RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/138  
 
12 March 2021  
(21-2153) Page: 1/88 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
25 AND 26  NOVEMBER  2020 
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR MIKAEL ANZÉN  (SWEDEN ) 
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/1 7; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/7 89. The present document contains the record of the Council 's meeting held on 
25-26 November  2020. The meeting was convened in virtual format and proceeded on the basis of the 
following agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  4 
2   ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 (G/L/1110/ADD.6)  ...................  4 
3   ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 (G/L/1137/ADD.5)  ...................  6 
4   MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  ................................ ................................ .............................  7 
5   COVID -19: MEASURES RELATED TO TRADE IN GOODS – REQUEST FROM CANADA; 
COLOMBIA; COSTA RICA; HONG KONG, CHINA; NEW ZEALAND; NORWAY; SINGAPORE; 
AND SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  7 
6   PROPOSAL FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE  
TO PROVIDE GREATER LEGAL CERTAINTY TO NON -RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES  
GRANTED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRY WTO  MEMBERS TO LEAST DEVELOPED  
COUNT RIES – REQUEST FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (G/C/W/775)  ........................  14 
7   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE  
LDC GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 –G/C/W/752)  ................................ ................................ ... 16 
8   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE  RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  18 
9   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION  
ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ . 19 
10   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 20 
11   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  23 
12   CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ............................  24 
13   CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ..... 26 
14   EGYPT – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS FOR SUGAR – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  27 G/C/M/138  
 
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  15   EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...............  27 
16   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM ARMENIA, CHINA, KAZAKHSTAN, 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERA TION  ................................ ....................  29 
17   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU) 2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU) 
2018/825 – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ...........................  36 
18   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL , 
CANADA,  COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, 
PARAGUAY, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  ........................  37 
19   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 46 
20   ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO INCLUDE CROATIA:  
NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6 OF THE GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 47 
21   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHINA, NEW 
ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIO N, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  ................  48 
22   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS REGARDING  
PROTECTED DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, 
TRADITIONAL TERMS, LABELLING AND PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN WINE SECTOR 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ........................  52 
23   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICAT IONS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES AND URUGUAY  ...........................  53 
24   EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY D IRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM COLOMBIA  ................................ .........................  55 
25   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUR OPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, 
AND THE UNITED STATES ................................ ................................ ...............................  56 
26   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  ............................  59 
27   MEXICO – FRONT OF PACK NUTRITION LABELING ( NOM -51) – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 61 
28   MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST  FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .............  63 
29   NIGERIA – FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS AFFECTING DAIRY IMPORTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNI ON ................................ ................................ .........  64 
30   PANAMA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM COSTA RICA  ........  66 
31   RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  67 
32   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA – TRADE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
CONCERNING TURKEY – REQUEST FROM TURKEY  ................................ ..........................  70 
33   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB  
EMIRATES, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, SWITZERLAND, AND THE  
UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  71 
34   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  72 G/C/M/138  
 
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  35   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, 
BRAZIL,  CANADA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE 
UNITED  STATES, AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ....................  75 
36   UNITED STATES - REVISED ORIGIN MARKING REQUIREMENT FOR GOODS 
PRODUCED  IN HONG KONG – REQUEST FROM HONG KONG, CHINA  ...............................  78 
37   UNITED STATES – EXECUTIVE ORDER ON SECURING THE BULK -POWER SYSTEM – 
REQUEST FROM CH INA ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 80 
38   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST 
FROM  THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........................  80 
39   UNITED STATES - MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 81 
40   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST 
FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  81 
41   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  ................................ ...................  82 
42   CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REP ORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE 
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ....................  83 
43   ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS TO  
THE GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C/W/787)  ................................ ................................ ..........  84 
44   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 84 
44.1   Procedures to Enhance Transpare ncy and Strengthen Notification Requirements under 
WTO Agreements (JOB/GC/204/Rev.4 JOB/CTG/14/Rev.4)  ................................ ..................... 84 
44.2   Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies – Information from the Chair  ................ 85 
44.3   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ................................ 88 
 
The Chairperson , at the outset of the meeting, and given its virtual nature, recalled to Members that , 
as indicated in the organizational and technical note that he had distributed t o all delegations before 
the meeting, the virtual format of the meeting required interventions to be time -limited; however, 
delegations were invited to send their full written statements to the Secretariat, either during the 
meeting itself or during the su bsequent 10  working days, for their incorporation into the meeting 's 
minutes. The Chairperson also invited Members raising specific trade concerns to share their full 
written statements with the Members concerned so as to allow them the fullest opportunity to respond 
to them.  He also informed Members that before the meeting one delegation had made a special request 
to be allowed to deliver a statement in full, which  he had accepted.  
 
Before the Agenda had been adopted, the delegation of the Unite d States indicated that, under Agenda 
Item "Other Business ", it intended to make an announcement related to the notification proposal 
"Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under 
WTO Agreements ". 
 
The Chairperson  informed delegations that, under  the same  agenda item, he would raise the matter 
of the date of the Council 's next meeting.  
 
The agenda  was so agreed . 
 
Before the Chair person  turned  to the agenda items  of the meeting , the United States, followed by 
Canada and t he European Union, made some observations regarding the information posted on the 
WTO website , as follows:  
 
The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
The United States would like to take a moment to note the precipitous increase in detailed information 
posted on the public WTO  website. For some time, the US has  noticed that the Secretariat is publishing 
advance information on WTO  meetings and near -full Minutes of WTO  meetings shortly after those G/C/M/138  
 
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  meetings  conclude. In doing so, the Secretariat is sometimes cherry -picking issues and presentations, 
describing exchanges between Members out of context, and pre -judging meetings that are yet to 
occur. The Secretariat has also announced a meeting date before Members have agreed to it and ha s 
distributed inaccurate information to the public. The United States does  not believe this is the role of 
the Secretariat.  To be clear, the US  fully support s transparency, but if there is a  reason to have a 
Members' website , it is that there is some infor mation there that, if shared, could actually inhibit the 
ability and willingness of Members to share information.  Starting with today's meeting, the United 
States requests that the Secretariat scale back its press releases, and strictly avoid the problems that 
we continue to point out.  
 
The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
The point that the US is raising around the detail in public releases from the Secretariat is an important 
one. Canada fully support s a high level of transparency in the work o f the WTO  and publicizing the 
good work under way in the various bodies of the WTO . In particular, the work of the Secretariat helps 
to spread the knowledge of the role of the Organization in supporting the multilateral trading system. 
However, picking up on what the US has just said, Canada  would ask that the Secretariat exercise 
more caution on the level of detail it includes on the exchanges between Members during these 
Committee meetings. The specifics of the exchanges are best left to meeting minutes, and thereby 
avoiding any possibility of creating incorrect impressions.  
 
The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
The European Union has  actually had the opportunity to convey its comments bilaterally to the 
Secretariat. The EU is, of co urse, a staunch supporter of transparency and trust s that the principles of 
confidentiality of the discussions within the meeting rooms, right after the meetings, and the principle 
of impartiality will be fully preserved.  
 
The Chairperson  proposed that the  Council take note of the statements made  and t he Council so 
agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adopti on by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members ' notifications of new regional 
trade agreements (RTAs).1 He informed the CTG that four  RTAs had been notified to the CRTA , as 
followed:  
(i) Free Trade Agreement between Peru and Australia, Goods (WT/REG404/N/1) ; 
 
(ii) Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Viet Nam, Goods 
(WT/REG406/N/1) ; 
 
(iii) United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA/CUSMA/T -MEC), Goods 
(WT/REG407/N/1) ; 
 
(iv) Accession of Samoa and Solomon Islands to the Interim Partnership Agreement 
between the European Union and the Pacific States, Goods  (WT/REG408/N/1 -
WT/REG409/N/1) . 
 
1.2.  The Chairperson  proposed that  the Council take note of the information provided . 
1.3.  The Council so agreed . 
2  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 (G /L/1110 /ADD.6)  
2.1.  The Chairperson  informe d Members that, in a communication dated 12  October  2020, the 
delegation of Armenia had requested the Secretariat to circulate document  G/L/1110/Add.6 relating 
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal of concessions, in connection with Armeni a's 
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), until 2  January  2022. In that document, Armenia 
indicated that it would not assert that Members that had submitted a claim pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 
of GATT  1994 were precluded from withdrawing substant ially equivalent concessions under 
Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 because such withdrawal had occurred later than six  months after 
Armenia 's withdrawal of concessions, provided that the claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions 
no later than 84  months after Armenia 's modification of concessions, or until 2  January  2022. The 
Council had extended the deadline on six  occasions, namely at its meetings of 26  March and 
10 November  2015, 17  November  2016, 10  November  2017, 12  November  2018, and 
14 November  2019.  
2.2.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
2.3.  After the last extension, Armenia has continued consultations and communications with the 
interested delegations . However , for understandable reasons, with less intensity this year than was 
initially anticipated. Armenia prepared and submitted a compensation package on NAMA and 
agriculture , with a list of goods for which it is ready to consider the possibility of further liberaliz ation, 
as well as TRQS for agriculture. Armenia has made positive developments and real progress on the 
NAMA  package and is very close to the finalization of negotiations on NAMA  substance. At the same 
time, Armenia has intensified its efforts and concentr ated more resources to come up with the 
formulation of a mutually acceptable position for a compensation package on agriculture . 
2.4.  However, considering the number of interested Members that are involved in the process , as 
well as the scope of the technical w ork to be done, Armenia believes that additional time will be 
required to continue compensation negotiations. Therefore , with the purpose of properly organizing 
the process pursuant to document  G/L/1110/Add. 6, Armenia has indicated the following: "In 
conne ction with the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU)  … ; and in view of ensuring that Members reserve their rights pending the communication 
to the WTO Secretariat of the agreements reached in the context of A rticle XXIV:6 (GATT), Armenia 
believes that it is desirable to provide for an extension of 12  months  (that is, until 2  January  2022) ." 
2.5.  In consequence, Armenia expresses its readiness to provide to Members an extension of an 
additional 12 -month period , until 2 January  2022, for the withdraw al of substantially equivalent 
concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of the GATT  1994. Armenia asks the Council to agree to this 
proposed extension.  
2.6.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
2.7.  In April 2019, the EU welcomed the progress achieved in its negotiations on tariffs for non -
agricultural products, where an agreement of principle had been reached. When it comes to 
agriculture, however, neither of the Members con cerned has offered genuine compensation yet for 
the substantial reductions in market access that the EU has had to face.  
2.8.  Recent talks with Eurasian partners have shown that, despite the current pandemic, it is still 
possible to move forward in these negoti ations, which remain important for the EU. The EU invites 
both countries to pursue these talks with a view to making substantial progress in them, and to 
concluding negotiations as soon as possible and within the time -frame provided by the period 
extension  requested.  
2.9.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
2.10.   Armenia has taken note of the statement made by the representative of the EU and will relay 
it to Capital. Armenia is ready to continue communicating with interested WTO  Members in a 
pragmatic an d constructive way. In this regard, Armenia confirms its readiness to organize the next 
round of bilateral negotiations with a view to bring ing them to their completion. Meanwhile, Armenia 
will, on a regular basis,  continue  to inform the Council , as well a s interested Members , on the ongoing 
compensatory adjustment negotiations.  
2.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made  and of Armenia 's 
communication, and that it agree to extend the deadline to withdraw substantially equival ent G/C/M/138  
 
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  concessions under GATT  Article  XXVIII for 12  months, until 2 January  2022, as set out in 
document  G/L/1110/Add. 6. 
2.12.   The Council  so agreed . 
3  ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 (G /L/1137 /ADD.5)  
3.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 14  October  2020, the 
delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document  G/L/1137/Add.5 , relating to the extension of the time -period for the wi thdrawal of 
concessions, in connection with the Kyrgyz Republic 's accession to the EAEU, until 12  February  2022. 
In this document, the Kyrgyz Republic indicated that it would not assert that Members that had 
submitted a claim pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were precluded from withdrawing 
substantially equivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 because such withdrawal 
had occurred later than six  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's withdrawal of concessions, provided 
that the claiming WTO Member withdrew concessions no later than 78  months after the Kyrgyz 
Republic 's modification of concessions, or until 12  February  2022. This Council had extended the 
deadline on five occasions, namely at its meetings of 10  November  2015, 14  July 2016, 
10 November  2017, 12  November  2018, and 14  November  2019.  
3.2.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
3.3.  The Kyrgyz Republic is still in the process of technical clarifications and other relevant data 
analysis based on Members ' initial claims  of interest. The Kyrgyz Republic has had informative 
technical exchanges with one of the interested Members and stand s open for cooperation with 
others. The time -period for the withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions expires on 
12 February  2021. Considering that an additional time would be required in order to move these 
negotiations  forward , and in view of ensuring that Members reserve their rights pending the 
communication to the WTO  Secretariat of the agreement, the Kyrgyz Republic requests f or a further 
extension of Members ' rights to withdraw concessions pending the conclusion of 
Article  XXVIII:3  negotiations after 12  months, until 12  February  2022, as reflected in 
document  G/L/1137/Add.5. The Kyrgyz Republic will not assert that WTO  Members  that have 
submitted a claim pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994 are precluded from withdrawing 
substantially equivalent concessions because this withdrawal occurs later than six  months after the 
Kyrgyz Republic 's withdrawal of concessions, provided that the claiming WTO  Member withdraws 
concessions no later than 78  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's modification of concessions.  
3.4.  On the basis of the above -mentioned, the Kyrgyz Republic expresses its gratitude for the 
understanding  of interested WTO  Members, and for their support in demonstrating no objections in 
the issue of the extension of rights. The Kyrgyz Republic will continue communicating and 
exchanging information with the relevant partners to this process in due course.  
3.5.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
3.6.  Back in April  2019, the European Union  welcomed the progress achieved in our negotiations 
on tariffs for non -agricultural products, where an agreement of principle has been reached. When it 
comes t o agriculture, however, neither of the Members concerned has offered genuine compensation 
yet for the substantial reductions in market access which the EU had to face.  
3.7.  Recent talks with Eurasian partners have shown that, despite the current pandemic, it is  still 
possible to move forward in these negotiations, which remain important for the European Union. The 
European Union invites both countries to pursue those talks with a view to making substantial 
progress and concluding negotiations as soon as possible  within the time -frame provided by the 
period extension requested.  
3.8.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
3.9.  The Kyrgyz Republic thanks the European Union for their comments, takes note of the 
intervention , and will address it through Ca pital in due course. The Kyrgyz Republic is ready to work 
and cooperate closely on this issue.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  3.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made  and of the 
Kyrgyz  Republic 's communication, and that it agree to extend the deadline to withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions under GATT  Article  XXVIII for 12  months, until 12 February  2022, as set out 
in document  G/L/1137/Add.5 . 
3.11.   The Council  so agreed . 
4  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, as indicated in the Agenda, the Committee on Market 
Access (CMA) had forwarded four  collective requests for waiver extensions concerning the 
introduction of Harmonized System (HS) changes into WTO  Schedules of Concessio ns for the 
consideration of this Council. These collective requests had been the subject of consultations in the 
CMA meeting that had taken place on 12  November  2020.  
4.2.  The Chairperson drew Members ' attention to the collective draft waiver decisions circulat ed in 
documents  G/C/W/782, G/C/W/783, G/C/W/784, and G/C/W/785 , which concerned 
one-year extensions of draft collective waiver decisions to the HS for the years 2002, 2007, 2012 , 
and 2017, respectively, that would all expire on 31  December  2020.  
4.3.  The Chairp erson proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decisions 
contained in documents  G/C/W/782, G/C/W/783, G/C/W/784, and G/C/W/785 to the 
General  Council for adoption.  
4.4.  The Council so agreed . 
5  COVID -19: MEASURES RELATED TO TRADE IN GOODS – REQUEST FROM CANADA; 
COLOMBIA; COSTA RICA; HONG KONG, CHINA; NEW ZEALAND; NORWAY; SINGAPORE; 
AND SWITZERLAND  
5.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegations of Canada; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Ne w Zealand; Norway; Singapore; 
and Switzerland , respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda of 
this meeting . After the Airgram had been issued, the co -sponsors of this item requested the 
Secretariat to circulate document  G/C/W/788 and Room Document  RD/CTG/11. The Council had 
held a lengthy discussion on this topic at its last meeting. The co -sponsors of this agenda item had 
requested the Secretariat to make a short presentation on the collection of information with respect 
to COVID -19-related measures in the area of trade in goods.  
5.2.  Upon the request of the co -sponsors of this item, the WTO Secretariat  (Committee on Market 
Access ) made a short presentation on measures implemented by Members in response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic.  
5.3.  The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
5.4.  Hong Kong, China thanks the Secretariat for the excellent presentation , which provides a useful 
overall picture of the implementation of goods measures under the pandemic , and which is ver y 
relevant to the work of the CTG. Hong Kong, China and seven  other Members (Canada, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore,  and Switzerland) have circulated a communication for 
this item, document symbol  G/C/W/788. They have also circulated a room document , 
document  RD/CTG/11 , about work in CTG  subsidiary bodies relating to COVID -19. 
5.5.  As the pandemic and its impact on everyone and on the global economy continues to evolve, 
the proponents  have suggested this agenda item for this meeting in orde r to review where we stand. 
Regarding COVID -19-related goods measures, there is abundant information available in the various 
websites and reports of the WTO and other international organi zations . Hong Kong, China  also take s 
note of the relevant efforts in the CTG's subsidiary bodies , as reflected in their annual reports. With 
this knowledge, it is time for the CTG to have a discussion, to monitor the functioning of the rules -
based multilateral trading system in the context of the pandemi c, and to encourage good practices 
in its subsidiary bodies. Hong Kong, China  believe s that  collective and concerted efforts could achieve 
more.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  5.6.  To encourage discussion under this item, the proponents  have suggested a few questions in 
their communication t hat Members could reflect upon. For example, if Members at this meeting 
recogni ze the usefulness of trade -facilitati ng measures under the pandemic, the CTG could call upon 
Members to consider whether trade -facilitati ng measures, although expired or introdu ced on a 
temporary basis, could continue as far as possible ; similarly,  whether an expiry date could possibly 
be set  for trade -restrictive measures . 
5.7.  In short, the CTG has a significant role to play in making use of the information available on 
the trade in  goods, and is in a unique position, without duplicating the efforts of other bodies, to 
enable a coherent and effective WTO contribution to global economic recovery.  
5.8.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
5.9.  Over the course of much of this year, W TO Members and the Organization itself have navigated 
unknown and quite turbulent waters. Institutions have had to adopt emergency measures and find 
creative solutions to multiple challenges in the areas of public health, movement of people, 
production and , of course, foreign trade. Given this situation, Colombia, together with seven  other 
proponents, submitted the proposal that the Council should, within the scope of its powers, revise 
and analyse the measures adopted by Members. Without wanting to duplica te efforts or call into 
question the measures identified, Colombia considers the CTG to be the ideal forum in which to 
discuss and analyse the measures adopted by Members in order to gain a broad and general 
understanding of them.  
5.10.   Colombia thanks the Secre tariat for systematizing and compiling all the information on the 
dedicated website, and for the presentation given today that includes new elements of analysis. As 
was set out in the communication circulated under this agenda item, there are several elements that 
may be analysed. For example, more than half of the 250  measures related to trade in goods 
compiled by the Secretariat have an end date. This suggests that Members have pursued temporary 
measures designed to tackle an emergency situat ion. Similarly, there are a series of trade facilitation 
measures that will have a positive impact in the long term. These initiatives could be implemented 
permanently to help entrepreneurs.  
5.11.   Meanwhile, several subsidiary bodies have addressed the measures adopted because of 
COVID -19, following their own rules and procedures, which we consider to be relevant and helpful. 
In document  RD/CTG/11, the proponents have gathered together the work of the Committees, as 
outlined in each of their annual reports, in an  effort to provide an overview of the discussions and in 
the interest s of transparency. Based on the review of the activities carried out, the proponents found 
in some cases that good examples of synergy and collaborative work between the WTO  Secretariat 
and other international organizations, such as the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO), have been identified. The proponents are of the view that this type of 
collaboration should be continued and strengthened.  
5.12.   As stated  previously, this is an invitation to discuss and carry out a collective analysis of the 
measures adopted. Times of crisis provide a learning opportunity, and this is the ideal moment to 
find elements that will allow us to better prepare ourselves, as Memb ers of this Organization, for 
potential new collective challenges in the future.  
5.13.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
5.14.   New Zealand supports ongoing dialogue and discussions on COVID -19, given the significant 
impact the pandemic has had on gl obal trade and supply chains. Many goods sub -committees are 
already monitoring COVID -19-related measures, along with the WTO  Secretariat. In this regard, the 
CTG is well placed to use the information provided by the sub -committees ( for example,  through the  
annual reports) and the WTO  Secretariat, to further understand, analyse , and identify trends 
regarding COVID -19-related measures and their broader impact on the trade in goods. This includes , 
for example , whether such measures are trade facilitating or re stricting; if measures continue to be 
in force or have been lifted; and the degree of impact on specific industry sectors or product groups 
and supply chains. New Zealand welcomes a streamlined mechanism for tracking the nature of 
COVID -19-related measures  for goods trade to maintain transparency, information -sharing , and an 
understanding of Members ' respective trade policy responses.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  5.15.   The delegate of Singapore  indicated the following:  
5.16.   Singapore believes that transparency is a key element in our joint effort s to mitigate the 
health and economic impact of the pandemic. Singapore has participated in a few of the discussions 
on Members ' implementation of measures to combat the COVID -19 pandemic under the CTG 's 
subsidiary bodies , and has found them to be very use ful. The CTG is a logical platform for continuing 
Members ' work on tracking and discuss ing trade -related measures that have been implemented 
during the crisis, and to gain an overview of such measures. The overview presented by the 
Secretariat today, for e xample, was very helpful. Discussions at the CTG and its subsidiary bodies 
could lead Members to reflect on which measures have helped and which measures have hindered 
their collective efforts to fight the pandemic. Therefore, Singapore supports further di scussions on 
this issue at the CTG and its subsidiary bodies.  
5.17.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
5.18.   As noted in document  RD/CTG/11 , several of the CTG 's subsidiary bodies have held 
discussions on the COVID -related measures taken by Members in response to the pandemic. He 
himself  had taken part in two of these  exchanges  and had found them of great benefit. In the Trade 
Facilitation Committee , several Member s highlight ed their actions taken to ensure that trade was as 
frictionless as possible.  International organizations had also communicated the work that they had 
undertaken over the past months to support WTO  Members ' efforts. Similarly, the Market Access 
Committee had provided an opportunity for Members to explain not only the restrictions put in place, 
but also to put a focus on their actions taken to reduce costs for users of medical goods. Canada 
sees continuing opportunities to examine how the multilate ral trading system can support collective 
efforts to address such a crisis.  
5.19.   Making the effort to share and discuss relevant information in the subsidiary bodies is an 
important part of that. A famous Canadian astronaut once said : "There is no problem so ba d that 
you cannot  make it worse ". It is important that Members  have space to reflect on the actions taken 
over the past year, to consider what has helped and what has hurt Members ' collective efforts, and 
to see what can be done to promote the former and d iscourage the latter. Canada supports further 
committee work in this regard.  
5.20.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
5.21.   Transparency is a key element in Members ' joint efforts to mitigate the health and economic 
impact of the pandemic. It is a necessary ingredient to further develop coordinated and global 
responses here at the WTO in terms of trade policies.  It is only natural that Members  use a formal 
WTO body, namely the C TG, to inform Members about COVID -19-related trade policies and to share  
their views on the matter.  
5.22.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
5.23.   This is a specific discussion on a situation having a worldwide impact with far -reaching trade 
and socio -economic implications. With regard to this discussion, the WTO and this  Council can 
support monitoring and strengthen transparency, which are fundamental principles for the 
functioning of this Organization. In order to avoid any repetition of the content of the written 
communication , and the excellent presentation made by Hon g Kong , China  and the other 
co-sponsors, Costa  Rica will merely urge other Members to participate in this discussion.  
5.24.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
5.25.   Australia welcomes the efforts of the past few months to enhance the transparency of 
trade-related measures taken in the context of COVID -19. Australia  also support s efforts to utili ze 
existing information and processes rather than duplicating or adding burdensome new obligations.  
5.26.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
5.27.   Uruguay welcomes the inclusion of this item on following  up on trade -related emergency 
measures taken in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. The COVID -19 pandemic has put the 
international community in an extremely complex and delicate situation. In this connection , Uruguay  G/C/M/138  
 
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  share s the interest in following up on these measures through a general and more systematic 
analysis of the information available at the level of the WTO's primary body responsible for trade in 
goods, which would lead to a better understanding of  the situation. Respecting the rights and 
obligations established in the Agreements, Uruguay  understand s that the intention is not to enter 
into new notification obligations or to duplicate work but, in line with the role of this Council, to 
contribute to the strengthening of the trading system and multilateral cooperation to combat the 
pandemic effectively.  
5.28.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.29.   The EU welcomes this initiative to foster our collective understanding of the various measu res 
that Members have taken in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic. The presentation from the 
Secretariat was useful and informative. Members should be mindful of the useful work in the TPRB, 
which is well placed to centrali ze monitoring of COVID -19-related measures, also because the scope 
of these measures goes beyond the trade in goods. But the EU encourages complementary work in 
the CTG and its subsidiary bodies , based on specific expertise.  
5.30.   The EU agrees that the CTG can be a platform for building on t he work undertaken in its 
subsidiary bodies, usefully summari zed in the room document. The CTG should take stock of the 
discussions on COVID -19-related measures in its subsidiary bodies and could identify directions for 
further work. The  EU would like to s hare a few reflections based on the questions set out in the 
communication circulated under that item. These reflections are preliminary because of the 
shortness of time, but the EU is ready to continue discussions , including in the subsidiary bodies.  
5.31.   First, the EU appreciates the effort s of the WTO  Secretariat to monitor all COVID -19-related 
trade measures. Updates on the status of these measures, especially if they have been terminated 
as planned, would be appreciated; although we note that this also depe nds on input from Members. 
Second, on trade facilitating measures, the EU would be interested to discuss and consider potential 
best practices and whether some could be made permanent. This might help Members to prepare 
for any subsequent  health emergency.  Third, with regard to question  (c), Members can also raise 
measures that have not been notified in the respective committees ; in this regard,  the work of the 
Secretariat is useful in increasing transparency about non -notified measures.  
5.32.   The EU is open -minded about further engagement with relevant international organi zations 
as well as publishing more insights from the WTO's work on COVID -19-related trade measures, but 
more discussion would be required about the details. Finally, the EU would also like to inform the 
Council that a number of WTO  Members, including the EU, have issued a communication calling on 
WTO Members to increase their coop eration and take action to strengthen the resilience of supply 
chains and contribute to an effective response to a public health emergency. The communication on 
a Trade and Health Initiative was circulated to the General Council yesterday.2 
5.33.   The delegate o f the United States  indicated the following:  
5.34.   The United States would like to make some brief initial remarks regarding the communication 
in document  G/C/W/788 and the Secretariat 's presentation . First, on procedure:  in their 
communication, the co -sponsors expressed interest in having a conversation, but they did not put 
document  G/C/W/788 on the meeting 's agenda, and they shared it and their room document long 
after the agenda closed.  The US is  puzzled that several of the co -sponsors also co -sponsor the dra ft 
General Council Decision, "Procedural Guidelines for WTO  Councils and Committees Addressing 
Trade Concern s". The US  respectfully remind s these co -sponsors that their actions here are 
inconsistent with the first  sentence of Paragraph  1 of the draft Decis ion. The US  also question s 
having the Secretariat present to Members without a request from the Membership and without it 
even appearing on the meeting agenda.  
5.35.   Second, on substance:  the US has  initial concerns with the call to turn the CTG into the 
platfor m described in document  G/C/W/788. Several elements would seem to duplicate, supplant, 
or otherwise undermine ongoing work. For example, if only 25 % of 250  measures have been 
properly notified to a relevant WTO  committee, Members should be using those committees to press 
for transparency and to counter -notify if necessary.  In addition, the US  question s the usefulness of 
 
2 Document  WT/GC/223.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  generalizing across disparate measures implemented for disparate reasons. Interested Members can 
and should focus on specific measures of concern in the relevant WTO  bodies.  Further, the US recall s 
that Members engage in committee work to monitor compliance with WTO  rules, not with principles 
or goals expressed in other forums by a different membership. For example, Question  (d) asks 
whether emergency trade measures to tackle COVID -19 are "transparent, targeted, temporary, and 
proportionate ". Those principles, however sensible, are drawn from G20  statements. The 
US reference point is the WTO  Agreement.  
5.36.   Closing with a few remarks about the Secretariat 's presentation , fundamentally, the US  does 
not believe it is the role of the Secretariat to judge whether trade measures are facilitative or 
restrictive.  This is  not a question of accuracy, but of who should make qualitative judgments about 
trade measures. In the US  view, this is the role of Members.  In making such judgments, in choosing 
to highlight specific policy objectives, and in identifying examples, the Secretariat is inherently 
participating in setting the agenda. Again, the US  sees this as the role of Members, not the 
Secretariat.  
5.37.   The representative  of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
5.38.   The United Kingdom welcomes all discussions about how WTO  Members can better 
understand and monitor COVID -19-related trade measures. The UK  welcomes the focus that 
Members are placing on these measures in subsidiary committees and think s that is an excellent 
route for scrutini zing such measures in detail. The UK thinks there may also be value in using the 
CTG to provide the "bigger picture " on goods -related measures, though to make this worthwhile 
Members  need to be clear about how they would use such information effectively. For example , 
while it is interesting to know how many measures have expired but have not been removed, without 
gettin g into the detail of which Members or measures those apply to , it is harder to have an impact 
in terms of scrutiny. Perhaps such analysis at a CTG  level would be most useful in helping Members 
know where to "target their efforts " in scrutini zing individual  measures in subsidiary committees. 
The UK  would welcome other Members ' views on this.  
5.39.   The UK  reiterate s its support for the G20  principles: that any COVID -19-related measures are 
targeted, proportionate, transparent, and temporary. The UK  strongly support s initiatives to improve 
transparency of COVID -19-related measures and will take this paper away to consider it further.  
5.40.   The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
5.41.   There are some measures that are affecting trade as part of the pandemic but there are a lso 
measures that are creating trade, not just trade facilitation in the sense of WTO  trade facilitation. 
When a country lowers its tariffs there is a facilitation measure and this in theory is in favour of 
trade because there are more actors with tariff i ncentives to promote exports. Furthermore, as the 
Secretariat has mentioned, with regard to the trade tension in the true sense, when exports are 
going up, they are promoting trade and when there are obstacles they are so serious that they can 
be an abuse of trade and therefore impact international trade. Therefore, Chile is also looking at the 
global trade alert of St  Gallen, according to which, since the beginning of the pandemic, there have 
been some 760  interventions made in favour of trade and the othe rs working against trade. And I 
would like to therefore thank the WTO once again for the path it has set out on, which is very 
meaningful.  
5.42.   Chile would also like to thank the co -sponsors of this agenda item because this is something 
that needs to be followe d and there needs to be a more detailed study or analysis for Members . The 
trends are very clear with regard to the pandemic and the effect it is having on trade, whether it is 
trade liberalization or trade restriction, and indeed there are measures in bot h senses, particularly 
national, economic, and trade measures.  
5.43.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
5.44.   Nigeria wishes to thank proponents of the paper titled "COVID -19: Measures Related to Trade 
in Goods " contained in document  G/C/W/788, which Nigeria has  forwarded to Capital for 
assessment. At the outset, Nigeria  wishes to associate itself with the statement made by the African 
Group.  Nigeria believe s transparency is critical for the effective functioning  of the multilateral trading 
system and this Council should continue to uphold this principle. However, since this issue was first G/C/M/138  
 
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  tabled in the Council in June, Members  are still grappling with the scope, objective , and value added 
of the proposal.  
5.45.   The pr oponents in their paper noted the fact that much work has been done in the 
CTG subsidiary bodies and other WTO  bodies to enhance the transparency of trade -related measures 
taken in the context of the COVID -19 crisis over the past several months, including with respect to 
trade in goods. Furthermore, the WTO has existing mechanism s for mapping and reporting trade 
measures , including COVID -19-related measures. There also exists a dedicated WTO  web page for 
COVID -19-related measures and issues. In addition, th e Secretariat issue s an Annual Trade Report 
as well as report s on a respective Member 's Trade Measures during its Trade Policy Review. The 
question , therefore , is what are the objectives and value added of this new proposal? Is it appropriate 
for this Council to dissipate energy and time reinventing the wheel whereas there is an array of other 
pressing issues requiring its attention?  
5.46.   In conclusion, it will be ap preciated if the proponents could clarify the questions raised and 
shed more light on the issues raised by Nigeria and other Members on this proposal to enable us to 
gain greater insight  into it . This will enhance constructive engagement on the proposal.  
5.47.   The delegate of Botswana , speaking on behalf of the African Group , indicated the following:  
5.48.   At the outset, the African Group would like to thank the proponents for their joint submission 
and their introductory statements.  As indicated before, transparency remains a fundamental 
principle and enabler of the functioning of the global trading system , which the African Group holds 
in high regard, particularly in these turbulent times of the COVID -19 pandemic. While the African 
Group notes the clarifications by t he proponents in an attempt to address the concerns previously 
reflected in the CTG 's meeting in June, the African Group  cannot help but notice that things are not 
any clearer now than they were before.  
5.49.   It remains unclear what the scope and intent of this initiative is, and the addition al value it 
seeks to introduce;  while the African Group  appreciate s that this initiative aims to foster Members ' 
collective understanding of the various measures taken in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic, 
and per the emai l from the proponents that it would be a "one-off discussion "; what do Members 
anticipate will happen after this discussion? Relatedly, the COVID -19 pandemic continues to advance 
and is affecting all Members  in what is now proving to be a second  wave of the outbreak ; with that 
said, and in recognition that we are not  yet "out of the woods ", do Members expect to have yet  
another discussion in future?  Finally, b efore, there was a suggestion about the Secretariat preparing 
a factual report on COVID -19 measur es, which has since fallen off, and which now begs the question 
of what Members  will do with this information and discussions? Last but not least, the African Group 
hopes that more light can be shared on this initiative and its intent ion; this will help Members  to 
better inform their engagement going forward.  
5.50.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
5.51.   Indonesia would like to reiterate its views as expressed at the CTG 's previous meeting. While 
Indonesia is aware that the proposal tries not to duplic ate the work of other WTO  bodies, Indonesia 
is of the view that Members at this point should focus their efforts on maximizing the existing work 
in monitoring COVID -19-trade-related measures through notification and the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism.  
5.52.   The d elegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
5.53.   This is very useful, in Paraguay 's view, particularly the idea of a document that centralizes all 
the different debates, such as the one proposed in the room document distributed along with the 
agenda for today 's meeting. The questions raised by the proponents are very pertinent for starting 
this debate , which Paraguay hopes will continue, particularly taking into account how much work 
could be done with regard to measures that have expired as part of this monito ring. It is also 
important to improve the format, so as to make it more user -friendly for Members and therefore 
make the monitoring of these measures more effective, rather than just a compilation of the 
measures that exist.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  5.54.   The delegate of China  indicated  the following:  
5.55.   China thanks the Secretariat for its ongoing efforts to monitor trade -related measures 
implemented by Members in response to  the COVID -19 pandemic and support s the continuing work 
to track and discuss these measures.  China believes that tra nsparency and global cooperation are 
important during such a global crisis. China  calls on Members to avoid unnecessary trade restrictions 
and ensure the transparency of the measures related to the pandemic. Any measures must be 
targeted, proportionate, tr ansparent, temporary, and consistent with WTO  rules.  
5.56.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
5.57.   Ecuador considers that, in the current context, information on measures related to trade in 
goods is extremely useful to Members, particularly developing and least developed Members . 
Members ' discussions on and exchange s of information in this regard facilitate the analysis of such 
measures, new and old, which could affect any Member 's imports or exports through excessive 
restrictions. Ecuador therefore not es with interest the questions raised in document  G/C/W/788, 
especially regarding the duration of the measures adopted. In addition, Ecuador believes that it 
would be a good idea to consolidate the work and analysis conducted by other subsidiary bodies of 
this Council in order to have greater clarity on the current situation and gather information on best 
practices and lessons learned during this particularly challenging period for world trade.  
5.58.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  thanked Members for their view s and clarified  the following:  
5.59.   Members are not in need of a compilation of measures; Members already have much 
information. However, Members need a way to have a more effective monitoring. The TPRB is a 
platform to have an overview of this but Members need more discussion. The subsidiary bodies have 
technical discussions on the measures and look into the details, but Members need an overview and 
the CTG is a unique platform in this respect. Members may continue to discuss the questions raised 
or they can th ink of other more effective ways in which the CTG can monitor these measures, when 
they expire and are really terminated, and when they benefit trade and could be encouraged. A 
message could be sent from the CTG to Capitals that these measures are good to the global economy 
and we can encourage that. This is not just about taking a note of all Members ' statements and 
forgetting about it. But if the CTG can send a message to Members clearly to encourage  them, then 
there is value.  
5.60.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
5.61.   Maybe if Canada  could just add a couple of points. The first is in relation to the comment the 
United States made around the presentation by our colleague from the Market Access Division. 
Canada  would just like to make it clear th at this was a request from the co -sponsors. It was not a 
request or not an action by the Secretariat on its own. The co -sponsors requested this based on a 
presentation that had been made recently to another body , which co -sponsors  thought would be 
useful t o share. The comments so far hold that up to be true.  
5.62.   In terms of what to do with the discussions today , and how to build on  them, the co -sponsors 
are trying to encourage a discussion within the CTG which should benefit all of us in terms of 
understanding what is going on and in terms of understanding what each of the committees are 
doing. Because an important aspect of the work of the CTG is to supervise the work of the subsidiary 
bodies and therefore having a space for discussions  brings value to it, at l east to the extent that 
Members want to provide contributions and to participate in and learn from that discussion. It also 
allows CTG  Members and the CTG 's Chairperson  to speak to the chairs of the subsidiary bodies and 
to encourage them to continue to mo nitor and encourage Members to monitor the measures they 
have taken and to provide some transparency. Many Members stated that transparency is held in 
high regard and it is important that Members continue to make efforts to be transparent and provide 
information to the subsidiary body committees on measures that have been taken. As I said earlier 
in my intervention, this is in order to learn from what has happened, to learn from the effects of 
what Members have done in their jurisdictions, and to share that  information, so that others can 
either benefit from the good things that have been done or not make the same mistakes. More than 
anything, that is the biggest element of the idea behind this discussion that co -sponsors had hoped 
to have or hope to continu e having at least in the subsidiary bodies on this topic.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  5.63.   The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
5.64.   Chile seeks clarity regarding the future of this agenda item. It seems to be based on goodwill 
and good intentions and there is a room document but for  the next meeting, in terms of procedure, 
the question is whether Members are going to be continuing to discuss this issue, in order to get to 
the bottom of this debate, as is necessary and as is set out in the room document, and therefore 
whether Members will be discussing procedure or the issue at hand.  
5.65.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
5.66.   The Council so agreed . 
6  PROPOSAL FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE TO 
PROVIDE GREATER LEGAL CERTAINTY TO NON-RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES GRANTED BY 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY WTO  MEMBERS TO LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES – REQUEST 
FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (G /C/W/775)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the Republic of Korea had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
6.2.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
6.3.  In March  2020, Korea circulated its proposal (G/C/W/775)  for the adoption of an authoritative 
interpretation  of the Enabling Clause. Through the authoritative interpretation, Korea believes that 
developing countries should  also be able to grant non -reciprocal preferential treatments to LDCs 
based on the Enabling Clause rather than relying on a separate, temporar y waiver. As Korea 's 
delegation has already introduced its proposal during the CTG's June  2020 meeting, Korea  will not 
go over the specific details. However, Korea  would like to take this opportunity  to draw Members ' 
attention to its proposal and request t heir firm support.  
6.4.  First, Korea believes that its proposal will provide an opportunity to accelerate LDCs ' integration 
into the multilateral trading system , which will not only benefit all Members but also contribute to 
restoring trust in the system. The u nprecedented health and economic challenges caused by the 
COVID -19 pandemic have further highlighted the economic vulnerability of LDCs. From this 
perspective, it is all the more important to take measures to guarantee LDCs ' share in the global 
trading system. Second, Korea 's proposal solely aims at clarifying the legal basis of non -reciprocal 
preferential treatments already given to LDCs. It does not aim to create or modify any right or 
obligation  under the Enabling Clause. In this vein, Korea  hopes that Members would focus on the 
proposal 's purpose to grant non -reciprocal preferential treatments to LDCs  with legal certainty . 
Third, since the last meeting, Korea has  received feedback from numerous countries , and would like 
to thank Members for their constructive comments.  Korea  plans on reaching out to them and build ing 
on their comments to table its proposal at the General Council next year, or even at the Ministerial 
Conference  if possible . Korea  hopes to have further in -depth discussions with all interested parties 
in the months ahead  and invite s all Members to reach out with any enquiries  or comments.  
6.5.  The delegate of Afghanistan , on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the following:  
6.6.  Under this agenda item, the LDC Group would like to express its great interest in the 
submission which has been made by the Republic of Korea. Indeed, the fundamental objective of 
the LDC  Group within the WTO is to achieve, through the work undertaken in the institution, an 
improveme nt and development of integration into world trade. As any regulatory initiative likely to 
facilitate and develop trade with the LDC  Group 's trading partners, which would have positive 
repercussions for employment and social progress in these countries, th is initiative must be 
considered constructively. The LDC  Group welcomes the analytical work carried out by the Republic 
of Korea. It is true that LDC  countries are subject to specific constraints, of which WTO  Members are 
aware. In that respect, ensuring a  permanent waiver in favour of these countries regarding tariff 
preferences in a state of renewal process at key deadlines makes sense.  
6.7.  The LDC  Group fully supports the Republic of Korea 's proposal and is ready to discuss the 
details of the submission. Also, the LDC  Group seizes the opportunity to renew its thanks to the 
developing -country delegations of China, India, Brazil, Chile, Thailand, and Turkey who joined the G/C/M/138  
 
