RESTRICTED  
  
G/MA/M/76  
 
27 September  2022 
(22-7235) Page: 1/67 
Committee on Market Access  Original: English  
 
 
MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON MARKET ACCESS  
30 AND 31  MARCH  2022  
CHAIRPERSON: MR  CHAKARIN KOMOLSIRI (THAILAND)  
The Committee on Market Access (CMA, or the Committee) adopted  the agenda as reproduced in 
documents  WTO/AIR/MA/16/Rev.1, WTO/AIR/MA/16/Rev.1/Add.1 , and 
WTO/AIR/MA/16/Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 . An annotated agenda had been circulated in 
document  JOB/MA/153.  
 
1   INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF 
CONCESSIONS – STATUS REPORT (G/MA/W/158/REV.4)  ................................ ...............  3 
− HS1996 ( WT/L/6905)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 3 
− HS2002 ( WT/L/605 and WT/L/807)  ................................ ................................ ...............  3 
− HS2007 (WT/L/673 and WT/L/830)  ................................ ................................ ..............  3 
− HS2012 (WT/L/831)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 3 
− HS2017 ( WT/L/995)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 4 
2   THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE  
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  ................................ ................................ .......................  4 
3   OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATABASE (IDB) AND  
THE CONSOLIDATED TARIFF SCHEDULES (CTS) DATABASE  ................................ .............  6 
3.1   Status of Implementation of the 2019  IDB Decision (G/MA/367)  ................................ ....... 7 
3.2   Status of IDB  Notifications (G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.55)  ................................ ............................  7 
3.3   List of Members' Official Websites with Tariff Information and Import Statistics 
(G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.6)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 9 
3.4   Status of the CTS  Database  ................................ ................................ ......................... 10 
4   NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION  
PROCEDURES FOR QUANTIT ATIVE RESTRICTIONS (G/L/59/REV.1)  .............................  11 
4.1   Notifications  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 16 
4.2   Quantitative Restrictions: Factual Information on Notifications Received – Report by the 
Secretariat (G/MA/W/114/Rev.4)  ................................ ................................ ......................... 21 
5   SITUATION OF SCHEDULES OF WTO  MEMBERS – REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT 
(G/MA/W/23/REV.18)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 23 
6   REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT ON THE STATUS OF RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII OF THE GATT  1994 (G/MA/W/123/REV.9)  ................................ ..........  23 
7   TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  ......................  25 
8   REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE EXPERIENCE -SHARING SESSION  
IN RELATION TO TRADE IN COVID -19 RELATED GOODS AND REPORT BY THE 
SECRETARIAT (JOB/MA/152)  ................................ ................................ ........................  32 G/MA/M/76  
 
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  9   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ...................  37 
10   CANADA – RESTRICTIONS ON THE COMMERCIAL IMPORTATION OF CANNABIS  
AND CANNABIS PRODUCTS FOR MEDICAL USE – STATEMENT BY COLOMBIA  .................  38 
11   CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – STATEMENT BY 
AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  39 
12   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  .........................  43 
12.1   European Union – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism – Statement by the Russian 
Federation (G/MA/W/172)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...43 
12.2   European Union – Carbon Border Adjustment  Mechanism – Statement by Indonesia  ......... 44 
13   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (G/MA/W/169) – STATEMENTS  BY THE EUROPEAN UNION,  
SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..... 47 
14   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY  OF TAIWAN, PENGHU,  
KINM EN AND MATSU, AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ............  49 
15   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS  – STATEMENTS BY  
JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 51 
16   INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 – STATEMENT  
BY INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  52 
17   INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – 
STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN  UNION, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 53 
18   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME  – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN  UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  55 
19   INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION  
PRODUCTS – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ..........  56 
20   MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE – STATEMENT  BY  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 57 
21   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – STATEMENT  BY THAILAND  ................  58 
22   PERU – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED  KINGDOM  .........  59 
23   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – STATEMENTS   
BY AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THAILAND  ................................ ...............  60 
24   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  .................  63 
25   THE PHILIPPINES – SPECIAL  SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – STATEMENT  
BY INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  64 
26   UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ...............  65 
27   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 66 
27.1   Possible derestriction of the Uruguay Round negotiating materials  ................................ ..66 
27.2   Training session for Geneva -based delegates  ................................ ............................... 66 
27.3   Dates of the next meetings  ................................ ................................ ........................ 67 
28   ELECTION OF THE CHAIRPERSON  ................................ ................................ ............  67 
 
 G/MA/M/76  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF CONCESSIONS 
– STATUS REPORT (G/MA/W/158/REV.4)  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled  that a full version of the Secretariat's reports regarding the various 
transpositions of Schedules had been made available as a room document and on eAgenda1 and 
would be incorporated into the minutes of the meeting.2 
1.2.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja ) informed Members that a revised version of the report 
with the overall "Status of HS  Transpositions", document  G/MA/W/158/Rev.4, had been prepared 
by the Secretariat. The report sought to provide an overview of the overall state of play of the 
different HS transposition exercises, as of 17 March  2022, and had taken into account the results of 
the last HS  multilateral review, which had been held on 1 February  2022. 
− HS1996 ( WT/L/6905)  
1.3.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that one  file had remained pending in HS1996  
since February  2009, which was the file of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.3 
1.4.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2002 ( WT/L/605 and WT/L/807)  
1.5.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja ) recalled that the previous written report on this issue had 
been issued as document  JOB/MA/42/Rev.26, dated 11  September  2019. The status of the 
HS2002  transposition files after the multilateral review of 1 February  2022 was as follows: 116  files 
had bee n certified or were in the process of certification; and one  draft file had been completed and 
sent to the Member for its first  review. Finally, 18  Members had not been affected by the 
transposition, as eight  Members had acceded to the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in HS2002, 
another eight  Members in HS2007, and two  Members in HS2012. Further to the last multilateral 
review, a reminder had been sent by the Chairperson to the two  Members with pending 
HS2002  procedures: the Bolivarian Republic of  Venezue la and China.  
1.6.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2007 (WT/L/673 and WT/L/830)  
1.7.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/104/Rev.29, dated 24  January  2022. The status o f the HS2007  transposition files 
after the multilateral review of  1 February  2022 was as follows: 112  files had been certified or were 
in the process of certification; one  file had been released for multilateral review and had received 
comments from other Members; five  draft files had been completed and sent to Members for their 
first review; and eight  draft files remained to be prepared. Finally, ten  Members had not been 
affected by the transposition as eight  Members had acceded to the WTO with a Schedule of 
concessions in HS2007, and two  Members in HS2012. Further to the last multilateral review, a 
reminder had been sent by the Chairperson to those Members with pending HS2007  procedures: 
Argentina ; the Dominican Republic ; Iceland ; Indonesia ; Japan ; Paraguay;  and Tunisia.  
1.8.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2012 (WT/L/831)  
1.9.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/129/Rev.15, dated 24  January  2022. The status of th e HS2012  transposition files 
after the multilateral review of 1  February  2022 was as follows: 103  files had been certified or were 
in the process of certification; two  files had been released for multilateral review and had received 
comments from other Mem bers; six  draft files had been completed and sent to Members for their 
first review; and 22  draft files remained to be prepared. Finally, two  Members had not been affected 
 
1 https://agenda.wto.org/en/cma  
2 Document  RD/MA/100 . 
3 Ongoing separate  procedures , GATT  document  L/6905.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  by the transposition as they had acceded to the WTO with a Schedule of concessions i n HS2012. 
Further to the last multilateral review, a reminder had been sent by the Chairperson to those 
Members with pending HS2012  procedures: Ecuador ; the Republic of Korea ; Mexico ; the Russian 
Federation ; Singapore;  and the United States.  
1.10.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2017 (WT/L/995)  
1.11.   The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report  had been issued 
as document  JOB/MA/143/Rev.6, dated 24 January  2022. The status of the HS2017  transposition 
files after the  multilateral review of 1  February  2022 was as follows: 64  files had been certified or 
were in the process of certification; 16  files had been released for multilateral review and had 
received comments from other Members; one  file had been released for mul tilateral review but would 
be examined at the next informal meeting; three  draft files had been completed and sent to Members 
for their first  review  and 51  draft files remained to be prepared.4 
1.12.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
2  THE HARM ONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
2.1.  The Chairperson  welcomed Ms  Gael Grooby, Deputy Director of Tariff and Trade Affairs at the 
World Customs Organization (WCO ), who provided an update on the work of the WCO 's Harmonized 
System Committee and shared some feedback on the experience -sharing session on trade in 
COVID -19 goods organized by the Committee on 4  March  2022.5 
2.2.  The representative of the WCO  (Ms Gael Grooby ) reported as follows:  
2.3.  In this session of the CMA, I have been asked to address some of the concerns expressed in 
previous sessions of the CMA on the difficulties seen in achieving uniformity in tariff classification 
between Members. While I do not come he re with a solution to this, I can go through some of the 
reasons that are inherent within the HS itself as to why differences can occur. With a deeper 
understanding of the why, we will be in a better situation for discussing ways to improve the issues 
illustrated in the problems of tracking specific product types of pandemic supplies . The issues I will 
cover today are specificity, ambiguity, and classification resolution issues.  
2.4.  The level of specificity is highly variable across the HS . For example, one of the goods on the 
list is "Salicylic acid and its salts " and these have their own subheading, subheading  2918.21. 
Salicylic acid is used for a range of skin conditions in its own right, but its main interest, in terms of 
the pandemic, is that it is the prin cipal ingredient used to manufacture acetylsalicylic acid, which is 
aspirin, used to treat pain, fever and inflammation. But what about aspirin tablets themselves? They 
are a compounded medicament consisting of acetylsalicylic acid and various other non -active 
ingredients put up in a measured dose, that is, as tablets. So aspirin tablets or capsules are covered 
under subheading  3003.90 – Other . This is a very broad heading covering thousands of different 
products. So while we can track with a good level of precision trade in pure salicylic acid, or in pure 
acetylsalicylic acid (2918.22 – O-Acetylsalicylic acid, its salts and esters), we cannot track specifically 
international trade in ready -to-use aspirin through the HS. However, knowing these non -specific 
classifications is still vitally important nationally . If you want to put in domestic subheadings for 
aspirin tablets or capsules, or you want to put in concessions or measures to be applied to these 
goods, then you do need to know that they should be appli ed under  3004.90 in order to target 
national measures.  
2.5.  Why is the specificity level so variable ? The HS was created from what was in its predecessor 
– the Brussels Nomenclature – and then modified over the years on the basis of proposals from 
Member govern ments . So highly specific classifications reflect what was preoccupying the interest 
of governments at the time proposals came into the Harmonized System Committee . So an area like 
textiles, which has a long history of quotas, sensitive trade negotiations and economic importance, 
includes many very specific provisions . For example, 5206.33 covers cotton yarn (other than sewing 
 
4 Document  RD/MA/100.  
5 See agenda item  8. G/MA/M/76  
 
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  thread), containing less than 85% by weight of cotton, not put up for retail sale, in the form of 
multiple (folded or c abled yarn, of uncombed fibres, measuring per single yarn less than 
714.29  decitex but not less than 232.56  decitex (exceeding 14  metric number but not exceeding 
43 metric number per single yarn )). In fact, heading  52.06 has 20  subheadings detailing the va rious 
possibilities for cotton yarn (other than sewing thread), containing less than 85% by weight of 
cotton, not put for retail sale . And 5206 is one of two headings covering cotton yarn (other than 
sewing thread), not put up for retail sale . Taking headi ngs 52.05 and 52.06 together, there are 
44 very specific subheadings for this subset of goods. If we compare this to something like 
heading  90.18, which is an important heading in the pandemic that covers "Instruments and 
appliances used in medical, surgic al, dental or veterinary sciences, including scintigraphic apparatus, 
other electro -medical apparatus and sight -testing instruments ", in other words, the majority of the 
crucial medical equipment, we can see that it has not been heavily specified . Compared  to the 
44 subheadings for cotton yarn (other than sewing thread), not put for retail sale , the entire category 
of heading  90.18 has only 13  subheadings, of which only eight  name product types with relatively 
high specificity . The other five are "other " subheadings.  
2.6.  This difference in specificity between these examples relates to what the Members had put up 
for inclusion. The choices on where efforts are made to increase specificity are in the hands of 
Members. The HS is Member -driven and proposals are meant to come from Members or 
intergovernmental organizations  (IGOs) representing Members. We currently have very little from 
Members to improve on this situation for medical goods. We have only one  proposal before the 
Review Sub -Committee in relation to more specificity for medicaments. I would note that the cycle 
is close to finishing with only four  meetings of the Harmonized System Committee left, so if proposals 
do not arrive in the next few months, then the prospects for being better prepared in HS2027 for 
future health emergencies with more specificity for critical medical goods are limited.  
2.7.  It has been previously noted in the CMA that there is a level of ambiguity in some of the 
HS provisions relevant to the pandemic. One  product that was mentioned is paper masks . There are 
two potential subheadings of heading  48.18 that might cover these paper masks: 4818.50, which 
covers "Articles of apparel and clothing accessories " and 4818.90, which covers "Other ". So the 
question is, are masks articles of apparel or clothing accessories ? Different administrations have 
come to different answers on this. The HS is language -based . The inherent lexical ambiguity levels 
of most languages are very high. There are estimates that for English, over 80% of words have more 
than one  meaning. For perfect clarity between Members, then there would have to be a perfect 
shared understanding of the intended meaning of the corresponding English and French words , or 
phrases , used in the provisions, as well  as the ability to have available words or phrases that 
correspond perfectly to that understanding of the meaning in every language into which the HS is 
translated. Given that this is impossible, ambiguity is always going to be an issue. This is sometimes 
addressed by legally binding definitions . These can be very helpful but do add to the difficulty for 
HS users as their existence is not obvious to someone reading the provision unless it is actually 
specified in the terms, and usually it is not . They can a lso risk fixing the definition in a way that does 
not allow for the natural evolution of the goods . However, my own view is that definitional notes 
serve an important role in the HS. But this can be difficult when it is a question of the definition of 
very broad words , such as "apparel " or "accessory ", that is causing the consistency problems.  
2.8.  The other source of ambiguity is that there is a need inherent in the requirements within the 
legally binding rules of the HS to make certain judgements when there is  more than one  possible 
heading or subheading . Here I am mainly referring to the requirements to judge specificity or 
essential character, although these are not the only aspects in the Rules which require a judgement 
call. In particular, judgements on what constitutes the "essential character " of a particular item are 
a relatively common source of disagreements between Members. The other tool is the Explanatory 
Notes, and although these are not legally binding, the value of proposals to update the Explanatory 
Notes should not be underestimated as they are very influential in classification.  
2.9.  Finally, we need to address the issue of international classification resolution . What is the 
process for clarifying these variations in classification at the six-digit level that were highlighted by 
the CMA ? Firstly, the normal process is for one of the Contracting Parties to refer the matter to the 
Harmonized System Committee ( HSC). The HSC will make a decision . This may occur in the 
first meeting or the HSC may first ask for more information and consider it in a subsequent meeting . 
It can also be postponed if the HSC has insufficient time to consider all of its agenda: as agendas 
normally cover very large numbers of items, this can easily  happen . The matter is decided on a 
simple majority vote – so 50% of the vote cast plus  1. There are then six  months available for a G/MA/M/76  
 
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  reservation by Contracting Parties . Matters can be reserved for re -examination up to three  times . 
So a decision can be made  at one  meeting,  or it can take multiple meetings . As meetings only occur 
twice a year, if a matter is not decided at the first  meeting, then the minimum wait time is 
six months,  and it can be measured in years if it is subject to delays and reservations. So the 
resolution of differences is not always a rapid matter . It should also be noted that such decisions are 
not binding, although most Members follow them in good faith. One last point , I should also note 
that the publication of a Classification Opinion  is a separate matter from a decision, and if one is 
wanted, then after the decision is final, it goes to the next meeting of the HSC , in six  months' time , 
for the approval of the Classification Opinion draft.  
2.10.   Having looked at the issues of the variations in specificity, the inherent ambiguity of natural 
language provisions, and the potentially long time -frames for resolving classification variations, 
where does that leave us for looking at how we do better in the future? I will touch on two  points . 
2.11.   One is the need for the HSC and the WCO  Secretariat to consider alternative ways to engage 
Members when public classification advice is needed urgently . The WCO  Secretariat faced a major 
dilemma with the pandemic . The HSC was due to meet in person in March  2020 when the lockdowns 
and travel restrictions were first imposed in Belgium . So we effectively lost that meeting . This left a 
bad situation where there was an urgent need for public advice from the HSC in an emergency 
situation, but no capacity or proces s to provide such  advice . The WCO  Secretariat does not normally 
have a mandate for giving public classification advice, this is a function of the HSC and only as an 
in-session function, yet there would be no meeting until September . Even for September, the re were 
doubts about what could be covered as there was no format in place for holding a two -week meeting 
virtually. This is why the lists were published as indicative only and stressed the need to consult with 
national administrations. We also updated the  lists when Members made us aware of differing 
practices and presented the lists to the HSC at the first  opportunity. The HSC accepted the lists as 
indicative only, not having sufficient time in virtual meetings, focused on urgent HS  2022 work, to 
go throu gh all the classifications. Even going this far went beyond what is in the normal scope of the 
WCO Secretariat . 
2.12.   So there does need to be a process in place for obtaining authorization and, if possible, 
endorsement, from Members out of session and quickly i n situations that meet a definition of an 
event requiring classification information to be disseminated urgently . We are launching this year 
an Exploratory Study of the HS as a basis for a possible Review, and this is something that I will 
refer to that te am as an item for consideration and for reporting on, within their intermediate reports, 
to the HSC for their consideration.  
2.13.   The second  point is the importance of Whole -of-Government input into the HS . While it is the 
Customs administrations who normally p ut forward proposals, these reflect government policies and 
needs, as well as technical needs . So input into what is needed in HS  2027 to address the issues 
identified as a result of the pandemic is an issue that the trade and health administrations in 
countries should be looking at in conjunction with the customs administrations in order to achieve 
desired results. I will end by noting again that we have only four  HSC sessions left in the HS  2027 
negotiations cycle . Time is of the essence.  
2.14.   The Committee took note  of the WCO  report.  
3  OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATABASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED TARIFF 
SCHEDULES (CTS) DATABASE  
3.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were four  issues to discuss under this agenda item, 
namely: (i)  the status of implementation of t he IDB  Decision; (ii)  the status of IDB  notifications; 
(iii) the document with the list of Members' official websites; and (iv)  the status of the CTS  database.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  3.1  Status of Implementation of the 2019  IDB Decision  (G/MA/367)  
3.2.  The Chairperson  recalled that a ful l version of the Secretariat's report and the presentation had 
been made available as a room document6 and in  the eAgenda and would be incorporated into the 
minutes of the meeting.  
3.3.  The Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) reported  that additional projects had been undertaken 
relating to the implementation of provisions indicated in document  G/MA/367 , as followed : 
a. New dissemination portal: the consultant engaged by the Secretariat to help develop 
better interfaces to improve the use r experience for the new dissemination portal had 
submitted her report, which had been further refined by the core group based on 
additional inputs from users. The development phase, with support from  the Information 
Technology Solutions Division  (ITSD), was expected to start by the second  quarter of 
2022.  
b. On the automatic electronic transmission of data (paragraph  8 of G/MA/367), there 
were currently two  Members that had concluded such an agreement with the Secretariat 
(Canada and Uruguay) , and the Secreta riat continued to engage with other interested 
delegations. On 22  March  2022, a meeting to discuss the automatic data transmission 
had been held with Mauritius and this possibility had also been mentioned in a meeting 
on data issues with Paraguay. Meanwhil e, the other parallel project related to the 
automatic data notification for Members using ASYCUDA was progressing. The 
Memorandum of Understanding ( MoU) had been recently signed with Togo, in addition 
to Madagascar and Côte d'Ivoire. The Democratic Republ ic of the Congo had also 
expressed its interest in participating but the process had been put on hold due to some 
administrative matters ; however, it was currently being revisited. The module to 
automate some of the tasks related to data receipt, validation, integration, update of 
the information system, and other processes until the final dissemination of data was 
currently in an early phase of its develop ment.  
c. On a related subject, the Tariff Download Facility ( http://tdf.wto.org ), one of the 
IDB/CTS  online dissemination applications which facilitated mass download for data at 
different HS  standard levels chapter (2 -digit), heading (4 -digit), and subheading 
(6-digit) levels for multiple years/reporters was scheduled for decommissioning since 
the majority of tariff indicators published on this online portal were already available in 
the WTODATA ( http://stats.wto.org ) portal which was API-enabled and mass download 
could therefore be carried out more efficiently . 
3.4.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
3.2  Status of IDB  Notifications (G/MA/IDB/2/ Rev.55) 
3.5.  The Chairperson  recalled that a full version of the Secretariat's report and presentation had 
been made available as a room document7 and in the eAgenda and would be incorporated into the 
minutes of the meeting.  
3.6.  The Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) recalled that the report by the Secretariat on the status 
of submissions to the IDB had been circulated in document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.55. Data cut -off had 
been 14 March  2022, which was 16 days ahead of the deadline for 2022  applied tarif fs notification 
scheduled on 30  March  2022. Hence, the latest dataset due from Members was for 2020 imports, 
which had been due by 31  October  2021. The electronic copy for all years from 1996 was also 
available for download from the site https://IDBFileExchange.wto.org . A "call to notify" email had 
been sent to concerned Members in mid -February  2022 for the current year (2022) applied tariffs. 
For the statistics cited below, the cut -off date had been 21 March  2022.  
3.7.  Ahead of the official deadline for 2022  applied tariffs, only 36  Members (or 26%) had notified 
among the 136  expected notifying Members. This might have seem ed lower if compared to what 
 
6 Document  RD/MA/100 . 
7 Document  RD/MA/100.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  had been reported in the first  CMA meeting of 2021, which had been held after the submission 
deadline, when there had been 46 applied 2021  tariff notifications. However, the 2022 percentage 
was higher than the corresponding statistic for 2020 , which had been 21%. Based on all expected 
yearly notifications of Memb ers from 1996, data on applied tariffs data were 81% complete. Of the 
36 available data on 2022 applied tariffs , 32 had been official submissions while the other four had 
been collected by the Secretariat from approved "framework sources". As to the inclus ion of other 
applied tariffs, notably preferential rates, 22  submissions (or 61% of received notifications) had 
included non -MFN duty schemes . Further more, there had been two  notifications which had contained 
the optional additional import taxes . Overall, 29 Members representing 21% of notifying Members 
had a complete notification record on  MFN applied tariffs. However, there remain ed 51 Members 
(38%) with six or more years of outstanding applied tariff data.  
3.8.  The 2020  import data  had been due in October  2021 and this reference had been used as the 
basis for the import notification statistics. There were 54  available notifications which represented 
40% of the 136  expected notifications. All of these had been notified, meaning that no framework 
dataset for 2020 had been collected yet. Of those expected datasets, 41 (30%) had been submitted 
by the 31  October  2021 deadline. Data on imports required for submission from notifying Members 
for the years 1996 up to 2020 were 75% complete . For all data on im ports due for those years, 
41 Members , or 30% of notifying Members , had complete data. The number of Members with six or 
more years of data which were yet to be submitted was 53, representing 39% of notifying Members. 
On a positive note, there were already  five Members that had notified their 2021 imports , well ahead 
of the deadline . 
3.9.  The number of recomposed tariffs as provided in paragraph  22 of document  G/MA/367, which 
referred to "estimated" MFN  tariffs when a single year historical tariff dataset was outstanding but 
the tariffs for adjacent years and imports for the corresponding year had been notified, remained at 
thirty -five country periods with the latest recomposed year as 2015. The IDB would  send out a 
notification reminder email to all Members with outstanding data after 30  March  2022 (deadline for 
submitting tariffs) to determine if missing historical tariffs could still be collected. Further more, the 
Secretariat would examine existing noti fications to see if additional notified imports could be 
integrated with recomposed applied MFN  tariffs which had been outstanding for at least five years 
(2017 or earlier).  
3.10.   Overall, as of the same data cut -off, the IDB disseminated data consist ed of 2,858  country 
periods of either applied tariffs with matched imports at the national tariff line level or either of the 
required notifications. All WTO  Members , except for Afghanistan  and six  acceding Members (Algeria, 
Bahamas, Belarus,  Comoros,  Iran, and Serbi a) had notified their data in the IDB , and these  had 
been disseminated in the different online portals , namely  TAO, TDF, and WTODATA . 
3.11.   On the PTA-TM data (Table  1), which should also be notified to the IDB based on the 
IDB Decision, and the 24  notifying Members of the PTA8, only 11  Members had notified the required 
applied tariffs (MFN plus the PTA  preferences) and 13  Members had no applied tariff notification yet 
for 2022. In addition, there were five  Members with outstanding 2021  applied tari ff data. On import 
data, with a breakdown by the PTA -TM required duty scheme, there had been 13 notifications  
received out of 24  expected for 2020 ( the United Kingdom was expected to notify its imports 
separately). Of those , three  Members had submitted only their regular import data , without the 
breakdown by PTA -TM duty scheme , and eight Members had not yet submitted any import data. As 
stipulated in para graph  5 of the IDB  Decision , and to avoid the multiple processing of data, the 
Secretariat would await the complete PTA -TM datasets (tariffs or imports) before integrating the 
notifications . 
 
8 The European Union (27) and the United Kingdom are counted separately from 2021 for tariffs. 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein count as one.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  Table 1. Status of Notifications of Required PTA -TM data 
Data Notified   Number  Percentage  (%) 
Applied MFN Tariff + PTA  Preferences  
2020  2021 
 2022  2020  2021  2022  
MFN Only 0 1 0 0 4 0 
MFN + GSP/LDC (incl. Other PTAs) + 
Other Duty Schemes  21 18 11 91 75 46 
No Notification  2 5 13 9 21 54 
Expected PTA Tariff Notificationsa 23 24 24 100 100 100 
 Imports by PTA  Duty Scheme  
 2018  2019  2020  2018  2019  2020  
Regular Imports with No Breakdown by 
PTA Duty Scheme  6 5 3 26 22 13 
With PTA -TM breakdown  16 15 13 70 65 54 
No Notification  1 3 8 4 13 33 
Expected PTA Import Notificationsa 23 23 24 100 100 100 
 a  EU tariff notifications until 2020 include its 27  member States and the UK. Starting in 2021, 
UK tariffs were notified separately. The UK is expected to notify its 2020 import data separately.  
 
3.12.   After the data cut -off for document  G/MA/IDB /2/Rev.55 , on 14  March  2022, the following 
additional notifications were received (until 24  March  2022): 
• Angola 2022  tariffs ; 
• Canada 2020  imports ; 
• Colombia 2022  tariffs and 2021  imports ; 
• European Union 2022  tariffs ; 
• Guatemala 2022  tariffs and imports for 2 003, 2004 and 2016 ; 
• Mauritius 2022  tariffs ; 
• Oman 2022  tariffs ; 
• South Africa 2020  imports ; 
• United States 2022  tariffs . 
 
3.13.   Since the Committee 's previous meeting,  in October  2021, the Secretariat had participated in 
the following online technical assistance ac tivities , and/or presentations , concerning the 
IDB/CTS  data and related tools:  
• 2022 cohort of Young Professionals ; 
• French and Irish Mission Internship Programme (FIMIP) and the Netherlands Trainee 
Program me (NTP) . 
 
