G/RO/W/196  
 
7 April 2020 
(20-2764) Page: 1/9 
Committee on Rules of Origin    
 
SUMMARY OF THE INFOR MAL SESSION CELEBRATING  THE 25TH ANNIVERSAR Y OF  
THE WTO AGREEMENT ON  RULES OF ORIGIN – 4 MARCH 2020  
1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  An informal session of the Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) was organized on 4  March  2020 
to celebrate the 25 th Anniversary  of the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin (the Agreement, or 
ARO), which had been finalized by GATT  Contracting Parties in December  1990, and which had come 
into force in 1995 along with the other Agreements concluded during  the Uruguay Round.  
1.2.  The session offered Members an opportunity to reflect upon the Committee's work over these 
25 years and to look ahead to its future work.  
1.3.  After opening remarks from Mrs  Suja Rishikesh Mavroidis, Director of the WTO  Market Access 
Division, and Mrs  Uma Muniandy (Singapore), Chairperson of the Committee, participants heard 
presentations from the WTO Secretariat , the World Customs Organization  (WCO) , the International 
Chamber of Commerce  (ICC) , the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop ment ( UNCTAD ), 
the International Trade Centre  (ITC), and the private sector. These presentations are summarized 
below.  
2  DARLAN F. MART Í, SECRETARY TO THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF ORIGIN, 
WTO  SECRETARIAT  
2.1.  Mr Martí described the history of the negotiations that had led to the WTO  Agreement on Rules 
of Origin, as well as the progress that had been made in the CRO on the Harmonization  Work 
Programme (HWP). He explained that the Committee was currently in a period of transition ; its goal 
was the ha rmonization of rules of origin, although Members held differing perspectives about the 
regimes that should be adopted across the board.  
2.2.  To provide an overview of the current situation and the status of rules of origin, Mr  Martí 
explained that  rules of orig in serve d an important function in today's international trading system. 
Due to the existence of inter alia Free Trade Agreements FTAs, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
import quotas and anti -dumping duties , the conditions apply ing to the importation o f identical 
imported goods differed depend ing on the ir origin. Goods were treated differently on the basis of 
rules of origin that served to identify the appropriate treatment and measures to be applied . 
2.3.  The first concerns over origin had emerged during th e early days of the GATT. In fact, co untry 
of origin marking regulations ("made in  …" labels), had first been introduced in the 1950s in the 
context of consumer  protection policies . Quotas allocated by country (for example , for textiles and 
clothing produc ts) had also required a determination of origin. In the 1970s and 1980s, a n increase 
in the use of anti -dumping measures and the use of different standards for determination of origin 
had created uncertainty for producers. Concerns were subsequently expressed over arbitrary 
definition s of origin  and a general lack of predictability and transparency . In addition , governments 
had been at liberty  to set and change the ir rules of origin  at whim , which to traders had often been 
a source of frustration . Furthermore, companies seeking arbitrat ion in disputes regarding  rules of 
origin had recourse only to the national courts of the importing country in question . 
2.4.  The ICC had recommended that GATT  Contracting Parties  standardize  their rules of origin  
already in 1958; even so, the GATT contained very few disciplines relating to rules of origin. 
The most significant instrument to have been developed regarding rules of origin was  
the 1974 International Convention on the S implification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures  G/RO/W/196  
 
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  (the Kyoto Convention) . However, the Kyoto Convention was vague ; it lacked oversight and 
enforcement ; and it was adhered to by only a modest number of governments . 
2.5.  It had been decided that rules of origin should be included as an issue for negotiation at the 
outset of the Uruguay Round , and the first draft  of the Agreement was finalized  already in 1990 . 
The purpose of the Agreement  was to establish clear and predictable rules of origin  that would lead 
to an increase in trade and economic growth, with standardization and harmonization considered to 
be the best way s of achiev ing this. It was also believed that such objectives would ensure that rules 
of origin remain ed technical and neutral instrument s that would not create unnecessary obstacles 
to trade . Although Members did ponder the benefits of harmonizing all rules of origin, a decision was 
subsequently taken to harmonize only those rules use d for non -preferential p urposes. Nevertheless , 
Annex  II of the Agreement contain s certain general disciplines on the use of preferential rules of 
origin . 
