Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
25Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-
Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service 
Systems)
)
)
)
)IB Docket No. 21-456
REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
Comment Date:     45 Days After Publication in the Federal Register
Reply Comment Date:     75 Days After Publication in the Federal Register
Adopted:  April 20, 2023 Released:  April 21, 2023
By the Commission: Chairwoman Rosenworcel and Commissioner Starks issuing separate statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this Report and Order, we revise Commission rules governing spectrum sharing among 
a new generation of broadband satellite constellations to promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and 
spectrum efficiency through good-faith coordination.  Specifically, we adopt rules clarifying protection 
obligations between non-geostationary satellite orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS) systems 
authorized through different processing rounds by using a degraded throughput methodology, and subject 
those protections to a sunset period.  After the sunset period, new entrants authorized in later processing 
rounds will share spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-round incumbents.  We also clarify that all 
NGSO FSS operators licensed or granted market access in the United States must coordinate with each 
other in good faith, regardless of their processing round status, and we explain our expectations for 
information sharing during this good-faith coordination.  In the accompanying Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, we seek comment on which specific metrics should be used to define the protection afforded 
to an earlier-round NGSO FSS system from a later-round system, and seek specific comment on 
implementation of the degraded throughput methodology that we are adopting.  This Report and Order 
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking will continue the Commission’s efforts to promote 
development and competition in broadband NGSO satellite services made possible by the new space age.1
II. BACKGROUND
2. This proceeding continues the Commission’s recent efforts to update and refine its rules 
governing NGSO FSS systems.2  Constellations of NGSO FSS satellites traveling in low- and medium-
1 See generally Executive Order No. 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 FR 36987 (July 
9, 2021) (“The heads of all agencies shall consider using their authorities to further the policies set forth in section 1 
of this order, with particular attention to:  (i) the influence of their respective regulations, particularly any licensing 
regulations, on concentration and competition in the industries under their jurisdiction; and…”).  Executive Order at 
86 FR 36991.
2 Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non- Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, IB Docket No. 
21-456, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 36 FCC Rcd 17871 (2021); Revision of Section 25.261 of the 
Commission’s Rules to Increase Certainty in Spectrum Sharing Obligations Among Non-Geostationary Orbit Fixed-
Satellite Service Systems, Order, RM-11855, FCC 21-123 (2021) (NPRM); see also Update to Parts 2 and 25 
Concerning Non-Geostationary, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems and Related Matters, Report and Order, 32 FCC 
Rcd 7809 (2017) (NGSO FSS Report and Order), pets. for recon. pending.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
2Earth orbit may provide broadband services to industry, enterprise, and residential customers with lower 
latency and wider coverage than has previously been available via satellite.3  The number of applications 
filed in recent years for NGSO FSS system authorizations, and the number of satellites launched, are 
unprecedented.4
3.Processing Round Procedure Overview.  Applications for NGSO FSS system licenses 
and petitions for declaratory ruling seeking U.S. market access for non-U.S.-licensed NGSO FSS systems 
are considered in groups based on filing date, under a processing round procedure.  Pursuant to the 
Commission’s rules, a license application for “NGSO-like”5 satellite operation, including operation of an 
NGSO FSS system, that satisfies the acceptability for filing requirements6 is reviewed to determine 
whether it is a “competing application” or a “lead application.”7  A competing application is one filed in 
response to a public notice initiating a processing round.8  Any other application is a lead application.9  
Competing applications are placed on public notice to provide interested parties an opportunity to file 
pleadings in response to the application.10  Lead applications are also placed on public notice.11  The 
public notice for a lead application initiates a processing round, establishes a cut-off date for competing 
NGSO-like satellite system applications, and provides interested parties an opportunity to file pleadings 
in response to the application.12
4. The Commission reviews each application in the processing round and all the pleadings 
filed in response to each application.13  Based upon this review and consideration of such other matters as 
it may officially notice, the Commission will grant all the applications for which the Commission finds 
that the applicant is legally, technically, and otherwise qualified, that the proposed facilities and 
operations comply with all applicable rules, regulations, and policies, and that grant of the application will 
serve the public interest, convenience and necessity.14  The Commission will deny the other applications.15
3 See generally, e.g., Communications Marketplace Report, FCC 22-103, para. 6 (2022) (approximately 98% of all 
satellite launches in 2021 were deployed into low-Earth orbit to provide internet connectivity) (CMR).
4 See generally Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 35 FCC Rcd 4156, 4158, para. 3 (2020); see also, e.g., CMR, FCC 22-103, para. 6 (noting 
SpaceX had launched more than 3,350 of its satellites); Letter from Blake Wiles, Market Access Manager, North 
America, OneWeb, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, IBFS File No. SAT-MPL-20200526-00062 (filed Jan. 
20, 2023) (noting OneWeb had launched 544 of its satellites).
5 The term “NGSO-like satellite operation” is defined as: (1) Operation of any NGSO satellite system; and (2) 
operation of a geostationary satellite orbit, mobile-satellite service satellite to communicate with earth stations with 
non-directional antennas.  47 CFR § 25.157(a).
6 47 CFR § 25.112.
7 47 CFR §§ 25.156(d)(1), 25.157(c).  A non-U.S.-licensed NGSO-like satellite system seeking to serve the United 
States can be considered contemporaneously with other U.S. NGSO-like satellite systems pursuant to this procedure 
and considered before later-filed applications of other U.S. satellite system operators if the non-U.S.-licensed 
satellite system: (1) Is in orbit and operating; (2) has a license from another administration; or (3) has been 
submitted for coordination to the International Telecommunication Union.  47 CFR § 25.137(c).  This procedure 
does not apply to applications for authority to operate certain replacement space stations.  47 CFR § 25.157(b)(1).
8 47 CFR § 25.157(c).
9 Id.
10 47 CFR § 25.157(c)(1).
11 47 CFR § 25.157(c)(2).
12 Id.
13 47 CFR § 25.157(d).
14 47 CFR § 25.156(a).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
35.NGSO FSS System Spectrum Sharing Overview.  The Commission has adopted rules for 
spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS systems.16  NGSO FSS space station applications granted with a 
condition to abide by these sharing rules are exempt from frequency band segmentation procedures that 
otherwise apply to applications for NGSO-like satellite operation.17  Instead, NGSO FSS operators must 
coordinate with one another in good faith the use of commonly authorized frequencies.18  If two or more 
NGSO FSS satellite systems fail to complete coordination, a default spectrum-splitting procedure 
applies.19
6. Under the default spectrum-splitting procedure, whenever the percentage increase in 
system noise temperature of an earth station receiver, or a space station receiver for a satellite with on-
board processing, of either system, ΔT/T, exceeds 6% due to interference from emissions originating in 
the other system in a commonly authorized frequency band, such frequency band will be divided among 
the affected satellite networks (i.e., individual links) in accordance with the following:  (1) Each of n 
(number of) satellite networks involved must select 1/n of the assigned spectrum available in each of 
these frequency bands; (2) the affected station(s) of the respective satellite systems may operate in only 
the selected (1/n) spectrum associated with its satellite system while the ΔT/T of 6% threshold is 
exceeded; and (3) all affected station(s) may resume operations throughout the assigned frequency bands 
once the ΔT/T of 6% threshold is no longer exceeded.20  The spectrum selection order for each satellite 
network is determined by the date that the first space station in each satellite system is launched and 
capable of operating in the frequency band under consideration.21
7. In the NGSO FSS Report and Order, the Commission stated that it will “initially limit” 
sharing under the ΔT/T of 6% threshold to qualified applicants in a processing round.22  The Commission 
explained that treatment of later applicants would be case-by-case based on the situation at the time and 
considering both the need to protect existing expectations and investments and provide for additional 
entry, as well as any comments filed by incumbent operators and reasoning presented by the new 
applicant.23
8.NPRM.  The NPRM sought comment on rule changes that would clarify the relative 
obligations between NGSO FSS systems approved in different processing rounds.24  Specifically, the 
Commission proposed to limit the existing NGSO FSS spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 to 
those systems approved in the same processing round, and to require systems approved in a later 
processing round to coordinate with, or demonstrate they will protect, earlier-round systems.  The 
Commission invited comment on how to quantify inter-round protection and whether it should sunset 
(Continued from previous page)  
15 See 47 CFR § 25.157(d).
16 47 CFR § 25.261.  These sharing rules apply to NGSO FSS operation with earth stations with directional antennas 
anywhere in the world under a Commission license, or in the United States under a grant of U.S. market access.  
47 CFR § 25.261(a).
17 47 CFR § 25.157(b)(2), (e), (f), (g).
18 47 CFR § 25.261(b).
19 47 CFR § 25.261(c).
20 Id.
21 47 CFR § 25.261(c)(1); see also The Establishment of Policies and Service Rules for the Non-Geostationary 
Satellite Orbit, Fixed Satellite Service in the Ku-Band, Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 7841, 7857, para. 53 & n.77 
(2002) (“A[n NGSO FSS] system is deemed operational when at least one of its satellites reaches its intended orbit 
and initiates transmission and reception of radio signals.”).
22 NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd 7809, 7829, para. 61.
23 Id.
24 NPRM, FCC 21-123, paras. 12-26.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
4after a period of time.  The Commission also proposed to require all NGSO FSS grantees,25 regardless of 
their processing round status, to coordinate with each other in good faith and sought comment on specific 
information sharing obligations that could facilitate operator-to-operator coordination.  In response to the 
NPRM, seventeen comments, fifteen reply comments, and numerous ex partes were filed.26
III. DISCUSSION
9. After review of the record, we adopt rule changes that will promote market entry, 
regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency among a new generation of broadband NGSO satellite 
constellations.  Specifically, we adopt three proposals in the NPRM that received broad support: 1) 
limiting the default spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 to NGSO FSS systems approved in the 
same processing round, before sunsetting; 2) requiring NGSO FSS systems approved in a later processing 
round to coordinate with, or demonstrate they will protect, earlier-round systems; and 3) requiring all 
NGSO FSS grantees to coordinate with each other in good faith.  We also address three issues that 
produced a diverse record.  After reviewing the proposed options for inter-round protection, we conclude 
that an interference analysis based on a degraded throughput methodology offers the most technically 
promising path for NGSO FSS inter-round sharing and require later-round systems to use such a 
methodology when demonstrating that they will protect earlier-round systems.  On information sharing 
requirements, we clarify our expectations as to the necessary exchanges of information that will take 
place as part of the universal NGSO FSS good-faith coordination requirement we are adopting in this 
Order.  We also conclude that protection of earlier-round NGSO FSS systems must ensure a stable 
environment for continued service and investment but should not hinder later-round systems indefinitely.  
Accordingly, we adopt a sunsetting provision.  NGSO FSS systems will be entitled to protection from 
systems approved in a subsequent processing round until ten years after the first authorization or market 
access grant in that subsequent processing round.  After that date, all systems in both processing rounds 
will be treated on an equal basis with respect to spectrum sharing in the absence of a coordination 
agreement, and the default spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 will also apply between 
systems in the two rounds.  Finally, we apply the rule changes adopted in this Report and Order to all 
current NGSO FSS licensees and market access grantees as well as pending and future applicants and 
petitioners.
A. Limiting the Default Spectrum-Splitting Procedure to Systems Approved Through 
the Same Processing Round, before Sunsetting
10. In the NPRM, the Commission noted that, while it stated in the 2017 NGSO FSS Report 
and Order that it would “initially limit” the default spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 to 
qualified NGSO FSS applicants in the same processing round,27 there is no such limitation in the current 
rule text.  Nonetheless, recent NGSO FSS system licenses and grants of market access have included a 
requirement to apply the spectrum-splitting procedure only among NGSO FSS systems approved within 
the same processing round.28  To provide greater regulatory certainty, the Commission proposed to codify 
25 In this Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the term “grantee” refers to U.S.-licensed 
satellite operators granted Commission space station licenses and non-U.S. licensed satellite operators granted U.S. 
market access.
26 See Appx. E.
27 See NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd 7809, 7829, para. 61.
28 See, e.g., WorldVu Satellites Limited, Debtor-in-Possession, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Granting Access to 
the U.S. Market for the OneWeb Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Fixed-Satellite Service V-Band System, Order 
and Declaratory Ruling, 35 FCC Rcd 10150, 10160, para. 30m (2020) (OneWeb V-band Grant); Kuiper Systems, 
LLC, Application for Authority to Deploy and Operate a Ka-band Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit System, Order 
and Authorization, 35 FCC Rcd 8324, 8344, para. 59b (2020) (Kuiper Grant); ViaSat, Inc., Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling Granting Access for a Non-U.S.-Licensed Non-Geostationary Orbit Satellite Network, Order and Declaratory 
Ruling, 35 FCC Rcd 4324, 4342-43, para. 54 (2020) (Viasat Grant); The Boeing Company, Application for 
(continued….)Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
5this limitation.29  Doing so would eliminate general “case-by-case” consideration of how to treat later 
NGSO FSS applicants relative to approved systems,30 except when considering waiver requests.