3.14.   The 2022  edition of the World Tariff Profiles (WTP) was expected to be launched in June  2022. 
The number of downloads of the previous edition (WTP  2021) had been around 99,000 from 
July 2021 to February  2022.  
3.15.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
3.3  List of Members' Official Websites with Tariff Information and Import Statistics  
(G/MA/IDB/W/13/ Rev.6) 
3.16.   The Chairperson  recalled that the 2019  IDB Decision required the Secretariat to prepare a list 
of Members' official websites containing tariff information a nd import statistics. A sixth  revision of G/MA/M/76  
 
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  this document had been prepared by the Secretariat. In this regard, the Secretariat had consulted 
with Members informally prior to circulating this sixth revision in document  G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.6.  
3.17.   The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) indicated the following : 
3.18.   As in previous cases , the Secretariat took a close look at all the weblinks of the official websites 
on tariff information and import statistics, checked that all of those links were still functioning and , 
if not, looked for alternative links that could be replaced in the draft document, while also adding 
weblinks that were previously missing. As a next step, the draft of this document was then shared 
with WTO Members for their verification of the updated weblink s and the Secretariat subsequently 
received several corrections from Members . The final document was circulated on 24  March  2022 
and new revisions will be prepared in the future.  
3.19.   The Chairperson  recalled that, as announced at the Committee 's previous forma l meeting,  in 
October  2021, the Secretariat had worked with the web team to make this information available on 
the WTO  website .9 He gave the floor to the Secretariat to show the mock -up. 
3.20.   The Secretariat  (Mr Berisford Codd) indicated the following : 
3.21.   The Secretariat has prepared a mock -up with the updated websites for tariff information and 
import statistics. On the page, there was a full listing of all WTO  Members , along with official websites 
for tariff information and import statistics. The table sh owed up to 100  Members on one  page. A 
blank space indicated  where official sources were not identified , and the webpage was to be updated 
as new revisions of the document became available. In addition to the general page, the links were 
also available from  the individual WTO Member pages. The links would be located on the top left of 
the page. The Secretariat remained open to receiving any additional updates , which could be emailed 
to the Secretariat.  
3.22.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
3.23.   India thanks the Secretariat for compiling this information and notes that India had submitted 
its official website links on tariff information , as well as its import statistics. This information was 
shared on 25  March, and hence it had not yet been reflec ted in document  G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.6. 
India looks forward to the inclusion of its submission in the document's subsequent revision.  
3.24.   The Chairperson  recognized the usefulness of having this information available online because 
interested Members could direct ly access the websites t hrough the links without having to go into 
the document first. He therefore asked the Secretariat to make this webpage available online.  
3.25.   It was so agreed . 
3.26.   The Chairperson  reminded delegations to continue to test the weblinks and to inform the 
Secretariat as soon as possible of any change, so that this information was kept up to date . 
3.27.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's reports and the statements made.  
3.4  Status of the  CTS Database  
3.28.   The Chairperson  drew the Committee's attention to the Secretariat report on the status of the 
CTS database. A full version of the Secretariat's report and presentation had been made available 
as a room document and on eAgenda and would be incorporated into the minutes of  the meeting.10 
3.29.   The Secretariat  (Ms Alya Belkhodja) reported that the Secretariat had made CTS  files 
available to all Members on the TAO.11 Out of the 135  CTS files: 54  had been made available in 
 
9 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/tariffandimpofwebsites_e.htm  
10 Document  RD/MA/100 . 
11 https://tao.wto.org  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  HS2017; 49  had been made available in HS2012; 16 in HS2007; 14 in HS2002; and two  remained 
in HS96. All legal instruments were available through the Goods Schedule e -Library.12 
3.30.   In addition, the Secretariat had published on TAO the complete CTS  database in MS  Excel in 
June 2021. Each Member's file reflected the late st information on bound commitments as included 
in the CTS  MS Access files. However, the CTS files in Excel followed the presentation used in the 
legal instruments, as, for example , in the Uruguay Round Schedule of concessions. An updated 
version of the CT S Excel files had been posted to TAO on 24  March  2022.  
3.31.   The representative of Switzerland  asked whether the Secretariat could inform the Committee 
about the project to update the TAO.  
3.32.   The Secretariat  (Ms Alya Belkhodja) replied that the project for developing a new TAO was 
under way and that a report would be made under the agenda item on the IDB.13 
3.33.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report and of the statements made.  
4  NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS (G/L/59/REV.1)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the notificatio ns of quantitative restrictions (QRs) 
from 16  Members. He noted that many of these notifications related to measures implemented in 
response to the COVID -19 pandemic and, to the extent possible, asked Members to refer to them 
under agenda item  7. Finally, he recalled that, in the case of a connection problem preventing any 
Member from indicating that it wished to have more time to examine a notification, and thus keep 
the notification on the Committee's agenda for its next formal meeting, that Member would have 
until 8  April 2022 to inform the Secretariat accordingly.  
4.2.  The representative  of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
4.3.  Under this agenda item, Ukraine consider s it necessary , as a matter of urgency and for the 
sake of transparency , to draw Members ' attentio n to Ukraine 's notification  in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/Add.2 , of 25  March  2022. This notification was prepared by 
Capital -based colleagues , of whom Ukraine is grateful and proud. The majority of Ukraine's 
Capital -based colleagues, as well as their familie s, are either hiding from attacks in bomb shelters 
or were forced to flee their homes along with more than 10  million other Ukrainians seeking safe 
places to stay. Despite all the horror of the war unleashed by the Russian Federation, they continue 
to fulfil their duty and demonstrate Ukraine's commitment to the fundamental rules of this 
Organization . 
4.4.  Due to the R ussian Federation's military invasion of Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine was 
forced to introduce export restriction measures and non -automatic licensing of the exportation of 
certain agricultural products. This is a forced step to ensure national food s ecurity of Ukraine in these 
hard and terrifying times for the Ukrainian people and their lives. Active military actions have already 
halted trade and destroyed many sown areas and farms. Today, one of the targets of the R ussian 
army is Ukrainian agricultur al equipment, food , and especially petroleum depots. Even under these 
circumstances, Ukraine's farmers , while risking their lives , have already started the sowing season 
in some regions of Ukraine . 
4.5.  Ukraine  firmly believe s that it is extremely important to share this information with Members, 
so that they can focus on policies likely to help mitigate or help solve a possible food crisis. Since 
the effects of the aggression on international trade in food products are already perceptible, this 
issue is being d iscussed by many Members, and the agricultural community , in all relevant forums. 
At the meeting of the General Council on 24  February  2022, the day that the Russian aggression 
against Ukraine began, Ukraine clearly stated that the world face d a looming food crisis. In this 
regard, Ukraine informed Members that all its resources and measures, including its trade and 
 
12 https:// goods -schedules.wto.org  
13 See paragraph  3.3(a). G/MA/M/76  
 
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  economic  resources and measures , would be directed to maintain the national economy and save 
the lives of Ukraine's people.  
4.6.  Ukraine wishes  to conclude by quoting the statement made by one  Member at the General 
Council's most recent informal meeting, with which we fully and extremely agree , that  "absent this 
military action, that infrastructure would still be working. Absent this military action, cargo ships 
would be transiting the Black Sea . Absent this military action, world food prices would reflect normal 
market conditions. " To date, this statement remains completely relevant for all trade issues.  
4.7.  The representative  of the United Kingdo m indicated the following:  
4.8.  The United Kingdom  thank s Ukraine for its intervention, against the context of the Russian 
Federation's  illegal war. Indeed, Russia 's invasion of Ukraine is an egregious violation of international 
law and the UN  Charter. Russia 's actions have undermined the ability of another WTO  Member – 
Ukraine – to fully participate in all aspects of the world trading system, including on trade in goods. 
As a result, WTO Members  cannot continue "business as usual ". The consequences of Russia's 
actions are affecting trade in goods not only in Ukraine, but in markets across the globe, increasing 
the prices of key commodities such as oil and gas, grains, and metals.  
4.9.  To name a few examples: first, when it comes to agricultural goods, Ukrainian farmers and 
manufacturers cannot plant, harvest or produce the food needed to feed the world, because of 
Russian tanks in Ukrainian fields. The UN  Secretary General has called the crisis a "hurricane of 
hunger ", and the Director of the World Food  Programme expects a "catastrophe on catastrophe ". 
Second, when it comes to manufacturing and industrial goods, Ukrainian export and import 
infrastructure and plants are being bombed and blockaded by Russian missiles from land and air, 
and therefore Ukrain e cannot participate in industrial supply chains. Third, when it comes to the 
infrastructure that underpins trade in goods, Ukrainian ports and airports cannot export or import, 
because they are blockaded by Russian ships and troops. Fourth, let us not for get that trade in goods 
depends on trade in services. With Russia 's invasion spurring the fastest -growing refugee crisis since 
the Second World War, the UN  High Commissioner  for Refugees has noted that 10  million Ukrainians 
have had to flee , with a quarter of Ukraine 's population displaced inside the country, or as refugees 
abroad, because of Russia 's actions.  
4.10.   The point here  is that , while the Russia n Federation  continues its illegal invasion of Ukraine, 
these impacts will persist across supply chain s, which is to the detriment of Ukraine and the rest of 
the world.  And it is only when Russia stops this illegal invasion that Ukrainian farmers can start 
planting the seeds needed to feed the world. And it is only when Russia stops this illegal war that 
Ukrainian supply chains on goods can restart, and Ukrainian ports import and export goods. That is 
the solution, and it lies with one WTO  Member only: the Russian Federation. And while Russia 
continues to violate international law, human rights , and multipl e commitments to peace and 
security, the United Kingdom  will work with its allies and partners across the multilateral system to 
condemn Russia 's appalling actions and to isolate it on the international stage. As the UK does so, 
it will remain transparent on its measures, including through the WTO. For example , the UK has just 
notified, through the IDB, that it has implemented a 35%  tariff added on top of the current MFN 
tariff rates for a number of goods originating in Russia. The UK  will keep Members upda ted, as 
appropriate.  
4.11.   The representative  of the United States  indicated the following:  
4.12.   The United States reiterates its strong support for Ukraine during this unimaginably difficult 
time. The United States is deeply impressed with the heroism of the Ukraini an people and the bravery 
of their armed forces and their leaders. The United States condemns Russia 's premeditated and 
unprovoked attack on Ukraine as well as the actions of the Belarus regime, which is aiding Russia 's 
war of aggression. President Putin 's premeditated war has brought catastrophic loss of life and 
human suffering. Russia is solely responsible for this death and destruction, and the world must hold 
Russia accountable.  
4.13.   The United States  calls upon Russia to immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and 
refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any UN  member State. The United 
States is united with its allies and partners in its commitment to ensure the Russian government 
pays a severe economic an d diplomatic price for its further invasion of Ukraine. The actions of Russia G/MA/M/76  
 
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  are incompatible with the rules -based system that WTO  Members  have built and work to improve. 
The WTO is predicated on certain values, among these that a fair and just internatio nal order is one 
built on rules, reciprocity, and transparency.  
4.14.   The representative  of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
4.15.   The Russian Federation draws Members' attention to the Terms of Reference of the C MA 
contained in document  WT/L/47 , as adopted by the General Council. According to this document , 
the CMA shall: (a)  in relation to market access issues not covered by any other WTO  body, supervise 
the implementation of concessions relating to tariffs and non -tariff measures and provide a forum 
for consultation on matters relating to tariffs and non -tariff measures; (b)  oversee the application 
of procedures for modification or withdrawal of tariff concessions; (c)  ensure that GATT  Schedules 
are kept up -to-date, and that modifications, including those resulting from changes in tariff 
nomenclature, are reflected; (d)  conduct the updating and analysis of the documentation on QRs 
and other non -tariff measures, in accordance with the timetable and procedures agreed by the 
CONT RACTING PARTIES in 1984 and 1985; (e)  oversee the content and operation of, and access to, 
the Integrated Data Base; and (f)  report periodically – and in any case not less than once a year – 
to the Council for Trade in Goods."  
4.16.   The Russian Federation partic ularly underscore s that consideration of matters of global or 
regional security concerns, and UN Charter enforcement or compliance , do not fall under the 
mandate of the present Committee. Russia hopes that the Committee's Chairperson will be able to 
modera te the discussion accordingly , resisting pressure from those delegations negligent to this 
basic rule and their attempts to violate rules that they themselves have developed and adopted for 
the discussion. Otherwise , Russia considers that the Committee run s the risk of having a medieval 
bazaar rather than a WTO  Committee meeting. Russia urges delegates to exercise self -restrain t in 
this regard.  
4.17.   The representative  of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
4.18.   Paraguay wishes to thank Ukraine for bringing its notifica tion to the attention of the 
Committee, despite the fact that this item was not on the agenda. Paraguay thanks Ukraine for its 
effort and commitment to the system. Paraguay supports the Ukrainian people, and particularly their 
families, who are in such a difficult position. The WTO is based on respect for international law ; 
therefore , WTO Members must all ensure their compliance with that law. The WTO must continue to 
contribute to peace and security. In this regard, Paraguay  wishes to reiterate that it condemns the 
attacks on the Ukrainian people, which are in violation of the principles of sovereignty and 
international law ; in addition, it reiterate s the necessity of finding a peaceful and mutually acceptable  
solution.  
4.19.   The representative  of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
4.20.   New Zealand thanks  Ukraine for its notification and submission and for its commitment to 
transparency and the multilateral order. New Zealand  cannot discount the reasons for Ukraine 's 
notification at this time, which is relevant to discuss within this Committee . New Zealand reiterate s 
that it stands with the international community in condemning Putin 's unjustified and illegal attack 
on Ukraine, which represents a clear violation of Ukrai ne's sovereignty and territorial integrity. New 
Zealand's thoughts are with the people in Ukraine impacted by this conflict. New Zealand is deeply 
concerned to see reports of mounting casualties and widespread damage.  
4.21.   New Zealand has called for Russia to a ct consistently with its international obligations, cease 
military operations in Ukraine, withdraw its troops , and return to diplomatic negotiations as a 
pathway to resolve this conflict. A unified response sends a shared message to Russia: no country 
may seize the territory of a sovereign state and no country has a veto over another 's security 
partners or political path.  
4.22.   The representative  of Japan  indicated the following:  
4.23.   Japan condemns the Russian Federation's recent aggression against Ukraine in the strongest 
terms. Japan believe s that the significance of the Market Access Committee lies in its capacity to 
maintain and develop the rules-based international order, which is the foundation of the multilateral G/MA/M/76  
 
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  trading system , with the WTO at its core. However, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia is an act that 
undermines the very foundation of the international order and the multilateral trading system . In 
this respect, Japan appreciates the statements from Ukraine, t he United Kingdom , the United States , 
Paraguay,  and New Zealand, and also shares their concerns.  
4.24.   The representative  of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
4.25.   The Republic of Korea  thanks Ukraine for its notification and for sharing their informatio n. 
Like others, Korea also believes that this is relevant to the work of this Committee. In addition , 
Korea echoes previous speakers regarding the situation in Ukraine. The Korean government strongly 
condemns the Russian invasion against Ukraine as a viola tion of the principles of the UN  Charter. 
Ukraine's  sovereignty, cultural integrity , and political independence must be respected. Korea also 
share s the deep concerns of the international community over the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. 
Reaffirming its commitment to the rules-based global trade order under the WTO, Korea is also 
concerned over the serious impact and uncertainty created by Russia's action s on the globa l supply 
chain , in many different areas, including security and shortage s of key products . 
4.26.   The representative  of Norway  indicated the following:  
4.27.   Norway thank s Ukraine for its notification, which clear ly shows the challenges they are facing 
in these difficu lt times. Norway condemns in the strongest possible terms the unprecedented military 
aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Norway express es its concern for the severe 
destruction and human suffering this illegal act of aggression is causing . By its unprovoked, 
unjustified, and premeditated military actions, the Russian Federation is grossly violating 
international law, on the core principles of which the international rule s-based order is built , and the 
fundamental principles of the UN  Chart er, which has prevailed since World War  II. It is an attack on 
what the UN, the WTO, and Geneva as a capital of multilateralism, stand for. Norway expresses its 
full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  
4.28.   The representative  of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
4.29.   Türkiye  reject s the unjust and unlawful attacks against Ukraine. Türkiye 's firm support for the 
unity, sovereignty , and territorial integrity of Ukraine will continue. This military aggression causes 
a huge humanitarian crisis. Türkiye  is providing Ukraine with military and other assistance. Türkiye  
reiterate s its call for an urgent humanitarian pause for dialogue and diplomacy. To this end , Türkiye  
is in close contact with Ukraine and the Russia n Federation . Upon Türkiye 's initiative and intensive 
diplomatic efforts , four Ministers from Ukraine and Russia met on the margins of the Antalya 
Diplomacy Forum , on 10  March  2022; as part of these efforts , Türkiye 's foreign minister visited both 
countries on 16 and17  March. Lastly the negotiating delegations of Russia and Ukraine had met in 
Istanbul on the previous day . As Türkiye 's foreign minister said yesterday , the talks in  Istanbul had 
yielded the most significant progress since the military aggression had begun . Türkiye  will continue 
these efforts with a view to restoring peace and stability in its close neighbourhood.  
4.30.   The representative  of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.31.   The European Union  cannot ignore the international context in which the Committee's  meeting 
takes place, that is , the Russia n Federation 's war of choice against Ukraine. The EU and its member 
States stand in full solidarity with U kraine and its people. Because of Russia 's invasion of Ukraine, 
trade in goods in and from Ukraine is being strongly disrupted. Ukraine, and several other 
delegations before us, have spoken eloquently of the extraordinary hardships that Russia 's military 
actions against Ukraine have caused . Because of these extraordinary challenges, Ukraine was 
compelled to take a number of trade measures, and the EU has taken due note of the latest 
QR notification that Ukraine has circulated. Ukraine also referred to the e ffects of the war on 
international trade; these effects are being felt around the world.  
4.32.   As reflected in the recent Joint Statement on aggression by the Russian Federation against 
Ukraine14, the European Union and other WTO  Members have adopted measures ag ainst Russia to 
protect their essential security interests. The purpose of these measures is to restore peace and 
security as soon as possible, in full respect of Ukraine 's territorial integrity and sovereignty. These 
 
14 Document  WT/GC/244.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  actions come as a response to Russia 's act of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian Federation 
bears full responsibility for that act and its consequences. The European Union demands that Russia 
immediately cease its military actions and respect Ukraine 's sovereignty within its international ly 
recogni zed borders.  
4.33.   The representative  of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
4.34.   Chinese Taipei  thank s Ukraine for its intervention and notification to the Committee , despite 
its very difficult circumstances. Chinese Taipei also joins others in raising its serious concerns 
regarding the war , which has led to a devastating loss of human life in Ukraine. This is not acceptable 
from any perspective. This unjustified attack needs to be stopped. As mentioned by previous 
speakers , the war ha s undermined the supply chain for food and other essential goods and has 
deteriorated food security. In addition, it seriously undermines the livelihood of people in many 
countries. All of this is of importance to the WTO. Chinese Taipei therefore call s on the Russian 
Federation to end its acts of aggression immediately. Chinese Taipei stand s firmly by Ukraine and 
its people  
4.35.   The representative  of Australia  indicated the following:  
4.36.   Australia thanks Ukraine for its notification. This issue is relevant to the work of this 
Committee. Australia condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia 's unprovoked, unjust , and 
illegal invasion of Ukraine. This invasion is a gross violation of international law, including the Charter 
of the United Nations . Australia strongl y supports Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
calls on Russia to cease its attacks on Ukraine and withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory. 
Russia 's war on Ukraine is exacting a catastrophic humanitarian toll. Australia supports colle ctive 
action by the international community to impose costs and increase leverage on Russia and those in 
Russia who bear responsibility.  
4.37.   The representative  of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
4.38.   Switzerland  wishes to thank Ukraine for its efforts to meet its notification obligations in spite 
of its current difficulties. Like previous speakers, Switzerland condemns the illegal military 
aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. This 
aggression is a gross violation of international law and in particular the prohibition of the use of force  
and the respect for state territory and integrity. Leading to a de -escalation, Switzerland calls upon 
Russia to respect its international obligations, to cease its military action, and to immediately 
withdraw its troops  from Ukrainian territory. Switzerland calls upon all parties to fully respect 
international law , including international humanitarian law. The parties must guarantee the 
protection of the civilian population and people who are not directly involved in combat, and it must 
respect the rules of war. Attacks on civilians or civilian infrastructure are fo rbidden and must cease 
immediately. The only way of putting an end to this conflict is through dialogue and diplomacy. 
Switzerland is very concerned about the consequences of this military aggression , as the UK has 
clearly spelled  out; these consequences affect all Members, in particular the most vulnerable.  
4.39.   The representative  of Canada  indicated the following:  
4.40.   As WTO Members  all recognized here, the monitoring of QRs is fully within the mandate of 
the Market Access Committee , and it is up to each Member to  determine how it explains its measures 
and what additional information to provide. Canada would like to thank Ukraine for its early 
transparency efforts, especially given the unimaginable circumstances their colleagues in Capital are 
currently facing. In that same spirit, Canada wishes to bring to the Committee 's attention a new 
quantitative restriction it has recently imposed on imports of petroleum products from the Russian 
Federation. Specifically, as of 10  March  2022, all imports of petroleum products from Russia have 
been banned. Canada will submit an update to its QR  notification in the coming days.  
4.41.   There is a crisis, and no one should be blinded to the one and only reason this is happening. 
Canada strongly condemns Russia 's unjustifiable and unprovok ed invasion of Ukraine. These attacks 
are causing widespread humanitarian consequences and resulting in the senseless deaths of innocent 
people. The international community must continue to be seized of this issue. This is not just an 
attack on Ukraine. Th is is an attack on international law, including the UN  Charter, as well as 
democracy, freedom, and human rights.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  4.42.   The representative  of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
4.43.   The Russian Federation expresses its apologies that Members have to liste n to all the se 
interventions , which are clearly outside the scope not only of the Committee but  of the WTO  itself. 
Unlike WTO  Members that have just made their politicized interventions, Russia will focus its 
response statement on the unilateral trade rest ricting measures introduced by those Members that 
have just taken the floor , in direct violation of WTO  rules. Such measures are the reason for the 
broken  global supply chains that are still fragile after the pandemic. And it is these measures that 
are leading to the increasing energy costs, including natural gas that is used to produce fertilizes, 
and spiking food prices. Indeed, w ide-scale consequences could have been avoided if the 
WTO Members that have just taken the floor had not breached b asic WTO  rules. In particular, the 
following measures are clearly inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions: implementation of 
import tariffs above MFN  rates; import ban on Russian oil, oil refining products, as well as other 
energy resources, such as natural gas and coal; restrictions on export to Russia of various goods, 
including oil refining equipment and technologies, foodstuff s and other goods; blocking of Russian 
financial institutions, transportation companies, export support agencies; ban on th e use of EU  sea 
ports; and not to mention the freezing of a substantial part of Russia 's currency reserves, which is 
robbery if we call a spade a spade.  
4.44.   The Russian Federation is not specifying all trade restricting measures because to do so would 
otherwis e need a dedicated session of the Committee. In addition , Russia's views are explained in 
more detail in document  WT/GC/245. Unilateral measures against Russia's  oil and gas industry, as 
well as its financial sector , have  led to the increased global energy costs and global prices for 
fertilizers that are produced from gas. Unilateral measures against Russia are the reason for the 
drastic increase in the cost of freight and insurance for exported Russia n products , including  
agricultural products . And it is therefore no wonder that all the additional costs due to these 
unilateral measures are being passed on to consumers , resulting in growing global food prices. 
Moreover, the overcompliance of international commodity traders , as well as international banks 
transferring money for the supplied products , has resulted in reduced shipments of products, 
including agricultural products , onto the global market. All these unilateral measures put severe 
pressure on global supply chains,  and on the global food market  in particular . The Russian Federation 
is convinced that the only way of dealing with the current crisis is to talk economics, not politics, 
and prevent the violation of multilaterally agreed trade rules through unilateral mea ns. Otherwise, 
world markets and the economies of many Members will continue to suffer.  
4.45.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
4.1  Notifications  
− Albania (G/MA/QR/N/ALB/1/Add.2)  
4.46.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from Albania  that had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/ALB/1/ Add.2  and concerned the termination of restrictions 
relating to COVID -19. 
4.47.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Australia (G/MA/QR/N/AUS/5/Add.3)  
4.48.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from Australia that had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/AUS/5/Add.3 and related to measures introduced in response to 
COVID -19. 
4.49.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Canada (G/MA/QR/N/CAN/4/Add.2)  
4.50.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from Canada that had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/CAN/4/Add.2.  
4.51.   The representative  of Canada  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  4.52.   The measures implemented are designed to hel p safeguard the Canadian drug supply by 
ensuring that bulk importation frameworks do not cause or exacerbate a drug shortage in Canada. 
The sale of drugs for consumption outside of Canada continues to be permitted when such sales will 
not cause or exacerba te a drug shortage in Canada. Assessments will be made on a case -by-case 
basis. The scope of the order is limited only to drugs intended for the Canadian market for which a 
shortage would have the highest impact on patient health and safety. Sales of produ cts 
manufactured in Canada solely for export are not impacted by the new measure.  
4.53.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Colombia (G/MA/QR/N/COL/1/Add.3)  
4.54.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification by Colombia that had been 
circula ted in document  G/MA/QR/N/COL/1/Add.3.  
4.55.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− European Union (G/MA/QR/N/EU/5/Add.7)  
4.56.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from the European Union that 
had been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/ EU/5/Add.7 and related to measures introduced in 
response to COVID -19. 
4.57.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.58.   The European Union  circulated this notification on 7  October  2021, which was after the closing 
date of the agenda for t he October meeting. Addendum  7 was about the extension until 
31 December  2021 of the export authori zation requirement applicable to exports of vaccines 
produced by companies with which the EU has Advance Purchase Agreements. As a reminder, that 
scheme was established at the end of January  2021 and notified to the WTO a few days later , on 
5 February  2021,  in document  G/MA/QR/N/EU/5/Add.1. The need for the mechanism was regularly 
reviewed and notifications were provided promptly every time the scheme was exte nded. At the end 
of 2021, the European Commission assessed that the risk that exports affect either the execution of 
the Advance Purchase Agreements or the security of Union supplies of COVID -19 vaccines had been 
steadily decreasing due to increased levels of production and vaccination in the EU. In light of this , 
and as the EU informed Members at the informal meeting of this Committee in December  2021, the 
scheme was terminated on 31  December  2021. Instead, a monitoring mechanism applies si nce 
1 January  2022 for statistical purpose s, which provides the Commission with timely, 
company -specific vaccine export data. The Commission thereby collects information on the number 
of COVID -19 doses exported outside the EU. The Commission publishes such  information on the 
website of its Directorate General for Trade, currently on a bi -weekly basis.  
4.59.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− India (G/MA/QR/N/IND/2, G/MA/QR/N/IND/2/Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/IND/3)  
4.60.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous m eeting, the  Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by India that had been circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/IND/2, 
G/MA/QR/N/IND/2/Add.1, and G/MA/QR/N/IND/3. Questions remained pending from the European 
Union and the United States.  
4.61.   The repres entative of India indicated the following:  
4.62.   India's submission , as against document  G/L/59/Rev.1 , was contained in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/IND/3 , circulated on 29  September  2021. This was discussed in the last 
CMA meeting on 11 -12 October  2021. In that meeting, some Members had made interventions 
mentioning items which were in the import licensing domain. Subsequently, India 's notification under 
Article 7.3 of the Import Licensing Procedures was made on 20  January  2022 and circulated in 
document  G/LIC/N/3/IND/21. Between these two  notifications, India has covered all the relevant 
information on QRs and import licensing.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  4.63.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Kazakhstan (G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3/Rev.2/Add.1)  
4.64.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to  a new notification from Kazakhstan that had 
been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3/Rev.2/Add.1 and related to measures introduced in 
response to COVID -19. 
4.65.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Republic of Korea ( G/MA/QR/N/KOR/3/Add.2 ) 
4.66.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from the Republic of Korea 
that had been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/KOR/3/Add.2.  
4.67.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Kyrgyz Republic (G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.11, G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add. 12, 
G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.13, G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.14 and G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.15)  
4.68.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to five  new notifications from the Kyrgyz Republic, 
which had been circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1 /Add.11 -G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1 /Add.15 . 
G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1 /Add.14  contained measures introduced in response to COVID -19. In addition, 
the Kyrgyz Republic had submitted G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1 /Add.16  after the agenda of this meeting had 
closed. This notification would be reviewed at the next formal meeting  of the Committee.  
4.69.   The Committee took note  of these notifications.  
− Liechtenstein (G/MA/QR/N/LIE/3)  
4.70.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from Liechtenstein that had 
been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/LIE/3.  
4.71.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Republic of Moldova (G/MA/QR/N/MDA/2/Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/MDA/2/Add.2)  
4.72.   The Chairperson  drew Me mbers' attention to two  new notifications from the Republic of 
Moldova that had been circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/MDA/2 /Add.1  and 
G/MA/QR/N/MDA/2 /Add. 2. 
4.73.   The Committee took note  of these notifications.  
− Russian Federation (G/MA/QR/N/RUS/5)  
4.74.   The Chairpers on drew Members' attention to a new notification from the Russian Federation 
that had been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/RUS/5.  
4.75.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Thailand (G/MA/QR/N/THA/2, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.2 and 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.3, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.4, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.5, 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.6)  
4.76.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by Thailand that had been circulated in documents  G/MA/ QR/N/THA/2 , and 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 /Add.1 -G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 /Add.4 . Questions remained pending from the 
European Union . Since then, Thailand had submitted two  other addenda, which had been circulated 
in documents  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 /Add.5  and G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 /Add. 6. Addenda  2, 3, 4 and 6 
contained measures introduced by Thailand in response to COVID -19. G/MA/M/76  
 
