.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAP AN, AND THE UNITED STATES  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, the European Union, Japan, and the United States.  
25.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
25.3.  It is unfortunate that , despite the United States and other WTO  Member s raising significant 
concerns with the Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation (CSAR) and its 
implementing measures in the past 11 TBT Committee me etings and five  meetings of the Council 
on Trade in Goods, China has not sought to work with the United States and other WTO  Member s to 
reach resolution.  
25.4.  The United States maintains that it has serious concerns with CSAR and its implementing 
measures ' likely inconsistency with TBT  Agreement obligations, including unequal treatment for 
imports; overly burdensome and disproportionate information requirements that may unnecessarily 
put companies ' intellectual property at risk; lack of procedures to ensure the protection of 
confidential and proprietary information; duplicative in -country testing, and continued challenges 
with transparency in the development and implementation of the CSAR  measures . 
25.5.  As we have long noted, US  industry is facing pressing challenges in trying to comply with 
China 's often unrealistic implementation timelines for CSAR and its conflicting technical regulations  
– complicated further by the lag from prior COVID -19 shutdowns over the past three  years, and 
backlogs at labs in China.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  25.6.  In Novem ber, we asked that China consider extending by two to three  years the national 
CSAR  implementation deadlines for the notified measures contained in CHN/1459, 1515,  1525, and 
1526, including extending the deadlines that have already gone into effect. We urg e China to address 
this point.  We also ask that China consider how it can rely more upon international recognition 
schemes for conformity assessment to reduce the costs and timelines for companies to comply.  
25.7.  Another measure of serious concern is the Provis ions for the Supervision of Cosmetics 
Sampling and Testing. We understand that China published the final measure on 12 January. This 
published measure does not appear to address the concerns we expressed in the written comments 
submitted by the United Stat es and US  industry. We remain particularly concerned that the 
seven  days provided for companies to appeal test findings on potential non -compliance of their 
products with CSAR  requirements is not sufficient.  
25.8.  US companies remain eager for a means to engage with China's National Medical Products 
Administration  (NMPA ) on questions arising from CSAR  implementation, including regarding the new 
requirements and use of NMPA 's new online platforms for product and ingredient filings. Does China 
have any plans for this? 
25.9.  Finally, we refer to previous US  statements for other unresolved concerns and unanswered 
questions.  And w e request that China continue to consider how these trade concerns expressed by 
the United States and many other WTO  Member s may be resolved in t he implementation of CSAR.  
25.10.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
25.11.   Australia respects the right of Member s to implement technical measures for legitimate 
policy purposes and in accordance with WTO  obligations. Australia, however, remains concern ed that 
measures under China 's CSAR and various implementing regulations, which entered into force on 
1 May 2021, are more stringent than necessary for low -risk cosmetics. In that context, we ask that 
China pursue its objective of ensuring the safety and q uality of imported cosmetics using less 
trade-restrictive measures.  
25.12.   Australia requests that China provide a reasonable transition period for cosmetics 
manufacturers to consider the regulation 's requirements and make adjustments to their processes. 
We also request that China clarify why it has maintained its requirement for mandatory animal 
testing of cosmetics products to be used on children.  Australian exporters are concerned about 
stringent and inflexible measures under the CSAR  framewo rk, particularly regarding testing, 
registration requirements , and requirements to provide detailed information on production processes 
and other aspects of their intellectual property.  
25.13.   We reiterate that Australia is a reliable supplier of high -quality and  safe cosmetics products 
domestically, and to international markets. As we have said on previous occasions, the Australian 
Government stands ready to work with China and to discuss the CSAR and our respective systems 
for cosmetics regulation.  
25.14.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.15.   The European Union  would like to reiterate the concerns it already shared in previous 
meetings of the Council Trade in Goods (July and November  2021, and April, July, and 
November  2022) with regard to the C SAR in force since 1  May 2021. To recall, these concerns relate 
in particular to:  (i) the mandatory disclosure of commercially sensitive information, touching on the 
intellectual property rights  of companies involved, in the registration process. The EU reque sts China 
to consider the possibility to require continuous access to inspect the sensitive information at the 
companies ' files, but without imposing the obligation to submit it to an external database ; (ii) the 
amount of information required for the notification of new ingredients, as well as potential issues 
over the disclosure of such information after a certain period of time. In particular, the Chinese 
legislation requires both the specification issued by the raw materials manufacturer and the 
ingredient composition reported by the cosmetic companies in their product application to be exact 
matching figures , and any mismatch between the information provided by the raw material producer 
and the cosmetic companies would make the application of the la tter invalid. Given that the exact 
composition of raw materials is never completely stable , but may vary/evolve over time within 
certain limits, it is almost impossible to guarantee a complete consistency between the figures. G/C/M/145  
 
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  Furthermore, access to this da tabase would reveal cosmetics ' formulation. The EU encourages China 
to accept a range of values instead of exact matching figures ; and (iii)  the need to publish a detailed 
summary of efficacy substantiation evaluation, which may damage business secrets , as this 
information is disclosed to the public even before products are made available to consumers, 
providing commercial advantage to competitors.  
25.16.   The EU believes that these requirements are unnecessarily stringent to ensure consumer 
safety and traceability  of the ingredients used in cosmetics, diverging from international practice. 
This extensive level of information is not required elsewhere in the world for notification and 
registration purposes, and the safety of consumers is always ensured.  Besides, the  EU would like to 
reiterate its comment that a differentiated approach is needed between new products and products 
on the market. This would avoid a situation when product supply could be interrupted for an 
extended period of time due to insufficient prepa ration time for both industry and supervision 
authorities.  
25.17.   In addition, according to EU  stakeholders, since the new requirements to register high -risk 
New Cosmetic Ingredients (NCI) entered into force in May 2021, and at least until January  2023, no 
high-risk NCIs have been successfully registered in China. This is deemed due to the excessively 
detailed technical information required, which go es beyond what is necessary to evaluate the safety 
of ingredients, for example requiring R&D  reports, information on  how the ingredient was invented , 
or a description of the manufacturing process . 
25.18.   Finally, the European Union  would like to recall that no laboratories have been accredited in 
EU member States . This means that , even if the CSAR  rules do not impose local tes ting upon arrival 
in Chinese territory, de facto importers of cosmetics are forced to test their products in China. This 
requires  sending samples only for these purposes, then undergoing the approval procedure , and 
only later importing cosmetics for sale. The EU would encourage China to facilitate the accreditation 
of laboratories in other countries, notably in EU  member States . 
25.19.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
25.20.   New Zealand continues to have concerns in relation to China 's regulatory syst em for 
cosmetics which are well -documented in previous meetings of both the TBT  Committee and the 
Council for Trade in Goods.  As we pointed out at the November meetings, New Zealand continues 
to urge China to consider additional measures to allow for:  (i) the exemption of animal testing 
requirements through non -government regulatory authority -issued GMP  certification or other trade 
facilitative mechanisms for providing product assurances;  (ii) providing flexibility in respect of 
product testing requirements. In particular, we encourage China to accept test reports from 
accredited laboratories situated outside of China; and  (iii) further limitations on product disclosure 
requirements, particularly in relation to sensitive information – that is,  limited to that which is 
required to assure product safety in China 's domestic market, so as not to compromise intellectual 
property.  New Zealand looks forward to engaging further with China on its C SAR to address these 
issues.  
25.21.   The delegate of the Republic o f Korea  indicated the following:  
25.22.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by other Member s regarding China 's 
CSARs and its implementing measures, and refers to our statement at the last TBT  meeting.  As 
previously mentioned, Korea 's businesses ar e still facing many issues in fulfilling the 
CSAR  requirements, particularly in relation to testing laboratories, labelling  requirements , and the 
scope of information disclosure, which impose negative effects for both Members'  industries.  Given 
our mutual interest in the cosmetic industry, Korea again urges China to harmonize its regulation 
with widely recognized international practices so as not to raise unnecessary barriers to trade.  The 
Republic of Korea stands ready to further engage with China to resol ve these issues constructively.  
25.23.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
25.24.   Japan has continued to express its concerns on China' s CSARs, as well as the related 
implementing regulations.  We call for the following measures to be taken to ensure that trad e 
restrictive measures are not more restrictive than necessary , in accordance with Articles  2.2 and 
5.1.2 of the TBT  Agreement:  (i) we call for the acceptance of test results of overseas inspection G/C/M/145  
 
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  institutions that have the same qualifications and capabil ities as the domestic cosmetics registration 
inspection institutions in China; and (ii) for the approval of test methods that are internationally 
recognized by OECD, ISO, etc , in order for the regulations not to be overly regulated.  
25.25.   We request that the basis for efficacy claims evaluation be determined by cosmetics 
registrants/notifiers based on the specific wording of claims and their scientific validity, that the 
scope of app lication of the "Guiding Principles for Evaluating Equivalent Efficacy " be expanded, and 
that the concept of read -across be introduced.  We also request that no more detailed information 
be required on cosmetic ingredients than necessary for cosmetics regis tration, even for products 
containing high -risk ingredients , or for new products.  
25.26.   Regarding labelling  rules, we request that the labelling  of cosmetics should not be required 
to be labelled  by the manufacturing company, but by the person who registered or notified the 
cosmetics, and that ingredients with a content of 1% or less can be listed in no particular order, in 
accordance with international practice.  Furthermore, we request that in the future, when 
implementing relevant laws and regulations, an appro priate period of time be allowed between the 
publication to the implementation of each relevant law and regulation , in accordance with 
Articles  2.12 and 5.9 of the TBT  Agreement , so that cosmetics registrants and notifiers can bring 
their products into com pliance with the new relevant laws and regulations.  
25.27.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
25.28.   China  takes note of the statements made by Member s. We refer to the statements made in 
previous meetings in this Council and the most recent TBT  meeting in M arch. Regarding the 
inspection required for cosmetics registration and notification, requiring the inspection for cosmetics 
registration and notification to be carried out by professional institutions aims to protect consumers ' 
rights and ensure the accura cy of the inspection results. Inspection institutions shall obtain the 
certification of inspection and testing qualification (CMA) in the field of cosmetics. However, China 
does not prohibit foreign inspection institutions from getting the certification, a nd China 's 
Administrative Measures for the Accreditation of Inspection and Testing Institutions does not restrict 
foreign inspection institutions from getting such certificates either.  
25.29.   Based on the WTO's non-discrimination principle, the Provisions on the Administration of 
Cosmetics Registration and Filing Data put forward exactly the same requirements on imported and 
domestic ordinary cosmetics regarding alternative program mes of animal test ing for safety 
evaluation. For both domestic and imported ordinary  cosmetics, a toxicological test can be replaced 
with a safety risk assessment once they have obtained quality management system certification 
issued by government authorities.  
25.30.   On the evaluation of cosmetic s efficacy claims , the formulation of the specific ation for the 
Evaluation of Cosmetic Efficacy Claims is to further ensure the specificity, accuracy , and reliability 
of the evaluation of cosmetic efficacy claims, safeguard the rights and interests of consumers, and 
promote social co -governance and the healthy development of the cosmetics industry. The 
Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Cosmetics and the Specifications and other 
supporting regulations clearly require that the claims of cosmetic s efficacy should be based on 
sufficient sc ientific evidence. Based on the principle of equivalence, the test method of efficacy claim 
evaluation does not make many  limitations as to selecting the evaluation methods. Cosmetic s 
registrants may, by themselves or through entrusted competent evaluation  institutions, carry out 
cosmetic s efficacy claim evaluation according to the relevant requirements set out in the Cosmetic 
Efficacy Claim Evaluation Project Requirement and Technical Guidelines for Cosmetic s Efficacy Claim 
Evaluation. The specific require ments for the equivalent evaluation of freckle removing and 
whitening efficacy have been clearly defined by the contents about "equivalent evaluation of efficacy 
claim " in the Test Method of Cosmetic s Freckle Removing and Whitening Efficacy and the 
Specifi cation for Evaluation of Cosmetic s Efficacy claims and other supporting documents . 
25.31.   On the cosmetics labelling -related issues , the information of cosmetics manufacturers 
includes the relevant information of the manufacturers , their locations , etc. Requiring  the labelling  
of the information of manufacturers is an important measure to protect consumers' right to know, 
as well as an important means through which to promote social co -governance and crack down on 
counterfeiting and shoddy products. The Regulation s on the Supervision and Administration of 
Cosmetics clearly stipulate that the registrant of cosmetics are responsible for the quality and safety G/C/M/145  
 
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  of cosmetics.  Furthermore, t he Measures for the Administration of Cosmetics Labels stipulates that 
ingredient s with weight percentage not exceeding 0.1% (w/w) should be labelled with "other trace 
ingredients " as indicating words. The measures do not require a descending order of ingredient 
content or any other specific order.  
25.32.   On the raw material s safety informati on related issues , product safety is closely related to 
the safety of raw materials. It is an important measure to ensure product safety to require registrants 
to clarify the relevant information of raw materials safety when applying for registration. Cons idering 
that it is common for enterprises to change the raw material manufacturer, the Provisions on the 
Management of Cosmetics Registration and Notification Data make corresponding provisions 
according to different situations in which the raw material ma nufacturers of registered or notified 
products have changed . If the manufacturer of registered or notified raw materials has changed, but 
the content of the raw materials used in the formula and the type and proportion of ingredients in 
the raw materials h ave not changed, it only needs to maintain the raw material manufacturer 
through the registration and notification information platform . If the manufacturer of raw materials 
of registered or notified products changes,  but the content of raw materials in th e formula and the 
content of main functional ingredients and solvents in the raw materials do not change, and the type 
or content of minor stabilizer, antioxidant, preservative , and other ingredients added to ensure the 
quality of raw materials change, onl y the change -related information shall be submitted, not all the 
information. In order to facilitate the cosmetics registrant to fill in the raw material safety -related 
information, it is made clear in the Regulations on the Administration of Cosmetics Reg istration and 
Record Holder issued by the State Food and Drug Administration that if the raw material 
manufacturer has already submitted the raw material safety -related information according to the 
regulations, the registrant only needs to fill in the raw material submission code for information 
association.  
25.33.   On the protection of trade secrets and intellectual property rights, the procedures and data 
requirements for the registration and notification of cosmetics and new raw materials are detailed 
and clear in the relevant regulation papers. Requiring registrants to submit safety -related materials 
is also a common practice that aims  for the safety review of health -related products in various 
countries.  
25.34.   It is exactly for the purpose of protecting the intellectual property rights and trade secrets 
of enterprises that , in the process of formulating relevant technical documents, the evaluation data 
required of cosmetic s efficacy claims only include the summary of the supporting material of the 
efficacy cl aims rather than the full text. The required technical materials of new raw materials only 
cover the basic aspects, such as name, registration number, source, composition, physical and 
chemical properties, purpose of use, scope of use, safe amount of use, precautions, storage 
conditions , and best before period, rather than the complete information. The authorities and 
administrative staff will strictly protect trade secrets in handling cosmetics registration, as prescribed 
by all relevant laws and regulatio ns. 
25.35.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
26  INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union.  
26.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.3.  Indonesia 's import restrictive policies and practices are a long -standing item in several 
WTO bodies.  The European Union  has repeatedly stressed its deep concerns on the increasing 
number and scope of Indonesian restrictions, which negatively impact trade flows.  The EU is 
particularly concerned by the restrictive impact that the commodity balance system m ay have. Such 
a system was established under Government Regulation  5/2021 and Ministry of Trade 
Regulations  19/2021 and 20/2021, and its scope of application keeps expanding.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  26.4.  We welcome efforts to ensure a coordinated and streamlined approach on the manage ment 
of import and export licen ces. However the mechanism also raises concerns that it may result in 
further restrictions to trade flows , in turn raising questions in terms of its WTO compatibility . 
26.5.  Economic operators are confronted with a lack of clarity as to the actual implementation of 
the commodity balance, including on its scope and timelines for its application to different groups of 
products. This creates additional challenges in terms of legal certainty and predictability.  The EU 
would also like to  reiterate that imports remain necessary as a part of Indonesia 's ambition to 
develop its domestic industry, and that raising barriers to trade would hamper its economic growth, 
which cannot be achieved through export promotion alone.  
26.6.  The EU would like to ask Indonesia to provide clarity as to the introduction of the "commodity 
balance " system as the basis for issuing import (and export) approvals, as well as on the 
implementing measures that it intends to take.  The EU also urge Indonesia to ensure that such 
policies and measures will be compliant with its WTO  obligations.  
26.7.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
26.8.  The United States joins the European Union  in again raising concerns regarding Indonesia 's 
commodity balance policy.  Since the  policy was implemented, importers have reported experiencing 
significant delays in obtaining import licen ces for certain agricultural products, as well as reductions 
in the volumes received . Please explain how the Government of Indonesia is addressing the se 
administrative delays . In addition, p lease explain whether importers are entitled to receive a licen ce 
covering whatever volume they request , and why there are reports that this is not happening.  
26.9.  The commodity balance policy appears to be stipulated for  certain commodities in different 
stages . For example, in 2021, the first  stage stipulated that commodity balances would exist for 
rice, sugar, beef, salt, and fisheries, but it has since been expanded to include non -agricultural 
products . Please explain h ow the Government of Indonesia determines to which products the policy 
will apply.  While Indonesia has previously explained that this policy was designed to build better 
trade governance and transparency, we strongly urge Indonesia to not expand its policy  to other 
products, and to rethink this counter -productive and trade -disruptive goal of import substitution . 
26.10.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
26.11.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by the European Union  and the United 
States regarding Indonesia 's Commodity Balance Mechanism.  It has been reported that our 
exporters face challenges , such as undue delays of the issuance of the recommendation and limited 
quantity of import quarter, brought about by the Commodity Balanc e Mechanism. In particular, 
Korea believes that Indonesia' s import restrictions, which are based on its own projection of domestic 
supply and demand, would undermine the transparency of the mechanism itself . Accordingly, Korea 
requests that Indonesia enhan ce the transparency and improve the functioning of the mechanism 
so that it does  not serve as an unnecessary obstacle to trade. The Republic of Korea stands ready 
to deepen our engagement with Indonesia to fully resolve this matter.  
26.12.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
26.13.   As indicated in previous meetings of the Council, Switzerland shares the concerns raised by 
the European Union,  the United States,  and the Republic of Korea, regarding Indonesia's  Commodity 
Balance Mechanism. Specifically, Indonesia had a plan aimed at reducing the value of imports by 
35% compared to its 2019  level by the end of 2022. Switzerland is interested in the clarifications 
Indonesia will provide, in particular regarding the rationale for this pla n, and the implementation 
details of the commodity balance system. Finally, we would be interested to know how Indonesia 
intends to ensure the consistency of these measures with its WTO  obligations.  
26.14.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
26.15.   Under the "Commodity Balance System ", an SPI (Import Permit) is required to be obtained 
for the import of subject products, and the issuance of export and import permits to businesses is 
to be conducted through the "National Commodity Balance System (SNAS -NK)" based  on the G/C/M/145  
 