2.6.  The HWP was launched  in 1995,  and from 1995 until 2000, the CRO and the WCO  Technical 
Committee on Rules of Origin worked tire lessly in Geneva and Brussels to harmonize Members' rules 
of origin on an HS nomenclature product -sector basis . During this time, Members succeeded in 
agree ing upon harmonized rules of origin for approximately two thirds of all products (HS  codes). 
However, the HWP was not completed because of the complexity of the issues involved. In particular, 
certain delegations feared that harmonized rules would restrict the ability of their governments to 
implement anti -dumping measures. For these reaso ns, there are currently no harmonized, 
non-preferential rules of origin, and Article  2 of the Agreement contain s the only disciplines guiding 
Members on the use of non -preferential rules of origin . 
2.7.  As outlined in the Agreement , countries began to notify th e Secretariat of their currently 
applicable rules of origin. According to those notifications , 50 Members had rules of origin in place , 
while 60 did not. All Members had at least one  regime for preferential rules of origin. However, 
Members' notifications  in this area did not necessarily reflect accurately their current practices. 
In some cases, t he notifications were outdated (92 of the relevant  notifications had been received 
in 1995, and significantly fewer notifications had been  received in subsequent years). In other cases, 
the notifications seemed to contain only  partial information (for example , they did not always 
describe whether or not a Member required certificates of non -preferential origin and, where a 
Member did so, under what circumstances ). Moreover, a total of 77 WTO Members had reported that 
they had anti-dumping investigation authorities , while only 50  reported that they  had implement ed 
legislation relating to non -preferential rules of origin. Similarly, a WCO survey had reported that 8% 
of WCO Members  require d the presentation of non-preferential origin certificate s in all cases , 
whereas 80% had reported making use of this requirement in certain cases. Such information was 
not adequately captured in Members' notifications.  
2.8.  Mr Martí considered that, given the range and variety of rules of origin being adopted by 
WTO Members, as well as the subsequent uncertainty generated by such a situation, simplification 
and standardization in this area must remain ed a high priority . 
3  STEFAN MOSER (SWITZE RLAND), FORMER CHAIR  OF THE COMMITTEE ON  RULES OF 
ORIGIN  
3.1.  Mr Moser explained that , although most enterprises thought of rules of origin in preferential 
terms , including in order to obtain such benefits as tariff reduction s, access to reliable information 
on non -preferential rules of origin was also of paramount importance to avoid incurring unexpected 
costs when goods reach ed the border.  
3.2.  Although the Agreement was largely  silent on implementation, new agreements , such as the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) , had provide d additional impetus for simplifying origin 
requirements . 
3.3.  Article  2 of the Agreement was the main WTO  instrument on rules of origin. It formulated  the 
understanding that Members should not change their rules of origin in order to manipulate trade 
patterns, although this now seemed somewhat naive given that modifications to rules of origin were 
used to do precisely that. The difficulty encountered  when attempting to address this issue was that 
implementation was very difficult in practice and required making an assessment of the intention of 
the Member that had enacted a change in its rules of origin . G/RO/W/196  
 
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  3.4.  Even though the HWP remained unfinished, it had not been in vain , and many countries had 
adopted systems that incorporate d its results in to their FTAs . 
3.5.  Current issues regarding rules of origin in international trade were no different to  those of the 
1990s. If anything, the problems had only become more  acute and more generalized as preferential 
origin requirements  had multiplied . Therefore, harmonization remained an important trade 
objective.  
4  METTE AZZAM,  SENIOR TECHNICAL OF FICER, ORIGIN SUB -DIRECTORATE, TARIFF AND 
TRADE AFFAIRS DIRECT ORATE, WCO  SECRETA RIAT  
4.1.  Ms Azzam described the history and significance of the Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC), and 
other origin -related tools that the WCO had prepared.  
