RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/144  
 
10 March  2023 
(23-1813) Page: 1/127 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
24 AND 25 NOVEMBER  2022  
CHAIRPERSON: MR  ETIENNE OUDOT DE DAINVILLE  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG , or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/23 , WTO/AIR/CTG/23/Rev.1 , and WTO/AIR/CTG/23/Rev.1/Add.1 ; the 
proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in document  G/C/W/823.  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ..................  4 
2   MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  ................................ ................................ .........................  5 
2.1   Decision on the Derestriction of the Uruguay Round Negotiating Materials – Draft Decision 
(G/C/W/822)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 5 
2.2   Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Concessions – 
Extension of Collective Waiver Decisions  ................................ ................................ .............. 5 
2.3   Introduction of Harmonized System 2022  Changes into WTO  Schedules of Tariff  
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/820)  ................................ ................................ 5 
3   ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM 
ARMENIA (G/ L/1110/ADD.8)  ................................ ................................ ......................  5 
4   ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM  
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC (G/L/1137/ADD.7)  ................................ ................................ .. 6 
5   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREE MENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM DJIBOUTI ON BEHALF OF THE 
LDC GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  ................................ ................................ ... 7 
6   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA,  
COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, JAMAICA, 
PANAMA, PARAGUAY, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV. 1) ..........  8 
7   INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM CANADA, THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, 
KINMEN AND MATSU, AND THAILAND ................................ ................................ .........  19 
8   CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA; THE SEPARATE 
CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWA N, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU; AND THE UNITED 
STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  22 
9   UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES  
MEASURES OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ...... 26 
10   UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE  GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN – REQUEST FROM CHINA ...... 33 
11   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ... 37 G/C/M/144  
 
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  12   NIGERIA – RESTRICTIVE POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST  
FROM BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  40 
13   UNITED KINGDOM – UK ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FOREST RISK COMMODITIES – 
REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ... 41 
14   AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................  44 
15   CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY 
POINT OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTR ALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ...........................  51 
16   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  ....................  54 
17   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .....................  56 
18   PAKISTAN – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON FOODSTUFFS AND CONSUMER GOODS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ...... 56 
19   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME AND COMMODITY BALANCE – 
REQUEST  FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ...... 57 
20   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  ...........................  60 
21   EGYPT – MANDATORY USE OF A LETTER OF CREDIT AS PAYMENT CONDITION  
FOR IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ .............  64 
22   EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE PRODUCTS – REQUEST FR OM AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 65 
23   EUROPEAN UNION – COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (CVD) ON STAINLESS STEEL 
COLD -ROLLED ( SSCR) – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ................................ ..................  69 
24   EUROPEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT 
MECHANISM AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES) – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL  
AND INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  70 
25   AUSTRALIA – INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES ON 
A4 COPY PAPER – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ................................ ...........................  80 
26   VIET NAM – ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION DUTY ON SUGAR – REQUEST FROM  
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  81 
27   PHILIPPINES – INVESTIGATION OF SAFEGUARD DU TY ON HIGH -DENSITY 
POLYETHYLENE (HDPE) PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ..............................  82 
28   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU) 2017/2321 AND REGULATION 
(EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ..... 83 
29   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272 /2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...............................  84 
30   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM   
JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ...............................  84 
31   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,  
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QA TAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  .......................  86 
32   UNITED STATES – THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S MARKET ECONOMY STATUS IN 
ANTI -DUMPING PROCEEDINGS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  .............  87 
33   CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION  
REGULATIONS (CSAR) – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, 
AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ...........................  88 G/C/M/144  
 
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  34   MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  91 
35   INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM  FREE  
CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST  
FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .........................  92 
36   PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING – REQUEST 
FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .... 94 
37   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING ANNEXES  2  
AND 5 TO REGULATION EC  NO. 396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN PARL IAMENT AND  
OF THE COUNCIL AS REGARDS TO MRLS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND  
THIAMETHOXAM IN OR ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 95 
38   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ...101  
39   EUROPEAN UN ION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ....... 102  
40   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ .............................. 102  
41   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR CHINESE ENTERPRISES – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ .............................. 106  
42   UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ........... 107  
43   UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ...108  
44   CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY  
SPECIFICATION FOR OFFICE DEVI CES) – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ............................... 108  
45   CHINA – DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW – 
REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ................................ .............................. 110  
46   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ...110  
47   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  ................................ .................... 113  
48   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY ......... 113  
49   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  ............... 114  
50   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .............................. 115  
51   CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE 
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ................ 116  
52   ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C/W/821)  ................................ ................................ .116  
53   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ............................... 117  
53.1   Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies – Information from the Chairperson  .... 117 
53.2   Implementation Matters from MC12 – Information from the Chairperson  ......................  121 
53.3   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ...........................  127 
 G/C/M/144  
 
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The Chairperson  observed tha t, given the long agenda, it would be preferable for Members to keep 
their interventions short, if possible. He invited those Members that were planning to submit longer 
written statements for incorporation into the meeting 's minutes to expressly indicate their intention 
to do so when taking the floor. To ensure transparency in the preparation of the minutes, the 
Secretariat would only reflect what had been said at the meeting, except in those cases where a 
Member had explicitly indicated that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
He also informed delegations that, under agenda item "Other Business ", he would comment on  the 
functioning of the CTG  and its subsidiary bodies based on the discussions that had taken  place at 
the Council 's informal meeting of  14 October  2022, update Members concerning the work 
undertaken on MC12  implementation matters , and announce  the date of the Council 's next meeting . 
 
The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
 
The Russia n Federation  wishes to co-sponsor Agenda Item 24, "European Union – European Green 
Deal – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and Deforestation -Free Commodities ", and withdraw 
Agenda Item 50, "European Union – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism – Request from the 
Russian Federation ". 
 
The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
 
The United States wishes to withdraw Agenda Item 18, "Pakistan – Import Restrictions on Foodstuffs 
and Consumer Goods ". 
 
The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
 
For the sake of clarity, the European Union notes that it is a sponsor of Agenda Item 18, "Pakistan 
– Import Restrictions on Foodstuffs and Consumer Goods ", and requests that the item be kept on 
the agenda.  
 
The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
 
Nigeria wishes to co-sponsor Agenda Item  24, "European Green Deal – Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism and Deforestation -Free Commodities ". 
 
The Chairperson  summarized these changes as followed: Agenda Item 50 had been withdrawn from 
the meeting 's agenda ; the Russia n Federation  and Nigeria had requested to co-sponsor Agenda 
Item 24; and although the United States ha d withdrawn as a co -sponso r of Agenda Item 18, the 
item remain ed on the agenda at the request of the European Union.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism1, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members ' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the Council that five RTAs had been notified to the 
CRTA , as followed:  
• Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus (Pacer Plus) – Entry Into Force for 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu, Goods (WT/REG451/N/2) ; 
 
• Free Trade Agreement Between the EFTA States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Member States, Goods (W T/REG465/N/1) ; 
 
• Trade Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, Goods 
(WT/REG425/N/2) ; 
 
• United Kingdom – Colombia, Goods – Notification of Termination (WT/REG410/N/2) ; and 
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/144  
 
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• United Kingdom – Türkiye, Goods (WT/REG434/N/1/Add.1) . 
 
1.2.  The Council took note  of the information provided.  
2  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  
2.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, as i ndicated in the Agenda, the Committee on Market 
Access (CMA) had forwarded three items for the Council 's consideration.  
2.1  Decision on the Derestriction of the Uruguay Round Negotiating Materials – Draft 
Decision (G/C/W/822)  
2.2.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  G/C/W/822 containing a Draft Decision 
on the "Derestriction of the Uruguay Round Negotiating Materials ". This draft Decision had follow ed 
the same approach that ha d been used in previous derestriction exercises for the previous rounds 
of multilateral trade negotiations. At its meeting of 18 -19 October  2022, the C MA had agreed to 
forward this draft Decision for the consideration of the Council. At that meeting, it had also been 
agreed that Members would have until 23  November to contact the Secretariat and request any 
additional document to be removed from the list of documents to be derestricted.  He informed the 
Council that, as no additional request had been received , document  G/C/W/822 contained the full 
list of documents to be derestricted. On that basis, he proposed that the Council agree to forward it 
to the General Council for adoption.  
2.3.  The Council so agreed . 
2.2  Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Concessions 
– Extension of Collective Waiver Decisions  
2.4.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, at its meeting of 18 -19 October  2022, the C MA had 
agreed to forward for the consideration of the Council four  draft collective requests for waiver 
extensions concerning the introduction of Harmonized System changes into WTO  Schedules of 
concessions, which were included in documents  G/C/W/815, G/C/W/816, G/C/W/817, and 
G/C/W/818. These documents propose d a one -year extension of the draft collective wai ver decisions 
concerning HS2002, HS2007, HS2012, and HS2017, all of which would expire on 31  December  2022.  
He propose d that the Council agree to forward the draft collective waiver decisions contained in 
these documents to the General Council for adoption . 
2.5.  The Council so agreed . 
2.3  Introduction of Harmonized System 2022  Changes into WTO  Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions – Draft Waiver Decision  (G/C/W/820)  
2.6.  The Chairperson  drew Members ' attention to document  G/C/W/820 containing a Draft Waiver 
Decision for the "Introduction of Harmonized System 2022  Changes into WTO  Schedules of 
Concessions ". This draft Decision followed the same approach that had been used in the waivers for 
the previou s transposition exercises. At its meeting of 18 -19 October  2022, the C MA had agreed to 
forward the draft Decision to the Council for its consideration prior to it being forwarded to the 
General Council for appropriate action. Accordingly, he proposed that the Council agree to forward 
the draft collective waiver decision to the General Council for its adoption.  
2.7.  The Council so agreed . 
3  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNIC ATION FROM 
ARMENIA (G/L/1110/ADD.8)  
3.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1 November  2022, the 
delegation of Armenia had requested the Secretariat to circulate document G/L/1110/Add.8 relating 
to the extension of the time -period f or the withdrawal of concessions, in connection with Armenia 's 
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), until 2  January  2024.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  3.2.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
3.3.  Following the last extension, Armenia has continued its consultations and communications with 
the interested delegations. However, given the current circumstances, it has done so with less 
intensity. Nevertheless, Armenia has made positive developments and real progress on the 
substance of the non -agricultural market access (NAMA)  package and is also working on the 
formulation of a mutually acceptable position for a compensation package on agriculture.  
3.4.  However, considering the number of interested Members that are involved in the process, as 
well as the technica l and logistical obstacles to overcome, Armenia believes that additional time will 
be required to complete the compensation negotiations. Therefore, with the purpose of properly 
organizing the process pursuant to document  G/L/1110/Add. 8, Armenia has indica ted the following: 
"In connection with the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) […]; and in view of ensuring that Members reserve their rights pending the 
communication to the WTO  Secretariat of the agreement s reached in the context of Article  XXIV:6 
(GATT), Armenia believes that it is desirable to provide for an extension of 12  months (that is, until 
2 January  2024)." 
3.5.  In consequence, Armenia expresses its readiness to provide to Members an extension of an 
additional 12 -month period, until 2  January  2024, for the withdrawal of substantially equivalent 
concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of the GATT  1994. Armenia asks the Council to agree to this 
proposed extension.  
3.6.  The Council so agreed . 
4  ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC (G/L/1137/ADD.7)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 2 November  2022, the 
delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document  G/L/1137/Add. 7, relating to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal of 
concessions, in connection with the Kyrgyz Republic 's accession to the EAEU, until 12  February  2024. 
4.2.  The delegat e of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
4.3.  The Kyrgyz Republic is still in the process of analy sing the qualifications and other relevant 
data announced based on the initial claims of interested Members. The Kyrgyz Republic  has the 
informative takin g an exchange with one of the interested M embers  and stand s open to cooperation 
with others. The Kyrgyz Republic  would like to recall that the term provided for withdrawal of 
substantially equivalent concessions expires on 12  February 2023. Considering that an additional 
time would be required in order to move these negotiations forward, and to ensur e that M embers  
reserve their rights pending the communication to the WTO  Secretariat  of the agreement reached 
in the context of Art icle XXIV: 6 of the GATT , the Kyrgyz Republic requests a further extension of 
Members ' rights to withdraw concessions pending the conclusion o f Article XXVIII: 3 negotiations 
until 12  February  2024, as reflected in document  G/L/1137/Add.7. Thus, "the Kyrgyz Republic  will 
not assert that WTO  Member s that have submitted a claim pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of the 
GATT  1994 are precluded from withdraw ing substantially equivalent concessions because this 
withdrawal occurs later than six  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's withdrawal of concessions ". 
4.4.  On the basis of the above -mentioned, the Kyrgyz Republic express es its gratitude for the 
understanding of the interested WTO Member s, and for their support in demonstrating no objections 
on the issue of the extension of rights. The Kyrgyz Republic will continue communicatin g and 
exchang ing information  with the relevant partie s to this process in due course.  
4.5.  The Council so agreed . G/C/M/144  
 
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  5  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM DJIBOUTI ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  
5.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Djibouti  on behalf of the LDC  Group. The Chairperson understood that the main thrust of this 
proposal was to allow graduated LDC  Members to  benefit from  a similar treatment to that granted 
to certain developing countries listed in Annex  VII(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement) . Following a request at the CTG 's meeting of July  2021, 
the Secretariat had u pdated the GNP  calculations for all Members, which had been circulated in 
November  2021 in document  G/SCM/W/585.  
5.2.  The delegate of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the following:  
5.3.  The statement from Bangladesh will be brief as Members are awa re of the LDC  Group 's request 
on this issue. For new delegates, and to refresh the Council 's memory, Bangladesh wishes to 
summari ze that , according to Article  27.2(a) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures ( ASCM ), some Members are eligible to enjoy flexibilities under this Agreement , namely for 
the use of export subsidies for non -agricultural products. The se Members are specified in Annex  VII 
of the Agreement under  two separate categories: (i)  all least -developed countries (listed as 
Annex  VII(a)); and (ii)  some developing countries (listed in Annex  VII(b), as long as their GNI  per 
capita remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms.  
5.4.  It is not clear from the ASCM whether an LDC , after its graduation, and if it remains below the 
same threshold of USD  1,000, should also benefit in the same way as do developing countries listed 
in Annex  VII(b). For this reason, the  LDC Group proposes that an LDC , after its graduation, and as 
long as its GNI remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms, should 
be allowed the possibility to use the flexibility under Article  27.2 of the ASCM , as are the developing 
counties listed in Annex  VII(b). Such a decision is  required for clarity and predictability. The CTG 
can approve the LDC  submission and recommend it to the General Council  for appropriate action.  
5.5.  Bangladesh makes reference to the  Secretariat note contained in document  G/SCM/W/585 , 
"GNP per Capita Calculati ons for All WTO  Members Using the Methodology in G/SCM/38 ", dated 
22 November  2021, which confirms the LDC  Group 's concerns . From the growth -rate trend in the 
note, it is evident that many LDCs may graduate from the LDC  category with a GNI per capita below  
the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms.  
5.6.  The LDC  Group is grateful to all those Members that have been supporting this proposal since 
its submission in 2018. Bangladesh, along with the LDC  Group, will continue working with the 
delegati ons of the European Union  and the United States and welcomes further suggestions from 
Members on how to achieve a positive result in this regard.  
5.7.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
5.8.  As indicated in April, the United States thank s the Secretariat for producing its Note of 
22 November  2021, as found in document  G/SCM/W/585, "GNP per Capita Calculations for All 
WTO Members Using the Methodology in G/SCM/38 ". The US has reviewed the Note carefully . 
Unfortunately, the Secretariat 's calculations confirm US concerns , namely that there remain gaps in 
the information that is needed for this proposal to be workable from a technical perspective.  The US 
is willing to consider ideas and proposals as to how to address these  gaps, or otherwise address the 
issue raised by this proposal.  
5.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.10.  The European Union is mindful of the challenges facing graduating LDCs and supports 
constructive initiatives to better integrate LDCs into  the multilateral trading system. For this reason, 
the EU  encourage s discussions on this issue . At the same time, t he European Union  would be 
interested in an in -depth discussion , which could be facilitated by the WTO  Secretariat,  on how LDCs 
make use of e xport subsidies and how these  help LDCs in their economic development. In this 
context, it would also be helpful for the LDCs to provide updated subsidy notifications under G/C/M/144  
 
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  Article  25 of the ASCM.  To this end, the EU recalls that technical assistance suppo rt regarding 
notifications  is available via the WTO . In conclusion, t he European Union stands ready to engage in 
informal consultations with the LDC  Group on this matter.  
5.11.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
6  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, JAMAICA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, the United States, and Uruguay.  
6.2.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
6.3.  Paraguay regrets the need to persist in raising this trade concern on the Council 's agenda but, 
unfortunately, we have not only been unable to make progress towards a resolution, despite the 
years that have elapsed since it was first  raised, but we also view with concern the proposal by the 
European Union to establish even more unjustified barriers  on agricultural products . Indeed , 
Paraguay notes that one  third of the extensive agenda currently before the Council is a result of 
EU policies, the bulk of which affect or will affect trade in agricultural products, so in the interests of 
time, and owing to the inter -related nature of the trade concerns and the length of this intervention, 
Paraguay will take the floor just once to address thi s item, the proposals concerning trade in 
deforestation -free commodities , and the reduction in MRLs for certain substances on environmental 
grounds that are included in the agenda of this meeting under Agenda I tems 24 and 37 , respectively.  
6.4.  With regard to t he suspension or non -renewal of the authorization for substances and the 
subsequent reduction in MRLs, the European Union  routinely responds in this and other forums that  
trade has not fallen ; but its argument is unsound. Members hear numbers to justify su pposed 
increases in inclusive trade, but a rise in the value of trade can occur despite a reduction in volume 
as a result of price rises in a market for food that , as a result of various challenges  we are currently 
facing , is highly volatile . Additionally, Members  know that the substances are being withdrawn 
gradually, meaning that there are still alternatives that sooner or later will be subject to the same 
fate as the substances facing non -renewal. We also know that v arious policies are in play, as is clear 
from the Council 's current  agenda . And these policies are not applied in isolation ; rather, they are 
related , and their phased implementation will mask the ir effect on trade until their full 
implementation has been achieved.  
6.5.  The second  argument that we hear from the European Union is that it is unable to provide 
longer transition periods to allow trading partners to adjust their production systems, especially in 
the absence of viable alternatives to substances for which the limit has been lowered to 0.01, 
because consumer health and its high level of consumer protection cannot be compromised . The EU 
alleges that non-renewal  is then only possible option if the hazard -based approach identified a 
potential risk to human health. However, Paragu ay is not calling for harmful substances to be 
renewed, but rather for such substances to be identified using scientific  and not political criteria. 
This kind of politicization often discourages chemical manufacturers from even applying for a 
renewal: reje ction in Europe could affect their products in other markets. Accordingly, Paraguay 
once again asks the EU to take account of information on Plant Protection Products (PPPs) provided 
by the specialized agencies recognized by the WTO, such as the Codex Alim entarius ; to base its 
decisions on conclusive scientific evidence and real risk weightings, in accordance with relevant 
international standards and principles; and, when measures are duly justified, to provide adequate 
transitional periods and import toler ances.  
6.6.  Paraguay reiterate s its concerns about the politicization of these scientific processes, as seen 
most recently in discussions on the renewal of glyphosate, when the European Union 's member 
States were unable to agree on an extension to enable the gl yphosate assessment process to 
continue because the three  Rapporteurs had not completed their review of the file on time. It is 
striking that one of the very States acting as a rapporteur refrained from allowing more time to 
complete the assessment. Paragu ay hopes that the European Commission is able to provide us with G/C/M/144  
 
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  more information on what it plans to do to be able to complete its assessment of the file, and to 
prevent enormous disruption to trade, given that the registration for glyphosate expires in 
approximately 20  days from now.  
6.7.  The third argument that we hear is that the European Union 's member States are required to 
comply with the same policy as the EU 's trading partners . However, the EU member States typically 
issue emergency authoriz ations for the very substances that the Commission views as posing a 
hazard to human health. The public information available shows a pattern of "constant emergencies " 
in which authorizations are provided time and again in the same member States, for the s ame 
products, and even in the same seasons, granting European producers a de facto authorization to 
continue using substances that are "prohibited " in the EU  since many years . On previous occasions , 
Paraguay has explained how many of these authorizations a re validated even without the application 
forms, which are also public, having been fully  filled out and completed . The EU will undoubtedly 
reply that these powers rest with its member States and that the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) reviews emerg ency authorizations to ensure that the member States do not abuse them . 
However,  in all the EFSA  reviews  that Paraguay has been able to find in the public domain, on all 
occasions when there was no chemical alternative to control a pest, even when other me ans of 
control and good agricultural practices exist ed, EFSA had taken the view that the emergency 
authorization was justified. In this way, European producers continue to systematically benefit from 
emergency authorizations and generous subsidies to maint ain production methods that are 
incompatible with different climatic and geographical conditions. The arguments put forward by 
European farmers when requesting these authorizations from their countries are similar to those 
made by the EU 's trading partners , such as the lack of viable alternatives, the potential for resistance 
generation, safe use in accordance with good agricultural practices , and the certain losses that would 
arise from not having such a tool for production. The difference is that European  producers and their 
complaints get heard, and the EU provides them with a solution, whereas Paraguay 's complaints 
continue to be ignored. Paraguay considers that this  is not about protecting health because there is 
no proven benefit from these policies or any scientific evidence to justify them; rather, it is a matter,  
simply , of protectionism.  
6.8.  Paraguay  addressed questions to the Commission several months before , and w hen the 
Commission  evaded those questions with the argument that the emergency authorizations were a 
matter for national authorities, Paraguay then posed the same questions, together with other 
WTO Members, to the 27  EU member States, which are also Member s of the WTO in their own right. 
We are still awaiting their replies. Paraguay  wonder s how something that, according to the 
Commission, poses an unacceptable risk to the health of European consumers can be justified as 
acceptable to EU member States when i t comes to protecting their own agricultural production . 
6.9.  Moreover, it is paradoxical that, even in cases where the hazard analysis conducted by the 
European Union  has concluded that certain substances are safe and harmless, other factors, that 
have nothing  to do with the health of humans, plants or animals, are taken into account when setting 
maximum residue limits (MRLs) . This is what happened with the MRL  reduction for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam to the limit of quantification (LOQ) notified in document  G/TBT/N/EU/908. Paraguay 
notes that the EU intends to use the MRLs for these substances not to protect European consumers, 
but to regulate the use of neonicotinoids in processes and production methods in third  countries. 
Paraguay is of the view that the T BT Agreement was not conceived to accommodate measures with 
clearly extraterritorial objectives. Moreover, Paraguay has serious concerns as to the compatibility 
of the measure notified by the EU with the market access and non -discrimination obligations 
provided for in the rules of the WTO.  
6.10.  Each WTO Member , including  Paraguay, faces specific needs and challenges in agricultural 
production, depending on its geography, ecosystem , and local scientific capacities, in seeking to 
achieve and maintain agricultural sustainability. This situation is reflected in regulatory frameworks 
that are based on sound scientific evidence and applied to registration processes in order to assess 
the risks of pesticides and their uses, including the assessment of risks to the envir onment and 
pollinators.  The European Union 's intention to impose its environmental standards on third  countries 
disregards and denigrates these local regulatory policies, including regional policies, and constitutes 
a threat to the application of environme ntal measures and policies that are compatible with each 
Member 's specific circumstances . In addition, it fails to take account of common but differentiated 
responsibilities.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  6.11.  Moreover, the European Union  is taking these measures without renouncing the right to grant 
emergency authorizations, which is a matter for EU  member States, thus making it possible for 
EU member States to continue using products that could not be used in third countries seeking to 
trade with the EU . In this regard, Paraguay notes that there is not only discrimination in practice 
between EU  producers and trading partners , but also an inconsistency over the legitimate objective 
pursued and the actions taken to achieve that objective . Paraguay also notes that, since 
neonicotinoids were banned in the EU, 213  emergency authorizations have been issued for their use 
in the EU , including 91 for sugar beet, 52 for oil seed rape, 27 for sunflower , and 40 for other crops , 
such as wheat and certa in vegetables.  
6.12.  Finally, a nother non -tariff trade barrier for agricultural products that is of major concern to 
Paraguay is the new regulation of deforestation -free commodities. On this issue, Paraguay cannot 
fail to recognize the extraordinary efforts that  the European Union  is making in the bilateral , 
plurilateral , and multilateral spheres. However, what Paraguay and its producers need is not a 
unilateral explanation of the measures , but rather a frank dialogue allow ing Paraguay 's legitimate 
demands to be met while at the same time moving towards a mutually acceptable solution to this 
trade concern . Paraguay reiterates that this trade concern is of great importance to countries 
exporting agricultural products, especially small developing countries with econ omies and livelihoods 
that depend primarily on the agricultural sector.  
6.13.  In relation to this measure Paraguay also  notes that, while some Members industrialized their 
economies and achieved their current level of development through highly polluting and 
environmentally damaging methods that are responsible for climate change, other Members , such 
as Paraguay itself , have only contributed marginally to climate change, but are never theless being 
penalized and forced to comply with those same measures , but without the same  levels  of support. 
This clearly disregards the principle enshrined in international environmental law of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.  
6.14.  Paraguay consid ers that the transition towards sustainability in productive systems needs to 
be gradual and determined by Members themselves according to their economic and social 
development needs. Local circumstances in different regions , possessing their own specific 
productive, social , and environmental characteristics , must also be respected.  Paraguay is  
particularly concerned over the high cost that would be incurred by producers merely to demonstrate 
their compliance with the EU 's measures which, in contrast with E uropean producers, will not be 
merely a small fraction of the significant subsidies they receive, but rather a share of their profits.  
6.15.  In its response to the question raised in this regard in the Committee on Agriculture , the 
European Union  stated that it had made a "significant commitment " of "EUR 1 billion to protect, 
restore and sustainably manage forests in the partner countries ". However, this sum does not even 
equal the trade and production -distorting support granted by the EU annually to the producti on of 
meat, this being one of the products covered by the proposal, and which , according to data in the 
EU's most recent DS:1  notification , amounts to support of EUR 1,781.7  million.  Paraguay notes that 
it has not yet even mentioned the additional support received through other programmes classified 
by the European Union under the Green Box, but routinely critici zed by other Members.  
6.16.  With respect to the  European Union 's system for categorizing Members by risk , some 
interesting elements  emerged at the recent meeting of the Committee on Agriculture , which took 
place earlier in the week . Paraguay notes that it is not yet clear how this system will function in 
practice , and that analysis of the system continues in Capital. Nevertheless , Paraguay is greatly 
concerned by what it has seen of the system thus far. Indeed, Paraguay asks if perhaps it  should 
have discussions with those colleagues responsible for negotiating environmental agreements with 
a view to the termino logy being changed from "National Determined Contributions " to 
"EU determined contributions ". Paraguay  hopes that this is not what will happen , and that the EU 
can clarify how it is planning to perform such classification , how it will take into account the  common 
but differentiated responsibilities, and how it will ensure that  the classification will be objective, 
transparent, and take account of all the relevant elements, including the three  sustainability pillars.  
6.17.  Paraguay  recall s that, while it has 16.6 million hectares of native forest (an area equivalent 
to that of Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands,  and Slovenia combined), provides free 
ecosystem and environmental services, supports the conservation of between 25% and 45% of 
native for ests in agricultural production facilities, and produces without subsidies, it will nevertheless 
still be penalized by this measure and the other EU measures covered under this statement.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  6.18.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
6.19.  In keeping with its  recurring  interventions in the Committees on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade, Ecuador yet again finds it necessary to support this trade 
concern.  Regrettably there has been no change in the situation compared to last ye ar. Moreover, 
Ecuador  feels that it has , knowingly or unknowingly, fallen into a fruitless revolving door of 
complaints that fail to result in an effective solution. In light of the discussions on WTO reform, the 
Council should consider how its mechanism f or work on trade concerns can be improved in order to 
generate genuine exchanges between Members that deal pragmatically with the substantive matters 
raised in this forum.  
6.20.  Ecuador refers to its previous interventions on this matter. In that regard , Ecuador  wishes 
briefly to recall the five  objections on which its shared trade concern is based , namely : (i) the 
adoption of measures without scientific evidence; (ii)  the failure to observe international standards; 
(iii) the failure to comply with the requiremen ts established in the SPS  Agreement; (iv)  the 
suspension of MRLs that are beyond the levels recommended by the Codex  Alimentarius ; and (v)  the 
absence of reasonable adjustment periods where such measures  are proven necessary. By limiting 
the substances available  for production , the European Union is obstructing the rotation of PPPs, 
which  combined with the harmful effects of climate change, raises the risk of resistance in pests with 
consequent dangers for biodiversity.  
6.21.  Taking the view that th ese concerns could form the basis for constructive dialogue with all 
trading partners with an interest in this matter, within the framework of this trade concern, Ecuador 
wishes to ask the European Union the following questions : 
(i) How does the EU assess the impact of its measures on the production methods of 
developing tropical countries such as Ecuador? How can the effects of climate change 
and environmental conditions in tropical countries be taken into account in order to 
arrive at phytosanitary soluti ons that fit the particular circumstances of countries 
subject to those effects and conditions?  
 
(ii) The negative impact on small farmers and developing countries of the measures 
complained of contravenes important principles of an Organization that promotes trade 
as a driver of economic growth and development as well as greater participation by 
developin g countries in global trade. Does the EU have information on the scale of the 
negative impact of its measures on small - and medium -sized farmers and on exports 
from developing countries?  
 
6.22.  The European Union is a valued trading partner for Ecuador.  For this  reason, Ecuador wishes 
this exchange of information to be not just a mere formality, but rather a means of finding a solution 
to this very long -standing trade concern.  
6.23.  The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
6.24.  Costa Rica supports the statements made by Paraguay and Ecuador, and shares the concerns 
raised by other Members on this  and previous occasions in this Council, and continues to co -sponsor 
and support this agenda item and document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1. Costa Rica  believe s that the 
concerns raised about the European Union 's regulatory approach remain relevant and should be 
resolved as a matter of urgency.  
6.25.  Costa Rica and the European Union share the objectives of protecting biodiversity and the 
environment as the only viable  way to achiev ing sustainable development that will secure the future 
of our planet. Costa Rica provides a vivid example of its commitment to these objectives because it 
has not only stopped the process of deforestation, but also increased the amount of fo rest cover. 
Today, 60% of Costa Rica 's national territory is covered by forests, which provide a wide variety of 
ecosystem services.  
6.26.  Costa Rica  notes that the European Union is interested in implementing measures to control 
deforestation and forest degrada tion related to the importation of certain products, including tropical 
products such as cocoa, coffee , and palm oil. There are many methodological doubts about the 
design of a trade mechanism such as the one proposed, but Costa Rica  understand s that the i ssue G/C/M/144  
 
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  is still under discussion in the European Parliament. Regarding this proposal, Costa Rica can only 
urge the EU to ensure that its measures are consistent with the WTO  Agreements and their 
fundamental principles, and that they are neither discriminator y nor disguised barriers to trade.  
6.27.  With regard to MRLs, Costa Rica has systemic and trade concerns about the European Union 's 
hazard -based  approach. In practice, this approach has led to the elimination of dozens of substances 
that are essential for pest a nd disease control in agricultural production in developing countries with 
a tropical climate, such as Costa Rica.  Costa Rica  also note s the European Union 's recent 
announcement , in notification  G/TBT/N/EU/908, concern ing the review of MRLs to their limit of 
detection for several substances. The EU argues that the implementation of the measure is based 
on an "environmental concern of global nature ". Beyond the eminently extraterritorial nature of the 
measure, Costa Rica is  concerned that such justification appears to be inconsistent with the principles 
of both the SPS and the TBT  Agreement s. 
6.28.  Costa Rica urges the European Union to continue its dialogue with the parties concerned and 
to address the concerns expressed by Members in this Council and its subsidia ry bodies.  
6.29.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
6.30.  Colombia certainly values the rapprochements that have taken place with the European Union, 
but it also regrets that little or no progress has been made since this item was first  included on the 
Council 's agenda.  In the interests of time, Colombia  refers to its previous statements regarding its 
ongoing concerns about the European Union 's general hazard -based regime , including the 
discriminatory nature of its policy.2 Please note that Colombia has  drawn up a new set of questions , 
along with other Latin American countries , and encourage s interested Members to study these 
questions and to review the previous replies.  Lastly, while Colombia views the process of open 
dialogue between authorities and th e European Union with limited optimism, it welcomes such 
dialogue and hopes it will lead to tangible outcomes regarding the trade concerns it has raised , 
including a reduction in market distortions.  
6.31.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
6.32.  Panama wi shes to reiterate the importance it attaches to this issue. The reduction of MRLs 
without sufficient scientific evidence restricts access to substances essential for agricultural 
production, especially in countries with tropical climates, such as Panama. Panama  believe s that the 
European Union 's set of policies and practices carries the risk of nullifying and undermining the 
legitimate rights of WTO  Members that are signatories to the Agreement on Agriculture and the 
SPS Agreement.  
6.33.  Panama shares the Europea n Union 's objective of supporting the global transition to more 
sustainable global agri -food systems, but these must be based on solutions that are designed and 
implemented through dialogue mechanisms and multilateral cooperation schemes. Panama  notes 
with regret that no progress has been observed to date. Panama once again calls up on the EU to 
listen to the legitimate concerns of dozens of WTO  Members. In Panama 's view, constructive, serious 
and ongoing dialogue, together with mutually agreed technical assistance, will make it possible to 
find solutions that are beneficial to all parties.  
6.34.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
6.35.  Australia has raised or supported a number of specific trade concerns relating to the E uropean 
Union 's impl ementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products, including at the most recent 
SPS and TBT  Committee meetings. Australia remains concerned that the EU 's application of its health 
and environmental standards to imported agriculture and agri -food p roducts in many aspects does 
not facilitate trade and is not conducive to achieving productive and sustainable outcomes in the 
agriculture sector.  For imported agricultural products, the European Union 's regulatory approach to 
agricultural inputs, producti on requirements, and specific measures targeted at protecting the 
environment has impacted third -country producers ' ability to access the EU  market. These concerns 
 
2 See, for example, document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  7.2-7.6. G/C/M/144  
 
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  include the EU 's recent attempts to set M RLs for certain pesticides in order to achieve envi ronmental 
outcomes in third  countries.  
6.36.  Australia does not consider that MRLs are an appropriate or efficient tool to achieve 
environmental outcomes. Third  country national authorities are indeed the best decision maker to  
ensure that pesticide application is undertaken in a safe, responsible , and sustainable manner in 
each country, and in accordance with their unique environment.  
6.37.  Australia also maintains concerns over the unfair competitive advantage provided to the 
European Union 's producers in applying EU  domestic production requirements to imports, without 
allowing for the recognition of third -country systems that achieve equivalent outcomes. 
EU producers are subsidi zed to implement EU  production requirements , and if they are unable to 
maintain productivi ty and profitability, then only EU  producers can access EU  exemptions from 
certain regulatory requirements, such as emergency authori zations. This creates a two -tiered 
system, with imported products being subject to more stringent regulatory conditions tha n 
domestically -produced products.  
6.38.  Australia recognizes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural imports in a manner 
that protects animal, plant and human health and the environment. However, Members are also 
bound by WTO  obligations, particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments 
and ensuring that measures are no more trade -restrictive than necessary. In order to ensure the 
free flow of agricultural trade without unnecessary regulatory burden, Australia maintains its request  
that the European Union  apply international standards and best practice for regulating imported 
agricultural products.  
6.39.  Australia  thank s the European Union for its ongoing engagement with Australia on these 
long-running issues.  
6.40.  The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
6.41.  Guatemala  regret s that it must continue to pursue this concern. As the European Union has 
indicated in other Committees, it has already responded to Members ' questions on 12 occasions. 
However , a reply that pays no heed to the questions raised does not constitute a reply, and nor does 
it offer a solution.  Guatemala reiterate s its concern around the European Union 's policy on active 
substances , which is a policy not backed by scientific evidence or science -based risk analysis, and 
one that fails to comply with the Codex  Alimentarius . For example, in the case of Mancozeb, the 
European Union  is continuing its MRL  review while Guatemalan producers must live with the ongoing 
uncertainty  surrounding EU  policy , and it goes without saying that an agricultural crop cannot be 
changed overnight . 
6.42.  Guatemala  regret s that the European Union is not taking into account the different climatic 
conditions globally , and notes that not  all countries enjoy European climatic conditions. Indeed , 
tropical countries face many challenges because of differences i n temperature, humidity , and 
atmospheric gases that affect growth and the capacity of plants, fungi , and insects to multiply, thus 
changing how pests, their natural enemies , and their hosts interact. This is not a minor point for 
those farming in such conditions although it has still not been dealt with by the EU.  
6.43.  Guatemala has previously asked the European Union for longer transition times that 
acknowledge the reality of the phases in its agricultural production . However , the EU's reply has 
been negative. Some sectors are currently trialling other substances to assess their imp act and 
effectiveness in a production area . Such tests began in January  2022 and the results will be available 
by the end of 2023 . It should be noted that production has already fallen by 20% because of the 
ineffectiveness of the alternative substances. Th is is why Guatemala needs to use these substances , 
because  it is a tropical country with extreme temperatures.  
6.44.  The European Union  states that its measures have no adverse effect on trade . However , as 
Paraguay has noted, exports are measured by volume , although it goes without saying that small 
producers should also be afforded recognition and the opportunity to engage in international trade. 
And it is they who are currently experiencing the most serious effects.  Products exported from 
Guatemala in 2022 have begun to be rejected and destroyed in European Union ports. This translates 
into economic loss, has a social impact , and affects rural development.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  6.45.  If there is a genuine health concern  over certain substances , Guatemala fails to understand 
how the Europea n Union can allow emergency authorizations for their use by European producers. 
That is, unless the health concern is not valid. Furthermore, Guatemala is of the view that these 
measures discriminat e between European producers and those of third  countries.  European 
producers use these products in circumstances where they have no alternative , but producers  in 
third countries, especially in a tropical country where the climate is extreme, face the same 
circumstance, namely that they have no alternative.  
6.46.  Guatemala  would be grateful if the European Union could indicate the actions it is taking to 
ensure that its measure does not distort trade further than is necessary, and explain how its measure 
upholds the WTO  principle of national treatment.  In Guatemala 's view, t here is a social and economic 
impact on producers of developing countries , such as Guatemala, which  the European Union is not 
taking this into account in its assessment.  Guatemala  hopes to have a real dialogue  with the 
European Union  on this matter  with the aim of finding genuine solutions, because the issues are 
real; they are not merely a matter of statements delivered at this Organization . 
6.47.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
6.48.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and sy stemic concern s regarding the European Union 's 
use of a hazard -based approach rather than full risk assessments in its regulatory decisions related 
to sanitary and phytosanitary matters. Uruguay understand s that any determination of MRLs, 
particularly when  they deviate from international standards such as those set by Codex, must be 
based on a full scientific risk assessment and conclusive scientific evidence, in accordance with the 
SPS Agreement.  
6.49.  Uruguay  agree s with other Members that the existence and pra ctical implementation of 
exception regimes, such as emergency authori zations, can lead to discriminatory situations. It is 
also of concern that insufficient transition periods are provided to make the necessary adjustments 
in production, and that the openi ng of international consultation periods has been transformed into 
a mere procedural instance, but with no practical impact on decision -making. Uruguay hopes that 
the European Union will ensure instances of real dialogue, which could lead to effective revi sions or 
modifications of its regulatory proposals in light of all the contradictions in them pointed out  by 
Members . 
6.50.  Finally, Uruguay again urge s the European Union, as one of the largest markets for 
agricultural products, to reconsider the general direct ion of its regulatory approach, with a view to 
avoiding the unjustified proliferation of barriers to international trade in agricultural products, taking 
into account the severe socio -economic consequences that these policies may have for developing 
and le ast developed countries, whose economies are based on the production and trade of 
agricultural products.  
6.51.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.52.  As noted in its previous interventions on this subject, Canada emphasizes the need for 
transparency and predictability in international trade. An important aspect in achieving this is 
regulatory frameworks that have been developed based on scientific data and risk analysis, and  
which  have taken into account the comments of trading partners so that they may achieve the 
outcomes desired while facilitating trade where this is feasible and appropriate.  
6.53.  In accordance with WTO  obligations, Canada recognizes a Member's right to regulate in the 
public interest and to apply the food safety measures it deem s necessary to protect human health. 
However, such measures must be implemented in a transparent manner that does not unjustifiably 
restrict international trade.  
6.54.  The European Union is the world 's leading agricultural and forest products importer and 
therefore plays an important role in ensuring a predictable and open trade environment. On this 
occasion , Canada wishes to comment on two  particular policy initiatives wh ere the EU 's approach is 
more trade restrictive than necessary and could result in increased uncertainty and higher 
compliance costs for importers and exporters, thus further complicating international supply chains.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  6.55.  The first  regulation Canada wishes  to comment on is the E uropean Union 's proposal on 
deforestation -free supply chains. While Canada share 's the EU 's objective of preventing global 
deforestation, the compliance mechanisms that have been proposed within draft legislation, 
including the use of plo t-of-land-based traceability, will result in increased costs and administrative 
burden for countries exporting to the EU  market. As the legislative process for this regulation is well 
under  way, and moving rapidly, it is imperative for the EU to seriously take into account concerns 
of trading partners, and to ensure that any new regulation to help curb global deforestation does 
not unnecessarily impact trade.  
6.56.  The second  issue Canada wishes to raise concerns the series of measures that support the 
European U nion's approach to regulating pesticides. Canada is particularly concerned with the 
apparent strategy to restrict the use of important PPPs through the reduction of M RLs, as this may 
lead to significant barriers to trade. Canada urges the EU to reconsider its current approach to the 
setting of MRLs, as all countries should have the ability to use PPPs that are appropriate to their 
particular circumstances and needs without unnecessarily jeopardizing access to trade. The current 
EU approach is also problemat ic as European farmers still have the ability to use some of these PPPs 
on an annual basis through emergency authorizations. Canada notes that EU  member States have 
authorized numerous emergency derogations to allow PPPs to be placed on the EU  market. There 
are many examples of emergency derogations being granted for individual member States for 
multiple years, which may indicate that there is a legi timate case for the use of such products. 
Frequent use of emergency authorizations in the context of the EU 's current approach to plant 
protection renewals creates an unfair playing field between domestic and imported products.  
6.57.  Canada reiterates its concer n and the concern of other EU  trading partners regarding the 
European Union's hazard -based regulation for active substances in PPPs and the impacts this may 
have on the setting of import tolerances. The EU must consider both hazards and exposure for all 
active substances in its regulatory decision -making process. This would bring the EU 's regulatory 
framework back in line with internationally recognized approaches while continuing to protect users 
and consumers, as well as enhancing global food security.  
6.58.  Canada also recalls that the European Union  has stated that it will be changing how requests 
for import tolerances are established in the context where the hazard -based cut -off criteria are  
involved, including taking into account certain environmental impact s in the country of origin. 
Canadian growers and exporters have yet to be assured of the real -world feasibility, commercial 
viability , and compliance with international obligations of the EU 's proposed approach. Consequently, 
Canada once again requests tha t the EU consider maintaining MRLs for substances that do not pose 
unacceptable dietary risks to European consumers, as this would be the only means by which 
consumers would be exposed to such products.  For example, Canada is concerned by the E uropean 
Union's notification to the TBT  Committee that it will be lowering the MRLs for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam to the L OQ based on environmental concerns for the global pollinator population. This 
type of policy and rationale restricts trade and appears to be t he EU 's attempt at levelling the playing 
field for regulations they have imposed upon their own agricultural producers. If a pesticide does 
not have dietary concerns and poses no risks to EU  consumers, the EU should maintain the MRLs or 
harmonize with Code x. 
6.59.  Furthermore, Canada requests the European Union  to take into account the timelines 
necessary for practical decision -making by farmers and producers, as well as the time and effort 
required to bring products to market, particularly for commodities with l ong shelf lives. Transition 
periods should therefore be appropriate to the circumstances and product type, and should allow 
commodities to clear channels of trade where no dietary risks of concern to consumers have been 
identified.  
6.60.  In conclusion, Canada ho pes that the reiteration of its concerns emphasize s the importance 
that Canada, and many WTO  Members, attribute to seeking enhanced transparency and 
predictability for trade, particularly in a context where such trade can contribute to global food 
security  and supply.  
6.61.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
6.62.  Brazil regrets that, since this issue was first  raised, more than  two years ago, not only has 
the European Union not provided adequate answers to the many concerns raised by a large number G/C/M/144  
 
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  of WTO  Members, but it has also continued to adopt non -tariff barriers (NTBs) that lack scientific 
evidence and further imbalance tr ade in agricultural goods.  Brazil therefore makes reference to its 
previous statements on this topic, as all Brazil 's concerns remain valid.3 
6.63.  In addition, Brazil notes that the  European Union has claimed that the measures being 
questioned have not prevent ed it from being a large importer of agricultural goods. Firstly, nowhere 
in the GATT does it say that being a large importer of  agricultural goods enables a WTO  Member to 
adopt discriminatory policies or to go against the basic principles of the SPS  Agree ment. Secondly, 
such imports simply reflect the reality that other regions of the world can produce more effectively 
and more sustainably than the EU without the thousands of euros of subsidies per farmer. But while 
enabling a more efficient allocation of production and promoting the rise of living standards through 
trade are key goals of this Organization, WTO  Members have never had a level playing field in the 
trade in agricultural goods, and the reform mandated by Article  20 of the Agreement on Agricultu re 
(AoA) is a clear indication of that. Besides, the scientific principle, enshrined in the SPS  Agreement 
and materialized through risk analysis, exists for a reason, namely, to establish a balance between 
the principle of protection of life and human and animal health and the guarantee that the market 
access conditions negotiated multilaterally are not undermined by unjustified measures . 
6.64.  However, after nearly 30  years, the European Union has not engaged meaningfully in 
redressing the imbalance in its favou r in the AoA and is constantly imposing prohibitions based on 
the hazard approach and/or recourse to Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement, despite contrary technical 
advice from renowned institutions. This not only tilts the balance towards protectionism, but also 
undermines the capacity of developing countries to raise living standards in rural areas. It is thus 
worrying that 25  years after its adoption, the interpretation that is being given to the SPS  Agreement 
is moving away from the purposes that guided th e negotiations during the Uruguay Round. It is also 
worrying that Brazil has to bring debates of this nature to the CTG in a context in which it has been 
following with concern the legislative projects that try to create new non -tariff barriers under the 
guise of environmental protection measures.  
6.65.  Additionally, Brazil would like to note that it is still waiting for adequate answers regarding 
the compatibility with WTO  law of the publication by the European Union of more than 
2,600  emergency authorizations b y its member States of substances under review since 2017, many 
of which presented the same arguments as delegations from other WTO  Members in the SPS and 
TBT Committees, while others simply do not offer any justification and yet were approved , a point 
just raised by Paraguay . 
6.66.  As a final comment, Brazil stresses that the world is facing an acute food security crisis, which 
will become even more challenging in the next decades as the world 's population grows. It is thus 
imperative to have in place incentives  and policies that support agriculture in those areas that, 
blessed with a favourable climate for agriculture, can increase output in a sustainable manner. 
Unfortunately, EU  policies in this area are not pulling in the direction WTO  Members need in order 
to support the poorest in developing countries and increase food security worldwide.  
6.67.  The delegate of United States  indicated the following:  
6.68.  The United States joins Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay in again raising its 
concerns regarding the European Union 's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural 
products.  As the United States has  noted in the past, the European Union  continues to lower many 
pesticide Maximum Residue Levels, or MRLs to trade -restrictive levels without clear scientific 
justification or measurable benefit to human health. This hazard -based approach to pesticide 
regulation may lead to trade barriers that threaten the security of globa l food systems.  
6.69.  Further more, the European Union  enforces newly reduced pesticide MRLs at the point of 
production for domestic goods, but at the point of importation for imported goods. This difference 
in the way that domestic and imported goods are treated  causes trade inefficiencies and disruptions 
for products destined for the EU  market and results in an unfair advantage for EU  producers, 
especially for those that produce products with long shelf lives.  
 
