WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
14 March  2023 
(23-1881) Page: 1/570 
Trade Policy Review Body  
14 and 16 December 2022  Original: English/anglais/inglés  
 
  
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
UNITED STATES 
MINUTES  OF THE MEETING  
Addendum  
Chairperson: H.E. Mr. Ángel Villalobos Rodríguez (Mexico)  
This document contains the advance written questions  and additional questions by WTO 
Members , and replies provided by  the United  States .1 
 
 
Organe d'examen des politiques commerciales  
14 et 16 décembre 2022  
EXAMEN DES POLITIQUES COMMERCIALES  
ÉTATS-UNIS 
COMPTE RENDU DE LA RÉUNION  
Addendum  
Président : S.E. M. Ángel Villalobos Rodríguez (Mexique)  
Le présent document contient les questions écrites communiquées à l'avance par les 
Membres de l'OMC, leurs questions additionnelles, et les réponses  fournies par  les États  Unis.1 
 
 
Órgano de Examen de las Políti cas Comerciales  
14 y 16 de diciembre de 2022  
EXAMEN DE LAS POLÍTICAS COMERCIALES  
ESTADOS UNIDOS  
ACTA DE LA REUNIÓN  
Addendum  
Presidente: Excmo.  Sr. Ángel Villalobos Rodríguez (México)  
En el presente documento figuran las preguntas presentadas anticipadamente por escrito  y 
las preguntas adicionales de los Miembros de la OMC,  así como las respues tas facilitadas por  los 
Estados  Unidos .1 
  
 
1 In English only ./En anglais seulement./En inglés solamente.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENT  
ARGENTINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  4 
AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  22 
BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  35 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 41 
CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........................  44 
CHILE  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................  61 
CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  73 
CHINA – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ ..............................  122  
COLOMBIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  193  
COSTA RICA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  203  
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  ................................ ................................ .........................  213  
ECUADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  215  
EL SALVADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  218  
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 224  
EUROPEAN UNION – FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS  ................................ ..............................  261  
GUATEMALA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  265  
HONDURAS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  269  
HONG KONG, CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 270  
ICELAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  277  
INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  279  
INDIA  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ ...............................  346  
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  353  
ISRAEL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........................  369  
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  371  
JAPAN  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS ................................ ...............................  374  
KAZAKHSTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  375  
KAZAKHSTAN  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ ...................  375  
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 376  
MALAYSIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  379  
MALAYSIA  - ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ .........................  389  
MEXICO  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  401  
NEW ZEALAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  420  
NORWAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  425  
NORWAY  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTION  ................................ ............................  427  
OMAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  428  
THE PHILIPPINES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  429  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 446  
SAUDI  ARABIA, KINGDOM OF  ................................ ................................ ......................  493  
SINGAPORE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  498  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  500  
CHINESE  TAIPEI  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  518  
THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  530  
THAILAND  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ ........................  537  
TÜRKIYE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  540  
TÜRKIYE  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ ...........................  542  
UKRAINE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  544  
UNITED KINGDOM  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  551  
URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  568  
VIET  NAM  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  569  
 
  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  ARGENTINA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  41, Para graph  2.15 
 
In Paragraph  2.15 the report indicates that the United  States  and the European  Union  announced 
their intention to negotiate by October  2023 the world's first carbon -based sectoral agreement on 
steel and aluminium. As a first step, the two sides reached a provisional agreement on tariffs on 
aluminium  and steel, and agreed to intensify cooperation on non -market spare capacity, trade 
enforcement and customs issues.  
 
QUESTION 1:  What is the tariff reduction agreed for steel and aluminium between the United  States  
and the EU?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum  are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Does this reduction depend on actions linked to the decarbonization of production?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Options for  the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  41, Para graph  2.16 
 
In Paragraph  2.16, the report indicat es that the United  States  is a party to a number of plurilateral 
WTO agreements or initiatives (such as the GPA, the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and the ITA Expansion Agreement), and recently joined 
dome stic regulatory initiatives, e -commerce and trade and environmental sustainability.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Given the importance of the role played by the United  States  in the functioning of 
the multilateral trading system and the importance that the country attaches  to the revitalization of 
the negotiating role of the WTO, Argentina is interested to know whether the United  States  intends 
to accede to the Structured Dialogue on Investment Facilitation for Development.  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States  believes that plurilateral negotiations at the WTO can be a useful 
means to advance issues of interest to Members, foster new ideas and approaches, and build 
momentum toward multilateral outcomes.  The plurilateral nature of these negotiations implies that  
not every Member need participate in each negotiation. Maintaining transparency of such 
negotiations, however, is key to enabling Members to assess their decision about whether to 
participate on an ongoing basis.  
 
Page  45, Para graph  2.31 
 
In Paragraph  2.31, the report indicates that the U .S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
expired on 31  December  2020 and that while new legislation has been proposed to renew it, it has 
not been passed to date.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Could you indicate the current status of th e draft renewal of the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP)?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The U .S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GSP and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program . 
 
Page  51, Para graph  2.41 
 
In Paragraph 2.41, the report indicates that, during the period under review, there have been a 
number of changes in the United  States  investment regime, including a marked trend towards 
increased inspection of foreign investment transactions for national security reasons.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 5:  In which sectors in particular and how is this increase in inspections reflected from 
an operational point of view?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United  States  (CFIUS) exclusively 
exercises jurisdiction over "covered transactions " and "covered real estate transactions ", which are 
defined at 31  C.F.R.  Parts 800 and 802, respectively.  
 
The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) expanded CFIUS' 
jurisdiction over "covered transactions" beyond transactions th at could result in foreign control of a 
U.S. business to also include certain non -controlling, non -passive investments into certain 
businesses involved in critical technology, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data. FIRRMA 
also extended CFIUS' s jurisdiction to "covered real estate transactions ", which involve the purchase 
or lease by, or concession to, a foreign person of certain real estate in the United  States . CFIUS only 
has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects to the extent that they a re involved in a transaction that 
is a "covered transaction" or a "covered real estate transaction" as defined in regulation. These 
authorities are further reflected in regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 
(31 C.F.R.  Part 800 and 3 1 C.F.R.  Part 802) and on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's website 
at: https://home.treasury.g ov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -
in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -laws-and-guidance . 
 
Data on the number of transactions reviewed by CFIUS and trend information on the business sectors 
involved in those transactions can be  found in CFIUS's Annual Report to Congress at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/internatio nal/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-
the-united -states -cfius/cfius -reports -and-tables . 
 
QUESTION 6:  Are there greater requirements to be met by the investor?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Detailed information on the procedures and information required for CFIUS filings 
can be found in regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (31  C.F.R.  Part 800 
and 31  C.F.R.  Part 802) and on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's websit e at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-
the-united -states -cfius/cfius -laws-and-guidance . 
 
Pages  60-61, Section  3.1.1.4  
 
Section  3.1.1.4 develops aspects related to Free Zones and customs warehouses. Considering that 
CBP monitors Free Zones through audits and inspections . 
 
QUESTION 7:  Could the U.S. government specify what control procedures are carried out in Free 
Trade Zones, which customs regimes are audited, and how often?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  It is the responsibility of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to provide 
oversight of bonded faci lities under their audit and inspection protocols.  Customs bonded facilities 
have their own statutory and regulatory authority (regulatory authority is provided in 
19 C.F.R.  Part 19). Every fiscal year, each port of entry is required to conduct compliance reviews 
of all foreign -trade zone and bonded warehouse facilities within its area of responsibility, using a 
risk-based approach. Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) regulations for FTZ audit and inspection protocols 
are provided in 19  C.F.R.  Part 146. Past proprieto r performance and compliance, along with the 
specific type of commodity involved, also play important roles in determining audit frequency.  Audits 
may be scheduled or occur in unannounced spot checks to ensure regulatory compliance and 
inventory accuracy.  See also: https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/bonded -warehouse -
manual -cbp-officers -and-bonded -warehouse -proprietors  
and https://www.cbp.gov/document/guides/foreign -trade-zones -manual . 
 
QUESTION 8:  Do audits and inspections depend on previous risk analyses or are the frequency of 
such audits established in current regulations?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Please see Response to #7.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Can the U.S. government provide information on ex officio border measures 
regarding assets suspected of infringing intellectual property rights in free zones?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 9:  At the border, CBP is authorized to exclude, detain, and seize imported merchandise 
that infringes federally registered and recorded trademarks and copyrights. CBP publishes annual 
statistics of intellectual property seizures at www.cbp.gov/ipr ; this information includes the number 
of seizures, the domestic value, and the Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price (MRSP) of the goods. 
Agency policy dictates that U.S. Customs focus its enforcement efforts on trademarks and t rade 
names that are "recorded" with Customs. Customs Regulations 19  C.F.R.  §§ 133.21 and 133.22 
provide for disclosure of certain information in cases where goods are detained and/or seized for 
violations of the trademark laws. CBP does not record data in a manner that would provide a ready 
response to IPR border measure enforced in FTZs.  
 
QUESTION 10:  Can customs seize ex officio goods suspected of infringing intellectual property 
rights that are in transit in the free zone?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  Yes. CBP has authority to detain or seize merchandise in -transit if it bears a 
counterfeit mark or is a piratical article. See 19 U.S.C.  § 1526(a), (b), and (e). Merchandise or 
packaging introduced or attempted to be introduced into the U.S. in violation of 17  U.S.C.  § 602 
(Section  602 of the Copyright Act of 1976) is subject to seizure under 19  U.S.C.  § 1595a(c)(2)(C), 
including goods transiting FTZs.  
 
Customs regulations implementing copyright enforcement are set forth at 
19 C.F.R.  §§ 133.42 -133.46.  Pursuant to the re gulations, the importation of infringing copies of 
works that have been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office and recorded with CBP is prohibited. 
19 C.F.R.  § 133.42(b).  "Infringing copies" are defined for customs purposes as "piratical articles, 
i.e. copies or phonorecords which are unlawfully made (without the authorization of the copyright 
owner) ". 19 C.F.R.  § 133.42(a). Because merchandise which is in -transit in the Un ited States  has 
been imported into the United  States , CBP has authority to seize it for bearing a counterfeit mark or 
being a piratical article.  
 
Page  61, Para graph  3.13 
 
Paragraph  3.13 indicates that customs warehouses continue to be an important part of the 
U.S. trade regime. In 2020, imports into free zones and customs warehouses amounted to 
USD 217.3  billion .15 In the United  States , customs warehouses were established pursuant to 
19 U.S.C.  1555, while their activities are governed by 19  U.S.C.  19, and this regime has not 
undergone significant changes during the period examined. CBP authorizes 11 different types or 
classes of customs warehouses, primarily for storage, but certain manufacturing or processing 
activities may also be carried out dependin g on the type in question, for example: metal smelting 
and refining, cigar manufacturing, and other customs -controlled manufacturing activities intended 
exclusively for export. Customs warehouses are generally more restrictive than free zones: goods 
can be  stored for a maximum period of five years and the types of processing or manufacturing 
allowed are limited. However, customs warehouses offer advantages such as not having to pay 
duties until the goods leave them for consumption in the United  States  - duties are determined on 
the basis of the last item that leaves the warehouse  - and the ability to export the goods or move 
them to another warehouse.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Could the U.S. Government provide information on whether the current regulations 
on Tax Wareho uses require as a requirement of authorization to operate the obligation to transmit 
in real time to CBP systems the existing stock of goods?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  CBP oversees customs bonded warehouses, as established pursuant to 
19 U.S.C.  § 1555 and 19  C.F.R.  Parts 19 and 144.  We note that although goods entered into CBP's 
bonded warehouses may receive tax deferral benefits, the U.S. Department of Treasury's Alcohol 
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) has oversight over domestic bonded facilities that provide 
specialized tax deferral treatment for alcohol, tobacco, and similar goods.  As such, we note that this 
response only addresses CBP's bonded warehouses, rather than TTB's "tax warehouses".  In terms 
of regulatory requirements, 19  C.F.R.  § 144.32 generally re quires parties to provide CBP with 
updated quantities in a summary statement for each withdrawal that occurs from a bonded 
warehouse.  However, there are exceptions to this rule.  For example, under 19  C.F.R.  § 144.34(c), 
for integrated class 2 bonded wareho uses (an importer's private bonded warehouse used exclusively 
for the storage of merchandise belonging or consigned to the proprietor thereof) and class 9 bonded 
warehouses (duty -free stores), the importer may apply to CBP to receive approval to transfer 
merchandise between the integrated warehouses without filing a withdrawal or a rewarehouse entry.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Strict centralized inventory controls are required for importers granted this priv ilege.  Merchandise 
transferred between warehouses will be treated as though it remains in the first warehouse so long 
as the actual location of the merchandise at all times is recorded as required.  Finally, we note that 
withdrawals for exportation from a c lass 9 bonded warehouse (duty -free store) may be recorded 
using sales tickets and tracked with a sales ticket register (accounting record).  See 
19 C.F.R.  § 144.37(h).  When a warehouse entry is closed out, the warehouse proprietor must verify 
that the sales  ticket register total with the amount withdrawn.  Under this process, CBP does not 
require real time reporting of existing stock in class 9 bonded warehouses.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Could you say whether CBP also conducts periodic checks on eligibility to maintain 
a customs warehouse clearance?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  CBP conducts the vetting of corporate officers, and warehouse/Free Trade Zone 
manager/proprietors, followed by a physical inspection of the premises of the new facility requesting 
bonded status, or review a requ est for alteration, relocation, suspension, and/or discontinuance of 
an existing facility to include bonded warehouse along with re -vetting of key employees to ensure 
compliance.  
 
Page  62, Para graph  3.15 
 
Paragraph  3.15 indicates that during the period und er review, CBP undertook a number of initiatives 
aimed at reducing IPR and other infringements. Since 2015, CBP has facilitated the reporting of 
trade violations by establishing the Electronic Pleadings Program, which allows for electronic 
reporting of sus pected violations to CBP. A dedicated website has been created.20 The Grant 
Acceptance Program (DAP) was established in FY 2015 as an arrangement to work more closely with 
the sector to improve trade facilitation and law enforcement activities. With regard  to IPR 
enforcement, since the inception of the Program, CBP has entered into 43 IPR -related DPI 
partnerships to accept tools and technology to verify and authenticate goods.  
 
QUESTION 13:  Could you indicate under which legal instruments the 43 association s with which 
you work in the verification and authentication of goods were formalized?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The Donations Acceptance Program Regulations can be found in 19  C.F.R.  § 133.61.  
The Donations Acceptance Program was established in FY 2015 to explore, foster, and facilitate 
partnerships for port of entry infrastructure and technology improvements.  
 
Section  482 of the Homeland Security Act, 2002, as amended by Section  2 of the Cross -Border Trade 
Enhancement Act, 2016, P.L.  114-279, (Section  482) augments CBP's ability to implement this 
initiative by authorizing CBP and the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) to collectively 
accept donations of real property, personal property, money, and non -personal services from private 
sector and Govern ment entities. Section  482 supersedes Section  559 of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2014, P.L.  113-76 (Section  559) while not affecting any agreement entered into 
nor any proposal accepted for consideration on or before 15 December  2016.  More informa tion can 
be found on the CBP.gov website at:  https://www.cbp.gov/border -security/ports -entry/resource -
opt-strategy /public -private -partnerships/donation -acceptance -program . 
 
QUESTION 14:  Are goods in violation of the IPR seized/seized by CBP?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Yes, CBP has the authority to seize goods in violation of intellectual property rights 
as per 19  C.F.R.  § 133.43.  
 
QUESTION 15:  What is the final destination of those infringing goods?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  Under 19  C.F.R.  § 133.52 (Disposition of forfeited merchandise), CBP disposes of 
infringing goods as follows:  
 
a) Trademark (other than counterfeit) or trade name vio lations.  Articles forfeited 
for violation of the trademark laws, other than articles bearing a counterfeit trademark, 
shall be disposed of in accordance with the procedures applicable to forfeitures for 
violation of the Customs laws, after the removal or o bliteration of the name, mark, or 
trademark by reason of which the articles were seized ; WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  b) Copyright violations.  Articles forfeited for violation of the copyright laws shall be 
destroyed ; 
c) Articles bearing a counterfeit trademark.  Merchandise forfeited for vi olation of the 
trademark laws shall be destroyed, unless it is determined that the merchandise is not 
unsafe or a hazard to health and the Commissioner of Customs or his designee has the 
written consent of the U.S. trademark owner, in which case the Commis sioner of 
Customs or his designee may dispose of the merchandise, after obliteration of the 
trademark, where feasible, by:  
1) Delivery to any Federal, State, or local government agency that, in the opinion of 
the Commissioner or his designee, has established a need for the merchandise; 
or 
2) Gift to any charitable institution that, in the opinion of the Commissioner or his 
designee, has established a need for the merchandise; or  
3) Sale at public auction, if more than 90  days has passed since the forfeiture and 
Customs has determined that no need for the merchandise has been established 
under paragraph (c)(1)  (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -19/section -
133.52#p -133.52(c)(1) ) or (c)(2)  (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -
19/section -133.52#p -133.52(c)(2) ) of this section.  
 
QUESTION 16:  What is the number of IPR court cases (civil or criminal) and law enforcement 
actions carried out by police and customs?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  CBP works with partner government agencies to facilitate legitimate trade. CBP and 
Immigratio n and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  - Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) identify 
cases in which third -party intermediaries have demonstrably directed, assisted financially, or aided 
and abetted the importation of counterfeit merchandise. In coordination w ith the Department of 
Justice, CBP and ICE -HSI seek all available statutory authorities to pursue civil fines and other 
penalties against these entities, including remedies under 19  U.S.C.  § 1526(f), as appropriate. In 
Fiscal Year 2021, ICE -HSI arrested 38 8 individuals, obtained 155  indictments, and received 
100 convictions related to intellectual property crimes.  
 
QUESTION 17:  What is the value of seizures made by judicial enforcement authorities (civil and 
criminal), police and customs during the reportin g period?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  In Fiscal Year 2022, CBP seized counterfeit goods with an estimated manufacturer's 
suggested retail price (MSRP) of nearly $3  billion , had the goods been genuine.  
 
QUESTION 18:  What kind of objects/merchandise were seized by judicial enforcement authorities 
(civil and criminal), police and customs  – respectively  - during the reporting period?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  In Fiscal Year 2022, CBP seized a variety of counterfeit goods. The top seized goods 
during this period were watches/jewel ry, handbags/wallets, wearing apparel/accessories, and 
consumer electronics.  
 
Page  120-121, Para graph  3.179 and 3.180  
 
Paragraphs 3.179 and 3.180 develop aspects related to customs procedures and requirements 
affecting exports.  
 
QUESTION 19:  Can the U.S. G overnment detail the legal and regulatory requirements needed to 
register as an importer/exporter?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  Registration as an importer starts with Customs Form 5106.  Section  24.5 of the 
Customs Regulations (19  C.F.R.  § 24.5) states that each person, business firm, Government agency, 
or other organization shall file Customs Form 5106, Notification of Importer's Number or Application 
for Importer's Number, or Notice of Change of Name or Address, with the first formal entry which is 
submitted. A Customs Form 5106 shall also be filed for the ultimate consignee for which such entry WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  is being made. CBP is authorized to collect the federal taxpayer identification number issued by the 
IRS or social security number (SSN) for doing business with the agency.  
 
QUES TION 20:  Can you indicate the grounds for suspension or deletion of importers and exporters' 
records?  
RESPONSE 20:  The following pertains to suspension or deletion of importer records.  Pursuant to 
19 C.F.R.  § 24.5(e), an importer identification number shall remain on file until one year from the 
date on which it is last used.  If not used for one year and there is no outstanding transaction to 
which it must be associated, CBP has the authority to void the importer identification num ber from 
the system of record, after which the party would need to submit another Customs Form 5106.  
 
Separately, CBP may suspend or debar a person, as defined by 2  C.F.R.  § 180.985, who has been, 
is, or may reasonably be expected to be a participant, as d efined by 2  C.F.R . § 180.980, a principal, 
as defined by 2  C.F.R . § 180.995, or a contractor, as defined by 48  C.F.R.  § 9.403 for cause. Some 
examples of causes for suspension or debarment:  
 
1. Convictions or Civil Judgments for Criminal and Civil Violatio ns; 
a. Violations Relating to Public Contracts and Transactions (fraud; anti -trust; theft; 
bribery; false statements; etc.) ; 
b. Violations of Certain Statutes (Made in America; Drug Free Workplace; etc.) ; 
c. Other Offenses Indicating a Lack of Business Hon esty; 
2. Performance of Public Contracts and Transactions (willful failure to perform; history of 
failure to perform) ; 
3. Certain Labor and Trade Violations (FAR  9.403) ; 
4. Additional Causes Under 2  C.F.R . §§ 180.700 and 180.800 ; 
5. Failure to pay a single substantial debt or a number of outstanding debts ; 
6. Violation of a material provision of any settlement of a debarment or suspension action ; 
7. Failure to disclose criminal law violations ; 
8. Other Serious or Compelling Causes ; 
9. Representation by Corporations Regarding Delinquent Tax Liability or a Felony 
Conviction under any Federal Law (FAR  52.209 -11); 
A full list of causes for suspension and debarment can be found at:  
 
• Suspension: 48  C.F.R.  § 9.407 -2 and 2  C.F.R.  § 180.700 ; 
• Debarment: 48  C.F.R.  § 9.406 -2 and 2  C.F.R . § 180.800 . 
 
Page  121, Para graph  3.181  
 
Paragraph  3.181 indicates that the Constitution (Article  I, Section  9) prohibits the application of 
export taxes, but authorizes the application of fees for certain services rendered (Article  I, 
Section  10), such as inspection and certification fees for exports of agricultural products.  
 
QUESTION 21:  What is the so -called "inspection fee" applied in connection with an export?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Since entry into force of th e Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2015, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) has been responsible for publishing fees and charges other than import 
and export duties and other than taxes within the purview of Article  III of GATT  1994 in connection WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  with the importation or exportation of goods.  For a list of such current fees please 
see: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/basic -import -export/user -fee-table. 
 
QUESTION 22:  What operations d oes it reach?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  Please see response to Question  21. 
 
QUESTION 23:  Is this fee mandatory regardless of when CBP inspection and/or control occurs?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  Please see response to Question  21. 
 
QUESTION 24:  Can your payment be waived if the task is completed during CBP's working day?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  Please see response to Question  21. 
 
Page  124, Para graph  3.198  
 
Paragraph  3.198 elaborates on aspects related to the duty drawback regime.  
 
QUESTION 25:  Since the request for duty drawback has b een filed, how long does it take on 
average for the United  States  Government to make effective the accreditation of such amounts to 
the interested party?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  In calendar years 2021 and 2022, drawback claims have liquidated within an 
average of 27  months of the original claim date.  
 
Regarding disbursement of the refund/payment, more than 85% of drawback claimants are eligible 
for an estimated, upfront drawback payment pursuant to 19  CFR 190.92 which is disbursed within 
3 weeks of the claim date. Fo r the claimants that do not receive the estimated payment at the time 
of claim filing, payment is usually made within 3  weeks of the claim's final liquidation date.  
 
QUESTION 26:  Could you briefly explain the administrative/IT procedure taken into account for the 
settlement and subsequent repayment of duties?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  All drawback claims are filed electronically within the Automated Commercial 
Environment (ACE) in accordance with strict policy and technical requirements. When a claim is 
transmitted to CBP, the claimed dollar amounts are validated electronically against the entry data 
maintained within CBP's automated data systems: claims that fail the validations (i.e.  overclaim the 
available dollars on an entry record) are automatically rejected back t o the filer; claims that pass 
the validations are accepted, then manually reviewed according to internal risk management 
procedures.  
 
Drawback specialists are responsible for reviewing claims and ensuring the claim amount does not 
exceed what is allowed by law. Drawback specialists will review/liquidate the claim in ACE and either 
approve the claimed amount or diminish/deny the claim as appropriate. The final liquidated amount 
is recorded in ACE by the drawback specialist, and ACE will automatical ly schedule either a bill or a 
disbursement, depending on the whether an estimated, upfront payment was paid at the time the 
claim was received. All liquidations are reviewed by CBP within one week of the liquidation date and 
if a refund payment is determi ned to be valid, the payment is allowed to proceed; invalid payments 
are cancelled.  
 
Page  71, Para graph  3.42 
 
In Paragraph  3.42, the report indicates that tariffs in Chapters 1 through 97 of the U .S. Tariff 
Schedule are fully bound, except for two tariff l ines on crude oil (subheadings 2709.00.10 and 
2709.00.20 of the HTSUS).  
 
QUESTION 27:  What is the reason why the United  States  has not bound tariffs for the above 
positions?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 11 - 
 
  RESPONSE 27:  The United  States , on average, has some of the lowest bound and appl ied tariffs 
among all WTO  Members. The referenced tariff lines above reflect the U.S. market access 
commitments made during the Uruguay Round.  
 
QUESTION 28:  Do you plan to do so in the future?  
 
RESPONSE 28:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  75, Para graph  3.52 
 
In Paragraph  3.52, the report mentions that, since 1986, the COBRA Act authorizes CBP to collect 
user fees for vario us services, in particular to offset the cost of inspections and that these rates are 
adjusted annually for inflation, so they have recently been modified for fiscal year 2022.  
 
QUESTION 29:  Beyond the adjustment made for annual inflation, under what criteria or parameters 
is the value of the COBRA Act rates determined?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  CBP is not authorized to determine the value of the COBRA fees beyond the annual 
adjustment for inflation.  The COBRA fees are set in statute by Congress, initially by the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act  (COBRA) (Public Law  99-272) that was enacted in 1986 and 
codified in 19  U.S.C.  § 58c. The second time Congress adjusted the fees was by Section  892 of the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004  (Public Law  108-357) which amended 19  U.S.C.  § 58c to 
1) renew the fees established under COBRA, and 2)  allow the Secretary of the Treasury to increase, 
no sooner than fiscal year 2006, such fees by an amount not to exceed 10 %. The 10 % increase took 
effect on 1 April 2007; s ee 72  Federal  Register  3730 ( 26 January  2007).  The fees remained at the 
2007 amounts until 2018, when the minimum threshold was reached to make the first adjustment 
for inflation, as mandated by the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015  (FAST  Act) 
(P.L. 114-94). Annual FAST Act adjustment s were also made for each fiscal year from 2019 through 
2022.  
 
Page  105, Para graph  3.136  
 
In Paragraph  3.136, the report refers to the measures implemented by the United  States  
government, based on Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, to determi ne the effect of 
steel imports on national security, which resulted in a 25% increase in the tariff applied to imports 
from all countries. with a few exceptions.  
 
QUESTION 30:  Does the measure have deadlines for review or does it have no expiration date?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  Under Section  232, the President has the authority to determine the nature and 
duration of the action that,  in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of 
the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
QUESTION 31:  On what circumstances does a possible revocation depend?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  Under Section  232, the President has the authority to determine the nature and 
duration of the action that,  in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of 
the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
Page  109, Para graph  3.146  
 
In Paragraph  3.146, the report mentions the Sectio n 232 investigation initiated by USDOC in 
May 2018 to determine whether imports of automobiles, including sport utility vehicles, light vans 
and trucks, and auto parts threatened to undermine the national security of the United  States . The 
Secretary of Com merce subsequently concluded that the current quantities and circumstances of 
imports of automobiles and certain auto parts were weakening the domestic economy of the 
United  States  and threatening to undermine national security as defined in Section  232, a nd 
recommended negotiating a deal or imposing tariffs of up to 35 %. 
 
QUESTION 32:  Could the U.S. government indicate the status of negotiations for such an 
agreement?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 12 - 
 
   
RESPONSE 32:  On 23 May 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine 
the effects on the national security of imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, vans and light 
trucks, and automotive parts. This investigation was initiated under Section  232 of  the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. On 17 February  2019, the Secretary transmitted a report with 
his findings that automobiles and certain automobile parts are being imported into the United  States  
in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the 
United  States . A public version of this report was published in July  2021. In May  2019, President 
Trump concurred with the Secretary's findings and directed the United  States  Trade Representative 
to pur sue negotiation of agreements to address the threatened impairment of the national security. 
The President has not taken any other action concerning automobiles and automobile parts imports 
under Section  232. 
 
QUESTION 33:  Does the U .S. plan to impose tariffs of up to 35%?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  224, Para graph  4.138  
 
In Paragraph  4.138. the report indicates that the United  States  has not set itself a national 
renewable energy target and does not have a specific federal support mechanism. However, the 
Public Services Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 requires regulated utilities to purchase electricity from 
alternative energy sources p roduced by "eligible facilities" at rates that cover the costs of such 
production. Incentives are also granted in the form of tax credits for investment in the installation 
of solar panels, and tax credits for the production of electricity generated by win d turbines. Although 
in 2021 wind and solar still accounted for 3.4% and 1.5%, respectively, of primary energy 
production, their growth rate has been high; In fact, overall, electricity generated by wind power 
has surpassed that generated by hydroelectric sources since August  2019. Thirty -one states and the 
District of Col umbia have enacted renewable energy portfolio rules; Each sets out its own policies, 
eligible sources and technologies, trade rules and specific objectives.  
 
QUESTION 34:  Could the United  States  explain how the government ensures consistency between 
district -wide renewable energy trade policies and regulations?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  Federal laws and regulations set nationwide rules and requirements for renewable 
energy; individual states' policies and measures must meet the requirements of federal statutes, 
which are implemented primarily by the U.S. Department of Energy.  
 
Page  220, Para graph  4.15 
 
In Paragraph  4.15, the report indicates that the U.S. government assigned the Interagency Task 
Force on Trade in Marine Products to enhance fair and reciprocal trade in marine products and to 
make recommendations to the USTR Office on a comprehensive interagency seafoo d trade strategy 
to identify opportunities to improve access to foreign markets through policy and negotiations. 
Commercial. On 5 August  2020, the Task Force submitted recommendations to the USTR Office, 
which communicated its Marine Products Trade Strateg y to the President on 3 November  2020.  
 
QUESTION 35:  Could you indicate what the above -mentioned strategy consists of and whether it 
is in force despite the change of national authorities in 2021?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  The comprehensive interagency seafood trade s trategy identifies opportunities to 
improve access to foreign markets through trade policy and negotiations, actions the Administration 
could pursue to resolve technical barriers to United  States  seafood exports, and means to support 
fair market access for  United  States  seafood products by ensuring that U.S. exports can compete on 
a fair and level playing field by supporting seafood product traceability, promoting comparable 
sustainable fisheries management practices, and broadening the use of domestic enfo rcement tools 
to address unfair practices by other nations. As directed by the Executive  Order, the Interagency 
Task Force on Trade in Marine Products submitted this strategy to the President (during the previous 
Administration) by the deadline specified i n the Executive  Order on Promoting American Seafood 
Competitiveness and Economic Growth.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  41, Para graph  2.15 
 
Point 2.2.2/  2.15 mentions the intention of the United  States  and the European  Union  to negotiate 
by October  2023 the world's first sectoral agreement based on low carbon intensity for steel and 
aluminium. According to the joint communiqué, countries will be invited to join this initiative with a 
view to cooperation in regulating excess capacity in steel production, in particular.  
 
QUESTION 36:  Could you comment on how the working group's negotiations have progressed and 
whether countries have already been invited to collaborate on the initiative?  
 
RESPONSE 36:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  46, Para graph  2.32 
 
Point 2.32 mentions the en try into force on 1 January  2020 of the second Japan -U.S. Digital Trade 
Agreement (USJTA), which did not require any changes to U .S. law and is considered a binding 
treaty.  
 
QUESTION 37:  Could you indicate whether the agreement's data privacy legal framework is within 
the CBPR System (Cross -Border Privacy System)?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  Recognizing that the U.S. and Japan may take different legal approaches to 
protecting personal information, the U.S. and Japan have agreed that the APEC Cross -Border Privacy 
Rules system is a valid mechanism under the USJDTA to facilitate cross -border information transfers 
while protecting personal information.  
 
Page  45, Section  2.3.2.2  
 
In December  2020, the GSP expired and since then the U.S. Congress has worked in negotiatio ns 
to update a new text that updates the program that already has 50  years of existence.  
 
QUESTION 38:  What is the legislative evolution in relation to the restitution of the system?  
 
RESPONSE 38:  The U.S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GS P and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program.  
 
QUESTION 39:  The new text is expected to include strong eligibility criteria regarding the fight 
against child labor, environmental protection, workers' rights, transpar ency of governors, protection 
and standards of intellectual property rights, data protection and privacy, economic empowerment 
of women. What standards are expected to be met by the new eligibility criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  Different bills propose additional eligibility criteria.  However, there is no one 
agreed -upon final bill.  After the program is reauthorized, and we have seen the text of the final bill, 
we will be in a better position to analyze its applicability.  
 
Page  57, Section  3.1.1.1  
 
Five projects based on the Silicon Valley Innovation Program (SVIP) were underway in 2022 using 
a combination of technology solutions to track goods from origin to delivery in the steel, pipelined 
oil, pipelined natural gas, e -commerce and food safety sectors.  
 
QUESTION 40:  Will the United  States  seek to advance in some pilot traceability scheme with trading 
partners, that is, with which it has free trade agreements, or does it plan to apply by sectors and 
intensity of trade to evaluate new technologies and trade administration?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  Most up-to-date information on the five pilot projects and other proof -of-concept 
initiatives can be found on the CBP website here: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/ace/whats -new-
innovation . Plans for next step are still under review, and as decisions are made they will be 
announced on the CBP website.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 14 - 
 
  Page  62, Section  3.1.1.5  
 
CBP is responsible for identifying various types of trade violations and enforcing relevant legislation. 
It is also responsible for implementing the prohibition on the importation of goods, products, articles 
and merchandise extracted, produced or manufactured in whole or in part in any foreign country by 
prisoners or through forced labor (/19  U.S.C.  Chapter  4). 
 
QUESTI ON 41:  Could you indicate where you can see an up -to-date list of the countries and goods 
identified by customs under infringement?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  Customs and Border statistics on infringement including seizures, can be found at 
the CBP website here: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats . 
 
Page  84, Section  3.1.6.1.1.3  
 
On 20 September  2021, the Department of Commerce published in the Federal Register the final 
version of the Regulation to Improve the Administration and Enforcement of Anti -Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Legislation. With regard to the order of "new exporters", certain requirements 
are established such as the certification of non -affiliated companies that demonstrate that they have 
not purchased the product from the exporter during the period of investigation and that the producer 
provides the necessary information requested by Commerce regarding purchases of the product.  
 
QUESTION 42:  Could you indicate what type of information must be submitted to the Department 
of Commerce by the exporter in order to make the application and whether the exporter can file the 
application after the publication in the Federal Register of the annual administrative review of the 
trade defense measure?  
 
RESP ONSE 42:  A request for a new shipper review must provide the date of the first sale to an 
unaffiliated customer in the United  States , volume and pricing data, and any subsequent sales to 
the United  States . In the case of a non -producing exporter, the reque st must include certifications 
regarding affiliation and that there were no exports by either party (producer or exporter) during 
the period of review. In antidumping proceedings involving imports from nonmarket -economy 
countries, the request must include certification that the export activities of the exporter are not 
controlled by the central government. An exporter can request a new shipper review within one year 
of the date on which subject merchandise was first entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for  
consumption, or, if the exporter or producer cannot establish the date of the first entry, then the 
date on which it first shipped  the merchandise  for export  to the United  States.  
 
Page  104, Section  3.1.7.1.1  
 
With regard to agreements reached with some countries for the administration of steel trade, the 
Secretariat's report mentions that disputes with Canada and Mexico were closed in 2019 after the 
parties notified that they had reached a mutually agreed solution.  
 
QUESTION 43:  Could you please ind icate how the administration of steel trade with Canada and 
Mexico works in practice?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  In Proclamation  9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States ) and Proclamation  9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminu m Into the 
United  States ), the President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided 
to adjust the imports of steel and aluminum articles by imposing a 25 % ad valorem  tariff on imports 
of steel articles and imposing a 10 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminum articles, so that such 
imports will not threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations also stated that any 
country with which the United  States has a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the 
United  States  alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused 
by imports from that country. Should the United  States  and any such country arrive at a satis factory 
alternative means to address the threat to the national security such that the President determines 
that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, the President may 
remove or modify the restriction on such import s from that country and, if necessary, make any 
corresponding adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries as U.S. national security 
interests require.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 15 - 
 
  In the proclamations, the President stated that, in his judgment, the measures reached with Canada 
and Mexico will provide an effective, long -term alternative means to address any contribution 
Canada and Mexico steel and aluminum articles imports contribute to the threatened impairment to 
the national security of the United  States . 
 
Page  291, Table  A3.3 
 
Table  A3. 3 Import prohibitions, restrictions and other measures (2022) report by the Secretariat.  
This table mentions the BIS and Article  XXI of the GATT as the legal basis for the regime derogating 
from Section  232 Import Quota for Steel Products from Argentina. The Foreign Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962, Section  232. 
 
QUESTION 44:  Could you indicate what the deadlines for replies are, once requests for exceptions 
have been submitted and no opposition comments have been submitted fr om the local productive 
sector?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  On 14 December  2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and 
Security published an interim rule on the Section  232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff Exclusions Process. 
This interim final rule revised as pects of the process for requesting exclusions from the duties and 
quantitative limitations on imports of aluminum and steel discussed in three previous Department 
of Commerce interim final rules implementing the exclusion process authorized by the Preside nt 
under Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. The interim rule addressed the 
need to create a more efficient method for approving exclusions where objections have not been 
received in the past for certain steel or aluminum articles. It also addressed a trend identified by 
commenters and validated in data reviewed by Commerce —that certain exclusion requesters may 
have requested more volume than they may have needed for their own business purposes compared 
to past usage. Additional  information  on the exclusions  process  can be found  
at: https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations . 
 
Page  127, Section  3.2.5  
 
It is mentioned that in certain circumstances, EXIM may approve funding even if the 51 % threshold 
is not reached.  
 
QUESTION 45:  Could you indicate what those circumstances would be?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  EXIM may provide financing for transactions in a "Transformational Export Area" 
with less th an 51% U.S. content if certain criteria are met.  Please 
see: https://www.exim.gov/about/special -initiatives/ctep/7 -factors -jobs-plan for further details.  
 
Page  272, Sec tion 4.4.5  
 
The report mentions Executive  Orders  13942, 13943 and 13971, which seek to limit the functions 
of some social networks because they consider that they represent a threat to the privacy and 
security of citizens. These orders were later revoked b y Executive  Order No.  14034  in June  2021; 
however, that directive required the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report to the Assistant to 
the President and National Security Advisor to recommend further executive and legislative action 
to address the ris ks posed and reports that the DOC continues to work with the CSN on dich and the 
Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor on those recommendations.  
 
QUESTION 46:  Could you indicate whether work is continuing on this report and what NIST pri vacy 
framework is implemented in 2020 as a voluntary tool for organizations to detect and manage 
privacy -related risks?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The U.S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GSP and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program.  Regarding future plans, the 
United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  131, Table  3.26 
 
Table  3.26 of the WTO Secretariat Report on Federal (Non -Agricultural) Subsidy Programs, 
FY2018 -2020 shows that the second most important program for fiscal year 2020 was the rebate WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 16 - 
 
  for biodiesel and renewable diesel, through income tax relief, Consumption tax relief and direct 
payments.  
 
QUESTION 47:  Could the U.S. provide detailed information on the operation of such a program, to 
which USD 5.12 billion  of funds were disbursed for fiscal year 2020?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  The referenced program is a tax credit for biodiesel or renewable diesel used as a 
fuel. The credit is equal to USD 1.00 per gallon for biodiesel (including agri -biodiesel). In addition, 
small producers of biodiesel are eligible for a 10 cent per gallon income tax credit.  This program was 
included in the United  States ' subsidy notification (see, G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021, Page 32). 
 
Page  205, Chart  2.4 
 
With regard to domestic support to agriculture reported by the U .S. in the Amber Box detailed in 
Figure  4.4 of the WTO Secretariat Report, it is found that for the 2018/19 and 2019/20 seasons, the 
current total product -specific and non -specific AMS far exceeded the current total AMS bound by the 
U.S. in its WTO schedule of concessions (USD  19.1 billion ). 
 
QUESTION 48:  Could the U .S. explain the very significant increase in the current total AMS granted 
to its agricultural sector during the last two seasons of the period under review and comment on 
what corrective measures it is taking to ensure that subsequent subsidies do not contin ue to exceed 
their bound AMS value?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  The increase in the Current Total AMS in 2018/19 and 2019/20 was due to two ad 
hoc, temporary programs that were targeted at assisting agricultural producers adversely impacted 
by trade retaliation and the COVID -19 pandemic. These two programs, the Market Facilitation 
Program (MFP) and the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP), are no longer in effect. For 
both 2018/19 and 2019/20, the Current Total AMS was below the Bound Total AMS and the 
United  State s is in compliance with its WTO commitments.  
 
Page  81-84, Section  3.1.6.1, Section  3.1.6.2, Section  3.1.6.3  
 
In relation to paragraph 3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures in the WTO Secretariat 
Report and more specifically with respect to the s tatistics on trade remedies in force detailed in 
paragraphs 3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures and 3.1.6.1.3 Countervailing measures, the increasing 
numbers of both anti -dumping and countervailing duties in force during the period under review are 
surprising,  as well as whether they are compared with the numbers of the pre -examination period.  
 
QUESTION 49:  To what does the U .S. attribute the increasing number of new anti -dumping and 
subsidy investigations and the increasing number of anti -dumping and countervailing measures in 
force during the period under review?  
 
RESPONSE 49:  The United  States  administers its trade remedy laws in strict accordance with WTO 
rules, and its antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are generally initiated in re sponse 
to petitions filed by the U.S. industry. The decision to impose an antidumping or countervailing 
measure is based purely on a factual determination of whether the dumping or subsidization exists 
and whether that dumping or subsidization has caused o r threatens to cause material injury to a 
domestic industry. Where dumping (or subsidization), injury or threat thereof, and a causal link have 
been found, the United  States  will impose an antidumping or countervailing duty measure.  
 
QUESTION 50:  How does the United  States  explain the small number of suspension agreements 
reached compared to the almost 500 anti -dumping measures that were in force on 
31 December  2021?  
 
RESPONSE 50:  Suspension agreements are between the respondents (and foreign government if 
CVD) and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Normally, the respondents initiate the request for a 
suspension agreement during the original investigation. The United  States  does not believe that a 
correlation can be drawn between the number of measures and the  number of suspension 
agreements in place, as the desire to enter into a suspension agreement is case specific and based 
on the facts and circumstances present during the investigation. Moreover, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce maintains certain legal and policy thresholds for entering into suspension agreements.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 17 - 
 
  QUESTION 51:  What factors prevent a greater number of suspension agreements from being 
reached?  
 
RESPONSE 51:  See response to Question  50 above.  
 
QUESTION 52:  Is there any instance in which the investigating authority has suggested a price 
undertaking, within the meaning of Article  8.4 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 52:  Draft suspension agreements initialed  by Commerce and foreign respondents or 
governments and final suspension agreements in force can be found on the U.S. Department of 
Commerce's website ( https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx ), in the Federal  Register, or (for older 
segments) in paper form in the Central Records Unit at the U.S. Department of Commerce.  
 
QUESTION 53:  How does the investigating authority determine whether or not the proposal 
eliminates the injurious effect of dumping as set out in Article  8.1 of the AD Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 53:  See response to Question  50 above. The U.S. Department of Commerce examines 
each proposal with a view towards whether the statutory requirements can be met and whether the 
facts and circumstances of the inv estigation warrant departing from the normal course of completing 
the investigation.  
 
QUESTION 54:  In view of Article  8.3 in fine of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, is the exporter given 
the opportunity to comment in cases where it is decided not to accept the  proposed price agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 54:  Yes, a respondent could comment in the event the U.S. Department of Commerce 
declines to open negotiations towards an agreement or decides not to accept a proposed price 
agreement. Further, the U.S. Department of Co mmerce provides an opportunity for the proposing 
party and other interested parties to comment on the proposal for a suspension agreement during 
certain times in the original investigation.  
 
Page  137, Para graph  3.249  
 
Paragraph  3.249 refers to responsibilities for the formulation, implementation and enforcement of 
SPS measures and the division of competencies among government agencies according to the 
products and the type of risk of each product.  
 
QUESTION 55:  Are these responsibilities and com petencies responsible for economic impact 
analyses?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  Yes, along with other agencies that would also perform economic analysis 
depending on the significance of the regulatory action. Executive  Orders  13563 and 12866 require 
agencies to provide a careful and transparent analysis of the anticipated consequences of significant 
regulatory actions. This analysis includes an assessment and, to the extent feasible, a quantification 
of benefits and costs anticipated to result from the proposed action an d from alternative regulatory 
actions. In addition, other laws such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act require agencies to evaluate the costs and benefits of certain rulemaking activities.  
 
QUESTION 56:  If so, is this ty pe of analysis performed for all SPS projects?  
 
RESPONSE 56:  The type of analysis depends on the significance of the regulatory action.  
 
QUESTION 57:  Are there cases where SPS projects are terminated because of their economic 
impact?  
 
RESPONSE 57:  Regulatory impact analyses are important to determine whether to move forward 
with, not move forward with, or modify a proposed SPS -related regulation. A determination of 
economic significance means that a rule will require more analysis to move forward, but in and of 
itself does not lead to the termination of a proposed rule. Executive  Order  12866 requires an analysis 
of the costs and benefits of rules and, to the extent permitted by law, action only on the basis of a 
reasoned determination that the benef its justify the costs.  
 
Page  140, Para graph  3.261  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 18 - 
 
   
QUESTION 58:  What are the reasons why the publication of a Pest Risk Analysis may be delayed?  
 
RESPONSE 58:  Pest risk analyses (PRAs) are complex documents that require the collection and 
analysis of extensive information from multiple sources. Their development does not adhere to a 
specific timeframe.  
 
Page  140, Para graph  3.262  
 
QUESTION 59:  Why does SPS notif ications not state in some of its SPS notifications USA whether 
the measure is based on international standards?  
 
RESPONSE 59:  The United  States  notifies measures that are aligned with international standards, 
or when international standards, guidelines, o r recommendations are partially applicable. The 
United  States  also notifies measurers that are not aligned with international standards or where no 
relevant international standard exists. In cases where there are deviations, the United  States  
provides a sc ientific justification for its measures.  
 
Page  205, Para graph  4.71 
 
In the 2019/2020 marketing year, the USA reported much higher Amber Box support than previous 
periods as a result of the Market Facilitation Programme (MFF) budget increase, i.e. product -specific 
support for essential commodities (i.e. maize and soybeans).  
 
QUESTION 60:  What are the reasons why the MFF increased so much?  
 
RESPONSE 60:  As explained in Paragraph  4.72 on Page 206, product -specific Market Facilitation 
Program (MFP) payments were significantly lower in 2019/20 compared to 2018/19.  
 
QUESTION 61:  Does the United  States  expect it to remain within these levels for years to come?  
 
RESPONSE 61:  The United  States  remains committed to abiding by its WTO commitments.  
 
QUESTION 62:  Has the MFF Program had any effect on U.S. exports, e.g. corn and soybeans?  
 
RESPONSE 62:  The Market Facilitation Program (MFP) was a temporary program designed to help 
assist producers with meeting the additional costs associated with disrupt ed markets for 
commodities targeted by retaliatory tariffs. This program had no effect on U.S. exports of corn and 
soybeans given that payments in 2018 were made after planting had ended and in 2019 were not 
made specific to corn or soybeans, thus limiting  any market impact.  
 
Pages 93 and 97, Para graphs  3.110 and 3.116  
 
Paragraphs 3.110 and 3.116 of the Secretariat's report highlight an increase in the number of trade 
defence investigations initiated in the period under review (2018 -2021) compared to the previous 
period (2015 -2017) and the consequent increase in the number of orders currently in force.  
 
QUESTION 63:  Does the United  States  consider that this increase in the use of trade defence 
measures  - in addition to measures taken under Section  232 of t he Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
and Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974  - is aligned with WTO Members' objective of promoting an 
open and inclusive multilateral trading system, that stimulates innovation, development and 
improvements in the standard of liv ing of the population?  
 
RESPONSE 63:  WTO Members have a legal right to impose antidumping and countervailing duty 
measures when the required legal elements under the applicable WTO agreements have been met. 
Such legal rights are part of the multilateral tr ading system.  
 
Pages 93 and 94, Para graph s 3.110 and 3.111  
 
Paragraph  3.110 mentions that "[t]he 178 [anti -dumping] duty investigations were initiated 
between 2018 and 2021, compared to 133 initiated between 2015 and 2017..." . In turn, 
Paragraph  3.111 of t he report in question indicates that "[t]he number of anti -dumping measures WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  in force increased during the period examined... As of 31  December  2021, 489  anti-dumping 
measures remained in force [...] compared to the 321 definitive anti -dumping measures in f orce as 
at 31 December  2017". 
 
QUESTION 64:  Could the United  States  describe how factors other than investigated imports that 
injure the domestic industry are taken into account in the injury determination?  
RESPONSE 64:  The details of the U.S. International Trade Commission's injury determinations can 
be found at http://www.usitc.gov . 
 
QUESTION 65:  What precautions are taken to prevent injury caused by these other factors from 
being attributed to the investigated imports?  
 
RESPONSE 65:  See response to Question  64 above.  
 
QUESTION 66:  Could you comment on how the United  States  implements the obligation under 
Article  6.13 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, which requires the authorities to take due account of 
difficulties that interested parties, particularly small businesses, may encounter in  providing the 
requested information and in providing them with all feasible assistance?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  The United  States  conducts its proceedings in accordance with the obligations 
contained in the Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General A greement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 19  U.S.C.  § 1677m(c) 
provides procedures for an interested party to make a request for assistance.  
 
QUESTION 67:  Could you give a concrete example among the hundreds of investigations carried 
out? 
 
RESPONSE 67:  The details of administrative proceedings in which the U.S. Department of 
Commerce has provided assistance to interested parties can generally be found on the U.S. 
Department of Commerce's website at https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . In addition to providing 
specific assistance when requested pursuant to the statutory provision referenced above in 
Question  66, the United  States  routinely provides ass istance to small - and medium -sized enterprises 
in various forms including, but not limited to, through pre -petition counseling, extension of time for 
information submissions, and guidance regarding the use of the U.S. Department of Commerce's 
online inform ation management database, ACCESS. The level of assistance is made available on a 
case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of the party or parties involved.  
 
QUESTION 68:  Does the United  States  consider it consistent with this obligation to apply "adverse 
facts available" when an interested party is prevented from providing information pertaining to an 
unaffiliated supplier despite having demonstrated efforts to obtain the required information?  
 
RESPONSE 68:  The United  States  administers its trade remedy laws in strict accordance with WTO 
rules; its practice is consistent with those rules.  
 
Page  94, Paragraph  3.112  
 
Paragraph  3.112 reads that "[a]n 31  December  2021, of the 489  anti-dumping measures in force 
(including suspension agreements), 245 had been renewed following a sunset review, i.e. had been 
in force for more than five years. At the end of 2021, the average duration of an anti -dumping 
measure in force was around 10.4  years.... By the end of 2021, 96  anti-dumping measure s had been 
in force for at least 20  years and 193 had been in force for at least 10  years ". 
 
QUESTION 69:  How does the United  States  explain that the injury alleged by the domestic industry 
can be attributed to a product subject to an absolute quota?  
 
RESP ONSE 69:  See response to Question  64 above.  
 
QUESTION 70:  What are the criteria on which the investigating authority relies to consider or not 
consider a proposed suspension agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  See responses to Questions 50 and 53 above.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 20 - 
 
   
QUESTION 71:  Is it the investigating authority that makes an initial consideration of the proposal 
or relies on the complainant's opinion?  
 
RESPONSE 71:  Suspension agreements are submitted by the respondents to the U.S. Department 
of Commerce for considera tion. See also the response to Question  53 above.  
 
QUESTION 72:  How is the situation of vulnerability of the domestic industry to a natural lack of 
competitiveness of the domestic industry assessed, particularly in cases where the measures remain 
in force for more than a decade?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  See response to Question  64 above.  
 
Page  97, Para graph  3.116  
 
Paragraph  3.116 describes that "between 2018 and 2021, 81 countervailing duty investigations were 
initiated (compared to 63 between 2015 and 2017)... In total, as of 31  December  2021, 
169 countervailing duty orders and one suspension agreement were in force... Between 
1 January  2018 and 31  December  2021, 81  countervailing duty orders were issued and 3 were 
revoked ". 
 
In Argentina's experience, it is the practice of including in its original questionnaires to the 
government and foreign producers/exporters an open -ended question on "other subsidies" that 
shifts the burden of providing information on any assistance provided during the period of 
investigation to the government and exporters concerned. The United  States  incorporates this 
question into its questionnaires with the caveat that in the absence of cooperation the investigating 
authority will resort to facts available.  
 
QUESTION 73:  How d oes the United  States  reconcile this approach with its obligations under the 
SCM Agreement  with respect to the requirements that must underpin the initiation of an 
investigation?  
 
RESPONSE 73:  The United  States  administers its trade remedy laws in strict a ccordance with WTO 
rules.  The decision to impose a countervailing duty measure is based purely on a factual 
determination of whether subsidization exists and whether that subsidization has caused or 
threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry . 
 
QUESTION 74:  In particular, the provisions of Article  11 that enable the initiation of an investigation 
only when it has sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy, of injury and of the causal link 
(see, for example, Article  11.6).  
 
RESPONSE 74:  See answer to Question  49 above.  
 
QUESTION 75:  Could you comment on how the United  States  implements the obligation in 
Article  12.11 of the SCM  Agreement , which requires the authorities to take due account of difficulties 
that interested parties, particula rly small businesses, may encounter in providing the requested 
information and in providing them with all feasible assistance?  
 
RESPONSE 75:  See answer to Question  66 above.  
 
QUESTION 76:  Could you give any concrete examples among the various investigation s carried 
out? 
 
RESPONSE 76:  The details of administrative proceedings in which the U.S. Department of 
Commerce has provided assistance to interested parties can generally be found on the U.S. 
Department of Commerce's website at https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . In addition to providing 
specific assistance when requested pursuant to the statutory provision referenced above, the 
United  States  routinely provides assistance to small - and medium -sized enterprises in various forms 
including, but not limited to, through pre -petition counseling, extension of time for information 
submissions, and guidance regarding the use of the U.S. Department of Commerce's online 
information management database, ACCESS. The level of assistance is made available on a 
case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of the party or parties involved.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Pages  10-11, Section  3.4 
 
It is mentioned that on 25 January  2022, the United  States  announced that it would develop its first 
specific trade strategy to combat forced labor. In this regard, it is mentioned that it will conduct a 
comprehensive interagency review of the existing trade policies and tools of the USTR Office to 
identify areas that may need reinforcement and identify gaps that need to be addressed.  
 
QUESTION 77:  Could you elaborate on what tools have been identified within USTR to combat 
forced labor?  
 
RESPONSE 77:  The United  States  is currently developing a focused trade strategy that will lay out 
the U.S. government's trade approach to addressing forced labor in global supply chains. Work to 
develop the strategy is ongoing.  
 
QUESTION 78:  What exactly will this initiative consist of ? 
 
RESPONSE 78:  See response to #77.  
 
QUESTION 79:  Currently, what objective evidence supports the inclusion of trading partners in 
forced and/or child labour lists?  
 
RESPONSE 79:  Please refer to the U.S. Department of Labor's Procedural 
Guidelines  (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/15/2020 -10341/notice -of-
amendment -to-procedural -guidelines -for-the-development -and-maintenance -of-the-list-of) for the 
development and maintenance of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor as 
mandated by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)  
(https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/about/laws ). 
 
Please refer to the U.S. Department of Labor's Procedural Guidelines 
(https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2001/01/18/01 -952/bureau -of-international -labor-
affairs -procedural -guidelines -for-the-maintenance -of-the-list-of) for the cri teria and procures for the 
development and maintenance of the List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor 
as required by Executive Order 13126  (https://www .govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR -1999-06-
16/pdf/99 -15491.pdf ). 
 
Pages  10-11, Section  3.4 
 
Point 3.4 of the Country Report refers to the administration's goal of "strengthening supply chain 
resilience ", highlighting Executive  Order  14017 aimed at Securing U.S. Supply Chains. However, the 
recently enacted Anti -Inflation Law contains local content requirements to grant credits for the 
purchase of electric vehicles and establishes that vehicle components must be local or from countries 
with FTAs, incl uding minerals from batteries, such as lithium. This law will be regulated before 
December  2022.  
 
QUESTION 80:  Are there plans to take steps in the regulations to ensure market access for all 
lithium producing and exporting countries to the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 80:  The United  States  intends to administer the Inflation Reduction Act in a manner 
that is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 22 - 
 
  AUSTRALIA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  110, Para graph  3.150  
 
The report states that, "Section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the USTR to take action 
in cases where, as a result of an investigation, it is determined that a foreign government is engaging 
in acts, policies, or practices that are unreasonable or discriminatory, and that burden or restrict 
U.S. commerce" . 
 
QUESTION 1:  Notwithstanding the potential existence of "acts, policies, or practices [by another 
member] that are unreasonable or discriminatory, and that burde n or restrict U.S. commerce", how 
is the unilateral imposition of discriminatory tariffs, including through Section  301, consistent with 
the United  States ' obligations under GATT Article  I, Paragraph  1 and GATT Article  II, Paragraph  1, 
and Article  23 of th e Dispute Settlement Understanding?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Question  1 appears to be hypothetical as it does not refer to a specific action taken 
by the United  States  under Section  301 of Trade Act of 1974, or to a tariff action imposed under any 
other U.S. law. The United  States  is not in a position to respond to a question of this nature.  
 
QUESTION 2:  How does the United  States  determine whether to seek redress for WTO -inconsistent 
measures taken by another member under United  States  law (i.e. Section  301 of the Tra de Act of 
1974) rather than through the WTO dispute settlement system?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The statute directs the circumstances under which the Trade Representative is to 
initiate formal dispute settlement procedures, including those of the WTO dispute settlement system.  
Specifically, section 303 of Trade Act of the Trade Act of 1974 directs t hat if an investigation involves 
a "trade agreement and a mutually acceptable resolution is not reached before the earlier of —(A) 
the close of the consultation period, if any, specified in the trade agreement, or (B) the 150th day 
after the day on which co nsultation was commenced, the Trade Representative shall promptly 
request proceedings on the matter under the formal dispute settlement procedures provided under 
such agreement."  
 
QUESTION 3:  In the event of any future use of Section  301, will the United  States revert to its 
former practice of using Section  301 investigations to support, rather than replace, action taken 
under the WTO dispute settlement system?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Does United  States  law allow for Section  301 to be used to impose tariff or other 
remedies without first taking WTO dispute settlement action and receiving authorisation to impose 
such countermeasures?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Section  301 does not mandate action inconsistent with the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.  
 
Page  149, Para graph  3.287  
 
The report states the review of waivers does not affect the existing waivers already granted under 
the Trade Agreements Act for GPA par ties and certain trade agreements.  
 
QUESTION 5:  How are the waivers granted under the Trade Agreements Act for GPA parties and 
other trade agreements reflected in the Federal Acquisition Regulation?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  Waivers granted under the Trade Agreements A ct (TAA) for WTO GPA parties and 
other trade agreements are reflected in FAR  25.402. See https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 23 - 
 
  Page  150, Paragraph  3.288  
 
The report refers to the implementation of new policy and encouraging domestic sourcing for 
procurement not covered by the GPA or other agreements.  
 
QUESTION 6:  What is the procedure for determining whether a procurement is covered by the GPA 
or other agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  U.S. market access schedules under the WTO  Agreement  on Government 
Procurement (GPA) or other agreements identify whether a procurement is covered. Factors 
affecting coverage include whether the acquisition threshold is reached, whether the entity is 
covered b y an agreement, and whether the good or service is a covered product. For more 
information  on Trade  Agreements  Act thresholds  and the determination  of a country  of origin,  see 
FAR 25.402  (https://www.a cquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). 
 
QUESTION 7:  At what stage of a procurement process is a decision made as to whether a 
procurement is covered by the GPA or other agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) procedures require detailed steps th at include 
determining whether a procurement meets the requirements to be covered by the WTO  Agreement  
on Government  Procurement  (GPA)  or other  trade agreements.  See, e.g., FAR 5.207  (https://www
.acquisition.gov/far/5.207 ). 
 
Page  151, Para graph  3.292  
 
The report states that the GSA's new single Schedule includes both national and foreign suppliers 
from parties to the GPA or other international agreements.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Is the GSA Sche dule subject to any Made in America Laws?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The Trade Agreements Act (TAA) provides for waiver of the Buy American Act (BAA), 
and TAA waivers have been granted for covered procurement from GPA parties.  Because the 
estimated dollar value of each Schedule exceeds the established TAA threshold, the TAA is applicable 
to all Schedules and the BAA does not apply. In accordance with the TAA, only U.S. -made or 
designated country end products ( e.g. products of GPA parties) are offered and sold under Schedule 
contracts.  
 
Pages  148-156, Para graph s 3.286 -3.308  
 
The report outlines the "Made in America " Executive  Orders, laws, regulations, rules and policies, 
and their impact on the government procurement framework and procedures of the United  States . 
This includes changes to increase domestic content tests and thresholds, domestic price preferencing 
including for "critical components ", the Simplified Acquisition Threshold, and federal statutory 
requirements for procurements undertaken at the State Governm ent level that are funded with 
federal money.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Could the United  States  please confirm that the implementation of its Made in 
America laws, regulations, rules and policies, including the Build America, Buy America Act:  
 
• Is consistent with the Un ited States ' international obligations under the WTO  Agreement  
on Government Procurement (GPA) and other relevant trade agreements, and  
• Does not place undue additional burden on international suppliers from the United  States ' 
trade agreement partners, and U .S. entities procuring from those suppliers at the federal 
and state levels?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Made in America requirements, including the Build America, Buy America Act, are 
consistent with the international obligations of the United  States  under the WTO  Agreement  on 
Government Procurement (GPA) and other relevant trade agreements. Regulations implementing 
Made in America requirements do not place undue burdens on international suppliers from U.S. 
trading partners, as designated in th e Trade Agreements Act, when bidding on eligible contracts for 
covered goods or services.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 24 - 
 
  QUESTION 10:  Could the United  States  please further clarify which federal statutory requirements 
State Governments need to comply with, when procurement is funded wi th federal money, and that 
these requirements remain consistent with the United  States ' relevant international government 
procurement obligations?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  For guidance regarding the Build America, Buy America Act, please see initial 
guidance OMB Memo randum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (M -22-11) issued on 
18 April 2022. The memorandum provides that the guidance must be applied in a manner consistent 
with the obligations of the United  States  under international agreements, pursuant to  
Section  70914  (e) of the Build America,  Buy America  Act. See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -c
ontent/uploads/2022/04/M -22-11.pdf . 
 
Page  154, Para graph  3.301  
 
The report states  that the publication of notices of proposed procurement in the SAM.gov website is 
required for federal government agency contracts above the Simplified Acquisition Threshold 
(currently USD  250,000), with some exceptions.  
 
QUESTION 11:  What exceptions exist from the requirement to publish notices of proposed 
procurement?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The threshold for disseminating information on proposed contract actions is 
$25,000; see FAR  5.101(a)(1).  Exceptions, such as national security reasons, a re provided in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See, e.g.  FAR Subpart  5.202 
(https://www.acquisition.gov/far/5.202 ). 
 
Page  154, Para graph  3.302  
 
The report states that the awards of contracts m ust generally be made on the basis of price, although 
there are some exceptions.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Noting the review refers to "price", can the U .S. explain if price is the sole factor in 
awarding a contract or if other factors that relate to value for money a re also considered when 
awarding contracts?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  In general, contracting officers are directed to make acquisition decisions that 
deliver the best value to the customer. When evaluating offers for supply of contracts that exceed 
the thresholds of certain trade agreements, including the WTO  Agreement  on Government 
Procurement (GPA), contracting officers are directed to: (1)  eliminate all offers that are unacceptable 
for reasons other than price; e.g.  nonresponsive, debarred or suspended, or a prohib ited source 
(see FAR  subpart  25.7); (2)  rank the remaining offers by price; (3)  if the solicitation specifies award 
on the basis of factors in addition to cost or price, apply the evaluation factors as specified and use 
the evaluated cost or price in deter mining the offer that represents the best value to the 
Government. See: FAR  subpart  25.502 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.502 ). 
 
QUESTION 13:  If other factors are considered, can the U .S. explain what the other factors are? 
Examples of other factors may include the quality of the goods or services, environmental 
sustainability of the goods and services or whole -of-life costs.  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The award decision is based on evaluation factors and significant subfactors that 
are tailored to the acquisition. These must represent the key areas of importance and emphasis to 
be considered in the source selection decision; and support meaningful comp arison and 
discrimination between and among competing proposals. All factors and significant subfactors that 
will affect contract award and their relative importance shall be stated clearly in the solicitation. See 
FAR Subpart  15.304 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/15.304 ). 
 
Page  156, Para graph  3.310  
 
The report states procurement data from Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) is generally 
made available on USAspending.gov within five days after a co ntract award or modification, and 
note contracting officers must report action to the FPDS within three business days, except DOD and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for which reporting is delayed 90  days.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 25 - 
 
  QUESTION 14:  Is USAspending.gov the portal for r eporting procurements contracts covered under 
the GPA and, if so, why is the DOD reporting delayed for 90 days when the GPA has a 72  day 
reporting requirement?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Procurement data from the General Service Administration's (GSA) Federal 
Procureme nt Data System (FPDS) is generally made available on USAspending.gov the next business 
day after it is reported by an agency. Procurement policy allows contracting officers three business 
days to submit a contract action report to FPDS; after they do so, t hat data is made available to 
USAspending.gov on the following morning and automatically published to the website the day after 
that. The exception to this is data reported to FPDS by the Department of Defense (including the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); which is held by FPDS for 90  days from the date of the action from 
release to USASpending.gov and other public access. This is due to operational security (OPSEC) 
risks related to  the data being  released  too soon.  For more on this delay,  please  see: 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2006 -2086-DPAP.pdf. Note also that classified 
actions are not reported to FPDS . 
 
Page  160, Para graph  3.320  
 
The report states that non -construction contracts with a value of USD  700,000 or more, if not set 
aside for small business, must have a subcontracting plan that includes small businesses, if awarded 
to a non -small business.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Can the U.S. provide further information on the subcontracting plan requirements 
that are applied to these procurements?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  More information is available on subcontracting plan requirements at 
FAR subpart  19.7, available at: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/19.7 . 
 
Page  163, Para graph  3.330  
 
The report states that, a major feature in recent years has been the increase in the number of 
patents linked to artificial intelligence (AI).  
 
QUESTION 16:  Does the U .S. consider IP rights such as patents linked to AI promote innovation?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  Strong intellectual property rights in key technology areas such as artificial 
intelligence and other emerging te chnologies (e.g.  quantum computing, synthetic biology, 
blockchain, precision medicine, and virtual reality), protect innovation and enhance economic 
prosperity, national security, and help solve world problems. See: 
https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial -intelligence . 
 
Page  191, Paragraph  4.12 
 
The report states "USDA Farm Service Agency data indicates that PLC payments to nearly 1.4  million 
farms totaled USD  4.95 billion for the 2019 crop year,  and USD  2.07 billion in the 2020 crop year to 
800,000  farms.5 Over the two years combined, the highest PLC payments were paid on base acres 
with historical production of wheat (USD  2,529  million), seed cotton (USD  1,439  million), maize 
(USD  1,099  million) , peanuts (USD  779 million), and long grain rice (USD  626 million) ". 
United  States  Domestic Support notification 11  October  2022 (G/AG/N/USA/166) . 
 
Page  35, Supporting Table  DS:9  
 
The United  States  most recent WTO domestic support notification (G/AG/N/USA/166) from 
1 October  2020 to 30  September  2021 notes on Page 35 that "Non -Product -Specific AMS for Price 
loss coverage (PLC) was USD  4.98 billion".  
 
QUESTION 17:  What was the statutory reference pri ce and the national average price for the 
covered commodities, which triggered the use of PLC non -product specific AMS for this notification?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 26 - 
 
  RESPONSE 17:  The effective reference price for 2019/20 for the commodities identified in 
Question  17 were:  
 
• Wheat: USD 5.50 per bushel ; 
• Seed cotton: USD 0.3670 per pound  
• Maize: USD 3.70 per bushel  
• Peanuts: USD 0.2675 per pound  
• Long Grain Rice: USD 0.1400 per pound  
 
The marketing year average (MYA) price for 2019/20 for the commodities identified in Question  17 
were: 
 
• Wheat: USD 4.58 per bushel  
• Seed cotton: USD 0.3058 per pound  
• Maize: USD 3.56 per bushel  
• Peanuts: USD 0.205 per pound  
• Long Grain Rice: USD 0.1200 per pound  
 
The value of PLC payments notified in G/AG/N/USA/166 for the period 1 October  2020 to 
30 September  2021, corresponds to payments made on the 2019/20 crop, which are not made until 
1 October  2020, which is in fiscal year 2021.  
 
QUESTION 18:  Can the United  States  explain how the national average price and the statutory 
reference price are calculated for the covered commodities and how these prices compared to the 
global price for those commodities at that time?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  The marketing year average (MYA)  price is the national average price received by 
producers during the 12 -month marketing year. The source of this data is the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS). The effective reference price is calculated as the higher of: 1)  the 2019 
referen ce price and 2)  85% of the Olympic average MYA price for the past 5  years; however, if this 
price is higher than 115% of the 2019 reference price, then in the case of crop year 2019, the 
effective reference price is set at 115% of the 2019 reference price.  Global prices are not a factor in 
the development of the MYA price and the effective reference price. There are a number of data 
sources for global prices that Australia may consult to conduct such a comparison.  
 
QUESTION 19:  Can the United  States  provide  further information on the value and details of what 
commodities received PLC non -product specific AMS?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  No production is required to receive payments under the PLC program. Payments 
are based on historical base acres of eligible covered comm odities. These are: wheat, oats, barley, 
corn, grain sorghum, long grain rice, medium/short grain rice, temperate japonica rice, seed cotton, 
dry peas, lentils, large and small chickpeas, soybeans, peanuts, sunflower seed, canola, flaxseed, 
mustard seed, r apeseed, safflower, crambe, and sesame seed.  
 
QUESTION 20:  If the direct payment amount of PLC for a covered commodity was known, can the 
United  States  explain why this notification was categorised as non -product specific AMS?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  The amount is n ot known, as payments are not based the amount of covered 
commodity grown, but rather on the historical base acres for the covered commodity.  
 
Page  193, Para graph  4.23 
 
According to the Secretariat's report, the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) insures against 
losses in yield, crop revenue, margin, whole -farm revenue and other types of losses, and is 
administered by the USDA Risk Management Agency (para . 4.20). The Secretariat notes that the 
insurance premiums are subsidised (para . 4.21-4.23) wit h 62-63% of insurance premiums paid by 
the Federal Government, on average, in crop years 2018, 2019 and 2020 (para . 4.23).  
 
The United  States  domestic support notification (DS:1) for 2020 -21 (G/AG/N/USA/166) notified 
expenditure by the Risk Management Agen cy covered salaries and expenses, administrative and 
operating reimbursements to insurers, and underwriting gains to insurers, at USD  3.49 billion . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 27 - 
 
  QUESTION 21:  Could the United  States  please explain whether the USD  3.49 billion  notified in its 
2020-21 DS :1 notification is the total amount of support provided by the United  States  under the 
FCIP for 2020 -21? 
 
RESPONSE 21:  The amount notified in supporting table DS:1 in G/AG/N/USA/166 under general 
services is associated with the delivery of the Federal Crop  Insurance Program (FCIP) as explained 
in the report. Premium subsidies are notified in supporting table DS:7 for individual commodities 
and in supporting table DS:9 for Whole Farm Revenue insurance.  
 
QUESTION 22:  Could the United  States  please clarify whe ther the USD  3.49 billion  notified covers 
only the amount expended on salaries and expenses, administrative and operating reimbursements 
to insurers, and underwriting gains to insurers and, if applicable, identify any other categories of 
expenditure under the FCIP for 2020 -21?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  See response to Question  21. 
 
QUESTION 23:  Can the United  States  explain how the support provided under the FCIP, as notified 
in its DS:1 notification, meets the eligibility criteria of the Agreement on Agriculture, Annex  II 
Paragraph  2(g), including that "in all cases the expenditure shall be directed to the provision  or 
construction of capital works only"?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The United  States  notified these expenditures under Paragraph  2(g) as these 
outlays support the institutional infrastructure for delivery of the Federal Crop Insurance Program 
(FCIP). These outlays go to private insurers to deliver and service products under the FCIP. The FCIP 
is a unique program in that its structure combines government oversight and administrative control 
with delivery and servicing of crop insurance products by private com panies through a reinsurance 
agreement. That agreement specifies the payment of administrative and operating costs and the 
sharing of underwriting risk to support that delivery and servicing activity. The United  States  has 
notified the budgetary outlays as sociated with delivery of crop insurance similarly to the way it 
notifies budgetary outlays for delivery of services to agricultural producers by government agencies.  
 
Page  189, Para graph  4.7 
 
The report states "Since 2018, U.S. agricultural producers have  faced extraordinary disruptions due 
to trade tensions, followed by the COVID -19 pandemic. However, some of the reduction in income 
has been offset by significant increases in federal government payments. According to the USDA 
ERS, net farm income rose by 20% from 2019 to 2020, and by 25% from 2020 to 2021, although 
in the latter case, higher cash receipts from strong agricultural markets offset lower government 
payments ". 
 
Page  197, Para graph  4.37 
 
The report states "Imports of raw cane sugar, refined sugar, and sugar -containing products are 
regulated under multilateral (WTO) and bilateral tariff rate quotas. Relatively high MFN tariffs 
normally discourage above -quota imports. The annual WTO TRQ minimum of 1,117,195  metric  tons 
raw value (MTRV) of raw cane sugar is allocated among 40  countries, based on patterns observed 
when trade was relatively unrestricted (1975 -81), with the Dominican  Republic, Brazil, the 
Philippines, and Australia taking the largest shares ". 
 
Australia values its sugar allo cation under WTO quota. Given Australia's successful fulfilment of past 
sugar quota allocations, we remain interested in, and have the ability to, supply more raw sugar to 
the United  States  than our current quota allows. In 2020 the United  States  deviated from its 
historical allocation approach, and other Members including Australia, received additional sugar 
quota. Australia notes that there are several countries that still receive a sugar allocation, but do 
not fill their quota.  
 
QUESTION 24:  Does the Uni ted States  expect to take into account past fill rates from countries in 
determining whether it should reallocate additional sugar quota to reliable suppliers of sugar, such 
as Australia?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  See response to Question  25. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 28 - 
 
  QUESTION 25:  Given curre nt world market conditions for sugar, does the United  States  expect to 
deviate from historical allocations for its WTO sugar quota, including whether it will consider 
excluding any countries from future allocations?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  The United  States  Departme nt of Agriculture (USDA) establishes annual fiscal year 
(1 October  – 30 Septembe r) volumes for the U.S. raw sugar, refined sugar and specialty sugar 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), in accordance with World  Trade  Organization obligations. The Office of the 
United  States  Trade Representative (USTR) is responsible for the annual allocation of these TRQs. 
In the case of the WTO raw sugar TRQ, USTR allocates the in -quota volume among certain supplying 
countries based on the countries' historical shipments to the  United  States  and consultations with 
quota -holding countries.  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade 
Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  200, Para graph  4.54 
 
The report states "The Coronavirus Food Assistance Pr ogram (CFAP) announced in April  2020 had 
two major components: (i)  USD 16 billion in direct support to farmers and ranchers affected by price 
declines and supply chain disruptions; and (ii)  USD 3 billion provided to purchase dairy, meat, and 
fresh produce to donate to people in need. Eligible producers were persons and legal entities of 
specified agricultural commodities who faced market disruptions and marketing costs due to the 
COVID -19 pandemic ". 
 
Page  201, Para graph  4.57 
 
The report states "in total, CFAP (1 and 2) made payments of USD  23.5 billion in 2020, and 
forecasted expenditures in 2021 were USD  9.3 billion. The CCC -funded payments (about 
USD 12 billion) were mostly paid in FY2021 ". 
 
4.1.1.3 Levels of support, Page  204 
 
Table  4.5 Total PSE and single commodity transfer values for selected commodities, 2016 -20 
According to the Secretariat's report, Table  4.5 indicates that the OECD's Producer Support Estimate 
(PSE) for the United  States  has declined from 19.5% of gross farm receipts  in 2000 -02 to 12% in 
2018-20, or USD  44.9 billion  on average over the three years. However, there has been a 
disproportionate increase in the amount of support received by specific industries in the 5 -year 
period from 2016 to 2020. In particular, support for beef and veal increased from USD  1 million  in 
2016 to over USD  4.7 billion  in 2020, support for maize increased from USD  2.2 billion  in 2016 to 
4.7 billion  in 2020 and support for soybeans increased from USD  1.2 billion  in 2016 to USD  2 billion  
in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 26:  Could the United  States  please provide further information clarifying why domestic 
support for these specific industries increased by such a large amount from 2016 to 2020?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  As explained in the report, the United  States  provided temporary, ad hoc assistance 
to agricultural producers in response to unprecedented market disruptions due to the impacts of the 
COVID -19 pandemic on the entire U.S. agricultural sector beginning in 2020. The increases 
referenced in Australia's q uestion are due to the provision of Coronavirus Food Assistance Program 
(CFAP) payments in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 27:  Could the United  States  please provide further information clarifying the eligibility 
criteria for agricultural producers to receive this additio nal support.  
 
RESPONSE 27:  The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) provided direct payments to 
producers of eligible commodities who faced market disruptions due to COVID -19. The program was 
authorized by the CARES Act (P.L.  116-136) and Section  5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) Charter Act (P.L.  80-772). Eligibility rules can be found in 7  CFR §9.3 and 7  CFR §9.202 (see: 
https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -7/subtitle -A/part -9). 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 29 - 
 
  Page  204, Para graph  4.69 
 
According to the Secretariat's report, it will "be important for the United  States  to ensure that the 
recent resort to ad hoc support against market shocks and natural disasters does not become 
entrenched ". 
 
QUESTION 28:  Could the United  States  please provide further information clarifying whether the 
United  States  intend to use this same ad hoc model of su pport for future market shocks or natural 
disasters?  
 
RESPONSE 28:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 29:  Could the United  States  please provide further information clarifying whether the 
United  States  plan to institutionalise any of the ad hoc support measures it has implemented.  
 
RESPONSE 29:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are r etrospective exercises.  
 
Page  205, Chart  4.3 Green Box support in the United  States , 2001 -02 – 2019 -20 
 
Australia notes the amount of Green Box support provided by the United  States  for domestic food 
aid from 2001 -02 to 2019 -20 has increased more than any other form of Green Box support. The 
most recent DS:1 notification submitted by the United  States  (G/AG/N/USA/166) indicates that by 
far the largest amount of expenditure for Green Box support is provided through the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Progr am (SNAP).  
 
QUESTION 30:  Could the United  States  please provide further information clarifying the eligibility 
requirements for members of the public in the United  States  to access food aid through the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  To get Supplemental Nutrition Assistan ce Program (SNAP) benefits, a household 
must meet certain conditions and requirements. Under federal rules, these include income, resource, 
and work requirements.  
 
Australia notes the United  States ' response to Japan's question from the 103rd Committee on 
Agriculture meeting (ref:  103126) regarding eligibility criteria of the nutritional objectives of SNAP, 
specifically that food purchases through SNAP are made directly by beneficiaries at retail food outlets 
and that beneficiaries using SNAP benefits purch ase the same food products as other consumers at 
market prices, which may be domestically produced or imported.  
 
QUESTION 31:  Could the United  States  please clarify: Through the Supplementary Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), does the United  States  government purchase any food directly from 
producers to be provided to sections of the domestic population in need? If so, what is the value (in 
USD) of food purchased directly from U .S. agricultural producers compared to the value (in USD) of 
support provided  directly to consumers in the domestic population to enable them to purchase food?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  The United  States  government does not purchase any food directly from producers 
to be provided to sections of the domestic population in need under the Supplem ental Nutrition 
Assistance Program.  
 
4.1.1.2.2. Exports  
 
The Secretariat's report notes the United  States  has consolidated its export promotion activities 
recently, rolling four previously separate programs under one 'umbrella' of the Agriculture Trade 
Promotion and Facilitation program (see Paragraph  4.62). Australia notes this consolidation has 
created another separate funding avenue for the four consolidated programs through a newly 
created Priority Trade Fund (see Paragraph  4.63). The Priority Trade Fun d is described as necessary 
to support circumstances where one of the four programs is over -subscribed (despite being 
consolidated) and it is necessary to reallocate unused funds from the other "consolidated " programs. 
On face value, it is difficult to see  the logic of consolidation if an additional fund must be created to 
reallocate funds between so -called consolidated programs.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 30 - 
 
  The Nairobi Decision on Export Subsidies committed members to eliminate export subsidy 
entitlements by 2018 and ensure that expor t subsidies were not applied in a manner which 
circumvented the requirement to reduce and eliminate them.  
 
QUESTION 32:  Consistent with the Nairobi Declaration, can the U .S. please describe how each 
program in total and as part of the consolidated Agricultural Trade Promotion Facilitation funded 
through the Priority Trade Fund demonstrates maximum repayment terms of no more than 
18 months?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  The Agriculture Trade Promotion and Facilitation program (ATPF) is not a defined 
program covered under the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, and the funds are 
not used to subsidize the export of U.S. products. ATPF helps U.S. agricultural exporters identify an d 
develop new markets, which will help mitigate the adverse effects of the retaliatory tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers imposed on U.S. agricultural products. The ATPF provides cost -share assistance 
to eligible U.S. organizations for activities such as cons umer advertising, public relations, 
point-of-sale demonstrations, participation in trade fairs and exhibits, market research, and technical 
assistance.  
 
QUESTION 33:  Consistent with the Nairobi Declaration, can the U .S. please describe how each 
program in total and as part of the consolidated Agricultural Trade Promotion Facilitation funded 
through the Priority Trade Fund demonstrates self -financing, with premiums charged on a risk basis?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  The ATPF is not a defined program covered under the Nai robi Ministerial Decision 
on Export Competition, and the funds are not used to subsidize the export of U.S. products.  
 
QUESTION 34:  How does the United  States  demonstrate transparency and compliance with the 
2015 Nairobi Declaration (as described above) of  this export competition program when domestic 
supports remain high in key commodities (as per domestic support questions above, support is 
especially high in beef, maize and soybeans)?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  The United  States  has provided and continues to provide full transparency regarding 
its export competition activities through its annual Export Competition Questionnaire (ECQ) 
submissions. The ATPF is not a defined program covered under the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on 
Export Competition, and the funds are n ot used to subsidize the export of U.S. products.  
 
QUESTION 35:  How does the United  States  demonstrate transparency and compliance with the 
2015 Nairobi Declaration (as described above) of this export competition program when the current 
program's complex structure, which does not distinguish between the allocation of funds between 
previously s eparate activities?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  The United  States  has provided and continues to provide full transparency regarding 
its export competition activities through its annual ECQ submissions. The ATPF is not a defined 
program covered under the Nairobi Minister ial Decision on Export Competition, and the funds are 
not used to subsidize the export of U.S. products.  
 