11. Commenters broadly welcome the Commission’s proposal,31 which we adopt to provide 
greater regulatory stability and predictability to NGSO FSS operators as they deploy their initial 
constellations, subject to the sunsetting provision described below.  The purpose of the Commission’s 
recent NGSO FSS processing rounds has been to establish a sharing environment among authorized 
systems to provide a measure of certainty in lieu of adopting an open-ended requirement to accommodate 
all future applicants.32  NGSO FSS operators have planned, invested, and begun deploying thousands of 
satellites in their initial constellations based in part on their assessment of the specific characteristics of 
other participants in their processing round, which allows them to estimate the amount of spectrum likely 
to be available during a situation governed by the spectrum-splitting procedure.  Limiting the spectrum-
splitting procedure to systems approved within the same processing round is therefore an important 
element of regulatory stability for NGSO FSS grantees as they deploy their initial constellations, reflected 
in the licensing decisions taken under the current, case-by-case approach.  Over time, this anticipated 
NGSO FSS sharing environment will change as system authorizations granted in the same processing 
round are surrendered or not ultimately built out, new entrants are approved in later processing rounds 
and coordinate with existing systems, and operators’ own system designs are updated for later-generation 
constellations.  Therefore, while we do expect that the need for the stability and predictability offered by 
limiting the default spectrum-splitting procedure to systems approved through the same processing round 
will diminish over time and should be counterbalanced with the benefits of promoting new entry, as 
addressed through the sunsetting provision discussed below, we conclude that the establishment of an 
initial sharing environment will promote the development of NGSO FSS systems.
12. While no commenter suggests the Commission grant every new NGSO FSS application 
filed after a processing round cut-off date on an equal basis with applications filed within the processing 
round, some parties nonetheless encourage the Commission to retain discretion when considering later-
filed NGSO FSS applications.33  We always retain such discretion in the context of a rule waiver upon a 
finding of good cause, although we expect such circumstances to be rare.34  We believe the waiver 
standard is the appropriate threshold for considering whether an NGSO FSS application submitted after a 
relevant processing round cut-off date should be treated as if it had been filed within the processing round 
(Continued from previous page)  
Authority to Launch and Operate a Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit System in the Fixed-Satellite Service, Order 
and Authorization, FCC 21-115, para. 52 (2021) (Boeing V-band Grant).
29 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 13.
30 NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd 7809, 7829, para. 61 (explaining that the case-by-case approach 
would consider:  (1) “the situation at the time”; (2) “the need to protect existing expectations and investments”; (3) 
the need to “provide for additional entry”; and (4) “any comments filed by incumbent operators and reasoning 
presented by the new applicant”).
31 See, e.g., SpaceX Comments at 5; O3b Comments at 5-7; Kepler Comments at 3-4; Telesat Comments at 3-4; SN 
Space Comments at 6; SpaceLink Comments at 4-8; Hughes Comments at 3-4; Inmarsat Comments at 3.
32 NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd at 7829, para. 61.
33 See AST Comments at 2-3; see also Intelsat Comments at 3-4.
34 47 CFR § 1.3.  Waiver is appropriate only if both (1) special circumstances warrant a deviation from the general 
rule, and (2) such deviation better serves the public interest.  NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 125-128 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (citing Northeast Cellular Telephone Co., 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (1990)).  Generally, the Commission may 
waive any rule for good cause shown and, in making this determination, may take into account considerations of 
hardship, equity, or more effective implementation of overall policy on an individual basis.   WAIT Radio v. FCC, 
418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (WAIT Radio); Northeast Cellular, 897 
F.2d at 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Northeast Cellular); NetworkIP, 548 F.3d at 125-128.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
6window and therefore given equal access to spectrum, through the default spectrum-splitting procedure, 
with timely filed applications.
B. Protection of Earlier-Round Systems from Later-Round Systems
13. Another important element of regulatory stability for NGSO FSS grantees is the 
knowledge that they will be protected from harmful interference that might be caused by later-authorized 
systems.  In the NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify an inter-round protection requirement 
consistent with licensing decisions.35  The rule would require that, prior to commencing operations, an 
NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either certify that it has completed a coordination 
agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier 
processing round, or demonstrate that it will not cause harmful interference to any such system with 
which coordination has not been completed.36
14. Commenters broadly support, and none oppose, a requirement for later-round NGSO FSS 
grantees to protect earlier-round grantees, which we adopt herein.37  As explained in the NPRM, the 
protection of an NGSO FSS system from systems approved through a subsequent processing round goes 
to the heart of the stability of interference environment the Commission intended to create through use of 
the processing round procedure.38  Accordingly, to clarify the obligations of later-round grantees and to 
provide greater regulatory certainty, we codify a requirement that, prior to commencing operations,39 an 
NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either submit in the International Communications 
Filing System (ICFS) a certification that it has completed a coordination agreement with any operational 
NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round, or submit for 
Commission approval a showing that it will not cause harmful interference to any such system with which 
coordination has not been completed.40  If an earlier-round system becomes operational after a later-round 
system has commenced operations, the later-round licensee or market access recipient must submit a 
certification of coordination or a compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no later 
than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations as notified under section 25.121(b) or 
35 See Kuiper Grant, 35 FCC Rcd at 8344, para. 59a (2020); Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, Request for Orbital 
Deployment and Operating Authority for the SpaceX Gen2 NGSO Satellite System, Order and Authorization, FCC 
22-91, para. 135v (2022) (SpaceX Gen2 Order).
36 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 16.  The Commission further sought comment on how to quantify such protection, for 
example using an I/N limit or degraded throughput methodology, and whether to sunset the inter-round protection 
requirement after a period of time.
37 See, e.g., Letter from David Goldman, Sr. Director, Satellite Policy, SpaceX, Kimberly Baum, VP, Spectrum 
Engineering & Strategy, OneWeb, Suzanne Malloy, VP Legal and Regulatory Affairs, O3b, and Nickolas Spina, 
Director of Regulatory Affairs, Kepler, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, Exh. A at 1 (field Nov. 22, 2022) 
(SpaceX, OneWeb, O3b, and Kepler ex parte); Telesat Comments at 3; Viasat Comments at 11; Hughes Comments 
at 3.  As discussed below, the inter-round protection requirement is subject to a sunset provision and may be 
quantified as a result of the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
38 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 15.
39 In this context, commencing operations means that the licensee or market access grantee has successfully placed a 
space station into its approved non-geostationary orbit and begun transmission and reception in conformance with 
the terms and conditions of the space station license or grant of market access.  See 47 CFR § 25.121(b); The 
Establishment of Policies and Service Rules for the Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit, Fixed Satellite Service in the 
Ka-Band, Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 7857, para. 53 & n.77 (2002).  The operator need not have begun 
providing service to customers.
40 We believe that the public certification of coordination will provide transparency into compliance with this 
requirement, and decline to remove the certification element and re-order the rule text as proposed by one 
commenter.  See Letter from David Goldman, Sr. Director, Satellite Policy, SpaceX, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC, at 10 (filed Nov. 22, 2022).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
7otherwise.41  Notices of commencement of operations for NGSO FSS systems subject to section 25.261 
will be placed on public notice as informative to facilitate the filing of these certifications and showings.  
Compatibility showings will be placed on public notice for comment by interested parties before action 
by the Commission.42  Further, to address the possibility that a later-round system may need to 
significantly limit its operations to protect a large, planned, earlier-round system of which only one or a 
few satellites have been launched and are operating,43 we will allow later-round systems to operate on an 
unprotected, non-interference basis with respect to an earlier-round system after they have submitted a 
required compatibility showing for the earlier-round system and while it remains pending with the 
Commission.44  By requiring this technical showing before operations on a non-interference basis may 
begin, we will allow the affected earlier-round operator, and any other interested parties, to provide the 
Commission with their views on the sufficiency of the showing.  At the same time, we guard against an 
incentive for earlier-round grantees to use Commission processes to delay service by the later-round 
system by vigorously opposing all compatibility showings by grantees that have not yet completed 
coordination with them.45
C. Level of Protection for Earlier-Round Systems
15. The NPRM identified three principal methods, suggested by satellite operators, by which 
the Commission could quantify a required level of protection for earlier-round NGSO FSS systems from 
41 Under section 25.121(b), the license term for a non-geostationary orbit space station authorization begins on the 
date when the licensee notifies the Commission pursuant to section 25.173(b) that operation of an initial space 
station is compliant with the license terms and conditions and that the space station has been placed in its authorized 
orbit.  47 CFR § 25.121(b)(2), (3).  Non-U.S. licensed satellite operators granted U.S. market access are not subject 
to section 25.121(b).  However, non-U.S. licensed NGSO FSS operators have notified the Commission, and other 
NGSO FSS grantees, of their commencement of operations with respect to section 25.261(c)(1).  See, e.g., Letter 
from Brian D. Weimer, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Counsel for OneWeb, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC, IBFS File No. SAT-LOI-20160428-00041 (filed April 29, 2019); Letter from Nick G. Spina, 
Director Launch & Regulatory Affairs, Kepler, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, IBFS File No. SAT-LOI-
20160428-00041 (filed May 13, 2019).  
42 See OneWeb Comments at 13.
43 See Intelsat Comments at 5.
44 In the NPRM, the Commission proposed to require that, prior to commencing operations, an NGSO FSS licensee 
or market access recipient must either certify that it has completed a coordination agreement with any operational 
NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round, or demonstrate that it will 
not cause harmful interference to any such system with which coordination has not been completed.  NPRM, FCC 
21-123, para. 16 and Appx. A.  One commenter specifically proposes that the Commission affirmatively act on any 
compatibility showings before a grantee may commence operations in the absence of a coordination agreement.  
OneWeb Comments at 13.  Allowing later-round operations on a non-interference basis pending approval of a 
compatibility showing is consistent with most recent Commission licensing action.  See SpaceX Gen2 Order, FCC 
22-91, para. 135v.  Our approach is also simpler and more easily implemented than limiting inter-round protection 
to those earlier-round systems which have “begun deploying and [are] capable of delivering service, consistent with 
the scale envisioned by their authorizations,” a vague standard, as suggested by one commenter.  See Intelsat 
Comments at 5.  It also allows later-round operators to operate on an unprotected, non-interference basis with 
respect to the actual, in-orbit operations of an earlier-round system rather than with respect to its entire approved 
constellation after submission of a required compatibility showing.  See id.; Letter from Michael John Carlson, 
Senior Corporate Counsel, Kuiper, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 6 (filed Apr. 13, 2023) (Kuiper Apr. 13, 
2023 Ex Parte) (suggesting removal of the submission of a certification of coordination or a compatibility showing 
with respect to the earlier-round system if an earlier-round system becomes operational after a later-round system 
has commenced operations).
45 But see OneWeb Comments at 13 (arguing the Commission should affirmatively act on any compatibility 
showings before a grantee may commence operations in the absence of a coordination agreement).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
8later-round systems or otherwise ensure their compatible operations.46  First, the Commission could 
develop and adopt an interference-to-noise (I/N) limit.  The I/N limit could incorporate a standard 
reference antenna mask and standard noise temperature and specify a percentage of time during which the 
limit may be exceeded.  Applicants in a later processing round could be required to demonstrate that their 
proposed systems would comply with the I/N limit based on a probabilistic analysis.  Second, the 
Commission could adopt interference protection criteria based upon the percentage of degraded 
throughput experienced by the earlier-round NGSO FSS system.  A degraded throughput method would 
recognize that most, if not all, modern NGSO systems will use adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) 
and may be designed to meet performance objectives stated as either the packet error ratio or the spectral 
efficiency (bit/s/Hz) as a function of carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N).  Satellite systems using ACM can 
maintain a satellite connection despite signal degradation, but at lower throughput rates.  Third, the 
Commission could adopt a modified spectrum-splitting procedure for inter-round sharing.  Under this 
option, when a 6% ΔT/T threshold is passed, the earlier-round system would be entitled to use 75% of the 
commonly authorized spectrum and the later-round system 25% of the available spectrum, instead of the 
50%/50% split applicable to NGSO FSS systems approved through the same processing round.
16. Commenters are divided on their preference for an I/N limit,47 a degraded throughput 
methodology,48 or a modified band-splitting option.49  Supporters of an I/N limit argue that it is easily 
administrable, familiar to operational NGSO systems engaged in coordination, and less susceptible to 
misapplication based on subjective carrier characteristics.50  Commenters that favor a degraded 
throughput methodology note that it takes into account the design and objectives of modern NGSO 
systems, including the use of ACM.51  Proponents of a modified band-splitting option argue that it would 
encourage both parties to coordinate because both would have to reduce their spectrum use when the 
interference trigger is reached.52  Several commenters request the Commission seek further comment on 
the development of an inter-round protection criteria before it is adopted,53 and specifically argue that no 
reference values currently exist for quantifying proposed new criteria.54  
17. After review of the record in response to the NPRM, we believe that pursuing a degraded 
46 NPRM, FCC 21-123, paras. 17-21.
47 See SpaceX at 6-12; Hughes Comments at 6; Kepler Comments at 7; SN Space Comments at 7; OneWeb Reply at 
12.  SpaceX also states that a degraded throughput method “holds significant promise.”  SpaceX Comments at 15.
48 See Kuiper Comments at 5-12; Intelsat Comments at 6-9; Intelsat Reply, Exh. A; PIO Comments at 8-11; Telesat 
Comments at 6; Viasat Comments at 12; Letter from Simone La Torre, Director, Spectrum Planning and 
International Coordination, Stellar Telecommunications SAS, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC (filed Jan. 13, 
2023); Letter from Michael Calabrese, Director, Wireless Future Program, New America’s Open Technology 
Institute, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 2 (filed Apr. 5, 2023) (OTI and PK Apr. 5, 2023 Ex Parte); Letter 
from Cynthia J. Grady, Assistant General Counsel, Intelsat, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 2 (filed Apr. 
13, 2023) (Intelsat Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte); Letter from Cynthia J. Grady, Assistant General Counsel, Intelsat, to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 2 (filed Apr. 14, 2023) (Intelsat Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte).
49 See O3b Comments at 8-9; Comments of the Boeing Company at 7-8; Mangata Reply at 3; see also SN Space 
Reply at 5 n.12.
50 See generally, e.g., SpaceX Comments at 13-15.  While supporting an I/N limit, OneWeb opposes use of 
standardized system parameters.  See OneWeb Reply at 14.
