RESTRICTED  
  
WT/BFA/W/574  
13 September  2021 
(21-6776) Page: 1/32 
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration  Original:  French  
 
  
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL AUDITORS  ON THE WTO'S HANDLING  
OF THE COVID -19 HEALTH CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES  
The Report of the Independent External Auditors on the WTO's handling of the COVID -19 health 
crisis and its consequences is attached . WT/BFA/W/574  
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    WT/BFA/W/574  
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EXTERNAL AUDIT OF THE  
WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  
 
AUDIT REPORT  
  
THE WTO'S HANDLING OF THE  
COVID -19 HEALTH CRISIS  
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES  
(June 2021)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RÉFÉRENCE COUR DES COMPTES: OMC 2021 -1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RÉFÉRENCE COUR DES COMPTES: OMC 2021 -2 
 WT/BFA/W/574  
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 WT/BFA/W/574  
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  CONTENTS  
SUMMARY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  7 
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS  ................................ ................................ .........................  10 
I. FRAMEWO RK, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE AUDIT  ..............................  11 
1. Framework of the audit  ................................ ................................ ...............................  11 
2. Objectives of the audit ................................ ................................ ................................  11 
3. Conduct and methodology of the audit  ................................ ................................ ..........  11 
II. CONTEXT  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  12 
III. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  ................................ ...........................  13 
1. Preparing the Organization for crisis management  ................................ ..........................  13 
1.1. Weaknesses in risk assessment and management  ................................ ........................  13 
1.2. Lack of a general business continuity plan  ................................ ................................ .. 14 
2. Organization of crisis management from March 2020  ................................ ......................  14 
2.1. Timeline of crisis management implementation  ................................ ............................  14 
2.2. Creation of the Health Task Force (HTF)  ................................ ................................ ..... 15 
2.3. Communication with staff  ................................ ................................ .........................  16 
3. Technological dimension of crisis management  ................................ ...............................  17 
3.1. Impact on business continuity  ................................ ................................ ...................  17 
3.2. Adaptation measures and their effectiveness  ................................ ...............................  18 
3.3. ITSD support and security of operations  ................................ ................................ ..... 21 
4. Human resources management  ................................ ................................ ....................  23 
4.1. Adapting the Staff Rules  ................................ ................................ ...........................  24 
4.2. Monitoring employee health and prevention mechanisms  ................................ ..............  25 
4.3. Management of on -site work  ................................ ................................ .....................  25 
4.4. Establishing and managing teleworking  ................................ ................................ ...... 26 
5. Financial and budgetary impact of the crisis  ................................ ................................ ... 28 
5.1. Estimated financial impact  ................................ ................................ ........................  28 
5.2. Impact on the Organization's performance  ................................ ................................ .. 30 
IV. CONCLUSION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  31 
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ................................ ................................ ...............................  32 
 
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    WT/BFA/W/574  
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  SUMMARY  
The C OVID -19 health crisis has affected the whole world after successive epidemic events since 
late 2019 and early 2020 . The WHO officially declared a pandemic on 1 1 March  2020 and stated  
on 13 March  2020 that "Europe has now become the epicentre of the pandemic ". From 
mid-March  2020, many States started taking  restricti ve measures , including on  transport and travel  
or on the use of certain places  conducive to  the spread  of the pandemic . The Schengen area thus 
closed all its borders on 17 March  2020. In Switzerland , the first case of  COVID -19 was reported  
on 25 February  2020 and the first death on 6 March  2020. On 16 March , the Federal Council 
announced  that it was an "extraordinary  situation " within the meaning of the law on epidemics, 
authorizing  it to take immediate and temporary measures throughout the country . Such measures 
would be repeated  throughout 2020, and again in 2021, in response to the developments  in the 
pandemic and successive waves . The restrictions imposed across the bo ard, including on public 
transport, the closure of certain shops or cultural or leisure facilities, the more or less uniform 
requirement for teleworking, the restriction on public activities by some governments, physical 
distancing requirements and the clo sure of schools, on the one hand, have created disruption in the 
operation of all productive work units and, on the other hand, resulted in exceptional costs in 
response to the situation created by such measures.  
For the WTO, these measures have created a work environment that is fairly comparable to that of  
other international organizations : travel restrictions affecting operational activities and the ability to 
hold international forums ; impact of the crisis on Member States' budgetary capacity ; widesprea d 
teleworking  for staff , with its implications for labour productivity ; savings on certain fixed and 
variable costs due to  the closure of facilities , set against  additional costs arising from remote work ing 
and extraordinary  specific protective measures ; impacts on overall operational performance ; sick 
leave and isolation for workers  infected with  COVID -19, as well as  other illnesses  that are gradually 
emerging linked to  new collective  and professional life styles . 
The crisis came on  sudden ly and caught  the Organization by surprise . For a number of  years, and 
especially following cases of  zoonoses that have led to emerging epidemics (SARS, avian influenza , 
etc.), many futurists  and health surveillance  officials had been warning  of the growing likelihood of 
disruptive pandemics . However, while awareness of the need for proactive risk management was 
growing at the same time, practically no public or private organization, even the most advanced in 
this field, considered this pandemic risk to be so serious  as to  justify the prior develop ment of 
mechanisms  (structures  and procedures) to contain  any resulting  crisis.  
In this regard, t he WTO has not fared better or worse  than most public organizations . But since it  
had not  develop ed a structural system to identify risks of all kinds and manage crises likely to affect 
it, and  since it lacked any predefined, robust and tested  business continu ity plans , it did not have  
the legal, structural and operational tools to tackle this particula r crisis when it erupted . 
However, the Organization reacted  promptly  and effectively to the emergency  by putting in place 
the structures ( the Health Task Force ( HTF)) and sui generis  procedures to address two key issues 
having the greatest impact on  its resources  and mission : (a) protect ing the health of staff and doing 
its best to allow them to continue  to serve the Organization's interests and mission ; and (b) ensur ing, 
as far as possible , the continu ity of the Member States' collective activities (committees and other 
forums).  
The HTF, originally set up  to manage just the  health risk s, went on to bring together  specific  critical 
operational  divisions to contribute, quickly and effectively, to the design and implementation of 
necessary measures of all kinds (organization of work, IT support, security, etc.) . Some ambiguities 
arose with regard to i ts governance  and powers  following  the departu re of the Deputy 
Director -General (DDG), who originally chaired the HTF and endorsed the operational decisions  
within his purview . 
Not being prepared for the management of acute crises, owing  to the lack of tried and tested  plans, 
structures and procedures , the WTO thus implement ed, as a matter of urgency,  an extraordinary  
mechanism underpinned by  the good will, skills or empiricism of some staff members . In the light 
of generally  accepted principles of crisis management in complex organizations, this mechanism ha d 
some shortcomings ( such as imperfect decision -making  chains, unassigned  operational  
responsibilities, limited  initial scope  of critical functions within the HTF). WT/BFA/W/574  
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  However, it is fair to say that most large public organizations were no better prepared , although  this 
does not absolve  the Organization of its responsibility . Moreover , despite its shortcomings and 
weaknesses in principle, the mechanism put in place at short notice  has been sufficiently effective , 
partic ularly with regard to the communication with and information for staff and delegations,  the 
comprehensiveness  and transparency of which was a key strength of the WTO's  crisis management.  
As soon as access to premises and working tools was prohibited  and st aff were asked  to telework 
for an indefinite period of time, the management of the crisis took on a greater  technological 
dimension . Tools for remote w orking, communication and exchanges  were needed . The value of 
initiatives undertaken prior to the outbreak of the crisis in the context of a potential shift in 
communication tools (Zoom, WebEx) then became evident . Similarly, a previous test , planned for  
the end of 2019, of specific  video conference software that allows Member States to meet under  
proper  conditions of confidential ity with an  interpretation function (Interprefy), meant that  the tool 
and its functionalities could be adopted extremely quickly after the onset of the crisis . The heavy  
use of remote working tools, as w ell as the high number of contacts between tele working staff  and 
the support service illustrates the importance  of the technical choices  of the Information Technology 
Solutions Division (ITSD) , its effectiveness and , ultimately , the resilience of the Organization.  
Teleworking  not only raises  technical issues,  but also legal and psychosociological concerns . In 
concrete terms, decisions had to be and were taken to establish and organiz e the tele working  for all 
staff. From a l egal point of view , the External Auditor is concerned however  about the 
Director -General's authority  to modify the Staff Rules , with a view to the collective and systemic  
application , even in the event of force majeure . For its part, the Secretariat considers that these 
powers are clearly established by provision  115.2 of the Staff Rules . Given the exceptional nature of 
the situation and the absence of any pre -established formal crisis management framework, in this 
case the Ministerial Conference should  probably  have explicitly grant ed the Director -General 
exceptional management powers , including the authority to waive the Staff Rules , and should do so 
in the event of a future serious and unforeseeable crisis (recommendation No. 1). 
More broadly, the current framework governing tele working covers  a normal state of affairs  where 
this arrangement  is used on a voluntary and exceptional basis . It is undoubte dly not suited to a  
crisis situation in which tele working is imposed on all or some  staff members . New forms of 
teleworking were trialled nolens volens  by the Organization during the crisis . Should this experience 
lead to changes in  the WTO's teleworking regulatory framework, naturally the new framework , which 
would  be discussed and adopted , should provide for the necessary developments to adopt 
teleworking as a means of crisis management (recommendation No. 2). 
Undeniably a nd conclusivel y, while all the mechanisms , introduced and implemented as a matter of 
urgency , are not flawless , they have, on the whole , proven to be agile  and effective, meeting the 
needs  of virtually all stakeholders (staff, delegations, partners).  
Now the emergency that warranted  "reactive" management is over , the time has come for the WTO  
to undertake  a comprehensive feedback exercise , whether it is a question of risk  structuring  and 
management, crisis governance and organization, or operational issues relat ing to staff support  or 
management,  including in terms of computing and digitization tools . 
Some  projects, including those that have remained  pending for many years , such as cr isis 
management (policy, governance, structures, procedures,) or the relationship between risk 
management and internal monitoring,  should now be able to be finalized quickly . Others, including 
those linked to  new modes  of organization of work discovered during the crisis, certainly , certainly 
warrant  further  analys is and wider internal discussion . 
Beyond the qualitative and operational approach to the management of the crisis, the financial cost 
of the crisis was CHF 7.8 million  in 2020 . Insofar as  the situation has also enabled the Organization 
to reduce its expenditure by CHF 21.4 million , the res ult is a net saving on the 2020 budget 
of CHF 13.6 million. T hese amounts are minimal, in particular because  staff costs, which have not 
been significantly affected by the crisis, account for  a very large proportion of the budget . Thus, the 
financial results of the management of the COVID -19 crisis do not call for any particular  comments.  
However , this audit provides example s of performance management and analysis  shortcomings . 
While the External Auditor was able to  identify shifts , and the choices they represent , in the allocati on WT/BFA/W/574  
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  of resources to the various  operational objectives, it is impossible to establish the impact of the crisis 
and the extent  to which  the situation has affected the Organization's performance , in quantitativ e 
and/or qualitative terms . 
Ultimately, t his crisis therefore underlines the particular importance of having specific indicators to 
measure performance  rather than resources (means) or the level of effort made  
(recommendation  No. 3). 
At the WTO , as elsewhere, the pandemic has put an exceptional spotlight on the weak points as well 
as the capacities  and potential of an organization which can no longer be content to replicate a way 
of functioning whose efficiency, as the crisis has shown through specific examples, still leaves room 
for improvement.  
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  LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
1.  The recommendations  are given in  order of priorit y: 
• priorit y 1, fundamental issue , requiring management's immediate attention . Points to 
the existence of a high level of risk for the Organization's objectives;  
• priorit y 2, less urgent issue to be handled by management . Points to an intermediate 
level of risk ; 
• priorit y 3, issue for which oversight could be improved and to which management's 
attention is drawn . Points to a moderate level of risk . 
Area  and 
services 
concern ed Priorit y Recomm endation  
DDG 1 1. The External Auditor recommends submitting a prop osal to the 
Ministerial Conference that, in the event of a  major, unexpected and 
prolonged crisis , the Director -General be given the necessary special 
powers for the flexible and proactive management of the Secretariat, 
including the possibility of delegating powers to certain directors . 
DDG 1 2. The External Auditor recommends finalizing, in accordance with 
future crisis management p lans,  a set of regulations  to be submitted, 
depending on the ir particular  nature and  scope, to either the governing 
bodies or  senior management for approval, so as to provide  a 
framework for teleworking when  major  crisis situations make it 
necessary . This set of texts specifically focused on crisis management 
should,  in any event,  form part of the overall legal framework for 
teleworking, which could possibly be renewed in the light of the 
experience gained during the COVID -19 pandemic . 
DDG 1 3. The External Auditor recommends formalizing the monitoring of 
the Organization's performance through quantifi ed means and 
performance indicators . These indicators should be defined by each 
service and transmitted to the Financial Operations Directorate  for 
consolidation . In the longer term, this monitoring could form the basis 
for an annual performance report  separate from the Annual Report and 
the Financial Performance Report . 
 