4.1.1.2.3 Food aid  
 
In 2010, the United  States  moved to complement the provision of in -kind food assistance with 
cash-based security programs that enabled the purchase of foods locally and regionally, thereby 
supporting local producers and markets. Australia notes the increasing volumes of in -kind food 
assistance provided by the United  States , as reported in recently submitted ES:3 notifications. A 
comparison of volumes reported in 2018 -19 (G/AG/N/USA/138) against 2020 -21 (G/AG/N/USA/161) 
shows a 21% increase of in -kind food aid volumes provided.  
 
Increased provision of cash -based programs would have positive flow -on effects for food systems in 
develo ping countries currently hardest hit by high international food prices and associated inputs. 
Australia notes evidence that cash -only assistance helps build the capacity and resilience of local 
food systems through stimulating returns and investment.  
 
QUES TION 36:  Given current disruptions to global food systems, is the United  States  considering 
further reforms to its food aid policy to align with international best practice of cash -only grant 
assistance for the provision of food aid?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 31 - 
 
  RESPONSE 36:  U.S. Gove rnment international food aid is shifting from a combination of in -kind 
and cash -based assistance towards more cash -based assistance. Regarding future reforms, the 
United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises. We look  
forward to keeping the Membership informed as appropriate if there are changes by Congress in the 
future.  
 
Page  273, Para graph  4.311  
 
The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (P.L.  106-229) provides that 
generally an electronic signature, contract, or other record may not be denied legal effect solely 
because it is in electronic form. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act aimed at harmonizing state 
laws in this regard and provided a model law that can be adopted by s tates. The Internet Tax 
Freedom Act (P.L.  105-277) prohibits state and local taxation of Internet access and multiple and 
discriminatory taxation on e -commerce; this prohibition has been indefinitely extended by the Trade 
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement  Act (P.L.  114-125). However, regarding taxation on sales online, 
the states may compel online retailers to charge sales tax regardless of a physical presence in the 
state; small sales exceptions for sales tax registration depend on economic thresholds tha t vary 
substantially across U.S. states.  
 
QUESTION 37:  Noting the aim of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act to harmonise state laws 
on electronic signatures across the U .S., could the U .S. please provide further details on the number 
of states that ha ve now adopted the model law.  
 
RESPONSE 37:  The Act has been enacted by 51 of 53 jurisdictions; New  York and Puerto  Rico have 
not yet enacted.  
 
Page  273, Para graph  4.312  
 
Section  230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47  U.S.C.  230) provides immuni ty to 
interactive computer service users and providers, including online platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter, from civil liability based on third -party content and for the removal of content in certain 
circumstances. Section  512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (P.L.  105-304) shields online 
service providers from monetary liability and limits other forms of liability for copyright 
infringement  - referred to as safe harbors  - in exchange for cooperating with copyright owners to 
expeditious ly remove infringing content if the online service providers meet certain conditions.  
 
QUESTION 38:  We understand that there has been some discussion under the Biden  administration 
about reforming Section  230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. Coul d the U .S. please 
provide an update on where these discussions are at?  
 
RESPONSE 38:  President  Biden has called for fundamental reforms to Section  230, and the 
discussions  are ongoing.  See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -releases/20
22/09/08/readout -of-white -house -listening -session -on-tech-platform -accountability/ . 
 
Page  275, Paragraph  4.320  
 
In March  2019, FTC initiated a study on privacy practices among the six largest broadband providers 
whose findings were published in October  2021. The FTC report found that Internet service providers 
collected and used data in ways that ra ise several privacy concerns for consumers; it underscored 
the importance of restricting such practices. In October  2019, FTC brought up its first case against 
stalking apps on mobiles, which provided third -party access to sensitive data about device users  
(physical movements, online activities, data collection).  
 
QUESTION 39: We note the reference in Paragraph  4.313 that there is no comprehensive federal 
consumer data protection and privacy regulation in the United  States . However given ongoing data 
collec tion and privacy concerns and in light of the FTC Report's findings regarding data collection 
and privacy concerns for consumers, is the U .S. considering any specific actions or measures to 
improve consumer protection?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  Regarding future plans,  the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 32 - 
 
  Page  275, Paragraph  4.321  
 
In January  2020, NIST launched a Privacy Framework, which is a voluntary tool helping organizations 
identify and manage privacy risks and allowing them to continue building innovative products and 
services while protecting individuals' privacy. In December  2021, NTIA hosted three listening 
sessions concerning personal data (privacy, equity, and civil rights) to gather information on the 
ways in which commercial data flows of personal information can lead to disparate impact and 
outcomes for marginalized or disadvantaged communities.  
 
QUESTION 40:  Could the U .S. please provide some additional details on the operation of the Privacy 
Framework a nd the extent to which it has helped organi sations to identify and manage privacy risks.  
 
RESPONSE 40:  NIST maintains an extensive website on the Privacy Framework that provides 
significant detail on its operation: https://www.nist.gov/privacy -framework/privacy -framework . 
For views on its helpfulness, see the section on "Perspectives and Success Stories": 
https://www.nist.gov/privacy -framework/getting -started -0/perspectives -and-success-stories . 
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  5, Para graph  2.1 
 
The report states "[t]he U.S. recovery has been strong, outpacing many of our trading partners, due 
primarily to an early and rapid vaccine rollout as well as significant fiscal and monetary policy 
support. Inflation emerged as a challenge for the United States and nearly all our major trading 
partners as strong demand, skewed toward goods and away from services, interacted with supply 
chain issues ". 
 
QUESTION 41:  Given the  challenge that the United  States  outlined with inflation, can the 
United  States  provide details, including value/timing, of all the agriculture related support programs 
in the Inflation Reduction Act  (IRA)?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provides USD 19.5 billion  for agricultural 
conservation, including USD 18 billion  in additional funding for existing conservation programs, 
including the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), the Regional Conser vation 
Partnership Program (RCPP), the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), and the Agricultural 
Conservation Easement Program (ACEP). Conservation technical assistance and a carbon 
sequestration and greenhouse gas emissions quantification program are a lso funded. On 
17 November  2022, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Natural Resources and Conservation 
Service (NRCS) published a Notice in the Federal Register for public input on implementation of 
IRA-funded conservation programs.  
 
The IRA also includes funding to assist distressed farm loan borrowers of direct or guaranteed loans 
administered by the USDA. To date, USD 800 million  has been disbursed to over 13,000 distressed 
USDA farm loan borrowers. The Act also provides USD 2.2 billion in financial assistance to farmers 
who have experienced discrimination in USDA's farm lending program. On 13 October  2022, USDA 
requested public comments on implementation of the IRA provisions to assist these farmers.  
 
Regarding future plans, the Uni ted States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 42:  Can the United  States  provide details of which agriculture related IRA programs will 
be classified as exempted support/non -exempted support as per the WTO's Agreement on 
Agriculture?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  All relevant expenditures under the Inflation Reduction Act will be notified consistent 
with WTO rules and at the appropriate time.  
 
QUESTION 43:  For example, the IRA provides around USD  14 billion  to the USDA for rural 
development funding, including around USD  9.7 billion  for loans and grants to help rural electric 
cooperatives purchase renewable energy and deploy systems for renewable energy and carbon 
capture and storage. Can the United  States  provide more de tails of these programs, including WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 33 - 
 
  value/timing, and whether the payments under these programs are expected to be exempted 
support or non -exempted support as per the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  On 28 October  2022, the U.S. Department of A griculture (USDA) Rural 
Development's Rural Business and Cooperatives and Rural Utilities Service published a Notice in the 
Federal Register announcing IRA listening sessions and providing an opportunity for interested 
parties to provide written comments a nd suggestions to the agency regarding implementation of the 
IRA provisions related to rural development. The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises, and all relevant expenditures under the IRA will be notified 
consistent with WTO rules and at the appropriate time.  
 
QUESTION 44:  Can the U .S. advise how it plans to ensure that the IRA's EV tax credit will be 
consistent with WTO commitments, including the GATT, the Trade -Related Investment Measures 
Agreement, and t he Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. 
 
Paragraph 5.3  
 
The report states that "the United States supports a WTO reform agenda that reflects the priorities 
of a worker -centered approach  - one that protects our planet, supports improved labor conditions 
and living standards, and contributes to shared prosperity".  
 
QUESTION 45:  How doe s the United  States  envision WTO reform as supporting improved labour 
conditions?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement begins with the recognition that trade 
should raise living standards, ensure full employment, pursue sustainable develop ment, and protect 
and preserve the environment.  Improved labor conditions are interwoven among these enduring 
and ambitious goals. We believe Members must engage differently at the WTO —in committees, in 
negotiations, and in resolving disagreements —for the WTO to meaningfully advance these goals.  
Doing so should be the overriding aim of our reform efforts.  We will also promote initiatives and 
outcomes such as the JSI on Services Domestic Regulation that reduce barriers, particularly for 
women, underserved an d marginalized workers, entrepreneurs and SMEs to participate in global 
markets in the services sectors that underpin future growth.  
 
Paragraph  5.4 
 
The report states that "for many years, WTO dispute settlement has not met the needs of WTO 
Members, includ ing the United States" and that "the United  States  supports a reform discussion that 
aims to ensure that WTO dispute settlement reflects the real interests of Members".  
 
QUESTION 46:  From the United  States ' perspective, how would a reformed WTO dispute settlement 
system operate to meet the needs of WTO  Members?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The United  States  is not prejudging what the reformed system would look like  - and 
have asked other Members to likewise approach the conversation with an open mind.  We believ e 
this approach  - working collectively towards a system that meets the needs of all 
Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving durable, lasting reform.  The 
United  States  believes that the first step towards reform is to better underst and the interests of all 
Members in WTO dispute settlement.  An approach centered on the interests of Members can facilitate 
greater mutual understanding without resorting to the same positions that have slowed the reform 
discussion for many years.  
 
Paragraph 5.20  
 
The report states "the United States promotes cooperation to tackle harmful non -market policies 
and practices through bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral vehicles including relevant WTO 
committees, G7, G20, and other fora; existing tr ade agreements and frameworks; and new 
initiatives".  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 34 - 
 
  QUESTION 47:  How does the U .S. consider the WTO can tackle harmful non -market policies and 
practices?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  The United  States  considers that it is important to address the global challenges 
posed by harmful non -market policies and practices, a task which involves evaluating whether 
existing tools, and rules, are adequate and where further work, including relevant initiatives, is 
needed to address such policies and practices.  
 
PART III: OTHER QUES TIONS  
 
United  States  Domestic Support notification 11  October  2022 (G/AG/N/USA/166)  
 
Pages 14 - 21, Supporting Table  DS:6  
 
The United  States ' most recent WTO domestic support notification (G/AG/N/USA/166) from 
1 October  2020 to 30  September  2021 notes in Table  DS:6, details of non -exempt direct payments 
to commodity producers under the United  States  Market Facilitation Program (MFP) and the 
Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP).  
 
United  States  Domestic Support notification 30  September  2021 (G/AG/N/US A/157)  
 
Pages 14 - 21, Supporting Table  DS:6  
 
The United  States ' WTO domestic support notification (G/AG/N/USA/157) from 1  October  2019 to 
30 September  2020 notes in Table  DS:6, details of non -exempt direct payments to commodity 
producers under the United  States Market Facilitation Program (MFP) and the Coronavirus Food 
Assistance Program (CFAP).  
 
QUESTION 48:  For both MFP and CFAP payments to commodity producers, can the United  States  
provide details of the methodology for allocating the direct payments acr oss different marketing 
years?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  MFP and CFAP payments, like those for all disaster and emergency relief programs, 
are notified on a fiscal -year basis that aligns with the marketing year of the notification.  
 
QUESTION 49:  Does the timing of MFP and CFAP notifications coincide with the date that funds 
were paid to commodity producers or some other trigger?  
 
RESPONSE 49:  Yes; notification is based on the date that funds were paid to commodity producers.  
 
QUESTION 50:  Can the  United  States  advise if all MFP and CFAP payments have been fully 
disbursed?  
 
RESPONSE 50:  Both the MFP and CFAP programs are no longer in effect and notified expenditures 
will eventually reduce to zero. CFAP was a temporary program designed to minimize t he negative 
economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture, while MFP was a temporary program designed 
to help assist producers with meeting the additional costs associated with disrupted markets for 
commodities targeted by retaliatory tariffs. In both c ases, a specific amount of funding was 
authorized for these programs. That funding is no longer available and as previously stated, both 
programs are no longer in effect.  
 
QUESTION 51:  If not, can the United  States  provide details, including value, of the expected 
remaining direct payments to commodity producers?  
 
RESPONSE 51:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 35 - 
 
  BRAZIL  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Paragraph 2.18 
 
In the area of dispute settlement, the United  States ' participation, as measured by the number of 
cases it has filed as a complainant, declined significantly during the review period compared to 
previous periods. The United  States  raised 2  complaints , was a respondent in 8 cases, was involved 
in 2 active arbitrations, appealed 6  cases to the Appellate  Body, and exercised third party rights in 
29 cases (Table  A2.1). In the DSB, the United  States  continued to raise its systemic concerns with 
Appellate  Body overreach.  
 
QUESTION  1: Regarding the ongoing crisis of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), how 
does the United  States  envisage a permanent solution that can be achieved by 2024, as mandated 
by the Ministers in the MC12?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The United  States  believes that the first step towards reform is to better understand 
the interests of all Members in WTO dispute settlement.  An approach centered on the interests of 
Members can facilitate greater mutual understanding without resorting to the same p ositions that 
have slowed the reform discussion for many years.  The United  States  is not prejudging what this 
reformed system would look like, and we have asked other Members to likewise approach the 
conversation with an open mind.  We believe this approach  - working collectively towards a system 
that meets the needs of all Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving 
durable, lasting reform.  
 
QUESTION  2: As long as the DSM crisis endures, does the U .S. consider favoring any alternative 
means to regular dispute settlement in order to prevent "appeals into the void", s uch as the 
Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA)? If not, please indicate why.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The aim of dispute settlement is to facilitate the prompt settlement of a dispute 
between Members and the United  States  welcomes engagement between parties in order to achieve 
that end, including in situations where an appeal has been filed.  Members have a variety of means 
under the DSU through which they can achieve a resolution, including pursuant to Article  4, 
"Consulta tions"; Article  5, "Good Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation"; and Article  25, "Arbitration ". 
If any Member considers that use of these provisions may assist it in securing a positive solution, 
then the United  States  in principle supports such efforts.  
 
Paragraph 4.64  
 
The United  States  has two schemes that provide export credit guarantee programs, allowing the 
exporter or private financial sector in the United  States  to extend dollar -denominated financing at 
prevailing market interest rates. The GSM -102 c redit guarantee program and the Facility Guarantee 
Program (FGP) were both reauthorized under the 2018 Farm Act. GSM -102 guarantees credit (terms 
up to 18  months) to approved foreign financial institutions for the purchase of U.S. food and farm 
products. T he CCC selects commodities and products according to market potential and applicable 
legislative and regulatory requirements. The CCC also qualifies the exporters for participation and 
approves the financial institutions involved. The GSM -102 program fees cover the program's 
long-term operating costs and losses. The FGP provides payment guarantees on the sale of goods 
and U.S. services that will enhance the sale of U.S. agricultural goods in markets where demand 
may be constrained by impediment s in handling, marketing, storage, or distribution. The FGP covers 
credit terms up to 10  years. The CCC is required by statute to make available a total of 
USD 5.5 billion  annually, to both the GSM -102 program and the FGP. For FY2022, the USDA FAS 
announce d the availability of USD  500 million  for 85 eligible countries under the FGP.  
 
QUESTION  3: The Secretariat report states that the GSM -102 program fees cover the long -term 
operating costs and losses. The fees, according to the 2014 MoU signed between Brazi l and the 
United  States , should follow inter alia minimum premium rates set out by the OECD. On 
4 November  2022, however, the U .S. informed Brazil that the GSM -102 Program will no longer 
operate in a manner consistent with the terms described in Section  IV of the 2014 MoU. In that 
regard , could the U .S. please provide the new applicable fees?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 36 - 
 
  RESPONSE  3: All current  fees are available  at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/export -
credit -gurantee -program -gsm-102/gsm -fee-schedule . 
 
QUESTION  4: Does the U .S. plan on changing fees for all tran sactions under the GSM -102 or only 
for transactions with tenor longer than 15  months but less than 18  months?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Fees charged in Export Credit Guarantee programs are not static and are subject to 
change at any time based on a number of factors, i ncluding risk.  
 
QUESTION  5: How can the U .S. ensure that the new fees still cover the program's long term 
operating costs and losses?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The United  States  continuously monitors programmatic data and risk and will 
continue to ensure that program fees are risk -based and sufficient to cover the long -term operating 
costs and losses of the program. The United  States  continues to operate its Export Credit Guarant ee 
program consistent with the provisions pertaining to Export Credits under the Nairobi Ministerial 
Decision, as well as its domestic statutory requirements pertaining to self -financing its Export Credit 
Guarantee programs.  
 
Paragraph 4.144  
 
Federal tax c redit programs play a key role in new generation capacity. These programs include the 
Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), the Investment Tax Credit (ITC), and the 
Residential Energy -Efficient Property Credit (REEPC).130 Renewable energy deve lopers may choose 
to benefit from the PTC or the ITC but cannot receive the two benefits. The PTC provides eligible 
generation facilities with a tax credit per kWh for the first 10  years a facility is in operation.131 The 
Further Consolidated Appropriation s Act of 2020 (P.L.  116-94) and the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2021 extended the PTC tax benefit for wind and other renewables facilities that began 
construction before the end of 2021. Similarly, the ITC, introduced in 2005, has been extended 
several times since then. Solar and geothermal energy has a permanent 10% ITC; however, the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L.  115-123) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 
increased the ITC temporarily to 30% through 2021.132 The REEPC is a tax cr edit for residential 
owners for qualifying properties, such as, inter alia, solar electric property, solar water heaters, 
geothermal heat pumps, small wind turbines, and fuel cell property.133 Estimated revenue losses 
related to these tax provisions amount ed to USD  13.2 billion  and USD  12.6 billion  in FY2020 and 
FY2021, respectively.  
 
QUESTION  6: In line with its objectives of increasing renewable energy capacity, the U .S. 
Government has recently enacted the "Inflation Reduction Act" (IRA), which establishes a series of 
domestic content requirements. In this regard, please clarify the following points:  
Do the tax credits granted under the IRA constitute rebates on future ta xes due? Alternatively, are 
they direct payments to beneficiaries?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Tax credits can reduce the amount of taxes owed or can increase a tax refund, 
depending on each taxpayer's individual situation. Some tax credits under the IRA may be applied 
at the point of sale, which can result in a reduction of the good's price. With respect to elective 
payment options that may be available for certain credits, the U.S. Department of Treasury and the 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service anticipate issuing guidance to implement the IRA's elective payment 
provisions.  
 
QUESTION  7: How does the U .S. ensure that the domestic content requirements under the IRA are 
consistent with WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The United  States  intends to administer the Inflation Reduction Act in a manner that 
is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION  8: How will domestic content be measured?  
 
RESPONSE  8: Most of the requirements under the Inflation  Reduction Act are not yet effective and 
will be addressed in future implementing guidance issued by the U.S. Department of Treasury and 
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. The U.S. domestic implementation process for IRA provisions is WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 37 - 
 
  transparent and publi c. The United  States  intends to administer the Inflation Reduction Act in a 
manner that is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION  9: Does the U.S. government intend to adopt regulations to specify the computing of 
components in the domestic content requirements further?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  See response to Question  8. 
 
QUESTION  10: Is there a definition for "critical materials" as regards the Electric Vehicles incentives 
program?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The Act defines " applicable critical minerals" for the Clean  Vehicle Credit  as: 
aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barite, beryllium, bismuth, cerium, cesium, chromium, cobalt, 
dysprosium, erbium, europium, fluorspar, gadolinium, gallium, germanium, graphite, hafnium, 
holmium, i ndium, iridium, lanthanum, lithium, lutetium, magnesium, manganese, neodymium, 
nickel, niobium, palladium, platinum, praseodymium, rhodium, rubidium, ruthenium, samarium, 
scandium, tantalum, tellurium, terbium, thulium, tin, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, ytterbium, 
yttrium, zinc, and zirconium.  
 
QUESTION  11: What is considered to be a "free trade agreement" for the purposes of the EV 
incentives program? Is there a list of agreements applicable to that provision?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  See response to Question  8. 
 
QUESTION  12: How will the IRA affect bilateral and multilateral initiatives related to critical minerals 
such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The IRA's objective is to increase investments in clean energy technologies to 
seriously c ombat the climate crisis and complement U.S. bilateral and multilateral initiatives.  
 
Section  3.1.6.1.1.3 New Regulations on Administration and Enforcement of AD and CVD 
Laws (3.82)  
Regarding item (ii)  of Paragraph  3.82 
 
The changes introduced by the Final Regulations, 2021 , include a revision of 19  C.F.R. 
Section  351.214 to ensure that the sales to be reviewed in a new shipper review are bona fide. 
Among the factors established by 19  C.F.R. Section  351.214 (k) in determining bona fide sales, 
paragraph  (2) states that it should be considered "[w]hether the producer, exporter, or customer 
has lines of business unrelated to the subject merchandise".  
 
QUESTION 13 : Please explain the rationale of considering whether the producer/exporter or 
customers have l ines of business unrelated to the subject merchandise. Does that mean that if a 
company only produces the subject merchandise such circumstance would render its exports as not 
being considered bona fide sales when petitioning for a new shipper review?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The United  States  cannot answer this question due to its speculative nature. A new 
shipper determination is case -specific, based on the facts and circumstances on the record of a 
specific segment of a proceeding. The determinations for each segment of a proceeding are available 
at the U.S. Department of Commerce's website  at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Regarding item (iii)  of Paragraph  3.82 
 
According to the changes introduced by the Final Regulations, 2021, 19  C.F.R. 
Section  351.225(i)  recognizes that Commerce may make a scope determination in the context  of 
another segment of the proceeding, such as an administrative review under 19  C.F.R. 
Section  351.213.  
 
QUESTION 14:  Could the U.S. please provide information on how it envisages scope determinations 
in the context of an administrative review given that the purpose of an administrative review is to 
determine the applicable duty? Could the U .S. point to any case in which it has conducted a scope 
determination in an administrative review?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 38 - 
 
  RESPONSE 14:  Regarding how the United  States  will approach futur e determinations, the 
United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
The determinations made in each AD/CVD segment  - including scope determinations  - are available 
on the U.S. Department of Commerce's website ( https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx ). From here, 
Members can obtain, on a case -by-case basis, information about the approaches applied and the 
rationale for the determination.  
 
Questions  7-9 
Section  3.1.6.1.1.5  - Administrative reviews and Section  3.1.6.1.1.6  - Sunset Reviews 
(3.90; 3.93)  
 
QUESTION 15:  Regarding CVD orders, would the U.S. kindly provide an explanation on which would 
be the correct procedure for a foreign government to present informat ion on the termination or 
changes on programs that were previously considered countervailable to have a CVD rate 
reassessed?  
 
QUESTION 16:  Could the U.S. clarify whether foreign governments can present evidence on the 
termination or changes on programs and  request a review without the participation of an exporter?  
 
QUESTION 17:  If Commerce issues a finding with a different understanding of a program that was 
considered as countervailable in a previous case, which would be the correct procedure for a foreign  
government to ask for a review of such a previous case so that Commerce can reconsider its new 
finding also for previous cases being reviewed?  
 
RESPONSE 15 -17: With respect to administrative reviews, Commerce's regulations, at 
19 CFR 351.213, state that " {e]ach year, during the anniversary month of the publication of an 
antidumping or countervailing duty order, a domestic interested party or an interested party 
described in section 771(9)(B) of the Act (foreign government) may request in writing that 
[Comm erce] conduct an administrative review under section 751(a)(1) of the Act of specific 
individual exporters or producers covered by an order…".  During the course of an administrative 
review, the Government of Brazil, if participating as an interested party,  may provide information in 
response to questionnaires or other factual information as defined in Commerce's regulations, as 
well as arguments regarding such information during the course of the review.  Commerce will 
consider all such properly filed inform ation in its determinations.  
With respect to a sunset review, Commerce's regulations at 19  CFR 351.218(c)(1) note that 
Commerce will publish a notice of initiation of a sunset review no later than 30  days before the fifth 
anniversary date of an order.  Provided that the Government of Brazil chooses to participate and 
properly files the required information, it may provide a substantive response and all such properly 
filed information will be considered by Commerce in its determinations.  
 
3.1.6.1.1 .7 Circumvention rulings (3.95)  
 
QUESTION 18:  Section  781 of the Tariff Act contains provisions related to the prevention of 
circumvention of AD and CVD. Is there any legal provision governing possible circumvention reviews 
of safeguard measures or measure s imposed under Section  232? 
 
RESPONSE 18:  No, there is no such provision. Any alleged circumvention of a safeguard measure 
or measures imposed under Section  232 would be investigated under CBP's more general 
authorities.  
 
Section  3.1.6.1.1.9  - Determination of evasion of AD/CVD orders (3.107)  
 
QUESTION 19:  Please provide information on whether there are bilateral agreements with foreign 
customs authorities in place. If so, with which ones?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The list of countries with which the United  States  has Customs Mutual Assistance 
Agreements can be found on CBP's website at: https://www.cbp.gov/b order -security/international -
initiatives/international -agreements/cmaa . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 39 - 
 
  3.1.7.1 Section  232 investigations (3.135)  
 
The Secretary Report indicates that the U.S. President has taken action to adjust imports in response 
to the Secretary's findings in two re cent instances, imposing additional duties on aluminum and steel 
products in 2018.  
 
QUESTION 20:  Could the U.S. indicate the relevant provisions of the U.S. legislation that regulates 
the review and termination of the measures under Section  232? 
 
RESPONSE 20: Under Section  232, the President has the authority to determine the nature and 
duration of the action that,  in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of 
the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
QUESTION 21:  What is the legal provision governing reviews to be made by the Secretary of 
Commerce on the impact of the measures imposed by the President under Section  232? Are such 
reviews made publicly available?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Under Section  232, the President has the authority to determine the nature and 
duration of the action that,  in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of 
the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
Item  4.1., Page 187 
 
With regard to the statement, "Almost 86% of all U.S. farms were owned by families or individuals, 
followed by agricultural partnerships (6.3%). Since 2007, such types of farms have been decli ning, 
while the number of farming corporations is increasing (to 5.7% of all farms in 2017) ". 
 
QUESTION 22:  What is the difference(s) identified, in terms of governance and taxation, between 
the production units called farms owned by families or individual s, agricultural partnerships and 
farming corporations?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The data on farms by legal status is collected as part of the Census of Agriculture. 
The Census does not provide information on the differences, in terms of governance and taxation, 
betwe en these different classifications.  
 
QUESTION 23 : What are the reason(s) for the increase in the number of farming corporations to 
the detriment of farms owned by families or individuals and agricultural partnerships?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The U.S. farm sector is continually evolving and changing in response to market 
and other economic conditions.  
 
Item  4.10, Page 191 
 
With regard to the statement, "It released an Action Plan for Climate Adaptation and Resilience, a 
framework to prepare farmers, ranchers, and land managers for current and anticipated impacts of 
climate change, in October  2021". 
 
QUESTION 24:  Are there adaptive actions for storage and conservation activities for agricultural 
products?  
 
RESPONSE  24: The Department of Agriculture Act ion Plan for Climate Adaption and Resilience 
contains extensive information about adaption strategies for agriculture. It can be accessed at: 
https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/usda -2021-cap.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 25 : Are there adaptive actions, including spatial distribution, of the storage system at 
the national level? As storage system it means the set of storage units in the country destined for 
the safekeeping and conservation of agricultur al products, their derivatives, by-products  and 
residues of economic value.  
 
RESPONSE 25:  Please see response to Question  24. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 40 - 
 
  Item  4.43, Page 198 
 
With regard to the statement, "The Noninsured  Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) 
compensates enrolled agricultural producers for natural disaster damage to crops where crop 
insurance is not available ". 
 
QUESTION 26 : Are there situations in which insurance is not offered or insurance covering natu ral 
disasters is not offered for some locations or crops?  
 
RESPONSE 26 : Eligible crops must be commercially produced agricultural commodities for which 
crop insurance is not available. If federal crop insurance is available for the crop in the county where  
it is grown, it is generally not eligible for NAP. However, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 
amended NAP crop eligibility provisions to allow coverage for certain crops for which catastrophic 
risk protection is not available under section 508(b) of  the Federal Crop Insurance Act and additional 
coverage under subsections 508(c) and 508(h) is not available or, if such coverage is available, it is 
only available under a policy that is in a ''pilot'' program category, provides coverage for specific 
intervals based on weather indexes or under a whole farm plan of insurance.  
 
QUESTION 27 : In such cases, what reason(s) were identified?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Please see the response to Question  26 for information on NAP crop eligibility.  
 
2.44. During the review peri od, four new or revised TIFAs were negotiated by the United  States : 
with Brazil, Ecuador, Fiji, and Paraguay. The TIFA with Fiji, completed in 2020, marked the 
United  States ' first TIFA with a small Pacific island nation. In the case of Brazil and Ecuador,  existing 
agreements were amended, both in 2020, to include a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency. 
The Protocols agreed upon by Brazil and Ecuador are exceptional among TIFAs in that they contain 
obligations of the parties similar to that seen in bila teral or multilateral trade agreements. Each 
protocol contains three annexes: (i)  Trade Facilitation and Customs Matters, which is consistent with 
the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA), although the Annex goes beyond the TFA with regard to 
certain obli gations; (ii)  Good Regulatory Practices; and (iii)  Anti-Corruption. In addition, the Protocol 
agreed upon by Ecuador also contains a fourth Annex: Small and Medium -Sized Enterprises. These 
recent protocols to the TIFAs with Brazil and Ecuador provide a tra nsition period to one or both of 
the parties to implement certain articles of the agreements . 
 
QUESTION 28:  Regarding the Annex on Trade Facilitation and Customs Matters in the Brazil -U.S. 
Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, could the U .S. please elaborate on how it implements 
the obligations concerned? Please identify the relevant laws, decrees, regulati ons, guidances, or 
policy that implements the obligations.  
 
RESPONSE 28 : Regarding implementation on customs and trade facilitation matters, we refer Brazil 
to the U.S. notification under article  1.4 of the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
(G/TFA/N/USA/1/Rev.1 ). 
 
QUESTION 29:  Regarding the Annex on Good Regulatory Practices in the Brazil  - US Protocol on 
Trade Rules and Transparency, could the U .S. please elaborate on how it implements the obligations 
concerned? Please identify the relevant laws, decrees, regul ations, guidances, or policy that 
implements the obligations.  
 
RESPONSE 29:  The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 is  the United  States  federal statute that 
governs the way in which administrative agencies of the federal government may propose and 
establ ish regulations. Other U.S. laws relevant to implementation of regulatory practices include the 
Federal Register Act, Information Quality Act, Paperwork Reduction Act, Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
and the E -Government Act. There have also been a number of Executive  Orders (EO) issued across 
administrations providing guiding regulatory principles and processes, including EO  12866, 
EO 13563, EO  12498, EO  13601, and EO  13609.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 41 - 
 
  BRUNEI DARUSSALAM  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page 51  
2 TRADE AN D INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4 Investment Regime  
 
2.41. There have been several developments in the United  States ' investment regime during the 
review period, with a new law and rules expanding the types of foreign investment subject to 
examination, new reportin g requirements for certain types of FDI, and the formalization and 
streamlining of the committee for the assessment of foreign investment in the telecommunications 
sector. Thus, there has been a marked move towards greater scrutiny of foreign investment 
transactions on national security grounds.  
 
2.4.1 Investment framework  
 
2.42. In terms of its investment framework, the United  States  has subscribed to trade and 
investment framework agreements (TIFAs)44, bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and FTAs 
contai ning investment provisions, all of which provide a stable environment conducive to 
encouraging foreign investment as well as securing important provisions for U.S. investors abroad 
(Table  2.5). Most of these frameworks did not undergo significant revision since the last Review ; 
however, a few new TIFAs came into force, and the USMCA includes a revised chapter on investment.  
 
2.43. TIFAs have traditionally been used by the United  States  to have a higher degree of engagement 
and dialogue with trading partners in order to promote their mutual interest on trade and investment 
matters. They have often served as an intermediary step before moving towards a deeper 
relationship in an FTA, and the va st majority are with developing countries. TIFAs create binding 
obligations to meet and discuss matters within their scope, but they typically do not create 
substantive obligations with regard to trade and investment, although there are exceptions. No 
changes to U.S. law have been required to implement TIFAs. In essence, most TIFAs establish a 
joint Council where the parties agree to meet and engage in a dialogue or consult on trade and 
investment matters.  
 
QUESTION 1:  How would the new law and rules on for eign investment affect existing TIFAs, BITs, 
FTAs?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  As the President reaffirmed on 8 June 2021, the United  States  remains committed 
to maintaining an open investment policy. The developments noted in Paragraph  2.41 of the 
Secretariat Report, sp ecifically the expansion of authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United  States  and the formalization of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign 
Participation in the United  States  Telecommunications Services Sector, are focused on p rotecting 
important U.S. national security interests. Existing TIFAs, BITs, and FTAs remain in force according 
to their terms.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Does the United  States  plan to revise investment chapter in existing TIFAs based on 
the new laws and rules on foreign investment?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Existing TIFAs, BITs, and FTAs remain in force according to their terms. Regarding 
future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that  Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page 6  
2. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT  
2.4 Nominal Savings/Investment  
 
2.9. U.S. gross savings as a percentage of gross national income fluctuated during the period under 
review. They were 19.2% (USD  4.03 trillion ) in 2018, 19.1% (USD  4.16 trillion ) in 2019, and then 
fell to 18.8% (USD  4.00 trillion ) in 2020 before increasing to 19.5% (USD  4.63 trillion ) in 2021. The 
personal saving  rate was steady at 7.6% in both 2018 and 2019 (prior to the recession), peaked at WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 42 - 
 
  16.6% in 2020, declined to 12.3% in 2021 and was 5.6% in the first quarter of 2022. Overall, U.S. 
gross investment increased by USD  582 billion  between 2018 and 2021 to USD  4.9 trillion . 
 
QUESTION 3:  Could the United  States  elaborate on the gross investment increased by 
USD 582 billion  between 2018 and 2021 and in what areas. What percentage of the increase made 
up of foreign investment?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The USD 566 billion  (revised since the USG report) increase in gross investment from 
2018 to 2021 was more than accounted for by increases in private fixed investment in residential 
structures ( USD 305 billion ) and in intellectual property products ( USD 275 billion ). The increase in 
residential structures reflected increases in the construction of single -family houses 
(USD 134 billion ), improvements ( USD 75 billion ), and brokers' commissions and other ownership 
transfer costs ( USD 72 billion ). The increase in intellectual property products reflected increases in 
research and development ( USD 165 billion ) and software ( USD 110 billion ). 
 
Foreign Direct Investment data are not a direct input into the calculation of gross domestic 
investment.  Information on foreig n-owned U.S. affiliate data, for which the latest data is 2020, is 
shown below.  These are the only types of domestic investment that are reported for foreign -owned 
U.S. affiliates.  
 
U.S. Domestic Investment by Foreign -Owned U.S. Affiliates (USD  million)  
  
2018  2020  
R&D investment by foreign -owned U.S. affiliates  69,662  71,416  
Investment in tangible capital by foreign -owned U.S. affiliates  273,831  281,759  
 
Page 8  
3 ADVANCING A WORKER -CENTERED TRADE POLICY  
3.1 Standing up for Worker Rights  
 
In addition, the United  States  has promoted the creation of innovative trade tools to address topics 
important to working people. We are prioritizing labor issues in the United  States -European  Union  
Trade and Technology Council (TTC), in the Indo -Pacific Econ omic Framework (IPEF), in the 
United  States  – United  Kingdom Dialogues on the Future of Atlantic Trade, the U.S. -Taiwan Initiative 
on 21st Century Trade, and in the United  States -Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Could the Unit ed States  share the innovative tools to address topics important to 
working people?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement begins with the recognition that trade 
should raise living standards, ensure full employment, pursue sustainable develo pment, and protect 
and preserve the environment. Improved labor conditions are interwoven among these enduring 
and ambitious goals. We are prioritizing a range of labor issues in our work around the world. We 
are implementing existing commitments and devel oping new tools.  For example, the United  States  
Launched the Trade and Labor Dialogue under the TTC. Information about its first meeting is 
available at: https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -offices/press -office/press -
releases/2022/september/us -trade-representative -and-us-department -labor-host-transatlantic -
tripartite -trade-and-labor. In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all 
four IPEF pillars.  The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future labor 
negotiations.  Please  see here for more information:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -09/IP
EF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text %20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEASE%20
(1).pdf . In January  2022, the United  States  announced that it will develop its first -ever focused trade 
strategy to combat forced labor. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that 
Trade Polic y Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 5:  Will these innovative tools also be introduced as part the cooperation under IPEF?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  As noted above, in September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements 
on all four IPEF pillars.  The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future 
labor negotiations.  Please see here for more information: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -
09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEASWT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 43 - 
 
  E%20(1).pdf . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are re trospective exercises.  
 
Page 20  
5 TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  
5.3.3 Addressing Forced Labor  
 
5.31. In January  2022, the United  States  announced that it will develop its first -ever focused trade 
strategy to combat forced labor. The development of this strategy includes a thorough, interagency 
review of existing trade policies and tools used to combat forced labor, including forced child labor, 
to determine areas that may need strengthening and gaps that need to be filled. The United  States  
will use this analysis to establish objectives, priorities, new tools, and key action items to advance 
its goals to combat forced labor.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Could the United  States  share the current progress of the focused trade strategy to 
combat forced labour and what are the new tools and key action items to advance its goal to combat 
forced labour?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  The United  States  is in the process of developing its focused trade strategy to combat 
forced labor. The strategy will lay out the U.S. Government's t rade approach to addressing forced 
labor in global supply chains. The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 27 -28 
5. TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  
5.5.10 Indo -Pacific Economic Framework  
 
QUESTION 7:  What are the potential tangible benefits which United  States  envisions under the 
IPEF?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The IPEF will advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, 
fairness, and competitiveness for our economies. Through IPEF,  the partners aim to contribute to 
cooperation, stability, prosperity, development, and peace within the region. The Framework will 
also offer tangible benefits that fuel economic activity and investment, promote sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth, and benefit workers and consumers across the region. For more 
information,  see here:  https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/agr eements -under -negotiation/indo -paci
fic-economic -framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 44 - 
 
  CANADA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Summary  
Page  14, Paragraph  19 
 
As noted in the paragraph, the U.S. procurement policy encourages the participation of small 
businesses and women -owned businesses, amongst others, in the procurement process.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Does the U.S procurement policy include programs specific to Indigenous -owned 
small businesses as well?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The Indian Incentive  Program is one example of programs the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) is implementing to provide maximum practicable opportunity to participate in 
performing  contracts  awarded  by federal  agencies.  See FAR subpart  26.1 (https://www.acquisition
.gov/far/subpart -26.1). More generally, federal regulations establish a rebuttable presumption that 
Native Americans (Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, or enrolled members of a Federally or State 
recognized Indian Tribe) qualify as a socially disadvantaged group eligible for c ertain small business 
set aside programs. See: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -13/chapter -I/part -124. 
 
QUESTION 2:  Does the United  States  enforce specific information -sharing strat egies and 
mechanisms to promote and enhance visibility and awareness of procurement opportunities available 
to SMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  In addition to electronic publication of procurement opportunities, the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) also provides assi stance and counselling that helps small business compete for 
federal contracts. For more information on available assistance, please visit the SBA website at: 
www.SBA.gov . 
 
3.1.6.1.1.2 Administrative procedures  
Page  81-84, Paragraphs  3.73-3.80 
 
QUESTION 3:  If the U.S. Department of Commerce does not have the authority to conduct 
expedited reviews, what legislative or regulatory measures will the United  States  undertake to 
ensure that the Department of Commerce has the auth ority to conduct expedited reviews, and when 
will any such measures be adopted?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States  conducts its proceedings in accordance with the obligations 
contained in the Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as implemented by U.S. 
law. There is domestic litigation pending concerning the U.S. Department of Commerce's authority 
to conduct expedited reviews in counterv ailing duty proceedings; as such, we will not comment on 
ongoing litigation. Regarding actions in the future, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade 
Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.1.6.1.1.7 Circumvention rulings  
Page  89, Paragraph  3.98 
 
This paragraph summarizes the anti -circumvention determinations made by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (USDOC) during the period under review.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Does the USDOC proactively monitor trade flows from countries that have 
anti-dumping  and/or countervailing duty orders placed on them?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The U.S. Department of Commerce monitors trade flows from countries covered by 
existing antidumping and/or countervailing duty orders to ensure proper enforcement of trade 
measures.  To that en d, the U.S. Department of Commerce monitors trade flows to identify situations 
where potential circumvention may be occurring.  
 
QUESTION 5:  What factors trigger the United  States  to self -initiate an anti -circumvention 
investigation?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 45 - 
 
  RESPONSE 5:  The decisio n to self -initiate an anti -circumvention investigation is based on the facts 
and circumstances before the U.S. Department of Commerce at a certain point in time.  
 
3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation  
Page  107, Paragraph  3.141  
 
In October  2021, the Unites  States and the EU announced the emissions -based sectoral 
arrangement on steel and aluminum trade, a part of which includes the creation of a working group 
that aims to develop methodology to address the carbon intensity of traded steel and aluminum.  
 
QUEST ION 6:  Can the United  States  please indicate what methodology it and the EU intend to 
develop to assess the embedded emissions in traded steel and aluminum?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discuss ion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.3.6.1 Institutional framework and general policies  
Page  149, Paragraph  3.287  
 
The Secretariat's report references that regulatory changes to procurement were introduced by 
Executive  Order  14005 in January  2021, titled "Ensuring the Future is Made in All of America by All 
of America's Workers ". On 15 November  2021, President  Biden signed the Infrastructure Investment 
and Jo bs Act (IIJA), which includes the Build America, Buy America Act (BABA). Specifically, BABA 
expands the coverage and application of Buy America preferences in Federal financial assistance 
programs for infrastructure. On 18 April 2022, OMB issued memorandum  M-22-11, "Initial 
Implementation Guidance on Application of Buy America Preference in Federal Financial Assistance 
Programs for Infrastructure" (Implementation Guidance).  
 
QUESTION 7:  Will there be additional guidance issued by the OMB or other U.S. federal agencies 
to assist in applying BABA's requirements?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
QUES TION 8:  If so, is there a specific timeframe in which this guidance will be issued?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Given the significant expansion of Buy America requirements under the BABA, how 
will the United  States  ensure that federally -funded procurements undertaken by those 37  U.S. states 
covered under the WTO  Agreement  on Government Procurement (GPA) will be consistent with their 
international trade obligations?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
Page  150, Paragraph  3.289  
 
It is no ted that, between the establishment in October  2021 of a digital waiver portal to submit 
proposed Made in America waivers to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Made in 
America Office, and February  2022, "25  requests for non -availability Made in America waivers have 
been presented, and 20  determinations have been made ". 
 
QUESTION 10 : To clarify, in this instance, are the waivers being proposed by suppliers to an 
external -facing U.S. government portal, or by other U.S. government agencies to an internal portal 
at the OMB?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  U.S. government agencies submit proposed waivers to the Office of Management 
and Budget's Made in America Office (MIAO). The list of proposed waivers, including determinations WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 46 - 
 
  of the review, are available to the pu blic on the MIAO's website at: 
www.madeinamerica.gov/waivers . 
 
It is further noted that "In all cases the waiver was granted as the requests were found to be 
consistent with policy ". 
 
QUESTION 11 : Is OMB considering reviewing its guidelines on the application of Made in America 
provisions, to ensure a more consistent overall approach with the provisions, thereby limiting the 
necessity for a waiver submission and review process?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  Regard ing future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews. Further guidance and instructions will be issued as MIAO expands 
its waiver review process to cover all types of waivers from covered Made in America L aws, as 
defined in Section  2(b) of Executive  Order  14005.  
 
3.3.6.6 Set -asides and preferences  
Page  161, Paragraph  3.325  
 
The report states that the U.S procurement goal to award 6% of all federal contracts to 
women -owned small businesses have generally not been met.  
 
QUESTION 12:  What are the strategies that the United  States  has put, or plans to put, in place to 
ensure that this objective is fully met or surpassed in the coming years?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The Administration has announced a government -wide goal to grow Federal 
contracting with small, disadvantaged businesses, including women owned small businesses, by 
50%. For more information, see: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -
releases/2021/12/02/fact -sheet -biden -harris -administration -announces -reforms -to-increase -
equity -and-level-the-playing -field-for-underserved -small -business -owners/ . 
 
In addition, the certification process for Women -Owned Small Businesses (WOSBs) and Economically 
Disadvantaged WOSBs (EDWOSBs) changed in 2020 to make it easier for qua lified small businesses 
to participate in the WOSB Federal Contracting program by improving the customer experience 
strengthening oversight and integrity of the certification process. The updated WOSB Federal 
Contracting program regulations were published in the Federal Register in May  2020.  
 
In general, the Small Business Administration (SBA) offers a variety of programs and resources to 
assist women owned small businesses. For more general information on the types of assistance 
available, please see: https://www.sba.gov/federal -contracting/contracting -assistance -
programs/women -owned -small-business -federal -contract ing-program . 
 
QUESTION 13 : Can the United  States  share feedback and recommendations received from 
stakeholders with respect to the 6% threshold for women -owned businesses in government 
procurement?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  A survey of the literature suggests that wom en-owned businesses are 
underrepresented in federal contracting due to a number of barriers, including potential 
discrimination, lack of knowledge about or disinterest in government contracting, difficulties with 
federal certifications, smaller size, reduc ed capacities, limited government and business networks, 
and other unfavorable social, policy, and regulatory environments. For more information, see: 
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -03/WOSB%20NAICS%20Analysis%20 -
%20FINAL%20VERSION%20%283%29%20%281%29%20%281%29%20%283%29%28R%29%
20%282%29.pdf . 
 
One recent study, prepared for the SBA, on  the overall process for establishing agency procurement 
goals can be found at: https://www.sba.gov/document/report -evaluation -sbas-small -business -
procurement -scorecard . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 47 - 
 
  3.3.7.1 Overview  
Page  163, Paragraph  3.330  
 
Per the paragraph, a major feature in recent years has been the increase in the number of patents 
linked to artificial intelligence.  
 
QUESTION  14: As related to patent applications linked to AI, can the United  States  provide an 
overview of any trends it has noted in grounds for refusal?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  AI-related inventions can be viewed as a subset of computer -implemented 
inventions. Therefore, USPTO  guidance regarding computer -implemented inventions can be a useful 
resource. See https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial -intelligence/artifici al-intelligence -
resources . 
 
QUESTION 15 : In particular, we note that a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit released in August  2022, found that AI systems can't patent inventions. What will be 
the effects of this ruling in the United  States , including as it pertains to how and whether 
AI-generated inventions are protected (for example, has the U.S. seen any spillover into trade 
secrets protection)?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  As to what will be the effects of the ruling, the United  States  reminds Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 16 : Have the Patent Cooperation Highways played a role in the increased number of 
patent applications linked to artificial intelligence?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  The United  States  does not have data on the number of patent applications linked 
to AI as affected by the Patent Prosecution Highways.  
 
3.3.7.2 General regulatory framework  
Page  164, Paragraph  3.332  
 
Per the paragraph, recent amendments to U .S. legislation notified to the WTO include: the 
implementation of the Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing Engineering and Science Success 
Act of 2018 (SUCCESS Act) with respect to certain aspects of patent law, which entered into force 
on 31  October  2018. 
 
QUESTION 17 : We note that the Final Report to Congress for the Success Act was submitted on 
31 October  2019. Can the United  States  please summarize the findings and any steps or follow -ups 
taken to date?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  The SUCCESS Act report was transm itted to Congress on 31 October  2019. See the 
list of major findings and other details at: https://www.uspto.gov/ip -policy/legislative -
resources/successact . 
 
3.3.7.3 Patents  
Page  167, Paragraph  3.344  
 
The paragraph highlights the U.S. government's efforts in promoting the participation of women, 
minorities, […]in entrepreneurship activities and the patent system with the support of the Study of 
Underrepresented Classes  Chasing Engineering and Science Success Act of 2018.  
 
QUESTION 18 : Can the United  States  please share data on STEM -focused women entrepreneurs 
or women -owned small businesses that participate in trade?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  See the USPTO's report on "Progress and  Potential, 2020 update on U.S. women 
inventor -patentees" at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE -DH-Progress -
Potential -2020.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 48 - 
 
  3.3.7.7 Trade secret protection  
Page  176, Paragraph  3.371  
 
The Secretariat Report notes that the United  States ' Economic Espionage Act of 1996 does not apply 
to lawful activity by government entities.  
 
QUESTION 19 : Can the United  States  please state the conditions under which a U.S. government 
entity can lawfully share a third party's trade secret with another U.S. government entity?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  U.S. government entities are permitted to share another's information with other 
government  components where there is a specific statutory authorization to do so, and are generally 
prohibited from disclosing trade secret information unless authorized by law. See 18  U.S.C.  § 1905 
(the Trade Secrets Act). The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel may undertake a legal 
analysis of a potential disclosure. An example of such analysis can be found here: Applicability of 
Trade Secrets Act to Intra -Governmental Exchange of Regulatory Information, DOJ Office of Legal 
Counsel ( 5 April 1999) (available at: https://www.justice.gov/file/19546/download ). 
 
3.3.7.8 Copyright  
Page  179, Paragraph  3.381  
 
The Secretariat Report indicates that the Music Modernization Act establishes a mec hanical licensing 
collective (MLC) to maintain a searchable database of information relating to musical works, their 
owners, and the sound recordings in which they are embodied.  
 
QUESTION 20 : Can the United  States  please indicate how the MLC administers th e information 
contained in the database?  
 
RESPONSE  20: The MLC is required to "establish and maintain a database containing information 
relating to musical works (and shares of such works) and, to the extent known, the identity and 
location of the copyrigh t owners of such works (and shares thereof) and the sound recordings in 
which the musical works are embodied ". 17 U.S.C.  § 115(d)(3)(E)(i). It must also "engage in efforts 
to identify the musical works embodied in particular sound recordings, as well as to identify and 
locate the copyright owners of such works (and shares thereof), and update such data as 
appropriate ". Id. 
 
QUESTION 21:  More specifically:  
 
a) Who has authority to submit information?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  The MLC's database contains information about  musical works and sound 
recordings. The MLC allows musical work copyright owners to identify themselves and provide 
contact, ownership, and other relevant information to the database. Musical work copyright owners 
may include music publishers and administ rators; self -administered songwriters, composers, and 
lyricists; and ex -U.S. collective management organizations ("CMOs"). The MLC uses the term 
"members" to refer to copyright owners who have registered with the MLC. As discussed further 
below, the MLC al so identifies musical work copyright owners itself, using public databases and other 
research sources.  
 
Digital music providers are also required to supply certain musical work and sound recording data 
for works used under the blanket license. The sound re cording data that the digital music providers 
provide to the MLC ultimately comes from sound recording copyright owners ( e.g. record labels). 
Due to concerns that the sound recording data provided by digital music providers may be outdated 
or otherwise ina ccurate, the MLC must include a conspicuous disclaimer that states that its database 
is not an authoritative source for sound recording information.  
 
QUESTION 22:  
 
b) Does the MLC validate the submitted information?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The MLC states that it "utilizes over 30  public databases and other research sources 
to support its matching efforts[,]  include[ing] various collective rights management organization 
databases, music credit databases, [digital music provider] websites, content owner websites, an d WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 49 - 
 
  other niche and genre specific sources ". However, it "does not consider any one source as 
authoritative" and "attempts to validate information by cross -referencing multiple sources, as 
necessary, on a work -by-work basis." The MLC, 2021 Annual Report 
App'x 20, https://www.themlc.com/hubfs/Marketing/23856%20The%20MLC%20AR2021%206 -
30%20REFRESH%20COMBINED.pdf  ("MLC 2021 Annual Report").  
 
Further, the MLC states that it occasionally may review its musical works database information and, 
in doing so, "may request information and documentation associated with musical works (and shares 
of such works)" and, as appropriate, may "update musical work and s ound recording information" 
and remove "registrations of musical works, claims to shares of musical works, and 
sound  recording  information  from the [database]."  MLC, Portal  Terms  of Use, https://www.t hemlc.
com/portaltermsofuse  (last visited 30 November  2022).  
 
QUESTION 23:  
 
c) How can information in the database be revised if needed?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The MLC is required to update its database. See 17 U.S.C.  § 115(d)(3)(I)(i), 
(d)(3)(E)(i). MLC members may update information in the database using the MLC's portal. See MLC 
2021 Annual Report at 4.  
 
QUESTION 24:  
 
d) Is there any procedure available should the information be contested?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The MLC does not resolve musical work ownership disputes. When th ere is a dispute 
and it is substantiated by adequate and timely documentation, the MLC will put the payment of any 
corresponding royalties on hold.  See 17 U.S.C.  § 115(d)(3)(K)(ii); The MLC, Dispute Policy: 
Musical  Work Ownership  ¶1.1 (Feb. 2021),  https://f.hubspotusercontent40.net/hubfs/8718396/file
s/2021 -02/MLC%20Dispute%20Policy%20Statement%20(Musical%20Wor ks%20Ownership).pdf  
("MLC Dispute Policy"). The MLC will release the hold after receiving either documentation that the 
dispute has been resolved by the parties or a legal order, decision, or judgment resolving the dispute. 
See MLC Dispute Policy at 8.1.  
 
4.1.1 Main features  
Page  189, Paragraph  4.7 
 
The report indicates that "Since 2018, U.S. agricultural producers have faced extraordinary 
disruptions due to trade tensions, followed by the COVID -19 pandemic. However, some of the 
reduction in income has been offset by significant increases in federal g overnment payments. 
According to the USDA ERS, net farm income rose by 20% from 2019 to 2020, and by 25% from 
2020 to 2021, although in the latter case, higher cash receipts from strong agricultural markets 
offset lower government payments ". 
 
QUESTION 25 : Should members understand that the support provided by the United  States  to its 
farmers and ranchers exceeded the negative price impacts producers faced in cash receipt caused 
by trade tensions and the COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  No. The Federal Gover nment payments estimated for 2020 and 2021 include a 
broader suite of pandemic response measures, including programs that were available to all U.S. 
businesses adversely impacted by the economic effects of the pandemic. The estimates also include 
programs unrelated to the pandemic, such as conservation and natural disaster relief.  
 
4.1.1.1.8 Other Farm Act and disaster programs  
Pages  198-201, Paragraphs  4.46 to 4.58  
 
In section 4.1.1.1.9 and 4.1.1.1.10, the United  States  highlights how billions of dollars were provided 
to producers through different programs (e.g. MFP, CFAP, etc.) in response to trade tension and the 
COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
QUESTION 26:  Did the United  States  take any measures to minimize or alleviate the trad e 
distorting effects of these programs on global markets?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 50 - 
 
  RESPONSE 26:  Yes. The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) was a temporary program 
designed to minimize the negative economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture, while the 
Market Facilita tion Program (MFP) was a temporary program designed to help assist producers with 
meeting the additional costs associated with disrupted markets for commodities targeted by 
retaliatory tariffs. These programs had no market impact as assistance to producers  was based on 
factors such as past production, acres already planted, or past sales, therefore having no market 
impacts.  
 
4.1.1.3 Levels of support  
Page  204, Table  4.5, Total PSE and single commodity transfer values for selected 
commodities, 2016 -2020  
 
QUESTION 27 : As per the OECD, the single commodity transfer for maize has consistently grown 
since 2016 (4.2% of gross farm receipts in 2015 compared to 7.1% in 2020). What is the reason for 
such an increase in support for maize?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  As explained  in the report, the United  States  provided temporary, ad hoc assistance 
to agricultural producers in response to unprecedented market disruptions due to the impacts of the 
COVID -19 pandemic on the entire U.S. agricultural sector beginning in 2020. The increases 
referenced in Canada's question were due to the provision of CFAP payments in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 28 : As per the OECD, the single commodity transfer for beef and veal for the 2020 was 
8.8% of gross farm receipts, which is a large increase from less t han 1% for the years 2016 to 2019. 
What is the reason for such an increase in support for beef and veal products?  
 
RESPONSE 28:  As explained in the report, the United  States  provided temporary, ad hoc assistance 
to agricultural producers in response to unp recedented market disruptions due to the impacts of the 
COVID -19 pandemic on the entire U.S. agricultural sector beginning in 2020. The increases 
referenced in Canada's question were due to the provision of CFAP payments in 2020.  
 
Page  205, Chart  4.4, Ambe r Box support in the United  States , 2001/02  - 2019/20  
 
It is noted that the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program ( Page 200, Paragraph  4.54), introduced 
in April  2020, contributed to the United  States  Current Total AMS of USD 18.25  billion  in 2019/2020, 
just less than its total AMS commitment level ( USD 19.1 billion ). 
 
QUESTION 29 : Can the United  States  please specify what is included in the "other" product 
category for the year 2019 -2020 in Chart 4.4? 
 
RESPONSE 29:  Noting Chart  4.4 was compiled by the WTO Secretariat, not the United  States , a 
full list of product -specific AMS by product that has likely been aggregated in "other" can be found 
in Supporting Table  DS:4 of G/AG/N/USA/166 and previous Table  DS:1 notifications submitted by 
the United  States . 
 
QUESTION 30 : Can the United  States  please indicate why there was such an increase in support 
for the "other" category as compared to previous years in Chart 4.4? 
 
RESPONSE 30:  As explained in the report, the United  States  provided temporary, ad hoc assistance 
to agricultural producers in response to unprecedented market disruptions due to the impacts of the 
COVID -19 pandemic on the entire U.S. agricultural sector beginning in 2020. The increases 
referenced in Canada's ques tion were due to the provision of Coronavirus Food Assistance Program 
payments in 2020.  
 
Pages  205-206, Chart  4.3, Chart  4.4, Paragraph  4.72 
 
In Charts 4.3 and 4.4., and in Paragraph  4.72., the United  States  highlights support notified, over 
the years, under the WTO green box and amber box. The report remains silent, however, to the fact 
that starting with notification 2017/18, the United  States  modified its reporting methodologies, going 
from a crop year to a marketing year basis, changing the covered period of reporting. Such changes 
coincide with the United  States  reporting large increases in amber box government support.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 51 - 
 
  QUESTION 31 : Can the United  States  please confirm why this information was not highli ghted in 
the report?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  The Secretariat Report was compiled by the WTO Secretariat, not by the 
United  States . 
 
QUESTION 32 : Can the United  States  please specify on what basis (i.e. crop year or marketing 
year) Charts 4.3 and 4.4 are being report ed? 
 
RESPONSE 32:  Charts 4.3 and 4.4 correspond to the U.S. Table  DS:1 notifications to the WTO, 
which are provided on a marketing year basis. However, some data, as specified in each notification, 
is provided on a fiscal year basis that corresponds to the  marketing year notified.  
 
4.1.2.1 Production, trade, and border measures  
Page  209, Paragraph  4.79 
 
It is noted that Lacey Act covers wood products across 11 HS chapters but does not include key 
products such as pulp and paper (47 & 48).  
 
QUESTION 33 : Does the United  States  have plans to expand the Act to include other wood products 
in the near future? If so, which products would be targeted?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospec tive exercises.  
 
4.1.3.3 Policy, fisheries management, and support measures  
Page  219, Paragraph  4.114  
 
This paragraph mentions that the Seafood Competitiveness Executive Order "instructed the USDOC 
to prepare a prioritized list of recommended actions to reduce burdens on domestic fishing and to 
increase production within sustainable fisheries ". 
 
QUESTION 34 : How does the United  States  plan to ensure that increased fishing production does 
not have a negative impact on the sustainability of fishe ries? 
 
RESPONSE 34:  All fishery management actions recommended as part of Executive  Order  13921 
are developed under the authority of the Magnuson -Stevens Fishery Management Act, which has 
strict requirements to prevent overfishing and achieve optimum yield.  
 
QUESTION 35:  Can the United  States  please indicate if the list of recommended actions is publicly 
available, and if so, where it can be accessed?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  The recommended actions are not publicly available.  
 
QUESTION 36 : Have any of th e recommended actions resulting from this aspect of the 
Executive  Order been initiated or implemented? If so, which ones?  
 
RESPONSE 36:  Per the Executive  Order, the Secretary of Commerce and the United  States  Trade 
Representative co -chaired an Interagency Seafood Trade Task Force. Within 90  days of the 
Executive  Order, the Seafood Trade Task Force provided recommendations to the Office of the 
United  States  Trade Representative to be considered in the development by USTR of a 
comprehensive intera gency seafood trade. During the previous administration, USTR, as directed 
under the Executive  Order, prepared and submitted to the President, the comprehensive interagency 
seafood trade strategy described in the Executive  Order.  
 
Pages  224-225, Paragraph  4.138  
 
This paragraph states that "incentives are also provided in the form of investment tax credits for the 
installation of solar panels, and production tax credits for power generated by wind turbines ". 
QUESTION 37 : Can the United  States  please provide a list of federal and state agencies that 
manage incentives and indicate which incentives they manage?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 52 - 
 
  RESPONSE 37:  Administering agencies at both the federal and state levels of government can be 
found in our subsidy notification (see, G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021).  
 
QUESTION 38 : Can the United  States  please indicate what the rationale is for these incentives and 
how the incentives impact the setting of standards at the federal and state levels?  
 
RESPONSE 38:  Given the number and variety of programs, ther e is no single rationale, but 
generally speaking, the rationale for these incentives would be to address climate change and 
encourage the development of sustainable energy sources to support the low -carbon transition and 
meet our decarbonization objectives . 
 
4.4.3 Transport  
Page  252-257, Paragraphs 4.237 to 4.257  
 
The Secretariat Report makes note of the U.S. trade policies and measures with respect to Air and 
Maritime transport, but does not include information or updates relating to rail or road transport ation 
in the United  States . 
 
QUESTION 39 : Can the United  States  please identify new or amended trade policies and measures, 
including liberalization efforts, taken with respect to the rail and road transport sectors since the last 
Trade Policy Review period in 2018, in the manner that was done for Air and Maritime tra nsport?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  The United  States  is not expected to produce new sections of the Secretariat Report 
as part of the Question process. The U.S. Department of Transportation maintains a site of 
"significant rulemakings" organized by year, which include those of the Federal Highway 
Administra tion, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Federal Railroad 
Administration,  and other  relevant  transport  agencies:  https://www.transportation.g ov/regulations
/significant -rulemaking -report -archive . 
 
4.4.3.2.1 Maritime Transport  
Page  259, Paragraph  4.264  
 
The Secretariat Report notes that the U.S. maintains restrictions to cabotage services for both cargo 
and passengers under the coastwise laws. Th e U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is 
responsible for enforcing the coastwise laws, including the Jones Act, and can impose fines and 
penalties on violators.  
 
QUESTION 40 : Did CBP experience an increase in violations or increased need for enforceme nt 
during the Pandemic (e.g. more foreign operators disregarding rules)?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  No. CBP noted no increase in coastwise violations, nor a need for increased 
enforcement during the Pandemic.  
 
Page  259, Paragraph  4.264  
 
The Secretariat Report notes that the U.S. maintains restrictions to cabotage services for both cargo 
and passengers under the coastwise laws. In general, the same requirements found in the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920 regarding cargo service apply to domestic passenger service u nder the Passenger 
Vessel Service Act of 1886 (PVSA).  
Canada noted that in late May  2021, President  Biden signed the Alaska Tourism Recovery Act to 
facilitate west coast cruising to Alaska in summer 2021. It is our understanding that the temporary 
measure considered voyages from Seattle to Alaska as a foreign voyage in order to allow 
foreign -flagged cruise vessels to get around the existing PVSA rules that require all non -U.S. 
passenger vessels to stop in a foreign port (e.g. Vancouver) when transporting Am erican citizens 
between two U.S. ports. This Act has since expired.  
 
QUESTION 41 : Did the Tourism Recovery Act result in a significant change in economic activity 
either in Alaska or for the Pacific Northwest cruise vessel sector?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  U.S. Custom s and Border Protection Vessel Management System data show that 
foreign -flagged cruise vessels sailed directly between the Pacific Northwest Mainland (PNM) and 
Alaska (AK), with no apparent stops in Canada, during the time in which the Alaska Tourism Recov ery WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 53 - 
 
  Act was effective. Following the termination of the Act, the same data indicated no more observations 
of direct calls between the PNM and AK and instead a rise in calls interconnecting between the PNM, 
AK, and Canada. Between 13 May 2021, and 31 March  2022, the effective period of the Act, there 
were approximately 80  direct calls carrying a total of approximately 120,000  passengers from the 
PNM to AK from foreign -flagged cruise vessels. Without the Act, the number of calls  for that time 
period wou ld have effectively been zero (between the PNM and AK). In 2019 for the same monthly 
time period pre -pandemic, there were over 210  calls with a total of approximately 
634,000  passengers. All of the voyages for these 210  calls included a stop in a Canadian port. 
 
QUESTION 42 : Given the restart of the cruise industry and increase in passenger traffic in North 
America, would the United  States  consider adopting a similar Act in the future?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  259, Paragraph  4.265  
 
The Secretariat Report notes that waivers to the provisions of the Jones Act and other coastwise 
laws may be granted under limited circumstances.  
 
QUESTION 43 : Was there an increase in waiver requests due to the circumstances of the COVID -19 
pandemic (e.g. labour shortages, virus outbreaks on vessels etc.) ? 
 
RESPONSE 43:  No. CBP did not note any increase in waiver requests due to the circumstances of 
the COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
4.4.3.2.2 Port Services  
Page  263, Paragraph  4.280  
 
It is noted that the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA) has established a licensing system for 
ownership, construction, operation and decommissioning of deepwater  port structures located 
beyond the U.S. territorial sea for the import and export of oil and natural gas.  
 
QUESITON 44 : Can foreign investors, developers and operators receive a license under the DWPA?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  Non-citizens are not permitted to hold a deepwater port license directly.  
Non-citizens may hold ownership interests in a licensee, provided the licensee is incorporated in the 
U.S., its president (or CEO) and chairman of its board of directors (by whatever title) are U.S. 
citizens, and no more of its directors are non -citizens than constitute a minority of the number 
required to form a quorum to conduct the business of the board. 33  U.S.C.  1502(4).  
 
QUESTION 45 : If so, how are national security priorities assessed in this context?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  Further to the response to Question  44, issues of national security are also managed 
through CFIUS, as described in Paragraph  2.50. 
 
4.4.4.2.1 Recent developments and issues  
Page  269, Paragraphs 4.298 and 4.299  
 
It is noted the United  States  established the COVID -19 Telehealth Program in response to the CARES 
Act, and made unprecedented use of telehealth in 2020 during the COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
QUESTION 46 : Given the growing importance of digitalization efforts in influencing trade in 
services,  would the United  States  please explain whether the establishment of the COVID -19 
Telehealth Program contributed to trade in health services? If so, how?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The COVID -19 Telehealth Programs would not be expected to significantly affect 
internati onal trade in health services, as they were not designed to increase the provision of medical 
services to foreign residents, nor do they support the use of telehealth services by foreign suppliers.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 54 - 
 
  4.4.5 E -commerce  
Page  273, Paragraphs  4.309 and 4.310  
 
The paragraphs note that various aspects of e -commerce are subject to federal and state measures.  
 
QUESTION 47 : Can the Uni ted States  please indicate which aspects of e -commerce are under 
federal jurisdiction and which are under state jurisdiction?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  In the United  States , inter -state commerce is governed by federal law. Contract 
law is generally governed by state law.  
 
Page  273, Paragraphs 4.309 and 4.310  
 
The Secretariat Report notes that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted 24  enforcement 
actions for alleged unfair or deceptive privacy and data security practices in 2020 and 2021.  
 
QUESTION 48:  Given the importance of online consumer protection and the protection of personal 
information for digital trade, please exp lain what triggered the launch of enforcement actions and 
what have been the outcomes?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  Specific information on why the FTC chooses to investigate conduct that results in 
enforcement actions is typically not public to the extent that it would reveal investigative tools or 
techniques. As a general matter, however, FTC staff routinely monitor privacy and data security 
practices in digital trade to detect unfair or deceptive acts or practices that may violate the FTC Act 
or to enforce sector -specific laws under the FTC's jurisdiction. In addition, consumers have the ability 
to file complaints via our Consumer Sentinel platform and FTC staff routinely track consumer 
complaints as part of their assessment of what practices may warrant further investi gation.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  
Page  9, Paragraph  3.7 
 
This paragraph states that the United  States  is pursuing a new generation of trade policies that will 
more affirmatively promote decarbonization.  
The Inflation Reduction Act (August  2022) provides USD 369 billion  over 10 years in measures to 
address climate change, including financial support to ind ustry and consumers for the 
decarbonization of manufacturing, transportation, energy generation and energy consumption. 
Canada notes that four programs that provide tax credits to incentivize the production of, and 
investment in projects for, U.S. clean en ergy include a domestic content bonus if U.S. steel, iron 
and "manufactured products" are used (i.e.  Credit for Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable 
Resources, the Energy Credit, the Clean Electricity Production Credit and Clean Electricity Investme nt 
Credit).  
 
QUESTION 49 : Would the United  States  please explain how the domestic content requirements in 
the above -mentioned programs aligns with WTO subsidies rules, with particular regard to disciplines 
that prohibit import substitution subsidies?  
 
RESP ONSE 49:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION 50 : What is the United  States ' rationale for the domestic content bonus and how is it 
expected to impact imports of implicated goods?  
 
RESPONSE 50:  The overall objectives of IRA are to increase investments in clean energy 
technologies to seriously combat the climate crisis. The United  States  intends to administer the Act 
in a manner that is  consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 55 - 
 
  Page  9, Paragraph  3.7 
 
This paragraph states that while the United  States  is pursuing a new generation of trade policies to 
promote decarbonisation, it will also continue to stre ngthen and expand its more traditional 
trade-based commitments to advance environmental protection.  
 
QUESTION 51 : How does the United  States  intend to strengthen and expand its traditional 
approach to climate and environmental issues within trade, apart fr om its new generation of trade 
policies?  
 
RESPONSE 51:  Please refer to the section, New Agreements and Approaches to Advancing Our 
Climate Goals and Protecting the Environment at Page 4 of the President's 2022 Trade Policy 
Agenda,  available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%2
0and%202021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
Page  9, Paragraph  3.8 
 
The United  States  and the EU launched the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in June  2021 to 
grow transatlantic trade, while addressing climate and environmental issues through at least two of 
its 10 working groups: Climate and Cle an Tech and Global Trade Challenges working groups.  
 
QUESTION 52 : What are the trade and climate -related priorities of the Global Trade Challenges 
working group (Working Group 10), and what approaches will the United  States  undertake to achieve 
them?  
 
RESPONSE 52:  For more details on the  priorities of Working Group 10, please refer to the U.S. -EU 
Joint statement of the Trade and Technology Council 16  May 2022, Annex  X on Page 43 et seq ., 
available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/05/TTC -US-text-Final-May-
14.pdf . 
 
Page  9, Paragraph  3.11 
 
This paragraph indicates that the United  States  plans to pursue opportunities through regional 
engagements that will improve environmental protection and increase climate ambition, including 
decarbonisation, with its trading partners. This includes mobilizing technologies, investment, and 
technical res ources to scale up clean energy infrastructure and facilitate trade in climate -friendly 
goods, services, and technologies.  
 
QUESTION 53:  Given the importance of addressing carbon leakage, is it the United  States ' intention 
to use trade policy measures, lik e border carbon adjustments, to address trade and competiveness 
issues? If so, how?  
 
RESPONSE 53:  The United  States  prioritizes environment and climate as a core pillar of our trade 
policy, and all trade -related tools to address climate change challenges a re therefore under 
consideration. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  10, Paragraph  3.14 
 
This paragraph notes that the United  States  will continue to support and promote more circular and 
resource -efficient approaches in international fora such as the WTO's CTE and the TESSD, and cited 
the example of a discussion paper on climate change and circular economy it submitted in May  2022 
(Page 37, Paragraph  8.6). 
 
QUESTION 54:  How does the United  States  intend to support and promote these circular economy 
approaches in fora such as the CTE and TESSD?  
 
RESPONSE 54:  The United  States  has actively led discussions in the CTE and TESSD to consider  
how trade can facilitate a more circular economy approach to resource management. Additionally, 
during the 2022 WTO Environment Week, the United  States  hosted a panel discussion focused on 
how WTO Members can support a more affirmative trade policy to enh ance circularity for climate WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 56 - 
 
  change solutions, which included several recommendations from the panelists regarding trade 
facilitative opportunities to promote and improve circularity approaches.  
 
4.1 Promoting Equitable, Inclusive, and Durable Trade Policy  
Page  12, Paragraph  4.1 
 
The report states that "the United States recognizes that an intersectional, interconnected 
framework in trade and investment policy advances the United States' economic competitiveness 
and resiliency while expanding the benefits of trade" and highlight the United  States ' National 
Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, which aims to advance and mainstream racial and gender 
equity in U.S. trade policy.  
 
QUESTION 55 : Does the United  States  consider underrepresented and unde rserved groups such 
as Indigenous Peoples, persons with disabilities and LGBTQI+ in its intersectional approach to trade 
and investment?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  For the United  States , a richly diverse nation, our intersectional approach to trade 
and investment consi ders historically underserved, underrepresented and marginalized communities 
that include Black, Latino, Indigenous and Native American persons, Asian Americans, Native 
Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders, other persons of color; women; members of religious m inorities; 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) persons; persons with disabilities; persons 
who live in rural areas; and persons otherwise adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality.  
 
QUESTION 56 : If so, what are the policies  and initiatives the U.S. government pursues to ensure 
full participation of these groups in international trade and investment?  
 
RESPONSE 56:  The President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda and 2021 Annual Report explain the  trade 
policy objectives and prioritie s of the United  States  and actions proposed to achieve them for this 
year, including Trade Policy Agenda Section  IV on Promoting Equitable, Inclusive, and Durable Trade 
Policy and Expanding Stakeholder Engagement; and provide information on the President's  trade 
agreements program, including Annual Report Chapter  III.A. on Initiatives to Advance an Inclusive 
and Equitable Worker -Centered  Trade Policy. Examples of this work include robust domestic travel 
and engagements with key communities, including civil, human, and labor rights advocates, hosting 
annual Tribal consultation meetings, and exploring how to develop meaningful equity and ge nder 
provisions in new engagements with trading partners.  
 
Moreover, the Office of the United  States  Trade Representative's Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 
2022-2026 includes the goal, " Develop Equitable Trade Policy Through Inclusive Processes", which 
ensures that as part of the agency's performance appraisal process, each employee shall advance 
equity in every aspect of trade policy and build trusted relationships with underserved, 
underrepresented, and marginalized communities. In addition, in accordance  with the President's 
Executive  Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the 
Federal Government  (EO 13985), USTR publicly released its Equity Action Plan in April  2022. Finally, 
the United  States  uses its convening a uthority to ensure that whether in domestic engagements or 
in designing stakeholder sessions with trading partners, equity, equality, and women's economic 
empowerment are included in developing, implementing, and enforcing inclusive, worker -centered 
trade policy.  
 
5.5.2 Japan to 5.5.5 Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
United  States  of America and the Government of The People's Republic of China (Phase 
One Agreement)  
 
Page  25, Paragraph  5.74 
 
QUESTION 57 : Can the United  States  please provide a timeline of when it intends to notify the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements of the U.S. -Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA)?  
 
RESPONSE 57:  Japan and the United  States  are coordinating on the appropriate notification 
procedure and look forward to notifying the WTO when that coordination is complete.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 57 - 
 
  Pages 25 to 26, Paragraphs 5.74 to 5.80  
 
QUESTION 58 : Can the United  States  please explain how its 'Phase One' trade agre ements with 
China and Japan are consistent with GATT Article  I (MFN)?  
 
RESPONSE 58:  The United  States  considers that the agreements are consistent with the parties' 
WTO obligations.  With respect to the U.S. -Japan Trade Agreement, the United  States  and Japa n are 
coordinating on the appropriate WTO notification procedure and look forward to discussing the 
agreement at that time.  
 
QUESTION 59 : Can the United  States  please provide a timeline for when it plans (as understood 
by GATT Article  XXIV(5)(c)) to contin ue negotiations of its Phase One trade agreements with Japan 
and China in order for each agreement to cover substantially all trade (as understood by 
Article  XXIV(8)(b) and (c))?  
 
RESPONSE 59:  The United  States -Japan Trade Agreement refers to future negotiations; the 
Economic and Trade Agreement between the United  States  and China provides that the parties will 
agree on the timing of future negotiations.  
 
5.5.3 United  States -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  
Page  26, Paragraph  5.76 
 
QUESTION 60 : Can the United  States  indicate what types of cooperation on digital trade it 
undertakes with ASEAN?  
 
RESPONSE 60:  Under the U.S. -ASEAN TIFA, the cooperative activities may include dialogues, 
workshops, or capacity building. The United  States , through the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), provides technical assistance to ASEAN bodies including on digital economy 
(https://asean.usmission.gov/ignite -inclusive -growth -in-asean -through -innovation -trade-and-e-
commerce/ ). 
 
5.5.10 Indo -Pacific Economic Framework  
Page  28, Paragraph  5.92 
 
It is noted the United  States  will use the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework to advance high standard 
commitments on good regulatory practices. Pillar One of the Framework specifically cites the goal to 
"build on the outcomes reached in the WTO Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation". Pillar 
One of the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework also notes the goal to "[improve] accessibility to 
information, including online, about existing laws and regulatory processes ". 
 
QUESTION 61 : Can the U.S. provide further information on how the Indo -Pacific Economic 
Framework will seek to improv e transparency, and whether it will work with partners to expand 
existing databases like the OECD STRI to promote transparency with its members?  
 
RESPONSE 61:  IPEF negotiations are still in the early stages, and the parties have not yet agreed 
on commitments or mechanisms.  The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 62 : Can the U.S. provide information on the level of cooperation expected under this 
pillar on matters related to technical standards and requirements in clean energy and tec hnologies 
(e.g. battery storage, hydrogen), as well as carbon sequestration, utilization and storage?  
 
RESPONSE 62:  In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF 
pillars. The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview o f our intention for future environment 
negotiations,  including  clean energy  opportunities.  Please  see here for more information:  https://u
str.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pilla
r)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEASE%20(1).pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 58 - 
 
  5.5.11 U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council  
Page  28, Paragraph  5.96 
 
The Climate and Clean Tech working group of the U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is 
noted to be exploring methodologies, tools, and technologies for calculating embedded greenhouse 
gas emissions in global trade, among other priorities.  
 
QUESTION 63 : What methodo logies and tools is the Climate and Clean Tech working group of the 
TTC pursuing?  
 
RESPONSE 63:  Please refer to the U.S. -EU Joint statement of the Trade and Technology Council 
16 May 2022, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/05/TTC -US-
text-Final-May-14.pdf . 
 
5.6.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (Including China -Related 301)  
Page  29, Paragraph  5.99 
 
Per the Government Report, the United  States  works with many trading partners to strengthen IP 
protection and enforcement through the provisions of bilateral instruments, including trade 
agreements and memoranda of understanding.  
 
QUESTION 64 : Beyond the scope of trade agree ments, can the United  States  provide an overview 
of their existing bilateral instruments (such as memoranda of understanding or working groups with 
trading partners) as regards the discussion of intellectual property protection and enforcement?  
 
RESPONSE 6 4: Other trade -related bilateral instruments include Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties. Please see Annex  II. Trade -Related Agreements  and 
Declarations  in the 2021 Annual  Report  on the President's  Trade  Agreements  
Programat:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202
021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
Page  30, Paragraph  5.102  
 
The Government Report notes that the provision of technical assistance and capacity building is 
critical to U.S. trade policy in the arena of IP protection and enforcement.  
 
QUESTION 65 : Could the Unites  States please provide a list of publicly available information 
regarding technical and capacity building assistance it provides to developing and least developed 
countries?  
 
RESPONSE 65:  Please refer to "Technical Cooperation Activities: Information from Members, the 
United States  of America ", document number IP/C/R/TC/USA/3 ( 22 September  2022).  
 
5.6.2 Promoting Digital Trade  
Page  30, Paragraph  5.105  
 
It is noted that "through IPEF, the United  States will work with our partners to ensure we take full 
advantage of the opp ortunities presented by digital trade".  
 
QUESTION 66 : Can the United  States  please indicate how the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework 
will support digital trade?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF 
pillars. The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future digital 
negotiations. Please see here for more information: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -
09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEAS
E%20(1).pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 59 - 
 
  6.1.3 St andards Alliance  
Page  33, Paragraph  6.16 
 
It is noted that the U.S. Standards Alliance works with other countries on biofuel standards to 
increase competitiveness of U .S. exports.  
 
QUESTION 67 : How does the U.S. Standards Alliance work with other countries  on biofuel standards 
to increase competitiveness of U.S exports in relation to wood pellets or advanced biofuels?  
 
RESPONSE 67:  The Standards Alliance does not work specifically on increasing the competitiveness 
of U.S. exports in relation to wood pellets  or advanced biofuels. The program provides 
capacity -building trainings designed to promote the concept of clean cooking with bioethanol 
cookstoves and fuel as sustainable alternatives to traditional fuels such as biomass (wood, dung, 
charcoal) or fossil -based fuels (kerosene). The overall objective of programming is to provide 
practical knowledge around bioethanol for household energy, connect stakeholders and government 
entities in developing countries with resources to support business development, and a ddress  the 
lack of access to clean cooking solutions by promoting adoption of harmonized international 
standards and the production/ importation of denatured ethanol for cooking. In the long term, these 
harmonization efforts are expected to facilitate expo rts from U.S. companies to the SA2 partner 
countries to meet the growing demand from expanded bioethanol use.  
 
8 Trade and Environment  
Page  36, Paragraphs 8.2 to 8.7  
 
It is noted that the United  States  is prioritizing the implementation of FTAs and their Environment 
Chapters (e.g. USMCA Chapter  24) to combat wildlife trafficking and illegal trade.  
 
QUESTION 68:  Given the importance of investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes like 
illegal logging and associated trade, would the United  States  please explain how U.S. trade 
measures, like FTAs, strengthen the ability of U.S. federal agencies to identify th e legality of high -risk 
imports?  
 
RESPONSE 68:  The United  States  leverages trade policy tools like FTAs to advance sustainability 
and to support our work to investigate and prosecute environmental crimes. For example, our 
modern FTAs include ambitious envi ronment commitments, such as the effective enforcement of 
environmental laws, and the core commitment that trading partners not waive or derogate from 
enforcing environmental laws to promote trade or investment. Another standard commitment in our 
trade agr eements is that trading partners regularly report on their efforts to implement environment 
chapter commitments at regular intervals. Finally, our trade agreements also include robust 
opportunities for public participation, to include opportunities for the  public to support 
implementation and compliance by supplying information regarding potential noncompliance. All of 
these measures enhance transparency, collaboration, and strengthen our ability to identify the 
legality of high -risk imports.  
 
QUESTION 69:  Which federal agencies collaborate to undertake enforcement actions, including 
targeting, investigation and prosecution?  
 