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  LDC Group in July  2019 to allow a decision, taken by the General Council, e xtending for ten  years 
the waiver on preferential tariff treatment for LDCs. The LDC  Group concludes by expressing its 
thanks to all Members that attach importance to doing what is necessary at the WTO  level to promote 
more authentic development for LDCs.  
6.8.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
6.9.  Brazil would like to reiterate its reservations expressed at the CTG 's meeting in June.  Brazil 
co-sponsored, on both occasions applicable, the proposed renovation of the waiver that, since 1999, 
has offered a legal basis for unilateral concessions from developing countries for least developed 
countries. Over the years, there seems to have been no evidence or manifestation indicating that 
the waiver provides insufficient legal certainty or discourages the imple mentation of these 
concessions.  In this context, Brazil requests clarification on the motivation of the Korean proposal, 
in particular about the innovation that would represent the suggested term "authoritative 
interpretation ", non-existent in Article  IX:2 of the WTO  Agreement.  In preliminary analysis, it is not 
clear that there would be anything to gain from reversing the understanding, in force since 1979, 
that the Enabling Clause (L/4903) does not provide a basis for developing countries to grant 
unilateral concessions to  LDCs, which is exactly what led to the 1999  Waiver Decision. Brazil would  
also like to add that the text of the Enabling Clause clearly recognizes that LDCs are part of the 
broader group of developing countries (L/4903, paragraph  2(d): "the least developed among the 
developing countries "). 
6.10.   The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
6.11.   The delegation of Bangladesh thanks the Republic of Korea for its explanation of the proposal . 
Under th is item, the Bangladesh  delegation endorse s the statement made by Afghanistan on behalf 
of the LDC  Group. As stated during the CTG 's meeting in June, on this issue , the Bangladesh  
delegation  looks forward to constructively working with Members.  
6.12.   The delegat e of China  indicated the following:  
6.13.   China worked together with Brazil, Chile, India, Thailand, and Turkey last year and extended 
the waiver for developing Members to grant preferential tariff access schemes to LDCs by a further 
10 years, starting from 1  July 2019 until 30  June 2029.  China supports exploring a permanent 
arrangement for developing Members to grant preferential treatment to LDCs. However, China is of 
the view that Korea 's reinterpretation of the Enabling Clause is different from Members ' previous 
understanding. It may change the original intention and the nature of the Enabling Clause. China 
has raised its questions and concerns to the Korean delegation and look s forward to the responses 
and clarification from Korea on this proposal.  
6.14.   The dele gate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
6.15.   Regarding the proposal for an authoritative interpretation of the Enabling Clause, Turkey 
would like to thank the Republic of Korea for its initiative and continued bilateral engagement on the 
issue. As one of the de veloping countries that accords one of the most extensive preferential 
treatment schemes to the Least Developed Countries, Turkey believes that trade is among the most 
effective pathways for development of the LDCs. In this sense, Turkey highly values the waiver, 
which enables the continuation of non -reciprocal preferential treatment to LDCs by developing 
countries. That is why Turkey co -sponsored the recent extension of the waiver for another 10  years , 
in 2019. Against this background, Turkey is definitely  supportive of the ultimate objective and 
rationale behind Korea 's proposal. That said, as the waiver has so far been extended without 
controversy , and rather smoothly, Turkey is not certain in what ways the proposal could really work 
to spur greater use o f the preferences . In addition, Turkey has certain questions regarding the legal 
underpinnings of this proposal, which were already communicated to Korea bilaterally.  
6.16.   The delegate of Botswana , on behalf of the African Group, indicated the following:  
6.17.   The Af rican Group holds the view that the Enabling Clause is an important provision in the 
WTO in recognition of differences in levels of development among WTO  Members. It allows 
contracting parties to accord differential and more favourable treatment to develop ing countries 
taking into account the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries and LDCs. G/C/M/138  
 
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  The waiver on Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least  Developed Countries waives GATT  Article  I and 
provides a means for developing  country Membe rs to offer preferential tariff treatment to products 
of least  developed countries. This is in keeping with the need for positive efforts to be designed to 
ensure that LDCs secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs 
of their economic development as set out in the Marrakesh Agreement. The African Group welcomes 
the proposal by the Republic of Korea providing for an authoritative interpretation of the Enabling 
Clause , which in essence takes away the need to renew the waive r every 10  years ; nevertheless, 
the African Group is still analysing the proposal and will revert with more concrete views on it. 
6.18.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
6.19.   India has been one of the main proponents of an LDC waiver for preferential imp orts by 
developing countries providing such schemes. While India's legal experts are examining the 
proposed authoritative interpretation of the Enabling Clause, India looks forward to a bilateral 
meeting with its Korean colleagues to bring clarity on certain issues of legal interpretation in that 
regard . It will help the clear understanding of the basis of such an interpretation and facilitate further 
consideration.  
6.20.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
6.21.   I would  like to extend my gratitude to all delegations which have shown interest in Korea 's 
proposal. Regarding the concerns some Members have expressed, I will report them to Capital and 
reach out to those countries to further develop our proposal. Based on the opinions of WTO  Members, 
Korea plans to circulate the Joint Proposal with a draft decision in the near future. Korea would like 
to request the wide interest and support of Members. Korea firmly believes that it is high time to 
establish, through its propos al, a stable and predictable legal basis on which developing 
WTO Members can continue implementing non -reciprocal preferential tariff schemes for LDCs.  
6.22.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
6.23.   The Council so agreed . 
7  MEASU RES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 –
G/C/W/752)  
7.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that,  in communications dated 10 November  2020, the 
delegation of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group , had requested the Secretariat to include this 
issue on the agenda.  
7.2.  The delegate of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group,  indicated the following:  
7.3.  The submission is self -explanatory and aims to correct a technical omission regarding the use 
of export subsidies under the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM Agreement ). As Members will agree, export subs idy is a policy tool that can potentially help 
Members in transition. When the SCM Agreement  was negotiated in the early 1990s, probably no 
one could visualize that , in future , the LDCs (that is, countries listed in Annex  VII(a) ), would be 
graduated from t he LDC  category and that some of them might still remain with their GNI per capita 
levels below USD  1,000. This gap is nothing but a technical omission , which can be corrected without 
adding any new flexibility in the original agreement. The delegation of Bangladesh reiterates that an 
omission cannot be interpreted as a deliberate intent by Members to prevent graduating LDCs from 
benefit ting from Article  27.2(a) flexibilities.  
7.4.  This submission (WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752) has received wide support from a large nu mber 
of Members, and the LDC  Group is thankful for their support. However, some Members have asked 
questions and requested additional information. One delegation has expressed that "the specific 
need for this proposal remains unclear " and has also question ed the "need to change the rules ". The 
LDC Group 's response is clear: namely, that the specific aim of this proposal is to correct a technical 
omission in the SCM Agreement , and nothing else. And it has not proposed to change any rule, 
because the rule is already there in Article  27.2(a) of the SCM Agreement . Another delegation is of G/C/M/138  
 
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  the view that LDCs must first provide notifications on export subsidies. The same delegation further 
argues that , without assessing the actual use of export subsidies by LDCs, it would not be clear 
whether LDCs after graduation might need to continue using export subsidies. In this regard, the 
response of the LDC  Group is the following: first, providing notification is not the eligibility criteria 
for inclusion into the Annex  VII list and therefore this should not be made a pre -condition to the 
discussion that aims to correct a technical omission. Sincerely, the LDCs respect the notification 
obligation ; however,  many of them could not provide notification s due to capacity constraints and 
coordination challenges ; and second , Article  27.2 clearly provides the basis of the eligibility criterion 
that GNI  per capita below USD  1,000 is the only threshold and , except this, th ere are no other 
criteria for inclusion in the Annex  VII list. Therefore, the concern over "actual use of export subsidies " 
is not the issue here.  
7.5.  During the CTG 's meeting of June 2020, the Bangladesh delegation cited the historic example 
of Honduras,  which inadvertently had not been included in the original list of 20  developing -country 
Members in the Annex  VII(b) list in 1995 , although the GNI per capita of Honduras had been below 
USD 1,000. To correct this omission, the General Council graciously allowed  the inclusion of 
Honduras in the year 2000. This means that a technical correction is possible. Moreover, the Doha 
Ministerial Decision on Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN/(01)/17) , in 
paragraph  10.4, further confirms that , if a Member has been excluded from the Annex  VII(b) list, it 
shall be re -included in it when its GNI  per capita falls back below USD  1,000. Now, if a  
least-developed country after graduation still falls back below this threshold of USD  1,000 in 
constant 1 990 US dollar terms, why should it not be considered eligible to use the flexibility? The 
LDC Group requests the CTG to accept the current submission. The delegation of Bangladesh, along 
with the LDC  Group, stands ready to engage constructively with Member s. 
7.6.  The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
7.7.  Turkey would like to share with the Council that its support for this proposal remains unchanged 
as stated in previous CTG  meetings. As Members know very well, this policy flexibility was crafted 
for assis ting the LDCs and developing countries through providing them with a carve -out under the 
SCM Agreement. Consistent with this understanding, this policy should follow an update to allow 
graduating LDCs to continue to be exempted from the disciplines under t his Agreement. The 
Membership cannot deprive them of this toolbox while they are still facing  trade and developmental 
challenges and restraints in composing their industrial policies.  In this respect, Turkey  reiterate s 
that graduated LDCs with GNP below US D 1,000 should be given the same rights as the developing 
countries listed in Annex  VII(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
7.8.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.9.  The EU 's views expressed at the last meetings remain. The EU supports constructive initiatives 
to better integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading system and encourages discussing this proposal 
– as any Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) proposal – on the basis of analysis that shows 
where specific problems lie. The  EU is mindful of the challenges that graduating LDCs face.  However, 
the EU  would still need to assess the actual use of export subsidies by LDCs in order to establish 
whether a transition period is needed which would allow graduated LDCs to continue using  export 
subsidies. Unfortunately, the EU  has little knowledge about whether, or to which extent, LDCs use 
export subsidies (or any other subsidies, for that matter) because LDCs hardly submit any 
notifications under Article  25 of the SCM  Agreement . 
7.10.   The EU again encourages the LDC  Group to work with the Secretariat to improve the situation 
of notifications. Possibilities of technical assistance via the WTO are available for support regarding 
notifications. The EU recalls its suggestion that the LDC  Group mak e a presentation on how LDCs 
make use of export subsidies and how that helps their economic development. In addition, the EU 
suggests that the countries concerned also seek assistance for reshaping any export subsidies to 
make them WTO -compatible. The EU s tands ready to engage in informal consultations with the 
LDC Group on this matter. The EU also notes the recent documents circulated to the General Council 
by the LDC  Group, in particular the Communication on smooth transition in favour of countries 
gradua ting from the LDC  category ( WT/GC/W/807) . The EU would welcome clarifications as to 
whether there is an interlink between this recent submission in the General Council and the 
LDC proposal that is currently being discussed.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  7.11.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.12.   As the United States has noted each time this issue has been raised in the CTG, the specific 
need for this proposal remains unclear, as there do not seem to be export subsidy program mes in 
place for which an extension might be needed. As such, the US  continue s to question the need to 
change the rules in this area.  
7.13.   The delegate of Botswana , on behalf of the African Group, indicated the following:  
7.14.   The 2001 Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns provides 
for a modification of a consecutive three -year period where the US D GNP per capita requirement 
must be fulfilled accordingly: "Annex  VII(b) to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures includes the Members that are listed therein unti l their GNP per capita reaches US D 1,000 
in constant 1990  dollars for three  consecutive years. " As the LDC  Group  explained,  this decision did 
not take account of graduated LDCs. This constitutes an oversight that needs to be corrected. The 
African Group, t herefore, supports this proposal and encourage s all Members to do so.  
7.15.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
7.16.   India's delegation would also like to thank the delegation of Chad for  the inclusion of this 
agenda item. India has already supported this proposal in earlier meetings of the CTG. India 's stand 
on this issue remains the same.  
7.17.   The delegate of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the following:  
7.18.   The LDC  Group thanks all the delegates for their comments and would like to make two  points. 
First, until this issue is resolved, the LDC  Group would request to keep this item on the agenda of 
the next meetings of the Council. On the questions, particularly from the EU, the LDC  Group would 
be delighted to discuss further with the delegatio ns, although one  document has been submitted to 
the General Council 's meeting on LDC  Graduation citing two  specific resolutions to support 
graduating LDCs in their smooth transition. They are both linked, but the specific proposal for this 
item that we are  discussing today is on the threshold of USD  1,000 in 1990  constant dollar terms, 
while the graduation issue concerns a general support measure for LDCs. The LDC  Group would be 
happy to explain more to our colleagues from the EU. On the US question, the LD C Group tried to 
answer these questions at the previous meeting. The specific aim of this proposal is to  correct a 
technical omission and nothing else. The subsidy programmes are not the issue here.  
7.19.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of th e statements made.  
7.20.   The Council so agreed . 
8  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
8.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested t he Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
8.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
8.3.  According to Presidential Decree No. 23/19 , Angola introduced import restrictions on certain 
agricultural and industrial products. Under Article 1 of the decree , this measure establish es priority 
for domestically manufactured products and promotes consumption of goods produced in Angola.  
According to this decree, locally produced goods shall be given priority over like products; only 
wholesa lers and domestic producers are authorized to import; importers have to confirm the 
non-availability of locally produced products on the internal market that they intend to import; 
import authorization includes submission of contracts on the purchase of na tional products.  In the 
view of the Russian  Federation , the measure at issue cannot be justified under Articles  XI and III of 
the GATT.  Russia urges Angola to bring these measures into conformity with the WTO  Agreement 
and to lift the import bans on agricu ltural products.  As of today, Angola has failed to provide an G/C/M/138  
 
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  explanation as to how these measures are in consistency with WTO  rules. The Russian Federation  
urges Angola to engage with it bilaterally.  
8.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the follow ing: 
8.5.  The EU maintains its concern over Decree No. 23/19 , which seems to protect domestic 
industries in a manner that is incompatible with WTO  rules and that could be highly  detrimental to 
foreign investments in Angola.  The EU is supportive of Angola 's inte ntion to diversify its economy 
and to develop its domestic industry. Nonetheless, the EU  urges Angola to review the relevant 
measures to ensure their compliance with WTO  rules.  
8.6.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
8.7.  As expressed in this Council and in the C MA, the United States remains concerned that this 
decree appears aimed at restricting Angola 's imports.  Since the implementation of the decree, the 
US heard reports of confusion over how th e decree is being enforced and of delays facing goods at 
the border. The US  agricultural exporters are particularly concerned over delays that perishable 
goods face amidst all this uncertainty.  The US  urges Angola to revise this decree and ensure that its 
measures with respect to imports are in compliance with WTO  rules.  The US  also urge s the Angolan 
government to continue its work with the US  Embassy in Luanda in developing good regulatory 
practices and technical standards cooperation. Such work would help  the Angolan government 
develop policies and regulations that consider stakeholder concerns and address strategic policy 
goals, while avoiding disruptive trade policies such as this decree.  
8.8.  The representative  of Angola  indicated the following:  
8.9.  The Angolan delegation has been taking note of the recurring statements made by the Russia n 
Federation , the United States , Brazil, and the European Union, and other proponents  that claim that 
there are practices of import restrictions in Angola.  Angola reaffirms that the nature of the decree 
in question is not to exclude , and is being misinterpreted ; in fact, Angola still has neither the capacity 
nor the conditions to develop without imports. Angola  restate s that its intention is simply:  (i) to 
encourage traditional importers to explore and consult the domestic market before making their 
import decisio ns, without any obligation; and  (ii) to promote the consumption of domestic goods of 
certain products for which it already ha s the installed capacity to meet the demand with comparable 
quality.  
8.10.   As Angola  has been saying in its statements, bilateral dialogu e is the best way to resolve any 
controversial issue, reinforced by the fact that Angola and the proposing countries have excellent 
diplomatic, economic, and commercial relations.  On this basis, Angola  is glad to inform Members 
that yesterday in Luanda, bi lateral consultations were started with the Russia n Federation , the 
United States , and Brazil , and will continue with other diplomatic representations, of which Angola 
has the information that these interactions were fruitful and is convinced that it is on the right path.  
The consultations will continue,  and Angola asks  the proponents to understand that they do not need 
to reopen the discussions in the various committees.  
8.11.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
8.12.   The Brazilian delegation recalls its intervention made at the last CTG  meeting and supports 
maintaining of this item on the agenda.  
8.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
8.14.   The Council so agreed . 
9  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITI ON ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
9.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  9.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
9.3.  China would like to continue raising its concern regarding Australia 's prohibition on China 's 
equipment suppliers from the Australian 5G  rollout in a non -transparent and discriminative manner. 
China is deeply concerned that the sc ope of the measures has also been extended from the 5G to 
the 4G network. This issue has been on the agenda for over two years. China has engaged the 
Australian side under the WTO  framework. China  had provided three  lists of written questions to the 
Australian side , in September  2018, in April  2019, and in June  2020. Australia  did provide 
three  response s to the Chinese side, including one that we received just this morning. Regrettably , 
the replies either  did not substantively address most of China 's questions , or they raised new 
questions requiring further explanation and clarification from Australia.  In the meantime,  over the 
two years, Australia 's 5G "ban" on certain  Chinese vendors has been extended to cover also 4G. 
9.4.  Two years have passed, yet China's simple questions remain unanswered and its concerns  
remain unaddressed . China  believe s that the Australian measure violates GATT  Article  10 
"Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations ". China is  also concerned that the Australian 
measure s are inconsistent  with the MFN principle established  under the GATT and the 
TBT Agreement. China  could  go on with its list of questions. But in the interest s of time, it will stop 
here. Two years may not be long enough for breaking  the record  for the longest outstanding issue 
on the agenda  of the CTG , but for the high -tech industry, two years have resulted in devastating 
business consequences for both Chinese and Australian business es. China would like to reiterat e 
that excluding China 's equipment suppliers from Australian 5G  rollout and extending the relevant 
measures to the 4G network would not be helpful for the cybersecurity of Australia, nor for 
Australia 's economic interests.  China has been pragmatic in growi ng its business relations with all 
partners, including Australia, within the framework of the rule s-based multilateral  trading system. 
China  will wait patiently for the Australian side to respond to its questions and concerns in action.  
9.5.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
9.6.  Australia notes China 's latest statement in relation to Australia 's 5G security guidance.  Since 
China first raised this issue , in late  2018, Australia has engaged constructively and in good faith with 
China to explain in detail the rationale for its position on 5G  networks, including in relation to the 
protection of Australia 's national security.  Prior to this meeting, Australia again provided China with 
a substantive response to another detailed set of wri tten questions seeking further explanation and 
clarification of Australia 's position on 5G  networks.  As has now been clearly underscored on multiple 
occasions, Australia 's position on 5G  networks is country -agnostic, transparent, risk -based, 
non-discrimina tory, and fully WTO -consistent.  Finally, Australia notes the keen interest from many 
other WTO  Members on the issue of 5G  security as evinced by the participation of over 120  states 
at the recently held 2nd Prague 5G  Security Conference.  
9.7.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
9.8.  The Council so agreed . 
10  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
10.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of Australia had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
10.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
10.3.   Australia and China have enjoyed a strong bilateral partnership and trad ing relationship, built 
over many decades, that has delivered benefits to both sides. Australia is concerned by a series of 
trade disruptive and restrictive measures implemented by China on a range of Australian goods that 
appear inconsistent with its WTO  obligations and undermine the trade between our two  countries. 
Australia has raised some of these issues in the relevant WTO  committees, but the range of 
measures and impacted commodities has significantly increased in recent months.  
10.4.   Australia is a major e xporter of barley and wine, neither of which have previously been the 
subject of anti -dumping or countervailing duty action by other WTO  Members. China initiated G/C/M/138  
 
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  anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations on imports of barley from Australia in lat e 2018 
resulting in the imposition of anti -dumping and countervailing duties of 73.6 % and 6.9 %, 
respectively , in May  2020. Following the imposition of duties on barley, China initiated anti -dumping 
and countervailing duty investigations on imports of wine from Australia in August  2020.  
10.5.   Australia has always appreciated and welcomed the close relationship it has  with China in the 
trade remedy space as evidenced by the early establishment of a High -Level Dialogue on Trade 
Remedies.  Australia  hopes to continue this amicable and open dialogue. In addition to bilateral 
discussions on barley, Australia raised concerns at the recent WTO  Subsidies and Anti -Dumping 
Committees. At those meetings, Australia  identified key concerns with the procedures, analysis , and 
findings of these investigations into Australian barley, including significant procedural and due 
process deficiencies that impeded Australian exporters ' ability to defend their interests as provided 
for under WTO  rules.  
10.6.   Australia has had longstanding concerns  with the unreasonable delays in obtaining Chinese  
government approval for export establishments for Australian agricultural commodities (meat, dairy, 
and seafood) and new approvals of Australian seafood species. Over the course of 2020, Australia 's 
concer ns have been amplified with five  Australian meat establishments covering a significant share 
of Australian meat exports to China having been suspended from exporting to China. The Australian 
Government provided detailed critical investigation report findin gs within the required time -frames. 
However there has been a lack of timeliness and transparency by China with the General 
Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China (GACC) not providing a clear process 
for lifting the suspensions.  
10.7.   In addi tion, Australia  remain s concerned about the lack of reinstatement of three  Australian 
establishments who voluntarily suspended exports to China in July and September due to the 
detection of SARS -CoV-2 in onsite workers. These establishments acted in good faith and pursuant 
to the GACC 's commitment to trading partners that such establishments would have a clear and 
expedited pathway to lifting the suspension and reinstating trade following the resolution of 
COVID -19-related incidents. For other trading  partners, Australia is  aware that suspensions have 
been lifted for a number of establishments.  
10.8.   Australia received notifications in early November that GACC had detected non -compliant 
consignments of live rock lobster, which resulted in significantly highe r inspection and testing rates. 
The time required to complete the testing has made the trade in these time -sensitive products 
non-viable and substantial product s perished. As they were implemented without warning, exporters 
were unable to prepare shipments  in case of delayed clearance . Similarly, in late October, 
GACC  suspended all imports of timber logs from the state of Queensland, and subsequently the state 
of Victoria in early November, following notification of non -compliant consignments of Australian 
logs. 
10.9.   In addition to the imposition of AD and CVD  duties on Australian barley and the launch of 
investigations into Australian wine imports, GACC has recently suspended some Australian barley 
exporters due to non -compliant consignments and Australian indus try is reporting increased 
inspection and laboratory testing of imports of Australian wine, with industry reporting 100 % of 
consignments being subjected to inspection and testing by GACC. This is resulting in significant 
delays and additional costs, due to  the wine being detained until the test results are released after 
up to 15  working days. While Australia recogni zes the right of any country to inspect and test 
imported products to ensure their safety, we strongly advocate for any such requirements to be  
notified in advance, especially where it relates to highly perishable goods and the local port does not 
have a facility to store product s while awaiting test results.  
10.10.   Australia has treated these issues on their technical merits  and has  sought to address t hem 
bilaterally with relevant Chinese officials. Australia takes detections of non -compliant consignments 
seriously and initiates investigations into the cause of the non -compliance. However, to progress 
and resolve these issues there needs to be a willing ness by both sides to engage in a timely and 
responsive manner. It is worth noting that a number of these suspensions have been the result of 
non-compliant consignments that were detected in some cases months before the GACC  notice, 
without any prior notic e or warning. Australia  seeks assurances from China that it will implement 
changes to inspection and testing requirements; respond to the submission of non -compliance 
investigation reports; and action requests for new listings and reinstatement of establis hments in a 
timely, transparent, non -discriminatory, and predictable manner.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  10.11.   On coal, since early October  2020, there were reports from industry about disruptions to 
imports of Australian coal as a result of a Chinese government instruction to Chinese impo rters to 
stop purchases of Australian coal. This is in addition to reports of delays in the issuance of import 
licences, informal import quotas , and significant customs clearance delays reportedly due to 
congestion at Chinese ports. The number of vessels t ransporting Australian coal waiting for customs 
clearance at Chinese ports increased in October. According to industry analysts, at the beginning of 
November there were 75  vessels carrying around 8.7  million tonnes of Australian coal waiting for 
clearance at China 's northern ports, up from 56  vessels a month earlier. The clearance delays have 
resulted in welfare issues for crew aboard these vessels and significant costs to exporters and 
shipping lines.  
10.12.   On cotton, there have been recent widespread and consis tent reports, including a statement 
from the Australian cotton industry, that on 16  October the Chinese National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) told Chinese millers to stop or limit purchases and imports of Australian 
cotton. It is claimed that C hinese businesses that do not stop purchases and imports from Australia 
risk losing access to imports of cotton under existing or future cotton tariff -rate quotas (TRQs). This 
includes China 's WTO  cotton TRQ of 894,000  tonnes with an in -quota rate of 1 %. 
10.13.   International trade relies on certainty and predictability, as delivered through the 
WTO rules-based trading system. Recent developments have created uncertainty and increased risk 
for Australian exporters, and their Chinese customers.  China has consistently stated it is committed 
to open trade and the multilateral trading system. Australia  expect s all WTO  Members to conduct 
their trading relationship with Australia in a manner consistent with their WTO  obligations, and the 
market -oriented policie s that underpin WTO  membership. Allowing enterprises to make their own 
purchasing decisions is an important policy that should be observed by all WTO  Members.  
10.14.   Accordingly, Australia seeks assurances from China that Australian exports are not subject 
now an d will not be subject in the future to official instructions to stop or limit purchases and imports 
of Australian goods. Similarly, Australia would like China to provide reassurance that relevant import 
licences will be issued, including under existing and  future TRQs, and consignments will be cleared 
by relevant Chinese customs officials in a timely, transparent, non -discriminatory and predictable 
manner consistent with China 's WTO  obligations.  
10.15.   Australia has actively sought meetings to discuss these issues  and we remain open and 
willing to progress constructively any technical issues in our trade with China bilaterally, at all levels, 
in Geneva, in Beijing, and in Canberra, at the earliest opportunity.  
10.16.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
10.17.   China wo uld like to thank Australia for raising this issue and it could be useful if the Australian 
delegation could send the statement in writing. China always honours  its commitments and actively 
fulfils  its obligations under the WTO and the China -Australia Free  Trade Agreement. From 2015 to 
2020, China has, for six  consecutive years, lowered the import tariffs of the Australian products in 
line with the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement. At present, about 95% of imported goods from 
Australia enjoy zero  tariff treatment. China and Australia 's bilateral  economic  and trade relationship 
was indeed amicable and mutually beneficial, as pointed out by the Australian delegate just now.  
10.18.   Recently, some Australian products exported to China were found with problems in th e 
process of inspection and quarantine, and a few measures have been taken by China with a view to 
protecting the life and health of the Chinese people, which are consistent with Chinese laws, 
regulations and international practices, as well as the WTO  Agreements and the provisions of the 
China -Australia Free Trade Agreement. China has been very transparent on these measures. They 
have been published on the relevant Chinese government websites. China also notified Australia 
about the relevant measures witho ut delay.  China also has clear provisions regarding epidemic 
prevention and control at ports and quarantine requirements for sailors  and provided clear 
instructions and  convenience for the sailors involved while complying with these provisions . There 
are no oral instructions from government officials to limit the purchase of some Australian products.  
10.19.   With regard to some of the specific measures that Australia has mentioned, for example 
anti-dumping measures. First, anti -dumping measures are legitimate WTO tools for trade defence  
purposes. Second, China has been very restrained in using anti -dumping measures. As the record G/C/M/138  
 
- 23 - 
 
  shows, Australia has initiated 106  anti-dumping and countervailing investigations against China, 
more than 26  times the number of inv estigations initiated by China against Australia. Some of the 
measures have employed the problematic methodology  of "particular market situation ". As for other 
measures, China 's relevant government agencies, including the Customs, have responded  to the 
Australian side.  
10.20.   The Australian  delegate mentioned the market -oriented policies and a llowing enterprises to 
make their own decisions . China has always pursued  market -oriented policies . And market -oriented 
policies and a llowing enterprises to make their own decisions  should apply to all areas of our bilateral 
economic  and trade relations, including 5G  equipment. However certain Australian measures have 
just violated market principles, disrupted the sound momentum of pragmatic cooperation between 
the two  sides, harmed the interests of the two  peoples, and also damaged Australia 's own image 
and credibility in the WTO. China  hopes that Australia will do more to enhance the mutual trust and 
cooperation between China and Australia, support the companies from both s ides to restore 
confidence, and promote the sound development of China -Australia economic and trade relations.  
10.21.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
10.22.   The Council so agreed . 
11  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
11.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 12  November  2020, the 
European Union and Japan had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
11.2.   The delegate  of the European Union  indicated the f ollowing:  
11.3.   The EU closely follows the developments on China 's new Export Control Law, which passed 
the Standing Committee of China 's National People 's Congress on 17 October  2020 and would take 
effect on 1  December  2020. The EU asks for China 's indications about the scope and purpose of the 
new export control law.  In particular, the EU has three  major concerns . 
11.4.   First, e xtraterritorial application : The law contains a new provision with extraterritorial 
application determining consequences to foreign individua ls and organizations outside of China 
violating the law  and endangering the national security and interests of China (Article  44). Such 
provision is not in line with internationally agreed export controls. Second, r ules on deemed exports 
and re -exports : The law stipulates that controls also apply to transactions within China (that is, 
deemed exports,  Article  2). In this regard, the EU places great importance on the non-discriminatory 
treatment of EU  companies in China  (for example, of their Chine se subsidiaries). The EU is concerned 
that the concept of deemed exports, which goes beyond the internationally agreed controls, might 
lead to an unequal treatment  and have adverse effects on the activities of EU  companies in China  
(for example, research and development activities). Furthermore, the law foresees controls on 
re-exports. It is unclear whether the obligation not to re -export items without the prior consent of 
the Chinese authorities also applies to foreign products that contain controlled item s obtained from 
China as components . Third, o bjectives and scope of controls : The law names "national security and 
interests " as a prime objective, next to "non-proliferation and other international obligations ". Even 
though the law does not reference "development interests ", "industrial competence " or 
"technological development " anymore as control principles, the EU is concerned that Article  1 
"national security and interests ", as well as Article  3, "national security and development " contain 
vague language still reflecting objectives other than the international security obligations and 
commitments . 
11.5.   The EU recalls that export controls should be exercised on the basis of specific control 
objectives in line with international commitment s only. The EU would therefore welcome a 
clarification in this regard as well as on the intended application and specification of other related 
provisions that could lead to legal uncertainty  for economic operators, for example, on: application 
of control parameters ( "national security ", Articles  1, 3, 13; "terrorist purposes ", Article  12); scope 
of controls ( "temporary controls ", Article  9); understanding of exporters ' obligations in these regards 
("is or should be aware ", Article  12); scope of investigati ons by the authorities (in case of "suspected 
violations ", Article  28), and information restrictions (prohibited for reasons of national security, G/C/M/138  
 