4.2.  The RKC was the only international agreement that dealt with origin procedures and 
certification , includin g both preferential and non -preferential rules of origin (Annex  K of the RKC). 
At the same time , the RKC had existed now for 25  years and it was insufficiently detailed to meet 
the needs of the current trading environment . 
4.3.  At present, there were  over 350 FTAs in force globally, creating a "spaghetti bowl of rules of 
origin". Nevertheless , commonalities did exist between the se various systems and this was 
encouraging. The major models in the trading system were the following: the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  (currently transitioning to the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement 
(USMCA )); the Pan -Euro-Med model ; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ; and the 
Trans -Pacific Partnership ( TPP). Against this background, the WCO Secre tariat had endeavoured to 
provide tools that WCO  Members could use to develop their own practices. The WCO did not use the 
word harmonization  because  in practice it was extremely difficult to convince countries to agree to 
apply the same standards. Instead , the WCO's tools sought in general to "streamline" procedures, 
which in turn would facilitate trade if all governments then move d in the same direction . 
4.4.  The WCO  Secretariat had also prepared studies and non -binding guidelines, which were 
practical tools designed to help Members in their daily work. The WCO  Revenue Package ( so named 
because revenue collection was the principal purpose of customs agencies) addressed the following: 
origin verification, certification, and irregularities ; advance rulings (ARO and TFA had made advance 
rulings legislation a requirement, and the recent push for TFA  implementation was contributing 
towards  generalizing legislation in this area) ; and origin infrastructure. In addition, the 
WCO Secretariat had also prepared guidelines  for the implementation of the WTO  Ministerial 
Decisions on Preferential Rules of Origin for Least Developed Countries ( LDCs). 
5  DARLAN F. MART Í, SECRETARY TO THE COMMITTEE ON RUL ES OF ORIGIN, 
WTO  SECRETARIAT  
5.1.  Mr Martí explained the steps that had been taken as a result of the WTO , in its 2013 and 
2015 Ministerial Decisions , expand ing its  work in the area of rules of origin. The 2013  Bali and 
2015 Nairobi Ministerial Decisions had established new guidelines on rules of origin to ensure that 
LDCs could benefit from preferential market access schemes.  
5.2.  The 2005  Hong Kong Decision on Measures in Favour of Least Developing Countries had 
required developed Members and developing country Members in a position to do so to grant 
duty-free and quota -free treatment to goo ds originating in LDCs. In order to ensure that LDCs could 
fully benefit from  these preferences, given their industrial and production limitations, this 
commitment had been complemented by the requirement that the rules of origin used in such 
preferential schemes were to  be simple and transparent . 
5.3.  The 2013  Ministerial Decision had established  the first legal instrument containing detailed 
provisions on the designation of preferential rules of origin. These efforts had been  complemented 
by the 2015  Ministerial Decision. Taken together, these  decisions had cover ed the design of rules of 
origin and had also introduced requirements on certification and direct consignment. In addition , the 
decisions had established clear, institutionalized examination and monitoring mechanisms, including, 
for example, the use of  utilization rates to serve  as indicator s of the effectiveness of preference 
schemes . G/RO/W/196  
 
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  5.4.  The decisions contained binding and non -binding language and strengthened transparency. 
They equipped delegations with a n effective  tool for monitor ing the impact of preferential rules of 
origin . They also allowed for a comparison between  different requirements and the identification of 
best practices. And w hile this work had focused on preferential rules of origin for LDCs, the lessons 
learnt from this exercise had been  relevant to all WTO Members and had proven especially useful in 
the context of regional trade agreements. In sum, the 2013 and 2015  Ministerial D ecisions had b een 
instrumental in expanding and strengthening the WTO's work on rules of origin.  