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  government -determined commodity supply and demand balance, thus it put s the existing import 
application and permit system out of operation in December  2022.  
26.16.   However, in January  2023, there were delays and glitches in the operation of SNAS -NK, 
which  is compliant with the system, resulting in major disruptions, such as import permits being 
delayed. In the case of steel products, the system has had a serious impact, with import applications 
themselves being blocked for a period of time, and inventories  have been depleted to the point 
where production stoppages have become a reality for related industries in the region.  In addition, 
obstacles to imports, including air conditioners and textiles, continue to persist, as the number and 
timing of approvals a fter applications are filed are mixed and unpredictable, and only a small portion 
of the volume applied for is approved. The commodity balance system is highly likely to violate 
Article  XI:1 of the GATT , as a measure that has a trade restrictive effect on imports.  
26.17.   Besides, we are concerned that the specific formula for calculating the commodity balance 
and the specific method for determining the quantities that can be imported are not specified in the 
law and are inconsistent with the obligation to publish trade rules as stipulated in Article  X of the 
GATT , and may also violate the Agreement  on Import Licensing Procedures , given that actual 
operations have caused significant obstacles to import permits, and we request that the situation be 
rectified as soon as possible.  
26.18.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
26.19.   Indonesia refers to the statement it made at the CTG's previous meeting, and would like to 
again emphasize that this mechanism is not intended to hinder imports from WTO  Member s. The 
Commodity Balance Mechanism aims to create and facilitate a better business environment, 
certainty in doing business, and free trade flows, without adding burden to import procedure s. 
26.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
27  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand.  
27.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.3.  This is a very long-standing agenda item, and it is an issue of deep concern to the E uropean 
Union – as well as to many other WTO  Member s – that no real progress could be registered. Rather, 
the number and scope  of Indonesia's  restrictions seem to have further expanded over time, with 
negative impacts on trade flows.  In particular, the EU reiterates its serious preoccupation with 
Indonesia 's burdensome and lengthy SPS  import authori zation procedures, complex rule s and lack 
of pragmatic certification procedures for Halal labelling, mandatory use of domestic SNI  standards 
diverging from international standards  for an increasing number of products, wider use of local 
content requirements, and restrictive import licensing requirements or other import control 
measures , such as the slow and partial allocation of import authori zations for textiles and footwear.  
27.4.  In addition to the concerns raised under the previous agenda item on the Commodity Balance 
Mechanism, the EU notes the introduction of a new export regime under Regulation  18/2021, which 
appears to significantly expand the scope of goods subject to export proh ibitions (from 39 to 
275 tariff lines). Such a regime further hinders trade flows and raises doubts in terms of compliance 
with WTO  obligations.  
27.5.  The EU also reiterates its call on Indonesia to ensure that all relevant measures are notified 
to the WTO in or der to allow Member s to provide comments on them.  And t he EU urges Indonesia 
to reduce the high number of trade barriers which have been affecting EU  trade flows for too long , 
and to refrain from introducing new trade barriers . G/C/M/145  
 
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  27.6.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
27.7.  New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by the European Union,  Japan, and others , in 
previous CTG  meetings.  As New Zealand has noted previously, we believe that Indonesia 's 
restrictions on agricultural imports continue to undermine core WTO  principles.  The frequent 
changes to import requirements reduce commercial certainty, which in turn hampers returns for 
businesses and can lead to increased costs. Moreover, in the food and beverage sector , this 
uncertainty also contributes to the ongoing increasing cost of food, which can have a particularly 
negative effect on people on low incomes.  
27.8.  New Zealand is particularly concerned about the inconsistent time -frames and issuance of 
import licen ces. Uncertainty around import licen ces leads to c ommercially significant market access 
issues for trading partners , and can lead to importers having greater difficulty in sourcing food 
products for local consumers.  We request that Indonesia provide greater clarity on the time -frames 
for the issuance of import recommendations for commodities not currently under the SNANK  system , 
and how import volumes are calculated and allocated to importers . We also request that Indonesia 
also provide further information to trading partners on the Commodity Balance Mechanism, including 
how the mechanism is calculated, and how Indonesia is undertaking to make the mechanism more 
transparent . 
27.9.  New Zealand welcomes that a stated objective of the Presidential Regulation  32/2022 on 
Commodity Balances is to improve the import licen sing process and facilitate business access to 
imports. However, we note that the Regulation appears likely to add further complexity, as it allows 
for import restrictions to be applied where domestic supply is calculated to be sufficient to me et 
projected demand. Details of the Commodity Balance/import licens ing system are yet to be provided, 
which is adding to the uncertain environment for imports.  
27.10.   Finally, New Zealand appreciates Indonesia 's comments at the CTG  meeting in July  2023 
that, "in principle, Indonesia has no intention to impede the flow of international trade through our 
import and export policies "; that "Indonesia always pursues for simplification, transparency, and 
efficiency to make exports and imports easier to implement "; and t hat "Indonesia stands ready to 
engage bilaterally with WTO  Member s on their concerns ". We join others in asking Indonesia to 
make renewed efforts to address these long -standing concerns about Indonesia 's import restricting 
policies and their impact on agri cultural trade.  
27.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
27.12.   In past CTG and TRIMs  Committee  meetings , Japan has continuously expressed its concerns 
about the WTO-consistency of various Local Content Requirement (LCR) measures implemented by 
Indonesia re lating to 4G  LTE equipment, TV  equipment, and the retail industry.  Indonesia has 
repeatedly explained that the LCR  measures in general are based on the government procurement 
policy, but the content of the government procurement policy is unclear. It does not appear that all 
LCR measures are being implemented as part of government procurement, nor are they immediately 
justified because of government procurement policies. In addition, at the TRIM s Committee 's 
meeting of  February  2023, Indonesia  argued that t he measures "are related to policies such as 
meeting the welfare and the necessities of life of the Indonesian people. Third, they are related to 
policies such as strategic goods for national management. " However, as mentioned in the past, these 
reasons do  not immediately justify LCR  measures under the WTO  Agreement. Japan understands 
the importance of the objective, but believes that taking LCR  measures easily as a means to achieve 
the objective should not be allowed.  
27.13.   Regarding the comprehensive review, In donesia has repeatedly stated at TRIM s Committee 
meetings that it has "initiated multiple reviews of measures at the level of domestic components 
and that this process is ongoing. " Japan would like a concrete explanation of the schedule and the 
details of the review.  
27.14.   In May  2022, the Indonesian government announced that it would introduce the "Neraca 
Komoditas " (Commodity Balance System) for these products from 2023, based on Minist erial Decree 
No. 25 of 2022 of the Minister of Commerce. Japan's concerns about the commodity balance system 
are on the agenda. As mentioned under A genda Item 26, Japan's concerns about the commodity 
balance system are that it violates Article  XI.1 of the GATT  1994 (prohibition of quantitative G/C/M/145  
 
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  restrictions), Article  X of the GATT  1994 (publication of trade rules), and the provisions of the Import 
Licensing Agreement, and we call for a remedy for the situation to be found as soon as possible.  
27.15.   Furthermore, wi th regard to textile products, it was truly regrettable that the safeguard 
measure on carpets was introduced on 17  February  2021, even though Japan ha d been raising this 
measure at various discussions, including at the Safeguards Committee , as well as in consultations. 
It is regrettable that no improvement has been seen.  There are two  main problems: (i) the tariff is 
as high as 150 -200% in terms of ad valorem  tax conversion ; and (ii) the tariff has been introduced 
in a situation in which carpet imports have  dropped sharply.  
27.16.   At the Safeguards  Committee meeting held in October  2022, in response to Japan's 
concerns, Indonesia stated that the share of imports from Japan ha d not decreased, but since the 
overall volume of imports has decreased sharply, we request that a clear rationale be provided and, 
as long as there is no change in the effect of Indonesia's import restrictions, that the  import 
restrictions  be eliminated as soon as possible.  
27.17.   Japan is concerned about the increasing number of trade  restrictive meas ures in Indonesia, 
which are thought to be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement, and we would like to request a 
concrete explanation regarding the background of the introduction of these systems , and their 
consistency with the WTO  Agreement.  
27.18.   In particular, with regard to the three  measures for the import regulation on air conditioners, 
import licen ce for steel, and import regulation for textiles, Japan submitted written questions to the 
Import Licens ing and TRIMs  Committee s. We expect a prompt response from Indonesia. We do hope 
that import regulations on air conditioners will be operated so as not to fall under import restrictions, 
that permit standards and procedures will be stipulated with more transparency, and that othe r will 
measures be corrected or abolished as soon as possible.  
27.19.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
27.20.   We remain concerned with the import substitution program me of Indonesia. It appears that 
several measures undertaken are more trade restrictive th an necessary to achieve the policy 
objectives Indonesia has set. Our businesses have complained about several trade barriers they 
have faced in Indonesia in recent times, including those in agricultural products. We request 
Indonesia to review its import l icensing procedures and other trade measures and remove any 
inherent barriers to trade contained therein.  
27.21.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
27.22.   Switzerland shares the concerns expressed by other delegations. According to feedback from 
our ex porters, the import of dairy products in Indonesia is repeatedly subject to delays or blockages 
that are incomprehensible. We would appreciate receiving further information from Indonesia on its 
current import system. We are particularly interested in know ing the following: (i ) how import 
licences are issued , and quantities calculated and allocated ; and (ii) what are the reasons for the 
difficulties faced by our exporters.  
27.23.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
27.24.   As we intervened last year , we would like to take this opportunity to again underscore our 
concerns with Indonesia 's import and export restricting policies and practices.  The United States has 
raised concerns with specific Indonesian policies in past meetings of the Council, as wel l as in the 
TRIMs, TBT, ITA, and Market Access Committees.  
27.25.   First, we again ask Indonesia to provide the Council with an update on its review of its local 
content policies , which has been ongoing for some time . We underscore the importance of ensuring 
that its consultations allow for broad public input.  
27.26.   Second, we continue to have concerns regarding Indonesia 's continued application of tariffs 
on multiple ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments.  We have raised 
this issue with Indo nesia bilaterally and across multiple WTO  committees over the past four  years, 
without receiving a substantive response to our concerns . We urge Indonesia to engage G/C/M/145  
 
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  constructively on this issue, and finally address these long -standing concerns to ensure the integrity 
of its market access commitments.  
27.27.   Third, we are concerned by Indonesia 's continued practice of finalizing trade -related 
measures without sufficient opportunities for stakeholder input . Indonesia has demonstrated a 
pattern of issuing final measures connected to its Halal product assurance law without sufficient 
notification and with little, if any, opportunities for public input.  These measures have the potential 
to impact a significant p roportion of global goods trade with Indonesia, including US  exports. By 
finalizing measures in this manner, Indonesia misses an opportunity to receive valuable feedback 
from stakeholders regarding the trade impact of its measures.  Additionally, we remain concerned 
that Indonesia has yet to respond to important questions on its Halal measures that we have 
circulated at the TBT  Committee.  
27.28.   Going forward, we strongly encourage Indonesia to adopt a more transparent and 
consultative policymaking process , as well  as to reconsider its trade -restrictive policies , which will 
support its broader economic goals as well as the interest of Indonesian consumers, workers, and 
businesses . 
27.29.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
27.30.   To pick up on the comment from the Uni ted States around ICT  products, this was an issue 
that was raised last week in the IT A Committee, and Canada also continues to have systemic 
concerns with Indonesia's application of tariffs  above its bound rates on ICT  products. Canada calls 
upon Indonesia  to eliminate those tariffs in a way that is consistent with its WTO  commitments.  
27.31.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
27.32.   Indonesia refers to its statement delivered at the previous CTG and related Committee 
meeting s, as follow s. On the Local Content Requirements, these are intended for policies relat ing to 
government procurement, and policies relat ing to fulfilling the need to maintain welfare and the 
necessities of life for the people of Indonesia, or policies relat ing to strategic  resources managed by 
the state.  
27.33.   Regarding tariffs on ICT  products, domestic consultations between the relevant ministries  
and i nstitutions are still ongoing. Indonesia will continue to strive to comply with all 
WTO Agreements, including Indonesia's commit ment to the WTO  Agreement.  
27.34.   On the textile import licensing regime, based on existing regulations, applications for import 
licences are currently being carried out electronically . Once  all the documents submitted are 
complete and in line with the regulation , import permits are processed in a relatively short time , in 
accordance with the Import Licensing Agreement.  
27.35.   Regarding the licensing regime for importing agricultural products, Indonesia has committed 
to implement ing the recommendations and decisions of t he DSB in DS477/478.  
27.36.   On the import licensing procedures relat ing to Sanitary and Phyto sanitary (SPS)  measures , 
Indonesia has  continued,  and always will continue, to strive to make progress, improvements, and 
become more transparent in our SPS -related impor t licensing approval procedures.  
27.37.   On Halal regulations, Indonesia reaffirms our openness and transparency for international 
cooperation in  the Halal Assurance System, based on mutual principles, cooperation, mutual 
recognition, and mutual acceptance, in acc ordance with international practices and regulations. 
Indonesia has also submitted to the TBT  Committee a number of clarifications regarding Indonesian 
Halal regulations.  
27.38.   On the Indonesian National Standard (SNI), this policy is part of Indonesian policy for 
consumer protection, and not intended to hinder imports from WTO  Member s. The SNI  policy is to 
ensure that products fulfil the aspects of safety, security , and health of Indonesian consumers, and 
is enforced both for domestic and impo rted products . Indonesia also always strives to fulfil the 
principles of WTO  transparency by notifying every implementation of mandatory SNI  regulations and 
other related technical regulations to the WTO.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  27.39.   Indonesia reiterate s that we will continue to striv e to comply with all of our commitments 
and to every WTO  rule and principle , particularly to the principles of transparency and 
non-discrimination.  
27.40.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
28  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FR OM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States.  
28.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
28.3.  Australia thanks India for its response to Australia 's questions raised during the CTG's 
previous meeting, held in November  2022.  As Member s will recall, India implemented temporary 
quantitative import restrictions back in late 2017, which we and many other Member s viewed as 
WTO-inconsistent.  
28.4.  In May  2021, India announced that it would remove its quantitative  restriction policy for a 
limited n umber of pulses  – namely urad and tur or pigeon peas  – shifting them from the "restricted " 
to the "free" product list. This change was effectively a carve -out from a distortionary policy 
implemented by India.  
28.5.  On 28  December  2022, India 's Directorate Genera l of Foreign Trade announced a further 
extension of its "free import policy " for the same few pulses – urad and tur or pigeon peas – until 
31 March  2024. We note that by the time this latest extension of the free import policy for urad and 
tur or pigeon pe as is scheduled to expire, India will have maintained a "temporary " suspension on 
its WTO -inconsistent quantitative restrictions policies for almost three  years.  
28.6.  Australia appreciates the extended duration of the most recent exemption of these pulses 
from import restrictions, not to mention its advance notice, which is effectively a signal of greater 
liberali zation of India 's trade policy. This will be positively received by global markets for pulses.  
28.7.  However, we cannot ignore that this is still a temporary  exemption,  and, for that reason, 
Australia once again encourages India to consider the longer -term benefits to its own food security 
of permanently removing its quantitative restrictions on all pulses. More permanent, open trade 
settings would be more eff ective at building greater resilience in India's supply of pulses, providing 
greater certainty to suppliers and reducing risk -related costs. For consumers, more open trade 
settings would mean a more reliable supply of pulses and lower prices, with clear be nefits for food 
security.  
28.8.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
28.9.  The United States shares the concerns of other Members regarding India's quantitative 
restrictions for select varieties of pulses . As we have stated previously at meetings of the Committee 
on Import Licensing, Committee on Agriculture , and Committee on Market Access, we repeat our 
request for information on how the measures reflect India's WTO commitments , and when and how 
the measu res will be ended. We continue to urge India to consider less trade restrictive 
requirements,  and to notify future relevant measures and regulations in a timely manner.  
28.10.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
28.11.   As done many times in this Council,  and in other WTO  Committees before, Canada continues 
to call for India to immediately and expeditiously remove its trade restrictive measures put in place 
on dried peas and other pulses, and to implement alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that 
promote a predictable and transparent import regime for pulses.  Canada continues to question the 
legal interpretation provided by India to justify trade restrictive measures on dried peas, especially 
its "temporary nature " when the quantitative restrictions were established on 25 April 2018.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  28.12.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.13.   The European Union  remains concerned with the lack of certainty and stability when it comes 
to the import regime for certain varieties of pulses in India, which implicitly have an impact on the 
global pulses market. India has been saying now for years that its measures are of a temporary 
nature, whereas we can easily notice that in practice the situation is different . The EU calls on India 
to reconsider its measures while ensuring that they are WTO -consistent.  
28.14.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
28.15.   Argentina than ks the delegations that included this item on the Agenda. As we have 
previously stated in this Council , and in the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Argentina 
reiterates its concern over the uncertainty that these measures entail for our exporters , and requests 
their review by the Indian  authorities . 
28.16.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
28.17.   India would  like to thank the intervening delegations for their continued interest in this issue. 
As addressed in the previous meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods , as well as the Committee 
on Market Access, the measures adopted by India are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining 
food and nutritional security. This is an area of great importance to our economy and the policies on 
imports are regular ly reviewed and updated.  
28.18.   The trade measures applicable to pulses are in compliance with the relevant 
WTO Agreements and specified procedures of th ose agreements. My delegation would urge the 
proponents of this agenda to specifically state what problems the ir exporters are facing , and the 
quantification thereof. In absence of this information, it will be unfortunate if this specific trade 
concern still carries forward in other meetings of WTO  regular bodies.  
28.19.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
29  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union.  
29.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the followi ng: 
29.3.  The European Union once again reiterates its concern on the import restrictions imposed by 
the United States on apples and pears from the EU. The United States has still not solved this 
unjustified barrier.  This long-standing  concern has been raised mu ltiple times in this Council as well 
as in the SPS  Committee.  
29.4.  All the necessary scientific groundwork has been carried out and the United States has 
finalized its scientific assessment , concluding already several years ago that apples and pears from 
the EU  are safe for imports into the United States under the accepted systems approach.  The only 
remaining step is purely administrative , as it requires a publication of a final notice. This publication 
is blocked by the United States without any scientific just ification for such a delay , as all technical 
work has been satisfactorily concluded. The United States is thereby ignoring its own risk assessment 
carried out at the technical level. And the United States is thereby not respecting its obligations 
under the  SPS Agreement.  
29.5.  The EU reiterates i ts request and urges the United States to respect its obligations under the 
SPS Agreement. The EU further urges the US to base its import conditions on science and to resolve 
this important matter without further delay. T he EU looks forward to continuing working with the 
United States with a view to resolving this issue promptly.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  29.6.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
29.7.  The United States thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight  EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach to the 
United States. The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request . We would again note that the EU is able to export apples and pears to 
the United States under the existing preclearance program.  
29.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  PAKISTAN – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS AND DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT ON 
FOODSTUFFS AND CO NSUMER GOODS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union.  
30.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
30.3.  The European Union  would like to recall  its serious concern over Pakistan's frequent issuing 
of new Statutory Regulatory Orders (SRO s), which are very detrimental in terms of transparency 
and legal predictability.  These regulatory duties have banned or restricted imports and impacted 
companies and consumers in Pakistan, with further negative consequences on local competitiveness 
and the business environment.  We noticed that the regulatory duties introduced by Pakistan last 
June, via SRO  966, with its subsequent amendments , which  althou gh temporary in nature, have 
been further extended until the end of March, via the new SRO s 204 and 205 , issued on 
20 February  2023. We would therefore like to invite Pakistan to confirm whether these measures 
will not be further extended or replaced by ne w ones . 
30.4.  The new SRO  297(1)/2023 , adopted by the Pakistani authorities on 8  March  2023, is an 
additional source of concern , as it states that , "the sales tax shall be charged, levied and paid at the 
rate of twenty five percent of the value of the goods imported and their subsequent supply or the 
retail price  … ". According to the Pakistan Sales Tax Act  1990, the sales tax was levied at a rate of 
17% on both imported and domestically produced goods, while the new SRO seems to introduce a 
discriminatory ap proach between the two  categories, which is inconsistent with the national 
treatment principle.  
30.5.  We would like to invite Pakistan to provide further clarification on this topic.  The EU stands 
ready to work jointly with Pakistan to remove these restrictions as they are detrimental to 
consumers, exporters and at the same time they have not helped to remedy Pakistan's fiscal 
imbalances and budget deficit in a sustainable manner.  
30.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JA PAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES 
– REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
31.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
31.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements on the unilateral trade restrictive measures 
made during previous CTG  meetings. The number of anti -Russian measures imposed by Aust ralia, 
Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States continues to grow rapidly. Today this number is approaching 3,000.  
31.4.  Since the beginning of the year, this long list of measures has been supplement ed by new 
export bans on certain industrial and medical goods, additional import bans on mineral products 
from Russia, a nd a number of new restrictive measures target ing major Russian banks, research 
institutes , and commercial companies.  These measures are not only WTO -inconsistent, but also G/C/M/145  
 