3 Document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  7.32-7.38.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  6.70.  The United States  remain s concerned that it appears as though the European Union  is 
following a similar approach with its new veterinary drug legislation through prohibitions on the use 
of antimicrobials that are not considered medically important for human health.  Like other Members, 
the United States has  shared its concerns in the SPS  Committee that these prescriptive restrictions, 
which do not appear to be based on completed risk assessments, will apply to foreign producers 
exporting animals and animal products to the European Union . 
6.71.  Given the E uropean Union's position as one of the largest importers in the world, EU  polices 
affect production practices in third  countries, as producers must choose between adopting European 
production practices or abandoning trade with the EU.  The United States requests that  any 
EU measure allows flexibility to trading partners to meet the EU  level of protection in a manner that 
is appropriate to the needs of farmers and producers within the exporting countries ' own domestic 
context.  
6.72.  In light of recent calls for coordinated action to ensure predictable trade flow and support 
international food security, the international community should be working together to support 
science -based measures that promote a safe and sustainable food supp ly, and we call on the 
European Union  to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutually beneficial approaches.  
6.73.  The delegate of Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
6.74.  The Dominican Republic welcomes the inclusion of this matter on the Comm ittee's agenda 
and, for the sake of brevity, refer s to its statements made at the last meeting of the Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures . The Dominican Republic share s the European Union 's concern 
regarding the protection of human and animal health , as well as the  measures to protect the 
environment. However, the Dominican Republic is concerned about the systemic and commercial 
impact that the measures to reduce MRLs may have on its exports, given that this type of regulation 
has a direct soci o-economic impact on the Dominican Republic, particularly affecting agricultural 
producers, who tend to be the most vulnerable populations in LDCs and developing countries , and 
who are directly hit by the socio-economic  consequences of these restrictions o n international trade.  
6.75.  It is important to recall that Members must take into account the scientific evidence generated 
from studies in experimental animals , as well as epidemiological studies on exposed populations , to 
clearly establish disruption as an ef fect, thereby eliminating the presumption of adverse effects. In 
this line, it is convenient to add that the report published by EF SA in 2010 with the conclusions of 
risk assessments of active ingredients, like imazalil, and mutagenicity studies, concluded  that it  is 
not genotoxic. The evaluation of other effects concluded that it is not toxic at a reproductive level , 
and is not teratogenic. Thereby, the Dominican Republic consider s that the reasons provided by the 
European Union to present these modificati ons are not based on an identified risk to the consumer, 
but are due rather to a lack of studies needed to rule out certain risks. The EFSA had indicated that 
said studies would be necessary to conclude its scientific assessment. For this reason , both of the 
EFSA's scientific assessments about MRLs do not recommend any specific MRL, but instead indicate 
the need for more studies before reaching an y conclusion . However, the European Commission has 
interpreted the lack of conclusion by EFSA as a health risk. The Dominican Republic therefore invite s 
the EU to comply with the Codex  Alimentarius  by reconsidering the implementation of these 
measures that affect agricultural producers in developing countries.  
6.76.  The delegate of Jamaica  indicated the following:  
6.77.  Jamaica supports the inclusion of this item on the agenda and shares the concerns raised by 
other co -sponsors. Jamaica reiterates the systemic implicat ions of the European Union 's 
MRL policies, especially as they relate to their impact on Jamaica 's exporters and producers of the 
substances  affected . Jamaica is of the view that the Members have the right to adopt measures that  
protect their plant, animal and human health, as well as to protect the environment. But such 
measures should be based on scientific evidence that is accepte d and justified by the global scientific 
community. Jamaica  believe s that the EU's approach requires recalibration in this regard as it does 
not adhere to established international best practices and standards. In addition  to imposing high  
compliance costs , the time for Jamaica 's exporters and producers to adapt to the MRL adjustments 
is severely insufficient. It is unfortunat e that no sooner had Jamaica 's farmers invested hugely  in 
adapting to  the EU 's previous  MRL adjustments then the EU announced new adjustments to those 
substances. Jamaica does not even have enough time to carry out an impact assess ment in the G/C/M/144  
 
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  sectors  affected. In Jamaica 's view, this is  an unnecessary restriction, especially when there are 
studies to prove that the adjustment is much more than required to meet the objective of the 
measure. As a developing country Member seek ing successful integration  into t he global trading 
system, such measures negatively affect Jamaica 's producers and exporters, which in turn have an 
impact on Jamaica 's export earnings and export potential. Jamaica  calls on the EU to heed the calls 
of Members to take their concerns into ac count and to revise its approach to its MRL  policies to 
achieve an appropriate balance between its objectives and the need to ensure that the trade impact 
is minimal.  
6.78.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
6.79.  India shares the concerns raised by Members in document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1, dated 
November  2019, over the  European Union 's application of non -tariff barriers on agricultural 
products. That these issues are still being discussed three  years later demonstrate s the serious 
concerns  held by the  EU's trading partners regarding the EU's adopted approach . The EU's unilateral 
measures are increasingly undermining regulatory principles and are not founded on internationally 
agreed risk analysis principles ; nor do they  take into account alternative approaches to meeting 
regulatory objectives. In implementing its SPS  measures , as well as in its new approach to using  
TBT measures for environmental reasons, the EU seems to impose its own domestic regulatory 
approach onto it s trading partners. India observe s with concern that this is becoming a wider trend , 
as also seen under the European Green Deal 's related regulations. The EU has not taken into account 
Members ' feedback on its proposed regulations. Furthermore, the  EU's hazard-based approach does 
not adequately balance the twin  objectives of protecting human health and facilitating trade.  
6.80.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
6.81.  Argentina once again reiterates its concern and stresses the importance of ensuring that all 
Members implement measures based on risk assessments  and scientific analysis . Although it shares 
the E uropean Union's concern over strengthening the protection of human health and the 
environment, Argentina wishes once again to underline the importance of complying with the 
provisions of the TBT and SPS  Agreements to ensure that measures are not more trade -restrictive 
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.  
6.82.  Argentina is  particularly concerned by the number of substances banned by the 
EU Commission, which has been increasing with each passing day. This situation may have serious 
consequences for a number of WTO  Members, particularly developing country Members , whose 
populations and economies are highly dependent on agricultural expo rts, as was already stressed 
by previous interventions . In addition, the approach taken by the European Union  to establish 
transition periods for MRLs is hasty and fails to take into account the needs and capacities of 
third countries to be able to adapt , nor the particular production conditions . The transition period s 
clearly need to be longer, for which reason Argentina calls for their review.  
6.83.  Argentina considers that it  is thus crucial for the European Union  to use a risk assessment 
approach in the analysis of these regulatory changes and to have conclusive scientific studies to 
determine the various aspects that may affect human health and the environment.  
6.84.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
6.85.  Japan  acknowledge s that the European Union is working to apply the EU  health and 
environmental standards to imported agricultural, livestock , and fishery products, which requires 
the EU 's health and environmental standards to be applied to these products in ord er for the EU to 
build a sustainable food system.  However, in order to build a sustainable food system, it is necessary 
not only to address agricultural products imported into the European Union,  but also agricultural 
products produced around the world. To that end, it is important for each Member  to work on building 
a sustainable food system that takes into account its own climate and other factors. Japan is  of the 
view that EU  health and environ mental standards should not be uniformly applied to imported goods, 
but the efforts of each Member  should be respected.  
6.86.  The European Commission 's report on the "Application of EU  health and environmental 
standards to imported agricultural and agri -food pro ducts " has stated that the European Union  will 
continue to make efforts at the multilateral level to obtain a global consensus on internationally G/C/M/144  
 
- 19 - 
 
  agreed standards. If the EU introduces such a new approach, Japan  request s that the EU at the 
same time ensure  that its measures are consistent with the WTO Agreements , and that it hold s 
international discussions on this topic.  
6.87.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.88.  The European Union takes note of the concerns expressed by WTO  Members.  The Eu ropean 
Union provided detailed replies to these concerns at previous meetings  of the CTG . Without repeating 
its previous statements in full, the EU wishes to underline that its previous statements remain 
unchanged and valid in their entirety.  
6.89.  The European Union is one of the biggest importers of agri -food products in the world. The 
EU has developed a highly trusted, transparent , and predictable system based on a high level of 
consumer health protection, to which some other countries defer in the absence of their national 
MRLs. The European Union has an open market. Its high level of consumer protection has never 
been an impediment to the import of agricultural commodities, including from the Members raising 
this concern, whose large exports of agricultural p roducts to the EU during these five  years have 
remained stable.  
6.90.  The European Union provides technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs, directly 
or through other international organi zations, such as the FAO, to support a smooth transition toward s 
new products or production systems.  The European Union remains committed to continu ing an open 
dialogue on its policies and measures. The EU stands ready to further engage and explain its policies 
to its trading partners.  
6.91.  Finally, based on the outcome of  the 2021  UN Food Systems Summit , the European Union 
believe s that Members have a shared interest in making food systems sustainable by tackling the 
issue of toxic active substances and protecting citizens ' health with appropriate measures.  
6.92.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
7  INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND 
MATSU, AND THAILAND  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada, the European Union, Indonesia, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, and Thailand.  
7.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
7.3.  Indonesia reiterates its concerns already raised several times regarding India's import policy 
on tyres. To date , Indonesia has not received adequate solution s or firm explanation s from India 
concerning  India's limitation s on import s of tyre products from Indonesia, which is a policy that has 
been implemented for two years, result ing in limited market access to India for Indonesian t yre 
products.  
7.4.  Indonesia request s further explanation s from the Government of India regarding the rationale 
of its tyre imports policy , which hinder s tyre import s from Indonesia, and on its decision to impose 
a marking fee for the use of the Indian Standard Mark (IS  Mark) for tyre products exported to 
third countries.  Indonesia understands that the Government of I ndia has implemented an 
amendment to its tyre import policy , from "free" to "restricted ", as stipulated in Notification 
No. 12/2015 -2020, dated 12  June 2020.  Indonesia is of the view that India's current tyre import 
policy will become more stringent, where  every container of t yres shipped to India will need to be 
sampled for customs purposes, and will need to comply with provisions regarding the registration of 
the warehouse where the imported tyres will be stored.  
7.5.  As a form of the said tyre import restrict ion policy, India has required importers to make 
separate statements via email regarding import restrictions for certain types and size categories of 
tyres that can be produced by domestic tyre manufacturers in India, as well as regarding warehouse G/C/M/144  
 
- 20 - 
 
  registr ation requirements , including the  warehouse s where the tyres are to be stored. Indonesia  
notes that violation of these provisions will be subject to criminal sanctions under the FTDR  Act 1992.  
7.6.  This policy of limiting t yre imports in to India has significant ly reduce d market access for 
Indonesian t yre products to India, especially due to the wide variety of tyre sizes that can be 
produced in India,  as one of the main tyre producers in the world . In Indonesia 's view , the policy 
potential ly conflict s with the WTO 's national treatment principle.  Furthermore, India has also 
imposed a marking fee on tyre products using the Indian Standard (IS)  Mark. Indonesia perceives 
that the imposition of the IS  Mark marking fee on t yre products to be exported to thir d countries is 
not a common policy, and has burdened Indonesian t yre businesses and created unnecessary 
barriers to international trade.  
7.7.  Based on India 's previous response, Indonesia notes that the conformity assessment process 
carried out by the Bureau of  Indian Standards (BIS) had referred to the Scheme  I of BIS  regulations , 
indicating that the imposition of a marking fee is carried out in a non -discriminatory manner for both 
local and foreign manufacturers to cover BIS  operational costs in conducting con formity assessment 
and surveillance costs , as well as purchase of market samples and testing charges. Indonesia can 
understand this. However, Indonesia is  still encounter ing obstacles when exporting its tyres. For this 
reason, Indonesia requests India to provide further detailed explanation regarding this policy.  
7.8.  Finally, at the CTG's previous meeting, India had also stated that the tyre import restriction 
regime that it had imposed , including the application of marking fees , was a non -automatic licensing 
procedure. Indonesia recalls that, b ased on Article  3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement ( LIC), 
WTO Members implementing non -automatic import licensing procedures must inform the Committee 
on Import Licensing of their scope and time -frame for implementatio n. The policy must not have an 
additional impact that impede s trade and increase s the administrative burden for applicants for 
import permits. Furthermore,  based on Article  3.3 of the ILA, WTO  Members implementing 
non-automatic import licensing procedures that are intended for reasons other than implementing 
quota restrictions are required to provide information regarding the basis for granting the import 
permit. 
7.9.  Indonesia urges the Indian government to provide further explanation of how long its policy 
will continue to be enforced, as well as providing  its further justification of the policy 's 
implementation . Indonesia also request s India immediately to review its policy on limiting imports 
of tyre products with a view to ensur ing its  compliance with India 's commitments to Article  2.1 and 
2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, Article  XI of the  GATT  1994 regarding general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions, as well as in relation to the WTO  principles of transparency and non-discrimination.  
7.10.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
7.11.  The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu would like once again 
to register its concerns regarding India 's licensing regime for the importation of pneumatic tyres 
under Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 on "Amendment in Import Policy on Tyres " of 12 June 2020. 
Since October  2020, Chinese Taipei has  consistently raised its concerns at all the relevant 
WTO Committee meetings, as well as at bilateral meetings, urging India to resolve this issue as soon 
as possible. Therefore, it  is regrettable that India has made no adjustment to its measures; indeed, 
India has not revoke d its existing measures, nor clarified its criteria for granting licen ces, nor 
explain ed the reasons for its refusals.  According to the trade data illustrated by Chinese Taipei  and 
other Members in the relevant committees, the measures taken by India have resulted in  a 
significant impact on the trade  in tyres. 
7.12.  Chinese Taipei  urges India to abide by the relevant provisions of the WTO  Agreement on 
Import Licensing Proc edures , which  specifically require that import licensing measures neither 
restrict nor distort trade . In addition , Chinese Taipei requests India to publish complete information 
about its import licen ce application  procedures , based on the principle of transparency , so that 
foreign manufacturers are able to understand in detail both the basis on which a licence may be 
approved, and the detailed reasons why a licen ce application may be rejected.  Furthermore, it is 
clearly evident that India 's measures have resulted in a quantitative restriction on tyre imports. 
Therefore, Chinese Taipei requests  India to explain the WTO -consistent justification for its restrictive 
measure. Otherwise, Chinese Taipei urges India to ensure that all applications o f import licen ces G/C/M/144  
 
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  that are fully compliant with the quality of tyre products required are granted , and granted  without 
any quota limitations whatsoever . 
7.13.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
7.14.  Thailand echoes earlier speakers in reiterat ing the concern s that it has raised on numerous 
occasions in past meetings of the Committee on Import Licensing, the CMA, and the CTG, regarding 
India's import policies on tyres , which have still considerably affected Thailand 's exports of tyre 
products to India.  Indeed , in 2021, Thailand 's exports of tyre products to India declined by more 
than 40% in value , or 45% in volume relative to 2019 , and  before this restrictive measure was 
implemented. Moreover, tyre exports from Thailand to India have  fallen by approximately half to 
date in 2022 compared to the same period in 2019.  
7.15.  As stated previously, Thailand reiterate s its concern that  the Indian authority 's issuance of 
import licen ces for tyres remains  subject to considerable delay s and unclear an d dubious 
administrative procedure s. In addition, Thailand regrets that it is yet to receive any response from 
India regarding its request for information made at the meeting of the Committee on Import 
Licensing of 7 October  2022, and the meeting of the CMA of 19 October  2022. Therefore, Thailand 
reiterate s its request that India provide the following information as soon as practicable: 
(i) information on the administration of the restrictions, including the time -frame or period for 
processing application s; (ii) information on the import licences recently granted to Thailand; and 
(iii) information on  the distribution of such licen ces among supplying countries.  
7.16.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.17.  This has become a long -standing issue. Several Members, including the European Union , have 
raised their concerns on multiple occasions in various bodies of the WTO , including  this Council, the 
Market Access Committee, the TBT Committee, the Import Licensing Committee, and the 
TRIMs Committee. Despite the EU 's repeated calls, it is very worrying that no progress has been 
made towards a possible resolution  of this issue . 
7.18.  The European Union continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure on the imports 
of tyres, as these imports have been decreasing since June  2020. Indeed, only  a limited number of 
licences have been granted to EU  tyre manufacturers. In addition, these licen ces are limited in 
duration, quantity, and type of tyres. The EU is deeply concerned by what is a bl atant discrimination 
against EU tyre manufacturers.  The EU continues to urge India to reconsider and eliminate any 
implicit or explicit quantitative  or other restrictions on the import of replacement tyres as these 
restrictions are contrary to WTO  requirem ents. 
7.19.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.20.  Canada reiterate s its concerns , previously expressed at the most recent meeting of the  CMA, 
over India 's import policies on tyres . Canadian stakeholders have raised concerns with India 's 
non-automatic import licensing system for tyres.  India's system effectively imposes quotas on tyre 
imports and, as such, limits imports of tyres into India.  Canada calls upon India to eliminate this 
quantitative import restriction in accordance with its WTO  commitments.  
7.21.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
7.22.  India thank s the delegations of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, Thailand, the European Union, Indonesia,  and Canada,  for their continued interest in this 
issue. India refers to its response s provided in previous meetings of the C TG, the CMA, and the 
Committee on Import Licensing. India reiterate s that its non-automatic licensing requirements for 
tyres are administered in a manner consistent with the rules of the WT O Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures, including with respect to the time -frames for the grant ing of import licen ces. 
7.23.  The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu had sought specific 
data on licen ces granted and the same has been shared with their delegation.  The issue of marking 
fees raised by Indonesia has been addressed in various committees, including in the Committee on 
Import Licensing and the TBT  Committee.  The specific questions raised , and the data provided by G/C/M/144  
 
- 22 - 
 
  the del egations of Thailand, the European Union,  and Indonesia,  in the Committee on Import 
Licensing and the CMA, are being reviewed by Capital.  
7.24.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
8  CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS PRODUCERS 
OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA ; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY 
OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU ; AND THE UNITED STATES  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia ; the Separate Customs T erritory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ; and the United 
States.  
8.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
8.3.  The United States remains deeply concerned with China 's lack of response to requests for 
scientific justification or explanation of how Decrees  248 and 249 will address food safety and public 
health concerns.  The lack of guidance provided by China, and inconsistency in China 's 
implementation and enforcement of the se measures is causing considerable confusion for exporter s 
and competent authorities, leading to negative trade impacts.  
8.4.  The General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) should continue to use existing 
government -to-government facility registration processes already implemented under bilateral 
agreements an d not require facilities to provide additional information online. Furthermore, the 
GACC should ensure that all facilities are able to self -register without foreign competent authority 
involvement, thereby streamlining the process and facilitating trade.  The United States  notes that 
the GACC 's requests for additional detailed information from facilities and competent authorities, 
such as process -specific food safety plans and facility floor plans on an 
establishment -by-establishment basis, are not consisten t with a systems -based approach to food 
safety.  
8.5.  The United States  repeat s its request that China hold an informational session in Geneva for 
trading partners to learn more about China 's implementation of its Decree  248. The United States 
looks forward to China 's response to these specific requests and comments.  
8.6.  The delegate of Australia indicated the following:  
8.7.  Australia remains concerned that China 's Regulation on Registration and Administration of 
Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Food, promulgated as Decree  248, will unnecessarily disrupt 
and restrict trade and is more trade res trictive than necessary to fulfil China 's food safety objectives. 
Furthermore, Members were not given sufficient time and information to register, adjust , and 
prepare , before the measures entered into force on 1  January  2022. The regulations do not 
disting uish between food safety risk categories, nor provide the scientific justification for the 
measures or the required equivalency of foreign food safety systems.  
8.8.  Australia has previously raised its concerns on several occasions in both the Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)  Measures and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  
Exporters are continuing to report delays in registration and customs clearance, adversely impacting 
their trade to China. In particular, Australia has in good fai th provided information for registration 
of establishments that has not been accurately reflected in China 's registration system. This is 
causing significant industry concern. Australia reminds China that its regulations must not be used 
to discriminate ag ainst imported goods, and that delays in processing registration renewals and new 
applications from overseas food producers may lead to imported foods being treated less favourably 
than China 's domestic product.  
8.9.  Australian food exporters are ready and willing to comply with China 's food safety 
requirements, but businesses and governments need clarity and a reasonable time -frame to make 
changes to comply with new measures.  
8.10.  In light of the above, Australia requests that China 's customs authorities adapt a  flexible 
approach to implementation until 1  July 2023, during which time they would allow entry of products G/C/M/144  
 
- 23 - 
 
  in line with historical trade, in addition to entry under China 's new system of registration, pending 
completion of outstanding applications, corre ctions , or updates to online registrations.  Australia 
urges China to address these issues promptly and remains willing to work collaboratively with China 
to ensure that food safety is upheld while facilitating undisrupted trade.  
8.11.  The delegate of Chinese Ta ipei indicated the following:  
8.12.  The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu continues to have 
concerns over China 's administrative measures regarding the registration of overseas manufacturers 
of imported food.  Given the wide range of its food industries that have been , or are likely to be , 
affected by this measure, Chinese Taipei has been closely following its development ever since China 
notified the WTO of its draft decree on 12  November  2020. Chinese Taipei has  raised its concerns 
on multiple occasions, including in the TBT and SPS  Committees. However, many concerns still 
remain even after the measure took effect on 1  January  2022. Chinese Taipei needs to reiterate the 
following ongoing issues and problems, which are based on real ex periences . 
8.13.  Firstly, one great difficulty is the lack of information on registration requirements and the 
guidance on how to follow them. This issue is even more critical for those facilities that need to file 
applications by themselves. Chinese Taipei  urges China to designate and provide an enquiry point 
that these facilities can engage with directly, so they can deal with their particular concerns about 
the online registration system, and find their own ways to overcome them.  
8.14.  Secondly, there are genuine co ncerns about the measure 's review and approval procedures. 
The standard or anticipated processing periods are not clear. The same applies to the status and 
stage of the application. Furthermore, some of Chinese Taipei 's facilities have been rejected by the  
GACC without any explanation given, making it impossible for such facilities to correct their 
applications on the registration system. Therefore, Chinese Taipei  urges the GACC to comply with 
the requirements as set out under Article  5.2.2 of the TBT  Agree ment. These include transparency 
and the requirements for the applicant to be informed in a precise and complete manner of all the 
deficiencies in its application, so as to allow for any necessary corrections to be made.  
8.15.  Thirdly, another difficulty Chinese  Taipei  faces is the significant ambiguity of China 's HS code 
categorization and the scope of the product that is subject to this measure. Some of Chinese Taipei 's 
facilities have reported that their products encountered customs clearance suspension for no  reason.  
8.16.  Fourthly, any measure of this magnitude requires far more time for relevant industries to 
implement, so Chinese Taipei urges China to consider offering a longer grace period for 
implementation in order to prevent even more serious trade disruption  in the future. This additional 
time will at least allow facilities to accurately enter or update the product information in their online 
registration systems.  
8.17.  And finally, Chinese Taipei  urges China to hold an information session in the WTO so that 
China 's trading partners can learn more about the implementation of the measure by the GACC and 
engage in constructive dialogue in resolving the above -mentioned difficulties.  
8.18.  The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
8.19.  The Republic of Korea reiterate s its concerns over China 's administrative measures for 
registration of overseas producers of imported foods, and refer s to its statement delivered at the 
most recent meeting  of the TBT  Committee . 
8.20.  The Republic of Korea respects China 's right to ensure food safety and recognizes its efforts 
to facilitate implementation of its measures.  Korea nonetheless remains concerned that several 
points raised have yet to be fully addressed.  In particu lar, Korea continues to be concerned that 
China 's measures still apply for low -risk food products provided in Article  7 of Decree  248, which 
creates unnecessary obstacles to trade.  In addition, as pointed out at the most recent meeting of 
the TBT Committee , Korea 's applicants are facing several challenges in trying to register through 
China 's system, notably its time -consuming nature and uncertainty.  
8.21.  The Republic of Korea would like to underline that all WTO  Members have the obligation to 
implement food saf ety regulations based on sound science evidence and in a transparent manner.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  The Republic of Korea stands ready to further engage with China to resolve these issues 
constructively.  
8.22.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.23.  Canada continues to share the concerns of other Members over the trade impacts of China 's 
administrative measures for the registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food. Canada 
also refers to its previous intervention on this item, which remains valid.  Canadian companies 
continue to face significant challenges and delays with their registration updates and renewals in the 
online China Import Food Enterprise Registration (CIFER)  system.  Serious technical difficulties with 
the operation of the CIFER  system , and the  lack of engagement by Customs China,  make it 
impossible for companies to successfully submit their applications in CIFER and keep their 
registrations current.  Canada often waits months for a response from Customs China after 
submitting an application in C IFER. This has created great uncertainty for Canadian companies as 
there is potential for unnecessary trade disruptions.  
8.24.  Canada asks China to commit to improving the efficiency of the approval process in CIFER by 
clearly communicating timelines and approva l decisions in a transparent manner and providing  
alternative backup registration procedures given the ongoing technical issues with CIFER.  As many 
questions remain regarding the CIFER  registration process, Canada calls on China to develop clear 
guidance d ocuments, create separate contact points within Customs China for both industry and 
foreign competent authorities, and to work directly with companies for the completion and renewal 
of their registrations in CIFER.  Canada calls on China immediately to demo nstrate transparency and 
flexibility relat ing to the requirements under Decrees  248 and 249 and the CIFER  system  in order  to 
avoid further delays in the registration process for Canadian companies and prevent unnecessary 
trade disruptions.  
8.25.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.26.  The European Union would like to reiterate its concerns about the implementation of 
Decree  248 of the General Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China (GACC).  
Overall, the European Union  shares and supports China 's objective of ensur ing that imported food 
products come from legitimate sources.  
8.27.  China has provided guidance information and engaged in a dialogue with the European Union . 
However , problems persist with regard to the lengthy and  burdensome mechanism set up by China 
to register exporting businesses, including: (i)  cases of shipments being held up at ports in China 
due to erroneous or missing information in CIFER ; (ii) cases of establishments in the meat, dairy 
and fishery sector t hat were notified to G ACC before the deadline of 31  December and remain 
unregistered; (iii)  lack of clarity about the scope and categories of products that are covered, which 
keep expanding; and (iv)  the obligation put on competent authorities and business es to consult 
CIFER almost permanently to be able to follow all the changes made by China to the structure of the 
CIFER  system and to individual registrations, as well as to be informed about the deadlines to 
re-register individual establishments.  
8.28.  Therefor e, the European Union  urges China: (i) to solve implementation issues pragmatically 
and expeditiously; (ii) to facilitate new and old registrations by continuing to provide supporting 
material  and guidance documents in English, including on how competent a uthorities have to verify 
the establishments that were registered under the fast track procedure; (iii) to facilitate 
amendments/corrections to existing registrations; and (iv) to facilitate the management by 
competent authorities and businesses of the cha nges in CIFER, of the information requested by 
China,  and of the deadline to register establishments by introducing an automatic email notifications 
system in CIFER.  
8.29.  The European Union thank s China for its openness and for the ongoing dialogue to solve the 
technical issues relat ing to Decree  248, and in part icular for China 's replies to the EU received on 
1 July. The EU is  currently reviewing these replies. Nevertheless, i mportant implementation issues 
remain and need to be resolved in order to eliminate all disruptions to trade as soon as possible , 
and befor e 1 July 2023.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  8.30.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
8.31.  The United Kingdom thanks  China for their recent discussion s on this matter  and encourage s 
China to take action to minimi ze the adverse impacts of this measure.  Despite concerns fro m the 
United Kingdom  and other Members, China 's Regulation on Registration and Administration of 
Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Food entered into force on 1  January  2022. The amount of 
documentation required is significant and disproportionate, and for  "high-risk" products the specific 
requirements often change in an arbitrary manner , with no prior notification provided to the 
exporting country, or guidance provided.  
8.32.  Much effort has been taken to meet China 's administrative requirements . Yet,  since the new 
registration regulations were introduced in January  2021, the United Kingdom  has only successfully 
registered one  new medium to low -risk business. The blanket application of these measures is 
incommensurate with the risk posed by many food products and  seems to detract from China 's aim 
of more economic openness.  
8.33.  The United Kingdom  asks that China takes into account the UK 's own rigorous controls and 
processes for ensuring the safety of food destined for domestic and international markets , and that 
it reviews these measures to ensure that they are applied in a manner that is not more trade 
restrictive than necessary to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection , 
in line with China 's obligations under Article  5, paragr aph 6, of the SPS  Agreement.  
8.34.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
8.35.  Mexico reiterates its concerns regarding China 's Decree  248, notified on 16  November  2020, 
which entered into force on 1  January  2022. Mexico also shares the concerns raised by pr evious 
Members. In this regard, Mexico reiterate s the importance that it places on Members , in the 
measures they adopt,  comply ing with the ir international commitments contained in the 
TBT Agreement. As indicated in the TBT  Committee, Mexico has identified concerns about possible 
effects on international trade, and is aware of recent problems  experienced by Mexican companies  
in the registration process.  Mexico  also reiterate s its request to China to indicate a contact point to 
assist companies that have enco untered difficulties in the registration process.  Mexico supports the 
request made to China in the TBT  Committee to hold information sessions in Geneva regarding the 
implementation of its Decree  248. 
8.36.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
8.37.  Switzerland shares and support s the concerns  that have been  expressed by other Members. 
Switzerland supports China 's objective to ensure that only safe food and food from legitimate sources 
is imported. However, Switzerland regret s to note the persisting problems and uncertainties with 
the CIFER  system. Switzerland strongly encourages China to extend the June  2023 deadline for the 
renewals and the validity of existing approvals of establishments falling under Article  7 of Decree  248 
by one  year. This additional time would enable the G ACC to fix the problems relating to the 
CIFER  system and allow Switzerland 's authorities to accurately enter or update product information 
in their online registration. Finally, Switzerland supports oth er Members ' calls for the creation of 
contact points for industries and authorities.  
8.38.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
8.39.  Japan  notes that there are many uncertainties in the registration procedures relat ing to 
China 's "Regulations for Management  of Registration of Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Foods ", 
which impose a significant burden on overseas authorities and business operators, including  that the 
online registration system is sometimes changed suddenly and without prior notice.  Japan  requests 
China to improve its operations and the transparency of its procedures relat ing to the 
implementation of these regulations so that the procedures do not become an excessive burden on 
business operators.  
8.40.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
8.41.  As the same trade concern was raised and discussed in  the TBT Committee meeting held just 
one week before , China currently has no further update on this issue. For the sake of time, China G/C/M/144  
 
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  makes reference to, but will not repeat , its statement  delivered at the meeting of the TBT Committee 
of 17 November  2022. 
8.42.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
9  UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES MEASURES 
OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
9.1.  The Chairpe rson recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
9.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
9.3.  The United States  recently enacted  the Inflation Reduction Act  (IRA). While its policy objectives 
are relate d to address ing climate change and promot ing green transition, the measures adopted 
include many discriminatory and distortive subsidy policies that blatantly violate the WTO 's rules. In 
this intervention, Chin a wishes to (i) go through some of the most problematic provisions in the IRA ; 
(ii) raise some issues of potential violation of the WTO 's rules; and (iii) highlight the distortive nature 
of such discriminatory subsidy policies.  
9.4.  The IRA provides as much as USD 369 billion in subsidies for the production of clean products 
and the investment in qualified facilities. Among its many provisions, China has identified nine  types 
of tax credits that contain domestic content requirements. They include: (i)  Clean Vehicle Credit 
(Section  30D Credit)4; (ii) Sustainable Aviation Fuel Credit (Section  40B Credit)5; (iii)  Credit for 
Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources (Section  45 Credit)6; (iv)  Credit for 
Production of Clean H ydrogen (Section  45V Credit)7; (v) Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit 
(Section  45X Credit)8; (vi) Clean Electricity Production Credit (Section  45Y Credit)9; (vii)  Clean Fuel 
Production Credit (Section  45Z Credit)10; (viii)  Energy Tax Credit (Section  48 Credit)11; and 
(ix) Clean Electricity Investment Credit (Section  48E Credit).12 
9.5.  References to these measures relate to different sections of Title  26 of the US  Code.  While 
these measures relate to different types of products and/or facilities, they all have something in 
common, namely that they make local content requirements (LCRs) the preconditions for granting 
tax credits.  China gives Members the following  three examples.  
9.6.  The first example is the Clean Vehicle Credit. The products covered are  new clean vehicles. The 
tax credit is available for purchases of new clean vehicles. For vehicles that satisfy the critical 
minerals requirement, the amount is USD  3,750 , and for vehicles that satisfy the battery 
components requirement, the amount is also  USD 3,750. In total, the tax credit could reach 
USD 7,500, subject to certain limitations.  
9.7.  The tax credit is contingent upon three  LCRs: (i) an overarching requirement that the final 
assembly of such new clean vehicle s occurs within North America; (ii)  with respect to the critical 
mineral credit, specified percentages of the vehicle battery 's critical minerals need to be extracted 
or processed in the United States , or originating from a US  free trade agreement (FTA)  partner, or 
being recycled in North Amer ica; and (iii)  with respect to the battery component credit, specified 
percentages of the battery 's components need to be manufactured or assembled in North America.  
9.8.  Last but not least, it appears that the IRA would prohibit the application of the above ta x credits 
where a vehicle 's battery contains any critical minerals sourced from China, or if any components 
contained in the battery were manufactured or assembled in China.  
 
4 26 US Code Section  30(D).  
5 26 US Code Section  40B. 
6 26 US Code Section  45. 
7 26 US Code Section  45V. 
8 26 US Code Section  45X. 
9 26 US Code Section  45Y. 
10 26 US Code Section  45Z. 
11 26 US Code Section  48. 
12 26 US Code Section  48E. G/C/M/144  
 
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  9.9.  The second  set of examples include the following four  credits , which share similar  domestic 
content requirements, namely the Credit for Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources, 
the Clean Electricity Production Credit, the Energy Tax Credit, and the Clean Electricity Investment 
Credit.  The products and facilities covered by these credits include power generating facilities using 
wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, municipal waste , or hydropower; and clean electricity produced 
at a qualified facility , and such qualified facilities.  
9.10.  A domestic content bonus credit is granted, eq ual to a 10% markup on the pre -existing eligible 
credit amount.  The bonus tax credit is contingent upon three  LCRs, as follows : (i) any steel, iron, or 
manufactured product, which is a component of such facility, and which was produced in the United 
States ; (ii) in the case of steel or iron, the above -mentioned requirement is applied in a manner 
consistent with "Buy America Requirements ", that is, all steel and iron manufacturing processes take 
place in the US, except metallurgical processes involving refin ement of steel additives; and (iii)  in 
the case of the manufactured products, they shall be deemed to have been produced in the US, if a 
certain threshold of domestic content is satisfied, calculated as the percent age of the total costs of 
all such manufac tured products.  
9.11.   The third  example is the Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit. The products covered 
include a wide range of manufactured products and critical minerals, such as solar energy 
component s, wind energy component s, certain power inverter s, qualifying battery component s, and 
applicable critical minerals.  The tax credits would apply with respect to each eligible component that 
is produced within the United States and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person. Credits differ 
with respect to d ifferent eligible components, and in the case of any applicable critical mineral, for 
example, the tax credit is equal to 10 % of the costs incurred with respect to production of such 
mineral.  
9.12.  With respect to the LCRs, only production in the United States is taken into account , and the 
tax credits apply only with respect to eligible components, the production of which is within t he US 
or a possession of the US.  In the interest s of time, China will not go through each and every item. 
For transparency purposes, China  will attach to its statement the list of nine tax credit measures 
with reference to the product scope and the LCRs, to be included in the minutes of the meeting.  
9.13.  These US tax credits appear to violate multiple WTO  rules, and t he provisions speak for 
themselves. They contain clearly discriminatory domestic content requirements and may constitute 
trade-distorting subsidies . These provisions could be in breach of the following WTO  rules:  
(i) domestic content requirements violate the national treatment obligations contained in Article  III 
of the GATT  1994;  (ii) import substitution subsidies, to the extent that the tax credits  are made 
contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods, are prohibited by the ASCM ; 
(iii) trade -related investment measures (TRIMs), to the extent that the investment tax credits 
contain domestic content requirements, are  inconsistent with nationa l treatment obligations in the 
TRIMs  Agreement ; (iv) final assembly requirements discriminate against like imports and violate the 
national treatment obligations contained in Article  III of the GATT  1994; (v) potential adverse 
effects. The tax credit provi sions seek to incentivize production in the United States , which could 
potentially cause adverse effects under the ASCM, including injury to the domestic industry of 
another Member or serious prejudice to the interest of another Member ; (vi)  provisions lim iting 
subsidies to FTA  partners and the "China exclusion " provisions in the Clean Vehicle Credit violate the 
MFN obligations contained in Article  I of the GATT  1994.  
9.14.  The trade and market -distorting effects of such tax credits are three -fold. 
9.15.  First, they distort international investment flows and beggar thy neighbo ur. From the 
perspective of businesses, the green incentives in the IRA made the United States  a very much more 
appealing place to invest.13 The auto and energy industries in other Members h ave already started 
pivoting to the US.14 On this, the industry representatives of other WTO  Members have sounded an 
alarm:  "While the IRA is being presented in many quarters as key legislation to fight climate change, 
in reality it is an act of trade protectionism, forcing the on -shoring of future powertrain production 
 
13 "US beats EU as magnet for green investment, says Iberdrola ", 
https://www.ft.com/content/7797bd70 -645d 4ef9 -a7ee-0c90aa1a09c6  
14 "European industry pivots to US as Biden subsidy sends 'dangerous signal '", 
https://www.ft.com/content/59a8d135 -3477-4d0a-8d12-20c7ef94be07  G/C/M/144  
 
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  within the borders of the United States at the expense of all other countries ."15 According to media 
reports, a Member could lose EUR 8 billion  in investment as factories set up in , or move to , North 
America to benefit from subsidies for local production.16 
9.16.  Second, they distort the global markets in downstream sectors and turn the efforts to protect 
the global common s into a zero -sum game. According to the comments submitted by one  Member  
to the US  Treasury Department , "having access to subsidized low -carbon technologies and sources 
of clean energy, key parts of the United States economy will receive a market -distorting boost, tilting 
the global level playing field and turning a common glo bal objective – fighting climate change – into 
a zero -sum game ".17 
9.17.  Third, they initiate a race to the bottom regarding subsidies competition and increase trade 
tensions. In fact, it has been reported in the media that the top US  trade official urged other Members 
to join forces on subsidies18, to which the Members concerned responded  by calling for industrial 
policy  possibilities to prevent downside effects of protectionist measures and ensure that WTO  rules 
were respected by all.19 But actually the race ha d started elsewhere, with another Member 
announcing big tax credits for green t ech investment to keep up with the United States .20 However, 
this is exactly something that the WTO's Director -General  has warned  against;  "We don 't want a 
subsidy war in [the] fight against climate change ", she said in an interview.21 
9.18.  On responding to cli mate change through international cooperation , China acknowledges the 
importance of the IRA and its legislative objective to respond to climate change and promote green 
transition. These are laudable objectives. As such, they should be matched with equally  laudable 
means of policy instruments and implementation measures. Local content measures, to the contrary, 
will not be able to deliver such goals. As pointed out in the World Trade Report  2022: Climate Change 
and International Trade: "some evidence suggests that local content requirements have hindered 
global international investment flows in solar PV and wind energy, reducing the potential benefits 
from international trade and investment and ultimately can hamper or slow down climate c hange 
mitigation efforts. "22 
9.19.  Responding to climate change is the common responsibilit y of all WTO  Members. Trade should 
be an important policy tool to help address, adapt to , and mitigate against climate change. As 
pointed out in the G20  Bali Leaders ' Declaration: "We believe that trade and climate/environmental 
policies should be mutually supportive and WTO  consistent and contribute to the objectives of 
sustainable development. "23 
9.20.  Measures intended to achieve environmental objectives should not be impleme nted in a way 
that violates WTO  rules, should not be implemented to beggar thy neighbour, and should not be 
implemented to cause distortion to the global market. Rather, international cooperation and 
coordination, on the basis of the WTO  rules, should be a  core part in any domestic agenda to 
decarbonize and promote a green transition.  
 
15 "Canada's auto, steel and manufacturing sectors sound alarm over U.S. inflation act ", 
https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/ news/canadas -auto-steel-manufacturing -sectors -120108864.html  
16 "Trade rift between EU and US grows over green industry and jobs ", 
https://www.ft.com/content/48178f1e 5572 -496e-8fbe-bb4c0e3ec8ea  
17 Submission by the European Union on the Inflation Reduction Act November 2022, 
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/IRS -2022-0020-0774 
18 "Top US trade official urges EU to join forces on subsidies amid green deal tensions ", 
https://www.ft.com/content/0e52d609 -5cfe-453c-9baf-b33b66e941e9  
19 "We call for a renewed impe tus in European industrial policy" , Joint statement by Bruno Le Maire, 
Minister of the Economy, Finance and industrial and digital Sovereignty of France, and Robert Habeck, 
vice-chancellor, Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate action of Germany , 
https://ue.delegfrance.org/we -call-for-arenewed -impetus -in 
20 "Ottawa unveils green energy tax credits of up to 40% in bid to keep up with Biden ", 
https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/ottawa -unveils -green -energy -tax-214218621.html  
21 "WTO Urges US, EU to Avoi d ‘Subsidy War’ in Green Energy Spat ",  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022 -11-07/wto -urges -us-eu-to-avoid -race-to-the-bottom -
in-subsidyspat  
22 World Trade Report  2022: Climate Change and International Trade, p.  71. 
23 G20 BALI LEADERS' DECLARATION,  Bali, Indonesia, 15 -16 November  2022, para.  37. G/C/M/144  
 
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  9.21.  China  calls upon the United States to faithfully carry out the G20  leaders ' declaration and 
remove from the IRA all discriminatory and distortive elements that are inconsisten t with WTO  rules.  
9.22.  List of US  Tax Credits in the IRA  Inconsistent with WTO  Rules24 
9.23.  1. Clean Vehicle Credit (Section  30D Credit)25 
a. Products Covered: new clean vehicle.26 
b. Tax Credit: a credit against the tax imposed  (…) an amount equal to the sum of the credit 
amounts determined under subsection (b)  (…) (2) critical minerals  (…) the amount 
determined under this paragraph is $3,750 and (3)  battery components  (…) the amount 
determined under this paragraph is $3,750.27 
c. Local Content Requirements:  (1) the final assembly of such new clean vehicle occurs 
within North America;28 (2) the percentage of the value of the applicable critical minerals 
contained in such battery that were extracted or processed in the United States, or in any 
country with which the United States has a free trade agreement in effect, or recycled in 
North America, is equal to or greater than the applicable percentage;29 (3) the percentage 
of the value of the components contained in such battery that were manufacture d or 
assembled in North America is equal to or greater than the applicable percentage.30 
9.24.  2. Sustainable Aviation Fuel Credit (Section  40B Credit)31 
a. Products Covered: a qualified mixture of sustainable aviation fuel and kerosene .32 
b. Tax Credit: an amount equ al to the product of the number of gallons of sustainable aviation 
fuel in such mixture, multiplied by  the sum of $1.25, plus the applicable supplementary 
amount with respect to such sustainable aviation fuel.33 
c. Local Content Requirements: the term "qualif ied mixture" means a mixture of sustainable 
aviation fuel and kerosene if such mixture is produced by the taxpayer in the United States 
(…).34 
9.25.  3. Credit for Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources (Section  45 Credit)35 
a. Products and Facilities Covered: power generating facilities using wind, solar, geothermal, 
biomass, municipal waste or hydropower, etc.36 
b. Domestic Content Bonus Credit Amount: the amount of the credit determined under 
subsection (a) (…) shall be increased by an amount  equal to 10 percent of the amount so 
determined.37 
c. Local Content Requirements: (1)  any steel, iron, or manufactured product which is a 
component of such facility (…) was produced in the United States; (2)  in the case of steel 
or iron  (…) applied in a mann er consistent with "Buy America Requirements" in 
49 U.S. Code Section 661.5; (3)  the manufactured products  (…) shall be deemed to have 
 
24 Attachment submitted by China as part of its written submission to its statement under Agenda 
Item 9. 
25 26 U.S. Code Section 30(D) . 
26 26 U.S. Code Section 30(D) Subsection (a) and (d) . 
27 26 U.S. Code Section 30(D) Subsection (b)(2), (b)(3) . 
28 26 U.S. Code Section 30(D) Subsection (d)(1)(G) . 
29 26 U.S. Code Section 30(D) Subsection (e)(1) . 
30 26 U.S. Code Section 30(D) Subsection (e)(2) . 
31 26 U.S. Code Section 40B . 
32 26 U.S. Code Section 40B Subsection (a) and (c) . 
33 26 U.S. Code Section 40B Subsection (a) and (b) . 
34 26 U.S. Code Section 40B Subsection (c) . 
35 26 U.S. Code Section 45 . 
36 26 U.S. Code Section 45 Subsection (a) and (c)(1) . 
37 26 U.S. Code Section 45 Subsection (b)(9)(A) . G/C/M/144  
 
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  been produced in the United States, if not less than 40  percent, or 20  percent for offshore 
wind facility, of the total c osts of all such manufactured products  (…) are attributable to 
manufactured products  (…) which are mined, produced, or manufactured in the United 
States.38 
9.26.  4. Credit for Production of Clean Hydrogen (Section  45V Credit)39 
a. Products Covered: qualified clean hydrogen .40 
b. Tax Credit: equal to the product of the kilograms of qualified clean hydrogen  (…) at a 
qualified clean hydrogen production facility during the 10 -year period  (…) multiplied by 
the applicable amount.41 
c. Local Content Requirements: (…) shall not i nclude any hydrogen unless such hydrogen is 
produced in the United States or a possession of the United States.42 
9.27.  5. Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (Section  45X Credit)43 
a. Products Covered : eligible component, including solar energy component, wind energy 
component, certain inverter, qualifying battery component, and applicable critical 
mineral.44 
b. Tax Credit: This tax credit would apply with respect to each "eligible component" that is 
produced  (…) within the United States (…) sold (…) The amount determined  (…) with 
respect to any eligible component  (…) shall be equal to:45 (1) in the case of a thin film 
photovoltaic cell or a crystalline photovoltaic cell  (…) 4 cents multiplied by the capacity of 
such cell  (…); (2) in the case of a  photovoltaic wafer, $12 per square metre; (3)  in the 
case of solar grade polysilicon, $3  per kilogram; (4)  in the case of a polymeric backsheet, 
40 cents per square metre; (5)  in the case of a solar module  (…) 7 cents, multiplied by 
the capacity of such m odule  (…); (6) in the case of a wind energy component, if such 
component is a related offshore wind vessel  (…) 10 percent of the sales price of such 
vessel, and [otherwise] (…) the applicable amount  (…) multiplied by the total rated 
capacity  (…) of the com pleted wind turbine; (7)  in the case of a torque tube, 87  cents per 
kilogram; (8)  in the case of a structural fastener, $2.28 per kilogram; (9)  in the case of 
an inverter  (…) the applicable amount  (…) multiplied by the capacity of such inverter  (…) 
(10) in the case of electrode active materials, an amount equal to 10  percent of the costs 
incurred  (…) with respect to production of such materials; (11)  in the case of a battery cell  
(…) $35 multiplied by  (…) the capacity of such battery cell  (…); (12) in the c ase of a battery 
module  (…) $10 or  (…) $45 multiplied by  (…) the capacity of such battery module  (…); 
(13) in the case of any applicable critical mineral  (…) 10 percent of the costs incurred  (…) 
with respect to production of such mineral.  
c. Local Content Requirements: only production in the United States taken into account  (…) 
only with respect to eligible components the production of which is within the United States 
(…) or a possession of the United States.46 
9.28.  6. Clean Electricity Production Credi t (Section  45Y Credit)47 
 
38 26 U.S. Code Section 45 Subsection (b)(9)(B) . 
39 26 U.S. Code Section 45V . 
40 26 U.S. Code Section 45V Subsection (a) and (c) . 
41 26 U.S. Code Section 45V Subsection (a) and (b) . 
42 26 U.S. Code Section 45V Subsection (c)(2)(B) . 
43 26 U.S. Code Section 45X . 
44 26 U.S. Code Section 45X Subsection (a) and (c) . 
45 26 U.S. Code Section 45X Subsection (b) . 
46 26 U.S. Code Section 45X Subsection (d)(2) . 
47 26 U.S. Code Section 45Y . G/C/M/144  
 
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  a. Products and Facilities Covered: electricity produced at a qualified facility for which the 
greenhouse gas emissions rate is not greater than zero .48 
b. Domestic Content Bonus Credit Amount: the amount of the  credit determined  (…) shall be 
increased by an amount equal to 10  percent of the amount so determined .49 
c. Local Content Requirements: (1)  any steel, iron, or manufactured product which is a 
component of such facility  (…) was produced in the United States; (2)  in the case of steel 
or iron  (…) applied in a manner consistent with "Buy America Requirements" in 
49 U.S. Code Section 661.5; (3)  the manufactured products  (…) shall be deemed to have 
been produced in the United States if not less than the adjusted percentage  (…) of the 
total costs of all such manufactured products of such facility are attributable to 
manufactured products  (…) which are mined, produced, or manufactured in the United 
States.50 
9.29.  7. Clean Fuel Production Credit (Section  45Z Credit)51 
a. Products Covered : certain trans portation fuel with an emissions rate which is not greater 
than 50  kilograms of CO2e per mmBTU .52 
b. Tax Credit: an amount equal to……the applicable amount per gallon  (…) with respect to 
any transportation fuel  (…) produced (…) and sold, and the emissions fact or for such fuel  
(…).53 
c. Local Content Requirements: only registered production in the United States taken into 
account  (…) no clean fuel production credit shall be determined  (…) unless such fuel is 
produced in the United States.54 
9.30.  8. Energy Tax Credit (Section  48 Credit)55 
a. Energy Property Covered : Power or heat generating facilities using solar, geothermal, fuel 
cell or microturbine, combined heat and power system, wind, ground water, waste energy 
recovery,  energy storage, biogas or microgrid .56 
b. Domestic Content Bonus Credit Amount: (…) the energy credit for any taxable year is the 
energy percentage of the basis of each energy property placed in service during such 
taxable year57 (…). In the case of any energy project which satisfies the [local co ntent] 
requirement (…) the energy percentage shall be increased by  (…) 2 or 10  percentage 
points.58 
c. Local content requirement: rules similar to rules of Credit for Electricity Produced from 
Certain Renewable Resources (Section  45 Credit).59 
9.31.  9. Clean Electr icity Investment Credit (Section  48E Credit)60 
 
48 26 U.S. Code Section 45Y Subsection (a)(1) and (b) . 
49 26 U.S. Code Section 45Y Subsection ( g)(11)(A) . 
50 26 U.S. Code Section 45Y Subsection (g)(11)(B) and (C) . 
51 26 U.S. Code Section 45Z . 
52 26 U.S. Code Section 45Z Subsection (a)(1) and (d)(5) . 
53 26 U.S. Code Section 45Z Subsection (a) . 
54 26 U.S. Code Section 45Z Subsection (f)(1)(A) . 
55 26 U.S. Code Section 48 . 
56 26 U.S. Code Section 48 Subsection (a)(1) and (a)(3) . 
57 26 U.S. Code Section 48 Subsection (a)(1) . 
58 26 U.S. Code Section 48 Subsection (a)(12) . 
59 26 U.S. Code Section 48 Subsection (a)(12)(B) . 
60 26 U.S. Code Section 48E . G/C/M/144  
 
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  a. Facilities Covered: any qualified facility used for the generation of electricity for which the 
anticipated greenhouse gas emissions rate is not greater than zero and any energy storage 
technology .61 
b. Increase in Credit Rate Contingent Upon Domestic Content:  rules similar to the rules of 
Energy Tax Credit (Section  48 Credit) .62 
c. Local Content Requirements: rules similar to Credit for Electricity Produced from Certain 
Renewable Resources (Section  45 Credit) .63 
9.32.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
9.33.  Switzerland welcomes the efforts of the United States to combat inflation by means of 
environmental measures to the benefit of the American people. Switzerland refer s here to the tax 
credit scheme applied to the purchase of US  electric vehicles. Switzerland recognize s that promoting 
clean energy and transportation technologies may contribute to environmental objectives. And 
Switzerland wishes to reiterate that trade po licy plays an essential role in combat ing climate change 
and other environmental problems.  Indeed, trade policy must be part of the solution. That said, 
Switzerland expresses its concerns regarding the discriminatory aspect of the measures against 
imported  like products. In our view, environmental measures by means of trade policy instruments 
must be non -discriminatory and in compliance with WTO  rules.  
9.34.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
9.35.  The United States considers that  all Members share an urgent need to increase investments 
in clean energy technologies to seriously combat the climate crisis, as well as to address supply 
chain issues.  The Inflation Reduction Act ( IRA) signed by President Biden is a key tool for the United 
States to me et these critical objectives.  The transportation sector is the highest source of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, and the US  will not meet its Paris commitments and 
other climate goals without bold action to promote major new investments in c lean energy 
technology, especially incentives for electric vehicle production and their adoption.  The Act provides 
clean vehicle tax incentives to encourage a rapid transition to clean transport. It ensures that the 
United States  can create more diverse an d robust supply chains and promote the domestic adoption 
of clean vehicles.  
9.36.  In addition to the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit for new clean vehicles purchased, the I RA also 
provides for a Commercial Clean Vehicle Credit and a Previously -Owned Clean Vehicle Credi t. These 
provisions create tax credits for certain eligible light, medium and heavy -duty clean vehicles 
purchased by businesses, and for used clean vehicles. Final assembly, battery , and critical mineral 
requirements do not apply to these credits.  
9.37.  The Unit ed States  believe s that these vehicles will account for a significant share of the total 
clean vehicle purchases in the future , and the US  Congressional Budget Office estimates  that these 
vehicles will receive roughly 40% of the overall Clean Vehicle Tax Credit funding.  
9.38.  The United States is  in the early stages of developing the regulations for this program. The 
US is considering input from all stakeholders as the Department of Treasury moves forward with its 
public process in implementing these credits , as required by the legislation. The US  notes that 
several of its trading partners have already taken advantage of th e opportunity to participate in its 
transparent process, and that there will be future opportunities to engage in this process.  
9.39.  The United States  would note that many of its trading partners, including China, have also 
prioritized investment in EV  technolo gies, and taken a range of domestic measures to support 
zero emission vehicles.  
9.40.  In discussions regarding electric vehicle measures, the starting point should be the 
importance of working to achieve Members ' overall climate, supply chain, and related goals in 
 
61 26 U.S. Code Section 48E Subsection (a)(1), (b)(3) and (c) . 
62 26 U.S. Code Section 48E Subsection (a)(3)(B) . 
63 26 U.S. Code Section 48E Subsection (a)(3)(B ). G/C/M/144  
 
