RESTRICTED  
  
G/MA/M/79  
 
5 February  2024 
(24-0891) Page: 1/77 
Committee on Market Access    
 
MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON MARKET ACCESS  
16 AND 17 OCTOBER  2023  
CHAIRPERSON: MS  RENATA CRISTALDO OVIEDO  
The Committee on Market Access (CMA, or the Committee) adopted the agenda as reproduced in 
document  WTO/AIR/MA/19/Rev.1 , with the inclusion of the following item under Other Business:  
(i) presentation of the changes to the annotated agenda; and (ii) dates of next meetings.  In addition, 
the European  Union requested to be added as a co -sponsor to Agenda Item 13. The United  States 
requested to be removed as a co -sponsor of Agenda Item 14. Finally, Argentina requested to be 
added as a co -sponsor to Agenda Item 24. An annotated agenda had been circulated in 
document  JOB/MA/169 . 
 
1   INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF 
CONCESSIONS – STATUS REPORT (G/MA/W/158/REV.7; RD/MA/118; RD/MA/119)  ..... 3 
- HS96 (L/6905)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  4 
- HS2002 (WT/L/605, WT/L/807)  ................................ ................................ ............  4 
- HS2007 (WT/L/673, WT/L/830)  ................................ ................................ ............  4 
- HS2012 (WT/L/831)  ................................ ................................ ...............................  4 
- HS2017 (WT/L/995)  ................................ ................................ ...............................  4 
- HS2022 (WT/L/1123)  ................................ ................................ .............................  5 
2   EXTENSION OF THE HS -RELATED WAIVERS  ................................ ................................  5 
3   THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE  
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  ................................ ................................ .......................  5 
4   OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATA BASE (IDB) AND THE  
CONSOLIDATED TARIFF SCHEDULES (CTS)  DATABASE (RD/MA/118; RD/MA/119)  ........  8 
4.1   Status of implementation of the 2019  IDB Decision (G/MA/367)  ................................ ....... 8 
4.2   Status of IDB  notifications (G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.58)  ................................ ...........................  8 
4.3   List of Members' official websites with tariff information and import statistics 
(G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.9)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 9 
4.4   Status of the CTS  database  ................................ ................................ .........................  9 
5   NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION  
PROCEDURES FOR QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS (G/L/59/REV.1)  .............................  10 
5.1   Notifications  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  10 
5.2   Report from the Secretariat (G/MA/QR/13)  ................................ ................................ ... 16 
6   MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS: IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON MARKET ACCESS - REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON (JOB /MA/170)  ....... 16 
7   CMA THEMATIC SESSIONS – REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON  ................................ .... 19 G/MA/M/79  
 
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  8   TRADE -RELATED MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA IN RESPONSE TO THE 
COVID -19 PANDEMIC AND PREPAREDNESS FOR FUTURE PANDEMICS  
(JOB/MA/168) – STATEMENT BY INDIA  ................................ ................................ ........  22 
9   UPDAT E ON G20  TRADE AND INVESTMENT MINISTERS' MEETING OF AUGUST  2023 
AND JAIPUR CALL FOR ACTION FOR ENHANCING ACCESS TO INFORMATION  
FOR MSMES – STATEMENT BY INDIA (RD/MA/120, RD/MA/121)  ................................ .. 23 
TRADE CONCERNS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  23 
New trade concerns  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  23 
10   THAILAND – LICENSING REGIME FOR WHEAT (ID  104) - STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  23 
11   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON PCS, TABLETS, AND OTHER ELECTRONIC 
PRODUCTS (ID  105) - STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................  24 
12   CHINA; HONG KONG, CHINA; MACAO, CHINA - RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS OF 
AQUATIC PRODUCTS FROM JAPAN AFTER THE DISCHARG E OF ALPS -TREATED  
WATER INTO THE SEA (ID  106) - STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ................................ ...............  25 
13   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURE ON GALLIUM AND GERMANIUM PRODUCTS 
(ID 107) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  ................................ ... 28 
Previously raised trade concerns  ................................ ................................ ........................  30 
14   ANGOLA - IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES (ID  46) - STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  30 
15   AUSTRALIA – MATURATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED ALCOHOL  
(ID 94) – STATEMENT BY BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ..................  31 
16   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT (ID  39) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ...........................  32 
17   CANADA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT (ID  79) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ...........................  32 
18   CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES  
(ID 58) – STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ............  33 
19   CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T)  
FOR OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECUR ITY 
SPECIFICATION FOR OFFICE DEVICES) (ID  80) – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ......................  35 
20   CHINA – DRAFT REVISION  OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT  
LAW (ID  81) – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ............  36 
21   DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION ON SOME FOOD  
IMPORTED PRODUCTS (ID  82) – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ......................  37 
22   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (ID  69) – 
STATEMENTS BY CHINA, INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  .........................  38 
23   EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION -FREE COMMODITIES (DFC) (ID  84) – 
STATEMENTS BY INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...... 42 
24   EUROPEAN UNION – MRL REDUCTION OF CERTAIN SUBSTANCES  TO MEET 
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN THIRD  COUNTRIES (ID  86) – STATEMENTS BY 
ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA AND PARAGUAY  ................................ .................  48 
25   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON SHIPMENTS OF WASTE AND AMENDING 
REGULATION (EU) NO.  1257/2013 AND (EU) NO.  2020/1056 (ID  96) – STATEMENT  
BY INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  52 
26   INDIA – BASIC CUSTOMS DUTY (BCD) ON SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND 
MODULES (ID  87) – STATEMENT BY CH INA ................................ ................................ .... 54 
27   INDIA – APPROVED LIST OF MODELS AND MANUFACTURERS (ALMM) OF SOLAR 
PHOTOVOLTAIC MODUL ES (ID  88) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ..........  54 G/MA/M/79  
 
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  28   INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES 
(G/MA/QR/N/IND/2, G/MA/QR/N/IND/2/ADD.1) (ID  36) – STATEMENTS BY 
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA  ................................ ................................ ..............................  55 
29   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES (ID  61) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, 
KINMEN AND MATSU AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ .............  57 
30   INDIA – QUALITY CONTROL ORDER FOR CHEMICAL AND PETROCHEMICAL 
SUBSTANCES (ID  98) – STATEMENTS BY INDONESIA AND THAILAND  ...........................  59 
31   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS (ID  62) – STATEMENTS BY 
JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 60 
32   INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM (ID  99) – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  61 
33   INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS 
(ID 42) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ..............................  63 
34   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN,  
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES , THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND  
QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS (ID  35) – STATEMENTS  
BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  ...........................  64 
35   MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE (ID  64) – STATEMENT BY  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 66 
36   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS (ID  50) – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  ... 66 
37   PERU – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO (ID  74) – STATEMENT BY  
THE UNITED KINGDOM  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 67 
38   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS (ID  56) – STATEMENT  
BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .............................  68 
39   TÜRKIYE – DISCRIMINATORY ADDITIONAL TARIFFS ON ELECTRIC VEHICLES 
(ID 100) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ..................  69 
40   UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY (ID  101) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ...............  70 
41   UNITED STATES, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS  
AGRE EMENT ON CHIP EXPORT RESTRICTIONS (ID  102) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  .........  71 
42   UNITED STATES – A SERIES  OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN (ID  103) – STATEMENT BY 
CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  72 
43   UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA  
(ID 90) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....................  73 
44   UNITED STATES – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF STURGEON 
(ID 91) – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ..........................  74 
45   ELECTION OF THE VICE -CHAIRPERSON  ................................ ................................ ... 76 
46   DRAFT REPORT (2023) OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE  
IN GOODS (G/MA/SPEC/63)  ................................ ................................ ..........................  76 
47   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 76 
47.1   Changes to the annotated agenda  ................................ ................................ .............  76 
47.2   Dates of upcoming meetings  ................................ ................................ ....................  77 
 
1  INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF CONCESSIONS 
– STATUS REPORT ( G/MA/W/158/REV.7 ; RD/MA/118 ; RD/MA/119 ) 
1.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the Secretariat report which had been circulated 
in document  G/MA/W/158/Rev.7 . The report provided an overview of the status of work regarding G/MA/M/79  
 
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  the introduction of Harmonized System (HS)  change s in Members' Schedules. The full version of the 
Secretariat's report and presentation on the various transpositions of WTO  Schedules had been made 
available in document  RD/MA/118  and RD/MA/119 , as well as on eAgenda1 prior to the meeting.  
1.2.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) reported that a  revised version of the status report had 
been circulated in document  G/MA/W/158/Rev.7 . It provide d in one  single document an overview of 
the overall state of play of the different HS  transposition exercises as of 2 7 September  2023, 
including the results of the previous multilateral review held on 3  July 2023.  
- HS96 ( L/6905 ) 
1.3.  The Secretariat (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that there was one  file that remained pending 
since February  2009 in HS  1996, which was the file of the Bol ivarian Republic of Venezuela. T his 
was an ongoing procedure under the separate procedure in GATT  document  L/6905 . 
1.4.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
- HS2002 ( WT/L/605 , WT/L/807 ) 
1.5.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/42/Rev.26 , dated 11  September  2019. The status of the HS2002  transposition 
files after the multilateral review of 3  July 2023 was as follows: 116  files had been certified or were 
in the process of certification; and one  draft file had been completed and sent to the Member for its 
first review. Finally, 18  Members had not been affected by the transposition, as eight  Members had 
accede d to the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in HS  2002, another eight  Members in HS  2007, 
and two  Members in HS  2012.  
1.6.  The Committee took note  of the  Secretariat's  report.  
- HS2007 ( WT/L/673 , WT/L/830 ) 
1.7.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/104/Rev.3 3, dated 26  June 2023. The status of the HS2007  transposition files 
after the multilater al review of 3  July 2023 was as follows: 113 files had been certified or were in  
the process of certification; one  file had been released for multilateral review but would be examined 
at a future meeting as the Member concerned had provided comments; four  draft files had been 
completed and sent to Members for their first  review; and seven  draft files remained to be prepared. 
Finally, 10  Members had not been affected by the transposition as eight  Members had acceded to 
the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in HS  2007 and two  Members in HS  2012.  
1.8.  The Committee took note  of the  Secretariat's  report.  
- HS2012 ( WT/L/831 ) 
1.9.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/129/Rev.19 , dated 26  June 2023. The status of the HS  2012 transposition files 
after the multilateral review of 3  July 2023 was as follows: 105  files had been certified or were in 
the process of certification; two  files had been released for multilateral review and had received 
comment s from other Members; one  file had been released for multilateral review; six  draft files had 
been completed and sent to Members for their first  review; and 19  draft files remained to be 
prepared. Finally, two  Members had not been affected by the transposi tion as they had acceded to 
the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in HS  2012.  
1.10.  The Committee took note  of the  Secretariat's  report.  
- HS2017 ( WT/L/995 ) 
1.11.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report  had been issued 
as document  JOB/MA/143/Rev. 10, dated 26 June 2023. The status of the HS  2017 transposition files 
 
1 https://agenda.wto.org/en/cma . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  after the multilateral review of 3  July 2023 was as fol lows: 89  files had been certified or were in the 
process of certification; five  files had been released for multilateral review and had received 
comments from other Members; three  files had been released for multilateral review; five  draft files 
had been c ompleted and sent to Members for their first review  and 33  draft files remained to be 
prepared.  
1.12.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's  report . 
- HS2022 ( WT/L/1123 ) 
1.13.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) informed the Committee that work concerning the 
introduction of HS  2022 changes to Schedules of concessions using the CTS  database ( WT/L/1123 ), 
had begun  with the development of the program mes to prepare the draft HS  2022 transposition 
files. 
1.14.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's  report . 
2  EXTENSION OF THE HS -RELATED WAIVERS  
2.1.  The Chairperson  recall ed that the General Council ha d agreed to extend the waivers granted 
to a number of Members regarding HS  transpositions by means of a "collective decision". The most 
recent waivers had been  circulated in the following documents: WT/L/1160  for HS  2002; WT/L/1161  
for HS  2007; WT/L/1162  for HS  2012; WT/L/1163  for HS  2017; and WT/L/1164  for HS  2022. She 
noted that  these exemptions w ould expire on 31 December  2023 and that not all Members covered 
by the collective waivers ha d completed the relevant procedures for the transposition  of their 
Schedules.  
2.2.  She therefore propose d that the Committee extend all of these collective waivers  until 
31 December  2024 and forward to  the General Council, through the Council for Trade in Goods, the 
draft waiver decisions granting the extension s, as contained in documents  G/C/W/831 , G/C/W/832 , 
G/C/W/833 , G/C/W/834 , and G/C/W/835/Rev.1 , for appropriate action .2 
2.3.  It was so agreed . 
3  THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
3.1.  The Chairperson  welcome d Ms Gael Grooby, Acting Director of the Tariff and Trade Affairs 
Directorate of the World Customs Organization (WCO) , who report ed on the meeting of the 
Harmonized System Committee that had taken place in September  2023, and which had included 
an item on its agenda relating to the communication that this Committ ee had sent to the 
WCO Committee on the subject of COVID -19 (document  G/MA/406 ). 
3.2.  The representative of the World Customs Organization  indicated the following:  
3.3.  I would like to update the Committee on three  areas today: (i) the extension to the review 
cycle; (ii) the HS  study progress ; and (iii) the WTO  matters currently before the Harmonized System 
Committee (HSC) or the Review Sub -Committee (RSC).  
3.4.  Let us start with the extension of the current HS  Review Cycle . The most important update is 
the extension of th e current HS  review cycle by one  year, to change HS  2027 to HS  2028. As you 
all are aware, the year  2020 presented us with an unprecedented challenge in the form of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, affecting the functioning of the World Customs Organization (WCO) wo rking 
bodies from 2020 to 2022. This pandemic compelled the cancellation of in -person meetings, creating 
substantial obstacles to the progress of the review cycle. The WCO adapted by transitioning to virtual 
and hybrid meetings, ensuring the continuity of the work, but at a cost in productivity. The 
constraints imposed by the reduced hours of virtual meetings have resulted in a significant loss of 
verbal negotiating hours, equivalent to the loss of three  meetings between 2020 and 2022. Despite 
 
2 The General Council Decisions were adopted on 13  December  2023 and circulated in the following 
documents: WT/L/1181  (HS2002); WT/L/1182  (HS2007); WT/L/1183  (HS2012); WT/L/1184  (HS2017); and 
WT/L/1185  (HS2022).  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  determined ef forts to push forward, the RSC found itself facing considerable challenges in finalizing 
amendments for HS  2027, which were due to be finalized this November.  
3.5.  In just one  negotiating meetin g, the 63rd session , scheduled for November  2023, there would 
be nearly 50  items still under negotiation, many of them major proposals encompassing multiple 
changes. In response to this situation, at the end of the 71st session of the HSC , in March  2023, the 
RSC Chair had introduced a proposal from the floor to extend the current HS  review cycle by 
one year. He noted that the alternatives were that either HS  2027 would contain only a few 
amendments, with major proposals with much support delayed until 2032, or discussions would be 
rushed, potentially leading to p roblematic drafting that could not be repaired until 2032. Either 
scenario was undesirable. The possibility of this was foreshadowed during the June  sessions of the 
WCO Policy Commission and Council. At the 72nd HSC session , in September  2023, the matter w as 
debated, and the HSC had unanimously agreed to the extension, with the following conditions : (i) it 
was made clear that this was due to exceptional circumstances , and hence it set no precedent for 
future late changes; (ii) existing proposals were strict ly prioritized; and (iii) the following cycle 
returned to a five -year cycle, giving HS  2028 followed by HS  2033.  
3.6.  The next update I would like to give is on the Exploratory Study for a Possible Strategic Review 
of the HS . The HS  study project is a two -year project that has been running for 14  months, that is , 
since last September. The project team completed the draft interim report and presented it to the 
HSC session in October. This report outlined the preliminary assessment of the issues and potential 
strategies that had arisen from the consultation with stakeholders and the research.  
3.7.  The input identified four  major areas where introduction or improvement of HS  capabilities 
would be required for the HS  system to better meet the future needs identified by st akeholders . 
These were  as follows : (i) a greater capacity to identify goods more specifically; (ii) the ability to 
identify goods using a broader range of non -physical criteria; (iii) improved alignment with the 
development of global policies and policy analysis needs; and (iv) increased simplicity of use.  
3.8.  A wide range of specific problems had also been identified, such as the lack of wide 
understanding of the General Rules of Interpret ation, confusing language, lack of free accessibility 
of the major HS  tools, the need for early and more informative correlation tables, and so on.  
3.9.  The report outlined the preliminary assessment of both the issues and problems raised and of 
the feasibility  of potential strategies for future improvements that may address the gap between 
demand and capacity. The input at the HSC has been supplemented by further written input from 
Members and this will be reflected in the final interim report , which will be pr esented at the 
WCO Policy Commission in December  2023. The draft final report will be presented to the 
March  2024 HSC and then to the WCO  Council in June  2024. 
3.10.  The final m atter that I would like to update you on concerns matters  before the HSC or RSC 
originating at the WTO . Indeed, there are a  number of items under consideration at the HSC and 
RSC that originated from the WTO.  
3.11.  The following is a brief update on exploring options for HS  amendments intended to improve 
transparency in the trade flow of plastic  products. This arose from the Dialogue on Plastic Pollution 
and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (DPP). The request to the HSC was to provide more 
specificity on plastics. As there were no specific draft provisions, the WCO  Secretariat worked 
informally with the Secretariats of the WTO and of various UN  bodies to develop a starting set of 
proposals. These targeted certain problematic plastic products and a few alternatives. The HSC 
agreed to accept this draft proposal as an item to be sent to the  RSC for discussion. It will be 
discussed in November at the RSC.  
3.12.  There are two  items that came under one  agenda item here. We had changes to allow ad hoc 
meetings of the HSC for global emergencies , and the classification of essential medical goods and 
possible amendments to the Harmonized System for such goods (request by the Committee on 
Market Access (WTO)).  
3.13.  There was agreement on the ongoing work on amendments to the HS for medical goods  at 
the last HSC . On the matter of arranging ad hoc meetings, th ere was no support for the amendments 
to the Rules of Procedures as they were presented. However, the HSC did agree  to continue its G/MA/M/79  
 
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  conversation on the matter on the basis of a new working document. It was also decided to separate 
the issues of the HS  amen dments and the possibility of ad hoc meetings for the next session , and 
that the working document on the possibility of ad hoc meetings would incorporate the input from 
the HSC.  
3.14.  Broadly, there was limited support for this despite some understanding of the need for it. 
There were also some interesting proposals raised, affording the Secretariat a greater ability to 
create lists in the case of an emergency, as guidance lists, without having to wait for negotiations 
for approval to be able to depart from norma l practice. We will continue working on this and return 
to the next HSC with some new proposals.  
3.15.  Regarding the possible amendment to the nomenclature in respect of certain facemasks and 
respirators ( a proposal coming from the Committee on Market Access), d ue to the size of the agenda, 
this matter was postponed at the last RSC. It will , however , be further discussed at the RSC in 
November. This was one of those matters that I alluded to before , where time was against us if we 
had an HS  2027. At this stage, i t appears to be slowly moving towards a positive outcome. I hope 
to have more positive news after this or the next RSC , in May  2024.  
3.16.  There is a new item, that is indirectly from this Committee, which is the possible amendment 
to the nomenclature in respect  of vaccines (proposal by the WHO) This item arose out of the 
"Classification of Essential Medical Goods and Possible Amendments to the Harmonized System for 
Such Goods (Request by the Committee on Market Access ( WTO))" item. While the original request 
to amend the HS to cover pandemic vaccines was rejected by the HSC, informal talks between the 
Secretariats of the WTO, the WCO , and the WHO produced a new request, with more specificity and 
wider impact. It will be discus sed at the RSC in November. Thank you for the opportunity to update 
you on the work in the HSC and RSC relevant to the CMA.  
3.17.  The Chairperson  remind ed Members that, at the Committee's formal meeting in April, the 
previous Chairperson  had been asked to share with the Harmonized System Committee the 
document on lessons learned from the experience -sharing sessions on trade in COVID -19-related 
products (document  G/MA/409 ). The Chairperson was  pleased to inform Members  that this 
document  had been shared with the HS  Commi ttee at its September  meeting and been reflected in 
the final report of that session. Regarding the other essential medical products that had been listed 
in the CMA  communication to the HSC  as deserving of clearer classification in the HS, she informed 
the Committee that the Secretariat had begun work , in collaboration with the WCO and the World 
Health Organization , on a proposal to improve the classification of vaccines in the next version of 
the nomenclature , and that the Committee would be kept informed of any development . 
3.18.  The representative of Ecuador  indicated  the following : 
3.19.  Firstly, I would like to thank Ms  Grooby for the report and information  shared. I would like to 
better understand the current situation regarding the proposal on vaccines, which I understand had 
initially been rejected. What is the current situation and the WCO 's analysis ? 
3.20.  The representative of the World Customs Organization  indicated the following:  
3.21.  Yes, the idea had originally been rejected. The view of the HSC was that there was no 
knowledge of what a next pandemic might be, so it was difficult to target, and also that it was of 
limited use once we managed to reduce the need for the COVID -19 vaccine. After discussion s with 
the WHO, a new and far more specific proposal was sent to the WCO last Friday , which lists a wide 
variety of vaccines, enabling us to better understand trade in essential vaccines for both endemic 
diseases and diseases with epidemic or pandemic pote ntial. While the proposal does not specifically 
cater for new vaccines for pandemics, since it is very specific in the types of vaccines covered, you 
will be able to target very precisely any new vaccines for diseases that currently do not have 
vaccines. T he WCO  Secretariat is currently preparing the working document, and it will be discussed 
at the November  RSC, which will be held in the last two  weeks of November. I hope this clarifies  the 
matter , but if there is any further question, do please feel free  to ask it . 
3.22.  The Committee took note  of the  WCO report and the statements made . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  4  OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATA BASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED TARIFF 
SCHEDULES (CTS)  DATABASE ( RD/MA/118 ; RD/MA/119 ) 
4.1.  The Chairperson  indicated that there were  four issues  to be examined : (i) the status of 
implementation of the Decision on the "Modalities and Operation of the Integrated Data Base (IDB)"; 
(ii) the status of communications to the IDB; (iii) the list of Members' official websites; and (iv) the 
status of the Consolidated Tariff Schedules (CTS)  database. In relation to these issues, the 
Secretariat ha d prepared comprehensive reports  and a presentation  that had been circulated prior 
to the meeting in document s RD/MA/118  and RD/MA/119 , and which were also available on 
eAgenda. She propose d that the Committee consider the four  issues individually.  
4.1  Status of implementation of the 2019  IDB Decision (G/MA/367 ) 
4.2.  The Secretariat  (Mr Thomas Verbeet) reported that the Secretariat was updating and 
redesign ing the dissemination tool known as "Tariff Analysis Online" (TAO – http://tao.wto.org ). In 
recent  months, significant progress ha d been made by using more efficient information and cloud 
computing technology, and through the redevelopment of an updated user interface. In close 
cooperation with the WTO's Information Technology Solutions Division ( ITSD), the primary goal was 
to evaluate a more efficient data storage  and access by reviewing the calculations for the indicators 
for publication. A prototype was expected to be presented to Members in early 2024.  
4.3.  He further informed the Committee that three  Members (Canada, Mauritius, and Uruguay) had 
successfully reached agreements with the Secretariat for the automatic electronic transmission of 
data, as outlined in paragraph  8 of document  G/MA/367 . The Secretariat rem ained actively involved 
in discussions with interested delegations, both in Geneva and Capitals , regarding similar 
agreements. Notably, discussions with Norway on an API -based data transfer were advancing  well. 
In addition , the Secretariat has met with the  Philippines. Meanwhile, a parallel project relating to 
automatic data notification for Members utilizing the Automated System for Customs Data 
(ASYCUDA ) had come to a project finish. An ASYCUDA  data module had been implemented in 
Côte d'Ivoire and Madagascar. Despite the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
Togo,  the project had not yet been finalized.  
4.4.  Regarding the third  item, on notification reminders, the Secretariat informed the Committee 
that a  "reminder" to notify outstanding data had been  sent to Members at the beginning of 
September. Following the wish expressed by certain  Members  at the CMA's previous meeting,  those 
reminder letters ha d also been addressed to the delegate  contact details identified for CMA  matters, 
through the WTO  e-registration platform ( https://eregistration.wto.org/e -directory ). He invited 
Members to verify and u pdate all the information in the e -directory.  
4.5.  Finally, he reminded Members that  the current status of data notifications to the IDB could  be 
consulted at any time on the WTO's online Notification Portal .3 The information contained in the 
Notification Portal was very similar to the information in the upcoming agenda item , in 
document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.58 , but given that it was  an online database , the information there  was 
always up to date.  
4.6.  The Comm ittee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
4.2  Status of IDB notifications ( G/MA/IDB/2/ Rev.58) 
4.7.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to the Secretariat's report on Members ' tariffs and 
imports , which had been  circulated in document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.58 . A full version of the 
Secretariat's report and presentation had been made available in documents  RD/MA/118  and 
RD/MA/119 , which had been uploaded to eAgenda  prior to the meeting.  
4.8.  The Secretariat  (Mr Thomas Ver beet) reported that , overall , IDB disseminated data consist ed 
of about 3 ,000 country periods of either applied tariffs or import data at the national tariff line level. 
When examining all the expected annual notifications since 1996, the presently accessible data 
demonstrate d an 83% completion rate. By the cut -off date of 25  September  2023, which had been  
communica ted in the reminders sent to Members , and which fed into document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.58 , 
 
3 https://notifications.wto.org/en/notification -status/integrated -database . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  about half of all applied tariffs, that is, 67 out of 136, were available. Regarding the import data for 
the year 2021 (the data for 2022 was not officially due yet  as it could be submitted until 
end-October  2023) , out of 136  Members expect ing to report import data, the Secretariat had  
received 6 0, which represent ed a little under 44%.  
4.9.  The presentation available in  document  RD/MA/119  showed the number of Members that were 
compliant with the ir notification obligations on tariff and import data. Currently, 44  Members were 
up to date with respect to their tariff data. There were complete sets of 44  Members. The data sets 
of 21 Members  were mostly complete, with only one or two  annual periods missing. 25  Members 
had between three and five  years of outstanding data. Finally, 46 Members had outstanding tariff 
data of six  years or more. He indicated that information on  the import data side  was similar.  
4.10.  The Secretariat further noted that , since the issuance of document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.58 , the 
following additional notifications had been received:  
• Brazil 2022  import  data;  
• Madagascar  2022 tariffs and import  data;  and 
• United States of America import  data with preferential  duty schemes  for 2020, 2021 , 
and 2022 . 
4.11.  All the data was integrated in the IDB database  and the current status of submissions could 
be consulted on the Notification Portal.  
4.12.  The Committee took note  of the Secre tariat's report.  
4.3  List of Members' official websites with tariff information and import statistics 
(G/MA/IDB/W/13/ Rev.9) 
4.13.  The Chairperson  recalled that the 2019  IDB Decision request ed the Secretariat to prepare a 
list of Members' official websites containing tariff information and import statistics. The Secretariat 
had prepared a further revision of that document, had consulted Members informally on it , and had 
circulated it as  document  G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.9 . This information had also been made available on 
the WTO  website .4 
4.14.  The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) indicated the following:  
4.15.  The Secretariat thanks Members that sent updates or confirmed that the information is st ill 
correct. Updates are available not only in this document , but also on the WTO  website. When a 
Member clicks on their profile, there is a section on the left -hand side where this can be seen.  
4.16.  The Chairperson  urged delegations to verify  the relevant links and to inform the Secretariat 
of any changes as soon as possible in order to keep the information up to date. In particular, 
Members should contact the Secretariat when information was missing.  
4.17.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
4.4  Status of the CTS database  
4.18.  The Chairperson  drew the Committee's attention to the Secretariat's report on the status of 
the CTS  database. A full version of the Secretariat's report and presentation had been made available 
in documents  RD/MA/118  and RD/MA/119 , and on eAgenda  prior to the meeting.  
4.19.  The Secretariat  (Ms Alya Belkhodja) indicated the following:  
4.20.  The Secretariat had made CTS  files available to all Members on the Tariff Analysis Online 
system (https://tao.wto.org ). Of the 135  CTS files: 83  had been made available in HS  2017; 21  had 
been made available in HS  2012; 18 in HS  2007; 11 in HS2002; and two remained in HS  96. All 
 