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  exacerbate global economic, energy, and food crises, and cause irreparable harm to the global 
economy.  Despite this, we have witnessed a number of attempts to accuse Russia of triggering the 
global food crisis. Such att empts are not based on an objective assessment of the background data.  
31.5.  The growth in prices for inputs of agricultural products is the consequence of some countries ' 
decision to reject Russian hydrocarbons, and fertilizers, and to impose restrictions on tr ansportation, 
finance , and insurance. Russia is both a major producer and exporter of wheat and fertilizers. For 
instance, Russian fertilizers ensure the production of 117  million ton nes of wheat, or 
440 million  tonnes of corn, which is enough to feed abou t 500 million people. The measures against 
Russia led to increase s in costs of logistics and food prices, decreasing the availability of such goods 
for those in need (namely emerging market economies, developing and least developed countries 
who are net im porters of such goods from our country).  
31.6.  Despite claims of there being no restrictions, Russian exporters face:  (i) increased import 
tariffs ; (ii) blocking of payments ; (iii) bans on seaport entry ; (iv)  restrictions for freight and road 
transport , as well as insurance and legal services ; (v) inability to purchase and deliver spare parts 
for necessary agricultural equipment ; and (vi)  restrictive measures against related companies and 
individuals that include freezing of assets and prohibition to deal with su ch persons.  These measures 
have result ed in increased transaction costs and de facto quantitative restrictions on Russian  
supplies of food and fertilizers , leading to global food shortages and price hikes. Thus, all attempts 
to shift the blame for all of the above -mentioned problems on to Russia look ridiculous.  
31.7.  We also note that the targeted sectors of sanctions align suspiciously with traditional 
protection ist policies against Russia. These measures serve typical market interests and alter global 
competition. Sanctions restrict trade relations, allowing others to pursue their economic interests. 
This approach fragments the multilateral trading system and und ermines the WTO's foundations of 
resisting protectionist pressures. Trade is only open for Members of specific "like-minded clubs ", 
leading to discrimination and distorted competition.  
31.8.  The WTO's value lies in negotiating trade agreements, settling disputes , and addressing trade 
problems. The anti -Russian measures continue to undermine the multilateral trading system ( MTS). 
The blatant disregard of the basic principles and rules of the WTO diminishes its role as a cornerstone 
of the MTS. Unilateral impositio n of politically biased trading measures clearly states the new norm 
that no Member is safe from same unlawful treatment.  
31.9.  In this context, the Russian Federation  calls on the WTO  Members in question to restore the 
smooth functioning of the WTO , and urges those same Members immediately to lift their unilateral 
trade restrictive measures, including those with extraterritorial implications, and to stop their 
coercive actions aimed at forcing other WTO  Members to follow suit.  
31.10.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
31.11.   The far -flung narrative we  have heard just now from Russia was – frankly – about as 
unconvincing as it was untruthful.  Indeed, the United Kingdom will not ignore Russia's futile – and, 
evidently, implausible – attempts to disinform, divert, and distract Member s from the impacts of 
their unjustified, illegal invasion of Ukraine – which is now on Day  403. 
31.12.   The fact is that Russia alone bears responsibility for the worsening global implications of 
their chosen war w ithin Ukraine, the  impacts of which have been highlighted by multiple international 
organi zations, including the World Bank in October.  Indeed, in contrast to Russia 's weak 
smokescreen of lies, the cold hard facts stand out with resounding clarity:  
31.13.   The fac t is that the UN  Human Rights Office has confirmed 8 ,000 civilians in Ukraine have 
been killed by Russia 's war. Describing that figure as the "tip of the iceberg " back in February, the 
UN High Commissioner labelled the toll on civilians as "unbearable. " And it is. That is a sobering 
reminder to everyone in this room of the appalling ongoing suffering in Ukraine.  
31.14.   The fact is that Russia has crippled Ukraine 's grain export capabilities. Russia 's actions have 
rendered more than 5  million hectares of agricultur al land in Ukraine unusable. Russia has destroyed 
or damaged 84 ,000 units of Ukrainian agricultural machinery. And – as Russian missiles, landmines 
and tanks continue to displace Ukrainians, prevent Ukrainians planting and harvesting food, and G/C/M/145  
 
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  destroy Ukra inian infrastructure – the catastrophic impacts on global food security will continue to 
grow more acute.  
31.15.   The fact is that the impact is already dire. After the invasion in 2022, the UN  World Food 
Programme said that close to 70  million people were being p ushed closer to starvation by the war. 
And the Global Crisis Response Group has recently forecasted that 19 million more people are 
expected to face chronic undernourishment in 2023 because of Russia 's war.  
31.16.   And – in reaction to a spiralling global food cri sis, galvani zed by their war – the fact is that 
Russia is choosing to make a bad situation worse.  Because – having unilaterally cut global supply, 
and thus upped demand, and stimulated price hikes in food – Russia has, as enshrined in their 
legislation, ta ken unilateral steps that further increase global prices of agri -food. 
31.17.   They have done this through placing restrictions on their own exports. Such measures cover 
numerous agricultural goods – including fertili zer, white sugar, raw cane sugar, wheat, rye, meslin, 
barley, corn, rice, sunflower oil and seeds, and rapeseed oil and seeds.  Again: the facts here speak 
for themselves. And the UK will continue to shine a spotlight on this deliberate weaponi zing of food.  
31.18.   So these are facts of the impacts of Rus sia's war. But we must also address the 
disinformation that Russia is spreading on the UK 's sanctions.  The fact is that the target of 
UK sanctions is Putin 's war machine. Not global food and fertili zer sectors. And, unlike Russia, the 
UK does not have any unilateral global export restrictions on agri -food. 
31.19.   So, as enshrined in our law, the UK has not imposed sanctions on food or fertili zer exports 
from Russia to third  countries. Should anyone seek any more information on how we  have done this, 
we remain at Member s' disposal to explain the clear and obvious mitigations designed specifically to 
prevent unintended impact on Russian food exports.  
31.20.   Looking ahead, in terms of the crisis, the UK will keep doing all we can to support resilience 
in food security across  the rest of the world , including funding worth USD 230 million to the Global 
Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), worth USD 20 million to increase food production 
in vulnerable countries, and nearly USD 180 million towards humanitarian crises in  East Africa.  
31.21.   In closing, we would reaffirm that the United Kingdom will stand with Ukraine for as long as 
it takes.  We will keep working with our international partners to ensure maximum international 
scrutiny on Putin and his war machine – until he withd raws his troops, and ends this unjust and 
illegal war in Ukraine.  
31.22.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
31.23.   The European Union reiterates its resolute condemnation of the Russian Federation's war of 
aggression against Ukraine, which deliberately violates the UN  Charter and disregards the 
rules-based international order. It undermines international security and stability, and has no place 
in the 21st century.  The European Union 's support for Ukraine 's independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and right of self -defence is unwavering.  
31.24.   Thus, the European Union remains committed to maintaining and increasing collective 
pressure on Russia, including through possible further restrictive measures, and to continue wor king 
on the oil price cap together with partners. We will continue our efforts to ensure effective 
implementation of sanctions.  
31.25.   We strongly condemn Russia 's disinformation attempts which blame international sanctions 
for rising food insecurity. Our sanctio ns – which neither target trade in agricultural, food or medical 
products, nor the trade of Russia with third  countries – are not to blame.  Russia, by weaponizing  
food in its war against Ukraine, is solely responsible for the global food insecurity that th is war has 
provoked.  
31.26.   In that context, the EU will continue its efforts, through inter alia, the UN  Black Sea Grain 
Initiative, the EU 's Solidarity Lanes and the Ukrainian "Grain from Ukraine"  initiatives to bolster 
global food security.  It is essential to ensure the continued availability and affordability of agricultural 
products for the countries that are most in need.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  31.27.   The EU has taken all its measures in a fully transparent manner. The relevant EU  measures 
are publicly accessible, including through notif ication to the C ommittee on Market Access . 
31.28.   The EU calls on Russia to stop its acts of aggression and withdraw its troops from Ukraine. 
Russia must cease actions endangering civilians and respect international humanitarian law , and 
fully respect Ukraine 's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence within its internationally 
recogni zed borders.  
31.29.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
31.30.   We condemn Russia 's unjustifiable, unprovoked, and illegal aggression against independent 
and sove reign Ukraine, and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause . We will spare no 
efforts to hold President Putin and the architects and supporters of this aggression accountable for 
their actions . We underline our resolve to impose severe economic  and financial consequences on 
Russia.  As we have said before, Russia is complaining about a situation that it has created, and is 
trying to shift the blame for the death and destruction that it has caused.  
31.31.   Russia started this war; Russia perpetuates this war; Russia illegally tried to annex e parts 
of Ukraine; Russia continues to destroy Ukraine 's agricultural and energy infrastructure; and Russia 
continues to spread disinformation that Western sanctions are causing food insecurity when we have 
made it quit e clear that banks, insurers, shippers, and other actors can continue to bring Russian 
food and fertilizer to the world.  In short, Russia, with support from Belarus 's complicity, is 
responsible for much of the devastation and disruption being felt around t he world.  
31.32.   The United States will continue to condemn Putin 's brutal, unprovoked and unjustified war 
against Ukraine.  The United States will continue to support Ukraine 's courageous efforts to defend 
itself, uphold its territorial integrity and protect its population.  The United States will continue to 
work with its partners and allies to sustain and intensify international pressure on President Putin's 
regime, and its enablers in Belarus, for as long as necessary.  
31.33.   The delegate of Canada  indicate d the following:  
31.34.   Canada continues not to engage with Russia 's delegation to the WTO in a business -as-usual  
fashion given Russia 's unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression in Ukraine.  
31.35.   No amount of misinformation can hide Russia 's culpability; R ussia is solely responsible for 
this crisis, not Western sanctions, which are only designed to stop Russia 's unjust and brutal war in 
Ukraine. Russia 's efforts to blame Western sanctions for the cause of these crises are simply 
attempts to re -direct the na rrative away from its own actions.  It is Russia 's ongoing invasion that 
has significantly disrupted global supply chains, and created significant uncertainty in international 
trade, driving up costs of food and energy worldwide . 
31.36.   Canada 's support for Ukrain e and its people is unwavering, and we will work to find ways to 
use trade to support Ukraine in rebuilding its economy and its society.  
31.37.   The evolving food crisis remains a top priority for Canada and other donors, as demonstrated 
by its continued prioritiz ation within the G7 and G20  agendas in 2023.  
31.38.   Canada will continue to support humanitarian partners, such as the World Food Programme, 
to help meet the emergency food and nutrition needs of the growing number of acutely food insecure 
people.  Canada has made  significant new commitments to humanitarian food and nutrition 
assistance, including a record USD 650 million allocated in 2022, and continues to provide 
longer -term development assistance to address root causes of hunger and malnutrition.  
31.39.   Canada is also supportive of efforts to mitigate export shortfalls from the invasion of Ukraine 
and reduce global food prices, including through the EU  Solidarity Lanes and the Black Sea Grain 
Initiative.  We will continue to take actions that we consider necessary to pro tect our essential 
security interests, and we will work closely with like -minded partners to promote peace and security 
for all states and their citizens.  Finally, we once again call for Russia to immediately cease all hostile 
actions against Ukraine.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  31.40.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
31.41.   Norway implements restrictive measures as other Member s mentioned under Agenda 
Item 31. The measures have been taken as a reaction to Russia 's unprovoked military invasion of 
Ukraine and illegal attempts to annex e Ukrainian territory which  Norway condemns in the strongest 
possible terms.  The restrictive measures are directed at Russia' s war machine.  We are appalled by 
Russia 's continued war of aggression, which is a gross violation of international law and th e 
UN Charter. The blame for the global consequences of this aggression lies squarely with Russia.  
31.42.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
31.43.   Switzerland condemns Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest terms 
and calls on Rus sia to take military de -escalation measures to end hostilities and to immediately 
withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory.  The continuation of this military attack blatantly violates 
international law, most notably the prohibition on the use of force,  the principle of the territorial 
integrity of States , and the obligation to protect the civilian population.  Switzerland calls on all actors 
to respect international law, in particular humanitarian international law.  
31.44.   In response to Russia's military aggre ssion, Switzerland has taken a number of economic 
measures. We stress that these measures do not relate to foodstuffs or fertilizers and are exceptional 
in nature. They have been taken as a result of Russia's violation of international law and are in 
accor dance with international law, including WTO  law. 
31.45.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
31.46.   As other Member s who have spoken, Australia again condemns , in the strongest possible 
terms , Russia 's illegal and immoral, full -scale invasion of Ukraine.  This invasion is a gross violation 
of international law . Australia strongly supports Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
31.47.   Australia has imposed a comprehensive suite of measures against Russia in response to its 
invasion of Ukraine, including mo re than 1 ,000 targeted financial sanctions and trade measures such 
as: (i) a ban on imports of Russian oil, refined petroleum products, coal and gas (effective from 
25 April); (ii) a ban on exports of alumina and bauxite to Russia (effective from 20  March ); (iii) a 
ban on the export of certain luxury goods to Russia, including wine and cosmetics (effective from 
7 April); and  (iv) denying Russia access to most -favoured -nation tariff treatment and imposing an 
additional tariff of 35 % on goods.  Australia has notified these trade measures to the WTO to ensure 
transparency, which is an important obligation on all Member s that Australia takes seriously . 
Australia has also joined like -minded partners to prohibit the importation of Russian gold to red uce 
Russia 's ability to fund its war.  
31.48.   These measures are justified given Russia 's unprecedented invasion, and are justified under 
WTO rules, in particular Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. Food and agricultural commodities (aside from 
a limited number of luxury goods , such as lobster and caviar) are not sanctioned by Australia.  
31.49.   Rather, it is Russia 's own decisions that are constraining its contribution to global food 
stocks, including through the imposition of restrictions on its own exports.  Russia 's illegal invasion 
is also compounding human suffering and propelling the global crisis in food and energy security by 
destroying Ukraine 's agricultural land and facilities for processing and exporting staple foods, and 
disrupting regular trade through the Black  Sea. 
31.50.   Australia is committed to strengthening the global rules -based order, and is a ready and 
able partner for all countries that seek a peaceful and prosperous world, where sovereignty is 
respected.  
31.51.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
31.52.   Russia' s aggression of Ukraine clearly infringes upon Ukraine' s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and constitutes a grave breach of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of 
force. Japan will never accept the unilateral attempt to change the stat us quo by force and it is an 
extremely serious situation that shakes the very foundation of  the international order. Japan 
condemns Russia' s actions in the strongest terms.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  31.53.   In response to Russia’s aggression, Japan is implementing strict sanctions in close  
cooperation with the international community, including the G7.  We continue to work with our 
partners, including international organizations, to proactively address the impact of Russia's 
aggression of Ukraine on areas such as energy and food, among other s, across many countries.  
Japan and other countries have been carefully addressing the situation by imposing sanctions in a 
manner that does not hinder the provision of humanitarian assistance or the operation of global 
agricultural trade.  
31.54.   We insist that t he Russian Federation must urgently stop its aggression against Ukraine and 
immediately withdraw its troops. We are firmly convinced that the Russian Federation must be held 
accountable and must cease its actions, which undermine peace and security.  
31.55.   The de legate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
31.56.   Ukraine would like to emphasize once again that the main reason for  the imposition of trade 
restrictive measures against Russia is Russia 's illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against 
Ukraine that constitutes a blatant violation of international law and undermines the rules -based 
international order.  
31.57.   Russia started and continues the war and now Russia is blaming everyone except itself and 
spreading disinformation that sanctions are causing and aggra vating crises. The sanctions imposed 
because of Russia 's full-scale invasion of Ukraine were introduced in accordance with international 
law, including WTO  law. No disinformation can hide the real culprit – Russia is solely responsible for 
the war and the deepening crises we face.  
31.58.   All these economic measures are targeted at ending this war and not hindering trade in 
agricultural, food or medical products. Russia itself uses food insecurity as a new weapon. For 
example, the volume of Ukrainian food exported by sea could be significantly higher if it was  not for 
Russia 's policy of delaying the inspection of vessels.  Russia 's deliberate destruction of Ukrainian 
farming and agricultural infrastructure, including transportation and storage facilities, can hardly 
contribute to global food security.  
31.59.   We are confident that the sanctions regime should not only be maintained, but also 
strengthened in order to limit Russia 's ability to finance its war.  We expect the sanctions coalition to 
be expanded further , and hope that more WTO  Member s will join it, and cease to provide material 
support to Russia 's war. Preventing Russia 's efforts to circumvent the existing sanctions is also 
critical.  
31.60.   We reiterate our gratitude to all our partners for their comprehensive support and c all on 
other WTO  Member s to put more pressure on Russia to end its ability to wage war and to undermine 
the rules -based multilateral trading system aimed at sustainable development that is impossible 
without achieving peace and stability.  
31.61.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
31.62.   New Zealand remains united with the international community to hold Russia to account for 
violations of humanitarian and international law through its illegal and unprovoked invasion of 
Ukraine, which New Zealand condemn s unequivocally . Like others, New Zealand has applied 
sanctions on Russia in a transparent manner for one  purpose, to bring an end to this war. Sanctions 
are not intended to disrupt trade in essential goods.  
31.63.   Let us be clear . It is Russia 's invasion of Ukraine that has seriously undermined global peace, 
security, and economic stability – as well as creating uncertainty and volatility in world food prices 
and supply.  We are appalled by reports of the devastating and indiscriminate attacks on Ukraine 's 
population by Russian troops, including evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well 
as the destruction of civilian infrastructure , including the energy grid, hospitals, schools, and homes . 
We will spare no effort in holding those responsible f or this aggression to account.  
31.64.   We stand in full solidarity with Ukraine and its people and reaffirm our unwavering support 
for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  31.65.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the followin g: 
31.66.   The Republic of Korea has been strongly condemning Russia 's armed invasion against 
Ukraine.  Regarding the current item, Korea believes that it is essential to focus on the very origin of 
the sharply aggravating situation on the global supply chain in ma ny areas, posing a significant 
threat to  the rules-based global trade order under the WTO.  The way to end all this is to stop Russia 's 
military action in Ukraine.  
31.67.   The delegate of  the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  indicated the following:  
31.68.   We would like t o reiterate our gratitude to the Russian Federation for having raised at this 
meeting an issue that, for my delegation, is highly sensitive. As we have pointed out on previous 
occasions, Venezuela has been warning for years against the proliferation of uni lateral coercive 
measures. Since at least 2015, so for seven  years, Venezuela has suffered a multidimensional 
financial, commercial, economic and patrimonial attack, with multimillion dollar losses. As a result, 
Venezuela's revenues have been cut by 99%, a nd the negative impact has spread to all areas, 
notably the food, health, transport, communications and technology sectors.  We are witnessing first -
hand the collateral damage that this type of measure causes not only to the population of the country 
concer ned, but also to other economies, provoking disruptions of all kinds, including trade 
distortions.  
31.69.   We wish to reiterate that the WTO has proved to be an organization that is primarily guided 
by economic considerations and sound legal rules. The very defini tion of unilateralism implies 
conduct that violates principles and rules. In this connection, we call for a return to multilateralism 
as the best way to settle our differences and call for a multilateral trading system that is predictable, 
transparent, inc lusive and based on rules agreed by consensus.  
31.70.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
32  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING ANNEXES  II AND 
V TO REGULATION (EC) NO.  396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL AS REGARDS MAX IMUM RESIDUE LEVELS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND 
THIAMETHOXAM IN OR ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
32.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
32.3.  The United States shares the EU 's concerns about pollinator health,  and we are actively 
working to protect bees and other pollinators in the United States . To date, the global scientific and 
regulatory community has found that complex interactions among multiple factors affect pollinator 
health, including the health of be es. 
32.4.  Given the critical importance of the pesticides identified in the Regulation as part of integrated 
pest management  (IPM) program mes on crops that are exported to the EU by many countries, the 
proposed measure appears to pose a significant obstacle to i nternational trade and production of 
agricultural products.  
32.5.  Use of pesticide MRLs is intended to manage the food safety risk of treated imported food 
products upon arrival into a market . MRLs are not intended to be an environmental safety 
management tool, and their use for this purpose may have unintended consequences that could 
undermine the development and use of international standards for food safety.  
32.6.  In the March SPS and TBT  Committee meetings, we again asked the EU to explain how the 
conclusions from these risk assessments support the reduction of MRLs to the limit of detection  
(LOD) for the impacted products. We further asked the EU to provide any analysis and studies that 
it had conducted to review production systems outside the EU.  
32.7.  The United States  is concerned by the apparent lack of the scientific or technical information 
that demonstrates how the reduction of these MRLs to the LOD contributes to the objective of the G/C/M/145  
 