6  HELEN CHANG , PROJECT OFFICER, T RADE FACILITATION TE AM, MARKET ACCESS 
DIVISION, WTO  SECRETARIAT  
6.1.  Ms Chang identified o rigin-related provisions in the WTO  Trade Facilitation Ag reement  (TFA), 
as well as  certain provisions that had been  omitted from the Agreement.  Ms Chang explained that 
the TFA and the ARO converge d in places, while in other s they were complement ary. Where there 
were contradiction s, no element in one of the agree ments was to  be construed in such a way as to 
diminish the obligations set out in the other. Therefore , when examining a particular obligation from 
the TFA, one must at the same time take into account  all other WTO provisions  that also covered 
that obligation.  
6.2.  Although both the ARO and the TFA contain ed transparency obligations,  only the ARO required 
Members to notify their rules of origin to the WTO  Secretariat. The TFA required that Members 
publish their rules of origin "in a  non-discriminatory and easily accessible manner" , and publication 
was also a requirement under the ARO. Under the TFA, Members were encouraged but not obliged 
to make all published information available on the internet . 
6.3.  Advance rulings were treated in the  same way  in the TFA and the ARO, meaning that Members 
did not have two  separate obligations in this regard ( in other words, there was  no need to establish 
two distinct  bodies , each  issuing its own advance rulings). Nevertheless, the language of the 
two agreements differ ed to some extent. The ARO required that an advance ruling be issued no later 
than 150  days after the request had been made, whereas the TFA stipulated that the period to issue 
an advance ruling should be bound , but without providing an expl icit indication of time-frame 
(advance rulings were typically issued within 60 to 90  days). Moreover, the TFA established a new 
obligation , namely that, in the event that a request for a ruling was declined, a Member was obliged 
to communicate to the applicant  its reasons for doing so . Lastly, the ARO stated that advance rulings 
must remain valid for three  years, whereas the TFA stated that they must remain valid for a 
reasonable period of time unless circumstances change d. 
6.4.  On the topic of small consig nments, attempts had been made to establish a monetary value 
below which Members would not collect duties, although actual practice in this area varied to such 
an extent that delegations had not been able to agree on what that value  should be . Nevertheless , 
a conditioned obligation had been established for the introduction of facilitated procedures for small 
value consignments. This was not an area covered by the ARO . 
6.5.  During the TFA negotiation s, an objective of some Members had been to  eliminate the 
"consu larization" of trade documents , thus expanding  WTO disciplines relating to origin. However, 
certain other delegations had objected on the grounds that these procedures were a source of 
revenue collection. In consequence , this aspect was not currently cover ed by the disciplines  
established in either the ARO or the TFA.  
6.6.  On digitalization , the TFA was technology -neutral , as was the ARO. For this reason , it included 
only best endeavour provisions with regard to  the issuance or acceptance of electronic documents.  
7  MARTIN VAN DER WEIDE , POLICY ADVISER ON OR IGIN AT THE NETHERLA NDS 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND DEPUTY CHAIR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CE RTIFICATE OF 
ORIGIN COUNCIL AT TH E INTERNATIONAL CHAM BER OF COMMERCE  (ICC)  
7.1.  Mr Van der Weide noted that Chambers of Commerce were key player s in the area of rules of 
origin : they issue d certificates of origin and also interpret ed the origin rules of the importing country. 
He described how Chambers of Commerce typically issued certificates of origin. He explained that 
the ICC worked to promote high -quality certificates via a number of initiatives. He also  described a 
new self -certification project currently under  way at the ICC . G/RO/W/196  
 
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  7.2.  In this regard, he noted that the concept of  self-certification was not new, but  complete 
self-certification , without any  requirement s in the importing country , was without precedent . 
The path towards s elf-certification  could also be challenging for smaller companies, which often 
feared making  mistakes  in this area . Self-certification  involved risks for importers, who could find 
themselves liable  for the payment of any duties or penalties . 
7.3.  The working title of this new ICC  project  was "Genesis" , and its objective was to build an 
in-house engine and inte grated interface system permitting  Chambers of Commerce worldwide to 
certify invoice declaration s within the framework of preferential rules of origin in FTAs. The goal was 
to create  options for self -certification  to simplify processes.  If the importer or exporter wished  to do 
so, Genesis would also permit  them to verify their self -certification with the Chamber of Commerce . 