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  I. FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE AUDIT  
1. Framework of the audit  
2.  In accordance with the mandate given to us by the General Council of the World  Trade  
Organization (WTO), the provisions of parag raph XI of the Organization's financial regulations and 
the notification issued on 12  January  2021, as supplemented on 28  March  2021, a team of 
three  auditors carried out a performance audit from 3 to 21  May 2021 on "The WTO's handling of 
the COVID -19 heal th crisis and its consequences". The terms of reference of the audit were shared 
in advance with the Organization's management.  
3.  The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for Supreme Audit 
Institutions (ISSAI) on performance aud iting and compliance auditing, the WTO financial regulations 
and the mandate entrusted to the External Auditor. These standards require the External Auditor to 
comply with the relevant ethical requirements, to exercise professional judgment and apply criti cal 
thinking throughout the audit.  
2. Objectives of the audit  
4.  The External Auditor has set himself the following objectives:  
- Inform the General Council of the details of the measures adopted by the Organization 
in response to the situation created by the C OVID -19 health crisis;  
- Examine the consistency and effective timing of these internal measures in relation to 
the development of external constraints that were imposed on the Organization by the 
Swiss federal or cantonal authorities or that the Organizatio n chose to impose on itself 
in consideration of its responsibility as a public stakeholder in the canton of Geneva;  
- Calculate the cost of each of these measures where data were available;  
- Draw up the overall balance sheet (costs/savings) for 2020 and possible extension 
for 2021 and beyond.  
5.  In addition to the short -term aspect of managing the effects of the pandemic, this audit was 
supplemented by an assessment of the organization of, and structural procedures pertaining to, risk 
analysis and the foreca sting and management of potential crises, and a study of the handling of 
feedback within the Organization.  
3. Conduct and methodology of the audit  
6.  Due to the health situation and resulting restrictions on travel and physical contact, the whole 
audit proces s was conducted remotely . For the first year of its mandate, this constraint proved 
particularly burdensome for a performance audit which, besides documentary analysis, requires, 
more than any other form of audit, close and continuous contact with those in charge of the 
programme  being audited, in order to achieve a better understanding of the occurrences observed.  
7.  Even though the WTO provided computer equipment to the Auditors to perform this remote work 
in accordance with the Organization's security rules, these circumstances ha mpered access to the 
resources (data and evidence) required to analyse and document the subjects covered, and contact 
with the persons responsible for the services concerned by the handling of the health crisis. Despite 
the services' unquestionable willing ness to cooperate, which the External Auditor would like to 
emphasize, this significantly slowed down progress on the work and lengthened the timetable for 
the production of the final report, the substance of which has nevertheless been little affected.  
8.  The audit methodology involved a combination of:  
- Analyses of pre -existing internal documents and the use of questionnaires to collect raw 
quantitative and qualitative data;  WT/BFA/W/574  
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  - Interviews with the main divisional managers in both the administrative and financial  
sectors as well as the operational sectors, and with the heads of the ad hoc  mechanisms 
created during and for the management of the crisis;  
- Interviews with health crisis managers at other international organizations (public and 
private) operating in the canton of Geneva;  
- The design, dissemination and use of two qualitative surveys aimed at members of the 
senior management team and all WTO staff.  
9.  Draft written observations on each of the examined subjects were shared with the managers 
concerned, who were a ble to provide an initial formal and factual response during the audit. All the 
observations and recommendations contained in this report were ultimately discussed with the 
relevant managers during a comprehensive formal response procedure: the Secretariat  received the 
External Auditor's draft report on 30  July 2021; its comments (factual and/or formal) and written 
contributions, provided to the External Auditor on 25  August  2021 have been examined and, where 
appropriate, fully reflected in this report.  
II. CONTEXT  
10.  The whole world has been affected by the COVID -19 crisis, after successive epidemic events 
since late 2019/early 2020. Following the detection and treatment of numerous cases of COVID -19 
in more than 20 countries outside China in the first few wee ks of 2020, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on 30  January  2020. 
The WHO officially declared a pandemic on 11  March  2020 and stated on 13  March  2020 that "Europe 
has now become the epic entre of the pandemic". From mid -March  2020, many States started taking 
restrictive measures, particularly on transport and travel and on the use of certain places likely to 
become breeding grounds for the spread of the pandemic. The Schengen area thus clo sed all its 
borders on 17  March  2020.  
11.  In Switzerland, the first case of COVID -19 was declared on 25  February and the first death 
on 6 March. On 16  March, the Federal Council stated that the situation in Switzerland was an 
"extraordinary situation" within t he meaning of the law on epidemics, authorizing it to take 
immediate and temporary measures throughout the country. Such measures continued to be 
introduced throughout 2020, and in 2021, in response to developments in the pandemic and 
successive waves.  
12.  Naturally, these measures have had a very serious impact on the social, economic and cultural 
activities of the countries affected, with each country - and in Switzerland, in some instances or 
circumstances, each canton - establishing its own rules that are n ot necessarily coordinated with the 
"rest of the world". The effects of these measures nevertheless remain contingent. However, across 
the board, the restrictions imposed on public transport, the closure of certain shops or cultural and 
leisure facilities,  the more or less uniform requirement for teleworking, some governments' 
restrictions on public presence, behavioural requirements, including physical distancing, and the 
closure of schools have not only led to disruption in work activities, but also resul ted in exceptional 
costs to deal with the situation.  
13.  For the WTO, these measures have created a work environment that is fairly comparable to that 
of other public or private organizations: widespread teleworking, with its implications for labour 
productivi ty; savings on certain fixed and variable costs due to the closure of facilities, set against 
additional costs arising from remote working and unusual specific protective measures; impacts on 
overall operational performance; isolation of infected workers a nd sick leave due to COVID -19, as 
well as illnesses linked to new collective and professional lifestyles.  
14.  Specific impacts - constraints as well as opportunities - related to the international nature of 
the Organization had to be taken into account: the si gnificant impact of reduced international travel 
due to reduced services and border restrictions; the advantages of diplomatic status in the face of 
travel or border restrictions; the impact of these measures on the holding of multilateral forums; 
and the budgetary capacity of the contributing States (themselves facing exorbitant domestic 
financial needs) to finance the management of the crisis.  WT/BFA/W/574  
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  III. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Preparing the Organization for crisis management  
1.1. Weaknesses in risk  assessment and management  
15.  Risk assessment and management is a recent concern for the WTO. While a draft "risk 
management policy" document was prepared in late 2012, it was not until March  2014 that the 
necessary clarifications were adopted for the publica tion of a supposedly definitive document.  
16.  Producing such a document was highly important, if only symbolically, to support the 
commitment of the senior management to establish a risk management "system". Although it is 
presented as a "general policy" document, the current version (which has not been revised 
since 2014) is particularly condensed. It merely sets out general principles and standard definitions 
applicable to any organization. While it does provide for a degree of distribution of re sponsibility in 
risk identification, assessment and management, the audit showed that the most important 
provisions have not yet been strictly applied (or only in a sporadic or irregular fashion).  
17.  With the exception of IT risks (operations and security), w hich are naturally addressed in a 
dedicated, continuous and professional manner by the Information Technology Solutions Division 
(ITSD), the term "risk -owners" in the risk management policy is not sufficiently explicit.  
18.  The annual production of a first ris k management report only occurred in November  2016 
followed by another in September  2018, with no reports having been produced since. This lack of 
reports may be explained by the vacancy of the position of head of governance and risk 
management. These old risk management reports, which have been reviewed by the External 
Auditor, focus on "critical risks", namely those with a high assessment score (resulting from the 
probability of occurrence score and potential impact score). Aside from the technological ri sk relating 
to the development of cybercrime and the "risks" relating to the financing of the Organization by its 
contributors, the risks reported to senior management, and to the Committee on Budget, Finance 
and Administration (CBFA) for its information, are of an external nature and relate to the 
Organization's central mission to safeguard and promote the multilateral trading system.  
19.  Despite the precedent of avian influenza  and alarmist assessments by a number of experts from 
specialized international age ncies (WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO)) and futurists, and despite the preparedness measures taken by a number of Western 
governments, which warned, as early as 2004, of the likelihood and risks of a highly lethal pan demic, 
no system for managing such a risk had been developed, let alone deployed, prior to the onset of 
the COVID -19 crisis, in the Organization's records or plans.  
20.  It is fair to say that, prior to the current crisis, neither this prospect, nor the critica l disruption 
it risked causing, were generally taken into consideration either in the international public sector 
(save the exceptions above) or in the private sector.  
21.  Even though the occurrence of a sudden and unexpected crisis cannot be reasonably antici pated, 
a pre -established crisis management system can at least enable a response thereto. Such a plan, 
covering most typical situations (namely, according to the document, when "a sudden and 
unexpected event requires immediate action") has existed in draft  form since October  2008 (a 
pandemic crisis was listed as a potential emergency). For 12 years, this draft, which was 
nevertheless complete, structured and adapted to the Organization, was not implemented for 
reasons the External Auditor was unable to iden tify: besides the fact that the position of risk manager 
has lacked continuity since 2017 (which does not in itself explain why the document remained in 
draft form for so many years), it is likely that a certain management routine, combined with a 
dilution  of responsibilities for risk management, as well as the dynamics of decision -making within 
the Organization were enough to provide a certain sense of security that delayed the finalization of 
this crisis management plan.  
22.  Finally, at the very least and in the absence of a specific internal dynamic, the head of internal 
audit should have been in a position to encourage reflection on risk assessment, preparation for 
crisis management and finalization of the plan establishing the mechanisms and procedures for 
dealing with an unexpected critical event. The delays in finalizing and approving the Organization's WT/BFA/W/574  
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  internal oversight framework (see: report on the accounts of the WTO for the year ending 
31 December  2020) may also have contributed to the delay in processing the plan, as the authority 
of the Office of Internal Oversight and its contribution to enterprise risk management (ERM) are not 
clearly identified. At the time of finalizing this report, the Secretariat indicated that the recruitment 
of a Compli ance, Risk and Resilience Officer was under way and that the formal internal oversight 
framework, which could not be finalized under the previous Director -General, would be submitted in 
due course for approval by the new Director -General.  
1.2. Lack of a ge neral business continuity plan  
23.  Business continuity is a key aspect of crisis management. The concept was also clearly identified 
and was the subject of specific provisions (creation of a business continuity team) in the 
above -mentioned draft crisis managem ent plan prepared in 2008. While ongoing initiatives have 
been taken and plans adopted in the technological domain managed by the ITSD, albeit limited to 
purely technical aspects without addressing the occupational aspect of business continuity (see 
report  on the accounts of the WTO for the year ending 31  December  2020), no general business 
continuity plan had been drawn up or was even under development at the onset of the COVID -19 
crisis when stringent material obligations were imposed. Admittedly, in Janu ary 2020 the work plan 
for the Administration and General Services Division (AGSD) did include the "updating of the crisis 
management policy". However, the mention of such an - obviously necessary - action under the 
summary heading of one of the points in a long list of an assortment of actions to be undertaken, 
may illustrate a willingness, but not the substance of a genuine business continuity plan.  
2. Organization of crisis management from March  2020  
2.1. Timeline of crisis management implementation  
24.  As stated above, after the WHO declared a PHEIC on 30  January, the first COVID -19 case was 
reported in Switzerland on 25  February. On 28  February, on the basis of the law on epidemics, the 
Federal Council banned gatherings of more than 1,000 people until 15  March, declaring a "special 
situation". On 16  March, the Federal Council declared Switzerland to be in an "extraordinary 
situation" within the meaning of the law on epidemics, authorizing it to take immediate and 
temporary measures throughout the country. Su ch measures continued to be introduced 
throughout  2020, and in early 2021, in response to developments in the pandemic and successive 
waves.  
25.  The WTO reacted quickly and moved in step with the Federal Government. According to the 
information gathered by the  Auditors, the WTO reportedly participated in the Federal Council press 
conferences from February  2020. At the end of the same month, in consultation with the cantonal 
doctor, the WTO set up its first cross -functional crisis response team. The staff and th e General 
Council were kept abreast of the situation by senior management (communications from Deputy 
Director -General (DDG) K. Brauner) on 28  February and 3  March  2020. Specific initiatives were 
taken with the same forward -looking responsiveness, such as the advance purchase of stocks of 
hand sanitizer by the AGSD at the end of January  2020, and a number of training sessions by 
the ITSD on videoconferencing using the Microsoft Teams software.  
26.  The WTO was one of the first international organizations in Gene va to close its doors, the 
Director -General deciding on the first site closure two days before the Federal Council's statement 
on 14  March  2020. It appears that the school closures by the local government pointed to more 
restrictive measures ahead, thereby  providing a strong warning signal. In addition, an exchange and 
coordination meeting of the United Nations (UN) agencies based in Geneva was held on 
14 March  2020.  
27.  In the absence of a pre -existing crisis management mechanism and plan, the early adoption o f 
certain practical measures in response to the statements by the WHO and later by the Swiss Federal 
Council, and the establishment of the crisis response team in February, show that despite the 
significant uncertainties surrounding the nature and reality of the pandemic, and how to protect 
against it, the Secretariat of the Organization responded swiftly to the information as it became 
available.  WT/BFA/W/574  
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  2.2. Creation of the Health Task Force (HTF ) 
28.  Given the lack of pre -established mechanisms and plans, the WTO se t up an ad hoc  crisis 
management system. The establishment of the Health Task Force (HTF) through a circular 
dated  26 February  2020, broadly defines its scope of work without, however, specifying its exact 
competences:  
"A Special Task Force has been create d to monitor the coronavirus COVID -19 outbreak 
and ensure that contingency plans are being monitored  and adjusted as necessary 
to prevent and control any impact the outbreak may have on the WTO environment and 
work. " 
29.  The part stating "contingency plans are being monitored" may come as a surprise, since no 
contingency plan existed upon the mechanism's establishment. However, its originators can be given 
credit for their willingness to entrust it with the monitoring of any plans adopted while managing the 
crisis.  
30.  At the time the crisis was unfolding, when the only certainty was that of its harmfulness and its 
significant, though still poorly understood, lethality, priority was given to the safety of staff. This is 
illustrated by the name of the mechanism and the fact that its management was entrusted to a DDG 
responsible for administration and therefore human resources management, rather than to an 
operational DDG.  
31.  The HTF's membership was necessarily devised in a hurry, and the involvemen t of certain units 
that were in fact inevitably concerned (such as the ITSD) was not planned from the outset. This was 
quickly corrected to ensure optimal centralization of the necessary decisions. However, no internal 
text provides the HTF with clear and defined powers: its decision -making power lies with its chair 
(DDG) and the powers delegated to him. Furthermore, the members are appointed intuit personae , 
albeit by virtue of their functions and, as no provision has been made for their replacement, there  
is a risk of dysfunction.  
Table 1: Membership of the Health Task Force (HTF)  
Name  Function at the WTO  Function in the HTF  
Karl Brauner  Deputy Director -General  Chair 
Miguel Burnier,  Legal Counsel  Secretary  
Members of the initial team  
Wayne McCook  Office of the Director -General (DGO)   
Christian Dahoui  Human Resources Division (HRD)   
Dr Charbanou Jochum  (HR) Doctor   
Muriel Salette Carroz  Travel Specialist   
Amène Bellir  Security/Prevention Officer   
Subsequently appointed members  
Sandra Gripari  Facilities Management   
Rachad Fakhouri  Facilities Management   
Appalanaidu Tamminayana  ITSD  
Jenifer Mutano  Conference Services   
Simon Padilla  Staff Council Representative   
Malika Gonin  Administrative support   
Fernando Puchol  Communications   
Cathy Boyle  DGO  
Téné Sidibé  Administrative support   
Carole Fernando Michelle  HRD  
 