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  parallel , and to do so in a way that maintain s the support of our stakeholders. This includes, for 
example, Members ' shared goal in ensuring we achieve the Paris commitments.  
9.41.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
10  UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISR UPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
10.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
10.3.  Recently, the United States has  adopted a series of disruptive policy measures targeting the 
global semiconductor supply chain.  On 9 August  2022, the United States  enacted the CHIPS  Act of 
2022, which provides for semiconductor investment, production , and R&D  subsidies to a total 
amount of as much as USD 78 billion , which  is a huge amount of subsidies. To put the numbers in to 
perspective, according to an OECD  study on government support for the semiconductor sector,  the 
21 largest semiconductor firms were granted over USD 50 billion during the period 2014 -2018.64 
The new US  subsidies dwarf that number, by over 50%.  
10.4.  In addition to the subsidies, the CHIPS  Act of 2022 explicitly requires a covered entity to 
disengage c ertain business activities with China in order to receive  the benefits under the 
program me, that is, the so -called "guardrails ". For that purpose, the United States  will establish a 
process of mandatory notification of planned relevant transactions in Chin a, and agency review of 
such transactions, with potential remedies and mitigations. A lot of questions remain to be answered, 
including with respect to the applicable scope of such a mechanism, the depth of government 
interventions into business operations , and the transparency and predictability of the administrative 
actions.  
10.5.  On 7 October  2022, the United States  issued sweeping new export control measures on China. 
The measures are designed to limit the development and production in China of advanced node 
semiconductors; semiconductor production equipment; advanced computing items; and 
supercomputers. The new rules impose not only traditional controls on the export of listed 
commodities, software, and technology, but also broad and vague controls on activit ies of 
US corporations and individual US  persons; exports of unlisted items for specific end -uses; and 
shipments from outside the United States  (including from China) of non -US-origin items produced 
with certain US  technology, software, or equipment.  
10.6.  What makes these new measures extraordinary is that they push US unilateralism to the 
extreme. First, they have no basis under multilateral export control regimes. Second, they are 
targeted only at China. Third, they apply to essentially commercial items. Last but not least, 
individuals and enterprises in other Members are compelled to follow the United States , against their 
will, and at the cost of their legitimate interests, by virtue of US extra-territorial control.  
10.7.  These measures combined were dubbed by the United States  as a "Modern American 
Industrial Strategy ".65 Grand as the term may sound, the se combined policy measures represent an 
about -face in the US ' long-standing posture regarding industrial subsidies and export control s, and 
will likely lead to sig nificant distortions and disruptions to the global semiconductor supply chain. As 
such, to borrow the quip from Voltaire, the "Modern American Industrial Strategy " is neither 
"modern " nor "American ". 
10.8.  China voiced its concerns regarding the WTO -compatibilit y of such subsidies in the 
October  meeting of the SCM  Committee, including its concerns over the potential violation of the 
MFN principles, the rule on the general elimination of quantitative restrictions , and the subsidies 
disciplines contained in the ASC M. China has also repeatedly raised its concerns over the abusive 
use and extra -territorial application of US  export control measures beyond the traditional scope of 
 
64 "Measuring distortions in international markets: The semiconductor value chain ", OECD, 2019.  
65 Remarks o n Executing a Modern American Industrial Strategy by NEC  Director Brian Deese, 
13 October  2022.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  controlling weapons of mass destruction, conventional military items, and dual -use commodities, 
software, and technology.  
10.9.  On this occasion , China 's intervention will focus on the ramifications of the US  measures 
beyond the damage inflicted upon the WTO 's rules. By over -generalizing the concept of national  
security, by overstretching the extent of export control s, by bullying other WTO Members to fall in  
line, the United States  has caused severe disruptions to world trade and risked the disintegration of 
the global semiconductor supply chain. From the G20 to APEC, no economy, including the  US, is in 
support of such disruptions and decoupling. In Bali, the G20  leaders committed  to reinforc ing 
international trade and investment cooperation to address supply chain issues and avoid trade 
disruptions. In Bangkok, the APEC leaders reaffirmed the ir commitment to keep ing markets open 
and to address ing supply chain disruptions. However, there seems to be a discrepancy between what 
the US preaches and what it practices. In fact, the US  policies will deal a severe blow to global 
semiconductor supply ch ains, to the rule s-based multilateral trading regime , to the general principles 
of international law, and to the growth prospects of the global economy.  
10.10.   The US export control measures have wreaked havoc on the global semiconductor supply 
chain. Chaos has d escended on major players in the semiconductor sector, with their revenue s 
slashed and their investment s skewed. According to Fitch, the US  measure is a significant challenge 
for companies in the sector with considerable China exposure.66 
10.11.   The measure could actually end up hurting  the American semiconductor industry. The new 
rules are expected to adversely affect revenue generation at the leading chip -making equipment 
producers, such as KLA and Lam Research. Sales in China made up about 30% of t hese leading 
equipment producers ' revenue in the latest reporting period. Leading US  electronic design 
automation companies, such as Cadence Design Systems, are also expected to face revenue 
headwinds as China constitutes an important strategic customer. N ews report s indicate  that chip 
equipment maker Applied Materials cut its fourth -quarter estimates for net sales by approximately 
USD 400 million. NVIDIA, the largest US  chipmaker by market value, warned that new licensing 
requirement s on advanced chip ship ments to China could cost the firm as much as USD 400 million 
in quarterly sales.67 
10.12.   The impact to other major semiconductor suppliers could be even worse. Chip gear firm 
Tokyo Electron revised its sales forecast down for this business year by 250 billion Y en, or roughly 
USD 1.8 billion, with half of the cut due to the new export curbs.68 Samsung Electronics, SK  Hynix , 
and TSMC, although being granted temporary exemptions, face an uncertain policy outlook with 
respect to their business operations in China.  
10.13.   The impact to the market as a whole could not come at a worse time as the sector is heading 
for a possible recession. According to news reports69,70, Micron, a maker of memory chips, reported 
a 20%  year-on-year fall in quarterly sales and plans to cut inves tments by more than 30% in 2024 . 
AMD, a chip designer, slashed its sales estimate for the third  quarter by 16%. SK  Hynix warned of 
an "unprecedented deterioration " in memory chip demand and said its investment in 2023 would  be 
cut by more than 50% after qu arterly profit s tumbled by 60%. The US  measure further dampened 
market demand and dented market confidence.  
10.14.   Furthermore, t he measures will interrupt the business and innovation cycle of the 
semiconductor industry. The semiconductor sector is an interdependent  and interlocking global 
ecosystem. Investment and productions are divided into different stages and established in different 
 
66 "New US  Export Controls to Challenge Semiconductor Companies ", 
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate -finance/new -us-export -controls -to-challenge -semiconductor 
companies -20-10-2022.  
67 "Why US tech controls on China could end up hurting American semiconductors ", 
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why -us-tech-controls -on-china -could -end-up-hurting -american -
semiconductors 193354968.html  
68 "Following U.S. on China chip export curbs would hit Japan's industry hard ", 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/11/17/business/us -chip-curbs -japan -impact/  
69 "The American chip industry’s $1.5trn meltdown, Thank the boom -and-bust cycle —and America' s 
government ", https://www.economist.com/business/2022/10/17/the -american -chip-industrys -15trn -meltdown  
70 "In 'unprecedented' global chip slump, SK Hynix to halve investment as recession looms "，
https://www.reuters.com/technology/sk -hynix -q3-profit -plunges -economic -downturn -hurts-chip-demand -
2022-10-25 G/C/M/144  
 
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  areas  of the world with proper comparative advantages. Cross -border trade connects the links in the 
chain and create s revenue that feeds into research and development. Market competitions create 
pressure and spur better performance, higher efficiency , and cooler innovations. This is a positive 
loop for economic growth and technology innovation.  
10.15.   However, this  business and innovation cycle is at risk of being picked apart, with the 
US sweeping tech controls, aimed at freezing China 's semiconductor development and dramatically 
limiting technology exchanges. Wiping out a major market and cutting out a supplier su ch as China 
from that chain is like throwing a huge wrench into the seamlessly running global semiconductor 
ecosystem.  
10.16.   It represents a myopic view with regard to  the development of the global semiconductor 
sector. By inhibiting market participation and com petition, revenue will be slashed , and innovations 
will happen at a much slower pace. To take the example of cell phone chips , since Huawei was put 
on an entity list and subject to foreign direct product rule in 2020, how long did it take for Qualcomm 
or Apple to issue a new generation of chips for mobile devices that significantly improved upon the 
previous generation?  
10.17.   The unilateral nature of the measures represent s an affront to the rule s-based multilateral 
trading system and general principles of intern ational law. The US  measures are unilateral to the 
extreme. The United States has  not only imposed export control s on China unliterally, without any 
basis in multilateral export control regimes, but  it has  also compelled other WTO Members to follow 
suit. In this way , it is as if the US not only violates the WTO  rules itself, but that it also bullies other 
WTO Members to violate the WTO  rules, at the cost of their legitimate interests, for the purpose of 
so-called "US national security ". 
10.18.   As a matter of gener al principle in international law, it is the sovereign right of states to 
decide what is in their national security interests. But w hat the United States does, with its so-called 
"Foreign Direct Product Rules ", is essentially to dictate its approach of using  export control s on China 
on other WTO  Members, thereby trespassing upon the sovereign rights of the Members concerned.  
10.19.   Underlying the US  approach is a cold war mentality, featuring a zero-sum game, picking 
sides, and building entrenched camps. But times have changed ; revisiting a cold war mentality is 
therefore good for no  one, and worse still for oneself.  
10.20.   The policy ramifications of the US  measures risk "technology decoupling " and bode ill for the 
world economy.  With rising geopolitical tensions affecting the semiconductor supply chain, 
"technology decoupling " often ma kes news headlines. No Member wants to see the semiconductor 
supply chain unwound, markets distorted , and comparative advantages skewed. Yet these are the 
policy ramifications of the US  measures , and they do not bode well for the world economy 's growth 
prospect s. 
10.21.   According to the IMF71, a world divided into trading blocs , if it came into being, would see 
annual permanent global losses estimated at 1.5 % of GDP, with losses for Asia and Pacific countries 
mounting to 3.3 % of GDP.  For some economies, these losses would un do all the gains from 
worldwide tariff reductions since 1990, including those from the Uruguay Round and preferential 
tariff reductions.  
10.22.   The WTO has reached similar conclusions. Citing a simulation by WTO  economists, 
WTO Director -General Ngozi Okonjo -Iweala warned that , if the world were to be fragment ed into 
two trading blocs, it would result in a 5%  loss of real global gro ss domestic product over the longer 
term. "We should remember that a fragmented world can be a very costly world, " she said.72 
10.23.   To conclude, China expresses its strong concern over US  unilateral measures and practices. 
Fighting trade wars and technology war s, artificially "building walls ", and forcing "decoupling ", 
completely violate market economy principles and disrupt international trade, which is good for no 
one, and worse still for  oneself. China opposes the politicization and weaponization of economic,  
 
71 "Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and the Pacific October 2022: Sailing into Headwinds ", 
28 October  2022, p.48 -49. 
72 "Rival trade blocs would lead to 'huge' global GDP loss: WTO chief ", https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor -s 
Picks/Interview/Rival -trade -blocs-would -lead-to-huge-global -GDP-loss-WTO-chief G/C/M/144  
 
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  trade, scientific , and technological exchanges. Therefore, China  calls upon the United States to 
correct the above -mentioned practices that violate the WTO  rules and the basic norms of 
international law, and jointly maintain the stability of the semicondu ctor global supply chain.  
10.24.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
10.25.   The CHIPS  Act consists of three  distinct initiatives: (i)  large-scale investments in 
leading -edge logic and memory manufacturing clusters; (ii)  expansion of manufacturing capacity for 
mature and current -generation chips, new and specialty technologies; and (iii)  initiatives to 
strengthen and advance US  leadership in R&D.  A successful CHIPS  program will respond to market 
signals, fill market gaps, and reduce in vestment risk to attract significant private capital.  
10.26.   As is clear from the text of the law, the contemplated support is consistent with the 
WTO Agreements, including the ASCM . The Subsidies Agreement does not have obligations with 
regard to restrictions on  eligibilities of entities receiving government support.  
10.27.   The US  Department of Commerce will implement certain restrictions to ensure that those 
who receive CHIPS  funds cannot compromise national security. Those national security restrictions 
are described in more detail in the Act.  Entities can choose whether or not to apply for incentives 
through the CHIPS  program, and thus be subject to the national security limitations.  It is important 
to note that the limitations in question on which entities can receiv e support reflect national security 
concerns.  The complete text of the CHIPS  Act of 2022 ( "the Act ") is available online.  The publicly 
available, published CHIPS  Act, explains in detail the initiative, including which entities and projects 
are eligible to receive support, and the types of support that they are eligible to receive.  The 
CHIPS  program has a website dedicated to publicly sharing information at www.chips.gov . On this 
public website, the US  Department of Comme rce has published its initial implementation strategy.  
10.28.   In addition, the US  Department of Commerce has issued multiple requests for information 
on the semiconductor industry and on implementation of the CHIPS  Act, which provided an 
opportunity for intereste d parties to submit information. The requests, and the comments received 
in response, are available at www.regulations.gov . Going forward, the US  expect s that there will be 
more opportunities for public comment , with corresponding access to those comments.  
10.29.   The United States  would note that China also has a semiconductor program. In particular, 
the national IC  fund, started in 2014, which has never been notified. In addition, China has numerous 
programs at the centr al and sub -central levels of government in the form of government guidance 
funds, none of which have been notified.  Finally, the  United States does not believe that the 
WTO Council for Trade in Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues relat ed to na tional 
security, including export controls.  
10.30.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
10.31.   China appreciates the intervention from the United States. R egarding several points 
mentioned by the US , China wishes to deliver a few comments, leaving  aside the issue of 
transparency on which China will make a  separate  intervention under Agenda Item  15. As for the 
so-called "national security ", used as an excuse for a slew of export control measures on China, it  
has bee n noted that the security exemption  has been interpreted in a constrained and narrow way 
by the D ispute Settlement Body (DSB) . Namely,  its provisions shall be invoked and applied in a very 
cautious manner so as to avoid unnecessary tensions among trading p artners  in a time that calls for 
collaboration and mutual trust for combat ing many of the common challenges facing us  all. As 
Members know, the CHIPS  Act of 202 2 blatantly requires a covered entity to disengage certain 
business activities with China for th e consideration of national security while , in stark contrast to 
this, China has noticed that several provisions of the Act intend to shore up the production chain to 
the US  demotic markets , as stated by the Secretary of the US  Department of Commerce, Gina  
Raimondo, on the website www.chips.gov . Thus, we have reason to doubt the real purpose of  the 
act. In conclusion, in the context of mounting global challenges, China  urge the US to implement its 
measures in the semiconductor sector in a way consistent with the WTO  rules, avoiding bringing a 
heavy blow to the global supply chain and injur ing trade.  
10.32.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  11  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia.  
11.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
11.3.  Australia values its mutually beneficial trade relationship with China . This includes the benefits 
that flow from a stable, predictable, and open global trading system , which is a key driver of 
prosperity for all WTO  Members , as well as from the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement, and the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Pa rtnership. This is why Australia wishes to see the ongoing 
concerns resolved.  
11.4.  By now, Members know Australia 's concerns regarding China 's trade disruptive and restrictive 
measures  well, as these are concerns that Australia has consistently raised in the WTO since 
November  2020.  Australia  believe s that China 's formal and informal practices go beyond what can 
reasonably be called "normal inspection and quarantine measures ", or changes in ma rket demand.  
11.5.  To remind Members, Australian commodities have been variously subject to the following 
measures: (i) quantitative restrictions such as de facto import bans; (ii) the imposition of unjustified 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties; (iii) increased and arbitrary border testing and inspections, 
including delays, applied without prior notification; or (iv) unwarranted delays in listing and re -listing 
export establishments, and in issuing import licences.  
11.6.  Such measures continue to affect a wide ran ge of Australian products, some of which have 
been impacted for over two  years . Furthermore, the measures have not been implemented in a 
transparent manner. To reiterate, the products affected include barley, coal, copper ores and 
concentrates, cotton, log s, rock lobsters, bottled wine, hay , and meat.  
11.7.  Australia  continue s to raise its concerns here  in the Council , and in other committees, because 
these actions continue to impede Australian exports to China, and because we have not yet had the 
opportunity to work through with Chinese officials any concerns China may have around the products 
at issue. A lack of clear guidance and advice on pathways to lift or resolve these trade disruptive 
and restrictive measures continues to be of concern to Australia.  
11.8.  Austra lia remains open to working bilaterally with China, including under our Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership, and look s forward to constructive engagement with the Chinese authorities to 
ensure  that these issues are resolved as quickly as possible.  
11.9.  The dele gate of Japan  indicated the following:  
11.10.   As mentioned at the Council 's previous meeting, Japan shares the concerns expressed by 
Australia that China 's trade measures, including its trade remedy measures, should be implemented 
within the framework of the WTO  Agreements, and that they should comply with the relevant 
WTO Agreements with regard to the procedures and fact -finding.  As Members pointed out during 
China 's most recent Trade Po licy Review , government measures by China conducted in an informal 
or undisclosed manner are problematic in terms of China 's WTO  Accession Protocol, as well as in 
relation to the WTO 's transparency principle. Japan  believe s that it is important that China ensure 
transparency for its relevant measures.  If China implements trade measures in an arbitrary manner , 
as reported, this conflicts with the free, fair , and rules -based international trading system. Japan 
hopes that China will respond to Australia 's conc erns in good faith and a timely manner.  
11.11.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
11.12.   Canada continues to share the systemic concerns of other Members with regard to the trade 
disruptive and restrictive measures adopted by China. Canada refers to its  previous intervention on 
this item, which remains valid.  China 's lack of transparency and predictability in its application of 
SPS measures continue unnecessarily and negatively to impact agricultural trade, restricting 
Canada 's exports of food, plant , and an imal products. Canadian exporters also continue to 
experience significant undue delays with China 's approval procedures.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  11.13.   Canada remains concerned with China 's trade disruptive and restrictive measures impacting 
agricultural trade, including with regard to the following: China 's COVID -19 measures on food 
imports; Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) -related trade restrictions; ongoing challenges 
with the regi stration approval process in the online C IFER system; as well as systemic and undue 
delays with China 's approval process for Canadian food establishments, new market access requests, 
and the reinstatement of suspended establishments.  China 's maintenance of  trade restrictions and 
its unwillingness to engage at a technical level to address trade issues is evidence of continuing 
arbitrary trade barriers.  The use of trade disruptive and coercive measures challenges and 
destabilizes the rules -based international  trading system from which China, Canada,  and all 
WTO Members have benefited.  
11.14.   Canada  encourage s all WTO  Members, including China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  
11.15.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.16.   As stated in previous meetings,  the European Union shares Australia 's concerns with regard 
to the matters Australia is once again raising in this Council  on China 's implementation of trade 
disruptive and restrictive measures.  On this occasion, the European Union  wishes once again to 
reiterate the same points of principle and of law  as on previous occasions . The EU continues to be 
concerned by the form, number and wide -ranging effects which these measures allegedly seem to 
have. As regards the form, informal, unpublished , and non -transpar ent trade restrictions are not in 
line with the WTO 's rules and spirit.  The European Union also speaks out against the alleged purpose 
of the measures in question, which appears to be coercive, placing the measures, if they exist, into 
incompatibility with  general international law.  Within the European Union, the legislative proposal 
for an anti -coercion instrument is progressing in the EU's legislature.  In addition , the European Union 
pursues a WTO  dispute with China in relation to a range of measures negatively affecting EU trade 
with China, and  where there also appears to be such a coercive intention.  
11.17.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
11.18.   Chinese Taipei  wishes to echo the concerns  raised by Australia regarding China 's 
implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures targeting a broad range of Australian 
goods.  China 's trade measures, which seem designed to hamper certain Members ' trade interests, 
whether imposed formally  or taken by the direction or instruction of its authorities, seem to be based 
on unrelated bilateral issues. These measures systemically undermine the rules -based multilateral 
trading system, and create a negative trade impact, not only on Australia,  but on all other 
WTO Members  as well . Chinese Taipei  therefore call s upon China to engage in dialogue  with the 
relevant WTO  Members  in good faith , and in a constructive manner, in order to resolve their 
legitimate trade concerns, and for China to uphold its co mmitments to the principles and obligations 
of the WTO  rules.  
11.19.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
11.20.   New Zealand holds a systemic interest in the concerns expressed on this topic by Australia 
and other WTO  Members. New Zealand continues to co mment on this matter, as it shares the view 
that China is yet to satisfactorily address the concerns raised by Members under this agenda item.  
11.21.   As New Zealand has repeatedly noted in a number of for ums, the multilateral rules -based 
trading system provides that all Members, regardless of their size or trading capacity, are subject to 
the same rights and obligations.  This provides the predictability and certainty necessary to ensure 
that trade can take place efficiently and with the least friction po ssible.  And g iven the challenges all 
Members are facing as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic and other disruptions, the certainty 
provided by the multilateral trading system is more important than ever.  
11.22.   If Members step away from their commitments, or adopt  remedies or other measures 
provided for under the WTO  Agreements in an arbitrary manner and for unrelated purposes, this will 
undermine the predictability and certainty on which the system rests. It will also reflect on 
perceptions of the Member undertaki ng such actions.  The adoption of measures by WTO  Members 
that cause widespread disruption to trade and lack transparency cause serious concern to New 
Zealand, including actions taken by China against a range of exports from Australia and other 
WTO Members.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  11.23.   New Zealand encourages Members to comply fully with their WTO  obligations, including in 
the application of trade remedies and the obligation to apply them in good faith.  
11.24.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
11.25.   The United States shares Australia 's concerns, and remains deeply troubled by the 
information provided by Australia, which  the US has also heard from other credible sources.  The 
United States  again register s systemic concerns with the broad range of restrictive measures, bo th 
formal and informal, that China has imposed on certain Australian goods in an inappropriate manner. 
In this connection, the US is also concerned by reports that Chinese authorities have informally 
instructed importers not to purchase certain goods.  
11.26.   As noted previously, China 's actions are not isolated to Australia. There are many instances 
of China using these harmful non -market practices against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation for 
unconnected bilateral issues, including China 's discrimination agains t Lithuanian goods and 
EU products with Lithuanian content.  It is important to identify similarly coercive actions taken by 
China against other Members, as they demonstrate a broader pattern of behaviour. Specifically, 
China uses, or threatens to use, arbi trary or unjustifiable trade actions to pressure or influence the 
legitimate decision -making of sovereign governments.  
11.27.   China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system, " but its actions speak 
for themselves. China continues to exploit th e rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or 
breaking rules in order to inflict harm on others to advance its geopolitical and economic ends.  
China 's failure to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles threatens and undermines the 
rules-based multilateral trading system and harms relations between its Members.  
11.28.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
11.29.   The United Kingdom wishes to again show support for Australia 's concerns and emphasize 
the UK 's disappointment that there has b een no adequate response from China on this issue.  
WTO Members must adhere to the fundamental principles and objectives of free and fair trade that 
underpin the rules -based multilateral trading system. Neither China nor any other Member benefits 
when these  rules are undermined for political motive s. The United Kingdom therefore ask s that China 
duly acts to provide clarifications to the points raised by Australia so that a solution may be reached 
in a timely manner.  
11.30.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
11.31.   China wishes to refer to its statements made during previous meetings of various 
WTO bodies.  China wishes to reiterate that the relevant measures it has taken against certain 
Australian products aim to protect the legitimate right s and interests of China 's domestic industries 
and the health and safety of its consumers. The business decisions made by Chinese companies are 
based on market and demand conditions. All these measures are in line with Chinese laws and 
regulations, interna tional practices , the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement, and the WTO rules.  
11.32.   China and Australia have tremendous potential in  terms of their  economic and trade 
cooperation. In 2021, the bilateral trade between China and Australia grew rapidly , by 35.1%, 
reaching USD 231 billion. From January to October  2022, bilateral trade has remained relatively 
stable , at USD 184 billion. China  hopes that Australia will continue to work together with China  to 
strengthen our economic and trade cooperation.  
11.33.   China  takes note, with concern , that the United States, in its statement , referred again to 
China 's legitimate measures as so-called "coercive actions ". As it has  said at previous meetings, 
China firmly opposes coercive actions. Actually , it is the United States that has been widely using 
coercive actions to pursue its various objectives. According to the report, "The United States of 
Sanctions, the Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion ", during President Barack Obama 's first  term, 
the United  States designated an average of 500  entities for sanctions per year. That figure nearly 
doubled over the course of Donald Trump 's presidency.  
11.34.   In addition to this shocking figure, the United States also has recourse to various coercive 
economic tools. A re port, "America 's Use of Coercive Economic Statecraft ", produced a summary of G/C/M/144  
 
- 40 - 
 
  these tools . One of the key takeaways of this report indicates  that "US policymakers will continue to 
intensively use a growing array of coercive economic tools, including tariffs , sanctions, trade 
controls, and investment restrictions. The growing use reflects a desire by policymakers to use 
coercive economic tools in support of a growing range of policy objectives ". 
11.35.   While these academic reports give us a general picture of US  coercive actions, this Council 
is probably more familiar with the following specific trade measures:  (i) the United States  
implemented Section  232 tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminium  to many Members to force 
them to agree to import quotas and to create negotiating leverage to realize US policy objectives ; 
(ii) the US revived Section  301 and launched 301  investigations against many WTO  Members for 
various issues, such as Foreign Digital Service Taxes, valuation of a Member 's currency, certain 
subsidies to the civil aircraft industry, and technology transfer ; and (iii)  the United States abused 
export control measures in the semiconductor i ndustry to force not only US  companies, but also 
other Members ' companies , from engaging in normal trade and investment with China, which is 
seriously disrupting the global supply chain.  
11.36.   WTO Members  often hear the United States criticizing other Members ' measures for 
undermining the rules -based multilateral trading system. However, US actions clearly speak for 
themselves . China hopes that the US could practice what it preaches and cease all its coercive 
actions against other Members.  
11.37.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
12  NIGERIA – RESTRICTIVE POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
BRAZIL  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Brazil.  
12.2.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
12.3.  Brazil recognizes the importance of fostering national agricultural production, especially that 
relating to the livelihoods of small, family, and medium -sized farmers, who are the producers given 
priority in Brazil 's agricultural policies. However, it is against the letter and spirit of the Covered 
Agreements for Members to pursue this goal through restrictive policies that are tantamount to 
import bans.  
12.4.  Brazil has raised several concerns both at the Committee on Agric ulture (CoA) and at the 
SPS Committee regarding a number of issues relating to Nigeria 's restrictive policies. To illustrate, 
a decade ago, Brazil was contributing to Nigeria 's food security through exports of rice, which 
increased overall supply and helpe d to keep prices in check. However, s ince 2014/2015, when 
Nigeria banned the use of foreign exchange to imports, Brazil 's exports have consistently decreased, 
reaching zero since 2018. And despite several enquiries by Brazil at the CoA, no answer has been 
provided by Nigeria.  
12.5.  At the SPS  Committee, Brazil has asked Nigeria about its refusal to launch negotiations for 
the establishment of SPS  requirements for the import of several products. Likewise, no answer has 
been provided to Brazil 's enquiries  thus far . More recently, during the most recent meeting of the  
SPS Committee, Nigeria affirmed that there would be no restrictive SPS  measures in force against 
Brazil. In response, Brazil mentioned that, failing to react to its proposals was a clear breach against 
Articles  2, 5, 7, 8, and Annex  C of the SPS  Agreement.  
12.6.  As stated in paragraph  2 of the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food 
Insecurity, "trade, along with domestic production, plays a vital role in improving global food security 
in all its dimensions and enhancing nutrition ". Therefore , trade should not be treated as the villain, 
but as an ally to food security and prosperity. For these reasons, Brazil urges Nigeria to revisit both 
international law and academic evidence on the issue, a nd to lift the restrictions imposed on its 
imports of agricultural products.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  12.7.  The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
12.8.  Nigeria has provided its response to the questions posed by Members on this issue in previous 
meetings of this Council, as well as  in the CoA. Today, Brazil has indicated that Nigeria has not 
responded despite the fact that Nigeria has provided replies, including in the questions and answers 
in the AG -IMS. Regarding the discussions in the SPS  Committee, Nigeria replied to Brazil that  the 
restrictions it has in place have nothing to do with SPS. They are not SPS  measures, and are not 
restricting trade on SPS  grounds, so we do not see the SPS  Committee as the forum for these 
discussions. Nigeria's government is currently reviewing the q uestions concerning the restrictions 
on Brazilian products which are not being restricted on the basis of e -certificates. Nevertheless, 
Brazil continues to place this issue on the Council's agenda even though we have provided responses 
on several occasions . 
12.9.  Nigeria imposed temporary import restrictions on a few agricultural products to address its 
economic development, balance -of-payments, and national security difficulties. These measures are 
taken within the framework of Article  XII of the GATT  1994; para graph  4(a) of Article  XVIII of the 
GATT  1994; Section  B of Article  XVIII of the GATT (paragraph  8 to 12 of Article  XVIII); and 
Article  XXI of the GATT, to address Nigeria's extraordinary economic development and 
balance -of-payment difficulties, as well as its national security challenges.  
12.10.   Nigeria's currency, the Naira, has come under record pressure due to unprecedented scarcity 
of foreign exchange  in Nigeria's economy. This is due to the sharp decline in demand and production 
of oil in  recent years, which has negatively impacted upon Nigeria's external reserves. Oil is Nigeria's 
main source of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. The situation has been further 
exacerbated by the COVID -19 pandemic, which has triggered exceptional reversals in c apital flows 
as a result of decreased global risk appetite. These developments have significantly weakened 
Nigeria's ability to finance its imports, undermined its balance -of-payments position, and increased 
Nigeria's chances of defaulting on its sovereign  debt if timely and appropriate measures are not 
taken. Nigeria is also saddled with severe livelihood and extreme poverty difficulties, with over 62% 
of Nigeria's population of 211  million people still living in conditions of extreme poverty. This 
situati on, as well as Nigeria's high rate of unemployment (32.5% as at 2021), has triggered 
exponential increases in social ills and terrorism, which have further worsened Nigeria's national 
security situation.  
12.11.   Nigeria's current difficulties notwithstanding, the Government of Nigeria is working 
assiduously to address Nigeria's economic development, balance of payment, and national security 
difficulties with a view to phasing out this temporary measure as soon as possible.  
12.12.   The Council took note  of the statements ma de. 
13  UNITED KINGDOM – UK ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FOREST RISK COMMODITIES – 
REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND INDONESIA  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Brazil and Indonesia.  
13.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the f ollowing:  
13.3.  Indonesia wishes once again to raise its concerns regarding the UK  Environmental Act, 
particularly those relating to the implementation of due diligence on forest risk commodities. 
Indonesia understands that one of the policies in the UK  Environm ental Act regulates the prohibition 
of imports of commodities that have the potential to cause deforestation. To be able to prove that 
imported goods are free from deforestation, business actors are required to carry out due diligence, 
namely by gathering information, as well as conducting risk assessment and mitigation.  
13.4.  Indonesia perceives that the obligation to exercise due diligence will potentially create 
restrictions on imported products and potentially violate Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, where 
WTO Members are prohibited from imposing prohibitions or restrictions, other than tariffs, taxes, or 
other duties. In addition, they are also prohibited from imposing other restrictions that can be in the 
form of quotas, import or export permits, or other poli cies related to import and export commodities. 
Furthermore, referring to Article  XX of the GATT  1994, WTO  Members can apply restrictive policies, G/C/M/144  
 
- 42 - 
 
  as long as the intended policy aim is to protect the safety or health of humans, animals or plants, 
which must  be proven based on: (i)  legitimate objective; and (ii)  the implemented policies are not 
more restrictive than necessary.  
13.5.  Indonesia requests more detailed information from the United Kingdom on its rationale and 
basis in selecting commodities to be used as  policy objects, as well as clarifications regarding the 
scientific evidence considered and used by the UK in developing its policies.  
13.6.  Indonesia perceives that the UK  Environmental Act could cause trade diversion to other 
WTO Members that do not have major  forestry responsibilities, and especially to developing 
countries, which should be subject to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as 
stated in the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFC CC). 
13.7.  Finally, Indonesia wishes to reiterate that the due diligence on forest risk commodities 
obligation contained in the UK  Environmental Act also has the potential to generate very large 
additional costs and create barriers to international trade.  
13.8.  The de legate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
13.9.  Brazil shares the objective of protecting ecosystems, understanding that they will be better 
protected if governments cooperate with one another, and if this cooperation is based on the 
observance of local law and territoriality. Brazil particularly shares the United Kingdom 's concern 
about illegal deforestation and notes that, at COP26, Brazil committed itself to eradicating this 
activity from its national territory by 2028.  This pledge has been renewed and strengt hened by 
President Lula at COP27.  
13.10.   The Brazilian government believes that improving the sustainability of international 
agricultural trade should be a result of the dissemination of best production practices to all rural 
producers. In line with their common  but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change, 
developed countries ought to support developing countries to achieve this goal, implementing the 
commitments made in different multilateral environmental agreements, particularly through 
financ ing, training, and technology transfer for conservation and sustainable production actions.  
13.11.   Brazil believes that the conciliation and cooperation efforts undertaken by Brazil with the 
United Kingdom in different formats, including the Forests, Agriculture and Commodity Trade  (FACT) 
Dialogue, is one  possible way forward. Implementing trade -restrictive measures will hardly help to 
solve the problem. In Brazil 's view, collaborative initiatives between producer and consumer 
countries would be far more successfu l than unilateral restrictive measures in terms of promoting 
sustainable value chains, reducing deforestation associated with the illegal conversion of forests and 
other ecosystems into arable land, and generating long -lasting advances in global agricultur al trade.  
13.12.   In particular, Brazil takes this opportunity to express its concerns about the following aspects 
of the UK  proposal.  
13.13.   The definition of the scope of application of this secondary legislation in relation to the 
impacted countries could be considere d discriminatory, as it will require measures almost exclusively 
from developing countries with tropical climates, which have managed, in their own processes of 
development over the last few centuries, to preserve their natural forests.  
13.14.   In the case of Brazil, it should be taken into account that more than 60% of its territory is 
covered by native vegetation and that almost 80% of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest is intact. 
Furthermore, Brazil notably has some of the world 's most stringent en vironmental protection 
legislation, in addition to being one of the most environmentally monitored countries, due to large 
domestic investments and international partnerships.  
13.15.   Among the possible consequences of such discrimination is trade diversion toward s imports 
of similar products from third  countries that will receive more favourable treatment under British 
law for not having preserved their natural forest cover to the same extent as the targeted countries. 
Furthermore, those countries would not be req uired to provide new information to their supply chain 
to support UK  businesses in applying the regulations and not being subject to import bans.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  13.16.   The definition of forest used in the Environment Act is reportedly in line with the definition 
of forest used by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). However, it 
omits an essential aspect of that multilaterally agreed definition, namely the minimum tree height, 
which should be above five  metres. By omitting this fundamental aspect of the definition, which is 
also included in the definition of forest used by the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), the British government is distorting the concept of forest and therefore creating a 
situation of conceptual uncertainty,  which could lead to arbitrariness in the implementation of the 
due diligence process.  
13.17.   In addition, it should be noted that the due diligence operation will be highly costly. Due 
diligence could, in practice, have the same effect as a prohibitive tariff on products imported from 
countries discriminated against under the scope of the secondary legislation. The increased costs 
will inform the decision -making process of UK  importers, who may stop their imports if they deem 
the prices exces sively high or the requirements overly burdensome, with possible undesirable 
consequences for international supply chains, including  for the wider international economy, and 
especially  for the food security of the population.  
13.18.   It is not clear to what extent  the additional costs incurred by supply -side companies  will be 
taken into account, in addition to the time needed to adapt to the different scenarios in the markets 
of origin. Nor is it clear whether, similar to the exemptions to be granted by the British  government 
to local companies, there will be exemptions for small and medium -sized companies, especially in 
exporting countries. Difficulties in complying with the requirements to be adopted may entail the 
risk of disruption to trade flows and an uncertai n scenario for commercial operators, who could incur 
costs with no guarantee that the British authorities will consider the legal requirements to have been 
met. 
13.19.   The above -mentioned costs would be disproportionately higher for smaller, lower -income 
producer s if the burden of due diligence were passed on to them by importers in the UK. This could 
have a negative social impact on developing countries by increasing poverty levels and related social 
problems.  Finally, considering that the public consultation per iod for the secondary legislation is 
over, Brazil asks that the contributions by the Brazilian government and Brazilian associations 
receive a fair share of attention.  
13.20.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
13.21.   Paraguay wishes to register its concer n and support to this agenda item. Paraguay is 
following with keen interest the developments of the legislative process in the United Kingdom 
regarding this initiative.  
13.22.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
13.23.   Argentina is closely monitoring the United Kingdom 's legislative process, in particular its 
compatibility with WTO  rules.  The Forestry Commodities Act is a unilateral measure that is likely to 
affect trade and be discriminatory because of the high costs that it can generate in terms of 
enforcement, even for those Members  that already meet strict standards in this area.  Argentina  
wishes to reiterate that all unilateral measures pursuing an environmental objective must be 
designed and implemented with a high degree of cautiou sness  and precautio n with regard to their 
consequences for developing and least developed Members , and should, above all, be considered in 
the light of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
13.24.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
13.25.   India remain s concerned over the way that environmental measures are being implemented 
by the United Kingdom. India continue s to study the various proposals and urge s the UK not to 
undertake trade restrictive measures while citing environmental objectives.  
13.26.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
13.27.   The Government of Nigeria also wishes to raise its concerns with respect to certain 
environmental measures that can restrict trade. Nigeria will continue to monitor the developments 
on this issue. Currently,  Nigeria has seen an increase in the introduction of these environmental G/C/M/144  
 
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  protection policies that continue to undermine the competitiveness of African businesses when they 
export to develop country markets. In Nigeria's view, they constitute a new form of trade 
protectionism. Nigeria has also raised concerns and expresses its interest in similar measures that 
have been introduced by the EU, but we will raise them under the corresponding agenda items.  
13.28.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the followin g: 
13.29.   The United Kingdom wishes to thank Indonesia, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and India, for 
their continued interest in the due diligence provisions in the UK's Environment Act  2021. As set out 
in the United Kingdom's previous responses to the Council on this matter, the UK's due diligence 
legislation is part of a wider package of measures. That package aims to improve the sustainability 
of supply chains and contribute to the international commitments made at COP26 to work collectively 
to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030.  
13.30.   The United Kingdom believes that the introduction of due diligence measures to tackle illegal 
deforestation in UK  supply chains will complement global, national, and local efforts to protect forests 
and other ecosy stems.  The UK held a consultation on this measure from 3  December  2021 to 
11 March  2022 to inform its development.  
13.31.   A summary of the consultation responses was published on 1  June 2022, and the United 
Kingdom thanks those WTO  Members that contributed to th e consultation. As the UK works towards 
implementation of the Environment Act provisions, it continues to ensure compliance with its trade 
obligations. The UK is happy to continue discussions with interested parties as it finalizes and 
implements the measu res. 
13.32.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
14  AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
14.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
14.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its deep concern regarding the illegal and unjusti fied trade 
restrictive measures imposed by Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States in respect of Russia.  As the Russian 
Federation has already stated, these restrictive measures incl ude import and export bans on Russian 
products, the imposition of additional tariffs, restrictive measures imposed on Russia 's largest banks, 
insurance agencies, transportation companies, export support agencies, industrial companies, 
Russian seaports, leg al and natural persons, and including the top management and owners of 
Russia 's largest companies.  All these measures have been introduced not only illegally, but also 
without any regard for the consequences for the world economy. They have already immense ly 
affected trade in goods and provoked global economic, energy, and food crises.  
14.4.  Russia is the third  largest oil and the second  largest natural gas producer in the world, as well 
as the world 's largest oil and gas exporter. Unilateral measures against Rus sian oil, petroleum 
products , and gas producers, and Russia's financial sector, as well as pressure on international 
transportation, trading companies , and foreign governments not to work with the Russian oil and 
gas sector has led to an increase in oil an d gas prices on the global market.  
14.5.  The Russian Federation would also like to note that oil restrictive measures are applied not 
only to Russia, but to third  countries as well. For example, it is clearly stated in the E uropean Union's 
act that "it shall be prohibited to transport, including through ship -to-ship transfers, to 
third countries crude oil falling under CN  code 2709 00, as of 5  December  2022, or petroleum 
products falling under CN  code 2710, as of 5  February  2023, […] which originate in R ussia or which 
have been exported from Russia ". G/C/M/144  
 
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  14.6.  Taking into account that Russia is one of the largest suppliers of energy products to the world 
market, imposition of restrictions on these products automatically leads to higher prices and a 
deepening econom ic crisis.  High energy prices translate into higher consumer prices across the full 
board of products, including food, fuelling inflation expectations and slowing global economic growth.  
As for the food crisis, the Russian Federation underlines that it is both a major producer and exporter 
of wheat and fertilizers.  
14.7.  Notwithstanding the exclusion of these products from direct restrictions, Russian exports and 
imports of these most essential products are facing indirect measures, such as bans on the use of 
foreign seaports, and measures against companies and individuals that include asset freeze s and a 
prohibition to deal with such persons.  Taking into account current as well as planned restrictions 
against Russia, international transportation, trading companie s, foreign banks , and insurance 
companies are coerced to refuse to work with Russian exporters, including those of food, energy , 
and fertilizers. Foreign governments are also coerced to drop any engagement with Russia, including 
buying its energy resources . 
14.8.  Unilateral trade restrictive measures result in increased transaction costs and de facto 
quantitative restrictions on Russian supplies of food and fertilizers leading to global food shortages 
and price hikes . According to the IFPRI, imports of fertilizer s from Russia have decreased by more 
than 30% to EU  countries , and 14% to the world.  
14.9.  Previously, members of the so -called "collective West " have stated numerous times that their 
unilateral restrictive measures do not affect the trade in agricultural produc ts, as well as fertilizers. 
However, on 29  August, the European Union published an updated text of clarifications on the 
application of sanctions against Russian fertilizers and agricultural products. It clearly contradicts 
the EU 's statements about not ap plying restrictions on trade in agricultural products and fertilizers 
of Russian origin.  The Russian Federation would like to draw Members ' attention to the fact that 
these clarifications are not a legal act, contrary to the EU  Regulation. Thus, these clar ifications 
cannot be considered as sufficient guarantees for economic operators. Therefore, the risk of 
overcompliance still exists.  
14.10.   Such a vast and outright violation of WTO  rules is a massive blow to the WTO  system. It 
undermines the role of the WTO as a  pillar of international trade rules and shows that no Member is 
safe from such vast, unjustified , and unlawful measures in the future.  
14.11.   The Russian Federation expresses its concern over the attempt to replace the system of 
global economic governance with u nilateral restrictive measures of extraterritorial scope. Despite 
different pretexts for such destructive policies they in fact put the prospects for global economic 
growth at serious risk and disproportionally hit developing countries. Being of a complex nature, 
these measures already have systemic negative implications on global value chains, international 
markets, and the stability of the price level. In this context, the Russian Federation calls on  the 
WTO Members in question  to restore the smooth funct ioning of the WTO and urges them to 
immediately lift their unilateral trade restrictive measures, including those with extraterritorial 
implications, and to stop their coercive actions aimed at forcing other WTO  Members to follow suit.  
14.12.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
14.13.   The United Kingdom will not ignore Russia's futile attempts to disinform, divert, and distract 
Members regarding the impacts of their illegal invasion of Ukraine. Because what we have just heard 
from Russia is i ndeed an attempt to distance themselves from the responsibility that they alone bear 
for the impact of their chosen war on global trade and food security. The UK therefore welcomes this 
opportunity to continue correcting Russia's lies, just as the UK conti nues to condemn, in the 
strongest possible terms, Russia's illegal war.  
14.14.   To set the context: the impact of Russia's actions on global food supplies is stark. The facts 
speak for themselves. Citing a global emergency of unprecedented magnitude, the UN  World Food 
Programme's Executive Director has said that close to 70  million people are being pushed closer to 
starvation by the war in Ukraine. And Russia's illegal war continues to affect commodity prices across 
the world, with Russia's unilateral decision to m anipulate energy supplies as the most significant 
factor inflating prices across the globe. This is further exacerbating the food crisis. Indeed 
UNCTAD  calculations estimate that, on average, more than 5% of the import basket of the poorest G/C/M/144  
 
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  countries are l ikely to face a price -hike due to Russia's invasion. So the United Kingdom recognizes 
that it is lower income countries that will continue to be most exposed to the consequences of 
Russia's invasion, and the measures being taken by the UK to support them w ill be addressed 
shortly.  
14.15.   Against this context, firstly: the United Kingdom wants to counter the disinformation just 
heard from the Russian Federation on the UK's  sanctions. The UK wants to be clear that, in 
implementing its own sanctions, it has been cons istent that its measures do not target food or 
fertilizer exports from Russia to third  countries. To the contrary, the UK's sanctions include clear 
mitigations to prevent an impact on Russian food exports.  
14.16.   Secondly: the United Kingdom wants to turn to Russ ia's attempt to distract and divert from 
its own impact on the food crisis because, in direct contrast to the UK's approach, it is Putin who is 
weaponizing food. Indeed, before Russia's invasion in February, Ukraine was the fifth  largest 
exporter of grain in the world, meeting the needs of hundreds of millions of people worldwide. This 
all changed on 24  February, when Russia began its destruction of Ukrainian farms and agricultural 
infrastructure, including transportation and storage, which has damaged regi onal and global supplies 
and driven up prices across the world.  
14.17.   And while simultaneously collapsing Ukraine 's capabilities, the Russian Federation has 
unilaterally introduced numerous measures on the export of its own agricultural and fertilizer 
products.  Russia's export measures and bans have included white sugar, raw cane sugar, wheat, 
rye, meslin, barley, corn, and rice. Russia has also introduced export measures against sunflower 
oil and rapeseed oil, and sunflower seeds and rapeseed seeds. An d these are Russia's unilateral 
measures, exacerbating global shortages; and only Russia can remove them all.  
14.18.   The United Kingdom is taking action to support those that are affected by Russia's actions. 
The UK is working with international partners to prior itize support to the most vulnerable people 
facing food insecurity. The UK has pledged over USD  20 million to improve the effective use of 
fertilizer and increase food production in vulnerable countries, and approximately USD  178 million 
towards humanitari an crises in East Africa. The UK supports the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which 
has enabled the World Food Programme to support vulnerable populations across the world.  
14.19.   The United Kingdom will continue to back Ukraine in its vital role supporting the food security 
of millions of people worldwide. But peace is the only way in which the global economy can truly 
return to stability. The United Kingdom has spoken at length about the impact of Russia's chosen 
war on trade across the world. In closing, and to be clear, the UK condemns, in the strongest possible 
terms, Russia's strikes on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Because there can be no 
excuse for such a series of attacks on a sovereign nation, including targeting those who cannot 
defend th emselves, and those who are most at risk from the consequences of Putin's war. To 
conclude, the United Kingdom will continue to stand alongside Ukraine for as long as it takes. Russia 
will be held accountable.  
14.20.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated th e following:  
14.21.   The United States condemns Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked, and illegal aggression 
against independent and sovereign Ukraine, and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause. 
This most recent campaign attacking Ukraine's energy inf rastructure as winter approaches is simply 
appalling. The US will spare no efforts to hold President Putin and the architects and supporters of 
this aggression accountable for their actions. The US underlines its resolve to impose severe 
economic and finan cial consequences on Russia. As the United States has said before, Russia is 
complaining about a situation that it has created, and is trying to shift the blame for the death and 
destruction that it has created.  
14.22.   Russia started this war; Russia perpetuates this war; Russia illegally tried to annex parts of 
Ukraine; Russia continues to destroy Ukraine's agricultural and energy infrastructure; and Russia 
continues to spread disinformation that western sanctions are causing food insecurity when we have 
made it quite clear that banks, insurers, shippers, and other actors can continue to bring Russian 
food and fertilizer to the world. In short, Russia, with support from Belarus's complicity, is 
responsible for much of the devastation and disruption being felt arou nd the world.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  14.23.   The United States will continue to condemn Putin's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustified war 
against Ukraine. The US will continue to support Ukraine's courageous efforts to defend itself, uphold 
its territorial integrity, and protect its popul ation. The US will continue to work with its partners and 
allies to sustain and intensify international pressure on President Putin's regime, and its enablers in 
Belarus, for as long as necessary.  
14.24.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
14.25.   New Ze aland supports the statements made by other Members before us. New Zealand 
continues unequivocally to condemn Russia's illegal and unprovoked attack on Ukraine. The actions 
of President Putin are a grave breach of international rules; and the use of force to change borders 
is strictly prohibited under international law, as is targeting of civilians. New Zealand is appalled by 
reports of the devastating and indiscriminate attacks on Ukraine's population by Russian troops, 
including evidence of crimes against  humanity and war crimes, as well as the destruction of civilian 
infrastructure, including the energy grid, hospitals, schools, and homes. New Zealand will spare no 
effort in holding those responsible for this aggression to account.  
14.26.   As New Zealand has hear d clearly, it is Russia's invasion of Ukraine that has seriously 
undermined global peace, security, and economic stability, as well as creating uncertainty and 
volatility in world food pricing and supply.  
14.27.   New Zealand has joined the international community in applying sanctions in a transparent 
manner. Information on the Russia Sanctions Act that was passed by the New Zealand Government 
on 8 March  2022 is publicly available on the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
website. Sanctions under the  Act are a direct response to Russia's illegal war of aggression, and are 
not intended to disrupt trade in essential goods. New Zealand remains united with the international 
community to hold those responsible for violations of humanitarian and internation al law to account. 
Imposing sanctions on Russia is a means to bring an end to this war. New Zealand stands in full 
solidarity with Ukraine and its people and reaffirms its unwavering support for the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of U kraine.  
14.28.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
14.29.   As a result of the Russian Federation's unprovoked, unjustified, and illegal war of aggression 
in Ukraine, Canada continues not to engage with Russia's delegation to the WTO in a 
business -as-usual fas hion. No amount of misinformation can hide Russia's culpability; Russia is 
solely responsible for this crisis, not Western sanctions, which are only designed to stop Russia's 
unjust and brutal war in Ukraine. Russia's efforts to blame Western sanctions for  the cause of these 
crises are simply attempts to re -direct the narrative away from its own actions.  
14.30.   Canada's support for Ukraine and its people is unwavering, and Canada will work to find 
ways to use trade to support Ukraine in rebuilding its economy and its society. Canada will continue 
to take actions that it considers necessary to protect its essential security interests, and will work 
closely with like -minded partners to promote peace and security for all states and their citizens.  
14.31.   Canada is a vocal ad vocate for addressing immediate crises in a coherent manner while also 
setting a course for medium - and long -term resilience. Canada is working with multilateral partners 
in major forums like the UN  Rome -based agencies, G7/G20, and the WTO, to promote an 
evidence -based and coordinated response to the crisis. Canada will continue to support humanitarian 
partners, such as the World Food Programme, to help meet the emergency food and nutrition needs 
of the growing number of acutely food insecure people.  
14.32.   More n eeds to be done to address weaknesses in the global food system, which have been 
exacerbated by Russia's illegal actions. Leveraging current efforts on sustainable agriculture and 
food systems, Canada's future development programming will focus on climate -smart agriculture, 
sustainable agri -food value chains, inclusive food systems governance, and productive safety nets 
to deliver multiple outcomes like food security, nutrition, gender equality, and climate action. Finally, 
Canada once again calls for Russi a to immediately cease all hostile actions against Ukraine.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  14.33.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
14.34.   Norway implements restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, as do other 
Members mentioned under this agenda item. The measures have been taken as a reaction to Russia's 
unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine, which Norway condemns in the strongest possible terms. 
Norway also condemns Russia's recent illegal attempts to annex Ukrainian territory. Norway is 
appalled by Russia's continued war  of aggression, which is a gross violation of international law and 
the UN  Charter. The recent new waves of attacks against Ukraine again clearly demonstrate Russia's 
complete disregard for the horrible suffering of millions of people. Damage to energy inf rastructure 
brings great humanitarian harm and will certainly cause illness and death during the cold winter. 
The attacks serve no military purpose, and their aim seems to be to terrorize the population. They 
are illegal, and may constitute war crimes. Thr ough its aggressive actions, Russia is acting with 
blatant disregard for international law. Russia must immediately heed the ruling of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and the calls of the United Nations General Assembly to suspend its military 
operations within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. Norway reiterates that it stands in 
solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  
14.35.   The delegate of  the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  indicated the following:  
14.36.   The Bolivarian Republic of Vene zuela wishes to thank the Russian Federation for once again 
raising an issue that is highly sensitive for Venezuela. As Venezuela has noted on previous occasions, 
it has been warning about the proliferation of unilateral coercive measures for years. Since at least 
2015, that is, for seven  years, Venezuela has been under a multidimensional attack on its finances, 
trade, economy and assets, with multimillion -dollar losses. This has led to the reduction of 99% of 
Venezuela's income, with a negative impact that  has spread to all areas, especially the food, health, 
transport, communications and technology sectors. Venezuela is a first -hand witness to the collateral 
damage that this type of measure causes, not only to the population of the affected country, but 
also to other economies, causing all kinds of disruptions, including trade distortions.  
14.37.   The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  wishes to reiterate that the WTO has proven to be an 
Organization guided primarily by economic considerations and sound legal rules. Unilateralism, by 
definition, violates those principles and rules. In this regard, Venezuela calls for a return to 
multilateralism as the best way to settle differences and advocates a forward -looking, transparent, 
inclusive multilateral trading system fou nded on consensus -based rules.  
14.38.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
14.39.   It is to be expected that the international community, including Japan, imposes sanctions in 
response to Russia's aggression of Ukraine. Japan continues to work with its partners , including 
international organizations, to proactively address the impact of Russia's aggression of Ukraine in 
areas such as energy and food, among others, across many countries. Japan and other countries 
have been carefully addressing the situation by im posing sanctions in a manner that does not hinder 
the provision of humanitarian assistance or the operation of global agricultural trade.  
14.40.   Russia's aggression of Ukraine clearly infringes upon Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and constitutes a grave breach of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of 
force. Japan will never accept this unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force, and it is an 
extremely serious situation that shakes the very foundation of the i nternational order. Japan 
condemns Russia's actions in the strongest terms.  
14.41.   Together with other Members, Japan insists that the Russian Federation must urgently stop 
its military aggression against Ukraine and immediately withdraw its troops. Japan is firm ly 
convinced that the Russian Federation must be held accountable and must cease its actions, which 
undermine peace, security, and international law.  
14.42.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
14.43.   Switzerland wishes to add its voice to the statements  of other Members by condemning in 
the most vigorous fashion the miliary aggression of Russia against Ukraine. This miliary aggression 
is totally unjustifiable. Switzerland calls upon Russia to take the measures necessary to deescalate 
the current situatio n, to cease its activities, and to remove its troops from Ukrainian territory G/C/M/144  
 