Genesis allowed only for interactions between importer s and exporter s, but not supplier s, as 
suppliers  were not as involved in the detail of processes involving rules of origin. The ICC hoped to 
finalize and launch the Genesis initiative in the  summer  of 2020 . 
8  DZMITRY KNIAHIN, MARKE T ANALYST, TRADE AND  MARKET INTELLIGENCE , MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT  DIVISION , INTERNATIONAL TR ADE CENTRE  (ITC)  
8.1.  Mr Kniahin gave an overview of the new ITC -WTO-WCO Origin Facilitator 
(https://findrulesoforigin.org ), which was the first and largest publicly available database of 
product -specific rules of origin and origin requirements. The database covered almost all regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) currently in force, as well as non -reciprocal preferential schemes for LDCs.  
8.2.  There were a significant number of factors involved in  the creation of this database. 
For example, companies found it difficult to take advantage of preferences granted in RTAs because 
of the highly technical nature of rules of origin, as was confirmed by a recent business survey 
indicating that rules of origin was one of the areas that posed most difficulty . 
8.3.  The ITC -WTO-WCO Origin Facilitator was an intuitive tool now available to the public  that could 
be used, for example, to compare trade agreements side by side to see which terms provide d the 
lower tariff, and which rules of origin were more restrictive , making compliance more difficult . 
8.4.  One of the main goals of the database was to reduce the complexity of rules of origin. Not only 
did it grant easier access to an applicable rule , it also codified all the rules in to 14 types , each 
explained in simple terms . This created a universal language for the various types of rules of origin 
that could be used in the future to refer to and further classify them. An analysis of the data in the 
Facilitator revealed that the mos t common type of rule was "change of tariff heading" . 
8.5.  The ITC was working to complete the database , including coverage of all 450 or so RTAs 
currently in force globally. The database could then subsequently also cover  non-preferential rules 
of origin once that information was available. Additional features would also be added soon, including 
content in French and Spanish , and an alert to flag the application of trade remedies , including 
anti-dumping duties.  
9  SIMON NEUMUELLER, EC ONOMIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, MARKET ACCE SS DIVISION, 
WTO  SECRETARIAT  
9.1.  Mr Neumueller described academic efforts to attempt to quantify the costs for companies of 
complying with rules of origin, as well as the research gaps that currently existed in this area. 
9.2.  Compliance costs were slightly different in the case of preferential and non -preferential rules 
of origin. For example , compliance with preferential rules of origin was a choice for a company , 
whereas  compliance with  non-preferential rules of origin was compulsory. To be in  compliance with 
rules of origin required business es to understand the specific rules that applied and to be familiar 
with the various and often distinct national requirements. The greater the number of export markets 
a company had, the more exposed it would be to divergent requirements. Some costs derive d from 
compliance with the rule itself , whereas other costs were administrative ( for example, certification) . 
9.3.  Transparency was a key factor. If business es did not know the rules,  they could not be expected 
to comply  with them . And knowing and complying with the rules was especially difficult for micro, G/RO/W/196  
 
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  small and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs). Furthermore, administrative costs for obtaining 
certificates of origin were not negligible . 
9.4.  One study had estimated the cost of complying with rules of origin to be as high as 6.8% (in  the 
case of the USA and NAFTA) and 8% (in the cas e of the European Union and Pan -Euromed rules) . 
9.5.  In the case of preferential rules of origin, additional costs could derive from trade diversion : 
when companies chose to change their suppl iers in order to quality for  preferences under RTAs . 
9.6.  Studies had also shown that more flexible rules of origin  allowed  for more foreign intermediate 
inputs during production. In addition, they  had shown that there was a learning curve for exporters 
in terms of their ability to comply with rules of origin. And some studies had question ed the use of 
rules of origin at all . 
9.7.  In terms of  how rules of origin affect ed companies , there were still many unknown elements, 
in part because there were so many variables that were so difficult to quantify. For example, the 
precise aspect of  rules of origin that was costly to corporations was still uncertain. It could be that 
the rules were too strict and that to comply with them was subsequently too difficult, or it could be 
that the administrative costs of certification were excessive.  