4 https://www.wto.org/english /tratop_e/markacc_e/tariffandimpofwebsites_e.htm . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  legal instruments are available through the Goods Schedule e-Library ( https://goods -
schedules.wto.org ). 
4.21.  Within the framework of revamping TAO, the MAIS  team is working on developing a program 
for additional verification of the CTS  database in order to improve and standardize information in 
the CTS  files. 
4.22.  In addition, the complete CTS  database in MS  Excel is available on TAO. Each Member's file 
reflects the latest information on its bound commitments as included in the CTS  MS Access fil es. 
However, the CTS  files in Excel follow the presentation used in the legal instruments, as in, for 
example, the Uruguay Round Schedule of concessions. The CTS  files in Excel are also available on 
the Members' page of the Goods Schedule e -library website . An updated version of the CTS  Excel 
files was posted to TAO on 22  September  2023.  
4.23.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
5  NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ( G/L/59/REV.1 ) 
5.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the notifications of quantitative restrictions from 
11 Members, two of which ha d been submitted for the first  time and as a result of the training 
workshop that the Secretariat had organized in April. The Secretariat ha d informed the Chairperson  
that a third  notification resulting from the workshop, the complete  notification from Montenegro, 
had been  received afte r the meeting's agenda had closed and would  therefore be considered at the 
Committee's following formal meeting. The Chairperson  propose d that the Committee consider each 
notification in the order in which they were listed in the English version of the Airgram. She proposed 
that, once the Committee  had finished with the notifications, it would  consider the Secretariat's 
annual report circulated in document  G/MA/QR/13 . 
5.1  Notifications  
- Australia  
5.2.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification from Australia that had been  
circulated in  document  G/MA/QR/N/AUS/6/Add.1 . 
5.3.  The Committee took note  of the notification.  
- The Gambia  
5.4.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification from the Gambia  that had be en 
circulated in  document  G/MA/QR/N/GMB/2 . It was  the first  complete  notification prepared by the 
Gambia as a result of its participation in the training workshop on notifications of quantitative 
restrictions. On behalf of the Committee , she congratulate d the Gambia for complying with  this 
notification  requirement.  
5.5.  The Committee took note  of the notification.  
- Hong Kong, China  
5.6.  The Chairperson  drew the Members'  attention to two  new notifications from Hong Kong, China 
circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/HKG/6/Ad d.1 and G/MA/QR/N/HKG/6/Add.2 . 
5.7.  The Committee took note  of the notifications.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  - Kazakhstan  
5.8.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete  notification from Kazakhstan for 
the biennial period  2022-2024 that had been  circulated in  document  G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/4 . 
5.9.  The Committee took note  of the notification.  
- Kyrgyz Republic  
5.10.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to three new notifications from the Kyrgyz Republic 
circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/ Add.25, G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/ Add.26, and 
G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/ Add.27. 
5.11.  The Committee took note  of the notifications.  
- Thailand  
5.12.  The Chairperson  recalled that , at its previous meeting, the Committee had agreed to r evert 
to the notifications from Thailand in documents  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 , G/MA/QR/N /THA/2/ Add.1, 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.2, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.3, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.4, 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.5, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.6, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.7, and  
G/MA/QR/N/THA/3 . Questions remained pending  from the European Union.  
5.13.  The representative of India indicated the fol lowing:  
5.14.  India refers to Thailand 's notification  in G/MA/QR/N/THA/3 , dated 27  March  2023. We seek 
more inputs for the following notifications:  
• Row 5 – Notification of the Ministry of Commerce on the import prohibition of Household 
refrigerator, Combined refrigerator – freezers utilizing CFCs in the pr oduction process, 
dated 13  March  2006 (B.E.  2549) ; 
• Row 12 – Notification of the Ministry of Commerce on the export of rice, dated 
11 April 2012 (B.E.  2555) ; 
• Row 23 – Notification of the Ministry of Commerce on the import prohibition of HCFC -22 
(Chlorodiflu oromethane) based air conditioning equipment with cooling capacity under 
50,000  BTU/hr., dated 16  January  2018 (B.E.  2561) . 
5.15.  India request s Thailand to clarify details of the measures undertaken, the policy objectives  
that they serve , and the HS  codes impac ted by these measures. We appreciate that Thailand's  
delegation may take some time to revert back to us on these questions, so we will request to keep 
this item on the agenda of the Committee's next meeting.  
5.16.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the fol lowing:  
5.17.  Thailand would like to thank India for their interest in our QR  notification. Your comments will 
be conveyed to Capital for consideration.  
5.18.  The Committee took note  of notifications  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 , G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.1, 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.2, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.3, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.4, 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.5, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.6, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ Add.7, and agreed to 
revert  to notification G/MA/QR/N/THA/3  at the Committee's next meet ing. 
- Trinidad and Tobago  
5.19.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from Trinidad and Tobago 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/TTO/1 . This was the first  notification prepared by Trinidad and G/MA/M/79  
 
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  Tobago as a result of its participation in the training workshop on notifications of quantitative 
restrictions. On behalf of the Committee, she congratulate d Trinidad and Tobag o for this notification.  
5.20.  The representative of Trinidad and Tobago  indicated the following:  
5.21.  Thank you for this opportunity briefly to introduce our notification , as contained in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/TTO/1 . The notification relates to measures affectin g exports of ferrous and 
non-ferrous waste and scrap. Through the introduction of these measures, an export licence is 
required for exports of ferrous waste and scrap and an export restriction is in place in respect of 
copper waste and scrap, in particular . As detailed in the notification, these measures were 
implemented:  (i) through amendment of the Export Negative List by means of Legal Notice No.  163, 
thereby requiring an export licence for ferrous waste and scrap ; (ii) through Legal Notice No.  66 of 
2023. In this regard, only manufacturers in possession of copper by virtue of it being a by -product 
or surplus material in respect of their manufacturing process would be allowed to export this 
non-ferrous scrap or waste and would need to apply for and secure  the requisite licence to do so ; 
and (iii)  through proclamation of the Scrap Metal Act, 2022 on 8 May 2023. As detailed in the Act, 
anyone wishing to export scrap metal (with the exception of copper waste and scrap) would need to 
submit an application for the requisite export licence  from the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  
5.22.  As outlined in the notification,  the introduction of these measures followed on from the 
implementation prior to that of a temporary measure, which was effective in reducing incidences of 
criminality relating to the scrap metal industry, including theft and vandalism. It also provided a 
space for work to progress relating to efforts to regulate the sector. The notification points to 
Article  XX of the GATT, and specifically to paragraphs  (a), (b) and (d) should be noted in this regard . 
After careful consideration, the measures outlined in the notification were introduced with the aim 
of curbing illegal and dangerous activity plaguing the domestic scrap metal industry. As stated in 
the notification, a marked increase in scrap metal exports occurred at the same time as a noticeable 
uptick in theft and damage in respect of State -owned infrastructure, including infrastructure relating 
to telecommunications, power generation, the energy sector , and critical road infrastructure. The 
negative implications of such activity for national security in T rinidad and Tobago are evident.  
5.23.  Finally, as outlined in this notification, work is under  way regarding the preparation of another 
notification relating to additional measures. The intent is for a submission to be made in this regard 
in the period ahead. Br oadly speaking, and in keeping with what we have highlighted in this house 
on several occasions, limited compliance with notification and transparency requirements is largely 
due to resource and capacity constraints, as opposed to wilful neglect. In this r egard, and in relation 
to this instance in particular, which is our first notification to this Committee, we take this opportunity 
to recogni ze and commend the capacity -building -related support of the WTO  Secretariat for our 
efforts to comply, despite cons traints, with our notification -related commitments and obligations.  
5.24.  The Committee took note  of the notification and statement made.  
- Ukraine  
5.25.  The Chairperson  drew the Committee's  attention to four  new notifications from Ukraine 
circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.5, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.6, 
G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.7, and G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.8. 
5.26.  The representative of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
5.27.  Allow me to make a brief explanation of Ukraine 's notifications. Despite Russia 's ongoing war 
of aggression against Ukraine, my country continues to fulfil its notification obligations to 
demonstrate our commitment to the fundamental rules of this Organization and to ensure the 
transparency of measures adopted by the Government of Ukraine under martial law.  
5.28.  The introduction of restrictions on export of certain products was a step necessary to ensure 
national food security under constant Russian military action and destruction of ou r agricultural 
infrastructure ( G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.6). At the same time, the relevant export restricting 
measures were regularly reviewed and, to the extent possible, replaced by less restrictive ones, or 
abolished altogether ( G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.5, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.7, and 
G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.8). At present , there are no quantitative restrictions on export s of sugar. G/MA/M/79  
 
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  This measure was in effect for only three months and has not been applied since 
15 September  2023.  
5.29.  In order to ensure proper preparation for the autumn -winter period of 2022/2023 , the 
Government of Ukraine introduced a coking coal licensing and quota regime, that was duly notified 
previously. There was also a need to ensure balance in the energy sector  of Ukraine under martial 
law. When the situation became relatively stabilized, the quota for coking coal export was 
additionally increased to 900,000  tonnes ( G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.8). 
5.30.  Undoubtedly, Russia will continue its abhorrent terror ist attacks against Ukraine 's energy 
infrastructure in the autumn -winter period of this year. On the grounds of security exceptions, fuel 
oil was also subjected to export restrictions. However, the quota for this product is now set at the 
level of 540,000  tonnes ( G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.5). We express our gratitude to all Members that 
stand togethe r with Ukraine in this most difficult and distressing time of Russia 's armed invasion of 
my country. Ukraine will continue to comply with all its obligations as a reliable WTO  Member.  
5.31.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
5.32.  Canada wants to re iterate our appreciation to Ukraine for continuing to update their 
quantitative restriction notifications to the WTO and carrying out their obligations while under an 
illegal invasion. Canada continues to unequivocally condemn Russia 's illegal, unprovoked , and 
unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine, a blatant violation of international law and the rules-based 
international order. While the invasion threatens Ukraine 's participation at the WTO, Ukraine 
continues  to carry out its obligations as a Member as best it  can. Ukraine 's commitment to the 
multilateral trading system and upholding the rule of law while under attack is commendable and an 
example to us all. Canada 's support for Ukraine and its people is unwavering, and we will continue 
to find ways for trade t o support Ukraine to rebuild its economy and its society. This includes the 
recently signed, modernized Canada -Ukraine Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), which we aim to enter 
into force as soon as possible. Finally, we once again call for Russia to immediately  cease all hostile 
actions against Ukraine and withdraw from Ukraine 's territory.  
5.33.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
5.34.  This is to remind Members that the Committee on Market Access is not a platform to raise 
political issues. Discussion s in the Committee are guided by the terms of reference adopted by the 
General Council , and therefore approved by all Members. Over previous meetings, this document 
was quoted multiple times , and hence all Members are familiar w ith it. For this reason, I will refrain 
from citing the terms of reference  of the Committee . I urge those Members that took the floor , and 
those that are going to take the floor under this item , to exercise self -restrain t in wilfully violating 
the Committe e's mandate.  
5.35.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.36.  The European Union  once more commends Ukraine for its effort and commitment to 
transparency through the notification procedure for quantitative restrictions even at a time when 
the country continues to suffer daily from Russia's unprovoked and unjustified aggression.  
5.37.  This commitment to following the WTO rules, even in these extremely difficult circumstances , 
is highly commendable and underscores the continued fundamental importan ce of the rules -based 
international trading system, based on international law.  
5.38.  The European Union once again expresses its full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
people and reiterates its resolute condemnation of the Russian Federation's war of aggression 
against Ukraine, which deliberately violates the UN  Charter and disregards the rules -based 
international order. It undermines international security and stability and has no place in the 
21st century. The European Union's sup port for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, territorial  
integrity , and right of self -defence is unwavering.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  5.39.  The representative of the United States  indicated  the followin g: 
5.40.  The United States again commends Ukraine on its QR  notifications and its steadfas t efforts to 
maintain its WTO  obligations in the face of Russia 's deadly, brutal, unprovoked, and unjustified war 
of aggression against Ukraine.  
5.41.  The United States continues to support Ukraine 's courageous effort to defend itself, uphold 
its territorial int egrity, and protect its population. And we applaud Ukraine for its commitment to 
transparency in this body, in light of all the challenges it faces.  
5.42.  The representative of Switzerland  indicated  the following : 
5.43.  Switzerland would like to thank Ukraine once aga in for its efforts to respect its notification 
obligations despite the situation it finds itself in. In line with preceding delegations, Switzerland 
extends its condemnation of the military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. 
The an nexation of Ukrainian territory by the Russian Federation attacks Ukraine's territorial integrity 
and sovereignty. These are violations of international law.  
5.44.  The representative of Australia  indicated  the following : 
5.45.  Australia would like to thank Ukraine for its notifications and its commitment to 
WTO transparency under very difficult circumstances. We join others in condemning Russia's illegal 
and immoral full -scale invasion of Ukraine,  which is a gross violation of international law. We strongly 
support Ukraine's  sovereignty and territorial integrity. We again call on Russia to withdraw its forces 
from Ukraine's territory.  
5.46.  The representative of Japan  indicated  the following : 
5.47.  Japan strongly condemns Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its attac ks against civilian 
infrastructure and cities across Ukraine. As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings 
during wartime, Japan absolutely cannot accept Russia's nuclear threats, let alone its use of nuclear 
weapons under any circumstances. J apan strongly urges Russia once again to stop the aggression 
and withdraw its forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders 
immediately. Japan will also continue to work firmly on the two  pillars of imposing severe sanc tions 
against Russia and providing robust support to Ukraine, in cooperation with the international 
community.  
5.48.  The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated  the following : 
5.49.  The Republic of Korea thanks Ukraine for its continued efforts to provide it s notifications for 
transparency in the WTO. Korea joins others in strongly condemning Russia's armed invasion against 
Ukraine, as a violation of the principles of the UN  Charter. Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity , 
and independence should be res pected.  
5.50.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
5.51.  It is shameful that the productive work of the Committee is continuously held hostage by a 
handful of WTO  Members to promote their biased views through their deliberate politiciz ation of 
work and confrontational rhetoric. Such unfortunate developments harmfully affect practical 
activities within this Committee and other WTO  working bodies to the detriment of activity to address 
global challenges. Such interventions clearly violate  the mandate of the Committee, waste delegates ' 
time, and aim to justify illegitimate unilateral trade -restrictive coercive measures with extraterritorial 
effect. Such measures are a reason for the breaking of global supply chains, the increased energy 
costs, and the cost of freight and insurance , that have led to growing price level s across the world. 
Widescale economic repercussions in the world could have been avoided if the  WTO Members that 
have just taken  the floor had not breached basic WTO  obligations. I w ill not  list thousands of 
trade-restricting unilateral coercive measures introduced by a number of Members that we have just 
heard from, as we have spoken about these measures multiple times in different WTO  bodies. I 
would just underscore that all additional costs due to unilateral measures are passed on to 
consumers resulting in growing global price level s, including for food prices.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  5.52.  The representative of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
5.53.  Ukraine took note of the comment made by the Russian  Federation, which basically makes a 
tremendous effort to beg for the lifting of the sanctions imposed in response to the invasion of 
Ukraine. Unlike the Russian delegation, I would like to ensure Members that our intervention was 
made within the mandate o f this Committee, dealing specifically with the notifications within the 
realms of our work.  
5.54.  The Committee took note  of the notifications and statements made.  
- United Kingdom  
5.55.  The Chairperson  drew the Committee's attention to a new notification from the United 
Kingdom circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/GBR/2/Add.2 . 
5.56.  The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
5.57.  The United Kingdom  will intervene on notifications by Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The 
notification listed  under this agenda item covers measures implemented since our last biennial  QR 
in September, in relation to sanctions on the Russian Federation.  We also applaud the Delegation of 
Ukraine for fulfilling its commitments to this Committee and the rules -based trading system. But the 
context of these measures could not be further from "business as usual " at the WTO.  
5.58.  The United Kingdom  condemns Russia 's illegal and unprovoked assault on Ukraine, as it seeks 
to use violence to rewrite the rules, redraw borders , and impose its will on the Ukrainian people.  
5.59.  Members of this Committee also bear witness to the coercive restrictions on trade by the 
Russian Federation on Ukraine, through its blockade of Ukrainian ships in the Black Sea and 
subsequent attacks on Ukrainian grain production facilities.  Ukrainian grain has been a lifeline for 
countries on the cusp of famine, supplying 80% of the World Food Programme 's global wheat grain 
delivered to Somalia, Sudan,  and Yemen, among others.  But in just one  month, Russia destroy ed 
enough grain to feed one million people for a year. To be clear, Russia destroyed more grain in a 
month than all the grain it has promised to donate to African countries.  
5.60.  The global trading system cannot return to "business as usual " until Russia ceases  this 
aggression. Until that time, the United Kingdom is committed to standing in support of Ukrainian 
sovereignty and the Ukrainian people.  
5.61.  The Committee took note  of the notification and statements made.  
- United States  
5.62.  The Chairperson  recalled that , at its previous meeting, the Committee  had agreed to revert 
to the notifications from the United States circulated as documents  G/MA/QR/N/USA/2 , 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/3 , G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 , G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/ Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/USA /4/Add.2, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5 , G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/ Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/ Add.2, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/ Add.3, and G/MA/QR/N/USA/6 . Questions were pending from the European 
Union, circulated as  documents  G/MA/W/116  and G/MA/W/127 , as well as from China.  
5.63.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
5.64.  China  noted that the United States had notified its import quotas on steel and aluminium 
products from the Republic of Korea, Argentina,  and Brazil,  under section  232 in its QR  notifications 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 , G/MA/QR/N/USA/5  and G/MA/QR/N/USA/6 . However, the tariff rate quotas that 
the US applies on the steel and aluminium products from the European Union , Japan,  and the United 
Kingdom since 2022 have not yet been included in the QR  notifications. We would like to receive  
clarification from the US about why the TRQs from the EU, Japan,  and the UK are not yet covered in 
the QR  notifications , and when the US will submit the relevant notifications.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  5.65.  The representative of the United States  indicated  the followin g: 
5.66.  The United States  takes note of the comments and questions raised by China regarding the 
WTO consistency of the Section  232 quotas. The United States has invoked Artic le XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 and the actions are therefore wholly consistent with the WTO. Regarding questions 
related to the operation of the Section  232 quotas, we refer Members to the relevant proclamations 
issued under Section  232, and to quota implement ation information published on the website of 
US Customs and Border Protection.  
5.67.  The Committee took note  of the statements made and agreed  to revert  to these notifications 
at its next meeting.  
- Uruguay  
5.68.  The Chairperson drew the Committee's attention to a ne w complete notification from Uruguay 
for the biennial period 2022 -2024, circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/URY/5 . 
5.69.  The Committee took note  of the notification.  
5.2  Report from the Secretariat (G/MA/QR/13 ) 
5.70.  The Chairperson  drew the Committee's  attention to document  G/MA/QR/13 , entitled "Status 
of Notifications under the Decision on the Notification Procedur e for Quantitative Restrictions" , which  
provided an overview of  the status of notifications of quantitative restrictions as of 
29 September  2023. The document showed  a slight improvement  in the notifications as  compared 
to previous years, in particular for  the last three  biennial periods (2018 -2020; 2020 -2022; and 
2022-2024).  
5.71.  She observed that , although the volume and quality of notifications ha d been increasing over 
the past few years, the overall level of compliance with the Quantitative Restrictions Notification 
Decision remain ed relatively low. To  the date of the report , 78 Members ha d never submitted a 
notification of their quantitative restr ictions. In addition, there were Members that ha d notified 
measures introduced in response to the COVID -19 pandemic that had indicated that they would 
submit a full notification with all quantitative restrictions in place at a later date, but ha d not yet 
done so.  
5.72.  She noted that t he workshop  organized by  the Secretariat in April had been  an opportunity 
for Members to better understand how this notification work ed, and as mentioned previously, 
three  new notifications ha d been received as a result of that work shop. She therefore urge d Members 
to comply with this notification obligation and to contact the Secretariat should they need assistance.  
5.73.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
6  MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS: IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON MARKET ACCESS - REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ( JOB/MA/170 ) 
6.1.  The Chairperson  inform ed the Committee about the discussions that Members had had on the 
various proposals to improve the functioning of th e Committee  on Market Access  and then invited 
the Committee  to consider the report that ha d been prepared by the Secretariat at the request of 
the Council for Trade in Goods  (CTG) , circulated in document  JOB/MA/170 . 
6.2.  The Chairperson noted that , following the mandate set out in paragraph  3 of the MC12  Final 
Document, which mandated the General Council and its subsidiary bodies to "conduct the work, 
review progress and consider decisions, as appropriate, to be submitted to the next Ministerial 
Conference" ( WT/MIN(22)/24 ), and upon instruction of the CTG Chairperson , who had requested 
the Chairpersons of the 14  subsidiary bodies to organize discussions in their respective bodies, in 
the context of their formal or informal meetings, on the functioning of their committees 
(JOB/CTG/23 ), the Committee on Market Acce ss was among the first  bodies to initiate such 
discussions , at its first  informal meeting , on 21  February  2023 ( ICN/MA/9  and ICN/MA/9/Add.1 ). G/MA/M/79  
 
- 17 - 
 
  6.3.  She recalled that, a s reported to Members during previous  informal meetings, on the basis of 
suggestions made by Members, on 20  April 2023, the previous Chairperson  had drawn up a 
preliminary li st of issues proposed for discussion by the Committee, which had been circulated in 
document  JOB/MA/162 . In that document, the issues had been grouped taking into account the 
Secretariat's comparison matrix ( G/C/W/824/Rev.1 ), as well as the structure  proposed in the 
preliminary list circulated by the  CTG's Chairperson  (ICN/CTG/9 ). 
6.4.  The preliminary list of issues had been  included on the agenda of the formal meeting of the 
Committee held on 26 -27 April 2023.5 At that formal meeting, it had been noted that the Committee 
on Market Access was a committee that was constantly improving its working procedures and had 
already  been implementing some of the proposals that had been identified in document  JOB/MA/162 . 
At the same time, it had been  noted that there were areas in which the Committee could still improve 
its operation. Due to the lengthy agenda of the April  formal meeting, the Committee  had agreed to 
organize discussions on this item at its subsequent  informal m eeting to allow Members sufficient 
time to review the list, propose new ideas , and have a more in -depth discussion under each item.  
6.5.  The Chairperson recalled that, f ollowing her appointment as Chair person  of the Committee, 
and in preparation for the informa l meeting on 3  July(ICN/MA/10 ), she had asked the Secretariat to 
convert the preliminary list of issues contained in document  JOB/MA/162  into a table showing the 
current status of each proposal to inform Members' discussions  going forward . The draft table had 
been emailed  to Members in the WTO's three official languages on 29  June 2023, and had been used 
during the informal meeting on 3  July to record the discussions held and proposed course of action 
for each item.  
6.6.  On 6 July 2023, as a fo llow-up to the informal meeting, the revised draft table was sent to all 
Members with an opportunity to check the contents and provide comments ( ICN/MA/10/Suppl.1 ). 
The revised table was officially circulated on 18  July 2023, in document  JOB/MA/165 . In this 
document, Members' proposals were divided into three  groups: ( i) proposals that could be 
implemented, or could continue to be implemented, without further action by the Committee; 
(ii) proposals for adoption by the Committee through written proc edures; and ( iii) proposals for 
which no specific follow -up was required because they were being discussed in other bodies 
("horizontal issues") and/or were not dependent on action by the Committee, the Chair person,  or 
the Secretariat. The document also identified proposals whose implementation had budgetary 
implications , and which might not be implemented or might be delayed due to resource constraints.  
6.7.  She recalled that, a s a result of this process, and based on pr oposals from Members, the 
Committee had agreed to introduce 12  improvements to the way  in which  it operate d, of which three 
had been  proposed for adoption by the Committee, and nine where the Secretariat had been  asked 
to introduce changes in the way it support ed the work of the Committee.  
6.8.  As discussed during the Committee's July informal meeting , and as reflected in 
document  JOB/MA/165 , it was proposed to use written procedures for the adoption of 
three  proposals , in line with the practice of other bodies. O n 20 July 2023, the Secretariat had 
circulated document  JOB/MA/166  explaining the written procedures and proposing that the 
three  proposals contained in the annex to this document would be considered adopted by the 
Committee unless any written objection were to be  received by the Secretariat by 4  August  2023. 
As she had already reported to Members at the informal meeting of 18  Septem ber 2023, no Member 
had objected to the adoption of these proposals by the deadline.  
6.9.  The Chairperson explained that , before circulating the final decision, it had nonetheless  been 
considered important to clarify the language of one of the three  proposals, and in particular the 
proposal to set the deadline for closing the agenda to 15 days prior to a formal meeting. This 
clarification had been needed more accurately  to reflect  what the Committee had agreed at the  
July informal meeting , and to avoid divergenc es in the procedures of this Committee from those of 
the CTG, which had already adopted the same decision. For this reason, the Secretariat had 
circulated a corrigendum to document  JOB/MA/166 , on 8 August  2023 with an extension to receive 
comments on this co rrigendum until 15 August  2023.  
 
5 See document  G/MA/M/78 , Agenda Item 10.2.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  6.10.  Following the circulation of the corrigendum, the Chairperson  had been  contacted by the 
delegation of Cambodia, on behalf of the LDC  Group, with some queries regarding the written 
procedure and the proposal to change the date for  closing the agenda. On 11 September  2023, the 
Chairperson had met with the  delegations of Cambodia and Djibouti to answer their questions and 
clarify their doubts. The Ch airperson informed the Committee that, o n 15 September  2023,  the 
Cambodian delegation had confirmed that the LDC Group  no longer had any outstanding queries 
regarding this procedure.  
6.11.  Therefore, at the informal meeting  of the Committee  held on 18 September  2023, the 
Chairperson had  indicated that there were no objections to the adoption of the three  proposals, and 
that the final document would be circulated under the symbol  G/MA/411 . At the same meeting, the 
Committee  was also briefed  on the progress that had been  made in other areas since the 
July meeting. In particular, the following improvements ha d already been made to the work of the 
Committee  on Market Access : 
i. The Secretariat ha d implemented a series of changes and new features to the eAgenda  
to allow delegates to download , from the "download all statements" section , a document 
that compile d all the information shared by Members and the Secretariat during a formal 
meeting. It was explained that the purpose of this document was  not to replace t he 
minutes of the meeting , which the Secretariat w ould continue to prepare , but to provide 
delegates with a compilation of all the information available in the eAgenda under each 
agenda item with a view to  facilitat ing their work in following a formal Comm ittee 
meeting. The Chairperson noted that  the usefulness of this document depend ed very 
much on the information that w ould be available on eAgenda. If, for its part , the 
Secretariat would  upload all its reports, the Chairperson 's statements, as well as 
opening and closing remarks under each item of a meeting 's agenda  as statements, it 
was up to Members also to do their part by upload ing their statements into the system. 
The more information that would be  shared on eAgenda, the more complete a picture 
of the  discussions held w ould be provided in the subsequently generated  report . In her 
view, t his could be very useful for delegates who had to report back to their Capitals on 
what had occurred at the meeting, and also for the Secretariat in preparing the 
meeti ng's minutes6; 
ii. with respect to periodic reminders , the Chairperson indicated that , since the 
July meeting , the Secretariat ha d begun sending reminders about ( i) notifications to the 
Integrated Data Base ; and ( ii) notifications of quantitative restrictions to the email 
accounts of CMA  delegates, in addition to the email accounts of missions. The 
Secretariat ha d made arrangements for this practice to continue in the future. She 
therefore  remind ed delegates to select the Committee on Market Access  in e-
Registration in order to receive this information  as well as any future communications 
from the CMA  Chairperson  or Secretariat, on their own account ; 
iii. with regard to the creation of a Committee on Market Access web page  that consolidated  
all informati on relating to the Committee, including a description of the digital tools 
used by the Committee itself,  in one  single webpage, the Secretariat ha d already 
introduced new web pages for the Council's subsidiary bodies, and the new CMA page 
was available online since 19  September  2023.7 This page contain ed very useful 
information for delegates, such as: (i) contacts for the Secretariat team; (ii) meeting 
dates; (iii) the Secretariat's annual presentation to delegates on the functioning of the 
Committee; (iv) instructions on the work of the Committee; (v) a description of the key 
digital tools and links to access these tools directly from the Committee's webpage; 
(vi) an explanation of the documents published by the Committee, including 
notificat ions; and (vii) other resources. She remind ed Members  that it was necessary 
to log in with their WTO  credentials to view much of this information. She indicated that 
the Secretariat w ould continue to develop material for this web page and invite d 
Members t o contact the Secretariat should they have any comments or suggestions for 
improvement ; 
 
6 The S ecretariat's presentation on the changes to the CMA  eAgenda is available in 
document  RD/MA/117 . 
7 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/markacc_com_e.htm  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  iv. with regard to the online notification system for quantitative restrictions  and the 
suggestion to send a communication to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs (CBFA), 
the Chairperson recalled that she had  met, together with the delegation of Ecuador,  as 
proponent of document  JOB/MA/158/Rev.1 , with the Chair person  of the CBFA  to discuss  
this matter. On that occasion, the CBFA  Chairperson  had indicated that delegations 
interested in obtaining additional resources for the implementation of the 
"reform -by-doing " improvements should make sure to participate in CBFA  meetings as 
this was the best way for them to secure such resources in the budget discussions. She 
therefore encouraged those  delegations interested in expediting the implementation of 
the online notification system for quantitative restrictions to inform their 
CBFA  counterparts of this interest ; and  
v. with regard to the thematic sessions , the Chairperso n recalled that, following  the good 
results of the CMA experience -sharing sessions on trade in COVID -19 goods , Members 
had agree d that the Committee should continue with the practice of organizing thematic 
sessions based on proposals from Members .8 
6.12.  Finally, the Chairperson recalled that m ore information on the proposals for improvements 
that could eventually  be included in the work of the Committee was provided in the draft CMA report 
to the CTG, which had been circulated in document  JOB/MA/170 . This report ha d been prepared at 
the request of the Chairperson of the CTG and was expected to be submitted no later than the 
first week of November , for the CTG's consideration at its next formal meeting , which had been 
scheduled for 30 November  2023. The purpose of the report was to provide an update to the Council 
regarding discussions on measures to improve the functioning  of the CMA. She had instructed the 
Secretariat to email the draft report to Members on  4 October  2023, with one  week for revi ew and 
comments . She informed the Committee that no Member had submitted comments by 
11 October  2023. She therefore proposed that t he Committee adopt the draft report , as contained 
in document  JOB/MA/170 , and submit it to the Council for Trade in Goods for its consideration.  
6.13.  It was so agreed . 
7  CMA THEMATIC SESSIONS – REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, following the positive experience of the 
COVID -19 pandemic -related trade in goods sessions, th e Committee ha d been discussing  since the 
beginning of the year  whether to continue technical discussions, either in the form of 
experience -sharing sessions or in other formats , and on what topics.  The proposals  for thematic 
sessions  submitted by Members ha d been compile d by the former Chairperson  in a preliminary and 
non-exhaustive list circulated in document  RD/MA/110 . Based on this list, a t the informal meeting 
of 3 July 2023 she had invited interested Members to submit concrete proposals for additional 
sessions so that th e Committee could consider such proposals and proceed with the organization of 
possible thematic sessions.  
7.2.  Following the Chairperson's  request, the following three delegations ha d expressed their 
interest in organizing thematic sessions: (i) the United  Kingdom ; (ii) Ecuador;  and (iii) Thailand. The 
delegation of the United  Kingdom had submitted a written proposal on supply chain resilience, which 
had been  circulated in document  JOB/MA/167 , and which was presented at the  CMA's informal 
meeting  of 18 September  2023. At that same meeting, the delegation of Ecuador had taken the floor 
to express its interest in  the topic  "Greening the HS ", and the delegation of Thailand  had suggested 
a thematic session  on quantitative restrictions and how to improve the t ransparency of QR measures.  
She informed the Committee that  the delegation of Thailand ha d withdrawn its proposal on 
quantitative restrictions. With respect to Ecuador's proposal, she asked the delegation  of Ecuador  to 
submit its proposal in writing so tha t the Committee c ould discuss it at its next informal meeting , on 
21 November.  
7.3.  Regarding the United Kingdom's proposal on supply chain resilience, she recalled that the 
Committee had heard a first  presentation of this proposal at its informal meeting on  18 September. 
Recognizing the interest of Members in addressing this topic at a technical level within the framework 
of the CMA, she proposed that the Committee begin to consider whether and when to hold thematic 
sessions on this topic.  To this end, o n 2 October  2023, the Chairperson had  invited all Members to 
 