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  4.77.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.78.   As in previous meetings, the European Union wishes to stress that Thailand's import licensing 
require ments for feed wheat should have been included in Thailand's QR  notification, given that they 
are non -automatic licensing requirements. The EU also reiterates its concerns on the import 
procedures for feed wheat introduced by Thailand, including the local corn purchase requirement. 
The EU would like to again ask Thailand to notify these import procedures in the context of the 
Import Licensing Committee. The EU  would also welcome receiving written replies to its questions 
submitted in that Committee in 2017 and 2018. The EU reiterates its interest in understanding on 
what basis the measure, announced as temporary, has been maintained for so long. The latest 
extension was adopted in November  2021 to cover the year 2022.  
4.79.   The European Union's  concerns and reques ts remain after the recent decision of Thailand's  
Ministry of Commerce , of 15 March  2022, to suspend the local purchase requirement on corn until 
31 July 2022. This decision is only a temporary measure responding to the global animal feed 
shortage caused b y Russia 's invasion of Ukraine , but the underlying non -automatic import licence 
requirement remains in place. The EU therefore maintains its request for this measure to be fully 
discontinued. The EU also reiterates its request to receive a detailed descrip tion of Thailand's  import 
licensing procedures , as well as relevant data about the actual situation regarding the market of 
corn, in order to better understand Thailand's justification of its measure. Based on the EU's 
information, average domestic prices have been trend ing upwards  since the introduction of the 
measure in late  2016. The EU understands that the support programme for corn production and the 
deficiency payment schemes developed by the Government of Thailand  have not been notified to 
the WTO. Therefore, the  EU requests Thailand to notify these measures in a timely manner. These 
supporting measures encourage the expansion of corn production; they actually contradict the 
rationale of corn oversupply that Thaila nd's authorities put forward to justify the conditions on the 
import of corn. This rationale is even less relevant in the current context of shortage of feed wheat 
due to Russia 's aggression against  Ukraine . The EU also remains strongly concerned about the  
WTO compatibility of Thailand's import licensing  regime for feed wheat. More general ly, the EU is 
also concerned about the apparent priority given to market considerations over WTO  rules as a driver 
for policy decisions in this area. In light of recent de velopments, the EU also considers that Thailand 's 
claim regarding "ongoing stakeholder consultations " on a possible  review of the measure cannot any 
longer be maintained.  
4.80.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
4.81.   Thailand would like to thank the European Union  for its interest and questions regarding 
Thailand's import policy on feed wheat. Thailand wishes to inform the EU that its import permit 
measures on feed wheat , including a possibility of increasing the appli ed rate of the product under 
Thailand's commitment s at the WTO , is still in progress and the relevant stakeholder s must be 
consulted.  
4.82.   The Committee took note  of the statements made and agreed to revert to these  notifications 
at its next meeting.  
− Türkiye  (G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add.2, G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add.3)  
4.83.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to two  new notifications from Türkiye  that had been 
circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add .2 and G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add .3. 
G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add .2 related to COVID -19 measures, whereas G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add .3 was 
Türkiye 's complete notification of all its QRs in force.  
4.84.   The Committee took note  of the se notification s. 
− United Kingdom (G/MA/QR/N/GBR/1/Add.1)  
4.85.   The Chairperson  drew Membe rs' attention to a new notification from the United Kingdom that 
had been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/GBR/1/Add.1 related to measures introduced in 
response to COVID -19. 
4.86.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  − United States (G/MA/QR/N/USA/2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/3, G/MA/QR/N/USA/4, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/Add.2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add.2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add.3, 
G/MA/W/116, G/MA/W/127)  
4.87.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous m eeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications from the United States, which had been circulated in 
documents  G/MA/QR/N/USA/2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/3,  G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 , G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 /Add.1, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 /Add.2,  G/MA/QR/N/USA/5 , G/MA/QR/N/USA/5 /Add.1,  and 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5 /Add. 2. Questions remained pending from the European Union, which had been 
circulated in documents  G/MA/W/116 and G/MA/W/127, and from China. Since then, the United 
States had submitted one  new notification , in document  G/MA/QR/N /USA/5/Add.3 . 
4.88.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.89.   The European Union  has been raising its concerns regarding US  trade prohibitions on sturgeon 
products in this Committee since 2015. In the latest US  notification (G/MA/QR/N/USA /5), the 
restrictions are listed in the measures numbered  11 and 12. As previously explained, the EU 's main 
concern is that the United States does not consider wild and farmed sturgeons and their products as 
separate categories. Consequently, the US applie s the same conservation measures to both, in a 
more restrictive way than the international environmental legislation, namely CITES, recommends. 
Any updates on this issue would be appreciated . The EU had the opportunity to explain these 
concerns , in more detail , to the US bilaterally in 2021 . In this regard , the EU would welcome receiving 
further updates about the ongoing review being carried  out by the U S Fish and Wildlife Service on 
the listing of sturgeon species as endangered. In particular, the EU requests the US to confirm that 
the Amur sturgeon  has been finally listed under the Endangered Species Act . 
4.90.   The European Union  will continue its dialogue with the United States on this matter and 
engage on the findings of the review, as appropriate. For this purpose, regular updates on the 
roadmap and calendar for the whole review process would  be very useful. The EU would also 
appreciate receiving further information through this Committee . Finally, the EU would like to 
confirm with the US whether it  is possible, in the case of farmed threatened species, to obtain an 
Endangered Species Act permit to avoid the ban ; if so, the EU would welcome clarification from the 
US as to the procedure to obtain  such a permit.  
4.91.   The representative of China  indicated th e following:  
4.92.   As mentioned at previous CMA  formal meetings, China has concerns about the US import 
quotas on steel and aluminium  products under Section  232, which has been reflected in the 
notification s circulated by the United States in documents  G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 and 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5. China believes that the measures in question are inconsistent with the provisions 
of Article  XI and Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. China has requested the US to provide detailed 
informat ion and a clarification of its measures. China regrets that the US response has to date been 
insufficient to alleviate its concerns. Taking this opportunity, China wishes to reiterate its prior 
request that the US provide details of its import quota measur es, including the volume of quotas 
received by WTO Members such as the Republic of Korea, Argentina, and Brazil, as well as the 
conditions for obtaining such quotas. China  also wishes the US to explain how such quotas can 
address its so-called "national se curity" concerns.  
4.93.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
4.94.   First, in response to Russia's  actions, the United States has imposed a variety of measures 
against Russia, including certain import and export prohibitions. The US promptly  notified these 
measures in document  G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add.3, which was circulated on 21  March  2022. 
4.95.   In response to the European Union's comments about sturgeon, the United States  appreciate s 
the EU 's continued interest in this matter. As communicated at the Committee's previous  meeting, 
as of May  2021, there are now six  foreign species of sturgeon listed as endangered under the 
US Endangered Species Act (ESA) . The ESA applies not only to wild animals , but to those in captivity 
as well . When a species is listed under the ESA, the listed entity includes both captive animals and 
wild animals . Mostly recently, in April  2021, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) G/MA/M/76  
 
- 21 - 
 
  published a final rule announ cing the determination of endangered species status of the Yangtze 
River sturgeon under the ESA, which became effective on 26  May 2021. There are nine  additional 
species of sturgeon under review by the US and the USFWS. In August  2021, the USFWS determined  
that the Amur sturgeon warrants listing under the ESA and proposed to list it as an endangered 
species . A notice reflecting this proposal , and a request for comments , was published in the Federal 
Register on 25 August  2021. During the comment period on th e proposed listing, the Service 
received a request to hold a public hearing . As a result, the US  will be reopening the comment period 
and holding a public hearing on a date and time to be determined.  
4.96.   With respect to the current status of the eight  other sp ecies under review, the USFWS is 
conducting a 12 -month status review on the petition to list those species of sturgeon under the E SA. 
The Service is collecting and evaluating information and has not made a determination regarding 
the listing of these speci es. A listing determination will be made on the best scientific and commercial 
information available. More specifically, the Service is currently reviewing the Ponto -Caspian and 
Siberian sturgeons. The Ponto -Caspian sturgeon review includes Russian, Persia n, ship, and stellate 
sturgeon. At any time during the Service 's review, the European Union  may provide additional 
information to help us make this determination. Once the status review is completed, if the Service 
finds that listing is warranted, the Serv ice will prepare a proposed rule. At that point, the public will 
be given 60  days to comment on the proposed listing. This will give the EU another opportunity to 
provide the Service with information. In addition, the US is happy to facilitate a continued discussion 
among the relevant authorities , as appropriate.  
4.97.   In reply to China's comments, the United States  takes note of the comments and questions 
raised by China regarding the WTO  consistency of the Section  232 quotas. The US has invoked 
Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and its actions are therefore wholly WTO-consistent . Regarding 
questions related to the operation of the Section  232 quotas, we refer Members to the relevant 
proclamations issued under Section  232, and to quota implementation inform ation published on the 
website of US  Customs and Border Protection.  
4.98.   The Committee took note  of the statements made and agreed to revert to these notifications 
at its next meeting.  
4.2  Quantitative Restrictions: Factual Information on Notifications Received – Report by 
the Secretariat (G/MA/W/114/ Rev.4) 
4.99.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to document  G/MA/W/114/Rev.4 , entitled 
"Quantitative Restrictions: Factual Information on Notifications Received". This periodic Secretariat 
report summarized the content of the QR  notifications that had been received  in the intervening 
period since the report's previous revision . He invited the Secretariat to briefly highlight the most 
important aspects of the report.  
4.100.   The Secretariat  (Ms Roberta Lascari) indicated the following:  
4.101.   In this presentation, I will briefly touch upon some of the main elements of the Secretariat's 
factual repo rt on the QR  notifications received, which was circulated in 
document  G/MA/W/114/Rev.4. With respect to the total number of notifications, to date 58  Members 
have notified under one or more of the biennial periods of the QR  Decision .15 This represents an 
increase of seven  Members since the last version of this report. Twenty -five Members have notified 
changes to their measures, which mostly relate to COVID -19. No "reverse" notification has been 
received to date. In the context of this r eport, the terms "QR" and "measure" are used to identify 
two different concepts. The main difference between the two  concepts is that one QR can be enforced 
through one or more measures. This explain why the number of measures is higher than the QRs 
notified. Calculations are based on the information contained in the latest notification by the Member.  
4.102.   Based on the notifications received so far, Members have mainly notified QRs that have 
taken the form of non -automatic licensing procedures, prohibitions, and  conditional prohibitions. 
Quotas represent a small percentage of measures notified. Regarding the type of measures, 
paragraph  2(ii) of the QR  Decision requires Members to provide a "precise indication of the type of 
restriction imposed using the symbols c ontained in Annex  2". Of the 2,289  measures notified by 
 
15 Document  G/L/59/Rev.1.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  Members, 62% consist of import measures while the remaining 38% are export measures. The 
QR Decision also requires Members to provide specific information at the tariff line level for the 
products tha t have been affected by the QRs. Overall, the 1,762  QRs used in the calculations relate 
to the complete universe of HS  Chapters. The ten  HS Chapters most frequently referred to in the 
QR notifications are as follows : Chapter  29 (Organic chemicals) , with th e highest number of notified 
QR measures, followed by Chapter  38 (Miscellaneous chemical products) , and Chapter  28 (Inorganic 
chemicals). No information on the HS  code has been provided for 14% of the notified QRs.  
4.103.   The QR  Decision further requires Members to provide an indication of the ground for adopting 
such prohibitions , as well as their WTO justification , including precise WTO  provisions. This 
information is indicative in nature and is provided by Members for transparency purposes only. 
Almost all of the QR  notifications (97%) mention the GATT  1994 as the legal basis for such 
measures. The most cited provision is Article  XX of t he GATT  1994 – General Exceptions – 
(1363  QRs, or 77% of the total). More specifically, subparagraph  (b) of Article  XX of the GATT  1994 
appear s in 54% of the QRs in the dataset. There are 20  QRs where no specific provision has been 
cited. The QR  Decision r equires Members to provide an indication of the grounds for the measures 
maintained, including "any relevant international commitment where appropriate". Some Members 
have provided extensive information on some of these international conventions and agreem ents, 
while others have cited only some of them. The most cited international conventions are the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer. Finally, I wish to recall that t he full notifications of all QRs in force are due by 
30 September of the current  year, and will cover the biennial period 2022 -2024. In order to prepare 
the notification, the following resources, in addition to the QR  database and this Secretariat's report , 
could be useful: (i) the practical guide on notifications (document  JOB/MA/101/Rev.2); (ii) the 
webpage "How to notify?" of the QR  database, and (iii) the Trade Policy Reviews of each Member. 
In this regard, the  Secretariat stands  ready to assist Members  with their notification s. 
4.104.   The Chairperson  thanked the Secretariat for its presentation and reminded Members that 
the Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions , in document  G/L/59/Rev.1 , 
provided that: "Members shall make complete notifications of all quantitative restrictions in force by 
30 September  2012 and at two  yearly intervals thereafter ." The deadline to submit notifications 
covering the next biennial period was 30  September  2022.  This meant that Members were required 
to notify the full list of QRs that they were currently applying by 30  September  2022. This notification 
would cover the period 2022 -2024 and therefore no additional notification would be required in this 
two-year per iod unless there was any change to the notified restrictions or new restrictions were 
introduced. He therefore urged Members to comply with this notification requirement and make the 
effort to submit their complete notifications before 30  September  2022. I n addition, he reminded 
those Members that had notified measures introduced in response to the COVID -19 pandemic and 
had indicated that they would submit a complete notification with all QR s in force at a later date, to 
do so. The Secretariat stood ready t o provide assistance to comply with this important transparency 
obligation.  
4.105.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.106.   The European Union thanks the Secretariat for its useful presentation and for the reminder 
about the deadline to s ubmit the next complete QR  notification. In this regard, the EU requests the 
Chairperson to circulate a communication to remind EU  colleagues in Brussels of the deadline. The 
communication could also include the different sources of information that are av ailable to prepare 
such a notification, as indicated in the presentation. Again, it might be difficult to find this information 
in the report, hence the EU considers that a specific communication in this regard would be very 
useful. In addition , the EU rec alls that the Secretariat had indicated at one  point that specific 
workshops on QRs  notifications would be organized. The reasons for delays  are well known , but the 
EU wonder s if there is still a plan to organize these  workshops.  
4.107.   The Secretariat  (Ms Roberta Lascari) indicated the following:  
4.108.   In response to the EU's request , yes, the Secretariat  can prepare a communication from the 
Chairperson for colleagues in Capital reminding them of the deadline and providing a list of 
resources. On the QR  workshop,  yes, the Secretariat was originally  planning to organize a workshop 
later in the year, especially in light of the deadline for the next complete notifications. However, 
because the CMA is planning to hold a number of meetings this year, there is a risk of too many 
activities being organized at the same time. Even so, the Secretariat is still considering whether such G/MA/M/76  
 
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  a workshop could take place in the second  half of the year. If not, the Secretariat has included a 
QR workshop specifically targeting notifica tions in its technical assistance biannual plan, which 
covers this year and the next, so the workshop will be held next year if it proves im possible  to hold 
it in the current year . 
4.109.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report and the statements made . 
5  SITUATION OF SCHEDULES OF WTO  MEMBERS – REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT 
(G/MA/W/23/REV.18)  
5.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new revision of the report by the Secretariat 
describing the current situation of Members' WTO  Schedules of concessions (G/M A/W/23/Rev.18). 
A full version of the Secretariat's report had been made available as a room document16 and on 
eAgenda.  
5.2.  The Secretariat  (Ms Roberta Lascari) indicated  the following:  
5.3.  As of 21  March  2022, Members have submitted 672  notifications pursuant to the Decision of 
26 March  1980 on Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions17 
(the "1980  Procedures"). These include, for example, changes relating to unilateral liberalization 
efforts; rectifications of er rors; tariff concessions resulting from plurilateral agreements modifying 
schedules of concessions, such as the 1996  ITA, the ITA  Expansion, and the Agreement on 
Pharmaceuticals (Pharma); as well as more recent changes to Part  IV of the Schedules resulting  
from the Nairobi Declaration eliminating export subsidies. In addition, these  notifications include the 
certification of renegotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994, which will be reported on 
separately under  the next agenda item. Two  additional procedures relating to the certification of 
HS transposition changes have been  circulated after issuing the report, bringing the total number of 
current procedures to 674. The vast majority of notifications to change WTO  Schedules 
(473 procedures) are the result of HS  transposition procedures.  
5.4.  The Secretariat has drawn  Members' attention to the work that remains pending for each 
Member, including the procedures on which reservations are outstanding , or where the Member 
concerned has indicated that the changes were subject to the completion of domestic procedures 
which had not been finalized after several years. Overall, of the current 674  procedures: 638  (95%)  
have been certified , and 32  procedures are ongoing. Leaving aside those procedures that are 
currently within  the 3 -month review period (12  procedures) , and 4  procedures that have been 
withdrawn, there remain 20  procedures that are pending because of either existing reservations 
raised by some Me mbers (16  procedures) or because the Member proposing the change has not yet 
completed its domestic procedures (4  procedures). However, since the date of circulation of the 
Secretariat's report, one  Member has notified that changes contained at the conclus ion of its 
domestic procedures would soon be certified. The Secretariat reminds  Members that they may 
consult and access a wealth of information relating to Schedules of concessions and their changes 
at the WTO  Goods Schedules e -Library.  
5.5.  The representative  of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
5.6.  Switzerland thanks the Secretariat for this presentation  of its comprehensive report . As 
mentioned by the Secretariat, Switzerland has notified the completion of its domestic procedures in 
relation to the renegotiations in document  G/SECRET/40 on 24  March  2022. This was Switzerland's 
last required notification regarding the formal certification of its seasoned meat modifications.  
5.7.  The Comm ittee took note  of the Secretariat's report and the statements made.  
6  REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT ON THE STATUS OF RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII OF THE GATT  1994 (G/MA/W/123/REV.9)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  drew the Committee's attention to a new revision of the "Factual Report on 
the Status of Renegotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994", which had been circulated in 
 
16 Document  RD/MA/101.  
17 BISD 275/25.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  document  G/MA/W/123/Rev.9. A full version of the Secretariat's report had been made available as 
a room document18 and on eAgenda.  
6.2.  The Secretariat  (Ms Roberta Lascari) indicated  the following:  
6.3.  The "Factual Report on the Status of Renegotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994" 
(G/MA/W/123/Rev.9) provide s an overview of all the renegotiations that have been undertaken by 
WTO Members pursuant to Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994. As of 18  March  2022, Members have 
undertaken 49  renegotiations , which are at different stages in the procedures. No major 
development in these procedures has occurred since the previous report. The overa ll status of 
Article  XXVIII renegotiation s remain s as follows: 24  renegotiation procedures have been concluded 
and the modifications to the WTO  Schedules certified; 5  renegotiations have been concluded 
(step 1), and the draft changes to the Schedules have been submitted by the relevant Members 
under the 1980  Procedures (step  2), but they have not yet been certified; 10  renegotiations remain 
ongoing; one request to initiate a renegotiation under paragraph  4 of Article  XXVIII of the GATT has 
not been approved ; and 9  renegotiation procedures have been withdrawn.  
6.4.  The Secretariat has also provided additional information with respect to each of these  
categories , as follows . Of the 49  renegotiations, 24 have been successfully concluded and the 
modifications certified. In five  cases, Members have concluded the ir Article  XXVIII negotiations and 
consultations with interested Members, notified the bilateral agreements and final report, and have 
begun the 1980  Procedures to certify the changes. Howev er, four of these procedures  are on hold 
due to reservations and the conclusion of one of them is subject to the completion of domestic 
procedures. Following the circulation of the Secretariat's report, the Member with outstanding 
domestic procedures notif ied the WTO of the conclusion of such procedures and the changes to the 
Schedule will be certified soon.  
6.5.  With respect to the conclusion of negotiations, the Secretariat recall s that renegotiations under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 follow a "two -step" p rocess from their initiation to their full 
completion. Under the first  step, Article  XXVIII procedures are undertaken and concluded once the 
renegotiating Member has circulated the bilateral agreements with the Members holding rights in 
the negotiations (n amely, Members holding Initial Negotiating Rights, principal suppliers, and 
Members with a substantial interest), as well as the final report describing the outcome of its 
renegotiation. The second  step of the procedures require s the renegotiating Member t o submit the 
draft modifications to its Schedule resulting from such negotiations under the "1980  Procedures for 
the Modification and Rectification of Schedules" (1980  Procedures). In the absence of objections 
within a three -month period from the date of c irculation of the draft changes, this second  step will 
result in a certification of the modifications to the Schedule by the Director -General and the 
Article  XXVIII  process is considered formally concluded.  
6.6.  With respect to the nine  procedures that have been withdrawn, some of these are linked to 
enlargement of the European Union. In these cases, a Member with an individual Schedule has begun 
a renegotiation process on its own, but then the overall Schedule has been withdrawn when that 
Member has joined the EU. In one  case, the request for authorization to initiate a renegotiation 
under paragraph  4 of Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 has not been approved by the Council for 
Trade in Goods. Finally, there are 10 renegotiations that have been launched, or the authorization 
to launch a renegotiation has been authorized. These procedures remain ongoing either because the 
negotiations and consul tations have not yet been concluded or the renegotiating Member has not 
completed the formal steps to conclude the process. The Secretariat stands ready to provide 
technical assistance to Members with respect to these procedures as required.  
6.7.  The representa tive of Senegal  indicated the following:  
6.8.  Senegal wishes to thank the Secretariat for its presentation and would like to share some 
information about its renegotiation process. Senegal has received support from the Secretariat with 
respect to the launch of its Article  XXVIII renegotiation process. Colleagues in Capital are finalizing 
the notification and it will soon be submitted to the Secretariat for circulation to Members so that 
 
18 Document  RD/MA/102.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  Senegal can officially start its renegotiation process. Senegal thank s the S ecretariat for its technical 
assistance in preparing the notification.  
6.9.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report and the statement made.  
7  TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were three  issues listed under this agenda item. The 
first issue concerned the updated list of all notifications and communications relating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic, which had been submitted by Members to the Committee as of 21  March  2022, 
and as contained in document  G/MA/W/157/Rev.4. The second  item concerned the revised summary 
report on export restrictions and trade easing measures relating to the COVID -19 pandemic 
prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee, which had been circulated in 
document  G/MA/W/168/Rev.2. The third  item related to communications submitted by Uruguay and 
the United Kingdom concerning unilateral measures aimed at facilitating trade for essential products 
to combat the COVID -19 pandemic (docume nt G/MA/W/173 and document  G/MA/W/175). He 
thanked the Members that had informed the Committee of these measures despite the fact that no 
obligation existed in the WTO  Agreements in this respect, as well as those Members that had 
submitted QR  notifications  on trade measures relating to COVID -19 since the Committee's previous 
formal meeting, all of which provided the Committee with a more accurate picture of the situation.  
7.2.  The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) indicated  the following :19 
7.3.  Since the beginning o f the COVID -19 pandemic in 2020, trade has played a crucial role in the 
response to the pandemic. Since then, trade policy measures have been implemented by many 
Members to, on the one  hand, facilitate or ease trade, making it easier and faster to import t he 
goods essential to fight the pandemic and, on the other, some Members have also restricted exports 
of these goods to ensure sufficient supply for domestic use.  
7.4.  The Secretariat has provided a factual overview of both export restricting and trade easing 
measures, explaining how these measures have evolved over time. In addition, a first  attempt in 
trying to better understand the relation ship between  export restrictions and their potential impact 
on trade has been  presented. This work stream is in a prelimi nary stage and the Secretariat considers 
that many methodological challenges may still need to be addressed , and that at this stage it is 
difficult to clearly identify the relationship and to arrive at conclusions. The report presented is in its 
second rev ision and includes an additional 25  measures when compared to the first  revision , which 
was presented at the Committee 's previous formal  meeting, on 11  October  2021. The term "trade 
easing" has been used in this revision of the report, as opposed to "trade facilitating", to better 
distinguish the types of measures covered from those measures under the purview of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement.  
7.5.  Export restrictions contained in the report relate to full bans or prohibitions, non -automatic 
licensing re quirements , and other restrictions . A wide range of products , which vary from Member 
to Member, including personal protective equipment, vaccines, other pharmaceuticals , and medical 
consumables like syringes , are subject to these measures. The report conta ins a total of 98  measures 
that have prohibited or restricted trade in relation to COVID -19. Of these, 35  Members (counting 
the European Union as one) have notified 68  export restrictions. Some Members wished  to provide 
additional transparency and notified  all modifications of these measures over time and, in addition, 
also notified the termination of some of these measures. The Secretariat remind s Members that 
according to the QR  decision  in document  G/L/59/Rev.1, Members have the obligation to notify all 
quantitative restrictions in force, as well as changes to those quantitative restrictions.  
7.6.  Nonetheless, a comparison of the measures that have been notified under the QR  Decision with 
the information contained in the WTO's trade monitoring report show s that there are an additional 
19 Members with 30  measures that have not yet been notified. When both notified and non -notified 
measures are  considered, and looking at the types of measures, the most frequent type used are 
full prohibitions, followed by non -automatic export licences and prohibitions except under defined 
conditions. However, since almost 30% of measures have not been notified formally, all these 
measures do not contain standardized information on the type of measure in place. Some measures 
 