RESPONSE 69:  The United  States  draws on a whole -of-government effort to monitor and enforce 
implementation of free trade agreements, a s well as to monitor and enforce domestic compliance 
with environmental laws. The federal agencies that will collaborate on any given matter will depend 
on the specific matter. For example, an investigation of a potential criminal matter involving illegall y 
harvested and traded timber may involve the U.S. Forest Service, Department of Homeland 
Security's Homeland Security Investigations branch, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, Department of Justice, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, among 
others.  
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
 
QUESTION 70 : Does the U.S. Department of Commerce, under current U.S. laws and regulations, 
have the authority to conduct an expedited review of an exporter whose exports are subject to 
countervailing duties but who was not actually investigated, so as to establish an  individual 
countervailing duty rate for that exporter, as required under Article  19.3 of the SCM  Agreement ? WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 60 - 
 
  RESPONSE 70:  As Canada is aware, this question is the subject of litigation before the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 61 - 
 
  CHILE  
PART I : REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  47, Para graph  2.8 
 
"Currently, U.S. trade policy is undergoing a shift, and 2021 was a transition year, in which the 
Administration adopted its "Building Back Better" plan ( Section  2.2.2.1). In the first summa ry of its 
Trade Policy Agenda in March  2021, Management highlighted nine main themes: (i)  addressing the 
COVID -19 pandemic and restoring the economy; (ii)  putting workers at the centre of trade policy; 
(iii) putting the world on the path to a sustainable environment and climate; (iv)  promoting racial 
equality and supporting underserved communities; (v)  addressing China's trade and economic 
practices through a comprehensive strategy; (vi)  forming partnerships with friends and allies; 
(vii) defen d American farmers, ranchers, food manufacturers, and fishermen; (viii)  promoting 
equitable economic growth worldwide; and (ix)  making standards count."  
 
QUESTION 1:  Paragraph  2.8 states that "In the first summary of its Trade Policy Agenda, in 
March  2021,  the Administration highlighted nine main themes: (...) (iv)  promote racial equality and 
support underserved communities". In this regard, Chile would be grateful if the United  States  could 
share what it means by the concept of "underserved communities" an d what its scope would be.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  On his first day in office, President  Biden signed  the Executive  Order on  Advancing 
Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government  
(EO 13985). This Executive  Order outlines a whole -of-Government mandate to advance equity for 
all Americans through a comprehensive approach to all Government practices, including: 
management; policymaking (including through regulation and guidance); procurement, contracting, 
and budgetin g; delivery of benefits and services; and data collection, reporting, and use, to tangibly 
improve the lives of every person across the nation, in particular, those who have been underserved, 
marginalized, and adversely affected by persistent poverty and i nequality.  
 
EO 13985 defines "equity" to mean "the consistent and systematic fair, just, and impartial treatment 
of all individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved communities that have been 
denied such treatment, such as Black, Latino, an d Indigenous and Native American persons, Asian 
Americans and Pacific Islanders and other persons of color; members of religious minorities; lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) persons; persons with disabilities; persons who 
live in rur al areas; and persons otherwise adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality ". 
EO 13985 defines the "underserved communities" to refer to "populations sharing a particular 
characteristic, as well as geographic communities, that have been systemat ically denied a full 
opportunity to participate in aspects of economic, social, and civic life, as exemplified by the list in 
the preceding definition of 'equity '". 
 
Page  50, Para graph  2.21 
 
"The United  States continues to conduct most of its trade on an MFN basis, although it has long 
offered unilateral preferences to developing and least -developed countries, most recently through a 
growing number of reciprocal bilateral or regional FTAs, some of which have recently been modified. 
In 2021, 49.9% of total U.S. imports entered duty -free, subject to zero MFN tariffs. 14.8% of imports 
benefited from additional tariff reductions or duty -free treatment under various reciprocal trade 
agreements, and 0.9% benefited from unilateral preferences."  
 
Page  50-51, Para graph 2.22 
 
"The United  States  has 14  FTAs in force with 20  countries (20). The main development during the 
period under review was the conclusion and implementation of the revised agreement with Canada 
and Mexico, which replaces the North American Free Trad e Agreement (NAFTA), now known as the 
United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA). This was the first time that the United  States  
had comprehensively modified or updated an existing FTA. During this period, FTAs with the 
Republic  of Korea and Morocco wer e also amended. No other agreements were modified, although 
the United  States  continued to engage with its FTA partners on implementation, labor and 
environmental provisions, and other issues related to the proper functioning of the agreements. 
Negotiation s for new FTAs with the European  Union , the United  Kingdom and Kenya have been 
announced or launched in recent years, but have not yet been concluded (as of July 2022). In WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 62 - 
 
  mid-2022, the Administration was reviewing the objectives of the negotiations with the 
United  Kingdom undertaken by the previous Administration; The activity of the negotiations has 
been interrupted while this review is carried out. USTR is also discussing with the Government of 
Kenya the next steps to strengthen the U. S.-Kenya trade and investment relationship. The current 
administration has no ongoing FTA negotiations with the European  Union . 
 
(20) In particular with Australia, the Kingdom  of Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa  Rica, the 
Dominican  Republic , El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, the Republic  of Korea, 
Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru and Singapore."  
 
Page  58, Para graph  2.36 
 
"The United  States has concluded several other trade agreements in recent years, mainly with major 
trading partners, such as Japan, China and the European  Union. In addition, trade and investment 
agreements with Brazil and Ecuador have been expanded to include trade facilitation -related 
concessions and regulatory commitments."  
 
QUESTION 2:  Paragraphs 2.21 , 2.22 and 2.36 refer to the trade developed by the U .S. through its 
regional trade agreements, RTAs (including those concluded at the bilateral level). In this regard, 
Chile would be grateful if the United  States  could share information on the process by which these 
agreements are incorporated into its domestic legislation.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Trade agreements enter into U.S. law via specific implementing legislation. By way 
of example, please see the implementing legislation for the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement 
(USMCA): https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th -congress/house -bill/5430/text . 
 
QUESTION 3:  In addition, Chile would be grateful if the United  States  could shar e information 
regarding the process of incorporating the decisions adopted by the administrative commissions of 
these agreements into U.S. domestic legislation.  
 
RESPONSE 3:  FTC decisions represent an international agreement that the USTR makes on behalf 
of the United  States . If a commitment included in the FTC decision requires a change in U.S. law, 
the United  States  would implement the law through a change in statute, regulation, or both, as 
appropriate. If the FTC decision does not require any changes in  U.S. law, then the U.S. government 
need not take any further action to bring the FTC decision into force.  
 
Page  152, Paragraph  3.195  
 
"The Export Promotion Act of 1992 established the Trade Promotion Coordination Committee. The 
objective of this interagen cy committee, chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, is to provide a 
unifying framework for export promotion and export financing activities and for the planning of such 
programs. The TPCC brings together 20 federal government agencies that implement export -related 
programs. In principle, the TPCC has to publish a National Export Strategy every year, although the 
last report published dates from December  2016. The TPCC also coordinates with government trade 
promotion agencies to improve the overall effective ness of export promotion strategies, develop 
best practices and provide better assistance to small businesses."  
 
QUESTION 4:  Paragraph  3.195 mentions the establishment of the Coordinating Committee for 
Trade Promotion, its objective and general characteris tics. In this regard, Chile would appreciate it 
if the United  States  could share the specific composition of the Committee, along with indicating 
whether it envisages a work plan for 2023.  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The agencies that comprise the Trade Policy Coordinating Committee include: 
Department of Commerce; Department of State; Department of the Treasury; Department of 
Transportation; Department of Agriculture; Department of Energy; Department of Defense; 
Depar tment of Labor; Department of the Interior; Agency for International Development; Trade and 
Development Agency; Environmental Protection Agency; Small Business Administration; U.S. 
International Development Finance Corporation; Export -Import Bank of the U. S.; Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative; Council of Economic Advisors; Office of Management & Budget; National 
Economic Council; and National Security Council. Information about the TPCC is available on website 
of the Department of Commerce at: https://www.trade.gov/tpcc . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 63 - 
 
  Page  157-158, Para graph  3.218  
 
In FY 2020, women's economic empowerment, which is a strategic priority of the DFC, channeled 
USD 2.5 billion  (and mobilized more than USD 4 billion  in capital) into projects owned or led by 
women, or that propose products or services for the benefit of women. Since the creation of the 2X 
Challenge for Women initiative in 2017, some USD 7 billion  has been mobilized under it for 
gender -sensitive investments.  
 
QUESTION 5:  Paragraph  3.218 refers to women's economic empowerment as a strategic priority 
of the DFC, and highlights that "Since the creation of the 2X Challenge for Women initiative in 2017, 
some USD 7 billion  has been mobilized under its framework for g ender -sensitive investments ". In 
this regard, Chile would be grateful if the United  States  could share information on the concept of 
"gender -sensitive investments", its scope and what kind of actions or programs it includes.  
 
RESPONSE 5:  In October  2021, t he United  States  released its inaugural National Strategy on 
Gender Equity and Equality . The whole -of-government strategy adopts an intersectional, 
interconnected approach in 10 cross -cutting, strategic areas: (1)  improving economic security and 
accelerati ng economic growth; (2)  eliminating gender -based violence; (3)  protecting, improving, 
and expanding access to health care, including sexual and reproductive health care; (4)  ensuring 
equal opportunity and equity in education; (5)  advancing gender equity an d fairness in the justice 
and immigration systems; (6)  advancing human rights and gender equality under the law; 
(7) elevating gender equality in security and humanitarian relief; (8)  promoting gender equity in 
mitigating and responding to climate change; (9) closing gender gaps in science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields; and (10)  advancing full participation in democracy, 
representation, and leadership. Examples of investments to advance gender equity, equality, and 
empowerment in the United  States ' National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality  include those 
that: 
 
• Enhance women's access to health services, unemployment benefits, retirement security, 
paid leave, education, and other family -supportive and initiatives  that would close 
socio-economic opportunity gaps ; 
• Uphold the fair pay, dignity, and employment of women workers, including domestic 
workers, the caregiving workforce, and those employed in the informal economy;  
• Encourage government and private sector inve stment in care, including child, elder, and 
health care, and universal early childhood education, as well as support programs that 
expand access to and availability of care;  
• Advance education, including financial inclusion and literacy, and resources that advance 
women's agency and close the gender wealth and digital gender gaps;  
• Reduce structural barriers to women's economic empowerment, including gender 
discrimination in business and consumer lending, and close persistent gender gaps in 
access to capital by catalyzing investment in women -owned businesses, including small 
and medium -sized enterprises, in the domestic and global marketplace;  
• Promote data collection and transparency in the financial, technology, and venture capital 
sectors to track the propor tion of investments in women -led businesses;  
• Improve the collection of sex -disaggregated data ; and  
• Build the capacity of women entrepreneurs and increase opportunities to participate in 
trade and access markets.  
 
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) supports the National Strategy on 
Gender Equity and Equality as a "guidepost for DFC to further its efforts to promote gender equity 
in low - and lower -middle income countries overseas ". See: https://www.dfc.gov/media/press -
releases/dfc -support -national -strategy -gender -equity -and-equality -1. Promoting gender equity in 
developing count ries is a key priority for DFC and an important consideration in its development 
finance projects across all sectors, including climate, health, technology, and more.  Through the 
agency's flagship 2X Women's Initiative, DFC is committed to addressing the unique challenges 
women face globally and unlocking the multi -trillion dollar opportunity they represent. As of 
October  2021, through 2X, DFC catalyzed more than USD 7 billion  of investment in projects that are 
owned by women, led by women, or provide a product or service that empowers women, and the 
agency is working to mobilize an additional USD 12 billion  by 2025.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  166, Para graphs  3.243 and 3.244  
 
"Between July  2018 and March  2022, the United  States  submitted 1,290  TBT notifications t o the 
WTO concerning proposed and final measures. In the last two years, more than 300  notifications 
were submitted: 370 in 2020 and 393 in 2021. Annual TBT  notifications were only higher in 2016. 
During the period under review, notifications covered both federal and state regulations; 
113 notifications covered the latter level. More than half (53.4 %) of all notifications were 
modifications of previous notifications, while 36.3 % were regular notifications; Since July  2018, only 
20 urgent notifications have been submitted, i.e. 1.6% of all notifications.  
 
In total, 980 notifications (76.0%) concern technical regulations (of which 110 at the state level) 
and 255 notifications (19.8%) concern conformity assessment procedures (of which 28 at the state 
level). An  increasing number of notifications (18.4% of all notifications submitted during the period 
under review) simultaneously concern technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures. 
Moreover, an increasing proportion of notifications (19.1 % during t he period under review, or 
246 notifications) do not indicate their relationship to a specific article of the TBT  Agreement . Based 
on the areas of standardization reported in notifications from the International Classification of 
Standards (ICS), at least two areas of ICS are mentioned in 70.9 % compared to 51.9 % in the 
previous review period. At the same time, regulations aimed at achieving several objectives also 
increased, from 15.6 % to 48.8 %. The most frequent objectives are environmental protectio n 
(49.3 %), protection of human health or safety (38.4 %), prevention of misleading practices and 
consumer protection (26.0 %) and consumer information and labelling (16.3 %)." 
 
QUESTION 6:  Paragraphs 3.243 and 3.244 refer to U .S. notifications to the WTO on TBT matters. 
In particular, Paragraph  3.244 states that "an increasing number of notifications (18.4% of all 
notifications submitted during the period under review) simultaneously concer n technical regulations 
and conformity assessment procedures ". In this regard, Chile would be grateful if the United  States  
could share whether there is a centralized website where its technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures can be acces sed. 
 
RESPONSE 6:  Final technical regulations published in the Federal Register that were notified in the 
draft rulemaking stage are notified to the WTO and are also published in the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR). Refer to the eCFR for online refe rences ( https://www.ecfr.gov/ ). 
 
Page  167, Paragraph  3.247  
 
"The United  States has concluded cross -sector mutual recognition agreements with numerous 
foreign partners, including two agreements with the United  Kingdom in 2021. The implementation 
of mutual recognition agreements varies from partner to partner, including under a common or 
regional arrangement, as regards the level of recognition of conformity assessment bodies and 
products covered. In the area of telecommunications equipment, mutual recognition agreements 
apply with some APEC members (Australia; Canada; the Republic  of Korea; Hong  Kong,  China; 
Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; Chinese  Taipei; and Viet  Nam), the European  Union, some EFTA 
States (Nor way, Iceland and Liechtenstein) and other trading partners (Israel, Japan, Mexico and 
the United  Kingdom). Signatories to a mutual recognition agreement designate their conformity 
assessment bodies accredited to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),  while NIST, 
through its Telecommunications Mutual Recognition Agreements Program Office, is the designated 
authority for conformity assessment bodies in the United  States. The agreement with the EFTA 
States also covers recreational craft, while the agreem ent with the European  Union covers electrical 
safety, recreational craft, medical devices and good manufacturing practices for pharmaceutical 
products. The coverage of the latter sector in the mutual recognition agreement between the 
United  States and the European  Union was modified in 2017. Good manufacturing practices for 
pharmaceuticals are also part of the recent mutual recognition agreement with the United  Kingdom. 
The United  States has also signed separate mutual recognition agreements with the Europe an Union, 
EFTA and the United  Kingdom on maritime safety equipment."  
 
QUESTION 7:  Paragraph  3.247 refers to mutual recognition agreements concluded by the U .S. and 
various foreign partners. In this regard, Chile would be grateful if the United  States  could  indicate 
whether such mutual recognition agreements signed by the United  States  are binding as part of the 
corresponding trade agreements, or are rather voluntary.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 65 - 
 
  RESPONSE 7:  U.S. mutual recognition agreements are typically separate instruments from fre e 
trade agreements. The scope of binding and voluntary commitments varies among U.S. mutual 
recognition agreements. In limited cases, provisions addressing the recognition of standards or 
encouraging additional forms of cooperation have been included in ag reements subject to U.S. free 
trade agreements provisions. See, e.g.  the 2011 side letter accompanying the U.S. -Korea  FTA, 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/2011_Side_Letter.p
df. 
 
Page  172, Para graph  3.261  
 
"The International Affairs Division of USDA's Foreign Agriculture Service acts as the national enquiry 
point and notification agency under t he WTO  SPS Agreement . The U.S. Codex Office, which is 
headquartered in USDA's USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, coordinates U.S. representation on the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, and APHIS is the point of contact with the 
World  Organization  for Animal  Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC)."  
 
QUESTION 8:  The paragraph refers to certain functions of the Division of International Affairs of 
the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. In this regard, Chile would be grateful if the United  States  
could indicate whether the Division is also responsible for coordinating public consultations in the 
Federal Register on draft import requirements for agricultural products.  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The Multilateral Affairs Division at USDA's Foreign Agr icultural Services is the national 
SPS enquiry point and notification authority, and coordinates with the relevant United  States  
regulatory agency on received enquiries on draft and final measures notified to the WTO.  
 
Page  204, Para graph  3.343  
 
"The changes introduced under NIST's regulations with respect to the Bayh -Dole Act went into effect 
on 14 May 2018 in order to reduce the regulatory burden on recipients of federal R+D funding. NIST 
published updates to C.F.R. articles implementing the Bay h-Dole Act of 1980 (37  C.F.R.  §§s 401 and 
404). The changes clarify certain definitions, reduce the compliance burden, address joint inventions 
of funding recipients and federal agencies, and simplify the electronic reporting process. They also 
provide for  automatic extensions of the requirement to file non -provisional patent applications and 
allow companies, universities or other partners to use their cooperative research and development 
agreements (CRADAs) with a federal laboratory to support a license ap plication for a federal 
invention developed under these CRADAs. In January  2021, NIST issued a notice of proposed 
regulation to streamline and further reduce regulatory burden, improve compliance, enhance 
contractors' ability to commercialize subject inven tions, and increase the return on investment of 
federal funds. The Stevenson -Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L.  96-48021), as 
amended pursuant to Title II (Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation) of the National 
Defense Appropriations A ct for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L.  116-92), which was signed into law on 
20 December  2019, requires federal laboratories to actively participate in technology transfer 
activities and allocate budgetary funds to those activities, understood as the transmission o f 
information from federal agencies to the public to promote the practical and commercial application 
of R+D. The Act requires laboratories to specifically set aside a percentage of their budget for 
technology transfer activities. P.L.  116-92 introduced mo difications to regional public or non -profit 
innovation initiatives to promote innovation -driven industry, strengthen its competitiveness through 
new product innovation and adoption of new technologies, accelerate the pace of commercialization 
of innovativ e research, and stimulate and enhance a region's global innovation capacity and 
long-term resilience. To this end, NIST's Office of Technology Partnerships works with other 
stakeholders to prioritize technology transfer issues and improve the process of pr omoting 
innovation and commercialization of technology."  
 
QUESTION 9:  Paragraph  3.343 mentioned changes introduced by the NIST regulations with respect 
to the Bayh -Dole Act. In this regard, Chile would appreciate it if the United  States  could share more 
information on the modifications that address joint inventions of recipients of funding and federal 
agencies.  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The 2018 Bayh -Dole regulation amendments address situations in which a federal 
employee is a co -inventor with the contractor of a subject invention developed under a federal 
funding agreement. The amendments clarify that the agency employing the co -inventor may file the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 66 - 
 
  initial patent application provided that the contractor retains the right to elect title. 
37 C.F.R. § 401.10(a)(2). This determination is made by the agency at its discretion and "in 
consultation with the contractor ". 37 C.F.R.  § 401.14(c)(4). If the contractor elects title in this 
situation, the agency employing the co -inventor retains all ownershi p rights to which they would 
otherwise be entitled. 37  C.F.R.  §401.10(a)(5).  
 
QUESTION 10:  Paragraph  3.343 also mentions amendments to the Stevenson -Wydler Act, which 
"require federal laboratories to actively participate in technology transfer activities a nd allocate 
budgetary funds to those activities, understood as the transmission of information from federal 
agencies to the public to promote the practical and commercial application of R+D ". In this regard, 
Chile would appreciate the U.S. sharing more inf ormation regarding the requirement that federal 
laboratories actively participate in technology transfer activities. In particular, whether such transfer 
must necessarily provide for licensing agreements.  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The Federal Technology Transfer Act ( FTTA) was enacted by Congress in 1986 and 
builds on the Stevenson -Wydler Act of 1980. FTTA improves access to federal government 
laboratories by non -federal organizations. It allows government inventors to patent their 
technologies and receive a share of t he royalties when patents are licensed. The goal of this 
legislation is to more efficiently and effectively put federally -funded technology to use in real -world 
applications. Details regarding federal laboratories' technology transfer activities under the Act is 
found  at: http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:15%20section:3710%20edition:prelim)#
amendment -note. 
 
Page  205, Para graph  3.344  
 
"The Engineering and Science Underrepresented Classes Study of 2018 (Success Act) Act of 2018 
directs the Director of the USPTO, i n consultation with the Administrator of the Federal Small 
Business Agency, to make recommendations to promote women's participation, minorities and 
ex-combatants in business and the patent system. In its report under the requirements of the 
Success Act, t he USPTO presented several legislative recommendations to increase the participation 
of women, minorities and veterans as patent inventors and entrepreneurs."  
 
QUESTION 11:  Paragraph  3.344 refers to the so -called "Law of Success ". In this regard, Chile 
would be grateful if the United  States  could share more information on the legislative 
recommendations presented by the USPTO.  
 
RESPONSE 11:  See the Report to Congress  - Legislative Recommendations, Section  5, Page 26, at 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOSuccessAct.pdf . 
 
Page  209, Para graph  3.354  
 
"Traditionally, the USPTO has considered design patents to protect designs incorporated in or applied 
to a manufactured article (or a part thereof) and not the article itself, and applicants have been 
required to demonstrate the application or incorporation of the design in a manufactured article. The 
USPTO curren tly requires that, in order to receive protection, a design for a computer -generated 
icon: (i)  be incorporated into the screen, monitor or other display panel of a computer, or a portion 
thereof; (ii)  is more than just an image on a screen; and (iii)  forms  an integral part of the operation 
of the computer displaying the design. However, recent technological developments have made it 
possible to develop designs that do not apply to or incorporate a physical product but can perform 
a utilitarian function, rat her than simply being mere displayed images. New designs obtained in the 
digital economy in the form of projections, holograms and virtual or augmented reality present new 
challenges for industrial design protection systems, as they do not require a physic al screen or other 
tangible item to be viewed. To address this issue, on 21 December  2020, the USPTO published a 
notice in the Federal Register seeking public input on whether the USPTO's interpretation of the 
35 U.S.C.  171 "manufactured article" requireme nt should be revised to protect digital designs 
incorporating new and emerging technologies."  
 
QUESTION 12:  Paragraph  3.354 refers to the protection of industrial designs, the requirement of 
the "manufactured article" and its application in the digital eco nomy. In this regard, Chile would be 
grateful if the United  States  could provide information on whether it envisages alternatives to 
protection beyond designs.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 67 - 
 
  RESPONSE 12:  In the United  States , patent, trademark, and copyright laws provide various forms 
of protection for the ornamental or aesthetic features of products, also referred to as "industrial 
designs ". Because these laws generally do not prevent overlapping protection, designers may obtain 
protection for their industrial designs under multiple dis ciplines. Some may choose to focus their 
resources on one form of protection but not others. Each discipline offers its own type and term of 
protection, and sets different standards and costs to qualify for and maintain protection. These same 
consideration s and characteristics apply to designs in the digital world. There is availability for 
protections for digital design via copyright, trademark, and design patents, with each structure 
having their own requirements.  
 
Pages  211-212, Box  3.4 
 
QUESTION 13:  Box 3.4 highlights the main amendments to the Trade Marks Act (1946), introduced 
by the Trade Marks Modernization Act of 2020. One of them concerns the possibility of evidence 
being presented by third parties during the examination. In this regard, Chile would be grateful if 
the United  States  could provide more information on the criteria for acceptance or rejection of such 
a request by the Director of the USPTO.  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 provides that the Director of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office may institute expungement and re-examination  proceedings if the 
Director discovers information that supports a prima facie case ("a reasonable predic ate") that the 
trademark has:  
 
• Never been used in commerce with certain goods or services (expungement) ; 
• Not been used in commerce as of the particular relevant date with certain goods or  
services covered by the registration ( re-examination ). 
 
Evidence of past and current non-use associated with expungement or re-examination  proceedings 
may take different forms. For additional information about the Trademark Modernization Act, 
see: www.uspto.gov/trademarks/laws/2020 -modernization -act. 
 
Page  214, Para graph  3.366  
 
"The United  States provides protection, through its trademark system, to foreign and domestic 
geographical indications of all types of goods and services when a particular q uality, reputation, or 
other characteristic is primarily attributable to their geographical origin. Protection of geographical 
indications is usually granted in the form of certification marks and collective marks indicating 
regional origin. GIs are consid ered to be a subset of trademarks, since, in the view of the 
United  States, they perform the same source -identifying functions as trademarks, even though they 
specifically target geographic source identification, and constitute quality assurances and valua ble 
commercial or business interests. The U.S. GI system uses trademark administrative structures. The 
USPTO Trademark Organization processes applications for geographical indications. The USPTO 
examines applications for geographical indications as tradema rks, or as certification marks or 
collective marks indicating regional origin. Applications for geographical indications filed with the 
USPTO are published so that interested parties have the opportunity to object to registration."  
 
QUESTION 14:  Paragraph  3.366 refers to the protection of trademarks and geographical indications 
by the U .S. and the general role that the USPTO has in this area. In this regard, Chile would be 
grateful if the United  States  could share more information on the protection of forei gn geographical 
indications and in particular:  
 
• On the manner in which the USPTO determines that the foreign applicant has standing to 
act abroad, to initiate the processing of a certification or collective mark.  
 
RESPONSE 14:  The United  States  protects foreign and domestic certification and collective marks 
of regional origin. See USPTO, Geographical Indication Protection in the United  States , 
at: https:// www.uspto.gov/ip -policy/trademark -policy/geographical -indications . 
 
QUESTION 15:  Paragraph  3.366 refers to the protection of trademarks and geographical indications 
by the US and the general role that the USPTO has in this area. In this regard, Chile would  be WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 68 - 
 
  grateful if the United  States  could share more information on the protection of foreign geographical 
indications and in particular:  
 
• On how the USPTO prevents misappropriation, in which an owner authorized to use the 
GI abroad limits the possibility of  using the GI in the U.S.  
 
RESPONSE 15:  GIs are protected as certification and collective marks indicating regional origin 
under Section  4 of the U.S. Trademark Act. Enforcement of GIs are the responsibility of the rights 
holder to take steps to prevent misappropriation.  
 
Page  220, Para graph  3.383  
 
"MLC should collect and distribute royalties based on usage reports provided by digital service 
providers. In the case of recordings whose owner of the copyright in the musical work cannot be 
identified, MLC shall deposit the royalties collected in an interest -bearing account for at least three 
years, after which the royalties and accrued interest may be redistributed to the holders of known 
copyright in the database, depending on their respect ive shares. Licensees are required to pay 
monthly royalties to MLC and submit reports on their use of musical works covered by the general 
license. The judges responsible for copyright royalties conduct proceedings to determine the fees 
and conditions appl icable under the general licence provided for in Article  115. Under the MMA Act, 
the criterion for determining rates is no longer based on a set of strategic factors, but on what an 
interested buyer and seller can negotiate in the market. MLC and DLC canno t be directly involved in 
the fee setting process, but they can collect and provide relevant information that can be used in 
the process."  
 
QUESTION 16:  Paragraph  3.383 refers to the functions and activities of a mechanical licensing 
collective management society (MLC), as established by the Law on the Modernization of Musical 
Works. In this regard, Chile would be grateful if the United  States  could share more information on 
the compulsory licensing system for digital music services. In particular, we would  appreciate sharing 
more information regarding the distribution of royalties through MLC, and whether any litigation has 
been filed in this regard.  
 
RESPONSE 16:  Information on MLC's royalty distributions may be found in MLC's annual report: 
https://www.themlc.com/hubfs/Marketing/23856%20The%20MLC%20AR2021%206 -
30%20REFRESH%20COMBINED.pdf . Additional information regarding the MLC may be found on the 
US Copyright Office website at https://www.copyright.gov/music -modernization/faq.html#mlma . 
One lawsuit,  Eight Mile Style v. Spotify , No. 3:19-cv-0736 (MD  Tenn., filed 21 August 2019), has 
been filed challenging the Music Modernization Act's limitation of liability provisions  - not specifically 
its royalty distributions.  
 
Page  274, Para graph  4.138  
 
"The United  States  has not set itself a national renewable e nergy target and does not have a specific 
federal support mechanism. However, the Public Services Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 requires 
regulated utilities to purchase electricity from alternative energy sources produced by "eligible 
facilities" at rates that cover the costs of such production. Incentives are also granted in the form of 
tax credits for investment in the installation of solar panels, and tax credits for the production of 
electricity generated by wind turbines. Although in 2021 wind and sola r still accounted for 3.4% and 
1.5%, respectively, of primary energy production, their growth rate has been high; In fact, overall, 
electricity generated by wind power has surpassed that generated by hydroelectric sources since 
August  2019. Thirty -one states and the District of Columbia have enacted renewable energy portfolio 
rules; Each sets out its own policies, eligible sources and technologies, trade rules and specific 
objectives."  
 
QUESTION 17:  Paragraph  4.138 mentions that the U .S. is in the Unite d States . "They have not set 
a national renewable energy target and no specific federal support mechanism." Later, it indicates 
that "incentives are granted in the form of tax credits for investment in the installation of solar 
panels, and tax credits for the production of electricity generated by wind turbines ". In this regard, 
Chile would appreciate the U.S. sharing information on those Federal and State support programs 
(e.g. subsidies, tax breaks, among others) for research, development, innovation, dem onstration, 
marketing, deployment, production and/or consumption of hydrogen generated through 
clean/renewable/low -greenhouse gas emissions (including nuclear and carbon capture and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 69 - 
 
  sequestration technologies). and its derivatives (such as synthetic fuels,  e-fuels, ammonia, 
fertilizers, among others).  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Administering agencies at both the federal and state levels of government can be 
found in our subsidy notification (see, G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021).  
 
Page  278-279, Paragraph  4.150  
 
"During th e period under review, the authorities actively worked to foster the development of the 
U.S. manufacturing sector through strategies in different areas, such as deepening regional trade 
integration, COVID -19 policy responses to facilitate vaccine development, strengthening the internal 
resilience of pharmaceutical and semiconductor supply chains, the provision of incentives to promote 
manufacturing, the implementation of domestic purchase programmes (including in government 
procurement procedures) and other measures addressed elsewhere in this report. " 
 
QUESTION 18:  Paragraph  4.150 refers to the development of the US manufacturing sector through 
strategies in different areas, such as deepening regional trade integration. In this regard, Chile would 
be grateful if the United  States  could indicate which instruments were used for this purpose and the 
productive sectors that concentrated the aforementioned regional trade integration, along with 
sharing how it has influenced the Global Value Chain of the same productive sectors.  
 
RESPONSE 18:  The United  States  has sought to deepen regional trade integration in a variety of 
ways across all parts of the manufacturing sector. Such ways include the negotiation of the 
United  States -Canada -Mexico Agreement (USMC A), which includes new automotive rules of origin 
intended to increase regional content and benefit the North American automotive industry. Other 
examples include the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and the U.S. -EU Trade 
and Technolog y Council (TTC), both of which include a focus on developing regional supply chains 
that are more secure, diverse, and resilient.  
 
Page  283, Para graph  4.164  
 
"For the first time in a U.S. trade agreement, the USMCA includes a specific chapter on SMEs, which 
recognizes their role in the economy of each signatory country. U.S. companies with fewer than 
500 employees account for two -thirds of companies trading goods with Canada and Mexico. The 
Agreement promotes cooperation and information exchange to gene rate more trade and investment 
opportunities for SMEs in the region, reduces paperwork for shipments of less than USD  2,500, 
raises de minimis levels, eliminates the requirement of local presence for cross -border service 
providers, and facilitates the exch ange of information and best practices for the participation of SMEs 
in covered public contracts, among other measures ." 
 
QUESTION 19:  Paragraph  4.164 mentions that the USMCA trade agreement was the first U .S. trade 
agreement to include  a specific chapter on SMEs. In this regard, Chile would appreciate it if the 
United  States  could share the concept or definition of SMEs that was used for this purpose.  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The definition of an SME is set out in Chapter  1 of the USMCA as follows: SME 
means a small and medium -sized enterprise, including a micro -sized enterprise.  
 
Page  320, Para graph  4.277  
 
"In the United  States there are more than 360  ports, which are operated by states, counties, 
municipalities or private companies, or jointly by several of th ose entities. The top 50  ports received 
approximately 85% of the tonnage of cargo transported by water. Port congestion, particularly on 
the west coast of the country, remains a problem and infrastructure needs to be improved. MARAD 
provides expert advice on port investment and financing and assists ports of all sizes and functions 
in terms of infrastructure development, efficiency (agility of port systems and cargo handling 
services), deep -water port licensing and transport. In addition, he chairs the Nati onal Port Readiness 
Network (NPRN) Steering Group and administers port planning orders for certain commercial ports 
in support of national defense."  
 
QUESTION 20:  Paragraph  4.277 states that "port congestion, particularly those on the west coast 
of the cou ntry, remains a problem, so infrastructure needs to be improved ". In this regard, Chile 
would appreciate the United  States  indicating whether it is implementing measures to address and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 70 - 
 
  eventually reverse this situation. If we are implementing them, we woul d appreciate sharing more 
information about them, along with indicating whether there is an agreed timeline to achieve the 
necessary infrastructure improvements.  
 
RESPONSE 20:  The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs  Act (P.L.  117-58), enacted on 
15 November  2021, contains appropriations for ports. In October of 2022, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation announced more than USD 703 million  to fund 41  projects in 23  states and one 
territory that will improve port facilities. The projects will benefit coastal seaports, Great Lakes ports, 
and inland river ports, helping improve supply chain reliability through increased port capacity and 
resilience, more efficient operations, reduced port emissions, and new workforce opportunities. The 
Administration has  engaged in near -term actions to address supply chain disruptions and is working 
to create the infrastructure for a stronger, more resilient supply chain for the long term.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  11-12, Para graph  3.12 
 
"In ad dition, in June  2022, the United  States joined other WTO members in agreeing on the first 
multilateral trade agreement with the environment at its core: the WTO  Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies. This Agreement prohibits subsidies for those engaged in illeg al, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing or fishing -related activities in support of IUU fishing, subsidies for fishing 
for overexploited stocks, and subsidies for fishing in unregulated areas of the high seas. It also 
includes improved transparency pr ovisions, which will provide important additional information on 
members' fishing and subsidy programmes. Negotiations will continue with a view to reaching 
agreement on additional disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. T he 
United  States  is committed to working with all WTO  Members to bring this Agreement into force 
without delay and to further strengthen disciplines in ways that improve the sustainability of fishery 
resources and the lives of fishers."  
 
QUESTION 21:  Paragraph  3.12 refers to the WTO  Agreement on fisheries subsidies and the 
continuation of negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on additional disciplines on subsidies 
that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. In addition, it emphasizes tha t the U.S. is 
determined "to work with all WTO  Members to bring this Agreement into force without delay and to 
further strengthen disciplines in ways that improve the sustainability of fishery resources and the 
lives of fishers ". In this regard, Chile woul d be grateful if the United  States  could share what in its 
opinion would be the elements to prioritize and the approach to be developed within the framework 
of these negotiations.  
 
RESPONSE 21:  The United  States  will continue to urge Members to support add itional, ambitious 
disciplines to discipline harmful fisheries subsidies, including subsidies that contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing. The United  States  will also continue to urge Members to support 
greater transparency with respect to the use of f orced labor on fishing vessels.  
 
QUESTION 22:  It would also be appreciated to know the current status of the domestic processing 
of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and the deadlines that tentatively handle for its subsequent 
deposit in the WTO.  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The United  States  is consulting internally with regard to acceptance of the Protocol 
and implementation of the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies.  
 
Page  14, Para graph  3.26 
 
"At the Twelfth Ministerial Conference, WTO members also agreed on a Ministerial Decision on the 
Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that accommodates 
intellectual property rules for COVID -19 vaccines that can facilitate a recovery from the global health 
situation. For more  than a year, the United  States, as part of its broader effort to end the pandemic, 
worked constructively with other members to facilitate discussions and bridge differences, leading 
to an intellectual property outcome that won consensus among all 164  WTO members."  
 
QUESTION 23:  Paragraph  3.26 refers to the ministerial decision reached at last MC12 on the 
Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which establishes 
intellectual property provisions for COVID -19 vaccines. This  decision contains a mandate to the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 71 - 
 
  WTO Membership to reach a new extension to the production and supply of COVID -19 diagnostics 
and treatments no later than six months after its adoption. In this regard, Chile would appreciate 
the United  States  sharing it s impressions regarding the next steps to be taken to advance towards 
the fulfillment of said mandate/extension.  
 
RESPONSE 23:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  14, Para graph 4.2 
 
"Accurate and accessible disaggregated economic data to assess the effects of trade on different 
types of American workers are essential for use as a basis for trade policy measures. The USTR 
Office requested the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to conduct an independent 
investigation of the potential distributional effects of trade policy and trade in goods and services on 
U.S. workers by skill level, wage and pay, gender, race/ethnicity, and age, especially the effects on 
underserved and underrepresented communities. This research will explore gaps in existing 
economic data and information, and propose additional analyses that may be conducted with 
classified data (i.e., data that are not available to the public or relevant ana lysts in the United States 
Government). The USTR Office will make the investigation report public. In all future trade initiatives, 
the United  States will take into account the potential distributional effects of trade and trade policy, 
including imports a nd exports of goods and services, on American workers."  
 
QUESTION 24:  Paragraph  4.2 refers to USTR's request to the USITC for an "independent 
investigation of the potential distributional effects of trade policy and trade in goods and services on 
U.S. work ers by skill level, wage and pay, gender, race/ethnicity, and age, especially the effects on 
underserved and underrepresented communities. This research will explore gaps in existing 
economic data and information, and propose additional analyses that may b e conducted with 
classified data (i.e.  data that are not available to the public or relevant analysts of the United  States  
Government) ". In this regard, and within the framework of Chile's interest in promoting a trade 
policy in which gender equity is cont emplated, we would be grateful if the United  States  could share 
more information on other actions that it would be contemplating in this area, in addition to the 
review, analysis, data collection and study indicated in the aforementioned paragraph.  
 
RESPON SE 24:  USTR requested a two -part investigation. In response to the first part of the 
request, the USITC has published a detailed report, which is publicly available on the ITC website 
at: https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5374.pdf . 
 
The second part of the investigation recommends that the USITC expand and develop new research 
and analysis capabilities so that future probable economic effects advice includes estimates of the 
potential  distributional effects of trade agreements and trade policy on U.S. workers.  
 
Regarding future plans for other actions in this area, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade 
Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises . However, improving the quality, g ranularity, scope, and 
availability of data and research is part of a whole -of-government effort to advance equity. 
Executive  Order  13985 on  Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities 
Through the Federal Government  (issued January  2021) established the Equitable Data Working 
Group which is "tasked with identifying inadequacies in our existing Federal data collection 
infras tructure and laying out a strategy for improving equitable data practices in the Federal 
government ". The United  States  seeks to assess " whether its programs and policies produce 
consistently fair, just, and impartial treatment of all individuals, as well as identify opportunities for 
targeted actions that will result in improved outcomes for underserved and disadvantaged 
communities ". To inform this analysis,  the United  States  consulted with key advocates and 
constituent communities and in April  2022 relea sed a report, "A Vision for Equitable Data: 
Recommendations from the Equitable Data working Group ". In addition, there is an ongoing 
coordinated interagency process to identify data gaps and make recommendations to address them. 
The findings from both the U.S. International Trade Commission investigation and the Equitable Data 
Working Group have identified the need for disaggregating data by characteristics such as race and 
ethnicity, income, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, skill, and rural /urban geographies 
to inform trade policy and provide recommendations to address identified disparities.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  23-24, Para graph  5.31 
 
"In January  2022, the United  States announced that it would develop its first trade strategy focused 
on combating forced labor. The development of this strategy envisages a comprehensive 
inter-agency review of existing trade policies and the tools used to combat forced labour (includi ng 
child labour) in order to identify areas that may need to be strengthened and gaps that need to be 
addressed. The United  States will use this analysis to establish goals, priorities, new tools, and key 
actions to advance its goals to combat forced labor ." 
 
QUESTION 25:  Paragraph  5.31 states that "in January  2022, the United  States announced that it 
would develop its first trade strategy focused on combating forced labor...". In this regard, Chile 
would be grateful if the United  States  would share whether  such a strategy would include statistics 
on forced labor and specifically statistics disaggregated by sex.  
 
RESPONSE 25:  Work to develop the strategy is ongoing. The United  States  reminds Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
Page  45, Para graph  9.1 
 
"USTR has launched a Small Business Initiative to increase export opportunities for U.S. small and 
medium -sized enterprises (SMEs) and intensify efforts to add ress the specific export challenges and 
priorities of SMEs and their workers as part of trade policy and law enforcement activities. During 
the period under review, USTR continued to work with other government partner agencies and U.S. 
trading partners to develop and implement new or ongoing initiatives to increase small business 
exports ." 
 
QUESTION 26:  Paragraph  9.1 refers to the launch of a Small Business Initiative to increase export 
opportunities for U .S. SMEs, among others. In this regard, Chile would appreciate it if the U.S. could 
share whether it has specific initiatives for women -led or women -owned small businesses.  
 
RESPONSE 26:  USTR's Small Business Initiative is inclusive of small businesses owned by women, 
minorities, indigenous, and underrepresented groups. For example, the  USMCA SME chapter includes 
commitments on enhanced cooperation to increase trade and investment opportunities for SMEs, 
including those owned by women, and directs the Parties to identify ways to assist SMEs to take 
advantage of the Agreement. In a July 2021 webinar for over 600  participants, organized by the 
USMCA SME Committee, women -owned SMEs shared best practices in expanding export sales into 
the North American markets, in cluding electronic commerce; and webinar participants received 
information about government resources, including Women's Business Centers.  
 
QUESTION 27:  If not, we would appreciate it if the U .S. could comment on whether it is considering 
such initiatives.  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Consistent with the President's 2021 Trade Policy Agenda, USTR has been 
conducting a review of existing trade programs to evaluate their contribution to equitable economic 
development, including whether they lead to the economic empowerment of women and 
underrepresented communities. In addition, USTR is committed to engaging in robust technical 
assistance and trade capacity building with trading partners to ensure workers and small and 
medium -sized enterprises, especially those owned by under represented groups, including women, 
around the world benefit from U.S. trade policy. See the 2022 Trade Policy Agenda and Annual 
Report for further details on Trade and Gender.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  CHINA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  28, Para graph  1.26 
 
The Federal Reserve is responsible for monetary policy in the United  States . Legislation specifies 
that, in conducting monetary policy, the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) should seek "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long -term interest rates".  
 
QUESTION  1: Under high inflation, the U.S. has raised interest rates sharply in succession, which 
has triggered multiple economic risks and generated serious negative spillover effects. Could the 
U.S. provide information on what responsible macroeconomic policies the U.S. will adopt to maintain 
the sound operation of the international economic and financial system.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Central banks around the world are tightening monetary policy in response to a global 
surge in inflation.  Each central bank serves domestic mandates and objectives.  The Federal Reserve 
has a dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability.  It also recognizes that it operates 
in a wor ld of global markets and strong economic interlinkages, and it pays close attention to the 
impact of its policies on foreign economies and those economies' effects on the United  States . 
 
Page  39, Paragraph  2.6 
 
The President has the authority to negotiate international agreements, including FTAs, but the 
Constitution gives Congress sole authority to lay tariffs and regulate foreign commerce. In this 
respect, when intending to conduct trade negotiations, Congress has traditionally granted the 
Execu tive negotiating authority through trade legislation known as trade promotion authority (TPA) 
or "fast track", as it allows a simple yes or no vote in Congress without deliberation or amendment 
of the contents.  
 
QUESTION  2: Could the U.S. update on the progress of the "Fast Track Authority" (Trade Promotion 
Authority, TPA) in trade negotiations, and clarify how the U.S. government conducts foreign 
negotiations, especially those related to market access, without the TPA autho rization from Congress?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  USTR would work with the Congress should Congress consider enacting Trade 
Promotion Authority legislation in the future.  The U.S. Government develops its positions in trade 
negotiations through extensive consultation wi th trading partners, a broad base of stakeholders, and 
Congress.  
 
Page  42, Para graph  2.18 
 
In the DSB, the United  States  continued to raise its systemic concerns with Appellate  Body overreach.  
 
QUESTION  3: The MC12 outcome document provides that the parties "commit to conduct 
discussions with the view to having a fully and well -functioning dispute settlement system accessible 
to all Members by 2024", but in October  2022, the U.S. again rejected over a propo sal to restart the 
Appellate  Body selection process for the 59th time. Although 127  members support the launch of the 
selection processes that could fill the remaining Appellate  Body vacancies as soon as possible, the 
U.S. still refuses to select new Appel late Body members.  
Could the U.S. elaborate on specific actions it would take to realize the goal of "having a fully and 
well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all Members by 2024" as stated in the 
outcome of MC12?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States  believes that the first step towards reform is to better understand 
the interests of all Members in WTO dispute settlement.  An approach centered on the interests of 
Members can facilitate greater mutual understanding without resorting to the same p ositions that 
have slowed the reform discussion for many years. The United  States  is not prejudging what this 
reformed system would look like, and have asked other Members to likewise approach the 
conversation with an open mind.  We believe this approach  - working collectively towards a system 
that meets the needs of all Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving 
durable, lasting reform.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  51, Paragraph  2.40 
 
The United  States maintains an open investment regime and has benefited for decades as one of 
the world's single  largest recipients and suppliers of FDI. The President issued a statement on the 
United  States' commitment to open investment on 8  June 2021. In recent years, the United  States 
has expanded and refined its  review of FDI through national security -based screening. U.S. 
investment policy has undergone a number of changes during the review period; due to 
U.S. predominance in world investment markets, U.S. policy has an important influence on world 
investment fl ows. 
 
QUESTION  4: China notes that the U.S. currently imposed foreign shareholding ratio limits in some 
areas. Could the U.S. side specify the main areas where foreign shareholding ratio limits exist at the 
federal and state levels and the considerations b ehind these restrictions?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  We refer you to the Secretariat Report, which contains the Secretariat's description 
of U.S. investment restrictions and includes a table on the requirements and restrictions on foreign 
investment by sector.  
 
Page  53-54, Para graph  2.50 
 
The role of CFIUS and U.S. screening of foreign investments in general have undergone one of the 
most important changes since CFIUS's legal authority was last amended in 2007 through the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act ( FINSA). These changes were authorized in the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), P.L.  115-23, enacted on 
13 August  2018. Certain provisions of FIRRMA became effective immediately upon enactment of the 
statute, while others came into effect through implementing regulations issued in January  2020 and 
thereafter.50 Other regulations defining the term "principal place of business" as it relates to the 
definition of U.S. business and establishing filing fees came into forc e in May  2020. In 
September  2020, Treasury published a final rule requiring transactions to be notified to CFIUS under 
certain circumstances.  
 
QUESTION  5: According to the CFIUS report, China has been the country with the highest number 
of cases examined f or many years. With 44  cases in 2021, Chinese companies ranked the first on 
the list, far exceeding the numbers of the second -place (Canada) and third -place (Japan) putting 
together. Could the U .S. explain how it ensures that the foreign investment review process is fair 
and objective?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  CFIUS focuses exclusively on national security, and its reviews are robust and 
analytically rigorous.  CFIUS is comprised of a range of agencies with different areas of expertise.  
Every transaction notified to CFIUS is analyzed by experts from across the U.S. Government through 
a methodical assessment of the national security risk presented by the facts and circumstances of 
the particular transaction.  
 
Page  79, Para graph  3.63 
 
In addition to measures applied multilaterally, the United  States  also maintains a number of 
quantitative restrictions or prohibitions on a bilateral or plurilateral basis.  
 
QUESTION  6: The Executive Order on Securing the United  States  Bulk-Power System restr icts the 
entry of foreign power equipment and parts into the U.S. market. Specifically, the Executive  Order 
restricts market access of equipment from certain countries.  
Could the U.S. please explain how the Executive  Order complies with GATT Article  1 "Gen eral 
Most-Favoured -Nation Treatment" and Article  11 "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions"?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  The emergency declaration made by Executive  Order  13920 Securing the 
United  States  Bulk-Power System  expired on 1 May 2021.  
 
QUESTION  7: Was commercial relations a factor in the U.S. issuance of the Executive  Order?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The Executive Order indicates that the President determined "that the unrestricted 
foreign supply of bulk -power system electric equipment constitutes an unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United  States, which has its source WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 75 - 
 
  in whole or in substantial part outside the United  States.  This threat exists both in the case of 
individual ac quisitions and when acquisitions are considered as a class ". 
 
QUESTION  8: Could the U.S. clarify whether it is an act of government intervention for the U.S. to 
directly intervene in the commercial competition between foreign and U.S. companies through the  
above administrative means to protect the interests of U.S. companies?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  We reject the premise of the question, that the emergency declaration was made to 
protect the interests of U.S. companies.  
 
Page  81, Para graph  3.69 
 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S. State 
Department administer and enforce a variety of economic and trade sanctions programs designed 
to protect U.S. national security interests. The programs include outright  prohibitions or restrictions 
on transactions involving certain sanctioned jurisdictions, governments, companies, and individuals 
that may affect import and export activities.  
 
QUESTION  9: In January  2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce promulgated regula tions to 
implement provisions for Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services 
Supply Chain, defining China as a foreign adversary and authorizing the U.S. Department of 
Commerce to conduct extensive investigations of transactions in  the information and 
communications sector. Recently, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued subpoenas to Chinese 
companies providing information and communications services in the U.S. to initiate investigations. 
The Federal Communications Commission has proposed to terminate the installation of equipment 
from five Chinese companies in U.S. communications networks and may even revoke authorization 
for the use of existing equipment from these companies.  
How do the country -specific import restrictions comply  with the relevant WTO provisions?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  U.S. measures with respect to its national security interests are consistent with U.S. 
WTO commitments.  
 
QUESTION  10: What are the reasons for the U.S. to impose unnecessary, country -specific 
conditions or restrictions on the purchase, sale, or use of the products by business entities?  
 
Response  10: For a discussion  of the rationale  for imposing  restrictions,  we direct  China  to the Ba
ckground  section  of the Final Rule: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/20 21/01/19/2021 -
01234/securing -the-information -and-communications -technology -and-services -supply -chain . 
 
Page  81, Para graph  3.70 
 
The United  States  updated or created new sanction measures during the review period including the 
implementation of new sanction s required by recent Congressional legislation and Executive  Orders. 
OFAC actions during the review period are publicly available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy -
issues/financial -sanctions/recent -actions . 
Question: Regarding unilateral sanctions . 
 
QUESTION  11: Does the U.S. believe that any country can arbitrarily and by any means expand 
the extraterritorial application of its domes tic law on the grounds of national security?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  This question is not a retrospective question about the U.S. trade regime and is 
therefore outside the scope of the trade policy review.  
 
QUESTION  12: Does the United  States  even believe that there  should be any boundaries with 
respect to the extraterritorial application of its domestic law?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  This question is outside the scope of a WTO Trade Policy Review.  
QUESTION  13: Does the U.S. agree with the opinion that the widespread use of unilateral sanctions 
by WTO members may bring the international economic and trade order back to the era of the law 
of the jungle ? 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 76 - 
 
  RESPONSE 13:  This question is beyond the scope of a WTO Tra de Policy Review.  
 
QUESTION  14: How does the U .S. ensure the consistency of its sanctions with the WTO  rules?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
administers and enforces comprehensive and targeted ec onomic sanctions programs in furtherance 
of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.  These sanctions programs implement multiple 
legal authorities, such as statutes or Executive  Orders issued by the President.  These authorities are 
further ref lected by OFAC in its regulations which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(Title 31, Chapter  V of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), and on OFAC's website 
at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/office -of-foreign -assets -control -sanctions -programs -
and-information . 
 
Table A2.1 Activity in WTO dispute settlement to which the United  States  is a Party, 
August  2018-March  2022 
In DS437, the U.S. was once again found by the Appellate  Body to be inconsistent with WTO  rules 
in the compliance proceeding, and the arbitrator ruled on 26  January  2022, that China may take 
retaliatory measures against the U.S. within USD  645 million . In DS471, the single rate presumption 
used by the U.S. in 30  anti-dumping measures against China was found to be in violation of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, the U.S. failed to take any measures to execute t he ruling after 
it came into effect, and the arbitrator has ruled that China is entitled to take retaliatory measures 
against the U.S. within USD  3,579 billion . However, so fat, the U.S. has continued to use the illegal 
methodology in its anti -dumping and countervailing investigations against China to date.  
 
QUESTION  15: Could the U.S. explain the reason for long -standing non -compliance with the 
WTO rulings?  
 
Response 15:  In response to the suggestion that the U.S. compliance record in WTO dispute 
settlement is poor, the facts simply do not support that assertion.  To the contrary, the record shows 
that the United  States  has fully complied in the vast majority of its disputes.  As for the remaining 
few - and those few are a small fraction of the total  - we are working towards compliance.  
 
QUESTION  16: When and how the U .S. intends to comply with the WTO  rulings?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  The question does not refer to specific recommendations adopted by the DSB, and 
the United  States  is not able to provide an answer in the abstract on how it will "comply with the 
WTO rulings ". 
 
QUESTION  17: Could the U .S. explain the relationship between its non -compliance and the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda in the international law?  
 
RESPONSE 17 : In response to the suggestion that the U.S. compliance record is poor, the facts 
simply do not support that assertion.  To the contrary, the record shows that the United  States  has 
fully complied in the vast majority of its disputes.  As for the remaining few - and those few are a 
small fraction of the total  - we are working towards compliance.  
 
Page  94, Para graph  3.112  
 
At the end of 2021, 96  AD measures had been in place for at least  20 years, and 193  AD measures 
had been in place for at least 10  years. The longest -lasting AD measure in place dates from 1978 
and is applied on pre -stressed concrete steel wire strand from Japan.  
 
QUESTION  18: According to the U.S.'s semi -annual notification on anti -dumping, countervailing, 
and safeguard measures to t he WTO in 2021, as of 30  June 2021, the U.S. still maintained 
19 anti-dumping measures against Chinese products that began since the last century. The 
excessively long and even "permanent" anti -dumping and countervailing measures have become 
barriers to tr ade, seriously distorting the international trade order and fair -trade environment. Could 
the U.S. provide reasons for retaining above ADP and CVD measures for such a long period?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  The United  States  administers its trade remedy laws in accordance with the 
applicable WTO  agreements.  In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or an 
antidumping order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury within a WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 77 - 
 
  reasonably foreseeable time, the U.S. International Trade Commission considers the factors set out 
in U.S. law at 19  U.S.C.  § 1675a(a).  The USITC considers these factors in the context of the record 
of the five -year review; it establishes a new record for each five -year review of an order.  
 
In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or antidumping duty order would 
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy or sales of the subject 
merchandise at less th an fair value, the U.S. Department of Commerce considers the factors set out 
in U.S. law at 19  U.S.C.  §§ 1675a(b) and (c), respectively.  
 
The determinations in each sunset review conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission or 
U.S. Department of Co mmerce are case -specific. The results for all sunset reviews can be found on 
the U.S. International Trade Commission's website ( http://pubapps2.usitc.gov/sunset/ ). Commerce 
publishes its sunset review deter minations in the Federal Register and also makes them available on 
Commerce's website ( http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/index.html ) and 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . From these sources, Members can obtain, on a case -by-case 
basis, information about the rationale for either the continuation or termination of a countervailing 
duty or a n antidumping duty order.  
 
QUESTION  19: Does the U.S. have any intention or plan to terminate the above measures?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  See response to Question  18 above.  
 
Page  97, Para graph  3.116  
 
Between 2018 and 2021, there were 81  CVD investigation initiations, up from 63 between  2015 and 
2017, with 23 in 2018, 17 in 2019, 30 in 2020, and 11 in 2021.  
 
The U.S. Department of Commerce seems refuse to comply in good faith with domestic judicial 
decisions. For example, the Export Buyer's Cr edit program, which is investigated by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce in almost every countervailing investigation against China, has not been 
used by any of the Chinese companies under investigation or their U.S. trading partners to date. 
However, the U. S. Department of Commerce has adopted the adverse facts available (AFA) method 
to find a high subsidy margin of 10.54% of that item in almost all cases, despite sufficient evidence 
provided by China. The Chinese companies involved have repeatedly filed law suits with the U.S. 
Court of International Trade (CIT), which has ruled on remand in more than 10  cases, while the U.S. 
Department of Commerce has only modified individual cases after losing the lawsuits and continued 
to use the original method in subseque nt cases.  
 
QUESTION  20: Could the U.S. please explain why it refuses to comply with the domestic judicial 
decisions?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  The United  States  disagrees with China's characterization of this issue. The 
United  States  complies with every judicial decision made by the courts, consistent with the remand 
instructions provided by the court. The basis for determinations in individual cases are made based 
on the facts and circumstances of that particular case and, again, con sistent with the instructions 
provided by the court. The U.S. Department of Commerce's remand determinations can be found on 
the court's docket at https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/ . 
 
Page  97, Para graph  3.117  
 
Of the 170 CVD measures in place on 31  December  2021 (including a suspension agreement), 78 
(45.9% of the total) were on iron and steel products, 20 (11.8%) on chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
16 (9.4%) on agricultural products, 13 (7.6%) on plastics and rubber, 12 (7.1%)on metals and 
minerals, 9 (5.3%) on miscellaneous manufactured products, 8 (4.7%) on machinery and equipment, 
7 (4.1%) on transportation equipment, and 7 (4.1%) on textiles and apparel.  
 
In February  2020, despite opposition from many parties, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
amended the countervailing regulations to include exchange rate undervaluation in 
single -exchange -rate countries in the scope of countervailing investigations. In the countervailing 
cases against China, countervaili ng investigations were conducted on the so -called exchange rate 
undervaluation program. The U.S. Treasury Department's assessment report also acknowledged that 
China did not manipulate the exchange rate, and the U.S. Department of Commerce issued negative WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 78 - 
 
  rulings on all exchange rate undervaluation programs in its individual countervailing investigations 
against China. The U.S. has also amended its regulations to allow all enterprises engaged in 
international trade in goods to be considered a group of enter prises for purposes of specificity 
determinations.  
 
QUESTION  21: Does the U.S. consider exchange rate issues to be within the WTO's jurisdiction?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  As we have notified to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/S uppl.31; 2  October  2020), it is the United  States ' position that currency 
undervaluation can result in a countervailable subsidy. We note that the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures explicitly includes certain currency -related practices in item (b) of 
the "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies " in Annex  I. 
 
QUESTION  22: Does the U.S. believe that the specificity of the SCM  Agreement  can be interpreted 
at will according to the needs of its members?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The conce pt of specificity is defined in Article  2 of the SCM  Agreement . In the 
context of the notified currency undervaluation regulations referenced above, it is the U.S. position 
that companies in the traded goods sector c an constitute a group of enterprises for  purposes of 
determining whether a subsidy is specific.  
 
QUESTION  23: How is the above approach consistent with the U.S. position in previous disputes, 
such as the U.S. -Byrd Amendment (DS217) and the U.S. -Upland Cotton Case (DS267)?  
 
Response 23:  The concept of specificity is defined in Article  2 of the SCM  Agreement . Whether or 
not a subsidy program is specific under Article  2 is dependent upon the facts of the particular 
program at issue.  
 
Page  100, Para graph  3.123  
 
Between 2018 and 2021, one new safeguard investigation was conducted by the United  States  under 
Section  201; measures corresponding to two investigations started in 2017  were in place. The new 
investigation was notified to the WTO. USITC made a negative serious injury determination in that 
investigation, and no safeguard measure was imp osed. The President extended the safeguard 
measure in each of the two investigations started in 2017 (see below) . 
 
QUESTION  24: Since February  2018, the U.S. has implemented Section  201 measures (safeguards) 
on imports of photovoltaic cells and modules. On  4 February  2022, the U.S. announced that such 
measures would be extended for four years until February  2026. The duration of this measure will 
reach 8  years, hitting the upper limit allowed by WTO rules. Could the U.S. please explain the reasons 
for maint aining above mentioned safeguard measures?  
 
Response 24:  The reasons for maintaining the safeguard measures in this instance can be found 
in G/SG/N/10/USA/7/Suppl.13 (dated 8  February  2022) and G/SG/N/10/USA/7/Suppl.13/Corr.1 
(dated 10  February  2022), where the United  States  notified, pursuant to Article  12.1©, both a 
determination by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), pursuant to section 204 © of the 
Trade Act of 1974 (the Act) (19  U.S.C.  sec. 2254©), that action under Section  203 of the Act with 
respect to imports of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic (CSPV) Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully 
Assembled into Other Products) (solar products) continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy 
serious injury and that there is evidence tha t the domestic large residential washers industry is 
making a positive adjustment to import competition, and the proclamation signed by the President 
detailing the extended measure to be applied on imports of solar products.  
 
Page  101, Para graph  3.126  
 
On 4 February  2022, the President issued a proclamation extending the safeguard measure on CSPV 
products. The extension,  to be in effect for four years, became effective on 7  February  2022. 
 
QUESTION  25: China notes that while the U.S. is restricting imports of new energy products, it is 
encouraging domestic clean energy investment on the grounds of responding to the climate crisis, 
and providing large subsidies for domestic production and utilization of electric vehicles.  
Could the U.S. please explain why there are differences between internal and external policies aimed WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  at promoting environmentally sustainable development?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  The safeguard measure on solar products was taken following an Inter national Trade 
Commission investigation under the U.S. safeguard law, which addressed whether solar products 
are being imported in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or 
threat of serious injury to the U.S. industry pro ducing a like or directly competitive product. 
Separately, encouragement of domestic clean energy investment is intended to develop sustainable 
sources of energy and to meet our Paris commitments and other climate goals.  
 
QUESTION  26: Is this "restricting imports of clean energy products while stimulating domestic 
production" approach aiming to achieve edges for specific domestic industries?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  No, the two actions have two separate objectives, as noted above.  
 
Page  105, Para graph  3.137  
 
On 31  May 2018, the United  States  announced agreements with Argentina, Australia, and Brazil on 
alternative means to address the threatened impairment to U.S. national security posed by steel 
article imports from these countries. The measures agreed included ann ual aggregate limits of steel 
product imports from Argentina and Brazil for the period starting with calendar year 2018 and for 
subsequent years.207USDOC has conducted 21 Section  232 investigations since 1980; of these, 14 
were concluded before or in 2001.  In 2018, two investigations were initiated on steel and aluminium . 
Question: In the notification of quantitative restrictions (QRs) for 2022 to 2024 submitted by the 
U.S. to the Committee on Market Access (G/MA/QR/N/USA/6), items No.  20 to No.  23 in the t able 
of QRs concern import restrictions on steel and aluminium  products under Section  232. 
 
QUESTION  27: Could the U.S. elaborate on what criteria the U.S. uses to determine the quotas 
received by specific members such as ROK, Argentina, and Brazil?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  As stated in Proclamations 9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States) and Proclamation 9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the 
United  States ), any country with which the United  States  has a security relationship is welcome to 
discuss with the United  States  alternative ways to address the threatened i mpairment of the national 
security caused by imports from that country. The United  States  and the countries previously 
identified agreed on a range of measures, including measures to reduce excess steel production and 
excess steel capacity.  
 
QUESTION  28: What are the conditions for different members to receive quotas?  
 
RESPONSE 28:  The satisfactory alternative means are assessed based on whether they provide an 
effective, long -term alternative means to address any contribution to the threatened impairment t o 
U.S. national security by the articles in question.  
 
QUESTION  29: How can those quotas address the so -called national security concerns of the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  As stated in Proclamations 9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States ) and Proclamation 9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminium  Into 
the United  States ), any country with which the United  States  has a security relationship is welcome 
to discuss with the United  States  alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the 
national security caused by imports from that country. Should the United  States  and any such 
country arrive at a satisfactory alternative means to address the threat to the national security such 
that the President determines t hat imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the 
national security, the President may remove or modify the restriction on steel and/or aluminium  
articles imports from that country and, if necessary, make any corresponding adjustments to the 
tariff as it applies to other countries as our national security interests require.  
 
QUESTION  30: Could the U.S. please indicate whether the Biden administration is willing to 
reconsider the need for the Section  232 tariffs?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 80 - 
 
  QUESTION  31: Please provide information on the process and timeline for doing so.  
 
RESPONSE 31:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  32: Four years after the imposition o f the tariffs, does the U.S. side believe that the 
Section  232 tariffs have been effective in achieving the domestic capacity utilization targets that the 
measure hoped to achieve?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  Under Section  232, the President has the authority to determi ne the nature and 
duration of the action that,  in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of 
the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security. 
The circumstances of global excess capacity continue to contribute to the threatened impairment of 
the national security of the United  States . According to the American Iron and Steel Institute, in the 
week ending on 19 November  2022, the U.S. raw steel capacity utilization ra te was 73.0 %. 
 
QUESTION  33: It seems that the U.S. steel capacity utilization rate has reached the target of 80% 
as set in the Section  232 report.  
Is the U.S. considering revising the measures, or does it intend to continue the Section  232 tariffs 
and rela ted trade arrangements on steel indefinitely?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  34: The U.S. apparently believes that 80% capacity utilization is normal for the steel 
industry. China's steel capacity utilization is also around 80%.  
Does the U.S. side acknowledge that China's steel capacity utilization rate is also in line with that of 
the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  In 2017, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation into the effects of 
steel imports on the national security of the United  States  pursuant to Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962. In 2018, the Secretary submitted  to the President a report on the findings 
of such investigation, concluding that steel articles are being imported into the United  States  in such 
quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the 
United  States  and recommending actions to adjust the imports of steel articles so that such imports 
will not threaten to impair the national security. That report stated, among other things, that 
increasing U.S. capacity utilization to 80 % or greater will enable U.S. ste el mills to increase 
operations significantly in the short -term and improve the financial viability of the industry over the 
long-term. Under Section  232, the President has the authority to determine the nature and duration 
of the action that,  in the judgm ent of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the 
article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
Page  107, Para graph  3.141  
 
On 31  October  2021, the United  States  and the European  Union  issued a joint statement with 
respect to the steel and aluminum tariffs.  
 
Page  108, Para graph  3.142  
 
On 7 February  2022, the United  States  and Japan issued a joint statement.  
 
QUESTION  35: According to the Report, the U.S. has reached agreements with some members, 
such as the EU and Japan, on the abolition of the Section  232 measures on steel; however, the U.S. 
has used the abolition of such measures as a price to coerce other members to take sides (such as 
requiring other membe rs to take trade remedy measures against third -country steel products) and 
has not notified the WTO of the above agreements.  
As the main proponent of the transparency proposal, when will the U.S. effectively fulfill its 
transparency obligations?  
 
Response 35: The United  States  and partners have issued joint statements concerning 
arrangements reached to address imports of steel and aluminium  into the United  States . In 
implementing changes to Section  232 duties, the President stated that, in his judgment, the  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 81 - 
 
  arrangements reached with the EU and Japan will provide an effective, long -term alternative means 
to address any contribution by Japanese and EU steel articles and EU aluminium  articles imports to 
the threatened impairment to the national security of the United  States  from Japan and the EU.  
 
QUESTION  36: Could the U.S. please explain the reasons for treating members differently and 
clarify when the U.S. will consult with affected members as required by the Agreement on Safeguards?  
 
RESPONSE 36:  Section  232 measures are not safeguard measures, and the Agre ement on 
Safeguards does not apply. Section  232 measures were taken pursuant to Article  XXI of the 
GATT 1994. 
 
In 2017, the Secretary of Commerce initiated investigations into the effects of steel and aluminium  
imports on the national security of the Unite d States  pursuant to Section  232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962. In 2018, the Secretary submitted to the President reports on the findings of such 
investigations, concluding that steel and aluminium  articles are being imported into the United  States  
in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the 
United  States  and recommending actions to adjust the imports of steel and aluminium  articles so 
that such imports will not threaten to impair the national s ecurity.  
 
In Proclamation  9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United  States ) and 
Proclamation 9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminium  Into the United  States ), the 
President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided to adjust the imports 
of steel and aluminium  articles by imposing a 25 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of steel articles and 
imposing a 10 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of  aluminium  articles, so that such imports will not 
threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations also stated that any country with 
which the United  States  has a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the United  States  
alternati ve ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports 
from that country. Should the United  States  and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative 
means to address the threat to the national security such that the  President determines that imports 
from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, the President may remove or 
modify the restriction on such imports from that country and, if necessary, make any corresponding 
adjustments to the tarif f as it applies to other countries as U.S. national security interests require.  
 
Page  109, Para graph  3.144  
 
On 31  October  2021, the United  States  and the European  Union  issued a joint statement with 
respect to the steel and aluminium  tariffs that terminated their DSB disputes (see above, steel).  
 
QUESTION  37: In addition to the exemption arrangements with certain countries when the 
Section  232 tariffs were initially impl emented, the U.S. now has similar arrangements with the EU, 
Japan and the UK, all of which use tariff quotas or other mechanisms to limit the quantities of 
relevant products imported from these regions to the levels prior to the implementation of the 
Section 232 tariffs. Could the U.S. side please explain whether these new exemptions and tariff 
quota arrangements are consistent with the original rationale for the Section  232 report calling for 
tariffs on steel and aluminium?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  The President stated that, determined that the arrangements, reached with the EU, 
Japan, and the UK will provide an effective, long -term alternative means to address any contribution 
by EU, Japanese, and UK steel articles and EU and UK aluminium  articles imports to the threatened 
impairment to the national security of the United  States . 
 
QUESTION  38: Does the U.S. intend to enter into similar arrangements with other WTO  Members 
affected by the Section  232 tariffs?  
 
RESPONSE 38:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
QUESTION  39: What criteria does the U.S. use to determine which member to enter into such 
arrangements with?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  As stated in Procl amations  9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States ) and Proclamation  9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminium  Into WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 82 - 
 
  the United  States ), any country with which the United  States  has a security relationship is welcome 
to discuss with the United  States  alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the 
national security caused by imports from that country. Should the United  States  and any such 
country arrive at a satisfac tory alternative means to address the threat to the national security such 
that the President determines that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the 
national security, the President may remove or modify the restriction on steel and/or aluminium  
articles imports from that country and, if necessary, make any corresponding adjustments to the 
tariff as it applies to other countries as our national security interests require.  
 
QUESTION  40: How does the U.S. explain the consistency of these di fferential treatments with the 
WTO MFN treatment obligation?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  The United  States  considers these measures necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests.  
 
Page  113, Para graph  3.159  
 
On 15  June 2018, USTR issued a list of products covering 1,102 separate U.S. tariff lines valued at 
some USD  50 billion  in 2018 trade values.  
 
QUESTION  41: The WTO dispute settlement panel has clearly ruled that the Section  301 measures 
on tariffs of the U.S. violate WTO rules, and the U.S. fil ed an appeal to the Appellate  Body, which is 
not functioning properly due to the U.S.'s obstruction. Could the U .S. explain the reason for such an 
appeal?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  As stated in the United  States ' notification of appeal in DS543/10, the United  States  
has appealed issues of law covered in the Panel report, and legal interpretations developed by the 
Panel.  
 
QUESTION  42: Does the U .S. have a strategy of using the paralysis of the appellate body to avoid 
losing its cases?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  The U.S. concerns with the Appellate  Body are not new: For more than 18  years 
and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United  States  has been raisin g serious concerns with 
the Appellate  Body. The United  States  supports WTO dispute settlement reform and is working 
towards achieving durable, lasting reform. That is the goal of the United  States  and we are prepared 
for continued and deepened engagement w ith Members on that basis.  
 
QUESTION  43: What does the U .S. think should be done to change the status quo of more than 
20 cases of appeal into the Void?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  The aim of dispute settlement is to facilitate the prompt settlement of a dispute 
between  Members and the United  States  welcomes engagement between parties in order to achieve 
that end, including in situations where an appeal has been filed. Members have a variety of means 
under the DSU through which they can achieve a resolution, including pursuant to Article  4, 
"Consulta tions"; Article  5, "Good Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation"; and Article  25, "Arbitration ". 
If any Member considers that use of these provisions may assist it in securing a positive solution, 
then the United  States  in principle supports such efforts.  
 
QUESTION  44: Numerous studies have shown that the Section  301 tariffs have increased the 
purchase price of U.S. consumers and reduced the competitiveness of U.S. exports, which has had 
a particularly significant impact on consumer prices at a time when the United  States  is experiencing 
the inflation pressures. Given these facts, why did the Biden administration choose to maintain the 
tariffs imposed by the Trump administration? We wonder whether there is a process and timetable 
for the U.S. to reconsider and  remove these tariffs.  
 
RESPONSE 44:  USTR recently announced the next steps in the investigation in the Federal Register 
at 87 Fed. Reg. 62,914 ( 17 October 2022). Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  45: Ms Yellen, United  States  Secretary of the Treasury, has said that tariffs are not 
helpful to the U.S. economy and that "tariffs are taxes on consumers" . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 83 - 
 
  Is it a failure t o reduce the trade deficit by imposing tariffs?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  The trade deficit reflects a number of macroeconomic factors, such as patterns of 
saving, spending and investment as well as growth differentials between trade partners. The tariffs 
recently imp osed by the United  States  were imposed for the reasons set forth in relevant public 
documents.  
 
QUESTION  46: How does the U.S. side view the relationship between domestic inflation and the 
imposition of tariffs?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The United  States  considers th at the tariffs imposed under Section  301 have had a 
minimal effect on overall inflation.  
 
Page  113, Paragraph  3.160  
 
In September  2018, the USTR approved List  3, which imposed additional duties on products of China 
classified under 5,733 tariff subheadings (from the 6,031 proposed) with an annual trade value of 
approximately USD  200 billion . The rate of the additional duty on these List  3 products was increased 
from 10% to 25% in May  2019. USTR again established an exclusion process for products of China 
covered under List  3, receiving approximately 30,300 exclusion requests, of which USTR approved 
approximately 1,500. In August  2019, the USTR determined a new action, devising a List  4 
comprising 3,805 tariff subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of USD  300 billion  to 
be subject to additional 10% ad valorem  duties. The tariff subheadings were separated into two lists 
with different effective dates: 1  September  2019 for List  4A, and 15  December  2019 for List  4B. 
Subseq uently, the USTR determined to increase the rate of the additional duties from 10% to 15%.  
 
QUESTION  47: While most of the tariffs will take effect at 0:00 Eastern Standard Time on 
1 September, USTR has removed some products from the list based on health, safety, national 
security and other factors. In addition, for consumer products such as mobile phones, laptops, game 
pads, certain types of toys, computer monitors, and footwear and apparel, USTR has delayed the 
effective date until 15  December, apparently  to avoid the shopping season. Could the U.S. please 
indicate the consideration of the inconsistency of effective dates on the same batch of product list?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  The 2019 Federal Register notice associated with this trade action explains the 
effecti ve dates. That notice, which can be found at 84 Fed. Reg. 43, 304 ( 20 August 2019) , explains 
as follows:  
 
List 1 includes tariff subheadings where China's share of U.S. imports from the world is less 
than 75 % for each subheading. For list  1, the additional duty of 10 % ad valorem  is effective 
1 September  2019. List  2 includes products where China's share of U.S. imports from the 
world is 75 % or greater for each subheading. To provide a longer adjustment period for U.S. 
interested persons, the additional duty of 10 % ad valorem  for list  2 is delayed until 
15 December  2019.  
 
Page  121, Para graph  3.182  
 
Export controls are guided by national security and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The 
United  States  currently restricts exports of certain goods, including defense articles, 
dual-use(commercial and military) goods, and nuclear materials and technology, or to deter the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile techn ology used to deliver 
them.  
 
QUESTION  48: On 7 October  2022，EST, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an interim rule 
to substantially revise the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to impose sweeping new 
export controls targeting advanced compu ting and semiconductor manufacturing, among other 
areas. The new rule is 139  pages long and significantly expands the scope of control items, and adds 
applicable scenarios of "long -arm jurisdiction". For controlled software and technology related to 
electronic products (including semiconductors, integrated circuits, acoustic wave devices, etc.) that 
are currently listed on the Commerce Control List, only exports to China are strictly restricted on the 
grounds of regional stability under the current co untry -specific policy. Could the U.S. explain how its 
measures are consistent with the WTO MFN treatment obligation?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 84 - 
 
  RESPONSE 48:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign  policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION  49: On 13  October  2022, Mr. Kendler, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 
Administration explained the new semiconductor export control rules announced on 7  October. He 
said that the U.S. must abandon its previous prac tice of maintaining a relative advantage over 
competitors and pursue the largest possible lead, which is the purpose of implementing these rules. 
The statement of the senior U.S. official indicates that the purpose of U.S. export controls obviously 
runs co unter to the WTO free trade principles and the prevailing practice of export controls to 
maintain national security and fulfill international obligations such as non -proliferation. Please 
explain the basis and rationale for imposing such export controls an d how they are consistent with 
WTO rules.  
 
RESPONSE 49:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administe rs U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  50: In March  2022, Alexa Lee of the Belfer Cent er for Science and International Affairs 
at Harvard Kennedy School published The U.S. -China Tech Rivalry: Don't Decouple - Diversify. The 
report noted that U.S. companies are also subject to regulation and uncertainty when  the U.S. 
imposes technology restrictions such as export controls on China. The U.S. government has failed 
to communicate a cohesive and clear national security narrative and assessment criteria to the 
industries over the past several years, particularly r egarding information and communications 
technology (ICT).  
Please elaborate on the criteria of national security that the U.S. government has emphasized in 
developing specific export controls in the ICT sector.  
 
RESPONSE 50:  Consistent with the Export Contr ol Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulati ons (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION  51: How does the U.S. government avoid uncertainty and impediments to normal trade 
transactions caused by export controls?  
 
RESPONSE 51: Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject t o the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  52: The U.S. has stated in previous trade policy reviews that its export controls are in 
the interes t of "our national security interests and foreign policy objectives".  
How does the U.S. define national security interests?  
 
RESPONSE 52:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations un der 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  53: In addition, foreign policy objectives are clearly not the same as national security. 
The U.S.'s practice of basing export control objectives on foreign policy is obviously different from 
the common practice of other countries. Could the U.S. provide the rationale behind it and clarify 
whether it is based on WTO rules or other international laws?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 85 - 
 
  RESPONSE 53:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUEST ION 54: The Semiconductor Industry Association of the U.S. once pointed out that export 
control measures should not be a policy tool to protect the competitiveness of U.S. industries and 
that the U.S. can only maintain a competitive edge through technologi cal progress and talent 
development. The Association called on the U.S. government to narrow the scope of the national 
security concept and reduce the impact of export control measures on normal business activities 
and national competitiveness in science a nd technology. The Association's perspective indicates that 
the U.S. government has clearly generalized the concept of national security and violated the 
principle of normal and free market competition, representing the views of most market players.  
Will t he U.S. government listen to the voices of the industries and avoid abusing export control 
measures?  
 
RESPONSE 54: Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to t he Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  55: Does the U.S. government fully consider the opinions of the public, including the 
industries, when introducing export control -related policies?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) admini sters U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  56: What measure or actions the U.S. governme nt has taken to ensure the concept of 
national security is not being generalized and causing negative impact on the normal operation of 
the domestic and foreign semiconductor business?  
 
RESPONSE 56:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (EC RA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in  a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  123, Para graph  3.190  
 
The export control regime was subject to numerous modifications in the period under review.  These 
reflect, for example, changes in the international export controls of the United  States  and its partners 
regarding munitions, dual -use goods and technologies, and missile technology; national security 
concerns; frequent changes in the Entity List and Unverified List of the BIS; the creation o f a Military 
End User (MEU) List; and modifications of sanctions and embargoes towards specific countries or 
entities (Table  A3.2.1).  
 
QUESTION  57: According to the latest export control rules, additional licensing requirements are 
imposed on items with th e end -use purpose of developing and producing supercomputers or 
semiconductors in China. In principle, the licensing policy is a presumption of denial. Chinese 
companies are included in the entity list and are subject to review almost without exception and  
contrary to the legal principle of presumption of innocence.  
Does this constitute a technology blockade on the grounds of U.S. national security in practices?  
 
RESPONSE 57:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to t he Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 86 - 
 
  the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  58: Does this mean that U.S. aims to restrain the development of China's advanced 
chip production capac ity through intensifying chip export controls upon China?  
 
RESPONSE 58:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  126, Para graph  3.209  
 
The law reauthorizing EXIM directs the agency to establish a Program on China and Transformational 
Exports and reserves 20% of its total financing authority (i.e. USD  27 billion ) to this end. The 
purpose is to support U.S. leadership, innovation, employment, a nd technological standards in 10 
transformational industries.  
 
QUESTION  59: China notes that the Export -Import Bank of the United  States , in its Report to the 
U.S. Congress on Global Export Credit Competition, has explicitly stated that "The People's Repub lic 
of China's position of the world's largest official MLT export credit provider has been identified a 
national security threat".  
Please provide the basis of the above statement.  
 
RESPONSE 59:  The primary mandate of the Export -Import Bank of the United  States  is to provide 
financing that is competitive with foreign official export financing in order to place U.S. exporters on 
a level playing field when selling their goods and services abroad. More information about the Bank's 
activities can be fou nd in the latest annual report to Congress on Global Export 
Credit  Competition  (https://img.exim.gov/s3fs -public/reports/competitivene ss_reports/2021/EXIM
_2021_Competitiveness_Report.pdf ). 
 
QUESTION  60: Could the U .S. explain the relationship between export credit and national security?  
 
RESPONSE 60:  The COVID -19 pandemic and recent global events have exposed long -standing 
holes in Ameri ca's supply chains, including insufficient manufacturing capacity and international 
competition. These structural weaknesses in both domestic and international supply chains threaten 
America's economic and national security. Solving these challenges, foste ring economic resilience, 
and revitalizing America's manufacturing capacity requires the United  States  to use all the tools in 
our toolkit  - including the Export -Import Bank.  
 
QUESTION  61: In U.S.'s view, how to avoid the arbitrary expansion of the concept of national 
security which could impede the normal transaction?  
 
RESPONSE 61:  We disagree with the premise of the question.  The Export Import Bank has not 
found that national security concerns have impeded normal commercial transactions; EXIM must 
seek reasonable assurance of repayment in all cases.  
 
Page  121, Para graph  3.183  
 
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (P.L.  115-232) (ECRA) is the principal implementing statute 
for export controls on dual -use and less sensitive military items; it is administered by the BIS.  
 
QUESTION  62: The U.S. Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) extends national security to 
maintaining technological leadership and industrial competitiveness, which goes far beyond the 
scope of basic national security interests defined in Article  21 of the GATT "Security Exceptions".  
Please provide a clear explanation on the relationship and linkage of "technological leadership and 
industrial competitiveness" and "national security".  
Will the U.S. government amend the relevant la ws and regulations in the future to give export 
controls more policy objectives?  
 
RESPONSE 62:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 87 - 
 
  (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  63: The U.S. policy statement in Section  102(2) of the Export Control Reform Act of 
2018 makes clear that national security requires the U.S. to maintain its leadership in science, 
technology, engineering, and manufacturing. This leadership requir es U.S. persons to be competitive 
in the global marketplace.  
Has the U.S. extended national security to maintain industrial competitiveness?  
 
RESPONSE 63:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on natio nal security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law a nd obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  64: Will any foreign competitor that is more competitive than U.S. persons in the global 
marketplace be considered a threat to U.S. national security?  
 
RESPONSE 64:  Consistent with the Export Control Refor m Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR ), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  65: Will the U.S. adopt inappropriate export controls due to threats to their 
competitiveness in science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing?  
 
