WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
5 April 2019  
(19-2149) Page: 1/395 
Trade Policy Review Body  
17 and 19 December 2018  Original: English/anglais/inglés  
Spanish/espagnol/español  
 
 
  
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
MINUTES  OF THE MEETING  
Addendum  
Chairperson: H.E. Ms. Sunanta Kangvalkulkij (Thailand)  
This document contains the advance written questions  and additional questions by WTO 
Members , and replies provided by  the United States of America .1 
 
 
Organe d'examen des politiques commerciales  
17 et 19 décembre 2018  
EXAMEN DES POLITIQUE S COMMERCIALES  
ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE  
COMPTE RENDU DE LA R ÉUNION  
Addendum  
Présidente : S.E.  Mme. Sunanta Kangvalkulkij (Thaïlande)  
Le présent document contient les questions écrites communiquées à l'avance par les 
Membres de l'OMC, leurs questions additionnelles, et les réponses  fournies par  Les États-Unis 
d'Amérique .1 
 
 
Órgano de Examen de las Políticas Comerciales  
17 y 19 de diciembre de 2018  
EXAMEN DE LAS POLÍTI CAS COMERCIALES  
ESTADOS UNIDOS  DE AMÉRICA  
ACTA DE LA REUNIÓN  
Addendum  
Presidenta: Excma.  Sra. Sunanta Kangvalkulkij (Tailandia)  
En el presente documento figuran  las preguntas presentadas anticipadamente por escrito  y 
las preguntas adicionales de los Miembros de la OMC,  así como las respues tas facilitadas por  los 
Estados Unidos .1 
 
                                                
1 In English and Spanish only./En anglais et espagnol  seulement./En inglés  y español solamente . WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Argentina  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Question 1  
Section 2.3.1 WTO (2.21)  
 
In paragraph 2.21, it is mentioned that going forward, the United States seeks to work with other 
WTO Members before the twelfth Ministerial Conference "to begin the process of identifying 
opportunities to achieve accomplishments, even if incremental ones, and avoid buying into the 
predictable, and often risky, formula of leaving everything to a package of results for Ministerial 
action", according to the document of the Trade Policy Agenda 2018 of the USTR.  
 
1. Could the United States explain how this pr ocess of identification of opportunities should be 
carried out in view of the next WTO Ministerial Conference? Could you identify specifically in 
which agricultural pillar does the country consider that an outcome could be achieved at the 
Twelfth WTO Minis terial Conference?  
 
RESPONSE: We do not believe it is prudent or necessary to prescribe a formal process for 
identifying opportunities where Members can make progress. We encourage Members to talk to 
each other, recognizing that increased transparency, inc luding up -to-date and accurate 
notifications by Members, is necessary to identify potential opportunities to make progress. This 
includes in agriculture, where Member notifications and tariff data must be updated prior to the 
consideration of any future ne gotiations.  
 
Question 2 -6 
Section 3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.1, 3.7, 3.10, 3.15, 3.16)  
 
Paragraph 3.1 indicates that since the adoption of the Customs Modernization Act (PL 103 -182), 
compliance with customs regulations is cons idered a joint responsibility of the Government and 
traders, and measures have been put in place gradually to facilitate this partnership.  
 
2. Could the United States indicate examples of this type of measures?  
 
RESPONSE: The Customs Modernization Act incorp orated the concept of "Informed Compliance 
and Shared Responsibility" which means the government is responsible for fully and clearly 
informing the trade community of their legal obligations with regards to customs matters, and 
the trade community is respo nsible for complying with all legal requirements related to the goods 
they import. For example, the government is expected to publish and make publicly available all 
current and proposed legal requirements, such as proposals to modify or revoke previous 
advance rulings, or the list of records subject to penalties for non -production for recordkeeping 
purposes. For their part, the trade community is expected to use reasonable care in ensuring 
the accuracy and timeliness of all data and information the governm ent requires to be provided 
in conjunction with an importation.  
 
Paragraph 3.1.1.2 develops aspects related to the operation of the foreign trade electronic single 
window. The report indicates that the savings in terms of import costs has been only 1.42%.  
 
3. By way of information, could the United States describe the drawbacks encountered when 
developing the single window and what actions is the government taking to resolve these 
problems?  
 
RESPONSE: Many lessons have been learned through the implementation of ACE. They include:  
- Defining  criteria  for success ; 
- Identifying necessary training, business process, and legal updates;  
- Identifying specific Partner Government Agency leads;  
- Identifying how the impact on the trade community will be measured;  
- Identifying how enhanced border coordination and risk management will be measured 
and implemented;  
- Determining which methods are the best to collect input from stakeholders;  
- Determining how requests for new ACE features and elements are reviewed and 
prioritized; and  
- Determining an approach for cost sharing across the entire government.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Paragraph 3.10 states that on the basis of the Company Profile and Security Profile submitted by 
the applicant, CBP will determine the company's ability to fulfil the minimum security re quirements 
set by C -TPAT, and arrange for an on -site inspection of the company's security practices. Enterprises 
found to satisfy the C -TPAT requirements upon inspection are validated as Tier II companies and 
eligible for the full benefits of the programme . 
 
4. Could the United States give more details of what are the benefits for companies that manage 
to classify as Tier II?  
 
RESPONSE: The benefits for companies consist of two elements: CTPAT Security and CTPAT 
Trade Compliance. Additional benefits for both s ecurity and compliance are in the development 
stage. Specific benefits include:  
CTPAT Security:  
- Assigned Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS)  
- "Front of the Line" treatment for cargo that is scheduled for examination  
- Reduced examination rates  
- Business re sumption  
- Benefits through mutual recognition arrangements  
- CTPAT Portal access (training aids, etc. for members)  
- Best practices sharing  
- Security verification interface (verification that business partners are also in CTPAT)  
- Safety ACT eligibility  
- FAST lane  eligibility  
- Penalty mitigation  
- Marketability of CTPAT membership  
 
CTPAT Trade Compliance:  
- National account manager  
- Multiple business units  
- Removal from focused assessments pool  
- ITRAC Data access  
- Penalty mitigation  
- Marketability of CTPAT membership  
 
In paragraph 3.15 the report indicates that, in the framework of the C -TPAT (Customs -Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism), the US Government has signed several mutual recognition 
agreements with 11 customs administrations around the world, which implies a set of benefits for 
operators that demonstrate security in the supply chain.  
 
5. Could the United States specify if it plans to extend this type of agreements? What conditions 
and stages are foreseen for their realization?  
 
RESPONSE: CBP recently signed its 12th Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA), with the 
Customs Administration in Peru. CBP/CTPAT is currently working towards additional MRAs with 
an additional five Customs administrations. Each one is at a different stage of the mutual 
recognition process.  
 
Four pre -requisites must be met before CBP begins to formally discuss an MRA with a foreign 
Customs Administration:  
1. The Customs Administration must have a full -fledged operational partnership program 
in place, that is, not a program in development or a pilot program.  
 
2. The AEO program must have a strong validation process built into its program.  
 
3. The AEO program must have a strong security component. A program that is 
compliance -only would not be eligible.  
 
4. The Customs Administration must have a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement 
(CMAA)2 in effect with the United States.  
                                                
2 http://www.cbp.gov/border -security/international -initiatives/international -agreements/cmaa . WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  C-TPAT has developed a methodology process to pursue mutual recognition (MR) involving 
multiple stages:  
 
1. Evaluation - Before formal negotiations of an MRA can begin, the potential partn er must 
have the political will to pursue an MRA; a CMAA must be signed and in force; and a 
fully-operational AEO Program with a security component compatible to C -TPAT.  
 
2. Joint-Work-Plan (JWP) - A JWP is a document that lays out the path towards MR betwee n 
the two countries' AEO programs. A JWP demonstrates commitment from both Customs 
Administrations, requires high level support, and lays out the necessary steps towards 
mutual recognition.  
 
3. Identification of Benefits - Potential MRA partners should think about what benefits an 
MRA would provide. For the United States, those benefits have included:  
 
- Reduced costs to government and to business due to fewer validations in 
partner countries;  
- Efficiencies to companies by reducing "ship -to-shelf" times through m ore timely 
customs release;  
- More efficient resolution of issues through increased contact with CBP's supply 
chain security specialists.  
 
4. Program and Criteria Comparison - A side -by-side comparison of program security 
requirements and ove rall processes and procedures.  
 
5. Validation Observations – Potential MRA partners must conduct observations of each 
other's validation processes to ensure compatibility.  
 
6. Formalization and Negotiation - After both MRA partners determine that a MRA would 
be beneficial, the fo rmal MRA process begins.  
 
7. The signing of the MRA - An MRA that recognizes the compatibility between C -TPAT and 
the foreign partnership program is signed by the senior leaders of each Customs 
Administration.  
 
8. Implementation - The countries/programs develop  operational procedures, primarily 
those associated with information sharing.  
 
9. Maintenance - The final step in the MRA process is continual engagement to ensure the 
partnership remains e ffective.  
 
In paragraph 3.16 the report indicates that the case of ad vance rulings relating to customs valuation 
and to carriers must be requested by letter, while those relating to tariff classification and origin of 
merchandise may be submitted online.  
 
6. Could the United States explain what are the reasons why they are pro cessed through two 
different modalities?  
 
RESPONSE: Generally, all advance ruling requests may be filed by letter directly with 
Regulations and Rulings (RR), which is a part of CBP's Office of Trade, in CBP Headquarters 
Washington, DC.  
 
However, the National Commodity Specialist Division (NCSD) of Regulations and Rulings, based 
in New York, NY, issues most advance rulings on tariff classification. In general, the ruling 
requests considered by the NCSD are those as to which a ruling may be  issued within 30 days 
of receipt of the request. The NCSD has created an eRulings system which permits ruling 
requests to be filed online, including requests involving samples (which is a rec ent enhancement 
to the system).  
 
Rulings pertaining to valuation  and carriers are issued by RR in CBP Headquarters. Also, 
classification rulings that require more time due to the number or complexity of the issues or 
requests for confidential treatment are issued by RR HQ. Please see the following link for WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  more informa tion concerning  the U.S. rulings  program:  https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/cbp_rulings_prog_3.pdf . 
 
Question 7  
Section 3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports (3.38)  
Paragraph 3.38 indicates that a custom user's fee applies. Likewise, it is indicated that in some 
regional trade agreements partner countries are exempt from the payment of this fee.  
 
7. What criteria has the United States taken into account t o include the exemption from the 
payment of this fee in these regional trade agreements?  
 
RESPONSE: Regional trade agreements reflect statutory and Administration objectives, as well 
as input received from traders and other members of the public. These obj ectives and views 
are taken into account in analys ing the trading regimes of trading partners and considering the 
treatment of customs user fees under any agreement.  
 
Question 8  
Section 3.1.5.1 Prohibitions and restrictions (4.48)  
 
Paragraph 3.48 mentions that a negative certification may result in the imposition of port restrictions 
and potential import restrictions on certain fish and fish products from the country concerned.  
 
8. Specifically, could the United States provide more details on what types of re strictions could be 
imposed?  
 
RESPONSE: The Moratorium Protection Act sets forth the standards for identifying and 
certifying nations for IUU fishing, bycatch, and shark catch (see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826j and 1826k). 
Implementing regulations are set out in 50 C .F.R. §§ 300.200 et seq. Countries that receive a 
negative certification are subject to denial of port privileges and potential import restrictions on 
certain fish or fish products from the country into the United States. Trade measures, if 
implemented, wo uld be tailored to the conduct for which the country has been identified.  
 
Questions 9 -11 
Section 4.1 Agriculture (4.6, 4.9, 4.46)  
 
In paragraph 4.6, it is mentioned that Authorization for most programmes under the Agricultural Act 
of 2014 (PL 113 -79), signed into law on 7 February 2014, will expire on 30 September 2018. The 
2014 Farm Bill introduced numerous changes in the system of support to agriculture. Market price 
support for dairy products was replaced by a margin protection programme for dairy fa rmers.  
 
9. Could the United States explain what are the differences between the new margin protection 
programme for dairy farmers and the old market price support program for dairy products? 
Could the United States specify what potential impact this program could have on international 
dairy trade?  
 
RESPONSE: The Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP) was repealed by the Agricultural 
Act of 2014. The Margin Protection Program for Dairy (MPP -Dairy) offers dairy operations the 
opportunity to participate in a program that insures the margin between the U.S. all -milk price 
and a national average feed cost. Producers who choose to participate register a production 
history based on their average production over the period 2011 -2013 and then may enrol 25 -
90% of that production history for coverage at margin levels between $4 -$8 per hundredweight. 
Producers pay a fee for coverage at the $4 level, with premiums required for coverage at higher 
margins. Because the margin insurance program is based on production histo ry, the program 
does not provide incentives to increase individual production and thus should have minimal 
impacts on trade.  
 
In paragraph 4.9, it is mentioned that in July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its 
intention to provide a short -term aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with market 
disruptions  caused by retaliatory tariffs.  
 
10. Could the United States explain in more detail what type of short -term aid measures will be 
established in order to assist agricultural producers ? What are the agricultural products that will WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  be subject to the application of these new short -term aid measures? Could the United States 
explain how long these new measures would last, their potential impact on international 
agricultural trade and their possible link to WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE: Payments under the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) will assist producers with 
costs associated with retaliatory tariffs. MFP payments will be made on 2018 production of nine 
affected commodities: soybeans, sorghum, wheat, corn, cotton, hogs, milk, sweet cherries, and 
almonds.  Further details can be found on USDA's website at: 
https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2018/09/04/usda -launches -trade -mitigation -
programs . 
 
These programs are consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support.  
 
In paragraph 4.46, it is mentioned that the 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized four export promotion 
programs, the most impo rtant of which is the Market Access Program (MAP).  
 
11. Could the United States explain in greater detail the three remaining export promotion 
programs -mentioned in footnote 48 -including their main characteristics?  
 
RESPONSE: The Foreign Market Development Co operator Program (FMD) uses funds from the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to create, expand, and maintain long –term export 
markets for U.S. agricultural products. First established under the authority of Public Law 480, 
the FMD was re –authorized by Tit le VII of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 and is administered 
by USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service. The program fosters a cost –sharing trade promotion 
partnership between USDA and U.S. agricultural producers and processors, who are represented 
by non –profit commodity or trade associations called Cooperators. Through this partnership, 
USDA and the Cooperators pool their technical and financial resources to conduct overseas 
market development.  
 
The Emerging Markets Program (EMP) provides funding for tech nical assistance activities 
intended to develop, maintain, or expand markets for U.S. agricultural exports in emerging 
market countries. The program underwrites assessments of the food and rural business system 
needs of emerging markets and funds projects recommended by those assessments. The EMP 
is authorized by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, as amended.  
 
The Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops (TASC) program funds projects that address 
sanitary, phytosanitary, or technica l barriers that prohibit or threaten the export of U.S. 
specialty crops. The TASC program is authorized by the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 
2008, as amended.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Australia  
Report by  the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Questions 1 -2 
3.1.6.1.1.1 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures – Main laws and regulations (3.59 -3.60)  
 
The report states that when conducting investigations into the evasion of anti -dumping or 
countervailing duties, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) must determine "not later than 300 
calendar days (or 360 calendar days in extraordinarily complicated cases)" after initiating the 
investigation, whether sufficient evidence of evasion exists. The report goes on to say in paragraph 
3.60 that CBP will notify the U.S Department  of Commerce (USDOC) of a determination "when 
necessary".  
 
1. What are the circumstances that may lead to a case being characterised as "extraordinarily 
complicated" for the purposes of the Enforce and Protect Act of 2005 (EAPA)?  
 
RESPONSE : The determination as to whether an investigation is extraordinarily complicated is 
based on the facts and circumstances of a particular investigation.  
 
2. When will it be "necessary" for the CBP to notify the USDOC of a determination made under 
the EAPA?  
 
RESPONSE : Under 19 U.S.C. section 1517(b)(4), when U.S. Customs and Border Protection is 
unable to determine from the allegation whether the merchandise at issue is covered 
merchandise, it may refer the matter to the U.S. Department of Commerce to make such a 
deter mination.  
 
Question 3  
3.1.6.1.1.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Main laws and regulations (3.63)  
 
The report states that, in 2016, the USDOC "modified its regulation concerning the extension of time 
limits for submissions in AD and CVD proceed ings".  
 
3. What were these time limits modified to, and what was the public policy rationale for the 
modification?  
 
RESPONSE : The details of the amendment to the U.S. Department of Commerce's regulation 
and the reasons for the change can be found at: G/ADP/N/ 1/USA/1/Suppl.15 -
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.15 (dated 10 October 2013).  
 
Question 4  
3.1.6.1.1.2 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Administrative procedures (3.67)  
 
The report states that as part of an anti -dumping investigation, the USDOC's International Trade 
Administration (ITA) "compares prices in the United States to a Normal Value". This comparison is 
done to calculate dumping margins. The report also states tha t the method used by the ITA to 
calculate the normal value "varies according to the circumstances".  
 
4. What "circumstances" influence the method of calculation used by the ITA to calculate the 
normal value?  
 
RESPONSE : The calculation of normal value is based on the facts and circumstances of that 
particular segment of a proceeding. For example, when there are no sales of the like product in 
the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country, th e normal value 
may be based on sales to an appropriate third country.  
 
Questions 5 -7 
3.1.6.1.1.2 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Administrative procedures (3.71)  
 
The report states that "administrative reviews of CVD and AD orders in effect each  year may be 
requested by interested parties during the anniversary month of the publication of the order".  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  5. Does "anniversary month" mean that an interested party can request an administrative 
review before 12 months had lapsed since the publication of the  relevant order? For example, 
if an order was published on 31 May 2018, could a review of that order be requested on 1 
May 2019?  
 
RESPONSE : In the example given by Australia, if the period of review ended on May 31, then 
the anniversary month would be in J une of that year. An interested party could, therefore, 
request a review at any time during that month (after the publication of the notice providing 
such an opportunity, which is normally done at the earliest opportunity during the anniversary 
month).  
 
6. What is the public policy rationale for permitting requests for administrative reviews in the 
"anniversary month" of the publication of the order (as opposed to the anniversary date)?  
 
RESPONSE : Under the retrospective system, the U.S. Department of Commerce  examines a 
specific period of time to determine the applicable duty to be assessed for that period. Interested 
parties are provided an opportunity to request an administrative review during the anniversary 
month because it is after the end of the applicab le period of review.  
 
7. How many days can lapse before the USDOC must respond to a request for an administrative 
review?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of Commerce responds to requests for administrative reviews 
as quickly as possible, taking into account th e legal timelines and requirements for conducting 
such a review.  
 
Question 8  
3.1.6.1.1.5 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Sunset reviews (3.72)  
The report provides that the purpose of sunset reviews is to determine whether revocation of an 
order or termination of a suspended investigation "would likely lead to a continuation or recurrence 
of dumping or countervailable subsidies" that is of "material injury to the domestic industry".  
 
8. What factors does the USDOC consider in determining whether the revocation of an order or 
the termination of an investigation is likely to lead to injurious dumping or countervailable 
activity?  
 
RESPONSE : The factors that the U.S. Department of Commerce may consider in making its 
determination can be found at 19 U.S.C.  section 1675a(b) and (c), and 19 C.F.R. section 
351.218.  
 
Question 9  
3.3.7.2 IPR – General regulatory framework (3.269)  
The report notes  that the United States joined T he Hague Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Industrial Designs in M ay 2015.  
 
9. What impacts has  the United States seen of T he Hague Agreement coming into force in May 
2015? Has an evaluation been undertaken or planned in the future?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States has not specifically studied what, if any, impacts have resulted 
from the coming into for ce of T he Hague Agreement.  In preparation for membership, the United 
States amended its laws (Patent Law Treaties and Implementation Act  of 2012)  and the USPTO 
updated relevant  regulations.  See: https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/hague -agreement -
concerning -international -registration -industrial -designs . Regarding future plans, the United 
States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Question 10  
3.3.7.3 IPR – Patents (3.274)  
The report notes that the Leahy -Smith America Invents Act (AIA), passed in 2011, provides a 75% 
discount for patent fees to all applica nts that qualify as micro entities.  
 
10. How does the United States define micro entities, and has there been an increase in the 
number of patent applications received from such entities as a result of these discounts?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE : See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 9th Editio n (MPEP) Section 509.04 – 
Micro Entity Status, at: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s509.html<#ch500_ 
d1ff69_210b3_1ca . The United States has not evaluated whether or not there has been an 
increase in the number of patent applications received from such entities as a result of the fee 
discount.  
 
Questions 11 -14 
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – major support programmes (4.9)  
The report  states that in July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its intention to provide 
a short -term aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with market disruptions caused 
by retaliatory tariffs.  
 
11. Noting the aid package was designed to "assist farmers in response to trade damage from 
unjustified retaliation by foreign nations"3, can the United States explain how it is ensuring 
the package only assists farmers who have suffered 'damage'?  
 
RESPONSE : The Market Facilitation Program provides payments to producers of nine 
commodities that have been negatively impacted by retaliatory tariffs. Purchases of other 
commodities  negatively  impacted  by retaliatory tariffs  will be made through the Food Purchase  
and Distribution Program. Further details can be found on USDA's website at: 
https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2018/09/04/usda -launches -trade-mitigation -
programs . 
 
12. Will assistance provided to agriculture producers under the short -term aid package be 
notified to the WTO as green or amber box domestic support?  
 
RESPONSE : The Market Facilitation Program and the Food Purchase and Distribution Pro gram 
will be notified as appropriate with other domestic support programs associated with the 2018/19 
marketing/fiscal year.  
 
13. Noting media reports that producers of a number of specific agricultural commodities have 
concerns about the design of the Market Facilitation Program and its lack of substantive 
assistance for their respective commodities, can the United States advise if it is considering 
restructuring the Program?  
 
RESPONSE : No changes have been announced for the Market Facilitation Program. We remind 
Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
14. If the announced US$12 billion aid package is not exhausted for 2018 production, will U.S. 
farmers be provided access to the funds in future years' production, particularly if dynamics 
of the trading relationship between the United States and China remain contentious?  
 
RESPONSE : Regarding access to the funds in future years' production, the United States 
reminds Members that Trade Pol icy Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
Question 15  
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – major support programmes (4.10)  
Preparations for a new farm bill began in 2016. A number of hearings were held in 2017, and the 
legislative process has been underway throughout the  reporting period in 2018.  
 
15. Compared to the 2014 Farm Bill, what new support programmes are planned for the new 
farm bill and when does the US expect the next farm bill to commence?  
 
RESPONSE : The 2014 Farm Bill authorizes current farm programs through the 2018 crop year. 
We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping the 
Membership informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill . 
 
                                                
3 https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2018/08/27/usda -announces -details -assistance -farmers -
impacted -unjustified . WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 16  
4.1.2.7 Agriculture – Sugar (4.31)  
The report states that all imports of raw cane sugar, refined sugars (certain sugars, syrups and 
molasses), and sugar -containing products take place under a syst em of tariff rate quotas (TRQs).  
The USDA determines the overall TRQ quantities for each fiscal year, while USTR allocates  the 
volumes. The TRQ for raw cane sugar is allocated among 40 countries, based on patterns observed 
at a time when trade was relatively unrestricted (1975 -81), resulting in the largest portions being 
allocated to the Dominican Republic (17%), Brazil (1 4%), and the Philippines (13%).  
 
16. Noting the United States allocates raw cane sugar TRQs among around 40 countries based 
on patterns observed around 40 years ago, and the average fill rate of the raw cane TRQ for 
the most recently notified three -year period (2 013-15) was 76.16% (as per notifications 
G/AG/N/USA/102, G/AG/N/USA/115 and G/AG/N/USA/120), can the United States advise if 
it is considering reallocating raw sugar quotas to better align with current global sugar 
market production and trade?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States regularly reallocates the raw sugar TRQ and consults with foreign 
governments during the process in order to facilitate utilization of the TRQ.  
 
Question 17  
4.1.2.7 Agriculture – Sugar (4.33)  
The 2014 Farm Bill eliminated market price support, deficiency payments for dairy producers, and 
dairy export subsidies.  
 
17. Are these previously eliminated support payments expected to feature in the next farm bill?  
 
RESPONSE : The 2014 Farm Bill authorizes current farm programs through the 2018 crop year. 
We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping the 
Membership informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill.  
 
Question 18  
4.1.2.9 Agriculture – Other major support programmes (4.39)  
The report states around 80% of projected outlays under the 2014 Farm Bill concerned domestic 
food aid via the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) [E]xpenditures on SNAP have 
been declining due to a lower number of pa rticipants. In April 2018, just under 40 million persons 
received payments under SNAP, down from nearly 46 million in FY2015. While changes in the benefit 
calculations may account for some of this reduction, the main contribution appears to be a firmer 
job market that has improved earnings for the low -income segment.  
 
Australia notes in its Domestic Support notifications from 2011 onwards, the United States has 
notified expenditure of more than USD100 billion on domestic food aid each year. This trend of 
increased expenditure began at the time of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  
 
18. Noting SNAP expenditures are declining due to a firmer job market and improved economic 
conditions in the United States following the GFC period, can the United States advise if it 
expects outlays on domestic food aid in the next Farm Bill to continue to maintain the current 
trend of more than USD100 billion each year?  
 
RESPONSE : The 2014 Farm Bill authorizes current farm programs through the 2018 crop year. 
We remind Members that  TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping the 
Membership informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill.  
 
Question 19  
4.1.3.1 Agriculture – Imports (4.42)  
The report notes over the last two years, the estimated average MFN d uties have increased for dairy 
products and sugar and confectionary, whereas the estimated average rates are unchanged or 
slightly lower for other agricultural product categories. The highest average applied MFN rates are 
found in dairy (30.1%) and beverag es, spirits and tobacco (22.6%).  
 
19. Can the United States explain why on one hand it has sought to renegotiate preferential 
trade agreements with trading partners, namely Mexico and Canada as part of the USMCA, WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  to enhance its own dairy market access, while a t the same time it has increased MFN duties 
for dairy to almost 10 times its simple average MFN applied tariff?  
 
RESPONSE : Please note that the Secretariat compiles this information. The difference may 
relate to Ad Valorem  Equivalent (AVE) tariff conversions of non -ad-valorem  tariffs ( i.e., specific 
or mixed tariffs). The United States has not raised tariff rates on dairy or sugar products and 
cannot, as U.S. WTO bound rates for these products equal U.S. applied rates.  
 
Question 20  
4.1.4 Agriculture – Levels of Support (4.50)  
The report notes that OECD data shows U.S. producer support and border protection has reduced 
substantially since 1986 -88, and support levels to agricultural producers have remained consistently 
below t he OECD average. The share of the potentially most distorting support is also lower than the 
OECD average. Market price support has declined in importance over the years relative to budgetary 
support that requires production. As many of the present program mes are counter -cyclical by design, 
the levels of budgetary support move inversely with developments in market prices. The OECD's 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for the United  States is currently around US$40 billion per year, 
or close to 10% of gross far m receipts (Table 4.5).  
 
Australia would highlight in particular the producer support estimates listed in the report for milk 
(19.7% of gross farm receipts for milk) and refined sugar (56.1% of gross farm receipts for refined 
sugar).  
 
20. Noting that under the  Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the United States and other Members 
agreed to developing disciplines to, inter alia, provide for substantial progressive reductions 
in agricultural support and protection, can the United States explain how it is working to 
reduce its high producer support for milk and refined sugar?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States remains actively engaged in WTO agriculture negotiations to 
achieve substantial progressive reduction in agricultural support and protection, including trade -
distorting support among all major agricultural subsidizers, and new market acc ess opportunities 
for Members.  
 
Question 21  
4.1.4 Agriculture – Levels of Support (4.53)  
As for Amber Box support, the United States notified product and non -product specific support 
totalling US$13.6 billion (including de minimis  subsidies) for the market ing year 2014 and US$17.2 
billion for 2015. Excluding de minimis  support, the current total AMS reported was US$3.8 billion in 
both 2014 and 2015.  
 
21. Is the US$12 billion dollar US farmer assistance package identified in paragraph 4.9 expected 
to significan tly increase US amber box support for the 2019 marketing year, particularly for 
soybean producers?  
 
RESPONSE : These programs are consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support 
and will be notified in due course.  
 
Questions 22 -24 
4.4.1.4 Financial  Services – Banking services (4.100)  
The report states that the US maintains some National Treatment limitations for foreign ownership 
in its banking sector. While foreign banks cannot be members of the Federal Reserve System, 
foreign -owned US bank subsidi aries are not subject to the limitation. Further, foreign ownership of 
Edge corporations [subsidiaries of banks or bank holding companies, organised to allow international 
banking and financial business] is limited to foreign banks and US subsidiaries of f oreign banks, 
while domestic non -bank firms may own such corporations.  
 
22. Following the post -GFC reform of the US' financial services sector, what National Treatment 
or other limitations are placed on foreign -owned US bank subsidiaries?  
 
RESPONSE : No specific national treatment or market access limitations were placed on 
foreign -owned U.S. bank subsidiaries as a result of post -GFC reform. For information on 
existing national treatment or market access limitations on foreign -owned U.S. bank WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  subsidia ries, please  see the U.S. Annex  III in the U.S.-Mexico -Canada  Agreement, available  
here:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agre ements/FTA/USMCA/Text/NCM_Annex_III_ 
United_States.pdf .  
 
23. Can domestic banks also own Edge corporations in the US? If so, what limitations and 
requirements exist for the ownership of Edge corporations by domestic banks and non -
banks?  
 
RESPONSE : Yes, domestic banks can own Edge Act corporations in the United States. For more 
information on ownership requirements, please see 12 CFR Part 211 – International Banking 
Operations (Regulation K): https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR -2017-title12 -vol2/pdf/CFR -
2017-title12 -vol2-part211.pdf. Foreign ownership of Edge Act corporations is limited to foreign 
banks and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks, while domestic nonbank firms may own such 
corporations, as explained in the U.S. Annex III in the U.S. -Mexico -
Canada  Agreement,  available  here:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/U
SMCA/Text/NCM_Annex_III_United_States.pdf . 
 
24. Noting th at foreign ownership of Edge corporations is limited to foreign banks and US 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, what percentage of Edge corporations in the US is currently 
foreign -owned?  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the Federal Reserve's Annual Report and its discuss ion of International 
Activities, available here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2017 -ar-supervision -
and-regulation.htm . 
 
Questions 25 -27 
4.4.1.5 .1.1 Financial Services – Insurance services – Legislation and regulation (4.109 -4.110)  
The report states that the insurance sector in the US is regulated mainly at the state level. Insurance 
companies, agents and brokers need to be licensed in the state where they plan to provide services 
in order to be able to offer insurance services. Lice nsing requirements vary across states, and 
insurance premium rates for many types of coverage need to be approved by state regulators.  
 
25. What recognition agreements, if any, exist between state regulators for the regulation of 
insurance services? If none, how is the provision of insurance across state borders regulated 
and facilitated?  
 
RESPONSE : In the United States, the business of insurance is primarily regulated at the state 
level by the insurance authorities of the fifty states, the District of Columbi a, and the five U.S. 
territories, although states seek to coordinate and achieve uniformity in certain areas. In 
general, each state where an insurer operates regulates the insurer's market conduct in that 
state. Similarly, the state where an insurer is in corporated is primarily responsible for its financial 
oversight as well as for sanctioning or taking other remedial actions if the insurer operates in an 
unsafe and unsound manner. The U.S Department of the Treasury's Report to the President, 
titled A Fina ncial System that Creates Economic Opportunities: Asset Management and 
Insurance , provides detail on the state -based system of insurance regulation and coordination 
among state insurance regulators. It is available at:  https://www.treasury.go v/press -
center/press -releases/Documents/A -Financial -System -That-Creates -Economic -Opportunities -
Asset_Management -Insurance.pdf.  
 
26. What regulatory or other systems are in place to allow for the national provision of insurance 
in the US?  
 
RESPONSE : There are some areas where the federal government helps to ensure availability of 
certain insurance products, such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, administered by the 
Treasury Department, and the National Flood Insurance Program, administered by the Federal  
Emergency Management Agency. A discussion of other aspects of the federal government's role 
in the national provision of insurance is available in the Federal Insurance Office's 2018 Annual 
Report on the Insurance Industry, available at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports -
and-notices/Documents/2018_FIO_Annual_Report.pdf . WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  27. What limitations, if any, are placed on the pr ovision of insurance to federal government 
employees or agencies operating in different states? Are such services regulated by the 
relevant state regulatory authorities, or by a federal agency?  
 
RESPONSE : We are not aware of general limitations relating to national treatment and market 
access, although certain conditions may need to be satisfied for all insurers seeking to do 
business with the federal government.  
 
Questions 28 -30 
4.4.1.5.1.1 Financial Serv ices – Insurance services – Legislation and regulation (4.116)  
The report states that the US and EU signed a covered agreement on 22 September 2017, addressing 
important areas of regulatory cooperation between the two on areas of insurance business, 
includ ing: group supervision, reinsurance (including collateral and local presence requirements), and 
exchange of information between the respective regulatory authorities. According to the FIO, this 
agreement allows US insurers with EU operations to avoid burde nsome capital, governance, and 
reporting requirements under the EU's "Solvency II" prudential regulatory system for insurers, as 
well as EU local presence and collateral requirements for US reinsurers. The agreement also commits 
the US to eliminating state -based reinsurance collateral requirements as applied to cessions to EU 
reinsurers that meet the consumer protection standards specified in the agreement.  
 
28. Does this covered agreement amount to recognition or a decision of equivalence for the 
areas of ins urance business listed?  
 
RESPONSE : By its terms, the Agreement addresses the following: "(a) the elimination, under 
specified conditions, of local presence requirements imposed by a Party or its supervisory 
authorities on an assuming reinsurer which has it s head office or is domiciled in the other Party, 
as a condition for entering into any reinsurance agreement with a ceding insurer which has its 
head office or is domiciled in its territory or for allowing the ceding insurer to recognise credit 
for reinsur ance or credit for risk mitigation effects of such reinsurance agreement; (b) the 
elimination, under specified conditions, of collateral requirements imposed by a Party or its 
supervisory authorities on an assuming reinsurer which has its head office or is  domiciled in the 
other Party, as a condition for entering into any reinsurance agreement with a ceding insurer 
which has its head office or is domiciled in its territory or for allowing the ceding insurer to 
recognise credit for reinsurance or credit for risk mitigation effects of such reinsurance 
agreement; (c) the role of the Host and Home supervisory authorities with respect to prudential 
group supervision of an insurance or reinsurance group whose worldwide parent undertaking is 
in the Home Party, incl uding, under specified conditions, (i) the elimination at the level of the 
worldwide parent undertaking of Host Party prudential insurance solvency and capital, 
governance, and reporting requirements, and (ii) establishing that the Home supervisory 
authori ty, and not the Host supervisory authority, will exercise worldwide prudential insurance 
group supervision, without prejudice to group supervision by the Host Party of the insurance or 
reinsurance group at the level of the parent undertaking in its territo ry; and (d) the Parties' 
mutual support for the exchange of information between supervisory authorities of each Party, 
and recommended practices for such exchange."  
 
The agreement text is available at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports -and-
notices/Documents/US_EU_Covered_Agreement_Signed_September_17.pdf . 
 
29. Which prudential and regulatory authorities in the US are covered by this agreement?  
 
RESPONSE : A discussion of the U.S. authorities covered in the U.S. -EU covered agreement is 
contained in the Federal Insurance Office's 2018 Annual Report on the Insurance Industry, 
available  at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports -and-notices/Documents/2018_FIO_ 
Annual_Report.pdf . 
 
30. What state -based reinsurance collateral requirements in the US are being eliminated for EU 
providers under this agreement? Are steps being taken to address these requirements for 
providers from other economies that meet the US' consumer protection standards?  
 
RESPONSE : A discussion of the treatm ent of reinsurance collateral requirements under the 
U.S.-EU covered agreement is contained in the Federal Insurance Office's 2018 Annual WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Report  on the Insurance  Industry,  available  at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/report
s-and-notices/Documents/2018_FIO_Annual_Report.pdf . 
 
Question 31  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.139)  
The report states that some telecom services are subject to foreign ownership restrictions. Under 
Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934, common carrier wireless licences cannot be granted 
to, or held by, non -USA citizens, corporations not organized  under the laws of the USA, or foreign 
governments, nor can they be granted to USA corporations of which more than 20 per cent of the 
capital stock is owned of record or voted by any of these entities without prior Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) a pproval.  
 
31. Is the USA considering any adjustments to the restrictions in Section 310 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 regarding foreign ownership and granting of common carrier 
wireless licences?  
 
RESPONSE : There is no pending legislation seeking to amen d Section 310 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 regarding foreign ownership and granting of common carrier 
wireless licences.  
 
Question 32  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.139)  
 
The report states that licences may be granted to companies set up in the United St ates that are 
controlled by holding companies set up in the United States and in which foreign individuals, 
corporations, or governments own of record or vote more than 25 per cent of the capital stock, 
unless the FCC finds that such ownership is inconsist ent with the public interest. Under the 
Communications Act, the FCC must conduct a public interest analysis when evaluating applications 
to receive authorization to exceed the 25 per cent foreign -ownership benchmark.  Since the inception 
of the WTO, no fore ign applicant has ever been denied a common carrier wireless licence under the 
FCC's public interest analysis of foreign ownership. During the review period, in 2016, the FCC 
revisited its prior policies with respect to broadcast applicants and licensees i nvolving more than 25 
per cent foreign ownership, and incorporated them into the existing streamlined rules and 
procedures that apply to common carrier applicants and licensees, with certain modifications. 
Australia seeks clarity on the USA's public intere st determination process.  
 
32. How does the FCC assess 'public interest' associated with granting licences to companies 
that meet relevant foreign ownership criteria in the Communications Act 1934? Does the 
USA intend to make any changes to these practices?  
 
RESPONSE : The FCC has adopted specific rules that apply to foreign ownership of common 
carrier radio (wireless) licensees and lessees as well as to broadcast and aeronautical licensees. 
These rules are codified at 47 CFR §§ 1.5001 -.5004. In exercising its s tatutory discretion to 
allow foreign ownership in excess of the 25 per cent  benchmark in Section 310(b)(4), the FCC 
conducts a public interest analysis that starts with a presumption (subject to rebuttal) that 
foreign ownership of common carrier radio lice nsees does not threaten competition in the U.S. 
telecommunications market. It also involves a consideration of policy concerns raised by federal 
government agencies in relation to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, or trade 
policy issues. The same public interest analysis applies to requests for FCC approval to exceed 
the 20 per cent  foreign ownership limit in Section 310(b)(3) of the Act under the FCC's 
forbearance approach, which applies only to common carrier radio licensees. (See: FCC ( 2013), 
Review of Foreign Ownership Policies for Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio Licensees 
under Section 310(b)(4)  of the Communications  Act of 1934,  as Amended, FCC 13 -50, at: 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC -13-50A1.pdf .) 
 
The FCC is not currently considering changes to its foreign ownership practices, which it last 
reviewed in the 2016. (See: FCC (2016), Review of Foreign Ownership Policies for Broadcast, 
Common Car rier and Aeronautical Radio Licensees under Section 310(b)(4) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, FCC 16 -128, at: 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC -16-128A1.pdf .) 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 33  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.143)  
The report indicates that the US has ended utility -style regulation of the internet in favour of market -
based policies.  
 
33. Does the USA consider that the current approach to internet regulation allows it to take 
adequate enforcement action against anti -competitive practices? Why?  
 
RESPONSE : Yes. As a result of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)'s Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regained its authority to take 
action  when broadband providers engage in anti -competitive, unfair, or deceptive acts or 
practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Other U.S. antitrust laws, including Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act, continue to apply to broadband providers. More informatio n can 
be found  in the Restoring  Internet  Freedom  Order,  pg. 87-93: 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC -17-166A1.pdf . 
 
Question 34  
4.4.3.1 Postal services market overview; 4.4.3.3 Regulatory regime (4.151, 4.164)  
The report states that the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) of 2006 directed the 
US Postal Service to establish in the Treasury a revolving Postal Service Competitive Products Fund, 
to be devoted to meeting the cost of competitive products. The report also states that the PAEA 
requires that the prices for the US Postal Service's competitive products must cover direct and 
indirect costs, may not be subsidized by market -dominant products, and must contr ibute an 
appropriate share of the USPS' institutional costs. The report states that this amount is currently 
5.5%.  
 
34. What safeguards are in place to ensure these requirements do not result in cross -
subsidization of USPS competitive products with revenue fro m its market -dominant 
products?  
 
RESPONSE : Before approving prices for a competitive product, the Postal Regulatory 
Commission (Commission) reviews the product's estimated revenue and attributable cost to 
ensure that: (1) the product should cover its attri butable cost; (2) the product will not be 
subsidized by market dominant products; and (3) competitive products, as a whole, will 
contribute their appropriate share to the Postal Service's institutional costs. See 39 U.S.C. §  
3633(a) and 39 C.F.R. § 3015.  
 
In addition, by law, the Commission conducts an annual compliance review to ensure that each 
competitive product continues to comply with the requirements listed above. If the Commission 
determines that a competitive product has not met all of the requirem ents, it has the authority 
to order the Postal Service to implement specific remedies.  
 
Questions 35 -37 
4.4.6.1.2 Airports (4.216, 4.218)  
The report states that the results of policies to promote airport privatization have been modest. In 
particular, the r eport indicates that only four of the 10 airports participating in the Airport 
Privatization Pilot Program have been privatized.  
 
35. Are there any limitations on the participation of foreign investors in airport ownership?  
 
RESPONSE : There are no federal limitations on foreign investor participation in airport 
ownership. Certain transactions involving foreign investment in United States airports are 
subject to review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS 
is an interagency committee authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign 
investment in the United States, in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the 
national security of the United States. CFIUS operates pursuant to s ection 721 of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950, as amended (section 721), and as implemented by Executive Order 
11858, as amended, and regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 800 and 31 C.F.R. Part 801, as amended.  
 
36. Can the US provide any further information regarding the barriers to the privatization of 
airports, or the difficulties encountered by the Airport Privatization Pilot Program?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE : In 1996, Congress enacted the Airport Privatization Pilot Program to explore the 
use of private investment to improve the management of public use airports and customer 
service, and lower the cost of operating public use airports. In 2012, Congress expanded the 
Pilot Program from 5 slots to 10 and removed the cap entirely i n 2018, providing an opportunity 
for more airports to submit an application. The program is voluntary and the decision to submit 
an application remains with the airport owner. The U.S. Federal Government considers 
privatization as another management tool f or managing and developing an airport. As a general 
policy, FAA leaves the selection of an airport's governance structure to local control.  
 
37. Can the US provide any updates on any new or planned policies to promote the privatization 
of airports?  
 
RESPONSE : The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 enacted several changes to the Airport 
Privatization Pilot Program. The program is now called the Airport Investment Partnership 
Program. The ten -airport cap has been eliminated. FAA will provide planning grants for an airport 
interested in pursuing airport privatization. The program will permit public sponsors and private 
investors to develop a partnership arrangement to manage and develop the airport.  
 
Questions 38 -39 
4.5 E-commerce (4.280)  
The report states that a Supreme Court ruling recently changed rules on taxation for online sales. 
Previously, businesses without a presence in a state were not obliged to charge sales tax on sales 
to customers located in states other than their own. The Supreme Court has now rule d (South Dakota 
v. Wayfair Inc.) that a state may compel an online retailer, regardless of whether they have a 
physical presence in that state, to charge sales tax on cus tomers located in other states.  
 
38. Can the US provide more detail on changes to taxation  for online sales, in particular under 
what circumstances (if any) a US state can compel an online retailer to charge sales tax 
regardless of whether the retailer has a physical presence?  
 
RESPONSE : The imposition of a sales tax is determined by each of t he individual U.S. States. 
The imposition of other taxes or fees on businesses is also determined by each of the individual 
U.S. States. The U.S. federal law known as the Internet Tax Freedom Act bars all levels of U.S. 
government from imposing multiple or  discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. The same 
law also prohibits any taxes on Internet access services.  
 
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, the Court held that a physical presence in a U.S. state 
was not an absolute necessity under the Commerc e Clause of the U.S. Constitution to establish 
a presence or nexus with the U.S. State for the purposes of collecting sales tax. In general under 
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. States may impose taxes so long as they (1) apply to an activity with 
a substantia l nexus with the taxing State, (2) are fairly apportioned, (3) do not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and (4) are fairly related to the services the State provides. In the 
absence of physical presence, a State must still rely on a substantial nex us with it to impose a 
tax on interstate activity.  
 
39. Will a legislative change to the taxation rules on online sales be made? Does this affect 
international cross -border sales?  
 
RESPONSE : We refrain from speculating on possible future actions or policies gi ven the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
Report by the United States (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Questions 40 -41 
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.4)  
The report states that the Administration recently began a determined effort to eliminate wasteful 
and unnecessary barriers that hamper business which, along with other efforts to strengthen the US 
economy, will make it easier for US companies to succeed in global markets.  
 
40. Which barriers did the US Administration identify as hamperin g the ability for service 
suppliers to 'do business' in global markets, and what efforts have been taken to address or 
eliminate them?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE : The United States provides a website that identifies all deregulatory and regulatory  
actions  by government agencies.  See: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain . The 
specific list of deregulatory and regulatory actions completed in fiscal year 2018  can be found  
here:  https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_Completed_Actions_for_Fiscal_
Year_2018.pdf . The specific list of deregulatory and regulatory actions  completed  in fiscal year 
2017 can be found  here: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/FINAL_BU_20171207. 
pdf. 
 
41. Have any of the barriers identified by the US as effecting the ability of service suppliers to 
'do business' been barriers within the US system and, if so, what steps have been taken to 
address these?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States provides a website that identifies all deregulatory and 
regulatory  actions  by government  agencies.  See: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgenda
Main. The specific list of deregulatory and regulatory actions completed in fiscal year 
2018 can be found  here:  https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_Completed_
Actions_for_Fiscal_Year_2018.pdf . The specific list of deregulatory and regulatory 
actions  completed  in fiscal year 2017 can be found  here:  https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/e
o13771/FINAL_BU_20171207.pdf . 
 
Question 42  
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.9)  
The report states the United State is interested in working with other Members on improving the 
functioning of the regular committees of the WTO.  
 
42. Which elements of the regular committees of the WTO are the US interested in improving, 
and what steps is the US proposing to take to achieve this?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States values the role of the standing committees of the WTO in 
providing opportunities to resolve questions of Members' compliance with their commitments, 
to develop initiatives aimed at systemic improvements, to promote transparency in Member s' 
trade policies, and to monitor and resist market -distorting pressures. We are interested in 
working with other Members to improve the functioning of the committees. A key element in 
need of improvement is Members' failure to comply with their notificati on obligations across the 
WTO Agreement. This lack of transparency is undermining the functioning of the regular 
committees of the WTO, as well as the negotiating arm of the WTO and the credibility of the 
organization. At the November 2017 meeting of the G eneral Council, the United States put 
forward a proposal aimed at improving Members' compliance with their notification obligations. 
In September 2018, the United States, Japan, and the EU agreed to co -sponsor an updated 
transparency and notification propo sal for consideration in the WTO Council on Trade in Goods. 
Australia, Argentina, Chinese Taipei and Costa Rica have also co -sponsored the proposal. The 
United States and other co -sponsors stand ready to work with Members to advance this proposal.  
 
Questio ns 43 -44 
2 The United States Economic and Trade Environment (2.3)  
The report states that the US real exports of goods and services have increased by 3.0% in 2017 
and 5% in the first half of 2018.  
 
43. What percentage of this reflects a growth in the export of trade in services?  
 
RESPONSE : Real exports of services grew 2.5 per cent  in 2017 and 2.9 per cent  in the first half 
of 2018. This accounted for 25 per cent  of the total growth of real exports of goods and services 
in 2017 (3.0 per cent ) and 17 per cent  of the growth in the first half of 2018 (5.0 per cent ).  
 
44. During the period under review, which services sectors saw the most growth in the US?  
 
RESPONSE: Between 2015 and 2017, U.S. exports of services increased by $42.4 billion. Forty 
per cent of this g rowth was in the category of "other business services" led by professional and 
management consulting services (mostly business and management consulting and public 
relations servcies) and research and development services. U.S. exports of financial service s WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 18 - 
 
  accounted for 17 per  cent of the export growth and exports of computer services accounted for 
15 per  cent of the export growth.  
 
In the first half of 2018, U.S. exports of services increased by $6.1 billion over the first of of 
2017. Thirty per  cent of t his growth was led by U.S. exports of financial services, 19 per  cent by 
U.S. receipts of intellectual property, and 17 per  cent by travel receipts (including education).  
 
Questions 45 -46 
2 The United States Economic and Trade Environment (2.10 -2.12)  
The report identifies the increased strength of US goods and services trade, of the US dollar, and of 
the lowering rate of US goods and services trade deficit during the period under review and, in 
particular, under the current Administration.  
 
45. What legislativ e or other changes have accounted for the increase in the US' trade in 
services?  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. trade in services (exports plus imports) increased 7.4 per cent  between 2015 
and 2017. U.S. services exports increased 5.6 per cent  while services imports incr eased by 10.3 
per cent. For the first half of 2018 (as compared to the same period in 2017), U.S. trade in 
services were up 4.6 per  cent as services exports and imports were 4.9 per  cent and 4.0 per  
cent higher, respectively. The increase in U.S. trade can  be attributed, in part, to stronger 
economic growth at home and abroad, and not any legislative changes.  
 
46. Noting the report indicates that the US supplied 15.1% of 'goods and services imports to the 
rest of the world' in 2017, which services sectors accou nt for the greatest percentage of US 
exports?  
 
RESPONSE: In 2017, U.S. services exports were led by travel services including education (26 
per cent), other business services (19 per  cent) led by professional and management consulting 
services (mostly  business and management consulting and public relations services) , intellectual 
property receipts (16 per  cent), and financial services (14 per  cent).  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Brazil 
PART I: QUESTIONS RE GARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
Question  1 
Section 1.2.3 Balance of payments  (1.22)  
 
Furthermore, the strong demand and the trade -in-goods deficit is also reflected in the U.S. savings 
pattern. Since the mid -1970s, the United States has seen a secular decline in the household savings 
rate. This downward trend was temporarily rever sed after the financial crisis but has, more recently, 
resumed. The evidence instead points to the 2008 –13 increase in the personal savings rate as being 
mainly the result of the path for lower disposable income, higher unemployment and the significant 
fall in wealth that was experienced during this period and that led people to save more for the future. 
The IMF predicts that the household savings rate will continue falling, and will eventually revert to 
the downward trend that was in place before 2007.  
1. Does the reversion of the household savings rate to a downward trend that has prevailed before 
2007 allow for the interpretation that at least one of the elements of financial fragility that 
headed to the financial crisis (the leverage of consumer spending) m ight be again at work in the 
U.S. economy?  
 
RESPONSE: We refer you to the July 2018 National Income and Product Account ( NIPA) 
revision. Updated information is found on www.bea.gov . When you examine that revision, you 
will find that the household saving rate is not declining.  
 
Questions 2 -3 
Section 3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.3; 3.4)  
 
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) leads an interagency National Trade 
Facilitation  Committee that organizes coordination and implementation of the TFA as part of its 
responsibilities to develop, coordinate, and implement trade policy. This is the national committee 
on trade facilitation for Article 23.2 of the TFA.2 More than 20 federal  agencies participate in the 
national committee, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health 
and Human Services, Homeland Security (including CBP), Interior, Justice, Labor, State, 
Transportation, and Treasury; the Environme ntal Protection Agency, the Small Business 
Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)  
After several unsuccessful efforts to complete ACE as a single window application, including a 
complete standstill of work in 2010, CBP swi tched its focus to the development and launch of "core 
capabilities" in ACE in small consecutive stages from 2013. Consistent with an Executive Order issued 
in February 2014, the end of 2016 was set as the new deadline for the completion of the single 
window for import and export processing. The Executive Order also mandated the creation of a 
Border Interagency Executive Council (BIEC) to enhance coordination between the border 
management authorities.  
2. Interagency coordination seems to be an important concer n for the U.S. and may represent a 
challenge in implementing measures of trade facilitation. Are decisions taken by the National 
Trade Facilitation Committee binding for all agencies? Does the Border Interagency Executive 
Council (BIEC) also issue binding decisions related to the implementation of the ACE?  
 
RESPONSE: The Border Interagency Executive Council was created by E.O. 13659, which 
required the building of the U.S. Single Window, and authorized the creation of the BIEC to 
provide a governance body f or that work. The BIEC ceased to exist in that form upon completion 
of the Single Window, ACE, and now operates in a modified version to continue to coordinate 
further enhancements and functionality and help prioritize enhancements of the ACE operating 
system. Decisions continue to be made through this governance structure with input and 
consensus of the working BIEC.   
 
The National Trade Facilitation Committee is a sub -group of the Trade Policy Staff Committee 
(TPSC), chaired by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). The U.S. Trade 
Representative has primary responsibility for developing, and for coordinatin g the 
implementation of, U.S. trade policy, and consults with and is advised by the interagency trade WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  policy organization in the performance of his functions. USTR executes its institutional 
interagency role through processes provided for in statute, inclu ding the Trade Policy Review 
Group (TPRG) and the TPSC – both chaired by USTR.  
 
3. Could the U.S. specify its main policies to ensure the involvement of all agencies to implement 
and enforce Trade Facilitation Measures?  
 
RESPONSE: Through the interagency process of the NTFC, a sub -group of the TPSC, USTR 
requests input and analysis from members of the appropriate TPSC subcommittee or subgroup. 
The conclusions and recommendations of subgroups are presented to the full TPSC and serve as 
the basis for reachin g interagency consensus on important policy matters. Over 20 federal 
agencies participate in the NTFC, including the Council of Economic Advisors; the Council on 
Environmental Quality; the Small Business Administration; the Departments of: Agriculture, 
Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security (including 
Customs and Border Protection), Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, and Treasury; 
the Environmental Protection Agency; the Agency for International Development; th e National 
Economic Council; the National Security Council; and the Office of Management and Budget. 
Representatives of other agencies are invited to attend NTFC meetings depending on the specific 
issues discussed. Active NTFC participants are senior techn ical-level experts, which allows the 
committee to conduct substantive, detailed discussion when necessary.   
 
Questions 4 -5 
Section 3.1.3 Tariffs (3.32)  
 
The report states that several changes to the HTSUS have not been notified to the WTO as changes 
to Sch edule XX  
4. Could the USA clarify on the decis ion not to notify such changes?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is working to notify modifications to Schedule XX and will provide 
the relevant information to the Committee on Market Access in due course.  
 
5. Other than  tobacco, did any other agriculture product had a tariff change not notified? If so, 
were they tariff increases?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has not changed any tariff rates in Schedule XX since 
implementing the modifications specified in the referenced p aragraph.  
 
Questions 6 -9  
Section 3.1.6.1.1.2 Administrative procedures (3.65)  
 
USDOC/ITA, USITC and CBP are responsible for the administration of AD and CVD laws and their 
collection.  
6. Which of these agencies is responsible for a public interest analysis r egarding the impact of the 
AD or CVD measure on the US market, with respect specifically to downstream industries and 
final consumer´s protection?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not conduct a separate public interest analysis with respect 
to the impact of AD/CVD measures on the market. As part of its determination as to whether 
imports injure or threaten to injure the domestic industry, the U.S. Inter national Trade 
Commission analys es the impact that subject imports have on the domestic industry.  
 
7. Does the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) take any part in the decision making process 
regarding the application, collection and maintenance of tr ade remedies applied by the US?  
 
RESPONSE: No. 
 
8. Is there any interaction between FTC and trade remedies authorities on the decision of applying 
a trade remedy?  
 
RESPONSE: No. WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 21 - 
 
  Regarding the collection of trade remedies duties  
9. May duty drawback claims be made with respect to applied antidumping and countervailing 
measures? Do imports under drawback receive a different tre atment in administrative reviews?  
 
RESPONSE: Adjustments for d uty drawback can be requested for the purposes of margin 
calculations during antidumping and countervailing duty original investigations and 
administrative reviews, subject to U.S. law, including the regulations at 19 C.F.R. section 
351.519.  Specific  determin ations  regarding  the U.S. Department of Commerce's treatment of 
duty drawback claims  in antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings can be found at: 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Question 10  
Section 3.2.4 Export support and promotion (3.147)  
 
10. Do the institutions operating at state and local level perform export -financing activities? If so, 
are they notified according to the commitments under article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States is unaware of state or local export -financing activities for 
agricultural products.  
 
Question 11  
Section 3.2.5.1 The Export -Import Bank (EXIM) (3.152)  
 
It is asserted on the report that the EXIM Bank's charter requires all authorized tr ansaction to 
demonstrate a rea sonable assurance of repayment.  
11. Could you specify how the "reasonable assurance of repayment" is evaluated regarding export 
financing supp ort for the agriculture sector?  
 
RESPONSE: EXIM does not have a special program to suppo rt agricultural exports specifically, 
but agricultural commodities can be supported under one of EXIM's standard short -term 
insurance products (yet would not receive any special treatment or benefit). As such, it applies 
the same methodology to evaluate "r easonable assurance of repayment" for agricultural 
commodity exports as other non -agricultural exports. "Reasonable assurance of repayment" is 
evaluated through EXIM's standard procedures for risk assessment and risk management. For 
short-term insurance, t his process involves evaluating the obligor's ability and willingness to 
repay, establishing a repayment term appropriate with the type of export and risk involved (up 
to a maximum of 360 days), and requiring that the (insured) exporter or bank have some d egree 
of risk sharing (except in the case of sovereign obligors). Finally, EXIM charges a premium 
commensurate with the level of risk borne across each product.  
 
Questions 12 -13 
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.175)  
 
In the elaboration of final rules, including those referencing or mandating standards, the APA, which 
generally provides for participation in agency rulemaking through a system of public notice and 
comment, requires agencies to apply the notice -and-comment proces s for rulemakings and to 
address substantive comments received from the public, domestic as well as foreign. In addition, 
Executive Order 12866 directs most federal agencies to present draft regulations that are significant 
to the Office of Information and  Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review prior to publication. An 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the regulatory action must be presented, together with the 
draft regulation.  
12. The report states that "most federal agencies" present draft regulations to the OIRA. What 
determines whether a federal agency shall or shall not submit draft regulations to OIRA?  
 
RESPONSE: Supplementing and complementing the requirements of notice and comment and 
other provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Exec utive Order 12866 of October 
4, 1993 ("Regulatory Planning and Review") establishes that significant Executive Branch 
regulatory proposals are subject to review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), within the Executive Office of the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB), WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 22 - 
 
  before they take effect. The EO directs OIRA to review all significant regulatory proposals, or 
those regulatory proposals with an expected "annual effect on the ec onomy" of $100 million or 
more.  
 
Even whe n a regulation is not considered "economically significant" in economic terms under the 
Executive Order, however, OIRA may designate a regulation as significant and subject to formal 
OIRA review for several reasons, including when the regulation would rais e important new policy 
or legal questions. (See Section 3(f)). These may include, for example, a potential inconsistency 
with WTO obligations, in which case OIRA would consult with trade and other agencies with 
expertise. For more information on coordinati on on regulations affecting trade, see G/TBT/W/315 
(Communication from the United States, "Good Regulatory Practice: the Role of Strong Central 
Government Coordination in TBT Agreement Implementation", 10 June 2009).  
 
Moreover, even for agencies or regulat ions not subject to OIRA review, all regulatory agencies 
are required to employ evidence -based decision -making pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), and their final regulation is subject to judicial review and possibly being 
vacated. In issui ng any final regulation, they must provide an explanation of: how the regulation 
achieves the agency's objectives, the rationale for the essential features of the regulation, and 
the nature of and reasons for any significant revisions made since making the  regulation 
available for public comment; the regulatory authority's views on any substantive issues raised 
in timely -submitted comments; major alternatives, if any, that the regulatory authority  
considered in developing the regulation and reasons supporti ng the alternative that it selected; 
and the relationship between the regulation and the key evidence, data, and other information 
the regulatory authority considered in finalizing its work on the regulation.  
 
For more information on the Federal agencies i ncluded in the Executive Branch, see: 
https://www.usa.gov/branches -of-government. For more information on significant regulatory 
proposals, see: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utiliti es/faq.jsp . 
 
13. It could be inferred from that paragraph that there are regulatory bodies acting outside the 
scope of the revision process established by the federal government. Could the U.S. specify 
which bodies are outside the scope of revision?  
 
RESPONSE:  See the U.S. response to Question 12, and the 2009 U.S. Communication to the 
WTO TBT Committee. All Federal agencies (whether or not part of the Executive Branch) are 
subject to the APA requirements and judicial review, as well as to applicable internatio nal trade 
obligations, related implementing laws and regulations, and associated coordination 
mechanisms, such as the TPSC.  
 
Questions 14 -15 
Sections 3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements & 3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
requirements (3. 177; 3.184)  
 
The Standards Coordination Office (SCO) of the NIST serves as the enquiry point and notification 
authority for the United States under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement).  
The International Regulations and Standard s Division at the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
operates the national enquiry point and notification authority under the WTO SPS Agreement.  
14. Given that Enquiry Points of TBT and SPS are held in different agencies, how does the U.S. 
proceed with the noti fication of measures that may fall under the scope of both agreements?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. National Notification Authorities (NNAs) for both TBT and SPS maintain 
respective standard operating procedures (SOPs) for determining measures that must be notified  
pursuant to the transparency obligations in the TBT and SPS Agreements. The SOPs of the TBT 
and SPS NNAs reference the definitions contained in the respective WTO agreements. Therefore, 
the notification practices of both the TBT and SPS NNAs rely on the s copes of the respective 
agreements. The SOPs are supported by procedures for interagency coordination between the 
TBT and SPS NNAs and USTR on questions that may arise on specific measures.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 23 - 
 
  15. Are there any specific mechanisms of coordination between those t wo focal points to ensure 
comprehensive and coherent notifications?  
 
RESPONSE: As noted above, the TBT and SPS NNAs rely on standard operating procedures and 
interagency coordination to support implementation of U.S. notification obligations on TBT and 
SPS measures.  
 
Question 16  
Section 3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.186)  
 
The report states that foreign government agencies are allowed to apply for recognition as an FDA's 
"accreditation body  
 
16. Does the granting of the condition of "acc reditation body" imply recognition of equivalence of 
sanitary and phytosanitary control systems, according to article 4 of the SPS Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE: Accredited Third -Party Certification does not imply a recognition of equivalence 
pursuant to Article 4 of the SPS Agreement; rather, Accredited Third -Party Certification is a 
voluntary program in which FDA recognizes "accreditation bodies" that will have the 
responsibility of accrediting third -party "certification bodies." The certification bodies will cond uct 
food safety audits and issue certifications of foreign food eligible entities and the foods for 
humans or animals they produce.  
 
Questions 17 -21 
Section 3.3.7.8 Copyright (3.305; 3.310; 3.312; 3.313)  
 
Paragraph 3.305 refers to the international treaties on copyright that the US is party to. On October 
10, 2018, the US President signed the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act, related to the WIPO 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works fo r Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled.  
17. Does current copyright legislation already contain an exception for the adaptation of a work for 
those who are blind and visually impaired?  
 
RESPONSE: The Marrakesh Treaty Implementat ion Act amended Section 121 of the Copyright 
Act, which already dealt with exceptions and limitations for the blind, visually impaired, and print 
disabled people. In addition, a new section, Section 121A, was added to address the importing 
and exporting of  accessible format copies  to eligible persons. The Copyright Office website 
contains information on the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act, at: https://www.copyright. 
gov/legislation/ . 
 
18. When is the treaty expected to enter into force in the US? 
 
RESPONSE: The United States government is working toward depositing its instrument with 
WIPO to join the Marrakesh Treaty.  
 
U.S. copyright law does not grant retransmission rights for broadcast organizations, but U.S. 
telecommunications law provides protections for broadcast signals and technical measures used in 
connection with the signals. Additionally, U.S. copyright law protects the copyrighted content 
contained within broadcast signals. Computer programs and compilations of data that constitute 
original works of authorship are protected as literary works. Owners of copyrighted works enjoy an 
exclusive right to create derivative works based on the copyrighted works.  
19. The US is not party to the Rome Convention (pag.131), thus it is not internationall y obliged to 
protect retransmissions from broadcast organizations. Nevertheless, we would like to know 
whether the US could explain how it implements this protection granted under the U.S. 
telecommunications law for broadcast signals and technical measures  used in connection with 
the signal.  
 
RESPONSE: Under the U.S. Copyright Act, the unauthorized copying and distribution of 
broadcast copyrighted works, including material that is fixed simultaneously with the 
transmission, is prohibited. Such unauthorized copying and distribution is subject to civil liability, WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 24 - 
 
  as well as criminal damages and possible criminal prosecution. U.S. federal telecommunications 
law contains retransmission consent provisions that prevent regulated broadcasters from 
rebroadcasting th e program of another broadcasting station without the express authority of the 
originating station (47 USC § 325). The interception of cable and satellite signals is also 
prohibited (18 USC § 2511; 47 USC §§ 553, 605). There are five federal statutes that further 
protect cable and satellite systems by criminalizing the trafficking in devices that facilitate the 
interception of a signal carrying protected content (18 USC §§ 1341, 1343, and 2512; 47 USC 
§§ 553, 605).  
 
The U.S. Copyright Office initiated its seventh triennial rulemaking proceeding under the DMCA in 
2017. In this proceeding, the Copyright Office established a streamlined procedure for the renewal 
of exemptions that were granted during the sixth triennial rulemaking and considered petitions for 
new exemptions to engage in activities not permitted by existing exemptions. In June 2017, the 
Copyright Office published a Notice of Inquiry requesting petitions to renew existing exemptions and 
comments in response to those petitions, as well as petition s for new exemptions to engage in 
activities not currently permitted by existing exemptions. Subsequently, in October 2017, the 
Copyright Office issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in which it stated its intention to 
recommend each of the existing exem ptions for re -adoption, and through which it initiated three 
rounds of public comment on the newly -proposed exemptions. Final rules will be issued in the fall of 
2018.  
20. According to the Secretariat Report, the US Government, through the Librarian of Congres s, has 
every three years renewed its exemptions to the DMCA's prohibition against circumvention of 
technological measures. The Secretariat Report also indicates that in October 2017, the 
Copyright Office issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in which it stated its intention to 
recommend each of the existing exemptions for re -adoption. In this sense, we would like to 
know what are the exemptions consistently renewed or re -adopted since the implementation of 
this system of public rulemaking.  
 
RESPONSE: The exemptions adopted in the rulemaking issued by the Librarian of Congress, are 
effective October 28, 2018, and will remain in force until the completion of 
the new rulemaking  in 2021.  The Final Rule can be found  at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
FR-2018-10-26/pdf/2018 -23241.pdf . Additional information on the Seventh Triennial 
Rulemaking appears on its own webpage at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/ . More 
information about section 1201 is available at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/ , which contains 
helpful resources, such as video tutorials, the Office's recent policy  study on section 1201, and 
links to prior rulemaking proceedings.  
 
21. Moreover, what were the final rules issued by the Library of Congress in the fall of 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: As noted in the above question, the final rule issued by the Librarian of Congress was  
published on October 26, 2018, see: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR -2018-10-26/pdf/2018 -
23241.pdf . The Copyright Office's webpage has a summary of the exemptions lists on its 
Frequently  Asked  Questions  page at: https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/faqs.html . 
 
Question 22  
Section 4.1.2.2 Price Loss Coverage (PLC) (4.11 -4.15)  
 
According to the report and the United Stat es notification document G/AG/N/USA/123, the 
Agriculture Risk Coverage  (ARC) or the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program are available for farmers 
that plant covered commodities (wheat, feed grains, soybeans, peanuts, other oilseeds, rice, and 
pulses) when th e price of said commodity falls below its reference price.  
Even if payments are made on a percentage of the farm's base acres (ARC -CO and PLC) or on the 
combined revenues of all covered commodities (ARC -IC), they are still contingent on revenue losses 
due to an unsuccessful harvest of one or more of the crops covered. Revenue losses, according  to 
USDA Farm Service Agency's website, occur when the actual county crop revenue of a covered 
commodity is less than the ARC -CO guarantee for the covered commodity or  when the effective 
price of a covered commodity is less than the PLC respective reference price for that commodity.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 25 - 
 
  The relation disbursement -product becomes evident in the secretariat report, as it shows that 
payment -related  data from USDA Farm Service A gency (para 4.12 and 4.15) is categorized according 
to the payments for each of the covered products specifically.  
It is also telling that, since farmers must make a one -time choice between PLC and ARC and since 
this choice can be made on a crop -by-crop basis for PLC and ARC -CO, electing one program over 
the other depends on the possible amount of specific support. For instance, a study commenting on 
the recently published 2014 Farm Bill, concludes that for 2014 ARC's' price coverage level is more 
favoura ble for corn and soybeans while PLC's reference price is more favourable for peanuts, rice, 
and barley ( https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2014/01/2013 -farm-bill-farm-safety -net.html ). 
22. Considering the specificities regarding which commodities farmers can be entitled to receive 
funding from ARC and PLC, why are payments made under their umbrella not notified as product -
specific support?  
 
RESPONSE: ARC-CO and PLC payments are made on historical base acres with no requirement 
that the owner of base acres plant the historical commodity upon which payments are based or 
any other commodity. Therefore, they are not specific to a commodity. ARC -IC payments are 
also not s pecific to any one commodity as they are based on the combined revenues for all 
covered commodities on the farm.  
 
Questions 23 -26 
Section 4.1.2.6 Cotton (4.27; 4.28)  
 
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 revised the ARC and PLC support programmes, with the 
introduction of seed cotton (...) as a covered commodity under ARC and PLC for the 2018 crop year. 
(...)Farmers who choose to enrol historical seed cotton base acres in ARC or PLC will not be eligible 
to enrol in STAX for current cotton production as from th e 2019 crop year.  
23. What is the estimated cost of extending ARC and PLC to seed cotton producers, as compared to 
the STAX?  
 
RESPONSE: Expenditures will be reported when available in the appropriate U.S. domestic 
support notifications.  
 
24. What is the overall im pact of the extension on the United States' Aggregate Measurement of 
Support?  
 
RESPONSE: Inclusion of seed cotton as a covered commodity under ARC and PLC is consistent 
with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support.  
 
As a temporary measure to support cotto n producers, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
announced  a second Cotton Ginning Cost Share (CGCS) programme in March 2018  
25. What is the estimated cost of this program?  
 
RESPONSE: Expenditures will be reported in the appropriate U.S. domestic suppor t 
notifications.  
 
26. What is the overall impact of the program on the United States' Aggregate Measurement of 
Support?  
 
RESPONSE: This program is consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support.  
 
Questions 27 -28 
 
4.4.1.2 Legislation and regulation (4.85; 4.90)  
 
The main legislation regulating the financial sector, that was promulgated in the aftermath of the 
2008 global financial crisis, is the Dodd -Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (DFA). The objective of the DFA is to pr omote the financial stability of the United States by: 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, ending "too big to fail" practices; WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 26 - 
 
  protecting the U.S. taxpayer by ending bailouts; and protecting consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, among other considerations. In pursuit of the above, the DFA established a new 
and comprehensive regulatory framework, which included bringing previously unregulated markets, 
entities, and activities under the regulatory sphere. Addition ally, the DFA also established a 
framework for the orderly resolution of large, complex and systemically important financial 
institutions. The largest bank holding companies (BHC) and the designated non -bank financial 
companies are required to submit resol ution plans to the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  
27. Which of these rules was also applied to the fintech sector?  
 
RESPONSE: A range of provisions of the Dodd -Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 , such as the creation of an agency focused on protecting consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, applies to nonbank financial services companies. Such 
companies can include firms known as fintech providers. For a more detailed discussion of 
regulatory issues affecting such providers and financial innovation, please see A Financial System 
That Creates Economic Opportunities: Nonbank Financials, Fintech and Financial Innovation, at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018 -08/A-Financial -System -that-Creates -
Economic -Opportunities ---Nonbank -Financials -Fintech -and-Innovation_0.pdf . 
 
One of the most significant changes brought about by the DFA was the introduction of the "Volcker 
Rule", which came into force in July 2015. The objective of the Rule is to reduce the amount of 
speculative investments in insured banks and any company affiliated with an insured bank. To 
achieve this, the Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from proprietary trading of any securities, 
derivatives or certain other financial instruments for a banking entity's own account. There are 
certain e xemptions to the definitions of proprietary trading and permitted activity exemptions.78 
Banking entities are also prohibited from acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership or other 
ownership interest in, or from sponsoring, a hedge fund or private eq uity fund (covered fund), under 
the Rule. However, these are also subject to exceptions and exemptions, depending on the definition 
of covered funds and certain permitted activities.  
28. What is the threshold for definition of significant degree exposure? Do t hese limits apply to 
investments made by US companies outside US territory?  
 
RESPONSE: The Volcker Rule's prohibitions on banking entities' proprietary trading and covered 
funds activities are subject to various exemptions as described here: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR -2014-01-31/pdf/2013 -31511.pdf . 
 
Questions 29 -30 
 
4.4.1.4 Banking services (4.97; 4.102)  
 
Due to the fragmented nature of the sector, a number of federal and state regulators are responsible 
for the supervision of the banking sector. The Federal Reserve is responsible for supervising  bank 
holding companies (BHCs), saving and loans holding companies, domestic and foreign financial 
holding companies, foreign bank s operating in the United States, state member banks, foreign 
branches, Edge Act and agreement corporations, and designated financial market utilities.  
29. Does this FED supervision include financial service suppliers from other countries providing 
digital ser vices within the US? If not, which body is responsible for this supervision?  
 
RESPONSE: The applicable supervisors for the provision of financial services within the United 
States, including by U.S. firms owned by foreign entities, will depend on a range of factors including 
the legal structure of the entity.  For a discussion of the regulatory framework for financial innovation 
in the United States, see: A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities: Nonbank 
Financials,  Fintech  and Financial  Innov ation,  at: https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018
-08/A-Financial -System-that-Creates -Economic -Opportunities ---Nonbank -Financials -Fintech -and-
Innovation_0.pdf  and Financial Technology: Information on the Subsectors and Regulatory 
Oversight, at: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO -17-361. 
 
Under the International Banking Act of 1978, foreign banks can establish a commercial presence in 
the United States by setting up federal or state licensed branches and agencies, representative WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 27 - 
 
  offices, or through the acquisition of a national or state subsidiary bank. These are accorded national 
treatment. If a foreign bank that poses a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system applies 
to set up an office in the United States, the DFA requires that the F ederal Reserve consider whether 
the home country of the foreign bank has adopted, or is in the process of adopting, regulation that 
would minimize such risk. In the absence of such criteria, the DFA gives the Federal Reserve powers 
to shut down the offices  of foreign banks.  
30. What are the exposure limits for subsidiaries and for branches of foreign controlled banks?  
 
RESPONSE: The criteria for the Board to consider in making a determination to terminate the 
activities of the U.S. offices of foreign banks under section 7(e)(1) of the International Banking Act 
(IBA) are set forth in section 7(e)(1) of the IBA, 12 U.S.C. 3105(e)(1), and may be found 
at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE -2011-title12/html/USCODE -2011-title12 -chap32 -
sec3105.htm . 
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
Question 31  
Section 2 THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT (2.1)  
 
The United States maintains  one of the world's most open trade regimes, with the U.S. simple 
average MFN tariff at 3.4% in 2017 on a bound basis under the WTO. When GSP and other tariff 
preferences are taken into account, the U.S. trade -weighted average tariff is 1.4% on an applied 
basis. By comparison, simple average applied tariffs in our top five trading partners range from 4.0% 
to 9.8% and trade -weighted average tariffs range from 2.5% to 5.2%. In 2017, nearly 70% of all 
U.S. imports (including under preference programs) entered the United States duty free. The United 
States also has among the lowest non -tariff barriers of any country in the world. U.S. service markets 
are open to foreign providers with limited exceptions, and U.S. regulatory processes are transparent, 
accessible,  and open to public input.  
 
31. Among the U.S. imports that enter the United States duty free (nearly 70% of all imports, 
according to the document), what is the percentage share of imports that come from U.S. 
companies established abroad?  
 
RESPONSE: The Unite d States does not collect data on imports that enter duty -free from U.S. 
companies established abroad. Thus, this information is not available.  
 
Question 32  
Section 4.4.1 Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (4.52)  
 
APEC also advanced work on promoting services trade through the implementation of elements of 
the APEC Services Competitiveness Roadmap, adopted in 2016. APEC is developing a region -wide 
index on trade restrictiveness in services based on existing indices. APEC continued to focus attention 
in 2017 and 2018 on the growing importance of digital trade to economic growth and innovation. 
The United States is leading the effort to adopt building blocks to facilitate digital trade, including 
principles related to enabling cross -border data flows and preventing forced localization of data. 
APEC also showed leadership by continuing efforts to strengthen the implementation of good 
regulatory practices.  
 
32. What are the main US contributions to the construction of the new indicator, in particular 
regarding t he quantification of the obligation to locate data?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States is leading an initiative in APEC to develop a set of building blocks 
to facilitate digital trade. These building blocks will promote policies to prevent barriers to digital 
trade that negatively impact economies' competitiveness, as well as to help APEC economies 
take advantage of the rapidly growing digital economy.  
 
Question 33  
Section 4.5.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (4.77)  
 
Given the importance of innovation to U.S.  economic growth, employment and exports, the United 
States places a high value on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property (IP), in both WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  domestic and foreign markets. Domestically, Congress continues to update and improve the U.S. IP 
legal regime, while the Administration stresses the importance of American leadership in the 
innovative and creative sectors. In foreign markets, a top trade priority for the Administration is to 
use all possible sources of leverage to encourage other countries to open their markets to U.S. 
exports of goods and services, and provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of 
U.S. IP rights. Toward this end, a key objective of the Administration's trade policy is ensuring that 
U.S. owners of IP have a fu ll and fair opportunity to use and profit from their IP around the globe. 
Through engagement with trading partners, the Administration advocates for strong IP protection 
and enforcement in other countries for, among other things, works, phonograms, perform ances, 
brands, designs, trade secrets and inventions by U.S. creators, inventors, artists, and businesses.  
 
33. Can the U.S provide more information on the latest updates in its copyright legal regime, 
particularly those related to the use of copyrighted works  on the Internet?  
 
RESPONSE: Congress recently adopted, and the President signed in October 2018, the Orrin G. 
Hatch –Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA) and the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation 
Act. 
 
Question 34  
Section 4.5.2 Promoting Digital Trade  (4.83)  
 
The United States places great importance on electronic commerce (or "digital trade"), which plays 
a crucial role in strengthening and supporting firms in every sector of the economy. Since the last 
U.S. Trade Policy Review, the United States has advanced engagement on digital trade issues across 
a range of fora, and worked to combat a rising tide of barriers to digital trade around the world.  
 
34. Which guidelines are enshrined in US digital trade policy to prevent illicit operations carried out 
in new means of payment such as the ones provided by fintechs?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. digital trade policy operates in conjunction with U.S. laws related to preventing 
illicit transactions. The relevant United States authorities work cooperatively and effectively to 
enforce U.S. law with respect to supply of payment and financial services, and prevent illicit 
operations, including those carried out online. U.S. digital trade policy, consistent with these 
laws and enforcement efforts, focuses on ensuring an open and com petitive global market in 
which innovative firms can compete on a level playing field.  
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
Questions 35 -36 
The Music Modernization Act (MMA) – Section 115, Title I, of the U.S Copyright Act  
 
On October 11, 2018, the Orrin G. Hatch –Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA) was signed 
into law. Among other things, it makes significant changes to the section 115 compulsory license. 
In accordance with the new law, the Copyright Office no longer accepts section 115 notices of 
intention t o obtain a compulsory license for making a digital phonorecord delivery of a musical work. 
The Office will continue to accept notices of intention with respect to phonorecords that are not 
digital phonorecord deliveries (e.g., for CDs, vinyl records, tapes , and other physical media).4 
 
Title I —Musical Works Modernization, among other things, modifies the existing section 115 
"mechanical" license for reproduction and distribution of musical works in phonorecords (which was 
previously obtained by licensees on  a per -work, song -by-song basis) to establish a new blanket 
license for digital music providers to engage in specific covered activities (namely, permanent 
downloads, limited downloads, and interactive streaming). Licensing of physical configurations ( e.g., 
CDs, vinyl) will still operate on a per -work, individual song license, basis. Title I establishes a market -
oriented "willing buyer, willing seller" rate standard that will apply to all licensees of musical works 
under the section 115 mechanical license. Pursuant to section 115(d)(3), as amended, the Register 
of Copyrights will designate an entity as the mechanical licensing collective to administer the blanket 
license and distribute collected royalties to songwriters and music publishers. The newly create d 
mechanical licensing collective will be tasked with developing and maintaining a database of musical 
works and sound recordings, which will be publicly available and is expected to become the most 
comprehensive database in the music industry. There will be a transition period to move to the new 
                                                
4 https://www.copyright.gov/licensing/sec_115.html  (Access in: 27/11/2018) . WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  blanket license, allowing digital music providers to limit copyright infringement liability so long as 
the provider engages in good -faith, commercially reasonable efforts to identify and locate musical 
work copyrig ht owners. The legislation also modifies the process for selecting federal district court 
judges to adjudicate rate -setting disputes regarding performance rights organizations that are 
subject to consent decrees with the Department of Justice ( i.e., ASCAP and BMI).5 
 
35. Can the U.S provide more information regarding the recently approved Music Modernization Act? 
How exactly would the blanket mechanical licenses to digital services work? Is there an estimate 
of when the single mechanical database will be available?  
 
RESPO NSE: The U.S. Copyright Office website contains information on the Music Modernization 
Act (MMA) at: https://www.copyright.gov/music -modernization/ . From that webpage, additional 
information on  the legislation can be accessed:  
 
• The MMA legislation  (H.R. 1551):  https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th -congress/ 
house -bill/1551/ ; 
• The Report and Section by Section Analysis  of H.R. 1551 by the Chairmen and 
Ranking  Members  of the Senate  and House  Judiciary  Committees:  https://www.copyrig
ht.gov/legislation/mma_conference_report.pdf ; 
• The Copyright  Act, as amended  by the MMA:  https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/20
18_mma_amendments.pdf . 
 
Pursuant to section 115(d)(3) of the Copyright Act, as amended, the Register of Copyrig hts 
will designate an entity as the mechanical licensing collective to administer the blanket 
license and distribute collected royalties to songwriters and music publishers.  The Copyright  
Act, as amended  by the MMA,  can be found  at: https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/201
8_mma_amendments.pdf . 
 
The Hatch -Goodlatte Music Modernization Act also creates a new collective management 
organization (CMO) for managing streaming royalties for musical recordings.  
 
36. Will this new CMO be responsible for managing streaming royalties for musical recordings 
belonging to foreign authors, performers or other rightholders? If so, how will these royalties be 
distributed by the new CMO to their counte rparts in other countries?  
 
RESPONSE: Title I of the MMA, among other things, modifies the existing section 115 
"mechanical" license for reproduction and distribution of musical works in phonorecords (which 
was previously obtained by licensees on a per -work, song -by-song basis) to establish a new 
blanket license for digital music providers to engage in specific covered activities (namely, 
permanent downloads, limited downloads, and interactive streaming). Licensing of physical 
configurations ( e.g., CDs, vin yl) will still operate on a per -work, i ndividual song license, basis.  
The MMA does not make any distinction regarding U.S. nationals and foreign rightsholders.  
 
Question 37  
Market Facilitation Program  
 
In August 2018, the United States launched the Market Facilitation Program, which is designed for 
farmers or ranchers whose commodities have been directly impacted by what is being considered 
by the US government unjustified foreign retaliatory tariffs, resulting in the loss of traditional export 
markets. It encompasses direct payments to eligible producers of soybeans, sorghum, corn, wheat, 
cotton, dairy, hogs, shelled almonds, and fresh sweet cherries. At recent regular meetings of the 
Committee on Agriculture, the United States claimed that these new suppor t measures will be 
notified as appropriate and that their assortment among the different forms of support provided for 
in the Agreement on Agriculture is yet to be made.  
 
37. How does the United States intend, in its future WTO notification, to report the Mark et Facilitation 
Program in terms of the domestic support modalities?  
 
                                                
5 https://www.copyright.gov/music -modernization/  (Access  in: 27/11/2018) . WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: The Market Facilitation Program will be notified to the WTO as appropriate with 
other domestic support programs associated with the 2018/19 marketing/fiscal year. No details 
have been finalized regarding any additional payments under the Market Facilitation Program.  
 
Questions 38 -39 
Market Facilitation Program, Food Purchase and Distribution Program, and Agricultural Trade 
Promotion Program  
 
The USDA has launched, in August/September 2018, the Market Facilitation Program, the Food 
Purchase and Distribution Program and the Agricultural Trade Promotion Program, in order to provide 
support for "farmers in response to trade damage from unjustified retaliation by foreign na tions" 
(https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2018/09/04/usda -launches -trade -mitigation -
programs ). 
 
38. What is the impact on the United States' Ag gregate Measurement of Support of those programs 
for each of the commodities covered?  
 
RESPONSE: The Market Facilitation Program is consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on 
domestic support.  
 
39. Will there be a second phase of those programs?  
 
RESPONSE: No det ails have been finalized regarding any additional payments under the Market 
Facilitation Program.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Canada  
PART I: QUESTIONS RE GARDING THE SECRETAR IAT REPORT (WT/TPR/S /382)  
Question 1  
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  (3.47)  
 
As noted in the Secretariat's report "[a]lthough SIMP is only applicable to imported seafood, similar 
reporting requirements also apply to domestic capture fisheries and aquaculture. SIMP entered into 
force for 11 of the 13 species on 1 January 2018. As for the two  remaining priority species (abalone 
and shrimp), the effective date has been delayed for one year, as the enforcement of SIMP for these 
two species is linked to the establishment of appropriate reporting and/or record -keeping disciplines 
for the domestic aquaculture production of abalone and shrimp."  
 
1. Will the US be adding new species to the list of species covered and enforced under SIMP?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  At this time, there is no 
plan for expanding the pro gram, which would require a new rulemaking.  
 
Questions 2 -3 
3.1.6.1.1.3 6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures - Suspension agreements 
(3.70)  
 
The Secretariat report states that "AD suspension agreements reached with non -market economies 
(NMEs) may combine price undertakings and additional elements, in order to prevent price 
suppression or undercutting."  
 
2. Canada notes that the last time the U.S.  identified its list of non -market economies was 2013 in 
the Federal Register. Could the U.S. please identify which countries are currently considered 
non-market economies?  
 
RESPONSE: The list of countries that the U.S. Department of Commerce has determine d to be 
non-market economies for antidumping purposes are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic), Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Vietnam (Viet Nam).  
 
3. Could the U.S. provide examples of the "additiona l elements" that may be combined with price 
undertakings in AD suspension agreements with non -market economies?  
 
RESPONSE: Under 19 U.S.C. section 1673c(l), the U.S. Department of Commerce can suspend 
an antidumping duty investigation in favo ur of an agree ment with a non -market economy 
country where the agreement will prevent suppression or undercutting of the prices of domestic 
products . Thus, with respect to a non -market economy, the U.S. Department of Commerce may 
enter into a suspension agreement with t he foreign government that contains a pricing 
mechanism, in addition to other elements.  
 
Question 4  
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures (3.68, 3.74)  
 
The Secretariat report states that "If the ITA makes a preliminary determination of  critical 
circumstances, preliminary measures may be applied retroactively to subject imports entered up to 
90 days before the determination was published in the Federal Register Notice".  
 
4. According to Table 3.5, of the 133 anti -dumping investigations init iated between 2015 and 2017, 
101 resulted in provisional measures being applied. Could the U.S. indicate in how many of these 
cases a preliminary determination of critical circumstances was made? In how many of these 
cases was a final determination of crit ical circumstances made?  
 
RESPONSE: The determinations for specific proceedings where a finding of critical 
circumstances were made can be found at: https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy.htm  (U.S. 
International T rade Commission) and https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx  (U.S. Department of 
Commerce).  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 32 - 
 
  Questions 5 -6 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures – Administrative reviews (3.71)  
 
5. In the con text of Administrative Reviews of AD and CVD proceedings, could the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (USDOC) extend the Period of review to respectively cover, as appropriate, entries, 
exports, or sales of the subject merchandise beyond the 12 months immediatel y preceding the 
most recent anniversary month of the publication of an order and beyond the most recently 
completed calendar year? If so, how would the USDOC determine the appropriate period of 
review for the subject merchandise?  
 
RESPONSE: When conducting  an administrative review, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
examines sales and entries made during the applicable period of review. If sales or entries were 
previously reviewed in a prior administrative review, then they would not be included in the 
subsequ ent review for margin calculation purposes.  
 
6. If the USDOC extends the Period of Review in the context of an Administrative Review, how does 
the USDOC determine the appropriate duty rates for the retroactive and prospective periods?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 5 above.  
 
Questions 7 -8 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures (3.74 -3.85)  
 
7. How would the USDOC determine it is appropriate to include, in the scope of a given duty order, 
products not produced by a Petitioner?  
 
RESPONSE: For any antidumping or countervailing proceeding, the written description of the 
scope is dispositive. Therefore, if a certain product coincides with the written description of the 
subject merchandise, it may be included within the scope.  
 
8. In addition, in ca ses where the USDOC does include within the scope of its duty orders products 
that were not the subject of a USDOC investigation, what measures does the USDOC take to 
ensure that the duty rates applied to these products are accurate/appropriate for these 
uninvestigated products?  
 
RESPONSE: Once a final determination is made regarding the scope of the merchandise subject 
to AD/CVD measures, the U.S. Department of Commerce issues instructions to U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection regarding the application of AD/CVD measures on that subject 
merchandise.  
 
Questions 9 -14 
3.1.6.2 Safeguards (3.89)  
 
The Secretariat report states that "If the President decides to apply a safeguard measure, the USITC 
must monitor developments in the industry and submit a report on th e results of its monitoring 
during the period of application of the measure (relief period). At the termination of any relief period, 
the USITC is required to report to the President and Congress on the effectiveness of the safeguard 
measure in facilitatin g the positive adjustment of the domestic industry to import competition."  
 
9. Could the U.S. please elaborate on the methodology and administrative practices used by the 
USITC to monitor developments in the industry? Are interested parties offered an opport unity 
to participate and provide information?  
 
RESPONSE: The methodology and administrative practices used by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission are those set out in 19 U.S.C. sec. 2254, and as further 
explained  in U.S. International  Trade  Commission  monitoring  reports  found  at: https://usitc.go
v/trade_remedy/publications/safeguard_pubs.htm . 
 
Yes, interested parties may participate in this process.  
 
10. When during the relief period does the USITC submit to the President its report on the results 
of its monitoring during the relief period?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 33 - 
 
  RESPONSE: If the initial period during which the safeguard measure exceeds 3 years, or if an 
extension of a measure exceeds 3 years, the U.S . International Trade Commission submits a 
report on the results of the monitoring to the President and to Congress not later than the date 
that is the mid -point of the initial period, and of each such extension, during which the measure 
is in effect.  
 
11. Are the reports to the President on the results of the USITC's monitoring during the relief period 
made publicly available? If yes, when and how are they made available to the public?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, they are made available to the public (with the exception o f confidential 
information), and they may be found on the U.S. International Trade Commission's website: 
http://www.usitc.gov . 
 
12. How long after the termination of the relief period does the USITC submit to the President its 
report on the effectiveness of the safeguard measure?  
 
RESPONSE: The report is due to the President no later than 180 days after the safeguard 
measure was terminated.  
 
13. How long after the termination of the relief period does the USITC submit to Congres s its report 
on the effectiveness of the safeguard measure?  
 
RESPONSE: The report is due to the Congress no later than 180 days after the safeguard 
measure was terminated.  
 
14. Are the reports to the President and to Congress at the termination of the relief period made 
publicly available? If yes, when and how are they made available to the public?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 11 above.  
 
Questions 15 -17 
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.100 -3.120)  
 
15. What rules are the U.S. applying to determine the c ountry of origin of a good in the application 
of its Section 232 tariff measures?  
 
RESPONSE: The country of origin rules applied to imports of steel and aluminum articles subject 
to additional tariffs under Section 232 are the same as those generally appl ied to articles 
imported into the United States.  
 
16. Are these same rules being applied regardless of whether or not a country is an FTA partner and 
across all affected goods?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes. 
 
17. Is this information publicly available?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes. Rules and procedures applicable to entries of imports subject to additional 
tariffs under Section 232 are provided for in proclamations issued by the President, provisions 
contained in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, and relevant regulations of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection.  
 
Questions 18 -19 
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.119)  
 
The report states that employment in motor v ehicle production has declined.  
 
18. Has this decline in employment been accompanied by an increase in productivity?  
 
RESPONSE: On May 23, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to 
determine the effects on the national security of imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, 
vans and light trucks, and automotive parts under section 232 of the Trade Ex pansion Act of WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 34 - 
 
  1962, as amended. According to statute, an investigation of this type must be completed within 
270 days of its initiation. As part of its investigation, on May 30, 2018, the Department of 
Commerce issued a Federal Register Notice inviting wr itten comments, including data, analyses, 
or information pertinent to this investigation, and announcing the public hearings. The comment 
period was open until June 22, 2018 and the Department of Commerce held a public hearing as 
part o f its investigation on July 19.  
 
19. How does the decline in motor vehicle production compare in relation to other sectors of 
manufacturing?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 18.  
 
Questions 20 -21 
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.119)  
 
The report states that the United Stat es has a low share of R&D for both vehicle manufacturers and 
parts manufacturers.  
 
20. What is the source of this data and how has it declined over time?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 18.  
 
21. Which countries are seeing an increased share of R&D globally?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 18.  
 
Question 22  
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.119)  
 
The report states that the decline of domestic automobile and automotive parts production threatens 
to weaken the internal economy of the U.S.  
 
22. Could the U.S. p rovide data or evidence to support this assessment?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 18.  
 
Question 23  
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.119)  
 
The report states that the decline of domestic automobile and automotive parts production could 
reduce R&D and jobs for skilled workers.  
 
23. Could the U.S. provide evidence that this is occurring?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 18.  
 
Question 24  
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.120)  
 
It is understood that the USDOC may, "if it is appropriate and after reasonable notice," hold public 
hearings or afford interested parties an opportunity to present information and advice rel evant to 
the 232 investigation.  
 
24. Could the U.S. indicate if such a public hearing will be held for the investigation  on imports of 
uranium imports?  
 
RESPONSE: The Department of Commerce published a notice on July 25, 2018, requesting 
public comments regarding the Section 232 investigation on imports of uranium. If public 
hearings are held in support of this investigation, a separate Federal Register  notice will be 
published.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 35 - 
 
  Questions 25 -26 
3.1.7.2 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (3.121 -3.137)  
 
25. What rules are the U.S. applying to determine the country of origin of a good in the application 
of its Section 301 tariff measures?  
 
RESPONSE: The Section 301 tariff actions do not change U.S. rules on the country of origin of 
a good. Thus, the rules of origin are the same as those generally applied to articles imported 
into the United States.  
 
26. Is this information publicly available?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes. Rules and procedures applicable to entries of imports subject to additional 
tariffs under Section 301 are provided for in provisions contained in the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States and relevant regulations of U.S. Customs and  Border Protection.  
 
Question 27  
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (3.146)  
 
The report states that:  
"Regarding export controls on energy, the Natural Gas Act of 1938, as amended, requires any 
person wishing to export or import natural  gas to obtain authorization from the Department of 
Energy (DOE). Permission is granted in the form of short -term or long -term authorizations. 
Applications to import or export liquefied natural gas (LNG) to countries that have concluded 
FTAs with the Unite d States are granted without modification or delay as the FTAs stipulate 
national treatment and such trade is deemed consistent with public interest. The DOE also 
authorizes natural gas exports to non -FTA countries unless the proposed exports are deemed 
inconsistent with public interest or explicitly prohibited by law or policy."  
 
27. Could the U.S. explain how "'public interest" is defined? What are the factors considered in order 
to determine if a licence is in the public interest? Is the final destination of  the product 
considered?  
 
RESPONSE: Section 3(a) of the NGA states that DOE "shall issue such order upon application, 
unless, after opportunity for hearing, it finds that the proposed exportation or importation will 
not be consistent with the public intere st." DOE has consistently interpreted this provision as 
creating a rebuttable presumption that a proposed export of natural gas is in the public interest. 
Accordingly, DOE will conduct an informal adjudication and grant an application to export LNG 
to non -FTA countries under section 3(a) of the NGA unless DOE finds that the proposed 
exportation will not be consistent with the public interest.  
 
In prior decisions, DOE's Office of Fossil Energy (DOE/FE) has identified a range of factors that 
it evaluates when  reviewing an application under section 3(a). DOE/FE's public interest review 
focuses on: (i) the domestic need for the natural gas proposed to be exported, (ii) whether the 
proposed exports pose a threat to the security of domestic natural gas supplies, ( iii) whether 
the arrangement is consistent with DOE/FE's policy of promoting market competition, and (iv) 
any other factors bearing on the public interest raised in any individual proceeding. In addition, 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requir es DOE to give appropriate consideration to 
the environmental effects of its proposed decisions.  
 
Question 28  
3.2.4 Export support and promotion (3.149)  
 
The Secretariat report highlights the work of the United States Trade and Development Agency 
(USTDA), which links U.S. businesses to overseas opportunities to develop sustainable infrastructure 
in emerging economies.  
 
28. How effective has this program been in creating economic opportunities for U.S. businesses and 
to what extent have small and medium -sized e nterprises (SMEs) been able to participate in, or 
benefit from, the work of the USTDA?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 36 - 
 
  RESPONSE: Nearly half of USTDA's projects result in some degree of implementation.  In FY 
2018, approximately 59 per cent  of the total value of USTDA's contracts awarded  under the U.S. 
Federal Acquisition Regulations went to small businesses.  
 
Questions 29 -30 
3.2.5 Export Finance, insurance, guarantees (3.157)  
 
The Secretariat report notes that the Small Business Administration "administers three broad 
programmes through its Office of International Trade that offer export financing for small businesses 
exporting or planning to export (Table 3.14). In addition, it provides grants to states to assist small 
businesses with information and tools to succeed in exporting through  its State Trade and Export 
Promotion Program (STEP). It also contributes staff to the U.S. Export Assistance Centers (USEACs), 
a joint effort with the USDOC and EXIM Bank to provide export marketing and finance assistance to 
small and medium sized U.S. bu sinesses."  
 
29. Could the U.S. please identify where in the U.S. subsidy notifications to the WTO these 
programmes are mentioned?  
 
RESPONSE: These programs are not notified because they do not meet the benefit and 
specificity criteria under Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement.  
 
30. If the programmes are not mentioned in the subsidy notifications, could the U.S. provide more 
detailed information on the programmes, including what types of export financing are provided?  
 
RESPONSE: SBA's programs are fully describe d in the Secretariat Report in paragraphs 3.157 
– 3.159 and paragraph 3.168.  Additional detail can be found at: www.sba.gov . 
 
Questions 31 -32 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.172)  
The report states that  "The majority of the standards developed are voluntary consensus standards, 
but there are also a growing number of consortia standards being developed in the technology space, 
which may have more narrow participation and work on an accelerated development  time frame to 
meet market needs."  
 
31. For consortia standards, which may have more narrow participation, how does the U.S. ensure 
that they respect the following paragraphs of the 'Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standa rds': 
a. E ("The standardization body shall ensure that standards are not prepared, adopted or 
applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade."); and  
b. H ("[The standardization] body shall make every effort  to achieve a national consensus 
on the standards they develop.")?  
 
RESPONSE: Consortia are most prevalent in fast -moving technology areas where the 
purpose is to develop standards quickly in order to address rapid technology changes. Many 
consortia have global membership, such as World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), as 
frequently the products in these areas are produced using a global supply chain.  
 
In the United States, ANSI has accepted the Code of Good Practice on behalf of standards 
developing organizatio ns (SDOs) that ANSI has accredited. Some consortia are ANSI 
accredited and therefore meet the "ANSI Essential Requirements: Due process requirements 
for American National Standards," which is available at: http://www.ansi.org/ 
essentialrequirements . Examples of ANSI accredited consortia include OASIS and 
MedBiquitous.  
 
Federal agencies use international standards when effective and appropriate, but when that 
is not the case, agencies have the opti on of using other standards, including consortia 
standards.  
 
32. Has the US ever taken a consortia standard and made it a mandatory technical regulation?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 37 - 
 
  RESPONSE: The United States makes available two options for searching which standards are 
incorporated by  reference in technical regulations. ANSI has the ANSI Incorporated by Reference 
portal, available at: https://ibr.ansi.org/ . NIST has the Standards Incorporated by Reference 
(SIBR) Database, available at: https://www.nist.gov/standardsgov/what -we-do/federal -policy -
standards/sibr  for historical references.  
 
Questions 33 -37 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization (3.219)  
 
The Secretariat report notes that, "At the federal level, a number of government corporations or 
government -sponsored enterprises generally fulfil public policy objectives or governmental functions 
and their intended purpose is not t o compete with private enterprises (Table 3.18)."  
 
33. Is Table 3.18 a complete list of all government corporations at the federal level?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, the United States believes this list to be current as of the issuance of the 
Secretariat's Report.  
 
34. If no,  could the U.S. provide a complete list?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 33.  
 
35. Do such entities exist beyond the federal level (e.g. state level)?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not maintain any information on state level entities.  
 
36. If yes, could the  U.S. provide examples of specific entities at the state level?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 35.  
 
37. What is the governance and accountability framework of federal government corporations?  
 
RESPONSE: Detailed information regarding each of the governmen t corporations in the 
Secretariat's Report can be found in their respective governing statutes, which are listed in Table 
3.18.  
 
Questions 38 -43 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization (3.220)  
 
The Secretariat report notes:  
"Government -sponsored enterprises (GSEs) operate exclusively in the financial sector. 
GSEs are quasi -governmental, private corporations structured and regulated by the 
Government to enhance their ability to borrow money (Table 3.19). As GSEs are private 
companies, they are not included in the Federal Budget, and their debt is not fully 
backed by the Federal Government."  
 
38. Is Table 3.19 a complete list of all government -sponsored enterprises (GSEs) at the federal 
level?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, the United States belie ves this list to be current as of the issuance of the 
Secretariat's Report.  
 
39. If no, could the U.S. provide a complete list?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 38.  
 
40. Do such entities exist beyond the federal level (e.g.: state level)?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not maintain any information on state level entities.  
 
41. If yes, could the U.S. provide examples of specific entities at the state level?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 38 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  See response to Question 40.  
 
42. How much of each GSE's debt is backed by the Federal Government?  
 
RESPONSE: The financial details of each government -sponsored entity can be found in each 
entity's financial statements, the location of which are listed at the end of Table 3.19.  
 
43. What is the governance and accountability framework of federal government -sponsored 
enterprises?  
 
RESPONSE: Detailed information regarding each of the government -sponsored entities listed in 
Table 3.19 can be found at each entity's website.  
 
Question 44  
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.252)  
 
While the U.S. has carved out preference  programs for small businesses from the scope of its 
international procurement commitments under the WTO GPA, the U.S. has unilaterally changed the 
monetary value of the U.S. small business set -aside over the years.  This has resulted in a significant 
chang e to the landscape of the U.S. procurement regime and the actual coverage provided to other 
GPA Parties. For example, when the U.S. re -negotiated its WTO GPA commitments in 2012 (with a 
WTO GPA threshold of US$191,000 for goods and services) the U.S. small  business set -aside was 
US$150,000. However, the U.S. has now unilaterally raised the U.S. small business set -aside to 
US$250,000 effectively withdrawing benefits previously provided to GPA Parties.  
 
44. Can the U.S. explain how the unilateral raising of its small business set -aside is consistent with 
one of the overarching objectives of the GPA which recognizes "the need for an effective 
multilateral framework for government procurement, with a view to achieving greater 
liberalization and expansion of, and im proving the framework for, the conduct of international 
trade" and Article XXIII of the GATT?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States' small business program and the recent increase in the set aside 
thresholds are applied consistent with U.S. obligati ons under the GP A and the GATT.  
 
Questions 45 -46 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.223)  
 
The Secretariat's report states:  
"The OFPP, headed by an Administrator appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate, provides overall direction for government -wide procurement  policies and plays a 
central role in shaping the policies and practices used by federal agencies to acquire goods and 
services. The OFPP Administrator may prescribe Government -wide procurement policies and 
may issue policy letters stating principles that must be followed by the agencies; 
implementation takes place through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)."  
 
45. Does the U.S. anticipate that the OFPP will make changes to U.S. procurement policies and 
practices in the next two years?  
 
RESPONSE: We remin d Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  The United States cannot 
speculate on measures or policies the Office of Federal Procurement Policy may pursue in the 
future.  
 
46. Is it possible that the President could direct the OFPP or another government agency to make 
changes to U.S. procurement policies pursuant to an Executive Order?  If so, what are the 
changes are being considered?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective. The United States cannot 
speculate on measures or policies the P resident may pursue in the future.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 39 - 
 
  Questions 47 -48 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.228)  
 
The Secretariat's report notes that federal agencies may waive domestic procurement requirements 
in U.S. law under certain conditions. The report references paragrap h 4 (c) of Executive Order No. 
13788, Buy American Hire America that reads: To the extent permitted by law, before granting a 
public interest waiver, the relevant agency shall take appropriate account of whether a significant 
portion of the cost advantage of a foreign -sourced product is the result of the use of dumped steel, 
iron, or manufactured goods or the use of injuriously subsidized steel, iron, or manufactured goods, 
and it shall integrate any findings into its waiver determination as appropriate.  
 
47. Could the U.S. clarify what is meant by "appropriate account"?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is considering what, if any, future interpretive guidance it may 
issue in connection with the Executive Order.  
 
48. How would the relevant agency determine whether a sig nificant portion of the cost advantage 
of a foreign -sourced product is the result of the use of dumped steel, iron or manufactured 
goods? Would it rely on a determination made by an off icial U.S. agency (e.g. USDOC)?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to question 47.  
 
Questions 49 -51 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.230)  
 
The Secretariat's report references Executive Order No. 13788, Buy American and Hire American 
(EO).   
 
49. Further to the discussion held during the October 2017 formal meeting of the WTO Committee 
on Government Procurement, could the U.S. provide an update on actions that have been taken 
as a result of the EO since October 2017?  
 
RESPONSE: The report from the Secretary of Commerce was provided to the White House. The 
original report and all subsequent annual reports are  for internal executive branch use and may 
inform the policy making process.  
 
50. Will the U.S. make the report referenced in section 2(f) of the EO  (report provided by the 
Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to the  President) publicly 
available?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to question 49.  
 
51. Are the U.S. considering making policy changes to the implementation of current Buy Ameri can 
Laws as a result of the EO or vis -à-vis another Executive Order or policy/leg islative/regulatory 
instrument? If so, could the U.S. provide more information on the changes being considered?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective. The U nited States cannot 
speculate on possible future measures or policy changes.  
  
Questions 52 -54 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.237)  
 
The Secretariat report notes changes to the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) that occurred as 
a result of the Nationa l Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2018 and that the Notice and comment 
rulemaking are to follow.  
 
52. Could the U.S. provide more information on when the Notice and comment rulemaking will be 
published and available for comment by trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States will issue a notice of proposed rulemaking in accordance with 41 
USC 1707. The proposed rule has not been released for public comment as of 4th December 
2018.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 40 - 
 
  53. When will the change to the micro -purchase threshold (raised from $3,500 to $1 0,000) and the 
SAT (from $150,000 to $250,000) be effective?  
 
RESPONSE: The rule will become effective on the date identified in the final rule. The final rule 
will be published after comments on the proposed rule are received and reviewed. See response 
to question 52. In the interim, the U.S. General Services Administration issued Memorandum 
CAAC Letter 2018 -02 on 16 February 2018, which allows heads of procuring entities to take 
advantage of the threshold increase.  
 
54. Are all purchases under the micro -purch ase threshold exempt from the requirements under the 
Buy American Act and Small Business Administration (i.e., Rule of Two)?  
 
RESPONSE: As specified in 41 USC 8302 (a)(2)(C), the Buy American Act does not apply to 
procurements under the micro -purchase thre shold. As specified in 15 USC 644 (j)(1) the Small 
Business Act set -asides do not apply under the micro -purchase threshold.  
 
Questions 55 -56 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.244)  
 
The Secretariat report notes that the head of each federal agency submits a report to Congress 
relating to acquisitions of articles, materials, or supplies manufactured outside the U.S. and that 
federal domestic preference requirements are sometimes included in annual appropriation and 
authorization bills.  
 
55. Are the reports to Cong ress made publicly available?  
 
RESPONSE: For FY 2009 through 2011, the head of each Federal agency was required to submit 
a report to Congress as required in 41 USC 8302(b)(2) and to make these reports publicly 
available to the maximum extent practicable. Currently, all Federal agencies are required to 
submit all procurement data, including contracts issued through waivers or exceptions to the 
Buy American Act, to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS -NG). This data system and 
its data are available to the public.  
 
56. How does the U.S. ensure that any federal domestic preference requirements proposed in annual 
appropriation and authorization bills are fully compliant with the revised WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA)?  
 
RESPONSE: The Administrati on works with Congress to ensure all federal domestic preference 
requirements proposed in annual appropriation and authorization bills are consistent with the 
revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.  
 
Question 57  
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.245 ) 
 
The Secretariat report notes that exceptions to the Buy American Act (BAA) can be granted if it is 
determined that the domestic preference is inconsistent with the public interest, in case of U.S. non -
availability of a supply or material, or for reasona bleness of cost.  
 
57. Can the U.S. indicate how many waivers were granted under the BAA over the past 5 years?   
 
RESPONSE: The "Buy American Act Place of Manufacturing Report" is publically accessible from 
the website of the Federal Procurement Data System -Next Generation (FPDS -NG) database, 
which contains historical contract data, including the types of waivers or exceptions granted 
under the BAA. See: www.fpds.gov . 
 
Questions 58 -59 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.252)  
 
The Secretariat report notes that contract opportunities above $250,000 must be set aside for small 
businesses if the Rule of Two is met.   
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 41 - 
 
  58. The U.S. increased the small business set -aside amount from $150,000 to $250,000 in 2018. 
Notwithstanding its small busi ness set -aside, given that the current U.S. GPA goods and services 
threshold under the GPA is $180,000, does the U.S. consider this increase to be consistent with 
its GPA threshold?  
RESPONSE: The United States small business program and the recent increase  in the set aside 
thresholds are consistent with U.S. obligations under the GPA.  
 
59. Can the U.S. provide assurance that the small business set -aside will not increase furt her? 
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  The United State s cannot 
speculate on possible future measures or policies changes.  
 
Question 60  
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.255)  
 
The Secretariat report notes that in the context of limitations applying to set -asides, waivers to the 
non-manufacture rule may be grante d by the SBA if it is determined there are an insufficient number 
of small businesses with the required manufacturing capabilities.  
 
60. If a waiver to the non -manufacture rule is granted, will the procurement opportunity provided 
by the small business prime contractor be open to foreign firms or only to U.S. firms that do not 
qualify as small businesses?  
 
RESPONSE: When a waiver to the non -manufacturer rule is granted, the procurement 
opportunity provided by the small business prime contractor is open to pro ducts of U.S. firms 
that do not qualify as small businesses as well as products of foreign firms unless otherwise 
provided for in U.S. laws and regulations implementing our international procurement 
obligations.  
 
Questions 61 -63 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property  Rights (3.263)  
 
The Secretariat's report noted that in 2016, the USDOC designated 81 industries, out of a total of 
313 (25.9% of the total), as IP -intensive, which, in 2014, collectively accounted for US$6.6 trillion 
in value added. In 2014, IP -intensive industries directly accounted for 27.9 million jobs, and 
indirectly supported an additional 17.6 million.  
 
61. What is the contribution of IP -intensive industries to exports and imports?  
 
RESPONSE: The share of total U.S. merchandise exports from IP -intensive industries was 52 
per cent  in 2014. The value of U.S. merchandise imports into IP-intensive industries totalled 
59.3 per cent  of overall U.S. merchandise imports in 2014. See: https://www.uspto.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf . 
 
62. For industries that are intensive in more than one IP right, how is the contribution attributed to 
each right?  
 
RESPONSE: When an IP -intensive industry is IP -intensive with respect to only one IP right, then 
all the industry's employment could be assigned to that IP right. However, when more than one 
IP right is implicated, there is no attempt to assign degrees of contribution.  
 
63. How is the "indirect support" calculated?  
 
RESPONSE: Indirect support is calculated from economic "input -output" tables of the economy. 
It includes those jobs that are supported by the intermediate input purchases of IP -intensive 
industries.  
 
Questions 64 -66 
3.3.7 In tellectual Property Rights (3.264)  
 
The U.S. federal technology transfer policy is under review, including issues pertaining to IP such as 
the licensing of technology developed using federal funds.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 42 - 
 
  64. What aspects of technology transfer policy are being cons idered?  
 
RESPONSE: As set out in the "President's Management Agenda," President Trump wants to 
bridge gaps between the lab and the market. The Return on Investment (ROI) Initiative is a 
Cross Agency Priority (CAP) Goal that is designed to improve the trans fer of federally -funded 
technologies from lab -to-market. Specially, this CAP Goal is looking at: Core Federal technology 
principles that need to be protected, modernized, or changed; approaches to remove regulatory 
barriers to technology transfer; partneri ng models and technology transfer mechanisms with the 
private sector, academia, other Federal agencies, State and other public -sector entities; metrics 
and methods of evaluation of ROI outcomes from Federal R&D investment; approaches to 
motivate increased technology transfer outcomes from the Federal sector, universities, and 
research organizations. A full description of the Return on Investment (R OI) Initiative may be 
found at: https://www.nist.gov/tpo/return -investment -roi-initiative . 
 
65. Is this part of a regular policy review process?  
 
RESPONSE: This policy review is part of the President's Management Agenda. The President's 
Management Agenda is a regularly occurring, public agenda. T he 2019 agenda includes 14 CAP 
Goals, to "Improve Transfer of Federally -Funded Technologies from Lab -to-Market" is CAP Goal 
14. The full President's Management Agenda may be found at:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ThePresidentsManagementAgenda.pdf . 
 
66. What is the objective of the review?  
 
RESPONSE: According to the Office of Management and Budget, this CAP Goal will be 
accomplishe d when Agencies "develop and implement stakeholder -informed action plans which 
may include improved Federal practices and policies, regulatory reform, and legislative 
proposals; increase interactions with private sector experts; identify, share, and adopt best 
practices for technology transfer; and increase the transfer of federally funded 
innovations  from lab to market."  This information,  along  with more details  about the CAP Goal 
may be found  at: https://www.performance.gov/CAP/CAP_goal_14.html . 
 
Questions 67 -70 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.264)  
The National Institute for Standards and Technology is currently working with stakeholders on 
prioritizing technology issues and improving the process to enhance innovation technology 
commercialization and partnerships.  
 
67. What is the process to enhance innovation technology, commercialization and partnerships?  
 
RESPONSE: As part of the NIST -led Return -on-Investment (ROI) Initiative, all aspect s of 
technology transfer policies and approaches from federal government laboratories and federally 
funded R&D are being examined. These include current policies about IP licensing, partnership 
models, existing statutory and administrative policies governi ng tech transfer, 
etc. Comprehensive  information  about  the issues  being  considered  can be found  in a request 
for information  available  at: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/01/2018 -
09182/request -for-information -regarding -federal -technology -transfer -authorities -and-
processes . 
 
68. Does this involve transfers from the Government?  
 
RESPONSE: The NIST ROI Initiative is focused on technology transfer from federal government 
laboratories and from federally funded R&D.  
 
69. Are there specific aspects of the innovation technology commercialization and partnerships that 
need to be improved?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see information in the preliminary paper (Green Paper) posted December 
6, 2018, at: https://www.nist.gov/tpo/return -investment -roi-initiative/green -paper . 
 
70. Will the results be published?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 43 - 
 
  RESPONSE: A report summarizing public comments and recommendations presented at public 
fora and in response to a request for information about the current state of Federal technology 
transfer and the public's ability to en gage with Federal laboratories and access federally funded 
R&D through collaborations, licensing, and other mechanisms is expected to be released in early 
2019. A preliminary paper (Green Paper) was released December 6, 2018.  Information  about  
thisstudy  and publicly  available  documents  can be accessed  at the ROI Initiative  webpage  at:  
https://www.nist.gov/tpo/return -investment -roi-initiative . 
 
Question 71  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.265)  
 
Government expenditures on R&D reached US$139.7 billion in 2016 across all federal R&D 
programmes.  
 
71. How has this figure evolved over time with respect to the amount of expenditures?  
 
RESPONSE: The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has recently published a report on 
Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding for FY2019. For a breakdown on how 
expenditures  have changed  by federal  agency,  please  see the analysis  on pages  4 and 5: https
://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45150.pdf . 
 
Question 72  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.272)  
 
Recent cooperative projects to improve the efficiency and quality of patent examination include 
technical training through the USPTO's Global IP Academy, exch anging best practices with 
counterpart offices, the Patent Prosecution Highway work sharing framework, the Cooperative Patent 
Classification system, and the Global Dossier Initiative.  
 
72. How does the U.S. measure the effectiveness of these cooperative programmes and projects? 
Are there best practices or reports published?  
 
RESPONSE:  The USPTO's Strategic Plan is available at: https://www.uspto.gov/s ites/default/ 
files/documents/USPTO_2018 -2022_Strategic_Plan.pdf . One key indicator is to "provide training 
and information on best practices to protect and enforce intellectual property." The United States 
also directs Members' attention to the USPTO's FY 2018 Performance and Accountability Report 
at: https://www.uspto.gov/about -us/performance -and-planning/uspto -annual -reports . 
 
Additional information can be found a t the below locations:  
• Global IP Academy information may be found at: https://www.uspto.gov/learning -and-
resources/global -intellectual -property -academy ; 
• PPH f iling data across the world may be found at: https://www.jpo.go.jp/ppph -
portal/statistics.htm ; 
• CPC revisions  and projects  may be found  at: https://www.cooperativepatentclassificati
on.org/index.html ; 
• Global  Dossier  Initiative  information  may be found  at: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -
getting -started/international -protection/global -dossier -initiative . 
 
Questions 73 -74 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.274)  
 
No major changes to U.S. patent law have occurred since the Leahy -Smith America Invents Act in 
2011.  
 
73. Does the U.S. anticipate updating its patent laws within the next review period?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
reviews.  
 
74. If so, what areas of patent law does the U.S. anticipate it will update or modernize?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 44 - 
 
  RESPONSE: We refrain from speculating on possible future actions or policies given the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
Questions 75 -76 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.278)  
 
U.S. law provides for the possibility of submitting a provisional 12 -month application for a patent. 
The provisional application provides a lower -cost first patent filing, permits the term "Patent 
Pending" to be applied in connection with the invention, and the application is not examined on its 
merits.  
 
75. Does the U.S. have figures on the amount of provisional application patents it has issued during 
this review period?  
 
RESPONSE: Provisional patent applications are automatically abandoned after 12 months by 
operation of law, 35 USC § 111(b), and d o not result in issued patents.  
 
76. What types of feedback has the U.S. received on its provisional application for patents program?  
 
RESPONSE: The USPTO understands that provisional applications allow applicants to, for 
example, investigate market potential,  find investors, search public documents and sources to 
determine previous invention or disclosure, and evaluate the need to hire a patent attorney or 
agent.  
 
Questions 77 -79 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.279)  
 
A patent applicant may request that the application not be published, but only if the invention has 
not been, and will not be, the subject of an application filed in a foreign country that requires 
publication 18 months after filing (or earlier claimed priority date) or under the Patent Coop eration 
Treaty.  
 
77. How many applications are currently pending at the USPTO that have requested not to be 
published?  
 
RESPONSE: The USPTO does not keep statistics specifically relating to applications that have 
non-publication requests.  
 
78. What is the average  pendency time of these applications?  
 
RESPONSE: The USPTO does not keep statistics specifically relating to applications that have 
non-publication requests. Patent pendency metrics do not distinguish between applications with 
or without a non -publication request.  
 
79. Do any of those applications receive Patent Term Adjustment? If so, what is the average amount 
of extended patent time that is granted to these applications?  
 
RESPONSE: The USPTO does not keep statistics specifically relating to applications that  have 
non-publication requests.  35 USC 154(b) sets forth the circumstances under which patent term 
adjustment may be provided.  
 
Questions 80 -81 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.281)  
 
During the review period, the USPTO has continued to make progress t owards addressing some of 
the concerns identified in previous years with respect to the pendency period for patent applications 
and the need to improve the quality of patent applications.  
 
80. Can the U.S. provide examples of the progress achieved or efforts m ade regarding the need to 
improve the quality of patent applications?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 45 - 
 
  RESPONSE: The USPTO has lowered its Average Patent First Action Pendency from 18.4 months 
in FY 2014 to 15.8 months in FY 2018. The USPTO has lowered its Average Total 
Patent  Pendency  from 27.4 months  in FY 2014 to 23.8 months  in FY 2018.  See 2018 
USPTO  Performance  and Accountability  Report,  p. 30, at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/ USPTOFY18PAR.pdf . 
 
81. Could the US provide a breakdown of the average pendency time (and resulting PTA) per 
industry?  
 
RESPONSE: The average pendency according to technology center can be found in the 
2018 USPTO  Performance  and Accountability  Report,  p. 180, at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/USPTOFY18PAR.pdf . 
 
Questions 82 -83 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.282)  
 
During the period under review, the number of patents granted by the USPTO increased. In FY2017, 
it granted a total of 315,367 utility patents, up from 304,568 in FY2016.  
 
82. Does this figure also reflect provisional applications for patents?  
 
RESPONSE: No, provisional patent applications are a utomatically abandoned after 12 months 
by operation of law, 35 USC § 111(b). They do not result in granted/issued patents. However, 
the USPTO does track the number of provisional patent applications filed. See 
2018 USPTO  Performance  and Accountability  Report, p. 178, at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/USPTOFY18PAR.pdf . 
 
83. If not, how many provisional applications for patents were granted during this repor ting period?  
 
RESPONSE: No provisional applications were granted during the reporting period. Provisional 
patent applications do not result in granted/issued patents.  
 
Questions 84 -85 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.292)  
 
The USPTO's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) amended Rules of Practice in Trademark 
Cases became effective in January 2017. This is the first amendment to the rules since 2007, and 
aims at streamlining trial proceedings by promoting the efficient an d cost -effective use of resources 
of both the Board and the parties to the proceedings.  
 
84. Following the updates to the Rules of Practice, has the U.S. witnessed efficiencies in trial 
proceedings and if so, what kind of efficiencies?  
 
RESPONSE: In FY2018 (O ctober 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018), the TTAB attained reductions 
in average overall processing times for appeal cases, trial cases, and Accelerated Case Resolution 
(ACR) trial cases. For appeal cases, the TTAB has reduced overall average processing time  for 
appeals for six consecutive fiscal years. For trial cases, the TTAB realized reductions in this 
measure of overall trial pendency for five consecutive years through FY2016, and barely missed 
a sixth consecutive reduction for FY2017. The decline in ove rall pendency resumed in FY2018.  
 
Apart from leveraging ACR -type efficiencies into the rules, the 2017 Rules changes also more 
clearly defined the time frames within which parties must take certain actions or complete certain 
activities. For example, disco very requests now must be served earlier, so that discovery is 
completed within the discovery period; and discovery disputes and motions for summary 
judgment now must be filed and resolved prior the service of the parties' pretrial disclosures, so 
that all  such motions are resolved prior to entry by the parties into the trial preparation and 
planning phase. While a few parties have been slow to comprehend the significance of these 
changes, for the most part the new time constraints have been easily complied  with. These also 
contribute to more efficient proceedings.  
 
85. Are there best practices that can be shared from the process to amend the Rules and results of 
such amendments?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 46 - 
 
  RESPONSE: The TTAB has found that open discussions with stakeholder groups well in advance 
of issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) facilitates the rulemaking process. 
Stakeholder IP groups, having been involved in lengthy discussions of rules changes under 
consideration are able to provide reaction and input that can help frame  the NPRM, so that few 
of the proposals are considered surprises.  
 
Question 86  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.293)  
 
The average pendency time for processing a new trademark application in FY2017 was 9.5 months.  
 
86. How does this pendency time compare t o previous years?  
 
RESPONSE: At the end of FY2018, the average number of days from filing to registration, notice 
of allowance, or abandonment was 9.6 months (excluding suspended and inter partes 
proceedings).  This is similar to previous years: FY2014 - 9.8 months; FY2015 - 10.1 months; 
FY2016 - 9.8 months; FY2017 - 9.5 months.  
 
Question 87  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.300)  
 
The Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 expanded the scope of the Economic Espionage 
Act (EEA), so that it now applies to products or services that are used or intended for use in interstate 
or foreign commerce. The EEA has extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases where the offender is a U.S. 
citizen or permanent resident, or if the offender is an organization organi zed under the laws of the 
United States or any U.S. state, or if the offense was committed in the United States.  
 
87. Can the U.S. provide additional background on how the courts have applied "extraterritorial 
jurisdiction" under the EEA?  
 
RESPONSE: Although t here is a general presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
criminal statutes in the absence of clear Congressional intent, the EEA's jurisdictional language 
clearly applies to conduct outside the United States. Pursuant to the EEA, the stat ute may be 
applied to conduct occurring outside the United States if the offender is a U.S. legal or natural 
person, or if "an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States." (18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1837.) It is not necessary for the entire offense to be completed within the United 
States; it is sufficient that any act furthering the offense was committed in the United States.  
 
Questions 88 -89 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (Table 3.30)  
 
Table 3.30 includes main amendments to t he US Copyright Act since 1995. In addition to those 
listed, this year Congress has passed the Copyright Music Modernization Act  and the Marrakesh 
Treaty Implementation A ct. 
 
88. What is the strategy and timeline for implementation for both of these Acts?  
 
RESPONSE: The Orrin G. Hatch -Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act is effective as of October 
11, 2018. The Copyright Office has begun implementation of the Act. All inform ation about 
implementation status is available on the U.S. Copyright  Office website  at: 
https://www.copyright.gov/music -modernization/ . 
 
The Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act  was signed into law on October 10, 2018. That 
legislation amended Section 121 of the Copyright Act and added a new Section 121A. These 
amendments conclude the necessary amendment to U.S. law; the United States government is 
working toward depositing its instrument with WIPO to join the treaty. The Copyright Office  
website  contains the text of the law (https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/2018_marrakesh_ 
amendments.pdf ), the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, and other documents at: 
https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/ . The Office also has dev eloped a document on Frequently 
Asked Questions,  available  at that site as well as at: https://ww w.copyright.gov/legislation/ 
2018_marrakesh_faqs.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  89. How will foreign mechanical rights administrators be implicated by the CMMA and what 
opportunities will there be for foreign rights holders to engage in the implementation process?  
 
RESPONSE: There will be a new Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC) through which foreign 
rights administrators may enter into reciprocal agreements. The U.S. Copyright Office will initiate 
a public notice and inquiry to designate the entity that will serve as the Mechani cal Licensing 
Collective. This rulemaking will be noticed in the Federal Register and will be open to public 
comments.  
 
Question 90  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.312)  
 
Under Section 1201 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code, the Copyright Office conducts a public rulemaking 
every three years so it can advise the Librarian of Congress on any proposed exemptions to the 
prohibition of circumventing technological protection measures . Petitioners submit evidence and 
arguments for the Copyright Office to consider when evaluating whether to recommend an 
exemption to the Librarian. The rulemaking has several phases: the petition phase, the public 
comment phase, which has multiple rounds,  and the public hearings phase.  
 
90. What criteria are used to assess whether to provide for an exemption?  
 
RESPONSE: The criteria for assessing whether to provide for an exemption are found in Section 
1201 of Title 17 of the United States Code. More informati on on the rulemaking, including the 
Acting Register's recommendation and the Librarian's Final Rule in the Seventh Triennial Section 
1201 proceeding, which was recently concluded in late October 2018, can be found on the U.S. 
Copyright Office website at: https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/ . 
 
Question 91  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.315)  
 
The USDOC's Internet Policy Task Force issued a comprehensive Green Paper on "Copyright Policy, 
Creativity, a nd Innovation in the Digital Economy" in 2013, and a follow -on White Paper on "Remixes, 
First Sale, and Statutory Damages in 2016."  
 
91. What is the status of the recommendations contained in both the Green Paper and the White 
Paper?  
 
RESPONSE: The Orrin G. Ha tch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act of 2018 implemented 
one of the Green Paper recommendations, which was to reform "music licensing, with a particular 
focus on the mechanical license for musical compositions." Copyright Policy, Creativity, and 
Innov ation in the Digital Economy  (2013), at 100. The White Paper's recommendations have 
been sent to Congress but have not yet been taken up.  
 
Questions 92 -94 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.318)  
 
The U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Committee (IPE C) has an IP Strategy that calls for the 
coordinated participation of a broad range of Executive Branch agencies and departments. Its 
strategic approach has four parts, including engagement with U.S. trading partners.  
 
92. What is the process for engaging with  U.S. trade partners?  
 
RESPONSE: The process for engaging with U.S. trade partners depends on the particular 
engagement. Examples of such engagements may be found in the "Annual Intellectual 
Property  Report  to Congress"  available  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2
017/11/2018Annual_IPEC_Report_to_Congress.pdf . 
 
93. How frequently does this engagement take place?  
 
RESPONSE: Engagement with trading partners takes place in preparation for and during 
regularly scheduled meetings, events, and discussions or on an as -needed basis.  Examples of 
such engagements may be found in the "Annual Intellectual Property Report to Congress" WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  available  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2017/11/2018Annual_IPEC_ 
Report_to_Congress.pdf . 
 
94. Is there a specific trigger that initiates the engagement process?  
 
RESPONSE: Engagement with trading partners takes place in preparation for and during 
regularly scheduled meetings, events, and discussions, or on an as -needed basis.  There is no 
specific trigger to initiate the process.  
 
Question 95  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.324)  
 
In FY 2017, the number of intellectual property rights seizures increased 8% to 34,143, from 31,560 
in FY2016.  
 
95. What factors have led to this increase?  
 
RESPONSE: The steady increase in e -commerce and  small package shipments has led to the 
increase in the overall IPR seizure numbe rs over the past several years. In FY 2017, 
approximately 89% of all IPR seizures pertained to international mail or express consignment  
shipments.  More information about the FY 2017 DHS IPR seizure statistics can be found on the 
CBP gov. website  at: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority -issues/ipr/statistics . 
 
Question 96  
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights ( 3.326)  
 
In FY2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 
initiated 713 IP investigations, arrested 457 individuals, obtained 288 indictments, and received 240 
convictions related to IP crimes.  
 
96. What are the noti ceable trends regarding the types or circumstances of indictments and 
convictions?  
 
RESPONSE: In FY17, HSI had an increase over FY16 in the number of investigations initiated 
in areas such as counterfeit pharmaceuticals an d counterfeit automotive goods. Arrests and 
indictments also increased fr om FY16 to FY17 in these areas. Active engagement by industry 
and law enforcement partners was one of the key contributors to this success.  
 
Questions 97 -100 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights (3.337)  
 
Between 1 January 2016 and 23 May 2018, 182 new Section 337 complaints were received by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission, and 127 investigations were instituted. The majority of the 
cases (87% in 2017) dealt with patent infringement, and given a few  cases dealt with copyright, 
trade secrets and trademarks with several intellectual property rights combined. Investigations 
covered products from 37 trading partners and from the United States.  
 
97. Can the U.S. provide additional background on the investigat ions covering products from the 
United States?  
 
RESPONSE: As an initial matter, the United States observes inaccuracies in some of the 
information provided above and implicit in some of the questions that follow.  First, during the 
time period January 1, 20 16 through May 23, 2018, the Commission received 140 violation 
complaints, and instituted 133  new violation investigations. Second, section 337 violatio n 
matters address articles imported into the United States. More information can be found at: 
https://pubapps2.usitc.gov/337external/ . 
 
98. What percentage of investigations are covering products from the U.S. or U.S. companies?  
 
RESPONSE: As noted, section 337 addresses articles imported into the U nited States.  For 
information on the location of companies associated with imported articles subject to section 
337 investigations, please refer to: https://pubapps2.usitc.gov/337external/ . WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  99. Is the leg al test for obtaining an exclusion order the same as obtaining an injunction at the 
federal court?  
 
RESPONSE: The referenced standards are addressed in 19 U.S.C. § 1337, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange , L.L.C., (U.S. 2006), and Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.  (Fed. Cir 2014).  
 
100.  Can foreign businesses file a complaint alleging a violation of section 337 with the USITC? If 
so, what percentage of complaints were from non -US businesses?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, foreign businesses can file a complaint alleging a violation of secti on 337 with 
the USITC . For percentages pertaining to any particular  time period,  please refer to: 
https://pubapps2.usitc.gov/337external/ . 
 
Question 101  
4.1.2 Agriculture – Major support programmes (4.9)  
 
In July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its intention to provide a short -term aid 
package designed to assist agricultural producers with market disruptions caused by retaliatory 
tariffs. The Secretariat report s that "In July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its 
intention to provide a short -term aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with market 
disruptions caused by retaliatory tariffs." Canada notes that, in the September 2018 press  release 
titled, " USDA Launches Trade Mitigation Programs", some details are included in the Market 
Facilitation Program section as to which commodities are covered as well as their respective Initial 
Payment Rate and Estimate Initial Payment. However, sin ce the press release, limited information 
has been shared regarding the actual payments made to date.  
 
101.  Could the U.S. detail the payments that have been made under the Market Facilitation 
Program, by commodity, since the launch of the Trade Mitigation Pro grams?  
 
RESPONSE: Final data on payments under the Market Facilitation Program will not be availab le 
until after enrol ment closes in 2019. As of the end of November 2018, $1.4 billion had been 
paid. 
 
Question 102  
4.1.3 Agriculture – Trade measures (4.45)  
 
The Secretariat reports that the maximum credit term for the Export Credit Guarantee Program 
(GSM -102) for agricultural commodities is 18 months, but that the limit may vary according to the 
obligor country.  
 
102.  Could the U.S. provide the average credit ter m under the Export Credit Guarantee Program 
(GSM -102) for agricultural commodities?  
 
RESPONSE: As reported by the United States in G/AG/W/125/Rev.8/Add.2 dated 24 April 2018, 
for U.S. fiscal year 2017, the average repayment period for the GSM -102 program was 12.4 
months.  The United States will provide updated information in its response to the next export 
competition questionnaire to Members in accordance with the terms of the Annex of the Nairobi 
Decision.  
 
Question 103  
4.2.2 Energy – Crude Oil (4.58)  
 
The Secretariat report notes that "Federal and state agencies manage a range of incentives, notably 
tax credits, to encourage investment in renewable energy."  
 
103.  Could the U.S. please provide more information on which federal and state agencies manage 
which i ncentives, and also provide more details on the incentives available, including but not 
limited to tax credits?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see pages 14 -18 in the U.S. Energy Information Administration's "Direct 
Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016," WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  publish ed in April 2018,  available  at: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsi
dy.pdf . 
 
Also, the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) provides a list of 
state-level incentives and is available at: http://www.dsireusa.org/ . 
 
Question 104  
4.4.1 Financial Services (4.94)  
 
Referring to the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCP Act), 
the Secretariat report states that "the most note worthy changes include: allowing banks with 
between US$50 billion and US$250 billion in assets to be run with less regulatory oversight […] 
[and] requiring the Federal Reserve to tailor regulations with respect to bank size rather than "one 
size fits all" […] (Table 4.8)".  
 
104.  Responding to the legislative direction contained in the EGRRCP Act, U.S. regulatory agencies 
recently proposed (October 31, 2018) a new tiered financial framework applicable to 
domestically owned U.S. banks. Proposed changes would more closely match regulations and 
compliance requirements for large banking organizations with their risk profiles. Regulators 
have committed to putting forward a separate tailored proposal covering foreign owned U.S. 
banks. Could the U.S. provide details with  regards to the timing of the release, or the specifics 
on how new rules would apply similarly or differently to foreign banks?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The United States will 
make such information publicly ava ilable at the appropriate time.  
 
Question 105  
4.4.6.2.3 Maritime Transport, Port Services and Shipbuilding – Shipbuilding and Ship Repairs (4.248)  
 
Under U.S. law, only U.S. -built ships qualify for domestic service; the U.S. was granted an exemption 
from GATT r ules for measures prohibiting the use, sale, or lease of foreign -built or foreign -
reconstructed vessels in commercial application between points in national waters or the waters of 
an exclusive economic zone.  
 
105.  Could the U.S. explain what constitutes foreig n reconstruction of a vessel? For example, what 
percentage of the vessel is reconstructed outside of the U.S. in order to qualify as being foreign -
reconstructed? ). 
 
RESPONSE:  For definitions  of U.S.-built vessels,  please  see 46 CFR 67.97:  https://www.gpo.g
ov/fdsys/granule/CFR -2009-title46 -vol2/CFR -2009-title46 -vol2-sec67 -97. 
 
For definitions of what constitutes foreign rebuilding of U.S. vessels, please se e 46 CFR 
67.177:  https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?packageId=CFR -2005-title46 -
vol2&granuleId=CFR -2005-title46 -vol2-sec67 -177&collectionCode=CFR&browsePath=Title+ 
46%2FChapter+I%2FSubchapter+G%2FPart+67%2FSubpart+M%2FSection+67.177&collapse
=true&fromBrowse=true . 
 
1  PART II: QUESTIONS R EGARDING THE GOVERNM ENT REPORT  (WT/TPR/G/382)  
Questions 106 -107 
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.8)  
 
The report states:  
"The United States wants to help build a better multilateral trading system and will remain 
active in the WTO. […] The United States will not allow any multilateral organization to prevent 
us from taking actions that are essential to th e economic well -being of the American people."  
 
106.  In the view of the U.S., what would constitute a better multilateral trading system?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has been concerned for a long time that the WTO is not operating 
as the contracting parties en visioned. To remain a viable institution that can fulfill all facets of 
its work, the WTO must find a means of achieving trade liberalization, must adapt to address WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  the challenges faced by traders today, including the market distortions and unfair trade pr actices 
of non -market economies, and must ensure that the flexibilities a country may avail itself of are 
commensurate to that country's role in the global economy.  
 
107.  In the view of the U.S., what is the appropriate role of the WTO in the multilateral tradi ng 
system?  
 
RESPONSE: The WTO is rooted in fundamental principles of market access, non -discrimination, 
reciprocity, fairness, and transparency. It is intended to be a Member -driven organization that 
should perform or fail based on the choices made by its Members. The WTO's committee system 
is intended to advance transparency and predictability in global trade rules, to provide a platform 
to encourage non -complying economies to bring measures into compliance with WTO rules, and 
to avert the need to resort t o dispute settlement. The WTO's negotiating arm is intended to be 
a venue for Members to reach agreements on issues of critical importance to the global economy, 
such as fishery subsidies and digital trade. The WTO's dispute settlement system is intended t o 
respect WTO rules as written and agreed by WTO Members.  
 
Question 108  
3 Openness and Accountability: Building Support for Trade (3.20)  
 
108.  Could the U.S. describe how the USTR ensures that the views of stakeholders and partners 
generally underrepresented in trade (e.g. women, immigrants, Indigenous peoples, SMEs) are 
taken into account during trade consultations and, in turn, inform U.S. trad e policy?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Government invites all stakeholders, foreign and domestic, to provide 
their views on U.S. trade policy through testimony at public hearings or in response to Federal 
Register Notices requesting submission of comments.  
 
Questions 109 -110 
6 Trade and Environment (6.3)  
 
The report states:  
"[…] the United States used a unique monitoring tool under our bilateral trade agreement with 
Peru in 2016 to verify that a particular timber shipment exported from Peru to the United 
States complied with all Peruvian laws and regulations. Following issuance of this verification 
report, which revealed significant levels of illegally harvested timber in that shipment, Peru 
agreed to undertake various reforms to address ongoing challenges of  illegal logging. In 2017, 
the United States determined that Peru had made insufficient progress in implementing these 
agreed upon and necessary reforms, and on October 10, 2017, USTR took unprecedented 
action by instructing the U.S. Customs and Border Pro tection (CBP) to deny entry of future 
timber shipments from the Peruvian exporter subject to the 2016 verification request. In 
February 2018, the United States requested that Peru conduct a second timber verification, 
this time of three separate timber shi pments exported from Peru to the United States. Peru's 
investigation could not establish that one of the shipments was compliant with Peru's laws, 
regulations, and other measures on the harvest and trade of timber products. The United 
States will continue to engage with Peru to address remaining challenges to combating illegal 
logging highlighted by the verification."  
 
109.  Could the U.S. clarify the circumstances that led to its seeking of the verifications?  
 
RESPONSE: The 2016 verification request was made fo llowing public reports that timber 
shipments by the Peruvian exporter subject to the verification request may have contained 
illegally harvested timber. The second request was made to test the integrity of Peru's system 
based on on -going concerns by the Un ited States Government about the practice of illegal 
logging in Peru and to monitor the impact of reforms that Peru had undertaken since the 2016 
verification request.  
 
110.  Could the U.S. provide further information on the resources required, in terms of perso nnel 
and time, in order to implement the provisions of the Annex on Forest Sector Governance in the 
Environment Chapter of the U.S. -Peru bilateral trade agreement?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: Implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of U.S. trade agreements is a top 
priority for the Trump Administration.  Multiple U.S. Government agencies support 
implementation of the Annex on Forest Sector Governance (Forest Annex) under the United 
States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. For example, the Interagency Committee on Trade 
in Timber Products from Peru, which is charged with overseeing implementation of the Forest 
Annex, includes representatives from seven different agencies who all have staff that participate 
to a varying degree in overseeing implementation of the Annex.  In addition, staff from several 
U.S. Government agencies are involved in supporting and overseeing technical cooperation to 
support implementation of the Forest Annex.   
 
Questions 111 -112 
8 Small and Medium -Sized Business Trade (8.1)  
 
The report notes that the  USTR has implemented a Small Business Initiative to increase exports 
opportunities for U.S. SMEs and to expand efforts to address SMEs' export challenges and priorities 
in trade policy and enforcement activities.  
 
111.  Has the USTR's Small Business Initiative  had a demonstrable impact on U.S. SMEs in 
addressing their capacity to export?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. small businesses are key engines for economic growth, jobs, and innovation. 
USTR has implemented a Small Business Initiative to increase export opportunities fo r U.S. small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and has expanded efforts to address the specific export 
challenges and priorities of SMEs and their workers in our trade policy and enforcement activities. 
Tariff barriers, burdensome customs procedures, di scriminatory or arbitrary standards, lack of 
transparency relating to relevant regulations, and insufficient IPR protection in foreign markets 
present particular challenges for our SMEs in selling abroad. Under the SME Initiative, USTR's 
small business off ice, regional offices, and functional offices are pursuing initiatives and 
advancing efforts to address these issues. USTR also works closely with the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA), the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Agriculture , and 
other agencies to help provide U.S. SMEs information and counselling on specific export 
opportunities.  
 
112.  In which markets did this initiative focus its efforts on behalf of SMEs, and what was the 
rationale for targeting these specific markets?  
 
RESPON SE: U.S. trade agreements, as well as other trade dialogues and fora, provide a critical 
opportunity to address specific concerns of U.S. SMEs and facilitate their participation in export 
markets. For example, the USMCA includes a small and medium enterpri se chapter with 
provisions to help ensure that small businesses have the online information tools and resources 
they need to navigate the Canadian and Mexican markets and to ensure that the Agreement is 
working for small business as it is implemented. The United States -UK Trade and Investment 
Working Group, launched in 2017 to explore ways to strengthen trade and investment ties and 
provide commercial continuity for U.S. and UK businesses, workers, and consumers, covers a 
range of topics including SMEs. Giv en the significance of small businesses to both economies, 
the U.S. and UK agreed to establish a U.S. -UK Small and Medium -sized Enterprise Dialogue in 
2018, to promote closer collaboration and the sharing of best practices on policies and programs 
to suppo rt SME businesses and export opportunities in each country's market. The United States 
and EU continue to collaborate on small business issues in the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(TEC), with the ongoing US -EU Small and Medium Enterprise Workshops held in  2017 in Wichita, 
Kansas and in 2018 in Vienna, Austria.  
 