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  Article  32). The EU places great importance on any secondary legislation and would welcome 
clarifications and  specifications on the application of such provisions.  
11.6.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
11.7.   Japan certainly refers to its previous statements and continues to have concerns over China 's 
Export Control Law enacted this October. Japan believes that  this law may constitute an overly 
stringent export regulation that goes beyond the scope of the international export control regime. 
Especially, Japan would like to mention that it is also concerned that the provisions on 
countermeasures for discriminator y export regulation s by other countries are maintained in the law  
and considers that they should be removed. Japan remains concerned regarding the "Unreliable 
Entities List " and what also concerns it is the catalogue of technologies subject to export bans and 
restrictions based on Foreign Trade Law. The relationship of the list and catalogue is unclear to us.  
11.8.   Japan requests China to ensure transparency and predictability by promptly publishing the 
detailed regulations that will be drafted before the Export Control Law comes into force in December. 
Japan will continue to monitor further development s, especially the detailed regulations that will be 
put in place and their actual implementation. In this c onnection, Japan  would like to request China 
to provide information on detailed regulations and their timeline with a sufficient grace period and  
full transparency.  
11.9.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
11.10.   For this issue, China has provided specific explanations in the previous meetings and today 
share s some updated information . China 's "Export Control Law " has been passed by the National 
People 's Congress Standing Committee  and would go into effect on 1 December  2020. The law on 
export control is bas ed on  Chinese previous enforcement experience of six  separate export control 
regulations established since the 1990s , and relevant international practices, including mirroring the 
relevant laws of other WTO  Members , especially developed Members . At present, China is speeding 
up the formulation of supporting regulations and control lists of the "Export Control Law " to ensure 
that the "Export Control Law " will be well implemented.  China 's "Export Control Law " is carefully 
drafted in order to impleme nt necessary trade management on limited, sensitive , and specific items, 
rather than to cause any restrictions on trade in normal goods. It will also help China to better fulfil 
its international obligations and conform to the interests of all parties.  China will continue to learn 
from the experience and practices of WTO  Members in export control, strengthen ing international 
cooperation and exchanges, and jointly fulfilling international obligations  such as non -proliferation.  
11.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
11.12.   The Council so agreed . 
12  CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STATES  
12.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
12.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
12.3.   The United States again reiterates its concerns, as expressed previously in this Council and 
in many other WTO  bodie s, regarding the negative trade and environmental impacts resulting from 
China 's import ban, and accompanying measures, on certain recovered materials.  In April  2020, 
China approved a revised Law on Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Soli d Wastes.  
The United States is very concerned with the overly broad scope of "solid waste ", as it appears in 
the revised Law, which effectively results in an import ban on certain plastic and paper scrap, which 
are recyclable materials. Recyclable material s are saleable commodities, not trash, and should not 
be subject to a framework designed for waste. The law allows for the import of "recycled raw 
materials " such as copper, aluminium, and brass as long as those materials meet strict purity 
standards. The United States would like China to explain the scientific bases that it has used to 
determine which categories of scrap materials it will allow to be imported.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  12.4.   The United States is also concerned with what appear to be different requirements for foreign 
and domestic commodities. These  abrupt  restrictions and bans have left recyclers without viable 
alternative processing capacity  and the global shortfall in processing capacity has also caused the 
decline, and in some cases, collapse, in prices for some recycl able materials.  Additionally, these 
policy measures seem to be contrary to China 's own pro -circular economy narrative that it is 
promoting in the WTO as well as internationally. As the world 's largest processor of scrap materials, 
these measures hinder Chi na's aspirations to transition to a more resource efficient, global, circular 
economy by directly impacting global recycling networks.  
12.5.   Further,  the United States is  concerned that these policies are a detriment to its shared 
environment and may result in a n increased volume of scrap materials going into landfills or other 
less desirable waste channels and becoming marine litter. The United States  reiterate s its request 
that China immediately halt implementation of its ban and revise the relevant measures in  a manner 
consistent with existing international standards for trade in scrap materials, which provide a global 
framework for transparent and environmentally sound trade in recycled commodities.  
12.6.   The delegate  of Canada  indicated the following:  
12.7.   Canada contin ues to share the concerns of the United States and would like to reiterate its 
comments on China 's restrictions with respect to solid waste from past C TG meetings . Canada does 
not wish to dispute China 's goal of limiting harmful environmental impacts resulting from 
contaminated waste material.  However, Canada notes that high quality scrap products are a valuable 
raw material for Chinese customers involved in various manufacturing sectors and a key compon ent 
of a strong circular economy which ultimately helps to reduce waste.  
12.8.   The delegate  of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
12.9.   New Zealand acknowledges and supports the right of all WTO  Members to regulate to achieve 
legitimate domestic health and environme ntal objectives. New Zealand applauds China 's stated 
proactive policy objectives in relation to sustainable development and encourages valid actions to 
limit harmful environmental impacts from contaminated waste inside its borders.  New Zealand in no 
way se eks to question China 's right to regulate to protect its environment. However, New Zealand 
remains concerned that vanadium slag is included in China 's catalogue of banned imports under this 
measure. New Zealand reiterates its view that vanadium slag is a p urposefully produced co -product 
with a specific end -use in production of specific forms of steel. It is not a waste product, and so 
should not fall under measures for solid waste. New Zealand recalls that China itself is the largest 
global producer of vana dium slag, with approximately 500,000  tonnes in annual production 
generated as a co -product from steel mills.  
12.10.   New Zealand would appreciate clarification on how China has ensured that the rules that 
apply to foreign products are no less favourable than thos e accorded to domestic products. New 
Zealand would be interested also to hear a further explanation from China on how it has ensured 
that the import ban on vanadium slag is not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve China 's 
environmental and heal th protection objectives. New Zealand thanks China for the recent discussion 
on this issue and looks forward to further constructive engagement on this topic to better understand 
China 's approach to distinguishing between waste and non -waste materials.  
12.11.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
12.12.   China reiterates that the solid waste is different from other normal goods. The solid waste 
itself and the process of the solid waste could cause environment al pollution and be harmful to  
human s, animals and p lants. China, as a developing country, has suffered from the pollution of solid 
wastes imported from other countries for decades. It is imperative for China to implement measures 
to limit the negative effect from importing and processing solid waste.  From the worldwide 
perspective, the danger of solid waste has been realized and acknowledged by almost all countries. 
According to the Basel Convention and internationally accepted principles, every country has the 
obligation to properly handle and dispose of its domestically produced solid wastes.  
12.13.   It is not the import restrictions that are detrimental to the environment, but the solid waste 
itself. The exporting countries should actively shoulder their international responsibilities to handle 
and dispose of their own solid waste , rather than deriving benefit at the cost of other countries ' G/C/M/138  
 
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  environment and human health. Regarding transparency, China has taken full consideration of all 
factors , including its obligations under the WTO , during the adjustment process of relevant policies 
and has notified the relevant measures to the WTO.  
12.14.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
12.15.   The Council so agreed . 
13  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
13.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
13.2.   The delegate of  Japan  indicated the followin g: 
13.3.   Japan simply  registers its continued concerns and will closely monitor future developments.  
13.4.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.5.   The European Union continues to have concerns about Chinese duties on multi -component 
semiconductors (MCOs) raised on numerous occasions in the past, including at the last Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) Committee on  30 October  2020.  The European Union welcomes the 
positive step taken by China to adequately classify certain products (Intelligent Power Module) in 
their schedule , free of duty. However, the European Union still expects China to step up the 
implementation of its commitments and urges China to reconsider the classification on other 
MCO products where duties should not appl y, even if such duties are being gradually lowered as the 
implementation of the staged cuts progresses.  
13.6.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
13.7.   The United States support s the statements raised by the European Union , Japan, and Chinese 
Taipei and reiterates  its concern with regard to a change in China 's applied duty rates for certain 
semiconductor products. This is an issue that the United States has  previously raised in the C TG as 
well as the CMA and the I TA. These semiconductor products have been duty -free for over a decade 
yet are being charged import duties at the border. The United States  continue s to assert, in line with 
the General Council Decision on HS  transpositions, that the scope of China 's concessions have 
changed substantially , and the value of the concession has been impaired.  
13.8.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
13.9.   Chinese Taipei fully supports the statements made by the European Union and Japan and shares 
the concerns that they raise. Chinese Taipei has expressed its views on this agenda item on 
numerous occasions already, most recently at the C MA. Just to reiterate, Chinese Taipei strongly 
holds the view that the scope of Members ' tariff concessions under the WTO  commitment s should 
not be altered during their tariff transpositions. It is regrettable that many tariff lines under the 
HS heading  8542, which were previously bound as duty -free, have been made subject to duty rates 
in China 's HS2017  schedule. It should not be possible for a purely technical pro cess of tariff 
transposition to result in undermining the level of concessions that Members have committed to 
previously. Chinese Taipei strongly urges China to reconsider its approach and eliminate the duty on 
those products at issue without further delay . 
13.10.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
13.11.   China has responded on many occasions and reiterates that it used the methodology 
consistent with WTO  rules. China also clarified relevant technical questions , including the 
reclassification both bilaterally  and in the meetings. China has always seriously undertaken its tariff 
reduction commitments. All the duties on MCO  products will be eliminated by next July as scheduled.  
13.12.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  13.13.   The Counc il so agreed . 
14  EGYPT – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS FOR SUGAR – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
14.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue  on the agenda.  
14.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
14.3.   On 4 June 2020, Egypt implemented a three -month prohibition on the import of sugar. In 
September, however, this import prohibition was extended for a further three  months. In the 
Committee on Agriculture on 28  July 2020, the EU asked Egypt to explain how it sees this measure 
respecting the require ments of GATT  Article  XI:2(c). To date, Egypt has not provided a reply.  
14.4.   Moreover, in the WTO  Committee on Import Licensing on 9  October  2020, the EU asked Egypt 
to submit all the relevant information which could justify the import prohibitions applied to r aw and 
white sugar. Again, to date, no information has been received.  The EU would insist on receiving 
replies from Egypt regarding its questions about these restrictions on the imports of raw and white 
sugar. The EU considers that these import restriction s are not in line with Egypt 's WTO obligations 
and urges Egypt to rapidly eliminate these trade -distorting measures.  
14.5.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
14.6.   The Egyptian government 's decision to impose restrictions on sugar imports are of concern t o 
Brazil from an economic  and commercial point of view, given the importance of sugar exports in the 
export basket of Brazil, as well as from a systemic point of view, given the prohibition under Article  4 
of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) to impose qu antitative restrictions on imports of agricultural 
products. It is of utmost importance, as a way of guaranteeing the stability of the agricultural trading  
system and to strengthen its resilience and robustness, that Members of the WTO, as established in 
the above -mentioned article of the AoA, limit themselves to applying tariffs to trade in food and 
agricultural products. In this context, Brazil requests Egypt to eliminate its current import ban on 
sugar.  
14.7.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
14.8.   Egypt  thanks the EU and Brazil for raising this issue and would like to clarify the following.  
Due to the sharp decline in sugar prices by almost 30% since the beginning of the year 2020, the 
Egyptian inventory of sugar increased creating a temporary surplus.  Hence, it was necessary to 
impose this import restriction to address this problem of the temporary surplus in accordance with 
GATT  Article  XI:2(c)(ii). Egypt would like to confirm that this import restriction measure is tempor ary 
in nature and is regularly reviewed.  
14.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.10.   The Council so agreed . 
15  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
15.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation s of the European Union and the Russian Federation, respectively, had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
15.2.   The delegate of the Russian Fede ration  indicated the following:  
15.3.   Russia remains concerned with the Egyptian registration procedures under Decree 
No. 43/2016 and reiterates the statements made during the previous meetings of the 
TBT Committee and the C TG. Russian exporter s of steel reinforcement bars have been subject to 
the registration process since 2016. The damage to the Russian steel industry has been estimated 
at USD 100 million per year.  On different occasions, Egyptian officials have informed our delegation 
that Rus sian steel exporter s would soon be registered to access the Egyptian market.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  15.4.   In addition, Russia has  other companies that cannot pass this registration, in particular those 
involved in manufacturing and export of confectionary and cosmetics. The scope of p roducts subject 
to this measure expands.  Russia r equest s the delegation of Egypt to provide the Russian companies 
with market access, taking into account the interests of local importers and consumers as well as 
the relevant rules of the WTO , and urges Egypt to bring its measures into conformity with WTO  rules.  
15.5.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
15.6.   The EU would like to reiterate its concerns with regard to the registration of companies 
exporting to Egypt under Decrees No.  991/2015, No.  43/2016 , and No.  44/2019 , as a number of 
registrations are still pending , creating unnecessary burden and administrative costs.  Some of the 
pending registration cases known to the EU have still not been processed due to expired quality 
certificates. Such certificates have a validity of one year, which means that they expired due to the 
failure of the relevant authorities implementing Decree No. 43/2016 to register the companies within 
reasonable time -limits.  Could Egypt confirm that companies , which will submit updated quality 
control system certificates and complete in this way their application documents, will be registered 
without any further delay and without the need ing to  restart the entire application process?  
15.7.   Also, the EU finds it very worrisome that some sectors (like ceramic tiles) have been 
disproportionately affected by the discretionary application of Decree No. 43/2016 , with practically 
no registrations taking place since the introduction of the decree in 2016. Structural  problems related 
to Decree No. 43/2016, like the lack of transparency of the registration process, the lack of clear 
deadlines for processing requests , and the lack of a clear appeal procedure, still persist. The EU  
therefore again urges Egypt to suspend or further  substantially improve the registration process with 
the objective of removing unnecessary obstacles to trade.  The EU is ready to work with the relevant 
Committee to finalize the registrations of pending applications and to work on solutions which would 
prevent delays of future registrations.  
15.8.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
15.9.   Turkey  joins the European Union and the Russian Federation in emphasizing its ongoing 
concerns regarding  Egypt 's Decree on its Manufacturer Registration System. For a long time, 
Members, including Turkey, have been voicing their concerns about this decree and its 
implementation not only in previous meetings of this Council but also at the meetings of the 
TBT Committee . Despite of all the concerns and questi ons from the membership in all these 
meetings, Egypt still maintains the system, and has even increased its coverage, provides  little 
information , and avoids answering essential questions. Even after four years, it is still unclear how 
the applications are  evaluated and whether the completion of the process is subject to any 
time-limits. Apparently, there are no clear deadlines for processing the requests. In addition, no 
notification is made to companies on the status of their application, and whether  or not it is approved. 
Unsurprisingly , companies face long delays and bear additional costs in the registration process. As 
a result, more than a hundred Turkish firms , and maybe thousands globally , are still await ing 
approval.  
15.10.   Recently, at the TBT  meeting las t month, Egypt emphasized that the purpose of the 
registration system was solely to enhance market surveillance and prevent deceptive practices, and 
in this spirit the decree had not made  the registration time -bound. Instead, Egypt indicated that 
registrat ion remained valid as long as the documents presented by companies were valid.  However, 
Turkey  would like to remind Egypt that some of those companies had been waiting for approval since 
the introduction of the decree in 2016. Although the list of these co mpanies has been submitted to 
the Egyptian side on various occasions, Turkey has not received any feedback. As such, some of 
these companies are now unfairly expected to reapply, starting from the very first  step in the 
registration process. In sum, structural  problems related to Decree  No. 43/2016 continue. In the 
context of such a picture, Turkey  would like to indicate that this system needs  wholesale 
amelioration.  
15.11.   In conclusion,  Turkey  would kindly ask  Egypt to review its measures considering its 
obligations under the WTO  Agreements and ensure their implementation in full transparency.  Turkey  
believe s that this hindrance will be overcome  given the continued dialogue among our countries . 
And Turkey stands ready to engage with Egypt on all trade -related measures.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  15.12.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
15.13.   Korea appreciates the Russian Federation for bringing forward this agenda item, regarding 
which Korea reiterate s its previous position. The measures taken by Egypt constitute a non -tariff 
barrier and undermine the free trade system. In particular , the registration procedure s stipulated 
under Decree No. 43/2016 , which require the issuance  of certificates of conformity, certifications of 
inspection , and so on, are resulting in serious delays for foreign manufacturer s of specific products.  
Korea urges Egypt to take appropriate measures in line with the WTO  rules by improving its 
trade -restrictive policies and practices.  
15.14.   Th delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
15.15.   Egypt thanks the EU and the Russian Federation for their continued interest in this issue; it 
also thanks the delegations of Turkey and  the Republic of  Korea for their intervention s. Egypt takes  
note of all the concerns raised by its trading partners and will convey them to Capital for 
consideration.  
15.16.   Egypt would like to refer to its statements at previous CTG and TBT  meetings and reiterates 
that the Egyptian competent authorities ha ve taken steps to facilitate the registration process and 
to improve its transparency , for example, and in response to the comments made by our trading 
partners at the most recent TBT meetings, the Egyptian General Organization for Export and Import 
Control has begun  to make the names of the companies having problems with their registration 
status available on the organization 's website , in English.  
15.17.   Egypt  understand s the concerns raised by some of its trading partners regarding the delay 
in the process  of registration, especially that the COVID -19 pandemic -related measures are still 
affecting negatively the pace of work and the coordination between different governmental entities 
involved in the process. Egypt  will continue to take steps to improve the registration process and to 
work closely with its trading partners to resolve the issue of pending registration requests.  
15.18.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
15.19.   The Council so agreed . 
16  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJU STMENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM ARMENIA, CHINA, KAZAKHSTAN, 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
16.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation s of Armenia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian Federation, 
respectively, had requested  the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
16.2.   The delegate of the  Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
16.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates the statements made during previous meetings of the CMA 
and the CTG on the plans of the European Union to introduce the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism  (CBAM)  in accordance with the European Green Deal strategy publishe d in 
December  2019.  Russia appreciates the intentions of the European Union to protect the environment 
and to reach economic neutrality ; however , Russia is  convinced that the climate agenda should not 
be used as a pretext for introducing new trade restrict ions and protectionist measures in a 
trade -restrictive and discriminative manner. These requirements are set both in Article  XX of the 
GATT  1994 and part  5 of Article  1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
16.4.   Russia  highlights that, in accordance with paragraph  2 of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement , 
the parties to the agreement should act in a manner that reflects "equity and principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities, in light of different nation al 
circumstances ". Hence, the parties must take into account the efforts of other parties to mitigate 
the consequences of climate change, but not to impose their terms, technology purchases , and 
principles of regulation.  In Russia 's view, the proposed mech anism also has the potential to cause a 
negative impact on global trade and to distort global value chains. In particular, the current proposals 
of the potential CBAM raise concerns regarding their consistency with Article  II of the GATT as they G/C/M/138  
 
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  entail an additional duty to be paid on importation of the products to the EU in excess of those set 
out in the EU 's Schedule of concessions. Alternatively, the additional  duty to be paid would constitute 
an internal tax applied to t he imported products in excess of those applied to domestic products.  
The relevant requirements and regulations would also afford protection to domestic products. Thus, 
the CBAM would constitute a measure inconsistent with Article III of the GATT. In any case, the 
CBAM seems to be inconsistent with Article I of the GATT as it entails application of differential 
duty/tax on the like products originating from different WTO  Members.  
16.5.   Finally, Russia  highlight s that the European Union has stated on different occ asions that the 
draft measure is being developed by July  2021. The EU conducted an initial impact assessment and 
public consultations; however, these procedures did not provide even the preliminary form of the 
proposed CBAM. Russia believe s that climate me asures should strike the right balance between the 
declared objectives to protect the environment and the EU 's commitments under the 
WTO Agreement when developing the CBAM.  Russia reiterate s its request to the European Union to 
provide information on the m easure and its consistency with WTO  law and looks forward to further 
consultations with the European Union.  
16.6.   The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
16.7.   The Republic of Kazakhstan urges the EU to fully consider the compatibility of its CBAM with 
WTO rules and regulations so that any such measure does not create obstacles to trade.  The Republic 
of Kazakhstan also encourages the EU to act transparently and notify the WTO in advance of the 
draft measure to allow a reasonable time-period for WTO  Members to comment on the draft.  
16.8.   The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following : 
16.9.   The issue of the CBAM of the European Union was raised more than once in different 
WTO bodies. A number of Members expressed their views and positions during the latest meeting of 
the CMA , on 12  November. The Kyrgyz Republic commends the efforts of WTO  Members in 
establishing and achieving the aim of a sustainable ecological environment. The issues related to 
ecology and the environment are important for all Members of the WTO. At the same time, the 
Kyrgyz Republic believes that all actions and measures taken to achieve the above -mentioned 
mission should not affect the interests of other Members and should be implemented and maintained 
in full compliance with WTO  rules and norms.  
16.10.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
16.11.   China would like to register its concern regarding the EU 's plan to propose a C BAM. The 
policy options indicated in this mechanism, such as import carbon tax or additional import duties, 
risk to be inconsistent with WTO  rules, to create additional trade obstacles , and to disrupt 
intern ational trade flows.  China  encourage s the EU to ensure transparency by providing timely 
progress updates of the relevant legislation, the design of the measures under this mechanism , and 
the sectors and products covered by this mechanism . China shares the climate ambition of the EU 
and other WTO  Members. However, all actions achieving that ambition should be in conformity with 
WTO rules and should not create unnecessary barriers to trade. China  encourage s the EU to fully 
consider the compatibilit y of the mechanism with its WTO  commitments.  
16.12.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
16.13.   Indonesia would like to thank proponents for maintaining this agenda item at this 
CTG meeting and register its interest. While Indonesia is studying the EU 's CBAM as part of the 
European Union 's green policies, Indonesia kindly requests the EU to engage with all Members in a 
transparent manner to provide more detailed information on the issue in order for Members to have 
a better understanding  of it. For the time  being, Indonesia will closely monitor the development of 
the issue and looks forward to having that discussion with the EU.  
16.14.   The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
16.15.   Armenia would also like to share the concerns already expressed by its colleagues from the 
delegation of the Russian Federation regarding the EU CBAM initiative. This is an important and G/C/M/138  
 
- 31 - 
 
  sensitive issue for a number of Members and Armenia will be carefully monitoring further 
developments in this respect.  
16.16.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicate d the following:  
16.17.   Nigeria wishes to thank the Russian Federation and other Members for placing this issue on 
the agenda. As with some Members, Nigeria has been following the issue of the proposed EU  CBAM 
under the European Green Deal with keen interest given its likely implications for the 
competitiveness of our exports in the EU  market. Nigeria believes the negative effects of climate 
change are unambiguous. Nigeria is  committed to fulfilling its obligati ons under the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change ratified in March  2017. Consequently, Nigeria is  of the view that the EU goal of 
achieving climate neutrality by 2050 is commendable. However, it is of critical importance that 
policies and regulations that w ill underpin the attainment of climate neutrality by the EU do not 
constitute disguised restrictions to trade or are designed to undermine the competitiveness of foreign 
products. The delegation of the Russia n Federation  has raised some pertinent questions  and Nigeria 
calls on the EU to respond as well as shed light on this issue to enable Members  to gain greater 
insight into the proposed EU  CBAM. 
16.18.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
16.19.   Bahrain would like to recall its statement made  at the previous CMA and echo similar 
concerns to those raised by other Members. Bahrain thanks the EU for information provided at the 
previous CMA and looks forward to a more detailed clarification on the application and consistency 
of the C BAM. 
16.20.   The deleg ate of Qatar  indicated the following:  
16.21.   Qatar would like to thank Armenia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian 
Federation, for bringing this issue to the CTG. This issue was also raised during the Market Access 
Committee and Qatar would like to mention some of the points that it made there. At the outset, 
Qatar has taken note of the European Union 's Green Deal and its ambition to become the first 
climate -neutral continent by 2050. Qatar compliments the EU for its political courage in setting t hese 
objectives. Similar to the EU, Qatar has also signed and ratified the Paris Agreement and is equally 
ambitious in its climate change objectives. However, Qatar feels obliged to express some 
trade -related concerns regarding the introduction of a CBAM t o address so -called carbon leakage. 
Qatar would like to seek clarification from the EU on how the CBAM would be able to be applied 
compatibly with fundamental principles, including the most -favoured -nation treatment principle, and 
the principle of national  treatment. Qatar is aware of the view that treating like products differently 
based on the carbon content of the production process would seem to go against decades of 
well-considered jurisprudence. Qatar takes this opportunity to thank the EU and looks f orward to 
having a closer and fruitful discussion on this matter.  
16.22.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
16.23.   Korea shares  the concerns over this issue as expressed by the previous speakers.  Korea  
understands the purpose of this new mechanism for climate change. However, the C BAM should be 
designed in a fair manner, focused on achieving environmental outcomes. In particular, the 
mechanism should respect the basic WTO  principles such as National Treatment and MFN or present 
clear reaso ns to justify its exceptional nature. For instance, the cost imposed to exporting companies 
or importers should not exceed that of companies in the EU. If the mechanism goes beyond the 
basic WTO  rules, it should prove that it meets the requirements stipula ted in GATT  Article  XX. Korea 
is closely monitoring the development of the mechanism and looks forward to engaging with the E U 
as it develops this proposal.  
16.24.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
16.25.   As the EU explained in previous meetings, the Europ ean Green Deal includes the goal of 
enshrining the long -term objective of climate neutrality and increasing the EU 's climate ambition to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Turkey believes that all members of the international community 
should, in fact, play their part to combat climate change taking into account the historical 
responsibilities for greenhouse gases. Turkey also underlines that this must be in accordance with G/C/M/138  
 
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  the common but differentiated responsibilities, as indicated in the scope of the Unite d Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In this respect, Turkey would like the EU to 
take into account this principle in their preparation of the C BAM along with the fact that not all 
members of the international community can have the s ame level of ambition because of their 
different capabilities and levels of industrialization.  
16.26.   On the other hand, the international climate change regime acknowledges that mitigation 
measures can affect the social and economic development of countries. The  UNFCCC affirms that 
responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an 
integrated manner with a view to avoiding the adverse impact of response measures. Turkey 's 
detailed comments have already been conveyed to th e EU within the framework of the inception 
impact assessment and Turkey hopes that they will be duly taken into account in the ensuing 
process. Turkey  also believe s that the EU  Commission should give all interested parties sufficient 
time to make necessary adjustments once it declares details of its methodology, on how the carbon 
content of imported  goods will be measured, calculated , and verified by the EU. All countries will 
need time and detailed information in order to analyze and adjust to the EU 's proposal. Last but not 
least, the EU 's future border carbon adjustment has to be fully aligned with GATT rules and 
principles, and not applied in an arbitrary manner or a manner th at constitute s unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.  
16.27.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
16.28.   Brazil is carefully monitoring the proposal for the establishment of a CBAM. The proposal 
mentions some possible alternatives for its implementation, such as: a fee charged on products 
imported; an Emission Trading System ( ETS) extension for imports, purchase requirement of 
emission allowances by foreign producers or importers; an obligation purchase of emission 
allowances, for imports, outside ETS, subject to the same prices as ETS; or a consumption tax, which 
would also be levied on European products.  The CBAM 's proposal also mentions that the calculation 
of the carbon content could be based on different methods, wh ich include benchmark s by product 
with free allocation in the ETS; global or specific benchmarks by country, with an estimate for direct 
emissions, indirect or both; estimation of emissions over the production chain in different countries; 
or use of the European "Product Environment Footprint " method, possibly adapted. It also mentions 
the possibility that CBAM will provide a "rebate " for European exporters.  There are currently several 
methodologies to quantify the so -called carbon footprint of products. Th ere is thus a high degree of 
heterogeneity between these regulations, as well as a high degree of uncertainty.  Hence the exact 
contours of the CBAM are still unclear , and Brazil expects that once specific elements of the CBAM 
have been defined, opportunity  for more direct dialogue between the competent authorities will be 
granted . 
16.29.   It should be remembered that, since 2013, the European Commission has been introducing 
specific regulations to deal with the risks of carbon leakage under its emissions trading sc heme 
(EU-ETS). Industrial facilities considered by the bloc as threatened with the transfer of operations 
to other countries ( "leakage ") receive privileged treatment to maintain their competitiveness, 
production , and jobs in Europe. In May  2019, the Commission published a new list for ETS, effective 
until 2030, which includes, among other sectors, mining, paper and cellulose production, sugar 
production, textile and leather manufactures, among others (Decision  No. 2019/708 of 
15 February  2019, which supplements the Directive  No. 2003/87/EC). As there is, so far, no sign of 
how this policy would be affected by 2030, with the introduction of the CBAM, attention should be 
paid to possible violation s of current rules.  In the absence of clarity about the methodology to be 
used, there are glimpses of risks related to the establishment of carbon quantification standards 
based on industry performance benchmarks from the EU, which may constitute undue privileges, 
disregardin g the reality of production in other countries.  
16.30.   Finally, it will be essential for the CBAM to be fully compatible with the rules of the WTO, 
including the principle of most favo ured nation and national treatment and other relevant aspects, 
in order to avoi d any protectionist bias or the adoption of discriminatory measures.  
16.31.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
16.32.   Chinese Taipei would like to thank the proponents for placing this item on the agenda and 
wishes to register its interest in this s ubject. Chinese Taipei sees the EU 's Green Deal programme G/C/M/138  
 
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  with its aim to become the world 's first climate -neutral continent as a leadership landmark in the 
international fight against climate  change and commends the EU on its efforts in pursuit of this 
ambitious goal. Having said this, Chinese Taipei  has the following comments and requests . First, the 
proposed CBAM  is designed to tackle the risk of carbon leakage from imported goods with higher 
carbon content. It plans to impose an additional border tax on  selected carbon -intensive products. 
Chinese Taipei is keen to understand exactly how and when the mechanism will be carried out. 
Second, w hile the proposed measure seems to preserve the competitiveness of the EU 's own 
domestic industry, how will the EU en sure that the mechanism is fair and transparent, that it will 
not be in breach of relevant WTO  rules, including the non -discrimination requirement under the 
GATT, and that it will not constitute a barrier to the trade of other Members? Third, according to 
Chinese Taipei 's understanding, the EU is currently undertaking an impact assessment as well as a 
study of the legal feasibility of the mechanism in light of WTO  rules. Chinese Taipei will be interested 
to have an update from the EU in due course.  
16.33.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
16.34.   Paraguay  would like to thank the delegations of Armenia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic,  and the Russian Federation for including these items on today 's agenda and express its 
interest in the subject. As Paraguay  also raised this item in the recent Market Access Committee 
meeting , and in the interest s of time, Paraguay will limit itself  to thanking the European Union for 
the responses received bilaterally to some of its queries  and hope s the EU  can provide specific details 
and greater clarity as soon as possible, including the possibility for partners to use the carbon credit 
facility.  Paraguay  will closely follow the development of this policy and await s the final confirmation 
of how to use this approach with agriculture once the impact assessments have been completed.  
16.35.   Th delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
16.36.   Egypt  thanks the sponsors of this agenda item, and the EU for the information provided in 
other WTO  bodies in recent  meetings. Egypt shares the concerns raised today by many Members 
regarding the EU  proposed C BAM. Egypt understands that the EU stated in different WTO  bodies 
that the proposed mechanism will be consistent with its international commitments , including 
WTO rules, and is looking forward to learning more of the details in this regard in the near future. 
Egypt would also like to ensure that such measure s would not have a negative impact on 
international trade , and especially on the market access opportunities f or developing countries and 
LDCs to the EU  market. Egypt fully understand s the need to adopt policies which contribute positively 
to environmental sustainability, but it is important as well to take into consideration the need s of 
developing countries and LDCs for transfer of technologies, capacity building, investments , and 
reasonable transitional periods in order to enable them to deal with the challenges of adjusting their 
production activities in the medium and long term.  
16.37.   The delegate of Japan  indicated  the following:  
16.38.   Japan also pays close attention to environmental measures, including measures for climate 
change taken by other Members , especially in relation to their impact on trade and on the rights and 
obligations of WTO  Members.  Japan would like to r equest  that the EU continue to update it on future 
developments concerning the C BAM in a transparent manner.  
16.39.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
16.40.   Pakistan thanks Russia and other Members for their statements on this issue and has taken 
note of all the statements made. Pakistan is also concerned about these developments and remains 
keenly interested in this issue. Pakistan will continue to follow further developments under this 
agenda item.  
16.41.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
16.42.   India would also like to thank the delegations of Armenia , China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and the Russian Federation for raising this important issue. In this context, India will 
request the delegation of European Union to share the specific details of  the C BAM, as envisaged in 
the EU Green Deal. India believes that a thorough legal analysis will be required to examine whether 
the C BAM is in conformity with the relevant WTO  rules. India would also like to state that any such G/C/M/138  
 
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  deal must take into consider ation the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities of different countries, in light of different national circumstances. India 
believes that there may be possible WTO  non-compliance issues relating to this Mechani sm that will 
require further deliberation.  
16.43.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.44.   Canada and the European Union have a long -standing history of fruitful cooperation on the 
environment and climate change. Like the EU, Canada is committed to ambitio us action and global 
leadership on climate change. Canada is watching recent developments, such as the EU 's work on a 
new Carbon Border Adjustment Measure, with great interest and intend s to be active participants in 
international discussions on these issu es. In this context, Canada would encourage the EU to develop 
its CBAM as transparently as possible and use appropriate WTO  committee meetings as opportunities 
to keep the broader WTO  Membership apprised of developments. Canada anticipates that the design 
of a CBAM will account for the carbon pricing policies and climate measures of partner countries. 
Canada also anticipates that the EU will ensure that any mechanism it puts in place will respect trade 
obligations.  Canada understands that the public consult ations on the CBAM  proposal  closed on 
28 October  2020. Canada would also welcome opportunities for meaningful engagement with 
EU officials throughout the CBAM  development process.  
16.45.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
16.46.   Argentina wishes to thank the proponents for including this item, which is a cause for growing 
concern among Members. Serious doubts have been raised regarding whether a mechanism of this 
nature is consistent with WTO  rules and, in particular, with the provisions of GATT  1994. All Members 
have a duty to combat climate change. The actions that they undertake, and the instruments that 
they use, must be in compliance with international commitments. They must neither be more trade 
restrictive than necessary to fulfil legitimate go als, nor constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade.  
16.47.   Against this backdrop, Argentina notes with concern the EU 's intention to impose the same 
level of ambition globally, without taking into consideration the principle of common but 
differen tiated responsibilities. Argentina wishes to stress to the EU the importance of avoiding 
unilateral actions that lack any proper legal basis. Argentina will be following the development of 
this initiative and hope to receive detailed information on the mod el to be adopted, the carbon 
calculation system and the scope of the mechanism, and hopes that this information will be provided 
in good time, in order to allow for productive exchanges. As requested during the meeting of the 
CMA, Argentina reiterates that , should this project go ahead, it is important that it be duly notified 
to the WTO.  
16.48.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
16.49.   From Saudi Arabia 's perspective, while the EU stated that the proposed mechanism will be 
in conformity  with WTO  rules and other international obligations, the EU is yet to provide 
explanations on how the EU aims to do so. While the EU is intending to address the risk of investment 
leakage from the EU to other countries , in fact the main objective is to mai ntain the competitiveness 
of EU  industries. Saudi Arabia 's very preliminary review indicates that the proposed mechanism 
raises very serious concerns due to its potential long -term negative implications on global trade that 
will distort the full value chain of trade , including goods, services, and jobs. Saudi Ara bia urges the 
EU to further engage in consultations with Members, in order to ensure the full compliance of the 
CBAM with WTO  rules and Agreements and to ensure that the proposed mechanism would not create 
unnecessary barriers to trade, or be applied in a manner that constitutes protection to EU  domestic 
industries.  Finally, Saudi Arabia  looks forward to further details and reflections from the EU on this 
proposed mechanism and the Kingdom is ready to be engaged with the EU and interested Members.  
16.50.   The deleg ate of the United States  indicated the following:  
16.51.   The United States continues to closely monitor the proposed EU CBAM  as it is being 
developed, particularly given the US -EU bilateral trading relationship. The US encourages the EU to 
share details on the pr oposed mechanism as it is developed, and further encourages the EU to fully G/C/M/138  
 
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  consider the compatibility of any such measure it develops with applicable WTO  rules, to ensure 
there is an open system of trade and that any such measure will not constitute a bar rier to trade.  
16.52.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
16.53.   Uruguay would like to thank Members who proposed including this item on the agenda and 
reiterates its statements in this Council and in the CMA. The announcement of the future adoption 
of a CB AM, within the so -called "European Green Deal ", continues to generate interest among a 
number of WTO  Members, including our country. Uruguay thanks the European Union for its 
comments in the last meetings of this Council and the CMA and notes the policy ob jectives identified, 
while reaffirming Uruguay 's strong commitment to climate matters. Uruguay also notes the 
information provided on the next steps planned; conducting impact studies prior to the adoption of 
the measure, including the legal viability of t he measure in light of the WTO  rules; and the 
Commission 's intention to present a CBAM  proposal for selected sectors by mid -2021. In this regard, 
Uruguay appreciates the willingness expressed by the European Union to continue exchanges with 
Members on the options under consideration, including in a conference scheduled for February or 
March  2021, while reiterating its interest in continuing to receive updated and detailed information 
on the initiative, including its current state of development and the expe cted time -frame for the 
measure 's adoption, how the measure will be designed, and its coverage at the sector and product 
level. Finally, Uruguay wishes to once again highlight the importance of ensuring the measure 's 
compatibility with the commitments made  by the European Union in the WTO.  
16.54.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
16.55.   Colombia would like to say that this issue has an accumulative effect on other measures that 
impact agricultural trade.  
16.56.   The delegate of the Philippines  indicated the follo wing:  
16.57.   The Philippines thanks the five proponents who requested this agenda item  and the 
numerous Members that have spoken on this matter. The Philippines ' comment will be concise, and 
this is simply to call on the EU to observe transparency, respect due process, conduct a careful 
assessment of the global impact of the proposed measures, and act consistently with the EU 's 
commitments in the WTO. The Philippi nes will be closely monitoring developments in this matter . 
16.58.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.59.   The EU appreciates the interest of partners on this important issue. The CBAM is one of the 
many measures which the Commission will tabl e in order to reach its goal of climate neutrality by 
mid-century. Specifically, in the European Green Deal Communication of December  2019, the 
European Commission announced that should differences in levels of ambition worldwide persist as 
the EU increase s its climate ambition, the Commission will propose by mid -2021 a CBAM, for selected 
sectors, to reduce the risk of carbon leakage. There would be a risk of carbon leakage, either because 
production is transferred from the EU to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction, 
or because EU  products are replaced by more carbon -intensive imports. If this risk materializes, 
there will be no reduction in global emissions, and this will frustrate the efforts of the EU and its 
industries to meet the g lobal climate objectives of the Paris Agreement.  
16.60.   The EU  wants to stress that the Commission has noted that this measure will be designed 
to comply with WTO rules and other international obligations of the EU. The European Union 's 
member States have also en dorsed the objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and that 
this should include "developing effective measures to tackle carbon leakage in a WTO -compatible 
way". In the European Green Deal, the Commission announced that it would make a proposal f or a 
CBAM for selected sectors in 2021. In terms of what sectors will be covered, the Commission 's 
March  roadmap noted that the measure applies where the risk of carbon leakage is the highest. The 
Commission is carrying out a detailed impact assessment to support the preparation of this initiative 
and to inform the Commission 's proposal. The assessment will notably look at various impacts of 
the CBAM, including environmental, social and financial impacts, economic efficiency and 
complementarity with the EU -ETS. G/C/M/138  
 