32.  As is generally the case in many public or private bodies, a crisis response team must cover 
four main areas: decision -making, situation, anticipation, communication. Such functions remained 
undefined or incomplete within the HTF: for example, no one was designated to take charge of the 
"anticipation" function. If the post had not been vacant this responsibility would normally have been 
given to the risk manager; in their absence the head of internal audit should probably have been 
assigned more responsibility, and more explicitly.  
33.  The establishment of the HTF did not prescribe a set meeting schedule, which was appropriate 
for a team tasked w ith responding to crisis developments. It can be observed that it met as often WT/BFA/W/574  
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  as deemed necessary, on a weekly basis, in response to government announcements and to critical 
aspects of developments in the pandemic.  
34.  The development and implementation of cr isis management measures was rapid and effective 
while the HTF was led by the DDG, who had decision -making powers by virtue of his main functions. 
The Secretariat stated to the External Auditor that in the event of a "significant governance 
measure", decis ion-making was no longer the responsibility of the HTF but of the Director -General, 
although no criteria clearly define which decisions were concerned. From the moment the DDG 
stopped taking part in the meetings, he was replaced de facto  by the Chief of Staff of the 
Director -General, given the lack of formal replacement process. All decisions then had to be 
submitted to the Director -General for approval. The External Auditor was unable to assess the time 
span between proposals by the HTF and actual implementation under this new arrangement; it is 
likely that this arrangement, involving a less flexible decision -making process, did not improve the 
efficiency of the crisis management mechanism.  
35.  In short, unprepared for the management of major  crises, for want of a plan, mechanisms and 
tried-and-tested procedures, the WTO thus had to implement an emergency sui generis  mechanism, 
relying on the goodwill, skills and pragmatism of a few of its staff members. In contrast with the 
generally accepted  principles for crisis management in complex organizations, this mechanism 
exhibited a number of shortcomings, including flawed decision -making chains, unassigned functional 
responsibilities, and limited initial coverage of critical functions within the cr isis response team. 
However, while not exonerating the Organization of its responsibility, it is fair to note, firstly, that 
most large public organizations were no better prepared, and secondly that, despite its shortcomings 
and weaknesses in principle, t he hurriedly established system worked as effectively as necessary, 
as illustrated by the observations above.  
2.3. Communication with staff  
36.  After providing general information to staff on COVID -19 on 28  February  2020, the 
first information note from the HTF was sent to all staff on 3  March  2020. The note was subsequently 
updated 12 times, most recently on 18  December  2020, with no similar note produced in 2021, 
as HTF chose to communicate with staff by other means (particularly email).  
37.  A comparison betwee n the frequency of the HTF's general communication with staff and trends 
in confirmed cases (WHO data) shows a level of responsiveness that is consistent with developments 
in the health crisis, i.e. a high level of responsiveness as of March at the time of  the first government 
measures, then once again from September onwards in light of the upsurge in cases and lockdowns.  
Figure 1: Comparison between HTF communication with staff and trends in confirmed 
cases in Switzerland (WHO data) in 2020  
 