RESPONSE 65:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for  items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  66: The U.S. Export Control Reform Act of 2018 states that national securit y and foreign 
policy require controls on exports of items and the activities of U.S. persons "to strengthen the 
United  States industrial base".  
 
What areas of industries are included in the so -called industrial base?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  Consistent with the Expor t Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  67: Does the practice of strengthening the U.S. industrial base through export controls 
imply that the U.S. government believes t hat export controls can be used to maintain competitive 
edges in industries rather than simply for national security?  
 
RESPONSE 67:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations un der 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  68: Section  1752(5) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) states that export 
controls should be fully harmonized with the multilateral export control system. According to 
statistics, there are nearly 2,800 items on the Commerce Control List (CCL), while dual -use items in 
the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG) total only 1,880. There is a huge difference 
between t hem. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 88 - 
 
  Are the nearly 1,000  items in the CCL other than the dual -use items of the multilateral mechanisms 
all unilaterally controlled items of the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 68:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are base d on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  69: What is the basis for the extensive unilateral control by the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 69:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to t he Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  70: Will it affect normal trade transactions?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform A ct of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  71: How does the U.S. ensure that the item control is harmonized with multilateral 
mechanisms?  
 
RESPONSE 71:  Consistent with the Export Control Ref orm Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (E AR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  121, Table  3.23 Items subject to export controls, including licensing  
 
QUESTION  72: WTO rules advocate trade liberalization and the removal of trade barriers, a position 
that the U.S. has continued to advocate. However, it is clear that the U.S. has not harmonized with 
these WTO objectives and requirements in formulating its export contr ol laws and regulations and 
in implementing export control policy measures. How does the U.S. ensure that the formulation of 
export control -related regulations and policies and their implementation are consistent with the WTO 
objectives and requirements of  free trade and non -discrimination?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S . export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  122, Para graph  3.185  
 
All items subject to the EAR have either been given an Export Control Classification Number(ECCN) 
or been designated EAR99. Controlled dual -use and certain munitions goods are listed on the 
Commerce Control List (CCL) together with their ECCNs, and any item not on the CCL(i.e. EAR99) 
may be exported or re -exported without a license unless the destination is an embargoed or 
sanctioned country, a party of concern, or in support of a prohibited end -use. Anti-terrorism  controls 
prohibit exports of nearly all items on the CCL to four countr ies ( the 
Democratic  People's  Republic  of Korea , Cuba, the Islamic  Republic  of Iran, and Syria). Regarding 
parties of concern, the BIS maintains a Denied Persons List, an Unverified List, and an Entity List. 
Exports,re -exports, and in -country transfers may be authorized under License Exception Strategic 
Trade Authorization (STA) to destinations considered low risk for non -authorized or impermissible 
uses(43  countries as of April  2022).  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 89 - 
 
  QUESTION  73: The U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) classifies different 
countries/regions into five different country groups (A, B, C, D, and E) and grant different licensing 
treatments.  
What are the main considerations for the U.S. to classify countries in  the world into different groups?  
 
RESPONSE 73:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  74: If a country/region considers its classification unr easonable and requests more 
favorable licensing treatment, is there a procedure or channel for consultation or appeal?  
 
RESPONSE 74:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to t he Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  75: The EAR clearly notes that Country Group A:4 is a list of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) countri es in which China is included, despite the fact that China is a party to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). What are the basis and rationale?  
 
RESPONSE 75:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are base d on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  76: On 29  June 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce removed the License 
Exception Civil End -Users in the EAR for countries or regions in Country Group D:1 (including China). 
In such case, A license should be applied with BIS if the export, reexport or transfer (in -country) is 
made to countries or regions restricted for national security reasons in the Country Groups, even for 
civil end users or for civil end uses. What is the basis and ration ale for the U.S. to remove the License 
Exception for Civil End -Users?  
 
RESPONSE 76:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  122, Para graph  3.184  
 
The BIS administers the laws, regulations, and policies governing exports and re -exports of goods, 
services, software, and technologies that fall under the jurisdiction of the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR).  
 
QUESTION  77: On 27  October  2022, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security 
Estevez said at a seminar of the Center for a New American Security that the U.S. Department of 
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) will focus on national security, regardless of trad e 
implications, when evaluating the steps it must take to protect U.S. technology from foreign 
adversaries. This is materially different from the Statement of Policy in Section  1752 of the Export 
Control Reform Act of 2018, which states that the U.S. will impose necessary export controls only 
after fully considering their impact on the U.S. economy.  
Please explain why the Under Secretary's statement is inconsistent with the objectives of export 
control policy under U.S. law.  
 
RESPONSE 77:  Consistent with th e Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administr ation WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 90 - 
 
  Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  78: Could the U.S. clarify whether its current export controls have deviated, and will 
continue to deviate from the legal requirement of "imposing necessary export controls only after 
fully considering their impact on the U.S. economy"?  
 
RESPONSE 78:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign p olicy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the W TO agreements.  
 
QUESTION  79: The U.S. export control process is complex and cumbersome. According to the 
guidance of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), enterprises must go through 29  steps to 
understand the legal requirements before exporting. Co uld the U.S. explain how its rules and 
practices comply with the provisions of the WTO  Agreement s particularly the requirements under 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement on trade facilitation?  
 
RESPONSE 79:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to t he Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  80: It takes a long time for the U.S. Department of Commerce to review exporters' 
application for expor t licenses. Some enterprises complained that they have been waiting too long 
for the approval of their license applications for export to China with no reason given. Could the U.S. 
clarify, for those enterprises that are waiting too long for approval, thro ugh what channels can they 
make appeal or seek remedy?  
 
RESPONSE 80:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  81: The Foreign Direct P roduct Rules and the Minimum Proportionality Principle under 
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) control non -U.S. goods in third countries, resulting in 
exports that may face dual licensing by the U.S. and a third country.  
What is the international  law basis for U.S. controls on products of foreign origin?  
 
RESPONSE 81:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  82: Will it undermine th e trade administration rights and trade interests of third 
countries, thereby constituting an economically coercive measure negatively affecting international 
trade?  
 
RESPONSE 82:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export co ntrols 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is c onsistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  83: If there is a conflict or inconsistency between the laws of a third country and the 
laws of the U.S., how should exporters coordinate?  
 
RESPONSE 83:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 91 - 
 
  are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  84: Section  744.6 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on restrictions on 
certain activities of "U.S. persons" defines "U .S. persons" to include any juridical person organized 
under the laws of the United  States  or any jurisdiction within the United  States , including foreign 
branches; and any person in the United  States . 
Is an overseas company owned or controlled by a foreign company listed in the U.S. subject to EAR?  
 
RESPONSE 84:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  85: Do "U.S. persons" include foreigner s who stay in the U.S. for a short period of time 
or for transit?  
 
RESPONSE 85:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  86: If so, is the scope of jurisdiction too broad?  
 
RESPONSE 86:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  87: How should the concepts of "U.S. persons" and "foreign persons" be harmonized?  
 
RESPONSE 87:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  122, Paragraph  3.187  
 
Reforms to reduce the complexity of export controls were launched by Presidential initiative in 2009. 
Many of the initial aims, including the establishment of a single control list for dual -use goods and 
munitions (i.e. merging the CCL and  the USML).  
 
QUESTION  88: When the Bureau of Industrial Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce adds 
an item to the Commerce Control List (CCL), how does it assess whether the item may pose a serious 
national security threat to the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 88:  Consistent with the Expor t Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  89: Will the government solicit public opinion and give the public opportunities to 
comment on the new controlled item?  
 
RESPONSE  89: Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 92 - 
 
  are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  90: How does the U.S. government balance national security with the short -term and 
long-term intere sts of industries?  
 
RESPONSE 90:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls  for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  91: Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (e.g.  EAR 744.11(a)(2)), 
exports of items not on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to users on the Entity List require a license.  
Does this mean that exports of purely civil goods to users on the Entity List are also subject to 
licensing?  
 
RESPONSE 91:  Consistent with  the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Admini stration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  92: On what basis does the U.S. restrict such exports?  
 
RESPONSE 92:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2 018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and doe s so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  93: What are the U.S. criteria for determining "Section 1758 technologies" under the 
Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA)? How can export controls on "emerging and foundational 
technologies" be justified as meeting national security requirements?  
 
RESPONS E 93:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  94: On 7 October  2022, the Department of Commerce issued item -based export control 
rules fo r semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which became effective immediately. The 
Department of Commerce specifically noted that this rule will not be issued as a technical rule under 
Section  1758 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) (which shall  include a notice and 
evaluation period in accordance with 50  U.S.C.  4817(a)(2)(C)) due to the urgent need to use this 
rule to counter China. Please explain how this effective -upon-release rule qualifies as a measure 
under exigent circumstances, which, if not implemented promptly, will pose an unacceptable threat 
to U.S. national security in a relatively short period of time.  
 
RESPONSE 94:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and f oreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations und er 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  95: On 7  October  2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce published new 
semiconductor export control rules targeting at China and added paragraph (d) to Annex  1 of 
Section  736 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to establish the temporary general 
license (TGL).  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 93 - 
 
  To which country group(s) is TGL applicable?  
 
RESPONSE 95:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to t he Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  96: What are the grounds and rationale for this differential treatment?  
 
RESPONSE 96:  Consistent with t he Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administ ration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  97: The new semiconductor export control rules announced by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce on 7  October  2022 clearly sta te that specific activities of "U.S. persons" that "support" 
the "development" or "production" of certain ICs in the PRC require a license. Please list all the 
behaviors deemed as such "support" and clarify the basis and rationale for controlling these 
behaviors.  
 
RESPONSE 97:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  98: According to Section  744.16 of the U.S. Export Control Regulations (EAR), the Entity 
List identifies entities "reasonably believed" to be involved, or to pose a significant risk of being or 
becoming involved, in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the 
U.S. 
Could the U.S. clarify the what evidences are needed for adding an entity to the Entity List, and what 
fact or information could qualify as evidence?  
 
RESPONSE 98:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreig n policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  99: Can unsubstantiated rumors and reports be used as an evidence basis for 
"reasonably believed"?  
 
RESPONSE 99:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to t he Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  100: Will the relevant stakeholder be given an opportunity to comment or explain 
"reasonably believed" before the End -User Review Committee (ERC) decides to add an entity to the 
Entity List?  
 
RESPONSE 100:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUEST ION 101: As of 31  October  2022, there were 2,210 entities from 83  countries and regions 
on the Entity List of the U.S. Department of Commerce, of which 461 were Chinese mainland entities, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 94 - 
 
  ranking second in the world. Especially since 2019, the U.S. has add ed 321  Chinese mainland entities 
to the Entity List.  
Could the U.S. explain the basis and rationale for adding such a significant number of Chinese 
mainland entities to the Entity List in recent years?  
 
RESPONSE 101:  Consistent with the Export Control Refo rm Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EA R), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  102: Could the U.S. provide specific reasons and facts for each of the above -mentioned 
321 Chinese entities being included in the Entity List s o as to ensure the stakeholders' rights to know 
and comment?  
 
RESPONSE 102:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION  103: According to Supplement No.  5 to Part 744 of the U.S. Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), member bodies of the End -User Review Committee (ERC) may make additions 
to, changes to or removals from the Entity List by submitting a proposal to the Chair. T he ERC will 
make all decisions to add an entry to the Entity List only by majority vote, but all decisions to remove 
or modify an entry by unanimous vote. According to statistics, once an entity is included in the Entity 
List, it can be rarely removed. Thi s unequal design of addition and removal system makes removal 
more difficult, blatantly unfair to the entities. What is the basis, consideration, or rationale for this 
design?  
 
RESPONSE 103:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S . export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manne r that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  104: The removal procedures and criteria of the Entity List under the U.S. Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) are unclear and lack transparency, and there is no det ailed 
description and rationale for refusal to remove. Moreover, the entities need to provide endless 
evidence materials when appealing, and many of the materials have nothing to do with the facts 
determined by the U.S.  
Could the U.S. clarify the criteria for removal and the scope of statutory evidence materials?  
 
RESPONSE 104:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Securi ty (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  105: Could the U.S. fully explain the necessity and reasonableness of its request for 
information materials in the review of specific cases so as to protect the trade secrets and personal 
privacy of the entities?  
 
RESPONSE 105:  Consistent with the Export Contr ol Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulati ons (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  106: The decision of the U.S. Department of Commerce to refuse to remove the entity 
from the Entity List is final.  
Could the U.S. explain how to guarantee the entities' right to appeal?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 95 - 
 
  RESPONSE 106:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security ( BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  107: What other remedies are avail able to the entities to safeguard their legitimate 
rights and interests?  
 
RESPONSE 107:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Indus try and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  108: Can the U.S . elaborate on cases where entities were successfully removed from 
the Entity List through other remedies?  
 
RESPONSE 108:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION  109: The U.S. imposed unprecedented restrictions on Huawei. On 16 May 2019, Huawei 
and 68 of its non -U.S. affiliates (located in 26  destinations) were added to the Entity List. On 
19 August  2019, another 46  non-U.S. affiliates of Huawei were added to the Entity List involving 
Huawei's branches in 25  destinations. On 17  August  2020, 38 more Huawei non -U.S. affiliates were 
added to the Entity List.  
What is the basis and rationale for the U.S. to include 152  Huawei and its affiliates in the Entity List?  
 
RESPONSE 109:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  110: As a matter of fact, many Huawei -related entities outside China are independent 
of Huawei in China. Which EAR provisions have these Huawei -related entities outside China violated?  
 
RESPONSE 110:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and f oreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations und er the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  111: On 15  September  2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce identified five Chinese 
enterprises, including Suzhou Kenai Kete Electronics Co., Ltd. and Jinpai Technology Co., Ltd., which 
had been included in the Entity List, as "Russian MEU" on the grounds that they provided products 
to the Russian and Belarusian military and industrial sectors. It does not match with the definition 
of "military end users" in EAR Section  744.17.  
What is the basis and rationale for identifying these five Chinese enterprises as "Russian military 
end users"?  
 
RESPONSE 111:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  112: Has th e U.S. broadened the identification of "military end -users"?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 96 - 
 
  RESPONSE 112:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  113: Does this violate the EAR?  
 
RESPONSE 113:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. expor t controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  123, Para graph  3.190  
 
The export control regime was subject to numerous modifications in the period under review.  
 
QUESTION  114: Does the U.S. set a reasonable time limit for seeking and soliciting public 
comments when formulating or revising export control -related policies involves trade interests and 
public interests?  
 
Response 114:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  115: To what extent does the U.S. take public opinions into con sideration?  
 
RESPONSE 115:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for i tems that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  116: In recent years, the U.S. has issued a number of new export control rule s. Some 
of these rules were published and took effect on the same day; some came into force even before 
they were published; and some were only notified to U.S. companies individually in the form of 
internal notices.  
Could the U.S. provide the basis and ra tionale for doing so?  
 
RESPONSE 116:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export cont rols for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  117: Could the U.S. explain how to guarantee the stakeholders' righ ts to be informed 
quickly and to comment?  
 
RESPONSE 117:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administ ers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  118: How could these practices meet the requirements under Article  10 "Publication 
and Administration of Trade Regulations" of GATT  1994? 
 
RESPONSE 118:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national se curity and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 97 - 
 
  Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  129, Para graph  3.221  
 
Federal government agencies and departments may provide grants, loans, scholarships,  insurance, 
property, counselling, or other assistance.  
 
QUESTION  119: China notes that the following problems exist in the subsidy notification submitted 
by the U.S. to the WTO. First, the amount of local notification items is incomplete, and most items 
are not notified of the amount of subsidies. Second, the local subsidy notifications fail to provide the 
legal basis for the subsidies as required by the SCM  Agreement . Third, some of the U.S. subsidy 
items that are subject to dispute settlement have never been notified to the WTO. Fourth, the U.S. 
apparently adopts double st andards for the completeness of the notifications. For example, the U.S. 
notified some non -specific subsidies and service subsidies but accused other members of excessive 
notification at relevant meetings.  
As the main advocator of the transparency issue, t he U.S. has always emphasized the important role 
of transparency in maintaining the effective operation of the multilateral trading system and has 
repeatedly stated that it will take the lead. At the same time, it accuses other members of not 
fulfilling th eir transparency obligations.  
Could the U.S. please explain the double standards (i.e.  being lenient with itself and strict with 
others) regarding the completeness of notification?  
 
RESPONSE 119:  As noted in the Secretariat's Report, the United  States  notified nearly 
750 programs. Like many other Members, such as China, it has been difficult for the United  States  
to identify all the relevant program information at the sub -central levels of government. Over the 
years the number of sub -central programs notified by the United  States  has generally increased, 
reflecting enhanced efforts at the federal and sub -central levels of government. In the notification 
submitted by the United  States  in June of 2021, numerous fossil fuel programs at the state level 
were notified for the first time.  
 
QUESTION  120: Could the U.S. elaborate on its plan to improve transparency, especially in the 
area of notification of its own subsidies?  
 
RESPONSE 120:  For the notification due in June  2023, the United  States  will continue to focus on 
updating programs previously notified and closely examining whether programs not previously 
notified should be included in next year's notification. This requires significant time and resources 
and close coordination with federal and su b-central government officials. Planning for the compilation 
of the programs for next year's notification has already begun, which we expect will result in the 
timely submission to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
Page  132, Para graph  3.227  
 
The most recent notification, circulated in July  2021, covers FY2019and FY2020. The notification 
includes nearly 750  programs maintained at the sub -federal level. The estimated expenditures on 
federal non -agricultural programs are summarized i n Table  3.26. 
 
QUESTION  121: In June  2022, U.S. senators proposed the Clean Competition Act (CCA), proposing 
to impose a carbon tax on the portion of a product's carbon emissions intensity above the baseline, 
involving fossil fuels, refined petroleum produ cts, petrochemical products, etc. However, China notes 
that the U.S. has provided hefty fossil fuel subsidies. Please explain the internal logic between the 
above policies. Could the U.S. justify those seemingly contradicting policy objectives?  
 
RESPONSE 121: As noted, the bill was a proposal and is not law in the United  States . We are not 
in a position to comment on or speculate about proposals in the legislative branch.  
 
Page  149, Paragraph  3.286  
 
The general policy with respect to federal government pro curement is contained in the FAR, which 
includes all regulations pertinent to U.S. participation in the WTO  Agreement  on Government 
Procurement (GPA), the USMCA, and other international agreements where government WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 98 - 
 
  procurement is covered. For legal purposes , the phrase "Made in America Laws" refers to all statutes, 
regulations, rules, and E.O.s relating to federal financial assistance awards or federal procurement, 
including those that refer to "Buy America" or "Buy American", that require, or provide a pref erence 
for, the purchase or acquisition of goods, products, or materials produced in the United  States , 
including iron, steel, and manufactured goods offered in the United  States . 
 
QUESTION  122: In July this year, the U.S. government issued the "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" 
on "Buy American" to further strengthen the "Buy American" requirement through administrative 
means. Please explain whether the measure applies to federal and state governme nts, and specify 
the implementation of the policy and the next steps. Could the U.S. please provide the statistics on 
the development of the U.S. government procurement market since the last review, in particular the 
proportion of foreign goods, services a nd projects provided?  
 
RESPONSE 122:  On 30 July 2021, Department of Defense  (DoD), General Services Administration 
(GSA), and National Aeronautics and Space (NASA) published a proposed rule (86  FR 40980) to 
implement section 8 of Executive  Order  14005, which directs the Federal Acquisition Regulatory 
Council (FAR Council) to stre ngthen the impact of Federal procurement preferences in the Buy 
American statute for products and construction materials that are domestically manufactured from 
substantially all domestic content.  After receiving and incorporating comments from interested 
stakeholders, the U.S. FAR Council published a Final Rule on 7 March  2022,  as Federal Acquisition 
Circular (FAC) 2022 -05, which took effect on 25 October  2022.  
 
Subject to exceptions, the final rule increases the domestic content threshold for federal 
procurement initially from 55 % to 60%, then to 65 % in calendar year 2024 and to 75 % in calendar 
year 2029. For more information on the implementation of the rule and applicable exceptions, see 
FAR 25.101.  The rule also increases domestic price preferences for end products and construction 
material deemed to be critical or made up of critical components. A subsequent rulemaking will 
establish the definitive list of critical items and critical components in the FAR, along with their 
associated enhanced price pref erence(s). When a final rule goes into place establishing the list and 
preference factors at FAR  25.105, the higher price preference for critical items or critical components 
shall be used.  
 
For current U.S. statistics on federal procurement covered under the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement, see 3.312 of U.S. T PR Report  by the Secretariat. Additional statistics on U.S. 
procurement is available through the Federal Procurement Data System at sam.gov.  
 
Page  163, Para graph  3.330  
 
A major feature in recent years has been the increase in the number of patents linked to artificial 
intelligence (AI). A recent report by the United  States  Patent Office (USPTO) shows that AI is 
increasingly important for invention, diffusing broadly across technologies, inv entor -patentees, 
organizations, and geography.  
 
QUESTION  123: In terms of patent examination rules and practices, could the U.S. provide 
information on how to ensure the transparency and consistency of standards for the examination 
towards authorized subje ct matter, inventive step and sufficient disclosure for patents related to new 
technologies such as artificial intelligence?  
 
RESPONSE 123:  AI-related inventions can be viewed as a subset of computer -implemented 
inventions. Therefore, USPTO guidance regarding computer -implemented inventions can be a useful 
resource. See:  https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial -intelligence/artifici al-intelligence -
resources . 
 
Page  175, Para graph  3.364  
 
The United  States  provides protection to foreign and domestic geographical indications (GIs) through 
its trademark system for all classes of goods and services where a given quality, reputation, or oth er 
characteristic is essentially attributable to their geographic origin.  
 
QUESTION  124: The U.S. mainly uses the trademark system to protect geographical indications. 
Could the U.S. provide information on the relevant legislation and practice for the protection of 
services and geographical indications for non -agricultural goods?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 99 - 
 
  RESPONSE 124 : The United  States  provides protection to geographical indications (GIs) through 
its trademark system for all classes of goods and services. See USPTO, Geographical 
Indication  Protection  in the United  States.  Viewed  at: https://www.uspto.gov/ip -policy/trademark -
policy/geographical -indications  and http://www.uspto.gov /sites/default/files/web/offices/dcom/olia
/globalip/pdf/gi_system.pdf . Trademarks are governed by the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 
as amended (15  U.S.C.  1051 et seq.), the Trademark Rules (37  CFR Part 2), the Trademark 
Manual  of Examining  Procedures,  including  TMEP  1306.05a  at: https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TME
P/current#/current/TMEP -1300d1e632.html , and state laws.  
 
Page  178, Para graph  3.377  
 
Owners of copyrighted works enjoy an exclusive right to create derivative works based on the 
copyrighted works.  
 
QUESTION  125: The Copyright Law of the United  States  excludes Article  2 of the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works by providing that derivative works based on the 
original works are not protected without the permission of the copyright owner.  
Could the U.S. explain the consideration and legal basis for this inconsistency?  
 
RESPONSE 125:  U.S. law is consistent with Article  2 of the Berne Convention. Article  2 provides 
that "[t]ranslations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic 
work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the co pyright in the original work ". 
U.S. law affords copyright protection to the author of a derivative work for "the material contributed 
by the author of such work . The copyright in such work is independent of  any copyright protection 
in the pre -existing  material". 17 U.S.C.  103(b).  
 
QUESTION  126: Does the U.S. have any plan to expand the scope of protection to make relevant 
provisions in line with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the 
Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects  of Intellectual Property Rights?  
 
RESPONSE 126:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  187 Para graph  4.4 
 
The United  States is the world's largest producer of soybeans, maize, beef, and chicken and turkey, 
and a major producer of pig meat and cotton  (Table  4.2). Although the agricultural producers benefit 
from a large domestic market to absorb their output, the U.S. farm sector is also characterized by 
significa nt export orientation for certain commodities. Overall, about one fifth of U.S. agricultural 
production goes to foreign markets, with particularly high export shares for cotton (more than 75%), 
and wheat and soybeans (about 50%).  
 
QUESTION  127: According to the U .S. domestic notification, in marketing year 2020/2021, 
product -specific AMS for corn and soybean were USD 4,945 billion  and USD 2,323 billion . According 
to the U .S. census Bureau, in 2021, export of corn and soybean were 70  million  tons and 53  million  
tons. Not limited to corn and soybeans, beef, cotton, wheat and other products mentioned in 
Paragraph  4.4 are highly subsidized every year.  
Could the U.S. please explain the reason to provide high subsidies when exports are so strong?  
 
RESP ONSE 127:  The higher than usual levels of domestic support in 2020/21 was largely due to 
the inclusion of Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) payments. CFAP was a temporary 
program designed to minimize the negative economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture. U.S. 
corn and soybean exports reflect market conditions in 2021 and are unrelated to U.S. farm programs.  
 
QUESTION  128: How does the U.S. ensure that subsidies will not affect healthy competition in 
agricultural exports?  
 
RESPONSE 128:  As a general point, U.S. domestic support measures are designed to allow 
producers to produce for markets rather than to maximize government payments. In 2020/21, the 
primary reason for the increase in the product -specific AMS was due to the Coronavirus Food  
Assistance Program (CFAP). CFAP payments did not impact markets because the program was 
temporary and provided ad hoc emergency assistance based on past production or acres planted, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 100 - 
 
  meaning that producers could not alter their production decisions to incr ease their payment.  
 
QUESTION  129: Has any evaluation to the impact of subsidies on corn, soybeans, beef, cotton, and 
wheat on international markets, including the impact on export prices ever been carried out? If yes, 
please provide relevant information.  
 
RESPONSE 129:  The United  States  is not aware of any evaluations having been completed.  
 
Page  200, Paragraph  4.54 
 
Commodities that had not seen a price decline of 5% or more were ineligible for support under 
CFAP 1. Payments under CFAP  1 were capped at USD 250,000 per person or legal entity, or 
USD 250,000 per shareholder in a corporate entity, at most USD  750,000 per corporate entity.  
 
QUESTION  130: Starting from 2020, the USDA pandemic assistance for producers are still in place.  
Please explain the relationship between price decline and the pandemic.  
 
RESPONSE 130:  USDA's pandemic assistance programs are targeted, ad hoc emergency measures 
designed to address the negative economic effects of COVID -19. The largest pandemic assistance 
program for producers was the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP), which is no longer in 
effect. Additional pandemic assistance programs have been utilized with th e objective of distributing 
assistance broadly and equitably to those who qualify and to use authorities extended by Congress 
to assist producers who have not benefitted from previous rounds of pandemic assistance, including 
underserved producers and small er and medium -sized operations.  
 
QUESTION 131:  Why is the U.S. so sure that the price drop is caused by the pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 131:  The impacts of the pandemic on the agricultural sector are well known. Farm -level 
agricultural prices saw declines in 2020 due to economic uncertainty related to the impact of 
COVID -19 on the global economy. Supply chain disruptions and significant changes in consumer 
behavior (e.g.  home  vs. restaurant/retail consumption) contributed to declines in prices and 
situations where farmers were unable to sell their product.  
 
QUESTION 132:  Please explain considerations in the design of the policy, including the assessment 
of the relevant product market.  
 
RESPONSE 132:  The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) was a short -term measure 
designed to help address the adverse market impacts due to the COVID -19 pandemic and is no 
longer in effect.  
 
The first round of CFAP payments were made on the lesser of the producer's unpriced inventory of 
crop year 2019 production as of 15 January  2020, or 50% of their crop year 2019 production. The 
payme nt rates were based on the change in prices (or other economic factors) for each commodity 
during a specified time period, which generally corresponded to the first quarter of 2020 when the 
pandemic first began. The formula for calculating the second round  of CFAP payments continued to 
be directed towards mitigating the negative impacts of the pandemic on U.S. agricultural producers 
through the fourth quarter of 2020 and was based on planted acreage for crop year 2020 and the 
estimated share of the 2020 cro p that would be marketed in 2020. Payment rates were not 
announced until September  2020, after planting, which means the program could not influence 
planting decisions or production levels.  
 
QUESTION  133: China notes that the upper limit of subsidy payment  is USD 250,000 for individuals 
and US D 750,000 for corporate entities, which is far beyond the general level of agricultural subsidies 
by WTO  members and is very different from China's understanding that agricultural subsidies are to 
maintain farmers' livelihoods and ensure food security. Please explain the reasons for such a high 
subsidy cap and share with us the understanding of the purpose of agricultural subsidies.  
 
RESPONSE 133:  Generally, market receipts account for around 90 % of gross fa rm cash income. 
Payment limits have been in place since the 1970 Farm Bill, and are part of broader, longstanding 
eligibility requirements for certain U.S. farm programs, including limits on adjusted gross income, 
demonstrating compliance with conservation  regulations, and other requirements.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 101 - 
 
  Payment limits differ by program and in the case of CFAP, payment limits were established as follows:  
 
The total amount of CFAP  2 payments made to a legal entity  – such as to a corporation, limited 
liability corporatio n, limited partnership, trust, or estate  – was USD 250,000 except if:  
 
• Two different members of the legal entity each provided at least 400  hours of active 
personal labor, active personal management, or combination thereof with respect to the 
production of  2020 commodities, then an entity may receive up to USD 500,000 ; 
• Three different members of the legal entity each provided at least 400  hours of active 
personal labor , active personal management, or combination thereof with respect to the 
production of 2020 commodities, then an entity may receive up to USD 750,000.  
 
Although the payment limitation was increased for the corporation, limited liability company, limited 
partnership, trust, or estate, each member's payment limitation (received directly or indirectly) 
remained subject to the USD 250,000 individual person pa yment limit.  
 
Page  221, Para graph  4.121  
 
In its annual notification to the WTO pursuant to Article  XVI:1 of GATT  1994 and Article  25of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the United  States  notified eight programs in 
the fisheries area ( Table 4.13).  
 
QUESTION  134: Regarding the notification of U.S. fishery subsidies, China notes that the 
notification of state -level fishery subsidies submitted by the U.S. to the WTO involves a number of 
fuel rebates.  
Please clarify if there are any measures in place to avoid such subsidies from contributing to 
overfishing.  
 
RESPONSE 134:  Insofar as the notification obligation is a transparency -oriented provision that, 
pursuant to Article  25.7 of the Subsidies Agreement, carries no legal weight as to the actual 
identification or measurement of a subsidy, its status as an actionable subsidy, or its trade effects, 
the United  States  has included certain activities in its notifications which arguably are not (or are 
not always) "specific subsidies" within the meaning of the Agreement.  
 
With respect to overfishing and overcapacity, the United  States  operates a rigorous fisheries 
management system based on internationally recognized best practices and the best scientific 
evidence available.  
 
QUESTION  135: In addition, some state governments have provided subsidies for ship -building. 
Could the U.S. please explain whether such subsidies would lead to overcapacity in fishing?  
 
RESPONSE 135:  Insofar as the notification obligation is a transparency -oriented provisi on that, 
pursuant to Article  25.7 of the Subsidies Agreement, carries no legal weight as to the actual 
identification or measurement of a subsidy, its status as an actionable subsidy, or its trade effects, 
the United  States  has included certain activities in its notifications which arguably are not (or are 
not always) "specific subsidies" within the meaning of the Agreement.  
 
With respect to overfishing and overcapacity, the United  States  operates a rigorous fisheries 
management system based on internationa lly recognized best practices and the best scientific 
evidence available.  
 
Page  247, Paragraph  4.220  
 
The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (P.L.  116-222), enacted on 18  December  2020, 
amended the SOX Act to require the SEC to identify each covered issuer that retains a registered 
public accounting firm that has a branch or office located in a foreign jurisdiction, which the PCAOB 
determined it is unable to inspect or investigate completely because of a position taken by an 
authority in the f oreign jurisdiction. If the SEC determines that a covered issuer has three 
consecutive non -inspection years, it must prohibit the securities of the covered issuer from being 
traded on a national securities exchange or through any other method that is withi n the jurisdiction 
of the SEC to regulate, including through over -the-counter trading. The prohibition is removed on 
proof of compliance, but, in case of re -incidence, a new prohibition, for a minimum of five years, will WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  be imposed.  
 
QUESTION  136: In December  2020, the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act was signed 
into law by the U.S. government, which puts forward additional information disclosure requirements 
for foreign companies listed in the U.S. The Act stipulates that if foreign issue rs fail to meet the 
inspection requirements of the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) for 
accounting firms for three consecutive years, their securities are prohibited from trading in the U.S. 
In addition, the U.S. Senate and House of R epresentatives passed bills including the Accelerating 
Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which intends to shorten the delisting deadline under 
the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act from three years to two years. Could the U.S. side 
brief o n the main contents of the above -mentioned inspection and cross -border cooperation?  
 
RESPONSE  136: The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act requires the PCAOB to determine 
whether it is unable to inspect or investigate registered public accounting fir ms located in a foreign 
jurisdiction "completely". The Statement of Protocol the PCAOB signed with the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Finance of the People's  Republic  of China on 
26 August  2022 was only a first step. Starting in  September, PCAOB teams began working in 
Hong Kong,China  to begin putting the agreement to the test on both inspections and investigations, 
including taking testimony. The teams have returned home, but their work is ongoing. Onsite work 
is only one part of the PCAOB's inspections and investigations process. In December, the PCAOB 
must under its rules re -assess the determinations it made under the HFCAA in 2021 and will decide 
whether the PRC authorities have allowed the Board to inspect and investigate completely.  
 
Page  249-250, Paragraph  4.227 -4.229  
 
"Before a company may assign an FCC license to another company or acquire a company holding an 
FCC license, it must receive the Commission's approval. FCC reviews applications for the transfer of 
control and assignment of licenses and authorizations to ens ure that the public interest is served by 
approving the applications.  Following procedures initiated before the issuance of E.O.  13913, FCC 
revoked the licenses of four foreign common carrier wireless providers during the review period."  
 
QUESTION  137: In recent years, the U.S. has revoked the Section  214 authority of China Telecom 
and China Unicom in the U.S. on the grounds of national security concerns. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) also put companies including China Telecom, China Mobile and 
China Unicom on the so -called "List of Communications Equipment and Services that Pose a Threat 
to National Security", restricting them from providing equipment and services in the U.S.  
Could the U.S. please provide the factual basis for the abo ve measures ? 
 
RESPONSE 137:  With limited exceptions, the United  States  does not publicly disclose the 
information used in making these determinations.  
 
QUESTION  138: Could the U.S. explain how the U.S. measures are consistent with its GATS 
commitments?  
 
RESPONSE 138:  The U.S. measures are consistent with its GATS commitments.  
 
Page  259, Paragraph  4.264  
 
The United  States maintains restrictions to cabotage services of both cargo and passengers under 
the coastwise laws. Section  27 of the Merchant Marine Act  of 1920, commonly referred to as the 
Jones  Act (46  U.S.C.  55102), reserves cargo service between two points in the United  States 
(including its territories and possessions), either directly or via a foreign port, for ships that are 
registered and built (o r repaired) in the United  States and that are at least 75% owned by a 
U.S. corporation, and on which 100% of the officers and 75% of the crew are U.S. citizens.  
 
QUESTION  139: China notes that members continue to be concerned about the negative impact of 
the U.S. Jones  Act on international shipping.  
Could the U.S. side brief on the current implementation of the Jones  Act? 
 
RESPONSE 139:  The Jones  Act is being implemented as des cribed in Paragraph  4.264.  
 
QUESTION  140: Is there any plan to amend the Act and reform relevant practices?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 103 - 
 
  RESPONSE 140:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  276, Para graph  4.327  
 
The United  States  also works on a bilateral basis to facilitate the development and deployment of 
new technologies. For example, working groups of the U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council are 
looking at data governance and tech platform regula tion, misuse of technology threatening security 
and human rights, and information and communications technology and services (ICTS) security 
and competitiveness.  
 
QUESTION  141: The United  States  has adopted numerous restrictions on goods, services and 
investment on "national security" grounds, including: limiting the import and export of specific goods 
and services through long -standing export controls and the expansion of the scope of regulated 
subjects and products; restricting or excluding foreign manufacturers or service providers from 
entering or trading or operating in the ICTS sector under Executive  Order  13873, Securing the 
Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Supp ly Chain, and 
Executive  Order  14034, Protecting Sensitive U.S. Data from Foreign Adversaries, and the 
Department of Commerce's resulting ICTS Final Rule. and 14034 Protecting Sensitive U.S. Data from 
Foreign Adversaries; and excluding the products and serv ices of certain telecommunications 
companies from the U.S. market under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act. As 
several U .S. Executive  Orders have stated that the President's authorization to issue the Executive 
Order comes from the National Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act,  
Could the U.S. please provide details on how the concept of a state of emergency is interpreted and 
applied under the aforementioned laws?  
 
RESPONSE 141:  For details on the emergency addressed by the referenced Executive  Orders, 
please see E.O.  13873, the ICTS final rule, and E.O.  14034. For details on the national security risks 
addresse d by the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, please see the Act, including 
Section  1. 
 
QUESTION  142: Could the U.S. demonstrate how these two laws ensure consistency in procedures 
and standards when authorizing the President to impose specific investment restrictions and 
sanctions on specific entities through Executive Orders, and how they ensure that discretionary 
powers are properly monitored and not abused.  
 
RESPONSE 142:  Section  II of the Final Rule (Response to Comments) reviews many considerations 
related to the allocation of authority consistent with U.S law and standards.  
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/19/2021 -01234/securing -the-information -
and-communications -technology -and-services -supply -chain . 
 
QUESTION  143: In 2019, the U.S. adopted new rules for ICTS Transactions that would allow the 
U.S. government to  intervene in, block or require the unwinding of transactions involving ICTS 
products and services with countries that the U.S. considers "foreign adversaries" in any way, which 
would result in goods or services from other WTO members being denied access t o the U.S. market.  
Does the U.S. acknowledge that the ICTS rule may result in a breach of U .S. obligations under 
Article  11 of GATT  1994 and Article  17 of GATS, and on what basis the U.S. will defend itself?  
 
RESPONSE 143 : The United  States  considers these measures necessary for the protection of 
essential security interests.  
 
QUESTION  144: If the US justification is a "security exception", could the U.S. please identify in 
detail the specific sub -clauses of the "security exception" that app ly to the ICTS rules?  
 
RESPONSE 144:  The text of the security exception does not require the Member exercising its right 
under the exception to identify the relevant subparagraph ending to that provision that an invoking 
Member may consider most relevant. Furthermore, nothing in the text of the security exception 
suggests that the subparagraphs are mutually exclusive. By invoking the security exception, the 
Member is indicating that one or more of the subparagraphs is applicable.  
 
QUESTION  145: 2021-present The U.S. Department of Commerce revised the ICTS Final Rule, and 
parties that submitted comments on the draft rule, such as the Information Technology Industry WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 104 - 
 
  Council, argued that the proposed rule included products and services that did not pose an 
identifiable risk to U.S. national security.  How did the U.S. respond to this objection?  
 
RESPONSE 145:  Please refer to Section  II: Response to Comments in the Final Rule, and in 
particular  section  7.3 with respect  to Scope  of Covered  ICTS Transactions. See: https://www.federa
lregister.gov/documents/2021/01/19/2021 -01234/securing -the-information -and-communications -
technology -and-services -supply -chain . 
 
QUESTION  146: What are the responses to the comment that the rule essentially gives unlimited 
discretion to the Department of Commerce?  
 
RESPONSE 146:  Section  II of the Final Rule (Response to Commen ts) reviews many considerations 
related to the allocation of authority consistent with U.S law and standards. 
See: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/19/2021 -01234/securing -the-
information -and-comm unications -technology -and-services -supply -chain . 
 
QUESTION  147: Has the U.S. fulfilled its WTO obligation of administering laws and regulations of 
general application in a uniform, fair, reasonable and objective manner in its legislation?  
 
RESPONSE 147: The administration of U.S. laws and regulations is consistent with its 
WTO commitments.  
 
Page  284, Table  A2.1 
 
QUESTION  148: Since the establishment of the WTO, the U.S. is the respondent in 143  cases in 
the WTO, accounting for 23% of all WTO dispute settlement cases. There were 28  disputes over the 
ineffective implementation of rulings, accounting for about 20% of all cases wh ere the U.S. is the 
respondent. There were 9 cases where the Dispute  Settlement  Body authorized to take retaliatory 
measures against the U.S., accounting for more than 6% of all cases where the U.S. is the 
respondent. Could the U.S. explain its repeated fa ilure to implement the rulings of the dispute 
settlement mechanism?  
 
RESPONSE 148:  In response to the suggestion that the U.S. compliance record is poor, the facts 
simply do not support that assertion. To the contrary, the record shows that the United  States has 
fully complied in the vast majority of its disputes. As for the remaining few  – and those few are a 
small fraction of the total  – we are working towards compliance.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  7, Paragraph  2.17 
 
New waves of COVID -19 infections depressed international travel and weighed on the recovery of 
some services that are important for U.S. exports such as tourism.  
 
QUESTION  149: Could the U.S. give information on the development of tourism in the U.S. since 
the last review, and the five -year tourism recovery plan recently launched by the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 149:  In 2020, decline in travel and tourism to and within the United  States  accounted 
for 56% of the decline in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and travel exports dropped 65% in 
2020 when compared to 2019, or pre -pandemic levels. However, monthly overseas arrivals to the 
United  States  increased from roughly 775,000 in October  2021 to more than 2  million  in April  2022. 
indicating a positive trend toward recovery even as international travel remains below pre -pandemic 
levels.  The 2022 Travel and Tourism strategy sets a five -year goal of attracting  90 million  visitors.  
For details  of the strategy,  see: https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -06/National -
Travel -Tourism -Strategy.pdf . 
 
Page  8, Para graph  3.3 
 
In addition, the United  States  has promoted the creation of innovative trade tools to address topics 
important to working people.  
 
QUESTION  150: According to the Office of the United  States  Trade Representative website, the U.S. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 105 - 
 
  has signed and is implementing FTAs with 20 trading partners. It is negotiating new trade initiatives 
with its allies under the worker -centered trade agenda. Please introduce the progress of these new 
trade initiatives and elaborate on how these trade initiatives serve the purpose standing up for 
workers'  rights.  
 
RESPONSE 150:  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement begins with the recognition that trade 
should raise living standards, ensure full employment, pursue sustainable development, and protect 
and preserve the envir onment. Improved labor conditions are interwoven among these enduring and 
ambitious goals . The United  States  is prioritizing labor issues in trade engagement, consulting with 
a broad range of stakeholders to ensure our policy serves workers' interests. Mor e specifically, we 
are prioritizing a range of labor issues in the United  States -European  Union  Trade and Technology 
Council (TTC), in the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), in the 
United  States  – United  Kingdom Dialogues on the Future of Atlantic Tra de, and in discussions with 
Kenya on ways to enhance trade and investment relations. All of these initiatives are ongoing and 
specific policy proposals are under development.  
 
Page  9, Para graph  3.8 
 
Launched during the U.S. -EU Summit in June  2021 to deepen transatlantic trade and economic 
relations, the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) held its inaugural meeting in 
September  2021.During this meeting, the co -chairs reaffirmed the TTC's commitment to grow the 
transatlantic trade and investment relatio nship, fight the climate crisis, and protect the environment.  
 
QUESTION  151: In September  2021, the first meeting of the U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council 
stated that policies should be based on shared democratic values. Please elaborate on the criteria 
for democratic values and how to ensure they do not become a tool to undermine free and open 
trade and investment.  
 
RESPONSE 15 1: As part of the U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the United  States  and 
the EU have reaffirmed our shared belief that international rules -based approaches to trade, 
technology, and innovation that are founded on solid democratic principles and values can improve 
the lives of our citizens and generate greater prosperity fo r people around the world. Through the 
TTC's working groups, the United  States  and the EU are supporting sustainable, inclusive economic 
growth and development, promoting a human -centric approach to the digital transformation, and 
ensuring that internation al human rights norms and international trade norms are respected and 
reflect our shared values. The United  States  and the EU cooperation in the TTC thus fully promotes 
free and open trade and investment and bolsters market competition.  
 
Page  9 Para graph  3.9 
 
In October  2021, the United  States  and the EU further announced their commitment to negotiate 
the world's first emissions -based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminium  trade. Together, the 
United  States  and EU are working to address the carbon inte nsity of steel and aluminium  traded into 
their market, as well as countries that adopt non -market practices that contribute to worldwide 
over-supply. The arrangement will drive investment in green steel and aluminium  production in the 
United  States , Europe, and around the world, reducing emissions in two of the most carbon -intensive 
industrial sectors.  
 
QUESTION  152: In October  2021, the U .S. and EU announced their intention to negotiate a "Global 
Arrangement to Address Carbon Intensity and Global Overcapacity" in the steel and aluminium 
sectors.  
Under this Agreement, would any WTO member's steel and aluminium products be allowed to enter 
the U.S . market as long as they meet the "low carbon intensity standard" agreed between the U.S. 
and the EU?  
 
RESPONSE 152:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under 
discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  remin ds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  153: How will this "low carbon intensity standard" be implemented in practice?  
 
RESPONSE 153:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 106 - 
 
  discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  154: What criteria does the United  States  plan to use to determine the carbon intensity 
of steel and aluminium pro ducts to determine whether they will be allowed to enter the CEPA market?  
 
RESPONSE 154:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under 
discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy  Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  155: How will the assessment process and criteria differ for U.S. -made products?  
 
RESPONSE 155:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under 
discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  156: Will U.S. -made products that do not meet this criterion be prohibited from being 
sold? 
 
RESPONSE 156:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under 
discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  157: The United  States  and Europe have concluded that "the Arrangement" will "restrict 
market access to non -Arrange participants that do not meet market -oriented conditions and create 
non-market excess capacity".  
Could the United  States  please explain how it assesses whether a non -CEPA participant meets the 
"market -oriented conditions" and whether it contributes to "non -market excess capacity"?  
 
RESPONSE 157:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under  
discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  158: If the country's capacity utilization rate for steel and aluminium products is equal 
to or higher than that of the United  States , does the United  States  consider that the country is not 
contributing to overcapacity?  
 
RESPONSE 158:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under 
discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  159: Could the U.S. explain the WTO compliance of the Arrangement, which will, to 
some extent, deny certain WTO members' products access to the U .S. market?  
 
RESPONSE 159:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are under 
discussion . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.24 
 
The Biden  Administration is taking a whole -of-government approach to address the pandemic, at 
home and abroad. These efforts include COVID -19 vaccine donations through COVAX and other for 
a, investment in vaccine production and delivery infrastructure in underserved  regions, and working 
with trading partners to facilitate the flow of goods.  
 
QUESTION  160: In 2021, as the COVID -19 pandemic continued to worsen, the United  States  gave 
priority to safeguard the needs of domestic vaccine manufacturers, resulting in de fac to export 
restrictions on equipment and raw materials used for vaccine production. As a major exporter of 
these products in the world, the above -mentioned practice of U.S. exerted serious impact on global 
vaccine production. While the COVID -19 variants con tinue to ravage the world today, major vaccine 
manufacturers around the world are actively developing updated vaccines against the new variants, 
and the international community has reached agreements on ways of promoting vaccine production WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 107 - 
 
  through mechanis ms such as TRIPS waiver decision related to COVID -19 vaccines and Medicines 
Patent Pool (MPP). As a major supplier of vaccines and its production equipment and raw materials 
well as major owners of related intellectual properties, what is the U.S.'s plan t o tackle with the 
challenges in terms of the global vaccine R&D and production supply chain, so as to ensure the 
global access to key equipment, raw materials and essential technologies?  
 
RESPONSE 160:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.26 
 
WTO Members also agreed at the 12th Ministerial Conference on a Ministerial Decision on the 
WTO Agreement  on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that provides 
accommodations to the intellectual property rules for COVID -19 vaccines that can facilitate a global 
health recovery.  
 
QUESTION  161: At present, COVID -19 diagnostic and therapeutic produ cts are playing an 
increasingly prominent role in fighting against the COVID -19 pandemic. However, the vast number 
of developing members are facing difficulties in the accessibility and affordability of diagnostic and 
therapeutic products. The WTO members are having discussions over the possibility of TRIPs waiver 
on COVID -19 diagnostic and therapeutic products, while the outlook is unclear. Besides, it remains 
to be seen when the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) mechanism will provide sufficient production and 
fair allocation of those products that developing members needed. As the world's largest supplier of 
COVID -19 diagnostic and therapeutic products, what is the U.S.'s plan to assume the responsibility 
of promoting a fair and sufficient supply of diagnostic and therapeutic products worldwide?  
 
RESPONSE 161:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  20, Para graph  5.30 
 
"In June  2022, DHS, as Chair of the FLETF, issued the FLETF's strategy to support the enforcement 
of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which establishes a rebuttable presumption that the 
importation of any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produc ed, or manufactured 
wholly or in part with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the 
People's  Republic  of China, or produced by certain entities appearing on a list maintained by the 
United  States , is prohibited under Section  307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended."  
 
QUESTION  162: The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which came into effect in June  2022, 
presumes guilt that products related to China's Xinjiang region are "produced by forced labor", and 
unreasonably requires enterpris es to bear the burden of proof. It causes serious damage to Xinjiang's 
normal participation in international economic and trade cooperation and the normal operation of 
the global industrial chain. Since China's implementation of reform and opening up, espe cially since 
China's accession to the WTO, Xinjiang has actively integrated into the international market, taking 
advantage of local resource endowments, and formed the region's characteristic industries. While 
contributing high -quality products and services to the international community, the Xinjiang region 
has also been seeing rapid social and economic development visible to the international community, 
and delivering better social benefits to the local people. However, recentl y, the U.S. has suddenly 
begun to allege the existence of forced labor in Xinjiang, despite China's repeated direct discussions 
and explanations in various public occasions, wilfully sticking to a smear campaign for China's 
disrepute, and has even gone so far as to unilaterally restrict the import of Xinjiang -related products 
through discriminatory legislation. The Act openly targets a specific area within the territory of a 
particular WTO member and imposes discriminatory trade -restrictive measures.  
How do es the U.S. explain the inconsistency between the legislation and the WTO's 
non-discrimination principle?  
 
RESPONSE 162:  The United  States  has reviewed these measures and considers that they are 
consistent with our WTO  obligations.  
 
QUESTION  163: The Act h as already wreaked grave damage. Lots of enterprises in Xinjiang have 
been forced to stop normal production, resulting in high unemployment rate. Relevant international 
industrial chains have also been badly interrupted, adding more uncertainties to the gl obal economic WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 108 - 
 
  recovery.  
Has any evaluation ever been carried out by the U.S. to assess how this law and its enforcement 
violated Xinjiang people's basic human rights, including the right to personal survival and 
development, and how serious the damage is t o the international supply chains?  
 
RESPONSE 163:  The United  States  passed the  Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act to protect 
human dignity.  The United  States  has reviewed the Act's measures and considers that they are 
consistent with our WTO  obligations. For more information, please visit:  https://ustr.gov/about -
us/policy -offices/press -office/press -releases/2022/june/forced -labor-enforcement -task-force-
launches -enforcement -strategy -uyghur -forced -labor-prevention -act. 
 
QUESTION  164: If not, will the U.S. conduct a comprehensive assessment and change its measures?  
 
RESPONSE 164:  The United  States  passed the  Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act to protect 
human dignity.  The United  States  has reviewed the Act's measures and considers that they are 
consistent with our WTO  obligations. For more information, please visit:  https://ustr.gov/about -
us/policy -offices/press -office/press -releases/2022/june/forced -labor-enforcement -task-force-
launches -enforcement -strategy -uyghur -forced -labor-prevention -act. 
 
Page  23 Para graph  5.58 
 
The USMCA contains strong commitments on digital trade, financial services, and intellectual 
property rights.  
 
QUESTION  165: The digital trade chapter of the U .S.-Mexico -Canada Agreement and the U .S.-Japan 
Digital Trade Agreement provide broad exceptions to the free flow of data, allowing measures that 
are not more restrictive than necessary to achieve pub lic policy objectives and do not result in 
discriminatory trade restrictions, and allowing participating parties to take measures they deem 
necessary to protect their essential security interests.  
Could the U.S. clarify whether the above -mentioned provisions would constitute a template for future 
U.S. data flow rules?  
 
RESPONSE 165:  The United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement and the United  States -Japan Digital 
Trade Agreement include comprehensive and high -standard provisions addressing digital trade . 
Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  166: How would the rules reconcile with the domestic law of the participating countries 
of the relevant agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 166:  The disciplines apply to domestic measures as provided for in the agreement. If a 
Party considers that another Party's domestic measures are not in compliance with the agreed 
disciplines, Parties may address it through appropriate mechanisms.  
 
QUESTION  167: Have there been any cases where these provisions has been invoked?  
 
RESPONSE 167:  Information regarding disputes under the dispute settlement provisions of the 
USMCA is publicly available on the website of the USMCA Secretariat. To the exte nt that China seeks 
additional information, discussions among Parties are not public information.  
 
QUESTION  168: If so, can the U.S. please provide basic information on such cases?  
 
RESPONSE 168:  Information regarding disputes under the dispute settlement provisions of the 
USMCA is publicly available on the website of the USMCA Secretariat. Discussions among Parties are 
not public information.  
 
Page  26, Para graph  5.80 
 
"In 2017, the United  States  launched an investigation into China's acts, policies and pra ctices 
relating to technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation under Section  301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. The findings made in this investigation led to substantial U.S. tariffs on imports from 
China as well as corresponding retaliation by C hina."  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 109 - 
 
  QUESTION  169: In 2018, according to the results of the "Section  301 investigation", the U.S. began 
to impose large -scale tariffs on goods imported from China. Recently, the Office of the United  States  
Trade Representative (USTR) said that the action of imposing tariffs will not stop. This U.S. measure 
violates the most basic spirit and principles of the WTO and is a unilateral practice prohibited by 
Article  23 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Proc edures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU). It not only harms the interests of China and other members, but also jeopardizes the 
multilateral trading system. On top of that, the U.S. unilaterally releases the Special  301 Report on 
an annual basis, i gnoring China's significant improvement in the system and protection practice in 
the field of intellectual property rights in recent years, making China remain in the "Priority Watch 
List", and giving a negative evaluation to China's intellectual property protection work. This fully 
reflects that the U.S abuses the intellectual property system, ignores the opposition of other 
countries, especially developing countries, and practices trade protectionism and bullying on the 
grounds of intellectual property pr otection. The above -mentioned practices of the U.S. are highly 
inconsistent with WTO rules, please clarify the basis of its rules.  
 
RESPONSE 169:  The United  States  disagrees with the basis of the question which asserts that the 
U.S. practices are inconsist ent with WTO rules.  
 
Page  28, Paragraph  5.91 
 
"On 23  May the United  States launched the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). 
In addition to the United  States, IPEF includes 13  partners: Australia, Brunei  Darussalam, Fiji, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic  of Korea, Malaysia, New  Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Viet  Nam."  
 
QUESTION  170: Could the U.S. update on the progress of the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework 
(IPEF)?  
 
RESPONSE 170:  In September  2022, the United  States  and the 13  IPEF partners released 
statements that outlined the scope of future negotiations. The next step is for the United  States  and 
IPEF partners to engage in negotiations.  
 
QUESTION  171: Please provide details on t he nature and development plans of this mechanism.  
 
RESPONSE 171:  The IPEF is an economic initiative that will include four pillars: (1)  trade; 
(2) supply chains; (3)  clean economy; and (4)  fair economy. For more information, see 
here:  https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/agreements -under -negotiation/indo -pacific -economic -
framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
Negotiations on the IPEF are just getting underway. Regarding future plans, the United  States  
reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  172: What measures will the U.S. take to ensure the negotiation results a re not 
exclusionary and discriminatory?  
 
RESPONSE 172:  The United  States  is committed to ensuring the IPEF initiative is in line with WTO 
rules.  
 
QUESTION  173: What are the consideration on the digital economy/digital trade issues under the 
IPEF, and what elements will be included?  
 
RESPONSE 173:  In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF 
pillars.  The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future 
digital  economy  negotiations.  Please  see here for more information:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/f
iles/2022 -09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%2
0RELEASE%20(1).pdf . Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
 
QUESTION  174: Nikkei  Asia reported on October 25 that the recent introduction of the new U.S. 
export control regulations on semiconductors has led to business difficulties for two ROK storage WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  companies, Samsung and SK hynix, which have a substantial production capacity in Chi na. 
Does this mean U.S. national security may sacrifice the interests of its so -called allies in China?  
 
RESPONSE 174:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy inte rests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreeme nts. 
 
QUESTION  175: If not, how can the U.S. protect the interests of its allies in China?  
 
RESPONSE 175:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  176: In last year's WTO trade policy review on China, the U.S. questioned China's Export 
Control Law, claiming it had exceeded the scope of international practices and the provisions of the 
countermeasures constituted unilateral export c ontrol measures not aimed at national security, 
which violated WTO rules. However, the latest U.S. export control regulations not only control items 
originating in the U.S. but also govern foreign products produced using specific U.S. -controlled 
software a nd technologies, which is the so -called Foreign -Direct Product (FDP) Rules. Could the U.S. 
please clarify whether this is a unilateral control measure not aimed at national security, and whether 
it violates WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 176:  Consistent with the Exp ort Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration  Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  177: According to the latest U.S. export control rules, if the relevant entity is not able 
to complete the end -use verification  by the U.S. Department of Commerce after 60  days of being 
added to the Unverified List, BIS will initiate an interdepartmental process to add the company in 
question to the Entity List.  
Does the U.S. agree that 60 -day period is too short?  
 
RESPONSE 177:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  178: Considering the completion of this verification depends totally on the progress of  
the U.S. Department of Commerce's but not on the entities involved, is it unfair for the entities 
involved to bear the consequences?  
 
RESPONSE 178:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national se curity and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  179: Could the U.S. clarify Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 
(ECRA), U.S. export controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. 
Bureau of Industry and Securit y (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to 
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. 
law and obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
Whether there is an automatic conversion between the Unverified List and the Entity List?  
 
RESPONSE 179:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) a dministers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  180: What are the extenuating circumstances?  
 
RESPONSE 180:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administe rs U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION  181: Under Section  103(b)(5) of the U.S. CHIPS a nd Science Act, an entity receiving 
subsidies under the U.S. chip incentive program is prohibited for 10 years from conducting any 
significant transaction in China that will result in any substantial expansion of semiconductor 
production capacity. These re strictions will apply to any new facility unless the facility primarily 
produces legacy semiconductors for the market in that country, and existing facilities that 
manufacture traditional semiconductors are not affected by this provision. These restriction s will 
apply for a period of 10  years after receipt of financial assistance.  
Could the U.S. please explain the rationale for this restriction?  
 
RESPONSE 181:  Section  103 of the Act describes in more detail the restrictions and the basis for 
the restriction s, which include that a country is covered by Section  4872(d) of title  10 U.S. Code or 
is determined to be engaged in conduct that is detrimental to the national security or foreign policy 
of the United  States . 
 
QUESTION  182: What is the specific definition of a significant transaction?  
 
RESPONSE 182:  Section  103 of the Act sets forth the criteria and process for such updates. To the 
extent this question is seeking further information about  future plans, the United  States  reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  183: Does a significant transaction involve restrictions on the export of goods?  
 
RESPONSE 183:  See response to Question  182. 
 
QUESTION  184: If yes, how is it consistent with the GATT principle of MFN and general elimination 
of quantitative restrictions?  
 
RESPONSE 184:  See response to Question  182. The United  States  intends to administer the Act in 
a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. 
 
QUESTION  185: What is the definition of a legacy semiconductor?  
 
RESPONSE 185:  "[L]egacy semiconductor" is defined in Section  103(b)(6)(A)(i)  of the Act.  
 
QUESTION  186: What are the legal basis from both WTO and domestic law perspectives for the 
discriminatory tax credit policy adopted by the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 186:  The United  States  disagrees with the characterization of the Act. Furthermore, like 
all WTO  Members, the Unit ed States  is entitled to determine who is eligible for government support.  
 
QUESTION  187: Under Section  103(b)(5) of the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, in order to ensure 
that restrictions are in line with the current state of semiconductor technology and U.S . export 
control regulations, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce consults with the Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of National Intelligence to update the threshold of technologies prohibited to be produced 
in relevant countries, determine the thresholds for restricted processing capabilities for memory and 
packaging, and which semiconductors are critical to national security.  
How could the U.S. ensure predictability in the implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act?  
 
RESPONSE 187:  Section  103 of the Act sets forth the criteria and process for such updates. To the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  extent this question is seeking further information about  future plans, the United  States  reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  188: Does this mean that the U.S. can arbitrarily adjust who receives assistance during 
implementation?  
 
RESPONSE 188:  See response to Question  187. 
 
QUESTION  189: How does the U.S. ensure that the Act will not have a significant disruption to the 
stability of the global semiconductor industry chain and supply chain?  
 
RESPONSE 189 : Act sets forth the structure and operation of the programs. On chips.gov, the 
United  States  has provided information about the program strategy and objectives, which include 
implementing in a way that "will respond to market signals" and "fill market gaps". To the extent 
this question is seeking further information about future plans, the United  States  reminds Members 
that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  190: Considering that the layout of the global semiconductor industry is based on the 
laws of the market, does the U.S. consider the government's forcible violation of the laws of the 
market to reconstruct the global semiconductor industry chain and supply cha in as a concentrated 
manifestation of mercantilism?  
 
RESPONSE 190:  The United  States  disagrees with the characterization in this question. See 
response to Question  189. 
 
QUESTION  191: According to the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, the U.S. CHIPS incentive program 
totals USD  39 billion , and the advanced semiconductor manufacturing investment tax credit totals 
USD 24 billion . Both are explicitly targeted at the chip industry and are de jur e specific.  
Has the U.S. evaluated the possibility that the semiconductor incentives will displace or discourage 
other members' exports of similar products from third -country markets, thereby adversely affecting 
the interests of other members?  
 
RESPONSE 191:  See response to Question  189. 
 
QUESTION  192: How does the U.S. ensure that its measures do not adversely affect the interests 
of other members for the benefit of all trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 192:  See response to Question  189. 
 
QUESTION  193: What are the specific plans in this regard?  
 
RESPONSE 193:  See response to Question  189. 
 
QUESTION  194: The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act explicitly provide 
hefty subsidies to the U.S. chip and electric vehicle related indust ries in the form of legislation. China 
notes that the U.S. has continuously criticized the industrial subsidy policies of other members on 
various occasions over the years. It argues that these industrial subsidies distort the market, cause 
unfair competit ion, harm the interests of other members, and are a reflection of the development 
model of a non -market economy. It has called for further tightening WTO industrial subsidy 
disciplines through a series of publicly released documents, such as tripartite sta tements.  
Please clarify whether the consistent position of the U.S. has changed.  
 
RESPONSE 194:  As alluded to in the question, the legislation and implementing regulations are 
transparent and publicly available, and may be referenced for further informatio n about the structure 
and operations of the relevant programs. T he United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner 
that is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. 
 
QUESTION  195: If not, please explain why, while requiring other members to exercise caution and 
restraint in the use of industr ial subsidies, the U.S. is introducing subsidy policies to relevant 
domestic industries that seems inconsistent with existing WTO rules.  
 
RESPONSE 195:  See response to Question  194. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION  196: Section  103(a)(3) of the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act imposes specific domestic 
content requirements on critical manufacturing industries. This practice is likely to constitute a 
prohibited subsidy policy under Article  3.1(b) of the SCM  Agreement : "subsidies contingent, whether 
solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods". What 
specific assessments or plans does the U.S. have to ensure that it does not violate the relevant 
provisions of the SCM  Agreement  to meet its WTO  obligations?  
 
RESPONSE 196:  The complete text of the CHIPS Act of 2022 ("the Act") is available online at the 
following address: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW -117publ167/pdf/PLAW -
117publ167.pdf . On its face, Section  103(a)(3) of the Act concerns the size of "an industry, industry 
group, or a set of related industry groups", measured by the value of production and the number of 
individuals employed. Similarly, on its face, Section  103(a)(6) of the Act permits consideration of 
"whether a covered entity produces or supplies equipment or materials used in the fabrication, 
assembly, testing, or packaging of semiconductors at mature technology nodes that are necessary 
to support a critical manufacturing industry ". Nothing in Section  103(a)(3) or Section  103(a)(6) of 
the Act makes any subsidy contingent, neither solely nor as one of several other conditions, upon 
the use of domestic over imported goods.  
 
QUESTION  197: According to Gina Raimondo on the CHIPS.Gov | NIST website, provisions related 
to the key manufacturing industries in the Act are intended to strengthen industry chains in the U.S. 
domestic market. However, such a policy would impede established industry chains in the markets 
of other WTO members.  
Could the U.S. provide information on any assessment in this regard?  
 
RESPONSE 197:  The United  States  disagrees with the characterization in this question. On 
chips.gov, the United  States  has provided information about the program strategy and objectives, 
which include implementing in a way that "will respond to market signals" and "fill market gaps". 
Like all other WTO  Members, the United  States  may provide support in a manner that is con sistent 
with its commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. Furthermore, the Act includes an International 
Technology Security and Innovation Fund to support international information and communication 
technology security and semiconductor supply chain activiti es. 
 
QUESTION  198: What measures does the U.S. have to avoid the impact on the global industry 
chain?  
 
RESPONSE 198:  See response to Question  197. 
 
QUESTION  199: The Research and Innovation section of the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act restricts 
the flow of fe deral funds to institutions that host or support China's Confucius Institute. It requires 
fund-receiving universities to disclose foreign funding of USD  50,000 or more every year, regardless 
of whether the foreign funding is received in the form of donations or partnerships, directly or 
indirectly.  
Could the U.S. clarify the main reasons and rationale for this requirement?  
 
RESPONSE 199:  See response to Question  187. 
 
QUESTION  200: Has the U.S. assessed the impact of this policy?  
 
RESPONSE 200:  No funds under the U.S. CHIPS have been awarded so it would be premature to 
"assess the impact ". 
 
QUESTION  201: Section  102 of the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act provides for the establishment of 
four funds, including the CHIPS for America Fund. Its qualification  examination requires that 
applicants shall not use the assistance to relocate existing facilities unless the activity is in the U.S. 
interests and that the applicant shall not be a foreign entity that threatens U.S. national security.  
Could the U.S. pleas e explain what it means by "U.S. interests" and "foreign entities that threaten 
U.S. national security" in this context?  
RESPONSE 201:  See response to Question  187. 
 
QUESTION  202: How does the U.S. ensure that its standards for defining threats to U.S. nat ional 
security are consistent and fair?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 202:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. In addition, see response to 
Question  187. 
 
QUESTION  203: Does the applicant have the right to apply for reconsideration of the qualification 
examination results?  
 
RESPONSE 203:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. In addition, see response to 
Question  187. To the extent this question is seeking information about future plans with respect to 
implementation of the Act, United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  204: If not, what measures does the U.S. have in place to ensure that its review of 
relevant concepts does not impair the applicant's rights?  
 
RESPONSE 204:  See response to Question  203. 
 
QUESTION  205: Section  9202(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 
indicates that the U.S. will coordinate with partner nations to establish a co -funding mechanism to 
form the Multilateral Telecommunications Secur ity Fund. The fund will be used to support the 
development and application of secure and trusted telecommunications technologies, strengthen the 
supply chain, and promote the selection of trusted providers. The fund would last for 10  years, and 
any remaini ng amounts in the fund after this period will be deposited in the Treasury's General Fund.  
Could the U.S. please introduce the progress of the current co -funding mechanism and the list of 
interested members?  
 
RESPONSE 205:  The Department of State has not proposed to allocate funds for the Multilateral 
Telecommunications Security Fund.  
 
QUESTION  206: What is the legal basis for the U.S. to deposit the balance of the fund after 10  years 
into the Treasury's General Fund?  
 
RESPONSE 206:  See the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal  Year 2021,  Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/p
ubl283/PLAW -116publ283.pdf ). 
 
QUESTION  207: How does the U.S. determine each member's share of fund contributions under 
this mechanism?  
 
RESPONSE 207:  See Response  205. 
 
QUESTION  208: How will the establishment of the Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund 
ensure that it does n ot result in de facto discrimination against non -members?  
 
RESPONSE 208: See Response  205. 
 
QUESTION  209: The U.S. Department of the Treasury established the U.S. Defense CHIPS Fund 
and appropriated USD  400 million  every fiscal year from FY 2023 to FY 2027 to it. Funds are 
transferred to and consolidated with the account of the Department of Defense. It is used to 
implement the national network for microelectronics research and development authorized in the 
National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 for cost -economic and cost -effective 
exploration of new materials, devices, and architectures and for other related activities as deemed 
necessary by the Secretary of Defense.  
Could the U.S. please introduce the scope of other relevant activities deemed necessary and the 
criteria for determining the necessity?  
 
RESPONSE 209:  Section  103(b) of the Act provides information concerning the establishment of 
this fund. To the extent this question is seeking further information about future implementation 
plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  210: What is the legal basis for the U.S. to merge the CHIPS Fund with the account of WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  the Department of Defense?  
 
RESPONSE 210:  The Act is a federal law that was passed by Congress and signed into law by 
President  Biden on 9 August  2022.  
 
QUESTION  211: On 15 June 2020, North American Sugar Industries, Inc. filed a lawsuit against 
Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida. North American Sugar Industries, Inc. alleges that Goldwind has taken over land property 
confiscated by the Cuban revolutionary government during the Castro era, constituting unfair trade. 
It brought suit under Article  III of the Helms -Burton Act, seeking treble punitive damages and 
interest, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. The Act defines unfair trade broadly to include 
knowingly engaging in business activities that use the confiscated property or any other conduct 
that profit s from the acquired assets.  
Could the U.S. please explain the specific scope of unfair trade?  
 
RESPONSE 211:  The United  States  understands the question to refer to Title  III of the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, codified as  Chapter  69A of the U.S. Code. 
That section does not use the term "unfair trade".  
 
QUESTION  212: How does the U.S. ensure that the standard of determination in applying this 
provision is consistent?  
 
RESPONSE 212:  To the extent that the referenced Act creates a private right of action, it is 
enforceable in U.S. courts, which are responsible for interpreting the law and determining whether 
a complainant is entitled to a recovery . 
 
QUESTION  213: What specific monitoring mechanisms does the U.S. have in place to ensure that 
this provision is not abused?  
 
RESPONSE 213:  To the extent that the referenced Act creates a private right of action, it is 
enforceable in U.S. courts, which are responsible for interpreting the law and determining whether  
a complainant is entitled to a recovery.  
 
QUESTION  214: The Helms -Burton Act is broad, and its key provisions favor plaintiffs. For example, 
the Act's definition of unfair trade is too broad; the Act allows plaintiffs with very small claims to file 
a mass ive recovery claim by first calculating the present value of the acquired assets (multiplied by 
approximately four) and then tripling the punitive damages; the plaintiffs are entitled to have their 
attorney's fees and court costs paid by the defendant.  
Could the U.S. please present a scientific analysis to explain the rationality of the 12 -fold claim 
amount?  
 
RESPONSE 214:  To the extent that the referenced Act creates a private right of action, it is 
enforceable in U.S. courts, which are responsible for int erpreting the law and determining whether 
a complainant is entitled to a recovery, and the amount of the recovery, based on the facts of the 
case. As this is a fact -intensive inquiry, the United  States  is not in a position to evaluate the outcomes 
on an aggregate basis.  
 
QUESTION  215: How does the U.S. ensure that the Act does not harm the legitimate interests of 
third-party businesses?  
 
RESPONSE 215:  To the extent that the referenced Act creates a priv ate right of action, it is 
enforceable in U.S. courts, which are responsible for interpreting the law and determining whether 
a complainant is entitled to recovery.  
 
QUESTION  216: Since the enactment of the Act in 1996, President Clinton and his successors  
suspended such prosecutions for a period of six months in succession due to its widespread impact. 
On 2 May 2019, the Trump administration officially activated Article  III of the Helms -Burton Act.  
Could the U.S. please explain the reasons for reinvigorating this provision?  
 
RESPONSE 216:  The U.S. Department of State provides a briefing on this decision at  https://2017 -
2021-translationa.state.gov/2019/04/17/telephonic -press -briefing -with-senior -state-department -
official -on-the-u-s-policy -towards -cuba/index.html . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION  217: How effective has the implementation of the provis ion been?  
 
RESPONSE 217:  That information is in the hands of the private claimants, and not the U.S. 
government.  
 
QUESTION  218: What are the responses from enterprises in third countries?  
 
RESPONSE 218:  Enterprises' responses to claims under the referenced statute are part of court 
proceedings and, to the extent they are publicly available, may be obtained from the relevant courts.  
 
QUESTION  219: Section  13401 of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act limits the place of extraction or 
processing of key mineral raw materials, the place of manufacture or assembly of components, and 
the place of assembly of complete vehicles to the U.S., countries with which the U.S. has signed 
FTAs, or North America, as prerequisites for receiving tax credits. Due to logis tics costs and other 
reasons, in practice, U.S. companies may be more likely to enjoy tax credits than companies in other 
countries, resulting in U.S. violations of Article  3 of the GATT. Could the U.S. specify how to ensure 
its measures are consistent wit h its WTO obligations?  
 
RESPONSE 219:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION 220:  Under Section  13401 of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, relevant products from 
Canada, Mexico, and other countrie s that have signed FTAs with the U.S. or are located in North 
America will receive more favorable treatment than products from other members. This section also 
explicitly excludes products from foreign entities of concern, which constitutes discrimination against 
other members. Could the U.S. explain how to ensure its measures are consistent with the 
obligations of Article  1 of the GATT.  
 
RESPONSE 220:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S.  commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION  221: Section  13401 of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act requires that a consumer subsidy 
in the form of a tax credit be contingent on the consumer's choice of a locally manufactured or 
assembled electric vehicle and that the value content of the relevant battery components 
manufactured or assembled in North America meets or exceed the required percentage. EU officials 
have also described the provisions above as an unbalanced subsidy and amounting to a breach of 
WTO rules. Does the U.S. agree with these comments? How does the U.S. view the relationship 
between above mentioned measures and Article  3.1(b) of the WTO SCM  Agreement . 
 
RESPONSE 221:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a man ner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION 222 : The Agreement on Trade -Related Investment Measures prohibits members from 
adopting any trade -related investment measures (in particular, requiring enterprises to purchase or 
use domestic products or any products of domestic origin) that are inconsistent with the provisions 
of Article  3 of the GATT. Could the U.S. specify how could the relevant measures under Section  13401 
of the Inflation R eduction Act be consistent with its TRIMs obligations.  
Some members have expressed the view that the adoption of trade restrictive measures through 
the generalization of the concept of "national security" would undermine the foundation of the WTO's 
rules-based multilateral trading system. How does the U .S. respond to this concern?  
 
RESPONSE 222:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION  223: In July  2021, the United  States  issued the Executive  Order on Promoting 
Competition in the American Economy, which ordered a "whole -of-government" approach to the 
enforcement of U.S. competition law, including a focus on regulating competition in online m arkets. 
Could the U.S. side please describe the policies and actions taken to promote competition in online 
markets and to reduce anti -competitive conduct in e -commerce ? 
 
RESPONSE 223:  Since the issuance of the Executive  Order, agencies around the federal 
government have been taking steps to bolster competition pursuant to the parameters of the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 117 - 
 
  Executive  Order.  Some  of the details  regarding  those  efforts  can be found  at http://www.usdoj.gov  
and http://www.ftc.gov . 
 
QUESTION  224: In October  2021, 136  countries, including China and the United  States , signed the 
Statement on a Two -Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitization of the 
Economy, which is part of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 
The two pillars work together to address the ability of countries to tax a portion of the income of 
non-resident service providers from the provision of digital services in their jurisdi ctions. Could the 
U.S. please provide an update on the implementation of Pillars  I and II, including the implementation 
of establishing the lowest global corporate tax rate of 15%?  
 
RESPONSE 224:  Multilateral work is ongoing on the development of both Pill ar 1 and Pillar  2. No 
country, including the United  States , has yet adopted  Pillar 1 or Pillar  2 in domestic legislation.  
 
QUESTION  225: Please clarify where to access the specific requirements of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) on the content, form and timing of disclosure.  
 
RESPONSE 225:  To access the information on specific requirements on content of patent disclosure, 
go t o: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s608.html . To access the 
informationon  Information  Disclosure  Statement  (IDS),  go to: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/s609.html  and https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ebc/portal/efs/dct_ids_tutorial.
pdf. 
 
QUESTION  226: According to the current regulations, the IDS system imposes different 
requirements for the applicant receiving a notice of examination for the relevant patent application 
in another country when the patent application in the U.S. is in the stage of iss uing a Notice of 
Allowance and waiting for the payment of the issue fee. If the relevant patent application falls in the 
same patent family, the applicant needs to pay an official fee of USD 260 when filing the IDS. If the 
patent application is not in the same patent family, the applicant needs to file the IDS through the 
Request for Continue Examination (RCE) procedure, and pay an official fee of at least USD 1,360. 
We understand that the purpose of the IDS system is to assist examining bodies to improve t heir 
efficiency and accuracy, but why do applicants, as providers of assistance, have to pay high fees for 
submitting an IDS?  
 
RESPONSE 226:  The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination 
occurs when, at the time an applicati on is being examined, the Patent Office is aware of and 
evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with 
the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with 
the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to 
be material to patentability as defined in this section.  
 
An applicant, attorney, or agent who is aware of material prior art or other information and its 
significance should submit the information early in prosecution, e.g.  before the first Office action, 
and not wait until after allowance. Potentially material information discovered late in the prosecution 
should be promptly submitted. That the issue fee has been paid is no reason or excuse for failing to 
submit information. See the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) §  609.04(b) at 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac /mpep/s2001.html . 
 
QUESTION  227: This provision runs counter to the original intention of IDS. Could the U.S. explain 
the starting point of the regulation and make appropriate amendments?  
 
RESPONSE 227:  The U.S. Patent Law and Regulations provide for the d uties owed toward the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office by each individual who is associated with the preparation or prosecution 
of the application. These duties, of candor and good faith and disclosure, have been codified in 
37 CFR § 1.56 and 37  CFR § 1.555, as promulgated pursuant to carrying out the duties of the 
Director under Sections 2, 3, 131, and 132 of Title  35 of the United  States  Code. See: 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2000.html#d0e195426 . Regarding future plans for 
amendments, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retro spective 
exercises.  
 
QUESTION  228: Can reliable and professional translation tools be made available to facilitate the 
submission of earlier office observations by applicants in other countries before substantive changes WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  are made?  
 
RESPONSE 228:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  229: Please clarify under what circumstances a patent would be deemed unenforceable 
due to IDS issues by providing some specific cases.  
 
RESPONSE 229:  See MPEP  § 2016: Fraud, Inequitable Conduct, or Violation of Duty of Disclosure 
Affects All Claims, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2016.html . 
 
QUESTION  230: The RR notice does not divide the claims into Class  A (Example  1) and Class  B 
(Example  2) (even if different examples belong to the same invention idea) according to different 
essential features as internationally accepted, or into Class  A (method claims) and Class  B 
(corresponding device claims) according to different claim types, so as to directly determine that 
there is no unity between Classes A and B.  
Please explain the basis for suc h determination.  
 
RESPONSE 230:  See MPEP  § 802: Basis for Restriction Practice in Statute and Rules, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s802.html ; and 37  CFR § 1.142 Requirement f or 
restriction ("(a) If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in a single application, 
the examiner in an Office action will require the applicant in the reply to that action to elect an 
invention to which the claims will be restricte d, this official action being called a requirement for 
restriction (also known as a requirement for division)").  
 
QUESTION  231: What are the differences from international practices, such as the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) unitary criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 231:  See MPEP  § 823: Unity of Invention Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s823.html . The analysis used to determine whether 
the Office may require restriction differs in national stage applications submitted under 
35 U.S.C.  § 371 (unity of invention analysis) as compar ed to national applications filed under 
35 U.S.C.  § 111(a) (independent and distinct analysis). See MPEP Chapter  1800, in particular 
MPEP  § 1850, §  1875, and §  1893.03(d), for a detailed discussion of unity of invention under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).  
 
QUESTION  232: In the patent application examination process, the provisions on the user's 
physical signature impose a heavy burden on the user, while the use of electronic signature can 
effectively reduce the burden on the users.  
Could the U.S. to explain and clarify to users the current status of the provisions on electronic 
signatures?  
 
RESPONSE 232:  The USPTO accepts three types of signatures, depending on the types of 
correspondence with the Office. See 37  CFR § 1.4 (Nature of  correspondence and signature 
requirements) and MPEP  § 501, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s501.html . 
 
QUESTION  233: Does the U.S. have any plan to improve the process to redu ce the burden of 
physical signatures, by means of extending the scope of use of electronic signatures, acceptance 
and recognition of electronic signatures of all documents within the scope permitted by law, and the 
acceptance of scanned copies of signed do cuments.  
 
RESPONSE 233:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  234: Could the U.S. clarify which steps in the patent application process have not yet 
been electronic, and whether there is a timetable for the full electronic patent application?  
RESPONSE 234:  See "Filing on Line" at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply  and EFS -Web 
Guidance and Resources at https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/applying -online/efs -web-
guidance -and-resources . Regarding a timetable, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade 
Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION  235: Starting 1 January  2023, the USPTO will require payment of a surcharge fee if the 
patent applications are not filed in DOCX format. Could the USPTO provide users with more flexibility 
in format choices instead of restricting the application format by charging an additional fee?  
 
RESPONSE 235:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Pol icy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  236: Patent assignment procedure is cumbersome and complex. It is difficult to search 
for patent assignment information. Could the U.S. clarify whether it has any plan to simplify the 
process, provide inqu iry path, and improve the transparency of patent assignment information?  
 
RESPONSE 236:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  237: The USPTO has a very long trademark examination cycle, generally taking more 
than one year. This seems unreasonable given the rapid development of the Internet economy. Does 
the U.S. have any plans to improve work efficiency?  
 
RESPONSE 237:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  238: Chinese trademark applicants have received significant examination opinions from 
the USPTO on goods and services, requiring for further detailed information on the goods and 
services. However, there is no unified rule, which affects the progress of tradem ark application. 
Could the U.S. clarify the specific examination standards?  
 
RESPONSE 238:  Requirements for the specific wording of goods and services are determined based 
on the principles set forth in the individual entries of the USPTO's Manual of Accep table Identification 
and Classification of Goods and Services (ID Manual) and the examination standards described in 
Section  1402 of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure. Each case must be decided on its 
own merits. Applicants are encouraged to sele ct pre -approved items from the ID Manual, available 
at https://idm -tmng.uspto.gov/id -master -list-public.html . 
 
QUESTION  239: China finds that the regulations, standards and test procedur es for energy 
efficiency certification, chemical control, electronic and electrical appliances in the U.S. are 
frequently updated, and some even do not have implementation plans and specific testing methods, 
which has caused unnecessary obstacles to corpor ate compliance. In accordance with relevant WTO 
regulations, the U.S. shall publish such technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, 
and provide reasonable review periods and transition periods. Could the U.S. explain and clarify how 
these practices could comply with relevant WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 239:  U.S. law, with respect to U.S. government engagement and participation in 
standards related activity, is fully consistent with WTO obligations.  
 
U.S. law provides that "[n]o Federal agency may engage in any standards -related activity that 
creates unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United  States ", 19 USC 2532, and 
that "[e]ach Federal agency shall ensure, in applying standards -related activities with respect to any 
imported product, that such product is treated no less favorably than are like domestic or imported 
products…" "Standards -related activity" is defined in 19  U.S.C.  2571 and covers certain standards 
and technical regulations as well as conformity assessment p rocedures. These statutory 
requirements reflect U.S. international obligations under the World  Trade  Organization  (WTO) 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT  Agreement ). 
 