8 See Agenda Ite m 7. G/MA/M/79  
 
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  open informal consultations  in which the following four questions  were to be addressed : (i) what 
specific topics in relation to supply chain resilience would Members like to explore in the Committee 
on Market Access, taking into account the Committee's terms of reference ; (ii) what format should 
these sessions take; (iii) should the Committee invite external stakeholders ( such as other 
international organizations, the private sector, and academia) to share their views on the topic; and 
(iv) what could be a possible schedule for these sessions ?9 
7.4.  The Chairperson reported that, as a result of Members' interventions  at the consultations , there 
was support for the organization of thematic sessions on supply chain resilience in the Committee 
on Market Access.  
7.5.  With regard to the specific topics that the Committee could explore, and taking into account 
the Committee's terms of reference,  she reported t hat Members  had indicated that supply chain 
resilience was a very broad concept that c ould mean different things to different Members. For this 
reason, it had been  suggested to start with an introductory session, with presentations by 
international organiz ations, that could define what is meant by resilience of supply chains and which 
related topics may be relevant to the work of the Committee.  
7.6.  It had also been suggested that external stakeholders, and in particular other international 
organizations, be inv ited as speakers to the introductory session to provide their definition of supply 
chain resilience and lay the groundwork for subsequent experience -sharing sessions among 
Members. In considering which stakeholders to invite, Members felt that it would be important to 
invite  a variety of organizations, and also to include the perspective s of both developed and 
developing Members , including those of least developed Members . 
7.7.  In terms of format, delegations  had agreed to use the same format that was used for t he 
experience -sharing sessions on COVID -19, in particular as concerned the technical focus of the 
discussions.  With regard to a possible schedule for these sessions, it had been  pointed out that the 
next few months w ould be very intense and full of meeting s due to the preparations for the WTO's 
13th Ministerial Conference ; therefore, in order to ensure the active participation of Members, it was 
suggested to postpone such sessions until after the Ministerial Conference. She reported that , at the 
same , there  was no opposition to  the organiz ation of  an introductory session with the international 
organizations in November  2023, in conjunction with the informal meeting  of the  Committee.  
7.8.  The Chairperson  therefore  asked whether the  Committee  could agree to  proceed with the 
organization of a first introductory session on the definition of supply chain resilience with the 
participation of other international organizations on 21 November  2023, in conjunction with the 
Committee's next informal meeting. The obje ctive of this introductory session would be to better 
understand what was meant by supply chain resilience in order to provide Members with a conceptual 
framework from which they c ould take up and develop some issues in the framework of the 
Committee.  
7.9.  The representative of  Canada  indicated  the following:  
7.10.  Canada supports holding an introductory session , as proposed by the Chair. A focused 
discussion on defining the concept of supply chain resilience will help to ensure future discussion 
and experience -sharin g sessions remain within the scope of the Committee.  
7.11.  The representative of  India indicated  the following:  
7.12.  India appreciate s the efforts taken by you , Chair, and supported by the Secretariat , to move 
this discussion forward . The informal discussions on 2  October were constructive. We support 
inter-governmental organizations presenting their view s on supply chains, such that the 
Member -driven characteristic of the WTO is preserved. We remain open to the idea of scheduling 
this discussion in November, such tha t the CMA can organize thematic discussions on resilient supply 
chains after MC13.  
7.13.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated  the following:  
 
9 See document  ICN/MA/12/Suppl.1 . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  7.14.  The European Union  would once again express our appreciation to the Chair for bringing this 
process forward , as well as to the United Kingdom for their proposal on holding thematic sessions 
on supply chain resilience in the CMA.  The European Union  agrees with the proposed timeline , 
starting with holding a first  introductory session on the concept with th e participation of other 
international organizations at the Committee's next informal meeting , in November.  
7.15.  The representative of  China  indicated  the following:  
7.16.  China  thank s the Chair for the report. We also appreciate your consultation on this matter.  
We have tabled a proposal regarding the supply chain issue in the General Council, which shows our 
great interest in this topic. We support this thematic session.  
7.17.  As for the time -frame of this thematic session, considering the heavy workload Members have 
before MC13, China  prefer s to have these  thematic sessions after MC13, to allow Member s to have 
enough time to prepare for the discussions. We can go along with the suggestion regarding inviting 
international organizations to have an introductory session on the supply chain issue in November.  
7.18.  China  thinks further consultations are needed to collect Members ' ideas about the format and 
content of the thematic session. We have some areas  of interest to us , such as supply chain logistics, 
private sector experiences  and practices, and regional cooperation. We will continue actively 
participating in the relevant discussions.  
7.19.  The representative of  the United States  indicated  the following:  
7.20.  The United States  thank the United Kingdom for its proposal of a thematic discussion on 
supply chain resilience and we thank other Members for sharing their views at the open -ended 
consultations  and for the Chair for facilitating that conversation . 
7.21.  The United States supports holding the first  introductory session on 21  November  2023.  We 
very much look forward to this and the future sessions , and remain ready to assist with their planning 
and preparation.  
7.22.  The representative of  the United Kingdom  indicated  the following:  
7.23.  The United Kingdom  would like to convey our thanks t o the Chair person, to the Secretariat , 
and to the wider Membership in supporting these discussions , which we think are incredibly valuable 
already, even at a technical level. We would also very much welcome the momentum that a session 
on 21  November , led by international organizations , could help  to bring, and look forward to support 
on that . 
7.24.  The representative of  Ecuador  indicated  the following:  
7.25.  I would like to thank the Chair for your efforts , and the United Kingdom for their proposal on 
supply chain resilience. As Ecuador said during the informal consultations, we believe it would be 
useful to have a meeting in November to set the scene and identify relevant issues that could be 
developed further into thematic sessions for 2024. My delegation is worki ng on the details of its 
proposal on "Greening the HS", which we will submit before the November meeting.  
7.26.  The representative of  Thailand  indicated  the following:  
7.27.  Thailand thank s the United Kingdom and Ecuador for their submissions. It is unfortunate that 
we have had to drop our earlier proposal, but we are more than willing to support and actively 
participate in an introductory session and the discussions or organization of this thematic session. 
We support the idea of having an introductory session in November. We also support the idea of 
having a discussion regarding the organization of these thematic sessions after MC13.  
7.28.  The Chairperson  proposed that  the Committee take note  of the statements made and agree d 
to organize a first  session with the participation of other international organizations on 
21 November  2023, on the margins of the Committee 's next informal meeting . To this end, she 
invited delegations to contact her or the Secretariat ( cma@wto.org ) to indicate which organizations 
should be invited  as speakers no later than Tuesday, 31 October  2023. She also indicated that t he G/MA/M/79  
 
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  session would  be confirmed once there were enough speakers , and that a n email confirming the 
session and proposing a draft program me would be sent to all Members in due course.  
7.29.  It was so agreed . 
8  TRADE -RELATED MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA IN RESPONSE TO THE 
COVID -19 PANDEMIC  AND PREPAREDNESS FOR FUTURE PANDEMICS ( JOB/MA/168 ) – 
STATEMENT BY INDIA  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of India.  
8.2.  The representative of  India indicated  the following:  
8.3.  The COVID -19 pandemic was a difficult time for the world, with unprecedented collective 
suffering , significant loss of human life , and unprecedented economic losses. This Committee was 
at the forefront of pandemic -related discussions in the WTO, organizing extremely valuable informal, 
thematic discussions on how different WTO  Members were handling  the crisis. For this effort, we 
commend the previous two  Chairpersons  of the CMA , as well as the Secretariat.  
8.4.  As a developing country with the world's second -largest population of about 1.4  billion people , 
India was also impacted by the COVID -19 pandemic. The Government of India responded to the 
COVID -19 crisis with a whole -of-government approach, including the effective use of relevant trade 
policy instruments. The policy measures undertaken b y India in the area of healthcare, food security, 
services sector, trade facilitation , and international cooperation were significant for us in responding 
to, and recovering from , the pandemic. These measures can also be used as a trigger -ready 
mechanism t o respond to future pandemics. Given the mandate of paragraphs  23 and 24 of the 
WTO's Ministerial Declaration on the response to the pandemic ( WT/MIN(22)/31 ), my delegation 
submitted document  JOB/MA/168  for information on such pandemic response measures. While the 
document is detail ed, I would highlight the following areas related specifically to trade:  
• Supplying C OVID -19 vaccines to around 100  countries/customs destinations and 
medicines to around 150  countries/customs destinations ; 
• domestically administering 2.2  billion doses of vaccines, ensuring that India does not 
crowd out the market for a supply -restricted commodity ; 
• efforts made alongside South Africa in the WTO for a TRIPS  waiver for 
COVID -19 vaccines, therapeutics and diagnost ics with the cooperation of a large 
number of WTO  Members ; 
• leveraging digital healthcare within the country to promote and develop the 
telemedicine sector ; 
• sharing healthcare -related Digital Public Goods expertise with other countries ; 
• keeping India's thriving services sector open for business through the pandemic, which 
ensured business -as-usual operations in several critical sectors of the global economy ; 
• ensuring food security for the large Indian population, demonstrating that public 
stockholding is a c ritical aspect of agriculture trade policy. This effort also ensured that 
India did not crowd out international food stocks, thus making the scarce commodities 
accessible, available and affordable for other Members ; 
• rapid digitalization of border customs m easures and trade processes, promoting trade 
facilitation using technology ; and  
• working with many other countries through the pandemic towards  keeping supply 
chains open amidst a tough operational environment. For this cooperation, we thank 
our internation al trade partners.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  8.5.  India hopes that this document compilation is helpful in the spirit of experience -sharing and 
information exchange. We remain available to address any queries.  
8.6.  The representative of  the United Kingdom  indicated  the following:  
8.7.  The United Kingdom  wants to thank India for circulating this paper and we commend them for 
the level of detail they have provided. The importance of transparency was a key reflection 
throughout the pandemic experience -sharing sessions, and this paper sets the tone for the degree 
of transparency and the spirit of cooperation that should characteri ze the work of this Committee. 
Members stand to benefit from this paper as a useful case study to reflect on their own approaches 
to the COVID -19 pandemic and future pandemics, so we would encourage all to read it.  
8.8.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
9  UPDATE ON G20  TRADE AND INVESTMENT MINISTERS' MEETING OF AUGUST  2023 AND 
JAIPUR CALL FOR ACTION FOR ENHANCING ACCESS TO INFORMATION FOR MSMES  – 
STATEMENT BY INDIA ( RD/MA/120 , RD/MA/121 ) 
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of India.  
9.2.  The representative of  India indicated  the following:  
9.3.  Under  the ongoing G20  presidency of India, the G20  Trade and Investment Ministerial Meeting 
(TIMM) was held in August  2023. This meeting focused on easing barriers to international trade and 
investment; helping boost productivity and output and fostering economic growth and prosperity for 
all. While addressing the o pening session of TIMM in Jaipur, Rajasthan, Hon ourable Minister of 
Commerce and Industry Shri Piyush Goyal encouraged the Ministers from G20 and other invitee 
countries to work collectively to achieve concrete, decisive and action -oriented outcomes. This 
session resulted in a TIMM  declaration, which also included the Jaipur Call for Action for enhancing 
access to information for MSMEs. This agenda item has been added to share an update with the 
WTO delegates from this declaration, with the outcomes being r elevant to our ongoing work in this 
Organization .10 
9.4.  The Committee  took note of the statement made.  
TRADE CONCERNS  
New trade concerns  
10  THAILAND – LICENSING REGIME FOR WHEAT ( ID 104) - STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union.  
10.2.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
10.3.  First of all, the European Union  would like to note that , while this item appears under new 
trade concerns, it is in fact a long -standing item that had been previously discussed under Agenda 
Item 5 (Notifications Pursuant to the Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative 
Restrictions). As highlighted in previous meetings, Thailand's import licensing requirements for feed 
wheat are non -automatic licensing requirements and should have been included in Thailand's 
QR notification. The EU also reiterates its long -standing deep concerns on the import procedures for 
feed wheat, including the local corn purchase requirement, introduced by Thaila nd in late  2016. 
These have been in place for more than six  years , although presented as of "temporary nature" – 
and remain, despite the increase in average domestic corn prices over the last years.  
 
10 The presentations by India can be found in documents  RD/MA/120  and RD/MA/121 . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  10.4.  Thailand put in place temporary suspensions of its local corn purchase requirement from May 
to July  2022 and for imports of 130,000  tonnes of feed wheat in 2023 for seven  shrimp feed millers 
in response to complaints over increasing production costs. These are a clear indication that the 
measure is not temporary . The system in place raises questions in terms of its WTO compatibility , 
as well as in terms of transparency in the decision -making process. The EU welcomes the 
announcement by the new Prime  Minister of Thailand that his government will not pursue any 
agriculture price intervention measures as they are market distortive.  
10.5.  The European Union  asks Thailand about the timeline for the discontinuation of the corn 
deficiency payment scheme. The EU requests Thailand to discontinue , in the same vein , the distortive 
feed wheat import licence regime in place since 2017.  The EU refers to the detailed points raised in 
the last meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing. We urge Thailand to address the concerns 
that we have repeatedly expressed.  
10.6.  The repr esentative of  Thailand  indicated  the following:  
10.7.  Thailand thanks the European Union for its continued interest and enquiries regarding 
Thailand's import policy for wheat. We greatly appreciate the EU's engagement on this matter.  We 
wish to confirm that Thai land has taken good note of the concerns raised by the European Union 
today, as well as those previously discussed in the meetings of the Committee on Market Access and 
Committee on Import Licensing. These concerns have been duly conveyed to our Capital for careful 
consideration.  
10.8.  Thailand wishes to reaffirm our commitment to our obligations under the WTO. We would like 
to refer to our previous statements made in the recent meetings of the Committee on Market Access 
and the Committee on Import Licensing. We wish to reiterate that the review of the wheat import 
measure is an ongoing process, and that consultations with the relevant stakeholders on this 
important crop are currently in progress.  
10.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
11  INDIA – IMPORT  REST RICTIONS ON PCS, TABLETS, AND OTHER ELECTRONIC 
PRODUCTS ( ID 105) - STATEMENT BY CHINA  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
11.2.  The representative of  China  indicated  the following:  
11.3.  On 3  August  2023, India abruptly announced that a licensing requirement for importing 
laptops, tablets, and personal computers would be imposed immediately. One  day after the initial 
announcement, India decided to delay the implementation of the licensing requirement until 
1 November  2023. Recently it has been reported that an import registration management syst em 
may be implemented instead of the import licensing requirement. We would like to seek clarifications 
from India with regard to these rapidly changing measures , and an explanation of the purpose of 
these policies . We encourage India to ensure that its relevant measures comply with WTO  rules.  
11.4.  The representative of  the United States  indicated  the following:  
11.5.  The United States  is concerned that India 's new import licensing requirements for computers, 
tablets, and servers will have a significant impact on trad e in these products, including for US  exports 
to India, once implemented.  We are also concerned about the manner in which these new regulations 
were developed. There was no notice or opportunity for public comments. Detailed information about 
how the requi rements would operate has not been provided, creating uncertainty for exporters and 
downstream users.  We welcomed the news that implementation may be delayed, but request that 
India rescind the requirements, in light of their potential impact on trade and WTO requirements.  
The surprise announcement of these import licensing requirements, without notice or opportunity 
for public comment, prompts U S and other firms to think twice about doing business in India, making 
it harder for India to generate the type o f manufacturing jobs it is intending to create.  
11.6.  The representative of  Chinese Taipei  indicated  the following:  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  11.7.  Chinese Taipei would like to echo the concern about India 's announcement to impose import 
measures on personal computers, laptops, tablets and other electronic items falling under 
HS Code 8471 , starting from 1  November  2023. Such adopted measures have the effect of 
quantitative restrictions , leading to protection of India's domestic industry. We urge India to explain 
the rationale behind this re strictive measure. We also urge India to cease adopting any import 
licensing measures that create trade distortive or restrictive effects. We also call on India to adhere 
to the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. This is crucial to ensure 
that non -automatic licensing regime s not have any trade restrictive or distortive effects. We further 
request India to observe the principle of transparency by publishing sufficient information to enable 
other Members and traders to know its basis for granting licences, as well as  details relating to the 
administration of the restrictions.  
11.8.  The representative  of the Republic of Korea  indicated  the following : 
11.9.  The Republic of  Korea shares the concerns expressed by previous speakers regarding I ndia's 
import restrictions on PCs, tablets, and other electronic products.  Korea believes that the proposed 
measures seem inconsistent with the WTO's rules, specifically Article  XI of the GATT  1994, and could 
consequently create unnecessary trade barriers.  While the implementation has been delayed until 
31 October, once enacted , from 1 November, they will present significant challenges by limiting 
imports. Therefore, the Republic of Korea requests that India reconsider the implementation of  these 
measures and provide detailed clarification  and information  on this issue, including its timeline.  
11.10.   The representative of  India indicated  the following:  
11.11.   India has taken good note of the statements made by the delegations of China,  the Republic 
of Korea, Chinese  Taipei , and the United  States today. Our Capital will examine the issue and the 
questions raised.  
11.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
12  CHINA; HONG KONG, CHINA; MACAO, CHINA - RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS OF 
AQUATIC PRODU CTS FROM JAPAN AFTER THE DISCHARGE OF ALPS -TREATED WATER 
INTO THE SEA ( ID 106) - STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan.  
12.2.  The repr esentative of  Japan  indicated  the following:  
12.3.  On 24  August, China ; Hong Kong, China;  and Macao, China imposed an import restriction 
measure on Japanese aquatic products, and on other foodstuffs in Macao, China, following the 
discharge of Japan's Advanced Li quid Processing System (ALPS) treated water.  Japan's position is 
as set out in the communications circulated by the Secretariat on 4 and 27  September respectively, 
and we will not go into details on our position again today. However, Japan would like to st ress that 
the discharge of ALPS-treated water into the sea has been carried out, in accordance with 
international safety standards and practices, after taking all possible safety precautions. 
Furthermore, as the I nternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s  comprehensive report indicates, 
the discharge of ALPS-treated water into the sea has negligible impact on human health and the 
environment.  
12.4.  In addition, following the discharge of the ALPS-treated water, the Government of Japan , with 
the support of independent international experts from the IAEA  Task Force , and with the continuous 
involvement of the IAEA, including IAEA -led reviews, has carried out monitoring relating to the 
concentration of radioactive substances and has also published the results i n a timely and 
transparent manner.  
12.5.  Japan is committed to taking appropriate measures, including the suspension of any 
discharges in the event that the monitoring indicates that the concentration of radioactive material 
exceeds the level at which discharges  should cease. The fact that these three  Members have imposed 
import suspension measures on Japanese aquatic products and on other foodstuffs in Macao, China 
is not based on scientific grounds and is totally unacceptable. In fact, the value of Japanese sea food 
exports to China this August fell by approximately 66% compared to the same month last year. G/MA/M/79  
 
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  Thus, access to markets for Japanese fishery products and foodstuffs has been significantly 
hampered, causing significant economic damage to domestic fisherme n and other stakeholders. 
These measures are clearly contrary to Article  XI:1 of the GATT (General elimination of quantitative 
restrictions) and Japan strongly urges China ; Hong Kong, China;  and Macao, China to immediately 
cease such measures.  
12.6.  Furthermore,  today, Russia announced its intention to join China's measure and its decision 
to strengthen import restriction measures for Japanese aquatic products. This measure is unjustified, 
is not based on scientific grounds , and is also totally unacceptable as it  goes against the international 
trend towards easing or eliminating import restrictions on foodstuffs from Japan. Japan strongly 
urges Russia to immediately cease such a measure.  
12.7.  The representative of  the United States  indicated  the following:  
12.8.  The United S tates takes note of Japan 's intervention, and its concern that China ; Hong Kong, 
China;  and Macao, China continue to apply a trade restrictive measure to suspend imports of Japan 's 
aquatic products without justification.  The US reiterates that it shares Hong Kong, China 's concerns. 
We urge China ; Hong Kong, China ; and Macao, China to immediately repeal their measure.  
12.9.  The United States agrees with the position of the IAEA and other international bodies, after 
rigorous safety reviews, that the discharge of ALPS-treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station does not pose a concern to public safety, and that the discharge will have a 
negligible impact on any concentrations of elements in international waters. The three  Members ' 
implementation of  the measure cannot be regarded as being based on scientific principles.  The US 
notes reports that China 's own active nuclear power plants annually release several times more of 
certain radioactive compounds, such as tritium, than will be released by the F ukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station. This undermines claims from China about their concern over the same 
compounds for safety reasons.  
12.10.   The United States further notes evidence of numerous Chinese -flagged vessels fishing in the 
same waters China has bann ed Japanese imports and subsequently selling their seafood in China as 
domestic products.  These reports further corroborate the position of Japan  that there is no legitimate 
scientific -based concern underlying this measure.  The United States reiterates our systemic concern 
with the broad range of restrictive measures China has imposed upon a number of WTO  Members 
in an abusive, arbitrary, or pretextual manner.  
12.11.   The representative of  the United Kingdom  indicated  the following:  
12.12.   The United Kingdom  would like to reiterate its full support for the Government of Japan 's 
decision to discharge Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water from the Fukushima  
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the Pacific Ocean. We would also like to restate our fu ll satisfaction 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency  (IAEA) 's monitoring and judgement that Japan 's 
release of treated water from the Fukushima  Daiichi nuclear site is safe and consistent with 
internationally accepted nuclear safety standards. We ar e therefore troubled by the imposition of 
new import restrictions on all aquatic products from Japan by China, as well as new partial import 
restrictions by Hong Kong, China and by Macao, China, despite the fact that this practice is 
scientifically robust,  safe, and compliant with international regulations.  
12.13.   The United Kingdom  asks China to clarify its concerns in light of the decision of the IAEA and 
the routine nature of the aqueous discharges of tritium, which is a standard practice throughout the 
nuclear  industry globally. We hope that China will engage constructively and transparently with these 
concerns, raised both here and in other Committees.  
12.14.   The representative of  Canada  indicated  the following:  
12.15.   Canada acknowledges the conclusions of the Internationa l Atomic Energy Agency  (IAEA)' s 
Comprehensive Report on the Safety Review of the ALPS -Treated Water at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station. Canada 's veterinary and public health authorities have concluded that the 
release of this treated water by J apan does not constitute a food safety concern. Canada believes 
that SPS -related trade measures should rely on science -based evidence , in accordance with the 
obligations of the WTO  SPS Agreement . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  12.16.   The representative of  the European Union  indicated  the following:  
12.17.   The European Union  takes note of the Japanese government 's decision to release treated 
water from the Fukushima power plant into the sea. Any analysis must be based solely on facts and 
scientific grounds.  The comprehensive report of the International Atomic Energy Agency  (IAEA)  of 
4 July 2023 assessed that the Japanese approach is consistent with the highest nuclear international 
safety and radioactivity standards. The EU supports the IAEA 's continuous efforts to provide technical 
assistance  in reviewing the safety of the discharge of treated water and to provide continued 
independent monitoring.  The involvement of the IAEA is key to ensur ing science -based credibility 
and transparency in the monitoring process.  We invite the Japanese authorit ies to continue providing 
regular updates on the Fukushima status in a timely and transparent manner.  
12.18.   The representative of  Australia  indicated  the following:  
12.19.   Australia acknowledges Japan 's statement and its concerns regarding this measure.  Australia 
notes  the importance of measures being based on evidence and scientific risk assessments.  We are 
following this development closely.  
12.20.   The representative of  Macao, China  indicated  the following:  
12.21.   Macao, China has noted Japan 's communications in 
document  G/SPS/GEN/1233/Rev.6/Add.3 . I do not have any information off -hand for the time being, 
but it will be reported to the home government for consideration.  
12.22.   The representative of China  indicated the fo llowing:  
12.23.   China thank s the relevant Members who mentioned International Atomic Energy Agency  
(IAEA)  report just now. However, the IAEA's Director General said in July that the IAEA report is 
neither a recommendation nor an endorsement of Japan 's decision to release the treated water 
stored at the Fukushima Daiichi power station.  
12.24.   As regards to the data on the nuclear contaminated water discharged by Japan into the sea, 
due to the limited number of water samples being examined , the data cannot eas e public concerns 
on environmental and food safety and the public health. China is a neighbouring Member of Japan 
and an important importer of Japanese aquatic products . China has repeatedly raised serious 
concerns on this matter because we believe that nu clear-contaminated water discharged into the 
ocean will impose serious risks to environmental safety, food safety , and public health. We have 
taken precautionary emergency measures to suspend the import of aquatic products originating 
from Japan since 24  August, in accordance with relevant Chinese laws and regulations , and the 
SPS Agreement of the WTO.  
12.25.   The measures that we are taking are to protect the health of Chinese consumers and to 
ensure the safety of imported food. They are fully justified, reasonable , and necessary. We reiterate 
that the measure s that we are taking are precautionary emergency measures. We urge Japan to 
assess the huge risks to global food safety caused by Japan 's discharge of nuclear -contaminated 
water into the ocean, in a science -based, responsible, sincere , and transparent manner. We request 
Japan to comprehensively collect data and conduct ri sk assessment s, and to provide the relevant 
assessment reports to China in a timely manner. China will exam and analyse the relevant data and 
reports provided by Japan and take appropriate action based on our assessment.  
12.26.   The representative of Hong Kong, Ch ina indicated  the following : 
12.27.   Despite the repeated concerns that Hong Kong, China has conveyed to Japan at the bilateral 
level, the Japanese government has persisted in its decision to proceed with the discharge of 
nuclear -contaminated water from the Fukush ima Nuclear Power Station. This water has been in 
direct contact with the active raw materials of the nuclear reactors , and contains a high concentration 
of various types of radioactive substances, including some with long half -lives. The discharge of 
treated nuclear -contaminated water is an unprecedented action and will last for 30  years or more. 
It is essential to note that , while tritium can be diluted, it cannot be entirely removed from the water. 
Consequently, the risk of other radioactive substances p otentially escaping along with tritium into 
the treated nuclear -contaminated water at any moment in time cannot be entirely ruled out.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  12.28.   Given the uncertainty over the effects of the radionuclides on the food chain, which may 
have harmful effect s on human he alth, and the need to further observe whether the dilution and 
discharge system will operate as intended, Hong Kong, China can only have a more accurate 
assessment of the impact of the discharge sometime after the commencement of the discharge, 
when more s urveillance data is available.  
12.29.   Considering the aforementioned risks, Hong Kong, China must take corresponding 
precautionary measures to prevent or reduce the possibility of danger to public health or to mitigate 
any adverse consequence of a danger to public health. As a result, in response to Japan's initiation 
of the discharge of treated nuclear -contaminated wast e, Hong Kong, China has made the decision 
to suspend the import of aquatic products, sea salt, and seaweeds originating from Fukushima and 
nine nearby metropolises/prefectures.  Hong Kong, China will continue to maintain close 
communication with Japan to closely monitor the latest situation regarding import of food from Japan 
and the discharge plan of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station , and per form risk assessments to 
help safeguard the food safety and public health of citizens in Hong Kong , China . 
12.30.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following : 
12.31.   Japan appreciates the comments made by Australia, Canada, the European Union, the United 
Kingdom , and the United States. With regard to the comments of China; Macao, China; and Hong 
Kong, China , Japan's position is as already stated and will not be repeated, but the measures in 
question are not based on scientific evidence and are totally unacceptabl e. These measures are 
clearly contrary to Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, and Japan strongly urges China; Hong Kong, 
China ; Macao, China ; and the Russian Federation to immediately repeal such measures.  
12.32.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
12.33.   China would like to point out that Japan 's discharge of 1.3 billion ton nes of 
nuclear -contaminated water into the ocean for 30  years is unprecedented in history. This creates 
huge uncertainty in terms of food safety and public health. China is a neighbouring  Member of Japan 
and import s a lot of aquatic food from Japan . It is fully justified, reasonable , and necessary for China 
to take precautionary emergency measures to protect its consumers ' health and environmental 
safety.  It also need s to be pointed out that the water discharged by Japan into the ocean is 
nuclear -contaminated water resulting from an accident , which is completely different from water 
normally produced by nuclear power plants worldwide.  
12.34.   The Committee took note  of the stat ements made . 
13  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURE ON GALLIUM AND GERMANIUM PRODUCTS 
(ID 107) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union and Japan.  
13.2.  The representative of  Japan  indicated  the following:  
13.3.  On 1 August, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China enforced a measure 
to impose a permit system for the export of gallium and germanium -related items on the grounds 
of protecting national security and interests, and Japan is concerned about the intention of this 
measure. While there is information that exp ort permissions to some companies have been granted, 
Japanese companies have expressed concerns that it is taking a very long time to obtain export 
licences. We request an explanation of the status of the examination from China and request that 
the permit procedure is carried out fairly and promptly.  
13.4.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated  the following:  
13.5.  On 3  July, China 's Ministry of Commerce announced that exports from China of items 
containing gallium and germanium will require a dual -use expo rt licence as of 1  August  2023, on the 
alleged basis of "national security and interests ". At the Council for Trade in Goods on 7  July 2023, 
the European Union  pointed out that the scope of the announced export restrictions was very broad . 
China has not de fined any technical parameters for these items that would relate to their use in G/MA/M/79  
 