Question 113  
8 Small and Medium -Sized Business Trade (8.4)  
 
The United States –Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA) includes a SME chapter that the U.S. 
indicates is intended to help ensure that the Agree ment benefits SMEs.  
 
113.  What actions does the U.S. intend to undertake in order to help ensure that the USMCA 
benefits SMEs?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: The United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement (USMCA) recognizes the 
fundamental role of small and medium -sized enterpris es (SMEs) as engines of the North 
American economy. Mexico and Canada are the top two export destinations for U.S. SME goods. 
In 2016 (latest data available), 82,000 U.S. small and medium sized businesses exported $51.2 
billion in goods to Canada, and 53,0 00 U.S. small and medium businesses exported $76.2 billion 
in goods to Mexico. The USMCA includes a dedicated chapter on SMEs, as well as other key 
provisions supporting small and medium -sized businesses throughout the Agreement. The 
chapter promotes coope ration between the Parties to increase SME trade and investment 
opportunities. It establishes information -sharing tools that will help SMEs better understand the 
benefits of the Agreement and provides other information useful for SMEs doing business in the  
region. The chapter also establishes a committee on SME issues comprised of government 
officials from each country. Furthermore, the chapter launches a new framework for an ongoing 
SME Dialogue, which will be open to participation by SMEs, including those  owned by diverse 
and under -represented groups. The Dialogue will enable participants to provide views and 
information to government officials on the implementation and further modernization of the 
Agreement, thereby ensuring that SMEs continue to benefit.  
 
Question 114  
8 Small and Medium -Sized Business Trade (8.5)  
 
The U.S. and the United Kingdom launched the U.S. -UK Trade and Investment Working Group in 
2017 to explore ways to strengthen bilateral trade and investment ties, and subsequently launched 
an ongoing U.S. -UK SME Dialogue in 2018 to promote closer collaboration and the sharing of best 
practices on policies and programs that support SME businesses and export opportunities in each 
country.  
 
114.  What best practices can be shared from the U.S. -UK SME Di alogue, and has this collaboration 
had a demonstrable impact on U.S. SMEs' ability to export?  
 
RESPONSE: Launched in 2018 under the auspices of the U.S. -UK Trade and Investment Working 
Group, the ongoing US -UK SME Dialogues have brought together hundreds of U.S. and UK SMEs 
with government officials from both countries to discuss ways to deepen trade and investment 
and enhance SME cooperation, identify resources currently available from both governments to 
assist SMEs, and hear from SMEs on their specific challenges and opportunities when trading 
bilaterally.  At the SME Dialogues which took place in Washington D.C., London, and New York 
City, the U.S. and UK governments jointly released the guide "Doing Business in the U.S. and 
UK: Resources for Small Busin ess," found at:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/ 
Releases/final final compressed smallSMEDoing Bu sinessUSandUK.pdf . The guide is a key tool 
for SMEs seeking to benefit from  U.S-UK trade.  The U.S. and UK also released IP toolkits for 
SMEs, found at: https://www.uspto.gov/IPToolkit , and E-Commerce  resource  guides  for SMEs 
at the SME Dialogues,  found  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/IssueAreas/Small -Business/ 
eCommerce_Guide_for_ US_Small_Business.pdf . 
 
Question 115  
8 Small and Medium -Sized Business Trade (8.8)  
 
The U.S. posits that "In the WTO context, USTR is exploring the development of further work with 
other WTO Members on issues of interest to SME stakeholders".  
 
115.  What are the  steps being taken by the U.S. to enhance commercial opportunities for SMEs 
owned by diverse and under -represented groups, such as indigenous peoples, women, youth 
and minorities?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Small Business Administration's Women's Business Centers  (WBCs) 
represent a national network of over 100 educational centers throughout the United States and 
its territories, which are designed to assist women in starting and growing small businesses. 
WBCs seek to "level the playing field" for women entrepreneu rs, who still face unique obstacles 
in the business world.  
 
SBA's Office of Women's Business Ownership (OWBO) oversees the WBC network, which 
provides entrepreneurs (especially women who are economically or socially disadvantaged) 
comprehensive training an d counsel ling on a variety of topics in several languages.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 54 - 
 
  The Department of Commerce's Minority Business Development Agency promotes the growth of 
minority -owned business through public and private sector programs, policy, and research, 
including access t o business experts counse lling. The Centers are located in areas with the 
largest concentration of minority populations and the largest number of minority businesses.  
 
2  PART III: OTHER QUES TIONS  
Questions 116 -117 
Patent litigation venue shopping  
Canada is concerned with the issue of venue shopping in patent infringement lawsuits in the U.S. 
Owing to the Supreme Court ruling in the TC Heartland  case in 2017, U.S. domestic defendants may 
now only be sued (i) where they are incorporated or (ii) where  they have an established place of 
business and where acts of infringement were committed (see 28 U.S.C. §1400(b)). However, 
foreign defendants with no subsidiary or place of business in the U.S., including Canadian businesses, 
do not enjoy that same prote ction and may be sued in any judicial district (see 28 U.S.C. 
§1391(c)(3); TC Heartland  at footnote 2; and Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries , 406 
U.S. 706). This differential treatment between U.S. and foreign businesses creates an un -level 
playing field and uncertainty for foreign defendants, as the ruling protects domestic defendants 
against a plaintiff's choice of venue while explicitly denying a similar protection to foreign based 
defendants.  
 
116.  Can the U.S. confirm that the TC Heartland  decisio n had no effect on preventing non -US based 
defendants from being sued in the jurisdiction of the plaintiff's choice, and that Brunette  (along 
with 28 U.S.C. §1391(c)(3)) still governs the law of venue for patent defendants?  
 
RESPONSE: Under U.S. law, a def endant not resident in the United States may be sued in any 
judicial district. This is a general rule and not specific to patent law. In re HTC Corp.  (Fed. Cir. 
2018). As Canada notes, this long -established rule was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1972 
in Brunette. Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries  (1972).  
 
117.  Can the U.S. confirm whether subsequent judicial decisions have had a bearing on the law of 
venue for foreign patent defendants?  
 
RESPONSE: TC Heartland cited to Brunette at footnote 2.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Chile  
Part I: Questions from the Secretariat's Report: WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1 -4 
Section 1.3.2 Trends and patterns in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Chart 1.7; 1.35; 1.37; 1.38)  
 
Chart 1.7, Foreign Direct Investment into the United States, 2008 -17 (p. 31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Chart 1.7 shows a decline during year 2017 in the Foreign Direct Investment into the United 
States. Regarding this information, Chile would be thankful if the USA could point out the main 
reasons identified for this decline in Foreign Direct Investment.  
 
RESPONSE: Foreign Direct Investment into the United States was at record levels in 2015 and 
2016. In 2017, inflows returned toward average levels seen over the last decade. This decline 
toward lower levels also follows trends se en in global foreign direct investment, after specific 
deals and corporate restructurings inflated 2016 numbers.  
 
FDI into the United States is highly concentrated with respect to origin. The EU -28 is responsible for 
59% of the FDI stock in the United Stat es, followed by Japan (12%), Canada (11%), and Switzerland 
(8%) (Chart 1.8). However, in terms of growth, the rising amount of investment from Asian 
economies such as China and Singapore has been particularly high in recent years.  
 
2. Paragraph 1.35 highlight s that, in terms of growth, there is a rising amount of investment from 
Asian economies such as China and Singapore, particularly high in recent years. In the context 
of this trend, Chile would be thankful if the USA could indicate the policies developed b y the 
government in order to successfully attract investment from the Asian region.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. maintains an open and market -driven economic system based on the rule 
of law, which welcomes foreign investment into the U.S. economy. This system and t he strength 
of the U.S. economy have made the United States the largest destination for FDI in the world.  
 
The United States continues to be the largest foreign investor abroad. On a historical cost basis, the 
stock of outward FDI was US$5.3 trillion in 20 16. Nearly 54% of this was invested in the EU -28, 
followed by Canada (7%), Bermuda (6%), British Caribbean islands (6%), and Singapore (5%). 
Furthermore, 96% of this outward FDI stock comprised of reinvested earnings, 10% of equity capital 
and -5.8% of int ercompany debt (payments to the United States). More than half of outward FDI is 
WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  invested in holding companies; around 12% of the total in the financial sector, and 13% in 
manufacturing.  
 
3. Paragraph 1.37 points out that nearly 54% of the stock of outward FDI was invested in the EU -
28, followed by Canada (7%), Bermuda (6%), British Caribbean islands (6%), and Singapore 
(5%). Regarding this information, Chile would be thankful if the USA could comment regarding 
the nature of the sectors in which these invest ments are done in the main outward FDI receiving 
countries.  
 
RESPONSE: As the question indicated, over half of U.S. outward FDI is in holding companies. 
This trend holds true for investment in many specific economies including the European Union, 
Bermuda, and Singapore. U.S. FDI in Canada is led by manufacturing and followed by holding 
companies. Together, these industries represent 54% of U.S. FDI in Canada. Public data on the 
sectors for which U.S. FDI is concentrated for the British Caribbean Islands is not available. The 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis provides more detail on the breakdown of US FDI abroad at 
www.bea.gov . 
 
The effect of U.S. direct investment abroad on U.S. workers and wages was addressed in a recent 
report to Congress. The report shows that 74% of the accumulated U.S. FDI abroad is concentrated 
in high -income developed countries, and, in recent years, the share of investment going to 
developing countries has fallen. Evidence also shows that U.S. firms invest abroad to serve the 
foreign local market rather than to produce goods to export back to the United States.  
 
4. Paragraph 1.38 indicates that 74% of the accumulated U.S. FDI abroad is concentrated in high -
income developed countries, and, in recent years , the share of investment going to developing 
countries has fallen. In this context, Chile would be thankful if the USA could comment on the 
reasons observed for this decline in developing countries´ investments.  
 
RESPONSE: Over the last few decades, U.S. investment abroad has shifted from extractive, 
processing, and manufacturing industries toward high technology services and financial 
industries. As a result, U.S. direct investment abroad focused less in developing countries and 
more in developed countrie s with advanced infrastructure and communications systems.  
 
Questions 5 -8 
Section 3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures (3.70; 3.71; 3.73; 3.77)  
 
AD and CVD investigations may be suspended under some circumstances, based on an agreement 
to cease  exports, or to eliminate the injurious effect (suspension agreements). These agreements 
are generally voluntary limits on exports or price undertakings, or involve the elimination of subsidies 
by the investigated countries. In the case of AD investigation s, under suspension agreements, 
exporters may agree to accept price undertakings or to cease exports. AD suspension agreements 
reached with non -market economies (NMEs) may combine price undertakings and additional 
elements, in order to prevent price suppre ssion or undercutting. In CVD cases, a suspension 
agreement may be reached if the Government alleged to be providing the subsidy agrees to eliminate 
the subsidy, to completely offset the net subsidy, or to cease or limit exports to the United States. 
Suspe nsion agreements entered into with a WTO Member considered a market economy may involve 
only price undertakings in the case of AD investigations. Agreements with respect to CVD 
investigations may also involve quantitative restrictions.  
 
5. Chile would be tha nkful if the USA could provide further information regarding the suspension 
agreements mentioned in the paragraph 3.70, especially in relation with the requirements for 
the cease of exports.  
 
RESPONSE: Under 19 U.S.C. section 1673c(l), the U.S. Department of Commerce can suspend 
an antidumping duty investigation in favo ur of an agreement with a non -market economy 
country where the agreement will prevent suppression or undercutting of the prices of domestic 
products . Thus, with respect to a non -market econom y, the U.S. Department of Commerce may 
enter into a suspension agreement with the foreign government that contains a pricing 
mechanism, in addition to other elements.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Administrative reviews of CVD and AD orders in effect each year may be requested by inte rested 
parties during the anniversary month of the publication of the order. The list of orders eligible for 
review is published in the Federal Register. An interested party must specify the individual producers 
or exporters covered by the order or suspens ion agreement for which they are requesting a review, 
and the basis for the request. In a review of a suspension agreement, the USDOC reviews the current 
status of, and compliance with, the agreement. In administrative reviews of AD/CVD orders, the 
USDOC e xamines a particular company's entries, exports, or sales made 12 months immediately 
preceding the anniversary month in which the review was requested (review period). The review 
determines the actual weighted -average amount of dumping/subsidy and duty ass essments for that 
period, and the future cash deposit rate. If no review is requested for a particular 12 -month period, 
final duties are assessed in the amount deposited for that period. Requests for duty absorption 
rulings may also be made in administrati ve reviews, but only for those initiated two or four years 
after publication of the AD order. The results of the reviews are normally issued within 12 months 
from the date of initiation.  
 
6. Chile would appreciate if the USA could explain the concept of "dut y absorption rulings", in the 
context of Administrative reviews of CVD and AD orders.  
 
RESPONSE: Details regarding the conduct of duty absorption reviews can be found in the U.S. 
regulations at 19 C.F.R. section 351.213(j). Detailed information regarding duty absorption 
determinations made in specific antidumping or countervailing duty proceedings can  be found 
at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Sunset reviews are order -specific (country - and product -specific) but may be grouped in an 
investigation; suspension agreements are also subject to suns et review. In its determination of 
whether revocation of an order or termination of a suspended investigation would likely lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping, the USDOC considers the rates established in the 
investigation and/or reviews conducte d during the sunset review period, as well as the volume of 
imports for the periods before and after issuance of the order or acceptance of the suspension 
agreement. There are no sunset reviews for AD orders on products from non -WTO Members.  
 
7. Paragraph 3.7 3 mentions that non -WTO Members AD measures (orders) would not be subject 
to sunset reviews. In this regard, Chile would be thankful if the USA could clarify if there is some 
alternative procedure to the sunset reviews for AD orders on products from non -WTO Members.  
 
RESPONSE: The provisions relating to the conduct of a sunset review of an AD measure are 
contained in Article 11 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and are therefore not applicabl e to measures on exports 
from a non -Member country.  
 
Of the 333 AD measures in place (excluding suspension agreements) at 17 July 2018, 215 had been 
renewed after a sunset review, that is, they had been in place for over five years. The average 
duration of  an AD measure in place at the end of 2017 was some 11 years. At the end of 2017, 61 
AD and 5 CVD measures had been in place for more than 20 years; and 159 AD and 14 CVD measures 
had been in place for over 10 years. The longest -lasting AD measure in place  dates from 1977, and 
is applied on pressure sensitive plastic tape from Italy; a measure on pre -stressed concrete steel 
wire strand from Japan dates from 1978.  
 
8. Considering that more than 60% of AD measures in place by mid -2018 are the result of their 
renewal after a sunset review, Chile would be thankful if the USA could point out if it is 
considering amending its rules regarding these proceedings.  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  The United States will 
promptly notify changes to its AD/CVD law to the appropriate WTO committee.  
 
Questions 9 -10 
Section 4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.132; 4.138)  
 
In its latest (2017) report, "Measuring the Information Society", the ITU noted the high level of 
penetration and competitive tarif fs of the U.S. telecommunications market. The ITU also highlighted 
that operators are engaged in upgrading technology, and that the 5G service is expected to be WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  available beginning in 2019. The report also notes that fixed broadband is an affordable and fa st 
service, but that challenges remain with respect to the provision of high -speed broadband to rural 
areas. The report recognizes the role played by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 
the development of the sector.  
 
9. Paragraph 4.132 indicates t hat challenges remain with respect to the provision of high -speed 
broadband to rural areas. The cited report recognizes the role played by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in the development of the sector. Regarding this issue, Chile 
would be th ankful if the USA can comment if it has some project or program that promotes the 
rural connectivity. If there is such program, Chile would be thankful if the USA can share details 
about it.  
 
RESPONSE: Many actions by the FCC are designed with promoting ru ral connectivity in mind, 
from removing barriers to infrastructure investment to promoting innovative satellite and 5G 
technologies. Where the business case for broadband deployment does not exist, the FCC has a 
Universal Service Fund with programs for hig h-cost rural areas called the Connect America Fund 
as well as programs for rural healthcare that support telehealth and connectivity to doctors and 
hospitals. More information can be found at the links below:  
 
- https://www.fcc.gov/about -fcc/fcc -initiatives/bridging -digital -divide -all-americans  
- https://www.fcc.gov/general/rural -health -care-program  
- https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman -pai-remarks -international -regulators -forum -
mexico -city 
- https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman -pai-discusses -fccs-telehealth -work-boston -
conference  
 
See also the rural broadband programs administered by the U.S . Department of 
Agriculture:  https://www.rd.usda.gov/programs -services/all -programs/telecom -programs . 
 
The FCC maintains regulatory safeguards to deter conduct by a foreign carrier that could result in 
harm to competition in the U.S. telecommunications market. These safeguards include the "no 
special concessions" rule, the benchmark settlement rates policy,  and dominant carrier 
requirements. Under the no special concessions rule, U.S. international carriers are prohibited from 
agreeing to enter into exclusive arrangements with foreign carriers that have sufficient market power 
to affect competition adversely  in the U.S. market. The Foreign Participation Order adopted a 
presumption that carriers with less than a 50% market share in the foreign market lack such market 
power".  
 
10. Paragraph 4.138 indicates that the FCC maintains regulatory safeguards to deter condu ct by a 
foreign carrier that could result in harm to competition in the U.S. telecommunications market. 
In this context, Chile would be thankful if the USA can further explain the regulatory safeguards, 
specifically to foreign carriers with regards to dete r harm to competition. Are there any similar 
safeguards to domestic carriers?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S.-authorized international telecommunications carriers that are affiliated with a 
carrier possessing market power on the foreign end of a U.S. -international route a re subject to 
the safeguards in section 63.10(c) and (e) of the FCC's rules, 47 CFR § 63.10(c), (e). These 
safeguards apply whether the foreign carrier is U.S. - or foreign -owned. They differ significantly 
from the safeguards the FCC traditionally has impos ed on U.S. carriers regulated as "dominant" 
in the provision of U.S. domestic service because the FCC's domestic rules are generally designed 
to prevent a carrier from raising its prices by restricting its output rather than to prevent a 
carrier from raisi ng its prices by raising its rivals' costs. 47 CFR § 63.10 can b e viewed at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CFR -1999-title47 -vol3/CFR-1999-title47 -vol3-sec63 -
10/content -detail.html . 
 
Question 11  
Section 4.4.3 Postal and courier services (4.165)  
 
The mailbox rule (18 U.S.C. § 1725) prohibits private carriers from delivering mailable matter to 
most types of mail receptacles installed a t residences and businesses, unless postage is paid. The 
mailbox rule applies regardless of content. Private carriers can hang mailable matter on doorknobs, WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  place articles under doors, leave articles in doorways, use receptacles designated for receipt of 
newspapers or circulars, arrange to have the recipient retrieve articles at a designated location, or 
deliver in person to the recipient. Postal regulations also limit access to post office boxes in USPS 
retail units.  
 
11. Paragraph 4.165 explains the prohibition in the mailbox rule for private carriers from delivering 
mailable matter to most types of mail receptacles installed at residences and businesses, unless 
postage is paid. In relation with this information, Chile would be thankful if the USA cou ld further 
explain the rationale behind this rule.  
 
RESPONSE: Congress enacted the statutory mailbox restriction in 1934 to protect the former 
U.S. Post Office Department's revenue and keep unstamped matter out of mailboxes. The law 
was intended to stop bu sinesses, such as utility companies, from delivering or using private 
carriers to deliver mailable matter to mailboxes without paying postage, which reportedly 
deprived the former Post Office Department of considerable revenue.  
 
In a 1981 case before the Supreme Court of the United States (U.S. Postal Service v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), the Postal Service said that in addition to 
protecting revenues, mailbox restriction aided investigations of mail theft, facilitated t he efficient 
and secure delivery of mail, and promoted the privacy of mail patrons. Furthermore, if the 
mailbox restriction were eliminated, the Postal Service argued that letter carriers would have to 
separate unstamped mailable matter from outgoing mail,  which would substantially increase 
delivery costs.  
 
Question 12  
Section 4.4.4 Distribution services (4.185)  
 
Franchising is an important activity in the United States. The USDOC estimates that it accounts for 
50% of all retail sales across 75 industries, and that it is responsible for one in seven jobs in the 
United States.151 The International Franchise Association estimates that there were over 745,000 
franchise businesses directly employing almost 7.9 million people in 2017. The Association's report 
also notes that franchise establishments are set to grow by 1.9% to 759,000 locations in 2018, while 
employment is expected to increase by 3.7% to 8.1 million. The sector's GDP is expected to reach 
US$451 billion, up 6.1% from 2017, representing approximately  3% of nominal GDP.152 The 
United  States is a major net exporter of franchising services. The surplus i n franchise fees reached 
US$5.2  billion in 2017, resulting from exports tota lling US$5,268 million and imports of US$62 
million (Chart 4.14). There is no  publicly available official information on the share of FDI and the 
participation of foreign affiliates in these franchised activities.  
 
12. Paragraph 4.185 indicates that there is no publicly available official information on the share of 
FDI and the participation of foreign affiliates in these franchised activities.  Regarding this issue, 
Chile would be thankful if the USA could share the reasons why there is not such information 
available. In addition, Chile would be thankful if the USA could comment if there are plans to 
make it available in the future . 
 
RESPONSE: There is no publicly available official information on the share of FDI and the 
participation of foreign affiliates into these franchised activities because in the investment 
statistics, fra nchisors and franchisees are classified in the industry of the product or service they 
produce and are not separately identifiable from other companies. The United States does not 
have plans to collect this information in the future.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  China  
PART I. QUEST IONS BASED ON REPORT  BY THE SECRETARIAT (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Question 1  
Summary (1)  
the focus of U.S. trade policy has shifted to adopting policies that are intended to support its national 
security and strengthen its economy.  
 
1. National security is the most basic value pursuit of a country, but its extension and connotation 
cannot be arbitrarily expanded to harm free trade. Please explain the criteria that the U.S. uses 
to measure national security in the fields of trade and investment, and please tell how th e U.S. 
can effectively restrict and prevent the abuse of national security?  
 
RESPONSE: The views of the United States regarding the relationship between U.S. trade policy 
and national security are articulated in the 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual  
Report  of the President  of the United  States  on the Trade  Agreements  Program , available 
at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Pres s/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report
%20FINAL.PDF . 
 
Questions 2 -6 
Summary (3)  
Fiscal policy turned pro -cyclical in 2018, with the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act o f 2018. Tax rates were 
lowered for businesses and individuals: the top corporate tax rate was reduced from 35% to 21%, 
and the tax system was changed from global to territorial. Federal budget deficits are projected to 
continue increasing, from 4.2% of GDP  in 2018 to 5.1% in 2022.  
 
2. What is the consideration for the change of the tax system from global to territorial? How 
specifically does this change take place?  
 
RESPONSE: The 2017 U.S. tax reform legislation, referred to informally as the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA or the "Act"), aligned the U.S. international tax system more closely with 
territorial tax systems of other jurisdictions.  In particular, the United States established a 
participation exemption system, while also strengthening its contro lled foreign corporation (CFC) 
regime.  In addition, the Act imposed a one -time transition tax on certain earnings of CFCs. The 
full text of the Act and the accompany ing Conference Report have been published  and are 
available  at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th -congress/house -bill/1. 
 
3. What is the main content of individual income tax reform? What are the individual tax policies 
to attract innovative talent in science and technology?  
 
RESPONSE: The TCJA lowered marginal tax rates at nearly every income level and increased 
the standard deduction. The TCJA also expanded support for families with children by increasing 
the maximum value of the child credit (CTC)  and the additional child credit (ACTC) and made 
the credits available to more families. Individual income tax credits and deductions supporting 
education and trainin g were not changed by the TCJA. As a result of the TCJA, most families will 
see a decrease  in their federal income taxes. Lower marginal rates improve incentives for people 
to seek employment or to work harder. To learn more please see: https://www.jct.gov/ 
publicat ions.html?func=startdown&id=5060 . 
 
4. How does the reduction of the individual income tax better adjust incomes? How does it ease 
the burden on people from different social classes?  
 
RESPONSE: The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that the TCJA will  provide a total 
tax cut of $259 billion in 2019, including $180 billion from individual inco me tax reform and 
$79 billion from business tax reform. The new law will reduce the federal tax burden by nearly 
$1,500 per family and benefit taxpayers across all  income levels.  The vast majority of f amilies 
will receive a tax cut. The non -partisan Tax Policy Center estimated that about 80 per  cent of all 
families will receive a federal tax cut in 2018, and only 5 per  cent will see their taxes rise. About 
15 per  cent of all families will have no change i n their federal taxes in 2018.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 61 - 
 
  According to the JCT, TCJA will deliver an 8 per  cent reduction in federal tax burdens in 2019, 
and several low - and middle -income groups will receive a tax reduction of more than 8 p er cent. 
In contrast, tax  payers earnings $1 million or more —representing the top 0.3 per  cent of 
taxpayers —will have a less -than-average, or 5.9 per  cent, tax cut.  In addition, the new law 
slightly changes how federal taxes are allocated across income gro ups. 
 
For more information please see: Joint Committee on Taxation, Distributional Effects of the 
Conference  Agreem ent for H.R.1, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (https://www.jct.gov /publications. 
html?func=startdown&id=5054 ); Tax Policy Center, Distribution Analysis of the Conference 
Agreement for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/ 
distributional -analysis -conference -agreement -tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/full ); and Joint Committee 
on Taxation, Distributional Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R.1, the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act (https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5054 ). 
 
5. What is the effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), implemented since Jan. 2018, on reducing 
the tax burden on enterprises and individuals? Has this policy generated large -scale investment 
reflux?  
 
RESPONSE: In many respects it is too early to evaluate the growth effects of the TCJA. However, 
the TCJA reduced personal income tax rates, increased the stand ard deduction, and increased 
credits which reduced marginal tax rates on labo ur, which should encourage an increase in the 
labour supply that leads to higher growth. Similarly, by reducing the corporate tax rate, allowing 
full expensing for 5 years followe d by a phase down, and adding a tax deduction for certain pass -
through business income, the TCJA will reduce the after -tax cost of capital. As a result of these 
changes, both employment and capital investment are projected to increase. GDP growth has 
been robust in 2018, and was estimated to be 3.5 per  cent in the third quarter of 2018, down 
slightly from the second quarter at 4.2 per  cent. Similarly, business fixed investment increased 
8.2 per  cent in the second quarter and 6.6 per  cent in the third.  
 
6. Have the implementation rules with regard to the GILTI, FDII, and BEAT newly introduced by 
the TCJA been released? If yes, please provide detailed information. In addition, how does the 
government ensure their consistency with WTO rules and international tax a greements?  
 
RESPONSE: The IRS has already issued proposed guidance with respect to the global intangible 
low-taxed income (GILTI) regime. The notice of proposed rulemaking was published in the 
Federal Register  at 83 FR 51072.  The IRS hopes to issue additio nal proposed guidance relating 
to the GILTI and foreign -derived intangible income (FDII) and the base erosion and anti -abuse 
tax (BEAT), by the end of this year or early next year. As part of the regulatory process, the 
public has an opportunity to provide  comments on proposed regulations prior to their finalization. 
In addition, that guidance is subject to extensive review as part of the regulatory process, 
including coordination within the U.S. government.  
 
Question 7  
Summary (10)  
At the time of completion of this report, the United States was renegotiating NAFTA, with the aims 
of modernizing the Agreement, and reducing the U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA partners. In August 
2018, the United States and Mexico reached an agreement in principle to ame nd NAFTA. In October, 
an agreement  with Canada was announced. The United States withdrew from the proposed Trans -
Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017.  
 
7. The text of TPP announced by the U.S. highly overlaps with that of the newly reached USMCA. 
Please explain  why the U.S. signed the USMCA after withdrawing from the TPP, given the 
similarity between the USMCA and TPP.  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA updates and improves the NAFTA and includes provisions that go 
substantially further than the TPP in many priority areas for  the United States.  
 
Question 8  
Summary (15)  
The highest tariffs, sometimes exceeding 100%, are applied on certain agricultural items (e.g., 
tobacco and peanuts). Outside of agriculture, above -average applied rates are mainly found in 
textiles, clothing an d footwear  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 62 - 
 
  8. Is there any plan to address the issue of high tariffs in agricultural negotiation?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States, on average, has some of the lowest bound and applied tariffs 
amongst all WTO Members. In the agricultural negotiations, the United States remains 
committed to the trade -liberalizing reform process that all Members agreed to and continues to 
call upon all Members to improve their transparency so that Members may engage in 
negotiations in a substantive manner.  
 
Question 9  
Summary (19)  
During the review period, the United States reverted to conducting Section 232 investigations to 
determine the effects of imports of any article on national security, and to recommend the application 
of countermeasures, including an increase in tariffs, to  the President.  
 
9. On Apr. 5, 2018, China submitted a consultation request to the DSB regarding the United States 
imposition of tariff on certain steel and aluminium products imported from China, and on Oct. 
18, 2018, China requested the establishment of a panel. China belie ves that the measures taken 
by the United States violates Articles 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 7, 11.1 (a), 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 
of the Agreement on Safeguards , and Articles I:1, XIX:1, XIX:2, II:1 (a), X:3 (a) and II:1 (b) 
of GATT. Could the United States pl ease explain how the measures comply with WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE: As China notes, this question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute 
settlement proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"). We refer China to the statements of the United States at the 
29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Question 10  
Summary (20)  
In August 2017, an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was init iated into 
China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and 
innovation. On 15 June 2018, USTR issued a list of products covering 1,102 separate tariff lines, 
valued at approximately US$50 billion, which would  be subject to an additional ad valorem  tariff of 
25%. The measure entered into effect on 6 July for 818 lines, covering  approximately US$34 billion 
worth of imports from China; public comment was sought on the application of the duty on 284 tariff 
lines, covering some US$16 billion worth of imports. China responded to the initial action by imposing 
increased duties on goods imported from the United States.  
 
10. On March 23, 2018, the United States submitted a consultation request to the WTO regarding 
Chinas i ntellectual property issue, seeking to resolve disputes within the WTO framework. The 
WTO forbids unilateral retaliation (Article 23 of DSU). The measures taken by the United States 
under Section 301 clearly violates WTO rules. Could the United States plea se provide justification 
for the measures against China taken under Section 301?  
 
RESPONSE: China is well aware  of the justification for the measures taken in connection with 
the U.S. investigation of China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, 
intellectual property, and innovation. The proceedings were conducted transparently, with 
multip le published notices, and opportunities for public comment. Chinese interests participated 
in the investigation, submitting written comments and oral testimony.  The U.S. findings  are 
explained in detail in a 20 -page report issued in March 2018. The full report is publicly available 
on the USTR website, at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF . The 
United States has encouraged all Members to review it. In  November 2018, the United States 
issued a 50 -page supplemental report, available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
enforcement/301Inves tigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf . The supplemental report 
explains that China has not fundamentally altered its unfair, unreasonable, and market -distorting 
practices that were the subject of the March 2018 report. Indeed, certain practices, such as 
cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, appear to have grown worse. In addition to these 
public reports, the United States has repeatedly raised these issues in bilateral discussions with 
the Government of China.  
 
The U.S. reports contain extensive evide nce that China engages in four types of practices 
involving technology transfer and intellectual property. To summarize:  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  • First, China uses foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture requirements and 
foreign equity limitations, and various administrative review and licensing processes, to 
require or pressure technology transfer from foreign companies. China's forei gn 
ownership restrictions prohibit foreign investors from operating in certain industries 
unless they partner with a Chinese company, and in some cases, unless the Chinese 
partner is the controlling shareholder. China's requirements preclude foreign compan ies 
from entering the market on their own terms, and lay the foundation for China to require 
or pressure the transfer of technology. Pressure is applied through China's administrative 
licensing and approvals processes, which foreign investors must complete  in order to 
establish and operate a business in China. Vague provisions and uncertainty about the 
applicable rules provide Chinese authorities with wide discretion to use administrative 
processes to coerce technology transfer.  
• Second, China's regime of te chnology regulations forces U.S. companies seeking to 
license technologies to Chinese entities to do so on non -market -based terms that favo ur 
Chinese recipients. China imposes a different set of rules for imported technology 
transfers originating from outs ide China, such as from foreign entities attempting to do 
business in China. These rules do not apply to technology transfers occurring between 
two domestic Chinese companies.  
• Third, China directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition 
of, foreign companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting -edge 
technologies and intellectual property and generate the transfer of technology to Chinese 
companies. The role of the state in directing and supporting this outbound in vestment 
strategy is pervasive, and evident at multiple levels of government – central, regional, 
and local. China has devoted massive amounts of financing to encourage and facilitate 
outbound investment in areas it deems strategic. To implement these poli cies, China 
employs tools such as investment approval mechanisms and a system of "encouraged" 
sectors to channel and support outbound investment.  
• Fourth, China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the 
computer networks of for eign companies to access their sensitive commercial 
information and trade secrets. Through these cyber intrusions, China has gained 
unauthorized access to a wide range of commercially -valuable business information, 
including trade secrets, technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and 
proprietary internal communications. China has used cyber -enabled theft and cyber 
intrusions to serve its industrial policy objectives.  
 
These policies harm every Member, and every industry in every Member, that rel ies on 
technology for maintaining competitiveness in world markets and increasing its people's 
standard of living.  
 
From the outset of the investigation, the United States was clear that where an act, policy, or 
practice appeared to involve WTO rules, the  United States would pursue the matter through WTO 
dispute settlement. The second area of investigation – involving technology licensing – appears 
to be amenable to WTO dispute settlement. In particular, China's technology licensing measures 
appear to be i nconsistent with China's obligations under the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Accordingly, the United States is pursuing a 
WTO dispute on these issues. ( China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protecti on of 
Intellectual Property Rights (DS542)).  
 
As China is well aware, the U.S. measures taken in the investigation are not connected to the 
matters covered in the ongoing WTO dispute initiated by the United States.  
 
Question 11  
Summary (32)  
The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order reversed the policy applied in the sector, and returned 
to the lighter -touch framework that had been in place before. The Order, among other things, ended 
utility -style regulation of the Internet in favour of marke t-based policies, restored broadband 
Internet access service to the information service classification, eliminated certain reporting 
requirements, and restored the authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to police the privacy 
practices of Internet service providers (ISPs).  
 
11. Please introduce the implementation of the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order  in the 
country, including in each state? What are the main problems that exist during the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  implementation of the order? What are the specific measures taken by the FTC to monitor the 
privacy behavio ur of Internet service providers?  
 
RESPONSE: The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order has been in effect nationwide since 
June 11, 2018. More information about the order can be found on the FCC websi te, 
at: https://www.fcc.gov/restoring -internet -freedom . The FCC and FTC have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding Restoring Internet Freedom, whic h describes specific 
measures  the FTC  may take.  More information is available at: https://www.ftc.gov/news -
events/press -releases/2017/12/ftc -fcc-outline -agree ment-coordinate -online -consumer -
protection . 
 
Questions 12 -14 
Summary (36)  
The regulatory framework of maritime transport and air transport services has not changed during 
the period under review and restrictions to cabotage remain. Regarding maritime transport, 
preferences are accorded to U.S. -flag vessels to encourage a privately -owned and operated U.S. -flag 
merchant marine. The United States maintains two maritime transport programmes related to 
national defense: the Maritime Security Program (MSP) a nd the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) Program.  
 
12. What are the pre -conditions for a vessel to fly the U.S. flag? Can the vessel owned by a foreign -
invested enterprise in the U.S. (including sole proprietorship, joint venture) fly the U.S. flag ? 
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. flag vessels must be owned and operated by qualified U.S. citizens or U.S. 
documentation citizens. See, 46 U.S.C. § 12102; 46  U.S.C. § 50501; 46 U.S.C. § 8103.  
 
A vessel owned by a U.S. documentation citizen is eligible for a registry end orsement and may 
operate in the trade between the United States and foreign countries. A business entity may be 
entirely owned by noncitizen stockholders and qualify as a U.S. documentation citizen.  
 
A U.S.  documentation citizen must be U.S. domiciled and must be managed by U.S. citizens. 
Specifically, for a corporation to document a vessel in the United States:  
 
1. it must be incorporated under the laws of the United States or a state;  
2. its chief executive officer, by whatever title, and the chairman of the board of 
directors, must be U.S. citizens; and  
3. no more than a minority of the number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum 
can be non -citizens.  
 
For a general partnership to document a vessel, each and every general partner must be a U.S. 
documentation citizen. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3). In addition, unlike a corporation, U.S. citizens 
must own at least 50 per  cent of the "equity interest in the partnership" for a general par tnership 
to document a U.S. -flag vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3).  
 
13. Can a foreign -invested enterprise in the U.S. (including sole proprietorship, joint venture) be 
engaged in the U.S. coastal transport or the U.S. international relay service?  
 
RESPONSE: Certain coastwise laws restrict the transportation, dredging, and towing between 
points in the United States to vessels owned and operated by qualified U.S. citizens. (See, 
46 U.S.C. § 55102; 46 U.S.C. § 55103; 46 U.S.C. § 55109; 46 U.S.C. § 55111; 46 U.S.C. 
§ 55118; 46 U.S.C. § 80104.)  
 
A business entity must comply both with structural criteria —such as being organized in the 
United  States —and a facts and circumstances assessment of U.S. citizen control in order to 
qualify as a U.S. citizen.  
 
A business enti ty must satisfy two structural requirements in order to qualify as a U.S. citizen 
eligible to own and operate a vessel in the U.S. coastwise trade. First, a business entity must be 
eligible to document a vessel in the United States with the U.S. Coast Guar d. 46 U.S.C. 
§ 55102(b)(2). Such an entity can be referred to as a "U.S. documentation citizen." Second, a 
U.S. documentation citizen must be owned at least 75 per cent  by U.S. documentation citizens WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  eligible to own and operate a vessel in the coastwise tr ade. 46 U.S.C. § 12112; 46 U.S.C. § 
50501; 46 U.S.C. §  55102(b)(2).  
A business entity as a U.S. documentation citizen must be U.S. domiciled and must be managed 
by U.S. citizens. Specifically, for a corporation to document a vessel in the United States:  
 
1. it must be incorporated under the laws of the United States or a state;  
2. its chief executive officer, by whatever title, and the chairman of the board of 
directors, must be U.S. citizens; and  
3. no more than a minority of the number of directors nec essary to constitute a quorum 
can be non -citizens. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(4); 46 C.F.R. §§ 67.39(a), 221.3(c)(2).  
 
A U.S. documentation citizen corporation that does not seek the right to engage in the coastwise 
trade or to participate in certain programs re stricted to U.S. citizens (e.g., the Maritime Security 
and the Capital Construction Fund programs (46 U.S.C. chs. 531, 535)) can be 100 per  cent 
owned by non -citizens.  
 
For a general partnership to document a U.S. -flag vessel, each general partner must be  a U.S. 
documentation citizen (See, 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3); 46 C.F.R. §§ 67.35, 221.3(c)(3)) and U.S. 
citizens must own at least 50 per cent  of the "equity interest in the partnership." (See, 46 C.F.R. 
§ 67.35; see also 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3); 46 C.F.R. § 221.3(c)(3)).  
 
A U.S. documentation citizen qualifies to own or operate a Jones Act vessel if 75 per  cent of the 
ownership is retained by U.S. citizens. (See, 46 U.S.C. § 505 01; 46 C.F.R. § 67.31(a)).  
 
An exception to the general rule requiring 75 per  cent of stock to be owned by U.S. citizens is 
delineated at 46 U.S. Code § 12118, which permits certain U.S. corporations to own unpowered 
barges and small self -propelled vessels if such vessels are: (i) used to carry the cargo or 
personnel of the owner's affiliated group in the coastwise trade; or (ii) bareboat chartered to an 
unrelated coastwise -eligible citizen subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation 
Board in the Department of Transportation for use in the coastwise trade, other than in  a non -
contiguous domestic trade. In order to qualify under this exception, a corporation must certify 
that: (1) it is incorporated under the laws of the United States or any state, territory, district, or 
possession thereof; (2) a majority of its officers  and directors are  U.S. citizens; (3) at least 
90 per cent of its employees are residents of the United States; (4) it is engaged primarily in a 
manufacturing or mineral industry in the United States; (5) the aggregate book value of its 
vessels does not ex ceed 10 per  cent of the aggregate book value of all the corporation's assets; 
and (6) at least 75 per  cent of the raw materials used or sold by the corporation are purchased 
or produced in the United States.  
 
14. What is the background, main contents and curre nt progress of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE: The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program is a partnership 
between the U.S. Government and the maritime industry to provide the Department of Defense 
(DOD) with "assured access" to commercial sealift and intermodal capacity to support the 
emergency deployment and sustainment of U.S. military forces. Intermodal capacity includes 
dry cargo ships, equipment, terminal facilities and intermodal management services.  
 
The VISA pr ogram is authorized under the Maritime Administration's authorities under the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, and the Maritime Security Act of 2003, and was approved as a 
DOD commercial sealift readiness program on January 30, 1997. The VISA document is av ailable 
in Federal Register/Vol. 79, No. 209, 64462 -64470, dated October 29, 2014.  
 
Question 15  
Summary (37)  
Only U.S. -built ships qualify for domestic service; the United States was granted an exemption from 
GATT rules for measures prohibiting the use, sale, or lease of foreign -built or foreign -reconstructed 
vessels in commercial applications between points in national waters or the waters of an exclusive 
economic zone.  
 
15. What are the U.S. policies and requirements on foreign investors in building and ope rating ports 
in the U.S.?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an 
interagency committee of the United States Government that is authorized to review certain 
transactions involving foreign investment in the United St ates in order to determine the effect 
of such transactions on U.S. national security.  CFIUS has the authority to review certain 
transactions —and assess and mitigate any identified national security risk —involving foreign 
investment in U.S. ports.  Each tran saction that is notified to CFIUS is reviewed —exclusively for 
national security purposes —based upon the specific facts and circumstances of the transaction.  
 
Question 16  
Summary (39)  
The United States does not have a general e -commerce law; however, e -comm erce is subject to a 
number of federal and state measures that address various aspects of it. Two federal agencies 
oversee different aspects of e -commerce: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).  
 
16. Could the Unite d States please introduce specific mea sures regarding e -commerce at both 
federal and state level?  
 
RESPONSE: If China intended to request that we identify measures, please see Table 4.32 and 
the answer to question 116.  
 
Question 17  
3.1.5.3 Controls, special procedures, or diplomatic measures (3.50)  
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury administers 
nearly 30 programmes that involve economic and trade sanctions directed against specific countries 
or measures generally designed to counter terrorism, transnational criminal organizations, cyber -
related crimes, drugs trafficking, human rights abuses, corruption, trade in rough diamonds, or the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  
 
17. The sanctions imposed by  the OFAC are mainly designed to counter terrorism, transnational 
criminal organizations, cyber -related crimes, drugs trafficking, human rights abuses, corruption, 
or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, the U.S. has also imposed 
sanctions on Iran, Russia, etc. against certain industries such as energy, shipping, and 
automobile. Please introduce the implementation of industrial sanctions and provide the 
justification for the industrial sanctions.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of the T reasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
administers and enforces comprehensive and targeted economic sanctions programs in 
furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. These sancti ons programs 
implement multiple legal auth orities, such as statutes, or Executive Orders issued by the 
President. These authoritie s are further reflected by OFAC in its regulations which are published 
in the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 31, Chapter V of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations),  
and on OFAC's website at: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac . OFAC's targeted sanctions on Russia 
were first imposed in 2014 in response to Russia's destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine as 
well as Russia's p urported annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine.  These sanctions will 
remain in place until Russia implements its commitments under the Minsk agreements and 
Russia withdraws from Crimea. The energy -related sanctions on Russia include targeted blocking 
sanctions against individuals and entities as well as targeted sectoral sanct ions on Russia's 
energy sector. For additional information on OFAC's Ukraine/Russia -related sanctions program, 
please see OFAC's website at:  https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/sanctions/ Programs/ 
Pages/ukraine.aspx . In addition, OFAC implements sanctions targeting certain activities related 
to Iran's energy, shipping, shipbu ilding, and automotive sectors. These sectoral sanctions are 
part of a comprehensive sanctions program that targets the Iranian regime's malign behavio ur 
including its support for terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destru ction, and human 
rights abus es. For additional information on sanctions imposed on Iran, including on specific 
sectors,  please  visit OFAC's  Frequently  Asked  Questions  at: https://www.treasury. gov/resourc
e-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx . 
 
Questions 18 -21 
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures (3.55)  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  It is noted that the U.S. has introduced amendments to U.S. AD and CVD laws to modify the 
provisions addressing the selection and corroboration of certain information that may be used as 
facts otherwise available with an adverse infere nce in an AD or CVD proceeding.  
 
18. China has noted that the US has added procedural stipulations of adverse inference for the 
determination of the de gree of dumping and subsidization. Please clarify the specific standards 
of adverse inference?  
 
RESPONSE:  As notified in G/ADP/N/1/USA/Suppl.20 – G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.20 (dated 16 
July 2015), the United States amended certain aspects of its law related to  AD/CVD proceedings.  
For specific instances involving adverse inferences, please refer to the 
documents  of a particular  proceeding,  which  can be found  at: https://access.trade.gov/login.as
px. 
 
19. Where the investigated companies or member governments have made the best efforts to give 
assistance even though the information provided may be not perfect, could the investigators 
apply adverse inference to it or not?  
 
RESPONSE: The use of facts available is based  on the facts and circumstances of a specific 
proceeding. For specific instances involving adverse inferences, please refer to the 
documents  of a particular  proceeding,  which  can be found  at: https://acce ss.trade.gov/login.as
px. 
 
20. In the USs countervailing investigations against China, China has always been actively 
cooperating, providing fully valid information to prove that China does not use export buyers 
credit, but the US never admits that. Instead, in  almost all countervailing investigations, the US 
imposed a high tax rate of 10.54% based on the so -called adverse inference. What 's the USs 
rationale for such decisions?  
 
RESPONSE: The use of facts available is based on the facts and circumstances of a sp ecific 
proceeding. For specific instances involving an adverse, please refer to the documents of a 
particular proceeding, which can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
21. In 2018, in the case of Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd. v. United States (Slip Op 18 -140), the US Court 
of International Trade ruled that its inappropriate for the USDOC to apply adverse inference to 
EIBCs buyers credit program in its countervailing investigations, because the Chinese 
government had fully answered the USDOCs inquiry clarifying that the credit program was not 
used and fundamental information was not missing. There is no valid proof to justify the USDOCs 
ruling to the contrary. Does this mean the USs previous application of adverse inference to the 
program was inappropriate? How will US investigation agencies restrain from the abuse of 
adverse inference?  
 
RESPONSE: The litigation with respect to Guizhou Tyre  remains pending and there has been no 
final and conclusive resolution by the courts.  
 
Questions 22 -24 
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures (3.55)  
(iii) Section 504 amends Sections 771(15) and 773 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to modify  the definition 
of ordinary course of trade and the provisions governing the treatment of a particular market 
situation (PMS) in AD proceedings.  
 
22. Please elaborate on the specific modifications on the particular market situation(PMS) clause.  
 
RESPONSE: As notified in G/ADP/N/1/USA/Suppl.20 – G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.20 (dated 16 
July 2015), the United States amended certain aspects of its law related to AD/CVD proceedings.  
 
Determinations involving a particular market situation are made on a case -by-case basis,  and 
are based on the facts and circumstances of a particular proceeding. Instances involving such a 
determination can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  23. In the US antidumping investigatio n against South Koreas OCTG in 2016, the USDOC, based on 
the particular market situation  (PMS), replaced the cost price of the hot rolled steel, one of the 
raw materials. Are there any WTO rules or domestic laws that justify such practice by the US?  
 
RESPO NSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
24. In the USDOCs antidumping investigation against South Korea OCTG, was it the first time for 
the United States to adopt an alternative cost price? Does such practice reflect modifications of 
the PMS clause? In future antidumping investigations, will this practice continue?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are  the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
Questions 25 -27 
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures (3.57)  
Section 421 of the EAPA requires the CBP Commissioner to initiate an investigation within 15 
business days of the receipt  of a properly filed allegation from an interested party or referral from 
another Federal agency that reasonably suggests that merchandise covered by an AD/CVD order 
has entered the customs territory of the United States through evasion.  
 
25. What are the majo r modes of investigation that the CBP usually launches against commodities 
that allegedly evade antidumping and countervailing duties? Can the CBP launch such an 
investigation according to its authority? What were the specific modes of the 10 investigation s 
launched by the CBP against tax evasion since the EAPA took effect in 2016?  
 
RESPONSE: Enforce and Protect Act (EAPA) investigations serve to determine whether a U.S. 
importer has evaded the payment of required AD/CVD duties. If U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection determines that the merchandise is subject to an AD/CVD order and that payment of 
duties should have been made, it will take measures to protect the revenue to ensure that the 
U.S. importer pays the required duties.  
 
More generally,  details  on all of U.S. Customs and Border Protectio n's duty evasion investigations 
under  EAPA can be found  at: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade -enforcement/tftea/enforce -
and-protect -act-eapa. 
 
26. The CBP can initiate an investigation based on the referral from another Federal agency. What 
agencies does another Federal agency usually refer to?  
 
RESPONSE: As indicated in 19 U.S.C. sec. 1517(b)(3), a referral can be made "by any other 
Federal agency, including the Department of Commerce or the United States International Trade 
Commission."  
 
27. With respect to the claim that reasonably suggests that merchandise covered by an AD/CVD 
order has entered the customs territory of the United  States through evasion, what are the 
criteria with which the U.S. defines reasonable? Are there specific standards in U.S. laws 
regarding the launch of investigations against tax evasion?  
 
RESPONSE: The determination to initiate a duty evasion investigati on is made on a case -by-
case basis, based on the evidence before U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Specific details 
on all of CBP's duty evasion investigations under EAPA can be found at: https://www.cbp.gov/ 
trade/trade -enforcement/tftea/enforce -and-protect -act-eapa. 
 
Questions 28 -30 
3.1.6.1.1.2 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Administrative procedures (3.66)  
This includes determining that a petition is filed by an interested party and has industry support, for 
which it must meet two criteria: (a) domestic producers or workers who support the petition must 
account for at least 25% of the total production of the domestic like product; and (b) t he domestic 
producers or workers who support the petition must account for more than 50% of the production 
of the domestic like product produced by that portion of the industry expressing support for, or 
opposition to, the petition.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  28. Do workers or the worke rs organizations (such as the labo ur union) enjoy the equal qualification 
with producers as applicants?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, workers may be considered as part of the domestic industry for determining 
industry support.  
 
29. When the workers and producer s' qualificat ion as applicants and representativeness are 
assessed, is it to conduct the accumulative assessment on both the representativeness of the 
workers and producers or to conduct the independent assessment respectively? Is it to conduct 
the assessment on the wo rkers and producers ' qualification as applicants on the basis of the 
producers ' representativeness assessment, or the workers representativeness assessment, or 
on the basis of both the workers and the producers representativeness assessment?  
 
RESPONSE: The determination of whether there is sufficient industry support is made on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the facts and circumstances in the petition and consistent with 
U.S. law and international obligations. Instances involving such determinations can be found at: 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
30. How to determine the representativeness of the producers if the producers keep silent rather 
than taking the clear standing on support? Would the investigat ion be initiated at the requests 
of the workers or workers organization (such as labo ur union) when the portion of the producers 
expressing support for, or opposition to  fail to meet the above -mentioned standards?  
 
RESPONSE: The determination of whether th ere is sufficient industry support is made on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the facts and circumstances in the petition and consistent with 
U.S. law and international obligations. Instances involving such determinations can be found at: 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Questions 31 -33 
3.1.6.1.1.2 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Administrative procedures (3.66)  
AD and CVD investigations may be initiated at the request of petitioners, or may  be self -initiated 
by the USDOC, although this has seldom been the case. There was one such case during the 
period under review: on 28 November 2017, the USDOC announced the self -initiation of AD and 
CVD investigations of imports of common alloy aluminium sheet from China. Prior to 2017, there 
had been three such self -initiations by the USDOC sin ce 1980, most recently in 1991.  
 
31. Will the USDOC collect relevant information and evidences while self -initiating an investigation? 
And how?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, in insta nces where the U.S. Department of Commerce determines to self -initiate 
an investigation, the U.S. Department of Commerce collects and reviews any necessary information 
required by U.S. law. The specific manner in which it will collect necessary information  will depend 
upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case.  
 
32. Will the USDOC disclose the relevant information and evidences on the case while self -initiating 
an investigation?  
 
RESPONSE: Public information regarding any specific petitions and in itiations, including self -
initiations, can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
33. How to make sure that the information and evidences, on which the investigation is based, are 
in compliance wi th laws and regulations while investigat ion authorities self -initiating an 
investigation if the relevant producers or industrial organizations fail to file anti -dumping and 
countervailing petition or submit the relevant evidences?  
 
RESPONSE: Determinations  regarding initiation of an investigation, including self -initiation, are 
made pursuant to the requirements in U.S. law.  
 
Questions 34 -37 
3.1.6.1.1.2 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Administrative procedures (3.67)  
For the determination of the m argin of dumping, the ITA compares prices in the United States to a 
Normal Value (NV), the calculation of which varies according to the circumstances. For example, the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 70 - 
 
  NV may be based on the company's actual costs and prices in the comparison market, which  can be 
either the respondent's home country or some other suitable third country or, if the ITA does not 
find a suitable comparison market, it may base the NV on the Constructed Value (CV) which is a 
cost-based build -up of a surrogate price.  
 
34. What method is employed while calculating the Normal Value in anti -dumping investigation 
against China? What are the specific rules on the constructed value?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
35. What are the WTO rules and legal basis for US investigators to adopt the above -mentioned 
methods?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
36. According to Article 15 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, as 
from Dec. 11, 2016, WTO members cannot use third -country prices to determine the degree of 
dumping in anti -dumping investigations against China. The USs practice violates this WTO 
obligation. Could the U. S. please provide reasonable explanation for this?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
37. What are the criteria for selecting a surrogate country? Is there a list of surrogate countri es for 
China? In some cases, the United States selected some nations as surrogate countries whose 
economic development clearly mismatches Chinas. How does the U.S. explain and justify such 
selections?  
 
RESPONSE: Determinations regarding surrogate country selection are made on a case -by-case 
basis, and based on the facts and circumstances in the administrative record. Determinations 
made in a specific proceeding can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Questions 38 -39 
3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.77)  
Of the 333 AD measures in place (excluding suspension agreements) at 17 July 2018, 215 had been 
renewed after a sunset review, that is, they had be en in place for over five years. The average 
duration of an AD measure in place at the end of 2017 was some 11 years. At the end of 2017, 61 
AD and 5 CVD measures had been in place for more than 20 years; and 159 AD and 14 CVD measures 
had been in place fo r over 10 years. The longest -lasting AD measure in place dates from 1977, and 
is applied on pressure sensitive plastic tape from Italy; a measure on pre -stressed concrete steel 
wire strand from Japan dates from 1978.  
 
38. As of end of 2017, how many CAD and A D measures which have been in place for more than 30 
years? Which members and what products are those CAD and AD measures applied on?  
 
RESPONSE: Information regarding the duration of specific AD/CVD orders can be found at: 
https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy.htm , under Research Tools.  
 
39. What is the substantial review standard for US sunset review? In particular, in the case for which 
the term of measure implementation has repeatedly  extended, how to determine the damages 
suffered by the domestic industries under protection?  
 
RESPONSE:  The determination  for specific  sunset  reviews  can be found  at: https://usitc.gov/t
rade_remedy.htm  (U.S. International  Trade  Commission)  and https://access.trade.gov/login.as
px (U.S. Department of Commerce).  
 
Questions 40 -41 
3.1.6.1.4, Table 3.8, EAPA Investigations  
in the line of Evasion of the AD duty  order on Hydrofluorocarbon Blends from China, the CBPs final 
determination is Pending a determination on a scope referral to the USDOC.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  40. What are the stipulations in the U.S. laws regarding the work division and links of the USDOCs 
anti-circumvention inves tigation and the CBPs investigation against tax evasion?  
 
RESPONSE: Anti-circumvention proceedings conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and duty evasion investigations conducted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection are separate 
legal proceedings governed by separate laws with separate legal requirements.  
 
41. If the CBP received a request for investigation of tax evasion of a commodity after the USDOC 
rules that the commodity is not within the coverage of the anti -dumping or countervailing tax 
act, wi ll the CBP set out to initiate the investigation and request the USDOC to remake a ruling? 
Or will it consider the case to be settled and set the case aside?  
 
RESPONSE: The determination of whether to initiate and conduct an investigation of AD/CVD 
duty ev asion is based on the facts and circumstances at issue. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. sec. 
1517(b)(4), if U.S. Customs and Border Protection is unable to determine whether the 
merchandise at issue is covered merchandise under the statute, then it can refer the mat ter to 
the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine whether the merchandise is covered 
merchandise.  
 
Questions 42 -46 
3.1.6.2.1.2 Safeguard investigations 2016 -18, Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (3.93)  
 
42. On 27 November 2017, USTR requested additional  information from the USITC to assist him in 
making a determination.  
 
RESPONSE:  That is correct,  as notified  in G/SG/N/8/USA/9/Suppl.2  (dated  4 December 2017).  
 
43. In the PV 201 Investigation, the USTR once requested additional information from the USITC. 
What specific information does the additional information refer to?  
 
RESPONSE: As indicated in the above -referenced notification, "the President requested 
additional information from the ITC to assist him in determining the appropriate and feasible 
action to take that will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive adjustment 
to import competition and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs. Specifically, 
the President requested that the ITC identify any unforeseen developme nts that led to the 
articles at issue being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a 
substantial cause of serious injury."  
 
44. What were the responsibilities of the USTR and USITC respectively in the 201 Investigation?  
 
RESPONSE : With regards to safeguards, the responsibilities of the U.S. International Trade 
Commission and United States Trade Representative can be found at: G/SG/N/1/USA/1 (dated 
6 April 1995).  
 
45. Does the United States have any laws regarding unforeseeable development? If yes, what are 
the names of such laws? In practice, which department is in charge of the investigation? How 
does the department conduct analysis and  what elements need to be analys ed? 
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. International Trade Commission conducts safeguard investigations under 
Section 201 – 204 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2251 – 2254). The authority and 
requirements for such investigations can be found in these provisions.  
 
46. Prior to taking 201 Measure against photovoltaic products, the US has already applied CAD and 
AD measures on them. How could the US investigators deal with the double remedy?  
 
RESPONSE: The factors that the U.S. International Trade Commission took into account in 
making  its serious  injury  determination  can be found  at: https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy/ 
publications/safeguard_pubs.htm . 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 47  
3.1.7.1.2 and 3.1.7.1.3 Sect ion 232 investigations – Steel investigation and Aluminium investigation 
(3.109 and 3.116)  
The United States has imposed additional 25% and 10% ad valorem tariff on steel articles and 
certain aluminium articles respectively on most of the WTO Members, pursuant to Section 232 of 
the Trade Expansio n Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862).  
 
47. As a result of the United States imposition of tariff pursuant to Section 232, its tariff on imported 
steel and aluminium products exceeds the bound rate in the United States tar iff concession 
commitment and thus allegedly violates Articles 2.1(a) and 2.1(b) of the GATT1994. How will 
the US explain and justify this imposition of tariff? What WTO rules and legal basis did the U.S. 
refer to in making such a decision that goes agains t its concession commitment?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. Please refer to information provided by the United States at the 23 
March 2018 meeting of the Council for Trade in G oods, and the statements of the United States 
at the 29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Questions 48 -50 
3.1.7.1.2 and 3.1.7.1.3 Section 232 investigations – Steel investigation and Aluminium investigation 
(3.110 and 3.116)  
It is noted that the United States has exempted certain limited number of WTO Members from its 
additional import tariff measures on steel articles and certain aluminium articles. This is because the 
United States had agreed in principle with Ar gentina, Australia, and Brazil on satisfactory alternative 
means to address the threatened impairment to its national security posed by steel articles imported 
from these countries.  
 
48. Please elaborate on the specific content of satisfactory alternative mean s agreed between the 
United States and each of the WTO Members exempted from its additional tariff on certain steel 
and aluminium products pursuant to Section 232.  
 
RESPONSE: Proclamations issued by the President on 30 April 2018 (Proclamation 9740) and 
31 May 2018 (Proclamations 9758 and 9759) describe the satisfactory alternative means 
between the United States and certain other countries, in light of which the President determined 
that imports from these countries no longer threaten to  impair U.S. nation al security. 
The texts of these  proclamations  are available  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/  
and https://www.federalregister.gov/ . 
 
49. Please explain specifically how the alternative means resolve the threats posed by imported steel 
and aluminium products to the United States national security?  
 
RESPONSE: Please refer to the Presidential Proclamations issued on 30 April 2018 (Proclamation 
9740) and 31 May 2018 (Proclama tions 9758 and 9759).  
 
50. The United States exemption of certain WTO Members from the tariff imposed pursuant to 
Section 232 allegedly violates Article 1.1 of GATT1994 regarding most -favoured-nation 
treatment. How does the United States explain and justify th is? What WTO rules and legal basis 
did the U.S. refer to for such action?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. Please refer to information provided by the United States at the 23 
March 2018 meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, and the statements of the United States 
at the 29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Questions 51 -53 
3.1.7.2.3 Section 301 cases (3.131)  
Subsequently, USTR, with the assistance of the interagency Section 301 Committee, prepared a 
report that concluded that the acts, policies, and practices of the Chinese Government related to 
technology transfer, IP, and innovation are unreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict 
U.S. commerce. USTR estimated that China's policies had resulted in harm to the U.S. economy of 
at least US$50 billion per year.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  In 2000, the DSB ruled that Section 301 seemingly violated Article 23 of DSU. However, as the U.S. 
definitively, form ally, and again unconditionally reiterated its commitment in the Statement of 
Administrative Actions, that is, the U.S. government would implement Section 301 in a way 
consistent with its WTO obligations, the panel eventually ruled that Section 301 did not  violate WTO 
rules. The 301 measure taken by the U.S. against China clearly violates WTO rules and its 
commitment.  
 
51. The tariff imposed by the U.S. on Chinese products exported to the U.S. pursuant to Section 301 
clearly violates WTO rules. Does the U.S. h ave any adjustment plans?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States refers China to the U.S. response to China's question #10.  
 
52. Please explain how the U.S. calculated the loss of at least USD 50 billion caused by Chinese 
policies to the U.S. annually.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States refers China to the U.S. response to China's question #10.  
 
53. In each notice of tariff that the U.S. imposes on Chinese products exported to the U.S. pursuant 
to Section 301, the U.S. claims that such tariff is justified. Has the U.S. conducted  any 
assessment? If yes, please provide the assessment methods and basis.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States refers China to the U.S. response to China's question #10.  
 
Question 54  
3.1.7.2.3.1 Section 301 cases – China technology transfer regime  
 
54. China has no la w that requires foreign enterprises to transfer their technologies to Chinese 
partners. In the 301 report, the US accuses China of mandating technological transfer but gave 
no specific case to back up this accusation. Can the US provide any specific case?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States refers China to the U.S. response to China's question #10.  
 
Questions 55 -56 
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (3.141)  
The United States maintains export restrictions, including prohibitions, licensing requirements or 
additional controls on a variety of exports and re -exports for reasons of national security, foreign 
policy considerations, the non -proliferation of nuclear materials, and other temporary objectives.  
 
The U.S. Department of Commerce release d a statement on Oct. 29 adding Chinese company Fujian 
Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co. (JHICC) to the export control list and saying that this move was taken 
for national security reasons. The statement mentioned that the chips produced by JHICC are for 
civil use and the company had not yet launched production. The purpose of taking this measure is 
to protect the long term economic viability of U.S. suppliers of these essential components of U.S. 
military systems.  
 
55. The U.S. recently added Chinese company Fuji an Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co. (JHICC) to its 
export control entity list. What are the main reasons and rationale for this decision? In the case 
of JHICC, does the U.S. consider commercial competition to be the main factor? Does the U.S. 
governments use of administrative measures to directly intervene the commercial competition 
between U.S. companies and foreign companies to protect U.S. companies interests constitute 
an act of government intervention in the market?  
 
RESPONSE: The entity listing imposes a  license requirement for exports to Fujian Jinhua.  The 
United States placed Fujian Jinhua on its Entity List because Fujian Jinhua poses a significant 
risk of becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security interests of the 
United States.  Fuijian JinHua is nearing the completion of substantial production capacity for 
dynamic random access memory integrated circuits.  The additional production, in light of the 
likely U.S. -origin technology, threatens the longer term economic viabili ty of US suppliers of 
these essential components of U.S. military systems. Placing Fujian Jinhua on the entity list will 
limit Fujian Jinhua's ability to threaten the supply chain for essential components in U.S.  military 
systems.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  56. On what grounds does the  U.S. believe that JHICC's production jeo pardizes its national security? 
Does it mean that as long as a foreign enterprise produces products that U.S. suppliers may 
provide to the military, the U.S. national security is threatened?  
 
RESPONSE: Fuijian JinHu a is nearing the completion of substantial production capacity for 
dynamic random access memory integrated circuits.  The additional production, in light of the 
likely U.S. -origin technology, threatens the longer term economic viability of U.S. suppliers of  
these essential components of US military systems. Placing Fujian Jinhua on the entity list will 
limit Fujian Jinhua's ability to threaten the supply chain for essential components in U.S. military 
systems.  
 
Questions 57 -58 
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, rest rictions, and licensing (3.142)  
The ECRA is now the principal implementing statute for the export controls BIS had administered 
pursuant to the Executive Order issued under the IEEPA.  
 
57. Please introduce the main reforms in the ECRA compared with existing le gislation, including the 
controlled export mode, scope of export items (such as categories in the Commerce Control List 
and product categories), control requirements, etc.  
 
RESPONSE: The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), Pub. L. No. 115 -232, tit. 1 7, subtitle 
B, 132 Stat. 2208 (2018) is the principal statute for the Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) 
administration of controls for dual -use and less sensitive military items. The Export 
Administration Regulations remain in effect. Among other thi ngs, ECRA mandated an interagency 
process to identify and control emerging and foundational technology, increased civil penalties, 
enhanced law enforcement authorities, and provided for the confidentiality of export licensing 
and other information. With re spect to emerging and foundational technology, ECRA requires 
the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy, and other agencies as appropriate 
to lead a regular, ongoing interagency process to identify emerging and foundational 
technologies not cu rrently subject to multilateral export controls but that may raise national 
security concerns, and to assess whether more restrictive controls are warranted. The bill also 
directs BIS to utilize its Emerging Technology Technical Advisory Committee to ident ify emerging 
and foundational technologies likely to emerge o ver the next five to ten years.  
 
ECRA also provided BIS export enforcement agents enhanced law enforcement authorities, 
including the authority to conduct undercover and overseas operations and to utilize electronic 
surveillance. ECRA also addressed additional important issues, including the authority for the 
Secretary to appoint administrative law judges to hear administrative enforcement cases.  
 
58. According to the ECRA of 2018, exports that invol ve sensitive commodities and technologies 
need to obtain prior approval from the Department of Commerce. After this act was passed, the 
BIS of the U.S. Department of Commerce introduced the strictest technological export control 
plan in history to control the exports of 14 technologies related to national security and cutting -
edge science and technology, involving AI, chips, quantum computing, robots, face print and 
voice print technologies, etc. Does the U.S. intend to continue using this Act to restrict C hinese 
enterprises investment in the USs sensitive technologies? Will this Act hamper the technological 
development of the world?  
 
RESPONSE: As noted above, ECRA requires an interagency process to identify emerging and 
foundational technologies not current ly subject to multilateral export controls but that may raise 
national security concerns, and to assess whether more restrictive controls are warranted. On 
November 19, 2018, BIS published in the Federal Register  an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (A NPRM), seeking public comment on criteria for identifying emerging technologies 
that are essential to U.S. national security. See 83 F ed. Reg. 58201 (Nov. 19, 2018).  
 
The notice included a representative sample of general categories of technology for which  
Commerce seeks public comment on whether they are emerging technologies that are essential 
to the national security of the United States. The ANPRM did not impose additional controls on 
those technologies. Rather, comments on the ANPRM will help inform th e interagency process 
to identify and describe such emerging technologies. Comments are due December 19, 2018. 
This process will result in the development of proposed rules identifying specific emerging 
technol ogies.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Questions 59 -60 
3.3.1 Incentives (3.165 , 3.166)  
On 23 May 2018, the CFDA was migrated to the website https://beta.SAM.gov , where the search 
engine is now referred to as "Assistance Listings". According to a database maintained by SelectUSA, 
some 108 federal programmes and incentives exist specifically to promote small businesses, provide 
support to existing or prospective exporters, and assist enterprises with regulatory compliance.  
 
A database developed by the Council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER), accessible at: 
http://selectusa.stateincentives.org/?referrer=selectusa , includes information on 1,790 
programmes enacted in the 50 states. Such support is provided in the form of tax credits, tax 
exemptions, grants, loans or loan participation, or other forms of assistance.  
 
59. With regard to the subsidy progr ams in all the subsidy notifica tions that the U.S.  has submitted 
to the WTO, including tax credit programs, are they consistent with those specified on the above 
two websites, namely https://beta.SAM.gov  and http://selectusa.stateincentives. 
org/?referrer =selectusa ? If there are inconsistencies, what 's the reason?  
 
RESPONSE: The two cited websites are intended for a different purpose than U.S. notifications 
under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement). 
The criteria for inclusion on both websites do not take into account the definitional elements of 
"financial contribution" and "benefit" as set out in Article 1 of the Subsidies Agreement or the 
concept of "specificity" as defined in Article 2 of the Subsi dies Agreement.  
 
60. Besides the above two websites, are there any other channels for us to learn about U.S. subsidy 
programs? If yes, please specify them.  
 
RESPONSE: In the United States, transparency is central to the proper functioning of the legal 
system a nd there is a plethora of sources to learn about incentive programs. For example, all 
laws and regulations in the United States at the federal and state level of government are 
published and readily accessible by the public.  
 
Question 61  
3.3.2 Standards an d other technical requirements (3.171)  
A private, non -profit organization, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), coordinates 
and administers the VCS system. ANSI is the sole U.S. member body to the International 
Organization for Standardization  (ISO) and, through the U.S. National Committee, to the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).  
 
61. Please introduce the composition of the ANSI, its operation mode, the standard formulation 
process, and the relationship between the government and th e ANSI. Can foreign enterprises 
participate in the ANSI? What are the qualification requirements?  
 
RESPONSE: Members of ANSI are associated with one of six categories: company, educational, 
government, individual, international, and organizational, as defi ned in the ANSI By -Laws. While 
ANSI membership includes government agencies, the government is merely a participant in the 
U.S. standards system, it does not control it. Foreign enterprises may participate in ANSI. 
Applicants for ANSI membership must compl ete an application and pay dues. An applicant may 
be admitted to ANSI in a specified category of membership by vote of the Executive Committee 
of the Board. The Executive Committee may consider a prospective member's ability to meet 
member obligations, bas ed on past dealing with such individual or entity.  
 
For clarity, we note that ANSI does not develop standards. For the criteria ANSI utilizes to assess 
accreditation for an organization, please see the document, "ANSI Essential Requirements: Due 
process re quirements for American National Standards," which is available at: 
http://www.ansi.org/essentialrequirements . 
 
Question 62  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.174)  
Federal law specifically prohibits any government agency from engaging in any standards -related 
activity that creates unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Federal 
agencies are obliged to ensure that imported goods are treated no less fav ourably than like domestic 
products in the application of standards -related activities.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  62. The U.S. uses a national security review process towards Chinas high -tech products exported to 
the U.S., such as mobile phones, telecommunications equipment, and high -speed rail equipment. 
How these systems are developed and implemented? The basis and standards for review are not 
transparent. Will the U.S. consider increasing transparency, inviting all parties concerned for  the 
review and providing expla nation for the de cisions made and implemented, such as banning 
Huawei mobile phones in the United States.  
 
RESPONSE: On August 1, 2018, the U.S. Congress passed the Nati onal Defense Authorization 
Act. On August 13, 2018, the Pres ident signed this act into law. This act ban s U.S. government 
purchases of telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company and 
ZTE Corporation and the ir subsidiaries and affiliates.  It also bans U.S. government purchases of 
video surveillance and telecommunications equipment pro duced by Hytera Communications 
Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company and Dahua Technology Company 
and the ir subsidiaries and affiliates. Before passing this act, the U.S. Congress published draft 
bills, held multiple public hearings, publicly considered numerous proposed amendments and 
participated in many hours of public debate.  
 
Question 63  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.181)  
The United States has concluded mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) with numerous forei gn 
partners. In the area of telecommunications equipment, MRAs have been signed with Australia; 
Canada; Chinese Taipei; Europe (EU/EFTA); Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea, Republic of; 
Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Singapore; and Viet Nam.  
 
63. Please i ntroduce the execution of the MRAs in the area of telecommunication equipment and the 
main obstacles or problems that exist.  
 
RESPONSE: In each of the agreements, which are based on the Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement for Conformity Assessment of Telecommun ications Equipment (APEC TEL MARA), 
participating countries agree to accept the test results and/or product approvals performed by 
the Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs) of the other country based on the use of a set of 
internationally accepted procedures . The scope of the MRA includes equipment subject to 
telecommunications regulations, including wire and wireless, network terminal attachments, 
terrestrial, and satellite equipment. For such equipment the APEC TEL MRA, for example, covers 
electromagnetic c ompatibility (EMC), radio, and telephone terminal equipment requirements. 
The MRAs do not attempt to harmonize regulatory st andards or technical standards.  
 
The value is that manufacturers of telecommunications equipment can have their products tested 
and approved with conformity assessment bodies located in their own country. This will help in 
the speed and cost of placing new telecom products o n the market. Further detail on U.S. 
implementation can be found  here: http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/ea/mra/implementation.html . 
 
Question 64  
3.3.4.3 Competition policy – Policy Developments (3.207)  
A new approach has been proposed in relation to standard essential patents, the so -called "New 
Madison" approach. This approach aims at ensuring that: (i) patent holders have adequate incentives 
to innovate and create new technologies; and (ii) licensees have the appropriate incentives to 
implement them. In addition, the Antitrust Division will adop t an evidence -based approach in 
applying antitrust law equally to both innovators who develop and implementers who use 
technological standards in innovation industries.  
 
64. Please elaborate on the analysis framework of the "New Madison" approach. What is the 
similarity and difference between the analysis approach regarding standard -essential patents 
previously adopted by the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies and this approach?  
 
RESPONSE: Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim gave a speech detailing the " New 
Madison" approach to antitrust and intellectual property. The speech is available on the U.S. 
Department of Justice website, at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant -attorney -
general -makan -delrahim -delivers -keynote -address -university . 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 65  
3.3.4.4 Competition policy – Legislative and institutional framework developments (3.211)  
In October 2016, antitrust guidance for human resource  (HR) professionals was issued for the first 
time. This guidance aims at alerting HR professionals, and others involved in hiring and/or 
compensation decisions, about potential violations of antitrust law, e.g. in the implementat ion of 
"no-poaching" agreements. It also discusses how antitrust laws apply to firms' decisions to share 
sensitive information, such as compensation information, with competing employers, either directly 
or through third -party entities.  
 
65. Please elaborate o n the background and reasons for the U.S. to develop and promulgate the 
antitrust guidance for human resource (HR) professionals. What new requirements on corporate 
antitrust compliance have been put forward?  
 
RESPONSE: Through examples of prior enforcemen t actions, the U.S. Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals was issued 
to educate human resource and other business professionals about how the antitrust laws apply 
to hiring and compensation d ecisions. Further, the Guidance provides notice that the U.S. 
Department of Justice intends to criminally investigate "naked" no -poaching or wage -fixing 
agreements that are not reasonably necessary to a separate, legitimate transaction or 
collaboration bet ween the employers. It is left to the firms to decide how to best comply with 
the law. More information can be found on the U.S. Department of Justice website. See: 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download . 
 
Question 66  
3.3.4.4 Competition policy – Legislative and institutional framework developments (3.213)  
Another significant development during the review period was the 2017 update of the Antitrust 
Guideline s for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, issued jointly by the Antitrust Division and the 
FTC. 
 
66. Please provide a summary of the newly revised Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property. What are the main changes to the new version  compared to the previous 
one? What is the reason for the change? What new requirements on corporate antitrust 
compliance have been put forward?  
 
RESPONSE: A brief summary and reasons for the updates to the IP Licensing Guidelines can be 
found in the press  release announcing the proposed revisions to  the Guidelines. See: 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/doj -and-ftc-seek-views-proposed -update -antitrust -guidelines -
licensing -intellectual -property . 
 
Like the agencies' prior IP Guidelines, the updated IP Guidelines start from the proposition that 
the intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting 
innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. The purpose of the revi sions was to modernize the 
IP Guidelines to reflect case law, policy, and statutory developments without changing the 
agencies' enforcement approach, which is to apply standard, effects -based antitrust analysis to 
activities involving intellectual property . The updated IP Guidelines also reflect the agencies' 
longstanding view that "the antitrust laws generally do not impose liability upon a firm for a 
unilateral refusal to assist its competitors, in part because doing so may undermine incentives 
for invest ment and innovation."  
 
The IP Guidelines promote compliance and transparency by helping businesses and the public 
understand the circumstances under which the agencies may challenge a licensing practice as a 
violation of the antitrust laws. However, it is left to the firm to decide how to best comply with 
these laws. More information can be found on the U.S. Department of Justice website, 
at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/doj -and-ftc-issue-updated -antitrust -guidelines -licensing -
intellectual -property . 
 
Question 67  
3.3.4.4 Competition policy – Legislative and institutional framework developments (3.215)  
During the review period, the t hreshold for premerger notification was adjusted. On 26 January 2017 
the FTC published a notice to reflect adjustment of the reporting thresholds as required by the 
amendments to Section 7A of the Clayton Act effected in 2000. The size of transaction thres hold 
was raised from US$78.2 million to US$80.8 million, effective  27 February 2017.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  67. Please give the reasons why FTC adjusted the threshold for premerger notification, and provide 
the details on adjustment and the approach used.  
 
RESPONSE: The Federal Trade Commission is required to revise premerger notification 
thresholds annually based on the change in gross national product, in accord with the Hart -
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18A(a)(2) & 19(a)(5).  
 
Questions 68 -69 
3.3.7.9 IP R – Enforcement (3.323)  
Estimates of the annual cost of IP theft to the economy in counterfeit goods, pirated software, and 
theft of trade secrets, including cyber -enabled trade secrets, range between US$225 billion and 
US$600 billion. The estimated cost o f trade secret theft alone to U.S. firms is between 
US$180  billion, or 1% of U.S. GDP, and US$540 billion, 3% of GDP.  
 
68. Could the U.S. please tell its specific methods for measuring the loss caused by intellectual 
property theft to the U.S. economy and the loss caused by commercial secret theft to the U.S. 
economy.  
 
RESPONSE: Please refer to the report:  The Theft of American Intellectual Property: 
Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy . 2017, Update to the IP Commission 
Report, by the Commis sion on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, found at: 
http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf . 
 
69. Why is there a gap of hundreds of billions of dollars between the maximum amount and minimum 
amount estimated?  
 
RESPONSE: Please refer to the report:  The Theft of American Intellectual Property: 
Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy . 2017, Update to the IP Commission 
Report, by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, found at: 
http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf . 
 
Questions 70 -73 
4.1.2. 1 Agriculture – Major support programmes –General legal framework (4.6)  
Authorization for most programmes under the Agricultural Act of 2014 (PL 113 -79), signed into law 
on 7 February 2014, will expire on 30 September 2018. The 2014 Farm Bill introduced nu merous 
changes in the system of support to agriculture. A system of direct payments to crop producers, in 
place since 1996, was discontinued. Countercyclical payments on historical base were replaced by 
the option to enrol in one of two programmes tied to historical base, either a price -based 
countercyclical income support programme the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) or a revenue -based 
countercyclical income support programme the Ag ricultural Risk Coverage (ARC).  
 
70. The 2014 Farm Bill was supposed to expire on 30 September 2018. When will the new Farm bill 
be issued? Can the United States elaborate on the new Farm Bill, focusing on changes compared 
to previous ones, please?  
 
RESPONSE: Current farm programs are authorized under the 2014 Farm Bill through the 2018 
crop year. We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping 
the Membership informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill.  
 
71. Please provide detailed information on PLC and ARC implementation since 2014, including  the 
coverage of each program, how many farmers chose each program, how are the subsidies 
calculated, and how and when do farmers get the subsidies, and so on.  
 
RESPONSE: The ARC and PLC programs provide payments on historical base acres and yield of 
covered commodities. Owners of base acres are not required to plant the historical commodity 
or any commodity to be eligible for payments. Covered commodities include wheat, feed grains 
(corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats), rice (long -grain, medium and short gr ain, and temperate 
japonica), oilseeds (soybeans, peanuts, canola, crambe, flaxseed, mustard, rapeseed, safflower, 
sesame seed, sunflower), and pulses (large and small chickpeas, dry peas, lentils), and 
beginning in 2018, seed cotton.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Program participants  made a one -time election to enrol their base acres in ARC or PLC, which 
has remained in place since the 2014 crop year. In total, 23 per cent  of base acres were enrolled 
in PLC and 77 per cent  in ARC, with peanuts and rice more commonly enrolled in PLC, c orn, 
soybeans, and lentils more commonly enrolled in ARC, and wheat, small grains, and minor 
oilseeds more evenly divided between PLC and ARC . Detailed ARC and PLC election data are 
available at: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs -and-services/arcplc_program/index . 
 
PLC payments are made when the national average price of a  covered commodity falls below 
the statutory reference price. ARC program participants could choose to participate at either the 
county (ARC -CO) or individual farm (ARC -IC) level (only about 1 per cent  of ARC participants 
elected individual farm coverage). ARC payments are made when the  average revenue for a 
covered commodity falls below a county or individual farm guarantee based on the average of 
the previous 5 years' prices and yields. Detailed explanations of the PLC and ARC payment 
formulas are available at: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA -FSA-Public/usdafiles/ 
FactSheets/2017/arcplc_enrollment_aug2017.pdf . 
 
Payments, if triggered, are made beginning in October in the year following the end of the 
program year. For example, payments for program year 2017 (2017/18 crops) began in October 
2018.  
 
72. Considering the current agricultural trade, is there going to be any adjustments made to PLC or 
ARC program in th e new Farm Bill?  
 
RESPONSE: Current farm programs are authorized under the 2014 Farm Bill through the 2018 
crop year. We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping 
the Membership informed of any changes that may occur in  a future Farm Bill.  
 
73. Please explain why PLC and ARC made on base period area are notified as non -specific Amber 
Box. According to relevant studies and DSU267 (Brazil vs. U.S. on highland cotton), base -period 
area (in CCP) is almost equal to current plante d area and the subsidies were provided de facto 
to current producers. Therefore, it is for the same reason that we believe the base -period area 
in PLC or ARC has the same effect with the current planted area. Thus, PLC and ARC should be 
notified as specifi c Amber Box.  
 
RESPONSE: ARC-CO and PLC payments are made on historical base acres with no requirement 
that the owner of base acres plant the historical commodity upon which payments are based or 
any other commodity. Therefore, ARC -CO and PLC are not specif ic to a commodity. ARC -IC 
payments are also not specific to any one commodity as they are based on the combined 
revenues for all covered commodities on the farm.  
 
Question 74  
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – Major support programmes –General legal framework (4.7)  
Based on expected and actual outlays, the 2014 Farm Bill has been dominated by the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), providing food assistance to low -income households. Nearly 
80% of the projected expenditure concerned the funding of SNAP.  
 
74. Please explain in detail the procurement of SNAP and the relevant departments and agencies 
involved.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service implements the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). SNAP does not in volve the acquisition of 
food stocks. SNAP benefits, which are distributed in the form of electronic debit cards, are limited 
to the purchase of food items for use at home, as well as to seeds and plants to produce foods 
for use at home. Participants can u se SNAP benefits at places such as supermarkets, grocery 
stores, and farmers markets.  
 
Question 75  
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – Major support programmes –General legal framework (4.9)  
In July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its intention to provide a short -term aid 
package designed to assist agricultural producers with market disruptions caused by retaliatory 
tariffs.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  75. Does this subsidy program comply with the WTOs relevant subsidy rules? As the United States 
is the world 's largest producer of agricu ltural products, such as soybeans, maize, and beef, what 
impact will this U.S. subsidy program have on the international market prices of relevant 
agricultural products? Does it constitute unfair trade practice and a non -market policy?  
 
RESPONSE: These programs are consistent with the United States' WTO commitments on 
domestic support. These programs were designed to provide limited, short -term assistance to 
U.S. producers.  
 
Question 76  
4.1.1 Agriculture – Main features: Table 4.2 U.S. and world production and trade of selected 
commoditeds,2010 -19 
 
Table 4.2 shows that the U.S. is a major producer of corn, wheat, cotton, soybeans, beef and poultry 
in the world, and exports of these commodities account for a large share in the global market. 
Accord ing to the 2014 Agricultural Act (Section 4.1.2 Major support programmes), these 
commodities have been covered by the U.S. domestic agricultural support policies for years. The 
agricultural subsidies budget during the period of implementation of the Act wa s as high as 
$489 billion, and according to the CairnsGroup calculations (JOB/AG/69, Table 7), the 
U.S. agricultural aid has exceeded $5,000 per annum per person, and in July 2018, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture announced an additional $12 billion subs idy (para. 4.9). The effects 
of these support policies will be expanded to the world market with the export of large quantities of 
U.S. agricultural commodities, which in turn will have an impact on global markets and prices.  
 
During the period of the 2016  WTO trade policy review of the United States, the U.S. explained 
(answer to Question 124) that: The U.S. has been trying to ensure that its policies have no or only 
minor trade -distorting effects., but according to Table 4.3, from 2014 to 2017, the averag e export 
prices of soybean, wheat, corn, soybean meal, pork and beef from the U.S. continued to drop 
significantly, with cotton price falling by 12%, soybean and corn prices falling by nearly 20%, and 
wheat price falling by more than 26%, and these commodi ties are exported to the international 
market at a continuously decreasing price.  
 
76. Please explain how the U.S. government has been trying to ensure that its policies have no or 
only minor trade -distorting effects.  
 
RESPONSE: To clarify, the $489 billion re ferred to in the question is the budget for all programs 
covered by the Farm Bill, including the SNAP program, which accounts for 80  per cent  of Farm 
Bill expenditures. Expenditures on U.S. programs covered under the commodity and crop 
insurance titles of the Farm Bill make up only about 15 per cent  of Farm Bill expenditures.  
 
Beginning with the 1996 Farm Bill, U.S. farm policy has moved towards measures that are more 
decoupled from production and less trade -distorting. Expenditures on "green box" measures, 
which by definition are non - or minimally -trade distorting, not includin g domestic food aid (e.g., 
SNAP) expenditures, have grown from $13.98 million in 1996 to $17.2 million in the most recent 
U.S. domestic support notification for 2016/17. In addition, it should be noted that falling 
commodity prices are the result of severa l complex factors, including increasing global 
production of major exported commodities.  
 
Question 77  
4.1.1 Agriculture – Main features: Table 4.3 Exports and imports of selected products, 2012 -18 
 
77. The 2012 -2015 export and import data in this table is rel ated to the same period as 2012 -2015 
in Table 4.3 on Pages 110 -111 of the 2016 WTO Trade Policy Review of the U.S. The commodity 
types are the same, but the statistics have been almost completely adjusted. Please explain the 
reason, purpose and basis for a djusting the statistics.  
 
RESPONSE: The Secretariat coordinated the compilation of data for the report.  
 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Questions 78 -79 
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – Major support programmes –General legal framework (4.5)  
While some of the programmes have permanent authorization (e.g. crop insurance), others are 
authorized only for the life of the farm bill, and their authorization will lapse unless they are continued 
in a subsequent farm bill.  
 
78. Please introduce the meanin g of permanent authorization. Besides agricultural insurance, are 
there any other permanently authorized subsidy programs?  
 
RESPONSE: Permanent authorization means that the program does not require renewed 
authorization in the Farm Bill or other legislatio n to continue, although it may still require 
appropriation of funds to operate. In addition to the federal crop insurance program, a number 
of disaster assistance programs are permanently authorized, including the Noninsured Crop 
Disaster Assistance Progra m (NAP), the Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP), the Livestock Forage 
Disaster Program (LFP), the Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm -Raised 
Fish Program (ELAP), the Tree Assistance Program (TAP), and the Emergency Disaster Loan 
Program  (EM).  
 
79. What law grants permanent authorization to agricultural insurance and other permanent 
authorization programs?  
 
RESPONSE: The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 (7 U.S.C. §1501 et seq.) authorizes the 
federal crop insurance program. The Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program is authorized 
by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (7 U.S.C. 7333), and the 
livestock and tree disaster programs are authorized by the 2014 Farm Act. Title III of the 
Consolidated Farm and Rural Dev elopment Act (P.L. 87 -128) authorized emergency disaster 
loans.  
 
Question 80  
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – Major support programmes –General legal framework (4.9)  
In July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its intention to provide a short -term aid 
packa ge designed to assist agricultural producers with market disruptions caused by retaliatory 
tariffs.  
 
80. Is this plan under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program? What specific agricultural 
products are involved? How will this program be implemented? D oes it allegedly violate the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?  
 
RESPONSE: Payments under the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) will assist producers with 
costs associated with retaliatory tariffs, consistent with WTO obligations. MFP payments will be 
made on 2018 production of nine affected commodities —soybeans, sorghum, wheat, corn, 
cotton, hogs, milk, sweet cherries, and almonds. Trade Adjustment Assistance is a separate 
program.  
 
Further  details  can be found on USDA's website at: https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases 
/2018/09/04/usda -launches -trade -mitigation -programs . 
 
Questions 81 -82 
4.1.2.5 Crop Insurance (4.20)  
At present, the insurance products on offer include revenue or yield -based plans as well as whole -
farm policies. Some 130 crops are covered, including specialty crops (fruit, vegetables, nursery 
crops, and tree nuts), although four major crops maize, soybeans,  wheat, and cotton dominate in 
terms of area enroll ed (75%) and claims paid (80%).  
 
81. Which specific government agency is responsible for supervising agricultural insurance?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Risk Management Agency is responsible for 
implementing the United States' crop insurance programs.  
 
82. During the review period, what are the specific amounts of agricultural insurance support funds 
for the four major crops, maize, soybeans, wheat, and cotton, respectively?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE:  Relevant data on agricultural insurance support can be found in the United  States' 
domestic support notifications to the WTO.  
 
Questions 83 -89 
4.1.3.2 Agriculture – Exports (4.45)  
The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA administers the Export C redit Guarantee Program 
(GSM -102) on behalf of the CCC.  
 
83. What laws and regulations have made provisions on export credit guarantee for agricultural 
products? Please explain the provisions.  
 
RESPONSE: The Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, as amended (7 U.S.C . 5622 and 7  U.S.C.  5641) 
authorizes the program.  
 
The regulations  pertaining to the program can be found at: https://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/retrieve 
ECFR?gp=1&SID=dfddef3cdf31d00dd883a830bf708c38&ty=HTML&h=L&n=7y 10.1.2.3.41&r=P
ART#7:10.1.2.3.41.1 . 
 
84. Which department is responsible for carrying out GSM -102? Which banks or financial institutions 
are involved in it? What are the specific roles of government sectors in this program?  
 
RESPONSE: The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) administers the GSM -102 program. For more information about the program visit 
the website  at: https://www.f as.usda.gov/programs/export -credit -guarantee -program -gsm-
102. 
 
A summary of the program, which includes an explanation of the r ole of government, is available 
at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/export -credit -guarantee -program -gsm-102/about -
export -credit -guarantee -program -gsm-102. 
 
Financial institutions approved for participation in the program can be found on the FAS website 
at: https://www.fas. usda.gov/programs/resources/gsm -102-and-facility -guarantee -program -
participating -us-financial -institutions  and https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/res ources/gsm -
102-approved -foreign -financial -institutions . 
 
85. How does the U.S. determine the premium rate of GSM -102? What factors do you consider and 
which formulas have you adopted?  
 
RESPONSE: Guarantee fee rates are issued in accordance with 7 C.F.R. Section 1493.110(a). 
Fee rates are based on the country risk that Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is undertaking, 
including country -specific macroeconomic variables; risk of the foreign obligor (bank); the 
repayment term (tenor); and repayment frequency under the guarantee.  
 
86. What is the government budget for GSM -102 each year during the review period?  
 
RESPONSE: The GSM -102 program is self -financing.  
 
87. Are the premium rates for each country and pr oduct variety able to cover operating costs of the 
issuers? Where will relevant information or data be disclosed?  
 
RESPONSE: Fees are published at: https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gsm_web_fee_calc/calc.html . 
 
88. The US Export Credit Guarantee Program for Agricultural Products consists of four sub -programs, 
namely, GSM -102, GSM -103, SCGP and FGP. US has dismantled GSM -103 and SCGP due to the 
United States ---Subsidies on Upland Cotton (Brought by Brazil) while FGP is seldom applied in 
practice. Is this understanding correct?  
 
RESPONSE: Only the GSM -102 and FGP Programs are currently operational.  
 
89. GSM-102 will be maintained until 2018 under the Agricultural Act of  2014 and has become the 
most important support measure for agricultural product export in the United States.  According 
to the United States ---Subsidies on Upland Cotton (Brought by Brazil), GSM -102 has been WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 83 - 
 
  identified as an export subsidy by both the pane l and the Appellate Body. Please explain the 
compliance of this program with WTO rules. Will US retain the program after 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States administers GSM -102 program consistent with its WTO 
obligations and the Ministerial Decision of 19 D ecember 2015 on Export Competition. GSM-102 
was permanently authorized by the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 and is not dependent on 
reauthorization.  
 
Questions 90 -92 
4.1.3.2 Agriculture – Exports (4.46)  
Four export promotion programmes, among which the Market Access Program (MAP) is the most 
important, were reauthorized in the 2014 Farm Bill. Four export promotion programmes, among 
which the Market Access Program (MAP) is the most important, were reauthorized in the 2014 Farm 
Bill. MAP provides co -fundin g for the overseas marketing and promotional activities of agricultural 
trade associations, cooperatives, state regional trade groups, and small businesses. Participants 
must put up a minimum of 10% of the funding for generic marketing and promotion, while  50/50 
cost-sharing is required for the promotion of branded products. Applicants for export promotion and 
market development funding managed by the FAS access the programmes through a single portal - 
the Unified Export Strategy (UES).  
 
90. Please introduce th e details of the four export promotion programmes involved in para 4.46. 
What's the government budget for each programme each year during the review period?  
 
RESPONSE: The Market Access Program (MAP) is funded by the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) to a id in the development, expansion, and maintenance of foreign markets for U.S. 
agricultural commodities and products. The MAP is authorized by Section 203 of the Agricultural 
Trade Act of 1978 and is administered by USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service. The MAP forms a 
partnership between non –profit U.S. agricultural trade associations, non –profit U.S. agricultural 
cooperatives, non –profit state –regional trade groups, small U.S. businesses, and CCC to share 
the costs of overseas marketing and promotional acti vities for U.S. agricultural products. 
Examples of typical activities supported through the MAP include: trade shows, market research, 
consumer promotions, technical assistance, trade servicing, and seminars to educate overseas 
customers. The 2014 Farm Bil l set an annual level of MAP funding at $200 million.  
 
The Foreign Market Development Cooperator  Program (FMD) is funded by the CCC to create, 
expand, and maintain long –term export markets for U.S. agricultural products. First established 
under the authority of Public Law 480, the FMD was re –authorized by Title VII of the Agricultural 
Trade Act of 19 78 and is administered by USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service. The program 
fosters a cost –sharing trade promotion partnership between USDA and U.S. agricultural 
producers and processors, who are represented by non –profit commodity or trade associations 
called Cooperators. Through this partnership, USDA and the Cooperators pool their technical and 
financial resources to conduct overseas market development. The 2014 Farm Bill set an annual 
level of FMD funding at $34.5 million.  
 
The Emerging Markets Program ( EMP) provides funding for technical assistance activities 
intended to develop, maintain, or expand markets for U.S. agricultural exports in emerging 
market countries. The program underwrites assessments of the food and rural business system 
needs of emergi ng markets and funds projects recommended by those assessments. The EMP 
is authorized by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, as amended. The 
2014 Farm Bill set an annual level of EMP funding at $10 million.  
 
The Technical Assistance  for Specialty Crops (TASC) program assists U.S. organizations by 
providing funding for projects that address sanitary, phytosanitary, or technical barriers that 
prohibit or threaten the export of U.S. specialty crops. The TASC program is authorized by the  
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, as amended. The 2014 Farm Bill set an annual 
level of TASC funding at $9 million.  
 
91. Please explain the Unified Export Strategy (UES) mentioned in para 4.46.  
 
RESPONSE: The Unified Export Strategy (UES) system is the centralized portal that interested 
applicants use to apply for and manage their participation in the FAS market development 
programs. The UES allows applicants to apply to the FAS market development programs. By WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  applying through the UES, applicants pro vide a marketing plan that outlines proposed foreign 
market development activities and make requests under each of the FAS market development 
programs.  
 
92. Please provide the parts concerning the above -mentioned programmes in the 2014 Farm Bill. 
What factors does the US consider in the approval for each programme? Is each programme 
related to the export performance? Or is the export performance a major consideration factor in 
approving the applications?  
 
RESPONSE: The applicat ion review criteria are detailed i n each program's Notice of Funding 
Availability and program regulations. Please see 7 CFR 1489 at: https://www.federalregister. 
gov/documents/2018/08/30/2018 -18870/agricultural -trade-promotion -program . 
 
Questions 93 -94 
4.1.4 Agriculture – Levels of support (4.53)  
As for Amber Box support, the United States notified product and non -product specific support 
totalling US$13.6 billion (including de minimis  subsidies) for the marketing year 2014 and 
US$17.2  billion for 2015. Excluding de minimis  support, the curren t total AMS reported was 
US$3.8  billion in both 2014 and 2015.  
 
93. Amber Box support . Please introduce the specific subsidy programs involved in Amber Box 
support.  
 
RESPONSE: Information on these measures can be found in the United States'  domestic support 
notifications. Moreover, the United States has provided additional information for these measures 
in response to inquiries at the Committee on Agriculture.  
 
94. Take 2015 as an example, please explain, in Chart 2 Amber Box support of Page 60 of the 
Secretariat Report, how you determine the amount of subsidies for specific agricultural products 
such as corn, soybeans, sugar, cotton and dairy products, etc.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. domestic support notifications provide information and calculation de tails 
for support provided to these commodities.  
 
Questions 95 -96 
4.2.1 Energy – General (4.57)  
The Federal Government receives royalties, rents, and other income from the sales of federal leases 
of oil, natural gas and coal.  
 
95. Please introduce the ownership of the oil, natural gas and coal owned by the US government.  
 
RESPONSE: The Federal government's Department of the Interior manages the oil, natural gas, 
and coal in the onshore Federal subsurface mineral estate, and in offshore submerged lands, as 
defined under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). Further information can be found 
at: 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy -and-minerals   
https://www.boem.gov/Federal -Offshore -Lands/  
 
96. Are there any specific regulations in relevant laws of the United States for the above -mentioned 
ownership?  
 
RESPONSE:  Yes, management and leasing of t hese resources is pursuant to regulations issued 
under relevant legislation, such as the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq., and the 
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. Further information can be found via the web links mentioned in 
the response to  question 95.  
 
Questions 97 -98 
4.2.2 Energy – Crude Oil (4.60)  
About one fifth of the world's refining capacity is located in  the United States. The many modern and 
sophisticated facilities produce a full range of refined output, including high value light products, and 
the United States is currently the world's second largest exporter of petroleum products.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 85 - 
 
  97. Please explain US policies on oil import and export, including current policies and changes in 
historical policies.  
RESPONSE: There are no current restrictions on the import or export of crude oil and petroleum 
products. However, any item subject to the Export Administratio n Regulations (EAR) cannot be 
exported to an embargoed destination (Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Crimea) 
without a license. Additionally, imports from countries subject to economic sanctions may be 
restricted, depending on the nature of the s anctions. The Department of the Treasury's Office of 
Foreign Assets Control administers U.S. economic sanctions (in cooperation with other agencies), 
and products that may be covered are specific to the country and type of sanction involved. 
Specific infor mation can be found at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/sanctions/ 
Pages/default.aspx . 
The U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) p ublished a 
final rule (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/05/12/2016 -11047/removal -of-
short-supply-license -requirements -on-exports -of-crude -oil) to amend the EAR to remove the 
short supply license requirements that, prior to the entry into force of the ''Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016'', on December 18, 2015, applied to exports of crude oil f rom the United 
States. Specifically, the final rule removed the Commerce Control List (CCL) entry and the 
corresponding short supply provisions in the EAR that required a license from BIS to export 
crude oil from the United States. The changes made by this  rule are intended to bring the 
provisions of the EAR into full compliance with the act, which mandates that, apart from certain 
exemptions specified therein, ''no official of the Federal Government shall impose or enforce any 
restrictio n on the export of crude oil.''  
 
This rule also amended certain other EAR provisions to reflect the removal of these short supply 
license requirements. Crude oil exports are treated similarly to exports of petroleum products 
listed in Supplement No. 1 to part 754 that have not been produced or derived from the Naval 
Petroleum Reserves (NPR) or become available for export as a result of an exchange of any NPR 
produced or derived commodities (such petroleum products are not controlled under ECCN 
1C980, 1C982, 1C983, or 1C984 o n the CCL, but are designated as EAR99 items, instead). This 
rule went into effect on May 12, 2016.  
 
As an EAR99 item, crude oil remains subject to the EAR, as described in § 734.3(a) of the EAR, 
and BIS authorization continues to be required for exports o f crude oil to embargoed or 
sanctioned countries or persons, and to persons subject to a denial of export privileges, as 
described in parts 744, 746, and 764 of the EAR. The continuance of these EAR controls is 
consistent with the exemptions stated in Divi sion O, Title 1, Section 101, subsections (c) and 
(d) of Public Law 114–113. 
 
98. Please elaborate the details of authorization to the Department of Energy (DoE) on oil import 
and export. What are the standards for DoE to decide whether or not to issue an impo rt or export 
license? Does the US government issue licenses in strict accordance with these standards in 
practice? Is there any discretion?  
 
RESPONSE: The Department of Energy does not issue authorizatio ns for the export of crude oil. 
As an EAR99 item, crude oil remains subject to the EAR, as described in § 734.3(a) of the EAR, 
and exports of crude oil continue to require authorization from BIS to embargoed or sanctioned 
countries or persons and to persons subject to a denial of export privileges, as described in parts 
744, 746, and 764 of the EAR. The continuance of these EAR controls is consistent with the 
exemptions stated in Division O, Title 1, Section 101, subsections (c) and (d) of Public Law 114–
113. 
 
BIS implements U.S. Governme nt sanctions against  specific countries pursuant to the EAR, 
either unilaterally or to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The license 
requirements, license exceptions, and licensing policy vary depending upon the particular 
sanctioned d estination. Exporters and re -exporters should be aware that other U.S. Government 
agencies administer regulations that  could also impact their export or reexport transactions. For 
example, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ( OFAC) 
(https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx ) also implements 
country specific sanctions. Exporters and re -exporters are responsible for c omplying with all 
applicable regulatory requirements.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Questions 99 -100 
4.2.3 Energy – Natural Gas (4.62)  
The United States is the world's largest consumer and producer of natural gas. Technological 
breakthroughs in the exploitation of shale gas, which made  it a relatively inexpensive energy 
resource, sparked a 500% increase in shale gas production between 2007 and 2013, and it currently 
represents about 67% of the domestic gas supply. Weaker prices have slowed the growth in the 
production of natural gas, in cluding shale gas. About three quarters of the currently produced shale 
gas is extracted from four plays (Marcellus, Barnett, Fayetteville, and Haynesville). The electric 
power industry has been a major driver of domestic demand for natural gas, as it has been retiring 
coal-fired generation capacity.  
 
99. Please explain US governments investments in shale gas technology innovation, including but 
not limited to R & D and the assistance provided to enterprises.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. government's oil and natural gas R&D is led by the Department of Energy 
(DOE), and focuses on early -stage research for increasing ultimate recovery of our abundant 
natural resources, including unconventional oil and gas. Starting in the late 1980s, DOE research, 
in partnership with th e private sector, developed advanced multi -stage hydraulic fracturing and 
extended horizontal lateral drilling technologies. Those two technologies, when applied in a 
successive manner in a single well, made  possible the shale revolution.  
 
Current unconven tional oil and gas research focuses on understanding the fundamental 
subsurface science of individual basins plus developing technology that can be applied across 
many basins and regions. Major program activities include field laboratories, research on the  
fundamentals of shale, and high -performance computing, machine learning, and big data. This 
research is conducted in partnership with the private sector and at many of the 17 national 
laboratories, including the National Energy Technology Laboratory, and through Funded 
Opportunity Announcements (FOAs) in partnership with industry and academia. Information 
about DOE oil and gas research can be found at: www.energy.gov/fe/science -innovation/oil -gas-
research . 
 
100.  Please explain the amount of shale gas in US electricity consumption and its proportion to the 
electricity cost. Has the low cost of shale gas caused any distortion in electricity cost?  
 
RESPONSE: Increased domestic production o f low-cost natural gas from shale resources has 
increased the share of natural gas used in power generation over the last several years, but the 
availability and use of natural gas used in power generation is only one component of electricity 
prices. Accor ding to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, from 2010 to 2017, 
the share of net power generation from natural gas increased from 23.9 per cent  in 2010 to 32.1 
per cent  in 2017. During the same period, the average retail price of electrici ty rose from 9.83 
cents per kilowatt hour in 2010 to 10.48 cents per kilowatt hour in 2017.  
 
Questions 101 -102 
4.2.3 Energy – Natural Gas (4.63)  
The United States is now a net exporter of natural gas. It principally imports gas from Canada to 
areas that are either impossible or uneconomical to serve with domestic gas. Net imports represent 
about 5% of the total gas supply. Exports of gas to Canada and Mexico occur for similar economic 
reasons in those countries. Exportation of LNG is an attractive option,  and export volumes are on 
the rise. As detailed in Section 3.2.3, all imports or exports of natural gas require authorization  from 
the Department of Energy.  
 
101.  Please explain US policies on natural gas import and export, including current policies and 
chang es in historical policies.  
 
RESPONSE: The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fossil Energy (FE) is responsible for 
authorizing exports of domestically produced natural gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
to foreign nations pursuant to section 3 o f the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Under section 3(a) of the 
NGA, DOE/FE reviews applications to export natural gas to countries with which the United States 
has not entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) requiring national treatment for trade in 
natural gas,  and with which trade is not prohibited by U.S. law or policy (non -FTA countries). 
Section 3(a) of the NGA states that DOE "shall issue such order upon application, unless, after 
opportunity for hearing, it finds that the proposed exportation or importatio n will not be WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 87 - 
 
  consistent with the public interest." DOE has consistently interpreted this provision as creating 
a rebuttable presumption that a proposed export of natural gas is in the public interest. 
Accordingly, DOE will conduct an informal adjudication  and grant an application to export LNG 
to non -FTA countries under section 3(a) of the NGA unless DOE finds that the proposed 
exportation will not be consi stent with the public interest.  
 
Under section 3(c) of the NGA, the import and export of natural gas,  including LNG, from and to 
a nation with which there is in effect a free trade agreement requiring national treatment for 
trade in natural gas, and the import of LNG from other international sources, are deemed to be 
consistent with the public interest, a nd applications for such imports or exports must be granted 
without modification or delay. The United States currently has FTAs requiring national treatment 
for trade in natural gas with Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, 
Republic of Korea, and Singapore. FTAs with Israel and Costa Rica do not require national 
treatment for trade in natural gas.  
 
102.  Please elaborate the details of authorizati on to the Department of Energy (DoE) on natural gas 
import and export. What are the standards for DoE to decide whether or not to issue an import 
or export license? Does the US government issue licenses in strict accordance with these 
standards in practice ? Is there any discretion?  
 
RESPONSE: DOE reviews applications to import and export natural gas, including LNG, under 
section 3 of the NGA. For exports to non -FTA countries under section 3(a) of the NGA, DOE will 
conduct an informal adjudication and grant a non -FTA application unless DOE finds that the 
proposed exportation will not be consistent with the public interest. The statute does not, 
however, define "public interest" or identify criteria that must be considered. In prior decisions, 
DOE/FE has ident ified a range of factors that it evaluates when reviewing an application under 
section 3(a). DOE/FE's public interest review focuses on: (i) the domestic need for the natural 
gas proposed to be exported, (ii) whether the proposed exports pose a threat to t he security of 
domestic natural gas supplies, (iii) whether the arrangement is consistent with DOE/FE's policy 
of promoting market competition, and (iv) any other factors bearing on the public interest raised 
in any individual proceeding. In addition, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires 
DOE to give appropriate consideration to the environmental effects of its proposed decisions.  
 
Section 3(c) of the NGA was amended by section 201 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 
102-486) to requir e that FTA applications "shall be deemed to be consistent with the public 
interest" and granted "without modification or delay." Therefore, for applications submitted 
under section 3(c) of the NGA —including applications to export LNG to FTA countries —DOE l acks 
discretion and must approve the authorization without modification or delay.  
 
Question 103  
4.2.7 Energy – Electricity (4.74)  
The electricity industry is, with few exceptions, subject to regulatory regimes at municipal, state, 
and federal levels.  
 
103.  Please introduce the regulatory regimes at municipal, state, and federal levels, including the 
contents, responsible departments and legal basis.  
 
RESPONSE: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) jurisdiction and legal authority 
over utility rates, terms, and conditions comes principa lly from Part II of the Federal Power Act 
(Subchapter II) (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/usc_sup_01_16_10_12.html ), as amended 
over time. In November 2015, the FERC published an Energy Pri mer (https://www.ferc.gov/ 
market -oversight/guide/energy -primer.pdf ) which contains a general descri ption of the U.S. 
electric industry and its electric regulatory structure (see pages 35-102).  
 
For states, in July 2015, DOE published an energy  primer (https://www.energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/2015/12/f28/united -states -electricity -industry -primer.pdf ), which contains an 
overview of state regu latory authority (see page 27). Municipa l entities are largely governed by 
state laws, which can vary . The American Public Power Association (APPA) 
(https://www.publicpower.org)  is the association that represents many of these entities and is 
a good source of information on their authorities.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Questions 104 -106 
4.2.7 Energy – Electricity (4.74)  
State Public Utility Commissions deal with regulatory issues that fall outside the legal jurisdiction of 
the FERC, including the regulation of retail sales to customers, the approval of generation facilities, 
and distinct reliability issues.  
 
104.  Please intro duce the contents of the regulation on electricity retail industry and explain its legal 
basis.  
 
RESPONSE: The National Association of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC) 
(https://www.naruc.org/abo ut-naruc/about -naruc ) is the association that represents state 
public utility commissions, and would be the best resource to describe regulation at the retail 
level. What is not subject to FERC authority under Part II of the Federal Power Act (FPA) broadly  
includes:  
⚫ "Local" distribution of electric energy, and the rates, terms, and conditions of such 
distribution;  
⚫ Sales of electric energy to end users (i.e., sales at retail), and the rates, terms, and 
conditions of such sales;  
⚫ What generation gets built, including the choice, siting, and construction of generation 
(other than hydroelectric generation, which is separately subject to FERC jurisdiction 
under Part I of the FPA);  
⚫ What transmission gets built, including the choice, siting, and construction of 
transmission facilities (with the exception of so -called "backstop" siting authority under 
section 216 of the FPA (16 USC 824p));  
⚫ Environmental matters (with the exception of hydroelectric generation -related 
environmental matters, which are separately subjec t to FERC jurisdiction under Part I of 
the FPA);  
⚫ Regulation of the U.S. government and its agencies and instrumentalities, and states 
and their agencies and instrumentalities (including municipalities) - with certain limited 
exceptions, e.g., sections 206( e) and 222 of the FPA (16 USC 824e(e), 824w);  
⚫ Regulation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Utility Service -financed 
cooperatives and smaller cooperatives.  
 
105.  Please explain US policies on electricity import and export, including current policies and 
changes in historical policies.  
 
RESPONSE: The Department of Energy's Office of Electricity, Transmission Permitting & 
Technical Assistance Division authorizes exports of electric energy to foreign countries under 
section 202(e) of the Federal Power Ac t, codified at Title 16, Unite d States Code, section 824a(e). 
The former Federal Power Commission held this authority from 1935 until 1977, when the 
Department of Energy Organization Act established the Department of Energy, eliminated the 
Federal Power Co mmission, and transferred the export authorization authority to the Department 
of Energy.  The Federal Power Act provides that exports of electric energy should be allowed 
unless the proposed export would impair the sufficiency of electric power supply with in the 
United States or would impede or tend to impede the coordinated use of the U.S. power supply 
network.  
 
106.  Please elaborate the details of authorization to the Department of Energy (DoE) on electricity 
import and export. What are the standards for DoE t o decide whether or not to issue an import 
or export license? Does the US government issue licenses in strict accordance with these 
standards in practice? Is there any discretion?  
 
RESPONSE:  DOE grants authorization to export electric energy if it determin es that (1) 
sufficient generating resources exist such that the exporter could sustain the export while still 
maintaining adequate generating resources to meet all firm supply obligations, and (2) the 
export would not cause operating parameters on regional  transmission systems to fall outside 
of established industry criteria.  
 
Electricity exports are only authorized over transmission facilities that hold an active Presidential 
permit, which is required for the construction, operation, maintenance, or connection of electric 
power transmission lines at the Unit ed States international border. The authority to grant these 
permits stems from the President's authority to conduct foreign affairs under Article II of the WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  United States Constitution. Through Exec utive Order 10485 (September 1953), as amended by 
Executive Order 12038 (February 1978), the President has delegated to DOE the authority to 
receive applications for and grant the permits. DOE's Transmission Permitting & Technical 
Assistance Division, disc ussed in response to question 105, is in charge of processing 
applications for these permits. The Executive Order delegation states that, before a Presidential 
permit may be issued, the action must be found to be consistent with the public interest.  DOE 
uses two criteria to determine if a proposed project is consistent with the public interest and 
therefore eligible for a permit: (1) the project's environmental impact (historically evaluated 
using the framework of the National Environmental Policy Act of 19 69, as amended), and (2) 
the project's impact on electric reliability of the U.S. electric power supply system —that is, the 
ability of the existing generation and transmission system to remain within acceptable voltage, 
loading, and stability limits during  both n ormal and emergency conditions. Upon the favo urable 
recommendations of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (or their delegates), 
DOE may issue a Presidential permit. DOE does not regulate imports over transmission facilities 
at the i nternational border.  
 
Questions 107 -108 
4.3 Manufacturing (4.78)  
Manufacturing USA  brings together industry, academia and federal partners within a growing 
network of advanced manufacturing institutes, for collaborative research in innovations in 
manufacturing technology of benefit to broad industrial sectors, with the overall goal of increasing 
manufacturing competitiveness, and promoting a robust and sustainable national manufacturing 
R&D infrastructure.  
 
107.  In what ways do you support enterprises u nder Manufacturing USA? Please explain in detail.  
 
RESPONSE: Manufacturing USA funds, on a cost -share basis, research institutes that bring 
together industry, academia and federal partners to en gage in collaborative research. These 
institutes are funded through a private -public partnersh ip via a cooperative agreement. The 
federal funding level is matched or exceeded by funding from private industry and other non -
federal sources,  with a minimum 1:1 cost share. For example, under Manufacturing USA, the 
U.S. Department of Energy created its new Reducing Embodied -Energy and Decreasing 
Emissions (REMADE) Institute, which will be headquartered in Rochester, New York and funded 
equally between the federal government  and over 100 private entities. The research foc us of the 
REMADE Institute will be on reducing costs of technologies needed to reuse, recycle, and 
remanufacture materials in order to reduce the energy used in materials production which, in 
turn, will reduce harmful emissions.  
 
108.  Is Manufacturing USA avail able to foreign enterprises? What are the specific application 
requirements if its available to non -US enterprises?  
 
RESPONSE: Application requirements can be found at: https://www.manufacturingusa.com/ . 
 
Question 109  
4.3 Manufacturing (4.80)  
USTR works to level the playing field for U.S. manufacturers by: (a)eliminating tariff and non -tariff 
barriers; (b) negotiating WTO rules to benefit U.S. manufacturers; (c) countering foreign trade 
distorting practices; and d) enforcing trade agreements.  
 
109.  What are the US priorities in negotiating WTO rules in the next step? Please introduce the 
specific plans, negotiation contents and purposes.  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We also encourage you 
to review Section 4.1 of the U.S. Government Report, including paragraphs 4.6, 4.7, 4.9, and 
4.10.  
 
Question 110  
4.4.1.4 Financial services - Banking services (4.97)  
The Federal Reserve is responsible for supervising bank holding companies (BHCs), saving and loans 
holding companies, domestic and foreign financial holding companies, foreign banks operating in the 
United States, state member banks, foreign branches, Edge Act and agreement corporations, and 
designated financial market utilities.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  110.  China International Capital Cor poration Limited (CICC) is indirectly controlled by China 
Investment Corporation (CIC). Under US Bank Holding Company Act, CIC is considered a bank 
holding company. CICC, which is indirectly controlled by CIC, cannot get engaged in core 
investment banking activities such as securities underwriting and market making transactions in 
the United States. As a state investor, CIC holds the shares on behalf of the country and does 
not actually participate in the decision -making management and daily operations of i ts financial 
institutions. CICC is independent in conducting business and competition. In view of this, will 
the Federal Reserve consider to engage CICC in activities such as securities underwriting and 
market making transactions in the United States? If n ot, please explain why.  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. U.S. federal regulatory 
authorities apply in the United States the same prudential supervisory and regulatory standards 
to like domestic and foreign banking instituti ons in accordance with U.S. law.  
 
Question 111  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.133)  
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, continues to be the main law governing the 
sector.  
 
111.  No universal service support may be used to purchase or obtain any equipment or services 
produced or provided by any company posing a national security threat to the integrity of 
communications networks or the communications supply chain.  China has noted that on May 2, 
US FCC announced proposed new regulations of the Federal Communica tions Act, planning to 
add prohibitions to the Act, which stipulate that No universal service support may be used to 
purchase or obtain any equipment or services produced Or provided by any company posing a 
national security threat to the integrity of comm unications networks or the communications 
supply chain. How does the U.S. decide when civil communication equipment suppliers will pose 
a national security threat?  
 
RESPONSE: On April 17, 2018, the FCC adopted the Protecting Against National Security 
Threa ts to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking  (NPRM).  See: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc -proposes -protect-national -
security -through -fcc-programs -0. On May 2, 2018  the NPRM's comment and reply comment 
deadlines were announced. The FCC's NPRM applies only to FCC programs, including its Un iversal 
Service program. In Section II.B of the NPRM, the FCC sought comment on how the FCC should 
identify companies that pose a national security threat to the integrity of communications 
networks or the communications supply chain for the purposes of FC C programs. The FCC has 
not reached a final decision on how and if it should do so.  
 
Question 112  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.135)  
Before granting an application for a new licence/authorization or for approval of a transfer, the FCC 
must determine whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by granting 
the application.  
 
112.  Which legal clauses have provided the basis for reviewing public interest, convenience, and 
necessity before FCC grants an application for a new licence/authoriza tion or for approval of a 
transfer? Are there any standards and detailed explanations of public interest, convenience and 
necessity? Please provide specific review procedures. Are there any cases that fail the review? 
If any, please explain those cases.  
 
RESPONSE:  Sections 214, 309, and 310 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. §§  214, 309, 310, include clauses that require the FCC to consider the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity when evaluating applications for new licenses, a uthorizat ions, and 
transfers of control. Specific standards and review procedures governing international 
telecommunications authorizations and transfers of control are available at 47 CFR. pt. 63 . The 
Commission discussed the applicability of the public -interest standard to such authorizations, 
which includes consideration of national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade 
policy issues, in the 1997 Foreign Participation Order. See: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ 
attachments/FCC -97-398A1.pdf . The FCC is considering pending applications that raise 
particular public interest concerns; however, it has not denied any international WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  telecommunications authorizations or transfers of control due to ownership of the applicant by 
foreign individuals or entities.  
 
Question 113  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.136)  
The FCC is responsible for managing and licensing the electromagnetic spectrum for commercial 
users and for non-commercial users, including state, county and local governments.  
 
113.  Please introduce FCCs current progress in granting 5G spectrum licence.  
 
RESPONSE: The FCC is focused on making additional low -, mid -, and high -band spectrum 
available for 5G services.  
▪ High-band:  The FCC initiated an auction for 28 GHz licenses in November 2018 and 
has set out procedures  for an auction  of the 24GHz  bands  to follow.  See: https://www.
fcc.gov/auction/101/factsheet  and https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC -
353228A1.pdf . The FCC has also taken steps towards auctioning the upper 37 
GHz, 39 GHz, and 47 GHz bands  in 2019.  See: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachment
s/DOC -353229A1.pdf. The FCC has also taken steps to free up 5G spectrum in 
the 26 and 42 GHz bands.  See: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC -
351388A1.pdf . 
▪ Mid-band:  The FCC has worked to make spectrum in the 2.5 GHz, 3.5 GHz, and 
3.7-4.2 GHz bands  available  for 5G deployments.  See: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/atta
chments/DOC -354694A1.pdf  and https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc -proposes -
expand -flexible -use-mid-band-spectru m. 
▪ Low-band:  The FCC has made targeted changes to the 600 MHz, 800MHz, and 
900MHz  bands  to improve  their use for 5G services.  See: https://www.fcc.gov/docume
nt/auction -1002-long-form-applications -granted -3, https://www.fcc.gov/general/800 -
mhz-spectrum , and https://www.fcc.gov/document/900 -mhz-notice-inquiry . 
▪ Unlicensed:  Recognizing that unlicensed spectrum will be important for 5G, the FCC is 
creating new opportunities for the next generation of Wi -Fi in the 6 GHz and above 
95GHz  band.  See: https://www.fcc.gov/news -events/blog/2018/06/20/scoring -victory -
5g and https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc -proposes -open-spectrum -horizons -new-
services -technologies . 
 
Question 114  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.138)  
The FCC maintains regulatory safeguards to deter conduct by a foreign carrier that could result in 
harm to competi tion in the U.S. telecommunications market. These safeguards include the "no 
special concessions" rule, the benchmark settlement rates policy, and dominant carrier 
requirements. Under the no special concessions rule, U.S. international carriers are prohibi ted from 
agreeing to enter into exclusive arrangements with foreign carriers that have sufficient market power 
to affect competition adversely in the U.S. market.  
 
114.  How do you define affect competition adversely in the U.S. market while prohibiting U.S. 
international carriers from agreeing to enter into exclusive arrangements with foreign carriers 
that have sufficient market power to affect competition adversely in the U.S. market? What type 
of agreem ents are exclusive arrangements ? Do they cover all types of basic telecommunication 
and value -added telecommunication services?  
 
RESPONSE:  The "no special concessions" rule does not cover value -added telecommunications 
services. It covers only a U.S. -authorized carrier's provision of basic telecommunications 
services. A special concession is defined in the FCC's rules as "an exclusive arrangement 
involving services, facilities, or functions on the foreign end of a U.S. international route that are 
necessary for the provision of basic telecommunications services  where the arrangement is not 
offered to similarly situated U.S. -authorized carriers." 47 CFR § 63.14(b)  (emphasis added). The 
prohibition on special concessions, however, does not extend to the rates, terms, and conditions 
in settlement agreements for termi nating basic telecommunications traffic in the destination 
market (47 CFR § 63.14(c)).  
 
This rule addresses the risk that a foreign carrier with market power in an essential input market 
on the foreign end of a U.S. international route (e.g., cable landing  station access and backhaul) 
has the ability to leverage its "upstream" market power into the "downstream" U.S. end -user WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  market, to the detriment of competition and consumers, by increasing its U.S. rivals' costs or 
restricting their output. The FCC has f ound that, absent effective regulation in the U.S. market, 
a foreign carrier with market power in an upstream input market could engage in discrimination 
in a downstream end -user market by favo uring one downstream entity at the expense of its 
competitors, which could result in increases in prices, decreases in quality, and a reduction in 
alternatives in end -user markets.  
 
The FCC's regulatory framework is tailored to address, in particular, two anticompetitive 
strategies that could cause harm to competitio n and consumers. First, such a carrier could 
engage in price discrimination, e.g., by raising the price of the input to its downstream 
competitors, whether or not the foreign carrier raises the price to a downstream partner (which, 
in the case of a fully i ntegrated firm, would pay the economic cost regardless of the nominal 
transfer price of the input). Second, the foreign carrier could engage in non -price discrimination 
by delaying its delivery of the input to U.S. rivals while continuing to provide the in put to its own 
U.S. partner on a timely basis, or by degrading the quality of the input provided to its U.S. rivals.  
 
The no special concessions rule recognizes that foreign market power can be abused regardless 
of whether the foreign carrier is affiliate d with a U.S. -authorized carrier. Thus, the no special 
concessions rule applies to all U.S. carrier dealings with foreign carriers that possess market 
power. Because it has found that an ownership affiliation between a U.S. and foreign carrier 
creates a he ightened ability and incentive to engage in anticompetitive behavio ur, the FCC's 
regulatory framework also includes additional safeguards that apply to dealings between the 
U.S.-authorized carrier and its foreign carrier affiliate.  
 
Question 115  
4.4.6.1 Air transport and airports  
 
115.  Some Chinese enterprises engaged in manufacturing security -check equipment were rejected 
by the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) when applying for the TSA 
certification. The reasons are yet to be announ ced. Could the United States publicize the TSA 
certification standards, and the reasons for refusing to provide certification for products 
manufactured by Chinese enterprises.  
 
RESPONSE: The TSA Certification on Security Screening Equipment program is developed under 
U.S. Federal Acquisition Requirements (FAR).  The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
has in place an equitable process for the request of evaluation and possible certification of civil 
aviation security screening equipment.  TSA pro curements are subject to the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations.  TSA procurements covered under U.S. procurement obligations, such as the WTO 
GPA, are open to goo ds, services and suppliers from designated countries. For information on 
designated countries see  FAR subpart 24.5, at: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/ 
Subpart%2025_4.html . Information on the qualification process for regulated air cargo security 
technologies is availabl e on: www.fbo.gov . Any company that is determined to be ineligible to 
be qualified is formally informed of that and is provided information about the Agency's decision.  
 
Question 116  
4.5 E-commerce (4.271, 4.279)  
Para 4.271 and 4.279 of the United States Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report provide a brief 
introduction to the United States e -commerce taxation. It includes prohibiting multiple taxations on 
e-commerce, and allowing the American states to force onlin e retailers to pay sales tax regardless 
whether a retailer has an entity in that state.  
 
116.  What are the American tax policies for the digital economy, including e -commerce? Which Acts 
are involved respectively?  
 
RESPONSE: Taxes in the United States are gener ally applied in a technology neutral manner, so 
digital-specific tax rules are rare. Two exceptions are the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which, in its 
2016 version, permanently exempted Internet -access services from taxation; and a 2018 
Supreme Court ruling, which gave states the right to impose state sales taxes on online sales 
originating out o f state. Until this ruling, out -of-state sales were exempt from taxation unless 
the seller had a physical presence in the consumer's state.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 117  
4.5 E-commer ce (4.271, 4.279)  
The United States has no overarching federal cybersecurity law. Protection of cybersecurity is 
regulated mainly by state laws and federal regulations, which provide industry -specific 
mandates with respect to data security.  
 
117.  What are  the industry -specific mandates for cybersecurity protection?  
 
RESPONSE: Apart from rules under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 
governing government -owned networks and devices, cybersecurity standards are, for the most 
part, voluntary. The key program promoting industry -specific cybersecurity is that implemented 
by the Department of Homeland Security under  Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD -21): Critical 
Infrastruct ure Security and Resilience , which advances a national policy to strengthen and 
maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure.  
 
PART II. QUESTIONS B ASED ON POLICY STATE MENT BY THE UNITED S TATES 
(WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Questions 118 -119 
2.2 Economic Growth (2.2)  
The increase in growth in the first half of 2018 is based on several factors: higher consumer spending 
(resulting from robust job gains, rising after -tax incomes, and greater consumer confidence), strong 
business investment, and stron g growth in exports and manufacturing output (due to good economic 
performance in the rest of the world).  
 
118.  The United States Governments Strategy for American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing 
issued in October 2018 emphasizes policy measures of trade p rotection and government 
intervention in the market such as local supply chain and purchasing American goods. Could the 
United States please elaborate on the strategy and clarify whether the policy measures in the 
strategy violate the principle of free tra de. 
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Strategy for American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing has nothing 
to do with trade protection or government intervention. It relies on human capital investments 
and providing incentives for innovation in key sectors. More detai l is available 
here:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2018/10/Advanced -Manufacturing -
Strategic -Plan-2018.pdf . 
 
119.  Could the Unite d States please elaborate on the operation mechanism of the 2018 BUILD Act.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Development Finance Corporation is the operational mechanism for the 
BUILD Act, combining capacities from OPIC and USAID DCA as detailed in numerous public 
releases. It will catalyze private investments by adhering to OECD norms, and will offer a full 
range of development finance tools including loans, loan guarantees, political risk insurance, 
limited equity and investment funds, and technical assistance program s. 
 
Question 120  
2.5 Labo ur Markets (2.8)  
other major advanced economies have seen output growth step down from its 2017 level, while 
several emerging market economies have come under pressure as rebounding commodity prices, 
rising U.S. interest rates, and shifts in investor sentiment have interac ted with pre -existing 
weaknesses and led to episodes of financial volatility.  
 
120.  How does the United States evaluate the adverse economic impact of the US dollar interest rate 
rise on emerging market countries? As the world 's largest economy and the US doll ar issuer, 
does the United States plan to take measures to reduce the impact of economic turmoil caused 
by unilateral interest rate rise on the global economy, especially on emerging markets?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. Policymakers in the 
United States are well aware that U.S. policy actions can have effects on foreign economies, and 
likewise that foreign country policy actions have effects on U.S. economic activity.  Conditions in 
foreign economies are monitored carefully, as foreign developments have important implications 
for the trajectory of the U.S. economy.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 121  
2.8 Challenges to the U.S. and Global Economy (2.14)  
The global economy also remains marked b y very large trade and current account imbalances, in 
part due to persistent trade and investment barriers across many economies.  
 
121.  The global economy currently experiences large -scale trade and current account imbalance. Is 
this linked to the US dollars le adership in the global financial market and the lack of domestic 
savings in the countries concerned? Has the United States assessed the impact degree of each 
cause of large -scale trade and current account imbalances in the global economy? If so, please 
specify. 
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Treasury has recently reviewed the evolution of global trade and current 
account imbalances in its April 2018 Report to Congress on Macroeconomic and Foreign 
Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United  States.  Please  see: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/macroeconomic -and-foreign -exchange -
policies -of-major -trading-partners . As noted in Annex I of the April 2018 Report ("Rebalancing 
the Global Economy – Progress Report"), there are not currently signs that typical adjustment 
mechanisms – notably, real exchange rates and relative rates of demand growth (along wit h 
correspondent shifts in saving rates) – are pointing toward a narrowing of external 
imbalances.  We continue to press other countries with large and persistent external surpluses 
to support stronger and more balanced global growth by facilitating domestic  demand as the 
primary engine for economic expansion.  
 
Questions 122 -123 
4.1 WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.3)  
This includes where panels or the Appellate Body have, through their findings, sought to add to 
or diminish WTO rights and obligations of Members in a broad range of substantive areas...For 
example, in the context of meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body, the United States has 
expressed concerns with respect to the Appellate Body's consistent exceeding of the 90 -day 
deadline for appeals in  contravention of DSU Article 17.5.  
 
122.  The United States said that the panels or the Appellate Body have, through their findings, sought 
to add to or diminish WTO rights and obligations of Members. Please elaborate on specific cases.  
 
RESPONSE: The United St ates refers China to pages 22 -24 of the President's Trade Policy 
Agenda, in which the administration addresses the longstanding U.S. concern of panels and the 
Appellate Body adding to or diminishing rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. We 
also r efer China to U.S. statements before the Dispute Settlement Body in which these concerns 
also have been addressed.  See, for example, Minutes of the May 16, 2001 DSB meeting 
(WT/DSB/M/105), para. 41 et seq.; Minutes of the March 8, 2002 DSB Meeting 
(WT/DSB/ M/121), para. 35 et seq. 21; and Minutes of the January 27, 2003 DSB meeting 
(WT/DSB/M/142), para. 55 et seq.; Minutes of March 25, 2011 DSB Meeting (WT/DSB/M/294), 
at 18; Minutes of the June 13, 2012 DSB meeting (WT/DSB/M/317), para. 13 et seq., and July 
23, 2012 DSB meeting (WT/DSB/M/320), para. 94 et seq.  
 
123.  In the report, the United States stated about Appellate Body 's consistent exceeding of the 90 -
day deadline for appeals. In fact, the United States has been obstructing the selection of 
Appellate Body, resulting in a serious shortage of judges and a paralys ed dispute settlement 
body. Please explain the US own practice of obstructing the selection process while accusing the 
Appellate Body of exceeding the deadline.  
 
RESPONSE: For more than 15 years and ac ross multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council meeting, if WTO 
members say that  we support a rules -based trading system, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995. And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its repor ts 
within 90 days of an appeal. A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member may not 
continue deciding appeals as if his term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
The Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to those 
relating to domestic law. The Appellate Body may not give advisory  opinions on issues that will 
not assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure into 
comp liance with WTO rules. The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 95 - 
 
  precedent or provide  authoritative interpretations. And the Appellate Body may not change 
Members' substantive rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreem ents. When 
the Appellate Body abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it 
undermines the legitimacy of t he system and damages the interests of all WTO Members who 
care about having the agreements respected as they were negoti ated and agreed. The 
United  States will continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement 
system, and  will continue our efforts and our discussions with Members to seek a solution on 
these important issues.  
 
Question 124  
4.1 WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.3)  
The United States has grown increasingly concerned with the activist approach of the Appellate Body 
on procedural issues, interpretative approach, and substantive interpretations. These approaches 
and findings do not respect WTO rules as written and agreed by the United States and other WTO 
Members.  
 
124.  The United States has expressed strong dissatisfa ction with various aspects of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, especially the Appellate Body. The United States has also taken 
various measures on various occasions to deliberately obstruct the selection of members of the 
Appellate Body. Does this uni lateral act of the United States contradict its claimed support for 
resolving trade disputes under the multilateral trading system?  
 
RESPONSE: No. Again, when the Appellate Body abuses the authority it was given within the 
dispute settlement system, it und ermines the legitimacy of the system and damages the 
interests of all WTO Members who care about having the agreements respected as they were 
negotiated and agreed.  The United States will continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by 
the WTO dispute set tlement system, and will continue our efforts and our discussions with 
Members to seek a solution on these important issues.  
 
Question 125  
4.1 WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.4)  
Consequently, the United States will not negotiate off the basis of the DDA mandates or old DDA 
texts and considers the Doha Round to be a thing of the past.  
 
125.  The United States has completely abandoned the Doha negotiations and has repeatedly 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the WTO negotiation mechanism. What is the United Sta tes 
thinking about the reform on the WTOs existing negotiation mechanism?  
 
RESPONSE: Please note that at the Nairobi Ministerial meeting, Ministers did not reaffirm the 
Doha Development Round of trade negotiations. See Paragraph 30 of the Nairobi Ministeri al 
Declaration (WT/MIN(15)/DEC). The United States, as well as other Members, no longer view 
the DDA as an active negotiation. Further, we remind Members that TPRs are retrospective 
reviews. We encourage you to review Section 4.1 of the U.S. Government Report. For example, 
we note in Paragraph 4.5 that:  
 
"For the WTO to be successful going forward, its membership will need to break from the 
failures of the last two decades, and base future work on lessons learned and, importantly, 
current data and up -to-date notifications. Members' failure to comply with their notification 
obligations under the WTO Agreement undermines the negotiating function of the WTO and 
the credibility of the organization. At the November 2017 meeting of the General Council, 
the Unit ed States put forward a proposal aimed at improving Members' compliance with their 
notification obligations. In September 2018, the United States, Japan, and the EU agreed to 
co-sponsor an updated transparency and notification proposal for consideration at  the next 
meeting of the WTO Council on Trade in Goods. The United States stands ready to work with 
Members to advance this proposal."  
 
Questions 126 -128 
4.3.2 North American Free Trade Agreement (4.22)  
On September 30, 2018, the three Parties announced th ey had reached agreement on the United 
States  Mexico  Canada Agreement  
 
126.  What is the content in Article 32.10 of the Agreement?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 96 - 
 
  RESPON SE: The final text of Ch. 32 of the USMCA is available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/32_Exceptions_and_General_Provisions.pdf . 
 
127.  What are  the domestic law and WTO law bases for this article? Is this article governed by the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism? Does the United States adopt similar approaches in 
previous contracting practices? If so, please list the name of the treaty and the spe cific terms  
 
RESPONSE: This is the first time the United States has included this particular provision in a 
trade agreement.  
 
128.  What are the legal consequences if the signing parties violate Article 32.10?  
 
RESPONSE: Article 32.10 is subject to the same enfo rcement provisions as the rest of the 
USMCA.  
 
Question 129  
4.4.4 Engagement with the Middle East and North Africa (4.57)  
To date, the United States has focused on a number of areas, including trade facilitation, investment 
promotion, the information and co mmunications technology (ICT) sector, and agricultural trade, as 
key priorities in developing longer -term trade and investment ties to trading partners in the region.  
 
129.  Please introduce the ICT cooperation of the United States in the MENA region and the regions 
concerned. What are the effects and problems?  
 
RESPONSE: Given the importance of the technology sector to the U.S. economy, ICT issues are 
central to the Administration's trade agenda.  We address these issues through various 
interactions we have wi th countries in the MENA region, including where applicable management 
of our five FTAs, engagement through Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with 
multiple countries, reviews of GSP benefits, and through work on WTO accession for those 
countries se eking it.  
 
Question 130  
4.4.5 U.S. -EU Trade (4.63)  
The Working Group is also laying the groundwork for a potential, future free trade agreement once 
the UK has left the EU in March 2019, and exploring areas in which the two countries can collaborate 
to pro mote open markets and free and fair trade around the world.  
 
130.  After the completion of the legal procedures for Brexit, will the United States sign a bilateral 
free trade agreement with the United Kingdom? What relationship will the agreement maintain 
with t he current TTIP being negotiated between the United States and Europe?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The United States Trade 
Representative has notified Congress under the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
Accountability Act of the President's intent to begin negotiations with the UK on a new bilateral 
trade agreement.  
 
Question 131  
4.4.6 China  
 
131.  The function of the review mechanism is to examine the impact of a Member's trade policies 
and practices on the multilateral trading system. We have noticed that the U.S. has taken this 
opportunity to comment and challenge other states policies. We believe  that this act of the U.S. 
is actually looking for excuses for its trade protectionism and unilaterism practices. At present, 
the U.S. emphasizes "America first", ignores the multilateral trading system and frequently 
adopts trade protectionism and unilate rism practices. Such behavio ur of the U.S.is the biggest 
threat to the multilateral system. We believe making comment and challenging other members' 
policies in its own policy statement is not the right attitude the U.S. should take as a member 
under review. Could the U.S. please explain?  
 
RESPONSE: China's determination to maintain the state's leading role in the economy and to 
continue to pursue industrial policies that promote, guide, and support domestic industries while 
simultaneously and actively  seeking to impede, disadvantage, and harm their foreign WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 97 - 
 
  counterparts is the biggest threat to the multilateral trading system. China's approach is 
incompatible with the market -based approach expressly envisioned by WTO Members and 
contrary to the fundamen tal principles running throughout the many WTO agreements.  
 
Question 132  
4.4.6 China (4.67)  
The United States also will take all other steps necessary to rein in harmful state -led, non -market 
policies and practices pursued by China, even when they do not f all squarely within WTO disciplines, 
as evidenced by USTR's investigation of Chinese technology transfer policies and practices pursuant 
to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.  
 
132.  The United States has promised in the Statement of Administrative  Action, the attachment of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, that the United States will resort to WTO dispute settlement 
for unfair trade measures covered by the WTO rules, and will not apply to the 301 investigation. 
The United States is asked to explain  why it initiated the 301 investigation on China on the 
discriminatory technology licensing policy covered by the WTO rules. Does this violate the 
commitment made by the United States in the Statement of Administrative Action?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States refers China to the U.S. response to China's question #10.  
 
Question 133  
4.5.2 Promoting Digital Trade (4.83)  
The United States places great importance on electronic commerce (or "digital trade"), which plays 
a crucial role in strengthening and supporting firms in every sector of the economy.  
 
133.  A broad consensus has been reached that the digital economy has made s ignificant 
contributions to economic growth in a country and even across the globe. The United States has 
also expressed its concern about digital trade issues on various occasions. However, in order to 
construct the international rules of digital trade, w e have to consider the digital divide between 
countries with different levels of development. As a power of the digital economy, should the 
United States consider the interests of developing countries in the rule construction process? 
How should their inte rests and demand be balanced?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. These questions are 
outside the scope of the Trade Policy Review.  
 
Questions 134 -135 
7 Trade and Labo ur (7.1)  
The new United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement includes a Labor Chapter with enforceable rules 
that protect the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining; prohibit trade in goods 
produced by forced labo ur, including forced child labo ur; add ress violence against workers exercising 
their rights; ensure that migrant workers are protected under labo ur laws; and establish mechanisms 
to monitor and address labo ur concerns.  
 
134.  The USMCA Labor Chapter also requires that 40% -45% of the products must b e manufactured 
by laborers with an hourly wage of not less than USD 16. This rule appears to protect the labo ur 
rights in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. In fact, will it increase the cost of the auto 
manufacturing industry in North America and prev ent American job opportunities from being lost 
due to low labo ur costs in Mexico? Will it also prevent other low -labour-cost products from other 
countries to enter the United States? Does this rule counter to the concept of free trade?  
 
RESPONSE:  The new labour value content rules in the USMCA will support better jobs for North 
American producers and workers by requiring that a significant portion of vehicle content be 
produced by high -wage workers. This will help ensure that high -wage producers and worker s 
are able to compete on an even playing field, and incentivize new vehicle and par ts investment 
in North America.  
 
135.  Will the high labo ur standards lead to the return of American automakers invested by the 
United States in Mexico back, and thus deprive Mexi can workers of employment opportunities? 
Does this practice violate the original intention of labo ur protection?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: The new USMCA rules will help maintain, re -shore, and incentivize automotive 
manufacturing, investment, and jobs in North America an d help support employment 
opportunities for all North American countries.  
 
PART III. OTHER QUES TIONS  
 
Question 136  
136.  In the American manufacturing sector, although there is no incentive policy for the 
manufacturing industry at the federal level, there are a large number of incentive programs at 
the state level to attract manufacturing investment. For example, New Jersey implements the 
Assisting New Jersey Economic Growth Plan to provide preferential tax relief for investment in 
specific towns and industries. Economic Regeneration  and Growth Plan provides an auxiliary 
award of 20% of the total cost of the development projects for investment in specific towns, 
covering industries which include a large number of manufacturing areas. Mississippi provides a 
50% or 100% consumption tax exemption for enterprises that have headquarters in the state 
or purchase new equipment from designated businesses. Florida exempts manufacturing tax for 
manufacturing goods e specially  for export. Are these incentive plans included in the subsidy 
notifications provided by the U.S. Are these incentive plans suspected of violating the provisions 
concerning the prohibited subsidies and specific subsidies in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Article 3)? Please expl ain. 
 
RESPONSE: We refer China to our last subsidies notification (G/SCM/N/315/USA), which 
covered the period from October 1, 2014 through September 30, 2016 and included over 650 
sub-federal programs.  We note that the notification included thirteen progra ms administered by 
the New Jersey Economic Development Authority.  In addition, eight notified programs were tax 
incentive programs administered by Mississippi, and 17 were tax incentives administered by 
Florida.  
 
Question 137  
137.  The US announced in July 2018 that a new aid package will be provided as temporary help for 
producers hit by retaliatory tariffs. Is there any detailed implementation plan for this package? 
Will the subsidies depend on current production factors? Will such amber box payments exceed 
the bound AMS?  
 