Source:  External Auditor (survey of memos/emails to staff – in red) and WHO (trend in the number of 
confirmed cases in Switzerland – in blue) . 
WT/BFA/W/574  
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  38.   According to a survey of all staff organized by the External Auditor, staff consider that they 
were kept well informed (71 % score of 8 or more on a scale of 10 for staff below grade 10) about 
the measures taken by the Organization. Less than 5 % consider that they were not kept well 
informed. In all workplaces, managing the pandemic demonstrated the importance of handling the 
human aspect and information. This survey's highly satisfactory results thus illustrate the 
appropriateness of the HTF crisis response team's communication choices.  
3. Technological dimension of crisis management  
39.  The onset of the crisis accelerated the Organ ization's IT strategy and provides a good 
opportunity for its transition to digital administration. The Organization adopted its 2020 -2023 IT  
strategy in February  2020, on the eve of the crisis. This project comprises several components:  
- Striving for secur ity and user satisfaction at acceptable costs  
- Increased productivity  
- Developing innovative solutions  
40.  It is specifically structured around the search for a seemingly fine balance between the need to 
digitize administration and management and a desire for st ability in the Organization, or even a form 
of resistance to change. This last aspect could be observed in the delays and hesitations in 
establishing risk management mechanisms and responsibilities or the internal oversight framework, 
which is an area of i mprovement the Secretariat.  
41.  The Secretariat's sudden shift to teleworking, driven by crisis management, as well as the switch 
to webinars for delegations' conferences, were major operational - and IT - challenges that could 
prove to offer an opportunity to  make faster progress than expected in modernizing the 
Organization's culture, practices and digital tools.  
3.1. Impact on business continuity  
42.  Since IT is now an essential operational tool for organizations, any business continuity initiative 
must include a "digital" component, covering equipment, infrastructure and remote working tools, 
ideally in conjunction with a framework of business procedures established before the outbreak of a 
crisis.  
43.  In most areas, crisis preparedness was minimal, and while it was  more advanced in the area 
of IT, it remained limited in operational terms. The existence of "business continuity plans" was the 
minimum requirement for the deployment of an information system and did not in itself constitute 
a risk management measure cond ucted beyond the purely technical sphere. This matter was 
extensively covered in the audit report on the 2020 accounts.  
44.  In addition, as the WTO has a mediation and trade resolution mission, business continuity 
requires that meetings, committees and forums be held by means of sufficiently robust and secure 
systems.  
45.  The ITSD had previously conducted a risk assessment and concluded that messaging (email) 
was the most critical service for the continuity of the Organization's operations. The Division had 
recomme nded that this matter be addressed through a joint initiative in which each stakeholder 
identified their needs in relation to business continuity.  
46.  The External Auditor could not establish whether this assessment was available at the onset of 
the crisis. Fr om this point of view, it is all the more regrettable that no ITSD representative was 
invited to sit on the HTF upon its establishment, which was corrected a month later. What might 
appear to be a tactical error at the start of the handling of the crisis c an be explained, however, by 
the fact that the HTF was set up to deal with a health situation that did not foretell a rapid and 
widespread switchover of staff to teleworking. This also highlights the shortcomings in the flow of 
information relating to risk  identification, assessment and management: a member of the crisis 
response team responsible for anticipation could have foreseen the critical need for messaging and 
remote communication tools at an early stage.  WT/BFA/W/574  
- 18 - 
  3.2. Adaptation measures and their effectiveness  
47.  The move to full teleworking in March  2020 prompted the Organization to implement new tools, 
which, while already deployed, were not yet widely used. The Microsoft Teams web conferencing 
solution was particularly successful, as reflected in the usage figures, following a period of 
adjustment in April  2020.  
Figure 2: Use of Microsoft Teams in the Organization in 2020 and early 2021  
 