- 29 - 
 
  military applications. Instead, China seems to restrict all exports of products containing gallium and 
germanium, regardless of any specific dual -use concerns.  The EU has stil l not received a satisfactory 
response to our request that China provide information on the scope, including on the technical 
parameters , for these controls, and the security -related rationale of the measures.  The EU calls upon 
China to tailor its controls  to relevant security considerations, in compliance with WTO  rules, and to 
ensure that its controls do not unduly interfere with civilian trade and value chains.  
13.6.  The European Union  recalls that China stated expressly that it would be granting export 
licences, and that trade in germanium and gallium would continue. The EU is monitoring the markets 
and trade flows very attentively in order to assess developments.  However, industry representatives 
indicate that licences are taking a long time to process. The EU requests an explanation of the status 
of the review process on the Chinese side , and requests that the permit procedure is carried out 
fairly and promptly.  
13.7.  The representative of  Australia  indicated  the following:  
13.8.  Australia  notes the stateme nt by Japan in relation to China 's Export Control Law.  As set out 
in Australia 's submissions to China 's consultations on these then proposed laws and regulations, we 
welcomed efforts to codify the regulatory framework for defence export controls.  However, Australia 
still has concerns about the broad scope of the export control law, including China 's recent 
announcement on the implementation of export controls on gallium and germanium -related items 
on the basis of "national security ". 
13.9.  Australia is closely mo nitoring this latest measure in regard to its WTO -consistency and its 
impact on global supply chains.  We encourage China to continue to provide greater clarity in relation 
to key elements of the law, including jurisdiction, the scope of administrator power s, how these 
measures safeguard China 's national security, and confirmation that the law is consistent with 
China 's international commitments including WTO  rules and the China -Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (ChAFTA).  We continue to urge China to take accou nt of the concerns of foreign 
businesses and WTO  Members in the implementation of this law and development of any associated 
measures.  
13.10.   The representative of  Switzerland  indicated  the following:  
13.11.   Switzerland would also like to refer to the recent announcement made by the Chinese 
Authorities with regards to the export control of gallium and germanium for reasons of national 
security. This measure is likely to have a strong impact on global supply chains and the multilater al 
trading  system. Switzerland therefore welcomes further clarifications in order to analyse the 
measure and its implementation, especially with regard to its WTO  compatibility.  
13.12.   The representative of  Canada  indicated  the following:  
13.13.   Canada thanks Japan for raising the 3  July 2023 announcement by the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce and the General Administration of Customs on the Export Control of Gallium and 
Germanium -Related Items on the grounds of protecting national security and interests. Canada will 
closel y monitor the implementation of these new measures, in particular their consistency with 
WTO commitments.  
13.14.   The representative of  the United Kingdom  indicated  the following:  
13.15.   The United Kingdom supports Japan in raising this concern and we join the calls for further 
transparency from China around the implementation of this measure. We have noted media reports 
that Chinese exports of gallium and germanium dropped to zero in August, compared to 5.1 5 metric 
tonnes and 8.63  metric ton nes in July, respectively.  We continue to seek clarification on what China 
would define as its "national interest " for the purposes of this measure. And we call on China to 
provide a justification for these controls with regards to its WTO  commitments, for example, through 
notification to this Committee. We would also welcome confirmation that export licences will continue 
to be approved promptly . 
13.16.   The representative of  the United States  indicated  the following:  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  13.17.   The United States shares similar concerns with the imposition of this export measure on 
gallium and germanium.  We are concerned with the lack of transparency around this restriction and 
the uncertainty it is causing for traders.  We urge Chi na to notify this measure in accordance with its 
WTO commitments and we will continue to monitor this situation closely.  
13.18.   The representative of the  Republic of Korea  indicated  the following:  
13.19.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns raised by others regardi ng China 's export control 
measure on gallium and germanium products.  Korea is closely monitoring the measure 's potential 
ramifications on global supply chains and the multilateral trading system.  Korea expresses its desire 
for the measure to be implemented  in a fair and transparent manner , in accordance with 
WTO principles.  
13.20.   The representative of  China  indicated  the following:  
13.21.   Gallium and germanium -related items can be used for both military and civilian purposes. 
Export control s on gallium and germanium -related items is international customary practice. Since 
1996, gallium and germanium -related items have been gradually included in the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual -Use Good and Technologies and 
42 member States of Th e Wassenaar Arrangement have implemented the Arrangement.  
13.22.   China imposes export control s on gallium and germanium -related items in a justified, 
reasonable and non -discriminatory manner under the framework of the WTO, with the aim to better 
fulfil its international non-proliferation obligations. It should be noted that export control does not 
prohibit exports, and exports that are used for lawful purposes and meet the relevant regulations 
will be allowed. We have already approved a number of export appl ications since the implementation 
of the export control. We will continue reviewing the export applications and make proper decisions 
in accordance with the relevant regulations in an open, transparent , and non -discriminatory manner.  
13.23.   The Committee took not e of the statements made . 
Previously raised trade concerns  
14  ANGOLA - IMPORT  RESTRICTING PRACTICES (ID  46) - STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union.  
14.2.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated  the following:  
14.3.  Angola 's import restrictions on a list of over 50  products is a long -standing trade concern.  In 
view of lack of progress both at the multilateral (i.e., no notification at the WTO) and at the bilateral 
level, including in particular the lack of answers by Angolan authorities to questions posed by the 
European Union , the EU underscor es once again its concern about the compatibility of Presidential 
Decree  23/19 with WTO  rules.  To recall, on 14  January  2019, Angola published Presidential 
Decree  23/19 , which included a set of import restrictions on a list of 54  products, mainly agricultu ral 
products for day -to-day consumption, such as rice, beans, potatoes , or pork.  Such restrictions take 
the form of quantitative restrictions and import licensing requirements that appear to prioritize the 
use of domestic production, similar to an import s ubstitution policy. In practice, priority is given to 
products produced in Angola by requiring that importers demonstrate that they either cannot find a 
product domestically or have already purchased domestically.  
14.4.  The European Union  remains supportive of A ngola 's intention to diversify its economy and to 
develop its domestic industry. Nevertheless, the EU maintains its deep concern over Presidential 
Decree  23/19 aiming to protect domestic industries in a manner that could prove detrimental to 
foreign invest ments. The EU strongly urges Angola once again to review the relevant measures in 
order to ensure their compliance with WTO  rules.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  14.5.  The representative of  Angola  indicated  the following:  
14.6.  Before starting our statement, Angola  acknowledge s with gratitude the i mportant message 
received at the beginning of this meeting from the United States . We believe that the US has given 
to the dialogue the relevance it deserves, while taking into consideration the high level of the bilateral 
relations we are enjoying today. With this positive step taken by the US, Angola assures you that 
we will continue making all efforts to comply with the rules of the multilateral trading system. 
Hopefully we will also continue to count on your generous support.  
14.7.  Angola thanks the European Union  for the concerns raised , and we consider Angola's previous 
statements made in this and other committees  to remain valid . Given the need to increase national 
production and diversify exports, the Government of Angola adopted measures that aim to 
accelerate the diversification of national production and the generation of wealth, and in this way 
has implemented strategies to reduce foreign exchange expenditure and the import of inputs, such 
as fertilizers, seeds , and other means for the various productive sectors of the economy. Currently, 
Angola is a product -importing country but has been working to gradually change this situation by 
increasing its national production. In this context, more than simply making a statement, we would 
also like to present relevant statistical data on the volume of imports between Angola and the 
EU member States.  
14.8.  The largest and the main products o riginating from the European Union are s ugar, rice, 
potatoes, chicken meat , onions, corn flour , wheat flour , spaghetti pasta , soybean oil , sunflower oil , 
frozen and dried miscellaneous fish , soap, common salt , and wheat grain . However, there is already 
some surplus in the pr oduction of wheat flour, corn flour, milk, spaghetti pasta, fish , and onion s. 
After this declaration , we will send through the Permanent Mission of Angola the statistical data 
relating to the information provided on the volume of imports  between Angola and the EU , proving 
that there is no restriction on import s. 
14.9.  New strategies are being implemented in Angola . In this way, Angola will be even more 
committed to the application and adherence to the rules, discipline , and transparency assumed  in 
the WTO Agreements , thereby contributing to the better functioning of the multilateral trading 
system and trade liberalization.  
14.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
15  AUSTRALIA – MATURATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED ALCOHOL (ID  94) – 
STATEMENT BY BRAZIL  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Brazil.  
15.2.  The representative of  Brazil  indicated  the following:  
15.3.  Brazil makes reference once again to STC  636, raised since May  2020, under the 
TBT Committee, regarding Australian Customs Notice N o. 2007/19 on technical requirements for the 
importation of alcoholic beverages. This regulation directly violates Art icle XI:I of the GATT by 
imposing a minimum period of two years of maturation in wooden barrels for the importation of 
sugar cane alcoholic beverages, without exceptions. This technical requirement is not related to any 
sanitary or quality standard applicable to cachaça.  
15.4.  Therefore, Brazil urges Australia to adopt immediate action in order to eliminate this blatant 
quantitative restriction . Brazil poses two  questions to Australia: (i) does Australia i ntend to notify 
the regulation as a quantitative restriction, as it implies a ban on the importation of cachaça that 
does not meet the maturation requirement; and ( ii) when can we expect internal measures in 
Australia that will promote the necessary reform , namely the amendment of the legislation on 
importation of unmatured alcoholic beverages?  
15.5.  Brazil acknowledges the efforts from Australian officials to implement a permanent solution 
to this concern. This trade concern has been in place for years. We count  on Australia's authorities 
to take action as soon as possible, so that this restriction can be overcome.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  15.6.  The representative of  Australia  indicated  the following:  
15.7.  Australia acknowledges Brazil 's interest in Australia 's maturation requirements for certain 
imported alcohol products and its concern with how these requirements impact cachaça. We 
acknowledge Brazil has raised this as a long -standing issue in the TBT  Committee.  Australia 
established a whole -of-government working group in 2022 to consider trading partners' concerns 
regarding the maturation requirements for the importation of certain alcohol products into Australia. 
This working group continues to meet, most recently in August  2023. The working group is 
considering the legislative framework for the importation of certain unmatured alcohol products 
under section  105A of the Customs Act  1901 (Customs Act). The working group is also considering 
any relationship to corresponding domestic maturation requirements.  
15.8.  This is a complex issue which requires res ourcing from multiple government portfolios. Any 
legislative changes to section  105A of the Customs Act and any other possible changes to 
requirements contained in other legislation need to be made in accordance with Australia's domestic 
regulatory reform processes.  Australia takes these concerns seriously and has ensured that 
Australian Government Ministers remain updated on the status of this issue. We appreciate the 
patience shown while we work through the complexities of a resolution. The Australian government 
will notify WTO  Members of any proposed changes to address the issue through the TBT  Committee 
when we are able  to do so , in accordance with Australia's obligations under the TBT  Agreement.  
15.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
16  AUSTRALI A – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G EQUIPMENT 
(ID 39) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item h ad been included at the request of China.  
16.2.  The representative of  China  indicated  the following:  
16.3.  China's  concern on this matter remains. The measures taken by Australia to restrict Chinese 
enterprises from providing 5G  equipment and services to the Australian market violates the 
most-favoured -nation (MFN)  principle and the general elimination of quantitative  restrictions of the 
WTO, and undermines China's legitimate rights and interests under the WTO.  
16.4.  China  urges Australia to correct its discriminatory and WTO -inconsistent practice and provide 
a fair, non -discriminatory and predictable business environment fo r Chinese enterprises.  
16.5.  The representative of  Australia  indicated  the following:  
16.6.  Australia takes note of China 's statement.  China first  raised this issue elsewhere in the WTO 
in 2018. Since that time , Australia has engaged constructively and in good faith w ith China to explain 
the rationale for its position.  Australia also notes that other WTO  Members have made similar 
decisions in their national interest on equipment for national 5G  networks.  
16.7.  Australia reiterates that its position on 5G  networks is country -agnostic, transparent, 
risk-based, non -discriminatory , and fully WTO  consistent.  
16.8.  The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
17  CANADA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G EQUIPMENT 
(ID 79) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
17.2.  The representative of  China indicated  the following:  
17.3.  In 2022,  the Canadian government, without any evidence, announced that 5G  equipment 
from Huawei and ZTE would be removed or terminated by June  2024, along with a deadline of 
December  2027 to remove existing 4G  equipment provided by the Chinese companies. The G/MA/M/79  
 
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  measures taken by Canada violate the MFN  principle and the general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions of the WTO, and undermine China's legitimate rights and interests under the WTO.  
17.4.  China  urges Canada to correct its discriminatory and WTO -inconsistent practice and provide 
a fair, non -discriminatory and predictable business environment for Chinese enterprises.  
17.5.  The representative of  Canada  indicated  the following:  
17.6.  The Government of Canada takes th e security of Canadians, their data and information, and 
its telecommunications system very seriously. Canada 's decision to amend the Telecommunications 
Act was carefully considered and took into account a changing technological and global environment. 
Canada's critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly interconnected, interdependent, and 
integrated with cyber systems, particularly with the emergence of new technologies such as 5G. 
Every country, including China, has its own domestic laws and regulati ons on telecommunications.  
17.7.  The Government of Canada is taking important steps to further protect Canada 's critical 
infrastructure systems in a way that is consistent with Canada 's WTO  commitments, while 
championing emerging technologies such as 5G.  
17.8.  The Com mittee took note  of the statements made . 
18  CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES (ID  58) – STATEMENT BY 
AUSTRALIA  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Australia.  
18.2.  The representative  of Australia  indicated  the following : 
18.3.  Australia and China enjoy a mutually beneficial trading relationship. We are free trade 
partners through the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement, and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership. We share the benefits, as do all WTO  Members, of a stabl e, predictable , and 
open global trading system. That is why we continue to seek the resumption of normal trade between 
our two  countries. Members are aware of Australia 's ongoing concerns regarding China 's trade 
disruptive and restrictive measures, applied  without adequate transparency or justification, on a 
range of Australian commodities.  
18.4.  Australia has seen recent positive developments to our trading relationship with China. Some 
measures remain in place, including on bottled wine, live rock lobster , and some red meat 
establishments. Action should be taken to remove these measures without delay. While they remain 
in place, we will continue to raise our concerns here, and in other WTO  committees. Australia looks 
forward to continuing our engagement with Chi na on these issues, in the WTO and through our 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, to achieve further progress in the interests of both China and 
Australia.  
18.5.  The representative  of the United Kingdom  indicated  the following : 
18.6.  The United Kingdom again support s Australia 's concerns about trade restrictive measures 
taken by China. We note continued progress on measures being lifted by China and welcome a full 
resolution to follow.  
18.7.  The representative  of Canada  indicated  the following : 
18.8.  Canada shares Australia 's concerns with the ongoing challenges caused by China 's continued 
adoption of trade disruptive and restrictive measures. As previously noted, Canada 's agricultural 
market access in China continues to be negatively impacted by the lack of transparency and scie ntific 
justification for China 's measures , by long delays in China 's approval process for Canada 's market 
access requests , and by discriminatory treatment compared to that provided to the same products 
from other Members. Canada again calls on China to engage in two -way technical dialogue to address 
and resolve ongoing trade concerns based on internationally recognized scientific pr inciples and 
practices. We encourage all WTO  Members, including China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  18.9.  The representative  of the United States  indicated  the following : 
18.10.   The United States takes note of Australia 's intervention, including its report of rec ent bilateral 
developments and its concern that China continues to apply trade restrictive measures on a number 
of products without adequate transparency or justification.  The US reiterates that it shares 
Australia 's concerns. We remain deeply troubled by the information provided by Australia,  and from 
other credible sources, including that Chinese authorities instructed importers not to purchase 
certain goods.  
18.11.   The United States  again register s its systemic concern with the broad range of restrictive 
measur es, both formal and informal, that China has imposed on certain Australian goods in an 
abusive, arbitrary, or pretextual manner.  As noted previously, China 's actions are not isolated to 
Australia. There are many instances of China using these harmful non -market practices against 
WTO Members in apparent retaliation for unconnected bilateral issues, including China 's 
discrimination against Lithuanian goods, EU  products with Lithuanian content, Chinese Taipei 
pineapples, and Canadian barley.  
18.12.   It is important to  identify similarly coercive actions taken by China against other Members, 
as they demonstrate a broader pattern of behaviour. Specifically, China uses pretextual, 
non-transparent processes and spurious claims to impose economic costs and weaponize economi c 
dependencies with the intent to pressure or influence the legitimate decision -making of other 
governments.  China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system ", but its actions 
speak for themselves. China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring 
or breaking rules and exploiting gr ey zones in order to inflict harm on others to advance its 
geopolitical ends.  
18.13.   The representative  of Chinese Taipei  indicated  the following : 
18.14.   Chinese Taipei thanks Australia for providing updates on this agenda item. We continue to 
share Australia 's concerns about China's certain trade measures, which apparently have adverse 
implications on the rule s-based multilateral trading system. We would like to emphasi ze that 
Members ' trade measures, whether formal or informal, published or unpublished, should be 
implemented in a WTO -consistent manner and should never be based on unrelated issues. My 
delegation will continue to closely follow the development of this subject from a systemic 
perspective.  
18.15.   The representative  of the European Union  indicated  the following : 
18.16.   As stated in previous meetings, the European Union shares the concerns which Australia and 
also others are once again raising in relation to these trade disruptive and restrictiv e measures by 
China. Australia has reported on some progress on some products and measures, while others have 
nevertheless remain unresolved now for a very long period of time , which keeps getting longer.  
18.17.   There is no technical justification that would permit these measures under the 
WTO Agreement. And many Chinese measures are informal, unpublished , and non -transparent, 
again in violation of WTO  rules and principles. Based on the available evidence , and as reported in 
numerous independent studies, the measu res were implemented , rather,  as measures of economic 
coercion, in an attempt to force the Australian government to change policies that were fully within 
Australia's rights internationally.  
18.18.   As the European Union has also experienced, China,  and also a num ber of other countries, 
is occasionally adopting such measures of economic coercion, which qualify as illegal interferences 
in the affairs of another State under general international law.  
18.19.   The representative  of Japan  indicated  the following : 
18.20.   Japan shares Australia's concerns regarding China's trade measures, including trade 
remedies. If China is operating its trade measures in an arbitrary manner, as reported, it is contrary 
to a free and fair rules -based international trading system. We call on Chi na to respond to Australia's 
concerns in good faith and in a timely manner. Japan has repeatedly expressed concern about G/MA/M/79  
 
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  economic coercion that undermines the function and credibility of the rules -based multilateral 
trading system.  
18.21.   The representative  of New Zealand  indicated  the following :  
18.22.   New Zealand continues to hold a systemic interest in the concerns that have been expressed 
on this topic by Australia and other WTO  Members.  We welcome the progress that has been made 
to date to resolve the issues raised . We remain concerned with the adoption of measures by 
WTO Members that cause widespread disruption to trade and lack transparency, including the 
actions taken by China against a range of exports from Australia – some of which remain in place.  
18.23.   As New Zeala nd has repeatedly noted in a number of fora, the multilateral rules -based 
trading system provides that all Members, regardless of their size or trading capacity, are subject to 
the same rights and obligations. We wholeheartedly endorse the view that , throu gh the WTO , we 
share the benefits, as do all WTO  Members, of a stable, predictable , and open global trading system.  
18.24.   This provides the predictability and certainty necessary to ensure that trade can take place 
efficiently and with the least friction possibl e. If Members step away from their commitments, or 
adopt remedies or other measures provided for under the WTO  Agreements for unassociated 
purposes, this will undermine the predictability and certainty on which the system rests.  
18.25.   The representative  of China  indicated  the following : 
18.26.   China  would like to refer to its statements made in previous meetings. As pointed out by 
Australia just now, there is some positive progress on this matter . Australian exports of commodities , 
including coal, logs, barley and other products to China have resumed. We hope both sides can 
continue working together to improve, maintain , and strengthen bilateral economic and trade 
cooperation.  
18.27.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
19  CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES) (ID  80) – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan.  
19.2.  The representative of  Japan  indicated  the following:  
19.3.  Japan understand s that this draft National Standard is currently under public comment 
procedure and opinions are being sought. Japan has previously raised concerns at various committee 
meetings about the draft National Standard on the grounds that the provisions requiring the 
development and production of multifunction peripherals ( MFPs) and printers in China may violate 
WTO Agreements, including Article  III.4 of the GATT . 
19.4.  However, it was noted that no such provisions exist in the current draft National Standard . 
We understand that discussions and procedures will be carried out to establish this National Standard 
in the future, but we continue to call on China to apply equal treatment to domestic and foreign 
products , and not to include content that could lead to  demands for technology transfer.  
19.5.  In this respect, the provisions of this draft National Standard still pose concerns about a 
potential leakage of trade secrets or technological leaks depending on the content of the information 
provided by office equipment  providers for the security testing of office equipment. For example, 
the draft National Standard requires the provision of materials on the supply chain, materials on 
third-party technologies, materials on the manufacturing process of office equipment, and so on, 
which contain information on trade secrets and sensitive technologies. In designing and operating 
the security test, we request that it be consistent with international law, including the 
WTO Agreements.  
19.6.  Japan plans to submit opinions on this draf t National Standard in accordance with the public 
comment procedure, and we would like China to consider the content of those opinions. We request G/MA/M/79  
 
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  that China take measures not only in the development of its regulations, but also in the actual 
operation, by  ensuring that there are no discriminatory domestic or foreign requirements, including 
those that may entail the leakage of trade secrets or technological leaks.  
19.7.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
19.8.  As Japan pointed out just now, we publish ed the draft Information Security 
Technology -Security Specification for Office Devices for public comment on 25  August  2023. 
Interested Members can submit comments before 24  October  2023.  
19.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
20  CHINA – DRAFT REVISI ON OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW (ID  81) – 
STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan.  
20.2.  The representative of  Japan  indicated  the following:  
20.3.  In July last year, China published a draft amendment to its Government Procurement Law. 
With regard to the scope to which the La w applies, Articles  2 and 12 of the draft amendment add 
"other procurement entities". We would like to request that the determination of "other procurement 
entities " by the State Council under Article  12 of the proposed amendments should not be expanded 
without limitation. If the Local Content Requirement (LCR) is implemented by this amendment in a 
manner that includes procurement beyond "procurement by government agencies" , as stipulated in 
Article  III:8(a) of the GATT, foreign products, including Japanese  products, will be treated in a 
discriminatory manner, and this will violate Article  III:4 of the GATT, which stipulates the principle 
of non -discrimination between domestic and foreign products.  
20.4.  Furthermore, with regard to Article  23 of the Draft Amendmen t, which specifies "support for 
home industries", a new local content requirement has been added, whereby products with a higher 
value -added ratio within China will be given preferential treatment in government procurement, 
which is also not permitted unde r the government procurement exception in Article  III:8(a) of the 
GATT,  unless they genuinely fall under government procurement , and may violate Article  III:4 of 
the GATT and Article  2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.  In addition, local governments in Shaanxi, 
Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Anhui and other provinces have issued notices stating that , in government 
procurement, preference is given to domestic products and that expert opinions and submission of 
applications and approval from the relevant government f inance department are required when 
purchasing imported products, which may violate Article  III:4 of the GATT . 
20.5.  At November's meeting of the  Council for Trade in Goods, China stated that it treated foreign 
and domestic Chinese companies equally in governmen t procurement, except with regard to security 
matters ; however , the examples above are contrary to such statements. In addition, these proposed 
amendments to the Government Procurement Law and local government notifications do not meet 
the standards requir ed by the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which China has 
already been negotiating to join for many years, and these amendments are in fact a move in the 
opposite direction. We would like to add that China's application to join the GPA and ot her 
high-standard agreements must raise questions as to whether China is willing to meet those 
standards.  
20.6.  The representative of  China  indicated  the following:  
20.7.  It appears to us that this item more appropriately belong s to another committee . We urge 
Japan to  evaluate where this issue should be taken up so that the relevant committee with the 
appropriate terms of reference could address this issue.  
20.8.  China reiterate s that supporting domestic products through government procurement is a 
customary international pr actice. China is willing to communicate with Japan on this issue within the 
framework of China's accession negotiation to the  WTO Government Procurement Agreement.  
20.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  21  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION  ON SOME FOOD IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (ID  82) – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
21.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union.  
21.2.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated  the following:  
21.3.  The European Uni on maintains its concern regarding the discriminatory application of the 
Domestic Value Added Tax  (ITBIS) of 18% on imported products, mostly on imported matured and 
cream cheeses, cooked hams, canned vegetables , and some other food products. The tax does not 
apply to "like" domestic products, resulting in a discriminatory treatment of imported products.  
21.4.  Although the authorities from the Dominican Republic have indicated that measures would be 
taken to eliminate the discrimination, there has been no tangibl e progress in resolving the matter. 
Recently, the Dominican Republic has focused its position on reiterating that there is no legal 
provision in the country underpinning the discriminatory application of the tax. Yet evidence at 
retailers indicate s otherwise. We would insist that the principle of national treatment must be 
observed both de jure and de facto. EU operators are negatively affected by this discriminatory 
taxation.  
21.5.  We request the Dominican Republic to resolve the matter promptly. We would welcome 
clarifications as to what steps the Dominican Republic intends to take to that end, and within which 
timelines.  We remain ready to engage with  the Dominican Republic with  a view to making progress 
on this issue but are looking at further ways to highlight the importance of this case.  
21.6.  The representative of  the United States  indicated  the following:  
21.7.  The United States continues to share the concerns raised today by the European Union.  We 
seek clarification from the Dominican Republic on the taxes applied to some food products and 
answers to the questions raised today.  
21.8.  The representative of  the Dominican Republic  indicated  the following:  
21.9.  As stated at the Committee 's meeting of 26 -27 April 2023, the Dominican Republic's legal 
system does not include any discriminatory tax measures. Accordingly, we reiterate that the Tax on 
the Transfer of Industrialized Goods and Services (ITBIS) is levied at rates of 18% and 16% on 
goods and servic es that have been produced or supplied  domestically and on those that have been 
imported.  
21.10.   To this end, and following the multiple communications and statements from the European 
Union, the Government of the Dominican Republic has been conducting  a series o f assessments of 
how this tax is being applied effectively across our country's various commercial sectors.  As we 
indicated at previous meetings, this assessment showed that certain local food producers have been 
claiming tax exemptions for goods that are not eligible for such exemptions under the Tax Code. 
The Government of the Dominican Republic has therefore made the corresponding changes to their 
tax returns in a timely manner  and applying penalties in accordance with the Dominican tax system.  
21.11.   Lastly, o ur delegation would like to reiterate the Dominican government's commitment to 
complying with the agreements signed by our country , and its willingness to continue working with 
the European Union and all our trading partners to resolve any issue identified  in the area of trade, 
which we view as a fundamental instrument for promoting relations and strengthening the economic 
development of the Dominican Republic and its trading partners.  We appreciate the European Union's 
collaboration  to provide information to enable the Dominican tax system to be implemented more 
efficiently and to promote fair competition.  
21.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  22  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (ID  69) – 
STATEMENTS BY CHINA, INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China, 
Indonesia , and the Russian Federation.  
22.2.  The representative of  the Russian Federation  indicated  the following:  
22.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements on the European Union's  Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism  (CBAM)  that were made during the previous meetings of the C ommittee on 
Market Access , Council for Trade in Goods, and C ommittee on Trade and Environment.  
22.4.  The Regulation on the establishment of the CBAM entered into force on 1  October  2023. Our 
analysis shows tha t the EU has failed to make it compatible with the WTO  rules. The CBAM covers 
the most sensitive sectors of the EU 's economy – cement, fertilizers, iron and steel, aluminium – 
those sectors which the EU usually protects with anti -dumping and safeguard meas ures. 
22.5.  By using the CBAM , the European Union  seeks to ensure cross -border application of its 
Emission Trading System (ETS) or carbon pricing methodology, to protect its domestic industry from 
fair foreign competition, as well as to solve the potential probl em of relocation of its production 
facilities to third  countries. Such goals can hardly be justified by the WTO  rules.  The CBAM 
establishes a discriminatory trade regime for like products not only depending on their production 
method, but also depending on  their country of origin. The CBAM will be applicable only to goods 
originating in the WTO  Members which will not establish an emission trading system fully linked with 
the EU  ETS or apply a carbon price without any rebates beyond those also applied in acc ordance 
with the EU  ETS. 
22.6.  With this regulation , the European Union establishes not only additional charges on the 
importation of products, but also a substantial administrative burden and import restrictions. 
According to the CBAM  Regulation, "goods shall b e imported into the customs territory of the Union 
only by an authorized CBAM  declarant". It will also be prohibited to import goods without 
CBAM  certificates.  
22.7.  The CBAM cannot be justified by the provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC ) or the Paris Agreement. Introduction of unilateral trade measures 
contradicts the UNFCCC  principles. The Convention, as well as the Paris A greement, does not allow 
the use of climate change -related measures to restrict international trade.  In our view, the CBAM is 
incompatible with Articles  I, II, III and XI of the GATT  1994. We urge the EU to align the Regulation 
with the WTO  rules.  
22.8.  The repr esentative of  China  indicated  the following:  
22.9.  China  refers to its previous statements made in the Committee. We reiterate that climate 
change is a common challenge for all humanity  and an important area of global governance. All 
Members should uphold multil ateralism, adhere to the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC),, and work together to address climate 
change through greater international cooperation.  
22.10.   Since the European Union  put forward its CBAM, m any WTO  Members have raised concerns 
and questions about  it. Members stress that the CBAM should adhere to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, comply with the basic principles and rules of the WTO , and avoid 
constituting protection ist measures and green trade barriers.  
22.11.   China  noted that , on 1 October  2023, the European Union's CBAM entered into application 
in its transitional phase. We are closely following the implementation of the EU's CBAM. We urge the 
EU to ensure that its CBAM be implemented in a fair, just and transparent manner, abide by 
WTO rules, and mitigate the negati ve impact on trade.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  22.12.   The representative of  Indonesia  indicated  the following:  
22.13.   Indonesia again reiterates its objections to the European Union's CBAM . Indonesia is of the 
view that the CBAM is not in line with the WTO  provisions, as well as the WTO principle s of national 
treatment and most favoured nation (MFN). This mechanism also has the potential to be applied in 
a discriminatory and restrictive manner. Based on our understanding, the CBAM refers to the ETS, 
which has a free allowances ceiling for each sec tor. As a result, the tariffs imposed on EU  domestic 
goods will be lower than those imposed on imported goods. Despite the European Union's promises 
to gradually phase out free allowances in all sectors, Indonesia has yet to receive clarification on 
when a nd how the reduction in allowances will be implemented.  
22.14.   Indonesia understands that not all WTO  Members have a sufficient carbon market and 
carbon accounting system, especially for WTO  Members who do not apply the ETS. Thus, the 
mechanism for determining ca rbon prices will also be different from one Member to another. The 
grouping of WTO  Members with low or high emission reduction ambitions in determining carbon 
prices is also not based on clear criteria.  Furthermore, the CBAM also has the potential to creat e 
additional burdens for producers outside the European Union , with additional levies beyond the tariffs 
under the EU 's WTO Schedule of concession s. 
22.15.   We would like to request further clarification from the European Union regarding plans to 
expand the product sector covered by CBAM. Finally, Indonesia would also like to remind the EU 
that every policy relating to the environment should be aligned to the principles of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC), as contained in the UNFCCC 
and the Paris Agreement. The CBDR -RC principle stipulates that developing countries have 
fundamental responsibilities, capabilities a nd obligations that are different from developed countries.  
22.16.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated  the following:  
22.17.   Paraguay thanks the European Union for the information session held during the 
WTO Environment Week and for documents WT/CTE/GEN/31  and WT/CTE/GEN/32  circulated in this 
connection. However, Paraguay's systemic concerns, presented on numerous occasions, including 
at the last formal meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, were not properly addressed, so I would 
like to reiterate them in this Committee.  
22.18.   Paraguay would like to know how the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC) is taken into account in light of national circumstances and 
Nationally Determined Contributions in this measure for environmental purposes . How does CBAM 
take into account mitigation measures other than carbon pricing, especially in countries such as 
Paragua y, which are carbon sinks?  
22.19.   Paraguay would also like to know whether the European Union plans to introduce a 
mechanism to provide preferential access to products which, despite originating from countries that 
do not have a carbon pricing mechanism, have a lower carbon footprint or originate from developing 
countries, which are highly impacted  by the negative effects of climate change and which are carbon 
sinks like Paraguay. On this, we have already heard the EU say that the CBAM takes into account 
the specific emissions of imported goods, but at most this would stop the additional tariff bein g 
imposed, but would not provide preferential access.  
22.20.   The industrial sector in Paraguay and in many other developing countries is very small. 
Measures such as the CBAM will not promote green industrialization without other elements and 
policies; rather, su ch measures will hamper it. Paraguay would like to know whether the European 
Union plans to redirect the revenue from the CBAM to support the green transition in developing 
countries, in line with its financing commitments, and provide the means of impleme ntation laid out 
in international environmental law. 
22.21.   This regulation and other unilateral measures that supposedly have environmental 
objectives and a clear impact on trade are discussed in several WTO  bodies, and the European Union 
even said that it would  organize a new information session at the next meeting of the Committee on 
Trade and Environment. We therefore hope that the EU will be able to respond to the questions and 
concerns raised in one of these spaces, as Members need a dialogue and not a unila teral presentation 
on EU  measures.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  22.22.   The representative of India indicated  the following:  
22.23.   India has expressed its concerns about the CBAM on numerous occasions in various 
WTO bodies , like the Council for Trade in Goods, the Committee on Market Access , and th e 
Committee on Trade and Environment. We have also been engaged with the European Union  
bilaterally, where these concerns have been explained in significant detail to our EU  counterparts.  
22.24.   While the CBAM is now in force, we would like to reiterate our views  raised in various forums. 
We remain concerned with the use of the concept of leakage. This concept is today being applied to 
carbon leakage, but we risk global trade fragmentation if the concept is extended horizontally or 
vertically.  
22.25.   The CBAM is a trade and environment hybrid, going even by the European Union 's own 
explanation. Hence, well -established principles and rules of both the international trade law and the 
international environment law should have been followed in designing the CBAM. In not doing so , 
and ignoring the principle of CBDR -RC, this measure upends the hard -built consensus in the 
Multilateral Environment Agreements over the last 50  years. The CBAM  forces an emissions 
reduction path on the EU's trading partner s. It disregards the Nat ionally Determined Contributions 
made by the EU's trading partners and effectively impinges on sovereign decisions. The worst effects 
of the EU's CBAM will be felt by MSMEs, who will not be able to meet the complexities of emissions 
tracking, measuring , and reporting. Over  time, MSMEs may be replaced by big firms in the EU's 
trading profile, thus having a negative impact on the sustainable development objective of the WTO 
enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement.  
22.26.   India remain s concerned about the CBAM reporting  and implementation which has kicked in 
now. Given the realities of trade, we may encounter situations where businesses have to share their 
trade secrets or sensitive information with intermediaries and EU  authorities or choose not to operate 
in the EU  market. Our businesses remain concerned about such second -order problems. Given so 
many design and implementation issues, we are compelled to believe that the EU's CBAM is 
effectively a trade protectionist measure rather an environmental intervention.  
22.27.   Finally , India request s the European Union to notify its CBAM to the relevant WTO  bodies , 
like the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
22.28.   The representative of  the Republic of Korea  indicated  the following:  
22.29.   The Republic of Korea understands the European Union 's objective in introducing the CBAM, 
which includes tackling carbon leakage.  However, Korea is concerned that this measure might 
significantly diminish the market accessibility of the EU for foreign businesses.  
22.30.   Specifically, under the CBAM, external compan ies face stringent obligations relating to 
information disclosure.  Additionally, EU  importers are confronted with an increased administrative 
load and potential penalties in relation to reporting obligations, making them more likely to forego 
the importation of external products.  Furthermore, if external businesses are forced to obtain a 
certificate from an official EU  institution when assessing carbon emissions, it imposes a duplicative 
burden on them.  
22.31.   In response to this, the Republic of Korea su ggests that the European Union recognize 
certifications from other official institutions based in where these foreign businesses operate, by 
establishing standards for mutual recognition. Korea stands ready to deepen its engagement with 
the EU to resolve t his issue in a timely fashion.  
22.32.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated  the following:  
22.33.   Türkiye thank s China, Indonesia,  and the  Russian Federation  for keeping this item on the 
agenda. We would like to refer to our previous statements in this Committee, as w ell as the CTG 
with regard to this issue .11 
 