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  16.61.   As part of the impact assessment, the Commission has actively consulted citizens as well as 
domestic and international stakeholders, and encouraged them to give their views on the best option 
to enforce ambitious policies against climate change in an open economy while addressing the risk 
of carbon leakage. The EU is committed to transparency and the inputs for the consultation have 
been published on the European Commission 's central consultation page. Looking forward, the EU 
will engage – in multilate ral and bilateral forums – with other trading partners to explain the 
envisaged mechanism. In addition, a conference on CBAM is planned for April.  
16.62.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
16.63.   The Council so agreed . 
17  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU) 2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU) 2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
17.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation s of China  and the Russian Federation , respectively, had requested the Secretariat to 
include this issue on the agenda.  
17.2.   The delegate of the  Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
17.3.   At numerous previou s CTG  meetings the Russian Federation raised the issue of amendments 
to the EU basic regulation on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU)  2018/825. At the Council 's previous meeting , the EU  delegate 
reiterated its position that the new methodology of dumping calculation is "country -neutral ". 
However, Russia has  not heard from the EU how exactly it is going to ensure its declared "country 
neutrality ". What Russia has  seen so far indicates quite the oppos ite. The EU has ultimately published 
the report on so -called "significant distortions " in Russia. Thus, there are two  "country reports " 
published now – on Russia and China. However, these are not the only WTO  Members whose 
products are subject to anti -dumping measures of the EU. Following Russia and China, an equal 
number of measures are applied in respect of products from India and  the Republic of  Korea. So far , 
the EU has not indicated any plans to prepare "country reports " on these, or any other coun tries, 
and does not seem to have such plans.  
17.4.   Russia has  heard from the EU at the previous CTG  meeting , and within the Committee on 
Anti-Dumping Practices , that the country reports are supposed to be the source of "prima facie  
evidence " of so-called "distor tions". Having read the report on Russia carefully, Russia  fails to see 
how the European Commission can find reliable data in it.  The report includes lots of 
self-contradictions, misquotes, references to information from unreliable resources, references to  
documents, including legal acts, that never existed, situations that never happened, multiple 
translation errors that affect dramatically the substance of what has been translated , and basic 
factual errors. The quality of this document makes a horrible im pression.  The Russian Federation 
reiterates its position that the new calculation methodology introduced in Regulation (EU)  2017/2321 
cannot comply with WTO  rules. Russia  will not repeat the details today. However, the sufferings of 
Russian exporters from the WTO -incompatible methodologies will be exaggerated by the use of 
flawed information, which the EU calls "prima facie  evidence ". This is a deeply disappointing 
development.  
17.5.   It should be noted that the report on Russia has not spared Russia 's second  concern, namely 
the probable combination of punishments. It appears that the EU intends to adjust the exporters ' 
costs due to "significant distortions ", and not to apply the "lesser duty rule " due to so -called "raw 
material distortions " pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/825. Although the EU gives the so -called 
"distortions " different names, it appears just to be trying to build higher barriers for imports.  
However, such attempts cann ot be in line with the letter and spirit of the WTO  Agreements . At the 
CTG's previous meeting , the EU stated that the country reports "do not pass judgement on the 
economies in question ". However, that is what the EU is actually doing – trying to label cer tain 
WTO Members to whom it does not wish to give fair and non -discriminatory access to its market.  
Russia urges the EU to reconsider this approach and to respect WTO  rules.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  17.6.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
17.7.   China  would  like to reiterate its position regarding this issue.  China is of the view that 
Article  2.6(a) of the EU 's Anti -Dumping Regulation violates Article  2.2 and 2.2.1.2 of the 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and is inconsistent with the relevant panel and Appellate Body 
(AB) reports. The content of the European C ommission 's staff working document on significant 
distortions in the economy of China for the purpose of trade defence investigations is one -sided, and 
seriously deviates from the objective facts. The investigations co nducted on this basis shall be invalid 
from the beginning.  The European Commission currently only issues the documents for a very small 
number of countries, which have raised concerns on whether it is consistent with the principles of 
MFN treatment and nat ional treatment.  The investigation practice conducted by the European 
Commission in accordance with Article  2.6(a) of the EU 's anti-dumping regulation is "double 
standards ", as in the 26  original and review cases against Chinese products, the EU has neithe r 
examined whether there are market distortions in the EU 's industries and upstream industries so 
far, nor does it analyse whether the third -party data it uses is market -distorted. Therefore, the basic 
logic of the entire investigation system cannot be sel f-consistent . 
17.8.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.9.   The legislative changes introduced in 2017 fully respect WTO  rules and ensure that the EU 's 
trade defence system can adequately address dumping from countries whose economies have 
significant distortions due to state interference.  The EU will therefore continue applying the 
2017/2321  amendment, whenever legally warranted.  The anti -dumping calculation rules foreseen 
under the 2017/2321  amendment are country -neutral and apply potentially to all WTO  countries 
where domestic prices and costs are significantly distorted owing to state interference. The reports 
on significant distortions are technical, purely descriptive, and fact based.  They draw on many 
sources, in particular  the official public records of the countries concerned. They are therefore 
objective and impartial. In any event, in every investigation where the use of the reports is 
considered, the EU explicitly invites the government of the respective countries to commen t on the 
relevant report and to complement or rebut its content.  
17.10.   China and Russia were selected for the first two  reports purely in view of their relative 
importance in the EU 's trade defence activity. The reports therefore do not target these two or any 
other Member.  The legislative changes introduced in 2018 are distinct from those under 
amendment  2017/2321 and concern different aspects of trade defence investigations. This applies 
also to the definition of significant distortions under amendment  2017/232 1, as opposed to 
distortions on raw materials under amendment  2018/825. The rules determining the modulation of 
the lesser duty rule under amendment  2018/825 are in any event unambiguous and based on a set 
of objective material criteria. The EU recalls in this connection that there is no specific guidance by 
WTO rules on the lesser duty rule.  
17.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
17.12.   The Council so agreed . 
18  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTUR AL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, 
COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, PARAGUAY, 
THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  
18.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 30 September, 
6 November, and 12  November  2020, the delegation s of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the United States, and 
Uruguay, respectively, had requested the S ecretariat to inclu de this issue on the agenda.  
18.2.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
18.3.   Colombia, like other Members, has been raising this trade concern in multiple committees and 
forums of the WTO for more than three  years. Colombia also raised it bilaterally. Yet, despite this, 
so far it has not been possible to engage in serious and fruitful dialogue. On the contrary, measures 
that are affecting global agricultural trade are still being applied and implemented and ha ve even G/C/M/138  
 
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  increased, in some instances even more quickly during the pandemic, despite the fact that many 
delegations have requested that these measures be suspended while they try to tackle the 
consequences of COVID -19. 
18.4.   Colombia shares the environmental goal s of the European Union. However, there are many 
drawbacks to the EU 's policies and practices, which make it increasingly difficult for agricultural 
products to enter the common market. Colombia  will very briefly set out five  points here and counter 
the ar guments raised, in order to move forward and give an idea of the extent of our concerns. 
There were several more points, but time constraints meant Colombia  had to choose. First , Colombia 
is concerned about the sanitary measures that are not based on a "risk assessment " that takes into 
account both the harm caused by and exposure to the active substance. It has sometimes been said 
that establishing a limit involves a risk analysis. This does not seem to be the case, but the main 
problem is not necessarily s etting a limit, rather it arises much earlier, at the beginning of the 
process. When the renewal of the marketing authorization for a substance is requested, the EU does 
not seem to carry out a risk assessment of the substance. As a result, the other steps  are simply 
obvious consequences of the initial decision. The long institutional process that culminates with the 
adoption of these measures is closed to the countries concerned and is not very transparent. The 
measures arrive at the WTO fully defined afte r a process with very little public consultation, without 
having undertaken an impact study and without it being clear if the least disruptive alternative for 
trade has been chosen.  
18.5.   Second, the SPS  Agreement also requires contracting parties to base their specific maximum 
residue levels (MRLs)  on those of the Codex, and to carry out individual risk assessments only 
exceptionally. The EU has argued that its MRLs are 70% aligned with the Codex standards. This 
argument is far from satisfactory. The remaining 3 0% is a cause for concern, as it includes many of 
the plant protection products that are now the only alternatives that are safe and multilaterally 
approved in line with international standards. Just because 70% are apparently aligned, it does not 
mean tha t this 30% do not have to be.  
18.6.   Third, these issues are compounded by subsidies. The EU has a Just Transition Mechanism 
(JTM) to offset the costs of a transition, such as the one suggested by the EU. According to 
EU figures, the JTM will provide specific sup port in the amount of at least 100  billion euros to mitigate 
the socio -economic  impact of the transition. Moreover, the EU has calculated how much the required 
transformation would cost each farmer, per hectare, which forms the basis for the calculation of  the 
necessary subsidies. Countries such as Colombia do not have the financial space to provide this type 
of assistance. The EU 's enormous capacity to subsidize its producers, coupled with the non -tariff 
provisions discussed, skews the playing field to the  direct detriment of Colombia 's farmers ' long-term 
opportunities.  
18.7.   Fourth, the social effects of this policy on the EU 's trading partners are worrying and often 
unexpected. For example, the EU has argued that there is no detrimental impact on trade because 
our countries ' exports to the common market are increasing. But this is not grounds for a measure, 
since there should not be any detrimental effects. Particularly when it is clear that these prospective 
measures are now beginning to affect our exports and will have an ever -greater impact on access 
to the European market. On the contrary, Members should be more concerned about the current 
good level of trade, not relaxed. Furthermore, these aggregate figures do not speak to which specific 
products and which specific producers are bearing the brunt of the effects. In reality, these measures 
disproportionally affect small producers in rural areas, who are unlikely to have the resources to 
adapt to new requirements. This situation affects the concentration of pr oduction and could 
potentially exacerbate social inequality in developing countries.  
18.8.   Lastly, on top of this difficult situation, there is an apparent lack of fair competition in the 
European market, caused by large -scale buyers with a presence throughout E urope. In the absence 
of conditions of competition for wholesale purchases, these buyers have the power to decide to 
unilaterally reduce the purchase price per kilogram, affecting the price across the entire European 
market. This weak competition can be se en, for example, in the case of Aldi, which purchases 
bananas from all countries  in the region . 
18.9.   In conclusion, all of the above, coupled with potentially discriminatory practices and their 
potentially negative impact on the size of harvests around the worl d, Colombia believes that the 
EU's set of policies and practices carries the risk of nullifying and undermining the legitimate rights 
of WTO  Members that have signed the A oA and the SPS  Agreement. For these reasons, Colombia G/C/M/138  
 
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  will continue to call for a dia logue that allows it to raise concerns candidly and constructively. 
Colombia firmly believes that a structured, serious and ongoing dialogue, in conjunction with 
mutually agreed technical assistance, will allow mutually beneficial solutions  to be reached , within 
the general spirit of partnership that characterizes Colombia 's relationship with the EU.  
18.10.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
18.11.   Costa Rica is a co -sponsor of this agenda item and of joint communication  G/C/W/767 and 
the revision thereo f previously submitted in this Council. This item has the highest number of 
co-sponsors of all the items on this Council 's agenda. It also brings together the largest number of 
concerns raised in the TBT and SPS  Committees. It is a concern that has been su pported by some 
90 Members, of which the vast majority are developing and least developed countries. This is a 
matter that affects production systems and food security worldwide and therefore, in Costa Rica 's 
view, is of the utmost importance. Costa Rica 's technical concerns are well known, having been put 
forward on several occasions as part of a large number of concerns raised in the SPS  Committee, 
the TBT  Committee and, since June last year, in this Council. Costa Rica continues to have multiple 
concerns  regarding the scientific soundness of the EU 's MRL  assessments and what, in its view, is a 
hazard -based approach, rather than one based on risk. The reduction of MRLs without sufficient 
scientific evidence restricts access to critical substances for agricultural production, particularly in 
countries with a tropical climate, such as Costa Rica. Moreover, it generates additional costs and 
increases the risk of pests emerging and having an impact on production and export capacity.  
18.12.   While Costa Rica agrees with the EU 's goal of supporting the global transition to more 
sustainable world agri -food systems, it is of the view that the fulfilment of this goal must be based 
on building solutions designed and implemented through dialogue mechanisms and multi lateral 
cooperation frameworks. Costa Rica is concerned that forcing change, even through well -intentioned 
initiatives, further aggravates the problems that Costa Rica is already facing and repeatedly 
discussing in this Council. Costa Rica is also concerne d that the costs of the adjustment being 
proposed will fall on the producers, exporters , and most vulnerable population groups of developing 
countries and that there will be severe consequences for global food security. The co -sponsors ' 
countries were alre ady facing an intensification of the effects of climate change, on top of which 
there is now the pandemic and its socio -economic consequences. Agricultural producers, especially 
the smallest ones, and MSMEs would be greatly affected by new measures and mor e restrictive 
requirements for exports at a time when all efforts are being directed towards health -related 
containment measures and economic recovery. In awareness of this crucial historical moment, 
Costa  Rica has presented, together with 38  other Members , a communication to the EU 
(document  G/SPS/GEN/1778/Rev.3) requesting it, in consideration of the present exceptional 
circumstances, to interrupt its regulatory process and suspend the implementation of the reduction 
of MRLs for critical substances for ag ricultural production.  
18.13.   Costa Rica is disappointed that the EU communicated in the SPS  Committee that it would 
proceed with its processes for reducing MRLs, despite the potential impact that this would have on 
the production systems of its most vulnerable t rading partners. Costa Rica urges the EU once again 
to listen to the legitimate concerns of dozens of WTO  Members and establish a mechanism for 
dialogue and evaluation of its policies on MRLs that takes into consideration and effectively addresses 
our syst emic and trade -related concerns. Costa Rica is sure that, through increased and 
better -quality multilateral dialogue, Members can find solutions together, which will enable them to 
progress towards mutually beneficial trade.  
18.14.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
18.15.   Ecuador continues to endorse this statement, chiefly due to the increasingly restrictive ban 
on the use of plant protection tools that are key to pest eradication, which affects food quality. 
Ecuador insists that such measures can s eriously hamper many products ' entry into the market of 
one of its main trading partners. This is compounded by challenges and difficulties in overcoming 
the effects of the COVID -19 pandemic throughout the Ecuadorian productive sector, faced by 
agricultura l producers and exporters in particular. According to estimates from the IMF, World Bank 
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (CEPAL ), 
Ecuador 's Gross Domestic Product for 2020 will decrease by roughly 6%. As Ecuad or has said at the 
WTO on countless occasions, world trade is key to Members ' sustainable economic recovery. 
Maintaining trade restrictions, such as those of the EU, in the midst of the pandemic could potentially G/C/M/138  
 
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  heighten the economic impact on a sector re lied on by hundreds of thousands of low -income rural 
families.  
18.16.   Ecuador would like to refer to its previous statements on the matter3 and, once again, urges 
the EU: (i)  not to adopt excessively restrictive measures without conclusive scientific evidence, 
without an actual increase in the level of health protection and without taking into account the 
economic and social impact on its trading partners in the short, mid and long term; (ii)  to observe 
the globally recognized international standards on human, pl ant and animal health protection; (iii)  to 
comply with the requirements established in the WTO  SPS Agreement to take a risk assessment 
approach to any measure, minimize the adverse effects of its trade -related measures and prevent 
them from becoming unjust ified barriers to trade; and finally (iv)  to consider suspending the ongoing 
implementation of measures to reduce MRLs and maintain the levels recommended by the Codex, 
and to grant the necessary adjustment period – of at least 36  months – in cases where t he reduction 
of MRLs is shown to be essential.  
18.17.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
18.18.   Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and systemic concern regarding the use of a 
hazard -based approach by the European Union in its regulatory determinations r elating to 
SPS matters, which has led to a number of specific trade concerns in the SPS and TBT  Committees 
in recent years. Uruguay wishes to make it clear that any determination in this area, particularly 
when it departs from internationally accepted stan dards and the harmonization efforts made in 
multilateral areas, such as the Codex, must be based on a full scientific risk assessment and 
underpinned by validated methodologies, in line with the provisions of the relevant Agreements, and 
by conclusive scie ntific evidence. This is essential to maintaining the right balance between the right 
of Members to pursue their legitimate objectives and the need to avoid creating unnecessary barriers 
to trade in the process.  
18.19.   It is the special responsibility of the larg est importers of agricultural products to consider 
the impact that their regulatory approaches and determinations might have on developing and least 
developed countries, whose economies are largely based on the production and trade in agricultural 
and agro -industrial products, and through which they make an invaluable contribution to global food 
security, particularly when such approaches lack sufficient scientific justification. In light of the 
above, Uruguay once again urges the European Union to reconsid er its regulatory approach in order 
to avoid the unjustified proliferation of barriers to international trade in agricultural products and 
the serious social and economic consequences of such an approach on other Members, especially 
developing and least de veloped countries, for which the European Union market is of key importance.  
18.20.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
18.21.   Paraguay 's delegation would like to reiterate its concern over the lack of progress and 
dialogue on these topics. Paraguay shares the European Union 's objectives but differs on how to 
achieve them. Throughout the year, Paraguay has expressed its concrete concerns to the European 
Union at different forums within this Organization. Paraguay has also asked specific quest ions in 
these committees , which are routinely met with replies that are sketchy or evasive. Paraguay has 
not received replies to the last set of questions submitted in the SPS  Committee, and that was over 
a month ago; nor has it received the single complet e list of evaluated substances and those that will 
be evaluated since February. A response has also not been received to Paraguay 's consultation,  
originally presented in March, which contains three  questions in the Committee on Agriculture, on 
whether the European Union intends to introduce new subsidies for its producers, in other member 
States, as it did with Luxembourg for no longer using glyphosate.  
18.22.   The majority of these non -tariff barriers are based on environmental concerns, as indicated 
in the replie s to the questions submitted by Colombia in the most recent Committee on Agriculture 
and the SPS  Committee. However, these measures have no scientific basis. That is why there is a 
concern about using environmental considerations as an excuse for establish ing trade barriers and 
obstacles, which moreover serve to protect the competitiveness of a highly subsidized agricultural 
sector that is otherwise unsustainable. In document  G/SPS/GEN/1868 distributed yesterday, the 
European Union stated that "Food securit y and food safety are cornerstones of the EU food system 
and will never be compromised ". However, the European Union regularly compromises its own 
 
3 Document  G/C/M/137, paragraphs  17.14 -17.18.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  standards by using and allowing emergency measures for plant protection products that are 
prohibited in the E uropean Union. Paraguay notes with concern the high number of emergency 
measures allowed by the European Union for the benefit of its producers to allow them to continue 
to use prohibited substances, a flexibility from which its trading partners ' producers  cannot benefit 
and who have little certainty as to the tolerance procedures for imports and what is referred to as 
"other legitimate factors " in the process, despite having requested a definition of these factors on 
several occasions.  
18.23.   Similarly, Paraguay has observed a certain reticence by the European Union to acknowledge 
the existence of other production methods that depend on geographical and climatic conditions, as 
well as various best agricultural practices used based on the production models of each Member of 
this Organization that may be as or more effective than those encouraged by the European Union to 
achieve their sustainability objectives. The European Union 's insistence on using a single method or 
way, decided unilaterally, as being the most ap propriate, which its trading partners must adopt if 
they want to continue exporting to the European Union, is very worrying indeed.  
18.24.   As recently as last week, at the meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment, the 
European Union indicated that Paragu ay's producers would benefit from better prices if they adapted 
to the European Union 's production methods, but if the producers benefit from better prices, why 
are additional subsidies needed for producers to adapt, as proposed in the Just Transition Fund  under 
the Farm to Fork and Biodiversity Strategies? Also worrying is the use of environmental concerns to 
justify new subsidy programmes that do not have a net positive effect on the environment and 
furthermore can potentially increase the carbon footprin t, water use and food waste.  
18.25.   Paraguay would like to state that although it shares the concern for sustainability, the 
concept of sustainability in agricultural production, as defined by the FAO, also includes economic, 
social and environmental aspects and that some Members prefer to only focus on one aspect, in 
order to avoid addressing the environmental issues caused by subsidies under such a cross -cutting 
concept. The OECD  FAO Agricultural Outlook 2020 -2029 recommends that governments should roll 
back mar ket distorting agriculture subsidies as these tend to be the most environmentally harmful. 
Paraguay wishes to point out that the European Union grants high levels of trade -distorting subsidies 
to sustain and support a sector that represents less than 2% of  its GDP and that is a source of 
employment for less than 2% of its population. That is why Paraguay believes that the European 
Union could consider doing away with or significantly reducing the billions of euros it provides 
through these subsidies rather than increasing them as a first step in transitioning to a green 
economy.  
18.26.   On several occasions, including by note dated 28  August, Paraguay requested that the 
European Union initiate a broad dialogue. Regrettably, the European Union has responded to these 
requests for dialogue, intended for the EU to hear, listen and respond to Paraguay 's concerns, with 
promises of information sessions, including one planned for early 2021, which is not at all what 
Paraguay requested: a two -way conversation among equals. Pa raguay appeals once again to the 
European Union to set up a broad and open dialogue mechanism to identify solutions to these 
concerns that are affecting their trading partners and which, according to a recent study published 
by the US  Department for Agricu lture (USDA), can in addition significantly increase the price of food 
globally and exacerbate food insecurity across the world.  
18.27.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
18.28.   Australia, as a co -sponsor of this paper, again highlights its ongoing conce rns in relation to 
the European Union 's agricultural chemical regulations and policy and the potential negative effect 
on farmers and trade. Australia has previously raised its concerns about the EU 's risk assessment 
and import tolerance setting policies i n this Committee, as well as the TBT and SPS  Committees.  
While Australia recogni zes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural and other chemicals in 
a manner that protects animal, plant and human health and the environment, Members are also 
bound by WTO  obligations particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments and 
ensuring that measures are not more trade -restrictive than necessary.  
18.29.   Australia questions the EU 's approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection 
product authorizations and import tolerance limits that relies primarily on hazard -based assessment. 
In doing so, it is unclear how the EU hazard -based assessment is consistent with internationally G/C/M/138  
 
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  agreed risk assessment standards for import tolerances. Au stralia seeks clarification on how the EU 
determines hazards to consumers of treated produce and would welcome discussion on the risk 
assessments that underpin EU  decisions on import tolerances. Australia also seeks greater clarity 
from the EU on how hazar ds of a substance are differentiated in terms of the substance use in a 
production system compared with presence in consumed produce.  
18.30.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
18.31.   Brazil 's co-sponsorship of this agenda item stems from the understanding t hat the EU 's 
position in regarding the definition of maximum residue limits jeopardizes the balance established 
in the SPS  Agreement between protecting human, animal or plant life or health and ensuring that 
multilaterally negotiated market access conditio ns are not undermined by unjustified non -tariff 
measures.  This balance rests on the importance of scientific justification, enshrined in the 
SPS Agreement and materialized through risk analysis, which should guide the adoption of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures.  When prohibitions based on the hazard approach and/or recourse to 
Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement become the rule, despite technical advice from renowned 
institutions such as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), or standard -setting bodies (SSB) 
recognized by the SPS  Agreement, the balance tilts towards protectionism.  This condition of 
imbalance cannot last.  
18.32.   The document that Brazil  co-sponsor s shows that this issue is not merely technical or legal. 
This European policy brings concrete risks  to the maintenance of safe and efficient production 
systems in various regions of the globe, as has been also argued by other delegations. It prevents 
access to instruments for reducing pests that threaten the viability of food production and 
discourages scientific research, which would enable access to new chemical technologies and to fight 
these pests.  Currently, it is fashionable to draw attention to the risk that climate change leads to 
the introduction of new pests, especially in temperate agriculture  areas. Without underestimating 
this risk, it is imperative to remember that tropical countries, such as Brazil and other co -sponsors, 
face these SPS  risks continuously, and the success or failure of agricultural activity depends on 
access to these technol ogies.  In the Brazilian case, sustainability is at risk in different cultures, such 
as soy, citrus, coffee, wheat, bananas and papayas, which are a source of income and nutrients for 
a very important portion of the Brazilian and world population.  
18.33.   The intro duction of these technologies has also led to a more sustainable agricultural 
production because it enabled the use of new practices, such as a no-tillage system in several 
countries.  Brazil  can affirm that production has become more sustainable, as no -tillage prevents 
erosion and reduces water loss through evaporation, increases the level of organic matter in the soil, 
reduces the use of fossil fuels with machinery and equipment and provides  better microbiological 
balance in soils . This is an essential mechanism for increasing production through increased 
productivity, not from expansion of the planted area.  It is worrying that the interpretation given to 
the SPS  Agreement after 25  years of i ts adoption strays from the purposes that guided the 
negotiations during the Uruguay Round. It is also worrying that Brazil has  to bring debates of this 
nature to the CTG in a context in which a growing number of discriminatory initiatives create new 
non-tariff barriers under the guise of environmental protection.  
18.34.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
18.35.   Argentina wishes to reiterate its concern regarding the proliferation of non -tariff barriers to 
trade in agricultural products in the EU and insi st on Members ' obligation to base their measures on 
a full scientific risk assessment, in accordance with the WTO  Agreements. In particular, Argentina is 
referring to the implementation by the EU of measures that effectively prohibit the use of a number 
of substances required for safe and sustainable agricultural production, which have been assessed 
and authorized for use by many WTO  Members. This grievance has been raised on a number of 
occasions in the SPS and TBT  Committees, emphasizing the disproportion ate impact that such 
measures have on trade in agricultural products. As stated in document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1, 
Argentina urges the EU to provide additional information on the process and timelines for setting 
import tolerances for active substances that have  not been re -authorized by the EU, as well as 
applicable transition periods for MRLs. Furthermore, Argentina asks the EU to establish a 
transparent, predictable and commercially viable import tolerance process that includes a risk 
assessment based on techn iques developed by the relevant international organizations.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  18.36.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
18.37.   As noted in previous interventions on this subject in the CTG over that past three  meetings, 
Canada emphasizes the need for transparency and predic tability in international trade. Agricultural 
sustainability, that is where agricultural production meets current demand without compromising 
the ability for future generations to meet their needs, is a key policy objective for the Government 
of Canada and  one that has environmental, economic, and social dimensions . Canada shares the 
EU's ambitions related to health, safety and the environment.  Agricultural innovation, including 
precision agriculture, integrated pest management and products of biotechnology , contribute to the 
objectives of both Canada and the EU to make the agriculture sector more sustainable and adaptable.  
18.38.   In order to work in practice, frameworks must be predictable and based on thorough 
scientific analysis and risk assessments that reflect  specific realities at the national and regional 
levels. Canada continue s to recognize a Member 's right to adopt measures to achieve legitimate 
objectives and to apply the food safety measures deemed necessary to protect human health, in 
accordance with WT O agreements. However, such measures must be implemented in a transparent 
way that does not unjustifiably restrict international trade. The Communication highlights Members ' 
shared need for greater transparency and predictability around the EU 's approach t o approving and 
renewing plant protection product authorizations, as well as Members ' shared concerns about the 
impacts this approach is having on trade in food.  
18.39.   The lack of clarity on how and when import tolerances will be set for an active substance 
falling under the cut -off criteria authorization is causing a high degree of uncertainty and risk for 
exporters wishing to maintain access to the EU.  It is important for the EU to provide its trading 
partners with confirmation that import toleran ces for plant protection products that fall under the 
hazard -based cut -off criteria will be established on the basis of an assessment of risks conducted in 
accordance with relevant international guidelines.  It is also important that detailed information be  
provided to clarify the process the EU will follow.  Canada urges the EU to take into account the 
timelines necessary for practical decision -making by farmers and producers, as well as the time 
required to get products to market , particularly in the global trade context.  Canada hopes that 
reiterating the concerns contained in this Communication to the CTG serves as a clear indication of 
the importance many WTO  Members, including Canada, attribute to seeking enhanced transparency 
and predictability for trade.  
18.40.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
18.41.   The United States is  disappointed that it again has  to raise concerns about the EU 's 
implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products. The EU 's codificati on and subsequent 
implementation of a hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation is profoundly and adversely 
impacting global agricultural production and trade, particularly in developing countries.  At the last 
SPS Committee meeting, the United States h ighlighted concerns with the EU 's Farm to Fork 
Strategy, Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, and regulatory fitness and performance program REFIT for 
pesticides. In these documents, the EU details its plans to use all of its "diplomacy, trade policy, and 
devel opment support instruments " to promote adoption of its hazard -based approach to pesticides 
in third  countries and that it will no longer conduct "full risk assessments " for substances meeting 
hazard cut -off criteria.  
18.42.   Previous responses from the EU have fai led to clarify how such policies will be implemented 
in a manner consistent with the obligations of the SPS  Agreement.  Recent actions taken by the EU 
underscore the adverse impact of such policies, as alternative substances in a number of categories 
contin ue to be limited, offering few options for controlling certain pests.  For example, in July, the 
EU lowered to the limit of detection the MRL for pymetrozine, an insecticidal active ingredient 
registered globally that is one of only two active ingredients w ithin its class registered for use in 
controlling leaf hoppers, aphids, and whiteflies. The EU did so without finalizing a risk assessment 
and without its Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food, and Feed delivering an opinion on the 
active substance p rior to non -renewal.  As another example, at the 23 October meeting of the  
Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food, and Feed, experts from the EU  member States 
supported the Commission 's proposal  not to renew the authorization of mancozeb, another globa lly 
registered active ingredient. The EU had already determined it would not renew its authorization for 
chlorothalonil, which acts similarly to mancozeb on certain diseases, and lowered its MRL to the limit 
of detection.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  18.43.   Taken together, these actions seve rely limit access to important, necessary tools by banana, 
cranberry, and other producers and will likely have negative effects on small -scale producers in 
vulnerable populations, including increasing population migration.  The international community 
should be working together to support science -based measures that promote a safe and sustainable 
food supply. The US  calls on the EU to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutually 
beneficial solutions.  
18.44.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
18.45.   Indonesia would like to thank the proponents for bringing up this agenda item again and 
would like to be included as co -sponsor in the communication. Furthermore, Indonesia would like to 
underscore the increase on the application of non-tariff barriers in agricultural products, especially 
for those of lack of scientific evidence and not in line with international standards and agreements 
that may undermine our collective efforts to have more trade through the reduction of tariffs. 
Indonesia will continue to monitor the development of these issues, including technical issues such 
as MRLs, farm to fork strategy, and hazard -based approach to pesticide regulations in the relevant 
committee.  
18.46.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following : 
18.47.   As a co -sponsor, Guatemala would simply like to align itself with what was said by those 
Members that spoke before. Guatemala is concerned by the NTBs imposed by the EU when these 
are not based on risk and on scientific evidence. The European Union is ap plying measures in practice 
such as the reduction by substances by MRLs which affect areas beyond the European Union with 
the change of certain substances for certain foods, and differentiation with certain substances per 
product. It is important to highli ght the procedures for clearances of the imports and the fact that 
these should be based on transparency, should be predictable, and should be risk -based as according 
to the competent international organizations. Real conditions for producers should be tak en into 
account. At the global level, the EU is concerned about rural development in developing countries ; 
however, it is applying measures that run counter to these actions because these NTBs have an 
adverse impact on rural agricultural producers in devel oping countries.  
18.48.   The delegate of the Philippines  indicated the following:  
18.49.   The Philippines would like to thank the co -sponsors which have jointly raised in the CTG the 
issue of evolving MRLs established by the EU in Regulation No.  396/2005. The Philippines can see 
the impact of the uncertainty introduced by EU  practice, and the potentially restrictive effects such 
a measure can force upon trade in agricultural products. It is indeed helpful to view this issue here 
in the CTG rather than attempt to pin down m atters separately in other bodies, namely the TBT and 
the SPS  Committees. The Philippines ' interest in this issue should be obvious considering that it is 
not an insignificant exporter of certain agricultural products to the EU. The Philippines will contin ue 
to evaluate the growing tendency of the regulation to unilaterally lower MRLs for an expanding list 
of pesticides on the basis of hazard -based assessments and not on scientific risk assessment s that 
account for factors such as exposure and potency. Inte rnational standards already exist in the Codex 
Alimentarius and these would allow a science -based approach to risk assessment. But these seem 
to be ignored.  The Philippines would also wish to request the EU to provide greater transparency on 
the substances  whose approval may soon not be renewed, and whose MRLs may likely be adjusted 
downwards. The stakes can be high. Predictability will be key.  
18.50.   The delegate of El Salvador  indicated the following:  
18.51.   The impact the pandemic has had on El Salvador is obliging it to focus on health efforts and 
economic recovery. El Salvador knows that it is not the only Member going through this very difficult 
situation. That is why El Salvador asks the European Union to base its regulatory measures on 
scientific evalua tions, especially for MRLs, for the use of substances, because El Salvador shares the 
concerns expressed by other delegations regarding the impact that this measure would have on 
Salvadoran exports, and likewise for many other developing countries exportin g into the European 
Union.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  18.52.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
18.53.   India joins other Members on the concerns raised by them relating to implementation of 
Non-Tariff Barriers on Agricultural Products by the European Union that effectively prohibit th e use 
of a number of substances that are required for safe and sustainable agricultural production, and 
have been assessed and authorized for use by many WTO  Members. In this context, India would like 
to reiterate its trade, as well as systemic concerns. T his hazard -based measure by the EU is 
significantly impacting the trade from developing countries, including India. It also lacks 
transparency , hindering predictability for exporters. India would urge the EU to avoid such 
unnecessary barriers to trade, and  to find out a mutually acceptable solution to this issue through 
dialogue with Members, as early as possible.  
18.54.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.55.   The EU takes note of the concerns expressed by WTO  Members.  The EU has been highly 
transparent about its policy objectives and the EU  regulations on plant protection products and 
pesticide residues have been discussed with WTO  Members on numerous occasions.  The EU informs 
trading partners about the possible restrictions and non -approvals o f active substances via 
WTO-TBT notifications, and about the proposed lowering of the MRLs for such substances via the 
WTO-SPS notification system. Responding to specific requests from Members, the EU has recently 
started to notify non -approval measures un der both Agreements. The EU has regularly provided 
detailed explanations in the SPS and TBT  Committees and ultimately also in this setting about the 
rationale and necessity of its SPS and TBT  measures. Multiple seminars, workshops, information 
sessions and  bilateral meetings on risk assessment, authorization procedures and on specific 
substances have been organi zed in the past and are planned in the future.  
18.56.   The EU is also the only Codex member openly raising reservations and communicating to 
Codex when not in a position to adopt a new Codex MRL, providing scientific reasons for the 
reservations and consequent non -alignment. To increase transparency and predictability in 
international trade, the EU encourages other Members to do likewise.  The EU has the duty to ensure 
a high level of human health protection for its citizens. In doing so, the EU always ensures that it 
respects its international commitments and that its legislation is in line with the 
WTO SPS Agreement. The EU 's approach to regulate active subst ances is based on the most 
up-to-date scientific advice provided by the EFSA, as well as existing international standards as 
stipulated by its own legislation. The EU has developed a highly trusted, transparent and predictable 
system based on the high level of consumer health protection, to which some other countries defer 
in the absence of their national MRLs.  
18.57.   Delegates seem to object to measures taken to protect consumers ' health. These measures 
apply to substances that have been found to be mutagenic , carcinogenic, reproductive toxicants and 
endocrine disruptors. Consumers should not be deliberately exposed to these substances and the 
risk of human exposure to their residues should be minimized. The EU is an open market and its 
high level of protectio n has never been an impediment to the import of agricultural commodities.  
The high and increasing volume of imports into the EU of fruit and vegetables, which in 2018 
amounted to 16.8  billion euros, comes as an irrefutable evidence of our open and transpar ent 
policies. As a recent FAO  case study on MRLs in rice shows, stricter MRLs do not necessarily impede 
imports.  
18.58.   The EU provides technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs, directly or through 
other international organi zations, such as the FAO, to support a smooth transition towards new 
products or production systems. The EU also provides sufficient transition periods to allow operators 
to adapt to the new measures, unless these substances are genotoxic and carcinogenic or their 
presence on the m arket poses otherwise an unacceptable risk to consumers ' health. The 
EU measures do not discriminate against WTO  Members: the same health and safety requirements 
for food and feed apply equally to EU  member States and third  countries alike, irrespective of  the 
origin of the product. Equally, the EU ensures that its import requirements for agri -food products 
are not more trade -restrictive than required to achieve the level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection the EU considers appropriate for its consumers . 
18.59.   The EU Regulation on MRLs does not impose a zero tolerance, as some other trading partners 
do (for example, the US), but gives clear orientation to operators about what they must achieve. In G/C/M/138  
 