RESPONSE: Details on the Market Facilitation Program can be found at: 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/08/30/2018 -18842/m arket-facilitation -
program . Final data on payments under the program will no t be available until after enro lment 
closes in 2019. As of mid -November, approximately $840 million had been paid. These programs 
are administered consistent with WTO obligations.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Follow up questions from  China  
Part I. Questions based on Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Questions 1 -16 
Section Summary (paragraphs: 6; 8; 11; 12; 16; 20; 21; 29; 30)  
Page11, para 6  
The United States continues to be the world's main recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
main FDI sources are: the EU -28 (59% of the FDI stock in the United States in 2017), Japan (12%), 
Canada (11%), and Switzerland (8%).  
 
1. There  are many cases in which China fails to invest in the United States due to t he U.S. 
governments intervention. Is the United States of the opinion that this is one of the main reasons 
that affect Chinas emergence as a major source of FDI in the United States?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States maintains an open and market -driven economic  system based 
on the rule of law, which welcomes foreign investment into the U.S. economy.  The system and 
the strength of the U.S. economy have made the United States the largest destination for FDI 
in the world.  The independent Secretariat Report attrib utes this to the United States’ “open 
markets, liberal investment regime, large consumer base, higher education system, skilled and 
productive workforce, a business environment that encourages innovation, legal protections, 
and the world’s largest venture capital and private equity market.”  
 
Page 11, para 8  
As mentioned above, the thrust of trade policy changed during the review period. The President's 
2018 Trade Policy Agenda is driven to achieve "free, fair, and reciprocal" trade relations, considered 
critical to the U.S. national security policy.  
 
2. Are there any timetables or regional plans for the renegotiation and revision of trade 
agreements? If so, can you brief on the estimated timetables and the priority targets?  
 
RESPONSE:  The President ’s 2019 Trade  Policy Agenda is scheduled to be published on March 
1, 2019.  It will be posted on USTR’s website – www.ustr.gov  – in the Reports section.  
 
Page 11, Para 8  
As mentioned above, the thrust of trade policy changed during t he review period. The President's 
2018 Trade Policy Agenda is driven to achieve free, fair, and reciprocal trade relations, considered 
critical to the U.S. national security policy. It also focuses on renegotiating and revising trade deals. 
In terms of ref orming the multilateral trading system, the Agenda advocates for sensible and fair 
reforms to the WTO. It notes that the United States remains committed to working with all WTO 
Members who share the United States' goal of fair and reciprocal trade deals.  
 
3. How to look at fairness and justice from a global and historical perspective? In particular, how 
to protect fairness and justice for developing countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  These questions do not appear to appear to be retrospective questions about the 
U.S. trade  regime, and they are therefore outside the scope of the TPR.  
 
Page 12, para 11  
The U.S. foreign investment regime remained unchanged during the review period. The investment 
regime is generally open, with a few sector -specific limitations, and review procedures on foreign 
investment in a few industries, including the airline and nuclear energy industries. Additionally, the 
United States has a national security review process, applicable to foreign investment that might 
affect national security interest s. International investment agreements and investment chapters in 
FTAs are used by the United States to foster foreign investment.  
 
4. Please list in detail which sectors and areas in the United States have restrictions and review 
requirements for foreign inv estment.  
 
RESPONSE: The OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements provides a summary of the 
sectors in the United States (and other countries) in which there are certain limitations 
on foreign investment.  See: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment -policy/Code -capital -WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 100 - 
 
  movements -EN.pdf . Separately, the pilot program implemented by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) includes within the scope of transactions subject to CFIUS 
review certain non -controlling investments in U.S. businesses that produce, design, test, 
manufacture, fabricate, or develop critic al technologies related to specific industries.  
 
The U.S. government issued the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization in August and the 
Determination and Temporary Provisions Pertaining to a Pilot Programme to Review Certain 
Transactions Involving F oreign Persons and Critical Technologies in October this year. The U.S. 
government has further expanded the scope of national security from critical infrastructures and 
critical technologies to information, networks, data and other sectors, and incorporate d 27 key 
industries into key review areas such as aircraft manufacturing, missile and spacecraft 
manufacturing, nuclear power, petrochemical manufacturing, research and development in 
nanotechnology, research and development in biotechnology, semiconductor  and related device 
manufacturing. The above policy trends show that the U.S. government is significantly strengthening 
its foreign investment security review system. We believe that the Secretariats report has ignored 
the above policy trends in its judgme nt that the foreign investment system in the United States has 
remained unchanged.  
 
5. Please list in detail the changes in all laws, regulations and policies on foreign investment over 
the past two years.  
 
RESPONSE: The measures cited by China became law af ter the TPR period of review.  The 
Secretariat’s assessment that the investment regime remained unchanged during the period of 
review is accurate.  
 
Page 12, para 12  
CFIUS reviews transactions based on voluntary notifications filed by the parties, or on its  own 
initiative if it believes the transaction is a covered transaction and may raise national security 
concerns.  
 
6. Please elaborate on examples of national security reviews in each specific area.  
 
RESPONSE: The CFIUS regulations provide numerous examples o f “covered tran sactions” at 31 
C.F.R. 800.301.  Please also see the published guidance on the types of transactions that CFIUS 
has reviewed that have presented national security considerations,  available at: 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/international/foreign -investment/Pages/cfius -
guidance.aspx . 
 
7. Please indicate the next step of implemen tation plan of foreign investment review in the United 
States, including whether it is aimed at specific countries and sectors or not. Will the United 
States use CFIUSs investment review as a means of counterbalance in trade?  
 
RESPONSE: Like prior CFIUS le gislation, FIRRMA itself does not single out any specific 
country.  CFIUS reviews transactions solely on t he basis of national security. The United States 
reminds Members that the TPR is a retrospective exercise.  
 
8. Could  the US please indicate whether there will be any sectors that will be affected much more 
than other sectors after the issuance of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
(FIRRMA)? If so, which sectors are they?  
 
RESPONSE:  We refrain from spec ulating on future outcomes.  We remind Members that the 
TPR is a retrospective review.  
 
Page 13, para 16  
The United States continues to be an active user of anti -dumping (AD) duties. Between 2015 and 
2017, the number of AD investigation initiations increas ed, totalling 133.  
 
9. Please  explain why anti -dumping measures are still often used while Section 201, Section 232 
and Section 301 investigations are frequently initiated. Has it caused double remedies over the 
same products?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: The United States adm inisters its trade remedy laws in a manner that is consistent 
with its WTO obligations, and its antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are 
generally initiated in response to petiti ons filed by the U.S. industry.  The decision to impose an 
antidu mping or countervailing measure is based purely on a factual determination of whether 
the dumping or subsidization exists and whether that dumping or subsidization has caused or 
threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry. Where dumping (or s ubsidization), 
injury or threat thereof, and a causal link have been found, the United States will impose an 
antidumping o r countervailing duty measure. No other factors are taken into consideration 
before imposing such measures.  
 
Antidumping or countervai ling measures are not related to mechanisms such as Section 201, 
232, and 301, which are each subject to different legal authority under U.S. law and address 
different har ms. 
 
Page 15, para 20  
One such case emerged in December 2016 concerning a 1999 beef dispute with the European Union; 
as of mid -2018 no action had been taken.  
 
10. Please introduce the reason why the United States has not taken action on the beef dispute with 
the European Union.  
 
RESPONSE: The matter is currently being handled bilaterally with  the European Union.  
 
Page 15 Para 21  
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury administers 
nearly 30 programmes involving economic and trade sanctions. In general, the measures are 
designed to counter terrorism, tr ansnational criminal organizations, cyber -related crimes, drugs 
trafficking, human rights abuses, corruption, trade in rough diamonds, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Many of the measures target individuals or entities rather than 
jurisdictions. Country -specific sanctions have been tightened against the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, Iran and Cuba during the period under review, while programmes related to 
Myanmar and Cte d'Ivoire were terminated in 2016.  
 
11. How does the United S tates view the price fluctuations as a result of the changes in the relations 
of market supply and demand of some commodities caused by sanctions against some countries 
and their negative impact on economic development?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
administers and enforces comprehensive and targeted economic sanctions programs in 
furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. These sanctions programs 
implement multiple  legal authorities, such as statutes, or Executive Orders issued by the 
President.   These  authorities are further reflected by OFAC  in its regulations which are published 
in the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 31, Chapter V of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), 
and on OFAC's website at: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac . 
 
Page17, para 29  
The 2014 Farm Bill was amended in early 2018, through the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2018, to  provide support for seed cotton, to make the Margin Protection Programme more 
attractive for small and medium -sized dairy farms, and to make additional disaster relief available. 
A programme to support the cost of cotton ginning was re -introduced as a tem porary measure in 
March 2018. The legislative process for the 2018 Farm Bill is ongoing.  
 
12. How does the United States provide support for cotton seeds? Please specify the details of the 
policy and how to enjoy the policy.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States does not provide support for cotton seeds. The Bipartisan Budget 
Act of 2018 (BBA) made historical seed cotton base acres eligible for payments under the Price 
Loss Coverage or Agriculture Risk Coverage programs.  Seed cotton is raw cotton containing 
both lint and seed, as harvested and before ginning. Eligibility for payments does not require 
production of seed cotton or any other commodity.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 102 - 
 
  13. Please specify the details of the Margin Protection Programme and the  programme to support 
the cost of cotton g inning , and how to enjoy the policies.  
 
RESPONSE: The Margin Protection Program for Dairy (MPP -Dairy) allows dai ry operations to 
participate in  an insurance -like program that makes payments on their historical production 
when the margin between the nationa l all-milk price and a national average feed price falls below 
specified levels between $4 and $8 per hundredweight. Producers register their historical 
production and choose the share of that production to cover and at what margin. Coverage at 
the $4 marg in is available for an administrative fee per operation; coverage at higher margins 
requires payment of  a premium per hundredweight.  
 
In March 2018, USDA announced a Cotton Ginning Cost -Share (CGCS) program to provide 
assistance to cotton producers to help  cover ginning costs. Producers were eligible based on 
their historical 2016 cotton plantings, and payments were equal to 20 percent of the average 
ginning cost in the producer’s production region. Producers had to meet income and conservation 
compliance r equirements and faced i ndividual payment limitations.  
 
14. Are the above policies or other new policies included in the 2018 Farm Act?  
 
RESPONSE:  We look forward to keeping the Membership informed of any changes in agricultural 
policies as a result of the 2018 Farm Bill.  
 
Page 15 Para 30  
The United States is a major producer and consumer of primary energy resources, and technological 
breakthroughs in the domestic production of shale oil and gas have had a profound effect on global 
energy markets over the la st ten years. U.S. production of crude oil reached 11 million barrels per 
day in July 2018, for the first time in history, and the United States is now a net exporter of petroleum 
products and natural gas. On the demand side, U.S. primary energy consumptio n has levelled off, 
as the economy has become ever more energy efficient. Natural gas has replaced coal as the 
principal resource in electricity generation, but coal -fired power plants still deliver 30% of the 
electricity produced. About 17% of the electri city generated in the United States in 2017 was made 
from renewable energy resources. The United States does not have a national target for renewable 
energy or an explicit federal support mechanism. However, 29 states and the District of Columbia 
have adop ted renewable portfolio standards or similar binding targets, and a further 8 states (and 
one territory) have set non -binding targets. States apply numerous measures to promote the 
development and use of renewable energy resources.  
 
15. The United States has become a major producer and consumer of primary energy resources and 
a net exporter of petroleum products and natural gas. What non -trade measures have been taken 
by the United States to promote oil and gas exports?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. government fully  supports an efficient, transparent and smooth 
functioning international market for both oil and gas, and U.S. companies export these 
commodities all around the world. Multiple U.S. agencies are involved in the regulatory process 
of, for example, LNG expor t facilities, and have already authorized exports of over 230 billion 
cubic meters per year of natural gas LNG to anywhere in the world not prohibited by U.S. law or 
policy.  All export sales are controlled, however, by market conditions, and market condit ions 
determine U.S. oil and gas exports. The U.S. government also participates in numerous public 
and private energy industry meetings, trade missions, symposiums, conferences, exhibitions, 
and related events to provide detailed information on the role of the U.S. government in this 
process, while again, leaving the export sale conditions to the markets.  
 
16. Objectively speaking, are the United States sanctions against Iran conducive to increasing the 
share of U.S. oil and gas exports in the world?  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. sanctions programs are in furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign 
policy objectives, not for competitive advantage.   
 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 103 - 
 
  Questions 17 -20 
Section Economic environment  
Page 21, para 1.12  
There was a policy shift in 2018, when fiscal  policy turned pro -cyclical, with the enactment of the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) (Box 1.1), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 and the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018.  
 
17. In 2018, the U.S. fiscal policy turned to expansionary, while the  U.S. trade policy emphasizes 
the reduction of trade deficit. How does the United States view the deviation between these two 
policy objectives?  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. fiscal policy changes were motivated by long -term considerations, including 
bringing the U.S. c orporate tax rate in line with those of other countries.  At the same time trade 
policy has prioritized free, fair, and reciprocal trade.  A main objective of both these policies is 
to level the playing field for U.S. companies; as such they do not diverge . 
 
Page 35, para 1.37  
The United States continues to be the largest foreign investor abroad. On a historical cost basis, the 
stock of outward FDI was US$5.3 trillion in 2016.  
 
18. Please update the data on the stock of outward FDI to the present or 2017.  
 
RESPONSE: The stock of U.S. outward FDI was $6.0 billion in 2017 (historical cost basis).  This 
information can be found on the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ website: www.bea.gov . 
 
19. Please provide more information on ou tward FDI of the United States, including sectoral 
distribution, investment patterns, and comparison of operating conditions in developed and 
developing countries.  
 
RESPONSE: The stock of U.S. outward FDI was $6.0 billion in 2017 (historical cost basis).  This 
information can be found on the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ website: www.bea.gov . 
 
Page 35, para 1.38  
The report shows that 74% of the accumulated U.S. FDI abroad is concentrated in high -income 
developed countries, and, in recent years, the share of investment going to developing countries 
has fallen.  
 
20. In recent years, U.S. FDI in developing countries  has declined. Please explain the situation in 
detail, including specific data and the analysis for the reason of this declination.  
 
RESPONSE: Over the last few decades, U.S. investment abroad has shifted from extractive, 
processing, and manufacturing indu stries toward high technology ser vices and financial 
industries.  As a result, U.S. direct investment abroad focused less in developing countries and 
more in developed countries with advanced infrastructure and communications systems.  
 
Questions 21 -22 
Section 2.2.2 Trade policy formulation (2.16; 2.18)  
 
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress established an interagency trade policy 
mechanism to advise the USTR on trade policy Both the TPSC and TPRG are chaired by the USTR, 
and they consist of st aff- and sub -cabinet -level officials, respectively, of the Departments of Treasury 
the Environmental Protection Agency the Council on Environmental Quality  
 
The private and public sector also have a role in the formulation of U.S. trade policy through the 
trade advisory committee system, established by Congress in the Trade Act of 1974The system 
includes: The President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN); five 
general policy advisory committees dealing with environment, labour, ag riculture, Africa , and 
intergovernmental issues.  
 
21. Environmental Protection Agency the Council on Environmental Quality USTR. Please elaborate 
on the functions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 104 - 
 
  mentioned in paragraph 2.16. On which environmentally relevant areas do the two institutions 
provide policy advice to the USTR respectively?  
 
RESPONSE: The Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality, 
as members of the interagency trade pol icy organization, provide policy advice on the whole 
array of trade issues that are presented to the interagency organization, though their expertise 
is in the intersection of trade and environment.  
 
22.  Please elaborate on the composition, specific funct ions and work procedures of the advisory 
committee dealing with environment issues under the trade advisory committee system.  
 
RESPONSE: Information regarding the TEPAC is available on USTR’s website at: 
https://ustr.gov/about -us/advisory -committees/trade -and-environment -policy -advisory -
committee -tepac . The Membership of the TEPAC is listed, and the Charter provides information 
on the objectiv es and scope of activities, description of duties, and other operational information.  
 
Questions 23 -28 
Section 2.4 Investment Regime ( 2.43; 2.48)  
 
International investment agreements are used in the United States to foster foreign investment. The 
objective  of these agreements is to develop opportunities for the United States and partner countries 
to enhance opportunities for trade and investment. Topics for cooperation usually include: market 
access issues; labour; environmental protection; and the enforcem ent of intellectual property rights.  
 
23. Please elaborate on the specific areas of activities involved and the progress made in 
environmental cooperation under investment agreements.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has successfully negotiated provisions in bilateral investment 
treaties and free trade agreements (FTAs) including investment rules, that make clear that 
environmental rules should not be relaxed to encourage foreign investment.  For example, Article 
24.4(3) of the USMCA states in part: “[A] Party  shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or 
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or 
reduces the protection afforded in those laws in order to encourage trade or investment between 
the Parties.”  
 
Page 46, Table 2.1 Foreign Investment covered transactions reviewed by CFIUS 2013 -15, P47 
Table2.2 Origin of foreign investor and industry reviewed by CFIUS.  
 
24. Please update the data of the above two tables to 2016 -2017.  
 
RESPONSE: The most recent statistics that are publicly available, including certain statistics 
from 2016, can be found at: https://www.treasury.gov/res ource -center/international/foreign -
investment/Pages/cfius -reports.aspx . 
 
25. Please provide detailed information on the FDI programmes reviewed by CFIUS, including 
programme name, country of investment destination, time, sector, reason and basis for reject ion. 
 
RESPONSE: CFIUS does not publicly disclose information on specific transactions.  CFIUS does, 
however, publish reports with categories of information about transactions it has reviewed, 
including the sec tor, country, and disposition. This information  can be found at: 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/international/foreign -investment/Pages/cfius -
reports.aspx . 
 
CFIUS reviews transact ions based on voluntary notifications filed by the parties, or on its own 
initiative in the absence of a voluntary notification if it believes the transaction is a covered 
transaction and may raise national security concerns. Each transaction is reviewed o n a case -by-
case basis based on individual facts and circumstances. Once a formal notification is submitted, 
CFIUS conducts an initial review. If during the initial review period CFIUS cannot make a final 
determination, the case will proceed to an investig ation phase. If national security concerns are 
identified during the review and investigation phase, CFIUS may impose conditions, or CFIUS and 
the transacting parties may negotiate a mitigation agreement to resolve any national security 
concerns. If CFIUS determines that the national security concerns cannot be resolved and the parties WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  do not withdraw and abandon the transaction, the Committee will recommend that the President 
prohibit the transaction.  
 
26. This year, the US government issued the Determinat ion and Temporary Provisions Pertaining to 
a Pilot Programme To Review Certain Transactions Involving Foreign Persons and Critical 
Technologies, which stipulates that foreign investments in 27 key sectors such as aircraft 
manufacturing, missile and spacecr aft manufacturing, nuclear power, petrochemical manufacturing, 
research and development in nanotechnology, research and development in biotechnology, 
semiconductor and related device manufacturing must be reported to CFIUS beforehand. Do foreign 
investors need to report to CFIUS beforehand for all the investment programmes involving the 27 
key sectors? In the case that U.S. enterprises are not controlled by foreign investors, how to 
understand the concept that foreign investment may obtain material non -public technical 
information from U.S. enterprises?  
 
RESPONSE: Information on the pilot program, including frequently asked questions, can be 
found at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -
investment -in-the-united -states -cfius. 
 
27. The two foreign investment projects rejected by the U.S. government in 2016 -2017 were both 
implemented by Ch inese enterprises in the semiconductor sector, including a Chinese enterprises 
acquisition of a German company with businesses in the United States. Did CFIUS consider 
implementing mitigation agreements when reviewing the two projects? Has the United State s ever 
communicated with the Chinese enterprises on taking necessary measures to eliminate national 
security risks? If yes, please brief on the processes and results of communication. If not, please 
explain why the United States did not communicate with th e Chinese enterprises.  
 
RESPONSE:  CFIUS does not publicly disclose information on specific transactions.  
 
28. National security is not clearly defined in the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
of 2018, which leads to great ambiguity and subje ctivity in the review process. Does this constitute 
an abuse of GATT Article 21 on national security exceptions?  
 
RESPONSE: While the scope of CFIUS’s jurisdiction has expanded under FIRRMA, CFIUS reviews 
transactions solely on t he basis of national securi ty. Please see section 721(f) of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950, as amended, as well as the published guidance available 
at: https://www.t reasury.gov/resource -center/international/foreign -investment/Pages/cfius -
guidance.aspx  for an illustrative list of factors that CFIUS considers in determining whether a 
particular transaction poses national security risk.  FIRRMA is consistent with the Uni ted States’ 
WTO obligations.   
 
Questions 29 -34 
Section Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.4; 3.25)  
 
29. Please further explain or clarify the relationship between the ACE system of the United States 
and its Single Window system, and the latest achievements in and future plans for the construction 
of the Single Window system.  
 
RESPONSE:  ACE serves as the U.S. Single Window and its streamlined trade processes are 
valued at a savings of over $388 million for the private sector and $35 million for CBP in fiscal 
year 2018.  Through the implementation of ACE, CBP has converted 269 import and export paper 
forms into electronic data submission, thus greatly reducing the workload for importers and 
facilitating trade.  Additional examples of improved facilitation of trade volume supported by ACE 
capabilities include:  
 
- 250 million electronic data transmissions to pa rtner government agencies supporting the 
single window;  
- 65% duties, taxes, and fees collected via the Periodic Monthly Statement, which 
streamlines accounting and payment; and  
- $227 million in recovered revenue from targeting activities through ACE validat ions. 
 
In February 2018, CBP deployed the last of the major s cheduled core ACE deployments. All 
phases of cargo processing are now available in ACE. CBP is currently focused on sustaining all WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  deployed ACE capabilities and ensuring ACE operates as a highly available and reliable system.  
There is also an ongoing demand for additional ACE enhancements that emerge from our active 
dialogue with our industry, government agency, a nd congressional stakeholders.  
 
With regard to ACE enhancement requirements from our  Partner Government Agencies (PGA), 
prioritization and funding for this work will continue under the Border Interagency Executive 
Council (BIEC) , an interagency collaboration and decision -making group comprised of those U.S. 
Federal agencies that regulate international trade.  
 
In 1996, the United States notified the WTO that the legislation it had notified to the GATT had not 
been changed and thus remained valid under the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. No changes 
have been made to the customs valuation re gulations during the period under review.  
 
Based on the above information, we have paid close attention to and hope to understand how U.S. 
Customs responds to the valuation problems brought by emerging trade models and forms with the 
customs valuation syst em remaining unchanged. Our detailed questions are as follows:  
 
30. As regards the transfer pricing of multinational corporations, how does U.S.  
Customs conduct price check, and are there uniform procedures and standards for the check?  
 
RESPONSE: Since the  Customs Modernization Act (PL 103 -182), the United States has applied 
the concept of “Informed Compliance and Shared Responsibility” which means the government 
is responsible for fully and clearly informing the trade community of their legal obligations w ith 
regards to customs matters, and the trade community is responsible for complying with all legal 
requirements related to the goods they import.    Thus, the importer is responsible for declaring 
the value of imported goods to CBP.  As part of its risk ma nagement, CBP may seek further 
information to substantiate the declared value of merchandise based on identification of the 
transaction as high risk for non -compliance with US laws.  All requests for information, including 
those pertaining to valuation, fo llow a standardized process.  
 
31. Are the OECD principles and methods of transfer pricing fully accepted by the US customs?  
 
RESPONSE:  The OECD principles and methods of transfer pricing pertain to the taxation aspects 
of transfer pricing that tax administ rations examine, but do not pertai n to customs valuation. 
CBP’s appraisement decisions are consistent with the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement as 
implemented in U.S. law, including with respect to transfer pricing.   
 
32. As for cross -border e -commerce, ha s U.S. Customs implemented a simple yet highly efficient 
valuation management system? If yes, please specify.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States applies the same rules and procedures for e -commerce as it does 
for other types of shipments, and complies with the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement, as 
implemented in U.S. law for all types of import transactions.  
 
33. Have different price check procedures been applied to imported commodities of trade and non -
trade natures respectively?  
 
RESPONSE: As stated above, The U nited States applies the same rules and procedures to all 
import transactions and fully complies with the WTO Customs Valuation Agreemen t, as 
implemented in U.S. law.  
 
34. How does U.S. Customs implement the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement for a large numb er 
of imported commodities of non -trade natures without transaction prices?  
 
RESPONSE: For all import transactions, the United States complies with the WTO Customs 
Valuation Agreement, as implemented in U.S. law, including with respect to whether transacti on 
value or another method  of valuation is appropriate.  
 
Question 35  
3.1.2.2 Preferential (3.28)  
Each FTA concluded by the United States has its own set of origin criteria. The variety of methods 
applied reflects the outcome of the negotiations, including industry preferences for particular WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  methods, notably in textiles ... However, it also uses other methods, e.g. ... NAFTA prescribes a 
specific format for the certificates of origin, but most other FTAs or preferential agreements do not.  
 
35. Regarding the determination of the preferential conditions in the rules of origin, please clearly 
explain which  methods or standards are applicable to variety of methods and other methods. What 
are the applicable rules in the case where NAFTA prescribes a specific format for the certificates of 
origin, but most other FTAs or preferential agreements do not?  
 
RESPONS E: The NAFTA Certificate of Origin can be found at the following link: 
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/nafta/nafta -certificate -origin . A certificate of origin template 
for other  FTAs is available  at the following  link: https://www.cbp.gov/document/guides/certific
ation-origin -template . 
 
Questions 36 -37 
Section 3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports (3.39; 3.42)  
 
The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (PL 99 -272) (COBRA) - introduced a number 
of customs user fees, including fees for processing and inspection services. The Fixing America's 
Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (PL 114 -94) (FAST Act) - subsequently amended COBRA by 
requiring the user fees to be adjusted periodically to account for inflation, taking 2014 as the base 
year. 
 
36. Please introduce the adjustment procedures of customs user fees. In particular, under what 
circumstances will the adj ustment of customs user fees be triggered, and how is the adjustment 
range of fees determined?  
 
RESPONSE: Section 32201 of the FAST Act amended section 13031 of the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c) which requir es the fee to 
be increased to be commensurate with the percentage increase of the Consumer Price Index for 
the previous 12 months.  
 
Excise taxes may be levied at the federal, state, local, or municipal level, and some products are 
taxed at more than one le vel. More than 100 excise taxes are maintai ned at the federal level 
(Table  3.4). The revenue from these taxes are either dedicated to specific purposes (trust funds) or 
held for general expenditure (general funds). Goods taxed at state or local level inclu de fuels, 
cigarettes and other tobacco products, and alcoholic beverages. Rates vary widely from state to 
state. Excise taxes are applied equally to imported and domestically produced goods and services.  
 
37. Is it true that the United States did not levy royalties representing the rights and interests of 
national owners from some mineral products owned by the federation? If so, what is the 
consideration? Can this be regarded as a subsidy provided by the government to mineral products?  
 
RESPONSE: Consistent  with Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, the United States has notified all of the federal programs that it considers to be 
subsidies to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
Questions 38 -39 
Section  3.1.5.3 Controls, special procedures, or diplomatic measures (3.51)  
 
The United States lifted nuclear -related sanctions on Iran in early 2016 as part of a Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed between Iran and the United States and its partners 
on 14 July 2015. 6 The President announced on 8 May 2018 the end of U.S. participation in the 
JCPOA.  
 
38. What is the international legal base for the United States unilateral pullout from the JCPOA? Has 
such a unilateralist act affected the free a nd fair trade environment? Is it within the scope of the 
security exceptions of GATT and the subsequent WTO? Is it in line with the strict restrictions on the 
principle of protective jurisdiction in international law? Please demonstrate whether Iran’s 
behaviours have constituted criminal behaviours generally recognized by all civilized countries and, 
in particular, had a demonstrable impact on the United States as stated in Restatement of the Law: 
                                                
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  The Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Is it necess ary to impose sanction, an economic 
action of extraterritorial jurisdiction?  
 
RESPONSE: The JCPOA is not part of the trade regime of the United States, and therefore it is 
outside of the TPR exercise.  
 
39. Please elaborate further on the resumption of sanc tions against Iran and provide the division of 
labour and the role played by the functional agency that made decision on the sanctions as well as 
concrete and objective discretion criteria. For example, what kind of trade involving Iran will 
constitute sub stantial funding, and what kind of sanctions will be imposed on transactions with 
entities controlled by those on the SDN list?  
 
RESPONSE:  Information on the sanctions programs applicable to Iran appears at: 
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm . 
 
Questions 40 -42 
Section 3.1.6 AD, CVD, and Safeguard Measures (3.65; 3.71)  
 
Question  
40. How can the U.S. government and its relevant agencies further improve the efficiency of 
administrative reviews?  
 
RESPONSE: Administrative reviews are conducted in accordance with the timelines imposed 
under U.S. law.  
 
41. Is there any unfair treatment for the enterprises involved to trace the export tax rates that they 
had to pay with the tax  rate results determined through administrative reviews?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States conducts all of its administrative proceedings in a fair and 
impartial manner, as required under U.S. law.  
 
42. In some cases of administrative review, the US adopts a s pecial sampling method. What are the 
specific criteria for sampling? The calculation of separate tax rates does not exclude 0, de minimus , 
and some or all of AFA enterprises tax rates. Are there any WTO rules that justify such practice?  
 
RESPONSE: The criteria used to sample are based on the facts and circumstan ces of a particular 
proceeding.  China should examine the specific proceedings for further information, which can be 
found at: https://access.tr ade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Questions 43 -48 
Section 3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation (3.105 -3.112)  
An investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 
1862), to determine the effect of imported steel on national security was initiated on 19 April 2017. 
As mandated by Section 232(b) (1) (B), the USDOC notified the Department of Defence the same 
day. 
 
43. How does the United States determine the effects of imported steel on U.S. national security? 
What are the criteria for deter mining national security? How to ensure that security clauses are not 
used in extended application?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governin g the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
44. With regard to the imposition of taxes in the Section 232 Investigation, the US exempted, 
through agreements, countries with large exports from such imposition, while many countries with 
small exports are excluded . What are the conditions of the US governments execution of exemption? 
How does the US measure the threat posed by relatively small exports to US national security? What 
WTO rules and laws can justify such practice?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issue s that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  (e) China was identified as the largest producer and exporter of steel, and the largest source of 
excess steel capacity; and (f) for certain types of steel, such as for electrical tran sformers, only one 
U.S. producer remains.  
 
45. the largest source of excess steel capacity Please specify the time frame and basis for the 
description of the largest source of excess steel capacity.  
 
RESPONSE:  We refer China to the report of the Department  of Commerce on its investigation 
conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.  
 
46. for certain types of steel, such as electrical transformers, only one U.S. producer remains, 
regarding for certain types of steel, such as el ectrical transformers, only one U.S. producer remains, 
please explain whether the United States believe that the closure or reduction of production of 
enterprises due to insufficient competitiveness in the market may also be attributed to the excess 
capaci ty of other countries. If yes, please explain the logic.  
 
RESPONSE: We refer China to the report of the Department of Commerce on its investigation 
conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.  
 
47. What is the United States ' view on the global comparative advantage of steel production? Has 
the United States analysed that its decline in shares has been caused by a decline in global 
competitiveness or an increase in industrial transfer and upgrading rather than the problems caus ed 
by other producing countries? Is it contrary to the trade liberalization advocated by the United States 
to comprehensively raise the import tariffs on steel or impose additional tariffs?  
 
RESPONSE: The view of the United States —widely recognized by oth er WTO Members —is that 
China’s non -market policies and practices have led to massive excess capacity and distortions 
of world markets.  China’s policies have also led to global conditions in which core industries 
vital to U.S. national security are not abl e to survive and invest for the future on market -based 
terms.  China’s policies undermine the basic fairness of international trade.  
 
48. How does the United States view the potential impact on steel prices caused by this non -market 
factor?  
 
RESPONSE: We refer China to publicly available information on steel prices.  
 
Questions 49 -52  
Section 3.1.7.1.3 Aluminium investigation (3.114; 3.115; 3.120)  
Some of the main findings in the USDOC's report include: (a) aluminium is essential to U.S. national 
security, as it is needed to satisfy requirements for the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) for 
maintaining effective military capabilities, and requirement s for critical infrastructure sectors that 
are central to the operation of the U.S. economy and Government, including power transmissions, 
transportation systems, manufacturing industries, construction, and others;  
 
49. In addition to aluminium, actually many mineral products are vital to national security. However, 
the global distribution of mineral resources is uneven, so all countries need to rely on trade for the 
supply of certain types of resources. Is it the best way for resource importing countries to secure 
the safety supply of resources with free trade? If anti -trade liberalization measures that increase 
import tariffs are adopted, will it have a negative impact on the security of global trade in mineral 
products? Has the United States evaluated it ? 
 
RESPONSE: As noted in response to Question 47 above, non -market policies and practices by 
certain WTO Members have led to massive excess capacity and distortions in global markets.  
These policies have also led to conditions in which core industries vit al to U.S. national security 
are not able to survive and invest for the future on market -based terms.  hese policies undermine 
the basic fairness of international trade.  
 
50. The aluminium smelters in the United States  are closing down , the production capa city is 
declining, and employment is dropping. However, overall data of the United States show that, this 
has not caused the overall levels of employment and manufacturing of the United States at the 
national level to decline. Has the U.S. ever evaluated t o what extent the U.S. industrial upgrading WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  and transfer as well as global division of labour has attributed to the declining production capacity 
and employment in the aluminium sector?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see the response to Question 49 above. The United St ates also refers China 
to the findings in report of the Department of Commerce on its investigation conducted under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.  
 
51. Does the U.S. share the view that it is one -sided to evaluate the productio n and employment of 
a sector alone without taking into account the macro situation of the country’s overall production 
and employment?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has previously expressed its views regarding the causes of global 
excess capacity, the harm it is wreaking on market economic actors in Members such as the 
United States, and the reasons why the President has taken action to adjust import s of 
aluminium under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.  We refer China 
to, for example, the statements of the United States at the 29 October 2018 of the Dispute 
Settlement Body.  
 
The Secretary of Commerce recommended to the Presi dent three alternative remedies for dealing 
with excessive imports of aluminium: (a) a tariff of at least 7.7% on all aluminium imports from all 
countries; (b) a tariff of 23.6% on all products from: China; Hong Kong, China; the Russian 
Federation; the Bol ivarian Republic of Venezuela; and Viet Nam, with all other countries subject to 
quotas equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the United States; or (c) a quota on all imports from 
all countries equal to a maximum of 86.7% of their 2017 exports to the Unit ed States. Each of the 
three proposals was intended to raise production of aluminium from the present 48% average 
capacity to 80%, a level considered to provide the industry with long -term viability. The tariffs and 
quotas would be in addition to any dutie s already in place.  
 
52. Although the remedy measures of increasing tariffs adopted by the United States may increase 
the domestic share from its own perspective, does the U.S share the view that it will lead to 
distortions in global resource supplies and prices? Will this in turn further affect the security of 
resources?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not share the view articulated by China.  
 
Question 53  
Section 3.1.7.1.5 Investigation into uranium imports (3.120)  
On 17 January 2018, two U.S. uranium mining companies, UR -Energy and Energy Fuels, filed a 
petition requesting that the USDOC initiate a Section 232 investigation into imports of uranium ore 
and products.  
 
53. What is the mechanism or procedures for the U nited States to initiate investigation into a mineral 
product that affects national security? There are many other mineral products in the United States 
that are highly dependent on imports. Will the U.S. consider expanding the 232 investigation to 
other m ineral products?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  The Department of 
Commerce initiated an investigation into whether the quantity and circumstances of uranium 
ore and product imports into the United States threaten to impa ir U.S. national security pursuant 
to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, following the filing of a petition 
for such an investigation by two U.S. uranium mining companies.  
 
Question 54  
Section 3.1.7.2.3.1 China Technology Transfer Regime (3.133)  
 
The United States referred Members to the USTR website for more information about the Section 
301 actions, and noted that, according to the USTR report, China's technology transfer policies and 
practices were causing billions of dollars in losses annually to U.S. businesses and individuals, and 
that the United States had requested consultations with China under the WTO's DSU with respect to 
one of the four matters covered in the investigation.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  54. How does the United States assess the losse s caused to U.S. businesses and individuals by 
Chinas technology transfer policies and practices? Please elaborate on the methods and basis of 
assessment.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States refers China to U.S. response to Question 52 of Chi na’s first set 
of que stions.  
 
Questions 55 -60 
Section 3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (3.141; 3.142; Table 3.11)  
 
The United States maintains export restrictions, including prohibitions, licensing requirements or 
additional controls on a variety of exports and re -exports for reasons of national security, foreign 
policy considerations, the non -proliferation of nuclear materials, and other temporary objectives.  
 
55. The U.S. Department of Energy issued the U.S. Policy Framework on Civil Nuclear Coopera tion 
with China on October 12, 2018, claiming that it is based on national security, diplomatic 
considerations and other factors. Could the U.S please indicate what the national security and 
diplomatic considerations actually refer to? Has the U.S. governm ent violated the principles of free 
trade and fair competition within the WTO framework? Is the U.S. government overprotecting civilian 
nuclear technology? How to view the impact and influence of this move on the U.S. nuclear sector?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Go vernment is implementing new measures through licensing authorities 
at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Department of Energy (DOE) to prevent 
China’s diversion of U.S. nuclear power -related technologies, material, and equipment for 
military use or unauthorized purposes.  
• The United States cannot ignore the national security implications of China’s efforts to obtain 
nuclear technology outside of established processes of U.S. -China civil nuclear cooperation 
and in violation of U.S. law.  
• The United States has determined that a change in U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with China 
is necessary to strike an appropriate balance between long -term risks to U.S. national 
security and economic interests and the immediate impact to the U.S. nuclear industrial 
base.  
 
56. The Part 810 Regulations on nuclear export controls issued by the United States actually has 
potential conflicts with the Agreement between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy. What is the order of precedence i n domestic legislation, political decisions, 
and international treaties when the United States makes decisions on export control?  
 
RESPONSE: The Agreement between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy (“123 Agreement”) esta blishes the legal basis for civil nuclear exports, but does 
not license or oth erwise authorize such exports. 10 CFR Part 810 (Part 810) is the regulatory 
mechanism through which the United States licenses exports of U.S. civil nucl ear technology 
and assist ance. There is no conflict between the 123 Agreeme nt and the Part 810 regulation.   
 
57. The United States is highly reliant on imports of nuclear materials and related services but has 
strict restrictions on the export of nuclear materials, technology and equipment, and has issued the 
Part 810 Regulations on nuclear export controls. When the United States makes decisions on export 
control measures, in addition to the factors mentioned in the report, has it considered other 
legitimate rights and interests of  the World Trade Organization such as maintaining free trade and 
multilateral cooperation?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. government must first and foremost protect its national security.  In 
addition, the U.S. government has carefully weighed the economic impact of this change in 
policy. The U.S. Government considered a range of factors in making this decision, including 
first and foremost national security and legal factors such as past viola tions of the Atomic Energy 
Act. It also looked to economic, safety, securit y, and non -proliferation considerations. The United 
States is taking these measures to strike an appropriate balance between the risk to U.S. 
national security and our economic interests.  
 
58. The Part 810 Regulations on nuclear export controls cut the coo peration and trade between two 
countries in a one -size-fits-all manner. Apart from the considerations mentioned in the report, has WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  the United States considered the principle of appropriateness when making decisions on export 
bans?  
 
RESPONSE: 10 CFR Part 81 0 does not prohibit any specific transfers.  Rather, the Part 810 
regulations provide flexibility for the Department of Energy to consider a range of diplomatic, 
national security, political, and economic factors when analy sing export authorization request s. 
Applications for specific authorizations are reviewed and considered on a case -by-case basis.  
 
The ECRA is now the principal implementing statute for the export controls BIS had administered 
pursuant to the Executive Order issued under the IEEPA.  
 
59. O n November 19, 2018, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) on export controls over 14 
new technologies. Please clarify the rationality of the proposed export con trols over related 
technologies, how to define the exporting of a certain technology, how to define the impact of the 
export behaviour on the national security of the United States, whether the relevant provisions apply 
to the joint work of employees from different countries within a company, and what the impacts on 
companies around the world including U.S. companies in terms of  their exchanges, cooperation, 
joint researches, and commercialization in related technologies?  
 
RESPONSE: The public comment peri od on the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking closed 
on December 19, 2018.  BIS is currently reviewing the comments received. Therefore, it is not 
appropriate at this stage to speculate what emerging and foundational technologies may be 
identified and t he rat ionale behind those decisions.  
 
60. According to [Table 3.11], nuclear materials and nuclear technology fall into different categories 
and are handled by different government departments. Is there a difference in the policies applicable 
to the categories of nuclear materials and nuclear technology when considering whether to issue 
export control permits or not? If there is a difference, what is the difference between the policies 
applicable to the two categories?  
 
RESPONSE: Under the Atomic Ener gy Act of 1954, as amended, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) is responsible for licensing exports and imports of nuclear materials, facilities, 
and equipment to ensure these items are u sed only for peaceful purposes.  This authority extends 
to production and utilization facilities, to special nuclear, source and byproduct materials, to 
certain nuclear facility components, and to certain other materials, including nuclear grade 
graphite for nuclear end use and deuterium . The Nuclear Non -Proliferation Act of 1978, in part, 
was a legislative framework to ensure effective controls by the U.S. Government over exports 
of nuclear materials and equipment.  The requirements necessary for export and import of 
nuclear material and components  are found in 10 CFR Part 110.  
 
There is a difference in how exports of certain nuclear materials are licensed by the NRC.  For 
example, more proliferation significant materials will require a more stringent export licensing 
review, which can inc lude review by the Executive Branch and a  vote by the NRC Commission.  
 
U.S. Exports under 10 CFR 110 and 10 CFR Part 810, which is the Department of Energy’s 
regulation that governs the transfer of U.S. technology and assistance, are influenced by various 
types of U.S. policy considerations th at impact the U.S. government. Under the Atomic Energy 
Act, the export controls for both nuclear technology and nuclear materials (and equipment) are 
intended to prevent exports that are inimical to the interests of th e U.S. and its common defense 
and security, including exports that could lead to nuclear proliferation. U.S. government policy 
on exports of nuclear technology as well as nuclear materials and equipment are consistent with 
and in furtherance of  this statut ory framework.  
 
The executive branch agencies work effectively together based upon well -established processes 
and procedures related  to nuclear non -proliferation. A recent example involves the October 11, 
2018 U.S. Policy Framework on Civil Nuclear Coopera tion with China, which required extensive 
interagency coordination and cooperation to ensure consistent implementation of export 
decisions involving technology transfer, equipment, and materials to China.  
 
 
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  Questions 61 -64 
Section 3.2.5.1 EXIM (3.152; 3.1 53; 3.154; 3.156)  
 
 ... Private sector lenders normally act as partners in EXIM Bank transactions.  
 
61. What are the requirements for the qualifications of private lending institutions? What is the 
cooperation model between EXIM and private lending institu tions?  
 
RESPONSE:  EXIM is able to offer both direct lending and insurance or guarantees (“pure cover”) 
but will normally  support transactions by providing insurance or a guarantee to a private lending 
institution rather than providing a direct loan.  
 
As part of EXIM’s due diligence process, EXIM requires that private lending institutions submit 
an application to become an Approved Finance Provider; see: https://www.exim.gov/sit es/ 
default/files//forms/eib10_06.pdf . In order to be accepted as an Approved Financial Provider, 
EXIM requires that the lending institution be an entity of integrity, generally regulated, and 
capable of operating the kind of loan that EXIM may be insuring  or guaranteeing. However, the 
specific criteria may  vary from program to program.  
 
Measured by the volume of exposure, the Bank's most important markets are Mexico, Saudi Arabia, 
China, Australia, and India. ...  
 
62. For the Chinese market, what kind of business does EXIM mainly provide?  
 
RESPONSE: Major sectors for which EXIM has outstanding exposure on transactions with 
exports to China include: aircraft, manufacturing, transportation and warehousing, services and 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting.  
 
... As new legislation reauthorizing EXIM Bank until 30 September 2019 entered into force in 
December 2015, its lending authority was capped  (at US$135 billion), while its small business 
lending target was raised from 20% to 25%. In FY2017, more than 90% of its authorizations 
concerned small businesses, which made up more than 63% of the total dollar value of the 
authorizations and nearly 76% of the direct export value supported by the Bank. However, the 
Bank's overall financial exposure as of August 2018 (about US$64 billion) is well below the 
established ceiling and is steadily declining, as a further key operational roadblock persists.  
 
63. What is EXIM Banks definition and standard for small businesses? What are the operating models 
of EXIM for such small businesses and what are the risk control measures?  
 
RESPONSE:  To qualify as a small business with EXIM Bank, the business must meet the 
definition set forth by the Small Business Administration (SBA). In general, a manufacturer will 
qualify if the total number of employees in the company (including any parent, subsid iaries, and 
affiliates) is fewer than 500 or fewer than 100 if the company is a distributor or wholesaler. To 
qualify for EXIM's small business insurance programs, the business must meet the SBA definition 
and have export credit sales of less than $7.5 mil lion; see:  https://www.sba.gov/ 
document/support --table-size-standards . 
 
EXIM primarily supports small business through short -term trade credit insurance and indirectly 
through w orking capital support. As for risk control, EXIM is mandated to only support 
transactions with a reasonable assurance of repayment; as such, EXIM underwrites and accounts 
for the risk of all tr ansactions regardless of size.  
 
The 2015 legislation reauthori zing EXIM Bank includes provisions (Section 55002) mandating the 
United States to initiate and pursue negotiations with other major exporting countries to reduce 
substantially, and with a view to possibly eliminating (by 2025), subsidized export -financing 
programmers and oth er forms of export subsidies  
 
Questions:  
64. What major recent developments has the initiative made so far?  
 
RESPONSE: EXIM engages within the OECD and International Working Group (IWG) 
negotiations as part of USG’s delegation. As previo usly stated, each year, the Department of the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Treasury delivers a report to Congress which provides an update on the progress achieved in 
implementing the instruction set forth in Section 55002.  
 
Question 65  
Section 3.2.5.2 SBA Export Loan Programs (3.157)  
 
The SBA, created by Congress in 1953 to "aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, 
the interests of small business concerns", administers three broad programmes through its Office of 
International Trade that offer export financing for sm all businesses exporting or planning to export 
(Table 3.14).  
 
65. Please elaborate on the source of funds, operational mechanisms, and specific ways to support 
foreign trade enterprise financing of the SBA. Please introduce the rate levels of financing guarantees 
provided by the SBA and the comparison of similar service rates of financial institutions.  
 
RESPONSE: Information on the legislative authority for the SBA and its programs appears at: 
https://www.sba.gov/about -sba/what -we-do/authority . 
 
Questions 66 -67 
Section 3.2.5.3 OPIC (3.160; Table 3.15)  
 
Operating since 1971, the OPIC is the Governments development finance institution. It mobilizes 
private capital to help address critical development challenges by providing investor financing, 
political risk insurance, and support for private equity investment funds when such funding is not 
forthcoming fro m normal commercial sources.  
 
66. It is understood that OPIC is undergoing institution al adjustments; after the adjustments, does 
it overlap with EXIM in terms of functions? How are the functions of the two institutions specifically 
divided?  
 
RESPONSE: On October 5, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Better Utilization of 
Investments  Leading to Development Act of 2018 (the BUILD Act). The BUILD Act consolidates, 
modernizes, and reforms the U.S. government’s “development finance” capabilities – primarily 
OPIC and USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) – into the United States Inter national 
Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). The USIDFC’s mandate is to mobilize and facilitate 
the participation of private sector capital and skills in the economic development of less 
developed countries and countries in transition from nonmarket to market economies, in order 
to complement the development assistance objectives of the United States. Structurally, the 
USIDFC will operate as an independent, wholly -owned government corporation. The BUILD Act 
gives the USIDFC additional tools and flexib ilities relative to OPIC: the USIDFC will, in addition 
to providing loans, guaranties, and political risk insurance, have the authority to make equity 
investments, provide technical assistance, and conduct feasibility studies specific to 
development financ e projects. As with OPIC and DCA, the new USIDFC will be concentrated 
entirely on development finance operations, and the new agency will not assume any export 
credit functions currently as sociated with the EXIM Bank.  
 
Questions:  
67. [In table 3.15], Pleas e explain why the U.S. exports projected surged in FY 2017 (0.26 and 0.10 
in 2015 and 2016 respectively, and 3.09 in 2017). Which countries/regions or specific sectors/areas 
were involved in this growth?  
 
RESPONSE: OPIC reports on the projected U.S. export s that are expected to be generated by 
the projects it supports every year.  These projections are based on expected procurement by 
OPIC’s clients, and reflect U.S. exports that are expected to be generated through the normal 
operations of the OPIC -sponsore d investment.  OPIC support for a project is not contingent on 
any level of U.S. export activity or procurement.   In FY 2017, OPIC supported a large gas field 
development project in Israel that expects to import more than $1 billion of U.S. -based input 
material during its set -up and first five years of operation.  The large level of U.S. procurement 
from this project created a one -time, temporary, jump in OPIC’s reported U.S. exports.  
 
 
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  Questions 68 -69 
Section 3.3.1 Incentives (3.165; 3.166; Table 3.16)  
201520161.145 The United States has always maintained substantial subsidies for its nuclear 
technology development, of which small reactor technology alone received a total of $114.5 million 
of subsidies in 2015 and 2016.  
 
68. How does the United States gu arantee that its subsidy policy does not give its nuclear sector an 
unfair competitive position?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has notified subsidies provided for small reactor technology;  
please see: G/SCM/N/315/USA.  
 
A database developed by the Council fo r Community and Economic Research (C2ER), accessible at: 
http://selectusa.stateincentives.org/?referrer=selectusa , includes information on 1,790 
programmes enacted in the 50 states. S uch support is provided in the form of tax credits, tax 
exemptions, grants, loans or loan participation, or other forms of assistance.  
 
69. Does the 1,790 programmes provided by the C2ER database include all the support and 
incentives programmes provided b y the federal, state, territorial and local governments? If not, what 
is the reason for the omission? What is exactly included in other forms of assistance?  
 
RESPONSE: The subsidy programs in the United States subject to the notification obligation 
under t he Subsidies Agreement can be found in the most recent subsides notification of the 
United States; please see: G/SCM/N/315/USA.  
 
Questions 70 -71 
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.174)  
 
Federal law specifically prohibits any government agency from engaging in any standards -related 
activity that creates unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States.7 Circular 
A-119 encourages federal regulatory agencies to participate in SDOs.  
 
Question  
70. Federal law spec ifically prohibits any government agency from engaging in any standards -related 
activity that creates unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. However, 
the last sentence encourages federal regulatory agencies to participate in SD Os. Are these two 
sentences contradictory to each other?  
 
RESPONSE: We do not see a contradiction.  
 
Comments and queries received from other WTO Members on notified proposed U.S. measures are 
forwarded to the relevant domestic regulatory authority within t hree business days. The SCO 
received 60 information requests in 2017, and a further 36 in the first seven months of 2018.  
 
71. As all comments and queries are forwarded to the relevant domestic regulatory authority within 
three business days, when will you  provide feedbacks and responses? The United States previously 
explained that all the replies would be published through the Federal Register. However, we found 
that we could not find replies to all the queries through the Federal Register. Has the United States 
considered feeding back relevant information directly to the inquiring Members via emails?  
 
RESPONSE: As noted, U.S. regulators respond to substantive comments in the final rule, which 
is published in the Federal Register, the national gazette of th e United States, and the U.S. TBT 
Inquiry Point notifies that final rule to the WTO.  To be clear, the regulator must respond in a 
reasoned manner to comments received, clarify or even change the rule to address any 
substantive issues presented by the comm ents, explain how the agency resolved any significant 
issues raised in the comments, and show how that resolution led th e agency to the ultimate rule. 
Because multiple stakeholders may ask similar questions, the regulator frequently groups 
comments of simi lar substance and provides one response to the similar comments.  
 
 
                                                
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  Questions 72 -73 
Section 3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements  
 
72. Food Safety Modernization Act 2017621FDAFDA From the launch of websites regarding the 
accreditation of third -party certification bodies on June 21, 2017 by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) under the Food Safety Modernization Act to date, the FDA has only approved 
three certification bodies. It may cause many food enterprises to exceed their compliance  periods 
when queuing for certification. Is the FDA considering accelerating the accreditation of certification 
bodies?  
 
RESPONSE:  The conduct of accreditation activities by FDA, including the pace of those activities, 
is determined by the relevant require ments in U.S. law and regulation.  
 
73. Although the Voluntary Qualified Importer Programme (VQIP) issued by the FDA is a voluntary 
programme, it has a huge impact on suppliers. The programme can speed up the review of imported 
foods, but the procedures for  third-party certification have not been introduced yet. As a result, 
enterprises have been unable to apply through the website of VQIP. Please provide the timetable for 
the introduction of third -party certification procedures.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. FDA open ed the Voluntary Qualified Importer Program (VQIP) application 
portal on October 1, 2018 through which importers interested in applying may submit their 
completed applications for the FY20 benefit year. FDA has published a step b y step guide to the 
applica tion process:  https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Imports 
Exports/Importing/UCM608130.pdf . 
 
Questions 74 -80 
Section 3.3.7.8  Copyright (3.306; 3.307; 3.311; 3.313  
Copyright owners who have registered their copyright with the Copyright Office may also choose to 
record their registration with CBP for protection against the importation of infringing copies.  
 
74. This provision allo ws copyright owners who have registered their copyright with the Copyright 
Office to record their registration with CBP for protection against the importation of infringing copies 
from abroad. Please clarify whether this provision provides unfair treatment  for rights owners who 
have not registered their copyrights?  
 
RESPONSE:  CBP maintains the ex officio authority to enforce all copyrights at U.S. borders 
regardless of whether the copyright is recorded; the efficacy of CBP's border enforcement 
regime, and p articularly its ability to target for goods that infringe U.S. copyrights, is enhanced 
by recordation. Specifically, CBP's internal recordation database provides CBP officers access to 
updated, pertinent information which assists officers in making infring ement determinations. 
Thus, recordation ensures robust border enforcement of those copyrights which are recorded 
with CBP.  
 
75. Please further clarify whether copyright owners who have not registered their copyright can 
request CBP for protection against t he importation of infringing copies from abroad. If not, how can 
rights owners who have not registered their copyright effectively prevent the importation of 
infringing copies through border protection?  
 
RESPONSE: CBP maintains the ex officio authority to enforce all copyrights at U.S. borders 
regardless of whether the copyright is recorded; the efficacy of CBP's border enforcement 
regime, and particularly its ability to target for goods that infringe U.S. copyrights, is enhanced 
by recordation. Specificall y, CBP's internal recordation database provides CBP officers access to 
updated, pertinent information which assists officers in making infringement determinations. 
Thus, recordation ensures robust border enforcement of those copyrights which are recorded 
with CBP.  
 
Registration is not required for protection, although, in addition to establishing a public record of the 
copyright claim, there are additional benefits that accrue with timely registration, including the 
availability of statutory damages.  
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  76. Please further elaborate on this: while legally registered copyright owners can obtain statutory 
damages, can unregistered rights owners receive such relief? If not, is this provision a discriminatory 
treatment of unregistered copyright owners?  
 
RESPONSE: Registration is not required in order for a party to recover actual damages for 
infringement. Statutory damages are available only to a party that has timely registered his 
work.  Foreign persons are treated no less favo urably than domestic ones.  
 
Copyright Act provides for several types of statutory licenses. Generally, interested parties are given 
the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the license; a rate is set by the authorities only if they fail 
to agree.  
 
77. Please further clarify the criteria for t he authorities to set a statutory license rate in the event 
that both parties fail to reach a license agreement. Is the rate fixed or floating?  
 
RESPONSE: An overview of the various statutory licenses and the relevant rate -setting 
procedures  may be found  on the Copyright  Office  website  at: https://www.copyright.gov/licens
ing/. 
 
78. If there is not a clear criterion for the setting of the rate, will there be different rates for similar 
situations?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please see the response to question 77 above.  
 
In this proceeding, the Copyright Office established a streamlined procedure for the renewal of 
exemptions that were granted during the sixth triennial rulemaking and considered petitions for new 
exemptions to engage in activities not permitted by existing  exemptions. In June 2017, the Copyright  
Office published a Notice of Inquiry requesting petitions to renew existing exemptions and comments 
in response to those petitions, as well as petitions for new exemptions to engage in activities  not 
currently permi tted by existing exemptions.  
 
79. Please provide further details on the new exemptions mentioned here.  
 
RESPONSE: More information on the most recent rulemaking, including the Acting Register’s 
recommendation and the Librarian’s Final Rule in the Seventh T riennial Section 1201 proceeding, 
which was recently concluded in late October 2018, can be found on the U.S. Copyright Office 
website at: https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/ . 
 
80. Please further clarif y whether the above new exemptions will harm the legitimate interests of 
copyright owners and the preconditions for the application of the exemptions.  
 
RESPONSE: The criteria for assessing whether to provide for an exemption are found in Section 
1201 of Ti tle 17 of the United States Code.  Section 1201 specifies the factors that must be 
considered for an exemption to be granted, including “the effect of circumvention of 
technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works.”  
 
Questions 81 -82 
Section 3.3.7.9.2 Special 301 (3.133)  
 
The Notorious Markets List identifies selected  markets, including those on the Internet, that engage 
in and facilitate copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting. The List includes markets where 
owners, operators, and governments have failed to address concerns. The List is not an exhaustive 
accoun t of all physical and online markets worldwide in which IP infringement may take place. The 
List does not make findings of legal violations, nor does it reflect the U.S. Government's analysis of 
the general IP protection and enforcement climate in the coun tries connected with the listed markets.  
 
Question  
81. Please further clarify the objective evaluation criteria for notorious markets.  
 
RESPONSE: The Notorious Markets List highlights prominent and illustrative examples of online 
and physical marketplaces that reportedly engage in, facilitate, turn a blind eye to, or benefit 
from substantial piracy and counterfeiting.   Markets are included in the NML because they WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  exemplify global counterfeiting and piracy concerns and because the scale of infringing activit y 
in these marketplaces can cause significant harm t o U.S. intellectual property (IP) owners, 
consumers,  legitimate  online platforms, and the economy. See: https://www.federalregister. 
gov/documents/2018/08/16/2018 -17649/2018 -special -301-out-of-cycle-review -of-notorious -
markets -comment -request . 
 
82. Please further clarify what actions of network service providers constitute infringements in the 
sense of U.S. copyright law. If a network service provider is identified as an infringer, is it 
contradictory to the prin ciple of technology neutrality.  
 
RESPONSE:  In U.S. law, the evaluation of liability for direct or secondary infringement of 
copyright depends on the facts of each case.   It is not clear what a ‘network service provider’ is 
in the context of this question, but there is no universal rule of liability that applies to any single 
type of technology.  
 
Questions 83 -85 
Section 4.2.2 Crude Oil (4.60; 4.62)  
About one fifth of the world's refining capacity is located in the United States. The  many modern 
and sophisticated facilities produce a full range of refined output, including high value light products, 
and the United States is currently the world's second largest exporter of petroleum products. It is 
now a net exporter, having been a net  importer for decades prior to 2011. The surge in domestic 
refining was partly a response to the surge in shale oil production at a time when crude oil exports 
were effectively banned under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and other statutes.  
However, these export restrictions were lifted in December 2015.  
 
83. What are the access policies for investment in the US oil refinery sector? What procedures must 
be followed? And what is the legal basis for such procedures?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. does not maintain sectoral investment restricti ons in the oil refinery 
sector.  
 
The United States is the world's largest consumer and producer of natural gas. Technological 
breakthroughs in the exploitation of shale gas, which made it a relatively inexpensive e nergy 
resource, sparked a 500% increase in shale gas production between 2007 and 2013, and it currently 
represents about 67% of the domestic gas supply. Weaker prices have slowed the growth in the 
production of natural gas, including shale gas. About three  quarters of the currently produced shale 
gas is extracted from four plays (Marcellus, Barnett, Fayetteville, and Haynesville). The electric 
power industry has been a major driver of domestic demand for natural gas, as it has been retiring 
coal-fired gener ation capacity.  
 
84. The United States has one fifth of the worlds refining capacity and is currently the world’s second 
largest exporter of petroleum products. Its share of natural gas and coal exports is also increasing. 
Considering that energy is a more  important strategic resource in the general sense, how does the 
United States view its position in the world?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question does not relate to U.S. trade policy and is therefore outside the scope 
of the TPR exercise.  
 
85. In the light of the fo regoing, the United States regards the decline in its global share of steel 
and aluminium as a threat to national security and thus increases tariffs. If the same logic is adopted, 
do the U.S share the same view that the increase in United States share of oil and gas in the world 
could also be regarded as a threat to the national security of other countries?  
 
RESPONSE: This question does not relate to U.S. trade policy and is therefore outside the scope 
of the TPR exercise.  
 
Questions 86 -87 
Section 4.4.1.3 Consolidated financial sector regulation (4.94)  
 
Enabling large foreign banks to avoid regulations by allowing them to tally their U.S. assets in certain 
ways that keeps them below the US$250 billion threshold.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 119 - 
 
  86. What do certain ways actually refer to?  
 
RESPONSE:  On 24 May 2018, President Trump signed into law the Economic Growth, Regulatory 
Relief and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. 115 -174).  This law raises the threshold for automatic 
application of enhanced prudential standards under section 165 of the  Dodd-Frank Act from $50 
billion in total global consolidated assets to $250 billion, but the Federal Reserve may continue 
to apply enhanced prudential standards to foreign banking organizations with total global 
consolidated assets between $100 billion an d $250 billion. The Act does not require the Federal 
Reserve to change the U.S. asset threshold for establishment of an intermediate holding 
company, which is currently at $50 billion in U.S. non -branch assets.  For more information 
regarding implementatio n of P.L. 115 -174, please see the testimony of Federal Reserve 
Chairman Randal K. Quarles before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs on October 2, 2018 at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/quarles 
20181002a.htm . 
 
87. Please introduce the original intention of this initiative.  
 
RESPONSE: The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 115 -
174) will make financial regulations more efficient, effective, and appropriately tailored while 
continuing to maintain important consumer protections and the ability of U.S. financial regulators 
to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system.  
 
Questions 88 -100 
Section 4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.132; 4.135; 4.141; 4.142; 4.143; 4.145; 4.147)  
 
the 5G service is expected to be available beginning in 2019.  
 
88. Please elaborate on the specific plan of 5G commercialization and how to ensure the national 
treatment of foreign -funded enterprises?  
 
RESPONSE: 5G commercialization in the United States is industry -led and not centrally planned 
by the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government instead works to create an enabling environment 
for the private sec tor, foreign and domestic, to invest in 5G in the United States. The FCC, for 
its part, has a 5G FAST plan to (1) get more spectrum into the marketplace; (2) update 
infrastructure policy to speed the deployment of small cells; and (3) modernize outdated 
regulations. Foreign -funded enterprises, like domestic enterprises, participate in the FCC's 5G 
spectrum auctions, benefit from faster small cell deployment, and fall under the light -touch 
regulation adopted in the Restoring Internet Freedom order.  
 
Before g ranting an application for a new license/authorization or for approval of a transfer, the FCC 
must determine whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by granting 
the application.  
 
89. The United States enacted the Foreign Inv estment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) in 
August this year, which expanded the scope and objectives of security review. Does this mean that 
the U.S. security review of foreign -funded enterprises in the telecommunications sector will be more 
stringe nt? Can the United States explain whether this constitutes an access restriction on foreign 
investment, and can the United States clarify the security review processes and increase the 
transparency?  
 
RESPONSE: FIRRMA modernizes CFIUS and strengthens the U. S. government’s ability to protect 
national security while preserving the longstanding open investment policy of the United States.  
FIRRMA expands the scope of transactions reviewable by CFIUS, regardless of the sector, to 
address more effectively current  national security concerns.  The United States welcomes foreign 
investment and continues to be one of the most open countries in the world to foreign investors.  
Information on the CFIUS review process, FIRRMA’s key provisions, and certain changes to the 
review process in light of FIRRMA are available on the CFIUS Web page at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/internati onal/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -
in-the-united -states -cfius. 
 
90. Based on the U.S. Export Administration Regulation, artificial intelligence, robot, and quantum 
computing have been brought under export controls, and 44 Chinese entities have been i ncluded in WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  the list of entities. Could the US please clarify whether this act has violated the principle of 
technology neutrality and has adverse impacts on the technological development of global 
industries?  
 
RESPONSE:  The answer to both parts of the ques tion is no.  
 
91. Why will new competitors impair competition? What are the factors that United States will take 
into consideration during assessment?  
 
RESPONSE:  Congress has charged the FCC with initially assigning licenses and authorizations 
under the Com munications Act.   The standards for the FCC’s review have also been set by 
Congress: the FCC must determine whether “the public interest, convenience, and necessity” 
would be serve d by granting the application. The FCC has found that part of its public in terest 
review is considering any national security, law enforcement, foreign policy or trade policy 
concerns with respect to a potential entrant into the U.S. market that has foreign ownership.  
The FCC has a presumption that entry by an entity from a WTO Member would not adversely 
affect competition in the U.S. telecommunications market.  
 
The FCC will typically review the evidence and hear the views of the public before it issues its 
decision: it may approve the application unconditionally, or with conditi ons designed to ensure that 
the public interest is served or that any potential harms identified by the FCC are eliminated or 
mitigated. If the evidence in the record presents a substantial and material question of fact or if the 
FCC for any reason is unab le to make an affirmative finding that the public interest will be served 
by approving a transaction involving wireless or broadcast licenses, the FCC must designate the 
application for a hearing. (If there are no such questions in dispute, the FCC will de ny the 
application.)  
 
92. What is the United States criterion on the issuance of licenses? A license may be issued only 
when there is a benefit, or a license may not be issued when there is harm? Please specify. If the 
FCC denies an application when there is no objection, does it mean that the United States adopts a 
default denial attitude towards applications?  
 
RESPONSE:  Congress has charged the FCC with initially assigning licenses and authorizations 
under the Communications Act.   The standards for the FCC’s review have also been set by 
Congress: the FCC must determine whether “the public interest, convenience, and neces sity” 
would be served by granting the application.  For the provision of domestic wireline 
telecommunications the FCC has a presumption that new entry is in the public interest and does 
not require an authorization prior to providing service.  For wireless  services the FCC reviews 
application for technical issues to ensure there is no interference.  For the provision of 
international telecommunications services the FCC reviews the applications to ensure that a 
foreign carrier with market power in the foreig n destination market cannot use its market power 
to affect competition adversely in the U.S. market.  
 
The Internet Freedom NPRM also proposed to reinstate the determination that mobile broadband 
Internet access service is not a commercial mobile service, a nd to re -evaluate the FCC's rules and 
enforcement regime to analyse whether ex ante regulatory intervention in the market was 
necessary. In this respect, the Internet Freedom NPRM proposed to eliminate the Internet conduct 
standard and the non -exhaustive l ist of factors intended to guide application of that rule. 8 It also 
sought comment on whether to keep, modify, or eliminate the blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization prohibitions, and the transparency rule.  
 
93. Which rules have been optimized by t he United States?  
 
RESPONSE: The Restoring Internet Freedom Order was the result of the proposals made in the 
Internet Freedom Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). In the Order the FCC amended its 
rules in 47 CFR Parts 1, 8, and 20. The specific rule changes made by the Restoring Int ernet 
Freedom Order can be found in the Order’s Appendix A on pg. 197 -198. See: 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC -17-166A1.pdf . 
 
                                                
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  but that challenges remain with respect to t he provision of high -speed broadband to rural areas in 
rural areas only 68.6% (61%) of the people had access to both services (fixed terrestrial broadband 
and mobile broadband)  
 
94. How does the U.S. government encourage and guide key operators to invest i n broadband 
construction in rural areas. Does the enterprises have the willingness to invest?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. government takes a multifaceted approach to promoting investment by 
the private sector in rural broadband. The U.S. government encourages inve stment by the 
private sector broadly as a general matter, recognizing that small businesses play an important 
role in extending broadband to rural areas. The FCC, for its part, encourages private sector 
investment through steps such as removing regulatory barriers to infrastructure investment and 
promoting innovative satellite and 5G technologies. The FCC also has a Universal Service Fund 
that supports the Connect America Fund programs for high -cost rural areas, as well as programs 
for rural healthcare that  support telehealth and connectivity to doctors and hospitals. More 
information can be found at the links below:  
 
- https://www.fcc.gov/about -fcc/fcc -initiatives/bridging -digital -divide -all-americans  
- https://www.fcc.gov/general/rural -health -care-program   
- https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman -pai-remarks -international -regulators -forum -
 mexico -city 
- https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman -pai-discusses -fccs-telehealth -work-boston -
 conference  
 
Other U.S. Government agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture also have programs 
to promote investment in rural broadband. See: https://www.rd.usda.gov/programs -
services/all -programs/telecom -programs . 
 
95. When key operators lack the willingness to invest in the construction of broadband facilities in 
rural areas, wha t countermeasures does the government have?  
 
RESPONSE: See the response to Question 94.  
 
96. After the provision of universal services and funding, how does the government monitor the 
implementation effects and the use of funds?  
 
RESPONSE: The FCC monitors the implementation of the universal service programs and the 
use of universal service funds in many ways including through annual Federal -State Joint Board 
Monitoring Reports in conjunction with state governments: https://www.fcc.gov/general/ 
federal -state-joint-board -monitoring -reports . 
 
For the Lifeline program in particular, the FCC is also currently working on establishing a National 
Eligibility Verifier ensure that only those eligible for funds are able to receive them. See: 
https://www.usac.org/li/tools/national -verifier/default.aspx . 
 
The FCC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also includes a Universal Service Fund Division 
that conducts audits and inspections of USF program service providers and beneficiaries. More 
information about OIG's audits can be found in their semi -annual reports: 
https://www.fcc.gov/inspector -general/reports/general/semi -annual -reports -issued -office -
inspector -general . 
 
The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau and the Department of J ustice are empowered to investigate 
potential violations of the FCC’s universal service rules and to take action against any violations.  
 
97. If, in spite of the market mechanism, no enterprise intends to invest in the construction of 
broadband infrastruct ures in some remote and rural areas, how can the government protect the 
rights and interests of users in these areas and whether the measures to bridge the urban -rural 
digital divide have achieved the expected results?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. government agencies r eview their initiatives to bridge the digital divide on an 
ongoing basis to improve their efforts to encourage rural broadband deployment through more 
refined data collection, streamlined regulation, and better tailored action.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Under the new Open Internet Order, now commonly referred to as the Title II Order, adopted by the 
FCC on 26 February 2015, and effective on 12 June 2015, fixed and mobile broadband Internet 
access service were reclassified as a telecommunication service proposed to reinstate the 
classification of broadband Internet access service as an information service also proposed to 
reinstate the determination that mobile broadband Internet access service is not a commercial 
mobile service  
 
98. Given that the United States is actively promoting broadband development and infrastructure 
investment, is the United States inclined to encourage more foreign companies to provide services 
relevant to fixed and mobile broadband construction and operation in the United States? If yes, are 
there any access or regulatory requirements (including requirements for data storage, transmission, 
etc.) on foreign companies? And will the United States maintain restrictions through the security 
review mechanism?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States maintains an open investment  regime, including with respect to 
broadband services.  In fact, of the four largest mobile telecommunications suppliers in the 
United States, two are owned by foreign parents, as is the fourth largest cable TV provider.  
Services that these companies offe r that are classified as information services (e.g. Internet 
access services) are not subject to licensing requirements, but they are subject to general 
obligations in areas such as consumer protection.  There are no general restrictions in the United 
States with respect to data storage or cross -border data transmission.  
 
Under the FCC’s rules, any party that is classified as a domestic interstate communications 
common carrier, including for transmission services, is authorized to provide services to any 
domestic point and to operate or construct any domestic transmission line without prior FCC 
approval.  47 CFR sec. 63.01.  FCC approval is required to transfer control of lines or 
authorization to operate or to discontinue domestic services.  47 CFR secs. 63 .03-04, 63.71.  
 
Any person or entity that seeks to provide U.S. -international common carrier service must obtain 
prior FCC approval pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934. No person or 
entity shall offer U.S. -international telecommunicat ions service before the FCC grant of the 
application or operate other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the international 
Section 214 authorization. More information can be found here: https://www.fcc.gov/research -
reports/guides/international -section -214-application -filing-guidelines . 
 
Prior FCC approval is also generally required to be granted or to hold common carrier radio  
station licensees, among others. More information about the FCC’s policies and procedures 
regarding foreign ownership of common carrier radio station licenses can be found here: 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/foreign -ownership -second -report -and-order . 
 
With respect to security review, please see questions 23 -28 and 89.  
 
by bringing down the cost of deploying broadband and creating incentives for providers to connect 
consum ers in hard -to-serve areas  
 
99. What specific measures does the United States have in promoting the lowering of broadband 
rates, and what is the result of the measures?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. works to create an enabling environment for broadband deployment by  
the private sector; competition in the private sector leads to the lowering of broadband rates. 
More information about competition in market and the FCC’s recent initiatives can be 
found  in the FCC’s  recent  Communications  Marketplace  Report:  https://www.fcc.gov/document
/fcc-adopts -first-consolidated -communications -marketplace -report -0. 
 
100. How to judge whether communication services (including b roadban d) rates are reasonable or 
not? If it is determined that a rate is unreasonable, how to bring the enterprise under supervision?  
 
RESPONSE: A service can be classified as either a “telecommunications service” defined in 47 
U.S.C. § 153(53) or as an “ information service” defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). The rates for 
telecommunications services must be just and reasonable pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 201, while 
information services are n ot subject to this obligation. (47 U.S.C. §§ 201 -208 contain the 
statuto ry provisions related to the just and reasonable rates for telecommunications services.)  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  The FCC, in its Restoring Internet Freedom Order, classified broadband as an information service 
and such services are not subject to this obligation. More information  can be found at: 
https://www.fcc.gov/restoring -internet -freedom . 
 
Question 101  
Section 4.4.3 Postal and courier services (4.160; Chart 4.9)  
In 2016, the United States ran a large trade surplus  in air freight services with most of its main 
trading partners, except China, with whom it exhibits a small deficit (Chart 4.9).  
 
101. Please elaborate on the statistical caliber and calculation method of the United States 
US$106  million of trade deficit with China in air freight services in 2016.  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. methodologies are described in U.S. I nternational Economic Accounts: 
Concepts  and Methods  at: https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/methodologies/ONE%20PDF
%20-%20IEA%20Concepts%20Methods.pdf#page=50 . 
 
Questions 102 -103 
Section 4.4.6.1 Air transport and airports (4.210; 4211)  
 
For the last 25 years, the U.S. has adopted the policy to engage with international aviation partners 
to achieve Open Skies Agreements (OSAs). The United States currently has OSAs, as defined by the 
USDOT, with 125 trading partners. These OSAs cover, among other issues, market access, pricing, 
and c ommercial opportunities (i.e. including code -sharing, self -handling, user charges, fair 
competition, and intermodal rights).  
 
102. For the WTO Members that have not signed OSAs but have signed bilateral air transport 
agreements with the United Sates, shoul d the United States also strive to further expand and open 
up the market and, under the WTO framework, based on the principles of free trade and fair 
competition and according to the requirements of the Members on expanding air traffic rights 
arrangements,  engage in timely negotiations and update the contents of existing bilateral 
agreements that no longer meet the needs of market development?  
 
RESPONSE:  All air transport agreements, including Open Skies Agreements (OSAs), are 
negotiated as deemed appropria te by bilateral aviation partners, and excluded from WTO 
disciplines. The United States encourages all countries to meet their obligations under existing 
bilateral air transport agreements, to ensure a fair and equal opportunity to compete for carriers, 
and to strive to develop market conditions that support the conclusion of OSAs.  
 
In order to ensure the provision of air transport services to areas of the country where it would not 
otherwise be profitable to do so, the USDOT implements one subsidy program and one grant 
program: The Essential Air Service (EAS) Program and the Small Community Air Service 
Development Program (SCASDP), respectively.  
 
103. Please explain the scope, method and standard of subsidies for basic air transport services of 
the United States and the scales of subsidy funds in the past few years.  
 
RESPONSE:  The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), passed in 1978, gave air carriers freedom to 
determine which markets to serve domestically and what fares to charge for that service. The 
Essential  Air Service (EAS) program was put in place to guarantee that small communities that 
were served by certificated air carriers before airline deregulation maintain a minimal level of 
scheduled air service.  The United States Department of Transportation (th e Department) is 
mandated to provide eligible EAS communities with access to the Nati onal Air Transportation 
System.  This is generally accomplished by subsidizing two round trips a day with 30 - to 50-seat 
aircraft, or additional frequencies with aircraft w ith 9-seat or fewer, usually to a  large- or 
medium -hub airport. The Department currently subsidizes commuter and certificated air carriers 
to serve approximately 61 communities in Alaska and 111 communities in the 48  contiguous 
states, Hawaii, and Puerto R ico, that otherwise would not receive any scheduled air service.  
 
In the past three years, the Department has paid $826,453,885 (see chart below) in subsidies 
to domestic carriers that serve EAS -eligible communities. The Department administers the EAS 
program by providing monthly subsidy payments to domestic commuter and certificated air 
carriers based on an annual amount that is negotiated in subsidy contracts between the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Department, the community receiving EAS, and the carrier to provide the service. To a ccomplish 
this, the Department issues a Request for Proposals (RFP) approximately 6 to 9 months prior to 
the expiration of the current contract to all air carriers holding scheduled authority and institutes 
a carrier -selection proceeding.  Carriers that ar e qualified and interested in providing EAS submit 
competing proposals with annual subsidy requests. This RFP along with the proposals submitted 
by interested carriers are posted on a publicly facing web site.  
 
The Department works closely with the communi ty to choose a fit and willing carrier to provide 
quality air service to the community with cost -effective subsidy requests and executes a two, 
three, or four -year contract with the carrier. In addition to other items, the contracts stipulate 
the frequency  of service, the type of aircraft used, the designated airport hub(s) for the 
community, and the dollar amount that the Department will subsidize for each flight to make 
the route sustainable for the carrier.  After the contract is signed and made public, the carrier 
can begin serving the community. After each month of service, the carrier submits an invoice 
along with a report detailing the number of flights flown on the pre -determined route. The 
Department reviews this report and remits the subsidy paymen t for the number of flights 
performed by the carrier. The per -flight subsidy amount is calculated using the pre -negotiated 
annual subsidy amount and service frequency.  
 
Funding for the program is provided by combination of a discretionary appropriation fro m 
Congress at the beginning of the fiscal year and a portion of overflight fees collected by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Congress exercises discretion in providing an annual 
appropriation partially based on prior year expenditures, and the F AA is required by law to fund 
remaining program requirements.  
 
EAS Subsidy Paid Amounts by Fiscal Year  
 
 
 
The Small Community Air Service Development Program (SCASDP)  grants are awarded 
directly to small, rural airports to allo w them to attract air servic e. Congress generally 
appropriates between $5 million and $10  million each year for SCASDP. The program is limited 
to a maximum of 40 grant awards, with a maximum of four grants per State, in each year the 
program is funded. There are no limits on the amounts of individual awards, and the amounts 
awarded will vary depending upon the features and merits of the proposals selected. In past 
years, the Department’s individual grant sizes have ranged from $ 20,000 to nearly $1.6 million.  
 
Part II. Questions ba sed on Policy Statement by the United States (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Question 104  
Section 1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.8)  
 
Instead of serving as a negotiating forum where Members can develop new and better rules, the 
ability of Members to ne gotiate has become increasingly frustrated by an overactive dispute 
settlement system in which activist "judges" impose their own policy preferences and institutional 
preferences on Members.  
 
104. What are the specific behaviours referring to in the report  that activist judges impose their own 
policy preferences and institutional preferences on Members? Can the United States elaborate on 
what reform proposals will be put forward for the WTO dispute settlement mechanism?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States refers China to pages 22 -24 of the President’s Trade Policy 
Agenda, in which the administration addresses the longstanding U.S. concern of panels and the 
Appellate Body adding to or diminishing rights and obligations under the WTO Agreeme nt. We 
also refer China to U.S. statements before the Dispute Settlement Body in which these concerns 
Fiscal Year (October through September) Total Subsidy Paid
Fiscal Year 2016 255,446,791 $                                       
Fiscal Year 2017 282,098,006 $                                       
Fiscal Year 2018 288,909,089 $                                       
Total 826,453,885 $                                     WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  also have been addressed.   See, for example, Minutes of the May 16, 2001 DSB meeting 
(WT/DSB/M/105), para. 41 et seq.; Minutes of the March 8, 2002 DSB Me eting 
(WT/DSB/M/121), para. 35 et seq. 21; and Minutes of the January 27, 2003 DSB meeting 
(WT/DSB/M/142), para. 55 et seq.; Minutes of March 25, 2011 DSB Meeting (WT/DSB/M/294), 
at 18; Minutes of the June 13, 2012 DSB meeting (WT/DSB/M/317), para. 13 et s eq., and July 
23, 2012 DSB meeting ( WT/DSB/M/320), para. 94 et seq.  The United States will continue to 
insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system, and will continue our 
efforts and our discussions with Members to seek a solution  on these important issues.  
 
Questions 105 -109  
Section 2 US Economic and Trade Environment (2.5; 2.10)  
U.S. gross savings as a percentage of gross national income slight ly declined from 19.6% 
(US$3.66  trillion) in 2015 to 18.3% (US$3.48 trillion) in 2016 before increasing to 18.5% 
(US$3.68  trillion) in 2017 and 18.7% (US$3.88 trillion) in the second quarter of 2018 (on an annual 
rate). Although there was a slight increase in gross savings of US$17 billion between 2015 and 2017, 
this was due to an increase in business savings of US$165 billion, being offset by an increase in 
government dissaving of US$143 billion.  
 
105. We believe that for a long term , the investment in the United States is higher than its savings, 
which is one of the reasons for the trade d eficit in the United States. Does the United States agree 
with this view? If not, please explain the reasons.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has made reducing chronic bilateral trade deficits a priority.  
Trade balance changes have a number of causes and som e of these – such as high growth rates, 
over-savings rates, and rising investment levels – are macroeconomic phenomena that are not 
of inherent concern for trade policy. American trade policy is broadly aimed at the elimination of 
trade barriers, level ling the playing field, and the expansion of fair trade, in recognition of 
benefits that Americans and the world can derive from both exports and imports on a level 
playing field.  
 
Nominal U.S. exports of goods and services (on a balance of payments basis) dec reased by 2.2% 
between 2015 and 2016 (the 2nd consecutive annual decline), then increased by 6.1% in 2017.  
 
106. Since this year, the United States has imposed tariffs on several economies such as the 
European Union, Canada, and China. However, U.S. import s have maintained rapid growth so far 
this year, with a growth rate of 8.3%, up from 6.1% in 2017. We believe this means that the U.S. 
policy of reducing trade deficits by adding tariffs is ineffective. Does the United States agree with 
this view? If not, please explain the reasons.  
 
RESPONSE: Recent U.S. trade actions were not made for the purpose of reducing trade deficits, 
but to address other legitimate concerns, such as national security and unfair trade practices.  
It is too early to determine any imp act on trade balances from these recent legitimate U.S. trade 
actions.  
 
The global economy also remains marked by very large trade and current account imbalances, in 
part due to persistent trade and investment barriers across many economies.  
 
107. On one h and, the United States recognizes that the global economy also remains marked by 
very large trade and current account imbalances, in part due to persistent trade and investment 
barriers across many economies. On the other hand, the United States has issued  a large number 
of bans, such as Part 810 Regulations on nuclear export controls, on Chinese enterprises with regard 
to nuclear materials, nuclear technology, chips, etc. Does the U.S. believe such bans belong to trade 
and investment barriers?  
 
RESPONSE:  Neither  10 CFR Part 810 nor the Licensing Framework constitute a ban on exports.  
Part 810 allows for the export of certain technologies to China.  Moreover, the Framework 
enables the authorization of certain types of technologies while also attempting to l imit higher 
risk exports due to Chi nese proliferation activities.  
 
108. Please elaborate on the trade and investment barriers of the United States.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 126 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  We refer you to the Secretariat Report, which contains the Secretariat’s description 
of the U.S. trade regime.  
 
109. Does the United States have plans to relax trade barriers and investment controls in the near 
future? If so, please provide the timetable.  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
Questions 110 -111 
Section 4.1 WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.1)  
 
The WTO is an important institution, and the United States has a strong track record of building 
coalitions of like -minded Members to use the WTO committee system, in particular, to pressure non -
complying economies to bring measures into conformity with WTO rules, to advance transparency 
and predictability in global trade rules, and to avert the need to resort to dispute settlement.  
 
110. Please explain the relationship between the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and t he 
domestic trade policies of the United States.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has a variety of means through which it can develop and promote 
U.S. domestic trade policies and enforce U.S. trading rights under international agreements.  
 
111. What are the ex pected goals, plans and means of the United States to promote WTO reform?  
 
RESPONSE: As discussed in the U.S. Government Report, the United States is drawing 
Members’ attention to concerns with the operation of the WTO, and we intend to work with like -
minded countries to address them.  The United States was the first Member to put forward a 
concrete proposal for WTO reform, in November 2017, with its proposal aimed at improving 
Members' compliance with their notification obligations. In November 2018, Argent ina, Australia, 
Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, and the United States presented an updated 
transparency and notification proposal for consideration in the WTO Council on Trade in Goods. 
The United States stands ready to work with Members to adva nce this proposal and does not 
preclude the possibility of tabling other proposals on WTO reform in the future.  
 
Questions 112 -113 
Section 4.46 China (4.65; 4.67)  
 
112. Through China -U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue, China -U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialo gue 
mechanism and China -U.S. Comprehensive Economic Dialogue mechanism, the two sides have 
conducted comprehensive and in -depth discussions on holistic , strategic and long -term economic 
issues of common concern. Both sides have also maintained regular communication and exchanges. 
As a result, the two sides have achieved the goal of enhancing understanding, promoting 
cooperation, and controlling differences, and hundreds of mutually beneficial and win -win results 
have been gained. All the efforts have pl ayed a key role in maintaining the long -term and healthy 
development of China -U.S. economic relations and fuelling world economic recovery and growth. As 
the fields of economic cooperation between China and the United States continue to expand and the 
degree to deepen, it is inevitable to experience some frictions and differences in the cooperation 
process. Although the dialogue cannot solve the problem immediately, the confrontation will only 
lead to the loss of interests of both parties, and even bring ad verse impact to the stable and healthy 
development of the global economy. Does the United States share the above view of China?  
 
RESPONSE: Despite years of dialogues between our two sides, China has displayed a 
determination to maintain the state's leading  role in the economy and to continue to pursue 
industrial policies that promote, guide, and support domestic industries while simultaneously 
and actively seeking to impede, disadvantage, and harm their foreign counterparts. This 
approach is incompatible wi th the market -based approach expressly envisioned by WTO 
Members and contrary to the fundamental principles running throughout the many WTO 
agreements, and is the real threat to a stable and healthy development of the global economy.  
 
Instead, China has di splayed a determination to maintain the state's leading role in the economy 
and to continue to pursue industrial policies that promote, guide and support domestic industries 
while simultaneously and actively seeking to impede, disadvantage and harm their f oreign WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 127 - 
 
  counterparts, even though  this approach is incompatible with the market -based approach expressly 
envisioned by WTO members and contrary to the fundamental principles running throughout the 
many WTO agreements.  
 
113. What is the basis of this allegat ion from U.S. government?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States bases this allegation on its review and analysis of China’s 
approach to the economy and trade over the years.  The United States regularly has reported 
on this situation in USTR’s annual Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.  
 
The United States also will take all other steps necessary to rein in harmful state -led, non -market 
policies and practices pursued by China, even when they do not fall squarely within WTO disciplines, 
as evidenced by US TR's investigation of Chinese technology transfer policies and practices pursuant 
to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.  
 
114. Please explain what so -called steps necessary the United States will take to rein in Chinas non -
market policies fro m harming the United States. Please explain how these steps are consistent with 
multilateral rules.  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Members that TP Rs are retrospective exercises.  One current example 
of the United States taking steps to rein in China’s non -market poli cies can be found in the 
Section 301 investigati on, which is referenced above. The Section 301 investigation is a tool that 
the United States is using both to address matters that fall within the scope of the WTO 
agreements and matters that fall outside th e scope of the WTO agreements.  
 
Question 115  
Section 4.5.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (4.79)  
 
The United States seeks to address these concerns through multiple avenues. One major effort is 
negotiating binding commitments with trading partners for th e strong protection and enforcement 
for IP rights, including through trade agreements, as well as through WTO and OECD accession 
negotiations. In addition, the United States engages in other ways, by pursuing commitments and 
implementation of commitments t hrough Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, 
Memoranda of Understanding, and Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement work plans.  
 
115. What kind of commitments or clauses will be used to strengthen the IP protection among the 
above -mentioned avenues? Is there a plan to universally implement the above -mentioned IP 
protection approaches, or to conduct targeted consultations and negotiations? Can the United States 
introduce relevant plans and priorities if targeted consultations and negotiations are to take place?  
 
RESPONS E: Regarding commitments or clauses to be used in the future, and future plans, the 
United States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Part III. Other Questions  
 
116. Please introduce the respec tive duties between the federal and state governments of the United 
States in agricultural support policies.  
 
RESPONSE: Agricultural programs authorized by Congress are implemented at the Federal level 
unless otherwise specified in the law.  U.S. States may  provide other agricultural programs, and 
in general, these State -level programs support technical assistance, education, research, 
marketing and promotion, and conservation.  
 
117. Please introduce the implementation and actual results of the U.S. Agricult ural Act of 2014, as 
well as the direction of further adjustment and reform.  
 
RESPONSE: Commodity programs under the Agricultural Act of 2014 include the Price Loss 
Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage based on historical production without current 
production requirements; marketing assistance loans that provide short -term post -harvest 
credit to help producers spread marketing beyond the harvest period; the Margin Protection 
Program for Dairy offering producers insurance -like coverage for the margin between milk and 
feed prices; disaster assistance programs available to help producers recove r from forage, WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 128 - 
 
  livestock, and tree losses from adverse natural conditions; and Federal crop and livestock 
insurance. Other programs address conservation, nutrition assistance, credit, and research and 
extension. Details of these domestic support programs h ave been notified through 2016 and are 
described in detail in both the 2018 and 2016 U.S. Trade Policy Review Secretariat Reports. 
Regarding the future direction of agricultural policies, the United States reminds Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retr ospective exercises.  
 
118. Please list in detail the specific content and scale of the green box policy, blue box policy and 
yellow box policy for supporting agriculture by the federal and state governments of the 
United  States in 2017, including but not l imited to the support policies, the corresponding amount 
of subsidies, subsidy standards, conditions for obtaining subsidies, the number of farmers who have 
obtained the subsidies and the farmers role in various fields such as agricultural production, 
circulation, processing, trade and agro -ecological environment.  
 
RESPONSE: Data and information on U.S. domestic support in 2017 will be provided in the next 
U.S. DS: 1 notification to the Committee on Agriculture.  Data on the number of farmers 
participating in U.S. farm programs is not readily available.  The United States does not collect 
data on the role of farmers in various fields.  
 
119. Please introduce the goals of the United States for agricultural development by 2020 and 2025.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United S tates reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
120. Please introduce the considerations of the U.S. government in improving the competitiveness 
of agricultural products.  
 
RESPONSE: Generally, U.S. farmers maintain their compe titiveness by producing quality 
products based on market demand and by adopting new practices and technologies  to improve 
their productivity.  The U.S. government supplements private market and research investment 
with public investments in agricultural res earch, both directly and through public/private 
partnerships, and makes the results of that research available throug h the public extension 
system.  
 
121. Please introduce the main challenges and problems currently facing agricultural  development 
in the Uni ted States.  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. agriculture is highly productive and produces sufficient supplies of many 
commodities for both domestic use and export markets. However, U.S. farmers face a broad 
range of trade barriers that limit access in overseas markets. Ad dressing those barriers remains 
a key objective for U.S. agriculture.  
 
122. Please introduce the direction and approaches of the federal and state governments of the 
United States in reforming the agricultural support policies in the next step.  
 
RESP ONSE:  The United States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
123. The United States has established the US International Development Finance Corporation 
(USIDFC), a state -owned enterprise wholly owned by the federal government of the United States. 
A USD 60 billion investment quota has also been set to invest in underdeveloped countries. Please 
introduce the specific operation model and the objectives  of the company. Please also introduce the 
impact of this model on a third coun try making investment  in the country invested by USIDFC.  
 
RESPONSE: On October 5, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Better Utilization of 
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (the BUILD Act).   The BUILD Act consolidates, 
modernizes, and r eforms the U.S. government’s “development finance” capabilities – primarily 
OPIC and USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) – into the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC).   The USIDFC’s mandate is to mobilize and facili tate 
the participation of private sector capital and skills in the economic development of less 
developed countries and countries in transition from nonmarket to market economies, in order 
to complement the development assistance objectives of the United S tates.  Structurally, the WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 129 - 
 
  USIDFC will operate as an independent, wholly -owned government corporation. The BUILD Act 
gives the USIDFC additional tools and flexibilities relative to OPIC: the USIDFC will, in addition 
to providing loans, guaranties, and politi cal risk insurance, have the authority to make equity 
investments, provide technical assistance, and conduct feasibility studies specific to 
development finance projects.   The USIDFC will operate according to internationally recognized 
best practices and s tandards with respect to ensuring the avoidance of market distortions and 
the crowding out of private sector lending.  
 
124. What is policy proposition of the United States to promote the interconnection of regional and 
international infrastructure, especia lly the overall infrastructure level in underdeveloped WTO 
countries, thus stimulating the trade potential of these countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  China’s question is beyond the scope of this trade policy review.  
 
125. By the end of 2018, more than 100 countries have signed memoranda of understanding with 
China on jointly building the Belt and Road. What attitude does the United States have towards the 
actions of these countries? If there is space for improvement fo r Belt and Road Initiative proposed 
by China, what will the United States suggest?  
 
RESPONSE: China’s question would be more appropriate to discuss in connection with a trade 
policy review of China.  
 
126. Under the G20 framework, countries across the world have reached the principle of global 
challenges and collective responses regarding steel overcapacity. What is the policy stance of the 
United States on international steel trade? How does the United  States address the problem of 
domestic steel overcapacity? What are the remaining problems? What are the bases for the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to identify China as the largest steel manufacturing and exporting country, 
and judge China as the largest s ource of steel overcapacity accordingly?  
 
RESPONSE:  As noted in the response to Question 47 above, China’s non -market policies and 
practices has been widely recognized by WTO Members as leading to massive excess capacity 
and distortions of world markets.  In particular, China’s non -market economic system, driven by 
its industrial policy, has created new plant and maintenance of existing production contrary to 
market signals.  The result is a staggering level of global overcapacity that is directly attributa ble 
to China.  
 
In October 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce made the final ruling of anti -dumping and anti -
subsidy on photovoltaic cells originated in China. It ruled that the anti -dumping duty rate of Chinese 
enterprises was 18.32% to 249.96%, and the  anti-subsidy  duty rate was 14.78% to 15.97%. In 
December 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued the second final ruling of anti -dumping 
and anti -subsidy. It ruled that the dumping margin of mainland Chinese manufacturers was 26.71% 
to 165.04%, with the subsidy margin range being 27.64% to 49.79%; and the dumping margin of 
manufacturers in Chinese Taipei was 11.45% to 27.55%.  
 
127. Please explain the rationality of this policy and its impact on the photovoltaic market in the 
United States.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States administers its trade remedy laws in a manner that is consistent 
with its WTO obligations, and its antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are 
generally initiated in response to petitio ns filed by the U.S. industry. The decisio n to impose an 
antidumping or countervailing measure is based purely on a factual determination of whether 
the dumping or subsidization exists and whether that dumping or subsidization has caused or 
threatens to cause material  injury to a domestic industry . Where dumping or subsidization, injury 
or threat thereof, and a causal link have been found, the United States will impose an 
antidumping o r countervailing duty measure.  
 
With respect to the specific margin calculations in the question, China should exam ine the 
specific proceedings for further information, which can be found at: 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
128. How effective is this policy to protect enterprises manufacturing solar cells and co mponents in 
the United States?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 130 - 
 
  RESPONSE: The United States disagrees with China’s characte rization of its AD/CVD regime. 
For questions regarding specific proceedings, please see the response to question 127 above.  
 
In January 2018, the U.S. government announced that it would impose a maximum tariff of 30% on 
imported solar cells and components, followed by a 5% annual decline until the tariff reaches 15% 
in the fourth year.  
 
129. Please explain the rationality of this policy to protect enterprises manuf acturing solar cells and 
components in the United States.  
 
RESPONS E: Information related to the determination in question can be found in the U.S. 
International Trade Commission’s report ( https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy/publications/ 
safeguard_pubs.htm ) and in the President’s January 23, 2018 Proclamation (published in 83 
Fed. Reg. 3541 -50 (Jan. 25, 2018)).  
 
130. Does the policy violate  the WTO Agreement on Safeguards? Why?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States administers its safeguards investigations and implements any 
measures in accordance with WTO rules.  
 
Recently, in the field of service trade, the United States has adjusted various visa policies regarding 
Chinese students studyi ng in the United States. On the grounds of national security, the United 
States has tightened the visa policy for Chinese students to study in the United States. As a result, 
there are more obstacles, more administrative examinations and longer processing time for Chinese 
students to apply visa for studying in the United States. The Chinese students are now facing 
increasingly stricter entry examination.  
 
131. Has the United States implemented a tightened visa policy?  
 
RESPONSE: Like all travel lers, Chinese  students and academic exchange visitors undergo 
extensive security screening through the visa process to ensure U.S. national security.  Each 
case is reviewed individually based on the unique circumstances of the applicant, and our goal 
is to complete the  review process as rapidly as possible consistent with national sec urity.  
 
132. If such a policy is implemented, please introduce the consideration based on which such a 
policy is implemented.  
 
RESPONSE:  At this time, there are no ne w policy measures to an nounce. We review all 
applications for possible risks to U.S. n ational security.  
 
133. Has the United States assessed how the tuition fees paid by Chinese students have contributed 
to the development of university disciplines, scientific and technological progress, the welfare 
improvement to the faculty, and the investment income of each university in the United States? Has 
the United States assessed how the direct and indirect consumption of the Chinese students in the 
United States has contributed to the U.S. economy? Has the United States assessed how the Chinese 
students will contribute to the economic, technological and corporate development if they decide to 
stay and work in the United States? If so, please specify.  
 
RESPONSE: Questions regarding the s pecified “contributions” of Chinese students are not within 
the sc ope of the trade policy review.  
 
134. What major concessions have Canada and South Korea made in the renegotiation of the NAFTA 
and the U.S. -Korea Free Trade Agreement? What new changes have  been made especially  in the 
energy and petrochemical industries?  
 
RESPONSE: The final text of the United States -Mexico -Canada Agre ement (USMCA) is available 
at: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/free -trade -agreements/united -states -mexico -canada -
agreement/agreement -between . For comparison purposes, the text of the NAFTA is available at: 
https://www.nafta -sec-alena.org/Home/Texts -of-the-Agreement/North -American -Free-Trade -
Agreement . Modifications to the KORUS are available on the US TR website, at: https://ustr.gov/ 
about -us/policy -offices/press -office/press -releases/2018/september/ustr -publishes -agreed-
outcomes -us. WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  135. What restrictions and safety reviews does the U.S. government have for Chinese enterprises 
investing in oil and gas exploration and development, refining and chemical projects, LNG projects, 
etc. in the United States? What are the res trictions on Chinas imports of crude oil and LNG from the 
United States? Will there be more restrictions in the next step? If yes, please specify.  
 
RESPONSE:  Transactions that meet the definition of a “covered transaction” at 31 C.F.R. 
800.207 or “pilot pr ogram covered transaction” at 31 C.F.R. 801.210 are subject to CFIUS 
jurisdiction, regardless of sector.  
 
There are no U.S. restrictions placed on imports by China of U.S. crude oil or LNG. The United 
States reminds Members that the TPR is a retrospective exercise.  
 
136. The United States collects data about import and export trade in goods on a full -caliber  basis 
in calculating the international trade surpluses and deficits. Earlier, the WTO has called for improving 
the statistical method of recording import and export trade in goods and suggested to adopt a value -
added  approach. To this end, China is concer ned about and hopes to know the latest developments 
and whether there are improvement plans regarding the approach of the United States in recording 
the import and export trade in goods.  
 
RESPONSE: The official  U.S. statistics are collected and reported fo llowing international 
principles and guidelines, which call for producing data based on the full value of goods entering 
and leaving the United States.  In addition, the United States is a participant and at the forefront 
of new statistical techniques and analysis to provide a clearer description and interpretation of 
the data.  
 
137. On June 7, 2017, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy of the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) issued the notification G/TBT/N/USA/661/Add.7, which confirmed to direc tly adopt 
the Direct Final Rule (DFR) for Miscellaneous Refrigeration Products (81 FR 75194) issued in the 
Federal Register on October 28, 2016 by DOE. The effective date of the regulation was announced 
to be still on February 27, 2017. According to the DF R, miscellaneous refrigeration products ( MREFs ), 
including chillers and combined refrigeration products, would be included in the product range of 
Section A of Title III of the revised Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). It also revised the 
definiti on of MREF, set the test requirements, methods and energy efficiency standards for relevant 
products, and required that all the products concerned should meet the new energy conservation 
standards set in the DFR by October 28, 2019. This new regulation has  significantly increased the 
energy efficiency limit of wine cabinets, showing a significant  rise compared with that in the following 
three regulatory requirements: the limits for refrigeration products such as wine cabinets in the CEC -
400-2015-021 of Cali fornia, for household refrigerators in the U.S. DOE 430.32, and for household 
refrigerating appliances in the COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 643/2009. Among them, the 
energy efficiency requirement in the new regulation for wine cabinets has even increased b y more 
than 50% compared to that in the CEC.  
 
From the perspectives of technical feasibility and economic rationality, Could the United States 
please introduce the basis for setting the energy consumption limit in the regulation?  
 
RESPONSE:  The basis for s etting the relevant energy conservation standards was fully 
explicated in the Direct Final Rule.  
 
138. Article 7.6 of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation encourages Members to measure and publish 
their average release time of goods periodically and in a co nsistent manner.  
 
Could the United States please provide details on the implementation of that trade facilitation 
measure, including the main measurement body, measurement methods, publication channels, 
intervals of publication, etc. of the average releas e time?  
 
RESPONSE:  CBP’s annual Trade and Travel Report provides an overview of the agency’s trade 
facilitation initiatives.  Links to recent reports, other statistics, and summaries are available at: 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats . 
 
Section 1101 of the Copyright Law of the United States regarding musical performance.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  139. Are there any legal obstacles for the performer(s) to obtain protection in the United States 
based on the common law or statut es of any State. Please clarify whether this practice complies with 
the national treatment p rinciple stipulated in the TRIPS ? 
 
RESPONSE: Section 1101 of the Title 17 of the U.S. Code addresses unauthorized fixation and 
trafficking in sound recordings and m usic videos, and makes liable specific acts done without the 
consent of the performer or performers involved in a live musical performance. The provision 
does not make any distinction between national and foreign performers.  
 
140. Based on the transparency  principle of the WTO, please list in detail the state statutes and 
common law protecting the performer(s) of the works.  
 
RESPONSE:  It is not clear from this question what is meant by “protecting t he performer(s) of 
the works.” In the case of performers of  live musical performances, please refer to the answer 
above in questio n 139 regarding Section 1101.  
 
The objects of the copyright law listed in Article 102 of the Copyright Law of the United States include 
both compiled and deductive works. However, with regard to the protection of the work created from 
the copyrighted materials that have been existing, the protection of that work does not extend to 
any part of that material that is illegally used in the work.  
 
141. Will the compiled and deductive works created without the consent of the original copyright 
holder be protected by the Copyright Law of the United States? Does the use of such works without 
permission violate the copyright of individual(s) who have created the compiled and deductive 
works?  
 
RESPONSE: Section 103(a) of the Copyright Act provides that no copyright can be claimed for 
any part of a derivative work that has used preexisting material unlawfully. However, if the 
unlawful aspects of the derivative work can be separated from the other p arts of a work that 
were created lawfully, the latter aspects can qualify for copyright protection. In other words, in 
any case where a protected work is used unlawfully, copyright will not be extended to the illegally 
used material. In addition, the autho r of a derivative work does not in all instances require the 
consent of the copyright owner for the creation of a “lawful” derivative work. The unauthorized 
reproduction of a work, made without the consent of the copyright owner, may nevertheless be 
“lawfu l” under the doctrine of fair use.  
 
142. If the United States protects the compiled and deductive works created without the consent of 
the original copyright holder of the works, why did Circuit Judge Posner hold the opposite view in 
the case of Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (1983)? Is the above legal precedent 
effective in the United States?  
 
RESPONSE:  As explained in the response to question 141 above, a derivative work copyright 
can only be obtained when an author legally uses the material on  which the derivative work was 
based. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). Judge Posner’s opinion in Gracen  endorsed this principle, stating 
that “even if Miss Gracen’s painting and drawings had enough originality to be copyrightable as 
derivative works she could not c opyright them unless she had authority to use copyrighted 
materials from the movie.” 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Section 103(a)). For 
additional information on the unlawful use of pre -existing material in a derivative work, see 
Section 313.6( B) of The Comp endium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices (Third Edition), available 
at: https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf . 
 
143. If the United States does not protect the compiled and deductive works created without the 
consent of the original copyright holder of the works, does Article 103(a) of the U.S. Copyright Law 
comply with the provisions in the Berne Convention and the TRIPs? Should the United States amend 
Article 1 03(a) of the Copyright Law?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States observes that the question is based on a conditional premise, 
which is not reflective of U.S. law, as indicated in the r esponse to question 141 above. There is 
no need to amend Article 103(a) in orde r to comply with the Berne Convention or TRIPS.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Colombia  
INFORME DE LA SECRETARIA WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
Resumen (12)  
 
En el parágrafo 12 del Informe de la Secretaria se señala que  "El Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras 
en los Estados Unidos (CFIUS) sigue siendo el organismo encargado de supervisar las repercusiones 
de la inversión extranjera en la seguridad nacional. El CFIUS examina las transacciones sobre la 
base de las notificacio nes voluntarias que le presentan las partes, o bien a iniciativa propia si 
considera que se trata de una transacción abarcada que puede plantear problemas de seguridad 
nacional. Cada transacción se examina caso por caso en función de los hechos y circunsta ncias 
individuales. En el supuesto de que identifique problemas de seguridad nacional durante el examen, 
el CFIUS puede imponer condiciones, o bien negociar con las partes en la transacción un acuerdo de 
mitigación para resolver cualquier preocupación rela cionada con la seguridad nacional. Si el CFIUS 
determina que los problemas de seguridad nacional no se pueden resolver y las partes no se retiran 
y abandonan la transacción, el Comité recomendará que el Presidente prohíba la transacción".  
 
1. ¿Podría Estados Unidos explicar cómo funciona esta nueva ley y qué tipo de análisis lleva a cabo 
CFIUS para prohibir inversiones extranjeras en ciertos sectores?  
 
RESPONSE: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an 
interagency committee of the U.S. Government that is authorized to review certain transactions 
involving foreign investment in the United States in order to determine the effect of such  
transactions on U.S. national security.  CFIUS was established more than 30 years ago and the 
statutes and regulations governing CFIUS have been amended several times, most recently in 
August with the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Moderniza tion Act of 2018 
(FIRRMA).  FIRRMA strengthens and modernizes CFIUS, including by expanding the scope of 
foreign investment transactions reviewable by CFIUS.   
 
While the scope of CFIUS's jurisdiction has expanded under FIRRMA, CFIUS continues to focus 
exclusively on national security.  CFIUS evaluates potential national security risks based on a 
review of the particular facts and circumstances of each transa ction before it.  
 
More information on CFIUS and FIRRMA is available at:  https://home.treasury.gov/policy -
issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius.  
 
Quest ions 2 -6 
2.4 Régimen de inversiones (2.45)  
 
El párrafo 2.45 del informe de la Secretaría indica que "2.45. SelectUSA, creado en 2011, es un 
programa público dirigido por el Departamento de Comercio para promover la entrada de inversiones 
en los Estados Uni dos. El programa presta servicios a dos colectivos interesados: las empresas de 
propiedad extranjera que están considerando la posibilidad de invertir en los Estados Unidos y las 
organizaciones de desarrollo económico (EDO) de los Estados Unidos que desean  atraer IED de gran 
impacto. La asistencia prestada comprende servicios de información, orientación y asesoramiento, 
mediación, fomento de la inversión, y comercialización y promoción a través de encuentros 
mundiales."  
 
2. ¿Además de los servicios descritos e n el Informe de la Secretaría, SelectUSA ofrece algún tipo 
de incentivos para la atracción de IED de alto impacto hacia Estados Unidos?  
 
RESPONSE: SelectUSA does not offer incentives to attract high -impact FDI to the United States.  
 
3. ¿Desde la creación del programa, ¿en qué sectores económicos se ha enfocado la atracción de 
IED de alto impacto?  
 
RESPONSE: Since its creation, SelectUSA has provided assistance to facilitate greenfield FDI 
into the United States without additional consideration to its economic sector.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 134 - 
 
  4. ¿Cómo ha sido la coordinación con otras entidades del gobierno de Estados Unidos para el 
funcionamiento del programa?  
 
RESPONSE: Coordination with other entities of the U.S. government, particularly through the 
Interagency Investment Working Group  (IIWG), has successfully assisted in facilitating business 
investment in the United States by directing investors to the right points of contact to answer 
their inquiries on specific federal programs. For more information, please refer to our IIWG 
webpage : https://www.selectusa.gov/iiwg . 
 
5. ¿Los servicios que presta el programa incluyen un espacio de atención preferencial a los 
inversionistas extranjeros para facilitar los procedimientos y trámites relacionados con el 
establecimiento y expansión de sus inversiones, es decir, un mecanismo tipo ventanilla única de 
inversión?  
 
RESPONSE: Rather than a "single -window investment mechanism," SelectUSA acts as a first 
point of contact to help facilitate business investme nt in the United States. Please refer to the 
SelectUSA services webpage, https://www.selectusa.gov/services . 
 
6. ¿Cómo se define la IED de alto impacto o cuál es el criterio utilizado para definirla?  
 
RESPONS E: "High -impact" FDI refers to business investment with positive spillover effects for 
the U.S. economy, such as job creation, expor t propensity, and R&D spending.  
 
Questions 7 -8 
3.1.1.2 Ventanilla única (3.7, 3.18)  
 
En el parágrafo 3.7 se informa que "Según el CBP, la eliminación de procedimientos basados en 
papel a través del ACE ha permitido automatizar la presentación de 269 formularios utilizados por 
el CBP y sus 47 organismos gubernamentales asociados, incluidos los 22 organismos asociados que 
exigen documentos para verificar y despachar la carga importada y exportada. Entre otros muchos 
efectos positivos, se atribuye al ACE la aceleración de la tramitación de las solicitudes de fianza que 
ahora es unas 68 veces m ás rápida) y la reducción del tiempo de espera para el trámite de los 
camiones en los puertos de entrada terrestres en un 44%. Se estima que, en el ejercicio fiscal 2016, 
el ahorro asociado a las inversiones del CBP en sistemas automatizados y simplificado s, incluido el 
ACE, ha supuesto por término medio una reducción de los costos de importación de un 1,42% (un 
total de 6.500 millones de dólares EE.UU.). En cuanto a los costos de implantación del ACE, los 
gastos del CBP hasta el ejercicio fiscal 2017 ascen dieron en total a 3.810 millones de dólares EE.UU., 
y se estima que hasta 2026 (es decir, a lo largo del ciclo de vida previsto del ACE) será preciso 
invertir otros 890 millones en mantenimiento y desarrollo."  
 
7. Colombia desearía conocer más sobre la ventan illa única (Entorno Comercial Automatizado - 
ACE):  
1. Quienes participan en el sistema,  
2. Quien lidera la ventanilla única,  
3. Qué tipo de trámites se pueden realizar a través de la ventanilla,  
4. De qué manera se integran todos los actores de dicho sistema (por w eb services o deben ingresar 
a la plataforma) o algún otro medio,  
5. Que tipo de documentos físicos se eliminaron en los procesos de exportación e importación,  
6. En qué etapa de implementación se encuentra la ventanilla única,  
7. Tiene interoperabilidad con otr as ventanillas únicas?  
 
RESPONSE:  
 
i) Who participates in the system?  
The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is the commercial trade processing system that 
connects three key participant/stakeholder groups: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
the international trade community, and over 47 Partner Government Agencie s (PGAs). ACE, the 
U.S.' "Single Window," is the primary processing system through which all trade -related data 
required by U.S. Government agencies is electron ically submitted and processed. For more 
information  about  ACE, see: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated . 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 135 - 
 
  ii) Who leads the single window?  
The Trade Transformation Office (TTO) within CBP's Office of Trade provides integrated business 
support services for the development, sustainment, and modernizatio n of automated import and 
export processing systems and of transformation initiatives critical to executing and advancing 
the trade mission. TTO oversees and manages system requirements for ACE and ensures user 
needs are represented as part of CBP's modern ization efforts. TTO operates in combination with 
the Cargo Systems Program Directorate (CSPD) within CBP's Office of Information Technology, 
as the Program Management Office (PMO) for ACE and other trade transformation initiatives.  
 
iii) What kind of procedure s can be done through the window?  
Functionality is available in ACE to support all phases of cargo processing, including import 
manifest, cargo release, post release, export, and PGA integration.  
 
iv) Which way all the actors of that system are integrated (by  web services or they 
must enter the platform) or some other means?  
For the trade community, there are two primary methods of interacting with ACE:  
 
1. Filing transactions via Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) Interfaces: EDI is the 
mechanism through which mo st transactions (entries, entry summaries, and manifests) 
can be filed in ACE.  
2. Using the ACE Secure Data Portal: The ACE Portal is an online tool that allows users to 
file electronic truck manifests, protests, export commodity filings and, for low volume 
filers, importer security filings. Users can also access financial data and run reports. ACE 
reports can be used to monitor compliance and daily operations.  
 
For PGAs, there are three ways they can interact with ACE:  
 
1. Interoperability Web Services is the pi peline through which data is tr ansmitted between 
CBP and PGAs.  
2. The PGA Message Set is the consolidated set of data to be collected electronically from 
trade partners by CBP on behalf of go vernment agencies.  
3. Document Image System allows trade partners to su pply supporting documentation 
electronically as image files to CBP and PGAs.  
 
v) What kind of physical documents were eliminated in the export and import 
processes?  
CBP implemented security and technical requirements for the integration of nearly 50 PGAs into 
the Single Window, including converting 269 import and export PGA paper forms to electronic 
data submission in ACE.  
 
vi) In what stage of implementation is the one -stop shop?  
In February 2018, CBP deployed the last of the major scheduled core ACE deployme nts, and all 
phases of cargo processing are available in ACE. CBP is now focused on sustaining all deployed 
ACE capabilities and ensuring ACE operates as a highly available and reliable system. Ideas for 
additional ACE enhancements emerge on an ongoing bas is from our active dialogue with our 
industry, government agencies, and congressional stakeholders.  
 
vii) Is it interoperable with other one -stop shops?  
The transition to ACE as the U.S. Single Window  has transformed the way our country processes 
trade and has  laid the groundwork for future enhancements to border management.  
 
Although the U.S. Single Window system does not currently allow for cross -border exchange of 
data with partner countries, CBP continues to identify appropriate measures to promote our 
trade-related goals through engagements in international organizations (such as the World 
Customs Organization) and bilateral relationships with foreign partners.  
 
En el párrafo 3.18 del informe de la Secretaria se señala que "En el marco de la Iniciativa sob re la 
Seguridad de los Contenedores (CSI), cerca del 80% de toda la carga marítima con destino a los 
Estados Unidos se somete a una inspección previa en los puertos extranjeros. La CSI, puesta en 
marcha en 2002 en virtud de la Ley de Seguridad Portuaria (L ey SAFE) de 2006 (P.L. 109 -347), está 
en funcionamiento en 61 puertos del mundo entero. Toda carga transportada en contenedores y 
considerada de alto riesgo se inspecciona manualmente con equipos no intrusivos de visualización y WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 136 - 
 
  de detección de radiaciones  a gran escala. La Iniciativa sobre la Seguridad de la Carga, prevista en 
el artículo 232 de la citada Ley, se puso en marcha con el objetivo de comprobar si era posible 
escanear el 100% de la carga en espera de ser despachada a los Estados Unidos desde de terminados 
puertos. Sin embargo, tras evaluar los costos y beneficios potenciales y otras preocupaciones, se 
decidió volver al sistema de control de la carga de alto riesgo en todos los puertos piloto, con la 
excepción del de Qasim (Pakistán)."  
 
8. Bajo la CS I, ¿cómo se coordina el trabajo con los países donde se despacha la mercancía? Se 
establecen Acuerdos de Cooperación o Asistencia?  
 
RESPONSE: A Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed between U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection and each participating cou ntry. CBP Officers stationed in the host country target high 
risk cargo and coordinate with host country counterparts to examine the cargo prior to lading 
on the vessel. CBP officers and host country counterparts work together to share information 
and exam ine high risk cargo of mutual interest.  
 
Questions 9 -11 
3.1.6.1.1.1 Principales leyes y reglamentos  (3.63, 3.64)  
  
En el párrafo 3.63 de Informe de la Secretaria  se señala que "En 2016 se introdujeron algunos 
cambios en las prácticas relacionadas con los procedimientos de investigación en materia de 
derechos antidumping y compensatorios. El USDOC modificó su Reglamento relativo a la prórroga 
de los plazos para la presentación de comunicaciones en procedimientos antidumping y en materia 
de derechos compensatorios. Asimismo, modificó su Reglamento relativo a los ajustes de precios en 
los procedimientos en materia de derechos antidumping con el fin de aclarar que no t iene el propósito 
de aceptar un ajuste hecho después del momento de la venta, salvo si la parte interesada demuestra 
que tiene derecho a ese ajuste."  
  
9. ¿Cuál fue el propósito de Estados Unidos de introducir una modificación en su Reglamento 
relativo al ajuste de precios, en materia derechos anti -dumping que se menciona en el párrafo 
3.63 del Informe de la Secretaría General?  
 
RESPONSE: The background rega rding this regulation can be found in the Federal Register 
publication of the regulation, which was notified at G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.24 (dated 1 April 
2016).  
 
10. ¿Qué se prevé en el escenario de que la parte interesada demuestra que tiene derecho a ese 
ajuste, respecto a una situación que afecte la "comparabilidad de precios" (price comparability) 
y el margen de dumping previamente establecido respecto del producto investigado?  
 
RESPONSE: The determination of whether a party is entitled to a certain price adj ustment being 
claimed in an antidumping proceeding is made on a case -by-case basis, and is based on the 
facts and circumstances in the administrative record. Determi nations in specific proceedings on 
the treatment  of such claims  can be found  at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
En el párrafo 3.64 se indica que "En el Comité de Prácticas Antidumping de la OMC, los Miembros 
han expresado su preocupación respecto de algunas cuestiones relacionadas con los procedimientos 
o las normas para las investigaciones anti -dumping."  
 
11. ¿Cuáles s on las razones que tienen los Estados Unidos para introducir en 2017 las enmiendas 
en los procedimientos Anti -dumping respecto de la utilización de la "totalidad de datos 
disponibles" (the "total facts available") y de la metodología de definición de la "s ituación 
particular del mercado" (PMS) ["particular market situation" (PMS)]?  
 
RESPONSE: As notified in G/ADP/N/1/USA/Suppl.20 – G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.20 (dated 16 
July 2015), the United States amended certain aspects of its law related to AD/CVD proceedin gs. 
The legislation provided for five amendments to U.S. AD and CVD laws: (i) Section 502 amended 
Section 776 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to modify the provisions addressing the selection and 
corroboration of certain information that may be used as facts ot herwise available with an 
adverse inference in an AD or CVD proceeding; (ii) Section 503 amended Section 771(7) of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 to modify the definition of ''material injury'' i n AD and CVD proceedings; 
(iii) Section 504 amended sections 771(15) and 773 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to modify the WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 137 - 
 
  definition of ''ordinary course of trade'' and the provisions governing the treatment of a 
''particular market situation'' in AD proceedings; (iv) Section 505 amended Section 773(b)(2) of 
the Tariff Act of 1 930, to modify the treatment of distorted prices or costs in AD proceedings; 
and (v) Section 506 amended Section 782(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 to modify the provision 
regarding accepting voluntary respondents in AD and CVD proceedings.  
 
Question 12  
3.1.6.1.2 Medidas antidumping  (3.75)  
 
El parágrafo 3.75 señala que "El número de medidas antidumping en vigor aumentó durante el 
período abarcado por el examen. Al 31 de diciembre de 2017, excluidos los acuerdos de suspensión, 
estaban en vigor 321 medidas anti dumping definitivas. En esa fecha se mantenían en vigor 314 
órdenes de imposición de derechos antidumping y 7 acuerdos de suspensión, en comparación con 
293 en diciembre de 2016 y 265 en diciembre de 2015. De acuerdo con la información del USDOC 
y de la US ITC, al 17 de julio de 2018 se mantenían en vigor 340 órdenes de imposición de derechos 
antidumping (cuadro 3.6)".  
 
12. Se destaca en el Párrafo 3.75 el informe contiene el Cuadro 3.6 que contiene el Listado de países 
con medidas anti -dumping vigentes entre 20 15 julio 17 de 2018, en el cual aparecen 30 países 
(5 latinoamericanos) más la Unión Europea, pero el informe no men ciona a Colombia en esta 
lista. 
 
Cabe señalar al respecto, que este tema es de particular interés de Colombia, puesto que el 
pasado 5 de jun io de 2018, el Departamento de Comercio de Estados Unidos publicó la decisión 
final frente a las investigaciones dirigidas contra Colombia, Bélgica y Tailandia, por presuntas 
ventas de Ácido Cítrico a un precio menor al precio del mercado e impuso un derec ho definitivo 
del 28.48%. El 10 de julio de 2018, la ITC notificó al USDOC de la decisión final, afirmando que 
la industria norteamericana ha sufrido un daño material derivado de las importaciones 
provenientes de Colombia y Bélgica, pero no de aquellas pro venientes de Tailandia. Esta 
notificación fue publicada el 16 d e Julio en el registro federal.  
 
Puesto que el registro de esta medida no aparece en el Cuadro 3.6 del Párrafo 3.75 del Informe 
de la Secretaría de la OMC, resulta pertinente que la delegación de Colombia pregunte que 
Estados Unidos precise la razón de no incluir esta información o precise la fecha de vigencia de 
dicha medida.  
 
RESPONSE: While the U.S. International Trade Commission's determination regarding its 
finding of material injury to the  domestic industry was published in the Federal Register on July 
16, 2018 (see 83 Fed. Reg. 32905), the antidumping duty orders were not issued by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce until July 25, 2018 (see 83 Fed. Reg. 35214 -16). The data in the 
tables conta ined in the Secretariat's r eport were as of July 17, 2018.  
 
Question 13  
3.2.5.2 Programas de crédito a la exportación de la Administración de Pequeñas Empresas (SBA)  
(3.158)  
 
En el párrafo 3.158 del Informe de la Secretaria se indica que "La SBA no es prop iamente un banco. 
Por consiguiente, las condiciones específicas de sus préstamos se negocian entre el prestatario 
calificado y un prestamista aprobado por la SBA. Los solicitantes de créditos a la exportación de la 
SBA deben presentar los correspondientes planes de exportación, con inclusión de datos históricos, 
proyecciones e información escrita sobre la probabilidad de incremento de las ventas de exportación. 
No se exige que el empréstito tenga una cuantía mínima, y la SBA garantiza los préstamos hasta 5 
millones de dólares EE.UU. La tasa que cobra la SBA por su garantía depende del plazo de 
vencimiento del préstamo y de la cantidad garantizada (que llega al 90% en la mayoría de los casos), 
y la paga inicialmente el prestamista."  
 
13. Colombia quisiera saber s i los prestatarios calificados a los que se hace mención son un banco 
comercial y si la SBA condona la diferencia entre las condiciones comerciales del préstamo y 
aquellas ofrecidas por el prestatario.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: The "qualified borrower" referred to in th e Secretariat's report is the small business 
that is obtaining the loan.  SBA does not compensate the commercial lender that participates in 
the program in the manner referenced in the question.  
 
Questions 14 -17 
3.3.2 Normas y otras prescripciones técnicas  (3.173, 3.177, 3.181)  
 
El párrafo 3.173 del informe de la Secretaría indica que "El marco jurídico básico para la preparación 
y adopción de normas y reglamentos técnicos comprende la Ley de Acuerdos Comerciales de 1979, 
la Ley de Procedimiento Administrati vo (APA) de 1947, la Ley de Transferencia y Promoción de la 
Tecnología Nacional (NTTAA) de 1995 (P.L. 104 -113), la Circular A -119 de la Oficina de Gestión y 
Presupuesto (OMB) de los Estados Unidos y las Órdenes Ejecutivas 12866 (sobre planificación y 
revisión normativas), 13563 (sobre mejora de la reglamentación y del examen normativo), 13609 
(sobre promoción de la cooperación internacional en materia de reglamentación), 13610 (sobre 
determinación y reducción de la carga de la reglamentación), 13771 (sobre reducción de la 
reglamentación y control del gasto normativo) y 13777 (sobre observancia del programa de reformas 
normativas)."  
 
14. A Colombia le interesa obtener más información sobre la experiencia de Estados Unidos en la 
revisión de las reglamentaciones vi gentes. Por favor explicar los resultados hasta el momento, 
incluido el proceso implementado para las revisiones y si se ha introducido algún cambio y por 
qué. 
 
RESPONSE: The report is correct in citing The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the National 
Techno logy Transfer and Advancement Act, and other sources as setting out the basic framework 
for standards and technical regulations. Amendments and revisions of existing regulations may 
come about as a result of a variety of reasons or mechanisms —including a r equest by a 
stakeholder ("petition") to a regulatory agency for a change in a regulation, or through a review 
by the regulatory agency of part or all of the regulation, whether prompted by changed 
circumstances, general guidance on standards, a Presidentia l directive to undertake 
retrospective reviews, or as required by the underlying statute.  
 
Recent retrospective review programs at the Presidential level have included Executive Orders 
13563 and 13771, as noted in the question. EO 13771 requires Federal ag encies to eliminate, 
on average, two regulations for each new regulation, and to meet a regulatory cost cap. In 2017, 
OMB set a cost cap of zero, meaning the regulatory costs created by new regulatory actions 
needed to be offset by regulations that elimina ted regulatory costs. In 2018, across all agencies 
the cap was set at a $9.8 billion (present value) reduction in regulatory costs. In the first two 
years under EO 13771, Federal agencies have exceeded both the two -for-one requirement and 
the regulatory co st caps. In 2017, Federal agencies issued 67 deregulations and 3 new significant 
regulations, saving in present value $8.1 billion in regulatory costs. In 2018, Federal agencies 
issued 176 deregulations and issued 14  new significant regulations, saving in present value 
$23 billion in regulat ory costs. See: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_ 
Final_Accounting_for_Fiscal_Year_2018.pdf . 
 
Circular A -119 provides specific guidance with respect to review of existing technical regulations 
that incorporate standards. Consistent with Executive Orders 13563, "Improving Regulation and 
Regulatory Review,"  and 13610, "Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens," the Circular 
calls on agencies to regularly review and if necessary update references to standards that have 
been incorporated by reference. Each agency is encouraged to undertake a standards -specific 
review of such incorporated standards every three -to-five years, or when stakeholders otherwise 
provide adequate information that a standards -specific review is necessary (for example due to 
urgent matters of health and safety, the need to remain curre nt with technological changes, or 
for other compelling reasons). For example, a stakeholder —whether foreign or domestic --may 
petition agencies to update incorporated standards. The Circular also encourages upstream 
consultations with stakeholders, includin g in the context of a retrospective review, and provides 
specific  guidance  on how to approach  updating  a standard.  See: https:// www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/revised_circular_a -119_as_of_1_22.pdf . 
Also see: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information -regulatory -affairs/information -policy/ . 
 
Irrespective of the source or reason for reviewing the regulation, the way an agency can amend 
the substance of a regulation is through a "notice and comment" procedure, a practice that is WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 139 - 
 
  required by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1947 and has evolved over the years following 
interpretation by U.S. Federal courts. Agencies normally publish the proposed text of the 
amendment for public comment in the Federal Register (including online),  along with a 
description of its underlying rationale, and the evidentiary basis for it (such as more recent 
scientific studies, or an evaluation of impacts based on current conditions). Draft regulatory 
impact assessments (RIAs) must be made publicly avai lable for public comment along with the 
draft text. Public comment periods can vary from 30 or 60 days, to longer, depending on the 
complexity of the proposed amendment or regulation. In developing a final rule, an agency must 
consider and respond to subst antive issues raised by the public during this period, and provide 
explanations (as described in U.S. response to question 15 below.) Failure to abide by the APA 
requirements is a basis for judicial review, which is a key way of holding U.S. regulatory age ncies 
accountable.  
 
The U.S. government does not maintain statistics on specific standards or technical regulations 
that have been changed as a result of retrospective review. However, some recent  examples of 
proposed updates to standards in technical regu lations include:  
• EPA's proposed update, to an existing rule, of references to certain ISO/IEC 
standards  from their 2004 to 2017 versions  (https://www.federalregister.gov/documen
ts/2018/11/01/2018 -23592/technical -issues -formaldehyde -emission -standards -for-
composite -wood -products ); and  
• HHS's update, as a result of a retrospective review, of fire safety requirements for certain 
health care facilities to reflect a more recent version of a set of voluntary standards 
known as the Life Safety Code ( https://www.hhs.gov/open/retrospective -
review/february -2016-hhs-retrospective -review -submissions.html ). 
 
15. ¿Podría Estados Unidos informar cómo preparan los análisis de impacto regulatorio para evaluar 
sistemáticamente los efectos de las reglamentacion es propuestas?  
 
RESPONSE: Several laws and a series of presidential executive orders since 1981 have required 
executive agencies of the Federal Government to carry out RIAs. Executive Order 12866 of 
October 4, 1993 (Regulatory Planning and Review) sets out the requirements to conduct impact 
assessment subject to review by OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). EO 
12866 directs agencies to evaluate the costs  and benefits of all significant regulatory proposals; 
those significant regulatory proposals with an expected "annual effect on the economy" of $100 
million or more must conduct a more formal Regulatory Impact Assessment. Executive Order 
13563 of January 18, 2011 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review) supplements 
Executive Order 12866 and directs agencies to take into account, inter alia, minimizing public 
burdens of regulations, and risks to public health, the environment, and public safety. The 199 5 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act also provides direction to report the anticipated costs and 
benefits of a regulation. (Som e agencies also routinely analys e the costs and benef its of non -
significant rules).  
 
Even when a regulation is not considered "economic ally significant" in economic terms under the 
Executive Order, OIRA will conduct a formal interagency review of the rule when other 
circumstances are present, such as when the regulation likely raises new or important legal or 
policy legal questions (inclu ding whether the rulemaking is consistent with U.S. international 
trade obligations, in which case trade and other agencies with expertise would participate in an 
interagency review of the rule). Moreover, even for regulations not subject to OIRA review, 
regulatory agencies are required to employ evidence -based decision -making pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act. In issuing any final regulation, they must provide an explanation 
of: how the regulation achieves the agency's objectives, the rationale for the essential features 
of the regulation, and the nature of and reasons for any significant revisions made since making 
the regulation available for public comment; the regulatory authority's views on any substantive 
issues raised in timely -submitted c omments; major alternatives, if any, that the regulatory 
authority considered in developing the regulation and reasons supporting the alternative that it 
selected; and the relationship between the regulation and the key evidence, data, and other 
informatio n the regulatory authority considered in finalizing its work on the regulation.  
 
OMB has published detailed guidance for agencies on conducting an RIA, which aims to 
"standardize the way benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions are measured and 
reported." (OMB, Circular A -4 of September 17, 2003, Regulatory Analysis). The document sets 
out the objectives of, as well as methodological guidance on, issues such as discount rates and WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 140 - 
 
  valuation of human life. The preferred method is Benefit Cost Analysis  (BCA), using quantification 
to the extent possible. The U.S. RIA guidance explains that, in the BCA, both benefits and costs 
are expressed in monetary units, which allows the analyst to evaluate different regulatory 
options with a variety of attributes us ing a common measure. The size of net benefits, the 
absolute difference between the projected benefits and costs, indicates whether one policy is 
more efficient than another. Even when a benefit or cost cannot be expressed in monetary units, 
the analyst sh ould still try to measure it in terms of its physical units. If it is not possible to 
measure the physical units, the analyst should describe the benefit or cost qualitatively.  
 
Structurally, the RIA begins with the problem definition, which focuses on ide ntifying market 
failures. The RIA guidance document states:  
 
"Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address (including, where 
applicable, the failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new agency 
action) as well as  assess the significance of that problem. Thus, you should try to explain 
whether the action is intended to address a significant market failure or to meet some 
other compelling public need such as improving governmental processes or promoting 
intangible v alues such as distributional fairness or privacy. If the regulation is designed 
to correct a significant market failure, you should describe the failure both qualitatively 
and (where feasible) quantitatively. You should show that a government intervention is 
likely to do more good than harm. For other interventions, you should also provide a 
demonstration of compelling social purpose and the likelihood of effective action. 
Although intangible rationales do not need to be quantified, the analysis should pres ent 
and evaluate the strengths and limitations of the relevant arguments for these intangible 
values."  
 
Regulators must also identify the baseline scenario: "Identify a baseline. Benefits and costs are 
defined in comparison with a clearly stated alternati ve. This normally will be a "no action" 
baseline: what the world will be like if the proposed rule is not adopted."  
 
The kinds of alternatives that should be considered are listed in the RIA guidance, Circular A -4:  
 
• Different Choices Defined by Statute   
• Different Compliance Dates  
• Different Enforcement Methods  
• Different Degrees of Stringency  
• Different Requirements for Different Sized Firms  
• Different Requirements for Different Geographic Regions  
• Performance Standards Rather than Design Standards  
• Market -Oriented Approaches Rather than Direct Controls  
• Informational Measures Rather than Regulation  
 
The options should be ranked using both BCA and cost -effectiveness analysis (CEA), which 
"provi de a systematic framework for identifying and evaluating the likely outcomes of alternative 
regulatory choices".  
 
For further information on RIA methodology, see OMB Circular A -4 at: https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/ circulars/A4/a -4.pdf. 
 
El parágrafo 3.177 señala que "La Oficina de Coordinación de Normas del NIST funciona como 
servicio de información y es el organismo nacional encargado de la notificación en el marco del 
Acuerdo sobre Obstáculos Técnicos al Comercio de la OMC (Acuerdo OTC). Todas las notificaciones 
de los demás Miembros de la OMC se dan a conocer a las partes interesadas del país, a quienes se 
brinda la oportunidad de examinar y formular observaciones sobre las propuestas de reglamentos 
técnicos extra njeros y los procedimientos de evaluación de la conformidad a través de Notify U.S., 
un servicio por correo electrónico de suscripción gratuita en la web. Las observaciones y preguntas 
recibidas de otros Miembros de la OMC sobre las medidas propuestas en l os Estados Unidos y 
notificadas se hacen llegar a la autoridad normativa competente en un plazo de tres días laborables. 
La Oficina de Coordinación de Normas recibió 60 solicitudes de información en 2017 y 36 más en los 
siete primeros meses de 2018."  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 141 - 
 
  16. Sobre el mecanismo nacional de coordinación para tratar los asuntos OTC ¿puede Estados Unidos 
explicar cómo funciona y su experiencia con la herramienta Notify U.S?  
 
RESPONSE: To be clear, the NIST Office of Standards Coordination is not the national 
coordinat ion mechanism for the TBT Agreement. The NIST Office of Standards Coordination does 
coordinate and provide advice to federal agencies and other stakeholders on standards and 
conformity assessment policy in the United States. The NIST Office on Standards Co ordination 
also serves as the U.S. inquiry point and notification authority under the TBT Agreement. To 
disseminate information to U.S. stakeholders on proposed foreign notifications of standards 
related measures, the U.S. TBT Inquiry Point operates a web -based service, Notify U.S., which 
sends an e -mail to registered stakeholders to alert them when proposed actions in sectors of 
interest are notified to the TBT Committee. In this way, U.S. stakeholders are informed about 
notifications that could impact the ir business, and can comment on them through the U.S. TBT 
Inquiry Point. By using the U.S. TBT Inquiry Point to submit comments on other WTO Member 
notifications, the U.S. government is informed about U.S. industry concerns with proposed draft 
regulations at a time when comments can still be taken into account, prior to finalization of the 
measure.  
 
En el párrafo 3.181del Informe de la Secretaria indica que "Los Estados Unidos han firmado acuerdos 
de reconocimiento mutuo (ARM) con numerosos interlocutores c omerciales. En la esfera del equipo 
de telecomunicaciones, se han suscrito ARM con Australia; el Canadá; la República de Corea; Europa 
(UE/AELC); Hong Kong, China; Israel; el Japón; Malasia; México; Nueva Zelandia; Singapur; el 
Taipei Chino; y Viet Nam. Es tos ARM sobre telecomunicaciones establecen procedimientos de 
reconocimiento por las Partes de los respectivos organismos encargados de la evaluación de la 
conformidad, para la ulterior aceptación de los resultados de la evaluación de la conformidad de eso s 
organismos a efectos reglamentarios. Los interlocutores extranjeros en ARM informan de sus 
organismos de evaluación de la conformidad cualificados y acreditados (laboratorios de ensayo y/o 
órganos de certificación) a la Comisión Federal de Comunicaciones  (FCC). En los Estados Unidos, el 
NIST (por conducto de la Oficina de Programas de ARM) designa los organismos de evaluación de la 
conformidad nacionales cualificados (laboratorios de ensayo, órganos de certificación y/o 
organismos acreditados en el caso d e la UE) y los notifica a los asociados pertinentes en ARM para 
su reconocimiento. Los Estados Unidos han firmado ARM por separado con la UE (2004) y los Estados 
de la AELC (2006) en relación con el equipo de seguridad marítima."  
 
17. En términos del acuerdo d e reconocimiento mutuo, ¿puede Estados Unidos ilustrar sus políticas 
e información sobre los acuerdos de reconocimiento mutuo firmados y ejecutados?  
 
RESPONSE: USTR is authorized by section 411 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and section 
141 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1974, as amended, to negotiate mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs) on behalf of the United States. Such agreements provide, for example, a 
mechanism whereby the United States and a trading partner agree to accept conformity 
assessm ent results from testing laboratories or certification bodies located in each other's 
respective territories that both trading partners recognize as competent. Most U.S. MRAs are in 
the telecommunications sector. MRAs are not needed for foreign bodies to t est and certify 
products for the U.S. market; the United States allows foreign bodies to test and certify products 
for the U.S. market according to terms and conditions that are no less favo urable than those it 
applies to U.S. testing and certification bod ies. With respect to reliance on International 
Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) and International Accreditation Forum (IAF) 
accreditation, the choice of whether to rely on such accreditation is at the discretion of each 
regulator; however, as ap propriate, USTR encourages regulators to consider ILAC and IAF 
accreditation as they develop and implement their conformity assessment programs. The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, for example, uses ILAC accreditation in its third -party 
testing require ments for toys.  
 
Questions 18-19 
4.4.2 Telecomunicaciones  (4.141)  
 
El párrafo 4.141 señala que "Con arreglo a la nueva Orden sobre la Internet Abierta, ahora 
denominada comúnmente Orden del título II, que la FCC adoptó el 26 de febrero de 2015 y entró 
en vigor el 12 de junio de 2015, el servicio de acceso a Internet de ba nda ancha fijo y móvil se 
reclasificó como servicio de telecomunicaciones en el sentido del título II de la Ley de 
Telecomunicaciones (de ahí la denominación de Orden del título II). En consecuencia, los WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 142 - 
 
  proveedores de servicios de acceso a Internet de ban da ancha quedaron sujetos también a algunas 
de las disposiciones legales aplicables a las empresas de servicios públicos de telecomunicaciones, 
incluida la relativa a la prohibición de las prácticas injustas o irrazonables o la discriminación 
injustificada . Las disposiciones eran aplicables tanto al servicio de banda ancha fijo como al móvil. 
La Orden del título II prohibía el bloqueo de contenidos aplicaciones y servicios legales, o dispositivos 
que no supongan un peligro, así como la ralentización (entorp ecimiento o lentificación del tráfico 
legal en Internet según el tipo de contenido, aplicación o servicio, o por la utilización de dispositivos 
que no supongan un peligro) y la priorización mediante pago (gestión de la red de un proveedor de 
servicios de b anda ancha para favorecer directa o indirectamente a un tipo de tráfico respecto de 
otro, a cambio de contraprestaciones (económicas o de otro tipo) por parte de un tercero, o para 
beneficiar a una entidad asociada). Además, la Orden del título II establec ía una norma general de 
conducta que prohibía la interferencia o el trato desfavorable o irrazonable en Internet con respecto 
a las conductas no abarcadas por dichas prohibiciones del bloqueo, la ralentización y la priorización 
mediante pago. La Orden del título II también añadió prescripciones en materia de presentación de 
información a la norma de transparencia de la FCC para el servicio de acceso a Internet de banda 
ancha. La Orden no se aplicaba a los servicios prestados a las empresas, los servicios de  red privada 
virtual, el hospedaje ni los servicios de almacenamiento de datos. La Orden del título II fue 
impugnada por varios colectivos, entre ellos la Asociación de Telecomunicaciones de los Estados 
Unidos. En 2016 un tribunal del Circuito del Distrito  de Columbia respaldó la Orden del Título II en 
el asunto United States Telecom Association v. FCC, y determinó que la clasificación del servicio de 
acceso a Internet de banda ancha realizada por la FCC era admisible."  
 
18. Con la modificación de la Orden sobr e la Internet Abierta y de vuelta a lo establecido en el título 
I de la Ley de Comunicaciones, Estados Unidos se aparta de aplicar el principio de neutralidad 
de la red? Esto indica que se permiten realizar bloqueo de contenidos aplicaciones y servicios 
legales y priorización mediante pago de servicios digitales?  
 
RESPONSE: The Restoring Internet Freedom Order requires broadband internet access service 
providers to disclose blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization among other 
practices.  See pg. 130-132 of the RIF Order,  at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC -
17-166A1.pdf . Several major ISPs have made enforceable public commitments regarding these 
practices.  
 
19. ¿En la aplicac ión del título I de la Ley de Comunicaciones de Estados Unidos se pueden ver 
bloqueados contenidos de proveedores de servicios digitales extranjeros (no americanos)?  
 
RESPONSE: The rules adopted in the Restoring Internet Freedom Order do not distinguish 
between foreign and domestic content or foreign and domestic broadband internet access service 
providers. Any blocking practices must be disclosed publicly.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 143 - 
 
  Chinese Taipei  
Report by  the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Questions 1 -2 
3.1.6.1.1.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Main laws and regulations (3.59 -3.60)  
 
The report states that when conducting investigations into the evasion of anti -dumping or 
countervailing duties, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) must determine "not later than 30 0 
calendar days (or 360 calendar days in extraordinarily complicated cases)" after initiating the 
investigation, whether sufficient evidence of evasion exists. The report goes on to say in paragraph 
3.60 that CBP will notify the U.S Department of Commerce (USDOC) of a determination "when 
necessary".  
 
1. What are the circumstances that may lead to a case being characteriz ed as "extraordinarily 
complicated" for the purposes of the Enforce and Protect Act of 2005 (EAPA)?  
 
RESPONSE : The determination as to whether an investigation is extraordinarily complicated is 
based on the facts and circumstances of a particular investigation.  
 
2. When will it be "necessary" for the CBP to notify the USDOC of a determination made under 
the EAPA?  
 
RESPONSE : Under 19 U.S.C. section 1517(b)(4), when U.S. Customs and Border Protection is 
unable to determine from the allegation whether the merchandise at issue is covered 
merchandise, it may refer the matter to the U.S. Department of Commerce to make such a 
determination.  
 
Question 3  
3.1.6.1.1.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Main laws and regulations (3.63)  
 
The report states that, in 2016, the USDOC "modified its regulation concerning the extension of time 
limits for submissions in AD and CVD proceedings".  
 