10  LAWR ENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PA RTNER, BARNES, RICHA RDSON & COLBURN  
10.1.   Mr Friedman stated that many of his clients  had experienced difficulty navigating rules of 
origin, including in the context of  a few court cases in the United States. This underscored  that rules 
of origin were complex ; it also signalled  that implementation of these requirements  was highly 
subjective due to the lack of a cohesive set of domestic and international standards . 
10.2.   It was often difficult for MSMEs to know what the applicable rules of origin were, especially in 
the area of non-preferential rules of origin. Furthermore, while many of the concepts relating to rules 
of origin seem ed obvious to trade experts, even basic concept s could sometimes be difficult for 
businesses to understand. On occasion , Mr Friedman had seen US  companies adapt their supply 
chains to comply with a trade agreement, such as NAFTA, only to then be confused about why they 
could not export on the basis of the same preferences to Australia under the US -Australia  FTA. 
10.3.   In one case, Chinese materials were being shipped to Canada and Mexico before being 
incorporated  into a final product. The final product qualified for duty -free entry into the US under 
NAFTA  preferential rules of origin because  of the value -added content from Mexico that comprised 
part of  the product. However,  the non-preferential substantial transformation rule of Section  301 on 
goods imported from China meant  that customs ultimately determined that the importer had to pay 
duties on the product as if China had been its origin . 
10.4.   The complex nature of origin labelling and other local requirements complicate d the picture  
still further . For example, Mexico's mandatory standards ("NOMs") , and Nigeria's prohibition on dual 
or multiple markings, made it more  difficult for businesses to export . 
10.5.   He also highlighted the fact that US  standards were continually evolving and highly complex. 
A particular area of concern was what to do about software , firmware , and other intangibles, and 
whether their origin also needed to be taken into account. Another example concern ed the minimum 
requirements for substantial transformation. The level of subjectivity in the substantial 
transformation test was undeniab le. For example, adding bristles in the US to a handle created in 
Japan was considered to be a substantial transformation ; however , adding the soles in the US to the 
upper part of a pair of shoes imported from Indonesia was not.  
10.6.   The complexity and subjecti vity of these rules resulted in  an equally complex supply chain, 
which in turn led to a dazzling array of production, assemblies, and subassemblies , leading to the 
final classification and importation of a given product.  G/RO/W/196  
 
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  11  ANNA MARCINOWSKI , SENIOR MANAGER , CUSTOMS AND FOREIGN  TRADE, 
DAIMLER  AG 
11.1.   Ms Marcinowski discussed her role in managing the complex international supply chains of 
Daimler  AG, including a review of the many challenges the company faced in the area of rules of 
origin . She review ed the company 's financial structure . And she explained why Daimler had car and 
truck production sites all over the world . 
11.2.   Daimler  AG, as a large multinational company, considered it important to establish an internal 
body with clear responsibilities for managin g origin requirements ; monitoring changes in supply 
chains  and production networks was also crucial. On the external side, global companies needed to  
train their suppliers regarding rules of origin  and to  maintain a close working relationship with 
customs  authorities.  
11.3.   Formerly, the management of rules of origin had been less challenging than was currently the 
case because there had been fewer  major changes in FTAs ; in this sense, the trading environment 
had been somewhat predictable. More recently, the mana gement of rules of origin had become more 
challenging in the context  of Daimler  AG's constantly growing and increasingly complex international 
supply chains, coupled with an expansion of the use of FTAs around the world, plus the increased 
sophistication of trade policy tools used in political disputes.  Uncertainty and unpredictability had 
also contribute d to these difficulties. For example, there were still no clear determina tions on Brexit. 
The change from NAFTA to USMCA was also altering the trading landscape  through increases in local 
content requirements and changes in labour standards . 
11.4.   Companies were also experiencing high levels of political pressure to move away from th e 
combustion engine and to channel more investment into electric technologies ; this was forcing 
automotive companies such as Daimler  AG to rethink their supply chains . 