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  addition, the EU allows trading partners to request the establi shment of import tolerances for all 
active substances. Such import tolerance requests will systematically undergo a product specific risk 
assessment and will be considered on a case -by-case basis, as set out by the EU  legislation on MRLs, 
and in line with WTO requirements. Between 2012 and 2019, a total of 2567  CXLs (Codex MRLs) for 
food commodities were adopted by Codex Alimentarius. In that period, the EU has taken on board 
1833 MRLs out of these 2567  CXLs. Taking into account EU -MRLs that are set at the same or higher 
level than the CXLs for the same food products, the EU is aligned with more than 70% of the CXLs 
established in this period. This level is comparable with the level of alignment of other major 
economies.  The EU has one of the highest levels of uptake of Codex MRLs among major economies. 
The EU systematically aligns its MRLs to new Codex MRLs on an annual basis, without requiring 
applications or any other action from interested parties. Unlike some other major economies ( for 
example, the  US or  Canada), the EU has routine procedures in place to review its MRLs at the time 
Codex adopts new MRLs.  
18.60.   In conclusion,  while ensuring a high level of health protection, the EU remains one of the 
largest fruit and vegetables importer s, to the benefit of farm ing communities in exporting countries 
– including those partners that believe they must express concerns about the EU  trade policy. 
Against this background, the EU would like to emphasize its  commitment to continue an open 
dialogue on its SPS  policies and  measures. The EU is  ready to further engage and explain its policies 
to its trading partners. The EU  believe s that it has  a shared interest in tackling the issue of toxic 
active substances and protecting its citizens ' health with appropriate measures. The EU remains an 
open market and is committed to implement SPS  measures in the least trade -restrictive manner. 
However, the health issue at stake is of the utmost concern and should be properly addressed not 
only by the EU, but also by the entire WTO  Membership. The protection of public health must be a 
priority for all Members ' deeply interconnected societies and the COVID -19 pandemi c has only 
confirmed it.  
18.61.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
18.62.   The Council so agreed . 
19  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
19.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of  the Russian  Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
19.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
19.3.   The Russian Federation is very concerned with the cobalt classification as a carcinogen  1b for 
all routes of exposure under the 14th Adaptation to Technical Progress to the CLP  regulation.  Russia  
thanks the EU for the progress in application of gastric bioelution when  classifying alloys and 
ensuring the opportunity of self-classification. However, the measure was adopted without  any 
scientific justification for cobalt carcinogenicity for other routes of exposure rather than inhalation. 
It is clear that the EU will go further and develop both industrial and product specific regulation on 
the basis of this classification decision, which will set unjustified restrictions . As for the direct 
consequences of this measure, the CLP  Regulation sets labelling and packaging requirements 
prohibition for the use  of cobalt . Moreover, even without further restrictions, cobalt and 
cobalt -containi ng products consumption will unduly suffer due to their deselection as a result of 
stigmatization when manufacturing the final products, such as electric vehicle batteries, energy 
storage units , and similar equipment critical to mitigate climate change and  achieve green 
sustainability.  
19.4.   The Russian Federation  draws attention to the fact that interested Members of the WTO 
repeatedly informed the EU that the global cobalt industry had launched the relevant scientific study 
on cobalt carcinogenicity for oral ro utes of exposure ; however , this information was not taken into 
account.  Russia is  addressing the following questions to the European Union:  (i) could the EU inform 
Members about the epidemiological data confirming the increasing number of cancer cases due to 
exposure to cobalt for oral or dermal routes that explain the urgency of cobalt classification in 
accordance with the 14th Adaptation to Technical and Scientific Progress (ATP) ; (ii) could the EU  G/C/M/138  
 
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  explain why the gastric bioelution was not applied in the case of cobalt classification while it was 
used when lead and copper were classified ; and (iii)  could the EU confirm that when new scientific 
evidence of cobalt carcinogenicity for oral route s is available , the relevant amendments to the 
Globally Harmoniz ed System ( GHS) in respect of cobalt will be made ? 
19.5.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
19.6.   As explained at the last meeting, titanium dioxide and cobalt were included in the 14th ATP 
amending the CLP  Regulation. Several discussions on the classification of cobalt and TiO2 and the 
classification of mixtures containing TiO2 took place in the expert group for REACH and CLP 
(CARACAL) and in the regulatory committee (the REACH  Committee). After its adoption by the 
Commission o n 4 October  2019, the Commission Delegated Regulation was sent to the Council and 
the European Parliament for the two  months objection period. As no objection was raised, the 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)  2020/217 was published in the Official Journ al of the EU on 
18 February  2020 and the classification of cobalt as carcinogen will become applicable as of 
1 October  2021.  The classification of cobalt as carcinogen for all routes of exposure is based on the 
scientific opinion of the Risk Assessment Com mittee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency 
(ECHA) as well as on the comments received and concerns expressed by the member States and 
stakeholders. This opinion is in line with the CLP  Regulation as well as the UN  Globally Harmonized 
System of Classific ation and Labelling of Chemicals (UN  GHS). The opinion and the background 
document containing all the relevant scientific information on which the opinion is based are available 
to all WTO  Members and stakeholders at the ECHA website (https://echa.europa.eu/registry -of-clh-
intentions -until-outcome/ -/dislist/details/0b0236e1806bd156 ) 
19.7.   In its scientific assessment, ECHA 's RAC  Committee took all av ailable data into account, 
including the information submitted during the public consultation period. Review of a n RAC opinion 
is only possible if new and relevant scientific information becomes available.  All comments which 
WTO Members sent in the context of the EU  notification in accordance with the TBT  Agreement were 
duly taken into account by the Commission and member States in the decision -making process. The 
Commission has also sent written replies to the comments from WTO  Members on the 
TBT notification of the measure.  The EU also proposed to harmoni ze at OECD  level the method on 
bioelution.  This method could be useful to ensure that if a metal contained in an alloy is not 
bioavailable ( that is, it remains in the matrix), then the alloys ( for example,  stainless steel) do not 
need to be classified. An agreement at the OECD has been reached in May  2020 to develop and 
validate this method. The EU would welcome any support for third  countries to actively participate 
in the development of the OECD  test method on bioelution. A special expert sub -group has also been 
recently established by the Commission, in order to provide advice and exchange views on technical, 
legal and policy issues related to the use of the relative in-vitro bio -accessibility of a  hazardous metal 
in metal compounds or alloys, for the refinement of their classification under CLP. The discussions 
are expected to focus on the applicability of the data generated with a validated test method.  
19.8.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council ta ke note of the statements made.  
19.9.   The Council so agreed . 
20  ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO INCLUDE CROATIA: NEGOTIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6 OF THE GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
20.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of  the Russian  Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
20.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
20.3.   The Russian Federation  would like to reiterate its deep concerns regarding the European 
Union 's negotiations under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT within the framework of its enlargement to 
include Croatia.  Russia has  repeatedly raised this issue bilaterally, as well as at the CMA and during 
the meetings of th e Council. Russia 's concerns have been transmitted to the European Union in 
writing, as well as circulated among the WTO  Members.  To date, the EU has failed to enter into a 
constructive discussion with Russia on this issue.  Russia once again calls upon the  EU to engage into 
compensatory adjustment negotiations with Russia.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  20.4.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.5.   The EU would like to recall the explanations provided at previous meetings.  The EU informed 
WTO Members about the conclusion an d outcome of the negotiations following Croatia 's accession 
to the EU on 26  July 2018 (in document  G/SECRET/35/Add.2), pursuant to paragraph  5 of the 
Guidelines on Procedures for Negotiations under Article  XXVIII. The outcome of the Article  XXIV:6 
process will be faithfully reflected in the EU -28 Schedule  CLXXV , which is currently undergoing the 
process of certification. As of today, the EU  is pleased to note that it has  been able to clarify and 
accommodate the comments and questions of all Members; except one. The EU has extensively and 
repeatedly explained, orally and in writing, the reasons for not having accepted the compensation 
claims of the Russian Federation in the context of the EU 's last enlargement. For the record, the EU 
would like to point out t hat the indication of a WTO  Member as principal supplier in a 
GATT  Article XXIV:6/XXVIII  notification does not constitute an automatic recognition of a right for 
that WTO  Member to obtain compensation. Some principal suppliers make a claim, others do not. 
The notifying Member then enters into negotiations/consultations with those Members who have 
submitted a claim in conformity with the procedures and within the deadlines applicable under 
WTO rules, with a view to identifying if there is an entitlement  for compensation.  
20.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
20.7.   The Council so agreed . 
21  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND,  THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  
21.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegations of  Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, the 
United  States, and Urugua y, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
21.2.   The delegate  of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
21.3.   Uruguay  reiterates its position and concerns already raised in this forum and in others, 
including in document  RD/CTG/5, an d emphasizes the importance for the multilateral trading system 
that this matter be resolved through substantive bilateral negotiations between the parties 
concerned, in accordance with WTO  rules. Five  weeks from the expiry date of the transition period 
established in the ''Withdrawal Agreement '', the negotiations between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom continue, and therefore there is a high level of uncertainty about: (i)  the future 
trade relations between the two  parties taking place after 1  January  2021; and (ii)  the implications 
this process will have for interested third  parties, including in terms of the use of the erga omnes  
tariff rate quotas.  
21.4.   As negotiation processes under Article  XXVIII are taking place in parallel with the bilateral 
negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom, Uruguay  again draw s attention 
to the need to take due account of these concerns in the WTO  open processes.  Uruguay will continue 
to work constructively with the European Union with a  view to finding adequate solutions in the 
processes under way.  
21.5.   The delegate  of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
21.6.   The Russian Federation would like to reiterate its concern in respect of the EU 's approach to 
the TRQ 's negotiations in the cont ext of Brexit. The approach of the EU to the apportionment of 
TRQs cannot be considered as WTO -consistent, neither can it provide the EU with the possibility to 
maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions.  The Russian 
Feder ation is of the opinion that these negotiations cannot be concluded without a respective 
agreement on compensation with principal suppliers of the products concerned . The Russian 
Federation is ready to continue to engage with the EU in constructive negotia tions.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  21.7.   The delegate  of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
21.8.   This intervention relates to Agenda Items 21 and 35.  Members of the CTG will have become 
very used to seeing these items on the agenda over recent years.  But this should not be 
misconstrued to be a routine matter. Far from it , as New Zealand  has pointed out previously, the 
nature and scale of the changes to existing bound commitments that have been proposed by the EU 
and the UK – which would affect 196  individual concessions (affecting more than 36 5 tariff lines) 
and have enormous potential to impact global trade in these products given the EU 's role as the 
world 's largest agricultural importer and exporter – are unprecedented in the life of the WTO . 
Moreover, some four and a half years since the Brexit process began, New Zealand still ha s not seen 
the EU and UK come forward with meaningful solutions to address the concerns a large number of 
WTO Members have raised – yet the end of the transition period  will be upon us in less than 40  days.  
21.9.   Given this, the time is now for the EU and UK to demonstrate that they are taking these 
concerns seriously and for them to provide substantive responses on:  first of all, how, in their own 
schedules, the EU and UK are  going to deliver outcomes that leave other WTO  Members ''no worse 
off'' in terms of their market access, as required under  Article  XXVIII;  and second, how they are 
going to provide clear assurance, in their own schedules, that other WTO  Members will not b e 
''crowded out '' of access to their markets under their MFN  quotas.  New Zealand  is ready to work 
assiduously with the UK, the EU and other interested WTO  Members to find practical solutions to 
address these concerns. This will, however, take serious engag ement and commitment on all sides, 
including:  an open attitude towards the full range of possible ways to address these concerns in a 
commercially meaningful way , and a willingness to work intensively over the remaining period ahead 
to secure outcomes that  preserve the full value of the existing commitments the UK and the EU owe 
to other WTO  Members.  
21.10.   The delegate  of Canada  indicated the following:  
21.11.   This intervention relates to Agenda Items 21 and 35. Canada continues to have concerns 
regarding the UK and the  EU's approach to apportioning the EU -28's TRQs and has made these 
concerns clear to the UK and the EU through multilateral and bilateral discussions. While these 
concerns remain, Canada notes the EU and the UK 's willingness to discuss these issues. Canada 
looks forward to continuing these discussions with the UK and the EU during bilateral negotiations 
under Article XXVIII.  
21.12.   The delegate  of Australia  indicated the following:  
21.13.   Australia has consistently raised concerns with the EU and UK 's approach to splitting the 
EU's existing TRQs as a result of Brexit since it was first proposed in 2017. It is clear the proposed 
modifications to TRQs will diminish the commercial value of Australia 's existing market access, by 
not only removing flexibilit y in where product is sent year -to-year, but by also rendering some 
TRQ allocations too small to be commercially viable. Australia appreciates the recent constructive 
and pragmatic engagement from the EU on these issues with a view to reaching agreement be fore 
the end of the transition period and seeking to ensure implementation of any agreed arrangements 
in a timely manner. This will provide certainty to Australian exporters with the new post -Brexit 
trading environment.  
21.14.   The delegate  of China  indicated the following:  
21.15.   The statement will address item  21 and item  35. China 's concerns and requests on this issue 
remain unchanged.  China has been actively and constructively engaged with the EU and the UK on 
this issue. In February, China formally provided its reque sts to the EU and the UK. Despite the 
several rounds of bilateral consultations and negotiations have been carried out with the EU and the 
UK，it is regretful that there is not much progress that has been achieved. China hopes that the UK 
and the EU would s ubstantially improve the offers in the bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching 
mutually satisfactory outcomes at an early date.  
21.16.   The delegate  of the United States  indicated the following:  
21.17.   As was already noted here and in other committees, the United States remains concerned 
that the approach as proposed by the EU and UK will lead to a loss of access for  US goods into both G/C/M/138  
 
- 50 - 
 
  markets. The United States identified its priorities in both markets and are engaging with the EU 
and UK in productive negotiations  that ensure that US trade interests are maintained. However, the 
United States find s it worrisome that the EU and UK  proposals fail to clarify how bilateral EU -UK trade 
will be treated in the absence of an EU -UK bilateral agreement once the transition period ends in a 
little more than one  month from now.  Currently , that bilateral trade is not subject to the TRQs. Other 
WTO Members have the opportunity to export the full TRQ  quantity into either the UK or EU -27. But 
if the UK and the EU -27 are  subject to the same TRQs the rest of the Members  face, the United 
States will be quickly crowded out and lose access to both markets.  
21.18.   The delegate  of Brazil  indicated the following:  
21.19.   In July, during Brazil 's last intervention on this topic , Brazil urged the UK and  the 
EU delegations to undertake that all TRQs eventually established contain the  observation "except for 
the UK " and "except for the EU ", respectively, in case at the transition period  an agreement is not 
signed between the parties. Five months later, the demand remains valid, as we continue with the 
same concerns.  The EU and the UK have not concluded their negotiations and there is risk that the 
limited but essential quotas tariffs that make up the commitment  to access the EU and the 
UK markets are flooded with products from the bilateral trade, displacing other Members of the WTO.  
21.20.   Alternatively, following the logic of the EU itself during the negotiations on Article  XXIV and 
Article  XXVIII due to the enlargem ents of the EU, in which the EU  trade with the partner is subtracted 
in accessing the increase in quota volume, the so -called "netting out ", it would be essential for the 
EU and UK to include the volume of bilateral trade in quota volume if they chose not to exclude each 
other from access to  TRQs, the so-called "netting in ". Systemic concern also persists, as the EU 
insists on its own interpretation of procedures established by Article  XXVIII and other related 
instruments, denying that the reduction in the volume of the current EU -28 TRQs, from 
1 January  2021, implies leaving other Members in worse conditions of access compared to those 
that currently exist.  
21.21.   The reasons why Brazil – and many others delegations – considers that it will be in worse 
conditions of access to the European market and which were raised in previous meetings remain, in 
face of uncertainties in the negotiations between the EU and the UK and non -recognition by the EU 
that a successful conclusion of neg otiations under Article  XXVIII will demand flexibilities in its 
negotiating position.  
21.22.   The delegate  of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
21.23.   Switzerland is of the view that legal uncertainties regarding the reallocation of TRQ  quantities 
to the EU -27 and UK from 1 January  2021 must be avoided and that in this respect the Article  XXVII I 
negotiations need to be concluded as soon as possible. Switzerland asks both the UK and the EU to 
come forward as soon as possible with a solution to ensure that existing tarif f quotas are not filled 
by bilateral trade between the EU and UK.  
21.24.   The delegate  of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
21.25.   The Republic of Korea would like to join previous speakers in expressing systemic concerns 
regarding the proposed modification of EU  TRQ commitments. The Republic of Korea has a very keen 
interest in the ongoing negotiations between the EU and other WTO  Members, as the modification 
will bring about significant effects on the WTO  system. Therefore, Korea will continue to monitor the 
development of the negotiations between the EU and other WTO  Members.  
21.26.   The delegate  of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
21.27.   Chinese Taipei  wishes to address item  21 and item  35 together here. With the end of the 
Brexit transition period no w imminent, Chinese Taipei  is closely following developments in the trade 
negotiations between the EU and the UK on the assumption that the result will have a profound 
impact on market access for other WTO  Members. As was stated before, Chinese Taipei  is particularly 
concerned about the methodology used by the EU and UK for the modification of TRQs following 
Brexit. Chinese Taipei  strongly urges the EU to ensure that future market access conditions are 
maintained at the current level and that they will be n o less favourable than those provided prior to 
the negotiation, as stipulated under GATT  Article  XXVIII.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  21.28.   In addition, it is still unclear as to whether the rest of the WTO  Members will have to compete 
with the EU or the UK to access each other 's modified q uotas. Chinese Taipei  urges both parties to 
address this subject very carefully so that any unintended trade disruption that could occur from the 
1 January  2021 can be avoided. Chinese Taipei  also encourages them to take account the concerns 
raised by Members at this meeting today, and we all look forward to further updates on this matter 
in the coming weeks.  
21.29.   The delegate  of Mexico  indicated the following:  
21.30.   As was already said, Mexico shares the concerns expressed by Members that have already 
taken the f loor. Mexico wishes to reiterate its systemic concern over the EU 's intention to modify the 
tariff quotas included in its Schedule of Concessions and the proposed methodology for doing so, 
which would result in a reduction, and even an elimination, of mark et access opportunities. In 
addition, the lack of clarity on the EU 's future obligations to the UK in the context of the WTO adds 
to our systemic concern.  
21.31.   In light of the above, Mexico urges the EU to continue discussions with WTO  Members and 
to take into consideration the trade and systemic concerns raised, with a view to finding a mutually 
satisfactory solution through procedures compliant with the rules of the WTO.  
21.32.   The delegate  of India indicated the following:  
21.33.   India has already expressed its concerns, b oth in writing and during formal consultations 
with the EU. India has also made it clear how the present methodology and threshold years, taken 
into account by the EU for apportionment of tariff rate quotas, adversely affect Members rights. 
Moreover, the n ature of the future trade relationship between the EU -27 and the UK not being known 
at this stage, also leads to uncertainty in these areas.  
21.34.   India expects  that the EU will provide reasonable opportunities to all WTO  Members, 
including India, to exercise th eir rights under the WTO  Agreements and take into account concerns 
raised. India looks forward for fruitful negotiations with the EU.  
21.35.   The delegate  of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
21.36.   Indonesia thanks proponents for putting placing this item on the agenda  and shares their 
concerns. Indonesia urges the EU to come up with a solution as soon as possible by continuing to 
respect the WTO rules as well as to maintain the level of concessions on a reciprocal basis.  
21.37.   The delegate  of Paraguay  indicated the following : 
21.38.   Paraguay  will deal with item  21 and item  35 of today 's agenda in the interest s of time , as 
they are related. Paraguay  would like to thank the delegations that proposed these items for 
inclusion in the agenda and recall its concern that third -party market access could adversely impact 
these processes.  The uncertainty that continues to prevail is truly worrying for their t rading partners, 
who still have not been provided with the definition of certain topics linked to the allocation of tariff 
quotas, not only in terms of how they are to be divided up, but also the possible saturation of erga 
omnes  TRQs given the no deal bet ween the European Union and the United Kingdom, which would 
effectively mean a substantive loss of market access.  Once again, Paraguay  urges the delegations 
of the European Union and the United Kingdom to ensure compliance with the commitment they 
both mad e to maintain the same levels of market access following this process and to ensure that 
no trading partner is disadvantaged as a result.  
21.39.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.40.   Negotiations under the Article  XXVIII procedure are still ongoing with the partners who have 
recogni zed rights. The most recent round , in October  2020, showed good progress in these 
discussions. This included many of the Members who raised this issue at today 's meeting. The EU 
welcomes the increased engagement of  many WTO  Members and aims to make progress paving the 
way towards a constructive finali zation of discussions with as many Members as possible by the end 
of the year.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  21.41.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
21.42.   The Council s o agreed . 
22  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMP LEMENTING REGULATIONS REGARDING PROTECTED 
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, TRADITIONAL TERMS, 
LABELLING AND PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN WINE SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
THE UNITED STATES  
22.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated  12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the United States  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
22.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
22.3.   The Unite d State s is disappointed that it again has to raise this issue in this Council. In the 
interest s of time, the United States  request s that the minutes for this meeting reflect its intervention 
from the November  2019 CTG meeting .4 This statement reads as follows:  
22.4.   The delegate of the United States expressed disappointment at having again to raise 
US concerns over the EU 's policies on geographical indications and traditional terms for wine, in 
particular with regard to its pending applications for traditional terms. The United States had been 
raising concerns over these policies and the associated regulations for 20  years. In their view, the 
EU's persistent failure to provide any information left the United States no choice but to raise these 
concerns again. At severa l TBT Committee meetings, in this Council, and in the EU 's responses to 
US comments, the EU had said that the pending applications for traditional terms were still under 
consideration, but that the EU could not provide a precise timeline for their approval . However, the 
US failed to understand why the EU was unable to provide an estimate of the timeline or information 
on the status of the applications. Furthermore, the US did not understand why the EU had chosen 
not to include timelines and greater transpar ency with regard to traditional terms as part of its 
review and revision of the relevant measures, even though the EU had provided some timelines and 
transparency for geographical indications in its recent revised regulations. She asked the EU why 
there wa s such a difference and why the EU appeared to be making no effort to ensure that delays 
on the approval of traditional terms would discontinue. The US also asked the EU to clarify whether, 
and if so how, the processing of these applications would change f ollowing the recent 
EU parliamentary elections, including whether responsibility for processing applications would be 
assigned to a new agency within the European Commission. The US reiterated its request that the 
EU provide transparency on the status of other applications so th at the US could see how its own 
applications compared. In addition, she noted that the US did not understand why the EU seemed 
unable or unwilling to provide transparency regarding the applications that had been submitted, or 
to provide greater predictabil ity through timelines in respect of traditional terms. The United States 
once again requested the EU to move expeditiously to approve their applications so that they could 
remove this longstanding item from the Council 's agenda. The US expected that, given  the EU 's 
proposal on improving the process for addressing concerns in WTO  Committees, it would spend 
additional time trying to address the concerns raised by its trading partners, or even to provide basic 
information relating to specific trade concerns ra ised against it.  
22.5.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
22.6.   Argentina has expressed on many occasions, particularly in the TBT  Committee, its concern 
regarding the fact that the traditional terms "Reserva " and "Gran Reserva " may not be used on 
Argentine wine labels. As was indicated, Argentina successfully completed the substantive procedure 
to approve such terms in March  2012 under the EU 's own legislation. In light of the facts, Argentina 
is of the view that the implementation of the EU 's standard  discriminates against third  countries.  
22.7.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
22.8.   New Zealand recogni zes that Members have the right to protect their consumers from 
deceptive practices in line with their obligations under the WTO. New  Zealand as ks that the European 
Union take into consideration concerns  raised by Members relating to the scope and application of 
 
4 Document  G/C/M/136, paragraph  21.2. G/C/M/138  
 
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  the system of traditional terms, as well as transparency, process, and timelines relating to 
applications by third  countries who wish to use traditional terms in the European Union.  
22.9.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.10.   The European Union  understands the continued interest of the US (and other Members) in 
this issue. The EU has completed the revision of its internal le gislation on traditional terms which 
was discussed in previous TBT  Committees (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)  2019/33 and 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)  2019/34). The EU believes that its internal legislation 
offers a meaningful and transpar ent system of protection to traditional terms used on wine products 
from the EU as well as on products from third  countries.  In the past, the EU has demonstrated its 
ability to address specific Members ' concerns in this area either via its internal legisla tion or via 
bilateral agreements.  
22.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
22.12.   The Council so agreed . 
23  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES AND URUGUAY  
23.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegations of  the United States and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat t o include 
this issue on the agenda.  
23.2.   The delegate  of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
23.3.   Uruguay reiterates its concern and regrets having to refer to this item once again in this 
Council. In this regard, Uruguay would like to refer to previous statements, rea ffirming the concern 
about the European Union 's decision to register the term "Danbo " as a protected geographical 
indication, despite objections by a number of Members. In systemic terms, it is worrying that an 
important Member of the WTO is disregarding r ecognized international rules and standards and 
calling into question the harmonization, coherence and value of the multilateral work undertaken in 
the Codex. In trade terms, the creation of unnecessary barriers to the marketing of this type of 
cheese in t he European Union and the impact this has when extended to third  markets is a matter 
of concern. There is also the issue of the uncertainty created by this situation as to the legitimate 
expectations of producers, many of whom are immigrants of European or igin and small -scale 
producers, who brought with them or acquired rich cultural knowledge, including on cheese 
production.  
23.4.   Uruguay does not agree with the position that this is exclusively an intellectual property issue 
that should not be dealt with in thi s forum, and point s out that the standard under which these rights 
were originally granted was correctly notified by the European Union to the TBT  Committee in 
November  2013. In this connection, Uruguay would like to once again repeat the following questio ns 
with regard to the practical implementation of Community legislation on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs, on which we have still not received an answer: (i)  Has the 
registration of terms such as protected geographical indications  been refused, or have some 
flexibilities been introduced for their use, in response to the objections or observations made by 
producers or authorities of the member States of the European Union? In which cases? (ii)  Has the 
registration of terms such as p rotected geographical indications been refused, or have some 
flexibilities been introduced for their use, in response to the objections or observations made by 
producers or authorities of other WTO  Members? In which cases?  
23.5.   To conclude, Uruguay urges the Eu ropean Union to comply with the Codex international 
standards and to reconsider its regulatory approach in order to avoid the creation and proliferation 
of unnecessary restrictions on international trade in cheese.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  23.6.   The delegate of the United States  indicat ed the following:  
23.7.   The United States is disappointed that it again has to raise this issue in this Council. In the 
interest s of time, the US requests that the minutes for this meeting also reflect its intervention from 
the November  2019 CTG  meeting .5 This statement reads as follows:  
23.8.   The delegate of the United States regretted that her delegation had again to raise this issue 
in this Council. The United States and other WTO  Members had voiced their objections to the EU 's 
proposed protection of the term Havarti as a geographical indication (GI) during the 2014  opposition 
period, in this Council and in other WTO  Committees; insofar as Havarti had been established as an 
international standard under the Codex Alimentarius, the EU had nevertheless moved forward with 
the process. Havarti had undergone a rigorous review to prove its use in the public domain and in 
international trade, which had been reconfirmed by Codex members, including the EU, in 2007, 
2008, and 2010. The EU 's decision to move forward ra ised serious questions about the views of 
Denmark and the EU  Commission regarding the legal relevance of Codex and the integrity of the 
international standards system, as well as the international trading system. The US reminded the 
EU that no WTO  Agreemen t was superior to another. Therefore, the fact that the EU asserted that it 
was following procedures under the T rade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS)  Agreement did not mean it could disregard TBT  commitments to uphold international 
standard s. The EU had to comply with both WTO  Agreements. The US strongly encouraged the EU 
to uphold its WTO  TBT obligations to follow international standards and to consider a less trade 
restrictive approach to protecting Danish cheese producers by linking Havar ti with the place of origin 
and protecting only the entire compound term.  
23.9.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
23.10.   Argentina regretfully reiterates its concern over the registration of the term "Danbo " as a 
protected GI in favour of Denmark. Neit her the comments made by Argentina and other Members 
nor the international reference standard CODEX  STAN  264 were taken into account when registering 
this term. Under this standard, "Danbo " is established as the generic name for this food product and 
the p roduct 's country of origin must be declared on the label. Given that it is the international 
reference standard for the identity and quality of "Danbo " cheese, no country that bases its technical 
regulation on this standard should encounter constraints to trade due to a misappropriation of the 
term.  
23.11.   As Argentina stated in the previous meeting, it does not see the point of deploying efforts 
to multilaterally agree a Codex standard on "Danbo " cheese, only for the use of this term to later 
become the exclusive  preserve of Danish producers. Moreover, Argentina is aware that, for the EU, 
this is essentially a matter of intellectual property rights that falls outside the purview of the C TG. 
Argentina also beg s to differ on this point. The above -mentioned Codex sta ndard did not regulate a 
GI, but rather regulated the generic name of a product manufactured across the world (and not only 
in Denmark). In essence, registering the term "Danbo " as a GI constitutes an undue restriction on 
international trade in this cheese . In any case, as Argentina has stated on previous occasions, its 
concerns are not purely trade -related, but also encompass systemic aspects, in particular the impact 
on international harmonization efforts.  
23.12.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the followi ng: 
23.13.   New Zealand is raising this item in the Council because of a conflict in positions the EU has 
taken in standard -setting bodies and the actions they have taken ex post facto  to restrict the labelling 
within the EU of products produced using those standa rds by producers outside of Denmark. This 
does not relate solely to grounds for granting or denying IP  protection, but also to the importance 
of legal consistency, upholding internationally agreed standards, and not frustrating legitimate 
expectations of b usiness es operating within those standards.  
23.14.   New Zealand remains concerned that the European Commission has chosen to register the 
terms ''Danbo '' and ''Havarti '', despite having previously agreed to a Codex standard in which the 
European Commission and Denmark both acknowledged ''the country of origin statement preserves 
its generic nature ''. Such actions will negatively affect producers outside Denmark who have i nvested 
 
5 Document  G/C/M/136, paragraph  14.6. G/C/M/138  
 
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  with the legitimate expectations that they could use the standard. The EU 's approach to registering 
cheese names for which there are existing CODEX  standards shows disregard for the integrity of the 
standards -setting system that promotes reliabilit y and consistency in international trade rules, which 
we would expect the EU to support.  
23.15.   The delegate  of the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.16.   The EU has always said that the fact that a GI  name is subject to a specific Codex 
Alimentarius Standard or  that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention does not imply that it 
has become generic. Generic status in the EU can only be assessed with regard to the perception of 
consumers on EU  territory. In the EU, the relevant public is comprised mainly o f the reasonably 
well-informed members of the public and/or customers who may purchase the product or a like 
product.  
23.17.   Regulation (EU) No.  1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 
as well as subsequent delegated and implementin g regulations, were notified to the WTO under the 
TBT Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the TBT  Agreement ( for example, provisions 
related to technical standards, definitions and labelling issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual 
property  rights (in particular, elements related to the substantive protection of geographical 
indications) are part of the notified measures, those are not relevant for TBT  purposes.  
23.18.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
23.19.   The Council so agreed . 
24  EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM COLOMBIA  
24.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 6 November  2020, the 
delegation of Colombia had requested the Sec retariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
24.2.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
24.3.   Colombia reiterates its concerns with regard to the Directive  2009/28/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council and the fact that the first  generation biofu els with the high risk of causing 
direct land use change have been gradually reduced with regard to their contribution to renewable 
quotas to zero per cent in 2030. As has already been stated, Colombia welcomes public policies that 
aim to protect the envir onment and to promote the use of renewable fuels and energies. Colombia 
is a country which is extremely committed to fighting deforestation and has undertaken relevant 
commitments for reduction of palm oil produced in regions of deforestation. And so, Colombia is 
looking to extend crops which have a lower environmental impact which will address these problems.  
24.4.   In Colombia 's view, t he current provisions of these European rules are incompatible with the 
obligation of national treatment and the MFN of the GATT  1994 and the TBT  Agreement. This 
measure is de facto  discriminatory between imported like products, as well as imported and domestic 
like products. Colombia should highlight the competitive relationship and the high technical and 
economic substitution which exists with other oils such as soy oil. Colombia wishes to call attention 
to the way in which the Directive excludes different version s in terms of similar  raw materials which 
are competitive , many of which are produced within the European Union 's territory. Colombia would 
like to request the European Union to undertake a revision of the act in 2021 and invites the EU to 
take into consideration the comments submitted.  
24.5.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
24.6.   Guatemala affirms its interest in the topic as a palm -oil producing country and will therefore 
follow the discussion on this issue.  
24.7.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
24.8.   Costa Rica  wishes to thank the delegation of Colombia for bringing this subject to the attention 
of the Council once again. Costa Rica would also like to take this opportunity to again urge the EU G/C/M/138  
 