19 Document  RD/MA/103.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  have changed type over time . For example, there are cases where a full export prohibition on all 
face masks was introduced, which then evolved into a non -automatic licensing scheme only for 
N95 masks. In other words, some restrictions have changed both in ter ms of the type of measure 
and its product coverage. In March  2020, when the WHO declared a global pandemic, many Members 
considered it necessary to introduce export restrictions, in the third  quarter of 2020, almost no 
additional measures have been notifie d, and since then only a few additional measures have started 
to show up again. In addition, there are six cases where it cannot easily be deduced when a given 
measure has entered into force.  
7.7.  Almost all export restrictions that have been introduced in rela tion to COVID -19 mention that 
they are "temporary", a term that is not defined in the WTO  provisions. When the total duration of 
a measure is considered, that is, a measure that has  first been introduced for 90  days and that then 
has been extended by anoth er 90  days, is counted as a 180 -day measure. 22  measures have been  
in force for less than 3  months, an additional 13 for less than 6  months, 23  additional measures for 
less than one  year, while seven  measures have lasted for more than one  year. Information on 
duration is not complete, since 33  measures have no clearly indicated duration, despite having been 
notified as "temporary" in many cases. Considering the current status of the measures, the highest 
number of export restrictions that h ave been in force was at the end of April  2020, during the first 
wave of the COVID -19 pandemic. Since then, the number of measures in force has progressively 
dropped, and seems to have plateaued towards the end of 2021. As of March  2022, 34  export 
restrict ions are still in force.  
7.8.  Product categories have been defined according to Annex Table  4 to compare coverage of the 
measures. The types of restricted products in the first  6 months of 2020 were mainly related to 
personal protective equipment and sanitizers  and disinfectants. In March  2022, two  years later, 
considerable changes in the types of products subject to export restrictions were observed . For 
example , food items are no longer prohibited for exportation as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic 
and the nu mber of restrictions on facemasks, protective garments and gloves have since  been 
reduced. The evolution is even more visible for percentage changes in the types of restricted 
products. In relative terms, pharmaceuticals, other medical supplies, such as syringes, and medical 
devices and equipment continue to be more heavily restricted in 2022. Other products, such as 
COVID -19 test kits and vaccines have been,  in the absolute number of measures, less restricted for 
exports.  
7.9.  Most measures that have been not ified refer to Article  XI:2(a) of the GATT. Measures that have 
been applied are those intended to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other 
products essential to the exporting Member. In addition, many of the notifications referred to 
Article XX(b) of the GATT, which relates to measures that are necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health. A considerable number of measures in the report do not have information on 
their justification, since either the notification has not made explicit reference to a WTO  provision or 
because the measures have not been notified under the QR  Decision, so in these cases there is no 
information available regarding the WTO  justification. Since the report's previous  revision, the 
overall picture of  the status of the measures has slightly changed. As of March  2022, a third of the 
measures still seem to be in force, which represents a drop from 41% in October  2021. The 
remaining two  thirds of the measures have either expired or their termination has been explicitly 
notified.  
7.10.   In addition to the export prohibitions and restrictions, the Secretariat has also summarized 
and prepared a short description of other measures that could be characteri zed as easing or 
facilitating trade. The report contains  inform ation on a total of 169  trade easing measures. 
14 Members  had voluntarily provided, for increased transparency, 26 communications , with 
41 trade -easing measures  that had been implemented in response to COVID -19, irrespective of the 
fact that there was no notification requirement. The WTO  Trade Monitoring Report contains  an 
additional 129  measures from 59  Members. The report uses the term "trade easing" measures, since 
the measures in question seek to make it easier to import, export , or transit, and mostly  cover 
aspects relating to changes in the applied tariffs and other charges. The Secretariat considers  that 
it is important not to use the term "trade facilitating" to avoid giving the impression that it refers  to 
measures under the purview of the Trade Facilitation  Agreement. The same approach in categorizing 
and standardizing the measures is used as is used with regard to export restricting measures . 
7.11.   The majority of measures are tax-related measures, which can be explained by two  different 
types of motiva tion. First, to reduce the price of products that are essential to combat the G/MA/M/76  
 
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  COVID -19 pandemic, and second, to provide liquidity and improve the cash flow of traders. The 
latter had been more frequent during the early phase of the pandemic, and included measures such 
as the deferral of payment of tariffs and other taxes on the importation of all products.  
7.12.   These tax -related measures are mostly related to the reduction, elimination, suspension or 
waiver of tariffs, and make up more than 50% of all the measures in the report. Other important 
categories include the elimination/suspension or waiver of other internal taxes, fees , and other 
charges.  
7.13.   In most cases, these measures have been qualified as temporary and have focused on a 
narrow list of produc ts. The second  major category of measures relates  to different types of customs 
procedures, including expedited or simplified clearance procedures, as well as the simplification of 
other customs procedures. In this category, some measures seem to relate to  provisions covered by 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement. A minority of measures relate to the establishment of procedures 
for donated goods in a state of emergency. The majority of measures , where such information is 
available, show that the measures are temporary in nature. However, for almost 50% of the 
measures, information about their duration has been insufficient, so the figures could change 
considerably if this information is eventually included in the analysis.  
7.14.   In terms of the types of products, the  majority of Members seem to have focused on 
facilitating imports of personal protective equipment (PPE), including face and eye mask production, 
protective garments and gloves. What is most interesting is that the PPEs are also the products with 
the highe st number of export prohibitions or restrictions, which show s the importance that Members 
attached to sourcing these products from the international market, in particular during the 
first phase of the pandemic.  
7.15.   15 measures have facilitated trade in vaccine s, showing the importance of vaccines as a 
solution to end the pandemic. A recent communication to the WTO has explicitly made reference to 
the Joint Indicative List of Critical COVID -19 Vaccine Inputs , published on the WTO  website, to define 
14 goods elig ible for tariff suspension.  
7.16.   The situation is almost unchanged from that of October  2021 with respect to the current 
status of the trade easing measures. Only 16% seem still to be in force, while 41% have expired, 
and for 44% of the measures , the Secretariat does not have sufficient information to know whether 
they are in force or if they have expired.  
7.17.   The final part of the presentation show s a preliminary analysis made by the Secretariat which 
tries to analyse the effects of export restrictio ns on trade in COVID -19 essential goods, as notified 
by Members. This stream of work was requested by some Members at the Committee's previous 
formal meeting , on 11  October  2021. The limitations and caveats on the results of the Secretariat 
analysis are too abundant to draw definitive conclusions, hence the results presented are only 
preliminary.  
7.18.   By definition, quantitative restrictions have a limiting effect on trade. For example, in the case 
of full export bans or prohibitions, the product cannot leave the exporting country and therefore 
there is no trade in the products subject to bans or prohibitions . However, the effect of quantitative 
restrictions on trade may be less obvious or difficult to measure. In case of restrictions, for example,  
non-automatic export licences do not fully halt trade but establish additional requirements to export. 
That is, depending on the type of the measure, the effect on trade may be smaller or larger, and 
easier or more difficult to measure.  
7.19.   Another major challenge f or the analysis is with respect to frequency of trade data available . 
Since, based on information available, most export restrictions only seem to have lasted for a few 
months within a particular year, using yearly trade data, which is the typical way in w hich this 
information is captured at the WTO, is problematic. This analysis could have benefit ed from using 
monthly import data, as this would make it easier to capture the actual impact of export restrictions 
on trade.  
7.20.   From a methodological point of view,  several other factors make  it difficult to isolate the effect 
of export restrictions on trade. In particular, the large majority of export restrictions in the analysis 
had been introduced between March and April  2020, a time-period where three  shocks affected trade G/MA/M/76  
 
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  at an unprecedent scale. First, a supply shock due to the closure of many factories as a result of 
sanitary protocols and lockdowns had resulted in global supply chain disruptions. Second, at the 
same time, a demand shock had affected  Members that had all been trying to access the same 
products to combat the pandemic. This had resulted in a sharp rising demand, for example, for 
facemasks, protective garments, gloves and disinfectants. Third, there had been a major disruption 
in all mea ns of transport . Border closures, lockdowns , and sanitary measures for ship and airplane 
crews had led to global transportation disruptions to move goods across borders. Putting all of this 
together had made it difficult to untangle the individual effects from one another.  
7.21.   Another additional methodological difficulty had to do with how trade in goods is measured. 
In most cases, COVID -19 essential goods were classified at either the HS  subheading level 
(six digits) or at the national tariff line level (eight  digits or more) together with many other products 
that were not directly related to the fight against the pandemic and were not subject to the export 
restrictions. This means that the dataset could show , for example , trade in a certain product, where 
in fact exports of this specific product were fully banned but since other products of this subheading 
were not banned, trade values were still positive. This made it hard to measure trade in these 
essential products and, as a result, to provide analysis on th e evolution of trade in these products. 
More details on the problems relating to the measurement of trade in these products were also 
discussed in the WTO's report on Improving trade data for products essential to fight COVID -19: a 
possible way forward20, and the Secretariat report on the first experience -sharing session on trade 
in COVID -19 related goods .21 
7.22.   The basis for this analysis was the WTO's Quantitative Restrictions Database22, which 
contained all notified export restrictions with detailed informat ion on covered tariff lines. These 
specific exporter tariff lines23 were then matched with quarterly data on imports for each concerned 
importer and exporter to precisely identify the impacted trade flows. The analysis had not taken into 
account the non -notified measures of the trade monitoring exercise.  
7.23.   As highlighted in the Secretariat report, the majority of export restrictions on COVID -19 goods 
had been in force for less than three  months. In order to relate these measures to trade values, 
quarterly tra de data, sourced from outside the WTO, were used to give a more nuanced picture.24 If 
annual data were used, the effect of these restrictions might not have even been visible at all, since 
these effects might have been smoothed out over time. The analysis could have been further 
strengthened through (i)  the use of monthly trade data and (ii)  a focus on volume of trade rather 
than value, none of which was available to the WTO  Secretariat at the time. For ease of simplicity, 
the exact duration of the export p rohibitions and restrictions was not considered at this stage of the 
analysis, but it could have been considered in future work.  
7.24.   Quarter -on-quarter growth of total global imports was put in relationship with the 
quarter -on-quarter growth of imports of all COVID -19 products that were subject to export 
restrictions by the concerned exporting Members. The value of imports in the restricted goods had 
grown during the first  quarter of 2020, while global imports had fallen  in the same time-period by 
8%, which  could have suggested that the increased demand for these products had then led to an 
increase in the trade volume of the concerned products. However, another partial explanation could 
have been that an increase in the unit price of these goods – due to in creasing global demand – had 
led to rises in trade values despite these products having been restricted. For example, the price of 
face masks had exploded in the early months of 2020, which had led to much higher trade values in 
these products . This meant that the same number of imported face  masks would have shown a 
much higher trade value. In the second  quarter of 2020, when global total imports had fallen by a 
dramatic 14%, imports of COVID -19 essential goods that were restricted for exports had only fal len 
by 8%. However, when global imports had rebounded in the third  quarter of 2020 by a massive 
19%, imports in restricted goods had recovered only at a 4%  rate. 
7.25.   The data had also seemed to suggest that the impact of export restrictions differed across 
product categories. Several key products were considered in this preliminary analysis. Imports of 
face masks for example, from those Members that restricted exports in face  masks were compared 
 
20 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_data_report_e.pdf  
21 JOB/MA/152.  
22 https://qr.wto.org  
23 At the six -digit (subheading ) level in the Harmonized System (HS).  
24 https://tradedatamonitor.com/  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  with imports from those Members that did not restrict exports. Man y types of face  masks were 
classified in HS  subheading 6307.90 ("Made -up articles of textile materials"). Exports in this 
subheading had skyrocketed during the first  two quarters of 2020 from those Members that had 
subsequently introduced export restrictio ns. In the second  quarter of 2020, imports from those 
Members without export restrictions had grown faster compared to those origins from where exports 
had been restricted.  
7.26.   The reasons why imports from those Members with export restrictions in place had co ntinued 
to grow, although at a lesser  rate, could have been numerous, and included, but were not limited 
to, the following: (i)  not all restrictions had resulted in full bans as some had taken the form of 
non-automatic licensing schemes; (ii)  the difficult y of measuring trade in face  masks, which falls  
under a subheading where many other products, not subject to restrictions were classified; (iii)  only 
certain types of face  masks had been restricted; and (iv)  export restrictions had not covered the full 
quarter, which meant that some exports had taken  place in the unrestricted periods. The global race 
to import face  masks seemed to have somewhat subsided in the third  quarter of 2020, and since 
some export restr ictions had been removed by the end of 2020, exports from Members in the 
"restricted" category started to grow again in the fourth  quarter of 2020.  
7.27.   The Secretariat encourage s Members that submitted QR  notifications or submitted 
information on trade easing measures to review the information provided and to contact the 
Secretariat in case of errors. The Secretariat stands ready to adjust or update the report as necessary 
in order to respond to Members' needs.  
7.28.   The representative of Norway  indicated the followi ng: 
7.29.   Norway encourage s the Secretariat to continue to give priority to this important information 
for Members.  
7.30.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
7.31.   Colombia thank s the Secretariat for its report and useful, very detailed, presentation. In 
addition, Colombia  thank s Uruguay and the United Kingdom for the document that they have shared , 
which also make an important contribution to this discussion. For Colombia, it has  been extremely 
useful and interesting to see the changes that have been made in the ir trade -related 
COVID -19 measures, as well as the adjustment in the ir national policies as the pandemic has 
progressed. Colombia is  also happy to see the progressive reduct ion in restrictive measures and 
would call for other restrictive measures to be withdrawn as soon as they can  be. Export restrictions 
on vaccines have seen an increase of 33%, which was really the only category where there was an 
important increase from th e analysis that the Secretariat has presented . When it comes to PPE and 
vaccines , they have a particular importance within the analysis that Members have seen and most 
trade facilitating measures , as well as trade restrictive measures , have impacted upon developing 
countries the most. Colombia thank s the Secretariat for its effort s in the analysis of export 
restrictions on trade and understand s the limitations of the methodology used ; nevertheless, 
Colombia thinks that this is an analysis which has shown to the Committee  the impact of export 
restrictions on the trade of these various important goods. Colombia suggest s that this presentation 
and other documents be shared in the experience -sharing session , which would feed into Members'  
discussion in a very positive manner.  
7.32.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
7.33.    Thailand wishes to thank the Secretariat for its very insightful report on trade -related 
measures related to the COVID -19 pandemic as well as the factual information on the 
QR notifications and the report by the Secretariat. Thailand recognize s the efforts and time that the 
Secretariat has invested in these very helpful reports, which deserve to be published and circulated 
to a wider audience . Thailand wishes to encourage the Sec retariat to keep  up the good work.  
7.34.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.35.   Canada appreciates the work of the Secretariat in updating the Summary of Export 
Restrictions and Trade Easing Measures Relating to the COVID -19 Pandemic. Canada consi ders that 
the presentation  demonstrates that it is quite a rich and substantive review of what has been G/MA/M/76  
 
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  happening over the last year and a half. Canada considers that the report provides some very 
valuable information to guide Members'  work on an effective  WTO response to the pandemic. Like 
Colombia, Canada  hopes that Members can continue to examine this. In fact, it confirms that the 
examination of such measures in  a time of crisis is a useful and important approach.  
7.36.   Canada wishes to make a few additional points. First, Canada considers that the switch to the 
term "trade easing " is good, and helps to ensure that a clear distinction is drawn relative to the work 
of the  Trade Facilitation Committee . Canada notes that there  were six  QR measures where it was 
not possible to understand the date of their entry into force. The Secretariat had  also mentioned 
that 33 of the measures were of an unspecified duration . Canada is di sappointed that Members have 
not provided this important information in their notifications , especially as  at least a couple of the 
measures cross over into Article  XI:2(a) of the GATT, and the exception that is claimed as 
justification. Canada recalls that the words in that Article quite clearly refer to temporary  measures , 
and so an understanding of when a measure comes into force and when it ends is key.  
7.37.   The Secretariat  also mentioned that , if Canada recalls correctly,  there were 14  Members that 
had provided 26  notifications of information that was not required under the Agreement. Canada 
recognizes that it was one of those 14  Members . Nevertheless, Canada considers that the other 
13 Members  provided a very worthwhile service to this Committe e, and to Members, in providing 
information on what was happening, the measures that they were taking, and what they were doing. 
Canada sees this as an element of transparency that is much discussed , and an element that should 
also be practised to the full est extent possible,  especially in the context of a global crisis. Even if 
Members are not required to provide such information under the Agreements, if the information is 
trade -related , then there is no harm in providing it, such that all Members understa nd what is 
happening in the context of a crisis.  
7.38.   The Secretariat mentioned the technical aspects of the presentation , of which Canada should 
have liked to have seen still more . Canada notes that this is a technical committee, and that 
delegates here are su pposed to be technical experts, or at least to have a knowledge of the rules , 
data, and tariffs . For these reasons , Canada considers that it is important that the Committee  
continue to dig into this information and not be afraid to spend the time to unders tand and further 
analyse it , including with regard to the impact and rationale behind any measures introduced . 
Therefore, Canada requests the Secretariat to continue to do this type of work , including digging 
into the trade impact, as mentioned over the last few slides  of the Secretariat's presentation . 
7.39.   One element of the Secretariat's analysis also speaks to the next agenda item, but Canada 
also wished to highlight it here. The Secretariat indicated that most of the restrictions wer e full 
export prohibitions. For Canada, this indicates that there is a way , as part of this discussion , to dig 
into why a full prohibition was chosen  instead of a less  trade  restrictive measure . 
7.40.   Similarly, the Secretariat  noted in its review that up to two-thirds of the measures have either 
expired or terminated, which, to Canada, indicates that Members have perhaps decided that they 
no longer needed the measures . In Canada's view , this also allows for an enquiry into what the 
factors were behind the dec ision not to extend , and to terminate, these export restrictions . Canada 
considers that this is part of an important process that the Committee needs to be undertaking in 
the coming months. Finally, Canada notes that it shares the views of Colombia on this item , and 
also thanks Uruguay and Ukraine for providing further details on their measures and for maintaining 
a level of transparency that Canada hopes that Members in the Committee can con tinue.  
7.41.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.42.   The European Union  thank s the Secretariat for its report and presentation . The various reports 
produced so far have been useful to inform Members ' considerations about transparency an d how it 
could be improved , and the EU invite s the Secretariat to keep updating the analysis. According to 
Secretariat's  latest report, as of 25  March  2022, Members have adopted 98  measures that prohibit 
or restrict exports as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic. This means that , since the previous report , 
of October  2021, Members have introduced 21  new measures. And , unfortunately , 30 out of the 
98 measures have not been notified under the QR  Decision , so there is certainly room for 
improvement . G/MA/M/76  
 
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  7.43.   The European Union  also note s that more than a third of the measures have taken the form 
of full bans or prohibitions. Most of the se measures were introduced at the beginning of the 
pandemic , in 2020 , but for a large number of them their envisaged duration is unclear. Therefore, 
the EU would very much echo the comments on this issue just made by Canada concerning the type 
and duration of the measures introduced . Although Members do not provide the underlying reasons 
for keeping the ir measures in place, the report assumes that this may be an indication of global 
shortages in pharmaceuticals, medical products , or COVID -test kits. Yet, without an appropriate 
analysis of demand and supply, which is beyond the scope of the report, it canno t be concluded with 
certainty that the form of the measures ( for example, a full ban) actually depends on the gravity of  
the experienced shortages.  
7.44.   The report states that  35 Members have provided notifications on the imposition of export 
restrictions durin g the pandemic. It would be interesting to hear from those M embers that maintain 
such restrictions, including in the most extreme form , such as prohibitions, why they consider them 
necessary. The European Union has stated on many occasions that it consider s that such measures 
may be justified and necessary , in particular in a situation of a critical shortage of essential products; 
however, the EU also  consider s that such measures should always be proportionate, targeted , and 
time bound . If a Member considers that a situation of critical shortage exists, and provides 
explanations, it would also be incumbent on the Membership to consider how to assist that Member 
in reducing that critical shortage. The EU would  also like to express its appreciation to those Members 
that voluntarily notified and informed the Committee about the measures that they had introduced 
to ease trade during the pandemic. Indeed, the EU considers that t ransparency on both trade -
restricting and trade -facilitating meas ures is crucial to governments and the private sector. 
Therefore, the EU looks forward to further engage ment on the work on this issue.  Lastly, regarding 
the impact of the measures, the EU took note of the preliminary findings and various caveats 
associate d with the analysis ; nevertheless, these were interesting findings. The EU  invite s the 
Secretariat to continue exploring these issues.  
7.45.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
7.46.   India thank s the Secretariat for its efforts in collating this very detailed document , which will 
help Members to understand what interventions other Members have undertaken  to fight the 
common global challenge of the COVID -19 pandemic. This compilation and the subsequent efforts 
by the Committee and Secretariat to tr ack COVID -19-related export information , and to conduct 
experience -sharing sessions , is truly appreciated. India also notified its trade facilitating measures 
in document  G/MA/W/171 , circulated on 29 September  2021. India believe s that these temporary 
meas ures have helped in solving specific pandemic -led problems. India also thank s the Members 
that undertook these notifications.  
7.47.   The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) indicated the following:  
7.48.   In relation to the issue on vaccines , for example, this big increas e in percentage terms is due 
to the low overall number of measures in place. In the beginning of 2020 there were only 
three  measures in place , and as of March  2022, four measures, lead ing to a percentage increase of 
33%. With respect to the technical work that the Secretariat presented at the end, the Secretariat 
was interested to hear more from Members on how they could support the analysis by providing , on 
a voluntary basis, more detailed data at a higher frequency than annual data.  
7.49.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
7.50.   The United Kingdom is pleased to provide this communication to the Committee in order to 
provide further tra nsparency on the trade -facilitative tariff measures that it has applied since 
March  2020 in support of trade in COVID -19 critical goods. Throughout the pandemic, the UK has 
maintained transparency by publishing information on its national website as measur es have come 
into effect, providing traders with detailed guidance about their scope and operation. In this 
communication, the UK has summari zed the approach that it has taken to apply tariff reliefs and 
tariff suspensions and signposted to the locations o n its national website where full information can 
be found. This includes all lists of COVID -19 critical goods that the UK has used.  
7.51.   The United Kingdom  strongly welcome s the opportunity provided by this mechanism to 
formally note these records for the bene fit of all Members . The UK has greatly benefited from the G/MA/M/76  
 
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  information contained in similar communications made by other Members and captured under the 
COVID -19 pages on the WTO  website by the WTO  Secretariat . The UK encourage s Members to 
consider this mech anism to share information on their approach to facilitating trade during the 
pandemic, as well as their lists of COVID -19 critical products. To conclude, the United Kingdom would 
also like to echo comments made by other colleagues today by thank ing the Secretariat for its 
detailed and informative presentation on COVID -19 measures.  
7.52.   The Chairperson  encouraged the Secretariat to continue updating the report and to present 
its next revision at the subsequent formal meeting of the Committee. He reminded Members to duly 
notify all quantitative restrictions in relation to COVID -19 and , in addition to the original notification, 
to also notify all modifications and termination of mea sures. Moreover, he stated that notifying all 
of the measures covered by the trade monitoring exercise to the Committee , in accordance with the 
QR Decision25, including details on their precise entry into force and termination dates, would be 
important to assist  the Secretariat in making its report more accurate.  
7.53.   The Committee took note  of the reports by the Secretariat, the four  documents, and the 
statements made.  
8  REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE EXPERIENCE -SHARING SESSION IN RELATION 
TO TRADE IN COVID -19 RELATED GOODS AND REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT 
(JOB/MA/152)  
8.1.  The Chairperson  reported to the Committee about the first experience -sharing session on trade 
in COVID -19-related goods and invited Members to consider the summary report prepared by the 
Secretariat and circulated in document  JOB/MA/152.  
8.2.  The Chairperson  reported that the Committee had held its first  experience -sharing session on 
trade in COVID -19 related goods on 4  March  2022. This session had been  organized following the 
information session of 28  January 2022, where the Secretariat had presented the work  that it had 
done in relation to the COVID -19 pandemic, including a number of reports and new tools which were 
particularly relevant to the work of the Committee. Following that information session, at the 
informal meeting of the Committee on 1  February  2022, some delegates had asked the Secretariat 
to continue to update Members about any COVID -19 related work of interest to the Committee and 
to continue an exchange of views or experiences am ong Members, including through additional 
information or experience -sharing sessions organi zed by the Committee, as appropriate.  
8.3.  Following the informal meeting, he invited all Members to open -ended consultations, on 
9 February  2022, with the objective of exchanging views and ideas about possible technical work by 
the Committee in the area of trade in COVID -19 related goods. A number of delegations had taken 
the floor to support this type of work by the Committee, had proposed topics of interest, and had 
provided suggestions on how to organize the discussions. Based on Members' interventions at the 
informal consultations, the following topics had emerged as possible areas in which the Committee 
could engage in a technical dialogue on Members' practices: (i) the definition of essential goods to 
combat the pandemic, namely, how Members have defined such lists and updated them over time; 
(ii) tariff classification of these essential or critical goods within the Harmonized System, including, 
once the products had been identified, whether Members faced issues with their HS  classification. 
This was an area in which collaboration with the World Customs Organization could be necessary; 
(iii) how Members had monitored and measured trade in these essential goods to comba t the 
pandemic, including the creation of national tariff lines or statistical breakouts; (iv) the sharing of 
Members' practices on measures aimed at easing trade under the purview of the Committee 
including, for example, in relation to tariff suspension, reduction, or elimination; and (v) how to 
improve transparency in export restrictions, as well as a sharing of experiences with respect to the 
choices underpinning the use of such restrictions ( for example, why a certain type of measure was 
chosen, what factors determined the termination/non -renewal of certain measures, whether a 
review of their effectiveness was undertaken, and so on ). In terms of the format, Members had 
pointed to the importance of gathering together in an informal mode within the context of the 
Committee, through experience -sharing sessions at the technical level , to exchange information on 
these topics. The benefit of inviting experts from other organizations and/or the private sector, and 
strengthening the link between WTO  Commit tees, was also mentioned.  
 