11.5.   Renegotiation periods for FTAs were too long and there were in any case too many FTAs, 
making it impossible for companies to react quickly. Some FTAs provide d for such options as full 
culmination or model -based averaging but there was no harmonization across the board . 
11.6.   Non-preferential origin rules were a mandatory requirement and the  consequ ences for 
non-compliance  were severe . In addition , non-preferential origin rules had increasingly been used 
as a weapon in international trade and political disputes, especially as concerned the application of 
anti-dumping duties . 
11.7.   In terms of preferential rules of origin, companies would greatly benefit from a reduction in 
the time taken to renegotiate FTAs ; they would also benefit from non -preferential rules of origin not 
being used in  trade  and political  disputes . 
12  LISA M cAULEY , CEO, GLOBAL TRADE PROFESSIONALS ALLIAN CE, UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW SOUTH WALES  
12.1.   Ms McAuley explained that the emergence of global value chains and new RTAs had created 
an environment where the regimes for rules of origin  were continually evolving . She discu ssed how 
the costs and risks associated with rules of origin could be reduced, as well as the work that the 
Global Trade Professionals Alliance (GTPA) was doing to make this a reality.  
12.2.   Developing global standards that support ed traceability and product cer tification, as well as 
technology that streamlined origin procedures, would help traders immensely . 
12.3.   Global standardization could have benefits similar to those of harmonization in terms of 
facilitating global trade. These standards could also enhance the t raceability of origin and other 
product certifications, while assuring that the important efforts of governments to protect their 
consumers did not result in trade barriers . 
12.4.   The GTPA's current initiative involved building integrity into global value chains . 
The components of this initiative were closely linked to rules, especially in the areas of security and 
sustainability. The work of the GTPA would include a technology platform to render the G/RO/W/196  
 
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  harmonization of standards  operational . Developing a global sta ndard would not be an easy task, 
but it was a worthy one.  
13  METTE A ZZAM , SENIOR TECHNICAL O FFICER, ORIGIN SUB -DIRECTORATE, TARIFF 
AND TRADE AFFAIRS DI RECTORATE , WCO SECRETARIAT  
13.1.   Ms Azzam discussed the potential modernization of Annex  K of the Revised Kyoto Convention 
(RKC) dealing with rules of origin.  
13.2.   The modernization of Annex  K of the RKC had originally been postponed because of the 
WTO HWP. However , certain WCO Members had since submitted proposals to modernize Annex  K 
on the basis of language that  was compatible with the WTO  TFA. This modernization of the RKC was 
likely to lead to its adoption by more members (currently, only 20  countries had subscribed to this 
Annex) . 
13.3.   She also discussed how the "spaghetti bowl" of rules of origin had led many to conclude that 
it was unrealistic to envisage harmonization in the area of rules of origin. Nevertheless , the RKC's 
revision was intended to establish binding rules for origin certification and origin verification. 
The revised rules would mark a clear distin ction between preferential and non -preferential rules of 
origin and provide standardized definitions for commonly used terms, such as "wholly obtained" and 
"substantial/sufficient transformation". Finally, the revised rules would promote the application of  IT 
for certification and verification.  
14  STEFANO INAMA , CHIEF, DIVISION FO R AFRICA, LEAST DEVE LOPED COUNTRIES AND 
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES A T THE UNITED NATIONS  CONFERENCE ON TRADE  AND 
DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD)  
14.1.   Mr Inama discussed the potential for a plurilateral or se ctoral convergence of rules of origin, 
arguing for the need to take a fresh look at product -specific rules of origin (PSROs) and to aspire to 
find convergence on various aspects of such rules rather than aiming at a one -size-fits-all 
harmonization solution.  
14.2.   There had been a  push for the harmonization of rules of origin during the 1990s, and attitudes 
towards such a development had at that time been  very positive . The Uruguay Round had been 
concluded  and expectations had been high. Howe ver, the attitudes prevailing then were  very 
different from those prevailing today . 