Source:  ITSD data . 
48.   The Organization's sudden shift to teleworking is a success story that can be credited to the 
crisis response team and to the strategic and technical support of the ITSD: despite the lack of an 
advance crisis management policy, the pre -deployment of teleworking tools contributed significantly 
to ensuring business continuity.  
49.  However , mandatory teleworking requires staff to agree to work at home as if they were at their 
desk on the Organization's premises. In this regard, the decision taken in November  2020 to cover 
the staff's necessary costs for fitting out their home environments a nd workspaces, while entirely 
necessary and therefore justified from an operational point of view, was nevertheless only adopted 
eight months after the start of the crisis.  
50.  According to the figures provided by the Organization, 353 staff members – approxim ately 
50% of the workforce – availed themselves of this possibility. The External Auditor is not in a position 
to assess the effectiveness of this measure, between a windfall effect and a proven need, and which 
ultimately appears, despite its belatedness, to be a flexible and suitable response, at an limited cost 
of around CHF  82,000 (CHF  232/person on average). The advantage in terms of sustaining output 
and the quality of remote working conditions and, if nothing else, in terms of staff morale, was not 
assessed but is likely.  
51.  On 13  March  2020, the HTF decided to cancel all on -site activities, leading the Organization to 
set up teleconference solutions for use by delegations. The pre -existing solution (Zoom software) 
was deemed inappropriate for the Secreta riat and more so for the delegations. Despite the fact that 
many public, including governmental, and private organizations have been using it since the start of 
the pandemic, an assessment conducted in April  2020 by the UN Information Security Special 
Interest Group (UNISSIG) concluded that security was inadequate, at least in respect of certain 
individual and collective activities.  
52.  While Zoom software was still used for certain purposes that did not require (from the 
Organization's point of view) a high le vel of security, calls for tenders were launched in April  2020 
(based on the market knowledge previously developed by the ITSD) to set up teleconferencing tools 
that were deemed to be both user -friendly and secure. The use of exceptions to advertising 
WT/BFA/W/574  
- 19 - 
  requirements under Financial Rule 9.3.c1 of the WTO Financial Regulations for emergency purchases 
proved to be justified.  
53.  As a result of the collaboration between the Organization's legal experts and the ITSD to 
determine the need for confidentiality of certai n meetings and discussions, and liaison with 
international organizations with similar needs, WebEx videoconferencing software was finally 
chosen. It is currently being enhanced to include interpretation of confidential meetings with WebEx 
Legislate.  
54.  In add ition, the introduction of Interprefy software, used for the first time on 15  May 2020, 
enabled delegations to quickly resume the pace of their activities by teleconference, a pace which 
increased rapidly in the summer of 2020 and quickened after September  2020. Fortunately, beyond 
the constraints of crisis management and as part of a structural equipment plan, initial contacts with 
the supplier of this software solution were made in late 2019 and a "pilot" was produced in 
February  2020, which undoubtedly g reatly facilitated its rapid integration for the benefit of 
delegations.  
Figure 3: Number of web conferences by web conferencing software for delegations at 
the end of 2020 and beginning of 2021  
 
Source:  ITSD. 
55.  It is interesting to note that while, unsurpr isingly, the number of delegation meetings fell sharply 
over the period March -May 2020 and recovered from June  2020 onwards (video conferences and 
physical meetings) to a little over a third of the previous level, the number of participants in this 
reduced  number of meetings rose significantly.  
 
 
WT/BFA/W/574  
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  Figure 4: Number of delegates or experts participating in virtual meetings in 2020  
 
Source:  External Auditor based on AGSD data (since the Auditor was only given the overall figure for the 
period June -December 2020 , the figure has been spread over periods of approximately 2.5 months 
for ease of comparison).  
05,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,000Number of participantsWT/BFA/W/574  
- 21 - 
  Figure 5: Number of international meetings in 2020  
 
Source:  External Auditor based on AGSD data (since the Auditor was only given the overall figure for the 
period June -December 2020, the figure has been spread over periods of approximately 2.5 months 
for ease of comparison).  
56.  While meetings and forums via videoconference are not usual practice and require a 
well-functioning technical environment, it appears th at members of staff and delegations actually 
find them more accessible and are in favour of them. The responses in the surveys carried out by 
the External Auditor on this point and on the future of videoconferencing confirm these data. They 
certainly justi fy giving further consideration post -crisis to the future use and economic scope of 
remote connection and meeting tools, differentiated according to type of meeting and user 
categories. It goes without saying that such a study should look at the qualitativ e aspects, including 
in terms of preserving the Organization's "corporate" culture, maintaining staff productivity in the 
long term, and the reduction in direct human relationships and its impact on the efficiency of 
diplomatic relations (especially in are as such as negotiations or arbitration).  
3.3. ITSD support and security of operations  
57.  After the initial phase of organizing the handling of the crisis and the critical phase of the 
pandemic's first wave, during which activity was extremely restricted, the Organization did not 
experience any more technical incidents than usual. The IT Service Centre  did not face a higher 
volume of user requests after the onset of the crisis. Overall, according to the data 
collected,  18,779  notifications of in cidents/service requests were processed in 2020, compared 
to 18,511  in 2019, which is an insignificant increase. Moreover, if we exclude requests related to 
securing remote access and using Microsoft Teams, demand for IT support was even lower.  
58.  Requests sp ecifically related to "incidents" account for 50 % of requests for assistance compared 
to 46.5 % in 2019, which points to staff experiencing slightly more difficulty in using the equipment 
and software solutions available to them.  
WT/BFA/W/574  
- 22 - 
  Figure 6: Main reasons for referral to ITSD support in 2019 and 2020  
 