51 See, e.g., Kuiper Comments at 7-9.
52 See, e.g., O3b Comments at 9.
53 See SpaceX, OneWeb, O3b, and Kepler ex parte, Exh. A at 1; Letter from Jennifer A. Manner, Senior Vice 
President, Regulatory Affairs, Hughes, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, at 2 (filed June 2, 2022); Telesat 
Reply at 12; SpaceLink Reply at 6; Inmarsat Comments at 4; see also Viasat Reply at 7 n.19.
54 See SpaceX, OneWeb, O3b, and Kepler ex parte, Exh. A at 1. Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
9throughput approach to quantify the level of protection for earlier-round systems from later-round 
systems is the most technically promising option as it would account for the realities of modern NGSO 
systems and be based on a key design consideration for such systems.  As they transit through the view of 
an earth station, NGSO satellites operate across a range of path distances, elevation angles, and antenna 
scan angles.55  Atmospheric conditions, such as rain attenuation, can also cause link degradations and 
outages, especially in higher frequency bands and modern NGSO systems use ACM, uplink and downlink 
power control, and network protocols to provide continuous data services in the face of these varying 
environmental effects.  A degraded throughput methodology would recognize that the mechanisms NGSO 
FSS systems use to tolerate signal degradation due to path-loss changes and link outages due to weather 
effects, and would also provide resilience to certain interference from other NGSO FSS systems.  Further, 
degraded throughput analyses submitted on the record demonstrate that the analysis can be performed 
using widely available satellite system operational information, such as contained in an ITU filing or 
Commission space station application, and is not unduly difficult to perform.56  With respect to the issues 
of potential synchronization loss and taking into account GSO interference and aggregate interference 
from multiple NGSO FSS constellations, these will be explored through the Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking below and can be addressed within the framework of a degraded throughput methodology.57  
Accordingly, we will require an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient that has not yet reached a 
coordination agreement with an earlier-round system to use a degraded throughput methodology in its 
demonstration that it will protect earlier-round systems.58  
18. In contrast, we are concerned that adopting an I/N limit for the protection of earlier-round 
systems, rather than as a band-splitting trigger for systems in the same processing round, may 
overprotect59 earlier-round systems by not taking into account ACM and other methods used by modern 
NGSO systems to tolerate certain amounts of interference while continuing to provide reliable service to 
consumers, and therefore weaken their incentives to complete coordination with new entrants.  In 
addition, while a 75%/25% band-splitting procedure between earlier- and later-round systems would 
provide some incentive to both parties to coordinate, this option may not ensure the continuity of earlier-
round operations with existing customer bases if the earlier-round operator were required to reduce its 
spectrum usage by 25% during an event surpassing the ΔT/T threshold with a later-round system with 
which it has not yet found an appropriate accommodation.60
19. While we adopt a requirement to use a degraded throughput methodology in 
demonstrations of compatibility with earlier-round systems because it accounts for ACM and other 
techniques used by modern NGSO systems and holds the best potential proposed on the record to protect 
earlier-round systems without unduly burdening later-round systems, we recognize that certain details of 
its implementation may benefit from further comment, such as the final percentage criteria to be used.61  
55 See, e.g., Kuiper Comments at 7-9.
56 See Intelsat Reply, Exhs. A and B; Letter from Michael John Carlson, Corporate Counsel, Kuiper Systems LLC, 
to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, Appx. A (filed Sept. 23, 2022) (Kuiper Sept. 23, 2022 Ex Parte).
57 We can also address, through selection of final percentage metrics, the fact that operators may have service quality 
commitments that vary by customer.  See O3b Comments at 12.
58 We do not adopt a percentage value at this time and seek comment on additional technical details in the FNPRM.  
See SpaceX Apr. 12, 2023 Ex Parte at 2
59 See Intelsat Reply, Exh. A; Kuiper Sept. 23, 2022 Ex Parte, Appx. B.
60 It is also unclear how the unequal spectrum-splitting procedure would apply among multiple systems and/or 
systems approved through first, second, third, or even later processing rounds.  See Intelsat Reply at 5.
61 See also SpaceX Apr. 12, 2023 Ex Parte at 2 (“[T]he record is sufficient to adopt a degraded throughput 
methodology to protect next-generation satellite systems in earlier processing rounds.  But the draft correctly looks 
to further examine the appropriate protection values and assumptions.”).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
10The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is dedicated to finalizing these issues.  However until the 
particular issues in the Further Notice are resolved, we conclude that using the degraded throughput 
methodology as a basis for inter-round protection is more promising than an I/N protection criteria or 
modified spectrum-splitting option proposed on the record for the reasons discussed above.
D. Good-Faith Coordination
20. Although the Commission has adopted default rules for spectrum sharing among NGSO 
FSS systems, it has consistently affirmed that coordination among NGSO FSS operators in the first 
instance offers the best opportunity for efficient spectrum sharing.62  Accordingly, the NPRM proposed to 
adopt a rule providing that the good-faith coordination requirement applies among all NGSO FSS 
grantees, including those approved through different processing rounds.
21. All commenters on this issue support the Commission’s proposal to require good-faith 
coordination among all NGSO FSS grantees,63 which we adopt.64  With this requirement, we make clear 
that all NGSO FSS operators approved by the Commission must engage in good faith when discussing 
and accommodating the shared use of spectrum with other NGSO FSS operators.  We will review any 
allegations that an NGSO FSS operator has not met the good-faith coordination requirement and may take 
enforcement actions, including monetary forfeitures,65 modification, or termination of the NGSO FSS 
authorization.66  We discuss expectations for information sharing in the context of good-faith coordination 
below. 
E. Information Sharing during Good-Faith Coordination
22. In addition to the overall need for good-faith coordination, the Commission has 
emphasized that information sharing among NGSO FSS operators is essential to their efficient use of 
spectrum.67  In the NPRM, the Commission invited comment on whether to require sharing of certain 
types of information, such as beam-pointing information, that may be necessary for the implementation of 
any spectrum-sharing solution or protection criteria between NGSO FSS systems.  The NPRM also 
sought comment on any practical concerns associated with such information sharing, and how best to 
address any associated, potential, competitive harms.  More broadly, the Commission inquired as to 
whether it should add a definition of “good faith” coordination in our rules and how it may better 
62 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 16; NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd at 7825, para. 48 But see SpaceX Apr. 
12, 2023 Ex Parte at 2 (stating that the Commission should generally seek comment on spectrum efficiency for 
earlier-round systems).
63 See AST Comments at 3-4; Astra Comments at 3; Boeing Comments at 17; Inmarsat Comments at 3; Intelsat 
Comments at 9; Kepler Comments at 8-9; Kuiper Comments at 22-23; Mangata Comments at 3; O3b Comments at 
3-7; OneWeb Comments at 15; PIO Comments at 4; SN Space Comments at 3; SpaceX Comments at 5; SpaceLink 
Comments at 10; Telesat Comments at 5; Hughes Comments at 4; OTI and PK Apr. 5, 2023 Ex Parte at 1; see also 
Intelsat Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 1; Intelsat Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte at 1.  We note that Intelsat states that good faith 
coordination obligations should be extended to NGSO FSS applicants as well.  Intelsat Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 6-
7; Intelsat Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte at 6-7.  Nothing in this order suggests that applicants should not also be 
coordinating in good faith.  We simply focus here on the sharing rules applicable to licensees or market access 
grantees.
64 We agree with commenters that, as drafted in the NPRM, the good-faith coordination rule in section 25.261(b) 
unnecessarily included the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Commission” and we remove this phrase from 
the final adopted rule.  See Inmarsat Comments at 3-4; OneWeb Comments at 16; O3b Reply at 4-5.  
65 See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b).
66 See also OTI and PK Apr. 5, 2023 Ex Parte at 2 (arguing that the Commission should “more explicitly state that… 
the Commission intends to review and vigorously enforce any complaints about a failure to coordinate”).
67 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 23.  Cf. OTI and PK Apr. 5, 2023 Ex Parte at 2 (stating that the Commission should 
“more explicitly state that good faith coordination inherently includes necessary and feasible information sharing”).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
11encourage efficiency among NGSO FSS systems.
23. The record produced a variety of views regarding information sharing requirements.  
Commenters generally recognize that more detailed technical discussions may assist parties in reaching 
an operator-to-operator coordination agreement, but diverge on whether the types of information to be 
shared should be agreed to by the coordinating parties,68 or whether the Commission should specify types 
of information that must be shared in all coordination discussions.69  Some commenters recommend the 
development of a third-party clearinghouse or industry-run database to facilitate sharing of NGSO FSS 
operational information.70  Commenters raise particular concern that a requirement to share real-time 
beam-pointing information may be impracticable for systems that use dynamic beam pointing and reveal 
confidential and proprietary traffic trends whose competitive harm may be difficult to address by means 
such as non-disclosure agreements.71  Some commenters argue that information sharing requirements 
should be limited to operational NGSO FSS systems,72 or make other proposals.73  
68 See, e.g., AST Reply at 3 ( “[T]he Commission should decline a blanket mandate for the exchange of highly 
sensitive and dynamic beam-pointing information at every instance, and should instead permit the parties to any 
individual coordination to determine what information should be exchanged”); Boeing Reply at 14 (“[T]he 
Commission must resist injecting itself in the coordination process by delineating the specific information that must 
be shared between the parties”); O3b Reply at 13 (“[T]he Commission can and should rely on operators engaged in 
coordination to determine what information they should exchange to facilitate an agreement”); SpaceX Reply at 13-
14 (“[T]he Commission should rely on the coordinating NGSO operators to determine which and how much 
information to share during the coordination process”); SpaceX Apr. 12, 2023 Ex Parte at 2 (“[S]pecific information 
sharing requirements are not required for extending its good-faith coordination requirement.”).
69 See Letter from Michael Carlson, Corporate Counsel, Kuiper Systems LLC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, 
FCC, at 5 (filed Dec. 14, 2022) (proposing “the Commission adopt a rule that would require the disclosure of 
satellite-selection information and gateway location information as part of operators’ obligation to coordinate with 
each other in good faith.”); Intelsat Reply at 11 (“[T]he Commission should adopt a rule requiring operators to 
provide key operational parameters in bilateral coordination: (1) satellite tracking strategy, to determine which 
satellites are active; (2) the number of satellites that can provide service at the same location; (3) the exclusion angle 
to the GSO arc; (4) the average distance between earth stations; and (5) the minimum earth station elevation 
angle.”); SN Space Reply at 6 (contending that “sharing as much information as is commercially and operational 
feasible would be in the interest of all NGSO operators.”); TechFreedom Reply at 6 (arguing the good-faith 
coordination rules should include a requirement to share all necessary information, including beam locations); 
Hughes Comments at 6-8 (proposing detailed information requirements in NGSO FSS applications); Letter from 
Michael J. Carlson, Senior Corporate Counsel, Kuiper, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1-2 (filed Apr. 12, 
2023) (Kuiper Apr. 12, 2023 Ex Parte) (reiterating Kuiper’s proposal that the Commission require the disclosure of 
satellite-selection information and gateway location information); see also Letter from Michael J. Carlson, Senior 
Corporate Counsel, Kuiper, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 2 (filed Apr. 7, 2023) (emphasizing the 
necessity of stronger incentives and clearer requirements to share information in coordination); Kuiper Apr. 12, Ex 
Parte at 2 (requesting that the Commission specify that securing greater protection should act as an incentive for 
further information sharing).
70 See SpaceX Comments at 19; Intelsat Comments at 10; PIO Comments at 7-8; Kuiper Reply at 18.  But see 
Boeing Comments at 13; Telesat Reply at 9.
71 See, e.g., Telesat Comments at 7 (“[T]he Commission should not be requiring operators to share beam-pointing 
information that is only available after the fact, when it could not be acted upon, and that includes sensitive 
information the disclosure of which would be detrimental to potential customers requiring confidentiality and would 
facilitate unfair competition.”); Viasat Reply at 12-13; O3b Reply at 13-17; Space Link Comments at 9; see also 
Mangata Reply at 1-2 (supporting the sharing of beam-pointing information between operators in a manner that 
preserves confidentiality in advance of system implementation, to facilitate operator-to-operator coordination, but 
opposing a requirement for operators to exchange dynamic beam-pointing information in real time after system 
implementation).
72 See SpaceX Comments at 18-19; OneWeb Comments at 16.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
1224. We decline to codify specific information sharing requirements as part of good-faith 
NGSO FSS coordination at this time.  As an initial matter, we are encouraged that some first-round and 
second-round NGSO FSS systems have already completed coordination agreements under the 
Commission’s existing regulatory framework, and this demonstrates that systems can effectively 
coordinate, even absent a third-party clearinghouse or other database to facilitate information sharing.74  
We expect that number will grow as systems proceed in development and deployment.  For systems 
approved in the same processing round, we believe the prospect of splitting spectrum under the default 
sharing mechanism provides significant incentive for both parties to share the necessary technical 
information to conclude an agreement that ensures beneficial and stable access to spectrum.  For systems 
approved in different processing rounds, the prospect of a later-round system operating on a non-
interference basis after submitting a compatibility showing, which can be made using publicly available 
information, also may provide an incentive to the earlier-round operator to share additional technical 
information to ensure its ongoing operations are in fact protected.  Beyond these incentives, we expect 
that certain essential NGSO operating parameters and other information that is typically publicly 
available, such as the maximum number of satellites that can provide service simultaneously at the same 
location (N co), exclusion angle to the GSO arc, minimum earth station elevation angle, and location of 
gateway earth stations,75 will not be withheld during good-faith coordination.  We also recognize that 
satellite selection information, revealing which satellites will be transmitting in a given situation, can be 
especially important to efficient spectrum sharing between larger and smaller constellations to ensure the 
smaller constellation is not unnecessarily restricted.76  When evaluating whether an NGSO FSS operator 
has acted in good faith in refusing to provide information in coordination, we will consider the relative 
benefit of the information to the other party, which may increase if the other party is already operational, 
as well as the relative competitive or other risks to providing the information.77  However, coordination 
(Continued from previous page)  
73 Kepler Comments at 8 (proposing an annual reporting requirement to disclose NGSO FSS operational 
information); OneWeb Reply at 15-16 (supporting requirements to share beam pointing and satellite selection 
information and proposing that if “operators still wish to retain the right to abstain from sharing the necessary 
technical information, the Commission should require that those operators use their own satellite diversity to avoid 
the interference events that could otherwise be mitigated if the information had been shared”).