14.3.   Part of the challenge of  agreeing to Harmonized Rules of Origin (HRO) at that time was that 
certain RTAs had recently been signed, such as the NAFTA, and delegations had wished to retain the 
rules that they had established under those regimes.  For example, the rules of origin for  horses had 
been discussed at length  between the EU and the US . In the end, the rather obvious conclusion had 
been reached that the origin of a horse was the country in which that horse  had been  born.  The fact 
that countries wished their own  rules of origin to be those  that became the global standard still 
remained one of the major stumbling blocks preventing harmonization . 
14.4.   In order to adopt internati onal disciplines on rules of origin, delegations needed to recognize 
that work in this area was necessary, and that the substance of a rule ( its restrictiveness) was 
different from its form ( its draft), and that the draft results of the HRO could be used as a benchmark 
in the search for convergence in rules of origin . 
14.5.   Neither the RKC nor the ARO indicate d what governmental or intergovernmental authorities 
would be  charged with implementing the AR O. For developing countries , and especially LDCs, 
identifying the responsible authority was one of the major challenges for the implementation of any 
agreement on rules of origin . 
14.6.   Some sectors were  more sensitive, such as textiles in the US, and fisheries in Japan and the 
EU, and such sensitivities could  make convergence in those areas more difficult. In these cases, it 
was still important to identify areas of divergence in order to increase transparency so that 
companies knew what to expect. However, in other sectors, similarities between rules made  
convergence more likely . G/RO/W/196  
 
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  14.7.   UNCTAD had identified many product -specific rules of origin that were totally convergent in 
certain  RTAs ( for example, the USMCA, and the RTA between the EU and Japan). Furthermore, 
divergences had  been divided into options considered  more or less trade restrictive. They had also 
identified that there was a clear tendency toward s convergence in identifying PSROs, which was 
encouraging . 
14.8.   In this regard, Mr Inama advocated for governments to  begin a discussion at multilateral or 
plurilateral level on guidelines for drafting PS ROs, but to aim in such discussions for reasonable 
convergence  rather than full harmonization . 
15  EMMANUELLE GANNE , SENIOR ANALYST, EC ONOMIC RESEARCH AND STATISTICS 
DIVISION, WTO  SECRETARIAT  
15.1.   Ms Ganne explained how the digitalization of trade documents and the use of blockchain 
technology in origin  requirements and trade documentation could greatly simplify and streamline 
rules of origin procedures , while at the same time making all kinds of international transactions more 
secure.  
15.2.   Blockchain was a decentralized, peer -to-peer network, which was highly secure because the 
network was distributed, meaning that there was no central server and therefore no single p oint of 
failure . 
15.3.   Part of the issue with streamlining and digitizing the complicated and multistep processes 
involved in trade was that the technologies had not allowed stakeholders to ensure documentation 
authenticity. However, blockchain technology would solve this problem given  the high level of 
security inherent in the system . 
15.4.   One of the advantages of blockchain was its ability to automate processes, such as , for 
example,  a payment being automatically deposited when a truck crossed a border. In addition,  there 
were already many initiatives that made use of blockchain platforms . 
15.5.   At present , blockchain platforms had the potential to lower the administrative costs generated 
in rules of origin procedures. This technology also had the potential to reduce compl iance costs as it 
could lead to a simplification in the way that rules of origin were established . 
15.6.   The key issues to address before blockchain technologies could begin to make a real impact 
on the facilitation of trade were the following : the recognition of e -signatures and e-documents ; the 
need for a cross -border approach ; regulatory issues ( for example,  the EU  General Data Protection 
Regulation ); legal recognitio n of blockchain transactions (China had made progress on this issue ); 
and challenges for customs , such as the use of different technologies, multiple nodes , and the 
interoperability of various software designs . 
15.7.   If blockchain could create full transparency along the supply chain,  it could eventually even 
eliminate the need for origin certificates. However, for this to be a realistic possibility, there needed 
to be governmental agreement , across the board , on what rules of origin  elements need ed to be 
include d. 
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