3. What were these time limits modified to, and what was the public policy rationale for the 
modification?  
 
RESPONSE : The details of the amendment to the U.S. Department of Commerce's regulation 
and the reasons for the change can be found at: G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.15 -
G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.15 (dated 10 October 2013).  
 
Question 4  
3.1.6.1.1.2 Anti -dumping and countervailing  measures – Administrative procedures (3.67)  
 
The report states that as part of an anti -dumping investigation, the USDOC's International Trade 
Administration (ITA) "compares prices in the United States to a Normal Value". This comparison is 
done to calcula te dumping margins. The report also states that the method used by the ITA to 
calculate the normal value "varies according to the circumstances".  
 
4. What "circumstances" influence the method of calculation used by the ITA to calculate the 
normal value?  
 
RESPONSE : The calculation of normal value is based on the facts and circumstances of that 
particular segment of a proceeding. For example, when there are no sales of the like product in 
the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting coun try, the normal value 
may be based on sales to an appropriate third country.  
 
Questions 5 -7 
3.1.6.1.1.2 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Administrative procedures (3.71)  
 
The report states that "administrative reviews of CVD and AD orders in effect each year may be 
requested by interested parties during the anniversary month of the publication of the order".  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 144 - 
 
  5. Does "anniversary month" mean that an interested party can request an administrative 
review before 12 months had lapsed since the publica tion of the relevant order? For example, 
if an order was published on 31 May 2018, could a review of that order be requested on 1 
May 2019?  
 
RESPONSE : In the example given by Australia, if the period of review ended on May 31, then 
the anniversary month wo uld be in June of that year. An interested party could, therefore, 
request a review at any time during that month (after the publication of the notice providing 
such an opportunity, which is normally done at the earliest opportunity during the anniversary 
month).  
 
6. What is the public policy rationale for permitting requests for administrative reviews in the 
"anniversary month" of the publication of the order (as opposed to the anniversary date)?  
 
RESPONSE : Under the retrospective system, the U.S. Department of Commerce examines a 
specific period of time to determine the applicable duty to be assessed for that period. Interested 
parties are provided an opportunity to request an administrative review during the anniversary 
month because it is after the end of t he applicable period of review.  
 
7. How many days can lapse before the USDOC must respond to a request for an administrative 
review?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of Commerce responds to requests for administrative reviews 
as quickly as possible, taking into  account the legal timelines and requirements for conducting 
such a review.  
 
Question 8  
3.1.6.1.1.5 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Sunset reviews (3.72)  
The report provides that the purpose of sunset reviews is to determine whether revocation o f an 
order or termination of a suspended investigation "would likely lead to a continuation or recurrence 
of dumping or countervailable subsidies" that is of "material injury to the domestic industry".  
 
8. What factors does the USDOC consider in determining w hether the revocation of an order or 
the termination of an investigation is likely to lead to injurious dumping or countervailable 
activity?  
 
RESPONSE : The factors that the U.S. Department of Commerce may consider in making its 
determination can be found a t 19 U.S.C. section 1675a(b) and (c), and 19 C.F.R. section 
351.218.  
 
Question 9  
3.3.7.2 IPR – General regulatory framework (3.269)  
The report notes  that the United States joined T he Hague Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Industrial Designs in May 2015.  
 
9. What impacts has the United States seen of The Hague Agreement coming into force in May 
2015? Has an evaluation been undertaken or planned in the future?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States has not specifically studied what, if any, impacts have resulted  
from the coming into force of T he Hague Agreement.  In preparation for membership, the United 
States amended its laws (Patent Law Treaties and Implementation Act of 2012) and the USPTO 
updated  relevant  regulations.  See: https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/hague -agreement 
-concerning -international -registration -industrial -designs . Regarding future plans, the United 
States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Question 10  
3.3.7.3 IPR – Patents (3.274)  
The report notes that the Leahy -Smith America Invents Act (AIA), passed in 2011, provides a 75% 
discount for patent fees to all applicants that qualify as micro entities.  
 
10. How does the United States define micro entities, and has there been an increase in the 
number of patent applications received from such entities as a resul t of these discounts?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE : See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 9th Edition (MPEP) Section 509.04 
– Micro  Entity  Status,  at: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s509.html<#ch500_d
1ff69_210b3_1ca . The United States has not evaluated whether or not there has been an 
increase in the number of patent applications received from such entities as a result of the fee 
discount.  
 
Questions 11 -14 
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – major support programmes (4.9)  
The report states that in July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its intention to provide 
a short -term aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with market disrupt ions caused 
by retaliatory tariffs.  
 
11. Noting the aid package was designed to "assist farmers in response to trade damage from 
unjustified retaliation by foreign nations"9, can the United States explain how it is ensuring 
the package only assists farmers who  have suffered 'damage'?  
 
RESPONSE : The Market Facilitation Program provides payments to producers of nine 
commodities that have been negatively impacted by retaliatory tariffs. Purchase s of other 
commodities negatively impacted by retaliatory tariffs will be made through the Food Purchase 
and Distribution Program. Further details can be found on USDA's  website  at: https://www.usda. 
gov/media/press -releases/2018/09/04/usda -launches -trade -mitigation -programs . 
 
12. Will assi stance provided to agriculture producers under the short -term aid package be 
notified to the WTO as green or amber box domestic support?  
 
RESPONSE : The Market Facilitation Program and the Food Purchase and Distribution Program 
will be notified as appropria te with other domestic support programs associated with the 2018/19 
marketing/fiscal year.  
 
13. Noting media reports that producers of a number of specific agricultural commodities have 
concerns about the design of the Market Facilitation Program and its lack of substantive 
assistance for their respective commodities, can the United States advise if it is considering 
restructuring the Program?  
 
RESPONSE : No changes have been announced for the Market Facilitation Program. We remind 
Members that TPRs are retrospe ctive reviews.  
 
14. If the announced US$12 billion aid package is not exhausted for 2018 production, will U.S. 
farmers be provided access to the funds in future years' production, particularly if dynamics 
of the trading relationship between the United States and China remain contentious?  
 
RESPONSE : Regarding access to the funds in future years' production, the United States 
reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
Question 15  
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – major support programmes (4.10)  
Preparations for a new farm bill began in 2016. A number of hearings were held in 2017, and the 
legislative process has been underway throughout the reporting period in 2018.  
 
15. Compared to the 2014 Farm Bill, what new support programmes are planned for the  new 
farm bill and when does the US expect the next farm bill to commence?  
 
RESPONSE : The 2014 Farm Bill authorizes current farm programs through the 2018 crop year. 
We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping the 
Memb ership informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill . 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2018/08/27/usda -announces -details -assistance -farmers -
impact ed-unjustified . WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 16  
4.1.2.7 Agriculture – Sugar (4.31)  
The report states that all imports of raw cane sugar, refined sugars (certain sugars, syrups and 
molasses), and sugar -containing products take place under a system of tariff rate quota s (TRQs).  
The USDA determines the overall TRQ quantities for each fiscal year, while USTR allocates the 
volumes. The TRQ for raw cane sugar is allocated among 40 countries, based on patterns observed 
at a time when trade was relatively unrestricted (1975 -81), resulting in the largest portions being 
allocated to the Dominican Republic (17%), Brazil (14%), and the Philippines (13%).  
 
16. Noting the United States allocates raw cane sugar TRQs among around 40 countries based 
on patterns observed around 40 years ago, and the average fill rate of the raw cane TRQ for 
the most recently notified three -year period (2013 -15) was 76.16% (as per notifications 
G/AG/N/USA/102, G/AG/N/USA/115 and G/AG/N/USA/120), can the United States advise if 
it is considering reallocating raw sugar quotas to better align with current global sugar 
market production and trade?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States regularly reallocates the raw sugar TRQ and consults with foreign 
governments during  the process in order to facilitate utilization of the TRQ.  
 
Question 17  
4.1.2.7 Agriculture – Sugar (4.33)  
The 2014 Farm Bill eliminated market price support, deficiency payments for dairy producers, and 
dairy export subsidies.  
 
17. Are these previously eliminated support payments expected to feature in the next farm bill?  
 
RESPONSE : The 2014 Farm Bill authorizes current farm programs through the 2018 crop year. 
We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping the 
Membersh ip informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill.  
 
Question 18  
4.1.2.9 Agriculture – Other major support programmes (4.39)  
The report states around 80% of projected outlays under the 2014 Farm Bill concerned domestic 
food aid via the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)… [E]xpenditures on SNAP have 
been declining due to a lower number of participants. In April 2018, just under 40 million persons 
received payments under SNAP, down from nearly 46 million in FY2015. While chan ges in the benefit 
calculations may account for some of this reduction, the main contribution appears to be a firmer 
job market that has improved earnings for the low -income segment.  
 
Australia notes in its Domestic Support notifications from 2011 onwards,  the United States has 
notified expenditure of more than USD100 billion on domestic food aid each year. This trend of 
increased expenditure began at the time of the  Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  
 
18. Noting SNAP expenditures are declining due to a firmer job market and improved economic 
conditions in the United States following the GFC period, can the United States advise if it 
expects outlays on domestic food aid in the next Farm Bill to continue to maintain the current 
trend of more than USD100 billion each year?  
 
RESPONSE : The 2014 Farm Bill authorizes current farm programs through the 2018 crop year. 
We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. We look forward to keeping the 
Membership informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill.  
 
Question 19  
4.1.3.1 Agriculture – Imports (4.42)  
The report notes over the last two years, the estimated average MFN duties have increased for dairy 
products and sugar and confectionary, whereas the estimated average rates are unchanged or 
slightly lower for other agricultural product categories. The highest average applied MFN rates are 
found in dairy (30.1%) and beverages, spirits and tobacco (22.6%).  
 
19. Can the United States explain why on one hand it has sought to renegotiate preferential 
trade agreement s with trading partners, namely Mexico and Canada as part of the USMCA, WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  to enhance its own dairy market access, while at the same time it has increased MFN duties 
for dairy to almost 10 times its simple average MFN applied tariff?  
 
RESPONSE : Please note th at the Secretariat compiles this information. The difference may 
relate to Ad Valorem  Equivalent (AVE) tariff conversions of non -ad-valorem  tariffs ( i.e., specific 
or mixed tariffs). The United States has not raised tariff rates on dairy or sugar products and 
cannot, as U.S. WTO bound rates for these products equal U.S. applied rates.  
 
Question 20  
4.1.4 Agriculture – Levels of Support (4.50)  
The report notes that OECD data shows U.S. producer support and border protection has reduced 
substantially since 1986-88, and support levels to agricultural producers have remained consistently 
below the OECD average. The share of the potentially most distorting support is also lower than the 
OECD average. Market price support has declined in importance over the year s relative to budgetary 
support that requires production. As many of the present programmes are counter -cyclical by design, 
the levels of budgetary support move inversely with developments in market prices. The OECD's 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for th e United States is currently around US$40 billion per year, 
or close to 10% of gross farm receipts (Table 4.5).  
 
Australia would highlight in particular the  producer support estimates listed in the report for milk 
(19.7% of gross farm receipts for milk) and refined sugar (56.1% of gross farm receipts for refined 
sugar).  
 
20. Noting that under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the United States and other Members  
agreed to developing disciplines to, inter alia, provide for substantial progressive reductions 
in agricultural support and protection, can the United States explain how it is working to 
reduce its high producer support for milk and refined sugar?  
 
RESPON SE: The United States remains actively engaged in WTO agriculture negotiations to 
achieve substantial progressive reduction in agricultural support and protection, including trade -
distorting support among all major agricultural subsidizers, and new market access opportunities 
for Members.  
 
Question 21  
4.1.4 Agriculture – Levels of Support (4.53)  
As for Amber Box support, the United States notified product and non -product specific support 
totalling US$13.6 billion (including de minimis  subsidies) for the marketing year 2014 and 
US$17.2  billion for 2015. Excluding de minimis  support, the curren t total AMS reported was 
US$3.8  billion in both 2014 and 2015.  
 
21. Is the US$12 billion US farmer assistance package identified in paragraph 4.9 expected to 
significantly increase US amber box support for the 2019 marketing year, particularly for 
soybean producers?  
 
RESPONSE : These programs are consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support 
and will be notified in due course.  
 
Questions 22 -24 
4.4.1.4 Financial Services – Banking services (4.100)  
The report states that the US maintains some National Treatment limitations for foreign ownership 
in its banking sector. While foreign banks cannot be members of the Federal Reserve System, 
foreign -owned US bank subsidia ries are not subject to the limitation. Further, foreign ownership of 
Edge corporations [subsidiaries of banks or bank holding companies, organised to allow international 
banking and financial business] is limited to foreign banks and US subsidiaries of fo reign banks, 
while domestic non -bank firms may own such corporations.  
 
22. Following the post -GFC reform of the US' financial services sector, what National Treatment 
or other limitations are placed on foreign -owned US bank subsidiaries?  
 
RESPONSE : No specific national treatment or market access limitations were placed on foreign -
owned U.S. bank subsidiaries as a result of post -GFC reform. For information on existing national 
treatment or market access limitations on foreign -owned U.S. bank subsidia ries, please see WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 148 - 
 
  the U.S. Annex  III in the U.S.-Mexico -Canada  Agreement, available here: https://ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/files/agr eements/FTA/USMCA/Text/NCM_Annex_III_United_States.pdf . 
23. Can domestic banks also own Edge corporations in the US? If so, what limitations and 
requirements exist for the ownership of Edge corporations by domestic banks and non -
banks?  
 
RESPONSE : Yes, domestic banks can own Edge Act corporations in the United States. For more 
information on ownership requirements, please see 12 CFR Part 211 – International Banking 
Operations (Regulation K): https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR -2017-title12 -vol2/pdf/CFR -
2017-title12 -vol2-part211.pdf . Foreign ownership of Edge Act corporations is limited to foreign 
banks and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks, while  domestic non -bank firms may own such 
corporations, as explained in the U.S. Anne x III in the U.S. -Mexico -Canada Agreement, 
available  here:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/NCM_An
nex_III_United_States.pdf . 
 
24. Noting that foreign ownership of Edge corporations is limited to foreign banks and US 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, what percentage of Edge corporation s in the US is currently 
foreign -owned?  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the Federal Reserve's Annual Report and its discussion of International 
Activities, available here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2017 -ar-supervision -
and-regulation.htm . 
 
Questions 25 -27 
4.4.1.5.1.1 Financial Services – Insurance services – Legislation and regulation (4.109 -4.110)  
The report states that the insurance sector in the US is regulated mainly at the state level. Insurance 
companies, agents and brokers need to be licensed in the state where they plan to provide services 
in order to be able to offer insurance services. Lice nsing requirements vary across states, and 
insurance premium rates for many types of coverage need to be approved by state regulators.  
 
25. What recognition agreements, if any, exist between state regulators for the regulation of 
insurance services? If none, h ow is the provision of insurance across state borders regulated 
and facilitated?  
 
RESPONSE : In the United States, the business of insurance is primarily regulated at the state 
level by the insurance authorities of the fifty states, the District of Columbia , and the five U.S. 
territories, although states seek to coordinate and achieve uniformity in certain areas. In 
general, each state where an insurer operates regulates the insurer's market conduct in that 
state. Similarly, the state where an insurer is inc orporated is primarily responsible for its financial 
oversight as well as for sanctioning or taking other remedial actions if the insurer operates in an 
unsafe and unsound manner. The U.S Department of the Treasury's Report to the President, 
titled A Finan cial System that Creates Economic Opportunities: Asset Management and 
Insurance , provides detail on the state -based system of insurance regulation and coordination 
among state insurance regulators. It is available at:  https://www.treasury.gov/press -
center/press -releases/Documents/A -Financial -System -That-Creates -Economic -Opportuniti es-
Asset_Management -Insurance.pdf . 
 
26. What regulatory or other systems are in place to allow for the national provision of insurance 
in the US?  
 
RESPONSE : There are some areas where the federal government helps to ensure availability of 
certain insurance pr oducts, such as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, administered by the 
Treasury Department, and the National Flood Insurance Program, administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. A discussion of other aspects of the federal government's role  
in the national provision of insurance is available in the Federal Insurance Office's 2018 Annual 
Report on the Insurance Industry, available at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports -
and-notices/Documents/2018_FIO_Annual_Report.pdf . 
 
27. What limitations, if any, are placed on the provision of insurance to federal government 
employees or agencies operating in different states? Are such services regulated by the 
relevant state regulatory authorities, or by a federal agency?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 149 - 
 
  RESPONSE : We are not aware of general limitations relating to national treatment and market 
access, although certain conditions may need to be satisf ied for all insurers seeking to do 
business with the federal government.  
 
Questions 28 -30 
4.4.1.5.1.1 Financial Services – Insurance services – Legislation and regulation (4.116)  
The report states that the US and EU signed a covered agreement on 22 September 2017, addressing 
important areas of regulatory cooperation between the two on areas of insurance business, 
including: group supervision, reinsurance (including collateral and l ocal presence requirements), and 
exchange of information between the respective regulatory authorities. According to the FIO, this 
agreement allows US insurers with EU operations to avoid burdensome capital, governance, and 
reporting requirements under the  EU's "Solvency II" prudential regulatory system for insurers, as 
well as EU local presence and collateral requirements for US reinsurers. The agreement also commits 
the US to eliminating state -based reinsurance collateral requirements as applied to cessio ns to EU 
reinsurers that meet the consumer protection standards specified in the agreement.  
 
28. Does this covered agreement amount to recognition or a decision of equivalence for the 
areas of insurance business listed?  
 
RESPONSE : By its terms, the Agreement addresses the following: "(a) the elimination, under 
specified conditions, of local presence requirements imposed by a Party or its supervisory 
authorities on an assuming reinsurer which has its head office or is domiciled in the other Party, 
as a conditio n for entering into any reinsurance agreement with a ceding insurer which has its 
head office or is domiciled in its territory or for allowing the ceding insurer to recognise credit 
for reinsurance or credit for risk mitigation effects of such reinsurance agreement; (b) the 
elimination, under specified conditions, of collateral requirements imposed by a Party or its 
supervisory authorities on an assuming reinsurer which has its head office or is domiciled in the 
other Party, as a condition for entering into  any reinsurance agreement with a ceding insurer 
which has its head office or is domiciled in its territory or for allowing the ceding insurer to 
recognise credit for reinsurance or credit for risk mitigation effects of such reinsurance 
agreement; (c) the role of the Host and Home supervisory authorities with respect to prudential 
group supervision of an insurance or reinsurance group whose worldwide parent undertaking is 
in the Home Party, including, under specified conditions, (i) the elimination at the l evel of the 
worldwide parent undertaking of Host Party prudential insurance solvency and capital, 
governance, and reporting requirements, and (ii) establishing that the Home supervisory 
authority, and not the Host supervisory authority, will exercise world wide prudential insurance 
group supervision, without prejudice to group supervision by the Host Party of the insurance or 
reinsurance group at the level of the parent undertaking in its territory; and (d) the Parties' 
mutual support for the exchange of inf ormation between supervisory authorities of each Party, 
and recommended  practices for such exchange."  
 
The agreement text is available at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports -and-
notices/Documents/US_EU_Covered_Agreement_Signed_September_17.pdf . 
 
 
29. Which prudential and regulatory authorities in the US are covered by this agreement?  
 
RESPONSE : A discussion of the U.S. authorities covered in the U.S. -EU covered agreement is 
contained in the Federal Insurance Office's 2018 Annual Report on the Insurance Industry, 
available  at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports -andnotices/Documents/ 
2018_FIO_Annual_Report.pdf . 
 
30. What state -based reinsurance collateral requirements in the US are being eliminated for EU 
providers under thi s agreement? Are steps being taken to address these requirements for 
providers from other economies that meet the US' consumer protection standards?  
 
RESPONSE : A discussion of the treatment of reinsurance collateral requirements under the 
U.S.-EU covered a greement is contained in the Federal Insura nce Office's 2018 Annual Report 
on the Insurance Industry, available at: https://www.treasury.gov/i nitiatives/fio/reports -and-
notices/Documents/2018_FIO_Annual_Report.pdf . 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 150 - 
 
  Question 31  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.139)  
The report states that some telecom services are subject to foreign ownership restrictions. Under 
Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934, common carrier wireless licences cannot be granted 
to, or held by, non -USA citizens, corporations not organized  under the laws of the USA, or foreign 
governments, nor can they be granted to USA corporations of which more than 20 per cent of the 
capital stock is owned of record or voted by any of these entities without prior Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) a pproval.  
 
31. Is the USA considering any adjustments to the restrictions in Section 310 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 regarding foreign ownership and granting of co mmon carrier 
wireless licences?  
 
RESPONSE : There is no pending legislation seeking to amend Section 310 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 regarding foreign ownership and granting of common carrier 
wireless licences.  
 
Question 32  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.139)  
 
The report states that licences may be granted to companies set up in the United States that are 
controlled by holding companies set up in the United States and in which foreign individuals, 
corporations, or governments own of record or vote more than 25 per cent of the capital stock, 
unless  the FCC finds that such ownership is inconsistent with the public interest. Under the 
Communications Act, the FCC must conduct a public interest analysis when evaluating applications 
to receive authorization to exceed the 25 per cent foreign -ownership ben chmark.  Since the inception 
of the WTO, no foreign applicant has ever been denied a common carrier wireless licence under the 
FCC's public interest analysis of foreign ownership. During the review period, in 2016, the FCC 
revisited its prior policies with respect to broadcast applicants and licensees involving more than 25 
per cent foreign ownership, and incorporated them into the existing streamlined rules and 
procedures that apply to common carrier applicants and licensees, with certain modifications. 
Australia seeks clarity on the USA's public interest determination process.  
 
32. How does the FCC assess 'public interest' associated with granting licences to companies 
that meet relevant foreign ownership criteria in the Communications Act 1934? Does the 
USA in tend to make any changes to these practices?  
 
RESPONSE : The FCC has adopted specific rules that apply to foreign ownership of common 
carrier radio (wireless) licensees and lessees as well as to broadcast and aeronautical licensees. 
These rules are codified  at 47 CFR §§ 1.5001 -.5004. In exercising its statutory discretion to 
allow foreign ownership in excess of the 25 per cent  benchmark in Section 310(b)(4), the FCC 
conducts a public interest analysis that starts with a presumption (subject to rebuttal) that 
foreign ownership of common carrier radio licensees does not threaten competition in the U.S. 
telecommunications market. It also involves a consideration of policy concerns raised by federal 
government agencies in relation to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, or trade 
policy issues. The same public interest analysis applies to requests for FCC approval to e xceed 
the 20 per cent  foreign ownership limit in Section 310(b)(3) of the Act under the FCC's 
forbearance approach, which applies only to common carrier radio licensees. (See: FCC (2013), 
Review of Foreign Ownership Policies for Common Carrier and Aeronaut ical Radio Li censees 
under Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, FCC  13- 50, at: 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC -13-50A1.pdf .) 
 
The FCC is not cu rrently considering changes to its foreign ownership practices, which it last 
reviewed in the 2016. (See: FCC (2016), Review of Foreign Ownership Policies for Broadcast, 
Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio Licensees under Section 310(b)(4) of the 
Communi cations Act of 1934, as Amended, FCC 16 -128, at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ 
attachments/FCC -16-128A1.pdf .) 
 
Question 33  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.143)  
The report indicates that  the US has ended utility -style regulation of the internet in favour of market -
based policies.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 151 - 
 
  33. Does the USA consider that the current approach to internet regulation allows it to take 
adequate enforcement action against anti -competitive practices? Why?  
 
RESPONSE : Yes. As a result of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)'s Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regained its authority to take 
action when broadband providers engage in anti -competitive, unfair, or deceptive acts or 
practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Other U.S. antitrust laws, including Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act, continue to apply to broadband providers. More information can be found 
in the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, pg. 87 -93: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ 
FCC-17-166A1.pdf . 
 
Question 34  
4.4.3.1 Postal services market overview; 4.4.3.3 Regulatory regime (4.151, 4.164)  
The report states that the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) of 2006 directed the 
US Postal Service to establish in the Treasury a revolving Postal Service Competitive Products Fund, 
to be devoted to meeting the cost of competitive products. The report also states that the P AEA 
requires that the prices for the US Postal Service's competitive products must cover direct and 
indirect costs, may not be subsidized by market -dominant products, and must contribute an 
appropriate share of the USPS' institutional costs. The report sta tes that this amount is currently 
5.5%.  
 
34. What safeguards are in place to ensure these requirements do not result in cross -
subsidization of USPS competitive products with revenue from its market -dominant 
products?  
 
RESPONSE : Before approving prices for a co mpetitive product, the Postal Regulatory 
Commission (Commission) reviews the product's estimated revenue and attributable cost to 
ensure that: (1) the product should cover its attributable cost; (2) the product will not be 
subsidized by market dominant pro ducts; and (3) competitive products, as a whole, will 
contribute their appropriate share to the Postal Service's institutional costs. See 39 U.S.C. §  
3633(a) and 39 C.F.R. § 3015.  
 
In addition, by law, the Commission conducts an annual compliance review to ensure that each 
competitive product continues to comply with the requirements listed above. If the Commission 
determines that a competitive product has not met all of the requirem ents, it has the authority 
to order the Postal Service to implement specific remedies.  
 
Questions 35 -37 
4.4.6.1.2 Airports (4.216, 4.218)  
The report states that the results of policies to promote airport privatization have been modest. In 
particular, the r eport indicates that only four of the 10 airports participating in the Airport 
Privatization Pilot Program have been privatized.  
 
35. Are there any limitations on the participation of foreign investors in airport ownership?  
 
RESPONSE : There are no federal limi tations on foreign investor participation in airport 
ownership. Certain transactions involving foreign investment in United States airports are 
subject to review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS 
is an interagency c ommittee authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign 
investment in the United States, in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the 
national security of the United States. CFIUS operates pursuant to section 721 of the Defense  
Production Act of 1950, as amended (section 721), and as implemented by Executive Order 
11858, as amended, and regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 800 and 31 C.F.R. Part 801, as amended.  
 
36. Can the US provide any further information regarding the barriers to the privatization of 
airports, or the difficulties encountered by the Airpo rt Privatization Pilot Program?  
 
RESPONSE : In 1996, Congress enacted the Airport Privatization Pilot Program to explore the 
use of private investment to improve the management of public use airports and customer 
service, and lower the cost of operating public use airports. In 2012, Congress expande d the 
Pilot Program from 5 slots to 10 and removed the cap entirely in 2018, providing an opportunity 
for more airports to submit an application. The program is voluntary and the decision to submit WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  an application remains with the airport owner. The U.S. Fe deral Government considers 
privatization as another management tool for managing and developing an airport. As a general 
policy, FAA leaves the selection of an airport's governance structure to local control.  
 
37. Can the US provide any updates on any new or p lanned policies to promote the privatization 
of airports?  
 
RESPONSE : The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 enacted several changes to the Airport 
Privatization Pilot Program. The program is now called the Airport Investment Partnership 
Program. The ten -airport cap has been eliminated. FAA will provide planning grants for an airport 
interested in pursuing airport privatization. The program will permit public sponsors and private 
investors to develop a partnership arrangement to manage and develop the airport.  
 
Questions 38 -39 
4.5 E-commerce (4.280)  
The report states that a Supreme Court ruling recently changed rules on taxation for online sales. 
Previously, businesses without a presence in a state were not obliged to charge sales tax on sales 
to customers located in states other than their own. The S upreme Court has now ruled (South Dakota 
v. Wayfair Inc.) that a state may compel an online retailer, regardless of whether they have a 
physical presence in that state, to charge sales tax on customers located in other states.  
 
38. Can the US provide more det ail on changes to taxation for online sales, in particular under 
what circumstances (if any) a US state can compel an online retailer to charge sales tax 
regardless of whether the retailer has a physical presence?  
 
RESPONSE : The imposition of a sales tax is determined by each of the individual U.S. States. 
The imposition of other taxes or fees on businesses is also determined by each of the individual 
U.S. States. The U.S. federal law known as the Internet Tax Freedom Act bars all levels of U.S. 
government  from imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. The same 
law also prohibits any taxes on Internet access services.  
 
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, the Court held that a physical presence in a U.S. state 
was not an absolute n ecessity under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to establish 
a presence or nexus with the U.S. State for the purposes of collecting sales tax. In general under 
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. States may impose taxes so long as they (1) apply to an activity with 
a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) are fairly apportioned, (3) do not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and (4) are fairly related to the services the State provides. In the 
absence of physical presence, a State must still  rely on a substantial nexus with it to impose a 
tax on interstate activity.  
 
39. Will a legislative change to the taxation rules on online sales be made? Does this affect 
international cross -border sales?  
 
RESPONSE : We refrain from speculating on possible fut ure actions or policies given the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
Report by the United States (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Questions 40 -41 
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.4)  
The report states that the Administration recently began a determined effort to eliminate wasteful 
and unnecessary barriers that hamper business which, along with other efforts to strengthen the US 
economy, will make it easier for US companies to succeed in global markets.  
 
40. Which barriers did the US Admini stration identify as hampering the ability for service 
suppliers to 'do business' in global markets, and what efforts have been taken to address or 
eliminate them?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States provides a website that identifies all deregulatory and regulatory 
actions  by government  agencies.  See: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain . The 
specific list of deregulatory and regulatory action s completed in fiscal y ear 2018 can be found 
here:  https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_Completed_Actions_for_Fiscal_WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Year_2018.pdf . The specific list of deregulatory and regulatory actions completed in fiscal year 
2017 can be found here: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/FINAL_BU_20171207. 
pdf. 
 
41. Have any of the barriers identified by the US as effecting the ability of service suppliers to 
'do business' been barriers within the US system and, if so, what steps have been taken to 
address these?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States provides a website that identifies all der egulatory and 
regulatory  actions  by government  agencies.  See: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgenda
Main. The specific list of deregulatory and regulatory action s completed in fiscal year 201 8 
can be found  here:  https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_Completed_Action
s_for_Fiscal_Year_2018.pdf . The specific list of dere gulatory and regulatory actions completed 
in fiscal year 2017 can be found  here:  https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/FINAL_BU
_20171207.pdf . 
 
Question 42  
1 The United St ates in the Global Trading System (1.9)  
The report states the United State is interested in working with other Members on improving the 
functioning of the regular committees of the WTO.  
 
42. Which elements of the regular committees of the WTO are the US intere sted in improving, 
and what steps is the US proposing to take to achieve this?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States values the role of the standing committees of the WTO in 
providing opportunities to resolve questions of Members' compliance with their commitments, 
to develop initiatives aimed at systemic improvements, to promote transparency in Member s' 
trade policies, and to monitor and resist market -distorting pressures. We are interested in 
working with other Members to improve the functioning of the committees. A key element in 
need of improvement is Members' failure to comply with their notificati on obligations across the 
WTO Agreement. This lack of transparency is undermining the functioning of the regular 
committees of the WTO, as well as the negotiating arm of the WTO and the credibility of the 
organization. At the November 2017 meeting of the G eneral Council, the United States put 
forward a proposal aimed at improving Members' compliance with their notification obligations. 
In September 2018, the United States, Japan, and the EU agreed to co -sponsor an updated 
transparency and notification propo sal for consideration in the WTO Council on Trade in Goods. 
Australia, Argentina, Chinese Taipei and Costa Rica have also co -sponsored the proposal. The 
United States and other co -sponsors stand ready to work with Members to advance this proposal.  
 
Questio ns 43 -44 
2 The United States Economic and Trade Environment (2.3)  
The report states that the US real exports of goods and services have increased by 3.0% in 2017 
and 5% in the first half of 2018.  
 
43. What percentage of this reflects a growth in the export of trade in services?  
 
RESPONSE : Real exports of services grew 2.5 per cent  in 2017 and 2.9 per cent  in the first half 
of 2018. This accounted for 25 per cent  of the total growth of real exports of goods and services 
in 2017 (3.0 per cent ) and 17 per cent  of the growth in the first half of 2018 (5.0 per cent ).  
 
44. During the period under review, which services sectors saw the most growth in the US?  
 
RESPONSE:  Between 2015 and 2017, U.S. exports of services increased by $42.4 billion. Forty 
per cent  of this growth was in the category of "other business services" led by professional and 
management consulting services (mostly business and management consulting and public 
relations servcies) and research and development services. U.S. exports of financial servic es WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  accounted for 17 per cent  of the export growth and exports of computer services accounted for 
15 per cent  of the export growth.  
 
In the first half of 2018, U.S. exports of services increased by $6.1 billion over the first of of 
2017. Thirty per cent  of this growth was led by U.S. exports of financial services, 19 per cent  by 
U.S. receipts of intellectual property, and 17 per cent  by travel receipts (including education).  
 
Questions 45 -46 
2 The United States Economic and Trade Environment (2.10 -2.12)  
The report identifies the increased strength of US goods and services trade, of the US dollar, and of 
the lowering rate of US goods and services trade deficit during the period under review and, in 
particular, under the current Administration.  
 
45. What legislativ e or other changes have accounted for the increase in the US' trade in 
services?  
 
RESPONSE : U.S. trade in services (exports plus imports) increased 7.4 per cent  between 2015 
and 2017. U.S. services exports increased 5.6 per cent  while services imports incr eased by 10.3 
per cent . For the first half of 2018 (as compared to the same period in 2017), U.S. trade in 
services were up 4.6 per cent  as services exports and imports were 4.9 per cent  and 4.0 per 
cent higher, respectively. The increase in U.S. trade can  be attributed, in part, to stronger 
economic growth at home and abroad, and not any legislative changes.  
 
46. Noting the report indicates that the US supplied 15.1% of 'goods and services imports to the 
rest of the world' in 2017, which services sectors accou nt for the greatest percentage of US 
exports?  
 
RESPONSE : In 2017, U.S. services exports were led by travel services including education (26 
per cent ), other business services (19 per cent ) led by professional and management consulting 
services (mostly  business and management consulting and public relations services) , intellectual 
property receipts (16 per cent ), and financial services (14 per cent ). 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Costa Rica  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Questions 1 -3 
Section 3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.3)  
 
The United States formally accepted the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) on 23  January 
2015. Since the entry into force of the TFA on 22 February 2017, the United States has, as a 
developed country Member, been bound by all the commitments contain ed in the Agreement. It 
provided its notification on transparency, the operation of its single window, measures on the use of 
customs brokers, and TFA contact point in June 2017.1 The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) leads an interag ency National Trade Facilitation Committee that organizes 
coordination and implementation of the TFA as part of its responsibilities to develop, coordinate, and 
implement trade policy. This is the national committee on trade facilitation for Article 23.2 o f the 
TFA. More than 20 federal agencies participate in the national committee, including the Departments 
of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security 
(including CBP), Interior, Justice, Labo ur, State, Transportat ion, and Treasury; the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Small Business Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Input from the private sector is mainly sought through the Industry Trade 
Advisory Committee (ITAC) on Cus toms Matters and Trade Facilitation. For agricultural trade issues, 
the national committee is aided by an Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee as well as six technical 
advisory committees.  
 
1. Can the United States provide further information on the operati onal dynamics of the National 
Trade Facilitation Committee in order to ensure efficiency in its working sessions and in the 
decision -making processes?  
 
RESPONSE: On April 4, 2018, The United States submitted to the WTO Committee on Trade 
Facilitation a det ailed White Paper outlining the structure and role of the U.S. National Trade 
Facilitation Committee (NTFC). The paper is available online through the WTO's TFA Database, 
at: https://www.t fadatabase.org/uploads/document/W5.pdf . 
 
Overall, the United States has found that three key elements are essential for a well -functioning 
NTFC capable of implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). These elements 
are: 
• Full inter -agency part icipation;  
• Clear leadership with political imperatives; and  
• Strong links to the private sector.  
 
2. Besides the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee, which other committees are created to 
support the National Trade Facilitation Committee functions?  
 
RESPONSE: No other committees were created specifically to support the U.S. NTFC; however, 
several existing committees with expertise in customs and trade facilitation provide advice and 
support to the U.S. NTFC.  
 
The U.S. NTFC regularly solicits input from the public through several established mechanisms. 
The primary vehicle for regular stakeholder feedback on trade facilitation is the Interagency 
Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) on Customs Matters and Trade Facilitation. The Customs 
Matters and Trade Facili tation ITAC provides detailed policy and technical advice, information, 
and recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce and USTR regarding trade barriers, 
negotiation of trade agreements, and implementation of existing trade agreements. More 
information r egarding the ITAC system can be found at: www.trade.gov/itac . 
 
The U.S. NTFC is also informed by recommendations from the Commercial Customs Operations 
Advisory Committee (COAC). The COAC, administered by the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), advises the Secretaries of the Department of the Treasury and the De partment 
of Homeland Security (DHS). Approximately 20 private sector participants serve on the COAC, 
representing a group of participants with expertise in customs, logistics, and trade facilitation 
from companies across the United States. Additional infor mation regarding the COAC is available 
at: www.cbp.gov/trade/stakeholder -engagement/coac .  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Further information regarding this topic can be found in the U.S. White Paper  on the Structure 
and Role of the U.S. NTFC,  at: https://www.tfadatabase.org/uploads/document/W5.pdf . 
 
3. Can the United States provide information on the mechanism used by the private sector, within 
the Trade Advisory Committee of the Industry, to inform the National Trade Facilitation 
Committee of the relevant decisions, opinions or projects on customs matters and trade 
facilitation?  
 
RESPONSE: The Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs) are a unique public -private 
partnership jointly managed by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) that engages business leaders in formulating U.S. trade 
policy. As part of the USTR -led trade advisory committee system, the  Department of Commerce 
and USTR co -administer fourteen ITACs and more than 300 trade advisors, who provide detailed 
policy and technical advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce and the United 
States Trade Representative regarding trade bar riers, negotiations of trade agreements, and 
implementation of existing trade agreements affecting industry sectors; and perform other 
advisory functions relevant to U.S. trade policy matters. The ITAC system includes 14 trade 
advisory committees that repr esent a variety of sectors and trade concerns, including Intellectual 
Property Rights, Consumer Goods, Textiles and Clothing, and Small and Minority Business, 
among others. More information on the operations of the ITACs can be found at: 
https://www.trade.gov/itac /. 
 
The NTFC regularly solicits input from the Interagency Trade Advisory Committee (ITAC) on 
Customs Matters and Trade Facilitation. The Customs Matters and Trade Facilitation ITAC 
consists of approximate ly 15-20 members with relevant expertise. At the beginning of 2018, the 
NTFC used the ITAC's group of specialized experts to collect data for policy planning. The NTFC 
drafted and circulated a survey to the ITAC on Customs Matters and Trade Facilitation to  gain a 
better understanding of the private sector's priorities and positions on TFA implementation. More 
information regarding the U.S. NTFC's engagement with this Industry group and the private 
sector is detailed in the United States' White Paper on this  topic, available at: 
https://www.tfadatabase.org/uploads/document/W5.pdf . 
 
Question  4 
Section 3.1.1.3 Other trade facilitation measures (3.12)  
 
Participation in the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) programme, a commercial clearance programme 
for low -risk shipments entering the United States from Canada or Mexico, requires all elements of 
the supply chain (i.e. manufacturers, carriers, drivers, and imp orters) to be enrolled in C -TPAT. CBP 
inspects and validates the supply -chain security measures of the foreign C -TPAT members on a 
regular basis. Truck drivers who are U.S., Canadian or Mexican citizens may enrol in FAST and use 
the streamlined procedures of dedicated FAST lanes at 34 land border crossings. More than 78,000 
commercial drivers have joined the programme. The processing fee for a five -year membership in 
FAST is US$50/Can$50. The fee applies only to drivers.  
 
4. Who are part of the Free and Secure  Trade (FAST) programme? What are the benefits of being 
part of this programme?  
 
RESPONSE: In order for a truck to utilize the FAST lane processing it must 1) be a U.S. Customs -
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C -TPAT) approved carrier, 2) carry qualify ing goods 
destined for a C -TPAT approved importer, 3) be driven by an individual in possession of a valid 
FAST-Commercial Driver Card, and 4) have a high -security seal.  On the southern border, 
manufacturers must also be C -TPAT approved in order for shipmen ts to qualify for FAST release. 
Only approved commercial truck drivers who make qualified FAST trips between the United 
States and Canada or between the United States and Mexico receive FAST Driver cards that 
afford them expedited release/entry into Canada , the United States, or Mexico.  
 
The benefits for those who are accepted into the FAST program include: dedicated lanes (where 
available) for greater speed and efficiency in the clearance of FAST trans -border shipments; 
reduced number of examinations, as w ell as secondary priority processing; streamlined 
processes through the partnership with the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA)/Partners in 
Protection (PIP) and CBP (C -TPAT) administrations; and enhanced supply chain security and WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  safety; and, for carrier participants, the knowledge that they are transporting shipments for a 
C-TPAT approved importer or, on the southern border, a C -TPAT manufacturer.  
 
Question 5  
Section 4.3 Manufacturing (4.80)  
 
Through its trade policy, the Administration aims to advance and defend the interests of 
manufacturers and their workers, by expanding export opportunities and strengthening enforcement 
of trade rules. USTR works to level the playing field for U.S. manufacturers by: (a) eliminating tariff 
and non -tariff barriers; (b ) negotiating WTO rules to benefit U.S. manufacturers; (c) countering 
foreign trade distorting practices; and d) enforcing trade agreements. In this respect, the President's 
Trade Policy Agenda stresses that U.S. trade remedy laws and other trade laws must  be vigorously 
enforced to ensure fair trade for U.S. manufacturers and their workers.  
 
5. Can the United States provide examples of WTO rules that might benefit U.S. manufacturers?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States believes that the full spectrum of WTO rules benefits U.S. 
manufacturers by providing them with market access and a level playing field for exporting the 
goods they produce. However, for these benefits to be realized, the rules must be fully 
implemented by WTO Members, effectively enforced, and not c ircumvented through non -
market -based policies that lead to excess capacity, theft of intellectual property, and involuntary 
technology transfers.  
 
Question 6  
Section 4.4.7.3 GATS and bilateral commitments ( 4.269 ) 
 
There are full ("none") market access comm itments for modes 1, 2 and 3, and full national treatment 
commitments for all four modes for all four sectors. The only exceptions are a restriction in mode 3 
for market access for travel agencies and tour operators, that states that "official tourism offi ces 
with diplomatic or official status are not permitted to operate on a commercial basis in the United 
States or to act as agents or principals in commercial transactions", and another restriction for 
modes 2 and 3 for market access for tour guide service s that states that "the number of concessions 
available for commercial operations in federal, state and local facilities is limited". Mode 4 market 
access commitments for the four subsectors make cross -reference to the horizontal commitment 
limitations, wh ich concern limitations on the temporary entry and stay of natural persons. There are 
no sector -specific MFN exemptions regarding tourism services.  
 
6. Can the United States please provide more information on the restrictions for modes 2 and 3 for 
market acce ss for tour guide services? What kind commercial operations are currently limited? 
Can the United States please provide information on the rationale for a mode 2 limitation?  
 
RESPONSE: The reservation  represents a conservative scheduling approach to the in herent 
restrictions on commercial activity on public lands. For more information on concession policy in 
national parks, see: https://www.nps.gov/subjects/co ncessions/upload/36 -CFR-51-Concession -
Contracts.pdf . With respect to Mode 2, the Secretariat Report was incorrect; the United States 
has full Mode 2 commitments with no limitations for all tourism services.  
 
Question 7 -8 
Section 4.5 E -commerce ( 4.275 ) 
 
The United States has no overarching federal cybersecurity law. Protection of cybersecurity is 
regulated mainly by state laws and federal regulations, which provide industry -specific mandates 
with respect to data security. The Federal Government has, however,  through its National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, developed a Cybersecurity Framework, which seeks to support the 
development of better cybersecurity practices by both governmental and non -governmental actors.  
 
7. Can the US provide further informa tion on whether there has been broad adoption of standards 
by state and federal lawmakers with respect to its Cybersecurity Framework?  
 
RESPONSE: There is extensive use of the Cybersecurity Framework at federal, state, and local 
government levels in the United States. Section (1)(C)(ii) of the Executive Order 13800 on 
Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure requires all WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Federal  agencies  to use the Framework  to manage  their cybersecurity  risk. 
See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential -actions/presidential -executive -order -
strengthening -cybersecurity -federal -networks -critical -infrastructure/ . 
 
Similarly, agencies are using the Cybersecurity Framework and the Multi -State -Information 
Sharing and Analysis  Center (MS -ISAC) for measuring and reporting their cybersecurity 
posture/maturity. See: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/success -stories/ms -isac. 
 
We expect adoption and use of  the Framework and the technical standards included in the 
Framework to continue to grow.  Using language from Version 1 of the Cybersecurity Framework, 
a 2018 Technical Report of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International 
Electr otechnical Commission (IEC) provides guidance on how to leverage and utilize existing 
standards in a cybersecurity framewor k and achieve a well -controlled approach to cybersecurity 
management. More information can be found at: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso -
iec:tr:27103:ed -1:v1:en . 
 
8. Can the United States provide further information on the process of elaborating such standards 
and comm unicating them to stakeholders?  
 
RESPONSE: NIST has followed a very extensive process of ongoing public engagement, 
including through workshops, webinars, formal requests for information, seminars, and public 
comment opportunities, in developing the Framework and raising awareness about the 
Framework.  Information  about  these  engagements  is available  at: https://www.nist.gov/cyberf
ramework/events -and-presentations . 
 
Additional informati on about the development of the Framework is available in the Q&A section 
of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, under the question "When and How Was the Framework 
Developed" in the Section on "Framework Basics". This information can be viewed 
at: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/events -and-presentations . 
 
REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 9  
Section 4.4.1 Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum ( 4.52)  
 
APEC also advanced work on promoting services trade through the implementation of elements of 
the APEC Services Competitiveness Roadmap, adopted in 2016. APEC is developing a region -wide 
index on trade restrictiveness in services based on existing indices. APEC cont inued to focus attention 
in 2017 and 2018 on the growing importance of digital trade to economic growth and innovation. 
The United States is leading the effort to adopt building blocks to facilitate digital trade, including 
principles related to enabling c ross-border data flows and preventing forced localization of data. 
APEC also showed leadership by continuing efforts to strengthen the implementation of good 
regulatory practices.  
 
9. Can the United States please provide further information on its main areas of focus in the 
implementation of the elements of the APEC Services Competitiveness Roadmap, besides from 
digital trade which is already mentioned in the report?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is working with other APEC economies to develop a services 
trade restrictiveness index to identify areas in which removal of restrictions can improve the 
overall competitiveness of services markets. This index will be compatible with similar indices 
prepared by organizations such as the OECD, so that comparisons can be made with non -APEC 
economies. The United States has also worked with APEC economies to develop principles for 
improving regulatory due process and transparency in services, in order to strengthen regulatory 
practices in the region.  
 
Question 10  
Section 4.4 .3 The U.S. -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement ( 4.56)  
 
The United States is pursuing several initiatives to expand and deepen economic engagement with 
the 10 member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN colle ctively 
represents both the United States' fourth largest goods export market and largest trading partner. WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Under the Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement signed in 2006, the United States is 
working with ASEAN countries to enhance and deepen the U.S. -ASEAN economic relationship and 
support ASEAN regional integration. In 2017 -2018, the United States supported the launch of the 
ASEAN Single Window under the U.S. Agency for International Development's US -ASEAN 
Connectivity through Trade and Investment (U S-ACTI) program. For 2018 -2019, the United States 
and ASEAN have decided to work together on agriculture biotechnology regulatory cooperation and 
continue discussions on proposals regarding electronic payment services and automotive standards.  
 
10. It has been  widely discussed that one of the main barriers to electronic commerce lies on 
electronic payment services. In this line, can the United States please provide further information 
on the scope and content of proposals discussed with ASEAN regarding electron ic payment 
services?  
 
RESPONSE: Retail electronic payment services are a key area of financial services trade. In the 
digital economy, electronic payment services are critical to facilitate global digital trade and 
promoting an open and competitive market that welcomes foreign and domestic suppliers on a 
level playing field, and can be an important driver of development, innovation, economic growth, 
and trade. The United States has raised issues relating to ensuring a level playing field with 
respect to ret ail electronic payment services in the context of the ASEAN -United States Trade 
and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Cuba  
Con respecto al Informe presentado por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos sobre el Examen de sus 
Políticas Comerciales, circulado como documento WT/TPR/G/382, el Gobierno de la República de 
Cuba solicita que sean incluidas en el decimocuarto examen de ese M iembro, una serie de preguntas 
en relación con los acápites de estos informes que a continuación se relacionan:  
 
▪ Informe de los Estados Unidos ( WT/TPR/G/382 de 12 de noviembre de 2018):  
 
El gobierno de la República de Cuba desea hacer notar que en varios acápites y párrafos del Informe 
presentado por los Estados Unidos se hace referencia a los objetivos y prioridades de este Miembro 
para "crear un entorno comercial justo, abierto y previsible", y para "promover mercados abiertos y 
comercio libre y justo en  todo el mundo", entre otros aspectos relacionados con la liberalización del 
comercio. Sin embargo, el bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por el gobierno de 
los Estados Unidos contra Cuba por casi sesenta años es el sistema de sanciones uni laterales más 
dilatado e implacable que se ha aplicado contra un país a lo largo de la historia, en violación de las 
normas más elementales de la OMC que supuestamente está concebida para la promoción de un 
comercio justo entre sus Miembros que posibilite el desarrollo económico de estos.  
 
En el período transcurrido desde el decimotercer Examen de Política Comercial de Estados Unidos, 
el 19 y 21 de diciembre de 2016, hasta la fecha, la política de bloqueo contra Cuba se ha recrudecido, 
tanto en el ámbito bi lateral como en el multilateral, por el alcance creciente de sus implicaciones 
extraterritoriales, afectando el comerci o con otros Miembros de la OMC.  
 
El voto a favor de la resolución titulada "Necesidad de poner fin al bloqueo económico, comercial y 
financiero impuesto por los Estados Unidos contra Cuba", aprobada en la Asamblea General de las 
Naciones Unidas durante 27 años consecutivos, es expresión de la voluntad mayoritaria de la 
comunidad internacional contra esa política.  
 
Se relacionan a continuaci ón las referencias del Informe relacionadas con los comentarios y las 
preguntas a presentar por Cuba:  
 
Acápite I . LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS EN EL SISTEMA MUNDIAL DE COMERCIO:  
 
En el párrafo 1.7  de este acápite se menciona que "La vigorosa labor de la Oficina del Representante 
de los Estados Unidos para las Cuestiones Comerciales Internacionales (USTR) y de los organismos 
estadounidenses afines, como los Departamentos de Agricultura, Comercio, Trabajo, Estado y 
Tesoro, contribuy e a asegurar que los acuerdos comerciales reporten los máximos beneficios en 
cuanto a lograr acceso a los mercados para los estadounidenses y crear un entorno 
comercial justo, abierto y previsible ". 
 
ACÁPITE II.  EL ENTORNO ECONÓMICO  Y COMERCIAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS  
En el párrafo 2.1  de este acápite se expresa que "Los Estados Unidos mantienen uno de los 
regímenes comerciales más abiertos del mundo ;…" 
 
Por consiguiente , el gobierno de la República de Cuba considera que las políticas y medidas 
anteriormente citadas del Informe de los Estados Unidos, resultan incongruentes con la política de 
bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero que desde hace casi 60 años ha aplicado los Estados 
Unidos contra Cuba.  
 
ACÁPITE IV.  EVOLUCIÓN DE LA POLÍ TICA COMERCIAL DESDE  2014 
En el párrafo 4.5  de este acápite se expresa que " En la reunión del Consejo General celebrada en 
noviembre de 2017, los Estados Unidos presentaron una propuesta destinada a mejorar el 
cumplimiento por los Miembros de sus obligaciones de notificación . En septiembre de 2018, 
los Estados Unidos, el Japón y la UE acordaron copatrocinar una propuesta actualizada sobre 
transparencia y notificación con miras a su examen en la siguiente reunión del Consejo del Comercio 
de Mercancías de la OMC".  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  ▪ Informe de l a Secretaría (WT/TPR/S/382 del 12 de noviembre de 2018)  
 
El gobierno de la República de Cuba desea resaltar que el informe presentado por la Secretaría 
reconoce que "… durante el período objeto de examen se endurecieron las sanciones 
aplicadas a  (…) Cuba ." y que  "Los países sujetos a las sanciones más amplias comprenden  
la República Popular Democrática de Corea, el Irán, Siria, el Sudán y Cuba".  
 
El gobierno de la República de Cuba desea reafirmar que las políticas y medidas de bloqueo 
económico, comercia l y financiero que durante casi 60 años han sido mantenidas por los Estados 
Unidos contra Cuba, resultan incongruentes con las normas jurídicas de la OMC y con las políticas 
de liberalización comercial propugnadas por esta Organización. La condición de est e Miembro de 
gran potencia económica mundial, engrandece negativamente la ilegitimidad del bloqueo contra 
Cuba.  
 
Se relacionan a continuación los acápites y párrafos del Informe de la Secretaría, relevantes en la 
elaboración de las preguntas a presentar po r Cuba a los Estados Unidos:  
 
RESUMEN  
 
En el párrafo 21  del Resumen de la Secretaría se afirma que " En cuanto a las sanciones respecto de 
países específicos, durante el período objeto de examen se endurecieron las sanciones aplicadas 
a la República Popular  Democrática de Corea, el Irán y Cuba , y en 2016 se puso fin a los programas 
que se aplicaban a Myanmar y a Côte d'Ivoire."   
 
Acápite 2.3 ACUERDOS Y ARREGLOS COMERCIALES.  
 
2.3.1 OMC  
 
En el párrafo 2.20  se especifica que "En el Programa de Política Comercial para 2018 se señala que 
la OMC es una institución importante , y que los Estados Unidos tienen un "sólido historial de 
formación de coaliciones de Miembros con opiniones afines en el sistema de comités de la OMC, en 
especial con el propósito de presionar a las economías en situación de incumplimiento para que 
pongan sus medidas en conformidad con las normas de la OMC, promover la transparencia y 
previsibilidad de las normas del comercio mundial  y evitar tener que recurri r a la solución de 
diferencias"  
 
Acápite 3.1.5.3  CONTROLES, PROCEDIMIENTOS ESPECIALES O MEDIDAS DIPLOMÁTICAS  
En el párrafo 3.50  se confirma que "La Oficina de Control de Activos Extranjeros (OFAC) del 
Departamento del Tesoro de los Estados Unidos administr a casi 30 programas en el marco de los 
cuales se imponen sanciones económicas y comerciales a países específicos  o se aplican 
medidas destinadas en general a la lucha contra el terrorismo, las organizaciones criminales 
transnacionales, los delitos cibernét icos, el narcotráfico, la violación de los derechos humanos, la 
corrupción, el comercio de diamantes en bruto y la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva. 
Dados los numerosos programas de sanciones dirigidos a personas y entidades (y no a 
jurisdiccio nes), la OFAC mantiene en su sitio web una lista actualizada de nacionales especialmente 
designados y otras personas sujetas a bloqueo (SDN) y en la que se enumeran las personas y 
entidades cuyos activos han sido congelados conforme a sus normas. En la lis ta SDN figuran 
actualmente alrededor de 6.400 personas y entidades con las que las personas de los Estados Unidos 
no pueden realizar ninguna transacción, independientemente de su ubicación. Además de la lista 
principal, la OFAC mantiene también algunas otr as listas en las que se identifica a personas o 
entidades sujetas a sanciones distintas de la congelación de activos. Los países sujetos a las 
sanciones más amplias comprenden  la República Popular Democrática de Corea, el Irán, Siria, 
el Sudán y Cuba . En 2 016 se puso fin a los programas que se aplicaban a Myanmar y a Côte 
d'Ivoire."   
 
Por su parte en el párrafo 3.52  se reconoce que "Aunque en 2015 y 2016 se flexibilizaron 
algunas políticas, incluidas sanciones, contra Cuba, el embargo se mantuvo en lo esencial 
en vigor "  
 
ACAPITE 3.2.3  PROHIBICIONES, RESTRICCIONES Y LICENCIAS DE EXPORTACIÓN  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  En el párrafo 3.143 se reconoce que " Los embargos específicos por países u otras medidas 
especiales de control afectan principalmente al comercio con Cuba , la Repúbl ica Popular 
Democrática de Corea, la Federación de Rusia, el Irán, el Sudán y Siria.  
 
El informe de la Secretaría detalla las múltiples acciones que desarrollan los Estados Unidos para 
promover la transparencia de sus normas y procesos. Entre otros, se de tallan en el párrafo 13 del 
Resumen, y en los párrafos 2.10; 2.20; 2.25; 2.47; 3.212; 3.239 y 3.240.  
 
Por consiguiente, el gobierno de la República de Cuba  solicita recibir respuestas concretas de los 
Estados Unidos sobre las siguientes interrogantes:  
 
Question 1  
1. ¿Cómo puede explicar el gobierno de los Estados Unidos, a pesar de los hechos mencionados, la 
aseveración contenida en su Informe cuando afirma que mantiene uno de los regímenes 
comerciales más abiertos del mundo y dirigido a "promover mercados abiertos y comercio libre 
y justo?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States maintains one of the world's most open trade regimes. U.S. 
tariffs are among the lowest in the world (3.4 per cent  on a simple average MFN bound tariff, 
and under 2 per cent  on an applied basi s after preferences). The United States has among the 
lowest non -tariff barriers in the world. U.S. services markets are open to foreign providers with 
limited exceptions. U.S. regulatory processes are transparent, accessible, and open to public 
input. Exe mplifying U.S. openness is the fact that the United States is the largest goods and 
services importer in the world, being the recipient of 18.7% of goods and services exports from 
the rest of the world (excluding intra EU exports) in 2017 as well as for ma ny years.  
 
Question 2  
2. ¿Sobre qué base legal puede el gobierno de los Estados Unidos sustentar que es un Miembro 
respetuoso de los compromisos y normas de la OMC cuando mantiene un bloqueo económico, 
comercial y financiero contra Cuba por casi 60 años, con  serias implicaciones extraterritoriales 
que afecta a terceros Miembros de la Organización?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States' embargo on trade with Cuba is fully compliant with our relevant 
obligations under our international trade agreements. The embargo is not a blockade; the 
embargo regulations apply only to persons or property subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The 
United  States considers the embargo a bilateral issue.  
 
Question 3  
3. ¿Puede explicar el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos la compatibilidad del alcance e xtraterritorial 
de su política de bloqueo contra Cuba, con las disposiciones de la OMC? ¿Cómo explica que 
continúen aplicando sanciones millonarias a bancos y empresas comerciales de terceros países?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States' embargo on trade with Cuba  is fully compliant with our relevant 
obligations under our international trade agreements. The embargo is not a blockade; the 
embargo regulations apply only to persons or property subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The 
United  States considers the embargo a bil ateral issue.  
 
Question 4  
4. La propuesta destinada a mejorar el cumplimiento por los Miembros de sus obligaciones de 
notificación presentada en el Consejo de Mercancías el 12 de noviembre de 2018, documento 
JOB/GC/204, busca aplicar un enfoque punitivo a lo s Miembros de la OMC que no hayan podido 
notificar ciertas obligaciones. ¿No cree los Estados Unidos que en lugar de ese enfoque sería 
positivo buscar mejorar el sistema de notificaciones y transparencia con una agenda positiva, 
tratando de entender cuáles  son las dificultades de la mayoría de Miembros para no notificar y 
buscar una solución basada en la creación de capacidad?  
 
RESPONSE: We appreciate your interest in the notifications proposal presented by Argentina, 
Australia, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, and the United States, and your interest to 
further prom ote transparency and the fulfil ment of WTO notification requirements. Please refer 
to the minutes of the CTG meeting cited in your question for a full discussion of the proposal. 
We enc ourage your delegation to meet with the co -sponsors to discuss further.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Dominican Republic  
 
INFORME DE LA SECRETARIA WT/TPR/S/382  
 
  
 
 
"Los Estados Unidos aplican varios programas para facilitar el comercio, al tiempo que atienden 
también las preocupaciones relacionadas con la seguridad nacional, en forma de asociaciones entre 
los sectores público y privado. Entre esos programas figuran la Asociación Aduanera y Comercial 
contra el Terrorismo (C -TPAT) , que engloba toda la cadena de suministro e implica la utilización de 
medidas de seguridad mejoradas y de prácticas óptimas, el Programa de Autoevaluación para los 
Importadores (ISA), que se basa en la C -TPAT para lograr un nivel incluso más elevado de 
cumplimiento, y el Programa de Comercio Libre y Seguro (FAST), que permite acelerar el despacho 
de los envíos de bajo riesgo que llegan desde el Canadá o México. En el marco de la Iniciativa sobre 
la Seguridad de los Contenedores (CSI), la carga marítima con  destino a los Estados Unidos se 
somete a una inspección previa en los puertos extranjeros. El CBP tiene acuerdos de seguridad con 
otras 11 administraciones de aduanas, y ha firmado planes de trabajo conjuntos para el 
reconocimiento mutuo con seis países."  
 
1. ¿Qué pasos debería dar la República Dominicana para poder acogerse también a acuerd os con 
los Estados Unidos para agilizar los trámites de sus exportaciones hacia su país? ¿podrían 
establecerse programas de asistencia técnica orientados hacia estos propósitos?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has a number of bilateral agreements and arrangem ents in place 
with trading partners, including with the Dominican Republic, such as Customs Mutual Assistance 
Agreements, the Customs Security Initiative, and the Secure Freight Initiative. The United States 
also offers technical assistance in the area of customs and trade facilitation through a number 
of different programs and implementing agencies, including the Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  
 
Question 2 -3 
2.3.1 OMC (2.21, 2.24)  
 
"En el Programa de Política Comercial también se observa qu e en la Undécima Conferencia Ministerial 
de la OMC, celebrada en Buenos Aires en diciembre de 2017, los Miembros acordaron varios 
resultados importantes, entre los que cabe mencionar la Decisión Ministerial sobre las subvenciones 
a la pesca; el Programa de  Trabajo sobre el Comercio Electrónico, que prevé una prórroga de la 
moratoria sobre la imposición de derechos de aduana a las transmisiones electrónicas; y la creación 
del Grupo de Trabajo sobre la Adhesión de Sudán del Sur. En el futuro, los Estados Unid os esperan 
trabajar con otros Miembros de la OMC antes de la Duodécima Conferencia Ministerial a fin de 
"empezar a identificar oportunidades para alcanzar logros, aun cuando sean graduales" y "no caer 
en la fórmula previsible, y a menudo arriesgada, de con centrarlo todo en un conjunto de resultados 
para que los M inistros decidan al respecto"."  
 
2. ¿Es posible conocer los avances de los trabajos realizados por los Estados Unidos con otros 
Miembros de la OMC antes de la Duodécima Conferencia Ministerial?  
 
RESPONSE: We look forward to continuing to work with Members to achieve progress wherever 
possible.  However, for the viability of the WTO, we do not believe that progress on issues that 
are important to our stakeholders today and in the future should wait for Ministerial Conferences. 
We encourage Members to work toward solutions now and finalize new Decisions in advance of 
the next Ministerial Conference.  
 
"Los Estados Unidos tienen 14 acuerdos de libre comercio (ALC) vigentes con 20 países: Australia; 
Bahrein; Chile; Colombia; Israel; Jordania; República de Corea; Marruecos; Omán; Panamá; Perú; 
Singapur; Costa Rica, República Dominicana, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua 
(CAFTA -DR); y Canadá y México (TLCAN). Entre ellos hay 12 acuerdos bilateral es y dos acuerdos 
plurilaterales (el TLCAN y el CAFTA -DR). La mayoría de los acuerdos abarcan tanto el comercio de 
mercancías como el de servicios, excepto el ALC firmado con Israel (que solo abarca el comercio de WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  mercancías). Los Estados Unidos han notifi cado todos sus ALC al Comité de Acuerdos Comerciales 
Regionales de la OMC."  
 
3. ¿Las autoridades de Estados Unidos estiman algún cambio en los compromisos asumidos en el 
marco del DR -CAFTA en los próximos años?  
 
RESPONSE: If the United States wishes to recon sider any issues related to the CAFTA -DR, we 
would consult with the other Parties to that agreement.  
 
 
 
 
"El Servicio de Inspección Zoosanitaria y Fitosanitaria (APHIS), un organismo del Departamento de 
Agricultura (USDA), recauda derechos de cuarentena e inspección agropecuaria (AQI) que se 
reparten con el CBP de forma convenida. A finales de 2015, a raíz de un informe elaborado por la 
GAO en 2013, esos derechos se modificaron con el fin de ajustar mejor los ingresos obtenidos de 
los derechos a los costos de los programas. A raíz del ajuste, disminuyeron los en el caso de 
determinados servicios (carga transpor tada por ferrocarril y pasajeros de vuelos internacionales), 
pero se incrementaron notablemente las cargas que se aplican al despacho de aeronaves, a las 
embarcaciones comerciales y a los camiones. Se está introduciendo progresivamente, a lo largo de 
un pe ríodo de cinco años, un nuevo derecho para los casos en que el APHIS prescriba tratamientos 
en relación con plagas cuarentenarias. Está previsto aumentar ese derecho a 237 dólares EE.UU. a 
partir del 28 de diciembre de 2019 (142 dólares EE.UU. en 2018). Ta mbién se perciben derechos 
por los servicios veterinarios y de laboratorio (cuadro 3.3)."  
 
4. ¿Ha considerado el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos implementar alguna medida que agilice el 
análisis de los procesos de admisibilidad sanitaria de productos agrícolas  y agropecuarios a su 
territorio? República Dominicana tiene un TLC firmado y en vigor con los Estados Unidos, pero 
no tienen ninguna preferencia en el proceso de acceso a mercado en términos de mayor agilidad 
en el análisis y menor tiempo de espera en el proceso.  
 
RESPONSE: SPS measures are based on risk and scientific principles, not preferential 
treatment.  
 
Question 5  
3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias (3.189)  
 
"La FDA está colaborando con las autoridades mexicanas encargadas de la inocuidad de los alimentos 
para garantizar la inocuidad de los productos frescos y mínimamente procesados. En junio de 2018 
se publicó un informe de situación sobre la Alianza para la I nocuidad de los Productos Agrícolas entre 
la FDA de los Estados Unidos y México."  
 
5. Nos gustaría saber si las autoridades de Estados Unidos estarían dispuestas a colaborar con las 
autoridades dominicanas para establecer mecanismos similares para que nuestros productos 
tengan un mejor acceso al mercado norteamericano.  
 
RESPONSE: FDA's collaborative activities are based on a variety of factors including trade 
volume, history of interaction on food safety issues, and availability of resources.  Although F DA 
will continue to prioritize collaborative work based on these and other factors, the agency is 
open to specific proposals from trading partners. For more information on the 
U.S. FDA-Mexico  Produce  Safety  Partnership  (PSP),  please  see: https://www.fda.gov/Food/Int
ernationalInteragencyCoordination/InternationalCooperation/ucm610841.htm . 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Ecuador  
INFORME DE LA SECRETARIA WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
Resumen (1)   
 
1. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indicarnos qué se espera por "acuerdos comerciales de mejor calidad"?  
 
RESPONSE : The Trump Administration seeks to reach agreements designed to promote free, 
fair, and reciprocal trade that support American jobs and prosperity. The United States is 
interested in efforts to develop new trade rules that will promote efficient markets around the 
world.  
 
Question 2  
3.1.1.2 Ventanilla única (3.4)  
 
De conformidad con el párrafo 3.4 del Informe de la Secretaría, en virtud del Acuerdo de Facilitación 
de Comercio, se han venido implementando en fases consecutivas desde el 2013, las "funciones 
básicas" del ACE (Entorno Comercial Automatizado) como ventanilla única para el procesamiento de 
las importaciones y las exporta ciones. Mediante una Orden Ejecutiva de 2014 se dispuso un nuevo 
plazo para la puesta en marcha de esta ventanilla única y se creó un Consejo Ejecutivo 
Interinstitucional para las Operaciones en Frontera, con el cometido de mejorar la coordinación entre 
los organismos responsables de la gestión de las fronteras.  
 
2. ¿Podría Estados Unidos brindar mayor información respecto al funcionamiento, atribuciones y la 
integración de este Consejo Ejecutivo Interinstitucional para las Operaciones en Frontera, 
además de su coordinación con el ACE?  
 
RESPONSE : The Border Interagency Executive Council (BIEC) is responsible for the 
development of common risk management principles and methods to inform agency operations 
associated with the review and release of cargo at the bo rder; development of policies and 
processes to orchestrate, improve, and accelerate agency review of electronic trade data 
transmitted through relevant systems; and identifying opportunities to streamline Federal 
Government systems and reduce costs through  the elimination of redundant capabilities or 
through enhanced utilization of the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) capabilities as a 
means of improving sup ply chain management processes.  
 
The BIEC oversaw the completion and implementation of ACE. Enhancements and improvements 
to ACE will continue under the BIEC. The BIEC's Single Window Sustainment Initiative ensures 
funding for continued ACE development is provided by other USG agencies. T he BIEC has 
developed, implemented, and uses a new cost -sharing framework that allows the agencies to 
collaboratively maintain the system by paying for new enhancements through shared costs 
across PGAs.  
 
 
Question 3  
3.1.1.3 Otras med idas de facilitación del comercio (3.16)  
 
De conformidad con la página 52, párrafo 3.16, se menciona que el CBP dicta, cuando se le solicita, 
resoluciones anticipadas vinculantes en las que indica el trato que se dará a una operación de 
importación o de tr ansporte prevista, sin embargo, hace una diferencia en cuanto a la presentación 
de las solicitudes, de pendiendo si se trata de una resolución anticipada relativa a valoración y 
transportista o relacionada con clasificación arancelaria.  
 
3. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indicarnos por qué la diferencia en la presentación de la solicitud de 
resolución anticipada?  
 
RESPONSE : Basic tariff classification rulings are issued by the commodity specialists in the 
National Commodity Specialist Division (NCSD). The NCSD has d evised special electronic intake 
procedures for ruling requests to better enable it to issue rulings expeditiously (the norm is 30 
days or less). More complex classification rulings, and many other types of rulings, are issued WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 166 - 
 
  by attorney advisors at CBP H eadquarters. Among these are rulings on valuation, intellectual 
property right issues, restricted merchandise, as well as "Carrier" rulings. The intake procedures 
for these more diversified types of rulings handled by CBP Headquarters differ from those use d 
by the NCSD.  
 
Advance rulings on "Carriers" refer to rulings that apply the vessel and navigation laws of the 
United States. Such rulings also cover those laws pertaining to entry, clearance, and cabotage 
with respect to vessel, aircraft, truck, and rail  conveya nces. As noted, advance rulings are 
binding  on both CBP and the applicant.  For additional  information,  see: https://www.gpo.gov/f
dsys/pkg/CFR -2011-title19 -vol2/pdf/CFR -2011-title19 -vol2-sec177 -2.pdf and https://www. 
cbp. gov/sites/default/files/documents/cbp_rulings_prog_3.pdf . 
 
Question 4  
3.1.1.4 Zonas francas (3.19)  
 
De conformidad con la página 53, párrafo 3.19, se indica que Estados Unidos tiene zonas francas en 
todos sus Estados, pero que no todas están activas.  
 
4. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indicarnos por qué motivo no están activas todas las zonas francas?  
 
RESPONSE : Upon approval of an FTZ, there is no requirement that a zone be active. Zone operators 
may use the zone based on their business needs.  
 
Question 5  
3.1.4.1 Derechos de usuario de la aduana (3.41)  
 
De conformidad con la página 60, párrafo 3.41: "(¼) Se está introduciendo progresivamente, a lo 
largo de un período de cinco años, un nuevo derecho para los casos en que el APHIS prescriba 
tratamientos en relación con plagas cuarentenarias. Está previsto aumentar ese derecho a 237 
dólares EE.UU. a partir del 28 de diciembre de 2019 (142 dólares EE.UU.  en 2018) (¼)."  
 
5. ¿Podría Estados Unidos informarnos cuál es el informe técnico que respalda el aumento del 
derecho?  
 
RESPONSE : Through the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, also called 
the FACT Act, Congress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe and collect user fees 
sufficient to cover the cost of providing Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (A QI) services. The 
AQI fee adjustments are consistent with the United States' international trade obligations. The 
adjusted fees will ensure adequate resources for agriculture inspection at U.S. borders, helping 
to support and facilitate safe international trade.  
 
Question 6  
3.1.5.1 Prohibiciones y restricciones (3.46)  
 
De conformidad con la página 64, párrafo 3.46: "El CBP, en nombre de unos 40 organismos 
federales, aplica leyes que pueden prohibir o restringir la importación de determinadas mercancías. 
La importación puede: i) prohibirse totalmente; ii) permitirse en determinadas condiciones; o iii) 
estar sujeta a prescripciones especiales como las relativas a los puertos de entrada designados o las 
restricciones de ruta (cuadro A3.2)."  
 
6. ¿Podría Estados Uni dos informarnos cuáles son esas determinadas mercancías, respecto de las 
cuales podría prohibir o restringir su importación? ¿Cuáles son las determinadas condiciones 
para prohibir o restringir la importación de dicha mercancía? ¿Bajo qué condiciones permit iría la 
importación de la mercancía?  
 
RESPONSE : As stated in the Secretariat report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
the authority to enforce a number of U.S. laws either restricting or prohibiting the import of 
goods, such as hazardous goods or cultural property. Regulations detailing restricted and 
prohibited goods and conditions under which they may be imported are found in Part 12 of 
the Customs  Regulations  (19 CFR Part 12) at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.
action?collectionCode=CFR&browsePath=Title+1 9%2FChapter+I%2FPart+12&granuleId=CFR -
2002-title19 -vol1-part12&packageId=CFR -2002-title19 -vol1&collapse=true&fromBrowse=true . WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 7  
3.1.6.1 Medidas antidumping y compensatorias – Principales leyes y reglamentos (3.56)  
 
7. Respecto a la División de Aplicación de la Legislación sobre Medidas Comerciales Correctivas 
(TRLED) dentro del Servicio de Aduanas y Protección de Fronteras (CBP) del Departamento de 
Seguridad Interior de los Estados Unidos, se solicita brindar más información sobre sus 
competenci as.  
 
RESPONSE : A description of the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection can be found at: 
http://www.cbp.gov . 
 
 
Question 8  
3.1.6.1 Medidas antidumping y compensatorias – Principales leyes y reglamentos (3.61)  
 
De conformidad con el párrafo 3.61 del mismo informe, "La EAPA promueve también la cooperación 
con los países extranjeros para prevenir la elusión de las leyes sobre medidas comerciales 
correctivas, mediante la negociación y la conclusi ón de acuerdos bilaterales con las autoridades 
aduaneras u otras autoridades competentes. Esos acuerdos bilaterales deben prever la entrega de 
documentos relativos a la producción, al comercio y al tránsito y otra información necesaria para 
determinar si l as exportaciones procedentes del país exportador están sujetas a las leyes sobre 
medidas comerciales correctivas del país importador; asimismo, dichos acuerdos deben permitir que 
el país importador participe en procesos de verificación en el país exportado r, incluso mediante 
visitas sobre el terreno. La reglamentación provisional sobre la investigación de las alegaciones de 
elusión de los derechos antidumping y compensatorios por el CBP entró en vigor en agosto de 2016".  
 
8. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indicarnos c uál es el procedimiento a seguir y el alcance de la 
cooperación por parte de los Estados Unidos en materia de prevención de la elusión en las leyes 
sobre medidas comerciales con las autoridades aduaneras?   
 
RESPONSE : The provisions relating to cooperation in duty evasion investigations can be found 
in the relevant bilateral agreement.  
 
Question 9  
3.1.6.1 Medidas antidumping y compensatorias – Principales leyes y reglamentos (3.62)  
 
"El 31 de marzo de 2017 se publicó una Orden Ejecutiva Presidencial sobre el  establecimiento de 
una mejor recaudación y aplicación de los derechos antidumping y compensatorios y la infracción 
de las leyes comerciales y aduaneras. La Orden establece que la política de los Estados Unidos 
consiste en imponer requisitos apropiados de fianza, basados en evaluaciones de riesgo, a las 
entradas de artículos sujetos a derechos antidumping y compensatorios, cuando ello sea necesario 
para preservar los ingresos de los Estados Unidos en los casos en que los importadores eludan 
ilegalmente los derechos antidumping y compensatorios, y ordena el desarrollo de un plan de 
aplicación en el plazo de los 90 días siguientes a la fecha de la Orden".  
 
9. ¿Podría Estados Unidos mencionar cuáles fueron los parámetros utilizados para el levantamiento 
de la evaluación de riesgo con la que se ha logrado determinar que transacciones representan 
un riesgo para los ingresos de los Estados Unidos? ¿Cuáles fueron las políticas aplicadas para la 
evaluación del riesgo de los importadores y cuales han sido sus resulta dos hasta la fecha?  
 
RESPONSE : Details regarding risk assessment can be found at: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/ 
priority -issues/adcvd . 
 
Question 10  
3.1.6.1.1.3 Medidas antidumping y compensatorias – Acuerdos de suspensión (3.70)  
 
"(...) Los acuerdos de suspensión antidumping alcanzados con economías no de mercado pueden 
combinar compromisos relativos a los precios con elementos adicionales a fin de evitar la contención 
de la subida de  los precios o la subvaloración de los mismos (...)".  
 
10. En relación a los acuerdos de suspensión, se menciona que en el caso de que se los realice con 
economías de no mercado además de los compromisos relativos a los precios se considerarán WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  elementos adicio nales. Al respecto, ¿cuáles serían los parámetros para la determinación de 
aquellos elementos adicionales a ser tomados en cuenta para la realización de los acuerdos de 
suspensión con una economía de no mercado?  
 
RESPONSE : Under 19 U.S.C. section 1673c(l),  the U.S. Department of Commerce can suspend 
an antidumping duty investigation in favo ur of an agreement with a non -market economy 
country where the agreement will prevent suppression or undercutting of the prices of domestic 
products . Thus, with respect t o a non -market economy, the U.S. Department of Commerce may 
enter into a suspension agreement with the foreign government that contains a pricing 
mechanism, in addition to other elements.  
 
Question 11  
3.1.7.1.1 Marco jurídico y administrativo (3.101)  
 
11. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indicarnos cuánto tiempo han durado las medidas de reajuste de 
importaciones para productos agropecuarios? ¿cuáles han sido los productos agropecuarios que 
han pasado por esta medida?   
 
RESPONSE : The United States has not applied an adjustment of im ports to agricultural 
products.  
 
Question 12  
3.1.7.1.2 Inves tigación sobre el acero (3.107)  
 
"En el informe se recomienda establecer un proceso que permita al Secretario de Comercio acceder 
a las solitudes de exclusión de productos específicos que presenten empresas estadounidenses si los 
Estados Unidos carecen de capacidad nacional suficiente o por consideraciones de seguridad 
nacional".  
 
12. ¿Podría Estados Unidos explicarnos cuáles han sido los resultados en los procedimientos para la 
presentación de solicitudes de exclusión al incremento arancelario al acero y aluminio emitido 
por el Departamento de Comercio de Estados Unidos el 19 de marzo de 2018, cuál es el proceso 
a seguir, cuántas solicitudes han sido aceptadas y de qué países?  
 
RESPONSE : Information about the process for seeking exclusion from the Section 232 steel and 
aluminum tariffs is available at the website of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations ). As of December 3, 2018, more 
than 14,500 exclusions have been granted for steel or alumin ium imports. Each deci sion is 
posted on https://www.regulations.gov . 
 
Question 13  
3.3.1 Incentivos (3.165)  
 
13. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indícarnos cómo se regulan las subvenciones que se otorgan a nivel 
federal y subfederal si es que no existe un marco jurídico general que lo haga?  
 
RESPONSE : See the most recent subsidy notification of the United States (G/SCM/N/315/USA).  
 
Question 14  
4.1.2 Agricultura – Princip ales programas de ayuda (4.5)  
 
14. ¿Podría Estados Unidos mencionar qué otros programas tienen autorización permanente además 
del seguro de cosechas?  
 
RESPONSE : In addition to the federal crop insurance program, a number of  disaster assistance 
programs are permanently authorized, including the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance 
Program (NAP), the Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP), the Livestock Forage Disaster Program 
(LFP), the Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bee s, and Farm -Raised Fish Program 
(ELAP), the Tree Assistance Program (TAP), and the Emergency Disaster Loan Program (EM).  
Question 15  
4.1.2 Agricultura – Principales programas de  ayuda (4.6)  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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15. ¿Podría Estados Unidos comunicarnos cómo se sustituyeron los pagos directos a los productores 
agrícolas cuando se puso fin a los mismos en virtud a la Ley de Agricultura de 2014?  
 
RESPONSE : The 2014 Farm Bill repealed the Direct and Counter -Cyclical Payment programs 
and the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program.  
 
Question 16  
4.1.2 Agricultura – Principales programas de ayuda (4.9)  
 
16. ¿Podría Estados Unidos explicarnos para qué productos agropecuarios el Departamento de 
Agricultura de los Estados Unidos anunció su intención de establecer un conjunto de medidas de 
ayuda a corto plazo? ¿bajo qué condiciones?  
 
RESPONSE : Payments under the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) will assist producers with 
costs associated with retaliatory tariffs. MFP payments will be made on 2018 production of nine 
affected commodities: soybeans, sorghum, wheat, corn, cott on, hogs, milk, sweet cherries, and 
almonds.  Further  details  can be found  on USDA's  website:  https://www.usda.gov/media/press -
releases/2018/09/04/u sda-launches -trade -mitigation -programs . 
Question 17  
4.1.2 Agricultura – Principales programas de ayuda (4.10)  
 
17. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indicarnos cuáles son los principales cambios propuestos en la nueva 
Ley de Agricultura?  
 
RESPONSE : We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The 2014 Farm Bill 
authorizes farm programs through the 2018 crop year. We look forward to keeping the 
Membershi p informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill.  
Question 18  
4.1.2.2 Agricultura – Cobertura de Pérdidas relacionadas con los Precios (PLC) (4.11)  
 
18. ¿Podría Estados Unidos explicarnos a qué tipo de productores está dirigido el programa PLC 
(Cobertura de Pérdidas relacionadas con los Precios)?  
 
RESPONSE : PLC payments are made to owners of historical base acres of covered commodities 
as spe cified in the 2014 Farm Bill. Owners of historical base acres are not required to plant the 
historical commodity upon which payments are based or any other commodity to be eligible for 
payments.  
 
Question 19  
4.1.2.3 Agricultura – Cobertura de Riesgos Agrícolas (ARC) (4.13)  
 
19. ¿Podría Estados Unidos mencionarnos los productores agropecuarios de rubros básicos puedes 
beneficiarse de más de dos programas?  
 
RESPONSE : ARC payments are m ade to owners of historical base acres of covered commodities 
as specified in the 2014 Farm Bill.  Owners of historical base acres are not required to plant the 
historical commodity upon which payments are based or any other commodity. Owners of base 
acres  were required to make a one -time election to participate in either PLC or ARC for each 
covered commodity for which they owned historical base acres.  
 
Question 20  
4.1.2.6 Agricultura – Algodón (4.28)  
20. ¿Podría Estados Unidos informarnos cuáles son los criterios para establecer medidas temporales 
para apoyar a los productores de algodón?  
 
RESPONSE : The Cotton Ginning Cost Share (CGCS) program provided assistance payments to 
cotton producers to help with costs of ginning the 2016 cotton crop. The CGCS program was 
established under the statutory authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act  and WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  under the administration of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Farm Service Agency 
(FSA).  
 
Question 21  
4.1.3.2 Agricultura – Exportaciones (4.45)  
 
21. ¿Podría Estados Unidos comunicarnos cuáles son los criterios para que el Programa de Garantía 
de los Créditos a la Exportación ofrezca a los exportadores estadounidenses garantías para sus 
ventas, principalmente a países en desarrollo?  
 
RESPONSE : As per 7 CFR §1493.4, the criteria considered in reviewing proposals for country 
and regional allocations includes, but is not limited to the following:  
 
(a) Potential benefits that the extension of Payment Guarantees would provide for the 
development, expansi on, or maintenance of the market for particular U.S. Agricultural 
Commodities in the importing country;  
(b) Financial and economic ability and/or willingness of the country of obligation to 
adequately service Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guaranteed debt;  
(c) Financial status of participating Foreign Financial Institutions in the country of 
obligation as it would affect their ability to adequately service CCC guaranteed debt;  
(d) Political stability of the country of obligation as it would affect its ability and/o r 
willingness to adequately service CCC guaranteed debt; and  
(e) Current status of debt either owed by the country of obligation or by the participating 
Foreign Financial Institutions to CCC or to lenders protected by CCC's Payment 
Guarantees.  
 
INFORME DEL GOB IERNO WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 22  
8 Comercio de las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (8.1)  
 
22. ¿Podría Estados Unidos indicarnos cuáles han sido exactamente las  iniciativas desarrolladas y 
aplicadas que han permitido aumentar las oportunidades de exportación de las MIPYMES en 
Estados Unidos?  
 
RESPONSE : U.S. small businesses are key engines for economic growth, jobs, and innovation. 
USTR has implemented a Small Bu siness Initiative to increase export opportunities for U.S. small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and has expanded efforts to address the specific export 
challenges and priorities of SMEs and their workers in our trade policy and enforcement activitie s. 
Tariff barriers, burdensome customs procedures, discriminatory or arbitrary standards, lack of 
transparency relating to relevant regulations, and insufficient IPR protection in foreign markets 
present particular challenges for our SMEs in selling abroad . Under the SME Initiative, USTR's 
small business office, regional offices, and functional offices are pursuing initiatives and 
advancing efforts to address these issues. USTR also works closely with the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA), the U.S.  Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 
other agencies to help provide U.S. SMEs information and counselling on specific export 
opportunities.  
Question 23  
1 Los Estados Unidos en el Sistema Mundial de Comercio (1.5)  
 
23. ¿Podría Estados Unidos mencionar en qué aspectos ha mejorado el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio 
entre los Estados Unidos y Corea (KORUS)?  
 
RESPONSE : Negotiations to improve the KORUS in 2017 -2018 included amendments to the 
U.S. tariff schedule in the KORUS, as well as outcomes related to autos and auto parts, 
pharmaceuticals,  and customs  facilitation.  For more information,  please  see: https://ustr.gov/t
rade-agreements/free -trade-agreements/korus -fta/september -2018-korus -amendment -and-
modification . 
 
Question 24  
4.3.9 Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos y Corea (4.38)  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  24. ¿Podría Estados Unidos explicarnos cuáles son los países en desarrollo que los Estados Unidos 
han propuesto corregir desequilibrios comerciales bilaterales?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States is committed to achieving fair and reciprocal trading relationships 
with our trading partners regardless of development status. We  are seeking equal and reliable 
access for American exports to markets in order to address chronic and significant trade barriers, 
imbalances, and deficits and to support American jobs and prosperity.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Egypt  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Question 1  
1. Could the U.S. verify whether there are any intentions in the near future  to review tariffs 
imposed pursuant to the Proclamations adjusting imports of Steel (Presidential Proclamation 
9705) and Aluminium (Presidential Proclamation 9704)?  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. As directed in 
proclamati ons issued by the President, the Secretary of Commerce continues to monitor imports 
of steel and alumin ium articles, and to review the status of such imports with respect to the 
national  security of the United States.  The Secretary shall inform the Preside nt of any 
circumstance that in the Secretary’s opinion might indicate that the increase in duty rate and 
quantitative limitations on steel and alumin ium imports are no longer necessary.  
 
Question 2  
2. Could the U.S. clarify the “satisfactory alternative means  to address the threatened impairment 
to its national security” that have been agreed with the countries exempted from the tariffs 
stated in the Proclamations?  
 
RESPONSE: The proclamations issued by the President on 30 April 2018 (Proclamation 9740) 
and 31 May 2018 (Proclamations 9758 and 9759) describe the alternative means arrived at 
between the United States and certain other countries, in light of which the President 
determined that imports from these countries no longer threaten to impair U.S. national 
security. The texts of these  proclamations  are available  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/  and 
https://www.federalregister.gov/ . 
 
Question 3  
3. Could the U.S. consider exempting countries with a low volume of exports to the U.S from the 
tariffs stated in the Proclamations, given the fact that such a low volume of exports does not 
consti tute a threat to its national security?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The President has 
excluded certain countries from the tariffs imposed on steel or alumin ium imports under Section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 19 62, as amended, based on alternative means arrived at 
between the United States and those countries to address the threatened impairment to U.S. 
national s ecurity posed by these imports.  In light of these alternative means, the President 
determined that re levant imports from these countries no longer threaten to impair U.S. 
national security.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  El Salvador  
INFORME DEL GOBIERNO WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 1  
4.1 Acuerdos e iniciativas de la OMC (4.3, 4.4, 4.8)  
 
En relación a lo mencionado por Estados Unidos sobre las tres preocupaciones que mantiene con 
respecto al sistema multilateral del Comercio, siendo las mismas: "que el sistema de solución de 
diferencias de la OMC se ha apropiado de facultades que los Mie mbros de la Organizació n nunca 
pretendieron conferirle ", "la incapacidad de la OMC para llegar a acuerdos que son de importancia 
crítica en la economía mundial moderna", y, "una necesidad acuciante de que la OMC cambie la 
manera en que enfoca las cuestione s relativas al Desarrollo  "…. 
 
1. Cuál es la visión de estados unidos con relación a los trabajos ordinarios y extraordinarios de la 
OMC para los próximos años y como considera pueden resolverse en el corto plazos las 
preocupaciones expresadas?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. That said, the concerns 
we stated in Section 4.1 are important matters for Members to discuss, and we intend to work 
with other like -minded Members to address them.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Follow up questions from El Salvador  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Question 1  
Section 3.1.2.1 Non -preferential (3.27)  
US non -preferential rules of origin distinguish between "wholly obtained" products, i .e. those wholly 
grown, produced or manufactured in a particular country, and goo ds that have been subject to 
"substantial transformation", i .e. a change in name, character or use, in the country of origin. The  
substantial transformation criterion is applied case -by-case. For certain transactions, CBP may also 
use value added or change  in nature or essential character of a product to determine the country of 
origin.  The United States notified its non -preferential rules of origin to the WTO in 1995 and 
administrative rulings of the  US Customs Service in 1996.  
 
Could the United States cla rify what criteria it uses when assessing whether a good has undergone 
a substantial transformation that allows it to define the country under which it was manufactured? 
If it is mentioned that CBP applies this criterion case by case, does it mean that CBP  applies a 
different criterion in each case?  
 
RESPONSE: The substantial transformation criterion requires a change in name/character/use 
method (i.e., an article that consists in whole or in part of materials from more than one country 
is a product of the last country in which it has been substantially transformed into a new and 
different article of commerce with a name, character, and use distinct from that of the article 
or articles fro m which it was so transformed).  In making an assessment about whether an 
article has been substantially transformed, CBP may also consider the following:  
 
• the class or kind of merchandise;  
• the nature and sophistication of processing in the country of exportation;  
• the properties, essential components, and end -use of the produ ct; 
• the cost of production compared to the value added; and  
• the level of investment  
 
While the criterion is the same for all cases, the results may differ depending on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.  
 
Question 2  
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other  technical requirements (3.181)  
The United States has mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) with numerous foreign partners. In 
the area of telecommunications equipment, MRAs have been signed with Australia; Glen; Chinese 
Taipei; Europe (EU / EFTA); Hong Kon g, China; Israel; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Mexico; 
New Zealand; Singapore; and Viet Nam. These telecom MRAs establish procedures enabling the 
Parties to recognize each other's competent compliance assessment bodies (CABs), and then to 
accept th e conformity assessment results of those CABs for regulatory purposes. Foreign MRA 
partners designate their qualified accredited CABs (testing laboratories and /or certification bodies) 
to the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). In the United States, th e NIST (through the MRA 
Program Office) designates qualified US CABs (testing laboratories, certification bodies, and / or 
Notified Bodies in the case of the European Union) to the relevant MRA partners for recognition.197 
The United States You have signed  separate MRAs with the EU (2004) and EFTA States (2006) for 
marine safety equipment.  
 
Apart from the ARM signed in the telecommunications area, could the US delegation indicate which 
other areas are working for the ARM signature? Do they have cooperation programs for developing 
countries on the subject of ARM and trans fer of experiences? of the same ? 
 
RESPONSE: We do not plan to conclude any new MRAs in the near term.  
 
Question 3  
Section 3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.188)  
On 9 March 2018, the FDA announced a proposal to recognize the equivalent of the shellfish control 
systems of Spain and the Netherlands, based on those countries' implementation of EU food safety 
controls for bivalve molluscan shellfish.204 The determinati ons would conclude that the control 
systems in Spain and the Netherlands achieve at least the same level of public health protection WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  provided by US controls for bivalve molluscan shellfish, administered through the National Shellfish 
Sanitation Program.  Following the FDA's announcement, it received 25  comments which will be taken 
into account as the FDA prepares its final equivalence determination to be published in a second 
Federal Register notice.  
 
Could the United States comment if it has cooperation pro grams for developing countries for the 
establishment of equivalences of control systems and sanitary and phytosanitary vulnerability?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United  States  engages  with developing  countries  on SPS-related  capacity  
building  projects,  including  those  related  to the establishment  of equivalence  control  systems,  
where  consistent  with U.S. programs  and with partner  country  and U.S. priorities.  
 
Question 4  
Section 3.3.7.9.4 IP and technology transfer (3.342)  
The United States also uses science and technolo gy (S & T) agreements as frameworks for increased 
international collaboration, by facilitating cooperation between US technical agencies and foreign 
counterparts, on topics including public health, watershed management, agriculture, environment 
and biodive rsity protection, biotechnology, earth sciences, marine science, and alternative energy.  
 
Could the United States indicate the procedures so that a developing country can make use of the 
agreements of science and technology (S & T) in the different areas o f cooperation.  
 
RESPONSE: Proposals to initiate Science and Technology (S&T) Agreements typically grow out 
of consultations between U.S. technical agencies, their foreign counterparts, the U.S. 
Department of State, and foreign affairs ministries on matters  of mutual interest. Subject 
matter experts wishing to explore S&T cooperation are encouraged to reach out to U.S. technical 
agency counterparts, contacts at U.S. embassies, or both. Further information on S &T 
cooperation can be found at: https://www.state.gov/e/oes/stc/ . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  EU 
WT/TPR/S/382 – WTO Secretariat's Report  
 
Questions 1 -2 
1.2.1 Fiscal policy (1.13 -1.16)  
The report provides an overview of the Tax and Jobs Act of 2017. There are two specific sections of 
the legislation – the Base Erosion and Anti -Abuse Tax ("BEAT") and the Foreign -Derived Intangible 
Income ("FDII") that appear to be discriminatory and at odds with the WTO commitments of the US 
due to their discriminatory nature or because they confer f orbidden subsidies.  
 
1. With regard to  the BEAT, does the US share the view that a tax deduction that applies to 
domestic transactions but not to international transactions is likely to constitute a breach of 
national treatment? Could the US clarify the operational aspects of the BEAT and its compliance 
with the WTO commitments?  
 
RESPONSE: Base erosion is a well -recognized problem internationally, and other jurisdictions 
have also recently implemen ted anti -base erosion measures. The U.S. Treasury is currently 
working on regulations on implement ation of the base erosion anti -abuse tax provisions in the 
Tax and Jobs Act of 2017.  
 
2. With regard to the FDII, the ability of a US -based corporation to deduct income depends on the 
ratio between its income from exports of goods and services and its gross t otal income. Does 
the US agree that this makes it contingent on export performance, as the more a company 
exports, the greater the tax deduction it can claim? This seems to amount to an export subsidy 
that is explicitly forbidden by the WTO Subsidies Agree ment in view of its trade distorting effects. 
Could the US clarify the operational aspects of the FDII and its compliance with WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE: Base erosion is a well -recognized problem internationally, and other jurisdictions 
have also recently imple mented anti -base erosion measures. The U.S. Treasury is currently 
working on regulations on implementation of the anti -base erosion measures in the Tax and Jobs 
Act of 2017.  
 
Questions 3 -4 
1.2.1 Fiscal policy (1.15)  
The IMF staff considers that the combination of revenue losses from the TCJA and the approved 
increase in spending will lead to an increase in the fiscal deficit in the next few years; it is estimated 
that the deficit will be 4.5% of GDP in 2019. In the IMF staff's view, the increase in t he federal deficit 
will exacerbate the upward dynamic in the public debt -to-GDP ratio. Even with the planned fiscal 
consolidation scheduled to start in 2020, the federal debt will continue to climb, exceeding 90% of 
annual GDP by 2024. The IMF staff deems that the expansion in the deficit leaves few budget 
resources available to invest in a range of needed supply -side reforms that could boost medium -
term growth and raise living standards.  
 
3. The tax reform including the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 is expect ed to result in higher growth 
of the US economy. If the expansionary growth outlook is not fulfilled, how does the US 
administration foresee the realizat ion of the supply -side reforms?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  Resul ts thus far indicate 
that the TCJA has helped to provide stronger economic growth. The Administration will continue 
to pursue robust economic growth, and current policies are delivering the desired result.  
 
4. The procyclical fiscal stimulus is being implemen ted at a late stage in the US economic cycle, 
when the unemployment rate is at a historic low and core price pressures are close to targets of 
the Federal Reserve. Is the US concerned that the fiscal stimulus could generate overheating in 
the economy (e.g.  sharp rise in wages and prices) and prompt a more aggressive reaction of 
monetary policy than currently expected? To the contrary, in the case of a sudden slow -down of 
the global and the US economy, are you concerned that the ongoing depletion of fiscal b uffers 
could result in the US authorities not being able to exploit the usual fiscal tools to stimulate the 
economy?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: The TCJA was not a fiscal stimulus package, but rather a long -term structural 
adjustment. The appropriate response to a sudden e conomic slowdown will be determined by 
the circumstances of time and place, and the United States has many possible tools at its 
disposal.  
 
Questions 5 -6 
1.3.2 Trends and patterns in FDI (1.34)  
The report states that the US continues to be the world's foremost destination for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), inter alia  because of its open markets and liberal investment regime. FDI inflows 
on a historic cost basis reached a record amount of US$468  billion in 2015 and US$472 billion in 
2016, before dropping to US$277 billion in 2017.  
 
5. Does the US Administration have an explanation for the lower inflow of FDI in 2017?  
 
RESPONSE: Foreign Direct Investment into the United States was at record levels i n 2015 and 
2016. In 2017 inflows returned toward average levels seen over the last decade. This decline 
toward lower levels also follows trends seen in global foreign direct investment, after specific 
deals and corporate restructurings inflated 2016 number s. 
 
6. Has the Administration seen a change of trend in 2018 after the enacted tax measures at the 
end of 2017?  
 
RESPONSE: In 2018 FDI has reflected expected changes in repatriation of foreign profits by 
U.S. multinationals. The net effect has been a sharp di scontinuity in prior trends.  
 
Question 7  
2.4 Investment regime (2.42)  
The report states that the foreign investment regime contains some sector -specific limitations, with 
review procedures on foreign investment in a few industries, including the airline an d nuclear energy 
industries.  
 
7. Could the US communicate the full list of the "few industries" subject to the limitations and give 
details on the scope of those limitations? Are there any limitations at a sub -federal level?  
 
RESPONSE: The OECD Code of Libera lisation of Capital Movements summarizes U.S. fe deral-
level limitations on FDI. See http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment -policy/Code -capital -
movements -EN.pdf . Sub-federal level investment limitations are rare in the U.S. system, and 
notably, in the same publication, the Council has determined that such limitations are "unlikely 
to have a significant practical effect."  
 
Question 8  
3.1.1.2 Single window (3.5)  
The Sin gle Window was finalized in February 2018 and the Administration has already seen savings. 
According to the previous TPR Secretariat's report, the US was planning the cooperation and aligning 
with Canada and Mexico.  
 
8. Has the US advanced in aligning the Si ngle Window with Canada and Mexico, and is the US 
planning to align its system with other partners?  
 
RESPONSE: The transition to ACE as the U.S. Single Window has transformed the way our 
country processes trade and has laid the groundwork for future enhancements to border 
management. Although the U.S. Single Window system does not currently allow for cross -border 
exchange of data with partner countries, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues 
to identify appropriate measures to promote our trade-related goals through engagements in 
international organizations and bilateral relat ionships with foreign partners.  
 
Questions 9 -10 
3.1.1.3 Other trade facilitation measures (3.16)  
The report states that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issues binding advance rulings on how 
it will treat a prospective import or carrier transaction. In recent months, there has been a significant 
increase in the revocation of advanced ruling letters  on tariff classification. In many cases, this 
revocation also implies an increase in the tariff applied. This situation generates a lack of legal WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  security and uncertainty in the commercial sphere, which is undesirable. The recent case concerning 
sheep's m ilk cheeses is a clear example.  
 
9. Could the US explain the reasons for the increase in the revocations of advanced ruling letters 
on tariff classification?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has not experienced a significant increase in revocations of 
advance rul ings on classification issues. The United States Customs and Border Protection 
proposes revocations or modifications of advance rulings to correct its interpretation of the legal 
text of the Harmonized Tariff Schedul e of the United States (HTSUS). If a pro posed action is 
finalized, the effect can be either an increase in the duty rate applied to the subject merchandise 
or a reduction in the applicable duty rate (or, in some instances, the rate may stay the same, 
despite a change in classification). Regardle ss, the impetus for a revocation is not the effect that 
it might have on the applicable duty rate, but rather, a desire for clarity and legal correctness.  
 
10. Does the US administration not consider that this increase is affecting traditional commercial 
excha nges and creating a problem of uncertainty and legal uncertainty for commercial 
operators?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has not experienced a significant increase in revocations of 
advance rulings on classification issues.  
 
We further note that the cited e xample is not in fact a revocation – rather, the example cited is 
a proposed revocation. Proposed revocations of rulings that have been in place for 60 days or 
more are subject to a public notice and comment period (see 19 USC 1625). During the comment 
period, commercial operators may provide their input on the technical and legal me rits of CBP's 
proposed action. As with the cited example concerning the classification of certain sheep's milk 
cheeses, this provides CBP with the opportunity to re -evaluate its  proposed position on the 
matter or address technical and leg al points raised by commenters. Contrary to the implication 
in the question, the process of reconsideration of advance rulings enhances legal certainty 
regarding the basis for CBP's interpretatio ns of the HTSUS – the process allows CBP to provide 
clarity and elaborate upon the questions at issue.  
 
Questions 11 -13 
3.1.4.1 Customs user fees (3.38 -3.41)  
The report mentions all customs user fees that apply in the US. Although individually the amount o f 
some is not very high, for some types of operations or products the sum of these fees may involve 
significant additional costs, putting imported goods at a disadvantage. Paragraph 3.38 explains that 
the principal customs user fee is the Merchandise Proce ssing Fee (MPF). The EU understands that 
further increases of the MPF were instituted in October 2018.  
 
11. Is the US considering to reduce or eliminate customs user fees, which put imports at a 
disadvantage in certain cases?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States remi nds Members that trade policy reviews are retrospective. 
The United States does not agree with the charact erization of customs user fees.  
 
12. What are the current minimum and maximum values for the Merchandise Processing Fee?  
 
RESPONSE: Effective October 1, 2018, the minimum Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF) is 
$26.22 and the maximum fee is $508.70.  
 
13. What was the reason for two increases in 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: The fee was increased on January 1, 2018, and on October 1, 2018, pursuant to 
the FAST Act (Pub. L. 114–94). The fee is paid for the processing of merchandise entering the 
United States.  
 
Question 14  
3.1.4.1 Customs user fees (3.41)  
According to the report, the US altered the fees collected by the Animal and Plant Health Inspectorate 
(APHIS) to ensure th at revenues derived from fees align with programme costs. As a result of these WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  changes, some services have seen their fees reduced (e.g. the fees applied to railway cargo) while 
others have seen their fees increased markedly (e.g. aircraft clearance and co mmercial vessel fees).  
 
14. The EU would like to seek further details regarding the 2015 revisions to the Agriculture and 
Quarantine Inspection (AQI) fees. Could the US please clarify whether these changes solely 
reflect changes in the price of providing the a bove-mentioned services or whether other 
considerations/factors influenced the alteration of the fees?  
 
RESPONSE: The inspection fees for commercial vehicles, trucks, and aircraft increased. In each 
of these categories, previous fees did not generate enoug h revenue to cover the costs of the 
AQI services provided. The difference between the revenue collected and the actual costs was 
borne by taxpayers (through congressionally appropriated funding). The inspection fees for 
international air passengers and com mercial cargo railcars at U.S. ports of entry were lowered.  
 
Questions 15 -16 
3.1.6.1.1.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Main laws and regulations (3.55, 3.64)  
The latest amendments to the anti -dumping and anti -subsidy legislation have raised co ncerns among 
WTO members. One of these is the use of "facts otherwise available". In recent cases there has also 
been an abuse of what is known as "adverse facts available", which often leads to higher duties. At 
the same time, as stated in paragraphs 3.74 , 3.75 and 3.83 of the WTO Secretariat's report, there 
has been a noticeable increase in cases initiated and measures adopted.  
 
15. Could the US explain in more detail the modifications recently made in their anti -dumping and 
anti-subsidy regulation and, in pa rticular, the circumstances in which the use of "adverse facts 
available" should be applied? Do the US consider that these amendments may have contributed 
to the increase in the number of measures taken and the high level of duties imposed?  
 
RESPONSE: As notified in G/ADP/N/1/USA/Suppl.20 – G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.20 (dated 16 
July 2015), the United States amended certain aspects of the statute related to AD/CVD 
proceedings. In addition, the United States made one change to its AD/CVD regulations which 
relate s to the calculation of AD/CVD margins with regard to price adjustments. The background 
regarding this regulation can be found on the Federal Register publication of the regulation, 
which was notified at G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Supp.24 (dated 1 April 2016).  
 
16. Does the US intend to make further changes to its anti -dumping and anti -subsidy legislation in 
the short term?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States reminds Members that TPRs are retrospective. However, should 
there be any changes to its AD/CVD law, the United States wi ll promptly notify these changes 
to the appropriate WTO committee.  
 
Question 17  
3.1.6.1.1.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Main laws and regulations (3.57)  
The report states that small businesses may receive technical assistance.  
 
17. What is the extent of technical assistance available and what has been the rate of use of this 
assistance?  
 
RESPONSE: Both the U.S. International Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce provide technical assistance to anyone who wishes to submit a petitio n seeking an 
AD/CVD remedy. For example, the U.S. International Trade Commission's Trade Remedy 
Assistance Office ( TRAO) provides information to the public, and technical and legal assistance 
and advice, to eligible small businesses to enable them to (a) p repare and file petitions and 
applications; and (b) seek to obtain the remedies and benefits available under the trade laws. 
The United States does not formally track the rate of requests for technical assistance.  
 
Questions 18 -19 
3.1.6.1.1.3 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Suspension agreements (3.70)  
The report states that AD and CVD investigations may be suspended under some circumstances.  
 
18. Could the US explain what conditions must be met in order to suspend the duties in force and 
whether thi s procedure can be triggered ex officio?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: There are no formal requirements to suspend AD/CVD duties in force. Rather, the 
United States enters into suspension agreements consistent with the procedures set forth in 19 
U.S.C. section 1671c and 1673c , as well as 19 C.F.R. section 351.208, et. seq. In extraordinary 
instances, the United States has suspended duti es at the request of interested parties. 
Details  of these  instances  can be found  at: https: //access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
19. Could the US comment on how voluntary agreements work and how and when they can be 
applied for?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is unclear as to what is meant by the term "voluntary 
agreements." Under U.S. law, an AD/CVD invest igation may be suspended if a suspension 
agreement (referred to in the WTO Agreements as an "undertaking") is accepted. The 
requirements for submitting and accepting a suspension agreement can be found at: 19 C.F.R. 
section 351.208.  
 
Question 20  
3.1.6.1.1. 4 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures – Administrative reviews (3.71)  
The report indicates that administrative reviews may be requested by interested parties.  
 
20. Could the US clarify whether it would be possible to carry out ex officio reviews and, if so, what 
conditions should be met?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States refrains from speculating on future ex officio reviews.  
 
Questions 21 -22 
3.2.5.2 Small Business Administration (SBA) export loan programmes (3.157)  
The report summarises assistance available to small businesses that export.  
 
21. How do the US Export Assistance Centres determine eligibility and deliver export marketing and 
finance assistance offered to small and medium sized U.S. businesses?  
 
RESPONSE: SBA maintains a staff of Export Finance Manage rs at U.S. Expo rt Assistance Centers 
(USEACs). These Export Finance Managers provide training on trade finance and SBA's export 
loan guarantee programs to both U.S. len ders and U.S. small businesses. To qualify for SBA's 
export loan programs, a small busin ess must provide evidence at the time of the loan application 
to a SBA -approved guarantee lender that the business meets SBA's definiti on of a small business 
concern.  
 
22. How do they measure impact of the assistance provided?  
 
RESPONSE: SBA measures the impac t of these Export Finance Managers based on both the 
loan volume and dollar amount of export loan guarantees generated t hrough their marketing 
efforts. In addition, the number of small businesses and lenders trained on trade finance and 
SBA's export loan g uarantee programs is considered.  
 
Question 23  
3.2.5.3 Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (3.160 -3.163)  
The report presents the Government's development finance institution. The EU noted recent changes 
in the US legislation concerning a restruct uring of US official financial support for private investment 
in developing countries and would appreciate more explanations in this regard.  
 
23. What will be the main changes related to the US legislation of October 2018, which foresees the 
transformation of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) into the International 
Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) – in terms of mandate, mission/main goals, structure, 
operation and budget of the IDFC as the successor of OPIC?  
 
RESPONSE: On October 5, 2018,  President Trump signed into law the Better Utilization of 
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018  ("The BUILD Act "). The BUILD Act 
consolidates, modernizes, and reforms the U.S. government's "development finance" capabilities 
– primarily OPIC and USAID's Development Credit Authority  ("DCA") – into the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation (" USDF C"). The USDFC's mandate is to mobilize 
and facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skills in the economic development WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  of less developed countries and countries in transition from non -market to market economies, 
in order to complement th e development assistance o bjectives of the United States. Structurally, 
the USDFC will operate as an independent, wholly owned government corporation. The BUILD 
Act gives the USDFC additional tools and flexibilities relative to OPIC: the USDFC will, in add ition 
to providing loans, guaranties, and political risk insurance, have the authority to make equity 
investments, provide technical assistance, and conduct feasibility studies specific t o 
development finance projects. The USDFC's  investment cap is $60 bil lion. Until the USDFC begins 
operations, provisionally targeted for October 1, 2019, OPIC and DCA will con tinue operations 
uninterrupted. At the end of the transition period, all functions, personnel, assets and liabilities  
of OPIC transfer to the USDFC. The administrative budget for the USDFC is to be determined 
through the Congressional appropriations process.  
 
Questions 24 -25 
3.3.1 Incentives (3.170)  
This paragraph concerns the latest US notification of subsidies  under the SCM Agreement. Table  3.16 
gives an overview of non -agricultural federal subsidy programmes including on fisheries. However, 
no information regarding sub -federal programmes is provided in the context of the TPR. There 
appears to be an agreement that one of the most problematic types of s ubsidies in terms of negative 
impact on the sustainabilit y of stocks are fuel subsidies.  
 
24. The EU understands that no fuel subsidies are provided at the federal level. Could the US please 
confirm?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not have any fuel subsidies at the federal level that are 
subject to the subsidy notification obligation of Article 25 of the Subsidies Agreement.  
 
25. Could the US please give information on fuel subsidies in the fisheries sector granted at the state 
(sub-federal) level? This concerns direct fuel subsidies and so called fuel de -taxation schemes. 
The latter concerns cases where fuel is provided to fishers without tax that, or with tax at a 
lower level than, would have otherwise been imposed when fuel is provided to the general p ublic 
or other sectors of economy.  
 
RESPONSE: In the context of preparing the most recent WTO sub sidy notification of the 
United  States, substantial efforts were made to identify subsidies provided at the state level to 
fishermen, including var ious state f uel tax exemptions. These efforts resulted in the addition of 
numerous pr ograms not previously notified. Please see G/SCM/N/315/USA.  
 
Questions 26 -29 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.171 -3.172)  
The paragraphs summarise the processes for developing standards in the United States.  
 
26. How does the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ensure that during the development 
of voluntary standards, international standards developed by ISO and IEC are taken into account 
by the standards develo ping organizations in order to avoid the creation of technical barriers to 
trade?  
 
RESPONSE: ANSI's chief mission is to coordinate the activities of the U.S. voluntary standards 
system and avoid conflict and duplicat ion in the development process. To achie ve a consistent 
set of American National Standards and to represent the United States in non -treaty 
international standards activities, it is necessary for ANSI to harmonize ongoing standards 
activity, minimize duplication, and avoid the promulgation of co nflicting American National 
Standards. The goal of avoiding conflict and duplicatio n is also included in the "ANSI Essential 
Requirements: Due process requirements for American National Standards," which is available 
at: http://www.ansi.org/essentialrequirements . As an example, when undertaking a standards 
activity, developers are encouraged to consult any relevant international or regional guides that 
may impact a pr oposed standard and advise the relevant ANSI -Accredited U.S. Technical 
Advisory Group(s) if the standard is intended to be submitted for consideration as an ISO, IEC 
or ISO/IEC JTC -1 stan dard.  
 
27. How does the United States ensure that only standards that we re developed on a basis of broad 
participation of all those affected by the activity are referenced in technical regulations?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) and 
Circular A -119, federal agencies are directed to  give preference in their regulatory activities to 
standards developed by voluntary consensus standards (VCS) bodies, which are generally 
private sector organizations, over unique government -developed standards. These VCS bodies 
utilize a process incorpora ting the following elements: openness, balance, due process, 
consensus, and an appeals process. In addition, Circular A -119 provides further guidance to 
agencies on the selection of appropriate standards. Section 5(a) outlines some of the factors 
agencies should consider when determining which standards are most appropriate. Additional 
guidance is provided to agencies under Section 5(h), which details the WTO TBT obligations 
agencies must adhere to regarding the use of standards, and under Section 5(i), whi ch provides 
guidance on using or recognizing standards used by trading partners. However, Circular A -119 
does not preclude the use of other standards in rulemaking, procurement, or other program 
activities in cases where voluntary consensus standards do no t exist or the use of existing 
voluntary consensus standards would be inconsistent with the law or otherwise impractical, 
including where the use of a voluntary consensus standard would not be effective in meeting the 
agency's objective needs.  
 
28. The EU seek s further clarification on the United States' regulations for food labelling related to 
nutrition. Could the US clarify how they determine the criteria for food labelling?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labe lling rules and criteria and the 
basis for them may be found at: https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Guidance 
DocumentsRegulatoryInformation/ LabelingNutrition/default.htm . 
 
It should be noted that in May 2016, FDA finalized the new Nutrition Facts label for packaged 
foods to reflect new scientific information, including the link between diet and chronic diseases 
such as obesity and heart diseas e. The Nutrition Facts Label is the only mandatory nutrition 
information required on food packages in the United States. The new label will make it easier 
for consumers to make informed food choices. The FDA extended the compliance dates for the 
Nutrition Facts and Supplement Facts label final rule and the Serving Size final rule, from July 
26, 2018 to January 1, 2020, for manufacturers with $10 million or more in annual food sales. 
Manufacturers with less than $10 million in annual food sales would receive  an extra year to 
comply – until January 1, 2021. In addition to the Nutrition Facts label, all food packages must 
also provide an Ingredient Declaration (see link above) which can provide consumers with 
complementary information to that provided in the Nu trition Facts label.  
 
29. The EU seeks further clarification on the United States' regulations pertaining to federal law. 
Specifically, prohibiting any government agency from engaging in any standards -related activity 
that creates barriers to the foreign comme rce of the United States. As TBT policies are set at 
the federal level, how is the federal -state relationship managed to support the overall US policy?  
 
RESPONSE: The Office of the United States Trade Representative's Office of Intergovernmental 
Affairs and Public Engagement (IAPE) leads USTR's public outreach efforts to state and local 
governments, and coordinates activities for the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee 
(IGPAC), which includes state and local government representatives. With respec t to specific 
trade concerns, USTR coordinates on measures with the relevant state governor's office.  
 
Question 30  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.174)  
Despite Circular A -119, the uptake of ISO/IEC standards by government agencies throu gh 
referencing in tec hnical regulations is very low.  
 
30. How does the US ensure that no unnecessary obstacles to foreign trade are created by the low 
uptake of relevant international standards?  
 
RESPONSE: Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement  Act (NTTAA) and 
Circular A -119, federal agencies are directed to give preference in their regulatory activities to 
standards developed by VCS bodies, which are generally private sector organizations, over 
unique government -developed standards. Circular A -119 further elaborates that VCSs are 
standards developed through a process that includes the following attributes or elements: 
openness, balance, due process, and an appeals process. In addition, Circular A -119 provides 
further guidance to agencies on the selection of appropriate standards. Section 5(a) outlines WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  some of the factors agencies should consider when determining which standards are most 
appropriate. Additional guidance is provided to agencies under Section 5(h), which details the 
WTO TBT obligati ons agencies must adhere to regarding the use of standards, including 
reference to the WTO Decision on Principles for Development of International Standards, Guides 
and Recommendations with Relation Article 2.5 and Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement on Technical  
Barriers to trade, and under Section 5(i), which provides guidance on using or recognizing 
standards used by trading partners.  
 
Questions 31 -32 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.176)  
The report states that the National Institute of Stand ards and Technology (NIST) is directed to 
coordinate public and private sector conformity assessment activities, to eliminate unnecessary 
duplication.  
 
31. How does the NIST ensure that procedures of accreditation and conformity assessment are not 
more burdens ome than necessary in light of the risk linked to the product in question?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States relies on a broad range of approaches to conformity assessment, 
depending on the sector (supplier's declaration of conformity, third -party testing and/o r 
certification, etc.). Accreditation programs are operated by all levels of the private sector and 
the government. Regulators frequently rely on private -sector bodies. The procedures for 
accreditation of conformity assessment bodies vary depending on the sector, particular standard, 
or technical regulation. NIST has recently issued documents that provide guidance to federal 
agencies on conformity assessment, which is available at: https://www.nist.gov/standardsgov 
/conformity -assessment -resources -federal -agencies . 
 
32. Are there adequate processes in place to prevent and eliminate duplicative conformity 
assessment requirements?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States main tains a robust system to support implementation of its trade 
obligations through strong central management of its regulatory regime, an effective interagency 
trade policy mechanism, and public consultation. The central regulatory review process 
administere d by the Office of Management and Budget ensures international trade obligations 
are taken into account in the development of regulatory policies, including conformity 
assessment procedures. E.O. 12866 and Circular A -4 are the primary basis on which good 
regulatory practice (GRP) has been integrated into the Federal regulatory structure. These 
practices ensure openness, transparency, and accountability in the regulatory process, and, as 
a result, help ensur e that the United States fulfil s key WTO obligation s, including ensuring that 
imported goods are treated no less favo urably than like domestic products. In addition, the 
Administrative Procedures Act requires agencies to undertake a notice and comment process 
open to all members of the public, both foreign and domestic, for rulemakings, and to take these 
comments into acc ount in the final rule. The notice and comment process under the APA provides 
an opportunity for trading partners to provide input to regulators regarding the impact of 
proposed regulations on imported products.  
 
Question 33  
3.3.2 Standards and other techn ical requirements (3.181)  
The report lists countries with whom the US has concluded mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs).  
 
33. Does the US administration plan to conclude any new MRAs in the short term and if so, in which 
sectors?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective. However, we are not working on 
any new MRAs at this time.  
 
Questions 34 -38 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.182, 3.183)  
The report illustrates that US legislation in this matter is very c omplex, involving many departments 
and agencies. This makes it complicated to find out all requirements that a product must meet for 
import, which is a major concern for European exporters. Overall this leads to lengthy and 
burdensome import procedures whe re the US cannot provide standard processing period of each 
import application procedure, neither is the anticipated processing period communicated to the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 184 - 
 
  applicant upon request. In addition, the mandatory registration of exporters and importers of agri -
food products before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must be renewed every even year 
representing a major bureaucratic burden for our companies.  
 
34. The EU seeks further clarification regarding the implementation of the final rule for APHIS to 
expand the  notice -based process to fruits and vegetables, which entered into effect on 
15 October 2018. Could the US confirm that requests made prior to the implementation of the 
new ruling will undergo the noticed -based process?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States confirm s that requests made prior to the implementation of the 
new ruling will undergo the notice -based process if they meet the criteria laid out in the Final 
Rule published in the Federal Register, which entered into effect in October 2018.  
 
35. What is the role of  the States in regulating food safety and animal and plant health? How are 
divergences from federal regulations managed?  
 
RESPONSE: Imports into the United States are regulated by federal government agencies. Many 
states have cooperative arrangements with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the USDA 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to regulate or inspect for the safety and health of 
domestically prod uced food, plants, and animals.  
 
36. Do the US intend to establish a single point of information for all the regulations and 
requirements that mu st be met by imported products?  
 
RESPONSE: The Customs and Border Protection website provides a single point of information 
for agricultural  imports  into the United  States,  which  can be found  at: https://www.cbp.gov/tr
avel/clearing -cbp/bringing -agricultural -products -united -states . 
 
37. Have the US considered simplifying FDA registration renewal procedures and exten ding 
deadlines? Would it be possible to at least establish a term of validity of more than two years 
for those companies that have a flawless track record?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  Section 415 of the 
Federal Food, D rug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) (21 U.S.C. 350d) requires food facilities that 
are required to register with FDA to renew such registration during the period beginning on 
October 1 and ending on December  31 of each even -numbered year.  
 
38. Do the US intend to  simplify in general its import application procedures to shorten significantly 
the overall time these procedures take and to make these procedures more predictable by 
providing the anticipated processing periods of all steps in the procedure and the stand ard 
processing period of each procedure?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is streamlining the import and export process through the 
implementation of  the Single  Window.  For more details,  please  see the following  websites:  
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017 -Aug/ACE%20Accomplishment
s%20Infographic.pdf , and https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated . 
 
Questions 39 -41 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.185)  
The new Foreign Supplier Verification Program (FSVP) has created great concern among European 
exporters and has been the source of numerous consultations. There are also doubts as to whether 
its implementation is really effective for the purposes for which  it was designed.  
 
39. Has the US considered publishing a new and more detailed guide on the new FSVP that can help 
importers and their foreign suppliers?  
 
RESPONSE:  FDA published  several  guidance  documents  at: https://www.fda.gov/food/guidan
ceregulation/fsma/ucm361902.htm . 
 
40. Does the US administration plan to carry out any studies to assess the perception of this FSVP 
and whether it has really improved the traceability of the food ch ain? If so, when would this be 
made available?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: We refrain from speculating on possible future actions or policies given the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews . 
 
41. Have the FSVP and its procedures accelerated approvals compared to the  previous period? To 
what extent have they simplified and streamlined the import procedures?  
 
RESPONSE: The FSVP's first compliance dates went into force in May 2017, with additional 
compliance dates extending through March 2019. As such it is still too ea rly in the 
implementation process to have data sufficient to assess the impact to a pprovals and import 
procedures.  
 
Questions 42 -43 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.186)  
The paragraphs deals with the accreditation of third -party certi fication bodies.  
 
42. Have foreign bodies applied for accreditation under the Accreditation of Third -Party Certification 
Bodies during the period in review?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes. 
 
43. In what matters is accreditation of foreign bodies different from the accreditation of  domestic 
bodies?  
 
RESPONSE: An accreditation body recognized by FDA under this program could be a foreign 
government or agency or a private third party (domestic or foreign). The recognition process is 
the same for domestic or foreign public or private ap plicants.  
 
Questions 44 -45 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.188)  
This paragraph refers to EU safety controls for bivalve molluscan shellfish. It notes that "On 9 March 
2018, the FDA announced a proposal to recognise as equivalent the shellfish control systems of 
Spain and the Netherlands, based on those countries' implementation of EU food safety controls for 
bivalve molluscan shellfish. The determinations would conclude that the control systems in Spain 
and the Netherlands achieve at least the same level of public health protection provided by U.S. 
controls for bivalve molluscan shellfish, administered through the National Shellfish Sanitation 
Program."  
EU Questions 44 -45 
 
44. When does the FDA plan to publish its final determination on th e equivalence of Spain's and The 
Netherlands' control system in relation to bivalve molluscan shellfish?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  FDA will publish its final 
determination in the Federal Register once the administrat ive procedure is complete.  
 
45. Could the US provide an update concerning equivalency determinations for EU Member States 
other than Spain and The Netherlands?  
 
RESPONSE: There are no updates at this time.  
 
Question 46  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) re quirements (3.182 -3.189)  
These paragraphs set out the US regime on SPS measures, as well as referring to recent initiatives 
and FDA decisions in this regard. The pending EU application for market access of apples and pears 
is at the same stage of the publi cation of a final ruling (in comparison with the bivalve molluscan 
shellfish). The publication of the final rule is the only remaining step for allowing market access. This 
publication has been delayed with more than a year now despite that all technical w ork has been 
satisfactorily concluded by the US already several years ago.  
 
46. Could the US provide an update on the pending EU application for market access of apples and 
pears under a systems approach?  
 
RESPONSE: USDA is working to publish the final rule.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 47  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.187)  
The report refers to the new Voluntary Qualified Importer Program (VQIP), an expedited review and 
entry programme for food and notes the ongoing process to issue accreditations to thir d-party 
auditors.  
 
47. Could the US administration elaborate on the current stage of implementation of the VQIP and 
progress regarding the accreditation of third -party auditors?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) opened the Voluntary Qualified 
Importer Program (VQIP) application portal on October 1, 2018 through which importers 
interested in applying may submit their completed applications  for the FY20 benefit year. FDA 
has published  a step-by-step guide  to the application  process:  https://www.fda.gov/downloads
/Food/GuidanceRegulation/ImportsExports/Importing/UCM608130.pdf . 
 
Questions 48 -49 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.229)  
According to the report, the Department of Defense (DoD) created an 18 -person panel in 2016 
tasked with finding ways to streamline and improve the defense acquisition process.  
 
48. Could the US expound on the results achieved so far in terms of procurement polic y 
recommendations?  
 
RESPONSE:  Information  on Section  809 reports  can be found  at the following  link: https://sec
tion809panel.org/media/updates/ . 
 
49. Is this process open -ended? If not, could the US indicate by when it is slated to be completed?  
 
RESPONSE: Section 809(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 
provides that the panel's report to the Secretary of Defense and the Congressional defense 
committees  will be available  by January  15, 2019.  See Frequently  Asked  Questions  at: https://
section809panel.org/faqs/ . 
 
Questions 50 -51 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.230)  
The Executive Order No. 13788 on buy American and hire Americ an instructed Heads of Agencies to 
submit annually reports on implementation of Buy American Laws to the Secretary of Commerce 
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, starting on 15 November 2018.  
 
50. Based on the 2018 annual reports, could t he US explain the state of implementation of Buy 
American Laws and highlight the measures taken to ensure compliance with its GPA 
commitments?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has complied, and will continue to comply, with its GPA 
commitments.  
 
51. Has the acquisition of domestically produced goods by federal agencies increased?  
 
RESPONSE: The annual reports are for internal executive branch use and may inform the policy 
making process.  
 
Question 52  
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.231)  
According to the report, on 16 June 2018, new cybersecurity rules for defense contractors went into 
effect, requiring contractors to meet certain minimum standards, or have a plan in place to meet 
those standards.  
 
52. Could the US explain the content and the scope of such minimum standards that have to be met 
by contractors?  
 
RESPONSE: The rule criteria can be found in DFARS 252.204 -7008 and DFARS 252.204 -7012. 
See https://www.acq. osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/html/current/252204.htm . WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Questions 53 -54 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.237)  
According to the report, a new requirement has been introduced recently for any entity willing to 
register online in the System for Award Management. This  refers to the submission of a notarized 
letter appointing the authorized Entity Administrator.  
 
53. Could the US confirm if this requirement is applicable to all entities willing to register or only to 
foreign ones?  
 
RESPONSE: Registration online in the Syst em for Award Management (SAM), at  www.sam.gov , 
an official website of the U.S. Government, is required to do business with the U.S. Government. 
Both domestic and international entities may register.  GSA posted instruction s specific to each 
type of registrant, including letter templates, for easy reference. Entities should follow the 
instructions and use the templates provided.  
 
54. Could the US explain the rationale for introducing this new requirement and what are the 
implica tions for foreign companies?  
 
RESPONSE: The requirement strengthens protection and enforcement against fraudulent 
activity in GSA's System for Award Management.  
 
Question 55  
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.238)  
This paragraph notes that "Procurement at the  sub-federal level is governed by state or other sub -
federal government laws and procurement regulations. Where procurement is funded with federal 
money, states must comply with certain federal statutory requirements."  
 
55. Could the US explain to which regula tory requirements a public procurement product at sub -
federal or local level is subject to if it is partly funded by federal funds? Does the Buy American 
Act apply in addition to or in lieu of local regulatory requirements?  
 
RESPONSE: The Buy American Act only applies to the procurement of goods by the federal 
government. There is no umbrella statute that applies Buy American like provisions for federal 
financial assistance and grants. Generally, such provisions are tied to specific financial assistance 
and grant programs, where they exist.  
 
Question 56  
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.239)  
According to the report and with the objective of increasing transparency, the introduction for each 
contract of the Procurement Instrument Identifier to be used in federal procurement is to be 
completed by end of this year.  
 
56. Could the US inform on whether all the necessary regulatory, process and information technology 
changes have been completed as planned? And if so, could the US inform on the benefits this 
new sys tem is bringing in particular for foreign bidders?  
 
RESPONSE: These changes have been completed. This new system, designed to streamline 
internal government procedures, aims to improve the government's ability to report 
procurement data accurately and will  have a minimal impact on vendors. Domestic and foreign 
companies may need to make modest conforming adjustments to their internal business 
systems.  
 
Questions 57 -58 
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.236, 3.252)  
The report states that the National Defense Au thorization Act (NDAA) increased the Simplified 
Acquisition Threshold (SAT) to USD 250.000. Para 3.252 reports about the small business set -aside 
thresholds: purchases between USD 10.000 and USD 250.000 have to be automatically set aside 
for small business es. 
 
57. Could the US explain what are the implications of the NDAA increase in the SAT threshold on the 
Small b usiness set -aside's thresholds?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE: The NDAA increase in the SAT threshold will concurrently raise the small business 
set-aside threshold, pe r Section 1702(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act, which 
amended section 15(j)(1) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 644(j)(1)).  
 
58. Could the US clarify if the NDAA linked the increase in the small business set -aside thresholds 
to the simplified acquisition threshold, so that any future increase in the SAT would lead to 
automatic increases in the threshold for small -business set -asides?  
 
RESPONSE: Section 1702(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act amended section 
15(j)(1) of the Small Busin ess Act (15 U.S.C. 644(j)(1)) to replace specific dollar thresholds with 
the terms "micro -purchase threshold" and "simplified acquisition threshold." This change ties 
the requirement to set aside for small businesses to these thresholds. In the future, if these 
thresholds were to increase, so would the small business set -aside threshold.  
 
Question 59  
3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.241)  
The report states that for sub -central entities the estimated procurement was $510.95 billion in 
2015.  
 
59. To what extent does this figure for estimated procurement of sub -central entities include also 
non-covered procurement, namely procurement at sub -central level that is excluded from 
coverage as it is subject to notes and reservation in the US schedule?  
 
RESPONSE: The Uni ted States provided detailed information on the methodology used in 
collecting  and preparing  its sub-central  level statistics  in GPA/WPS/STAT/9  and 
GPA/WPS/STAT/24/Add.2/Suppl.1.  
 
Question 60  
3.3.7.3 Patents (Table 3.27)  
The table provides an overview of the number of patents issued by origin of the applicant.  
 
60. Could the US provide similar data with regard to patent revocations or opposition procedures?  
 
RESPONSE: Table 3.27 is based on data maintained by USPTO. USPTO doe s not maintain data 
on patent revocations or opposition procedures by origin of applicant.  
 
Question 61  
3.3.7.6 Geographical indications (3.296)  
The report states that "protection is not granted to geographic terms or signs that are generic for 
goods or se rvices."  
 
61. The EU would like to ask the US whether it holds an exhaustive list of geographical indications 
that it considers to be 'generic'.  
 
RESPONSE: Terms that are generic for goods or services are not eligible for protection . Whether 
a given term is ge neric depends on  consumer perceptions in the market in question, and may 
change, such as if a particular term becomes generic over time . 
 
Question 62  
3.3.7.7 Trade secret protection (3.302)  
The report notes that under the EEA, economic espionage for a foreign power, and the theft or 
misappropriation of a trade secret, are federal crimes .  
 
62. Is the Administration willing to share details or lists of the 'priority foreign countries' it has 
identified to watch in this space?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States observes that the Secretariat's Report references "priority 
foreign countries" in paragraph 3.303, addressing Section 1637 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act. The President's report required under the statute is submitted to Congre ss. 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 63  
3.3.7.9.1 IPR – Enforcement – Main provisions, institutions, and actions (3.316 -3.327)  
These paragraphs set out the main enforcement tools for IP laws the US has at its disposal.  
 
63. The EU would like to know more generally how – in terms o f defence of intellectual property 
rights – the United States intends to treat the phenomenon of "Patent trolls" in the United States. 
Where do things stand as concerns the STRONGER Patents Act, and will this Act help to 
effectively deal the phenomenon of "patent trolls"?  
 
RESPONSE: The STRONGER Patents Act of 2018  has not been enacted into law.  
 
Questions 64 -66 
4.1.2.1 Agriculture – Major support programmes – General legal framework (4.9)  
The report states that in July 2018, the Department of Agriculture a nnounced its intention to provide 
a short -term aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with market disruptions caused 
by retaliatory tariffs. In the related press release, it is stated that the USDA will authorize up to $12 
billion in program s, consistent with World Trade Organization obligations.  
 
64. Could the US elaborate on the expected timeframe and legislative procedure for creating this 
short-term aid package?  
 
RESPONSE: These programs were launched on September 4, 2018 and are authorized 
under  existing  authorities.  Further  details  can be found  on USDA's  website  at: https://www.us
da.gov/media/press -releases/2018/09/04/usda -launches -trade-mitigation -programs . 
 
65. Could the US provide further information on the value of the short -term aid package and which 
is the amount of support authorized in the period under review?  
 
RESPONSE: USDA has announced initial payments of approximately $4.7 billion under the 
Market Facilitation Program for affected commodities, up to $1.2 billion under the Food Purchase 
and Distribution Program for purchases made at market prices, and up to $200 millio n for the 
Agricultural Trade Promotion Program to assist in market development. Further details can be 
found on USDA's website  at: https://www.usda .gov/media/press -releases/2018/09/04/usda -
launches -trade -mitigation -programs . 
 
66. Could the US specify how the aid package will impact on the aggregate level of support for 
agriculture in general and in particular for corn, cotton, dairy, hog, sorghum, soybea n and 
wheat? How does the US assess the risk that this package could result in the US breaching its 
domestic support reduction commitments?  
 
RESPONSE: These programs are consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support.  
 
Questions 67 -68 
4.1.2.5 Cro p insurance (4.19 -4.22)  
The section describes the federal crop insurance system.  
 
67. Could the US please specify the current aggregate level of support for specialty crops (fruit, 
vegetables, nursery crops, and tree nuts) taken as a whole and for each of thes e crops separately 
where the support is understood as insurance provided by the Federal Government (e.g. through 
reimbursement of administrative and operating expenses, payment of insurance premiums)?  
 
RESPONSE: Support provided by the crop insurance progr am to specific products, including 
specialty crops, is available in the United States' domestic support notifications through 
marketing year (MY) 2016.  
 
68. Do producers of specialty crops benefit from support measures other than crop insurance  at the 
same tim e? If so, what is the current value of that support?  
 
RESPONSE: All relevant support for specialty crops is reported in the United States domestic 
support notifications.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 69  
4.1.2.7 Sugar (4.31)  
The paragraph deals with the import regime and stru cture for sugar and sugar products.  
 
69. Sugar exports from Mexico to the US are limited through a suspension agreement as amended 
in June 2017. Will this agreement remain in force when the USMCA, recently concluded with 
Canada and Mexico, enters into force?  
 
RESPONSE: The suspension agreements with Mexico for sugar and sugar products are not 
related to the entry into force of USMCA and are a separate proceeding of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce.  
 
Questions 70 -72 
4.1.2.8 Dairy sector (4.34)  
The report describe s the Margin Protection Program for Dairy.  
 
70. How has the uptake of MPP -Dairy evolved in the period under review?  
 
RESPONSE: Production history registered for the MPP -Dairy program increased from 
167.8 billion pounds of milk production history in 2014 to 176 .1 billion pounds of milk production 
history in 2017. Producers make an annual decision as to how much of their production history 
they will enrol for MPP coverage. Production history enrolled and thus eligible for payments fell 
from 142.1 billion pounds i n 2015, compared with 169.6 billion pounds of registered production 
history (eligible production history is not available for 2014) to 137.8 billion pounds in 2017. 
Production history registration and enrolment data for 2018 are not yet available.  
 
71. Which s hare of US milk production does it cover?  
 
RESPONSE: The program covers historical, not current milk production. Producers make an 
annual decision as to how much of their production history they will enrol  for MPP coverage (25 -
90 per cent ). Production hist ory enrolled and thus eligible for payments was 137.8 billion pounds 
in 2017, compared with 169.6 billion pounds of production history registered for MPP in that 
year (the most recent for which data are available).  
 
72. Has USDA made use of its possibility to adjust individual historical production levels? If yes, 
when and in which circumstances?  
 
RESPONSE: USDA has increased individual production history annually since 2015 to reflect 
increases in national average milk production, as required by the 2014 Farm Bill. As noted in 
responses to questions 70 and 71 above, not all registered production history is eligible to 
receive payments, as producers make an annual decision as to how much, if any, of their 
production history they wish to enrol for coverage.  
 
Ques tions 73 -74 
4.1.3.3 Food aid (4.47)  
The report states that US food assistance is principally provided in the form of agricultural 
commodities procured by the USDA and made available to developing countries in response to 
emergency or chronic food shortages .  
 
73. What was the level of non -emergency in -kind food aid (value and type of commodities) and what 
were the destinations of this type of aid in the last three years?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States provides required information regarding food aid in its Export  
Communication Questionnaire (ECQ) submission to the WTO. The WTO ECQ submission contains 
the data and information for 2016, 2017, and 2018.  
 
74. What were the respective shares of food aid in -kind and of monetized food aid in the period 
under review?  
 
RESPONSE:  In the 2016 U.S. International  Food Assistance  Report  (https://www.usaid.gov/s
ites/default/files/documents/1866/FY_2016_IFAR_FINAL.pdf , pages  48 and 54) and https://
www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/PA00MHDH.pdf , pages 50 and 57), the WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 191 - 
 
  most recent publicly available information, the  United  States  provided  information  on its 
monetization  made  under  the Food for Peace  Title II program. However,  no information  was 
available  for the level of monetization  that occurred  under each  of the two USDA  programs  (i.e., 
McGovern -Dole and Food For Progress).  
 
In FY 2015, the McGovern -Dole program monetized 1,740 MT, or 0.03 per cent  of the 
program's in -kind food aid.  The McGovern -Dole program did not monetize com modities in 
FY 2016 or FY 2017.  
 
The Food for Progress program monetizes 100 per cent  of in-kind food aid.  
Total Metric Tons:  
FY2015: 131,620  
FY2016: 308,400  
FY2017: 328,440  
 
Question 75  
4.1.4 Levels of support (4.51)  
The report refers to OECD recommendat ions on support to agriculture.  
 
75. Has the US administration considered taking into account the comments made by the OECD in 
relation to its agricultural subsidy policy, and more specifically those referring to the specific 
nature of some of the US subsidy programs or the need to review its risk management 
instruments?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. far m programs are designed to minimize distortions and enable producers to 
respond to market signals. U.S. risk management programs are structured to be fiscally sound 
and provide a broad range of insurance products to help farmers manage risk. Regarding the 
OECD recommendation that risk management instruments be reviewed, Congress periodically 
reviews farm programs and risk management instruments, generally within the context of the 
Farm Bill legislative process. Regarding the OECD recommendation for all farm -revenue 
insurance, the United States introduced Whole Farm Revenue Insurance (WFRI) in 2014, which 
provides revenue protection for all commodities on a farm under a single insurance policy. The 
plan is tailored to any farm with up to $8.5 million in insur ed revenue, including farms with both 
crops and livestock and those producing specialty or organic commodities.  
 
Questions 76 -77 
4.2.3 Natural gas (4.63, see also 3.146)  
The report states that exportation of LNG is an attractive option and export volumes are on the rise, 
as well as that all imports or exports of natural gas require authorization from the Department of 
Energy.  
 
76. How will the US enable effective and efficient procedures to obtain the necessary authorization 
to export LNG, taking into consider ation the Natural Gas Act?  
 
RESPONSE: The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fossil Energy (FE) is responsible for 
authorizing exports of domestically produced natural gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
to foreign nations pursuant to section 3 o f the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Under section 3(a) of the 
NGA, DOE/FE reviews applications to export natural gas to countries with which the United States 
has not entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) requiring national treatment for trade in 
natural gas,  and with which trade is not prohibited by U.S. law or policy (non -FTA countries). 
Section 3(a) of the NGA states that DOE "shall issue such order upon application, unless, after 
opportunity for hearing, it finds that the proposed exportation or importatio n will not be 
consistent with the public interest." DOE has consistently interpreted this provision as creating 
a rebuttable presumption that a proposed export of natural gas is in the public interest. 
Accordingly, DOE will conduct an informal adjudication  and grant an application to export LNG 
to non -FTA countries under section 3(a) of the NGA unless DOE finds that the proposed 
exportation will not be consistent with the public interest.  
 
In prior decisions, DOE/FE has identified a range of factors that it  evaluates when reviewing an 
application under section 3(a). DOE/FE's public interest review focuses on: (i) the domestic need 
for the natural gas proposed to be exported, (ii) whether the proposed exports pose a threat to 
the security of domestic natural gas supplies, (iii) whether the arrangement is consistent with WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  DOE/FE's policy of promoting market competition, and (iv) any other factors bearing on the 
public interest raised in any individual proceeding. In addition, the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) requires DOE to give appropriate consideration to the environmental effects of its 
proposed decisions.  
 
77. Is the US planning any extension to international maritime transportation of non -government 
procured goods (as for example international trade of LNG) of the requirements to use US built 
and flag vessels which currently exists for transportation within US waters?  
 
RESPONSE: We refrain from speculating on possible future actions or policies given the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy revie ws. 
 
Questions 78 -79 
4.2.5 Renewable energy (4.66 -4.67)  
The section explains, in paragraph 4.66, that consumption of biofuels and other renewable energy 
resources (other than hydropower) more than doubled between 2000 and 2017, mainly in response 
to federa l and state requirements or incentives. It further notes in paragraph 4.67 that 30 
"renewable portfolio standards" or similar binding targets are in place at State level.  
 
78. Could the US specify which kind of federal and state requirements or incentives are in place to 
promote renewable energy as part of the efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, other than 
the ones mentioned in the report?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Energy Information Administration's "Direct Federal Financial 
Interventions and Subsidies in En ergy in Fiscal Year 2016," published in April 2018, is available 
at: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf . 
 
Also, the Database of State Incentives for Re newables & Efficiency (DSIRE) database provides 
a list of state -level incentives and is available at: http://www.dsireusa.org/ .  
 
The Department of Energy's Alternative Fuels Data Center provides information on fede ral and 
state laws and incentives for alternative fuels and vehicles, air quality, fuel efficiency, and other 
transportation -related topics, and is available at: https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/ . 
 
79. Could the US specify what is meant by "renewable portfolio standards or similar binding targets"?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see pages 51 -52 in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Energy 
Primer, which is available at: https://www.ferc.gov/market -oversight/guide/energy -primer.pdf . 
 
Also see: Galen Barbose, U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards: 2017 Annual Status Report 
(Lawrence  Berkeley  National  Laboratory,  July 2017),  available  at: http://eta -publications.lbl. 
gov/sites/default/files/2017 -annual -rps-summary -report.pdf . 
 
Question 80  
4.4.1.4 Financial services - Banking services (4.99)  
The report states that "The United States provides national treatment with respect to all banking 
services, except that branches of foreign banks are not allowed to accept FDIC insured deposits 
unless grandfathered, and agencies of foreign banks are not permitted to accept deposits from U.S. 
citizens and residents".  
 