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  protection of pollinators, including bees. We are also uncertain about the object ive criteria the EU 
will use in assessing applications for import tolerances under this Regulation , and ask that the EU 
provide more detailed information on such criteria.  
32.8.  In the absence of scientific or technical information indicating how the reduction o f MRLs to 
the LOD on the impacted products contributes to the objective of protection of pollinators, including 
bees, the United States requests that the EU maintain its current MRLs for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam.  
32.9.  Complex environmental challenges requi re collaboration across the global community; 
unilateral approaches based on incomplete science may complicate or further delay meaningful 
progress on these pressing issues while unnecessarily affecting agricultural production and trade . In 
place of the EU 's proposed regulation, the United States would welcome a collaborative approach to 
protecting pollinators and the opportunity to contribute resources, scientific expertise, and new 
ideas.  
32.10.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
32.11.   Uruguay reiterates  its concern regarding the approval, without substantive changes, of 
Regulation No.  2023/334 amending the MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam, despite the 
numerous comments made by some 20  trading partners in the aforementioned consultation process, 
and by many WTO  Members at recent meetings of the Goods Council and the SPS, TBT and Market 
Access Committees.  
32.12.   Uruguay understands that setting MRLs is a tool designed to protect consumer health from 
the risks arising from ingestion and that it therefore natu rally falls within the scope of the 
SPS Agreement. The international reference body for such issues is the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, where health -related issues are comprehensively addressed in relation to the adoption 
of MRLs.  
32.13.   Without prejudice to ot her European standards of the vast and complex European regulatory 
framework, the main and specific rule on MRLs for pesticides in food and feed is Regulation 
No. 396/2005, Article  3(d) of which defines MRLs as: "the upper legal level of a concentration fo r a 
pesticide residue in or on food or feed set in accordance with this Regulation, based on good 
agricultural practice and the lowest consumer exposure necessary to protect vulnerable consumers".  
32.14.   Uruguay shares concerns about promoting the protection of p ollinators, in line with 
environmental and biodiversity protection, and supports the establishment of regulatory 
environments based on scientific criteria, so as to avoid putting food security at risk or erecting 
barriers to trade. In this connection, Urug uay reiterates its willingness to cooperate with other 
Members, including the EU, to find mechanisms that can be used to achieve these objectives without 
unnecessarily restricting trade, while also ensuring conservation of the environment and protection 
of human, animal and plant health.  
32.15.   However, Uruguay still has doubts as to both the relevance and the legal basis, in 
EU regulations and WTO  standards, of reducing MRLs to the level stated on the grounds of 
"environmental issues of global concern" or other i ssues unrelated to human health.  
32.16.   Despite awareness of the importance of the environmental aspects, we understand that 
these are not included in the process of establishing MRLs, but that they are and must be addressed 
by countries individually in their ter ritory using the appropriate tools, on the basis of their own 
production and regulatory systems, environmental conditions and policies. This was ratified by the 
Codex Secretariat, which confirmed that environmental issues are not currently considered in th e 
risk analyses used for plant protection products  (PPPs)  under the Codex.  
32.17.   In short, Uruguay is of the view that MRLs must be established on the basis of a risk 
assessment with the aim of protecting consumer health and not for environmental protection 
purposes. Similarly, Uruguay would like to highlight that the sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
adopted or implemented by WTO  Members, such as the EU, must be adapted to the objectives set 
out in Annex  A, paragraph  1, to the SPS  Agreement, and the other subs tantive obligations under 
this Agreement, such as those concerning international harmonization, the avoidance of approaches G/C/M/145  
 
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  that unnecessarily restrict trade, and transparency, as well as corresponding obligations under the 
GATT  1994.  
32.18.   Lastly, we reiterate our interest in following up on the future consideration of emergency 
authorization applications for these and other substances subject to restrictions under regulations 
at the Community level, in the light of the recent CJEU  judgement of 19  January 2023.  
32.19.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
32.20.   Paraguay reiterates its concern about the EU's claim to use the MRLs for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam, not to protect European consumers, but as a means to regulate the use of 
neonicotinoids in p roduction processes and methods in third  countries. Paraguay also has serious 
concerns regarding the compatibility of the notified EU  measure with obligations relating to market 
access and non -discrimination under WTO  rules.  
32.21.   Paraguay shares a genuine inter est in environmental and biodiversity conservation, and 
accords primacy to the protection of human, animal and plant health, including protection of 
pollinators, which also play a key role in global food production and contribute to higher yields of 
agrono mically important crops.  But each country has particular needs and challenges in its 
agricultural production, on the basis of its geography, ecosystem and local scientific capacities, as 
part of the quest to attain and maintain sustainability in agricultur e. This situation is reflected in the 
evidence -based regulatory frameworks applied to registration processes to assess the risks of 
pesticides and their uses, including the assessment of risk to the environment and pollinators. For 
example, the European fr amework does not envisage any cases where G APs would allow these 
substances to be applied at times when bees would be unaffected.  
32.22.   My country, like several other Members, submitted comments on notification  
G/TBT/N/EU/908  within the established deadline. However, on 27  September  2022, the EU  Standing 
Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (ScoPAFF) approved the proposal to reduce the MRLs 
for these substances without modifications, thereby failing once again to take its trading partners' 
comments into account.  
32.23.   Commission Regulation  (EU) No. 2023/334 was approved at the start of February, and I 
would like to point out that , like we did at the SPS and TBT Committees,  an incorrect reference was 
made to Paraguay in footnote  19, with a resolution and ministry that do not exist in my coun try. 
Our representatives in Brussels have already lodged the relevant complaints and, although they 
assured us that steps would be taken to correct it, we would appreciate an update regarding the 
status of the correction and an explanation as to why Paragu ay was mistakenly included in a 
regulation that was not only discussed but also approved by the European Parliament at the 
Commission's behest.  
32.24.   Far from achieving environmental outcomes, the measure will serve to impose restrictions 
on international trade and make farmers less competitive in Paraguay and the region than farmers 
in Europe who do not have to contend with the same pests and climatic conditions to produce food, 
and who could until recently benefit from emergency authorizations to continue using  these 
substances. Accordingly, we welcome the European Court of Justice ruling regarding the prohibition 
of emergency authorizations for neonicotinoids that are banned in the EU. It will finally require 
European producers to fully implement European regul ations. Perhaps now the Commission will 
finally understand the need to review some of its policies given that they are not viable for production 
systems, even within the European Union itself.  
32.25.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
32.26.   We thank the del egation of the United States  for raising this item on the agenda. The 
EU policies on sanitary and phytosanitary measures have already been discussed under Agenda  
Item 8. The rich discussion showed Member s' wide-ranging concerns on EU  policies , and on the EU's 
administering of its policies , related to Maximum Residual Limits.  
32.27.   This particular agenda item has been discussed in the Committee on Agriculture, the 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures , where we raise d this as a separate item , and 
the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. This agenda  item has, in recent meetings of these G/C/M/145  
 
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  bodies , taken the maximum time, with Member s from all continents , and with a broad range of levels 
of development , urging the EU t o review its proposals. It is unfortunate that the EU is using the 
environment as a pretext to manage MRL -related issues and without taking into account the unique 
climatic, environmental , and soil conditions which prevail in different parts of the world.  
32.28.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
32.29.   Ecuador thanks the United States for its interest in including this concern on the agenda for 
this meeting. My delegation would also like to reiterate its concern in relation to this matter, in line 
with wha t we have already expressed before the Committees on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and on Market Access.  
32.30.   We stress that the new proposal for a regulation would distort the objective of 
Regulation  396/2005, since it would shift the approach to "Europe an consumer" protection and add 
unilateral consideration of "environmental factors" in countries outside the territory and jurisdiction 
of the European authorities.  Such an approach ignores and invalidates the adequacy of the 
regulatory policies of other c ountries, which sovereignly establish the conditions for food production 
and agricultural activity in their jurisdictions. The European Union's extraterritorial objectives do not 
always seem to be consistent with WTO  rules or to take into account the clima tic and developmental 
conditions of its various trading partners.  
32.31.   These measures impose an even heavier burden on small producers, who are still trying to 
recover from the adverse effects of the pandemic. Adjusting to new MRLs would increase the cost 
or quantity of fertilizers and pesticides. Indeed, t he development of new substances to replace those 
that would be withdrawn from the market is either in the experimental stage or so costly as to be 
unaffordable to small and medium -scale producers.  
32.32.   Ecuador firmly believes that sustainability rests on three  pillars: social, economic and 
environmental. When adopting measures on MRLs, account must be taken of the negative effects 
that they will have on the other sustainability pillars in the European Union's tr ading partners, 
particularly developing countries.  For these reasons, we once again urge the European Union to 
maintain the current maximum levels for third  countries, as import tolerances.  
32.33.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
32.34.   We would like t o thank the United States for including this item on the agenda.  Argentina 
remains concerned about the consistency of this measure with WTO  principles. We consider that the 
measure is inappropriate and disproportionate,  and that the EU's decision is an ext raterritorial 
application of law because it clearly has an impact on third -party decisions and a totally negative 
effect on trade.  
32.35.   Argentina fully shares the EU's genuine interest in the strategic importance of pollinators for 
the global environment, espec ially bees for ecosystems and biodiversity. Likewise, as a major food 
producer, it recognizes the significant contribution they make to agriculture and global food security.  
That is why, like many other countries, we have stepped up measures to provide pro ducers with the 
tools required to properly protect plant life, which will enable them to continue producing food. At 
the same time, by adopting good agricultural practices, we are reducing the effects of pollinators 
from the use of certain products.  Howeve r, everything seems to suggest that this measure notified 
by the EU will, rather than protecting the environment or pollinators, create an obstacle that will 
restrict producer third  countries' ability to export to the EU.  
32.36.   Irrespective of whether or not the  objective being pursued is legitimate, the EU's measure 
will result in a virtual ban on access to its market for a wide range of food and feed products. 
Therefore, we believe that the trade -disruptive impact that the reduction of the MRLs would have on 
all the products covered by the measure would not be proportional to the objective being pursued 
by the EU.  
32.37.   Equally of concern to Argentina is that implementing the measure would amount to a 
disguised restriction on international trade, contrary to the provi sions of the SPS  Agreement. The 
EU has established an MRL at the level of detection to protect bees, when MRLs are actually adopted G/C/M/145  
 
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  to ensure food safety, not to protect the environment. The Codex Alimentarius recently adopted new 
MRLs for neonicotinoids, demonstrating that they are safe for consumers.  
32.38.   Argentina considers that the measure adopted by the EU is not clearly justified and 
constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade because it is disproportionate to the 
objective that it claims to  protect and unduly restricts trade, as it prevents the marketing of any 
product that has been treated with these neonicotinoids that may exceed the LOQ, even though the 
EU cannot demonstrate that MRLs at the level established by the Codex may affect the h ealth of 
consumers, which ultimately is the intended purpose of an MRL.  
32.39.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
32.40.   On the European Union's proposed regulation , which withdraws the approval of active 
substances thiamethoxam and clothianidin, and restri cts the MRLs in certain products, Brazil would 
like to recall Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement. We understand that the EU's current proposal goes 
against this commitment, as it  falls outside the scope of the TBT  Agreement to support unilateral 
policies aimed at protecting the environment in third  countries.  
32.41.   Besides the need for further discussion , on a sound scientific basis , about the risks that  
thiamethoxam and clothianidin may have on the bee population worldwide , Brazil un derstands that 
one could not expect to extend to all countries of the world trade restrictive measures that do not 
consider  the variety of local conditions , including climate and soil.  Furthermore, there are different 
needs and challenges posed by agricult ural production in each country.  
32.42.   The EU affirms that its trade restrictive measures would seek to avoid the transfer of adverse 
effects on bees from food production in the EU to food production in non-EU countries. However, for 
Brazil, this approach does not appropriately consider that many countries, including Brazil, have 
technical procedures for approving substances . Furthermore, Brazil believes that , due to its 
extraterritorial effects, the EU's  propos ed regulation goes against the rules and jurisprudence of the 
multilateral trading system.  
32.43.   Brazil is also  concern ed that, if the current proposal for restricting the use of those 
substances becomes the basis for other similar restrictions, farmers i n Brazil and worldwide could 
face serious problems that will affect productivity and their capacity to contribute to global food 
security. Therefore, Brazil calls for the European Commission to consider a more balanced approach  
that is in harmony with the Codex Alimentarius recommendations for the MRLs of those substances.  
Brazil also appreciates  the opportunity to provide comments and would be grateful if they could be 
taken into account , and replied to , before the adoption  of the notified  draft.  
32.44.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
32.45.   The lowering of the MRLs for the two  active ingredients for the protection of pollinator insects 
outside the region is clearly different from the previous method of setting MRLs for the protection of 
human lif e or health, and deviates from the international harmonization on MRLs.  The EU claims that 
this measure is a TBT  measure on the grounds that it is not directly related to consumer health 
issues and is intended to protect the environment, but we believe tha t when bringing in a new 
approach to measures that affect third  countries, such as MRLs, it is necessary to have full 
discussions with third  countries, including at SPS  Committee meetings.  The EU states that if there 
is no risk to pollinators, it is possib le to apply for import tolerance, but details should be clarified.  
32.46.   Given that the environmental conditions in each country are different, and the authorities in 
each country set the method of use of pesticides in consideration of the environmental conditio ns, 
the EU should not make decisions on the pros and cons of the use of pesticides in third  countries.  
32.47.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
32.48.   New Zealand shares the concerns raised by other Member s following the EU 's adoption of 
the proposal notified in document  G/TBT/N/EU/908 , which seeks to address pollinator decline by 
lowering the MRLs of the neonicotinoids clothianidin and thi amethoxam to the limit of quantification.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  32.49.   New Zealand shares worldwide concern for the decline of pollinators given their vital role in 
supporting ecosystem functions and food production. However, the extent of this pollinator decline 
varies considerably t hroughout the world and can be associated with a range of different causes. 
New Zealand encourages the EU, like all WTO  Member s, to address global environmental issues, 
including sustainable pesticide use, by working with trade partners in multilateral forums. 
32.50.   New Zealand reiterates concerns previously raised in the Council for Trade in Goods that 
unilaterally imposing prescriptive import measures, in a manner such as those notified, may not 
successfully achieve the intended goal, and could create unjustifi ed trade barriers for trading 
partners. New Zealand maintains that national authorities are the most appropriate decision -makers 
with respect to the sustainable use of pesticides within their country. While it is noted that there is 
a large variability in trading partners ' production and regulatory systems, reflecting their unique 
climate, environment, and pest and disease status, amongst other factors, New Zealand encourages 
Member s to recogni ze that different production and regulatory systems can, and do,  deliver desirable 
environmental outcomes. New Zealand encourages the EU to use risk -based measures founded on 
sound science and relevant international standards, which are least trade -restrictive and appropriate 
to achieve the desired outcome.  
32.51.   The delegat e of Colombia  indicated the following:  
32.52.   We remain concerned about the European Union's overall hazard regime, which is evident 
mainly in the pesticides policy that establishes technical and health regulations that are more 
restrictive than necessary. Colombia has also stated that the measure may be discriminatory when 
selecting the substances to be reviewed, when allowing the involvement of stakeholders, when 
establishing criteria such as how a food product is consumed, and in disregarding t he different 
geographical and climatic conditions of countries, especially in tropical areas, and, last but not least, 
when establishing different exemption regimes for European and foreign producers. Today, we wish 
to reiterate all of these arguments and our previous statements.  
32.53.   Colombia would like to express its agreement with the legitimate objective pursued by the 
European pesticides regime. However, I would like to ask the European Union: why not establish 
longer transition periods for substances that are in the process of approval? Why not avoid regulatory 
action during production if the pesticide residue does not exceed the authorized level at the time of 
application? Why not maintain existing MRLs while import tolerance applications are being reviewe d 
and until a full risk assessment has been completed, or why not consider third  country data earlier 
in the European Union's process for renewals and approvals? Is it not possible to work together to 
give our producers of goods imported into the European Union an outlet? My producers are running 
out of solutions, and these are avenues that do not involve a change of policy but offer a way out.  
32.54.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
32.55.   We thank the United States for including this agenda item. This is a matter in relation to 
which we have previously expressed concern , and we reiterate our comments made at previous 
meetings. We will be following this issue's  progress.  
32.56.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
32.57.   The European Union take s note of the interest by the United States and other Member s on 
this issue.  As previously communicated, the EU takes into account environmental objectives when 
deciding about setting MRLs for substances no longer approved in the EU due to environmental 
concerns of a global nature, while respecting WTO  standards and other international obligations. The 
EU addresses this matter on an incremental basis, considering and reviewing the position of each 
particular active substance on a case -by-case basis, founded  on the best available scientific evidence 
and ensuring that its measures are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their 
objective.  
32.58.   The European Union informed WTO  Member s about its approach already two  years ago in 
November  2020 ( G/SPS/GEN/1868 ). The EU has regularly updated the SPS and TBT  Committees on 
progress since then. The draft Regulation on lowering the maximum reside levels f or the 
two neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam was notified to the TBT  Committee on G/C/M/145  
 
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  6 July 2022 ( G/TBT/N/EU/908 ). The EU has  carefully studied and replied to all comments received 
from WTO  Member s during the notification process.  
32.59.   Last February, the new rules were adopted through Commission Regulation (EU)  2023/334. 
This Regulation is the first  one implementing the new policy an nounced in the European Green Deal 
and – more specifically – the Farm to Fork Strategy on imported food in relation to pesticides 
residues.  
32.60.   We have explained in previous meetings the rationale for the measures and refer to these 
explanations. The environme ntal objectives of global concern that this Regulation targets are those 
related to the protection of pollinators. This is an issue of global concern, which goes beyond national 
boundaries and cannot be solved through actions at EU  level alone.  
32.61.   The EU 's objective is to ensure that food and feed consumed in the EU do not contribute to 
the global decline of pollinators, independently of whether the product is produced in the EU or 
imported from third  countries.  
32.62.   With regards to possible trade impacts, the Regu lation defers the application date of the 
Regulation to 36  months after entry into force (instead of six months, which is the standard period 
given in the EU). It allows products placed on the market before the application date to remain on 
the market unti l the end of their shelf life. The Regulation will therefore become applicable only at 
the beginning of 2026.  
32.63.   The EU considers that currently there is no alternative to the lowering of the MRLs of 
clothianidin and thiamethoxam which would be less trade res trictive and equally contribute to the 
objective of protecting pollinators. Based on the best available current knowledge, reducing the use 
of neonicotinoids is an effective and preventable action to tackle pollinator decline. The EU is acting 
in full comp liance with WTO  rules, which allow Member s to adopt measures if they are necessary to 
achieve a legitimate objective.  
32.64.   The EU acknowledges that third  countries may face production conditions and pest pressures 
different from those in mainland Europe. Theref ore, import tolerances can be granted to active 
substances not authori zed in the European Union provided that the submitted information 
demonstrates that the use is safe to pollinators.  
32.65.   The EU provided clarifications on emergency authori zations in its stat ement under Agenda 
Item 8. 
32.66.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
33  CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had bee n included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia and the United States.  
33.2.  The delegate of  the Australia  indicated the following:  
33.3.  Australia remains concerned that China 's Regulation on Registration and Administration of 
Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Food, promulgated as Decree  248, will unnecessarily disrupt 
and restrict trade and is more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil China 's food safety objectives.  
Australia has previously raised its concerns on several occasions in both the Com mittee on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS)  Measures and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  
33.4.  Australia appreciates the cooperation between the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry and the General Administration of Customs of Chi na (GACC) to work through the many 
system issues being experienced in the CIFER  system. We remain willing to continue to work with 
China to minimi ze impacts to trade.  
33.5.  Australia is concerned at the resource  and labour -intensive costs borne by exporters and 
exporting countries ' competent authorities to comply with registration in the CIFER  system. This G/C/M/145  
 