74 See Letter from David Goldman, Senior Director, Satellite Policy, SpaceX, and Kimberly Baum, VP, Spectrum 
Engineering & Strategy, OneWeb, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, IBFS File No. SAT-MPL-20200526-
00062 (filed June 13, 2022) (announcing successful coordination between the first-round and second-round systems 
of OneWeb and SpaceX “after extensive good faith coordination discussions”); Letter from Julie Zoller, Global 
Head of Regulatory Affairs, Kuiper Systems LLC, and Torstein Losnedahl, Group Legal Counsel/Contract Manager, 
Space Norway AS, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, IBFS File No. SAT-MPL-20220311-00029 (filed Nov. 
18, 2022) (announcing successful coordination between the Space Norway first-round system and the Kuiper 
second-round system); Letter from Julie Zoller, Global Head of Regulatory Affairs, Kuiper Systems LLC, and 
Elisabeth Neasmith, Director, ITU and Regulatory, Telesat, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, IBFS File No. 
SAT-LOA-20190704-00057 (filed Sept. 21, 2022) (announcing successful coordination between Telesat’s first-
round system, including “the relevant portion of Telesat’s contemplated expansion of this system,” and the Kuiper 
second-round system).
75 While individually licensed earth station locations are publicly available on the Commission’s website, they may 
not be routinely publicly disclosed in other licensing administrations.
76 See Intelsat Reply, Exh. C; see also Intelsat Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 1-2 (contending that this clarification of the 
scenarios in which information sharing would be required will maximize the public interest benefits of the NGSO 
sector); Intelsat Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte at 1.
77 As noted above, an NGSO FSS operator found to have not lived up to its good-faith coordination obligation may 
be subject to forfeiture or modification or termination of license.  Given that we are not adopting explicit 
information sharing requirements during good-faith coordination, however, we also decline to adopt any companion 
provision that a party not sharing required information would have to protect the other party using its own satellite 
diversity, if available.  See OneWeb Reply at 15-16. Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
13discussions typically do not begin only once the two systems are operational.  With respect to sharing of 
real-time beam information, we note the practical difficulties raised in the record for advanced systems 
with dynamically repointable beams which, in addition to competitive concerns, may not be overcome by 
use of a third-party clearinghouse or industry-run database because introducing a third-party database 
between the operator that has changed its beam pointing plans in real time could only further delay the 
time until other operators receive the updated beam pointing data, adjust their own operations to reflect 
these changes, and then further de-conflict any interference issues that may arise from the other operators 
having adjusted their operations which must also be circulated via the third-party database.  However, we 
will monitor the progress of NGSO FSS systems as they proceed in coordination and deployment and 
may revisit this issue in the future if ongoing coordination difficulties among operational systems suggest 
that more information sharing requirements are required.  We note that the potential benefits for spectrum 
efficiency of dynamic beam pointing would appear to require some level of information sharing in order 
to be realized by more than one system so that other operators are not required to protect links that could 
be used, but are not used at a given time.78  When earlier round systems do not share certain non-public 
information, later round systems may have to make assumptions regarding the operations of earlier round 
systems in order to plan operations and submit a compatibility showing.
25. Beyond a general good-faith coordination requirement, and any related information 
sharing requirements, OneWeb argues the Commission should adopt a definition of “good faith” that 
mandates, inter alia, “that both parties to the coordination agree to utilize all inherent flexibility and 
capabilities in the operation of their respective systems to avoid interference between the two systems.”79  
We believe good-faith coordination places obligations on both parties to promote spectral efficiency.  
OneWeb’s proposed definition, however, could disincentivize investments in more advanced, spectrally 
efficient systems by requiring all those efficiencies to be used to accommodate systems that have been 
built with more limited sharing capabilities.80  We decline to require such a sharing outcome in all cases 
and therefore do not adopt the proposed definition.  As noted above, we intend to monitor compliance 
with the foregoing requirements and will address the need for further steps in light of our experience. 
F. Sunsetting of Inter-Round Protection Requirement
26. In conjunction with the proposal in the NPRM to require later-round NGSO FSS systems 
to protect earlier-round systems absent a coordination agreement, the Commission also inquired as to 
whether this inter-round protection requirement should sunset after a period of time, and what protection 
should apply to an NGSO FSS system after any sunsetting.81  We sought specific comment on how any 
sunset provision may affect investment in NGSO FSS systems and ongoing operations of earlier-round 
systems as well as competition and new market entry. 
27. Commenters suggest a variety of sunset periods.  Several oppose any sunsetting.82  Some 
commenters also encourage a further notice of proposed rulemaking on this issue.83  Proponents of 
78 See also Kuiper Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 7 (contending that securing greater protection by sharing additional 
operational information should act as an incentive for further information sharing).
79 See OneWeb Comments at 15; see also Intelsat Reply at 13.  But see O3b Reply at 5; SpaceX Reply at 4-5.  
Intelsat alternatively requests that operators be required “to use satellite operational strategies that minimize the 
probability of in-line events.”  Intelsat Reply at 12.
80 See, e.g., SpaceX Reply at 5 (arguing that under the proposed definition, a system’s “inherent inflexibility and 
incapability to avoid in-line events would place the entire burden for spectrum sharing on other NGSO systems that 
have invested in technologies that facilitate efficient spectrum sharing”).  Intelsat’s similar proposal raises the same 
concern and we do not adopt it for the same reason.
81 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 25.
82 See, e.g., Letter from Steve Collar, Chief Executive Officer, SES, S.A., O3b Limited, Matt Desch, Chief 
Executive Officer, Iridium Communications Inc., David Kagan, Chief Executive Officer, Globalstar, Inc., Dean A. 
Manson, Executive Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary, EchoStar Satellite Services L.L.C., Hughes 
(continued….)Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
14sunsetting argue that it would encourage innovation and new entry, promote coordination by time limiting 
the advantages of incumbency, and is consistent with the iterative and dynamic approach of NGSO FSS 
operators upgrading and modifying their own systems.84  Opponents argue that any sunsetting provision 
would jeopardize quality and continuity of service by operational earlier-round systems, incentivize 
coordination delays by later-round systems until after an earlier round system’s priority expires, and 
discourage investment by introducing regulatory uncertainty.85  
28. The proposed sunset periods are: 6 years after the application cut-off date in a processing 
round;86 6 years after grant of the earlier-round system;87 at the 6-year, 50% deployment milestone of an 
earlier-round system if the milestone is not met, otherwise at the 9-year, full deployment milestone;88 less 
than 10 years after grant of the earlier-round system;89 less than the 15-year license term of the earlier-
round system;90 at the expiration of the 15-year license term of the earlier-round system;91 10 or 12 years 
after grant of the first application in a subsequent processing round; or 15 years commencing from release 
of this Order for the current Ku-/Ka-band processing rounds, and 15 years from the first authorization or 
market access grant in a subsequent processing round for future processing rounds.92  Commenters 
propose that after the sunset period has run, both earlier- and later-round systems would share spectrum 
on an equal basis under the spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261.93  
29. After review of the record and consideration of furthering development and competition 
in NGSO FSS systems, we adopt a sunset provision of 10 years after the first grant in a subsequent 
processing round.94  As the Commission has repeatedly stated, the purpose of the recent NGSO FSS 
(Continued from previous page)  
Network Systems, LLC, Barry French, Chief Marketing & Communications Officer, Inmarsat, Michael Schwartz, 
Senior Vice President, Corporate and Business Development, Telesat Corporation, John Janka, Chief Officer, 
Global Government Affairs & Regulatory, Viasat Inc., and Massimiliano Ladovaz, Chief Technology Officer, 
WorldVu Satellites Limited, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC (filed Nov. 21, 2022) (Sunsetting Opponents Ex 
Parte); Boeing Comments at 15-16; SpaceLink Comments at 10-11; Letter from Kimberly M. Baum, Vice 
President, Spectrum Engineering and Strategy, OneWeb, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 (filed Apr. 7, 
2023) (OneWeb Apr. 7, 2023 Ex Parte); Letter from Kimberly M. Baum, Vice President, Spectrum Engineering and 
Strategy, OneWeb, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 (filed Apr. 12, 2023) (OneWeb Apr. 12, 2023 Ex 
Parte); Letter from Kimberly M. Baum, Vice President, Spectrum Engineering and Strategy, OneWeb, to Marlene 
H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 (filed Apr. 13, 2023) (OneWeb Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte); Letter from Kimberly M. 
Baum, Vice President, Spectrum Engineering and Strategy, OneWeb, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 
(filed Apr. 14, 2023) (OneWeb Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte); Letter from Suzanne Malloy, Vice President, Legal and 
Regulatory Affairs, O3b, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC at 1 (filed Apr. 13, 2023) (SES  & O3b Apr. 13, 
2023 Ex Parte).
83 See Letter from David Goldman, Sr. Director, Satellite Policy, SpaceX, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, at 
2 (filed Nov. 22, 2022); Intelsat Comments at 11.
84 See, e.g., Kuiper Comments at 15-18; SpaceX Comments at 15-18.
85 See Sunsetting Opponents Ex Parte.
86 Intelsat Reply at 15.
87 Kuiper Comments at 16; PIO Comments at 11; AST Comments at 6; see also OTI and PK Apr. 5, 2023 Ex Parte 
at 3 (proposing a sunset of six or at most eight years).
88 SN Space Comments at 8.
89 TechFreedom Reply at 7.
90 Astra Comments at 3.
91 Kepler Comments at 9.
92 OneWeb Apr. 7, 2023 Ex Parte at 2; OneWeb Apr. 12, 2023 Ex Parte at 2; OneWeb Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 1-2; 
OneWeb Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Partie at 1-2; SES & O3b Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 2.
93 See SpaceX Comments at 16; Intelsat Reply at 15.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
15processing rounds has been to establish a stable sharing environment among authorized systems.95  But 
earlier-round advantages should not continue indefinitely.  
30. We believe that the protection afforded to an earlier-round system by a later-round 
system should work in concert with our deployment milestones for NGSO systems to relieve earlier-
round grantees of the uncertainty of near-term, equal sharing with new entrants while also giving later-
round systems an equal opportunity after they have demonstrated their commitment to provide service 
and completed their final deployment milestone.  To accomplish these goals, the sunset date should be 
tied to the date of authorization of systems in a subsequent processing round,96 and define the period 
during which they will be required to protect any earlier-round systems.  With each new processing 
round, therefore, incumbents will be ensured of a period of time during which they will be protected by 
systems approved in that processing round, and may plan to accommodate those systems as they proceed 
through deployment, before the time that they will be required to share spectrum on an equal basis in the 
absence of a coordination agreement.  Fixing a sunset date dependent on the authorization date of the 
earlier-round system could mean that after the sunset date, any approved later-round system would 
automatically be afforded equal spectrum sharing with existing, earlier-round systems, without the same 
lead time that would enable earlier-round systems to assess their likely sharing requirements with the 
systems that will actually proceed to deployment, and adjust accordingly.  In addition, fixing a single date 
to sunset the protection between systems in two processing rounds simplifies the sharing expectations for 
all operators in both rounds.  By fixing the sunset date at 10 years after the first grant in a subsequent 
processing round, many later-round systems will be near, or have already passed, their 9-year full 
deployment milestone depending on their grant date.  Thus, later-round systems will be afforded equal 
spectrum sharing opportunities under the spectrum-splitting procedure once their full service 
constellations are operational, while earlier-round systems will have had time to adjust to the 
constellations ultimately deployed by later-round grantees.97  We believe this period appropriately 
(Continued from previous page)  
94 SpaceX Reply at 12; Kuiper Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 2 (“The Draft Order’s sunset period of 10 years reflects a 
reasonable compromise.”).  See also O3b Comments at 20 (“At a minimum, any sunset rule should be tied to the 
licensing date of the later-filed system, not the earlier-round system.  That way, a new entrant would at least have to 
build out its proposed fleet before gaining equal sharing rights with established, operational systems.”); Kepler 
Reply at 9 (agreeing that a sunset provision tied to the licensing date of later-round systems would enable new 
systems to reach maturity before they are treated on equal footing with earlier licensed systems.).  Despite Kuiper’s 
support of a ten year sunset period, Kuiper also suggests that we inquire about shortening the sunset period in the 
FNPRM.  See Kuiper Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 8.  Relatedly, Intelsat proposes that we state our intent to adopt a 
sunset period but defer determination of the length of the sunset period and the sunset trigger in the FNPRM, 
arguing that the sunset creates no incentive for rapid deployment of NGSO FSS systems, relies on multiple 
contingencies, and that tying the sunset trigger to the earlier processing round encourages earlier- and later-round 
grantees to rapidly deploy their systems.  See Intelsat Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 2-6; Intelsat Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte 
at 2-6.  
95 See NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd 7809, 7829, para. 61; NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 15.
96 This authorization can include partial grant or modification, provided the NGSO FSS operations will be 
considered part of the later processing round.  See Intelsat Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte, Exh. C (asking how should the 
sunset interact with partial grants, or if it matters whether the application is a modification); Intelsat Apr. 14, 2023 
Ex Parte, Exh. C.