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  immediately. The continuation of these attacks represent a flagrant violation of international law, 
especially the prohibition against the use of force, the violation of territor ial integrity, and the 
obligation to protect a civilian population. In the wake of this aggression, Switzerland has adopted 
a number of economic measures. These measures are exceptional in nature, and they have been 
adopted because of Russia's violation of  international law. The measures have been taken in parallel 
with international law, and also are in keeping with the rules of the WTO.  
14.44.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
14.45.   As other Members did before it , Australia again condemns in the stron gest possible terms 
Russia 's unilateral, illegal , and immoral invasion of Ukraine.  This invasion is a gross violation of 
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Australia strongly supports Ukraine's 
sovereignty and territorial integ rity, and again calls on Russia immediately to withdraw its forces 
from Ukrainian territory. Russia's war on Ukraine is exacting a catastrophic humanitarian toll, in 
addition to trade disruptions and a food crisis.  
14.46.   Australia supports the collective action by Members and has imposed far -reaching sanctions 
to inflict heavy costs on Russia and those responsible. In addition, Australia has implemented trade 
measures including: the ban on imports of Russian oil, refined petroleum products, coal and gas 
(effectiv e from 25  April); the ban on exports of alumina and bauxite to Russia (effective from 
20 March); the ban on the export of certain luxury goods to Russia, including wine and cosmetics 
(effective from 7  April); and denying Russia access to most -favoured -nation tariff treatment and 
imposing an additional tariff of 35% on goods that are the produce or manufacture of Russia 
(effective from 25  April).  
14.47.   Australia has notified these trade measures to the WTO to ensure transparency, which is an 
important obligation o n all Members, and one which Australia takes seriously. Australia has also 
joined like -minded partners to prohibit the importation of Russian gold to reduce Russia's ability to 
fund its war. These measures are justified given Russia's unprecedented invasio n, and are justified 
under WTO  rules, in particular Article  XXI of the GATT.  
14.48.   Although sanctions are negatively impacting Russia's economy, food and agricultural 
commodities (aside from a limited number of luxury goods, such as lobster and caviar) are not 
sanctioned by Australia. Rather, it is Russia's own decisions that are constraining its contribution to 
global food stocks, including through the imposition of restrictions on its own exports. Russia's war 
is also reducing global food supplies by destroying  Ukraine's agricultural land and facilities for 
processing and exporting staple foods, and disrupting regular trade through the Black Sea.  
14.49.   Australia is committed to strengthening the global rules -based order, and is a ready and 
able partner for all countri es that seek a peaceful and prosperous world, where sovereignty is 
respected.  
14.50.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
14.51.   The European Union is committed to the rules -based international order. The EU therefore 
continues to condemn Russia's unprovoked and unjustified act of aggression against Ukraine, which 
grossly violates international law and the UN  Charter, and undermines international security and 
stability. The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms the continu ed heinous 
attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. This illegal war against Ukraine also continues to cause 
immense economic harm to Ukraine with effects felt around the globe. Approximately 1.7  billion 
people in over 100  countries are now facing  severe food, energy, and commodity supply issues and 
price rises.  
14.52.   The European Union wishes to underline once again that its sanctions against Russia neither 
target trade in agricultural, food, or medical products, nor the trade of the Russian Federation with 
third countries. The European Union considers its measures fully consistent with its WTO  rights and 
obligations as actions necessary to protect its essential security interests. The measures include 
export and import restrictions targeting Russia's ab ility to finance this reprehensible war.  
14.53.   The European Union has taken all its measures in a fully transparent manner. The relevant 
EU measures are publicly accessible, including through our recent quantitative restriction notification G/C/M/144  
 
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  to the CMA. The EU cl osely monitors their implementation in order to ensure that the measures 
achieve their objective, namely to hamper the ability of the Russian government and military 
machine to sustain this illegal war.  
14.54.   The European Union calls on Russia to immediately cea se its military actions, withdraw all 
its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine, and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, and independence within its internationally recognized borders.  
14.55.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
14.56.   Costa Rica wishes to join in the expressions of support and solidarity with the people of 
Ukraine and condemns the unjustified aggression by Russia in the strongest possible terms. The 
cruel human tragedy that millions of Ukrainian families are suffering is unthinkable for a country like 
Costa Rica, a democracy without an army and with a pacifist tradition.  
14.57.   Costa Rica has been, and will always be, a fervent advocate of multilateralism and of an 
international architecture at the service of peace, security, sustainable development, and the 
protection of human rights. Costa Rica firmly believes that trade can and should contribute to the 
stability and peace of nations. In this context, Costa Rica is concerned about the impact that the 
Russian aggress ion against Ukraine is having on international trade in agricultural products and 
inputs critical to global food security. Costa Rica urges Russia to cease hostilities as soon as possible 
and to embark on a route that will restore international peace and s ecurity.  
14.58.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
14.59.   The Republic of Korea has been strongly condemning Russia's armed invasion of Ukraine. 
Regarding the current item, the Republic of Korea believes that it is essential to focus on the o rigin 
of the sharply aggravating situation on the global supply chain in many areas, which poses a 
significant threat to the rules -based global trade order under the WTO. The way to end all this is 
obvious; that is, for Russia to stop its military action i n Ukraine.  
14.60.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
14.61.   Under this agenda item, Ukraine wishes to express its sincerest gratitude to all 
WTO Members mentioned in Russia's request, and to other Members that support Ukraine in this 
difficult time of unju stifiable aggression of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, which has brought 
about a catastrophic loss of life and human suffering in Ukraine, and which poses a direct threat to 
the international security order.  
14.62.   Ukraine appreciates all the support, includi ng sanctions, imposed in response to Russia's 
aggressive war. The Russian Federation's hostile act has had catastrophic effects not only on 
Ukraine, but also on its neighbours, and people across the globe, exacerbating the already rising 
food and energy pr ices worldwide, and affecting economic stability across all regions. It is Russia's 
actions that are the most significant factor inflating global prices.  
14.63.   Nevertheless, Russia continues its acts of state terrorism against Ukraine and Ukrainians. 
Active mili tary actions have already disrupted trade and destroyed many enterprises. At present, 
the aims of Russia's massive attacks are not only the objects of military infrastructure, agricultural 
enterprises, food and petroleum depots, but Russia has also deliber ately attacked, for weeks now, 
Ukraine's energy and water supply infrastructure. Many of Ukraine's energy facilities have been 
damaged or destroyed by Russia's attacks, which are causing electricity blackouts, heating and water 
supply disruptions. Ukraine firmly believes that it is extremely important to share this information 
with Members so that Members can focus on policies that may mitigate or help solve a possible 
crisis. Ukraine underscores that sanctions are not responsible for this crisis; they are designed only 
to stop the war. Russia alone is responsible.  
14.64.   Russia's war has not only seriously undermined Ukraine's ability to participate in global 
trade, but it has also caused trade disruptions and aggravated food insecurity worldwide. Despite 
the indi sputable facts, Russia continues its disinformation campaign and keeps pushing false 
narratives in an attempt to shift the blame for the food crisis on countries that have imposed 
sanctions against it, although those sanctions do not target food. Rather, t he sanctions are a direct G/C/M/144  
 
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  response to Russia's illegal act of aggression, and are not intended to disrupt trade in essential 
goods.  
14.65.   Ukraine reiterates its gratitude to its partners for their comprehensive support and calls on 
other WTO  Members to make ever y effort to limit Russia's ability to wage war, to kill Ukrainians, 
and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
14.66.   The delegate of  the Republic of Moldova  indicated the following:  
14.67.   The Republic of Moldova wishes to join other Members in addin g its voice of support to 
Ukraine and in reiterating its solidarity with the Ukrainian people. Moldova condemns in the strongest 
possible terms Russia's war against Ukraine, which continues to cause a devastating loss of life and 
have a huge negative impac t over our economies. Moldova reiterates in this Council its serious 
concerns regarding the consequences of war in Ukraine over Moldova's economy. Moldova, as one 
of Ukraine's closest neighbours, is being seriously and directly affected economically by thi s war.  
14.68.   Currently, the Republic of Moldova faces unprecedented challenges linked to its national 
security crisis and its energy crisis, amplified by spikes in inflation. Moreover, on 23  November, 
one day before this meeting, the Republic of Moldova experien ced a full and all -day power outage 
across its entire territory, while many cities and villages in Moldova continue to experience power 
shortages still today as a result of Russia's attacks hitting Ukrainian cities and vital infrastructure. 
In short, every  bomb falling on Ukraine is also affecting Moldova's people and economy.  
14.69.   The Republic of Moldova will continue to remain in full solidarity with Ukraine and its people. 
Moldova calls upon Russia to stop the war and withdraw its troops immediately and unconditionally 
from the territory of Ukraine.  
14.70.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
14.71.   Russia did not raise a point of order during the interventions that have just been made. 
However, most of the interventions clear ly violate the mandate of the present Council. Russia has 
repeated on multiple occasions that discussions on the regional or global security situation, and on 
UN Charter enforcement or compliance, evidently go beyond the mandate not just of this Council, 
but of the WTO itself. Trade diplomats do not possess the expertise to discuss these issues; rather, 
these discussions belong to the specialized UN  bodies and agencies. And it is in these bodies and 
agencies where Russia shares, in detail, its position on t he roots and reasons for its special military 
operation, as well as on the issues that arise during the conflict. Those interested can watch the 
recordings of the UN  Security Council and other relevant UN  body meetings.  
14.72.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the  following:  
14.73.   Canada wishes to reiterate its earlier comment that the security situation in Ukraine clearly 
affects its ability to trade, and as we heard from the Ukrainian delegate earlier, it also clearly affects 
Ukraine's ability to participate in these m eetings here at the WTO, where Members do discuss 
economic issues. For these reasons, Canada will continue to raise the security situation because it 
has a direct impact on the trading system of Ukraine and the trading system around the world.  
14.74.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
15.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
15.3.  As the Council is aware, over the years, the United States and many other Members have had 
numerous concerns with respect to the transparency of China's industrial subsidy regime. In China's G/C/M/144  
 
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  Protocol of Accession, China agreed to publish all trade -related measures in a sing le journal, which 
China has designated as the China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette, or 
MOFCOM  Gazette. However, China rarely publishes its subsidy measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette, 
especially what it calls "normative documents", as well as me asures from sub -central governments. 
And sometimes these measures are not made public at all. In its Protocol of Accession, China also 
agreed to "establish or designate an enquiry point where, upon request of any individual, enterprise 
or WTO  Member all in formation relating to the measures required to be published … may be 
obtained".  
15.4.  Several years ago, the United States came across references to five  legal measures, 
two relating to fuel subsidies for fishermen, one  relating to the development of China's dis tant water 
fishing fleet, and two  relating to the semiconductor industry. Unable to find these measures in the 
MOFCOM  Gazette, or anywhere else, the US submitted a request to China's WTO  enquiry point in 
April 2020, over two  years ago now.  
15.5.  Under its Protoc ol of Accession, China agreed with respect to its enquiry point that "Replies 
to requests for information shall generally be provided within 30  days after receipt of a request. In 
exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45  days after receipt of a  request. Notice of the 
delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in writing to the interested party." Despite having 
submitted the initial request for the missing legal measures in April  2020, two  years later the United 
States has yet to receive a written response to its request. In September  2020, a Ministry of 
Commerce representative did speak with the US  Embassy and stated that China would not be 
providing copies of any of the requested measures because they were either soon to be replaced by 
new measures or were, in its view, not relevant to China's WTO  commitments. MOFCOM did not 
provide any information on timing of the replacement measures.  
15.6.  Is it China's position that it can refuse to provide any requested measure, if that measure is 
soon to be  replaced? China's Protocol of Accession certainly does not provide for such an exception, 
and given that legal measures are often superseded, China's position would rather significantly 
undermine the obligation itself. And is it China's position that gove rnment support and development 
policies for its fishing and semiconductor industries are not relevant to its WTO  commitments?  
15.7.  The United States views China's handling of the United States' request as inadequate and not 
in keeping with China's WTO  commitmen ts. The transparency obligations of China's Protocol of 
Accession are there because Members were concerned, in part, with the lack of transparency of 
China's industrial subsidy regime. After twenty -one years, those very same concerns remain. But 
more funda mentally, as the United States noted at the Council's previous formal meeting, beyond 
the legal technicalities, the US has to ask the obvious question: why is China refusing to make public, 
for example, a legal measure on its fuel subsidy programme for fis hers? It is difficult to understand.  
15.8.  As noted at the Council's previous meeting, the United States has now found, through its own 
further investigation, two of the measures that it requested relating to China's fuel subsidy 
programmes for its domestic and distant water fishers. These measures were published on unofficial 
Chinese news sites, and they still do not appear on any official government websites; and, as noted 
earlier, they have not been published in the MOFCOM  Gazette.  
15.9.  The essence of these two  measures, which cover China 's fuel subsidy program mes from 2015 
to 2020, is that, while China is keeping the overall level of support for its fishing industry the same, 
it has reduced subsidies for its fishers in its own waters, while increasing the level of subsidies for 
its distant water fleet.  These measures also provide striking new details about China's support for 
domestic fishers. For example, the measure covering fishers in China's domestic waters cites the 
objective of renovating 14,000  fishing vessel s and scrapping, or converting to other uses, 
20,000  fishing vessels.  
15.10.   So what exactly is it about these measures that China does not want us to see? What makes 
them so revealing that China has been willing to ignore its obligation to publish these measures  as 
required by its Protocol of Accession and to refuse to provide the measures pursuant to a legitimate 
request of another WTO  Member, or even to provide a written explanation as required under its 
Protocol of Accession?  G/C/M/144  
 
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  15.11.   And what is in the other measures that China has refused to provide or to otherwise make 
public? Of the remaining measures, one  appears to be China's plan to develop its distant water 
fishery. The other two  measures relate to China's semiconductor policies. What is it about these 
measures that China does not want us to see?  
15.12.   Often the first  response that the United States hears from China on these transparency 
issues is that China takes its WTO  transparency obligations very seriously. But to be frank, the 
US experience in making a very simpl e request to China's enquiry point seems to demonstrate 
otherwise. And the US can only wonder what else it is that China is not showing us, despite its 
WTO transparency obligations.  
15.13.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
15.14.   The commitment  by China under its Protocol of Accession to publish all trade -related 
measures, as well as providing information through the enquiry point, are designed to improve 
transparency. China must publish all its trade -related measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette and a ctually 
respond to requests for information under the enquiry point. This is not only in the interests of 
transparency, but it is also required under China's obligations in its Protocol of Accession. The 
European Union urges China to fully comply with its commitments under its Protocol of Accession to 
the WTO by publishing all trade -related measures, as it agreed to do, and by responding to requests 
for information under the enquiry point without undue delay.  
15.15.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
15.16.   Australia attaches considerable importance to the WTO  notification and transparency 
obligations, particularly relating to subsidies. These obligations stem from both the Agreements and 
the obligations made by Members under their P rotocols of Accession. Transparency remains critical 
to the proper functioning of the WTO and underpins the Subsidies Agreement. It creates certainty 
for all our exporters in being able to compete fairly in international markets. Australia therefore 
urges China to fulfil its transparency commitments made as part of its Protocol of Accession.  
15.17.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
15.18.   A WTO  Member's observation of, and compliance with, its notification and transparency 
obligations, is in the interests of  all WTO  Members, and represents one of the most important 
foundations of the WTO  system. If the transparency of subsidy spending is not ensured, there are 
concerns that distorted subsidy delivery will be encouraged, which may lead to problems such as 
excess production capacity. This issue has been discussed by the Subsidies Committee, but it is 
difficult to say whether China has taken sufficient measures.  
15.19.   Regarding China's subsidies, various Members have expressed their concerns in the 
Committee about tran sparency and the possibility of non -notification issues. China is the world's 
largest trading nation, and it is required to ensure transparency and comply with the WTO's 
notification  obligations, especially with regard to subsidy expenditure. Japan also ur ges China to 
fulfil its transparency obligations agreed in its WTO  Accession Protocol and to ensure the 
effectiveness of mechanisms that contribute to increased transparency.  
15.20.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
15.21.   The notification and transparency  requirements are integral aspects of the multilateral 
trading system, and it is important that these obligations are upheld for the proper functioning of 
the rules -based international system.  With that in mind, Canada continues to echo the concerns of 
others regarding China's compliance with its WTO  transparency obligations, and remains concerned 
that China is not upholding its obligations as outlined in its Protocol of Accession.  
15.22.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
15.23.   The United Kingdom again wishes to show its support for the concerns raised by the United 
States, and other co -sponsors, regarding China's compliance with its transparency obligations under 
its Accession Protocol. The UK wishes to reiterate its belief that transparen cy is central to the proper 
functioning of the WTO. It is vital that China, as a WTO  Member, takes all the necessary steps to G/C/M/144  
 
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  fulfil its obligations, including any Member -specific commitments, in a timely manner. Therefore, the 
UK encourages China to compl y with its transparency commitments, in accordance with its 
WTO obligations.  
15.24.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
15.25.   New Zealand considers transparency as critical to the proper functioning of the WTO, and 
attaches considerable importance to a dherence by all Members to WTO  notification and transparency 
obligations, particularly in relation to subsidies, including under their Protocols of Accession. It is 
vital that all Members fulfil these obligations in a timely manner, including any Member -specific 
commitments. Adhering to these obligations helps build certainty for exporters and makes an 
important contribution to the successful functioning of the rules -based international trading system.  
15.26.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
15.27.   China wi shes to refer to its statements made at the Council's previous meetings and other 
relevant Committees.73 In contrast to what the United States has claimed in its statements, China 
has no intention of hiding its relevant policies. Regarding the documents th at the US enquired about 
relating to China's fishery development, these documents were replaced by a new document, and 
the new document has been published on the official website of China's State Council.  
15.28.   China wishes to stress that, in order to support th e WTO  fisheries negotiations, China has 
made great efforts and taken active steps to reform its domestic fishery policies. The new document 
aims to promote high -quality development of fisheries, protect fishery resources, and support the 
sustainability of fisheries. It highlights the importance of supporting the WTO  fisheries negotiations 
and contributes to the success of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies concluded at MC12.  
15.29.   Regarding the two  documents on semiconductors, China wishes to reiterate that, si nce these 
documents are not laws, regulations, or other measures pertaining to, or affecting, trade in goods, 
they are not relevant to China's enquiry point commitments. China's enquiry point has already 
communicated with the United States on this issue.  
15.30.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
16  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the reques t of 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States.  
16.2.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.3.  Canada and other Members have raised India's restrictions on imports of pulses in this Council 
and in other WTO  committees. Canada continues to be concerned with India's trade restrictive 
measures, including quantitative restrictions, minimum import prices, restricting imports to 
one seaport, and uncertainty introduced by frequent changes to tariffs on imports of pulses, in 
particular for dried  peas.  
16.4.  Canada continues to question the legal interpretation provided by India to justify its trade 
restrictive measures on dried peas. It is increasingly difficult for Canada to understand why India 
continues to claim that these measures are "temporary", when the quantitative restrictions on 
imports of dried yellow peas were established on 25  April 2018, and now, over four and a half years 
later, this "temporary" measure is still in place. To conclude, Canada calls on India immediately and 
expeditiously to  remove its trade restrictive measures put in place on dried peas and other pulses, 
and to implement alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that promote a predictable and 
transparent import regime for pulses.  
 
73 See, for example, document  G/C/M/143, paragrap hs 26.33 -26.34.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  16.5.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated  the following:  
16.6.  The United States shares the concerns of other Members regarding India's quantitative 
restrictions for select varieties of pulses. As previously stated in the Committees on Import Licensing, 
Agriculture, and Market Access,  the United States repeat s its requests for information on how the 
measures reflect India 's WTO  commitments, and when and how the measures will be ended.  Taking 
note that India reinstated its restrictions on certain pulses  earlier this year, the United Stat es 
continues to urge India to consider less trade restrictive requirements and to notify future relevant 
measures and regulations in a timely manner.  
16.7.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
16.8.  Australia appreciates India's response to this agenda i tem at the Council's previous meeting 
held on 7 and 8  July 2022. In response to the question posed by India at the Council's previous 
meeting requesting specific information on problems being experienced by traders, Australia is not 
currently aware of trad ers experiencing any specific problems with India's free import policy. Rather, 
the issue lies in the uncertainty of the temporary nature of India's free import policy and the 
long-term supply -side adjustments that are necessary when a Member's import poli cies are 
frequently changed. Indeed, the issue is not about current problems being experienced by traders, 
but rather about anticipated problems should India reinstate import restrictions after 31  March  2023. 
It is worth noting that India's current removal  of import restrictions for pulses now extends back to 
measures announced in May  2021. Seeing as some media articles have forecast another year of 
reduced pulse production for 2023 due to adverse seasonal conditions, we question if the removal 
of these imp ort restrictions will be extended for another year.  
16.9.  Rather than continuing to alternate between the permission and prohibition of imports, 
Australia encourages India to consider the longer -term benefits of permanently removing import 
restrictions relating to pulses. More open settings would build greater resilience in India's pulse 
supplies, increase certainty for suppliers and reduce risk -related costs. This would mean lower prices 
and more reliable pulse supplies for Indian consumers with clear benefits f or food security.  
16.10.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
16.11.   As Argentina has  stated on previous occasions in this Council and its subsidiary bodies, this 
measure affects two of the main pulses exported from Argentina to India: yellow peas and mung  
beans. As in previous statements , and as clearly articulated by Australia , Argentina  reiterates its 
concern over the uncertainty that this measure creates for its exporters , and requests its review by 
the Indian authorities.  
16.12.   The delegate of  the European U nion indicated the following:  
16.13.   The European Union fully supports the interventions from Canada, the United States, 
Australia, and Argentina. As mentioned before, the European Union remains concerned about India's 
import restrictions for certain pulses. The EU urges India to provide certainty and stability when it 
comes to its import regime for pulses.  
16.14.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
16.15.   India thanks the delegations of Canada, the United States, Australia, Argentina, and the 
European Union, for the ir continued interest in this issue. As addressed in previous meetings of the 
CTG, as well as in the CMA, the measures adopted by India are undertaken for the purpose of 
maintaining food and nutritional security. This is an area of great importance to Indi a's economy 
and its policies on imports are regularly reviewed and updated.  
16.16.   India's Notification No.  63/2015 -2020, made by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade on 
29 March  2022, states that the free import policy of urad HS  code 07133110 and tur or pig eon peas 
HS code 07136000 has been extended until 31  March  2023.  
16.17.   India's notification on the import measure of moong  has already been notified to the 
Committee on Import Licensing under Article  5.1-5.4 notifications and the reference for the same is 
document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/22. India's annual notification under Article  7.3 of the Agreement on G/C/M/144  
 
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  Import Licensing, which shoul d shortly be available, also makes reference to India's import policy 
on moong.  
16.18.   As such, India urges the proponents of this agenda item to specifically state what the 
problems are that their exporters are facing, and the quantification thereof. In the abse nce of such 
information, it would be unfortunate if this specific trade concern continued to be carried forward to 
other meetings of WTO  regular bodies.  
16.19.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
17  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union.  
17.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.3.  The European Union regrets to have to reiterat e its concerns on this long -standing issue. The 
EU has repeatedly voiced its concerns and requests on this issue to the United States. However, the 
US has so far not provided information on when apples and pears from the EU under a systems 
approach will be  allowed market access to the US. The EU urges the United States to base its import 
conditions on science and to solve this important matter without further delay. The EU reiterates its 
call on the US to play its part in supporting a constructive and mutua lly beneficial cooperation.  
17.4.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
17.5.  The United States thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight EU  member States to export apples and pears under a system s approach to the 
United States. The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request. The United States would again note that the European Union is able to 
export apples and pears to the US under the exi sting pre -clearance program.  
17.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
18  PAKISTAN – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON FOODSTUFFS AND CONSUMER GOODS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the requ est of 
the European Union . 
18.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.3.  The European Union wishes to refer to the Council's previous discussion on Statutory 
Regulatory Order (SRO)  598 issued by Pakistan's authorities. The Order introduced a temporary 
import ban on non -essential and luxury goods. The European Union welcomes the decision of the 
Government of Pakistan to lift this three -month import ban. That said, the EU wishes to express its 
growing concerns over the new restrictive import mea sures that Pakistan has introduced, in the form 
of "regulatory duties", instead of the previous ban.  
18.4.  The European Union understands that Pakistan needs to tackle the severe debt crisis that it 
is currently facing, which is further exacerbated by the recent  rise in commodity and energy prices. 
However, Pakistan has been practising a policy of import compression since 2018. That policy is not 
only detrimental to EU  exports; it has also not helped to adjust Pakistan's fiscal imbalances and 
long-standing extern al pressures. Furthermore, the new "regulatory" duties, although temporary in 
nature, will continue to impact companies and consumers in Pakistan, with further negative 
consequences on local competitiveness and the business environment.  
18.5.  The European Union also notes with serious concern that the frequent issuing of new Statutory 
Regulatory Orders is very detrimental to transparency and legal predictability. The European Union 
invites Pakistan to clarify which of its SROs are still in place.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  18.6.  The European Uni on recalls to Pakistan's authorities the need to ensure prior consultation and 
to fulfil the notification requirements for any new restrictive measures, as well as to ensure their full 
compliance with the WTO  rules. The EU invites Pakistan to make these me asures the least 
trade-restrictive possible, and to allow economic operators time to adapt to them.  
18.7.  The European Union stands ready to work jointly with Pakistan to remove these restrictions. 
The EU has seen many times in the past that import restrictive m easures are not the solution to 
dealing sustainably with soaring public debt and budget deficits.  
18.8.  The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
18.9.  Pakistan thanks the European Union for its comments on Pakistan's regulation 
(SRO 598(I)/2022) of 19  May 2022, and thanks the United States twice, once for their comments 
on the SRO, and once for withdrawing those comments. As this Council may recall, this measure 
was taken by Pakistan's authorities with a view to addressing the balance -of-payments emergency 
facing Pakistan at that time.  
18.10.   Pakistan is pleased to inform the Council that the measure was withdrawn on 
19 August  2022, just a few weeks after the Council's July  meeting. The measure is therefore no 
longer in place and all related trade restrictions have be en lifted. Nevertheless, Pakistan wishes to 
avail itself of the opportunity to respond to some of the comments made by the European Union in 
its interventions during the Council's meeting in July.  
18.11.   Pakistan makes every effort to abide by its multilateral co mmitments when adopting 
trade-restrictive measures. Even in situations such as this serious balance -of-payments concern, 
compounded by the broader context of an unstable and fragile post -COVID -19 economic 
environment, Pakistan has strived to safeguard the trading interests of all its trading partners. This 
good-faith effort is shown in the limited scope of the measure and in its very short duration, of just 
three months.  
18.12.   Pakistan notes with satisfaction the European Union's recognition of Pakistan's need to  
address its balance -of-payments situation, as well as the EU's acknowledgement that Pakistan's 
measure "has been taken on the ground of the balance of payments and current account deficit crisis 
affecting the country". Pakistan fully agrees and wishes to highlight that it is vital for the legitimacy 
of the WTO that developing Members can react speedily to emergencies of this kind, especially in 
the current challenging economic environment.  
18.13.   Finally, with respect to notification, Pakistan notes that, faced w ith the deteriorating 
balance -of-payments situation in May of this year, Pakistan's authorities were required to act with 
great urgency. Pakistan must also remind Members that these issues, and the crisis, have since 
deepened due to climate change induced disasters. In this regard, Pakistan urges big polluting 
Members to take immediate steps towards achieving environmental sustainability, doing so in the 
best interests of those Members that are most vulnerable to climate change, and in order to help 
them in  their economic recovery efforts. However, Pakistan regrets any delay in the formal 
notification of the measures to the WTO that resulted from these exceptionally challenging 
circumstances.  
18.14.   Pakistan thanks the Members of this Council for their concern over  Pakistan's economic and 
general situation.  
18.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
19  INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME AND COMMODITY BALANCE – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the age nda at the request of  
the European Union.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  19.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
19.3.  Import restrictive policies and practices by Indonesia are a long -standing item in several 
WTO Committees and in this Council. The European Union has repeatedly stressed its deep concerns 
about the increasing number and scope of Indonesian restrictions, with negative impacts on trade 
flows. The European Union is particularly concerned by Indonesia's increased focus on import 
substitution, and especially  that the target of a reduction of imports equivalent to 35% of the value 
of its 2019  import potential was advanced to 2022.  
19.4.  Despite Indonesia's reassurances that the purpose of its import substitution programme is 
not protectionist, the European Union has  seen a worrisome increase of a broad range of 
import -restrictive measures, including expanding local content requirements (LCRs), including in 
public procurement, the mandatory use of national "SNI"  standards, as well as the further 
promulgation of cumber some import licensing procedures.  
19.5.  EU operators across a variety of sectors are already negatively affected by these measures. 
The European Union is further concerned about the commodity balance system established under 
Government Regulation  5/2021 and Mini stry of Trade Regulations  19/2021 and 20/2021, as this 
system may also have a restrictive impact. The EU welcomes efforts to ensure a coordinated and 
streamlined approach on the management of import and export licences. That said, the mechanism 
might resul t in further restrictions to trade flows, and raises questions in terms of its 
WTO compatibility. It is also unclear if the commodity balance will actually be implemented because 
there is a lack of clarity on its scope and timelines for its application to different groups of products. 
This creates additional challenges for economic operators that lack the legal certainty and 
predictability that they need to do business in Indonesia.  
19.6.  The European Union reiterates that imports remain necessary to Indonesia gi ven that it 
intends to develop its domestic industry. In contrast, raising barriers to trade would hamper 
Indonesia's economic growth, which cannot be achieved through export promotion alone.  
19.7.  The European Union requests Indonesia to clarify its underlying rationale for increasing import 
substitution policies. The EU would further welcome clarification of Indonesia's introduction of the 
"commodity balance" system as the basis for issuing import (and export) approvals, as well as on 
the implementing measures that Indonesia intends to undertake. The European Union also stresses 
the need to ensure that such policies and measures will comply with Indonesia's WTO  obligations.  
19.8.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
19.9.  The United States continues to  share the European Union's concerns regarding the Indonesian 
government's statements that it will suppress imports with the goal of "substituting 35  percent of 
imported products" in 2022. The United States requests that Indonesia provide an update on this  
item, and the specific policies it is implementing, or intends to implement, to achieve its import 
substitution goals. If Indonesia is proceeding with an import substitution programme, will it make 
the draft measures that it is developing publicly availab le and hold a notice and comment period to 
ensure that affected parties have the opportunity to provide input?  
19.10.   Indonesia has stated that this policy "has no element of protectionism", and "is not intended 
to hinder imports from other [WTO]  Members." It is difficult to see how that is possible. Could 
Indonesia provide further clarity on the intent and scope of its import substitution programme? The 
United States again strongly urges Indonesia to rethink this counter -productive and trade -disruptive 
goal. 
19.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
19.12.   Regarding the P3DN  programme, in which Indonesia stipulates that the purchase and use of 
domestic products should be prioritized on the basis of Decree No.  29/2018, Japan is concerned 
about the possibility of dome stic and foreign discrimination as a means of promoting import 
substitution with domestic products. Japan also shares the concerns about the plan to introduce 
domestic SNI  certification pointed out by the European Union. Japan has repeatedly expressed its 
concerns about the fact that Indonesia has introduced and maintained local content requirement 
measures in various fields. Japan is concerned that this programme will exacerbate such situations. G/C/M/144  
 
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  Japan requests Indonesia to clarify how it implements the P3D N programme if it does not intend to 
guarantee trade protections. Japan also asks Indonesia to explain how it aims to ensure 
WTO consistency with these measures that Indonesia is working to implement to realize its plan.  
19.13.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicat ed the following:  
19.14.   Switzerland shares the concerns raised by the European Union, in particular regarding 
Indonesia's plans in its import substitution programme aimed at reducing, by the end of 2022, the 
import value by 35% compared to its 2019  levels. Switz erland is also interested in the clarifications 
that Indonesia will provide.  
19.15.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
19.16.   India remain s concerned about Indonesia's  import substitution program me. It appears that 
several measures undertaken are more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the policy 
objectives that Indonesia has set. Indian businesses have complained about procedural delays in 
several areas of trade, including those in agricultural products. India request s Indonesia to review 
its import  licensing procedures and measures , and to remove any inherent barriers to trade 
contained therein.  
19.17.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
19.18.   The United Kingdom echoes the concerns raised by the European Union and other partners. 
Local co ntent requirements (LCRs) introduced by Indonesia represent a significant barrier to trade 
and go against the principles of free and fair trade. The high levels of LCRs in several sectors are 
such that investment into Indonesia is ceasing to be viable. In the pharmaceutical sector, LCRs are 
inhibiting a stable supply and increasing the cost of medicines to Indonesian consumers. In the 
energy sector, LCRs for solar are disincentivizing large investment projects, while domestic products 
remain insufficient to  fulfil domestic demand, thereby hindering support for Indonesia's renewable 
energy transition. The United Kingdom requests Indonesia to consider lowering its LCRs across all 
sectors. The UK would welcome further information from Indonesia on any future de velopments 
regarding this policy, and looks forward to future engagement on this subject.  
19.19.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
19.20.   Indonesia thanks the European Union, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, India, and the 
United Kingdom, for thei r continued interest in Indonesia's import substitution programme, and its 
commodity balance system, and also thanks Japan for its condolences and sympathy regarding  
Indonesia's recent and devastating earthquake.  
19.21.   Indonesia refers to its statement delivered  at the CTG's previous formal meeting.74 Indonesia 
wishes again to emphasize that its import substitution programme and the commodity balance 
system are not intended to inhibit imports from other WTO  Members. Rather, the import substitution 
programme, and the commodity balance system, are aimed at increasing Indonesia's contribution 
to building better and more orderly global trade governance.  
19.22.   On the commodity balance system, Indonesia's policy, while not burdening Indonesia's 
import regime, is intended to c reate and facilitate a better business environment, certainty in doing 
business, and free trade flows. The policy also serves as an evaluation tool by the Government of 
Indonesia for policy transparency, which is based on more accurate data, and will be ca rried out by 
the relevant government ministries and institutions.  
19.23.   From a government policy standpoint, Indonesia's commodity balance system will be useful 
in providing more complete, detailed, transparent and accurate data for the relevant government 
minis tries and institutions, while for business the commodity balance aims to support business 
certainty, transparency, and business development calculations.  
19.24.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
 
74 See document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  9.21-9.22.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  20  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand.  
20.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the follo wing:  
20.3.  In previous meetings of the CTG and TRIMs  Committee, Japan has continuously expressed its 
concerns about the consistency with the WTO  Agreements of various local content requirement 
(LCR) measures implemented by  Indonesia, including in relation to 4G  LTE equipment, 
TV equipment, and the retail industry. Indonesia has repeatedly explained that its LCR  measures in 
general are based on its government procurement policy. However, the content of Indonesia 's 
government  procurement policy is unclear. It does not appear that all LCR  measures are being 
implemented as part of government procurement, and nor are they immediately justified because 
of government procurement policies. Indonesia explained at the TRIMs  Committee in October  2022 
that a comprehensive review is currently under way . Accordingly, Japan requests to receive  details 
of the review's schedule and consultations.  
20.4.  Japan is also concerned about the increase in import restriction measures for the import 
registra tion and approval system for textile products and air conditioners, and has concerns about 
their consistency with Article  XI:1 of the GATT. Japan appreciates that there has been an 
improvement in the level of permitted quantities; however, Japan hopes that  the criteria will be 
clarified in depth, and that operational transparency will be improved.  
20.5.  During the meeting of the Import Licensing Committee held in October  2022, Indonesia stated 
that import licences for textile products were processed electronicall y and swiftly. However, since 
the measure has been introduced, there have been no cases of an import licence application being 
approved, and exports are actually declining. Japan is concerned about the continuation of such 
import restricting effects.  
20.6.  Moreo ver, Japan continues to be concerned by Indonesia's import licensing system for steel 
products, which has been implemented in accordance with the Minister of Trade Regulation No.  20 
of 2021. For example, since the measure's introduction, the number of appr oved licence applications 
has reduced significantly compared to the actual number of applications submitted, regardless of 
the type of licence. Japan is concerned that a measure having such trade restricting effects on 
imports may not be consistent with th e WTO  Agreements, including with Article  XI:1 of the GATT.  
20.7.  At the meeting of the Import Licensing Committee of October  2022, Japan asked about the 
relationship between the objective of ensuring the importation of safe products and the reduction of 
the quan tity of applications. For example, Japan asked about what kind of technical standards were 
taken into consideration when reducing the quantity of applications. However, no response from 
Indonesia has been received. In this regard, Japan considers that the significant reduction in the 
quantity of applications should not be maintained, and that the reasons and criteria for such a 
reduction in applications should be clarified.  
20.8.  Furthermore, Japan understands that a new framework ( Neraca Komoditas , a supply and 
demand adjustment framework called the "Commodity Balance") will begin in 2023. Japan requests  
Indonesia to provide a detailed explanation of this new framework, in particular with regard to the 
implications for steel products, and how changes to the impor t procedures will be made compared 
to the current system.  
20.9.  Furthermore, regarding textile products, Japan considers Indonesia's safeguard measure on 
carpets, introduced on 17  February  2021, to be truly regrettable, given that Japan has been raising 
this mea sure at various consultations and discussions, including during the SG  Committee. And 
Japan considers that it is also regrettable that no improvement has been seen. For Japan, there are 
two main problems: (i)  the tariff is as high as 150 -200% in terms of ad valorem  tax conversion; and 
(ii) the tariff has been introduced in a situation in which carpet imports have dropped sharply.  
20.10.   At the SG  Committee meeting held in October  2022, in response to Japan 's concerns, 
Indonesia stated that Japan 's share of imports  had not decreased, but since the overall volume of G/C/M/144  
 
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  imports has decreased sharply, the comparison of the share of imports from Japan among the total 
volume of imports is meaningless. In addition, imports from Japan have decreased compared 
to 2019.  
20.11.   Japan is  concerned about the increasing number of Indonesia's trade restrictive measures, 
which may be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreements. For this reason, Japan requests a concrete 
explanation regarding the background of the introduction of these systems and th eir consistency 
with the WTO  Agreements.  
20.12.   Furthermore, Japan recalls that it submitted written questions to the Import Licensing and 
TRIMs  Committees regarding the following three  Indonesian measures: (i)  import regulation on air 
conditioners; (ii)  import l icence for steel; and (iii)  import regulation for textiles.  
20.13.   Japan expects Indonesia to respond promptly to its questions. In particular, Japan hopes 
that Indonesia's import regulations on air conditioners will not be operated as import restrictions, 
that p ermit standards and procedures will be stipulated with more transparency, and that other 
measures will be corrected or abolished as soon as possible.  
20.14.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.15.   The European Union, as well as many other WTO  Members, is deeply concerned that no real 
progress can be registered regarding Indonesia's import and export restrictive policies and practices. 
Rather, the number and scope of Indonesia's restrictions seem to have further expanded over time, 
with negative  impacts on trade flows. In particular, the European Union reiterates its serious 
preoccupation with Indonesia's burdensome and lengthy SPS  import authorization procedures, its 
complex rules and lack of pragmatic certification procedures for Halal labellin g, its mandatory use 
of domestic SNI  standards diverging from international standards, its wider use of LCRs, and its 
restrictive import licensing requirements or other import control measures, such as the slow and 
partial allocation of import authorizatio ns for textiles and footwear.  
20.16.   As mentioned under the previous agenda item, the European Union is also concerned as to 
the actual management and impact of the commodity balance system established under Indonesia's 
Government Regulation  5/2021 and Ministry o f Trade Regulations  19/2021 and 20/2021, on which 
the EU seeks further clarifications.  
20.17.   In addition, the European Union notes the introduction of a new export regime under 
Regulation  18/2021. This new export regime appears to significantly expand the scope of goods 
subject to export prohibitions (from 39 to 275  tariff posts), which could further hamper trade flows, 
and which also raises doubts in terms of the regime's compliance with Indonesia's WTO  obligations.  
20.18.   The European Union therefore urges Indonesia t o reduce its high number of trade barriers, 
which have been affecting EU  trade flows for too long, and to refrain from issuing new regulations 
that erect further trade barriers. The EU also reiterates its call for Indonesia to ensure that all its 
relevant measures are notified to the WTO in order to afford Members an opportunity to provide 
their comments on them.  
20.19.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
20.20.   New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by the European Union and Japan, as raised also 
by oth ers at the Council's previous meetings. As New Zealand has noted previously, it believes that 
Indonesia 's restrictions on agricultural imports continue to undermine core WTO  principles.  
Indonesia's frequent changes to import requirements reduce commercial certainty, which in turn 
hampers returns for farmers and can lead to increased costs of production. Moreover, this 
uncertainty also contributes to the ongoing increasing cost of food, w hich can have a particularly 
negative effect on people on low incomes. New Zealand is particularly concerned about the 
inconsistent issuance of import licences. Delays in import licences lead to commercially significant 
market access issues for trading par tners and can lead to importers having greater difficulty in 
sourcing food products for local consumers.  
20.21.   New Zealand requests that Indonesia also provide further information to its trading partners 
on its commodity balance mechanism, including how the mech anism is calculated, the process  G/C/M/144  
 
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  exporters have to go through to get import licences, timelines for implementation for particular 
commodities, and how Indonesia is undertaking to make the mechanism more transparent.  
20.22.   New Zealand welcomes that a stated objec tive of the Presidential Regulation  32/2022 on 
Commodity Balances is to improve the import licensing process and facilitate business access to 
imports. However, New Zealand notes that the Regulation appears likely to add further complexity, 
as it allows fo r import restrictions to be applied where domestic supply is calculated to be sufficient 
to meet projected demand. Details of the commodity balance/import licence system are yet to be 
provided, which is adding to the uncertain environment for imports.  
20.23.   Finally, New Zealand appreciates Indonesia's comments at the Council's meeting in July that 
"in principle, Indonesia has no intention to impede the flow of international trade through our import 
and export policies"; that "Indonesia always pursues for simplifi cation, transparency, and efficiency 
to make exports and imports easier to implement", and that "Indonesia stands ready to engage 
bilaterally with WTO  Members on their concerns". New Zealand joins others in asking Indonesia to 
make renewed efforts to addre ss these long -standing concerns about Indonesia's import restricting 
policies and their impact on agricultural trade.  
20.24.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
20.25.   The United States wishes to take this opportunity to again underscore its conce rns with 
Indonesia's import and export restricting policies and practices. The United States notes the growing 
number of Members that are intervening on this agenda item, as well as the increasing number of 
Indonesian policies that Members are raising as c oncerns. The US hopes that Indonesia takes heed 
of this worrying trend. The US has raised concerns with specific Indonesian policies in past meetings 
of the Council, as well as in the TRIMs, TBT, ITA, and Market Access Committees, and regrets that 
the US m ust raise them again on this occasion.  
20.26.   First, the United States notes that, at the Council's previous meeting, Indonesia stated that 
it had "begun several reviews" of its local content policies and that consultations were ongoing. The 
US requests that Indo nesia provide the Council with an update on these reviews, and underscores 
the importance of ensuring that its consultations allow for broad public input.  
20.27.   Second, the United States continues to have concerns regarding Indonesia's application of 
tariffs on certain ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments. While there 
were some positive developments earlier in the year, Indonesia continues to maintain tariffs on 
multiple ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commit ments. The US has raised 
this issue repeatedly with Indonesia over the past three  years, but without receiving a substantive 
response to its concerns. In multiple past CTG  meetings, Indonesia has noted that the issue is under 
review and that it "strives to  comply with relevant agreements". The US urges Indonesia to engage 
constructively on this issue, providing more than the standard "still reviewing" update, and finally 
address these long -standing concerns to ensure the integrity of its market access commi tments. The 
US believes that these tariffs on certain ICT  products are to Indonesia's own detriment as they limit 
access for Indonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech products that form the backbone 
of the digital economy. US  traders have also been actively noting the disincentives to investment 
that result from these tariffs.  
20.28.   Third, the United States is concerned by Indonesia's continued practice of finalizing 
trade-related measures without sufficient opportunities for stakeholder input. Indone sia has 
demonstrated a pattern of issuing into effect final measures connected to its Halal product assurance 
law, without sufficient notification and with little, if any, opportunities for public input. These 
measures have the potential to impact a signif icant proportion of global goods trade with Indonesia, 
including US  exports. By finalizing measures in this manner, Indonesia misses an opportunity to 
receive valuable feedback from stakeholders regarding the trade impact of its measures. 
Additionally, the  US remains concerned that Indonesia has yet to respond to important questions on 
its Halal measures that the US has circulated at the TBT  Committee. Going forward, the US strongly 
encourages Indonesia to adopt a more transparent and consultative policy -making process.  
20.29.   In closing, the United States urges Indonesia: (i)  to provide a response to the US  questions 
posed during the April  2021 ITA  Committee; (ii)  provide a response to US  questions on Indonesia's G/C/M/144  
 
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  Halal measures previously submitted to the TBT  Comm ittee; and (iii)  provide an update on its 
ongoing review of its local content policies.  
20.30.   The United States believes that Indonesia's trade restricting policies run counter to  
Indonesia's broader economic recovery goals, as well as the interest of Indonesian  consumers, 
workers, and businesses, and strongly encourages Indonesia to reconsider such policies. The US is 
hopeful that Indonesia can respond to US  concerns, and stands ready to engage.  
20.31.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
20.32.   Canada shares the concerns expressed by other WTO  Members relating to Indonesia 's 
administration of its import licensing system for agricultural products and would request additional 
information on the administration of its commodity balance mechanism.  Canada calls on Indonesia 
to implement its import measures in a transparent and predictable manner, in accordance with the 
relevant WTO  provisions, particularly in a context where international trade can help to achieve 
Indonesia's food security objectives. C anada also adds its voice to those with a systemic and 
commercial concern with Indonesia's application of tariffs above its bound rates on ICT  products. 
Canada calls on Indonesia to eliminate its tariffs on ICT  products in a way that is consistent with its  
WTO commitments.  
20.33.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
20.34.   Indonesia thanks Japan, the European Union, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada 
for their continued interest in Indonesia's import and export policies and practices. Indonesia woul d 
also like to thank New Zealand for its condolences and sympathy in relation to Indonesia's recent 
devastating earthquake.  
20.35.   Indonesia wishes to address certain issues raised by Members also with reference to its 
statement delivered at the previous meeting of the CTG, as well as in related committee meetings, 
as follows.  
20.36.   With regard to LCRs, Indonesia notes that these are intended for policies relating to  
government procurement, policies relating to fulfilling the needs to maintain welfare and life 
necessiti es for the people of Indonesia, or policies relating to strategic resources managed by the 
state. A comprehensive review process of localization measures, especially those relat ing to 
government procurement for goods and services, is still ongoing.  
20.37.   Regardi ng tariffs on ICT  products, domestic consultations between relevant ministries and 
institutions are ongoing. Indonesia will continue to strive to comply with its commitments in all of 
the WTO  Agreements.  
20.38.   On the textile import licensing regime, based on exi sting regulations, applications for import 
licences are currently being carried out electronically. Once all documents have been submitted, and 
are complete and in line with the regulation, import permits are processed within a relatively short 
time, in ac cordance with the Import Licensing Agreement.  
20.39.   Regarding the licensing regime for importing agricultural products, Indonesia is committed 
to implementing the recommendations and decisions of the DSB in DS477/478.  
20.40.   Regarding the licensing regime for imports o f steel products, Indonesia notes that the 
purpose of the policy is to ensure that all steel products in the Indonesian market are fulfilling the 
necessary standards, specifications, and qualifications relating to health and safety aspects in the 
use of im ported steel products. Indonesia considers that these policies are in accordance with the 
WTO principles of transparency and non -discrimination, as well as with the provisions in the Import 
Licensing Agreement.  
20.41.   On the import licensing procedures relating t o SPS  measures, Indonesia has made progress, 
and will always continue to strive to make progress, and improvements, and to become more 
transparent in its SPS -related import licensing approval procedures.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  20.42.   On Halal regulations, Indonesia reaffirms its openne ss and transparency for international 
cooperation regarding its Halal Assurance System, based on mutual principles, mutual recognition, 
and mutual acceptance, in accordance with international practices and regulations. Indonesia has 
also submitted a number  of clarifications regarding Indonesian Halal regulations to the 
TBT Committee.  
20.43.   On Indonesia's National Standard (SNI), this is an Indonesian consumer protection policy, 
which is not intended to hinder imports from WTO  Members. Rather, the SNI  policy is in tended to 
ensure that products fulfil the relevant safety, security, and health aspects to protect Indonesian 
consumers, and that these are enforced both for domestic and imported products alike. In this 
regard, Indonesia notes that it always strives to fu lfil the principles of WTO  transparency by notifying 
to the WTO its every implementation of mandatory SNI  regulations and other related technical 
regulations.  
20.44.   Indonesia reiterates that it will continue to strive to comply with all of its WTO  commitments, 
including every agreement, and every regulation, and likewise to comply with all of the 
WTO principles, including transparency and non -discrimination.  
20.45.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
21  EGYPT – MANDATORY USE OF A LETTER OF CREDIT AS PAYMENT CONDI TION FOR 
IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
21.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union.  
21.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.3.  The European Union closely monitors the developments relating to the recent mandatory 
requirement to use a Letter of Credit as payment condition for imports in Egypt. The EU has also  
raised this issue at the most recent meeting of the CMA. The European Uni on understands that, 
since February  2022, imports in Egypt can be authorized by the Customs Authority only after the 
Egyptian banks have opened a Letter of Credit. This has led to a de facto blockage of EU  trade at 
ports and customs points. This situation has been compounded by a lack of transparency and 
predictability regarding the introduction and implementation of the measure. The measure was 
adopted without prior warning to economic operators or prior WTO  notification.  
21.4.  The European Union understands tha t earlier this month the Central Bank of Egypt announced 
the gradual removal of the measure with full implementation as of December  2022. The EU requests 
Egypt to confirm the exact date of the measure's full removal, and also to provide more detail on 
the steps being taken to ensure that trade flows in Egypt are reinstated. The EU welcomes Egypt's 
decision to reconsider the measure in order to address the serious concerns raised with respect to 
imports in Egypt.  
21.5.  The delegate of Norway  indicated the followin g: 
21.6.  Norway thanks the European Union for raising this agenda item. Like the EU, Norway also 
raised concerns regard the mandatory requirement to use Letters of Credit as payment for imports 
to Egypt at the October meeting of the CMA. Norway also pointed to t he resulting deadlocks at ports 
and customs points, including for goods supposed to be excluded from the measure, and to the lack 
of transparency and predictability regarding the introduction and implementation of this 
requirement. As the EU, Norway welcom es Egypt's decision to reconsider the measure and would 
appreciate receiving more information on the timing and steps taken to restore the trade flows.  
21.7.  The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
21.8.  Egypt wishes to thank the European Union and Norway for r aising this issue. In fact, this issue 
has already been the subject of exchanges between Egypt and the European Union bilaterally, and 
in various forums, including in the CoA and the C MA. Egypt wishes to highlight recent developments 
in this respect, inclu ding that the Central Bank of Egypt, in October  2022, introduced a number of 
facilitating measures with the aim of gradually phasing out the requirement by end -December  2022. G/C/M/144  
 