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  burden is exacerbated by the number of technical issues, delays , and lack of clarity experienced 
within the CIFER  system. Australian food exporters are ready a nd willing to comply with China 's food 
safety requirements, but businesses and governments need clarity and a reasonable time -frame to 
make changes to comply with new measures.  
33.6.  In light of the above, Australia requests that China 's customs authorities adap t a flexible 
approach to implementation until 1  July 2023, during which they would allow entry of products in 
line with historical trade, in addition to entry under China 's new system of registration, pending 
completion of outstanding applications, correct ions, or updates to online registrations.  
33.7.  Australia urges China to address these issues promptly and remains willing to work 
collaboratively with China to ensure that food safety is upheld while facilitating undisrupted trade.  
33.8.  The delegate of  the United St ates indicated the following:  
33.9.  The United States remains deeply concerned with China 's lack of response to requests for 
scientific justification or explanation of how Decrees  248 and 249 will address food safety and public 
health concerns.  The lack of guidance provided by China, and inconsistency in China 's 
implementation and enforcement of the measures , is causing considerable confusion for exporters 
and competent authorities, which is leading to negative trade impacts.  
33.10.   In addition, we again note that China 's GACC appears to require foreign competent 
authorities to maintain information in China 's online system for each registered facility from their 
country producing certain categories of products . Such a requirement creates tremendous 
administrative bu rdens on foreign competent authorities without a clear connection to food safety 
outcomes. GACC should ensure that all facilities are able to self -register without foreign competent 
authority involvement or unreasonable information requirements.  
33.11.   Finally, we note that GACC 's deadline of 30 June 2023 for firms and competent authorities 
to complete the registration process is completely unrealistic . The actions GACC appears to request 
would take years to complete  – if they are even poss ible at all. We request that China indefinitely 
suspend this deadline to allow trade to continue while China addresses outstanding concerns with 
these requirements.  We maintain our availability to work with China on this issue and look forward 
to receiving  the information that we have requested.  
33.12.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
33.13.   The Republic of Korea would like to reiterate our concerns with China 's administrative 
measures for registration of overseas producers of imported foods , and refer to our statement at 
the last TBT  meeting.  Korea respects China 's right to ensure food safety, and recognizes its efforts 
to facilitate implementation of its measures. However, Korea remains concerned that several points 
raised have yet to be fu lly addressed.  In particular, Korea continues to be concerned that China 's 
measures still apply for low -risk food products provided in Article  7 of Decree  248, which creates 
unnecessary obstacles to trade. In addition, Korea 's applicants are facing several  challenges in trying 
to register through China 's system, notably its time -consuming nature, inefficiency , and uncertainty . 
Korea would like to underline that all WTO  Member s have the obligation to implement food safety 
regulations based on sound scien tific evidence , and in a transparent manner.  The Republic of Korea 
stands ready to further engage with China to resolve these issues constructively.  
33.14.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.15.   The European Union  would like to reiterate its concerns about the implementation of 
Decree  248 of the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China (GACC). More 
than a year after its entry into force, the EU considers that the whole process of implemen tation of 
Decree  248 is still very burdensome , and not transparent.  As previously mentioned, EU  applicants 
are still facing many issues in the registration process, mostly due to recurrent technical problems 
with the web -based registration system (CIFER), making the electronic submission of documents 
cumbersome, time -consuming , and uncertain, be it to apply for new registrations or to amend or 
correct existing registrations.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  33.16.   In this context, EU  applicants are concerned with the upcoming deadline of June  2023 to 
provide supplementary information for existing registrations. Due to recurrent technical problems 
with the CIFER  system , it is unlikely that all establishments will be able to complete their registration 
on time.  More recently EU  applicants have also faced difficulties regarding the renewals of past 
registrations, with a burdensome procedure including first an application for "modification " followed 
by an application for "extension ". 
33.17.   In order to avoid food trade disruption, the EU urges China:  (i) to resolve the technical 
software problems with the CIFER  system; (ii) to facilitate the process to amend/correct existing 
registrations ; (iii)  to extend the deadline of June  2023 to provide supplementary information on 
existing registrations ; and (iv)  to simplify the renewal procedure for past registrations and allow that 
trade can continue until these establishments conclude the ir renewal . The EU would like to thank 
China for the constructive dialogue , which has so far helped to address several questions rela ted to  
the implementation of Decree  248. 
33.18.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
33.19.   The United Kingdom would like to thank Australia and the United States for once again 
raising this concern on China 's administrative measures for the registration of overseas producers.  
We have highlighted our concerns in previous interventions on this matter, so we will only make a 
short statement. We remain concerned that the application of these measures is disproportionate to 
the risk posed by many of the products . We welcome China 's decision to remove the requirement 
for submission of a checklist for modification and extension applications of overseas meat, fish, and 
dairy establishments producing high -risk products. This is a positive step and we r equest that 
consideration be given to also removing this requirement for medium -risk commodities . The UK 
would again urge China to take a proportionate approach to the application of administrative 
measures, taking into account the UK 's own rigorous contro ls and processes for ensuring the safety 
of food destined for domestic and international markets.  
33.20.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
33.21.   Canada continues to have concerns with China's administrative measures for the registration 
of overseas manufa cturers of imported food. Canada remains concerned with the registration and 
renewal process in CIFER. The lack of predictability, transparency, and clarity with respect to CIFER 's 
approval procedures continues to create undue administrative burden, uncert ainty, and delays for 
foreign establishments.  We will continue working with China to resolve these issues.  
33.22.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
33.23.   We note that there are many uncertainties in the registration procedures relat ed to China' s 
"Regulatio ns for Management of Registration of Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Foods ", which 
impose a significant burden on overseas authorities and business operators . For example, the online 
registration system may be changed suddenly and without prior notice. We request China for an 
improvement of operations and the transparency of procedures related to the implementation of 
these regulations so that the procedures do not become an excessive burden on business operators.  
33.24.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated  the following:  
33.25.   My delegation  has been  consistently express ing its concerns regarding China 's administrative 
measures on the registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food.  As a wide range of our 
food industries have been or may be affected by thi s measure, we have been closely monitoring its 
development. Our concerns have been explained in a detailed manner on multiple occasions, 
including in the previous CTG  meeting , and in the most recent meetings of the TBT and 
SPS Committees. In the interest of time, we would like to simply highlight the following requests.  
33.26.   Firstly, we urge China to designate and provide an enquiry  point that business facilities can 
engage with directly to address their specific concerns about the online registration system, and 
seek solutions to overcome them.  
33.27.   Secondly, we urge the GACC to comply with the requirements as set out under Article  5.2.2 
of the TBT  Agreement. These include transparency and the requirements for the applicants to be G/C/M/145  
 
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  informed in a precise and complete manner of all the deficiencies in their applications, allowing for 
any necessary corrections to be made.  
33.28.   Thirdly, we urge China to clarify the ambiguity of HS  code categorization and the scope of 
the products subject to this measure.  
33.29.   Fourthly, we urge China to consider offering an extended grace period for implementation 
to avoid further serious trade disruptions in the future.  
33.30.   Finally, despite seeking clarification from China several times through both bilateral channels 
and in this forum, we have  yet to receive a sufficient and detailed response. We therefore urge China 
to engage in a constructive dialogue to resolve the above -mentioned difficulties.  
33.31.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
33.32.   China would like to thank Members for their interes t in this issue. We have taken good note 
of the comments and questions raised and would like to refer to our statements made in previous 
meetings of this Council , and the most recent SPS  Committee meeting of March.14 With regard to 
the regulations and the registration system , China 's General Administration of Customs (GACC) is 
willing to respond to questions by Members and provide the necessary technical support. In fact, 
China's GACC has maintained close communication with the competent authorities of relevant 
Member s on this issue. To date, the GACC has held video conferenc es with the competent authorities 
of 152  Member s, and organized training sessions for more than 2,000  overseas companies to 
address their questions.  So far, m ore than 100  Member s have provided lists of recommended 
companies for registration, and a total of  82,000  overseas companies have been registered. China 
will continue engaging with Members on this issue.  
33.33.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
34  CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Ja pan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
34.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
34.3.  As the Council is aware, over the years, the United States and many other Member s have had 
numerous concerns with respect to the transparency of Chin a's industrial subsidy regime.  In China 's 
Protocol of Accession, China agreed to publish all trade -related measures in a single journal, which 
China has designated as the China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette, or 
MOFCOM  Gazette . However, China rarely publishes its subsidy measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette – 
especially what it calls "normative documents ", as well as measures from sub -central governments. 
And sometimes these measures are not made public at all.  
34.4.  In its Protocol of Acces sion, China also agreed to "establish or designate an enquiry point 
where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or WTO  Member  all information relating to the 
measures required to be published … may be obtained. " 
34.5.  Several years ago, we came across spec ific references to five  legal measures, two  relating to 
fuel subsidies for fishermen, one  relating to the development of China 's distant water fishing fleet, 
and two  relating to the semiconductor industry.  Unable to find these measures in the 
MOFCOM  Gazett e, or anywhere else, we submitted a request to China 's WTO  enquiry point in 
April 2020, three  years ago now.  Under its Protocol of Accession, China agreed with respect to its 
enquiry point that "Replies to requests for information shall generally be provid ed within 30  days 
after receipt of a request . In exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45  days after receipt 
of a request . Notice of the delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in writing to the 
 
14 See, for example, document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  8.40-8.41. G/C/M/145  
 
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  interested party. " Despite having submit ted the initial request for the missing legal measures in 
April 2020, almost three  years later we have yet to receive a written response to our request.  In 
September  2020, a Ministry of Commerce representative did speak with the US  Embassy and stated 
that China would not be providing copies of any of the requested measures because they were either 
soon to be replaced by new measures or, in its view, were not relevant to China 's WTO  commitments. 
MOFCOM did not provide any information on timing of the replacement measures.  
34.6.  Is it China 's position that it can refuse to provide any requested measure, if that measure is 
to be replaced at some point in time? China 's Protocol of Accession certainly does not provide for 
such an exception, and given that legal measures are often superseded, China 's position would 
rather significantly undermine the obligation itself, if not render it entirely meaningless.  
34.7.  At the previous meeting, China argued that the semiconductor measures requested were not 
relevant to China 's WTO commitments "since these documents are not laws, regulations, or other 
measures pertaining to, or affecting, trade in goods, they are not relevant to China's enquiry point 
commitments. " Is it China 's position then that these measures are not "laws, reg ulations or other 
measures ", or that the measures are not "pertaining to, or affecting, trade in goods "? 
34.8.  The United States views China 's handling of the United States ' request as inadequate and not 
in keeping with China 's WTO  commitments.  The transparency obligations of China 's Protocol of 
Accession are there because Member s were concerned, in part, with the lack of transparency of 
China 's industrial subsidy regime . After twenty -one years, those very same concerns remain.  But 
more fundamentally, as we noted  at the last meeting, beyond the legal technicalities, we have to 
ask the obvious question: why is China refusing to make public, for example, a legal measure on its 
fuel subsidy program me for fishers? It  is difficult to understand.  
34.9.  As noted at the last me eting, we have now found, through our own further investigation, two 
of the measures that we requested relating to China 's fuel subsidy program mes for its domestic and 
distant water fishers . These measures were published on unofficial Chinese news sites – they still 
do not appear on any official government websites and, as noted, have not been published in the 
MOFCOM  Gazette.  The essence of these two  measures, which cover China 's fuel subsidy 
program mes from 2015 to 2020, is that, while China is keeping the  overall level of support for its 
fishing industry the same, it has reduced subsidies for its fishers in its own waters, while increasing 
the level of subsidies for its distant water fleet.  These measures also provide striking new details 
about China 's support for domestic fishers . For example, the measure covering fishers in China 's 
domestic waters cites the objective of renovating fourteen  thousand fishing vessels and scrapping 
or converting to other uses, twenty  thousand fishing vessels.  
34.10.   So what exact ly is it about these measures that China does not want us to see? And what is 
in the other measures that China has refused to provide or to otherwise make public? Of the 
remaining measures, one appears to be China 's plan to develop its distant water fisher y. The other 
two measures relate to China 's semiconductor policies . What is it about these measures that China 
does not want us to see?  
34.11.   At the last meeting , China stated that it "has no intention of hiding its relevant policies ". If 
so, then we request tha t China either provide the requested legal measures or tell us where they 
can be found in the public domain.  
34.12.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
34.13.   Australia attaches considerable importance to the WTO  notification and transparency 
obligations,  particularly relating to subsidies, which stem from both the WTO Agreements and the 
obligations made by Member s under their Protocols of Accession.  Transparency remains critical to 
the proper functioning of the WTO and underpins the Subsidies Agreement . It helps provide greater 
certainty for all our exporters in being able to compete fairly in international markets . It is for the 
subsidizing Member  to notify its measures promptly and comprehensively,  and not to place the 
burden of discovery on other WTO  Members. Australia therefore urges China to fulfil the 
transparency commitments made as part of its Protocol of Accession.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  34.14.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
34.15.   The United Kingdom again would like to show support for the concerns raised  by the US, 
Australia, Canada, and Japan,  regarding China complying with its transparency obligations under its 
Accession Protocol. This has now been raised multiple times without resolution of the concern.  
Transparency is core to the functioning of the WTO and forms the foundation of the multilateral 
trading system. I t is therefore vital that Member s take all necessary steps to fulfil their obligations, 
including any Member -specific commitments.  
34.16.   In accordance with its WTO  obligations , we encourage China to provide Member s with clarity 
on how they should engage with China 's enquiry points. China should respond to information 
requests in a complete and timely manner. We encourage China to use the MOFCOM  Gazette to 
follow through on commit ments of publishing all measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, 
including subsidies, in a clear and accessible manner.  Engaging constructively on these matters will 
help to address concerns raised by Member s and will reduce the need for further  follow -ups. 
34.17.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
34.18.   Japan has repeatedly pointed out in the Committee on Subsidies that if transparency in 
subsidy disbursement is not ensured, distortions in subsidy disbursement will be encouraged, which 
may lead t o problems such as excess production capacity. In particular, various Members have 
expressed concerns about the transparency of Chinese subsidies , and the possibility that they may 
not be notified, but it is difficult to say that China is taking sufficient  action in response to the points 
raised.  We would like to request that China also fulfil its notification obligations under the Subsidy 
Agreement , and its transparency obligations agreed to in the Accession Protocol, and ensure the 
effectiveness of the me chanisms that contribute to improving transparency.  
34.19.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
34.20.   Canada continues to echo the concerns of other Member s regarding China 's compliance with 
WTO transparency obligations.  The notification and transparency req uirements are integral aspects 
of the multilateral trading system, and it is important that these obligations are upheld for the proper 
functioning of the rules -based international system.  It is imperative that all Member s comply with 
the notification requ irements and responses to enquiries in accordance with WTO  rules, including 
the transparency obligations in Protocols of Accession to the WTO.  
34.21.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
34.22.   New Zealand considers transparency as critical to the proper functioning of the WTO, and 
attaches considerable importance to adherence by all Member s, including China, to WTO  notification 
and transparency obligations, particularly in relation to subsidies, including under their Protocols of 
Accession.  It is vital that these obligations are fulfilled in a timely manner, including any 
Member -specific commitments. Adhering to these obligations helps build certainty for exporters and 
makes an importan t contribution to the successful functioning of the rules -based international 
trading system.  
34.23.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
34.24.   The European Union  wishes to echo the concerns raised by other co -sponsors regarding 
China's complianc e with its transparency obligations under its Accession Protocol. The EU refers to 
its past statements on the matter. We urge China fully to comply with its Member -specific 
commitments by publishing all trade -related measures , as it agreed to do , and by respond ing to 
requests for information under the enquiry point without undue delay.  
34.25.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
34.26.   China would like to thank Members for their interest on this issue. We would like to refer to 
the statements we made in previou s meetings in this Council.  As we  have said in previous meetings, 
the documents the US  enquired about, relating to China 's fishery development , already  expired and 
was replaced by a new document, and the new document has been published on the official webs ite 
of China 's State Council.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  34.27.   With regard to the two  documents relating to semiconductors, China would like to reiterate 
that, since these documents are not laws, regulations , and other measures pertaining to or affecting 
trade in goods, so they are not relevant to China 's enquiry point commitment. China 's enquiry point 
has already communicated with the United States on this issue.  
34.28.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
34.29.   We would  like to thank China for that response. However , we note t hat it did not specifically 
and completely answer the questions that we posed. The questions are not new and have in fact 
been repeated in past CTG  meetings , and China has previously received our interventions  in writing 
with the same questions . Can China please clarify why  it is unable, or perhaps unwilling, to provide 
complete responses to all of these questions? Or can China commit today, before the other Members, 
that it will have meaningful and complete responses to all these questions before or at th e next 
CTG meeting?  
34.30.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
34.31.   We thank the United States for the follow -up comments. As we  have stated just now , and 
at previous meetings, the documents relating to the fisheries development requested by the United 
States ha ve already expired, so if the United States is really interested in China's fisheries policies, 
it should please look at  China's currently valid policy , which can be found on China's State Council's 
website . If the United States cannot find it, we  are happy to provide our assistance.  
34.32.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION MEASURE, BASED ON EGYPTIAN STANDARD 
ES 4249/2014 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HALAL FOOD ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC 
SHARIA – REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE U NITED STATES  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada and the United States.  
35.2.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
35.3.  Canada continues to be concerned with Egypt 's Halal certification requireme nts for all 
imported food and beverage products.  Canada understands Egypt 's objective to ensure that Egyptian 
consumers are confident that they are buying and consuming Halal -certified products in agreement 
with Islamic Sharia. However, such measures should not create unnecessary barriers to international 
trade or be more trade -restrictive than necessary to fulfil that objective.  
35.4.  While Canada appreciates Egypt's delayed implementation of the Halal certification for dairy 
products until 31 March 2023, we are now past this date and Canada requests that this measure be 
suspended until the following questions are answered . Canada requests further information on 
procedures to receive certification, fee structures, details on audits (if needed), and specificity on 
how these requirements will be implemented.  
35.5.  Canada also notes that the proposed new regime only specifies one  Egyptian certification body 
that will have the authority to certify Halal products for the Egyptian market. It is our understanding  
that this has already significantly raised the Halal certification fee , which will have to be borne by 
exporters of Halal product to Egypt. The new measure could result in a certification process that is 
overly burdensome, costly , and more trade restricti ve than necessary to achieve Egypt 's stated 
objective. Canada invites Egypt to consider a Halal certification system that would allow multiple, 
well-established certification entities, in accordance with international best practices.  
35.6.  Canada is open to meet ing with Egypt bilaterally to have an open and transparent discussion, 
further clarify the requirements under this new measure, and consider the impact it may have on 
trade. Until then , we respectfully request that Egypt suspend the implementation of the m easure.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  35.7.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
35.8.  While the United States acknowledges that Egypt has delayed implementation of its new Halal 
requirements for dairy products multiple times, with the most recent delay in effect until 
1 April 2023, the United States continues to share concerns expressed by multiple Member s in 
regard to  Egypt 's implementation of the Halal certification requirements.  
35.9.  One specific concern is the lack of choice of a Halal certifier . Egypt has mentioned that it is  
considering approving other overseas certification bodies . The United States is supportive of this 
trade facilitating effort and is waiting for Egypt to provide further information on the process as well 
as a specific timeline . Approving more than one  certifier would help keep certification costs low, and 
certification services competitive.  
35.10.   The United States is also waiting for a draft decree or regulation for Halal certification of 
dairy products that would provide further guidance and information for tra ding partners . Egypt has 
mentioned that such a draft is under consideration, but Egypt has not indicated when it will be ready 
to share the draft.  
35.11.   The United States seeks clarification of the scope of the products in question , as the 
ES 4249/2022 seems to contradict the scope outlined in Egypt 's notification to the WTO . We request 
that Egypt provide written clarification of the scope of products covered by this measure.  
35.12.   Finally, the United States requests that Egypt formally suspend any new Halal requirements 
until the requested information has been made available and certifier issues have been resolved . 
These efforts will provide the assurance that the US and other expor ters need in order to confidently 
ship Halal-compliant dairy products to Egypt.  
35.13.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
35.14.   Paraguay continues to support this trade concern , and in the interest s of time we make 
reference to our previous interventions  in this Council15, and in the Committee on Technical Barriers 
to Trade, the most  recent of which took place  last month.  
35.15.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
35.16.   The European Union  would like to ask Egypt to consider keeping the Halal ce rtification and 
labelling voluntary for dairy products, in order to pursue the legitimate objective of ensuring reliable 
information without unduly hindering trade flows. Consumers should be able to decide whether to 
buy Halal -certified food or not, based on clear labelling.  
35.17.   The EU would appreciate if Egypt would consider further trade facilitating measures, such as 
requiring Halal certification for the product and not per container, as well as proportional costs of 
Halal certification that take into accoun t the international practice and correspond to the service 
rendered.  
35.18.   The EU would like to ask Egypt about the concrete steps envisaged to provide comprehensive 
information about the new measures , and clear written and publicly available guidance to 
stakeho lders, including a detailed description of the certification procedure, its duration, costs, and 
required documents, as well as the process for registration of suppliers.  
35.19.   The EU is ready to work with Egypt on solutions that would avoid this measure having a 
negative impact on food and beverages imports to Egypt.  Moreover, the EU would like to invite Egypt 
to reconsider the decision to grant the right to certify compliance with Halal requirements to a single 
company, IS  EG Halal. We urge Egypt to provide for  a Halal certification system that would allow 
multiple, well -established certification entities, in accordance with international best practices. 
Recertification by IS  EG Halal of products from establishments already certified by other companies 
is an unnecessary duplication , and would lead to longer time to market and higher costs for 
consumers.  
 