25 Document  G/L/59/Rev.1 . G/MA/M/76  
 
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  8.4.  Against this background, the Chairperson had sent an email , on 10  February  2022, proposing 
that the Committee organize the first of a series of experience -sharing sessions , starting with the 
first two topics from the list, namely:  how Members defined their lists of "essential goods" to combat 
the pandemic, what challenges they faced with their tariff classification, and what could  be learn ed 
as a way forward, including for better international cooperation.  
8.5.  The first  session had tak en place on 4  March  2022 and representatives from six  Members had 
participated as speakers, namely: Canada ; China ; Ecuador ; the European Union ; Singapore;  and 
the United Kingdom. Several other Members had participated in the discussion by taking the floor 
and sharing their experiences at the meeting or by requesting the Secretariat to circulate written 
communications afterwards. The two  communications from Uruguay and the United Kingdom that 
the Committee had considered under the previous agenda item had stemmed from this session. The 
Chairperson thanked all those Members for their active engagement in this exercise and for sharing 
their valuable experiences. A representative from the WCO had also participated in the meeting and 
had provided written contribu tions. The Secretariat had compiled all the documents and 
presentations relating to this session and summarized the discussions held in a report which had 
been circulated in document  JOB/MA/152.  
8.6.  The Chairperson  believed that this type of exercise was very useful for improving Members' 
understanding of the main challenges faced during the pandemic and for sharing information and 
knowledge about what solutions worked well. He recalled that nobody had been spared by this 
pandemic and that it was important that Members join ed forces to be better prepared for the future.  
8.7.  Regarding next steps, and as requested at the session, the Chairperson informed Members 
that the Secretariat had been looking into possible dates for the organization of three  additional 
experience -sharing sessions to cover the other topics that Members had identified. The Secretariat 
had made provisional bookings on the following dates. First, on 26  April 2022, to discuss how 
Members had monitored and measured trade in essential goo ds to combat the pandemic, including 
through the creation of national tariff lines or statistical breakouts. This session would be linked to 
the one organized on 4  March  2022 and could build upon the information provided in that context. 
As mentioned by Me mbers, the participation of the World Customs Organization in this particular 
session would be extremely useful. The third  session had been tentatively scheduled on 
20 June 2022 and would focus on Members' practices in relation to measures aimed at easing trade 
under the purview of this Committee including, for example, in relation to tariff suspension, 
reduction, or elimination, among others. Finally, on 16  September  2022, the session could take place 
for Members to discuss how to improve transparency in e xport restrictions and share experiences 
with respect to the choices underpinning the use of such restrictions ( for example , why a certain 
type of measure had been  chosen, what factors determined the termination/non -renewal of certain 
measures, and whether  a review of their effectiveness was undertaken).  
8.8.  The Chairperson  recalled that this was a tentative programme for the series of 
experience -sharing sessions on the topics identified by Members so far. He thanked Members for 
listening to his report and open ed the floor for comments or feedback.  
8.9.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.10.   The European Union thanks the Secretariat for its comprehensive report of the useful technical 
meeting in March on the COVID -19 pandemic and the treatm ent of essential COVID -19 goods by 
customs. The report very well reflects Members ' challenges when confronted with the need to 
facilitate the movement of essential goods across borders. Based on Members ' inputs, the report 
provides a very accurate, albeit non-exhaustive, compilation of the lessons learn ed during the 
pandemic. The EU believes that all the lessons distilled in Section  3 of the report are useful and 
deserve more consideration. The EU would like to highlight some of them in particular.  
8.11.   The European Union  agrees that the WTO  framework has proven very valuable in containing 
temptations to erect barriers that are eventually self -defeating. The EU also fully shares the view 
that improved dialogue between Members and cooperation with internationa l organizations are 
crucial assets during a health crisis. Likewise, the EU sees value in deeper engagement and 
consultation with stakeholders, be it at domestic or WTO  level, to inform decision -making and 
implementation. The EU welcomes the identification  of tangible avenues to do better in these G/MA/M/76  
 
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  different fields, especially as these are based on Members ' experience . The EU suggest s that the 
Committee continue exploring these.  
8.12.   During this crisis , many Members were unable to find out what the exact availabi lity of 
essential goods was. And this is notably because it was challenging to monitor trade or production 
of such goods. This was notably due to the fact that we did not always have appropriate codes in 
our tariff schedules. The European Union  has introdu ced amendments to its tariff nomenclature to 
rectify this situation . The EU therefore believes that Members could further consider the option of a 
common reference list of core items , which should be reflected in their national nomenclatures, or 
which coul d be used as a reference for an efficient customs clearance process. Where there are 
classification issues, Members could discuss them and exchange relevant information in appropriate 
forums  or through appropriate mechanisms , including in collaboration wit h the WCO. Members  
should reflect further on the best way to do that. The EU believes that these small steps would 
enhance trade monitoring and potentially improve predictability. The EU also uses this opportunity 
to thank the WCO for its presentation unde r item  2, which was very rich  and detailed . The EU hopes 
that this presentation can be circulated in writing, and it sees high value in the WCO participating in 
future experience -sharing sessions. Unfortunately , Members cannot  rule out that a future pandemic 
or crisis may unfold, and shortages may concern different types of goods. Members could reflect on 
how to better use the existing WTO  mechanisms to be able to quickly react and engage with other 
Members in response to a crisis. The EU sees value in continuing the technical discussions on these 
various issues under the aegis of this Committee. The EU looks forward to additional 
experience -sharing meetings.  
8.13.   The representative of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
8.14.   The United Kingdom warmly welcomes this report by the Secretariat, and the additional 
reflections shared by the WCO earlier in the session. The information session on 4  March  2022 
focus ed on how Members have defined COVID -19 critical products and the issues th e UK has 
encountered regarding product classification. It highlighted the value of shared work done at a 
national level to produce lists of COVID -19 critical goods; this is why the UK has shared information 
on its lists, and trade facilitative measures as set out under agenda item  7. The UK would welcome 
any further information that other Members may share on these types of measures.  
8.15.   The United Kingdom  thanks other Members for their reflections and expertise and looks 
forward to continuing to discuss the sp ecific issues relating to product identification and classification 
challenges with Members moving forward. The UK concludes by extending its thanks to the 
Chair person  and the Secretariat for their ongoing work to facilitate reflective discussions among 
Members about their experiences of responding to the COVID -19 pandemic through trade. The UK 
looks forward to the opportunity to engage in future sessions.  
8.16.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
8.17.   The United States would like to thank  the Chair person  for his report, and the Secretariat for 
its summary of the 4  March discussion. The US  found that discussion to be very informative and 
looks forward to participating in future experience -sharing sessions.  
8.18.   The representative of India indica ted the following:  
8.19.   India thanks the Chair person  for his tireless efforts to set up these experience -sharing 
sessions in January and March in relation to trade in COVID -19-related goods. India's delegation 
immensely benefited from the session and India look s forward to participating in the other sessions 
planned through the year. India reiterates its request from the information and informal session 
conducted in January. This request is for the Secretariat on the COVID -19 vaccine trade data page.  
8.20.   Firstly, India requests the addition of a total population number to the tables where vaccine 
exports have been documented. As the Director -General of this esteemed Organization has said 
several times , no one is safe until everyone is safe in this pandemic . This statement truly reflects 
the urgency to provide vaccine access and vaccine equity to every human being. Hence, countries 
with large populations , such as India, were also working in the global interest while running a very 
successful public vaccinati on campaign, which has seen almost two billion inoculations completed. 
This number puts the exports in the right context. India was able to further vaccine equity to the G/MA/M/76  
 
- 35 - 
 
  second  largest national population and was also able to further vaccine equity to thos e around the 
world who needed it the most.  
8.21.   Secondly, and to stress the previous point, the Secretariat is requested to also add the vaccine 
flows to the export figure. It will be good to understand for each of the top exporting Member the 
destination for t he vaccines. A percentage split between high -income, middle -income , and 
low-income countries would provide an additional qualitative perspective to exporting Members ' 
efforts towards vaccine access, vaccine equity , and vaccine affordability.  
8.22.   The representa tive of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.23.   Canada joins others in thanking the Chairperson and the Secretariat for their effort s in 
organizing these meetings and in providing the report that has been shared with Members today. 
Canada would also like to mentio n that, in addition to the documents circulated by Uruguay and the 
United Kingdom , Canada had also circulated document  G/MA/W/174, which essentially records the 
speaking points for Canada's presentation in the previous week's session, and which supplement s 
the PowerPoint presentation in the  Annex to document  JOB/MA/152. Canada also supports the 
European Union's  intervention considering further lessons learned. This is going to be part of our 
work programme going forward , which Canada also fully supports. It will give us space in the 
Committee to have this type of exchanges and to try to allow time for Members to prepare their own 
contributions to the discussion. Canada found the discussion at the beginning of this month v ery 
enlightening. It highlighted the different ways that each Member took to identifying the products 
which they found to be essential and to how they lowered their tariffs to ease the access of the users 
within their jurisdiction. Canada also echoes what the EU said about the presentation by the WCO. 
Canada appreciates what was provided at the meeting today and hopes that the WCO  representative 
will share some of her speaking points with the Committee because her presentation  was quite 
detailed and very in teresting. Canada sees a very high value to including  in future discussion the 
tariff classification aspects of the work that the Committee is undertaking over the next year at least.  
8.24.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
8.25.   Colombia echoe s others in thanking the Chairperson for convening this meeting , and also the 
Secretariat for the summary report. Colombia wishes to thank those Members that made 
presentations or circulated documents as a part of this experience -sharing session, which was v ery 
interesting and constructive. Colombia appreciat es having specific dates for the coming sessions 
because it also allows us to organize ourselves and our work with our delegates back in Capital so 
that we can indeed have a greater level of active partic ipation. Colombia also stressed the 
importance of keeping in mind the time differences in order to allow for wider participation from 
Capital -based officials and Members. On document  JOB/MA/152, Colombia would like to highlight 
three  elements in the area o f lessons learned. The first  point relates to improving and strengthening 
the dialogue among Members, in particular to improve the exchange of information such as the 
publication of list s of essential products and notifications of measures adopted by Members. Members 
have all agreed that having such updated information contributes to facilitating  access to information 
and therefore enhance s trade. Second, it is also important to step up tr ansparency through an 
ongoing exchange  of good practices and information. It is quite important to stress the positive 
results obtained through the dialogues and experience sharing, and also the importance of 
continuing to work with other international org anizations. Colombia joins those that already made 
comments on the good cooperation with the WCO  in this regard . Finally, Colombia observe s that the 
pandemic is not over in all countries . There are still important risks prevailing for different waves of 
the pandemic. This should give us elements to be able to face other situations which could crop up 
in the future , and as we are currently witnessing in other areas. Colombia stresse s that the lessons 
learned in Section  3 of document  JOB/MA/152 should be comp lemented by what is discussed and 
what is identified in the coming sessions. Therefore , this Committee could have a dedicated 
document on lessons learned on the basis of what has been discussed among Members.  
8.26.   The representative of Japan  indicated the follo wing:  
8.27.   Japan thanks the Chairperson for this very comprehensive report. These sessions were highly 
beneficial for Members. This provides a big picture regarding COVID -19-related trade in goods , and 
the related challenges , covered by this Committee. Japan  looks forward to engaging in the future 
session s. G/MA/M/76  
 
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  8.28.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.29.   Australia wishes to join colleagues in echoing congratulations to the Secretariat for this very 
useful work. Australia found the March  session quite thought -provoking and illuminating.  Australia 
values the arrangement of the future sessions. Australia thinks it is very imp ortant that Members  do 
exchange this sort of information and learn from each other's experiences. Australia looks forward 
to contributing to the future sessions and would appreciate, when possible, try ing to arrange a 
suitable time for in -Capital participa tion. 
8.30.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
8.31.   Thailand wishes to thank the Chair person , the Secretariat , and particularly the speakers who 
made the presentation during the first  experience -sharing session. Thailand has benefit ed 
immensely f rom this presentation, and would share it with colleagues in Capital . Thailand also shares 
many  of the experiences and difficulties that have been faced by those Members that made the 
presentations, such as on the issue of product classification , which has introduced ambiguity in to 
how to monitor trade flows of products such as surgical masks and N95  respirators. To conclude, 
Thailand wishes to express its appreciation to those involved and see s a high value in continuing 
this work. Thailand looks forward to participating in the next experience -sharing session.  
8.32.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
8.33.   China wishes to thank the Chairperson and the Secretariat for holding this 
first experience -sharing session and for preparing these report s. China will actively participate in the 
coming sessions.  
8.34.   The Chairperson  thanked the delegations of the European Union, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, India, Canada, Colombia, Japan, Australia, Thailand and China for their comments. 
The Chairpers on indicated that the Secretariat had made preliminary bookings to hold the next 
experience -sharing session on Tuesday, 26  April 2022, from 12 noon until 3pm. The topic of the 
session would build upon the topic of the first  experience -sharing session and w ould focus on how 
Members had monitored and measured trade in COVID -19 essential goods, including through the 
creation of national tariff lines or statistical breakouts. The second  experience -sharing session would 
also take place in hybrid format to allow Capital -based officials to participate virtually and would be 
based on contributions by Members. The Chairperson encouraged delegates to contact their 
colleagues in Capitals and to enquire whether they would be willing to contribute to the session. As 
had been demonstrated in the first  session, the participation of speakers offering diverse 
perspectives and backgrounds was of great benefit to this kind of activity. The Chairperson indicated 
that the deadline to propose speakers was Thursday, 14  April 2022. The Chairperson requested that 
Members take note of the date for the time being , and the Secretariat would follow up with a written 
communication in this regard. The Chairperson noted that , provided there was a sufficient number 
of speakers for the second experience -sharing session, he would ask the Secretariat to confirm the 
session and to circulate a draft programme to Members.  
8.35.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.36.   On a poi nt of clarification, Canada wishes to confirm that the topic of the session on 26  April 
would be as indicated, but would include also the topic of the first  session. This will provide an 
opportunity for any Member who wishe s to present on the first topic b ut that did not previously have 
time to prepare for it.  
8.37.   The Secretariat  indicated the following:  
8.38.   Indeed, the focus of this session is really on trade monitoring and the measurement of trade , 
but to do that it is of course also relevant to discuss how these goods have been classified at the 
national level, and there is an overlap between the two topics. If there are Members that were unable 
to contribute to the discussion in the first  session, they may of course do so in the seco nd session , 
given that the issues are inter -related. Nevertheless, to  make progress with the discussion and to 
cover the issues identified by Members, the main focus will be on trade monitoring and 
measurement.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  8.39.   The Committee took note  of the report and the statements made.  
9  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENT S BY THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union and the United Stat es. 
9.2.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
9.3.  The European Union's  concerns over Presidential Decree No. 23/19 remain as this Decree aims , 
in the EU's assessment , to protect domestic industries in a manner that is not compatible wit h 
WTO rules. These concerns have been raised at numerous WTO meetings since 2019, including at 
the Committee on Agriculture, the Import Licensing Committee, this Committee and the Council for 
Trade in Goods . To date, Angola has not provided any substantive  reply and/or explanations on how 
it intends to make this Decree compatible with WTO  law. The EU strongly urges Angola to review 
the relevant measures in order to ensure their compliance with the WTO's rules.  
9.4.  Irrespective of the issue of WTO  compatibility,  the European Union  reiterates its request for 
Angola to provide clarification as to what process related to this decree, including what changes 
Angola intends to introduce , and in which areas. For example, the  Decree does not provide 
information on how im port restrictions would be implemented ; notably , it is unclear if licences are 
to be used to manage these restrictions. The EU requests Angola to clarify these issues. Should 
licences be involved in the implementation of this Presidential Decree, the EU  would recall that the 
measure should be notified under the Agreement on Impor t Licensing Procedures.  
9.5.  The European Union wishes to share a set of detailed questions with Angola and look s forward 
to engaging with Angola further on that basis , as follows . 
• Could Angola provide additional information on the agricultural products covered  by 
Presidential Decree No. 23/19 , if possible,  with the specific HS  codes for each commodity , 
as well as a list of specific goods produced in the Special Luanda -Bengo Economic Zone that 
are subject to the Decree ; 
• could Angola elaborate on the process impo rters and wholesalers have to follow to be eligible 
for an import licence, including on the specific steps required ; 
• could Angola provide additional clarifications on the quantitative restrictions laid down by 
Article  11 of the Decree, especially on how th e assessment of the existence of internal 
capacity for import substitution is conducted? The EU would like to better understand if and 
how Angola intends to implement quantitative restrictions ; 
• Angola previously indicated that whether the Decree would be c ancelled will actually depend 
on the achievement of its objectives. Could Angola elaborate on the methodology and 
process for the assessment of the achievement of those objectives ; and 
• could Angola clarify whether any impact assessment study or similar eva luation is available 
for consultation, and whether Angolan authorities have consulted economic operators on 
possible adverse impacts that the measure may have on international trade, and to explore 
less trade -restrictive alternatives?  
9.6.  The representative of  the United States  indicated the following:  
9.7.  As it has expressed previously in this and other Committees, the United States continues to 
have significant concerns with Presidential Decree No. 32/19 , which appears aimed at restricting 
Angola 's imports. The US understands that Angola is a developing country with a reliance on imports 
and is looking to promote domestic production and diversify its economy . However, the measure 
counters the objectives of the WTO to reduce obstacles to international trade and ens ure stability 
and fair conditions of competition among Members, thereby ensuring Angola 's economic 
development.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  9.8.  The United States  understand s that Angola is working to address the issues raised by Members, 
including with respect to WTO  rules. Is there any update on that review? The US  also understand s 
that Angola is undertaking an analysis of its internal market this year . Can Angola provide 
information on the status of that analysis and the final results?  
9.9.   The representative of Angola  indicate d the following:  
9.10.   Angola takes note of the statements made by the European Union and the United States 
regarding their concerns over Angola's import  measures . Angola considers that its previous 
statements made in this, and other committees , remain valid. Ho wever, Angola continues to work 
towards adjusting the Decree to make it more comprehensive. It should be noted that imports  into 
Angola  continue to develop in a normal way.  
9.11.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
10  CANADA – RESTRICTIONS ON THE COMMER CIAL IMPORTATION OF CANNABIS AND 
CANNABIS PRODUCTS FOR MEDICAL USE – STATEMENT BY COLOMBIA  
10.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Colombia.  
10.2.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
10.3.   Colombia again r aises this trade concern due to the restrictions adopted by Canada on the 
importation of cannabis and cannabis products for medical use. Colombia  appreciate s the willingness 
of the Canadian authorities to address the doubts and concerns of Colombia in bilateral settings in 
Bogotá, Ottawa , and Geneva.  
10.4.   Canada is a leading country in progressive regulations for the use of cannabis for medical 
purposes, and Canadi an companies stand out globally in this growing and evolving market. However, 
Colombian companies have been experiencing difficulties in exporting to Canada cannabis and 
cannabis -containing products for medical, not recreational, use. Based on the review o f Canadian 
regulations, including the Cannabis Law and its regulatory norm, Colombia  found three  elements 
where there seems to be an incompatibility with the WTO  rules, to the extent that restrictions are 
applied to the importation of medicinal cannabis an d its products. First, Canada's general policy 
seems to allow the importation of only a certain type of medical cannabis, that is , it only allows the 
importation of raw materials , and  not finished products. Second, imports are restricted to certain 
quantit ies, that is , only those quantities necessary for the number of authorized plants. Third, 
imports are allowed only to a certain type of importer, namely those that are licence holders.  
10.5.   In the first  case, the Canadian legislation does not detail which produ cts are considered within 
the category of raw materials and the treatment applied to processed or manufactured products 
(those that are not considered as raw materials). Colombia  asks Canada for more details on the 
definition of raw materials under its Gen eral Cannabis Law.  In the second  case, there seems to be a 
restriction on the quantities that can be imported , a limitation which is linked to the number of 
authorized plants. In this regard, Colombia  asks Canada to clarify the reasons that justify this 
limitation , as well as to provide information on the number of authorized plants and the manner in 
which the said authorizations are granted. This restriction on the quantities and types of products 
creates a prohibition to access the ordinary commercial and  distribution channels, such as 
pharmacies or hospitals. In the third  case, imports are only allowed for new licence holders ; 
however , the rule is not clear about who is considered to be a new licence holder, and nor does it 
specify how a new licence can be requested and obtained. Colombia  asks Canada for detailed 
information on these points . 
10.6.   Finally, and although in practice there is a restriction on access to the Canadian medical 
cannabis market, Colombia  draws attention to the fact that the Canadian regulation establishes that 
only medical cannabis that meets the requirements of the Good Pro duction Practices (GPP) 
standards, which are specific to the Canadian regulatory system, can be sold or distributed, including 
the verification of compliance with this standard through inspection. Colombian producers have 
requested the recognition of GPP  standards or inspection visits to obtain the GPP standard ; however , 
these requests have been denied by the Canadian authorities. This creates a less favourable G/MA/M/76  
 
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  treatment for imported products compared to national products. On this matter, Colombia  asks 
Canada to detail the procedure to obtain the GPP  certificate for foreign producers.  
10.7.   Regarding the Good Production Practices of Canada versus the standard of Good 
Manufacturing Practices of Colombia, Colombia  wishes to ask Canada to undertake a "process of 
equivalence of standards" with Colombia's  health authority (INVIMA), with the purpose of having 
the opportunity to demonstrate that , through the standard of the country of origin (Colombia) , the 
guarantees and confidence of maintaining or covering the level of  protection of health risk of the 
importing country (Canada) , are provided. It is worth noting that the WTO has recommended to 
governments that they should recognize the measures of other Members  as equivalent, even when 
they differ from their own, as long  as they provide an equivalent level of protection.  
10.8.   To date , the Canadian authorities have not presented the ir reasons for why imports of 
cannabis and cannabidiol products for medical purposes are not allowed or are restricted, while 
domestic production an d exports of the same products can be carried out, in compliance with the 
corresponding internal regulations. Colombia reiterates the importance of avoiding any type of 
unjustified trade restriction , as well as the need to have non -discriminatory treatment  between  
national producers.  
10.9.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
10.10.   Canada continues to engage with Colombia bilaterally to discuss Colombia 's concerns with 
Canada's  regulation of its trade in cannabis and will respond to the specific written questions 
Colombia recently agreed to provide on this matter.  
10.11.   Since 2020, Canadian regulators have met with Colombian diplomatic officials and private 
companies on many occasions to discuss this issue and to provide information on Canada 's 
regulation. The Cannabis Act and its regulations set out the restrictions pertaining to the import and 
export of cannabis. Only holders of licences issued by Health Canada under the Cannabis Regulations 
may import or export cannabis, and only for medical or scientific purposes. Under the Cannabis Act 
and its regulations, the import and export of cannabis for any other purpose (such as distribution or 
sale for non -medical purposes) is strictly prohibited.  
10.12.   As outlined in Canada 's Cannabis Import/Export Bulle tin, authorization of the import or 
export of cannabis for medical or scientific purposes is only granted in very limited circumstances, 
in a manner that is consistent with the public health and public safety objectives of the Cannabis Act 
and Canada 's obligations under international drug control treaties, to which Canada is a party. Before 
issuing an import permit, Health Canada considers whether there are risks to public health and public 
safety. More information on importation of cannabis and cannabis pr oducts for medical use is 
available on Health Canada 's website.  
10.13.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
11  CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – STATEMENT BY 
AUSTRALIA  
11.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at t he request of Australia.  
11.2.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
11.3.   Members will recall what Australia said in this committee regarding the value Australia places 
on its strong, mutually beneficial trading relationship with China. It is why Australia is deeply 
concerned about the trade disruptive and restrictive measures that China continues to apply to a 
wide range of Australian products. These have a direct impact on Australia's  market access into 
China. It is particularly concerning that Ch ina's official statements and articles in state media have 
linked China 's trade actions to unrelated issues in the China -Australia bilateral relationship. Australia  
notes that, in January  2022, the European Union initiated a WTO  dispute against China regarding 
disruptive and restrictive trade practices imposed on Lithuania and other exporters in the EU. The 
increasing use of disruptive trade measures poses a risk to all Members and undermines the 
multilateral trading system on which all Members rely.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  11.4.   Australia wishes to again register its concerns with a series of quantitative restrictions or 
de facto import bans, which appear inconsistent with China 's WTO  commitments and which limit 
Australia 's market access. Australia has received multiple credible re ports, including from Chinese 
industries, that China 's authorities have informally instructed importers not to purchase Australian 
barley, coal, copper ores and concentrates, cotton, lobster, logs, sugar, and wine. These actions are 
in addition to China 's formal actions against other Australian products, which have also been raised 
in other relevant committees. Australia further notes that Chinese trade data shows virtually no 
Chinese imports of Australian coal and copper ores and concentrates since Decembe r 2020, despite 
consistent historical high and consistent trade in these products and no formal measures being 
implemented by China on these goods.  
11.5.   Australia wishes to reiterate that it consider s any instruction by China 's authorities, whether 
formal or in formal, not to purchase Australian products to be inconsistent with China 's 
WTO obligations, including the fundamental WTO  principle of non -discrimination. Australia  calls 
again upon China to notify these import bans and de facto QRs to the WTO. China 's responses to 
Australia's  requests for advice in this Committee, and other WTO  meetings, still have not adequately 
addressed its requests regarding China 's trade measures more broadly, and formal or informal 
instructions from China 's authorities to tradin g enterprises specifically. Australia stands ready and 
willing to engage substantively with China – in Geneva, Beijing, or Canberra – to discuss these 
ongoing issues.  
11.6.   Australia  must remind itself and all Members of the value of international rules and what  is at 
stake when they are not respected. Australia expects that all WTO  Members, including China, will 
conduct their trade in accordance with their commitments and fundamental WTO  principles. This is 
important for Australia's  trading relationship  with Chi na, but also for Australia's confidence in, and 
the integrity of, the rules -based system more broadly.  
11.7.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.8.   The European Union shares Australia 's concerns with regard to the matters Australia is again 
raising in this Committee  on this occasion , as already at previous meetings of the Council for Trade 
in Goods. On these occasions, the European Union has made a statement outlining its concerns. On 
this occasion , the EU again wishes to raise the same  points of principle and of law . 
11.9.   The European Union  continues to be concerned by the sheer number of alleged measures and 
the cumulative product range and trade value affected . The EU is likewise concerned by the form 
which these measures allegedly take , and notes that the  GATT  rules also cover such informal 
measures . More importantly, informal, unpublished , and non -transparent trade regulations are 
per se at odds with the WTO 's rules and spirit.  WTO Members should not adopt such measures; this 
is not how international trade,  or this Organization , should operate . 
11.10.   The European Union is also concerned by the alleged purpose of the measures in question. 
If the true reason for their adoption was an intenti on to punish, put pressure on, or coerce another  
Member because of a policy choice which lies within the rights of that Member, then in addition to 
the trade angle, these measures are also at odds with general international law.  Within the EU, 
growing conc erns regarding such practices have led to a legislative proposal for a so -called 
anti-coercion instrument. That proposal is presently being considered in the EU's legislature. In 
addition , the EU has recently initiated a WTO  dispute vis-à-vis China in rela tion to a range of 
measures negatively affecting its trade with China, and  where there also appears to be such a 
coercive intention . 
11.11.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
11.12.   The United States remains deeply troubled by the informati on provided by Australia and that 
it has heard from other credible sources. The US again register s its systemic concern with the broad 
range of restrictive measures, both formal and informal, that China has imposed on certain 
Australian goods in an abusive , arbitrary, and pretextual manner . In this connection, the US is 
concerned by reports that Chinese authorities have informally instructed importers not to purchase 
certain goods.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  11.13.   China 's actions are not isolated to Australia . There are many instances of C hina using these 
harmful non -market practices against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation for unconnected 
bilateral  issues, including China 's discrimination against Lithuanian goods and EU  products with 
Lithuanian content.  
11.14.   China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system ", but its actions speak 
for themselves. China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or 
breaking rules in order to inflict harm on others to advance its geo political and economic ends. 
China 's failure to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles threatens and undermines the 
rules-based multilateral trading system and harms relations between its Members . 
11.15.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated  the following:  
11.16.   The United Kingdom would again like to express its support for Australia 's concerns about 
trade restrictive measures taken by China.  
11.17.   China must ensure that its trade measures are applied in a non -discriminatory, predictable 
manner, and with  the necessary transparency around decision -making and administrative 
procedures, as required by the relevant WTO  agreements. It is vital that, as Members, we adhere 
to the fundamental principles and objectives of free and fair trade underpinning the rules -based 
multilateral trading system . 
11.18.   The United Kingdom closely monitors reports of China 's trade actions being deliberately 
targeted against goods of some countries for political reasons. The UK  also note s the remarks by 
the European Union regarding measur es taken against one of its Members. The UK wishes to express 
its concern. Unfair market distorting trade practices risk undermining the integrity of, and trust in 
the multilateral trading system and lead direct ly to harmful consequences to citizens and business es 
worldwide. The UK  urges China to engage in good faith and , in a timely and responsive manner , to 
provide clarifications to the points raised by Australia and the European Union . 
11.19.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
11.20.   Canada shares the systemic concerns raised by Australia, as well as by the European Union , 
the United States, and the United Kingdom . Canada has also raised a number of specific trade 
concerns regarding China 's application of sani tary and phytosanitary (SPS)  measures that are 
restricting trade in food, plants and animals, and their products. Canadian agri -food exporters 
continue to experience a lack of transparency and predictability with respect to China's application 
of SPS  measu res, and Canada continues to experience significant undue delays in China's approval 
procedures.  
11.21.   Canada has noted a recent pattern regarding China 's growing willingness to use unjustified 
SPS and TBT  measures to block or otherwise hinder trade. The use of these trade disruptive and 
coercive measures challenges and destabilizes the rules -based international trading system from 
which China, Canada,  and all WTO  Members have benefited. There are troubling patterns in China 's 
use of SPS and TBT  measures that blo ck or hinder trade, particularly in agricultural and agri -food 
products. For example, Canadian canola seed exports to China continue to be arbitrarily and 
unjustifiably restricted. This is why Canada has requested the establishment of a WTO  panel on the 
matter. 
11.22.   In addition, Canada remains concerned that measures adopted by China in 2020 to 
temporarily suspend exports from meat and fish establishments due to China 's alleged concerns 
regarding COVID -19 transmission remain in place despite recent findings from  the FAO/WHO that 
point to the contrary. With no scientific evidence to support these measures, the continued 
suspension can only be viewed now as a tool to block trade. In this regard, Canada urges China to 
base its SPS  measures on sound science and to ta ke into account the updated FAO/WHO  guidance 
that confirms that food and food packaging is not a pathway for the spread of COVID -19. 
11.23.   Canada also remains concerned that other new regulations in China, notably 
Decrees  No. 248 and 249, create unjustified disr uptions and delays for Canadian food exporters. 
Canada  asks China to  provide , at the very least, more clarity on these two  decrees and on the online 
China Import Food Enterprise Registration (CIFER) system, as well as provide a transition period of G/MA/M/76  
 