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  Such measures include increasing the value limit of shipments excluded from the L etter of Credit 
Requirement from USD  5,000   to USD  500,000 (or their equivalent in other currencies).  
21.9.  Having said that, Egypt wishes to note that a Letter of Credit is a common payment method, 
and is in many cases required by exporters given that it provid es a high level of assurance to the 
exporter. In addition, letters of credits do not create import blockages.  
21.10.   In case of any delay, it is important to note that the current and unprecedented global 
challenges have placed the monetary reserves of a net food importing country like Egypt under 
pressure. This in turn may cause delays and affect a Member's ability to finance its imports, including 
those essential goods.  
21.11.   Concerning the availability and publication of information, since the introduction of 
mandato ry use of Letters of Credit for various products  in February  2022, the Central Bank of 
Egypt  (CBE) has ensured transparency through the issuance of a number of circulars. The latest 
circular is dated 27  October  2022, and clarifies the scope of the requirem ent, in terms of entities, 
products, and trade regimes, and the relevant administrative procedures.  
21.12.   Furthermore, Letters of Credit are not the only payment method allowed; there are also 
other accepted payment methods, as explained in the Central Bank's ci rculars. The circulars also 
explain that there are many products not falling within the product coverage, including, inter alia: 
medicines, vaccines and relevant chemicals, medical supplies and their inputs, and supplies for 
medical testing laboratories; t ea, meat, poultry, fish, wheat, oil, powder milk, infant milk, beans, 
lentils, butter, and corn; live cattle and poultry, in addition to veterinary medicines and their relevant 
chemicals; and raw materials and production inputs, including seeds, chemicals used in agricultural 
activities, and raw cocoa powder.  
21.13.   Finally, to ensure that no shipments of perishable goods (agricultural and food products) 
face any customs delays, Egypt's ports are currently instructed that all perishable shipments be 
cleared from c ustoms provided the importer pledges to finalize the administrative procedures with 
the bank within a maximum of one  year. 
21.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
22  EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, and the United States.  
22.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
22.3.  Australia acknowledges its ongoing bilateral communication and engagement with Egypt on 
the implementation of Egypt's new Halal certification requirements for IS  EG Halal. Australia 
welcomes Egypt's third  addendum to their notific ation at the TBT  Committee's meeting of 
15 August  2022, which clarified which products required Halal certification as an Egyptian import 
requirement. Nevertheless, Australia remains concerned about a number of issues, including the 
need to provide Members  with adequate time to comment on any proposed changes to the measures.  
22.4.  Australia encourages Egypt to meet its WTO  transparency obligations and to provide 
notifications in advance of further changes and any implementation of Egypt's new Halal certification  
measures. At the same time, Australia welcomes ongoing discussion on the Halal certification 
requirements to ensure they meet Egypt's policy goals, while also not being more trade restrictive 
than necessary.  
22.5.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
22.6.  Canada continues to be concerned with Egypt's new Halal certification requirements for all 
imported food and beverage products.  Canada understands Egypt's objective to ensure that Egyptian 
consumers are confident that they are buying and consuming Halal -certified products in agreement 
with Islamic Sharia. However, Canada also believes that such measures should not create G/C/M/144  
 
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  unnecessary barriers to international trade or be more trade -restrictive than necessary to fulfil that 
objective.  
22.7.  Although Canada appreci ates Egypt's delayed implementation of the Halal certification for 
dairy products, Canada remains concerned with the lack of details, documentation, and specificity 
on how these requirements will be implemented, and how specific products will be impacted. For 
example, the proposed new regime only specifies one  Egyptian certification body that will have the 
authority to certify Halal products for the Egyptian market. It is Canada's understanding that this 
has already significantly raised the Halal certificat ion fee, which will have to be borne by exporters 
of Halal product to Egypt. The new measure could result in a certification process that is overly 
burdensome, costly, and more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve Egypt's stated objective.  
22.8.  Canada st rongly encourages Egypt to have open and transparent discussions with its trading 
partners to share information, further clarify the requirements under this new measure, and consider 
the impact it may have on trade. Until then, Canada respectfully requests  that Egypt suspend the 
implementation of the measure.  
22.9.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
22.10.   The United States continues to share the concerns expressed by Australia and Canada 
regarding Egypt's implementation of Halal certification re quirement, as notified in 
document  G/TBT/N/EGY/313, and the subsequent three  addenda. It is important to note that the 
United States recognizes Egypt's right to assure its consumers of certain products' compliance with 
the precepts of Islamic Law through a  Halal certification.  
22.11.   At this time, it does not appear that Egypt has provided the information necessary for 
exporters to adequately understand Egypt's new Halal requirements for dairy products. Without 
these details incorporated in clear technical regulat ions, US  producers are unable to adjust 
production practices and continue shipping quality goods to Egypt. This is especially concerning 
given the significant food security challenges the world has faced over the past year.  
22.12.   The United States requests that Egypt suspend implementation of its Halal requirements for 
dairy products until Egypt is ready to provide: (i)  specific Halal criteria that producers must meet; 
(ii) conformity assessment procedures; (iii)  clear product scope (by HS  code); (iv)  certificati on fee 
structures; (v)  audit procedures (for example, if audits are to be required, what criteria will facilities 
and certifiers be audited against); (vi)  criteria Egypt will use to approve overseas Halal certifiers; 
(vii) government enforcement mechanisms  (for example, required documentation at port, corrective 
action mechanisms); (viii)  process to appeal enforcement actions and remedy non -compliance; and 
(ix) any other details necessary for overseas producers and certifiers to meet these new import 
requir ements.  
22.13.   The United States also requests a reasonable implementation period of at least six  months 
after notifying the technical regulations that would include the aforementioned information. The 
United States stands ready to work with Egypt through technic al engagements to assist Egypt in 
implementing Halal certification requirement measures.  
22.14.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
22.15.   Paraguay wishes to register its support for this item. Paraguay understands Egypt's 
legitimate objectives, but despit e repeated requests for information to Egypt, Paraguay still does not 
have the information that it requested. Although Paraguay sought greater clarity from Egypt more 
than a year ago, the fact that it still does not have clear information or details on the  procedures for 
its implementation is preventing operators from being able to adapt in order to ensure compliance.  
22.16.   Egypt regularly reminds us at the WTO that it is a net -food importing developing country 
and that we are in an unprecedented food security cr isis. However, measures such as these prevent 
exporters from being able to access the Egyptian market and that trade can be a tool that can 
provide solutions to the Egyptian people's food needs.  
22.17.   Paraguay again requests that Egypt suspend the implementation  of its new Halal certification 
requirements until Members have all the information requested and necessary, so that trade G/C/M/144  
 
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  operators have enough time to adapt to these new requirements, allowing food exporters, in this 
way, to be part of the solution to Eg ypt's food and food security needs.  
22.18.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
22.19.   New Zealand thanks Egypt for their ongoing dialogue on its proposed Halal standard and the 
recent further extension for the inclusion of dairy.  New Zealand continues t o respect Egypt's desire 
to ensure Egyptian consumers can be assured of the Halal status of their imported food, but remains 
concerned with aspects of the proposed Halal requirements, including having only one  approved 
Halal certification body.  
22.20.   In addition , the inclusion of all dairy products requiring Halal certification does not follow 
globally accepted norms for food products. New Zealand understands that, by their nature, dairy 
products are intrinsically Halal and should not require Halal certification (other than dairy products 
with added non -dairy animal product ingredients). New Zealand requests Egypt to clarify this and 
issue a final regulation with Halal registration requirements that includes a sufficient notification 
period to implement any new re quirements once the new standard is finalized and formally notified.  
22.21.   New Zealand also asks if the additional registration requirements, as noted as free text in 
document  G/TBT/N/EGY/313/Add.3, will be part of legislated requirements, or a guidance document . 
New Zealand notes its understanding that any registration requirements for manufacturers or 
exporters will not be required before the final Halal standard enters into force.  New Zealand 
encourages Egypt to apply the least trade restrictive requirements i n relation to Halal and welcomes 
further engagement with Egypt on this matter.  
22.22.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.23.   The European Union wishes to express its concerns with regard to Egypt's requirements on 
Halal certification, applyin g as of 1  October  2021, based on the Egyptian Halal standard  4249/2014. 
The EU is concerned about the negative impact of this measure on food and beverages imports to 
Egypt.  The EU welcomes the more recent facilitating measures notified by Egypt to the 
TBT Committee on 4  April 2022 extending, until 30  September  2022, the period in which imports of 
milk and dairy products are accepted in Egypt without a Halal certificate. At the same time, the EU 
would welcome Egypt's clarification as to whether the suspensi on measure may be further extended 
to provide for a reasonable period for companies to adapt to the new requirements.  
22.24.   The European Union would also like to invite Egypt's authorities to not further extend the 
list of products covered by Halal certification . An extension would create significant new trade 
barriers for importers and would have negative impacts on Egypt's consumers, in the form of higher 
prices and limited choice due to limited competition.  
22.25.   In addition, the European Union would like to invite Egypt to reconsider its decision to grant 
the right to certify the compliance with Halal requirements to a single company, IS  EG Halal. The EU 
encourages Egypt to provide for a Halal certification system that would allow multiple, 
well-established certific ation entities, in accordance with international best practices.  
22.26.   Finally, the European Union wishes to ask Egypt about the concrete steps it intends to take, 
in particular to provide comprehensive information about the new measures, as well as clear writte n 
and publicly available guidance to stakeholders, including a detailed description of the certification 
procedure, its duration, costs, and required documents, as well as the process for registration of 
suppliers, and the product coverage. The EU is ready  to work with Egypt on solutions that would 
avoid the negative impact this measure would have on food and beverages imports to Egypt.  
22.27.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
22.28.   Argentina reiterates its concern about this measure and the lack of detailed and complete 
information on it. In particular, the recent postponement of the entry into force of the new regime 
does not allay Argentina's concerns and worries. These concerns re late mainly to the lack of 
transparency and predictability, as there is no information on the certification procedures or other 
regulatory details. Argentina therefore requests that Egypt provide the necessary information and G/C/M/144  
 
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  refrain from implementing this  measure until detailed information is available, and sufficient time 
has been granted to foreign producers to adapt to it.  
22.29.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
22.30.   The United Kingdom understands Egypt's objective to ensure Egyptian consumers' 
confidence when purchasing Halal-certified products. Alongside Canada and the United States, the 
United Kingdom encourages Egypt to have transparent discussions with its trading  partners, to share 
information, and to provide clarity on the requirements under this new measure. The UK looks 
forward to engaging with Egypt on this.  
22.31.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
22.32.   At the outset, Egypt thanks Australia, Canada, the Unite d States, Paraguay, New Zealand, 
the European Union, Argentina, and the United Kingdom for their interest in this matter, and takes 
note of what has been said. Egypt wishes to refer to its statements on this issue made in previous 
TBT Committee and CTG  meetings on this issue.75 
22.33.   Since its first  notification, in December  2021, Egypt has been keen to respond to the 
comments and concerns of WTO  Members, and its trading partners, through numerous formats, 
including bilateral exchanges, the Egyptian TBT  enquiry p oint, and through notifying further addenda 
to its original notification, in order to address the issues of common concern.  
22.34.   Egypt wishes to note that it has been almost a year since the original notification was made. 
In the interim, Egypt has delayed the entry into force of the requirement of imports of milk and dairy 
products to be accompanied by the Halal certificate, and notes that, to date, no imports of milk and 
dairy products have been denied entry into Egypt if not accompanied by a Halal certificate . 
Furthermore, the substance of the requirement, and the implementing procedures through which it 
is be implemented, as set by the General Organization for Veterinary Services (GOVS), have not 
changed since the initial notification. Hence, the delay introd uced by Egypt has provided economic 
operators with the appropriate period of time to adapt to the requirement.  
22.35.   It is also noteworthy that Egypt's import data of dairy products indicate that the flow of trade 
has not been disrupted as a result of the requir ement. In fact, comparing the volume of Egypt's 
imports of dairy products from the world during the first seven  months of 2021 and 2022, there has 
been a minor decrease, which cannot be attributed to the Halal certification requirement. The impact 
of the m ultiple crises faced by our countries on prices, and hence on demand, should also be taken 
into account.  
22.36.   In its latest addendum, in document  G/TBT/N/EGY/313/Add.3, Egypt was keen to clarify the 
points raised by Members during the TBT  Committee's previous m eetings, and bilaterally. For 
example, the scope of the products has been defined in HS  code as requested by all countries. In 
this respect, Egypt stresses that the scope is limited and confined to the specified products, as 
notified. The original notifica tion and its addenda never contained a reference to requiring a Halal 
certificate for imports of all agricultural products. Since the original notification, the specified 
products were meat and poultry and their products, and milk and dairy products (excep t for crude 
milk). The most recent addendum also clarified the procedures involved in Halal certification as  
applied by the currently approved certification body by GOVS. It also clarified the labelling 
requirements that are issued by the currently approve d and recognized certification body by GOVS.  
22.37.   Furthermore, responding to Members' questions on the status of the revision of the Egyptian 
Standard (ES) 4249 "General requirements on Halal food according to Islamic Sharya", the latest 
addendum noted that the  final draft had been finalized and was available for comments from Egypt's 
TBT enquiry point. Indeed, a number of Members had provided their comments during the 60 -day 
comment period, to which Egypt had replied.  
22.38.   ES4249 comprises nine  articles and two  tables that cover the following: scope; definitions 
and terminology; general requirements for Halal food; instruments, vessels, and production inputs; 
storage, display, and transport; cleanliness, health, and safety conditions; inspection and approval; 
 
75 See document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  27.26 -27.29.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  display  in the markets; and Halal Labelling. The two  tables included in the standard provide for the 
following: (i)  categorization of what is not Halal; and (ii)  the food products that shall have a Halal 
Certificate according to their product label and ingredient s. 
22.39.   It is also important to clarify that ES4249 does not, and shall not, provide for any supervision 
requirements for a specific certification body. The relevant authority is the one to recognize the 
certification body that certifies compliance with Halal r equirements, which is currently ISEG  Halal. 
Members will be duly notified if other certification entities are also approved.  
22.40.   As for the fees structure, it is determined by the certification body and is dependent on the 
type of the product and quantity.  
22.41.   Finally, Egypt wishes to express its appreciation and readiness to continue engagement with 
all Members on this topic.  
22.42.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  EUROPEAN UNION – COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (CVD) ON STAINLESS STEEL 
COLD -ROLLED (SSCR) – REQUEST F ROM INDONESIA  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
23.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
23.3.  Indonesia wishes to again convey its concerns to the European Union on the imposition of 
CVD on Stainless Steel Cold -Rolled (SSCR)  products from Indonesia, after imposing both safeguards 
and anti -dumping duties on the same product. The imposition of CVDs practically declines market 
access and reduces the export value and competitiveness of Indo nesian SSCR  products on the 
EU market due to the high duties imposed. Indonesia emphasizes that the European Union has made 
a mistake in interpreting Indonesian policies as a financial contribution to the stainless -steel 
industry. Furthermore, the EU has b roadened the interpretation of the meaning of subsidies in the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (ASCM) , by including cross -country financing 
as a subsidy. Indonesia believes that the imposition of CVD by the European Union to Indonesian 
SSCR products has the potential to violate the provisions contained in the ASCM . Indonesia wishes 
to engage further with the EU on this matter.  
23.4.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
23.5.  China expresses its concerns over the European Union's distortive interpretation of the 
SCM Agreement, and its introduction of a novel concept of "cross -border" subsidy in countervailing 
investigations and measures. The EU has departed from the clear text of the SCM  Agreement in 
several countervailing investigations by i nvoking cross -border subsidies, a concept that was not 
derived from the Agreement, but rather created by the EU. Embedded in such concept was the EU's 
distortive interpretation of Article  1.1(a)(1) of the SCM  Agreement, which clearly states that "a 
subsidy  shall be deemed to exist if there is a financial contribution by a government or any public 
body within the territory of a Member". However, in the case of a cross -border subsidy, the EU 
construes the normal practices in overseas investment activities as a subsidy, for example, a 
non-binding bilateral economic cooperation between country  A and country  B, overseas investments 
made by private corporations in country  A to country  B, and finances secured by such corporations 
in banks in country  A in overseas i nvestments. By the EU's logic, any normal bilateral cooperation 
and overseas investments could be treated as subsidies and therefore be subject to countervailing 
measures. Such practices clearly depart from the basic principles of the SCM  Agreement.  
23.6.  The Eu ropean Union's actions are inconsistent with the SCM  Agreement. Such actions not only 
affect the legitimate interests of corporations and Members involved, and disrupt normal bilateral 
economic cooperation and overseas investments, but they are also detrim ental to the sustainable 
and inclusive growth of the global economy. China requests the EU to correct its problematic 
practices, terminate all measures concerning cross -border subsidization, and stop conducting similar 
investigations.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  23.7.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.8.  The European Union appreciates and respects Indonesia's right to develop its steel industry 
and exploit its considerable nickel reserves. However, this legitimate industrial policy aim should be 
carried out in line wi th the WTO  rules. The EU recalls that it lodged a WTO  complaint against 
Indonesia's export ban on nickel ore. This European Union's countervailing duty case targets two  key 
subsidies, which undermine many competitive EU  industries in the emerging new lands cape of unfair 
trade: subsidized raw materials critical for industrial value chains, and cross -border subsidies 
deriving from China that Indonesia accepted based on the numerous documents found.  
23.9.  Two further features need highlighting here: (i)  Indonesia's authorities only partially 
cooperated in many aspects of the investigation, so that the European Union had to rely in part on 
the so -called 'facts available'; and (ii)  moreover, this case has revealed a large number of 
agreements between the authorities of  Indonesia and China for channelling cross -border subsidies.  
23.10.   The European Union has acted in full compliance with the WTO  rules. The EU did not 
countervail subsidies granted outside the national jurisdiction of the exporting country. In fact, the 
Chinese s ubsidies are clearly attributable to the Indonesian government, as evidenced by the dense 
web of agreements Indonesia had agreed with the Chinese government in the framework of a close 
cooperation. In sum, the investigation revealed that, by providing subs idies to exporting producers 
established in Indonesia with the express acceptance and acknowledgement of the Indonesian side, 
China is creating additional capacity and opening new channels in order to export subsidized products 
to the EU, thereby causing i njury to EU  producers. As long as distortive, WTO -countervailable 
subsidies continue damaging the European Union's steel industry, jeopardizing tens of thousands of 
jobs, the EU will have no choice but to exercise its legitimate WTO  rights to their fullest  extent.  
23.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
24  EUROPEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT 
MECHANISM AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES) – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND 
INDONESIA  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Brazil and Indonesia.  
24.2.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
24.3.  Brazil will touch upon the European Union's C arbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)  
under Agenda Item  40, so will only address deforestation free commodities at this point. Brazil 
believes that the European Union's proposal establishes an illegitimate obstacle to international 
trade, is strongly discriminatory in nature, and will have li ttle impact, if any, on its alleged goal of 
reducing deforestation and forest degradation.  
24.4.  First, Brazil considers that the proposed regulation does not contribute to the fight against 
deforestation. Deforestation is a multivariable problem that should be dealt with through 
comprehensive public policies  in the short, medium, and long term . Illegal activities linked to 
deforestation must be halted. Alternative means of livelihood must be made available to the millions 
of people that live near forests , 25 million people in the case of the Brazilian Amazon . And 
sustainable production practices must be fostered and scaled -up. 
24.5.  In this sense, trade restrictions are a very limited instrument. They unfairly punish  more than  
99% of rural producers and do not provide any other remedy for the direct and indirect drivers of 
deforestation. By acting as an obstacle to economic development, trade restrictions actually reinforce 
some of the dynamics that lead to deforestation and reduce government capacity to deal with this 
issue.  At the same time, their use rests on the flawed assumption that the affected producers will 
simply to turn to legal activities as a consequence of this measure.  
24.6.  Second, the proposed regulation is also heavily skewed towards punishment and 
disengagem ent by excluding from the EU  market any producer suspected of having links to 
deforestation (or worse still, based on an area regarded as high risk, regardless of the specific 
sustainability credentials of each producer) with no flexibilities or margin for  remedial or G/C/M/144  
 
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  compensatory action such as reforestation. Once cut off, producers no longer have any incentives 
to improve their practices and will probably also lack the means for doing so.  
24.7.  Brazil is committed to the protection of its forests. In its last N ationally Determined 
Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC  Paris Agreement, Brazil confirmed that it will strive to end illegal 
deforestation in the Amazon by 2028  and this commitment has only been strengthened and 
reinforced at COP27 by President Lula.  Brazil also excels in the legal protection of its natural 
ecosystems, with 30% of Brazil's terrestrial area and 26% of its marine areas being protected. In 
the Amazon, this number rises to 50%. These figures are significantly higher than those of the 
European Uni on. It is also worth noting that 10.9  million hectares of land are going through the 
process of natural regeneration in Brazil.  
24.8.  Demanding that Brazil accomplishes its NDC  targets immediately not only violates the Paris 
Agreement and the UNFCCC, but also op ens the floodgates for similar initiatives by other Members. 
Should Brazil perhaps classify as high -risk those Members that do not meet Brazil's "ambition" in 
having an energy grid of which 80% comes from renewable energy sources, and ban their products 
accordingly? Just as Brazil does not criticize the European Union in light of the challenges it is facing 
in increasing its reliability on renewable energies, the EU should take into account the many 
challenges that Brazil faces in the Amazon, an area larger  than the EU  itself.  
24.9.  Third, Brazilian agriculture is sustainable. Brazil is the third -largest exporter of agricultural 
products in the world. This position was achieved through massive increases in productivity. In the 
last 25  years, grain production has g rown by 248%, in a harvested area that expanded by only 58%. 
In livestock, Brazil's cattle herd increased by 49%, while areas of pastureland decreased by 11%.  
24.10.   Fourth, Brazil believes that international trade contributes to the fight against deforestation. 
Sustainable development only materializes through the simultaneous improvement of its three  core 
dimensions: economic , social , and environmental. It is precisely because international trade helps 
improve conditions in all three that it can be such a powerf ul tool in that process. International trade 
has a proven beneficial effect by providing opportunities for small and medium -sized companies, as 
well as for families, to access new markets and improve their income, escape poverty, and improve 
their economic  and social conditions. The European proposal, however, disregards such positive 
effects and instead proposes to restrict trade by imposing a potential ban on the trade of several 
commodities based on an unnecessarily strict concept of "deforestation -free products" that diverges 
from the 2030  Agenda for Sustainable Development and all relevant multilateral environmental 
agreements, including the UNFCCC and the CBD, which acknowledge the importance of notions such 
as sustainable use, ecosystem regeneration, and reforestation, among others.  Therefore, the 
European Union's proposed regulation is likely to have very little impact in terms of actually reducing 
deforestation. It lacks any provisions or pathways for rehabilitation and offers no incentive s for 
struggling producers to improve their practices.  
24.11.   Fifth, Brazil considers that the benchmarking system is discriminatory and distorts trade. 
The proposed country benchmarking system, with its tiered classification, will not contribute to 
fighting deforestation. On the contrary, it will only promote trade diversion.  Brazil considers that 
there are several reasons to believe that a benchmarking system in general, and more specifically, 
the benchmarking system proposed by the European Commission, is an entirely inef ficient tool when 
trying to halt deforestation. First, the benchmarking system is inherently discriminatory and will 
impose a different treatment to producer countries based on a unilateral decision by the European 
Commission in light of criteria as subjec tive as the suitability of a country's environmental laws and 
enforcement capabilities. Second, by mandating "enhanced scrutiny" over products originating from 
high-risk countries, it stigmatizes entire countries and penalizes those producers that produce in a 
sustainable manner in those countries. Third, it creates a significant incentive for trade diversion, as 
operators interested in escaping the heavy administrative and financial burdens related to the due 
diligence system, and in avoiding the possibili ty of heavy penalties, would then simply abandon all 
exchanges with those countries or areas and merely switch to other sources.  
24.12.   Sixth, in Brazil's view, as raised in the CoA, the proposed regulation is incompatible with the 
WTO's  rules. 
24.13.   Seventh, for Brazi l, the proposed regulation must be adapted to the production reality on 
the ground. The proposal has been designed in such a manner as to be disconnected from actual G/C/M/144  
 
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  production practices and the way supply chains have been organized over the past decades. For the 
regulation to work, it is imperative that the due diligence system is adapted to production 
characteristics and needs of which cover each commodity. Instead, the European Union's approach 
is to impose a "top -down", "one  size fits all", very detaile d and cumbersome due diligence obligation 
on traders and operators within the EU  market, which includes a heavy informational and 
documentary burden, as well as full geo -localization and traceability requirements throughout the 
supply chain. This system is  then complemented by comprehensive and strict provisions on 
monitoring and enforcement, and by heavy penalties in case of non -compliance, not to mention the 
possibility of transferring the costs of enforcement to traders and operators.  
24.14.   Such a system compl etely disregards the very significant differences in the ways in which 
the covered commodities are produced, and their supply chains organized. For example, it ignores 
the fact that some of the commodities are largely produced by smallholders (like coffee) , as well as 
the fact that the supply chain for several commodities (such as coffee and soya) usually include 
several links between producer and trader/operator. It also fails to take into account that these 
commodities are usually stored along the supply chain, not according to origin producer, but to other 
criteria related to their physical characteristics, quality, and chemical composition. As a result, 
deregulation will likely result in significant disruptions of supply and even shortages as operators 
and traders will be unable to comply with the stringent requirements contained therein and forced 
to restructure entire supply chains. It will also likely result in significant price surges for European 
consumers and for European producers using the covered  commodities as inputs in a time when 
inflationary pressures are already intensifying, and food security is under stress.  
24.15.   Eighth, Brazil believes that the proposed regulation should foster cooperation and focus on 
the future. In this regard, it is disappoi nting that the European Commission has decided to pursue 
an avenue of unilateral legislation and enforcement when it comes to an issue of such importance. 
There are several appropriate multilateral forums in which initiatives to reduce deforestation could 
have been discussed with a more significant participation and engagement from producing countries. 
Brazil is convinced that the E uropean Union's proposal would have benefited, during its inception, 
from a more open and participatory process, which might ac tually have taken into account the 
realities, challenges, and experiences of producing countries. At the very least, such a process would 
have contributed to a fairer and less commercially harmful legislation, with fewer of the 
aforementioned technical and  conceptual problems.  
24.16.   Ninth, Brazil considers that the proposed regulation should have objective criteria. In this 
regard, the criteria used to evaluate the risk of non -compliance with the regulation are insufficiently 
clear and objective. For example, it contains unclear parameters, including governance criteria, 
which are not always related to deforestation risk. Furthermore, the proposed regulation's criteria 
may be applied in a discretionary manner by the Commission, which is not required to justify cou ntry 
categorization or decisions regarding compliance or non -compliance with the regulation. In addition, 
the criteria are not internationally agreed and there is no harmonized methodology to assess and 
evaluate them. This lack of objective criteria, besid es reinforcing the perception of a unilateral and 
arbitrary piece of legislation, is an obstacle to the very participation of countries and producers in 
the evaluation process, which is not guided by international and consensual values and measures.  
Only a  piece of legislation issued with shared and objective parameters would allow producer 
countries to participate in the confirmation and implementation of this system and give them more 
predictability in their evaluations.  
24.17.   In addition to these remarks on sp ecific aspects of the European Union's proposal, Brazil 
believes that the EU's initiative should be seen in a broader context. If Members were to take a 
bird's -eye view of the discussions on this occasions , Brazil, for its part, would note that, in 
Agricul ture, the EU has benefited from an unbalanced playing field regarding agricultural subsidies, 
has consistently adopted policies that violate the SPS  Agreement and granted undue and 
discriminatory benefits to its own producers. In CBAM, similarly, Brazil se es that the EU is going 
against the letter and spirit of the UNFCCC and the GATT in granting undue benefits to its domestic 
producers. And in "deforestation -free commodities", as Brazil has argued, there are many grounds 
to affirm that the proposal may vio late WTO and UNFCCC  norms and grant undue benefits to 
domestic producers. This is an extremely worrying pattern that, if it were to persist, would weaken 
the capacity of both trade and environmental regimes to provide global solutions to Members' 
common ch allenges. And if Members are to have a proper rules -based international order , and not 
the law of the jungle , they cannot have such an important member of the international community 
adopting policies that depart from the principles and spirit of both regi mes. G/C/M/144  
 
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  24.18.   One final aspect that Brazil wishes to address is that of historical responsibilities, as many 
Members have referred to International Environmental Law (IEL) principles. First, Brazil address es 
what it is not. Common But Differentiated Responsibilitie s (CBDR) is not an excuse for developing 
countries to avoid environmental commitments. Members have seen large developing countries 
assuming ambitious net zero  commitments in line with the idea of "respective capabilities", but what 
historical responsibili ty does mean is that mean, however, is that Members that developed for 
centuries on the back of dirty energy sources and unsustainable practices have a moral and legal 
obligation to do more. The consumer preferences of a few hundred millions should not be an excuse 
for shifting the transition costs to billions of rural producers in the developing world, especially if 
those consumers are only in a position to do so because of centuries of unsustainable practices by 
their countries. And, as EU  consumers are w ell aware, the transition towards a low carbon economy 
must be based on the principles of justice and fairness.  
24.19.   Brazil has a legacy of constructive effort in building bridges in both trade and environmental 
regimes, making meaningful and often decisive contributions to achieving outcomes that balance 
the interests of all Members, thus putting Members on a proper path to addressing their common 
challenges. Ther efore, Brazil reiterates that the European Union will find in Brazil a strong and 
committed partner in the promotion of sustainable development, and Brazil urges the EU to duly 
consider the many concerns that Brazil has expressed and adopt a constructive a pproach on these 
issues, to the benefit of both regimes, and to the benefit, most especially, of small producers in the 
developing world.  
24.20.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
24.21.   Indonesia wishes to refer to its statement delivered at the CTG's p revious meeting, and 
again raises its concerns to the European Union regarding the European Green Deal policy, 
specifically the CBAM and Deforestation Free Commodities (DFC)  proposal. Indonesia notes that 
several commodities listed in the CBAM are required  to comply with carbon emission limits for 
accessing the EU  market. However, specific methodology for calculating the average price that will 
be included in the CBAM  certification is not yet clearly reflected in the regulation.  
24.22.   Indonesia understands that t he European Union will be imposing tax for imported products 
while exempting the same tax on domestic products, which will depart from one of the main 
principles of the WTO. Indonesia requested the EU to consider other approaches to achieving its 
environme ntal goals that are not burdensome to their trading partners, especially developing 
countries. Moreover, Indonesia requests the EU to provide more detailed technical information on 
the CBAM  mechanism, including the methodology for calculating the average p rice for the 
CBAM  certificates.  
24.23.   With regard to the DFC  proposal, Indonesia is of the view that this policy will shift the burden 
to developing country producers and erect more barriers to international trade. Indonesia would like 
to seek more detailed info rmation from the European Union on the scope of commodities, the due 
diligence mechanism, the scientific basis, as well as  the EU's plans to provide technical cooperation, 
if any.  
24.24.   Indonesia shares the European Union's view of the high importance of protect ing the 
environment. Nevertheless, any policy formulated by WTO  Members to achieve environmental goals 
must comply with WTO  provisions and principles, particularly the non -discrimination principle.  
24.25.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the follo wing:  
24.26.   The Russian Federation reiterates its deep concern in respect of the CBAM, which is now 
being finalized by the European Union. Russia also reiterates its statements made during the 
previous meetings of the CMA and the CTG.76 The Russian Federation believes the CBAM to be a 
protectionist measure aimed at improving the business environment for EU  domestic industries for 
the following reasons.  
24.27.   First, one of the objectives of the CBAM is to address the risk of carbon leakage, whi ch is 
stated in paragraph  1 of Article  1 of the EU's draft regulation establishing a CBAM. According to the 
 
76 Document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  41.56 -41.60.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  Explanatory Memorandum to this draft regulation "carbon leakage occurs if, for reasons of different 
ambitions related to climate policies, businesse s in certain industry sectors or subsectors were to 
transfer production to other countries with less stringent emission constraints or imports from these 
countries would replace equivalent but less GHG  emissions intensive products due to the difference 
in climate policy".  
24.28.   The whole concept of prevention of the so -called carbon leakage is an intention to localize 
capacities in the EU  territory, especially those that are European but have been moved outside the 
Union.  
24.29.   The Russian Federation would like to remi nd the EU and other WTO  Members that the 
UNFCCC, as well as the Paris Agreement, allows their Parties to choose their own way of achieving 
climate goals that is the most effective for them. According to Article  3 of the UNFCCC "policies and 
measures to dea l with climate change should be cost -effective so as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different 
socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources , sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors".  
24.30.   In addition, Article  5 of the UNFCCC provides for the cooperation of its Parties in order "to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that wo uld lead to sustainable 
economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus 
enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate 
change, including unilateral ones, should  not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade".  
24.31.   The Russian Federation notes that the major principles of the Paris Agreement are the 
following: (i)  common but differentiated responsi bility; (ii)  the transfer of technologies, their 
deployment and dissemination; and (iii)  cooperation. The CBAM neglects all these principles and 
absolutely does not meet the terms of the multilateral arrangements on how to address the climate 
change proble m concluded at the global level.  
24.32.   Despite all these provisions, the European Union has decided to punish all those countries 
that are applying climate policies different from its own.  
24.33.   Second, it is no secret that the European Union's institutions have made their proposals to 
amend the initial draft regulation. These proposals include: (i)  extension of the scope of products 
subjected to the CBAM; (ii)  no opportunity to recognize alternatives to carbon pricing internal 
measures aimed at decarbonization applied  by exporting to the EU  countries as effective when 
calculating the CBAM  rate; (iii)  no ability for mutual recognition of the verification results; and 
(iv) ensure export rebates for the so -called most effective installations involved in export activity, 
according to the EU  Emissions Trading System (ETS)  regulation.  
24.34.   Third, the CBAM should mirror the European Union's ETS for importers of the covered 
products. However, the EU  ETS implies financial contribution measures. The EU  State Aid Guidelines 
provide com pensation for the reduction of indirect Green House Gas  emissions. In other words, 
national authorities provide financial support to companies if they consume alternative energy 
resources produced within the EU. Besides, the participants of the EU  ETS have  free allocation within 
this system and do not purchase any allowances.  
24.35.   Finally, the Russian Federation would also like to draw Members' attention to the 
EU institutions' discussion on possible export rebates for EU  producers to help them remain globally 
competitive. It is obvious that even if the EU establishes the CBAM to increase the cost of imported 
products in the domestic market, the EU's exported goods will still be uncompetitive in the market 
of third  countries. However, it is not clear how this exp ort rebate will comply with WTO  rules on 
export subsidies?  
24.36.   All these elements reflect that the nature of the proposed measures is purely economic, 
rather than environmental.  
24.37.   As for the proposal on deforestation -free products, such measures, in Russia's vie w, are 
aimed at imposing trade -restrictive measures in order to improve the business environment and G/C/M/144  
 
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  ensure compulsory localization in the EU  territory. One of the examples is a proposal of the European 
Commission on deforestation -free products, which impl ies import authorization procedures in 
respect of certain categories of goods, such as cattle, cocoa, oil palm, soya, and wood and products 
derived from them.  
24.38.   According to the draft Regulation, permits on import of such goods are supposed to be issued 
in case: (i)  the production of the supplied products has not caused deforestation and forest 
degradation; (ii)  production has been carried out in accordance with the national legislation of the 
country of origin; and (iii)  due diligence expertise by the import er has been conducted. At the same 
time, this proposal neither sets out any relevant specific provisions, nor any quality or quantity 
criteria, for the implementation of this approach and compliance therewith.  
24.39.   The draft regulation imposes benchmarks for ri sks depending on the product's country of 
origin. And if the country of origin falls under the high -level risk group, the imports from this territory 
are prohibited. This seems like another unilateral measure that is not in conformity with the 
WTO rules an d main principles of the global arrangements related to the issue of combating climate 
change.  
24.40.   Moreover, the European Union's institutions within the framework of the trialogue go further 
and propose to extend the scope of products subject to deforestation -free regulation, as well as to 
add new, and vague, conditions for import authorization, which are: (i)  absence of compulsory 
labour force in manufacturing process of products exported to the EU; and (ii)  compliance with 
international standards despite the  existence of the technical regulation system in the EU, and 
others.  
24.41.   There is no doubt that all these requirements, together with the initial proposals of the 
Commission, will create additional administrative obstacles for international trade that do not s erve 
the interests of the multilateral trading system. In conclusion, the Russian Federation urges the 
European Union to fully respect the WTO  rules and international climate agreements.  
24.42.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
24.43.   Guatemala is conce rned about the implementation of these measures and their negative 
effect domestically on rural development in developing countries. Countries' sustainability is 
managed individually in line with each Member's needs and resources. However, the resources of  
developing countries, such as Guatemala, are limited in comparison with the support offered by the 
European Union, which is in the range of millions of euros. 
24.44.   In relation to the proposal for a Regulation concerning certain relevant commodities and 
product s associated with deforestation and forest degradation, Guatemala is not fully clear about 
the criteria used to select the commodities likely to be included in the Regulation. The European 
Union has responded at the WTO that it is based on the impact asses sment carried out for the 
measure. In that assessment, the section "Product Scope" refers only to commodities imported into 
the EU, but no study was used that addressed commodities produced within the EU. Accordingly, we 
have concerns about national treatm ent under the application of this measure.  
24.45.   In relation to risk categorization by country and risk areas for third  countries, Guatemala is 
similarly unclear as to the criteria and scientific basis underlying such categorization. Guatemala 
reiterates the imp ortance of having rules that follow WTO  principles, such as most -favoured -nation 
treatment and national treatment.  
24.46.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
24.47.   Ecuador would first like to thank Brazil and Indonesia for including this trade concern on t he 
agenda of the Council's meeting. As stated at the previous meeting of the CMA, Ecuador is concerned 
by the development of policies under the Green Deal and rules on deforestation -free commodities, 
since they are unilateral decisions that have internatio nal ramifications beyond the borders and 
jurisdiction of the European Union, and may affect third  countries. Ecuador is a strong advocate on 
matters of the environment and, as such, recognizes, supports, and promotes compliance with 
countries' internationa l commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. Under the Paris Agreement, each 
country establishes its own targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through nationally G/C/M/144  
 
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  determined contributions. As such, each country, while retaining its sovereignty and observi ng the 
principle of common but differentiated obligations, in line with its development capacities, 
establishes its own system for controlling the expansion of crops at the expense of forests, forage, 
or vegetation with high carbon stock.  
24.48.   Against that back ground, any measure adopted in relation to controlling greenhouse gases 
and deforestation should follow the provisions agreed globally in the Paris Agreement. In other 
words, they cannot be decided unilaterally, much less without considering national capac ity, 
progressivity, and a multilateral follow -up system.  
24.49.   It should be borne in mind that the measure disproportionately affects countries with primary 
tropical forests, the bulk of which are in developing countries, and furthermore, it neither includes 
their points of view nor translates into a proportionate increase in the funds available for sustainable 
development that can also address the effects of climate change. Meanwhile, there are indeed 
resources available to allocate billions, notably resources f or agricultural subsidies that affect 
competitiveness, distort markets, and disadvantage countries that do not have the resources to pay 
similar generous subsidies.  
24.50.   Ecuador would be grateful for any information that the European Union could offer in reply 
to the comments made at this meeting of the Council, including replies to the particular details of 
those comments or recommendations made by various Members, in a timely manner, and by 
different channels, on how they were included in the development of th e policies.  
24.51.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
24.52.   As Paraguay has covered its concerns regarding other elements under the Green Deal that 
affect trade in agricultural products, on this occasion Paraguay will focus on the Carbon Border 
Adjustmen t Mechanism. Regarding the CBAM, Paraguay reiterates its systemic interest in this 
concern and requests that its prior statements are reflected in the minutes of today's meeting .77 
24.53.   Paraguay requests the European Union , once more, to share information on whether they 
are planning a lowering of tariffs for imported products that contain a lower carbon footprint, and 
whether they are considering increasing tariffs for products with a higher carbon footprint than that 
of EU products, as there should be a mechanism to recogni ze positive contributions and lower carbon 
footprints, and not just a penalty for producers who pollute more than European companies.  
24.54.   Paraguay  also reiterate s that responsibilities are common but differe ntiated , and must be 
taken into account , and that these mechanisms should be negotiated and not unilaterally imposed, 
so that they actually fulfil their objectives – which may be shared . But the policy tools are critici zed 
due to the manner in which they a re built, designed , and implemented, lending themselves to 
protectionism and trade distortions.  
24.55.   Briefly, regarding commodities free of deforestation, Paraguay wishes  to make reference to 
its statement delivered under Agenda I tem 678, but to add that there is an intrinsic discrimination in 
the design of the measure, even if according to the European Union it applies in the same way to its 
producers. This discrimination exists from the moment production of some of these commodities 
does not take place in Euro pean territory, and that the EU only has 3% of its native forests, and 
thus the same conditions do not apply as to those with a higher percentage of native forests. 
Therefore, we are being penali zed for our conservation and preservation efforts , and for pr oviding 
eco-systemic services for years, and continuing  to do so, when Europe has eliminated 97% of its 
native forests.  
 
77 Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 7 and 8  July 2022, document  G/C/M/143, 
paragraphs  16.42 –16.43: "The delegate of Paraguay indicated the following: Paraguay wishes to reiterate its 
interest in this trade concern and requests that i ts previous statements be placed on record. In addition, Paraguay 
again requests information from the European Union on whether it plans a tariff reduction for imported products 
with a lower carbon footprint, and how it plans an increase for those with a h igher footprint. Paraguay believes 
that incentives are just as important as penalties in measures such as these, and that common but differentiated 
responsibilities should also be taken into account." Footnote: " Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  36.24 -36.25. " 
78 Paragraphs  6.2-6.17.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  24.56.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
24.57.   India thanks the delegations of Brazil and Indonesia for placing this item on the Council 's 
agenda. In the previous month's Committee on Trade and Environment, during Environment Week, 
more than a dozen Members intervened on the European Green Deal agenda item, including 
developed and developing countries, Members large and small by geographic  area, and Members 
large and small by population. The concerns around the European Green Deal are numerous, 
widespread, and global.  
24.58.   Sustainable development and environmental protection, and to enhance the means for doing 
so in a manner consistent with the respective needs and concerns of countries at different levels of 
economic development, are critical concerns for each country. However, there  are serious concerns 
as regards the trends and manner on the increasing use of unilateral measures impacting trad e, 
which are sought to be justified as environmental measures.  The implications of such measures for 
the WTO  rules need to be reflected upon. The underlying concern is one of systemic implications for 
international law as a whole, and the impact any unilat eralism would have for the multilaterally 
negotiated rights and obligations of countries.  
24.59.   Reducing greenhouse gas emissions to address climate change is a global effort, and all 
WTO Members are members of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC functions on the basis of th e principles of 
equity, and in accordance with UNFCCC  members' common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.  
24.60.   India also notes that the Sharm el -Sheikh Implementation Plan was adopted just days ago, 
at the end of COP -27, and promot ed international cooperation. On the other hand, the European 
Green Deal, and the various related legislations and rules being framed  around it, are being 
discussed in the CTG, the Committee for Trade and Environment, the TBT  Committee, and the 
SPS Committ ee, among others. In this light, India urges the European Union to reflect on the 
proportionality of its unilateral, trade -restrictive, consumer -choice -restrictive actions being taken in 
the name of the environment.  
24.61.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
24.62.   Argentina is closely following the European Union's legislative process on deforestation and 
is concerned about the proposed single model concept  that the EU intends to impose, which does 
not take into account the different characteristics of th e production models of the various countries. 
Argentina also reiterates that the regulations must be compatible with the WTO's rules. Argentina 
considers that the new regulations stemming from the European Green Deal should respect the EU's 
commitments to the WTO, and also be based on scientific evidence, to ensure that the EU's measures 
do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or be a disguised restriction 
on international trade.  
24.63.   Argentina shares European concerns about clima te change and, above all, the objective of 
producing food sustainably, taking into account the current challenges of safeguarding food security 
in changing climatic conditions. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that there are regional 
and nation al differences in natural resources, environmental challenges, and the impacts of climate 
change, meaning that best practices in one  region of the world may differ from those in another.  
24.64.   Given this scenario, Argentina is convinced that there is no single m odel for achieving 
environmental protection, and that environmental degradation, including climate change, must be 
addressed by respecting the core principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Solutions 
should therefore be geared towards local realities, and the proposed policies and initiatives for the 
legitimate purpose of environmental protection must be flexible, pragmatic, implementable, and 
realistic, providing the most effective measures to achieve the objective sought, while being the 
least trade -restrictive to that end.  
24.65.   In this connection, the unilateral approach of the European Union's trade policies under the 
Green Deal is cause for concern, given that it does not take into due account the environmental 
commitments made by third  countr ies, in line with their national priorities and policies. In fact, in 
the case of Argentina, the country has undertaken and extended its environmental commitments, G/C/M/144  
 
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  fulfilling its responsibilities in terms of its international obligations. Thus, third -count ry measures 
should be taken as equivalent, avoiding the imposition of one -size-fits-all solutions.  
24.66.   With regard to the CBAM, Argentina has already stated in this Council that this measure is 
cause for growing concern among Members. Serious doubts have been raised regarding whether a 
mechanism of this nature is consistent with the WTO  Agreements, in particular with the provisions 
of the GATT  1994.  
24.67.   All Members have a duty to combat climate change. The actions that they take, and the 
instruments that they use, must be in compliance with their international commitments. They must 
neither be more trade -restrictive than necessary to fulfil legitimate objectives, nor constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade. Against this backdrop, we are concerned a bout the 
European Union's intention to impose the same level of ambition globally, without taking into 
consideration the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
24.68.   Regarding the draft Regulation on deforestation, Argentina is concerned that i t does not 
consider measures that could be less trade -restrictive to meet the environmental objective sought, 
such as the recognition of forest conservation programmes or third -country certification. Instead, 
the Regulation proposes applying the same EU  standards globally, without making clear the criteria 
established by the EU or the scientific basis for determining "high -", "medium -" and "low -" risk 
countries. Given that there could be different local and regional realities in each country with respect 
to forest conservation, generalizations should be avoided. Similarly, by imposing the proposed due 
diligence and more onerous requirements on countries classified as "high risk" than on other 
countries, the EU will be applying more stringent and trade -restrictive criteria to certain countries 
classified by the EU itself as "high risk", which could be incompatible with WTO  rules. Furthermore, 
the proposed approach is not in line with developed countries' historical responsibility for 
environmental degradation,  including the EU, by setting a baseline of 2020 without taking into 
consideration land -use changes and deforestation since the Industrial Revolution in such countries. 
This effectively penalizes developing countries, which is incompatible with the princip le of common 
but differentiated responsibilities.  
24.69.   In short, Argentina stresses the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that lack any 
proper legal basis or multilateral support, or the required scientific basis. Argentina will follow the 
development o f these initiatives closely in order to prevent any disguised restrictions on international 
trade in the name of environmental protection.  
24.70.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
24.71.   Colombia thanks the delegations that placed this trade concern on t he Council's agenda. 
Colombia has a 0.6% share of global GDP and, according to international sources, is currently 
responsible for 0.2% of global CO 2 emissions (historically the figure is much lower).  However, a 
number of measures pertaining to deforestation, different types of compensation and adjustment, 
and restrictions based on environmental considerations, are having increasing and potentially 
significant effects on production in Colombia. This is  a lose -lose situation.  
24.72.   The measures we are discussing do not have a significant environmental effect, and one 
could even argue that they would have negative effects because of their lack of synchronization, 
given that they are unilateral actions that frag ment the response to a global problem and could 
provoke reaction and retaliation. Furthermore, they have direct negative effects on Colombia's 
production, its trade and the general well -being of its population, thereby exacerbating other 
problems. In conse quence, these tariff compensation and adjustment measures, based on 
environmental grounds, are unbalanced, unfair, and, above all, ineffective. They do not address the 
real problem of environmental degradation and, worse still, shift attention away from th e real 
problem.  
24.73.   In this context, this series of new environmental compensation measures, referred to in 
Agenda Items  6, 13, 14, 25, 29, 30, 39, 42, 52 and 53 of the Council's agenda, do not acknowledge 
the principles negotiated and adopted by all our count ries as part of international environmental law, 
with the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and sovereignty principles being two of 
the most important.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  24.74.   Members' efforts must instead focus on agreeing on a collective multilateral environment al 
remedy with baselines and mutually beneficial conditions that is effective in the long term, 
synchronized, and does not affect our opportunities to reduce development gaps.  
24.75.   The response of trade and the WTO to the climate crisis must be collective and n egotiated. 
The measures we are discussing, and other similar measures, are, however, quite the opposite. In 
Colombia's view, they are not an adequate public policy response to global environmental concerns. 
On the contrary, they fragment the response, open  the door to possible disputes, and negatively 
affect collective confidence. The so -called "green fortresses" are therefore not the right answer.  
24.76.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
24.77.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thanks the proponents for raising the subject matter of the 
CBAM. From its perspective, while Saudi Arabia understands that the proposed mechanism will be 
in conformity with the WTO  rules and other international obligations, the European Union has yet to 
provide an exp lanation of how it aims to achieve this . While the EU intends to address the risk of 
investment leakage from the EU to other countries , Saudi Arabia considers that  its main objective is 
in fact to maintain the competitiveness of EU  industries.  
24.78.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's very preliminary reviews indicate that the proposed 
mechanism raises very serious concerns due to its potential medium - and long -term negative 
implications on global trade . Indeed, Saudi Arabia believe s that the EU's measures are unilater al 
and trade protectionist in nature , providing specific protection to the EU's domestic industry. The 
consistency of the CBAM with the fundamental rules of the WTO is questionable. Therefore, the 
burden of proof to confirm that this mechanism is consisten t with the EU 's WTO obligations and 
commitments regarding MFN, national treatment, rules of origin, and NTBs, lies on the EU  itself. 
Furthermore, monitoring and collecting the information on the carbon emissions  included in the 
products covered by the CBAM  is not a straightforward task , and many details of the calculation 
methodology are not yet clear.  
24.79.   As far as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia understand s, the EU  ETS implies effective financial 
contribution measures, while the guidelines of EU member  States pro vide compensation for a 
reduction in indirect GHG  emissions. This scheme looks to Saudi Arabia as if it is a specific subsidy , 
which is prohibited by the WTO  Agreements. Therefore, Saudi Arabia requests the European Union 
to provide further clarification on this matter. In particular, Saudi Arabia kindly requests the EU to 
specify the articles from the WTO  Agreements that allow it to adopt this unnecessarily complicated 
mechanism. Saudi Arabia also urge s the EU to further enga ge and include consultation with Members 
in order to ensure the full compliance of the CBAM with the WTO  rules and agreements , and to 
ensure that the proposed mechanism would not create unnecessary barriers to trade, be used as a 
means of arbitrary or unju stifiable discrimination , or as a disguised restriction on international trade , 
or be applied in a manner that constitutes a protection to EU  domestic industries. Finally, Saudi 
Arabia  looks forward to receiving further details and reflections from the EU on its proposed 
mechanism. Saudi Arabia stands ready to engage with the EU and other interested Members  in this 
regard . 
24.80.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.81.   The European Union thanks Members for their comments. Deforestation is a main driver of 
climate change and biodiversity loss. The European Union contributes to deforestation by consuming 
a significant share of products associated with it. The EU, therefore, has the responsibility to 
contribute to ending it. A nd with the proposed new EU  law on deforestation and forest degradation, 
the EU aims to foster transparent and deforestation -free supply chains.  
24.82.   The draft Regulation is based on the following principles: (i)  transparency, accountability 
and sound scientifi c and methodological basis; (ii)  consistency with agreed international 
commitments; and (iii)  non-discrimination. The rules will apply equally to commodities and products 
produced inside and outside the European Union.  
24.83.   The draft Regulation is part of a bro ader set of policies. It will be implemented hand -in-hand 
with other measures, including, where appropriate and feasible, support to producing countries, G/C/M/144  
 