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  to take account the impact that this policy could have on world trade  in biofuels, and also the impact 
on population groups that depend on these products, especially in developing countries that have 
invested in sustainable production practices. Costa Rica will closely monitor the concerns outlined 
by other Members with reg ard to this policy, both in the TBT  Committee and in the Dispute 
Settlement Body.  
24.9.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.10.   The EU thanks Colombia for raising this issue. The European Union notes that the issue of 
amendments to the EU  Renewable Energy Directive is now subject to WTO  dispute settlement 
proceedings, notably under DS593 ( EU – Certain measures concerning palm oil and oil palm -based 
biofuels ). In order to preserve the integrity of such proceedings the European Union will defer all 
discussions to that forum and accordingly refrain from discussing this matter in this Council today.  
24.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
24.12.   The Council so agreed . 
25  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, AND 
THE UNITED STATES  
25.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation s of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russia n Federation, Ukraine, and the 
United States, respectively,  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
25.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
25.3.   The Russian Federation would like to uphold its long -standing concern regarding India's policy 
restricting the importation of yellow peas and other pulses to its territory.  In April  2020, India 
introduced a zero volume sub -quota for yellow peas. The Russian Federation consider s such a 
measure as a de facto  import prohibition on yellow peas, which will be in effect until April  2021. 
India has also remained active regarding the minimum import price requirement for pulses, legal 
grounds for which within the WTO  framework the Russian Federation  would like India t o clarify. 
Russia  would also be grateful if India could explain in detail its position on the necessity to import 
yellow peas only through the seaport Kolkata.  
25.4.   The Russian Federation notes that such restrictive trade measures resulted in a significant 
decrease of Russian export s of yellow peas to India.  In accordance with India's statements at 
previous meetings of the CTG, India sticks to the position that a total prohibition on importation of 
yellow peas and quotas on pulses, as well as other restrictive m easures, could be justified under 
Article  XX of the GATT  1994, in particular paragraphs  (a) and (b). Russia  urges India to provide 
detailed clarification of the ways in which such measures on yellow peas importation are necessary 
to protect public morals a nd human life and health. The Russian Federation considers that the 
application of "temporary " import quotas, which have been ongoing  for three  years, the minimum 
import price requirement, ports of entry restriction and the imposition of  an import ban on y ellow 
peas for the current year do not comply with India's obligations within the WTO. Therefore, Russia  
requests India to bring its measures into conformity with WTO  rules.  
25.5.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
25.6.   Australia 's concerns with India's restrictive measures on pulses imports are well known to 
Members, particularly India 's quantitative restrictions (QRs) on a variety of pulses. These concerns 
are shared by a number of other Members, including developing Members. Despite Australia 's 
ongoing efforts, India has failed to provide a sufficient explanation of the WTO -basis for the QRs, 
which India has implemented for more than three  years. These are no longer temporary and must 
be removed.  Pulses are not a "small " commodity for India, nei ther by tonnage nor the value produced 
and consumed, nor with respect to trade. Therefore, India's measures matter in the global pulses 
market. India's current suite of measures on pulses, including significant levels of market price 
support, high tariffs and QRs, continue to negatively impact the stability and predictability of the 
global pulses market and are demonstrably ineffective.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  25.7.   This is evident simply in the fact that India has continued to renew some of the measures, 
despite calling them temporary.  Putting aside their WTO  consistency, if the QRs were effective, they 
would have stabili zed the Indian pulses market and have been phased out. But the reality is that 
the QRs have only added to the problem and have made the global pulses market more unstab le 
and unpredictable.  Since this Council last met in June, India has continued to implement additional 
changes to the existing QRs, announcing on 1  October what appears to be an additional 
150,000  tonnes of Urad, with restrictive import licensing requireme nts. Australia has made clear on 
numerous occasions that it is seeking stability and predictability in the global pulses market and 
ensuring measures are WTO  consistent. Australia does not believe this is an unreasonable request 
to a WTO  Member, particular ly such an important and large country like India. It is what Members  
should all strive to achieve in the interests of farmers, traders and consumers alike.  
25.8.   Australia has posed a series of questions at the last meeting of the Council in June, and in 
late 2 019, including providing them to India in writing , and has still not received a response. Australia  
will avoid repeat ing the questions, but notes that it was  requesting India to provide a detailed 
explanation of how India's QRs satisfied the requirements o f GATT  Article  XI:2(c)(ii) and 
Article  XX(a) and (b), which Australia does not believe are appropriate or legally available in respect 
of India's import restrictions on pulses.  Australia again requests India to provide prompt and fulsome 
responses bilatera lly, and table those responses in this Council  expeditiously; or otherwise it 
request s India to remove the measures immediately.  
25.9.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
25.10.   The United States has repeatedly stated its concerns with India's use of domestic support 
policies, multiple increases in tariff rates, and the application of quantitative import restrictions for 
pulses including pigeon peas, mung beans, black gram lentils , and peas. The US  concerns remain 
unchanged.  Despite India stating several times that its QRs on pulses were temporary, in April the 
Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued Trade Notice No.  05/2020 -21 extending QRs on 
pulses for the Indian fiscal year through 31 March  2021.  Therefore, the US  request s that India 
confirm that these allegedly "temporary " measures will be permanently removed starting 
1 April 2021.  
25.11.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
25.12.   Ukraine would like to reiterate its conc erns about India 's pulse s policy.  Despite the systemic 
concerns expressed by Members at almost all meetings of the Committee on Agriculture, the C MA, 
and the CTG, India has continued to impose QRs on import s along with other trade -distorting policies 
in relation to various pulses for about three  years and not provided substantial explanations as to 
the nature and duration of such restrictive measures. Needless to say, such measures have a 
destructive effect o n the international pulse crop markets.  As a result, Ukraine 's export s of pulses 
to India have been negatively affected and dropped significantly.  
25.13.   India's import restrictive measures seem to violate both GATT  Article  XI and Article  4 of the 
AoA, although I ndia does not want to agree with this and refers to Article  XX of the GATT  1994. 
Ukraine believes that measures such as QRs, minimum import prices and limitations of  imports to 
one single port of entry can hardly be justified as not violating the requireme nts of Art icle 4.2 of the 
AoA. Ukraine also stresses that India 's QRs are not temporary and transparent as Article  XI:2(c) of 
GATT requires.  Ukraine would like to ask India when its pulse s policy will be changed and import 
restrictive measures eliminated i n order to guarantee predictable trade opportunities to access 
India's pulses market . 
25.14.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
25.15.   As the largest supplier of pulses to India, Canada has been most negatively affected by 
India's measures to limit the import of pulses. Pulses are an important source of protein for many 
Indian consumers and Canada is a high quality and reliable supplier.  Canada is disappointed that 
India continues to use QRs on the import of dried peas and other pulses. This situation ha s been 
going on for more than two  years for peas and three  years for other types of pulses.  It is difficult 
for Canada to see how India can still be claiming these measures to be temporary. The combination 
of a prohibitive minimum import price, import quot a of zero  tonnes and restriction on the port of 
entry constitutes a perfect storm of measures that is blocking all access for yellow dried peas to G/C/M/138  
 
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  India for an entire year. As expressed in other committees, these measures violate both GATT  Article 
XI:2(c) and Article  4 of the A oA. 
25.16.   In the June  2020 CTG, India justified these measures by arguing that Article  4.2 of the A oA 
did not envisage the tariffication of temporary or short -term measures, and that consequently 
Article  4.2 of the A oA should not extend to GATT  1994 Article  XI:2(c). However, Canada questions 
the validity of such a rationale.  The Appellate Body report in Indonesia  – Import Licensing Regime  
clearly ruled that "Members cannot maintain quantitative import restrictions on agricultural products 
that satisfy the requirements of Article  XI:2(c) of the GATT  1994 without violating Article  4.2 of the 
AoA." 
25.17.   The elimination of QRs was and is a fundamental principle of the GATT and the A oA. 
Article  4.2 of the A oA prohibits Members from maintain ing, resort ing to, or revert ing agriculture -
specific non -tariff measures. Such measures include quantitative import restrictions, minimum 
import prices, and discretionary import licensing as currently being used by India.  To conclude, 
Canada reiterates its call  for India to immediately and expeditiously review the measures it has in 
place on pulse imports and to implement alternative, less trade -distorting, WTO -consistent policy 
options that promote a predictable and transparent import regime for pulses.  
25.18.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.19.   Unfortunately, there is no positive progress to report since our last meeting in June. The 
EU's previous comments are unfortunately still valid. The EU finds it hard to comprehend that after 
three  years of quantitative import restrictions in place, India is unable and unwilling to reply as to 
how its policy conforms to WTO  rules. For over three  years, India has conveyed that the measures 
were temporary. After three  years the measures are clearly not tempo rary. The EU urges India to 
eliminate these trade -distorting measures as soon as possible.  
25.20.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
25.21.   Argentina wishes to echo the concerns raised by those who requested this item, which relate 
to the legal basis and  alleged temporary nature of the measure implemented by India, which restricts 
imports of certain pulses.  
25.22.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
25.23.   India would like to thank the delegations of the Australia, Canada, the European Union, the 
Russian Fed eration, Ukraine, the United States, and Argentina for their continued interest in this 
matter. Most of the issues raised today have also been raised in the earlier meetings of this Council  
as well as in other Committees. Most recently, in the  CMA meeting held on 12  November  2020. In 
this context, India would like to reiterate that the objective of this measure is to cater to the food 
and livelihood security of small and marginal farmers. India submits that a mere increase in tariffs 
on pulses has n ot been sufficient to handle the prevailing domestic demand and supply situation of 
pulses in India. India's government has been regularly reviewing this measure based on the market 
situation of pulses, owing to which the quota of pulses has been increased  from time to time.  
25.24.   A few Members have sought to know relevant specific WTO  provisions under which India has 
imposed these measures. India's delegation has replied earlier that the QRs on pulses are necessary 
for the enforcement of governmental measures to  remove any surplus of pulses, as permitted under 
Article  XI(2)(c)(ii) of the GATT  1994, and the protection of public morals and human, animal , or 
plant life or health in India, as recognized under Article  XX(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994.  India 
believes tha t the General Exceptions under Article  XX allow a Member to impose measures necessary 
to protect its small and marginal farmers ' food and livelihood security.  
25.25.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
25.26.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/138  
 
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  26  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  
26.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation s of the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand, respectively,  had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
26.2.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.3.   This is a long -standing agenda item. The European  Union  already stressed that an announced 
shift towards more trade openness and a deeper integration of Indonesia in world trade, which the 
EU welcome s, cannot result solely in measures to improve the country 's trade balance and an 
exclusive focus on promoting e xports and attracting investments. To truly integrate in global value 
chains, a country also needs to be open to increasing imports. Creating a trade and 
investment -friendly climate is necessary to achieve this result. The EU is therefore encouraged by 
the passing by the Indonesian Parliament of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation . The Bill is designed 
to stimulate domestic and foreign investment by removing bureaucratic inefficiencies and excessive 
licensing requirements as well as opaque, overlapping and cont radictory regulations. A host of 
implementing regulations will have to be passed in the coming month s and the EU  is looking forward 
to see ing the trade facilitation effect of those measures.  
26.4.   However, as of today, the EU  trade and investment relations with Indonesia continue to be 
hampered by a long list of pervasive non -tariff barriers. The list of measures is long, and the EU will 
only elaborate on recent developments. On the export restrictions side, as of 1  January  2020 the 
ban on nickel export has been brought forward by two  years. Although the EU understands the 
Government objective of developing the downstream sector of minerals , this policy, inconsistent 
with the WTO  obligations of Indonesia, is creating distortions to international prices and adds 
uncertainty to the sector . Imports of food and agricultural products in Indonesia are hampered by 
the lack of transparency and undue delays in SPS  import approval procedures. The EU is in particular 
concerned by the lack of progress on its export application s on beef, dairy, poultry, pork and plant 
products, which in some instances were submitted more than six years ago. On most of the 
34 EU pending applications, Indonesia has failed to provide any feedback for many years. Moreover, 
Indonesia has only concluded the approval procedure and opened the market in very few cases. The 
long-lasting period needed for risk assessment is also not justified from a scientific point of view.  
26.5.   Recently, the EU  industry also warned that a new legislation (Regulation No.  77 of 2019 
regarding the "Second  Amendment on the Ministry of Trade Regulation No.  85/M-DAG/PER/10/2015 
regarding the Provisions on the Imports of Textiles and Textile Products ") aims at preventing 
importation of a significant number of textiles and texti le products by means of an extremely 
complex import licensing scheme. Since January  2020, those products can only be imported to meet 
the processing needs of domestic producers and small or mid -sized industries. This legislation has 
not been notified in ac cordance with WTO  terms.  Moreover, the EU is  concerned about the Ministry 
of Trade Regulation No.  68/2020 of 28  August  2020 concerning Provisions for the Imports of 
Footwear, Electronics, and Two -Wheeled and Tricycle Bicycles, clearly aiming at suppressing  the 
imports of the targeted consumer goods.  
26.6.   The EU would also like to raise the de facto  ban that some products of EU  origin have suffered 
in the last years. Without any formal notification or justification, imports of alcoholic beverages and 
dairy produc ts have been denied access to the Indonesian market in 2019 and 2020. Although dairy 
importers received licences in June  2020 and just recently there was information of a partial 
unblocking of the import licences for alcoholic beverages, the EU is expectin g the Indonesian 
Government to fully re -establish normal terms of trade, by allowing importers to place EU  products 
on the Indonesian market and fulfil their customers ' orders. The EU recalls  that the denial of import 
licences to products of EU  origin, and  products of EU  origin only, is in blatant violation of Indonesia 's 
WTO commitments.  
26.7.   Finally, uncertainty continue s to surround the implementation of Law No. 33/2014 – also 
known as the Halal Law. Government Regulation No . 31 of 2019 on the Implementation of Law 
No. 33 of 2014 entered into force in May  2019. None of those measures has been notified to the 
TBT Committee. The European Union would request Indonesia to provide clarification on the specific 
products covered within the defined categories (Halal and Haram). Furthermore, Indonesia 's G/C/M/138  
 
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  requirement for a bilateral government -to-government Mutual Recognition Agreement as a 
pre-condition for the Indonesian Halal Product Assurance Agency (BPJPH) to start recogni zing 
Halal-certifying agen cies in a foreign country is complicated in practice and unnecessarily 
burdensome. The additional registration requirement for Halal certifications issued by foreign bodies 
appears to be duplicative and time -consuming. The EU  therefore invite s Indonesia to  consider less 
cumbersome practical solutions to continue recogni zing Halal certifying institutions and to provide 
further information on the technical implementation of the cooperation between BPJPH and foreign 
Halal agencies. The EU also calls upon Indon esia to keep Halal certification and Halal labelling 
voluntary as a less trade restrictive measure, and not to impose non -Halal labelling for products or 
services not claimed by the producer as being Halal.  The EU considers that "non-Halal" labelling is 
unnecessary and creates an excessive burden for operators. The EU  refers for more detail to its 
comments and questions raised in the TBT  Committee.  
26.8.   To sum up, the EU  urges Indonesia to fully restore market access to EU  alcohol beverages, in 
compliance with i ts WTO  obligations , and asks to reduce the high number of trade barriers and to 
refrain from issuing new ones, in line with its commitments in the G -20. 
26.9.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
26.10.   Unfortunately, Japan continues to have concerns over Ind onesia 's local content requirement 
measures. Japan does  not wish to repeat its concerns as those were  expressed in this Council and 
other relevant committees.  Focusing on new developments, Japan  would like to note that it has  still 
been observing an increasing number of trade restricting measures that may not be consistent with 
WTO Agreements.  For example, Indonesia has newly introduced a local content requirement 
measure for TV  equipment.  On Indonesia 's safeguard measures on carpets and other textile floor 
coverings, Japan is  disappointed as it is not able to receive any reasonable explanation from 
Indonesia during Committee on Safeguard s and bilateral consultation s. Japan  remain s concerned 
and disappointed as it sees  new trad e restrictive measures being introduced.  Indonesia has 
explained that it has been conducting a comprehensive review of these measures. Japan would 
appreciate any specific details and updates on the plans Indonesia will adopt as well as on the latest 
situat ion regarding these measures.  
26.11.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
26.12.   New Zealand welcomes Indonesia ' s commitment to implement the WTO  decision under 
WTO Case DS477 -478 and the steps that have been taken to date. New Zealand echoes the concer ns 
raised by the European Union and Japan. New Zealand believes that Indonesia 's restrictions on 
agricultural imports undermine core WTO  principles. New Zealand is particularly concerned about 
the inconsistent issuance of import licen ces. Delays in import licences earlier this year prevented 
commercially meaningful access for New Zealand horticultural products to the Indonesia market for 
a significant proportion of our export season. With the 2021 import season opening this month for 
import licensing applic ations, it looks forward to the timely issuance of commercially meaningful 
import licen ces to allow trade to flow freely for the season. New Zealand requests an update from 
Indonesia on how the issues previously experienced will be addressed ahead of the 2 021 season.  
26.13.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
26.14.   Australia welcomes the opportunity to comment on this agenda item. Australia  share s 
Members ' concerns regarding Indonesia 's import restricting measures, particularly import licensing 
restrictions on agricultural products. Australia  notes that a number of Indonesia 's import policies 
continue to unnecessarily restrict and impact Australian exports. Australia encourages Indonesi a to 
bring all its measures into compliance with its WTO  obligations. Australia  thank s Indonesia for its 
engagement with Australia to date on this issue and request s this continues to ensure any delays 
are resolved and trade can resume.  
26.15.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
26.16.   This Council is well aware of the breadth of concerns the United States has  with Indonesia 's 
trade and investment regime.  In previous interventions in this body, the US has  reviewed in some 
detail the broad range of  its concerns including localization requirements, import licensing 
requirements, standards requirements, pre -shipment inspection requirements, and export G/C/M/138  
 
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  restrictions, including taxes and prohibitions, among others.  These types of restrictions affect a 
broad range of sectors.  
26.17.   The US  would like to focus its remarks today on Indonesia 's application of tariffs on certain 
ICT products that raise serious concerns regarding its WTO  bound tariff commitments.  The US  
continue s to note concerns that Indonesia is appl ying tariffs at the border on a category of 
ICT products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments.  For example, Indonesia has 
a duty -free tariff commitment for all products that are classified under tariff subheading  8517.62. 
However, US and Indonesian traders report that a 10 % duty is being levied for certain products in 
this tariff category.  
26.18.   The US has  been raising this issue repeatedly with Indonesia over the past year including in 
the Market Access and ITA  Committees as well as bilaterally.  Unfortunately, Indonesia has yet to 
provide a substantive response to the US  concerns.  US companies have also engaged the Indonesian 
government directly on this issue, seeking clarification of Indonesia 's application of these tariffs. 
Despite their efforts, they too have yet to receive a satisfactory response from Indonesia.  
26.19.   The costs of Indonesia 's policies in this space are not insignificant. Indonesia 's tariffs not 
only impose an unfair financial burden on foreign firms, but they also limit access for Indonesian 
consumers and firms to important high -tech products.  The US is  hopeful that raising this issue today 
can help move towards an expeditious resolution of this issue  and thank s the Indonesian delegation 
in advance for its engagement.  
26.20.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
26.21.   Indonesia took note of concerns by the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the US 
regarding Indonesia 's foreign export authorizations. Indonesia is now in the process of making a 
better foreign trade and i nvestment climate through a series of regulations and policy improvements. 
The current one is the Omnibus Law. Indonesia is doing its best to address concerns by Members in 
the relevant committees, and would like to highlight that, according to its statist ic import of goods 
remains stable amidst this present pandemic situation and despite the concerns raised. Specifically, 
Indonesia would like to address the local content provision in terms of three  aspects: first , in relation 
to government procurement poli cy; second, in relation to policies which fulfil the need to maintain 
Indonesian peoples ' welfare and their life necessities; and third, in relation to policies on strategic 
resources.  
26.22.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements m ade. 
26.23.   The Council so agreed . 
27  MEXICO – FRONT OF PACK NUTRITION LABELING (NOM -51) – REQUEST FROM THE 
UNITED STATES  
27.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the United States  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
27.2.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
27.3.   The United States has provided comments on, and continuously raised concerns with, Mexico 's 
notification of NOM -051, "General Labeling Specification s for Pre -Packaged Foods and Non -Alcoholic 
Drinks – Commercial and Health Information ". The US  wants to thank Mexico for providing clarifying 
guidance to address delays at the border caused by confusion over whether food service products 
are subject to app lication of NOM -051. The guidance has mitigated the backup that US exporters 
were experiencing at the border. The United States, however, continues to have concerns that 
NOM-051, intended to address public health, may be more trade restrictive than necessa ry to meet 
Mexico 's legitimate health objectives, may not be based on robust scientific evidence, does not 
appear to consider the relevant international standards, and may contribute to consumer confusion. 
Most recently, the US is  concerned about unnotifie d amendments in Mexican law stemming from 
NOM-51 setting caffeine limits on beverages.  G/C/M/138  
 
- 62 - 
 
  27.4.   In addition, the United States raised its concern at the October meeting of the TBT  Committee 
regarding several unprecedented measures related to NOM -051, including Mexico's proposed 
amendment to its Regulation on Sanitary Control of Products and Services and its state regulations 
restricting the sale of food and beverages to minors. While the US is  pleased to hear that processed 
products can continue to be fortified with  vitamins and minerals, it remain s concerned that Mexico 's 
Sanitary Control regulation seeks to restrict use of characters, animations, cartoons, celebrities, 
athletes or pets, or interactive elements, such as games or digital downloads, when products requ ire 
a front of pack warning label for excessive sugar, fat, salt, or calories, in compliance with NOM -051. 
In addition, any advertising of such products requires pre -approval from the Comisión Federal para 
la Protección contra Riesgos Sanitarios (COFEPRIS) . These restrictions limit a company 's ability to 
promote its product with consumers and compete in the market, while the pre -approval of 
advertising is burdensome and likely to result in delays that negatively impact sales of foods and 
beverages.  
27.5.   The Unit ed States  continue s to remain concerned that the Mexican States of Oaxaca and 
Tabasco have published measures banning the sale of foods and beverages that carry a front of pack 
warning label for sugar, fat, salt, or calories over certain thresholds, in com pliance with NOM -051. 
The US  understand s that 25 of the 32  states in Mexico are considering enacting restrictions and a 
federal ban is also being contemplated.  Preliminary industry and market research firms estimate 
that more than 80 % of the pre -packaged f oods and non -alcoholic beverages in Mexico will have at 
least one  warning label, meaning they could not be purchased or provided to minors except by a 
parent or guardian, and not at all if the parent is under the age of 18.  These measures could affect 
up to $3.4  billion in trade from the United States to Mexico.  
27.6.   In addition, the US has  learned via communications through our respective Enquiry Points 
that Mexico does not believe that state -level measures should be notified to the 
WTO TBT Committee, and there fore does not plan to do so. In the United States ' view, these 
measures form part of a larger package of measures that include federal level technical regulations, 
and therefore should be notified to the WTO.  Can Mexico explain why it believes the measures should 
not be notified?  
27.7.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
27.8.   Costa Rica wishes to thank the delegation of the United States for bringing this matter to the 
attention of the C TG. Costa Rica, like other delegations, has expressed its systemic and trade -related 
concer ns at Mexico 's proposal on front -of-pack nutrition labelling in the TBT  Committee. As things 
currently stand worldwide in light of the COVID -19 pandemic, the implementation of measures of 
this kind constitutes a challenge that hampers worldwide economic re covery efforts, especially in 
countries that depend on trade in agricultural and agri -food products. Costa Rica urges Mexico to 
review the implementation period, to ensure that it is based on science and on work relating to 
international standards, such as  that being done on front -of-pack nutrition labelling in the context 
of the Codex Alimentarius.  
27.9.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
27.10.   Guatemala would like to thank the United States for bringing this item to the agenda. 
Guatemala is concerned with the Mexican rule that has come into force and that it does not take on 
board the concerns aired by Members in the different committees where it was discussed. This type 
of measure tends to trigger unnecessary distortions to trade as these are measures  which could be 
considered optional to limit trade beyond what is necessary.  
27.11.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
27.12.   Paraguay supports Mexico 's goal to protect public health and considers that the provision of 
nutritional information for the cons umer would be an appropriate strategy. Having said that, 
Paraguay shares the concern expressed by other countries regarding the mandatory declaration of 
added sugar, which is not provided for under Codex guidelines. Furthermore, Paraguay is also 
concerned that there is no analytical method for distinguishing total sugars from added sugars to a 
food, which renders enforcement difficult, since this is dependent on the information provided by 
the industry. The absence of harmonization based on international gu idelines regarding nutritional G/C/M/138  
 
- 63 - 
 
  information labelling could pose a barrier to trade among countries. Paraguay urges Mexico to take 
these observations into consideration and review this measure.  
27.13.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
27.14.   Mexico thanks t he US  delegation for its interest in Mexican Official Standard NOM -051 
SCFI/SSA1  2010: General specifications for the labelling of pre -packaged food and non -alcoholic 
beverages. Mexico would like to refer to its technically detailed statements from previou s 
TBT Committees and to the statement delivered at the last CTG.6 Mexico is developing a 
comprehensive national strategy that seeks to combat public health issues in the country, such as 
obesity and excess weight, in both adults and minors, the effects of  which have been further exposed 
by the COVID -19 pandemic. The state measures that have been approved in some Mexican states, 
relating to the sale of certain pre -packaged products and non -alcoholic beverages to minors, and 
the adjustments to instruments li ke the Ministry of Health 's Regulations on Sanitary Control of 
Products and Services, are aimed at strengthening this new national strategy and making it coherent. 
Mexico would like to reiterate that its aim is not to create unnecessary barriers to interna tional trade, 
but rather, to achieve a legitimate objective. Mexico welcomes and takes note of the statements 
made today and reiterates its commitment to pursuing an open dialogue.  
27.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
27.16.   The Council so agreed . 
At this point of the meeting, at the outset  of the second day, the Chair person  and the delegation of 
the United States referred to the conduct of the current meeting .7 
28  MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
28.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communica tion dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
 
6 See document  G/C/M/137, paras.  13.23 -13.27; document  G/TBT/M/82, paras.  2.42-2.43. 
7 The Chair person  referred to the Technical Note that had been sent to Members before the meetin g 
outlining the time -limits for interventions. The same Technical Note had also been sent for the June meeting. He 
indicated that he had followed the recommendations in the Technical Note because he considered it important 
to advance with the agenda. The a im of all Members was to resolve issues, and the best way of doing so was to 
focus the discussion on new issues, and not to repeat old ones. Instead, delegations could refer to previous 
statements. He noted that in his 20  years of experience at the Ministr y of Foreign Affairs in Sweden he had learnt 
that keeping statements short and to the point was crucial. The key messages could be made at the meeting 
and then further technical details could be provided in the written statements. Furthermore, in other int ernational 
organizations the time for oral interventions could be much shorter, and most WTO  Members were also members 
of those organizations. The Chair person  noted that, under agenda item "Other Business", he would invite 
delegations to an informal meetin g to explore their views on this subject.  
 
The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
 
The United States only wanted to make a brief intervention to register its concern with some of the 
modifications imposed on Members yesterday, which app ear, now that they have been put into practice, to 
restrict or undermine the effectiveness of the Council as a forum for discussing and resolving trade issues. The 
US has on several previous occasions stated that it does not support the modifications propo sed by some other 
Members, many of them adopted by the Chair yesterday, and wanted to once again restate its concerns, and 
clarify for the record, that these modifications are not the result of a Committee consensus. The US fully shares 
the Chair's objecti ve of making the CTG a more effective forum for discussion and believes that improvements 
are needed, and possible. However, the US believes that these new procedures are not the correct path to 
achieve this goal. In fact, the US  is troubled by the "path o f least resistance" culture that they seem to be 
encouraging. The US would welcome a continuation of the consultation process on improving the committee 
functioning. Members should be focused on encouraging and increasing a collective expectation of substa ntive 
responses and engagement, and the US would like to work with the Chair towards that goal. In the meantime, 
the US would ask that Members be afforded the time they believe is necessary to raise issues or respond to each 
other, that Members put on the record what they believe to be the most appropriate, and that any subjective or 
normative characterization about new or old information or issues be avoided, since these terms can have 
unintended prejudicial impacts.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  28.2.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
28.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statement made du ring the previous meeting of the 
Council concerning Mongolia 's measures applied with respect to importation of certain agricultural 
products.  Since 2013, Mongolia has used a quota regime for importation of certain agricultural 
products. Mongolia did not op en quotas for import s of bottled water, liquid milk , and wheat flour for 
2020. However, these products were not excluded from the list of agricultural products subject to 
annual QRs, which means that the quotas may be imposed in the future.  
28.4.   Mongolia 's quot a regime continues to be inconsistent with Mongolia 's obligations under 
WTO Agreements, in particular, Article  XI of the GATT  1994 and Article 4.2 of the A oA, as well as 
Mongolia 's accession commitments under para graph  20 of its Working Party Report. In light of this, 
the Russian Federation expects Mongolia to clarify when it is going to abolish the quota regime on 
importation of certain agricultural products, as Mongolia previously stated that the quota regime 
was implemented temporarily until  the Enrichment Law came into force in December  2019.  
28.5.   The Russian Federation also has concerns regard ing the Enrichment Law, which sets out the 
mandatory requirements for wheat flour to be fortified with vitamins and mineral compounds in 
order to be market ed. The measure in question is a technical regulation under Annex  1 of the 
TBT Agreement as it sets product characteristics and requirements for production methods. The 
technical regulations shall not be elaborated, adopted , and applied in a discriminative  and 
trade -restrictive manner. Besides, Mongolia has not provided a period for comments and a 
reasonable interval between publication and entry into force of this regulation.  
28.6.   The Russian Federation  request s Mongolia to suspend the Law, to notify it to the WTO, to take 
into account the comments of WTO  Members , and to provide a reasonable interval for adaptation.  
The Russian Federation has raised certain issues with respect to the application of Mongolia 's quota 
regime and the Law on the Enrichment of Food Products in various WTO  Committee meetings, 
including the TBT  Committee. The Russian Federation  would like to ask Mongolia to provide its 
feedback on these issues.  The Russian Federation expects Mongolia to take all further necessary 
steps to bring its legis lation and measures in to compliance with the relevant WTO  provisions. The 
Russian Federation  will continue to monitor the revisions to Mongolia 's quota policy and food nutrition 
measures carefully.  
28.7.   The delegate of Mongolia  indicated the following:  
28.8.   Mongolia  thanks the Russian Federation for its continued interest in Mongolia 's trade policy.  
Mongolia would like to reiterate its statement delivered at the CTG's previous meeting , as well as 
those given at the meetings of the Committee on Agriculture, the C MA, and the TBT  Committee this 
year. Mongolia reported that the import prohibitions had been removed since April  2018 and that 
import quotas on wheat flour and liquid milk had been abolished since the beginning of this year 
following the recommendations of the National Food Security Council in November  2019. These 
products are entering the market without any quota. The measures are being taken step -by-step. 
28.9.   With regard to the specific concerns of the Russian Federation that were raised bil aterally, 
Mongolia  would like to inform Members that internal consultations are taking place, including the 
necessary amendments to the Food Law.  Mongolia informs Members that all necessary measures 
continue to be taken by its Government in order to bring the laws and regulations into conformity 
with WTO  rules. These measures include the draft Trade Law and the draft Safeguards Regulations.  
28.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
28.11.   The Council so agreed . 
29  NIGERIA – FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS AFFECTING DAIRY IMPORTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
29.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 Novembe r 2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/138  
 
- 65 - 
 
  29.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.3.   The EU would like to indeed bring to the attention of the CTG the restrictions impos ed by 
Nigeria as of February this year as regards access to foreign currency for the importation of dairy 
products and its derivatives.  The EU already raised a question to Nigeria in the meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture in July, when Nigeria justifi ed the measure under GATT  Article  XII (related 
to the Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments), Article  XVIII (Governmental Assistance 
to Economic Development) as well as Article  XXI (on security exceptions).  While the EU fully 
understands the exceptional economic circumstances for Nigeria, the EU continues to be concerned 
that this measure is applied to protect domestic industry in a manner which is not compatible with 
WTO rules.  Actually, the Central Bank of Nigeria published a  press release indicating that this 
measure was aimed at promoting the local production of milk in Nigeria. Prima facie  this measure 
was not therefore justified by balance -of-payments issues.  
29.4.   While recogni zing the provisions of GATT  Article  XII and Article  XVIII(b), as well as the 
Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance -of-Payments Purposes adopted in 
November  1979, the EU would appreciate if Nigeria could explain how it intends to fulfil its 
commitments, as set out in the Understanding on the Balan ce-of-Payments Provisions of GATT  1994, 
and in particular:  (i) to "announce publicly, as soon as possible, time -schedules for the removal of 
restrictive import measures taken for balance -of-payments purposes " and to explain why if this is 
not done;  (ii) "give preference to those measures which have the least disruptive effect on trade "; 
(iii) "justify why price -based measures are not adequate " if QRs are imposed.  
29.5.   Could Nigeria explain how the measure complies with the Declaration on Trade Measures 
Taken for  Balance -of-Payments Purposes adopted in November  1979, which specifies that measures 
should not be taken "for the purpose of protecting a particular industry or sector "? As regards the 
justification given by Nigeria under GATT  Article  XXI (National Security) could Nigeria further explain 
in which precise way the measure is expected to address Nigeria 's national security difficulties, and 
in particular illustrate what is the underlying emergency in international relations as provided for in 
GATT  Article  XXI(b)(iii)?  Finally, the EU would appreciate clarifications from Nigeria on how the 
backward integration program me works in practice (notably the eligibility criteria) as well as how 
much flexibility there is as regards the inclusion of other companies in th e list of six companies 
published on 11  February  2020.  
29.6.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
29.7.   Nigeria wishes to thank the EU for its interest in Nigeria's  measure regulating access to Foreign 
Exchange (Forex) from the official Forex Market for Milk and Dairy Products Importation. The EU had 
raised a similar question at the 93rd Committee on Agriculture Meeting and Nigeria has responded 
through the AGIMS  ID 93016. However, since the issue has been placed on the agenda of this 
Council, Nigeria's  delegation wishes to provide the following clarifications.  
29.8.   Nigeria relies heavily on oil as its main source of foreign exchange government revenues. The 
sharp decline in demand and prices of oil in recent years negatively impacted N igeria 's external 
reserve and exerted unprecedented pressure on our currency (Naira). This is further exacerbated 
by the COVID –19 pandemic , which triggered exceptional reversals in capital flows as a result of 
decreased global risk appetite. These developm ents have significantly weakened Nigeria 's ability to 
finance its import s, undermine its Balance -of-Payment position , and increase Nigeria 's chances of 
defaulting on its sovereign debt if timely and appropriate measures are not taken. The Nigeria n 
measure regulating access to Forex from the official Forex market for Milk and Dairy Products 
Importation is a temporary measure taken within the framework of Article  XII of GATT  1994 to avert 
a looming economic catastrophe. As we speak , the Nigerian economy has s lipped into recession. 
This is Nigeria 's second  recession in the last four years.  
29.9.   Nigeria is also saddled with severe livelihood and extreme poverty difficulties with over 62% 
of Nigeria 's population of 190  million still living in extreme poverty condition s. This measure was 
taken within the framework of paragraph  4(a) of Article  XVIII of the GATT  1994 to address Nigeria 's 
livelihood and extreme poverty difficulties. It is also pertinent to note that Section  B of Article  XVIII 
(paragraph  8 to 12 of Article  XVIII) provides for special balance -of-payment exceptions for 
developing countries, like Nigeria,  experiencing the difficulties mentioned above.  Nigeria 's extreme 
poverty and livelihood security difficulties, as well as its high rate of youth unemployment (23% as G/C/M/138  
 
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  at 2019), has also triggered an exponential increase in social ills and vices which have further 
worsen ed our national security situation. This m easure is part of temporary measures taken to 
address Nigeria 's national security difficulties.  
29.10.   It is pertinent to note that it is not Nigeria 's intention to restrict access to its Market or 
discriminate between locally produced and imported milk and dairy  products. The temporary 
measure only relates to criteria for accessing Forex from the official Forex Market for Milk and Dairy 
Products Importation. All companies  including those that are eligible under the measure to access 
Forex from the official Forex market are free to source Forex from other sources for the importation 
of milk and dairy products.  Regarding the specific question that the EU  delegation raised in this 
Council, Nigeria  would  appreciate it if the EU could forward the question formally to e nable Nigeria  
to respond appropriately, because the EU made a reference to some WTO  provisions that Nigeria  
needs to clarify and is willing to provide such clarification as soon as it receive s the formal request 
from the EU regarding its question.  In concl usion, Nigeria wishes to state that this measure was 
necessitated by extraordinary economic circumstances and force majeure . 
29.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
29.12.   The Council so agreed . 
30  PANAMA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM COSTA RICA  
30.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of Costa Rica had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
30.2.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
30.3.   Costa Rica wishes to express its deep concern regarding the growing number of unjustified 
import restrictions that Panama has been implementing, and the negative impact that these 
measures have had on bilateral and regional trade. The  adverse effects of these measures are being 
accentuated by the high level of economic vulnerability caused by the COVID -19 pandemic. Costa 
Rica has been facing unjustified obstacles to its tomato exports since 2011 and the situation 
deteriorated last year  following Panama 's implementation of new barriers for bananas, plantains, 
pineapples , and strawberries from Costa Rica.  
30.4.   Furthermore, new measures were taken on 30  June this year, which led to the sudden closure 
of the Panamanian market to imports of dairy  products, pork, beef, processed poultry meat, 
sausages and fish food from Costa Rica and other regional partners. The matter was raised at the 
Committee on Agriculture meeting in July. Unfortunately, in addition to the de facto  closure of the 
Panamanian m arket to imports of dairy products in June, Panama, in its most recent communication, 
signalled its intention to eliminate its bound tariff rate quotas for liquid and evaporated milk. Both 
matters were addressed in the SPS  Committee and the C MA in November . During these meetings, 
Costa Rica again highlighted Panama 's apparent breaches of its obligations under the 
SPS Agreement and its MFN  treatment obligation under Article s I:1 and XI:1 of the GATT on the 
non-adoption of import restrictions or prohibitions.  
30.5.   Costa Rica has sought dialogue with the various Panamanian authorities in order to 
understand their reasoning and find mutually satisfactory solutions. To date, these efforts have not 
yielded results. Despite multiple bilateral meetings in recent months, the Panamanian authorities 
refuse to explain the reasons for the implementation of measures that are inconsistent with regional 
and multilateral trade rules. Instead, they have focused their argument on form and time 
infringements and have emphasized the n eed to reduce their trade gap with Costa Rica as a valid 
argument for the imposition of their measures, which, pursuant to bilateral, regional and multilateral 
trade rules, does not constitute grounds for the measures applied.  
30.6.   Costa Rica is concerned that Panama 's trade policies in the agricultural sector are shifting 
towards protectionist measures that deliberately obstruct trade and are clearly inconsistent with 
Panama 's WTO  commitments. Such measures have become even more damaging against the 
backdrop of the pandemic. This is particularly the case given the highly sensitive nature of the goods 
in question, especially dairy products.  Costa Rica remains willing to give dialogue in good faith 
another chance and will do so for as long as is reasona ble and warranted by the circumstances. In G/C/M/138  
 