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  18 months to afford companies sufficient time to register and/or amend their registrations and for 
China to communicate how to navigate the complex registration system.  
11.24.   Canada  encourage s all WTO  Members, including China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  
11.25.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
11.26.   New Zealand also shares a systemic interest in the concerns expressed on this topic. As New 
Zealand has repeatedly noted in a number of for ums, the multilateral rules -based trading sys tem 
provides that all Members, regardless of their size or trading capacity, are subject to the same rights 
and obligations. This provides the predictability and certainty necessary to ensure that trade can 
take place efficiently and with the least possibl e friction . 
11.27.   Given the challenges that all Members are facing as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic and 
other disruptions, the certainty provided by the multilateral trading system is more important than 
ever. If Members step away from their commitments or a dopt remedies or other measures provided 
for under the WTO  Agreements in an arbitrary manner and for dissociated  purposes, this will 
undermine the predictability and certainty on which the system rests. It will also reflect on 
perceptions of the Member und ertaking such actions.  
11.28.   The adoption of measures by WTO  Members that cause widespread disruption to trade and 
lack transparency cause serious concern to New Zealand, including actions undertaken against a 
range of exports from Australia and other WTO  Member s. New Zealand encourages Members to 
comply fully with their WTO  obligations, including in the application of trade remedies and the 
obligation to apply them in good faith.  
11.29.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
11.30.   Japan shares the views express ed by Australia that anti -dumping measures should be 
implemented within the framework of the WTO  Agreements, and that China should comply with the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement not only for the investigation procedures themselves but also for 
fact-finding and ana lysis in conducting an investigation. Japan also share s the concerns expressed 
by Australia that every necessary transparent measure should be secured.  
11.31.   In addition, as was pointed out by Members in China's  Trade Policy Review of the previous 
year, opaque m easures taken by the China in an unofficial or unpublished manner are problematic 
from the perspective of China's Accession Protocol and the transparency rules in the GATT. 
Therefore, Japan  urges China to ensure transparency in its trade measures.  
11.32.   If China  is implementing its trade measures in an arbitrary manner , as reported, that 
arbitrary implementation runs counter to a free, fair , and rules -based international trading system. 
Japan  expect s China to respond to Australia's concerns in good faith and in a  timely manner.  
11.33.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
11.34.   China has repeatedly provided its explanations of these trade issues raised by Australia in 
previous meetings of various WTO  committees.  
11.35.   China has always honoured its commitments by actively fulfilling its WTO  commitments and 
its obligations under the China -Australia  FTA, and by reducing tariffs on imported products from 
Australia for six  consecutive years , from 2015 to 2020. Currently, about 95% of imported products 
from Australia enjoy zero -tariff treatment. The relevant measures taken by the competent Chinese 
authorities in response to some Australian products are in line with Chinese laws and regulations, 
international practice, and WTO  rules, as well as the relevant  provisions of the China -Australia  FTA. 
China has also notified Australia promptly.  
11.36.   It is inappropriate for Australia to make groundless speculation on the normal inspection and 
quarantine measures taken by China and the business decisions made by Chinese enterprises based 
on market demand. China has always believed that trade and investment cooperation between 
Members based on equality and mutual benefit, and in accordance with the WTO  rules and market 
principles, is the approach most conducive to improvin g the well -being of people around the world.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  11.37.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
12  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
12.1  European Union – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism – Statement by the Russian 
Federation (G/MA/W/172)  
12.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
Russian Federation.  
12.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
12.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during the previous meetings of t he 
CMA and the Council for Trade in Goods and expresses its deep concern with regard to the proposed 
EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.  
12.4.   The Russia n Federation  supports international efforts aimed at combating climate change and 
its consequences. Russia  believe s that these goals may be achieved only in cooperation between all 
members of the international community. Russia also believe s that the current provisions of the 
international climate agreements have not yet been exhausted. In this context, Russia wishes to 
note that Article  5 of the U nited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  
provides for the cooperation of its Parties in order "to promote a supportive and open international 
economic system  that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, 
particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate 
change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones , should not constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade ." 
This is why Russia remain s concerned about the proposed EU  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism , 
which in Russia's view could res ult in additional trade restrictions in the EU  market.  
12.5.   The Russian Federation  notes that the European Union's  institutions are currently developing 
proposals on amending the provisions of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) . For 
instance, in Febr uary 2022 the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety of the 
European Parliament published its proposals that imply, inter alia , expanding the list of products 
subject to the CBAM , and the reduction of the transition period without levying CBAM  charges. In 
accordance with the EU  Council proposals, published in March  2022, an accredited verifier under 
CBAM may be a person accredited in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2018/2067, in othe r words , the EU 's people  only. This makes mutual recognition of verification 
between the EU and its trading partners impossible. Russia  also note s that the EU  Council 's proposals 
also expand the scope of products subject to the CBAM.  
12.6.   The Russian Federation  circulated written questions to the European Union in 
document  G/MA/W/172 and document  G/C/W/800. However, Russia has received no response. 
Russia  urges the EU to consider these questions and provide Russia  with its answers in accordance 
with the WTO  procedures.  Russia  also expect s that current trade rules and international climate 
agreements will be fully respected by the EU while developing the CBAM.  
12.7.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
12.8.   Paraguay wishes to reiterate its concern with respect to this EU measure and its subsequent 
regulations.26 
12.9.   Paraguay notes that, since the Committee's previous meeting, the European Union has 
published its proposal regarding a CBAM, which seeks to avoid carbon leakage as part of the EU's 
ambitious implementation of the Paris Agreement. However, the EU's justification seems to be 
problematical because it assumes that all Members have the same ambition, although the Paris 
Agreement itself is based on the principle of "common but differentiate d responsibilities". Paraguay, 
for example, does not have the same national objectives as other Members because it is not 
responsible for current or historical damage to the environment. Therefore, Paraguay believes that 
 
26 In accordance with Paraguay's request, its statement under this agenda item from the Committee's 
previous formal meeting is reproduced here in full. See document  G/MA/M /75, paragraph s 12.12 -12.13.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  this "level playing field" approach , which does not take into account the existing differences in terms 
of economic development or fiscal policies among Members, and which assumes that there exists 
one single approach for all Members, is a major problem. Finally, Paraguay requests the Europ ean 
Union to provide information on the compensation programme for third  countries so that Members 
can be sure that the system is fair.  
12.10.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
12.11.   India has been raising its concerns on the proposed rules under the EU Green Deal in various 
WTO forums. Environment is the global commons that we should all be worry ing about the most. 
The world is coming together in an unprecedented manner in addressing the challenges of 
environment and climate change. This was demonstr ated in COP -26 in Glasgow and , more recently , 
in the UNEP  summit  in Nairobi . 
12.12.   At Glasgow, which hosted 194  countries, the world kept the goal in reach of limiting global 
warming to 1.5  degrees above pre -industrial levels. India 's Prime Minister announced India's 
NetZero plans by 2070, presented five  nectars or Panchamrit , some with near -term 
2030 commitments , and stressed the importance of the acronym LIFE – Lifestyle For Environment. 
In Nairobi, 175  countries came together and made possible the adoption of a landmark resolution 
to Beat Plastic Pollution, which is a major step forward in our efforts to make peace with nature. An 
agreement to create a legally binding international instrument is a historic achievement.  
12.13.   India considers that these efforts show co llective resolve, which is what is required to solve 
environment al and climate problems. However,  International Trade Law cannot form the unilateral 
basis for addressing these concerns. The principles enshrined in International Environment Law, 
discussion on which predates the formation of the WTO itself by more than two decades, should be 
fully reflect ed in the measures proposed under International Trade Law. Cherry -picking of 
environment law or measures into trade is not the right way to address the biggest challenge 
currently faced by humankind.  
12.14.   India continues to study the various provisions of the European Green Deal and , within that, 
the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. India prima facie  believe s that these measures encroach 
upon the sovereign policy -making rights of WTO Members. The proposed measures also violate the 
basic principles of International Environment Law , such as "Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities ". India remain s opposed to such externalization o f 
domestic laws as a matter of principle and continue s to analyse the substantive aspect of the 
proposed legislation.  
12.2  European Union – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism – Statement by Indonesia  
12.15.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had also been included at the request of 
Indonesia.  
12.16.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
12.17.   Indonesia understands the high importance of protecting the environment and reducing 
global carbon emissions, as well as Members ' rights to do so. Nevertheless, Indonesia is of the view 
that such action should be based on international standard s, should not constitute trade barriers, 
and should be in accordance with the WTO's rules.  
12.18.   On the technical  aspects , Indonesia seek s detail ed explanation s from the European Union  
regarding its proposal for the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), 
mainly on the mechanism plan and implementation method, which in Indonesia's  view is still difficult 
to understand, in particular regar ding the methodology for imposing additional fees for a number of 
products covered by the CBAM, including iron and steel products, refineries, cement, aluminium , 
chemical -based materials, fertilizers, and electrical products. Indonesia would also like to k now 
whether there will be a review process in terms of the conformity of the CBAM with WTO  rules.  
12.19.   Indonesia has carried out preliminary calculations, where it has  found that the trade barriers 
caused by the imposition of the CBAM have the potential to detr imental ly impact efforts to reduce 
poverty, export growth, and increase productivity in the sectors affected by the policy. Indonesia's G/MA/M/76  
 
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  exports are at risk of decreas ing, which will increase the trade deficit currently estimated at 
USD 3.3 billion due to t he implementation of the proposed CBAM.  
12.20.   Indonesia is worried that if the CBAM is implemented it will create import restrictions and 
hamper Indonesia's and other WTO  Members' market access to the European Union under the 
pretext of environmental protection.  Furthermore, Indonesia request s more relevant explanations, 
clarifications , and justifications from the EU regarding its policies, especially those relating  to 
advancing trade -related environmental measures.  
12.21.   The representative of China  indicated the follo wing:  
12.22.   China would like to echo previous speakers. China believes that actively addressing climate 
change, strictly implementing the U NFCCC  and its Paris Agreement, lowering tariffs and non -tariff 
barriers, and liberalizing trade and investment , are important safeguards for building a community 
with a shared future for mankind and promoting global sustainable development.  
12.23.   However, China considers that the CBAM is inconsistent with the basic principles of the 
UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, such a s "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capabilities" and the institutional arrangement of "Nationally Determined Contributions "; 
it also contradicts WTO  principles and the concept of a free and open multilateral trading system. It 
will not only damage the mutual trust of the international community and the prospects for economic 
growth but will also be detrimental to the post -pandemic recovery of the global economy.  
12.24.   China hopes that the relevant legislative measures of the European Uni on are in line with 
the WTO  rules and avoid the formation of new trade barriers. China stand s ready to continue to work 
together with the EU and other Members to promote the liberalization of trade and investment in 
green sectors and address climate change  jointly.  
12.25.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
12.26.   The Kingdom of Bahrain shares similar concerns to those raised by this item's  proponents, 
and wishes to recall, in this regard, its statements made at previous Committee meetin gs.27 
12.27.   The representative of Qatar  indicated the following:  
12.28.   Qatar wishes  to take this opportunity to recall its previous statements under this agenda 
item. Qatar compliment s the European Union for its political courage in setting these objectives and 
for its ambition of becoming the first  climate -neutral continent by 2050. Like the EU, Qatar has also 
signed and ratified the Paris Agreement and is equally ambitious in its climate change objectives.  
12.29.   However, reiterating its previous statements, Qatar wishes to seek further clarification from 
the European Union  on its plan to introduce a CBAM . In particular, Qatar would like to seek 
clarification on how the CBAM will be able to be applied compatibly with fundamental WTO princi ples, 
including MFN and national treatment . Qatar finds that the different treatment of "like products " 
based on the carbon content of the production process would seem to go against decades of 
well-considered jurisprudence.  
12.30.   Qatar  takes this opportunity to  thank the European Union  and look s forward to having a 
detailed  and fruitful discussion on this matter . 
12.31.   The representative of Brazil  indicated the following:  
12.32.   Brazil follows with attention the debate on the European Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism. As stated in previous meetings of the CMA and other Committees, Brazil  await s further 
clarifications about the specific methodology to be adopted, as well as about the Mechanism 's 
consistency with the European Union 's commitments at the WTO and the UNFCCC.  
 
27 See, for example, document  G/MA/M/75, paragraph s 12.8-12.9 and G/MA/M/74, and 
paragraph s 12.14 -12.15 . G/MA/M/76  
 
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  12.33.   In the absence of clarity about the methodology to be used, Brazil  regard s with concern the 
possible establishment of carbon footprint quantification standards based on the sectoral 
performance benchmarks of the European bloc, disregarding the reality of production in other 
countries. Brazil is also concerned about the possibility  that the mechanism establishes an equal 
level of obligations for all countries in terms of eliminating carbon emissions, overlooking the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
12.34.   Brazil  calls upon the European Union to provide for the mecha nism's full consistency with 
WTO rules, including the principles of most-favoured -nation and national treatment,  and to avoid 
any protectionist bias in its implementation.  
12.35.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
12.36.   The Kingd om of Saudi Arabia wishes to thank the proponents for raising the subject matter 
of the CBAM. From Saudi Arabia's  perspective, while the European Union said that the proposed 
mechanism would be in conformity with the WTO  rules and the EU's  other internatio nal obligations, 
the EU is yet to provide explanations concerning  how it aims to achieve this . While the EU is intending 
to address  the risk of investment leakage from the EU to other countries , the CBAM's main objective 
is in fact to maintain the competitiveness of EU  industries. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia's very 
preliminary review indicates that the proposed mechanism raises very serious concerns due to its 
potential long -term negative implications on global trade , which would disturb the full valu e chain 
of trade , including goods, services , and jobs.  
12.37.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia urges the European Union to further engage in consultations 
with Members in order to ensure the full compliance of its CBAM with the WTO rules and agreements , 
and to ensure that the proposed mechanism would not create unnecessary barriers to trade or be 
used as a means of protectionism, or unjustified discrimination, or disguised restrictions on 
international trade , or be applied in a manner that constitute s protection to the  EU domestic 
industry. Finally, Saudi Arabia looks forward to hearing further details and reflections from the EU 
on this proposed mechanism and stand s ready to engage with the EU  in this regard . 
12.38.   The representative of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
12.39.   Kazakhstan reiterates its position , as expressed at the most recent meeting of the Council 
for Trade in Goods , and continues to follow developments around the European Union's CBAM. 
Kazakhstan again urges the EU to fully consider the CBAM's compatibility wit h WTO  rules and 
regulations and to ensure that any such mechanism does not create obstacles to trade.  
12.40.   The representative of  the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  indicated the following:  
12.41.   The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela wishes to echo the statements made by other 
delegations and hope s that the EU  measure will not become a trade restriction.  
12.42.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
12.43.   The European Union  thanks Indonesia, Paraguay, India, China, the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
Qatar, Brazil, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan,  and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
for their interest in this important issue.  
12.44.   Recently, in March , WTO Members had the opportunity to exchange views with a 
representative of the European Union who explained the state of the proposal on a C BAM and 
provided clarifications regarding  the scope of the mechanism. There is an urgency to tackle climate 
change and we can only do this if we scale up global ambition. If we do so, keeping the 1.5°C  Paris 
Agreement goal is still within reach. The refore, the  EU has stepped up its climate ambition, fully 
translating the implementation of the Paris Agreement into legislation, and invites its partners to 
share a comparable level of ambition.  
12.45.   The introduction of a C BAM to address the risk of carbon leakage is an integral part of that 
implementation and ambition, as reflected in the European Green Deal. It aims to avoid EU  climate 
action being undermined. The CBAM is only one of many components of the European Green D eal, G/MA/M/76  
 
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  which sets out a path towards achieving the EU's climate targets. It aims to provide market 
incentives to the private sector to green their production.  
12.46.   The CBAM is a purely climate -oriented, environmental policy tool and it will be applied in a 
non-discriminatory and even -handed manner , in full compliance with WTO  rules and other 
international obligations. The proposal is based on the actual carbon content of a product. By 
mirroring the existing EU  Emissions Trading System (ETS), it ensures that foreig n and domestic 
producers are treated equally.  
12.47.   The CBAM does not target third  countries. It is addressed to companies as it applies to goods 
of certain carbon -intensive sectors. It takes into consideration the application of carbon pricing 
systems by third  countries opening possibilities for reduction or non -payment of the CBAM  charge. 
It also takes into account the carbon footprint of individual producers in that the CBAM will be 
charged according to the actual emissions of imported goods. Under the proposa l, to provide 
third countries with legal certainty and stability, a monitoring and reporting system would apply from 
2023 and be terminated at the end of 2025, giving time for the final system to be put in place. This 
transitional period will give trading partners time to prepare. The system will be subject to a review 
in 2025.  
12.48.   The European Union  has been exchanging with the most affected companies and 
governments in order to limit the impact of CBAM on third  countries. The proposed CBAM would 
start applying with revenue collection only in 2026. As of 2026, the CBAM will start applying gradually 
to the products covered and in direct proportion to the reduction of free allowances allocated under 
the EU  ETS for those sectors. Over time, the CBAM would replace the free allocation of allowances.  
12.49.   In terms of process, the "Fit for 55 " package of proposals, including the CBAM, is currently 
before the EU  co-legislators. In March  2022, the EU  Council adopted a common approach on the 
CBAM  proposal. The proposal  is now being debated in the European Parliament. The co -legislators 
will analyse the package in depth and come to a joint agreement in order to adopt the different 
proposals . The EU is ready to engage with trade partners and international organi zations to inform 
and, where possible , to assist them with the implementation of the measure.  
12.50.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
13  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (G/MA/W/169) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
13.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union, Switzerland, and the United States. Writ ten questions had been circulated in 
document  G/MA/W/169.  
13.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
13.3.   The United States, along with the European Union, Japan,  and Switzerland, circulated 
questions in April  2021 to Gulf Cooperation Coun cil (GCC) member State governments regarding the 
selective tax on beverages. While the US  appreciate s the information provided during the 
Committee 's previous  meeting , in October, it notes that it still has yet to receive written responses 
to those questions ; for this reason, the US asks these Members to  provide an  update as to when 
such responses will be provided.  
13.4.   As the United States has conveyed before, it request s a substantive update on revisions to 
the GCC  excise tax model and its implementatio n plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement, 
and note s the importance of timely engagement with interested parties regarding this issue.  
13.5.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
13.6.   As stated by the United States , Switzerland would also like to receive answers to its questions 
and hope s to receive them soon. Once again, Switzerland is unable to report any progress on the 
selective tax. In October  2021,  consultations between C apital and Geneva -based  representatives G/MA/M/76  
 
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  took place and both sid es agreed to convene another meeting within two to three  months. Therefore, 
at the beginning of January  2022, the United States,  in the name also of the European Union and 
Switzerland,  asked the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a meeting in the week of 25  January. 
Unfortunately, no answer has as yet been received, and this despite out reach on several occasions  
to the Saudi mission. According to the GCC  statement delivered in this Committee last October, "the 
GCC member States are open and stand ready to any  demand for consultations ". Therefore, 
Switzerland  again request s the GCC to provide a date for a meeting in the near future.  
13.7.   On several occasions in this Committee and in the C ouncil for Trade in Goods (CTG) , the 
GCC coordinator said that  a formal communi cation will be made to the WTO once a decision is taken 
at the GCC  level. In other words, Members  will be informed after a decision has already been taken. 
As the GCC holds regular consultations with the private sector, Switzerland wishes to underscore 
that a similar mechanism with Government officials is necessary in order to have regular exchanges 
and know which elements are taken into consideration  before  any final decision.  
13.8.   In addition, based on the answers provided by the United Arab Emirates  during its TPR last 
week, Switzerland  seeks clarification regarding the status of the study on the tax reform. The UAE 
stated that the study was still ongoing and still at the first  stage of preparations, whereas the Zakat, 
Tax and Customs Authority of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia indicated that the study had been 
finalized and sent to the GCC  members for domestic consultations on the need to come to a common 
position regarding the reform . Switzerland  kindly request s each GCC  member State to clarify 
whether they have started their domestic consultations and when they plan to complete them.  
13.9.   Turning to its long-standing request for a  harmonization of the tax rate at 50% for all 
sweetened bev erages,  Switzerland  notes that it remains unaddressed because the GCC said that the 
reform process was still ongoing. The current discrimination between energy drinks and other 
sweetened beverages has been  in place since implementation of the tax. The UAE indicated in its 
TPR that the revenues collected were below the projections for energy drinks, carbonated soft drinks , 
and other sweetened beverages. In the absence of additional details, Switzerland is of the view that 
this could be the result of the very  high tax rates.  
13.10.   Switzerland  urges the GCC not to wait until the reform is implemented to address its concern. 
Switzerland stand s ready to hold a meeting with the GCC  competent authorities  in the near future . 
13.11.    The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.12.   As in previous meetings of this Committee, as well as in the Council for Trade in Goods and 
in bilateral contacts, including at the most recent EU -GCC Trade and Investment dialogue, the 
European Union wishes to reiterate its serious concerns in relation to the GCC  "Treaty on Excise Tax " 
of December  2016. The EU is disappointed that there has been no progress recently on this issue.  
13.13.   The European Union wishes to reiterate the importance of har monizing the implementation 
of the Excise Tax Law and the need for a close engagement with private industry stakeholders on 
the process for revising the tax.  
13.14.   The European Union  welcomes the GCC 's willingness to consult with trading partners and 
industry st akeholders before a revised system is put in place, but would like to see that put in 
practice. In this regard , the EU calls upon the GCC to share their study on proposed tax rates and 
their expected impact with interested stakeholders for consultation pri or to adopting a revised 
taxation model. The EU would also welcome information on the envisaged timeline for the change 
to the volumetric tax and an acceleration of the implementation of the new tax regime.  
13.15.   The European Union  wishes to underline the call f or providing immediate relief for industry 
until the ongoing GCC  excise taxation revision takes effect. This could be done by exempting all 
zero sugar beverages from the tax and harmonizing the tax rate at 50% for energy drinks and all 
other categories of sugar -sweetened beverages subject to the tax.  
13.16.   The European Union  would welcome greater engagement from the GCC on this issue so as 
to solve this trade barrier in the near future.  
13.17.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  13.18.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Sultanate of Oman, the 
State of Qatar,  and the State of Kuwait, the Kingdom of S audi Arabia wishes to thank the delegations 
of the United States , the European Union , and Switzerland for the interest they have attached to the 
GCC Excise Tax regime , and for their communication on the Excise Tax and carbonated soft drinks, 
malt beverages , energy drinks, sport s drinks, and other sweetened beverages.  
13.19.   As for the timeline of the ongoing process of the GCC  Excise Tax model and its 
implementation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recall s once again that the revision of the Excise Tax 
is a complex ex ercise that needs great  effort, extensive coordination , and comprehensive study . The 
GCC Working Group on Tax Issues is sparing no effort to complete this exercise in order to submit 
to the GCC  member States appropriate results and a high standard excise t ax model. Finally, 
appropriate procedures and timeline s are adopted by the GCC  member States for the revision of 
their excise tax regime. Once the process has been completed the relevant information will be shared 
with WTO  Members  immediately . 
13.20.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
14  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND 
MATSU, AND THAILAND  
14.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei , and Thailand.  
14.2.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
14.3.   Chinese Taipei wishes once again to register its concern  on this agenda item , along with the 
European Union, Thailand,  and Indonesia. The situation has bee n ongoing for almost two  years since 
India announced its restrictive import measure on new pneumatic tyres in June  2020. Chinese Taipei 
has flagged its concern over this issue numerous times in prev ious meetings of this Committee, as 
well as in the Committee on Import licensing and the CTG. It is regretful that the concern has 
remained unchanged.  
14.4.   The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry announced  on 12  June 2020 that a restrictive import measure had been imposed on new 
pneumatic tyres. As a result, importers must apply to the DGFT for a licence or special approval 
before importing those items. Since then, Chinese Taipei has noticed that only about  40% of its 
application cases have been approved by the DGFT when  compared to the average figures of the 
previous three  years. Not only the difficulty in obtaining import licences but also the lengthy approval 
process has severely affected Chinese Taipei's exports to India, resulting in a sharp decrease in trade 
in 2020 and 2021 compared to the same period in 2019. To Chinese Taipei's  understanding, India 
appears to issue import licences only fo r those kind of pneumatic tyres that are not produced 
domestically, and set s a limit on those imported tyres. This constitutes a ban on tyre imports. 
Chinese Taipei  question s how the measure would be compatible with WTO  rules concerning QRs. 
14.5.   As such, Chine se Taipei  urges India to ensure that applications are fully granted, and that it 
implement s its policy in line with WTO  rules. In particular, non -automatic licensing procedures 
should be implemented in a transparent and predictable manner and shall not hav e trade -restrictive 
or trade -distortive effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of restrictions. 
Chinese Taipei request s India to provide the rationale that led it to implement this new measure, 
which by nature is restrictive and di scriminatory. Chinese Taipei also request s India to provide , as a 
point of reference,  information on its domestic practices for granting licences. 
14.6.   Chinese Taipei  calls upon India to review the current practice and implement it in a manner 
that is consisten t with WTO  rules so that normal trade can soon be restored.  
14.7.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
14.8.   At the outset, Indonesia wishes to express its gratitude to India for their bilateral meetings 
held both on the sidelines of the recent TBT Committee meeting and in the Working Group on Trade 
and Investment (WGTI) meeting, in order to solve Indonesia 's concerns regarding India's  policies G/MA/M/76  
 