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  dialogue with other large consumer countries, and cooperation at international level, especially in 
the relevant multilateral forums.  
24.84.   The Regulation is the opportunity, together with the EU's trading partners, to create more 
sustainable supply chains. The legislative process for the adoption of the Regulations is in its final 
phase. As per usual practice, the Commission will keep WTO  Members updated on the developments 
of the proposal in the Committee on Trade and Environment.  
24.85.   As regards the European Union's CBAM, the EU will reply under Agenda Item  40. 
24.86.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  AUSTRALI A – INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES ON A4  COPY 
PAPER – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
25.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
25.3.  Indonesia would like to thank Australia for its response at the CTG's previous meeting. 
Nevertheless, as there have been no changes since that meeting, Indonesia again raises its concern 
regarding the initial investigation and sunset review of the imposition of an a nti-dumping duty by 
Australia on A4  paper products from Indonesia.  
25.4.  With this imposition, Indonesia has lost access and market share for its paper products in 
Australia. Indonesia wishes to receive further clarification from Australia regarding whether the 
losses to Australia's domestic industry were caused by Indonesian A4  paper, or by other factors, 
considering that, statistically, Indonesia's exports of A4  paper to Australia have dropped dramatically 
since 2017. Indonesia requests Australia to re -evaluate  its imposition of anti -dumping duty on 
A4 paper products from Indonesia.  
25.5.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
25.6.  Australia is happy to provide an update on the two  cases raised by Indonesia. Australia 
welcomes that Indonesia has raised the two cases at the Committee on Anti -Dumping, which was 
held on 26  October. Australia also appreciated the bilateral meeting held with Indonesia in the 
margins of that meeting, and Indonesia's very positive engagement. This enabled us to explain the 
two distinct cases that Indonesia has referenced today.  
25.7.  On 17  October  2022, the Minister for Industry and Science made his decision to accept the 
recommendations to apply anti -dumping duties on A4  copy paper exported by one  Indonesian 
exporter. This decision relat ed to a new anti -dumping investigation into A4  copy paper imported 
from Indonesia, specifically relating to one  Indonesian exporter, and was triggered by a duly 
documented application from Australia's domestic industry.  
25.8.  Australia's approach in this new inv estigation took into account the findings of the 
WTO dispute settlement panel in DS529, and was conducted in strict conformity with Australia's 
WTO obligations. Australia emphasizes that the investigation concerned a range of different factors 
distinct to that of DS529, including different fact patterns and periods of investigation. Interested 
parties were able to seek merits review up until 21  November  2022, being 30  days after public notice 
of the Minister's decision, and can consider judicial review aven ues. 
25.9.  Separately, on 29  August  2022, the Minister for Industry and Science made his decision on 
merits review of a decision on 19  April 2022 to continue anti -dumping measures on imports of 
A4 copy paper, including from certain exporters from Indonesia. This  merits review was triggered 
by an application from exporters to Australia's independent merits review authority, the 
Anti-Dumping Review Panel. The Minister affirmed the decision to continue measures on certain 
exporters from Indonesia. Interested parties  were able to apply for judicial review of that decision 
within 28  days of its publication.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  25.10.   Australia also notes that the continued measure does not apply to the two  Indonesian 
exporters who were the subject of DS529; nor does it apply to the one  Indonesia n exporter who was 
the subject of the separate original investigation.  
25.11.   As Australia clarified both at the Committee on Anti -Dumping and at its bilateral meeting 
with Indonesia, Australia is committed to ensuring that its anti -dumping system and any measure s 
imposed are consistent with WTO  rules. Australia's anti -dumping investigations are transparent, 
independent, and evidence -based. All affected overseas producers and exporters have a full and fair 
opportunity to provide evidence and make representations d uring the investigation process in line 
with Australia's WTO  obligations.  
25.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
26  VIET NAM – ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION DUTY ON SUGAR – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the ag enda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
26.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
26.3.  Indonesia states its concern regarding Anti -Circumvention Duties imposed by Viet  Nam to 
Indonesian sugar products under HS  Codes 1701.13.00, 1701.14.00, 1701.91.00, 1701.9 9.10, 
1701.99.90, and 1702.90.91. The anti -circumvention duties are in the form of anti -dumping duties 
and anti -subsidized duties. With the imposition of the anti -circumvention duties, Indonesian 
businesses cannot export refined sugar products to Viet  Nam due to the high tariffs imposed.  
26.4.  Indonesia believes that the anti -circumvention discipline is not regulated in the provisions of 
the WTO or the ASEAN  Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), such that the validity of the application 
is still debatable (arguable) within the framework of international trade law.  
26.5.  Indonesia believes that Viet  Nam's domestic regulations stipulate that one of the factors to 
implementing anti -circumvention is by proving a loss for the domestic industry based on the findings 
of the Vietna mese Investigating Authority. Nevertheless, Indonesia sees that Viet  Nam's domestic 
sugar industry has not suffered losses and has instead experienced profits as seen from a significant 
increase in net profit, revenue, return on assets, prices, and other e conomic indicators.  
26.6.  Indonesia regrets that the decision to implement the anti -circumvention measure by Viet  Nam 
was arbitrary. The Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade of Viet  Nam on Anti -Circumvention 
was issued on 1  August  2022, while the final r eport on the results of the investigation (final report) 
was issued on 19  August  2022. According to Viet  Nam's domestic regulations, the Decree of the 
Minister of Industry and Trade Viet  Nam can only be issued no later than 15  days after the final 
report i s issued. Therefore, Indonesia wishes to request further explanation and clarification from 
Viet Nam. 
26.7.  The delegate of Viet Nam  indicated the following:  
26.8.  Viet Nam notes that this matter appropriately relates to the Anti -Dumping and 
SCM Committees. During the meetings of these committees, Viet Nam had provided relevant 
information regarding Indonesia's concerns. Nevertheless, Viet Nam is happy to update the Council 
on the issue raised by Indonesia.  
26.9.  Viet Nam conducted the anti -circumventi on investigation in an objective and transparent 
manner, in compliance with the provisions of its domestic laws, as well as with its international 
commitments, including all WTO  regulations. Therefore, the final determination found only that only 
the use o f sugar materials importing from Thailand currently subject to anti -dumping and 
countervailing duties for refining in a third  country and then exporting into Viet  Nam constitutes a 
circumventing act. The use of sugar canes to produce and export sugar to Vi et Nam does not 
constitute a circumventing act.  
26.10.   Upon such findings, some producers and exporters, one of which is an Indonesian company, 
were eligible for exclusion from the imposition of anti -circumvention measures. Other Indonesian G/C/M/144  
 
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  producer importers wer e not eligible due to significant discrepancies, inconsistencies, and/or 
misleading information in their questionnaire responses. Viet Nam notes that the  final determination 
include d detailed analysis of each participating Indonesian producer exporter. Indeed, Viet Nam's  
Ministry of Industry and Trade ha d duly noted, analysed, and responded to the submission from 
Indonesia in its final determination. Viet Nam's trade remedies system is transparent, independent, 
and non -discriminatory. Viet Nam is committed to ensuring that its trade remedy system , and any 
measures imposed , are consistent with the rules of the WTO. Viet  Nam remains willing to meet 
bilaterally with Indonesia , and to provide appropriate information to further clarify Indonesia's 
concerns.  
26.11.   The C ouncil took note  of the statements made.  
27  PHILIPPINES – INVESTIGATION OF SAFEGUARD DUTY ON HIGH -DENSITY 
POLYETHYLENE (HDPE) PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia . 
27.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
27.3.  Indonesia wishes to state its concerns regarding the Definitive General Safeguard Measures 
document for High -Density Polyethylene (HDPE)  products issued by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), of the Philippines, on 30  September  2022. In this document, the Philippines' DTI 
determines the amount of safeguard duty for HDPE  products for three  years, namely Php  1,338/MT 
for the first  year, Php  1,271/MT for the second  year, and Php  1,208/MT for the thir d year. 
27.4.  Based on Annex  A of the document, Indonesia is not included in the category of de minimis  
developing countries that are excluded. Previously, the Tariff Commission (TC) on 27  June 2022 had 
recommended DTI to charge a Safeguard Duty of 2% ( ad valore m) for three  years; however this 
safeguard duty was not imposed for HDPE  products originating from developing countries with a 
share of imports from de minimis  (below 3%). Based on the Annex  M Final Report issued by the TC, 
Indonesia is included in the list of developing countries with a de minimis  export value so that 
Indonesia is excluded from this safeguard duty.  
27.5.  Indonesia considers that the Philippines' DTI should exclude Indonesia from the list of 
countries subject to safeguard duty based on the results of the TC  investigation, which has been 
based on calculations of injury to the Philippines' domestic industry during the investigation period. 
This is also a  practice that has been carried out by the DTI  thus far, where DTI determines the 
safeguard duty based on the recommendations submitted by the TC. Therefore, Indonesia perceives 
that the DTI has violated WTO  regulations, specifically Article  4.2(a) and 4.2 (b) of the Agreement 
on Safeguards. In addition, based on domestic regulations in the Philippines, the establishment of 
an Order from the DTI should have been made 15  days after the TC's recommendation. Indonesia 
wishes to seek the Philippines' further exp lanation of this issue.  
27.6.  The delegate of  the Philippines  indicated the following:  
27.7.  The Philippines thanks the delegation of Indonesia for its interest in the Philippines' safeguard 
measure on high -density polyethylene pellets and granules (HDPE), and notes I ndonesia's view that 
its share of imports of HDPE during the period of investigation falls below the de minimis  volumes. 
The Philippines wishes to inform Indonesia that the data collected by its Tariff Commission on 
Philippine HDPE  imports from 2017 to Jun e 2021 was used only as a basis in the determination of 
the de minimis  level. However, the Philippines' investigating authorities used the updated volume of 
imports using the full year 2021  data, which shows that the volume of the Philippines' HDPE  imports  
from Indonesia increased beyond the de minimis  threshold, at 4.85%, based on Electronic Import 
Entry Declarations from the Philippines' Bureau of Customs.  
27.8.  The decision was issued beyond the 15 -day period as the Philippines' investigating authorities 
considered additional comments from interested parties relevant to the Tariff Commission's report. 
The delegation of the Philippines will continue to coordinate this matter with Capital, and the 
Philippines stands ready to further discuss this issue with Indone sia moving forward.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  27.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
28  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the r equest of  
the Russian Federation.  
28.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
28.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its concerns regarding the amendments to the EU  basic 
regulation on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulati on (EU)  2017/2321 and 
Regulation (EU)  2018/825. At previous CTG  meetings, the Russian Federation pointed out the 
discriminatory nature of the amendments, which can be illustrated by the following points. First, the 
European Commission may punish the export ers twice for the same situation, labelled by the 
amendments as "significant distortions" and "raw material distortions". And second, the European 
Commission has issued only two  "reports" on so -called "significant distortions" in two  particular 
exporting c ountries. This clearly shows the discriminatory nature of the EU's approach regarding the 
application of anti -dumping measures. Without going into further detail, the Russian Federation 
reiterates its systemic concern about the WTO -inconsistency of the ame ndments. Russia urges the 
European Union to abstain from its application and not to violate its WTO  obligations.  
28.4.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
28.5.  China has clearly expressed its position on multiple occasions, namely that Article  2(6a) of 
the Basic Regulation is not consistent with the WTO's rules. China wishes to reiterate its comments 
on these issues. Article  2(6a) of the Basic Regulation introduces a novel concept, "significant 
distortion", and six  elements of such distortion. After introdu cing the concept, it goes on to stipulate 
that, when it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs due to significant distortions, the 
normal value shall be constructed. However, such a method is contrary to Article  2.2 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreeme nt, which provides an exhaustive list of situations where the normal value 
can be constructed, namely: (a)  where there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course 
of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country; (b)  because of a partic ular market situation 
in the domestic market of the exporting country, such sale does not permit a proper comparison; 
and (c)  because of the low volume of the sale in the domestic market of the exporting country, such 
sale does not permit a proper comparis on. "Significant distortion" falls within none of the listed 
circumstances.  
28.6.  Article  2 (6a) allows for the use of data from an appropriate representative country or 
international prices to construct normal value. This is also inconsistent with GATT  Article  6.1(b) and 
Article  2.2 of the ADA, especially Article  2.2.1.1. The WTO  rules require using the cost of production  
in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and 
for profits when constructing normal value . However, Article  2(6a) of the Basic Regulation broadened 
the scope of data source to include the costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative 
country, or international prices, costs or benchmarks. But this goes well beyond the scope of t he 
WTO's rules.  
28.7.  Therefore, whether the EU  Basic Regulation  2(5) is in line with the WTO  rules or not, the 
Commission should not construct normal value when there is so -called "market distortion" based on 
the authorization of the Basic Regulations Article  2(6a). The GOC requests the Commission to amend 
its legislation to make it consistent with the WTO's rules.  
28.8.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.9.  The European Union takes due note of the statement by China, and notes that the EU's 
statement delivered on this issue when it was last discussed still holds.  
28.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  29  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
29.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
29.3.  As the Russian Federation's concerns remain unaddressed, Russia reiterates its statements 
made during the previous meetings of WTO  bodies regarding the European Union's cobalt 
classification as a carcinogen  1b for all routes of exposure. The Russian Federa tion stresses that the 
measure was adopted in the absence of sufficient scientific justification, either laboratory or 
epidemiological, and without taking into account the grounded comments and opinions of 
WTO Members and businesses. At the same time, the European Union had previously informed 
Members of its intention to adopt the gastric bioelution protocol at the EU and OECD  levels. However, 
the EU has not adopted this methodology, and has not incorporated its use into the CLP  Regulation 
as a regular prac tice of classifying, inter alia, alloys and compounds that will allow to exclude many 
cobalt -containing products from the scope of further restrictions to be developed within the 
implementation framework of this classification decision. Furthermore, the EU  has not provided any 
updates on the adoption status of bioelution at the EU  level. For these reasons, the Russian 
Federation urges the European Union to incorporate bioelution into the CLP as soon as possible, as 
well as to provide an update on the status  of its adoption.  
29.4.  The Russian Federation notes the European Union's lack of engagement on this trade concern 
in this body. In Russia's view, this is not the best strategy to resolve differences with regard to a 
situation of systemic concern. Russia recalls  that transparency is an important pillar of this 
Organization, and that provision of explanations on various measures and policies in the CTG is part 
of the transparency mechanism. Therefore, a refusal to respond to the trade concerns raised is in 
stark c ontrast with the EU's own rhetoric on the importance of transparency in this Organization.  
29.5.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.6.  For the sake of clarity, the European Union would like to insist that it has provided its position 
very c learly under Agenda Item  14. 
29.7.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND 
THAILAND  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan and Thailand.  
30.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
30.3.  Thailand wishes to echo Japan's concerns regarding India's import prohibition on air 
conditioners containing refrigerants. Thailand has also expressed similar concerns on several 
occasions in vari ous WTO  bodies. Thailand regrets that, unfortunately, its concerns seem to be 
ignored. Thailand's exports of air conditioners to India continue to be subject to this highly restrictive 
import measure, which is clearly inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.  
30.4.  According to India, the ban at issue serves to protect the stratospheric ozone layer within the 
meaning of the Montreal Protocol, and is, therefore, justified under the exceptions in Article  XX of 
the GATT  1994. Like India, Thailand is dedicated  to protecting the stratospheric ozone layer, as 
required by the Montreal Protocol. Thailand, however, fails to see any rational connection between 
India's ban and the objective of protecting the ozone layer.  
30.5.  India's Notification No.  41/2015 -2020 merely li sts two  HS Codes for air conditioners that are 
subject to India's import prohibition if they contain refrigerants. The Notification does not specify 
the types of prohibited refrigerants, or, for instance, explain whether these are the ozone -depleting 
subst ances listed in the Montreal Protocol. Nor does this Notification refer to India's legislation on G/C/M/144  
 
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  the protection of the stratospheric ozone layer. There is thus no clear nexus between this measure 
and India's obligations under the Montreal Protocol, as req uired under Articles  XX(b) or XX(g) of the 
GATT  1994.  
30.6.  Moreover, India's Ozone Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) Rules, read together 
with their 2014  Amendment, provide for many exceptions for India's domestic products that contain 
ozone -depleti ng substances, including air conditioners. This suggests that India fails to apply its 
import ban "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" within the 
meaning of Article  XX(g) of the GATT  1994, and instead applies its ban "in  a manner that constitutes 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail" within the meaning the chapeau of Article  XX of the GATT  1994. Thailand provided many 
examples of these exceptions for Indi a's domestic products during the meeting of the CMA of 
19 October  2022.  
30.7.  For all these reasons, Thailand is convinced that India's prohibition on air conditioners is 
inconsistent with Article  XI:1, and cannot be justified under Articles  XX(b) or XX(g) of th e 
GATT  1994. Thailand, therefore, insists that India's import prohibition on air conditioners, which has 
been in force for over two  years, must now be amended or immediately repealed.  
30.8.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
30.9.  Japan continues to expres s its concerns that India's import ban on air conditioners, including 
refrigerants, introduced in October  2021, is a measure that unreasonably imposes a restructuring of 
corporate supply chains. Japan is seriously concerned that this measure is likely to c onstitute an 
import ban that is inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT, as well as Article  2.1 of the 
TRIMs  Agreement.  
30.10.   India responded in previous CTG  meetings that the measure was consistent with its 
obligations under the Montreal Protocol. However, J apan considers this import ban to be superfluous 
and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that use refrigerants. Furthermore, 
these air conditioners are not subject to India's reduction, elimination obligations under the Montreal 
Protocol, or the regulation for freon gas causing ozone layer depletion under India's domestic 
regulation.  
30.11.   Although it was explained during the CTG's previous meeting that consideration was given 
to "reduce the risk to the human body, animals, and plants, e tc.", it can be said that the fact that 
the measure covers all air conditioners which contain some kind of refrigerant is clearly an excessive 
regulation. In this regard, and after considering India's previous responses, Japan submitted written 
questions t o the TRIMs  Committee meeting in September  2021 to request more detailed 
explanations from India; no response was received, however. In order to move forward 
constructively in future discussions, Japan expects India to provide faithful and prompt answers t o 
its questions.  
30.12.   In addition, and as previously mentioned, with regard to the IS  Mark certification system  
based on the Quality Control Orders for air conditioners and their parts, which will come into effect 
in January  2023, and in order to prevent delays  in the certification procedure for imported products, 
Japan requests that the BIS conduct smooth overseas factory inspections; or if it is difficult to travel 
overseas, Japan requests India to consider alternative procedures for certification other than 
overseas factory inspection.  
30.13.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
30.14.   India thanks the delegations of Japan and Thailand for their continued interest in this issue. 
India has already shared details of these measures with the delegation of Japan, inclu ding their 
intention and ongoing developments. India draws Members' attention to 
notification  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 made by India to the Committee on Import Licensing under 
Article  5.1-5.4. This notification clearly spells out the details of the restricted impo rt policy for 
hydrofluorocarbons, which are relevant to this agenda item.  
30.15.   The points raised by the delegation of Japan on inspection procedures have been addressed 
during the previous meeting of the TBT  Committee. India also thanks the delegation of Thaila nd for G/C/M/144  
 
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  sharing relevant data during the previous meeting of the CTG, the previous meeting of the CMA, and 
again on this occasion. These questions are currently being examined by Capital.  
30.16.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA , KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE 
STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the re quest of  
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, 
Oman, and Qatar.  
31.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
31.3.  The United States, along with Switzerland, the European Union, and Japan, circulated 
questions in March  2021 to GCC  member state Governments regarding the status of the selective 
tax on beverages. While the US  appreciate s the info rmation  provided at the Co uncil's previous  
meeting, as well as in separate discussions with member State officials since then, the US notes that 
it has still to receive written responses to the questions from March  2021. The US requests the 
GCC member States to update the Council as to when such responses to those questions will be 
provided. As the US has conveyed before, it request s a substantive update on revisions to the 
GCC excise tax model and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement, 
and note s the imp ortance of engagement with interested parties regarding this issue.  
31.4.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
31.5.  As in the CTG's previous meeting, in July, Switzerland thanks the GCC  member States for its 
previous contacts. Since its last meeting w ith the GCC  authorities last May, Switzerland has 
reiterated its interest in receiving an update on the current state of play of the selective tax reform. 
Switzerland notes that, unfortunately, a decision by the GCC  finance ministers, which was due during 
the autumn, is still outstanding. Switzerland is aware that the reform of the excise tax on beverages 
is a complex process. However, Switzerland would appreciate any information from our 
GCC colleagues as to why the implementation of the reform has been de layed, and on the date that 
is currently targeted.  
31.6.  Since the selective tax entered into force in June  2017, almost five and a half years have 
elapsed, and Members still know very little about the content of the new excise tax, and the date of 
its entry into force. Therefore, Switzerland would welcome another meeting with the GCC  authorities 
in the beginning of 2023. Switzerland hopes that this trade irritant will be resolved in the near future.  
31.7.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the follo wing:  
31.8.  The European Union welcomes the fact that the GCC  excise tax system is under review and 
that a volumetric tax model based on international best practice is being considered based on the 
"Tax Reform Study". The EU understands that the "Tax Reform Stud y" commissioned by the 
GCC countries on the future GCC  excise tax reform is expected to be finalized very soon, and that it 
will serve to inform the decisions of the GCC  Ministers of Finance. The EU would ask if the finalized 
study report is going to be ma de public, and if the GCC could share the study with the EU. In addition, 
the European Union highlights the importance of a robust stakeholder consultation process with 
respect to forthcoming GCC  proposals on the excise tax reform.  
31.9.  The European Union consi ders that the taxation of energy drinks at 100% under the present 
GCC excise tax regime is discriminatory and not in accordance with international legal obligations. 
It would therefore be important that the reform equalize the tax rate of energy drinks wit h the tax 
rates applied on other soft drinks with immediate effect. The EU will continue engaging with the GCC 
on this important issue.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  31.10.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , speaking on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council,  indicated the following : 
31.11.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
thanks the delegations of the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States for the interest 
they attach to the GCC  excise tax regime, and for their communication on the application of the 
excise tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other 
sweetened beverages.  
31.12.   As for the time line of the ongoing process of the new GCC  excise tax model and its 
implementation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recalls, once again, that the revision of the excise tax 
on beverages is a complex exercise that needs significant effort, extensive coordinatio n, and 
comprehensive studies. The GCC  Working Group on Tax issues is sparing no effort to complete this 
exercise in order to submit to the GCC  member States the appropriate results and a high standard 
excise tax model. In conclusion, an appropriate procedu res and timeline will be adopted by the 
GCC member States for the revision of their excise tax regime. Once the process has been 
completed, the relevant information will be immediately shared with WTO  Members.  
31.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
32  UNITED STATES – THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S MARKET ECONOMY STATUS IN 
ANTI -DUMPING PROCEEDINGS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
32.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
32.3.  On 11  November, the US  Department of Commerce, for the first  time in its history, reversed 
the so -called market economy status  of a WTO  Member, Russia, and determined that non -market 
economy methodology should be applied to Russian exports. This event took place just a year after 
a decision of 2021 to retain the market economy status of the Russian economy in the context of an 
anti-dumping law. This impressive decision was based on equally impressive conclusions, among 
which Russian wishes to highlight some of the most memorable.  
32.4.  First, the US  Department of Commerce considered as "non -market" those measures that were 
taken by Russ ia to stabilize its monetary and financial situation in response to US  unilateral 
measures taken against it earlier in the year. Does the United States see its illegal bans to deal with 
Russian economic operators as market economy tools? If so, why then wa s Russia's reaction to such 
measures considered as evidence of non -market behaviour? The Department of Commerce totally 
ignores the elephant in the room. The root cause of Russia's stabilizing measures are offensive 
actions by Washington and its allies. Mo reover, the Russian Federation did not do anything that had 
not been done by the US  itself, or by its OECD  partners, in cases of balance -of-payments issues. 
What is the problem with using the same policy tools as other Members in similar situations?  
32.5.  Second , the US  Department of Commerce considered the draft law on possible nationalization 
of the property of foreign companies in Russia to be a non-market action. However , this draft has 
been in the State Duma for months without movement. It has not been adopt ed, quite simply; and 
it is simply not a measure in legal terms. However , according to the US  Administration , a draft law 
already constitute s a reasonable sign of non -market behaviour. Remarkable wisdom. How shall we 
qualify the intention of the US and its  allies to illegally confiscate the private property of Russian 
persons? How shall we treat freeze s of Russian assets? Billions of dollars are at stake . Apparently , 
these steps should be considered as truly market behaviour because they were made by the US  and 
its allies, right?  
32.6.  Third, concerning mustard – yes, mustard, one of the accusations for the change in market 
economy status was based on a newspaper review that had said that the company, which had bought 
the McDonalds business in Russia, "even used o ld McDonald's mustard packets rebranded with the 
new logo". It seems that, in the view of the US  DoC, in market economy conditions the company 
should have burned the mustard packets for which it had paid money, and scattered their ashes in G/C/M/144  
 
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  the wind instead  of just using rebranding the material for the ordinary operations of the newly 
acquired business. Is that right? It seems so in the US  DoC's way of thinking.  
32.7.  Finally, the Russian Federation was not surprised that the Department of Commerce could not 
pass the references to control over Russian internal natural gas control pricing, even if this measure 
had existed for decades and been thoroughly described in the context of Russia's accession to the 
WTO. Suddenly, in 2022, it became a non -market factor. Just one thought pops up in the latest 
newspaper headlines. How about the US and its allies that are imposing, right now, price controls 
on imported oil and gas globally? Their actions are strengthening market relations in the global 
energy sector, right? Are w e definitely missing something here?  
32.8.  It is unfortunate that a founding WTO  Member, which claims leadership positions in our 
Organization, takes such poorly written decisions, with such weak economic rationale, which are 
based neither on rules nor common se nse. And the icing on the cake – these decisions cannot be 
challenged. These decisions cannot be challenged, first, because the US has directly prohibited 
appeal decisions on market economy status, and second, because the same Member has unilaterally 
paralyzed the WTO's  Appellate Body. And this is what a group of Members representing only around  
one eighth of the global population calls the rules -based international order.  
32.9.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
32.10.   For reasons that are self -evident to all, the United States will not engage with Russia in a 
business -as-usual manner. The United States continues to condemn Russia's premeditated and 
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and its attempt to annex parts of Ukraine's sovereign territory.  
32.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
33  CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agen da at the request of  
Australia, the European Union, Japan, and the United States.  
33.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
33.3.  It is unfortunate that, despite the United States and other WTO  Members raising significant 
concerns with the CSAR and its implementing measures in the past ten TBT  Committee meetings, 
and the past four  meetings of the CTG, China has not sought to work with the United States and 
other WTO  Members to reach a resolution.  
33.4.  The United States maintains that it has serious co ncerns with the CSAR and its implementing 
measures' likely inconsistency with China's TBT  Agreement obligations, including unequal treatment 
for imports, overly burdensome and disproportionate information requirements, lack of procedures 
to ensure the prot ection of confidential and proprietary information, duplicative in -country testing, 
and continued challenges with transparency.  
33.5.  The United States refers to previous US  statements for its unresolved concerns and 
questions.79 However, the US once again raises this specific trade concern (STC) on the Council's 
agenda due to the pressing challenges that US  industry is facing in trying to understand and comply 
with China's often unrealistic implementation timelines for CSAR and i ts various technical 
regulations, a situation that has been complicated even further by COVID -19 shutdowns. For 
example, NMPA requires product claims and some safety testing to be conducted at China 
Metrological Administration (CMA) -accredited labs. Howeve r, many of these labs have delays of 
four months or more due to the demand created by CSAR  filing deadlines and COVID -19 shutdowns. 
US companies report that their test samples are also getting stuck when ports shut down.  
 
79 See, for example,  document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  8.7-8.15.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  33.6.  The United States understands that some NMPA  provincial offices are allowing companies to 
apply for individual product extensions, but this appears similarly burdensome, as companies must 
still meet initial CSAR  deadlines and request approval for incomplet e documentation.  
33.7.  Instead, the United States asks that China consider extending by two to three  years the 
national CSAR  implementation deadlines, including extending the deadlines that have already gone 
into effect, for the following measures: Guidelines fo r Cosmetic Safety Assessment (1459); 
Administrative Measures on Cosmetics Labeling (1515); Specifications for Cosmetics Efficacy Claim 
Evaluation (1526); and the Specifications for Registration and Filing of New Cosmetic Ingredients 
(1525). This will allow  companies a realistic timeline to implement the extensive new requirements 
introduced by CSAR and would align more closely with the transition periods provided in other 
markets for extensive regulatory updates.  
33.8.  The United States also asks that China consi der how it can rely more upon international 
recognition schemes for conformity assessment to reduce the costs and timelines for companies to 
comply with the extensive changes introduced by CSAR. For example, NMPA could accept claims and 
safety testing and documentation from overseas labs that are certified to good laboratory practices 
or good clinical practices per the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements 
for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) guidelines.  
33.9.  US companies have also  requested a means to engage with NMPA on questions arising from 
CSAR  implementation, including regarding the new requirements and use of NMPA's new online 
platforms for product and ingredient filings. Does China have any plans for this? The US notes that 
China did not address its question about this in the TBT  Committee earlier that month.  
33.10.   The United States requests that China continue to consider how these trade concerns 
expressed by the United States, and many other WTO  Members, may be resolved in the 
implementation of its CSAR.  
33.11.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
33.12.   Australia respects the right of Members to implement technical measures for legitimate 
policy purposes and in accordance with their WTO  obligations. Australia, however, remains 
concerned that measures under China's CSAR and various implementing regulations, which entered 
into force on 1  May 2021, are more stringent than necessary for low -risk cosmetics. In that context, 
Australia asks that China pursue its objective of ensuring the  safety and quality of imported 
cosmetics using less trade -restrictive measures.  
33.13.   Australia requests that China provide a reasonable transition period for cosmetics 
manufacturers to consider the regulation's requirements and make adjustments to their proces ses. 
Australia also requests that China clarify why it has maintained its requirement for mandatory animal 
testing of cosmetics products to be used on children, regardless of the level of risk presented by 
individual products.  
33.14.   Australian exporters are conc erned about stringent and inflexible measures under the 
CSAR  framework, particularly regarding testing, registration requirements, and requirements to 
provide detailed information on production processes and other aspects of their intellectual property. 
Australia also seeks clarification as to why "Good Manufacturing Practice" certification is deemed 
necessary for low -risk general cosmetics, and why governments need to provide such certification 
when commercial providers are equally capable of doing so.  
33.15.   Australia reiterates that it is a reliable supplier of high -quality and safe cosmetics products, 
domestically and to international markets. As it has said on previous occasions, the Australian 
Government stands ready to work with China to discuss the CSAR and  our respective systems for 
cosmetics regulation.  
33.16.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.17.   The European Union would like to reiterate its concerns already shared in previous meetings 
of the CTG (July and November  2021, and April and July  2022) with regard to the Cosmetic 
Supervision and Administration Regulation in force since 1  May 2021.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  33.18.   On the mandatory disclosure of commercially sensitive information, touching on the 
intellectual property rights (IPR) of companies involved, in the regi stration process, the European 
Union requests China to consider the possibility to require continuous access to inspect the sensitive 
information of the companies' files, but without imposing the obligation to submit it to an external 
database.  
33.19.   On the amou nt of information required for the notification of new ingredients, as well as 
potential issues over the disclosure of such information after a certain period of time, the European 
Union notes, in particular, that the Chinese legislation requires both the specification issued by the 
raw materials manufacturer and the ingredient composition reported by the cosmetic companies in 
their product application to be exact matching figures, with any mismatch between the information 
provided by the raw material produ cer and the cosmetic companies making the application of the 
latter invalid. Given that the exact composition of raw materials is never completely stable, but may 
vary/evolve over time within certain limits, it is almost impossible to guarantee complete co nsistency 
between the figures. Furthermore, access to this database would reveal cosmetics' formulation. The 
EU encourages China to accept a range of values instead of exact matching figures.  
33.20.   On the need to publish a detailed summary of efficacy evaluation , which may impact business 
secrets, the European Union believes that these requirements are unnecessarily stringent to ensure 
consumer safety and traceability of the ingredients used in cosmetics, diverging from international 
practice. Such an extensive l evel of information is not required elsewhere in the world for notification 
and registration purposes, and the safety of consumers is always ensured.  
33.21.   Besides, the European Union reiterates that a differentiated approach is needed between 
new products and p roducts already on the market. This would avoid a situation where product supply 
could be interrupted for an extended period of time due to insufficient preparation time for both 
industry and supervision authorities.  
33.22.   Finally, the European Union recalls tha t no laboratories have been accredited in EU  countries. 
This means that, even if the CSAR  rules do not impose local testing upon arrival in Chinese territory, 
de facto importers of cosmetics are forced to test their products in China. This requires sending  
samples only for these purposes, then undergoing the approval procedure, and only later importing 
cosmetics for sale. The EU would encourage China to facilitate the accreditation of laboratories in 
other countries, notably in the EU.  
33.23.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
33.24.   Since the March  2019 meeting of the TBT  Committee, Japan has continued to express its 
concerns about China's CSARs, as well as the related implementing regulations. Japan requests the 
following in terms of the safety and efficacy evaluation of cosmetics: (i)  to accept the test results of 
overseas inspection institutions that have the same qualifications and capabilities as the domestic 
cosmetics registration inspection institutions in China; (ii)  to approve test methods that are 
internationally recognized by the OECD, the ISO, and others, in order for the regulations not to be 
overly regulated; and (iii)  for cosmetics registrants/notifiers themselves to be able to make 
individual judgements based on scientific validity so that effic acy appeal evaluation methods do not 
become unnecessarily strict requirements.  
33.25.   Japan is of the view that there is a problem in that, when a cosmetics manufacturer registers 
cosmetics with the authorities, it is required to provide information about the raw  material 
manufacturer of the cosmetics. This practice is a heavy burden both on the cosmetics manufacturers 
and raw material manufacturers. Therefore, appropriate action is required so as not to make 
excessive demands in light of legitimate purposes. In a ddition, Japan requests that the labelling 
rules be consistent with international practice, so that the measures do not unnecessarily restrict 
trade. In conclusion, Japan requests that, when implementing new regulations, a sufficient grace 
period is provid ed before enforcement, so that manufacturers can newly adapt their products in 
accordance with the new requirements.  
33.26.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
33.27.   New Zealand has raised this issue at the WTO on a number of occasions, including in th e 
Council's previous meeting, in July, and in the July and November TBT  Committee meetings. New G/C/M/144  
 
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  Zealand welcomes China's endeavours to modernize its regulatory system for cosmetics and 
appreciate the opportunity to comment on specific elements of China's r egulations. New Zealand 
recognizes China's intention to improve safety and quality assurance, and at the same time would 
like to encourage China to ensure that facilitation of trade is considered in the implementation of 
the regulations.  
33.28.   New Zealand's conc erns in relation to China's regulatory system for cosmetics are well 
documented. In particular, New Zealand wishes China to consider additional measures to allow for 
the following: the exemption of animal testing requirements through non -government regulat ory 
authority -issued GMP  certification or other trade facilitative mechanisms for providing product 
assurances; providing flexibility in respect of product testing requirements – in particular, 
New Zealand encourages China to accept test reports from accre dited laboratories situated outside 
of China; and further limitations on product disclosure requirements, particularly in relation to 
sensitive information – that is, information limited to that which is required to assure product safety 
in China's domesti c market, so as not to compromise intellectual property.  
33.29.   New Zealand appreciates its recent constructive bilateral engagement on cosmetics issues 
and looks forward to engaging further with China on its CSAR to address these issues.  
33.30.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
33.31.   The Republic of Korea reiterates its concerns with the C SARs and its implementing measures, 
and refers to its statement delivered at the most recent meeting of the TBT  Committee.  Korea 
respects China's right to ensure  product safety and appreciates its continued cooperation in 
responding to Korea's comments. However, Korea remains concerned with several points which 
China failed to fully address in its finalized specifications and regulations. As previously mentioned, 
Korea's businesses are still facing many issues in fulfilling requirements, particularly in relation to 
testing laboratories, labelling requirements, and the scope of information disclosure, which impose 
negative effects for both nations' industries. For t hese reasons, Korea requests China to harmonize 
its regulation with widely recognized international practices so as not to raise unnecessary barriers 
to trade. Korea remains ready to continue its constructive engagement with China to resolve these 
issues.  
33.32.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
33.33.   As the same trade concern was raised and discussed in the most recent meeting of the 
TBT Committee , just one  week before , China asserts that, for the time being, it has no further update 
on this issue. Therefo re, China wishes to refer to its statement made in the TBT  Committee meeting  
of 17 November.  
33.34.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
34  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
34.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
34.3.  The United States remains highly concerned with Mexico's revised measure. Could Mexico 
provide a timeline for when it will respond to WTO  Members' comments? Could Mexico please provide 
an update on the status of this measure and an estimated time -frame of when the revised m easure 
will be notified to the WTO?  
34.4.  The United States reiterates its request that Mexico consider allowing fatty acid analysis to 
be voluntary rather than mandatory. Currently, there are no internationally well -accepted 
biomarkers to differentiate milk fat  from vegetable fat. Additionally, there are no relevant Codex or 
other international standards available for this type of analysis.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  34.5.  The United States is concerned this measure may conflict with the ongoing redrafting of the 
corresponding cheese standard. How will Mexico harmonize its update to the NOM -223 cheese 
standard with the NOM -223 cheese CAP notified to the WTO on 8  February  2022? Once finalized, 
will implementation of the measure move forward based on Mexico's Quality Infrastructure Law or 
the law it replaced, the Federal Law on Metrology and Standardization? Could Mexico provide 
clarification on the different roles that each Ministry will play in the monitoring, compliance, and 
verification activities listed in the draft measure? Has Mexico conside red extending its eventual 
timeline for implementation of the measure to a period of 12  months or more? If Mexico proceeds 
with implementation of the current measure, the United States (Government and industry) would 
need at least one  year to launch system s to comply.  
34.6.  The United States urges Mexico to indefinitely delay implementation of the measure and 
consider less trade -restrictive alternatives as previously proposed by the US  Government, other 
WTO Members, and industry stakeholders.  
34.7.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
34.8.  New Zealand welcomes the opportunity to again speak in support of this STC raised by the 
United States, and notes that it has also done so in the TBT  Committee. New Zealand considers that 
the conformity assessment procedure s that Mexico has set out for cheese under NOM -223 are more 
trade restrictive than necessary, with some aspects of the conformity assessment procedure creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade and likely to cause difficulties for New Zealand's 
exporters. New Zealand supports the request for Mexico to consider less trade -restrictive 
alternatives to the measures. New Zealand looks forward to receiving a response from Mexico to the 
concerns raised, and an update on the status of any revised version  of the Conformity Assessment 
Procedure.  
34.9.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
34.10.   Mexico thanks the delegations of the United States and New Zealand for their comments. As 
mentioned during the previous week's meeting of the TBT  Committee, Mexico rea ffirms its 
commitments on transparency in the TBT  Agreement and its correlatives in the free trade 
agreements to which it is a party.  As noted, the competent standard -setting authorities are currently 
continuing the process of analysing the comments receiv ed during the public consultation period. 
Once the authorities have exhausted this process, the final version of the measure will be duly 
shared and notified to WTO  Members.  In addition, the Government of Mexico reaffirms its 
commitment to ensure that the entry into force and the implementation process of the measure will 
be carried out in accordance with the Quality Infrastructure Law, which provides for compliance with 
the principles contained in the TBT  Agreement, and its correlatives in the free trade a greements to 
which Mexico is a party.  
34.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM  FREE CERTIFICATE 
ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
35.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
35.3.  As it had noted most recently at the November  2022 meetings of the TBT and 
SPS Committees, the United States once  again reiterates its serious concerns with India's measure 
mandating "non -GM (genetically modified) origin and GM  free certificates" for certain agricultural 
imports into India, notified on 2  September  2020, as document  G/TBT/N/IND/168, and a later 
notified entry -into-force date of 1  March  2021. To date, India has not responded to US  questions 
regarding its rationale for requiring a non -GM certificate on a consignment basis.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  35.4.  India has previously referenced its Environment Protection Act (1986), Rules  1989,  and the 
absence of Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) approvals for the 24  crops listed in the 
Order as evidence that the non -GM requirement is neither new nor trade restrictive.  
35.5.  The United States must stress that, while India's authority to re gulate "GM" foods is neither 
new nor in question, the requirement of a non -GM certificate from a competent authority on a 
consignment basis was first ordered in 2020 and caused trade disruptions to US  apple and rice 
shipments in 2021. The absence of approv als from GEAC highlights the lack of transparency and 
inefficiency in the approval process, compounding the burden India is placing on its trading partners.  
35.6.  The United States again encourages India to accept its offer for technical cooperation to 
explore a lternatives to this measure.  
35.7.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
35.8.  Argentina reiterates its concern over this measure and once again stresses that there is no 
scientific explanation to support it.  As Argentina has expressed previously in this Council and in the 
TBT Committee,  it is concerned that this requirement would set a precedent for other products or 
even their derivatives to be included in the future, and that this requirement  becomes an obstacle to 
trade.  
35.9.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
35.10.   Paraguay wishes to register its support for this concern, which it also supported at the most 
recent meetings of the SPS and TBT  Committees, and in the interests of time , and given the lengthy 
agenda for th e Council at this session, requests that the records of the meeting reflect its previous 
interventions.80 
35.11.   On this occasion, Paraguay wishes  merely to stress that this measure, which purportedly 
seeks to achieve safety and human health  objectives, has not b een notified to the SPS  Committee ; 
accordingly, Paraguay urges India to notify this measure to the SPS  Committee  immediately. 
Similarly, Paraguay recalls that the conventional counterparts of GMOs do not provide different 
properties from a safety point of view, or additional benefits for human health  based on science and, 
therefore, Paraguay  sees no scientific justification for this regulation . Paraguay once again  urges 
India to provide the scientific justification and relevant risk analyses underpinning the measure and, 
in the event that it cannot do so, that it  withdraw the measure as soon as possible.  
35.12.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
35.13.   Canada thanks the U nited States for placing this item on the agenda. Canada wishes to 
reiterate its concerns raised at previous meetings of the TBT  Committee, the SPS  Committee, and 
the CTG, regarding India's non -GM Order, which mandates that a non -genetically modified (non -GM) 
or GM  free certificate accompany imported consignments of 24  imported food products. Canada is 
concerned with the lack of scientific support for India's measure given the broad scientific consensus 
that GM  products are as safe as their conventional cou nterparts. Canada is equally concerned with 
the undue burden and negative commercial impact the measure imposes on exporting countries 
through unjustified certification requirements. Canada requests once again that India suspend the 
implementation of this measure and permit trade to continue without a GM -free certificate 
requirement. This would enable India to engage with Members to discuss and consider alternate, 
less trade -restrictive approaches that would meet India's objectives and minimize impacts on t rade. 
35.14.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
35.15.   Japan expresses its concern that there may be a possibility that this would constitute a 
trade-restrictive measure that is not based on scientific evidence. Japan request s that agricultural 
products exported from exporting countries that exercise proper control of their genetically modified 
agricultural products be excluded from this requirement.  
 