In addition, the United  States  maintains a robust system to support implement ation of its trade 
obligations through strong central management of its regulatory regime, an effective interagency 
trade policy mechanism, and public consultation. The central regulatory review process administered 
by the Office of Management and Budget e nsures international trade obligations are taken into 
account in the development of regulatory policies, including conformity assessment procedures. 
E.O. 12866 and Circular A -4 are the primary basis on which good regulatory practice (GRP) has been 
integrat ed into the Federal regulatory structure. These practices ensure openness, transparency, and 
accountability in the regulatory process, and, as a result, help ensure that the United  States  fulfils 
key WTO obligations, including ensuring that imported goods are treated no less favorably than like WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  domestic products. In addition, the Administrative Procedures Act requires agencies to undertake a 
notice and comment process open to all members of the public, both foreign and domestic, for 
rulemakings, and to take  these comments into account in the final rule. The notice and comment 
process under the APA provides an opportunity for trading partners to provide input to regulators 
regarding the impact of proposed regulations on imported products.  
 
QUESTION  240: The s tandards and conformity assessment procedures of electronic appliances and 
fitness equipment in the U.S. are very different from international standards such as ISO and IEC. 
According to the relevant WTO rules, members shall adopt international standards o n the basis of 
which to formulate national standards. Could the U.S. explain the reasons for the deviation from 
international standards?  
 
RESPONSE 240:  The United  States  is unaware of any inconsistency between U.S. law and WTO 
obligations.  
 
U.S. law provides that "[n]o Federal agency may engage in any standards -related activity that 
creates unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United  States," and that "[e] ach 
Federal agency shall ensure, in applying standards -related activities with respect to any imported 
product, that such product is treated no less favorably than are like domestic or imported 
products…." 19  USC 2532. "Standards -related activity" is defin ed in 19  U.S.C.  2571 and covers 
certain standards and technical regulations as well as conformity assessment procedures. These 
statutory requirements reflect U.S. international obligations under the 
World  Trade  Organization  (WTO) Agreement on Technical Bar riers to Trade (TBT  Agreement ). 
Specifically, Articles 2.1 and 2.2 and Annex  3 of the Agreement commit the United  States , with 
respect to standards and technical regulations, to provide no less favorable treatment to imported 
products than like domestic pr oducts and to avoid unnecessary obstacles to trade. In addition, the 
United  States  is obligated under the TBT  Agreement  to use relevant international standards, except 
where such standards would be an ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfill the legitimate 
objective pursued. In particular, the TBT  Agreement , Article  2.4, provides that: "Where technical 
regulations are  required and relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent, 
[WTO] Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical 
regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would b e an ineffective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of 
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems ". In addition, 
19 U.S.C.  2532 directs Federal agenc ies, in developing standards, to base the standards on 
international standards if appropriate.  
 
The WTO  TBT Agreement  does not provide a list of bodies that develop international standards. 
However, in 2000, the WTO  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade  adopted a decision setting out 
principles that standards bodies should follow when developing international standards (the Decision 
on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with 
Relation to Articles 2, 5 and  Annex  3 of the WTO  Agreement  on Technical Barriers to Trade).  
 
QUESTION  241: The Telecommunications Industry Association publishes SCS9001: the first 
ICT-Specific Standard for Global Supply Chain Security. The standard, as a security standard that 
affects  the global ICT supply chain, characterizes China as an ICT attacker.  
On what facts, laws and procedures the U.S. relies to make such a judgement?  
 
RESPONSE 241:  The referenced standard, SCS9001, was developed by the Telecommunications 
Industry Association (TIA), which is a private, U.S. -domiciled organization.  Because TIA is not a 
government entity, any question regarding the facts and procedures on which TIA rel ied in the 
development of a standard should be directed to the organization itself.  
 
QUESTION  242: Could the U.S. explain why the above -mentioned practice is consistent with the 
WTO principles of non -discrimination and not creating unnecessary obstacles to  trade?  
 
RESPONSE 242:  The U.S. government is unaware of any instance in which the referenced standard 
has been incorporated into U.S. regulation.  
 
QUESTION  243: In 2020, the U.S. prohibited the use of federal funds to procure rail transportation 
products from CRRC on the grounds of national security. In 2021, the U.S. revoked China Telecom's 
international telecommunications service license on the grounds of endangering national security.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 121 - 
 
  Please elaborate on the criteria of national security in these cases.  
 
RESPONSE 243:  Regarding limitations on certain rolling stock procurements  please refer to the 
National  Defense  Authorization  Act for Fiscal  Year 2020,  including  Section  7613: https://www.cong
ress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS -116s1790enr.pdf . 
 
Regarding  China  Telecom,  please  refer to the Order  at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FC
C-21-114A1.pdf . 
 
QUESTION  244: Could the U.S. provide the reasons and evidence that CRRC and China Telecom 
do not meet these national security criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 244:  Except in certain circumstances, the United  States  does not make public this 
information.  
 
QUESTION  245: Is enterprise  ownership a factor considered in the national security criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 245:  Please refer to the section on Initial Review of the ICTS Transactions in the Final 
Rule:  https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/19/2021 -01234/securing -the-
information -and-communications -technology -and-services -supply -chain . 
 
QUESTION  246: Please introduce the implementation of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 
since it was signed into law and its impact on the international logistics industry.  
 
RESPONSE 246:  The Federal Maritime Commission maintains a page on its website that is 
devote d to implementation  of the Ocean  Shipping  Reform  Act of 2022:  https://www.fmc.gov/osra -
2022-implementation/ . 
 
QUESTION  247: Please provide information on the U.S. student visa applications that have been 
accepted since the last review, including the number of applicants accepted and the number of visas 
issued, especially the proportion of students majoring in science, engineering, agriculture, medicine 
and STEM.  
 
RESPONSE  247: According to the 20 22 Open Doors Report, China was the top source country for 
international students in the United  States . U.S. embassies and consulates in China issued nearly 
65,000 visas to students, scholars, and their dependents in FY 2022. The data is not broken down 
by academic field. The mission worked hard to ensure that appointments  were 
readily  available  for students  and that wait times  were short.  See: https://opendoorsdata.org/fact
_sheets/china/ . 
 
QUESTION  248: We note that there has been a significant drop in the issuance of U.S. student 
visas to Chinese students in recent years, falling by 48% year -on-year in the first seven months of 
this year. Could the U.S. provide reasons for this drop?  
 
RESP ONSE  248: The most recent data from the 2022 Open Doors report indicates that China 
remained the top sending country of international students to the United  States  in 2021/2022, with 
290,086 students on U.S. campuses ( -9% year -over-year). The United  States  does not comment on 
year-to-year changes.  See: https://opendoorsdata.org/fact_sheets/china/ . 
 
QUESTION  249: China notes that the entry of Chinese business managers into the U.S. has been 
restricted in recent years. Could the U.S. provide detailed information about policies on the entry of 
business managers and the issuance of relevant types of visas. Please provide the number of entries 
of Chinese business managers into the U.S. since the last review?  
 
RESPONSE  249: Business managers may qualify for different U.S. visas depending on the purpose 
of the visit. Descriptions of relevant visas can be found on the websites of the U.S. Department of 
State https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us -visas.html  and the Visa Wizard can help identify 
the most appropriate visa: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us -visas/visa -information -
resources/wizard.html . Annual data on non -immigrant visa issuances by nationality and visa 
category can be found here: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa -law0/visa -
statistics/annual -reports.html . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION  250: In 2021, the 101st Session of the Committee on RTA of the WTO reviewed the 
Agreement between the United  States , Mexico and Canada (USMCA). Before the Session, China 
submitted its Questionnaire to the Secretariat asking why the USMCA includes the provisions that 
"...Before commencing free trade agreement negotiations with a non -market country a Party must 
inform the other Parties of its intentions to do so and shall provide, upon request, as much 
information as possible about the objectives for such negotiations... If a Party enters into an FTA 
with a non -market country the other two Parties may terminate the Agreement on six months' 
notice...". China also asked whether these provisions violate the WTO principle of non -discrimination. 
The U.S. responded that allowing the Parties and non -market countries to sign free trade agreements 
will dilute the negotiated benefits of the Parties. Does the above response of the U.S. mean that the 
U.S. side restricts the right of Parties of the USMCA to increase freedom of trade by voluntarily 
signing free trade agreements , thus violating the spirit of Article  24.4 of GATT?  
 
RESPONSE 250: As the United  States  responded before the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements in October, this provision is intended to ensure that the negotiated benefits of the 
USMCA remain with the USMCA Parties and are not diluted by one Party's agreement with a 
non-market country. If a USMCA Party were to enter into such an agreement, the other Parties would 
review information and ensure that they are not disadvantaged. This response does not mean that 
the United  States  restricts the rights of any USMCA Party.  
 
QUESTION  251: Annex  14-D of the USMCA provides for a mechanism for the settlement of 
investment disputes between Mexico and the U.S. The original text of the agreement reads that 
"Claimant means an investor of an Annex Party that is a party to a qualifying investment dispute, 
excluding an investor that is owned or controlled by a person of a non -Annex Party that, the other 
Annex Party has determined to be a non -market economy...". China asked the U.S. to explain the 
purpose of the establishment of this provision and whether it violates the principle of 
non-discrimination. The U.S. responded that each State makes a sovereign choice regarding the 
scope of its consent to investor -State  arbitration when entering into an international investment 
agreement. Does the above -mentioned response mean that the U.S. not only chooses to violate the 
principle of non -discrimination to jeopardize the interests of other WTO members, but also imposes 
this practice on other members through economic coercion? For instance, Mexico claims that it does 
not have such concept of a non -market country.  
 
RESPONSE 251:  As the United  States  responded before the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements in October, int ernational investment agreements, such as the USMCA investment 
chapter, prescribe specific limits and conditions upon a respondent State's consent to arbitration. 
Each State makes a sovereign choice regarding the scope of its consent to investor -State arbi tration 
when entering into an international investment agreement. The United  States  affirms that this 
limitation of its consent to arbitration does not violate the principle of non -discrimination, nor 
constitute in any way economic coercion.  
 
 
CHINA – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
PART I: SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
Page 11, paragraph 2  
 
During most of the review period (mid -2018 to early 2022), fiscal policy continued to be 
expansionary.  Despite solid economic growth, the federal government deficit rose from 2. 8% of GDP 
in calendar year 2017 to 5.4% of GDP in 2019. As a response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the 
authorities put in place several support packages, including the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act  (CARES Act), the Coronavirus Preparednes s and Response Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 2020, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP Act), the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, and some parts of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, 
which together provided an estimated USD 8.3 billion in emergency funding for federal agencies to 
respond to the COVID -19 outbreak.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Please explain the necessity of the expansionary fiscal policy during the review 
period.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 123 - 
 
  RESPONSE 1:  Both fiscal and monetary support was provided to address both the COVID -19 
pandemic and support the economy by trying to avoid many of the long -term harm ful effects that 
often follow an economic shock. These support measures contributed to a much higher growth than 
anticipated and employment recovered more quickly than initially anticipated.  
 
QUESTION 2:  The government support packages launched in response  to the COVID -19 pandemic 
provided up to USD  8.3 billion of emergency fund. Which areas does the fund focus on? Please 
elaborate on the specific distribution and the effect of implementation of this fund.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  U.S. government fiscal support during the pandemic primarily focused on five areas: 
1) aid to the jobless from augmented emergency unemployment insurance; 2)  support to 
households in the form of direct cash transfers (commonly called "Economic Impact Payments"); 
3) support to small businesses in the form of forgivable Paycheck Protection Program loans meant 
to help firms maintain payrolls; 4)  support to state and local governments to offset losses in 
revenue; and 5)  fund to research and distribute vaccines and medical equipment in direct respon se 
to the pandemic. According to the Congressional Budget Office, legislation passed in 2020 raised the 
level of U.S. real GDP by 4.7% that year above where it would have been otherwise absent fiscal 
support.  
 
Page 11, paragraph 3  
 
...the Federal Reserve c ommitted to using its full range of policy tools to support the U.S. economy, 
promoting its maximum -employment and price -stability goals.  
 
QUESTION 3:  How many of the policy tools were actually put into implementation as the Federal 
Reserve committed?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The Federal Reserve implemented a number of policies to support the U.S. economy. 
From quickly easing the federal funds rate to its effective lower bound and support financial market 
participants, to the municipal bond facility used to support loc al government debt issuance, the 
Federal Reserve used every tool it could to support the economy during the economic collapse. Some 
of these special policy tools had been used during the financial crisis of 2007 (e.g. the Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity  Facility). Others were newly created for the pandemic economy (e.g. the 
municipal bond facility).  
 
While the Federal Reserve responded quickly with a host of programs and facilities, not all were 
extensively used during the subsequent recovery. The establ ishment of the facilities themselves 
sufficiently calmed markets that the facilities were not needed. Backstopping financial markets 
provided a cushion such that the backstop itself went unused.  
 
QUESTION 4:  How effective were them in promoting employment and stabilizing prices?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The programs and facilities established by the Federal Reserve were highly effective 
at promoting employment and stabilizing prices. Unemployment went above 10% early in the 
pandemic, and inflation dipped below one perc ent before the Federal Reserve programs began 
operation. Without prompt entry, undoubtedly outcomes would have been worse.  
 
The question of the counterfactual – what would the economy have been like if the Federal Reserve 
had not enacted all of its policie s – is difficult to answer. We observe what happened in the real 
world, but not what happened in the theoretical world. In the real world, the programs were effective. 
In the theoretical world, as unemployment skyrocketed and prices fell, a financial crisi s larger than 
2008 would have taken place without the guarantees provided by the Federal Reserve.  
 
Page 11, paragraph 5  
 
In 2021 the U.S. Administration put in place its "Build Back Better" agenda, which includes, inter 
alia, putting workers at the center of trade policy, tackling the COVID -19 pandemic, promoting a 
sustainable environment and climate path, promoting equitable economic growth around the world, 
and addressing main trading partners' economic trade practices through a comprehensive strategy. 
Recent legislation and initiatives have included the ARP Act that provided funding for COVID -19 
vaccines and addressed medical supply chains, and several other initiatives that address supply 
chains more generally as well as critical infrastructure.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 124 - 
 
  QUESTION  5: Please elaborate on in what ways are workers put at the center of trade policy and 
in what ways are the environment and climate path sustainable in the "Build Back Better" agenda?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The United  States is implementing a worker -centered trade policy. This means we 
are focused on ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and that the benefits of 
trade are broadly shared by all people. We are developing new tools and im plementing existing 
commitments to achieve these goals. We think it is critical to include a wide range of stakeholders, 
including workers and their advocates, in the development and implementation of trade policy. We 
are regularly consulting with a range of labor stakeholders, both in the  United  States and around 
the world, to hear their thoughts on how trade is affecting them and how they think it can better 
serve all people.  
 
Simultaneously, we are taking ambitious national action to achieve a net -zero e missions economy 
by no later than 2050. For example, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act makes a 
historic investment in the modernization, sustainability, and security of our domestic infrastructure. 
Among these investments is a USD  3 billion expansion of the Smart Grid Investment Matching Grant 
Program that is designed to improve the flexibility of the grid by upgrading existing transmission 
and distribution systems and improving energy storage. Additionally, the Act makes a USD  6 billion  
investment in the Civilian Nuclear Credit program to prevent premature retirement of existing 
zero-carbon nuclear plants, and a USD  2.5 billion in advanced nuclear demonstrations and research. 
We have also streamlined climate considerations into our trade  and development policies; through 
USAID, for example, the  United  States has partnered with more than 45 countries to implement 
ambitious emissions reduction measures, protect critical ecosystems, transition to renewable 
energy, build resilience against th e impacts of climate change, and promote the flow of capital toward 
climate -positive investments.  
 
QUESTION 6:  What is the plan for the U.S. to promote equitable economic growth around the world 
in ways acceptable to its trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  As a proudly diverse nation, the  United  States strives to apply an intersectional 
approach to trade and investment that seeks to collaborate with trading partners to ensure that the 
benefits of trade reach historically underserved, underrepresented, and m arginalized communities. 
The United  States finds that many trading partners are similarly exploring how trade policy can be 
a constructive tool, within the broader economic toolbox, to address contemporary challenges, apply 
the lessons of history, and buil d for a more equitable and prosperous future.  They share the U.S. 
goals of creating well -paying jobs in safe, healthy, and respectful working conditions, redressing 
inequality, growing the middle class, and incentivizing climate and environmental action.  
 
Page 12, paragraph 7  
 
During the review period, the U.S. investment regime underwent a number of significant changes, 
including passing a new law and rules expanding the types of foreign investment subject to 
examination, the introduction of new reporting requirements for certain types of foreign direct 
investment, and the formalization and streamlining of the committee for the assessment of foreign 
investment in the telecommunications sector. A number of these changes have moved the U.S. 
policy direction t owards greater scrutiny of foreign investment transactions on national security 
grounds. In terms of investment restrictions, there remain 14 main categories of long -standing 
requirements or restrictions on foreign investment.  
 
QUESTION 7:  According to CFI US, over the past years, Chinese investment in the U.S. made based 
on simple declaration dropped radically, with only one such case in 2021.  
Does this mean that the U.S. had discrimination against Chinese enterprises in its review of simple 
declarations?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The United  States notes that the CFIUS process remains largely voluntary, where 
parties may elect to file a notice or submit a short -form declaration notifying CFIUS of an investment 
in order to receive a potential "safe harbor" letter (which l imits CFIUS from subsequently initiating 
a review of a transaction except in limited circumstances). Therefore, a decline in declarations 
submitted by investors from a particular country may reflect a decision by those investors to file a 
notice instead, a  decision by those investors not to voluntarily engage in the CFIUS process, and/or 
a decline in overall investment into the United  States by those investors.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 125 - 
 
  QUESTION 8:  If not, could the US provide any explanation for this shar [p] decline?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Please refer to the response to Question  7. 
 
QUESTION 9: Please explain the difference between normal and simple declarations in terms of 
how the declarations are handled?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  With the exception of certain transactions that are subject to the mand atory filing 
requirement authorized under FIRRMA, parties voluntarily submit declarations or notices of 
transactions to CFIUS. For transactions filed as notices, CFIUS has 45 days to complete its review. 
At the end of the review period, CFIUS may initiate an investigation that could last up to 45 additional 
days if CFIUS determines that it needs additional time to complete its assessment.  
 
Instead of a voluntary notice, parties may alternatively submit a declaration: an abbreviated 
notification to which the  Committee must respond within a 30 -day assessment period. After 
assessing a submitted declaration, CFIUS is authorized to (1)  request that parties file a written 
notice; (2)  inform the parties that the Committee is unable to conclude action with respect t o the 
transaction on the basis of the declaration and that the parties may file a written notice; (3)  initiate 
a unilateral review; or (4)  notify the parties that the Committee has concluded all action under 
section  721 of the Defense Production Act of  1950, as amended.  
 
QUESTION 10:  Please explain why CFIUS review of cases involving China's telecommunication 
industry lasted longer and followed more complex procedures.  
 
RESPONSE 10: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the  United  States and the Committee for 
the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications Services Sector 
each operate pursuant to different authorities, procedures, and timelines. For CFIUS, there is no 
difference in the timelines or procedures for th e Committee's review of transactions involving the 
telecommunications industry compared to its review of transactions involving other industries. 
However, the same transaction may be subject to separate reviews by both committees. CFIUS 
reviews may be comp leted in the initial 45 days or may proceed to the investigation phase of up to 
an additional 45 -days. Reviews by the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in 
the United  States Telecommunications Services Sector last no more than 120 days, with the 
potential for an additional 90 -day secondary assessment. More information about CFIUS is available 
here: https://h ome.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -
in-the-united -states -cfius. More information about the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign 
Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications Services Sector is availab le here: 
https://www.justice.gov/nsd/committee -assessment -foreign -participation -united -states -
telecommunications -service s-sector . 
 
QUESTION 11:  Please give a detailed description of the following issues: new law and rules 
introduced in the investment regime during the review period.  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The developments noted in the Secretariat Report, specifically the expansion o f 
authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the  United  States and the formalization of 
the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications 
Services Sector, are focused on protecting important U.S. n ational security interests.  
 
Specifically with respect to foreign investment, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization 
Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) expanded CFIUS's jurisdiction over "covered transactions" beyond 
transactions that could result in foreign c ontrol of a U.S. business to also include certain 
non-controlling, non -passive investments into certain businesses involved in critical technology, 
critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data. FIRRMA also extended CFIUS's jurisdiction to 
include tr ansactions which involve the purchase or lease by, or concession to, a foreign person of 
certain real estate in the  United  States, referred to in regulations as "covered real estate 
transactions". "Covered transactions" and "covered real estate transaction s" are defined at 31 C.F.R. 
Parts 800 and 802, respectively, and additional information is available on the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury's website: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-
foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -laws-and-guidance . More information about the 
Committee for the Assessment of For eign Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications 
Services Sector is available on the U.S. Department of Justice's website: WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 126 - 
 
  https://www.justice.gov/nsd/committee -assessment -foreign -participation -united -states -
telecommunications -services -sector . 
 
QUESTION 12:  The expanded types of foreign investment subject to examination.  
 
RESPONSE 12: Please refer to the response to Question  11. 
 
QUESTION 13:  The new reporting requirements for certain types of foreign direct investment and 
their implementation, e specially the specifics and the implementation of the Executive Order to 
Ensure Ro bust Reviews of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the  United  States and its impact on the U.S. security review regime for foreign in vestment.  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The President issued Executive Order 14083 of 15  September  2022 on Ensuring 
Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the  United  States, which provides direction to CFIUS by e laborating on existing statutory factors 
and adding several national security factors for CFIUS to consider during its review process. While 
the Executive Order provides important context for how CFIUS considers these national security 
factors when evaluat ing the transactions under its jurisdiction, it does not change CFIUS jurisdiction, 
operations, or process.  
 
QUESTION  14: Since the 2021, U.S. legislative and executive bodies have repeatedly indicated 
publicly that they are studying the introduction of la ws or executive orders relating to the review of 
U.S. outbound investment, including but not limited to H. R. 6329, H. R. 4521, s. 1854, and so on, 
and so on with the National Critical Capacity Act (NCCA) or the national critical capacity review 
(NCCR) and  so on. The draft authorizes the administration to review U.S. outbound investments and 
to modify, terminate or even cancel transactions and impose penalties.  
Please brief us on the enactment of the relevant bill, including the comments of stakeholders on the 
enactment of the bill.  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Has the U.S. assessed the impact of the bill on U.S. Foreign Investment and 
internationa l trade?  
RESPONSE 15:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 16:  Does the U.S. side believe that the relevant system is consistent with WTO rules 
and commitments under the GATS schedule?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 17 : What is your view on the relationship and connection between foreign investment 
review policy and national security?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the  United  States is an interagency 
committee of the U.S. Government authorized by law to review certain transactions involving foreign 
investment in the  United  States in order to dete rmine the effect of such transactions on U.S. national 
security. Each transaction that is notified to CFIUS is reviewed exclusively for national security 
purposes and based upon the specific facts and circumstances of the transaction. An illustrative list 
of factors that CFIUS considers in determining whether a particular transaction poses national 
security risk is available under Section  721(f) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 
as well as in published  guidance  on the U.S. Department  of the Treasury's  website  at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUSGuidance.pdf . The President issued Executive 
Order 14083 of 15  September  2022 on Ensuring Robust Considerat ion of Evolving National Security 
Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the  United  States, which provides direction to 
CFIUS by elaborating on existing statutory factors and adding several national security factors for 
CFIUS to consider during it s review process.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 127 - 
 
  QUESTION 18:  The Executive Order on Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security 
Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the  United  States clearly requires the CIFUS to 
focus on investments from competing or hostil e countries during reviews, and relevant laws contain 
specific definitions for competitors and major hostile countries of the  United  States.  
What is the view of the U.S. on the consistency of these measures with WTO rules, especially such 
provisions as MFN  treatment and the implementation of domestic laws and regulations in a unified, 
fair and reasonable manner?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  The President issued Executive Order 14083 of 15  September  2022 on Ensuring 
Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the  United  States, which provides direction to CFIUS by elaborating on existing statutory factors 
and adding several national security factors for CFIUS to consider during its review process. Each 
transaction that is notified to CFIUS is reviewed exclusively for national security purposes and based 
upon the specific facts and circumstances of the transaction. The CFIUS process enhances confidence 
in the  United  States' longstanding open investment policy by restricti ng only those foreign 
investments that pose unresolved national security concerns.  
 
Section  721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, as well as its implementing 
regulations at 31 C.F.R. Parts 800 and 802, set forth the requirements the Commit tee must meet in 
order to exercise its authorities with respect to a covered transaction. For example, any 
determination of the Committee to refer to the President to suspend or prohibit a covered 
transaction, or to negotiate, enter into or impose, or enfo rce any agreement or condition with respect 
to a covered transaction must be based on a risk -based analysis, conducted by the Committee, of 
the effects on the national security of the  United  States of the covered transaction, including credible 
evidence de monstrating the risk and an assessment of the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences 
to national security related to the transaction. The underlying legal authorities provide transparency 
with respect to the timeframes and processes for transaction revi ews and related activities.  
 
QUESTION 19:  Will normal international trade order and market competition be distorted or 
otherwise affected by stricter reviews of foreign investment transactions?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  Please refer to the response to Question  18. 
 
QUESTION 20:  In 2018 and 2019, Chinese investment in the was equivalent to only 8.1% of 
Japanese investment in the, according to the Ministry of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis 
website and the CFIUS ann ual report, but the number of transactions reviewed by CFIUS is 
equivalent to 86% of the number reviewed in Japan, which is 10 times more likely to be reviewed.  
Does this mean that the U.S. is discriminating in the selection of transactions for review.  
RESPONSE 20:  CFIUS reviews transactions solely on the basis of national security and does not 
single out investors from any specific country. Each transaction is reviewed on a case -by-case basis 
based on individual facts and circumstances. Filing a notice or submitting a declaration of a 
transaction with CFIUS remains largely voluntary.  
 
Page 12, paragraph 10  
 
Most of the products subject to import prohibitions, restrictions, or licensing remained unchanged 
during the review period. However, the American Innov ation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act of 2020 
set up an allowance and trading program for importers of certain hydrofluorocarbons and new rules 
were put in place to implement amendments to the Lacey Act for the importation of certain plant 
and plant products. Amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act also imposed new 
prohibitions on shrimp and other fish and fish products caught in the Upper Gulf of California.  
 
QUESTION 21 : Is unfair competition involved in the setting up of an allowance and trading progr am 
for importers of certain hydrofluorocarbons and the putting in place of new rules?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Please see the website for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for more 
information on the implementation of the AIM and the phasedown of hydrofl uorocarbons: 
https://www.epa.gov/climate -hfcs-reduction . 
 
Page 13, paragraph 14  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 128 - 
 
  The United  States cooperates with other countries in many instances to restrict exports of defense 
articles and dual -use goods and technologies or to deter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons and related technologies.  
 
QUESTION 2 2: On 7 October, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued export control measures.  
Has the U.S. reached an agreement on the implementation of the new rules and relevant trading 
partners?  
Please describe concrete progress.  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The public comment pe riod on this interim final rule closes on 31  January  2023: 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/federal -register -notices#10132022 . 
 
Page 13, parag raph 15  
 
The Export -Import Bank (EXIM), the official export credit agency, has been reauthorized through 
2026. EXIM's Congressional mandates include mandates addressing small businesses, sub -Saharan 
Africa, environmentally beneficial goods and services, an d China and transformational exports. As a 
long-standing impasse restricting EXIM's ability to engage in long -term finance was resolved in 2019, 
EXIM still has more than USD  90 billion of available lending authority.  
 
QUESTION 23 : Could the U.S. please bri ef on the EXIM -related current policies and 
implementation.  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The most up -to-date information on EXIM's current policies and procedures can be 
found at www.EXIM.gov on the policies  page ( https://www.exim.gov/policies ) and CTEP page  
(https://www.exim.gov/about/ special -initiatives/ctep ). 
 
Page 13, paragraph 16  
 
... Nearly USD  1 trillion, including forgivable loans, was channeled through the Small Business 
Administration, notably through the Paycheck Protection Program and COVID -19 Economic Injury 
Disaster Loans.  
 
QUESTION 24 : Please specify how the additional USD  1 trillion of subsidy was used, including 
where was it used and whom did it go to.  
 
RESPONSE 24:  For data and reports on the Paycheck Protection Program including forgiveness 
reports, data on achieving eq uity, program reports, and loan data, please see PPP data (sba.gov). 
For program reports and data regarding Economic Injury Disaster Loans, please see EIDL data 
(sba.gov).  
 
QUESTION 25: Does it involve any breach of WTO rules?  
 
QUESTION 26: Has it been notified to the WTO?  
 
RESPONSE 25 and 26:  The United  States considers that all of the actions taken during the 
pandemic have been consistent with our WTO obligations. In its next subsidy notification, 
the United  States will notify any subsidies that meet t he criteria of Article  25.2 of the 
SCM Agreement.  
 
Page 13, paragraph 17  
 
As regards competition policy, the  United  States recently adopted a "whole -of-government" 
approach to fostering competition in U.S. markets and to vigorously enforcing antitrust laws . Some 
recent legislative developments included the permanent extension of incentives for corporations to 
self-report their involvement in criminal antitrust conspiracies and the enhancement of protections 
for employees denouncing criminal antitrust violat ions. Mergers in the healthcare and 
pharmaceutical industry drew significant activity for enforcement agencies during the review period. 
Savings to U.S. consumers related to merger and non -merger enforcement activities by antitrust 
agencies were estimated at USD  12.9 billion in FY2019 and FY2020.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 129 - 
 
  QUESTION 27:  Please provide more details of the "whole -of-government" approach and how it can 
promote competition in the US market.  
 
RESPONSE  27: Further  information  on this issue can be found  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/b
riefing -room/statements -releases/2021/07/09/fact -sheet -executive -order -on-promo ting-
competition -in-the-american -economy/ . 
 
QUESTION 28:  Please provide details of the latest legislative moves of the U.S., including but not 
limited to what has been mentioned in the report.  
 
RESPONSE 28:  In 2020, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhanceme nt and Reform Permanent 
Extension Act became law. The Act reauthorizes the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and 
Reform Act (ACPERA) and repeals the sunset provision therein. Congress enacted ACPERA in 2004 
in part to provide greater incentives for co rporations to self -report and cooperate pursuant to the 
Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy. Since 2004, ACPERA's provisions have substantially 
strengthened the Antitrust Division's ability to detect and prosecute anticompetitive cartel activity  
through the Leniency Program. ACPERA will continue to mitigate a successful leniency applicant's 
civil damages exposure from treble damages to actual damages if the company provides civil 
plaintiffs with timely and satisfactory cooperation.  
 
The Criminal Antitrust Anti -Retaliation Act was signed into law on 23  December  2020. The Act 
prohibits employers from taking punitive action against certain individuals who report potential 
criminal antitrust violations. It also affords protections to individuals who a ssist a federal government 
investigation or proceeding, and it allows individuals to vindicate those protections by filing a 
complaint with the Department of Labor or, under certain circumstances, by bringing an action in 
district court.  
 
As to ongoing leg islative efforts, the  United  States cannot comment on these as the TPR process is 
retrospective in nature.  
 
Page 14, paragraph 19  
 
The United  States is a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Government 
procurement at the federal and stat e levels is decentralized. A number of "Made in America Laws" 
are in place for procurement not covered by the GPA or other trade agreements. Regulatory changes 
were introduced in January  2021, which put in place the new Made in America initiative and 
estab lished the Made in America Office (MIAO) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
The new policy aims at increasing procurement from domestic sources and reducing the number of 
waivers to Buy American provisions by making them subject to review. A lso in January  2021, a Final 
Rule was published that modified the implementation of the Buy American Act (BAA) by increasing 
the domestic content requirements to 55%, and the margin of price preference for domestic end 
products and construction material co ntained in the BAA from 6% to 20% for large businesses, and 
from 12% to 30% for small businesses. Also, foreign iron and steel products must be less than 5% 
of the cost of all components in the product. U.S. procurement policy makes use of set -aside 
progra ms to foster the participation of small businesses, veteran -owned small businesses, small 
disadvantaged businesses, HUBZone businesses, and women -owned small businesses in the 
procurement process. Under the Small Business Act, government purchases with an anticipated 
value above the micro -purchase threshold of USD  10,000, and up to USD  250,000, are to be 
automatically and exclusively set aside for small businesses, provided there are at least two or more 
small business concerns that are competitive in terms  of market prices, quality, and delivery. The 
same applies for construction contracts with a value of USD  1.5 million or more.  
 
QUESTION 29 : Are the above -mentioned practices of the U.S. a trade subsidy in disguise?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  No. The referenced practices refer to domestic preferences in federal procurement 
policy. The text of the WTO  Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) establishes rules 
requiring that open, fair and transparent conditions of competition be ensured in government 
procurement. However, only those procurement activities that are carried out by covered entities 
purchasing listed goods, services or construction services of a value exceeding specified threshold 
values are covered by 
the Agreement.  These  schedules  are publicly available  here:  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e
/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm . In acquisitions covered by the GPA, and other relevant international WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 130 - 
 
  trade agreements, th e U.S. Trade Representative has waived the Buy American statute and other 
discriminatory  provisions  for eligible  products.  See FAR 25.402  
(https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). For more information on procedures relating to 
procurement covered by the TAA, including the GPA, please refer to FAR 25.408 
(https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.408 ). 
 
QUESTION 30:  Do the above -mentioned practices of the U.S. result in de facto discrimination 
against enterprises in other trading partners and cause losses in business activities to these 
enterprises?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  The above referenced laws refer to domestic preferences in federal procurement 
programs. Su ch programs explicitly afford preferences to domestic enterprises in procurement 
opportunities within established thresholds and in a manner consistent with existing U.S. trade 
agreement obligations.  
 
Page 14, paragraph 21  
 
Payments under the MFP totaled n early USD  27 billion between 2018 and 2020, when the program 
was phased out. Estimated outlays under the FPDP were USD  1,144  million in FY2019 and 
USD 1,203  million in FY2020. The ATP allocated USD  300 million to 59 organizations in 2019. USDA 
received fun ding for measures to mitigate or prevent the effects of the COVID -19 pandemic in 
FY2020 to which nearly USD  87 billion of supplementary appropriations were added in FY2021. 
Almost USD  50 billion of the USD  78.5 billion in total COVID -19 outlays in FY2021 w ere spent to 
boost the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The initial Coronavirus Food Assistance 
Program (CFAP) announced in April  2020 comprised USD  16 billion in direct support to eligible 
farmers and ranchers and USD  3 billion for food purchase s. As additional funding became available 
through the USDA Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), CFAP 2 was launched in summer 2020. 
CFAP (1 and 2) payments totaled USD  23.5 billion in 2020 and USD  9.3 billion in 2021 (projected); 
CCC-funded payments, some U SD 12 billion, were mostly paid in FY2021.  
 
QUESTION 31 : China noted that CFAP and MFP included crops such as cotton, soybean, rapeseed, 
corn and wheat, as well as dairy products, livestock, wool, fruits and vegetables. Payments were 
directly linked to pri ce or production of those products ，which the U.S. notifies as Amber Box 
support.  
Between 2018 and 2021, the amount of payments for these temporary programs has increased year 
by year. Does the U.S. see this trend of Amber Box support in line with the aim o f the reform in the 
Agreement on Agriculture "to provide for substantial progressive reduction in agricultural support"?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  Increased expenditures in 2018 -19 through 2020 -21 were due to emergency 
assistance programs, which are no longer in effec t and were designed to be targeted, temporary, 
and to minimize any market impacts.  The United  States is actively engaged in advancing agricultural 
reform at the WTO and looks forward to working with other Members to find solutions that reduce 
distortions i n agricultural markets, while also increasing the resiliency and sustainability of food 
systems to reduce global food insecurity.  
 
QUESTION 32:  Please offer more information on the reasons behind the increases in spending 
under these programs.  
 
RESPONSE 32: The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program and the Market Facilitation Program 
accounted for much of the increase in expenditures in support to producers in recent years. Both 
programs had a specific amount of funding authorized, funding is no longer avai lable, and the 
programs are no longer in effect.  
 
QUESTION 33:  Has any evaluation ever been carried out on the impact of MFP and CFAP on the 
international agricultural products market?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  The United  States is not aware of any such evaluation.  
 
QUESTION 34:  Since the above -mentioned subsidies belong to the USDA temporary programs and 
the amount has increased rapidly in recent years, has U.S. been exploring a new trend of subsidy 
approach?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 131 - 
 
  RESPONSE 34:  No. 
 
QUESTION 35:  Has the U.S. assessed the i mpact of this new trend in temporary subsidies on WTO 
rules and dispute settlement, and what demonstration effect will it have on WTO members?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  No. 
 
QUESTION 36:  Although the title of these temporary programs are different, the elements are 
highly overlapping, including the sub -programs (such as specialty crops), the products covered, the 
calculating of payments, etc. In view of this, does the  United  States consid er reporting the 
"temporary program" as one or several fixed subsidy measures in DS: 1, so as to maintain the 
stability of notification framework and ensure effective member supervision? If not, please explain 
why. 
 
RESPONSE 36: The United  States' notifica tions comply with WTO rules and notification guidelines.  
 
QUESTION 37:  Are the above -mentioned practices of the U.S. agricultural trade subsidies in 
disguise after it has no reason to launch a trade war against other members, thus violating relevant 
WTO ru les? 
 
RESPONSE 37:  The United  States disagrees with the basis of the question. The  United  States 
notified these measures consistent with its WTO obligations.  
 
Page 15, paragraph 24  
 
... Pharmaceutical manufacturers developing COVID -19 vaccines and related goods received 
government assistance, as the authorities aimed at accelerating the domestic production of 
medicines, personal protective equipment, critical inputs, finished drugs, and other finished devices.  
QUESTION 38:  Please specify the government assi stance for medicines, personal protective 
equipment, critical inputs, finished drugs and other finished devices.  
 
RESPONSE 38:  The Secretariat Report covers all the COVID -19 related U.S. government 
expenditures, including expenditures for vaccines and medi cines, in great detail on pages 22 -26, 
paras 1.13 -1.20, as well as Boxes 1.1 and 1.2.  
 
Page 15, paragraph 26  
 
...On the policy side, efforts seeking to reduce the digital divide in services, the establishment of the 
Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications 
Services Sector, and a growing interest among policymakers in the security and protection of 
telecommunications infrastructure shaped the main regulatory changes.  
 
QUESTION 39 : What are the new acts lau nched in the U.S. for the regulation of the 
telecommunication industry?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  The Secretariat Report describes the main trade -related changes in regulation since 
the last TPR. Please refer to paragraphs 4.229 – 4.235 of the report. One can also vie w and search 
all changes to FCC regulations (Title 47) for any time period at: https://www.ecfr.gov/recent -
changes?search%5Bdate%5D=current&sear ch%5Bhierarchy%5D%5Btitle%5D=4 . 
 
QUESTION 40:  What are the changes regarding the procedures and standards?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  Please refer to the previous response.  
 
QUESTION 41:  Are the changes targeted at specific countries and industries?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  No. 
 
QUESTION 42: Citing national security risks, the Federal Communications Commission has banned 
telecoms products and video surveillance equipment from the Huawei and other four Chinese 
companies from being imported and sold in the US.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 132 - 
 
  What is the factu al basis for this decision?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  As we indicated in the response to China's same question from its first set of 
questions, with limited exceptions, the  United  States does not publicly disclose the information used 
in making these determinations.  
 
QUESTION 43:  How do civilian products threaten the U.S. national security?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  Many products have both civilian applications as well as terrorism, military, or 
weapons of mass destruction -related applications. Many countries, including China, reg ulate such 
products on the basis of national security. Executive Order 13873 provides a rationale with respect 
to information  and communication  technologies.  See: 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/17/2019 -10538/securing -the-information -
and-communications -technology -and-services -supply -chain . 
 
Page 20 -21, paragraph 1.9 & 1.11  
 
The Off ice of Management and Budget's (OMB) FY2022 Budget forecasts real GDP growth of 3.3% 
in 2022, 2.2% in 2023, 1.8% in 2024 and 2025, and 1.9% in the following two years, with consumer 
price index (CPI) increases of around 2.3% -2.5%, and an unemployment rate stabilizing at around 
3.8%. These forecasts now seem a bit optimistic with respect to inflation.  
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts for FY2022 to FY2025 project real GDP growth of 
6.1% in FY2022, slowing to 2% in FY2023, and to just above 1% i n the following two years 
(Table  1.3). Real potential GDP growth, which increased from 1.9% in FY2020 and 2021 to 2.1% in 
FY2022, reflects the effect of the economic packages implemented to recover from COVID -19; 
however, according to CBO estimates, the ef fect will be temporary and potential growth will return 
to 1.9% by FY2025.  
 
QUESTION 44:  How does the U.S. compare the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) forecasts 
of real GDP growth in FY2022 with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) figures and why ? 
 
RESPONSE 44:  As the President's Budget notes, there can be variation across economic forecasts 
for a range of reasons. A standard reason relates to timing: a forecast finalized more recently can 
take advantage of more current data. With respect to diffe rences between OMB and CBO forecasts 
in particular, assumptions on fiscal policy also differ substantially. OMB assumes that the President's 
proposed policies will be implemented in full. In contrast, by statute CBO's forecasts must be made 
under the "curr ent law" assumption, and hence do not take into account any of the President's 
proposed policies or other changes to fiscal policy.  
 
Page 24, paragraph 1.20  
 
... The ARP Act, inter alia, includes provisions on aid to state and local governments, hard -hit 
industries and communities, and tax changes; sends direct stimulus payments of USD  1,400 to 
eligible individuals; extends the unemployment benefit programs; provides direct aid to state and 
local governments; adds resources to the vaccination program; and i ncreases funding for school 
reopening.  
 
QUESTION  45: Please specify to which fields the federal aid to state and local government as 
provided for in the ARP Act are allocated.  
 
RESPONSE 45:  Much of the federal aid to state and local governments was provided to be spent at 
the discretion of the state or local government. Federalism within the  United  States means that 
non-federal governments may know the needs and desires of their regions bett er than the federal 
government. While some provisions were added to constrain waste of ARP funds, state and local 
governments had significant discretion about the funds' use. Additionally, the federal aid provided 
to individuals and businesses, while not n ecessarily flowing through the state and local governments, 
helped the revenue side of those entities.  
 
QUESTION 46:  How does it comply with relevant WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The ARP is fully consistent with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreements.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  30, paragraph 1.30 -1.31 
 
After slightly exceeding the longer -run 2% goal at times in 2017 and 2018, 12 -month PCE inflation 
remained below 2% throughout 2019 and 2020. The recessionary effect of the pandemic resulted in 
the CPI rising just 1.2% and PCE pri ce inflation of 1.3% in 2020, allowing the Federal Reserve space 
for a more accommodative policy. In 2021, the CPI rose rapidly, by 4.7%, reflecting in part a 20.8% 
increase in energy prices, but also supply shortages linked to the pandemic increased deman d, while 
the PCE Price Index rose by 5.8% (Table  1.6). 
Price inflation accelerated in the second half of 2021 and in early 2022, encompassing price increases 
in areas other than energy. The CPI increased 1.2% at a monthly rate in March  2022; over the 
12 months ending March  2022, CPI inflation was 8.5%. Increases in prices of food, electricity, and 
shelter were the largest contributors to higher inflation. Core inflation (CPI excluding food and 
energy) rose 6.5% in the 12  months ending March  2022, the larges t 12-month change since the 
period ending August  1982; over the same 12 -month period, the energy index rose 32%, and the 
food index increased 8.8%.  
 
QUESTION 47:  Does the U.S. plan to revise its longer -run 2% inflation goal, taking into account 
the PCE fig ures for 2021 and 2022?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  There is no current plan to revise its inflation goal.  
 
QUESTION 48: Does the U.S. consider the increase of the energy index to be under control?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  Recent readings of the energy component of the CPI and PCE  price index have 
shown substantial declines in energy prices. While earlier world events such as Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine led to elevated energy prices and concerns about future supply, the world has adapted to 
uncertain times. America's ability to ut ilize the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has helped calm 
markets, and ensured the future investment needed to maintain stable oil prices in the future.  
 
Page 39, paragraph 2.8  
 
U.S. trade policy is currently undergoing a shift, and 2021 was a year of transiti on as the 
Administration pursues its Build Back Better agenda (Section  2.2.2.1). In the first outline of its trade 
policy agenda in March  2021, the Administration highlighted the following nine main themes: 
(i) tackling the COVID -19 pandemic and restoring the economy; (ii)  putting workers at the center 
of trade policy; (iii)  putting the world on a sustainable environment and climate path; (iv)  advancing 
racial equity and supporting underserved communities; (v)  addressing China's economic trade 
practices thr ough a comprehensive strategy; (vi)  partnering with friends and allies; (vii)  standing 
up for U.S. farmers, ranchers, food manufacturers, and fishers; (viii)  promoting equitable economic 
growth around the world; and (ix)  making the rules count.  
 
QUESTION 4 9: Please explain the reason, content and possible impact of the such shift mentioned 
in the report.  
 
RESPONSE 49:  This is the Secretariat's assessment. We invite Members to review the U.S. 
Government Report (WT/TPR/G/434), particularly sections 1 ("The  United States in the Global 
Trading System"), 3 ("Advancing a Worker -Centered Trade Policy"), and 5 ("Trade Policy 
Developments since 2018"). We also invite Members to review the 2022 Trade Policy Agenda of the 
President of the  United  States,  found  here:  
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20An
nual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 50:  How will t he U.S. ensure that such shift do no harm to multilateralism and the 
multilateral trading system represented by the WTO?  
 
RESPONSE 50:  We do not see a contradiction between U.S. trade policy and the multilateral trading 
system.  
 
QUESTION  51: Please specify what policy and measures the U.S. will use to promote equitable 
growth around the world.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 134 - 
 
  RESPONSE 51:  Regarding future plans for oth er actions in this area, the  United  States reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises. That said, improving the quality, 
granularity, scope, and availability of data and research is part of a whole -of-government effort to 
advance  equity. The  United  States continues to support economic development throughout the 
world.  
 
QUESTION  52: Please introduce in detail the implementation of the Build Back Better agenda and 
the extent to which the established policy objectives have been achieved.  
 
RESPONSE 52:  We invite Members to review the U.S. Government Report (WT/TPR/G/434), 
particularly s ections 1 ("The  United  States in the Global Trading System"), 3 ("Advancing a  
Worker -Centered Trade Policy"), and 5 ("Trade Policy Developments since 2018"). We also invite 
Members  to review  the 2022 Trade  Policy  Agenda  of the President  of the United  States, found  here:  
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20A n
nual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUES TION 53:  The U.S. government has re -calibrated its policy direction after withdrawing from 
the Paris Agreement. How can the U.S. ensure the stability and continuity of its policy direction?  
 
RESPONSE 53:  The United  States is committed to achieving a net -zero emissions economy by no 
later than 2050, as evidenced by the many legislative, regulatory, and other measures we have 
taken. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 54:  The United  States has offered to partner with friends and allies and to address 
Chinese trade practices through a comprehensive strategy. Does the  United  States believe that there 
are any other WTO members whose trade policies/practices fall into the catego ries of "Friend, Ally" 
trade policies/practices and "Non -friend" trade policies/practices?  
 
RESPONSE 54:  We are unable to answer this question because we do not recognize such categories.  
 
QUESTION 55:  As a founding member of the GATT and WTO, could the  United States state what 
rules it considers to define this distinction?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  Please see the response to Question  54. 
 
QUESTION  56: "Rules first" is one of the priorities of U.S. trade policy. Please explain the definition 
of rules.  
 
RESPONSE 56:  We do not recognize the concept of "rules first", and therefore we are not in a 
position to accept China's assertion that this concept is a priority of U.S. trade policy.  
 
QUESTION 57:  Do U.S. rules treat all WTO members equally?  
 
RESPONSE 57:  U.S. laws and regulations are consistent with our WTO obligations.  
 
QUESTION 58:  Are the recent trade negotiations promoted by the  United  States in accordance with 
the rules of the  United  States and WTO?  
 
RESPONSE 58:  U.S. trade negotiations are consistent with our WTO obligations.  
 
Page 40, paragraph 2.9  
 
... The Administration conti nued to address the issue of critical supply chains through its 100 -day 
assessment for four critical products in particular: semiconductor manufacturing and advanced 
packaging, large -capacity batteries, critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals and active 
pharmaceutical ingredients. As part of this assessment, recommendations were made on 
strengthening international trade rules through trade enforcement mechanisms.  
 
QUESTION  59: After the 100 -day supply chain assessment, which trade enforcement m easures did 
the US strengthen? Please provide details.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 135 - 
 
  RESPONSE  59: Please see the full 100 -day supply chain review report at: 
https://www.whiteho use.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/100 -day-supply -chain -review -
report.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 60:  What are the reasons for enforcement targeting specific fields?  
 
RESPONSE 60:  Please see the response to Question  59. 
 
QUESTION 61:  Are some countries targeted?  
 
RESPO NSE 61:  Please see the response to Question  58. 
 
QUESTION 62:  Do the above -mentioned measures overlap with other anti -dumping and 
anti-subsidy measures and do they constitute misuse of trade remedies? Please provide details.  
 
RESPONSE 62:  We disagree with the premise of the question. The  United  States conducts all of its 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty proceedings in a manner consistent with U.S. law its WTO 
commitments.  
 
Page 40, paragraph 2.10  
 
The United  States has been involved and engaged in the negotiations taking place in the WTO, or 
under its auspices in a plurilateral form, i.e. fisheries subsidies, agriculture, e -commerce, and 
domestic regulation. In her opening speech for the 12th Ministerial  Conference  (MC12), the USTR 
stressed the United  States' commitment to the WTO. Noting that the WTO rules had contributed to 
maintaining the flow of global trade and fostered transparency on measures taken by countries to 
respond to the (COVID ‑19) crisis, she encouraged Members to be clear -eyed about the challenges 
we face today and rise to meet this moment. She urged the WTO Members with the capabilities to 
commit at MC12 to exempt their donations to the World Food Program from any export restrictions. 
She encouraged Members to engage in conve rsations about the role of the WTO in development, 
the risks of widening inequality, fundamental worker rights and employment, and the role of trade 
to be part of the solution in addressing climate change, and to send a clear message to the world 
that a re form effort that is open and inclusive, that repositions the WTO to deliver on its foundational 
goals, and enables the organization to adapt to changing global realities, would be undertaken.  
 
QUESTION 63:  What's the U.S. plan to include trade in the frame work of combating climate 
change?  
 
RESPONSE 63:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. Please refer to the section, New Agreements and Approaches 
to Advancing Our Climate Goals and P rotecting the Environment starting  on page 4 of the 
President's  2022 Trade  Policy  Agenda,  available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/defa ult/files/2022%20Tr
ade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
Page 40, paragraph 2.11  
 
... In 2018, following the inaugural meeting of the U.S. -China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue 
(CED), the U.S. Administration indicated that it wou ld pursue a new approach to the  United  States' 
engagement with China. One manifestation of this new approach was USTR's investigation of acts, 
policies, and practices of China relating to technology transfer, intellectual property (IP), and 
innovation unde r Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which led to the  United  States' imposition of 
tariffs on Chinese imports beginning in June  2018.The  United  States and China subsequently 
entered into an economic and trade agreement in January  2020 that became known as the Phase 
One Economic and Trade Agreement (Phase One Agreement). In October  2021, USTR outlined its 
new approach to or strategic vision for the U.S. -China trade relationship. The main elements include 
discussing with China its performance under the Pha se One Agreement, beginning a targeted tariff 
exclusion process, raising state -centered and non -market trade practice policy concerns, using the 
full range of tools to address those concerns, and continuing to work with allies to define new and 
fair trade rules for the 21st century.  
 
QUESTION 64:  How many products have been excluded from Section  301 tariffs list and what is 
the proportion in all taxed products?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 136 - 
 
   
RESPONSE 64:  Most of the Section  301 tariffs were imposed at the 8 -digit tariff level. USTR gran ted 
approximately 2,200 exclusions. Of these, 2,120 were for specific products under 10 -digit tariff 
codes and 89 were for entire 10 -digit tariff lines. In all, USTR excluded products from 1,143 10 -digit 
tariff lines.  
 
QUESTION  65: The U.S. vision for trad e policy includes working with allies to define new and 
fair trade rules for the 21st century. Is there any possibility that this "new and fair trade rules for the 
21st century" could be inconsistent with WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 65:  China's question asks abou t the WTO consistency of unspecified future rules. We 
decline to speculate in the abstract, but we see no inherent contradiction between the concept of 
"new and fair trade rules for the 21st century" and our WTO obligations.  
 
Page 41, paragraph 2.12  
 
... the  United  States is beginning to consider the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), which is slated to expire in  2025. The U.S. Government has numerous ongoing trade 
capacity -building initiatives and has stated that it is looking to  deepen its trade and economic 
relationship through the Prosper Africa initiative, which was launched in 2019 and renewed by the 
current Administration. The Administration has also stated that it is seeking to use trade policy tools 
with African partners t o promote investment, equitable and inclusive development, and sustainable 
trade. In addition, it is working to support the negotiation and implementation of the African 
Continental Free Trade Area.  
 
QUESTION  66: What countries can participate in the Prosp er Africa Initiative?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  Prosper Africa works with partner countries across the entire continent.  
 
QUESTION 67:  How could the U.S. ensure the criteria or conditions for participation in the initiative 
be guaranteed to be open, objective, uncondi tional and non -discriminatory?  
 
RESPONSE 67:  According to the Prosper Africa Secretariat, the goal of the initiative is to 
substantially increase two -way trade and investment between the  United  States and African 
countries. This means Prosper Africa supports viable business opportunities wherever U.S. 
Government engagement can be effective and decisive.  
 
QUESTION 68:  In the past years, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Eritrea, the Central  African  Republic, and 
Côte d'Ivoire were successively removed from the A GOA beneficiary list. The reasons given in 
Table  2.4 are mostly related to technology or infrastructure. Does this involve an intentional 
circumvention of political reasons?  
 
RESPONSE 68:  To qualify for AGOA benefits, countries must meet a series of eligib ility criteria set 
forth in: (1)  section 104 of the AGOA legislation (19  U.S.C. 3703); and (2)  section 502 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 (19  U.S.C. 2462): https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 106th-congress/house -bill/434 . 
Neither technology nor infrastructure however are part of the eligibility criteria.  
 
QUESTION 69:  Please specify the standard for inclusion as an AGOA beneficiary.  
 
RESPONSE 69:  To qualify for AGOA benefits, countries must meet the eligibility criteria, on an 
annual basis, that is set forth in: (1)  section 104 of AGOA (19  U.S.C. 3703); and (2)  section 502 of 
the Trade Act of 1974 (19  U.S.C. 2462) (see above for link).  
 
QUESTION 70:  According to statistics, sin ce 2010, US investment in Africa has been declining and 
African export to the US also has had a shrinking share in the total.  
Could the U.S. provide an explanation for the above -mentioned declines?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  The United  States maintains a strong trade a nd investment relationship with the 
African continent with a growing number of American companies doing business with Africa across 
a wide array of economic sectors. Oil has historically been one of Africa's main exports to 
the United  States and the declin e in value of African exports is mainly the result of the lower value 
of oil imports.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 137 - 
 
  Page 41, paragraph 2.14  
 
In January  2021, the Administration launched its initiative on Buy American policies with an 
Executive Order outlining a government -wide proposal  to use government procurement as one 
method to strengthen American manufacturing.  
 
QUESTION 71:  Please explain the details of the proposal of the Buy American Act.  
 
RESPONSE 71:  The final rule, published as FAC 2022 -05, amends the Federal Acquisition Regu lation 
(FAR) to implement section 8 of E.O. 14005. Upon the 25  October  2022, effective date, the final FAR 
rule changes the domestic content threshold to 60% immediately, then to 65% for items delivered 
starting in calendar year 2024, and then to 75% for i tems delivered starting in calendar year 2029. 
Local content requirements under Buy America laws apply fully to federal procurement contracts 
above the micro -purchase threshold, unless waived or excepted. All provisions relating to domestic 
content require ment are directed, by statute, to be applied in accordance with any applicable 
obligations of the  United  States under international agreements. For more information on the final 
rule, please see the discussion of the final rule, published in the federal re gister, available at: 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/07/2022 -04173/federal -acquisition -
regulation -amendments -to-the-far-buy-american -act-requirements . 
 
QUESTION 72:  How does the U.S. ensure that this proposal will not discriminate against the goods 
of other members?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  In general, the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) provid es the authority for the President 
to waive the Buy American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products from 
countries that have signed an international trade agreement with the  United  States, or that meet 
certain other criteria, suc h as being a least developed country. The President has delegated this 
waiver authority to the U.S. Trade Representative. In acquisitions covered by the WTO  GPA, Free 
Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative has waived the Buy 
American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products. These waiver designations 
granted under the TAA are reflected in the FAR and incorporated into the FAR's detailed procedures 
for agency procurement. Offers of eligible products  receive equal consideration with domestic offers. 
See FAR 25.402 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). For additional information on procedures 
designed to ensure fairness, see FAR 25.408 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.408 ) and FAR 
subpart 14.400 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/14.400 ). For additional information on appeal and 
protest procedures, please refer to FAR Part 33 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part -33). 
Page 45, paragraph 2.29  
 
The United  States continued its practice of providing several unilateral preference programs to 
developing and least developed countries during the review period: the AGOA, focused on countries 
in Africa; the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 
and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnersh ip Act (CBTPA)), which focus on Caribbean/Central 
American countries; and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for a large number of 
developing and least developed countries throughout the world. The two most significant 
developments during the peri od were: (i)  the expiry of the GSP program in December  2020 – to 
date (January  2022), the program had still not been renewed, although several initiatives were taken 
in that direction (see below); and (ii)  the renewal of preferences under the CBTPA until 2 030. 
 
QUESTION 73:  When will Congress re -authorize GSP?  
 
RESPONSE 73 : The U.S. Congress is currently deliberating on when and how it will update and 
renew the program.  
 
QUESTION 74:  What has been the economic impact of the expiration of GSP?  
 
RESPONSE 74 : We do not have data regarding the economic impact of the lapse in GSP benefits . 
 
Page 49, paragraph 2.38  
 
On 15  January  2020, the  United  States and China concluded an Economic and Trade Agreement 
covering a variety of trade and related matters; it entered into force on 14  February  2020. The WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 138 - 
 
  Agreement includes operational chapters on IP, technology transfer, trade in food and agricultural 
products, financial services, macroeconomic policies and exchange rate matters and transparency, 
expanding trade, and bil ateral evaluation and dispute resolution.  
 
QUESTION 75:  In the Phase One Agreement, the U.S. committed to open to China the market of 
tangerine, fragrant pear, fresh date, and cooked poultry. For tangerine products from China, the 
U.S. imposed over 300  inspection and quarantine requirements (e.g. core temperature kept at no 
higher than 1.67°C for 22 days or more), the numbers of which are far more and stricter than 
imports from other sources. Please provide scientific basis for such stringent requirements.  
 
RESPONSE 75:  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) published a risk analysis 
for public comment on 1  May 2019 and published a final notice of its "Decision to Authorize the 
Importation of Fresh Citrus From China Into the Continental Unite d States" on 15  April 2020. These 
publications identify the scientific basis for the establishment of phytosanitary measures that must 
be undertaken to export China -origin citrus to the  United  States while meeting our appropriate level 
of protection agains t quarantine pest threats.  
 
QUESTION 76:  Please explain whether it goes against the WTO MFN clause to impose stricter 
requirements on products from China than those from other places of origin.  
 
RESPONSE 76:  As a Member of the WTO, the  United  States adhere s to the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS  Agreement), which allows Members to 
apply sanitary and phytosanitary measures to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection from risk.  
 
Page 51, paragraph 2.41  
 
There have been several developments in the  United  States' investment regime during the review 
period, with a new law and rules expanding the types of foreign investment subject to examination, 
new reporting requirements for certain types o f FDI, and the formalization and streamlining of the 
committee for the assessment of foreign investment in the telecommunications sector. Thus, there 
has been a marked move towards greater scrutiny of foreign investment transactions on national 
security gr ounds.  
 
QUESTION 77:  The U.S. launched a number of rules and regulations to expand the coverage of 
review of foreign investment transactions. It has also been reported that the Congress and the 
White  House are planning to issue rules for outbound investmen ts too.  
Please specify relevant considerations.  
Does greater coverage of investment review go against the openness for investment commitment 
made by the U.S. President on 8  June 2021?  
 
RESPONSE 77:  The United  States welcomes foreign investment and remains committed to 
maintaining an open investment policy. The developments noted in Paragraph 2.41 of the Secretariat 
Report, specifically the expansion of authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investm ent in 
the United  States and the formalization of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation 
in the  United  States Telecommunications Services Sector, are focused on protecting important U.S. 
national security interests and enhance confidence  in the longstanding U.S. open investment policy 
by continuing to restrict only those foreign investments that pose national security concerns. 
Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION  78: How can the U.S. ensure that such reviews will not affect normal business 
behaviours and will not discriminate against investors from specific countries?  
 
RESPONSE 78:  Please refer to the response to Question  77. 
 
Page 53, paragraph 2.50  
 
CFIUS is an interagency committee of the Government that is authorized to review certain 
transactions involving foreign investment in the  United  States and certain real estate transactions 
by foreign persons, to determine the effect of such transactions on n ational security. CFIUS operates 
pursuant to statutes, Executive Order, and regulations administered by the Department of the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 139 - 
 
  Treasury. During the review period, there was no change in the composition of CFIUS, and it is still 
composed of nine Cabinet memb ers, two ex officio members, and several White House offices that 
observe and participate, as appropriate, and other relevant agencies depending on the particular 
transaction under review. However, CFIUS's underlying review procedures, the type of transact ions 
examined, and the laws and regulations governing them underwent significant changes during the 
review period. Among other things, the  United  States introduced mandatory filing and review of 
certain foreign investment transactions. The role of CFIUS an d U.S. screening of foreign investments 
in general have undergone one of the most important changes since CFIUS's legal authority was last 
amended in 2007 through the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA). These changes 
were authorized in th e Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), P.L. 
115-23, enacted on 13  August  2018. Certain provisions of FIRRMA became effective immediately 
upon enactment of the statute, while others came into effect through implementing regulat ions 
issued in January  2020 and thereafter.50 Other regulations defining the term "principal place of 
business" as it relates to the definition of U.S. business and establishing filing fees came into force 
in May  2020. In September  2020, Treasury published  a final rule requiring transactions to be notified 
to CFIUS under certain circumstances (Table  2.6). 
 
QUESTION  79: In FIRRMA, there is no detailed definition of key technology, key infrastructure, or 
sensitive personal data, leaving extreme ambiguity and arbitrariness.  
Does this constitute an abuse of GATT Article  XXI "National Security Exceptions"?  
 
RESPONSE 79:  The regulations implementing FIRRMA include detailed definitions of these terms. 
"Critical technologies" is defined at 31 C.F.R. § 800.215; "critical infrastructure" is defined at 31 
C.F.R. § 800.214 and "covered investment critical infrastructure" is def ined at 31 C.F.R. § 800.212 
(and listed in appendix A to 31 C.F.R. Part 800); and "sensitive personal data" is defined at 31 C.F.R. 
§ 800.241.  
 
QUESTION  80: What are the specific industries covered by the CFIUS mandatory declaration 
requirements?  
 
RESPONSE  80: Although the CFIUS process remains largely voluntary, filing a declaration for a 
transaction is mandatory in certain circumstances. In particular, the regulations at 31 C.F.R. § 
800.401 implement FIRRMA's requirement that certain covered transactions are subject to a 
mandatory declaration. These regulations require the filing of a declaration for covered transactions 
involving certain U.S. businesses that produce, design, test, manufacture, fabricate, or develop one 
or more critical technologies. This mandatory declaration requirement is based on whether certain 
U.S. Government export control authorizations would be required to export, reexport, transfer (in 
country), or retransfer such U.S. business's critical technology to certain transaction parties or their 
owners. The regulations also provide for mandatory declarations with respect to a covered 
transaction that results in the acquisition of a substantial interest in a "TID U.S. business" by a 
foreign person in which the national or subnational gover nments of a single foreign state (other than 
an excepted foreign state) have a substantial interest. TID U.S. business is defined at 31 C.F.R. § 
800.248. When a mandatory declaration requirement applies, transaction parties may choose to file 
a notice inst ead of a declaration.  
 
QUESTION 81:  Does this target some specific countries?  
 
RESPONSE 81:  Please refer to the response to Question  80. 
 
QUESTION 82:  What are the considerations of this policy?  
 
RESPONSE 82:  Please refer to the response to Question  80. 
 
QUESTION 83:  Does it go against provisions in the Agreement on Trade -Related Investment 
Measures related to international investment facilitation?  
 
RESPONSE 83:  No. 
 
Page 55, paragraph 2.52 -2.54 
 
Pursuant to FIRRMA, CFIUS also introduced the concepts of "e xcepted foreign state", "excepted real 
estate foreign state", "excepted investor", and "excepted real estate investor". Qualification as an WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 140 - 
 
  excepted foreign state requires, inter  alia, that the Committee determines that the state has 
established and is eff ectively utilizing a robust process to assess foreign investments for national 
security risks and to facilitate coordination with the  United  States on matters relating to investment 
security.  
During the period from 10  November  2018 to 12  February  2020, and  pursuant to FIRRMA, CFIUS 
put in place a Pilot Program to address "ongoing risks to the national security of the  United  States 
resulting from two urgent and compelling circumstances: (1)  the ability and willingness of some 
foreign parties to obtain equity  interests in U.S. businesses in order to affect certain decisions, and 
(2) the rapid pace of technological change in certain U.S. industries". The Pilot Program implemented 
the expanded scope of transactions subject to CFIUS jurisdiction, to include certa in non -controlling 
investments in U.S. businesses involved in critical technologies in certain industries. Pursuant to a 
FIRRMA provision authorizing CFIUS to require declarations for certain transactions, declarations for 
transactions under the Pilot Prog ram were mandatory. The program ended on 13  February  2020, 
when the regulations implementing many of the provisions in FIRRMA went into effect. CFIUS 
examined 124  declarations under the Pilot Program. A new filing format, the short -form declaration, 
was in troduced; parties may continue to use it for any transaction, offering a condensed initial review 
period of 30  days rather than 45  days. Under both the Pilot Program and the current regulations, 
CFIUS is authorized to take one of four actions with regard t o a declaration: (i)  complete all action 
with respect to a transaction (i.e. clear it to proceed); (ii)  determine that CFIUS is unable to complete 
action with respect to the transaction on the basis of the declaration; (iii)  request that the parties 
to the  transaction file a written notice; or (iv)  initiate a unilateral review of the transaction.  
During 2017 -19, the number of CFIUS notices filed remained generally steady, with CFIUS clearing 
a greater percentage of cases in the initial review period. In 202 0, the number of notices filed 
decreased as the number of post -FIRRMA declarations increased. China had the largest percentage 
of covered notices during most of the review period (15% of total notices). However, China's 
percentage of covered transactions d eclined to 9% in 2020, from 24% in 2018. Over the same 
period, Japan accounted for 14.8% of total notices on average. The finance, information, and 
services sector accounted for 43% of covered transactions in 2020, followed by manufacturing with 
36%. It is  rare that the President, upon the referral of CFIUS, blocks or prohibits a foreign 
investment. During 2017 -20, there were four such presidential decisions. A new development during 
the period was the formal establishment of the Committee for the Assessmen t of Foreign 
Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications Services Sector by Executive Order in 
April 2020. This review differs from the one conducted by CFIUS as it is focused on the operation 
purposes of licenses; some transactions may trigger a  review by the two bodies.  
 
QUESTION 84:  How long does the CFIUS review process take on average?  
 
RESPONSE 84:  CFIUS's annual reports provide information on the duration of the Committee's 
reviews and investigations, and are available on the U.S. Departmen t of the Treasury's website at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committe e-on-foreign -investment -in-
the-united -states -cfius/cfius -reports -and-tables . For covered transactions in 2021, transactions 
closing in review took an average of 46 calendar days and transactions closing in investigation took 
an average of 65 calendar days.  These numbers may exceed 45 or 90 calendar days in some cases 
because, in certain circumstances, the 45th calendar day of a review or investigation can fall on a 
Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday. In those cases, the next business day is considered the final 
day of the review or investigation.  
 
QUESTION 85:  Under what circumstances will CFIUS require parties to refile requests for 
pre-clearance and how often does that occur in practice?  
 
RESPONSE 85:  Under 31 C.F.R. § 800.406 and § 800.509, and § 802.404  and § 802.509, parties 
to a transaction may request withdrawal of their notice or declaration at any time during the notice 
review or investigation periods or declaration assessment period. Such a request must be made in 
writing and is subject to the appr oval of CFIUS. Such approval may include conditions on the parties, 
such as requirements that they keep CFIUS informed of the status of the transaction or that they 
re-file the transaction at a later time. CFIUS's annual reports provide information on the number of 
withdrawn notices and are available on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's website at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-
the-united -states -cfius/cfius -reports -and-tables . In 2021, CFIUS approved the withdrawal of 74 
notices. In 63 of these instances, the transaction parties filed a new notice in either 2021 or 2022.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 141 - 
 
  QUESTION 86:  What are the factors that the President takes into account when deciding whether 
to block or prohibit foreign investment upon the referral of CFIUS?  
 
RESPONSE 86:  Each transaction that is notified to CFIUS is reviewed exclusively for national 
security purposes and based upon the specific facts and circumstances of the transaction. An 
illustrative list of factors that CFIUS considers in determining whether a particu lar transaction poses 
national security risk is available under Section  721(f) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as 
amended, as well as in published guidance on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's website at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUSGuidance.pdf . CFIUS's annual reports also 
include a detailed discussion of the perceived adverse effects of covered transactions on the national 
security of the United  States, available here: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -
issues/international/the -committee -on-foreig n-investment -in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -reports -
and-tables . Finally, the President issued Executive Order 14083 of 15  September  2022 on Ensuring 
Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the  United States, which provides direction to CFIUS by elaborating on existing statutory factors 
and adding several national security factors for CFIUS to consider during its review process.  
 
QUESTION 87:  China Mobile's section 214 authorization application in the United  States was 
denied, and U.S. government's investment review of Tiktok is still going on. Were the strict foreign 
investment reviews imposed by the  United  States on the above -mentioned Chinese enterprises 
consistent with your "open investment regi me"? Was there any abuse of national security 
exceptions? Compared with Chinese funded enterprises, the  United  States includes Australia, 
Canada and other allies and partners in its list of excepted foreign states and offers them 
undemanding foreign invest ment review criteria. Does this violate the WTO's principles of 
non-discrimination? According to 2021 official data of the  United  States, the highest number of 
official notices were from Chinese investors, accounting for 16.5% (44 notices), more than twice  the 
number of 2020. Are the review criteria for Chinese investors getting stricter?  
 
RESPONSE 87:  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the  United  States and the Committee for 
the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the  United  States Telecommunication s Services Sector do 
not publicly discuss transactions that may or may not be under review.  
 
QUESTION 88: Please provide details on the approval or denial of transactions involving Chinese 
funded enterprises.  
 
RESPONSE 88: Please refer to the response to Q uestion  87. Regarding future plans, 
the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 55, paragraph 2.55  
 
According to the OECD's FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, the  United  States ranks above the 
OECD average in terms of restrictiveness.  
 
QUESTION 89:  Does the U.S. have any plans to reduce restrictions on foreign investment?  
 
RESPONSE 89:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 90:  What measures will the U.S. take to reduce restrictions on foreign investment?  
 
RESPONSE 90:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 57, paragraph 3.1  
 
Customs proced ures, facilitation, and related requirements are overseen and carried out by 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is the  United  States' unified border entity 
operating under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). CBP oversees trade and customs 
operations at 328 ports of entry throughout the country, i.e. points of entry by land, sea, and air, 
as well as operations in 50 foreign countries. CBP is the second largest revenue collector for the 
Government and is working towards its "21st Century Customs Framework" to stay modern and 
adapt to a challenging new trade landscape.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 142 - 
 
  QUESTION 91:  What are the main contents of CBP's "21st Century Customs Framework"?  
 
RESPONSE 91:  We note again that the 21st Century Customs Framework (21CCF) is still be ing 
developed. CBP summarizes its approach below, but notes it is possible that it would revise some 
elements in the future.  
 
• In pursuing the 21CCF, CBP envisions a trading system where: legitimate goods move 
swiftly and securely; ethical production methods are used throughout the global supply 
chain; domestic industries compete on a level playing field; and the U.S. leads the world 
with innovative trade practices.  
 
• CBP seeks to achieve the 21CCF vision through:  
 
- A re-imagined entry process  that aligns more closely with the modern supply chain 
and leverages the latest technology to improve security and facilitation;  
- Improved data sharing to reduce duplicative data submissions, improve 
coordination with stakeholders, and provide intellectual property rights holders with 
the information they need to protect their marks;  
- Modernized enforcement authorities allowing CBP to hone in on unlawful actors in 
modern supply chains, apply timely and appropriate consequences that produce 
meanin gful change in violative behavior, and maintain a fair and level playing field 
for lawful traders.  
 
QUESTION 92:  What are the new measures?  
 
RESPONSE 92:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 57, paragraph 3.3  
 
During the review period, CBP was active in examining and pursuing new ways to modernize its 
trade systems. As part of this initiative, it launched several pilot projects using blockchain in order 
to test the feasibility  of using it in different scenarios to facilitate the movement of legitimate trade 
securely. During FY2018/19, CBP advance tested blockchain for intellectual property rights and 
certain FTAs (the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Dominica n Republic -Central  America FTA (CAFTADR)). Thereafter, CBP moved towards multi -tech 
solutions and not exclusively blockchain to track supply chains and improve transparency. As of 
2022, five projects were underway with the Silicon Valley Innovation Program  (SVIP) using a mix of 
technological solutions to track goods from origin to delivery on steel, pipeline oil, pipeline natural 
gas, ecommerce, and food safety. CBP has also been active in responding to specific COVID -19 
pandemic related matters. A COVID -19 Cargo Resolution Team (CCRT) was established as a 
coordinating group of experts to help facilitate imports and queries on pandemic -related trade 
matters and a dedicated webpage was set up on these matters. Some of the activities of the CCRT 
included facil itating inbound shipments through ports of entry, expediting importation of critical 
medical supplies, and providing responses to inquiries about the importation of personal protective 
equipment, COVID -19 test kits, ventilators, and other medical supplies.  Early in the pandemic there 
was also the possibility to postpone payment of estimated duties, taxes, and fees for 90 days for 
importers experiencing a significant hardship. Over 2,600 importers deferred over USD  574 million 
during this period.  
 
QUESTION 9 3: Please provide specific information about these pilot projects, including contents, 
progress, challenges encountered, results achieved and experience.  
 
RESPONSE 93:  For the IPR and E -Commerce pilots we provide key points below:  
 
• In 2019, CBP convened an  E-Commerce Task Force (ETF) of industry participants covering 
all equities of e -commerce to more accurately identify the nature and origin of Section  321 
(i.e. low value or de minimis) shipments;  
• In coordination with the ETF, CBP mapped business models sp ecific to e -commerce, 
identified parties responsible for the sale and movement of goods, and established which 
parties had access to, and could provide, additional data with which to better assess 
e-commerce risk;  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 143 - 
 
  • This mapping served as the foundation for both the Section  321 Data Pilot and the Entry 
Type 86 Test;  
• The goal of these two test programs was to collect data that CBP could use to identify:  
- The entities responsible for the movement of Section  321 shipments;  
- The exact contents of these shipments, i .e. "what's in the box" and;  
- Their final destination after arriving in the  United  States.  
• The Data Pilot has reduced the burden on the trade community by creating a pathway for 
trade facilitation benefits, such as time and cost savings, in the e -commerce environment;  
• Section  321 Data Pilot participants who are providing seller information, product pictures, 
and other transactional details benefited from fewer CBP holds.  
 
The five projects currently underway with SVIP through the DHS Science and Te chnology Directorate 
(DHS S&T) are taking steps to verify the feasibility of using distributed ledger technology (DLT) to 
track goods from origin to delivery. Through these projects, CBP seeks to achieve the following 
objectives:  
 
• Introduction of interoper able standards;  
• Expedited acquisition of data;  
• Increased transparency, security, and facilitation in supply chains;  
• Enhanced identification of trade entities;  
• Increased security and facilitation throughout trade processes.  
 
In 2023, CBP intends to test the first two SVIP programs that will connect CBP with trade users. In 
2024, CBP plans to test the ability to transmit to our Partner Government Agencies (PGAs),  in 
support of an upgraded Single Window. These two events will help inform CBP for future ACE 
modernization efforts.  
 
Page 57, paragraph 3.4  
 
Since raising the de minimis threshold on informal entries in February  2016 from USD  200 to 
USD 800 for duty -free entries and also due to the growth of e -commerce online purchases, 
the United  States has seen a strong and steady rise in small shipments. These include express 
consignments and international mail shipments, which have increased nearly 700% since FY2013. 
As a result of this significant increase in "Section 321" imports (i.e.  goods under a total val ue of 
USD 800 imported without paying any tax), CBP launched a pilot project on "E -Commerce 
'Section  321' Data Pilot" in September  2019. The pilot aims to test the collection of certain advance 
data related to shipments of these goods eligible under Sectio n 321 so as to reduce CBP's information 
gap on these shipments and reduce high -risk shipments.  
 
QUESTION 94:  Will the regulation on the de minimis threshold on informal entries be further 
adjusted, and how to ensure transparency and fairness in the amendme nt of laws?  
 
RESPONSE 94:  The de minimis threshold is set in statute, so the authority to change the de minimis 
threshold from USD  800 to another figure rests with the Congress of the  United  States. Any revision 
to the customs regulations consistent with c hanges to statute, including to the statutory framework 
governing the de minimis threshold, would be subject to public notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures outlined elsewhere in the report.  
 
Page 62, paragraph 3.15  
 
CBP undertook a number of initiatives in order to reduce IPR and other violations during the review 
period. Since 2015, CBP has facilitated the reporting of trade violations by establishing the 
e-Allegations Program, which allows for electronic submission of suspected violations to  CBP. A 
dedicated website has been established for this reporting. [CBP, Trade Violations Reporting. Viewed 
at: https://eallegations.cbp.gov/s/ ]. The Donations Acceptance Program (DAP) was created in 
FY201 5 as an arrangement to work more collaboratively with industry to improve trade facilitation 
and enforcement activities. In terms of IPR enforcement, since the Program's inception, CBP has 
entered into 43 DAP partnerships that were IPR -related in order to accept tools and technology to 
verify and authenticate merchandise.  
 
QUESTION 95:  Please brief us on the specific initiatives undertaken by CBP to reduce IPR and other 
violations.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 144 - 
 
  RESPONSE 95:  The Donations Acceptance Program was established in FY 2015 to explore, foster, 
and facilitate partnerships for port of entry infrastructure and  technology improvements.  
 
Section  482 of the Homeland Security Act, 2002, as amended by Section  2 of the Cross -Border Trade 
Enhancement Act, 2016, P.L. 114 -279, (Section  482), augments CBP's ability to implement this 
initiative by authorizing CBP and the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) to collectively 
accept donations of real property, personal property, money, and non -personal services from private 
sector and Government entities. Section  482 supersedes Section  559 of the Consolidated 
Appropriat ions Act, 2014, P.L. 113 -76 (Section  559) while not affecting any agreement entered into 
nor any proposal accepted for consideration on or before 15  December  2016.  
 
The Donations Acceptance Program (DAP) is a partnership mechanism to collaboratively explor e and 
implement tangible solutions to trade and travel facilitation and enforcement challenges. DAP is 
authorized to accept donations of real property, personal property, and non -personal services from 
private sector and government entities.  
 
The DAP overs ees two major partnership portfolios: infrastructure and non -infrastructure. The latter 
consists primarily of intellectual property rights enforcement partnerships aimed at protecting CBP's 
trade stakeholders and U.S. consumers from counterfeit and potenti ally unsafe goods.  
 
Quantitative data currently is not available for the DAP partnerships; however, qualitative feedback 
has indicated that the IPR -related tools donated by rightsholders via the program have proven 
beneficial to CBP personnel in verifying the authenticity of suspected infringing goods.  
 
QUESTION 96:  How do relevant border protection measures link up with domestic measures?  
 
RESPONSE 96:  CBP enforces intellectual property rights (IPR) most visibly by seizing products that 
infringe IPR such a s trademarks and copyrights. To protect both industry and consumers, CBP has 
made IPR enforcement a priority trade issue. As such, CBP developed a multi -layered, strategic 
approach to IPR enforcement that includes efforts to educate and engage stakeholders  to deter the 
importation of illicit goods and employs innovative approaches to enforce IPR law at all ports of 
entry.  
 
In fiscal year 2021, CBP seized over 27,000 counterfeits with an estimated manufacturer's suggested 
retail value of USD  3.3 billion, had  the goods been genuine. In addition to seizing goods at U.S. 
borders, the strategy includes expanding the border through post -import audits of companies that 
have been caught bringing fake goods into the  United  States, collaborating with foreign governmen ts 
and multi -lateral organizations, and working closely with industry and partner government agencies. 
CBP also issues civil fines and, where appropriate, refers cases to other law enforcement agencies 
for criminal investigation.  
 
CBP collaborates closely with Immigration and Customs Enforcement -Homeland Security 
Investigations (ICE —HIS) and 25 additional partners at the IPR Center to ensure that IPR border 
seizures representing criminal activities lead to investigations, arrests, and convictions. Working 
with rights holders to use the web -based tool, e -Recordation, to record their trademarks and 
copyrights with CBP is a priority. Recordation makes information on protected rights available to 
CBP offices throughout the  United  States. CBP's e -Allegations prog ram provides an electronic portal 
through which the public can report possible IPR violations and other suspected trade violations.  
 
To help educate the public on the dangers of counterfeit goods, CBP hosts "The Truth Behind 
Counterfeits" public awareness campaign. For more information about this effort visit: 
www.cbp.gov/FakeGoodsRealDangers . 
 
Page 63, paragraph 3.19  
 
The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) continues to be CBP's electronic platform  for 
processing imports and exports; ACE was developed further and improved during the review period. 
As at December  2021, ACE was still adding on new features and there were a number of future 
initiatives planned. ACE's automation and process simplificati on efforts resulted in an estimated 
economic benefit of approximately USD  1.4 billion for the trade community and USD  106 million for 
CBP in FY2020. The work on ACE as the main platform for trade, or the single window, commenced 
in 2014 and the main elemen ts were completed in 2018. Approximately 250 government forms were WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 145 - 
 
  automated through ACE and the procedures of more than 40 government agencies were 
incorporated. Thus, all import manifest, cargo release, post release, and export processes are 
handled by A CE. The use of ACE for all electronic manifest filings has been required since 
1 May 2015. During the review period, new features were added to ACE to implement consolidated 
importers' deferred tax statements, the Craft Beverage Modernization Act, USMCA dr awback 
changes, AD/CVD Flags for EAPA Evasion and Injunctions, and Real Time Automated Surety Interface 
(ASI). CBP announced that it would deploy Phase 1 of ACE's Portal Modernization on 
22 January  2022. This modernization effort was expected to transfer e xisting functionality to an 
upgraded platform and thereby provide easier use and better performance. Some of the 
enhancements included a new login page, global search tool, and upgraded account user interface. 
During 2022 a number of other enhancements or changes were scheduled.  
 