80. Is the US considering any measures to  reduce the said limitations for branches and agencies of 
foreign banks?  
 
RESPONSE: There is no update at this time.  
 
Question 81  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.141)  
The paragraph describes the new Open Internet Order, or Title II Order.  
81. Does the US agree th at suppliers of leased circuit lines can be subject to the measures defined 
under the "Competitive Safeguards" provision and the "Interconnection" provision in the GATS 
Reference Paper on Telecommunication Services?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: The United States does not vi ew the Trade Policy Review as an appropriate forum 
for interpreting the scope of legal instruments.  
 
Question 82  
4.4.7 Tourism services (4.267)  
The report states that "The National Travel and Tourism Strategy, launched in 2012, aims at 
attracting 100 milli on international visitors, with an estimated expenditure of US$250 billion 
annually, by the end of 2021. A new goal is under development as the United States has achieved 
its financial target."  
 
82. Has the US fixed the new goal for 2021 and beyond?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is in the process of updating this goal, as the initial spending 
target has been reached. A new target has not yet been set.  
 
Questions 83 -86 
4.4.6.2.1 Maritime transport (4.227)  
The report refers to the conditions placed upon c argo service between two points in the United 
States, according to the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 or Jones Act. Presently, there 
are also several initiatives in the US Congress to further reserve shipping activities to US -flagged 
vessels  (e.g. the Energizing American Shipbuilding Act, which seeks to reserve the transportation of 
a certain percentage of crude oil and liquefied natural gas to US -flagged vessels).  
 
83. What are the possibilities for foreign suppliers to obtain waivers in the int erest of other than 
"national defense", such as the transport of specialized products?  
 
RESPONSE: Waivers are 'in the interest of national defense.' 46 U.S. Code § 501 permits 
waivers:  
• Upon request of the Secretary of Defense, when the waiver is necessary in the interest of 
national defense.  
• If the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) determines that no coastwise vessels 
are available and capable to provide the proposed transportation and a determination is 
made that the proposed transportation is "in the interest of national defense."  
 
The maritime industry may request a Jones Act waiver from U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), which is an agency of the Department of Homeland Security. Upon receipt of a waiver 
request, CBP forwards the reques t to MARAD, the Secretary of DHS, DOD, and —if the 
transportation is energy related —the Department of Energy. To determine if there are U.S. -flag 
vessels available to meet the needs, MARAD surveys the maritime industry to establish the 
capability and availa bility of coastwise vessels to meet the needs of the requested transportation.  
 
84. Could the US explain in more detail the initiatives that currently exist in Congress that would 
imply a strengthening of the existing restrictions under the Jones Act? Is the e nvironmental 
impact of reduced maritime and increased road traffic, a consequence of the Jones Act, taken 
into account?  
 
RESPONSE: We refrain from commenting on proposals or speculating on possible future actions 
or policies given the retrospective orienta tion of trade policy reviews.  
 
85. Is CBP (Customs Border Protection) still planning to introduce some modifications and 
revocations of ruling letters relating to customs application of the Jones Act to the transportation 
of certain merchandise and equipment b etween coastwise points, as it did in its proposal of 
18 January 2017 which was subsequently withdrawn?  
 
RESPONSE: We refrain from speculating on possible future actions or policies given the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
86. Has the US administration considered suppressing the so -called grandfathering clause (and the 
regulations it encompasses for all contracting parties affected)?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 194 - 
 
  RESPONSE: To the extent the question is in reference to the exemption under the  Paragraph 
3(a) of GATT 1994 – we confirm that the United States has not modified the legislation to which 
the exemption pertains.  
 
Questions 87 -88 
4.5 E-commerce (4.271 and Table 4.31)  
Table 4.31 lists the US Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (the  
ESIGN Act) as one of the measures affecting e -commerce and the main law regarding the 
enforceability of contracts formed over the Internet and the enforceability of electronic signatures.  
 
87. Could the US elaborate on the conditions for the enforceability of  contracts formed over the 
internet?  
 
RESPONSE: The E -SIGN Act covers signatures, contracts, and other records relating to any 
transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.  It therefore does not cover signatures, 
contracts, and other records relating solely to intra -state transactions.  There are also specific 
exemptions under section 103 of the Act, including wills and court orders or notices required to 
be executed in connection with court proceedings.   
 
The E -SIGN Act provides that a signatu re, contract, or other record covered by the Act may not 
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforcement solely because it is in electronic form, and that a 
contract relating to the transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability 
solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation.   The statute 
defines "electronic signature" to mean "an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or 
logically associated with a contract or other record and exec uted or adopted by a person with 
the intent to sign the record" and "electronic record" means "a contract or other record created, 
generated, sent, communicated, received or stored by electronic means" (an oral communication 
does not qualify as an electron ic record). For instance, if a contract is formed over the internet 
using an electronic record or electronic signature, that contract cannot be denied legal effect 
solely because an electronic record or  electronic signature was used.  
 
The Act, however, pro vides that if a statute, regulation, or other rule of law that governs the 
transaction provides for additional requirements, these additional requirements  must be 
satisfied. For example, if the law requires that information relating to such transaction be 
provided or made available to a consumer in writing, certain consumer disclosure requirements 
in section 101(c)(1)(A) -(D) must be met, including a requirement that the consumer 
affirmatively consent to the use of an elec tronic record for such purpose. Such additional 
requirements are addressed in section 101(c),  (d), (e) and (g) of the Act. The Act is found at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW -106publ229/pdf/PLAW -106publ 229.pdf . 
 
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) has been adopted by 47 states, the District of 
Columbia, and the US Virgin Islands, and those laws cover signatures, contracts, and other 
records relating to intra -state transactions.  
 
88. The EU would a lso like to know whether/under which conditions this statue applies to smart 
contracts and to machine -to-machine contracts, considering the growing importance of those 
algorithm -driven contracts for the global economy.  
 
RESPONSE: The E -SIGN Act provides th at "[a] contract or other record relating to a transaction 
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or 
enforceability solely because its formation, creation, or delivery involved the action of one or 
more ele ctronic agents, so long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable 
to the person to be bound."  See Sec. 101(h). The term "electronic agent" is defined under the 
Act as "a computer program or an electronic or other automated means us ed independently to 
initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part without 
review or action by an individual at the t ime of the action or response."  
 
The E -SIGN Act provides for the use of contracts formed using ele ctronic signatures or records 
and involving one or more electronic agents, such as smart contracts and machine -to-machine 
contracts, and prohibits denying legal effect to such contracts "so long as the action of any such 
electronic agent is legally attribu table to the person to be bound."  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 195 - 
 
  The UETA also covers "automated transaction," which is defined as a transaction performed or 
conducted by electronic means in which machines are used without human intervention to form 
contracts and perform obligations un der existing contracts.  Section 14 of the UETA specifically 
provides rules governing automated transaction and confirms that contracts can be formed by 
machines functioning as electronic agents for parties to a transaction.  
 
WT/TPR/G/382 – US Government's Report  
 
Questions 89 -91 
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.3)  
The US government issued in December 2017 a new National Security Strategy for the United States, 
which states that "A strong economy protects the American people, supports our way of life, and 
sustains American power." It also makes clear that in order to  fulfil these goals the United States 
will use all possible tools such as tariff increases in accordance with US Section 232 statute.  
 
89. Tariff increases are known to be a very ineffective tool for reducing an aggregate trade deficit, 
while they lead to pric e distortions, decrease the efficiency of domestic producers and increase 
the cost of consumption. Given that other factors and policies such as demography, 
competitiveness, income levels, investment positions, fiscal stance etc. tend to be empirically 
much stronger related to trade deficits, do you consider that other instruments than tariffs can 
be more effective in achieving this objective?  
 
RESPONSE: The President's National Security Strategy sets out a number of actions through 
which the Administration  is pursuing the objective of promoting free, fair, and reciprocal 
economic relationships. These include modernizing existing trade and investment agreements, 
countering unfair trade practices, working with like -minded partners, and facilitating new market  
opportunities.  
 
90. Several studies have started to analyse the effects of Section 232 measures on jobs in the US. 
According to most of them, somewhere between twelve and eighteen jobs would be lost for 
every steel/aluminium job created. Would the US share th e views expressed in these findings?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States expresses no view on the analyses and findings of third -party 
studies.  
 
91. Has the US made any study on the jobs which could be lost due to the restrictive measure on 
steel and aluminium produc ts applied in the period under review?  
 
RESPONSE: The Department of Commerce is regularly reviewing the impact of the steel and 
aluminium tariffs imposed by the President under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, as amended, including on downst ream sectors.  
 
Questions 92 -94 
2.3 Federal Budget Deficit (2.4)  
According to the report, the US authorities forecast an increase of the budget deficit to 4.4% of GDP 
in 2018 and 5.1% of GDP in 2019. This fiscal expansion accompanie s a vigorously growing ec onomy.  
 
92. What is, in the opinion of the US, the impact of the strongly pro -cyclical fiscal policy on the US 
trade balance and current account?  
 
RESPONSE: The trade balance is generally procyclical, and the current account is sensitive to 
net savings. Both a re reacting as expected following the passage of TCJA.  
 
93. According to the report, the US authorities forecast an increase of the budget deficit to 4.4% of 
GDP in 2018 and 5.1% of GDP in 2019. This fiscal expansion is already adding materially to 
domestic de mand, and combined with the buoyant near -term economic outlook and a strong US 
dollar, is expected to further boost US imports in the rest of this year and next. In this regard, 
how would you assess the risk to widening of the US current account deficit in  the near -term?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. current account is reacting as expected.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  94. In today's interconnected world bilateral trade deficits are often a result of complex global value 
chains, which increase efficiency and cost -effectiveness of production. As such, they benefit 
consumers by decreasing consumption costs and spur and diffuse innovation and technological 
efficiency, which benefits domestic producers. American firms constitute an integral part of these 
chains and during the recent years have consid erably benefitted from their development. 
Bilateral deficits based on gross volumes of trade also typically paint a biased picture of the 
bilateral trade links as they do not properly account for the imports content of exports. Finally, 
given that the aggr egate deficits are insensitive to trade measures, closing a bilateral deficit with 
a trading partner is often counter -productive as a deficit is likely to re -emerge elsewhere. In this 
context, do you agree that bilateral trade deficits should not be used a s a metric of the openness 
of trade partners markets?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has made reducing chronic bilateral trade deficits a priority. 
American trade policy is broadly aimed at the elimination of trade barriers, level ling the playing 
field, and the expansion of fair trade, in recognition of benefits that Americans and the world 
can derive from both exports and imports on a level playing field.  
 
Question 95  
2.4 Nominal Saving/Investment (2.5)  
The personal savings rate in the US appears low relativ e to comparator countries, and fell further to 
6.7% in 2017; while this also coincides with a widening current account deficit (to 2.4% of GDP).  
 
95. What structural policy measures is the US considering to address the widening gap between 
savings and investm ent in the US, and thus rein -in the current account deficit?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  TCJA was aimed at 
increasing investment, which will increase productivity and ultimately wages. All else being 
equal, the short r un effect of increasing investment is to increase the savings gap.  
 
Questions 96 -97 
3 Openness and Accountability: Building Support for Trade (3.2)  
The report notes that USTR has broadened opportunities for public input from stakeholders and 
facilitates fo rmal consultations with State and local Governments regarding the President's trade 
priorities.  
 
96. Could the US elaborate on the new outreach initiatives that USTR has undertaken?  
 
RESPONSE: USTR launched a new website, providing increased user -friendly feat ures to access 
a vast amount of trade policy information posted as part of USTR's commitment to transparency.  
 
97. How are State and local Governments consulted regarding future US bilateral agreements and 
how is their input integrated into trade policy making ? 
 
RESPONSE: USTR's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs and Engagement (IAPE) is designated 
as the state coordinator for the World Trade Organization and provides outreach to official state 
points of contact, governors, legislatures, and associations on al l trade issues of interest to 
states.  In addition, IAPE consults with the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee 
(IGPAC) which provides policy advice on issues involving trade  and development that have a 
significant  relationship  to the affairs  of U.S. state and local government.  See: https://ustr.gov/
about -us/advisory -committees/intergovernmental -policy -advisory -committee -igpac. 
 
Questions 98-100 
4.3.2. North American Free Trade Agreement (4.22)  
The report states that in August 2017, the United States began negotiations with Canada and Mexico 
and that on 30 September 2018, the three parties announced they had reached an agreement on 
the Unit ed States –Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA). The Rules of Origin (RoO) in the automotive 
sector provided in the available text of the USMCA are stricter than NAFTA. Originating status is 
conferred by a combination of factors: (i) higher production value cont ent in the production of cars 
(from 62.5% to 75% net cost) and car parts (from 60/62 % up to 75%) and core parts such as 
engines and transmissions must be originating; (iii) steel and aluminium content from North America 
(70 % originating); (ii) labo ur-value content (up to 40 % of a vehicle's production must be completed 
by workers earning at least 16 USD per hour).  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  98. The 70% regional sourcing requirement for steel and aluminium appears to be difficult to 
reconcile with WTO commitments as it is unrelated to t he "last substantial transformation" of 
exported automobiles (and many parts), as well as unrelated to individual products, as it pertains 
to all purchases of a producer in the preceding year. Does the US think that this could entail a 
local content requir ement  violation in departure from national treatment (Article III:4 and III:5 
of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement) and from most -favoured -nation 
treatment (Article I:1 of the GATT 1994)?  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA is consistent with U.S. obligat ions under the WTO.  
 
99. The available text of the USMCA, as well as the annexed side letters, provides partial exemptions 
of Canadian and Mexican exports from future US Section 232 measures on cars, light trucks and 
car parts up to significant levels of expor ts. Does the US think that these exemptions could 
constitute a voluntary restraint?  
 
RESPONSE: No, these exemptions are not a voluntary restraint.  
 
100.  It seems that the USMCA could not comply with the "substantially all trade" liberalisation 
criteria due to t he cumulative impact of the partial liberalisation in various sectors, including 
automobiles. Could the US explain how it considers USMCA to meet the criterion of "eliminating 
duties and other restrictive regulation of commerce on substantially all trade" in accordance with 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994?  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA is consistent with U.S. obligations under the WTO.  The agreement was 
signed by the parties on November 30, 2018.  Per the procedures of the Transparency Mechanism 
for Regional Trade Agre ements (RTA -TM), found in WT/L/671, the United States and the other 
parties to the USMCA will notify the agreement to the WTO for transparency purposes no later 
than directly following the parties' ratification of the agreement.  We look forward to keeping 
Members informed, as appropriate.  
 
Questions 101 -103 
4.5.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (4.78)  
The report refers in general terms to the systems that have "lack of transparency and due process" 
as regards protection of geographical indications (GIs). S ince 'Feta' cheese protected as geographical 
indication in the EU is quoted, the EU would like to submit some observations in that respect. Under 
the EU legal system, agricultural products and foodstuffs, wines and spirit drinks can be protected 
as GIs. Th e procedures for registration of the names as GIs are clearly defined in three main basic 
regulations, completed by more specific rules contained in the relevant delegated or implementing 
acts. The mentioned regulations, in conformity with TRIPS provisions , define also the relations 
between the GIs and the trade marks, in particular as regards those either prior or posterior to GI 
registrations. The complete set of EU regulations is publically available under the link 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food -farming -fisheries/food -safety -and-quality/certification/quality -
labels/quality -schemes -explained_en#geographicalindications . 
 
At the inception of the system in the 1990s the EU took over the GIs protected in various ways at 
national level and across the EU. Under legislation in force, the EU and Member States operate a 
double opposition proce dure, although no opposition process is a requirement of the TRIPS 
agreement. The EU would welcome support from the US for the EU's efforts to develop global 
standards of IP management for GIs such as opposition processes and clear identification of GIs. I n 
relation to the requirements of TRIPS the EU invites the US to limit any complaints to the rules in 
force.  
 
As regards generic terms, defined in the EU legislation as 'the names of products which, although 
relating to the place, region or country where t he product was originally produced or marketed, have 
become the common name of a product in the Union, it is clear that such terms shall not be 
registered as GIs. In that respect, the EU underlines though that to conclude on the genericity of a 
name, the t erritoriality rule should be applied. The assessment of whether the name is to be 
considered as generic or not should be carried out with respect to the respective territory of that 
country only and not any other countries territory.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 198 - 
 
  101.  Could the US elabora te how the procedures for geographical indications are established, as 
well as relations with trademarks defined, in the relevant US legal acts, in particular from the 
perspective of the TRIPS Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States provides protection to  geographical indications (GIs) through its 
trademark system for all classes of goods and services. See USPTO, Geographical Indication 
Protection  in the United  States . Viewed  at: http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/office
s/dcom/olia/globalip/pdf/gi_system.pdf . Trademarks are governed by the Trademark Act of 
1946 (Lanham Act), as amended (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.), the Trademark Rules (37 CFR Part 
2), the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures, and state laws.  
 
102.  In this regard, the EU is concerned that the US increasingly appears to not follow the 
territoriality principle when it comes to other Members' territories. Does the US argue that a 
generic, so determined in say the EU or China, should be regarded as generic in the US even if 
the conditions for genericity are not met within the US territory?  
 
RESPONSE: The United St ates will not comment on the hypothetical situation described in the 
question.  
 
103.  Could the US clarify how the right of review for new geographical indications (GIs), which is 
part of the new US trade agreements with Mexico, Canada and the Republic of Korea,  is 
compatible with WTO' rules?  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA and United States -Korea Free Trade Agreement are fully compatible 
with WTO rules.  
 
Question 104  
5.4 Standards Alliance (5.14)  
The report notes that the Standards Alliance facility is used among others to  "strengthen domestic 
practices related to adopting rel evant international standards".  
 
104.  In the implementation of this program, does the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
coordinate with relevant international standardization organizations, such as ISO and IEC to 
ensure international convergence?  
 
RESPONSE: ANSI serves as the U.S. representative to the ISO and IEC. It is therefore able to 
apply that experience and expertise in the development of Standards Alliance technical 
assistance programs.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Follow up question s from the EU  
Part I – Questions based on the Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Questions 1 -2 
Section 1.2.1 Fiscal Policy (1.13 -1.16)  
The report provides an overview of the Tax and Jobs Act of 2017. There are two specific sections of 
the legislation – the Base Erosion and Anti -Abuse Tax ("BEAT") and the Foreign -Derived Intangible 
Income ("FDII") that appear to be discriminatory and at od ds with the WTO commitments of the US 
due to their discriminatory nature or because they confer forbidden subsidies.  
 
Initial EU Question 1:  With regard to the BEAT, does the US share the view that a tax deduction 
that applies to domestic transactions but  not to international transactions is likely to constitute a 
breach of national treatment? Could the US clarify the operational aspects of the BEAT and its 
compliance with the WTO commitments?  
 
RESPON SE: Base erosion is a well -recognized problem internatio nally, and other jurisdictions 
have also recently implemented anti -base erosion measures.   The U.S. Treasury is currently 
working on regulations on implementation of the base erosion anti -abuse tax provisions in the 
Tax and Jobs Act of 2017.  
 
EU Follow -up question:  
1. Could the United States please address our original question and explain why in its view the 
BEAT measures do not breach the  national treatment obligation?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States does not agree with the characterization of the B EAT set forth in 
the question. As explained in the original response, the BEAT addresses base erosion within the 
context of the new U.S. tax system.  
 
Initial EU Question 2: With regard to the FDII, the ability of a US -based corporation to deduct 
income dep ends on the ratio between its income from exports of goods and services and its gross 
total income. Does the US agree that this makes it contingent on export performance, as the more 
a company exports, the greater the tax deduction it can claim? This seems  to amount to an export 
subsidy that is explicitly forbidden by the WTO Subsidies Agreement in view of its trade distorting 
effects. Could the US clarify the operational aspects of the FDII and its compliance with WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE: Base erosion is a we ll-recognized problem internationally, and other jurisdictions 
have also recently implemented anti -base erosion measures.   The U.S. Treasury is currently 
working on regulations on implementation of the anti -base erosion measures in the Tax and Jobs 
Act of 2017.  
 
EU Follow -up question:  
2. Could the United States please address our original question and explain why in its view the FDII 
measure do not represent a prohibited subsidy?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not agree with the characterization of the FDII set forth in 
the question.  As explained in the original response, the FDII addresses base erosion within the 
context of the new U.S. tax system.  
 
Question 3  
Section 3.3.6 Government Procurement (3.230)  
The Executive Order No. 13788 on buy American and h ire American instructed Heads of Agencies to 
submit annually reports on implementation of Buy American Laws to the Secretary of Commerce 
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, starting on 15 November 2018.  
Initial EU Question 50:  
 
Initial EU Question 50 : Based on the 2018 annual reports, could the US explain the state of 
implementation of Buy American Laws and highlight the measures taken to ensure compliance with 
its GPA commitments?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States has complied, and w ill continue to comply, with its GPA 
commitments.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  EU Follow -up question:  
3. Could the United States please reply to our initial question, which enquired as to the state of 
implementation of Buy American laws and asked to highlight the measures taken by the US to 
ensure compliance with its GPA commitments?  
 
RESPONSE: As noted in P aragraph 3.227, the Trade Agreements Act implemented the United 
States’ GPA commitments.  The Buy American and Hire American report has not necessitated 
legal changes to the Trade Agreements Act or the Buy American Act.  
 
Question 4  
Section 4.1.2.1 General legal framework (4.9)  
The report states that in July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its intention to provide 
a short -term aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with market disruptions caused 
by retaliatory tariffs. In the rel ated press release, it is stated that the USDA will authorize up to $12 
billion in programs, consistent with World Trade Organization obligations.  
 
Initial EU Question 66: Could the US specify how the aid package will impact on the aggregate 
level of suppo rt for agriculture in general and in particular for corn, cotton, dairy, hog, sorghum, 
soybean and wheat? How does the US assess the risk that this package could result in the US 
breaching its domestic support reduction commitments?  
 
RESPONSE: These progra ms are consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support.  
 
EU Follow -up question:  
4. Could the United States please address our original question and explain why in its view the 
short-term aid package for agricultural producers is in line with WTO obl igations?  
 
RESPONSE: The annual U.S. Current Total AMS under the 2014 Farm Bill has consistently been 
below $4 billion. There is no risk that the United States will breach its domestic support 
commitments.  
 
Part I – Questions based on the Report by the Go vernment (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Questions 5 -7 
Section 4.3.2 North American Free Trade Agreement (4.22)  
The report states that in August 2017, the United States began negotiations with Canada and Mexico 
and that on 30 September 2018, the three parties announced they had reached an agreement on 
the United States –Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA). The Rules of Origin (RoO) in the automotive 
sector provided in the available text of the USMCA are stricter than NAFTA. Originating status is 
conferred by a combination of factors: i) higher production value content in the production of cars 
(from 62.5% to 75% net cost) and car parts (from 60/62 % up to 75%) and core parts such as 
engines and transmissions must be originating; (iii) steel and aluminium content from North Ame rica 
(70 % originating); (ii) labor -value content (up to 40 % of a vehicle’s production must be completed 
by workers earning at least 16 USD per hour).  
 
Initial EU Question 98:  
The 70% regional sourcing requirement for steel and aluminium appears to be di fficult to reconcile 
with WTO commitments as it is unrelated to the “last substantial transformation” of exported 
automobiles (and many parts), as well as unrelated to individual products, as it pertains to all 
purchases of a producer in the preceding year . Does the US think that this could entail a local content 
requirement  violation in departure from national treatment (Article III:4 and III:5 of the GATT 1994, 
Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement) and from most -favoured -nation treatment (Article I:1 of the  
GATT 1994)?  
 
RESPONSE:  The USMCA is consistent with U.S. obligations under the WTO.  
 
EU Follow -up question:  
5. Could the United States please explain, in the light of our initial question, why in its view the 
USMCA is consistent with U.S. obligations under the WTO?  
 
RESPONSE:  As noted in the original reply, the USMCA, including its rules of origin, is consistent 
with U.S. obligati ons under the WTO. The United States looks forward to providing information WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 201 - 
 
  regarding the USMCA through the procedures of the Tran sparency Mechanism for Regional Trade 
Agreeme nts, at the appropriate time.  
 
Initial EU Question 99: The available text of the USMCA, as well as the annexed side letters, 
provides partial exemptions of Canadian and Mexican exports from future US Section 232 measures 
on cars, light trucks and car parts up to significant levels of exports. Does the US think  that these 
exemptions could constitute a voluntary restraint?  
 
RESPONSE:  No, these exemptions are not a voluntary restraint.  
 
EU Follow -up question:  
6. Could the United States please explain, in the light of our initial question, why in its view the 
partia l exemptions under the USMCA and its side letters do not contain elements of voluntary 
export restraint?  
 
RESPONSE:  As the United States does not believe these are voluntary restraints, we have 
nothing to add.  
 
Initial EU Question 100: It seems that the US MCA could not comply with the "substantially all 
trade" liberalisation criteria due to the cumulative impact of the partial liberalisation in various 
sectors, including automobiles. Could the US explain how it considers USMCA to meet the criterion 
of "elim inating duties and other restrictive regulation of commerce on substantially all trade" in 
accordance with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994?  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA is consistent with U.S. obligations under the WTO.   The agreement was 
signed by the parties on No vember 30, 2018. Per the procedures of the Transparency Mechanism 
for Regional Trade Agreements (RTA -TM), found in WT/L/671, the United States and the other 
parties to the USMCA will notify the agreement to the WTO for transparency purposes no later 
than d irectly following the parties’ ratification of the agreement.   We look forward to keeping 
Members informed, as appropriate.  
 
EU Follow -up question:  
7. Could the United States please explain, in the light of our initial question, why the USMCA meets 
the obligation of "substantially all trade" coverage foreseen by GATT?  
 
RESPONSE:  As already noted, the United States looks forward to providing information 
regarding the USMCA through the procedures of the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade 
Agreements,  at the appropriate ti me. 
 
 
Additional questions  
 
Part I – Questions based on the Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Question 8  
Section 3.1.3 Tariffs (3.32)  
This paragraph notes, as regards  the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), that 
“Over the years, various changes to the HTSUS have not been notified to the WTO as changes to 
Schedule XX, including Chapter Notes, the Article XXVIII renegotiation (tobacco), and the third  and 
fourth revisions to the pharmaceutical coverage.”  
 
8. The EU notes that the US has not notified the conclusion of the Article XXVIII negotiations on 
tobacco. When does the US intend to address this issue?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States is working to notif y modifications to Schedule XX and will provide 
the relevant information to the Committee on Market Access in due course.  
 
Question 9  
Section Table A3.2 Prohibitions, restrictions or other special requirements  
The table mentions, as regards “Radiation - and sonic -radiation -producing products”, the 
requirement of “Compliance with a radiation performance standard”.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 202 - 
 
  9. Requirements for electromagnetic compatibility differ between the EU and the US, both when it 
comes to levels allowed as well as testing methods.  Under the US requirements, radio equipment 
may not disturb e.g. hearing aids. EU requirements are on emissions, the same as the US 
requirements, but also on the unacceptable degradation in the presence of the electromagnetic 
disturbance. As the barrier  concerns structural differences, we wonder if there would be an 
interest from the US side to cooperate in the field of electromagnetic compatibility of mobile 
phones?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective exercises.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Guatemala  
INFORME DEL  GOBIERNO WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 1  
 
4.5.2 Promoción del comercio digital (4.83)  
 
Los Estados Unidos conceden gran importancia al comercio electrónico (o "comercio digital"), que 
desempeña una función esencial de fortalecimiento y consolidación de las empresas en cada sector 
de la economía. Desde el último examen de las políticas comerciales de los Estados Unidos, este 
país ha reforzado su compromiso con las cuestiones relativas al comercio digital en diversos foros y 
se ha esforzado por combatir un a oleada creciente de obstáculos al comercio digital en todo el 
mundo.  
 
1. Podría la delegación de Estados Unidos, ampliarnos información sobre los mecanismos que ha 
utilizado para fortalecer y consolidad el papel del comercio digital en las empresas ¿  
 
RESPONSE:  Digital trade is a broad concept, capturing not just the sale of consumer products 
on the Internet and the supply of online services, but also data flows that enable global value 
chains, services that enable smart manufacturing, and myriad other platforms and 
applications.  In today's economy, nearly every business is digitally enabled, and every industry 
leverages digital technology to compete internationally.  A recent report by the U.S. International 
Trade Commission describes recent developments  in global trade in digital products and 
services:  https://www.usitc.gov/publications/industry_econ_analysis_332/2017/glo bal_digital_
trade_1_market_opportunities_and.htm . 
 
Question 2  
8 Comercio de las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (8.1)  
 
El USTR ha puesto en marcha una Iniciativa para las Pequeñas Empresas con objeto de aumentar 
las oportunidades de exportación  de las pequeñas y medianas empresas (pymes) estadounidenses 
e intensificar los esfuerzos para dar respuesta a las dificultades y prioridades de exportación 
específicas de las pymes y sus trabajadores como parte de las actividades de política comercial y 
aplicación de la ley. En 2017, el USTR siguió colaborando con otros organismos públicos asociados 
y con los interlocutores comerciales de los Estados Unidos para desarrollar y aplicar iniciativas 
nuevas o en curso con objeto de aumentar las oportunidades de  exportación de las pequeñas 
empresas.  
 
 RESPONSE:  No Question Was Asked.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 204 - 
 
  Hong Kong, China  
Questions 1 -3 
Section 2.4 Investment Regime ( 2.47-2.50)  
 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) continues to oversee the national 
security implications of foreign investment. CFIUS reviews transactions based on voluntary 
notifications filed by the parties, or on its own initiative if it  believes the transaction is a covered 
transaction and may raise national security concerns. Each transaction is reviewed on a case -by-
case basis, based on individual facts and circumstances. If national security concerns are identified 
during the review, CFIUS may impose conditions, or CFIUS and the transacting parties may negotiate 
a mitigation agreement to resolve any national security concerns. If CFIUS determines that the 
national security concerns cannot be resolved and the parties do not withdraw and  abandon the 
transaction, the Committee will recommend that the President prohibit the transaction.  
 
1. What are the objective criteria for assessing the impairment or threat to national security for 
different industries/sectors?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see sectio n 721(f) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, as 
well as the published guidance available at : https://www.treasury.gov/reso urce-center/ 
international/foreign -investment/Pages/cfius -guidance.aspx  for an illustrative list of factors that 
CFIUS considers in determining whether a particular transaction poses national security risk.  
 
2. Are there any appeal/review mechanisms in place to ensure that objective assessment has been 
fairly applied to ensure a level -playing field and non -discriminatory treatment for foreign 
investment? Please provide more details about the mechanism in place.  
 
RESPONSE: CFIUS focuses exclusively on national security, and its reviews are ro bust and 
analytically rigorous. CFIUS is comprised of a range of agencies with different areas of expertise. 
Every transac tion notified to CFIUS is analys ed by experts from across the U.S. Government 
through a methodical ass essment  of the national security risk.  
 
3. The statistics on CFIUS reviewed transactions are available up to 2015 only. We would be 
interested to know the latest statistics. Are there considerable differences in the figures and 
changes in the trend in the rec ent two years as compared to the past?  
 
RESPONSE: The most recent statistics that are publicly available, including certain statistics 
from 2016, can be found at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/international/foreign -
investment/Pages/cfius -reports.aspx . 
 
Questions 4 -5 
Section 2.3.1 WTO (2.23) & 4.2 Trade Enforcement Activities (4.12)  
 
During the review period, the US was involved in 13  dispute settlement cases as a complainant and 
has used the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as an enforcement tool.  
 
4. The Appellate Body currently has four vacancies, and only three serving members. The WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism would not function w hen the terms of two Appellate Body 
members expire in December 2019. In order not to paralyse the proper functioning of the 
Appellate Body, will the US consider supporting the immediate commencement of the 
appointment process?  
 
RESPONSE: For more than 15 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council meeting, if WTO 
memb ers say that we support a rules -based trading system, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995.  And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its repor ts 
within 90 days of an appeal. A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body  member may not 
continue deciding appeals as if his term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body.  The 
Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to those relating 
to domestic law. The Appellate Body may not g ive advisory opinions on issues that will not assist 
the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure into compliance WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 205 - 
 
  with WTO rules.  The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as precedent or provide 
authoritative inter pretations.  And the Appellate Body may not change Members' substantive 
rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreements. When the Appellate Body 
abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it undermines the 
legitimacy of the system and damages the interests of all WTO Members who care about having 
the agreements respected as they were negotiated and agreed.  The United States will continue 
to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system,  and will continue 
our efforts and our discussions with Members to seek a solution on these important issues.  
 
5. Does the US have specific proposals in mind to address its concerns on the operation of the 
Appellate Body?  
 
RESPONSE: For more than 15 years and  across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council meeting, if WTO 
members say t hat we support a rules -based trading system, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995. And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its reports 
within 90 days of an appeal.  A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member m ay not 
continue deciding appeals as if his term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
The Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to those 
relating to domestic law. The Appellate Body may not give advis ory opinions on issues that will 
not assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure into 
compliance with WTO rules.  The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as 
precedent or provide  authoritative interpretation s. And the Appellate Body may not change 
Members' substantive rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreements. When 
the Appellate Body abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it 
undermines the legitimacy o f the system and damages the interests of all WTO Members who 
care about having the agreements respected as t hey were negotiated and agreed. The United 
States will continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system, 
and will  continue our efforts and our discussions with Members to seek a solution on these 
important issues.  
 
Question 6  
Summary (paragraph 13) & Section 3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.1 -
3.8) 
 
In February 2018, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced that its Automated 
Commercial Environment (ACE) had been completed. Importers and exporters may use the 
electronic portal to declare goods, obtain permits, and access transaction and tr ade data. Within 
CBP, ten Centers of Excellence have been established to specialize in all aspects of customs 
processing in several areas.  
 
6. Does the ACE cover all permits required for the import / export of goods? How does the US 
measure the effectiveness of the ACE? What is the future plan to improve the ACE?  
 
RESPONSE: ACE is the primary means of receiving from users the standard set of data and 
other relevant documentation required for the release of imported cargo and clearance of cargo 
for export, howe ver this excludes application forms for permits and licenses.  
 
ACE serves as the U.S. Single Window and its streamlined trade processes are valued at a 
savings of over $388 million for the private sector and $35 million for CBP in fiscal year 2018. 
Through  the implementation of ACE, CBP has converted 269 import and export paper forms into 
electronic data submission, thus greatly reducing the workload for importers and facilitating 
trade. Additional examples of improved facilitation of trade volume supported  by ACE capabilities 
include:  
 
- 250 million electronic data transmissions to partner government agencies supporting 
the single window;  
- 65% duties, taxes, and fees collected via the Periodic Monthly Statement, which 
streamlines accounting and payment; and  
- $227 million in recovered revenue from targeting activities through ACE validations.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  In February 2018, CBP deployed the last of the major scheduled core ACE deployments. All 
phases of cargo processing are now available in ACE. CBP is currently focused on s ustaining all 
deployed ACE capabilities and ensuring ACE operates as a highly available and reliable system. 
There is also an ongoing demand for additional ACE enhancements that emerge from our active 
dialogue with our industry, government agency, and cong ressional stakeholders.  
 
With regard to ACE enhancement requirements from our Partner Government Agencies (PGA), 
prioritization and funding for this work will continue under the Border Interagency Executive 
Council (BIEC) , an interagency collaboration and decision -making group comprised of those U.S. 
Federal agencies that regulate international trade.  
 
Question 7  
Section 3.1.3 Tariffs (3.32)  
 
Schedule XX contains the WTO tariff commitments of the United States. The last modifications to 
Schedule XX were undertaken in 2016 to incorporate the formal adherence of the United States to 
the Declaration on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products. The United States 
remains under waiver to implement changes stemming from HS2012. Over the years, v arious 
changes to the HTSUS have not been notified to the WTO as changes to Schedule XX, including 
Chapter Notes, the Article XXVIII renegotiation (tobacco), and the third and fourth revisions to the 
pharmaceutical coverage.  
 
7. The Secretariat Report of the last Trade Policy Review on the US in 2016 already pointed out 
that a number of changes to the HTSUS, including Chapter Notes, the Article XXVIII 
renegotiation (tobacco), and the third and fourth revisions to the pharmaceutical coverage, have 
not been noti fied to the WTO. The same observation is reported again in this year's Secretariat 
Report. To uphold the spirit of transparency, what is the US' plan to notify the WTO of the 
modifications so as to reflect the changes to its tariff schedule?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is working to notify modifications to Schedule XX and will provide 
the relevant information to the Committee on Market Access in due course.  
 
Question 8  
Summary (paragraph 13) & Section 3.1.6.1 AD, CVD (3.74 -3.87)  
 
The United States continue s to be an active user of anti -dumping (AD) duties. Between 2015 and 
2017, the number of AD investigation initiations increased, totalling 133. There were 340 AD orders 
in place as of end -July 2018, compared with 269 on 30 June 2016. The trading partners m ost 
affected by the measures were China, Chinese Taipei, the European Union, India, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea. The investigations initiated during the period were mainly concentrated in the 
steel industry. Of the 109 countervailing duty (CVD) measure s in place as of end -July 2018, some 
50.5% were also applied on iron and steel products. There were 123 sunset review initiations of AD 
orders during the period from 1 January 2016 to end -June 2018. During the same period, there were 
eight revocations, whi le 104 orders were continued. There were 52 sunset review initiations of CVD 
orders during the period from 1 January 2016 to end -April 2018. During the same period, 27 sunset 
reviews of CVD orders were concluded; there were six revocations, while the remai ning orders were 
continued.  
 
8. We note that there has been a prominent increase of AD and CVD investigations since 2017, 
specifically the number of AD investigations has risen from 37 in 2016 to 54 in 2017; whereas 
the number of CVD investigations has risen from 16 in 2016 to 24 in 2017. We would appreciate 
it if the US could share with us the major reasons for this trend, and whether it is the US policy 
to increasingly and extensively use AD and CVD enforcement tools to achieve its trade 
objectives. How woul d the US ensure such tools and measures will not be used in a manner that 
may become protectionist measures in disguise.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States administers its trade remedy laws in a manner that is consistent 
with its WTO obligations. The decision to  impose an antidumping or countervailing measure as 
the result of an investigation is based on the factual determination of whether dumping or 
subsidization has occurred and whether that dumping or subsidization has caused or threatens 
to cause material in jury to a domestic industry. For dumping or subsidization, where injury or 
threat thereof and a causal link have been found, the United States will impose an antidumping WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  or countervailing duty measure. The use of such trade remedy measures to address the e ffects 
of unfairly traded goods is consistent with the basic principles and goals of the WTO.  
 
Question 9  
Summary (paragraph 19) & 3.1.7.1 Section 232 Investigations  
 
During the review period, the United States reverted to conducting Section 232 investigat ions to 
determine the effects of imports of any article on national security, and to recommend the application 
of countermeasures, including an increase in tariffs, to the President. In 2018, four new 
investigations were initiated on: steel, aluminium, aut o imports, and uranium imports. Up to 
September 2018, import surcharges were announced on the first two investigations. This 
announcement was followed by countermeasures by trading partners.  
 
9. We note that the US has put in place a mechanism to request exem ption of products from the 
Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium but, as reported widely, the process has been slow 
and cumbersome. We would like to know the latest position of the exemption approval process 
and what measures the US has taken and will  take to expedite and simplify the exemption 
process.  
 
RESPONSE: On September 5, 2018, the Department of Commerce issued revisions to the 
product exclusion process for the Section 232 steel and alumin ium tariffs. The new rules, 
effective September 11, were  informed by comments received by Commerce in response to its 
earlier published rules and by the Department's experience with managing the exclusion process.  
 
Question 10  
Section 4.4.1 Financial Services (4.127)  
 
Section 504 of the Economic Growth, Regulat ory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, signed into 
law on 24 May 2018, creates a new subset of venture capital funds, called qualifying venture capital 
funds (QVCFs), that cannot be defined as an investment company as stipulated in the Investment 
Company Act (ICA). It is noted that being exempt from the ICA definition reduces the QVCF's 
registration and disclosure requirements. A QVCF, as defined, needs to have less than 250 beneficial 
investors and less than US$10 million in invested capital.  
 
10. What are th e differences in registration/ disclosure requirements and regulatory supervision 
between QVCFs and an investment company as defined in the ICA?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see SEC's discussion of the registration and other requirements for 
investment companies here : https://www.sec.gov/investment/fast -answers/divisionsinvest 
mentinvcoreg121504htm.html . 
 
Questions 11 -12 
Section 4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.139; 4.1 46-4.147)  
Regarding the provision of telecommunication services, in some cases there are foreign ownership 
limitations only under certain circumstances. The examples quoted are wireline based carriers and 
submarine cable landing licensees, which are not ge nerally subject to any foreign ownership 
restrictions beyond Federal Communication Commission (FCC)'s general obligations and 
qualifications for ownership of such entities.  
 
11. Under what circumstances would telecommunication services be subject to foreign o wnership 
restrictions? What are the FCC's obligations and qualifications?  
 
RESPONSE: The foreign ownership restrictions applicable to telecommunications carriers are 
codified in Sections 310(a) and 310(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. § 310(a), (b). The restrictions in Section 310(a) prohibit any foreign government or its 
representative from holding a radio (wireless) license in its own right. By contrast, the foreign 
ownership restrictions in Section 310(b) apply only to certain specified radio licenses —common 
carrier, broadcast, aeronautical fixed, and aeronautical en route licenses. Thus, a carrier's 
provision of telecommunications services is subject to the statutory foreign ownership 
restrictions only in circumstances where th e carrier holds a common radio carrier license or 
leases common carrier spectrum from another U.S. carrier. The FCC has adopted specific rules 
that apply to foreign ownership of common carrier radio licensees and lessees as well as to WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  broadcast and aeronau tical radio licensees. These rules are codified at 47 CFR §§ 1.5001 -.5004. 
In exercising its statutory discretion to allow foreign ownership in excess of the 25% benchmark 
in Section 310(b)(4), the FCC conducts a public interest analysis that starts with a  presumption 
(subject to rebuttal) that foreign ownership of common carrier radio licensees does not threaten 
competition in the U.S. telecommunications market. It also involves a consideration of policy 
concerns raised by federal government agencies in re lation to national security, law 
enforcement, foreign policy, or trade policy issues.  
 
In response to the slowdown in broadband deployment (both actual and predicted) in the wake of 
the 2015 Title II of the Communication Act, the FCC has taken action, begi nning in 2017, including 
by removing barriers to infrastructure investment, promoting competition in the telecommunications 
market, and by restoring the previous light -touch regulatory framework for broadband Internet 
access services. In this respect, the FCC's Strategic Plan set a number of priorities in order to "bring 
the benefits of the digital age to all Americans" as set out in para. 4.147.  
 
12. What specific measures has the US taken to remove barriers to infrastructure investment and 
promote competition ? 
 
RESPONSE: The FCC is updating infrastructure policy and encouraging the private sector to 
invest in 5G networks, thereby promoting facilities -based competition.  
 
- Speeding Up Federal Review of Small Cells:  The FCC adopted new rules that will reduce 
federal regulatory impediments to deploying the small -cell infrastructure needed for 5G 
(as opposed to large cell towers) and help to expand the reach of 5G for faster, more 
reliable wireless service. See: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc -acts-speed -
deployment -next-gen-wireless -infrastructure . 
 
- Speeding Up State and Local Review of Small Cells:  The FCC has refor med rules designed 
decades ago to accommodate small cells. The reforms remove regulatory barriers at the 
state and local level that have the effect of prohibiting deployment of 5G and give states 
and localities a reasonable deadline to approve or disapprov e small -cell 
siting  applications.  See: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc -facilitates -wireless -
infrastructure -deployment -5g. 
 
- Speeding Up Access to Utility Pol es: The FCC reformed the framework governing utility 
pole attachments by adopting a process called "one -touch, make -ready" in which the 
new attacher moves existing pole attachments and perf orms all other work required to 
make  the pole ready  for a new attachment  such as fiber.  See: https://www.fcc.gov/do
cument/fcc -speeds -access -utility -poles-promote -broadband -5g-deployment . 
 
Questions 13 -14 
Section 4. 4.6.2 Maritime transport, port services, and shipbuilding (4.227; 4.240)  
 
It is noted that restrictions to cabotage services of goods remain in place. The Jones Act reserves 
cargo service between two points in the United States (including most of its terri tories and 
possessions), either directly or via a foreign port, for ships that are registered and built (or repaired) 
in the US, and that are at least 75% owned by a U.S. corporation, and on which 100% of the officers 
and 75% of the crew are U.S. citizens.  
 
13. We notice that the Customs and Border Protection's January 2017 notice of proposed 
modification and revocation of various ruling letters relating to the Jones Act has been withdrawn 
for reconsideration. What has been the development since then?  
 
RESPONSE : We have no updates, and Customs and Border Protection continues to enforce the 
Jones Act.  
 
In response to challenges identified by MARAD, a medium -run strategy was launched, in 
particular to  meet the challenge posed by ageing ships and infrastructure, and to face foreign 
competition.  
 
14. What are the scope and the details of the medium -run strategy, including specific initiatives 
being implemented or planned?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: Section 603 of U.S. Public  Law 113 -281, the Howard Coble Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 (Coble Act), defines the minimum scope and details for the 
National Maritime Strategy. The strategy also considers recommendations from public maritime 
stakeholders provided  through two maritime symposiums and consultation with MARAD's federal 
advisory committee. Details on the strategy will be made public after the document is delivered 
to Congress.   
 
Part II Questions on the Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Question 15  
Section 4.3.2 North American Free Trade Agreement – USMCA  
 
On 1 January 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico (NAFTA) entered into force. In August 2017, the United States began negotiations with 
Canada  and Mexico to address remaining market access barriers, and to modernize and rebalance 
the obligations between the Parties. On 30 September 2018, the three Parties announced they had 
reached agreement on the United States –Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA).  
 
15. We would be interested to know the process ahead and the timeline for the entry into force of 
the USMCA.  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA was signed on Nov. 30, 2018. It will replace the NAFTA and enter into 
force after it is approved by all the three Parties, consis tent with each Party's internal procedures.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Honduras  
INFORME DE LA SECRETARIA WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
3.3.4  Política de competencia (3.210)  
 
1. En el parrafo 3.210, podria  los Estados Unidos, indicarnos el listado de jurisdicciones 
participantes en el Marco Multilateral de Procedimientos de Investigación y Aplicación relativos 
a la Legislación de Defensa de la Competencia (MFP).  
 
RESPONSE: The Multilateral Framework on Proc edures is currently under negotiation.  
 
Question 2  
3.3.6  Contratación pública (3.252)  
 
2. En el parrafo 3.252, podrian por favor proporcionarnos estadisticas sobre el porcentaje de 
empresas propiedad de mujeres?  
 
RESPONSE: The statistics  can be found in Table 3.23 of the Secretariat Report. See WOSB 
(Women Owned Small Businesses).  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Iceland  
Part I – Questions from the Secretariat's Report Document WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
Section 3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (3. 46-3.48)  
 
Under the MMPA, the United States prohibits imports of commercial fish or fish products caught in 
commercial fishing operations resulting in the incidental killing or serious injury (bycatch) of marine 
mammals in excess of United States standards . National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) published 
regulations implementing these MMPA import provisions in August 2016. The regulations came into 
effect on 1. January 2017 and apply to any foreign nation with fisheries exporting fish and fish 
products t o the United States, either directly or through an intermediary nation.   
 
According to the provisions, a harvesting nation must apply for and receive a comparability finding 
for each of its export and exempt fisheries to continue to export fish and fish products from those 
fisheries to the United States. The provisions require harvesting nations to develop regulatory 
programs comparable in effectiveness to U.S. programs, which may include assessment of marine 
mammal stocks, estimating bycatch and mitigati ng that bycatch to levels comparable with U.S. 
regulatory programs in an analogous domestic fishery. Furthermore, the provisions apply to all kinds 
of seafood and all marine mammals, including those that ar e not threatened to extinction.  
 
The new rule, adm inistered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), gives 
countries that want to export seafood to the U.S. a five -year grace period (until 1. January 2022) to 
prove that their exporting fisheries monitor and limit marine mammal bycatc h as effectively as U.S. 
fisheries are required to do under the MMPA. Import prohibitions can be imposed in accordance with 
the rules and will remain in effect until the harvesting nation reapplies and receives a comparability 
finding for that fishery.  
 
Iceland has the following question:  
 
1. Could the United States provide information on how it will ensure that the implementation of the 
Marine Mammal Protections Act, Import Provisions to Reduce Marine Mammal Bycatch, will be 
consistent with the WTO Agreemen ts? 
 
RESPONSE: NMFS works closely with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to ensure that 
any actions taken under the MMPA are consistent with the United States' WTO obligations.  NMFS 
seeks to ensure that its implementing actions under the MMPA are  fair, transparent, non -
discriminatory, and based on the best available science. In doing so, NMFS will take into account 
different conditions in a nation's fishery, including conditions that could bear on the feasibility 
and effectiveness of certain bycat ch mitigation measures. NMFS will work to assist nations to 
achieve sustainable fisheries and bycatch management.  
 
PART III: Other Questions  
 
Questions 2 -5 
Trade and Gender  
 
On the occasion of the 11th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires last december more than 120 
WTO members and observers launched a joint declaration on women and economic empowerment 
that aims inter alia at sharing best practices and working together at t he WTO to remove barriers 
for women's economic empowerment and increase their participation in trade.  
 
The report prepared by the United States for this trade policy review mentions how the US 
government's procurement policy encourages the participation o f small businesses, including 
veteran -owned, women -owned, and disadvantaged small businesses through the use of set -aside 
programmes. The government -wide procurement goal stipulates that at least 23% of all federal 
government contracting dollars should be awarded to small businesses. The sub -goal for Women 
Owned Small Businesses is 5%, which was close to being met in the fiscal year of 2017 with 4,72% 
of contracts. The Small Business Administration is responsible for defining and specifying the size 
standar ds for each industry and to determine which businesses qualify as small. To be eligible for a WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Women Owned Small Business the business must be at least 51% owned and controlled by women 
who are US citizens and have women manage day -to-day operations and mak e long -term decisions.  
 
Iceland welcomes these efforts to promote inclusive economic growth and help small businesses 
grow and would be interested to have more information about which practices have provided the 
best results, and what challenges have prese nted themselves, in particular as regards women owned 
small businesses.  
 
Iceland has the following questions:  
2. Could the United States provide information on its efforts to ensure women owned small 
businesses access to the government procurment market? What  have been the challenges and 
best practices of this programme?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Small Business Administration runs a number of programs aimed at 
helping women entrepreneurs launch new businesses and compete in the marketplace. 
Information on SBA's prog rams can be found on the following link: https://www.sba.gov/ 
business -guide/grow -your-business/women -owned -businesses . 
 
3. What is the participation of women in t he economy in the United States, and in particular  in 
trade?  
 
RESPONSE: According to a U.S. Small Business Adminsitration (SBA) women's business 
ownership analysis issued in 2017, women make up more than 50% of the U.S. population, and 
they have grown to b e 47% of the workforce. Women control $14 trillion, or 51%, of U.S. 
personal wealth and are now the primary source of income in over 40% of households. Women 
were majority owners of 9.9 million businesses which generated $1.4 trillion in sales and 
employed  over 8.4 million individuals. In addition, another 2.5 million businesses were equally -
owned by women and men, and they accounted for another $1.1 trillion in sales and 6.5 million 
jobs. As majority and joint business owners, women entrepreneurs generated  $453 billion in 
payroll for 14.9 million workers through more than 12.3 million businesses.  
 
Seventeen (17) per cent  of women -owned manufacturing firms export. Eight (8) per cent  of 
women -owned firms in the transporation sector export. In all firm sizes and industries, firms 
that export report higher sales than those that do not.  
 
4. Have particular barriers that limit women's participation in trade been identif ied? 
 
RESPONSE: We bel ieve that the best way to promote the advancement of women in global 
trade is to focus on rule -making that benefits ALL traders without discrimination.  We also believe 
that women and men will benefit most from Members' implementation of existing WTO 
commit ments, such as th e Trade Facilitation Agreement. In addition, all traders benefit when 
Members pursue greater transparency - by providing access to information about laws, 
regulations, policies, and other official requirements for starting, running, and gr owing 
businesses, including information about international trade rules, requirements, and preference 
programs - and observe the rule of law.  
The United States firmly believes that societies that empower women to participate fully in civic 
and economic lif e are more prosperous and peaceful. We support efforts to advance women's 
equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women and youth empowerment 
programs. Assisting developing countries in addressing barriers to women's entrepreneurship i n 
their countries, developing initiatives that increase the ability of women to start, run, and grow 
businesses in their countries, and ensuring that there is equality of economic opportunity for 
similarly situated men and women will help to promote the ec onomic empowerment of women.  
5. Have the United States implemented any specific measures, other than those referred to above , 
to encourage women's participation in trade and promote women's entrepreneurship, or are 
such measures being developed?  
 
RESPONSE: Women can be empowered by expanding economic opportunity. Recent private 
sector reporting shows that if the world closed the gender gap in workforce participation, global 
GDP would increase by $28 trillion by the year 2025. That is precisely why President Tr ump WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 213 - 
 
  announced the creation of the Women's Entrepreneurship Finance Initiative at the G20 Leaders 
Summit in 2017. Since its launch in October 2017, the United States has contributed $50 million 
to support women entrepreneurs and create enabling environments  for women in business. 
Along with contributions from fourteen international partners, the initiative has provided more 
than $340 million in contributions from countries and leveraged more than $1.6 billion in blended 
finance to help advance women's entrep reneurship around the globe.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  India  
QUESTIONS ON SECRETARIAT REPORT (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Question 1  
Summary (5)  
1. It has been stated in the report that the US current account deficit has been increasing since 
the year 2013 and reached 469.1 Billion USD in 2017. Can United States provide the reasons 
for the current account deficit to rise at such a high level?  
 
RESPONSE : Although the U.S. current account deficit has grown from $348.8 billion in 2013 
to $449.1 billion (revised) in 2017, it has stayed relative ly moderate as a share of GDP only 
increasing from 2.1% in 2013 to 2.3% in 2017. The primary reason for the increase in the 
value of the U.S. current account deficit between 2013 and 2017 has been the increase in the 
U.S. goods deficit from $701 billion in  2013 to $807 billion in 2017. Goods exports declined 
by $40 billion, while goods imports increased by $67 billion.  
 
Question 2  
Summary (7)  
2. Can United States explain as to how it maintains the balance between the Legislative and 
Executive decisions taken in respect of trade, so as to ensure minimum imbalance?  
 
RESPONSE : The U.S. Trade Representative has primary responsibility, with the advice of the 
interagency trade policy organization, for developing and coordinating the implementation of 
U.S. trade policy.  USTR builds its trade agenda through constant coordination with the U.S. 
Congress, particularly with its Committees of jurisdiction the H ouse Ways and Means 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.  
 
Question 3  
Summary (10)  
3. According to the secretariat report, most of the FTA's cover both goods and services except 
in the case of Israel. Can United States mention the reasons for the same?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States and Israel in Article 16 of the 1985 United States -Israel Free 
Trade Agreement agreed "to develop means for cooperation on trade in services pursuant to 
the provisions of a Declarat ion to be made by the Parties." The Declaratio n was signed on 
April 22, 1985.  
 
Question 4  
Summary (12)  
4. According to the secretariat report, there exists a committee on foreign investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) which oversees the national security implications of foreign investment. 
Is there any provision for an appeal from a decision rendered by CFIUS and if so, which is the 
appropriate authority where the appeal can be filed?  
 
RESPONSE : Pursuant to the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 
(FIRRMA), a civil action challenging an action or finding by CFIUS under section 721 of the 
Defense Production Act of 1950 (the statute that gives CFIUS its authority), as amended, may 
be brought only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. If 
the President  suspends or prohibits a covered transaction that threatens to impair the national 
security of the United States, such action is not subject to judicial review.  
 
Question 5  
Summary (23)  
5. Federal law specifically prohibits any government agency from engaging  in any standards -
related activity that creates unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States, and federal agencies are obliged to ensure that imported goods are treated no less 
favourably than like domestic products in the application  of standards -related activities. What 
penalties are levied upon if the following above -mentioned conditions are not met?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States maintains a robust system to support implementation of its 
trade obligations through strong central management of its regulatory regime, an effective WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  interagency trade policy mechanism, and public consultation. The central regulatory revi ew 
process administered by the Office of Management and Budget ensures international trade 
obligations are taken into account in the development of regulatory policies, including 
standards -related activities. Executive Order 12866 and Circular A -4 are the primary basis on 
which good regulatory practice (GRP) has been integrated into the Federal regulatory 
structure. These practices ensure openness, transparency, and accountability in the regulatory 
process, and, as a result, help ensure that the United Stat es fulfils key WTO obligations, 
including ensuring that imported goods are treated no less favo urably than like domestic 
products.  
 
Question 6  
Summary (27)  
6. Administration, as IP is considered critical for economic growth. The objectives are to reduce 
count erfeit and infringing goods in domestic and international supply chains and identify 
unjustified impediments to effective enforcement action against the financing, production, 
trafficking, or sale of counterfeit or infringing goods. How do the concerned au thorities ensure 
that there is no infringement causes both in the domestic as well as the international supply 
chain?  
 
RESPONSE : Please refer to the "Annual Intellectual Property Report to Congress" (March 
2018) by the United States Intellectual Property E nforcement Coordinator. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/2018Annual_IPEC_Report_to_Co
ngress.pdf  
 
Question 7  
Summary (33)  
7. Accordi ng to the secretariat report, Postal and courier services are open to competition, with 
the exception of services reserved for the United States Postal Service (USPS). Does United 
States plan to open Services reserved for the United States Postal Service ( USPS) to WTO 
members any time soon?  
 
RESPONSE : We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
Question 8  
Summary (39)  
 
8. The United States does not have a general e -commerce law; however, e -commerce is subject 
to a number of federal and state measur es that address various aspects of it. In case of a 
dispute between the federal and state measures, which law will prevail?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States Constitution provides, in general, that federal law addressing 
commerce among the states preempts state  law in conflict with federal law . 
 
Question 9  
1.2 Economic Developments (1.7)  
9. Despite solid economic growth, productivity growth has been weak and below the rates 
recorded during previous expansions. How does United States propose to tackle such 
imbalances?  
 
RESPONSE : A main goal of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) was to increase capital 
spending, and that goal appears to have been achieved. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
has been slowed by relatively low rates of capital per hour  worked. With a larger capital stock, 
this limit on TFP growth should be relaxed.  
 
Question 10  
1.2.1 Fiscal Policy (1.13)  
10. The implementation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 
and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, according to the secretariat report, would 
result in reduced revenues and increased outlays. How will this affect the employment 
opportunities at large in the United States?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 216 - 
 
  RESPONSE : The unemployment rate is 3.7 per cent  as of November 2018, holding at the 
lowest rate since 1969. Private sector payrolls continued to grow and average hourly earnings 
rose by 3.1 per cent  over the past year. These robust employment statistics all point to a 
healthy labo ur market.  
 
Question 1 1 
1.2.1 Fiscal Policy (1.14)  
11. Why is the U.S. government not considering enacting a law to contain the huge deficit, as is 
being followed in many developing countries, given that public debt is expected to rise to 96% 
of GDP by 2028?  
 
RESPONSE : We remind Me mbers that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
Question 12  
1.2.2 Monetary Policy (1.17)  
12. The Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy in the United States. Legislation specifies that, 
in conducting monetary policy, the Federal Reserve System and the Federal O pen Market 
Committee (FOMC) should seek "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long -term interest rates. In case of a dispute between the two, 
can United States shed light on as to how the dispute is to be solv ed? 
 
RESPONSE : In most circumstances, the objectives of monetary policy are in alignment.  For 
example, when unemployment is high, inflation tends to be too low, such that easier monetary 
policy assists in meeting both objectives.  On the occasion that the objectives are not in 
alignment, the FOMC judges the appropriate stance of policy based on their assessment of the 
overall economy, including the nature and persistence of the factors that have pushed the 
objectives in different directions.  
 
Question 13  
2.1 Trade and Investment Regimes – General Framework (2.1)  
13. According to the secretariat report, Congress has legislative and oversight authority over trade 
policy, and works with the Executive Branch to shape and implement trade agreements. 
Generally, multip le Executive Branch agencies are involved in developing and implementing 
trade policy, therefore interagency coordination is an important part of the process. Can United 
States shed light on the branch agencies involved in this process?  
 
RESPONSE : The Trad e Policy Review Group (TPRG) and the Trade Policy Staff Committee 
(TPSC), both administered and chaired by USTR, are the subcabinet interagency trade policy 
coordination groups that are central to the trade policy process. The member agencies of the 
TPSC a nd the TPRG are the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, State, Treasury, 
Labor, Justice, Defense, Interior, Transportation, Energy, Health and Human Services, and 
Homeland Security; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Office of Management and 
Budget; the Council of Economic Advisers; the Council on Environmental Quality; the U.S. 
Agency for International Development; the Small Business Administration; the National 
Economic Council, and the National Security Council as well as US TR itself. The U. S. 
International Trade Commission is a non -voting member of the TPSC and an observer at TPRG 
meetings. Representatives of other agencies also may be invited to attend meetings 
depending on the specific issues discussed.  
 
Question 14  
2.1 Trade and Investmen t Regimes – General Framework (2.2)  
14. It has been mentioned as per the secretariat report, that in case of any agreement requiring 
change in statutory law, the same has to be implemented only by a legislation enacted by 
Congress. Can such implementation be a lso done qua a delegated legislation?  
 
RESPONSE : If implementation of an agreement requires changes to statutory law, then those 
changes must be made through legislation enacted by Congress.  If the implementation of an 
agreement falls within the President' s own Constitutional authority or within authority 
delegated to the President by Congress, a statutory change would be unnecessary.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 15  
2.2.1 Trade Policy Objectives (2.6)  
15. As per the secretariat report, the trade policy agenda of the year 2018, is driven to open 
foreign markets, obtain more efficient global markets and fairer treatment for American 
workers. Does this agenda apply to all members of the WTO or are country specific?  
 
RESPONSE : The President's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda indicated that the Trump 
Administration would focus on five major priorities: (1) adopting trade policies that support 
our national security policy; (2) strengthening the U.S. economy; (3) negotiating better trade 
deals that work for all Americans; (4) enforcing U.S. tra de laws and U.S. rights under existing 
trade agreements; and, (5) reforming the multilateral trading system. These objectives apply 
with respect to the entirety of U.S. international trade.  
 
Question 16  
2.2.1 Trade Policy Objectives (2.7)  
16. As per the secretariat report, the 2018 Agenda points to its current negotiations to improve 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S. -Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS), as well as its plans for negotiating a trade agreement with the Un ited Kingdom after 
it leaves the European Union. What are the measures that the United Sates government is 
taking so as to achieve these objectives?  
 
RESPONSE : Given that the TPR is retrospective, w e will respond with regard to these negotiating 
objective s during the timeframe of the review.  
 
• The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the United States – Mexico – Canada 
Agreement on Nov. 30, 2018. Per the procedures of the Transparency Mechanism for 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTA -TM), found in WT/L/671, the United States and the 
other parties to the USMCA will notify the agreement to the WTO for transparency 
purposes no later than directly following the parties' ratification of the agreement.  We 
look forward to keeping Members informed, as appropriate.  
• On September 24, the United States and Korea signed the Protocol amending the United 
States – Korea Free Trade Agreement.  
• On October 16, the United States Trade Representative notified Congress under the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accounta bility Act of the President's intent 
to begin negotiations with the UK on a new bilateral trade agreement.  
 
Questions 17 -18 
2.2.1 Trade Policy Objectives (2.9)  
17. Could the US clarify what is its understanding of "reciprocal market access"?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States seeks to work with those Members who are ready and able to 
negotiate free, fair, and reciprocal agreements, with the expectation that participants to these 
agreements will contribute commensurate with their status in the global economy.  
 
18. Would the US agree that reduction in agriculture domestic support is an essential aspect of 
open market?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States has always recognized "the long -term objective of substantial 
progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fu ndamental reform" set out in 
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture as a basic objective of any agriculture negotiations. 
This includes the reduction in barriers to trade such as lowering of tariffs and the reduction in 
use of trade -distorting forms of  domestic support.  
 
Question 19  
2.3.1 WTO (2.20)  
19. According to the secretariat report, the Trade Policy Agenda notes that the United States has 
long been concerned that the WTO is not operating as the contracting parties envisioned. How 
does United States propose to solve this issue?  
 
RESPONSE : As discussed in the U.S. Government Report, the United States is drawing 
Members' attention to these concerns, and we intend to work with like -minded countries to 
address them. The United States was the first Member to put forward a concrete proposal for WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  WTO reform, in November 2017, with its proposal aimed at improving Members' compliance 
with their notification obligations. In November 2018, Argentina, Australia, Chinese Taipei, 
Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, and the Un ited States presented an updated transparency and 
notification proposal for consideration in the WTO Council on Trade in Goods. The United States 
stands ready to work with Members to advance this proposal and does not preclude the 
possibility of tabling ot her proposals on WTO reform in the future.  
 
Question 20  
2.3.2.1 Reciprocal agreements (2.25)  
20. It has been mentioned that United States is renegotiating NAFTA and through renegotiation, 
the administration has two principle objectives being:  
• to modernize th e Agreement, including through improved provisions to protect intellectual 
property and facilitate efficient cross -border trade, among other updates, and through new 
provisions on digital trade  
• to rebalance NAFTA with a view to reducing the U.S. trade d eficit with the NAFTA countries  
 
What are the measures that the United Sates government is taking so as to achieve these 
objectives?  
 
RESPONSE : The final text of the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA) is 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/free -trade -agreements/united -states -
mexico -canada -agreement/agreement -between . Per the procedures of the Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements (RTA -TM), found in WT/L/671, the United States 
and the other parties to the USMCA will notify the agreement to the WTO for transparency 
purposes no later than directly following the parties' ratification of the agreemen t. We look 
forward to keeping Members informed, as appropriate.  
 
Question 21  
2.3.2.1 Reciprocal agreements (2.27)  
21. Why were the TTIP negotiations paused, and what is the future course of action there?  
 
RESPONSE : On July 25, 2018, President Trump and European Commission President Juncker 
launched a new phase in the relationship between the United  States and the European Union. 
On October 16, the United States Trade Representative notified Congress that the President 
intends to initiate negotiations on a trade agreement with the EU.   
 
Question 22  
2.3.2.2.1 GSP (2.29)  
22. To qualify for GSP, a beneficiary country must meet mandatory GSP eligibility criteria 
established by Congress, including respecting arbitral awards, combating child labour, 
respecting inter nationally -recognized worker rights, providing adequate and effective 
intellectual property protection, and providing the United States with equitable and reasonable 
market access. Does this benefit apply to all LDC's and Developing Countries of the WTO or  
are country specific?  
 
RESPONSE : All GSP beneficiary countries  need to meet the eligibility criteria established by 
Congress.  
 
Question 23  
2.3.2.2.1 GSP (2.32)  
23. The 2018 Trade Policy Agenda placed new emphasis on enforcement of the GSP eligibility 
criteria, to ensure that all countries receiving GSP benefits are meeting the criteria established 
by Congress. What are the measures that the United Sates government is  taking so as to 
ensure that the relevant criteria are met?  
 
RESPONSE : In October 2017, USTR established a triennial assessment process to examine 
each GSP beneficiary country's compliance with the statutory eligibility criteria. If the 
assessment of a ben eficiary country raises concerns regarding the country's compliance with 
an eligibility criterion, the Administration may self -initiate a full country practice review of that 
country's continued eligibility for GSP.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 24  
2.4 Investment Regime (2.4 2) 
24. What are the sector -specific limitations being talked about here?  
 
RESPONSE : The OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements summarizes U.S. 
limitations on FDI.  See: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment -policy/Code -capital -
movements -EN.pdf . 
 
Question 25  
2.4 Investment Regime (2.44)  
25. What is the list of countries with which U.S. has signed BITs?  
 
RESPONSE : See: https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm . 
 
Question 26  
2.4 Investment Regime (2.47)  
26. The government of United States is requested to provide clarifications regarding the United 
States Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) and its impact on 
trade:  
• The details of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) and 
the changes it has introduced in the review process of the CFIUS.  
• Whether the provis ions of this Act are consistent with US's commitments at the WTO given 
the fact that they appear to accord significant discretion to the CFIUS and also prescribe 
mandatory filing with penalties for non -compliance.  
• Does the Act increase uncertainty for fore ign investors given the discretion available and the 
complexity of the modified review process?  
 
RESPONSE : Summaries of FIRRMA's key provisions and certain changes to the CFIUS review 
process are available on the CFIUS Web page at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -
issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius. 
FIRRMA is consistent with the  United States' WTO obligations and does not increase 
uncertainty for foreign investors. Like the prior CFIUS legislation, FIRRMA establishes clear 
timelines for reviews and investigations. CFIUS will continue to develop, seek public input on, 
and publish regulations and associated guidance to implement FIRRMA.  
 
Question 27  
3.1.1.3 Other trade facilitation measures (3.9)  
27. Have any changes/amendments been made to the Customs Trade Partnership Agreement 
against Terrorism after the codification of the same in the year 2006?  
 
RESPONSE : C-TPAT has evolved over the past 12 years. CBP has added additional business 
entity types; updated criteria for participation and for vetting procedures; increased staff 
training; and updated and increased outreach to the private sector. These changes are part 
of meeting the ever changing threats to the supply chain security environment.  
 
Question 28  
3.1.1.3 Other trade facilitation measures (3.16)  
28. As per the secretariat report, upon a request made, the CBP issues binding advance rulings 
on how it will trea t a prospective import or a carrier transaction. What is the time limit within 
which such a request has to be responded upon?  
 
RESPONSE : Most advance rulings on tariff classification are issued by the National Commodity 
Specialist Division (NCSD), a group  of CBP employees who specialize in and have expertise on 
the tariff classification of commodities. In general, classification ruling requests considered by 
the NCSD are those that may be issued within 30 days of receipt of the ruling request.  
 
Matters th at require more time due to the number or complexity of the issues or are 
accompanied by requests for confidential treatment of information provided, are dealt with by 
Regulations and Rulings attorney -advisors at CBP Headquarters.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 29  
3.1.1.4 Fo reign Trade Zones (3.19)  
29. What is the exact purpose of establishing FTZs?  
 
RESPONSE : The Foreign -Trade Zones Act of 1934 established the FTZ program to expedite 
and encourage international trade. The customs procedures available through the FTZ 
program prov ide logistical or duty savings to companies importing merchandise for 
consumption in the United States or for re -export.  
 
Question 30  
3.1.1.5 Bonded warehouses (3.23)  
30. To establish a bonded warehouse, the application for the establishment shall be directed 
towards the CBP port director. What is the remedy available in case such an application is 
rejected and whether on rejection of the above -mentioned application, the reasons are 
provided for?  
 
RESPONSE : CBP will provide the grounds for denial if an applicat ion to establish a bonded 
warehouse is denied.  If denied, a new application for a bonded warehouse in the same location 
may be submitted.  
 
Question 31  
3.1.3.2 Tariff rate quotas (3.37)  
31. Is there a proposed timeline to phase out TRQs, in line with the idea o f 'tariffication of trade'?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States remains actively engaged in WTO agriculture negotiations and 
looks forward to discussions on market access, including TRQs.  
 
Question 32  
3.1.4.2 Excise taxes (3.42)  
32. As per the secretariat report, exc ise taxes may be levied at the federal, state local or municipal 
level and some products are taxed at more than one level. Doesn't this practise lead to double 
taxation and if so, how does the Government of United States propose to tackle the same?  
 
RESPON SE: For certain goods, such as motor fuels and tobacco, excise taxes may be imposed 
at both the federal level and  also the state or local level. These taxes are only imposed once 
at any level, therefore avoiding issues associated with cascading taxes or turnover taxes.  
 
Questions 33 -35 
3.1.5.1 Prohibitions and restrictions (3.47)  
33. Kindly clarify the reporting requirements for domestic fisheries and aquaculture. India is 
particularly concerned with sophisticated and expensive approval requirements imposed o n 
seafood exported from India's domestic market, which do not seem to cover domestic capture 
fisheries and aquaculture.  
 
RESPONSE : All of the species covered by the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) are 
managed by the federal government, the applica ble state government, or both. Accordingly, 
the comparable reporting and recordkeeping requirements for such species caught 
domestically can be found in those federal and state regulatio ns applicable to that species. In 
the United States, all federal and s tate regulations are published in the applicable official 
journals and are available online. If India has specific questions about how the United States 
regulates particular species covered by SIMP, India should contact NOAA Fisheries.  
 
34. How is this not a violation of the principle of National Treatment?  
 
RESPONSE : Domestically produced fish are subject to comparable record keeping 
requirements to combat seafood fraud and IUU fishing.  
 
35. What is the policy objective behind the requirement of obtaining an IFTP  and whether it is an 
SPS/TBT measure?  
 
RESPONSE : SIMP is not a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement nor 
is it a measure that has an objective that falls within the SPS Agreement (such as the WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  protection of human health). The objecti ve of SIMP is to combat illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing and seafood fraud. As such, SIMP does not fall within the scope of 
the TBT or SPS Agreements or the work of the TBT or SPS committees.  
 
Question 36  
3.1.6.1.1.2 AD, CVD, and Safeguar d Measures – Administrative procedures (3.66)  
36. It has been provided as per the secretariat report, that AD and CVD investigations maybe 
initiated at the request of either party or suo moto  by the USDCO. What is the penalty in a 
case where it is found out th at the investigation initiated by the petitioners is false, frivolous 
and has no evidentiary or legal backing?  
 
RESPONSE : Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are initiated by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, typically in response to petition s filed by the U.S. industry. Each 
petition must meet the required statutory criteria identified in U.S. law in order for an 
investigation to be initiated; thus the U.S. Department of Commerce will not initiate an 
investigation if the petition is found to be false, frivolous, or without an evidentiary or legal 
backing.  
 
Question 37  
3.1.6.1.1.3 AD, CVD, and Safeguard Measures – Suspension agreements (3.71)  
37. How can the interested parties request the administrative reviews of AD and CVD orders? 
Does the reques t have to be under the Right to Information?  
 
RESPONSE : The requirements for an interested party to request an administrative review can 
be found at 19 C.F.R. section 351.213(b).  
 
Question 38  
3.1.6.1.1.5 AD, CVD, and Safeguard Measures – Sunset reviews (3. 73) 
38. Last line of this paragraph mentions that "There are no sunset reviews for AD orders on 
products from non -WTO Members." Can the US in dicate the reason for the same?  
 
RESPONSE : The provisions relating to the conduct of a sunset review of an antidumping 
measure are contained in Article 11 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and are therefore not applicable to measure s 
on exports from a non -Member country.  
 
Questions 39 -40 
3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.75)  
39. Out of the total number of anti -dumping measures in force during 2015 -2017, could the US 
provide year -wise details of the percentage of measures, which were in force for a period 
exceeding 5 years?  
 
RESPONSE : Information regarding the duration of specific AD/CVD orders can be found at 
https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy.htm  under "Research Tools."  
 
40. Out of the total nu mber of CVD measures in force during 2015 -2017, could the US provide 
year-wise details of the percentage of measures, which were in force for a period exceeding 
5 years?  
 
RESPONSE : See response to Question 39.  
 
Question 41  
3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures ( 3.77)  
41. The United States imposed AD/CVD duties on certain steel products from India several years 
before (Stainless Steel Bar in 1995, Stainless Steel Wire Rod in 1993 and Welded Carbon Steel 
Pipe & Tube in 1986). They continue to be in force even today. Pu rsuant to imposition of 
AD/CVD, imports of those products have declined drastically or have stopped completely. Even 
when imports were nil, duties have been continued. For instance, Stainless Steel Bar Sunset 
Review concluded in 2017. Please explain the ra tionale behind the policy of the United States 
under which protective duties are continued on one pretext or another even when the imports 
are nil or significantly low. Whether the United States have any policy for terminating 
protective measures that have  been in force for far too long?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE : Interested parties wishing to have antidumping measures terminated must follow 
the requirements under U.S. law, and participate in the relevant sunset reviews pertaining to 
the measure. The United States conducts its sunset review proceedings consistent with the 
provisions of Article 11 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. The purpose of those proceedings is to allow the 
administering authorities to ex amine whether dumping and injury would be likely to continue 
or recur if the measures were removed. Given that the U.S. system is evidence -based, 
participation by interested parties is helpful both in terms of the information that may be 
provided, and the arguments made by interested parties. Requirements for participation in 
sunset reviews can be found at 19 C.F.R. section 351.218 and 19 C.F.R. Part 207, Subpart F.  
 
Question 42  
3.1.6.1.3 Countervailing measures (3.84)  
42. United States has determined a counter vailing duty rate of 541.15% on imports of "Large 
Diameter Welded Pipes" from India (83 FR 56819). Please provide the details of "facts 
available" based on which the United S tates determined the said rate.  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative 
Determination of the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Large Diameter Welded Pipe from 
India, dated November 14, 2018, which can be accessed directly at:  http://enforc  
ement.trade.gov/frn/ . 
 
Questions 43-49 
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.100 -3.120)  
43. Please explain the objectives of Section 232 of Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 USC 1862) 
and the measures that may be imposed under Section 232.  
 
RESPONSE : The objective of Section 232 of the Trade Ex pansion Act of 1962, as amended, 
is to protect the national security of the United States. We refer India to the reports of the 
Department of Commerce on its investigations conducted under Section 232, which provide 
information on the applicable legislativ e framework.  
 
44. Please also explain the facts or the situation that indicated that imports could pose a threat to 
"national security" before the United States decided to conduct an investigation under Section 
232. 
 
RESPONSE : This question concerns issues tha t are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes ("DSU"). We refer India to the statements of the United States at the 29 October 
2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
45. How does the US determine whether a case demands the imposition of safeguard measures 
or measures under section 232?  
 
RESPONSE : This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU . We refer India to the statements  of the United States at the 
29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
46. Please explain the procedure followed by the United States for imposing additional duties 
under Section 232.  
 
RESP ONSE : This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. We refer India to the reports of the Department of Commerce on 
its investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 
amended.  
 
47. Did the United States receive any representation or application from the steel, aluminium or 
defense industries before it decided to invoke and conduct an investigation under Section 232?  
 
RESPONSE : This question concerns issues that are the subje ct of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. We refer India to the reports of the Department of Commerce on WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  its investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 
amended.  
 
48. The relevant Proclamations stated that relief  from additional duties may be provided for any 
steel article determined not to be produced in the United States in a sufficient and reasonably 
available amount or of a satisfactory quality. What are the criteria for determining that an 
article is not prod uced in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory 
quality?  
 
RESPONSE : Information about the exclusion process is available at the website of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce ( https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations ) and 
set forth in revised product exclusion rules that went into effect on September 11, 2018.  
 
49. Please provide details of exclus ion requests accepted by the United States. Please provide 
whether the exclusion requests were product -specific or country specific or both?  
 
RESPONSE : Exclusions granted by the Department of Commerce are for specific quantities 
of product from specific co mpanies or suppliers located in specific countries, as identified by 
individual requesters in their exclusion requests. Information about the exclusion process, 
including instructions for accessing individual exclusion requests, are available 
at: https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations . 
 
Questions 50 -51 
3.1.7.1  Section 232 investigations (3.100 -3.120)  
In the case of product specific exclusions:  
 
50. Please provide details of production in the United States of those products that are considered 
to be not in sufficient and reasonably available amount or not of a satisfactory quality.  
 
RESPONSE : Information regarding individual product exclusion requests , including 
objections, rebuttals, and surrebuttals, are accessible through links provided at: https://www. 
commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations . 
 
51. Please confirm that all such exclusions are applicable to imports from all WTO Members.  
 
RESPONSE : Exclusions granted by the Department of Commerce are for specific quantities 
of product from specific companies or suppliers located in countries, as identified by individual 
requesters in their exclusion requests.  
 
Questions 52 -54 
3.1.7.1 Sect ion 232 investigations (3.100 -3.120)  
 In the case of country specific exclusions,  
52. Please explain what is the relevant provision that enables the United States to grant such 
exclusions?  
 
RESPONSE : Country exemptions from the tariffs are effectuated by the President through 
proclamation, based on authority provided to the President under Section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.  
 
53. Please explain what are the criteria used to determi ne which country shall be granted 
exclusions? Whether such criteria was applied in a non -discriminatory manner to all Members 
that export the products in question to the United States?  
 
RESPONSE : The President excluded countries from the tariffs he imposed  under Section 232 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, based on alternative means arrived at 
between the United States and those countries to address the threatened impairment to U.S. 
national security posed by imports from those countries.  
 
54. Please provide details of the products that are produced by the beneficiaries of the exclusion 
requests.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE : Information regarding individual product exclusion requests is accessible through 
links provided at https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations . 
 
Questions 55 -63 
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations (3.100 -3.120)  
55. The US Secretary of Defense released a memorandum addressed t o the Secretary of 
Commerce in response to the DOC Reports. The memorandum states that the "DOD does not 
believe that the findings in the reports impact the ability of DOD programs to acquire the steel 
or aluminium necessary to meet national defense requir ements". Please explain whether this 
memorandum was taken into account when deciding whether to take the import restrictions 
at issue under Section 232. If this memorandum was taken into account, please explain how 
the United States reconciles the recommen dations of the Department of Defense with its 
decision to apply additional tariffs on steel and aluminium. If this memorandum was not taken 
into account, please explain why.  
 
RESPONSE : This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlemen t 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
56. The U.S. Department of Commerce stated in its steel report and aluminium report that, based 
on the analysis of market situations and calculations with data models, it is believed that the 
purpose of the measures could be achie ved through imposition of a 24 per cent  tariff on steel 
products and a 7.7 per cent  tariff on aluminium products. The US finally imposed tariff 
measures of 25 per cent  on steel products and 10 per cent  on aluminium products. Please 
explain the reasons for the departure from the recommendations of the Department of 
Commerce and provide a detailed analysis or calculation to support these changes.  
 
RESPONSE : This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
57. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862), the Secretary of 
Commerce is granted authority to conduct investigations to determine the effects of imports 
of any article on the national security of the United States. Is the authorit y granted to the 
secretary of Commerce a legislative authority or an executive authority?  
 
RESPONSE : The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, is an act of the United States 
Congress.  
 
58. Investigations under Section 232 may be initiated based on an application from an interested 
party, on a request from the head of any department or agency, or may be self -initiated by 
the Secretary of Commerce. Does a summons need to be issued to the defen dant before the 
conduct of such an investigation?  
 
RESPONSE : We refer India to the reports of the Department of Commerce on its 
investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 
which provide information on the legi slative framework and investigation process. See: 
https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations .  
 
59. The WTO Secretariat report mentions that a request for an investigation to be undertaken 
under section 232 must be made in writing. Does such a request have to be exclusively in 
English, or another language is also acceptable?  
 
RESPONSE : Requests for investigation must be in English.  
 
60. How exactly does the issue of global exces s capacity contribute to the threatened impairment 
of national security? Is there a detailed study supported by data that establishes a nexus 
between these two?  
 
RESPONSE : This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings  under the DSU. We refer India to the reports of the Department of Commerce on 
its investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 
amended, and to the statements of the United State s at the 29 October 2018 and 
21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  61. Can the US explain how its commitment to the values of free trade is consistent with the 
selective and unilateral exemption of countries from the additional tariffs imposed pursuant 
to action under Section 232?  What is the legal basis, under WTO rules, to grant such selective 
exemption to these countries? Does this not violate the MFN principle, which is a cornerstone 
of the rules -based trading system?  
 
RESPONSE : This question concerns issues that are the subjec t of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. Please refer to information provided by the United States at the 
23 March 2018 meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, and the statements of the United 
States at the 29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018  meetings of the Dispute Settlement 
Body.  
 
62. Can the United States clarify how it reconciles the USDOC findings that aluminium is essential 
to U.S. national security with the imposition of additional tariff on certain aluminium products?  
 
RESPONSE : This ques tion concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. We refer India to the reports of the Department of Commerce on 
its investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 
amended, and to the statements of the United States at the 29 October 2018 and 21 
November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
63. Nine WTO Members have challenged the US' section 232 measures on steel and aluminium. 
One of the key issues that will be adjudicated i n the course of these disputes is the scope and 
applicability of the 'national security' exception under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. Is the US 
contemplating launching new section 232 measures on autos, even as their previous section 
232 measures are subj ect to a challenge within the WTO dispute settlement system?  
 
RESPONSE : On May 23, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to 
determine the effects on the national security of imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, 
vans and light trucks, and automotive parts under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Ac t of 
1962, as amended. According to statute, an investigation of this type must be completed 
within 270 days of its initiation. As part of its investigation, on May 30, 2018, the Department 
of Commerce issued a Federal Register Notice inviting written comm ents, including data, 
analyses, or information pertinent to this investigation, and announcing the public hearings. 
The comment period was open until June 22, 2018 and the Department of Commerce held a 
public hearing as part of its investigation on July 19 .  
 
Question 64  
3.1.7.1 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (3.121)  
64. The USTR when under the Trade Act of 1974, receives a petition to initiate an investigation, 
it must determine, within 45 days, whether to initiate an investigation, based on 
considerations of the effectiveness of an action under Section 301 in addressing the act, policy 
or practice involved. In case, the petition is struck down by the USTR, then can the aggrieved 
party appeal against the decision of the USTR and if yes, which will serve as the Appellate 
Body for the same?  
 
RESPONSE : The 301 statute does n ot establish an ad ministrative appeal mechanism.  
 
Question 65  
3.1.7.1 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (3.124)  
65. What are the qualifications that are necessary for an individual to be elected as a Chairman 
of the subordinate body of the Trade Policy Staf f Committee (TPSC) assisting USTR?  
 
RESPONSE : The 301 statute does not set out specific qualifications for various persons 
involved in the Section 301 process.  
 
Question 66  
3.1.7.2.2 Section 301 determinations (3.129)  
66. Though Section 306 of the Trade Act o f 1974 mandates that USTR monitor the implementation 
of each measure taken and agreement entered resulting from a Section 301 investigation or 
from a dispute settlement proceeding under a trade agreement or the WTO, how does the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Government of United States  ensure that such monitoring is being done without any flaw 
attached to it?  
 
RESPONSE : The 301 statute does not prescribe the modalities by which the UST R will monitor 
implementation.  
 
Questions 67 -68 
3.1.7.2.3 Section 301 cases – China technology transfer  regime (3.134)  
67. How does the US justify its action under Section 301 against China, despite the Statement of 
Administrative Action Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (SAA), wherein the 
US had stated that it will base any section 301 determination only on a panel or Appellate 
Body findings adopted by the DSB?  
 
RESPONSE : If the USTR determines that a matter covered in a Section 301 investigation 
involves a trade agreement, and if the agreement includes formal dispute settlement 
procedur es, USTR may pursue the investigation through consultations and dispute settle ment 
under the trade agreement. In situations where the USTR determines that a matter is not 
covered by a trade agreement, the USTR will pursue the investigation without recourse  to a 
dispute settlement proceeding.  
 
68. Could the US explain how its commitment to the values of free trade and rules of international 
trade of the WTO are consistent with it taking action under Section 301, despite explicit 
prohibition on unilateral trade a ction Article 23 of the DSU?  
 
RESPONSE : The premise of this question is incorrect; neither the terms "prohibit" nor 
"unilateral action" are contained in Article 23 of the DSU. The United States appreciates, 
however, India's recognition that the United Stat es is committed to the values of free and fair 
international trade, and to Members' compliance with the rule s set out in the WTO Agreement.  
 
Question 69  
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (3.143)  
69. The BIS maintains a Denied Persons List comprising persons and entities denied export 
privileges and with whom any dealings are prohibited; an Unverified List, a list of end -users 
the BIS has been unable to verify in prior transactions; and an Entity List, i.e. parties whose 
presence in a transa ction may trigger a supplementary licence requirement. How often this 
list is updated and complied with?  
 
RESPONSE : BIS regularly updates the Denied Persons, Unverified, and Entity Lists with 
additions or removals. Failure to adhere to Export Administratio n Regulations (EAR) licensing 
requirements is a violation of the EAR and could result in criminal or civil penalties, so BIS 
recommends that exporters screen the parties to transactions against these lists as a standard 
part of pre -transaction due diligenc e activities.  
 
Questions 70 -72 
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (Table 3.11)  
70. Could the US explain the rationale behind applying export controls on medical devices?  
 
RESPONSE : In most cases, medical devices are not listed on the Commerce Control List and 
those items would not require a license for export to most destinations. However, in situations 
where a medical device could contribute to an end use contrary to U.S. national security and 
foreign policy goals, it would be control led for that reason.  
 
71. What objectives are sought to be achieved through these export controls?  
 
RESPONSE : The objective is to prevent U.S. items and technology from contributing to the 
proliferation of programs that threaten U.S. national security interests, such as the 
proliferation of WMD and related delivery systems, and to implement U.S. foreign policy.  
 
72. Why, in the view if the US, the same objectives cannot be achieved through a trade measure 
that is less trade restrictive?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE : Export p rohibitions, restrictions, and licensing do not pose a barrier to trade with 
India. As a Major Defence Partner, India enjoys favourable licensing policies. Of the 
$25.7  billion in U.S. exports to India in 2017, only 1.8% were subject to a BIS license 
requirement;  and of that 1.8% only  0.5% were exported under a BIS license.  
 
Question 73  
3.2.4 Export support and promotion (3.148)  
73. Is there a mandate as to how many times the President's Export council must meet in a year?  
 
RESPONSE : The PEC Charter calls for i t to meet at least twice per year.  
 
Questions 74 -77 
3.2.5.1 The Export -Import Bank (EXIM) (3.152)  
74. Since the credit and country risks assumed by the US EX -IM are not picked up by commercial 
lenders and insurers, they are likely to have greater default proba bility. In the last three years, 
how much such defaults occurred on the lending or guarantee extended by the US EX -IM? 
 
RESPONSE : It is n ot necessarily true that there is automatically a greater default probability; 
other factors that are independent of th e underlying risk, such as capacity constraints, can 
affect the willingness of a commercial lender/insurer to do a transaction. EXIM is required by 
its Charter to provide a quarterly report to Congress which catalogues the default rate for 
EXIM's financing s. The information is publically available  here:  https://www.exim.gov/who -
we-serve/congressional -and-government -stakeholders/f acts-about -exim/default -rate-
reports . 
 
75. Whether the losses incurred by US EX -IM on account of defaults are underwritten by US 
Government or any other Government Agency?  
 
RESPONSE : EXIM is mandated by its Charter to only support transactions for which there is 
a "reasonable assurance of repayment." Additionally, for each transaction that EXIM supports, 
it charges a premium commensurate with the risk that it assumes. EXIM is solely r esponsible 
for all of its underwriting; no other Government Agency underwrites EXIM transactions.  EXIM 
sets aside loan loss reserves from the premiums it charges for its transactions.  All claims are 
paid out of these loan loss reserves.  
 
76. If so, how much (i n value terms) of such losses were underwritten in the last three years, and 
how much it accounts (per cent terms) for in the total business of US EX -IM? 
 
RESPONSE : Not applicable.  
 
77. If not, how much (in value terms) of such losses were absorbed by US EX -IM on its looks in 
the last three years, and how much it accounts (per cent terms) for in the total profit of US 
EX-IM? 
 
RESPONSE : For transactions underwritten in FY 2016, FY 2017, and FY 2018, total claims 
paid have total led $4 million on $11. 8 billion underwritten (0.03%). EXIM has generated $551 
million in profit (after setting aside loan loss reserves) since FY 2016.  
 
Question 78  
3.2.5.1 The Export -Import Bank (EXIM) (3.154)  
78. As mentioned in the secretariat report, EXIM Bank is independent fr om the Government in 
day-to-day operations but its lending authority is established by Congress. So is it safe to 
presume that EXIM Bank is government controlled?  
 
RESPONSE : EXIM is an independent agency of the United States government. EXIM is 
controlled by its Board which includes the EXIM Chairman, Vice Chairman and three other 
members. All board members are nominated by the President of the United States and 
confirmed by Congress.  
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Questions 79 -84 
3.2.5.1 The Export -Import Bank (EXIM) (3.152 -3.156)  
79. In the last three years, how much of usage of funds from Tied Aid were combined with other 
financing or guarantee programme?  
 
RESPONSE : EXIM has not used its Tied Aid Credit Program and Fund in the last three years.  
 
80. Whether such combining the Tied Aid Funds with other financing and guarantee programmes, 
of US EX -IM or other private entities are in compliance to the OECD Agreement on Tied Aid?  
 
RESPONSE : EXIM has not authorized use of its Tied Aid Credit Program and Fu nd since 2011. 
EXIM does not initiate the use of tied aid. All of EXIM's medium and long -term activity is in 
full compliance with the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, including 
the rules governing the use of tied aid.  
 
81. When combinin g the Tied Aid Funds with other financing and guarantee programmes, what 
will be the grant element, and whether the grant element matches with the grant elements of 
IMF or OECD?  
 
RESPONSE : Per the rules governing the use of tied aid in the OECD Arrangement  on Officially 
Supported Export Credits, any use of EXIM's Tied Aid Credit Program and Fund would have a 
concessionality level of at least 35% (or, in the case of Least Developed Countries, 50%). If 
EXIM were to authorize tied aid to a public obligor in a country subject to IMF debt limits 
conditionality requiring concessional financing, any tied aid authorized by EXIM would also 
meet the IMF minimum concessionality requirements.  
 
82. If there is no fiscal year limitation of USD 100 million, whether higher loss es can also be borne 
by the Secretary Treasury and compensated to the US EX -IM through other means (such as 
recapitalization, grant etc)  
 
RESPONSE : We interpret this question as referring to a situation in which EXIM's claims would 
potentially exceed its r eserves. On that basis, EXIM's guarantees and insurance are backed 
with the Full Faith a nd Credit of the United States. If EXIM were to face claims which exceeded 
EXIM's reserves, EXIM could continue to pay.  
 
83. While we understand that on July 01, 2015 the a uthorisation to US EX -IM lapsed, the reduction 
in subsidies since FY 2015 is well explained. Kindly provide the data on appropriation warrant 
provided by the US Treasury every year in FY 2012, 2013 and 2014.  
 
RESPONSE : Like most federal agencies, Congress allocates the funds available to EXIM to 
support its authorized activities through the annual appropriations process. EXIM is self -
sustaining and, as such, EXIM receives what is known as a "net -zero" appropriation from 
Congress.   
 
The FY 2012, FY 2013, and  FY 2014 Appropriations Acts for EXIM contained the following 
language: "Receipts collected pursuant to the Export -Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, 
and the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, as amended, in an amount not to exceed the 
amount appropriate d herein, shall be credited as offsetting collections to this account: 
Provided , That the sums herein appropriated from the General Fund shall be reduced on a 
dollar -for-dollar basis by such offsetting collections so as to result in a final fiscal year 
appropriation from the General Fund estimated at $0."  
 
This means that while Congress sets the level of EXIM's administrative expenses, EXIM covers 
all of its operation and program costs directly through fees and interest collected from its 
customers. This re sults in a net $0 appropriation. In summary:  
 
FY 2012  
Administrative Expenses: $89.9 million  
FY 2012 Net Appropriation: $0  
FY 2013  
Administrative Expenses: $89.9 million  
FY 2013 Net Appropriation: $0  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  FY 2014  
Administrative Expenses: $105.0 million  
FY 2014  Renovation Expenses: $10.5 million  
FY 2014 Net Appropriation: $0  
 
84. Whether such appropriation warrant provided by the US Treasury is compatible with ASCM 
and OECD Guidelines on Export Credit?  
 
RESPONSE : EXIM is not provided a subsidy from U.S. Treasury nor does EXIM provide a 
subsidy to foreign buyers.  
 
At the start of the fiscal year, the U.S. Treasury provides EXIM with an appropriation warrant 
for program costs as well as administrative expenses. The amount of the warrant is established 
by spending limits set by Congress. Fees collected during the year that are in excess of 
expected losses (offsetting collections) are retained by EXIM Bank and used to repay the 
warrant received at the start of the year . The result is a net appropriation of zero. Therefore, 
the Bank is self -financing for budgetary purposes.  
 
EXIM's programs comply with the WTO ASCM and OECD Arrangement on Export Credits.  
EXIM is mandated by its Charter to only support transactions for which there is a "reasonable 
assurance of repayment". Additionally, for each transaction that EXIM supports, it charges a 
premium commensurate with the risk that it assumes. As such, each year EXIM collects 
sufficient premium income to offset its operating  costs and losses due to claims paid in the 
event of defaults —the result is that each year EXIM forwards profits to the U.S. Treasury to 
assist with deficit reduction.  
 
Questions 85 -89 
3.2.5.2 SBA export loan programmes (3.157)  
85. Can the US provide Annual details of top five sectors, which provide SBA assistance for the 
past three years?  
 
RESPONSE : SBA does not publish  a breakdown of industry usage of SBA's export loan 
programs.  However, the small businesses that SBA supports are found in a wide variety of 
different industries in the United States.  
 
86. Whether the Ex -Im Bank lending is heavily concentrated in one sector?  
 
RESPONSE : No; EXIM's portfolio of activity spans across a variety of industries including: 
transportation, aerospace, power (both renewable and non -renewable), manufacturing 
equipment, and agricultural equipment.  
 
87. Does the future conferment of benefits depend directly/indirectly on export performance of 
such units?  
 
RESPONSE : SBA's export loan programs are loan guarantee scheme s focused on fil ling the 
market gaps in international trade fin ance for U.S. small businesses.  
 
88. What are the qualifying criteria for a business entity  to be eligible for such loans/ grants under 
STEP?  
 
RESPONSE : A business must meet SBA's definiti on of a small business con cern. In addition, 
the business must have sufficient resources in order to expand into new markets.  
 
89. Whether US provides federal budget support to Exim Bank for its operations?  
 
RESPONSE : See response to question 83.  
 
Question 90  
3.2.5.2 SBA export loan programmes (3.158)  
90. Whether SBA guarantees the loans beyond USD 5 million? If so, whether a fee is charged, and 
who pays the fee?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE : The SBA does not provide export loan guarantees that exceed USD 5 million per 
borrower.  
 
Question 91  
3.2.5.3 Overseas  Private Investment Corporation (3.160 -3.163)  
91. Whether the proposed interest rates and the tenor of USIDFC would violate the USA's 
commitments under the OECD Export Credit Rules.  
 
RESPONSE : Pricing and tenor for loans under the newly formed USDFC will mirro r current 
pricing and tenor policies, and will remain in accordance with OECD Export Credit Rules.  
 
Question 92  
3.3.1 Incentives (3.165)  
92. The United States has no overarching legal framework governing subsidies at federal and sub -
federal levels. In case of a dispute of subsidies at federal and sub federal levels, how is the 
same handled if it is not backed by any statutory authority?  
 
RESPONSE : Generally, there are no "disputes" about subsidies at the federal and sub -federal 
levels.  
 
Question 93  
3.3.1 Incen tives (3.166)  
93. State, territorial and local governments also provide support and incentives, particularly in 
relation to business start -ups or the expansion of existing operations. What are the measures 
that the United States government is taking to ensure that such support is not misused?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States Trade Representative (USTR) notifies state programs to the 
WTO. We refer India to our notifications.  
 
Questions 94 -98 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements (3.182 -3.189)  
94. Can the US clarify with an example as to which are the food -use products that needs to have 
a tolerance/MRL?  
 
RESPONSE : The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required by law to perform a 
risk assessment for each new use of a pesticide showing that risks a re acceptable prior to 
granting the use or tolerance. Food-use products are those products used on or around food 
or feed crops the use pattern of which may result in residues on food or feed items. For 
example, direct application to a growing crop in an a gricultural setting would be a food -use. 
 
95. Also, explain the statement "below the limit of quantification of the method, a tolerance will 
be established at the limit of quantification for the enforcement method on that commodity."  
 
RESPONSE : When residues of a pesticide in a commodity are expected to be present, but 
below the analytical method limit of quantification, the lowest level that can be reliably 
measured by the analytical method is the U.S. tolerance or minimum residue limit (MRL). The 
U.S. tolera nce or MRL is set at the limit of quantification of the analyt ical method for that 
commodity.  
 
96. What is the difference between the limit of quantification of the method and limit of 
quantification of enforcement in the context of tolerance; and  
 
RESPONSE : The MRL is the enforced level.  
 
97. Does it mean that products that are exported by lower technological capable countries can be 
subjected to refusals?  
 
RESPONSE : MRLs are applied the same no matter if the product is domestic or from a country, 
regardless of it s technological capabilities, exporting to the United States.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  98. The response by the US for question 12 raised by India in 2016 was linked to (Q13), with one 
answer and therefore is not sufficiently addressing the concerns. India would therefore would 
reques t the US to provide detailed information on the following four questions:  
 
a) The WTO notification[s] dealing with such MRLs changes;  
b) The risk assessment dossiers dealing with food -use needs and agency responsible;  
c) EPA documents dealing with MRL or any other similar studies; and  
d) Other scientific documents used/conclusively suggesting for establishing the said MRL  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the responses to questions 103 and 104.  
 
Question 99  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements (3.183)  
99. Could the US explain why there is a difference in the understanding of the WTO Secretariat 
and the United States government on the authority and jurisdiction of EPA? In response to 
India's questions on the US TPR for 2016 (questions 12 and 13). The US has claimed that the 
EPA has no authority for fixing the default MRLs. The US is requested to provide a clarification 
on the position of taken by the WTO Secretariat.  
 
RESPONSE : The U.S. EPA does not have any authority to establish "default" tolerances/MRLs. 
Every food -use needs to have a tolerance/MRL. For residues that fall below the limit of 
quantification of the method, a tolerance will be established at the limit of quantification for 
the enforcement method on that commodity.  
 
Questions 100 -104 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phyto sanitary requirements (3.183)  
 
India has found some new active ingredients (AIs) and agricultural products which got covered by 
the latest MRL standards.  
 
There were nine new AIs which are introduced in 2017/2018 with default MRL of 0.01 ppm.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Table 1: New active ingredients introduced  in 2017 or 2018.  
s. n. Active Ingredients  No. of Agr. 
Products covered  Name of the Products  
1 Afidopyropen  57 Arracacha, root; Arrowroot, tuber; Artichoke, 
Chinese, tuber; Artichoke, Jerusalem, tuber; 
Canna, edible, tuber; Cassava, root; Chayote, 
root; Chinquapin; Chufa, tuber; Coconut; 
Ginger, root; Japanese horse -chestnut; Leren, 
tuber; Nut, African nut -tree; Nu t, almond; Nut, 
beech; Nut, Brazil; Nut, Brazilian pine; Nut, 
bunya; Nut, bur oak; Nut, butter; Nut, cajou; 
Nut, candle; Nut, cashew; Nut, chestnut; Nut, 
coquito; Nut, dika; Nut, ginkgo; Nut, Guiana 
chestnut; Nut, hazelnut (filbert); Nut, heartnut; 
Nut, hi ckory; Nut, macadamia; Nut, Mongongo; 
Nut, monkey puzzle; Nut, monkey -pot; Nut, 
okari; Nut, pachira; Nut, peach palm; Nut, 
pecan; Nut, pequi; Nut, pili; Nut, pine; Nut, 
pistachio; Nut, sapucaia; Nut, tropical almond; 
Nut, walnut, black; Nut, walnut, Englis h 
(Persian); Nut, yellowhorn; Potato; Soybean; 
Sweet potato; Tanier, corm; Taro (dasheen), 
corm; Turmeric, root; Yam bean (jicama), root; 
Yam, true, tuber  
2 Fluensulfone  39 Chinquapin; Coconut; Japanese horse -chestnut; 
Nut, African nut -tree; Nut, almond; Nut, beech; 
Nut, Brazil; Nut, Brazilian pine; Nut, bunya ; 
Nut, bur oak; Nut, butter; Nut, cajou ; Nut, 
candle; Nut, cashew; Nut, chestnut; Nut, 
coquito; Nut, dika; Nut, ginkgo ; Nut, Guiana 
chestnut; Nut, hazelnut (filbert); Nut, heartnut; 
Nut, hickory; Nut, macadamia; Nut, Mongongo; 
Nut, monkey puzzle; Nut, monkey -pot; Nut, 
okari; Nut, pachira ; Nut, peach palm; Nut, 
pecan; Nut, pequi ; Nut, pili; Nut, pine; Nut, 
pistachio; Nut, sapucaia; Nut, tropical almond; 
Nut, walnut, black; Nut, walnut, English 
(Persian); Nut, yellowhorn  
3 Ethaboxam  17 Arracacha, root; Arrowroot, tuber; Artichoke, 
Chinese, tuber; Artichoke, Jerusalem, tuber; 
Canna, edible, tuber; Cassava, root; Chayote, 
root; Chufa, tuber; Ginger, root; Leren , tuber; 
Potato; Sweet potato; Tanier, corm; Taro 
(dasheen), corm; Turmeric, root; Yam bean 
(jicama), root; Yam, true, tuber  
4 Aminocyclopyrachlor  5 Cattle, meat; Goat, meat; Horse, meat; Milk; 
Sheep, meat  
5 Pydiflumetofen  5 Cattle, meat; Corn, sweet; Goat, meat; Horse, 
meat; Sheep, meat  
6 Cyclaniliprole  4 Cattle, meat; Goat, meat; Horse, meat; Sheep, 
meat 
7 Halauxifen -methyl  3 Barley, grain; Triticale, grain; Wheat, grain  
8 Tolpyralate  3 Corn, grain; Corn,  pop; Corn, sweet  
9 Benzobicyclon  1 Rice, grain  
Source:  Data sourced from Global MRL database and  Bryant Christie Inc.  
100.  Can the US clarify the basis for the usage of default MRLs?  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the response to Question 99.  
 
101.  Is it different from the existing international measure under the Codex, IPPC or OIE;  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the response to question 102.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  102.  If there is a deviation, how has the US arrived at the MRL level for the food products;  
 
RESPONSE : Under the Food Quality Protection Act ( FQPA), the U.S. EPA is required to 
consider the levels of any existing CODEX MRL and try to harmonize domestic tolerances with 
those levels. In circumstances where the U.S. EPA is unable to harmonize (typically due to a 
different use pattern), the U.S. EPA  is required to explain the reasons why the U.S. EPA was 
unable to harmonize. In order to establish an MRL, the U.S. EPA must make a safety finding 
that the pesticide can be used with reasonable certainty of no harm. To make this finding, the 
agency consid ers the toxicity of the pesticide and its break -down products, how much of the 
pesticide is applied and how often, how much pesticide residue remains on the food by the 
time it is marketed and prepared (including dietary risk assessments), and possible rou tes of 
exposure to that pesticide ( e.g., residues on each crop use, as well as exposure from drinking 
water and residential exposure).  
 
103.  If the risk assessment was carried out, can the US provide the web link of the agency 
responsible for fixing the MRL; an d 
 
RESPONSE : Risk assessments for all tolerances are published in the Federal Register at 
www.govinfo.gov . They are also included in dockets that are searchable 
at www.regula tions.gov . The U.S. EPA is the federal agency responsible for setting tolerances 
and MRLs. Its website is www.epa.gov , with additional information on the setting of tolerances 
and MRLs at https://www.epa.gov/pesticide -tolerances . 
 
104.  Was this notified to the WTO? If yes, can the US provide the notification details?  
 
RESPONSE : Yes, the WTO is notified as appropriate, and consistent with WTO obligations. 
U.S. SPS notifica tions can be searched for on the W TO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Information Management  System:  https://spsims.wto.org/en/notifications/search . 
 
Question 105  
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary r equirements (3.186)  
105.  The US is requested to provide details on the November 2015 Accreditation of Third -Party 
Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety Audits and Issue Certifications. What is the 
criterion adopted by the US to provide clearance of third party certification bodies of foreign 
members and private parties?  
 
RESPONSE : The criterion is included in the Accredited Third -Party Certification 
regulation  in the U.S. Code of Federal  Regulations:  https://www.govregs.com/regulations/tit
le21_chapterI_part1_subpartM . This regulation subpart describes the requirements with 
which accreditation bodies and certification bodi es must comply to be recognized or accredited 
under the program.  
 
Questions 106 -107 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements (3.187)  
106.  India requests the US to provide details about the fees charged on the Importer under the 
Voluntary Qualified Importer  Program (VQIP). What is its additional impact on per unit cost of 
imports and its impact on the competitiveness of imported product?  
 
RESPONSE : On or before August 1 each year, FDA will publish a Federal Register  notice 
announcing the VQIP user fee sched ule for the next VQIP year. Current and past VQIP 
fiscal year user fee rates can also be found  at: http://www.fda.gov/forIndustry/UserFees/ . 
 
For additional information and  guidance, see FDA's Volunt ary Qualified Importer Program 
Guidance for Industry: https:/www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Guidance  
DocumentsRegulato ryInformation/UCM448558.pdf . 
 
107.  "Importers need to meet certain eligibility criteria and pay a user fee to participate in the 
program" - Voluntary Qualified Importer Program (VQIP). The US needs to justify the 
economics of the trade facilitating principle in  the policy?  
 
RESPONSE : The Voluntary Qualified Importer Program (VQIP) is a voluntary, fee -based 
program that provides expedited review and import entry of human and animal foods into the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  United States for participating importers. Participating importers will be able to import their 
products to the United States with greater speed and predictability, avoiding unexpected 
delays at the point of import entry. To participate, importers must meet eligibility criteria and 
pay a user fee that covers the cost asso ciated with the FDA's administration of the program. 
The user fee includes the costs of reviewing applications; the costs of conducting inspections 
of importers (both foreign and domestic) accepted into the program; and the annual 
Information Technology (I T) maintenance costs.  
 
Question 108  
3.3.4.3 Competition policy – Policy developments (3.207)  
108.  A more systematic balance between IP and Competition laws is being sought so as to give 
particular attention and weight to innovation by allowing the innovators to  reap the full 
rewards of their investments in research and development. What steps the government of 
United States is taking so as to ensure the happening of the same?  
 
RESPONSE : Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim  gave a speech detailing the "New 
Madison" approach to antitrust and intellectual property. The New Madison approach was 
introduced to ensure that patent holders have adequate incentives to innovate and create 
exciting new technologies, and that licensees have appropriate incentives to implement those 
technologies.  
 
More information  is available  on the U.S. Department  of Justice  website.  See: https://www.j
ustice.gov/opa/speech/assistant -attorney -general -makan -delrahim -delivers -keynote -
address -university . 
 
Question 109  
3.3.6.1 Government procurement – Institutional and legal framework (3.228)  
109.  The TAA provides authority for the President to waive purchasing requirements, such as those 
contained in the BAA, designate eligible countries, and bar procurement from non -designated 
countries. Can the US explain what are these non -designated countries and what are the 
criterion employed for such classification?  
 
RESPONSE : The criteria for designation of eligible countries is specified in 19 U.S. Code §§ 
2511(b), 2512(a). "Designated country" is further defined under Federal Acquisition 
Regulation  (FAR)  subpart  25.003  (https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/Subpart%2025_1.ht
ml). 
 
Questions 110 -111 
3.3.6.3 Government procurement – Market access conditions (3.242)  
110.  Can the US inform the value of procurements from GPA partne rs in the years 2016 and 2017 
vis-à-vis the value of total procurement of goods and services above the threshold value 
committed under GPA? Which is the website to see the country -wise break -up figures of the 
US Government procurement both at Federal and S ub Federal levels?  
 
RESPONSE : The GPA does not require members to report statistics based on country of origin. 
The most up -to-date WTO GPA procurement statistics can be found on the WTO 
GPA Notifications  page.  See: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/notnat_e.htm . 
 
111.  Is there any standard prescribed value addition criterion for allowing procurement from GPA 
partners? If so, does it vary fr om procurement to procurement? Kindly provide details.  
 
RESPONSE : All federal procurement follows the procedures laid out in the FAR. Procurement 
that is open to GPA partners is described in FAR subpart 25.403 ( https://www. 
acquisition.gov/fa r/html/Subpart%2025_4.html#wp1086884 ). 
 
Question 112  
3.3.6.3 Government procurement – Market access conditions (3.248)  
112.  Under Title III of Public Law 111 -347, a federal excise tax of 2% is applied to government 
purchases of goods and services from foreign e ntities not party to an international 
procurement agreement, entered on or after 2 January 2011. Can the US inform as to how 
long this excise tax would continue on such Government procurements?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 235 - 
 
  RESPONSE : We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective revi ews. 
 
Question 113  
3.3.6.4 Government procurement – Bidding procedures (3.250)  
113.  Government agencies are generally required to publish all contracts exceeding US$25,000 15 
days before solicitations begin. They must allow for a 30 -day response time, or a 40-day 
response time for procurements covered under an international trade agreement. What is the 
remedy available in case any responses are filed after the time frame allotted?  
 
RESPONSE : Article XV.2 of the GPA states that " A procuring entity shall not p enalize any 
supplier whose tender is received after the time specified for receiving tenders if the delay is 
due solely to mishandling on the part of the procuring entity." Please see the FAR subpart 
14.304(b)(1) and subpart 15.208(b)(1) for more informati on about how this is handled in the 
U.S. federal procurement system.  
 
Questions 114 -116 
3.3.7.1 Intellectual property rights – Overview (3.262 -3.263)  
114.  What are the guidelines available for granting IP protection to the inventions pertaining to 
artificial in telligence (AI) and block chain?  
 
RESPONSE : The USPTO uses the same criteria for all applications, regardless of the type of 
technology. For more information about invention criteria, see https://www.uspto.gov 
/patents -getting -started/general -information -concerning -patents . 
 
115.  How many such patent applications have been filed in 2016 and 2017?  
 
RESPONSE : The USPTO does not maintain statistics relating specifically to AI for the years 
2016 and 2017.  
  
116.  What are the common challenges being faced b y the authorities while assessing these patent 
applications for grant of patent?  
 
RESPONSE : As stated in earlier questions, the USPTO uses the same criteria for all 
applications, it is not more or less challenging to assess this technology as compared to a ny 
other type of technology.  
 
Questions 117 -122 
3.3.7.1 Intellectual property rights – Overview (3.264)  
117.  Kindly provide information on how the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) 
promotes innovation and enables technology commercialization.  
 
RESPONSE : NIST's mission is "to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by 
advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic 
security and improve our quality of life." A great deal of information about NIST programs is 
available at www.nist.gov . 
 
118.  What is meant by 'underused facilities'? Is this assessment made by NIST and if so in what 
capacity?  
 
RESPONSE : NIST does not define or assess "underused facilities." See, e.g., GAO's 2015 
report, GAO-15-346, "Underutilized Facilities: DOD and GSA Information Sharing May 
Enhance Opportunities to Use Space at Military Installations."  
  
119.  Kindly provide information on how NIST prioritizes technology transfer.  
 
RESPONSE : Improving Technology Transfer is an element of the President's Management 
Agenda. The Administration's progress towards t his goal is available by review of the 
September  2018 Action  Plan. See: https://www.performance.gov/CAP/action_plans/FY2018
_Q3_Lab_to_Market.pdf . 
 
120.  How is the role of NIST different from privat e standard setting organizations?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 236 - 
 
  RESPONSE : Information about NIST's role in voluntary consensus standards is available at : 
Standards.gov . 
 
121.  If the research has been funded by the Federal  Government, Does the US Government charge 
for the technology transferred to private entities? Please provide details of this.  
 
RESPONSE : Under the Bayh -Dole Act, the US Government does not charge for inventions 
made with federal funding.  
 
122.  Does the Governm ent retain any safeguards against possible abuse of such right? If so please 
provide the details.  
 
RESPONSE : The laws governing intellectual property apply to rights arising from both 
government - funded research and other research.  
 
Questions 123 -124 
3.3.7.1 Intellectual property rights – Overview (3.266)  
123.  Digital trade has raised new challenges for the U.S. Administration, such as how to best 
address new and emerging trade barriers created by other countries. What measures the 
Government of United Stat es is taking so as to ensure that there is no infringement of either 
party's rights?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States places great importance on digital trade, which is essential to 
the U.S. economy and serves as a critical driver of global economic growth. Th rough its FTA 
practice and in the WTO, the United States has sought to negotiate trade rules that address 
and prevent digital trade barriers, and allow the digital economy to realize its potential. The 
digital trade rules that the United States has conclud ed in recent agreements operate in 
conjunction with rules that provide robust protection of intellectual property rights.  
 
124.  The secretariat report (WT/TPR/S/382) on USA (quoting National Trade Estimate Report - 
2018) identifies 'restrictions on data flow acr oss border' as an emerging trade barrier to the 
digital trade. How according to USA, are these restrictions acting as trade barrier to IP 
intensive industries?  
 
RESPONSE : In today's economy, a wide range of industries are "IP -intensive," and an equally 
wide range of industries depend on the ability to move data across borders. Certain industries, 
for example the software industry, belong to both categories. For such industries, restrictions 
on cross -border data flow serve as a very serious trade barrier.  
 
Question 125  
3.3.7.1 Intellectual property rights – Overview (3.267)  
125.  The adequate and effective protection and enforcement of IP rights (IPRs) has remained a top 
trade policy priority for the U.S. Administration, as reflected in the 2017 and 2018 Special 3 01 
Reports. The stated objectives are to encourage and maintain enabling environments for 
innovation, including effective IP protection and enforcement, in markets worldwide, which 
would benefit U.S. exporters and domestic IP -intensive industries in those markets as well. 
What are the measures that the United States government is taking to ensure that the said 
objective with respect to protection and enforcement of IP rights is met?  
 
RESPONSE : Please refer to the "Annual Intellectual Property Report to Cong ress" (March 
2018) by the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/2018Annu al_IPEC_Report_to_Co
ngress.pdf . 
 
Question 126  
3.3.7.2 Intellectual property rights – General regulatory framework (3.269)  
126.  Is the US a member of the Marrakesh Treaty for the Visually Impaired Persons? If not, is there 
any move to ratify the treaty?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States government is currently working toward depositing its 
instrument with WIPO to join the Marrakesh Treaty. The Copyright Office website contains WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 237 - 
 
  information on the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act at: https://www.copyright.gov/ 
legislation/.  
 
Questions 127 -134 
3.3.7.2 Intellectual property rights – General regulatory framework (Table 3.24)  
127.  Are computer tables and computer databases protected under the Copyright Regime in  United 
States?  
 
RESPONSE : U.S. copyright law generally protects computer databases as "compilations," 
which are defined as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials 
or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in s uch a way that the resulting work 
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101. For further 
information, s ee U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright 
Office  Practices  §§ 727 et seq. (3d ed. 2017),  https://copyright.gov/comp3/chap700/ch700 -
literary -works.pdf . 
 
128.  What is the percentage of fair use which is allowed under the Copyright Regime in the United 
States?  
 
RESPONSE : As codified in Section 10 7 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. 107), the law provides 
the statutory framework for determining whether something is a fair use and identifies certain 
types of uses —such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and 
research —as example s of activitie s that may qualify as fair use.  
 
129.  Does the Copyright Regime of United States contain a definition of academic use under the 
fair use doctrine?  
 
RESPONSE : No, there is no definition of "academic use" in our Copyright Act. Section 107 
calls for consideration of four factors in evaluating a question of fair use. For more information, 
see the U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index at : https://www.copyright.gov/fair -
use/index.html . 
 
130.  Patents are granted for inventions or products /processes which possess something novel. 
Does the patent law of United States provide for patentability of DNA recombinant technology?  
 
RESPONSE : Please  see the following  for USPTO's  patentabil ity criteria: https://www.uspto. 
gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep -2100.html . 
 
131.  Whether scienti fic principles can be patented?  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the following for USPTO's patentability criteria: 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep -2100.html . 
 
132.  According to the Patent Law of United States, it is states that in order for an invention to be 
patentable it shall be non -obvious. Whether inventions that are actually obvious may still be 
patented because of t heir commercial considerations?  
 
RESPONSE : Please see the following for obviousness criteria under 35 U.S.C. 103: 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2141.html . 
 
133.  Whether the methods of doing business can be patented. What if the business is in the nature 
of financial and inventory management?  
 
RESPONSE : For more information about business metho d patents, including examination 
criteria, please see the following: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -getting -started/patent -
basics/types -patent -applications/utility -patent/patent -business#step1 . 
 
134.  Plant varieties or plants are specifically patentable in the United States Plant Protection Act. 
What is the United States government's stand on the issue of pat entability of  animal varieties?  
 
RESPONSE : For more information about patentability criteria for living subject matter, please 
see: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2105.html . WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 238 - 
 
  Questions 135-137 
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.275)  
135.  Inventions that are new, useful, and non -obvious are patentable. Can the method of doing a 
surgery by a doctor be said to be patentable?  
 
RESPONSE : All applications are assessed on a case -by-case basis. For more information 
about patent examination procedures, please see: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -getting -
started/general -information -concerni ng-patents.  
 
136.  Whether the biotechnological inventions need to be protected by the patent legislations and 
how? 
 
RESPONSE : For more information about patent examination procedure, please see: 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents -getting -started/general -information -concerning -patents . 
 
137.  Section 102 of the United states patent code, discusses what are the s tatutory bars to 
patenting. Under section 102 of the United States code, whether a secret commercial use by 
the inventor amounts to public use?  
 
RESPONSE : For more information about 35 U.S.C. 102, please  see: https://www.uspto 
.gov/web/office s/pac/mpep/s2152.html . 
 
Questions 138 -39 
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.274)  
138.  What are the rights that a registered patent owner has under the United States Patent Law?  
 
RESPONSE : Patent rights are granted, not registered, at the USPTO.  The right conferred by 
the patent grant is, in the language of the statute and of the grant itself, "the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling" the invention in the United States or 
"importing" the invention into the United States (35 U.S.C. section 154).  
 
139.  Is the best mode to carry out an invention required to be disclosed under the Leahy -Smith 
America Invents Act? What is the consequence of its non -disclosure?  
 
RESPONSE : For more information about best mode examin ation criteria, please see: 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2165.html . 
 
Question 140  
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.275)  
140.  The patent community has been wait ing a long time for clear guidance as to what subject 
matter is patentable in the fields of computer -readable software, business methods, and 
biotech. While the Supreme Court has issued several decisions in the last few years finding 
certain subject matter s unpatentable, ( Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics , 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (isolated DNA sequences);  Mayo v. Prometheus , 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012) (method of giving a drug to a patient and measuring metabolites of that drug); and 
Bilski v . Kappos , 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (hedging program to minimize risk), it has failed to 
provide substantial guidance as to what is patentable subject matter.  What measures the 
Government of United States is taking to ensure so as to remove this void relating  to 
patentability?  
 
RESPONSE : For the latest on U.S. subject matter eligibility, please see: https://www.uspto. 
gov/patent/laws -and-regulations/examination -policy/subject -matter -eligibility . 
 
Question 141  
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.277)  
141.  The filing date of an application for patent is the date on which a specification, and any 
drawings necessary to understand the subject matter sought to be patented, are received in 
the USPTO or the date on which the last part completing the application is received, in the 
case of a previously incomplete or defective application. What is the remedy in case a party 
files for a patent on the filing date which is accepted whereas another party also files for the 
same patent but completes the structure of the patent before the former party does? In that 
situation who will be the rightful owner of the patent?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 239 - 
 
  RESPONSE : Generally, the first inventor to file is awarded a patent. Please see  https:// 
www.uspto.gov/patent/first -inventor -file-fitf-resources  for more information.  
 
Question 142  
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.278)  
142.  U.S. law provides for the possibility of submitting a provisional application for a patent. What 
is the remedy in a situation where after the filing of the provisional application for the patent 
by the applicant, some other applicant files the complete specification for the same patent? 
In such a case, which application will be given priority over the other?  
 
RESPONSE : Under the America Invents Act, the United States is a first inventor -to-file 
system, please see https://www.uspto.gov/patent/first -inventor -file-fitf-resources . For more 
information about provisional ap plications, please see: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -
getting -started/patent -basics/types -patentapplications/provisional -application -patent . 
 
Question 143  
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.279)  
143.  Does Inter partes review allow legal immunity to sovereign entities in challenges in from of 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board? Please explain the rationale and latest po sition on this 
issue.  
 
RESPONSE : Please see  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Fed. Cir. 
2018)  at: http://www.cafc.uscour ts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions -orders/18 -1638.Opinion. 
7-20-2018.pdf . 
 
Questions 144 -145 
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.280)  
144.  In the overall Strategic Plan for 2018 -22, the USDOC identified a role for the USPTO in 
accelerating U.S. l eadership in the strengthening of IP protection, both in the United States 
and abroad, so as to strengthen U.S. economic and national security. How does the 
Government of United States propose to achieve the said goal?  
 
RESPONSE : See pg. 13 of the 2018-2022 USPTO's  Strategic  Plan: https://www.uspto.gov/s
ites/default/files/documents/USPTO_20182022_Strategic_Plan.pdf . 
 
145.  The secretariat report mentions that USPTO Strategic Plan 2014 -2018 sets out important goals 
that includes optimization of trademark quality and timeliness. What are the steps undertaken 
to enable improvement in patent and trademark quality?  
 
RESPONSE : USPTO is constantly striving to improve quality through a multi -prong approach, 
including: an extensive training and mentoring program for new examining attorneys that 
diminishes gradually over a two -year period; continuing legal education lectures throughout 
the year for all attorneys; extensiv e examinations resources that are consistently updated, 
including: a searchable Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure; a Law Library with 
librarians who help with evidentiary searching; a form paragraph manual; a unit dedicated to 
Identification and Clas sification, including a searchable classification manual; a quality review 
program, including management review of random case pulls in the law office; random reviews 
of cases throughout the process by a quality review legal unit; and a review of files to be 
published for opposition.  
 
Questions 146 -149 
3.3.7.3 Intellectual property rights – Patents (3.281 -3.283)  
146.  Please provide a breakup of the patent applications received and those granted for 2017 into 
utility patents, patents, plant patents and design pat ents. 
 
RESPONSE : For the latest patent data, please see: https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/ 
patents/main.dashxml . 
 
147.  From the Secretariat's report it appears that 'utility patent' and 'p atent' are one and the same 
rights. Please clarify.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 240 - 
 
  RESPONSE : For more information about utility patents, please see: https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents -getting -started/patent -basics/types -patent -applications/nonprovisional -utility -
patent . 
 
148.  The secretariat report notes that patents of foreign origin issued by USPTO during the review 
period continue to be larger than the share  of patents of domestic origin. Does this fact remain 
true in context to the utility patents as well?  
 
RESPONSE : For the latest  patent  data by country,  please see: https://developer. 
uspto.gov/visualization . 
 
149.  How many utility patent applicati ons were received by USA from foreign countries in 2016 and 
2017? How many of them were granted?  
 
RESPONSE : For the latest patent data by country, please see: https://developer.uspto. 
gov/visualization . 
 
Question 150  
3.3.7.4 Intellectual property rights – Industrial Designs (3.285)  
150.  Can cranes be protected under industrial designs under the United States Code?  
 
RESPONSE : For information about design patent criteria, please see: https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents -getting -started/patent -basics/types -patent -applications/design -patent -application -
guide . 
 
Question 151  
3.3.7.4 Intellectual property rights – Industria l Designs (3.286)  
151.  Under the US patent law statute, no protection is presently available for unregistered designs. 
All design patent -related rights must be procured by the timely filing of a design patent 
application at the USPTO and the subsequent grant of  a design patent by the USPTO. What is 
the remedy in case of an infringement of an unregistered design?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States does not have an unregistered design system. For more 
information about design patent criteria, please see: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -getting -
started/patent -basics/types -patent -applications/design -patent -application -guide . 
 
Questions 152 -153 
3.3.7.5 Intellectual property rights – Trademarks (3.288)  
152.  Federal registration of a mark is not a requisite to establish rights to it, nor is it required in 
order to use it. However, federal registration grants the holder additional rights, such as the 
legal presumption of ownership, validity, and the entitlement to use the mark in connection 
with the goods or services identified in the registration. In case of an infringement faced by a 
non-registered trademarks owner, what is the remedy available to him in case of 
infringement?  
 
RESPONSE : Unregistered trademarks  can be protected under common law rights as long as 
the mark is used in commerce. Owners can obtain certain protections, rights, and privileges 
simply through the establishment and use of the tra demark in commerce.  
 
153.  The protection granted to a mark may be cancelled if an affidavit of use is not provided 
between the fifth and sixth year of use. Can the same be granted as an exception if the 
registered owner of the trade mark owner provides a valid reason because of which the 
affidavit of use was not provides between the 5th and 6th year of use?  
 
RESPONSE : If an affidavit of use, or excusable non -use, is not filed before the end of the 
requisite timeframe, it can be filed within the subsequent six-month period, upon payment of 
a grace -period fee.  
 
Questions 154 -159 
3.3.7.5 Intellectual property rights – Trademarks (3.290)  
154.  Does the Trademark act of the United States permit a colour to be registered as a Trademark?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 241 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  Yes, both single colo ur and multi -coloured marks can be registered as 
trademarks.  
 
155.  What is the process as mandated by law for the cancellation of trade mark registration?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please see response to question 156 below, addressing both questions.  
 
156.  Can the government of U nited States further clarify the instances in which a registered 
Trademark can be cancelled/suspended or revoked by the authority of law?  
 
RESPONSE:  Registrations can be cancelled ex officio, or as a result of an inter partes  
proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. The Director will also cancel by order 
of a U.S. court.  
 
A registration can be cancelled as a matter of law if the owner does not timely file statutorily -
dictated submissions of use (or excusable non -use). The registration will expire as a matter 
of law if the owner does not timely file renewal documents.  
 
157.  In case, the cancellation of a registered Trade Mark is initiated, does the owner of the 
registered Trademark have to be notified prior to such a r evocation by the authorities? If yes, 
is the said intimation written or verbal?  
 
RESPONSE:  In inter partes proceedings the registrant is notified in writing. For ex officio 
actions, the USPTO attempts to notify the registrant that a required document is du e. This 
post-registration filing information is also on the registration certificate. If the registrant does 
not timely file the required documents, the cancellation notice will be published in the 
Trademark Official Gazette.  
 
158.  What are the grounds for recognition of a well -known trade mark? Is use of a well -known 
trade mark required for protection? Will its knowledge among the relevant sector of the public 
be considered while recognizing the well -known trademark even when there may not be any 
'use in commerce'?  
 
RESPONSE:  It is possible for a mark to be well known without use in U.S. commerce if it can 
be shown that U.S. consumers are aware of its reputation. Use or intent to use is required for 
any trademark to be regis tered.  
 
159.  The secretariat's report mentions that 'use of a mark in promotion or advertising before the 
product or service is actually provided under the mark does not qualifies as use in commerce'. 
In determining well -known trademark is knowledge of the trademark ob tained among the 
relevant sector of the public as a result of the promotion of the trademark given due 
consideration.  
 
RESPONSE:  For trademark applications filed based on use in commerce or bona fide intention 
to use the mark in commerce, use of a mark in  promotion or advertising before the product 
or services is provided does not meet the criteria for registration. However, an owner of a 
well-known mark that has reputation but no use in U.S. commerce has standing to oppose or 
petition to cancel an entity filing in bad faith. A foreign applicant can base its application on 
the Madrid Protocol or the Paris Convention, neither of which require use of the mark in 
commerce before registration.  
 
Question 160  
3.3.7.5 Intellectual property rights – Trademarks (3.2 91) 
160.  An owner of a famous mark is entitled to obtain an injunction against the use of a mark or 
trade name in a manner that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or tarnishment, as well as 
to oppose applications or cancel registrations that are likely to cause dilution with the famous 
mark. Does this treatment apply to trademarks belonging to different classes as well?  
 
RESPONSE:  Owners of famous marks may bring enforcement, opposition, and cancellation 
proceedings against trademarks in other cla sses. A determination of likelihood of dilution of a 
famous trademark can be found for classes of goods or services that are different from the 
famous mark.   WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 242 - 
 
  Question 161  
3.3.7.5 Intellectual property rights – Trademarks (3.292)  
161.  Opposition to a mark's registration m ay be filed up to 30 days after publication and this period 
may be extended for up to six months. In case an opposition to the trade mark is filed after 6 
months where the applicant show cases reasonable cause for doing so, can the opposition to 
the trade mark be accepted?  
 
RESPONSE:  No. An opposition filed more than six months after publication in the Trademark 
Official Gazette will be denied as untimely. However, once the mark is registered, parties who 
believe they will be harmed by continued registratio n of the mark may file a petition to cancel.  
 
Question 162  
3.3.7.5 Intellectual property rights – Trademarks (3.295)  
162.  The USPTO as a part of its mission to optimize trademark quality and timelines, continued to 
encourage electronic filing through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and 
discourage paper filing during the review period. What are the measures that the government 
of United States is taking so as to ensure the success of this mission?  
 
RESPONSE:  The USPTO has created a very user -friendly system for filing applications on -line 
and has reduced fees to incentivize total electronic filing, which is a pproaching 100 per cent . 
Applicants are also incentivized to respond to office actions by means other than paper through 
a reduction in fees.  
 
Questions 163 -165 
3.3.7.6 Intellectual property rights – Geographical Indications (3.298)  
163.  What is the time frame  for which a geographical indication can be registered and can it be 
renewed over a period of time?  
 
RESPONSE:  Geographical Indications are registered as trademarks for a term of ten years 
and can remain registered indefinitely upon compliance with the Tra demark Act.  
 
164.  As per the secretariat report, it is mentioned that the registration for the Geographical 
Indicators is optional. In case of an infringement taking place, what is the remedy available 
to the owner of the Geographical Indication?  
 
RESPONSE:  Owners of an unregistered Geographical Indication enjoy the same legal rights 
as owners of unregistered trademarks. These rights are protected by state -based laws 
concerning unfair competition.  
 
165.  The geographic term must not be deceptive. What measures is the government of United 
States taking so as to ensure that the geographical indicator is not deceptive of its name, 
nature and quality?  
 
RESPONSE:  During examination of a certification or collective mark of regional origin, the 
owner must submit production standards showing that the product is produced in the territory 
named, with the methods and human knowledge required to give the product a given quality, 
reputation, or characteristic that is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.  
 
Question 1 66 
3.3.7.7 Intellectual property rights – Trade secret protection (3.299)  
166.  The definition of the term trade secrets is provided in the EEA. Can the government of United 
States shed light on as to for how long the trade secrets are protected?  
 
RESPONSE:  No time limit is imposed on trade secret protection by law. However, if any of 
the elements defining a trade secret cease to exist, the trade secret will also cease to exist 
and will no longer warrant protection as such.  
 
Questions 167 -168 
3.3.7.7 Intellectua l property rights – Trade secret protection (3.299 -3.300)  
167.  The Defend Trade Secret Act was introduced in 2016 which amended the Economic Espionage 
Act. 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 243 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  The United States observes that no question is presented here.  
 
168.  Please indicate statistics on enforcement action under the Defend Trade Secrets Act in 2017 
and 2018 so far.  
 
RESPONSE:  DOJ does not collect statistics on the number of civil actions filed under DTSA.  
 
Question 169  
3.3.7.7 Intellectual property rights – Trade secret protection (3.300)  
169.  The provisions of the EEA do not apply to lawful activity by government entities. So is it safe 
to presume that the government entities are immune from the provisions of EEA?  
 
RESPONSE:  The EEA does not provide for immunity from its provisions to governmen t 
entities.  
 
Questions 170 -172 
3.3.7.7 Intellectual property rights – Trade secret protection (3.301)  
170.  The DTSA (Defend Trade Secrets Act, 2016) authorizes a trade secret owner to file a civil 
action in a district court seeking relief for trade secret misap propriation related to a product 
or service in interstate or foreign commerce. What is the pecuniary jurisdiction of such a 
district court? What if the amount of relief claimed by the trade secret owner exceeds the 
pecuniary jurisdiction of the district co urt? 
 
RESPONSE:  United States federal courts do not have any pecuniary limits in cases brought 
under the DTSA.  
 
171.  The Defend Trade Secrets Act, 2016 (Herein referred to as DTSA), authorizes a trade secret 
owner to file a civil action in a district court seeking relief for trade secret misappropriation 
related to a product or service in interstate or foreign commerce. The Act provides for private 
civil remedies, including ex parte orders for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the 
propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of the action. Can the 
government of United States clarify as t o on whom does the burden of proof lies to prove or 
disprove that the infringement of trade secrets has occurred or not occurred?  
 
RESPONSE:  The party bringing the claim bears the burden of proof regarding the elements 
of its claim. The defending party bea rs the burden of proof regarding affirmative defenses.  
 
172.  The DTSA provides for whistle -blower protection for an individual who makes a confidential 
disclosure to a government official in cases of a suspected violation of the law, or files a sealed 
document to the court with respect to an anti -retaliation lawsuit. Does the protection to the 
whistle blower extends for a limited period of time or is indefinite?  
 
RESPONSE:  The DTSA does not limit the length of whistleblower protection. Provided the 
circumstances  that gave rise to the protection remain in force, the protection will continue.  
 
Questions 173 -174 
3.3.7.8 Intellectual property rights – Copyright (3.304 -3.315)  
 
173.  What changes have been brought in by the recently promulgated 'Music Modernization Act, 
2018' with respect to the intermediary liability?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. Copyright Office website contains information on the Music 
Modernization Act (MMA) \ at https://www.copyright.gov/music -moderniz ation/ . From that 
webpage, additional information on the legislation can be accessed:  
 
• The MMA legislation (H.R. 1551): https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th -congress/ 
housebill /1551/  
• The Report and Section by Section Analysis of H.R. 1551 by the Chairmen and Ranking 
Members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees: https://www.copyright. 
gov/legislation/mma_conference_report.pdf   
• The Copyright  Act, as amended  by the MMA: https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/ 
2018_mma_amendments.pdf  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 244 - 
 
  Pursuant to section 115(d)(3) of the Copyright Act, as amended, the Re gister of Copyrights 
will designate an entity as the mechanical licensing collective to administer the blanket license 
and distribute collected royalties to songwriters and music publishers.  The Copyright Act,  
as amended  by the MMA can be found  at: https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/2018_mma
_amendments.pdf . 
 
174.  Whether statutory licenses are also granted under the said Act? If yes, how are they different 
from the ones granted unde r US Copyright Act?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Music Modernization Act (MMA) amended the Copyright Act. The answer to 
question 173 also applies to this question.  
 
Question 175  
3.3.7.9 Intellectual property rights – Enforcement (3.316 -3.327)  
175.  As noted by the secretaria t report, on the aspect of IP enforcement, DOJ continues to prioritize 
IP investigations and prosecutions that involve health and safety issues, trade secret theft or 
economic espionage, and large -scale commercial counterfeiting and online piracy. The DOJ 
has also increased focus on IP crimes that are committed or facilitated by use of the Internet, 
or perpetrated by organized criminal networks. What are the special steps taken by Govt 
agencies in this regard? Kindly give detail.  
 
RESPONSE:  For additional i nformation on the Department's IP enforcement priorities, 
we refer to the Department's  2017 PRO-IP Act Report  (https://www.justice.gov/iptf/page/fil
e/1031771/download ), and specificall y to pages 11 -20. 
 
Question 176  
3.3.7.9 Intellectual property rights – Enforcement (3.317)  
176.  There are several agencies involved in the enforcement of IPRs, including the Departments of 
Commerce, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, State, Agriculture, Heal th and Human 
Services, the Copyright Office, and the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator (IPEC). What are the measures that the Government of United States is taking so 
as to ensure that the agencies involved in the enforcement  of IPR's are satisfactorily 
performing their duties?  
 
RESPONSE:  For information on IPR enforcement, please refer to the "Annual Intellectual 
Property Report to Congress" (March 2018) by the United States Intellectual Property 
Enforcement  Coordinator.  (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2017/11/2018 
Annual_IPEC_Report_to_Congress.pdf .  
 
Question 177  
3.3.7.9 Intellectual property rights  – Enforcement (3.321)  
177.  Whether the function exercised by the Department of Justice is that of an executive function 
or a delegated legislative function?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Department of Justice is part of the executive branch of the United States 
government. The executive branch implements and enforces the laws passed by our Congress.  
 
Question 178  
3.3.7.9 Intellectual property rights – Enforcement (3.322)  
178.  The IPR Centr e, headed by an ICE -HSI Director, with Deputy Directors from the FBI and CBP, 
has as its mission to stop predatory and unfair trade practices that threaten the global 
economy. What are the measures that are being taken so as to help the IPR centre achieve 
its desired goal?  
 
RESPONSE:  CBP collaborates with ICE and the other twenty -two National Intellectual 
Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center) partners on stopping unfair and illicit trade 
practices and combatting IP theft by maintaining staff at t he IPR Center and supporting the 
various IPR Center enforcement initiatives, trainings, and engagement activities with domestic 
and international stakeholders.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Questions 179 -180 
3.3.7.9 Intellectual property rights – Enforcement (3.322)  
179.  How is the DOJ m onitoring the IP crimes that are committed or facilitated by use of the 
Internet, or perpetrated by organized criminal networks?  
 
RESPONSE:  For additional information on the Department of Justice's efforts with regard to 
online IP crime and IP crime involv ing organized criminal groups, we refer to the Department's 
2017 PRO -IP Act Report ( https://www.justice.gov/iptf/page/file/1031771/download ). 
 
180.  How is the DOJ monitoring the IP investig ations and prosecutions that involve health and 
safety issues, trade secret theft or economic espionage, and large -scale commercial 
counterfeiting?  
 
RESPONSE:  For additional information on the Department of Justice's efforts regarding the 
issues identified  above, we refer to the Department's 2017 PRO -IP Act Report 
(https://www.justice.gov/iptf/page/file/1031771/download ). 
 
Question 181  
3.3.7.9.2 Intellectual property rights – Special 301 (3.330)  
181.  In cases where a trading partner has been identified as a PFC, the USTR is required to initiate 
a Section 301 investigation within 30 days of when the country was identified, unless the 
USTR determines that the initiation of such an investigati on would be detrimental to U.S. 
economic interests, or where the act, policy, or practice identified as the basis for the PFC 
identification is the subject of any other investigation or action under Section 301. Can the 
investigation be initiated after 30 days where the USTR successfully proves that there existed 
sufficient except as provided above so as to delay the initiation of the investigation?  
 
RESPONSE:  Under the statute, a PFC designation is not a pre -requisite to the initiation of an 
investigation.  
 
Question 182  
3.3.7.9.2 Intellectual property rights – Special 301 (3.332)  
182.  How often does the USTR conduct Out of Cycle Reviews that focus on identified IP challenges 
in specific trading partner markets?  
 
RESPONSE:  USTR has typically conducted several out of cycle reviews annually in recent 
years. For additional information, please see Special 301 Reports and Annual Reviews of 
Notorious Markets for the period covered by this review (available at https://ustr.gov ).  
 
Question 183  
3.3.7.9.2 Intellectual property rights – Special 301 (3.333)  
183.  Since the Notorious market lists does not make findings of legal violations, nor does it reflect 
the U.S. Government's analysis of the general IP pr otection and enforcement climate in the 
countries connected with the listed markets, can it be presumed that the Notorious Market list 
functions as ancillary to the US Government legislations on protection of legal rights?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Special 301 Report  (Report) is the result of an annual review of the state of 
IP protection and enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world, which the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) conducts pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 , as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (19 
U.S.C. § 2242).  
 
Questions 184 -185 
3.3.7.9.3 Intellectual property rights – Section 337 in vestigations (3.334)  
184.  Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. Section 1337) declares unlawful "unfair 
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation and sale" of articles subject to 
satisfaction of a domestic industry test. Can the gover nment of United States provide a 
description as to what is a domestic industry test?  
 
RESPONSE:  The domestic industry test is found at 19 U.S.C. Section 337 (a)(2) and (3).  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 246 - 
 
  185.  What are the exact parameters based on which "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts 
in the importation and sale" are determined?  
 
RESPONSE:  Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in importation and sale are based 
on causes of action found by the federal and state courts to be unfair.  
 
Question 186  
3.3.7.9.3 Intellectual  property rights – Section 337 investigations (3.334 -3.338)  
186.  On the aspect of unfair competition, what changes have been brought in by the 'Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property' issued jointly by Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property were forward -looking when they were first 
issued in 1995 and have stood the test of time. In 2017, th e agencies updated the IP 
Guidelines to reflect intervening changes in statutory and case law. See 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ doj-and-ftc-issue-updated -antitrust -guidelines -licensing -
intellectual -property . The 2017 IP Guidelines modernized, but did not disturb, the Guidelines' 
core principles or mode of analysis. The agencies' general enforcement approach to intellectual 
property  licensing has not changed.  
 