11 See, for example , document  G/MA/M/78 , paragraphs 21.38 –21.46 , and document  G/C/M/146, 
paragraphs  22.41 -22.46 . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  22.34.   Türkiye continue s to closely follow the ongoing legislative and implementation processes 
under the European Green Deal, including the CBAM. Despite the fairly open process followed by the 
EU, for which we would l ike to express our appreciation, our concerns remain with regard to the 
compatibility  of CBAM with international trade law as well as international  environmental law. 
22.35.   Not repeating Türkiye 's previously stated arguments in detail, we believe that trade-related 
measures for tackling climate change should pass the necessity test, prioritize international 
cooperation and collective action, should take into account different circumstances and histo rical 
responsibilities of countries, respect social and economic development needs of others , and not 
constitute arbitrary or disguised restriction and unjustifiable discrimination in international trade. 
Türkiye looks forward to further engagement and upd ates from the European Union in this regard.  
22.36.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  indicated  the following:  
22.37.   Chinese Taipei share s the understanding that climate change is a pressing global issue. We 
also recognize that avoiding any possible unnecessary inte rvention in international trade is of 
paramount importance. While we appreciate the efforts of the European Union to promote 
environmental sustainability, including its use of trade -related measures to achieve climate 
objectives, we also note the CBAM 's significant impact on international trade. It is equally important 
that the CBAM is effective in achieving the goal of preventing carbon leakage and that the related 
measures are consistent with WTO  rules. Ensuring the compliance of a CBAM with WTO  rules and  
preventing the measures from being discriminatory or becoming a disguised restriction on 
international trade are the fundamental obligations of any WTO  Member, regardless of the 
underlying purpose or nature of the measures.  
22.38.   With respect to the issue of di scriminatory treatment, Chinese Taipei wishes to point out 
that CBAM applies to several downstream products in the iron and steel industry. In the European 
Union , carbon emissions of such downstream products were neither subject to the EU  ETS scheme, 
nor subject to the obligations to report and verify their emissions. However, the EU's CBAM imposes 
obligations on foreign manufacturers of such downstream products to report, and, after 2026, to 
verify the embedded emissions for such products. There is a genui ne concern about the measure 
incorporating discriminatory elements against imported like products.  
22.39.   Moreover, with respect to disguised restrictions on international trade, the European Union's 
CBAM involves perplexing implementing procedures. EU  importers are required to obtain an array 
of information from foreign exporters which could potentially involve trade secrets. Substantial fines 
for submitting incorrect information could also be imposed , and there is a critical lack of 
EU-accredited verif iers to implement the mechanism. Collectively, these complicated procedures 
substantially and disproportionately increase compliance costs and create undue burdens for foreign 
exporters, especially small and medium -sized enterprises. They could give rise t o a significant barrier 
and constitute a disguised restriction on international trade, hampering the rights of exporters 
seeking access to the EU  market.  
22.40.   To ensure the effectiveness of the CBAM to combat climate change while preserving the 
principle of fai rness and non -discrimination enshrined in the WTO  rules, we urge the European Union 
to engage in comprehensive consultations with Members concerning the requirements and 
implementation of its CBAM. We also welcome any opportunity for in -depth bilateral dis cussions on 
this subject.  
22.41.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.42.   The European Union  takes due note of the interest and the concerns of our partners in the 
EU CBAM.  During previous meetings, we had the opportunity to provide Membe rs with an outline of 
the proposal, its objectives and its interaction with other EU  policies targeted , such as ETS,  at 
achieving environmental sustainability and carbon neutrality. We have been transparent throughout 
the design stage, and we will continue  to engage, now that CBAM entered into the transitional period 
on 1 October  2023. We are going to present the CBAM  methodology for the transitional period during 
the next meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment in November.  
22.43.   The CBAM  methodology f or the transitional period was adopted on 17  August after a 
four-week-long consultation period where all stakeholders , including partner countries , had the G/MA/M/79  
 
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  opportunity to comment. The European Union has also sent a communication to Members of the 
Committee  on Trade and Environment , on 13  June 2023, informing them that the EU has published 
the text of the Implementing Regulation on the reporting obligations during the transitional period 
of the CBAM , for feedback.  
22.44.   Please note that the European Union  has also rolled out an information campaign on its 
CBAM.  The information campaign features online seminars, physical events, distribution of guidance 
documents, and direct assistance, aimed at assisting third-country operators and importers to the 
EU in pe rforming all new obligations required by the CBAM  Regulation and its secondary  legislation.  
Members  can already find relevant information and recordings of webinars on the European 
Commission 's dedicated website.  
22.45.   Finally, the European Union underline s that the CBAM will only be introduced gradually. From 
October  2023 until the end of 2025, only reporting obligations under the Regulation will apply. The 
transitional period will involve extensive consultation of stakeholders,  including international 
partners , to increase our mutual understanding of the instrument.  
22.46.   The Committee took note of the statements made . 
23  EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION -FREE COMMODITIES (DFC) (ID  84) – 
STATEMENTS BY INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia 
and the Russian Federation.  
23.2.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated  the following:  
23.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its position regarding the European Union's regulation on 
deforestation -free products, which was stated during the previous meetings of the C ommittee on  
Market Access , the Council for Trade in Goods, and the Committee on Trade and Environment . 
23.4.  The Regulation constitutes yet another example of the protectionist policy conducted by the 
European Union  under the cloak of climate change. It introduces a prohib ition to make available on 
the EU  market or export products from the EU, unless all the following conditions are fulfilled by the 
products covered by the Regulation: ( i) they are deforestation -free; ( ii) they have been produced in 
accordance with the relev ant legislation of the country of production; and ( iii) they are covered by 
a due diligence statement. With this regulation , the EU seeks not only cross -border application of its 
regulation, but also to determine if an imported product complies , or not , with the legislation of the 
country of its origin. The role of the judge is assigned to the operator, who shall verify and analyse 
the collected information, as well as carry out a risk assessment in order to determine if there is a 
risk that the relevant pr oducts intended to be placed on the market are non -compliant, including 
with the relevant legislation of the country of production.  
23.5.  The risk assessment should include, inter alia: (i) the presence of indigenous peoples in the 
country of production or parts thereof;  (ii) the consultation and cooperation in good faith with 
indigenous people in the country of production or parts thereof;  and (iii)  concerns in relation to the 
country of production and origin or parts thereof, such as level of  corruption, prevalence of document 
and data falsification, lack of law enforcement, violations of international human rights, armed 
conflict or presence of sanctions imposed by the UN  Security Council or the Council of the European 
Union.  
23.6.  The Regulation, up to the present moment, covers trade in live cattle, meat and meat 
products, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, soya, and wood. However, this list may be extended in the 
future. In our view, this Regulation is a simple quantitative restriction that violate s the WTO 's rules, 
in particular Article XI of the GATT  1994. Thus, we urge the European Union  to bring its measures 
into consistency with the WTO  norms.  
23.7.  The representative of  Indonesia  indicated  the following:  
23.8.  Indonesia would like to express its deep conc erns over the recent entry into force of the 
EU DFC policy, as also stated in the joint letter to the EU  authorities by 17  developing country G/MA/M/79  
 
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  Members , dated 7  September  2023.12 The policy includes mandatory due diligence on 
seven  products that are considered to have a potential impact on deforestation, namely: soy a beans ; 
beef; palm oil ; wood ; cocoa ; rubber ; and coffee. Indonesia believes that the DFC will discriminate 
against imported commodities in the EU. The unnecessary due diligence process has the potential 
to become a covert trade barrier, which limit s import access of the seven  products in the European 
market.  
23.9.  Furthermore, the DFC could affect developing countries ' develo pment efforts . We also note 
its potential inconsistencies with the European Union's  commitment under the WTO provisions , 
considering that the regulations drawn up by the EU cannot be imposed by force on other 
WTO Members.  Indonesia would like to request a further explanation from the EU regarding its basis 
for determining the commodities covered by the DFC, its plans to expand the list of DFC  commodity 
coverage, as well as details of the mandatory due diligence mechanism.  
23.10.   Furthermore, Indonesia urge s the European Union  to rev iew the DFC proposal so that it does 
not interfere with international trade and does not conflict with Article  XI of the GATT  1994. 
Indonesia also emphasize s that the EU should take into account the CBDR -RC principle in every 
trade policy relating to the environment.  
23.11.   The representative of Brazil  indicated  the following:  
23.12.   On 7 September  2023, a joint letter was sent from 17  developing country  Members 
regarding the entry into force, on 29 June 2023, of the European Union's  so-called 
"anti-deforestation law" ("EU  Deforestation Regulation") to the main authorities of the European 
Union.  The letter was signed by a significant group of Members  from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Africa,  and Asia. In addition to Brazil, Argentina, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic,  Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru and Thailand also signed the documen t. 
23.13.   The objective of the initiative is to reiterate concerns about the punitive and discriminatory 
nature of this particular European regulation, as well as to highlight the importance of the European 
Union maintaining an effective dialogue with producing c ountries, with a view to avoiding disruptions 
in trade and excessive burdens on producers of agricultural goods and derivatives covered by the 
measure.  Since this is a trade measure that hinders access to the EU  market, we firmly believe that 
it is in the interest of the Membership to be aware of it.  
23.14.   Brazil remains firmly committed to combating deforestation and has strengthened inspection 
and prevention activities in Brazilian forests, particularly in the Amazon. However, in Brazil's view, 
European law, in  addition to conflicting with the principles that govern international trade , and with 
multilateral understandings on climate and biodiversity, imposes imbalances in the economic, social , 
and environmental aspects of the problem it aims to address , and jeo pardizes sustainable 
development.  
23.15.   I will now read the full content of the joint letter: "We, the undersigned, wish to convey 
through this letter our deep concern regarding the recent entry into force of the European Union's 
regulation on deforestation -free products (EUDR), on 29 June 2023. As stated in the letter dated 
27 July 2022 from a group of producing countries, this legislation disregards local circumstances and 
capabilities, national legislations and certification mechanisms of developing produc ing countries, 
their efforts to fight deforestation, and multilateral commitments, including the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities. It also establishes a unilateral benchmarking system that is 
inherently discriminatory and punitive, which  is potentially inconsistent with WTO  obligations. 
Considering that despite multiple manifestations of concern, particularly from developing countries, 
the legislation will enter into application in less than 18  months, and that the EU is still working on 
its implementing acts and guidelines, we urge the Commission and other EU  institutions to engage 
in a more meaningful and open dialogue with producing countries than what has been undertaken 
so far.  
23.16.   The EU should work to repair this legislation, or, at a m inimum, aim to mitigate its more 
harmful impacts through implementation guidelines that adequately value the current, as well as 
 
12 See document  G/AG/GEN/223  and its revisions.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  developing local sustainable practices in agricultural value chains, and avoid trade disruption 
including the excessive adminis trative burden related to the geolocation and traceability 
requirements, certifications, and customs procedures. The EU's 'one-size-fits-all' approach, 
implemented through this model of due diligence and traceability, ignores the different local 
conditions  and will inevitably impose immense costs on exporting and importing countries alike, as 
well as on producers and consumers. While these costs are certain, we consider that the legislation, 
by itself, will bear no positive impact on deforestation rates and  may even produce other adverse 
effects, such as increased poverty, diversion of resources, and hindrance of the attainment of SDGs. 
Smallholders are especially vulnerable to the EUDR and require special support.  
23.17.   The EU should acknowledge the efforts made by developing countries to improve their 
livelihood and sustainability practices as well as the significant challenges faced by them regarding 
limited access to financing schemes, new technologies and technical training and assistance. 
Smallholders may end  up being excluded from international value chains not because they have 
deforested their land but due to their inability to show compliance with the stringent requirements 
imposed by the EUDR. That would unfairly deprive smallholders of an important sourc e of income 
and livelihood, and even impact their ability to adopt sustainable practices.  
23.18.   We call, therefore, on the Commission to formulate clear and detailed implementing acts 
and guidelines that include differentiated compliance and due diligence regime s for commodities and 
products originating from smallholders in developing countries, considering that EU  SMEs will be 
granted more flexible treatment. In conclusion, we reiterate our commitment to the SDGs and to 
multilateral environmental agreements and goals. Given our shared objectives and the need to work 
together to tackle global challenges, we call on the EU to engage in effective cooperation and 
meaningful dialogue, with its partners in the areas of trade and sustainable development to jointly 
addre ss the impact of EU  legislation and its implementing instruments, including providing support 
to facilitate trade. " 
23.19.   The representative of Peru indicated  the following:  
23.20.   As expressed in other fora of this Organization , Peru wishes to express its concern about the 
approval and early entry into force of the aforementioned EU  Regulation, due to  its potential to 
create significant disruptions in the trade of products under its scope of application, which represent 
supply c hains where mostly small producers participate.  
23.21.   In Peru's opinion, this unilateral measure does not take into account the different realities 
and efforts made by countries such as my own in terms of deforestation. In this sense, we believe 
that the multila teral arena is the most appropriate place to develop this type of initiative. We are 
sincerely concerned that there are many aspects regarding the implementation of the Regulation 
that remain unclear, or that require complementary regulations, making the e ffective deadline set 
for the adaptation of operators actually less than the 18  months established for implementation.  
23.22.   Peru's concerns are based on the experience we have had with the application of the 
EU standard that establishes a due diligence process for exports of timber. We have witnessed the 
lack of clarity on the documents that are required by customs authorities and the procedural 
deadlines. As a result, for example, we have had Peruvian containers detained in Belgium for more 
than a year and four  months, without clear information on the reasons or the necessary 
requirements for releasing them.  
23.23.   Returning to the characteristics of the DFC  Regulation, Peru considers that this regulation 
discriminates against third  countries, given that, for example, it establishes a period of six  months 
for EU  Members to make a simple notification on which competent authorities will be responsible for 
compliance with the obligations of the Regulation, while it expects third  countries to implement 
complex proc esses in only 18  months, which include traceability, geolocation , and monitoring of 
agricultural chains involving hundreds of thousands of producers.  
23.24.   Peru is also sincerely concerned about the unilateral rating of the level of deforestation risk, 
whose spe cific criteria and methodology have not been properly communicated and coordinated with 
potentially affected countries. In this regard, if this classification is based on general indices and 
does not take into account the particular situations that may ari se within each of the countries, it G/MA/M/79  
 
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  could negatively affect producers and exporters in low -risk areas, putting them at a disadvantage 
with respect to similar products in other countries.  
23.25.   Peru believes that there are multiple ways of tackling deforestation,  and we regret that the 
European Union's regulation has chosen the least appropriate one, also taking away the opportunity 
for small producers, who find themselves in a harmonious coexistence between agriculture and care 
for the forests, to continue develo ping their economic activity in order to be able to escape from 
poverty. We must not lose sight of the fact that one of the causes of deforestation is poverty, against 
which international trade provides powerful tools. The fight against deforestation is in  everyone's 
interest, and we must therefore bear in mind that it requires joint and coordinated action.  
23.26.   Peru believes that the implementation of this regulation should be carried out once it has 
undergone a thorough debate at the multilateral level, that t here is complete clarity regarding the 
requirements and deadlines that have been established and that there is certainty that the European 
Union will have the necessary tools to resolve any issue that may arise in its implementation.  
23.27.   The representative of Guatemala  indicated  the following:  
23.28.   Guatemala would like to thank the delegations of the Russian Federation and Indonesia for 
including this item on today's agenda. Like other delegations, Guatemala wishes to reiterate the 
concern that has been raised at se veral fora about the implementation by the European Union of the 
Regulation on deforestation -free products.  
23.29.   This new legislation includes a comparative evaluation of the countries for which the 
European Union will perform an analysis and assign a risk leve l. Depending on the risk, operators 
will face certain requirements, including new procedures for our exporters.  
23.30.   This legislation will come into force in 2025, resulting in a period of approximately 15  months 
to make the applicable internal preparations. In  our opinion, this legislation does not take into 
consideration the specific circumstances and capabilities of developing countries. This 
one-size-fits-all approach does not seek to solve the legitimate environmental concerns, but rather 
will result in oth er adverse effects.  
23.31.   Guatemala therefore encourage s the European Union to engage in a dialogue with those 
producer countries that will be affected in order to mitigate the negative consequences of this new 
policy, and to take the implementation of support i nto consideration in order to ensure compliance 
with this new policy. We reaffirm our commitment to solve global problems, with account always 
being taken of the WTO  Agreements in this regard.  
23.32.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated  the following:  
23.33.   Ecuador would like, once more, to express its concern regarding the development of policies 
under the Green Deal and deforestation -free products. In that respect, I would also like to make 
reference to the letter of 7  September signed by several Ambassadors to the  European Union – 
including Ecuador's – and sent to the European Parliament, the European Council , and the European 
Commission, which outlines the main points of this concern, namely: ( i) the Regulation on 
deforestation -free products disregards local capab ilities and practices, as well as national 
legislations; ( ii) the unilateral benchmarking system that is inherently discriminatory and punitive, 
which is potentially inconsistent with the EU's obligations within the framework of the WTO; 
(iii) smallholders are especially vulnerable to this Regulation, as they may end up being excluded 
from international value chains not because they have deforested their land but because they lack 
the skills and resources needed to show compliance with the Regul ation; and ( iv) implementing this 
Regulation will impose immense costs on exporters and importers alike, as well as on producers and 
consumers.  
23.34.   Ecuador therefore joins other Members in calling on the European Union to engage in a more 
meaningful dialogue t han there has been to date, in which it properly assesses the practices 
developed in various producer countries to achieve the common and shared objective of 
environmental protection and sustainability. Ecuador renews its commitment to pursuing 
constructiv e dialogue.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  23.35.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated  the following:  
23.36.   Paraguay would like to express our appreciation to the delegation of Brazil for reading the 
letter sent on 7  September, by our country and others, to the European Union in connection with 
this regulation. Paraguay thanks the European Union for the information session held during the 
WTO Environment Week, the circulation of document WT/CTE/GEN/30 , the recent publication of a 
document with frequently asked questions , and for the bilateral  discussions. However, Members' 
concerns and questions remain, as can be seen from the number of specific questions and trade 
concerns raised in relation to this measure.  
23.37.   This regulation and other unilateral measures that supposedly have environmental 
objectives and a clear impact on trade are being discussed in several bodies in this Organization. 
The European Union has already announced that it will even organize a new information session at 
the next meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment. We t herefore hope that the EU will 
be able to respond to the questions and concerns raised in one of these spaces.  
23.38.   Paraguay would like to call once again on the European Union to engage in effective 
cooperation and meaningful dialogue with its partners in the areas of trade and sustainable 
development to jointly address the impact of EU  legislation and its implementing instruments, 
including providing support to facilitate trade. Moreover, I would like to say that we will be sending 
written questions to the EU on this measure.  
23.39.   The representative of  India indicated  the following:  
23.40.   India has raised its concerns on the proposed EU  measures under the Green Deal, such as 
the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ), the Deforestation -free Commodities ( DFC), and 
other  proposals , in various forums. Most recently, India submitted a paper JOB/TE/78  to the 
Committee on Trade and Environment in March  2023, which pointed out that we are witnessing 
potential trade fragmentation if Members continue to take unilateral trade measures which apply 
extra-territorially. We also urged the need to act in acco rdance with the principles of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC), as well as honouring the 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).  
23.41.   It is not clear how the European Union will undertake the country risk clas sification and if 
there would be a nuanced approach of using a combination of product and sub -national classification , 
or if the classification would remain a standard national label irrespective of the product concerned 
or regional variations. Our busines ses have also expressed concerns that there may be situations 
where business -critical information would have to be shared with EU  importers and authorities. The 
EU suggestion that the importing entities look at geo -spatial imagery and satellite data is als o 
concerning. Such intrusive measures do not respect the sovereignty of the EU's trading partners. 
The measure as proposed right now will hurt agriculture exports in the chosen commodities to the 
EU. Its worst effects will be felt by small and marginal far mers in the developing countries. The 
agriculture sector in developing countries , including India,  is a key driver for employment as well as 
the economic well -being of a large part of the population, especially women and those associated 
with MSMEs. It is unfortunate that the EU is making policy choices, which directly harm the economic 
interests of these socioeconomic groups. Finally, we request the European Union to notify  its 
Deforestation -free Commodities (DFC)  measure to the relevant WTO  bodies , like the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade.  
23.42.   The representative of Argentina  indicated  the following:  
23.43.   Argentina would like place on record its support for this trade concern and thanks the 
delegations that included it on the agenda.  
23.44.   As Argentina has  stated in other forums and bodies of this Organization, we are convinced 
that there is no single model for achieving environmental protection, and that environmental 
degradation, including climate change, must be addressed by respecting the core principle  of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC). Solutions should 
therefore be geared towards local realities, and the policies and initiatives put forward with the 
legitimate purpose of protecting the environment must be flexible, pragmatic, implementable and G/MA/M/79  
 
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  realistic, in addition to being the most effective for achieving the objective sought, while also being 
the least trade restrictive.  
23.45.   With respect to the DFC  regulation in particular, we are concerned that it does n ot consider 
measures that could be less trade -restrictive in order to achieve the environmental objective sought. 
Instead, the regulation applies the same EU  standards globally, without making clear the criteria 
established by the EU or the scientific basi s for determining "high -", "standard" and "low -" risk 
countries, bearing in mind that there could be different local and regional realities in each country 
with respect to forest conservation, and that generalizations should therefore be avoided. Similarly , 
by imposing the proposed obligatory due diligence requirements on countries classified as "high risk" 
that are more onerous than those imposed on other countries, the EU will be applying more stringent 
and trade restrictive criteria to certain countries classified by the EU  itself as "high risk", which could 
be inconsistent with the WTO rules.  
23.46.   Furthermore, the proposed approach is not in line with the historical responsibility for 
environmental degradation borne by developed countries, including the Europ ean Union , as it sets 
2020 as the baseline, without taking into consideration land -use changes and deforestation in 
developed countries since the Industrial Revolution. This effectively penalizes developing countries, 
which is incompatible with the princip le of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC). 
23.47.   In short, Argentina would like to stress the importance of avoiding unilateral actions that 
lack any proper legal basis or multilateral support, or the required scienti fic basis, which result in 
disguised restrictions on international trade in the name of environmental protection.  
23.48.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated  the following:  
23.49.   Türkiye would like to refer to our previous statements in this Committee13 and in the C ouncil 
for Trade in Goods14 with regard to this issue. Without repeating those, we would like to particularly 
emphasize the importance of working with partner countries in making risk classifications and use 
of solid scientific data. This is also valid for any possible extension in the scope of this legislation. 
Also, technical requirements like certification or verification that third  country operators face should 
not be overly burdensome, discouraging small producers from participating in supply chains. We 
would appreciate a furthe r update from the European Union on this and remain ready to cooperate.  
23.50.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.51.   The European Union  takes due note of the interest and concerns expressed also today by 
several Members.  
23.52.   The main driver of deforestation and forest degradation is the expansion of agricultural land, 
linked in particular to the production of a series of commodities of which the European Union is a 
major consumer. The seven  commodities covered by the scope of the regulation – beef, wood, palm 
oil, soya, coffee, cocoa, rubber, as well as some of their derived products, such as leather, furniture, 
print products , or chocolate – are the commodities through which the EU has a bigger impact on 
degradation of the world's forests. These commodities have been selected objectively, based on the 
best available scientific data. The Regulation will introduce mandatory due diligence rules fo r 
operators who place those commodities and their derived products on the EU  market or export from 
it. Only products that are both deforestation -free and legal according to the laws of the country of 
origin will be allowed on the EU  market.  
23.53.   The Regulation will apply even -handedly to commodities produced inside and outside the 
European Union . It relies on concepts developed at international level, and specifically on the work 
of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), to define what is to be considered  a "forest"  or 
"deforestation" under the Regulation. There will be no ban of any country or any commodity. All 
countries, including countries considered at high risk of deforestation, will be able to continue to sell 
 