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  on tyre imports and import ed tyres from Indonesia. However, Indonesia regrets that it has not yet 
received an appropriate response and solution to this problem.  
14.9.   Indonesia is highly aware that India has imposed import restrictions on tyre products for 
certain types and size categories that can be produced by tyre manufacturers in India. The policy 
was implemented shortly after India imposed a temporary  six-month  import ban on tyre products 
to India, as stated in Notification No. 12/2015 -2020, dated 12  June 2020. The implementation of 
this policy has hampered Indonesia 's tyre exports to India considerin g that the variety of tyre that 
can be exported is very limited. The policy also has the potential to eliminate market access for 
Indonesia n tyres in India considering the various types and sizes of tyres produced by India as one 
of the world's main produc ers. On the other hand, Indonesia wishes to inform the Committee that 
Indian tyre products can access the Indonesia n market without encountering any trade barriers at 
all. 
14.10.   Indonesia also has concerns regarding  the requirement to provide separate statement s 
through email of import restrictions for certain tyre types and size categories, where no official 
provisions governing this  requirement exist . The requirement has, de facto, hampered Indonesia 's 
market access for tyres in India. In this regard,  Indonesia would like to seek clarification as to 
whether such requirements apply both to imported and domestically produced tyres. In addition, 
Indonesia also seek s clarification s from India regarding the application of a royalty policy or marking 
fee on tyre products that use the India n Standard (IS) Mark. Indonesia is of the view that the 
imposition of the IS  Mark marking fee on tyre products to be exported to third  countries has the 
potential to burden businesses and create unnecessary barriers to inter national trade.  
14.11.   Indonesia is of the view that the implementation of these two  policies is inconsistent with 
the principle of non -discrimination and national treatment , and has the potential to create  
unnecessary obstacles to international trade as set out in the provisions of Article  2.1 and Article  2.2 
of the TBT  Agreement. In this regard, Indonesia requests India to provide its further clarification of 
these two  issues . Indonesia also  asks India to review the policy to ensure its conformity with the 
applicable provisions of the WTO  Agreement . 
14.12.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
14.13.   Thailand wishes to reiterate its concern regarding India 's import policies on tyres and would 
therefore appreciate it if India could inform Members of the p rogress on the notification of its import 
policies on tyres. Additionally, Thailand wishes to seek India's detailed clarification regard ing its 
procedures and time-frames for issuance of import permit s for tyres. 
14.14.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
14.15.   The European Union wishes to reiterate the concerns it has been raising in this Committee 
since 2020 regarding the licensing regime for importation of pneumatic tyres for motor cars, buses, 
lorries, motor scooters and motorcycles introduced by India under Notification N o. 12/2015 -2020. 
This is now a long -standing issue. It is very worrying that , despite having been raised on multiple 
occasions in this and other WTO  Committees , there has been no progress towards a possible 
resolution.  
14.16.   The European Union  continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure on the 
import of tyres, which have been highly restricted since June  2020. Only a limited number of licences 
has been g ranted to EU  tyres manufacturers and these licences are themselves limited in duration, 
quantity,  and type of tyres. No licences have yet  been granted , after two  years, to bus and truck 
tyres. This represents  a blatant discrimination against the EU and , more specifically , against EU bus 
and tyre manufacturers.  
14.17.   The European Union  therefore urges India to reconsider and eliminate any implicit or explicit 
quantitative or other restrictions on the import of replacement tyres that could go contrary to 
WTO requir ements. The EU invite s India to engage in a constructive dialogue with EU  member States 
and the Delegation of the EU in Delhi. Solving such trade irritants is key to facilitat ing EU-India 
trade, especially in view of the potential future trade negotiations  between the EU and India . 
14.18.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  14.19.   The United States  thank s those M embers that continue to raise this issue on the agenda , 
and the US continue s to share the ir concerns. The US would also like to thank Japan and Thailand 
for raising the next agenda item. The US continue s to monitor all of these issues and is interested 
to hear how India plans to address the concerns raised.  
14.20.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
14.21.   India wishes to thank the delegations of the European Union, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei , 
Thailand,  and the United States for their continued interest in this issue. This issue was also 
discussed in October  2021, in the Committee on Market Access , and India believes that it had 
clarified the issue on that occasion . 
14.22.   India wishes  to reiterate that the non -automatic licensing requirements for tyres are 
administered in a manner consistent with the rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures , including with respect to the time -frames for the grant ing of import licences. The 
licensing procedure is being administered in a fair manner. This is reflected in the fact that a number 
of licences have been granted after approval by the Exim Facilitation Committee . The import policy 
measure has been taken keeping in view the quality issues for the product. For granting licences 
under this non -automatic licensing procedure, India has laid down specific criteria to evaluate the 
applications received. The comments of the concerned administrative Ministries are also taken into 
account as part of this non -automatic licensing procedure.  
14.23.   Specifically on Indonesia 's questions, India's response s provided in previous meetings of the 
Council for Trade in Goods and the Committee on Market Access had already clarified the technical 
details , as follows . 
14.24.   It may be clarified that the fee is not termed as a "Royalty Fee on tyres"; rather, it is termed 
as a marking fee. The Bureau of Indian S tandards operates a Product Certification Scheme as per 
the Scheme -1 of the BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulation, 2018 under BIS  Act, 2016. Under 
the scheme, the Bureau of Indian Standards grants Product Certification licence s to the domestic or 
foreign manufacturers as per BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulation, 2018. The manufacturer is 
required to pay BIS the necessary fee, which includes a marking fee for each product. The marking 
fee for a product is specified as: (i) minimum marking fee per annum; a nd (ii) unit and unit rate. 
The manufacturer is required to pay a minimum marking fee in advance for the validity period of 
the licence. The actual marking fee for each year is calculated by multiplying the unit rate with the 
quantity (units) marked with an ISI mark during the year by the manufacturer. The actual marking 
fee thus arrived at , or the minimum marking fee for the year, whichever is higher , is payable by the 
manufacturer. The marking fee as per the process described above is the same for domesti c and 
foreign manufacturers , and  the marking fee is chargeable on all production of tyres carrying an 
ISI mark.  
14.25.   India request s the proponents of this agenda item to share their specific data on applications 
submitted and any other substantiating information. India remain s committed to address ing these 
issues bilaterally.  
14.26.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
15  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – STATEMENTS BY  JAPAN AND 
THAILAND  
15.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan and 
Thailand.  
15.2.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
15.3.   Thailand wishes to reiterate its concern regarding India 's import prohibition  on air conditioners 
with refrigerant. Thailand is of the view that the measure at issue may be inconsistent with the 
WTO principle of national treatment  since domestic producers are allowed to inject refrigerant into 
domestically manufactured air conditio ners. Therefore, Thailand request s India to amend the 
measure to ensure its compliance with India 's commitments under the WTO.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  15.4.    The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
15.5.   Japan again reiterates its concerns, as expressed previously in this and ot her WTO  bodies, 
regarding India's import ban on air conditioners including refrigerants, introduced by Notification 
No. 41/2015 -2020. This is a measure that unreasonably imposes a restructuring of corporate supply 
chains. Japan is strongly concerned that t his measure is likely to be inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of 
the GATT , and Article  2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement . 
15.6.   Thus far, India has explained that the measure is consistent both with India 's obligations 
under the Montreal Protocol and with its regulations on hydrochlorofluorocarbons ( HCFCs ). However, 
this import ban is still thought to be superfluous and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air 
conditioners that use refrigerants. Furthermore, Japan reiterate s that these air conditioners are 
subject to neither India's reduction and elimination obligation under the Montreal Protocol nor India 's 
domestic regulations for freon gas. In this respect, Japan expects India to provide prompt responses 
to Japan's  written questions submitted to the T RIMS Committee last September. In the previous 
CMA meeting, India had responded that it was open to bilateral discussions, but Japan believe s that 
it is crucial to receive answers from India in good faith in order to start a constructive discussion.  
15.7.   With r egard to the IS  Mark certification based on the Quality Control Orders for air 
conditioners and their related parts, Japan  acknowledge s that the scheduled implementation date 
has been extended from January  2022 to January  2023. Japan  welcome s this extensio n. However, 
Japan request s India to ensure that the factory testing for foreign manufacturers is conducted 
smoothly by the Bureau of Indian Standards. Otherwise, Japan  calls upon India to consider 
introducing some alternative procedures in case its officia ls face difficulty in traveling overseas.  
15.8.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
15.9.   India wishes to thank the delegations of Japan and Thailand for their continued interest in 
this issue. This is an issue previously  raised in the meetings of the  Council for Trade in Goods of 
31 March and 1  April, and 1 and 2  November  2021, at which India explained the rationale for its 
measure.  
15.10.   Having addressed this issue in earlier meetings, India wishes to reiterate that this measure 
has been taken to reduce risk to human, animal and plant life and for health reasons. As per the 
Ozone Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) Amendment Rules, 2014, import of air 
conditioners containing Group  VI substa nces (hydrochloroflourocarbons) is prohibited since 
1 July 2015. India's  measure was necessary for the application of standards and regulations in line 
with its commitment to the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol . 
15.11.   The Committee took note  of the sta tements made.  
16  INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER 2020 – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
16.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia.  
16.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
16.3.   Indonesia expresses its appreciation to India for the ir bilateral meetings held on the sidelines 
of the recent meeting of the TBT Committee, as well as in the Working Group on Trade and 
Investment (WGTI) meeting , to discuss the is sues around India's implementation of its 2020 Plain 
Copier Paper (Quality Order) policy. However, since the enactment of the regulation, Indonesia has 
not been able to export to India due to strict factory visit requirements, which remain impossible 
due to travel limitation s. 
16.4.   India has been one of the important partners for the export of Indonesian paper products, 
meaning that the absence of plain copy paper exports to India since December  2020 has resulted in 
considerable losses for Indonesian exporters. Furthermore, the in -person inspection requirement is 
a burdensome procedure during the current COVID -19 situation, which at the end could hinder 
market access to India  for Indonesia n paper . G/MA/M/76  
 
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  16.5.   According to a statement delivered by the Indian delegation at the most recent meeting of 
the TBT Committee, in March  2022, sufficient capacity testing for plain copier paper products is very 
important for laboratories recognized by the BIS, where accredit ed laboratories must refer to 
ISO/IEC  17025 , and where the accreditation body is a full member of the APAC/ILAC as an initial 
requirement for laboratory recognition under the BIS  Quality Control Order  2020. Decisions 
regarding laboratory recognition by BIS  will then be considered through Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRA s) between countries.  
16.6.   Indonesia urges India to refer to Article 6.1 of the TBT  Agreement on accepting conformity 
assessment results , and also to consider remote assessments , or other policy  relaxations , in 
conducting factory visits. Therefore, Indonesia requests India to accept the test results from 
Indonesian conformity assessment bodies accredited under the international accreditation signatory 
framework. In this case, a n MRA can be carrie d out to ensure that the test results from an accredited 
conformity assessment agency in Indonesia can be accepted by the BIS. 
16.7.   Indonesia hopes that India may reconsider its 2020 Plain Copier Paper (Quality Order) policy 
in order to allow to industry a sufficient transition time to comply with the regulation, and to 
cooperate in terms of trade facilitation for the plain copy paper product.  
16.8.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
16.9.   India wishes to thank the delegation of Indonesia for its continued  interest in this issue. There 
is no provision in the Bureau of Indian Standards (Conformity Assessment) Regulations, 2018 for 
remote assessment or any other means of inspection. The government is considering alternatives 
for in -person inspection, but due to the ongoing global sanitary situation, this discussion remains in 
its preliminary stages.  
16.10.   Factory inspections were on hold due to the restrictions on international travel because of 
the COVID -19 pandemic. This position is not discriminatory against any individual Member. 
Currently, the nomination of Bureau of Indian Standards officers is being considered for carrying out 
the factory inspection for applications received from foreign manufacturers. Currently, this planning 
is going on for the Members where  the country to be visited facilitates the visit of fully vaccinated 
Bureau of Indian Standards officers who carry negative RT -PCR test reports, without any restrictions 
like quarantine and RT -PCR test upon arrival. India remain s committed to a discussion of this issue 
bilaterally and to arriving at a mutually acceptable conclusion.  
16.11.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
17  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – 
STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
17.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, and the United States.  
17.2.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
17.3.   QRs on India 's importation of various pulses have been a long -standing  agenda item in this 
Committee , and Australia 's concerns about this are well known. Despite welcoming India 's temporary 
suspension of certain QRs, it does not address Australia 's underlying concerns and  its continued 
requests for QRs to be permanently removed.  
17.4.   Australia has previously said in this Committee and other relevant WTO  bodies that it believe s 
that India is using these WTO -inconsistent measures as an ongoing tool to flexibly manage imports 
in response to changing domestic circumstances. Australia understand s the previous temporary 
suspension of the QRs and the imposition of domestic stock limits for all pulses had been to address 
concerns about inflation of pulse prices. This reinforces Australi a's concerns about how India is using 
the QRs. Australia also notes that India continued to increase the minimum support prices for a 
range of pulses at the same time.  
17.5.   Australia and the co -sponsors of this agenda item have submitted numerous formal request s 
to India in various WTO  forums, including the Council for Trade in Goods and the Committee on G/MA/M/76  
 
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  Agriculture. It is important that India provide detailed answers to explain the market and other 
conditions behind its decisions, including the temporary suspen sions, and to explain how they believe 
these measures are WTO -consistent. While the WTO  Agreements contain exceptions, the onus is on 
the Member implementing the measure to explain how such exceptions may apply.  
17.6.   Pulses are not a "small " commodity for India, neither by tonnage nor the value produced and 
consumed, nor with respect to trade.  Therefore, India' s measures influence the global pulses market. 
India's current suite of measures on pulses, including significant and increasing levels of market 
price support, high tariffs on some pulses , and QRs, continue to have a negative impact on the 
stability and predictability of the global pulses market, which is to the detriment of all producers and 
consumers, including those in India . 
17.7.   Australia  asks India t o clearly explain the status of all its QRs on pulses. In particular, Australia 
asks that India identify the QRs on the import of any pulses, including yellow peas and moong. 
Australia also request s that India provide an update on whether urad and tur will  be "free" beyond 
31 March  2022. India needs to provide certainty and stability to exporters, traders, and the global 
pulses market, which will not be achieved by continuing to implement "temporary suspensions " to 
what were claimed to be "temporary measure s" that have now been in place since August  2017. 
Australia request s that India permanently remove the QRs.  
17.8.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
17.9.   As previously noted in this and in other Committees and Councils, Canada continues to be 
conce rned with the trade restrictive measures implemented by India, including QRs, minimum 
import prices, restricting imports to one  seaport , and uncertainty introduced by constant changes 
on tariffs on imports of pulses, in particular for dried peas.  
17.10.   Canada co ntinues to question India 's justifications for these trade restrictive measures and 
calls upon India to immediately implement alternative, trade facilitative measures for the import of 
pulses.  
17.11.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.12.   The European Union  fully supports the interventions from Australia and Canada.  As 
mentioned before, the EU remains concerned by India's import restrictions for certain pulses. The 
EU urges India to provide certainty and stability when it comes to the import regime for pulses . 
17.13.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.14.   The United States  support s the statements under this agenda item just delivered by other 
Members . The US remains concerned with India 's use of d omestic support policies, multiple increases 
in tariff rates, and the application of import restrictions for pulses , including pigeon peas, mung 
beans, black gram lentils, and peas. The US  repeat s its previous requests for information on how 
the measures r eflect India 's WTO  commitments, and when and how the measures will be ended.  
17.15.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
17.16.   India wishes to thank the delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union,  and the 
United States for their continued interest in this issue. As addressed in previous meetings of the 
Committee on Market Access and the Council for Trade in Goods, the measures adopted by India 
remain temporary and are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining food and nutritional security. 
This is an area of great importance to India's economy and the policies on imports are regularly 
reviewed and updated.  
17.17.   Notification No. 63/2015 -2020, made by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade on 
29 March  2022, on the free import policy of urad (HS  code 07133110) and tur or pigeon peas 
(HS code 07136000) , has been extended until 31 March  2023. India 's notification on QRs in 
document  G/LIC/N/3/IND/21 , made against the Section  7.3 notification requirement and circulated 
on 20  January  2022, clearly calls out these measures with full transparency , while also giving their  
background.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  17.18.   Furthermore, India 's notifications in documents  G/LIC/N/2/IND/18, G/LIC/N/2/IND/19 , and 
G/LIC/N/2/IND/20 , made under  Section  5.1 to 5.4 of the Agreement on Import Licensing , clearly 
demonstrate its transparent communication on this issue. These notifications also show that the 
process of review of import restrictions is agile, dynamic , and continuous. India continue s to review 
the measures.  
17.19.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
18   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN  UNION  
18.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union.  
18.2.   The re presentative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.3.   Indonesia's import  restrictive policies and practices are a long -standing item in several 
WTO Committees. The European Union  is deeply concerned as the number and scope of Indonesian 
restrictions has expanded over time, with negative impacts on trade flows  further compounded by 
the pandemic. The EU would therefore like to refer to some worrisome recent developments with 
regard to Indonesia 's increased focus on import substitution.  
18.4.   Amon g others, the European Union  has serious concerns over reported plans by the 
Indonesian Ministry of Industry to achieve , by 2022 , a reduction of imports equivalent to 35% of 
the value of its 2019  import potential. These plans would be achieved through a ra nge of measures , 
including expanding local content requirements and the mandatory use of Indonesian national 
standards ( "SNI"), as well as the further promulgation of cumbersome import licensing procedures.  
18.5.   The implementation of this approach seems to be a lready under  way through a variety of  
initiatives, for instance with the adoption of import restrictions on medical devices through the 
"freezing " of several foreign devices in the Indonesian e -catalogue for public procurement, 
preventing their purchase by  government health institutions. The many implemented import 
restrictive measures negatively affect EU  operators across a variety of sectors. These measures will 
also hamper the post -pandemic economic recovery of Indonesia, which cannot be achieved through  
export promotion alone.  
18.6.   The European Union  would therefore like to ask Indonesia to clarify four issues , as follows : 
(i) the reported plans for an import substitution programme and its underlying rationale; (ii) the 
introduction of the "commodity balance " system as the basis for issuing import and export approvals; 
(iii) the implementing measures that it intends to take; and (iv) how Indonesia would ensure that 
such measures will be compliant with its WTO  obligations.  
18.7.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
18.8.   The United States  continue s to share the European Union's concerns regarding the Indonesian 
government 's recent statements that it will suppress imports with the goal of "substituting 
35 percent of imported products " in 2022 . Does Indonesia have any updates on this item ? If 
Indonesia is proceeding with an import substitution program me, will it make the draft measures that 
it is developing publicly available and hold a notice and comment period  to ensure that affected 
parties have the opportunity to provide input?  
18.9.   The United States  urges Indonesia to share further information on its recent statements, and 
strongly urge s Indonesia to rethink this counter -productive and trade -disruptive goal . 
18.10.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
18.11.   India remains concerned with the Indonesian import substitution program me, which will aim 
to reduce access to the Indonesian market. Indonesia is maintaining a number of restrictions on 
imports as well as ex ports, which is affecting Indian businesses, both in terms of impact on exports 
as well as in terms of supply chain disruptions.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  18.12.   Firstly, Indonesia has been applying an annual quota system on the importation of bovine 
meat. Indonesia reduced the quota in 2 021. Apart from the quota system, there are port restrictions 
on imports which have led not only to difficulties, but also to increase s in costs for India's exports.  
Secondly, Indonesia has suddenly stopped the issuance of Horticultural Products Import 
Recommendation s (RIPH s) in respect of agricultural products, such as onion s and potato es, without 
assigning any reason for the same. This is impacting India 's exports of horticultural products. For 
this reason, India request s Indonesia to immediate ly resume the issuance of RIPH s and to remove 
the quota s on RIPH s for these products.  Thirdly, India also requests Indonesia to lift restrictions on 
exports of ginger. Fourthly, Indonesia imposes QRs on imports of automobile and components 
thereof. Fifthly,  these policies remain a concern for Indian chemicals and pharmaceutical products.  
Lastly, on the exports side, India would like to inform the Committee that Indonesia has put in place 
a high export duty and export levy on palm oil and adopted export curbi ng procedures, which is 
pushing up palm oil prices and prices of edible oils in India. In this regard, India request s Indonesia 
to take necessary action in order not to resort to increas ing the reference price of palm oil.  
18.13.   All these issues have been discus sed bilaterally with Indonesia, but so far with no clear 
response. In conclusion, India urges Indonesia not to adopt trade restrictive measures but instead 
to constructively and transparently engage on these proposals.  
18.14.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
18.15.   Like previous speakers, Switzerland shares the important concerns expressed regarding 
Indonesia's objective of reducing its imports by 35% by the end of the current year. Switzerland 
also wishes to hear Indonesia's clarifications and answers to the questions raised.  
18.16.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
18.17.   Indonesia thanks the European Union, the United States, India, and Switzerland for their 
interest in Indonesia's import substitution program me. As stated in Indon esia's intervention s at 
previous meetings of the CMA and CTG, its import substitution program me is not intend ed to hinder 
import s from other Members. The purpose of the program me is mainly an effort to reduce the 
dependence of Indonesia's domestic industry , as well as to maintain the supply of domestic needs , 
especially for raw and auxiliary materials. This purpose is particularly associated with the possibility 
of a future global crisis, including a pandemic, which could disrupt international trade supply  chains 
and stability.  
18.18.   Indonesia wishes to inform the Committee that the issuance of import licences and the 
Indonesian National Standard (SNI) is not related to the import substitution program me. One of the 
purpose s of issuing import licences is to provide  better data on imported products. Likewise, the 
labelling  of the Indonesian National Standard (SNI) is to ensure that products that are placed on the  
Indonesia n market  fulfil the aspects of domestic consumer protection, including in terms of safety, 
security, and health. Furthermore, this  policy is applied indiscriminately to both domestic and 
imported products.  
18.19.   In addition, Indonesia always strives to comply with the p rinciple of transparency, by 
notifying its every implementation of mandatory SNI  regulations , and other technical regulations , to 
the WTO. Indonesia is open to discuss ing this program me further  with interested Members.  
18.20.   The Committee took note  of the statem ents made.  
19  INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS – 
STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
19.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union and the United States.  
19.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
19.3.   The United States notes its ongoing concerns with Indonesia 's continued applicati on of tariffs 
at the border on select ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments. 
Furthermore, the US  continue s to be disappointed that Indonesia has not responded to its specific G/MA/M/76  
 
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  questions, nor otherwise addressed US concerns. The us has been raising this issue repeatedly with 
Indonesia for more than two  years, along with other Members, including in this and other 
WTO Committees, as well as bilaterally . 
19.4.   Indonesia 's tariffs not only impose an unfair financial burden on foreign firms, but they also 
limit access for Indonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech products. US traders have 
also been actively noting the disincentives to investment in Indonesia that result from these tariffs. 
The United States  understan ds that US  companies have also engaged the Indonesian government 
directly on this issue, seeking clarification of Indonesia 's application of these tariffs . Despite their 
efforts, they too have yet to receive a satisfactory response from Indonesia.  
19.5.   The Unit ed States  urges Indonesia to engage constructively on this issue and finally to address 
these long -standing concerns to ensure the integrity of its market access commitments.  
19.6.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
19.7.   The European Un ion echoes the comment made by the United States. Despite the EU's 
requests and calls for aligning the tariff treatment of certain ICT  products classified under 
subheading  8517.62 with Indonesia 's WTO  commitments, it appears that Indonesia continues to 
charge a significant tariff of 10% on products classified under tariff line  8517.62.49. The EU has not 
heard any explanation from Indonesia yet, although the EU  had raised it in both the Market Access 
and the ITA  Committee s. 
19.8.   In this particular category of pro ducts (tariff item  8517.62.49) the European Union  has 
recorded a significant drop of exports to Indonesia. The EU has observed a 60%  drop in the value 
of its exports in 2020 compared to 2019, and a 21% drop in 2020 compared to 2018.  
19.9.   The European Union  therefore reiterate s its calls to bring the tariffs in this tariff subheading 
down to zero . The EU  seeks further clarification as to why Indonesia continues to apply tariffs that 
are not in line with its WTO  bound commitments.  
19.10.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
19.11.   Japan appreciates the European Union  and the United States ' inclusion of this item on the 
agenda. Regarding the imposition of 10%  customs duties on certain telecommunications products, 
previously in this Committee , and in the ITA  Committee, Indonesia has explained that certain 
products may have been affected by the splitting and merging process during transposition. 
Indonesia also explained that it did not intend to take action beyond its commitments or obligations 
under the ITA  Agreement.  To facilitate careful consideration of the facts, Japan urges Indonesia to 
provide further details on the aforementioned customs duties, including information on a possible 
way forward.  
19.12.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
19.13.   Indone sia expresses its gratitude to the United States, the European Union,  and Japan for 
their continued interest in the issue of import duties for telecommunications products. As Indonesia 
has stated in its statement delivered at various meeting s of various bo dies, including at the CMA, 
the ITA Committee , and the CTG, Indonesia continues to strive to comply with all the 
WTO Agreements, including its commitments under the ITA  Agreement.  
19.14.   Indonesia wishes to inform this Committee that, according to the 2022  Indonesian Customs 
Tariff Book, the products concerned are listed as 0%  tariff, which is in accordance with Indonesia's 
commitments under  the ITA  Agreement.  
19.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
20  MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  
20.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the United 
States.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  20.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.3.   The United States would like to reiterate its concern with the 2021  announcement by Mexico 's 
National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) recommending an import quota on 
glyphosate and glyphosate -containing products, as well as the January  2022 statement by CONACYT 
recommending quota quantities.  
20.4.   These announcements c ome after Mexico implemented a de facto import ban on 
glyphosate -containing products by rejecting all applications for import permits for those goods . Since 
CONACYT issued these recommendations, Mexico has not provided an opportunity for public 
comment, su bmitted notification to the WTO of these QRs, or provided scientific evidence for the 
import permit rejections. Can Mexico explain how the quota level was determined and later reduced ? 
Did Mexico solicit and consider public input when making its determinat ion? When does Mexico intend 
to provide additional information to traders on how this quota will be administered ? What HS  codes 
are affected ? How will the quota be allocated? How does Mexico justify these measures in light of its 
GATT  obligations, includin g Article  XI of GATT  1994?  
20.5.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
20.6.   Article  XI of the GATT prevents Members from imposing QRs. While paragraph  2 provides 
carve -outs for very specific circumstances under which Members may impose certain import or 
export restrictions, these do not appear to be relevant in the context of Mexico 's measure limiting 
imports of glyphosate. Canada requests Mexico to provide an update on the work of its agencies and 
a justification for the imposition of this measure.  
20.7.   The representative of Mexico  indicated the following:  
20.8.   Mexico thanks the United States and Canada for their interventions. Regarding the Decree 
published in the Official Journal of the Federation on 31  December  2020, and as Mexico indicated 
earlier , the work of the agencies responsible for its implementation has not been completed and is 
still in progress.  
20.9.   Mexico is aware of the concerns raised by the United States and Canada and has maintained 
a constant dialogue on these issues in various forums, such as the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures of the Treaty between Mexico, the United States,  and Canada (T -MEC), and 
the Working Group for Cooperation on Agricultural Biotechnology of the same Treaty.  
20.10.   Mexico reiterate s the commitment of th e Federal Government and the agencies involved in 
the implementation of the Decree to ensure that the execution of this instrument will be carried out 
as prescribed, and taking into consideration Mexico's  international obligations and commitments.  
20.11.   The Comm ittee took note  of the statements made.  
21  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  
21.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Thailand.  
21.2.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
21.3.   The Government of Thailand has been informed by Thai exporters that they have not been 
able to export caffeinated mixed en ergy drinks to Nepal since 2019 due to the implementation of 
the Government of Nepal's measure on import prohibition of caffeinated mixed energy drinks and 
flavoured  synthetic drinks. There has not been any official notification from Nepal regarding the 
information or justification of the measure under the WTO's  rules and regulations, and Thailand is 
deeply concerned about the said measure as it significantly affects Thailand 's exports of energy 
drinks into Nepal's market.  
21.4.   In addition , Thailand wishes to re call Nepal's statement delivered at the previous 
two meetings of the  CMA, in April and October  2021, at which Nepal justified its action regarding 
the import prohibition measure on energy drink s as a matter of balance of payment and foreign 
exchange reserves. Moreover, Nepal informed the Committee that it would provide an official G/MA/M/76  
 
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  notification to further clarify to WTO  Members the precise WTO legal basis justifying the temporary 
adoption of such measure , as well  as discuss ing with the relevant organizations to consider its 
implementation.  
21.5.   The Government of Thailand wishes to request Nepal to report on its progress concerning its 
official notification to WTO  Members and its consideration to eliminate the said meas ure. Lastly, 
Thailand would welcome bilateral consultation s with Nepal to find a mutually acceptable solution.  
21.6.   The representative of Nepal  indicated the following:  
21.7.   Nepal thank s Thailand for its statement and continued interest in Nepal 's trade policy 
measu res. Nepal wishes to refer to its statements delivered at the meetings of this Committee held 
in June and November of 2020, and in April and October of 2021, and reiterates all the justifications 
presented during those meetings with a view to them being considered positively and as part of this 
statement . 
21.8.   Nepal 's export -import ratio of trade in goods reached 1:15.3 in 2017/2018 , from 1:2.5 in 
2004/2005 after its accession to the WTO , resulting in a huge trade gap. Such an import surge posed 
severe challenges to the entire economic development process of the country. The main legal basis 
of this measure is Section  3(1) of the Export and Import ( Control ) Act 1957, which allows Nepal to 
take necessary measures under certain conditions, such as to safeg uard the external financial 
position and balance of payments , to address a serious decline in foreign currency reserves , and 
others. This Act was being implemented during the Nepal's process of accession and had been 
notified to the WTO at that time.  
21.9.   The m easure is not focused on any specific area and trade restriction of only a few products; 
rather , it broadly covers trade regulation and facilitation aspects of Nepal 's international trade. This 
is applied as part of the Export and Import ( Control ) Act 1957 on a temporary basis , and fully 
complies with WTO  rules and is applied on an MFN  basis. The Government of Nepal is assessing the 
measure  and may periodically  review  and revise it based on the study findings and consultations . 
Due to COVID -19 pandemic , it may take some time . 
21.10.   Regarding the notification, Nepal is coordinating with the Secretariat and the Capital -based 
agencies concerned to finalize its technical part , including the HS code and other aspects. Nepal 
extends its sincere appreciation  to the Secretariat colleague s who are directly involved in this 
technical work.  
21.11.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
22  PERU – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM  
22.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been include d at the request of the United 
Kingdom.  
22.2.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
22.3.   The United Kingdom  wishes to express its concern on Peru 's tax treatment of Pisco.  
Notwithstanding the strength of the UK's  trading relationship , and some recent progress that has 
been made in bilateral discussion s on this issue, the UK remains concerned that Peru 's tax exemption 
for Pisco creates a discriminatory environment for trade, protecting and promoting Peru 's domestic 
production of spirits at t he expense of imported spirits.  
22.4.   The United Kingdom wishes to request that Peru provide information on how this measure is 
consistent with their WTO  obligations and what specific actions Peru plans to take to ensure a 
non-discriminatory trade environment.  
22.5.   The representative of Mexico  indicated the following:  
22.6.   Mexico thanks the United Kingdom for including this item on the agenda. Mexico wishes to 
express its support to the concerns expressed by the UK on domestic taxes applied by Peru on 
distill ed spirits. This is a topic that has been discussed  between delegations for a certain period of G/MA/M/76  
 