Question 187  
3.3.7.9.3 Intellectual property rights – Section 337 investigations (3.335)  
187.  When a complaint alleging a violation of section 377 is received, on whom does the burden as 
well the onus of proof lie to prove that a vi olation of section 377 has taken place?  
 
RESPONSE:  The burden of proof to prove a violation of section 337 lies with the complainant.  
 
Question 188  
3.3.7.9.3 Intellectual property rights – Section 337 investigations (3.336)  
188.  According to the secretariat rep ort, there exist a set of exclusion orders, that bar the entry of 
infringing goods into the United States from whatever source (general exclusion orders) or to 
bar entry to imports from specifically identified entities (limited exclusion orders). The USITC  
must consider the effects of a remedial order on: public health and welfare; competitive 
conditions in the U.S. economy; the production of like or directly competitive articles in the 
United States; and U.S. consumers. What are the measures that the gover nment of United 
States taking to ensure that the overall working of the United States economy is not disrupted?  
 
RESPONSE:  The ITC requests briefing from the parties and the public on whether issuance of 
an exclusion order will harm consumers or competitive conditions in the United States, and 
will tailor its exclusion order accordingly.  
 
Question 189  
3.3.7.9.4 Intellectual p roperty rights – IP and technology transfer (3.339)  
189.  As per the secretariat report, Government's research conducted by federally operated 
laboratories and federally funded R&D centres results in inventions or findings that contribute 
to the development of n ew technologies and processes. Commercialization of these outputs 
can yield economic and social benefits that increase returns on the investment in federal R&D. 
What measures is the United States government taking to ensure that the said 
commercialisation is not misused?  
 
RESPONSE:  Under the Bayh -Dole Act, it is the policy and objective of the U.S. Congress to 
use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported 
research or development; to encourage maximum partici pation of small business firms in 
federally supported research and development efforts; to promote collaboration between 
commercial concerns and non -profit organizations, including universities; to ensure that 
inventions made by non -profit organizations an d small business firms are used in a manner 
to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and 
discovery; to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the 
United States by United Stat es industry and labo ur; to ensure that the Government obtains 
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 247 - 
 
  protect the public against non -use or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the 
costs of adm inistering policies in this area. 35 USC 200 . 
 
Questions 190 -191 
3.3.7.9.4 Intellectual property rights – IP and technology transfer (3.339 -3.340)  
190.  Has there been any recent study to assess the success of programs conducted by USA that 
are aimed towards strengthening technology transfer and capacity building in LDC countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  We are not aware of any such studies.  
 
191.  Also, are th ere any priority areas identified by the government that are given special regard 
in projects aimed towards facilitating technology transfer and capacity building in LDC 
countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer to "Report on the Implementation of Article 66.2 of  the TRIPS 
Agreement: United States of America," document number IP/C/W/646 (Oct. 18, 2018).  
 
Questions 192 -193 
3.3.7.9.4 Intellectual property rights – IP and technology transfer (3.340)  
192.  Please provide information/ details on patent cases under 28US Code 1498 so far.  
 
RESPONSE:  A historical review of cases decided under 28 USC 1498 is beyond the scope of 
the current Trade Policy Review. Detailed information regarding Section 1498 (entitled "Patent 
and Copyright Cases") of U.S. Code Title 28 (entitled "Judiciary and Judicial Proc edure"), 
Chapter 91 (entitled "Court of Federal Claims") can be found at 28 U.S.C. 1498.  
 
193.  Please provide information on the number and details of petitions received for 'march in rights' 
under the Bayh Dole Act so far.  
 
RESPONSE:  The 2016 Congressional Res earch Service Report , "March -In Rights Under the 
Bayh-Dole Act," notes that "six petitions have been filed requesting that the NIH 'march in' 
with respect to a particular pharmaceutical," and describe s the nature of these petitions. The 
Federal Government has never exercised its march -in rights since the Act was implemented 
in 1980. For more information on the Bayh Dole Act, see: https://www.nist.gov/tpo/bayh -
dole-regulations -federally -funded -inventions . 
 
Question 194  
3.3.7.9.4 Intellectual property rights – IP and technology transfer (3.341)  
194.  The Partnerships for Enhanced Engagement in Research (PEER) program aims  to build capacity 
among local scientists and research institutions strengthen research partnerships world -wide 
and better translate data and evidence into policy. What measures the government of United 
States is taking so as to provide the required suppor ted needed by PEER?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer to "Report on the Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement: United States of America," document number IP/C/W/646 (Oct. 18, 2018).  
 
Question 195  
4.1.1 Agriculture – Main features (4.3)  
195.  The U.S. agri cultural sector is among the largest in the world. Despite a sizable domestic 
market, much of agriculture is highly export oriented, particularly in the production of 
soybeans, maize, wheat, cotton, and chicken. Can the government of United States provide 
the reasons for the same?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. agricultural sector is highly productive due to climate, agronomic 
conditions, and high levels of technology adoption coupled with implementation of economies 
of scale. As a result, U.S. producers are able to export a share of their production on a 
competitive basis.  
 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 196  
4.1.2 Agriculture – Major support programmes (4.9)  
196.  In July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced its intention to provide a short -term 
aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with market disruptions caused by 
retaliatory tariffs. The United States is requested to provide the following information:  
a. How does the USA intend to classify this expenditure under the domestic support 
provisions of the Agreement o n Agriculture?  
b. It is also reported that the USA will tap federal food purchase and distribution 
programs to buy surplus commodities to help the farmers. What products would be 
covered under such public stockholding programmes at administered prices?  
 
RESPO NSE: The United States will determine the appropriate classification when the 
programs are notified. The Food Purchase and Distribution Program is a program to purchase 
commodities targeted by retaliatory tariffs for nutritional programs, not a public stoc kholding 
program. The commodities will be purchased through an open bid process at prevailing 
market prices. The commodities purchased will include meat, dairy, rice, and specialty crops 
and will be distributed to eligible nutrition programs.  
 
Further det ails can be found on USDA's website: https://www.usda.gov/media/press -
releases/2018/09/04/usda -launches -trade -mitigation -programs . 
 
Questions 197 -199 
4.1.2.2 Agriculture – Price Loss Coverage (PLC) (4.11)  
197.  Could the US explain how the PLC is decoupled when it is triggered by current prices of covered 
commodities?  
 
RESPONSE:  PLC payments are made on historical base acres with no requirement that the 
owner of base acres plant the historical commodity upon which payments are based or any 
other commodity.  
 
198.  The PLC payments were given to specific crops such as wheat (US$1,273 million), long grain 
rice (US$736 million), peanuts (US$528 million), sorghum (US$ 342 million), and maize 
(US$208 million). Why the US has not notified these payments under product specific support?  
 
RESPONSE:  The expenditures noted by India represent payments made to owners of 
historical base acres of those commodities. PLC payments are not made to current production 
of specific crops. They are paid on historical base acres, with no requirement that the owner 
of base acres plant the historical commodity upon which payments are based or any other 
commodity. Therefore, they are not spec ific to a commodity.  
 
199.  As per the domestic support notification, the PLC payments has increased from US$ 1.9 billion 
in 2015 to US$ 3.27 billion in 2016. What are the reasons for this sharp increase in PLC 
payment?  
 
RESPONSE:  The PLC guarantee is a fixed ta rget price, so as prices for some historically -
covered commodities have fallen, this has led to larger income payments on historical base 
acres enrolled in PLC.  
 
Questions 200 -201 
4.1.2.2 and 4.1.2.3 Agriculture – Price Loss Coverage and Agricultural Risk Coverage (4.11, 4.15)  
200.  US is requested to provide PLC and ARC payments details as percentage of value of production 
during 2014 – 2016 for the following crops wheat, rice, peanuts, sorghum, maize, soybean.  
 
RESPONSE:  ARC-CO and PLC payments are made on hist orical base acres with no 
requirement that the owner of base acres plant the historical commodity upon which payments 
are based or any other commodity. They bear no relationship to the current value of 
production of the historical commodities.  
 
201.  There is a sharp decline in ARC -CO payment in 2016 (US$3.77 billion) in comparison to year 
2015 (US$5.9 billion)? Please explain the reasons for sharp decline in ARC -CO Payments?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 249 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  The ARC -CO guarantee is based on average revenue over the preceding five 
years. As prices for some historically -covered commodities have decreased over time, the 
average revenue used to calculate the guarantee has declined, leading to smaller income 
payments on historical base enrolled in ARC -CO. 
 
Questions 202 -205 
4.1.2.6 Agriculture – Cotton (4.24)  
202.  Cotton has always been an important export crop, and exports have continued to rise with the 
decline in textile production in the United States. Can the government of United States provide 
the reasons for the same?  
 
RESPONSE:  Per the response to Question 204, U.S. cotton exports vary by year, depending 
on market conditions.  
 
203.  What is the average farm size of cotton farm in the US?  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. farms generally produce more than one commodity, so the size of most 
operations will be larger than the acreage devoted to any one crop. On average nationally, 
farms that produce cotton plant 626 acres of their operations to cotton. That average vari es 
regionally, however, from a high of 932 acres in the Prairie Gateway region to a low of 300 
acres  in the Heartland  region. (For a map of U.S. production regions, see: 
https://wayback.archive -it.org/5923/20110913212900/ 
http:/www.ers.usda .gov/Briefing/ARMS/resourceregions/resourceregions.htm#older).  
 
204.  Could the US provide details of annual domestic production of and its exports for the years 
2014 - 2016?  
 
RESPONSE:  
U.S. Cotton Production and Exports  
 2014/2015  2015/2016  2016/2017  
 1,000 480 lb. bales  
Production  16,319  12,888  17,170  
Exports  11,246  9,153  14,917  
Source:  USDA Foreign Agriculture Service Production Supply and Distribution Database  
205.  What is the share of small, medium, long and extra -long cotton (lengthwise) in total export 
and total production of cotton for each year during 2014 to 2017?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States does not have readily available production data on staple 
length that corresponds to the lengths outlined in the U.S. tariff codes. Export data, by staple 
length, can be found in the following table:  
 
 U.S. Cotton (HS 5201) Exports  
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 metric tons  
Total 2.17 2.40 2.47 3.25 
5201.00.1025  
"<25.4mm"  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.08 
5201.00.1090  
"25.4 -28.575"  1.11 1.16 1.06 1.14 
5201.00.2030  
">28.575/Pima"  0.08 0.05 0.09 0.09 
5201.00.9000  
">28.575 Other"  0.95 1.17 1.29 1.94 
Source:  USDOC Bureau of Census.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Questions 206 -208 
4.1.2.7 Agriculture – Sugar (4.32)  
206.  What is the eligibility criterion to participate in the Refined Sugar Re -Export Program and the 
Sugar -Containing Products Re -Export Program?  
 
RESPONSE:  The only eligibility requirement is to meet the definition of refiner or 
manufacturer.  The requirements  can be found  in CFR 7 Part 1530:  https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi
-bin/text -idx?SID=664bf695ba6605b31940a63031e4b5fa&mc=true&node=pt7.10.1530&rgn
=div5 . 
 
207.  What is the annual expected expenditure during the period 2016 -17? 
 
RESPONSE:  There are no expenditures in the Refined Sugar Re -Export Program or the Sugar -
Containing Products Re -Export Program. There are no fees for a license, and no costs, other 
than routine administrative costs.  
 
208.  Given the fact that the trade distorting support was 64 % for sugar in 2016, is the US 
government is planning to reduce tr ade distorting support under next farm bill?  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The 2014 Farm Bill 
authorizes current farm programs through the 2018 crop year. We look forward to keeping 
the Membership informed of any changes  that may occur in a future Farm Bill. The United 
States would note that sugar is rarely procured under the market price support program 
implemented by the United States, despite notifying the full quantity of production eligible to 
be procured at the anno unced administered price, as set out under WTO rules.  
 
Question 209  
4.1.4 Agriculture – Levels of support (4.50)  
209.  The OECD notes that the United States has reduced its producer support and border protection 
substantially since 1986 -88, and support levels to  agricultural producers have remained 
consistently below the OECD average. The share of the potentially most distorting support is 
also lower than the OECD average. Market price support has declined in importance over the 
years relative to budgetary suppor t that requires production. Can the United States 
government the measures it is taking so as to ensure that the OECD guidelines are followed?  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. farm programs are designed to minimize distortions and enable producers 
to respond to market signals. U.S. risk management programs are structured to provide a 
broad range of insurance products to help farmers manage risk. Congress periodically reviews 
farm programs and risk management instruments, generally within the context of the Farm 
Bill leg islative process.  
 
Questions 210 -215 
4.4 Services  
210.  The US has taken specific commitments in the GATS on its H -1B visa and other categories. 
Over the past few years, a large number of policy changes have been announced by the US 
Citizenship and Immigration S ervices (USCIS) on measures relating to issue of H -1B visas and 
other visas. It will be useful to highlight key changes in its TPR, especially those changes which 
impact its WTO commitments.  
 
RESPONSE:  This question relates to matters that presently are the subject of a request for 
consultations from India under Article 4 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"). As a general matter, information about U.S. 
visa categories is available at the websites of the U.S. Department of State 
(https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en.html ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(https://www.uscis.gov/) . 
 
211.  The US GATS commitments states that the entry for persons engaged in speciality occupations 
is limited to three years. The new policy announced by the US in February 2018 empowers 
the US Citizenship and Immigra tion Services (USCIS) to issue H -1B visas to an employee only 
for the period for which he/she has work at a third -party worksite. However, no such 
requirement is mentioned in the US GATS commitments. The US is requested to inform how 
imposing this conditio n is GATS consistent.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 251 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  This question relates to matters that presently are the subject of a request for 
consultations from India under Article 4 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"). As a ge neral matter, information about U.S. 
visa categories is available at the websites of the U.S. Department of State 
(https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en.html ) and U.S. Department of Homelan d Security 
(https://www.uscis.gov/) . 
 
212.  It is understood that as a result of this policy companies seeking H -1B visas for their 
employees working at a third -party site, would now have an intensive paper work to file be fore 
submitting their applications. This includes evidence of actual work assignments, which may 
include technical documentation, milestone tables, marketing analysis, cost -benefit analysis, 
brochures, and funding documents. The US is requested to inform h ow much extra cost 
companies would be incurring per visa application as a result of this new policy?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question relates to matters that presently are the subject of a request for 
consultations from India under Article 4 of the Understanding o n the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"). As a general matter, information about U.S. 
visa categories is available at the websites of the U.S. Department of State 
(https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en.html ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(https://www.uscis.gov/) . 
  
213.  Is this new policy applicable equally to domestic companies as well as foreign companies?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question relates to matters that presently are the subject of a request for 
consultations from India under Article 4 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"). As a general matter, informat ion about U.S. 
visa categories is available at the websites of the U.S. Department of State 
(https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en.html ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(https://www.uscis.gov/) . 
 
214.  How many speciality occupations visas of less than three years were issued after the 
implementation of this policy and how does it compare with speciality occupations visas issued 
in the previous year s? 
 
RESPONSE:  This question relates to matters that presently are the subject of a request for 
consultations from India under Article 4 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"). As a general matter, info rmation about U.S. 
visa categories is available at the websites of the U.S. Department of State 
(https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en.html ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(https://www.uscis.gov/) . 
 
215.  According to a US think tank National Foundation for American Policy, the top seven Indian IT 
companies experienced a whopping 43 per cent drop in their H -1B visa approvals between 
2015 and 2017. The report also showed that more H -1B visas are going to US technology 
companies. The US is requested to inform the reasons for this steep drop in H1B visa approvals 
to Indian IT companies.  
 
RESPONSE:  This question relates to matters that presently are the  subject of a request for 
consultations from India under Article 4 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"). As a general matter, information about U.S. 
visa categories is available at the websites of th e U.S. Department of State 
(https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en.html ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(https://www.uscis.gov/) . 
 
Question 216 
4.4.1 Financial services (4.83)  
216.  The US is requested to inform whether foreign banks are allowed to have benefits under the 
TARP or not. If yes, how many foreign banks got benefitted under the TARP?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer to: U.S. Department of the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program 
Monthly Report to Congress, available at: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
financial -stability/reports/Documents/October%202014%20Monthly%20Report%20to%20CWT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 252 - 
 
  ongress.pdf  and U.S. Department of the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year 
Retrospective, available at: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial -stability/reports/ 
Documents/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Re trospective10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf. 
 
Questions 217 -219 
4.4.1.2 Financial services – Legislation and regulation (4.85)  
217.  The DFA (Dodd -Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010) established 
a new and comprehensive regulatory f ramework, which included bringing previously 
unregulated markets, entities, and activities under the regulatory sphere. How far is this 
regulatory framework proving to be effective?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer to: Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2017 An nual Report, 
available  at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies -reports/Documents/FSOC_20
17_Annual_Report.pdf , and A Financial Syste m That Creates Economic Opportunities: 
Nonbank  Financials,  Fintech  and Financial  Innovation,  available  at: https://home.treasury.go
v/sites/default/files/2018 -08/A-Financial -System -that-Creates -Economic -Opportunities ---
Nonbank -Financials -Fintech -and-Innovation_0.pdf .  
 
218.  The US is requested to inform whether there is any discrimination ag ainst foreign financial 
institution in the DFA.  
 
RESPONSE:  Details with respect to foreign banking organizations are available in the final 
rule, available at:  "Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign 
Banking Organizations" Final Rule, Federal Reserve System, 12 CFR Part 252 [Regulation YY; 
Docket No. 1438], Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 59 / Thursday, March 27, 2014 / Rules and 
Regulations. See: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR -2014-03-27/html/2014 -05699.htm . 
The Federal Reserve reasserted the non -discriminatory approach and "due regard to the 
principle of national treatment and equality of competitive opportunity, and to take into 
account the extent to which the foreign banking organization is subject, on a consolidated 
basis, to home country standards that are comparable to those applied to financial companies 
in the United States". (Federal Register Vol. 79, no 59. p. 17241) This was also a requirem ent 
of Dodd -Frank Act Section 165.  
 
219.  The US is requested to provide details of the framework established under the DFA.  
 
RESPONSE:  Please  refer to: Financial  Stability  Oversight  Council,  2017 Annual  Report,  avail
able at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies -reports/Documents/FSOC_2017_ 
Annual_Report.pdf . 
 
Question 220  
4.4.1.2 Financial services – Legislation and regulation (4.90)  
220.  DFA introduced the Volcker Rule under its ambit whose objective was to reduce the amount 
of speculative investments in insured banks and any company affiliated with an insured bank. 
Has the introduction of this rule proved to be a success?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer to: Financial  Stability  Oversight  Council,  2017 Annual  Report,  avail
able at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies -report s/Documents/FSOC_2017_ 
Annual_Report.pdf . 
 
Question 221  
4.4.1.3 Financial services – Consolidated financial sector regulation (4.97)  
221.  Due to the fragmented nature of the sector, a number of federal and state regulators are 
responsible for the supervision of  the banking sector. In case a dispute has arisen, which 
regulator will prevail over the other?  
 
RESPONSE:  See the agreement at the link below from the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors,  which  covers  this issue: https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017 -11/state 
_federal_fbo_agrmnt.pdf.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 253 - 
 
  Question 222  
4.4.1.4 Financial services – Banking services (4.99)  
222.  The US is requested to inform exceptions to accept  FDIC insured deposit has been granted in 
any of its FTAs or with any other country on a reciprocal basis.  
 
RESPONSE:  Please see page 6 of the U.S. Annex III in the U.S. -Mexico -Canada 
Agreement,  available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/T
ext/NCM_Annex_III_United_States.pdf . 
 
Question 223  
4.4.1.4 Financial services – Banking services (4.104)  
223.  The US is reques ted to inform what are these other limitations that could be applied at the 
state level.  
 
RESPONSE:  Please see the U.S. schedule of commitments in the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services.  
 
Question 224  
4.4.1.5 Financial services – Insurance  services (4.105)  
224.  The US is requested to inform what are the restrictions, if any, on cross -border insurance 
portability for medical purposes. Which are the insurance companies that offer such insurance 
portability?  
 
RESPONSE:  Many insurance companies offe r medical coverage for policyholders who are 
overseas. The United States does not restrict insurance companies from offering such benefits.  
 
Question 225  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.148)  
225.  The US is requested to inform about the interoperability provisions in its autonomous regime 
as well its various FTAs.  
 
RESPONSE:  FCC rules address interoperability in several different contexts including 
interoperability between federal and non -federal users in certain spectrum bands related to 
public safety, interoperabi lity across certain spectrum bands, interoperability of certain 
accessibility technologies, and notice by local exchange carriers when they make changes that 
would affect the interoperability of their facilities and networks.  
 
As for U.S. free trade agreem ents, the recently signed U.S. -Mexico -Canada Agreement 
(USMCA) is one of the first to have a chapter on telecommunications that considers 
interoperability in its article on access and use of public telecommunications service.  
 
The United States also enters  into mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) with other 
governments regarding conformity assessment of telecommunications equipment. More 
information about the FCC's role is available below. The USMCA also addresses MRAs in its 
sectoral annex on information and communication technology. 
See: https://www.fcc.gov/general/equipment -authorization -mutual -recognition -agreements . 
 
Question 226  
4.4.3 Postal and courier s ervices (4.154)  
226.  The US is requested to inform what are the policy changes that led to strong increase in 
receipts (exports) and decline in payments (imports).  
 
RESPONSE:  It is more likely that the changes in the trade balance are related to 
macroeconomic a nd other factors.  
 
Question 227  
4.4.4 Distribution services (4.181)  
227.  The US is requested to inform what are the sub -federal and local non -discriminatory limitations 
on the sales of alcohol and firearms.  
 
RESPONSE:  Limitations, which vary at the sub -federal level, include limits on the number of 
alcohol retailers and limitations on types of firearm sales and transfers. State regulations of WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 254 - 
 
  firearm sales can be found at: https://www.atf.gov/firearms/state -laws-and-published -
ordinances -firearms -32nd-edition .  
 
A directory of state alcohol control boards, where relevant regulation for particular states can 
be found, is at: https://www.ttb.gov/wine/state -ABC.shtml#US . 
 
Question 228  
4.4.4 Distribution services (4.184)  
228.  The US is requested to inform what are the restrictions at the sub -federal and local levels that 
affect movement of professionals from one state to another state in the US, particularly in IT 
services and professional services.  
 
RESPONSE:  In general, a professional license to practice in one state does not provide a 
practice right in another stat e in the absence of recognition provisions. Most IT services do 
not require state licensure.  
 
Question 229  
4.4.4.5 Distribution services - franchising (4.186)  
229.  The US is requested to inform what are the federal regulations and state laws regulating 
franchis ing. How much royalty is being paid and received annually by the US on account of 
franchising?  
 
RESPONSE:  The primary federal regulation is described at length in the Secretariat's report. 
Paragraph 4.191 characterizes key differences in state -level regula tion of franchising; states 
with franchising laws publish these laws on their websites. The data on royalty and license 
fees for trade in franchising services is provided in Chart 4.14 of the Secretariat Report.   
 
Question 230  
4.4.5.2 Construction services – Regulatory regime (4.199)  
230.  The US is requested to inform what are the conditions for granting the licenses for contractors 
involved in construction business.  
 
RESPONSE:  Regulations for the licensing of contractors differ by state. As an example of 
information available, see https://www.nascla.org/page/LicensingInfo , where the National 
Association of State Contracto r Licensing Agencies has links to U.S. state requirements.  
 
Question 231  
4.4.5.2 Construction services – Regulatory regime (4.201)  
231.  The US is requested to inform what are the barriers faced by the construction industry. What 
are the limitations on foreigner s' participation in private construction activities?  
 
RESPONSE:  Limitations exist for foreign participation in marine dredging for construction 
projects.  
 
Question 232  
4.4.6.1.2 Airports (4.217)  
232.  It is understood that the US applies Buy American provisions to a number of services sectors, 
as reflected in the TPR. The US is requested to inform how the provisions of Buy American 
policy are GATS consistent particularly in those services sectors where the US has undertaken 
'None' commitments for national treatme nt.  
 
RESPONSE:  The Buy American program covers government procurement and is outside the 
scope of GATS Article XVII.  
 
Question 233  
4.4.6.2.3 Shipbuilding and ship repairs (4.249)  
233.  India is concerned with MARAD, that provides financial assistance to ship -owners and US 
shipyards through Federal Ship Financing Program (Title XI) as well as Capital Construction 
Fund and Construction Reserve Fund. Considering that these can be considered as industry -
specific subsidies, we seek further explanation as to why they may not be prohibited as these 
measures take the form of loans with interest rates below market rates.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 255 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  Under the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, whether financial 
assistance constitutes an actionable subsidy depends on whether t he assistance conveys a 
benefit to the recipient and is provided to a specific sector. This entails a complex legal and 
factual analysis. Of the three referenced programs, only the Title XI program involves 
financing. The mere fact that a program facilitat es financing below market interest rates does 
not necessarily mean that it provides a prohibited subsidy.  
 
Question 234  
4.4.7.2 Tourism – Regulatory regime (4.263)  
234.  The US is requested to inform what are the subsidy programmes available for tourism industry  
in the US. How much is the subsidy provided to tourism industry in previous five years? How 
much of this was available only to domestic players?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States does not have subsidy programs for the tourism industry. 
Similar to many other co untries, including India (Incredible India), the United States does 
have a tourism education and promotion program (Brand USA).  
 
Question 235  
4.5 E-commerce (4.271)  
235.  The US is requested to inform the details of the federal and state measures that address 
various aspects of e -commerce? Is the list provided in Table 4.31 on page 216 of the TPR 
exhaustive? What are the provisions for cr oss-border flow of information?  
 
RESPONSE:  The list of measures provided on page 216 of the Secretariat Report is a useful 
list of major laws in the United States that have an effect on what is commonly understoo d to 
constitute e -commerce. The United States does not have measures that specifically regulate 
the flow of information across its national border.  
 
Questions 236 -249 
4.5 E-commerce  
The government of United States is requested to provide clarifications regarding the United States 
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act) and its impact on trade with respect to the 
following:  
236.  How compatible is the CLOUD Act wi th EU GDPR? In instances of incompatibility, what 
mechanisms for resolution have been proposed under the Act?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Act sets up a framework to reduce conflicting legal obligations that U.S. 
companies may face when confronted with orders by one cou ntry to produce data that another 
country's law prohibits them from disclosing. It authorizes the government to enter into 
executive agreements under which the United States and certain countries may commit to 
remove legal impediments to cross -border compl iance with court orders in cases that involve 
serious crimes and where certain targeting restrictions are followed. Only countries with robust 
laws protecting privacy and civil liberties are eligible for such agreements. For more 
information about the CLOU D Act, please consult the statement of Associate Deputy Attorney 
General Sujit Raman, available here: https://www.justice .gov/opa/speech/associate -deputy -
attorney -general -sujit-raman -delivers -remarks -center -strategic -and. 
 
237.  Effect of the Act, if any, on the US -EU Privacy Shield.  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act involves government access to data for law enforcement 
purposes and does not expand the powers of criminal law enforcement authorities. It does not 
conflict with the US -EU Privacy Shield Framework,  which provides a basis under EU law for 
transfers of personal data from the EU to participating U.S. companies and other 
organizati ons. The Privacy Shield Framework is unrelated to, and unaffected by, the CLOUD 
Act. 
 
238.  Does the Act enable the Unites States to acquire data across international borders regardless 
of other nations' data privacy laws? I f yes, what are the conditions/ safeguards which will need 
to be fulfilled in order to acquire such data?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act does not give U.S. law enforcement any new  legal process to 
acquire data; rather it clarifies the scope of existing authority. Among other things, the CLOUD WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 256 - 
 
  Act clarifies that under the Stored Communications Act, which is one U.S. statutory basis for 
law enforcement investigations, a provider subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who 
receives a search warrant is obligated to produce responsive data within its control, no matter 
where the provider has chosen to store it. A warrant under the CLOUD Act must satisfy the 
same constitutional and statutory protections applicable to other warrants, including probable 
cause and particularity, based on a sworn  affidavit, to the satisfaction of an independent judge 
before the government may obtain the requested information.  
 
This approach clarified  by the CLOUD Act is the same approach taken under the laws of 
many  other rights -respecting countries, including in Europe and elsewhere, in authorizing law 
enforcement investigators to obtain a warrant to compel the disclosure of evidence stored 
outside their nation's borders. The ability to compel a person within a country's territory to 
produce data within their cont rol is also required by Article 18 of the Budapest Convention.  
 
239.  Which conditions, if any, require the consent of the foreign individual, the foreign government 
and the company which is expected to provide the data? In case consent of the first two 
parties is required, who is expected to bear the economic costs of such a process?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act clarifies the obligation of communication service providers 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to preserve, backup, or disclose data within 
their control, no matter where they have chosen to store it. The CLOUD Act does not give U.S. 
law enforcement any new  legal process to acquire data; rather it clarifies the scope of existing 
authority. The CLOUD Act does not impose any new legal requirements . It also mirrors the 
obligation of a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce paper records 
and physical evidence pursuant to a U.S. subpoena, no matter  where the records are located.  
 
The CLOUD Act also sets up a framework to re duce conflicting legal obligations that U.S. 
companies may face when confronted with orders by one country to produce data that another 
country's law prohibits them from disclosing. It authorizes the government to enter into 
executive agreements under whic h the United States and certain countries may commit to 
remove legal impediments to cross -border compliance with court orders in cases that involve 
serious crimes and where certain targeting restrictions are followed. Only countries with robust 
laws protec ting privacy and civil liberties are eligible for such agreements.  
 
240.  What safeguards are in place to prevent misuse of this Act, to not only impact the privacy of 
persons but to also prevent large economic costs to the companies?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act do es not give U.S. law enforcement any new  legal process to 
acquire data; rather it clarifies the scope of existing authority. Among other things, the CLOUD 
Act clarifies that under the Stored Communications Act, which is one U.S. statutory basis for 
law enf orcement investigations, a provider subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who 
receives a search warrant is obligated to produce responsive data within its control, no matter 
where the provider has chosen to store it. A warrant under the CLOUD Ac t must satisfy the 
same constitutional and statutory protections applicable to other warrants, including probable 
cause and particularity, based on a sworn affidavit, to the satisfaction of an independent judge 
before the government may obtain the requeste d information.  
 
The CLOUD Act also sets up a framework to reduce conflicting legal obligations that U.S. 
companies may face when confronted with orders by one country to produce data that another 
country's law prohibits them from disclosing. It authorizes the government to enter into 
executive agreements under which the United States and certain countries may commit to 
remove legal impediments to cross -border compliance with court orders in cases that involve 
serious crimes and where certain targeting restr ictions are followed. Only countries with robust 
laws protecting privacy and civil liberties are eligible for such agreements. Such laws must be 
compatible with the Budapest Convention, safeguard the global free flow of information, and 
uphold internationa l human rights obligations, among other things. In addition, that nation's 
orders must be subject to review or oversight by a court, judge, magistrate, or other 
independent authority; they may not be used to infringe freedom of speech, and they must 
be tar geted at individual accounts.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 257 - 
 
  241.  The United States may list the current Executive Agreements with foreign governments under 
the CLOUD Act. Also, the US may inform if it has shared data with these countries after the 
signing of the agreement.  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act requires that the Attorney General of the United States must 
certify to the Congress that an executive agreement, and the foreign partner's legal system, 
meet the various requirements set out in the CLOUD Act. The Congress then has 180 days to 
review the agreement. The Attorney General has not yet certified any executive agreements 
to the Congress. The United States Government is in the process of negotiating a CLOUD Act 
agreement with the United Kingdom.  
 
242.  Does the CLOUD Act allow for extra -territorial jurisdiction of any kind by the United States 
which may have a bearing on a foreign individual, a country, or a company?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act clarifies the obligation of communication service providers 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce data within their control in response 
to lawful U.S. government warrants, no matter where they have chosen to store it. Th is 
clarification in the CLOUD Act does not impose any new legal requirements . It mirrors the 
obligation of a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce paper records 
and physical evidence pursuant to a U.S. subpoena, no matter where  the records are located.  
 
243.  What types of data can the U.S. authorities ask for (as envisaged under the Act), especially 
regarding non -U.S. citizens and the foreign location of storage of such data?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act clarifies the obligation of commu nication service providers 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce data within their control in response 
to lawful U.S. legal process, no matter where they have chosen to store it. The CLOUD Act 
does not give U.S. law enforcement any ne w legal process to acquire data; rather it clarifies 
the scope of existing authority.  
 
244.  Does the CLOUD Act grant U.S. law enforcement officials the ability to order production of 
digital records, regardless of where the data is physically stored? If yes, wh at are the 
safeguards in place under the Act and do such actions involve acquiring consent of the foreign 
government, the foreign individual, and the foreign company involved.  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act clarifies the obligation of communication service providers 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce content and other data within their 
control in response to lawful U.S. legal process, no matter where they have chosen to store 
it. The CLOUD Act does not give U.S. law enforcement any new  legal process to acquire data; 
rather it clarifies the scope of existing authority.  
 
245.  What kinds of commercial presence of U.S. companies in other countries does the Act apply 
to? For exampl e, if a U.S. company has a minor share in a joint venture in a data services 
company in another country, is the foreign company liable to accede to requests for 
information?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act clarifies the obligation of communication service provide rs 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce data within their control in response 
to lawful U.S. legal process, no matter where they have chosen to store it.  
 
246.  What are the penalties which can be imposed for non -adherence to requests?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act merely clarifies the scope of existing authority; it does not 
address the issue of penalties for non -compliance with a request.  
 
247.  Is recourse to the judicial authorities of the country the data is stored in and/ or country of 
citizensh ip of the individual envisioned under the Act?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act establishes a new framework for bilateral agreements with our 
partners that directly addres ses potential conflicts of law. Under such agreements, each nation 
commits to removing legal impediments so that providers can comply with the other nation's 
lawful orders seeking communications data in investigations of serious crime.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 258 - 
 
  248.  Does the Act require companies to ensure the data is to be made available if a U.S. judicial 
authority enforces a  search warrant? Which other judicial authorities are involved in this 
process under the Act?  
 
RESPONSE:  The CLOUD Act clarifies the obligation of communication service providers 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce data within their  control in response 
to lawful U.S. legal process. The CLOUD Act does not give U.S. law enforcement any new legal 
process to acquire data; rather it clarifies the scope of existing authority. Among other things, 
the CLOUD Act clarifies that under the Store d Communications Act, which is one U.S. statutory 
basis for law enforcement investigations, a provider subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States who receives a search warrant is obligated to produce responsive data within its control, 
no matter wher e the provider has chosen to store it. A warrant under the CLOUD Act must 
satisfy the same constitutional and statutory protections applicable to other warrants, 
including probable cause and particularity, based on a sworn affidavit, to the satisfaction of  
an independent judge before the government may obtain the requested information.  
 
This approach clarified by the CLOUD Act is the same approach taken under the laws of 
many  other rights -respecting countries, including in Europe and elsewhere, in authorizing law 
enforcement investigators to obtain legal process to compel the disclosure of evidence stored 
outside their nation's borders. The ability to compel a person within a country's territory to 
produce data within their control is also required by Article 18 of the Budapest Convention.  
 
249.  FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 and its effects, if any, on trade.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States does not anticipate the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act 
of 2017 to have any effects on trade.  
 
Questi on 250  
4.5 E-commerce (4.275)  
250.  The US is requested to inform the details of the Cybersecurity Framework, which seeks to 
support the development of better cybersecurity practices by both governmental and non -
governmental actors.  
 
RESPONSE:  Created through co llaboration between industry and government, the 
Cybersecurity Framework is based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices for 
organizations to better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk. The Cybersecurity Framework 
consists of three main componen ts: the Core, Implementation Tiers, and Profiles. The 
Framework Core provides a set of desired cybersecurity activities and outcomes using common 
language that is easy to understand.  The Framework Implementation Tiers guide 
organizations to consider the a ppropriate level of rigor for their cybersecurity program and 
are often used as a communication tool to discuss risk appetite, mission priority, and budget. 
Framework Profiles are an organization's unique alignment of their organizational 
requirements and objectives, risk appetite, and resources against the desired outcomes of the 
Framework Core. Profiles are primarily used to identify and prioritize opportunities for 
improving cybersecurity at an organization. For further details, see: https://www.nist.gov/ 
cyberframework . 
 
Question 251  
4.5 E-commerce (4.279)  
251.  The US is requested to inform what is the current practice of taxing online businesses in the 
US. Are there any exceptions? What is the current ra te of taxing online sales? Is there any 
discriminat ion for foreign online sellers?  
 
RESPONSE:  The imposition of a sales tax is determined by each of the individual U.S. States. 
The imposition of other taxes or fees on businesses is also determined by each of the individual 
U.S. States. The U.S. federal law known as the Internet Tax Freedom Act bars  all levels of 
U.S. government from imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. The 
same law also prohibits any taxes on Internet access services. Both the federal government 
and sub -federal governments tax electronic businesses on th eir income applying general tax 
rules.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 259 - 
 
  In a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, the Court held that a physical presence in a U.S. state 
was not an absolute necessity under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to establish 
a presence or nexus with the  U.S. state for the purposes of collecting sales tax. In general 
under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. States may impose taxes so long as they (1) apply to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) are fairly apportioned, (3) do not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) are fairly related to the services the State 
provides. In the absence of physical presence, a State must still rely on a substantial nexus 
with it to impose a tax on interstate activity.  
 
QUESTIONS ON GOVERNMENT  REPORT (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Questions 252 -253 
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.1)  
252.  How is it justified to reform the entire global trading system on the basis of national interests 
of one economy, when it comprises of 163 other countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  We do not accept the premise of the question, that there is an effort to reform 
the global trading system on the basis of one economy's national interests. The issues at stake 
are of deep interest and concern to many Members.  
 
253.  How does US plan on  reconciling the conflict of interest between 'fairer outcomes for US 
workers and businesses' and 'more efficient markets for countries around the world'?  
 
RESPONSE:  We see no inherent conflict between fairer outcomes for workers and businesses 
and more ef ficient markets. For example, unfair, mercantilist, and distortionary trade practices 
of non -market economies damage workers and producers in other economies and undermine 
market efficiency.  
 
Question 254  
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1 .6) 
254.  Could the US provide details of the policies it has adopted to promote market competition in 
its own domestic market for agricultural products; and for business activities related to 
electronic commerce?  
 
RESPONSE:  Regarding agriculture, the United Sta tes encourages India to review the U.S. 
submission to the Committee on Agriculture "United States' Experience with Domestic Food 
Security," which outlines how the United States has moved away from policies such as price 
supports and public stockholding. Be ginning with the 1996 Farm Bill, U.S. farm policy has 
moved towards measures that are decoupled from production and less trade -distorting, 
allowing farmers to respond to market signals, such as market prices and import competition. 
Regarding electronic com merce, the United States promotes market competition for business 
activities with a regulatory environment that encourages innovation, promotes investment, 
and facilitates robust cross -border digital trade.   
 
Questions 255 -256 
1 The United States in the Gl obal Trading System (1.7)  
255.  The US states that the "United States will use all tools available – including unilateral action 
where necessary" to prevent countries from benefitting from unfair trade practices. Can the 
United States elaborate what kind of unil ateral actions it is considering in this respect? Will 
these unilateral actions be inconsistent with its WTO commitments? If yes, how does the 
United States reconcile the two.  
 
RESPONSE:  U.S. tools for combatting  unfair  trade  practices  are consistent  with our WTO 
obligations. We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
256.  Does the United States feel that the existing rules at the WTO are ill -equipped to tackle unfair 
trade practices? If yes, what changes does it propose in the WTO agreements to ad dress this 
issue?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has been clear, along with others, that the WTO is not well 
equipped to handle effectively the challenges posed to the trading system by non -market 
economies that generate significant market distortions. The United States has been discus sing WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 260 - 
 
  this issue with those WTO Members that are interested in contributing to a more productive 
future for the WTO and welcomes continued discussions in the future.  
 
Question 257  
1 The United States in the Global Trading System (1.7 -1.8) 
257.  How does US justif y the conflicting approaches between conforming and promoting the respect 
for multilateral trading system in the case of dispute settlement by curbing judicial activism, 
and no refrain from taking unilateral action where its own interests are threatened?  
 
RESPONSE:  There is no conflict between confronting other Members' unfair trade practices 
and promoting respect for the multilateral trading system by insisting that WTO rules be 
followed by the WTO dispute settlement system.  In fact, confronting unfair tra de practices is 
necessary if the multilateral trade system is to be viable and respected.  
 
Question 258  
2.8 Challenges to the U.S. and Global Economy (2.14)  
258.  Could the US provide specific action, which it has taken for dismantling its own domestic 
barriers to services exports of other countries to it under Mode IV?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States is a leading importer of Mode 4 services. Entry requirements 
for foreign service suppliers are relatively low, and represent a balance between facilitating 
the travel of legitimate visitors and securing our borders.  
 
Question 259 -260 
4.1 WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.8)  
259.  Could the US provide justification for it to continue to benefit from flexibilities under the 
Agreement on Agriculture (including concentrating prod uct-specific domestic support at very 
high levels in just a handful of products), while it seeks to curtail the flexibilities available to 
developing countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States is seeking fundamental reform, including substantial 
progressive r eductions in support and protection by all major agricultural players and 
subsidizers.  
 
260.  Could the US provide justification why the product -specific domestic support granted by it 
should not be capped at de minimis , if it seeks to curtail the flexibilities available to developing 
countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please see the response to question 259.  
 
Question 261 -263 
4.1 WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.9)  
261.  Could the US elaborate why its professed commitment to values of free trade are in harmony 
with its imposing additional tariffs on steel and alumin ium products exceeding its bound rates, 
without meeting the requirements of Article XX of GATT?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. Please refer to the statements of the United States at the 29 
October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
262.  Could the US elabo rate why its failure to comply with DSB ruling within the Reasonable Period 
of Time in many disputes promotes the value of free trade and commitments accompanying 
these values?  
 
RESPONSE:  In response to the suggestion that the U.S. compliance record is po or, the facts 
simply do not support that assertion.  
 
263.  Could the US justify why its professed commitment to values of free trade is promoted by 
imposing quotas on exports of steel product from a WTO member, although seeking and 
granting such quotas is strict ly prohibited under the Agreement on Safeguards?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. Please refer to the statements of the United States at the 29 
October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Question 264 -266 
4.2 Trade Enforcement Activities (4.17)  
India appreciates and recognises the United States commitment in managing the international 
agreements. In the process, its role is to identify the violations and  confront such unjustified barriers 
stemming from sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures as well as from technical regulations, 
standards, and conformity assessment procedures (standards -related measures). The exercise done 
for other trading partners ca nnot be compared with any other member, however, in the context of 
the US economy, India would like the US to respond to the queries:  
 
264.  Is there any domestic measures taken by the US that needed correction to meet up with 
International agreements?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States regularly reviews domestic measures to ensure consistency 
with our obligations in international agreements.  
 
265.  If yes, what method[s] did the US adopt to identify such a deviation[s] in the domestic 
regulations and barriers? And  
 
RESPONSE:  Following internal review to ensure consistency with international obligations, 
draft measures are submitted for public comment and notified to appropriate WTO committees 
for comment.  
 
266.  Can the US provide details of such barriers that have been ad dressed in the context of SPS 
and TBT measures?  
 
RESPONSE:  Notification of updates to SPS and TBT measures are submitted to the 
appropriate committee.  
 
Question 267  
4.5.1  Protecting Intellectual Property (4.82)  
267.  What are the components of technical assistance and  capacity building measures that the U.S. 
government undertakes for better enforcement of IP?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer to "Report on the Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement: United States of America," document number IP/C/W/646 (Oct. 18, 2 018).  
 
Question 268  
4.5.2  Promoting Digital Trade (4.85)  
268.  What are the specific details of the digital trade rules that have been incorporated under 
USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE:  The text of the United States – Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA) is publicly 
available. In the U SMCA the United States and its partners achieved the highest -standard 
digital trade chapter ever negotiated in an FTA. This chapter includes rules ensuring cross -
border data flows and prohibiting data localization, rules requiring non -discriminatory and 
duty-free treatment of digital products, rules prohibiting discriminatory requirements to 
transfer source code or algorithms as a condition of market access, and others. The text of 
the chapter is available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA 
/Text/19_Digital_Trade.pdf.  
 
Question 269 -274 
6 Trade and the Environment (6.2)  
269.  What are the geographical jurisdictional powers a t Federal and Sub Federal levels in the US 
for monitoring and surveillance of marine fisheries catches. How the Federal Govt ensures that 
the Provincial Governments implement the rules and regulations strictly within their 
jurisdictions?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 262 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  The U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends no more than  200 nautical 
miles  from the territorial sea baseline and is adjacent to the  12 nautical mile  territorial sea of 
the United States. Under certain U.S. fisheries laws, such as the Magnuson -Stevens Fishe ry 
Conservation and Management Act, the term "exclusive economic zone" is defined as having 
an inner boundary that is  coterminous  with the seaward (or outer) boundary of each of the 
coastal states. While its  outer  limit is the same as the EEZ on NOAA charts, its  inner limit is 
coterminous with the coastal states' boundary at 3 nautical miles , except for Texas, western 
Florida, and Puerto Rico, which claim a 9 nautical mile  belt. See: https://oceanservice.noaa. 
gov/facts/eez.html . 
 
270.  What is  the frequency of the Fish stock assessment in the US and what are the process and 
thresholds being used? Further, is the assessment done for all varieties of species or certain 
targeted species identified by the US?  
 
RESPONSE:  NOAA Fisheries provides catc h advice and other scientific information for the 
nearly 500 marine fisheries stocks and stock complexes managed under U.S. Federal Fishery 
Management Plans. About 200 stock assessments are completed annually. Their results help 
establish annual catch limi ts and provide information about stock status. Because annual 
assessments are not necessary for many stocks, NOAA Fisheries uses a prioritization process 
to help schedule its stock assessments. Working with the Fishery Management Councils, NOAA 
Fisheries s cores each stock on a number of factors ( e.g., importance to commercial or 
recreational fisheries, ecosystem importance, data availability and trends, etc.) to determine 
its importance for a full assessment in the coming year. NOAA Fisheries is also workin g to 
establish stock -specific target assessment frequencies and target levels  for assessment data 
inputs (e.g., catch, abundance, life history) to help guide future data collection and stock 
assessment activities. Detailed information about NOAA Fisheries'  stock assessment programs 
and regional assessment processes  is provided  in the 2018 document, Implementing a Next 
Generation  Stock  Assessment  Enterprise , at: https://spo.nmfs.noaa.gov/co ntent/tech -
memo/SAIP2018 . 
 
271.  What is the yardstick to define the artisanal and small -scale fisheries in the US and their 
numbers?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States does not have a universal standard def inition for artisanal and 
small -scale fisheries. If needed, we would determine this on a case -by-case basis and would 
use characteristics of the fleet and its operations ( e.g., revenue, amount of fish landed 
compared to overall catch limit, size of vessels, etc.). Generally , we consider Tribal and other 
native comm unity fisheries to be in this category.  
 
272.  Can the United States inform the annual catches by its fishers in the US jurisdictional waters, 
RFMO waters and High Seas?  
 
RESPONSE:  The most recent information on U.S. fisheries can be found in the report Fisherie s 
of the United States, 2016, at: https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/resource/document/fisheries -
united -states -2016-report . 
 
273.  Has the United States entered into  Access agreement with any of the countries and if so, then 
the details thereof?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States 
and the United States of America provides fishing access for U.S. purse seine vesse ls to the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 16 Pacific Island parties (PIPs) and promotes broader 
cooperation between the par ties and relevant stakeholders. The Tre aty entered into force in 
1988. In 2016, the United States and PIPS successfully concluded negotiations on 
amendments to the Treaty, including extending the terms of fishing access through 2022.  The 
amendments update the Treaty to promote more effective cooperation between the parties 
and better reflect how tuna fishe ries are managed in the regi on. Vessels pay license fees in 
exchange for fishing access. Up to 40 purse seine vessels operate under the Treaty.  The U.S. 
government exercises its flag state responsibility to enforce the terms of the Treaty on vessels, 
as well as related regulations im plementing applicable conservation and management 
measures adopted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.  In addition to the 
United States, the parties to the Treaty include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 263 - 
 
  Micronesia, Fiji, K iribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islan ds, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) serves as Administrator of the Treaty.  
 
274.  Details of assistance being provided by the US on capacity Building for conservation and 
management measures on marine capture fisheries by other countries?  
 
RESPONSE:  An inventory of U.S. technical assistance and capacity building related to marine 
capture fisheries is available at: https://rmportal.net/biodiversityconservation -gateway/ 
legality -sustainability/fisheries -development/project -search . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Indonesia  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Questions 1 -2 
Summary – (paragraphs 8, 6, 16)  
 “The President's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda is driven to achieve "free, fair, and reciprocal" trade 
relations, considered critical to the U.S. national security p olicy. It also focuses on renegotiating and 
revising trade deals. In terms of reforming the multilateral trading system, the Agenda advocates 
for "sensible and fair reforms to the WTO". It notes that the United States remains committed to 
working with all WTO Members who share the United States' goal of fair and reciprocal trade deals.”  
 
1. Would the U.S. Government kindly share the current U.S. trade and trade -related policies 
direction?  
 
RESPONSE: USTR’s 2019 Trade Policy Agenda is scheduled to be published on March 1, 2019.  
It will be posted on USTR’s website – www.ustr.gov  – in the Reports section.  
 
 “The United States is also one of the world's main importers.  U.S. imports are diversified: the largest 
categories are machinery and mechanical appliances, vehicles, mineral products, and chemicals. 
Reflecting sustained GDP growth, the shares of machinery and mechanical appliances, vehicles, and 
chemicals in total i mports have risen. In contrast, the share of mineral products has declined. The 
EU-28, China, Japan, Canada and Mexico are the United States' main trading partners. The United 
States continues to be the world's main recipient of foreign direct investment ( FDI). The main FDI 
sources are: the EU -28 (59% of the FDI stock in the United States in 2017), Japan (12%), Canada 
(11%), and Switzerland (8%).”  
 
 “The United States continues to be an active user of anti -dumping (AD) duties. Between 2015 and 
2017, the nu mber of AD investigation initiations increased, totalling 133. There were 340 AD orders 
in place as of end -July 2018, compared with 269 on 30 June 2016. The trading partners most 
affected by the measures were China, Chinese Taipei, the European Union, Indi a, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea. The investigations initiated during the period were mainly concentrated in the 
steel industry. Of the 109 countervailing duty (CVD) measures in place as of end -July 2018, some 
50.5% were also applied on iron and steel pr oducts. There were 123 sunset review initiations of AD 
orders during the period from 1 January 2016 to end -June 2018. During the same period, there were 
eight revocations, while 104 orders were continued. There were 52 sunset review initiations of CVD 
orders during the period from 1 January 2016 to end -April 2018. During the same period, 27 sunset 
reviews of CVD orders were concluded; there were six revocations, while the remaining orders were 
continued.”  
 
2. As the largest economy in the world, would the U.S.  Government please inform us why does 
the U.S. still apply protectionist policies, especially for agricultural, textile, and footwear 
products, by imposing high tariff rates, non -ad valorem  tariff rates, domestic support and strict 
trade remedies (includin g anti -dumping) policies?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. tariffs are among the lowest in the world.  The current U.S. simple average 
tariff is 3.4 per  cent on an applied basis and 2.4 per  cent on a trade -weighted basis. When tariff 
preferences are taken into account, the  U.S. trade -weighted average tariff is under 2 per  cent 
on an applied  basis. In 2017, nearly 70 per  cent of all U.S. imports, including those under 
preference programs, entered the United States duty -free.  The United States’ applied tariffs 
and domestic support are within our WTO commitments, as negotiated.  
 
Question 3 -4 
Section 2.3.2.2.1 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) (2.29, 2.33)  
“The GSP is a preference programme designed to promote economic growth in developing and least -
developed countries ( LDCs) by providing preferential duty -free entry. To qualify for GSP, a 
beneficiary country must meet mandatory GSP eligibility criteria established by Congress, including 
respecting arbitral awards, combating child labour, respecting internationally -recogn ized worker 
rights, providing adequate and effective intellectual property protection, and providing the United 
States with equitable and reasonable market access. The programme has effective dates, specified 
in relevant legislation, and requires periodica l reauthorization in order to remain in effect. The GSP 
expired on 31 December 2017; legislation to renew it (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 265 - 
 
  P.L. 115 -141) was enacted on 23 March 2018, and extended the programme from 1 January 2018 
to 31 Decemb er 2020.”  
 
3. What can be taken by Indonesia to improve the benefits from the currently ongoing GSP 
program?  
 
RESPONSE: The most critical step that Indonesia can take to benefit from GSP is to ensure 
that it meets all the eligibility criteria so that it can continue to receive GSP benefits.  USTR 
provides a great amount of information on the GSP program on its website 
https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/trade -development/preference -programs/generalized -system -
preference -gsp/gsp -program -inf. 
 
“During t he period under review, Argentina was reinstated as a beneficiary developing country on 1 
January 2018, and Seychelles, Uruguay, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were officially 
graduated from GSP status on 1 January 2017. In addition, Ukraine's GS P status was partially 
suspended; this became effective 120 days after the Preside ntial Proclamation issued on 
22 December 2017; the transition period granted to provide Ukraine the opportunity to improve its 
protection of intellectual property rights. Cas es for GSP eligibility are open for: Indonesia and 
Uzbekistan (intellectual property rights); the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Georgia, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Thailand and Uzbekistan (worker rights and/or child labour concerns); India, Indonesia, 
and Thailan d (market access); and Ecuador (arbitral awards). An application for new GSP benefits 
for Laos is pending.”  
 
4. What's the procedures and requirements to request for additional eligible products to be 
included in the GSP scheme since Indonesia has already imp lemented many policies based on 
sustainable development framework?  
 
RESPONSE: USTR conducts an Annual GSP Review, which is announced in the Federal Register . 
The Federal Register notice announcing the 2017/2 018 Annual GSP Review can be found at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/gsp/FRN%20reopening%202017 -2018%20AR%204 -
4-18.pdf . 
 
Question 5  
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other technical  requirements  (3.171)  
“The development of standards is decentralized and demand -driven. The private sector addresses 
the needs or concerns expressed by industry, Government, and consumers, through the 
development of voluntary consensus standards (VCSs). Th e actual work to develop these VCSs is 
undertaken by standards developing organizations (SDOs). A private, non -profit organization, the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), coordinates and administers the VCS system. ANSI 
is the sole U.S. member b ody to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and, 
through the U.S. National Committee, to the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).”  
 
5. Would the U.S. Government inform us the procedures and requirements for establishing a 
mutua l recognition cooperation in standards and conformity assessment?  
 
RESPONSE: Section 411 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and section 141 of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1974, as amended, authorize USTR to negotiate mutual recognition 
agreements on behal f of the United States. Such agreements provide, for example, a 
mechanism whereby the United States and a trading partner agree to accept conformity 
assessment results from testing laboratories or certification bodies located in each other's 
respective ter ritories that both trading partners recognize as competent. MRAs are not needed 
for foreign bodies to test and certify products for the U.S. market; the United States allows 
foreign bodies to test and certify products for the U.S. market according to terms  and conditions 
that are no less favourable than those the United States applies to U.S. testing and certification 
bodies. With respect to reliance on ILAC and IAF accreditation, the choice of whether to rely on 
such accreditation is at the discretion of e ach regulator; however, as appropriate, USTR 
encourages regulators to consider ILAC and IAF accreditation as they develop and implement 
their conformity assessment programs. The Consumer Product Safety Commission, for 
example, uses ILAC accreditation in it s third -party testing requirements for toys.  
 
Questions 6 -8 
Section 3.1.5.1 Prohibitions and Restrictions (3.47)  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 266 - 
 
  “The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA 
Fisheries) issued its final rule regarding the establishment of a Seafood Import Monitoring Program 
(SIMP) in December 2016. 45 The Program is set up pursuant to  the Magnuson -Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act (MSRA) of 2006 to cover imported fish and fish 
products at particular risk of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and seafood fraud. 
It requires the importers of r ecord to obtain an annual International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP), 
report data on the harvest of fish and fish products, retain additional supply chain data, and retain 
the records supporting their import filings for a period of two years. The harvest and landing 
documentation for U.S. imports (and exports) is filed electronically through the Automated 
Commercial Environment of the U.S. International Trade Data System (ITDS). SIMP may eventually 
cover additional seafood products.46 However, the Program has been introduced for 13 "priority 
species" identified as particularly vulnerable to IUU fishing or seafood fraud, including tunas 
(albacore, bigeye, skipjack, yellowfin, and bluefin), swordfish, sharks, Atlantic and Pacific cod, 
grouper, red snapper, an d sea cucumber. Although SIMP is only applicable to imported seafood, 
similar reporting requirements also apply to domestic capture fisheries and aquaculture. SIMP 
entered into force for 11 of the 13 species on 1 January 2018.47 As for the two remaining pr iority 
species (abalone and shrimp), the effective date has been delayed for one year, as the enforcement 
of SIMP for these two species is linked to the establishment of appropriate reporting and/or record -
keeping disciplines for the domestic aquaculture p roduction of abalone and shrimp. ” 
 
6. Kindly share the progress on the implementation of SIMP? We are hoping that the 
implementation of SIMP will be simple and will not add extra burden especially to the small 
scale fisheries in Indonesia.  
 
RESPONSE :  SIMP was successfully implemented with no significant disruption to imports of 
legally harvested seafood. NMFS completed a tremendous amount of outreach to U.S. 
importers, foreign exporters, brokers, and software developers to support the smooth 
implementation of SIMP.  Just in the last year:  
• At major ports, NMFS held domestic roundtable discussions to reach local importers and 
brokers.  
• For major exporting nations, NMFS conducted in -person technical assistance to support 
compliance with SIMP.  
• Virtual outreach ha s been a key component of disseminating the requirements of 
SIMP.   Those activities have included hosting many webinars and company -specific calls.  
• Online resource materials, including a compliance guide and aud it guide, have been 
developed. NMFS continues  to update and improve outreach materials as requested by 
industry.  
• A dedicated SIMP support phone and email line for industry was established.  
 
In the first few months of SIMP mandatory compliance, NOAA implemented an “informed 
compliance” period for SIMP  entry filing, allowing brokers additional time to address any issues 
in their software development.   Throughout the informed compliance period, NOAA contacted 
all brokers and importers with incomplete entry filings and, as a result, observed overwhelming 
compliance with the data reporting requirements of SIMP prior to the conclusion of “informed 
compliance” in April 2018.  
 
7. How does the U.S. ensure trading partner that the implementation of SIMP will be equally 
applied to domestic products and there will be  no gap with state’s level regulation?  
 
RESPONSE:  All of the species covered by the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) are 
managed by the federal government, the applica ble state government, or both. Accordingly, 
the comparable reporting and recordkeeping requirements for such species caught domestically 
can be found in the federal and state regulati ons applicable to that species.  In the United States, 
all federal and state regulations are published in the applicable official journ als and are available 
online. For farmed shrimp and abalone, the United States is finalizing a regulation in early 2019 
to ensure comparable data reporting and collection requirements as those applicable to imports 
of farmed shrimp and abalone under SIMP.  
 
8. Indonesia would like to suggest for the importing countries to have a harmonized standard on 
imported seafood products.  
 
RESPONSE: We appreciate the suggestion.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 9  
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.181)  
“The United States  has concluded mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) with numerous foreign 
partners. In the area of telecommunications equipment, MRAs have been signed with Australia; 
Canada; Chinese Taipei; Europe (EU/EFTA); Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea, Republi c of; 
Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Singapore; and Viet Nam. These telecom MRAs establish procedures 
enabling the Parties to recognize each other's competent conformity assessment bodies (CABs), and 
then to accept the conformity assessment results of thos e CABs for regulatory purposes. Foreign 
MRA partners designate their qualified accredited CABs (testing laboratories and/or certification 
bodies) to the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). In the United States, the NIST (through 
the MRA Program Office)  designates qualified U.S. CABs (testing laboratories, certification bodies, 
and/or Notified Bodies in the case of the European Union) to the relevant MRA partners for 
recognition.197 The United States has signed separate MRAs with the EU (2004) and EFTA S tates 
(2006) for marine safety equipment.”  
 
9. Would the U.S. Government inform us the procedures and requirements for establishing a 
mutual recognition cooperation in standards and conformity assessment?   
 
RESPONSE: Section 411 of the Trade Agreements Act of  1979 and section 141 of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1974, as amended, authorize USTR to negotiate mutual recognition 
agreements on behalf of the United States. Such agreements provide, for example, a 
mechanism whereby the United States and a trading partn er agree to accept conformity 
assessment results from testing laboratories or certification bodies located in each other's 
respective territories that both trading partners recognize as competent. MRAs are not needed 
for foreign bodies to test and certify products for the U.S. market; the United States allows 
foreign bodies to test and certify products for the U.S. market according to terms and conditions 
that are no less favourable than those the United States applies to U.S. testing and certification 
bodies. With respect to reliance on ILAC and IAF accreditation, the choice of whether to rely on 
such accreditation is at the discretion of each regulator; however, as appropriate, USTR 
encourages regulators to consider ILAC and IAF accreditation as they devel op and implement 
their conformity assessment programs. The Consumer Product Safety Commission, for 
example, uses ILAC accreditation in its third -party testing requirements for toys.  
 
Question 10  
Section 3.3.3 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Requirements ( 3.182)  
“The United States has numerous laws and regulations pertaining to food safety, animal health, and 
plant health. The promulgation of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) in 2011 (P.L. 111 -353) represented a maj or and long -awaited update in 
the oversight of food safety.198 The FSMA was accompanied by the issuance of seven key 
implementing regulations during 2015 and 2016, as well as four supplementary regulations, 
following a period of extensive public comment an d review. Other major long -standing pieces of SPS 
legislation include the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (including the FSMA amendments), the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, the Egg Products Inspection Act, 
the Plant Protection Act, the Animal Health Protection Act, and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act.”  
 
10. Would the U.S. Government inform us the procedures and requirements to determine equivalent 
of meat products with the United States?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) conducts an equivalency process to determine whether a foreign country’s food 
safety inspection system achieves the appropriate level of public health pr otection as applied 
domestically in the United States by FSIS for the importation of meat products, as defined by 
the regulations.  The criteria by which FSIS assesses the equivalence of a country’s food safety 
inspection system for meat products can be f ound under Title 9 CFR §327.2. For more 
information, please visit the FSIS webpage at: https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/ 
topics/international -affairs/Equivalence . 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Israel  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Question 1  
Section 2.3.2.1 Reciprocal agreements (2.25)  
"In August 2018, the United States and Mexico reached an agreement in principle to modernize 
NAFTA. The agreement in principle makes amendments to existing provisions on different areas and 
covers some new issues."  
 
1. Please explain how increasing the regional value content rule for the auto industry, limiting rules 
that allow for some use of non -NAFTA inputs in textile and apparel trade and increasing or 
introducing new regional value content rules for electronics would conform with the obligation 
in Article XXIV GATT to not raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties.  
 
RESPONSE: Our Free Trade Agreements are intended to prim arily benefit the FTA partners. This 
is reflected in the rules of origin in the USMCA, which are fully consistent with our WTO 
obligations.  
 
Questions 2 -3 
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.174, 3.178)  
 
"The NTTAA directs federal agencies to rely on the output of voluntary consensus standards bodies 
to meet their objectives, and codifies guidance provided in Circular A -119 whereby federal agencies 
are directed to rely on VCSs, rather than government uniqu e standards in the elaboration of technical 
regulations or in their procurement, unless such an approach would be inconsistent with law or 
otherwise impractical."  
 
2. Is there is a directive in the United States to adopt ISO or IEC standards wherever possibl e? 
 
RESPONSE:  Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) and 
Circular A -119, federal agencies are directed to give preference in their regulatory activities to 
standards developed by voluntary consensus standards (VCS) bodies, which  are generally 
private sector organizations, over unique government -developed standards.  Circular A -119 
further elaborates that VCSs are standards developed through a process that includes the 
following attributes or elements: Openness, Balance, Due proce ss, Appeals process.  In addition, 
Circular A -119 provides further guidance to agencies on the selection of appropriate standards. 
Section 5(a) outlines some of the factors agencies should consider when determining which 
standards are most appropriate.  Ad ditional guidance is provided to agencies under Section 5(h), 
which details the WTO TBT obligations agencies must adhere to regarding the use of standards, 
including reference to the WTO Decision on Principles for Development of International 
Standards, Gu ides and Recommendations with Relation to Article 2.5 and Annex 3 of the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade, and under Section 5(i), which provides guidance on 
using or recognizing standards used by trading partners.  
 
"The United States provided 442 TBT notifications concerning proposed and final measures to the 
WTO in 2016, and 295 in 2017."  
 
3. Is there a general rule in the United States that regulations will only enter into force after a 
certain period, such as 6 months after being adopted?  
 
RESP ONSE: No, we have no national rule. The United States Trade Representative enforces our 
trade agreement obligations under, inter alia,  the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, as amended.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Japan  
Report by the Government (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Question 1  
3.3 Advisory Com mittee Process (3.13)  
1. According to the report by the Government, Members of the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy 
and Negotiations (ACTPN) represent a variety of stakeholders including industry, agriculture and 
consumers. Does the government allow U.S. af filiates of foreign multilateral enterprises in the 
U.S. to input their interests into the U.S. trade policy? Does such foreign companies in the U.S. 
have an opportunity to make opinions in the ACTPN?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. Government invites all stakeholders, foreign and domestic, to provide 
their views on U.S. trade policy through testimony at public hearings or in response to Federal 
Register Notices requesting submission of comments.  
 
Question 2  
4.2 Trade Enforcement Activities (4.13)  
2. In 2018, the U.S. implemented trade measures against China, increasing tariff rates on certain 
products, pursuant to the Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Japan is aware that the U.S. 
had undertaken public consultation and is in an ongoing investigation to dete rmine whether to 
exclude particular Chinese products from subjects to additional tariff measures. Please specify 
when and how the U.S. plans to publish its decisions on public consultations. In addition, will 
USTR launch exclusion process for the items tha t are subject to import duties imposed on 
September 24, 2018?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has held extensive public notice and comment processes in 
connection with the trade actions taken with respect to the Section 301 investigation of China's 
acts, poli cies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. 
Those processes included publication of proposed actions; opportunities for written public 
comments; public hearings; and publication of a final action. Further, as the question recognizes, 
for certain actions, the United States has undertaken a second public process involving product -
specific requests for exclusions from a published final list. Details on the exclusion processes, 
including the status of pending req uests, is published on the USTR website, at: https://ustr.gov/ 
issue-areas/enforcement/section -301-investigations/request -exclusion . 
 
Question 3  
4.3 Free  Trade Agreements and Initiatives (4.22)  
3. According to the report by the Government, the United States, Canada and Mexico had reached 
agreement on the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA). Does the government of 
the United States have a plan to mak e guidelines for implementation of the agreement with 
regards to rule of origin? If so, when will the government start the process? Does the government 
have a plan to consult with industries to make such guidelines?  
 
RESPONSE:  Per the procedures of the Tra nsparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTA-TM), found in WT/L/671, the United States and the other parties to the USMCA will notify 
the agreement to the WTO for transparency purposes no later than directly following the parties'  
ratification of  the agreement. We look forward to keeping Members informed, as appropriate.  
 
Question 4  
4.3 Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives (4.22)  
4. According to the report by the Government, the United States, Canada and Mexico had reached 
agreement on the United St ates-Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA). What is the future process 
and outlook for ratification and entry into force? Also, when will the final text of USMCA be 
published?  
 
RESPONSE:  The USMCA was signed on Nov. 30, 2018. It will enter into force after it is  approved 
by all the three Parties, consistent with each Party's internal procedures. The final 
text of the United  States -Mexico -Canada  Agreement  (USMCA)  is available  at: https://ustr.gov/ 
trade -agreements/free -trade -agreements/united -states -mexico -canada -agreement/ 
agreement -between . 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 5  
4.3 Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives (4.38)  
5. The revised KORUS was signed in  September 2018. Does the U.S. plan to publish the final text 
that incorporate revised articles? If so, when will it be published?  
 
RESPONSE:  The modifications to the KORUS are available on the USTR website, at: 
https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -offices/press -office/press -releases/2018/september/ustr -
publishes -agreed -outcomes -us. 
 
Repo rt by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Question 6  
2.1 Trade and Investment Regimes – General Framework (2.4)  
6. According to the report by the Secretariat, unless the TPA 2015 became invalid, the fast track 
procedures that provide for the expedited ratificatio n of trade agreements on the condition that 
the administration fulfil the trade policy priorities and negotiating objectives set by Congress 
shall apply until July 2021. In this regard, is the fast track procedure under TPA 2015 applicable 
not only to conc lusion or amendment of trade agreements, but also to withdrawal from them? 
For example, if the United States is to withdraw from (1) the WTO or (2)NAFTA, what kind of 
domestic procedure is required in relation to the U.S. Congress?  
 
RESPONSE:  Fast track pr ocedures under TPA 2015 apply to consideration and approval of trade 
agreements by the U.S. Congress.  
 
Questions 7 -11 
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements (2.25 -2.26)  
7. Are the 232 Side Letters and the 232 Process Side Letters treated as a part of the USMCA  
Agreement? If so, once the USMCA is ratified, would the Side Letter and Process Letter gain (or 
continue to have) legal effects? In addition, what are the necessary procedures to revise the 
Side Letters after the ratification of the USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE:  The 232 letters between the United States and Mexico and between the United 
States and Canada are not part of the USMCA. There are no particular procedures for their 
modification.  
 
8. Could the U.S. explain the relationship between the 232 Side Letter and the 232  Process Side 
Letter? Accordingly , to the 232 Side Letters of between U.S  & Canada and US  & Mexico, if a 232 
measure is imposed on autos, will the United States suspend imposing 232 measures on 
Canadian and Mexican autos for at least 60 days?  
 
RESPONSE:  The letters entered into force upon completion of the exchange, therefore they 
apply to any action from that date on.  
 
9. How will the parties (US, Canada and Mexico) monitor and allocate the vehicles and autoparts 
eligible for the treatment stated in the 232 S ide Letter?  
 
RESPONSE:  Mexico and Canada will determine the allocation of vehicles and autoparts under 
the terms established in the respective letters.  
 
10. The 232 Side Letter states to what extent Canadian/Mexican autos and auto parts would be 
exempted from 232 measures. Could the U.S. explain how the U.S. intepret the above measure 
in relations to the WTO Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE:  The exemptions envisioned in the 232 letters are consistent with the WTO 
Agreement.  
 
11. Does the U.S. intend to impose additional tariffs as Section 232 measures if amounts of import 
exceeds the specified amount? If not, what kinds of measures will be imposed?  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Member s that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Questions 12 -13 
2.4 Investment Regime (2.47)  
12. 12. With regard to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States  (CFIUS), the pilot 
program under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018( FIRRMA) began 
to be implemented as of November 10, 2018. Based on the application of the pilot program so 
far, could the U.S. tell us how it plans to amend the pilot program when the final FIRRMA 
regulations are implemented?  
 
RESPONSE:  CFIUS is in the proc ess of developing the FIRRMA implementing regulations, which 
must be completed no later than 18 months after FIRRMA's enactment. We remind Members 
that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
13. CFIUS reviews transactions that could result in control of a U.S. busi ness by foreign person, in 
order to determine the effect of such transaction on the national security of the United States. 
Investments from Japan does not negatively affect the national security of the United States. 
Especially, Japanese companies based i n the U.S. has created more than 860 thousand jobs in 
2016. They make substantial contributions toward the U.S. Nevertheless, investments from 
Japan was not excluded from new covered transaction which the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act of  2018 provide. Why weren't investments from allied nations excluded from 
new covered transaction?  
 
RESPONSE:  Like prior CFIUS legislation, FIRRMA itself does not single out any specific country. 
Instead, FIRRMA requires CFIUS to prescribe regulations that  further define the term "foreign 
person" with respect to certain clauses in FIRRMA.  CFIUS is in the process of developing the 
FIRRMA implementing regulations, which must be completed no later than 18 months after 
FIRRMA's enactment.  
 
Question 14  
3.1.2 Ru les of Origin (3.27)  
14. The U.S. government sets forth the special marking requirements for rules of origin on finished 
watches and clocks in Chapter 91, Additional U.S. Note 4, HTSUS. In this regard, has the US 
government been considering deleting or simplif ying this US particular requirements? If yes, 
when will it be implemented?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States is not considering changes to these requirements.  
 
Question 15  
3.1.3 Tariffs (3.3)  
15. The Government of Japan is aware that the U.S. government currently c alculates tariffs on 
finished clocks and watches by aggregating tariffs on their components. In this regard, has the 
US government been considering to simplify procedure of trade by abolishing this import tariff 
calculation method and determining tariff ra tes on HS categorization 6 -digit basis? If yes, when 
will it be implemented?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States is not considering any modifications to the tariff structure for 
clocks and watches.  
 
Question 16  
3.1.4.1 Customs User Fees (3.40)  
16. Under the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, the United States charges 0.125% of 
import price as a harbour maintenance fee. We understand the fee is charged to the duty 
prescribed in the schedule of concessions. Does the United States consider that the fee is 
consis tent with GATT Article 2 and Article 8? If so, could the U.S. provide the reason?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Harbor Maintenance Fee is imposed on use of port facilities pursuant to the 
Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99 -662; 100 Stat. 4082, 4266; 26 U .S.C. § 
4461 et seq.).  Port use is defined as the loading of commercial cargo on, or the unloading of 
commercial cargo from, a commercial vessel at a port, regardless of the origin of the cargo.  See: 
26 U.S.C. §§  4461(a) and 4462(a)(1).  The fee is applied based on the value of the cargo 
declared by the user.  The fee is consistent with U.S. obligations.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 17  
3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.74)  
17. Although the Government of Japan recognizes tha t the Byrd Amendment, Continued Dumping 
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, was found to be inconsistent with the WTO agreement in January 
2003, and was repealed effective October 1, 2007, anti -dumping and countervailing (AD/CV) 
duties collected by CBP before October 1, 2007 has been continuing to be disbursed to domestic 
producers injured by foreign dumping and subsidies. The Government of Japan has reiterated 
this continuance is inconsistent with recommendations of the DSB. To clarify the future possible 
distribution by CBP, could the U.S. show us the remaining amount of the revenues from anti -
dumping and countervailing duties on goods imported from Japan to the United States before 
October 1, 2007, which has not yet been disbursed to the U.S. industries.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States cannot speculate on future actions by CBP. T he Deficit Reduction 
Act – which includes a provision repealing the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000 – was enacted into law in February 2006, and does not permit the distr ibution of duties 
collected on goods entered after October 1, 2007, more than 10 years ago. Accordingly, the 
United States has taken all actions necessary to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in this dispute. Additio nal information is availab le at CBP's Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy  Offset  Act website,  at: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority -issues/adcvd/continued -
dumping -and-subsidy-offset -act-cdsoa -2000. 
 
Question 18  
3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.75)  
18. Concerning the anti -dumping and countervailing duty orders on certain corrosion -resistant steel 
products from China, of which investigation was initiated by the DOC on November 14, 2016, 
and preliminary decision was issued on December 5, 2017, how can the current investigation at 
issue be conducted in a manner consistent with the WTO rules, given that neither GATT nor WTO 
clearly define the circumvention?  
 
RESPONSE:  All AD/CVD de terminations must be made pursuant to the requirements in U.S. law 
and consistent with international obligations.  
 
Question 19  
3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.77)  
19. We welcome the sunset of the AD measure on Japanese stainless steel bar. With regard to th e 
anti-dumping measures against Japanese products, the oldest existing measure was imposed in 
1978, and the average length of the measures is about 16 years. Anti -dumping measures must 
be terminated in 5 years in principle, in accordance with the WTO Agree ment. Only if the lifting 
of the measures may cause continued/renewed dumping and damages, the period of the 
measures may be extended as an exception. However, as abovementioned, the U.S. government 
repeats the extension of the period for anti -dumping meas ures and continues them over the 
long term in many cases. The Government of Japan would like to know the U.S. view on this, 
and call for the U.S. to quickly remove unfairly long -continued anti -dumping measures.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States administers its trade remedy laws in accordance with the 
applicable WTO agreements. In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order 
or an antidumping order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material  injury 
within a reasonably foreseeable time, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) 
considers the factors set out in U.S. law at 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a). The USITC considers these 
factors in the context of the record of the five -year review; it esta blishes a new record for each 
five-year review of an order. As Japan notes, the USITC's determination, based on the record in 
the recent five -year review, found that revocation of the antidumping duty order on imports of 
stainless steel bar from Japan woul d not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material 
injury to a U.S. industry. Stainless Steel Bar from Brazil, India, Japan, and Spain , Inv. Nos. 731 -
TA-678, 679, 681, and 682 (Fourth Review), USITC Pub. 4820 at 42 -45 (Sept. 2018).  
 
In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or antidumping duty order 
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy or sales of the 
subject merchandise at less than fair value, the U.S. Department o f Commerce (Commerce) 
considers the factors set out in U.S. law at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(b) and (c), respectively.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  The determinations in each sunset review conducted by the USITC or Commerce are 
case-specific. The results for all sunset reviews can be found  on the USITC's website, at: 
http://pubapps2.usitc.gov/sunset/ . Commerce publishes its sunset review determinations in the 
Federal Register and also makes them available on Commerce's website, at: 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/index.html . From these sources, Members can obtain, on a 
case-by-case basis, information about the rationale for either the continuation or termination of 
a countervailing duty or an antidumping duty order.  
 
Question 20  
3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.82)  
20. The Appellate Body report for DS 464 (US -Washing Machines) and the Panel and Appellate Body 
report for DS 471(US -AD Methodologies(China)), made clear that the denial of  offsets for non -
dumped sales when aggregating the transaction specific comparison results (so -called "Zeroing") 
violated the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti -dumping Agreement. The outcome in 
the two cases made it clear that Zeroing should be completely abolished as it is not permitted 
no matter what form it takes. Japan is of the view that no alternative methods should be applied 
to continue Zeroing practices. At the time of the last TPR, the U.S. indicated to take no specific 
steps to fully c omply the Appellate Body and Panel's recommendations mentioned above. Japan 
would like to know the U.S.'s opinion and concrete steps to take on this point.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has provided status reports to the DSB, in accordance with Article 
21.6 of the DSU, concerning the implementation of the recommendations in US – Washing 
Machines (DS464) and US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China)  (DS471).   
 
Question 21  
3.1.6.2.1.2 Safeguard investigations 2016 -18 (3.94)  
21. Japan understands that the product exclusion process on solar panel is still ongoing. Japan 
carefully watches the process, and requests the process to be conducted in timely manner, so 
that products that are still in the course of process will be appropria tely excluded. Is there  any 
information regarding sched ule of exclusion process?  
 
RESPONSE:  As stated in the September 19, 2018 Federal Register (83 Fed. Reg. 47,393 -394) 
notice announcing the exclusions granted to date, the United States Trade Representat ive will 
continue to evaluate the remaining requests that were received as of March 16, 2018 and will 
make the appropriate determination in due course.  
 
Question 22  
3.1.7.1 Section 232 Investigations – Steel and Aluminium (3.109, 3.114)  
22. According to the re port by the secretariat, the U.S. recognized that global excess capacity of a 
country threatens another country's impairment of national security, however, the Government 
of Japan understands that the global excess production capacity is a fundamental issu e which 
has to be ad dressed by multilateral attempts. Could the U.S. provide further explanation on how 
the U.S. interpret and connect global excess capacity issue with the security exceptions?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU"). We refer Japan to the statements of the United States at the 29 October 2 018 
and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Questions 23 -24 
3.1.7.1 Section 232 Investigations – Steel and Aluminium (3.109, 3.116)  
23. Japan has been explaining Japanese steel and alumin ium imports do not negatively affect U.S. 
national  security. Rather, these products have always contributed to the growth of the U.S. 
industries and the creation of jobs. However, the U.S. has imposed an additional 25% ad valorem 
tariff on Japanese products. Why and what kind of Japanese steel and alumin ium articles does 
the U.S. believe that they threaten the U.S.' national security.  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. We refer Japan to the reports of the Department of Commerce on 
its investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended 
(available at: https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations ), and to the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  statements of the United States at the 29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the 
Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
24. Japan understands that the product exclusion process on steel and alumni is still ongoing. Japan 
carefully watches the process, and requests t he process product exclusion process to be 
conducted in timely manner, so that products that are still in the course of process will be 
appropriately excluded. Is there any information regarding schedule of the product exclusion 
process for 2019 and after?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Department of Commerce will expeditiously grant properly filed exclusion 
requests that meet the requisite criteria, receive no objections, and present no national security 
concerns. The review period normally will not exceed 106 days for re quests that receive 
objections submitted on exclusion requests and any rebuttals to objections and surrebuttals. 
General information about the product exclusion process is available at the website of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce ( https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations ), 
which includes instructions on accessing information about individual exclusion requests.  
 
Questions 25 -26 
3.1.7.1 Section 232  Investigations – Steel (3.112)  
25. What is the U.S. view on the WTO consistency of the quantitative restrictions imposed on Korean 
steel products, particularly with respect to GATT Article 11? Such restrictions were not mentioned 
in the initial Presidential P roclamation, and thus are not regarded as an integral part of the whole 
232 measure. How does the U.S. explain its WTO consistency in the name of national security 
exemptions?  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlem ent 
proceedings under the DSU. Please refer to information provided by the United States at the 23 
March 2018 meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, and the statements of the United States 
at the 29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dis pute Settlement Body.  
 
26. With regard to the Section 232 investigation, the Import Quota is applied to the Steel and Alumni 
imported from certain countries, including the Republic of Korea. In case the import quota is 
allocated, would the trade measures taken  pursuant to Section 232 be exempt from the U.S. 
federal antitrust laws?  
 
RESPONSE:  The quantitative limitations established by the President under Section 232 with 
respect to imports from certain countries are administered on a "first come, first served" basis 
– that is, in the order that each entry/entry summary is presented.  
 
Questions 27 -28 
3.1.7.1 Section 232 Investigations – Auto imports (3.119)  
27. What is the rationale for this 232 investigation in the name of national security (Article 21 of 
GATT), in spite of different market conditions of automotive for civilians and military? When is 
the Department of Commerce (DOC) Report going to be publicized? What kind of autos and auto 
parts will be covered by the recommendations by DOC?  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  On May 23, 2018, the 
Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the effects on the national 
security of imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, vans and light trucks, and automotive 
parts under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. According to the 
statute, an investigation of this type must be completed within 270 days of its initiation. As part 
of its investigation, on May 30, 2018, the Department of Commerce issue d a Federal Register 
Notice inviting written comments, including data, analyses, or information pertinent to this 
investigation, and announcing the public hearings. The comment period was open until June 22, 
2018 and the Department of Commerce held a publi c hearing as part of its investigation on July 
19.  
 
28. Are the side letters and process letters in the USMCA with Canada/Mexico considered as part of 
the coming Section 232 auto investigation? If so, how can the US agree on it in advance of a 
Presidential pr oclamation? If not, then the national security exemptions, which the US alleges 
are applicable to 232 measure, are not applicable to these agreements - how does the U.S. 
explain these agreements' consistency with GATT Article 11 and SGA Article 11.1?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPO NSE:  The side and process letters of the USMCA are not part of the Section 232 
investigation. Please also s ee the response to Question 10.  
 
Questions 29 -30 
3.1.7.2.3 Section 301 cases – China technology transfer regime (3.136)  
29. Based on the investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States has 
imposed additional US$250 billion tariffs on imported goods from China. How does the United 
States evaluate its impacts on the economy, business and consumers in the United States?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States considered all available information, including information 
received in extensive public notice and comment processes. Those processes included 
publication of proposed actions; opportunities for written public comments; public hearings;  and 
publication of a final action.  
 
30. In the report of the Panel on the United States – Sections 301 -310 of the Trade Act of 1974 
(WT/DS152/R), the conclusions that Sections 301 -310 are not inconsistent with the WTO 
agreement are based on the certain U.S. A dministration's undertakings. Are the undertakings 
still valid under the circumstances that the U.S. imposes additional tariffs on import goods from 
China based on the investigation under Section 301? Also, could the U.S. provide information 
on legal basis  of the measures against imported goods from China.  
 
RESPONSE:  The actions taken in the Section 301 investigation of China's acts, policies, and 
practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are not based on 
policies of Ch ina covered by the WTO Agreement. Indeed, prior to proposing possible actions in 
the investigation, the United States identified one aspect of China's policies that appear to 
involve breaches of the WTO Agreement; the United States is pursuing those matter s separately 
in the dispute China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
(DS542).  
 
The Section 301 investigation of China's acts, policies, and practices is fully transparent, and 
includes extensive opportunities  for public notice and comment. The legal bases for the U.S. 
actions are set out in the public notices announcing the actions taken in the investigation.  
 
Question 31  
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (3.146)  
31. According to "the Natural Gas Ac t of 1938", natural gas export to countries that do not have free 
trade agreements with the U.S. is restricted, as it is only allowed after undergoing special review 
and obtaining approval of the Department of Energy(DOE). Japan would like to know the U.S.  
view on how this restriction is consistent with the WTO agreement.  
 
RESPONSE:  As we noted when Japan asked this same question in the 2016 TPR of the United 
States, the Department of Energy's authority to license U.S. natural gas imports and exports 
arises  from the Natural Gas Act (NGA). By law, under 15 U.S.C § 717b, applications to export 
U.S. natural gas to countries with which the United States has Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas are deemed to be consis tent with the public 
interest, and the Secretary of Energy must grant authorizations without modification or delay. 
The NGA directs DOE to evaluate applications to export U.S. natural gas to non -FTA countries. 
Under the NGA, DOE is required to grant applic ations for authorizations to export U.S. natural 
gas to non -FTA countries, unless the Department finds that the proposed exports will not be 
consistent with the public interest, or where trade is explicitly prohibited by law or policy.  
 
U.S. licensing of imports and exports of natural gas does not adversely affect U.S. trade partners 
and DOE procedures are administered consistent with WTO obligations. As of November 2, 2018, 
DOE has approved 53 long -term applications to export domestically produced LNG fro m the 
lower -48 states equivalent to 54.22 billion cubic feet/day (Bcf/d) of natural gas to FTA countries. 
DOE has also issued 29 final long -term authorizations to export lower -48 states domestically -
produced LNG to non -FTA countries in a volume equivalent to 21.35 Bcf/d of natural gas.  
 
In recent years, U.S. increased natural gas production, decreased imports, and increased exports 
have contributed to increased global supplies of natural gas, providing benefits to both the U.S. 
economy and contributing to the energy security of net importing countries. Assuming the 
appropriate authorizations are in place, the decision about whether, where, and when LNG is to WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 276 - 
 
  be exported is between the facility operator and its customers. Since U.S. LNG export facilities 
started operation, most LNG export shipments have been shipped to non -FTA countries.  
 
Question 32  
3.3.3 SPS requirements (3.188)  
32. According to the report by the Secretariat, the U.S. recognized the shellfish control systems of 
Spain and the Netherlands as equi valent to that of the U.S. on 9 March 2018. Japan understands 
that the U.S. is has been actively involved in the discussion of equivalence in meetings of the 
WTO SPS committee. The U.S. recognized animal health measures of EU and Canada as 
equivalent in 19 99 and 2012 respectively. It would be appreciated if the U.S. provides us with 
the detailed contents of the measures and the methods to operate them.  
 
RESPONSE:  Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) evaluation of the shellfish 
control systems of Spain and the Netherlands, FDA is addressing public comments received on 
the proposed equivalence determination published in the Federal Register on March 9, 2018. 
FDA will publish its final determination in the Federal Register once the administrative procedure 
is complete.  
 
For the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) equivalence is the process used to determine whether a foreign country's food safety 
inspection system achieves the appropriate level of public health protection as applied 
domestically in the United States by FSIS for the importation of meat, poultry and processed 
egg products, as well as Siluriformes fish and fish products. Additionally, the foreign food safety 
inspection system is to provide standards equivalent to the FSIS's standards to ensure other 
non-food safety requirements (such as humane handling, accurate labeling, and assurance that 
meat, poultry, or egg products are not economically adulterated) are met.  The country must 
objectively demonstrate how its procedures meet the U.S. level of sanitary protection. Countries 
wishing to become eligible to export meat, poultry, egg products, or Siluriformes fish and fish 
products to the United States must demonstrate that they have a re gulatory food safety 
inspection system that is equivalent to that of the United States.  
 
The criteria by which FSIS assesses the equivalence of a country's food safety inspection system 
can be found under Title 9 CFR §327.2 (for meat products), §557.2 (fo r fish of the order 
Siluriformes products), §381.196 (for poultry products), and §590.910 (for egg products). 
Countries wishing to request an initial equivalence determination in order to export fish of the 
order Siluriformes to the United Sta tes can find information on the initial equivalence process  
on the FSIS webpage  at: https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/international -affairs 
/Equivalence . 
 
Question 33  
3.3.7.2 IPR – General regulatory framework (3.271)  
33. One of the objectives that the USPTO and Director Iancu  put high priority on is to advocate the 
value of intellectual property as a critical driver of innovation and creativity, and it is also raised 
in the draft of USPTO's Strategic Plan for 2018 -2022. We would like to know how it is important 
to advocate suc h idea, and what specific actions to take.  
 
RESPONSE:  The USPTO's  Strategic  Plan is available  here:  https://www.uspto.gov/sites/defaul
t/files/documents/U SPTO_2018 -2022_Strategic_Plan.pdf . The United States appreciates 
Member interest in the importance of protecting intellectual property to drive innovation and 
creativity, and it directs Members' attention to the publication of the referenced Strategic Plan  
for further information.  
 
Questions 34 -35 
3.3.7.3 Patents (3.274)  
34. SMEs and start -up companies are one of the key elements for driving force of innovation, and 
the USPTO provided discount for patent fees, as mentioned in the report by the Secretariat. In 
this context, we would like to know USPTO's overall policy of supporting SMEs and start -ups, 
and its specific measures or efforts.  
 
RESPONSE:  The USPTO's  Strategic  Plan is available  here:  https://www.uspto.gov/sites/defaul
t/files/documents/USPTO_2018 -2022_Strategic_Plan.pdf . One key indicator is to "enhance 
assistance to independent inventor s and small businesses during the prosecution of their WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  applications."The  United  States  directs  Members'  attention  to: https://www.uspto.gov/learning
-and-resource s/inventors -entrepreneurs -resources . 
 
35. We would like to know the USPTO's views on how to gain momentum toward patent 
harmonization in the framework of Group B+ and the Patent Harmonization Experts Panel 
(PHEP)? We also would like to know what outcomes the U PSTO anticipates in the near future.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective  reviews.  Information  on harmonization  may be found  in: https://www.fiveipoffice
s.org/activities/harmonisation.html . The USPTO continues to work with its partners in Group B+ 
and IP5 in furtherance of harmonization.  
 
Question 36  
3.3.7.8 Copyright (3.304)  
36. According to the report by the Secretariat, the Copyrigh t Act has been amended several times. 
As for recent amendment, the MMA (Music Modernization Act) has been enacted. Under MMA 
Section102 (3) (C) (i) (V), it is provided that "Administer a process by which copyright owners 
can claim ownership of musical work s (and shares of such works), and a process by which 
royalties for works for which the owner is not identified or located are equitably distributed to 
known copyright owners."  
• How does the U.S. consider the practical implementation regarding this provision ? If any, 
Japan would like to obtain detail information about the implementation.  
• Especially, does the U.S. consider the measures that enable authors, including management 
organizations, to participate in the system or to claim ownership easily?  
• Does the U.S. consider the measures that provide the equal treatment between domestic 
right holders and foreign right holders?  
 
RESPONSE:  The question asks about section 102 of the Orrin G. Hatch -Bob Goodlatte Music 
Modernization Act (MMA); this section is codified  in the new paragraph (d) in Section 115 of the 
Copyright Act.  Section 102 of the MMA updates the Copyright Act's existing Section 115 
paragraphs (a) -(c). The specific citation in the question points to Section 115 (d) (3) (C )(i)(V) 
which addresses the ne w Mechanical Licensing Collective (MLC).  The Mechanical Licensing 
Collective has not yet been established.  For additional information on the Mechanical Licensing 
Collective, see https://www.copyright.gov/music -modernization/115/ , and for changes  to 
section  115, see https://www.copyright.gov/music -modernization/faq.html . 
 
The U.S. Copyright Office website contai ns information on the Music Modernization Act (MMA), 
including a dedicated webpage on the MMA and MMA -related information 
(including  notices  of inquiry  and notices  of proposed  rulemakings)  at: https://www.copyright.g
ov/music -modernization/ , as well as additional information on the legislation:  
• The MMA legislation (H.R. 1551): https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th -congress/ 
house -bill/1551/ . 
• The Report and Section by Section Analysis of H.R. 1551 by the Chairmen and 
Ranking  Members  of the Senate  and House  Judiciary  Committees:  https://www.c opyrig
ht.gov/legislation/mma_conference_report.pdf . 
• The Copyright  Act, as amended  by the MMA:  https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/20
18_mma_amendments.pdf . 
 
Question 37  
4.1.3.2 Agriculture - Exports Copyright (4.46)  
37. According to the report by the Secretariat, the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) administers 
four export promotion programmes,  among which the Market Access Program is most 
important. Japan understands that the value proposition of the program is in close coordination 
between the FAS and cooperators, including agricultural trade associations.  
 
• Japan also makes an effort to increas e agricultural exports, and would like the U.S. to 
elaborate on the respective roles and responsibilities of the FAS and its cooperators.  
 
RESPONSE:  The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) enters into cost –sharing trade promotion 
partnerships with U.S. agr icultural industry organizations to implement activities through the 
FAS market development programs.  Industry organizations submit activity proposals to FAS 
outlining proposed activities under each of the market development programs and a funding WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  request necessary to carry out the proposed programs.  FAS reviews the submitted applications 
for eligibility, completeness, and estimated impact and proposes funding levels for those 
applications it deems meritorious.  Organizations approved for participation in th e programs will 
receive reimbursement from FAS for conducting approved overseas promotional activities.  FAS 
monitors the participants' performance and results and requires a variety of performance and 
financial reports.  Through this partnership, FAS and th e industry organizations pool their 
technical and financial resources to conduct effective overseas market development.  
 
• In addition, could the U.S. elaborate the other export promotion programs (i.e. the Foreign 
Market Development Program, the Emerging Ma rkets Program and the Technical Assistance 
for Specialty Crops Program)?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Foreign Market Development Cooperator Program (FMD) uses funds from the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to create, expand, and maintain long –term export markets 
for U.S. agricultural products.  First established under the authority of Public Law 480, the FMD 
was re –authorized by Title VII of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 and is administered by 
USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service.  The program fosters a cost –sharing  trade promotion 
partnership between USDA and U.S. agricultural producers and processors, who are represented 
by non –profit commodity or trade associations called Cooperators.  Through this partnership, 
USDA and the Cooperators pool their technical and fina ncial resources to conduct overseas 
market development.  
 
The Emerging Markets Program (EMP) provides funding for technical assistance activities 
intended to develop, maintain, or expand markets for U.S. agricultural exports in emerging 
market countries.  The program underwrites assessments of the food and rural business system 
needs of emerging markets and funds projects recommended by those assessments.  The EMP 
is authorized by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, as amended.  
 
The Tec hnical Assistance for Specialty Crops (TASC) program assists U.S. organizations by 
providing funding for projects that address sanitary, phytosanitary, or technical barriers that 
prohibit or threaten the export of U.S. specialty crops.  The TASC program is authorized by the 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, as amended.  
 
• Furthermore, the USDA announced detailed actions that it would take to assist farmers in 
response to trade damage on 27 August 2018. According to this announcement, the FAS 
would im plement the Agricultural Trade Promotion Program (ATP). Could the U.S. elaborate 
the difference between the ATP and the abovementioned four export promotion 
programmes?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Agricultural Trade Promotion Program (ATP) includes elements drawn from 
FAS's Market Access Program (MAP), Foreign Market Development Program (FMD), and 
Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program (TASC). The ATP structure is largely drawn 
from MAP.  From FMD, the ATP includes legal fees incurred in resolving trade issues with foreign 
countries as an eligible expense and allows participants to seek reimbursement for limited U.S. 
office administrative expenses.  From TASC, the ATP allows participants to seek reimbursement 
for expenses associated with addressing cer tain non –tariff trade barriers.  
 
Question 38  
4.4.2 Telecommunications (4.143)  
38. Under the regulatory regime amended by the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, does a 
relevant regulatory body have the authority to step in the provision of a broadband Internet 
access service if the network management on such service is unreasonably discriminatory for its 
users or service suppliers that use such service to provide their own services? If so, Japan would 
like to understand how such intervention would be performed.  
 
RESPON SE: Following the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, broadband internet access 
service is no longer subject to the Title II prohibition on unreasonable discrimination. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) still however requires broadband provide rs to disclose their 
network management practices. Failure to make these disclosures is a failure to comply with 
FCC rules and could subject the provider to FCC enforcement action. In addition, as a result of 
the 2017 Order, the Federal Trade Commission (F TC) has authority to take action when 
broadband providers engage in anti -competitive, unfair, or deceptive acts or practices.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 39  
4.4.3.4 GATS and bilateral commitments (4.167)  
39. (This question is not only related to telecommunication services but al so to all service sectors.) 
Japan understands that the United States has never taken a full negative list approach regarding 
Market Access obligation in its FTAs, in other words, it always reserves the right to adopt or 
maintain any measure that is not inc onsistent with its obligations under Article XVI of the GATS 
as set out in its Schedule of Specific Commitments. Japan would like to know why the United 
States makes this kind of reservation which can undermine benefits of the negative -list 
scheduling.  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. practice with respect to scheduling Market Access limitations in its FTAs 
has been informed by an interest in achieving balanced outcomes across all of the FTA's 
obligations, consistency across FTAs, and the  dynamics of each negotiation.  
 
Question 40  
4.4.6.1.2 Airports (4.216, 4.217)  
40. While most U.S. airports with commercial services are publicly owned either by states or local 
governments, or local authorities, some Buy American provisions are applied to airport 
infrastructure projects when  they are financed under the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). 
The Buy American Preferences require that all steel and manufactured goods used in AIP -funded 
projects be produced in the U.S. including some waivers. Japan is concerned that such policies 
would be a hindrance to corporate activities while U.S. has no airline management services in 
its schedule and Japan would like to know the consistency with the WTO Agreement.  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. WTO GPA procurement obligations are specified in the U.S. 
sched ule and can be found  on the WTO website,  at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gpr
oc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm#revisedGPA . Airport authorities covered by the Unit ed States under 
the GPA can be found under Annex 3.  Note 5, Annex 3 of the U.S. schedule notes that the 
Agreement does not apply to restrictions attached to federal funds to airport projects.  
 
Question 41  
4.4.6.1.2 Maritime transport (4.227)  
41. Japan understa nds that the United States imposes restrictions on cabotage services. Is there 
any existing measure which restricts the supply of international maritime transport services 
(excluding cabotage) or maritime auxiliary services by foreign companies? If so, Jap an would 
like the United States to explain the restriction and to provide the relevant law.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States does not restrict the supply of international maritime 
transportation services or maritime auxiliary services.  If the foreign company w ishes to operate 
U.S. flag vessels, then the below requirements would apply.  
 
U.S. flag vessels must be owned and operated by qualified U.S. citizens or U.S. documentation 
citizens. See, 46 U.S.C. § 12102; 46  U.S.C. § 50501; 46 U.S.C. § 8103.  
 
A vessel owned by a U.S. documentation citizen is eligible for a registry endorsement and may 
operate in the trade between the United States and foreign countries. A business entity may be 
entirely owned by non -citizen stockholders and qualify as a U.S. documentati on citizen.  
 
A U.S. documentation citizen must be U.S. domiciled and must be managed by U.S. citizens. 
Specifically, for a corporation to document a vessel in the United States:  
1.  it must be incorporated under the laws of the United States or a state;  
2.  its chief executive officer, by whatever title, and the chairman of the board of 
directors, must be U.S. citizens; and  
3.  no more than a minority of the number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum 
can be non -citizens.  
 
For a general partnership to document a vessel, each and every general partner must be a U.S. 
documentation citizen. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3). In addition, unlike a corporation, U.S. citizens 
must own at least 50 per cent  of the "equity interest in the part nership" for a general partnership 
to document a U.S. -flag vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3).  
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Questions 42 -43 
4.4.6.1.2 Maritime transport (4.227 -4.229)  
42. The obligation to use U.S. -built ships concerning cargo service between two points in the United 
States  stipulated in the Jones Act (the Merchant Marine Act of 1920) is inconsistent with basic 
principles of the WTO Agreements such as National Treatment and General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions. Although the United States has repeated its argument  that the Jones 
Act is necessary for national security and claimed that the Act should be treated as an exception 
of the WTO Agreements, reasonable explanation for the necessity of the Act has not been 
provided yet. Therefore, Japan has a view that the Jon es Act should be abolished. Japan would 
like to know why and how this law contributes to its national security. Also, Japan would like to 
know if the United States has plan to expand the scope of exception of the restrictions under 
the Jones Act and to lim it the scope of the law to the extent essentially necessary for national 
security.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States continues to apply the provisions of the 'Jones Act' in accordance 
with the exception to Part II of the GATT 1994 provided in paragraph 3 of the  GATT 1994. 
Restrictions on domestic cabotage remain common among WTO Members. The U.S. cabotage 
regime continues to be an important means of ensuring the availability of experienced seafarers 
and maintaining domestic shipbuilding capability, which are imp ortant national security 
objectives. The fleet of U.S. -flagged, privately owned, and commercially operated vessels, along 
with government -owned vessels, provides critical sealift surge and sustainment capacity to move 
equipment and materials for the Armed Forces.  The Jones Act assists in providing a pool of 
qualified mariners to address a potential  shortage of U.S. -citizen mariners qualified to crew 
vessels. See U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Maritime Workforce 
Working Group Rep ort (Washington,  D.C., Sept.  29, 2017),  at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
700/693802.pdf . Demand for vessels qualified for Jones Act trade plays an important role in 
ensuring that there is adequate  American expertise and capacity to meet national shipbuilding 
needs and that these shipyards remain available when the military needs them. See: 
https://www.transportation.gov/content/state -us-flag-maritime -industry . 
 
43. Relating to the Jones Act, Japan has taken note of the Howard Coble Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2014 which promotes the transportation of liquefied natural gas to and 
from the U.S. According to the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015, a guideline to promote 
the use of U.S. -flag vessels for the transportation of liquefied natural gas to and from the United 
States is planned to be submitted by the Secretary of Transportation to the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Japan understand s, however, that the submission has yet to 
be done. Japan would like to know the current status of the guideline.  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  There are more 
than 110 LNG facilities  operating  in the U.S. performing  a variety of services  including  the exp
ort of natural  gas from the United  States.  See: https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus -
act/lng.asp .  
 
Question 44  
4.4.6.1.2 Maritime transport (4.23 4) 
44. According to the paragraph, the Maritime Security Program is a program which protects national 
fleets. However, the scope of application seems to be expanding. Japan requests the U.S. to 
explain why the U.S. expands the scope of application and whether this program has influenced 
the commercial shipping market. Japan also would like to obtain the details of this program.  
 
RESPONSE:  Section 3508 of the National Defense Authorization Act 2013 authorized the 
extension of the Maritime Security Program throug h fiscal year 2025. Under section 3508, the 
Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Maritime Administrator, is authorized to offer to 
extend the existing 60 Maritime Security Program Operating Agreements through fiscal year 
2025. Section 3508 autho rized a new payment schedule of increasing Maritime Security Program 
Operating Agreement payments through fiscal year 2025. These payment amounts were 
subsequently updated by the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016 and the National Defense 
Authorization A ct 2016. Section 3508 of the National Defense Authorization Act 2013 also 
provided a new procedure for awarding MSP Operating Agreements, including a new priority 
system for the award of operating agreements. Under the new priority system, an award will be  
first based on vessel type as determined by military requirements and then based on the 
citizenship status of the applicant. Section 3508 revised the procedure for the transfer of MSP WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Operating Agreements by eliminating the requirement to first offer an M SP Operating Agreement 
to a U.S. Citizen under 46 U.S.C. 50501. In addition, Section 3508 eliminated the procedure for 
early termination of MSP Operating Agreements based on the availability of replacement vessels. 
Section 3508 als o eliminated the eligibil ity of Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH)  vessels  to 
participate  in the MSP Fleet as a standalone  category  of vessel.  See: https://www.federalregist
er.gov/documents/2017/12/01/2017 -25898/maritime -security -program . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Follow up questions from Japan  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Question 1; Follow -up to Question 6  
2.1 Trade and Investment Regimes – General Framework (2. 4) 
1. The United States answered the question by saying that "[f]ast track procedures under TPA 2015 
apply to consideration and approval of trade agreements by the U.S. Congress." We would like 
to confirm whether our understanding is correct that withdrawal f rom the trade agreements are 
not covered under "consideration and approval" thereof, and accordingly, that the current TPA 
does not apply to the withdrawal from trade agreements.  
 
RESPONSE: Fast track procedures under TPA 2015 apply to consideration and ap proval of trade 
agreements by the U.S. Congress.  
 
Question 2 -3; Follow -up to Question 8  
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements (2.25 -2.26)  
2. With respect to our question regarding the relationship between the 232 auto  side letter and the 
232 process side letter which was unanswered, if a 232 measure is imposed on autos, will the 
United States suspend imposing 232 measures on Canadian and Mexican autos for at least 60 
days pursuant to the 232 process side letter?  
 
RESP ONSE:  As we already noted, the letters are in effect.  And, as set out in the “process ” 
letters, the United States has agreed not to adopt or maintain a measure imposing tariffs or 
import restrictions on goods or services of Canada or Mexico under Section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act for at least 60 days after such a measure is imposed.  
 
Follow -up to Question 10  
3. We would like to remind the U.S. delegation that there are still some points where we are not 
convinced of the U.S.’s position in relation to the  232 measures. (1) Please elaborate how the 
exemptions envisioned in the 232 letters are consistent with the WTO Agreement. (2) Also, 
assuming that the security exception (GATT XXI) does not apply to those side letter agreements 
based on US’ answers that t he side and process letters of the USMCA are not part of the Section 
232 measures, please explain the consistency of side letter agreements with GATT Article 11 
and SGA Article 11.1?  
 
RESPONSE : The fact that the letters are not part of the investigation do es not mean there is no 
relation to Section 232.  The commitments made in the letters only come into play in the event 
of an action taken under Section 232.  No action has yet been taken pursuant to the Section 232 
investigation.  
 
QUESTION 4; Follow -up to Question 28  
Section 3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports (3.119)  
4. We would like to remind the U.S. delegation that there are still some points where we are not 
convinced of the U.S.’s position in relation to the 232 measures. (1) Please elaborate how the  
exemptions envisioned in the 232 letters are consistent with the WTO Agreement. (2) Also, 
assuming that the security exception (GATT XXI) does not apply to those side letter agreements 
based on US’ answers that the side and process letters of the USMCA ar e not part of the Section 
232 measures, please explain the consistency of side letter agreements with GATT Article 11 
and SGA Article 11.1?  
 
RESPONSE:  See answer to Question 3.  
 
Question 5; Follow -up to Answer to Question 32  
3.3.3  SPS requirements (3.188)  
5a.  Regarding “other non -food safety requirements” referred to in the U.S. response, has the U.S. 
ever recognized any foreign country’s non -food safety requirements such as “humane handling” 
and “accurate label ling”? 
 
RESPONSE : Humane handling and label ling are considered whe n FSIS determines equivalence. 
Note that foreign governments may address the food safety and non -food safety elements of WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  its food safety inspection system, including humane handling and labe lling, using alternative 
approaches to those  used by the United States, as long as they still achieve the same outcomes.  
 
Regarding humane handling within the context of U.S. FSIS equivalence determinations, FSIS 
ensures that the foreign country has laws and regulations that require the humane handling 
and humane slaughter of livestock and the handling and slaughter of poultr y using good 
commercial practices. Foreign governments must include information in their submission to 
FSIS on the frequencies that foreign government inspection personnel verify that livestock and 
poultry are handled and slaughtered humanely.  
 
Regarding labelling within the context of U.S. FSIS equivalence determinations, foreign 
governments are required to describe how and at what frequency its inspection personnel 
perform label verification activities to ensure that U.S. labe lling requirements are met a nd that 
labels are accurate and truthful, for products intended for export to the United States. All labels 
must be approved in accordance with 9 CFR 412.1 or generically in accordance with 9 CFR 
412.2.  Refer to the following link for specific information for label approval: 
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/bf170761 -33e3-4a2d-8f86-940c2698e2c5/ 
Label -Approval -Guide. pdf?MOD=AJPERES  
 
5b. Regarding the mutual recognition agreements on animal health between the U.S. and 
Canada/the U.S. and EU, would the U.S. explain whether the U.S. has recognized the 
equivalence of the whole administration systems on animal health inclu ding the recognition of 
regional conditions, or only inspection systems on animal health? In addition, it would be 
appreciated if the U.S. provides us with the websites or the Federal Registers containing texts 
of the mutual recognition agreements and rele vant information.  
 
RESPONSE : With regard to the animal health recognition that USDA’s Animal Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) provides, APHIS recognizes the concepts of disease -free areas or 
low disease prevalence by conducting a comprehensive evalu ation of the exporting region’s 
official animal health system with regard to the disease(s) under consideration. The 
requirements for these evaluation s can be found in 9 CFR §92.2. Additional information on the 
evaluation  process  can be found  here:  https://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/do
wnloads/regionalization_process.pdf . In the case of Canada, APHIS also has concluded the U.S. 
– Canada Foreig n Animal Disease Zoning Arrangement framework, which involves mutual 
recognition of each country’s control methods in foreign animal disease outbreaks.   The scope 
of this arrangement is limited to animal diseases for which the United States and Canada are 
disease -free.  In the case of the EU, APHIS does not have a mutual recognition agreement but 
has recently published recognition of animal health status of certain regions in the EU based on 
the criteria found in 9 CFR §92.2.  
 
Question 6; Follow -up to Quest ion 39  
4.4.3.4 GATS and bilateral commitments (4.167)  
6. Japan requests the U.S. to provide further explanation. Does its answer mean that it is unfeasible 
for the U.S. to achieve balanced outcomes across all of the FTAs' obligations and to keep 
consistency a cross FTAs without this kind of reservation? Why is this type of reservation 
necessary to achieve them?  
 
RESPONSE : The question’s focus on negotiation dynamics is outside the scope of the TPR.  
 
Question 7; Follow -up to Question 42  
4.4.6.1.2 Maritime transp ort (4.227 -4.229)  
7. Japan would like to have further information. We question its measures of reserving cargo 
service between two points in the United States for ships built in the United States. What 
prevents the United States from taking alternative measur es that are consistent with the basic 
principles of the WTO Agreements?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States has determined that it can best meet its national security 
objectives by ensuring the continued availability of experienced seafarers and maintaining 
domes tic shipbuilding and repair capacity.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 8; Follow -up to Question 44  
4.4.6.1.2 Maritime transport (4.234)  
8. Although Japan received information on the contents of the Maritime Security Program (MSP), 
the United States has yet to answer the questions posed by Japan. Since Japan considers that 
the MSP can impede fair and free competition in the international shipp ing market, Japan would 
like to know the United States' view on that point, and Japan requests the United States' replies 
to the following two questions.  
 
Why does the U.S. expand the scope of application of the MSP?  
 
RESPONSE : The most recent legislatio n affecting the MSP (2015) did not expand the scope of 
the program, but simply increased the annual stipend amounts that could be paid to p articipants. 
The size of the MSP fleet remains the same and the eligibility criteria for entry into the program 
have not changed.  
 
Whether has the MSP influenced the commercial shipping market?  
 
RESPONSE : The U.S. Maritime Security Program supports sixty U.S. -flag vessels that are 
militarily useful and designated under obligation for assured access use by the Department of 
Defense to mobilize  and sustain U.S. Armed Forces.  These vessels do not have an option to not 
serve the defense sealift needs of the United States when required.  These sixty vessels operate 
internationally in competition for commercial cargo against ten s of thousands of non -U.S. flag 
vessels that influence the global shipping market.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Republic of  Korea  
Part 1 Questions Regarding the Secretariat Report - Document WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1 -2 
Section 3.1.7.1.4 Investigation into auto imports (3.119)  
 
On 23 May 2018, the USDOC initiated a Section 232 investigation into auto imports. The aim of the 
investigation is to determine whether imports of automobiles, including SUVs, vans and light trucks, 
and automotive parts into the United States threaten to i mpair the national security as defined in 
Section 232. Considerations taken into account to initiate the investigation include the increase of 
the share of imports of passenger vehicles sold in the United States from 32% to 48% in the last 20 
years; a 22% decline in employment in motor vehicle production between 1990 and 2017; the low 
share of R&D represented by U.S. vehicle manufacturers in the United States (20% of the total); 
and the fact that U.S. auto part manufacturers account for only 7% of that indu stry in the 
United  States. The points analys ed in the investigation include: whether the decline of domestic 
automobile and automotive parts production threatens to weaken the internal economy of the United 
States, including by potentially reducing R&D and  jobs for skilled workers in cutting -edge 
technologies. In July 2018, the USDOC held a public hearing on the investigation.  
 
Article XXI of the GATT 1994 explicitly allows essential security exceptions in cases "relating to 
fissionable materials or the mat erials from which they are derived," "relating to the traffic in arms, 
ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on 
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment," and "ta ken in time of 
war or other emergency in international relations."  
 
1. In the view of the U.S. government, does the status of the U.S. auto industry satisfy these 
conditions as stipulated in Article XXI of the GATT 1994?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. government has not  imposed measures on imports of automobiles and 
parts as the Section 232 investigation is ongoing.  
 
2. The prevailing interpretation of essential security interest under Article XXI of the GATT 1994 
has been generally understood to provide a 'narrow' exceptio n for genuine essential security 
measures, in order to guard against the imposition of trade -barriers for commercial or political 
purposes under the guise of national security. In the view of the U.S. government, are the 
prospective measures under Section 232 that impose tariffs or other restrictive measures on 
imports of automobiles and parts consistent with the rules and jurisprudence of the WTO 
Agreements?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. government has not imposed measures on imports of automobiles and 
parts as the Section 232 investigation is ongoing.  
 
Question 3  
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.179)  
 
The NIST also operates the U.S. inquiry point for NAFTA and provides technical background for the 
resolution of potential issues related to standards and conformity assessment between Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States.  
 
3. We would like to know if the SCO of NIST serves as the inquiry point for NAFTA and provides 
technical background for the resolution of potential issues related to standards  and conformity 
assessment between the three -member countries. Furthermore, is the SCO still serving as the 
inquiry point for the USMCA (which was formed as a bilateral agreement rather than a 
multilateral trade agreement like NAFTA), and performing exactl y the same tasks as before? If 
not, please let us know the umbrella organization where the TBT inquiry is affiliated.  
 
RESPONSE:  Yes, the SCO of NIST serves as the inquiry point for NAFTA. Since the USMCA has 
not yet entered into force, the SCO of NIST is not currently the inquiry point for USMCA, but it 
is our intention that the SCO of NIST fulfil that role.   
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 4  
Section 4.1.2.9 Other programmes (4.39)  
 
About 80% of the projected outlays under the 2014 Farm Bill concerned the Supplemental Nutrition  
Assistance Program (SNAP), a programme that offers assistance to eligible, low -income individuals 
and families. Although the average monthly benefit has remained roughly stable, at US$125 per 
person and US$255 per household, in recent years, expenditures on SNAP have been declining due 
to a lower number of participants. In April 2018, just under 40 million persons received payments 
under SNAP, down from nearly 46 million in FY2015.42 While changes in the benefit calculations 
may account for some of this re duction, the main contribution appears to be a firmer job market 
that has improved earnings for the low -income segment.  
 
4. About 80% of the projected outlays under the 2014 Farm Bill concerned the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This progra m is intended to support domestic agricultural 
products to promote the health and nutrition of vulnerable groups. Would this not constitute 
indirect support for farming households?  
 
RESPONSE:  The SNAP program is intended to provide financial assistance to low -income 
populations for purchase of food products at retail. Assistance is provided through electronic 
benefits that can be used at places such as supermarkets, grocery stores, and farmers markets 
to purchase both domestically -produced and imported goods.  
 
Question 5  
Section 4.1.4 Levels of support (4.52; Table 4.6)  
 
At the WTO, the United States provides information on support to a griculture to the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as well as to the Committee on Agriculture. The most recent 
subsidy notification to the SCM Committee covers FY2015 and FY2016, and reports payments under 
the new ARC and PLC programmes o f US$4.5 billion and US$779 million, respectively (Table 4.6). 
Disaster payments for livestock forage were particularly important in FY2015. This notification 
includes programmes that are not in the DS:1 notification to the Committee on Agriculture.  
 
5. In Ta ble 4.6, the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) was replaced by the Agricultural Risk 
Coverage (ARC), but the payment was increased (FY2015, ACRE US$ 279 million → FY2016, 
ARC US$ 4.5 billion). This is an extension of the AMS. Does this represent a revis ion toward 
stricter protection for the agriculture sectors?  
 
RESPONSE:  The Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program is a new program in the 2014 Farm 
Bill. The Average Crop Revenue Election program expired with the 2008 Farm Bill. The payments 
are made on historical base acres and do not require production of the historical commodity or 
any other commodity. Producers remain free to follow market signals in their production 
decisions and must sell their production at market prices.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Malaysia  
Part I – Questi ons from the Secretariat's Document WT/TPR/S/382  
Questions 1 -2 
Summary (Paragraph 29)  
 
Support to agriculture is primarily authorized by "farm bills", i.e. multi -year omnibus legislation 
covering a wide array of agricultural and food programmes. While some  of the programmes have 
permanent authorization (e.g. crop insurance), others are authorized only for the life of the farm 
bill. Authorization for most programmes under the Agricultural Act of 2014 was to expire on 30 
September 2018. Based on expected and actual outlays, the 2014 Farm Bill has been dominated by 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), providing food assistance to low -income 
households, which has accounted for nearly 80% of the projected expenditure. The 2014 Farm Bill 
was amend ed in early 2018, through the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, to provide 
support for seed cotton, to make the Margin Protection Programme more attractive for small and 
medium -sized dairy farms, and to make additional disaster relief available . A programme to support 
the cost of cotton ginning was re -introduced as a temporary measure in March 2018. The legislative 
process for the 2018 Farm Bill is ongoing.  
 
1. Could the United States explain the criteria for low -income household?  
 
RESPONSE:  Under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, income eligibility varies by 
location, household size, and whether the recipient is elderly or disabled. There are two criteria 
for income eligibility for most circumstances: a gross monthly income stand ard (which is 130 
per cent  of the poverty level) and a net monthly income standard (which is 100 per cent  of the 
poverty level). As an example, in FY 2018 a household size of four living in the continental United 
States would have a gross monthly income li mit of US$2,665 and a net monthly income limit of 
US$2,050 to receive benefits.  
 
2. Could the United States indicate when the implementation of the 2018 Farm Bill?  
 
RESPONSE:  We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The 2014 Farm Bill 
authorizes  farm programs through the 2018 crop year. We look forward to keeping the 
Membership informed of any changes that may occur in a future Farm Bill.  
 
Question 3  
Section 2.2.1 Trade policy objectives (2.6)  
 
The President's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda is driven " to open foreign markets, obtain more 
efficient global markets and fairer treatment for American workers".  
 
3. The impasse of the Appellate Body (AB) vacancy has challenged the effectiveness and credibility 
of WTO dispute settlement system. Since August 2018, the US has objected to the launch of 
multiple processes to begin selecting new judges to fill the current vacancies. Could the United 
States explain the rationale of this decision and the way forward?  
 
RESPONSE: For more than 15 years and across multiple U .S. Administrations, the United States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council meeting, if WTO 
members say that we support a r ules-based trading system, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995.  And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its reports 
within 90 days of an appeal.  A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member may not 
continue de ciding appeals as if his term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body.  The 
Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to those relating 
to domestic law. The Appellate Body may not give advisory opinions on is sues that will not assist 
the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure into compliance 
with WTO rules.  The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as precedent or provide 
authoritative interpretations.  And the Appella te Body may not change Members' substantive 
rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreements.  When the Appellate Body 
abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it undermines the 
legitimacy of the system and d amages the interests of all WTO Members who care about having 
the agreements respected as t hey were negotiated and agreed. The United States will continue WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system, and will continue 
our effo rts and our discussions with Members to seek a solution on these important issues.  
 
Questions 4 -5 
Sections 3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing & 3.2.3  Export prohibitions, 
restrictions, and licensing  
 
4. United States had mentioned that the re is a need for an export license for toxicological agents, 
including chemical and biological agents. Appreciate if the United States could share the 
legislations and standard operating procedures for the licence/permit applications for these 
items.  
 
RESP ONSE: The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115 -232) (ECRA) authorizes export 
license requirements administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce. As a member of the 
multilateral export control regime, the Australia Group (AG), the United States har monizes its 
export controls for chemical and biological agents with the other members of the AG. Chemical 
or biological agents that are listed on the control list require authorization for export out of the 
United States. Exporters must submit an applicati on to the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
request a license for the items to be exported. Those applications are reviewed by multiple U.S. 
government agencies to ensure the items to be shipped are going to legitimate end users for a 
proper use. Those review s normally take 45 days. The review and issuance of the export license 
are done electronically. Please see Section 742.2 "Proliferation of chemical and biological 
weapons" of the Export Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. Section 742.2) for additional 
information.  
 
5. Malaysia seeks clarification as to whether the United States imposes any license/permit 
requirements under the country's legislation and guidelines for below items: - 
a. importation of human remains, human tissues, microorganisms and pathogenic 
substances, and  
b. exportation of human tissues and human remains.  
If yes, kindly provide details of the relevant government agency issuing this license/permit as well 
as other relevant information i.e. the procedures and fees/charges imposed.  
 
RESPONSE: Human remains intended for interment or subsequent cremation after entry into 
the United States must be accompanied by a death certificate stating the cause of death. The 
remains must be shipped in a leakproof container in accordance with U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) requirements. Remains of a person who died from a quarantinable 
communicable disease may be subject to federal, state, and local quarantine.  
 
Additional information on importing human remains may be obtained from the we bsites of the 
CDC ( https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/human -remains.html ) and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection  (CBP)  (https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/237/~/requirements -for-
importing -bodies -in-coffins -%2F-ashes -in-urns). 
 
Human tissues imported for the implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer  into a human 
recipient are regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under 21 CFR 1271.420, 
pursuant to the authority in 42 USC 264 (regulations to control communicable diseases).  
 
The importation of biological materials is regulated by Fed eral and state laws, including laws 
that implement international requirements. Certain U.S. agencies may require import permits 
for entry. Imports of biological materials must be accompanied by all required permits and entry 
documents upon arrival and be p roperly packaged and label led per applicable state, Federal, 
and international requirements. Additional information on the importation of biological materials 
may be obtained from CBP's website at: https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/3681/~/ 
importing -biological -materials -into-the-united -states . 
 
There are no public heal th restrictions regarding the export of human remains or body parts 
from the United States. However, the CDC has broad authority to take actions to mitigate public 
health threats in the event of inadequate local control.  
 
The FDA regulates the export of hu man tissue if intended for use in a human recipient.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 6 -7 
Section 3.3.7.3 Patents (3.279)  
 
A patent applicant may request that the application not be published, but only if the invention has 
not been, and will not be, the subject of an application  filed in a foreign country that requires 
publication 18 months after filing (or earlier claimed priority date) or under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.327.  
 
Under U.S. law, a person who is not the owner of a patent may challenge the validity of an issued 
patent by filing a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent before the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB), an administrative court of the USPTO. Two options for challenging validity 
before the PTAB may be Post -Grant Reviews (limited to w ithin nine months of issuance), or inter 
partes reviews (any time after nine months of issuance, or the conclusion of a post -grant 
proceeding).  
 
The petitioner may request to cancel as unpatentable one or more claims of a patent, on certain 
grounds. A pet ition for inter partes review must be filed after the later of either the date that is nine 
months after the grant of a patent, or the issuance of a reissue of a patent. The Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB) is in charge of conducting inter partes revie ws, which can be appealed.  
 
6. What are the key differences between the post -grant petition review by the PTAB and the Hatch -
Watchman Act in the aspects of patent invalidation, especially the effects of the respective 
determination? (Eg.  Can a generic pharmaceutical enter the market immediately after the patent 
is invalidated?)  
 
RESPONSE: For more information about how the Hatch -Waxman Act operates, 
see: https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApp
roved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/ucm613498.htm . 
For more information  about  how PTAB post grant  review  operates,  see: https://www.uspto.gov
/patents -application -process/appealing -patent -decisions/trials/post -grant -review . 
 
7. If both post -grant opposition petitions (to PTAB and federal district court) are filed concurrently, 
what is the collateral effect one decision has on the other?  
 
RESPONSE: Post grant petitions can only be filed at the PT AB, not in federal district courts. 
For more information,  see: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -application -process/appealing -
patent -decision s/trials/post -grant -review .  
 
Questions 8 -13 
Section 3.1.7.1. 232 Investigation - Legal and administrative framework  
 
8. What are the rationales for its development, establishment and implementation of Section 232 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962?  
 
RESPONSE: The objective of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, is 
to protect the national security of the United States.  
 
9. Note that the use of Section 232 measure was last in 2001, such seek further clarification on 
the recent utili sation in 2017/2018?  
 
RESPONSE: We refer Malaysia to the reports of the Department of Commerce on its 
investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 
and to the statements of the United States at the 29 October 20 18 and 21 November 2018 
meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
10. Could the United States clarify on factors that lead to targeted industry or sector or product that 
undergoing a Section 232 investigation?  
 
RESPONSE: We refer Malaysia to the reports of the  Department of Commerce on its 
investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 
and to the statements of the United States at the 29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 
meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  11. Apprec iate if the United States could explain how the implementation of Section 232 measures 
are in line with the non -discrimination principles of the WTO.  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes . 
 
12. How does the United States address circumvention or transhipment issues? What are the 
initiatives that the United States have put in place? Does the United States collaborate with other 
countries on these issues? If yes, how? If no, why?  
 
RESPONSE: Where the President has decided to exempt imports from certain countries from 
the tariffs on steel and aluminium he has imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962, as amended, he has done so on the basis of alternative means —including measures to 
prevent transhipment —arrived at between the United States and those countries that, in the 
judgement of the President, address the threatened impairment of U.S. national security posed 
by imports from those countries. Imports of steel and aluminium from  all other countries are 
subject to the additional tariffs imposed by the President under Section 232.  
 
13. Paragraph 3.107 clearly states the reason for section 232 is to address "quantities and 
circumstances of steel imports threaten to impair national secur ity". Please clarify how Malaysia's 
insignificant imports of iron and steel at 0.28% in the US total imports of iron and steel products 
in 2016 has impaired the US national security?  
 
RESPONSE: We refer Malaysia to the reports of the Department of Commerce  on its 
investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 
and to the statements of the United States at the 29 October 2018 and 21 November 2018 
meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
Part II – Questions from the  Government's Document WT/TPR/G/382  
Question 14  
Section 4.3.2 North American Free Trade Agreement (4.22)  
 
In August 2017, the United States began negotiations with Canada and Mexico to address remaining 
market access barriers, and to modernize and rebalanc e the obligations between the Parties, 
including by bringing the labo ur and environment obligations that had been included in supplemental 
agreements into the core body of the agreement. On September 30, 2018, the three Parties 
announced they had reached a greement on the United States –Mexico –Canada Agreement (USMCA).  
 
14. United States reports indicate that the parties on 30 Sept 2018, have reached an agreement on 
the negotiations. It is also noted that this is a comprehensive agreement that covers market 
acces s, agriculture, Rules of Origin (ROO) /Product Specific Rules (PSR), textiles & Apparel, TBT 
financial services, investment, services, government procurement etc. The agreement also 
consists of side letters between parties.  
 
i. What does the US consider to be  a key factor in achieving this agreement i.e. any 
advantages to US exporters /manufacturers in terms of market access and ROO/PSR 
within the parties?  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA is a comprehensive update to the NAFTA, including new, higher 
standard provisions tha t reflect the realities of the 21st -century economy. Among other things, 
it builds upon the high levels of market access provided for under the NAFTA and updates rules 
of origin to better support North American trade.  
 
ii. When is the targeted date for the ent ry into force of this agreement?  
 
RESPONSE: The USMCA was signed on Nov. 30, 2018. It will enter into force after it is approved 
by all the three Parties, consistent with each Party's internal procedures.  
 
iii. Under the USMCA, there is a provision specifies th at if one of the current North American 
Free Trade Agreement partners enters a free trade deal with a "non -market" country, it WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  must notify the others three months before entering into such negotiations. Could the 
US share the potential and anticipated effe ct on export expansion by other parties?  
 
RESPONSE: The provision on non -market economies will ensure that the parties to the USMCA 
continue to benefit from the preferential market access in the agreement.  
 
Question  15 
Section United States –Singapore Free  Trade Agreement (4.48)  
 
The United States -Singapore FTA, the United States' first in Asia, has been in effect since 2004. 
Since 2003, the year before the FTA entered into force, two -way goods trade has increased 55%. 
Singapore is the 18th largest goods tr ading partner of the United States and reached US$49.2 billion 
in total goods trade and US$25.9 billion in total services trade in 2017 (latest data available). The 
stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Singapore reached US$274 billion in 2017 (latest  data 
available). Singapore is the second -largest source of foreign investment from the Asia -Pacific in the 
United States, while the Singapore is the top destination for outbound U.S. foreign direct investment 
in Asia. The United States consults regularly with Singapore to monitor implementation of the FTA, 
address bilateral issues, and further build and expand the bilateral relationship.  
 
15. Since its entry into force in 2004, are there any implementation issues (such as ROO/PSR if any) 
faced in general?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States continues to meet under the FTA to monitor implementation, 
bilateral issues, and further build and expand the bilateral economic relationship.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Follow up qu estion from Malaysia  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Questions 1 -3 
Section 3.1.6.2.1.2 Safeguard investigations 2016 -18 (3.92 -3.98)  
It was noted that the United States has implemented a Global Safeguard Measure on imports of 
CSPV cells (whether or not partially or fully assembled into other products) for a period of four  years 
beginning 7 February 2018. We further noted that 102 developing countries have been excluded 
from this measure.  
 
1. Malaysia seeks clarification on the details of percentage of imports of all countries during the 
period of investigation leading to the selection of countries being imposed and excluded from 
such a measure to demonstrate United States’ compliance to Article 9 of the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguard.  
 
RESPONSE:  Import statistics for the United States may be obtained from publicly available 
sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau.  
 
It was noted that the United States implemented a Global Safeguard Measure on imports of large 
residential washers and certain parts thereof for a period of three years and one  day beginning 
7 February 2018.  
 
2. Malaysia seeks clarification on the details of percentage of imports of all countries during the 
period of investigation leading to the selection of countries being imposed and excluded from 
such a measure to demonstrate United States’ compliance to Article 9  of the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards.  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 1 above.  
 
3. Should there be other WTO developing countries fitting the condition, will the United States 
review the list of excluded countries to this measure in compliance to Article 9  of the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States intends to review the measure and decide whether any 
adjustments are necessary as part of the mid -term review required under Article 7.4 of the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards.  
 
Question 4  
Section 3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations  
Section 3.1.7.1.1 Legal and administrative framework (3.100 -3.104)  
 
4. Few countries were given some level of relief from the adjustment made on imports of steel and 
alumin ium implemented under Section 232, Trade Expansio n Act 1962 and its amendments. 
Could the United States provide clarification/ transparency on the process of negotiation and 
concrete criteria to allow trading partners to engage with the United States with more certainty 
on expectations?  
 
RESPONSE: The Pr esident has excluded certain countries from the tariffs imposed on steel or 
alumin ium imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, based 
on alternative means arrived at between the United States and those countries to address t he 
threatened impairment to U.S. national security posed by these imports.  Proclamations issued 
by the President on 30 April 2018 (Proclamation 9740) and 31 May 2018 (Proclamations 9758 
and 9759) describe the alternative means arrived at between the Unite d States and these 
countries, in light of which the President determined that imports from these countries no longer 
threaten to impair U.S. national security.    
 
Question 5  
Section 3.1.3.1 Applied rates (3.34 -3.36)  
 
The Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018 (MTB) allows automatic reduction of duties from MFN rates 
for imports of selected items beginning 13 Octob er 2018 until 31 December 2018.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  It was observed that there is a possibility of overlap of products between the Global Safeguard 
Measure on CSPV c ells (whether or not partially or fully assembled into other products) with the 
MTB, namely HS 8501610000; and the adjustment on import of alumin ium under Section 232, Trade 
Expansion Act 1962 with the MTB, namely HS 7616995160 and HS 7616995170.  
 
5. If such overlaps exist, will the lower rates under MTB be used in lieu of MFN rates for these 
products, in calculating total tariff owed for the mentioned measures?  
 
RESPONSE:  Duty reductions and suspensions under the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018 are 
in effect until December 31, 2020, and are applied on an MFN basis to products specified by the 
Act.  Duties applied pursuant to the safeguard or under Section 232 are applied in addition to 
the MFN tariff rate in effect at the time goods are entered or withdr awn from warehouse for 
consumption.  
 
Question 6  
Section 2.2.1 Trade Policy Objectives (2.6 -2.10)  
Malaysia notes that the President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda is to achieve “free, fair and reciprocal” 
trade re lations for the United States. While “free” and “reciprocal” could be commonly understood, 
the term “fair” introduces a wide and selective prerogative, which may not be fully consistent with 
the core principles of the WTO, in advocating for a rules -based and predictable multilateral trading 
system.  We also note that the United States’ national security policy accords “fair” as a critical 
element in considering renegotiations and negotiations, of existing  and future trade deals. The 
element of “fair” is also being emphasised by the United States in advoc ating for WTO reforms.  
 
6. In view of these, and the standing of the United States in global trade, be it at multilateral, 
Malaysia would like to seek further clarification on the concept of “fair” from the pe rspective of 
the United States.  
 
RESPONSE: The Uni ted States has been clear that we are committed to working with like -
minded countries to promote fair market competition around the world, work to eliminate unfair 
trade barriers, and defend our interests in response to countries that engage in unfair trad ing 
practices.  
 
Questions 7 -10 
Section 4.1.2.2 Price Loss Coverage (PLC) (4.11)  
Section 4.1.2.3 Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) (4.13, 4.14)  
“PLC covers historical base (i.e. historical area and yield) of maize, soybeans, wheat, other feed 
grains, other oilseeds, peanuts, pulses, rice, and - from the 2018 crop year - seed cotton. When the 
current average market year price falls below the reference price set in the 2014 Farm Bill, PLC 
payments are made on 85% of the historical base for each covered commodi ty on a farm. Farmers 
were obliged to make a one -time choice (for the duration of the 2014 Farm Bill) whether to elect 
PLC for historical base of each covered commodity on the farm. PLC is decoupled from current 
production as it relies on historical base w ithout any requirement to produce, but it is triggered by 
current prices.”  
 
“Farmers have had the choice to enrol their historical base in PLC or ARC for the covered 
commodities. ARC is a revenue -based income support programme tied to county -level benchmar k 
revenue guarantees. Although the ARC revenue guarantee may also be determined at the farm level 
(individual ARC or ARC -IC), most farmers opting for ARC have chosen the version that establishes 
the revenue guarantee on a commodity -by-commodity basis at th e county level (ARC -CO). This 
solution has allowed producers to select the ARC -CO revenue guarantee for some crops and PLC for 
others. However, once a choice has been made, no switching back and forth between the two 
programmes is permitted.”  
 
“ARC-CO esta blishes benchmark revenue for each covered commodity corresponding to 86% of the 
five-year (Olympic) average national market price multiplied by the five -year (Olympic) average 
county yield. When the actual county revenue (based on current prices and curre nt county yields) 
falls below the county benchmark, farmers with a historical base of those commodities may be paid 
up to 10% of the difference.7 Payments are limited to 85% of the enrolled historical base. Like for 
PLC, landowners have been allowed to rea llocate, but not increase, their ARC base acres according 
to planted acres in 2009 -12.” 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  7. Malaysia would like to seek clarification on the definition of farmers, under the 2014 and 2018 
Farm Bill.  
 
RESPONSE: Enrolment in the ARC and PLC programs is open to landowners and operators of 
land with historical base acres of covered commodities.  
 
8. Appreciate if the United States could indicate the criteria/ requirement which qualified farmers 
to apply PLC or ARC.  
 
RESPONSE:  Following enactment of the 2014 Farm B ill, eligible landowners and operators 
(those owning or operating land with historical base of covered commodities) elected to 
participate in either the ARC or PLC programs for each of the covered commodities for which 
they had historical base acres. Since  2014, they have also had to make an annual decision to 
enrol those base acres in the elected program.  Owners of base acres are not required to plant 
the historical commodity or any commodity to be eligible for payments. Covered commodities 
include wheat,  feed grains (corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats), rice (long -grain, medium and 
short grain, and temperate japonica), oilseeds (soybeans, peanuts, canola, crambe, flaxseed, 
mustard, rapeseed, safflower, sesame seed, sunflower), and pulses (large and small c hickpeas, 
dry peas, lentils), and beginning in 2018, seed cotton.  
 
9. Malaysia seeks clarification on the control mechanism on the establishment of the revenue 
guarantee on the commodity -by-commodity basis at the county level (ARC -CO). 
 
RESPONSE: ARC-CO county revenue guarantees by commodity under the 2014 Farm Bill are 
86 percent of the revenue benchmark for the commodity in the county.  The county revenue 
benchmark is the product of the 5 -year Olympic average yield for the covered commodity in th e 
county and the 5 -year Olympic average national market price, or the statutory reference price, 
whichever is higher, for the covered commodity. Further details on calculation of ARC -CO 
revenue benchmarks and guarantees are available at: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA -
FSA-Public/usdafiles/arc -plc/pdf/base_acre_reallocate_arc_plc.pdf . 
 
10. What is the benchmark used among the counties to e nsure that the established prices are 
synchronized?  
 
RESPONSE:  The prices used to calculate the ARC -CO revenue be nchmark are nationally 
uniform.  Payment rates will vary by county based on differences in their 5 -year Olympic average 
yields that are used for  calculating the ARC -CO revenue benchmark.  County -level payment 
rates by covered commodity are available at: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs -and-
services/arcplc_program/ index . 
 
Questions 11 -12 
Section 2.4 Investment Regime (2.42, 2.45)  
During the review period, the U.S. foreign investment regime remained unchanged. Despite the 
investment regime being open, there are some sector -specific limitations, with review procedures  
on foreign investment in a few industries, including the airline and nuclear energy industries. 
Additionally, the United States has a national security review process applicable to foreign 
investment that might affect national security interests.  
 
11. What a re the sector specific limitations?  What is the outcome on the review procedures of the 
U.S. foreign investment regime? Please indicate whether the airline and nuclear energy will be 
liberalized in the near future.  
 
RESPONSE: The OECD Code of Liberalisatio n of Capital Movements summarizes U.S. fed eral-
level limitations on FDI. See: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment -policy/Code -capital -
movements -EN.pdf . With resp ect to review procedures, the Secretariat is here referring to 
standard administrative procedures that ensure that investments are consistent with certain 
sector -specific limitations, such as share of foreign ownership.  We remind Members that T PRs 
are ret rospective reviews. The United States cannot speculate on possible future measures or 
policy changes.  
 
SelectUSA, established in 201137, is a government programme led by the Department of Commerce 
to promote inward investment in the United States. The prog ramme has two main stakeholders: WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  foreign -owned firms considering investing in the United States and U.S. economic development 
organizations (EDOs) seeking to attract high -impact FDI. The services it provides include 
information, counselling, and advisory s ervices; ombudsman assistance; investment advocacy; and 
marketing and promotion through global events.  
 
12. What are the main areas promoted to attract high -impact FDI? Please explain the definition of 
high impact FDI.  
 
RESPONSE:  “High -impact” FDI refers to business investment with positive spillover effects to 
the U.S. economy, such as job creation, export propensity, and R&D spending. Since its creation, 
SelectUSA has provided assistance to facilitate greenfield FDI into the U.S.  without additional 
consideration to its economic sector.  
 
Question 13  
Section 4.3 Manufacturing (4.75)  
The manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP has declined in the past few years. It represented 
11.6% of GDP in 2017, down from 12.2% in 2013.59 Durab le goods accounted for 6.3% of GDP in 
2017, down from 6.5% in 2013, while non -durable goods represented 5.3% of GDP, down from 
5.7%. Considering individual subsectors, the largest contribution to GDP came from chemical 
products, which represented 2% of GDP  in 2017 (2.1% in 2013), followed by the computer and 
electronic goods subsector, which accounted for 1.5% of GDP in 2017 (1.6% in 2013), motor vehicles 
and parts (0.9% of GDP in 2017), machinery, fabricated metal products, and petroleum and coal 
products (0.8% of GDP each in 2017) (Table 4.7).  
 
13. Could the US share possible factors that contributed to the decline in the m anufacturing sector 
in the US. What are the initiatives by the Government in identifying the gaps and to improve the 
manufacturing sector?  
 
RESPONSE:  While the contributing share of manufacturing to the U.S. economy has declined 
relative to that of the services sector, U.S. manufacturing production has continued to grow.  
The U.S. manufacturing sector is the second largest in the world at $ 2.2 trillion (to China, with 
one-tenth the workers).  In real terms, it is up 11 percent since the depths of the recession in 
2009.  
 
U.S. government policy related to improving the manufacturing sector (and other sectors) can 
be viewed in depth in the 2018  Economic Report of the President, which can be viewed at: 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP -2018/pdf/ERP -2018.pdf . Further information on 
initiatives specifically related to manufacturing is contained in the Annual Report of 
Manufacturing USA, which is available at: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ams/NIST.AMS 
.600-3.pdf. 
 
Question 14  
Section 4.4. 1.4 Banking services (4.102)  
Under the International Banking Act of 1978, foreign banks can establish a commercial presence in 
the United States by setting up federal or state licensed branches and agencies, representative 
offices, or through the acquisiti on of a national or state subsidiary bank. These are accorded national 
treatment. If a foreign bank that poses a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system applies 
to set up an office in the United States, the DFA requires that the Federal Reserv e consider whether 
the home country of the foreign bank has adopted, or is in the process of adopting, regulation that 
would minimize such risk. In the absence of such criteria, the DFA gives the Federal Reserve powers 
to shut down the offices of foreign b anks.  
 
14. How is ‘a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system’ being defined, or determined?  
 
RESPONSE: The criteria for the Board to consider in making a determination to terminate the 
activities of the U.S. offices of foreign banks under section  7(e)(1) of the International Banking 
Act (IBA) are set forth in section 7(e)(1) of the IBA, 12 U.S.C. 3105(e)(1), and may be found 
at: https:/ /www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE -2011-title12/html/USCODE -2011-title12 -chap32 -
sec3105.htm< . The Federal Reserve also provided a framework for how it views financial stability 
issues in its November 2018 Financial Stability Report, which can be found at: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2018 -november -financial -stability -report -
framework.htm  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Summary (Para 16)  
 
The United States continues to be an active user of anti -dumping (AD) duties. Between 2015 and 
2017, the number of AD investigation initiations increased, tota lling 133. There were 340 AD orders 
in place as of end -July 2018, compared with 269 on 30 June 2016. The trading partners mos t 
affected by the measures were China, Chinese Taipei, the European Union, India, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea. The investigations initiated during the period were mainly concentrated in the 
steel industry. Of the 109 countervailing duty (CVD) measures in place as of end -July 2018, some 
50.5% were also applied on iron and steel products. There were 123 sunset review initiations of AD 
orders during the period from 1 January 2016 to end -June 2018. During the same period, there were 
eight revocations, while  104 orders were continued. There were 52 sunset review initiations of CVD 
orders during the period from 1 January 2016 to end -April 2018. During the same period, 27 sunset 
reviews of CVD orders were concluded; there were six revocations, while the remaini ng orders were 
continued.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States notes that no question was asked.  
 