15 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  22.14 -22.17.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  35.20.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
35.21.   New Zealand notes that a final Halal standard has not yet been published or made available. 
New Zealand re quests that Egypt provide a reasonable implementation period , of at least 
6-12 months , once this has been consulted and notified to the WTO as a final standard , to allow 
exporters time to understand and comply with the new standard and ensure compliance fo r any 
additional products covered, including dairy products with animal product additives. We also register 
our expectation that any fees, and any new requirements including for registration, auditing , and 
labelling that accompany Egypt 's new Halal standar d be promulgated by the relevant Government 
Ministry , and request that these are also notified to the WTO with sufficient time to enable Member s 
to provide feedback , and for business to implement the new requirements. We invite Egypt to clarify 
the process  for new Halal certification bodies to be approved for certification of exports to the 
Egyptian market, in accordance with international best practice. Allowing multiple, well -established, 
certification bodies to certify products as Halal will make Egypt 's Halal regulations less trade 
restrictive, reduce the impact of duplication and other unnecessary costs on consumers, help resolve 
supply chain issues, and promote Egypt 's overall food security.  
35.22.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
35.23.   The United Kingdom understands Egypt's objective to ensure Egyptian consumers' 
confidence when purchasing Halal -certified products. Alongside other s, the United Kingdom 
encourages Egypt to have transparent discussions with its trading partners, to share inf ormation, 
and to provide clarity on the requirements under this new measure. We want to also take this 
opportunity to thank Egypt for their cooperation to date, and we hope that will continue so that our 
concerns can be addressed.  
35.24.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
35.25.   Egypt would like to thank Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
Paraguay, and the European Union for their interest, and for raising this issue. Egypt welcomes and 
appreciates its continued engagement  with all Me mbers on this topic, both at the bilateral and 
multilateral levels.  We have engaged bilaterally with a number of delegates on the margin of the 
TBT Committee meetings, and we have had discussions on the matter with our trade partners.  
35.26.   Since the introductio n of this requirement, Egypt has notified a number of addenda to its 
initial notification , contained in document  G/TBT/N/EGY/313 , clarifying a number of matters relating 
to scope, the certification process, and the labelling requirements. Furthermore, with respect to milk 
and dairy products, via the General Authority for Veterinary Services, Egypt has introduced a number 
of facilitating  measures , extending the timeline for abiding by the requirement for over a year.  This 
has provided to business operators an appropriate period of time to adapt to the said requirements. 
It is also important to note that, since its initial notification, Eg ypt has been clear that the certification 
body currently recognized by the General Authority for Veterinary Services, is IS  EG Halal. In fact, 
a lot of export ers have indeed approached IS  EG Halal, and issued the Halal certification.  In our 
bilateral meeti ngs, we requested our trade partners to provide any clear case where there was a 
complaint or delayed process. To date, no imports of milk and dairy products not a ccompanied by a 
Halal certificate have been denied entry. The Capital is also carefully exami ning the comments and 
requests made by all Members regarding implementation issues, and is in the process of preparing 
a document that will clearly respond to those matters raised by our partners.  
35.27.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  INDIA – ORDER  RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE CERTIFICATE 
ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  36.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
36.3.  As we noted most recently at the March  2023 meeting s of the TBT  and SPS  Committee s, the 
United States once again reiterates its serious concerns with India 's measure mandating "non-GM 
(genetically modified) origin and GM  free certificates " for certain agricultural imports into India, 
notified on 2 September  2020, as document  G/TBT/N/IND /168, and a later notified entry -into-force 
date of 1 March  2021.  To date , India has not responded to our questions regarding its rationale for 
requiring a non -GM certificate on a consignment basis.  India has previously referenced its 
Environment Protectio n Act (1986), Rules  1989, and the absence of Genetic Engineering Approval 
Committee (GEAC) approvals for genetically engineered varieties of the 24  crops listed in the Order 
as evidence that the non -GM requirement is neither new nor trade restrictive.  
36.4.  The United States must stress that, while India 's authority to regulate "GM" foods is neither 
new nor in question, the requirement of a non -GM certificate for import of all varieties of the 24  crops 
from a competent authority on a consignment basis was first o rdered in 2020 , and caused trade 
disruptions to US  apple and rice shipments in 2021.  The absence of approvals from GEAC highlights 
the lack of transparency and inefficiency in the approval process, compounding the burden India is 
placing on its trading par tners.  We again want to encourage India to accept our offer for technical 
cooperation to explore alternatives to this measure.  
36.5.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
36.6.  Uruguay recognizes India's right to take measures to guarantee food safety and the health of 
its population.  However, there should be a logical connection between the proposed measure and 
the objective pursued, and in this case, beyond the answers provided by India so far, there appears 
to be no technical justification for the im plementation of the proposed certification measure, taking 
into account the cited legitimate objective of ensuring the safety and wholesomeness of imported 
foods. In view of this objective, we would like to reiterate the call for the delegation of India to  notify 
the measure to the SPS  Committee.  
36.7.  We consider it fitting to recall, once again, the existing international consensus that 
GM products, approved by exporting countries on the basis of Codex  recommendations in relation 
to the risk assessment methodology, are equivalent to their conventional counterparts.  Furthermore, 
Uruguay would like to stress how important it is for Members to establish measures based on 
scientific principles, and, in particular, for these measures to be implemen ted with the objective of 
minimizing negative trade effects, in line with the provisions of the SPS and TBT  Agreements.  
36.8.  Lastly, we wish to reiterate the questions posed by Uruguay in the March  2023 meetings of 
the SPS and TBT  Committees with respect to the  relationship between the measure referred to in 
this specific trade concern and the measure notified by India to the TBT and SPS  Committees on 
5 January  2023, in document  G/TBT/N/IND/240 -G/SPS/N/IND/290 , regarding the Draft Food Safety 
and Standards (Genetically Modified Foods) Regu lations, 2022.  We remain attentive to any 
comments and replies of the delegation of India in relation to the concerns of Members, as have 
been expressed for almost two  years by numerous delegations in both Geneva and New Delhi.  
36.9.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
36.10.   We would like to thank the United States for once again placing this specific trade concern 
on the Committee's agenda , and request that Argentina's support be recorded. Argentina regrets 
having to reiterate its concern once again  over India's measure and wishes to re -emphasize that the 
measure has no scientific explanation that supports it. Argentina fears that this requirement would 
set a precedent for other products or even their derivatives to be included in the future, and that 
this requirement would constitute a barrier to trade.  
36.11.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
36.12.   My delegation would like to thank the delegation of the United States for including this trade 
concern on today's agenda.  It is worrying that this measure  may create an unjustified assumption 
that GM food products evaluated and authorized on the basis of sound regulatory processes are less 
safe than non -GM food products. GM  products have undergone rigorous scientific safety 
assessments in accordance with international standards, guidelines and recommendations, in order G/C/M/145  
 
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  to ensure that they are considered equally as safe as their conventional counterparts and, as we 
heard in th e presentations yesterday, they have enormous potential to contribute to global food 
security and the transformation of agri -food systems to use practices that produce not only more, 
but better, thus ensuring their sustainability.  We wish to draw attention  to 
notifications  G/TBT/N/IND/240  and G/SPS/ N/IND/290 , which refer to draft regulations whose 
recitals refer in turn to the Order of 21  August  2020, and request India to clarify the relationship 
between these new drafts and the existing Orders.  
36.13.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
36.14.   Canada thanks the United States for placing this item on the agenda.  Canada wishes to 
reiterate its concerns raised at previous meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods, as well as the 
recent SPS and TBT  Committees, regarding India 's non -GM Order, which mandate s that a 
non-genetically modified (non -GM) or GM  free certificate accompany imported consignments of 
24 imported food products.  We are concerned with the lack of scientific support for India 's measure 
given the broad scientific consensus that GM  products a re as safe as their conventional counterparts . 
It remains unclear to Canada how India 's non -GM certification requirement will fulfil its intended 
objective.  We are equally concerned with the undue burden and negative commercial impact the 
measure creates on exporting countries through unjustified certification requirements.  
36.15.   Canada requests once again that India suspend the implementation of this measure and 
permit trade to continue without a GM -free certificate requirement. This would enable India to 
engage with Member s to discuss and consider alternate, less trade -restrictive approaches that would 
meet India 's objectives and minimize impacts on trade.  
36.16.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
36.17.   Japan expresses its concern that there might be a p ossibility that this would constitute a 
trade-restrictive measure that is not based on scientific evidence. We request that agricultural 
products exported from exporting countries that exercise proper control of their GM agricultural 
products be excluded f rom this requirement.  
36.18.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
36.19.   This issue was most recently discussed in the previous meeting of the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, where we have provided a detailed response to the various concerns 
raised b y interested Member s. We also thank the delegation of the United States for the constructive 
bilateral discussions that took place on the sidelines of the TBT Committee.  
36.20.   To date, exporters from several  of India's  trade partners , like the United States , the United 
Kingdom , Australia, Canada, Türkiye , Iran, China, Thailand,  and the European Union, including Italy, 
Germany, and France, are already providing requisite certificates. Hence, in our assessment, this 
order is not trade -restrictive. On similar lines,  India also issues such certificates for its own exports 
to other countries. The Government of India has authorized the Export Inspection Council (EIC) as 
the nodal agency for issuing Non -GMO certificates for export consignments. The EIC has issued more 
than 9,000  Non-GMO certificates for the export of primary food crops , as well as processed food 
products , for export to several countries.  
36.21.   Against  this background, we would request the interested delegations to share specific issues 
being faced with respect to this order.  
36.22.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
36.23.   Canada welcomes India's recent decision to accept Canada's non -GM attestation for exports 
of beans . However, this is only one of the 24  commodities impacted by the Order. We continue to 
have concerns with the potential trade impact on other crops covered by the Order.  We would 
reiterate our concern that India's Order could disproportionately impact the ability of GM -producing 
countries to export to India and unnecessarily restrict trade.  Canada looks forward to working 
collaboratively with India and continuing our bilateral discussions on this matter.  
36.24.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  37  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE UNDER MEXICAN OFFICIAL 
STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018, "CHEESE NAMES, SPECIFICATIONS, 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, AND TEST METHODS," PUBLISHED ON 31  JANUARY  2019 – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
37.2.  The d elegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
37.3.  The United States remains highly concerned with the revised measure . Could Mexico provide 
a timeline for when it will respond to WTO  Member  comments?  Could Mexico please provide an 
update on the status of this measure and an estimated time -frame of when the revised measure will 
be notified to the WTO?  
37.4.  The United States reiterates its request that Mexico consider allowing fatty acid analysis to 
be voluntary rather than mandatory. Currently, there are no i nternationally well -accepted 
biomarkers to differentiate milk fat from vegetable fat. Additionally, there are no relevant Codex or 
other international standards available for this type of analysis.  
37.5.  The United States is concerned this measure may conflict with the ongoing redrafting of the 
corresponding cheese standard. How will Mexico harmonize its update to the NOM -223 cheese 
standard with the NOM -223 cheese conformity assessment procedure ( CAP) notified to the WTO on 
8 February  2022?  Once finalized, will implementation of the measure move forward based on 
Mexico 's Quality Infrastructure Law , or the law it replaced, the Federal Law on Metrology and 
Standardization?  Could Mexico provide clarification on the different roles that each Ministry will play 
in the monitoring, compliance, and verification activities listed in the draft measure?  Has Mexico 
considered extending its eventual timeline for implementation of the measure to a period of 
12 months or more? If Mexico proceeds with implementati on of the current measure, the United 
States (Government and industry) would need at least one  year to launch systems to comply.  
37.6.  The United States urges Mexico to indefinitely delay implementation of the measure and 
consider less trade -restrictive alternat ives, as previously proposed by the US  Government, other 
WTO Member s, and industry stakeholders.  
37.7.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
37.8.  New Zealand welcomes the opportunity to again speak in support of this specific trade concern 
raised by th e United States, and notes we have also done so in the TBT  Committee.  New Zealand 
considers that the conformity assessment procedures that Mexico has set out for cheese under 
NOM-223 are more trade restrictive than necessary, with some aspects of the confo rmity assessment 
procedure creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade , and likely to cause difficulties for 
New Zealand exporters. We support the request for Mexico to consider less trade -restrictive 
alternatives to the measures.  We look forward  to receiving a response from Mexico to the concerns 
raised, and an update on the status of any revised version of the Conformity Assessment Procedure.  
37.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING RE QUIREMENTS 
– REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  
38.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada and the United States.  
38.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
38.3.  The United States continues to raise its concerns on Panama's newly implemented technical 
regulations for onions and potatoes. Since the last meeting of the CTG, the US has continued its 
attempts to constructively engage with Panama on this issue. Panama c ontinues to be unresponsive 
to these requests, and has still not provided the scientific justification for these measures. The US 
maintains its availability and commitment to work with Panama to refine the measures so that they G/C/M/145  
 
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  meet Panama's legitimate obj ectives while not being unnecessarily restrictive. In the interim, the 
US reiterates its request that Panama provide the scientific justification for its measures or suspend 
implementation of both the potato and onion regulations until technical discussion s have concluded.  
38.4.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
38.5.  Canada continues to be concerned with Panama 's quality requirements for fresh potatoes, 
implemented in February  2020, which are having a direct impact on Canada 's ability to export 
potatoes to Panama.  Canada would like to refer to its previous intervention at the February and 
November  2022 CTG  meetings on this item and ask it to be included in the meeting record as the 
situation has not changed.16 Canada respectfully requests again that Panam a pause the enforcement 
of these requirements to allow for additional technical dialogue to occur and ensure that Panama 's 
quality standards do not continue to create unintended barriers to our mutually beneficial bilateral 
trade in agriculture.  
38.6.  The delega te of Panama  indicated the following:  
38.7.  We take note of the concerns raised. Panama continues to study in detail the questions 
received on our technical regulation, and remain s open to listening to the concerns of our trading 
partners, as evidenced by last y ear's extension . Panama reaffirms its commitments in the are a of 
transparency and notes that Panama's authorities continue to address this issue in Capital, among 
all relevant  government al bodies. We re iterate that any update will be duly shared and notified to 
this Council.  
38.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
39  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE 
STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Switzerland and the United States.  
39.2.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
39.3.  Switzerland has raised this issue  for many years now , together with other interested 
Member s. We would like to underline that the selective tax entered into force in June  2017 in the 
first Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) member  State.  Since 2022, the information we receive 
regarding the st atus of the selective tax reform is that this is a very complex process that requires 
more time. Last year, the GCC  member s confirmed that the current ad valorem  tax will be replaced 
by a tiered volumetric tax, which is good news. Since then , however, we were not provided with any 
update on the state of play of the reform , and on its content. We therefore reiterate our request to 
our GCC  colleagues for more inform ation on the reform.  Switzerland is open to hold a meeting 
together with the GCC  authorities in charge of the reform , together with other interested Member s. 
We hope that this would enable an exchange with the GCC on the content of the reform and its 
timeline. Switzerland hopes that this trade irritant will be solved in the near future.  
39.4.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
39.5.  The United States, along with Switzerland, the European Union, and Japan, circulated 
questions in March  2021 to GC C member state Governments regarding the status of the selective 
tax on beverages. While the US  appreciate s the info rmation  provided at the Council 's previous  
meeting, as well as in separate discussions with member State officials since then, the US notes that 
it has still to receive written responses to the questions from March  2021. The US requests the 
GCC member States to update the Council as to when such responses to those questions will be 
provided. As the US has conveyed before, it request s a substan tive update on revisions to the 
GCC excise tax model and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement, 
and note s the importance of timely engagement with interested parties regarding this issue.  
 