13 Document  G/MA/M/78 , paragraphs  22.26–22.29.  
14 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  39.52 -39.54.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  their commodities on the EU  market prov ided that the operators ( that is , those who place them on 
the market) can demonstrate that those commodities are deforestation -free and legal.  
23.54.   The Regulation is an environmental measure, which complements global and multilateral 
action, developed in compli ance with the European Union's  international commitments, including its 
trade agreements, and WTO  requirements. Great importance has been given to the external 
dimension of the Regulation, both in its design stage and currently in the implementation phase.  
23.55.   At the e nd of June  2023,  the Commission services issued clear and easy to understand 
guidelines for compliance, for operators and traders, in particular SMEs. They will be regularly 
updated. Over the last months, we have also started more in -depth exchang es on the Regulation 
with the partners most concerned to further discuss the issues at stake. We will develop similar 
exchanges, in different format s, with other partners. We will also use partnerships and cooperation 
mechanisms to support countries in add ressing deforestation and the development of the tools 
necessary to the implementation of the Regulation. We believe that the Regulation is an opportunity 
to enhance trade in deforestation -free products and boost opportunities for sustainable actors 
around the globe.  
23.56.   As a f inal remark, I just want to mention that the reply to the letter that was sent by  
17 Members on 7  September  2023 to the three  presidents is forthcoming . The reply is being 
finalized, but since there are presidents that need to sign this letter, it takes a little bit longer, and 
I thank you for your understanding.  
23.57.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
24  EUROPEAN UNION – MRL REDUCTION OF CERTAIN SUBSTANCES TO MEET 
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN THIRD  COUNTRIES (ID  86) – STATEMENTS BY 
ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA AND PARAGUAY  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Argentina, 
Australia,  Indonesia,  and Paraguay . 
24.2.  The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
24.3.  Paraguay reiterates its concerns regarding the compatibility of the measure notified by the 
European Union with the market access and non -discrimination  obligations under Articles  XI and III 
of the GATT  1994. The restrictions on international trade imposed by this Regulation will make 
farmers in Paraguay less competitive than farmers in Europe, who do not have to deal with the same 
pests and climatic cond itions when producing food and can benefit from emergency authorizations 
to continue using these substances.  
24.4.  In the interest of time, I would like to provide a brief update only on the main points made at 
the Committee's previous meeting and the questions  which remain unanswered . With respect to 
written comments submitted on the notification within the time-limit provided for Paraguay and 
several other Members , I would like to ask the European Union  to clarify how the comments 
submitted by Members are taken  into account . In particular, bearing in mind the short time that 
elapsed between the end of the comment period and the decision of the Standing Committee on 
Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (SCoPAFF) of the EU, which approved the proposal to reduce the 
maximum residue levels (MRLs) for these substances without amendments.  
24.5.  I welcome the publication of a corrigendum with respect to the erroneous reference to 
Paraguay in the final version of Regulation  2023/334, even if it required twice as much time as it 
took SCoPAFF to analyse the comments of a number of Members. However, t o date, a revised version 
is still not available on the official EU  website , so when consulting Regulation  2023/334, the 
erroneous reference to Paraguay remains in footnote  19. 
24.6.  With regard to emergency authorizations, Paraguay has not received responses to the 
questions on how long it takes to approve an emergency authorization and the average cost of the 
approval process for an emergency authorization in order to understand how emergency 
authorizations are compatible with the non -discrimination obligation. With respect to the  EU Court 
of Justice 's ruling of 19  January  2023, Paraguay has not yet received responses explaining how this G/MA/M/79  
 
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  ruling affects emergency authorizations in general and authorizations for these substances 
specifically . We have identified at least five  emergency authorizations that were valid after the ruling 
and at least one  emergency authorization for thiamethoxam that was granted after the judgement. 
This authorization was granted by the Czech Republic on 4  April 2023. Although there have been no 
new emergency authorizations since then, this may be because of the times of year when the 
substances are required and not because of the ruling itself, so the clarification is still required.  
24.7.  Concerning import tolerances, I would like to use the example of another substance, 
tricyclazole,  for which the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) considered that import tolerances 
and "the proposed MRLs (in this case for rice) are fully supported by data and safe for consumers". 
And yet a number of EU member States did not support the approval of the draft Regulation 
submitted by the Commission. The draft fell short of the majority required in SCoPAFF and in the 
Council, and is likely to be vetoed in the European Parliament, meaning that the obligation to base 
measures on scientific principles has not been met. If EU member States fail to vote in favour of 
import tolerances when MRLs are set with the objective of protecting human health, how can the 
Commission argue that requesting import tolerances is a feasible way forward for MRLs set with 
enviro nmental objectives , for example  those covered by this Regulation?  
24.8.  With respect to the extraterritoriality of the measure, I do not think it is necessary to reiterate 
how this measure fails to recognize the ability of national authorities to establish regul atory 
frameworks  to protect its  pollinators. I will only ask the European Union  how this is consistent with 
its obligations under WTO  rules and its founding agreements.  
24.9.  These and other questions were submitted to the European Union  as part of the correspon ding 
trade concerns raised in the SPS  Committee, in document G/SPS/GEN/2140 , and we look forward 
to receiving responses shortly.  
24.10.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following :15 
24.11.   Indonesia would like to express its concerns to the European Union on the "Draft Commission 
Regulation on Maximum Residue Level (MRL) Limits for Clothianidin and Thiamethoxam." Specifically 
for goods containing clothianidin and thiamethoxam, particularly food and agricultural items from 
poor or non -OECD  nations. We have raised this issue at the TBT  Committee meeting on 
20-23 June 2023. Indonesia is concerned that this proposed legislation may restrict international 
trade.  
24.12.   Indonesia is aware that Regulation (EC)  No. 396/2005 does not address environmental 
problems specific to the European Union because Regulation (EC)  No. 1107/2009, which addresses 
pesticide use in the EU, adequately addresses these issues. The EU should not base its import 
restrictions and the implementation of MRLs that are stricter than int ernational norms on data 
pertaining to environmental impacts.  
24.13.   Indonesia requests that the European Union refers to the international standards, such as 
Codex Alimentarius, on the application of MRLs. Based on our understanding, the MRL or maximum 
limit for  clothianidin and thiamethoxam in Regulation (EC)  No. 396/2005 is lower than what is stated 
in the Codex Alimentarius. This proves that the EU violates international standards regarding MRLs 
for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in food products.  
24.14.   Finally, Indo nesia requests the European Union to review the draft MRL  regulations, so they 
comply with WTO  principles and rules, especially Article  XI of the GATT  1994 concerning the general 
elimination of quantitative restrictions.  
24.15.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
24.16.   Australia shares the concerns raised by Paraguay  and Indonesia about the European Union's 
use of maximum residue limits to implement environmental objectives in third  countries, and the 
impact that TBT  notification G/TBT/N/EU/908  will have on market access for agricultural products to 
 
15 The delegation of Indonesia indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  the EU. Australia notes that it will again be raising these concerns within the TBT and SPS  Committee 
meetings in November.  
24.17.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
24.18.   Ecuador would like to reiterate its concern in relation to this matter, in line with what we 
have already said in the Council for Trade in Goods and the SPS  Committee.  
24.19.   Ecuador understands and shares the aim of attaining the intern ational goals related to 
environmental protection and sustainability. However, my delegation is concerned that the use of 
MRLs, designed as they are with an environmental focus, does not seem to be aligned with the 
measure's objective, with the rules of th is Organization or with the standards agreed upon in other 
multilateral bodies.  
24.20.   In previous statements, Ecuador has expressed its concern regarding the use of this 
mechanism as a means of protecting pollinators within the European Union . Our concern is bas ed 
on the lack of scientific evidence in the EU's analysis, and in the criteria used in that analysis. The 
goal of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is consumer protection, but these measures 
address environmental concerns.  
24.21.   Moreover, this focus fai ls to take full account of the national legislation of the European 
Union's various trading partners, their production systems, and the particular climatic conditions 
that they face, in addition to other specific situations, which calls into question the l egal basis and 
even the efficacy of measures to reduce residue levels.  
24.22.   Ecuador therefore urges the European Union to hold a wide -ranging conversation, to avoid 
adopting measures that would constitute disguised restrictions on trade, and to consider the 
scientific basis and existing multilateral regulations for retaining the current maximum levels for 
third countries.  
24.23.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
24.24.   India is constrained to take the floor again to repeat that the European Union's unilater al 
measures taken in the name of the environment and applied extra -territorially will lead to imminent 
trade fragmentation. Measures like the ones related to MRLs, which do not take into account the 
geographic, climatic, socioeconomic and agricultural cond itions prevailing in the EU's trading 
partners , do not just complicate international trade but actively seek to exclude the most vulnerable 
sections of the trade ecosystem from reaping the benefits of international trade.  
24.25.   The European Union's  unilateral me asures are increasingly undermining regulatory principles 
and are not founded on internationally agreed risk analysis principles. They do not take into account 
alternative approaches to meeting regulatory objectives. In implementing its SPS  measures , as we ll 
as the new approach to use TBT  measures for environmental reasons, the European Union seems to 
impose its own domestic regulatory approach onto its trading partners.  
24.26.   India also note s with concern that the list of active substances which are being regula ted in 
this unilateral fashion may also continue to grow, further aggravating the compliance burden on our 
farmers and disrupting the agricultural value chains in a significant and irreversible manner.  
24.27.   The representative of Argentina  indicated the followin g:16 
24.28.   Argentina wishes to reiterate once again its concern in this Committee, as it has done in the 
TBT and SPS  Committees, and in the Council for Trade in Goods.  While Argentina received a response 
from the European Union  to its concerns, the substantive issues raised by my country remain valid.  
24.29.   The measure adopted by the European Union , establishing limit of quantification 
(LOQ)  values for these neonicotinoids, is not clearly justified and constitutes a disguised restriction 
on international t rade because it is disproportionate to the objective that it claims to promote and 
 
16 The delegation of Argentina indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  unduly restricts trade, given that it prevents any product that has been treated with these 
neonicotinoids that may exceed the LOQ from being marketed, even though the Europ ean Union  
cannot demonstrate that the MRLs at the level established by the Codex may affect the health of 
consumers, which ultimately is the intended purpose of an MRL.  
24.30.   The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.31.   The European Union ta kes note of the comments by Members on this issue.  The EU informed 
WTO Members for the first  time about this matter already more than two  years ago , through 
WTO document G/SPS/GEN/1797  of June  2020. Since then, the EU has regularly updated the SPS 
and TBT  Committees on all relevant developments. The EU has organi zed information sessions and 
provided detailed information through various communications. The EU also remains open to engage 
and provide further information.  
24.32.   As announced in the European Un ion's Farm to Fork Strategy, the EU has committed to  
taking  into account environmental objectives when deciding about setting maximum residue levels 
for substances no longer approved in the EU due to environmental concerns of a global nature, while 
respect ing WTO  standards and other international obligations.  As explained, the EU addresses this 
matter on an incremental basis, considering and reviewing the position of each particular active 
substance on a case -by-case basis, founded on the best available sci entific evidence and ensuring 
that its measures are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their objective.  
24.33.   On the specific case of clothianidin and thiamethoxam, the draft Regulation on lowering the 
maximum reside levels for these two  neonic otinoid substances was notified to the TBT  Committee 
on 6 July 2022 ( G/TBT/N/EU/908 ). A communication for information was also submitted to the 
SPS Committee ( G/SPS/GEN/2054 ). The European Union  has carefully studied and replied to all 
comments  received from WTO  Members during the notification process.  
24.34.   Last February, the new rules were adopted through Commission Regulation (EU)  2023/334. 
This Regulation is the first  one that is implementing the new policy announced in the EU  Farm to 
Fork Strateg y on imported food in relation to pesticides residues.  The European Union  has 
extensively explained in previous meetings the rationale for the measures and refers to those  
explanations. The environmental objectives of global concern that this Regulation targets are those 
related to the protection of pollinators. This is an issue of global concern, which goes beyond national 
boundaries and cannot be solved through actions at EU  level alone.  
24.35.   The European Union's  objective is to ensure that food a nd feed consumed in the EU do not 
contribute to the global decline of pollinators, independently of whether the product is produced in 
the EU or imported from third  countries.  The EU considers that currently there is no alternative to 
the lowering of the M RLs of clothianidin and thiamethoxam which would be less trade restrictive and 
equally contribute to the objective of protecting pollinators. Based on current knowledge, reducing 
the use of neonicotinoids is an effective action to tackle the decline in pollinators. The EU is acting 
in full compliance with WTO  rules, which allow Members to adopt measures if they are necessary to 
achieve a legitimate objective.  
24.36.   With regard to possible trade impacts, firstly, the Regulation defers the application date to 
36 months after entry into force instead of six months, which is the standard period given in the 
European Union . It allows products placed on the market before the application date to remain on 
the market until the end of their shelf life. The Regulation will therefore become applicable only at 
the beginning of 2026.  Secondly, the EU acknowledges that third  countries may face production 
conditions and pest pressures different from those in mainland Europe. Therefore, import tolerances 
can be granted to active s ubstances not authori zed in the EU provided that the submitted information 
demonstrates that the use is safe to pollinators.  Thirdly, the EU continues to provide technical 
assistance to developing countries and LDCs in improving their SPS capacity and mark et access, 
directly or through other international organi zations and partnerships, such as the WTO-hosted 
Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF).  
24.37.   Regarding emergency authori zations , the European Union has already provided general 
information and c larifications regarding emergency authorizations, as in  
documents  G/SPS/GEN/1970  and G/SPS/GEN/2038 . In addition , more information is available in 
guidance document SANCO/10087/2013 Rev.1. Briefly, the purpose of emergency authori zation is G/MA/M/79  
 
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  to allow serious dangers for plant health to be dealt with in emergency situations where there are 
no better alternatives. In this regard, the European Commission has taken action to verify whether 
such emergency authori zations granted by member States are justified. If that is not the case, the 
EU has taken measures to prevent the repetition of emergency authori zations . 
24.38.   According to a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice (case  C-162/21), EU  member 
States cannot anymore grant emergency authori zations for any outdoor use of thiamethoxam or 
clothianidin, whether these are for coating seeds , for outdoor sowing , or for any other outdoor uses 
such as foliar spraying. Nor can the y grant emergency authori zations for the sowing of seeds that 
have already been coated with either of these substances.  The Commission is considering the 
implications of the judgment for the granting of other emergency authorizations, for example, for 
other substances or for substances that have not been approved or have not been renewed in the 
EU because of risks to human  or animal health or the environment.  
24.39.   The European Union remains committed to engaging with Members on this issue.  
24.40.   The Committee took note of the statements made.  
25  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL ON SHIPMENTS OF WASTE AND AMENDING REGULATION (EU) 
NO. 1257 /2013  AND (EU) NO.  2020 /1056  (ID 96) – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia.  
25.2.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following :17 
25.3.  Indonesia reiterate s its previous statement delivered at the TBT Committee meeting in 
June 2023. Indonesia appreciates the European Union for its notification on the Proposal for 
European Parliament Regulations regarding waste transfers , in document G/TBT/N/EU/893 , and on 
the amendments to Regulation (EU)  No. 1257/2013 and (EU)  No. 2020/1056 (COM  (2021) 
709 final) ("proposal"), which was submitted on 25  May 2022.  
25.4.  Indonesia has submitted a question via the European Union's e nquiry point on 
23 December  2022 to request further clarification and detailed information regarding the relevant 
regulations in question. However, to date, we have not received an answer to this question. The 
Indonesian pulp and paper industry will be affected by this proposed regulation du e to the need to 
import recycled paper waste from the EU. If the EU  implements this proposed regulation , which we 
believe will hinder our industry from obtaining raw materials, this will not be in line with the 
sustainable economic program me both in Indone sia and the EU  itself. We have received information 
that the total availability of recycled paper raw materials in the EU is 54.4  million ton nes, but only 
47.9 million ton nes can be absorbed by the EU  pulp and paper industry. Indonesia's recycled paper 
can only meet the industrial needs of around 50% of total demand, while the need for packaging 
paper in this country continues to increase, to support other industries such as the food and beverage 
industry, packaging industry, shoe industry, electronics indu stry, and so on . 
25.5.  The Indonesian government has complied with international standards in the waste recycling 
industry, and Indonesia is ISO  certified in its methods. Indonesia's imports from the European Union  
are recycled paper waste, which is non -hazardou s waste. This means that Indonesia does not need 
to strictly comply with these proposed regulations, which are aimed at hazardous waste that has the 
potential to harm the environment. Referring to the perspective above, and with the aim of 
minimizing poten tial technical barriers to trade resulting from the EU  Waste Shipment Regulation 
proposal, Indonesia urges the EU to respond to Indonesia's questions and list Indonesia as one of 
the "Registered Countries" and exempt it from time -consuming and costly admin istration and 
certification requirements.  
25.6.  Indonesia will continue to monitor developments in the European Union's Waste Shipment 
Regulation proposal , and will carry out extensive assessments regarding the compatibility of this 
proposal  with WTO  provisions and their impact on international trade. Furthermore, we are eager to 
 
17 The delegation of Indonesia indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  fulfil our promises outlined in increasing the Nationally Determined Contribution ( NDC). In this sense, 
Indonesia seeks to expand its cooperation with the European Union . 
25.7.  The representat ive of India indicated the following :18 
25.8.  India thank s Indonesia for raising this item on the agenda today. We share some of the 
concerns raised by Indonesia. During the WTO Environment Week 2023  events , and in the bilateral 
discussions with the European Union  on the sidelines of the event, we had shared our concerns on 
how the EU proposes to regulate wate shipments.  
25.9.  A particular area of concern is not providing scrap steel to the developing countries and 
restricting its supplies to OECD  members. On the one hand, the European Union  wants steel 
production desti ned for the EU to be CBAM -compliant ; on the other hand, the EU now proposes to 
regulate the supply of the one feedstock that may help the developing countries reduce emissions 
involved in the production processes. Scrap steel also contains embedded emissio ns of the past. By 
keeping its supply open, the EU could have demonstrated its commitment to the principle of 
CBDR -RC, as explained in the earlier agenda item on the EU's CBAM.  
25.10.   The European Union  could have encouraged production of low emissions steel toda y by 
actively supplying raw material with embedded emissions of the past. It is unfortunate that this 
option is being foreclosed , and on top  of that , more punitive measures are being added by the EU 
through its CBAM. This situation leads us to believe that  the EU  Green Deal and other adjacent 
measures are not intended to solve the problems of the environment but to serve as trade 
protectionist measures for its domestic industry.  
25.11.   The representative of  the United States  indicated the following:  
25.12.   The United States  reiterate s our concerns that proposed revisions to the European Union's  
Waste Shipment Regulation may pose an unfair burden to international trade. The draft language 
appears to restrict non -hazardous waste and s crap exports and treat exports outside of the EU more 
strictly than internal shipments.  We continue to hear concerns that a restriction with respect to 
EU non-hazardous waste and scrap exports might create a global distortion which, among other 
things, wil l put a strain on producers ' access to high -quality, low -carbon inputs.  
25.13.   The United States understands that the proposed Regulation would require that EU  exporters 
demonstrate, through regular independent inspections of facilities in importing countries, th at their 
exports will be managed in an environmentally sound manner, regardless of destination country. 
This could prove burdensome for exporters, imposing additional financial and time -delay costs on 
them and their customers in other markets, and in turn discourage exports and limit options for 
environmentally sound recovery. We encourage the EU to ensure that the auditing requirements do 
not impose an additional burden on EU  exporters and their customers in other markets.  Should the 
proposed Regulation mo ve forward without consideration of these factors, it could lead other 
countries to impose similar measures which would further undermine global decarbonization 
objectives.  
25.14.   Legitimate trade in recycled commodities creates opportunities for economic growth and 
environmental sustainability by diverting end-of-life materials from landfills and providing  
high-quality, low carbon feedstock to manufacturing inputs. We continue to encourage the EU to 
remove non -hazardous scrap materials, such as metals, that pose negligible risks to the environment 
and that international producers are reliant on from the scope of the regulation.  
25.15.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
25.16.   Türkiye would like to refer to our previous statements in this Committee19, as well  as in the 
TBT Committee on this issue. We remain concerned with regard to this regulation. In our view, the 
monitoring and inspection requirements and measures envisaged in this regulation go beyond the 
stated legitimate environmental objectives and the trade restrictiv e nature of these are incompatible 
 
18 The delegation of India indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  
19 Document  G/MA/M/78 , paragraphs  20.12–20.18.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  with the European Union's  international commitments. We look forward to the EU's further 
clarifications . 
25.17.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.18.   The European Union  would like to thank Indonesia a nd others for their comments on the 
EU waste shipment regulation proposal. The EU notified the proposal to the TBT  Committee in 
May 2022 in document  G/TBT/N/EU/893 . 
25.19.   In line with the European Union's commitments under the European Green Deal, the Circ ular 
Economy Action Plan , and the Zero Pollution Action Plan, the proposal aims to ensure that the EU 
does not export its waste challenges to third  countries. It seeks to tackle illegal waste shipments 
and to contribute to the circular economy by facilitat ing shipments of waste for reuse and recycling 
in the EU.  
25.20.   The current waste shipment regulation already stipulates that waste can only be exported 
outside the European Union  if it is managed at destination in an environmentally sound manner, to 
conditions that are broadly equivalent to the EU's.  The lack of detailed provisions and mechanism to 
implement have led to weak enforcement , and  this is what the new waste shipment regulation is 
trying to remedy. The measure is necessary because the EU exports a lot of waste (33  million tonnes 
in 2020), and this quantity has substantially increased in the last decade (+75% since 2004).  
25.21.   The proposal lays down transparent, non -discriminatory and proportionate criteria to 
demonstrate that exported waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner. The notified 
draft does continue to distinguish between hazardous and "green -listed waste" relating to the 
applicable respective procedures for such wastes. The new requirements on the export of waste will 
apply three  years af ter the entry into force of the new regulation, leaving enough time for all relevant 
actors to comply with the new regime.  
25.22.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
26  INDIA – BASIC CUSTOMS DUTY (BCD) ON SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND 
MODULES (ID  87) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
26.2.  The representative of China indicated the following:  
26.3.  China  regret s to raise this issue again, as India continues imposing a 40% tariff on solar 
modules and a 25% tariff on solar cells, which exceed its bound rates and violate its commitment 
under  the ITA Agreement . We have noted that these WTO -inconsistent tariffs have already resulted 
in significant price increase s in India and have slowed down India 's solar deployment. The relevant 
stakeholders in India have called for the elimination of the high tariffs imposed on solar modules 
and solar cells to meet the demand gap.  China  urges India to immediately remove the 
WTO-inconsistent ta riffs and bring its measure into conformity with the WTO rules.  
26.4.  The representative of India indicated the following:  
26.5.  India has imposed a b asic customs duty on solar cells and solar modules, other than those 
exclusively used with ITA -1 items. This measure is consistent with India 's WTO  commitments.  
26.6.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
27  INDIA – APPROVED LIST OF MODELS AND MANUFACTURERS (ALMM) OF SOLAR 
PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULES (ID  88) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  G/MA/M/79  
 
- 55 - 
 
  27.2.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
27.3.  China  refers to its previous statements made in this Committee .20 We have noted that India 
has postponed the requirements of Approved List of Models and Manufacturers  (ALMM ) by 
April 2024. However, we still have concerns with the ALMM, which none of the Chinese 
manufacture rs have been included in, even if China is one of the main producers of solar modules.  
27.4.  China  encourage s India to facilitate the inclusion of Chinese companies in the ALMM by 
providing multiple ways to conduct on -site inspection and lowering the costs of verif ication.  We also 
encourage India to ensure that the relevant verification will be conducted in a fair, transparent , and 
non-discriminatory manner.  
27.5.  The representative of India indicated the following :21 
27.6.  India has  already provided a very detailed response on  this trade concern  in previous 
meetings of WTO  bodies, most notably in the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
27.7.  Earlier in the year, the ALMM  measure was also deferred for a reasonable time. The Indian 
Government vide F.N o. 283/54/2018  – GRID SOLAR A pproved Models and Manufacturers of Solar 
Photovoltaic Modules Order, 2019 ( "ALMM  Order ") provides for enlistment of eligible models and 
manufacturers of solar PV  cells and modules complying with the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) 
and publishes the same in a list called the "Approved List of Models and Manufacturers" (ALMM).  
27.8.  The registration process and conditions prescribed are uniform irrespective of the nationa lity 
of the manufacturer. No distinction is made between domestic producers and overseas producers. 
There are no separate provisions for domestic producers and overseas producers with respect to 
review and feedback time. India has published ALMM  Order, Gui delines, Application formats and the 
necessary FAQs on a website. The ALMM  Order and Regulations are transparent and clearly spell out 
the process and the documentation requirements for enlistment under the ALMM  List. The application 
fee has been determine d based on total installed manufacturing capacity as ALMM is intended in 
respect of manufacturer and total capacity and not actual production or export quota. It is also 
important to note that the said application fee and other charges are uniform, irrespe ctive of 
nationality of the producer – whether Indian or overseas producers. India considers that the 
application fee charged under ALMM  regulations is consistent with Article  VIII:1(a) of the GATT  and 
the said fee does not cause unreasonable burden or res trictions on international trade. The 
BIS certification requirement deals with quality control of the solar cells and modules. The 
ALMM  Order provides for enlistment of eligible models and manufacturers of solar PV  cells and 
modules complying with the BIS  Standards. While BIS  certification is with respect to maintaining the 
quality of the product, ALMM  certification intends to enlist eligible models and manufacturers, 
producing the said solar cells and modules. ALMM is thus aimed at ensuring the reliability  of the 
producers of the enlisted models. ALMM and BIS  certifications are reasonable requirements in the 
larger public interest to ensure the quality of the product as well as the reliability of the producer. 
ALMM  ensures the protection of consumer interes ts and the larger energy security of the country.  
27.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
28  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES 
(G/MA/QR/N/IND/2 , G/MA/QR/N/IND/2/AD D.1) (ID  36) – STATEMENTS BY 
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had b een included at the request of Australia 
and Canada.  
28.2.  The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
28.3.  Australia again  raises our concerns with India 's continued use of quantitative restrictions on 
imports of certain pulses.  Recalling Australia 's statement made during the April  2023 Council for 
 
20 Document  G/MA/M/78 , paragraphs  26.2–26.4.  
21 The delegation of India indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their statement 
would b e provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  Trade in Goods meeting22, by the time this latest extension of India 's free import policy for urad and 
tur or pigeon peas is scheduled to expire, India will have maintained a "temporary " suspension on 
its WTO -inconsistent quantitative restrictions policies for almost three  years , from May  2021 to  
March  2024.  
28.4.  While Australia appreciated the advanced announcement of this extension at the time, we 
cannot ignore the fact that this is still an extension to a tempora ry exemption. For that reason, 
Australia again encourages India to consider the longer -term benefits to its own food security of 
permanently removing the quantitative restrictions on all pulses.  Such a response by India would 
signal to markets that India a cknowledges the serious challenges to global food security currently 
and the negative impacts on global food markets from snap changes to import policies. The 
permanent removal of the quantitative restrictions would provide pulse producers with the certain ty 
they need to make rational, market -oriented planting decisions without fear of their exported product 
becoming stranded should the Indian Government make a snap decision to impose or extend import 
restrictions.  
28.5.  Australia  will continue to monitor India 's policy settings closely and look to raise this issue 
again in both the Council for Trade in Goods and in this forum.  
28.6.  The representative of Canad a indicated the following:  
28.7.  Canada continues to monitor the specific impact that India 's trade restrictive measures 
represent for Canadian pulse exporters and notes its significant concerns with these measures that 
remain unchanged. Canada 's exports of dry peas, for example, have been severely impacted by 
India's trade restrictive measures. Exports decreased from 1.3  million  tonnes before the measures 
were implemented in 2018 to 627  tonnes last year. We therefore consider it important to again 
formally register our significant trade concern and  urge India to undertake and implement 
WTO-consis tent measures as soon as possible.  
28.8.  The representative of Argentina  indicated the following:  
28.9.  Argentina places on record its support for this trade concern and thanks the delegations that 
included it on the agenda.  As we have stated on previous occasions in this Committee, this measure 
affects two of the main pulses exported from Argentina to India: yellow peas and mung beans. As 
in other previous statements, Argentina reiterates its concern over the uncertainty that this measure 
creates for our exporters, an d requests that it be reviewed by the Indian authorities.  
28.10.   The representative of the European Union indicated the following:  
28.11.   The European Union  would  also like to echo the statements made by Australia , Argentina , 
and Canada.  India has stated that the trade measures applicable to certain pulses have been put in 
place and are constantly reviewed for the purpose of maintaining food and nutritional security.  
28.12.   The European Union  believe s that a predictable and transparent import regime for the 
varieties of p ulses concerned by these trade measures would only have a positive impact both on 
India's food security and the global pulses market.  Therefore, we encourage India to consider the 
permanent removal of its import restrictions on certain pulses.  
28.13.   The represen tative of India indicated the following:  
28.14.   India w ould like to thank the intervening delegations for their continued interest in this issue. 
As previously stated, the measures adopted by India are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining 
food and nutritiona l security. This is an area of great importance to our economy and the policies on 
imports are regularly reviewed and updated. The trade measures applicable to pulses are in 
compliance with the relevant WTO  agreements and specified procedures of those  agreements.  
28.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
 