80 See document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  30.14 -30.15.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  35.16.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
35.17.   India thanks the delegations of the United States, the European Union, Australia, and Canada 
for their continued interest in this issue. The statements delivered in previous CTG and 
TBT Committee meetings still hold. In addition, India wishes to make the following points.  
35.18.   The Environment Protection Act (1986) and its Rules prescribe that no person shall import 
or export genetically engineered organisms/substances or cells except with the approval of the 
GEAC.  
35.19.   DGFT Notification No.  2 (RE -2006)/2004 -2009, dated 7  April 2006, on "Import of Genetically 
Modified Food" states that import of GMOs/LMOs for Food will be governed by the provisions of the 
Environment Protection Act, 1986 and Rules  1989.  
35.20.   The GEAC has so far n ot approved any of the crop varieties of Genetically 
Modified/Engineered origin listed on the Order mentioned above.  
35.21.   To date, exporters from several trade partners, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Turkey, Iran, China, Th ailand, and the European Union, including Italy, 
Germany, and France, are already providing requisite certificates. Hence, in India's assessment, this 
order is not trade -restrictive.  
35.22.   On similar lines, India also issues such certificates for its own exports  to other countries. 
The Government of India has authorized the Export Inspection Council (EIC) to be the nodal agency 
for issuing Non -GMO certificates for export consignments.  
35.23.   The EIC has issued more than 9,000  Non-GMO certificates for the export of prima ry food 
crops, as well as processed food products, for export to several countries.  
35.24.   Against this background, India requests the interested delegations to share specific issues 
being faced with respect to this order.  
35.25.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING – REQUEST FROM 
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada and the United States.  
36.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
36.3.  The United States continues to raise its concerns on Panama's newly implemented technical 
regulations for onions and potatoes. Since the last meeting of the CTG, the US has continued its 
attempts to constructively eng age with Panama on this issue. Panama continues to be unresponsive 
to these requests, and has still not provided the scientific justification for these measures. The US 
maintains its availability and commitment to work with Panama to refine the measures so  that they 
meet Panama's legitimate objectives while not being unnecessarily restrictive. In the interim, the 
US reiterates its request that Panama provide the scientific justification for its measures or suspend 
implementation of both the potato and onion  regulations until technical discussions have concluded.  
36.4.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
36.5.  Canada wishes to raise this STC regarding Panama's new quality requirements for fresh 
potatoes established by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on 20 February  2020. As a 
long-standing supplier of fresh potatoes to Panama with year -round exports, Canada continues to 
be concerned that implementing these new quality requirements could have a direct impact on its 
ability to export potatoes to Panama.  
36.6.  Canada recognizes that Panama delayed the implementation of these measures to allow for 
further consultations with trading partners and is appreciative of Panama's participation in a bilateral G/C/M/144  
 
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  technical meeting which was held in September  2021, to address ele ments of concern on this issue. 
However, despite this positive engagement, Canada notes that its concerns were not taken into 
account by Panama in the latest version of its quality requirements, which were implemented on 
17 February  2022, and for which not ification to the WTO was provided after the fact, on 
21 February  2022.  
36.7.  On 14  April 2022, Canada provided comments to Panama's Ministry of Commerce (MICI), on 
Panama's notification to the WTO, reiterating its concerns with restrictive time -limits for storag e and 
marketing, as well as the zero  tolerance for sprouting. To date, Canada has not received a response 
from Panama. Therefore, Canada wishes to know when Panama will respond to Canada's comments. 
Canada respectfully requests that Panama pause the enforc ement of these requirements to allow for 
additional technical dialogue to occur, and to ensure that Panama's quality standards do not create 
unintended barriers to our mutually beneficial bilateral trade in agriculture.  
36.8.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the  following:  
36.9.  Panama thanks the delegations of the United States and Canada for their comments and takes 
note of their concerns. Panama has been receptive to comments from its trading partners, as 
evidenced by the extension granted to the onion measure. As P anama stated to the US  delegation 
at a recent bilateral meeting, as well as in the TBT  Committee, it reaffirms its commitments on 
transparency, and points out that the Panamanian authorities continue to address this issue in 
Capital with all the relevant g overnment bodies, including the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the 
Panamanian Food Authority, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Panama reiterates that any updates will 
be duly shared and notified to this Council.  
36.10.   The Council took note  of the statements mad e. 
37  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING ANNEXES  2 AND 
5 TO REGULATION EC  NO. 396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL AS REGARDS TO MRLS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND THIAMETHOXAM IN OR ON 
CERTAIN PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED ST ATES  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
37.2.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
37.3.  The United States shares the European Union's concerns about pollinator health and is actively 
working to protect bees and other pollinators in the United States. To date, the global scientific and 
regulatory community has found that complex interactions among multiple factors affect pollinator 
health, including the health of bees.  
37.4.  Given  the critical importance of the pesticides identified in the Regulation as part of integrated 
pest management, or IPM, programs on crops that are exported to the EU by many countries, the 
proposed measure appears to pose a significant obstacle to internati onal trade and production of 
agricultural products.  
37.5.  Use of pesticide MRLs is intended to manage the food safety risk of treated imported food 
products upon arrival into a market. MRLs are not intended to be an environmental safety 
management tool, and thei r use for this purpose may have unintended consequences that could 
undermine the development and use of international standards for food safety.  
37.6.  In the November SPS and TBT  Committees meetings, the United States asked the European 
Union to explain how the conclusions from these risk assessments supported the reduction of MRLs 
to the limit of determination (LOD) for the impacted products. The US fur ther asked the EU to provide 
any analysis and studies that it conducted to review production systems outside the EU.  
37.7.  The United States is concerned by the apparent lack of the scientific or technical information 
that demonstrates how the reduction of these  MRLs to the LOD contributes to the objective of the 
protection of pollinators, including bees. The US is also uncertain about the objective criteria the EU G/C/M/144  
 
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  will use in assessing applications for import tolerances under this Regulation, and asks that the E U 
provide more detailed information on such criteria.  
37.8.  In the absence of scientific or technical information indicating how the reduction of MRLs to 
the LOD on the impacted products contributes to the objective of protection of pollinators, including 
bees, the United States requests that the European Union maintain its current MRLs for clothianidin 
and thiamethoxam.  
37.9.  Complex environmental challenges require collaboration across the global community; 
unilateral approaches based on incomplete science may compli cate or further delay meaningful 
progress on these pressing issues while unnecessarily affecting agricultural production and trade. In 
place of the European Union's proposed regulation, the United States would welcome a collaborative 
approach to protecting  pollinators and the opportunity to contribute resources, scientific expertise, 
and new ideas.  
37.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
37.11.   New Zealand supports the European Union's overarching ambition to mitigate climate and 
environmental challen ges as set out in the policies presented through the Green Deal. However, 
New Zealand holds concerns that unilaterally imposing prescriptive import measures that do not 
account for the realities of food production in different geographical and climatic con texts may hinder 
efforts to address global environmental challenges. For example, the proposed import measures 
may undermine efforts to achieve sustainable food systems through impacts on food security and 
rural development, particularly in developing and least developed countries. Policy measures and 
tools, particularly those with a global impact on trading partners, need to identify tensions and 
trade-offs between objectives and carefully consider their impacts across the food system.  
37.12.   New Zealand encourag es the European Union, and all WTO  Members, to address global 
environmental issues, including sustainable pesticide use, by working with trade partners in 
multilateral forums and recognizing that different production and regulatory systems can deliver 
similarly desirable environmental outcomes.  
37.13.   Given the complex nature of global food supply chains, it is New Zealand's view that 
countries must act together to improve the sustainability and resilience of food systems. Like the 
European Union and other Members , New Zealand is invested in tackling those barriers that impact 
beyond borders. However, New Zealand urges Members to develop environmental measures in a 
way that supports transparent and open dialogue, including through proactive and regular 
engagement w ith trading partners. Such an approach recognizes that there is no "one -size-fits-all" 
model for addressing global environmental issues, and that tailored solutions, accounting for 
differences in production systems, can be more effective and durable in del ivering desirable 
environmental outcomes.  
37.14.   New Zealand further encourages Members to use measures that are founded on sound 
science, are risk based, take a least trade restrictive approach, can be applied flexibly and 
realistically, and which genuinely achi eve the legitimate and intended outcome. International limits 
and guidance should be adopted where available. New Zealand is also interested in understanding 
the European Union's rationale and justification for using an SPS  tool to introduce proposed 
measu res with the stated aim of addressing a global environmental concern.  
37.15.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
37.16.   Paraguay wishes to express its support to this item and recalls that it has covered this issue 
extensively under Agenda Item  6. In this line, Paraguay requests to clarify, given that it has received 
questions in this regard, that the questions circulated to the European Union and its member States 
were posed in the circumstances of the most recent meeting of the SPS  Committee, and are incl uded 
in document  G/SPS/GEN/2076. These questions were formulated following up on, and because of, 
document  G/SPS/GEN/2038, circulated by the European Commission.  
37.17.   Paraguay reiterates that some of these questions had already been addressed to the 
Commission in March, particularly those relating to emergency authorizations in general. Given the 
Commission's evasiveness, Paraguay is presenting them again, and this time addressed, on some G/C/M/144  
 
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  occasions, to individual member States. This last set of questions is rele vant to this trade concern, 
as it includes specific matters related to emergency authorizations for neocotinoids, and EFSA's 
evaluations for the determination of justification for said authorizations, in the specific cases cited. 
Finally, Paraguay requests  answers from the European Union as soon as possible.  
37.18.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
37.19.   Ecuador thanks the United States for including this concern on the Council's agenda. Ecuador 
reiterates its concern in relation to this matter, in line w ith the statements it made in relation to 
Agenda Item  6, and at the SPS and Market Access Committees. It is relevant to recall that MRLs are 
trading standards developed to ensure there are no unacceptable risks to the health of consumers 
as a result of pes ticide residues in food. At the same time, the standards promote good agricultural 
practice in food production.  
37.20.   The primary objective of the European law in establishing MRLs was to "ensure a high level 
of consumer protection". The new proposal for a regul ation would distort the objective of 
Regulation  396/2005, since it would shift the approach to "European consumer" protection and add 
unilateral consideration of "environmental factors" in countries outside the territory and jurisdiction 
of the European au thorities.  
37.21.   If that approach were to gain acceptance, third  parties' points of view would not be included, 
especially the views of autonomous specialist technical bodies that are independent of their trading 
partners. This method of working could lead to th e imposition of unilateral practices which, without 
providing a right to reply or giving a proper hearing to dissenting points of view, are likely to affect 
farmers' competitiveness  adversely, for example farmers in developing countries who are facing 
specific, demanding scenarios with regard to agricultural production. The extraterritorial nature of 
the measure calls into question the capacity of third  countries' authorities to care for and manage 
their natural resources, and to use production methods and tools appropriate to their social, 
economic, and environmental circumstances.  
37.22.   Moreover, adjusting to new MRLs is likely to increase the cost or quantity of fertilizers and 
pesticides. The development of new substances to replace those that would be withdra wn from the 
market is either in the experimental stage or comes at such a high cost that they are unaffordable 
to small and medium -sized producers. In practice, the absence of a replacement would lead to a 
return to the use of lower tech products with grea ter toxicity that must also be applied more liberally 
with a much bigger environmental footprint. We ask whether this is how we want to protect the 
environment?  
37.23.   Sustainability rests on three  pillars: social, economic, and environmental. It is crucial not t o 
lose sight of the convergence of these three  aspects. When adopting measures on MRLs, account 
must be taken of the negative effects that they will have on the other sustainability pillars in the 
European Union's trading partners, particularly if they are  developing countries. When it comes to 
its member States, even the European Union itself is no stranger to this flexibility. Where necessary, 
European producers are able to make emergency use of substances that are officially "not 
authorized". Therefore, Ecuador stresses that there are sufficient regulatory and technical grounds, 
as well as sufficient grounds of principle, for the European Union to maintain the current maximum 
levels for third  countries as import tolerances.  
37.24.   The delegate of Japan  indicated  the following:  
37.25.   The reduction of MRLs for two  active ingredients for the purpose of protecting pollinating 
insects outside the region is clearly different from the conventional method of setting MRLs for the 
purpose of protecting human life or health. It d eviates from the international harmonization of MRLs. 
When introducing new approaches to measures that affect non -EU countries, such as MRLs, it is 
necessary to fully discuss these approaches with them, including through the SPS  Committee.  
37.26.   Regarding the pr otection of pollinators around the world, rather than uniformly forcing each 
country and region to follow the methods proposed by the European Union, the most rational and 
effective measure is for each country and region to consider its own climate, soil c onditions, pesticide 
usage, as well as other environmental factors, judging from the results of environmental impacts G/C/M/144  
 
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  and feasibility thus far. Japan has submitted its comments on the TBT  notification, and kindly 
requests the European Union to consider the se comments carefully.  
37.27.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
37.28.   Brazil believes that the current EU  proposal runs contrary to Article  2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement as it goes beyond the scope of the TBT  Agreement's unilateral policy support aimed 
at prot ecting the environment in third  countries. Besides the need for further discussion, on a sound 
scientific basis, about the risks that both substances may have on the bee population worldwide, 
Brazil understands that one could not expect to extend to all co untries of the world trade restrictive 
measures that do not consider the variety of local conditions, including climate and soils. 
Furthermore, there are different needs and challenges caused by agricultural production in each 
country. The EU affirms that its restrictive measure would seek to avoid a transfer of adverse effects 
on bees from production in non -EU countries. However, for Brazil, the EU's approach is not properly 
considering that many countries, including Brazil, have  their own procedures. Furthermore, Brazil 
believes that due to its extra -territorial effects, the EU's proposed regulation goes against the rules 
and jurisprudence of the multilateral trading system. In Brazil, the state of Sao Pa ulo is the main 
producer  of citrus  and is also where 84% of honey production is concentrated. In that state, there 
is no evidence of a decline in the number of pollinators. On the contrary, honey production in that 
region has increased by 136% in the last 15  years.  
37.29.   The delegate of Australi a indicated the following:  
37.30.   At the outset, Australia wishes to refer to its statement delivered at the most recent meeting 
of the TBT  Comm ittee. Australia recognize s the right of WTO Member s to regulate agricultural 
imports for legitimate policy purposes. H owever, M ember s are also bound by WTO  obligations, 
particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments and ensuring that measures 
are no more trade restrictive than necessary. A ustralia  does not support using MRLs on imported 
products to  achieve environmental outcomes outside the EU's borders. This extra -territorial 
approach impacts on the ability of third  countries to implement environmental policies consistent 
with their unique environmental circumstances. Indeed, national authorities o f third  countries are 
best placed to ensure that pesticide application is undertaken in a responsible and sustainable 
manner in each country. Australia also refers to its earlier statement under  Agenda Item  6. 
37.31.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the follow ing: 
37.32.   Argentina fully shares the European Union's genuine interest in the strategic importance of 
pollinators for the global environment, especially bees for ecosystems and biodiversity. Likewise, as 
a major food producer, it recognizes the significant cont ribution they make to agriculture and global 
food security. This is why, like many other countries, Argentina has taken extreme measures to 
provide producers with the tools needed for adequate plant protection, so as to enable them to 
continue producing fo od while at the same time, through good agricultural practices, reducing the 
effect on pollinators from the use of certain products. However, everything seems to suggest that 
this measure notified by the European Union will, rather than protect the environ ment or pollinators, 
result in the creation of an obstacle undermining the ability of third -country producers to export to 
the EU.  
37.33.   Various studies from around the world show that the decline in the number of pollinators 
has multifactorial causes and that n eonicotinoids, clothianidin and thiamethoxam are safe for bees 
when used following good agricultural practices and are absolutely necessary to control certain pests 
in extensive farming. In this case, the notified measures are not based on a risk analysis of the 
toxicity levels in all food and feed notified and the consequent effect on human health and life of 
both neonicotinoids within EU -member -State territory. Instead, the draft Regulation in question 
appears to be based on risk assessments of the exposu re of bees to these neonicotinoids used 
outdoors, as the EU's stated objective is to address an environmental concern of a global nature, 
namely the decline in pollinators worldwide. Seen in this light, the draft Regulation would be 
inconsistent with the E U's obligations, as it has failed to provide a scientific assessment under the 
terms of the SPS  Agreement (Articles  2.2 and 5.1) to justify the adoption of the measure in question.  
37.34.   Irrespective of whether or not the objective sought is legitimate, the Euro pean Union's 
measure will result in a virtual ban on access to its market for a wide range of food and feed products, G/C/M/144  
 
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  which would seriously affect any exporters to the Community market that failed to ban the outdoor 
use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam in their respective territories within 36  months from the 
application of the new MRLs. Argentina therefore believes that the trade -disruptive impact that the 
reduction of the MRLs would have on all the products covered by the measure would not be 
proportional  to the objective sought by the EU. In this regard, the draft Regulation would be contrary 
to the obligations set out in Articles  2.1 (to ensure that measures are applied only to the extent 
necessary), 5.4 (to minimize negative trade effects), and 5.6 (to avoid unnecessary trade -restrictive 
measures) of the SPS  Agreement.  
37.35.   Equally of concern to Argentina is that implementing the measure would amount to a 
disguised restriction on international trade, contrary to the provisions of Article  5.3 of the 
SPS Agreement. This observation is based on the fact that the performance of pollinators does not 
depend exclusively on the two  substances banned by the European Union, as well as the fact that 
the many emergency uses authorized by the EU under conditions that could not be extrapolated to 
third countries (export).  
37.36.   For these reasons, Argentina has submitted a number of comments on 
notification  G/TBT/N/EU/908, to which it is awaiting the European Union's reply.  
37.37.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the follo wing:  
37.38.   South Africa thanks the United States for placing this item on the Council's agenda. South 
Africa shares the concerns raised under this agenda item, including those delivered under related 
agenda items, particularly with regard to the European Union' s CBAM and the EU  green deal in 
general. South Africa is concerned about the systemic implications of unilateral environmental 
measures that the EU is increasingly adopting to the detriment of exports, especially of developing 
countries. South Africa joins  the United States and other Members that have spoken before it to 
raise concerns with the EU  Regulation on import tolerance regarding MRLs for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxan (pesticide and active substance) in or on certain products.  
37.39.   South Africa is commit ted to sustainability in all its dimensions and efforts towards 
environmental protection and climate change mitigation in line with relevant multilateral 
environmental agreements in the appropriate international multilateral forums, including the 
principle s thereto, that is, CBDR and Respective Capabilities.  
37.40.   While South Africa shares the European Union's goals for food systems transformation, and 
the commitment to address climate change and biodiversity loss by continuing to pursue more 
sustainable and resi lient food systems, South Africa however underlines that addressing issues of 
global commons requires multilateral solutions and not unilateral and extra -territorial trade 
measures such as those being introduced by the EU that seek to impose its own domest ic regulatory 
approaches on trading partners.  
37.41.   South Africa notes that the lowering of MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxan substances 
expands the scope of existing MRLs regulations beyond consumer protection to environmental 
considerations. The proposed measure of lowering MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxan 
substances will have an adverse effect on agricultural and agri -food exports to the European Union. 
Ultimately, the proposed measure will unnecessarily restrict trade of safe agricultural products,  
disrupt production, and negatively affect the livelihoods of small and rural producers in South Africa.  
37.42.   Countries have unique sustainability objectives and challenges. Amongst other related 
climate challenges, South Africa has high pest and diseases press ures due to a combination of heat, 
humidity, and moisture emanating from different weeds, pests, and fungi. Addressing these 
challenges requires the use of diverse methods, tools, and technologies to sustainably meet the 
world's growing demand for food and  feed in the face of climate change.  
37.43.   South Africa calls for transparency as well as science and risk -based decision -making driven 
by available data to enhance sustainability in agriculture and urges the European Union to take 
cognizance of climate conditio ns, crop -pest matrices, and the socio -economic conditions of  
developing and underdeveloped economies in the development and implementation of the measure.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  37.44.   South Africa also reminds the European Union that it raised similar concerns at the most 
recent meeti ng of the TBT  Committee, including questions that we trust the EU will respond to. 
These included: (i)  confirmation that, if this regulation is enforced, the MRLs will decrease to 
0.01 mg/kg for all products? If not, what are the applicable product specifi c levels; (ii)  confirmation 
that the EU has banned the use of clothianidin or thiamethoxam in all applications, including the use 
in permanent greenhouses. If not, will these products also have to adhere to the new MRLs; and 
(iii) since the EU has implemen ted the ban on the outdoor use of clothianidin or thiamethoxam, what 
alternatives are used in the EU and what was the cost implications to farmers?  
37.45.   The regulations include the following statement: "in order to meet the needs of international 
trade, applica tions for import tolerances for clothianidin or thiamethoxam may be submitted 
pursuant to Article  7 of Regulation (EC)  No. 396/2005 and should provide relevant information to 
demonstrate that the good agricultural practices applying for the specific uses o f the active 
substances are safe for pollinators".  
37.46.   What is the process to be followed and what is the proposed turn -around time?  
37.47.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
37.48.   India wishes to thank the European Union for notifying Members, via 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/908, of its MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam, and the United States 
for putting this item on the Council's agenda. India understands that the EU is considering lowering 
existing MRLs for pesticides no longer approved in its jurisdiction due t o environmental concerns, 
such as some neonicotinoid insecticides, to the default value and not considering new requests for 
import tolerances. This approach is not restricted to this notification, and for many products, the 
residual pesticide limits have been set at 0.01  mg/kg. EFSA has noted that the default MRL of 
0.01 mg/kg applies to nearly 690  pesticides that are not explicitly mentioned in the MRL  legislation.  
37.49.   As is evident from the comments by other trading partners, there are concerns with the 
setting of default MRLs for many products because this imposes a standard that may need to be 
sufficiently scientifically founded on imports from other countries. Some of the products not grown 
in the European Union face these thresholds. This disregards the c ompetence of the other countries' 
chemical regulators and artificially subjects them to a requirement that is neither scientific, 
evidence -based, nor practicable to be commercially employed. The EU often cites concerns related 
to protecting its citizens. H owever, even that remains questionable as citizens of other countries are 
found to be comfortable without those requirements; at the same time, the studies relied on by the 
EU are noted to need to be sufficiently representative of the EU  citizen pool in so me cases. For cases 
where environmental concerns are cited, India reminds the EU that it is important to respect each 
Member's right to set its regulations for environmental protection.  
37.50.   This approach adopted by the European Union also fails to recognize th e efforts of 
international scientific panels and standard -setting bodies, such as the Joint FAO/WHO  Meeting on 
Pesticide Residues and the Codex Alimentarius , in establishing a safe and harmonized level of 
pesticide residues in agricultural products. In the se circumstances, India urges the EU to revise its 
practices and avoid unnecessary trade disruption, ensuring compliance with its obligations under the 
WTO while setting MRLs and considering requests for import tolerances. India also requests the EU 
to res pect the regulatory authorities of other countries and their positions, especially when more 
than a few countries share a common understanding, and not to impose arbitrary MRL  standards, 
preventing unnecessary disruption to trade in safe products.  
37.51.   The dele gate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
37.52.   The European Union takes note of the interest by the United States on this issue. The draft 
Regulation on lowering the MRLs for the two  neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam was notified to the TBT  Committee on 6  July 2022 (G/TBT/N/EU/908). The comments 
were shared with the EU  member States and discussed at the meeting held in September  2022, 
where the member States endorsed the proposal. The Regulation will now be scrutinized by the 
Council and the European Parliament. If no objection is raised, the European Commission will adopt 
the Regulation in early 2023.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  37.53.   This draft Regulation is the first one implementing the new policy announced in the European 
Green Deal, and more specifica lly the Farm to Fork Strategy, on imported food in relation to 
pesticides residues. The environmental aspects that this Regulation targets are those related to the 
protection of pollinators. This is an issue of global concern, which cannot be solved throug h actions 
at EU  level alone. The Regulation is lowering the MRLs for the two  neonicotinoid substances 
clothianidin and thiamethoxam. These substances are known to contribute significantly to the decline 
of pollinator populations because of their intrinsic properties that lead to adverse effects on 
pollinators independent of where they are used geographically.  
37.54.   The European Union considers that currently there is no alternative to the lowering of the 
MRLs of clothianidin and thiamethoxam which would be less t rade restrictive and equally contribute 
to the objective of protecting pollinators. Based on current knowledge, reducing the use of 
neonicotinoids is an effective and preventable action to tackle the decline in pollinators. According 
to the Intergovernment al Science -Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), 
a clear consensus exists regarding the fact that both wild and managed bees are exposed to 
pesticides (mainly through nectar and pollen, in the case of the neonicotinoids), and that  the range 
of sub -lethal effects is quite broad.  
37.55.   The European Union acknowledges that the decline in pollinators worldwide is sufficiently 
supported by solid scientific evidence; multiple factors explain the decline. In this regard, the draft 
Regulation is  coordinated with other EU  programmes and international activities such as: (i)  the 
European Union pollinators initiative, which aims to improve scientific knowledge about insect 
pollinator decline, tackle its main known causes, and strengthen collaboratio n between all the actors 
concerned; and (ii)  the active EU  collaborations with FAO in its "Global Action on Pollination Services 
for Sustainable Agriculture", and with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) on 
projects to address the dec line of pollinators.  
37.56.   The European Union wishes to clarify that the draft Regulation is not requiring third  countries 
to ban the use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam in their own territory. If the harvested crop, 
however, is destined to be placed on the EU  market, it will have to comply with the MRLs in place in 
the EU. The EU is bound by the WTO  rules and is acting accordingly. The WTO  rules allow Members 
to adopt measures necessary to achieve a legitimate objective, which in this case is the protection 
of pollinators, a global environmental concern.  
37.57.   With regard to possible trade impacts: (i)  the draft Regulation includes trade facilitating 
provisions, mainly to defer the application date of the Regulation to 36  months after entry into force 
(instead of six  months, which is the standard period foreseen by WTO  rules) and to allow products 
placed on the market before the application date to remain on the market until the end of their shelf 
life; and (ii)  the European Union acknowledges that third  countries may face production conditions 
and pest pressures different from those in mainland Europe. Therefore, import tolerances can be 
granted to active substances not authorized in the EU provided that the submitted information 
demonstrates that the use is safe to po llinators.  
37.58.   The European Union remains available to discuss this matter further with any interested 
Member.  
37.59.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
38.1.  The Chairpers on recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
38.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
38.3.  China's concern on this issue remains, as Australia continues to implement market access 
restrictions on relevant Chinese 5G  products without providing any reasonable rationale and 
concrete evidence. These discriminatory measures are inconsistent with WTO  rules and seriously 
affect the operation and legitimate interests of relevant Chinese enterprises. Therefore, China urges G/C/M/144  
 
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  Australia to bring its measures into line with the WTO  rules, and to provide a fair, transparent, and 
non-discriminatory environment f or Chinese companies to operate in Australia.  
38.4.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
38.5.  Australia notes China's statement. Since China first  raised this issue in the WTO, in late 2018, 
Australia has engaged constructively with China to explain the  rationale for its position on 
5G networks. Australia also notes that other WTO  Members have taken similar decisions in their 
national interest on equipment for national 5G  networks. As Australia has previously stated, its 
position on 5G  networks is countr y agnostic, transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory, and fully 
WTO consistent. Australia looks forward to continuing to engage with China to explain the rationale 
for its decisions, and to allay any concerns.  
38.6.  The Council took note  of the statements mad e. 
39  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
39.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
39.3.  China  regrets to have to raise this issue again, as Sweden has not yet provided China with 
any credible explanations and evidence regarding Sweden's non -transparent, discriminatory 
measures against the products of Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE, which have be en operating 
in Sweden for more than 20  years. China urges Sweden to bring its measures into line with 
WTO rules, and provide a fair, transparent, and non -discriminatory environment for Chinese 
companies to operate in Sweden.  
39.4.  The delegate of  the European U nion indicated the following:  
39.5.  The European Union notes that the matter raised by China in relation to the recent Swedish 
5G spectrum auction is under legal proceedings under the bilateral investment agreement between 
Sweden and China. The EU also notes tha t Huawei has initiated a claim under the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) about the matter at issue. In light of these 
proceedings, the EU will not enter into details on this issue in the Council's current meeting.  
39.6.  The Cou ncil took note  of the statements made.  
40  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
40.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
40.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
40.3.  China takes note that the internal discussion on the CBAM is still ongoing. According to the 
statement made by the European Union at the CTG's  April meeting, a CBAM  monitoring and reporting 
system would apply from 2023 and finish at the end of 2025. As 202 3 is just around the corner, and 
the final contents of the CBAM are still not yet available, China would like to know whether the EU 
still plans to implement its CBAM from 1  January  2023, and when the EU will publish the final 
contents of its CBAM.  
40.4.  China s hares the European Union's view that Members need to take concrete actions to tackle 
climate change. This is why China has announced the timetable and roadmap for carbon peak and 
carbon neutrality, and updated its more ambitious National Determined Contrib ution, for example, 
by 2030, when China's carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP will have dropped by 65% compared 
to 2005. However, China believes that, in order to effectively address the challenge of climate 
change, the principle of "Common but Differ entiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities" G/C/M/144  
 
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  should be adhered to. In particular, Members should bear in mind the specific and different national 
conditions and challenges faced by developing Members and LDCs, and when necessary, provide 
financia l and technical assistance to developing Members and LDCs.  
40.5.  China shares concerns similar to those expressed by other Members about the consistency of 
the CBAM with the WTO  rules and the Paris Agreement. There seems to be no scientific basis for 
implementat ion of the CBAM. Many studies have pointed out that the EU -ETS does not lead to carbon 
leakage, and that the CBAM makes little contribution to a reduction  in global emission s. 
UNCTAD  reports indicate that the CBAM  can only reduce 0.1% of global emissions or 0.9% of 
EU emissions.  
40.6.  The European Union's CBAM will have a negative impact on developing Members, especially 
those with a relatively simple trade structure. This is against the "Common but Differentiated 
Respon sibilities and Respective Capabilities" stipulated in the Paris Agreement.  
40.7.  The European Union's CBAM seems to violate WTO  rules, including the elimination of the free 
quotas of ETS, the additional import licensing requirements for imported goods, exemption  
arrangements for specific EU  member States, and the method of measuring the actual carbon 
content of imported goods. All of these may not be compatible with the MFN and national treatment 
principles, the general elimination of quantitative restrictions, a nd the applicable conditions of 
relevant exception clauses.  
40.8.  China is willing to continue engaging with the European Union, through both bilateral and 
multilateral channels, in order to understand how the EU will cooperate with other WTO  Members to 
ensure t he CBAM's compatibility with the EU's multilateral obligations.  
40.9.  Finally, China notes that the previous week's G20  Bali Leaders' Declaration pointed out: "We 
believe that trade and climate/environment policies should be mutually supportive and 
WTO consisten t and contribute to the objectives of sustainable development". At COP27, 
Director -General Okonjo -Iweala also said the following: "[The] world  cannot afford to leave trade 
and [the] WTO behind in climate actions". For the same reason, China believes that M embers need 
to strengthen their cooperation and coordination on trade -related climate policy to minimize trade 
frictions and investor uncertainty arising from unilateral climate actions. The WTO can play a valuable 
role as a venue in this area.  
40.10.   The delegat e of Thailand  indicated the following:  
40.11.   Thailand joins China and previous speakers in expressing its concern over the European 
Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Measure. Thailand fully recognizes and shares the firm 
commitment of the international community to addressing the pressing global issue of climate 
change. But at the same time that we rise to this global challenge, Thailand also thinks that it is 
important to ensure that international rules and principles, including those under the WTO and the 
UNFCCC , are respected. This is Thailand's reason for raising its flag and echoing the concerns of 
other Members over the EU's CBAM.  
40.12.   According to the existing regulation, some could argue that the European Union's CBAM 
treats products made in the EU differently f rom like products imported into the EU from other 
Members that employ different process and production methods, or different emission reduction 
schemes, from those of the EU itself. How could the EU reconcile its current CBAM  regulations with 
the WTO's bas ic principle of non -discrimination enshrined in the GATT  1994's most -favoured -nation 
and national treatment obligations?  
40.13.   Moreover, Thailand firmly believes that such a global problem as climate change is best 
addressed by multilateral cooperation, and that  a measure such as CBAM should be thoroughly 
discussed in a multilateral setting before being implemented to ensure that it is WTO  consistent and 
in line with the principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities" 
enshrin ed in the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. However, as just stated by several other 
Members, the European Union's CBAM is a unilateral action by the EU that is applied 
extra-territorially, and also in a punitive manner, arguably. How could the EU reconcile its 
CBAM  regulations with such principles as those of collaborative spirit, supportive multilateral 
cooperation, and mutual respect to socio -economic differences and historical emissions among G/C/M/144  
 
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  Members, as firmly established in the international community i n the context of tackling climate 
change in the present day?  
40.14.   These observations are non -exhaustive and merely based on Thailand's preliminary 
assessment. Also, Thailand recognizes that the proposed regulation is still subject to change, given 
the European Union's ongoing internal process. However, when asked in the interview with 
Bloomberg in the COP27  summit whether the EU's CBAM is WTO -legal, the WTO  Director -General 
responded that "the "devil is in the detail of how it gets implemented". Therefore, Thail and wishes 
to encourage other Members to thoroughly examine the regulations and to see for themselves if the 
devil can actually be found in the details of the EU's CBAM; and if so, what can we do about it?  
40.15.   Finally, like other Members, Thailand looks forwar d to receiving an updated description of 
the European Union's CBAM  regulations, as well as further explanation from the EU about the 
compatibility of its CBAM with the WTO  rules and the well -established practices in the international 
community for fighting  against climate change. Thailand is willing to engage constructively with the 
EU and interested Members on this issue.  
40.16.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
40.17.   Paraguay notes that it has already addressed this matter extensively under Agenda I tems 24 
and 50.  
40.18.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
40.19.   Brazil refers to its statement from the Council's previous formal meeting in July, as its earlier 
concerns remain valid.81 
40.20.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
40.21.   Combating climate change and achieving a green transition are objectives that Türkiye 
shares with the European Union. In addition to its domestic policies to attain those objectives, 
Türkiye also welcomes increased effor ts at the global level to mitigate the impacts of climate change, 
as this is an issue of global effect. At the end of the day, all Members hope to achieve the massive 
transformation needed to attain environmentally sustainable economic growth globally, in an 
inclusive and just manner.  
40.22.   Türkiye is closely following the European Union's Green Deal, and the CBAM  regulation in 
particular, due to its significant effects on Türkiye's trade with the EU. In this sense, not only at this 
Council, but also in other com mittees, such as the Committees on Trade and Environment and Market 
Access, Türkiye has been voicing its expectations from the EU regarding its drafting and future 
implementation of the CBAM. At this point, Türkiye would also like to thank the EU for its t ransparent 
approach and constant information -sharing efforts on the Green Deal.  
40.23.   As Türkiye has very recently raised its questions regarding the ultimate form the CBAM will 
take, it will not repeat them here. Rather, it will suffice that Türkiye states once  more its expectations 
from this policy measure. Türkiye wishes to underline that unilateral mechanisms, such as the CBAM, 
should not create unnecessary barriers to trade and place undue burden on developing countries 
and LDCs. The measure's proportionalit y relative to the perceived risk of carbon leakage, strict 
observance of the rules based on the WTO  Agreement, and adhering to the principles of the 
multilateral environmental agreements, are all needed to ensure the mechanism's credibility. 
Otherwise, Tür kiye is concerned that measures such as the European Union's CBAM risk creating 
trade barriers and retaliations that, in turn, could harm the rules -based international trading order, 
and have negative repercussions on Members' climate change mitigation eff orts. 
40.24.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
40.25.   Japan considers climate change to be one of the world's most important issues. Countries 
must raise their ambitions and policy efforts to achieve carbon neutrality worldwide by 2050, while 
 
81 Document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  41.2-41.22.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  at the same ti me ensuring a level playing field and preventing carbon leakage. Therefore, policy 
coordination is important for the production and introduction of products with low carbon intensity.  
40.26.   When discussing policy coordination, each country has been making reduct ion efforts in the 
past according to its own circumstances, such as energy source constraints and the industrial 
environment and, in principle, the focus should be on "carbon intensity" as the "result" of such 
reduction efforts. In other words, if the "car bon intensity" of a country or sector is low, this would 
be the result of that country or sector having taken sufficient measures, such that there are no 
problems in terms of the level playing field or carbon leakage. In this regard, the European Union's 
CBAM is designed to charge at the border based on the level of specific policy, such as an explicit 
carbon price, at the present stage. In this case, even if the product has the same actual carbon 
intensity and does not cause any carbon leakage, taxation wi ll occur due to the explicit difference in 
carbon price.  
40.27.   In this respect, the environmental objective itself cannot be justified from the viewpoint of 
preventing carbon leakage, but sufficient consideration is required from the viewpoint of ensuring 
fair, competitive conditions. In addition to the above -mentioned institutional design issues, it is a 
prerequisite that this measure be designed consistently with the WTO  rules, as has been repeatedly 
stated.  
40.28.   With regard to the European Union's CBAM  measures, Th ailand understands that an expert 
meeting on methods for measuring product CO 2 emissions has kicked off. We hope that the CBAM  
will not be introduced without the EU having first ensured a sufficient international understanding of 
it. Otherwise, the EU's CB AM could potentially lead to international trade disputes.  
40.29.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
40.30.   The Republic of Korea recognizes that climate change is one of the most pressing issues that 
all WTO  Members should continue to jointl y focus on, finding effective ways to tackle it. While having 
initiated its nationwide emissions trading scheme since 2015, Korea is sparing no effort to achieve 
carbon neutrality by 2050. In addition, Korea actively participates in various international f orums to 
cooperate in combating climate change. However, trade measures targeted for this purpose, such 
as the European Union's CBAM, ought to be consistent with WTO  rules, and be carefully designed so 
as not to function as an unnecessary trade barrier. Mo reover, such a mechanism should take trading 
partners' individual efforts to address the issue of climate change fully into consideration.  
40.31.   Korea will continue to follow the CBAM's legislative process  closely, while encouraging the 
European Union to provide those subject to its measure with sufficient information and opportunity 
to comment. Furthermore, Korea looks forward to advancing the multilateral conversation on trade 
measures aimed at climate change.  
40.32.   The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the fol lowing:  
40.33.   Kazakhstan reiterates its position, as expressed at the Council's previous  meeting, and 
continues to follow developments around the European Union 's CBAM. Kazakhstan urges the EU to 
fully consider the CBAM 's compatibility with WTO  rules and regulat ions and to ensure that any such 
mechanism does not create obstacles to trade.  
40.34.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
40.35.   South Africa thanks China for placing this item on the agenda, and shares the concerns 
raised by other Members over the Eur opean Union's CBAM. While South Africa supports global efforts 
to mitigate climate change, it believes that these should be made in a balanced and evidence -based 
manner that ensures that trade measures do not undermine coherence in multilateral trade and 
climate policy making.  
40.36.   In this regard, South Africa refers to the UNCTAD  Report of July  2021 which demonstrated 
that a CBAM, as envisioned by the European Union, holds minimal climate mitigating benefits (that 
is, a CBAM is predicted to cut only 0.1% of glo bal CO 2 emissions), but on the contrary would inflict  G/C/M/144  
 
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  disproportionately high costs and impact on trade and exports, especially of developing countries.82 
South Africa is also worried about the compliance of the EU's CBAM with the WTO's rules, and hopes 
that the EU will take into account the concerns raised by a number of Members in this regard.  
40.37.   Addressing the effects of climate change requires global cooperation, and solidarity remains 
critical. This is an issue of global commons and cannot be addressed th rough unilateral measures.  
40.38.   Carbon border taxes that close off export markets will shift the burden and penalize already 
resource and financially constrained economies, making the move towards lower carbon -emitting 
economies even more challenging. This will  be the case for many developing and least -developed 
economies that stand to be disproportionately impacted by the EU's CBAM on the basis of their 
export profile and geographical locations to destination markets.  
40.39.   South Africa underscores that the transitio n towards carbon -neutrality must be just and 
equitable and must promote not just climate resilience, but also prioritize economic development. 
More importantly, it must be based on the principles agreed in the Paris Agreement and other 
instruments under th e UNFCCC, that is, the CBDR and Respective Capabilities, and that the polluter 
pays.  
40.40.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
40.41.   The European Union has been regularly updating various WTO  bodies on the developments 
of its CBAM  measure. Inde ed, the EU has spared no efforts to engage with Members on this issue, 
notably in the context of the Committee on Trade and Environment. In this regard, the EU refers 
Members to its presentation delivered at the meeting of the Committee on Trade and Enviro nment 
of 17  October  2022. The EU values such engagement with Members and has taken due note of 
Members' comments.  
40.42.   On this occasion, the European Union will therefore focus on updating Members on its 
domestic process. The EU's three  institutions – the Europ ean Commission, the European Parliament, 
and the Council – entered into a trialogue  negotiation in July  2022, with negotiations regularly taking 
place. The next political discussion between these three  institutions will take place on 
12 December  2022, with  the aim of reaching an agreement by the end of the year. The EU will 
continue to keep Members informed as its domestic process proceeds.  
40.43.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
41  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR CHINESE ENTERPRISES – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
41.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
41.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
41.3.  China has to raise this issue again because the United States continues to abuse export control 
measures to suppress Chinese enterprises in the name of so -called "national security". As of 
31 October  2022, there were 461  Chinese entities listed on the "Entity List" of the US  Department 
of Commerce. The relevant expor t control measures taken by the United States disregard the basic 
and fundamental WTO  rules, undermine market principles and fair competition, and endanger the 
security of global supply chains. China firmly rejects them. China urges the United States to st op its 
erroneous practice and remove Chinese companies and academic institutions from its "Entity List" 
as soon as possible in order to create sound conditions for the relevant enterprises and institutions 
from both sides to carry out normal business coope ration.  
 
82 A European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Implications for developing countries 
(https://unctad.org/webflyer/european -union -carbon -border -adjustment -mechanism -implications -developing -
countries) . G/C/M/144  
 
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  41.4.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
41.5.  As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security , including export 
controls.  
41.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
42  UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
42.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China. 
42.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
42.3.  China takes note that the United States made bilateral arrangements with the European 
Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom in 2021 and 2022, respectively, and imposed tariff quotas on 
the import of steel  and/or aluminium products from these Members, which were previously covered 
by Section  232 tariffs. In this regard, China refers to its statements made at previous meetings, 
including at those of the CMA and the CTG, and notes that its concern over this i ssue remains.  
42.4.  China would like to know when the United States intends to notify these arrangements to the 
relevant committees, in accordance with the WTO  rules. China is expecting the US to lead by 
example in fulfilling its transparency and notification ob ligations. In addition, China seeks further 
clarification from the United States on the following questions. Could the United States elaborate 
how these bilateral arrangements could address the so -called "national security" concern of the US? 
What criteria  does the United States use to determine which Members will be able to enter into such 
bilateral arrangements with the US, and which Members will be excluded? How could these 
differential treatments to WTO  Members be justified under the WTO  rules?  
42.5.  The dele gate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
42.6.  As expressed at the previous meeting of the CTG, as well as that of the CMA, Türkiye would 
like to take this opportunity to reiterate its concern with regard to the Section  232 tariffs that have 
been imposed by the United States on imports of steel and aluminium products since 2018. Türkiye 
once again notes its concern over the compatibility of the measures with the core WTO  rules and 
principles, as enshrined by the WTO  Agreement on Safeguards, as well as the GATT  1994. 
42.7.  Türkiye is of the view that the developments towards exclusion of some Members, as opposed 
to others, from Section  232 tariffs on a selective basis further exacerbates the problem, violating 
one of the core principles of the multilateral trading system . Bearing in mind that there exists no 
convincing reason for lifting the so -called measures for some Members, while excluding others, the 
measures being applied continue to be a source of concern for the smooth functioning of the 
multilateral trading syste m. In the way that they have been applied, quantitative restrictions go 
against the letter and spirit of the core WTO  principles by favouring some as opposed to others. On 
the basis of the foregoing, Türkiye would like to seize this opportunity to recall i ts request for the 
total elimination of all additional duties and quantitative restrictions, without losing any further time, 
in order to ensure that the multilateral trading system operates in an effective manner.  
42.8.  The delegate of  the United States  indicat ed the following:  
42.9.  The United States takes note of the comments and questions raised by China and Türkiye 
regarding the WTO  consistency of the Section  232 measures. The US has invoked Article  XXI(b) of 
the GATT  1994 and the actions are therefore wholly cons istent with the WTO. Regarding questions 
related to the operation of the Section  232 quotas, the United States refers Members to the 
proclamations issued by the President under Section  232, and to quota implementation information 
published on the website o f US Customs and Border Protection.  
42.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  43  UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
43.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
43.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
43.3.  As the Council is aware, China first raised this concern in 2019 because the United States had 
adopted rules to restrict market access to the ICT  products and services provided by countri es that 
the US considered as "foreign adversaries". China has serious concerns over this issue and firmly 
opposes the wrong practice of the US in discriminating against Chinese companies by abusing the 
concept of national security and defining China as a " foreign adversary".  
43.4.  ICT products' manufacturing and related services are crucial to technology innovation and the 
digital economy. This industry is one of the most interconnected in the world. If this industry is 
improperly disrupted, it will negatively af fect global supply chains and cause uncertainty to the global 
economy. This is why many ICT  companies, including relevant US  companies, are closely monitoring 
the development of the US  measures.  
43.5.  Despite repeatedly seeking detailed explanations and clarific ations from the United States on 
these measures, including on the WTO  consistency of the measures, the US often responds by saying 
that the CTG is not the proper forum for discussing national security issues. China wishes to point 
out that, for many decade s, mutual restraint was exercised on national security exceptions. 
However, in recent years, the concept of national security has been increasingly invoked, 
over-generalized, and abused, principally by the US. China understands that we should not prohibit 
measures that are needed purely for security reasons, but should also avoid taking measures with 
an essentially protectionist and commercial purpose, under the guise of security. It is a question of 
balance. To strike the right balance, one of the basic pr inciples we believe is that Members should 
not abuse the concept of national security, but carry it out in good faith. If any Member can justify 
its protectionist and unilateral measures by arbitrarily invoking the national security exception, 
without any boundaries, why bother to limit the circumstances in which it is available in the text of 
Article  XXI of the GATT? Why is Article  XXI in the WTO  rules at all if Members can invoke the national 
security exception without any boundaries?  
43.6.  Having said that, Ch ina urges the United States to bring its measures into line with the 
WTO rules, and to stop abusing the concept of national security, which is seriously undermining the 
multilateral trading system, and turning international trade into what the former Appel late Body 
Chairperson, James Bacchus, called a black hole of exceptions.  
43.7.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
43.8.  As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
43.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
44  CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFF ICE DEVICES) – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
44.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
44.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
44.3.  Regarding the draft of this national standard, Japan has already expressed its concerns at the 
TRIMs  Committee, the CMA, and the TBT  Committee. Japan has confirmed that a notice by the 
National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee, TC26 0, had indicated that the 
draft work for the standard had been completed.  Japan understands that this development means 
that work is under way to revise this standard. Japan has repeatedly expressed its concerns about G/C/M/144  
 
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  this. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the internal work for this revision is proceeding steadily. 
Japan would also like to point out that, at the October meeting of the CMA, China had stated that it 
had no plans to revise this national standard.  
44.4.  At the relevant committees, Japan has expre ssed its concerns regarding the amendment of 
the Recommended National Standards of China (GB/T) for office devices, such as multifunction 
peripherals and printers, that are procured by the operators of critical information infrastructure, if 
it would be th e case that the standard virtually would require that: (i)  office devices such as 
multifunction peripherals and printers, including their components, are required to be developed, 
designed, and produced in China; and (ii)   information must be disclosed to prove that office devices 
and/or their components are developed, designed, and produced in China.  
44.5.  These national standards raise concerns that foreign products will be discriminated against by 
other countries, that trade will be restricted more than necess ary, and that technology transfer will 
be forced. The standards may also be inconsistent with various WTO  Agreements, including the 
Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement, Articles  2.1, 2.3, and 5.1.2 of the TBT  Agreement, Article  III:4 
of the GATT, and also A rticle 7.3 of China's Accession Protocol.  
44.6.  Japan requests China to share the facts regarding its intention to revise this national standard, 
including its definition of critical information infrastructure operators, and the content of the 
proposed national standard, such as development requirements within China. Japan sincerely hopes 
that revisions to China's National Standards, and related systems and guidelines, will not be realized 
as outlined above. Rather, Japan hopes that the measures incorporating sim ilar requirements will 
not be formulated and introduced, either in the field of multifunction peripherals and printers, or in 
other fields.  
44.7.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
44.8.  The European Union would like to follow -up on the exchan ge that took place in various 
subsidiary bodies. At the TBT  Committee in July, China noted that the recommended national 
standard was not being revised but if it were to be the case, public opinion would be solicited.  
44.9.  At the November meeting of the TBT  Committee, China had explained that, if the 
administrative department for standardization approved the revision of the standards, a notice of 
project approval would be published through the National Public Service Platform for Standards 
Information. During th e process of revision, China would solicit public comments. Nevertheless, the 
European Union understands from information posted early in November on the website of China's 
National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee that a process ai med at revising 
the Recommended National Standards is now under way. And it appears that, according to the 
revised requirements, office devices and their components procured by critical information 
infrastructure operators would de facto need to be develop ed, designed, produced, and 
manufactured in China. If enacted, these standards would prevent overseas office device providers 
from participating in government procurement in China, as most of their products rely heavily on 
overseas components. The European  Union would like to emphasize that not all office equipment 
can be classified as "critical information infrastructure". At the same time, the EU urges China not 
to take similar measures in other sectors or for other products.  
44.10.   The delegate of China  indicat ed the following:  
44.11.   China refers to its response to the same concern raised by Japan at the previous week's 
meeting of the TBT  Committee. At present, the Standardization Administration of China has not 
approved the project initiation of revision plan of the recommended national standards related to 
printers and copiers. China would like to highlight that it has always remained open and transparent 
in the process of establishment and revision of national standards. If the revision process of the 
recommended na tional standards related to printers and copiers is initiated, China will publish it on 
the official website of the Standardization Administration of China and solicit public comment. All 
interested Members, including Japan, will have an opportunity to mak e comments on the revised 
standards at that time.  
44.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  45  CHINA – DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW – REQUEST 
FROM JAPAN  
45.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the  request of  
Japan.  
45.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
45.3.  In July of this year, China published a public hearing draft for the revision of its Government 
Procurement Law. With regard to the scope of the revised law, in addition to "state agencies, 
business units and organizations" in the current Article  2, "other procurement entities" has been 
added in Articles  2 and 12. With consideration to "other procurement entities", Article  12 of the 
revised bill refers to "public interest state -owned enterpri ses that engage in public works and operate 
public infrastructure or public service networks to realize public purposes", and adds that, "other 
procurement entities to which this Law applies and their specific scope of procurement shall be 
determined by th e State Council." If the scope of application of the Government Procurement Law 
expands to include even procurement beyond "procurement by governmental agencies", as 
stipulated in Article  3.8(a) of the GATT, and a local content requirement is made based on  Article  23 
of the revised law, foreign products, including those from Japan, may be treated in a discriminatory 
manner, thus violating Article  III.4 of the GATT. In light of this, Japan requests China to ensure that 
the State Council's definition of "othe r procurement entities" under Article  12 of the revised bill not 
be expanded without limit.  
45.4.  In addition to the existing LCR  regulation, Article  23 of the revised bill, which clearly includes 
"support for domestic industries", adds a new LCR that gives pref erential treatment in government 
procurement for products with a high added value ratio within China. Japan would like to point out 
that this, too, is not permitted under the government procurement exception of Article  III.8(a) of 
the GATT, unless it truly  falls under the category of government procurement. Japan notes that this 
LCR may also violate Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement, and Article  III.4 of the GATT. In this 
regard, Japan intends to carefully monitor the scope of this Article.  
45.5.  These new provi sions in China's draft amendments do not meet the standards required by 
the WTO  Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which China has already been negotiating to 
join for many years. In fact, these new provisions represent a move in the opposite directio n. 
Therefore, Japan is obliged to question whether China is willing to meet the standards of the GPA, 
and other agreements maintaining high standards, to which it has applied for membership.  
45.6.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
45.7.  Supporting domesti c products through government procurement is a common international 
practice. Indeed, many Members exercise a similar practice in their government procurement. In 
drafting the amendment to China's government procurement law, China has taken other Members' 
relevant practices and experiences  into account in order to streamline its own government 
procurement law. China reiterates that it treats the products and services provided by both foreign -
invested enterprises and local Chinese enterprises in government p rocurement  equally; the only 
exception is for those projects involving security and state secrets. As it is in the process of 
GPA accession, China is willing to discuss this issue with Japan under the framework of China's 
accession negotiation to the GPA.  
45.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
46  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
46.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
46.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
46.3.  Japan continues to have concerns over China's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020. The details of China's export -controlled items, as well as the details of China's 
regulations and operations, still remai n unclear to Japan. As Japan has stated in past CTG  meetings, G/C/M/144  
 
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  and taking into consideration the objective of the law to safeguard national interests, Japan wishes 
to reiterate its concerns on the following three  points in particular. First, Japan is concer ned there 
might be a possibility that the scope of products subject to export control is excessive. Second, 
Japan is concerned there might be cases that require unnecessary disclosure of its technical 
information during classification and end -user or usage  investigations. And third, Japan is also 
concerned that the provisions on countermeasures against discriminatory export regulations by 
other countries have been maintained in the law.  
46.4.  Japan is concerned that the aforementioned export restrictions stipulated in this law may 
constitute an overly stringent export regulation or be unnecessary in light of the international export 
control regime. They may therefore fall into the category of export restrictions prohibited under 
Article  XI of the GATT, and consequently be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
46.5.  In April  2022, a draft ordinance for the Dual -Use Item Export Control (draft of public 
consultations) was published regarding the operation of the law concerning dual -use products. The 
opacity of the legal operation has not been resolved at all in relation to the scope of items subject 
to regulation and disclosure requirements of techniques, and Japan will continue to request 
explanations on the details of the regulations related to the law.  
46.6.  In relation to this, Japan wishes to reiterate the following two  points, as pointed out in 
previous meetings of the CTG. First, Japan has concerns with regard to the fact that the draft 
regulations on rare earths published in January  2021 mentioned a plan  to set out strategic reserves. 
Japan believes that this plan could mean there is a possibility China might introduce controls on 
exports of rare earth -related products in accordance with the aforementioned Export Control Law. 
Second, regarding the "Unreli able Entity List" and export prohibition list based on the external trade 
law, Japan is concerned by the lack of clarity in the relationship between the entity list in the Export 
Control Law and the items covered in the law and the technology list.  
46.7.  China p reviously explained that the regulatory list and unreliable entity list provided in 
Article  18 of this law are constructed from different legal systems. However, Japan requests a clearer 
explanation as to what kind of legal system each is based on, and whe ther or not they are related. 
In particular, with regard to the "Unreliable Entity List" measures, Japan is concerned about whether 
the fairness and transparency in terms of the recognition of foreign entities and the content of 
measures taken against fore ign entities would be ensured. Japan notes that there might be a 
possibility that this measure would be inconsistent with Article  X of the GATT, among others.  
46.8.  Japan understands that China explained at the Council's previous meeting that it had 
accelerated the formulation and amendment of the supporting laws and regulations to the Export 
Control Law in order to provide clearer and more specific guidance for all parties to implement and 
abide by the Export Control Law. China had also explained that it welcome d Members to continue to 
engage with China and put forward their comments and suggestions during the public consultation 
period for laws and regulations.  
46.9.  Japan will continue to closely monitor the details of the regulations on implementing the law 
and hope s that its concerns will be addressed accordingly in the final draft of the regulations. In 
addition, Japan is of the view that countermeasure provisions should be removed from the law. 
Japan requests China to provide information on the detailed regulation s and their timeline with full 
transparency, while providing ample time for their consideration.  
46.10.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
46.11.   Australia notes the statement by Japan in relation to China's Export Control Law. As set out 
in Australia's submissions to China's consultations with interested parties ahead of the adoption of 
this law in December  2020, and draft regulations published in April  2022, Australia welcomed efforts 
to codify the regulatory framework for defence export controls. Austr alia also welcomes China's 
efforts to clarify aspects of its export control regime through the publication of a White Paper in 
December  2021.  
46.12.   Australia still has concerns about the broad scope of China's Export C ontrol Law. Australia 
encourages China to co ntinue to provide greater clarity in relation to key elements of the law, 
including jurisdiction, the scope of administrator powers, and confirmation that the law is consistent G/C/M/144  
 