16 Document  G/C/M/144 , paragraphs  36.4-36.7, and document  G/C/M/143 , paragraphs  31.2-31.5. G/C/M/145  
 
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  39.6.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
39.7.  With regard to the GCC  "Treaty on Excise Tax " of December  2016, the EU would like to 
reiterate the importance of harmonizing the implementation of the Excise Tax law and the need for 
a close engagement with private industry stakeholders on the process for revising the tax.  The EU 
welcomes the information that the pres ent GCC  excise tax system is under review , and that a 
volumetric tax model based on international best practice is being considered based on the "Tax 
Reform Study ". We also consider it important that the reform will equalize the tax rates for energy 
drinks  with the tax rates applied on other soft drinks.  The EU understands that the "Tax Reform 
Study " commissioned by the GCC  countries on the future GCC  excise tax reform is expected to be 
finalized very soon. The EU would ask if the finalized study report will be made public.  The EU is 
ready to continue working with the GCC on this important issue . 
39.8.  The delegate of Oman  indicated the following:  
39.9.  On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait,  and Oman,  I would like to thank the delegations of the 
United States,  Switzerland,  and the European Union for the interest in the GCC  excise tax regime , 
and for their communication on the application of the excise tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt 
beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other sweetened beverages.  
39.10.   Regarding the timeline of the ongoing process of the new G CC excise tax model and its 
implementation, I would like to reiterate that the revision of the excise tax on beverages is still 
under  way as it is a complex exercise that requires significant efforts, extensive coordination 
between multiple entities , and c omprehensive evaluation. The GCC  Working Group on Tax Issues is 
dedicated to completing this exercise in order to provide the GCC  member  States with appropriate 
results and high standards excise tax models.  In conclusion, GCC  member  States have adopted 
appropriate procedures and timeline s for the revision of their excise tax regime. Once the process 
is completed , the relevant information w ill be immediately shared with WTO  Member s. 
39.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
40  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
40.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda a t the request of  
Australia.  
40.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
40.3.  Australia would like to acknowledge the positive developments in its bilateral and trade 
relationship with China in recent months, including agreement to enhance dialogue on the  path to 
resumption of normal trade. Australia values our mutually beneficial trade relationship with China. 
We are free trade partners through the China --Australia Free Trade Agreement and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. We share the bene fits, as do others, of a stable, predictable , 
and open global trading system. That is why we wish to see all the trade disruptive and restrictive 
measures Australia has raised in recent years removed.  
40.4.  Australia 's concerns are well -known. Measures, applied without adequate transparency or 
justification, have affected and continue to affect trade in a wide range of Australian products. Some 
products (barley, timber logs, rock lobsters, bottled wine, hay and meat ) have been impacted for 
well over two  years. Co nsistent with steps both sides have taken to stabili ze the relationship, we 
have seen some trade in certain Australian products begin again (coal, copper ores and concentrates, 
and cotton ). This is a welcome development and is in both Australia 's and China 's interests. At the 
same time, measures impeding trade in other products remain. While these measures remain in 
place on Australian products, we will continue to raise our concerns here and in other committees.  
40.5.  We look forward to working constructive ly with China, in the WTO and under our 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, to build on the progress to date, and to address outstanding 
trade concerns in a timely way.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  40.6.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
40.7.  As stated in previous meet ings, the European Union shares Australia 's concerns with regard 
to the matters Australia is once again raising in this Council on China 's implementation of trade 
disruptive and restrictive measures. Australia has reported about some progress on a number o f 
products and measures, while others , however , have remain unresolved now for a very long period 
of time.  In this respect, the EU wishes to reiterate the points it made before . The form, number , and 
wide-ranging effects which China 's measures seem to have  is in itself a cause for concern . Informal, 
unpublished , and non -transparent trade restrictions are not in line with the WTO 's rules and spirit.  
40.8.  A separate problem is the alleged purpose of the measures in question, which seems coercive, 
placing those mea sures into incompatibility with general international law.  Within the European 
Union, an anti -coercion instrument will come into force in due course. On 28  March  2023, the 
European Union 's legislature has reached a political agreement on the main features of this 
legislation.  Also, the European Union pursues a WTO  dispute with China in relation to a range of 
measures negatively affecting its trade with China,  where the facts indicate that there has been such 
a coercive intention as well.  
40.9.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
40.10.   The United States shares Australia 's concerns, and remains deeply troubled by the 
information provided by Australia,  and that we have heard from other, credible sources.  As noted 
previously, China 's actions are not isolated to Australia . There are many instances of China using 
these harmful non -market practices against WTO  Member s in apparent retaliation for unconnected 
bilateral issues.  
40.11.   It is important to identify similarly coercive actions taken by China agains t other Member s, 
as they demonstrate a broader pattern of behaviour , specifically when China uses, or threatens to 
use, arbitrary or unjustifiable trade actions to pressure or influence the legitimate decision -making 
of sovereign governments.  
40.12.   China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system ", but its actions speak 
for themselves . China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or 
breaking rules in order to inflict harm on others to advance its geopolitical and  economic ends.  
China 's failure to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles threatens and undermines the 
rules-based multilateral trading system , and harms relations between its Member s. 
40.13.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
40.14.   The United Kingdom continues to support Australia 's concerns about trade restrictive 
measures taken by China. We appreciate that some measures have been lifted by China. This is a 
welcome step in the right direction,  and we hope that full resolution will fol low. 
40.15.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
40.16.   My delegation wishes to echo the concerns raised by Australia regarding China 's 
implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures targeting a broad range of Australian 
goods.  China 's trade measures, which appear to hamper certain Member s' trade interests , and which 
seem to be based on unrelated bilateral issues, whether imposed formally or taken by the direction 
or instruction of its authorities, have systemically undermined the rule s-based multilateral trading 
system, and created a negative trade impact, not only on Australia 's export s but also on exports 
from all other Member s. Consequently, we urge China to engage in dialogue, in good faith and in a 
constructive manner , with the rele vant Member s, aiming to address Member s' legitimate trade 
concerns, and to uphold China 's commitments to the principles and obligations of the WTO  rules.  
40.17.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
40.18.   As we mentioned at the previous CTG  meeting, Japan shar es the concerns expressed by 
Australia regarding China' s trade measures, including its trade remedies. If China implements trade 
measures in an arbitrary manner , as reported, it conflicts with the free, fair , and rules -based G/C/M/145  
 
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  international trading system. W e hope that China will respond to Australia's concerns in good faith 
and in a timely manner.  
40.19.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
40.20.   Canada t hanks Australia for raising this issue again, and we are happy to hear that there 
are positive developments. Nevertheless, Canada is concerned with the long -term challenges posed 
by disruptive trade restrictive measures applied for political purposes.  China 's discriminatory 
application of its measures and unwillingness to engage at a technical level is indicative of a wider 
problem. We encourage all WTO  Member s, including China, to support the rules -based trading 
system by abiding by their WTO  commitments and ap plying measures in a non -discriminatory and 
transparent manner.  
40.21.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
40.22.   New Zealand continues to hold a systemic interest in the concerns expressed on this topic 
by Australia and other  Members. We note and welcome the update that has been provided by 
Australia on the issue of the lifting  of some measures . Nevertheless, New Zealand has noted in a 
number of forums that the multilateral rules -based trading system provides  that all Members,  
regardless of their size or trading capacity, are subject to the same rights and obligations, and this 
provides the predictability and certainty necessary to ensure that trade can take place efficiently 
and with the least friction possible . If Members ste p away from their commitments, or adopt 
remedies provided for under the WTO  Agreements in an arbitrary manner, this will undermine the 
predictability and certainty on which the system rests, and it also reflects on perceptions of Members 
undertaking such a ctions. The adoption of measures by WTO  Members that cause widespread 
disruption to trad e, and lack transparency, have caused various concerns to New Zealand, including 
the actions taken by China against a range of exports from Australia, some of which sti ll remain in 
place.  
40.23.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
40.24.   We would like to reiterate that the relevant measures taken by China against some Australian 
products aim to protect the legitimate rights and interests of domestic industries and the healt h and 
safety of consumers. The business decisions made by Chinese companies are based on market and 
demand conditions. All these measures are in line with Chinese laws and regulations, international 
practices , and the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement.  In 2022, bilateral trade exceeded 
USD 220 billion, bringing real benefits to Chinese and Australian businesses and peoples. We look 
forward to working together with Australia to strengthen our economic and trade cooperation . 
40.25.   The Council took note  of the st atements made.  
41  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
41.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
41.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
41.3.  Japan continues to have concerns over China' s Exp ort Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020. The details of export -controlled items , and the details of regulations and 
operations , are still unclear.  As we have stated in past CTG  meetings, taking into consideration the 
objective of the law to safeguard national interests, we would like to reiterate our concerns on the 
following three  points in particular.  
41.4.  First, we are concerned there might be a possibility that the scope of products subject to 
export control is excessive. Second, we are  concerned there might be cases that require unnecessary 
disclosure of technical information during classification and end -user or usage investigations. And 
third, we are also concerned that the provisions on countermeasures against discriminatory export 
regulations by other countries have been maintained in the law.  We are concerned that the 
aforementioned export restrictions stipulated in this law may constitute an overly stringent export 
regulation or be unnecessary in light of the international export c ontrol regime. They may therefore G/C/M/145  
 
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  fall under the export restrictions prohibited in Article  XI of the GATT , and consequently be 
inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
41.5.  In April  2022, a draft ordinance for the Dual -Use Item Export Control (draft of public 
consu ltations) was published regarding the operation of the law concerning dual -use products. The 
opacity of the legal operation has not been resolved at all in relation to the scope of items subject 
to regulation and disclosure requirements of techniques, and we will continue to request explanations 
on the details of the regulations related to the law.  
41.6.  In this regard, China stated in the last CTG that "we are currently conducting a comprehensive 
review based on the said comments and will continue to work with J apan and interested countries. " 
We would like to know the schedule for future enactment and specific details based on the 
comments.  
41.7.  In relation to this, we would like to reiterate the following two  points that we have pointed 
out in previous meetings of th e CTG. First, we have concerns with regard to the fact that the draft 
regulations on rare earth , published in January  2021, mentioned a plan to set out strategic reserves. 
We believe that this plan could mean that there is a possibility that China might in troduce controls 
on exports of rare earth -related products in accordance with the aforementioned Export Control Law. 
Second, regarding the "Unreliable Entity List " and export prohibition list based on the external trade 
law, we are concerned by the lack of  clarity in the relationship between the entity list in the Export 
Control Law and the items covered in the law and the technology list.  In particular, with regard to 
the "Unreliable Entity List " measures, we are concerned about whether the fairness and tr ansparency 
in terms of the recognition of foreign entities and the content of measures taken against foreign 
entities would be ensured. We note that , because it can be said that the predictability of operations 
is remarkably low, there might be a possibili ty that this measure would be inconsistent with Article  X 
of the GATT , among others.  
41.8.  We will continue to closely monitor the details of the regulations on implementing the law and 
do hope that our concerns will be addressed accordingly in the final draft o f the regulations. In 
addition, we are of the view that countermeasure provisions should be removed from the law.  Finally, 
we would like to request that China provide information on the detailed regulations and the timeline 
for them with full transparency,  while providing ample time for consideration.  
41.9.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
41.10.   The European Union reiterates the concerns it previously expressed in previous meetings of 
this Council over China's export control regime, notably as regards  its extra-territorial application , 
its rules on deemed exports and re -exports , its objectives and scope of controls , and its risk 
assessment with regard to destination countries or regions and control lists.  The EU would like to 
invite C hina to consider amending the relevant legal provisions, to provide more legal clarity, and to 
address these concerns in upcoming implementing measures.  The EU would also like to underline 
its concerns with regard to China 's plan for revision of the catalo gue of technologies restricted or 
prohibited for export, as recently stated in the comments submitted by the EU to China.  The EU will 
continue to closely monitor new developments relating to China's export control regime.  
41.11.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
41.12.   The United Kingdom thanks Japan and the European Union for their statements just 
delivered;  likewise, the UK today again wishes to register our concerns regarding China 's Export 
Control Law measure.  Previously, the UK requested cl arifications regarding what China would define 
as its "national interest " for the purposes of this law.  We also asked how this law would relate to 
any export restrictions arising from it. And we also asked for further information on how China would 
decide which "other goods, technologies, services " come within the scope of this law , and what are 
the limitations . So the UK would continue to welcome any further possible clarifications from China.  
Furthermore, we note that China 's Ministry of Commerce 's consul tation on their technology import 
and export regulations has recently concluded, with – we understand – a proposal to place 
restrictions on rare earth element technology.  So, let us underline that export restrictions on goods 
inevitably disrupt global supply chains.  As WTO  Member s, we have all committed to avoiding these 
types of protectionist measures. The UK joins the calls for further transparency from China around 
their Export Control Law 's implementation.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  41.13.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
41.14.   We note the statement by Japan in relation to China 's Export Control Law.  As we set out in 
Australia 's submissions to China 's consultations on these then proposed laws and regulations, we 
welcomed efforts to codify the regulatory framework f or defence export controls.  Australia still has 
concerns about the broad scope of the Export Control Law. We encourage China to continue to 
provide greater clarity in relation to key elements, including jurisdiction, the scope of administrator 
powers, and confirmation that the law is consistent with China 's international commitments , 
including the WTO rules and the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA).  We continue to 
urge China to take account of the concerns of foreign businesses and Member s in th e implementation 
of this law and development of future measures.  
41.15.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
41.16.   We would like to thank Members for their interest on this issue and refer to China's 
statements at previous meetings. China is still working on the supporting complementary laws and 
regulations on the Export Control Law.  Last year, in May，China's Ministry of Commerce publicly 
solicited public comments on the "Daft Regulation on the Export Control of Dual -Use Items ". We 
welcome the comments submitted by the Japanese government , and other Member s, as well as 
relevant industry representatives. We are still conducting a comprehensive review of these 
comments . China will continue to engage with Japan and other interested  Member s on this issue.  
41.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
42  CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD FOR OFFICE 
DEVICES – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
42.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
42.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
42.3.  As Japan expressed our concerns during the relevant committees, with regard to the 
amendment of the Recommended National Standa rds of China (GB/T) for office devices such as 
multifunction peripherals and printers that are procured by the operators of critical information 
infrastructure . It has been suggested that the standard would compulsory require that:  (i) office 
devices , such as multifunction peripherals and printers , including their components , are required to 
be developed, designed , and produced in China;  and (ii) to disclose information to prove that office 
devices and/or their components are developed, designed , and produced in China.  These national 
standards raise concerns that foreign products, including Japanese products, will be discriminated 
against by other Members , that trade will be restricted more than necessary, and that technology 
transfer will be forc ed. Furthermore, t here would be the possibility that this would be inconsistent 
with various WTO  Agreements , including Article  2.1 of the TRIM s Agreement, Articles  2.1, 2.3, and 
5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, Article  III:4 of the GATT, and also Article 7.3 of  China' s Accession 
Protocol.  
42.4.  We understand that a study is being conducted under the direction of the National Information 
Security Standardization Technical Committee (TC260), and we would like to know the status of the 
study of this draft National Standa rd and its contents. We would appreciate it if China could share 
the facts , including: (i) the schedule up to the establishment of this National Standard, including 
when it will be open for public comment; (ii) the contents of the draft National Standard, in particular 
the scope of application of this National Standard, including the definition of critical information 
infrastructure operators, the provisions requiring the development and production of office 
equipment and its components in China; and (iii) the provisions requiring information proving that 
the equipment was developed and produced in China. We would like China to share the facts with 
us, including the provisions.  
42.5.  Furthermore, China pointed out at the TRIM s Committee meeting in February that "these are 
issues related to standards and should be discussed in the TBT  Committee ", but the subsequent 
explanation at the TBT  Committee meeting was only that "interested Members may express their 
opinions at the opportunity for public comments ". No convinc ing explanation has been obtained G/C/M/145  
 
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  regarding the specific concerns raised by Japan and other Members concerned. If these concerns 
are put forward for public comment in a manner that does not resolve them, we believe that this is 
an issue that could raise doubts about China's commitment to the authority of the WTO, which is 
the core of the multilateral tra ding system. From the perspective of avoiding such doubts, we hope 
that the concerns raised here by the Members  concerned will be well taken care of before being 
submitted for public comment.  
42.6.  We strongly hope that revisions to the National Standards, as we ll as systems and guidelines 
related to the National Standards, will not be realized in the form of the above -mentioned concerns. 
Japan also hopes  that measures incorporating similar requirements will not be formulated and 
introduced, not only in the field  of multifunction peripherals and printers but also in other fields.  
42.7.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
42.8.  Based on the information available for this new measure, the revised requirements, if enacted, 
would rule out the possibility f or overseas office device providers to participate in government 
procurement in China, as most of their products rely heavily on overseas components.  The EU would 
like to emphasi ze that all office equipment cannot be classified as critical information infr astructure 
and underline once again the importance of providing clarity on terms such as "critical information 
infrastructure ". The EU also urges China not to take similar measures in other sectors or products.  
42.9.  The delegate of China  indicated the following : 
42.10.   The recommended standard is currently under application for revision , and the notice for its 
revision application was published on 22 December  2022. So far, no objections have been received. 
The revision of this recommended national standard is still wai ting for the approval of the 
Standardization Administration of China.  The formulation and revision of China's national standards 
are always based on the principle of openness and transparency. After the standard revision plan is 
officially approved, releva nt information will be released to the public. All parties can obtain this 
information through the official website of the Standardization Administration of China and relevant 
other channels.  
42.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
43  CHINA – DRAFT REVI SION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW – REQUEST 
FROM JAPAN  
43.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
43.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
43.3.  In July of last year, China published a draft for revision of the Government Procurement Law.  
With regard to the scope of the revised law, in addition to "state agencies, business units and 
organizations " in the current Article  2, "other procurement entities " has been added in Article  2 and 
Article 12. With consideration to "other procurement entities ", Article  12 of the revised bill refers to 
"public interest state -owned enterprises that engage in public works and operate public 
infrastructure or public service networks to realize public purpose s", and adds "other procurement 
entities to which this Law applies and their specific scope of procurement shall be determined by the 
State Council. " 
43.4.  If the scope of application of the Government Procurement Law expands to include even 
procurement beyond "procurement by governmental agencies ", as stipulated in Article  III:8(a) of 
the GATT, and Local Content Requirement (LCR) is made based on Article  23 of the revised law, 
foreign products, including those from Japan, may be treated in a discriminatory manne r, thereby 
violating Article  III:4 of the GATT . In light of this, Japan requests of China that the State Council's 
definition of "other procurement entities " under Article  12 of the revised bill should not be expanded 
without limit.  
43.5.  In addition to the exis ting local content requirements regulation, Article  23 of the revised bill, 
which clearly includes "support for domestic industries ", adds a new local content requirement that G/C/M/145  
 
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  gives preferential treatment in government procurement for products with a high added value ratio 
within China. Japan would like to point out that this cannot be permitted either under the government 
procurement exception of Article  III:8(a) of the GATT  unless it truly falls under government 
procurement . This local content requirement  may also violate Article  2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement , 
and Article  III:4 of the GATT . In this regard, Japan intends to keep an eye on the scope of this 
Article.  
43.6.  Although China stated at the last CTG  meeting that it treats foreign and domestic Chinese 
companies equally in government procurement, except with respect to security matters, we are of 
the view that these new provisions in the proposed amendment are not yet meeting the standards 
required by the WTO  Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which  China has already been 
negotiating to join for many years, and in relation to which China is now, rather, moving in the 
opposite direction. This raises the question of whether China is willing to meet those standards , even 
though it has applied to join th e GPA and other high -standard agreements.  
43.7.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
43.8.  China would like to thank Japan for their interest on this issue and refer to past statements 
on the issue. Supporting domestic products through government procurement  is a common 
international practice. In drafting the amendment of China 's Government Procurement Law, we have 
taken into account other Member s' relevant practices and experience. We are willing to discuss this 
issue with Japan under the framework of China 's accession negotiation to the GPA.  China is willing 
to strengthen the engagement with relevant Member s to accelerate China 's GPA  accession process.  
43.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
44  UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY ARRANGEMENTS ON STEEL AND/OR A LUMINUM 
– REQUEST FROM CHINA  
44.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
44.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
44.3.  As this Council is aware, in 2018 , the United States imposed additional tariff s on steel and 
aluminium  imports in the name of "national security ". Since then, the US has selected a number of 
Member s from whom to lift the additional tariff. These discriminatory arrangements create a 
dangero us precedent and violate WTO  rules.  
44.4.  Member s may also have noted that , in 2021, the US started a negotiation with  the EU on a 
Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium. Recently  it has been reported that , as part 
of the Global Arrangement negoti ations, the US seeks to be exempt ed from the EU's Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism . 
44.5.  China  express es its concern over all these discriminatory arrangements. Such discriminatory 
arrangements provide specific treatment to select ed Member s and result in the exclusion of other 
Member s. We call on the WTO to strengthen the monitoring of these discriminatory arrangements 
to ensure that these protectionist measures would not be implemented in the name of addressing 
national security or climate  change.  
44.6.  The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
44.7.  As expressed at previous meetings of the CTG and the Committee on Market Access , and 
lastly at the Dispute Settlement Body, we would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our concerns 
with rega rd to the Section  232 tariffs that have been imposed by the United States on imports of 
steel and aluminium  products since 2018.  Taking this opportunity, Türkiye once again notes our 
concerns over the compatibility of the measures with the core WTO  rules a nd principles as enshrined 
in the Agreement on Safeguards , as well as the GATT  1994.  
44.8.  As is known, these concerns have in fact been validated as accurate by the Report of the 
Panel in DS564 , where the Panel correctly found that any alleged global excess cap acity in steel and G/C/M/145  
 