QUESTION 97:  Does ACE serve as a "single window" for international trade and has it achieved 
100% paperless operation?  
 
RESPONSE 97:  The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is the system through which the 
U.S. government has implemented the "single window," the primary system for processing 
trade-related import and export data required by government agencies. This transition away from 
paper -based procedures results in faster, more streamlined processes for both government and 
industry.  269 forms have been automated across CBP and more than 49 partner government 
agencies.  
 
QUESTION 98:  How does ACE realize the interconnection between CBP and other port 
departments?  
 
RESPONSE 98:  ACE centralizes in a single system the requirements of more than 49 partner 
government agencies (PGAs) that have a stake in cargo import and export through U.S. ports. 
Almost half of those PGAs have data requirements at time of import or export and collect trade 
information through ACE. The  remainder of the agencies have no data requirements at time of import 
or export, but can view ACE data.  
 
Page 64, paragraph 3.22  
 
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) continued to be CBP's most important 
trusted trader program, with 11, 000 certified partners in FY2021, accounting for 52% of all cargo 
imported into the  United  States (Table  3.4). As CTPAT is a voluntary public -private sector 
partnership program, CBP works closely with the private sector to improve cargo security and secure  
international supply chains. The benefits of becoming a certified partner are numerous and include 
reduced customs examinations, shorter wait times at the border, and access to FAST lanes at the 
land borders. CBP also has Mutual Recognition Arrangements ( MRAs) with 14 foreign partner 
customs administrations to collaborate and recognize validation findings of the partners and thereby 
facilitating the work. These MRAs indicate that the security requirements or standards of the foreign 
industry partnership pr ogram, as well as its verification procedures, are the same or similar to those 
of the CTPAT program.  
 
QUESTION  99: Will CBP expand the CTPAT program and include cross -border e -commerce in it?  
If yes, could you please brief us on the progress in this rega rd? 
 
RESPONSE 99:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 65, paragraph 3.23  
 
In 2019 the first major update of CTPAT occurred with changes to the program's minimum security 
criteria to take a more comprehensive approach to supply chain security, including new requirements 
or recommendations on cyber security, agricultural security, prevention of trade -based money 
laundering and terrorist financing, and using security  technology to enhance physical security 
requirements.  
 
QUESTION 100 : Please specify the update of the minimum security criteria and the major revisions 
made to the original criteria.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 146 - 
 
  RESPONSE 100:  In FY 2020, CTPAT updated the minimum security criteria a nd integrated CTPAT 
Security and CTPAT Trade Compliance to create a unified Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) 
program. The updates to the minimum security criteria aim to create a holistic approach to supply 
chain security. See:  https://www.cbp.gov/border -security/ports -entry/cargo -security/ctpat -
customs -trade -partnership -against -terrorism/apply/security -criteria . 
 
QUESTION 101:  How to validate these criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 101: CTPAT requires the trade company participant to document and validate their 
supply chain security procedures in relation to existing CBP CTPAT criteria or guidelines as applicable. 
CBP requires that CTPAT company participants develop an internal validation process to ensure the 
existence of security measures documented in their Supply Chain Security Profile and in any 
supplemental information provided to CBP. Further, CBP validates the s ecurity profiles of CTPAT 
participants to ensure accuracy. The participant's profile will be selected for validation based on the 
company's import supply chain risk, and may be initiated based on many factors, including 
security -related anomalies, threats posed by geographic regions, other risk -related information, or 
strategic import volume.  
 
Page 65, paragraph 3.23  
 
The program has adapted the virtual validation concept, as a way to address the travel restrictions 
that were imposed as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic. In 2022, dependent upon the conditions, 
CBP was expected to revert to in -person inspections as well as maintaining virtual inspections. The 
benefits of becoming a certified partner include reduced customs examinations, shorter waiting ti mes 
at the border, and access to FAST lanes at the land borders and access to the AQUA lane benefits at 
seaports.  
 
QUESTION  102: Please brief us on the use of virtual inspections during the COVID -19 pandemic.  
Were in -person inspections completely replaced  by it?  
 
RESPONSE 102:  CTPAT developed a Standard Operating Procedure to identify the risks (low, 
medium, or high) of partners within the program. Virtual validations during the pandemic were then 
conducted only on partners considered low or medium risk.  
 
QUESTION  103: CBP will revert to in -person inspections as well as maintaining virtual inspections 
in 2022. Then what will be the relationship between these two kinds of inspections?  
 
RESPONSE 103:  Virtual validations will continue to be available to CTPAT and its low risk members 
going forward and will be determined on a case -by-case basis in order to accomplish the program's 
annual goals.  
 
QUESTION 104:  Will they be interchangeable? Or will CBP mainly rely on in -person inspections 
with virtual inspections as supplements?  
 
RESPONSE 104:  See response to Question  103. 
 
Page 66, paragraph 3.28  
 
In June 2016, CBP produced a "Valuation Encyclopedia" providing guidance on interpretation or 
matters of judicial review that influenced CBP customs valuation decisions or procedures. An update 
of the Encyclopedia is expected to be issued in 2022. CBP also has an Informed Compliance 
Publication on Customs Value from 2006 that provides information to the trade community on 
valuation. It was also in the process of being upd ated as of March  2022. The United  States offers 
advance ruling on customs valuation through its CROSS system (Section  3.1.1.5.2).  
 
QUESTION 105:  Can the "Valuation Encyclopedia" be obtained through public channels?  
 
RESPONSE 105:  Yes; the internet link for the "Customs Valuation Encyclopaedia 1908 -2021" is: 
https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/customs -valuation -encyclopedia -1980-2021. This is the 
latest versio n, and it is available to the public.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 147 - 
 
  Page 78, paragraph 3.60  
 
The American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act of 2020 (42  U.S.C. 7675) contains provisions 
for the phasedown of production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by 85% by 2036.  
92 As of 1  January  2022, entities are required to expend allowances established by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) when HFCs are produced and imported, with limited 
exceptions. New regulations setting up the allocation and trading program have rece ntly been issued 
91 CBP (2006), Importing into the United  States, A Guide for Commercial Importers to receive 
allowances based on their historical production and import volumes; a set -aside pool is also being 
created for a limited set of entities.  
 
QUESTION 106:  What are the specific requirements and detailed timetables for the production and 
import of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) specified in the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) 
Act of 2020 and related U.S. regulations?  
 
RESPONSE 106:  The Am erican Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act directs the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement measures that reduce the risk to the climate 
caused by HFCs. These measures are: phasing down production and consumption; maximizing 
reclamati on and minimizing releases from equipment; and facilitating the transition to 
next-generation technologies through sector -based restrictions. The phasedown will gradually 
reduce the production and consumption of HFCs to 15% of the established baselines by the year 
2036, with specific company allocations generally determined based on historic production and 
consumption levels. The baselines established under the AIM Act are based on the same historical 
data points as in the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal P rotocol, and the AIM Act phasedown 
schedule matches the phasedown schedule under the Kigali Amendment.  
EPA established regulations implementing the AIM Act in 40 CFR, Part  84. These regulations are in 
effect currently and limit production and consumption o f HFCs starting in calendar year 2022 (see 
table below).  
 
Table HFC Phasedown Schedule and Consumption & Production Allowance Caps  
Date  Percentage of production baseline 
(%) Percentage of consumption baseline 
(%) 
2022-2023 90 90 
2024-2028 60 60 
2029-2033 30 30 
2034-2035 20 20 
2036 and thereafter  15 15 
 
EPA issues  a fixed quantity of generally transferrable production and consumption allowances to 
producers and importers of HFCs for each year. Entities producing HFCs expend both production 
allowances and consumption allowances. Importing HFCs requires expending onl y consumption 
allowances.  
 
On 15  December  2022, EPA published a Notice in the Federal Register for a proposed rule to restrict 
the use of certain higher -global warming potential (GWP) HFCs in aerosols, foams, and refrigeration, 
air conditioning, and heat p ump products and equipment.  
 
More detailed information is available on the EPA website:  https://www.epa.gov/climate -hfcs-
reduction . 
 
Page 81, paragraph 2.54  
 
... The U.S. Department of the Treasury 's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S. State 
Department administer and enforce a variety of economic and trade sanctions programs designed 
to protect U.S. national security interests.  
 
QUESTION 107:  How do the  United  States Department of the Treasury and the Department of 
State determine the impact of the sanctioned entities on the national security of the  United  States?  
 
RESPONSE 107:  Each sanctions program is administered according to its statute and regulations.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 148 - 
 
  QUESTION 108:  What are the mechanisms that trigger sanctions?  
 
RESPONSE 108:  The mechanism that triggers sanctions will depend on the particular program. The 
authority granted to the President under section 1702 of IEEPA, for examp le, may be exercised to 
deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part 
outside the  United  States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the  United  States, 
if the President declares a nati onal emergency with respect to such threat.  
 
QUESTION 109:  What are the criteria for determining national security?  
 
RESPONSE 109:  Determinations of national security are made pursuant to the relevant underlying 
statute and regulations.  
 
QUESTION 110:  How can we ensure that the application of national security clause is not 
expanded?  
 
RESPONSE 110:  This question is outside the scope of the TPR.  
 
QUESTION 111:  The United  States Department of Commerce announced export controls on 
7 October. At the same time, the United  States Department of Commerce imposed new restrictions 
on the export to China of advanced artificial intelligence and supercomputing chip manufacturing, 
production equipment and some of the tools needed.  
 
Please clarify the rationality of restri cting the export of related equipment and technology to China.  
"Presumptive denial" licensing policies, "Long arm jurisdiction" to restrict exports of non -us products 
to China, and a ban on U.S. personnel and entities providing services to China, is it a violation of 
WTO MFN obligations, the general lifting of quantitative restrictions, etc.?  
RESPONSE 111:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S.  Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION 112: How does the U.S. define the impact of a certain technology export on U.S. 
National Security?  
 
RESPONSE 112:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests . The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION 113:  What kind of impact will this have on the exchanges, cooperation, joint research 
and commercialization of relevant technology by the companies over the world including those from 
U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 113:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform  Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) , and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
Page 81, paragraph 3.73  
 
USDOC's International Trade Administration (ITA) and the  United  States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) are jointly responsible for conducting AD and CVD investigations and five -year 
(sunset) reviews under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. USITC determines material injury, or threat 
thereof, or material retardation of an industry by reason of dumped or subsidized imp orts. 109 
USDOC, through ITA's Enforcement and Compliance Unit (E&C), is in charge of determining the 
existence and amount of dumping and subsidy in AD and CVD investigations. CBP is responsible for 
enforcing AD/CVD laws and orders on imported goods, for c ollecting AD/CVD cash deposits, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 149 - 
 
  administering AD/CVD entries, assessing and collecting final AD/CVD, and enforcing AD/CVD on 
imports that evade AD/CVD orders.  110 The Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Directorate (TRLED) 
within the Office of Trade at CBP, is responsible for directing enforcement and compliance 
assessment activities concerning evasion, and for protecting the collection of AD and CVD duties. 
TRLED develop s policies for the assessment of risk of importers, to better determine the application 
of single entry and continuous bonds for entries of covered merchandise.  
 
QUESTION 114 : According to Article  15 "Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and 
Dumpin g" of the Protocol on the Accession of China to the WTO: "In any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii)  shall expire 15  years after the date of accession". It means that starting in 
2016, the U.S. can no longer use third -country prices or costs to a ssess China's level of dumping 
and subsidies, regardless of its market economy conditions.  
Why is the U.S. still using third country prices for comparison on the grounds that China is a 
"non-market economy country"?  
 
RESPONSE 114 : The question is based on an erroneous legal interpretation of Section  15 of the 
Protocol on the Accession of China to the WTO.  
 
WTO Members did not agree in China's Accession Protocol to set a time period after which market 
economy conditions would automatically be deemed to exist  in China no matter what the actual facts 
in China revealed. Nor did they agree that, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, domestic prices 
or costs in China would automatically be deemed to have been determined under market economy 
conditions. To the contrary, WTO Members and China recognized in Section  15 of China's Accession 
Protocol the longstanding rights of WTO Members — as set out in GATT  1994 Article  VI:1, the Second 
Note Ad Article  VI:1 of GATT  1994, practice of the Contracting Parties in the a pplication of Article  VI, 
the GATT accessions of Poland, Romania, and Hungary, and Article  2 of the Anti -Dumping 
Agreement  — to reject prices or costs that are not determined under market economy conditions in 
determining price comparability for purposes o f Anti -dumping comparisons.  
China remains today a non -market economy. As such, an importing WTO Member may reject 
domestic prices or costs in China and, as stated in Section  15 of China's Accession Protocol, "use a 
methodology that is not based on a strict  comparison with domestic prices or costs in China" in 
determining price comparability under GATT  1994 Article  VI:1 and the Anti -Dumping  Agreement.  
 
Page 93, paragraph 3.110  
 
Between 2018 and 2021, the number of AD investigation initiations totaled 178, co mpared to 133 
in the period between 2015 and 2017, covered by the previous review. The number of initiations 
decreased slightly from 34 in 2018 to 33 in 2019, but increased substantially, to 89, in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 115:  Please explain the reason for the sig nificant increase of anti -dumping 
investigations initiated by the  United  States.  
 
RESPONSE 115:  The number of investigations conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and U.S. International Trade Commission is primarily determined by the number of petit ions 
submitted that comply with the requirements under U.S. law.  
 
QUESTION 116:  How does the U.S. ensure that anti -dumping investigations will not be used as a 
disguise of trade protectionism?  
 
RESPONSE 116:  The United  States conducts its investigations in  accordance with its international 
obligations under the applicable WTO agreement and the requirements under U.S. law.  
 
Page 107, Box 3.2  
 
On 31  October  2021, the  United  States and the  European  Union issued a joint statement with 
respect to the steel and a luminium tariffs with the main following points.  
 
QUESTION 117:  How do the U.S. and the EU monitor the bilateral trade in steel and aluminum?  
 
RESPONSE 117:  The United  States monitors bilateral trade using a variety of data sources including 
U.S. Census data.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 150 - 
 
  QUESTION 118:  What indicators are you watching?  
 
RESPONSE 118:  Based on  the 31  October  2021 U.S. -EU Joint Statement, the  United  States 
monitors indictor s related to both carbon intensities and global non -market excess capacity in the 
steel and aluminium industries.  
 
QUESTION 119:  Is carbon intensity one of them?  
 
RESPONSE 119:  Yes. 
 
QUESTION 120:  What are the criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 120:  According to the 31  October  2021 U.S. -EU Joint Statement, the  United  States and 
EU intend to confer on methodologies for calculating steel and aluminium carbon -intensity and share 
relevant data.  
 
QUESTION  121: Please provide the monitoring results on the U.S. steel and aluminum trade with 
the EU in 2022.  
 
RESPONSE 121:  Complete 2022 data are unavailable as of January  2023. From Q1 to Q3  2022, 
bilateral steel and aluminium trade flows accorded with general historical patterns.  
 
Page 121, 123 , paragraph 3.18 2, 3.190  
Export controls are guided by national security and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.  
Notably, new controls affect the export of U.S. origin items to China (or Hong  Kong,  China) and to 
Chinese --owned companies, such as Huawei and its affil iates.  
 
QUESTION  122: Up to now, there are nearly 600 Chinese enterprises in the entity list.  
Is the placement of a large number of Chinese enterprises in the export control "entity list" in 
violation of the non -discriminatory principle of the WTO?  
 
RESPON SE 122:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subje ct to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION 123:  In October  2022, the new export control rules of the  United  States imposed strict 
foreign d irect product rules on 28 Chinese enterprises. Are Chinese enterprises subject to 
discriminatory treatment under these rules?  
 
RESPONSE 123: Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION  124: How does the U.S. ensure that export controls do not go beyond what is needed 
for national security, especially when it is difficult to distinguish dual -use goods in reality?  
 
RESPONSE 124:  Consistent wit h the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Admin istration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION 125:  Does the U.S. have any plan to draw clear boundaries or agree on convenient 
trade routes with relevant trade part ners on the scope of dual -use goods so as not to hinder 
legitimate trade?  
 
RESPONSE 125:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 151 - 
 
  Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to th e Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION 126:  If yes, please tell us more about the plan and the expected timetable.  
 
RESPONSE 126:  Consistent wi th the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
Page 123, paragraph 3.188  
 
The BIS reviewed nearly 33,000 license applications in that year and denied approximately 1.1% of 
them. 
 
QUESTION 127:  Does the  United  States have statistics on the number of license applications and 
rejections for the period 2020 -2022? 
 
RESPONSE 127:  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security provides data on its 
website:  https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/statistical -reports . 
 
Page 123, paragraph 3.190  
 
The export control regime was subject to numerous modifications in the period under review.  
 
QUESTION 128:  How does the U.S. ensure the  export control not be used as a mean to maliciously 
suppress competitors?  
 
RESPONSE 128:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION 129:  If the  United  States considers export control measures against specific countries 
to be reasonable and rule -consistent, does that mean that unilateral export controls imposed by U.S. 
competitors against the  United  States are also reasonable and rule -consistent?  
 
RESPONSE 129:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that ar e subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
Page 125, paragraph 3.201  
 
EXIM, a wholly owned government corporation, is the official export cre dit agency of 
the United  States. An independent agency of the Federal Government, EXIM assists exporters unable 
to access export financing from private sources with direct loans, loan guarantees, export credit 
insurance, and working capital loan guarantees . Private sector lenders and insurance brokers usually 
act as partners in EXIM transactions. EXIM ensures, as necessary, that its financial products are 
provided on competitive terms relative to the export credit agencies of other countries. Although 
EXIM acts independently of the Government in its daily business, EXIM's existence is periodically 
reauthorized by Congress, which also caps its lending authority. Moreover, its Board members are 
appointed by the President of the United  States, with the advice a nd consent of the Senate.  
 
QUESTION  130: It has been reported that EXIM launched the China and Transformational Exports 
Program (CTEP); also, there are the U.S. -initiated Partnership for Global Infrastructure and 
Investment (PGII) and the CHIPS and Science Act, all requiring financial support from EXIM.  
Please explain EXIM's participation in the whole -of-government approach.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 152 - 
 
  RESPONSE 130:  EXIM participates in a variety of interagency working groups, supporting various 
initiatives.  
 
QUESTION 131:  Please provide information on CTEP progress and explain in what circumstances 
the requirements can be relaxed for domestic elements.  
 
RESPONSE  131: All of the most up -to-date CTEP information can be found here: 
https://www.exim.gov/about/special -initiatives/ctep . EXIM may provide the maximum financing 
allowed under the OECD rules for transactions in a "Transformational Export Area" with at least 
51% U.S. content. EXIM can provide full financing  if there is less than 51%  U.S. content if certain 
criteria are met. Please see: https://www.exim.gov/about/special -initiatives/ctep/7 -factors -jobs-
plan for further det ails. 
 
QUESTION 132:  Please explain EXIM's participation in PGII.  
 
RESPONSE 132:  EXIM participates in a variety of interagency working groups supporting various 
initiatives, including PGII, as outlined in the Memorandum on the Partnership for Global 
Infras tructure and  Investment  (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/presidential -
actions/2022/06/ 26/memorandum -on-the-partnership -for-global -infrastructure -and-investment/ ). 
 
The U.S. Export -Import Bank (EXIM) recently launched the "Make More in America Initiative". Under 
this initiative, existing medium - and long -term loans, loan guarantees, and insu rance products 
(previously only for export business) can be used to support U.S. companies' "export -related U.S. 
domestic manufacturing projects". EXIM, as an official export credit agency (ECA), expanded the 
application scope of its products.  
 
QUESTION 13 3: Does it have a crowding -out effect on financing and insurance products offered by 
the private market?  
 
RESPONSE 133:  No, EXIM's "additionality requirement" still applies. In other words, EXIM takes 
great pains to make sure that its products are compleme nting, not displacing, private capital.  
 
QUESTION 134:  Does it entail unfair competition for financial institutions in the private market?  
 
RESPONSE 134:  No, EXIM pricing will be on market -terms and EXIM will ensure, similar to its 
export credit transactions, that private sources of capital are not displaced.  
 
Page 126, paragraph 3.209  
 
The law reauthorizing EXIM directs the agency to establish a Program on China and Transformational 
Exports and reserves 20% of its total financing authority (i.e. USD 27 billion) to this end. The 
purpose is to support U.S. leadership, innovation, employment, and technological standards in 10 
transformational industries: (i)  artificial intelligence; (ii)  biotechnology; (iii)  biomedical sciences; 
(iv) wireless communi cations equipment (including 5G); (v)  quantum computing; (vi)  renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and energy storage; (vii)  semiconductor and semiconductor -machinery; 
(viii) emerging financial technologies; (ix)  water treatment and sanitation; and 
(x) high-performance computing. The proposed transaction must have minimum 51% U.S. content 
to qualify for EXIM financing, at which point up to 85% of the value of eligible goods and services in 
the U.S. contract may be supported. EXIM formed a Subcommittee on St rategic Competition with 
China in September  2020. In FY2021, USD  141.3  million was authorized in direct support of this 
program.  
 
QUESTION 135:  Please explain whether the establishment of the "Subcommittee on Strategic 
Competition with China" and the imple mentation of the "Program on China and Transformational 
Exports" will have an adverse effect on Chinese enterprises? How exactly does the program work 
out, for example, through which products, loans or export credit insurance?  
 
RESPONSE 135:  The purpose of  all EXIM programs is to provide a level playing field for U.S. 
exporters against foreign competition, and allow companies to compete on quality rather than 
favorable financing. Any transaction, using any EXIM product, may be designated a CTEP 
transaction.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 153 - 
 
  QUESTION 136:  Which export businesses are eligible to apply for the program?  
 
RESPONSE 136:  Any export business could be considered a CTEP transaction.  
 
QUESTION 137:  Can the cost of the program cover long -term operating costs and losses?  
 
RESPONSE 137:  EXIM, consistent with its budget and WTO obligations, runs all its activities on a  
long-term, break -even basis.  
 
Page 128, paragraph 3.2.5.3  
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)  
 
QUESTION 138:  DFC has many similaritie s and overlaps in functions and business scope with 
USEXIM, USAID, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).  
How does DFC cooperate with above -mentioned agencies in serving U.S. exports and overseas 
investment and what are their respective duties?  
 
RESPONSE 138:  DFC's stated purpose is set forth at Section  1412(b) of the BUILD Act:  
 
The purpose of [DFC] shall be to mobilize and facilitate the participation of private sector capital and 
skills in the economic development of less developed countries … to complement the development 
assistance objectives, and advance the foreign policy interests, of the United  States.  
 
DFC, USEXIM, USAID, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) conduct their activities 
within their respective statutory purposes and under the U.S. Government's broad objective of 
ensuring the efficient use of taxpayer resources. DFC complements U.S. development assistance 
objectives by mobilizing private -sector capital to support projects with development objectives in 
less developed countries.  
 
Page 130, paragraph 3.223  
 
Among the programs administered by the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the 
USDOC, cost -shared technical assistance may be provided under the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
for Firms (TAAF) progra m to U.S. enterprises that have lost sales and employment due to imports 
of like or directly competitive products.  
 
QUESTION 139:  Does the TAAF program apply to sales losses of enterprises due to the pandemic, 
the energy crisis, supply chain disruptions or  other reasons?  
 
RESPONSE 139:  No. 
 
Page 132, paragraph 3.228  
 
The United  States considers any VCS developed in accordance with the Committee Decision on 
International Standards to be an international standard under the WTO TBT  Agreement regardless 
of the specific SDO or its location. The ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for 
American National Standards (Essential Requirements) serve as guidelines to develop VCSs and 
include principles for openness, balance, lack of dominance, due proces s, consensus, and the right 
to appeal. The procedural requirements outlined in the Essential Requirements align closely with the 
criteria for VCS outlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A -119 (discussed 
below) and also with the princ iples outlined in the Committee Decision on International Standards.  
 
QUESTION 140:  Does this paragraph mean that the U.S. side believes the VCS to be international 
standard?  
 
RESPONSE 140:  No. Only voluntary consensus standards that are developed in accor dance with 
the Committee Decision on International Standards may meet the definition of an international 
standard.  
 
QUESTION 141:  If so, please explain how U.S. ensure that VCS implements Principle 6 
(development dimension) of the Commission Decision on In ternational Standards in its development WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 154 - 
 
  process, especially how it deals with the issue of developing country's participation in standard 
making.  
 
RESPONSE 141:  The United  States does not accredit standards or standards development 
organizations (SDO). Ho wever, U.S. law directs Federal agencies, in developing standards, to base 
the standards on international standards if appropriate. See 19 USC 2532. To that end, regulating 
agencies considering the use of a particular standard may seek additional informati on directly from 
the standards developer regarding the conditions under which a standard was developed.  
 
As stated in the WTO Committee Decision, constraints on developing countries, in particular, to 
effectively participate in standards development, shoul d be taken into consideration in the process. 
ANSI's essential requirements for due process are designed to ensure that any party (organization, 
company, government agency, individual, etc.) with a direct and material interest has a right to 
participate by : a) expressing a position and its basis, b)  having that position considered, and 
c) having the right to appeal. Further, openness signifies that participation shall be open to all parties 
who are directly and materially interested in the activity in quest ion. There shall be no undue 
financial barriers to participation. Voting membership on the consensus body shall not be conditional 
upon membership in any organization, nor unreasonably restricted on the basis of technical 
qualifications or other such requi rements.  
 
Furthermore, as stated in the Committee Decision, it may be appropriate in some circumstances to 
use technical assistance to improve participation by developing countries. Many of the U.S. -domiciled 
SDOs maintain cooperative and technical assista nce programs to support, and promote the inclusion 
of, developing country standards bodies.  
 
Page 133, paragraph 3.230  
 
SDOs that adhere to the Essential Requirements may be accredited by ANSI to develop American 
National Standards (ANS) related to products, processes, services, systems, or personnel. In 
March  2022, there were 237 ANSI -accredited standard developers (ASDs); 18 organizations became 
ASDs during the review period. By the same date, ANSI listed more than 13,600 standards developed 
by ASD s, of which 1,075 new standards were issued between July  2018 and March  2022. In addition 
to the thousands of VCS developed by SDOs, consortia standards also help to fill the need for 
standards used by industry, especially in technology areas where a more rapid development pace is 
needed to meet market needs.  
 
QUESTION 142:  Given the large number of VCSs, through what methods or mechanisms do you 
ensure the coordination between VCSs and consortia standards, such as avoiding possible 
contradictions of conten ts? 
 
RESPONSE 142:  The United  States government does not seek to coordinate or interfere in 
privately -led standards development activities. The diversity of the sector -based, decentralized U.S. 
standardization system can result in duplicative efforts and s ometimes overlapping or conflicting 
standards. In many cases, this apparent overlap merely reflects different customer needs for 
different sectors or competitive approaches and solutions to new products. This diversity of 
approaches is a key feature in the  success and innovation of the U.S. privately led standards 
development system.  
 
However, duplication is generally discouraged if it does not appear to add value. ANSI plays an 
important role in coordinating between ANSI -affiliated SDOs and those outside t he ANSI framework 
to minimize or coordinate duplicative efforts.  
 
QUESTION 143:  Do consortia standards need to be filed with relevant organizations or government 
departments?  
 
RESPONSE 143:  There is no public requirement that standards must be filed with a ny organization. 
There are numerous reasons that organizations may choose to submit a standard for recognition to 
a private or public body. For example, an organization might apply to public authorities in order to 
protect any associated intellectual prope rty. 
 
QUESTION 144:  Which organizations or departments are responsible for the unified management 
of consortia standards?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 155 - 
 
  RESPONSE 144:  No public agencies are responsible for managing or cataloguing all standards.  
 
QUESTION 145:  For VCSs and consortia stan dards that have been published and implemented, is 
there a certain working mechanism which reviews and revises the standards regularly, or merges or 
abolishes as appropriate?  
 
RESPONSE 145:  There are no public agencies that are responsible for managing, or  publishing, or 
documenting all voluntary standards. Many standards development organizations maintain rules and 
procedures for reviewing and updating proprietary standards. In general, the U.S. government does 
not interfere in these private processes.  
 
In cases in which voluntary standards have been made mandatory by incorporation of a standard 
into technical regulations, U.S. agencies review references to standards on a regular basis. As 
directed by Circular A -119, agencies generally undertake a standards -specific review of such 
incorporated standards every three -to-five years, or when stakeholders otherwise provide adequate 
information that a standards -specific review is necessary due to urgent matters of health and safety, 
the need to remain current with  technological changes, or for other compelling reasons.  
 
To this end, U.S. government agencies must give interested persons the right to petition for the 
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. See 5 USC 553 ©. 
 
Page 133, paragraph 3.231  
 
In the  United  States, technical regulations can be established at the federal or sub -federal level, and 
rely heavily on VCS developed by the private sector making them mandatory by reference; technical 
regulations cover mostly products but can also concern processes or s ervices. While Congress can 
establish product regulations legislatively, it usually delegates enabling legislation to regulatory 
agencies, generally pursuant to broad guidance as to the factors to be considered and policy goals 
to be achieved. The majority  of rulemaking involves three steps: issuance of a notice of proposed 
rulemaking soliciting public comment, agency consideration of all relevant information, and the 
issuance of a final rule after consideration of the relevant information. Executive Order (E.O.) 13563 
requires the use of the Internet for the consultation procedure and the publication of rules to the 
extent possible and establishes a 60 -day period for consultations. Any interested person can submit 
petitions for reconsideration after final r ules have been issued. All final rules may be judicially 
reviewed. All regulations issued by agencies as final rules are subject to Congressional review under 
the Congressional Review Act (CRA).  
 
QUESTION 146:  In the U.S., electronic products follow standards and requirements issued by 
different government bodies (in terms of safety, energy consumption/efficiency, environmental 
protection, etc.) States also have special requirements in addition to those at the federal level. It is 
hard for enterprises to obtain full information. Is there a unified channel for the issuance of such 
requirements so that it can be easier for enterprises to understand and meet the access requirements 
of various states?  
 
RESPONSE 146:  All businesses must take steps to ensure regulatory compliance with both federal 
and state laws. The U.S. government does not collect and publish regulatory information relating to 
state law. In addition to individual state agency websites, commercial sol utions, such as electronic 
legal databases, may be available to compile similar laws across state and federal jurisdictions.  
 
QUESTION 147:  When VCS is cited in American technical regulations, if the VCS is different from 
relevant international standards a nd has significant impact on international trade, how does the U.S. 
ensure the timely notification to the WTO?  
 
RESPONSE 147:  Proposed technical regulations at the Federal (central) government level are 
published in the Federal Register and, as applicable,  notified to the WTO TBT Secretariat and 
circulated via ePing ( https://epingalert.org/en/Search/Index?domainIds=1&countryIds=C840 ). 
The United  States follows the TBT Committ ee Recommendation on the Coherent Use of Notification 
Formats (Revision adopted at the meeting of 13 -15 November  2019 as G/TBT/35/Rev.1), which 
describes what and when Members should notify. Final technical regulations published in the Federal 
Register tha t were notified in the draft rulemaking stage are notified to the WTO and are also 
published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Refer to the eCFR for online references 
(https://www.ecfr.gov/ ). WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 156 - 
 
  Page 134, par agraph 3.235  
 
The TAA restricts government agencies from engaging in any standards -related activity that creates 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the  United  States and ensures that imported 
goods are treated no less favorably than like dome stic products in the application of 
standards -related activities. The NTTAA directs federal agencies and departments to use VCS, both 
domestic and international, in lieu of government -developed requirements in regulations, to meet 
their objectives and reaf firms principles already expressed in Circular A -119. The NTTAA further 
directs the agencies to participate in the development of such standards to ensure that VCSs reflect 
government needs and to reduce government reliance on government -unique standards. To keep 
track of the use of government -unique standards used in technical regulations, the NIST publishes 
an annual report based on developments provided by 22 agencies for the fiscal year 2019.Circular 
A-119 also encourages federal agencies, in line with their missions, to participate in SDOs.  
 
QUESTION 148:  Given that TAA restricts government agencies from engaging in any 
standards -related activity, why are there government -unique standards?  
 
RESPONSE 148:  The TAA does not prohibit agencies from engaging in standards -related activity. 
It restricts such activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United  States, including violations of the requirement of non -discriminatory treatment for 
imported products. See 19  USC 2532(1). U .S. law and guidance establishes a strong preference for 
the use of voluntary consensus standards (VCS) in lieu of government -unique standards, but does 
not preclude the use of other standards in rulemaking, procurement, or other program activities in 
cases where VCS do not exist or use of existing VCS would be inconsistent with law or otherwise 
impractical, including where use of a VCS would not be as effective at meeting the agency's 
regulatory, procurement, or program needs. See Circular A -119(5)(b).  
 
Page 136, paragraph 3.245  
 
During the review period, 12 specific trade concerns (STCs) relating to measures maintained by 
the United  States were raised in the TBT Committee; 1 STC raised before the review period was 
reiterated since July  2018. The United  States actively participates in the TBT Committee and has 
raised or supported 82 new STCs against its trade partners. There is a dispute against U.S.  measures 
concerning the origin marking requirement applicable to goods produced in Hong  Kong,  China. 
The United States is participating as a third party in two disputes with reference to the 
TBT Agreement.  
Question:  
On 3 September  2021, the U.S. submitted NPRM and NOI to the WTO (G/TBT/N/USA/1771). The 
Chinese side submitted its comments within the review period but the U.S. side did not give a 
substantial response. At regular meetings of the WTO -TBT Committee, the Chinese side raised STCs 
on it for several times but the U.S. side still fail to respond effectively. The U.S. measures were on 
the ground of national security threats, and there is no technical standard or measurement criteria 
available. It prohibited FCC from authorizing equipment in the "covered list" that contains only five 
Chinese companies.  
 
QUESTION 149:  The Chinese side hereby request an explanat ion: How are these measures 
consistent with the TBT  Agreement's MFN, national treatment and other non -discriminatory 
principles?  
 
RESPONSE 149:  Most recently, on 25  November  2022, the U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) adopted new rules prohibiti ng communications equipment deemed to pose an 
unacceptable risk to national security from being authorized for importation or sale in 
the United  States. The Report and Order, issued by the FCC: on that date, provides additional 
information on the action, i ncluding a response to China's comments, submitted under the 
rulemaking notice and comment period. As noted by the FCC, the actions taken "are consistent with 
the United  States' international obligations under the WTO/TBT agreement. [The] Commission is 
required to include on the Covered List equipment and services based solely on determinations by 
four enumerated U.S. Government sources relating to national security. Under the relevant statutes, 
those determinations are not made, as suggested by these comme nters, on the basis of nationality 
but are made based on fact -specific reviews whether the relevant equipment and services are found 
to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the  United  States or the security and safety 
of United  States pers ons, and not on sweeping determinations on the basis of nationality. Indeed, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 157 - 
 
  the March  2022 update to the Covered List includes equipment and services from countries other 
than China. Finally, we note that nearly all products from China will remain eligibl e for equipment 
authorization under our new rules". See FCC Report and Order, para. 256, available at: 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc -bans-authoriz ations -devices -pose-national -security -threat . 
 
QUESTION 150:  The U.S. side has never announced relevant technical standard or measurement 
criteria. Could the U.S. provide the explanations for such a practice that goes against the principle 
of transparency?  
 
RESPONSE 150:  As noted in the response to Question  149, the FCC set forth its determination and 
sources in the Report and Order (see: https://www.f cc.gov/document/fcc -bans-authorizations -
devices -pose-national -security -threat ). As described in the Report and Order, " [t]he Secure 
Networks Act expressly provides in section 2 © that the Commission must place on the Covered List 
any communications equipmen t that poses an unacceptable risk to the national security or the 
security and safety of United  States persons 'based solely on one or more' of the determinations 
made by four enumerated sources specified in the Act".  
 
Page 136, paragraph 3.247  
 
The United  States has concluded mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) covering different sectors 
with numerous foreign partners, including two MRAs with the  United  Kingdom in 2021. MRA 
implementation varies for each partner, even within a common or regional  arrangement, regarding 
the recognition level of CABs and the product coverage. In the area of telecommunications 
equipment, MRAs are implemented with some APEC members (Australia; Canada; Chinese  Taipei; 
Hong Kong,  China; the  Republic  of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Singapore; and Viet  Nam), the 
European  Union, some EFTA States (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein), and other trading partners 
(Israel, Japan, Mexico, and the  United  Kingdom). MRA signatories designate their accredited CABs 
to the Federal Com munication Commission (FCC) while the NIST, through its Telecom MRA Program 
Office, serves as the designated authority for U.S. CABs. The MRA with the EFTA States also covers 
recreational craft, while the MRA with the  European  Union extends to electrical s afety, recreational 
craft, medical devices, and pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs). The coverage of 
this latter sector in the U.S. EU  MRA was amended in 2017. Pharmaceutical GMPs are also part of 
the recent MRA with the  United  Kingdom. The  United  States has also signed separate MRAs with 
the European  Union, EFTA, and the  United  Kingdom for marine safety equipment.  
 
QUESTION 151:  Some of the tests necessary for tyres, electronic products and medical devices 
require samples to be sent to the U.S. (e.g. NSF certification), while there are few authorized 
certification agencies within China, thus the certification requires a long peri od of time and high cost. 
NRTL certifications (UL/CSA and others) require frequent reviews.  
 
Are there any measures or plans to simplify relevant procedures, increase mutual recognition, and 
reduce the cost of conformity assessment for enterprises exportin g to the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 151: Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 142, paragraph 3.269  
 
O. 14036 of 9  July 2021394 adopted a "whole -of-government" approach to fostering comp etition in 
U.S. markets. It provided directives focusing competition policy enforcement efforts on labor 
markets, agricultural markets, healthcare markets, and the technology sector (including mergers by 
dominant Internet platforms) and called for enforcem ent agencies to vigorously enforce the antitrust 
laws. In addition, E.O. 14036 also established the  White  House Competition Council to monitor 
progress on competition initiatives in the Order; however, this Council is not directly involved in 
enforcement a ctions.  
 
QUESTION 152:  Please provide details of the  White  House Competition Council, including its 
functions, members, and measures to effectively monitor progress on competition initiatives in the 
Order.  
 
RESPONSE  152: Details  on the White  House  Competit ion Council  can be found  at: https://www.w
hitehouse.gov/competition/ . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 158 - 
 
  Page 143, paragraph 3.267  
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
enforc e federal antitrust laws.  
 
QUESTION 153:  On 25  August  2022, the U.S. Departments of Justice and Germany's Federal Cartel 
Office opened antitrust investigation and CIMC abandoned its plan to merge MCI as a result of the 
big uncertainties caused by the inves tigation of concentration of undertakings.  
 
Please specify the reasons, grounds, process, impact and other aspects of the DOJ's investigation 
into that merger and clarify if it has considered the losses and impact the case may cause to relevant 
enterprises  and the industry on the whole.  
 
RESPONSE 153:  The DOJ's investigation of the CIMC/Maersk shipping container merger is 
described in its press release: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/global -shipping -container -suppliers -
china -international -marine -containers -and-maersk . The investigation was pursuant to the Clayton 
Act, sec. 7, which prohibits mergers where the effect "may be subs tantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly". As part of its investigation, the DOJ undertook a thorough review of 
the affected industry.  
 
Page 146, paragraph 3.280  
 
Governmental ownership or control over enterprises that engage in commercial activities are 
exceptions to the rule in the  United  States. The Federal Government does not have a general 
incorporation statute, and each entity is thus chartered through an act of Congress with a clear and 
transparent mandate to perform a publ ic purpose and in many cases not to compete with private 
enterprises. Their legal personality is separate from the Federal Government, but they may receive 
federal appropriations to complement their own sources of revenue. At the sub -federal level, states,  
municipalities, and tribal governments have the power to charter corporations that they own, control, 
fund, or regulate.  
 
QUESTION 154:  Please elaborate on the rules governing the operation of state -owned or 
state-controlled enterprises in the  United  States and explain why this is a separate system?  
 
RESPONSE 154:  It is unclear what this question refers to, but the  United  States does not maintain 
a separate system for state -owned enterprises.  
 
QUESTION 155:  Please specify while governmental ownership or co ntrol over enterprises own more 
resources, how does the U.S. ensure private and foreign enterprises can compete with such 
enterprises on level ground.  
 
RESPONSE 155:  In general, U.S. SOEs largely provide public services that do not compete with 
private or foreign enterprises.  
 
QUESTION 156: How does the U.S. believe its state -owned or state -controlled enterprises differ 
from similar enterprises in other countries?  
 
RESPONSE 156:  The United  States' ownership or control of enterprises is fundamentally differe nt 
than countries such as China. In the  United  States, state -owned and state -controlled enterprises do 
not generally engage in the manufacture or production of internationally traded goods. In 
the United  States, SOEs are not trying to achieve global market  share targets unlike SOEs 
elsewhere. Further, the  United  States does not in general use state -owned enterprises to subsidize 
directly or indirectly the production of industrial firms. Lastly, in general, U.S. SOEs largely provide 
public services that do n ot compete with private or foreign enterprises.  
 
QUESTION  157: Please specify the channels through which enterprises owned, controlled, funded 
or supervised by state or local authorities obtain government funding.  
 
RESPONSE 157:  Unlike China, where state -owned or controlled enterprises receive significant 
subsidies via below -market goods inputs, below -market debt, below -market equity, and government 
procurement, U.S. government support for state -owned enterprises is generally transparent, public, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 159 - 
 
  for public  service purposes, consistent with WTO rules, and subject to rigorous domestic discussion 
and debate.  
 
QUESTION 158:  Does this violate WTO principles regarding subsidies?  
 
RESPONSE 158:  No. Unlike China, programs in the  United  States that support state -owned 
enterprises are transparent, consistent with WTO rules, and where applicable, notified to the WTO.  
 
Page 153, paragraph 3.29  
 
On 25  January  2021, the President signed E.O.  14005, whi ch defined a new procurement policy 
(Box 3.3). Section  8 of E.O.  
The Final Rule increases the domestic content threshold initially from 55% to 60%, then to 65% in 
calendar year 2024 and to 75% in calendar year 2029. The initial increase to 60% will occur s everal 
months from publication of the final rule, to allow industry time to plan for the new threshold and to 
provide workforce training on the new fallback threshold. The rule also has a fallback clause that 
allows, until one year after the increase of th e domestic content threshold to 75%, for the use of 
the 55% domestic content threshold in instances where an agency has determined that there are 
no end products or construction materials that meet the new domestic content threshold or such 
products are of  unreasonable cost after application of the price preference.  
 
QUESTION 159:  The U.S. government procurement rules on "Buy American" exclude a wide range 
of developing countries that are neither parties to the GPA nor have bilateral arrangements with the 
U.S. Please clarify whether the rule on the purchase of U.S. goods violates t he WTO 
non-discrimination rules?  
 
RESPONSE 159:  The final rule is consistent with all applicable obligations of the  United  States under 
international agreements. The WTO  Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) establishes rules 
ensuring that open, fair a nd transparent conditions of competition in government procurement 
should be carried out between its members.  
 
QUESTION 160:  Does it constitute an unnecessary obstacle for other countries to enter the U.S. 
federal procurement market?  
 
RESPONSE 160:  Buy Ame rican procurement rules explicitly afford preferences to domestic 
enterprises in procurement opportunities within established thresholds and in a manner consistent 
with existing U.S. trade agreement obligations.  
 
QUESTION 161:  Please elaborate on whether t hese requirements have resulted in a significant 
increase in the cost of government procurement in the  United  States? By how much?  
 
RESPONSE 161:  In general, the application of domestic content preferences, small business set 
asides, and other limits on pu blic procurement would be expected to increase the aggregate costs 
of government procurement in order to realize best value for money, and to achieve statutory and 
programmatic goals. The  United  States does not collect or analyse data related to hypothetic al 
contracts that would not meet public policy requirements for comparative purposes.  
 
Page 184, paragraph 3.397  
 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Section  1281, created a continuously 
updated list of individuals and organization s that have a history of IP theft, technology transfer 
violations, and cyberespionage or pose a serious risk of improper technology transfer. The list 
includes individuals and organizations that operate under the direction of a foreign military or 
intellig ence agency.  
 
QUESTION  162: Technology licensing and technology transfer are both market -oriented technology 
transactions. By unilaterally deeming market behavior as improper technology transfer, is the U.S. 
government interfering with the market?  
 
RESPONS E 162: We do not agree with the premise of the question. We do not see IP theft, 
technology transfer violations, and cyberespionage as market -oriented behavior.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 160 - 
 
  Page 191, paragraph 4.10  
 
The USDA assists producers in reducing GHG emissions, enhancing carb on sequestration, and 
adapting to a changing climate. It released an Action Plan for Climate Adaptation and Resilience, a 
framework to prepare farmers, ranchers, and land managers for current and anticipated impacts of 
climate change, in October  2021. The USDA operates a network of Regional Climate Hubs that links 
its research and program agencies. Their aim is to facilitate climate -informed decision -making and 
direct stakeholders towards resources needed to implement such decisions.  
 
QUESTION 163:  The U.S.  is the world's largest cattle producer. Is there any measure or plan from 
the US side to reduce methane emissions from animal husbandry?  
 
RESPONSE 163:  The United  States employs an approach that is grounded in science, 
market -driven, equitable, voluntary,  and incentive -based to help farmers adopt and build resilience 
to a changing climate while sustainably increasing agricultural productivity. For example, USDA's 
Partnerships for Climate -Smart Commodities Program will build and expand market opportunities 
for commodities produced using climate -smart production practices via a set of pilot projects 
spanning up to five years. Some of the pilot programs under this initiative are aimed at reducing 
methane emissions, including projects to help dairy producers ad opt climate -smart manure 
management practices and to identify cattle breeding methods based on reduced enteric methane 
emissions.  
 
QUESTION 164: If yes, what outcomes does the this measure or plan intend to achieve?  
 
RESPONSE 164:  The Partnerships for Climate -Smart Commodities Program projects will pilot 
innovative and cost -effective methods for quantification, monitoring, reporting, and verification of 
greenhouse gas benefits.  
 
Page 191, paragraphs 4.1.1.1.2 & 4.1.1.1.3  
 
QUESTION 165:  According to the U.S. side's report, during 2018 -2020, the U.S. government 
provided accumulatively up to USD  60.4 billion in special transfer payment to agricultural producers. 
The report made it clear that the market facilitation program of 2019 changed from support for 
specified products to support for unspecified products. ARC and PLC were also changed to unspecified 
products. Please provide detailed reasons for this. In particular, ARC and PLC had different payment 
rates for different crop s, with the rates still pegged to specific product prices.  
Why does the U.S. side believe this to be support for unspecified products?  
 
RESPONSE 165:  The 2019 Market Facilitation Program (MFP) for non -specialty crops was paid on 
a producer's total acreage of all eligible crops, with payments made at a single county -level payment 
rate per acre based on county -level aggregate historical acreage and yields. Because the payments 
were on a per -acre, non -product specific basis, they were notified as non -product s pecific. There 
has been no change to the way in which the PLC and ARC programs are notified. PLC and ARC 
payments, if triggered, are based on a percentage of historical base acres of eligible 
historically -produced crops. No production is required to receiv e an ARC -CO and PLC payments. 
Thus, these payments are not tied to specific commodities. ARC Individual Coverage (ARC -IC) 
payments are based on the combined revenues for all covered commodities produced on the farm 
and are also therefore not tied to specif ic commodities.  
 
QUESTION 166:  As described on page 191 of the report (paragraphs 4.11 to 4.16), PLC and ARC 
cover specific crop varieties. So why are they not included in the current aggregate support of 
product -specific subsidy?  
 
RESPONSE 166: See Respon se 165. 
 
QUESTION 167 : Please provide detailed data on the compensation paid by the PLC for each certain 
crop and explain how the reimbursement rate for different certain products is determined.  
 
RESPONSE 167:  PLC payments are not based current production,  but rather on the historical base 
acres for the covered commodity.  PLC provides payments when the national average price for the 
covered commodity falls below the statutory reference price for that commodity. Payments, if WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 161 - 
 
  triggered, are made on 85% of bas e acres of the covered commodity. No production is required to 
receive a payment, if one is triggered.  
 
Page 199, paragraph 4.49  
 
The MFP provided direct payments to eligible producers using CCC Charter Act authorities. In 2018, 
commodity -specific payment rates, paid on actual production, were established for almonds, fresh 
sweet cherries, maize, cotton, milk, hogs, soybeans, sorghum, and wheat, based on the level of 
estimated trade lost due to retaliation. Milk payments were made on production during a spe cified 
historical period, while hog payments were made on the number of hogs in a specific time period. 
The MFP covered additional specialty and non -specialty crops in 2019.  26 Payments for non -specialty 
crops were based on a single -county payment rate (US D 15 to USD  150 per acre) multiplied by a 
farm's aggregate plantings of MFP -eligible crops, irrespective of which of those crops were planted 
in 2019.  27 However, the total payment for eligible plantings could not exceed the total 2018 
plantings on each fa rm. A single rate was applicable for all eligible tree nuts, i.e. almonds, hazelnuts, 
macadamia nuts, pecans, pistachios, and walnuts. Payments under the MFP amounted to 
USD 8.6 billion in 2018, USD  14.5 billion in 2019, and USD  3.8 billion in 2020 (calend ar year). 
Payments in February  2020, which represented 25% of the authorized payment total, were the last 
tranche of MFP payments. Forecast outlays in calendar year 2021 (USD  42.1 million) refer to minimal 
residual payments to cover errors, omissions, and appeals.  
 
QUESTION 168:  Please provide the quantity and proportion of MFP -subsidized products that are 
ultimately exported.  
 
RESPONSE 168:  Data on production and exports for various commodities can be found at USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), Produ ction, Supply and Distribution database, which is available 
at: https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/advQuery . 
 
QUESTION 169:  Please explain the basis for the MFP's classification of specialty crops and 
non-specialty crops in 2019 and explain how the authorities determined that non -specialty crops in 
the relevant area fall in the scope of MFP protection.  
 
RESPONSE 169:  The definition of a "non -specialty crop" and a "specialty crop" for the purposes of 
the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) is established at 7 CFR §1409.102. The 2019 MFP was 
implemented to assist producers of 2019 agricultural commodities that had been significantly 
impacted by tr ade actions of foreign governments resulting in the loss of exports.  
 
Page 200, paragraph 4.54  
 
Specifically, the CARES Act provided the USDA with additional funding of USD  9.5 billion in support 
of agricultural producers and USD  14 billion in enhanced bor rowing authority for the CCC (available 
after June  2020). The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) announced in April  2020 had 
two major components: (i)  USD 16 billion in direct support to farmers and ranchers affected by price 
declines and supply ch ain disruptions; and (ii)  USD 3 billion provided to purchase dairy, meat, and 
fresh produce to donate to people in need. Eligible producers were persons and legal entities of 
specified agricultural commodities who faced market disruptions and marketing cos ts due to the 
COVID -19 pandemic. Moreover, to be eligible for payments, the producer had to have either average 
gross income of less than USD  900,000 in the tax years 2016, 2017, and 2018 or derive at least 
75% of their adjusted gross income from farming, ranching, or forestry.  32 Eligible commodities 
included livestock, dairy, wool, certain non -specialty crops (malting barley, canola, maize, upland 
cotton, millet, oats, soybeans, sorghum, sunflowers, durum wheat, and hard red spring wheat), and 
specialty c rops (various fruit and vegetables, nuts, beans, and mushrooms). Commodities that had 
not seen a price decline of 5% or more were ineligible for support under CFAP 1.  33 Payments under 
CFAP 1 were capped at USD  250,000  per person or legal entity, or USD  250,000 per shareholder in 
a corporate entity, at most USD  750,000  per corporate entity. The FSA accepted applications for 
participation in CFAP 1 from 26  May to 11  September  2020.  
 
QUESTION 170:  Please provide data about the support available for each certa in product and 
specify the final receivers of the products.  
 
RESPONSE 170:  The United  States has included CFAP payments in its domestic support 
notifications. Supporting Tables DS:6 of the Table DS:1 notifications (G/AG/N/USA/157 and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 162 - 
 
  G/AG/N/USA/166) provid es data on outlays under CFAP for each product. Eligibility rules for CFAP 
can be found in 7  CFR §9.3 and 7  CFR §9.202 (see: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -7/subtitle -
A/part -9). 
 
Page 202, paragraph 4.61  
 
The United  States has reserved the right to apply the Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) on certain 
imports from other WTO Members. The SSGs may be based on price or volume, but 
the United  States has rarely opted for volume -based SSGs. The last volume -based action was 
applied in 2015 (on butter), and this type of SSG had previously not been used since 2003. 
Price-based SSGs are triggered automatically when the declared price for an item is below a 
pre-established price range and, a pplied at the level of every single shipment, some SSGs may affect 
very small quantities of trade. The 194 tariff lines on which the  United  States has reserved the right 
to use SSGs mainly concern milk and dairy products, sugar and sugar -containing product s, and 
cotton. In 2020, price -based SSGs were taken on 33  tariff lines, down from 36  tariff lines in 2019, 
37 tariff lines in 2018, 41  tariff lines in 2017, and 55  tariff lines in 2016.  
 
QUESTION 171:  Please provide a list of products that triggered SSG an d price levels in the last 5 
years.  
 
RESPONSE 171:  The list of products that triggered the SSG, due to either volume or price levels, 
can be found in the  United  States' Table  MA:5 notifications: G/AG/N/USA/163 (CY2021), 
G/AG/N/USA/152 (CY2020), G/AG/N/USA/ 142 (CY2019), G/AG/N/USA/141 (CY2018), and 
G/AG/N/USA/140 (CY2017).  
 
2021  
Scheduled  
SSG -Tariff item 
number(s)  2020  
Scheduled  
SSG -Tariff item 
number(s)  2019  
Scheduled  
SSG -Tariff item 
number(s)  2018  
Scheduled  
SSG -Tariff item 
number(s)  2017  
Scheduled  
SSG -Tariff item 
number(s)  
04029945  02022080  04029945  02012080  02013080  
04051020  04029170  04039078  02013080  02023080  
04059020  04031050  04051020  04029945  04015025  
04061088  04051020  04059020  04029990  04021050  
04063091  04059020  04061028  04051020  04029990  
04064070  04061088  04061048  04059020  04031050  
04069012  04063053  04061088  04061028  04051020  
04069018  04063091  04063028  04061088  04059020  
04069042  04064070  04063053  04063028  04061028  
04069078  04069012  04063067  04063038  04061058  
04069097  04069018  04063075  04063053  04061078  
12024280  04069042  04063091  04063071  04061088  
17011250  04069048  04064070  04063091  04062053  
17019148  04069078  04069012  04064070  04063028  
17019950  04069097  04069018  04069012  04063075  
17029020  17011450  04069042  04069018  04063091  
17029058  17019130  04069048  04069042  04064070  
19019062  17019950  04069054  04069048  04069012  
19019071  17049058  04069068  04069074  04069018  
20081115  18061055  04069074  04069078  04069032  
20081160  19019036  04069078  04069097  04069042  
21011258  19019062  04069097  17011250  04069048  
21050040  19019071  17011450  17019950  04069074  
21069097  20081135  17019950  18061015  04069097  
22029928  20081160  17029020  18069059  17011350  
 21012058  18061015  19019071  17019158  
 21039078  18069059  20081115  17019950  
 21050040  19019036  20081160  17049058  
 21069026  19019071  21011258  19019036  
 21069066  20081115  21012048  19019062  
 21069094  20081160  21012058  19019065  
 21069097  21011258  21039078  20081160  
 22029928  21012058  21050020  21011258  
  21050020  21050040  21012058  
  21069097  21069080  21039078  
  22029928  21069097  21050020  
   22029928  21050040  
    21069009  
    21069097  
    22029028  
    22029928  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 163 - 
 
  Page 202, paragraph 4.64  
 
… "The United  States has two schemes that provide export credit guarantee programs, allowing the 
exporter or private financial sector in the United  States to extend dollar -denominated financing at 
prevailing market interest rates. The GSM -102 credit guarant ee program and the Facility Guarantee 
Program (FGP) were both reauthorized under the 2018 Farm Act." … 
 
QUESTION  172: Who are the guarantors of the two export credit guarantee programs? What are 
the main differences between these two programs? The paragraph mentions that the cost of one of 
the programs, GSM -102, can cover long -term operating costs and losses. Can the cos t of another 
program FGP cover long -term operating costs and losses?  
 
RESPONSE 172:  The United  States is the guarantor of payment on letters of credit issued by 
approved Foreign Financial Institutions under both programs. The GSM -102 export credit guarante e 
program covers approved agricultural products while the Facility Guarantee Program (FGP) covers 
goods and services. Both programs charge fees sufficient to cover the long -term operating costs and 
losses of the programs.  
 
Page 205, paragraph 4.71  
 
The United States does not grant agricultural export subsidies (Red Box) and does not report 
payments under production limitation programs (Blue Box).  43 As for subsidies that are capped in 
the WTO  framework (Amber  Box), they have been consistently below, or even  well below, 
USD 20 billion per year until recently (Chart  4.4). 
 
QUESTION  173: In your latest notification concerning new or modified domestic support measures 
for agriculture (G/AG/N/USA/166), the U.S. includes Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk 
Coverage (ARC) in its current aggregate support of non -product specific subsidy.  
Could the U.S. explain why PLC and ARC do not meet the criteria of Article  6.5 of the WTO Agriculture 
Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 173:  The United  States reminds China that G/AG/ N/USA/166 was a Table DS:1 
notification, not a Table DS:2 notification. ARC and PLC do not meet the production -limiting criteria 
in Article  6.5 to be exempt from the reduction commitment, and we have consistently notified ARC 
and PLC in our Table DS:1 noti fication since the programs were implemented in 2014.  
 
Page 224, paragraph 4.134  
 
Imports or exports of natural gas require short - or long -term authorizations from the Department 
of Energy, in accordance with the Natural Gas Act of 1938, as amended. Applications involving 
countries that have concluded FTAs with the  United  States are granted without modification or delay, 
and exports to non -FTA countries are also authorized unless considered inconsistent with public 
interest or explicitly proh ibited by law or policy.  
 
QUESTION  174: What are the detailed criteria for obtaining gas export licenses for non -FTA partner 
countries?  
 
RESPONSE 174:  Detailed information on LNG export licenses is available from the Department of 
Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/fecm/how -obtain -authorization -import -andor -export -natural -
gas-and-lng. 
 
QUESTION 175:  Please specify the What the circumstances of "incons istent with the public 
interest"?  
 
RESPONSE 175:  Detailed information on LNG export licenses is available from the Department of 
Energy at: https:/ /www.energy.gov/fecm/how -obtain -authorization -import -andor -export -natural -
gas-and-lng. 
 
QUESTION 176:  After obtaining a license, under what circumstances and through what procedures 
will the license be revoked?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 164 - 
 
  RESPONSE 176:  Detailed information on LNG ex port licenses is available from the Department of 
Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/fecm/how -obtain -authorization -import -andor -export -natural -
gas-and-lng. 
 
QUESTION 177:  Should consideration be given to the buyer's contractual rights in the ongoing 
contract for the sale of natural gas?  
 
RESPONSE 177:  Detailed information on LNG export licenses is available from the Department of 
Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/fecm/how -obtain -authorization -import-andor -export -natural -
gas-and-lng. 
 
QUESTION 178:  Under the U.S. tax code, will natural gas exporters bear the U.S. tax burden 
outside US territory?  
 
RESPONSE 178:  Detailed information on LNG export licenses is available from the Department of 
Energy at : https://www.energy.gov/fecm/how -obtain -authorization -import -andor -export -natural -
gas-and-lng. 
 
QUESTION 179:  If so, what are the tax liabilities?  
 
RESPONSE 179:  Detailed information on LNG export licenses is available from the Department of 
Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/fecm/how -obtain -authorization -import -andor -export -natural -
gas-and-lng. 
 
Page 232, paragraph 4.162  
 
Similar to what was stated in  E.O. 13953161, the recent review highlights the dependence on 
imports of several products and suggests adopting an environmentally and socially responsible 
production; expanding domestic production and processing capacity, including recycling; using DPA 
Title III and similar programs to support domestic capacities and emerging technologies; and 
strengthening U.S. stockpiles, among others. An updated List of Critical Minerals covering 50 
minerals was published in February  2022.  
 
QUESTION 180:  In August  2022, U.S. President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act, 
stipulating that for electronic vehicles sold in the U.S. to be eligible for subsidies, the final assembly 
of the vehicles must happen in the U.S., materials of the batteries must come from within the U.S. 
or a country having FTA with the U.S., and the battery components must be manufactured and 
assembled in North America. Meanwhile, by 2024, vehicles containing critical minerals from foreign 
entities of concern would not be eligible to U.S. governm ent subsidies. Many WTO  member states 
believe such provisions to be clearly against WTO's no -discrimination principle.  
 
Please clarify the US side's opinion on theses provisions' compliance to WTO rules, particularly 
Article  I and III of the GATT  1994, Art icle 3 of the ASCM and Article  2 of the TRIMS.  
 
RESPONSE 180:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement.  
 
QUESTION 181:  If other WTO members do the same as  the U.S. does through it 's the CHIPS and 
Science Act to provide large subsidies for its own domestic semiconductor manufactures will the U.S. 
welcome this practice?  
 
RESPONSE 181: See answer above.  
 
Page 231, paragraph 4.159  
 
Following the increased demand for medicines and medical equipment related to the COVID -19 
pandemic, E.O.  13944 of 6  August  2020 instructed the establishment of a list of Essential Medicines, 
Medical Countermeasures, and Critical Inputs. E.O.  13944 aims to accelerate th e development of 
domestic production of medicines, personal protective equipment, critical inputs, finished drugs, and 
other finished devices by prioritizing federal contracts or orders of these goods, and by maximizing 
domestic production in federal procu rement. E.O.  13944 also calls for reducing dependence on 
foreign manufacturers for these products and for ensuring reliable long -term domestic production, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 165 - 
 
  and states that it is the policy of the  United  States to accelerate the development of cost -effective  
and efficient domestic production of essential medicines and medical countermeasures.  
 
QUESTION  182: Do in vitro diagnostic products fall within the scope of E.O.  13944?  
 
If companies manufacturing in vitro diagnostic products can provide results of clini cal trials 
conducted in China, can the FDA consider only sampling these products for assessment to improve 
the efficiency of approval?  
 
RESPONSE 182:  Executive  Order  13944 directed the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
identify a list of essential  medicines, medical countermeasures and critical inputs that are medically 
necessary to have available at all times in an amount adequate to serve patient needs and in the 
appropriate dosage forms. The list may be found here: https://www.fda.gov/about -
fda/reports/executive -order -13944 -list-essential -medicines -medical -countermeasures -and-critical -
inputs . The device medical countermeasure list includes diagnostic testing kits and supplies for rapid 
test development and processing, personal protective equipment, active vital sign monitoring 
devices, devices for vaccine delivery, and devices for management of acu te illnesses such as 
ventilators, among others. In regards to clinical trials, FDA accepts results of clinical trials that are 
in line with U.S. laws and regulations. FDA does not sample products during the premarket review 
of a medical device.  
 
QUESTION 1 83: Can the U.S. reduce clinical costs and the length of clinical trials in the future for 
foreign products undergoing clinical trials on U.S. soil?  
 
RESPONSE 183:  Regulations with regards to clinical trials are applied consistently, regardless of 
the loca tion of the trial. For more information on clinical trials, visit Regulations: Good Clinical 
Practice a nd Clinical Trials | FDA  (https://www.fda.gov/science -research/clinical -trials-and-human -
subject -protec tion/regulations -good-clinical -practice -and-clinical -trials). 
 
Page 233, paragraph 4.165  
 
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) keeps track of savings related to reduced regulatory 
burden affecting small businesses in a yearly report.  165 Enhancing the ability of small businesses 
to participate in the global marketplace is a key objective for the authorities. Recommendations 
resulting from the E.O.  14017 review call for: (i)  investing in small, medium, and disadvantaged 
businesses in critical supply chains; (ii)  developing an ecosystem that includes growing innovative 
small, medium, and disadvantaged businesses; and (iii)  examining the ability of the U.S. 
Export -Import Bank to use existing authorities to support U.S. manufacturing. Other policies such  
as government procurement set -asides and preferences promote economic opportunities for small 
businesses, including those in manufacturing (Section  3.3). 
 
QUESTION  184: What specific measures does the EXIM Bank have in place to leverage its existing 
institutional capacity to support U.S. manufacturing?  
 
RESPONSE 184:  EXIM has the ability to deploy its existing financial products to domestic borrowers 
under certain conditions.  
 
QUESTION 185:  What progress and outcomes have they produced?  
 
RESPONSE  185: This resulted  in the Make More in America  Initiative  (https://www.exim.gov/abo
ut/special -initiatives/make -more-in-america -initiative ). 
 
Page 237, paragraph 4.179  
 
The Federal Reserve introduced the following emergency lending facilities to support the flow of 
credit into the economy: (i)  the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility, open to investment -grade 
companies and which provides bridge financing of up to four y ears; (ii)  the Secondary Market 
Corporate Credit Facility, which purchases in the secondary market corporate bonds issued by 
investment -grade U.S. companies and U.S. -listed exchange traded funds; (iii)  the Term 
Asset -Backed Securities Loan Facility, which provides non -recourse loans to holders of certain 
eligible asset -backed securities; (iv)  the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), which 
makes loans available to eligible financial institutions secured by high -quality assets purchased from WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 166 - 
 
  Money Market Mutual Funds; (v)  the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, which purchases eligible 
three -month unsecured commercial paper and asset -backed commercial paper from eligible issuers; 
(vi) the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which offers overnight and  term funding with maturities up 
to 90 days against a wide range of collateral; (vii)  the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility 
(PPPLF), which extends non -recourse loans to eligible financial institutions that pledge loans covered 
under the SBA's (PPP); (viii)  the Municipal Liquidity Facility, which purchases short -term notes 
directly from the different constituencies; and (ix)  the Main Street Lending Program, which 
purchases participations in loans made to eligible small and medium -sized businesse s. The Federal 
Reserve also participated in Central Bank Liquidity Swaps coordinated with other central banks, as 
well as in a Temporary Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) Repo Facility, which 
was extended through 30  September  2021.  
 
QUESTION 186:  Apart from loans, what are the common ways for small and medium -sized 
businesses to receive support?  
RESPONSE 186:  Small and medium -sized businesses may seek counseling and other services 
aimed at starting and expanding their businesses, incl uding developing export plans at U.S. Small 
Business Development Centers and U.S. Export Assistance Centers in locations around 
the United  States, and may also obtain market research and trade data analysis. See www.tra de.gov  
and www.sba.gov . 
 
Page 250, paragraph 4.229  
 
E.O. 13913 of 4  April 2020, Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation 
in the  United  States Telecommunications Services Sector, formalized the establishment of a 
Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications 
Services Sector, which assists FCC in its public interest review of national security and la w 
enforcement concerns raised by foreign participation in the U.S. telecommunications services sector. 
Upon referral by FCC, the Committee conducts a 120 -day review of certain types of applications, 
which can be extended by 90  days in case of a potential s econdary assessment. The Committee can 
make a range of recommendations to FCC including no objection to an application, approval of an 
application subject to mitigation, denial of an application, or modification or revocation of a license. 
In September  2020, FCC adopted a Second Report and Order that provides for new rules and 
procedures to formalize the review process of the Committee, notably by defining the scope of the 
review and establishing categories of information to be submitted by applicants. This  review differs 
from the one conducted by CFIUS as it is focused on the operation purposes of licenses; some 
transactions may trigger a review by the two bodies. Following procedures initiated before the 
issuance of E.O.  13913, FCC revoked the licenses of four foreign common carrier wireless providers 
during the review period.  
 
QUESTION 187:  What is the difference between the committee's review and the CFIUS review with 
regard to foreign participation in telecommunications services?  
 
RESPONSE 187:  CFIUS rev iews certain types of transactions such as mergers, acquisitions, certain 
other non -passive investments, and real estate transactions, among others. While some transactions 
will trigger a filing with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and also be subject to CFIUS 
jurisdiction, the FCC reviews licensure for the eventual purpose of operation, while CFIUS reviews 
all elements of the transaction for national security risk. The reviews by CFIUS and the FCC (inclusive 
of the review of the Committee for t he Assessment of Foreign Participation in the  United  States 
Telecommunications Services Sector) are independent of each other, though the Committee 
members are also members of CFIUS.  
 
QUESTION 188:  How is the division of duties between the two agencies?  
 
RESPONSE 188:  Please refer to the response to Question  187. 
 
QUESTION 189:  E.O. 13913 sets out the timeframe for review of new licence applications by the 
Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications 
Services  Sector, but does not specify the timeframe for review of existing licences.  
Could the  United  States clarify this issue?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 167 - 
 
  RESPONSE 189:  Section  6 of E.O.  13913 does not set a timeline for the Committee's review of 
existing licenses, but Committee license r eviews may proceed much like application reviews in terms 
of process, licensee engagement, and timing. In certain Committee license reviews, neither the FCC 
nor the licensee will be aware the Committee has conducted a review until the Committee issues its 
final recommendation to the FCC, at which point the FCC's process will begin (as described in the 
"Committee Review of Existing Licenses", Paragraphs 90 -92, of the FCC Report and Order in the 
Matter of Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC Applications and Petitions 
Involving Foreign Ownership, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC -20-133A1.pdf ). 
 
QUESTION 190:  In May  2019, FCC revoked China Mobile's 214 licen se for operation in the U.S. 
During 2020 -2021, the same happened to China Unicom, China Mobile, and PCOnline. In 
November  2022, FCC revised its equipment authorization rules banning issuance of equipment 
authorizations to companies on the FCC's Covered Lis t, thus banning the export and sales of new 
communications and video monitoring products of Huawei, ZTE and three other Chinese companies 
in the U.S., citing national security as the ground.  
Please specify the U.S. side's decision -making process, considera tions, and other aspects in this 
regard.  
Have there been communication with relevant enterprises or any consideration of the impact?  
 
RESPONSE 190:  With limited exceptions, the  United  States does not publicly disclose the 
information used in making these d eterminations.  
 
QUESTION 191:  Please clarify if there is any misuse of the "national security" concept.  
 
RESPONSE 191:  There has been no misuse.  
 
Page 257, paragraph 4.234  
 
In line with the John S. McCain National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 
(P.L. 115-232), FCC prohibited the use of Universal Service Funds for the purchase of products and 
services from two manufacturers (Huawei and ZTE) in November  2019. The Secure and Trusted 
Communications Networks Act  of 2019 (P.L.  116-352) established a mechanism to prevent the entry 
of communications equipment or services that pose a national security risk to U.S. networks and to 
mandate their removal if in current use. FCC is responsible for publishing and maintaini ng a list of 
equipment or services prohibited to be purchased with federal funds. In March  2021, FCC published 
the list of equipment and services covered by this legislation. The Secure Equipment Act of 2021 
(P.L. 117-55) requires FCC not to review or appr ove products on this list.  
 
QUESTION 192:  FCC listed five Chinese telecommunication companies, including Huawei and ZTE, 
as high -risk suppliers, banning U.S. carriers from purchasing their products and services with federal 
fund. Is this against the WTO ru le of non -discriminatory treatment?  
 
RESPONSE 192:  As we indicated when China submitted this question in its original set of questions, 
the U.S. measures are consistent with its GATS commitments.  
 
QUESTION 193:  FCC imposed restrictions on equipment authori zation for these listed enterprises, 
banned such equipment from the U.S. market, and seriously hampered its entry to other markets 
that recognize FCC equipment authorization. Does this constitute technical barriers to trade for 
Chinese products?  
 
RESPONSE  193: The FCC action is consistent with the international trade obligations of 
the United  States.  
 
QUESTION 194:  Is it a behavior of exceeding its authority of the FCC to prohibit procurement from 
non-communication equipment manufacturers?  
 
RESPONSE 194: The measures of the FCC and other relevant agencies are consistent with their 
authorities.  
 
Page 273, paragraph 4.313  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 168 - 
 
  There is no comprehensive federal consumer data protection and privacy regulation in 
the United  States; however, there are sector -specific  federal laws. For instance, HIPAA (P.L. 
104-191) requires covered entities and their business associates to safeguard protected health 
information they collect or process. HIPAA prohibits the sale of protected health information by a 
covered entity or bus iness associate without the prior written consent of the patient. The 
Gramm -Leach -Bliley Act (P.L.  106-102) requires financial institutions to inform consumers regarding 
their privacy practices, have processes in place to secure consumer financial informat ion, and 
provide opt -out options if the institution shares consumer financial information with non -affiliated 
third parties. In addition, several states, including California and Virginia, have adopted horizontal 
data protection laws.  
 
QUESTION  195: Is the  adoption of comprehensive federal consumer data protection and privacy 
regulation in the U.S. possible in the future?  
 
RESPONSE 195: Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
Page 274,  paragraph 4.315  
 
The United  States keeps a decentralized, market -driven approach to regulate digital services 
through policies, regulations, and laws on specific issues and/or sectors that together support the 
progression of digital transformation. Althou gh there is no general consensus on the contours of the 
digital economy or of digital trade, concerns regarding data security as well as an open, 
non-discriminatory, and fair competition in the digital economy have been rising.  
 
QUESTION 196:  Where do the main differences in perceptions of the contours of the digital 
economy or of digital trade lie?  
 
RESPONSE 196:  In their report on U.S. digital economy statistics for the years 2005 -2021, the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis includes in its de finition of the digital economy four major types 
of goods and services:  
 
• Infrastructure, or the basic physical materials and organizational arrangements that 
support the existence and use of computer networks and the digital economy, primarily 
information and communications technology (ICT) goods and services;  
• E-commerce, or the remote sale of goods and services over computer networks;  
• Priced digital services, or services related to computing and communication that are 
performed for a fee charged to the con sumer;  
• Federal nondefense digital services represents the annual budget for federal nondefense 
government agencies whose services are directly related to supporting the digital 
economy.  
 
For more information, please view the report on New and Revised Stati stics of the U.S. Digital 
Economy:  https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2022 -11/new -and-revised -statistics -of-the-us-digital -
economy -2005-2021.pdf . 
 
Page 274, paragraph 4.316  
 
In October  2020, the Undertaking Spam, Spyware, And Fraud Enforcement With Enforcers Beyond 
Borders Act of 2006 (U.S. SAFE WEB Act of 2006) (P.L. 109 -455), which authorizes the FTC to take 
actions against cross -borde r fraud and deception occurring over the Internet, was reauthorized until 
FY2027 by P.L.  116-173. 
 
QUESTION 197:  During the period under review, what actions had been taken by the  United  States 
against cross -border telecommunications fraud and internet fra ud? 
 
RESPONSE 197:  
 
• Telecommunications Fraud:  
- The FTC enforces the Telecommunications Sales Rule (TSR), which gives effect to 
the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act. This legislation 
gives the FTC and state attorneys general law enforcement tools to combat WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 169 - 
 
  telemarketing fraud, g ives consumers added privacy protection and defenses 
against unscrupulous telemarketers, and helps consumers tell the difference 
between legitimate telemarketing. Among other things, the law requires the 
telemarketers disclose specific information when mak ing telemarketing calls, 
prohibits misrepresentations, limits when telemarketers may call consumers, and 
prohibits calls to a consumer who has asked not to be called again. It also prohibits 
unauthorized billing and requires that specific business records be kept for two 
years.  (The FCC enforces the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which also 
regulates telemarketing.)  In April  2022, the FTC proposed several updates to the 
TSR. 
• Internet Fraud:  
- Since the early days of e -commerce, the FTC has made clear that the consumer 
protections provided for under the FTC Act against deceptive and unfair commercial 
conduct apply equally in the context of online transactions.  
- Information on FTC cases and proceedings can be found at 
https://www.ftc.gov/legal -library/browse/cases -
proceedings?search=&sort_by=search_api_relevance . 
QUESTION 198:  What actions are planned for the next step?  
 
RESPONSE 198:  Regarding f uture plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 199:  What are the considerations in responding to the needs of other members for 
international cooperation in this regard?  
 
RESPONSE 199:  The FT C administers the econsumer.gov platform that is available in multiple 
languages and is supported by numerous consumer protection agencies around the world. The 
platform allows consumers to report complaints involving cross -border transactions such as onli ne 
purchases from providers abroad.  
 
Given that cross -border online scams are increasingly prevalent, it is incumbent upon consumer 
protection agencies at all levels and across the globe to cooperate by sharing investigatory 
information in a confidential w ay and engaging in coordinated actions and enforcement assistance. 
For example, in 2020 the FTC engaged in a year -long coordination with five United  States agencies, 
consumer protection organizations from nine countries and 23  states, all of which resulted  in 251  law 
enforcement actions against Internet scams. This international law enforcement effort was made in 
conjunction with a meeting of the  International  Marketing  Supervision  Network, a group consisting 
of consumer protection enforcement authority fro m 29 countries with the cross -border nature of the 
Internet, an international collaboration effort is necessary to combat deceptive online commercial 
conduct. Participants in "Operation Top 10 Dot Cons", including consumer groups from Australia, 
Canada, Ge rmany, the  United  Kingdom and the  United  States, with such organizations as the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Postal Inspection 
Service taking part.  
 
In addition, in May of 2020, the FBI established th e Internet fraud complaint center in partnership 
with the national white -collar crime center.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
Page 5, paragraph 2.2  
 
The United  States maintains one of the world's most open trade regimes, with the WTO r eporting 
the U.S. simple average MFN tariff at 3.34% in 2021 on a bound basis and 2.34% in 2020 on a trade 
weighted average basis.  
 
QUESTION 200:  The World Bank database shows the U.S. simple average MFN tariff at 10.2% in 
2019 on a bound basis and the wei ghted average tariff at 17.9%, exceeding the overall tariff levels 
of developing countries. However, the U.S. simple average MFN tariff bound rate in 2021 is 3.34% 
and the weighted average tariff for trade in 2020 is 2.34%. Please explain why the tariff le vel was 
significantly increased in 2019 and on what specific basis?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 170 - 
 
  RESPONSE 200:  Please see paragraph 3.40 of the Secretariat Report: "The U.S. MFN applied tariff 
rates did not change significantly during the review period, and essentially remain the sam e as the 
levels in 2018 (Tables 3.6 and A3.1). The simple average rate remains low at 4.8% overall".  
 
QUESTION 201:  And we wonder whether it constitutes a violation of WTO tariff commitments.  
 
RESPONSE 201:  Please see paragraph 3.42 of the Secretariat Report: "There have been no changes 
to the  United  States' bound tariff rates since the last Review and, on average, they remain at 4.8%".  
 
Page 6, paragraph 2.11  
 
The unemployment rate also spiked in early 2020, from 3.5% in February  2020 to 14.7% in 
April 2020. It has systematically declined since then reaching 3.6% over the March to June  2022 
period and 3.5% in July  2022. Prior to the recession, the unemployment rate averaged 3.9% in 2018 
and 3.7% in 2019.  
 
QUESTION 202: Does the U.S. consider the recent massive layoffs in the tech sector as an indicator 
of the future state of the labour market?  
RESPONSE 202:  U.S. employment has increased a net 23  million since April  2020 (the trough of 
the recession), and is now up a net 1  million from February  2020 (pre -pandemic). Private 
employment is up a net 1.5  million from February  2020. The most recent unemployment rate was 
at 3.7% (November), and has been in a narrow range of 3.5% to 3.7% since March. In any economy , 
there will be job losses and job gains.  
 
Page 8, paragraph 2.21  
 
Inflation remains a global challenge. Many factors contributed to higher prices, including a slow 
recovery in global energy production, supply -chain disruptions and related shortages of spe cific 
inputs, persistently strong demand for durable goods, rising food costs in part due to supply chain 
issues, brisk growth in house prices, and increased demand for services (such as travel, leisure, and 
hospitality) as the economy reopened.  
 
QUESTION 203: Please explain whether inflation has been partly attributed to a slew of sanctions 
and decoupling policy measures introduced by the U.S.in recent years?  
 
RESPONSE 203:  Inflation remains a global challenge. Many factors contributed to higher prices, 
including a slow recovery in global energy production, supply -chain disruptions and related shortages 
of specific inputs, persistently strong demand for durable goods, rising food costs in part due to 
supply chain issues, brisk growth in house prices, and in creased demand for services (such as travel, 
leisure, and hospitality) as the economy reopened. The  Russian  Federation's unprovoked and 
unjustifiable war with Ukraine has further challenged the global outlook. It has exacerbated supply 
disruptions, driven up energy costs and increased food insecurity.  
 
QUESTION 204:  Please explain whether its expansionary monetary policy is also an important 
cause of inflation?  
 
RESPONSE 204: See response to Question  203. 
 
Page 8, paragraph 3.1  
 
Labor issues have been an im portant part of U.S. trade policy throughout the reporting period. In 
2021, the  United  States made it a priority to bring labor issues and topics important to working 
people to the forefront of trade policy. USTR engaged with governments around the world t o 
recalibrate trade policy to ensure that real people can realize the benefits of international trade. In 
addition, the  United  States increased stakeholder consultations to ensure workers' voices are heard 
and considered throughout the policy -making proces s. Under this new policy approach, 
the United  States promoted respect for labor rights as part of engagement with trade partners in 
2021 through the formal mechanisms of trade agreements and trade preference programs, as well 
as through country -specific in itiatives, capacity building , and technical assistance.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 171 - 
 
  QUESTION 205:  Bruce Yandle, a professor at George Mason University in the U.S., commented 
that the Biden Administration's "worker -centered" trade policy tries to respond to international 
competition with tariffs. While it claims to protect American workers, in fact, there are only 20  million 
manufacturing workers in the U.S. participating in international competition, and the interests of 
more than 100  million workers employed in the service sector ha ve been impaired by tariffs. It can 
be seen that the Biden -Harris Administration's worker -centered trade policy is introduced only for 
the purpose of winning the votes of workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector. This policy has in fact 
brought huge losses  to American workers in other fields such as services, and has not brought 
so-called "fairness" to most American workers, let alone workers in developing countries. What is 
the response of the U.S. regarding the above -mentioned comments?  
 
RESPONSE 205:  The worker -centered trade policy means that the  United  States is focused on 
ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and that the benefits of trade are broadly 
shared by all people. When we say "worker -centered", we mean workers within  the United  States 
and in our trade partner countries, as well as workers across all occupations and sectors. 
The United  States recognizes that trade can - and should - be a force for good. Done right, and in 
coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle class, redress inequality, and 
promote fair competition. We remain committed to upholding a fair and open global trading system 
– one that follows through on our partners' longstanding commitment to conduct economic relations 
with a vie w to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, and promoting sustainable 
development. We are developing new tools and implementing existing commitments to achieve 
these goals.  
 
QUESTION 206:  Does the U.S. agree with the opinion that the essenc e of the above trade policy is 
a form of "America First" trade bullying in disguise?  
 
RESPONSE 206:  No, we do not. The worker -centered trade policy means that the  United  States is 
focused on ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and that the benefits of trade 
are broadly shared by all people. The  United  States recognizes that trade can – and should – be a 
force for good. Done right, and in coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle 
class, redress inequality, an d promote fair competition. We remain committed to upholding a fair 
and open global trading system – one that follows through on our partners' longstanding 
commitment to conduct economic relations with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment, and promoting sustainable development. We are developing new tools and 
implementing existing commitments to achieve these goals.  
 
Page 8, paragraph 3.3  
 
In addition, the  United  States has promoted the creation of innovative trade tools to addres s topics 
important to working people. We are prioritizing labor issues in the  United  States European  Union 
Trade and Technology Council (TTC), in the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), in 
the United  States – United  Kingdom Dialogues on the Future of A tlantic Trade, the U.S. -Taiwan 
Initiative on 21st Century Trade, and in the  United  States -Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment 
Partnership.  
 