97 While the sunset may occur before some later-round systems have reached the full deployment milestone at nine 
years, contrary to OneWeb’s argument, this would not “effectively eliminate” advantages for first-round operators, 
since the speed of deployment of the later-round systems would not affect the overall time that the incumbents will 
be protected by systems approved in the later processing round.  See, e.g., OneWeb Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte at 1-2.  
Moreover, later round systems will also be subject to the six-year deployment milestone, requiring that the operator 
launch and operate fifty percent of the maximum number of authorized space stations within six years after grant.  
47 CFR § 25.164(b)(1).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
16balances the need for stability for incumbent operations and the possibility for new entrants to compete on 
an equal footing once they have built out their systems.
31. The length of this sunset period also addresses several concerns on the record.  First, we 
do not expect the sunset period to introduce significant coordination delays because the period is long 
enough that a later-round grantee would not wish to operate for years, including at near its full 
constellation size, without an agreement with earlier-round grantees.  Second, the iterative nature of 
NGSO FSS systems, and relatively shorter lifetime of NGSO satellites when compared to GSO 
satellites,98 undermines arguments that sunsetting would jeopardize existing services.  Rather than 
maintaining a fixed system design, our experience has been that NGSO FSS operators have proposed to 
modify and expand their NGSO FSS systems.99  As earlier-round grantees propose to expand and update 
their constellations, including through participation in subsequent processing rounds, any burden imposed 
by sunsetting their inter-round protection rights should be offset by benefits to the later-generations of 
their systems.  Sunsetting also will not upset existing expectations of interference protection because, 
under Commission policy in effect prior to this Order, later-round applicants were considered on a case-
by-case basis as to whether they will be entitled to share spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-round 
systems – as such there was never a guarantee that earlier-round grantees would be entitled to protection 
from all later-round systems.100  Nor do we believe that sunsetting will discourage overall investment in 
NGSO FSS systems or hamper efforts to promote broadband in underserved areas – on the contrary, we 
expect that increased competition facilitated by sunsetting inter-round protections will spur investment 
and development of new systems while providing appropriate returns for earlier-round systems initial 
constellations.101  Finally, the iterative development of NGSO FSS systems and evolving spectrum 
sharing requirements counsels in particular in favor of a sunsetting provision in this instance, as compared 
to other instances where the Commission has preferred to maintain incumbent protections indefinitely.  
As noted, many earlier-round grantees have proposed updated, second-generation systems filed in a later 
processing round that will enhance the services these grantees intend to provide.  Therefore, incumbents 
themselves will benefit from sunsetting for their second-generation systems.  The nature of NGSO FSS 
systems, which must be designed to endure changing environmental effects, also renders them more 
capable of sharing spectrum than other system designs.  After sunsetting, incumbents will be subject to 
co-equal spectrum sharing with the new entrants;102 but they will have had a significant period of time 
during which to reach a coordination agreement through good faith discussions that improves both 
operators’ spectrum usage possibilities.  Given the dynamic nature of NGSO FSS systems and the 
benefits of competition and new entry, we conclude that a 10-year sunset period beginning on the date of 
the first grant in a subsequent processing round appropriately balances the interests involved. 
98 For example, SpaceX satellites have a service life of 5-7 years.  Space Exploration Holdings, LLC Request for 
Modification of the Authorization for the SpaceX NGSO Satellite System, Order and Authorization and Order on 
Reconsideration, 36 FCC Rcd 7995, para. 63 (2021).
99 See, e.g., O3b Limited, Application to Modify U.S. Market Access Grant for the O3b Ka-band Satellite System, 
IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20200526-00058 (filed May 26, 2020); WorldVu Satellites Limited, Modification to 
OneWeb Market Access Grant for the OneWeb Ku- and Ka- Band System, IBFS File No. SAT-MPL-20200526-
00062 (filed May 26, 2020); Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, Application for the SpaceX Gen2 NGSO Satellite 
System, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA- 20200526-00055 (filed May 26, 2020); Telesat Canada, Application to Modify 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Grant Access to the U.S. Market for Telesat’s NGSO Constellation, IBFS File No. 
SAT-MPL-20200526-00053 (filed May 26, 2020); Viasat, Inc., Application for Modification of Viasat NGSO 
System, IBFS File No. SAT-MPL- 20200526-00056 (filed May 26, 2020).
100 See also Kuiper Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 3.
101 See also id.
102 See infra FNPRM.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
17G. Application of Rule Changes
32. The NPRM invited comment on whether to apply all, or some, of the rule changes 
adopted in this proceeding to existing grantees and pending applicants or only to new license applications, 
license modification applications, application amendments, and market access petitions filed after the new 
rules go into effect.103  
33. Most commenters on this issue support the general applicability of rule changes in this 
proceeding to existing grantees and applicants as well as future applicants.104  Some argue that applying 
certain rule changes to already approved systems would be onerous, as it may require reconsideration of 
the design and operation of the systems.105  
34. We will apply all rule changes adopted in this Report and Order to current NGSO FSS 
licensees and market access grantees, pending applicants and petitioners, as well as future applicants and 
petitioners.106  With respect to pending applications, applicants do not gain any vested right merely by 
filing an application, and the simple act of filing an application is not considered a “transaction already 
completed” for purposes of this analysis.107  Applying our new rules and procedures to pending space 
station applications will not impair the rights any applicant had at the time it filed its application.  Nor 
will doing so increase an applicant’s liability for past conduct.  Similarly, with respect to current NGSO 
FSS licensees and market access grantees, none of the actions we take here (that is, limiting the default 
spectrum-splitting procedure to NGSO FSS systems approved in the same processing round (subject to a 
sunset), requiring later-round systems to coordinate with or protect earlier-round systems, and requiring 
103 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 26.
104 See Boeing Comments at 18; Kuiper Comments at 24; Hughes Comments at 10; SpaceLink Comments at 11; 
SpaceX Comments at 20; Intelsat Reply at 19-20; TechFreedom Reply at 8.
105 See Kepler Comments at 11 (arguing that “any new NGSO FSS sharing regimes or establishment of specific 
protection criteria” should apply only to systems which have yet to be granted licenses); see also AST Comments at 
6 (arguing that pending NGSO FSS applications should continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis); O3b 
Comments at 21-22 (contending that any sunset provision or requirement to share beam-pointing information should 
not be applied to existing grantees).
106 An agency order is impermissible as “primarily retroactive” if it “alters the past legal consequences of past 
actions.”  Mobile Relay Assocs. v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 219 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).  An order can be primarily 
retroactive if it (1) “increase[s] a party’s liability for past conduct”; (2) “impair[s] rights a party possessed when he 
acted”; or (3) “impose[s] new duties with respect to transactions already completed.”  Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).  An agency order that “alters the future effect, not the past legal consequences” of 
an action or that ‘‘upsets expectations based on prior law’’ is not primarily retroactive.  Mobile Relay Assocs., 457 
F.3d at 11 (citations and quotations omitted).  Rather, such an order is considered secondarily retroactive and will be 
upheld if “reasonable, i.e., if it is not arbitrary or capricious,” both “in substance and in being made retroactive.”  Id.; 
U.S. Airwaves, Inc. v. FCC, 232 F.3d 227, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
107 Chadmoore Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 113 F.3d 235, 240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“In this case the 
Commission’s action did not increase [the applicant’s] liability for past conduct or impose new duties with respect to 
completed transactions.  Nor could it have impaired a right possessed by [the applicant] because none vested on the 
filing of its application.”); Hispanic Info. & Telecomms. Network v. FCC, 865 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (D.C.Cir.1989) 
(“The filing of an application creates no vested right to a hearing; if the substantive standards change so that the 
applicant is no longer qualified, the application may be dismissed.”); Schraier v. Hickel, 419 F.2d 663, 667 
(D.C.Cir.1969) (filing of application that has not been accepted does not create a legal interest that restricts 
discretion vested in agency); see also United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1952) (pending 
application for new station dismissed due to rule change limiting the number of licenses that could be held by one 
owner); Bachow Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 237 F.3d 683, 686-88 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding freeze on new 
applications and dismissal of pending applications in light of adoption of new licensing scheme); PLMRS 
Narrowband Corp. v. FCC, 182 F. 3d 995, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applicant did not, by virtue of filing 
application, obtain the right to have it considered under the rules then applicable).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
18all NGSO FSS grantees to coordinate with each other in good faith), increase liability for past conduct, 
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, or impose new duties with respect to transactions 
already completed.  Rather, all of these actions take effect in the future, after the rules become effective.   
While some commenters claim that some of the rule changes here, such as the sunsetting of interference 
protections, upset their expectations,108 NGSO FSS grants have been conditioned upon the outcome of 
future rulemakings and thus licensees and grantees have been on notice that the regulatory environment in 
which they are operate was subject to change.109  Moreover, even under the rules in effect prior to this 
Order, first round systems were not guaranteed protection from later round systems; rather, this issue was 
to be considered on a “case-by-case” basis.110  Accordingly, applying these rule changes to existing 
licenses and grants of market access will not upset any grantee’s reasonable expectations.  Further, we 
have crafted the sunset provision to provide incumbent NGSO FSS grantees sufficient time to evaluate 
and adapt to the eventual, equal sharing environment with systems ultimately deployed in each 
subsequent processing round.  Not applying the sunset provision to existing grantees, while applying the 
other rule changes to them, would substantially frustrate the purpose of sunsetting by locking in 
incumbent protections that are not assured under the current, case-by-case regime.  Sunsetting the inter-
round protection requirement, and allowing later-round systems an opportunity to share spectrum on an 
equal basis with earlier-round systems after the sunset period, removes a barrier to entry and therefore 
promotes competition and will favor technological innovation among earlier-round systems that facilitates 
their sharing with new entrants.  Whereas exempting first-round systems from sunsetting, which includes 
some large constellations, would destroy these benefits for all new entrants in second and later processing 
rounds for as long as the first-round systems remain active. 
H. Digital Equity and Inclusion
35. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to advance digital equity for all,111 
including people of color, persons with disabilities, persons who live in rural or Tribal areas, and others 
who are or have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty 
or inequality, invited comment on any equity-related considerations112 and benefits (if any) that may be 
associated with the proposals and issues discussed in the NPRM.113
108 See Kepler Comments at 11; AST Comments at 6; O3b Comments at 21-22; see also generally Sunsetting 
Opponents Ex Parte.
109 See, e.g., OneWeb V-band Grant, 35 FCC Rcd 10150, 10161, para. 31; Kuiper Grant, 35 FCC Rcd 8324, para. 
65; Viasat Grant, 35 FCC Rcd 4324, 4342, para. 52e; Boeing V-band Grant, FCC 21-115, para. 50c.  
110 See NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd 7809, 7829, para. 61.
111 Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended provides that the FCC “regulat[es] interstate and 
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make [such service] available, so far as possible, to 
all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or 
sex.”  47 U.S.C. § 151.
112 The term “equity” is used here consistent with Executive Order 13985 as the consistent and systematic fair, just, 
and impartial treatment of all individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved communities that have 
been denied such treatment, such as Black, Latino, and Indigenous and Native American persons, Asian Americans 
and Pacific Islanders and other persons of color; members of religious minorities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) persons; persons with disabilities; persons who live in rural areas; and persons 
otherwise adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality.  See Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009, 
Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal 
Government (January 20, 2021).
113 NPRM, FCC 21-123, para. 27.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
1936. Commenters support the Commission’s ongoing efforts to bridge the digital divide and 
highlight the role of satellite services in providing broadband access to underserved communities.114  They 
support technology inclusive policies that ensure regulatory certainty and spectrum access for satellite 
operators.115  We believe that the rule amendments in this Report and Order will encourage a more stable 
and competitive environment for the development of NGSO FSS systems well suited to reaching 
underserved areas with new broadband capacity, and therefore that this rulemaking will enhance digital 
equity and inclusion.
I. Other Issues Raised in Comments
37. Some commenters also suggest the Commission pursue broader rule changes regarding 
NGSO FSS systems to tackle a variety of issues, including addressing orbital debris concerns,116 verifying 
NGSO compliance with equivalent power-flux density limits for the protection of GSO networks,117 
revisiting the spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261,118 updated in 2017,119 or the NGSO 
milestone requirements,120 revised in 2015 and 2017,121 or taking up other suggestions not treated in the 
NPRM.122  Other commenters caution against expanding the scope of the current proceeding.123  Given the 
complexity and diversity of issues raised and their differing procedural statuses, some reiterating 
arguments in petitions for reconsideration or petitions for rulemaking,124 we decline to create an 
“omnibus” NGSO rulemaking at this time and instead move immediately in the Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking below to propose to finalize the remaining key issue raised in the NPRM.
IV. FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
38. In the Report and Order above, we adopt a requirement that, prior to commencing 
operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either certify that it has completed a 
coordination agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access 
in an earlier processing round, or submit a showing for Commission approval that it will not cause 
harmful interference to any such system with which coordination has not been completed using a 
degraded throughput methodology.  In this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we propose to 
114 See SIA Reply; AST Comments at 6-7; Hughes Comments at 11; SN Space Comments at 9-10; Kuiper 
Comments at 25-27; PIO Comments at 12-13; Boeing Comments at 18-20.
115 SIA Reply at 3.
116 See Viasat Comments at 5-6.
117 See Viasat Comments at 6-7; Hughes Comments at 8-10; OneWeb Reply at 28; O3b Reply at 29.
118 See Viasat Comments at 5-6, 9-11; OneWeb Comments at 9-10, 11; Intelsat Comments at 7; SN Space 
Comments at 6-7; Kuiper Comments at 14-15; SpaceX Comments at 10-12; AST Reply at 2-3.
119 NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd at 7823-29, paras. 45-61.
120 See Intelsat Comments at 12-13.
121 NGSO FSS Report and Order, 32 FCC Rcd at 7830-31, paras. 66-67; Comprehensive Review of Licensing and 
Operating Rules for Satellite Services, Second Report and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 14713, 14738 para. 59 (2015).