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  aluminium , and the United States ' wish to protect its steel and aluminium  producers, cannot 
constitute an "emergency in international relations " within the meaning of Article  XXI of the GATT, 
and thus cannot be justified as national secu rity measures.  
44.9.  As noted previously, we are also of the view that the developments towards exclusion of some 
Member s as opposed to others from Section  232 tariffs on a selective basis further exacerbate s the 
problem. We continue to believe that there exists  no convincing reason for lifting the so -called 
measures for some Member s, while excluding others. With the way they have been applied, these 
are quantitative restrictions that go against Article  XI of the GATT , and the letter and spirit of the 
core WTO  principles , by favouring  some as opposed to others.  In fact, the same Panel Report in 
DS564 has also found these measures to constitute quantitative restrictions inconsistent with 
Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.  This Panel Report has unfortunately been appealed into the void 
created by the failure to launch the selection processes for the vacancies of the Appellate Body 
member s. 
44.10.   On the basis of the foregoing, Türkiye would like to seize this opportunity to recall our 
request for the total elimination of all additional duties and quantitative restrictions , without further 
loss of time , in order to ensure that the multilateral trading system operates in an effective manner.  
44.11.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated  the following:  
44.12.   The United States and partners have issued joint statements concerning arrangements 
reached to address imports of steel and aluminum into the United States. In implementing changes 
to Section  232 duties, the President stated that, in his judgement, the arrangements reached with 
various trading partners will provide an effective, long term, alternative means to address any 
contribution by steel and aluminum articles imports from these partners to the threatened 
impairments to the national sec urity of the United States.  In October  2021, the United States and 
the European Union agreed to negotiate a global arrangement to restore market -oriented conditions 
and support the reduction of carbon intensity of steel and aluminum across modes of product ion. 
According to the joint statement, each participant in the global arrangement would undertake several 
actions compatible with international obligations and multilateral rules , including potential rules to 
be jointly developed. The United States and the  European Union are seeking to conclude the 
negotiations on the global arrangement by October  2023.  
44.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
45  UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
45.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
45.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
45.3.  China raised a couple of trade concerns in this Council , on multiple occasions, to express its 
concerns over some measures taken by the United States in the name of national security. As we 
are discussing how to improve the functioning of this Council, and the increasing number of agenda 
items is one of the issues that Member s are concerned with, we have taken a concrete step to 
shorten the list of trade concerns of this Council by combining our relevant trade concerns into 
one item. A nd as this is first  time that we make a statement under this reorganized item, I may take 
a little more time to deliver my statemen t. 
45.4.  Unilateral economic sanctions, in the name of "national security ", have become a major trade 
policy tool of certain WTO  Member s in recent years, and their wide areas of application, broad scope 
of ramifications , and severe harm to the multilateral tradi ng system have given rise to the concerns 
of many Member s. Some of the trade disruptive and discriminatory measures have been subject to 
the WTO  Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the dispute settlement panels have made consistent 
rulings in this regard. In  short, most of the trade restrictive measures in the name of "national 
security " deviated from the circumstance stimulated in the WTO's " security exemption " provisions , 
and constituted an abuse of "national security ". G/C/M/145  
 
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  45.5.  This growing trend of abusing nation al security exemptions started with the United States. 
Since the implementation of the Article  232 Steel and Aluminum tariffs in 2018, the United States 
has taken a number of trade restrictive measures in the name of national security, including the 
follow ing eight  categories:  (i) tariff measures: 232  tariff measures and tariff quotas initiated against 
imported steel and aluminium  products;  (ii) rule of origin measures: discriminatory application of 
origin marking;  (iii) direct export restrictions: extensive export controls on commercial products 
exported to China and on Chinese commercial entities;  (iv) extra-territorial application of export 
restrictions: restricting the exports of specific products of third  countr ies that do not cont ain any 
"US content " to China, through the so -called "foreign direct product rules "; (v) procurement 
prohibition: prohibit federal government agencies from procuring or using telecommunications 
products and services from specific Chinese companies; federal  government agencies will also be 
prohibited from purchasing or using electronic products containing semiconductors produced by 
specific Chinese companies;  (vi) discriminatory subsidies policies: prohibit subsidized 
telecommunications carriers from using p roducts from specific Chinese companies; require 
semiconductor companies receiving US  government subsidies to abandon their expansion plans in 
China, and disqualify subsidies for electric vehicles with batteries containing components or minerals 
originated  from China;  (vii) market authorization prohibitions: prohibit the provision of authorization 
necessary for the marketing of telecommunications equipment to specific Chinese companies;  and 
(viii) ICTS transaction reviews: review of commercial transactions for a very broad range of 
ICT products and services, including procurement, import, transfer, installation, deal -in, or use, with 
the possibility of imposing prohibitive measures.  
45.6.  The US  abuse of "national security " is reflected in the following aspects:  
45.7.  First, the US believes that the application of the "security exemption " provisions is solely 
"self-judging " and is not subject to review by WTO  dispute settlement panels. However, as several 
dispute settlement panel decisions have shown, neither the negotia ting history of the GATT, the text 
of the GATT, nor the interpretation of the relevant provisions by many other Member s agree with 
the US  claim. As many scholars have pointed out, a legal defence  on a purely self -judging basis is 
tantamount to a "black hol e"; it will make exceptions become the rule and seriously undermine the 
multilateral trading system.  
45.8.  Second, the scope of US  export control measures is so broad that it exceeds internationally 
agreed practice; moreover, the unilateral nature of US  export c ontrol measures is pushed to the 
extreme through its extraterritorial application. Under the Foreign -Direct Product Rules (FDPR), 
exports of items produced with US  software or technology are subject to US  controls, even if they 
do not contain any US  content. The extreme unfairness of the measure can be compared to such a 
case where a European author wrote a fiction with a US -made pen, but needed US  permission to 
publish a Chinese edition in China.  
45.9.  Third, the ban on market access for Chinese telecommun ications equipment and the extensive 
scrutiny of ICTS  transactions go well beyond the usual areas of applications such as government 
procurement and critical infrastructure, and include all sales and imports, including commercial 
sales.  
45.10.   Fourth, the discrim inatory nature of subsidy policies is elevated to an unprecedented level. 
Granting US  government subsidies contingent upon the prohibition from expanding capacity in China 
artificially fragments the market, and interferes with the autonomy of commercial bu sinesses to 
make their own business decisions. Even battery components made in China are considered a 
potential threat to US  national security and therefore require discriminatory treatment in its 
subsidies policy.  
45.11.   We took note of the US  view that the inte grity of the WTO was undermined by WTO  dispute 
panels ' decisions on national security cases , and the comments by USTR  Ambassador  Katherine Tai 
that "the WTO is getting itself on very, very thin ice ". We beg to differ. In fact, what really puts the 
WTO on v ery, very thin ice is the abuse of the security exemptions by the United States. Such abuses 
have broke n one window after another of the mansion of the multilateral trading regime, and would 
give rise to the "broken window theory ", where exemptions become the rule and put the rule s-based 
multilateral trading regime in grave danger.  G/C/M/145  
 
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  45.12.   China believes that , in order to strengthen the rules -based multilateral trading system , with 
the WTO at its core, it is necessary to strengthen the deliberative functions of the  WTO on such 
abusive security exemptions, within the framework of the rules and procedures of the WTO.  
45.13.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
45.14.   As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
45.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
46  INDIA – IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT POLICY THROUGH 
QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS (QCOS) IN VARIOUS SECTORS – REQUEST FROM CANADA 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  
46.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada and the European Union.  
46.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
46.3.  The European Union  is deeply concerned by the  increasing number of Quality Control Orders 
(QCOs) that India has been issuing across many sectors , such as toys, automotive parts including 
tyres, chemical and petrochemical substances, and steel.  The majority of QCOs introduced appear 
to have a protecti onist orientation and raise questions regarding their compliance with the 
TBT Agreement. The EU is particularly concerned by the visible trend of QCOs prescribing 
India-specific standards where international standards already exist.  
46.4.  Furthermore, QCOs presc ribe mandatory conformity assessment procedures that are more 
restrictive than necessary to fulfil their legitimate objective. They cause extra burden and economic 
cost to European stakeholders as a result of unnecessarily cumbersome procedures, including 
mandatory factory inspections, and sample testing in Indian laboratories to obtain necessary 
permissions or licences for products already tested and certified under established international 
standards and schemes. There is no provision for a streamlined pr ocess on the basis of existing 
certification from any international body.  
46.5.  The EU also would like to recall the importance of duly notifying all of these measures , as 
required.  So, we hope to be able to work with India on these matters.  
46.6.  The delegate of Canada indicated the following:  
46.7.  Canada remains concerned by the Q COs issued by India across a variety of sectors.  As 
expressed in other forums , such as the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Canada is 
concerned by the QCO  objectives, notification proces ses, and systemic issues in the framework.  We 
hope that India meaningfully engages with these concerns, and answers questions posed by many 
Member s, including Canada, and urge India to ensure that its QCO implementation is consistent with 
its WTO  obligations.  
46.8.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
46.9.  Japan supports the EU and Canada's comments on India's Quality Control Orders  (QCOs) . 
Although Q COs provide for overseas factory inspections by the B IS, Japan requests that Q COs not 
be more trade restrictive than necessary, in accordance with Articles  2.2 and 5.1.2 of the 
TBT Agreement.  In addition, we request that Q COs be consistent with the TBT  Agreement, for 
example, that international standards be used as the basis for Q COs, in accordance with Articles  2.4 
and 5.4 of the TBT  Agreement, and that an appropriate period be allowed before implementing 
QCOs , in accordance with Article  2.12 and 5.9 of the TBT  Agreement.  
46.10.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
46.11.   We thank the European U nion and Canada for raising this item , and Japan for supporting.  
The United Kingdom also has concerns with the number of Q COs being introduced by India on a G/C/M/145  
 
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  number of goods which seem to be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil India 's legitimate  
objectives.  We would encourage India to ensure that existing and incoming regulations are in 
accordance with international standards where they exist in order to prevent adverse impacts for 
foreign businesses and trade.  We look forward to continued engage ment with India on this issue . 
46.12.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
46.13.   We thank the delegations of the EU, Canada, Japan,  and the UK for their interest in India 's 
QCOs. The delegation of Canada had submitted a paper on this topic co -sponsored by other Member s 
in the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Capital is currently reviewing this paper and may 
consider submitting a response in due course.  
46.14.   We also thank the delegation of the European Union for outlining their views today i n this 
meeting. We take good note of these comments and will also transmit them to Capital for careful 
consideration. We also acknowledge the productive bilateral discussion with the European Union on 
the sidelines of the TBT Committee on this and other tr ade issues.  
46.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
47  EGYPT – MANDATORY USE OF LETTER OF CREDIT AS PAYMENT CONDITION FOR 
IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
47.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union.  
47.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
47.3.  We are pleased to report progress. We welcome Egypt 's decision to remove the mandatory 
requirement to use a Letter of Credit as prior condition for payments in the country and  thank Egypt 
for the steps taken so far.  We understand that , since 3  January  2023, other payment methods are 
available, which we see as a first important step towards restoring bilateral trade flows.  While trade 
flows did not yet resume, we expect that the situation on the ground will soon normalize , and we 
are confident that Egypt will  take all necessary steps in this direction.  
47.4.  The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
47.5.  Norway thanks the EU for raising this item.  We appreciate the positive developments in Egypt 
and, as also mentioned just now by the EU, we welcome Egypt 's decision  to remove the requirement 
to use Letters of Credit. We are hopeful that the situation will soon be normali zed. 
47.6.  The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
47.7.  Egypt  thank s the European Union and Norway for their continued interest in this matter . Egypt 
would simply like  to brief the Membership today  that, as highlighted in the Council's last meeting, 
in November  2022, the Central Bank of Egypt has taken a number of measures  with respect to the 
EU requirement so to enable its complete phase -out in December  2022. 
47.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
48  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
48.1.  The Chairp erson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
48.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
48.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its concerns regarding the amendments to the EU  basic 
regulation on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulation (EU)  2017/2321 and 
Regulation (EU)  2018/825.  At previous CTG  meetings, we pointed out the discriminatory nature of G/C/M/145  
 
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  the amendments, which can be illustrated by the following : (i) the European Commission may punish 
the exporters twice for the same situation labelled by the amendments as "significant distortions " 
and "raw material distortions "; and (ii)  the European Commission has issued only two  "reports " on 
so-called "significant distortions " in two  particular exporting countries. It clearly shows the 
discriminatory nature of the EU 's approach regarding the application of anti -dumping measures. 
Without going into further detail, we would like once again to reiterate our systemic co ncern about 
the WTO -inconsistency of the amendments. We urge the EU to abstain from their application and 
not to violate its WTO  obligations.  
48.4.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
48.5.  We would just like to refer to the s tatement we delive red under Agenda Item 31, where we 
stressed our call that the rules -based international order be respected . 
48.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
49  OTHER BUSINESS  
49.1  Report of Event "Who Notices Notifications? A Conversation With the Private Sector 
at the WTO"  
49.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
49.2.  As a first point, I recall that the United States wished to make a report on an event 
co-organized by the United States, "Who Notices No tifications? A Conversation with the Private 
Sector at the WTO".  
49.3.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
49.4.  In association with the WTO  Friends of Transparency, on 30  March several WTO  Members 
sponsored panel discussion, "Who Notices Notifi cations? A Conversation with the Private Sector at 
the WTO", on the margins of the April  2023 C TG. The discussion provided insights from private 
sector panellists  representing the International Chamber of Commerce; Manufacturers Association 
of Israel; US  Soybean Export Council; Fonterra, a New Zealand dairy manufacture; and Loc Kim Chi 
Seafood Company, a Vietnamese seafood exporter. The panel also included Israel's TBT  Enquiry 
Point.  
49.5.  Panellists  noted that staying up to date with the tremendous volume of WTO  notifications is 
a significant resource commitment, one that only large corporations and industry associations can 
possibly undertake. Micro, small, and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often unable to monitor 
WTO notifications due to resource constra ints. MSMEs are challenged by the current notification 
system and doubt their ability to shape Member policies that affect their business. Panellists  
suggested that enquiry points, trade associations, and universities could be helpful in raising 
awareness,  particularly among MSMEs, of WTO  notifications. The panellist  representing the 
Vietnamese seafood exporter shared their direct experience receiving training on WTO  notifications 
through a university programme , and the difference this knowledge made to the  company and their 
sense of engagement on policies affecting their operations.  
49.6.  One key takeaway from the session was that the private sector highly values coordination 
with government officials, foreign  and domestic , on policy changes, especially during th e early stages 
before a policy change is notified to the WTO. Private sector input can provide concrete examples of 
what the impact of a policy change may be. The event also highlighted that the global trading 
environment has become dramatically more compl ex since the WTO's notification system was 
created, and there is room for improvement. Panellists  suggested that translating WTO  notifications 
into more languages, making the ePing  system more user -friendly for non -government users, and 
Members improving t he specificity of notifications with regard to product coverage to allow for more  
targeted review by interested parties could be helpful improvements. The COVID -19 pandemic did 
not seem to have a significant impact on speakers' experiences with notificatio ns. 
49.7.  Our delegations will continue to work with WTO  Members to bring diverse and thoughtful 
perspectives to the WTO. These voices help us understand how WTO  notifications provide G/C/M/145  
 
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  predictability for traders, help them make informed business decisions, and co ntribute to a more 
inclusive global trading system.  
49.8.  This summary of the event, along with a link to the event recording, is available in 
document  RD/CTG/18 . 
49.9.  The Chairperson  thanked the United States and proposed that the Council take note of the 
statement made.  
49.10.   The Council so agreed . 
49.2  Tentative Annual Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in 
Goods ( JOB/CTG/22) and Evolving Tentative Calendar of Formal Meetings of WTO  Bodies 
for 2023 ( WT/INF/231/ Rev.1) 
49.11.   The Chairperson  drew the Council's attention to the most recent iteration of the "Tentative 
Annual Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods ( JOB/CTG/22 )", which 
would be updated for each subsequent formal meeting of the CTG  with a view to anticipating and, if 
possible, avoiding any scheduling issues , and the "Evolving Tentative Calendar of Formal Meetings 
of WTO  Bodies for 2023 ( WT/INF/231/Rev.1 )", which now forms part of the interactive calendar on 
the Members' site . This  document exists in part thanks to this Council . I had the opportunity to 
present the CTG  calendar  to the outgoing Chairperson of the General Council , mentioning that it had  
had proven its value during the two  previous years, and the General Council team was directly 
inspired by this  document , even if it is even harder for them to prepare their version , and it is less 
stable, given the increased number of bodies reflected in that calendar.  
49.12.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
49.13.   I would like to note that having an annual plan of meetings is very important to the 
sequencing of events throughout the WTO, and that the Council should take great care to adhere to 
the schedule to the fullest extent possible.  
49.14.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
49.15.   Paraguay would like to thank the Chair for both documents. We believe that having a 
schedule, even if tentative , at a larger scale, helps us all to better organize ourselves. We would 
also like to request that, should there be changes  in dates of meetings of this Council or its subsidiary 
bodies, that Members be informed of the reasons for said changes. We are often told that there are 
changes, but without  formally  receiving a reason . We believe this also promotes accountability, 
because in general these changes have a disruptive effect in the functioning of this Council and its 
subsidiary bodies.  
49.16.   The Chairperson  recalled that this had been a matter that had been raised at the Council' s 
informal meeting , and on which he had undertaken to write to the Chairperson of the General 
Council.  
49.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
49.3  E-Agenda  
49.18.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
49.19.   You will recall that on 13  February the Council adopted , following a written procedure, the 
introduction  of the eAgenda in the work of the Council for Trade in Goods  on a trial basis . I have the 
pleasure to inform you today that the system has been developed based on the model used by the 
Market Access Committee . In the coming weeks, the Secretariat will circulate a communication 
describing how the training and testing phase will proceed, including the possibility to provide 
feedback concerning any eventual adjustment to the system that may prove necessary.  If all goes 
well, the Council for Trade in Goods, could be in a position to use eAgenda, on an experimental 
basis, for its meeting of July  2023.  Finally, I would like to note that t he Council's Decision of G/C/M/145  
 
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  13 February has not yet been circulated. If you agree, and to facilitate the record of this Decision, 
the Secretariat will distribute it as a CTG  document.  
49.20.   The Council took note  of the statement made.  
49.4  Date of Next Meeting  
49.21.   The Chairperson  indicated that the Council's next formal meeting s had been scheduled for 
the dates of 6 -7 July 2023, with an informal meeting scheduled on the date of 31  May. These dates 
would be confirmed in due course.  
50  ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
50.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that the Chair of  the General Council had carried out consultations 
on a slate of names for Chairpersons to the different WTO  standing bodies in accordance with the 
established Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers. These proposed nominations had been 
approved by the General Council at its most recent  meeting. In line with the nominations, he 
proposed that the CTG elect H.E. Dr. Adamu Mohammed Abdulhamid from Nigeria  as Chairperson 
of the Council by acclamation.  
50.2.  The Council so agreed . 
50.3.  The outgoing Chairperson  congratul ated Ambassador Adamu Mohammed Abdulhamid  for his 
election and expressed his appreciation to delegations, and to the Secretariat, for their unwavering 
efforts and dedication to carrying out the work of the CTG.  
50.4.  The incoming Chairperson  recalled that, as ag reed under Agenda Item 3, the election of 
officers of the subsidiary bodies of the Council had been suspended. Once there was an agreed slate 
of names , the CTG  Chair would reconvene the CTG to deal exclusively with that agenda item.  
50.5.  The meeting was closed . 
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