QUESTION 207:  Please provide more details on the overall plan for the "innovative trade tools".  
How does such innov ative trade tools prevent exclusivism and severance of the global supply and 
how could they promote global free trade?  
 
RESPONSE 207: We are prioritizing a range of labor issues in our work around the world. We are 
implementing existing commitments and dev eloping new tools. For example, the  United  States 
launched the Trade and Labor Dialogue under the TTC. Information about its first meeting is available 
at: https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -offices/press -office/press -releases/2022/september/us -trade-
representative -and-us-department -labor-host-transatlantic -tripartite -trade -and-labor. In 
September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF pillars. The Trade 
Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future labor negotiations. Please see here 
for more information:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Minister
ial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20R ELEASE%20(1).pdf . The  United  States is 
also launching a focused trade strategy to combat forced labor, which will lay out the U.S. 
government's trade approach to addressing forced labor in global supply chains. Regarding future 
plans, the  United  States rem inds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 172 - 
 
  Page 9, paragraph 3.2  
Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  
 
QUESTION 208:  It is generally agreed that the effective address of global climate change requires 
cooperation among countries in accordance with the principles of multilateralism, and that national 
actions should be consistent with the objectives, principles and relate d arrangements set out in the 
United  Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement.  
Is the U.S. policy of using trade instruments to accelerate decarbonization following the principles 
of fairness, common but differentiate d responsibilities and respective capabilities?  
 
RESPONSE 208: Tackling climate change requires that every country take urgent national action, 
while simultaneously bolstering that through multilateral cooperation. The  United  States is taking 
ambitious nat ional steps to achieve a net -zero emissions economy by no later than 2050, and 
partnering with our global partners to strengthen our climate ambition and implement the 
multilateral commitments we have made. For example, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Invest ment and 
Jobs Act makes a historic investment in the modernization, sustainability, and security of our 
domestic infrastructure. Among these investments is a USD  3 billion expansion of the Smart Grid 
Investment Matching Grant Program that is designed to im prove the flexibility of the grid by 
upgrading existing transmission and distribution systems and improving energy storage. 
Additionally, the Act makes a USD  6 billion investment in the Civilian Nuclear Credit program to 
prevent premature retirement of exi sting zero -carbon nuclear plants, and a USD  2.5 billion 
investment in advanced nuclear demonstrations and research. We have also streamlined climate 
considerations into our trade and development policies. Through USAID, for example, 
the United  States has p artnered with more than 45  countries to implement ambitious emissions 
reduction measures, protect critical ecosystems, transition to renewable energy, build resilience 
against the impacts of climate change, and promote the flow of capital toward climate -positive 
investments.  
 
Page 9, paragraph 3.7  
 
The traditional approach to climate and environmental issues within trade has primarily focused on 
advancing levels of environmental protection for our trading partners. The  United  States will 
continue this work to strengthen and expand those commitments, but we also recognize that this 
singular approach will not fully achieve our climate goals. To this end, the  United  States is pursuing 
a new generation of trade policies that will more affirmatively promote the d ecarbonization necessary 
to limit global temperature increase to 1.5°C.  
 
QUESTION 209:  Please explain the content of the new generation of trade policies and its potential 
impact on international trade?  
 
RESPONSE 209:  Trade policy is important to advancing our shared environment objectives. For 
example, trade can help facilitate access to lower -emission goods and services, or promote 
investment in climate -friendly technologies. Trade can also incentivize environmental protection, 
advance human rights protections, and protect global workers.  
 
This is the reason the  United  States is working with the global community under the auspices of the 
WTO and under mechanisms like the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework and our bilater al and 
multilateral trade agreements to pursue wide -spread adoption of trade policies that are resilient, 
inclusive, and sustainable. Modern U.S. free trade agreements include a robust environment chapter 
with ambitious environment commitments that are sub ject to dispute settlement. A core 
commitment in these chapters is that we and our trading partners do not waive or derogate from 
enforcing environmental laws. This commitment is based on the understanding that countries that 
fail to enforce environmental laws impose economic and public health costs on their citizens, trading 
partners, and the global community. These countries may also have an unfair trade advantage in 
the global marketplace because their products or services do not reflect their true envir onmental 
cost. 
 
QUESTION 210:  And please explain how the content of the new generation of U.S. trade policies 
will contribute to decarbonisation and the achievement of climate goals without becoming a form of 
trade protectionism.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 173 - 
 
  RESPONSE 210:  Trade polic y can help advance our climate and environment objectives, including 
by facilitating access to lower -emission goods and services and promoting investment in 
climate -friendly technologies. Trade can also incentivize environmental protection, advance human 
rights protections, and protect global workers.  
 
The United  States is working with the global community under the auspices of the WTO and under 
mechanisms like the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework and our bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements to pursue  wide-spread adoption of trade policies that are resilient, inclusive, and 
sustainable. These efforts include modern U.S. free trade agreements that include a robust 
environment chapter with ambitious environment commitments that are subject to dispute 
settlement. A core commitment in these chapters is that we and our trading partners do not waive 
or derogate from enforcing environmental laws. This commitment is based on the understanding 
that countries that fail to enforce environmental laws impose economi c and public health costs on 
their citizens, trading partners, and the global community. These countries may also have an unfair 
trade advantage in the global marketplace because their products or services do not reflect their 
true environmental cost.  
 
QUESTION 211:  How does the U.S. government plan to implement these trade policies?  
Is the current practice aligned with the path to the 1.5°C goal?  
 
RESPONSE 211:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospe ctive exercises.  
 
QUESTION 212:  How can the U.S. effort contribute to the 1.5°C goal?  
 
RESPONSE 212:  The United  States is taking ambitious national action pursuant to our Paris 
Agreement commitments. For more information on these efforts, please see the  United States' 
Nationally Determined Contribution, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022 -
06/United%20States%20NDC %20April%2021%202021%20Final.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 213:  What multilateral or bilateral actions does the U.S. plan to take with other trading 
partners?  
 
RESPONSE 213:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospec tive exercises.  
 
QUESTION 214:  How to ensure these policy instruments be applicable to other countries with 
different national circumstances without compromising trade fairness?  
 
RESPONSE 214:  As this question relates to future plans for multilateral and b ilateral action, 
the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 9, paragraph 3.8  
 
Launched during the U.S. -EU Summit in June  2021 to deepen transatlantic trade and economic 
relations, the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) held its inaugural meeting in September  2021. 
During this meeting, the co -chairs reaffirmed the TTC's commitment to grow the transatlantic trade 
and investment relationship, fight the climate crisis, and protect the environment. Un der the U.S. -EU 
TTC Climate and Clean Tech and Global Trade Challenges working groups, the  United  States will 
work with the EU to collaboratively advance trans -Atlantic priorities to address climate and 
environmental issues.  
 
QUESTION 215:  Please descry be  the main progress and results of the current work of the U.S. -EU 
Trade and Technology Council (TTC)  
 
RESPONSE 215:  The results to date of the TTC have been described in the joint statements issued 
by the U.S. and EU co -chairs of the TTC at the conclusion of their two most recent ministerial 
meetings, on 16  May 2022, and 5  December  2022. The 16  May TTC joint statement can be found 
on the  White  House website, at this link: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -
content/uploads/2022/05/TTC -US-text-Final-May-14.pdf . The 5  December TTC joint statement can 
be found on the  White  House websi te, at this link: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 174 - 
 
  room/statements -releases/2022/12/05/u -s-eu-joint-statement -of-the-trade-and-technology -
council/ . 
 
QUESTION 216:  Please elaborate on the future work plan and vision of TTC?  
 
RESPONSE 216:  Regarding the future work plan and vision of the TTC, the  United  States reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are re trospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 217:  How does TTC comply with the WTO non -discrimination principle?  
 
RESPONSE 217:  The TTC does not prohibit or otherwise limit or restrict goods or services from 
entering into the  United  States. Therefore, because the TTC does not affect the importation of goods 
or services, the TTC does not implicate the WTO obligations of the  United  States generally.  
 
QUESTION 218:  Please elaborate what arrangements are in place for its work in the area of 
intellectual property rights and  in the administration of justice, etc.  
 
RESPONSE 218:  The TTC currently has no plans to work in the area of the administration of justice 
or the area of intellectual property rights. The TTC is currently discussing intellectual property, but 
only as it re lates to efforts to reduce barriers to research and development collaboration on quantum 
information science and technology.  
QUESTION 219:  What progress has the two working groups under the TTC made and what are 
outlook?  
 
RESPONSE 219:  Progress to date in all TTC working groups has been described in the two joint 
statements cited in the response to Question  215. 
 
QUESTION 220:  How to ensure pushing forward such bilateral cooperation without impairing the 
interests of third countries while being conducive to  addressing global climate and environmental 
issues?  
 
RESPONSE 220:  It is unclear precisely what this question is asking. For information about how 
the United  States is addressing global climate and environmental issues, please visit this website: 
https://www.state.gov/policy -issues/climate -crisis/ . 
 
QUESTION 221:  For the U.S. government, what are priorities in tackling climate and environmental 
issues?  
 
RESPONSE 221:  The United  States is pursuing a number of ambitious measures to achieve our 
climate and environmental sustainability objectives, in line with our national policy to put 
the United  States on a path to achieve net -zero emissions, economy -wide, by no later th an 2050. 
For more specific information on the action we are taking at the federal level, please consult 
Executive Order  14057, Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs through Federal Sustainability, 
and the 
accompanying  Federal  Sustainability  Plan: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/1
3/2021 -27114/catalyzing -clean-energy -industries -and-jobs-throu gh-federal -sustainability ; and htt
ps://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/federal -sustainability -plan.pdf . 
 
Page 9, paragraph 3.9  
 
In October  2021, the United  States and the EU further announced their commitment to negotiate 
the world's first emissions -based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminum trade. Together, 
the United  States and EU are working to address the carbon intensity of steel and alu minum traded 
into their market, as well as countries that adopt non -market practices that contribute to worldwide 
over-supply. The arrangement will drive investment in green steel and aluminum production in 
the United  States, Europe, and around the world, reducing emissions in two of the most 
carbon -intensive industrial sectors.  
 
QUESTION 222:  A large number of developing countries in the world are still faced with multiple 
challenges such as achieving sustained economic growth and eradicating poverty.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 175 - 
 
  Have the U.S. and EU considered the impact on other countries, especially developing countries, in 
formulating arrangements related to carbon intensity in the steel and aluminum sectors?  
 
RESPONSE 222:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel a nd Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 223:  How can developing countries can avoid bearing undue economic and social costs?  
How to ensure fairness in the sharing of historical emission responsibilities and inter -generational 
equity?  
 
RESPONSE 223:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Membe rs that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 224:  After the conclusion of the Joint US -EU Statement on Trade in Steel and Aluminum, 
are relevant products exported by the U.S. directly exempted by the EU's CBAM?  
 
RESPONSE 224:  Options  for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 9, paragraph 3.10, 3.11, 3.14  
 
QUESTION 225:  With reg ard to climate action in the steel and aluminum sectors as mentioned in 
paragraphs  3.10 and 3.11, and in relation to the circular economy and resource efficiency as 
mentioned in paragraph  3.14, does the  United  States have any intention and action plans to provide 
adequate financial, technology transfer and capacity -building support to developing countries, 
trading partners, etc. in order to facilitate the sharing of experiences and technologies and contribute 
to the global response to climate change.  
 
RESPO NSE 225:  The United  States provides extensive capacity building and technical assistance, 
among other forms of support, to partners through a myriad of existing bilateral and multilateral 
programs and initiatives. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade 
Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 226:  Can the U.S. -EU rules on trade in steel and aluminum apply to other trade 
partners?  
How to respond to the concerns that these rules are de facto trade barriers in the nam e of carbon 
decarbonization?  
 
RESPONSE 226:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum  are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 10, paragraph 3.12  
 
In addition, in June  2022, the  United  States joined other WTO Members to reach agreement on th e 
first multilateral trade agreement with environment at its core – the WTO  Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies. The Agreement prohibits subsidies to those engaged in illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing or fishing related activities in support of IUU fishing, subsidies for fishing 
on overfished stocks, and subsidies for fishing on the unregulated high seas. It also includes 
enhanced transparency provisions, which will provide important additional information regarding 
Members' fisheries and subs idies programs. Negotiations will continue in order to reach agreement 
on additional disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. 
The United  States is committed to working with all WTO members to ensure this agreement promptly 
enters into force, and to further enhance the disciplines, to improve the sustainability of our fisheries 
resources and the lives of fishers.  
 
QUESTION 227:  Does the U.S. have a plan to improve the sustainability of fishery resources and 
the living conditi ons of fishermen at home?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 176 - 
 
  RESPONSE 227:  More than 90% of stocks are not subject to overfishing and 80% are not overfished 
in the  United  States. In addition, since 2000, 47 stocks have been rebuilt. Science -based 
management under the Magnuson Stevens Act c ontinues to be the key to rebuilding and maintaining 
sustainable fish stocks. Managing fisheries sustainably is an adaptive process that relies on sound 
science, innovative management approaches, effective enforcement, meaningful partnerships, and 
robust p ublic participation. In partnership with the Regional Fishery Management Councils and 
Interstate Fisheries Commissions, the  United  States' dynamic, science -based management process 
is proving successful at ending overfishing and rebuilding stocks.  
 
Maintai ning sustainable fisheries contributes significantly to the U.S. economy, provides important 
recreational opportunities, and helps meet the growing challenge of increasing the  United  States' 
seafood supply. Sustainable U.S. fisheries play an important role  in the nation's economy providing 
opportunities for commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishing, and sustainable seafood for 
consumers. By ending overfishing and rebuilding stocks, the  United  States is strengthening the value 
of U.S. fisheries to th e economy, its communities, and marine ecosystems. U.S. commercial and 
recreational fishing supports 1.8  million full - and part -time jobs in fishing and across the broader 
economy.  
 
QUESTION 228:  If yes, please provide more information in this regard.  
 
RESPONSE 228:  Please see the response to Question  227 above.  
 
Page 10, paragraph 3.14  
 
Finally, the  United  States will continue to support and promote more circular and resource -efficient 
approaches in other international fora, including the WTO's Committee o n Trade and Environment 
and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, and at the OECD. In the 
APEC forum, we are leading a Recyclable Materials Policy Program under the Committee on Trade 
and Investment. We will continue to support  and expand this work, to help develop the capacity of 
APEC economies to identify and frame domestic policies that promote solid waste management and 
recycling infrastructure.  
 
QUESTION  229: Is there a mandatory target for recycling rates for recyclable ma terials in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 229:  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency released The National Recycling 
Strategy: Part One of a Series on Building a Circular Economy  in November  2021. The National 
Recycling Strategy is focused on enhancing and advancing the U.S. national municipal solid waste 
recycling system, and identifies strategic objectives and stakeholder -led actions to make the system 
stronger, more resilient, and more cost -effective. The National Recycling Strategy is aligned with 
and su pports implementation of the National Recycling Goal to increase the recycling rate to 50% 
by 2030. While the  United  States does not have a mandatory national recycling target, some U.S. 
states and communities have adopted mandatory recycling and compostin g laws and ordinances. 
For more information, please visit: https://www.epa.gov/recyclingstrategy/national -recycling -
strategy . 
 
QUESTION 230:  Could the U.S. side please provid e an overview of the main work, expected 
outcomes and schedule of the U.S. -led Recyclable Materials Policy Program?  
 
RESPONSE 230:  The Recyclable Materials Policy Program (RMPP) is a U.S. self -funded project 
endorsed by the APEC Committee on Trade and Inve stment (CTI). The RMPP seeks to develop the 
capacity of APEC economies to identify and frame domestic policies that promote waste management 
and recycling infrastructure, address barriers to trade and increase markets for recyclable materials 
while respect ing economies' domestic laws and regulations. In 2021 -22, the program included a 
webinar and survey of economies that were incorporated into a published study of the waste 
management and recycling -related policy landscape in the Asia Pacific region, availa ble here: 
https://www.apec.org/publications/2022/05/promoting -recyclable -materials -policies -in-the-asia-
pacific -region -a-study -of-the-policy -landscape -in-the-asia-pacific -region . In 2022, the CTI also 
endorsed an RMPP project on Promoting Compostable Bioplastics in the Asia -Pacific Region, which 
included a survey of economy -level information that will inform the content of a study that explores 
the challenge of plastic pollution and presents best practices for compostable bioplastics and suitable 
policy responses, including alternatives to fossil fuel derived plastics. More inf ormation about the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 177 - 
 
  RMPP and the Compostable Bioplastics project can be found in the APEC Project Database, found 
here: https://aimp2.apec.org/sites/PDB/default.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 231:  Does the  United  States assess the environmental impact of recyclable materials 
throughout their life cycle when leading policy initiatives on recyclable materials?  
 
RESPONSE 231:  Yes. For example, The National Recycling Strategy: Part One of a Series on 
Building a Circular Economy is focused on enhancing and advancing the national municipal solid 
waste recycling system and identifies strategic objectives and stakeholder -led actions to make the 
system stronger, more resilient, and cost -effective. The vision  of the Strategy includes the full impact 
of materials while also recognizing the need to achieve environmental justice priorities. The Strategy 
reflects the work of many stakeholders – including the public, companies, and non -governmental 
and community -based organizations – and input from other federal agencies, states, tribes and local 
governments.  
 
QUESTION 232:  Could the U.S. provide information on how to avoid the environmental pollution 
from the processing and use of recyclable materials?  
 
RESPONSE 23 2: Establishing and enforcing legal frameworks for the environmentally sound 
management of recyclables and waste are critical elements to help ensure that recyclable materials 
and residual waste generated from recycling are managed in a safe and environmen tally protective 
manner. Information about the requirements that apply to hazardous and non -hazardous recyclables 
and waste that are managed within the United  States is available at: 
https://www.epa.gov/hwgenerators/resource -conservation -and-recovery -act-rcra-orientation -
manual . Facilities managing recyclables in the  United  States must also comply with all applicable 
U.S. environmental laws and re gulations, including those that control emissions to air under the U.S. 
Clean Air Act and water under the U.S. Clean Water Act. More information can be found about these 
requirements at:  
 
• Clean Air Act: https://www.epa.gov/laws -regulations/summary -clean-air-act; 
• Clean Water Act: https://www.epa.gov/laws -regulations/summary -clean-water -act. 
 
QUESTION 233:  Could the U.S. provide information on how to prevent pollution transfer through 
trade in recyclable materials.  
 
RESPONSE 233:  For trade in recyclables that are regulated as hazard ous waste under the U.S. 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (the U.S. waste law), the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency requires prior informed consent from the proposed importing country and any transit 
countries.  More information  about  these  requirements  is available  at: https://www.epa.gov/hwgen
erators/information -exporters -resource -conservation -and-recovery -act-rcra-hazardous -waste . The 
COVID‑19 pandemic and the  Russian  Federation's further invasion of Ukraine have created 
significant disruptions to global supply chains and trade. These stresses put a spotlight on 
pre-existing vulnerabilities in many supply chains, inc luding in the  United  States, and the disruptions 
have led to higher costs for manufacturers, farmers, businesses, and families. The  United  States is 
focused on addressing these bottlenecks, securing our critical supply chains, lowering prices, and 
revitali zing American manufacturing.  
 
QUESTION 234:  Given that the  United  States is highly concerned about external disruptions to 
global supply chains, could the U.S. provide views on the disruption to global supply chains caused 
by its frequent imposition of a l arge number of export control measures?  
 
RESPONSE 234:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administer s U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
QUESTION 235:  If the  United  States plans to continue to imp lement more export control measures, 
could the U.S. explain whether there are supporting measures to mitigate the impact of these 
measures on global supply chains?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 178 - 
 
  RESPONSE  235: Regarding future plans, we remind Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 11, paragraph 3.20  
 
President Biden signed Executive Order  14017, "Securing America's Supply Chains", in 
February  2021, directing a whole -of-government approach to assess vulnerabilities in, and 
strengthen the resilience of, critical U.S. supply chains. Pursuant to the Executive Order, 
the United  States conducted a 100 -day review for four priority product areas: semiconductors, large 
capacity batteries, critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceut ical 
ingredients.  
 
QUESTION 236:  In respect of review for four priority product areas, could the U.S. detail the 
general considerations and the updates ? 
 
RESPONSE 236:  The full 100 -day reviews of the four priority product areas are available online at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/100 -day-supply -chain -review -
report.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 237:  Please clarify whether the scope of the review will be extended to other areas.  
 
RESPONSE 237:  Under Executive Order  14017, the  United  States conducted an additional six 
supply chain industrial base reviews. More information on those reviews, including the full reports is 
available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -releases/2022/02/24/the -
biden -harris -plan-to-revitalize -american -manufacturing -and-secure -critical -supply -chains -in-
2022/ . 
 
Page 11, paragraph 3.23  
 
The United  States is engaging bilaterally and multilaterally with its trading partners and stakeholders 
to, inter alia, identify s upply chain bottlenecks and chokepoints; ensure supply chains embody strong 
environmental and labor standards; and facilitate trade in the context of supply chain shocks.  
 
QUESTION  238: How can the U.S. ensure that it strengthens its own supply chain witho ut 
undermining that of others?  
 
RESPONSE 238:  The United  States disagrees with the premise of the question. Whether in 
responding to acute shocks of the kind we are experiencing in global trade today, or addressing the 
chronic long -term challenges in secto rs critical to our security, more resilient global supply chains 
are fundamental to sustainable economic development for all.  
 
QUESTION 239:  How does the U.S. ensure that it does not weaponize its supply chain to maliciously 
crack down its competitors?  
 
RESPONSE 239:  See response to Question  238. 
 
Page 11, paragraph 3.26  
 
WTO Members also agreed at the 12th Ministerial Conference on a Ministerial Decision on the 
WTO Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that provides 
accommodations to the intellectual property rules for COVID ‑19 vaccines that can facilitate a global 
health recovery. For over a year, the  United  States, as part of its comprehensive effort to end the 
pandemic, worked constructively with other Members to faci litate discussions and bridge differences 
that led to an outcome on intellectual property that achieved consensus across the 164  Members of 
the WTO.  
 
QUESTION 240:  We would like to learn whether the U.S. Government has proposed or developed 
any IPR policy in relation to the response to the COVID -19 pandemic, as well as enforcement or 
legislative activities carried out accordingly.  
 
RESPONSE 240:  U.S. Patent and Trad emark Office's (USPTO) COVID -19 pilot program prioritizes 
examination of certain patent applications claiming a product or process subject to an applicable WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 179 - 
 
  Food and Drug Authority (FDA) approval for COVID -19 use, and a companion Fast -Track Pilot 
Program fo r Appeals Related to COVID -19. As of 29  November  2022, 1024  applications have 
requested prioritized examination status in the USPTO's COVID -19 Prioritized Examination Pilot 
Program, 663 of which have thus far been granted. The pilot program was originally set to expire 
after the USPTO accepted 500  applications into the program, but this application limit has been 
removed. More information about USPTO's COVID -19 Prioritized Examination Pilot program can be 
found at: https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/covid -19-prioritized -examination -pilot. Further 
information on USPTO's  initiatives  on life science  technologies  can be found  
at: https://www.uspto.gov/coronavirus/uspto -covid-19-response -resource -center . 
 
In 2021 the USPTO launched a category of its Patents for Humanity Program for inventions that 
address the COVID -19 pandemic. This new category will provide business incentives for patent 
applicants, holders, and licensees whose inventions track, prevent, diagnose, or treat COVID -19. 
 
The United  States supported negotiations that resulted in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
issuing the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS  Agreement at the Twelfth Ministerial Conference on 
17 June 2022. The text -based negotiations with other WTO Members that we called for have 
produced accommodations to the intellectual property rules for COVID -19 vaccines t hat can facilitate 
a global health recovery.  
 
QUESTION  241: Please provide information on the landscape of patents owned by U.S. 
biopharmaceutical companies in relation to the COVID -19 vaccines and therapeutic drugs.  
 
RESPONSE 241:  WIPO has published a rep ort on "COVID -19-related vaccines and therapeutics" 
which provides information on the landscape of patent applications that are related to COVID -19 
vaccines and therapeutics, filed by U.S. entities including private and public sectors. See Table  8b 
and 16b  in the Report at: https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4589 . 
 
Page 12, paragraph 4.2  
 
Accurate and accessible disaggregated economic data to assess the impact of trade  on different 
types of U.S. workers is critical to informing trade policy actions.  
 
QUESTION 242:  Please specify the process and methods of assessing the impact of trade on 
different types of U.S. workers.  
 
RESPONSE 242:  USTR requested a two -part investiga tion from the U.S. International Trade 
Commission to assess the impact of trade and trade policy on different types of U.S. workers. In 
response to the first part of the requested investigation, the USITC has published a detailed report, 
which  is publicly  available  on the ITC website  at: 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5374.pdf . The second part of the investigation 
recommends that the USITC expand and develop new research and analy sis capabilities so that 
future probable economic effects advice includes estimates of the potential distributional effects of 
trade agreements and trade policy on U.S. workers.  
 
Page 12, paragraph 4.3  
 
Close collaboration between the U.S. Executive and Le gislative branches of government is critical to 
developing successful U.S. trade policy. USTR welcomes and seeks guidance and feedback from 
Members of Congress to share their views and constituents' priorities regarding trade policy. USTR 
regularly briefs Congress on initiatives. For example, in 2022, USTR has briefed Congress extensively 
on initiatives including: responses to the COVID -19 pandemic, the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework 
for Prosperity (IPEF), the U.S -Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, t he United  States -Kenya 
Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership, the WTO's MC12, the U.S./UK Dialogue on the Future 
of Atlantic Trade, and the  United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA) enforcement actions 
on dairy and labor rights.  
 
QUESTION 243:  Could the U.S. please explain how the "Special Section 301" report, as a unilateral 
and protectionist measure, conforms to WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 243:  We do not agree with the premise of the question. The Special 301 Report  serves 
a critical function by identif ying opportunities and challenges facing U.S. innovative and creative WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 180 - 
 
  industries in foreign markets and by promoting job creation, economic development, and many other 
benefits that effective IP protection and enforcement support. The Special 301 Report  informs the 
public and our trading partners and seeks to be a positive catalyst for change. The  United  States 
looks forward to working closely with the governments of the trading partners that are identified in 
the Special  301 Report  to address both emerging  and continuing concerns, and to build on the 
positive results that many of these governments have achieved.  
 
The Special 301 Report  has played a valuable role in helping the U.S. government and our trading 
partners to focus on improvements in IP protectio n and enforcement that support innovation, 
exports, access to diverse goods and services, and job creation. Over the course of the Special 301 
Report 's 34-year history we have seen remarkable improvements in markets all around the world. 
The Special 301 Report  alone is not the cause but we believe that it has made a positive contribution 
to this progress.  
 
QUESTION 244:  Does the  United  States government even  attach importance to and pay attention 
to the enforcement and abuse of intellectual property rights in the  United  States?  
 
RESPONSE 244:  We do not agree with the premise of the question. Please review Section  3.3.3.9 
of the Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: United  States (9  November  2022), 
Section  5.6.1 of the Trade Policy Review Report by the United  States (9  November  2022), and the 
U.S. responses to Member questions on the topic of intellectual property enforcement.  
 
QUESTION 245:  How much resource does the U.S. Government allocate to strengthening IP 
enforcement in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 245:  See The Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, Annual 
Intellectual Property Report to Congress (April  2022), at:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -
content/uploads/2022/0 4/FY21 -IPEC-Annual -Report -Final.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 246:  Please indicate what measures have been taken to improve the transparency, 
objectivity and accuracy of the Special 301 procedure and related annual reports.  
 
RESPONSE 246:  USTR solicited broad public part icipation in the 2022 Special 301 review process 
to facilitate sound, well -balanced assessments of trading partners' IP protection and enforcement 
and related market access issues affecting IP -intensive industries and to help ensure that the Special 
301 re view would be based on comprehensive information regarding IP issues in trading partner 
markets.  
 
USTR requested written submissions from the public through a notice published in the Federal 
Register on 13  December  2021 ( Federal Register notice). In additi on, due to the COVID -19 
pandemic, USTR fostered public participation via written submissions rather than an in -person 
hearing. The interagency Special 301 Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) 
sent written questions about issues relevant to the review to those that submitted written comments, 
including to representatives of foreign governments, industry, and non -governmental organizations. 
USTR posted the written questions and the written responses online at www.regulations.gov , docket 
number USTR -2021-0021. The Federal Register notice drew submissions from 44  non-government 
stakeholders and 18 for eign governments. The submissions filed in response to the Federal Register 
notice are available to the public online at www.regulations.gov , docket number USTR -2021-0021.  
 
The Special 301 listings and actions announced in the Special 301 Report are the result of intensive 
deliberations among all relevant agencies within the U.S. Government, informed by extensive 
consultations with participating stakeholders, foreign governments, the U.S. Congress, and other 
interested parties.  
 
USTR, together with the Special 301 Subcommittee of the TPSC, conducts a broad and balanced 
assessment of U.S. trading partners' IP protect ion and enforcement, as well as related market access 
issues affecting IP -intensive industries, in accordance with the statutory criteria. The Special 301 
Subcommittee, through the TPSC, provides advice on country placement to USTR based on this 
assessment . This assessment is conducted on a case -by-case basis, taking into account diverse 
factors such as a trading partner's level of development, its international obligations and 
commitments, the concerns of right holders and other interested parties, and the  trade and 
investment policies of the  United  States. It is informed by the various cross -cutting issues and trends WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  identified in Section  I of the  Special  301 Report . Each assessment is based upon the specific facts 
and circumstances that shape IP protectio n and enforcement in a particular trading partner.  
 
Page 15, paragraph 5.4  
 
Another aspect of reform is to the WTO's dispute settlement function. For many years, WTO  dispute 
settlement has not met the needs of WTO Members, including the United  States, for example, due 
to its complexity, delays, lack of transparency, and interpretive overreach. Many Members share 
U.S. concerns with the functioning of the system and its negative impact on the WTO's negotiating 
and monitoring functions. This fact underscores the importance of understanding better the interests 
of all Members in dispute settlement. The  United  States supports a reform discussion that aims to 
ensure that WTO dispute settlement reflects the real interests of Members. The  United States has 
been, and will continue to be, engaging with Members with an aim to achieving durable, lasting 
reform.  
 
QUESTION 247:  The real interests of WTO Members should be defined collectively by all WTO 
Members but not a certain member. Could the U.S.  please explain how its reform demands reflect 
the real interests of WTO Members?  
 
RESPONSE 247:  For many years, WTO dispute settlement has not met the needs of Members, 
including the United  States, for example, due to its complexity, delays, lack of trans parency, and 
interpretive overreach. We know well that many Members share U.S. concerns with the functioning 
of the system.  We look forward to engaging further with those Members that are also seeking an 
improved and reformed dispute settlement system.  
 
Page 17, paragraph 5.16  
 
Finally, the  United  States commits significant resources to identify and confront unjustified non -tariff 
barriers including disciplines on rules of origin, customs and trade facilitation, import licensing, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade measures (technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures), government procurement, trade - related 
investment measures, and services. USTR uses tools, including its Annual Report and the National 
Trade Estimate Report, to bring greater attention and focus to addressing non -tariff measures that 
may be inconsistent with international trade agreements to which the  United  States is a party. 
USTR's activities in the WTO technical committees are at the f orefront of these efforts. USTR also 
engages on these issues with U.S. trading partners through mechanisms established in free trade 
agreements and through regional and multilateral organizations, such as the Asia -Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD).  
 
QUESTION 248:  Will the  United  States consider reassessing its trade barriers and adopting a more 
open trade policy to ensure that appropriate initiatives are taken so that sufficient U.S. g oods and 
services are available for foreign purchase and import?  
 
RESPONSE 248:  Regarding future plans, we remind Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 18, paragraph 5.18  
 
The United  States actively monitors, evaluates, and where appropriate, participates in ongoing 
anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases conducted by foreign countries to safeguard 
the interests of U.S. industry and to ensure that Members abide by their WTO obligations in 
conducting such proceedings. To this end, the United  States works closely with U.S. companies 
affected by foreign countries' AD and CVD investigations and provides extensive responses to 
inquiries in foreign CVD investigations. The  United  States also advocates on behalf of U.S. industry 
in connection with ongoing investigations, with the goal of obtaining u nbiased and objective 
treatment consistent with the WTO agreements. In addition, in CVD cases, the  United  States 
provides extensive information in response to questions from foreign governments regarding the 
subsidy allegations at issue.  
 
QUESTION 249:  Will the United  States take equivalent measures to monitor and evaluate its 
ongoing anti -dumping and countervailing duty cases to ensure its own compliance with WTO 
obligations in conducting such proceedings?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 249:  The United  States conducts all of it s anti -dumping and countervailing duty 
proceedings in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations.  
 
Page 18, paragraph 5.19  
 
Free and fair trade benefits both the  United  States and the rest of the world by providing more 
affordable goods and services, rai sing living standards, fueling economic growth, and supporting 
good jobs. Reducing barriers to trade offers greater product variety, enhances product quality, 
increases innovation, and raises productivity.  
 
QUESTION 250:  Could the U.S. please explain what the true market competition is?  
 
RESPONSE 250:  It is unclear to the  United  States from where China is extracting the phrase "true 
market competition"; however, in its most basic terms, competition refers to a market situation 
where businesses can independe ntly strive for buyers in order to achieve profitability and market 
share, among other things. This presumes that such activity will be undertaken on a level playing 
field (i.e. without the need to utilize non -market practices and policies to achieve those  goals). Thus, 
competition, like free and fair trade, produces broad benefits like greater product variety and quality, 
innovation, increased productivity, and resilient markets.  
 
QUESTION 251:  Is the practice of suppression to its competitors through expo rt controls a true 
market competition?  
 
RESPONSE 251:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export 
controls are based on national security and foreign policy interests. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) administers  U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and 
obligations under the WTO agreements.  
 
Page 24, paragraph 5.58  
 
The USMCA contains strong commitme nts on digital trade, financial services, and intellectual 
property rights. It also addresses non -tariff barriers that can hinder U.S. exports through new 
provisions on transparency and regulatory matters, including in chapters covering technical barriers 
to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and a new chapter on good regulatory practices. 
Finally, the Agreement contains provisions to combat subsidies and non -market practices that have 
the potential to disadvantage American workers and businesses, including a chapter to address 
unfair currency practices, rules on trade distortions caused by state -owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
transparency obligations with respect to any USMCA Party's future trade negotiations with 
nonmarket economies.  
 
QUESTION 252:  Article  32.10 of the USMCA contains the following: "Entry by a Party into a free 
trade agreement with a non -market country will allow the other Parties to terminate this Agreement 
on six months' notice and replace this Agreement with an agreement as betwe en them (bilateral 
agreement)". Please explain whether this is in line with the WTO rules of non -discriminatory 
treatment and fair trade rules.  
 
RESPONSE 252:  As the  United  States responded before the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements in October, this provision is intended to ensure that the negotiated benefits of the 
USMCA remain with the USMCA Parties and are not diluted by one Party's agreement with a 
non-market country. If a USMCA Party were to enter into such an agreement, the other Parties 
would review information and ensure that they are not disadvantaged. This response does not mean 
that the United  States restricts the rights of any USMCA Party. The  USMCA is consistent with WTO 
obligations.  
 
Page 25, paragraph 5.72  
 
The United  States is looking forward to hosting APEC in 2023, underscoring our commitment to 
advance fair and open trade and investment, bolster American competitiveness, and ensure a fre e 
and open Indo -Pacific.  
 
QUESTION 253:  Can the U.S. explain what it plans to do to "bolster American competitiveness"?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 183 - 
 
  RESPONSE 253:  The United  States will use its host year to advance work in support of APEC's 
Putrajaya Vision 2040 and APEC's Aotearoa Plan of Action.  
 
QUESTION 254:  What impact will these measures have on the competitiveness of other Asia -Pacific 
Economic Cooperation economies?  
 
RESPONSE 254:  As stated in the APEC Putrajaya Vision, the work towards "a free, open, fair, 
non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable trade and investment environment", is necessary 
to "ensure that the Asia -Pacific remains the world's most dynamic and interconnected regional 
economy".  
 
Page 26, paragraph 5.80  
 
In 2017, the  United  States launched an investigation into China's acts, policies and practices relating 
to technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation under Section  301 of the Trade Act of 
1974. The findings made in this investigation led to substantial U.S. tariffs on imports fro m China as 
well as corresponding retaliation by China. Against this backdrop, in January  2020, the two sides 
signed the U.S. -China Economic and Trade Agreement, commonly referred to as the "Phase One 
Agreement". This Agreement included commitments from Chi na to improve market access for the 
agriculture and financial services sectors, along with commitments relating to intellectual property 
and technology transfer and a commitment by China to increase its purchases of U.S. goods and 
services.  
 
QUESTION 255:  Please specify what the U.S. has done for the implementation of the agreement.  
 
RESPONSE 255:  As China knows, if China believes that the  United  States has failed to implement 
any of its commitments under the Phase One Agreement, the Phase One Agreement pro vides a 
mechanism for China to raise its concerns with the  United  States, but to date China has not done 
so. 
 
Page 26, paragraph 5.81  
 
China has not yet implemented some of the more significant commitments that it made in the Phase 
One Agreement, such as c ommitments in the area of agricultural biotechnology and the required 
risk assessment that China is to conduct relating to the use of ractopamine in cattle and swine. China 
has also fallen far short of implementing its commitments to purchase U.S. goods an d services in 
2020 and 2021. Meanwhile, other commitments that China made, such as in the area of technology 
transfer, are difficult to verify given the tactics that China uses to obscure its activities. Importantly, 
this Agreement did not meaningfully add ress the more fundamental concerns that the  United  States 
has with China's state -directed, non -market policies and practices and their harmful impact on the 
U.S. economy and U.S. workers and businesses. The  United  States is exploring appropriate next 
steps . 
 
QUESTION 256:  In its assessment of the other party's policies, the U.S. side gave no consideration 
to the impact of COVID -19, which is unreasonable and unrealistic. (In contrast, COVID -19 impact 
was taken into consideration when the U.S. assessed why it s aid to other countries reduced.).  
Please specify whether the U.S. side has fully delivered all it committed to.  
 
RESPONSE 256:  As China knows, if China believes that the  United  States has failed to implement 
any of its commitments under the Phase One Agreement, the Phase One Agreement provides a 
mechanism for China to raise its concerns with the  United  States, but to date China has not done 
so. 
 
QUESTION 257:  Please specify "appropriate next steps".  
 
RESPONSE 257:  Regarding next steps, the  United  State s reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 27, paragraph 5.88  
 
The United  States is committed to engaging economically with partners in the Indo -Pacific region. 
In the coming decades, we believe that competitiveness will  be defined largely by how well countries WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 184 - 
 
  are able to harness technology and digital sectors of our economies and on our ability to adapt to 
the coming energy and climate transition. The United  States is also committed to promoting inclusive 
growth.  
 
QUEST ION 258:  Could the U.S. please explain the implication of inclusive growth?  
 
RESPONSE 258: The IPEF aims to promote inclusive growth for all people, including workers and 
underserved  populations.  Please  see here for more information:  https://ustr.gov/trade -agreement
s/agreements -under -negotiation/indo -pacific -economic -framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
QUESTION 259:  The U.S. continues to form cliques in the Indo -Pacific region excluding specific 
countries, could the U.S. please explain whether these practices are inclusive?  
 
RESPONSE 259:  The United  States disagrees with the premise of this question. The initiative w as 
launched with a strong, diverse group of Indo -Pacific partners who share the goals of the IPEF.  
 
Page 28, paragraph 5.90  
 
In October  2021, President Biden announced that the  United  States would develop an Indo -Pacific 
Economic Framework to deepen econom ic relationships with allies and partners in the region. This 
framework will promote resilient, sustainable, and inclusive growth for workers and businesses, 
including by advancing strong labour standards and addressing climate change. The framework is 
central to the  United  States' economic strategy in the Indo -Pacific and complements our national 
security goals in the region.  
 
QUESTION 260:  Could the U.S. please explain the implications of adopting the Indo -Pacific 
Economic Framework as a complement to the  U.S. national security objectives and the logic behind 
it? 
 
RESPONSE 260:  The United  States is committed to a free, open, fair, inclusive, interconnected, 
resilient, secure, and prosperous Indo -Pacific region. The IPEF is an opportunity to advance these 
values and achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth in the region.  
 
Page 29, paragraph 5.97  
 
Fostering innovation and creativity is essential to U.S. economic growth, competitiveness, and the 
estimated 63  million American jobs that directly or indirectly rely on intellectual property 
(IP)-intensive industries. To this end, a trade priority for the Administration is to protect American 
innovation and creativity in foreign markets employing all the tools of U.S. trade policy. IP 
infringement, including patent infringement, trademark counterfeiting, copyright piracy, and trade 
secret theft, causes significant financial losses for right holders and legitimate businesses, 
undermines U.S. competitive advantages in innovation and creativity, and can also harm American 
workers whose livelihoods are tied to America's innovat ion and creativity driven sectors. Through 
engagement with trading partners, the Administration advocates for strong IP protection and 
enforcement in other countries for, among other things, works, phonograms, performances, brands, 
designs, trade secrets, and inventions by U.S. authors, creators, inventors, artists, and businesses.  
 
QUESTION 261:  With regard to the "China Initiative" implemented by the  United  States, please 
provide information on the concrete implementation of the Initiative, including the number of cases 
investigated, the number of lawsuits filed, and the progress made so far.  
 
RESPONSE 261:  See The U.S. Department of Justice, Information about the Department of Justice's 
China Initiative and a Compilation of China -Related Prosecutions Sinc e 2018 (last updated 
19 November  2021), at:  https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information -about -department -
justice -s-china -initiative -and-compilation -china -related . 
 
QUESTION 262:  Please also provide information on the extraterritorial effects of the U.S. Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) and the extraterritorial enforcement and judicial situation.  
 
RESPONSE 262 : 18 U.S. Code Section  1837 states that the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) "also 
applies to conduct occurring outside the  United  States if - (1) the offender is a natural person who 
is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the  United  States, or an organiz ation organized under the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 185 - 
 
  laws of the  United  States or a State or political subdivision thereof; or (2)  an act in furtherance of 
the offense was committed in the  United  States". The provisions of the DTSA are codified within the 
EEA. 
 
Page 29, paragraph 5. 98 
 
Additionally, inappropriate protection of geographical indications, including the lack of transparency 
and due process in some systems, limits the scope of trademarks and other IP rights held by U.S. 
producers and imposes barriers on market access for U.S.-made goods and services that rely on the 
use of common names, such as "feta" cheese. Furthermore, while recognizing that certain 
extraordinary circumstances such as pandemics call for extraordinary measures, the Administration 
continues to seek adequa te and effective protection for pharmaceutical and other health -related IP 
around the world to ensure robust American innovation in these critical industries to fight not only 
the current, but also future pandemics. In addition, the Administration has soug ht to level the playing 
field abroad by reducing market access barriers, including those that discriminate against U.S. 
companies, are not adequately transparent, or do not offer sufficient opportunity for meaningful 
stakeholder engagement.  
 
QUESTION 263:  Please describe specific approaches and practices adopted by the U.S. to the 
protection of foreign geographical indications and please specify the circumstances in which cases 
are "inappropriate protection of geographical indications".  
 
RESPONSE 263:  The United States protects both foreign and domestic GIs under U.S. Trademark 
Law primarily as certification and collective marks indicating regional origin. See USPTO, 
Geographical Indication Protection in the  United  States, at: https://www.uspto.gov/ip -
policy/trademark -policy/geographical -indications . 
 
Examples of inappropriate protection in regard to the protection of geographical indications include 
(but are not limited  to): 
 
• Granting GI protection in violation of prior rights obtained through registration or use in 
the country where protection is sought (for example, in cases in which a company has a 
trademark that includes a place name);  
• Granting GI protection to terms  that are the common names for the products in the 
country where protection is sought, thus depriving producers from using the common 
name of the product and limiting the choice for consumers purchasing those products;  
• Failing to provide interested persons  with adequate published notice of, and the 
opportunity to oppose the grant of protection, or to seek cancellation of any protected GI 
and; 
• Granting protection to a GI consisting of multiple terms without specifying in the published 
notice for opposition w hich term(s) are still available for common use by producers.  
 
QUESTION 264:  We welcome the U.S.'s move to waive patents on COVID -19 vaccines, but 
considering the fast evolution of the virus, vaccines alone are not enough; treatment methods and 
equipment a re also key to the global fight against COVID -19. 
Will the U.S. consider waiving relevant patents too to protect the life and health of mankind?  
 
RESPONSE 264:  WTO Members adopted the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS  Agreement on 
17 June 2022, which sets forth clarifications and a waiver for eligible WTO Members to authorize the 
use of the subject matter of a patent required for the production and supply of COVID -19 vaccines. 
WTO Members did not reach consensus on whether to extend  the Ministerial Decision to the 
production and supply of COVID -19 diagnostics and therapeutics.  
 
USTR has consulted with Congress and a wide range of stakeholders on the question of extending 
the Ministerial Decision to COVID -19 diagnostics and therapeuti cs. The positions are divergent, even 
on basic questions around whether there is adequate global supply of diagnostics and therapeutics. 
These interested parties also diverge on whether extending the Ministerial Decision to COVID -19 
diagnostics and therape utics would in fact improve access, particularly in non -high-income countries, 
or undermine innovation. On 16  December  2022, USTR asked the  United  States International Trade 
Commission to launch an investigation into COVID -19 diagnostics and therapeutics a nd provide 
information on market dynamics to help inform the discussion around supply and demand, price 
points, the relationship between testing and treating, and production and access.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 186 - 
 
  Page 16, paragraph 5.8  
Where appropriate, the  United  States applies th e full range of its trade laws, including section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act).  
 
Page 29, paragraph 5.99  
 
The United  States works with many trading partners to strengthen IP protection and enforcement 
through the provisions of bilateral instrum ents, including trade agreements and memoranda of 
understanding.  
 
Page 29, paragraph 5.100  
 
The United  States also actively relies upon relevant enforcement provisions in its domestic law, 
including section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.  
Page 30, paragraph 5.101  
 
USTR must identify those countries that deny adequate and effective protection for IP rights or deny 
fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on IP protection, which may lead to designation 
as a "Priority Foreign Country". In addition,  USTR created a Special 301 "Priority Watch List" (PWL) 
and "Watch List" (WL), placement on which indicates that particular problems exist in the listed 
country with respect to IP protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying on IP.  
 
QUESTI ON 265:  Why unilateral trade enforcement activities, including ex parte investigations, 
should be carried out outside the WTO in accordance with United  States domestic law when the WTO 
has a dispute settlement mechanism endorsed by its members, and then negotiate agreements and 
monitor compliance through unequal commercial st atus, or impose sanctions?  
 
RESPONSE 265: The United  States routinely engages with trading partners to find a solution to 
trade issues as they arise, relying on a variety of tools – including WTO dispute settlement where 
appropriate  – to pursue a solution.  
 
Page 33, paragraph 6.14  
 
The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) works to reduce barriers to financing 
infrastructure, and links U.S. businesses to export opportunities by funding feasibility studies, 
technical assistance and pilot projects that in tegrate U.S. private sector innovation into infrastructure 
projects and foster economic growth in partner countries. The Agency also connects overseas project 
sponsors with U.S. partners through its reverse trade missions, industry conferences, and expert 
workshops. Over the last 30 years, USTDA has been working in sub -Saharan Africa connecting 
African project sponsors and U.S. companies through project preparation and export promotion 
activities in collaboration with the U.S. Government's Prosper Africa an d Power Africa initiatives, as 
well as USTDA's Access Africa initiative. The Power Africa initiative works to improve the legal and 
regulatory environment for power projects in the African market. USTDA's Access Africa initiative is 
a partnership with U.S.  industry to advance the development of high -quality information and 
communications technology infrastructure and services across Sub -Saharan Africa. In addition, 
USTDA advances Prosper Africa through its Global Procurement Initiative, which provides educa tion 
to public officials in emerging markets on how to establish procurement practices and policies that 
integrate life -cycle cost analysis and best value determination in a fair, transparent manner. The 
GPI helps partner countries acquire high -quality, lo ng-lasting technologies, while building smart, 
sustainable infrastructure with overall savings to their government.  
 
QUESTION 266:  Please specify the funding scale, main areas of investment, and progress so far 
as measured by relevant social indicators (e. g. access to electricity) of the U.S. government under 
the Prosper Africa, Power Africa and Access Africa initiatives.  
 
RESPONSE 266:  Since June  2019, under Prosper Africa, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) has supported African and U.S. businesses and investors in closing 196 deals 
worth more than USD  3 billion in new exports and investments, and built a business -to-business 
deal pipeline of more than USD  10 billion. Under Power Africa, the U.S. Government is harnessing 
the collective resources of over 170 public and private sector partners to double access to electricity 
in sub -Saharan Africa.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 187 - 
 
  Since 2013, Power Afri ca-supported projects have added nearly 12,500  MW of cleaner and more 
reliable electricity and more than 27  million new power connections for homes and businesses. Power 
Africa's goal is to add at least 30,000  MW and 60  million connections by 2030. In 2021  alone, Power 
Africa brought 1,329  MW of new, cleaner electricity online while avoiding 6.2  million metric tons 
(tCO2 e) of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which translates in taking nearly seven billion pounds 
of burning coal out of the energy mix. This w ork to date has helped more than 127  million people 
gain access to cleaner, more reliable electricity, including about 39  million people in the past year. 
To learn more about Power Africa visit: https://www .usaid.gov/powerafrica . 
 
USTDA's current Access Africa portfolio consists of 80 ongoing infrastructure development activities 
in 26 countries. These have the potential to help unlock more than USD  15 billion in financing and 
create more than USD  7 billion in U.S. export opportunities. The most recent USTDA Monitoring and 
Evaluation Policy can be found in the Reports and Records section of the website at: 
https://ustda.gov/ . 
Page 37, paragraph 8.6  
 
In APEC, the  United  State s continued to work with other Asia -Pacific economies through the Experts 
Group on Illegal Logging and Associated Trade to improve the capacity of APEC customs officials to 
combat illegal logging and associated trade and promote the trade in legally harves ted forest 
products within the APEC region. Within the Oceans and Fisheries Working Group, the  United  States 
supported implementation of the Port State Measures Agreement, and worked to identify areas of 
convergence and best practices to combat IUU fishing , including through APEC's Roadmap on 
Combating IUU Fishing. In addition, work continued on the U.S. -led Recyclable Materials Policy 
Program, which aims to develop the capacity of APEC economies to identify and frame domestic 
policies that promote solid wa ste management and recycling infrastructure. Through multilateral 
fora such as APEC and OECD, the  United  States is promoting circular economy approaches and 
discussing opportunities to decarbonize economies through trade tools. At the WTO, 
the United  State s is collaborating with trading partners to forge new partnerships to promote an 
environmentally sustainable trade agenda, and is working collaboratively through such initiatives as 
the WTO Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TES SD), which the 
United  States formally joined in November  2021. The  United  States submitted a discussion paper to 
the CTE and TESSD in May  2022 on the issues of climate change and circular economy.  
 
QUESTION 267:  What specific efforts has the  United  States made to promote an environmentally 
sustainable trade agenda. Please provide detailed information.  
 
RESPONSE 267:  For additional information on the  United  States' activities to promote an 
environmentally sustainable trade agenda, please see the 2021 USTR An nual Report found here:  
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20An
nual%20Report%20(1).p df. 
 
Page 38, paragraph 8.8  
 
US small businesses are key engines for U.S. economic growth, jobs, and innovation. USTR focused 
on making trade work for the benefit of U.S. SMEs, helping them take advantage of new markets 
abroad, access and participate in gl obal supply chains, and support jobs at home.  
 
QUESTION 268:  The discriminatory trade policies of the  United  States will result in some products 
not being sold in the  United  States, which will inevitably bring substantial economic losses to the 
relevant pa rties, including U.S. small businesses, and will also cause serious impact to the global 
supply chain of the relevant products. SMEs in the U.S. will be forced to use less cost -effective 
alternatives and indirectly lose competitiveness in their products. W hat efforts have been made by 
the U.S. to address this issue?  
 
RESPONSE 268:  The issue of supply chain resiliency is a key priority for the Biden -Harris 
Administration, as evidenced by the Executive  Order  (EO) 14017 on "America's Supply Chains" that 
Presid ent Biden issued on 24  February  2021, to launch a comprehensive review of U.S. supply chains 
and direct federal departments and agencies to identify ways to secure U.S. supply chains against a 
wide range of risks and vulnerabilities, including for small bu siness. The Administration is working 
across agencies to support principles for supply chain resilience: transparency; diversity, openness, 
and predictability; security; and sustainability.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 188 - 
 
  QUESTION 269:  Could the  United  States please explain how illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing is defined and how the  United  States ensures that the enforcement of domestic law does not 
adversely affect normal international fishing activities?  
 
RESPONSE 269:  Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is defined o r described under several 
U.S. statutes and regulations, including, among others, the following statutes:  
 
• Public Law 116 -92, Title XXXV – Maritime Matters, Subtitle C. Maritime SAFE Act 
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW -116publ92/pdf/PLAW -116publ92.pdf ); 
• 50 CFR Part 300, Subpart N  Identification and Certification of Nations, under the High 
Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act ( https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -
50/chapter -III/part -300/subpart -N); 
• Final Rule: High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium P rotection Act; Identification and 
Certification Procedures To Address Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Activities 
and Bycatch of Protected Living Marine Resources, 76 FR 2011 
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR -2011-01-12/pdf/2011 -507.pdf ) and;  
• Final Rule: High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act; Identification and 
Certification Procedures To Address Shark Conservation, 78 FR 3338 
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR -2013-01-16/pdf/2013 -00703.pdf ). 
 
The United  States takes appropriate enforcement actions consistent with international law and the 
measures of RFMO s to which we are a party. We take actions consistent with our international and 
domestic obligations as a flag state, coastal state, port state, and market state.  
 
Page 53, paragraph 5.98  
 
Top challenges for U.S. right holders abroad include copyright pir acy, which particularly threatens 
U.S. exports in media and other creative content. Trade in counterfeit and pirated products often 
fuels cross -border organized criminal networks, increases the vulnerability of workers to exploitative 
labor practices, and hinders sustainable economic development in many countries. The theft of trade 
secrets, often among a company's core business assets and key to a company's competitiveness, 
hurts U.S. businesses, including small and medium -sized businesses. The reach of tr ade secret theft 
into critical commercial and defense technologies poses threats to U.S. national security interests as 
well. Additionally, inappropriate protection of geographical indications, including the lack of 
transparency and due process in some sys tems, limits the scope of trademarks and other IP rights 
held by U.S. producers and imposes barriers on market access for U.S. -made goods and services 
that rely on the use of common names, such as "feta" cheese. Furthermore, while recognizing that 
certain extraordinary circumstances such as pandemics call for extraordinary measures, the 
Administration continues to seek adequate and effective protection for pharmaceutical and other 
health -related IP around the world to ensure robust American innovation in th ese critical industries 
to fight not only the current, but also future pandemics. In addition, the Administration has sought 
to level the playing field abroad by reducing market access barriers, including those that discriminate 
against U.S. companies, are  not adequately transparent, or do not offer sufficient opportunity for 
meaningful stakeholder engagement.  
 
QUESTION 270:  In its copyright enforcement actions, China often encounters cases where websites 
suspected of targeting Chinese users for pirated con tent are located outside China. A significant 
proportion of them are located in the U.S., making it impossible for China to continue its copyright 
enforcement and hindering the effective crackdown on infringing and pirated websites. Could the 
U.S. clarify whether the U.S. government has taken appropriate measures to prevent this situation 
from occurring, or whether there are mechanisms for relevant cross -border law enforcement 
cooperation?  
 
RESPONSE 270:  Various components of the United  States government, s pecifically the Department 
of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, are actively involved in enforcement of copyright 
infringement online, including actions against sites located in the  United  States that primarily engage 
in piracy of foreign works,  or that target audiences and customers outside the  United  States. The 
National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, overseen by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) receives and acts on refer rals from 
private rightsholders and public -sector agencies both inside and outside the United  States. In 
addition, because U.S. law includes mechanisms to encourage online service providers to respond 
expeditiously to claims of copyright infringement from copyright owner, most U.S. service providers WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  maintain systems to respond to claims of infringement and remove or block access to infringing 
materials upon request of a copyright owner.  
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
 
QUESTION 271:  The U.S. Department of Commer ce issued on 6  December  2021, "Public 
Comments Welcome on Draft Policy Statement on Licensing Negotiations and Remedies for 
Standards -Essential Patents Subject to F/RAND Commitments". Please specify relevant progress and 
future considerations and provide m ore information on antitrust enforcement policies regarding 
standard -essential patents.  
 
RESPONSE 271:  After a review of those public comments and a collaborative deliberation on how 
best to proceed, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), the National  Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (DOJ) concluded that 
withdrawal of the 2019 Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards -Essential Patents subject to 
Voluntary F/RAND commitments is the be st course of action for promoting both competition and 
innovation in the standards ecosystem. The Agencies issued a statement on the withdrawal on 
8 June 2022. See additional details at: https://www.uspto.gov/about -us/news -
updates/department -justice -us-patent -and-trademark -office -and-national -institute . Regarding  
future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Polic y Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
QUESTION 272:  The U.S. adopted the Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities 
Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People's Republic of China, banning US 
enterprises, institutions and indiv iduals from providing financial support for enterprises owned or 
controlled by the Chinese military, including a ban on purchasing stocks and financial derivatives of 
relevant enterprises. It also launched the American Financial Markets Integrity and Secur ity Act, 
banning U.S. investment companies, pension funds, and insurance companies from purchasing 
stocks of Chinese companies on the Department of Commerce's "entity list" and the Department of 
Defense's list of Chinese military -linked companies. How does  the U.S. explain these restrictions' 
compliance to GATS Article  II Most -Favored -Nation Treatment and GATS Article  XVI Market Access?  
 
RESPONSE 272: Executive  Order  13959, as amended by Executive  Order  14032, declared a 
national emergency with respect to t he PRC's military -industrial complex, finding that the PRC is 
increasingly exploiting United  States capital to resource and to enable the development and 
modernization of its military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses. Accordingly, these 
execut ive orders allow the  United  States to prohibit – in a targeted and scoped manner – U.S. 
investments in certain listed Chinese companies that undermine U.S. national security in accordance 
with the findings and requirements in the executive orders. These ex ecutive orders are consistent 
with the  United  States' WTO obligations. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 273:  In the U.S. Department of Commerce's investigation in the  Export -Import Bank 
of China's export buyer's credit, even though the bank did not provide any export buyer's credit to 
the U.S. importer of an investigated Chinese exporter and the bank did all it could to cooperate 
(including responding to questionnaires , providing screenshots of inquiries in the credit system, 
accepting on -site investigation, etc.), the U.S. side still raised requirements clearly beyond what was 
reasonable and, when such unreasonable requirements were not met, presumed the bank to have 
provided export buyer's credit by claiming that the bank had not done its best to cooperate in the 
investigation, and imposed a countervailing duty up to 10.54% on the investigated customer of the 
bank. Please explain the criteria of "adverse facts availabl e". 
 
RESPONSE 273:  The U.S. countervailing duty law provides that when necessary information is not 
available on the record or an interested party withholds information, fails to provide timely 
information, significantly impedes a proceeding, or provides u nverifiable information, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (Commerce) may use facts otherwise available. Further, Commerce may 
use adverse inferences if a party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to 
comply with a request for inf ormation.  
 
QUESTION 274:  Chinese enterprises have reported that when vehicle components are exported to 
the U.S., it takes too long to receive replies regarding designated agency and information disclosure 
from the U.S. Department of Transportation and complete other relevant pro cedures. It used to be WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  about two months before but can take more than nine months now. Please provide grounds for 
relevant procedures.  
 
RESPONSE 274:  If this question is regarding the designation of an agent for service of process for 
imported vehicles pur suant to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulations 
(49 CFR Part 551), information is available in NHTSA's New Manufacturers Handbook: 
https://vpic.nhtsa.dot.gov/ManufacturerHandbook.pdf . NHTSA has an online portal for submitting 
information for forms such as Designation of U.S. Agent by Foreign Manufacturer: 
https://vpic.nhtsa.dot.gov /mfrportal/ . Questions can be submitted through the portal or through 
NHTSA's Manufacturer Helpdesk at manufacturerinfo@dot.gov  or 1-888-399-3277.  
 
QUESTION 275:  Please explain why there have been such seriou s delays.  
 
RESPONSE 275:  See response to Question  273. 
QUESTION 276:  Does the U.S. side believe such serious delays constitute de facto barrier to trade?  
 
RESPONSE 276:  No, and the  United  States disagrees with the characterization in this question.  
 
QUESTI ON 277:  The U.S. adjusted the time frame for some of its report content from fiscal year 
to market year, resulting in discontinuity in the reports on some products for 2016 -2017. Please 
explain why such adjustment was made.  
 
RESPONSE 277:  It is unclear whi ch data is being referenced here. Some U.S. government data is 
reported on a fiscal year basis, and other data is on a calendar year basis.  
 
QUESTION 278:  According to the notification, the U.S. has 44 tariff quota products, mainly beef, 
dairy products, su gar, butter, cheese, chocolate, cotton, and others. The average quota completion 
rate of the U.S. was 54% in 2020 and the lowest rate was merely 3%, for cotton. The completion 
rate of some products were below the commitment of the Bali Tariff Rate Quota De cision.  
Please explain why the quotas were underfilled.  
 
RESPONSE 278:  The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market 
factors, including price trends, exchange rates, the recent global COVID -19 pandemic, supply, and 
demand.  
 
QUESTION 279:  Have the U.S. side taken specific actions or made plans to implement the Bali 
Tariff Rate Quota Decision?  
 
RESPONSE 279:  The United  States has and will continue to abide by the Bali TRQ Understanding 
as it has since its inception in 2013.  
 
QUESTION 280:  Please describe the import measures of the U.S. concerning tobacco leaf and the 
consideration behind those measures?  
 
RESPONSE 280:  Please see https://help.cbp.go v/s/article/Article -54?language=en_US . 
 
QUESTION 281:  Please explain how the  United  States has implemented the relevant requirements 
of the CHIP and Science Act in the area of technology standard setting and intellectual property 
rights, following the enactment of the Act.  
 
RESPONSE 281:  To the extent this question is seeking information about future plans with respect 
to implementation of the Act, United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 282:  With respect to the  United  States Departmen t of Commerce's "Public Comments 
Welcome on Draft Policy Statement on Licensing Negotiations and Remedies for Standard -Essential 
Patent Subject to F/RAND Commitments" issued on 6  December  2021, could the U.S. side please 
provide information on progress and  follow -up considerations on this matter, and provide further 
information on antitrust enforcement policies related to standard -essential patents.  
 
RESPONSE 282:  See Response  270. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 283:  With the world economy in the doldrums, to stay open and engag ed in cooperation 
and grow economic and trade ties is good not only for the U.S. and China, but also for the world 
economic recovery. Recently, on multilateral occasions such as the G20 and APEC, Members have 
formed a consensus on "no decoupling". European  leaders of including German Chancellor Scholz 
and French President Macron, have crystallized a supportive stance on globalization, and clearly 
stated that they do not support decoupling or bloc confrontation. President Biden also made it clear 
that the U. S. has no intention to decouple with China. While the protectionist and unilateralist 
practices of the U.S., such as the Chip and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act that include 
discriminatory industrial subsidy policies, tightening of export cont rols, and abusing of national 
security reviews of foreign investment, seems show that the U.S. is disrupting the global industrial 
and supply chains and manipulating some double standards in industrial policies. Please clarify, in 
the field of economy and trade, whether the U.S. is still pursuing a policy of decoupling? And if the 
answer is no, how does the U.S. carry out the policy of "no decoupling" into its action?  
 
RESPONSE 283:  We do not accept the premise of the question, which implies the  United  States 
has been pursuing a policy of decoupling. With respect to future plans, we remind Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 284:  Does the U.S. think that its policies and practices are inconsistent with the 
aforementioned consensus of no decoupling and no confrontation?  
 
RESPONSE 284:  U.S. trade policies and practices are fully consistent with the 2022 Trade Policy 
Agenda  of the President  of the United  States,  found  here:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022
%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 285:  As China will remain committed to its opening -up policy an d adheres to the course 
of economic globalization, and is willing to share market opportunities with the whole world, what 
plans does the  United  States have in the future to further open its markets and deepen its 
cooperation with China?  
 
RESPONSE 285:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 286:  "The U.S. government's Build Back Better Agenda in 2021 includes putting workers 
at the center of trade policy." Does this policy e rect invisible barriers to trade activities?  
 
RESPONSE 286: The worker -centered trade policy means that the  United  States is focused on 
ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and that the benefits of trade are broadly 
shared by all pe ople. The  United  States recognizes that trade can – and should – be a force for good. 
Done right, and in coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle class, redress 
inequality, and promote fair competition. We remain committed to upho lding a fair and open global 
trading system  – one that follows through on our partners' longstanding commitment to conduct 
economic relations with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, and 
promoting sustainable development.  
 
QUES TION 287:  Section  103(a) of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 Compilations and derivative 
works  
Subject matter of copyright: compilations and derivative works.  
 
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by Section  102 of the U.S. Copyright Act includes  
compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing pre -existing material in 
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been 
used unlawfully.  
 
Can compilations and derivative works created without the permission of the copyright owner of the 
original work be protected by the Copyright Act in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 287:  U.S. law affords copyright protection to the author of a derivative work for "the 
material contributed by the author of  such work. The copyright in such work is independent of any 
copyright protection in the pre -existing material." 17  U.S.C. § 103(b). This provision preserves 
copyright protection for those parts of an unauthorized compilation or derivative work that do not  
employ the pre -existing work. Moreover, if the use of a work in a compilation or derivative work is WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  permitted under a copyright exception, the use would not be infringing even if permission of the 
copyright owner is not obtained.  
 
QUESTION 288:  Does the u nauthorized use of such works infringe the copyright of the compilation 
or derivative work authors?  
 
RESPONSE 288: See Response  286. 
 
QUESTION 289:  If compilations and derivative works created without the permission of the 
copyright owner of the original w ork are protected in the U.S., why did Judge Posner hold the 
opposite view in the Gracen v. Bradford Exchange. 698 F. 2d 300 (1983)? Is this case valid in the 
U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 289:  In Gracen v. Bradford Exchange , 698 F. 2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983), the  United  States 
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held that an artist's painting based on a still image from 
The Wizard  of Oz (1939) lacked sufficient originality to be copyrightable as a derivative work. It did 
not deny that original con tributions to a compilation or an unauthorized derivative work could be 
protected separate from any protection in the pre -existing material. The Court of Appeals for the 7th 
Circuit has declined to extend some aspects of Gracen's  reasoning to other fact pa tterns. See Schrock 
v. Learning Curv Int'l , 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009).  
 
QUESTION 290:  If compilations and derivative works created without the permission of the 
copyright owner of the original work are not protected in the U.S., is Section  103(a) of the  U.S. 
Copyright  Act consistent with the Berne Convention and TRIPS?  
 
RESPONSE 290:  U.S. law is consistent with Article  2 of the Berne Convention. Article  2 provides 
that " [t]ranslations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literar y or artistic 
work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work". 
U.S. law affords copyright protection to the author of a derivative work for "the material contributed 
by the author of such work. The copyrig ht in such work is independent of any copyright protection 
in the pre -existing material". 17 U.S.C. 103(b). Nothing in the Berne Convention prohibits a 
contracting party from affording right holders an exclusive right to create derivative works.  
 
QUESTION 291: Should the U.S. amend Section  103(a) of the Copyright Act?  
 
RESPONSE 291:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 292:  Could the U.S. further clarify whether only autho rs of visual art works enjoy moral 
rights, and whether authors of other works also enjoy the protection of moral rights?  
 
RESPONSE 292:  U.S. law protects the moral rights of all authors through a combination of laws, 
including 17 U.S.C. § 1202's protection  for copyright management information, 17 U.S.C. §106's 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works, and state laws relating to the right of publicity, fraud, 
unfair competition, and defamation. In the case of visual artists, specifically, the Visual Artis ts Rights 
Act provides additional protections for attribution and integrity.  
 
QUESTION 293: The U.S. Copyright Act provides that copyright owners only have rights in digital 
broadcasting of phonorecords, and other broadcasters that do not use digital broad casting are not 
required to pay any fees to the copyright owners of phonorecords. How to protect the copyright of 
the copyright owners of phonorecords in the case of non -digital broadcasting?  
 
RESPONSE 293:  Under United  States law, a copyright in a sound recording does not confer an 
exclusive right to publicly perform the sound recording via over -the-air broadcast. Regarding 
future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retros pective 
exercises.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  COLOMBIA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
 
1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.2 Fiscal policy (1.24, 1.25)  
 
Paragraphs 1.24 and 1.25 mention the proposed Build Back Better Act (H.R5376) which set forth a 
restructuring of investment to rebuild the U.S economy and help reverse the pandemic's impact. 
The Build Back Better act became a public law in 2022 as the Inflation Reduction Act, which contains 
a series of tax credits for energy security, cle an fuels, clean cars, among others. Some of the most 
salient policy mechanisms enshrined in this law are aimed at incentivizing green technologies and 
some of the tax credit provisions have domestic content requirements that may present GATT and 
FTA confor mity issues such as the: 1)  Renewable Resources Tax Credit, 2)  Energy Tax Credit, 
3) Sustainable Aviation Fuel Tax Credit, 4)  Tax Credit for Production of Clean Hydrogen, 5)  Clean 
Vehicle Tax Credit, 6)  Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit, 7)  Clean Electricity Production 
Tax Credit, 8)  Clean Electricity Investment Tax Credit, 9)  Clean Fuel Production Tax Credit.  
 
QUESTION 1:  How does the United  States  intend to implement these incentives so that the 
domestic content requirements do not create a dis tortion in the markets benefiting from the credits 
and so that foreign manufacturers and investors of similar products under similar conditions are not 
put at a disadvantage?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 
QUESTION 2:  How can foreign companies that invest in U.S. green technologies benefit from these 
incentives?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Foreign companies that invest in the United  States  and meet the qualifications set 
forth in the Inflation Reduction Act and its implementing regulations may benefit from the Act's 
incentives.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Is the production of ethanol incentivized by any of the new tax credits or benefits in 
the Build Back  Better Act/Inflation Reduction Act?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  No, the Inflation Reduction Act does not incentive the production of ethanol.  
 
QUESTION 4:  If yes, when would the economic effects be expected to be perceived by the U.S. 
industry?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Not applicab le, see response to Question  3. 
 
QUESTION 5:  How are trade partners of the U.S. included in the domestic policies aimed at 
incentivizing green technologies and transformation?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  See response to Question  2. 
 
QUESTION 6:  In general terms, will the United  States  consider notifying to the WTO the subsidies 
that are provided at a State and city government level, considering that many cities and states do 
not necessarily comply with Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No.  77 (requiring  
disclosure of tax breaks)?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  The United  States  notifies specific subsidy programs at the sub -central levels of 
government. The Secretariat Report notes that nearly 750 such programs were notified in the last 
subsidy notification of the United  States (see, G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021).  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
 
2.2 Trade Policy Formulation and Objectives  
2.2.2 Trade policy objectives and direction (2.8)  
 
Paragraph 2.8 of the report highlighted some of the main objectives of the U.S trade policy for 2021 
in pursuing the Build Back Better Agenda. Section  (II) mentions "putting workers at the center of 
trade policy" as the main guiding principle.  
 
QUESTION 7:  Can the United  States  explain what specific criteria are used in evaluating tr ade policy 
decisions according to the standard of "putting workers at the center of trade policy"?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The worker -centered trade policy means that the United  States  is focused on 
ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and tha t the benefits of trade are broadly 
shared by all people. The United  States  recognizes that trade can  - and should  - be a force for good. 
Done right, and in coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle class, redress 
inequality, and p romote fair competition. We remain committed to upholding a fair and open global 
trading system  - one that follows through on our partners' longstanding commitment to conduct 
economic relations with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full empl oyment, and 
promoting sustainable development. We are developing new tools and implementing existing 
commitments to achieve these goals.  
 
QUESTION 8:  How is the protection of workers outside of the United  States  considered in this 
policy?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement begins with the recognition that trade 
should raise living standards, ensure full employment, pursue sustainable development, and protect 
and preserve the environment. Improved labor conditions are interwoven among these  enduring 
and ambitious goals.  The worker -centered trade policy means that the United  States  is focused on 
ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and that the benefits of trade are broadly 
shared by all people. This includes protectio n of workers both in the United  States  and our trade 
partner countries. We are regularly consulting with a range of labor stakeholders, both in the 
United  States  and around the world, to hear their thoughts on how trade is affecting them and how 
they think  it can better serve real people.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
 
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.1 Customs procedures and formalities (3.2)  
 
Paragraph  3.2 highlights that, during 2018 and 2019, CBP launched several pilot projects using 
blockchain to facilitate the movement of legitimate trade securely and to advance intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and certain FTAs (USMCA and CAFTA -DR). In addition to other multi -tech 
solutions to track supply chains and improve transparency.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Could the United  States  elaborate on the results, benefits, and lessons learned from 
CBP's initiative to use blockchain for IPR verification purposes with other FTA trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  CBP identified several benefits from the blockchain tests to its processes:  
 
a) NAFTA (now USMCA)/CAFTA test : 
i. Familiarized the agency with distributed ledger technology ; 
ii. System accepted documents but showed digitization led to improved efficienc y; 
iii. Tested interoperability specifications ; 
iv. 100% submission of data improved decision -making speed and efficiency ; 
v. Use of meta data helped to expedite data elements necessary for decision making . 
b) IPR test : 
i. Identifying the rights holder (e.g.  manufacturer, retailer, importer) ; 
ii. License verification from license holder assured legitimacy of the product/IP ; 
iii. CBP used the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) to identify the actual licensee.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 10:  Could it be also possible to elaborate on the result s of the implementation of CBP's 
main multi -tech solutions to improve transparency and monitor the supply chain together with other 
FTA trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The CBP tests were completed using straight blockchain technology. The tests 
helped CBP make the decision to pursue global interoperability standards, rather than being locked 
into a single solution or vendor. Interoperability has shown to be less expensive and provides the 
ability to implement and scale capabilities more quickly.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Is the United  States  pursuing a policy, or are there already initiatives underway, 
aimed at extending the use of the technologies referred to in questions 1a. and 1b. to supply chains 
shared with other FTA partners in the region.  
 
RESPONSE 11:  CBP has initiated the 21st Century Framework to review its operations and policies 
and CBP continues to pursue technology modernization. IPR capabilities will be further enhanced in 
the eCommerce technical demonstration, which is scheduled to begin in 202 3. CBP is considering 
additional plans for further testing with FTAs.  
 
3.1.1.3 Policy and strategies (3.8, 3.9; Box  3.1) 
 
The report mentions CBP's Strategy 2020 -2025, which sets out 12  strategic initiatives. Box  3.1 
highlighted in Goal 1 (Efficient Trade Facilitation) a key initiative on the deployment of robotic 
process automation to streamline administrative processes.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Can the United  States  provide more information on how the deployment of robotic 
processes is taking place,  the technologies associated, the results and lessons learned in the 
implementation of these processes?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Robotic Process Automation (RPA) software 
is transforming the way that industry and the federal government streamlines and automates their 
infrastructure. The RPA technology is used to create automations that execute repetitive, rule -based 
tasks and manipulate data and applications. To optimize RPA utilization, crowdsourcing of RPA ideas 
and idea campaigns have helped develop a rich grouping of automation use cases, empowering 
users to create and implement innovative time -saving solutions. Measuring the cost avoidance and 
time savings as part of the engineering lifecycle helps ensure leadershi p and user buy -in and sustains 
the culture shift to automation. Benefits of an RPA program in an organization include low financial 
investment, low risk, low technical complexity, rapid implementation, and a secure workflow.  
Additional lessons learned reve aled use case analysis needs to identify ideal project to ensure return 
on investment prior to development of an automation. Since September  2021, RPA has transformed 
over 60  processes across CBP, saving CBP millions of dollars and tens of thousands human resource 
hours, reducing error and allowing continued efforts to secure the border and lawfully enforce 
legitimate trade and travel. This success is made possible due to an ecosystem where an RPA 
Community of Practice is thriving in CBP.  
 
QUESTION 13:  Are there other initiatives underway for the countries of the region to implement 
harmonious technological standards together with CBP?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  CBP is pushing standards for interoperability to allow all types of systems to 
participate in supply chain act ivities. In July  2022, World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) accepted 
CBP's recommendation for a decentralized identifier (DID), a standard unique identifier. This is the 
first step in getting interoperability standards ingrained and widely accepted throughout t he industry. 
Global interoperability standards will lead to the creation of transparent and global supply chains 
while giving industry technology choice. So far, CBP's investment into interoperability has 
demonstrated exciting possibilities, including the ability to expedite cargo processing, support 
enhanced enforcement activity, and future -proof the trade process through choice of technology.  
 
3.1.1.6 Trade facilitation (3.17)  
 
Paragraph  3.17 mentions that a number of trade facilitation measures were still being implemented 
during the review period and a few new initiatives were launched.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 14:  Could the U.S. provide more information about the main initiatives for trade 
facilitation that were launched or are currently underway in which there is  space for cross -integration 
or cross -border collaboration with FTA partners?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Under the unified cargo processing program, officials from U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection and Mexico's Tax Administration Service conduct joint cargo inspection s at the facilities 
of the importing or exporting country.   
 
3.1.1.6.1 Single window (3.19)  
 
Paragraph  3.19 mentions that The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), CBP's electronic 
platform, was developed further and improved during the review period. AC E's automation and 
process simplification efforts resulted in an estimated economic benefit of approximately 
USD 1.4 billion for the trade community and USD  106 million  for CBP in FY2020.  
 
QUESTION 15:  What agencies make part of the ACE interoperability pl atform?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  The ACE system was built by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), who also 
maintains it.  The ACE system is used by 49  different U.S. Government agencies, who have different 
roles in the administration of imports and exports.  These include agencies with specific jurisdiction 
over particular commodities, such as food, drugs, transportation equipment, and many others. See: 
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated . 
 
QUESTION 16:  Does the ACE cover customs, foreign exchange and taxation?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  ACE is used to collect  customs  duties,  taxes,  and fees. Collections  brought  into ACE 
are written  to the system  of record,  the Automated  Commercial  System  (ACS).  ACS functionality,  
including  currency  foreign  exchange  rates,  is being  transition ed to ACE. ACE will become  the system  
of record.  
 
QUESTION 17:  How does CBP measure effectiveness and efficiency in the ACE system?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  CBP measures the effectiveness and efficiency of t he ACE system by regularly 
evaluating time saved or improved mission outcomes by utilizing capabilities available in ACE. 
Success is gauged by analysing results from system reliability and performance assessments, trade 
volume, transaction processing times , and end user surveys.  
 
QUESTION 18 : What administrative processes are yet to be incorporated in the ACE system?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  All core trade processes have been incorporated into ACE. CBP is in the process of 
migrating the final collections capabilities to ACE, which will be completed 2023. In addition, CBP 
routinely develops and deploys system enhancements and maintenance improvements to ACE, as 
funding allows, to keep pace with the ever -evolving international trade landscape. CBP identifies 
new capabilities for ACE through ongoing dialogue with our industry, government, and 
congressional  stakeholders.  A list of upcoming  developments  is maintained  here:  https://www.cbp.
gov/document/guidance/ace -development -and-deployment -schedule . 
 
3.1.2 Rules of origin  
3.1.2.2 Preferential rules of origin (3.331, 3.33, 3.34)  
 
Paragraph  3.34 mentions that changes to the rules of origin in the FTA with Colombia, also due to  
the nomenclature changes, became effective as of 1 January  2021.  
 
QUESTION 19:  Could the United  States  provide more information about the technical and legal 
procedures that had to be followed to make these changes effective?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  Section  1206(a)  of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 authorizes 
the President to proclaim modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United  States  (HTS) 
based on the recommendations of the United  States  International Trade Commission (USITC) i f the 
President determines that the modifications are in conformity with U.S. obligations under the 
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and do not 
run counter to U.S. economic interests. Based on the 2017 chan ges to the Harmonized System WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 197 - 
 
  nomenclature, the USITC recommended modifications to the HTS, which were contained in USITC 
Publication  4556.  
 
The United  States  consulted with Colombia on the effect that the modifications to the Harmonized 
System would have on the rules of origin under the United  States -Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement. The parties agreed upon a set of trade neutral changes to the rules of orig in. The 
United  States  implemented these changes through Presidential Proclamation 10053, which was 
issued on 29 June 2020.  
 
3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports  
3.1.4.3 Excise taxes (Table  3.11)  
 
Table  3.11 on Excise taxes for 2022 includes a 2% excise ta x on foreign procurement.  
 
QUESTION 20:  Could the United  States  provide more information on the way this tax operates, its 
legal background and whether it is related to public procurement covered by the Free Trade 
Agreements Act?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  The tax on specified Federal procurement payments is exempted in certain ca ses, 
including for payments made for goods manufactured or produced in or services provided by a 
supplier of a country that is a party to an international agreement with the United  States  that 
includes government procurement obligations (e.g.  the WTO  GPA and certain U.S. FTAs).  
 
For additional information regarding exemptions, please refer to 26  CFR 1.5000C -1(d). For more 
information on the procedures necessary to eliminate the withholding by an acquiring agency, 
please  refer to 26 CFR 1.5000C  2(d). Implementing  regulations  may be found  at: https://www.irs.
gov/irb/2016 -36_IRB/ar11.html . 
 
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.1 Prohibitions, restrictions, and quantitativ e measures (3.59, 3.64, 3.141; 
Table  A3.3; Box  3.2) 
 
Paragraph 3.59 highlights that several categories of goods are subject to prohibitions or restrictions 
by measures contained in the legislation of other agencies, such as the Clean Air Act.  
 
QUESTION 21:  Can the U.S identify and explain the restrictions to import palm oil biofuels to the 
United  States  under the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard in equal market conditions with 
other biofuels?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) prog ram at CAA Section  211(o), palm 
oil biofuel does not qualify as renewable fuel unless it is produced at a "grandfathered" facility, i.e.  
registered by EPA as exempt under 40  CFR 80.1403(c) or (d). The RFS program does not prohibit 
the import of palm oil or palm oil biofuel into the United  States . 
 
Paragraph  3.61 calls attention to a joint statement issued by the United  States  and the 
European  Union announcing the intention to "negotiate future arrangements for trade in steel and 
aluminum that take account  of both global non -market excess capacity and the carbon intensity of 
these industries (Section  2.3.3)", Box  3.2 describes some overarching elements. More detail about 
these elements would be valuable to create a shared understanding and develop policy re sponses 
to the issues of excess capacity and carbon intensity among WTO  members.  
 
QUESTION 22:  Can the United  States  provide more information on the specific requirements, 
structure, progress in the negotiation, and implementation of the arrangements to ta ckle global 
non-market excess capacity and carbon intensity?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum  are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures  
 
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures  
3.1.6.1.1.3  New Regulations on Administration and Enforcement of AD and CVD Laws 
(3.85)  
 
Paragraph  3.85 mentions that AD/CVD rules now introduce the possibility of retroactive application 
of duties in scope, covered merchandise and circumvention inquiries.  
 