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  with China's international commitments, including WTO  rules and the China -Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (ChAFTA). Australia continues to urge China to take account of the concerns of foreign 
businesses and Members in the implementation of this law and development of future measures. 
Australia looks forward to working closely with Ch ina to resolve these concerns.  
46.13.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
46.14.   The United Kingdom thanks Japan for tabling this item on the agenda and would also like to 
express concerns regarding China's Export Control Law measure, and enquire  further into its 
intended use. The UK notes that since the law's adoption in December  2020 China has published 
further information regarding the regulations that will underpin the use of the Export Control Law, 
and the publication of a White Paper in Dece mber 2021.  
46.15.   Export restrictions on goods inevitably disrupt global supply chains. The global trading 
systems only works if each Member is committed to avoiding protectionist measures in international 
trade and promotes a market -led approach to supply chain resilience, especially in critical goods 
including critical minerals. As the United Kingdom has noted before, unfair and market -distorting 
trade practices can undermine both the integrity of, as well as the trust in, the multilateral trading 
system, and co uld directly harm business and citizens worldwide.  
46.16.   The United Kingdom requests clarifications from China regarding what it would define as its 
"national interest" for the purposes of this law and how this would relate to any export restrictions 
arising fro m it. The UK seeks further information on how China would decide which "other goods, 
technologies, services" should come within the scope of this law, and what the limits are on this. 
The extra -territorial application of Article  44 could negatively affect global supply chain resilience. 
How does China envision the law being applied to "any organization or individual outside the territory 
of the People's Republic of China"? The United Kingdom would join calls for further transparency 
around this law's implem entation.  
46.17.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
46.18.   The European Union reiterates its concerns previously expressed at the Council's meeting in 
July 2022 over China's export control regime, notably as regards: extra -territorial applicatio n; rules 
on deemed exports and re -exports; objectives and scope of controls; and risk assessment with 
regard to destination countries or regions and control lists. The EU would like to invite China to 
consider amending the relevant legal provisions, to pro vide legal clarity, and to address these 
concerns in upcoming implementing measures. The EU will continue to closely monitor new 
developments relating to China's export control regime.  
46.19.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
46.20.   Canada reiterates its c oncerns expressed in previous CTG  meetings. Canada encourages 
China to circumscribe the application of the Export Control Law ( ECL) through its upcoming 
regulations and implementation with a view to harmonizing the practices with international 
standards.  
46.21.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
46.22.   China is still working on the supporting complementary laws and regulations of its Export 
Control Law. From 22  April to 22  May, the Ministry of Commerce of China publicly solicited public 
comments on the "Draft  Regulation on the Export Control of Dual -Use Items". China welcomes the 
comments submitted by the Government of Japan, and other Members, as well as those from 
relevant industry representatives. China is now conducting a comprehensive review of these 
comm ents. China will continue to engage with Japan and other interested Members on this issue.  
46.23.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  47  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
47.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Uruguay.  
47.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
47.3.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and systemic concern about the issue of unilateral 
modifications of the European Union's tariff rate quotas under Article  XXVIII of the GATT following 
Brexit, in particular with respect to the fact that they are not necessary and lack any legal basis 
under the WTO  Agreements.  
47.4.  Uruguay regrets that, even though it participated actively and const ructively in the process 
from the beginning, demonstrating the injury that its agricultural sector, and its economy as a whole, 
would suffer as a result of the apportionment, the European Union rejected even the most modest 
and reasonable requests for comp ensation that were submitted. This is why Uruguay wishes, once 
again, to reiterate its dissatisfaction with this situation, while reaffirming its willingness to find a 
mutually agreed solution, insofar as the European Union recognizes Uruguay's specific co nditions 
and needs, and demonstrates the necessary political will to reach an agreement.  
47.5.  Lastly, without prejudice to the bilaterally agreed commitments between the European Union 
and the United Kingdom, Uruguay once again requests that the EU unequivocall y remove the UK 
from the potential users of its tariff rate quotas in its WTO  Schedule of concessions. At the same 
time, as it has been almost two  and a half years since the end of the transition period of the 
Withdrawal Agreement and the completion of Bre xit, Uruguay continues to wait for the EU to proceed 
with the downwards adjustment of its final bound aggregate measurement of support (AMS) 
entitlements in its schedule of concessions, in line with the announcements made in a timely manner.  
47.6.  The delegate o f the European Union  indicated the following:  
47.7.  The European Union  is pleased to report excellent progress achieved so far with agreements 
formally signed with seven  partners and initialled with three  other partners. The EU is also close to 
reaching an agreement with several other partners. The EU welcomes the increased engagement of 
many WTO  Members. The EU remains fully committed to continuing these negotiations and 
consultations and to bringing them to a successful close expeditiously.  
47.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
48  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  
48.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
New Zealand and Uruguay.  
48.2.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
48.3.  New Zealand continues to raise this item in the CTG, and refers the European Union to its 
previous statements on this matter. New Zealand has considered the European Union's response  on 
this matter. However, New Zealand still sees a conflict in the European Commission's approach to 
protecting the cheese names "Danbo" and "Havarti", for which there are existing CODEX  standards, 
and the integrity of the standards setting system that pro motes reliability and consistency in 
international trade rules, which we would expect the EU to support.  
48.4.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
48.5.  Uruguay regrets having to put this item on the agenda again and wishes to refer to previous 
interventi ons, while reiterating the concern about the decision of the European Union to register the 
term Danbo as a protected geographical indication, despite the objections raised by several 
Members. As Uruguay has long pointed out, Danbo cheese is a cheese -makin g technique, which G/C/M/144  
 
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  does not correspond to any known geographical location. This manufacturing technique is covered 
by standard  264 of the Codex Alimentarius , which sets out the characteristics, production method, 
and labelling of this type of cheese. This standard has been modified several times, and its last 
modification in 2007 had the participation and approval of the European Union. However, later on, 
the EU decided to include Danbo cheese as a protected geographical indication, which it also includes 
in its free trade agreements, thus indirectly excluding non -Danish producers of this type of cheese 
from third  markets. It is for these reasons, and despite the time that has elapsed, that Uruguay will 
continue to maintain its trade concern.  
48.6.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
48.7.  The European Union takes note of the concerns expressed by Uruguay. The European Union 
has provided detailed replies to these concerns at previous CTG  meetings. Without repeating its 
previous statements in full,  the EU would like to underline that its previous statements remain 
unchanged. Notably, the European Union has consistently said that the fact that a GI  name is subject 
to a specific Codex Alimentarius  standard or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa  Convention 
does not imply that the name should be considered as a common or generic term.  
48.8.  Generic status in the European Union can only be assessed with regard to the perception of 
the consumers on the EU  territory. In the EU, the relevant public is compr ised mainly of the 
reasonably well -informed members of the public and/or customers who may purchase the product 
or a like product. Regulation (EU)  No. 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and 
foodstuffs, as well as subsequent delegated an d implementing acts, were notified to the WTO under 
the TBT  Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the TBT  Agreement (e.g. provisions 
related to technical standards, definitions, and labelling issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual 
property rights (in particular, elements related to the substantive protection of geographical 
indications) are part of the notified measures, these are not relevant for TBT  purposes.  
48.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
49  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDU LE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM URUGUAY  
49.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Uruguay.  
49.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
49.3.  In addition to referring to sev eral elements raised under Agenda Item  47, these are fully  
applicable to the case of the United Kingdom. Uruguay wishes to reiterate once again its position 
and concern with regard to the United Kingdom's claim of a significant total bound AMS of 
approxima tely five  billion pounds sterling to the currency conversion proposed in that Member's draft 
schedule of concessions, and its practical consequences, and to the UK's intention to replicate the 
rights to invoke the agricultural special safeguard for all pro ducts and under the same criteria and 
conditions as set out in the European Union's schedule. With regard to the ongoing Article  XXVIII 
process, Uruguay recognizes the recent constructive bilateral exchanges with the United Kingdom, 
and reaffirms its willi ngness to move forward in the negotiations with a view to reaching a mutually 
advantageous agreement, which would allow the United Kingdom to have an independent schedule 
of concessions formally established in the WTO.  
49.4.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated th e following:  
49.5.  Paraguay wishes to register its support for this systemic concern about the modification of 
the United Kingdom's schedule of commitments and to reiterate its position that the AMS amount 
the UK has awarded to itself as a result of its exit fro m the European bloc has not yet been reflected 
in a proportional reduction in the EU's schedule and registered AMS  amount.  Therefore, Paraguay is 
still unable to verify that subsidy levels have not been raised and that the division is equal to the 
original sum of the parts. Although the UK has not reported any use of this AMS, it has already 
submitted DS:1  notifications that include this amount  as an acquired right. Paraguay  urges both 
parties to complete the relevant processes so that their schedules can reflect the amounts including 
the relevant reduction also in the EU's schedule.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  49.6.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
49.7.  The Uni ted Kingdom would like to thank Uruguay and Paraguay for their interest in this agenda 
item today. Over the preceding months the United Kingdom has held further productive discussions 
with the majority of relevant outstanding Members in the process. This h as resulted in the UK signing 
with a considerable range of our partners in recent months, and indeed, recent weeks. The UK hopes 
to sustain this progress as it continues its discussions with the few remaining Members.  
49.8.  Regarding the statement made by Urugua y and Paraguay, the United Kingdom would like to 
refer Members to its previous statements as recorded in the Minutes of this Council, and at the CMA, 
which sets out the UK's position on these issues as they still stand.83 The UK would also like to note 
that, following engagement at a technical level, many Members that held initial concerns over this 
matter have since been satisfied to remove their objections.  
49.9.  The United Kingdom remains open to holding similar discussions with those Members that 
have express ed concerns today.  The UK would like to reiterate its thanks to all Members that have 
engaged constructively on matters relating to the UK's Goods schedule in this process. In line with 
WTO practice, the UK will further update Members following the conclu sion of 
Article  XXVIII  negotiations.  
49.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
50  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
50.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
50.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
50.3.  The Russian Federation expresses deep concern in respect of the European Green Deal and 
its implementation acts. Members have already discussed the European Union's Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism and deforestation -free products. Obviously, the Green Deal does not include 
just these two  elements. Other aspects of the Green Deal are also of concern, and these aspects, in 
the form of STCs, are being raised across the meetin gs of various relevant WTO  working bodies.  
50.4.  One measure that causes deep concern is the draft EU  Batteries Regulation. This measure 
sets out product requirements for new batteries as a condition for market access to the European 
Union, as well as material r ecovery targets for waste batteries. This regulation specifically sets 
requirements on the maximum level of carbon footprint over the life cycle of batteries and minimum 
level of recycled materials such as cobalt, lithium, lead, and nickel in the battery. Apparently, the 
requirement for a minimum level of recycled materials in batteries is intended to reduce the use of 
primary metals in the EU. The requirements of this draft Regulation are not based on science, nor 
on international standards or guidelines t hat specify the content of recycled materials in batteries, 
material recovery targets, and the levels and methodologies for the calculation of carbon footprint 
over the life cycle of this product.  
50.5.  Through the Green Deal and Farm to Fork strategy, the European Union seeks to reduce the 
use of mineral fertilizers and substitute them with organic fertilizers. The Russian Federation took 
note of the European Commission's press release on food security i ssued on 9  November, which, 
inter alia, states that the "Fertilizing Products Regulation already ensures a better access in the 
market to fertilizers made from recovered waste and green and circular alternatives to natural gas". 
In its communication on ens uring the availability and affordability of fertilizers, the EU clearly 
explains that "Europe has an important fertilizer industry but is dependent on imports of natural gas 
as well as on imports of phosphates and potash" and that "the substitution of mine ral fertilizers by 
organic fertilizers is part of the solution to reduce the EU's dependence on gas". Obviously, the goal 
aimed at substituting mineral fertilizers with organic fertilizers has nothing in common with the 
climate change issue and chases the idea of import substitution.  
 
83 See, for example, document  G/C/M/143, paragraphs  14.6-14.10.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  50.6.  The European Union seeks to use the Green Deal as a cover even for its customs reform, and 
to establish different treatment for like products. In its "Ten  Proposals to Make the EU  Customs 
Union Fit for Geopolitical Europe", it is stated that "Customs has a responsibility and a unique position 
to contribute to the EU  political agenda on the Green Deal" and "it can lead internationally in the 
efforts to reform the WCO  harmonized system nomenclature so that it can promote trade in 
environmentally -friendly goods". The Russian Federation notes the different proposals in respect of 
new Customs classification of certain products in the Committee on Trade and Environment.  
50.7.  Of course, the European Green Deal is not limited to the above -mentioned measures. It also 
provides for the promotion of EU  energy standards and technologies at the global level, the 
diversification of energy sources of supply, the adoption of new technical regulations, the revision 
of competition rules, and so on. The R ussian Federation expects that the European Union will fully 
respect the WTO  rules during implementation of the European Green Deal.  
50.8.  To conclude, the Russian Federation reiterates its systemic concern over the lack of 
engagement from the European Union on the issues raised. Transparency is an important pillar of 
this Organization, and the provision of explanations on various measures and policies in the CTG is 
part of the transparency mechanism. Refusal to respond to the trade concerns raised by Members 
is in stark contrast to the EU's rhetoric on the importance of transparency in this Organization.  
50.9.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
50.10.   Paraguay wishes to underline that its interventions under Agenda I tems 6 and 24 regarding 
aspects of the Green Deal are also valid for this agenda item.  
50.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
51  CONSIDERATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL 
FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
51.1.  The Chairperson  noted that, pursuant to the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which were adopted by the General 
Council on 15  November  1995, all bodies constituted under Agreements in Annex  1A of the 
WTO Agreement were required to submit a factual report to the Council for Trade in Goods annually, 
and the Council was to take note of these reports. Such factual reports were adopted at the last 
meeting of each subsidiary body and submitted to the CTG for its co nsideration. In the case of the 
Committee on Trade Facilitation (G/L/1468), the corresponding factual report would be submitted 
to the General Council directly.  
51.2.  The Chairperson proposed that the Council take note of the following factual annual reports: 
Committee on Agriculture (G/L/1446); Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (G/L/1436); 
Committee on Customs Valuation (G/L/1442); Committee on Import Licensing (G/L/1433); 
Committee on Market Access (G/L/1439); Committee on Rules of Origin (G/L/1440); Committe e on 
Safeguards (G/L/1435); Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (G/L/1443); 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (G/L/1438); Committee on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (G/L/1445); Committee on TRIMs (G/L/1437); Committee of Partici pants on the Expansion 
of Trade in Information Technology Products, ITA (G/L/1441); Working Party on State Trading 
Enterprises (G/L/1434); and the Independent Entity (G/L/1444).  
51.3.  The Council so agreed . 
52  ADOPTION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS TO THE 
GENERAL COUNCIL (G/C/W/821)  
52.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the Draft Report of this Council to the General 
Council, circulated in document  G/C/W/ 821 and G/C/W/ 821/Corr.1. In accordance with the 
"Procedures for an Annual Overview  of WTO  Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" 
(WT/L/105). He remind ed delegations that all sections of the Draft Report would be updated in light 
of the meeting , including the adjustments to the agenda,  and would be circulated to Members for 
comments , and that a written procedure would  be followed after the meeting to approve it.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  52.2.  In the absence of comments, the Chairperson propose d to proceed as follows. The Secretariat 
would  circulate by email a revised version of the Annual Report by Monday, 28  November, where 
the changes would be tracked. If no objection were received by the Secretariat by 13:00 of Friday, 
2 December, this revised draft would be considered to be approved and the Annual Report would be 
circulated under the G/L  document series so that it could be submitted to the General Council.84 
52.3.  The Council so agreed . 
53  OTHER BUSINESS  
53.1  Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies – Information from the Chairperson  
53.1.  The Chairperson  drew the Council's attention to document  RD/CTG/17, containing the mo st 
recent version of the annual calendar of meetings of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies for the year 
2022, and the information currently available for the year 2023. He explained that the document 
had been compiled by the CTG  team in close coordination w ith the Secretariat colleagues responsible 
for the CTG's subsidiary bodies with a view to avoiding any date clashes and to ensure an optimal 
programming of meetings. As previously indicated, the Secretariat would prepare an update of this 
annual calendar f or each formal meeting of the CTG with a view to swiftly identifying any potential 
issue, and to permit Members to organize their activities in this regard. He noted that almost all of 
the meetings had taken place as previously planned and communicated to Members in previous 
versions of the planning and calendar of meetings, which show ed that considerable progress had 
been made with respect to past years. The importance of this type of coordination had been 
emphasized at the retreat on WTO  reform that had taken place in October and was mentioned by 
several delegations as a good practice.  
53.2.  However, despite their best efforts, it had not been possible to program me a correct sequence 
for the Committee on Trade Facilitation  (CTF), whose meeting wo uld take place after the meeting of 
this Council. As delegations perhaps recalled, the Committee on Trade Facilitation had to move its 
dates as a result of the scheduling of a meeting of the General Council. The Chair and Secretariat 
had twice tried to rep rogramme the CTF and CTG  meetings to have the correct sequence, but without 
success due to meetings of other bodies and a lack of available meeting rooms. The Chair and 
Secretariat would continue to work on the scheduling of meetings to better serve the Me mbership.  
53.3.  In this regard, he also wished to inform the Council that, at a meeting with the Chairpersons 
of the CTG's 14  subsidiary bodies, he had informed them that he had heard concerns with respect 
to the planning of meetings in October and November of that year. If he had understood correctly, 
the formal meetings had overlapped with many week -long training  activities , workshops, and other 
activities, which had affected the effectiveness of the Council's  work. For this reason, he had 
suggested to the Chai rpersons that, to the extent possible, they should try to decompress next 
year's calendar and schedule those special activities during the first  part of the year, where there 
seem ed to be fewer meetings, and to try to avoid October and November , where there were typically 
many formal meetings of WTO  bodies that had to take place in the context of their reporting to the 
General Council. He was fully aware that this might  not prove possible for a number of reasons, but 
the Chair and Secretariat would try to w ork on improving this situation in the coming year.  
53.4.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
53.5.  If we wish to improve the functioning of the Council we should then begin with the most basic 
issues, perhaps issues as basic as meeting dates and schedul ing. Paraguay would therefore like to 
use this opportunity to record its displeasure at the change of dates for this meeting of the Council. 
Paraguay appreciates that unforeseeable circumstances can arise, and we appreciate your 
explanations about the effo rts made, but a change was made not once, but twice, for reasons 
unconnected with the functioning of this Council, with a view to accommodating other meetings that 
are outside its competence.  
53.6.  The change resulted not only in delegations having to be here un til 9pm on the previous day, 
and all of us making an effort to shorten our statements, with knock -on effects on the quality of the 
 
84 The Annual Report of the Council for T rade in Goods was adopted by written procedures on 
2 December  2022 and circulated as document  G/L/1463, dated 5 December  2022.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  debate, but actually prevented my delegation from making a statement before this Council because, 
as will have been noted, we  had to be absent for most of the morning as a result of previously 
scheduled bilateral consultations on other important matters had been organized for that date. This 
was precisely because Capital delegates would be here and there were no clashes with oth er 
meetings, a situation which changed with the shift in timing. Delegations, especially small 
delegations, need things to be predictable and foreseeable to ensure that they can prepare 
appropriately and participate effectively.  
53.7.  We acknowledge the efforts made by the Council's Secretary and team, as reflected in 
document  RD/CTG/17, and we acknowledge their readiness and good will, as well as the Secretary's 
cooperation in reading several statements on behalf of delegations that were unable to attend. 
Howeve r, just imagine if we had all sent our interventions to the Secretariat, for them to read them 
out to an empty room, with only the interpreters, for the record. That is not what should be 
happening in this Organization. Instead, the Council should be a spa ce for genuine debate between 
Members. We therefore urge you, as Chair of this Council, to take this message of displeasure and 
concern to the General Council as part of your report, and for every effort to be made in future to 
avoid changes to the meeting  dates for one of the WTO's most important bodies, which has an 
important agenda to tackle that cannot be rushed but should instead have the time required for full 
discussion.  
53.8.  Before closing, allow me to refer briefly to an issue that has come to light wit h the schedule 
in the meeting document I referred to earlier, namely that the CTG of July  2023 is scheduled to take 
place before the SPS  Committee and many of the concerns on the agenda are shared by the 
Committee and this Council. The fact that the debate s in the Council will occur before discussions at 
the SPS  Committee will not be conducive to making gradual and natural progress on those items.  
53.9.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
53.10.   Chair, India appreciate s the attempts made by you and the Secretariat to conduct the 
proceedings of this Council , and specifically this meeting , in the midst of the various scheduling 
constraints. It is deeply regrettable that the CTG, one of the key regular WTO  bodies, has had its 
meeting date moved twice becaus e of scheduling issues.  The functioning of the Organization is 
impaired when meetings of different regular bodies clash. The functioning is further impaired when 
the WTO  bodies that generally publish a forward -looking calendar, such as this Council, have t o 
move their meetings because other bodies have fluid schedules.  
53.11.   India has also, in the past, raised its concerns in the General Council on how WTO  regular 
bodies seem to be competing with non -multilateral initiatives. The lack of transparency on how 
WTO resources are being redirected away from the WTO  regular bodies does not augur well. Chair, 
India requests, through you, that these issues be systemically addressed, including in the Council's 
Annual Report.  
53.12.   The delegate of  the Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
53.13.   The Dominican Republic would like to thank you, Chair, for the proposed timetable that has 
been presented to us, and we would also like to thank you for all the efforts that have been made 
in requesting the reports on the ways to improve the  functioning of all of the CTG's subsidiary bodies 
that you requested to the Chairs of these bodies. However, we would like to share the views 
expressed by the delegation of Paraguay. Even though we have an excellent team working on these 
issues in the WTO  Secretariat, the issue is beyond them, and we do not know at what level it can 
be solved. This is why we think that it would be good for this to form part of the report of this Council 
to the General Council.  
53.14.   It is not possible that a Council such as this , one of the most important in the Organization, 
should have so many problems finding a room and that a meeting should have to end at 9pm. In 
our case, we would not have liked it at all that, had we brought a concern for the Council to hear, 
only to have o ur turn, at 8pm, to speak to an empty room, and when nobody could give their opinion 
or ask a question. In that sense, we would be grateful for this to be reflected in some way because 
this is in the record. This is not a plurilateral initiative or an info rmal dialogue. This is the Goods 
Council, which also involves capital experts, and it should be a priority.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  53.15.   At the same time, Chair, we trust in your good stewardship and in the good results that you 
can obtain in this regard, so that we are not penalized every time that meeting dates are changed.  
53.16.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
53.17.   While acknowledging the great work that you and the Secretariat have been doing in your 
efforts at coordinating the work of this Council, I would just like to second  the motion by Paraguay, 
that this is a very important issue that, to the extent possible, merits predictability and a proper 
sequencing of meetings.  
53.18.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
53.19.   Thank you, Chair, for your comprehensive report earlier , and thanks, too, to colleagues for 
their statements. I just wanted to talk about the unofficial room document because I was trying to 
find it on Documents Online recently and I could not do so. I would like to suggest that we change 
the document's status  to that of a JOB  document, or some other status, so that it is searchable 
through Documents Online.  
53.20.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
53.21.   The United Kingdom thanks the Chair and the Secretariat for their efforts outlined with a 
view to trying to schedule this meeting, and we appreciate that the rescheduling happened because 
of a knock -on, which was somewhat out of your control, and that you put a lot of effort into trying 
to sort this out. Like other speakers, we really do view the sc heduling issue through the lens of 
inclusivity, so it  is really important to us, and the UK's position across all committees, from the 
subsidiary bodies through the CTG to the General Council, that all of the meetings for next year are 
locked in as soon as  possible, ideally, to facilitate capital participation. And we would hope, as well, 
that that might assist with the planning of training activities, and so on, so that we are not 
experiencing an overload around the meetings; and this also applies for the Secretariat. So we see 
the CTG and its subsidiary bodies as part of a broader picture, and we really welcome the 
announcement at the Reform Retreat of a new scheduling tool within the Secretariat that the DG 
announced. On that basis, we do hope that this n ew tool will help, and that through it we can lock 
in a schedule of meetings that, crucially, also takes account of the scheduling needs of smaller 
delegations.  
53.22.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
53.23.   The United States seconds the remark s by Paraguay. We support all of the sentiments raised 
today on this issue and would ask that the Chair and Secretariat give greater regard to the scheduling 
of all meetings of all bodies under the CTG's purview, particularly with regard to maintaining the  
fixed dates in the schedule versus those bodies that are more fluid. And I know that this is an issue 
that has improved even as long as I have been covering the Council, and we know that the Chair 
and the Secretariat have worked very hard on this, and tha t you place a lot of importance on it, so 
thank you. But we place a lot of importance on it, too, and we hope that it can continue to improve.  
53.24.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
53.25.   I was listening to everyone here in terms of their interventions,  and I think that, as the 
United Kingdom stated, at least from my perspective as well, that the problems that you  have had, 
and that the Secretariat has had, in terms of organizing this meeting have been, at least from my 
understanding, are pretty much out  of your hands. They were in many ways imposed upon you 
because of the circumstances of other decisions that were taken by other Councils. And I think that 
maybe the message you should be taking away from this discussion here is that we greatly 
appreciate everything that you do, and that the Secretariat does, to organize us and to try to keep 
that continuum of work within the subsidiary bodies that then results in a discussion at the Council, 
including the timing, and the coherence to everything. But I thin k that you should carry a message 
from the Council to others that, as the UK said, there is a need for some coherence from others as 
well to ensure that there is coherence also for us in terms of our scheduling of meetings. As we 
understand the difficultie s in terms of this specific situation, and the difficulties in past situations as 
well, this Council would very much appreciate it if there were greater coherence from the entire 
Organization, working together, to make sure that meetings are not disrupted in this way. I would G/C/M/144  
 
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  also add that I think that the Secretariat does a lot of work, including a lot of requests from Members, 
and we really appreciate that and the efforts that are taken.  
53.26.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
53.27.   The Euro pean Union also considers that the question of the calendar is an important 
question, and that the needs of delegations, especially small delegations, should be understood and 
taken into account. We have already seen improvements, even if there are still o ther improvements 
to be considered. We think a balance needs to be struck between the need to maintain a certain 
flexibility, and to have a certain agility, and equally the concern around planning and organization 
in our work. The question of the calendar is certainly a candidate for a larger dialogue between the 
Goods Council and the committee Chairs of its subsidiary bodies, as well as between the other 
councils and committees, including the General Council.  
53.28.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
53.29.   I agree a 100% with all that you have said. First of all, if in a partisan and subjective way, I 
share your affirmation of the importance of this Council in the context and work of this Organization. 
More seriously, the Annual Report will be upd ated to take this discussion into account, and will be  a 
way to inform the General Council. This discussion  will also be reflected in the meeting's minutes. 
In addition, I will offer an echo of these comments to the Chairperson of the General Council. 
Australia had also asked for the symbol of the Annual Calendar to be changed into a JOB  document; 
and yes, this should be possible , and we will proceed accordingly. I will now pass the floor to the 
Secretariat to explain a difficulty that has occurred for the year 2023 in relation to the 
SPS Committee, one of whose meetings will take place after the Council's meeting. A last comment, 
regarding the Reform Retreat, not specifically in relation to the Council and its subsidiary bodies, 
but concerning  a general pre occupation, especially this last autumn, where we surpassed even the 
usual planning difficulties in autumn, when we had a particular situation linked to the success of 
MC12 . At this moment, a certain quantity of supplementary work for numerous committees  was 
launched concerning  the functioning of the Organization, the response to the pandemic , the 
TRIPS  Council, and the different General Council special meeting , of which there were three or 
four informal sessions . As a result, a significant number of meetin gs have taken  place in addition to 
those taking place in a standard WTO  year. All that to say that this is a preoccupation shared by the 
quasi-totality of the Members hip, and in the quasi -totality of the Organization's committees. But this 
makes the obliga tion for the General Council to address these issues with utmost seriousness  all the 
more important.  
53.30.   The Secretariat  (Mr Roy Santana) indicated the following:  
53.31.   I apologize again for all the difficulties that were caused by the reprogramming of the 
meeting.  It was really out of our hands. We have faced some constraints that make it increasingly 
difficult to programme some of the meetings. As Members are aware, there are some constraints in 
terms of what Members would like to do in the CTG. This had to do, for  example, with not having 
formal meetings of the CTG or subsidiary bodies at the same time. There are also constraints in 
terms of the sequencing because we should try to have the CTG  meetings, at least the one at the 
end of each semester, taking place aft er all the committees have met. Then there are also the 
general guidelines for the planning and organization of meetings, where, for example, the CTG 
cannot meet at the same time as the General Council, Trade Policy Reviews, TRIPS  Council, or 
Services Coun cil, and then there are also all sorts of elements that we have to take into account. In 
addition, the CTG has to meet at least 15  days before the General Council meeting to ensure a 
proper sequencing. If there are waivers or other decisions that have to b e transmitted to the General 
Council, these can only be placed on the agenda of the General Council if they are placed in time 
and the documents have to be issued and reflected in the Airgram. This means, for example, that 
the CTG would not be able to meet  in the week of 17  July (i.e. after the SPS  meeting) because then 
it would be far too late to be able to include documents or decisions for the General Council's 
consideration, which would normally meet towards the last week of that month, in this case the  
week of 24  July. Another element that has typically complicated our own planning is that the 
meetings of the SPS  Committee are actually defined even two to three  years in advance, 
programmed and coordinated with the other sister organizations as well. Thu s, the problem should 
be self -evident. There are not many dates that meet the cumulation of all those criteria, and then 
sometimes there are no dates that meet all the criteria and constraints. The CTG  team will get in 
contact with their counterparts servi cing the General Council and the SPS  Committee to explore G/C/M/144  
 
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  whether it would be possible to improve the sequencing, but of course bearing in mind all the 
constraints.  
53.32.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
53.33.   This confirms the importance of improving our way of organizing ourselves, but this can only 
be done with the General Council and the Secretariat.  
53.34.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
53.35.   I would like to excuse myself for only asking for the floor at this time, because I am coming 
from another m eeting due to a scheduling conflict, which thankfully I could also attend over 
Interprefy, allowing me to quickly switch between meetings.  
53.36.   I would only like to note that a situation like this allows us to take action towards realizing 
improvements. The aim  of our comments is to prevent this from happening in the future. We are 
very small missions, and we are in an Organisation with very big issues, so the objective is how to 
introduce improvements that can be taken into consideration when planning next year 's meetings. 
We know very well that the logistics and coordination within the WTO, like ours, are also complicated, 
but we appreciate the steps that you are taking towards improving the coordination for next year.  
53.37.   The Council took note  of the statements ma de. 
53.2  Implementation Matters from MC12 – Information from the Chairperson  
53.38.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
53.39.   On 14 October, I organized an informal meeting to present the report of the consultations 
that I had held, between 22  September and 12  October, on the question of whether, and if so, how, 
this Council should proceed with respect to the implementation of thr ee issues resulting from MC12. 
My report of this meeting was circulated in document  JOB/CTG/16, and my concluding remarks 
summarizing the outcome of this informal meeting was circulated in document  JOB/CTG/17.  
53.40.   On 19  October, I met with the Chairpersons of the CTG's 14  subsidiary bodies to inform 
them about the informal meeting and request them to prepare two  factual reports under their own 
responsibility, with the assistance of the Secretariat, concerning: (i)  the activities that had been 
undertaken in the context of the pandemic; and (ii)  the current functioning of their Committees, 
including actions taken over the past years to improve their work. Shortly afterwards, I sent them 
a written communication which was also circulated to Members in document  JOB/C TG/18. These 
reports are intended to be factual in nature, and prepared under the responsibility of each 
Chairperson . Nevertheless, I suggested that drafts be shared with Members before their formal 
submission and official circulation . I will also be worki ng with the Secretariat to prepare a similar 
report concerning the current functioning of the CTG and will share a draft with Members before its 
formal circulation , with an opportunity to send comments before close of business on Thursday, 
1 December.  
53.41.   Once all the reports have been circulated, I will organize an informal dedicated session early 
next year so that these reports can be presented to you by the respective Chairpersons, and we can 
have an initial discussion on how to proceed on the two  relevant i ssues. A room has been 
preliminarily booked for the presentations of the reports towards the end of January, or early 
February  2023. You will receive more details in writing through the usual channels.  
53.42.   Finally, as you have already been informed, following suggestions I received in my 
consultations concerning the times zones, we will experiment with a new approach. We will be 
holding an information session during the morning of Friday, 9  December  2022 to present the digital 
tools used by the CTG and its subs idiary bodies , and how they can assist delegates in their work, 
which will include a Q&A  session. This will hopefully be more convenient for capital -based officials in 
the East. A temporary recording will be made available for all delegations to watch that  afternoon 
or shortly thereafter, so that capital -based officials in the other time zones can watch it at their 
convenience. This will then be followed by an additional session for questions and answers on the 
afternoon of Monday 12  December, so it  is more convenient to the time zones in the West. We are G/C/M/144  
 
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  endeavouring to make it easier for Members in all different time zones to have an opportunity to 
interact with the WTO  Secretariat and pose questions in these sessions. You will be provided with 
more detail s in writing through the usual channels.  
53.43.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
53.44.   Thank you, Chair, for this useful update. Will the informal session you mentioned being in 
late January or early February be on Interprefy?  
53.45.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
53.46.   Thank you very much for the overview, and for all of the work you are doing across many, 
many subsidiary bodies on the next steps. We really appreciated the informal and the written report 
that you provided, and we have taken really good note of the fact that you are going to send a draft 
out for comments, which ensures a transparent process. I suppose, without prejudice to what that 
report will look like, that this kind of dedicated session to follow up with the presentations from the 
Chairpersons of subsidiary bodies is great in terms of the reform work on just the functioning of 
committees. It also takes into account what Canada has coined as a delegate -focused approach to 
trying to make all of our lives easier.  In this regard, it would be really helpful for the Secretariat to 
prepare, in addition to the report that you will be sending out, a user -friendly basic table that sets 
out what practices are being followed in each committee. For example, if an annotated agenda is 
being used in that body or not; if the eAgenda is being used by that body, yes or no. This will allow 
us to compare and contrast the different practices that are being followed by the different 
committees, and we find it would really be helpful i n terms of thinking a bit more and preparing for 
that session. I will leave the best format for the Secretariat to decide.  
53.47.   Secondly, thank you for organizing so swiftly the information session on the digital tools. We 
requested that at the informal, and we  very much appreciate it, on top of everything else you are 
doing, trying to schedule meetings, dealing with Member requests like the one we have just made. 
We really hope that the outcome of that training will be that we are then able to make more efficie nt 
use of the Secretariat's time as well. One digital tool that we have found has really helped free up 
our resources is the eAgenda in the CMA, so we would be really interested if you could explore 
whether other Members have found that useful. We find tha t it is useful not only in the preparation 
of meetings, but also in being able to see which Members are tabling what STCs so we can decide if 
we want to co -sponsor, and especially in being able to upload our statement directly. We can also 
access the state ments that are uploaded by other Members. It has taken us a while to get more 
comfortable, but it is really cutting down on the bureaucracy, especially in my Capital, so we would 
be very grateful to know if other delegations also find that helpful so you c an consult on whether it 
can be adopted in this Council.  
53.48.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
53.49.   Thank you, Chair, for your report. I would like to recognize that we have already come a 
long way, and in many areas, from where we were a few years ago. I am going to refer to very small 
and very simple things, but which have really changed delegates' lives. For example, we used to 
have a different password for every eAgenda we had access to instead of being able to log on with 
only one username and p assword, you required three, plus a different one for Documents Online, 
and a different one for www.wto.org , etc. These small and basic issues help a lot with the approach 
that the United Kingdom  mentioned, in relation to how we can make delegate -centred i mprovements 
in this Organization. The scheduling of meetings and the fact that we have this room document in 
front of us today is also a result of that effort.  
53.50.   However, we still have a lot of things to move forward on. For example, each Committee 
designs t heir section in the WTO  web page differently, and the information that is available in the 
section concerning the C MA is not the same, or is not placed in the same way, as in the SPS, TBT, 
or Agriculture Committees. And learning to navigate each of those sections in the WTO  webpage, 
especially when you first arrive, can be quite complicated and intimidating.  
53.51.   Another issu e and a good practice that we used to have, and left aside probably as a result 
of the Coronavirus and other factors, is that we used to have a session for new delegates in the 
different subsidiary bodies, and also in this Council. When you are new to this  intimidating G/C/M/144  
 
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  Organization, which covers many issues, as the colleague from Guatemala said, and in a small 
delegation, learning to navigate many of the very particular matters of each Committee or each 
Council can be complicated. Let me use as an example t he thematic sessions, the role of informal 
meetings, and the triennial reviews that some Committees have. All these little details take time to 
learn, and these introductory sessions, which we used to have a couple of years ago, used to be 
very helpful for  new delegates, and why not, also for delegates who were not new but had not had 
such a session.  
53.52.   Those are issues that we would like to see in your consultations, Chair, and we wanted to 
see how we could, through small changes, incorporate this approach of  having the delegate in the 
centre, and how to make life easier for us. Generally, we see especially in the reform discussions 
that we are all looking for more participation of the Membership, that it is not always the same 
fifteen or twenty  Members who ar e active in all the Committees. However, it is very difficult to be 
active when you cover all the Committees and without these little tools to facilitate one's work. They 
are small, but they can go a long way.  
53.53.   One other improvement that I do not want to le ave out, which was Colombia's work at the 
time, is that in eRegistration we can now see who covers what topic so that we can get in touch with 
our respective colleagues, and that there are mailing lists that reach out to delegates and not just 
to the main address of the respective Permanent Mission. These are small issues, which seem 
insignificant, but which have really helped us to make a lot of progress; and we believe that we can 
continue to make progress in this direction.  
53.54.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
53.55.   First of all, Thailand would like to thank you, Chair, for your dedication and hard work, adding 
that you have been cited as an icon of a hard -working Chair. Indeed, I have heard in the informal 
discussions that the CTG was referred to as a body that has made a lot of progress in terms of 
WTO reform. I certainly share with you the good work that's out there.  
53.56.   Secondly, I would like to echo the United Kingdom in that, during this information session, 
the Chair referred to the work that the  CMA had done in terms of an eAgenda. Again, I  would  like to 
say that, as a former CMA  Chair, we don't have a monopoly on the use of eAgenda. I think our 
friends in the SPS and TBT  Committees have also used the eAgenda long before us, which I think 
helped a lot from my point of view. Speaking under my own responsibility when I was CMA  Chair 
the eAgenda makes life a lot easier. I think maybe it  is time for us to consider how we can make a 
delegate's life easier by using digital tools, which certainly helps. It increases transparency. It 
increases efficiency. I think it  is good for us to see the trade concern in front of us. We don't have 
to relay the concern to the Secretariat to have it placed on the agenda. We can explore how to 
introduce it for ourselves i n this Council. And I echo a lot of the speakers before me, in that, making 
things easier for delegates is something that we should be striving for.  
53.57.   Thirdly, I agree with Paraguay that there is a disparity among the 14  subsidiary committees 
of the CTG. Eac h do have their own way of doing things. However, I admire one  initiative that was 
very successful. There is, among three  committees, namely SPS, TBT, and CMA, a shared trade 
concerns database, meaning that you can search the trade concern that was raised in these 
three committees, and you can see what the issues are, what are the responding countries, what 
are the complaining parties, and so on. And it has been successfully used by delegates as this makes 
our lives easier. Transparency is a cornerstone of our operation, as you can see very much from this 
discussion. So I agree. And I commend your efforts, Chair, in bringing together the 14  chairs of the 
CTG subsidiary bodies, and I also encourage you to go further: make them talk among themselves 
as well. W hen I was chairing the CMA, which was operating in hybrid mode at that time because of 
the global COVID -19 pandemic, the CMA was doing something, the SPS  Committee was doing 
something different, the Trade Facilitation Committee was doing something else, an d so on. There 
was a lack of coordination and communication among other committees. Therefore, it would greatly 
help if we could share information, if we could learn from one  another, and if we could share 
experiences and learn from each committee. After a ll, the world is judging us as one holistic body. 
Not as the SPS  Committee, or as the CMA, but rather, as the WTO as a whole, and on how we 
respond to global challenges. So, Chair, I would like to praise you for your efforts, and also to make 
a suggestion to make things even better, just to make our lives as delegates easier and more 
efficient.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  53.58.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
53.59.   I have also noted the General Council Chairperson's comment with regard to the work of the 
CTG. It  is really a collective wo rk, for which I thank you all. I have also pre -warned the General 
Council Chairperson that the work we are doing at the CTG is, in a certain way, very simple, very 
basic. We are trying to improve our day -to-day way of working, which is in our own interests . This 
will of course need to be a collective effort.  
53.60.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
53.61.   Canada appreciates the opportunity at this point to provide a reaction to your report, Chair, 
and to share some thoughts from Canada for future considerat ion by the Council. I am speaking 
specifically about the functioning of the Council aspect, and not so much on the pandemic side of 
things. And this is especially for some of the delegates that have not been participating in the 
discussion that this Counci l has had, for quite a while. In fact, we started this discussion in late 2018. 
We have had at least eight  meetings over the course of those four  years that I was able to find 
references to in the minutes, greatly stimulated by the contribution of our form er colleague, Carol, 
from Hong Kong, China. For me, it has revealed a lot of interest in improving the way the Council 
and its subsidiary bodies operate. That's clear from our discussions here today, and from those from 
back in October. Reading back throug h the minutes of those meetings, I have seen, I do see, some 
hesitance, in particular around changing mandates, or altering rights and obligations, so I would just 
like to be clear that, for Canada, this has never been, nor would it be, or is, an objective  of this 
exercise.  
53.62.   As mentioned in the Council's informal meeting on 14  October, and as the United Kingdom 
mentioned just now, we continue to participate in this discussion very much with a delegate -centred 
approach in mind, and considering how we can best  improve the practical aspects of our work. That 
is, what are the different challenges faced by delegates here in Geneva and in capital? We  have 
heard a little bit of it today, in terms of planning. But especially for those from smaller delegations, 
or wit h several responsibilities in their work, how can we best facilitate their engagement in the 
regular work of the WTO? And how can we enhance the organization and conduct of work in those 
WTO bodies in order to address those challenges? So for Canada, this is about creating an 
environment that empowers delegates all through their work processes, that is, as they prepare for 
meetings, as they engage in the discussions during the meetings, and as they follow -up on the 
results of those meetings. What will help us to use our time wisely? There's been a lot of progress 
on this front, I think, including in respect to the electronic tools the Secretariat has recently put in 
place. Even the small improvements and practices can have a big impact, exactly as Paraguay j ust 
noted, and these small little things do add up to a lot, and they do create a lot of benefits for us as 
delegates here in terms of the work we do.  
53.63.   Another example is the access to the convening notices for informal meetings through the 
Documents Online  system. I don't know how many of you remember this, but these convening 
notices were usually emailed out to delegates, and if you weren't on the email list, then you didn't 
get it. And so I think it has really been a big benefit to have access through the  online system. And 
indeed, the e -Registration functionality, too, and again, I think that Paraguay also mentioned it, to 
find out who your counterparts are in another Member.  
53.64.   However, Canada does remain convinced that more can be done and that it  is a win-win for 
both delegates and Secretariat staff. I mean, we all recognize very much the support that the 
Secretariat staff provides for us, and the more that helps us, I suspect, the more that's going to 
help them too. So we really appreciate the effort, Cha ir, that you  have put in to contacting the 
subsidiary body chairs, and speaking with them, and organizing with them, in terms of the process 
that you outlined for us here. And I have to admit that I especially appreciate the reports that we 
have started to  receive from the Chairs of the 14  subsidiary bodies in response to the request you 
mentioned.  
53.65.   Maybe just a couple of comments for those who have not had a chance to read these reports. 
I do see some useful aspects, in terms of things coming out of this. It  is clear for me that not all 
committees have training sessions on the process and conduct of their work for Geneva delegates, 
and I think Paraguay mentioned that. However, in the reports it  is also clear that maybe some of us 
didn't know that we c ould have them, and so we never asked for them. And I think that's part of the G/C/M/144  
 
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  process for delegates here, that is, to be active and proactive, and to ask for information not 
individually, but as a Council or a Committee itself. Some of the committees do u se the 
e-Registration system more than others, and I think that more delegate effort is required for that 
system to become even more useful than it is  already. I know that a number of chairs remind us at 
the end of each of these meetings to please go on e -Registration and indicate which committees and 
councils you are responsible for, because then it automatically allows you to be able to receive that 
information and for other delegates to find you when they look you up.  
53.66.   The reports also show that there are  differences in terminology. It is clear that an annotated 
agenda in one  committee is not always the same as an annotated agenda in another committee. 
They look very different, at least the ones that I have seen. And many committees do not even have 
one. A nd so I think that's another area where we should have some further discussion as to what 
those things could provide for us in our work going forward.  
53.67.   Timely issuance of minutes remains a great challenge in many cases. There's quite a variety 
in terms of t he length of time between the dates of meetings and the actual issuance of minutes, as 
noted in the reports from the Chairs, and that's in large part, I would admit, due to resource 
constraints. I note that there's a report that's just come out from the Im port Licensing Committee, 
which noted that one  WTO staff member is assigned to edit the minutes of seven  different 
WTO committees. So, there is a bit of a rationale behind why it takes so long; but maybe there are 
ways that things can be improved in this r espect as well.  
53.68.   Lastly, and I think this is something that's started up in recent years, is the provision by 
Chairs and the Secretariat of advance email notices of meetings and follow -up emails to meetings 
on next steps. I think that has been a real welcom e addition to the practices in the different 
committees as to making sure delegates know what  is coming up, and making sure that delegates 
know what comes next, more than anything. In a second  instance, it  is also clear that the rules of 
procedure we follo w in this Council and its subsidiary bodies, which were agreed 25  years ago, exist 
in a context that has changed a lot in that time. It is true that in some cases those practices and 
procedures have evolved in different committees as a result of delegate -driven changes, or through 
practical changes implemented by the Secretariat, but it also appears that little has changed in other 
committees, or at least there has not been any recent reflection that I can see on changes in those 
procedures to better respon d to the needs of delegates in today's reality. So this is another important 
area for us to reflect on, at least, when we start digging into this discussion. And then finally, in the 
third instance, I think the reports that I have read so far underline the  importance of this process 
that you, Chair, are steering. This is a great opportunity for us to engage in a coherent and horizontal 
discussion of what has been done, and what can be done to enhance the organization and conduct 
of our deliberative work in order to empower delegate awareness and engagement. In Canada's 
view, we see great value in being able to have a horizontal view, comparing what the 14  subsidiary 
bodies have done over the years. And then the results, for our discussion in this Council, ca n then 
inform discussions in the subsidiary bodies. And then it will be up to the delegates in each of those 
individual committees to determine what may and may not be useful for each individual committee 
to take on, given its particular situation and role . So I just wanted to share those initial reflections. 
And I very much look forward to our discussion in January or early February, and thank you. And I 
hope that we have some good results from this discussion.  
53.69.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated t he following:  
53.70.   I wanted to react quickly on two things. One was the suggestion by Paraguay to have 
orientation sessions for new delegates. I think it is a very good idea to have these types of sessions, 
but I also think we need to approach that with a bit o f caution. These type of sessions can infringe 
on substance on a number of occasions, and I do not think that any of us would want to put the 
Secretariat in a position of making substantive judg ements  about how certain provisions read in 
certain agreements . You can imagine what a mess that would be for a number of us. Secondly, I 
really wanted to strongly urge caution in using terms like "delegate -centric" in these types of 
discussions. While some valid points were made as to improvements that can be made, we want to 
be careful not to be in a position where we are shifting the burden onto the WTO, and the Secretariat, 
and the Chairs, to say to delegates "tell me how to do my job". I mean, that, squarely, is a 
responsibility that does fall on each individual mission, and on specific delegates, so we need to be 
careful and make sure that there is a balance in these efforts.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  53.71.   The delegate of El Salvador  indicated the following:  
53.72.   El Salvador fully support s Paraguay's statement regarding information sessions for new  
delegates. Speaking as a new delegate of a very small delegation , there is a lot of work . Therefore, 
this kind of initiative greatly support s the capacity of delegates  and helps to empower them,  
particularly those from small delegations.  
53.73.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
53.74.   For our part, we are cognizant of the work that has been undertaken in the Council and its 
subsidiary bodies on MC12  implementation matters, and we especially appreciate the fact that this 
work is str uctured by regular information updates, which is important to follow this work and to 
bring necessary contributions. We are interested by the suggestion from the UK and Canada to have 
a table permitting a thematic organization of the principal points that are underlined in the Chair 
reports, especially if one has 14  such reports. A table would significantly facilitate the work in this 
area, and notably to discuss the organization of the discussion in the Council and its subsidiary 
bodies. We also share the positive view of the eAgenda and the digital tools that are being developed. 
There is certainly a discussion to have on these digital tools, but they go in the direction of reinforcing 
the efficacy of our work, and the session of 9  December is of course we lcome. Generally speaking, 
there are certainly considerations around our discussion and clearly there are subjects on which to 
advance, and I must say that, personally, I have benefit ed from a certain number of training 
activities from the Secretariat, and  that these were extremely informative. There is a discussion to 
have, in effect, on the experience that one can have as a delegate that will permit us to shed light 
on certain of the ideas  proposed. So we look forward to our session in January or February . 
53.75.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
53.76.   New Zealand also wishes to thank you, Chair, for your efforts. We look forward to further 
discussions on 9  December, and we support calls for a draft skeleton of the areas on which we can 
focus in thos e discussions. I would also fully support the comments made by previous speakers, 
particularly Canada, and also Paraguay, on having training sessions. From a small mission myself, 
and we are not that small, but we do benefit from having information from th e Secretariat, and for 
me personally, I have participated in the CMA  training session, and that was really useful as an 
overview for both old and new delegates.  
53.77.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
53.78.   China thanks you, Chair, for your great efforts to organize the bilateral consultation in 
September, and also for the informal session in October on MC12  implementation matters. And we 
also want to thank you, and also all the chairs of the subsidiary bodies, for preparing those 
two reports. And I see th at some of the committee chairs are already sharing their reports, such as 
those from the CMA, the IL  Committee, and the ITA, so we are studying these reports already. We 
just hope that the remainder of the reports will be circulated to the Members as soon  as possible, 
so that we can have more time to digest them, and so that we have more time to come up with our 
ideas based on these reports. A lot of good and useful ideas were already being shared and 
mentioned in today's meeting, so we just want to have m ore time to digest these reports, so I hope 
these reports can be circulated as soon as possible. We are very much looking forward to the informal 
discussions in January or early February.  
53.79.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
53.80.   Thank you, Chair, a nd the Secretariat, for all the work that you have done. We are also 
looking forward to the discussions on the reports of the subsidiary bodies in January or February. As 
a delegate, I believe it  is really important to make our work more efficient, I  am just sorry that life 
will be better for delegates as my term is coming to an end. Just one point with regard to what 
Canada said on follow -up email notices, namely that, just like the summary reports after certain 
meetings, such as the CMA with regard to its  informal meetings are really helpful. And I think that 
these could be replicated by some other committees. I do not mean really long reports, but brief 
notes describing what has happened, so that we can just see what the future work will be going 
forward.  So they could be replicated in other bodies, and the sooner the better.  G/C/M/144  
 
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  53.81.   The Chairperson  indica ted the following:  
53.82.   I have the beginning of perhaps two or three preliminary responses  to your questions, but 
these can wait for our discussions early in 2023. On  the question from the United States, yes, the 
meeting of end -January or early February will also be accessible via Interprefy. On the idea of a 
comparative table, yes, we are going to try, coordinating with the chairs of the subsidiary bodies, 
and the Sec retariat, to have a report structure that facilitates a comparison. On this basis, I think 
that we will be in a position to circulate a report and perhaps to compile a synthesis document or 
comparative table sufficiently in advance. We will do our best to accomplish this. I have also noted 
several references to eAgenda, which is clearly one of the questions identified during my 
consultations and during our exchanges of 14  October. And I think that this is one of the points that 
will be discussed, among othe rs, efficiently, early in 2023. Thank you for this very positive exchange 
of ideas, which encourages me to continue in this direction.  
53.83.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
53.3  Date of Next Meeting  
53.84.   The Chairperson  indicated that the Council's next form al meeting had been scheduled for 
3-4 April 2023. These dates would be confirmed in due course.  
53.85.   The meeting was closed . 
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