Part II – Questions based on the Government Report (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Question 15  
Section 4.4.3 The US -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (4.56)  
The United States is pursuing several initiatives to expand and deepen economic engagement with 
the 10 member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN collectively 
represents both the United States' fourth largest goods expor t market and largest trading partner. 
Under the Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement signed in 2006, the United States is 
working with ASEAN countries to enhance and deepen the U.S. -ASEAN economic relationship and 
support ASEAN regional integration. In 2017 -2018, the United States supported the launch of the 
ASEAN Single Window under the U.S. Agency for International Development's US -ASEAN 
Connectivity through Trade and Investment (US -ACTI) program. For 2018 -2019, the United States 
and ASEAN have deci ded to work together on agriculture biotechnology regulatory cooperation and 
continue discussions on proposals regarding electronic payment ser vices and automotive standards.  
 
15. What are the US’s plans and initiatives relating to elect ronic payment services,  if any?  
 
RESPONSE: We look forward to future discussions with ASEAN members on electronic payments 
services based off the proposal we provided in 2018, given the importance of this sector as a 
key area of financial services trade.  Electronic payment serv ices are critical to facilitating global 
digital trade and promoting an open and competitive market that welcomes foreign and domestic 
suppliers on a level playing field, and can be an important driver of development, innovation, 
and economic growth.  
 
Ques tion 16  
Section 4.5.2 Promoting Digital Trade (4.83)  
The United States places great importance on electronic commerce (or “digital trade”), which plays 
a crucial role in strengthening and supporting firms in every sector of the economy. Since the last 
U.S. Trade Policy Review, the United States has advanced engagement on digital trade issues across 
a range of fora, and worked to combat a rising tide of barriers to digital trade around the world.  
 
16. What are the US’s plans and initiatives relating to digital t rade, if any?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States places great importance on digital trade, which is essential to 
the U.S. economy and serves as a critical driver of global economic growth.  In December 2017, 
the United States joined 70 other WTO Members in init iating exploratory work on possible future 
negotiations on these issues, and has engaged actively in exploratory discussions held to date. 
Furthermore, in the United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement (USMCA), the United States 
and its partners achieved th e highest -standard digital trade chapter ever negotiated in an FTA, 
which will serve as a model in the future.  As TPRs are retrospective in nature, we refrain from 
speculating on future U.S. government plans and initiatives relating to digital trade.  
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Part III – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
 
Question 17  
 
On 20 July 2018, the US Department of Commerce issued a preliminary affirmative anti -
circumvention determination concerning carbon steel butt -weld fittings from Malaysia, resulting in a 
higher US' import tariffs on Malaysian steel products manufacturers. H owever, there are genuine 
manufacturers which are producing these items with considerable value -added activities, rather than 
just importing from China and re -exporting it.   
 
17. While the U.S. has granted exemptions to some of these companies, the process re mains tedious 
and lengthy. As such, can the exemption process be made more efficient in order to reduce 
disruptions to these affected manufacturers?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States conducts its proceedings in accordance with the requirements of 
U.S. law and regulat ion. These legal requirements ensure that due process is afforded to affected 
parties.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Mexico  
INFORME DE LA SECRET ARIA WT/TPR/S/382  
Questions 1 -4  
3.1.6  Medidas Antidumping, compensatorias y de salvaguardia (3.66)  
 
1. El artículo 5.6 del Acuerdo Antidumping establece claramente que deben existir circunstancias 
especiales para que una autoridad investigadora pueda iniciar una investigación sin haber 
recibido una solicitud escrita hecha por o en nombre de la rama de produ cción nacional. ¿Podrían 
los Estados Unidos explicar en qué consistieron esas circunstancias especiales que permitieron 
que se iniciara de oficio la investigación sobre las importaciones de chapas de aleaciones de 
aluminio de China?  
 
RESPONSE: Details rega rding that specific proceeding can be found at: https://access.trade. 
gov/login.aspx . 
 
2. ¿Podrían los Estados Unidos explicar en qué momento de la investigación su autoridad 
investigadora determina qué productores constituyen la rama de producc ión nacional y sobre 
qué base?  
 
RESPONSE: When an AD/CVD petition is filed with the U.S. Department of Commerce, it must 
satisfy the relevant statutory requirements before the investigation can be initiated. The rules 
regarding the examination that takes p lace to determine the sufficiency of a petition (including 
the determination that a petition is supported by the domestic industry) can be found at 19 
C.F.R. section 351.203.  
 
3. En caso de que la autoridad estadounidense decida quiénes integran a la rama de producción 
nacional en el momento de iniciar la investigación, y considerando que los productores 
nacionales no solicitaron esa iniciación, ¿podrían indicar en qué datos, regis tros, cifras, etc., se 
basan para tomar la decisión relativa a quiénes debe incluirse y excluirse de la rama de 
producción nacional?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States presumes that this question is asking about an instance where 
the investigation is self -initiated. As mentioned in the response to Question 2, determinations 
regarding initiation of an investigation, including self -initiation, must be made pursuant to the 
requirements in U.S. law and consistent with international obligations. Therefore, in instanc es 
where the U.S. Department of Commerce decides to self -initiate an investigation, it collects and 
reviews any necessary information required by U.S. law. How that information is collected will 
depend on the facts and circumstances of that specific procee ding. 
 
4. En caso de que la autoridad estadounidense decida quiénes integran a la rama de producción 
nacional en algún momento posterior a la iniciación de la investigación, y considerando que los 
productores nacionales no solicitaron esa iniciación, ¿podría explicar de qué manera se aseguró 
la autoridad investigadora de tener datos suficientes sobre la existencia de daño, para poder 
iniciar la investigación de oficio?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 3 above.  
 
Questions 5 -6 
3.1.6.1.1.5 Exámenes por extinción  (3.72 and 3.73)  
 
5. ¿Podrían los Estados Unidos aclarar qué sucede si los productores nacionales son omisos en 
cuanto a manifestar interés en que los derechos antidumping subsistan? ¿El examen por 
extinción se iniciaría au tomáticamente, a pesar de ello?  
 
RESPONSE:  The regulations regarding the situation described in the question can be found at 
19 C.F.R. section 351.218(d)(1)(iii).  
 
6. Entendemos que los exámenes por extinción se inician a más tardar 30 días antes del quinto 
aniversario de la publicación de la orden de imposición de los derechos. Posteriormente, se indica 
que la política del USDOC consiste en notificar dichos exámenes con un mes de antelación. Al WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 299 - 
 
  respecto, ¿podrían los Estados Unidos aclarar a partir de cuándo se cuentan esos 30 días de 
antelación?  
 
RESPONSE: Thirty days before the fifth anniversary of the order in question.  
 
Question  7 
3.1.6.1.2 Medidas antidumping  (3.80)  
 
7. ¿Podrían los Estados Unidos indicar si actualmente llevan a cabo algún procedimiento o 
procedimientos para asegurar el pago de 3.100 millones de dólares EE.UU en concepto de 
derechos antidumping o compensatorios por importaciones realizadas desde 2001 y, en su caso, 
indicar de manera general en qué consiste ese pro cedimiento o procedimientos?  
 
RESPONSE: The collection of AD/CVD duties is conducted by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection. As indicated in the Secretariat's Report, further information regarding the legal 
responsibilities regarding the collection of duties can be found at: https://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2017/03/31/fact -sheet -enhanced -collection -and-enforcement -antidumping -and-countervailing -
duties. 
Question 8 -9 
3.1.6.2 Salvaguardias  (3.89)  
 
8. El artículo XIX del GATT de 1994 establece que sólo se puede imponer una medida de 
salvaguardia si como resultado de la evolución imprevista de las circunstancias y por efecto de 
las ob ligaciones contraídas en el propio GATT de 1994, las importaciones han aumentado en tal 
cantidad y se realizan en condiciones tales, que causan o amenazan causar un daño grave a los 
productores nacionales. Al respecto, ¿podrían los Estados Unidos indicar q ué factores, criterios, 
etc. se analizan?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. International Trade Commission conducts safeguard investigations under 
Section 201 – 204 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2251 – 2254). The authority and 
requirements for such investigatio ns can be found in these provisions. The details of a specific 
serious injury determination made by the U.S. International Trade Commission can be found at:  
https://usitc.gov/t rade_remedy/publications/safeguard_pubs.htm . 
 
9. ¿Qué metodologías aplican para realizar ese análisis, con el objeto de asegurarse de cumplir con 
esos requisitos?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 8 above.  
Question 10 -12 
3.1.6.2.1.2 Investigaciones en materia de salvaguardias, 2016 -2018 
Lavadoras de gran capacidad para uso doméstico (3.96)  
 
10. Entendemos que la Comisión de Comercio Internacional (ITC por sus siglas en inglés) determinó 
que las importaciones de lavadoras de México no eran parte sustancial del total de las 
importaciones de lavadoras, ni contribuían de manera importante al daño causado por las 
mismas y, por lo tanto, recomendó que México fuera excluido de la medida. No obst ante, en la 
proclamación del 23 de enero de 2018, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos determinó no excluir 
a México de la medida.  
 
RESPONSE: The details of the U.S. International Trade Commission's findings are available 
at: https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy/publications/safeguard_pubs.htm . Information regarding 
the President's Proclamation in this specific instance can be found at: 83 Fed. Reg. 3553 – 62 
(Jan. 25, 2018).  
11. Al respecto, tomando en cuenta que derivado del análisis técnico de la ITC, realizado con base 
en la normativa internacional aplicable, se encontraron méritos para excluir a México de la 
medida mencionada, ¿podrían los Estados Unidos ex plicar de qué manera la proclamación del 
Presidente es compatible con las obligaciones de los Estados Unidos establecidas en el GATT de 
1994 y el Acuerdo sobre Salvaguardias?  
RESPONSE: The United States makes its safeguard determinations consistent with th e 
obligations in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. Information regarding the President's 
Proclamation in this specific instance can be found at: 83 Fed. Reg. 3553 – 62 (Jan. 25, 2018).   
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  12. Por otro lado, dado que ya existía una medida antidumping vigente, y presumiblemente esa 
medida neutraliza el supuesto efecto dañino causado por las importaciones, ¿de qué manera 
puede sostenerse que aun cuando ya no existe un daño importante, sí hay daño grave (que 
además, es de mayor magnitud)?  
 
RESPONSE:  The details of t he U.S. International Trade Commission's serious injury 
determination can be found at: https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy/publications/safeguard_pubs. 
htm. 
 
Question 13  
3.3.2 Normas y otras prescripciones técnicas  (3.178)  
 
13. ¿Cómo fueron resultas las cuatro PCE resaltadas en el Comité OTC hacia Estados Unidos? ¿Cuáles 
son los mayores retos para Estados Unidos, en cuanto a la resolución de  PCE en el marco del 
Comité OTC?  
 
RESPONSE: While we are not entirely clear about the first part of this question, we note that 
each of the specific trade concerns were placed on the agenda for the TBT Committee ahead of 
time. We also had bilateral meeting s on the margins of the TBT Committee to respond to the 
concerned Member.  
 
In general, we agree there are challenges with obtaining resolution to specific trade concerns, 
such as ensuring that the responding Member has enough time to prepare a response and that 
the responding Member has the technical expertise to provide substantive responses. We also 
find it helpful when Members bring up issues in a timely manner when the regulation is in a draft 
stage instead of after the regulation has been finalized.  That said, we have found the TBT 
Committee process to be invaluable to making progress on specific trade concerns and enhancing 
transparency, even when not obtaining full resolution.  
Question 14 -23 
3.3.7 Derechos de  Propiedad Intelectual (3.270, 3.272, 3.274, 3.276, 3.278, 3.279, 3.292, 3.298, 
3.303, 3.311)  
 
14. ¿Qué tipo de mecanismos y compromisos son empleados para la resolución de asuntos 
relacionados con la protección y la observa ncia de la propiedad intelectual?  
 
RESPONSE: The judiciary and executive branches of the U.S. government provide mechanisms 
to resolve issues related to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property.    
15. ¿La Oficina de Políticas y Asuntos Internacionales de la USPTO tiene la facultad para sancionar 
actividades irregulares? De no ser así, ¿A qué instancia se canaliza?  
 
RESPONSE: The Office of Policy and International Affairs (OPIA) of the USPTO is not an 
enforcement body. An illustrative des cription of the OPIA's role can be found here: 
https://www.uspto.gov/about -us/organizational -offices/office -policy -and-international -affairs . 
 
The USPTO Office of Enrolment and Discipline (OED) is responsible for registering attorneys and 
agents to practice before the USPTO and for developing and administering the registration 
examination. Only registered patent attorneys and agents, as well as indi viduals granted limited 
recognition, are permitted to practice before the USPTO in patent matters. Additionally, the 
USPTO OED investigates allegations of misconduct by practitioners. For more information please 
see: https://www.uspto.gov/about -us/organizational -offices/office -general -counsel/office -
enrollment -and-discipline -oed. 
16. ¿A qué se refiere con "microentidades" y cuáles s on las condiciones para que los solicitantes de 
patentes sean clasificados de esa manera?  
 
RESPONSE: See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 9th Edition (MPEP) Section 509.04 – 
Micro Entity Status, at: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s509.html#ch500_ 
d1ff69_210b3_1ca . 
 
17. ¿Cuál es la autoridad que conoce de los asuntos relacionados con la infracción y observancia de 
las patentes?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 301 - 
 
  RESPONSE: To the extent this question asks about matters related to litigation concerning 
infringement and enforcement of patents that involves the USPTO, the USPTO Office of the 
Solicitor represents the agency in court proceedings. Please see https://www.uspto.gov/about -
us/organizational -offices/office -general -counsel/office -solicitor . 
 
To the extent this question asks what courts or administrative bodies of  the U.S. Government 
are involved in litigation concerning infringement and enforcement of patents, the United States 
Federal District Courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents, which includ es patent infringement under 35 USC 271. Please see 
28 USC 1338.  
 
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) is an independent, quasi -judicial 
Federal agency with broad investigative responsibilities on matters of trade. The USITC 
investigat es and adjudicates cases involving imports that allegedly infringe intellectual property 
rights, including imports that allegedly infringe a U.S. patent. See: https://www.usitc.gov/ 
intelle ctual_property.htm . 
 
18. ¿Cómo es el proceso para la presentación de una solicitud provisional de patente y en qué casos 
aplica dicha solicitud? ¿Los solicitantes extranjeros tienen los mismos derechos que los 
solicitantes estadounidenses, estos solicitantes extranjeros tienen que ser nacionales de algún 
país miembro de la OMC?  
 
RESPONSE: See: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -gettin g-started/patent -basics/types -patent -
applications/provisional -application -patent . Foreign and national applicants alike may file 
provisional patent applications.  
 
19. ¿Qué son los exámenes inter partes y cuáles son las condiciones para que una persona que no 
sea titular de una patente puede impugnar la validez de una patente ya emitida?  
 
RESPONSE:  See: https://www.uspto.gov/patents -application -process/appealing -patent -
decisions/trials/inter -partes -review . Also see: 35 USC Ch. 31 and 37 CFR Ch.42, Subpart B.  
20. Al no haber lista de marcas famosas ¿Quién y cómo se determina que marca es famosa?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States protects well -known marks  using the "likelihood of confusion" 
analysis under section 2(d) of the Trademark (Lanham) Act. Fame is a significant element in this 
determination. The United States also protects famous marks under its anti -dilution sections 
13(a) and 43(c) of the Tradem ark Act. Proceedings can be brought by owners of registered and 
unregistered well -known or famous marks at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board within the 
USPTO, and at U.S. courts.  
21. ¿Qué es un nombre o signo geográfico? ¿Este nombre o signo deben tener re lación con el lugar 
al que se refiere?  
 
RESPONSE: Geographical indications, including the name of the territory of a Member or a 
figurative element associated with that territory, are protected as marks of regional origin under 
Section 4 of the Trademark A ct. The name or sign indicating regional origin must be related to 
the place to which it refers, otherwise it may be refused protection as deceptive.  
 
22. En lo que se refiere al espionaje económico e industrial extranjero en el ciberespacio, ¿La Ley 
de Asignaciones a la Defensa Nacional (NDAA) determina el procedimiento a seguir y las 
sanciones en caso de alguna situación de espionaje?  
 
RESPONSE: The NDAA of 2015 authorizes, but does not require, the President to impose 
sanctions in certain situations in volving economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace.  This 
authority is just one of several that involve sanctions actions in response to acts of economic 
and industrial espionage in cyberspace.  
23. Para expedir licencias legales conformes con el Convenio d e ¿Cuál es el procedimiento a seguir 
de las partes interesadas y bajo qué condiciones se puede realizar dicho procedimiento?  
 
RESPONSE: This question appears to relate to paragraph 3.311 of the Secretariat's Report, and 
to the Berne Convention and statutor y licensing provisions of the Copyright Act. U.S. copyright 
law includes several statutory licenses, each of which operates differently from the others. See 
17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119 and 122. These licenses cover retransmission WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 302 - 
 
  of broa dcast signals by cable systems (§ 111), the making of certain ephemeral phonorecords 
of sound recordings (§ 112), public performances of sound recordings by means of digital audio 
transmissions (§ 114), the making and distribution of phonorecords of certai n non -dramatic 
musical works (including transmission of "digital phonorecord deliveries") (§ 115), public 
performances of musical works in jukeboxes (§ 116), the use of published non -dramatic musical 
works and published pictorial, graphic, and sculptural w orks by public broadcasting entities (§ 
118), and retransmission of broadcast signals by satellite carriers (§§ 119 and 122).  
 
The manner in which licensees obtain the right to use a statutory license varies from license to 
license, but often entails serv ice of a notice of use or intention to use the license being submitted 
to a collective or to the Copyright Office. Royalties are paid to copyright owners either directly 
or indirectly (indirect payments are made through collectives or through the Copyright  Office). 
The conditions and means of payment vary from license to license. For additional information on 
the statutory licenses available under the Copyright Act, see: www.copyright.gov/licensing . 
 
On Oct ober 11, 2018, the Orrin G. Hatch –Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA) was 
signed into law. Among other things, it makes significant changes to the section 115 compulsory 
license and it makes sound recordings created before February 15, 1972, subjec t to the section 
112 and section 114 licenses. In accordance with the new law, the Copyright Office no longer 
accepts section 115 notices of intention to obtain a compulsory license for making a digital 
phonorecord delivery of a musical work. The Copyright  Office's MMA homepage contains more 
information on this new law, see www.copyright.gov/music -modernization . 
Questions 24 -26 
4.4.1 Servicios Financieros  (4.83, 4.85, 4.89)  
 
"En respuesta a la crisis financiera, el Gobierno estableció el Programa de Ayuda para Activos 
Problemáticos (TARP)".  
 
24. México quisiera tener información adicional de los objetivos principales y la manera en la que 
opera este programa. Adicionalmente conocer más a fondo si se han establecido otros programas 
similares al Programa de Ayuda para Activos Problemáticos (TARP) y cuáles son las perspectivas 
futuras sobre el TARP.  
 
RESPONSE: Please refer to U.S. Department of the Treasury's Trou bled Asset Relief Program 
Monthly Report to Congress, available at: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/  
financia lstability/reports/Documents/October%202014%20Monthly%20Report%20to%20C  
ongress.pdf , and U.S. Department of the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two 
Year Retrospective,  available  at: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial -stability/reports  
/Documents/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.
pdf. 
25. México quisiera saber cuáles mercados, entidades y actividades que antes no estaban regulados 
se regularon con la DFA y si dicha ley se ha ido adecuando a las circunstancias para promover 
la estabilidad financiera de los Estados Unidos.   
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer t o the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2017 Annual Report, 
available at:  https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies -reports/Doc uments/FSOC_17_ 
Annual_Report. pdf . 
26. México quisiera saber si se ha modificado el número y las entidades declaradas importantes en 
2012. De ser el caso, ¿actualmente cuántas y cuáles entidades de servicios del mercado 
financiero han sido declaradas importan tes en el marco de la DFA?  
 
RESPONSE: Please refer to the Financial Stability Oversight Council's page on designations, 
available at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiat ives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx . 
 
Question 27 -29 
4.4.2 Telecomunicaciones  (4.132, 4.133, 4.143)  
 
27. De acuerdo con el Informe sobre la Medición de la Sociedad de la Información de 2017 de la 
UIT, se espera que el servicio de  5G se encuentre disponible desde el 2019 en los Estados Unidos 
de América. Al respecto, ¿cuáles han sido las acciones que ha realizado las distintas 
organizaciones involucradas para que sea posible el otorgamiento del servicio de 5G en el país 
y cuáles ha n sido los retos a los que se han enfrentado?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 303 - 
 
   
RESPONSE: The United States has taken a whole -of-government approach to 5G, as recognized 
at the White House 5G Summit in September 2018. More information can be found in the 
speeches at the summit by Federal Communications (FCC) Chairman Ajit Pai and National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Assistant Secretary David Redl:  
 
- https://www.fcc.gov/docume nt/chairman -pai-remarks -white -house -5g-summit  
- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2018/remarks -assistant -secretary -redl-
white -house -5g-summit . 
28. ¿Cómo se lleva a cabo la coordinación del trabajo entre la Comisión Federal de Comunicaciones, 
la Administración Nacional de Telecomunicaciones e Informa ción, la Oficina de Política 
Internacional de Comunicación e Información (CIP) bajo el Departamento de Estado y la Oficina 
Representativa de Comercio de los Estados Unidos, para la formulación y aplicación de políticas 
públicas relativas a las telecomunica ciones?  
 
RESPONSE: The FCC (an independent government agency), NTIA (part of the Department of 
Commerce), and the State Department's CIP work together on several topics including spectrum 
at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The FCC is respo nsible for consolidating 
the views of non -federal spectrum users (e.g. the private sector and state and local 
governments), NTIA is responsible for consolidating the views of federal users (e.g. NASA and 
the Department of Defense), and the State Department  reconciles these views ahead of 
international conferences.  
 
More information on the process and advisory groups for each agency (WAC for the FCC, IRAC 
and RCS for NTIA, and ITAC for the State Department) are available at the links below.  
 
- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/osmhome/roosa4.html  
- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/osmhome/wrc99pre/process.htm l 
- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/wrc -19 
- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/interdepartment -radio-advisory -committee -irac 
- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/radio -conference -subcommittee -rcs 
- https://www.fcc.gov/wrc -19 
- https://www.state.gov/e/eb/adcom/itac/  
 
29. ¿Qué acciones se han implementado desde que se emitió una nueva Orden que retoma las 
prácticas vigentes antes de que se implementara la Orden del Título II? ¿Se han tenido avances 
en la promo ción del despliegue de banda ancha en áreas rurales y la inversión en infraestructura, 
que son resultados que se espera tener con este nuevo Orden?  
 
RESPONSE: Since the Restoring Internet Freedom Order was adopted in December 2017, the 
Federal Communicatio ns Commission (FCC) has continued its work to promote broadband 
deployment in rural areas, as described in the speech by FCC Chairman Pai linked to below. As 
the Restoring Internet Freedom Order only went into effect in June 2018, the FCC is still in the 
process of collecting data on its impact. See: https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman -pai-
remarks -international -regulators -forum mexico -city. 
Question 30  
4.4.3 Servicios postales y de mensajeros  (4.149 -4.152)  
 
30. México desea saber si se modificará el papel facilitador del crecimiento económico desempeñado 
por el sector de los servicios internacionales de en trega urgente con los avances tecnológicos 
relacionados con el comercio digital?  
 
RESPONSE: We refrain from speculating on possible future actions or policies given the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
Question 31 -32 
4.5 Comercio electrónico (4.272, 4.279)  
 
31. De los casos denunciados por la Comisión Federal de Comercio en 2017, por cuestiones de 
violaciones de privacidad y seguridad de datos, ¿cómo es que la Comisión los resolvió? ¿Cuáles 
son las medidas que l a Comisión establece para mitigar estas acciones en el comercio digital?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 304 - 
 
  RESPONSE: To address privacy and data security violations in cases, the FTC generally seeks 
to obtain an order prohibiting the offending practice, and  seeks the creation of a privacy or data 
security program in order to prevent the recurrence of the practice. Each case resolution depends 
on the facts of the particular case. FTC has published a 2017 Privacy and Data Security Update 
which summarizes each of these cases and places them in the context of our privacy and data 
security program. See: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy -data-
security -update -2017-overview -commissions -enforcement -policy -initiatives consumer/privacy_ 
and_data_security_update_2017.pdf . 
 
The update contains  website links to each case, including press releases, blogs, copies of the 
legal complaints setting forth the FTC's allegations, and copies of any orders obtained.  
32. México quisiera conocer mayor información sobre la normativa relativa a la imposición de l as 
ventas en línea, en específico el alcance de ésta y sus posibles implicaciones para un 
inversionista en términos de competencia, en específico en los Estados que no imponen estos 
impuestos.  
 
RESPONSE: We interpreted Mexico's question to refer to the "im position of online sales taxes."  
 
The imposition of a sales tax is determined by each of the individual U.S. States. The imposition 
of other taxes or fees on businesses is also determined by each of the individual U.S. States. 
The U.S. federal law known as  the Internet Tax Freedom Act bars all levels of U.S. government 
from imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. The same law also 
prohibits any taxes on Internet access services.  
 
In the recent Wayfair decision, the Court held that a physical presence in a U.S. state was not 
an absolute necessity under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to establish a 
presence or nexus with the U.S. state for the purposes of collecting sales tax. In general , under 
the U.S. Constitution, U.S . States may impose taxes so long as they (1) apply to an activity with 
a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) are fairly apportioned, (3) do not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and (4) are fairly related to the services the State provide s. In the 
absence of physical presence, a State must still rely on a substantial nexus with it to impose a 
tax on interstate activity. We cannot speculate on the impact of the Wayfair decision on 
investment and remind Members that TPRs are retrospective re views.  
INFORME DEL GOBIERNO WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 33  
1 Los Estados Unidos en el Sistema Mundial de Comercio (1.5)  
 
33. En el informe de Gobierno, Estados Unidos indica que: "Durante demasiado tiempo, las normas 
del comercio mundial han sido desfavorables para los trabajadores y las empresas 
estadounidenses". ¿Podrían proporcionar ejemplos concretos a lo que se referirían con esta 
declaración?  
RESPONSE: We refer you to the discussion in the President's Trade Agenda, at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%
20FINAL.PDF . The U.S. Administration has made clear that it intends to pursue trade agreem ents 
designed to promote fair, balanced trade and to support American jobs and prosperity, and we 
have already begun to revise outdated and unfair trade deals.  
 
Question 34  
4.2 Actividades relacionadas con la observancia de las normas comerciales (4.17)  
 
34. ¿Cuáles son las actividades de vanguardia que el USTR realiza en el marco del Comité de 
Obstáculos Técnicos al Comercio de la OMC, con el fin de hacer frente a obstáculos injustificables 
al comercio?  
 
RESPONSE: It is unclear precisely what the question is a sking. However, the United States is 
an active participant in the WTO TBT Committee. We use the Committee to seek resolution of 
trade barriers that U.S. exports face in other WTO Members. As we noted in an earlier response, 
however, there are challenges to  achieving resolution to those barriers. The United States is also 
an active participant in the Triennial Review process in the TBT Committee and finds that process 
invaluable for Members to address systemic issues affecting implementation of specific 
obligations.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 305 - 
 
   
Question 35  
4.5.2 Promoción del comercio digital  (4.83)  
 
35. ¿Cómo es que Estados Unidos de América ha refor zado su compromiso con las cuestiones 
relativas al comercio digital desde 2017 y cuáles son los desafíos que han identificado en el corto 
plazo en la materia?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States places great importance on digital trade, which is essential to 
the U.S. economy and serves as a critical driver of global economic growth. However, digital 
trade is under threat from a growing number of laws and regulations that block the flow of data 
across borders, impede the provision of services such as cloud computin g, or otherwise restrict 
the ability of firms to take advantage of best -in-class digital services. In December 2017, the 
United States joined 70 WTO Members in initiating exploratory work on possible future 
negotiations on these issues, and has engaged act ively in exploratory discussions held to date. 
Furthermore, in the United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement (USMCA), the United States 
and its partners achieved the highest -standard digital trade chapter ever negotiated in an FTA.   
 
Questions 36 -48 
7 Comercio y Cuestiones Laborales (7.1, 7.2)  
 
36. ¿Por qué Estados Unidos no ha ratificado todos los Convenios Fundamentales de la Organización 
Internacional del Trabajo?  
 
RESPONSE:  In its trade agreements, the United States includes references and obligations 
related to the ILO Declaration on Principles and Rights at Work (1998), which embodies the 
fundamental labo ur rights of the ILO.  
 
37. ¿Estados Unidos considera que cumple con los Convenios Fundamentales de la Organización 
Internacion al del Trabajo? De ser así, ¿a través de que leyes cumple con dichos Convenios?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has a system of labo ur laws and practices that promote and 
protect the fundamental principles and rights at work embodied in the Constitution of th e ILO. 
More information on U.S. laws related to fundamental labo ur rights is available at: 
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights -we-protect , https://www.dol .gov/whd/childlabor.htm , 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/involuntary -servitude -forced -labor-and-sex-trafficking -statutes -
enforced , and https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/index.cfm . 
 
38. Como parte de la protección del derecho a la negociación colectiva, ¿A través de que leyes 
asegura Estados Unidos que sus trabajadores conocen los contratos colectivos de tra bajo? ¿Los 
trabajadores votan de manera personal, libre y secreta para elegir un sindicato? ¿Los 
trabajadores votan de manera personal, libre y secreta el contrato colectivo que les aplicará? 
¿En qué ley se establece este proceso y quién es el encargado de  regularlo? ¿Cuántos 
trabajadores son necesarios para formar un sindicato?  
 
RESPONSE:  As a general matter, two or more employees in the United States may engage in 
"concerted activity" in the workplace and form a union, and workers may choose a union to 
represent them in collective bargaining with the employer through a secret ballot vote. The 
National Labor Relations Act establishes rights related to collective bargaining, and the National 
Labor Relations Board implements these protections. More informati on on collective bargaining 
in the United States is available at: https://www.nlrb.gov/rights -we-protect/rights/employee -
rights . 
 
39. ¿Estados Unidos cuentan con una prestación monet aria regulada anual que deba proporcionarse 
a los trabajadores al final del año?  
 
RESPONSE:  No. 
 
40. ¿Cuántos días de vacaciones tiene un trabajador por ley al año? ¿A los trabajadores que reciben 
vacaciones se les paga el día normal? ¿Tienen una prestación monetaria adicional para el periodo 
y disfrute de sus vacaciones?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 306 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of the United States does not require payment 
for time not worked, such as vacations or holidays. These benefits are generally a matter of 
agreement between an employer and an employee, or the employee's representative. More 
information on this topic is available at: https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/workhours/holidays . 
 
41. ¿Los em pleadores en Estados Unidos están obligados a pagar una cantidad al gobierno o alguna 
institución pública para asegurar los gastos médicos de los trabajadores en caso de enfermedad 
y prestaciones como créditos de vivienda o asegurar su retiro? De ser así, ¿Qué porcentaje del 
salario del trabajador tiene que aportar el empleador? ¿A qué institución se otorga dicho 
porcentaje? ¿Qué leyes lo regulan?  
 
RESPONSE:  The U.S. federal government administers a social insurance program through the 
Social Security Admin istration (SSA), consisting primarily of retirement and disability benefits. 
To qualify for these benefits, workers generally pay taxes on their earnings, and benefits are 
based on the wage earner's contributions. More information on the SSA is available a t: 
https://www.ssa.gov/benefits . 
 
42. ¿En Estados Unidos están obligadas las empresas a compartir las ganancias que generaron en 
el año con los trabajadores? De ser así, ¿De cuánto es el porcentaje y que ley lo regu la? 
 
RESPONSE:  No. 
 
43. Cuándo un trabajador es despedido en Estados Unidos, ¿el empleador está obligado a 
proporcionarle una prestación monetaria debido a dicho despido?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has a system of unemployment benefits that requires 
contributions from employers and workers. More information is available at: 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/un employment -insurance . 
 
44. ¿Cuál fue el resultado de las reuniones de alto nivel que celebró Estados Unidos con funcionarios 
de Bahrein, Centroamérica y la República Dominicana, Colombia, el Perú y la República de Corea 
para examinar la aplicación de los capít ulos relativos a cuestiones laborales de los ALC suscritos 
por los Estados Unidos con esos socios y supervisar los progresos realizados en su marco?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States held government -to-government discussions on labo ur issues 
with several tradin g partners during the review period. More information on these activities is 
available in USTR's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, Chapter IV, 
Section  E, which  can be viewed  here:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/20
18/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20IV.pdf . 
 
45. ¿Qué actividades de cooperación en materia laboral tiene en vigor Estados Unidos que facilitan 
la aplicación de las Capítulos Laborales de los ALC de Estados Unidos?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States undertook extensive labo ur cooperation activities with several 
trading partners during the review period. More information on these activities is available in 
USTR's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, Chapter IV, Section 
E, which  can be viewed  here:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/f iles/Press/Reports/2018/AR/
2018%20Annual%20Report%20IV.pdf . 
 
46. ¿Qué programas de preferencias comerciales tiene en vigor Estados Unidos como parte de la 
intensificación de cooperación con los interlocutores comerciales en lo que respecta a los 
derechos labor ales? 
 
RESPONSE:  The United States undertook cooperation activities with several countries that 
participate in U.S. trade preference programs, such as the Generalized System of Preferences 
and the African Growth and Opportunity Act, to promote labo ur right s during the review period. 
More information on these activities is available in USTR's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 
Annual Report, Chapter IV, Section E, which can be viewed here: https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20IV.pdf . 
 
47. ¿Cuáles son los "otros medios" que tiene en vigor Estados Unidos como parte de la intensificación 
de cooperaci ón con los interlocutores comerciales en lo que respecta a los derechos laborales?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 307 - 
 
   
RESPONSE:  The United States has entered into Trade and Investment Framework Agreements 
(TIFAs) with numerous trading partners to provide for strategic dialogue on trade and  investment 
issues, including promoting respect for fundamental labo ur rights. More information on TIFAs is 
available at: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/trade -invest ment-framework -agreements . 
 
48. ¿Cuál es la relevancia de señalar las reuniones que Estados Unidos realizó con Argelia, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Malasia, Camboya y Filipinas? ¿Se documentaron los resultados de dichas reuniones? 
¿Existe interés de Estados Unidos y d ichos países en acordar disposiciones laborales relacionadas 
al comercio? ¿Se establecieron actividades de cooperación con dichos países? ¿Qué cuestiones 
relativas a los derechos laborales se examinaron?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with 
each of these countries, and discussion of labo ur rights issues are part of these agreements. 
More information on these activities is available in USTR's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda  and 2017 
Annual Report, Chapter IV, Section E, which can be viewed here: https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/ 2018%20Annual%20Report%20IV.pdf . 
 
 
Questions 49 -51 
4.5.1 Protección de la propiedad intelectual (4.77, 4.80, 4.81)  
 
49. En los mercados extranjeros, ¿Cuáles serían las fuentes posibles de influencia que se mencionan 
para alentar a otros países a que abran sus mercados a las exportaciones estadounidenses de 
bienes y servicios con el fin de velar por la protección de los derechos de propiedad intelectual?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States uses a variety of tools to seek market opening and protect its 
rights, including with respect to intellectual property issues, including Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, the annual Special 301 review of intellectual property protection and enforcement 
and related market access issues; trade agreement negotiations; m onitoring and enforcement 
of existing trade agreements; trade and investment framework agreements; participation in the 
TRIPS Council at the World Trade Organization; and high -level engagement in multilateral and 
bilateral meetings.  
 
50. ¿Cuál ha sido la reac ción de China a las consultas con arreglo al Entendimiento sobre Solución 
de Diferencias de la OMC, en relación con el asunto DS542 de marzo de 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: In July 2018, the United States consulted with China, with Japan and the EU 
attending as third parties. See China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS542/7 (Acceptance by China of the requests to join 
consulta tions). Although China accepted the requests to join consultations as a third party from 
Japan and the EU, it did not accept the requests of Ukraine; the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; and Saudi Arabia; and China did not pr ovide an explanation 
as to why those requests were not granted.  
 
However, the dispute was not resolved during consultations. Accordingly, on October 18, 2018, 
the United States requested that the WTO establish a panel to examine the U.S. complaint. 
China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights , 
WT/DS542/8 (Request for the establishment of a panel by the United States). A dispute 
settlement panel was established on November 21, 2018.  
 
51. ¿Cuáles son los criterios que calific an que un mercado sea considerado parte de los "mercados 
notorios" y en qué consiste el examen anual extraordinario de los "mercados notorios"?  
 
RESPONSE: The List highlights prominent and illustrative examples of online and physical 
marketplaces that repo rtedly engage in, facilitate, turn a blind eye to, or benefit from substantial 
piracy and counterfeiting.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 308 - 
 
  Republic of  Moldova  
PART I: Quest ions from Document WT/TPR/S/382  
Question 1 -2 
Summary – Telecommunications (paragraph 32)  
 
A new regulatory order on telecommunications was issued in December 2017, which removed the 
prior requirements that providers of broadband Internet access services be subject to some of the 
same rules that apply to common carriers, including a prohibition on unjust or unreasonable 
practices or unreasonable discrimination. The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order reversed the 
policy applied in the sector, and returned to the lighter -touch framework that had been in place 
before. The Order, among other thing s, ended utility -style regulation of the Internet in favour of 
market -based policies, restored broadband Internet access service to the information service 
classification, eliminated certain reporting requirements, and restored the authority of the Federal  
Trade Commission (FTC) to police the privacy practices of Internet service providers (ISPs).  
 
1. Please describe what additional „lighter -touch" requirements are established under the Order as 
per above paragraph comparing to previous regulatory framework.  
 
RESPONSE: Among other things, t he Restoring Internet Freedom Order replaced prohibitions 
on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization by providers of broadband internet access service 
with a transparency requirement that providers must disclose their blocking,  throttling, and paid 
prioritization  practices.  See: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc -releases -restoring -internet -
freedom -order .  
 
2. Please, mention if curren tly there are any requirements related to non -discrimination principle 
and in which cases these shall apply.  
 
RESPONSE: Following the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)'s Restoring Internet 
Freedom Order, broadband internet access service is no longer subject to the prohibition on 
unreasonable discrimination found in Title II of the Communications Act. However, as a result 
of the Order, the Federal Trade Commission has authority to take action when broadband 
providers engage in anti -competitive, unfair,  or deceptive acts or practices.  
 
Questions 3 -4 
Section 2.3.2.2.1 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) (2.31)  
 
GSP country and product eligibility are subject to an annual review conducted by the GSP 
Subcommittee of the TPSC, which receives and consider s requests seeking to add or remove 
products from the duty -free list under the GSP. Any person may petition the GSP Subcommittee to 
request modifications to the list of countries eligible for GSP treatment, and modifications are made 
following the annual r eview, and are implemented by Presidential Proclamation.  
 
3. Please describe what are the eligibility criteria necessary to be met in order to add additional HS 
lines in the duty -free list under the GSP for developing countries?  
 
RESPONSE: In making any decision with regard to the provision of duty -free treatment for any 
eligible article from any beneficiary country, the President under the GSP statute must have due 
regard for the following factors:  (1) the effects such action would have on furthering the  
economic development of the developing countries through the expansion of their exports; 
(2) the extent to which other developed countries have granted comparable preferences; (3) the 
anticipated impact on U.S producers; and (4) the developing country's e xport competitiveness 
with respect to the product . See: 19 U.S.C. 2461 et seq . 
 
4. What is the procedure related to the requests for the extension of the above -mentioned list?  
 
RESPONSE: USTR conducts an Annual GSP Review, which is announced in the Federal Re gister. 
The Federal Register notice announcing the 2017/2018 Annual GSP Review can be found at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/gsp/FRN%20r eopening%202017 -2018%20AR%204 -4-
18.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 309 - 
 
  Questions 5 -7 
Section 3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade – Incentives (3.169)  
 
Among the federal programmes, trade adjustment assistance programmes have been established 
for enterprises and workers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms (TAAF) provides technical 
assistance to eligible domestic manufacturers affected by import competition without regard to the 
nature of the industry. Support is provided on a cost -sharing basis for the development of bu siness 
recovery plans, and projects outlined in them, to expand markets, strengthen operations, and 
increase competitiveness. The TAAF is administered by the Economic Development Administration 
at the USDOC, and assistance is disseminated through 11 non -profit or university -affiliated centres 
serving firms in the 50 states. No funds are provided directly to firms. The FY2017 budget for TAAF 
was US$13 million, and the value of the technical assistance that fi rms received amounted to 
US$6.9  million.  
 
5. In which  sectors/industries do you register the biggest needs for adjustment assistance in the 
context of TAAF?  
 
RESPONSE: Many sectors benefit from the TAAF program. A list of fifty -two industries that used 
this program is available at: http://www.taacenters.org/industries.html . 
 
6. Could the US please provide some examples of how the TAAF program has worked in practice?  
 
RESPONSE: Here are two examples: (1) A North Carolina manufacturer of amplifier cabinets  
opened in 2000 and experienced steady growth for 13 years. However, as the result of import 
competition, the firm entered the TAAF program in 2013 and was able to update its website to 
improve consumer usability, make improvements to manufacturing process es, and obtain 
ISO9000 training and certification. When the firm completed the program in 2016, annual sales 
had increased by over $400,000, and it was able to rehire or add 29 employees. (2) A Colorado 
aerospace component manufacturer struggling with low -cost foreign competition entered the 
TAAF Program in 2010. The firm's sales had declined by 31 per cent  and employment had 
dropped by 47 per cent . As a result of TAAF projects to significantly streamline production and 
improve efficiency, the firm's compet itive position improved dramatically over a four -year 
period, resulting in a 54 per cent  increase in sales and a 52 per cent  increase in employment.  
 
7. Please describe the assistance, which was provided for manufactures affected by import 
competition in the context of TAAF?  
 
RESPONSE: TAAF provides technical assistance to assist trade -impacted firms to make strategic 
adjustments to improve their competitiveness. The technical assistance comes in the form of 
industry consultants, engineers, designers, and expe rts that assist in manufacturing, 
engineering, marketing, information technology, and quality projects designed to increase 
productivity. TAAF also provides firms with business recovery plans based on a financial, 
management, marketing/sales, production, a nd support systems analysis.  
 
Question 8  
Section 4.5 E -commerce (4.279)  
 
Rules on taxation on sales online were recently changed by a Supreme Court ruling. Under rules 
applied since 1992, in general terms, if an online retailer maintained a physical presence in, or had 
a nexus (personnel, etc.) within, a state that charges a sales tax on most purchases, then that online 
retailer was obliged to charge sales tax on any items sold to customers within the home state. In 
practice, that meant that most smal l businesses, which generally do not have a presence in several 
states, were not obliged to charge sales tax on sales to customers located in states other than their 
own. In the South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. case, the Supreme Court ruled that states may com pel 
online retailers to charge sales tax regardless of whether the retailer has a physical presence in the 
state.  
 
8. Please describe in more details the current situation for online sales tax and what states still 
apply the 1992 Quill decision. Is there a un ique legal framework regulated to the sales tax for 
all states or is there any other obligatory general legal framework? Additionally, please inform 
how the above -mentioned Court ruling is currently applied in practice. What are the expected WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 310 - 
 
  positive resul ts (except budget revenue) and what may be the negative impact on the 
development of the online as a result of application of the South Dakota court rule.  
 
RESPONSE: The imposition of a sales tax is determined by each of the individual U.S. States. 
Each of  the individual U.S. States also determines the imposition of other taxes or fees on 
businesses. The U.S. federal law known as the Internet Tax Freedom Act bars all levels of U.S. 
government from imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic comm erce. The same 
law also prohibits any taxes on Internet access services.  
 
Prior to the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, many states collected use taxes from purchasers 
on sales into their state by businesses without a physical presence. These use taxes were  at the 
same rate as the sales taxes and in some cases relied on out -of-state vendor's in -state activities 
to collect the use tax. In the recent Wayfair decision, the Court held that a physical presence in 
a U.S. state was not an absolute necessity under t he Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
to establish a presence or nexus with the U.S. state for the purposes of collecting sales tax. In 
general under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. States may impose taxes so long as they (1) apply to 
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) are fairly apportioned, (3) do not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) are fairly related to the services the State 
provides. In the absence of physical presence, a State must still rely on a subst antial nexus with 
it to impose a tax on interstate activity.  
 
At this point in time, it is premature to examine the effect of the states' responses to the Wayfair 
decision.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  New Zealand  
Part I – Questions from the Secretariat's Report Document WT/TPR/S/ 382 
 
Question 1  
Section 4.1.2.2 Price Loss Coverage (PLC) (4.11)  
 
Paragraph 4.11 details the Price Loss Coverage (PLC). Farmers made a one -time choice whether or 
not to elect PLC of each covered commodity, for the duration of the 2014 Farm Bill. PLC is dec oupled 
from production, with no requirement to produce, and is triggered by prices.  
 
1. What is the status of PLC since the 2014 Farm Bill expired on 30 September 2018 – are farmers' 
elected commodities still covered by PLC?  
 
RESPONSE: The PLC program is authorized through the end of the 2 018 crop year.  
 
Questions 2 -6 
Section 4.1.2.8 Dairy Sector (4.33 -4.36)  
 
Paragraphs 4.33 -4.36 detail the Margin Protection Program for Dairy (MPP -Dairy) noting that the 
historical production level is defined as equalling "the average annual milk sales during calendar 
years 2011, 2012, and 2013." Once producers are enrolled in MPP -Dairy they are required to stay 
in it until the 2014 Farm Bill expires. There is no upper limit on the compensation payments or farm 
size for eli gibility to receive MPP -Dairy payments.  
 
2. What percentage of dairy farmers enrolled in MPP in 2017 and 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: As of 2017, 60 per cent  of licensed dairy operations had registered production 
history under the MPP -Dairy program. Data for 2018 are not  yet available.  
 
3. Of those enrolled farmers, what percentage enrolled at the different margin coverage levels 
($4/cwt through to $8/cwt) in 2017 and 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: Of dairy operations enrolled in MPP in 2017: 93 per cent  had coverage at the $4 
margin leve l, 0.1 per cent  had coverage at the $4.50 margin level, 0.6 per cent  had coverage 
at the $5 margin level, 0.3 per cent  had coverage at the $5.50 margin level, 2.4 per cent  had 
coverage at the $6 margin level, 3.5 per cent  had coverage at the $6.50 margin l evel, 0.2 per 
cent had coverage at the $7 margin level, 0.2 per cent  had coverage at the $7.50 margin level, 
and 0.1 per cent  had coverage at the $8 margin level. Data for 2018 are not yet available.  
 
4. A farmer can choose the percentage of their milk produc tion history level they want covered. 
What was the average percentage of production history covered in 2017 and 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: While data on individual production history coverages are not publicly available, 
the total production history eligible for pay ments in 2017 was 78 per cent . Data for 2018 are 
not yet available.  
 
5. Considering the 2014 Farm Bill expired on 30 September 2018, with no extension or replacement 
Farm Bill yet in place, are MPP -Dairy producers permitted to leave the programme?  
 
RESPONSE: Changes made to the MPP -Dairy program in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, 
which was signed into law on February 9, 2018, allowed farmers to leave the program in 2018.  
 
6. What was the maximum amount paid in a single compensation payment under MPP -Dairy?  
 
RESPONSE: While data on individual payments are not publicly available, the most recent data on  
total 2018 payments  (as of July 11, 2018) are available  at: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA -
FSA-Public/usdafiles/MPP -Dairy/2018%20Monthly%20Payments%20Processed.pdf . These data do 
not reflect premiums and fees paid by producers.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Questions 7 -8 
Section 4.2 Energy (4.54; 4.66 – 4.67)  
 
Paragraph 4.66 states that there is an expectation that further expansion of the United States' 
renewable energy supply will occur in the coming years. Paragraph 4.67 mentions, however, that 
the United States does not have a national target for renewable energy or an explicit federal support 
mechanism.  
 
7. Could the United States outline its future plans, if any, for expanding its renewable energy 
supply?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States reminds Members that TPRs are retrospective in nature.  
 
8. Has the United State s considered setting a target for renewable energy or providing an explicit 
federal support mechanism? With fossil fuels having dominated the United States' energy mix 
for more than 100 years (para 4.54), how does the Government ensure that fossil fuel inc entives 
do not dis -incentivise the uptake of renewable energy?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Energy Information Administration's "Direct Federal Financial 
Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016," published in April 2018, is available 
at: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf . 
 
Also, the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) provides a list of 
state-level incentives and is available at: http://www.dsireusa.org/ . 
 
The Department of Energy's Alternative Fuels Data Center provides information on federal and 
state laws and incentives for alternative fuels and vehicles, air quality, fue l efficiency, and other 
transportation -related topics. Available here: https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/ . 
 
Part II – Questions from the Government's Report Document WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 9 -11 
Section 4.3 Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives  
 
Paragraph 4.22 states that the negotiation of United States Mexico Canada Agreement was  intended, 
amongst other things to address remai ning market access barriers.  
 
9. Which sectors or products, not covered by NAFTA, are subject to tariff elimination or reduction 
under USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE: The final text of the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA) is 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/free -trade -agreements/united -states -mexico -
canada -agreement/agreement -between . 
 
10. What new market access for dairy products has the US granted to Mexico and Canada and 
USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE: The final text  of the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA) is 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/free -trade -agreements/u nited-states -mexico -
canada -agreement/agreement -between . 
 
11. What new market access for dairy has the US gained in respect of Canada under USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE: The final text of the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA) is 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/free -trade -agreements/united -states -mexico -
canada -agreement/agreement -between . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Norway  
Part I – Questions from  the Secretariat's Report Document WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
Section 2.4 Investment Regime (2.47 -49) 
 
1. According to the report from the Secretariat (2.47 -49, pp. 42 -43), the Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) was signed into law on August 23, 2018. The law will expand 
the authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which 
reviews foreign ownership of American companies. What experiences can be drawn from the 
current investment screening regime?  
 
RESP ONSE: FIRRMA was signed into law on August 13, 2018.  FIRRMA modernizes CFIUS and 
strengthens the U.S. government's ability to protect national security while preserving the 
longstanding open investment policy of the United States. At its core, FIRRMA expands the scope 
of transactions reviewable by CFIUS to address more effectively current  national security 
concerns.  
 
Question 2  
Section 3.1.6.2.1.2 Safeguard investigations 2016 -18 (3.92)  
 
The report by the Secretariat (3.92, p. 71) mentions the imposed safeguard measure with respect 
to imported crystalline silicone photovoltaic cells and products. It included a tariff -rate quota and a 
30% tariffs on imports for a period of 4 years.  
 
2. The USTR invited companies to submit requests for exemptions for specifi c products before 
March 16, and 52 companies submitted requests. While some companies received product 
specific exemptions in September, other have yet to receive a result from the process. Could 
the United States provide an update regarding the status of the process and what the United 
States sees as a reasonable processing time for applications for product specific exemptions?  
 
RESPONSE: As stated in the September 19, 2018 Federal Register (83 Fed. Reg. 47,393 -394) 
notice announcing the exclusions granted  to date, USTR will continue to evaluate the requests 
received as of March 16, 2018 and will make the appropriate determination in due course.  
 
Question 3 -5 
Section 3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing (3.46 -3.48)  
 
3. With reference to the part of the report by the Secretariat (3.47, p. 57) that covers the Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program (SIMP):  
 
a. What are the scientific bases for including the 13 species that will be covered by the SIMP -
program from 2019?  
 
RESPONSE: In developing the Seafo od Import Monitoring Program, NMFS requested and 
received extensive public comment regarding principles for identifying species at particular risk 
of IUU fishing or seafood fraud and on the application of those principles to a list of candidate 
species. An  interagency expert working group reviewed public comments and confidential 
enforcement information and developed a draft list of species "at -risk" for being illegally caught 
or fraudulently marketed. The group again sought public comment prior to publicat ion of the 
final list of species to which this rule applies in October 2015 (80 FR 66867, October 30, 2015). 
In publishing the final list of species, NMFS provided the rationale for inclusion of each species 
on the list.  
 
b. How can the program be targeted wh en it is applied to seafood at the species level and does 
not take into account that various stock components may have different stock status and 
are subject to different management regimes?  
 
RESPONSE: NMFS has been clear about the fact that identification of priority species has been 
necessarily broad with respect to both area (it is applied at the species level without distinction 
of specific fisheries across the geographic range of the species) and pr inciples (species were WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  identified as priority on the basis of IUU -related principles, seafood fraud related principles, or 
any combination thereof). Records and data from both domestic and international sources were 
considered by the priority species  worki ng group. The process for making these 
determinations  is described  at: http://www.iuufishing.NMFS.gov/RecommendationsandActions/
RECOMMENDATION1415.aspx . 
 
NMFS has been clear throughout the process that inclusion of any species in the risk -based 
seafood traceability program should not be considered in any way an indictment, either explicit 
or implicit, of the management system or biological status of a fishery in  the United States or 
any foreign country. NMFS believes that the seafood traceability program will ultimately serve 
to reassure U.S. seafood consumers that seafood products harvested in, or imported to, the 
United States are harvested legally and conveyed  through a transparent supply chain.   
 
c. According to the report from the Secretariat (3.47, p. 57), the SIMP -program may eventually 
cover all seafood. A universal program will depart fundamentally from the risk -based 
approach. Are there any plans to expand  the program?  
 
RESPONSE: At this time there is no plan for expanding SIMP. Addition of any additional species 
to the program will require new rulemaking, which would include an opportunity for public 
comment.  
 
d. What kind of experiences have the United State s drawn from the implementation period? 
Has there been challenges that have affected the trade flows?  
 
RESPONSE: SIMP was successfully implemented with no significant disruption to imports of 
legally harvested seafood. NMFS completed a tremendous amount of  outreach to U.S. importers, 
foreign exporters, brokers, and software developers to support the smooth implementation of 
SIMP. Just in the last year:  
- At major ports, NMFS held domestic roundtable discussions to reach local importers and 
brokers.  
- For major exporting nations, NMFS conducted in -person technical assistance to support 
compliance with SIMP.  
- Virtual outreach has been a key component of disseminating the requirements of 
SIMP.  Those activities have included hosting many webinars and company -specific  calls. 
- Online resource materials, including a compliance guide and audit guide, have been 
developed. NMFS continues to update and improve outreach materials as requested by 
industry.  
- A dedicated SIMP support phone and email line for industry was established.  
 
In the first few months of SIMP mandatory compliance, NOAA implemented an "informed 
compliance" period for SIMP entry filing, allowing brokers additional time to address any issues 
in their software development.  Throughout the informed compli ance period, NOAA contacted all 
brokers and importers with incomplete entry filings and, as a result, observed overwhelming 
compliance with the data reporting requirements of SIMP prior to the conclusion of "informed 
compliance" in April 2018.  
 
4. With refere nce to the establishment of International Marine Mammal Bycatch Criteria for U.S. 
Imports under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA):  
 
a. According to the MMPA Import Final Rule Compliance Guide, fisheries that that are 
considered "export" fisheries may not change category to "exempt" in the interim period 
between the reviews of the List of Foreign Fisheries (LOFF) every four years. Is it th e 
United States' intention to apply a corresponding rule to comparability findings as well? 
May a harvesting nation that has not received a comparability finding, provide additional 
information and subsequently obtain comparability finding in the interim p eriod between 
the reviews of the LOFF?  
 
RESPONSE: In accordance with 50 CFR 216(h)(4), NOAA will update the List of Foreign 
Fisheries the year prior to the expiration of the exemption period and every four years 
thereafter, based on the information obtain ed from the harvesting nation, information in the 
Progress Report, other readily available information, and the information outlined in detail 
at 50 CFR 216.24(h)(3). Additionally, in accordance with 50 CFR 216.24(h)(9)(i)(B), a WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  harvesting nation with an e xport fishery without a comparability finding (i.e., NOAA denied 
the comparability application, NOAA terminated the comparability finding, or the 
comparability finding expired) may re -apply for a comparability finding at any time by 
submitting an applicati on to NOAA. Such application should include documentary evidence 
demonstrating that the harvesting nation has met the conditions specified in 50 CFR 216.24 
(h)(6)(iii) for a comparability finding, and, as applicable, the reasonable proof needed to 
determin e the effects on marine mammals of the commercial fishing technology in use in 
the fishery for the fish or fish products exported from such nation to the United States.  
 
b. Could the United States provide an update regarding the plans to conduct a midterm 
review of the MMPA in 2018? Will exporting countries' views be taken into account in the 
review? It will be of interest to Norway to be informed about how the United States 
intends to carry out this review.  
 
RESPONSE: The review that the United States conduct ed was an internal performance 
review, identifying areas for improvement in our implementation and outreach in our 
execution of the MMPA import rule. At this point the United States has no plans for external 
review.   
 
c. Could the United States share informat ion about the U.S. experiences in implementing 
national provisions regarding data requirements and stock size calculation, as well as 
experiences gained through the relevant monitoring programs?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States offers the following links:  
 
1. Link to take reduction teams and inform ation on U.S. domestic program: 
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine -mammal -protecti on/marine -
mammal -take-reduction -plans-and-teams . 
 
2. Link to information on guidelines for assessing Marine Mammal Stock and the stock 
assessment  reports:  https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine -mammal -
protection/guidelines -assessing -marine -mammal -stocks . 
 
These links provide detailed information about the guidelines for the development of our 
stock assessment reports, calculation o f the bycatch limit (potential biological removal level), 
and the development of our regulations specific to fisheries governed by a take reduction 
plan. If additional information is required, we reiterate our willingness to engage in a 
technical consultat ion with Norway, as we have with other nations that have requested such 
consultations.  
 
5. Norway appreciates the United States' longstanding engagement in the negotiations on fisheries 
subsidies. Through its free trade agreements, the United States has alrea dy committed to 
obligations regarding prohibitions on subsidies to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing and subsidies that negatively affect overfished stocks. Could the United States describe 
how it implements these prohibitions and which ste ps it has had to take as a consequence of the 
free trade agreements?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States operates a rigorous fisheries management system based on 
internationally recognized best practices and the best scientific evidence available. It also 
maintains an effective enforcement regime. These policies help to prevent IUU fishing from 
taking place and ensure that stocks that have been assessed to be in an overfished condition do 
not suffer negative effects. USMCA, the free trade agreement in which  the United States has 
committed to prohibitions on subsidies to IUU fishing and subsidies that negatively affect 
overfished stocks, has not yet entered into force.  
 
Question 6  
Section 3.3.1 Incentives/Trade and Labor (3.169; Government Report 7.3)  
 
The re port by the Secretariat mentions the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs (3.169, p. 
95). As we understand the description in the report, the funding through the TAA programs were 
mainly channe lled to U.S. workers, though there are also programs for firms as well as for farmers. WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  In the U.S. government report (7.3, p. 28), the figure US$716,364,000 was mentioned for FY2017 
as avai lable to carry out the program.  
 
Trade is a vehicle for structural c hange, and it is important that there are safety nets for employees 
faced with structural change. However, technology as such is an even more important vehicle for 
change, and U.S.' businesses are in the forefront of technological change. One would expect that 
U.S. innovative businesses will also negatively affect less competitive American businesses, and that 
structural change, whether foreign or domestically induced, can affect workers negatively and 
increase the need for retraining and re -education, as w ell as unemployment benefits.  
 
6. Does the U.S. government have figures regarding displacement of workers caused by 
technological change in general, technological change through American/domestic activity, as 
well as by foreign competition and imports? Do the  same type of safety nets exist for workers 
who are displaced because of domestic competition?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces 
estimates of displaced workers as part of a supplementary labo ur force survey  conducted every 
two years. Displaced workers are defined in the BLS survey as persons 20 years of age and older 
who lost or left jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient 
work for them to do, or their position or shift wa s abolished.  More information is available 
at: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/disp.toc.htm . Apart from the TAA program, the United 
States has a general system of unemployment benefits for work ers that lose their job for any 
reason, including domestic competition, that requires contributions from employers and 
workers.  More information is available at: https://www.dol.gov/g eneral/topic/unemployment -
insurance . In addition  to unemployment insurance benefits, the Workforce Innovation and 
Opportunity Act of 2014 provides some  employment and training services for dislocat ed 
workers.  More information is available at: https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/training/ 
dislocatedworkers  and https://www.doleta.gov/wioa/Overview.cfm . 
 
Question 7  
Section 3.3. 6 Government procurement (3.227)  
 
According to the report by the Secretariat (3.227, p. 111), only 37 states apply the GPA, the same 
number of states as during the last trade policy review of the United States.  
 
7. Norway would appreciate information about wh ether the United States has taken any measures 
to reconcile regulations at the state level with those of the U.S. Federal Government and its 
commitments to the WTO GPA sinc e the last trade policy review.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is in compliance with i ts international trade obligations, including 
those under the GPA.   
 
Question 8  
Section 4.4.6.2.3 Shipbuilding and ship repairs (4.249; 4.250; 4.251)  
 
The United States it to be commended for having made extensive notifications of federal and sub -
federal subsidies that go to the fisheries sector. Regarding subsidies that are received by fishing 
vessels and operators more generally, Norway has a query regarding the following measures 
mentioned in the report by the Secretariat:  
 
a. (4.249, p. 210) regarding the  Federal Ship Financing Program (Title XI) which provides for 
U.S. government -guaranteed debt.  
 
b. (4.250, p. 211). Title XI encourages U.S. ship -owners to obtain new vessels from U.S. 
shipyards by offering long -term debt repayment guarantees.  
 
c. (4.251, p. 211 ) regarding the Capital Construction Fund (CCF) and the Construction Reserve 
Fund (CRF) that allow U.S. citizens owning or leasing vessels to obtain tax benefits for the 
construction, reconstruction, or acquisition of vessels. The CCF provides tax -deferral  benefits 
to vessel operators in the foreign or domestic trade of the United States and U.S. fisheries.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 317 - 
 
  8. Can all three qualify as subsidies to the fisheries sector? The same question arises regarding 
some of the federal subsidy programs for energy and fuel  (table 3.16, p. 95). Does the U.S. 
government implement a general strategy covering both federal and sub -federal level to cut all 
subsidies to the fisheries sector, alternatively those that can have a negative impact on fisheries 
resources?  
 
RESPONSE: Under the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, whether financial 
assistance constitutes an actionable subsidy depends on whether the assistance conveys a 
benefit to the recipient and is provided to a specific sector. This entails a complex legal a nd 
factual analysis. We note that, as indicated in the Secretariat's report, since FY 2016, only one 
application was approved for the Title XI program, and that was not for the construction of a 
fishing vessel. The Title XI program, as administered by the Maritime Administration, does not 
provide specific support to the fishing industry. We also note that the CRF program is designed 
to benefit the U.S. merchant fleet, rather than the fishing sector. Finally, the energy -related 
programs in table 3.16 either relate to general energy conservation and renewable energy 
programs or research and development - none of which target the fishing industry. As a general 
matter, we would highlight that the United States operates a rigorous fisheries management 
system base d on internationally recognized best practices and the best scientific evidence 
available. It also maintains an effective enforcement regime. These policies help to ensure that 
fish stocks do not suffer negative effects.  
 
Part II – Questions from the Secre tariat's Report Document WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 9  
Section 5.2 The Enhanced Integrated Framework (5.7)  
 
9. Norway, as one of the main donors of the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF), is pleased to 
note the U.S. support for the program as stated in the government report (5.7, p.25). Norway 
believes it very important that donors of trade related technical assistance use the EIF 
mechanism for transparency, information sharing and coordination of assistance – to avoid 
overlap while filling in the gaps. Leve raging complementary assistance is an important 
component of the EIF, and Norway would welcome examples from the United States regarding 
how it has participated in EIF work on the ground.  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Agency for International Development's Mission i n Mozambique served as 
an EIF donor coordinator during 2016 -2017. The donor coordinator serves as the focal point for 
bringing together donors and trying to respond to issues raised within the scope of the Diagnostic 
Trade Integration Study. For additional  information on where and how the U.S. Government 
implements trade capacity building, including for least -developed countries, we refer you to 
tcb.usaid.gov . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Additional questions from Norway  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Questions 1 -2 
Section 4.4.6.2 Maritime Transport (4.248)  
 
The report by the Secretariat (4.248, p. 210)  mentions the U.S.' exemption from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) rules for measures prohibiting the use, sale, or 
lease of foreign -built or forei gn-reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between points in 
national waters or the waters of an exclusive economic zone. Norway has underlined its concern 
during the biennial reviews of this exemption, as the waiver in essence makes it impossible  to sell 
vessels to the United States.  
 
As regards how the review itself is conducted, Norway believes that it should focus on the salient 
point of paragraph 3 (b) of the GATT 1994 which is the examination of whether the conditions which 
created the need for the exemption still prevail. It is our view that we need to move beyond the 
point of discussing only statistical information submitted under paragraph 3 (c) of the GATT 1994 
and address also the conditions for exemption and continued need for this waiv er. 
 
1. Could the U.S. please provide information on whether there are any calculation on the economic 
effects of the restrictions on buying or even repairing vessels abroad contained in the Jones Act.  
 
RESPONSE: See the Maritime Administration report The Ec onomic Importance of the U.S. 
Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry , November 2015: https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ou treach/ 
publications/economic -importance -us-shipbuilding -and-repairing -industry -november -2015. 
 
2. On what basis does the US consider the exemption to be necessary today?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States continues to apply the provisions of the 'Jones Act' in accordance 
with the exception to Part II of the GATT 1994 provided in paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994. The 
Jones Act ensures the availability of experienced seafarers and domestic ship building and repair 
capability, which are important U.S. national security objectives. The fleet of U.S. -flagged, 
privately owned, and commercially operated vessels, along with government -owned vessels, 
provides critical sealift surge and sustainment capac ity to move military personnel, equipment, 
and materials. These military transport operations rely on the mariner labo ur pool support ed by 
the Jones Act. Further, the Jones Act assists in providing a pool of qualified mariners to address 
potential shortage s of U.S. -citizen mariners. See U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime 
Administration, Maritime Workforce Working Group Report (Washington, D.C., Sept. 29, 2017), 
at: https://www.gao.gov/assets /700/693802.pdf . Demand for vessels qualified for Jones Act 
trade plays an important role in ensuring that there is adequate American expertise and capacity 
to meet national shipbuilding and repair needs and that these shipyards remain availabl e when 
the m ilitary needs them.  See: https://www.transportation.gov/content/state -us-flag-maritime -
industry ; and the Maritime Administration report The Economic Importance of the U. S. 
Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry, November 2015: https://www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/ 
publications/econom ic-importance -us-shipbuilding -and-repairing -industry -november -2015. 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Oman  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
Section 3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
 
1. When will the United States of America remove the increased tariffs on steel and aluminium 
imposed on countries which balance of trade is in favour of the United States, including countries 
that signed FTAs with the United States of America?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The President has 
excluded ce rtain countries from the tariffs imposed on steel or alumin ium imports under Section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, based on alternative means arrived at 
between the United States and those countries to address the threatened impairmen t to U.S. 
national security posed by these imports. In light of these alternative means, the President 
determined that relevant imports from these countries no longer threaten to impair U.S. national 
security.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Peru  
INFORME DE LA SECRETARIA WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
Section 3.3.6.1. Marco Institucional y Jurídico (3.238)  
 
5.1.  La contratación a nivel subfederal se rige por leyes y reglamentos en materia de contratación 
promulgados por gobiernos de los estados u otros gobiernos subfederales. Cuando la contrataci ón 
se financia con fondos federales, los estados deben cumplir determinadas prescripciones federales 
reglamentarias. Los gobiernos locales disponen de sus propios organismos de contratación y 
establecen sus propias políticas al respecto. El Programa de Coo peración en las Adquisiciones 
permite que los gobiernos estatales, locales y tribales adquieran productos y servicios relacionados 
con la tecnología de la información, la seguridad y la aplicación de la ley que se ofrezcan a través 
de contratos específicos  abarcados por las Listas de suministro. Este Programa permite que las 
entidades autorizadas contraten con asociados aprobados, en cualquier momento, por cualquier 
motivo y utilizando cualquier fondo disponible.  
1. ¿Qué Estados permiten la participación de empresas extranjeras sin limitación alguna? ¿Existen 
Estados que mantengan normas de preferencia local, ya sea en bienes y/o servicios, incluidos 
los de construcción y cuáles son? ¿Cuáles son las políticas en favor  de sus pequeñas empresas? 
¿existe una sola plataforma electrónica para contratación pública o cada Estado cuenta con su 
propia plataforma? En tal sentido, ¿podría proporcionar el enlace o enlaces de las referidas 
plataformas?  
 
RESPONSE: The federal gover nment does not collect such information. For states covered under 
the WTO GPA, information on laws and regulations can be found on the following link: 
https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/government -procurement/additional -information -on-US-
Procurement . Under the United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreemen t, Peru has access to 
procurement by a number of states. The schedule and conditions for such procurement 
can be found  in Annex  9.1 of the Agreement:  https://ust r.gov/sites/default/files/09_GP_Annex
_Final_Version_4November13.pdf . 
 
Question 2  
6  SECTION 3.3.6. CONTRATACIÓN PÚBLICA  (3.255)  
Las reservas están sujetas a algunas normas y limitaciones. Una de ellas es la norma del no 
fabricante, es decir, que si una pequeñ a empresa a la que se adjudique un contrato como contratista 
principal no fabrica por sí misma los productos o los materiales que suministra al Gobierno al amparo 
de un contrato reservado para pequeñas empresas, el producto que suministre deberá proceder d e 
una pequeña empresa, a no ser que la SBA haya otorgado una exención o se trate de un contrato 
reservado a las pequeñas empresas debido a que su valor no llega al umbral de adquisiciones 
simplificadas. La SBA puede establecer exenciones a la norma del no fabricante si determina que el 
número de pequeñas empresas con la capacidad necesaria de fabricación es insuficiente. También 
la subcontratación está sujeta a algunas limitaciones, que afectan a los contratos de un monto 
superior al umbral de adquisiciones  simplificadas y a todos los demás contratos reservados o 
adjudicados directamente a un proveedor en el marco de programas 8(a), de programas para zonas 
empresariales históricamente infrautilizadas, de programas para pequeñas empresas propiedad de 
excombat ientes discapacitados o de programas para pequeñas empresas propiedad de mujeres. En 
todos estos casos y con arreglo a las condiciones de adjudicación de los contratos reservados, las 
pequeñas empresas están obligadas a limitar las sumas que destinan a pag ar a subcontratistas que 
no pertenezcan a la misma categoría de empresas: a) en el caso de los contratos de servicios, la 
pequeña empresa a la que se adjudique un contrato como contratista principal no podrá destinar al 
pago de subcontratistas más del 50% de la cantidad que se le abone en virtud de un contrato; b) 
en el caso de los contratos de suministro, el contratista principal no podrá destinar al pago de 
subcontratistas más del 50% de la cantidad que se le abone en virtud de un contrato, sin incluir el  
costo de los materiales; y c) la pequeña empresa a la que se adjudique un contrato como contratista 
principal no podrá destinar al pago de subcontratistas más del 85% de la cantidad que le abone el 
Gobierno, sin incluir el costo de los materiales, en el c aso de los contratos de construcción en general, 
ni más del 75%, sin incluir el costo de los materiales, en el caso de los contratos de construcción 
especiales.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  2. ¿Qué se entiende por pequeña empresa en el marco regulatorio federal de Estados Unidos? ¿Se 
permite la sub contratación de parte de pequeñas empresas de Estados Unidos con empresas 
grandes del mismo país o extranjeras de cualquier tamaño?¿Las metas de compras anuales 
también son aplicadas por los Estados? De ser el caso ¿cuáles son las referidas metas?  
 
RESPONSE: The Small Business Act defines a small business as "one which is independently 
owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation" (15 U.S.C. § 632).  
 
The Act and implementing regulations require a small business conce rn that receives an award 
as a result of its status as a small business to perform a certain percentage of the work. This 
requirement, known as the "limitations on subcontracting or performance of work requirement", 
generally requires that the small busine ss perform at least 50% of the cost of contracts for 
services with its own personnel, at least 50% of the cost (excluding materials) of contracts for 
goods, at least 15% of the cost (excluding materials) of general construction, and 25% of the 
cost (exclud ing materials) of construction by special trade contractors. (15 U.S.C. §637(a)(14); 
13 C.F.R. § 125.6; FAR 52.219 -3, 4, 14, 26, 29, and 30)  
 
The federal small business set aside does not apply to the states.  
 
INFORME DEL GOBIERNO WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 3  
7  1 LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS EN EL SISTEMA MUNDIA L DEL COMERCIO (1.2) 
La política comercial estadounidense se apoya en cinco pilares principales: apoyo a la seguridad 
nacional de los Estados Unidos, fortalecimiento de la economía estadounidense, negociación de 
mejores acuerdos comerciales, firme observancia de la legislación comercial de los Estados Unidos 
y reforma del sistema multilateral de comercio.  
 
Reforma del sistema multilateral del Comercio (1.8, 1.9)  
 
Los Estados Unidos desean contribuir a la creación de un sistema multilateral de comercio mejor y 
seguirán participando activamente en la OMC. Al mismo tiempo, reconocen que la Organización no 
siempre ha funcionado como se esperaba. En lugar de actuar como  foro de negociación en el que 
los Miembros pudieran elaborar nuevas y mejores normas, la capacidad de negociación de estos se 
ha visto cada vez más frustrada por un sistema de solución de diferencias sobrecargado de trabajo 
en cuyo marco "jueces" activist as imponen a los Miembros sus propias preferencias institucionales 
y de política. En lugar de refrenar a los países causantes de distorsión de los mercados, la OMC les 
ha otorgado en algunos casos una ventaja desleal sobre los Estados Unidos y otras econom ías de 
mercado. En lugar de promover mercados más eficientes, la OMC ha sido utilizada por algunos 
Miembros como baluarte en defensa de los obstáculos al acceso a los mercados, el dumping, las 
subvenciones y otras prácticas causantes de distorsión de los m ercados. Los Estados Unidos han 
venido señalando a la atención de los Miembros de la OMC casos en los que el Órgano de Apelación 
de la OMC ha hecho caso omiso de las normas explícitas acordadas por los Miembros en el 
Entendimiento sobre Solución de Diferen cias de la OMC. Los Estados Unidos no permitirán que 
ninguna organización multilateral les impida adoptar medidas que sean esenciales para el bienestar 
económico del pueblo estadounidense.  
 
Al mismo tiempo, como demostraron en la Undécima Conferencia Mini sterial de la OMC, los Estados 
Unidos siguen dispuestos a trabajar con países de ideas afines para construir un sistema económico 
mundial que permita elevar el nivel de vida allí y en todo el mundo. En la reunión del Consejo General 
celebrada en noviembre de 2017, los Estados Unidos presentaron una propuesta destinada a mejorar 
el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de notificación a la OMC, y están colaborando con otros Miembros 
para seguir desarrollándola. También están interesados en trabajar con otros Miem bros en la mejora 
del funcionamiento de los Comités ordinarios de la Organización. En su afán de mejorar la función 
de negociación de la OMC, los Estados Unidos están alentando un debate sobre la situación de 
desarrollo en la OMC para asegurar que una mayo r proporción de Miembros de la Organización 
contraiga obligaciones sustantivas en el marco de futuros acuerdos de la OMC.  
 
3. La reforma del sistema multilateral de comercio es uno de los cinco pilares de la política comercial 
estadounidense. En este sentido,  agradeceremos a Estados Unidos que explique en mayor 
detalle su visión sobre la reforma del sistema multilateral de comercio. De manera WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  complementaria, en vista de que Estados Unidos ha cuestionado el funcionamiento del Sistema 
de Solución de Diferencias,  ¿ha pensado Estados Unidos plantear propuestas concretas que 
modifiquen el Entendimiento de Solución de Diferencias o específicamente el funcionamiento del 
Órgano de Apelación?  
 
RESPONSE: For more than 15 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, th e United States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council meeting, if WTO 
members say that we support a rules -based trading syst em, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995.  And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its reports 
within 90 days of an appeal.  A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member may not 
continue deciding appeals as if hi s term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body.  The 
Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to those relating 
to domestic law. The Appellate Body may not give advisory opinions on issues that will not assi st 
the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure into compliance 
with WTO rules.  The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as precedent or provide 
authoritative interpretations.  And the Appellate Body may not change Members' substantive 
rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreements.  When the Appellate Body 
abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it undermines the 
legitimacy of the system and damages the interests of  all WTO Members who care about having 
the agreements respected as they were negotiated and agreed.  The United States will continue 
to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system, and will continue 
our efforts and our discussions  with Members to seek a solution on these important issues.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  The Philippines  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
Question 1 -2 
Section 2.3.2.2.1 GSP (2.32)  
 
The 2018 Trade Policy Agenda placed new emphasis on enforcement of the GSP eligibility criteria, 
to ensure that all countries receiving GSP benefits are meeting the criteria established by Congress. 
This new effort includes a triennial assessment by the USTR and other relevant agencies of each 
GSP beneficiary country's compliance  with the statutory eligibility criteria. This interagency process 
complements the current petition and public input process for country practice reviews, which will 
remain unchanged.  
 
In October 2017, US announced that GSP beneficiaries will be subject to  a triennial assessment by 
USTR and other relevant agencies of their compliance with GSP statutory eligibility criteria. The first 
assessment period will target GSP beneficiaries in Asia.  
 
1. What are the terms of reference for the assessment (including the process and timelines)?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States government examines GSP beneficiary countries' compliance 
with the 15 GSP eligibility criteria established by Congress, including respecting arbitral awards 
in favo ur of U.S. citizens or corporations, combating child labo ur, respecting internationally 
recognized worker rights, providing adequate and effective intellectual property protection, and 
providing the United States with equitable and reasonable market access. The first triennial 
assessment peri od focused on GSP beneficiaries in Asia.  
 
2. Is there a schedule already for the Philippines?  
 
RESPONSE: The first triennial assessment period covered the Philippines.  
 
Question 3  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.26)  
 
In accordance w ith longstanding laws and regulations, the United States requires every article of 
foreign origin to be legibly marked to indicate the English name of the country of origin to an ultimate 
purchaser in the United States. These rules are distinct and separat e from eligibility determinations 
for customs purposes. Additional labelling requirements apply to specific products, e.g. clothing 
(fabric content and washing instructions), tobacco (Warning Statement of the Surgeon General), 
food, pharmaceuticals, and mo tor vehicles.  
 
3. We note that the US requires additional labe lling requirements to specific products e.g. clothing 
(fabric content and washing instructions), tobacco (Warning Statement of the Surgeon General), 
food, pharmaceuticals, and motor vehicles. May we seek confirmation on whether such labe lling 
requirements are only applicable to imported goods and not to locally produced/manufactured 
goods?  
 
RESPONSE: Labelling requirements are applicable to both foreign and U.S. -manufactured 
goods.  For example, wit h respect to pharmaceutical products, the distributor is required to be 
set forth on the label regardless of whether the product is imported or produced in the United 
States.  
 
Questions 4 -5 
Section 3.1.2 Rules of Origin (3.27; 3.28)  
 
U.S. non -preferential rules of origin distinguish between "wholly obtained" products, i.e. those 
entirely grown, produced or manufactured in a particular country, and goods that have been subject 
to "substantial transformation", i.e. a change in name, character or use, in the c ountry of origin. The 
substantial transformation criterion is applied case -by-case. For certain transactions, CBP may also 
use value added or change in nature or essential character of a product to determine the country of 
origin. The United States notifie d its non -preferential rules of origin to the WTO in 1995 and 
administrative rulings of the U.S. Customs Service in 1996.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  4. May we request US to provide information on its non -preferential rules of origin for goods.  
 
RESPONSE: A comprehensive explanation of the U.S. non -preferential rules of origin can 
be found  at the following  link: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2016
-Apr/icp026_3.pdf . Legislation and implementing regulations governing non -preferential rules of 
origin may also be found at: 19  U.S.C.  § 1304, 19 CFR Part 134, and 19 CFR §102.0 . 
 
Each FTA concluded by the United States has its own set of origin criteria. The variety of methods  
applied reflects the outcome of the negotiations, including industry preferences for particular 
methods, notably in textiles. NAFTA and other FTAs concluded by the United States have 
incorporated a change in tariff classification ("tariff shift") method t o determine the eligibility for FTA 
benefits. However, it also uses other methods, e.g. local/regional value content or technical criteria, 
to determine origin beyond the "wholly obtained" criterion. Importers claiming preferential tariff 
treatment must ce rtify the origin of the good and present certificates of origin or other supporting 
documents when requested by CBP. NAFTA prescribes a specific format for the certificates of origin, 
but most other FTAs or preferential agreements do not.  
 
5. According to the WTO Secretariat Report, the rules adopted in each of US' Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs), "reflects the outcome of the negotiations, including industry preferences for 
particular methods, notably in textiles." In this regard, may we request US to provide further 
information on the specific preference of its textiles industry? Also, we would like to seek 
clarification on whether such industry preference on textile products is common across all of US' 
existing FTAs.  
 
RESPONSE: The rules of origin for textile s and apparel in U.S. FTAs typically follow the "yarn -
forward" approach. Under rules based on the yarn -forward approach, most textile and apparel 
goods qualify as originating only if all of the manufacturing processes from yarn -creation forward 
take place in the free trade area. Yarn -forward rules of origin for textile and apparel goods are 
included in almost all U.S. FTAs, including NAFTA, the recently concluded USMCA, and every 
U.S. FTA since 2002.  
 
Questions 6 -7 
Section 3.1.3 Tariffs (3.34; 3.36)  
 
The cu rrent HTSUS, in effect since 1 January 2018, has 10,878 tariff lines at the eight -digit level. 
The three -column tariff distinguishes between imports from trading partners that are subject to 
either: (i) the general rate (i.e. MFN treatment), (ii) "special"  duty (i.e. preferential treatment) 
stemming from unilateral or reciprocal agreements and arrangements26, or (iii) other (i.e. higher) 
import duty.27 The MFN rates are mostly ad valorem, but specific and compound duty rates are 
applied for approximately 11 % of the tariff lines (predominantly agriculture, fish, fuels, textiles, and 
footwear items). The MFN rates are generally identical to their bound levels and have remained 
virtually unchanged for 10 years or more.  
 
6. We note that US applies specific and com pound duty rates to agriculture fish, fuels, textiles, and 
footwear items. On this, we would like to request US to provide information on its method in 
converting these specific duties to their ad valorem equivalent.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not c onvert specific and compound duty rates. It applies 
the rates as they are specified in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.  
 
The United States has not been granting temporary tariff suspensions for several years, as the 
enabling legislation  for such relief on several hundred products of interest to U.S. manufacturers 
expired at the end of 2012. The American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 (H.R. 4923) 
introduced a new procedure for the consideration of temporary tariff suspensions a nd reductions. 
Petitions for relief are addressed to the USITC, which examines them and invites comments from 
the public. Key criteria to be evaluated with respect to petitions include (i) whether the petition is 
enforceable by CBP; (ii) whether the estima ted revenue loss associated with the petition would 
exceed US$500,000; and (iii) whether there is domestic production and objections have been raised 
by a domestic supplier or other party. Based on more than 2,500 petitions filed between 15 October 
and 12 December 2016, the USITC prepared a preliminary report in June 2017 and a final report for 
Congressional consideration in August 2017. The USITC recommended that duty suspensions be 
accorded to more than 1,600 products, mostly chemicals. The House of Repre sentatives approved WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018 (H.R. 4318) in January 2018. The Miscellaneous Tariff Bill 
Act of 2018 was approved with amendments by the Senate in July 2018 (S.  Amend. 3664). After 
reconciliation, the Miscellaneous Tariff Bi ll Act was submitted to the President, who signed it on 13 
September 2018. The tariff suspensions are valid until the end of 2020.  
 
7. We would like to request US to provide further information on whether there were any petitions 
for tariff suspensions after the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act, which temporarily reduces or 
eliminates import duties on specific raw materials / intermediate products, was signed in 
September 2018.  
 
RESPONSE: The American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 (Pub. L. 114 -159) 
establishes the procedures for temporary tariff suspensions and reductions and specifies the 
timetables for submitting petitions. Only the petitions that are submitted by those deadlines are 
reviewed by the USITC. Pursuant to the Act, a new petition and re view process will be initiated 
in October 2019.  
 
Question 8  
Section 3.1.7.1.4 Investigation into auto imports (3.119)  
 
On 23 May 2018, the USDOC initiated a Section 232 investigation into auto imports. The aim of the 
investigation is to determine whether imports of automobiles, including SUVs, vans and light trucks, 
and automotive parts into the United States threaten to impair the national security as defined in 
Section 232. Considerations taken into account to initiate the investigation include the incre ase of 
the share of imports of passenger vehicles sold in the United States from 32% to 48% in the last 20 
years; a 22% decline in employment in motor vehicle production between 1990 and 2017; the low 
share of R&D represented by U.S. vehicle manufacturers in the United States (20% of the total); 
and the fact that U.S. auto part manufacturers account for only 7% of that industry in the United 
States. The points analys ed in the investigation include: whether the decline of domestic automobile 
and automotive p arts production threatens to weaken the internal economy of the United States, 
including by potentially reducing R&D and jobs for skilled workers in cutting -edge technologies. In 
July 2018, the USDOC held a public hearing on the investigation.  
 
8. Are there u pdates on the investigation and if there are already timelines for implementation of 
US measures?  
 
RESPONSE: On May 23, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to 
determine the effects on the national security of imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, 
vans and light trucks, and automotive parts under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Ac t of 
1962, as amended. According to statute, an investigation of this type must be completed within 
270 days of its initiation. As part of its investigation, on May 30, 2018, the Department of 
Commerce issued a Federal Register Notice inviting written comm ents, including data, analyses, 
or information pertinent to this investigation, and announcing the public hearings. The comment 
period was open until June 22, 2018 and the Department of Commerce held a public hearing as 
part of its investigation on July 19 .  
 
Questions 9  
Section 3.2.5.3 OPIC (3.161)  
 
The OPIC is authorized to do business in more than 160 developing and post -conflict countries. It is 
mandated by law to prioritize investment in low -income countries. It also sets limits to its exposure 
in vari ous countries to maintain a balanced portfolio. Its domestic clients must be U.S. citizens, 
permanent residents, or U.S. companies, or the projects must imply a "meaningful involvement" of 
the U.S. private sector, defined as a minimum 25% stake in the proj ect or in the project company. 
The OPIC has a statutory requirement to ensure that its supported projects are established and 
maintained in accordance with internationally recognized worker rights standards. It has also 
elaborated an Environmental and Soci al Policy Statement, designed to ensure that supported 
projects are environmentally and socially sustainable.  
 
9. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) have committed to reduce Direct Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions associated with projects in its active po rtfolio by 30% over a ten -year period 
(June 30, 2008 – September 30, 2018) and by 50% over a fifteen -year period (June 30, 2008 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  – September 30, 2023). So far, has it achieved the consolidated 30% reduction goal? If it did, 
what were the driving forces to t he achievement of this goal? If it did not, what made it fail?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, as of September 30, 2017, OPIC had reduced its GHG emissions by over 
83.5% compared to the 2008 baseline, well above both the 30% and 50% targets. The two main 
driving forces be hind the reduction were (1) projects with large emissions dropping out of the 
OPIC Portfolio due to expiring contracts or loan repayment, and (2) a focus on renewable energy 
projects in the years after the 2008 baseline. OPIC is currently preparing its ann ual GHG Report 
for Fiscal Year 2018, and, based on the projects that have been added to the active portfolio 
during FY 2018, we do not anticipate emissions to increase above the level corresponding to the 
30% reduction target.  
 
Question 10  
Section 4.3 Manu facturing (4.78)  
 
The United States does not have policies specifically targeted to manufacturing, at the federal level. 
Its main policy thrust is to create the framework for market forces to act in a fair and competitive 
environment. However, at the state  level, there are programmes to attract investment in 
manufacturing. There is also a policy of encouraging small businesses, including those in 
manufacturing, through government procurement set -asides and preferences (Section 3.3.6). In 
addition, the USDOC  provides a national advanced manufacturing portal and information 
clearinghouse, found at : https://www.manufacturing.gov/  to provide general information on federal 
policy regarding advanced manufacturing. For mally authorized by Congress in 2014, Manufacturing 
USA brings together industry, academia and federal partners within a growing network of advanced 
manufacturing institutes, for collaborative research in innovations in manufacturing technology of 
benefit to broad industrial sectors, with the overall goal of increasing manufacturing 
competitiveness, and promoting a robust and sustainable national manufacturing R&D 
infrastructure.  
 
10. May we request US to elaborate on the programmes (at the state level) to att ract investments 
in the manufacturing sector, as stated in the WTO Secretariat report.  
 
RESPONSE: Please see the United States' subsidy notification (G/SCM/N/315/USA).  
 
Question 11  
Section 4.4.1 Financial Services (4.110)  
 
To be able to offer insurance se rvices, insurance companies, agents and brokers need to be licensed 
in the state where they plan to provide services. Licensing requirements vary across states. 
Furthermore, insurance premium rates for many types of coverage need to be approved by the stat e 
regulators.  
 
11. Can the US provide for the common licensing requirement in all states?  
 
RESPONSE: In the United States, the insurance sector is primarily regulated at the state level. 
Many aspects of insurance licensing are uniform across the United States  and state regulators 
closely coordinate on insurance supervision.  
 
Questions 12 -13 
Section 4.5 E -Commerce (4.271)  
 
The United States does not have a general e -commerce law; however, e -commerce is subject to a 
number of federal and state measures that addr ess various aspects of e -commerce. Current U.S. 
laws, regulations and orders affecting e -commerce address, among other things, the use of personal 
information, advertising, IP, cybercrime, taxation, and online speech  
 
12. How does the US implement its rules f or the protection of e -commerce?  
 
RESPONSE: The range of rules related to e -commerce are implemented by the relevant state 
and federal authorities.  
 
13. Will the US enact and implement a "general e -commerce law"?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: We refrain from speculating on possib le future actions or policies given the 
retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
Question 14 -15 
Section 4.4.9 Nepal Trade Preference Program (4.73)  
 
The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) entered into force on February 
24, 2016 and directed the President to establish a country -specific preference program to grant 
Nepal duty -free treatment for a set of textile, apparel, and headgear products covered by 66 8 -digit 
tariff lines in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) with a  view to assisting Nepal recover from the 
April 2015 earthquake and subsequent aftershocks.  
 
14. Aside from Nepal, what other countries are being considered for a country -specific preference 
program?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective r eviews. The establishment of any 
new preference program would require legislative action on the part of the U.S. Congress.  
 
15. As a country often visited by strong typhoons and prone to earthquakes and other natural 
calamities that have serious economic effects, can a specific program for the Philippines be 
considered that would cover textile products?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. The establishment of any 
new country -specific preference program would require legislativ e action on the part of the U.S. 
Congress.  
 
Question 16  
Section 5 TRADE -RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES (5.1)  
 
Trade policy and development assistance are key tools that together can help alleviate poverty and 
improve opportunities. Through "Aid for  Trade," the United States focuses on helping developing 
countries into the global trading community. Support to countries, in the form of training and 
technical assistance, can help them make decisions about the benefits of trade arrangements and 
reforms,  implement their international and regional obligations to bring certainty to their trade 
regimes, and enhance these countries' ability to take advantage of the opportunities of the 
multilateral trading system to compete in the global economy. Accordingly,  U.S. assistance 
addresses a broad range of issues so that communities, rural areas, and small businesses, including 
female entrepreneurs, benefit from trade rules negotiated in the WTO and in other trade fora. The 
United States promotes trade and economic  growth in developing countries through a wide range of 
trade capacity -building (TCB) activities.  
 
16. Can the US further elaborate on the training and technical assistance it provides to other 
countries?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States supports economic growth in developing countries by supporting 
domestic private sector development, providing training and technical assistance, and helping 
countries attract and make good use of foreign direct investment.  
 
Depending on country capacity and need, training and tech nical assistance programs may focus 
on increasing access to finance and international markets, mobilizing private capital, deepening 
trade relationships, and cultivating partnerships in science, technology, and innovation. These 
programs leverage the resou rces of the U.S. government and the private sector, including 
financial institutions.  
 
For additional information on where and how the U.S. Government implements trade capacity 
building, including training and technical assistance, see tcb.usaid.gov . 
 
Ques tion 17  
Section 6 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (6.6)  
 
The United States is also committed to combating wildlife trafficking and IUU fishing through a 
variety of means, including by using existing and future U.S. FTAs, environmental cooperation WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  mechanisms, and  other trade -related initiatives. For example, the United States has consistently 
raised these areas for discussion and collaboration in meetings under the Environment Chapters of 
our FTAs and included them in recent environmental programs. In October 2016 , the Eliminate, 
Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 became law, with the objectives of 
supporting anti -poaching efforts on a global scale, strengthening the capacity of partner countries 
to combat wildlife trafficking, and desig nating major wildlife trafficking countries for further strategic 
collaboration with the United States. The President issued an Executive Order on February 9, 2017 
that called for strengthened enforcement, including with respect to the "the illegal smuggli ng and 
trafficking of humans, drugs or other substances, wildlife, and weapons…." Multiple U.S. government 
agencies participate in implementing the President's Executive Order and the END Wildlife Trafficking 
Act.  
 
17. Aside from the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016, were 
there any major measures undertaken at the federal and state level relating to import and export 
of natural resources and wildlife?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States Government has a comprehensive multi -agency and multi -
pronged approach to combating wildlife trafficking. The United States has co -led and coordinated 
several cross -border wildlife enforcement operations, including: Operation Thunderbird (2017), 
Operation Thunderstorm (2018), and Operation 'Ee l-Licit' Trade (2018).  The operations were 
organized through the auspice of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime 
(ICCWC) and the INTERPOL Wildlife Crime Working group (WCWG). Operation Crash is an 
ongoing nationwide criminal investigat ion led by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that focuses 
on illegal trade in rhinoceros horn and elephant ivory. As of January 2018 Operation Crash has 
resulted in the prosecution and sentencing of nearly 50 subjects and recovery of approximately 
$7.8 mi llion through fines, forfeiture, and restitution.  In addition, although still subject to 
ratification by the parties, the USMCA Environment chapter includes ground -breaking 
commitments to combat trade in wildlife, plants and fish  — whether or not protecte d under 
CITES — if they have been taken or traded in violation of a domestic or foreign law. In addition, 
the Environment chapter requires parties to take measures to enhance the effectiveness of 
inspections of shipments of wild fauna and flora, and to tre at intentional, transnational trafficking 
of protected wildlife as a "serious crime," carrying with it a penalty of at least four years.  
 
Additional information on these and other initiatives can be found at:  
 
- https://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/Operation%20Crash%20Fact%20Sheet%20January%201
1,%202018.pdf ;  
- https://www.justice.gov/enrd/wildlife -trafficking ;  
- https://www.fws.gov/news/blog/index.cfm/2018/6/19/Global -Community -Unites -to-
Combat -Wildlife -Crime ;  
- https://www.usaid.gov/biodiversity/wildlife -trafficking ; 
- https://www.fws.gov/international/wildlife -trafficking . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Additional questions from The Philippines  
(2nd Batch of Questions)  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Questions 1 -3 
Section 3.1.3.1 Applied rates (3.35; Table A3.1)  
 
The MFN rates are generally identical to their bound levels and have remained virtually 
unchanged for 10 years or more. The MFN tariff regime is generally characterized by stable 
and, for the most part, low or no tariffs. At 4.8% overall, the simple average tariff remains 
virtually unchanged year by year (Table 3.1).  
 
Table A3.1 Analysis of United States MFN tariff, 2018 and Footnote a  
 
a Bound rates are provided in HS2012 classification and applied rates in HS2017; therefore, 
there is a difference between the number of lines included in the calculation. In some 
circumstances, a h igher applied MFN tariff average than the bound average is due to the 
change in nomenclature.  
 
1. Are there MFN rates higher than the bound rates? For which products do these apply?  
 
RESPONSE : The United States does not apply any MFN rate higher than the boun d rate.  
 
2. What is the procedure for tariff modification?  
 
RESPONSE: Modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States require either 
enactment of a statute, or action by the President pursuant to statutory authority.  The 
procedure for ta riff modification in specific circumstances would depend on the modification 
sought.  Modifications to change nomenclature based on the International Convention on the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System are generally made pursuant to 
author ity in section 1206(a) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 
3006(a)).  
 
3. Fish, textile and clothing products are among the major exports of the Philippines to US, are 
there plans by US to reduce MFN tariffs on these products?  
 
RESP ONSE: The United States is not considering any modifications to the tariff rates for fish, 
textile, and clothing products.  
 
Questions 4 -5 
Section 3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures (3.67; 3.68)  
 
For the determination of the margin o f dumping, the IT A compares prices in the 
United  States to a Normal Value (NV), the calculation of which varies according to the 
circumstances.  For example, the NV may be based on the company’s actual costs and prices 
in the comparison market, which can b e either the respondent’s home country or some other 
suitable third country or, if the ITA does not find a suitable comparison market, it may base 
the NV on the Constructed Value (CV) which is a cost -based build -up of a surrogate price.  
 
4. How is a surrogate  price determined as basis for the calculation of CV?  
 
RESPONSE: A surrogate price is not determined as the basis for the calculation of CV, rather a 
company’s costs of production are used to build -up a CV for each product sold.  It is this CV for 
each pro duct sold in the United States that is then used as NV in making comparisons to the 
U.S. price of these products when determining dumping margins.  The specifics of how CV is 
calculated for a particular respondent or proceeding is based on the facts and ci rcumstances of 
the spe cific segment of a proceeding. Details of such determination can be found at: 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  If a "reasonable indication" of material injury is found by the USITC, and the ITA makes an 
affirmative preliminary determination, preliminary AD or CVD measures, generally the 
posting of a cash deposit in an amount equivalent to the estimated margin of dumping or 
preliminary subsidy rate, may be applied for a period o f six months.  
 
5. What parameters are considered in the determination of a “reasonable indication” of material 
injury?  
 
RESPONSE: Determinations of whether there is a reasonable indication that an industry in the 
United States is materially injured or threate ned with material injury are based on the facts and 
circumstances on the administrative recor d of a specific investigation. Determinations of the 
U.S. International Trade Commission can be fo und at: https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy/ 
publications/opinions_index.htm . 
 
Questions 6 -7 
Section 3.1.6.1.1.5 Sunset reviews (3.72)  
 
The USDOC and the USITC initiate sunset reviews no l ater than 30 days before the fifth 
anniversary of publication of the Federal Register of an AD and CVD order or suspension 
agreement, with the aim of determining whether the revocation of the order would be likely 
to lead to continuation or recurrence of d umping or countervailable subsidies and of material 
injury to the domestic industry.  Initiations of the reviews are automatic. USDOC policy is to 
provide on one -month advance notification of sunset reviews in the Federal Register.  
 
6. What parameters were co nsidered in determining continuation or recurrence of dumping?  Does 
the determination include recalculation of dumping margin and modification of the applied AD 
duty?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States administers its trade remedy laws in a manner that is cons istent 
with its WTO obligations. The U.S. laws governing sunset reviews can be found at 1 9 U.S.C. §§ 
1675(c) and 1675a. The Department of Commerce’s regulations concerning sunset reviews can 
be found at 19 C.F.R. § 351.218. The decision as to whether revoc ation of a countervailing or 
antidumping duty order, or termination of an investigation that was suspended, would be likely 
to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy (as the case may 
be) and of material injury are based on the facts and circumstances on the administrative  record 
of the specific review.  Detail of such d eterminations can be found at: 
https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy/publications/op inions_index.htm  (U.S. International Trade 
Commission) and https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx  (U.S. Department of Commerce).  
 
7. Please explain initiations of sunset review are automatic. Were all AD orders subjected to sunset 
review regardless of a request from the domestic industry? What is the percentage of the review 
conducted motu proprio by the investigating authorities, i.e.,  without a request from the 
domestic industry?  
 
RESPONSE:  Initiations o f sunset reviews are automatic.  However, if no domestic interested 
party files a notice of intent to participate in the review within the time specified in regulation, 
the order will be  revoked.  
 
Question 8  
Section 3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.77)  
 
Of the 333 AD measures in place at 17 July 2018, 215 had been renewed after a sunset 
review, that is, they had been in place for over five years.  The average duration of an AD 
measure i n place at the end of 2017 was some 11 years.  At the end of 2017, 61 AD and 5 
CVD measures had been in place for more than 20 years; and 159 AD and 14 CVD measures 
had been in place for over 10 years.  The longest -lasting AD measure in place dates from 
1977, and is applied on pressure sensitive plastic tape from Italy; a measure on pre -stressed 
concrete steel wire strand from Japan dates from 1978.  
 
8. Would US consider limitation in the availment of sunset review? Pls. elaborate position on this 
issue.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE:  The United States administers its trade remedy laws in accord ance with its WTO 
obligations. In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or an antidumping 
order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material  injury within a reasonably 
foreseeable time, the U.S. International Trade Commission considers the factors set out in U.S. 
law at 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a).  The USITC considers these factors in the context of the record of 
the five -year review; it establishes  a new record for each five -year review of an order.  
 
In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or antidumping duty order 
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy or sales of the 
subject merc handise at less than fair value, the U.S. Department of Commerce considers the 
factors set out in U.S. law at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(b) and (c), respectively.  
 
The determinations in each sunset review conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission 
or U.S . Department of Commerce are case -specific.  The results for all sunset reviews can be 
found on the U.S. International Trade Commission's website ( http://pubapps2.usitc.gov/ 
sunset/ ). Commerce publishes its sunset review determinations in the Federal Register and also 
makes them available on Commerce's website ( http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/index.html ). 
From these sources, Members can obtain, on a case -by-case basis, information about the 
rationale for either the continuation or termination of a countervailing duty or an antidumping 
duty order.  
 
Questions 9 -11 
Section 3.1.6.2 Safeguards (3.89)  
 
If the President decides to a pply a safeguard measure, the USITC must monitor 
developments in the industry and submit a report on the results of its monitoring during the 
period of application of the measure (relief period). At the termination of any relief period, 
the USITC is requir ed to report to the President and Congress on the effectiveness of the 
safeguard measure in facilitating the positive adjustment of the domestic industry to import 
competition.  
 
9. Was there an instance that the President did not follow the findings and recom mendations of the 
USITC? If yes, kindly provide details.  
 
RESPONSE: All such reports are available to the public (with the exception of confidential 
information), and they may be found on the U.S. Internation al Trade Commission’s website: 
http://www.usitc.gov . 
 
10. Could you give more details on US’ procedure of monitoring of the developments in the industry?  
 
RESPONSE:  See response to Question 9 above.  
 
11. What factors were taken into consideration in determining the effective ness of the safeguard 
measure in facilitating the positive adjustment of the domestic industry to import competition?  
 
RESPONSE:  See response to Question 9 above.  
 
Questions 12 -13 
Section 3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation (3.108; 3.11)  
 
In a response making reference to both the steel and aluminium (see below) Section 232 
investigations, the Department of Defense (DoD), stated that it concurred with the USDOC's 
conclusion that imports of foreign steel and aluminium based on unfair trading practices 
impair the  national security. The DoD expressed its concern about the negative impact on 
U.S. key allies regarding the recommended options within the reports, but stated that, 
among the reports' alternatives, it considered that "targeted tariffs were preferable than  a 
global quota or global tariff", and recommended that "an inter -agency group further refine 
the targeted tariffs, so as to create incentives for trade partners to work with the United 
States on addressing the underlying issue of Chinese transshipment"  
 
The measures were applied to Canada, Mexico, and the European Union as from 1 June 
2018. As a result, on 6 June 2018, the European Union and Canada requested WTO dispute WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  consultations with the United States regarding the U.S. duties on certain imported stee l and 
aluminium products; other Members also requested dispute settlement consultations with 
the United States. Subsequently, several WTO Members, including China, the European 
Union, India, Japan, the Russian Federation and Turkey, notified to the WTO pro posed 
suspensions of substantially equivalent concessions, as they considered the measures as 
safeguards. The United States responded by stating that tariffs imposed pursuant to Section 
232 are not safeguard measures but rather measures taken pursuant to A rticle XXI of the 
GATT, and that the United States did not take action pursuant Section 201 of the Trade Act 
of 1974, which is the law under which the United States imposes safeguard measures; the 
United States did not consider the suspension of concession s justified, as, in its view, the 
measures adopted were not safeguard measures. On 16 July 2018, the United States 
requested consultations with Canada, China, the European Union, Mexico and Turkey 
regarding additional duties imposed by these Members in res ponse to the additional duties 
imposed by the United States on steel and aluminium products.  
 
12. In relation to the measures imposed on steel and alumin ium imports, can the US further 
elaborate on its rationale that these are security measures under GATT Arti cle XXI and not 
safeguard measures under GATT Article XIX?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
13. Please specify the particular provisions under GATT Article XXI that justify the measures taken 
on steel and alumin ium imports as security exceptions. Which of the three provisions of GATT 
Article XXI(b), in relevant part, would the security exception fall  on the following?  
 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;  
 
(ii)  relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic 
 in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or ind irectly for the purpose of 
 supplying a military establishment; and  
 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
Question 14  
Section 3.3.7.8 Copyright (3.307)  
 
The Office: examines and registers copyright claims and administers deposit requirements; 
records transfers, assignments, licenses and other transactions; and administers 
regulations, practices and programmes that explain the provisions of the law.  
 
14. Kindly provide more information on the function of the U.S. Copyright Office to "examine and 
register copyright claims" as it appears to contravene the no formality principle under the Berne 
Convention.  
 
RESPONSE:  Copyright registration with the U.S. Copyright Office is not a requirement for 
protection, but there are several advantages to registration, including creating a public record 
of the copyright claim. Section 410 of the 1976 Copyright Act establishes that if  made before or 
within five years of publication, registration will establish prima facie evidence in court of the 
validity of the copyright and the fa cts stated in the certificate. Further, according to Section 412, 
a timely registration will make statuto ry damages and attorney's fees available to the owner in 
court actions.  Registration also allows the owner to record the registration with U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection for protection against the importation of infringing copies into the United 
State s. Although Section 410 of the Act makes copyright registration a prerequisite for civil 
infringement actions, this only a pplies to United States works. Accordingly, there is no 
mandatory registration requirement for the works of foreign authors, and their  copyrights are 
protected in the United States to the same extent as domestic authors' rights.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 15  
Section 3.3.7.9.4 IP and technology transfer (3.341)  
 
The United States Government also conducts a number of technology transfer programmes 
through,  or with the support of, USAID. The Partnerships for Enhanced Engagement in 
Research (PEER) programme supports scientists in developing countries through institutional 
research awards ranging up to US$300,000. It aims to build capacity among local scientis ts 
and research institutions, strengthen research partnerships world -wide, and better translate 
data and evidence into policy. Under this programme, U.S. scientific agencies, as well as 
universities and research institutes around the world, have partnered with scientists in 
developing countries through PEER awards. Since its launch in 2011, PEER has supported 
more than 250 projects in 50 countries.388 The Research and Innovation Fellowship 
Program connects early -career U.S. researchers and scientists to hos ting organizations in 
the developing world, to conduct collaborative research projects of up to a year, funded by 
USAID and its partners. Other initiatives include the Global Innovation Exchange platform, 
a network that connects innovators, donors, academi a, and the private sector to innovative 
devices, data, technologies, approaches, processes and funding opportunities. Under this 
initiative, USAID both provides funds and facilitates. Under the Development Innovation 
Ventures (DIV) programme, a year -round grant competition, open to nearly any individual 
or organization for any sector in any country where USAID operates, grants are awarded 
based on cost -effectiveness, evidence of impact, and the potential to scale.  
 
15. Kindly provide more information on US gov ernment program/s to support and promote 
technology transfer between universities and research institutions and the private sector.  
 
RESPONSE:  The Bayh -Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. 200 et seq ., is the fundam ental statutory mechanism 
through which the U.S. Government supports and promotes the practical application of 
inventions made by universities and research instit utions with federal funding. For information 
on the regulations implementing the Bayh Dole Act , please see: https://www.nist.gov/tpo/bayh -
dole-regulations -federally -funded -inventions . Additionally, t he President’s Management Agenda 
is a regularly occurri ng, p ublic agenda. The 2019 agenda includes 14 CAP Goals, to “Improve 
Transfer of Federally -Funded Technologies from Lab-to-Market” is CAP Goal 14. The full 
President’s Management Agenda may be found at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -
content/uploads/2018/04/ThePresidentsManagementAgenda.pdf . 
 
Questions 16 -18 
Section 3.3.7.9.2 Special 301 (3.331)  
 
3.331. In its 2018 Special 301 report, released on 30 April 2018 , the USTR identified 36 
trading partners as failing to provide adequate and effective IP protection, and fair and 
equitable market access to persons that rely on such protection.377 No trading partner was 
identified as a PFC as a result of the review. Twe lve trading partners were placed on the 
Priority Watch List. In addition to identifying 36 countries on the Priority Watch List and the 
Watch List, the report also mentioned areas of concern in several countries. The Report also 
identified a wide range of cross-cutting IP concerns with regard to adequate and effective IP 
protection and enforcement worldwide, including: (a) concerns related to IP protection and 
enforcement and market access barriers with respect to pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices; (b) la ck of adequate or effective border enforcement against counterfeit and pirated 
goods, and lack of authority to take ex officio action to seize and destroy such goods at the 
border or to take such action for goods in transit; (c) failure to address the cont inuing and 
emerging challenges of copyright piracy; (d) online piracy; (e) restrictive patentability 
criteria and lack of adequate and effective protection for regulatory test or other data 
submitted by pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical producers; a nd (f) inadequate 
protection for trade secrets in a number of countries.  
 
16. Kindly provide information on the extent and coverage of test data protection submitted for 
regulatory approval.  
 
RESPONSE: Test data submitted to FDA to support an application for regulatory approval is 
kept confidential, see 21 C.F.R. sections 312.130 and 601.50 (investigational new drug 
applications); 314.430 (new drug applications); 601.51 (biologics license application); 812.38 
(investigational device exemption); 814.9 (premarke t approval application for device).  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 334 - 
 
  17. How do US enforcement authorities deal with enforcement referrals of websites that offers 
content that infringes on the IP rights belonging to citizens or entity of a trading partner where 
servers are located in the US.  
 
RESPONSE:  Under U.S. law, a person or entity located in the United States who is infringing a 
work that belongs to a foreign national and is eligible for protection under the Copyright Act can 
be subject to the same criminal penalties as one who infringes  a copyright belonging to a U.S. 
national.  
 
18. Kindly provide information on the ex -officio authority of the CBP to seize counterfeit goods at 
the border and the role of IP owners when alleged counterfeit goods are intercepted at the 
border. What is the basis  for enforcement actions taken on in transit goods?  
 
RESPONSE:  CBP has authority to examine all merchandise imported into the United States. 
(See 19 U.S.C. 1499(a).) The term “importation” is defined as the arrival of merchandise within 
the customs territo ry of the United States. (See 19 C.F.R. 101.1.) This includes in -transit 
merchandise. If CBP has a reasonable suspicion that imported merchandise bears a mark that 
is counterfeit of a federally registered trademark that is recorded with CBP, it may detain the 
shipment. (See 19 U.S.C. 1499(c)). If CBP needs assistance to establish whether a protected 
trademark was applied to the imported merchandise without authorization, it may contact the 
mark owner for assistance. (See 19 C.F.R. 133.21.) If CBP determines  there is probable cause 
to believe that imported merchandise bears counterfeit mark, the merchandise is subject to 
seizure, forfeiture and destruction.  (See 19 U.S.C. 1526(e) and 19 C.F.R. 133.21.)  
 
Question 19  
Section 3.3.7.3 Patents (Table 3.24; 3.275)  
 
3.275. Inventions that are new, useful, and non -obvious are patentable. Patents may be 
granted for a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or improvements 
thereof. The term of protection is 20 years from the filing date.  
 
19. Kindly provide  information on the extent to which second or further medical use/s for drugs and 
medicines are allowed/patented.  Are there limitations or exceptions?  How is second medical use 
distinguished from the first medical use?  
 
RESPONSE: All patent applications ar e examined for satisfaction of the requirements of 
patentability as set forth in title 35 of the United States Code including for novelty, non -
obviousness, and usefulness.   
 
Question 20  
Section 3.3.7.6 Geographical indications (3.296)  
 
3.296. The United States provides protection to foreign and domestic geographical 
indications (GIs) through its trademark system for all classes of goods and services, usually 
as certification marks and collective marks with indications of regional origin.  
 
20. Is co-existence of trademarks and geographical indications allowed in the US? If so, under what 
circumstances is co -existence allowed?  
 
RESPONSE:  Co-existence of trademarks and geographical indications is not allowed in the 
United States.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Additional questions from The Philippines  
(3rd Batch of Questions)  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
Questions 1 -3 
Section 4.1.2 Major Support Programmes (4.8)  
 
In early 2018, the US 2014 Farm Bill was amended through the passage of the Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 2018. The succeeding paragraph (para 4.10) mentioned that the legislative 
process of the new farm bill has been ongoing in 2018. In this context, the Philippines is 
eager to see the promulgation of this farm bill as support to agriculture is primarily 
authorized by this bill.  
 
1. May we request the US to provide an update and timeframe when the US Congress will be able 
to pass the 2018 Farm Bill?  
 
RESPONSE: President Trump signed the 2018 Farm Bill into law on 20 December 2018.  
 
2. With the passage of this new farm bill, m ay we know the US commitment for a substantive 
outcome in the domestic support discussions leading to the 12th Ministerial Conference in 2020?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States has always recognized “the long -term objective of substantial 
progressive reductions  in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform” set out in 
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture as a basic objective of any agriculture negotiations.  
This includes the reduction in barriers to trade such as lowering of tariffs and the re duction in 
use of trade -distorting forms of domestic support.   However, in order for WTO Members to find 
a meaningful and substantive outcome on any topic, including domestic support, Members must 
first have a common understanding of the current trade and policy landscape. Increased 
transparency, including up -to-date and accurate notifications by Members, is necessary to 
identify potential opportunities to make progress. In addition, there must be a commitment by 
all major producers and subsidizers to contr ibute commensurate with their status in the global 
agricultural landscape.  
 
3. Can the US notify the new farm bill once approved in consideration of the transparency rules of 
the WTO?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States will notify domestic support provided under th e new Farm Bill in 
due course.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Russian Federation  
QUESTIONS ON THE SECRETARIAT REPORT (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Questions 1 -2  
Section 3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.7)  
 
According to CBP, the elimination of paper -based procedures through ACE has automated 269 forms 
used by CBP and its 47 partner government agencies, including the 22 partner agencies that require 
documentation to verify and release cargo for import or expor t. Among the many positive effects, 
ACE is credited with having speeded up the processing of bond applications by around 68 times, and 
having cut the waiting time for the processing of trucks at land ports of entry by 44%. The estimated 
savings from CBP in vestments in automated and streamlined systems, including ACE, is said to have 
reduced importation costs by 1.42% on average, or US$6.5 billion in total, in FY2016.  
 
1. Could the United States provide the estimation on the average costs that importers are fa cing 
due to entry into force the Seafood Import Monitoring Program, which requires the provision of 
additional information through the ACE?  
 
RESPONSE: The cost to U.S. importers of implementing SIMP is detailed in The Final Regulatory 
Impact Review and Fin al Regulatory Flexibility Analysis , which is available online at: https:// 
www.regulations.gov/document?D=NOAA -NMFS -2015-0122-0112. The analysis includes the 
following summary:  
 
Assuming that this rule would affect 2,000 importers and 600 cu stoms brokers making 
215,000 entries per year for the priority species subject to the initial phase of the traceability 
program, total aggregate costs for permits, software, data entry, recordkeeping, and data 
storage would amount to $7,875,000 in the firs t year (includi ng one -time broker software 
acquisition), and $6,075,000 annua lly thereafter. For additional information: https://www. 
regulations.gov/document?D=NOAA -NMFS -2015-0122-0112. Given  the approximate 
$9 billion annual value of seafoo d imports for the priority species subject to the initial phase 
of the seafood traceability program, the estimated annual compliance costs of about $6 
million amount to less than one tenth of one per cent  of product value.  
 
2. What is the estimated waiting ti me for importers to fill the ACE requirements related to the 
Seafood Import Monitoring System considering the fact that the information shall be provided 
per harvest event?  
 
RESPONSE: Entry filers are able to  begin the entry filing process in ACE five days in advance of 
the product's arrival at the United States. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) encourages entry filers to begin the process as early as possible during the 5 -day window 
and offers technical assistance when needed.  
 
Questions 3 -5 
Section 3.1.4.1 Customs user fees (3.38)  
 
The principal customs user fee is the Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF), equal to 0.34674% of the 
customs value (not including duty, freight, or insurance charges) of formally declared commercial 
imports. Although the fee is ad valorem and its rate has remained unchanged in the period under 
review, the prescribed minimum and maximum levels of the  MPF were adjusted upwards on 
1 January 2018 to US$25.67 and US$497.99, respectively. For informal entries, e.g. personal 
imports and commercial imports valued at less than US$2,500, the MPF is not applied ad valorem, 
but at flat rates depending on whether the customs entries are (i) entirely automated (US$2.05); 
(ii) prepared manually, but not by CBP staff (US$6.16); or (iii) requiring preparation by CBP officials 
(US$9.24). The MPF is not levied on express and postal shipments, e.g. the receipt of online orders 
from abroad, below the de minimis  threshold of US$800. 34 Instead, a fee capped at US$1.03 
(minimum US$0.36) is charged for each waybill or bill of lading. Some of the preferential trade 
programmes of the United States and many of its FTAs include provisions that exempt such imports 
from the MPF.  
 
3. Please clari fy is the MPF a customs fee or a tax? Is there any equivalent of MPF for domestic 
products?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: MPF is a user fee assessed and collected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection to 
reimburse CBP for the cost of providing customs processing.  
 
4. Taking into  account that some import products are charged by MPF and the others are not, how 
is this process administrated by the customs authority of the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE: The MPF is provided for by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(COBRA) of 1985 a nd further defined in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST 
Act) of 2015. The importer of record is required to pay the fee to Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) at the time of presenting the entry summary. MPF is assessed on all imported 
merchandise, unless specifically exempted by Congress.   
 
Questions 5 -9 
3.1.5.1 Prohibitions and restrictions (3.17; 3.48)  
 
[…] However, the Program has been introduced for 13 "priority species" identified as 
particularly vulnerable to IUU fishing or seafoo d fraud, including tunas (albacore, bigeye, 
skipjack, yellowfin, and bluefin), swordfish, sharks, Atlantic and Pacific cod, grouper, red 
snapper, and sea cucumber. Although SIMP is only applicable to imported seafood, similar 
reporting requirements also ap ply to domestic capture fisheries and aquaculture.  
 
5. Could the United States provide the link to reporting requirements applied to domestic capture 
fisheries and aquaculture?  
 
RESPONSE: All of the species covered by the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (S IMP) are 
managed by the federal government, the applicable state government, or both. Accordingly, the 
comparable reporting and recordkeeping requirements for such species caught domestically can 
be found in those federal and state regulations applicable t o that species. In the United States, 
all federal and state regulations are published in the applicable official journals and are available 
online. If Russia has specific questions about how the United States regulates particular species 
covered by SIMP, R ussia should contact NOAA Fisheries.  
 
Section 607 of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (PL 104 -43) requires the 
Secretary of Commerce to provide a biennial report to Congress identifying countries whose fishing 
vessels are engaged in  IUU fishing, or whose fishing activities result in bycatch of certain protected 
living marine resources, or whose vessels are engaged in shark fishing on the high seas under certain 
practices. NOAA Fisheries then engages with countries thus identified to seek improvement in their 
fisheries management and enforcement practices. Following a two -year consultative process, the 
countries receive either a positive or negative certification that the fishing activities for which they 
were identified have been adeq uately addressed. The consequences of a negative certification 
include U.S. port restrictions and potential import restrictions on certain fish and fish products from 
the country concerned.  
 
6. Could the United States elaborate on the mechanism of imposing import restrictions in case a 
country was included in biennial report to the Congress?  
 
RESPONSE: Nations that receive a negative certification under the High Seas Driftnet Fishing 
Moratorium Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826d -k, are subject to denial of port privileges and 
potential import restrictive measures under the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1826a -1826c. Trade measures, if implemented, would be tailored to the conduct 
for which the nation has been identified.  
 
7. In such case ，does the United States restrict the import of all fish species from a country or only 
those species identified as subject to IUU fishing?  
 
RESPONSE: As described above, trade measures, if implemented, would be tailored to the 
conduct for which the nation has been identified.  
 
8. Could the United States describe the simultaneous application of the Seafood Import Monitoring 
Program (SIMP) and import restrictions imposed due to Section 607 of the  High Seas Driftnet 
Fishing Moratorium Protection Act? In case a consignment was stopped according to SIMP, would WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 338 - 
 
  the whole import from a country be prohibited due to Section 607 of the High Seas Driftnet 
Fishing Moratorium Protection Act?  
 
RESPONSE: SIMP and the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act are two distinct 
and separate processes. Section 607 of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act 
(PL 104 -43) requires the Secretary of Commerce to provide a biennial report to Con gress 
identifying countries whose fishing vessels are engaged in IUU fishing, or whose fishing activities 
result in bycatch of certain protected living marine resources, or whose vessels are engaged in 
shark fishing on the high seas under certain practices . NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service 
then engages with countries thus identified to seek improvement in their fisheries management 
and enforcement practices. Following a two -year consultative process, the countries receive 
either a positive or negati ve certification; positive indicating that the fishing activities for which 
they were identified have been adequately addressed. The consequences of a negative 
certification include U.S. port restrictions and potential import restrictions on certain fish a nd 
fish products from the country concerned. Trade measures under this Act, if implemented, would 
be tailored to the conduct for which t he country has been identified.  
 
The Seafood Import Monitoring Program requires additional data to be reported at the po int of 
entry into U.S. commerce or retained by the importer of record for imported fish and fish 
products identified as priority species due to the risk for IUU fishing and seafood fraud activities. 
Importers of record are identified to U.S. Customs and Bo rder Protection (CBP) on each entry 
filing. The U.S. importer of record will be required to obtain an International Fisheries Trade 
Permit (IFTP) from NOAA Fisheries to report certain harvest information at the time of entry 
filing, and to keep records reg arding the chain of custody of the fish or fish product from harvest 
to point of entry into the United States. Non -compliance with the recordkeeping requirements 
of SIMP constitutes a violation of the Magnuson -Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act and is subject to enforcement action for the International Fisheries Trade Permit holder.  
 
9. Please clarify how does the prohibition to use software by the "Laboratory Kaspersky" company 
applied by the USA state institutions correspond to the WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with other U.S. 
government agencies, determined that the risks presented by Kapersky -branded products 
justified the issuance of a Binding Operations Directive to safeguard Federal informati on and 
information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, 
vulnerability, or risk pursuant to 44 USC Sections 3552 and 3553.  
 
Questions 10 -13 
Section 3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures (3.55; 3.67)  
 
 "…Section 504 amends Sections 771(15) and 773 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to modify the definition 
of ''ordinary course of trade'' and the provisions governing the treatment of a ''particular market 
situation (PMS)'' in AD proceedings".  
 
10. The Russian Feder ation kindly asks the United States to provide clarifications on the mechanisms 
of normal value determination in cases involving the "particular market situation" as referred to 
in 19 U.S.C. Section 1677b.  
 
In particular, the wording "particular market si tuation" appears in the following clauses of 
Section 1677b (provided hereafter in conjunction with other provisions relating to it).  
 
First,  
 
(a) Determination In determining under this subtitle whether subject merchandise is being, or 
is likely to be, sold at less than fair value, a fair comparison shall be made between the export 
price or constructed export price and normal value. In order to achieve a fair comparison with 
the export price or constructed export price, normal value shall be determined as follows:  
 
(1) Determination of normal value  
 
(A) In general  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  The normal value of the subject merchandise shall be the price described in subpara graph (B), 
at a time reasonably corresponding to the time of the sale used to determine the export price 
or constructed export price under section 1677a (a) or (b) of this title.  
 
(B) Price The price referred to in subparagraph (A) is — 
 
(i) the price at wh ich the foreign like product is first sold (or, in the absence of a sale, offered 
for sale) for consumption in the exporting country, in the usual commercial quantities and in the 
ordinary course of trade and, to the extent practicable, at the same level o f trade as the export 
price or constructed export price, or  
 
(ii) in a case to which subparagraph (C) applies, the price at which the foreign like product is so 
sold (or offered for sale) for consumption in a country other than the exporting country or the  
United States, if — 
[…] 
 
(III) the administering authority does not determine that the particular market situation 
prevents a proper comparison with the export price or constructed export price (underlining 
added)  
 
(C) Third country sales This subparagraph  applies when — 
 
[…] 
 
(iii) the particular market situation in the exporting country does not permit a proper comparison 
with the export price or constructed export price. (underlining added)  
 
Second  
(e) Constructed value f or purposes of this subtitle, the constructed value of imported 
merchandise shall be an amount equal to the sum of — 
 
(1) the cost of materials and fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in producing 
the merchandise, during a period which would ordinarily permit the production of the 
merchandise in the ordinary course of trade;  
[…] 
For purposes of paragraph (1), if a particular market situation exists such that the cost of 
materials and fabrication or other processing of any kind does not accurately reflect the cost o f 
production in the ordinary course of trade, the administering authority may use another 
calculation methodology under this part or any other calculation methodology. For purposes of 
paragraph (1), the cost of materials shall be determined without regard to any internal tax in 
the exporting country imposed on such materials or their disposition that is remitted or refunded 
upon exportation of the subject merchandise produced from such materials. (underlining added)  
 
1. Based on these provisions, it is our understanding that the legislation of the United States on 
anti-dumping defines the "particular market situation" as a situation when "the cost of materials and 
fabrication or other processing of any kind does not accurately reflect the cost of production in the 
ordinary course of trade". Please explain:  
 
1a. Is this understanding correct?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States disagrees with the characterization of a particular market 
situation in U.S. law. The United States has an evidentiary -based system; therefor e, the 
determination of whether a particular market situation exists will depend on the facts and 
circumstances on the administrative record.  
 
1b. Is this the only definition of the "particular market situation" that the US legislation envisages? 
If it is not the case, please provide references to the provisions of the US legislation that include 
other definitions.  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 1a. above.  
 
1c. Is the said definition of the "particular market situation" equally applicable:  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  - for determination of "cost of materials and fabrication or other processing of any kind" for 
the purposes of construction of the normal value, and  
 
- for determination whether the normal value should be constructed in order to make a "fair 
comparison between the  export price or constructed export price and normal value"?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 1a. above.  
 
1d. If the answer to question 1c is negative:  
 
- please explain what is the difference between the definitions of the "particular market 
situation" t hat are applicable for the determinations listed in question 1c;  
 
- in case there are other determinations in which the investigating authorities may face the 
"particular market situation" than the ones listed in question 1c, please explain what are 
those determinations and how is the "particular market situation" to be determined for their 
purposes?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 1a. above.  
  
2. As it follows from the provisions of subtitle (e) "Constructed value", there are at least two 
methodologies  for calculations in cases when "the cost of materials and fabrication or other 
processing of any kind does not accurately reflect the cost of production in the ordinary course of 
trade". In the text of subtitle (e) they are referred to as "another calcula tion methodology under this 
part" and "any other calculation methodology". Please explain:  
 
2a. What methodology does the wording "another calculation methodology under this part" refer 
to? 
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 1a. above.  
 
2b. What methodolo gies does the wording "any other calculation methodology" refer to? Are all 
those methodologies referred to in the US legislation on anti -dumping? In case of positive answer 
please provide references to the relevant provisions.  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Q uestion 1a. above. Specific determinations involving the 
examination of whether a particular market situation exists can be found at: 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
2c. How do the US authorities ch oose whether to use a methodology referred to in question 2a or 
the one referred to in question 2b?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 1a. above.  
 
2d. Have the authorities of the United States already used the methodologies referred to in 
questions 2a and  2b? In case of positive answers, please provide examples of such cases.  
 
RESPONSE: Specific determinations involving the examination of whether a particular market 
situation exists can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
«…For the determination of the margin of dumping, the ITA compares prices in the United States to 
a Normal Value (NV), the calculation of which varies according to the circumstances. For example, 
the NV may be based on the company's actual costs and prices in the comparison market, which 
can be either the respondent's home country or some other suitable third country or, if the ITA does 
not find a suitable comparison market, it may base the NV on the Constructed Value (CV) w hich is 
a cost -based build -up of a surrogate price»  
 
11. Please explain whether the use of comparison markets other than the respondent's home country 
by the US authorities is limited to the following situations:  
 
- investigations into imports from WTO Members that have specific commitments in the sphere 
of anti -dumping in their protocols of accession to the WTO and Working Party Reports;  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 341 - 
 
  - investigations in which Article 2.7 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement applies;  
 
- investigations into imports from countries that are not Members to the WTO?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 12 below.   
 
12. In case of negative answer to question №11, please explain, what are other cases when 
comparison markets other than the respondent's home country are used? Please explain what 
provisions of the Anti -Dumping Agreement enable the use of such other comparison markets in 
cases other than the ones described in question №11?  
 
RESPONSE: The text of the relevant provisions speaks for itself and the United States will not 
comment on the hypo thetical cases described in Questions 11 -13. 
 
13. As understood from the aforementioned paragraph of the Report by the Secretariat, there may 
be a situation when the US authorities decide to use a surrogate country data (i.e. a comparison 
market is "some other  suitable third country"). However, in order to establish the normal value, 
the US authorities do not use sales of the like product in the surrogate country. Instead, they 
construct the normal value in the surrogate country on the basis of costs (i.e. make  "a cost -
based build -up of a surrogate price").  
 
Please explain:  
- Whether this understanding is correct  
- In case this understanding is correct, why do the US authorities deem it more appropriate 
in such situations to construct the normal value in a surrogate  country than to look for 
another surrogate country (i.e. to look for another representative market where sales of the 
like product would be appropriate to establish the normal value)?  
- Have the US authorities already used the methodology of constructing th e normal value in 
a surrogate country in practice? In case of positive answer please provide examples.  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 12 above.  
 
Questions 14 -16 
Section 3.1.6.1.1.5 Sunset reviews (3.72)  
 
«… The USDOC and the USITC initiate sunset revi ews no later than 30 days before the fifth 
anniversary of publication in the Federal Register of an AD or CVD order or suspension agreement, 
with the aim of determining whether the revocation of the order would be likely to lead to 
continuation or recurren ce of dumping or countervailable subsidies (USDOC) and of material injury 
to the domestic industry (USITC). Initiations of the reviews are automatic. …».  
 
14. As it is stated in the Report of the Secretariat, «initiations of the reviews are automatic». Does 
the Russian Federation understand it correctly that sunset reviews are initiated each time before 
the expiration of 5 -year period of duration of a measure, irrespective of whether the US 
producers request them?  
 
RESPONSE: The provisions regarding the initi ation of a sunset review can be found at 19 C.F.R. 
section 351.218.  
 
15. In cases when a sunset review is initiated without a duly substantiated request made by or on 
behalf of the US industry, do the US authorities collect and check the information (which 
preliminary substantiates that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and injury) prior to the start of the review or after the review has started?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 14 above.  
 
16. In case when a sunset review is initiated by the US authorities and the domestic industry doesn't 
provide any information, on the basis of what data the US authorities do the conclusion about 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury?  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Qu estion 14 above.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 17 -18 
Section 3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.75)  
 
The number of AD measures in force increased during the period under review. As of 31 December 
2017, excluding suspension agreements, 321 definitive AD measures were in force.  At that date, 
314 AD duty orders and seven suspension agreements were in effect, compared with 293 in 
December 2016, and 265 in December 2015. In accordance with information from the USDOC and 
the USITC, 340 AD orders were in place as of 17 July 2018 (Tab le 3.6).  
  
17. For what reason did the USA initiate an investigation under the Section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act the subject of which is already governed by the Agreement Suspending the 
Antidumping Investigation on Uranium from the Russian Federation?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Department of Commerce has initiated an investigation into whether the 
present quantity and circumstances of uranium ore and product imports into the United States 
threaten to impair U.S. national security. The investigation was initiate d following a petition filed 
by two U.S. uranium mining companies requesting that the Department initiate a Section 232 
investigation into imports of uranium ore and products.  
 
18. What are the reasons, despite positive trend in US production of carbon and all oy steel wire rod, 
for the imposition of antidumping duties by the USITC according to the Article 3.1 of Agreement 
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not accept the premise of Russia's question. In addition, 
the U.S. International Trade Commission does not impose antidumping duties, but rather 
determines if an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material 
injury by reason of dumped or subsidi zed imports. That being said, details of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission's injury determination in the specific investigation referenced 
by Russia can be found at: https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy.ht m. 
 
Questions 19 -20 
Section 3.1.6.1.1.2 Administrative procedures (3.67)  
 
«…For the determination of the margin of dumping, the ITA compares prices in the United States to 
a Normal Value (NV), the calculation of which varies according to the circumstances.  For example, 
the NV may be based on the company's actual costs and prices in the comparison market, which 
can be either the respondent's home country or some other suitable third country or, if the ITA does 
not find a suitable comparison market, it may ba se the NV on the Constructed Value (CV) which is 
a cost -based build -up of a surrogate price»  
 
19. Please clarify in which cases/under which circumstances does the United States refer to the 
usage of data from surrogate countries?  
 
RESPONSE: Each determination depends on the facts and circumstances on the administrative 
record.  
 
20. Please provide the explanation for the «cost -based build -up of a surrogate price».  
 
RESPONSE: See response to Question 19 above.  
 
Questions 21 -23 
Section 3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigatio n (3.106)  
 
«Following previous practice, the Secretary of Commerce in this investigation determined that 
"national security" for purposes of Section 232 includes the "general security and welfare of certain 
industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy nat ional defense requirements, which are critical to 
minimum operations of the economy and government."…»  
 
21. What are the industries, "general security and welfare" of which are, in the opinion of the United 
States, «critical to minimum operations of the econom y and government»? Please provide a list 
of these industries with an explanation why are those industries' general security and welfare 
«critical to minimum operations of the economy and government».  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 343 - 
 
  RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the sub ject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
22. How do the US authorities determine "general security and welfare" of the US industries? Are 
there any criteria for su ch determination? In case there are such criteria, please list them all.  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
23. What are the «minimum operations» of the economy and government referre d to in the said 
paragraph of the Report of the Secretariat? Is there a definition or a list of such "minimum 
operations" in the US legislation? Please provide the references.  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
Question 24  
Section 3.2.4 Export support and promotion (3.147)  
 
 "The TPCC is, in principle, required to publish an annual National Export Strategy". In accordance 
with the National export strategy 2016 (page 37) Smal l Business Administration (SMA) "offers a 
quick -approval financing program… SBA Export Express as a permanent loan program". According 
to SMA web -site it provides loans for exporters.  
 
24. Could the United States please provide detailed requirements of the lo ans? 
 
RESPONSE: The requirements of the relevant loans programs can be found in paragraphs 3.158 
and 3.159 of the Secretariat's report an d SBA's website (www.SBA.gov).  
 
Question 25  
Section 3.2.5.1 The Export -Import Bank (EXIM) (3.156)  
 
The 2015 legislation  reauthorizing EXIM Bank includes provisions (Section 55002) mandating the 
United States to initiate and pursue negotiations with other major exporting countries to reduce 
substantially, and with a view to possibly eliminating (by 2025), subsidized export -financing 
programmes and other forms of export subsidies. In addition, the United States is to initiate and 
pursue negotiations with countries that are not OECD members, to bring them into a multilateral 
agreement with rules and limitations on officially s upported export credits. Each year, the 
Department of the Treasury delivers a report to Congress which provides an update on the progress 
achieved in implementing the instructions set forth in Section 55002.  
 
25. Could the United States please provide an updat e on its plans concerning the mentioned 
negotiations in paragraph 3.156?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States remains committed to pursuing negotiations with other major 
exporting countries to reduce, and possibly eliminate, subsidized export -financing programs. 
The United States primarily pursues this objective through its participation in the International 
Working Group on Export Credits (IWG), a multilateral effort aimed at bringing non -OECD 
countries into a common set of market -reflective guidelines that level the playing field among 
exporters and minimize trade distortions. Participation in the IWG includes a broad range of 
exporting countries, including the Russian Federation, which is represented at the negotiations 
by the Russian Ministry of Finance and EXIA R, the Russian export credit agency.  
 
Question 26  
Section 3.3.1 Incentives (3.165)  
 
"The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) lists all federal financial (and non -financial) 
assistance programmes … provide support to existing or prospective export ers". 
 
26. Could the United States please describe in detail support programs provided to exporters at 
federal and sub -federal levels?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 344 - 
 
  RESPONSE: Please see the most recent subsidy notification of the United States 
(G/SCM/N/315/USA) for relevant support programs subject to the notification obligation under 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
Question 27 -28 
Section 3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements (3.186)  
 
The FDA published its final rule regarding the Accreditation of  Third-Party Certification Bodies to 
Conduct Food Safety Audits and to Issue Certifications ("Accreditation Third -Party Certification Rule") 
in November 2015.200 A voluntary certification programme allows "accreditation bodies", which may 
be foreign govern ment agencies or private entities, to seek recognition by the FDA to obtain the 
authority to accredit third -party "certification bodies", also known as third -party auditors. The 
certification bodies, in turn, conduct consultative and/or regulatory food saf ety audits, and issue 
certifications to eligible food producing entities. The FDA issued a guidance document describing the 
standards for the accreditation of third -party certification bodies ("Model Accreditation Standards") 
in December 2016.201 The FDA l aunched a website where organizations could apply for recognition 
as accreditation bodies on 21 June 2017.202 To date, the FDA has recognized three accreditation 
bodies: ANSI; the American National Accreditation Bureau (ANAB); and the National Bureau of 
Agricultural Comm odity and Food Standard (ACFS).  
 
27. Could the United States indicate the number of foreign government agencies or private entities 
which have been recognized and seek recognition by the Food and Drug Administration for 
accreditation as a third -party auditors? From which countries were these foreign government 
agencies?  
 
RESPONSE: Accredited Third -Party Certification is a voluntary program in which FDA recognizes 
"accreditation bodies" that will have the responsibility of accrediting third -party "certification 
bodies." The certification bodies will conduct food safety audits and issue certifications of foreign 
food facilities. For a list of recognized accreditation bodies and of accredite d certification bodies 
under the program, please see: https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Imports 
Exports/Importing/ucm594398.htm  and https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/Impor
tsExports/Importing/ucm618978.htm . 
 
28. The Russian Federation would appreciate a detailed information on where the guidance on the 
procedure to apply for the recognition of a fore ign government or a private agency as a third -
party auditor can be found.  
 
RESPONSE: For detailed information on the application procedure for Third -Party 
Certification,  please  see the following  website:  https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/
ImportsExports/Importing/ucm558461.htm . 
 
Question 29  
Section 3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises and privatization (3.219)  
 
"Government corporations … may r eceive federal allocations".  
 
29. The Russian Federation would appreciate a more detailed description by the United States of the 
performance of procurements by the US state trading, state -owned enterprises as well as an 
exhaustive list of relevant legal acts under which such procurements are regulated?  
 
RESPONSE: Detailed information regarding U.S. state trading enterprises can be found in U.S. 
notifications to the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises.  For all other entities listed in 
Section 3.3.5 of the Secretariat's Report, detailed information regarding the activities of those 
entities can be found on the websites for the specific entity.  
 
Question 30 -34 
Section 3.3.7 Intellectual property rights (3.262; 3.268; table 3.24; 3.283; 3.296; 3.321)  
 
The United States is one of main producers and exporters of goods and services that embody 
intellectual property (IP). IP is present in some 60% of U.S. goods exports and IP -intensive 
industries account for over one third of U.S. GDP (see below).301 In 201 6, the United States 
accounted for 31% of global commercial knowledge and technology intensive services, i.e., business, WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 345 - 
 
  financial and information: in that year, U.S. exports of information and communications technology 
ICT)-enabled services exports (exclu ding digital goods) reache d US$404 billion.302 The 
United  States has also been the largest global producer of high -technology manufactures with a 
global share of 31%, over the last decade.303 During the period under review, the United States 
has continued to post its traditional balance -of-payments surplus in IP -related payments, as 
measured by the category "charges for the use of IP". In 2017, net receipts were US$79.5 billion, 
with receipts totalling US$127.9 billion and payments reaching US$48.4 billion  
 
30. The WTO Secretariat's Report states that IP was present in 60% of goods exports from US. What 
methods have been used to calculate such percentage? What percentage out of those goods was 
exported to the Russian Federation?  
 
RESPONSE: The WTO's report is ba sed on the methodology d eveloped by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce.  It can be found  in the following  report: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ 
files/do cuments/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf . 
 
The data for these exports are not disaggregated by destination of export.  
 
As a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the United States participates 
in a large number of international conven tions and treaties related to IPRs, including 19 instruments 
administered by the WIPO. On 17 December 2005, the United States accepted the Protocol 
Amending the TRIPS Agreement adopted by the General Council on 6 December 2005 (WT/L/641).  
 
31. It is stated th at on 17 December 2005 the USA accepted the Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement adopted by the General Council on 6 December 2006 (hereinafter - Protocol). Please 
specify if any amendments to the US regulatory framework were required in order to implemen t 
the said Protocol.  
 
RESPONSE: The provisions of the 2005 Protocol did not require changes to U.S. law.  
 
32. Table 3.24 does not mention databases as objects of intellectual property rights. Does US 
copyright law extend copyright or related rights protection on databases? If yes, how are 
databases legally protected (criteria of granting legal protection, duration of legal protection)? 
Is registration of databases compulsory? If yes, what executive body is responsible for 
registration?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. copyright  law generally protects computer databases as "compilations," which 
are defined as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre -existing materials or of 
data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a w hole 
constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
 
U.S. law does not require copyright registration of any work, including databases. Copyright 
registration is voluntary, not mandatory. The Copyright Office is the federal agency that 
administers the copyright law, including registration. For further information on databases, see 
U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices §§ 727 et seq. (3d ed. 
2017), https://copyright.gov/comp3/chap700/ch700 -literary -works.pdf .  
 
The share of patents of foreign origin issued by the USPTO during the review period continued to be 
larger than the share of patents of domestic origin. Patents issued by the Unit ed States to residents 
of foreign countries represented almost 52% of total patents issued in FY2017.333 Among foreign 
countries, the largest share was held by Japan (28.7% of patents issued to foreign residents), 
followed by the Republic of Korea (12.6%),  Germany (10.0%), and China (7.8%)  
 
33. It is stated that the share of patents of foreign origin (about 52%) in US continues to be larger 
than that of national origin. Could the USA explain the reason for this trend?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not keep information indicating what forces may influence 
changes in the share of patents of foreign origin compar ed to national origin. For more data on 
this issue,  please  see: https://www. uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml . 
 
The United States provides protection to foreign and domestic geographical indications (GIs) through 
its trademark system for all classes of goods and services, usually as certification marks and WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 346 - 
 
  collective marks  with indications of regional origin. The U.S. system provides that an interested party 
may assert grounds (such as those described below) to oppose an application to register, or to 
cancel a registered mark, if that party believes that it will be damaged by the registration or 
continued existence of the registration. The USPTO examines applications for trademarks, including 
certification marks and collective marks with indications of regional origin. Protection is not granted 
to geographic terms or signs t hat are generic for goods or services. Under the system, the owner of 
a mark has the exclusive right to prevent its use by unauthorized parties when such use would likely 
cause consumer confusion, mistake or deception as to the source of the goods/services . A prior right 
holder has priority and exclusivity over any later users of the same or similar sign on the same, 
similar, related, or in some cases unrelated goods/services where consumers would likely be 
confused by the two uses. Complementary protection  is provided under the Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act and its implementing regulations for wine and distilled spirits of bo th domestic 
and foreign origin.  
 
34. Please inform about the possibilities to offer protection to foreign geographical indications 
through US trademark system and provide respective references to the provisions of national 
legislation. Does the US legislation regulate the protection of non -registered foreign geographical 
indications against unfair use? If a non -registered geographical i ndication is used as an element 
of a trademark in a way that may mislead consumers on the origin of the respective goods or 
services, can such use constitute grounds for a refusal to register such trademark? Does USPTO 
conduct examination of the case when the use of geographical indications as elements of applied 
trademarks may mislead consumers on the origin of the respective goods or services?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States provides protection to all geographical indications (GIs) through 
its trademark syst em for all classes of goods and services. Trademarks are governed by the 
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), as amended (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.), the Trademark 
Rules (37 CFR Part 2), the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures, and state laws. See 
USPTO, Geographical Indication Protection in the United States . Viewed at: http://www. 
uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/dcom/olia/globalip/pdf/gi_system.pdf . 
 