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  this vein, Costa Rica  respectfully and strongly urge s the Panamanian authorities to uphold their 
WTO commitments and lift the import prohibitions preventing the normal flow of trade between the 
two countries.  
30.7.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
30.8.   Mexico  thank s Costa Rica for having raised this item on today 's agenda and join s this concern 
as expressed by that delegation with regard to what seem to be protectionist measures that are 
resulting in regional trade restrictions.  Mexico has continued in its dialogue with Panama to find a 
solution to its concerns. However, Mexico  must, at this stage, point out that there has been a lack 
of response from the authorities in that country with regard to the renewal of certain Mexican 
exporters ' in pasteurized milk and other animal products.  This issue has been raised here as well as 
in the  SPS Committee.  
30.9.   Mexico  also express es its  interest in the most recent communication received from Panama 
in G/SECRET/45 of 12  August, in which it sets out its intention to remove bound tariff quota rates 
for liquid milk. The proposed modification would rem ove tariff rate quotas and preferences with 
regard to the very high bound and applied tariff rates in these products.  Mexico  therefore express es 
its interest in the procedural aspects as well as the protection of its rights.  Mexico , like Costa Rica, 
calls for the modification of the Schedule under Article  XXVIII and the fact that this requires 
negotiation and compensation.  Mexico  therefore urge s Panama to continue in constructive dialogue 
to address the concerns with regard to the trend and impact its measu res are having.  
30.10.   The representative of Panama  indicated the following:  
30.11.   Panama  takes note of Costa Rica 's comments and will forward its statement to Capital.  With 
regard to dairy products, Panama  held consultations with Costa Rica on 16  November. Panama is 
following the procedures under Article  XXVIII and is exercising the rights enjoyed by all Members, 
including Costa Rica.  As to plant certification, Costa Rica 's comments are not new , and the sit uation 
has not changed , since the last two  occasions on which Costa Rica raised its concerns.  Panama  would 
like to summarize what it has already said on the matter.  
30.12.   It has not been possible to inspect the plants referred to by Costa Rica since 2013. Their 
animal and plant health certifications for export to Panama would have expired shortly thereafter.  
In spite of this, with a view to facilitating trade, and in light of the close trade ties uniting the two  
countries, Panama has temporarily and voluntarily e xtended the periods for approval of plants until 
June 2020.  Obviously, this extension does not mean that Panama is waiving its rights under any 
WTO Agreement, including the SPS  Agreement, or under any other Agreement between our 
countries.  Throughout this temporary extension, Panama has been in constant communication with 
Costa Rica, with a view to Costa Rica initiating the process to renew the certifications.  
30.13.   Moreover, throughout this period, and to date, instead of initiating the necessary assessment 
and certification process, Costa Rica has preferred to argue on various grounds that Panama does 
not have the right to conduct its assessment to ensure food safety, and to protect human life and 
health and the country 's animals and plants.  The authorities in Panama  are still in contact. Panama 
remains fully committed to resolving the situation if Costa Rica decides to initiate the appropriate 
assessment and certification process. Panama  will inform our Capital of any comments made today.  
The delegate of Costa R ica thank ed Panama for its repl y and expressed his readiness to provide a 
written copy of its statement to Panama.  
30.14.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
30.15.   The Council so agreed . 
31  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRA CTICES – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
31.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/138  
 
- 68 - 
 
  31.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
31.3.   The Russian Federation continues to apply a policy of import substitution and forced 
localization of production which is contrary to the spirit and often also to the letter of 
WTO commitments. Mor eover, this policy is being expanded and developed further.  Unfortunately, 
the concerns the EU  expressed at the Council 's meeting in June remain  and the EU would like to 
touch more particularly on five  issues of concern . First, in addition to the EU's  previous statements, 
the EU  would like to note that over this summer Russia amended Federal Law No . 223 "On the 
Procurement of Goods, Works, Services by Certain Types of Legal Entities " with provisions expanding 
the economic activity subject to this law. There  is a requirement for the government to adopt a 
decree establishing quotas for foreign products in public procurement by SOEs and some unspecified 
private entities.  The draft Russian government decree is designed to limit imports of foreign products 
if the se products are procured by the state -owned enterprises and some commercial entities, as 
mentioned. If adopted, this decree would be a major violation of WTO  rules. The EU was disappointed 
by the lack of engagement on the questions we raised at the C MA on 12 November. The EU  therefore 
reiterate s those questions . When will Russia notify the legal basis for this decree ? What is the 
planned scope of the import restrictions? When does the Government plan to adopt the implementing 
act? 
31.4.   Second, the EU  continue s to raise the blockage of EU  cement export s to Russia, effective since 
2016, and urge Russia to proceed quickly to the change of standards as it indicated in the 
TBT Committee 's October  meeting.  Third, as stated as well at the October TBT  Committee  meeting, 
the EU  consider s the amendment to the Federal Law "on protecting consumer rights " on the 
pre-installation of Russian software mandatory in a number of consumer electronic devices a 
potentially discriminatory one and request its notification.  Fourth, the EU  also request s Russia to 
notify Federal Law  468 "on Viticulture and Winemaking " and regre ts that Russia  refuses to do so, as 
stated at the last TBT  Committee meeting. This law introduces many new requirements for the 
placing of wine products on t he Russian market, and it therefore has to be notified to the WTO in 
accordance with the TBT  Agreement. Furthermore, this law uses European geographical indications 
as definition for certain categories of wine, like Champagne, vin de Cahors , or Cognac , and the 
implementation of this law is not clear, potentially blocking imports into Russia of real Champagne. 
The EU  expect s that the amendments to the law currently in preparation will be proposed to eliminate 
the EU 's concerns.  And fifth, and finally, on 29 September, Russia has announced the introduction 
of an export ban on timber, starting from 1  January  2022. The EU  would like Russia to explain its 
compatibility with WTO  rules and notify the draft legislation on it.  
31.5.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the fo llowing:  
31.6.   Ukraine thanks the EU for keeping this issue on the agenda and echoes the concerns raised 
with regard to the Russian Federation certification requirements for cement. Ukraine continues to 
have strong concerns on the Russian Federation certificatio n requirements for alcohol ic drinks as 
well. Ukraine  would like to refer to its statements made in the course of the previous TBT  Committee 
meetings on these issues for further detail.  
31.7.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
31.8.   Australia understands that Russia 's Federal Law No. 468 of 27  December  2019 on wine 
making and wine growing in the Russian Federation entered into force on 26  June 2020.  Australia 
has raised its specific concerns in the TBT  Commit tee, and briefly restate s those here.  The Federal 
Law poses several barriers to the importation of wine into Russia, which coupled with the short 
timelines for the law 's implementation, are of concern to the Australian wine industry. A key concern 
is the m andatory declaration of vintage and variety required under the new law. This does not reflect 
International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) practices, of which Russia is a  member.  
31.9.   Russia 's Federal wine law includes provisions covered by the TRIPS  Agree ment, including 
geographical indications. Australia invites Russia to notify the measure to the Council for TRIPS 
accordingly.  Additionally, Australia notes that several obligations within the Federal wine law are 
inconsistent with the Eurasian Economic Un ion Technical Regulation  047/2018 "On safety of alcohol 
products ", which is expected to enter into force in January  2021. Australia seeks further clarification 
from Russia on how this regulation and Federal Law No. 468 will be implemented.  Australia 
encour ages Russia to take into account these concerns when reconsidering the implementation of G/C/M/138  
 
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  the new Federal wine law and look s forward to Russia notifying the WTO accordingly as soon as 
possible.  
31.10.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
31.11.   The United States would like to thank the EU for raising concerns about Russia 's trade 
restrictive practices.  Russia 's list of restrictive practices continues to grow, so the United States  must 
continue to draw attention to these issues.  In particular, the United States  would like to highlight 
three  particular issues – forced localization, the software pre -installation mandate, and the track 
and trace regime.  The United States has previously voiced concerns about Russia 's growing list of 
measures that favour  domestic products, works, and services, at the direct expense of imports.  In 
its latest effort to control its economy, Russia has proposed a measure to classify all state -owned 
enterprises and state corporations as "critical information  infrastructure " facilities.  Such a step would 
designate nearly half the Russian economy as "critical information infrastructure " and allow the 
Russian government to exert even greater control over the commercial decisions of these 
enterprises, including t heir purchasing decisions.  
31.12.   The United States  will provide specific written questions to Russia, but for the benefit of this 
Council, could  the delegate of the Russian Federation assure this Council that his/her government 
will ensure that purchases made by  commercial enterprises that are state -owned or state -controlled 
are governed by commercial considerations, as provided for in its Working Party Report?  Regarding 
the software pre -installation mandate, the United States has mentioned previously its concern s 
about the pre -installation requirement established in Federal Law No.  425-FZ "Law on Protection of 
Consumer Rights. " The United States  continue s to seek an explanation  of how this mandate complies 
with Russia 's WTO  obligation on national treatment.  Regar ding Russia 's Track and Trace labelling 
regime, this Council, and Russia, are familiar with United States concerns about Russia 's "track and 
trace" regime, which mandates the application of an encrypted label to a variety of goods.  
Specifically, the United  States remain s concerned about the potential for significant supply chain 
disruptions at the border and about unequal access to the machinery and the technological systems 
of the regime.  The United States  will continue to carefully monitor  Russia 's implem entation of the 
regime.  
31.13.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
31.14.   The Russian Federation  would like to thank the European Union, Ukraine, Australia, and the 
United States for their interest in the trade policy of the Russian Federation.  The Russian Federation  
commented previously on many of the concerns raised today and would refer to its previous 
statements in this Council as well as in the TBT  Committee, the Committee on Agriculture, and the 
CMA.8 Today the Russian  Federation just want s to highlight the following.  On cement certification , 
currently, the standard in question is being reviewe d. However, no precise timeline for the outcome 
of the discussion can be provided now.  On the law on winemaking, the Russian Federation  stress es 
that the federal law is not aimed at setting unnecessary obstacles to international trade but to 
creating the b rand "wine of Russia " and developing winemaking in Russia, including improving 
consumer properties and improvement of Russian wineries.  This legal act was developed taking into 
account the obligations of the Russian Federation in the WTO.  
31.15.   As for the pre -installation of the Russian software , the Russian Federation states once again 
that the measure does not set any restrictions and prohibitions for installation of foreign software 
and nor does it set any requirements on de -installation of any pre -established software, whether 
Russian or foreign , and applies equally to both Russian and foreign technically complex goods.  As 
for export restrictions on wood and the draft decree related to imports of certain entities, the Russian 
Federation  draws the attention of the Membership to the fact that currently the Russian government 
has not adopted legal acts on these issues.  The Russian Federation urges the  European Union, 
Ukraine, Australia, and the United States to send their statements in writing so that they can be 
conveyed to Capital.  
31.16.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
 
8 Document  G/C/M/137, paras.  33.20 -33.26. G/C/M/138  
 
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  31.17.   The Council so agreed . 
32  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA – TRADE RESTRICTIVE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
CONCERNING TURKEY – REQUEST FROM TURKEY  
32.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of Turkey had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
32.2.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
32.3.   Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are important  trade partners for each other, with 
close economic cooperation in various platforms and a bilateral trade volume exceeding USD 6 billion 
by 2019. However, the strong trade ties between the two countries have recently been disrupted by 
the trade restrictiv e policies of Saudi Arabia against the imports from Turkey.  In recent months, 
imports from Turkey have systematically been subject to unreasonably long delays at Saudi customs 
and unnecessarily burdensome product safety inspections. Customs clearances have  been taking 
generally more than 30  days due to these practices. As a result, hundreds of containers of fresh 
fruits and vegetables are being perished, Turkish exporters are facing high demurrage fees, and 
Turkish exports are being driven out of the Saudi Arabian market.  
32.4.   These restrictive and discriminatory practices took a new turn in October and became even 
more worrisome for Turkey. Turkish exporting companies in various sectors have been informed by 
the Saudi importers to suspend or to cancel their alre ady contracted shipments as the importation 
of Turkish products into Saudi Arabia would not be permitted. Also, some major logistic companies 
have warned their customers about the obstacles and very long delays in customs procedures for 
imports sourced fro m Turkey, as well as the high additional costs related to these delays.  In addition, 
Turkish exporters have been informed of "letters of commitment " signed by the importers pledging 
not to import from Turkey. This process has also been in parallel with a general backlash against 
Turkish products in the Saudi market.  
32.5.   As a result of these policies, Turkey 's exports to Saudi Arabia decreased by more than  40% 
during the first  half of November, when compared with both the same period of the last year and 
the first half of October this year. This sharp decline is even more dramatic in some sectors, such 
as steel, automotive, furniture, clothing and jewellery , while the exports of fresh fruits, vegetables 
and food products have almost totally halted.  Turkey is seriously concerned about these import 
prohibitive policies and practices of Saudi Arabia against Turkish goods, which are in clear violation 
of Article  I of the GATT on MFN  treatment, and Article  XI of GATT on QRs. Moreover, Turkey also 
believes that the discrimination against Turkish products in the Saudi Arabian market is also in 
breach of Article  III:4 of GATT on the principle of National Treatment.  
32.6.   In this vein, Turkey would like to invite Saudi Arabia to bring its policies and practices 
concerning Turkey in line with its WTO  obligations and to ensure a smooth flow of trade for Turkish 
goods. On the other hand, Turkey  does believe that the recent comm unication that took place at the 
highest level between Turkey and Saudi Arabia  will guide us in solving the situation amicably. Turkey 
stands ready to engage bilaterally with Saudi Arabia for addressing all trade -related matters and 
promoting fair and bala nced bilateral trade relations.  
32.7.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
32.8.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia always affirms its commitments to all trade rules stipulated in 
the WTO  Agreements.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a keen suppo rter of the multilateral trading 
system to achieve its objectives aiming to liberalize international trade among Members.  Having said 
that, Saudi Arabia  emphasize s that no official or unofficial instructions have been issued by the Saudi 
authorities to pre vent dealing with the Turkish companies or to hinder the importation of goods 
coming from Turkey. In fact, Saudi Arabia has confirmed to Turkey on several occasions that its 
borders and markets are open to all goods and products , including those coming fro m Turkey.  
Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  asks the delegation of Turkey to provide it with its statement 
and concerns in detail in writing in order to convey it to Capital for further review and consideration.  
32.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  32.10.   The Council so agreed . 
33  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST 
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN , SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  
33.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication s dated 9 and 
12 November  2020, the delegation s of the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and the United 
States had requested the Secretariat to include this iss ue on the agenda.  
33.2.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
33.3.   Switzerland  refers to its past statements in this Council9 as well as in the C MA, where it 
repeatedly raised concerns with regard to the selective tax, and notably addressed issues rel ated to 
the reform of the tax and the harmonization of the tax rate for energy drinks and other 
sugar -containing beverages.  In addition to these concerns, Switzerland would like to reiterate its 
opposition to the foreseen introduction of a digital tax stam p on beverages as these are not 
high-value goods subject to counterfeiting and smuggling. Such a requirement is not international 
best good practice for the soft drink s industry, as the sector does not suffer from tax avoidance. 
Switzerland  calls upon the competent authorities to look for other less trade restrictive alternatives 
as the costs of the stamp – as currently foreseen – would outweigh the benefits to governments and 
industry.  Switzerland has taken note of the statement made by the United Arab Emirates ( UAE) in 
the name of the Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) countries at the Market Access Committee 
two weeks ago that the ongoing study at GCC  level regarding the selective tax should be completed 
soon and that it foresees to replace the curr ent ad valorem  tax by a specific tax. Switzerland expects 
to be informed sufficiently in advance about the  results and recommendations of the study ; that is, 
before a final decision is taken at GCC  level.  Switzerland encourage s the GCCs to continue to enga ge 
and work closely with Switzerland and other Members , as well as the private sector , in order to 
modify the selective tax and related measures, so that they are applied in a transparent and non -
discriminatory manner and meet the ir legitimate health polic y objectives.  
33.4.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
33.5.   Japan has been expressing its concerns over this issue of the selective tax on carbonated soft 
drinks taken by certain GCC  Members since last year. Especially in the United Arab Emirates, a high 
tax rate is imposed on some Japanese carbonated soft drinks due to their classification as energy 
drinks based not only on the drinks ' ingredients but also on the marketing and merchandizing 
methods used for them.  Japan takes note of the statement by GCCs at the recently held Market 
Access Committee concerning its recent studies. Japan looks  forward to the subsequent update of 
the studies  and continues to pay close attention to future development s to make sure that the tax 
be administrated in a transparent and reasonable manner based on objective evidence.  
33.6.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
33.7.   The United States ' concerns remain as stated in previous meetings of this Council and the 
CMA. The United States'  concerns have ye t to be addressed.  At the last CMA  meeting in June, an 
offer was made to engage with the United States on this issue in more detail. The US  understand s 
that the United Arab Emirates has identified particular officials to follow -up with the United States 
on that offer. The United States has attempted to contact them but has not yet received a response. 
Could the UAE please let the United States know how it can ensure that this discussion takes place?  
33.8.   The delegate of the European Union  indica ted the following:  
33.9.   The European Union maintains its serious concerns as already voiced in this Council, and in 
the CMA, as well as in bilateral contacts with the GCC  countries in relation the GCC  "Treaty on Excise 
Tax" of December  2016.  The EU welcomes the  expansion of the tax base to include other sweetened 
beverages by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,  thus no longer 
discriminating soft drinks containing sugar. However, the EU is still concerned that the GCC  countries 
have not decr eased the tax for energy drinks from 100% to 50% in order not to discriminate between 
 
9 Document  G/C/M/137, paras.  18.2-18.5. G/C/M/138  
 
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  energy drinks and other sugary drinks.  The EU also acknowledges recent positive steps by the 
GCC countries to revise the excise tax, switching from an ad valorem  tax to a  specific tax based on 
content, in line with international  best practice.  The EU calls for a uniform implementation of the 
positive adjustments of the excise tax in all GCC  countries.  The EU also looks forward to receiving 
the results of the study the GCC is currently undergoing regarding the revision of the tax , once it is 
available.  The EU strongly encourages the GCC Members  to engage private industry stakeholders on 
the process for revising the tax, as well as to provide immediate relief for industry  until the revision 
takes effect.  
33.10.   The delegate of the United Arab Emirates  indicated the following:  
33.11.   On behalf of the GCC  member States, the United Arab Emirates  would like to thank the 
delegations that took the floor for the interest they attach to the tax  situation in the GCC  member 
States, and specifically on the drinks excise tax issue.  The United Arab Emirates  would like to refer 
to its statement delivered at the C MA on the 12 November.  The United Arab Emirates has taken 
note, on behalf of the GCC  membe r States , of the comments made today by the delegations of 
Switzerland, the United States, Japan, and the European Union, and  would like to assure them that 
their concerns are currently under consideration by the competent authorities in the GCC  member 
States. As indicated by the Kingdom of Bahrain in the previous meeting of the CTG, the GCC  member 
States will keep the inte rested delegations updated on any further development that will occur in 
this matter.  
33.12.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take not e of the statements made.  
33.13.   The Council so agreed . 
34  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
34.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
34.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
34.3.   With this item , the European Union would like to bring forward a discussion that started at 
the level of the C MA, and would like to express its concerns with the Imports and Exports Control 
Regulations adopted by Sri Lanka this year, in an alleged move to ease pressure on the exchange 
rate and overall balance of payment s. The measures were first published in April  2020, with 
reference to the Imports and Exports Control Act of 1969, and with an initially foreseen expiration 
date of 15  July. However further updates were released in May and in June, and again a revision 
was circulated in July of this year. These revis ions broadened the scope and removed the expiration 
date, such that the measures remain in force now until further notice.  The measures result in a 
broad quantitative restriction heavily affecting trade in goods. As such, the European Union has 
serious dou bts that Sri Lanka is accomplishing its commitments under the GATT  Agreements 
(specifically , the "Understanding on the Balance -of-Payments Provisions of the GATT  1994"). Even 
in exceptional circumstances, the Government needs to comply with WTO  rules. Conc retely , it means 
for instance that QRs should be avoided also when balance -of-payments issues arise. The side effects 
of restrictive measures should be the least trade distortive and ensure there is no discrimination 
among supplying countries.  
34.4.   Apart from t hese formal requirements, the European Union  tends to believe that the 
underlying motivation is the protection of Sri Lankan industries and import substitution under the 
guise of foreign currency pressure. In fact, the far -reaching import restrictions resu lt in a de facto  
wide import ban. These measures are potentially affecting hundreds of millions of EU  exports.  
Although the European Union has noted official statements alleging the measures to be temporary , 
the EU has not yet seen any changes in the Regul ation. For the time being , these measures apply 
"until further notice ", creating a lot of uncertainty and financial problems for traders and investors.  
The European Union  notes that, at the last C MA, on 12  November , Sri Lanka categorized these 
measures as restrictions or delay s on payments and transfers, covering certain activities in the 
financial sector, and that delays on payments and transfers were allowed under GATS  flexibilities.  
Without prejudice to this parti cular argument, the European Union  would only note that restrictions G/C/M/138  
 
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  taken under GATS should also be notified to the WTO (General Council and the Committee on 
Balance -of-Payments  Restrictions ). In addition,  measures taken under GATS would also need to be  
temporary and as least trade restrictive as possible.  
34.5.   In conclusion, the European Union  would like to express its deep concerns about the measures 
taken by the Government of Sri Lanka,  which are strongly affecting EU  exports. The European Union  
notes to this day the lack of a formal notification and justification of the measures, despite repeated 
calls by the EU and other WTO  Members to do so.  In the absence of any justification, the European 
Union  calls for their full withdrawal.  
34.6.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
34.7.   Argentina wishes to support the concern raised by the EU, since notification No.  2184/21 from 
the Government of Sri Lanka affects Argentine exports of mung beans.  
34.8.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
34.9.   Australia thanks the European Union for raising this item.  Australia shares the concerns of the 
European Union with respect to these measures implemented by Sri Lanka. These measures appear 
to be overly trade -restrictive , do not a ppear to have a clear end -date, noting that they are in place 
"until further notice ", and have not been notified to the WTO.  Australia appreciates the difficult 
circumstances that Sri Lanka is under as a result of the impacts of COVID -19 on its economy and  
trade. Nevertheless, a well -functioning, transparent, predictable , and stable global trading system 
is and will remain fundamental to global economic stability during the pandemic and the economic 
recovery post -pandemic. This is true for Sri Lanka and all  other WTO  Members.  Australia therefore 
requests Sri Lanka to notify the WTO of these measures as soon as possible and provide an 
explanation of the WTO  basis for its measures. Australia  would appreciate if Sri Lanka could reassure 
Members that the measure s will only be implemented to address the immediate impacts of 
COVID -19, will not be maintained longer than necessary, and ensure that they are being 
implemented in a manner consistent with Sri Lanka 's WTO  obligations.  
34.10.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated t he following:  
34.11.   Sri Lanka takes this opportunity to appreciate the interests being shown by the delegations 
of the EU, the United States, Australia and Argentina, on Sri Lanka' s trade policies in general and 
for directing their specific concerns on the curre nt trade measures taken by Sri Lanka to curb the 
COVID -19 pandemic in the island. Sri Lanka is  also pleased to inform that it has been holding 
discussions with the EU  delegation in different configurations since July  2020 and is encouraged to 
notice that t he EU  side has gained a better understanding on the very specific and challenging 
circumstances leading to Sri Lanka' s decision to impose these measures. Sri Lanka made a very 
detailed statement at the Market Access Committee when this matter was raised on  
12 November  2020 and the text of its intervention was also shared with the EU  delegation at its 
request and the content of this statement is still relevant in addressing the concerns raised. In 
addition, Sri Lanka wishes to state the following.  
34.12.   As informe d, the measures temporarily suspended the banking services, so that it served to 
limit facilitation of banking services by Sri Lankan banks. In effect, the measures imposed restrictions 
on or delay on payments and transfers. This enabled GOSL to limit the flow of scarce foreign 
exchange going out of the country during the COVID -19 pandemic. By temporarily limiting the 
provision of banking services necessary to pay for importation of goods, the measures essentially 
seek to temporarily stem the outflow of foreign exchange from Sri Lanka. The specific banking 
services affected by the me asures in question include certain services listed in Sri Lanka' s schedule 
of specific commitments under WTO  GATS for the banking sector ( please refer to page 5 of 
document  GATS/SC/79/Suppl.2 of 26 February  1998), particularly: (a)  acceptance of deposits a nd 
other repayable funds from the public; (b)  lending of all types, including, inter alia, consumer credit, 
mortgage credit, factoring and financing of commercial transactions; (d)  all payment and money 
transmission services ; (e) guarantees and commitments ; (f) trading for own account or for account 
of customers, whether on an exchange, in an over -the-counter market or otherwise, the following: 
- foreign exchange; (j)  settlement and clearing services for financial services, including securities, 
derivative products,  and other negotiable instruments . G/C/M/138  
 
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  34.13.   Such banking service sub -sectors listed in Sri Lanka 's schedule of specific commitments 
under the GATS are directly relevant to the provision by commercial banks of trade payment financial 
services and arrangemen ts needed to conduct importation of goods into Sri Lanka. By temporarily 
prohibiting banks operating in Sri Lanka (including both domestic banks and the Sri Lankan branches 
or subsidiaries of foreign banks) from providing the listed financial services, the  measures affect the 
ability of the Sri Lanka -registered and -located branch or subsidiary of a foreign bank to provide 
such services to Sri Lankan or foreign service consumers (GATS  Mode 3  – commercial presence). In 
doing so, the measures affect the trade  in services covered by Sri Lanka 's GATS -specific 
commitments and thereby pertain to or affect the operation of the GATS. Because the measures 
apply to domestic Sri Lankan banks and the Sri Lankan branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks, 
the measures do not affect GATS  Mode  1 (cross-border supply ), GATS  Mode  2 (consumption 
abroad ), or GATS  Mode  4 (presence of natural persons ): (a) the ability of foreign banks incorporated 
and located outside Sri Lanka to directly provide the banking services in question into Sri Lanka to 
service consumers located in Sri Lanka (GATS  Mode  1 – cross-border supply); (b)  the ability of 
foreign banks incorporated and located outside Sri Lanka to directly provide the banking services in 
question in situ overseas to serv ice consumers coming from Sri Lanka (GATS  Mode  2 – consumption 
abroad); and (c)  the ability of foreign banks incorporated and located outside Sri Lanka to provide 
such services by sending its staff to Sri Lanka to prepare the documents in relation to such services 
and utilizing funds based overseas (GATS  Mode  4 – presence of natural persons).  
34.14.   The restrictions imposed by the measures in question on the banking services at issue as 
described above conform to the GATS. While Mode  3 (commercial presence) market  access with 
respect to the provision of banking services has been restricted (subject to General Conditions 
specified in Sri Lanka' s Schedule), such restrictions are consistent with the requirements under 
GATS  Article  VI on domestic regulation, and the GA TS Annex on Financial Services. This is due to 
the policy flexibility and space that Sri Lanka incorporated into its GATS  Schedule of Specific 
Commitments with respect to Mode  3 (commercial presence) limitations on both market access and 
national treatment  on the provision of banking services. This policy flexibility arises from the fact 
that Sri Lanka 's Mode  3 market access and national treatment commitments were subject to the 
"General Conditions" that Sri Lanka inscribed in its schedule which, inter alia , specified that its 
commitments were subject to laws, rules and regulations issued by the Government of Sri Lanka 
which are consistent with GATS  Article VI and the Annex on Financial Services. ( please refer page  4 
of WTO  Document: GATS/SC/79/Suppl.2 of 26 February  1998) . 
34.15.   Sri Lanka amended the provisions in the applicable domestic regulation, namely, the Import 
and Export Control Regulation No.  11 of 2011 (Special Import Licen se and Payment Regulations of 
2 January  2012), which has already been notified t o the WTO  Committee on Import Licensing in 
2014 ( document  G/LIC/N/1/LKA/2 of 19 February  2014) . This regulation lays sub -regulations 
pertaining to the terms and conditions on payment terms for importation of goods into the country 
for commercial purposes. The way in which the General Conditions in Sri Lanka 's GATS  schedule 
were well written meant that Sri Lanka was not locked into applying only those laws, rules and 
regulations that existed at the time that it submitted its GATS  offer (on 26 February  1998) – thereby 
implying that those law, rules and regulations would be those as applied currently and as may be 
amended from time to time. Accordingly, the amendments made to the provisions of the Import and 
Export Control Regulation No.  11 of 2011 (Special Imp ort License and Payment Regulations of 
2 January  2012) are within the purview of Sri Lanka 's commitments and are not in violation of any 
of its WTO  commitments.  
34.16.   Given that the measures in question with respect to the banking services at issue are 
consisten t with GATS  Article XVI, and given that the measures also conform to GATS  Article XVII on 
national treatment, because they apply equally to both domestic and foreign banks in Sri Lanka, 
there is no need for Sri Lanka to seek recourse to GATS  Article XII on  restrictions to safeguard the 
balance of payments to justify the measures in question with respect to the banking services at 
issue. Concerns were also raised that Sri Lanka 's transparency obligations under the GATS  Article  III 
have not been complied with : under GATS  Article III:1 and Art icle III:2, Sri Lanka is required to 
publish these measures promptly or make them otherwise publicly available. Sri Lanka has already 
complied with these obligations as the measures were all published or made publicly avai lable by 
the relevant central government authority at the latest by the time of their entry into force. Further, 
GATS  Article III:3 also requires Sri Lanka to "promptly and at least annually inform the Council for 
Trade in Services (CTS) of the introduction of any new, or any changes to existing, laws, regulations 
or administrative guidelines which significantly affect trade in s ervices covered by its specific 
commitments under this Agreement." As the measures in question significantly affect the trade in G/C/M/138  
 
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  services (Modes  2 and 3) of the specific banking services covered by Sri Lanka 's schedule of specific 
commitments, Sri Lanka is  required to inform the CTS of such measures pursuant to 
GATS  Article III:3 "promptly" – i.e. "without undue delay" or "at least annually" – this means that 
there is no specific deadline for when Sri Lanka should make the notification. Sri Lanka has the ri ght 
to enjoy the benefit of this ambiguity and seek shelter under the time period indicated under "at 
least annually". In line of this, as stated before, Sri Lanka will soon be submitting to the CTS of its 
notification as required under GATS  Article III:3.  In conclusion, Sri Lanka's  delegation will continue 
its dialogue with the EU, United States, the Argentinean and the Australian delegations in a more 
constructive way with a view to addressing their ongoing concerns.  
34.17.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
34.18.   The Council so agreed . 
35  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, 
CANADA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIO N, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
URUGUAY  
35.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation s of Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, the United States, 
and Uruguay had requested the Secretari at to include this issue on the agenda.  Brazil 's request to 
co-sponsor this item was received after the Council 's agenda had closed.  
35.2.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
35.3.   Brazil would like to highlight that the concerns expressed in item  21 of the CTG  Agenda also 
apply to the United Kingdom.  Additionally, Brazil  would like to highlight that the UK becoming a new 
independent WTO  Member poses a series of challenges related, for example, to the conversion to 
pounds sterling of its tariffs and Final Bound Total Aggregate Measure of Support  (FBTAMS ) 
expressed in euros, as well as by its proposal for consolidation of tariffs, which is not economically 
viable as they are below the minimum percentage of 5% of the internal consumption negotiated in 
the Ur uguay Round.  When invoking its right to FBTAMS as an  original WTO  Member, the UK should 
also assume the full range of obligations that were negotiated for agricultural goods during the 
Uruguay Round.  
35.4.   It is worth recalling that a delicate balance was reache d in Market Access at the time, which 
involved, above all, tariffication, consolidation and reduction of tariff rates; elimination of QRs; the 
creation of agricultural tariff quotas; and the consolidation of the rights to impose special safeguards.  
Regardi ng the tariff lines whose access was limited by means of TRQs, their volumes should 
correspond, at the end of the transition period, to at least 5% of domestic consumption of the 
equivalent product. Many of the new British  TRQs do not comply with this limi t. Brazil  also draw s 
attention to the need for the UK to comply with basic WTO  obligations, such as the most favoured 
nation clause. Although negotiations are still ongoing, the British Government has already 
announced it will carry out simplified border c ontrol procedures for animal origin products from the 
EU in relation to that of other Members.  Finally, Brazil  recall s that there is still uncertainty in the 
way whereby the essential efforts to preserve the "Good Friday Agreement " with respect to the 
transit of goods will be compatible with WTO  rules and other Members ' rights.  
35.5.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
35.6.   When, in July  2018, the United Kingdom submitted the original draft Schedule  XIX, under the 
1980 Procedures, its certification was contested by a number of WTO  Members. These objections 
led to the formal opening of a process under Article  XXVIII, which is currently under way, on the  
tariff rate quota concessions that appear in its draft Schedule.  The additional amend ments recently 
proposed by the United Kingdom in document  G/MA/TAR/RS/570/Rev.1 add another layer of 
complexity to the procedure for drawing up the Schedule by the Member in question. Beyond the 
issue of tariff rate quotas, Uruguay still has concerns about  the United Kingdom 's claim to an 
automatic right to have FBTAMS without the matter being analysed by Members and without having 
verified compliance with the conditions proposed in the joint letter of the Permanent Representatives 
of the United Kingdom and  the European Union of 11  October  2017. Moreover, the question arises G/C/M/138  
 