Source:  ITSD performance dashboard . 
59.  The breakdown of these requests shows the situation clearly: the increase in requests is 
primarily to do with remote access to the Organization's resources ( request for access token ) and 
various general issues, which would seem to highlight the need for staff members to remain in 
contact with the support technicians in this unusual situation. More difficulties would have been 
expected and these results can be seen as an illustra tion of the Organization's resilience.  
60.  Apart from the time involved in exchanges between staff and technical support, processing 
times have remained broadly comparable, indicating that the responsiveness of IT support has not 
been adversely affected by the  crisis situation. The variations observed are primarily due to the 
method of processing requests adopted during the health crisis. Whereas in normal times requests 
could be made by telephone, they are now made by email. As requests are processed by teleph one, 
this has sometimes meant longer processing times than in a "normal" year, although they remain 
fairly limited (at most +30 minutes for an access authorization).  
Table 2: Comparison of the processing time for the main requests made to  
IT support in  2019 and 2020 (in minutes)  
Processing time  2019 2020 Variation  Maximum 
response time 
target (service 
contract)  Ratio 
performance/target 
in 2020  
Change of access authorization  97 127 +31%  300 42% 
Account extension  38 44 +16%  1200 4% 
Account creation  116 131 +13%  240 55% 
Request for a remote access token  27 24 -11% 240 10% 
Loan request  351 307 -13% 1200 26% 
Reply to a question  5 27 + 440%  600 5% 
Source:  External Auditor, based on ITSD data . 
61.   However, the analysis carried out, showing response times well below the theoretical targets 
set for IT support, raises questions about the target levels which, despite the new conditions created 
by the pandemic, have remained the same as those for 2019.  
62.   While users are satisfied overall with the actual response times, the terms and conditions of 
the "performance contract" of the ITSD division as a service provider for users are unsatisfactory 
insofar as the targets set are so far removed from reality tha t there is no way they could serve as a 
performance incentive. Either the service targets are too comfortable, or too many resources were 
invested in a support function that is certainly effective but inefficient and not very economical. 
Moreover, service targets, which have already been set by service category, should also be specified 
according to business line division needs.  
WT/BFA/W/574  
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  63.   Given the uncertainty that the Organization is still facing with regard to extending 
remote working, or even making it relatively  permanent, and what will need to be 
organized as a result, particularly in terms of support for staff and delegations, and the 
use of appropriate tools, the External Auditor has no recommendations to make. He 
suggests, however, that lessons be drawn from the handling of the health crisis in this 
area to improve the ITSD support service contract.  
64.  Very early on, a system for securing remote access to the Organization's servers (RSA Token) 
was put in place to enhance IT security. This shows that the issue of security from a technical 
viewpoint was taken into consideration at an early stage, as was the case for teleconferencing tools, 
at the level of the Organization's IT infrastructure.  
65.  The WTO needs, however, to take greater account of the growing and critica l risk of cybercrime. 
The External Auditor is pleased to note that, at the onset of the crisis, the Organization had 
two normative frameworks, one relating to the Policy on Security and Architecture Assessment of 
Information Systems (document OFFICE(15)/64 ) and the other to the Information Security Policy 
(document OFFICE(17)/91), which provided a basis to fall back on during the sudden transition in 
March  2020. Given that, apart from operational data protection and staff personal data protection 
requiremen ts, 5% of the information handled or stored (according to the Chief Information Security 
Officer, CISO) is related to highly confidential trade negotiations or arbitrations, the protection of, 
and access to, data in general are of paramount importance for the Organization.  
66.  According to data provided by the CISO, cyber threats increased significantly in 2020, and 
continue to be at a higher level in 2021 than before the crisis. This situation is not unique to the  WTO; 
it is a general observation made in publi c administrations and large enterprises.  
Table 3: Comparison of IT security alerts  
 2019 2020 2021*  
Detected  by the Organization's Security Operations Centre (SOC)  15 106**  59 
Reported  to the IT Service Desk  150 234 293 
Major incidents  3 11 10 
* Projection based on known data as at 18 May 2021 . 
** Some of the increase in 2020 is due to false alarms linked to the inclusion of new sources . 
Source:  External Auditor, based on data from the CISO . 
67.  These risks have already been categorized as the maximum in the risk register (likelihood:  3; 
impact: 3). Experience now shows that they have quite specific characteristics, as their likelihood of 
occurrence is not only "high" according to the risk register rating, but almost "certain". The WTO is 
theref ore aware that is a need for the risks to be assessed separately, outside of the common 
framework for assessing current risks, and also for the specific management of action plans for the 
monitoring and elimination of risks. The ITSD's existing high level of risk awareness and knowledge 
should enable it to respond to these specific characteristics.  
4. Human resources management  
68.  According to a survey conducted by the Secretariat in February  2021, 86 % of staff members 
consider that the crisis has significantl y or very significantly changed the way they work; none of 
the respondents indicated that the situation has had no impact. Human resources are at the core of 
the operations of the Organization, the mission of which is to deliver services to its Members. Th ey 
were therefore central to the actions taken both for the direct benefit of members of staff (health) 
and to ensure the continuity of operations (teleworking solutions in particular).  
69.  Guidelines on human resources management were issued by the HTF, to co mplement the 
existing rules, at the beginning of the crisis and continuously thereafter. These guidelines covered 
leave, special sick leave for COVID -19, travel restrictions and arrangements for accessing WTO  
headquarters.  
70.  Two subgroups of the HTF were est ablished, one specifically for case and contact tracing, and 
the other to identify which staff would be required to ensure the continuity of the Organization's 
operations.  WT/BFA/W/574  
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  4.1. Adapting the Staff Rules  
71.  There is no specific statutory provision in the WTO rule book for identifying an event constituting 
"force majeure " that allows exceptions to be made, in certain circumstances, to the existing Staff 
Rules. It is directive prepared by the HTF (document OFFICE(20)/24/Rev.1), dated 9  March  2020, 
which sets out  specific rules for making exceptions to the existing rules:  
"The Director -General has decided to make the following exceptions to the Staff Rules:  
Uncertified sick leave under Staff Rule 110.3(a)(ii) in connection with recommendation 
and instruction 1 abo ve may be taken up to five consecutive working days, instead of 
the three days stipulated in that provision; and  
Sick leave taken in relation to these recommendations and instructions do not count 
towards the total number of permissible uncertified sick le ave under Staff 
Rule 110.3(a)(iii). The Human Resources Division, in consultation with the Health Task 
Force, will monitor sick leave taken by staff members and may request additional 
information from staff members, as appropriate."  
72.  Urgent decisions had to  be taken in order to protect the staff members. However, the External 
Auditor questions whether the Director -General has the power to make unilateral exceptions to the 
Organization's Staff Rules. Article VI:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides that " The 
Director -General shall appoint the members of the staff of the Secretariat and determine their […] 
conditions of service in accordance with regulations adopted by the Ministerial Conference ". 
73.  It is therefore unclear whether a DDG or any other internal body , such as HTF, could, in the 
absence of explicit authority from the Council (or a crisis management plan regularly adopted by the 
governing body), make discretionary and unilateral changes to the Staff Rules.  
74.  The Secretariat does not agree with this analys is and considers that provision 115.2 of the Staff  
Rules gives the Director -General the power to amend or make exceptions to the Staff Rules and 
therefore provides the necessary flexibility for crisis management. This rule reads as follows:  
"Amendment of, and exceptions to, the Staff Rules  
Subject to Staff Regulation 13.2, the Staff Rules may be amended by the 
Director -General.  
Exceptions to the Staff Rules may be made by the Director -General, provided that such 
exceptions are not inconsistent with any Staf f Regulation, that they are agreed to by 
the staff member directly affected and that they are not prejudicial to the interests of 
any other staff member or group of staff members."  
75.  According to the External Auditor, provision 115.2 only provides for indivi dual situations in which 
it is appropriate to make exceptions to the rules generally applicable to staff members covered by 
the Staff Regulations. Admittedly, the need to take exceptional and urgent decisions prevailed on 
the day of the onset of the crisis . However, and insofar as the powers attributed to the 
Director -General can only be exercised in respect of individual situations (the modification of which 
must, moreover, be accepted by the member concerned), it would have been in keeping with the 
spirit of the texts and the powers of the governing bodies to submit to the General Council a decision 
covering the exceptions to the Staff Rules needed for crisis management as they appeared to the 
Secretariat after some weeks of experience. At the very least a nd using this experience as a basis, 
going forward this would have made up for the absence of a pre -established crisis management 
mechanism endorsed by the Member States in the event of a prolonged state of crisis.  
Recommendation No. 1 . The External Audito r recommends submitting a proposal to the 
Ministerial Conference that, in the event of a major, unexpected and prolonged crisis , the 
Director -General be given the necessary special powers for the flexible and proactive 
management of the Secretariat, including the possibility of delegating powers to certain 
directors.  WT/BFA/W/574  
- 25 - 
  4.2. Monitoring employee health and prevention mechanisms  
76.  As early as January  2020, the WTO put in place appropriate preventive measures (hand gel, 
masks and signage). The lead taken by the Organization in this area meant that it was able to 
provide two hand gel dispensers to another organization unable to obtain any following stock  
shortages owing to an unprecedented surge in orders.  
77.  The specific monitoring of employee health has been introduced. The Organization has continued 
the usual monitoring of staff by the human resources department, with the exceptional involvement 
of a doct or and a psychologist. In addition to monitoring the health of members of staff, a critical 
factor in the Organization's "collective" health, specific initiatives have been taken, in particular 
relating to stress management. Despite these efforts, over hal f of staff members consider that they 
have suffered from isolation from the work environment or from poorer working conditions. As this 
crisis has revealed that the major challenges faced by staff members were more of a psychosocial 
than a technical nature , the Organization should probably consider, if teleworking were to continue, 
a more methodical assessment of the psychosocial occupational risks involved and their impact on 
the motivation and individual productivity of staff and, secondly, on its ability  to maintain the 
sustained level of quality of services expected by the Member States.  
4.3. Management of on -site work  
78.  As of 15  March  2020, the HTF proposed initially that "on -site critical staff" be designated to 
ensure the continuity of the Organization' s operations and administrative functions (IT and payroll), 
but also to guarantee the accessibility of headquarters (security and maintenance). The crisis 
response team has played its full part in this.  
79.  "On-site critical staff" were therefore clearly ident ified by an HTF dedicated subgroup. In March 
and April  2020, during the most acute period of the crisis, only around 50 staff members had access 
to headquarters, based on a list managed by the security officers.  
80.  The HTF subsequently also decided that each department would make its own internal 
arrangements to limit the number of (non -essential) staff allowed to work on site, a decision that 
echoed federal directives implemented elsewhere in Switzerland. The number of staff members 
allowed to be on site at a ny one time was restricted to 130 (half the number before the limit was 
imposed).  
81.  The guidelines for on -site presence have been generally followed, at least during the critical 
period of the first wave of the pandemic. According to the data provided by the  officer in charge of 
safety and security, there have been few cases where access to headquarters has been denied, 
which shows that staff members remain disciplined and are acting responsibly.  
82.  There was a significant relaxation of this discipline after the  easing of health measures in early 
summer 2020, and even during the successive waves of autumn 2020 and spring 2021. The 
Organization had to cope with an influx of staff members on site at certain times: in September and 
October  2020, sometimes more than 500 people were present at headquarters, or 80 % of the 
workforce, way above the maximum number of 130 staff members allowed. This situation probably 
reflected the desire of managers and staff to return to their usual working environment following 
months of  health restrictions. Although this desire was understandable at the end of the summer 
and at a time when the information circulating was more reassuring, the situation is nonetheless still 
non-compliant and shows the challenge faced by senior management i n trying to strictly enforce, in 
a "corporate" spirit, a collective discipline that is supposed to rise above the interests of individual 
divisions. The return to teleworking from autumn 2020 naturally led to a fall in attendance at 
headquarters again, but  a degree of restriction fatigue could also explain the continued relative 
slackening of discipline compared with March  2020.  WT/BFA/W/574  
- 26 - 
  Figure 7: Highest attendance at headquarters in a single day  
 