Owners of unregistered geographical indications have recourse under Section 43 of  the 
Trademark Act for injunctive relief. If an application to register a trademark contains a non -
registered geographical indication that is known to the U.S. consumer, but it is not filed by the 
proper owner, it may be refused registration. Examination o f marks include research to 
determine if the U.S. consumer might be misled. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures at 
section 1210.05.  
 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) plays a key role in the enforcement of IPRs, both at the criminal 
and civil levels. It  is in charge of investigating and prosecuting a wide range of IP crimes, including 
those involving copyright piracy, trademark counterfeiting, and trade secret theft. Primary 
investigative and prosecutorial responsibility within the DOJ rests with the Fed eral Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the United States Attorneys' Offices, the Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section (CCIPS) in the Criminal Division, the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section 
(CES) in the National Security Division, and  the Consumer Protection Branch of the Civil Division 
with regard to offenses arising under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The DOJ also maintains a 
Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) Network, which consists of prosecutors who are 
speciall y trained in the investigation and prosecution of IP and computer crimes. IP enforcement is 
also an integral part of the mission of three sections of the DOJ's Civil Division: the IP Section, which 
brings affirmative cases when U.S. IP is infringed; the Na tional Courts Section, which initiates civil 
actions to recover various penalties or customs duties arising from negligent or fraudulent import 
transactions, and defends CBP enforcement of the USITC's exclusion orders under Section 337 of 
the Tariff Act of  1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1337); and the Consumer Protection Branch, which 
conducts civil and criminal litigation under th e Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  
 
NO QUESTION  
 
Question 35  
4.1.3.1 Imports (4.43)  
 
The tariff quota regime covers 54 bound TRQs, cor responding to approximately 200 tariff lines at 
present. It mainly affects imports of beef, cheese and other dairy products, sugar and sugar -
containing products, tobacco, and cotton. Fill rates vary considerably among the commodities WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 347 - 
 
  subject to TRQs. As ou tlined in Section 4.1.2.7, the sugar TRQs are country -specific and linked to a 
domestic market allocation mechanism, which means that quotas may be adjusted in the light of 
developments in the U.S. sugar market. The United States notifies the Committee on Agriculture 
regarding the administration of its WTO tariff quota commitments on a regular basis. The most 
recent notification, circulated in April 2018, covered imports under tariff quotas during the calendar 
year 2015. Arrangements applicable to TRQ impor ts of sugar and sugar -containing products for 
FY2018 were notified in September 2017.  
 
35. Could the United States clarify the reasons for delay in notification related to import within the 
tariff rate quotas (the latest notification circulated in 2 018 covers the period of 2015)?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States intends to submit its MA:2 notifications for 2016 and 2017 
shortly. There has been a change in the internal system for data collection.  
 
Question 36 -37 
Section 4.1.3.2 Exports (4.45; 4.46)  
 
The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA administers the Export Credit Guarantee Program 
(GSM -102) on behalf of the CCC. For exports of agricultural commodities financed through normal 
commercial channels or by the exporters themselves, the progr amme offers guarantees to approved 
U.S. exporters for sales to eligible countries, principally developing countries. The guarantees, issued 
by the CCC, insure payments under U.S. dollar denominated irrevocable letters of credit, and 
typically cover 98% of the principal and a portion of the interest payments. The maximum credit 
term is 18 months, but the limit may vary according to the obligor country. The CCC determines the 
product coverage of GSM -102 based on the market potential of the commodities and app licable 
legislative and regulatory requirements. Although most guarantees are issued for bulk commodities, 
intermediate goods (such as wood chips and pulp) and high -value processed consumer goods may 
also be covered. In FY2017, registered guarantees totall ed US$1.58 billion in value, principally for 
exports of yellow maize (US$541 million), soybeans (US$421 million), wheat (US$243 million), 
soybean meal (US$228 million), rice (US$48 million), and soybean oil (US$11 million). About one 
third of the guarantee s available in FY2018 (US$4.9 billion) had been used by 10 August 2018.  
 
36. According to the information provided in this paragraph, the Export Credit Guarantee Program 
offers guarantees to exporters for sale to eligible countries. Could the United States pr ovide 
details on the criteria of "eligibility" of the country under which export destination shall fall so as 
to allow the exporter to obtain credit guarantees?  
 
RESPONSE: Per 7 CRF 1493, the criteria considered in reviewing proposals for country and 
regional allocations includes, but is not limited to the following:  
 
(a) potential benefits that the extension of Payment Guarantees would provide for the 
development, expansion, or maintenance of the market for particular U.S. Agricultural 
Commodities in the impor ting country;  
 
(b) financial and economic ability and/or willingness of the country of obligation to 
adequately service Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guaranteed debt;  
 
(c) financial status of participating Foreign Financial Institutions in the country of obli gation 
as it would affect their ability to adequately service CCC guaranteed debt;  
 
(d) political stability of the country of obligation as it would affect its ability and/or 
willingness to adequately service CCC guaranteed debt; and  
 
(e) current status of debt ei ther owed by the country of obligation or by the participating 
Foreign Financial Institutions to CCC or to lenders protected by CCC's Payment 
Guarantees.  
 
Four export promotion programmes, among which the Market Access Program (MAP) is the most 
important, were reauthorized in the 2014 Farm Bill.48 MAP provides co -funding for the overseas 
marketing and promotional activities of agricultural trade associations, cooperatives, state regional 
trade groups, and small businesses. Participants must put up a minimum  of 10% of the funding for 
generic marketing and promotion, while 50/50 cost -sharing is required for the promotion of branded WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  products. Applicants for export promotion and market development funding managed by the FAS 
access the programmes through a single  portal - the Unified Export Strategy (UES).  
 
37. As it is stated in the Report, Market Access Program (MAP) provides co -funding for the overseas 
marketing and promotional activities of agricultural trade associations, cooperatives, state 
regional trade groups, and small businesses. One of the conditions of participation in this 
program is the requirement for participants to "put up a minimum of 10% of the funding for 
generic marketing and promotion, while 50/50 cost -sharing is required for the promotion of 
branded products". Could the United states provide a more detailed information on this program 
justifying that MAP cannot be considered as "cost reduction measures such as subsidies to reduce 
the cost of marketing goods for export" under the Article 9.1  of the Agreement on Agriculture?  
 
RESPONSE: The Market Access Program (MAP) uses funds from the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) to aid in the development, expansion, and maintenance of foreign markets 
for U.S. agricultural commodities and products.  It is a widely available program that forms 
partnerships between non -profit U.S. agricultural trade associations, non -profit U.S. agricultural 
cooperatives, and non -profit state and regional trade groups to broadly promote all U.S. 
agricultural products.  
 
Question 38  
Section 4.4.6.2.3 Shipbuilding and ship repairs (2.251)  
 
The Capital Construction Fund (CCF) and the Construction Reserve Fund (CRF) allow U.S. citizens 
owning or leasing vessels to obtain tax benefits for the construction, reconstruction, or acqu isition 
of vessels. CCF vessels must be U.S. -built and documented under U.S. laws for operation in the 
nation's foreign, Great Lakes, short -sea shipping, or non -contiguous domestic trade or its fisheries. 
Participants must meet U.S. citizenship requirement s. The CCF provides tax -deferral benefits to 
vessel operators in the foreign or domestic trade of the United States and U.S. fisheries. The CCF 
aims to make up for the competitive disadvantage operators of U.S. -flag vessels face in the 
construction and rep lacement of their vessels, relative to foreign -flag operators whose vessels are 
registered in countries that do not tax shipping income. The CRF is a financial assistance scheme 
that provides tax -deferral benefits to U.S. -flag, operators with respect to ga ins attributable to the 
sale or loss of a vessel, provided the proceeds are used to expand or modernize the U.S. merchant 
fleet.  
 
38. Could the United States provide the amount of tax benefits obtained by U.S. citizens owning or 
leasing vessels for constructi on, reconstruction or acquisition of fishing vessels in 2014 -2018?  
 
RESPONSE: The tax expenditures related to Capital Construction Fund (CCF) and the 
Construction Reserve Fund (CRF) were as follows:  
 
- FY 2014 $10 million  
- FY 2015 $20 million  
- FY 2016 $20 mil lion 
- FY 2017 $20 million  
- FY 2018 $12 million  
 
Complete tax expenditure reports by year can be accessed at: https://home.treasury.gov/ 
policy -issues/tax -policy/tax -expend itures . 
 
PART II: QUESTIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Questions 39 -40 
4.3.9 United States –Korea Free Trade Agreement (4.38)  
 
On July 12, 2017, the United States requested a special session of the KORUS Joint Committee to 
review the implementation of the agreement and to discuss additional steps to address the 
significant bilateral trade imbalance, including through possible amen dments and modifications. 
Negotiations to improve the agreement were launched in early 2018, with outcomes announced in 
March 2018. Following the completion of domestic procedures in the United States, the final texts 
reflecting the outcomes from these neg otiations were signed by the two countries on September 24, 
2018. The modernized provisions will then enter into force after completion of applicable procedures WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 349 - 
 
  by both countries. These outcomes focus on improving automobile trade, in addition to other 
provisions including on investment. Progress on implementation -related issues also was announced, 
including in the areas of pharmaceuticals and customs.  
 
39. How will the new provisions of the KORUS improve the terms of trade of automobiles between 
the United Sta tes and Korea? What are the improvements in investment provisions?  
 
RESPONSE: Amendments and modifications to the U.S. -Korea Free Trade Agreement, which 
have not yet entered in to force, seek to provide better access for U.S. automobile exporters 
through p rovisions related to automobile emissions, easing regulatory burdens on auto parts 
labelling, and acceptance of U.S. automotive safety standards. The amendments also provide a 
longer phase -out period for the U.S. tariff on trucks. For U.S. investors, the a mendments would 
include clarifications to select definitions, rules, and dispute settlement procedures.  
 
40. Please clarify what is meant by "implementation -related issues"? What progress in the area of 
pharmaceuticals and customs was reached after the review of the KORUS?  
 
RESPONSE: "Implementation -related issue" refers to areas in which the United States has 
concerns about the proper implementation of obligations under the U.S. -Korea Free Trade 
Agreement. The modifications to the KORUS are available on the US TR website, at: 
https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -offices/press -office/press -releases/2018/september/ustr -
publishes -agreed -outcomes -us. 
 
Question 41 -44 
Section 8 SMALL AND MEDIUM -SIZED BUSINESS TRADE (8.1)  
 
USTR has implemented a Small Business Initiative to increase expor t opportunities for U.S. small 
and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs).  
 
41. Could the United States provide a detailed information on this Initiative?  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. small businesses are key engines for economic growth, jobs, and innovation. 
USTR has implemented  a Small Business Initiative to increase export opportunities for U.S. small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and has expanded efforts to address the specific export 
challenges and priorities of SMEs and their workers in our trade policy and enforcemen t activities. 
Tariff barriers, burdensome customs procedures, discriminatory or arbitrary standards, lack of 
transparency relating to relevant regulations, and insufficient IPR protection in foreign markets 
present particular challenges for our SMEs in sel ling abroad. Under the SME Initiative, USTR's 
small business office, regional offices, and functional offices are pursuing initiatives and 
advancing efforts to address these issues. USTR also works closely with the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA),  the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 
other agencies to help provide U.S. SMEs information and counselling on specific export 
opportunities.  
 
42. Could the United States provide the exact definition of the term "SME" according t o its 
legislation?  
 
RESPONSE: SBA's general employee -based definition of "small business" is an independent firm 
with 500 employees or less. These firms are also referred to as "small and medium -sized 
enterprises" (SMEs) in academic and international liter ature. More specifically, SBA's size 
standards define whether a business entity is small and, thus, eligible for SBA programs. Size 
standards have been established for types of economic activity, or industry, generally under the 
North American Industry Cla ssification System (NAICS). A comprehensive list of the U.S. Small 
Business Administration's (SBA) size standards can be found at 13 CFR § 
121.201.  See: https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi -bin/text -idx?SID=b919ec8f32159d9edaaa36a7eaf6b 
695&mc=true&node=pt13.1.121&rgn=div5<<<#se13.1.121_1201 . 
 
43. Could the United States explain whether there are any limitations on for eign ownership of SMEs 
under the US legal framework?  
 
RESPONSE: SBA does not set any limitations on foreign ownership of small businesses. To 
qualify as a small business in a given industry for SBA programs, the business must meet the WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 350 - 
 
  size standard for th at industry as specified in 13 CFR 121.201 See: https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi -
bin/text -idx?SID= b919ec8f32159d9edaaa36a7eaf6b695&mc=true&node=pt13.1.121&rgn=div  
5<<<<<<<#se13.1.121_1201 . 
 
To qualify for SBA programs, a small business must have a place of business located in the 
United States and must operate primarily within the United States or make  a significant 
contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, 
materials or labo ur. A small business may be in the legal form of an individual proprietorship, 
partnership, limited liability company, corporation, joint  venture, association, trust, or 
cooperative. If the business is in the form of a joint venture, there can be no more than 49 per 
cent participation by foreign business entities in the joint venture.  
 
Since the last TPR, the United States has worked to inc rease  opportunities for SME exports.  
 
44. Could the United States please describe what state support measures (financial and non -
financial) applied to increase exports by SMEs?  
 
RESPONSE:  See answer to Question 41. In addition, USTR participates in the Trade Promotion 
Coordinating Committee's (TPCC) Small Business Working Group, collaborating with agencies 
such as the U.S. Department of Commerce, SBA, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Export -Import 
Bank, and U.S. Department of Agriculture to promote small busines s exports. The TPCC Small 
Business Working Group connects SMEs to trade information and resources provided by the 
Department of Commerce U.S. Export Assistance Centers and the SBA's Small Business 
Development Centers, to help SMEs take advantage of existin g trade agreements. Further, USTR 
participates in the TPCC Small Business Working Group's Digital Client Engagement (DCE) Task 
Force to improve interagency collaboration on digital outreach and introduce small businesses 
to online tools.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Additional questions from the Russian Federation  
QUESTIONS ON THE SECRETARIAT REPORT ( WT/TPR/S/382 ) 
 
Question 1  
Section 3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures (3.74)  
 
Between 2015 and 2017, the number of AD investigation initiations totalled 133. Although the 
number of initiations decreased from 42 in 2015 to 37 in 2016, it increased to 54 in 2017 (Table 
3.5). Of the 37 investigations initiated in 2016, 34 resulted in the imposition of definitive measures 
by end April 2018; in one case, no final duty was applied. In all the 2016 investigations, provisional 
duties were applied. As of 30 June 2018, 22 of the investigations initiated in 2017 had resulted in 
the imposition of definitive measures, and 8 had been terminated due to a no -injury finding. Between 
1995 and 20 17, the United States initiated 659 AD investigations.  
 
1. In case there is an AD measure imposed in the USA and at the time a new foreign producer, 
that had not existed as an entity and as a manufacturer at the time of the investigation, intends 
to sell its product to the US market, how can a review of AD measure be initiated and what are 
the requirements for the exporter relating to such a review?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States will not comment on the hypothetical situation described in the 
question.  However,  requirements for an exporter to request an administrative review can be 
found at 19 C.F.R. sec. 351.213 and 351.214.  
 
Question 2  
Section 3.2.5.1 The Export -Import Bank (EXIM) (3.156)  
 
The 2015 legislation reauthorizing EXIM Bank includes provisions (Section 55002) mandating the 
United States to initiate and pursue negotiations with other major exporting countries to reduce 
substantially, and with a view to possibly eliminating (by 2025) , subsidized export -financing 
programmes and other forms of export subsidies. In addition, the United States is to initiate and 
pursue negotiations with countries that are not OECD members, to bring them into a multilateral 
agreement with rules and limitat ions on officially supported export credits. Each year, the 
Department of the Treasury delivers a report to Congress which provides an update on the progress 
achieved in implementing the instructions set forth in Section 55002.  
 
2. Considering the current pr ogress within the International Working Group on Export Credits 
(IWG) and the role of the platform to make a concrete progress towards a set of international 
guidelines on the provision  of official export financing that are consistent with international be st 
practices and take into account varying national interests, could it be that the IWG processes 
might intentionally be forced by the US Delegation, so the participants will have to come up to 
a less favo urable regulations in a shorter term?  This issue be comes more sufficient with the 
initial goal of the US EXIM to pursue negotiations and further agreement on multilateral export 
credit regulation.  
 
RESPONSE:  The question appears to call for speculation on an undefined and hypothetical 
scenario, which is o utside the scope of the TPR.  
 
Question 3  
Section 3.2.5.2 Small Business Administration (SBA) export loan programmes (3.158)  
 
The SBA as such is not a bank. The specific loan terms are, therefore, negotiated between the 
qualified borrower and an SBA-approved lender. Applicants for SBA export loans must provide export 
business plans, including historical data, projections, and written information supporting the 
likelihood of increased export sales. No minimum borrowed amount is required, and the SB A 
guarantees loans up to US$5 million. The fee the SBA charges for its guarantee depends on the 
loan's maturity and the guaranteed amount (up to 90% for most loans), and is initially paid by the 
lender.  
 
3. Are the programmes, provided by the SBA supporting the exporters via the partner banks, 
considered as official export credit support? Please specify whether the initial loan terms are 
comparable to the relevant WTO/OECD regulations?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 352 - 
 
  RESPONSE:  All of SBA’s programs are consistent with WTO rules and all rel evant provisions of 
the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits . 
 
Question 4  
Section 3.3.1 Incentives (3.166)  
 
State, territorial and local governments also provide support and incentives, particularly in relation 
to business start -ups or the ex pansion of existing operations. A database developed by the Council 
for Community and Economic Research (C2ER), accessible at:  http://selectusa.stateincentives.org/ 
?referrer=selec tusa, includes information on 1,790 programmes enacted in the 50 states. Such 
support is provided in the form of tax credits, tax exemptions, grants, loans or loan participation , or 
other forms of assistance.  
 
4. We kindly ask the USA to clarify whether the c urrent state financing programs are considered 
as officially supported export credits. Please specify whether any of the programs included in 
the database are currently being notified to the WTO Secretariat as subsidies.  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States Export  Import Bank is the provider of officially supported export 
credits in the United States. For the most recent subsidies notification of the United States, 
please see: G/SCM/N/315/USA.  
 
Question 5 -6 
Section 3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements (3.182 3.185)  
 
The United States has numerous laws and regulations pertaining to food safety, animal health, and 
plant health. The promulgation of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) in 2011 (P.L. 111 -353) represented a major and long -awaited update in 
the oversight of food safety.198 The FSMA was accompanied by the issuance of seven key 
implementing regulations during 2015 and 2016, as well as four supplementary regulations, 
following a period of extensi ve public comment and review. Other major long -standing pieces of SPS 
legislation include the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (including the FSMA amendments), the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, the Egg Products Inspec tion Act, 
the Plant Protection Act, the Animal Health Protection Act, and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act.  
 
5. As mentioned in the Report, the Food Safety Modernization Act was accompanied by seven key 
implementing regulations issued during 2015 and 2016 and four supplementary regulations. The 
Russian  Federation would appreciate  a list of these documents and the web links to these 
regulations if publicly available.  
 
RESPONSE: Please see the web links below:  
1   
2  FSMA FINAL RULE FOR PREVEN TIVE CONTROLS FOR AN IMAL FOOD  
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm366510.htm  
 
3  FSMA FINAL RULE FOR PREVENTIVE CONTROLS FOR HUMAN FOOD  
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm334115.htm  
 
4  FSMA FINAL RULE ON F OREIGN SUPPLIER VERI FICATION PROGRAMS (F SVP) FOR 
IMPORTERS OF FOOD FO R HUMANS AND ANIMALS  
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm361902.htm  
 
5  FSMA FINAL RULE ON P RODUCE SAFETY  
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm334114.htm  
 
FSMA Final Rule on Accredited Third -Party Certification  
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm361903.htm  
 
6  FSMA FINAL RULE ON S ANITARY TRANSPORTATI ON OF HUMAN AND ANIM AL FOOD  
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/F SMA/ucm383763.htm  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  7  FSMA FINAL RULE FOR MITIGATION STRATEGIE S TO PROTECT FOOD AG AINST 
INTENTIONAL ADULTERA TION 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm378628.htm  
 
8  FSMA FINAL RULE ON AMEN DMENTS TO REGISTRATI ON OF FOOD FACILITIE S 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm440988.htm  
 
9  AMENDMENTS TO ACCRED ITATION OF THIRD -PARTY CERTIFIC ATION BODIES TO 
CONDUCT FOOD SAFETY AUDITS AND TO ISSUE CERTIFICATIONS TO PR OVIDE FOR THE 
USER FEE PROGRAM  
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/12/14/2016 -30033/amendments -to-
accreditation -of-third-party-certification -bodies -to-conduct -food-safety -audits -and-to 
 
10  CURRENT GOOD MANUFAC TURING PRACTICE, HAZ ARD ANALYSIS, AND RISK-BASED 
PREVENTIVE CONTROLS FOR HUMAN FOOD  
https://www.federalregister.gov/d ocuments/2018/09/12/2018 -19855/current -good-
manufacturing -practice -hazard -analysis -and-risk-based -preventive -controls -for-human  
 
11  THE FOOD AND DRUG AD MINISTRATION FOOD SA FETY MODERNIZATION A CT; 
EXTENSION AND CLARIF ICATION OF COMPLIANC E DATES FOR CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF 
FOUR IMPLEMENTING RU LES 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/20 16/08/24/2016 -20176/the -food-and-drug-
administration -food-safety -modernization -act-extension -and-clarification -of 
 
Under the FSMA, the Foreign Supplier Verification Program (FSVP) Rule requires U.S. -based food 
importers to establish FSVPs for the products (human or animal food) that they bring into the United 
States.199 An FSVP must be developed for each type of product and each foreign supplier, to confirm 
that the imported food is produced with the same level of health protection as that provided by the 
United States, which includes preventive controls and produce safety regulations, and that the goods 
have not been adulterated or misbranded. Risk -based supplier verification may be a ffected by 
various means, including annual on -site audits, sampling and te sting, or verification of the supplier's 
food safety records. As of June 2018, the FSVP Importer List, maintained by the FDA, contained 
more than 46,000 entries. However, the inclusion of an establishment in the List does not constitute 
approval or endorse ment by the FDA of the listed importer.  
 
6. Could you please elaborate on the Foreign Supplier Verification Program (FSVP) Importer List? 
What kind of document is it? Is it a part of the FSVP or a separate document? Is it the FSVP 
Importer List publicly avai lable? If yes, please indicate a web link or any other source.  
 
RESPONSE: In accordance with section 805(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
U.S.C. 384a(g)), FDA publishes a list of importers subject to the Foreign Supplier Verification 
Programs for Food Importers (FSVP) regulation 21 CFR part 1 subpart L, 
sections  1.500  – 1.514):  https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi -bin/text -idx?SID= 9108534bb7c210eb8056
29c31fc2b83b&mc=true&node=sp21.1.1.l&rgn=div6 . Please  the FSVP list of participants  at:   
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/Gu idanceRegulation/ImportsExports/Importing/UCM599
080.pdf . 
 
PART II: QUESTIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Question 7  
Section 3 OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE (3.2)  
 
Reflecting Congressional direction, and to draw advice from the widest array of stakeholders, 
including business, labor, agriculture, civil society, and the general public, USTR has broadened 
opportunities for public input and worked to ensure transparency  of trade policy through various 
initiatives. USTR works to ensure that timely trade information is available to the public and 
disseminated widely to stakeholders, and to offer opportunities for public comment on trade issues 
and for interaction with nego tiators during trade negotiations. In addition to public outreach, USTR 
is responsible for administering the statutory Advisory Committee system, created by the U.S. 
Congress under the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, as well as facilitating formal consultat ions with 
State and local Governments regarding the President's trade priorities and the status of current 
trade negotiations which may impact them or touch upon state and local government policies.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Section 3.2 Public Engagement and Transparency (3.9)  
 
USTR officials, including the U.S. Trade Representative, and professional staff from regional, 
functional, and multilateral offices as well as IAPE, conduct outreach with a broad array of 
stakeholders, including agricultural commodity groups and farm associa tions, labor unions, 
environmental organizations, consumer groups, large and small businesses, trade associations, 
consumer advocacy groups, faith groups, development and poverty relief organizations, and other 
public interest groups. USTR also engages wit h State and local Governments, non -governmental 
organizations, think tanks, and academics to discuss specific trade policy issues, subject to 
negotiator availability and scheduling.  
 
7. The interactions with the wide range of stakeholders including businesse s and communities 
described in paragraph 3.2 as the fundamentals for two -way communication and feedback 
mechanism with respect to formation and implementation of US trade policies.  This is a prudent 
way of ensuring the stability and consistency of busines s climate. However, knowing that many 
or even the majority of the US government decisions in the sphere of trade legislation have 
global repercussions including potentially adverse financial outcomes for many legitimate 
international businesses, would the US government consider that the same approach should be 
taken with respect to the views and values of the global stakeholders including major foreign 
businesses, communities and interests’ groups?  What is the US approach towards ensuring that 
collective v oice of the global stakeholders is heard and attended to by the respective US trade 
policy bodies when the issues that can potentially lead to negative implications for foreign 
businesses and wider interest groups are taken?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Government invites all stakeholders, foreign and domestic, to provide their 
views on U.S. trade policy through testimony at public hearings or in response to Federal Register 
Notices requesting submission of comments.   WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 355 - 
 
  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Questions  1-3 
 
Section 2.2 Economic Growth (2.2; 2.3; 2.4)  
 
In section, 2.2, it was mentioned the Administration is projecting real GDP growth of 3.1% for 2018, 
and 3.2% and 3.1% for 2019 and 2020, respectively. Since the end of the recession in the 2nd 
quarter of 2009 through t he 2nd quarter of 2018, U.S. GDP has increased at an annual rate of 2.3%.  
 
According to the last release of the IMF projections, the U.S. GDP will grow by 2.9% for 2018, and 
2.5% and 1.8 % for 2019 and 2020.  
 
1. How do you compare your forecast deviations wit h the IMF' figures and why?  
 
RESPONSE: The difference between the U.S. GDP estimates and the IMF estimates are 
discussed in the July 2018 IMF Article 4 staff report. The United States outlook incorporates 
long-run growth effects arising from the impact of the overhaul of the U.S. tax system, 
investment in infrastructure, higher labo ur force participation, and continued deregulation.  
In section 2.3, it was mentioned that the primary contributor to growth since 2016 has been 
consumer spending. Personal consum ption expenditures, which account for nearly 70% of U.S. GDP 
(68.4% in 2017), increased 2.7% in 2016, 2.5% in 2017, and 2.5%, on an annual basis, for the first 
half of 2018 (with a 4.2% growth in the 2nd quarter of 2018).  
2. How does the government balance be tween the GDP growth and Federal Tax Revenues? Is there 
any effort from the government to shift the growth from the consumption based to saving and 
investment? If yes, Please provide a short description of it.  
RESPONSE: The Administration uses a consensus process involving the Treasury Department, 
the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) provides strong incentives for investment.  
In section 2.4, the federal deficit in fiscal year  2017, at 3.5% of GDP, was still slightly over one -third 
of the 9.8% of GDP deficit recorded in 2009 during the depth of the recession. According to the U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget mid -session review of the FY2019 budget, the federal budget 
defici t is projected to increase to US$890 billion (4.4% of GDP) in FY2018, and peak at US$1.1 
trillion (5.1% of GDP) in FY2019. The debt -to-GDP ratio is projected to increase from 78.5% in 2018 
to 82.7% in 2022 before declining to 73.8% in 2028.  
3. How does the go vernment assess the effect of tax reduction on the federal deficit for the next 
two years? What sort of risks the government expecting from the increase in the debt –to – GDP 
ratio?  
RESPONSE: The government expects federal deficits for the next two years, but that in the long 
run, faster GDP growth will provide more revenue and reduce the federal deficit, all else being 
equal.  
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  Singapore  
PART I: QUESTIONS RE GARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT ( WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Question 1  
Section 1.2 Economic Developments (1.7)  
According to the OECD, tighter regulations contribute to slowing productivity in the U.S. economy. 
We note that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has taken steps to eliminate unnecessary 
regulations through Executive Orders 13771 and 13777.  
 
1. How e ffective have the two Executive Orders been in reducing regulatory burden for businesses, 
and what future steps does the U.S. intend to take to further improve the regulatory environment 
in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE: In the first two years under Executive Order 13771, Federal agencies have 
exceeded the two -for-one requirement and the regulatory costs caps. In 2017, Federal agencies 
issued 67 deregulatory actions and 3 new significant regulatory actions (22 -for-1), saving in 
present value $8.1 billion in regulator y costs. In 2018, Federal agencies issued 176 deregulatory 
actions and issued 14 new significant regulatory actions (12 -for-1), saving in present value $23 
billion in regulatory costs. For 2019 Federal agencies have adopted caps that are projected to 
save another $18 billion in present value of regulatory costs.  
 
Question 2  
Section 3.3.4 Competition policy (3.207)  
We note that the U.S. is looking to focus on the interface of competition laws with intellectual 
property rights, in the "New Madison" approach, which will aim at ensuring that patent holders as 
well as licensees have incentives to innovate and implement respectively.  
 
2. Can the U.S. elaborate further on the reasons, including any past cases or examples, which 
might have prompted the introduction of this new approach?  
 
RESPONSE: Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim gave a speech detailing the "New 
Madison" approach to antitrust and intellectual property. The speech is available on 
the U.S. Department  of Justice  website.  See: https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant -
attorney -general -makan -delrahim -delivers -keynote -address -university . 
 
Question 3  
Section 3.3.7 IP Right s (3.262 -3.267)  
The Secretariat Report states that "IP -intensive industries account for over one third of U.S. GDP". 
There is further emphasis that the U.S. Administration considers IP critical to economic growth, and 
has therefore placed this as a top pri ority to  ensure that U.S. IP owners have a full and fair 
opportunity to profit from their IP.  
 
3. What are the policies and programmes in place to support these owners in realising the economic 
benefits of their IP domestically or overseas, particularly in th e areas of licensing or accessing 
capital with their IP?  
 
RESPONSE: Through a wide variety of means, the United States strives to improve intellectual 
property protection and enforcement in overseas markets.  
 
Question 4  
Section 4.3.3. Postal and courier se rvices (4.162)  
The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the Postal Regulatory Commission's responsibilities include 
developing a rate setting system and engaging in international postal policy to support the U.S. 
Department of State.   
 
4. Does the U.S. intend to  engage in multilateral and/or bilateral negotiation of postal delivery 
rates moving forward?  
a. If yes, when does the U.S. plan to commence these negotiations?  
b. What will the envisioned scope of the postal services that would come under such 
multilateral and /or bilateral negotiations be?   WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  c. Could the U.S. share its views on how this will impact trade and the affordability of postal 
services for consumers?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
Question 5 -7 
Section 4.5 E -commerce (4.275; Table 4.31)  
We note that the U.S. currently does not have an overarching federal cybersecurity law. We further 
note that the Federal Government has developed a Cybersecurity Framework, which seeks to support 
the development of better cybersecurity practices by both governmental and non -governmental 
actors.  
 
5. Can the U.S. elaborate on its plans, if any, to develop an overall cybersecurity law at the federal 
level?  
 
RESPONSE: Created through collaboration between industry and government, the 
Cybersecur ity Framework is voluntary guidance, based on existing standards, guidelines, and 
practices for organizations to better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk. There is extensive 
use of the Cybersecurity Framework among governmental and non -governmental acto rs in the 
United States. We expect adoption and use of the Framework and the technical standards 
included in the Framework to continue to grow. As TPRs are retrospective in nature, we refrain 
from speculating on future U.S. government efforts to develop a federal cybersecurity law.  
 
We note that the table has highlighted various legislations affecting E -commerce and digital trade. 
However, it does not list the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD) which was enacted 
in 2018.  
 
6. Could the U.S. shar e more information on the CLOUD Act, and how it would interact with privacy 
regulations?  
 
RESPONSE: The CLOUD Act clarifies the obligation of communication service providers subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States to preserve, backup, or disclose data within their control, 
no matter where they have chosen to store it. The CLOUD Act does not give U.S. law enforcement 
any new legal process to acquire data; rather it clarifies the scope of existing authority. The 
CLOUD Act does not impose any new lega l requirements. It also mirrors the obligation of a 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce paper records and physical 
evidence pursuant to a U.S. subpoena, no matter where the records are located.  
 
The CLOUD Act also sets up a framework to reduce conflicting legal obligations that U.S. 
companies may face when confronted with orders by one country to produce data that another 
country's law prohibits them from disclosing. It authorizes the government to enter into 
executive agreem ents under which the United States and certain countries may commit to 
remove legal impediments to cross -border compliance with court orders in cases that involve 
serious crimes and where certain targeting restrictions are followed. Only countries with rob ust 
laws protecting privacy and civil liberties are eligible for such agreements.  
 
We also note that the table lists the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. Some 
states have also enacted their own privacy legislation, such as the Californ ia Consumer Privacy Act 
in 2018.  
 
7. Can the US elaborate on whether there are any plans to update or revise the federal ECPA?  
 
RESPONSE: As TPRs are retrospective in nature, we refrain from speculating on future U.S. 
government efforts to update or revise EC PA. The U.S. Government recently solicited feedback 
on a proposal for "user -centric" outcomes for possible Federal policy action on privacy, and the 
high-level goals —related to transparency, security and control of personal data —that would 
underpin such ou tcomes. Any possible new Federal policy action on privacy would be consistent 
with U.S. international objectives of protecting the free flow of cross -border data and promoting 
global interoperability among privacy regimes through frameworks like the APEC C BPR System.  
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Switzerland  
Part I. Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Question 1 -3 
Section 2.3.1 WTO (2.20; 2.21)  
 
1. Para 2.20 states that the United States has a "strong track record of building coalitions of like -
minded Members to use the WTO committee system, in particular, to pressure […] and to avert 
the need to resort to dispute settlement ". Many trade concerns hav e been raised in WTO 
committee for extended periods without being resolved. Accordingly, it is arguable that "the 
WTO committee system" is in many instances ineffective in resolving trade concerns. At the 
same time, the sole alternative option to resolve a  trade concern is to initiate a procedure 
pursuant to the DSU. Pursuing the objective to "avert the need to resort to dispute settlement", 
would the US consider alternative mechanisms, including third party mediation, to resolve trade 
concerns?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States values the role of the standing committees of the WTO in 
providing opportunities to resolve questions of Members' compliance with their commitments, 
to develop initiatives aimed at systemic improvements, to promote transparency in Members ' 
trade policies, and to monitor and resist market -distorting pressures.  We recognize that the 
functioning of these committees can and should be improved, and we are interested in working 
with other Members to pursue this objective.  The proposal on transpa rency and notifications —
co-sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, and the United 
States —is one example of our commitment to this goal.  
 
2. Para 2.21 states that the United States seeks to work with other WTO Members befo re the 
twelfth Ministerial Conference "to begin the process of identifying opportunities to achieve 
accomplishments […]". From the United States perspectives, what accomplishments can be 
achieved by the next ministerial conference?  
 
RESPONSE: We look forwa rd to continuing to work with Members to achieve progress wherever 
possible.  However, for the viability of the WTO, we do not believe that progress on issues that 
are important to our stakeholders today and in the future should wait for Ministerial Confere nces.  
We encourage Members to work toward solutions now and finalize new Decisions in advance of 
the next Ministerial Conference.  
 
3. According to para 2.21, the United States also submitted several counter -notifications during 
the period under review. Could  the US elaborate on the counter -notification process that was 
followed?  
 
RESPONSE : The counter -notifications made by the United States are a significant contribution 
to the functioning and viability of the WTO, made necessary by certain Members' repeated 
refusals to fulfill their WTO notification obligations and their disregard for transparency, a core 
tenet of the organization.  
 
In each instance, the United States followed its obligations under the relevant WTO 
agreement.  The Members for which we submitte d counter -notifications had advance notice, over 
a long period of time, that the United States —and in some instances, other Members —were 
seriously concerned by their failure to meet their notification obligations.  The Members had a 
full opportunity to meet  their obligations prior to the United States submitting a counter -
notification.  When these Members failed to do so, the United States undertook a substantial 
research effort in an attempt to provide the transparency that these Members have repeatedly 
denied to the Membership.  We incurred significant expenses translating hundreds of pages of 
legal measures.  Unfortunately, some Members have not responded productively or cooperatively 
to our counter -notifications and have yet to fully meet  their transparency obligations.  
 
Question 4  
Section 2.3.2.1 Reciprocal agreements (2.27)  
 
4.  Can the US give information about the discussions taking place with the EU?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: On July 25, 2018, President Trump and European Commission President Juncker 
launched a new phase in the relationship between the United States and the European Union.  On 
October 16, the United States Trade Representative notified Congress that the President intends 
to initiate negotiations on a trade agreement with the EU.   
 
Question 5  
Section 2.3.2.2  Unilateral Preferences (2.30)  
 
5. In para 2.30 and following, the origin criteria, the eligible products, the beneficiary countries are 
described. There is however no indication whether an origin certificate is required or not to be 
allowed to claim for pref erential treatment at import for good in the GST, AGOA, CBI and NTPP 
regimes.  
• What is the certification process?  
• Is it the same in all regimes mentioned above?  
• Do the exporters of the beneficiary undergo some registration process?  
 
RESPONSE: We encourage Members to refer to the descriptive language submitted to the 
Committee on Rules of Origin, specifically G/RO/LDC/N/USA/1 through 4, which contains 
information on the four preference programs cited above.  
 
The process for claiming a preference varies under  each program. Under GSP and the Nepal 
Trade Preference Program, no certificate of origin is required. Such a certificate is required for 
textile and apparel goods under AGOA. For textile and apparel goods entering under the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnersh ip Act (CBTPA), a certificate of origin must be employed to 
certify that the article being exported from a CBTPA beneficiary country to the United States 
qualifies for preferential treatment. For non -textile and apparel goods entering under CBTPA, 
CBP form  450 must be used.  
 
The United States does not require exporters from beneficiary countries to register with U.S. 
authorities.  
 
Question 6  
Section 2.4 Investment regime  
 
6. The United States was renegotiating NAFTA with its partners with the aim of modernizi ng the 
Agreement. In the new agreement, the USMCA, Canada and the USA renounced to an investor -
state-dispute settlement mechanism between investors of one country and the other country. 
Could you explain why this is the case between the United States and C anada when an investor -
state-dispute settlement mechanism is maintained between the United States and Mexico?  
 
RESPONSE: The negotiated outcome in the USMCA reflects the administration's priorities in 
rebalancing the relationship with our neighbo uring tra de partners.  
 
Question 7  
Section 3.1.2.1 Non -preferential (3.27)  
 
7. Para 3.27 states that the "substantial transformation" criterion is applied case -by-case at imports  
in the United States.  
 
a) Is this criterion described more precisely, for example in a list of working or processing 
conferring the originating status of the goods, that exporters abroad can refer to? (Please 
explain)  
b) How have the U.S. rules of origin evolved since notification to the WTO in 1995?  
c) In what circumstances does the U.S. Customs Serv ices require the importer to prove the 
non-preferential origin of the goods?  
d) Does the U.S. apply a single set of non -preferential rules of origin to all imports?  
 
RESPONSE: A comprehensive explanation of the U.S. non -preferential rules of origin can 
be found at the following  link: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2016
-Apr/icp026_3.pdf . Legislation and implementing regulations governing non-preferential rules of 
origin may also be found at: 19  U.S.C.  § 1304, 19 CFR Part 134, and 19 CFR §102.0.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 8  
Section 3.1.3 Tariffs (3.32)  
 
8. In paragraph 3.32 the Secretariat's report states that " over the years, various changes to the 
HTSUS have  not been notified to the WTO as changes to Schedule XX, including Chapter Notes, 
the Article XXVIII renegotiation (tobacco), and the third and fourth revisions to the 
pharmaceutical coverage ". 
 
a) As the US strongly supports transparency and the improvement of notifications' compliance, 
Switzerland is keen to know which factors prevent the US from notifying the abovementioned 
changes to the WTO?  
b) As this is not the first time that Switzerland raises this issue, when will the US make these 
notifications to the  WTO?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States is working to notify modifications to Schedule XX and will provide 
the relevant information to the Committee on Market Access in due course.  
 
Question 9  
Section 3.1.3.1 Applied tariffs (Table 3.1)  
 
9. According the table 3.1 (Structure of tariff schedules, selected years) 7.7% of the tariff lines of 
the HTSUS have an applied tariff that is greater than 0% but inferior or equal to 2%. Such tariff 
sometimes are called nuisance tariffs. Can the United Stat es explain the economic rationale 
behind these tariffs and give an assessment of their impact on the US economy? Since it can be 
assumed that these tariffs cause relevant administrative cost – not only to the government but 
also to the importer: Does the U nited States consider to set the tariff for these lines to 0?  
 
RESPONSE: The WTO defines nuisance tariffs as tariffs that cost a government more to collect 
than the revenue they provide. Given the large volume of U.S. imports, it is not appropriate to 
assume that low tariff rates result in a net cost to the United States and should be eliminated.  
 
Question 10  
Section 3.1.4.1 Customs user fees (3.38)  
 
10. According to para. 3.38, the prescribed minimum and maximum levels of the Merchandise 
Processing Fee (MPF) have been increased on 1 January 2018. Could the US indicate the reasons 
for such an increase?  
 
RESPONSE: The fee increased on January 1, 2018, pursuant to the FAST Act (Pub. L. 114 –94). 
The fee is paid for the processing of merchandise entering the United  States . 
 
Question 11 -12 
Section 3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures ( 3.74, 3.75, 3.83, 3.88, 3.76, 
3.84, 3.105)  
 
11. The report indicates an increase in antidumping, CVD and safeguard investigations and measures 
during the period under review. Could the US elaborate on the reasons for such an increase?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States administers its trade remedy laws in strict accordance with WTO 
rules, and its antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are generally initiated in 
response to petitions filed by the U.S. industry. The decision to impose an antidumping or 
countervailing measure is based purely on a factual determination of whether the dumping or 
subsidization exists and whether that dumping or subsidization has caused or threatens to cause 
material injury to a domestic industry. Where dumping (or subsidization), injury or threat 
thereof, and a causal link have been found, the United States will impose an antidumping or 
countervailing duty measure. No other factors are t aken into consideration before imposing an 
antidumping measure.  
 
Safeguard investigations are also generally initiated in response to petitions filed by the U.S. 
industry. For safeguards, specific information regarding the safeguards investigatory process 
can be found at paragraphs 3.88 and 3.89 of the Secretariat's Report.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  12. Steel products are subject to many AD and CVD measures, and  are now also subject to additional 
duties under Section 232. Could the US indicate if the different measures concern the same 
products and how it deals with the different measures overlapping?  
 
RESPONSE: The imposition of AD/CVD measures and duties put in  place under Section 232 are 
subject to different legal authorities under U.S. law. Switzerland should examine the scope of 
the specific measures to determine if there is any overlap.  
 
Question 13  
Section 3.1.6.2.1.2 Safeguard investigations 2016 -2018 – Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells  
 
In February 2018, the US implemented a safeguard measure on Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cell, 
including modules, laminates, panels, and building -integrated materials. The measure for cells is a 
tariff rate quota. The one for modules takes the form of increased duties. Both are in force for four 
years. The US also opened the possibility to request product exemptions from the measure under 
certain conditions.  
 
13. Could the US indicate whether the Safeguard duties collec ted, until a positive decision on the 
product exclusion request is taken, are paid back to the importer/exporter?  
 
RESPONSE: As stated in the September 19, 2018 Federal Register (83 Fed. Reg. 47,393 -394) 
notice announcing the exclusions granted to date, th e effective date of the exclusions is the date 
of publication of the notice ( i.e., September 19, 2018).  
 
Question 14  
Section 3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation (3.107)  
 
In para. 3.107 the USDOC report recommended alternative remedies (1) a global tariff of at least 
24% on all steel imports from all countries, or a tariff of at least 53% on all steel imports from 12 
countries; 2) a quota on all steel products from all countries equal to 63% of each country's 2017 
exports to the US). However, in para. 3.109 an ad ditional 25% ad valorem tariff on steel from all 
origins was imposed.  
 
14. The Secretary of Commerce recommended the imposition of a "24 per cent tariff on all steel 
imports". In light of this recommendation, please explain why has a 25% additional import duty  
been imposed by the President and on which basis this level has been determined? Please 
provide the detailed calculation.  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
Question 15  
Section 3.1.7.1.3 Aluminium investigation (3.116)  
 
15. In his alumin ium report the Secretary of Commerce recommended three alternative remedies 
for dealing with excessive imports of aluminium, among which a tariff of 7.7% on all aluminium 
imports from all countries. However, in para. 3.116 an additional 10% ad valorem tariff was 
imposed on certain aluminium articles imported from all countries, except Canada and Mexico, 
through Procla mation 9704.  
 
a) In light of this recommendation, please explain why has a 10% additional import duty been 
imposed by the President and on which basis this level has been determined? Please provide 
the detailed calculation.  
b) For both measures, could the US ind icate when the review process will take place?  
c) Could the US indicate how many jobs have been preserved by the measures for the steel 
and aluminium producers?  
d) Could the US indicate how many jobs have been lost in the downstream steel and aluminium 
industry?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Question 16  
Section 3.1.7.1.4 Investigation into auto imports (3.119)  
 
16. Para. 3.119 indicates that there is an ongoing Section 232 investigation into auto imports.  
 
a) As the deadline for the Department of commerce approaches could the US indicate which 
factors, other those mentioned in para. 3.199, it took into account, i.e. the opposition of the 
US automobile industry to such measures?  
b) How did the US take into account the fact that the automobile industry is highly globalized 
and relies on good functioning global value chains?  
c) How did the US take into account the fact that many foreign automobile manufacturers 
produce auto in their US factories?  
d) How will the DoC make independent recommendations when the President has threatened 
from the beginning to impose a 25% duty?  
 
RESPONSE: On May 23, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to 
determine the effects on the national security of  imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, 
vans and light trucks, and automotive parts under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, as amended. According to statute, an investigation of this type must be completed within 
270 days of its initia tion. As part of its investigation, on May 30, 2018, the Department of 
Commerce issued a Federal Register Notice inviting written comments, including data, analyses, 
or information pertinent to this investigation, and announcing the public hearings. The co mment 
period was open until June 22, 2018 and the Department of Commerce held a public hearing as 
part of its investigation on July 19.  
 
Question 17  
Section 3.1.7.2 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (3.129)  
 
17. Para. 3.129: The Secretariat's report indicates that if the USTR determines that the Section 301 
investigation involves a trade agreement, and if this agreement includes formal dispute 
settlement procedures, USTR may pursue the investigation through consultations and dispute 
settlement under t he trade agreement. Could the US elaborate on the relationship between such 
procedures and other remedies provided for under Section 301?  
 
RESPONSE: As the question states, where the USTR determines that a matter covered in a 
Section 301 investigation invo lves a trade agreement, and if the agreement includes formal 
dispute settlement procedures, USTR may pursue the investigation through consultations and 
dispute settlement under the trade agreement.  In situations where the USTR determines that a 
matter is n ot covered by a trade agreement, the USTR will pursue the investigation without 
recourse to a dispute settlement proceeding.   
 
Question 18  
Section 3.2.4.1 Drawback regime (3.151)  
 
18. Para. 3.151 on p. 90 in the Secretariat's report informs about the changes i n the duty drawback 
programme by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (TFTEA) of 2015. The changes 
include i.a. the extension of the deadline for the exportation or destruction of imported articles 
under the unused merchandise drawback programm e from three to five years. Could the U.S. 
explain the reasons for this extension? Does the new deadline also apply for imported raw 
materials that are exported in processed products? Could the U.S. elaborate on the compatibility 
of the extended deadline w ith the provisions of ASCM Annex I (i) which require that the period 
between import and export does not exceed two years for the refund not to be considered as an 
export subsidy?  
 
RESPONSE: The extension to 5 years simplified and implemented uniformity for  the filing period 
for claims. The deadline of 5 years also applies to filing claims with respect to imported raw 
materials that are exported.  Drawback of duty under U.S law is generally limited to 99 per cent  
of duties paid on the imported merchandise and  is not "in excess" of duties paid. Drawback with  
respect to unused merchandise requires prior notification to CBP . For more information,  please  
see: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated/news/drawback . 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Question 19  
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements (3.175)  
 
19. Further to paragraph 3.175, could the US expand on the process for selecting the standards that 
are referenced or mandated in  the finale rules? We would in particular be interested to 
understand the cooperation between the regulatory agency and the standards' organisations to 
demonstrate the linkage of the standards to the legislation.  
 
RESPONSE: Circular A -119 provides guidance  to agencies on the selection of appropriate 
standards. Section 5(a) outlines some of the factors agencies should consider when determining 
which standards are most appropriate. Guidance provided under Section 5(h) details the WTO 
TBT obligations that agen cies must adhere to regarding the use of standards. Section 5(i) 
provides guidance on using or recognizing standards used by trading partners. Regulators are 
ultimately responsible for selecting the standard(s) used in final rules; however, this will be 
influenced by comments received from the public during the notice and comment process.  
 
Question 20 -22 
Section 3.3.4. Competition Policy (3.193; 3.195 ) 
 
20. Para 3.193, private parties can seek damages for anticompetitive conducts on their own behalf 
or on behalf of an affected group. Are class actions frequently used opposed to individual actions? 
Are class actions an important "tool" for the enforcement of civil antitrust law?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Government, by definition, is not a party to private party l awsuits. 
Statistics kept by the federal judiciary are available on the federal courts' website: 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics -reports . 
 
21. Para 3.195, the private enforcement plays a major role i n the US. Nevertheless, the report 
mentioned that private antitrust litigation in the US have declined in recent years. What are the 
reasons for this trend? Do civil people see less chances of success in a civil procedure? Or are 
there actually less damage s in the antitrust area caused by the companies?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Government, by definition, is not a party to private party lawsuits. 
Statistics kept by the federal judiciary are available on the federal courts' website: 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics -reports . 
 
22. Para 3.215, the US is using a "transaction threshold" to determine if a premerger notification is 
necessary. How is this threshold calculated? Is the market price or the purchase pric e decisive?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. premerger notification "transaction threshold" is set by statute,  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 18A(a)(2). The U.S. Federal Trade Commission is required to revise the premerger 
notification "transaction threshold" annually based on the chang e in gross national product, in 
accordance with the Hart -Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18A(a)(2) and 
19(a)(5). The calculation, or valuation of the transaction, for purposes of the threshold is context 
specific. Further guidance can  be found on the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission  website,  at: https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger -notification -program/ 
hsr-resources . 
 
Question 23  
Section 4.1.2 Agricultural tariffs and tariff rate quotas (4.66)  
23. In para 4.66 the Secretariat's Report indicates that "price -based safeguards are invoked 
automatically on a shipment -by-shipment basis". Could the US provide an explanation as to why 
it applies price -based SSGs to very small quantities? What is the rationale behind applying price -
based SSGs in the case of products with already low in -quota trade (as is the case for various 
types of cheese)?  
 
RESPONSE: Importers declare a pre -established price range fo r their product. If there is a 
safeguard duty associated with that price range, the additional charge is automatically assessed.  
 
 
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  Question 24  
Section 4.1.3.3 Food aid (4.48)  
 
24. Para. 4.48 on p. 154 informs about numerous conditions related to the U.S. donations of 
agricultural commodities within the Emergency and Private Assistance Programs. Could the U.S. 
elaborate on the conformity of its food aid polices with the provisions of  the 2015 Nairobi Decision 
on Export Competition? In particular, have the food donations under the Emergency and Private 
Assistance Programs been needs driven and have the U.S. avoided adverse effects on local or 
regional production? Have the U.S. been see king to procure food from local or regional sources? 
Do the U.S. complete the required market analyses before monetization is authorized? Have the 
U.S. been making efforts to move towards more untied cash -based international food aid?  
 
RESPONSE: The United  States implements its food aid programs consistent with the 2015 
Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, including by conducting needs assessments and market 
analyses and allowing for local and regional procurement.  
 
U.S. relief agencies plan for and respond to humanitarian crises based on objective, evidence -
based analysis provided by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network or FEWS NET (for more 
information, see: http://fews.n et/about -us), and all U.S. food aid responses to humanitarian 
emergencies are provided through the United Nations' World Food Program, private voluntary 
organizations, and other qualified responders to emergencies. The organizations work closely 
with the n ational and local governments in the recipient countries to identify the recipient regions 
and beneficiaries who need the programs to save lives, reduce suffering, and support recovery 
for millions in both acute and chronic emergencies.  
 
The United States  has been procuring food through local and regional sources under the 
Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) funded by the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) 
account (U.S. Agency for International Development); a small component of Title II food 
assistance programming through the Title II Section 202(e) account (U.S. Agency for 
International Development); and Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture).  
 
CFR 7 Part 1733 prohibits the distribution of U.S. commodities in a recip ient country if the food 
aid would result in substantial disincentive to, or interference with, domestic production or 
marketing of agricultural commodities in that country. U.S. food aid for non -emergency 
development or capacity building is provided by pr ivate voluntary organizations, cooperatives, 
governments of developing countries and their agencies, universities, the United Nation's World 
Food Program and other international organizations. The organizations providing U.S. food aid 
must conduct a "Bellm on analysis" and other market assessments before monetized food aid is 
provided. The local and regional market analysis of the Bellmon Determination is conducted 
through market analysis that considers various market information such as quantitative and 
qualitative information, timing of harvests or a close substitute of the commodity in the country, 
suitability of commodity, and potential policy issues.  
 
U.S. Government international food aid is shifting from a combination of in -kind and cash -based 
assista nce towards more cash -based assistance. However, the U.S. Government provides in -
kind international food aid under appropriate conditions. For information on criteria used to 
provide cash -based, voucher, and local and regional purchase assistance, 
please  see: https://www.usaid.gov/food -assistance/what -we-do/emergency -activities/types -
emergency . 
 
Question 25  
Section 4.2.1 General (4.56; 4.58)  
 
25. Para 4.56 ment ions that energy is relatively lightly taxed in the United States compared with 
other industrialized countries. Is there a difference in taxation of fossil fuels and renewable 
energy sources? To what extend are negative externalities of fossil fuel utiliza tion reflected in its 
taxation? What policies are in place in order to foster renewable energy and to make it more 
competitive compared to fossil fuel (see also para 4.58)?  
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  RESPONSE: Please see the U.S. Energy Information Administration's "Direct Federal Financial 
Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016," published in April 2018, available at: 
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf . 
 
Also, the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) provides a list of 
state-level incentives and is available at: http://w ww.dsireusa.org/ . 
 
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  Thailand  
PART I: QUESTIONS RE GARDING THE SECRETAR IAT REPORT  
Question 1 -2 
SUMMARY – (Para 13)  
 
In February 2018, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced that its Automated 
Commercial Environment (ACE) had been completed. Importers and exporters may use the 
electronic portal to declare goods, obtain permits, and access transaction and trade data. Within 
CBP, ten Centers of Excellence have been established to specialize in all aspects of customs 
processing in several areas.  
 
1. Thailand commends the U.S. government's effort to improve efficiency in international trade.  
Thailand wishes to ac quire more information about the Automated Commercial Environment 
(ACE) system. Thailand also wishes to learn about the  U.S.'  assessment on ACE system, after 8 
months of its implementation. Is there any statistics showing how much the ACE system has 
helped  facilitate and enhance trade volume between the U.S. and trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE: Through ACE, the U.S. Single Window, there were over 32 million cargo entries 
and 21 million export shipments in FY 2018, with a total U.S. import value of $2.6 trillion , and 
exports of over $1.8 trillion, which generated over $45 billion in duties, taxes, and fees revenue.  
In FY 2018 ACE provided streamlined trade processes resulting in savings valued at over $388 
million for the private sector and $35 million for CBP.  Through the implementation of ACE, CBP 
has converted 269 import and export paper forms into electronic data submission, greatly 
reducing the workload for importers and facilitating legitimate trade.  Additional examples of 
improved facilitation of trade vol ume supported by ACE include:  
 
• 250 million electronic data transmissions to partner government agencies, supporting 
the single window/1USG vision;  
• 65% duties, taxes, and fees collected via the Periodic Monthly Statement, which 
streamlines accounting and payment; and  
• $227 million in recovered revenue from targeting activities through ACE validations.  
 
The United States does not have a general e -commerce law; however, e -commerce is subject to a 
number of federal and state measures that address various aspec ts of it. Two federal agencies 
oversee different aspects of e -commerce: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). The FTC has authority over unfair and deceptive practices in 
commerce on various aspects of e -commer ce, and it may bring enforcement actions for such 
practices. The FCC regulates the communications aspect of e -commerce. Electronic contracts are 
governed by the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESIGN Act), 
as well as by st ate laws that meet the requirements in the ESIGN Act.  
 
2. Thailand wishes to learn more about the U.S.' possibility and plan to develop a general or new 
law on e -commerce in order to better handle the thriving e -businesses as well as to improve 
coordination e fficiency between FTC and FCC, the two designated federal agencies responsible 
for this matter.  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
Question 3 -4 
Section 2.4 Investment regime (2.43; 2.47; 2.48)  
7.1.  U.S. law and policy regarding international trade in goods is largely the responsibility of the 
Federal Government. The U.S. legal regime for services, investment and intellectual property is a 
combination of federal and state law, with state regulation pr edominant in certain areas, such as 
insurance, professional services, and franchising (Section 4). Intellectual property rights issues are 
covered by federal legislation in the case of patents and copyright, while trademarks are protected 
by both federal a nd state laws.  
3. Does the U.S. have any plan to improve or amend its law on intellectual property (IP) protection, 
in compliance with the U.S. commitment as a member state of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)? Also, we wish to seek clarification on the pr otection measures for other IP WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  rights, which are not covered in this report, such as layout -design of integrated circuit, trade 
secret, geographical indication, and trade name.  
 
RESPONSE: The United States continuously seeks to improve its system for IPR p rotection and 
enforcement and, to that end, regularly conducts open, public, and transparent processes in 
which all interested parties and stakeholders are invited to participate and provide comments 
and input.  The United States observes that the Secretari at's Report addresses layout designs of 
integrated circuits in Table 3.24, trade secrets in sub -section 3.3.7.7, geographical indications 
in sub -section 3.3.7.6, and trademarks in sub -section 3.3.7.5.  
 
The Secretariat Report indicates that "the Committee o n Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) continues to oversee the national security implications of foreign investment. CFIUS is an 
inter-agency committee authorized to review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. 
business by a forei gn person ("covered transaction"), in order to determine the effect of such 
transactions on the national security of the United States…  
 
7.2.  CFIUS reviews transactions based on voluntary notifications filed by the parties, or on its own 
initiative in the abse nce of a voluntary notification if it believes the transaction is a covered 
transaction and may raise national security concerns. Each transaction is reviewed on a case -by-
case basis based on individual facts and circumstances. Once a formal notification i s submitted, 
CFIUS conducts an initial review. If during the initial review period CFIUS cannot make a final 
determination, the case will proceed to an investigation phase. If national security concerns are 
identified during the review and investigation ph ase, CFIUS may impose conditions, or CFIUS and 
the transacting parties may negotiate a mitigation agreement to resolve any national security 
concerns. If CFIUS determines that the national security concerns cannot be resolved and the parties 
do not withdra w and abandon the transaction, the recommend that the President prohibit the 
transaction.  
4. Thailand would like to ask the U.S. the following questions:  
 
a. What are the criteria set for transactions that may fall within the scope of "covered" 
foreign investmen t transactions to be determined by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS)?  
 
RESPONSE: Under the CFIUS regulations, at 31 C.F.R. 800.207, the term "covered 
transaction" means any transaction that is proposed or pending after August  23, 1988, by 
or with any foreign person that could result in foreign control of any U.S. business, including 
such a transaction carried out through a joint venture. Additionally, the CFIUS pilot program 
expands CFIUS jurisdiction over certain foreign inve stments into U.S. businesses involved 
in critical technologies related to specific industries. Please see the published pilot program 
regulation and guidance at:  https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -
committee -on-foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius. 
 
b. Is there any Thai investment that could fall under such scope and if so, what are the 
criteria tha t the consideration is subject to?  
 
RESPONSE: Investment from Thailand could be subject to CFIUS jurisdiction if the 
transaction meets the definition of a "covered transaction."  Please see the published 
guidance on the process for analys ing national securi ty risk, available 
at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/international/foreign -investment/Pages/ 
cfius-guidance.aspx . 
 
c. Please elab orate the guidelines for determining which or what transaction is considered 
threatening to its national security?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see the publis hed guidance on how CFIUS analys es whether a 
transaction poses national security risks and the types of trans actions that CFIUS has 
reviewed that have presented national security considerations, available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/ international/foreign -investment/Pages/cfius -
guidance.aspx . 
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  d. Please provide examples of "covered transaction" (transactions that could result in control 
of a U.S. business by a foreign person)?  
 
RESPONSE: The CFIUS regulations provide numerous examples of "covered transactions" 
at 31 C.F.R. 800.301.  
 
e. What kind of covered transaction would be considered as "raising national security 
concerns"?  
 
RESPONSE: Please see the published guidance on the types of transactions that CFIUS has 
reviewed that have presente d national security considerations, available at: 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/international/foreign -investment/Pages/cfius -
guidance.aspx . 
 
Question 5 -7 
Section 3.1.6 AD, CVD, and Safeguard Measures (3.55, 3.93, 3.103)  
The Secretariat report states that "Title V of the TPEA56, Improvements to Anti -dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws, also known as the American Trade Enforcement Effectiveness Act, 
introduced five amendments to U.S. AD and CVD laws: … (iii) Section 504 amends Sections 771(15) 
and 773 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to modify the definition of ''ordinary course of trade'' and the 
provisions governing the treatment of a ' 'particular market situation (PMS)'' in AD proceedings.…  
 
5. According to the Anti -Dumping Agreement in the WTO Agreement, there is no definition of 
"Particular Market Situation (PMS)". Could the United States please clarify the criteria to consider 
and deter mine that the P MS exists in AD investigations?  
 
RESPONSE: Determinations involving a particular market situation are made on a case -by-case 
basis, and are based on the facts and circumstances of a particular proceeding. Instances 
involving such a determina tion can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx.  
 
The Secretariat report claims that "The measure was notified to the WTO. In addition, the United 
States notified the non -application of the saf eguard measure to developing countries under Article 
9.1 of the Safeguards Agreement.  
 
6. Please explain how to determine developed countries and developing countries. Moreover, what 
are the list of developed countries and developing countries for the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE: The specifics of the determination in question can be found in the U.S. International 
Trade Commission's (USITC) report and in the President's January 23, 2018 Proclamation (published 
in 83 Fed. Reg. 3541 -51 (Jan. 25, 2018)). The US ITC Report can  be found at: 
https://usitc.gov/trade_remedy/publications/safeguard_pubs.htm.  
 
The Secretariat report indicates that "Some of the specific factors taken into account when 
conducting a Section 232 investigation for determining the effect of imports on national security 
include: (a) the importation of goods in terms of their quantities  and use; (b) the domestic 
production needed for projected national defense requirements113; (c) the domestic industry's 
capacity to meet those requirements; (d) related human and material resources; (e) the close 
relation of national economic welfare to U .S. national security; (f) the loss of skills or investment, 
substantial unemployment and decrease in government revenue; and (g) the impact of foreign 
competition on specific domestic industries and the impact of displacement of any domestic products 
by excessive imports."  
 
7. Please elaborate how is injury be considered due to the reasons above. Are there any specific 
standards to evaluate whether the U.S. domestic industries were injured by above reasons? If 
so, what are the criteria?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
 
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  Question 8  
Section 3.1.7.1 Section 232 Investigations  
8. With regards to  the Section 232 investigations, Thailand requests for the U.S.' clarification on 
(a) the definition and scope of "national security interest/concern", as well as its compliance 
with the Article XXI: National Security Exceptions of the GATT treaty; (b) cat egories and details 
of industries that will be affected by the importation of steel and aluminum; and (c) structure 
and calculation method of the new tariff rate.  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the  DSU. 
 
Question 9 -10 
Section 3.3.4 Competition policy (3.213; 3.214)  
9. It is stated in the TPR that the updated Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property (2017) covers issues such as patents, copyrights, trade secre ts, and know -how 
agreements. Please explain the reason why this updated Guideline does not cover trademark 
issues.  
 
RESPONSE: The updated Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (2017) 
deal with technology transfer and innovation -related issues that typically arise with respect to 
patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and know -how agreements, rather than with product -
differentiation issues that typically arise with respect to trademarks. The Guidelines recognize, 
however, that the same  general antitrust principles that apply to other forms of intellectual 
property apply to trademarks as well.  
 
10. Please further elaborate on the new feature "Penalty Plus." Also, is there an actual case where 
penalty plus has been enforced on? If so, please illustrate.  
 
RESPONSE: To be clear, "Penalty Plus" is not a new policy of the Antitrust Division. Instead, 
the Antitrust Division recently updated the "Frequently Asked Questions about the Antitrust 
Division's Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters" t o answer the question: "What is 
Penalty Plus?" More information can be found on the U.S. Department of Justice's website, at: 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/updated -faqs-provide -answers -antitrust -division -s-
leniency -program -and-model -leniency . 
 
Question 11  
Section 3.3.7.3  IP - Patents (3.281)  
The report indicates that "In this respect, it has made Optimizing Patent Quality and Timeliness its 
Strategic Goal I within its  Strategic Performance Framework, aimed at reducing the average time 
from filing until an  examiner's initial determination on patentability to 10 months, and average total 
pendency ave rage  time from filing until the application is issued as a patent or abandoned  )to 20 
months  .During the  period under review, the pendency time has continued to decrease  .In FY2017, 
total pendency time  was 24 .2 months, down from 25 .2 months in FY2016 and 2 6.6 months in FY2015 . 
The  unexamined patent application backlog fell from 537,655 at the end of FY2016 to 526,579 at 
the  end of FY2017   .Also in FY2017, average first action pendency was 16 .3 months . 
 
11. It is noted that the USPTO has constantly reduced the a verage time from filing patent 
applications until an examiner's initial determination on patentability as well as the average time 
of total pendency. In this regard, we would like to know the measures taken by the USPTO to 
achieve such reduction reflecting  the decrease of patent backlog.  
 
RESPONSE: One of USPTO's strategic goals for FY2018 was to optimize patent quality and 
timeliness. For more information about this goal, please see pg. 54 -65 of USPTO's FY2018 
Performance  and Accountability  Report,  at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documen
ts/USPTOFY18PAR.pdf . 
 
Question 12  
Section 3.3.7.5  IP - Trademarks (3.290)  
The report indicates that "For applications filed pursuant to the Paris Convention and the Madrid 
Protocol, use is not required for registration, but is required to maintain the registration  )…(A 
trademark registration can be cancelled at any time if there is evidence of non -use or if  it has been  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 370 - 
 
  discont inued  .Registration with the USPTO provides protection for the mark only in the  United States 
and its territories . 
 
12. Could the U .S .please elaborate whether the unregistered trademark or pending trademark can 
be protected  in the Federal level or in the State level ? Which laws  may be applied for such case?  
Who does bear the burden of proof in the case of petition for cancellation on the ground of "non -
use" of the trademark?   
 
RESPONSE: Federal trademark registration at the USPTO establishes nationwide protection as 
of the filing date of the application to register. Unregistered trademarks can be protected under 
Federal law if federal jurisdiction can be established through use of the mark in commerce 
regulated by the U.S. Co ngress. The Trademark Act of 1946 (also known as the Lanham Act), 
as amended, governs protection of both registered and unregistered marks. State trademark 
registration protection is limited to the U.S. state and is sought through the appropriate state 
government department. For petitions to cancel a federal trademark registration for non -use, 
the petitioner has the burden to establish a prima facie case of non -use. The burden then shifts 
to the registrant to rebut the allegations of non -use. 
 
Question 13  
Section 3.3.7.6  IP - Geographical indications (3.296)  
The report indicates that "The United States provides protection to foreign and domestic geographical 
indications (GIs )through its trademark system for all classes of goods and services, usually as  
certification marks and collective marks with indications of regional origin . 
 
The report indicates that  )…("the owner of a mark has the exclusive right to prevent its use by 
unauthorized parties when such use would likely cause consumer confusion, mistake or deception 
as to the source of the goods /services  .A prior right holder has priority and exclusivity over any later 
users of the same or similar sign on the same, similar, related, or in some cases unrelated 
goods /services where consumers would l ikely be confused by the two uses  . ")…(  
 
Please elaborate the examination process for the GIs protection through certification marks and 
collective marks as mentioned . Regarding the examination process, is there any requirement to 
consider the  linkage betw een the geographical origin and the quality, reputation or other 
characteristics?  Please  also provide the relevant example regarding this examination process  . 
 
RESPONSE: Certification marks and collective marks of regional origin are protected under 
Section 4 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). Such marks do not indicate source in a 
single company, but rather, in a group of producers in the named area who comply with the 
specifications set out by the certifier or collective. The specifications inclu de demarcation of the 
geographic area where the product must come from; the environmental conditions that attribute 
to the quality, reputation and characteristics, among other things. They are examined like other 
trademark applications except that the owne r of the mark cannot itself produce the goods. 
Certification marks of regional origin are exempt from refusals based on geographic 
descriptiveness because the purpose of these marks is to confirm that the product is from the 
area named. The registration fo r DARJEELING for tea is an example.  
 
a. Could the U .S .please elaborate the criteria for evaluating consumer confusion, mistake 
or deception  as to the source of the goods /services?   
 
RESPONSE: Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 USC 1052(d) provides  a basis 
for refusal, and a ground for opposition and cancellation, of a later -filed application for a 
mark which resembles a mark registered in the USPTO, as to be likely to cause confusion, 
or to cause a mistake, or to deceive. The analysis is based prim arily on a comparison of the 
marks and the goods, with other factors that may contribute to the evaluation, including the 
fame of the senior mark, channels of trade, etc.   
 
b. Could the U .S .please provide information on how to proceed with the case of 
homony mous GIs?   
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  RESPONSE: Homonymous GIs can be registered in the United States if the parties take 
measures to ensure that consumers will not be deceived. The applicants may file a joint 
application with the USPTO, or distinguish the GIs further by adding oth er indications of 
regional origin that are country -specific.  
 
Question 14  
Section 3.3.7.9  IP - Enforcement (3.320)  
The report indicates that "IP Enforcement Advisor Committee issued the new three -year Joint 
Strategic Plan on IP Enforcement for 2017 -2019  " 
 
13. Could the U.S. share with us the implementation results of the  Joint Strategic Plan on IP 
Enforcement for 2017 -2019 and the challenges arisen in the implementation context?  
 
RESPONSE: Updates on the U.S. Government's strategic efforts may be found in the  
"Annual  Intellectual  Property  Report to Congress,"  available  at:https://www.whitehouse.gov/w
p-content/uploads/2017/11/2018 Annual_IPEC_Report_t o_Congress.pdf . 
 
Question 15 -16 
Section 4.4.1 Financial Services (4.102, 4.116)  
The Secretariat Report indicates that "if a foreign bank that poses a threat to the stability of 
the U.S. financial system applies to set up an office in the United States, the  DFA requires 
that the Federal Reserve consider whether the home country of the foreign bank has 
adopted, or is in the process of adopting, regulation that would minimize such risk. In the 
absence of such criteria, the DFA gives the Federal Reserve powers to shut down the offices 
of foreign banks".  
 
14. What kind of activities of foreign bank which could be determined as posing a threat to the 
stability of the U.S. financial system?  
 
RESPONSE: The criteria for the Board to consider in making a determination to  terminate the 
activities of the U.S. offices of foreign banks under section 7(e)(1) of the International Banking 
Act (IBA) are set forth in section 7(e)(1) of the IBA, 12 U.S.C. 3105(e)(1), and may be found 
at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE -2011-title12/html/USCODE -2011-title12 -chap32 -
sec3105.htm . 
 
The Secretariat Report indicates that "on 22 September 2017, the United States and the 
Europea n Union signed a covered agreement…". (Bilateral Agreement between the United 
States of America and the European Union on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and 
Reinsurance)  
 
15. Does U.S. plan to arrange this kind of agreement with other countries/custom  unions in the 
future?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  
 
Question 17  
Section 4.4.3 Postal and courier services (4.155)  
The Secretariat Report indicates that "regional carriers, such as OnTrac  and Eastern 
Connection in the Western and North -Eastern states, are emerging, while start -ups, such as 
Shyp, PostMates, and Uber, and prominent companies, such as Amazon and Google, are 
trying to make a mark in this industry. Delivery by drone is now bein g tried by some 
companies".  
 
16. Does the U.S. have any laws or regulations to regulate drone traffic? Are there any limitations 
on foreign companies intending to provide drone delivery services?  
 
RESPONSE: The Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Rule, also commonly referred to as 
Part 107 of the FAA regulations, is the first set of rules for small UAS (meaning under 55 pounds 
including everything onboard or otherwise attached). It allows for routine commercial use of 
UAS under specific operating requirements , and serves as the foundation for UAS rulemaking.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 372 - 
 
  There  are a number  of requirements  for Part 107, which  can be found  at: https://www.faa.gov
/uas/getting_started/part_107/ . 
 
Non-U.S. citi zens who want to fly a UAS for commercial purposes may do so under the Small 
UAS rule (Part 107) by getting a Remote Pilot Certificate (RPC) issued by the FAA. The FAA does 
not currently recognize any foreign Remote Pilot Certificate or equivalent because globally 
recognized RPC standards have not yet been developed. To obtain an FAA -issued RPC, one must 
submit an application for foreign air carrier economic licensing. Application instructions are 
specified in 14 CFR Part 375 ( https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR -2012-title14 -vol4/xml/CFR -
2012-title14 -vol4-part375.xml ) and should be submitted by electronic mail to the Department 
of Transportation (DOT) Offi ce of International Aviation, Foreign Air Carrier  Licensing  Division. 
Additional  information  is available  at: https://cms.dot.gov/policy/aviation -policy/licensing/ 
foreign -carriers . 
 
All operations involving on -demand package delivery typically require 14 CFR Part 135 Air 
Carrier  and Operator  Certification  (https://www.faa.gov/about/initiat ives/atos/135_certificatio
n/) and a 14 CFR Part 21 Type Certification for the Aircraft.  
 
Question 18  
Section 4.4.6.2  Maritime transport, port services, and shipbuilding (4.227)  
The Secretariat Report indicates that "although the Jones Act places limitation s on cargo 
services, it does not prevent foreign companies from establishing shipping companies in the 
United States, as long as they meet the Act's requirements regarding citizenship, crew and 
operation of domestic -built vessels".  
 
17. Currently, what is the proportion of foreign shipping companies establishing and operating in 
the U.S. compared to U.S. companies? Are there any other limitations imposed on foreign 
shipping companies? Can their vessels have full access to every port in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE: Based on Bureau of Economic Analysis 2016 data, foreign -owned firms account for 
about 6.5 per cent  of U.S. employment in the U.S. water transport industry, 5.4 per cent  of 
equipment and structures, and 7.6 per cent  of value added.  The vast majority of internat ional 
maritime trade with the United States is conducted by foreign shipping companies.  According to 
2017 analysis by the Marine Administration of the Department of Transportation, 98.5 per cent  
of international maritime trade by cargo weight to the United  States in 2015 was done by foreign -
flagged vessels. If a foreign company wishes to operate U.S. flag vessels, the below 
requirements would apply.  
 
U.S.-flag vessels must be owned and operated by qualified U.S. citizens. See, 46 U.S.C. § 12102; 
46 U.S.C. §  50501; 46 U.S.C. § 8103.  
 
A vessel owned by a U.S. documentation citizen is eligible for a registry endorsement and may 
operate in the trade between the United States and foreign countries. A business entity may be 
entirely owned by non -citizen stockholders and qualify as a U.S. documentation citizen.  
 
A U.S. documentation citizen must be U.S. domiciled and must be managed by U.S. citizens. 
Specifically, for a corporation to document a vessel in the United States:  
1. it must be incorporated under th e laws of the United States or a state;  
2. its chief executive officer, by whatever title, and the chairman of the board of 
directors, must be U.S. citizens; and  
3. no more than a minority of the number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum 
can be non -citizens.  
 
For a general partnership to document a vessel, each and every general partner must be a U.S. 
documentation citizen. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3). In addition, unlike a corporation, U.S. citizens 
must own at least 50 per cent  of the "equity interest in  the partnership" for a general partnership 
to document a U.S. -flag vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b)(3).  
 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
Question 19  
Section 3.1 Policy Coordination (3.4)  
On November 15, 2018, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) announced the 
results of the 2017/2018 Annual Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Review. Based 
on that review, the United States determined to deny GSP treatment to all 92 products  that 
exceeded competitive need limitations (CNLs) for the 2017 calendar year but were imported 
in quantities below the applicable de minimis  threshold, and thus were eligible for de minimis  
waivers. There appears to be no recent precedent for the United S tates' decision to deny 
GSP treatment to all products that were eligible for de minimis  waivers. Moreover, the 
decision appears to be a significant departure from recent US practice, as the United States 
granted de minimis  waivers to dozens of eligible pro ducts in each of the three preceding 
annual GSP reviews.  
 
18. Given the seemingly -unprecedented denial of de minimis  waivers, has the United States changed 
its policy regarding the treatment of products eligible for de minimis  waivers under GSP? Please 
provide  the specific rationale for its determinations not to grant de minimis  waivers to the 
following products of Thailand based on the 2017/2018 Annual GSP Review.  
 
HTSUS  Description  
0603.13.00  Orchids, fresh cut  
0810.60.00  Durians, fresh  
0813.40.10  Papayas, dried  
0813.40.80  Tamarinds, dried  
2005.80.00  Sweet corn, prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar, acetic acid or sugar, 
not frozen  
2006.00.70  Fruit nesi , and nuts, except mixtures, preserved by sugar (drained, glace or 
crystallized)  
2008.99.50  Papayas, other than pulp, otherwise prepared or preserved, nesi  
4418.73.30  Assembled flooring panels of bamboo, for mosaic floors other than solid, having a 
face ply less than or equal to 6 mm in thickness  
8443.11.10  Reel-fed offset printing machinery, double -width newspaper printing presses  
9620.00.15  Monopods, bipods, tripods and similar articles, accessories of heading 9005  
 
RESPONSE: Thailand's products exceeded the competitive need limitations of the GSP program. 
Given that the Thai market share exceeded 50 per cent  of total U.S. imports for each of these 
products, the President determined that Thailand was already competitive with re spect to these 
products and GSP preferences were no longer necessary.  
 
Question 20 -21 
Section 4.2 Trade Enforcement Activities (4.11 -4.17)  
Since March 23, 2018, the United States has imposed additional tariffs of 25% on steel imports and 
10% on alumin ium imports from most countries, pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962. The United States also has exempted several countries from these tariffs on a long -
term basis in exchange for quantitative limitations on their exports of the subject p roducts to the 
United States. Specifically, the United States has exempted steel imports from Brazil, steel imports 
from South Korea, and steel and alumin ium imports from Argentina, and has imposed quantitative 
restrictions on US imports of these products.  The United States also has exempted steel and 
alumin ium imports from Australia with no quantitative restrictions. The United States has not 
published a standard set of criteria that it uses to determine whether to exempt a country from the 
Section 232 tar iffs. 
 
19. At the time the tariffs were first imposed, the President stated that USTR would publish a list of 
criteria for granting country exclusions, but the list has never been published. Can the United 
States now please list the criteria it uses to determi ne whether to exempt a country from the 
Section 232 tariffs?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  a. Please provide all facts supporting each of its determinations to exempt Argentina,  
Australia, Brazil, and South Korea from the Section 232 tariffs?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. Proclamations issued by the President on 30 April 2018 
(Proclamation 9740) and 31 May 2018 (Proclamations 9758 and 9759) describe the 
satisfactory alternative means between the United States and certain other countries, in 
light of which the President determined that imports from these countries no longer 
threaten  to impair  U.S. national security.  The texts of these proclamations  are available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/  and https://www.federalregister.gov/ . 
 
b. Please provide all facts supporting each of its determinations to grant and subsequently 
revoke temporary exemptions for steel and alumin ium imports from Canada, Mexico, 
and the European Union?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU. Please also refer to the Presidential Proclamations issued on 30 
April 2018 (Proclamation 9740) and 31 May 2018 (Proclamations 9758 and 9759).  
 
The Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 amended the US anti -dumping statute to grant  the US 
Department of Commerce (USDOC) additional discretion to find the existence of a "particular market 
situation" and to thereby reject a respondent exporter's home market sales prices and raw material 
costs when calculating dumping margins, instead us ing undefined methodologies. USDOC has made 
several affirmative findings of "particular market situation" under the amended statute to offset 
alleged market distortions (including widespread market conditions such as global overcapacity in 
steel production ). Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement provides that an investigating authority may, 
because of a particular market situation, disregard an exporter's home market sales prices, but only 
where such sales "do not permit a proper comparison" with the export price  due to the particular 
market situation.  
 
USDOC has found a "particular market situation" based on factors, such as price regulations or 
subsidies, affecting the inputs used in the production of subject merchandise, despite the fact that 
there was no reco rd evidence of these factors affecting the respondent exporters' cost of production 
for exported subject merchandise differently from the same costs for the subject merchandise 
destined for the exporters' home market.   
 
20. Is it the United States' position, therefore, that an economic regulation maintained by an 
exporting country, or a market condition present in an exporting country, that affects the cost 
of production of domestically -sold and exported goods equally can nonetheless constitute a 
"particular m arket situation" under Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE: The determination of whether a particular market situation exists will depend on 
the facts and circumstances on the administrative record.  Specific determinations 
regarding  the examination  of whether  a particular  market  situation  exists  can be found  at: http
s://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Question 22  
Section 6 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (6.7)  
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 req uired the USDOC to lift the stay of the 
effective date of the final rule for the US seafood import monitoring program (SIMP) (81 
Fed. Reg. 88975 et seq.) for abalone and shrimp, and to establish a compliance date of no 
later than December 31, 2018 for thos e species. The same law requires USDOC to establish, 
by December 31, 2018, a traceability program for United States inland, coastal, and marine 
aquaculture of shrimp and abalone from point of production to entry into United States 
commerce. USDOC on April 24, 2018 issued its final rule lifting the stay of the effective date 
of the SIMP for imported abalone and shrimp, with a compliance date of December 31, 2018. 
In addition, USDOC on October 11, 2018 issued a proposed rule to establish registration, 
reporti ng and recordkeeping requirements for US aquaculture producers of shrimp and 
abalone. However, USDOC has not yet issued the final rule.  
 
21. Please explain how the U.S. government intends to ensure that the SIMP requirements applicable 
to abalone and shrimp ar e applied in a WTO -consistent and non -discriminatory manner?  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: Shrimp and abalone were included in the SIMP program, but were stayed 
indefinitely as gaps were identified in the traceability requirements for domestic aquaculture -
raised shrimp and a balone. As noted, on October 11, 2018, NOAA published a proposed rule 
establishing a comparable domestic regulation for the collection and retention of information for 
domestic aquaculture shrimp and abalone products. NOAA is finalizing that rule, which wi ll 
ensure that the requirements for imported shrimp and abalone under SIMP are comparable to 
domestic requirements for farmed shrimp and abalone, and applied in the same WTO -consistent 
and non -discriminatory manner as for all other species covered by SIMP.  
 
Question 23  
Section 7 TRADE AND LABOR (7.2)  
In 7.2., The United States has continued its efforts to enhance U.S. Government engagement 
with trade partners through formal trade agreement mechanisms to improve respect for 
internationally recognized labo ur rights and to increase monitoring and enforcement of trade 
agreement labo ur provisions. Since the last TPR, the United States held senior -level 
meetings with officials from Bahrain, Central America and the Dominican Republic, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, and th e Republic of Korea to discuss implementation of and monitor progress 
under the labor chapters of our FTAs with those partners. These meetings also provided 
opportunities to discuss labo ur cooperation initiatives that support implementation of the 
labor ch apters of U.S. FTAs. The United States also continues to enhance its engagement 
with trade partners on labo ur rights through trade preference programs, and other means. 
In 2017 and 2018, the United States discussed labo ur rights issues with several countri es 
as part of meetings held under Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, including 
with Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia, and the Philippines.  
 
22. Please elaborate what policy, activity, provision or measure that the U.S will undertake for 
increasing monitoring and enforcement of trade agreement on labour provisions?  
 
RESPONSE: We remind Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews.  Addressing labo ur rights 
objectives and raising labo ur standards have underpinned U.S. trade policy since they were 
included in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA) and were renewed in the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015. The United States works 
to address labo ur challenges through a range of multilater al, regional, and bilateral trade 
agreements and initiatives, and has achieved the TPA's primary objectives on these issues by 
negotiating ambitious commitments in the labor chapters of new trade agreements. In addition, 
the United States regularly monitor s labo ur commitments under existing trade agreements and 
actively engages with trade partner countries to advance the Labor Chapter objectives of the 
agreements. The United States has a history of success in achieving TPA objectives on labo ur 
and issues pu blic re ports that describe and analyse ongoing efforts to promote  labour rights  
through trade agreements. For more information, see Chapter  IV, Section E of USTR's  2018 
Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual  Report,  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/ 
Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20IV.pdf . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Trinidad and Tobago  
Government Report - WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 1  
Section Strengthening the US Economy (1.4)  
 
In 2017, the President signed a new tax bill designed to make U.S. companies and workers more 
competitive with the rest of the world.  
 
1. What aspects of the tax regime have been changed to assist with making US companies a nd 
workers more competitive?  
 
RESPONSE: The TCJA reduced personal income tax rates, increased the standard deduction, 
and increased credits which reduced marginal tax rates on labo ur which should encourage an 
increase in the labo ur supply that leads to hig her growth. Similarly, by reducing the corporate 
tax rate, allowing full expensing for five years followed by a phase down, and adding a tax 
deduction for certain pass -through business income, the tax reform bill will reduce the after -tax 
cost of capital. As a result of these changes, both employment and capital investment are 
projected to increase. GDP growth has been robust in 2018, and was estimated to be 3.5 per 
cent in the third quarter of 2018, down slightly from the second quarter at 4.2 per cent . Similarly, 
business fixed investment increased 8.2 per cent  in the second quarter and 6.6 per cent  in the 
third.   
 
Question 2  
Section Reforming the Multilateral trading System (1.8)  
 
The United States wants to help build a better multilateral trading system and will remain active in 
the WTO. At the same time, the United States recognizes that the WTO has not always worked as 
expected. Instead of serving as a negotiating forum where Members can develop new and better 
rules, the ability of Members to negotiate has become increasing frustrated by an overactive dispute 
settlement system in which activist "judges" impose their own policy preferences and institutional 
preferences on Members. Instead of constraining market distorting countries, the WTO has in some 
cases given them an unfair advantage over the United States and other -market based economies.  
 
2. What action does the United States propose be undertaken to improve the WTO dispute 
settlement system?  
 
RESPONSE: For more than 15 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council meeting, if WTO 
members say that we support a rules -based trading system, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995.  And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its repor ts 
within 90 days of an appeal. A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member may not 
continue decidi ng appeals as if his term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body.  The 
Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to those relating 
to domestic law. The Appellate Body may not give advisory opinions on issues  that will not assist 
the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure into compliance 
with WTO rules.  The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as precedent or provide 
authoritative interpretations.  And the Appellate B ody may not change Members' substantive 
rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreements.  When the Appellate Body 
abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it undermines the 
legitimacy of the system and damag es the interests of all WTO Members who care about having 
the agreements respected as they were negotiated and agreed.  The United States will continue 
to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system, and will continue 
our efforts and our discussions with Members to seek a solution on these important issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Secretariat Report - WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 3  
Section 232 Investigations (3.100)  
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C 1862), the Secretary of Commerce 
is granted authority to conduct investigations to determine the effects of imports of any article on 
the national security interest of the United States. Invest igations may be initiated based on an 
application from an interest party, on a request from the head of any department or agency, or may 
be self -initiated by the Secretary of Commerce.  
 
3. How do investigations conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansi on Act of 1962 and the 
resulting adoption of corrective action on imports differ from the implementation of safeguard 
measures?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
Question 4  
Section 3.3.2 Standards and other Technical Requirements (3.180)  
 
The Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)'s Sub -Committee on Standards and Conformance 
(SCSC) and numerous S pecialist Regional Bodies (SRBs) work closely with the 21 member 
economies to promote APEC's agenda for the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, 
including the design of practical programmes to promote the development of technical 
infras tructure.196 Many bilateral FTAs concluded by the United States incorporate provisions 
reaffirming the adherence to obligations under the TBT Agreement as well as the Decision of the TBT 
Committee of 13 November 2000; acceptance of conformity assessment pr ocedures; joint work on 
standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures; and information exchange.  
 
4. Please elaborate  how the USA considers "equivalence" related to regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures.  
 
RESPONSE: U.S. reg ulators make equivalency determinations for  certain  technical regulations 
and conformity assessment procedures. For example, the Agricultural Marketing 
Service's  organics standard  provide for determinations of equivalency.  These  equivalency 
procedures are available online:  https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/organic -certification/  
international -trade/how -does-usda-assess -organic -equivalency -other -countries . 
 
  WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Turkey 
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382 AND THE GOVERNMENT REPORT 
WT/TPR/G/382  
Question 1  
Section 4.2. Trade Enforcement Activities  
It is stated in the Government Report  that “The United States has been actively engaged in numerous 
WTO dispute settlement actions, including important offensive actions related to China's 
discriminatory regime for technology licensing, agricultural market access in China, India, and 
Indonesi a, China's excessive agricultural domestic support, Indian prohibited export subsidies, and 
the EU's subsidies benefitting large civil aircraft. The United States has also initiated actions relating 
to additional duties imposed by certain Members related t o the administration's actions under section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to address the threat to national security presented by 
imports of steel and aluminium, as well as participating in related defensive actions brought by 
certain Members.”  
 
Section 3.1.7.1.1. Legal and administrative framework (3.102 -3.103)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “Requests for a Section 232 investigation must be 
submitted in writing; they must describe how the quantity, availability, character, and uses o f a 
particular imported article, or other circumstances related to its import, affect national security, and 
must contain, among other things, a description of the domestic industry affected, including 
information regarding companies and their plants, loca tions, capacity and current output of the 
industry; statistics on imports and domestic production, showing the quantities and values of the 
article; the nature, sources, and degree of the competition created by imports of the article; and the 
effect that i mports of the article may have upon the restoration of domestic production capacity in 
the event of national emergency. Requests must also contain information about the extent to which 
the economy, employment, investment, specialized skills, and productive  capacity is, or will be, 
adversely affected; revenues of federal, state, or local governments which are, or may be, adversely 
affected; and national security supporting uses of the article, including data on applicable contracts 
or sub -contracts.  
 
Some o f the specific factors taken into account when conducting a Section 232 investigation for 
determining the effect of imports on national security include: (a) the importation of goods in terms 
of their quantities and use; (b) the domestic production needed for projected national defense 
requirements; (c) the domestic industry's capacity to meet those requirements; (d) related human 
and material resources; (e) the close relation of national economic welfare to U.S. national security; 
(f) the loss of skills or  investment, substantial unemployment and decrease in government revenue; 
and (g) the impact of foreign competition on specific domestic industries and the impact of 
displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports.”  
 
1. Could the U.S. further expla in the method used in determining the amount of imports that could 
be considered as a national security threat? Is there any objective criteria in deciding threat? 
With regard to section 232 actions, some countries have received exemptions or quotas from 
the steel and alumin ium tariffs while some countries are fully subject to those tariffs. What was 
the selection criteria for those countries? Could the U.S. explain the criteria that was used to 
determine the countries which create a security threat?  
 
RESP ONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU").  
 
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/G/382  
 
Question 2  
Section 1. The United States in the Global Trading System (1.2 & 1.5)  
It is stated in the Government Report that “U.S. trade policy rests on five major pillars: supporting 
U.S. national security, strengthening the U.S. economy, negotiating better trade deals, aggressive 
enforcement of U.S. trade laws, and reforming the multilateral trading system.  
 
For too long, the rules of global trade have been tilted against U.S. workers and businesses. The 
United States has demonstrated that it will alter —or terminate —old trade deals that are not in the WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
- 379 - 
 
  U.S. national interest. In 2018, the United States complete d a comprehensive renegotiation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and improved the U.S. –Korea Free Trade Agreement 
to rebalance trade and address implementation concerns. Furthermore, with roughly 80% of the 
world's economy and 95% of the world's population living outside the United States, the United 
States is committed to opening foreign markets and is actively pursuing new and better trade deals 
with potential partners around the world.”  
 
2. Could the U.S. explain how it reconciles the cons iderable emphasis it attaches to national security 
and implementation of its trade laws with its goal to develop multilateral trading system through 
liberal and competitive policies functioning to advantage in global markets?  
 
RESPONSE: We do not agree wit h the premise of the question. We see no inherent contradiction 
between building a trading system based on market -oriented policies —as WTO Members pledged 
to do in the Marrakesh Declaration —and enforcing U.S. trade laws to address unfair trade 
practices an d protect U.S. national security.  
 
Questions 3 -6 
Section 2. The United States Economic and Trade Envirınment (2.2; 2.5; 2.8)  
It is stated in the Government Report that “…The Administration is projecting real GDP growth of 
3.1% for 2018, and 3.2%and 3.1% fo r 2019 and 2020, respectively…”  
 
3. Could the U.S. kindly share further information about its GDP growth projection for 2019 and 
2020, considering  the effects of unilateral trade remedies taken in 2018 (that is increasing tariffs 
on steel and alumin ium produc ts and increasing tariff barriers for its one of the biggest trade 
partner)? Does the U.S. expect those measures to eventually depress the potential economic 
growth or not?  
 
RESPONSE: The GDP growth projection is made in full awareness of trade remedies. Steel and 
aluminium tariffs affect a relatively small share of U.S. trade. The long -term implications of these 
actions depends largely on the response of trading partners and the willingnes s to address 
underlying factors that led to the United States taking action.  
 
It is stated in the Government Report that  “The labor market continues to improve. Labor force 
participation has remained constant at 62.7%, the same rate as in December 2015, th ough down 
from the 67.3% peak rate in April 2000…”  
 
4. Could the U.S. explain why recent economic growth has not increased the labour market 
participation rate? Does the decline in the labour market participation rate threaten the potential 
growth rate of the  U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE:  The decline in the labour market participation rate since April 2000 is mostly due 
to demographic factors, that is, the aging of the U.S. population and the labour force. In the 
long run, potential U.S. economic growth is affected by the labour market participation rate.   
 
It is stated in the Government Report that “…However, growth outside the United States has 
generally disappointed in 2018: other major advanced economies have seen output growth step 
down from its 2017 level, while several emerging market economies have co me under pressure as 
rebounding commodity prices, rising U.S. interest rates, and shifts in investor sentiment have 
interacted with pre -existing weaknesses and led to episodes of financial volatility. Though there are 
not yet signs that these financial pre ssures in key emerging markets are leading to broader 
contagion, a sharp tightening of financial conditions across emerging markets could be a significant 
drag on global activity and weigh on U.S. growth.”  
 
5. Could the U.S. explain whether the tariff hikes also played role in lowering the global economic 
growth following the statement in the latest OECD Economic Outlook that the underperformance 
of the trade and investment par tly resulted from tariff hikes?  
 
RESPONSE:  As the latest OECD Economic Outlook expl ains, there are numerous reasons, which 
differ across economies and regions, for the slowing economic growth outside the United States 
(for example, tightening macroeconomic  policies, rising oil prices).  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 380 - 
 
  It is stated in the Government Report that “The glo bal economy also remains marked by very large 
trade and current account imbalances, in part due to persistent trade and investment barriers across 
many economies. These barriers inhibit the efficient allocation of capital across the global economy 
and prev ent trade from expanding in a way that is fair and reciprocal. Growth across the global 
economy and in the United States could be stronger and more balanced if these trade and investment 
barriers were dismantled, and if domestic demand became the sustained  engine of expansion for 
key economies that have maintained large trade surpluses.”  
 
6. Could the U.S. kindly explain its approach to dismantle trade and investment barriers? To this 
respect, what would be the role of multilateral trade negotiations which aim  to prevent unfairness 
and inefficiency in trade?  
 
RESPONSE:  The United States continues to support trade liberalization and will deepen our 
relationships with countries which share our commitment to fair market competitio n and 
reciprocity.  The United Sta tes wants to help build a better multilateral trading system and will 
lead these efforts for reform in the World Trade Organization.  
 
Question 7  
Section 4.1. WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.3; 4.8)  
It is stated in the Government Report that “First among those concerns is that the WTO dispute 
settlement system has appropriated to itself powers that the WTO Members never intended to give 
it. This includes where panels or the Appellate Body have, through their findings, sought to add to 
or diminish WTO right s and obligations of Members in a broad range of substantive areas. The United 
States has grown increasingly concerned with the activist approach of the Appellate Body on 
procedural issues, interpretative approach, and substantive interpretations. These ap proaches and 
findings do not respect WTO rules as written and agreed by the United States and other WTO 
Members. The United States has been drawing the attention of WTO Members to instances where 
the WTO Appellate Body has disregarded the explicit rules ag reed by Members in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU)…”  
 
7. Could the U.S. clarify its view on whether there could be a more constructive and viable solution 
to break proclaimed failures rather than blocking reappointments of the WTO Appellate Bod y? 
Could the U.S. explain what kind of a mechanism or solution is envisaged to make the WTO 
dispute settlement system work better in this regard?  
 
RESPONSE:  For more than 15 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States 
has been raising  serious concerns with the Appellate Body’s disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council meeting, if WTO 
Members say that we support a rules -based trading system, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995.  And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its repor ts 
within 90 days of an appeal.  A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member may not 
continue deciding appeals as if his or her term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement 
Body.   The Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to 
those relating to domestic law.   The Appellate Body may not give advisory opinions on issues 
that will not assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure 
into compliance with WTO rules.   The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as 
precedent or provide authoritative interpretations.   And the Appellate Body may not change 
Members’ substantive rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreement s. When 
the Appellate Body abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it 
undermines the legitimacy of the system and damages the interests of all WTO Members who 
care about having the agreements respected as they were negotiat ed and agreed. The 
United  States will continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement 
system, and will continue our efforts and our discussions with Members to seek  a solution on 
these important issues.  
 
It is stated in the Government Report that “Third, the United States sees an acute need for the WTO 
to change how it approaches questions of development. While "least -developed countries" (LDCs) 
are defined in the WTO using the United Nations criteria, there are no WTO criteria for what 
designates a "developing country." Any country may "self -declare" as a developing country, thus 
entitling itself to all "special and differential" treatment afford ed to developing countries under the 
WTO agreements, as well as any new flexibilities afforded to developing countries under current or 
forthcoming negotiations. In practice, this means that more advanced countries receive the same WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  flexibilities as very lo w-income countries, despite these more advanced countries' very significant 
role in the global economy. Such disparities, where countries that some institutions categorize as 
high- or high -middle -income receive the same flexibilities as low - or low -middle -income, make it 
challenging to find balance in the application of existing obligations or the development of new 
commitments.”  
 
8. Does the U.S. plan to submit a proposal for redefining what designates a “developing country”? 
If so, could the U.S. clarify the  criteria it intends to propose?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States reminds Members that TPRs are retrospective reviews. However, 
we question why any OECD Member would claim developing country status in the WTO.  
 
Question 9  
Section 6. Trade and Environment (6.2)  
It is stated in the Government Report that “In August 2017, the United States, Mexico, and Canada 
formally launched the renegotiation of the NAFTA. On 30 September 2018, the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada completed a comprehensive renegotiation of the NAFTA, including the most 
comprehensive set of enforceable environmental obligations of any previous U.S. trade agreement. 
These include commitments relating to harmful fisheries subsidies; wildlife trafficking; illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) f ishing; the protection of marine species; marine litter; 
sustainable forest management; air quality; and public participation and environmental 
cooperation.”  
 
9. Could the U.S. explain its position regarding the possibility of renegotiations of the 
Environmen tal Goods  Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States continues to review opportunities to promote free and fair trade 
of environmental goods in a variety of forums, including the WTO.  
 
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/382  
 
Question 10  
Section 1.2.3. Balance  of payments (1.20 -1.21)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “The U.S. current account deficit has been increasing since 
2013, and reached US$449.1 billion in 2017 (2.4% of GDP), as the gap between gross national 
savings and gross investment widene d (Table 1.2).  
 
Exports of goods declined from US$1.63 trillion in 2014 to US$1.46 trillion in 2016, but subsequently 
increased to US$1.55 trillion in 2017. The decline was due to lower exports of food, animal feeds, 
and beverages, industrial supplies and materials; and capital goods except automotive products. In 
2015 and 2016, the real exchange of the dollar appreciated, prices for many commodity exports fell, 
and trade growth outside the United States was weak. In 2017, the dollar depreciated, commodity 
prices rose, and trade growth outside the United States was stronger. Goods imports also declined 
from US$2.38 trillion in 2014 to US$2.21 trillion in 2016, before increasing to US$2.36 trillion in 
2017. All categories of goods showed an increase in import s, except industrial supplies and materials. 
Consequently, the balance on goods deteriorated from US$749.9 billion (4.3% of GDP) in 2014 to 
US$807.5 billion (4.2% of GDP) in 2017.”  
 
10. Could the U.S. explain whether it has received any positive impact from pr otective measures 
taken regarding its goods trade and current account balance?   
 
RESPONSE: It is too early to determine any impact on trade balances from the recent legitimate 
U.S. trade actions.  
 
Question 11  
Section 2.2.1 Trade policy objectives  (2.7; 2.9 ) 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “The overall trade objectives state the goals of U.S. trade 
negotiations, including: to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access; to obtain 
reductions in barriers to trade and investment which decrease U.S. market opportunities; to 
strengthen the system of international trade and investment disciplines, including dispute 
settlement; to foster economic growth and rising living standards, enhanced competitiveness and 
full employment in the United States, and to enhance the global economy; to ensure trade and WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  environmental policies are mutually supportive; to promote respect for workers' rights; to seek 
provisions in trade agreements ensuring that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforde d 
in domestic environmental and labour laws; to ensure equal access to trade opportunities to small 
and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs); to promote the universal ratification of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning the prohibit ion of child labour; to ensure that trade 
agreements reflect the inter -relatedness and multi -sectoral nature of trade and investment; to 
recognize the growing significance of the digital economy; to take into account legitimate domestic 
objectives, such as  protection of health, safety, security, and consumer interests, and the laws and 
regulations pertaining thereto; to take account of the religious freedom of any party negotiating a 
trade agreement with the United States; to ensure trade agreements do not require changes to 
immigration laws or obligate the United States to grant access or expand access to visas; and to 
ensure that trade agreements do not establish obligations regarding greenhouse gas emissions.”  
 
11. Could the U.S. explain the reason behind not  preferring to establish obligations regarding 
greenhouse gas emissions in trade agreements?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States does not believe that free trade agreements are the appropriate 
fora to address greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
It is stated in the Secreta riat Report that “The Agenda notes that free, fair, and reciprocal trade 
relations are critical to the U.S. national security policy. It also focuses on strengthening the U.S. 
economy, and renegotiating and revising trade deals. In terms of reforming the m ultilateral trading 
system, the Agenda advocates "for sensible and fair reforms to the WTO, promoting rules for efficient 
markets, expanded trade, and greater wealth for all nations". The Agenda notes that the United 
States remains committed to working wit h all WTO Members who share in the United States' goal of 
fair and reciprocal trade deals…”  
 
The overall trade objectives state the goals of U.S. trade negotiations, including: to obtain more 
open, equitable, and reciprocal market access; to obtain reducti ons in barriers to trade and 
investment which decrease U.S. market opportunities; to strengthen the system of international 
trade and investment disciplines, including dispute settlement; to foster economic growth and rising 
living standards, enhanced comp etitiveness and full employment in the United States, and to 
enhance the global economy; to ensure trade and environmental po licies are mutually supportive.  
 
According to the 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, the WTO is viewed as an important institution, and the 
United States has a "strong track record of building coalitions of like -minded Members to use the 
WTO committee system, in particular, to pressure non -complying economies to bring measures into 
conformity with WTO rules, to advance transparency and predict ability in global trade rules, and to 
avert the need to resort to dispute settlement". Furthermore, the United States views that the WTO 
has achieved positive results and has the potential to achieve even more in the future. At the same 
time, the Trade Policy Agenda notes that the United States has long been concerned that the WTO 
is not operating as the contracting parties envisioned. In addition, the Agenda emphasizes that, if 
the WTO is to be a vibrant negotiating and implementing forum, Members must take advantage of 
every opportunity to advance work and seize results as they present themselves.”  
 
12. Could the U.S. elaborate on “sensible and fair reforms to the WTO”?  
 
RESPONSE: The chapeau to Question 12 appears to draw from the Summary of the Secretari at 
Report. The quoted phrase does not appear in the President’s Trade Policy Agenda.  
 
Questions 13 -14 
Section 2.4. Investment Regime (2.47 & 2.49 -2.50 & Table 2.1)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) continues to oversee the national security implications of foreign investment. CFIUS is an 
inter-agency committee authorized to review transaction s that could result in control of a U.S. 
business by a foreign person ("covered transaction"), in order to determine the effect of such 
transactions on the national security of the United States…  
 
In 2015, 143 notices were filed with CFIUS and 66 transacti ons were subject to investigation (Table 
2.1). The number of notices decreased slightly from 2014, although the number of investigations 
increased.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  In the period 2013 -15 (latest data available), the manufacturing sector accounted for the largest 
number o f industry reviews by CFIUS (172 out of a total 387). Within the manufacturing sector, 
43% of all the investment transactions notified to CFIUS between 2013 and 2015 were in the 
computer and electronic products sectors. This was followed by the machinery; transportation 
equipment; and electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing sectors… ” 
 
13. Table 2.1 demonstrates that the number of investigations has increased more than 37 percent 
from 2013 to 2015. Could the U.S. share further information regarding the reason behind this 
increase?  
 
RESPONSE: CFIUS cannot comment on specific transactions.  Every transac tion notified to 
CFIUS is analys ed by experts from across the U.S. Government through a methodical 
assessment of the national security risk p resented by the facts and circumstances  of the 
particular transaction.  While the number of investigations increased in 2015 as compared to 
2013, the number of notices filed in 2015 was also greater than 2013.  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “D uring the review period, the U.S. foreign investment 
regime remained unchanged. Despite the investment regime being open, there are some sector -
specific limitations, with review procedures on foreign investment in a few industries, including the 
airline an d nuclear energy industries. Additionally, the United States has a national security review 
process applicable to foreign investment that might affect national security interests.  
 
International investment agreements are used in the United States to foste r foreign investment. 
These agreements include trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs), bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), and FTAs that contain investment provisions. TIFAs provide frameworks 
for dialogue on trade and investment issues betwee n the United States and the other parties to the 
TIFA, and are generally the first step in establishing stronger trade and investment links. The 
objective of these agreements is to develop opportunities for the United States and partner countries 
to enhanc e opportunities for trade and investment. Topics for cooperation usually include: market 
access issues; labour; environmental protection; and the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.”  
 
14. Could  the U.S. clarify these sector specific limitations?  Does the U.S. have any plans to further 
liberalize its foreign investment market within the framework of used international investment 
agreement?  
 
RESPONSE:  The OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements provides a summary of the 
sectors in the United States (and other countries) in which there are certain limitations on foreign 
investment. See: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment -policy/Code -capital -movements -
EN.pdf . We remind Members that the TPR is a retrospective review.  
 
Question 15  
Section 3.1.6. Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures (3.55)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “… (iii) Section 504 amends Sections 771(15) and 773 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, to modify the definition of ''ordinary course of trade'' and the provisions 
governing the treatment of a ''particular market situati on (PMS)'' in AD proceedings;…”  
 
15. Could the U.S. provide detailed information on how PMS is evaluated in AD proceedings by 
specifically elaborating the conditions in which PMS becomes operational?  
 
RESPONSE: Determinations involving a particular market situ ation are made on a case -by-case 
basis, and are based on the facts and circumstanc es of a particular proceeding. Instances 
involving such a determination can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.as px. 
 
Questions 16 -17 
Section 3.1.7.1.2. Steel Investigation (3.107; 3.112)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “The USDOC report concluded that the quantities and 
circumstances of steel imports threatened to impair national security, and recommended to the 
President that he consider the following alternative remedies to a ddress the problem: (a) a global 
tariff of at least 24% on all steel imports from all countries, or a tariff of at least 53% on all steel 
imports from 12 countries (Brazil; China; Costa Rica; Egypt; India; Malaysia; Korea, Republic of; 
Russia; South Africa ; Thailand; Turkey; and Viet Nam), with a quota by product on steel imports WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  from all other countries equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the United States; or (b) a quota on 
all steel products from all countries equal to 63% of each country's 2017 expor ts to the United 
States.119 Each of these remedies was intended to increase domestic steel production from its 
present 73% of capacity, as calculated by the USDOC, to 80%, the minimum rate considered 
necessary for the long -term viability of the industry…”  
 
16. Could the U.S. provide information about the methodology in determining the minimum limit of 
80 percent and the monthly capacity utilization rates of domestic steel production since March 
2018? Does the U.S. have any predictions about how long it will tak e to achieve the minimum 
rate considered necessary for the long -term viability of the industry?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “In the case of the Republic of Korea, annual import quotas 
have been fixed for the steel products subject to the Section 232 investigation. Annual aggregate 
limits have been set for the different HTSUS subheadings covered (all in HTSUS Chapters 72 and 
73) to apply for the period starting with calendar year 2018 and for subsequent years, unless 
modified or terminated.130 Quarterly imports in an aggregate quantity under any of the subheadings 
covered by the agreement cannot exceed 30% of the total quota or 500 t ons, whichever is greater. 
Also, once the quota is filled, imports cannot take place under any condition: in accordance with 
U.S. regulations (19 CFR 132.5), merchandise subject to an absolute quota may not be imported for 
consumption after the quota limit  is reached; options after the quota limit is reached include 
warehousing, FTZs, exportation or destruction. The status of quotas may be viewed in the CBP 
website.”  
 
17. How does the U.S. justify  the application of these quotas  with article XI.1  of GATT?  
 
RESP ONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
 
Question 18  
Section 3.1.7.1.3. Aluminium Investigation (3.115)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “The Secretary of Commerce recommended to the President 
three alternative remedies for dealing with excessive imports of aluminium: (a) a tariff of at least 
7.7% on all aluminium imports from all countries; (b) a tariff of 23.6% on all products from: China; 
Hong Kong, China; the Russian Federation ; the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and Viet Nam, 
with all other countries subject to quotas equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the United States; 
or (c) a quota on all imports from all countries equal to a maximum of 86.7% of their 2017 exports 
to the United States. Each of the three proposals was intended to raise production of aluminium 
from the present 48% average capacity to 80%, a level considered to provide the industry with long -
term viability. The tariffs and quotas would be in addition to any duties already in place.”  
 
18. Could the U.S. provide information about the methodology in determining the minimum limit of 
80 percent and the monthly capacity utilization rates of domestic aluminium production since 
March 2018? Does the U.S. have any pred ictions about how long it will take to achieve the 
minimum rate considered necessary for the long -term viability of the industry?  
 
RESPONSE: This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the DSU.  
Question 19  
Section 3.2.5.1. The Export -Import Bank (EXIM) (3.154)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “Although EXIM Bank is independent from the Government 
in day -to-day operations, its lending authority is established by Congress. In 2015, the Bank 
experienced  an unprecedented five -month period during which its authority to approve transactions 
had lapsed and, as a result, all involvement in new business opportunities was curtailed. As new 
legislation reauthorizing EXIM Bank until 30 September 2019 entered into  force in December 2015, 
its lending authority was capped (at US$135 billion), while its small business lending target was 
raised from 20% to 25%.178 In FY2017, more than 90% of its authorizations concerned small 
businesses, which made up more than 63% of the total dollar value of the authorizations and nearly 
76% of the direct export value supported by the Bank. However, the Bank's overall financial 
exposure as of August 2018 (about US$64 billion) is well below the established ceiling and is steadily WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  declining, as a further key operational roadblock persists.”  
 
19. Could  the U.S. clarify whether all programs of EXIM Bank are self -financed and share information 
about sectors which benefit the most from its programs?  
 
RESPONSE: Yes, EXIM collects risk fees (and interest on direct loans) in excess of expected 
losses and funding costs. In FY2018, primary sectors supported by EXIM include: agriculture, 
services exports, and textiles.  
 
Questions 20 -21 
Section 4.1. Agriculture (4.9; 4.48)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “In July 2018, the Department of Agriculture announced 
its intention to provide a short -term aid package designed to assist agricultural producers with 
market disruptions caused by retaliatory tariffs.”  
 
20. Given the assistance became available on September 4, 2018, does the U.S. plan to classify the 
trade mitigation package consisting of Market Facilitation; Food Purchase and Distribution; and 
Agricultural Trade Program under domestic support notification prov isions?  Does the U.S. take 
any measures to alleviate trade distorting effects of this aid program on global markets?  Does 
the U.S. predict that trade mitigation programs will cover additional products?  
 
RESPONSE: The Market Facilitation Program, Food Purch ase and Distribution Program, and the 
Agricultural Trade Program are consistent with U.S. WTO commitments on domestic support and 
will be notified as appropriate with other programs associated with the 2018/19 marketing/fiscal 
year. No changes have been an nounced for the programs.  We remind Members that TPRs are 
retrospective reviews.  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “Food for Peace Title II (Emergency and Private Assistance 
Programs), which is the dominant programme with annual expenditures ave raging around US$1.8 
billion, is administered by USAID. It regulates U.S. donations of agricultural commodities to 
international organizations (such as the World Food Programme) and non -governmental 
organizations. U.S. laws subject in -kind food aid to nume rous conditions, notably that the food 
donations must be sourced in the United States and shipped on U.S. -flag vessels (at least 50%). 
Moreover, 20% -30% of the aid funded under Food for Peace (minimum US$350 million per year) 
should be non -emergency food a id, of which a minimum of 75% should be processed, fortified, or 
bagged. At least 50% of bagged food transfers should be whole -grain commodities bagged in the 
United States. Non -governmental recipients are also required to subject at least 15% of U.S. non -
emergency food donations to monetization, i.e. the sale of donated food in recipient -country markets 
to generate cash for development programmes. The FAS administers the other international food 
assistance programmes authorized under the Farm Bill. Expendi tures under these programmes 
averaged nearly US$400 million during FY2006 to FY2015.”  
 
21. According to the Nairobi Ministerial Conference Decision of Export Competition 
(WT/MIN(15)/ 45,WT/L/980), members shall monetize international food aid under some 
conditions. Could the U.S. further provide details on the conditions of its food aid monetization? 
How does the U.S. ensure that its food aid monetization comply with the provisions of the Nairobi 
Decision of Export Competition?  
 
RESPONSE The United States  implements its food aid programs consistent with the 2015 
Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, including by conducting needs assessments and market 
analyses and allowing for local and regional procurement.  
 
U.S. relief agencies plan for and respond to humanitarian crises based on objective, evidence -
based analysis provided by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network or FEWS NET (for more 
information, see: http://fews.net/about -us), and all U.S. food aid responses  to humanitarian 
emergencies are provided through the United Nations’ World Food Program, private voluntary 
organizations, and other qualified responders to emergencies.  The organizations work closely 
with the national and local governments in the recipie nt countries to identify the recipient regions 
and beneficiaries who need the programs to save lives, reduce suffering, and support recovery 
for millions in both acute and chronic emergencies.   
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  The United States has been procuring food through local and regional sources under the 
Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) funded by the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) 
account (U.S. Agency for International Development); a small component of Title II food 
assistance programming through the Title II Sect ion 202(e) account (U.S. Agency for 
International Development); and Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture).  
CFR 7 Part 1733 prohibits the distribution of U.S. commodities in a recipient country if the food 
aid would result in  substantial disincentive to, or interference with, domestic production or 
marketing of agricultural commodities in that country.  U.S. food aid for non -emergency 
development or capacity building is provided by private voluntary organizations, cooperatives , 
governments of developing countries and their agencies, universities, the United Nation’s World 
Food Program and other international organizations.  The organizations providing U.S. food aid 
must conduct a “Bellmon analysis” and other market assessments before monetized food aid is 
provided.  The local and regional market analysis of the Bellmon Determination is conducted 
through market analysis that considers various market information such as quantitative and 
qualitative information, timing of harvests or a close substitute of the commodity in the country, 
suitability of commodity, and potential policy issues.  
U.S. Government international food aid is shifting from a combination of in -kind and cash -based 
assistance towards more cash -based assistance. However, the U.S. Government provides in -
kind international food aid under appropriate conditions. For information on criteria used to 
provide cash -based, voucher, and local and regional purchase assistance, 
please  see: https://www.usaid.gov/food -assistance/what -we-do/emergency -activities/types -
emergency . 
Question 22  
Section 4.2. Energy (4.66 -4.67)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “Hydropower and  solid biomass generate the majority of 
renewable power. However, biofuels, wind, and solar energy have become important additional 
resources. Consumption of biofuels and other renewable energy resources (other than hydropower) 
more than doubled between 20 00 and 2017, mainly in response to federal and state requirements 
or incentives. The surge in production was particularly sharp for wind power, and to some extent 
also for solar power. As the reliance on renewable energy forms an essential part of efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, further expansion of the renewable energy supply is expected in coming 
years.”  
 
22. Could  the U.S. further explain its future projects in order to increase renewable energy 
generation within the additional sources such as bi ofuels, wind, and solar energy?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States reminds Members that the TPR is a retrospective exercise.  
Question 23  
Section 4.5. E -commerce (4.271)  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that “The United States does not have a general e -commerce 
law; however, e -commerce is subject to a number of federal and state measures that address 
various aspects of e -commerce. Current U.S. laws, regulations and o rders affecting e -commerce 
address, among other things, the use of personal information, advertising, IP, cybercrime, taxation, 
and online speech.”  
 
23. Could the U.S. provide detailed information on studies carried out to increase the role of e -
commerce in i ts exports and explain any future development plans in laws and regulations to 
support this increase?  
 
RESPONSE:  E-commerce (or “digital trade”) is a broad concept, capturing not just the sale of 
consumer products on the Internet and the supply of online s ervices, but also data flows that 
enable global value chains, services that enable smart manufacturing, and myriad other 
platforms and applications. The United States places great importance on digital trade, which is 
essential to the U.S. economy and serv es as a critical driver of global economic growth. A recent 
report by the U.S. International Trade Commission describes recent developments in global trade 
in digital products and services (https://www.usitc.gov/publications/industry_econ_analysis_ 
332/2017/global_digital_trade_1_market_opportunities_and.htm ).As TPRs are retrospective in 
nature, we refrain from speculatin g on the possibility of future development of laws and 
regulations related to digital trade.  WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Ukraine  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT ( WT/TPR/S/382)  
 
Questions 1 -5 
Section 2.4 Investment Regime (2.42 -2.49)  
 
The Report notes, that "During the review period, the U.S. foreign investment regime remained 
unchanged. Despite the investment regime being open, there are some sector -specific limitations, 
with review procedures on foreign investment in a few industries, including the airline and nucl ear 
energy industries. Additionally, the United States has a national security review process applicable 
to foreign investment that might affect national security interests."  
 
1. Could the United States kindly elaborate on such review procedures with respect to foreign 
investment in a few industries?  
 
RESPONSE: The Secretariat is referring to standard administrative procedures that ensure that 
investments are consistent with certain sector -specific limitations, such as share of foreign 
ownership.  
 
2. Ukraine woul d also appreciate if the United States could list specific sectors of the U.S. economy 
in which limitations related to foreign investment continue to apply.  
 
RESPONSE: The OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements summarizes U.S. limitations 
on FDI.  See: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment -policy/Code -capital -movements -EN.pdf . 
 
The Report states, that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States  (CFIUS) "reviews 
transactions based on voluntary notifications filed by the parties, or on its own initiative in the 
absence of a voluntary notification if it believes the transaction is a covered transaction and may 
raise national security concerns."  
 
3. Could the United States kindly advise whether there is a list of criteria of factors that can trigger 
the review process by CFIUS on its own initiative?  
 
RESPONSE: The CFIUS regulations at 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(c) discuss the circumstances in which 
an "agency notice" may be filed by any member of the Committee, or his or her designee.  
 
According to the Report, 143 notices were filed with CFIUS and 66 transactions were subject to 
investigation in 2015. The number of notices decreased slightly from 2014, although  the number of 
investigations increased.  
 
4. Could the United States kindly provide relevant statistics for 2016 -2017?  
 
RESPONSE: The most recent statistics that are publicly available, including certain statistics 
from 2016, can be found at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource -center/international/foreign -
investment/Pages/cfius -reports.aspx . 
 
5. Did the trend of 2014/2015 continue ove r the past three years?  
 
RESPONSE: The Secretariat report includes the most recent publicly available data with respect 
to notices and investigations.  
 
Questions 6 -7 
Section 3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements (3.9 -3.18)  
 
Under the Repor t, U.S. traders, customs brokers, manufacturers, transporters, carriers, 
transportation intermediaries, etc. can participate in several programmes aimed to strengthen 
international supply chains and to improve security: Customs -Trade Partnership Against Te rrorism 
(C-TPAT), the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) programme, the Importer Self -Assessment Program 
(ISA).  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 388 - 
 
  6. Could the United States kindly clarify whether these programmes operate as trade facilitation 
measures related to authorized operators (within the  meaning of Article 7.7 of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA))?  
 
RESPONSE: The facilitations provided through the CTPAT program align with the requirements 
of TFA Article 7.7.  
 
CTPAT is a voluntary public -private sector partnership program which recog nizes that United 
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can provide the highest level of cargo security only 
through close cooperation with the principal stakeholders of the international supply chain such 
as importers, carriers, consolidators, licens ed customs brokers, and manufacturers. CTPAT 
started in 2001 as a security based program, a program that embodies the authorized operator 
regime. CBP is implementing a further Trusted Trader Strategy to transition the ISA Program 
into CTPAT Trade Complianc e, and evolve its focus to cover both security and trade.  
 
7. Ukraine would appreciate if the United States could also inform on available authorized operators 
schemes implemented according to requirements of Article 7.7 of the TFA.  
 
RESPONSE: The facilit ations and criteria of the CTPAT program align with the requirements of 
TFA Article 7.7.  
 
CTPAT is a voluntary public -private sector partnership program which recognizes that United 
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can provide the highest level of cargo security only 
through close cooperation with the principle stakeholders of the international supply chain such 
as importers, carriers, consolidators, licensed customs brokers, and manufacturers. CTPAT 
started in 2001 as a security based program, a  program that embodies the authorized operator 
regime. CBP is implementing a further Trusted Trader Strategy to transition the ISA Program 
into CTPAT Trade Compliance, and evolve its focus to  cover both security and trade.  
 
Questions 8 -9 
Section 3.1.3 Tariffs (3.36)  
 
The Report mentions a new procedure for the consideration of temporary tariff suspensions and 
reductions, according to which the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018 (H.R. 4318) was approved 
with amendments by the Senate in July 2018 (S.  Amend. 3664). This Act provides for the tariff 
suspensions until the end of 2020. Before its adoption, the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) recommended that duty suspensions be accorded to more than 1,600 products, 
mostly chemicals.  
 
8. Would the United States, please, elucidate other products to which duty suspensions are accorded 
under the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018?  
 
RESPONSE: The products to which temporary tariff suspensions and reductions apply are 
specified in the Act it self, available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th -congress/house -
bill/4318/text . 
 
9. Who estimates the actual amount of revenue loss , associated with the petition for temporary tariff 
suspensions , for its examination by the USITC as one of the key criteria to be evaluated with respect 
to petitions?  
 
RESPONSE: As specified in the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 (Pub. L . 
114-159), which established the procedures for temporary tariff suspensions and reductions, 
the U.S. Inter national Trade Commission analys es the potential duty revenue loss for each 
petition.  
 
Question 10  
Section 3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and s afeguard measures (3.77, 3.78, 3.81)  
 
According to the Report, there were 123 sunset review initiations of AD orders during the period 
from 1 January 2016 to end -June 2018 (50 in 2016, 46 in 2017 and 21 in 2018). During the same 
period, there were eight re vocations (six in 2016, one in 2017, and one in 2018), while 104 orders 
were continued. Moreover, at the end of 2017, 61 AD and 5 CVD measures had been in place for WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  more than 20 years. The maximum level of AD definitive duties applied during 1 January 2016  - 31 
December 2017 was 493.46%.  
 
10. Would the United States, please, clarify how such protectionist policy complies with the basic 
principles of the WTO such as "Freer trade" and "Promoting fair competition" that implies reduction 
of tariffs and other ba rriers to trade as well as promoting openness, fair and undistorted competition?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States disagrees with the characterization of its AD/CVD measures by 
Ukraine. The United States administers its trade remedy laws in a manner that is con sistent with 
its WTO obligations. The decision to impose an antidumping or countervailing measure is based 
on the factual determination of whether dumping or subsidization exists and whether that 
dumping or subsidization has caused or threatens to cause ma terial injury to a domestic 
industry. For dumping or subsidization, where injury or threat thereof and a causal link have 
been found, the United States will impose an antidumping or countervailing duty measure. The 
use of such trade remedy measures to addr ess the effects of unfairly traded goods is consistent 
with the basic principles and goals of the WTO.  
 
Questions 11 -14 
Section 3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations – Steel and Alumin ium  
 
The United States has imposed additional duties on steel and alumin ium under Section 232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to address the threat to national security, presented by imports of steel 
and alumin ium. Tariffs on steel imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act are in effect 
as of March 23. According t o the relevant Proclamation of the U.S. President, expiration date is not 
established. However, the U.S. authorities shall continue to monitor imports of steel and alumin ium 
articles and shall, from time to time, review the status of such imports with resp ect to the national 
security and also inform the President of any circumstance that might indicate that the increase in 
duty is no longer necessary.  
 
11. Could the United States, please, clarify whether relevant provisions of the U.S. legislation and 
impos ition of the measures under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provide for 
granting the WTO special and differential treatment? Please, explain the legal reason for application 
of measures under Section 232 within the WTO provisions.  
 
RESPONSE:  This question concerns issues that are the subject of dispute settlement 
proceedings under the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  ("DSU"). We refer Ukraine to the statements of the United States at the 29 October 
2018 and 21 November 2018 meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
12. Would the United States, please, clarify how often the status of imports with respect to the 
nationa l security is reviewed and specify the exact period that is referred as "from time to time" in 
the Proclamation?  
 
RESPONSE: The President's proclamations do not specify an exact time period. The Department 
of Commerce is regularly reviewing the impact of t he tariffs.  
 
13. Would the United States, please, clarify if there is a certain procedure that regulates the review 
and termination of the measures under Section 232? If yes, please, describe the procedure. If no, 
please, explain how these measures are rev iewed.  
 
RESPONSE: The Secretary of Commerce is conducting his review pursuant to proclamations 
issued by the President and the relevant statute.  
 
14. Would the United States, please, clarify what kind of circumstances should occur in order to lead 
to the d ecision that the increase in duty is no longer necessary?  
 
RESPONSE: The reports of the Department of Commerce on its investigations conducted under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, as amended, set out the factors the Secretary assessed 
in determini ng the effect of imports of steel and alumin ium on U.S. national security. The 
Secretary's review of the impact of the measures imposed by the President under Section 232 
are based on those factors.  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  Questions 15 -16 
Section 3.2.5.2 Small Business Administr ation (SBA) export loan programmes (3.157)  
 
The Report describes activity of the Small Business Administration (SBA), which administers three 
broad export loan programmes to offer export financing for small businesses exporting or planning 
to export.  
 
15. Ukraine would appreciate the U.S. elaboration regarding eligibility of agricultural and agri -food 
business to participate in the SBA export loan programmes.  
 
RESPONSE: SBA does not have separate or distinct eligibility requirements for agricultural and 
agri-food businesses. All businesses must meet SBA's general loan program eligibility 
requirements (e.g., "must be a small business, as defined by SBA") regardless of industry sector.  
 
16. How could the United States ensure that such policy complies with the  U.S. commitments under 
the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition?  
 
RESPONSE: The U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA) Export Working Capital program is 
defined as working capital financing to the suppliers. The Export Express and Intern ational Trade 
Loan Programs can be used for different purposes such as working capital and investments to 
acquire, construct, renovate, modernize, improve, or expand facilities or equipment in the United 
States to produce goods or services involved in inte rnational trade. In addition, we note that 
SBA's export financing programmes are not specific to agricultural exports.  
 
Questions 17 -18 
Section 4.1 Agriculture (4.52)  
 
The Report states, "At the WTO, the United States provides information on support to agr iculture to 
the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as well as to the Committee on Agriculture. 
The most recent subsidy notification to the SCM Committee covers FY2015 and FY2016, and reports 
payments under the new ARC and PLC programmes of US$4.5 billion and US$779 million, 
respectively (Table 4.6). Disaster payments for livestock forage were particularly important in 
FY2015. This notification includes programmes that are not in the DS:1 notification to the Committee 
on Agriculture."  
 
17. Uk raine kindly asks the United States to explain circumstances, which led to establishing the 
ARC and PLC programmes in addition to the existing revenue and insurance programme support 
instead of income insurance and the income safety -net programmes under th e provisions of Annex 
2, paragraph 7 of the Agreement of Agriculture that have not been utilized over a long period of 
time. 
 
RESPONSE: The ARC and PLC programs are not revenue or insurance programs, as they do not 
provide support based on current producti on. Both make income support payments to owners 
of historical base acres when the farm economy shows signs of distress based on prices or 
revenue below benchmark levels. The U.S. Congress establishes farm support programs, such 
as the ARC and PLC programs,  through Farm Bills.  
 
Ukraine notes that there are no payments under the ARC and PLC programmes in 2015 (according 
to the Table 4.6 of the Report). At the same time, in Supporting Table DS:9 of WTO document 
G/AG/N/USA/121, the United States notified non -product specific support of US$ 5.933 billion under 
ARC-CO and US$ 1.943 billion under PLC.  
 
18. Could the United States, please, explain data relating to non -product specific support presented 
in the Table 4.6 of the Report and in Supporting Table DS:9 of W TO document G/AG/N/USA/121?  
 
RESPONSE: Table 4.6 of the Secretariat's Report presents data from the U.S. notification to the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) for fiscal year 2015, which covers 
the period October 1, 2014 to September  30, 2015, and for fiscal year 2016 (October 1, 2015 
to September 30, 2016). By comparison, several measures notified in Supporting Table DS:9 of 
G/AG/N/USA/121 correspond to crop years 2014 (2014/15) and 2015 (2015/16). For example, 
budgetary outlays for ARC and PLC reported as fiscal year 2016 in the SCM notification 
correspond to crop year 2014 payments, whereas ARC and PLC payments reported in the WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Supporting Table DS:9 report crop year 2015 payments. Pursuant to the provisions of the 2014 
Farm Act, ARC and PLC payments are issued on or after October 1, following the end of the crop 
year. Thus, crop year 2014/15 payments were issued after October 1, 2015, which is in fiscal 
year 2016 (October 1, 2015 to September 30, 2016), and crop year 2015/16 payments were 
issued after October 1, 2016, which is in fiscal year 2017.  
 
Questions 19 -23 
 
Section 4.4.1 Financial services (4.80 -4.90)  
 
The Report presents overviews of structure and relevant legislation, trade and regulatory regimes 
for financial services in the  United States.  
 
19. Could the United States, please, elaborate more on the procedure for the Financial Market Utility 
designation? What are the criteria for systems to be designated? What are the sources of information 
that can be used for such decision -making?  
 
RESPONSE:  Please refer to the Financial Stability Oversight Council's page on designations, 
available at: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx . 
 
20. Would the United States  kindly inform on the basic requirements for non -banking financial 
institution licensing, including requirements for equity, ownership structure and busi ness reputation?  
 
RESPONSE: Please refer to : A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities: Nonbank 
Financials, Fintech and Financial Innovation , available at: https://home.treasury.gov/sites/ 
default/files/2018 -08/A-Financial -System -that-Creates -Economic -Opportunities ---Nonbank -
Financials -Fintech -and-Innovation_0.pdf . 
 
21. What is the current status of the Fintech innovation development in the United States? Are there 
any bilateral agreements or other cooperation programs related to this sphere?  
 
RESPONSE: Please refer to: A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunit ies: Nonbank 
Financials, Fintech and Financial Innovation , available at: https://home.treasury.gov/sites 
/default/files/2018 -08/A-Financial -System -that-Creates -Economic -Opportunities ---Nonbank -
Financials -Fintech -and-Innovation_0.pdf . 
22. Please, share the experience of Arizona in terms of the regulation of the sаndbox: legislation, 
participation criteria, etc.  
 
RESPONSE: Please see the relevant Arizona legislation, available at: https://www.azleg.gov/ 
legtext/53leg/2R/laws/0044.pdf . 
 
23. What are the indicators o f a non -transparent ownership structure and approaches to revealing 
banks' beneficial owners that are used for assessment of banks' ownership structures transparency?  
 
RESPONSE: The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued the Customer Due 
Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, published May 11, 2016, as amended on 
September 29, 2017 ("CDD Rule"). The CDD Rule adds a key new requirement for U.S. financial 
institutions to know the real people who own, control, and profit from companie s (also known 
as "beneficial owners"), and to verify their identities. The CDD Rule is intended to address a 
weakness in the financial system which would otherwise enable criminals, kleptocrats, and 
others looking to hide ill -gotten proceeds to access the financial system anonymously. The 
beneficial ownership requirement addresses this weakness and provides information that assists 
law enforcement in financial investigations, helps prevent evasion of targeted financial sanctions, 
improves the ability of fin ancial institutions to assess risk, facilitates tax compliance, and 
advances U.S. compliance with international standards and commitments.  
 
FinCEN has issued additional guidance to address instances of complexity in a legal entity's 
ownership structure, as  well as means of sufficient identity verification (see, e.g., Frequently 
Asked Questions issued April 3, 2018). See: https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes -and-
regulations/cdd -final-rule. 
 
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
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  PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE REPORT  BY THE UNITED STATES  (WT/TPR/G/382)  
 
Questions 24 -25 
Section 1 THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (1.2)  
 
The Report notes that "U.S. trade policy rests on five major pillars: supporting U.S. national security, 
strengthening the U.S. economy, negotiating better trade deals, aggressive enforcement of U.S. 
trade laws, and reforming the multilateral trading syste m."  
 
According to statistical data, during the period under review the United States` economy continued 
to grow. U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) and U.S. trade are increasing. It is mentioned in 
the Report that the increase in U.S. trade can be att ributed, in part, to stronger economic growth at 
home and abroad.  
 
24. Could the United States, please, explain the main reasons for shifting the focus of U.S. trade 
policy on supporting U.S. national security and aggressive enforcement of U.S. trade laws since the 
last Review in 2016, despite solid growth of the U.S. economy and good near -term prospects?  
 
RESPONSE: Enforcement has long been a tenet of U.S. trade policy. The views of the United 
States regarding the relationship between U.S. trade policy an d national security are articulated 
in the 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report of the President of the United States 
on the Trade Agreements Program, available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/ 
Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.PDF . 
 
25. What are key criteria to adopt appropriate U.S. trade policy measures based on national security 
grounds?  
 
RESPONSE: The views of the United States regarding the relationship between U.S. trade policy 
and national security are articulated in the 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report 
of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, a vailable 
at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Repor
t%20FINAL.PDF . 
 
Questions 26 -30 
Section 4 .1 WTO Agreements and Initiatives (4.3; 4.7, 4.8)  
 
It is mentioned in the Report that the United States has been concerned that the WTO is not 
operating as the contracting parties envisioned and multiple administrations have voiced various 
concerns with the WTO system and the direction in which it has been  headed, in particular concerns 
with the WTO dispute settlement system.  
 
There are following concerns related to functioning of the dispute settlement system:  
 
- the Appellate Body's consistent exceeding of the 90 -day deadline for appeals as defined in Artic le 
17.5 of DSU;  
- the Appellate Body's review of fact -finding (including of the meaning of a WTO Member's 
domestic law) that could be interpreted as exceeding its mandate specified in Article 17.6 of 
DSU; 
- the Appellate Body's decisions pursuant to its Workin g Procedures for Appellate Review (Rule 
15) that purport to "deem" a person whose term of appointment had expired to continue to be 
an Appellate Body member and consistency of such approach with Article 17.2 of DSU.  
 
26. In this regard, could the United St ates, please, clarify concrete ways that, in the U.S. view, could 
lead to the improvement of the dispute settlement system and resolve the above concerns?  
 
RESPONSE: For more than 15 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members. As the United States explained at the most recent General Council mee ting, if WTO 
members say that we support a rules -based trading system, then the WTO Appellate Body must 
follow the rules we agreed to in 1995.  And, so the Appellate Body must circulate its reports 
within 90 days of an appeal.  A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member may not 
continue deciding appeals as if his term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body.  The WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but not limited to those 
relating to domestic law. The Appella te Body may not give advisory opinions on issues that will 
not assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO -inconsistent measure into 
compliance with WTO rules.  The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as 
precedent or provide au thoritative interpretations.  And the Appellate Body may not change 
Members' substantive rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreements.  When 
the Appellate Body abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it 
undermines the legitimacy of the system and damages the interests of all WTO Members who 
care about having the agreements respected as they were negotiated and agreed.  The United 
States will continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute s ettlement system, 
and will continue our efforts and our discussions with Members to seek a solution on these 
important issues.  
 
27. What mechanism within the WTO should be used for the constructive discussions of the urgent 
solution of the issue related to  the functioning of the dispute settlement system?  
 
RESPONSE: See the response to question 26.  
 
Ukraine highly appreciates U .S. efforts to strengthen international rules on fisheries subsidies within 
the WTO negotiations, aimed at implementation of the res pective Ministerial Decision. Ukraine would 
also like to highlight the comprehensiveness of the obligations on harmful fisheries subsidies and 
IUU fishing as well as other environmental provisions in the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement 
(USMCA).  
 
28. In the context of WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies, could the United States, please, 
elaborate on its vision regarding the prohibition of subsidies for fish stocks that have not been 
assessed?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States would welcome the opportuni ty to meet with representatives of 
Ukraine to discuss any matters relating to the ongoing WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies.  
 
29. Could the United States also clarify its position on the maritime zones where fishery subsidies 
relating to IUU, overfis hed stocks, overfishing and overcapacity should be prohibited?  
 
RESPONSE: The United States would welcome the opportunity to meet with representatives of 
Ukraine to discuss any matters relating to the ongoing WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies. 
As a g eneral matter, we see no reason to make distinctions between maritime zones in 
establishing new fisheries subsidies disciplines.  
 
In the Report the United States shares its opinion concerning designation of a "developing country" 
in the WTO. It is given th at "while "least -developed countries" (LDCs) are defined in the WTO using 
the United Nations criteria, there are no WTO criteria for what designates a "developing country". 
Any country may "self -declare" as a developing country, thus entitling itself to al l "special and 
differential" treatment afforded to developing countries under the WTO agreements, as well as any 
new flexibilities afforded to developing countries under current or forthcoming negotiations. In 
practice, this means that more advanced countr ies receive the same flexibilities as very low -income 
countries, despite these more advanced countries` very significant role in the global economy. Such 
disparities, where countries that some institutions categorize as high - or high -middle -income receive 
the same flexibilities as low - or low -middle -income, make it challenging to find balance in the 
application of existing obligations or the development of new commitments."  
 
30. Ukraine would appreciate if the United States could further elaborate on its vi ew with respect to 
definition of a "developing country" in the WTO, in particular how and where such definition may be 
included, based on what characteristics  (economic and trade performance or some other criteria), 
etc. 
 
RESPONSE: The 2018 Trade  Policy  Agenda, available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.PDF , explains the acute 
need for the WTO to change how it approaches questions of development. While "least developed 
countries" (LDCs) are defined in the WTO using the United Nations criteria, there are no WTO 
criteria for what designates a "developing countr y." Any Member may self -declare itself as a 
developing country, thus entitling itself to all special and differential treatment afforded to WT/TPR/M/382/Add.1  
 
- 394 - 
 
  developing countries under the WTO agreements, as well as any new flexibilities afforded to 
developing countries und er current or forthcoming negotiations. In practice, this means that 
more advanced countries, such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, receive the same 
flexibilities as very low -income countries, despite these more advanced countries' very 
significa nt role in the global economy. Such disparities make it challenging to find balance in the 
application of existing obligations or the development of new commitments. The United States 
will work with other like -minded countries to address this concern.  
 
Questions 31 -33 
Section 4.5.2 Promoting Digital Trade (4.84)  
 
The Report notes, that "At the WTO`s 11th Ministerial Conference in December 2017, the United 
States joined 70 other Members in announcing a commitment to initiate exploratory work on 
negotiations on electronic commerce. Since then, the United States has b een actively engaged in 
this initiative, and worked to ensure that it is a productive forum to advance a liberal global 
environment for digital trade. The United States also joined a consensus among WTO Members to 
maintain a moratorium on duties on electro nic transmissions and to continue the longstanding Work 
Program on Electronic Commerce."  
 
31. With a view of the U.S. active engagement in the work within the Joint Statement on Electronic 
Commerce, could the United States provide more information regardin g its view on the list of digital 
trade issues, which could provide the common basis for the future negotiations in this area?  
 
RESPONSE: In the communication circulated in April pursuant to the Joint Statement initiative 
on e-commerce (JOB/GC/178), the Un ited States outlined trade provisions that represent the 
highest standard in safeguarding and promoting digital trade. These provisions relate to free 
flow of information, the fair treatment of digital products, protection of proprietary information, 
and o ther areas. In subsequent meetings of the Joint Statement initiative, the United States has 
offered text -based examples of how it has incorporated these concepts into its FTA practice, 
including in the recently concluded U nited States – Mexico – Canada Agr eement (USMCA). The 
United States continues to believe that such provisions should provide the basis for future 
negotiations in the initiative, and looks forward to engaging with other participants in the 
initiative on these and related digital trade issue s as the initiative moves forward.  
 
Within the framework  of exploratory work under the Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce on the 
issue of the customs duties on electronic transmissions, the United States proposed that "No party 
shall impose customs du ties, fees or charges on or in connection with the importation or exportation 
of digital products transmitted electronically. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 shall not preclude a 
Party from imposing internal taxes, fees or other charges on digital produ cts transmitted 
electronically…".  
 
32. Ukraine would appreciate if the United States could clarify what internal taxes, fees or other 
charges the United States had in mind (please, provide appropriate examples).  
 
RESPONSE: The longstanding WTO e -commerce m oratorium prohibits customs duties on 
electronic transmissions, and does not address domestic taxation. In its FTA practice, the United 
States replicates the effect of the WTO e -commerce moratorium. Like the WTO moratorium, the 
rule included in U.S. FTAs o nly disciplines customs duties, fees, or charges; an additional clause 
clarifies that the rule does not address "internal taxes, fees, or other charges." For example, 
U.S. FTA practice does not discipline value -added taxes imposed on purchases of digital 
products, provided that such taxes are imposed in a non -discriminatory manner on domestic 
and foreign digital products alike.  
 
Within the e -commerce initiative in the WTO the United States supports the idea, that "No 
Party shall require the transfer of, or  access to, source code of software owned by a person 
another Party, or to an algorithm expressed in that source code, as a condition for the 
import, distribution, sale or use of that software, or products containing in its territory".  
 
33. Could the Unite d States kindly clarify whether there are any cases, in which the disclosure of 
the source code can still be required?  
 WT/TPR/M/382/Add .1 
 
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  RESPONSE: The example text captioned above, which is based on the recently concluded U nited 
States – Mexico – Canada Agreement (USMCA), prohibits requirements to transfer source code 
or algorithms as an ex -ante condition of market access. This rule does not prohibit requirements 
to transfer source code when those requirements are not a condition of market access. For 
example, the rule woul d not prohibit regulatory bodies or judicial authorities from requiring that 
businesses share source code or algorithms to facilitate a specific investigation or judicial 
proceeding. Furthermore, in its FTA practice, the United States excludes government 
procurement from the scope of this rule, in recognition of the fact that a government may have 
a legitimate interest in inspecting code that will be installed on government networks.  
__________