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  time but to date without result, including in Mexico's case. Mexico stands willing and ready to 
continue to work with Peru with a view to finding a solution to this situation as quickly as possible.  
22.7.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.8.   The European Union wishes to join the United Kingdom in raising concerns around Peru 's tax 
exemption in favour of Pisco. The EU is concerned that the e xisting tax regime undermines the ability 
of EU  spirits to compete on a level playing field on the Peruvian market. The EU  also wishes to 
request Peru's clarification on how this measure is consistent with its existing WTO  obligations, in 
particular the ob ligation not to discriminate against imported spirits. The EU looks forward to Peru 's 
suggestions as to how to solve this issue promptly.  
22.9.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
22.10.   The United States supports the United Kingdom's  intervention on Peru 's excise taxes for 
distilled spirits, specifically the "Impuesto Selectivo al Consumo ". The United States has expressed 
concerns in the past that domestically produced pisco appears to be subject to far lower specific 
minimum excise tax rat es than the specific minimum or ad valorem  rates applied to all other distilled 
spirits in Peru.  
22.11.   The Ministerial Resolution ( No. 021-2022 EF/15) issued by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance in January appears to exacerbate the disparate rates between pisco and all other products. 
Could  Peru explain why there is a discrepancy in the rates applied to pisco versus all other distilled 
spirits?  
22.12.   The representative of Peru indicated the following:  
22.13.   With regard to the United Kingdom  and other Members' statements, Peru wishes to clarify 
that the selective tax applied to distilled spirits does not establish any distinction affecting the UK or 
any other  WTO Member. This measure is applied to all distilled spirits in the context of a tax system 
that does not establish a differential treatment based on the product's origin. Therefore, this 
treatment is not aimed at protecting domestic production. Peru take s note of the statement made 
by the UK and the other Members and invite s them to discuss this issue  with Peru bilaterally.  
22.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
23  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, 
THE EUROPEAN UNION,  AND THAILAND  
23.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Australia, 
the European Union, and Thailand.  
23.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.3.   The European Union reiterates its concerns with the import restrictions imposed by Sri Lanka, 
in various forms, since April  2020. The measures have now been in place for two  years. Sri Lanka 
has still not complied with its obligation to noti fy the import restriction and enter into consultations 
with other WTO  Members. During the last session of consultations organized under the EU's bilateral 
framework, the Joint Commission, Sri Lanka committed to consult with the EU on its draft notification  
shortly . Unfortunately, this did not happen. The measures that Sri Lanka adopted have not reached 
the stated objective, namely improving Sri Lanka 's economic situation. On the contrary, the trade 
deficit has continued to increase, and the macro -economic s ituation is deteriorating.  
23.4.   Selective import restrictions have not solved the current account difficulties and lack of foreign 
currency , nor the challenges to secure long -term sustainable financing and pursue debt 
restructuring. The European Union  does not believe that this situation is sustainable in the absence 
of international macro -economic assistance, while continued restrictions of imports are hurting 
EU interests and significantly affecting EU  exports. The EU welcome s the recent decision of the Sri 
Lankan government to request technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To 
conclude, the EU  urges Sri Lanka to provide clear indications as to when it intends to remove the G/MA/M/76  
 
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  ban that has been in place fo r two  years now. The EU stands ready to continue working together 
with Sri Lanka in a constructive manner.  
23.5.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
23.6.   Australia thanks Sri Lanka for the updates provided in relation to its series of import 
restrictions, including in this Committee and at the Council for Trade in Goods in October and 
November  2021, respectively. Australia continues to appreciate the challenging circumstances that 
Sri Lanka faces as a result of the impacts of COVID -19 on its econo my and external sector. 
Nonetheless, Australia  continue s to emphasi ze the important role that transparency, predictability, 
and stability play towards a well -functioning global trading system, and ultimately, towards a global 
economic recovery from the pan demic.  
23.7.   Australia therefore continues to share the concerns of other WTO  Members with respect to 
the various measures imposed by Sri Lanka since April  2020. While modifications have been applied 
since then, Australia remains concerned about the cumulative i mpact of all the measures, and the 
disruption caused to trade by uncertainty. Australia notes the IMF  report on its Article  IV consultation 
with Sri Lanka, which recommended a phasing  out of import restrictions and improvements to the 
broader business and investment climate. The announcement of import licensing arrangements 
imposed on an additional 367  items, including agricultural goods, on 9  March  2022, from the Sri 
Lankan Ministry of Finance 's Gazette Notice 22710/18, is inconsistent with the IMF 's subse quent 
recommendation.  
23.8.   Australia is seeking clarification from Sri Lanka on its rationale for implementing the additional 
restrictions, advice on whether these measures are temporary in nature , and when the measures 
would be lifted. Australia again reiterates its request for Sri Lanka to notify these measures as soon 
as possible and to provide the WTO  basis of these measures. Sri Lanka has previously provided 
updates regarding its work with the Secretariat to appropriately notify the WTO. Australia  welcome s 
this collaboration and request s an update from Sri Lanka on the progress of this work. As previously 
stated, Australia remain s open to engaging with Sri Lanka on this issue , including through the 
suggested briefing with interested Geneva delegations.  
23.9.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
23.10.   Thailand wishes once again to urge Sri Lanka to notify  to the WTO  such measures as its 
temporary suspension of imports, imports on credit bas is, import control licence, and import ban. In 
addition , Thailand wishes to request Sri Lanka to update the Committee on the impacts that those 
measures  have had in relieving its foreign exchange reserve shortage. The aforementioned measures 
have greatly i mpacted Thai exporters and Thailand was unable to export small passenger vehicles 
to Sri Lanka in 2021.  
23.11.   In this connection, Thailand is of the view that the measures may be more restrictive than 
necessary . Therefore, Thailand request s Sri Lanka to reconsid er the adoption of these measures and 
the possibility of withdraw ing the import ban. In addition, and as a follow -up to Sri Lanka's response 
at the Committee's previous meeting , in October  2021, Thailand would very much appreciate Sri 
Lanka inform ing Thail and of the progress it is making on the withdrawal of the import on credit basis 
measure.  
23.12.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
23.13.   On 9 March, Sri Lanka introduced 367  import restrictions on what were deemed to be 
"non-essential goods ", including apples, grapes, butter and other dairy items . The new regulations 
establish a licensing process by which the government may allow some traders to continue importing 
the items, w hich delays imports. This action is the latest in a series of import restrictions . While the 
United States  understand s Sri Lanka 's balance of payment concerns, it is concerned about the lack 
of transparency, consultation, and notifications with respect to these measures. Additionally, the US 
asks when Sri Lanka plan s on reversing these restrictions.  
23.14.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  23.15.   Japan echoes the concern s expressed by Australia, the European Union , Thailand,  and the 
United States . Japan understand s that Sri Lanka advocates the need for this measure because of 
difficulties with its balance of payments (BOP). At the same time, such an import restriction due to 
the BOP should not be introduced unless it is carried out with utmost caution a nd due consideration 
for the substantive and procedural requirements in the WTO  Agreement . At the Committee's 
previous  meeting, in addition to the BOP, Sri  Lanka explained that it had taken into account the 
impact of the measures for some automobiles and c hemicals on the domestic environment. In this 
regard, Japan wishes to request Sri Lanka to specify which contents constitute measures that take 
into account the domestic environment. Japan requests Sri Lanka to explain how this measure meets 
those requirem ents and the reason why it considered the measure to be justified. Also, considering 
Sri Lanka 's explanation that this measure is to be applied temporarily, Japan  calls upon Sri Lanka to 
proceed with its early withdrawal.  
23.16.   The representative of the United K ingdom  indicated the following:  
23.17.   The United Kingdom wishes to echo the concerns raised by other Members. Sri Lanka 's 
import bans are significantly affecting the UK 's trade to Sri Lanka. The UK appreciates the difficult 
circumstances of Sri Lanka 's domestic situation. However, a well -functioning multilateral trading 
system requires transparency from all Members, including Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has now had almost 
two years to notify these measures, consult with fellow WTO  Members and provide an explana tion 
for their WTO  basis. The UK therefore requests that Sri Lanka provide an update on when they intend 
to notify these measures and consult with other WTO  Members , as well as indicate a time -schedule 
for when they see an end date for these temporary meas ures. 
23.18.   The representative of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
23.19.   Sri Lanka wishes to thank the delegations of Australia, the European Union, Thailand, the 
United States , Japan,  and the United Kingdom , for their continuous interest in Sri Lanka 's trade 
policy  measures introduced to curb the adverse impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on its economy.  
23.20.   As it has already stated at previous CMA  meetings, Sri Lanka has taken an array of steps 
progressively to relax most of its import restrictions, which were initially i mposed by Sri Lanka's 
authorities through Regulation No.  01 of 2020 , pursuant to Gazette No.  2171/05 of 16 April 2020, 
Regulation No.  02 of 2020 , pursuant to Gazette No.  2176/19 of 22 May 2020, Regulation No.  03 of 
2020, pursuant to Gazette No.  2182/10 of 30 June 2020, and Regulation No.  04 of 2020 , pursuant 
to Gazette No.  2184/21 of 16 July 2020.  
23.21.   Pursuant to  Sri Lanka's  import Regulation of No.  04 of 2020 , introduced through Gazette 
No. 2184/21 of 16 July 2020 and incorporating all the previous Regulations, around 21% of 
HS Codes at 8 -digits had been brought under so-called "temporary suspension ". As Sri Lanka has 
stated in its previous statements,  these measures did in no way aim to impose a complete ban on 
the importation of these items ; rather , these items were permitted to be imported under pre -defined 
payment terms by issuing instructions to all local and foreign commercial banks based in Sri Lanka 
as to how the foreign exchange could be released. As previously stated, Sri Lanka notified to the 
WTO these measures in relation to terms of payments for imports already in 2014.  
23.22.   After seeing modest improvements in its balance of trade account during 2020, Sri Lanka 
arranged a large -scale relaxation of these import mea sures through Regulation No.  10 of 2021 , 
introduced through Gazette No.  2231/18 dated 11 June 2021, which was introduced in place of 
Regulation No.  04 of 2020 of Gazette No.  2184/21 of 16 July 2020. Accordingly, the list of items 
consisting of 21% of HS  codes at 8 -digits, which were permitted to be imported on a credit basis 
and other pre -defined terms of payments, were totally removed by permitting their importation 
under normal payment terms. However, Sri Lanka would like to inform the Committee that certain 
automobiles and parts are still not permitted under normal payment terms. As thes e are 
non-essential items, the measures imposed on these items had resulted and will result in saving 
much limited foreign currency reserves to import essential items , including food and medicines.  
23.23.   Further more, Sri Lanka also wishes to flag that imports of  motor vehicles have been 
witnessing volatile situations even during the period of 2017/2019 due to Government of Sri Lanka's 
decision on the relaxation and suspension of duty -free car permits from time to time. These duty 
waivers and suspension of customs  duties, Import Cess , and excise duties in the case of duty-free G/MA/M/76  
 
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  car permits cannot be considered as commercial activities that take place  "under normal course of 
trade " (within the meaning of the WTO  rules) and accordingly the trading partners cannot pres ume 
that the trade flows taking place under "non-normal course of trade" to be the general norm and 
claim that Sri Lanka 's imports of motor vehicles from its trading partners have been effected due to 
the trade restrictive measures imposed by Sri Lanka. Du e to the comparatively high c.i.f. prices of 
motor vehicles made in certain exporting countries, in the absence of duty car permits, the demand 
for such vehicles is not expected to surge in tandem with the relaxation.  
23.24.   Even though Sri Lanka did not intend t o prolong its import restrictions further, the challenges 
posed by the third  wave of the COVID -19 pandemic and the current global situation have compelled 
it to do so. Sri Lanka has taken due note of the concerns expressed by delegations regarding delay s 
in the notification of its measures to the WTO. Sri Lanka will coordinate with its Capital to take action 
in this regard.  
23.25.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
24  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
24.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia.  
24.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
24.3.   Indonesia had informed the Committee in previous meetings that Sri Lanka 's Department of 
Export and Import Co ntrol had issued an Operating Instruction , No. 08/2021 dated 5  April 2021, 
temporarily to suspend the importation of palm oil products as set out in its annex , which are 
HS code 15.11 (1511.10.00; 1511.90.00; 1511.90.10; 1511.90.20; 1511.90.30; and 1511.90 .90). 
In addition to this instruction, Sri Lanka had also issued import and export control regulations No.  4 
of 2021 , on 7 April2021. Under that regulation, as explained by Sri Lanka in previous meetings, 
certain palm oil products are prohibited,  and other s are subject to an import licensing regime.  
24.4.   Indonesia acknowledges that discussions between Indonesia and Sri Lanka 's Capital s have 
taken place, and it has been informed that its palm oil has managed to enter into Sri Lanka's  market 
again. In this respect, Indonesia highly appreciate s the efforts made. However, Indonesia recognizes 
that the legislation remain s in force. On this occasion, Indonesia wishes to seek Sri Lanka's 
clarification regarding the expected duration of the implementation of the said legislation given the 
claim that the measure was being applied  temporarily . Indonesia also wishes to receive  information 
from Sri Lanka regarding when its legislation will be notified to the relevant WTO  Committees.  
24.5.   The represent ative of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
24.6.   Sri Lanka wishes to thank the delegation of Indonesia for its continuous interest in the trade 
policy measures introduced by Sri Lanka with regard to the importation of palm oil.  
24.7.   Sri Lanka had delivered detailed statements at the CMA on 11 October  2021, and at the CTG 
on 1 November  2021. No changes on palm oil importation have been introduced since then. 
Therefore, Sri Lanka's explanations and details provided during the said meetings are still valid. 
Nevertheless , Sri Lanka wishes to present the following information for the purpose of offering a 
better understanding of its import policy measures relating to palm oil.  
24.8.   Sri Lanka , though Gazette No.  2222/31 , dated 6 April 2021, introduced a trade policy 
measure by imposing a ban on crude palm oil under HS  1511.10.00, Palm oil imported in packing of 
210L and below under HS  1511.90.20 , and palm oil products other than RBD  palm oil f alling under 
HS 1511.90.90.  All other palm oil products , namely palm stearin under HS  1511.90.10, Crude palm 
olein under HS  1511.90.30 , and RBD  palm oil falling under HS  1511.90.90 have not been banned 
and can be imported after obtaining a licence with a f ee of 0.4% of c.i.f. value. 
24.9.   The main palm oil product imported into Sri Lanka is Crude palm olein falling under 
HS 1511.90.30 , and this single product accounts for about 75% of the total importation of palm oil 
products into Sri Lanka. This product is not banned ; it is only under import licence. Sri Lanka imports 
significant quantities  of RBD  oil, which is not banned either, and which can likewise be imported G/MA/M/76  
 
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  under licence. As these items can be imported after obtaining import licences, Sri Lanka has not 
closed its doors to foreign exporters of these major palm oil products.  
24.10.   As per Sri Lanka's  national statistics, the two  main products which are subject to the ban , 
namely, cr ude palm oil under HS  1511.10.00 and Palm oil imported in packing of 210L and below 
under HS  1511.90.20 , account for approximately 7% to 15% of Sri Lanka's total imports of palm oil 
products. Therefore, the actual impact of the ban is insignificant when one considers Sri Lanka's 
total importation of palm oil products. Furthermore , Sri Lanka's ban on a few palm oil products , 
imports of which are insignificant, is purely due to SPS  reasons relating  to Aflatoxin and mycotoxin, 
which are carcinogenic materials.  The Sri Lanka Standard Institute (SLSI) has already adopted 
standards for palm oil products that have been notified to the WTO.  
24.11.   Sri Lanka considers that it is important to note that crude palm oil is actually not intended 
for human consumption because it contain s heavy metals and Mycotoxin. The only product that is 
intended for human consumption is the RBD  palm oil, which Sri Lanka has not banned.  Finally, Sri 
Lanka  has taken due note of the concerns expressed by the delegation of Indonesia , which will be 
conveyed to Capital -based authorities for their observations.  
24.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
25  THE PHILIPPINES – SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – STATEMENT BY 
INDONESIA  
25.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had b een included at the request of Indonesia.  
25.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
25.3.   Indonesia wishes to draw Members' attention to the Philippines'  special agricultural safeguard 
measure on instant coffee from Indonesia (HS 2101.11.10). Indonesia has also previously registered 
the issue at meetings of the Committee on Agriculture.  
25.4.   The Philippines has been applying the measure  in question  since 2018. In the four years from 
the measure's initial application until now , Indonesia's exports of ins tant coffee to the Philippines 
have significantly declined. With this declining export trend within the period of the application of 
the special safeguard measure ( SSG), Indonesia assumed that its market share and the price of 
Indonesian instant coffee in the Philippines market would fall as well. Given these changes, Indonesia 
is of the view that the Philippines might need to update the operation of the measure , including the 
method used to respond to these changes , in accordance with Article  5.7 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture  (AoA) . 
25.5.   With this in mind , Indonesia is of the view that the Philippine s should follow its transparency 
obligations in applying this SSG, as it has already underlined at meetings of the Committee on 
Agriculture (C oA). Further more, Article  5.7 of the AoA indicate s that Members should refrain from 
undertaking an SSG measure where the volume of imports of the products concerned is declining. 
Without any update taking the changes  into consideration , Indonesia does not believe that  the SSG 
on instant coffee from Indonesia applied by the Philippines would be compatible with its substantive 
aspect , as required by Article  5 of the AoA. The applied tariff imposed as a result of the application 
of the SSG might also , from a certain persp ective, be  seen as inconsistent with the Philippines ' tariff 
commitment s as enshrined under Article  II of the GATT  1994.  
25.6.   Furthermore, Indonesia believe s that the application of an SSG should be temporary in nature 
or otherwise it would undermine the tariff commitments made by the Philippines and the legitimate 
expectation of other WTO  Members regarding its tariff liberalization. With already four  years of 
application of this SSG on instant coffee, and without any indication of the duration of the measure, 
Indonesia does not consider the application as temporary. In this regard, Indonesia seek s the 
Philippines' further clarification of this matter. Finally, Indonesia hopes that the Ph ilippines could 
immediately stop the application of its SSG on Indonesian instant coffee.  
25.7.   The representative of the Philippines  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  25.8.   The Philippines thanks the delegation of Indonesia for its statement on the Philippines ' Special 
Safegu ard on Instant Coffee. The Philippines looks forward to also receiving a copy of this statement 
in writing so that Indonesia's comments may be conveyed to Capital  in detail . The Philippines notes 
that Indonesia has also raised this matter in the Committee on Agriculture, where t he Philippines 
has provided its preliminarily responses. The Philippines stand s ready to further discuss this issue 
with Indonesia and remain s committed to addressing it in the appropriate forum.  
25.9.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
26  UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
26.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the r equest of China.  
26.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
26.3.   China  took note of the most recent development regarding the US  Section  232 tariffs, where 
the US will adopt tariff -rate quotas (TRQs) for products previously covered by Section  232 tari ffs 
from the European Union , Japan, and the United Kingdom . China wishes to know if and when the 
United States intends to notify the C MA of these measures. China would also like to know what the 
legal basis is for these trade measures  under the WTO  rules. 
26.4.   In addition , China wishes to raise the following concerns. First, any measures that bring in 
new quotas, maintain tariffs above the ceiling binding, or discriminate between WTO  Members seem 
difficult to reconcile with the WTO  rules, including  with Article  I, Article  XI, and Article  XIII of the 
GATT . Indeed, for the Member that had just concluded such an arrangement with the United States , 
it issued a separate statement, calling "these duties incompatible with World Trade Organization 
rules".  
26.5.   Second, raising tariffs on dubious national security grounds and then reducing them for 
selected trading partners constitutes a dangerous precedent. This is exactly the sort of arbitrary and 
discriminatory trade policy that is contrary to both the letter a nd the spirit of the WTO  rules, as well 
as the history of the multilateral trading system. Indeed, the arbitrariness and discriminatory 
character of such arrangements are of such a nature that even the signatories to such arrangements 
are treated different ly, for example, in terms of the base periods.  
26.6.   Last but not least, the fact that these trade -restrictive and discriminatory arrangements were 
concluded between major Members of the WTO, and that an ongoing WTO  dispute case regarding 
the legality of such ta riffs had been suspended as part of the arrangement, is deeply worrisome. The 
example provided by these Members , that national expedience could be pursued at the cost of the 
rules-based multilateral trading system at large, do es not bode well for the insti tution.  
26.7.   China notes that it has been almost four  years since the US implemented its Section  232 
tariffs on aluminium  and steel. Steel prices have remained elevated, and trade has been disrupted. 
Instead of selectively removing tariffs on certain partners, the United States should correct its course 
by removing these tariffs and quotas altogether, as required by the letter and spirit of the WTO  rules. 
As the saying goes, it is up to the doer to undo what he has done , and better late than never.  
26.8.   The represent ative of the United States  indicated the following:  
26.9.   The United States  takes note of China 's comment regarding its TRQs. The national legal basis 
for these TRQs is the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Section  232 (19  U.S.C.  1862) and the 
Presidential determinations, pursuant to that statute, that Section  232 tariffs are necessary to adjust 
imports of steel and aluminium  articles so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national 
security.  
26.10.   The proclamations imposing the Section  232 tariffs recognize "shared concern about global 
excess capacity, a circumstance that is contributing to the threatened impairment of the national 
security ", and provide that "[a]ny country with which we have a security relationship is welcome to 
discuss with the United States alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national 
security. " G/MA/M/76  
 
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  26.11.   In Proclamation  10328, recalling those statements, President Biden stated that "[t]he United 
States has successfully concluded discussions with the EU … on satisfactory alternative means to 
address the threatened impairment of the national security. " He stated that "[t]he United States will 
implement a number of actions, including a tariff -rate quota. " Similar statements are included in 
Proclamation  10327  adjusting imports of aluminium  from the European Union . The WTO  justification 
and grounds for these TRQs is Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. Information regarding these TRQs is 
available on the US  government's websites, including those of the Office of the U S Trade 
Representative and the US  Department of Commerce.  
26.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
27  OTHER BUSINESS  
27.1  Possible derestriction of the Uruguay Round negotiating materials  
27.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this Committee had started discussing t he possible derestriction 
of the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiating material in January  2021, more than one  year before . The 
bilateral negotiating materials of seven rounds of negotiations under the GATT had already been 
derestricted and, at present, only the bilateral negotiating materials of the Uruguay Round remained 
restricted. Additional information and all the derestricted documents were available on the 
WTO website.  
27.2.   He further recalled that the objective of the derestriction was to enhance transparency, in line 
with the WTO's efforts in this regard, and to make available to the public documents and materials 
of historical and research value. The objective was therefor e not to have a blanket derestriction of 
all these documents and Members would keep the right to decide if certain information should  remain 
classified. In this regard, in February  2021, the Secretariat had circulated the list of documents 
concerned by the  UR derestriction exercise and Members originally had until  31 October  2021 to 
review these documents before the Committee could take a decision about their derestriction. At the 
request of some Members, this deadline had been extended twice , first until 3 0 November  2021, 
and then subsequently until 28  January  2022.  
27.3.   At the Committee's informal meeting of 1  February  2022, Members had agreed to the overall 
derestriction process. However, some Members had requested more time to review the documents 
and had estimated that it was premature for the Committee to take a decision about the 
UR derestriction process at this formal meeting. Some delegations had also asked the Secretariat to  
prepare a background note explaining the process in more detail in order to help  Members take an 
informed decision. Following that request, the Secretariat would prepare a background note 
providing more information about the derestriction process . In addition, it would also circulate a 
first draft of the derestriction decision and the  list of documents to be derestricted so that Members 
would have all the information pertaining to this subject for their review and consideration. He 
clarified that no document would be derestricted until the Committee had taken a decision in this 
respect . 
27.4.   The Chairperson proposed that the Committee resume its discussions on the UR  derestriction  
process, based on the documents prepared by the Secretariat, at its next informal meeting, which 
was scheduled to take place on 27  June 2022.  
27.5.   It was so agreed . 
27.2  Training session for Geneva -based delegates  
27.6.   The Chairperson  recalled that the Secretariat had planned to organize the first  training session 
for Geneva -based delegates on 27  January  2022. However, due to the sanitary restrictions in place 
at the beginning of the year, the training had be en postponed. He informed the Committee that the 
Secretariat had tentatively scheduled Wednesday 6  July 2022 to deliver this in -person training . The 
Secretariat would reach out to those delegates that had already expressed an interest in the training 
in order to confirm the date and time and share the programme.  
27.7.   The Committee took note  of the statement.  G/MA/M/76  
 
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  27.3  Dates of the next meetings  
27.8.   The Chairperson  asked the Committee to take note of the following arrangements. The ne xt 
formal meeting of the Committee was scheduled to take place on 18 and 19  October  2022. However, 
before that, there were a number of meetings and activities organized by the Committee. The next 
informal meetings for the HS  multilateral review and other i ssues, as appropriate, were scheduled 
to take place on 27  June and 23  November  2022. In addition, the Committee also planned to 
organize three experience -sharing sessions on trade in COVID -19 goods, which were tentatively  
scheduled to take place on 26  April, 20 June, and 16  September  2022. He reminded the Committee 
that each session would be confirmed if there were enough speakers and encouraged delegates to 
propose speakers for the session on 26  April 2022.  Furthermore, as mentioned under the previous 
item, the first training session for Geneva -based delegates on CMA  issues was scheduled to take 
place on 6  July 2022.  
27.9.   The Chairperson  also reminded Members that they could up load the ir statements delivered at 
this meeting on the eAgenda  platform . As requested by Members, the Secretariat had extended the 
time-period to upload statements to the system. Therefore, Members had until Wednesday, 
13 April 2022 to upload their statements on the eAgenda  platform  if they wished to do  so. 
27.10.   The Committee took note of the statement.  
28  ELECTION OF THE CHAIRPERSON  
28.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the rules of procedure for the Committee stated that a 
Chairperson shall be elected at the end of the first  meeting of the Committee every year. However, 
as Members were awar e, the Chairperson of the Goods Council had been holding consultations with 
Members on a slate of names to chair the CTG's subsidiary bodies, and a list would be considered at 
a subsequent CTG  meeting. Consequently, the appointment of a chairperson for the  Committee had 
been delayed. He therefore suggested to proceed as in 2020, namely that, as soon as there was 
consensus on a slate of names, the Secretariat would circulate an email with the name of the 
proposed Chairperson for the CMA for 2022. If no objec tion was received within the time -frame 
indicated in that email, the candidate would be deemed to have been elected by the Committee by 
acclamation. The Secretariat would send a second  email by way of confirmation.  
28.2.   The Committee took note  of the statement.  
28.3.   The meeting was adjourned . 
__________