Source:  External Auditor, based on information on access from WTO s ecurity services . 
4.4. Establishing and managing teleworking  
83.  The only internal regulatory framework for teleworking is contained in a 2005 memorandum 
(document OFFICE(05)/10). It only covers teleworking on an exceptional  and voluntary basis and 
could not s erve as a legal or operational basis for a mass and mandatory extension of this working 
arrangement. During the first period of closure (March -April), it was therefore out of absolute 
necessity staff members had to begin teleworking because they were not a llowed access to their 
offices.  
84.  Here again, the needs of the unforeseen emergency prevailed. After the partial reopening of the 
premises in May  2020, the Human Resources Department attempted to systematize teleworking 
more consistently with the management of the ongoing crisis. A draft directive was finalized at the 
end of June  2020 and submitted to the other departments: according to the information gathered 
by the External Auditor, this draft has not yet been agreed between the departments or approved 
by the senior management. Thus, for several months, including during the subsequent waves of the 
pandemic, and even today, teleworking, its terms and conditions and the guarantees provided to 
staff members are still regulated informally by extending the pract ices adopted as an emergency 
measure in March  2020.  
85.  Although not documented, the Secretariat (in particular senior management in its replies to the 
External Auditor's survey) considers that, apart from the period March –April 2020, the measures, 
procedures and tools put in place have allowed activities to continue satisfactorily, with a limited 
impact on productivity.  
86.  According to the External Auditor's staff survey conducted in May  2021, two thirds of staff 
members think that teleworking will have to contin ue in the Organization. Three quarters of them, 
including those at Grade 10 or above, are in favour of continuing teleworking after summer 2021. 
This is not necessarily inconsistent with the widely shared belief that teleworking has led to a relative 
deterioration in work relationships and to personal stress. The issue for the future remains to find a 
balance in collectively organized teleworking in order to minimize its counter -productive social, 
operational and financial impacts.  
WT/BFA/W/574  
- 27 - 
  Figure 8: Results of the External Auditor's survey on the continuation of telework in the 
Organization  
 