122 See Viasat Comments at 5-6; OneWeb Comments at 5-6; Intelsat Comments at 11-12.
123 See SpaceX Reply at 18 (arguing the Commission should “reject the invitation to introduce extraneous issues into 
this proceeding”); O3b Reply at 29-30 (“ [T]he primary result of any such [rulemaking] consolidation would be to 
unnecessarily slow down Commission action on the time-critical matters at issue here.”).
124 See generally Viasat Petition for Reconsideration, IB Docket 16-408 (filed Jan. 17, 2018); OneWeb Petition for 
Reconsideration, IB Docket 16-408 (filed Jan. 17, 2018); Kuiper Systems LLC, Petition for Rulemaking, RM-11861 
(filed July 9, 2020); SpaceX Petition for Rulemaking, Revision of Section 25.261 of the Commission’s Rules to 
Increase Certainty in Spectrum Sharing Obligations Among Non-Geostationary Orbit Fixed-Satellite Service 
Systems, RM-11855, (filed Apr. 30, 2020).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
20finalize the details of the degraded throughput methodology and invite specific comment on the 
appropriate values and assumptions to be used in this requirement and whether we should adopt a rule 
limiting aggregate interference from later-round NGSO FSS systems into earlier-round systems.
39. We expect that  the degraded throughput analysis should consist of three steps.125  The 
first step is to establish a baseline of performance.  To do this, an operator models the earlier-round 
NGSO system’s performance without any additional interference by computing the earlier-round NGSO 
system’s probabilistic C/N level using its published system parameters and a rain-attenuation model.126  
This provides the baseline in terms of: (1) the earlier-round system’s time-weighted average throughput 
(derived by computing the spectral efficiency from the C/N results), and (2) the earlier-round system’s 
link unavailability time percentage (i.e., the percentage of time when the earlier-round system’s expected 
C/N will fall below its minimum usable level).  The second step is to repeat the analysis above, adding in 
the effect of the later-round system’s interference into the earlier-round system.  This produces a second 
measurement of time-weighted average throughput and link unavailability time-percentage.  The third 
step is to compare these two sets of figures to measure the effect of any additional interference.  If the 
resulting performance impact exceeds the permissible limits, then the later-round system must adjust its 
operations to mitigate interference to a permissible level.  We seek comment on this process.
40. Specifically, noting that 3% has been suggested as an appropriate value for several 
aspects of the degraded throughput analysis,127 we invite comment on the appropriate values for these 
limits, including their technical justification.  What is the appropriate baseline to consider for the earlier-
round system, and should it include existing sources of interference, such as interference from GSO 
networks or intra-system interference?128  Should a degraded throughput methodology compare an 
incumbent’s baseline level of performance given only natural degradation to that same incumbent’s 
expected performance given a single new entrant’s operations?  Should we use standardized antenna 
patterns and noise temperatures for the computation of C/(I+N) in a degraded throughput method?  A 
degraded throughput methodology would rely on detailed technical data about the relevant NGSO FSS 
systems.  How many locations should be evaluated in the methodology, and should the locations include 
sites outside the United States?  How should rain fade conditions in different locations be incorporated 
into the degraded throughput analysis?  What other technical data is needed to appropriately evaluate 
degraded throughput effects, and how can the Commission ensure that any degraded throughput analysis 
appropriately protects the specific characteristics of an NGSO system’s operations?129  What role should 
Schedule S information play in the analysis? 130  Are additional means needed to protect earlier-round 
systems against loss of synchronization due to potentially high levels of short term interference?  Should 
the earlier-round operator be able to specify two C/N objectives – one relative to the C/N level below 
which the victim modem would lose lock and another relative to the C/N level below which the victim 
125 See Kuiper Comments at 6-7.
126 Commenters in this proceeding have produced such technical analyses using a degraded throughput methodology 
based on widely available information, see Intelsat Reply, Exhs. A and B and Kuiper Sept. 23, 2022 Ex Parte, Annex 
A, contrary to concerns that this analysis requires information unavailable to satellite operators.  Letter from 
Suzanne Malloy, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, O3b Limited, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, Appx. at 
2 (filed Nov. 17, 2022).
127 See Kuiper Comments at 5-6; Kuiper Reply at 4; Kuiper Sept. 23, 2022 Ex Parte at 3-4; Kuiper Feb. 17, 2023 Ex 
Parte at 6-10; OTI and PK Apr. 5, 2023 Ex Parte at 2 (seeking a degraded throughput threshold of no less than 3%).
128 See Intelsat Reply at 9, Exh. B (providing study results showing that “for the hypothetical NGSO systems 
considered and a notional throughput degradation criterion of 3%, only a 3° avoidance angle is needed when GSO 
interference is considered.  By contrast, if GSO interference is not considered, the necessary avoidance angle would 
be 18°.”).
129 See SES & O3b Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 2.
130 See also id.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
21link would become unavailable because it is not able to offer the minimum wanted throughput?  What 
mitigation techniques would be appropriate if degraded throughput thresholds were not otherwise 
satisfied?  
41. We also note concerns on the record about aggregate interference from multiple NGSO 
systems.131  What is a permissible aggregate interference level for protecting priority NGSO systems in a 
frequency band, as part of an earlier processing round?  Should we expect that there will be a maximum 
number of NGSO FSS systems that can be accommodated in a given frequency band and if so, how 
should that affect any inter-round protection criteria and the opening of additional processing rounds?  
How does this methodology accommodate multiple NGSO systems that span multiple processing rounds?  
42. Additionally, we seek comment on what criteria should be applied among NGSO systems 
after the sunset period?  We recognize that our default spectrum splitting process is intended to encourage 
negotiation between systems in the same processing round.  Should that also be the default procedure 
applicable between systems after the sunsetting of interference protection in order to facilitate 
coordination, or is there an alternative better suited to systems that may be at different stages of 
deployment?  We seek comment on the fit of the default spectrum splitting process to the post-sunset 
environment.  What does co-equal mean when there are established operators on a co-equal basis with 
newer entrants?132
43.Digital Equity and Inclusion.  Finally, the Commission, as part of its continuing effort to 
advance digital equity for all,133 including people of color, persons with disabilities, persons who live in 
rural or Tribal areas, and others who are or have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely 
affected by persistent poverty or inequality, invites comment on any equity-related considerations134 and 
benefits (if any) that may be associated with the proposals and issues discussed herein.  Specifically, we 
seek comment on how our proposals may promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity, inclusion, and 
accessibility, as well the scope of the Commission’s relevant legal authority
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Ex Parte Rules - Permit-But-Disclose
44. The proceeding this Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding 
in accordance with the Commission’s ex parte rules.135  Persons making ex parte presentations must file a 
copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business 
days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies).  Persons 
131 See SpaceX, OneWeb, O3b, and Kepler ex parte at 3; Letter from David Goldman, Sr. Director, Satellite Policy, 
SpaceX, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, Appx. A (filed Nov. 22, 2022);
132 See OneWeb Apr. 13, 2023 Ex Parte at 4; OneWeb Apr. 14, 2023 Ex Parte at 4-5; see also OneWeb Apr. 7, 2023 
Ex Parte at 4; OneWeb Apr. 12, 2023 Ex Parte at 4.
133 Section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended provides that the FCC “regulat[es] interstate and 
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make [such service] available, so far as possible, to 
all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or 
sex.”  47 U.S.C. § 151.
134 The term “equity” is used here consistent with Executive Order 13985 as the consistent and systematic fair, just, 
and impartial treatment of all individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved communities that have 
been denied such treatment, such as Black, Latino, and Indigenous and Native American persons, Asian Americans 
and Pacific Islanders and other persons of color; members of religious minorities; lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) persons; persons with disabilities; persons who live in rural areas; and persons 
otherwise adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality.  See Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009, 
Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal 
Government (January 20, 2021).
135 47 CFR § 1.1200 et seq.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
22making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) 
list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was 
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation.  If the 
presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the 
presenter’s written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide 
citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying 
the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of 
summarizing them in the memorandum.  Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte 
meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with section 
1.1206(b).  In proceedings governed by section 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a 
method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte 
presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system 
available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable 
.pdf).  Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
B. Filing Requirements—Comments and Replies
45.Filing Comments.  Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission’s rules, 47 
CFR §§ 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates 
indicated on the first page of this document.  Comments may be filed using the Commission’s Electronic 
Comment Filing System (ECFS).  See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 
24121 (1998). 
•Electronic Filers.  Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the 
ECFS: http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs.
•Paper Filers.  Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each 
filing.
oFilings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight 
U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission’s 
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
oCommercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and Priority 
Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.U.S. 
Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must be addressed to 45 L Street 
NE Washington, DC  20554.
oEffective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the Commission no longer accepts 
any hand or messenger delivered filings. This is a temporary measure taken to help 
protect the health and safety of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of 
COVID-19.  See FCC Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and 
Change in Hand-Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020).  
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-
hand-delivery-policy. 
•Persons with Disabilities.  To request materials in accessible formats for people with 
disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to 
fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 
(voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
46.Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.  The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 
(RFA),136 requires that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and comment 
136 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612. The RFA has been amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
23rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that “the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”137  Accordingly, we have prepared a Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible impact of the rule changes contained in 
this Report and Order on small entities.  The FRFA is set forth in Appendix B.
47. We have also prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning the 
potential impact of the rule and policy changes contained in the Further Notice.  The IRFA is set forth in 
Appendix C.  Written public comments are requested on the IRFA.  Comments must be filed by the 
deadlines for comments on the Further Notice indicated on the first page of this document and must have 
a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to the IRFA.
D. Paperwork Reduction Act
48. The Report and Order contains modified information collection requirements subject to 
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13.  It will be submitted to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the PRA.  OMB, other Federal 
agencies, and the general public are invited to comment on the modified information collection 
requirements contained in this document.
49. In this document, we have assessed the effects of requiring later-round NGSO FSS 
grantees to submit compatibility showings with respect to earlier-round grantees with whom coordination 
has not yet been reached.  We find that doing so will serve the public interest and is unlikely to directly 
affect businesses with fewer than 25 employees.
50. In addition, the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking contains proposed modified 
information collection requirements.  The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce 
paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of Management and Budget to comment on 
the information collection requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13.  In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief 
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might 
further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 
employees.
E. Congressional Review Act
51.  The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget concurs, that this rule is “non-major” under the 
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2).  The Commission will send a copy of this Report and 
Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, 
see 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES
52. IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 7(a), 10, 303, 308(b), and 316 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 157(a), 160, 303, 308(b), 316, that this 
Report and Order IS ADOPTED, the policies, rules, and requirements discussed herein ARE ADOPTED, 
Part 25 of the Commission’s rules IS AMENDED as set forth in Appendix A, and this Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking IS ADOPTED.
53. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Report and Order SHALL BE effective 30 days 
after publication in the Federal Register, except Section 25.261(d) which contains new or modified 
information collection requirements and will be submitted for approval by the Office of Management and 
Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act and shall become effective after the Commission publishes a 
notice in the Federal Register announcing such approval and the relevant effective date.
137 5 U.S.C. § 605(b).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
2454. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission’s Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center will send a copy of this Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, in accordance with Section 603(a) of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
55. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission SHALL SEND a copy of this  Report 
and Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
SecretaryFederal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
25APPENDIX A
Final Rules
The Federal Communications Commission proposes to amend title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
part 25, as follows:
PART 25 – SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319, 332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.
2. Amend § 25.151 by revising paragraphs (a)(10)-(12) and adding paragraph (a)(13).
§ 25.151 Public notice.
(a) * * *
(10) The receipt of space station application information filed pursuant to § 25.110(b)(3)(iii);
(11) The receipt of notifications of non-routine transmission filed pursuant to § 25.140(d); 
(12) The receipt of EPFD input data files from an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient, 
submitted pursuant to § 25.111(b) or § 25.146(c)(2); and
(13) The receipt of NGSO FSS compatibility showings filed pursuant to § 25.261(d).
* * * * *
3. Amend § 25.261 by revising paragraph (b), revising the first sentence in paragraph (c)(1), 
and adding paragraphs (d) and (e) to read as follows:
§25.261  Sharing among NGSO FSS space stations.
* * * * *
(b) Coordination. NGSO FSS licensees and market access recipients must coordinate in good faith the 
use of commonly authorized frequencies regardless of their processing round status.
(c) * * *
(1) Each of n (number of) satellite networks involved that were licensed or granted market access through 
the same processing round, except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, must select 1/n of the 
assigned spectrum available in each of these frequency bands. * * *
(d) Protection of earlier-round systems.  Prior to commencing operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or 
market access recipient must either certify that it has completed a coordination agreement with any 
operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round, or 
submit for Commission approval a compatibility showing which demonstrates by use of a degraded 
throughput methodology that it will not cause harmful interference to any such system with which 
coordination has not been completed.  If an earlier-round system becomes operational after a later-round 
system has commenced operations, the later-round licensee or market access recipient must submit a 
certification of coordination or a compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no later 
than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations as notified pursuant to § 25.121(b) or 
otherwise.
(1) Compatibility showings will be placed on public notice pursuant to § 25.151(a)(13).
(2) While a compatibility showing remains pending before the Commission, the submitting NGSO FSS 
licensee or market access recipient may commence operations on an unprotected, non-interference basis Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
26with respect to the operations of the system that is the subject of the showing.