22 Document  G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  28.2-28.7.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  29  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES (ID  61) – STATEMENTS BY  THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN 
AND MATSU AND THAILAND  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
Europ ean Union, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei , and Thailand . 
29.2.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following :23 
29.3.  Indonesia would like to thank India for its response to Indonesia's concerns at the last 
CMA meeting. Indonesia refers to our previous statement and would like to again reiterate its 
concerns regarding Indonesia's  expressed objections to India, because India has not provided a 
satisfactory explanation and their desire to reconsider its tyre import policy , which imposes 
restrictions on tyre exports, especially from Indonesian tyre manufacturers.  
29.4.  Indonesia request s further clarification from India regarding its tyre import restriction policy 
and the policy of imposing marking fees on the use of the Indian S tandard Mark (IS  Mark) on tyre 
products exported to third  countries. As stated in Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 of 12 June 2020, 
every container containing imported tyres sent to India must be sampled for customs purposes, in 
accordance with the provisions  regarding the registration of the warehouse where the imported tyre 
products will be stored. This will make tyre exporters to India face more difficulties in customs 
clearance processes and take longer for their tyre products to be imported into India.  
29.5.  We have stated that Indonesian tyre manufacturers have experienced losses since the 
notification of the import policy. However, to date we have not received a satisfactory response from 
India indicating that it would  reconsider its policy. Instead, India has  only conveyed its intention to 
engage in bilateral negotiations. Indonesia believes that restrictions on imports of Indian tyres are 
discriminatory because they are applied selectively, namely on certain types and sizes of tyres that 
have been produced in India. This policy violates Article  XI of the GATT  1994 on the General 
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, as well as Articles  2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT  Agreement.  
29.6.  Indonesia also expressed its objection to the imposition of marking fees on tyre products 
marked with the Indian Standard (IS)  Mark that will be exported to third  countries, which has the 
potential to burden tyre manufacturers who export their tyre products to India, with additional 
marking fees. Therefore, Indonesia asks the India n government to immediately review the policy on 
import restrictions on tyre products to ensure India's compliance with Article  XI of the GATT  1994 
concerning the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, as well as the WTO  principles of 
transparen cy and non-discrimination . 
29.7.  The representative of Chinese Taipei  indicated  the following:  
29.8.  Chinese Taipei would like to draw India 's attention once again to its Notification 
No. 12/2015 -2020, which amended India 's import policy concerning new pneumatic tyres from 
"Free" to "Restricted ". We remain disappointed that Members ' concerns have not been appropriately 
addressed.  
29.9.  According to statistics from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India, the quantity of 
our tyre exports to India from 202 0 to 2022 sharply decreased , by 50% compared to the exports in 
2019. At the same time, according to the Indian Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association (ATMA), 
India's tyre exports in 2022 went up by 70%. These figures demonstrate that India 's tyres have 
benefited from the unrestricted markets in other Members, whereas tyre producers in other 
WTO Members have to face increased trade barriers to enter the Indian market.  
29.10.   Article  3.2 of the WTO Import Licensing Agreement stipulates that "non-automatic import 
licensing shall not have trade restrictive or distortive effects on imports additional to those caused 
by the imposition of the restriction". However, in this case, the trade restrictive effect of India 's tyre 
licensing policy is evident. We request India to address the problematic measures that result in 
 
23 The delegation of Indonesia indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  quantitative restrictions and to ensure that its licensing regime is administered in a manner 
consistent with WTO  rules.  
29.11.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
29.12.   Thailand reiterates our seri ous concern regarding India's restrictive import policy on tyres. 
We have voiced this concern on multiple occasions in various WTO  bodies. However, regrettably, we 
have yet to witness any substantial progress in addressing these issues.  
29.13.   First and foremost,  Thailand  would like to highlight a substantial discrepancy in the 
information provided by India concerning the import of tyres from Thailand. The official data from 
Thailand shows a notable decrease in the number of tyres exported to India in 2022, amount ing to 
400,000 tyres, which signifies a significant 49%  decrease from the 720 ,000 tyres exported in 2021. 
In stark contrast, the information shared by India suggests an import volume of 870,000  tyres in 
2022, a remarkable increase from 450 ,000 tyres in 2021.  Thailand believes that the figures provided 
by India do not accurately reflect the reality  on the ground , and we urge India to promptly rectify 
this disparity by providing precise and transparent data.  
29.14.   Furthermore, Thailand  is deeply concerned about the decline in Thailand's exports of tyres 
to India during the first  eight months of 2023. This decline of 32% compared to the same period in 
the previous year raises significant concerns regarding the continued adverse impacts of India's 
import policy on our exports.  
29.15.   Additionally, Thailand is deeply worried that India may have implemented import quotas on 
tyres, which, coupled with the lack of transparency in its import policy, could distort trade to the 
detriment of international suppliers.  
29.16.   Thailand  urgently requests India to provide the following information to address these 
concerns:  (i) the administration of the restrictions, including the time-frame or period for processing 
applications relating to tyre imports ; (ii) the import licences granted to Thailand over the recent 
period, as well as details regarding the number and volume of these licences; and (iii)  the 
distribution of such licences among supplying countries, specifically with regard to the tyre industry.  
29.17.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.18.   This issue has been a long -standing one and t he European Union  has voiced its concerns on 
various occasions in this and other WTO  Committees , such as the TBT Committee, the Import 
Licensing Committee , and the  TRIMS  Committee , but India's measures are still in place.  
29.19.   The European Union  once again recalls the questions it had submitted to India in 
November  2020 in the Committee on Import Licensing, to which it did not receive a response. The 
EU remains c oncerned by India 's measure and would like to repeat its request for further information 
from India.  
29.20.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
29.21.   Canada would like to express its continued concerns, which have been raised on a number 
of occasions in various WTO  bodies, with India 's non -automatic import licensing system for tyres. 
Canada urges India to eliminate this quantitative import restriction in accordance with its 
WTO obligations.  
29.22.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
29.23.   India w ould like to thank the various Members for their continued interest in this issue. We 
would also like to refer to our response provided in the previous meetings of the Council for Trade 
in Goods, the Committee on Market Access , and the Committee on Import Li censing.  
29.24.   India would like to reiterate that the non -automatic licensing requirements for tyres are 
administered in a manner consistent with the rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures , including with respect to the time -frames for the gra nt of import licences. We are G/MA/M/79  
 
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  engaging bilaterally with the concerned Members , including providing information and data on the 
applications received and licences granted.  
29.25.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
30  INDIA – QUALITY CONTROL ORDER FOR CHEMICAL AND PETROCHEMICAL 
SUBSTANCES (ID  98) – STATEMENTS BY INDONESIA AND THAILAND  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had bee n included at the request of Indonesia  
and Thailand . 
30.2.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
30.3.  Indonesia thanks India for its responses in the TBT  Committee on this concern. However, at 
the moment , Indonesia has not received any adequate solutions and firm explanations from India 
on providing an adequate transition period of 12  months from publication , or until 23  October  2023, 
so that Indonesian industry could comply with the regulations in questio n. 
30.4.  Indonesia believes that if our producers are not given a sufficient time-period in which to 
comply with the BIS  standards, the restrictions will be exceedingly difficult for them to comply with  
or modify . Indonesia request s that India accept the results  of the conformity assessments provided 
by foreign conformity assessment bodies , or the inspection bodies inside the MRA/MLA  framework , 
to speed up the audit process and lower certification costs.  
30.5.  Indonesia requests India to review its stance to ensure Indonesian  producers can have a 
sufficient transition period to comply with the relevant regulations.  
30.6.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
30.7.  Thailand would like to express its appreciation to the Government of India for its decision to 
postpo ne the entry into force date of the Quality Control Orders for Polyethylene Material for 
Moulding and Extrusion, which includes the IS  Mark Certification requirement, to January  2024. This 
gesture is recognized and acknowledged as a positive step towards a ddressing the concerns raised 
by Members, including Thailand, many times in the past , and predominantly in the TBT  Committee.  
30.8.  Having said that, Thailand feels compelled to raise this concern in the CMA  meeting today as 
there has been a significant delay in issuing IS  mark certificates to qualified Thai manufacturers of 
the product. India has cited inadequate manpower and testing facilities as reasons for this delay, 
which has had an adverse impact on Thai manufacturers.  The delay in issuing IS  mark certificates 
could potentially lead to discrimination between domestic and foreign manufacturers, raising 
concerns about the equitable and non -discriminatory treatment of all manufacturers, irrespective of 
their origin.  
30.9.  In light of these concerns, Thailand requests that India consider further delaying the 
implementation of the IS  Mark Certification based on the Quality Control Orders for Polyethylene 
Material for Moulding and Extrusion. This delay should continu e until India can efficiently issue 
certificates to all qualified manufacturers in a timely and non -discriminatory manner. By doing so, 
India can avoid imposing unjustified trade restrictions and contribute to fostering a more equitable 
and harmonious trad ing environment.  
30.10.   The representative of  the United States  indicated the following:  
30.11.   The United States  remain s concerned by the proliferation of Quality Control Orders (QCOs) 
in India and in particular the increasing number of chemicals for which India's Mini stry of Chemicals 
and Fertilizers intends to mandate compliance with standards set by the Bureau of Indian Standards.  
US industry remains concerned about the cost and administrative burdens these QCOs pose, and we 
continue to encourage India to consult wit h stakeholders to determine a less trade -restrictive 
measure to fulfil the government's stated objectives.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  30.12.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
30.13.   The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) is carrying out physical inspections for applications 
received from foreign manufacturers, where the country to be visited is facilitating the visit of 
BIS officers. The process of standards development of BIS is aligned with accepted international 
best practices that are based on the core principles of openness, transparency, impartiality and 
consensus. While formulating Indian standards, analysing the relevance of international standards 
– ISO, IEC , and others – to the situation in India is an integral part of the process. This process is 
in accordance with the C ode of Good Practice of the WTO TBT Agreement , and as a policy.  
30.14.   The BIS seeks to align Indian standards with the International Standards of ISO and IEC, 
where available , and to the extent possible, keeping in consideration the specific climatic  or 
environm ental conditions and technological development in the country. Around 88% of Indian 
Standards, for which corresponding ISO and IEC  standards are available, are harmonized with their 
ISO/IEC  counterparts.  
30.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
31  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS (ID  62) – STATEMENTS BY 
JAPAN AND THAILAND  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan a nd 
Thailand . 
31.2.  The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
31.3.  Japan remains very concerned  about India 's import ban on air conditioners containing 
refrigerants , introduced in October  2020, which is likely to be a measure that unduly pressures 
companies to reconfigure their supply chains and is contrary to Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994 and 
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.  
31.4.  India has so far responded that the measure is consistent with the country's obligations under 
the Montreal Protocol, as amended. However , it is broadly intended to cover all air conditioners 
containing any kind of refrigerant, including those using refrigerants that are not covered by India's 
reduction and elimination obligations under the Montreal Protocol and by India's national legislati on 
on the control of ozone -depleting substances, such as CFC  gases. It is unnecessary and 
unreasonable in that the ban includes all air conditioners containing any refrigerant.  
31.5.  Although India stated at the July  2023 meeting of the Council for Trade in Good s that it has 
also provided updates to the relevant Committees, no clarification on this measure has yet been 
given. In addition, Japan has prepared written questions on the points for which it would like to seek 
detailed explanations and submitted them to  this Committee in September  2021, but has not 
received any response, and expects a sincere and prompt response from India.  
31.6.  With regard to the certification system for IS  standards based on Quality Control Orders for 
air conditioners and their components, it is highly regrettable that the certification system came into 
force on 1  October  2023, despite the fact that Japan had requested, via a letter from its Ambassador, 
that the date of enforcement be postponed once again. Nevertheless, we would like to requ est the 
smooth implementation of overseas factory audits by the BIS  and measures to ensure that the 
certification procedures are not delayed, so that import restrictions are not caused by delays in the 
BIS certification procedures.  
31.7.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
31.8.  Thailand would like to express its serious concerns about India's import prohibition on air 
conditioners containing refrigerants, an issue that we have persistently raised in various WTO  bodies , 
to date without any progress.  We believe that this prohibition is inconsistent with the GATT  1994, 
specifically Articles  XI:1 and XX as these measures represent a de facto trade restriction, and we 
urge India to ensure that its policies comply with the principles and obligations enshr ined in the 
GATT . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  31.9.  Moreover, we draw attention to India's notification  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 , which, in our view, 
violates the principle of national treatment. This is because the importation of hydrofluorocarbons 
into India is still permitted if a non -automatic import licence is granted, while the importation o f the 
same substance is banned when it is contained within an air conditioner. This inconsistency raises 
concerns about the discriminatory nature of India's import prohibition and the adverse impact it may 
have on international trade.  For these reasons, th erefore, Thailand reiterate s that India must amend 
or discontinue the measure as soon as possible to ensure that it is in compliance with India 's 
commitments under the WTO . 
31.10.   Furthermore, Thailand has observed that India's IS  Mark Certification, based on the  Quality 
Control Orders for air conditioners and their related parts, has experienced issues in implementation. 
Specifically, the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) has ceased issuing certificates to all Thai 
manufacturers since June  2023, citing inadequate manpower and testing facilities. We emphasize 
that it is India's responsibility to ensure that the implementation of the IS  Mark Certification does 
not unfairly impede international traders, especially those who meet the standard requirements. 
Such actions  may be perceived as prioritizing domestic manufacturers over international ones, which 
is contrary to the principle of non -discrimination.  
31.11.   In light of these concerns, Thailand requests that India consider delaying the implementation 
of the IS  Mark Certifi cation based on the Quality Control Orders for air conditioners and their related 
parts until it can issue certificates to all qualified manufacturers in a timely and non -discriminatory 
manner. This will help avoid unjustified trade restrictions and foster  a more equitable trading 
environment.  
31.12.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
31.13.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by others regarding India 's import 
restriction on air conditioners.  Korea believes that the meas ure appears to be inconsistent with 
WTO rules, particularly Article  XI of the GATT  1994, thereby creating an unnecessary obstacle to 
trade. Korea requests that India resolve the issue in a timely manner. We stand ready to further 
engage with India.  
31.14.   The rep resentative of India indicated the following:  
31.15.   India would like to reiterate its previous responses on this issue provided in various 
WTO bodies. The measure in question was necessary to apply standards in reducing risks to human, 
animal and plant life and health. The measure is consistent with India's commitment to the Montreal 
Protocol.  
31.16.   Further, as per the Ozone -Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) Amendment 
Rules  2014, the import of air conditioners containing Group  VI substances (HCFCs) has been 
prohibited since 1  July 2015. We have shared the details of these measures, including their intention 
and the ongoing developments, with the concerned delegations. It is also pertinent to mention that 
this measure was adopted based on consultations wi th the relevant industry groups comprising of 
representatives from all sectors of the air conditioning industry. These discussions with the industry  
led to policy reforms aimed at meeting the cooling requirements of the country in a responsible 
manner. The  measures were designed after several rounds of discussions with the industry groups, 
which included industry players from domestic and international markets, including firms 
representing at least one  Member raising the trade concern.  
31.17.   The Committee took no te of the statements made.  
32  INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM (ID  99) – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that  this agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  32.2.  The representative  of the European Union  indicated  the following : 
32.3.  Import restrictive policies and practices by Indonesia are a long -standing item , which we have 
discussed  in several WTO  Committees. The European Union has repeatedly stressed its deep 
concerns on the increasing number and scope of Indonesian restrictions, with negative impacts on 
trade flows.  
32.4.  The European Union  is particularly concerned by the restrictive im pact that might derive from 
the commodity balance mechanism, under which import licences will only be granted if domestic 
demand cannot be met by domestic supply, with an expanding scope of application.  
32.5.  The European Union  welcome s efforts to ensure a coord inated and streamlined approach on 
the management of import and export licences, but the mechanism raises concerns that it might 
result in further restrictions to trade flows , in turn raising questions on its WTO  compatibility.  The 
lack of clarity on the a ctual implementation of the commodity balance, including its scope and 
timelines for the application to different groups of products, presents additional challenges for 
economic operators in terms of legal certainty and predictability.  
32.6.  Accordingly, the European Union  would like to ask Indonesia for clarifications on the 
implementing measures that it intends to undertake.  The EU also stresses the need to ensure that 
such policies and measures will be compliant with Indonesia's WTO  obligations.  
32.7.  The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
32.8.  The United Kingdom  shares the concerns raised by the European Union  in relation to the 
potential trade restrictive impact of the commodity balance mechanism . 
32.9.  The lack of transparency regarding the scope and substance of the regulation creates an 
environment of economic uncertainty for UK  traders, which compounds the impact of existing 
procedural delays in entering the Indonesian market.  We therefore reiterate our request f or more 
details on the exact goods that will be covered by Indonesia 's commodity balance mechanism, 
preferably using HS  codes.  
32.10.   The United Kingdom  would welcome further information from Indonesia on future 
developments regarding this policy and looks forwar d to future engagement on this subject.  
32.11.   The representative of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
32.12.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by others regarding Indonesia 's 
commodity balance mechanism.  It has been reported that our busi nesses still encounter challenges 
such as undue delays in the issuance of the recommendations and limited quantity of import quotas, 
stemming from the implementation of the commodity balance mechanism.  In particular, Korea 
believes that Indonesia 's measure s, based on its own projections of domestic supply and demand, 
serve as import restrictions and significantly contribute to trade distortions. This appears to be 
inconsistent with Article  XI of the GATT  1994.  
32.13.   Accordingly, the Republic of Korea requests tha t Indonesia improve the functioning of the 
mechanism, particularly by providing clarifications on the timeline for import recommendation 
issuance and the approval of import quotas, to ensure that the system does not act as a means 
through which to restrict  import quantities.  
32.14.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
32.15.   The United States joins the European Union  in again raising concerns regarding Indonesia 's 
commodity balance policy.  The commodity balance policy originally appeared to ap ply to certain 
agricultural commodities. For example, in 2021, the first  stage stipulated that the policy would apply 
to rice, sugar, beef, salt, and fish. The policy has since been expanded to include non -agricultural 
products, in particular consumer good s such as cell phones.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  32.16.   Since the policy has been  implemented, importers have reported experiencing significant 
delays in obtaining import licences for certain agricultural products, and some import licences issued 
by the Indonesian authorities covered lowe r volumes than requested by the importer.  
32.17.   The United States would like to have Indonesia p lease explain what steps it has taken to 
avoid these administrative delays in the future.  Please explain whether importers are entitled to 
receive a licence covering whatever volume they request.  Please explain how the Government of 
Indonesia determines to which products the policy will apply.  
32.18.   While Indonesia has previously explained  that this policy was designed to build better trade 
governance and transparency in the furtherance of its goal of import substitution, the United States  
strongly urge s Indonesia to not expand its policy to other products, and to rethink this 
counter -productive and t rade-disruptive policy.  
32.19.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
32.20.   Switzerland echoes the concerns of previous speakers regarding Indonesia 's commodity 
balance mechanism. Switzerland is still waiting to get Indonesia's answers on how it intends to 
ensure the consistency of this mechanism with its WTO  obligations . We urge Indonesia not to expand 
this policy to other products, and to provide answers to the questions raised by previous delegations 
on the scope of the products covered, the timel ine, and the implementing measures.  
32.21.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
32.22.   Indonesia intends to reiterate its statement delivered previously in the Committee on Market 
Access, that the Commodity Balance Mechanism is aimed at building a better and more orderly 
global trade governance. In addition , the Commodity Balance Mechanism does not burden the 
existing import regime ; in fact , the aim of the Commodity Balance Mechanism is to create and 
facilitate a better business environment, certainty in doing business , and free trade flows. Indonesia 
intends to once again emphasize that the Commodity Balance Mechanism is not a policy to inhibit 
trade; rather, it is a policy implemented by Indonesia to provide ease and certainty i n trying to 
increase investment and create jobs.  
32.23.   The Commodity Balance Mechanism is a policy evaluation tool used by the Government of 
Indonesia for policy transparency based on accurate data, which will be implemented by the relevant 
ministries and institutions. In addition, the Presidential Regulation on Commodity Balances has 
currently not been notified to the WTO and is still in the revision stage ; for this reason, Indonesia 
has not been able to provide more detailed information.  
32.24.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
33  INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS 
(ID 42) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of the United 
States . 
33.2.  The representative of  the United States  indicated the following:  
33.3.  The United States  continue s to be disappointed that Indonesia has not addressed our concerns 
with respect to applying tariffs on select ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff 
commitments.  
33.4.  The United States , along with other Members, has been raising this issue with Indonesia for 
over four  years. The United States has also raised t his issue bilaterally. Industry has raised concerns 
with the Indonesian government as well. There has been no progress on this issue despite their 
efforts.  
33.5.  The United States has unfortunately seen similar issues occur in multiple other countries. We 
recall  that earl y this year, several dispute panels found that India 's tariff treatment of a number of 
ICT products was inconsistent with its WTO  commitments.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  33.6.  We urge Indonesia to engage constructively on this issue and finally address these 
long-standing concer ns to ensure the integrity of its market access commitments.  
33.7.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
33.8.  Canada continues to have concerns with Indonesia 's application of tariffs above its bound 
rates on certain ICT products. We once again call o n Indonesia to address  its tariffs on ICT  products 
in a way that is consistent with its WTO  commitments.  
33.9.  The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
33.10.   Japan echoes the concerns raised by the United States. With regard to the issue of the 
imposition of a 10%  duty on some telecommunications -related equipment (HS  8517.62), which 
Indonesia has conceded duty -free, Indonesia explained in statements at the Committee on Market 
Access and the ITA  Committee that this is a result of the integration o f several items due to 
HS transposition, that there is no intention to violate the obligation, and that in the Indonesian Tariff 
Book 2022 the duty on related products is duty -free as per its ITA commitment. However, no 
information has been provided since then, and the duties continue to be levied. At the ITA  Committee 
meeting in March this year, Indonesia stated that it would like to continue domestic coordination 
and resolve the issue.  
33.11.   Japan would like to request Indonesia to respond in good faith by prov iding further detailed 
information and information on its future course of action at an early stage, in order to examine the 
facts of the matter.  
33.12.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
33.13.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns  expressed by others regarding Indonesia's 
customs duties on certain telecommunication products.  
33.14.   As noted, the Republic of Korea believes that ICT  products classified under HS  8517.62 fall 
within Indonesia's ITA  commitments, and should therefore be granted  duty-free treatment.  The 
Republic of Korea requests that Indonesia resolve the issue in a timely manner by complying with 
its commitments.  We stand ready to further engage with Indonesia.  
33.15.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
33.16.   Indonesia would like to reiterate our statement again from  the previous meeting of the CMA, 
that it is conducting internal consultations with relevant ministries and institutions to review the 
imposition of duties on a certain number of telecommunication products in  Indonesia. W e will 
continue to strive to comply with all WTO  Agreements , including Indonesia's commitment to the 
WTO ITA Agreement.  
33.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
34  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (ID  35) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union , Switzerland,  and the United States . 
34.2.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
34.3.  The European Union  would like to reiterate the importance of harmonizing the implementation 
of the excise tax law and the need for a close engagement with private industry stakeholders on the 
process for revising the tax.  
34.4.  The European Union  welcomes the information that the present Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) excise tax system is under review , as we just heard,  and that a volumetric tax model based G/MA/M/79  
 
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  on international best practice is being considered base d on the "tax reform study ". We also consider 
it important that the reform will equalize the tax rates for energy drinks with the tax rates applied 
on other soft drinks.  The European Union would consider it important that any transition from the 
present to  a new tax regime include a provision to equalize the tax rate of energy drinks with other 
soft drinks , with an immediate effect.  
34.5.  The European Union would like the GCC  member States  to clarify the process and timelines 
for the modifications of the excise t ax. 
34.6.  The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
34.7.  Switzerland  would like to thank  Oman, speaking  on behalf of  the GCC , for the bilateral meeting 
that took place in July , where we could underline the answers we were seeking . 
34.8.  Switzerland takes note of the advanced stage of the study regarding the tax reform, which is 
a welcome and positive development for which we have been waiting for a long time.  Do the 
GCC members foresee a target implementation date? We would appreciate more details regardi ng 
the implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Tax Agreement.  
34.9.  Although Switzerland  understand s the complexity and time needed for reforming the selective 
tax, we are deeply concerned and disappointed by the very slow pace of the reform process. In 
additi on, our concerns and disappointment extend to the difficulty  that we experience, and the 
efforts needed to get any information.  
34.10.   Switzerland  therefore urge s the GCC  member States to significantly improve their 
transparency and engagement with interested Members, as well as with the industry. We therefore 
request to be regularly updated , every six months , on the state of play , or when ever new 
developments occur. We kindly request each GCC  member State to clarify the reasons , except those 
that are well known , delay ing adoption of the reform.  
34.11.   Once again, Switzerland  revert s to its longstanding request, namely that the tax rate at 50% 
for all sweetened beverages is harmonized without further delay, that is , before any revised selective 
tax is implemented.  
34.12.   Finally , Switzerland  remind s the GCC  member States that we are still waiting for the answers 
from our GCC  colleagues to the written questions provided right after our bilateral meeting in 
July 2023, as well as those submitted in April  2021. We expect to receive them in the very near 
future and hope they will clarify some of the issues  still open . We also request to receive an English 
translation of the report study once it has been  published.  
34.13.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
34.14.   The United States  also has continuing concerns regarding the GCC  member States' selective 
tax on beverages.  We do appreciate the update that was given at the beginning of this STC.  
34.15.   The United States , along with Switzerland, the Europea n Union,  and Japan, circulated 
questions in April  2021, and then subsequently with Switzerland in June this year  to GCC  member 
State governments regarding the status of this selective tax.  While we appreciate the information 
provided during the last Commit tee meeting, we note that we still have yet to receive written 
responses to the questions from April  2021, and ask these Members to update us as to when such 
responses to those questions will be provided.  
34.16.   As the United States has conveyed before, we reques t a substantive update on revisions to 
the GCC  excise tax model and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement 
and note the importance of timely engagement with interested parties regarding th e issue.  
34.17.   The United States  understand s that a revision of the excise tax on beverages is under  way. 
Can the GCC  member States please provide us with an update on the status of that work and when 
the revision will be completed?  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  34.18.   The representative of Oman  indicated the following:  
34.19.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait and Oman , I would like to thank the delegations of the 
European Union,  Switzerland,  and the United  States for their continued interest in the GCC  selective 
tax on carbonated soft drinks, energy drinks, and other sweetened beverages.  
34.20.   I would  like to inform you that, as per the latest update from the GCC  Secretariat, the study 
reviewing the selective tax  regime has reached an advanced stage. We anticipate that a 
comprehensive report will be issued very soon. The delay is attributed to certain technical challenges . 
The GCC  member States are actively working to resolve these challenges and expedite the 
comp letion of the study . 
34.21.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
35  MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE (ID  64) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED 
STATES  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of the United 
States.  
35.2.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
35.3.  The United States would like to raise its continued concer n with the quantitative restrictions 
Mexico has implemented on glyphosate . In particular, we are referring to the March  2023 
announcement by Mexico's Federal Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS) 
reducing the permitted volume of i mported glyphosate from the already  restricted volumes last year.  
35.4.  Since Mexico began setting import quotas for formulated and technical glyphosate in 2021, it 
has not provided an opportunity for public comment, submitted notification to the WTO of these 
quantitative restrictions, or provided scientific evidence for the import quotas.  
35.5.  The United States seeks transparency on  the following : (i) how were these quota levels 
determined ; (ii) did Mexico solicit and consider public input in making this determinatio n; (iii) how 
is the quota administered ; and (iv)  what information has been provided to traders?  
35.6.  Under the 13 February  2023 decree by which various actions regarding glyphosate and 
genetically modified corn are established, the importation, production, distribution and use of 
glyphosate will be phased out by 31 March  2024. On what scientific evidence is this phase -out 
based? How does Mexico justify these measures in light of its GATT  obligations, including Article  XI 
of the GATT  1994?  
35.7.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
35.8.  Canada would like to express its continued concerns, which have been raised on a number  of 
occasions.  
35.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
36  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS (ID  50) – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Thailand . 
36.2.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
36.3.  Thailand extends its understanding and empathy towards the economic hardships and 
balance -of-payment difficulties faced by the people of Nepal. While we acknowledge these 
challenges, we find it necessary to raise our concern once again  regarding Nepal's im port ban on 
caffeinated mixed energy drinks and flavoured synthetic drinks from Thailand, which has been in 
effect since 2019. Despite the passage of time, Thai exporters continue to be a dversely affected by G/MA/M/79  
 