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  as to whether it is appropriate for the United Kingdom to attempt to replicate the rights to invoke 
the special agricultural safeguard, under Article  5 of the A oA, for all products and u nder the same 
criteria and conditions as set out in the European Union 's Schedule. Third, the proposal to introduce 
one currency conversion in the draft Schedule of Concessions based on the average daily exchange 
rate in the period 2015 –2019 also raises co ncerns, given its ability to generate bound tariffs and 
AMS entitlements higher than those that could result from considering other representative periods, 
and from its factual linkage with the process under Article  XXVIII under way.  
35.7.   Uruguay hopes that the  open procedure under Article  XXVIII of the GATT on tariff rate quotas 
will be settled through substantive bilateral negotiations between the Members concerned and the 
United Kingdom. It also hopes to continue holding open talks with a view to securing mar ket access 
commitments that are adapted to the reality of bilateral trade and the specific interests of the parties 
involved, and do not undermine current access opportunities, complying fully with the provisions of 
the relevant multilateral rules.  Given t he uncertainty about the form that the future trade 
relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom will take, Uruguay  also wish es to 
reiterate the need to take into account in the negotiations and to address the concerns over the 
possible e xhaustion of the erga omnes  tariff rate quotas proposed by bilateral trade between the 
European Union and the  United Kingdom, which would exclude the other Members.  Uruguay hopes 
to continue to engage in constructive discussions with the United Kingdom wit h a view to reaching 
timely solutions that will lead to an independent Schedule of Concessions being formally established 
in the WTO, while safeguarding the rights of the other Members concerned.  
35.8.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
35.9.   As the United States  noted under Agenda Item  21, the United States remains troubled with 
the approach taken by the UK and EU with respect to post -Brexit market access commitments. The 
primary goal of the United States is to ensure that the UK 's independent goods schedule is fair and 
does not result in a loss of access to either the UK or EU  market.  The United States  notes the 
liberalization the UK has announced as part of its Global Tariff, which will become effective on 
1 January  2021. However, the United States  remain s concerned that an unfair split of TRQs with the 
EU could become part of the UK 's bound schedule.  The Un ited States is also concerned about the 
UK's copy and paste approach to the Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) in its post -Brexit goods 
schedule. The United States would like to hear the rationale for keeping the SSG for products that 
are not sensitive, and in some cases not even produced, in the UK.  The United States  will continue 
to engage with the UK to ensure our trading interests are not adversely affected.  
35.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
35.11.   In addition to New Zealand's  points made under Item  21, New Zealand  would like to draw 
attention again to the following matters in regard to the UK 's proposed draft goods schedule.  Again, 
these are questions that New Zealand has raised consistently over the past few years, but it does 
not yet hav e answers on these important systemic questions:  (i) what plan the UK has to undertake 
the necessary consultation with other WTO  Members on its claim to establish a new, very substantial, 
entitlement to trade distorting domestic support. As Council Members  will be aware, the A oA does 
not contain provisions enabling a Member to amend its AMS commitments. In these circumstances, 
any proposals the UK might want to make to alter the current aggregate measure of support 
commitments, including any currency altera tions and their potential impacts, would need to be fully 
consulted and agreed by other interested WTO  Members;  (ii) what the UK 's justification is for its 
claims to apply the special agricultural safeguard to 685  agricultural products, including products for 
which it has no domestic production;  (iii) what basis the UK has to justify its claims to apply a 
"minimum entry price " and the "Meursing Tables " market management systems  following its exit 
from the EU  single market and adoption of an applied tariff schedule that eliminates  these trade 
distorting market measures.  
35.12.   As New Zealand has  said previously, it remain s ready to work with the UK and other 
WTO Members to find ways to resolve these concerns; as well as the important matters we have 
raised u nder agenda  item 21 above.  Importantly, though, New Zealand is  looking to the UK to 
redouble its efforts, and to bring a practical, problem -solving approach, to bear to these discussions, 
if it is to reach satisfactory conclusions with other WTO  Members in  the short time remaining.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  35.13.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
35.14.   Australia has consistently raised concerns with the EU and UK 's approach to splitting the 
EU's existing TRQs as a result of Brexit since it was first proposed in 2017. It is clea r that the 
proposed modifications to TRQs will diminish the commercial value of Australia 's existing market 
access, by not only removing flexibility in where product is sent year -by-year, but by also rendering 
some TRQ  allocations too small to be commercia lly viable.  That said, Australia appreciates the recent 
constructive and pragmatic engagement from the UK on these issues with a view to reaching 
agreement before the end of the transition period and seeking to ensure implementation of any 
agreed arrangeme nts in a timely manner. This will provide certainty to Australian exporters with the 
new post -Brexit trading environment.  
35.15.   Beyond the proposed TRQ  splits, Australia continues to be concerned that the issues it has 
raised with the UK 's initial rectification remain unaddressed. Australia considers the UK 's draft goods 
schedule circulated on 24  July 2018, contains substantive changes to the UK 's current 
WTO concessions, including the UK 's AMS commitments, and Special Safeguard (SSG) entitlements.  
Australia does not believe that the UK should have automatic rights to an AMS  entitlement without 
scrutiny from the Membership and potential changes. Australia is concerned with the UK 's inclusion 
of AMS  entitlement of GBP 4.95 billion, and it is worth not ing that the EU still has not formally 
proposed any corresponding reductions to its AMS  entitlements.  The UK needs to find a multilateral 
solution to this issue and to demonstrate to other Members that its expected future domestic support 
program mes will n ot unduly distort global agricultural trade. Australia  calls on the UK to reassure 
Members that the UK is a strong advocate for domestic support reform, to help show that it will be 
part of the solution, even if it has such a large initial AMS  entitlement.  
35.16.   Finally, Australia  also do es not think the UK should be able to simply "copy and paste " special 
safeguard rights from the EU 's WTO  Goods Schedule – which have a distinct history and basis from 
the Uruguay Round and could result in the perverse outcome of providing the UK  SSG rights for 
products that the UK does not produce.  Australia stands ready to have constructive discussions with 
the UK to help resolve these matters and move towards certification of the UK 's goods schedule.  
35.17.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
35.18.   Switzerland  refers to its statement under agenda item 21 and ask s the EU and UK to avoid 
legal uncertainty regarding reallocation of TRQ  quantities from 1  January  2021.  
35.19.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
35.20.   India has already expressed its concerns, both in writing and during formal consultations 
with the United Kingdom. India has also made it clear to the United Kingdom how the present 
methodology and the threshold years, taken into account by the United King dom for apportionment 
of tariff rate quotas, and some other provisions in its Schedule, adversely affect Members ' rights. 
Moreover, the nature of the future trade relationship between the EU -27 and the UK not being known 
at this stage, also leads to uncert ainty in these areas.  
35.21.   India expects that the United Kingdom will provide reasonable opportunities to all Members, 
including India, to exercise its rights under the WTO  Agreements and take into account the concerns 
raised. India looks forward for fruitful n egotiations with the United Kingdom.  
35.22.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
35.23.   As Mexico has  indicated previously, it would like to express its interest and share the 
concerns voiced by Members who have spoken before it with regard to the AMS and spe cial 
safeguards that the UK is claiming.  As Mexico  indicated under agenda item 21, it reiterate s its 
systemic concern as to any plans to modify TRQs that are part of the UK and the EU 's schedule, 
particularly in view of the proposed methodology. Mexico  also reiterate s its concern in view of the 
uncertainty as to future obligations that will fall to the United Kingdom and the European Union with 
regard to the use of the quotas by each side. Mexico  urges the UK to pursue discussions with 
Members and to addres s the systemic and trade concerns voiced such that a mutually satisfactory 
solution can be found.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  35.24.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
35.25.   The Russian Federation continues to have significant concerns regarding the UK 's approach 
to its TRQ ' renegotiations. Russia  stress es the impossibility of concluding negotiations without an 
agreement on compensation to be provided by the UK. The Russian Federation urges the UK to 
provide its compensatory proposal.  The Russian Federation also stresses the importance of 
establishing the U K's schedule of tariff concession s in full compliance with WTO  rules.  Russia has 
raised certain questions in respect of the UK 's draft schedule. These questions are related, inter alia , 
to the methodology of apportionment of AMS and the proposed currency c onversion.  These questions 
were transmitted to the UK in writing. However, we have not yet received any response.  The Russian 
Federation  urges the UK to provide a clarification of its proposed modification of its schedule . 
35.26.   The representative  of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
35.27.   The United Kingdom would like to update Members that it has now held a number of 
negotiation rounds under Article  XXVIII and would like to thank relevant Members for their continued 
engagement in this process. In particular , the United Kingdom is grateful to those Members with 
whom it has  held increasingly constructive conversations in recent months.  The United Kingdom is 
committed to engaging in good faith with Members in these discussions and looks forward to building 
on the progress and constructive conversations of recent rounds.  Turning to some specific points 
raised by Members , on the issue of EU  use of UK erga omnes  TRQs: the Political Declaration, signed 
by both the UK and the EU on 24  January  2020, sets out the ambition for the negotiations in the 
UK-EU Free Trade Agreement ( FTA), which are ongoing. If a deal within these parameters is agreed, 
it would allow zero -tariff, zero -quota trade between two  equal partners. Trade between the UK and 
the EU would proceed under the terms of the FTA, and the EU would not need to access the UK 's 
erga omnes  TRQs.  
35.28.   On AMS, the United Kingdom notes some Members asked about whether th e European 
Union 's AMS will reduce proportionally in line with the commitment set out in the UK 's Schedule  XIX. 
The United Kingdom cannot comment on the European Union 's ongoing processes. However, the 
United Kingdom would recall that it was clear in the j oint UK -EU letter to WTO  Members of 
11 October  2017 that the final bound commitment level for domestic agricultural support would be 
apportioned between the EU and the UK, and that intention was reiterated in the explanatory note 
to the UK 's schedule.  
35.29.   On the redenomination of the UK 's Goods Schedule into pounds sterling, the UK  would refer 
Members back to the explanatory note that accompanied document  G/MA/TAR/RS/570/Add.1 for 
the explanation for the exchange rate used.  In choosing the exchange rate, the Un ited Kingdom 
looked at relevant precedent and used a methodology that avoided speculation on the "natural " 
exchange rate, avoided the inherent volatility of day -to-day exchange rate fluctuations, and reflected 
the most recent and relevant economic conditio ns at the time, ensuring the scope of the concessions 
and commitments offered for application to the United Kingdom are not altered.  
35.30.   On Special Safeguards, the United Kingdom would note to Members that the UK 's draft 
Schedule replicates the concessions and  commitments applicable to the UK as expressed in the 
EU-28 Schedule.  The United Kingdom  remain s open to further discussions with Members on the 
various issues raised today, with the aim of maintaining the existing balance of rights and obligations 
between the United Kingdom and its trading partners.  
35.31.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
35.32.   The Council so agreed . 
36  UNITED STATES - REVISED ORIGIN MARKING REQUIREMENT FOR GOODS PRODUCED 
IN HONG KONG – REQUEST  FROM HONG KONG, CHINA  
36.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 11 November  2020, the 
delegation of Hong Kong, China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  36.2.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the fo llowing:  
36.3.   Hong Kong, China would like to express its strong objections to the revised origin marking 
requirement promulgated by the United States Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) that affects 
goods produced in Hong Kong and imported into the US.  On 11  August this year, the USCBP 
announced a revised requirement that goods produced in Hong Kong and to be imported to the US 
may no longer be marked to indicate "Hong Kong " as their origin, but must be marked to indicate 
"China " instead for the purposes of th e origin marking requirement set forth in Section  304 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, 19  U.S.C. § 1304. The revised origin marking requirement has already come into 
effect since 10  November  2020.  
36.4.   Hong Kong, China  maintain s its strong objection to this revised o rigin marking requirement 
and has on various occasions requested that it be withdrawn immediately. The US  measure 
unilaterally and arbitrarily dictates the name to be used on the origin marking of Hong Kong products 
without regard to the facts, prevailing commercial practices , and relevant WTO  rules. The US 
disregards the fact that Hong Kong , China  is a separate customs territory and a WTO  Member in its 
own right. The US  requirement also brings difficulties and additional burden to the business 
communities of both sides as well as confusion to consumers in the US.  
36.5.   Hong Kong, China is concerned that the US  measure is inconsistent with the US  obligations 
under multiple WTO  Agreements, including, but not limited to, the following provisions of 
GATT  1994: (i) Article I:1, because in respect of the rules and formalities of importation pertaining 
to marks of origin, the US does not extend to products originating in Hong Kong , China  immediately 
and unconditionally the same advantage, favour, privilege, or  immunity that the US extends to like 
products originating from other WTO  Members;  (ii) Article  IX:1, because on marking requirements, 
the US accords less favourable treatment to the products of Hong Kong , China ; (iii) Article  X:3(a), 
because the US does n ot administer its origin marking requirements in a uniform, impartial, and 
reasonable manner.  
36.6.   Hong Kong, China has also raised at the General Council, the Committee on Trade Facilitation, 
the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Committee on R ules of Origin , and would not 
repeat here,  its concerns on the inconsistency of the US  measure with provisions in the various 
WTO Agreements. Over the past months, Hong Kong, China has been trying to resolve the matter 
with the US through bilateral engagem ents, but to no avail. On 30  October, with a view to resolving 
the matter through bilateral efforts, Hong Kong, China  requested consultations with the US in 
accordance with the Dispute Settlement Understanding and the relevant provisions in the 
WTO Agreeme nts. Hong Kong, China appreciate s that the US has accepted our request for 
consultations.  
36.7.   Hong Kong, China is a staunch supporter of the rules -based multilateral trading system. Hong 
Kong, China takes the rights and obligations under the WTO  Agreements ser iously and expect s all 
Members to respect the WTO  rules and honour their commitments. Barring the outcome of the 
bilateral consultations with the US, Hong Kong, China  would like to reiterate in today 's forum its 
strong wish that the US honour its commitmen ts under the WTO  Agreements, and withdraw 
immediately its revised origin marking requirement on Hong Kong products.  
36.8.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
36.9.   On 30 October  2020, Hong Kong, China requested consultations under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding regarding what it characterizes as "certain measures affecting marks of origin ". The 
United States replied to that request on 9 November  2020. As reflected in the U S response, the 
President has determined that the situation in Hong Kong, China is a threat to the national security 
of the United States.  Without prejudice to whether the c onsultations request raises issues of national 
security not susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO  dispute settlement, the United 
States has accepted the request of Hong Kong, China, to enter into consultations.  As such, the 
United States  does not understand why Hong Kong, China is raising this issue in this Council.  
36.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
36.11.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/138  
 
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  37  UNITED STATES – EXECUTIVE ORDER ON SECURING THE BULK -POWER SYSTEM – 
REQUEST FRO M CHINA  
37.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
37.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
37.3.   China would like to refer to  its statement in previous meeting s in this Council.10 China would 
like to request the US to provide clarification on how to define "foreign adversary ", and ensure that 
the measures taken by the US are consistent with the WTO  rules.  
37.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
37.5.   As the United States has stated previously, the referenced Executive Order, issued by the 
President on 1 May, is a matter of the US national security. The United States does not believe that 
the WTO  Council for Trade in Goods  is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national 
security.  
37.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
37.7.   The Council so agreed . 
38  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FRO M 
THE EUROPEAN UNION   
38.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
38.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the  following:  
38.3.   The European Union regrets that the United States has so far failed to solve this matter, 
despite the EU raising this issue at multiple occasions in the SPS  Committee and in this Council as 
well. For more than a decade, exports of apples from t he EU to the US have been allowed under the 
so-called pre -clearance system. However, this pre -clearance system of the US is overly costly and 
burdensome. In practice, only very limited amounts of apples and pears are imported from the EU 
into the United St ates under this pre -clearance system.  Therefore, the EU applied already in 2008 
to have market access under a systems approach. Under a lengthy and complex approval procedure 
of the US, it took nearly eight years for the United States to conclude its scien tific pest risk 
assessment that apples and pears could be imported from several EU  member States in all safety 
based on the conditions assessed.  
38.4.   Despite this positive scientific assessment, dating back to 2014, the United States is still 
blocking the publi cation of its Federal Notice, which is the last remaining step to allow imports of 
apples and pears from the EU under this systems approach, and this without any scientific ground. 
The US is herewith going against the SPS  Agreement as the scientific risk a ssessment of the US has 
been finali zed already years ago and demonstrated that safe imports from the EU can take place.  
The EU urges the US to base its import policy on science in line with its WTO  commitments and in 
this regard to finalize the last purely administrative step to allow market access of apples and pears 
from the EU without any further delay. The EU looks forward to continuing  to cooperate with the US 
aiming at finding a swift solution to this matter.  
38.5.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
38.6.   The United States thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight  EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach t o the 
United States.  The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request.  The United States would again note that the EU is able to export apples 
and pears to the United States under the existing pre -clearance program.  The US appreciate s the 
 
10 Document  G/C/M/137, paras.  15.2-15.3. G/C/M/138  
 
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  bilateral engagement on this issue, including during the October  2020 Plant Health Working Group 
meeting.  
38.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
38.8.   The Council so agreed . 
39  UNITED STATE S - MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
39.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agen da. 
39.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
39.3.   China would like to refer to its statement in previous meeting s of this Council.11 In addition, 
China also noted with concern that there are more Chinese companies having been negatively 
affected by the Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and 
Services Supply Chain in recent time.  On 6 August  2020, the US issued two  executive orders, 
entitled "Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok " and "Addressing the Threat Posed by W eChat. " 
These are the first  Executive Orders that take action in respect of the "emergency " declared in 
Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply 
Chain. On 18 September  2020, the US  Department of Commerce  implemented the Executive Order 
related to TikTok by promulgating a new rule, which covered a very broad range of transactions.  
The global ICT  industry, including US  companies, is worried about the vague and broad wording of 
the above Executive Orders and  implementation rules, and worried that the national security 
justifications set out in the text of the measures are exclusively a disguise for the ulterior motives, 
such as forced technology transfer, appropriating value from successful Chinese companies.  China 
is of the view that the actions and measures taken by the US abused the concept of national security, 
violated the principle of market competition and international trade rules, and will damage the 
interests and image of the US.  China would like to request the US to immediately stop these  practices 
and ensure that the relevant measures are consistent with the WTO  rules.  
39.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
39.5.   As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods  is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
39.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
39.7.   The Council so agreed . 
40  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
40.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 12 November  2020, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
40.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
40.3.   China would like to express its concern on the tightened export control measures taken by 
the US recently. The typical example is the HUAWEI  company, for which the US has formulated twice 
the tailor -made new rules and restricted other countries ' companies from supplying pr oducts to 
Huawei.  China is of the view that the US has been using the national power to suppress Chinese 
companies. And the relevant measures abused the concept of national security and export control, 
ignored the international trade rules, undermined the market principles, and endangered the global 
supply chain . China  urges the US to immediately remove the Chinese companies and the research 
institutions from the "Entity List " in order to create sound conditions for the relevant companies to 
 
11 Document  G/C/M/137, paras.  30.3-30.7. G/C/M/138  
 
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  carry out norma l trade and investment and to avoid further negative impacts on the global supplying 
chain.  
40.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
40.5.   As the United States has stated previously, the United States does not believe that the 
WTO Council for T rade in Goods  is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national 
security.  
40.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
40.7.   The Council so agreed . 
41  WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
41.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that a Ministerial Decision had been adopted at MC11 
(document  WT/MIN(17)/65), in which Ministers had agreed to maintain the existing Work  
Programme on E -Commerce, and to endeavour to reinvigorate the WTO 's work on E -Commerce. The 
Ministerial Decision had also instructed the General Council to hold periodic reviews in its sessions 
of July and December  2018, and July  2019, based on the reports submitted by the relevant bodies, 
among them the C TG; and to maintain the current practice of not imposing customs d uties on 
electronic transmissions. Therefore, this Council was again tasked to discuss the E -Commerce 
aspects relating to trade in goods and, in order to fulfil its mandate, the E -Commerce issue was a 
standalone agenda item.  
41.2.   Since MC12 ha d been postponed o n two  occasions, and in order to fulfil the renewed mandate 
of this Council to update the General Council about the discussions that had taken place on this 
issue, he invite d delegations to continue to express their opinions and to make suggestions as to 
how to work on the preparation of the periodic review to be held in the General Council in preparation 
for MC12  [at its session of December  2020] . He also informed delegations that to fulfil this mandate, 
it was his intention to submit to the General Counci l, once again, a factual report under his own 
responsibility, as his predecessors had also done.  
41.3.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
41.4.   Regarding the Council 's report to the General Council, the United States  request s that the 
draft be approved by Members by written procedure.  
41.5.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
41.6.   As the digital revolution is still unfolding, India on a number of occasions has stated that it is 
important to first  understand the complex and multi -faceted dimensio ns of the issues related to 
E-Commerce. India still do es not comprehend the full implications of effects of E-Commerce on 
competition and market structures, issues related to transfer of technology, data storage and 
automation and its impact on traditional  jobs and gaps in policy and regulatory frameworks in 
developing countries. India, therefore, has been a proponent of strengthening our multilateral work 
under the non -negotiating and exploratory 1998  Work Programme on E-Commerce.  
41.7.   Under this multilateral W ork Programme, with the intention of understanding the implications 
of the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, India,  along with South Africa,  
has introduced three  submissions which explain our understanding on the scope and impact of  the 
moratorium.  In December  2019, India joined the consensus for a six-month extension of the 
moratorium, with an understanding that the Work Programme on E -Commerce will be reinvigorated 
with the specific objective of achieving clarity on issues related to the scope of the moratorium, the 
definition of electronic transmissions, identification of products which are covered under the 
moratorium , as well as its impact.  
41.8.   In this context, India would also draw the attention of the Membership to para graph  3.1 of  
the Work Programme, which requires this Council to examine and report on aspects of electronic 
commerce relevant to the provisions of GATT  1994, the trade agreements covered under Annex  1A 
of the WTO  Agreement, and the approved work programme. The said para graph  also provides an G/C/M/138  
 
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  inclusive list of issues to be deliberated on here in this Council. India would therefore urge the 
Membership to sincerely deliberate and report on these mandated issues, instead of prematurely 
jumping to rule -making on such  important issues.  
41.9.   The delegate of Botswana , on behalf of the African Group,  indicated the following:  
41.10.   Botswana is delivering this statement on behalf of the African Group.  As stated before, there 
is a direct link between the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmission s and tariff 
revenue loss. For this reason, the CTG is best placed to oversee such discussions with a special focus 
on the E-Commerce moratorium and implications for developing countries.  The African Group  
recognize s that t here are economic and policy implications arising , on the one  hand, from the 
increase in trade in electronic transmissions, and on the other, the continuation of the moratorium.  
The African Group sees merit in the CTG engaging in a deeper conversation abou t: (i) the scope and 
definition of electronic transmissions , including whether all Members have a common understanding 
of what electronic transmissions entail ; (ii) the implications of the moratorium on revenue ; and 
(iii) the impact of the moratorium on di gital industrial policy, particularly in the context of our African 
continental industriali zation agenda.  The African Group looks forward to more discussions on that 
basis to help our Ministers make an informed decision about the E -Commerce moratorium at M C12. 
41.11.   The COVID -19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of digital connectivity and 
E-Commerce; it has also brought to light the implications of the digital divide both within and 
between countries, particularly infrastructur e gaps to enabling  E-Commerce  in Africa, and how to 
develop it.  Flowing from this, and given the disproportionate impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on 
the African continent , the African Group calls for discussions to be reinvigorated on the Work 
Programme with a view to comprehensively address ing the development aspects of E-Commerce 
facing African countries, and to enable equitable participation and meaningful distribution of the 
economic and transformational benefits of E-Commerce to all Members.  Last but not least, the CTG 
has specific functions and issues to be examined as mandated by the Work Programme and tha t we 
need not repeat. That said, the African Group calls for a collective and constructive engagement to 
discuss the Work Programme with a view to provid ing our Ministers with enough information to make 
an informed decision at MC12.  
41.12.   The Chairperson  propose d that, in order to fulfil the Buenos Aires mandate and support the 
work of the General Council on the Work Programme on E -Commerce, he make, under his own 
responsibility, a purely factual report to the General Council in December 2020, based on the 
discus sion held in this Council during 202 0, and circulate  it to Members for approval.12 
41.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
41.14.   The Council so agreed . 
42  CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL 
FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
42.1.   The Chairperson  noted that, pursuant to the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO " (WT/L/105), which were adopted by the General 
Council on 15  November  1995, all bodies constituted under Agree ments in Annex  1A of the 
WTO Agreement were required to submit a factual report to the Council for Trade in Goods annually, 
and the Council was to take note of these reports.  
42.2.   Such factual reports were adopted at the last meeting of each subsidiary body and  submitted 
to the CTG for its consideration. In the case of the Committees on Agriculture, the corresponding 
factual reports would be submitted to the General Council directly.  
42.3.   The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the following factual an nual reports: 
Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (G/L/1366); Committee on Customs Valuation (G/L/1372); 
Committee on Import Licensing (G/L/1369); Committee on Market Access (G/L/1377); Committee 
on Rules of Origin (G/L/1378); Committee on Safeguards (G/L/ 1367); Committee on Sanitary and 
 
12 The Chairperson's factual report was distributed to all delegations. Since no delegation proposed 
changes to it within the deadline established, the report was circulated under document  G/C/67.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  Phytosanitary Measures (G/L/1376); Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(G/L/1368); Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (G/L/1379); Committee on Trade Facilitation 
(G/L/1375); Committee on TRIMs (G/L/1363  and G/L/1363/Corr.1); Committee of Participants on 
the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products, ITA (G/L/1371); Working Party on State 
Trading Enterprises (G/L/1370); and  Pre-shipment Inspection and Independent Entity (G/L/1373).  
42.4.   The Counci l so agreed . 
43  ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS TO THE 
GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C/W/787)  
43.1.   The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to the draft report of this Council to the General 
Council, circulated in document  G/C/W/787. In accordance with the "Procedures for an Annual 
Overview of WTO  Activities and for Reporting under the WTO " (WT/L/105), which had been adopted 
by the General Council on 15  November  1995, it was agreed that "[T]he respective sectoral Councils 
should report in November each year to the General Council on the activities in the Council as well 
as in the subsidiary bodies " and that the reports of the sectoral Councils should be "factual in nature, 
containing an indication of actions and decisions taken, with cross -references to reports of 
subordinate bodies and could follow the model of the GATT  1947 Council reports to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES ". 
43.2.   He noted that the draft report before M embers would be updated in light of the present 
meeting.  
43.3.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
43.4.   In paragraph  24.1 there is a factual correction  as Hong Kong, China did not make a statement 
under this item . 
43.5.   The delegate of the United Stat es indicated the following:  
43.6.   The US guidance was not delineated in terms of sections, but the US has some minor edits 
that it will request in writing. For example, in the current draft, paragraphs  19.1 and 19.2 provide a 
prejudicial description of that issu e. The United States also request s, given the number of bracketed 
paragraphs that will not be finalized until after this meeting, that the Secretariat seek Members ' 
consensus on the Annual Report through a written procedure.  
43.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that t he Secretariat subsequently circulate the revised draft report 
in a communication to Members indicating a deadline for comments before its formal adoption .13 
43.8.   The Council so agreed . 
44  OTHER BUSINESS  
44.1  Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements 
under WTO Agreements (JOB/GC/204/Rev.4 JOB/CTG/14/Rev.4)  
44.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that,  at the start of the meeting, it was indicated by the United 
States that they wished  to refer to this issue, on behalf of the co -sponsors, to in form Members  about 
an update on this proposal.  
44.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
44.3.   The United States is speaking as one of the co -sponsors of this proposal. Our revision to the 
Notification Proposal, entitled "Procedures to Enhance T ransparency and Strengthen Notification 
Requirements Under WTO  Agreements " has been issued for this meeting as  
document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.4 and document  JOB/GC/204/Rev.4. The revision reflects that the 
proposal now has a total of 11  co-sponsors . The proposal continues to have strong support. In the 
 
13 The Annual Report of the Council for Trade in Goods was ado pted by written procedures on 
3 December  2020 and circulated as document  G/L/1381, dated 4  December  2020.  G/C/M/138  
 
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  current challenging environment, the co -sponsors remain committed to this effort to strengthen 
WTO institutional transparency and  improve Members ' compliance with notification obligations.  The 
United States  will con tinue its outreach to Members to explain and build support for this proposal 
and intend s to return with a full update at the Council 's spring meeting.  
44.4.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statement made.  
44.5.   The Council so agreed . 
44.2  Functio ning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies – Information from the Chair  
44.6.   The Chairperson  reminded Members that an informal meeting of the Council had been held 
on 5 February  2020, organized by his predecessor, on the request of several Members at the meeting 
of November  2019. They had held informal consultations on a number of issues relating to the better 
functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. On that occasion, Members had welcomed the 
initiatives on elaborating on a tentative yearly plan of meetings; the reminders to delegations about 
dates of meetings and the closure of their respective agendas; the elaboration of CTG/Committee 
contact lists; the elaboration of a general e -mail address for delegates responsible for the CTG; and 
the scheduling of an annual briefing session addressed to new delegates; while some considered 
that other initiatives should be further discussed and contained in a specific proposal for Members 
for discussion.  He noted that these  were all housekeeping issue s, as was the issue of time-keeping  
and efficiency in the running of meetings , including his encouragement not to repeat but rather to 
refer to previous statements where these would be identical . He referred aga in to the Rules of 
Procedure of the General Council, applicable also to this Council, and signalled his willing ness to 
continue this discussion . 
44.7.   At the same time, he noted that the COVID -19 pandemic ha d delayed a lot of the 
Membership 's work. Nevertheless , the Secretariat  were preparing a yearly e -plan of meetings of the 
CTG and its subsidiary bodies, indicating when agendas would close. In this context, he noted that 
the issue of the scheduling of meetings across the Council and subsidiary bodies ha d been raised by 
many delegations, and future planning would be approached in such a way as to avoid clashes to 
the extent possible. He noted that such clashes in meeting dates were a problem for small 
delegations  in particular , including his own . 
44.8.   He encour aged Members to reflect on all of the issues relevant to the Council 's better 
functioning, noting a wish in this connection to see progress on the trade concerns raised, and even 
their resolution. In conclusion, he informed Members that it was his intentio n to invite them all to 
an informal meeting in the beginning of next year in order to discuss  these issues further.  
44.9.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
44.10.   Last year , Hong Kong, China requested the inclusion of an agenda item on Better Fu nctioning 
of the CTG and subsidiary bodies, to focus on small steps that could reduce the administrative burden 
of Members and the Secretariat, so that more resources could be devoted to substantive work in the 
WTO. These are not something merely nice -to-have but are practical enhancements to alleviate the 
pain points of Members in our day -to-day work. The year plan of meetings is an example. With this 
"can do " spirit, we could also tackle the new administrative challenges arising from the pandemic.  
The CTG is well positioned to encourage good practices among its subsidiary bodies. Hong Kong, 
China  welcome s an informal platform which could provide the space for Members and the Secretariat 
to understand each other 's particular challenges on administrative tasks, and to explore together 
ways to make the organization more effective.  
44.11.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
44.12.   Just two closing points from Canada . One, support the informal discussion s next year, and 
Canada considers this an important opportuni ty for Members  to continue to elaborate and to think 
a little more about how best to operate these meetings, as has been an ongoing discussion for a 
number of years. Two, Canada also wants to take this opportunity to encourage all  delegates to 
register the mselves and their areas of responsibility in the e-registration system , where  Members  
can pull up a list of the delegates who have indicated that they are responsible for the C TG, for G/C/M/138  
 
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  example.  This makes it easier and faster for Members to identify their contacts and counterparts 
from other delegations.  
44.13.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
44.14.   Paraguay  understood that under this item Members  would have the opportunity to look at 
the te chnical considerations for the CTG  meetings. As this was not possible at the beginning of the 
meeting, Paraguay  was wondering if there would be a specific meeting to discuss this  because 
Paraguay would like to make its position clear. Paraguay  understand s that the technical 
considerations of the meeting have been the same here as in the last meeting, although the 
circumstances have certainly changed. There is more than one WTO meeting room equipped for 
Interprefy which means that meetings can take place sim ultaneously, and there is therefore no need 
to eliminate these meetings at the expense of others. Paraguay  therefore think s that there is no 
need to limit the time available for  statements. In fact, this time -limit has not existed in recent 
meetings, as pa rt of the virtual meetings that have been held and the number of topics on the 
agenda cannot be an argument for limiting the speaking time . In fact, in the TBT and other meetings 
in October and November , Members have taken longer than normal to finish the ir meetings.  
44.15.   These agendas should not just be seen as a simple procedure. The aim of them is not  and 
cannot be to save time. The WTO  monitoring function is fundamental to the Organization 's work. 
Despite its disagreement with these time -limits, Paraguay has  done its best to respect them. 
However, the limit of three minutes and the maximum of four minutes is insufficient, particularly for 
those delegations that are not making statements in English. Such delegations  need to speak slowly 
for the interpreters, which is not possible with in these limits, and added to which, there are also the 
problems with Interprefy, which do not allow Members  to transmit their full message. These limits 
are having a significant impact on Members ' ability to take part effectively, which is why yesterday, 
as well as not being able to slow down the speed of Paraguay 's speeches, Paraguay was also obliged 
to remove entire paragraphs on specific aspects regarding  questions that remain pending  in relation 
to insufficient responses that we have had in other committees, particularly with regard to a multi -
sector concern that has been debated in many of the subsidiary bodies of the CTG, including those 
whose scope goes beyond the CTG, such as the TPR. To ensure that this is reflected in writing, 
Paraguay is submitting its statement s, but these do not have the same effect. This is a very political 
body, therefore, statements made here are also of a political nature, and therefore should be granted 
the necessary time. Paraguay  acknowledge s the flexibility that the Chairperson has shown,  and no 
delegation has been cut off either. And Paraguay  hopes that, in the future, and  despite continuing 
in virtual format, Members  will not have these limits  and can therefore continue as usual with these 
procedures without them having any impact against us.  
44.16.   In this regard, Paraguay  would like to say that, whil e consultations have been held in 
CTG subsidiary bodies, at the last cluster of meetings, in November, on the se procedures, this issue 
was not raised.  The exceptional use of such procedures in these circumstances should not be a rule 
for the future. Therefore, the logistical aspects, which modify the functioning of the CTG, need to be 
discussed and approved by th e Membership.  Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure found in 
document  WT/L/ 161 says that an intervention can be limited but only with the agreement  of the 
Member. Rule 23 says that , to the extent possible, statements will be brief, and that a more detailed 
statement can be sent, but this is a best endeavour clause.  Another provision on best endeavour is 
in Rule 24, which says that Members will do everythin g possible to avoid repeating themselves, but 
it does not make any specific reference to previo us statements.  
44.17.   Finally, Paraguay  would like to note that, despite these logistical restrictions , Paraguay  
understand s that there is a proposal  which  needs to be discussed by the CTG . Therefore, Paraguay 
will not go into further detail, although it would li ke to highlight that this proposal, to date, does not 
have the necessary consensus of Members and that there are still  divergences. Therefore , Paraguay  
cannot refer to these guidelines as a rule, or implement the recommendations in committees and 
Councils of the WTO.  
44.18.   The representative  of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
44.19.   The United Kingdom  support s efforts to improve the functioning of the C TG, and the 
Chairperson 's suggestion of convening an informal meeting on this.  While Members will need to 
discuss their views on different possible approaches in the informal meeting  that has been proposed , G/C/M/138  
 
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  the United Kingdom certainly welcome s the fact that the Chairperson is looking for ways to make 
Members ' exchanges in this Council more effective.  
44.20.   The deleg ate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
44.21.   Colombia thank s the United States and Paraguay for their comments on this topic.  Colombia 
appreciates the need for flexible and productive sessions but believe s that Members  should be 
cautious when it comes to adopting a "one-size-fits-all" approach.  The discussions that  reach and  
take place here  in the CTG, are important, serious, and challenging for all Members and their local 
audiences in terms of developing levels of production in economic terms.  As such, it  is not a matter 
of simply rubber stamping these issues on the same basis for all Members  and all interventions.  The 
Chairperson is right that Members must use the time responsibly and with utmost precision . 
Nevertheles s, Colombia thanks the Chairperson for his proposal and would invite him at the 
beginning of next year to discuss flexible alternatives with the Membership in order to reflect a better 
balance.  
44.22.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
44.23.   Costa Rica  agrees with the points sketched out by the United States at the beginning of this 
meeting today and with what was just said by the delegations of Paraguay and Colombia.  As Costa 
Rica sees it, time restrictions are to be applied only in exceptional circums tances and, as such, Costa 
Rica urges the Chair person  and the Secretariat to consider alternatives for organizing meeting s to 
ensure that time does  not become a limiting factor for the presentation and discussion of concerns 
such as those that have been be fore Members  in recent days.  Costa Rica has maintained a consistent 
stance on time -limits, both in this Council and its subsidiary bodies. Costa Rica  does not feel 
time-limits are  the best way to resolve the issue of increased trade concerns taking up the Council 's 
time. Rather, what  is needed  to deal with this is willingness on the part of Members to address the 
trade concerns which are arising ever more frequently.  Lastly, Costa Rica  agree s with the 
Chair person  as to the need to improve the way in which this Council works, and Costa Rica  stand s 
ready to work with the Chairperson to look for solutions , as Hong Kong , China  mentioned , in the 
course of the consultations to take place early next year.  
44.24.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
44.25.   The European Union  certainly believes that there is room to improve the way this Council 
works as well as the way Members interact.  To this end, the EU stands ready to continue its 
engagement in the context of t he informal consultations that suggest ed by the Chairperson . In this 
regard, the EU believe s that it is useful to consider following some good practices, while also noting 
that it is a matter of genuine collective effort and the choice and responsibility o f Members to follow 
such good practices.  By way of preliminary food for thought, and in  light of the discussions Members  
have had today and in previous meetings, the EU  sees that a number of trade concerns are raised 
from subsidiary bodies, and notes that it may be useful to explore amongst Members how best this 
Council can add value to the discussions that happen in subsidiary bodies rather than just repeating 
them. The EU also believe s that Members could further reflect on how to make the best use of time  
while, as mentioned by several  Members , and by the Chairperson , Members should not lose sight of 
the prime objective, which is to better address and possibly to resolve their trade concerns.  
Therefore, the EU looks forward to the informal consultations ea rly next year.  
44.26.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
44.27.   Mexico echoes Members ' concerns  on this issue . Mexico appreciate s the special 
circumstances and the need to render these meetings much more efficient , and Mexico also 
understand s the high cost entailed by virtual meetings. However, Mexico  also recognize s the fact 
that the imposition of time -limits  on speaking could hamp er Members ' ability to get their points 
across. Nevertheless, the Chairperson  can rest assured that Mexico will provide support in trying to 
find a balanced approach to address ing these concerns from all sides.  
44.28.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the follo wing:  
44.29.   Guatemala  share s the concerns  expressed by previous speakers . Guatemala also agrees that 
it should be up to Members to decide whether or not they choose voluntarily to submit a written G/C/M/138  
 
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  statement prior to a meeting. I t is important to improve the func tioning of the Council  but it is also 
important to recognize the importance of the discussions, which seek to improve the situation, or 
make inroads on trade concerns that have not been dealt with  previously  in the subsidiary 
committees.  Indeed, p articipat ion in this Council is not just a matter of coming and reading a 
statement; rather, it  is a matter of engaging in political discussion s of the topics raised , as noted by 
other delegations.  Guatemala feels that it is important to engage in consultations ear ly next year 
with a view to improving the way in which this Council  functions . 
44.30.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
44.31.   Like other delegations, Argentina  share s the Chairperson 's objective of improving the 
functioning and efficiency of this Council  and the way it deals with its various agenda items.  Various 
delegations also underscored the importance of reaching consensus on the procedures and 
guidelines to be followed when it come s to addressing the trade concerns brought before the Council . 
In this regard, Argentina echoes the remarks made on time-limits  and the use of time. In any event, 
Argentina 's interventions would not exceed three minutes . In this context, Argentina notes th at it is 
not entirely happy about making reference to previous statements. Argentina is always pleased to 
hear about new developments in meetings but, generally speaking, such developments  require 
responses from the Member in relation to whom the concern  is being raised, although  shifting the 
burden to the Member that must respond is often a challenge.  
44.3  Date of Next Meeting  
44.32.   The Chairperson  noted that the next meetings of the Council were scheduled to take place 
on 17 and 18  March  2021 and 10 and 11  May 2021.  However, these dates  would be confirmed in 
due course, as well as the date of the informal meeting to discuss better functioning.14 
44.33.   Regarding the closing of the agenda, he reminded delegations that, according to the Rules 
of Procedure, meetings of WTO  bodies were convened by a meeting notice issued not less than 
ten calendar days prior to the date set for the meeting. The agenda itself therefore closed one 
WTO working day prior to the circulation of the meeting notice; that is, 11  calendar days before the 
date set for the meeting (or, if the date fell on a weekend, the previous Friday).  
44.34.   The meeting was closed . 
__________  
 
14 The date of the next CTG  meeting was subsequently confirmed for 31  March –1 April  2021, with the 
agenda closing on 18  March  2021. The date of the fol lowing CTG  meeting was announced for 8 -9 July 2021, with 
an agenda closing date of 2 5 June 2021.