(e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first authorization or grant of market access in a processing round, the 
systems approved in that processing round will no longer be required to protect earlier-rounds systems 
under paragraph (d) of this section, and instead will be required to share spectrum with earlier-round 
systems under paragraph (c) of this section.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
27APPENDIX B
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as amended,1 an Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for 
Non- Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in 
December 2021 in this proceeding.2  The Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in 
the NPRM, including comment on the IRFA.  No comments were filed addressing the IRFA.  This Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.3
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Order:
2. In recent years, the Commission has received an unprecedented number of applications 
for non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) space station licenses, including for NGSO fixed-satellite 
service (FSS) systems.  Traveling closer to the Earth than a traditional GSO satellite, low- and medium-
orbit NGSO FSS satellite constellations are capable of providing broadband services to industry, 
enterprise, and residential customers with lower latency and wider coverage than was previously available 
via satellite.  This rulemaking continues to facilitate the deployment of NGSO FSS systems capable of 
providing broadband and other services on a global basis, and will promote competition among NGSO 
FSS system proponents, including the market entry of new competitors.
3. The Order amends the Commission’s rules governing the treatment of NGSO FSS 
systems filed in different processing rounds.  In particular, the Order adopts rules specifying that the 
Commission’s existing spectrum sharing mechanism for NGSO FSS systems will be limited to those 
systems approved in the same processing round.  The Order also adopts a rule providing that later-round 
NGSO FSS systems will have to protect earlier-round systems by using a degraded throughput 
methodology.  In addition, the Order adopts a sunset provision after which earlier-round grantees and 
later-round grantees will share spectrum on an equal basis under the existing spectrum sharing mechanism 
for NGSO FSS systems.
B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to the IRFA
4. There were no comments filed that specifically addressed the proposed rules and policies 
presented in the IRFA. 
C. Legal Basis:  
5. The proposed action is authorized under sections 4(i), 7(a), 303, 308(b), and 316 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 157(a), 303, 308(b), 316. 
D. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
6. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the RFA, the 
Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration (SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the 
proposed rules as a result of those comments.4  The Chief Counsel did not file any comments in response 
to the proposed rules in this proceeding.
1 See 5 U.S.C. § 603. The RFA, see 5 U.S.C. § 601-612, has been amended by the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, (SBREFA) Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
2 Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non- Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, IB Docket No. 
21-456, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 36 FCC Rcd 17871 (2021).
3 See 5 U.S.C. § 604. 
4 5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
28E. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Rules Will 
Apply
7. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of, 
the number of small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted herein.5  The RFA generally defines 
the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small organization,” 
and “small governmental jurisdiction.”6  In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as 
the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.7  A “small business concern” is one 
which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) 
satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business Administration (SBA).8  Below, we 
describe and estimate the number of small entities that may be affected by the adoption of the final rules.
8.Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms “primarily engaged in 
providing telecommunications services to other establishments in the telecommunications and 
broadcasting industries by forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of satellites or 
reselling satellite telecommunications.”9 Satellite telecommunications service providers include satellite 
and earth station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business 
with $38 million or less in annual receipts as small.10  U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 
firms in this industry operated for the entire year.11 Of this number, 242 firms had revenue of less than 
$25 million.12  Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, 
as of December 31, 2020, there were 71 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of 
satellite telecommunications services.13  Of these providers, the Commission estimates that approximately 
48 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.14  Consequently using the SBA’s small business size 
standard, a little more than half of these providers can be considered small entities.
9.All Other Telecommunications.  The “All Other Telecommunications” category is 
comprised of establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, 
5 Id.
6 5 U.S.C. § 601(6).
7 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small-business concern” in the Small Business 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an 
agency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity 
for public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the 
agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”
8 15 U.S.C. § 632.
9 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition, “517410 Satellite Telecommunications,” 
https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=517410&year=2017&details=517410. 
10 See 13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517410.
11 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Selected Sectors: Sales, Value of 
Shipments, or Revenue Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEREVFIRM, NAICS Code 517410, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?y=2017&n=517410&tid=ECNSIZE2017.EC1700SIZEREVFIRM&hidePreviw
=false. 
12 Id. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that 
meet the SBA size standard. We also note that according to the U.S. Census Bureau glossary, the terms receipts and 
revenues are used interchangeably, see https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_ReceiptsRevenueServices. 
13 Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Universal Service Monitoring Report at 26, Table 1.12 (2021), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/pubId.lic/attachments/DOC-379181A1.pdf. 
14 Id.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
29such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station operation.15  This industry also 
includes establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities 
connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and 
receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems.16  Establishments providing Internet services or 
voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also 
included in this industry.17  The SBA has developed a small business size standard for “All Other 
Telecommunications,” which consists of all such firms with annual receipts of $35 million or less.18  For 
this category, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that there were 1,442 firms that operated for the 
entire year.19  Of those firms, a total of 1,400 had annual receipts of less than $25 million and 15 firms 
had annual receipts of $25 million to $49, 999,999.20  Thus, the Commission estimates that the majority of 
“All Other Telecommunications” firms potentially affected by our action can be considered small.
F. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements for Small Entities
10. The Order amends rules that are applicable to space station operators requesting a license 
or authorization from the Commission, or entities requesting that the Commission grant a request for U.S. 
market access.  Specifically, the Order adopts changes to the spectrum sharing requirements among 
NGSO FSS satellite systems and requires space station licensees and market access grantees that were 
authorized through a later processing round to submit a technical demonstration that they will not cause 
harmful interference to space station licensees and market access grantees that were authorized through an 
earlier processing round, prior to the sunsetting period, if the later-round grantees have not certified that 
they have reached a coordination agreement with the earlier-round grantees.  The technical demonstration 
of compatibility between the later-round system and the earlier-round system is based on a degraded 
throughput methodology that consists of three steps.  The first step is to establish a baseline of 
performance.  To do this, an operator models the earlier-round NGSO system’s performance without any 
additional interference by computing the earlier-round NGSO system’s probabilistic carrier-to-noise 
(C/N) level using its published system parameters and a rain-attenuation model.  This provides the 
baseline: (1) the earlier-round system’s time-weighted average throughput (derived by computing the 
spectral efficiency from the C/N results), and (2) the earlier-round system’s link unavailability time 
percentage (i.e., the percentage of time when the earlier-round system’s expected C/N will fall below its 
minimum usable level).  The second step is to repeat the analysis above, adding in the effect of the later-
round system’s interference into the earlier-round system.  This produces a second measurement of time-
weighted average throughput and link unavailability time-percentage.  The third step is to compare these 
two sets of figures to measure the effect of any additional interference.  If the resulting performance 
impact exceeds the permissible limits, then the later-round system must adjust its operations to mitigate 
interference to a permissible level.  
11. Because of the costs involved in developing and deploying an NGSO FSS satellite 
15 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition, “517919 All Other Telecommunications,” 
https://www.census.gov/cgibin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?input=517919&search=2017+NAICS+Search&search=2017. 
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See 13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517919.
19 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Economic Census of the United States, Table ID: EC1251SSSZ4, Information: 
Subject Series - Estab and Firm Size: Receipts Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2012, NAICS Code 517919, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?text=EC1251SSSZ4&n=517919&tid=ECNSIZE2012.EC1251SSSZ4&hidePrev
iew=false.  
20 Id. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that 
meet the SBA size standard of annual receipts of $35 million or less.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
30constellation, we anticipate that few NGSO FSS operators affected by this rulemaking would qualify 
under the definition of “small entity.”  
G. Steps Taken to Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities 
12. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives that it has considered 
in developing its approach, which may include the following four alternatives (among others): “(1) the 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the 
resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance 
and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the use of performance rather than 
design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small 
entities.”21
13. The Order adopts a requirement for NGSO FSS systems authorized through a later 
processing round to either complete a coordination agreement with, or submit a technical demonstration 
using a degraded throughput methodology that they will not interfere with, NGSO FSS systems 
authorized through an earlier processing round.  The Commission adopted this requirement to ensure that 
earlier-round NGSO FSS systems will continue to have their services protected as new entrants deploy 
their systems.  The Commission selected a degraded throughput methodology as the basis for the 
technical demonstration because it offers the most promising technical path for protection of earlier-round 
systems without unduly burdening the operations of later-round systems.  The Commission also 
considered use of an interference-to-noise ratio (I/N) as a protection criteria for earlier-round systems, or 
use of a modified band-splitting approach in which earlier-round systems and later-round systems would 
have to operate in different spectrum bands, with the earlier-round system entitled to more spectrum than 
the later-round system, in the event that an interference threshold is surpassed.  The Commission did not 
adopt an I/N protection criteria because it may unduly burden the operations of later-round systems, and 
did not adopt a modified band-splitting approach because the Commission preferred a technically 
grounded inter-round sharing solution.  While a technical demonstration using a degraded throughput 
methodology might be more burdensome to produce than a demonstration using an I/N level, the record 
demonstrated the feasibility of degraded throughput analyses and their superior ability to model 
contemporary NGSO FSS systems and more precisely account for the likelihood of harmful interference.
14. As noted above, because of the high costs typically involved in the development of 
NGSO FSS constellations, we anticipate that few small entities will be required to submit such technical 
demonstrations.  However, for small entities seeking to operate NGSO FSS systems, adoption of a sunset 
provision combined with use of degraded throughput methodology will provide operators incentive to 
innovate and to coordinate with other systems, which will increase spectral efficiency and permit entities 
to implement newer socially-valuable technologies.
H. Report to Congress
15. The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order, including this FRFA, in a 
report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.22  In addition, the Commission 
will send a copy of the Report and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
SBA.  A copy of this Second Report and Order and FRFA (or summaries thereof) will also be published 
in the Federal Register.
21 5 U.S.C. § 603(c)(1)-(4).
22 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
31APPENDIX C
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
1.As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),1 the Commission has prepared this 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities by the policies and rules proposed in this Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (Further Notice).  The Commission requests written public comments on this IRFA.  
Commenters must identify their comments as responses to the IRFA and must file the comments by the 
deadlines provided on the first page of the Further Notice and as instructed in the Further Notice.  The 
Commission will send a copy of the Further Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.2  In addition, the Further Notice and IRFA (or 
summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.3 
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules: 
2. In recent years, the Commission has received an unprecedented number of applications 
for non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) space station licenses, including for NGSO fixed-satellite 
service (FSS) systems.  Traveling closer to the Earth than a traditional geostationary-satellite orbit (GSO) 
satellite, low- and medium-orbit NGSO FSS satellite constellations are capable of providing broadband 
services to industry, enterprise, and residential customers with lower latency and wider coverage than was 
previously available via satellite.  This rulemaking continues to facilitate the deployment of NGSO FSS 
systems capable of providing broadband and other services on a global basis, and will promote 
competition among NGSO FSS system proponents, including the market entry of new competitors.4
3.This Further Notice seeks public comment on proposed revisions to the Commission’s 
rules governing the treatment NGSO FSS systems filed in different space station processing rounds.  
Specifically, this Further Notice seeks comment on details regarding the implementation of a degraded 
throughput methodology.  It also seeks comment on what criteria should be applied among NGSO 
systems after the sunset period.  
B. Legal Basis: 
4. The proposed action is authorized under sections 4(i), 7(a), 303, 308(b), and 316 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 157(a), 303, 308(b), 316. 
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Proposed 
Rulemaking Will Apply: 
5. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where feasible, an estimate of 
the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules and policies, if adopted.5  The 
RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” 
“small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.”6  In addition, the term “small business” has 
1 5 U.S.C. § 603.  The RFA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 has been amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 847 (1996).
2 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
3 Id.
4 See generally Executive Order No. 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 FR 36987  (July 
9, 2021 (“The heads of all agencies shall consider using their authorities to further the policies set forth in section 1 
of this order, with particular attention to:  (i) the influence of their respective regulations, particularly any licensing 
regulations, on concentration and competition in the industries under their jurisdiction; and…”).  Executive Order at 
86 FR 36991. 
5 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(3).
6 5 U.S.C. § 601(6).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
32the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.7  A “small 
business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field 
of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.8 
6.Satellite Telecommunications.  This industry comprises firms “primarily engaged in 
providing telecommunications services to other establishments in the telecommunications and 
broadcasting industries by forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of satellites or 
reselling satellite telecommunications.”9  Satellite telecommunications service providers include satellite 
and earth station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business 
with $35 million or less in annual receipts as small.10  U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 
firms in this industry operated for the entire year.11  Of this number, 242 firms had revenue of less than 
$25 million.12 Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, 
as of December 31, 2020, there were 71 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of 
satellite telecommunications services.13  Of these providers, the Commission estimates that approximately 
48 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.14  Consequently using the SBA’s small business size 
standard, a little more than half of these providers can be considered small entities.
7.All Other Telecommunications.  The “All Other Telecommunications” category is 
comprised of establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, 
such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station operation.15  This industry also 
includes establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities 
connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and 
receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems.16  Establishments providing Internet services or 
voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also 
included in this industry.17  The SBA has developed a small business size standard for “All Other 
7 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small-business concern” in the Small Business 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632).  Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an 
agency, after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity 
for public comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the 
agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”
8 15 U.S.C. § 632.
9 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition, “517410 Satellite Telecommunications,” 
https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=517410&year=2017&details=517410.
10 See 13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517410.  
11 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Selected Sectors: Sales, Value of Shipments, 
or Revenue Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEREVFIRM, NAICS Code 517410, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?y=2017&n=517410&tid=ECNSIZE2017.EC1700SIZEREVFIRM&hidePrevie
w=false.
12 Id.  The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that 
meet the SBA size standard.  We also note that according to the U.S. Census Bureau glossary, the terms receipts and 
revenues are used interchangeably, see https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_ReceiptsRevenueServices.
13 Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Universal Service Monitoring Report at 26, Table 1.12 (2021),
https://docs.fcc.gov/pubId.lic/attachments/DOC-379181A1.pdf. 