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  this measure, and we note that Nepal has not ini tiated consultations with the Committee on 
Balance -of-Payments Restrictions, as required by Article  6 of the Understanding on the 
Balance -of-Payments Provisions , as well as Article  XII:4(a) and XVIII: 12(a) of the GATT  1994.  
36.4.  Thailand urges Nepal to respect and follow these provisions without delay. These provisions 
are essential components of the international trade framework, and their observance is critical for 
fostering a fair and equitable trading environment. Consultations through the Committee on 
Balan ce-of-Payments Restrictions are intended to facilitate constructive dialogue and offer the 
opportunity to address concerns and reach mutually beneficial resolutions.  
36.5.  The representative of Nepal  indicated the following:  
36.6.  Nepal would like to thank Thailand fo r its statement and continued interest in its trade policy 
measures and takes good note that this concern has also been raised in the CTG. Accordingly, Nepal 
wishes to refer to its earlier statements delivered at the meetings of the CMA held in April  2023,  and 
at the CTG  meeting s held in April and July  2023. In response to the concern raised today, while 
noting that the Government of Nepal has already started the reviewing process of the trade policy 
measure , there are many organizations involved in the pro cess of reviewing and the review may 
thus still take some time. My delegation will update the Committee as soon as possible once we 
have receive d a further progress report from Capital . 
36.7.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
37  PERU – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO (ID  74) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda  item had been included at the request of the United 
Kingdom . 
37.2.  The representative of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
37.3.  The United Kingdom  would like to again express its concerns around Peru 's discriminatory tax 
exemptions that favour pisco over other like products.  
37.4.  The United Kingdom  reiterate s that UK  traders are seriously impacted by this measure, which 
is a significant economic barrier to their trade into the Peruvian spirit s market. We ha ve been raising 
this bilaterally for over five years , and we have been raising this at the WTO for over one year now. 
This measure has resulted in tens of millions of pounds of harm to UK  exporters.  
37.5.  In April, Peru said that their Selective Excise Tax  did not establish any distinction that would 
affect other WTO  Members. Yet this tax charges pisco – a domestically produced spirit – 2.27 nuevos 
soles per litre. For comparison, a standardly priced whiskey – or other such like products – will be 
charged an ad valorem  40% tax rate, or 3.63 nuevos soles or more.  
37.6.  The United Kingdom  strongly considers the current measure to be a breach of Peru's national 
treatment obligations under the GATT. And the UK would like to remind Peru that we are still waiting 
for response s from questions we posed last September. We would welcome engagement on this 
issue, but without concrete answers, we will consider further action.  
37.7.  I hope it is therefore clear that the United Kingdom  takes this matter seriously and we ask 
Peru to do likew ise. 
37.8.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
37.9.  The United States continues to support the United Kingdom's intervention on Peru's excise 
taxes for distilled spirits. We remain concerned with the discrepancy in the tax rates applied to pisco 
versus all other distilled spirits.  
37.10.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
37.11.   The European Union  also wishes once again to join the United Kingdom in raising concerns 
around Peru's tax exemption in favour of pisco.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  37.12.   The European Union  continues to be seriously concerned that the existing tax regime 
undermines the ability of EU  spirits to compete on a level playing field on the Peruvian market. The 
EU also wishes to insist on Peru's clarification of how this measure is  consistent with its existing 
WTO obligations, in particular the obligation not to discriminate against imported spirits.  
37.13.   The European Union  looks forward to Peru's suggestions as to how to solve this issue 
promptly.  
37.14.   The representative of Peru indicated th e following:  
37.15.   Peru would like to reiterate that , in our opinion , the application of the Selective Consumption 
Tax to alcoholic beverages is made within the framework of a tax system that does not establish a 
differentiated treatment based on origin, and  we therefore believe that there is no treatment 
intended to provide protection to domestic production.  
37.16.   Of course, Peru is aware of the concerns and doubts that some Members have on the matter, 
so we have been analy sing this issue internally. Finally, we are w orking hand in hand with the local 
industry, the relevant trade associations , and other stakeholders in the development of national 
regulations. It is worth mentioning that any change in the Selective Consumption Tax requires 
modifications in the rank of a  law, with the procedural and administrative difficulties that this entails.  
37.17.   Finally, Peru reiterate s our willingness to continue our dialogue with interested Members on 
the technical aspects of this matter, within the framework of the bilateral mechanisms  available to 
us. 
37.18.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
38  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS (ID  56) – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
38.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union . 
38.2.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
38.3.  Since April  2020, the European Union  has raised on multiple occasions its concerns over the 
import restrictions imposed by Sri  Lanka on various products.  We have learned on 10  October that 
most of those restrictions have been lifted.  This is an extremely welcome development , and we 
would be grateful if Sri  Lanka could update Members about these latest developments.  In particular, 
we understand that import restrictions in relation to veh icles remain. We would welcome additional 
clarification with respect to when the remaining restrictions will be lifted.  
38.4.  The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
38.5.  Japan shares the concern expressed by the European Union  that import restrictions o n 
consumer passenger cars, motorbikes , and auto parts may constitute an import ban in violation of 
Article  XI:1 of the GATT . Sri Lanka continued to explain at the last Committee meeting that it was 
necessary to secure foreign exchange reserves to meet dome stic demand for essential items , such 
as foodstuffs. However , import restrictions on the grounds of balance -of-payment disparities  should 
not be easily exercised  as there are substantive and procedural requirements to be met.  
38.6.  Japan welcomes the removal of the import suspension on commercial vehicles in August  2023. 
However , as Sri  Lanka's foreign exchange reserves are recovering , and the economic crisis is 
improving due to the IMF  support programme and other means of support , Japan also urges the 
early with drawal of the remaining measures on consumer passenger cars and other products.  
38.7.  The representative of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
38.8.  The United Kingdom  thanks the European Union for putting this item on the agenda.  We 
warmly welcome the recent economic progress made by Sri  Lanka, including the easing of import 
restrictions, and continue to stand ready to support our partner country towards recovery.  The UK G/MA/M/79  
 
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  remains committed to a long -term trade relationship with Sri  Lanka and wants to wor k together to 
achieve closer trading ties and ensure the swift removal of restrictions from all imports.  
38.9.  The United Kingdom  would like to understand the rationale for the gradual removal of 
restrictions on certain imports up to this point , and would be int erested in any further information 
on the pathway, including potential timelines, for the eventual removal of all restrictions.  
Furthermore, will the outcome of the IMF's first  review of economic progress and  reforms associated 
with the EFF  agreement impac t plans to continue the easing of import restrictions?  
38.10.   The United Kingdom  also look s forward to Sri  Lanka 's submission of a notification to  the 
WTO regarding import restrictions.  We look forward to hearing from Sri  Lanka on this matter and 
stand ready to w ork with partners to find a solution.  
38.11.   The representative of  the United States  indicated the following:  
38.12.   The United States reiterates its concerns over the import restrictions Sri  Lanka introduced 
in March  2022 on what it deemed to be "non -essential goods".  The United States understood that 
Sri Lanka will lift ongoing import restrictions for certain goods in stages earlier this year after the 
country received an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in March  2023.  Can Sri Lanka provide 
an update on its work to lift the import restrictions?  
38.13.   The representative of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
38.14.   Sri Lanka would like to thank the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United  States for their continued interest in Sri  Lanka's impor t trade policy measures. At the last 
CMA meeting , held on 27  April, my delegation mentioned that all positive steps would be taken by 
Sri Lanka to remove the restrictive import policy measures in a progressive manner.  
38.15.   Accordingly, since the CMA's last meeting, Sri Lanka arranged to relax temporary suspension 
on 286  HS codes on 9  June, 327  HS Codes on 20  July, and 14  HS codes on 14  August.  Finally, 
through import and export control Regulations No.  14 of 2023 , published in the Gazette Notification 
No. 2353/16 , dated 9  October  2023, Sri  Lanka arranged to relax temporary suspension on all 
remaining HS  codes , except some items under Chapter  87. Accordingly, as of 10  October  2023, 
Sri Lanka has removed all the HS  codes from the schedule of temporary suspension, ex cept 
304 HS codes under Chapter  87. 
38.16.   Sri Lanka will arrange to progressively remove temporary suspension on these remaining 
few items and also update this Committee accordingly. My delegation has taken due note of the 
concerns expressed by Members today. We will arrange to provide responses to their concerns in 
consultation with our Capital  in due course . 
38.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
39  TÜRKIY E – DISCRIMINATORY ADDITIONAL TARIFFS ON ELECTRIC VEHICLES (ID  100) 
– STATEMENT BY CHINA  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of China.  
39.2.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
39.3.  China  regret s to raise this issue again. On 2 March, Türkiye issued a presidential decree 
imposing a 40%  additional tariff only on imported electric vehicles originating from China. Until now, 
despite various efforts made by China through both bilateral and multilateral channels, there is little 
movement from Türkiye to resolve this issue. The electric vehicl es originating from China are still 
subject to the discriminatory tariff treatment, significantly affecting China 's legitimate rights and 
interests under the WTO.  
39.4.  China  reiterate s that the presidential decree, which imposes a 40%  additional tariff only on 
China -made electric vehicles, is a measure inconsistent with, among others, Articles  I and II of the 
GATT  1994, as well as Türkiye 's commitment under the WTO Agreements . G/MA/M/79  
 
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  39.5.  In the Committee 's meeting in April, the delegate of Türkiye stated that Capital was d iscussing 
this issue and China 's comments would be conveyed. We look forward to the update from Türkiye 
today. We urge Türkiye to remove the discriminatory tariff without delay and bring the measures 
into conformity with WTO  rules.  
39.6.  The representative of Türkiye indicated the following:  
39.7.  The electric vehicles sector, as an infant industry, has a strategic importance for Türkiye. This 
sector presents potentials for technological and know -how spillover  to other sectors as well. Within 
this framework, as a resul t of an import surge in this sector , Türkiye, within its bound rates, 
increased its MFN  tariff rate on electric vehicles for non -preferential trade partners in July  2022.  
39.8.  Despite the introduction of the increased MFN  tariff rates, an import surge continued , 
predominantly from China among the non -preferential trade partners. Having said that, Türkiye has 
no intention of discriminating against any Member. We took note of the concerns expressed by China 
today. We will provide additional information once we rec eive any further instructions.  
39.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
40  UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY (ID  101) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
40.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
40.2.  The representative  of China indicated  the following :24 
40.3.  China  refers to its statements made in previous meetings of this Committee.  As the 
Committee is aware, since 2018 the United States has implemented a series of trade -restrictive 
measures in the name of national security against some Members, including China. The measures 
can be placed into eight  categories:  (i) tariff measures, such as Section  232 tariff measures against 
imported steel and aluminium products; (ii)  rule of origin measures, such as discriminatory 
application of origin marking; (iii)  direct export restrictions, including extensive export controls on 
commercial products exported to China; (iv)  extra-territorial application of export restrictions, which 
restrict third  countries from exporting products to China even if the products do not contain any  
"US content";  (v) procurement prohibition – for example, the US  prohibits federal government 
agencies from procuring or using telecommunications products and serv ices from certain Chinese 
companies; (vi)  discriminatory subsidies policies – such as restricting semiconductor companies 
receiving US  government subsidies from expanding their relevant investment in China; (vii)  market 
authorization prohibitions, which pr ohibit some Chinese telecommunication equipment from 
obtaining certificates necessary for market access; and (viii) ICTS transaction reviews – such as the 
US review of commercial transactions for a very broad range of ICT  products and services.  
40.4.  China believes that the broad scope and growing number of the measures taken by the 
United  States in the name of national security reflects how the US is abusing "national security".  We 
take Section  232 tariff measures on imported steel and aluminium products as an e xample. We have 
all seen how the United States raised tariffs in the name of so-called "national security", and then 
lowered tariffs only for certain Members , and put in place quotas, which are explicitly prohibited by 
the WTO  rules.  Another example is the  US export controls on which we will elaborate under Agenda 
Items 41 and 42. We also note , with surprise , that the United States even considers battery 
components of electric vehicles made by China to be a potential threat to US  national security, 
therefore requiring discriminatory treatment in its subsidies policy.  
40.5.  In China's view, the United States believes that the application of the "security exemption" 
provisions is solely "self -judging" and not subject to review by WTO  dispute settlement panel s. 
Challenging national security -based trade decisions has put the WTO "on thin ice". However, as 
indicated by several dispute settlement panels, neither the negotiating history of the GATT, the text 
 
24 The delegation of China indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their statement 
would b e provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  of the GATT, nor the interpretation of the relevant prov isions by many other Members , agree with 
the US  claim.  
40.6.  In fact, it is the abuse of national security by the United States  that really puts the WTO on 
thin ice. By abusing "national security", the US has broken one  window after another of the mansion 
of the  multilateral trading regime , and would give rise to the "broken window theory", where 
exemptions become the rule and put the rules -based multilateral trading regime in danger.  
40.7.  Finally, China believes that it is necessary to enhance the review and monitoring of security 
exemption abuses under the WTO  framework.  
40.8.  The representative  of the United States  indicated  the following : 
40.9.  As we have stated previously, the United States does no t believe that the WTO  Committee on 
Market Access is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
40.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
41  UNITED STATES, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS AGREEMENT ON 
CHIP EXPORT RES TRICTIONS (ID  102) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
41.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
41.2.  The representative  of China  indicated  the following : 
41.3.  China has serious concerns that the United States, Japan , and the Netherlands, within a short 
time-period, all revised relevant laws and regulations to introduce new export controls against China 
on the same sector, which is the semiconductor industry.  
41.4.  China noted that both the U nited States and the European Union stated in previous meetings 
that they took issue with the agenda ite m description as put forward by China, but the latest 
development speaks  for itself. Following the US  export controls on semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment, issued on 7  October  2022, Japan and the Netherlands have also implemented relevant 
export contro ls, on 23  July 2023 and 1  September  2023, respectively . Our question is, if no such 
agreement exists among the three  Members, how could the three  Members take similar actions in 
such a synchronized manner?  
41.5.  Regarding Japan's export controls on semiconductor  manufacturing equipment, China is 
concerned that the scope of products subject to new export controls is clearly excessive, as it covers 
products that have long been removed from the Wassenaar Arrangement. Despite Japan's claim that 
the objective of the m easures is to prevent technology from being diverted for military use and 
safeguard international peace and security, and that it does not target any specific country or region, 
many products and related technology covered by the export control are used fo r civilian purpose s. 
In addition, the classification of export licensing and country or region groupings under this export 
control reflect that the measures are discriminatory and targeted against China.  
41.6.  Regarding the new export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment issued by the 
Dutch government, China  takes note that the relevant semiconductor manufacturing equipment can 
be exported to China until the end of this year. We are concerned that the new exp ort controls go 
beyond the scope of the control list of items in the Wassenaar Arrangement , and include products 
that are not covered by the EU  dual-use export control list.  
41.7.  The latest export controls taken by the United States , Japan, and the Netherlands clearly 
deviate from the export control objective and practice widely shared by the international community, 
and are contrary to the purpose of the peaceful use of semiconductor manufacturing equipment  in 
science and technology.  
41.8.  Finally, China  request s the three  Members to notify the agreement and its follow -up measures 
to the WTO , and call s on the WTO to strengthen its monitoring of these measures.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  41.9.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
41.10.   The European Union  recalls its statement ma de in the previous meeting of this Committee. 
The EU continues to take issue with the description of the agenda point by China, as a factual matter. 
Moreover, the type of measures regulated by the GATT are those adopted by individual Members. 
The EU's stat ement therefore relates to the latter only. The matter raised by China concerns national 
export control measures by the Netherlands relating to advanced semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment adopted by Regulation of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Devel opment Cooperation of 
23 June 2023, and published on 30  June 2023. This measure falls under the dual use and export 
control framework  of the European Union. This framework allows EU  member States to impose 
additional national export controls based on essen tial security interests. The measure was adopted, 
in the same way as all existing restrictions of this type, in full conformity with the applicable 
WTO rules. Most notably, the exceptions of the GATT permit Members to take action which they 
consider necess ary for the protection of their essential security interests relating to traffic in goods 
carried on directly or indirectly for supplying military forces.  
41.11.   The representative  of the United States  indicated the following:  
41.12.   As an initial matter, the United Sta tes has previously explained why WTO  fora, such as the 
Committee on Market Access, are not appropriate to discuss issues related to national security, such 
as export controls.  Furthermore, as we have previously expressed in the C ouncil for Trade in Goods 
and this Committee, the United States takes issue with the agenda item description as put forward 
by China.  
41.13.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
41.14.   Japan has long been implementing strict export controls based on the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Act, which Japan considers necessary from the perspective of maintaining 
international peace and security, in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement s. We will continue 
to take action in accordance with the above policy.  
41.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
42  UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN (ID  103) – STATEMENT BY 
CHINA  
42.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
42.2.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
42.3.  China  wishes to express our serious concerns again on the disruptive and discriminatory 
measures taken by the United States with regard to the semiconductor industry. We note with 
concern that the US will probably take further steps soon to restrict the export of semiconductor 
products to China. We will closely follow the developments.  
42.4.  China  continue s to have concerns over the notice of Funding Opportunity CHIPS  incentive 
Program, issued by the US Department of Commerce . The notice requests t he CHIPS  funds 
applicants to demonstrate whether and how they intend to utilize domestically produced iron, steel, 
and construction materials as part of their projects , which may not comply with the relevant rules 
of the SCM and TRIMs  Agreement s. 
42.5.  China  also noted that the notice requests the applicant to demonstrate why the investments 
would not occur without the CHIPS  incentives. It seems to us that the applicant's investment 
decisions are not based on market orientation or commercial logic.  
42.6.  In addition, the Final National Security Guardrails for CHIPS for America Incentives Program , 
issued on 22  September  2023, prevents the CHIPS  funds recipients from expanding both advanced 
facilities and legacy facilities in China for ten  years.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  42.7.  This is a typi cal example of  a Cold War mentality, a zero-sum game , and trade bullying. The  
small yard, high fence approach the United States is taking is detrimental not only to China's  
interests, but also to the interests of the US itself. and other Members. It has se verely undermined 
the global semiconductor industry chain, violated market principles, disrupted the normal order of 
international trade and investment, and negatively affected the rules -based multilateral trading 
system. China  calls on the WTO to strength en its monitoring of the relevant measures.  
42.8.  The representative of the United  States  indicated the following:  
42.9.  The publicly available, published CHIPS  Act explains in detail the initiative, including which 
entities and projects are eligible to receive suppor t, and the types of support that they are eligible 
to receive.  The CHIPS  program has a website dedicated to publicly sharing information at 
www.chips.gov . On this public website, the US  Department of Commerce has published its initial 
implementation strategy and the first  notice of funding opportunity.  
42.10.   The CHIPS  Act consists of three  distinct initiatives: ( i) large-scale investments in 
leading -edge logic and memory manufacturing clusters; ( ii) expansion of manufacturing capacity for 
mature and current -generation chips, new and specialty technologies; and ( iii) initiatives to 
strengthen and advance US  leadership in research  and development.  
42.11.   As the United States has previously explained to China, the contemplated support is 
consistent with US  law and WTO  commitments. As detailed in the CHIPS  Act and implementing 
regulations, a successful CHIPS  program will respond to market s ignals, fill market gaps, and reduce 
investment risk to attract significant private capital. To that end, the publicly available CHIPS  Act 
and notice of funding opportunity set forth in detail the criteria, such as national security, including 
economic sec urity, objectives , and commercial viability, that the Department of Commerce will use 
to evaluate applications.  
42.12.   In addition, the US  Department of Commerce will implement certain restrictions to ensure 
that those who receive CHIPS  funds cannot compromise na tional security.  Those national 
security -based restrictions are described in more detail in the Act and in the final rulemaking  
published in the Federal Register on 25 September (88  Fed. Reg. 65600) . The final rule reflects input 
received from solicited comments on the proposed rule.  
42.13.   Again, this Committee is not the appropriate forum for issues related to national security.  
42.14.   The United States  would also note that China also has a semiconductor program.  In 
particular, the national IC  fund, started in 2014, has never been notified. In addition, China has 
numerous programs at the central and sub -central levels of government in the form of government 
guidance funds, none of which have been notified.  
42.15.   The Com mittee took note  of the statements made . 
43  UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA (ID  90) – 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  
43.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
43.2.  The representative  of China  indicated  the following : 
43.3.  China has to raise this issue again, as the United States continue s imposing Section  301 tariffs 
on some of China's exports to the US, even if it is a measure that is manifestly inconsistent with the 
WTO rules.  
43.4.  The Section  301 tariffs impos ed by the United States do not serve the interests of either 
Chinese or American enterprises and people. The cost of Section  301 tariffs is almost entirely borne 
by US  importers, driving up the price of US  enterprises inputs.  
43.5.  China  urges the United States to immediately remove all Section  301 tariffs imposed on 
Chinese products.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  43.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
43.7.  China's decision to continue to raise this matter in this and other WTO  committees has been 
a pointless waste of WTO  resources, given that China has already unilaterally imposed the only 
remedy that the WTO  Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) could potentially authorize: the suspension of 
WTO concessions.  
43.8.  China has already applied tariff measures to imports from the United St ates in excess of its 
WTO commitments for the explicit purpose of retaliating against the measures for which it now seeks 
legal findings. The US  understand s that, from July  2018 to September  2019, China imposed 
four rounds of tariffs , ranging from 2.5% to 30%, in retaliation against US  Section  301 tariffs, which 
covered approximately 71% (USD  109 billion) of 2017  imports into China from the United States.  
43.9.  China, of course, did so without obtaining the authorization from the DSB pursuant to the 
Dispute Settl ement Understanding. China does not dispute the fact that it has already imposed 
retaliatory tariff measures in response to the US  measures at issue. Nor does China dispute that 
these retaliatory measures remain in effect.  
43.10.   The United States  urges China to be mindful of the Committee's and Members' time and 
resources when raising matters in Committee meetings in the future.  
43.11.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
43.12.   China has to respon d to the statement made by the United States , as the U S consider s 
China's decision to raise this issue a waste of the Committee's time and resources. I will keep my 
response as short as possible, to avoid taking too much of the time and resources of this Committee.  
43.13.   The terms of reference of the Committee on M arket Access  indicate that the Committee 
shall: (i) supervise the implementation of concessions relating to tariffs and non -tariff measures; 
and (ii)  provide a forum for consultation on matters relating to tariffs and non -tariff measures. The 
Section  301 t ariffs imposed by the United States certainly fall under the scope of this mandate. 
Therefore , it is justified and necessary for China to raise and discuss this ongoing and 
WTO-inconsistent measure in this Committee.  
43.14.   China  once again urge s the United State s to immediately remove all Section  301 tariffs 
imposed on Chinese products , and to abide by the WTO rules. We believe that this is the best way 
not only to save  the Committee's time and resources, but also to save the multilateral trading system 
as well.  
43.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
44  UNITED STATES – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF STURGEON (ID  91) 
– STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
44.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union.  
44.2.  The representative  of the European Union  indicated  the following :25 
44.3.  The European Union  has been raising its concerns regarding US  trade prohibitions on sturgeon 
products in this Committee since 2015.  
44.4.  As a reminder regarding the facts: in 2014, the United S tates listed five species of sturgeon 
as "endangered " under the US  Endangered Species Act (ESA). The listing as "endangered " implies 
that trade in the relevant products is prohibited.  The US  Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) has been 
conducting a status review on a petition to list additional species of sturgeon as "endangered " under 
the Act.  
 
25 The delegation of the European Union indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of their 
statement would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  44.5.  The European Union is concerned that the trade bans cover both wild and farmed sturgeon. 
As previously  explained, the EU's main concern is that the US does not consider wild and farmed 
sturgeons and their products as separate categories. The US consequently applies the same 
conservation measures to both. This goes beyond the requirements of the relevant in ternational 
environmental legislation, namely the CITES  Convention.  
44.6.  In fact, commercial captive breeding of sturgeons actually helps to ensure the survival of wild 
stocks. Commercial aquaculture can be considered an effective tool to conserve these species  and 
ensure the survival of wild stocks. It has no impact on the wild population , and instead can reduce 
illegal trade and wild harvesting ,-and numerous sturgeon farmers contribute to efforts to 
re-introduce these species in the wild  - efforts that could e nd if trade in farmed sturgeon in the US 
is banned.  
44.7.  In addition to raising the issue in the CMA, the European Union has repeatedly conveyed our 
position in many bilateral contacts. Despite all our efforts, the US  position remains unchanged.  The 
proposed li sting of the additional species of sturgeon as "endangered" species is of particular and 
immediate concern to us given its potential impact on EU  producers.  The US is a very important 
market, representing 15%  of the global caviar market and 23% of EU  caviar exports. In addition to 
the halt of EU  exports to the US, the ban risks putting the EU  market under pressure in case of a 
sudden and significant increase in imports from other countries that can no longer export to the US.  
The European Union would be int erested to explore whether less trade restrictive options could  be 
available.  
44.8.  The European Union  looks forward to further engagement with the United States  with a view 
to finding a mutually acceptable way forward on this issue.  
44.9.  The representative  of Uruguay  indicated  the following :26 
44.10.   Uruguay thanks the European Union for including this item on the agenda of this meeting 
and wishes to take the floor to reiterate its concern regarding the proposed rule to list four  species 
of Eurasian sturgeon as endang ered species under the United States Endangered Species Act of 
1973. The adoption of the rule would result in a ban on the importation of the listed species, including 
the Russian sturgeon ( Acipenser gueldenstaed tii), which is produced in a sustainable man ner in 
Uruguay by companies that ship a significant share of their exports to the United States.  
44.11.   Uruguay understands and supports the intention to protect endangered species of sturgeon 
in natural habitats. However, we believe that the proposed rule, as cu rrently drafted, would not only 
be counterproductive for the conservation of species in the habitats in which they are found, but 
would also have a negative impact on the sustainable sturgeon -farming industry, which currently 
supports the continuity of the  species with viable alternatives for captive breeding that are not 
directly connected to the degradation of the sturgeon's habitat and to poaching, which threatens the 
Ponto -Caspian species in their native range States.  
44.12.   Uruguay believe s that this rule cha nge underestimates aquaculture's positive impact on the 
global industry, given that a huge volume of world trade in Acipenser gueldenstaedtii  comes from 
legally farmed production. The sturgeon -farming industry outside the range countries has little or 
no impact on the results of the restoration of the Caspian Sea habitat. However, the rule change 
proposed by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) will be more punitive for the aquaculture industry 
than for range States that fail to comply.  
44.13.   Uruguay believe s that the preservation of the Ponto -Caspian species could be ensured by 
establishing a comprehensive approach involving active cooperation with sustainable sturgeon fish 
farms to protect the species through continuous breeding and regulated trade.  
44.14.   Uruguay  would  very much appreciate an update on the status of the proposed rule and, once 
again, call s for a solution that makes it possible to protect wild species without creating a barrier to 
trade for those bred in captivity.  
 
26 The delegation of Uruguay indicated at the meeting t hat a longer written version of their statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/79  
 
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  44.15.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
44.16.   The United States  appreciate s the European Union  and Uruguay's continued interest in this 
matter.  As we have communicated previously, the US  Endangered Species Act does not allow for 
captive -bred populations to be assigned separat e legal status from their wild counterparts on the 
basis of their captive state, including through designation as a separate distinct population. It is also 
not possible to separate out captive -bred populations for different legal status under the Act by other 
approaches.  
44.17.   The United States  refers the European Union and Uruguay to our previous interventions on 
this issue , and reiterate s our offer to facilitate continued discussion among the relevant authorities 
on this issue.  
44.18.   The Committee took note  of the statements made . 
45  ELECTION OF THE VICE -CHAIRPERSON  
45.1.  The Chairperson  recall ed that Rule  12 of the Rules of Procedure for meetings of the Market 
Access Committee ( G/L/148 ) authorizes the Committee to elect a Vice -Chairperson, and that the 
long-standing practice is to e lect a Vice -Chairperson at the formal autumn meeting. As she had 
mentioned at the informal meeting on 3 July, after some preliminary consultations, it appear ed that 
the situation that had prevented the election of the Vice-Chairperson  of this Committee in 2022 still 
persist ed in 2023 . Therefore, she propose d to report back to the Committee in case there was any 
change in the current situation.  
45.2.  The Committee took note of the report.  
46  DRAFT REPORT (2023) OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS 
(G/MA/SPEC/63 ) 
46.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that the Committee was required to submit a n annual  report of its 
activities to the CTG. The draft report covering the activities of the Committee in 202 3 had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/SPEC/63 . She proposed th at the Committee request the Secretariat to 
email the report  to delegations on 2 0 October  2023. In the absence of objections by Members by 
27 October  2023, the report would be considered to have been approved by the Committee and 
would be submitted to the CTG for appropriate action.27 
46.2.  The Committee so agreed . 
47  OTHER BUSINESS  
47.1  Changes to the annotated agenda  
47.1.  The Chairperson  highlighted that  the Secretariat ha d made some changes to the annotated 
agenda circulated in document  JOB/MA/169 . Since this Committee ha d always used an annotated 
agenda, this item had not been included in the recent discussions on how to improve the functioning 
of the Committee.  
i. However, foll owing the adoption of the annotated agenda by the Council for Trade in Goods 
(JOB/CTG/34 ), the Secretariat had considered that it would be  useful to modify certain 
elements of the annotated agenda of this Committee to align it  to parts to the CTG model. 
These include d: (i) the introduction of the section on "Meeting Documentation and Logistical 
Arrangements";  (ii) further background information under each agenda item and reference 
to legal documents (e.g . decisions) , where applicable;  and (iii) the presentation of trade 
concerns in tabular form in the annex, where new concerns were separated from those 
previously raised.  
 
27 Document  G/L/1507  of 30 October  2023. G/MA/M/79  
 
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  47.2.  She noted that t hese changes were in addition to others  the Secretariat  had already 
introduced, such as links to the Trade Concerns  Database for the concerns raised and the inclusion 
of hyperlinks in all official documents.  
47.3.  The Chairperson propose d that the Committee discuss the improvements to the annotated 
agenda at its next informal meeting , in November  2023, so that Members had mo re time to review 
the changes and provide more appropriate feedback.  
47.4.  It was so agreed . 
47.2  Dates of upcoming meetings  
47.5.  The Chairperson  asked the Committee to take note of the following arrangements.  
47.6.  The last informal meeting of the Committee would take place on  21 November  2023 and its 
informal convening notice would be circulated in due course. Before the informal meeting, she 
recalled that the first  thematic session on supply chain resilience with other international 
organizations would be held on 21  November  2023 as well. The Secretariat would send a 
communication indicating whether the session was confirmed and other details after the deadline 
for proposing speakers on 31 October  2023.  
47.7.  Regarding the meeting dates for 2024, the formal meetings of the Committee  had been 
scheduled for 25 -26 March and 17 -18 October  2024. The informal meetings of the Committee had 
been scheduled to take place on 6  February; 11  June; and 28  November  2024. Additional informal 
meetings could be convened if necessary. The proposed date s took into account the tentative 
schedule of meetings of other CTG  subsidiary bodies, and the meeting dates of the CTG  itself, in an 
effort to avoid possible overlaps and facilitate the work of delegates.  
47.8.  Finally, the Chairperson  reminded delegations that they could upload the statements delivered 
at the meeting onto the eAgenda platform until 3  November  2023. As agreed by the  Committee, the 
statements available on eAgenda would  automatically be made available to all Members after  this 
date, unless a given  Member had requested that their statement not be made available . 
47.9.  The Committee took note  of the statement . 
47.10.   The meeting was adjourned . 
__________