Source:  External Auditor, survey conducted in May  2021. 
87.  As all the organizations have discovered during the crisis, there are advantages as well as 
disadvantages to extending teleworking, and the WTO will eventually have to take a position on this 
issue. Whether or not teleworking is extended Organization -wide and established as a new way of 
working, the WTO must review and expand the existing legal framework, which i s limited to 
individual and voluntary use, to include, in the crisis management plans it will have to draw up, a 
section specifically regulating the use of teleworking in the event of a serious crisis. All aspects of 
the issue should be addressed and cover ed either by extending the Staff Rules or by pre -established 
procedures ready to be launched in the event of a crisis, including decision -making processes, terms 
and conditions of obligation, terms and conditions of remuneration, and the monitoring of 
psychological risks.  
WT/BFA/W/574  
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  Recommendation No. 2 . The External Auditor recommends finalizing, in accordance with 
future crisis management plans, a set of regulations to be submitted, depending on their 
particular nature and scope, to either the governing bodies or senior management for 
approval, so as to provide a framework for teleworking when major crisis  situations make 
it necessary. This set of texts specifically focused on crisis management should, in any 
event, form part of the overall legal framework for teleworking, which could possibly be 
renewed in the light of the experience gained during the COVID -19 pandemic . 
5. Financial and budgetary impact of the crisis  
5.1. Estimated financial impact  
88.  In its 2021 Financial Performance Report, the WTO presented a balance sheet of the costs and 
savings arising  from the health crisis. According to the Secretariat, the balance sheet highlights net 
savings of CHF  7.4 million in the 2020 financial year, in other words CHF  10.1 million in savings on 
the one hand and CHF  2.7 million in additional expenditure on the o ther. 
89.  The method adopted for this calculation varies according to the expenditure item concerned. 
For some items, particularly for expenditure that is dependent on volumes consumed, the difference 
between the initial budget and final expenditure is used, o n the assumption that the difference is 
due entirely to the health crisis (for example, consumption of fluids and costs of the International 
Computing Centre (ICC)). For others, new expenditure strictly related to health management is 
recorded (for example , supplies of masks and hand gels and purchase of software required for 
remote working such as Interprefy). For yet other items, an estimate is made of the "crisis" part of 
the savings made (electricity, for example), or of the overall impact – positive or  negative – of the 
crisis (cleaning, for example).  
90.  Making a distinction between the impact of the crisis and its management and the impact of 
controlled management during a normal year is not straightforward. The method used by the 
Organization inevitably leads to an approximate result:  
- For example, the assumption that the difference between the initial budget and actual 
expenditure is due wholly to crisis management is not sound. However, in the absence 
of a more appropriate alternative assumption, there i s no choice but to settle for an 
approximate result;  
- The method of comparing 2020 expenditure to 2019 levels was rejected by the 
Secretariat. The latter indicated that the 2019 financial year had already been disrupted 
because of uncertainty over the colle ction of statutory contributions, meaning that the 
Organization had to reduce expenditure in the last quarter to ensure that staff salaries 
could be paid;  
- The impact of the crisis on staff -related operations (catering and payroll) is not reflected 
in the f inancial statement prepared by the Secretariat.  
91.  However, the cessation of catering activities resulted in a loss of CHF  90,000 on the rent usually 
received from the service provider. The WTO records this "loss" as reduced revenue: the crisis impact 
assessm ent, which focuses on expenditure (excess or reduced), obviously cannot take this into 
account.  
92.  Furthermore, a saving of CHF  11.2 million was made on staff costs compared to the initial 
budget. The bulk of this concerns salaries (CHF  7 million), pensions (CHF  1.9 million) and home 
leave (CHF  1 million). The underperformance in this area is due to the high number of vacant posts 
in 2020.  
93.  This saving is partly offset by additional expenditure of CHF  4.1 million for temporary staff. This 
expenditure is primarily due to the increased use of interns for research activities during the 
pandemic.  WT/BFA/W/574  
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  94.  The trend of offsetting the permanent staff budget against the temporary staff budget had 
already been mentioned in the 2019 Financial Performance Report, althoug h this was to a lesser 
extent (CHF -4.6 million savings on permanent staff vacancies and CHF  +5.3 million over budget for 
temporary staff).  
95.  If the above -mentioned operations are added back into the health crisis financial statement, 
final savings  amount to  CHF 13.8 million.  
Table 4: Savings made due to the health crisis in 2020 (in  millions of CHF)  
Additional expenditure items  COVID -19 variation   Savings items  COVID -19 
variation   
IT consultants  0.9 Translation  1.1 
International Computing Centre  0.4 Post 0.2 
IT Service Desk  0.1 Overall cleaning 
contract  0.1 
Safety equipment  0.1 Maintenance  0.5 
Audio -visual adaptation of 
meeting  rooms  0.2 Electricity  0.1 
Special cleaning and disinfection  0.1 Heating  0.1 
Medical supplies  0.1 Security provider  0.9 
Teleworking software  0.9 Travel (technical 
assistance missions 
and seminars)  6.2 
Catering rent (negative income)  0.9 Reprographics  0.4 
  Office supplies  0.1 
Publications  0.3 
Hospitality  0.2 
Temporary staff  4.1 Staff costs (excluding 
temporary staff)  11.2 
Total additional costs  7.8 Total savings  21.4 
Overall balance  13.6 
Source:  External Auditor based on WTO data . 
96.  Consequently, no conclusion can be drawn in the debate over whether there is a direct link, 
total or partial, between the crisis and the final amount of net savings or net additional costs because 
the External Auditor was unable to examine the items concerned operation by operation. This is not 
important ultimately, as the only controversial issue is the lower expenditure on permanent staff. 
Thanks to the other major savings item (travel), it had been possible to make additional purchases: 
furniture, audio -visual equipment and security equipment.  
97.  The draft 2021 budget was prepared in April  2020 and the Sec retariat quickly drew conclusions 
regarding the crisis and needs, in particular with regard to the adaptation of information systems. 
Resources were reallocated to the appropriate budget lines to ensure the continuation of 
teleworking:  
- Consultants for vari ous IT projects (CHF +300,000);  
- Allocation to the International Computing Centre provider of virtual platforms 
(CHF +150,000);  
- IT maintenance (CHF +300,000);  
- Expenditure on software for various IT projects, including Interprefy (CHF  +800,000);  
- Technical as sistance seminars (CHF +600,000)  
98.  In 2020, outstanding statutory contributions as at 31  December reached their highest level 
since 1995. Arrears doubled between 2019 and 2020, but this is not significant because it is due to 
one of the ten main contributors  to the WTO postponing payment of a large contribution to 
January  2021. No significant impact of the crisis on the payment of statutory contributions has yet 
been noted in 2021.  WT/BFA/W/574  
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  99.  Regarding voluntary contributions, the number of contributors has remained sta ble, but the 
amounts of contributions are decreasing (CHF  15.8 million in 2020 against CHF  21.9 million in  2019). 
Two project funds were closed at the end of 2019. Technical assistance activities decreased due to 
the pandemic, resulting in a 28 % fall in ne t expenditure.  
5.2. Impact on the Organization's performance  
100.  Since 2012, the allocation of resources has been analysed according to the eight operational 
objectives set by the Organization (the support function general objective is broken down into the 
eight others). Each quarter, staff are asked to declare the time they have spent on each of these 
objectives, and the information is then consolidated at the end of the year. Although these data are 
declarative, they appear to be consistent with the Organi zation -wide major activity trends.  
101.  During the crisis, WTO resources were redirected to certain areas. At first glance, there has 
been a decline in technical assistance and capacity building, but an increase in research activities 
(which resulted in the rec ruitment of staff on short -term contracts and interns). The WTO produced 
fewer documents (and therefore translated fewer documents), and conducted fewer key outreach 
activities. While trade policy monitoring  has also seen a significant drop in activity, th is is obviously 
linked to the drastic reduction in (or, during certain periods, even cancellation of) travel.  
102.  A review of the change in the Organization's expenditure by "output" category between 2018 
and 2020 shows that:  
- Expenditure on negotiations decrea sed by CHF  1 million over the period, and 
continuously in 2019 and 2020;  
- Expenditure on trade policy monitoring fell by CHF  6 million (CHF  28 million in 2018, 
CHF 25 million in 2019 and CHF  22 million in 2020), a decrease of 20 %. The number of 
trade policy  reviews decreased from 18 in 2018 to 12 in 2019 and to only 7 in 2020;  
- Expenditure on dispute settlements decreased by CHF  7 million, linked to the 
disappearance of the Appellate Body in 2019 and due in part to travel restrictions 
in 2020;  
- Expenditure on capacity development decreased only slightly in 2018 and 2019 
(from  CHF 41.9 million to CHF  41.4 million), despite a sharp decline in national activities 
(from  121 to 98). This decrease in activities is likely to have been even more signific ant 
in 2020 (although not costed), resulting in a decrease in expenditure of CHF  8 million 
between 2019 and 2020;  
- Expenditure on research remained stable between 2018 and 2020. The decrease in 
publications would have been offset by the increase in statisti cal activities, but the 
overall trend in research activities seems to be unclear – the recruitment of temporary 
staff points to an increase in research activities;  
- Expenditure on communications and public relations ("reaching out") increased 
by CHF 0.9 million. Despite the cancellation of physical events, collaboration with 
third-party organizations has increased, particularly in the areas of research and 
intellectual property.  
103.  In summary, most of the Organization's activities, with the exception of those d irectly affected 
by the stoppage of physical exchanges (such as meetings and missions), seem to have followed the 
general downward trend affecting the Organization's output for the past few years. This trend would 
not be closely linked to the health crisis . 
104.  The WTO's operational objectives are used only to describe the allocation of resources to the 
various objectives it is pursuing, and not to analyse the results achieved in pursuit of each objective. 
An objective measurement of the Organization's performa nce by operational objective would help to 
refine the analysis of resources allocated to each, which is presented annually in the Financial 
Performance Report and used as the basis for preparing the budget. Currently, resources are 
allocated to the differe nt objectives depending on the cyclical needs emerging during the financial WT/BFA/W/574  
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  year, rather than on the basis of needs predetermined by a strategy and work programme associated 
with the budget.  
105.  This is illustrated in particular in human resources management, which is characterized by the 
ongoing use of temporary staff while vacancies for permanent posts remain high. In 2018, the 
implementation rate of the human resources budget was 98 %: 96% under "permanent staff 
expenditure", and 113 % under temporary staff (d ue to three events and a high level of dispute 
settlement activity). In 2019, according to the written statements formally collected from the 
Secretariat by the External Auditor, the increase noted in temporary staff was the result of a choice 
to recruit s ome staff on short contracts to test them out before signing permanent contracts. These 
recruitments involved the agriculture negotiations, economic research and dispute settlement. At 
the end of 2019, a number of departures were noted, leading to an incre ase in the number of vacant 
posts. The same trend of increasing temporary staff continued in 2020, in the area of economic 
research and dispute settlement (fisheries negotiations). The situation should stabilize in 2021, when 
the results of the structural review currently under way will show human resources needs by area 
of activity.  
106.  The changes in trust fund expenditure cannot easily be correlated with the level of trust fund 
activity. For example, the Global Trust Fund has seen a decrease in contributions  received, but more 
significantly in its expenditure ( -58%). This is primarily because, given that it covers around 
two thirds of technical assistance costs, the corresponding expenditure has fallen as a result of the 
travel ban. This meant that, for the f irst time since 2014, the fund's expenditure did not exceed the 
amount in contributions received during the year and brought its balance sheet (CHF  11.4 million) 
closer to the target set by the Member States (CHF  12.5 million). However, in the absence of 
numerical data, it is difficult to reconcile the change in the fund's financial situation with its 
performance.  
107.  The purpose of the audit was to identify not only the impact of the health crisis on the 
Organization's budgetary and financial management, but a lso on the results it achieved. While the 
first issue has been clearly identified by the Organization itself, it is difficult to comment on the 
second in the absence of precise performance indicators. It is therefore impossible to use the 
analyses of the 2 020 crisis to identify the contribution of the different categories of resources to the 
achievement of the WTO's objectives.  
108.  The aim of the performance indicators is to measure progress against a quality target of the 
key results defined for them. Indicato rs should enable the WTO to report on and improve its 
performance by measuring results rather than resources (input) or amount of effort expended. The 
indicators should focus on the quality of key results and the impact outside and inside the 
Organization.  The indicators continue to evolve in order to best assess WTO performance. The 
purpose of this approach is to enable the WTO and stakeholders to measure the progress made by 
the Organization over time in terms of the effectiveness, efficiency, productivit y and quality of its 
work. To do so, the WTO should select a limited number of indicators related to its main areas of 
intervention.  
Recommendation No.  3. The External Auditor recommends formalizing the monitoring 
of the Organization's performance through quantified means and performance 
indicators. These indicators should be defined by each service and transmitted to the 
Financial Operations Directorate for consolidation. In the longer term, this monitoring 
could form the basis for an annual performance re port separate from the Annual Report 
and the Financial Performance Report.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
109.  For a number of years, and especially following cases of zoonoses that have led to emerging  
epidemics (for example, SARS and avian influenza), many futurists and health surveillance officials 
had been warning of the growing likelihood of disruptive pandemics. However, while awareness of 
the need for proactive risk management was growing at the s ame time, practically no public or 
private organization, even the most advanced in this field, considered this pandemic risk to be so 
serious as to justify the prior development of mechanisms (structures and procedures) to contain 
any resulting crisis.  WT/BFA/W/574  
- 32 - 
  110.  In this regard, the WTO has not fared better or worse than most public organizations. But since 
it had not developed a structural system to identify risks of all kinds and manage crises likely to 
affect it, and since it lacked any predefined, robust and teste d business continuity plans, it did not 
have the operational tools for tackling this particular crisis when it erupted.  
111.  However, the External Auditor is bound to note that the Organization reacted promptly and 
effectively by putting in place structures (th e HTF) and procedures to address the two key issues 
having the greatest impact on its resources and mission: (a) protecting the health of staff and doing 
its best to allow them to continue to serve the Organization's interests and mission; (b) ensuring 
the continuity of the Members' collective activities as far as possible. No doubt these mechanisms, 
which were established and implemented in an emergency, are not without shortcomings but overall 
they have functioned to the satisfaction of nearly all stakeho lders (staff, delegations and partners).  
112.  Whether it is a question of risk structuring and management, crisis governance and 
organization, or operational issues relating to staff support and management, including in terms of 
computing and digitization tools , the time has now come for the WTO to carry out an exhaustive 
feedback exercise. Some projects, including those that have remained pending for many years, such 
as crisis management (policy, governance, structures, procedures) or the relationship between r isk 
management and internal monitoring, should now be able to be finalized quickly. Others, including 
everything linked to new modes of organization of work discovered during the crisis, certainly 
warrant further analysis and internal discussion.  
113.  In any event, at the WTO, as elsewhere, the pandemic has put an exceptional spotlight on the 
weak points as well as the resources and potential of an organization which can no longer be content 
to replicate a way of functioning whose efficiency, as the cri sis has shown through specific examples, 
still leaves room for improvement.  
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
114.  The External Auditor would like to sincerely thank all WTO staff for their availability and for 
the precision of the information provided.  
End of audit observat ions. 
__________