14 Id.
15 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition, “517919 All Other Telecommunications”, 
https://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?input=517919&search=2017+NAICS+Search&search=2017.
16 Id.
17 Id.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
33Telecommunications”, which consists of all such firms with annual receipts of $35 million or less.18  For 
this category, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that there were 1,442 firms that operated for the 
entire year.19  Of those firms, a total of 1,400 had annual receipts less than $25 million and 15 firms had 
annual receipts of $25 million to $49, 999,999.20  Thus, the Commission estimates that the majority of 
“All Other Telecommunications” firms potentially affected by our action can be considered small.
D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements for Small Entities: 
8. The Commission seeks comment on potential changes to the spectrum sharing 
requirements among NGSO FSS satellite systems.  Specifically, comment is sought on how to implement 
the degraded throughput methodology.  Because of the costs involved in developing and deploying an 
NGSO FSS satellite constellation, we anticipate that few NGSO FSS operators affected by this 
rulemaking would qualify under the definition of “small entity.”
E. Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and 
Significant Alternatives Considered: 
9.The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant, specifically small business, 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, which may include the following 
four alternatives (among others): “(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements 
or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, 
consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rules for such small 
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of 
the rule, or any part thereof, for such small entities.”21
10. The Commission adopted a requirement that, prior to commencing operations, an NGSO 
FSS licensee or market access recipient must either certify that it has completed a coordination agreement 
with any operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing 
round, or submit a showing for Commission approval that it will not cause harmful interference to any 
such system with which coordination has not been completed using a degraded throughput methodology.  
This Further Notice invites comment on which specific metrics should be used to define the protection 
afforded to an earlier-round NGSO FSS system from a later-round system. 
11.The Commission seeks comment on the appropriate values and assumptions to be used 
with the degraded throughput requirement.  The Commission also seeks comment on whether to adopt a 
rule limiting aggregate interference from NGSO FSS systems that were authorized in a later processing 
round into NGSO FSS systems authorized in an earlier processing round.  The Commission also seeks 
comment on alternative means of protection of earlier-round NGSO FSS systems.  
12.The Further Notice also seeks comment on whether the Commission should expect that 
there will be a maximum number of NGSO FSS systems that can be accommodated in a given frequency 
band and if so, how should that affect any inter-round protection criteria and the opening of additional 
processing rounds.  The Further Notice also seeks comment on how the degraded throughput 
methodology accommodates multiple NGSO systems that span multiple processing rounds.
18 See 13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517919. 
19 See U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Economic Census of the United States, Table ID: EC1251SSSZ4, Information: 
Subject Series - Estab and Firm Size: Receipts Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2012, NAICS Code 517919, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?text=EC1251SSSZ4&n=517919&tid=ECNSIZE2012.EC1251SSSZ4&hidePrev
iew=false.
20 Id.  The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that 
meet the SBA size standard of annual receipts of $35 million or less.
21 5 U.S.C. § 603(c)(1)–(c)(4).Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
3413.To assist in the Commission’s evaluation of the economic impact on small entities, as a 
result of actions that have been proposed in the Further Notice, and to better explore options and 
alternatives, the Commission seeks comment on whether any of the burdens associated with the filing, 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements described above can be minimized for small entities.22  
Additionally, the Commission seeks comment on whether any of the costs associated with any of the 
proposed requirements to eliminate unlawful robocalls can be alleviated for small entities.23  The 
Commission expects to more fully consider the economic impact and alternatives for small entities based 
on its review of the record and any comments filed in response to the Further Notice and this IRFA.
F. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed Rules:
14. None
22 Id. at para. 8.
23 Id.Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
35APPENDIX D
List of Commenters
Comments in IB Docket No. 21-456
AST&Science LLC (AST)
Astra Space Platform Services LLC (Astra)
The Boeing Company (Boeing)
Hughes Network Systems, LLC (Hughes)
Inmarsat Inc. (Inmarsat)
Intelsat License LLC (Intelsat)
Kepler Communications Inc. (Kepler)
Kuiper Systems LLC (Kuiper)
Mangata Networks LLC (Mangata)
New America’s Open Technology Institute, Public Knowledge, the Center for Rural Strategies, Next 
Century Cities, the Benton Institute for Broadband & Society, Oregon Fiber Partnership (dba Link 
Oregon), and Access Humboldt (collectively, Public Interest Organizations or PIOs)
O3b Limited (O3b)
SN Space Systems Limited (SN Space Systems)
SpaceLink Corporation (SpaceLink)
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC (SpaceX)
Telesat Canada (Telesat)
Viasat, Inc. (Viasat)
WorldVu Satellites Limited (OneWeb)
Reply Comments in IB Docket No. 21-456
AST
Boeing
Intelsat
Kepler
Kuiper
Mangata
OneWeb
O3b
The Satellite Industry Association (SIA)
SN Space Systems
SpaceLink
SpaceX
TechFreedom
Telesat
ViaSat
Ex Parte Filings in IB Docket No. 21-456
Letter from Doris Matsui and Brett Guthrie, Members of U.S. Congress (filed Apr. 11, 2022)
Kuiper (filed May 18, 2022)
Kuiper (filed May 24, 2022)
Kuiper (filed May 24, 2022)
Kuiper (filed May 25, 2022)
Kuiper (filed May 25, 2022)
Hughes (filed June 2, 2022)Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
36Kuiper (filed Aug. 4, 2022)
Intelsat (filed Aug. 15, 2022)
Viasat (filed Aug. 24, 2022)
Kuiper (filed Sept. 6, 2022)
SpaceX (filed Sept. 7, 2022)
Viasat (filed Sept. 20, 2022)
Kuiper (filed Sept. 23, 2022)
SpaceX (filed Sept. 28, 2022)
Kuiper (filed Oct. 13, 2022)
SpaceX (filed Oct. 21, 2022)
O3b (filed Oct. 26, 2022)
SpaceX (filed Nov. 17, 2022)
O3b (filed Nov. 17, 2022)
EchoStar Satellite Services LLC and Hughes, Globalstar, Inc., Iridium Communications Inc., Inmarsat, 
OneWeb, O3b, Telesat, Viasat (filed Nov. 21, 2022)
Kepler, OneWeb, O3b, SpaceX (filed Nov. 22, 2022)
SpaceX (filed Nov. 22, 2022)
SpaceX (filed Nov. 23, 2022)
Intelsat (filed Dec. 1, 2022)
Viasat (filed Dec. 2, 2022)
Kuiper (filed Dec. 14, 2022)
SpaceX (filed Dec. 16, 2022)
PIOs (filed Dec. 16, 2022)
PIOs (filed Dec. 16, 2022)
PIOs (filed Dec. 20, 2022)
PIOs (filed Dec. 20, 2022)
Stellar Telecommunications SAS (Stellar) (filed Jan. 13, 2023)
PIOs (filed Feb. 1, 2023)
SpaceX (filed Feb. 7, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Feb. 17, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Feb. 23, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Feb. 28, 2023)
SpaceX (filed Feb. 28, 2023)
Mangata (filed Mar. 1, 2023)
Public Knowledge (filed Mar. 3, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Mar. 3, 2023)
Mangata (filed Mar. 10, 2023)
SES & O3b (filed Mar. 13, 2023)
Mangata (filed Mar. 15, 2023)
Open Technology Institute at New America and Public Knowledge (filed Mar. 15, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Mar. 16, 2023)
OneWeb (filed Mar. 2, 2023)
SpaceX (filed Mar. 22, 2023)
Mangata (filed Mar. 23, 2023)
OneWeb (filed Mar. 28, 2023)
Open Technology Institute at New America and Public Knowledge (filed Apr. 5, 2023)
OneWeb (filed Apr. 7, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Apr. 7, 2023)
OneWeb (filed Apr. 12, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Apr. 12, 2023)
SES & O3b (filed Apr. 13, 2023)
Kuiper (filed Apr. 13, 2023)
Intelsat (filed Apr. 13, 2023)Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
37OneWeb (filed Apr. 13, 2023)
OneWeb (filed Apr. 14, 2023)
OneWeb (filed Apr. 14, 2023)
Intelsat (filed Apr. 14, 2023)Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
38STATEMENT OF
CHAIRWOMAN JESSICA ROSENWORCEL
Re:Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, 
IB Docket No. 21-456; Revision of Section 25.261 of the Commission’s Rules to Increase 
Certainty in Spectrum Sharing Obligations Among Non-Geostationary Orbit Fixed-Satellite 
Service Systems, RM-11855, Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (April 20, 2023)
When I announced my plan to reorganize the Federal Communications Commission and establish 
a new Space Bureau, I said it was about ensuring that our policies keep up with the incredible pace of 
activity in the space sector.  I said that in light of this activity we need to identify how our existing 
frameworks may need to be reexamined and updated.  After all, you cannot just keep doing things the old 
way and expect to lead in the new.  
Today’s effort is a testament to this proposition.  We adopt a new framework for spectrum 
sharing among non-geostationary fixed satellite service systems that promotes efficiency, competition, 
and innovation.  All three are essential for the growing space economy.  
It has long been the practice of the Commission to license these satellite constellations in 
processing rounds.  In practice, this means that satellite systems that get their applications in early during 
the same round have equal rights to the shared spectrum in the band.  But for applications that come in 
later, it’s a different story.  They have to protect these earlier systems and work around the incumbents 
that are already there.  This means systems in the earlier round get a first-mover advantage.  This can be a 
good thing because it provides early entrants with the certainty needed to invest in costly and complex 
satellite deployments.  But the downside is that when this first-mover advantage continues in perpetuity it 
shuts out would-be competitors, prevents newer deployments, and discourages operators from 
transitioning to more efficient systems that are better suited to sharing.  That’s a not-so-good thing.  So 
today we update this process.  We adopt a sunset on this spectrum priority that kicks in ten years after a 
later-round system is authorized.  Now the first movers will enjoy the advantage they’ve earned by daring 
to think big and take on that risk, but they won’t be able to hold on to that regulatory privilege forever.  
This will open our skies to more competition.  
We also adopt rules that bring more certainty to the rights and obligations of systems within a 
processing round and among different processing rounds.  Under our old framework, there was an 
incentive to refuse to coordinate with your competitor and block them from entering the marketplace.  
Today we fix that.  We clarify that it is the responsibility of all parties to coordinate in good faith and to 
exchange the information with each other that is necessary to ensure the shared spectrum resources used 
by satellite systems can accommodate new innovation and new ideas.  
These updates are smart and modern.  They reward early investment but also help clear the way 
for new entrants.  They promote spectrum efficiency and open up possibilities for new innovation without 
regard to the date of system authorization. 
I am proud to have this be the first effort presented for vote by the new Space Bureau.  
Congratulations to Julie Kearney, the Chief of the Space Bureau, and to her team.  There is more to do 
and I am looking forward to working with the Bureau to make it happen.
Thank you to the agency staff who worked on this important rulemaking, including Clay DeCell, 
Jennifer Gilsenan, Julie Kearney, Karl Kensinger, Adrienne McNeil, Kathyrn Medley, Kerry Murray, 
Stephanie Neville, Jeanine Poltronieri, Sankar Persaud, Troy Tanner, and Merissa Velez of the Space 
Bureau; Michael Carowitz, Kimberly Cook, Matthew Gibson, Jason Koslofsky, Shannon Lipp, Jeremy Federal Communications Commission FCC 23-29
39Marcus, Ryan McDonald, Janet Moran, Elizabeth Mumaw, Victoria Randazzo, and Dedrick Roybiskie of 
the Enforcement Bureau; Paul Lafontaine, Catherine Matraves, Giulia McHenry; Michelle Schaefer, and 
Aleks Yankelevich from the Office of Economics and Analytics; Tom Sullivan from the Office of 
International Affairs; David Konczal and Bill Richardson from the Office of the General Counsel; and 
Cara Grayer and Joy Ragsdale from the Office of Communications Business Opportunities.Federal Communications Commission "FCC  XX-XXX" 
40STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER GEOFFREY STARKS
Re: Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, 
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking – IB Docket No. 21-456 
One thing is for sure—when you’re talking about spectrum sharing between NGSO systems, 
much is at stake.  Successful coordination could be the difference between expanding broadband’s reach 
to the hardest locations to serve in the United States—or delaying service and choice to those on the 
wrong side of the digital divide.  It could be the difference between maintaining pole position in the 
global space economy—or handing the lead to our economic and geopolitical rivals.  And it could be the 
difference between finding an economically sustainable path for massive space investments—or watching 
them shine fast and bright for a few years only to fizzle.  Then comes our security.  In this day and age, 
having multiple, secure, resilient, high-capacity, low-latency, and U.S.-based satellite broadband 
networks is essential.  That could be the difference between keeping our military and allies online and 
connected—or having their communications go dark when our collective security depends on access.
But reaching the right result is as challenging as it is important.  Why?  We’re being asked to 
strike a delicate balance that provides stability and security on the one hand while accommodating serial 
innovation in a truly dynamic industry on the other.  To further complicate matters, we have to achieve 
balance on any number of policy levers, many of which are interrelated.  What’s the right sharing 
methodology?  What’s the right protection level under that sharing methodology?  What’s the right 
effective period for that protection and how should sharing work after it expires?  What can operators 
do—and not do—while they’re still demonstrating how they will share with an existing system?  
I think we’ve reached that right balance today.  And it wasn’t easy—just look at the filings from 
the past three weeks.  I’m also pleased that we’re not rushing to judgment on several key issues that could 
benefit from additional exploration.  Because given the stakes here, getting each detail right is important. 
Finally, I’d be remiss if I didn’t thank the International Bureau for a fantastic closing performance 
in its long and storied history.  I look forward to working with the newly launched Space Bureau—and its 
inaugural Chief, Julie Kearney—on this and other satellite proceedings in the future.  
This item has my full support.