QUESTION 23:  Could the United  States  elaborate on how retroactive AD/CVD duties will apply and 
which standards will be applied to determine that a retroactive application is warranted?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The determinations for each segment of the proceedings re lated to circumvention 
and scope  inquiries  are available  on the U.S. Department  of Commerce's  website  at: https://acces
s.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 24:  Based on these changes and authorities, what are the temporal limits for U.S. 
agencies to subject products to AD/CDV duties?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The application of any duties in a circumvention or scope determination are 
case-specific, based on the facts and ci rcumstances on the record of a specific segment of a 
proceeding. The determinations for each segment of a proceeding are available at the U.S. 
Department of Commerce's website  at: https://access.trade.gov /login.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 25:  According to the new rules, under which circumstances and at which point in time 
does the authority of U.S. agencies to subject products to AD/CVD duties cease?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  See response to Question  24 above.  
 
3.1.6.1.1.4 Suspen sion agreements (3.87)  
 
Paragraph  3.87 notes that "U.S. law allows USDOC to enter an agreement to suspend an AD and/or 
CVD investigation under certain circumstances and when certain statutory and policy criteria are 
met".  
 
QUESTION 26:  Similarly, is any ag ency of the United  States  legally permitted to enter into 
agreements with other countries, and undertake actions necessary to eliminate injurious effects, or 
reduce or cease exports, in the AD/CVD investigations advanced by other countries that involve U.S . 
parties?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  Yes, in a CVD investigation, the U.S. Government may be able to enter into a 
suspension agreement in an investigation involving U.S. producers or exporters, pursuant to that 
country's law.  In an AD investigation, the agreement is between the respondents and the foreign 
government.  
 
3.1.6.1.1.9 Determination of evasion of AD/CVD orders (3.103)  
 
Paragraph  3.103 exposes that the Tariff Act of 1930 created a new framework for CBP to investigate  
allegations of evasion of AD/CVD orders, under newly created Section  517 (Procedures for 
18 Investigating Claims of Evasion of Anti -dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders).  
 
QUESTION 27:  What procedures that were included in the anti -dumping and counterva iling duty 
legislation are aimed at making investigations more effective in the process of identifying and 
validating the evasion of AD/CVD?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Details regarding EAPA investigations, including statutory and regulatory 
references, may be found on  CBP's website at: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade -
enforcement/tftea/eapa . The law and  regulations  were also notified  to the WTO in 
G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.23  G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.23  (dated  1 April 2016),  G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/
Suppl.25  G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.24  (dated  26 August  2016),  and G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.25/C
orr.1 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.24/Corr.1 (dated 13 September 2016).  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
3.1.7.1 Section  232 investigations  
3.1.7.1.1 Legal and administrative framework (3.134)  
 
Paragraph  3.134 notes the participation of the Department of Defense and highlights some of the 
elements that are taken into considera tion in Section  232 investigations: "(i)  the domestic 
production needed for projected national defense requirements; (ii)  the domestic industry's capacity 
to meet those requirements; (iii)  existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, 
products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national defense; (iv)  the 
growth requirements of such industries and such supplies and services including the investment, 
exploration, and development necessary to ensure such growth; (v) the importation of goods in 
terms of their quantities, availabilities character, and use as those affect such industries and the 
capacity of the United  States  to meet national security requirements; and (vi)  the relation of U.S.  
economic welfare to U.S . national security ". 
 
QUESTION 28:  In this process, does the United  States  weigh and value strategic and longstanding 
defense  relationships with regional allies, and/or their positions as NATO and Major Non -NATO allies 
of the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 28:  In Proclamation  9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States ) and Proclamation  9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminium  Into the 
United  States ), the President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided 
to adjust the imports of steel and aluminium  articles by imposing a 25 % ad valorem  tariff on imports 
of steel arti cles and imposing a 10 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminium  articles, so that such 
imports will not threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations also stated that any 
country with which the United  States  has a security relationship  is welcome to discuss with the 
United  States  alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused 
by imports from that country. Should the United  States  and any such country arrive at a satisfactory 
alternative means to ad dress the threat to the national security such that the President determines 
that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, the President may 
remove or modify the restriction on such imports from that country and, if nec essary, make any 
corresponding adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries as U.S. national security 
interests require.  
 
3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation and 3.1.7.2.1 Section  301 regulatory framework, procedures 
and determinations (3.139, 3.150)  
 
Paragraph  3.139 mentions that "Section  232 measures were taken pursuant to Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 and were not measures taken pursuant to Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 or the Agreement 
on Safeguards". In addition, Paragr aph 3.150 makes plain that Section  301 procedures and 
determinations are part of a very robust institutional framework under U.S. law. These measures 
are operating as non -traditional trade remedies, which could enrich the discussion in WTO reform if 
such a  framework was introduced at the multilateral level, so that all member countries could rely 
on measures that replicate the framework of Section  232 and 301 to advance their trade interests 
like the United  States . 
 
QUESTION 29:  Could the United  States  consider negotiating a framework of measures such as 
Section  232 and 301 measures at the multilateral level? Has the actual set of remedies at the WTO 
proven insufficient?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Polic y 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.1.7.1.4 Investigation into auto imports (3.147)  
 
Paragraph  3.147. mentions that the Secretary of Commerce found in its February  2019 report that 
the impact of excessive imports on the domestic automobile and automobile parts industry and the 
displacement of production in the United  States  was causing a weakening of the U.S. internal 
economy that could impair the national security as set forth in Section  232 and that the "President 
agreed with the Secretary's f inding and directed the USTR to pursue negotiation of agreements to 
address the threatened national security impairment".  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 200 - 
 
  QUESTION 30:  What are or have been the outcomes, progresses and priorities set out in these 
negotiations?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  On 23 May 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine 
the effects on the national security of imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, vans and light 
trucks, and automotive parts. This investigation was initiated under Section  232 of th e Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. On 17 February  2019, the Secretary transmitted a report with 
his findings that automobiles and certain automobile parts are being imported into the United  States  
in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the 
United  States . A public version of this report was published in July  2021. In May  2019, President 
Trump concurred with the Secretary's findings and directed the United  States  Trade Representative 
to pursue  negotiation of agreements to address the threatened impairment of the national security. 
The President has not taken any other action concerning automobiles and automobile parts imports 
under Section  232. 
 
3.1.7.2.2.5 DSTs in 10 economies (3.173)  
 
Paragraph  3.173 summarized some of the agreements reached between the United  States  and other 
countries on Section  301 remedies used to impose retaliatory measures due to the enactment of 
digital service taxes in those other countries. One of the elements of the agreements is that no taxes 
be implemented until the earlier of 31  December  2023 or the coming into force of the Multilateral 
Convention to implement Pillar  1. This deadline may well be reconsidered, as the Secretary -General 
of the OECD, Mathias Cor mann, indicated that the implementation of Pillar One would be delayed 
until 2024.2 Moreover, the scope of Pillar  1 only reaches the very largest of the largest of companies 
that operate in the digitalised and digital economies; companies with annual turn over of over 
EUR 20 billion and profit margins of over 10%. The threat of retaliatory measures under Section  301 
creates a detrimental barrier for countries to fairly tax companies that leverage their internal market 
to make profits, but that do not fall i n the scope of Pillar  1 (reserved only to the very largest of 
companies), in a context in which Pillar  1 will be delayed, countries still reeling from the destabilizing 
effects of the COVID -19 pandemic, and in which competition with digitized and digital c ompanies 
needs a system of taxation to level the playing field, in order to respond to the fiscal needs of 
countries so that they can tend to human realities.  
 
QUESTION 31:  What are the traits of digital service taxes the U.S. deems acceptable so as not to  
trigger retaliatory unilateral measures under Section  301, but that are still effective in taxing 
companies in the digitalised economy and leveling the playing field, in a way that does not only 
cover the largest companies in the world and that does not e ffectively render minimal differential 
tax collection for developing countries and market economies (as is the case with Pillar  1)? 
 
RESPONSE 31:  Multilateral work is ongoing on the development of both Pillar  1 and Pillar  2 and still 
in the process of defi ning what constitutes a prohibited unilateral measure and what does not.  
 
4.1.3.3 Policy, fisheries management, and support measures (4.119, 4.121)  
 
Paragraph  4.119 notes some of the main support measures for the fishing sector, and 
Paragraph  4.121 highlights that the United  States  notified 8 programs for fisheries support.  
 
QUESTION 32:  Could the United  States  indicate whether it can distinguish/discriminate it s figures 
related to subsidies or government support to fishing and fishing related activities, between those 
directed to activities in internal waters and those in waters beyond national jurisdiction?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  It is unclear precisely what the questio n is asking. However, the United  States  does 
not grant or maintain subsidies contingent upon fishing or fishing -related activities in areas beyond 
its national jurisdiction. Further details concerning the programs referenced in paras.  4.119 and 
4.121 of the Secretariat Report can be found at page  43 et seq . in the most 
recent  subsidies  notification  of the United  States  (G/SCM/N/372/USA),  available  at: https://docs.w
to.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009 -DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=275505&Curre
 
2 Grant Wardell -Johnson (2022), "OECD's Pillar One and Pillar Two —A Question of Timing ", 14 June. 
Viewed at: https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily -tax-report -international/oecds -pillar-one-and-pillar-two-a-
question -of-timing . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 201 - 
 
  ntCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglis hRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpani
shRecord=True . 
 
QUESTION 33:  Could the United  States  indicate a complete list of which Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations and/or Arrangements it participates in? In particular, can the U .S. 
confirm whether  it considers the South Pacific Tuna Treaty and the AIDCP mentioned in 
paragraph  4.122 of the Secretariat Report to be either a RFMO or a RFMA?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  The term "RFMO/A" is used in a variety of ways in a number of international and 
domestic instruments, and not all contain a definition of the term. Without prejudice to how the 
United  States  interprets and applies "RFMO/A" (or similar terms) in these inst ruments, please see 
below a list of international fisheries -related organizations and agreements to which the 
United  States  is a member or Party, and that we consider to be relevant to the question.  
 
The United  States  is a member of a number of treaty -based bodies with mandates to adopt legally 
binding conservation and management measures, including:  
 
1. Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources;  
2. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission;  
3. International Commission for the Conse rvation of Atlantic Tunas;  
4. International Pacific Halibut Commission;  
5. North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization;  
6. North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission;  
7. North Pacific Fisheries Commission;  
8. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization;  
9. Pacific Salmon Commission;  
10.South Pacific Regional Fishery Management Organization;  
11.Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission; and  
12.Great Lakes Fishery Commission.  
 
The United  States  is also party to a number of other bilater al and multilateral binding fishery 
agreements, including:  
 
1. Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program;  
2. Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean;  
3. Treaty between the Government of the United  States  of America and the Government of 
Canada on Pacific Coast Albacore Tuna Vessels and Port Privileges;  
4. Agreement between the Government of the United  States  of America and the Government 
of Canada on Pacific Hake/Whiting;  
5. Convention on the Conser vation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering 
Sea; and  
6. Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United  States  of America (South Pacific Tuna Treaty).  
 
4.1.1.1.1 General leg al framework (4.8, 4.48, 4.53, 4.54)  
 
Paragraph  4.8 mentions the Farm Bill as one of the main legislative packages that articulates 
agricultural policy in the United  States . The Market Facilitation Program is one of the most significant 
policies that transfers financial benefits to farmers in the United  States . The CARES act and the CCC 
Charter act that enabled, among others, the two rounds of the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program, 
also resulted in large transfers to U.S. agriculture. While the U.S. is bound to an amber box spending 
limit of USD  19.1 billion  under the Agreement on Agriculture, it appears that the disbursements by 
USDA and the Commodity Credit Corporation during 2018 and 2019 are at risk of exceeding the 
aggregate amount of assistance allowed under this agreement. The amounts are concerning, with 
USD 10 billion  in additional MFP payments for 2018, USD  14.5 billion  in 2019, in addition to the 
usual funds appropriated by the Farm Bill, the USD  16 billion  in the first round of the CFAP and  
USD 13 billion  in the second, not to mention the State and local government level assistance in the 
various States of the United  States  to respond to COVID -19, all this paints a picture of a U.S.  
agriculture that has benefited from subsidization, possibly , like never before since the inception of 
the Uruguay Rounds.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 202 - 
 
  QUESTION 34:  Does the United  States  envision that these rounds of subsidies will have a disruptive 
effect in any of the agricultural international markets and products that benefited from them ? 
 
RESPONSE 34:  Increased expenditures in 2018 through 2020 have been designed to be targeted, 
temporary, and to minimize or remove any impacts on producer decisions and markets.  
 
QUESTION 35:  Can the United  States  provide more discriminated information on  how much of the 
agricultural subsidies in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 has gone to benefit the corn and ethanol 
producers?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  The United  States ' domestic support notifications include all relevant outlays on a 
product -specific basis with data on outlays for each measure.  
 
QUESTION 36:  Will the United  States  take any measures to reduce any distortions in the 
international agricultural markets caused by this unprecedented level of subsidization?  
 
RESPONSE 36:  Increased expenditures in 2018 through 2 020 have been designed to be targeted, 
temporary, and to minimize or remove any impacts on producer decisions and markets.  Funding for 
CFAP and MFP, the major source of increased expenditures during the period, are no longer available 
and both programs are  no longer in effect.  
 
PARTI II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT - DOCUMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
3 ADVANCING A WORKER -CENTERED TRADE POLICY  
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices 
(3.7, 3.14)  
 
Paragraph  3.7 notes that the United  States  is pursuing a new generation of trade policies that will 
more affirmatively promote the decarbonization of industries as necessary to limit global 
temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Celsius.  
 
QUESTION 37:  Has the United  States  evaluated the  possibility of granting technical assistance to 
those countries that are its suppliers and do not have the capacity to assume the technical and 
logistical requirements of these new policies?  
If so, how?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  The United  States  regularly provides t raining and technical assistance to help 
developing countries implement trade commitments and reap the benefits of international trade. 
The mechanism through which we provide training and assistance varies, and may be to support the 
implementation of free trade agreement commitments, or be part of ongoing cooperation or 
development assistance.  
 
Paragraph  3.14 mentioned that the United  States  will continue to support and promote more circular 
and resource -efficient approaches in other international fora, inc luding the WTO's Committee on 
Trade and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, and 
at the OECD. In addition to continuing to support and expand this work, to help develop the capacity 
of APEC economies to identif y and frame domestic policies that promote solid waste management 
and recycling infrastructure.  
 
QUESTION 38 : Colombia would appreciate knowing more about the specific actions taken by the 
United  States in relation to investments in countries that are most affected by climate change.  
 
RESPONSE 38:  Please refer to the section, Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable 
Environmental Practices  at page  4 of the President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda, 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%20
2021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 203 - 
 
  COSTA RICA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/ S/434  
 
Page  48, Para graph  2.13 
 
For the current Administration, equity and inclusion are among its top policy priorities, which will 
influence future U .S. trade and investment policy as well. Thanks to a series of presidential directives 
and initiatives relating to a "common effort at all levels of government" to advance race and gender 
equity, equality and justice, many concrete measures are already being implemented and new ones 
have been included in the President's FY 2022 budget. To help develop inclusive, worker -focused 
trade and trade policy, the USTR Office requested the USITC to investigate the potential 
distributional effects of trade policy and tra de in goods and services in American workers by skill 
level, wage and salary, gender, race/ethnicity, age, and income level, especially how they affect 
underserved and underrepresented communities. In the October  2021 letter requesting the USITC 
to conduct  this two -part investigation, the USTR Office noted the Administration's equity initiatives 
and congressional calls for U .S. trade policy to America had a positive and equitable effect on 
underserved and marginalized communities.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Could the Uni ted States  provide more information on the concrete steps they are 
taking to advance race and gender equity, equality, and justice?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  On his first day in office, President Biden signed  the Executive  Order on  Advancing 
Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government  
(EO 13985). This Executive Order outlines a whole -of-Government mandate to advance equity for 
all Americans through a comprehensive approach to all Government practices, including: 
manageme nt; policymaking (including through regulation and guidance); procurement, contracting, 
and budgeting; delivery of benefits and services; and data collection, reporting, and use, to tangibly 
improve the lives of every person across the nation, in particula r, those who have been underserved, 
marginalized, and adversely affected by persistent poverty and inequality. Over 90 federal agencies 
across the federal government, including all Cabinet -level agencies as well as over 50 independent 
agencies, mobilized q uickly and effectively to implement the Executive  Order.  These equity action 
plans are publicly available:  https://www.performance.gov/equity . USTR's  Equity  Action  Plan is 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/equity . 
 
In addition, the President issued equity -related public policy initiatives taking a whole -of-government 
approach that include:  
 
• The reestablishment  of a White  House  Gender  Policy  Council  (https://www.whitehouse.g
ov/briefing -room/presidential -actions/2021/03/08/executive -order -on-establishment -of-
the-white -house -gender -policy -council/ ) and the United  States ' first National Strategy on 
Gender Equity and Equality  (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -
content/uploads/2021/10/National -Strategy -on-Gender -Equity -and-Equality.pdf ); 
• The White House Initiative a nd President's Advisory Commission on Asian Americans, 
Native  Hawaiians,  and Pacific  Islanders  (https://www.hhs.gov/about/whiaanhpi/index.ht
ml); 
• The White House Council on Native American Affai rs (https://www.bia.gov/whcnaa ) and 
the Presidential Memorandum on Tribal Consultation and Strengthening the 
Nation -to-Nation  Relationship (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/presidential -
actions/2021/01/26/memorandum -on-tribal-consultation -and-strengthening -nation -to-
nation -relationships/ ); 
• The White House Initiative on Advancing Educational Equity, Excellence and Economic 
Opportunity for Hispanics  (https://sites.ed.gov/hispanic -initiative/ ); 
• THE WHITE  HOUSE  INITIATIVE  ON ADVANCING  EDUCATIONAL  EQUITY,  EXCELLENCE,  
AND ECONOMIC  OPPORTUNITY  FOR BLACK  AMERICANS  (https://sites.ed.gov/whblacked
ucation/ ); 
• The Presidential Memorandum on Advancing the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons 
around the World  (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/presidential -
actions/2021/02/04/ memorandum -advancing -the-human -rights -of-lesbian -gay-
bisexual -transgender -queer -and-intersex -persons -around -the-world/ ) and Executive 
Orders on Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or 
Sexual Orientation  (EO 13988) ( https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/pres idential -WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 204 - 
 
  actions/2021/01/20/executive -order -preventing -and-combating -discrimination -on-basis-
of-gender -identity -or-sexual -orientation/ ) and Advancing Equality for Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Individuals (EO 14075)  
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/presidential -actions/2022/06/15 /executive -
order -on-advancing -equality -for-lesbian -gay-bisexual -transgender -queer -and-intersex -
individuals/ ); 
• The creation of the Justice40 Initiative  
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/en vironmentaljustice/justice40/ ); 
• The Executive  Order on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal 
Workforce  (EO 14035)  (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/presidential -
actions/2021/06/25/executive -order -on-diversity -equity -inclusion -and-accessibility -in-
the-federal -workforce/ ). 
 
QUESTION 2:  What initiative s have you found successful and which do you think could be replicated 
in other countries around the world?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The United  States  is a richly diverse, democratic nation. The above examples of 
initiatives to advance equity, justice, opportunity, and equality in federal public policy were 
developed in response to consultations with domestic constituencies. Success is measured through 
an intentional, intersectional, and iterative process that relies on constituent outreach and 
engagement; regular policy, grant, and program assessments; strengthening the granularity, scope, 
and quality of data and research; and accountability, transparen cy and consistent review.  
 
For example, USTR's Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022 -2026 includes the goal "to Develop 
Equitable Trade Policy Through Inclusive Processes ", which ensures that as part of the agency's 
annual performance assessment process, ev ery single employee has a duty to strive to advance 
equity in every aspect of trade policy and build trusted relationships with underserved, 
underrepresented, and marginalized communities. The United  States  also seeks to use its convening 
authority to ensu re that, whether in domestic engagements or in designing stakeholder sessions 
with trading partners, equity, equality, and women's economic empowerment are included in 
developing, implementing, and enforcing inclusive worker -centered trade policy.  
 
Page  58, Para graph  2.37 
 
In December  2019, pursuant to Article  103(a)(2) of the Trade Priorities Law, a presidential 
proclamation was issued announcing changes to certain rights pursuant to an agreement between 
the United  States  and Japan, called the United  State s-Japan Agreement (USJTA). The USJTA, which 
was signed on 7 October  2019 and entered into force on 1 January  2020, reduces or eliminates 
tariffs on 241  tariff lines for goods originating in Japan, either at the time of its entry into force or 
in an implementation period up to 2029. The Japanese beef TRQ was removed and became part of 
the general quota allocation for all other countries (Box  2.2). As of July  2022, this agreement had 
not been notified to the WTO. A similar presidential proclamation, pu rsuant to the same provisions 
of the Trade Priorities Law, was issued in December  2020 to announce the reductions in tariff barriers 
agreed with the European  Union  on 20 November  2020. 36 This agreement provided for reductions 
in MFN duties for six tariff lines, which applied from 1 August  2020, and another reduction applicable 
to five of them on 1 August  2021 (Box  2.2). In 2021, imports of these products from the 
European  Union  amounted to approximately USD  192 million , compared to USD  132 million  in 2020.  
In return, the European  Union  agreed to eliminate, on an MFN basis, the duties applicable to four 
tariff lines, corresponding to to frozen or live lobsters, for a period of five years from 1 August  2020 
to 31 July 2025.  
 
QUESTION 3:  When will you notify the WTO of this agreement between the United  States  and 
Japan?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Japan and the United  States  are coordinating on the appropriate notification 
procedure and look forward to notifying the WTO when that coordination is complete.  
 
Page  79, Pa ragraph  3.21 
 
The United  States  continues to offer advance rulings on customs matters, including classification, 
marking, origin, valuation, and carriers, as well as on the applicability of trade programs. Advance 
rulings, or ruling letters as they are cal led, are issued pursuant to CBP regulations at 19  CFR Part 177 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 205 - 
 
  and may be filed electronically using a template, with the exception of rulings relating to valuation, 
and the carriers, which must be presented in the form of a letter. It is CBP's general pol icy to make 
these rulings available to the public within 90  days of issuance through a searchable database known 
as the Customs Decisions Online Search System (CROSS).29 However, the regulations do not specify 
a deadline for the issuance of resolutions or their duration or period of validity. Rulings remain in 
effect unless modified or revoked by CBP or changed by law enforcement. In December  2021, the 
CROSS was searchable in 209,848  resolutions. In 2021, CBP issued 3,230  rulings; the most 
numerous referred  to classification.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Of the 3,230  resolutions issued in 2021, is it known how many days on average it 
took to issue the resolutions from your request?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Rulings issued in response to requests through the online portal, with respect to the 
classification of merchandise, which make up the vast majority of ruling requests, are issued within 
30 days of the original request (we note in FY 2021 the average was actually 18  days).  The figures 
for the number of days to respond as to t he other types of matters adjudicated through our rulings 
process are not available.  
 
Page  194, Para graph  3.318  
 
In addition to any applicable tariffs, pursuant to Title  III of PL  111-347, a 2% federal consumption 
tax is applied to public purchases of good s and services from foreign persons, made on or after 
2 January  2011. at a later date (article  52.22 -12 of the FAR). Payments for acquisitions made 
through simplified procedures that do not exceed the SAT are exempt from taxes, as are emergency 
acquisition s and certain foreign humanitarian assistance contracts. The definitive regulation for the 
application of this title was published in August  2016.456 The Government will retain 2% of each 
payment unless the foreign contractor requests an exemption; this cl ause applies only to foreigners.  
 
QUESTION 5:  How is this 2% federal consumption tax applied to public purchases of goods and 
services from foreign persons, which are covered by the GPA and by commercial instruments signed 
by the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 5:  The tax on specified Federal procurement payments is exempted in certain cases, 
including for payments made pursuant to a contract to the extent the payment is for goods 
manufactured or produced or services provided in a country that is a party  to the GPA.  
 
For additional information regarding exemptions, please refer to 26  CFR 1.5000C -1(d). For more 
information on the procedures necessary to eliminate the withholding by an acquiring agency, please 
refer to 26  CFR 1.5000C -2(d). 
 
Page  215, Paragr aph 3.368  
 
Geographical names or signs can also be registered as collective marks or as trademarks or 
trademarks . Although registration is preferable due to public announcement and other advantages, 
GIs can also be protected through  common law  without havi ng to be registered with the USPTO, as 
long as they are in use in the United  States  and that are certificates or regional collective marks that 
have validity under the  common law  (not a generic term). Collective trademarks or collective service 
marks indic ating regional origin, adopted by a "collective" (association, union, cooperative, etc.), 
are for the exclusive use of its members who meet the collective requirement of use the mark to 
identify their goods or services and distinguish them from those of no n-members. When geographical 
indications are registered as a collective mark indicating regional origin, the geographical term 
should be renounced, unless it can be shown that the term has acquired distinctive character. If 
geographical indications are reg istered as trademarks, the geographical term must not be 
misleading; and the applicant must demonstrate that that term has acquired a distinctive character 
or relinquish the exclusive right to use it. Under U .S. trademark law, geographical terms or signs 
cannot be registered as trademarks unless, through substantially exclusive use, consumers associate 
the product with a particular geographic source.  
 
QUESTION 6:  How do you apply the protection of foreign geographical indications under the  
common law , without them having to register?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 206 - 
 
  RESPONSE 6:  Registration at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is not required in order for a 
GI to be protected in the United  States . Protections of rights under the common law are acquired by 
virtue of use of the GI in commerce. The extent of rights in an unregis tered GI extend only to the 
geographic areas where the GI is actually used. Trademark rights in a GI acquired through 
substantially exclusive use for a significant period of time are also recognized. Rights as a 
certification mark of regional origin may be  established for an unregistered GI.  
 
Page  225, Para graph  3.397  
 
The National Defense Appropriations Law for fiscal year  202, article  1281, created a constantly 
updated list of individuals and organizations that have a history of intellectual property thef t, 
technology transfer violations, and cyber espionage, or that pose a serious risk for improper 
technology transfer. The list includes individuals and organizations operating under the direction of 
a foreign military or intelligence agency.  
 
QUESTION 7:  Is the list public or private?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The list is not public.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Does it include people and organizations abroad?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The list includes organizations abroad.  
 
Page  304, Para graph  4.229  
 
By virtue of Executive  Order  13913 establishing a Committee for the Evaluation of Foreign 
Participation in the Telecommunications Services Sector of the United  States , of 4 April 2020, the 
establishment of such Committee was formalized, which assists the FCC in its public interest review 
of national security and law enforcement concerns raised by foreign involvement in the U .S. 
telecommunications services industry. The Committee, upon referral by the FCC, has 120  days to 
review certain types of applications, which may be extended by 90  days if secondary review is 
required. The Committee can respond to the FCC that it does not object to an application, 
recommend approving it if mitigation measures are taken, or denying it, or modifying or revoking a 
license, among other things. In September  2020, the FCC adopted a second Report and Order that 
provides new rules and procedures to formalize the Committee's review process, in particular by 
defining the scope of the review and establishing categories of information to be submitted by 
participants. This examination differs from that carried out by CFIUS in that it focuses on the 
exploitation activities provided for in the licences; some transactions may result in a review by both 
agencies. The FCC has revoked, pursuant to the procedure provided prior  to the publication of 
Executive  Order  13913, the licenses of four public wireless service providers in the period under 
review.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Can the United  States  please provide a broad outline of the new rules and procedures 
that determine the categories  of information companies must submit to the Committee for the 
Evaluation of Foreign Participation in the Telecommunications Service Sector of the States States 
for its due evaluation?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The two FCC Report and Orders cited provide this informati on: 
 
• FCC, Report and Order in the Matter of Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of 
Certain FCC 
Applications  and Petitions  Involving  Foreign  Ownership,  https://docs.fcc.gov/publ ic/attac
hments/FCC -20-133A1.pdf ; 
• FCC, Second  Report  and Order,  issued  in September  2021:  https://docs.fcc.gov/public/a
ttachments/FCC -21-104A1.pdf . 
 
Page  332 and 333, Para graph s 4.309 -4.313  
 
4.309. The United  States  maintains federal and state measures covering various aspects of 
electronic commerce. The purpose of US law is to provide online consumers with levels of protection 
similar to those enjoyed by in -person consumers with respect to the use of their personal 
information, advertising, intellectual property, cybercrime, taxation, and expression. online.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 207 - 
 
  4.310. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) purview of unfair and deceptive business practices 
covers various aspects of ele ctronic transactions, including online advertising, mobile or app 
payments, refund requests of online medical expenses and consumer privacy. For e -commerce 
activities, in 2020 and 2021, the FTC applied 24  enforcement actions related to alleged unfair or 
deceptive practices affecting privacy and data security. The Online Buyers Confidence Restoration 
Act (PL  111-345) prohibits the use of certain opt -out features online358 unless sellers provide 
relevant information, obtain appropriate consent, and provide ea sy means to terminate to recurring 
charges. The FTC also takes action to stop deceptive advertising online based on the regulations 
governing conventional advertising. Commercial email messages, and not only those consisting of 
mass mailings, must comply w ith the provisions of the CAN -SPAM Law359, in particular those related 
to the inclusion of a rejection option; infringements may be subject to a sanction of a maximum 
amount of USD  46,517 for each infringing email message.  
 
4.311. The Electronic Signatures in Global and Domestic Commerce Act of 2000 (PL  106-229) 
provides that, in general terms, legal effect cannot be denied to an electronic signature, contract, or 
other document for the sole reason that its format is electronic. The Uniform Electr onic Transactions 
Act harmonized state laws in this area, establishing a model law that states may adopt.361 The 
Internet Tax Exemption Act (PL  105-277) prohibits the application state and local taxes on Internet 
access and multiple and discriminatory taxe s on electronic commerce; that prohibition has been 
extended indefinitely under the Trade Facilitation and Trade Standards Enforcement Act 
(PL 114-125). However, when it comes to online sales tax, states can require online sellers to apply 
sales tax regard less of whether or not there is a physical presence in the state362; Whether small 
sales are exempt from registration for sales tax purposes depends on economic thresholds, which 
vary substantially from state to state.  
 
4.312. Section  230 of the Communicat ions Decency Act of 1996 (47  USC 230) grants users and 
providers of interactive computer services, including certain online platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter, immunity from liability based on third -party content and provides for the removal of content  
in certain circumstances.363 Section  512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (PL  105-304) 
protects online service providers from financial liability and limits other forms of liability for copyright 
infringement  - through so -called safeguard clauses  - in exchange for cooperating with copyright 
holders to promptly remove infringing content if online service providers meet certain conditions.  
 
4.313. In the United  States , there is no general federal regulation on consumer privacy and data 
protection; how ever, there are federal laws relating to specific sectors. For example, HIPAA (PL  104 
191) requires covered entities and their business associates to maintain the confidentiality of 
personal health information they collect or process. HIPAA prohibits the s ale of personal health 
information by a covered entity or business associate without the prior written consent of the patient. 
Under the Gramm -Leach -Bliley Act (PL  106 102), financial institutions must inform customers of 
their privacy practices, maintain procedures to preserve customer financial information, and offer 
customers options to opt out if the institution shares client financial information with unaffiliated 
third parties. Additionally, several states, such as California and Virginia, have adopte d horizontal 
data protection laws.  
 
QUESTION 10:  Can the United  States  please clarify what is the territorial scope of the rules referred 
to in Paragraphs  4.309 to 4.313? That is, whether these rules apply only to U .S. e-commerce service 
providers, or whet her they also apply to foreign providers.  
 
RESPONSE 10:  We are not able to answer this succinctly, as the scope of any specific statute is 
determined by its text. In addition, it is not clear how we would respond for any particular measure, 
as it is unclear what is meant by the term "foreign providers" and, for  example, whether it applies 
to Mode 3 suppliers.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page 10, Para graph  3.3 
 
In addition, the United  States  has promoted the creation of innovative business tools to address 
issues that are important to workers . We are prioritizing labor issues in the EU -U.S. Council. Trade 
and Technology Forum (TTC), the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the U .S.-UK Dialogues 
on the Future of Atlantic Trade, the U .S.-Taiwan Initiative on the 21st Century Trade, and the 
U.S.-Kenya Strategic Partnership for Trade and Investment.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 208 - 
 
  QUESTION 11:  Could you provide examples of the business tools proposed under these agreements 
to support workers?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The specific proposals in each of these initiatives are still under development, 
however in each, we are prioritizing the significant role business plays in addressing issues important 
to workers.  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.7 
 
The traditional approach to climate and environmental issues in trade has been primarily to raise 
levels of environmental protection for U .S. trading partners. The United  State s will continue to work 
on it to strengthen and expand these commitments, but it also recognizes that this single approach 
will not lead to the full achievement of its climate goals. So they are embracing a new generation of 
trade policies that will more s trongly promote the decarbonisation needed to limit the global 
temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.  
 
QUESTION 12:  In addition to the Steel, Aluminum and Climate Change Agreement, what other 
next-generation trade measures will the United  States  be promoting to support the decarbonization 
of the economy?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The United  States  continues to promote mutually supportive trade and 
environmental policies and encourage high levels of environmental protection. It continues to 
prioritize actions  to address climate change, counter wildlife trafficking, and combat both illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing, as well as illegal logging and associated trade. Regarding future 
plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are  retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 13:  Could the United  States  please provide more detail on what do you anticipate the 
implications of the new generation of trade policies for investment, both inflows and outflows?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  We are not in a position to speculate about the implications for inward and outward 
investment.  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.8 
 
The Trade and Technology Council (TTC), launched during the U .S.-EU Summit in June  2021, held 
its inaugural meeting in September 2021. During that meeting, the co -chairs reaffirmed the TTC's 
commitment to expanding the transatlantic trade and investment relationship, fight the climate crisis 
and protect the environment. Under the U .S.-EU TTC Working Groups on Climate and Clean 
Technology and Global T rade Challenges, the United  States  will work with the EU to collaboratively 
advance transatlantic priorities for making address climate and environmental issues.  
 
QUESTION 14:  Could the United  States  provide more detail on the work agenda and priorities of  
the TTC's Climate and Clean Technology Working Group?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  For additional details, please refer to the May 16 U.S. -EU Joint Statement of the 
Trade  and Technology  Council,  Annex  II, available  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/up
loads/2022/05/TTC -US-text-Final-May-14.pdf . 
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.9 
 
In October  2021, the U .S. and the EU announced their commitment to negotiate the world's first 
emiss ions-based steel and aluminium  sector deal. The United  States  and the EU are working together 
to correct the carbon intensity of steel and aluminium  sold in their markets, as well as in countries 
that adopt non -trade practices that contribute to oversupply around the world. The agreement will 
boost investments in green steel and aluminium  production in the United  States , Europe and around 
the world, w hich will reduce emissions in two of the most carbon -intensive industrial sectors.  
 
QUESTION 15:  What kind of trade measures are being discussed within the framework of this 
agreement to favor exports of products with low climate intensity?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 209 - 
 
  RESPONSE 15:  Options for a potential Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are 
being discussed. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 16:  What kind of measures are being  discussed within the framework of this agreement 
to encourage investment in sustainable steel and aluminium  production?  
 
RESPONSE 16: Options for a potential Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are 
being discussed. Regarding future plans , the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 17:  What is the scope of the agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Options for a potential Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are 
being discussed. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 18:  How would it apply to third c ountries and for what type of products?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  Options for a potential Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are 
being discussed. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective e xercises.  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.11 
 
The United  States  continues to encourage like -minded trading partners to work with it to address 
the emissions intensity of steel and aluminium  production and non -trade excess capacity in the steel 
and aluminium  sectors. For example, the United  States  intends to take advantage of the 
opportunities off ered by regional collaborations to maintain and improve the environmental 
protection of its trading partners and raise the level of climate ambition, including decarbonizing 
their respective economies. The United  States  will seek to leverage and mobilize t he technologies, 
private and public investment, and technical resources necessary to expand clean energy 
infrastructure and facilitate trade in climate -friendly goods, services, and technologies, while 
creating jobs of high quality that drive economic grow th and help meet the commitments of the Paris 
Agreement.  
 
QUESTION 19:  Costa  Rica shares with the United  States  the objective of ensuring that trade and 
investment promote the use of technologies to decarbonize the economy. This is why Costa  Rica 
promotes trade agreements that facilitate the trade of goods and services associated with the 
decarbonization of the economy, such as the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability 
(ACCTS). What is the position of the United  States  on potential negotiati ons to liberalize trade in this 
type of goods and services within the framework of the WTO through multi or plurilateral 
agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The United  States  is actively participating in the WTO Trade and Environmental 
Sustainability Structured Disc ussions, which include considerations for strategies to promote and 
facilitate trade in environmental goods and services to meet environmental and climate goals. The 
United  States  notes that trade liberalization has played a role in the diffusion of goods,  however 
there are other non -tariff measures that may yield positive outcomes for encouraging the uptake of 
environmentally friendly goods.  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.12 
 
In addition, in June  2022, the United  States  joined other WTO  Members in agreeing to the first 
multilateral trade agreement with the environment at its core: the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries 
Subsidies. This Agreement prohibits subsidies to those who engage in illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing or fishing -related activities in support of IUU fishing, subsidies to fishing 
of overexploited stocks, and subsidies to fishing in unregulated areas of the high seas. It also 
includes enhanced transparency provisions, which will provide important additional information on 
Members' fisheri es programs and subsidies. Negotiations will continue with the aim of reaching an 
agreement on additional disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. The 
United  States  is determined to work with all WTO  Members to bring this A greement into force without WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 210 - 
 
  delay and to further strengthen disciplines in ways that improve the sustainability of fishery 
resources and the lives of fishermen.  
 
QUESTION 20:  What is the position of the United  States  on advancing along this same line withi n 
the framework of the WTO, considering multilateral agreements that include other types of subsidies 
with a negative impact on the environment, such as subsidies for fossil fuels, among others?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  The United  States  recognizes the role of the SC M Agreement  in disciplining 
subsidies. Any future negotiation on subsidy disciplines would need to be carefully considered.  
 
Page  12, Para graph  13.13  
 
The United  States  also tries to protect the oceans and marine resources, as well as the people whose 
livelihoods depend on them, from harm caused by plastic pollution. In 2022, the United  States  
supported the initiation of multilateral negotiations for an international agr eement on plastic 
pollution. The United  States  recognizes the critical role that trade plays both in contributing to the 
problem of plastic pollution in the environment, including the marine environment, and in its 
potential to be an important part of the solution.  
 
QUESTION 21:  What specific domestic and regional trade measures is the United  States  promoting 
to address the problem of marine plastic pollution?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  For the first time in a U.S. trade agreement, the United  States -Mexico -Canada 
Agreem ent (USMCA) includes a provision to address marine litter (Article  24.12). Additionally, the 
Save Our Seas Act 2.0 seeks to strengthen U.S. domestic marine debris response capabilities, 
enhance global engagement to combat marine debris, including through i nternational cooperation 
and outreach by federal agencies to other countries, and improve U.S. waste management and 
recycling infrastructure to help prevent plastic litter from entering the environment. The 
United  States  also is actively engaged in negotia tions together with representatives from over 
150 countries to develop a global agreement on plastic pollution.  
 
Page  23, Para graph  5.28 
 
Since 2018, the United  States  has increasingly turned to trade policy to address forced labor around 
the world, including in global supply chains. Many of the trade agreements to which the United  States  
is a party include provisions that require the parties to adopt, maintain, and enf orce legal provisions 
on the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor. In addition, the USMCA, which entered 
into force in July  2020, includes an innovative provision that obliges the three countries to prohibit 
the importation of goods produ ced in whole or in part through forced labor.  
 
QUESTION 22:  Could you provide more detail on the implementation of this measure to prohibit 
the importation of goods produced from forced labor?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  Section  307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19  U.S.C.  §1307) prohibits importing any 
product that was mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by forced labor, including 
forced or indentured child labor. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforces the prohibition.  
For more information on how C BP enforces 19  U.S.C.  §1307, please see: 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/ 2022-Jan/Slicksheet_Forced%20Labor_
How%20does%20CBP%20enforce%20508%20Compliant_0.pdf . 
 
Page  23, Para graph  5.31 
 
In January  2022, the United  States  announced that it would develop its first commercial strategy 
focused on combating forced labor. The development of this strategy provides for a comprehensive 
inter-agency review of existing trade policies and tools used to combat forced labor (including child 
labor) in order to identify aspects that may need to be strengthened and gaps that need to be filled. 
The United  States  will use this analysis to establish goals, priorities, new tools, and key actions to 
advance its anti -forced labor goals.  
 
QUESTIO N 23:  Could you provide more information about this strategy and when it would be 
finalized?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 211 - 
 
  RESPONSE 23:  The United  States  is in the process of developing its focused trade strategy to 
combat forced labor. The strategy will lay out the U.S. Government's trade approach to addressing 
forced labor in global supply chains. The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  30, Para graph  5.76 
 
The United  States  continued to work under the Trade and Investment Arrange ment to further 
strengthen economic ties with ASEAN, the United  States ' fourth largest trading partner. In the 
annual consultations held in September  2021 by the ASEAN and USTR Economic Ministers, both 
sides agreed to enhance cooperation on labour, environ ment and SMEs. The United  States  also 
continues to cooperate with ASEAN in areas such as digital trade, intellectual property, standards, 
competition, trade facilitation, and agricultural biotechnology.  
 
QUESTION 24:  Could the United  States  please provide more detail on the cooperative actions that 
are anticipated in terms of investment in the framework of this agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  Under the U.S. -ASEAN TIFA, the cooperative activities may include dialogues, 
workshops, capacity building, and best practice exchanges to support an open and predictable 
environment for trade and investment that facilitates sustainable, equitable, and inclusive economic 
growth. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  43-44, Para graph  8.3 
 
In addition, the United  States  has continued to prioritize compliance with the FTAs currently in force. 
In particular, the United  States  continued to actively monitor and enforce the U .S.-Peru Trade 
Promotion Agreement (PTPA) and its landmark Forestry Annex. Following a verification process in 
2018, the United  States  took action in July  2019 and subsequently in October  2020 to block future 
imports of timber from a Peruvian exporter whose supply chain had been observed to contain illegally 
harvested wood. In addition, the United  States  and Peru held regular bilateral discussions on 
compliance with the obligations under the Environmental Chapter and the Forestry Annex  of the 
Agreement, and in particular on the secretariat for submission of requests on compliance matters 
(secretariat) envisaged in article 18.8 of the Agreement. In September  2021, the United  States  and 
Peru began a process to elect a new Executive Director of the Secretariat. The new Execut ive Director 
was appointed in December  2021 and will serve a two -year term beginning in early 2022. The 
United  States  continued to work closely with Peru to combat illegal logging and improve governance 
of the forestry sector. Keeping illegal timber out of supply chains is a top priority, as illegal logging 
harms the global environment and the natural resources we all de pend on and creates unfair 
conditions for American workers and businesses.  
 
QUESTION 25:  Could the United  States  provide a detailed description of the mechanism through 
which certain imported timber is determined to have the presence of illegal harvesting in its supply 
chain?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  The referenced paragraph concerns actions taken pursuant to the 
United  States  - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement's (PTPA) Annex on Forest Sector Governance 
(Forest Annex). In 2016, the Interagency Committee on Trade in Timb er Products from Peru (Timber 
Committee) requested that the Government of Peru verify whether a specific timber shipment 
exported from Peru to the United  States  complied with Peruvian laws, regulations, and other 
measures governing the harvest of and trade  in timber products. The timber verification process 
was conducted by the Government of Peru and revealed that timber products contained in a 
shipment from a Peruvian exporter were not harvested and traded in compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations . 
 
QUESTION 26:  Who carries out the process?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  Further information concerning the timber verification process in the referenced 
paragraph and the PTPA Forest Annex is available at: https://u str.gov/peru -tpa/environment . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 212 - 
 
  Page  44, Para graph  8.4 
 
On 1 October  2021, the United  States  and Viet  Nam signed an agreement addressing U .S. concerns 
raised in the Section  301 investigation into Viet  Nam's timber exports, initiated in October  2020. 
This is the first investigation under to article  301 which addresses environmental concerns. The 
Agreement secured commitments that will help keep illegally harvested or traded timber out of 
supply chains and protect the environment and natural resources. The USTR determined that the 
Agreement provided a satisfactory resolution of the matter under investigation and therefore no 
trade action was appropriate at that time. The USTR is monitoring Viet  Nam's implementation of the 
Agreement. Pursuant to the Agree ment, bilateral discussions on this issue are continuing through 
the Timber Working Group established under the U .S.-Viet Nam Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement. This Working Group, which was created to facilitate coordination between the parties 
and monitor the implementation of the Agreement, met for the first time in April 2022.  
 
QUESTION 27:  Could the United  States  elaborate on the content and scope of the investigation on 
timber exports from Viet  Nam in light of Article  301? 
 
RESPONSE 27:  Please refer to the section, Viet Nam's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to the 
Import and Use of Illegal Timber in the President's  2022 Trade Policy Agenda , available at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20An
nual%20Report%20(1).pdf .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  48, Para graph  2.13 
 
2.13. For the current Administration, equity and inclusion are among its top policy priorities, which 
will influence future U .S. trade and investment policy as well. Thanks to a series of presidential 
directives and initiatives relating to a "common effort at all levels of government" to advance race 
and gender equity, equality and justice, many concrete measures are already being implemented 
and new ones have been included in the President 's FY 2022 budget. To help develop inclusive, 
worker -focused trade and trade policy, the USTR Office requested the USITC to investigate the 
potential distributional effects of trade policy and tr ade in goods and services in American workers 
by skill level, wage and salary, gender, race/ethnicity, age, and income level, especially how they 
affect underserved and underrepresented communities. In the October  2021 letter requesting the 
USITC to conduc t this two -part investigation, the USTR Office noted the Administration's equity 
initiatives and congressional calls for US trade policy to America had a positive and equitable effect 
on underserved and marginalized communities.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Can the Govern ment of the United  States  mention some of the results obtained 
regarding the measures applied aimed at improving equity and inclusion, through trade and 
investment policy?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  In response to the USTR request, the USITC has published a detailed rep ort, 
which  is publicly  available  on the ITC website  at: https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5374
.pdf. In reviewing the results of the investigation, the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre sentative is 
meeting with key domestic communities, including civil, human, and labor rights advocates, hosts 
annual Tribal consultation meetings, and exploring how to develop meaningful equity and gender 
provisions in new engagements with trading partners  to inform the development of substantive 
equity and gender provisions in new engagements with trading partners.  
 
Page  49, Para graph  2.14 
 
2.14. In January  2021, the Administration launched its U.S. Purchase Promotion Policies Initiative 
through an Executi ve Order outlining a government -wide proposal to use public procurement as one 
of the methods to strengthen the U .S. manufacturing sector. It provides for a series of measures, 
among them, the examination of institutional actions that are incompatible with the policies of the 
Administration, the update of the process of exemption of the provisions "Made in America" (mad e 
in the United  States ) and promoting transparency in federal contracting. Subsequently, in 
April 2021, the "Made in America" Office was established, under the Office of Management and 
Budget, to centrally, strategically, and comprehensively manage sourcin g activities in the country 
for federal contracting. Following these initiatives, a new proposed rule was announced in July  2021 
that would introduce the most significant changes to the Buying America Act in many years. One of 
the largest proposed changes would immediately raise the domestic content threshold from 55% to 
60%, and then gradually increase it to 75% ( Section  3.3.6). Procurement covered by the 
WTO Agreement  on Government Procurement (GPA) continues to be exempt from these 
requirements.  
 
QUESTIO N 2: Can you detail some of the results achieved through the "Made in America" initiative?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Section  70934 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) requires the 
Secretary of Commerce, the United  States  Trade Representative, and the D irector of the Office of 
Management and Budget to assess the impacts in a publicly available report of all United  States  free 
trade agreements (FTAs) and the World  Trade  Organization Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA) on the operation of Buy America n laws, including their impacts on the implementation of 
domestic procurement preferences. This report is expected to be released in early 2023 and will be 
made publicly available.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Has it been an initiative taken advantage of by American produ cers? 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 3:  Please see response to Question  2 above. Buy American laws are based on the 
principle that the purchasing power of the U.S. federal government can be leveraged to provide 
benefits beyond the direct economic benefits to domestic firms.  
 
Page  243, Para graph  4.48 
 
4.48. The commercial damage mitigation package announced in July  2018 to help farmers facing 
difficulties as a result of foreign retaliation measures consisted of three main elements: a Market 
Facilitation Program (MFP) under whic h payments were made to eligible producers to offset part of 
the increased costs resulting from the delay in marketing; a Food Purchase and Distribution Program 
(FPDP) for the purchase and distribution of basic products at the national level within the fra mework 
of nutritional assistance programs; and an Agricultural Products Trade Promotion Program (ATP) 
aimed at developing alternative foreign markets. More details were published in September  2018, 
including the estimated initial payments by product.  
 
QUES TION 4:  Is an evaluation of the benefits obtained with this mitigation package available?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The United  States  is not aware of any such evaluation on the benefits obtained with 
this mitigation package.  
 
QUESTION 5 : Is it possible to check the effectiveness of the implementation of such a package?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  See the response to Question  4. 
 
Page  279, Para graph  4.154 
 
4,154. Since 2014, the United  States  has supported a National Manufacturing Innovation Network 
known as "Manufacturing USA" . The goal of this network, which brings together representatives from 
industry, academia, and federal agencies, is to ensure global leadership in the advanced 
manufacturing sector through large -scale collaboration between the public and private sectors on 
technology. , supply chains and workforce training. In addition to federal agencies and more than 
1,200  manufacturers, the network consists of 16 innovation centers in the manufacturing sector 
partially funded by the Federal Government. At the state level, there are several programs whose 
purpose is to attract investment to the manufacturing sector in all the states of the country.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Would it be possible to broadly know the main state incentive programs offered by 
the various States in this type o f network?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  We refer you to the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Technology, 
which maintains a Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) National Network with MEP centers in 
all 50  states and Puerto Rico. Please see: https://www.nist.gov/mep/mep -national -network . 
  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  ECUADOR  
THE SECRETARIAT'S REPORT (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
Pursuant to page 163, paragraph 3.230  
 
"…In addition to the thousands of voluntary consensus standards produced by standards 
organizations, consortia standards also help meet the needs of industry, especially in the technology 
fields, where it makes standards need to be developed more quickly to meet market needs" . 
 
Could the United  States tell us : 
 
QUESTION 1:  What and what are the consortium rules?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Consortia are groups of like -minded companies and other interested parties who 
gather together to produce specific standards of interest to the membership. Consortia rules, and 
the degree to which consortia meet criteria for consensus, openness, balance, due process, and 
transparency, vary among individual consortia.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Are the consortium standards voluntary or mandatory?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Standards developed by consortia are generally developed as voluntary standards. 
Participation in their development is optional and the resulting standards are generally intended for 
voluntary use. However, any documentary standard – including those developed by consortia – may 
be referenced in government regulations, effectively making them "mandatory" standards, if the 
standard is found to be suitable for the regulatory purpose. U.S. government guidance to regulatory 
agencies provides a strong preference for the use of voluntary consensus st andards (VCS) in 
government regulation. These standards are developed through procedures that ensure an inclusive, 
balanced, and transparent process. As described in response to Question  3, below, some standards 
developed by consortia may meet the definiti on for a VCS. For more information on the use of VCS 
by U.S. government  agencies,  please  see Circular  A-119, available  at: https://www.whitehouse.go
v/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/revised_circular_a -119_as_of_1_22.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 3:  What is the difference between voluntary consensual norms and consortium norms?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  As discussed in Question  1, the procedures by which consortia develop standards 
vary widely. Some standards developed by consortia may meet the definition for a voluntary 
consensus standard (VCS) provided in Circular A -119. According to that definition, VCS, among other 
criteria, must be developed by a body that plans, develops, establi shes, or coordinates VCS using a 
process that includes the following attributes or elements:  
 
• (i) Openness: The procedures or processes used are open to interested parties. Such 
parties are provided meaningful opportunities to participate in standards deve lopment on 
a non -discriminatory basis. The procedures or processes for participating in standards 
development and for developing the standard are transparent;  
• (ii) Balance: The standards development process should be balanced. Specifically, there 
should be  meaningful involvement from a broad range of parties, with no single interest 
dominating the decision -making;  
• (iii) Due process: Due process shall include documented and publicly available policies and 
procedures, adequate notice of meetings and standards  development, sufficient time to 
review drafts and prepare views and objections, access to views and objections of other 
participants, and a fair and impartial process for resolving conflicting views;  
• (iv) Appeals process: An appeals process shall be avail able for the impartial handling of 
procedural appeals;  
• (v) Consensus: Consensus is defined as general agreement, but not necessarily 
unanimity. During the development of consensus, comments and objections are 
considered using fair, impartial, open, and tra nsparent processes.  
 
For more information  on the definition  of VCS, please  see Circular  A-119, available  at: https://ww
w.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/u ploads/2020/07/revised_circular_a -119_as_of_1_22.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 4:  Is there another type of norms besides the voluntary consensual and the consortium 
ones?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  As discussed in the response to Question  3, there is not a clear distinction between 
voluntary consensus standards (VCS), which refers to standards meeting certain criteria, and 
standards developed by consortia, which refers to a wide variety of standards setting organizations.  
In addition to VCS, Circular A -119 also defines and describes co nditions for the use of government 
unique standards (GUS). For more information on the use of GUS, please see Circular A -119, 
available at:  https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2020/07/revised_circular_a -
119_as_of_1_22.pdf   
 
Pursuant to page 163, paragraph 3.231  
 
"In the  United  States, technical regulations may be set at the federal or sub -federal level, and are 
largely based on voluntary consensus standards developed by the private sector, which, by 
reference, pass to be mandatory... " 
 
Could the United  States explain to us:  
 
QUESTION 5:  What does it mean that voluntary consensual norms become binding by reference?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  Voluntary consensus standards may become mandatory, or binding by reference, if 
they are included or referenced by a government entity in a regulation.  
 
QUESTION 6:  What is the basis for determining whether a technical regulation is established  at the 
federal or sub -federal level?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  In general, federal or state agencies may propose to regulate products or processes 
within the scope of their authorities, as delegated respectively by the U.S. Congress or the relevant 
state legislature. Delegating authorities, however, must conform to principles of federalism 
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, which enumerate certain federal powers, concurrent powers, and 
powers reserved to the states. Where both federal and state agencies exercise concu rrent powers, 
the U.S. Constitution requires that state laws must not interfere with the federal government's 
legitimate exercise of its constitutional authorities.  
 
Pursuant to page 164, paragraph 3.233  
 
QUESTION 7:  Does the  United  States have a website t o access the document that contains the 
evaluation and comparison of the benefits and costs that the organizations develop before issuing a 
technical regulation?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  In general, U.S. agencies are required to consider and publish the costs and bene fits 
of a significant  regulatory  action.  See EO 12866,  available  at: 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf . The agency's proposed rule, final rule, 
and regulatory  analysis is published in the Federal Register, available online at: 
https://www.federalregister.gov/ . In addition, many Federal agencies provide information on 
rulemaking actions via Regulations.gov ( https://www.regulations.gov/ ). This site is a source for 
information on the development of Federal regulations from the proposed to final rule stages, and 
other related documents issued by the U .S. government. Through this site, interested persons can 
find, read, and comment on regulatory issues. Besides proposed and final regulations, 
Regulations.gov provides access to certain notices, scientific and technical findings, guidance, 
adjudications, and comments submitted by interested persons. See: 
https://www.regulations.gov/faq  and https://www.regulations.gov/faq?type=site  for further 
informati on. 
 
Pursuant to page 194, paragraph 3.318  
 
"In addition to any applicable tariffs, pursuant to title III of PL 111 -347, a federal excise tax of 2% 
is applied to public purchases of goods and services from foreign persons, arranged on 
2 January  2011 or on a later date (article 52.229 -12 of the FAR)…".  
 
Could the United  States explain to us:  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 8:  How is the 2% federal consumption tax applied to public purchases of goods and 
services from foreigners?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  In general, U.S. law imposes, for any f oreign contracting party, a tax equal to 2% of 
the amount of a specified Federal procurement payment. The tax is exempted in certain cases, 
including for payments made pursuant to a contract to the extent the payment is for covered goods 
manufactured or pr oduced or services provided in a country that is a party to the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA), or to any free trade agreement to which the  United  States is a 
party that includes government procurement obligations.  For additional information reg arding 
exemptions, please refer to 26  CFR 1.5000C -1(d). For more information on the procedures 
necessary to eliminate the withholding by an acquiring agency, please refer to 26 CFR 1.5000C -2(d). 
 
QUESTION 9:  How is this measure implemented in accordance wi th the commitments acquired in 
Article  IV of the Plurilateral Agreement on Public Procurement on General Principles – 
Non-discrimination -, and the regional trade agreements that the  United  States has signed?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Please see response to Question  8. 
 
In accordance with page 196, paragraph 3.323  
 
"The purpose of the WOSB Program is to help increase the participation of women in federal public 
procurement up to 5% of the total..."  
 
QUESTION 10:  Could the  United  States provide information on whether this objective is exclusively 
for women of United  States nationality or not, based on the commitments acquired in the Plurilateral 
Agreement on Public Procurement (Art.  IV of the General Principles - Non-discrimination) and the 
regional trade agreements that maintain signed the  United  States?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  U.S. law defines a business concern eligible for assistance from SBA as a small 
business organized for profit, with a place of business located in th e United  States, and which 
operates primarily within the  United  States or which makes a significant contribution to the U.S. 
economy through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials or labor. 13 CFR 121.105. 
In addition, to qualify as a WOSB, a small business concern must be not less than 51% 
unconditionally and directly owned and controlled by one or more women who are United  States 
citizens. 13 CFR 127.200. The women owned small business program is implemented in line with 
existing U.S. trade agreement obligations. See, e.g. WTO GPA, U.S. Schedul e, Annex  7, note 1 
(exempting preferences for small or minority owned businesses), available at: https://e -
gpa.wto.org/en/Annex/Details?A greement=GPA113&Party=UnitedStates&AnnexNo=7&ContentCult
ure=en .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  EL SALVADOR  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
2.3 Commercial agreements and arrangements  
 
In Paragraph  2.3.2.2 on unilateral preferences, the Generalized System of Preferences ( GSP) is 
cited, targeting a large number of developing countries and least -developed countries around the 
world.  
 
QUESTION 1:  In that sense, please confirm if the GSP expired on 31 December  2020 or if it 
continues to apply?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The GSP program expired on 31 December  2020.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Are there plans to renew the aforementioned program?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The U.S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GSP and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program. There are different bills that 
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. However, there is no one 
agreed -upon bill at this time.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Which countries would continue to benefit from that program?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  After the program is reauthorized, and we have seen the text of the final bill, we will 
analyze its applicability.  
 
Item  3.1.3 Tariffs, 3.1.3.1 Nomenclature and HTSUS changes, Paragraph  3.39 
 
 
 
QUESTION  4: Could the United  States  elaborate on the main products affected by the high number 
of changes to the HTSUS during the review period?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  As noted in the Secretariat Report, many of the changes to the HTSUS during the 
review period were a result of changes made to implem ent Section  232 and Section  301 measures. 
Section  232 measures cover steel and aluminum products. Section  301 measures cover a very wide 
range of goods across nearly all sectors.  
 
"3.331. The U .S. Administration continues to prioritize the proper and effec tive enforcement and 
protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in its trade policy, as reflected in the 2021 
Section  301 Report special.479 A stated priority of the current Administration is to craft trade policy 
WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 219 - 
 
  that serves American workers, inclu ding those in innovation -driven export industries.  The 
Administration addresses, by identifying the opportunities and challenges faced by the innovative 
and creative industries in the United  States in foreign markets, to promote job creation, economic 
development, and other benefits that come from effective intellectual property protection and 
enforcement, and given the importance of innovation and intellectual property to make the 
necessary progress to combat the a With the current COVID -19 crisis, the Adm inistration is 
determined to pursue trade policies that ensure preparedness for the next pandemic. Combating 
piracy and counterfeiting and promoting market access for U .S. intellectual property in sectors 
ranging from high -tech to basic industries are also  policy objectives.480 "  
 
QUESTION 5:  Which government entity is responsible for developing those trade policies in 
preparation for the next pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has primary responsibility for developing 
and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade policy, with the advice of the U.S. Trade Policy 
Staff Committee.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Are there guidelines for the development of these policies?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  See Chapter  II.E. Combatting the COVID -19 Pandemic in the President's 2022 Trade 
Policy Agenda and Chapter  III.E. Intellectual Property in the 2021 Annual Report of the 
President  of the United  States  on the Trade  Agreements  Program,  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/defaul
t/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures  
 
QUESTION 7:  Paragraph  3.73 mentions that the USDOC's International Trade Administration (ITA) 
together with the United  States  International Trade Commission (USITC) are responsible for 
conducting antidumping and countervailing duty investigations; as well as, the five -year reviews 
(due to extinction) under Title  VII of the Tariff Law of 1938, without specifying the reviews due to 
changes in circumstances of Article  11.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Article  VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs Customs and Commerce  of 1994, what is the competent authority or 
authorities for this type of examination?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Changed circumstance reviews can be conducted by both the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission, depending on the alleged changed 
circumstance.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Paragraph  3.75 requires that a statement be submitted together with the 
investigation request indicating whether the applicant has requested other forms of aid to alleviate 
the effects of imports with respect to the same merchandise. What other forms of support might 
producers consider based on U .S. law? 
 
RESPONSE 8:  Generally, the most relevant forms of trade relief in this context are antidumping 
and countervailing duties and safeguards.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Paragraph  3.77 menti ons the possibility of alleging critical circumstances during the 
processing of an investigation. What are those critical circumstances that can be alleged, could the 
related regulations indicate?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Critical circumstances allegations are case-specific and depend on the facts and 
circumstances specific to a segment of a proceeding.  Determinations regarding changed 
circumstances allegations are governed by U.S. law at 19  U.S.C.  1675(b) and 19  CFR 351.221(c)(3).  
Details of changed circumstanc es review determinations can generally be found on the U.S. 
Department of Commerce's website at https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 10:  In relation to sunset reviews, Paragraph  3.92 states the power of the USITC to 
decide whether to conduct a full or expedited five -year review, what are the criteria that the USITC 
takes into account in deciding to conduct a full review? Or an accelerated o ne? 
 
RESPONSE 10:  Details of the USITC's determinations whether to conduct full or expedited sunset 
reviews can be found at http://www.usitc.gov . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 11 : Paragraph  3.107 mentions that EAPA promotes cooperation with  foreign countries 
to prevent circumvention of trade remedy laws, by negotiating and concluding bilateral agreements 
with customs or other competent authorities.  
Currently, which bilateral agreements have been signed and which are in force?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The list of countries with which the United  States  has Customs Mutual Assistance 
Agreements can be found at: https://www.cbp.gov/border -security/inte rnational -
initiatives/international -agreements/cmaa . 
 
QUESTION 12:  "3.333. Led by the USTR, The United  States  uses various mechanisms and channels 
at the bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral levels to resolve intellectual property protection and 
enforcement issues with its trading partners. In this regard, it seeks to include binding IPR -related 
commitments in bilateral or plurilateral FTAs, bilateral agreements and memorandums of 
understanding, bilateral investment treaties, and trade and investment framework agreements The 
United  States  also seeks to make intellectual property protection standards working i n this endeavor 
with countries wishing to join the WTO . Other instruments that the United  States  has used for the 
protection and enforcement of IPRs are annual reviews and reports under "Special Section  301" (see 
below). ) and dialogue on intellectual prope rty with trading partners; the lo development of 
multilateral commitments on issues related to intellectual property in the WTO, WIPO, APEC and 
other organizations; the application of a commercial policy of support to the American innovations; 
and the prov ision of inter -agency leadership in the area of trade policy. 488" . 
What are the guidelines or the work plan of the commercial policy to support innovations? (The 
query is made, because the information in the footer link turns out to be very general) . 
 
RESPONSE 12:  The United  States  works to protect American innovation in foreign markets 
employing all the tools of U.S. trade policy, including the annual Special  301 Report.  
 
3.3.6 Public procurement  
 
QUESTION 13:  Paragraph  3.286 indicates that U .S. purchase legislation includes laws that require 
a domestic preference for shipping and that grant exemptions to products made in the United  States  
under the "Made in America" policy. What is the "Made in America" principle?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The principle beh ind "Made in America" is that when the federal government spends 
American taxpayers' dollars, it should support American workers and businesses. The Federal 
government is a major buyer in a number of markets for goods and services, including the single 
largest purchaser of consumer goods in the world. Leveraging that purchasing power to shape 
markets and accelerate innovation is a key part of the Administration's strategy to grow the 
industries of the future to support U.S. workers, communities, and firms. As the pandemic has 
demonstrated, federal procurement can strengthen the resiliency of domestic supply chains, and 
reduce the risk of Americans being adversely impacted by the actions of competitor nations during 
a time of crisis. For more information, ple ase see the Fact Sheet on the Proposed Buy American rule, 
available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -releases/2021/07/28/fact -
sheet -biden -harris -administration -issues -proposed -buy-american -rule-advancing -the-presidents -
commitment -to-ensuring -the-future -of-america -is-made -in-america -by-all-of-americas/ . 
 
QUESTION 14:  How are the preemptions granted under the "Buy America" or "Buy American" 
orders reconciled with the principles set forth in the public procurement commitmen ts under the 
Trade Agreements signed by the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 14:  A key feature of Buy American policies is that, in acquisitions covered by the 
WTO Agreement  on Government Procurement (GPA), Free Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade 
Act, the U.S.  Trade Representative has waived the Buy American statute and other discriminatory 
provisions for eligible products. These waiver designations granted under the Trade Agreements Act 
(TAA) are reflected in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Offers o f eligible products 
receive  equal  consideration  with domestic  offers.  See FAR 25.402,  available  at: https://www.acqui
sition.gov/far/25.402 . 
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
 
QUESTION 15: Paragraph 3.340, How does provisional patent filing equate US applicants with 
foreign applicants? Who can file a provisional patent application?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 15:  One of the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (effective as of 
8 June 1995), is the establishment of a domestic priority system. The Act provides a mechanism to 
enable domestic applicants to quickly and inexpensively file provisional applications. Under the 
provisions of 35  U.S.C.  119(e), applicants are entitled to claim the  benefit of priority in a given 
application in the United  States . The domestic priority period will not count in the measurement of 
the 20 -year patent term. See 35  U.S.C.  154(a)(3). Thus, domestic applicants are placed on equal 
footing  with foreign  applica nts with respect  to the patent  term.  See: https://www.uspto.gov/web/o
ffices/pac/mpep/s201.html#ch200_d1ff6d_23490_24a . 
 
QUESTION 16:  Paragraph  3,372, the menti oned economic espionage can be penalized in the case 
of organizations with up to 10  million  or triple the value of the trade secret. What methods are used 
to value the amount of this intangible to impose the penalty of penalty fee?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  In assessi ng the value of a trade secret, several factors are considered, including 
the cost to develop the trade secret, acquisition cost of the trade secret, or the fair market value if 
sold. The means to establish the economic value of the trade secret may includ e the competitive 
advantage for the owner in using the trade secret, the costs for an outsider to duplicate the trade 
secret, lost advantages to the trade secret owner resulting from disclosure to competitors, or 
statements by the defendant about the value  of the trade secret.  
 
QUESTION 17:  Paragraph  3,373, in relation to the seizure of materials that is permitted by the Law 
for the Defense of Trade Secrets, is there any type of security or guarantee that the holder of a right 
must provide to compensate the  alleged infringer in a given case? the immediate or irreparable 
damage for which the merchandise was confiscated is not verified?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  18 U.S.C.  (b)(2)(B)(vi) states that an order shall "require the person obtaining the 
order to provide the security determined adequate by the court for the payment of the damages 
that any person may be entitled to recover as a result of a wrongful or excessive seizure or excessive 
attempted seizure under this paragraph ". In addition, the Defend Trade Secrets A ct includes several 
provisions to ensure that the alleged infringer is not unduly harmed from an ex parte seizure order.  
Specifically, 18  U.S.C.  Section  1836, (b)(B)(ii)  states that an order shall "provide for the narrowest 
seizure of property necessary to  achieve the purpose of this paragraph" and "direct that the seizure 
be conducted in a manner that minimizes any interruption of the business operations of third parties, 
and, to the extent possible, does not interrupt the legitimate business operations of  the person 
accuses of misappropriating the trade secret ". 18 U.S.C. Section  1836, (b)(B)(iii)(II) states that an 
order be accompanied "protecting the seized property from disclosure by prohibiting access by the 
applicant or the person against whom the ord er is directed, and prohibiting any copies, in whole or 
in part, of the seized property, to prevent undue damage to the party against whom the order has 
issued or others, until such parties have an opportunity to be heard in court ". 
 
QUESTION 18:  Paragraph  3,399, within the framework of the examination of special Article  301, 
what criteria are taken into account to consider that the laws, policies or practices of a country in 
the field of Intellectual Property have an adverse effect on U .S. products and therefore to incorporate 
into a country on the "priority foreign country" list?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  Pursuant to Section  182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, and the Trade 
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (19  U.S.C.  § 2242), the Office of the United  States  
Trade Representative (USTR) is required to identify "those foreign countries that deny adequate and 
effective protection of intellectu al property rights, or deny fair and equitable market access to United 
States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection ". 
 
The United  States  Trade Representative shall only designate as Priority Foreign Countries those 
countries that have the  most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices and whose acts, 
policies, or practices have the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. 
products. Priority Foreign Countries are subject to an investigation under the Sectio n 301 provisions 
of the Trade Act of 1974. The United  States  Trade Representative may not designate a country as a 
Priority Foreign Country if it is entering into good faith negotiations or making significant progress 
in bilateral or multilateral negotiati ons to provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property (IP). The United  States  Trade Representative is required to decide whether to identify 
countries within 30  days after issuance of the annual National Trade Estimate Report . In additi on, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  USTR may identify a trading partner as a Priority Foreign Country or re -designate the trading partner 
whenever the available facts indicate that such action is appropriate.  
 
QUESTION 19:  Under what criteria will a country be included in the Priority Wa tch List or Watch 
List in matters of Intellectual Property?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  To aid in the administration of the statute, USTR created a Priority Watch List and 
Watch List under the Special  301 provisions. Placement of a trading partner on the Priority Watch 
List or Watch List indicates that particular problems exist in that country with respect to IP protection, 
enforcement, or market access for persons relying on IP rights.  
 
The Special  301 Report listings and actions are the result of intensive deliberation s among all 
relevant agencies within the U.S. Government, informed by extensive consultations with 
participating stakeholders, foreign governments, the U.S. Congress, and other interested parties.  
 
USTR, together with the Special  301 Subcommittee of the Tr ade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), 
conducts a broad and balanced assessment of U.S. trading partners' IP protection and enforcement, 
as well as related market access issues affecting IP -intensive industries, in accordance with the 
statutory criteria. The S pecial  301 Subcommittee, through the TPSC, provides advice on country 
placement to USTR based on this assessment. This assessment is conducted on a case -by-case 
basis, taking into account diverse factors such as a trading partner's level of development, its 
international obligations and commitments, the concerns of right holders and other interested 
parties, and the trade and investment policies of the United  States . It is informed by the various 
cross-cutting issues and trends identified in Section  I. Each assessment is based upon the specific 
facts and circumstances that shape IP protection and enforcement in a particular trading partner.  
 
Item 2 The Economic and Business Environment of the United  States  
2.8 Challenges facing the U .S. econom y and the world economy  
 
Paragraph 2.21  
 
 
 
QUESTION 20:  Given the increase in inflation, can the United  States  elaborate on the policies it is 
applying to combat this problem?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  For information on policies implemented by the Federal Reserve, please refer to 
the FOMC  statements,  minutes,  and other  materials  at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary
policy/fomccalendars.htm . 
 
WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Item  9 Trade of Small and Mediu m Enterprises  
 
Paragraph 9.5 and 9.6  
 
 
 
QUESTION 21:  Does the United  States  have among its trade objectives to broaden the recognition 
of the fundamental role played by SMEs from other regions with which it has current trade 
agreements, such as CAFTA -DR, through measures of dialogue, cooperation and assistance?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  SMEs  play a fundamental role for economies in the Western Hemisphere.  Existing 
FTAs such as the CAFTA -DR can help small businesses to enter and compete more easily in the 
regional marketplace by reducing trade barriers and creating a more stable and transparen t trading 
and investment environment.  These agreements can provide greater predictability to companies, 
reducing costs, saving time, and cutting red tape, which is especially important for small businesses 
with fewer resources to navigate barriers.  
 
Miscellaneous questions  
 
QUESTION 22:  Paragraph  1.28, regarding monetary policy, what steps has the Federal Reserve 
taken to further its objectives of full employment and price stability?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  See response to Question  20. 
 
QUESTION 23:  What are the markers for those goals?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  See response to Question  20.  
WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  EUROPEAN UNION  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2 RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS  
 
Page 24, Paragraph  1.20 
 
"In March  2021, Congress passed the ARP Act, signed by the President on 11  March  2021, to 
continue some of the benefits provided for in the CARES Act and grant some new ones. The ARP Act 
provides some USD  1.9 trillion (8.8% of 2020 GDP) in additional relief to respond to the COVID -19 
pandemic, f ollowing nearly USD  4 trillion in COVID relief in 2020. The ARP Act, inter alia, includes 
provisions on aid to state and local governments, hard -hit industries and communities, and tax 
changes; sends direct stimulus payments of USD  1,400 to eligible indivi duals; extends the 
unemployment benefit programs; provides direct aid to state and local governments; adds resources 
to the vaccination program; and increases funding for school reopening. Most notably, the ARP Act 
provides USD  350 billion for fiscal relie f under the Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery 
Funds, 57% of which is allocated to states and 35% to local governments; it also provides over 
USD 165 billion for education (Box  1.2)."  
 
QUESTION 1:  The American Rescue Plan (ARP), signed by the President on 11  March  2021, was 
enacted when a healthy post -pandemic economic recovery was already ongoing. Did the ARP boost 
domestic demand beyond short -term production capacity and contribute to an inflatio n take -off? 
 
RESPONSE 1:  The American Rescue Plan played a key role in spurring one of the fastest economic 
recoveries in our country's history and also protected the United  States  from some of the successive 
shocks we faced like new variants of COVID -19. The ARP also helped prevent economic disruptions, 
like housing instability and long -term unemployment, that would normally be associated with such 
a steep downturn. Inflation is a challenge for countries around the world that has been exacerbated 
by shocks  like Russia 's war in Ukraine.  
 
Page  26, Table  1.4 
 
QUESTION 2:  As a general category. What does this category consist of and what definition of 
subsidy is used? For example, does this table include relocation subsidies such as tax breaks granted 
to Amazon to build a New York -based warehouse ? 
 
RESPONSE 2:  Table  1.4 of the Secretariat's report covers total U.S. federal government revenues 
and expenditure from 2017 through 2021. According to the BEA  glossary, subsidies are the 
"monetary grants paid by government agencies to private business or to government enterprises at 
another level of government ". Tax breaks would not be included in this measure or Table  1.4 more 
generally as they are foregone re venues rather than payments. With respect to the example given, 
that would not apply to Table  1.4 as that is a state/local government policy rather than a federal 
one. 
 
Page 27, Paragraph  1.23 
 
"As a result of the implementation of the above -mentioned Acts, the CBO projects budget deficits to 
continue at high, albeit decreasing, levels after FY2021, reaching 4.7% of GDP in FY2022 and 3.1% 
in FY2023. Deficits are expected to continue to decline to 2.9% of GDP in 2024, but, in the medium 
term, e ven as spending provided in response to the pandemic wanes and the economy continues to 
improve, deficits are expected to rise again, reaching 5.5% of GDP by 2031. The projected annual 
average budget deficit over the FY2022 -26 period is 3.6% of GDP, and 4. 2% over the FY2022 -31 
period. As a result of rising deficits, the CBO estimates that public debt will hover around 100% of 
GDP during the FY2022 -26 period.20 The OMB projects a deficit of 7.8% of GDP in FY2022, and 
subsequent deficits above 5% of GDP for t he FY2023 -26 period (Table  1.5)."  
 
QUESTION 3:  What will be the estimated impact of the increase in interest payments on the U .S. 
public deficit and debt, following the ongoing increase in the U .S. interest rates?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 3:  The latest estimates can be found in the 2023 Mid -Session Review,  which updates 
the Administration's budget estimates to account for economic, technical, and legislative 
developments.  See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/08/msr_fy2023.pdf . 
These numbers will again be updated with the release of the FY 24 President's Budget early next 
year. 
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 GENERAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Page  40, Paragraph  2.9 
 
"In 2021, the Administration launched its American Rescue Plan, which was signed into law in March, 
with the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L.  117-2). While the impetus of the American Rescue 
Plan was a massive stimulus package focused on the pandemic, it also addressed supply chain 
resilience, provided funding for COVID -19 vaccines, and more broadly tackled medical supply chain 
issues . The Administration continued to address the issue of critical supply chains through its 
100-day assessment for four critical products in particular: semiconductor manufacturing and 
advanced packaging, large -capacity batteries, critical minerals and mater ials, and pharmaceuticals 
and active pharmaceutical ingredients.11 As part of this assessment, recommendations were made 
on strengthening international trade rules through trade enforcement mechanisms, i.e. 
establishment of a trade strike force, and pursui ng a Section  232 investigation on neodymium 
magnets, and also working with allies to decrease vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Thereafter, 
in response, USTR established the interagency Supply Chain Trade Task Force12, a Section  232 
investigation on  neodymium was launched, and discussions were held with trading partners on 
addressing supply chain vulnerabilities. Modifications to Buy American provisions were introduced 
by the Build America, Buy America Act, Subtitle A  - Build America, Buy America of Title IX of 
Division  G of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs  Act of 15  November  2021 (P.L.  117-58) 
(Section  3.3.6)."  
 
QUESTION 4:  Buy America requirements traditionally extend to public works transportation and 
water -related infrastructure. The IIJA ex pands Buy America coverage to other infrastructure projects 
funded by federal grants, including transmission facilities; structures and equipment of electric 
utilities; broadband infrastructure; and real property and buildings. Other projects may be covere d; 
for example, the IIJA authorizes federal funding for an expanded clean school bus program. Although 
the program authorized in the IIJA to fund purchases of electric school buses by local school districts 
contains no explicit Buy America references, EPA may determine that Buy America requirements will 
extend to these items as well. Furthermore, Buy America requirements previously applied to iron, 
steel, and certain manufactured goods. The IIJA broadens coverage to include nonferrous metals, 
such as copper  used in electric wiring; plastic - and polymer -based products; glass, including optical 
fiber; and certain other construction materials, such as lumber and drywall. How will the U.S. make 
sure that the above -described expansion is compatible with U .S. comm itments in the 
WTO Agreement  on Government Procurement ("GPA")?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  See initial guidance Office of Management and Budget Memorandum for Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (M -22-11), issued on 18 April 2022. The memorandum 
provides that the guidance must be applied in a manner consistent with the obligations of th e 
United  States  under international agreements, pursuant to Section  70914(e) of the Build America, 
Buy America Act. See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/04 /M-22-11.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 5:  How will the U.S. ensure that the relevant actors, such as the contracting authority, 
involved companies (especially EU companies) are informed of the application of the GPA and thus 
the non -application of Buy America?  
 
RESPONSE  5: Buy American Act waiver designations granted under the Trade Agreements Act are 
reflected in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and in required procedures. See FAR  25.402 
https://www.acquisi tion.gov/far/25.402 ). For additional information on procedures designed to 
ensure fairness please see FAR  25.408 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.408 ) and 
FAR subpart  14.400 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/14.400 ). 
 
Interested companies may refer to the public, non -restricted solicitation point of entry available at 
https://SAM.gov . Solicitations covered by the GP A include the notice: "One or more of the items 
under this acquisition is subject to the World  Trade  Organization Government Procurement WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Agreement  and Free Trade  Agreements ". See FAR 5.207(c)(14)(ii)  (https://www.acquisition.gov/fa
r/5.207 ). 
 
QUESTION 6:  When will the guidelines for implementing IIJA be adopted?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
QUESTION 7:  Will they provide guidance as to how compliance with the U.S. international 
obligations under the WTO  GPA can be ensured?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Different federal departments have issued temporary waivers for Buy America rules 
applying to IIJA funding. Can you provide an overview of all waivers issued so far?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Federal agencies are responsible for processing and approving all  waivers, including 
waivers requested by recipients and on behalf of subrecipients. Before issuing a waiver, the head of 
the Federal agency must make publicly available on the agency's website a detailed written 
explanation for the proposed determination t o issue the waiver and provide at least 15  days for 
public comment on the proposed waiver. General applicability waivers are subject to a minimum 
30-day public comment period.  For transparency, a centralized website is available for applicable 
agencies is available at: https://www.madeinamerica.gov/waivers/financial -assistance/ . 
 
2.3 TRADE POLICY FORMULATION AND OBJECTIVES  
2.4 TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS  
 
Page  42, Paragraph  2.18 
 
"In the area of dispute settlement, the United  States' participation, as measured by the number of 
cases it has filed as a complainant, declined significantly during the review period compared to 
previous periods. The United  States  raised 2  complaints, was a respondent in 8 cases, was involved 
in 2 active arbitrations, appealed 6  cases to the Appellate  Body, and exercised third party rights in 
29 cases (Table  A2.1). In the DSB, the United  States  continued to raise its systemic concerns with 
Appellate  Body overreach."  
 
QUESTION 9:  Referring to the CVD on ripe olives, the WTO panel ruled that Section  771B of the 
U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 which presumes that the entire benefit of a subsidy for a raw a gricultural 
input product passes through to the downstream processed agricultural product (pass -through 
benefit) is by itself inconsistent with certain provisions of the GATT  1994 and the SCM  Agreement . 
The panel also found that the U .S. Department of Comm erce acted inconsistently with the same 
provisions when it incorrectly assumed that the entirety of subsidies provided to raw olive producers 
was transferred to ripe olives processors. The finding that Section  771B of the U .S. Tariff Act of 1930 
is in brea ch of certain provisions of the GATT  1994 and the SCM  Agreement  is particularly relevant 
as it would require that the U .S. brings its legislative framework in compliance with the 
recommendations of the report. U .S. agreed to adopt this panel decision and b ring in compliance 
before 14 January  2023. Could the U .S. clarify whether it intends to amend Section  771B of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, and bring itself in compliance with the decision of the panel on the "calculation of 
countervailable subsidies on certain processed agricultural products"?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The U.S. Department of Commerce is conducting a proceeding under Section  129(b) 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to issue a determination that would render the action in 
question not inconsistent with the findings of the panel.  Regarding future plans, the United  States  
reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
2.5 INVESTMENT REGIME  
 
Page  52, Paragraph  2.47 
 
"The United  States maintained BITs with 39  partne rs as of December  2021 (Table  2.5). BITs remain 
part of the U.S. investment framework, but there have not been any new BITs negotiated since WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 227 - 
 
  2008, and most BITs are more than 20  years old. A model BIT was established in 2012 to serve as 
a basis for future BITs. No BITs have been concluded using this template, but certain updated 
provisions were included in the USMCA investment chapter, such as clarifications to rules regarding 
expropriation, national treatment and most -favored -nation treatment, and t he minimum standard 
of treatment. In addition to these, the model BIT contains provisions on transfers, performance 
requirements, and dispute settlement. There has been a policy shift in recent years away from 
expanding the U.S. BIT program and the United  States is not currently seeking to negotiate any new 
BITs."  
 
QUESTION 10:  The report states That there has been a policy shift in recent years away from 
expanding the U .S. BITs program, and that the U .S. is not currently seeking to negotiate any new 
BIT. C ould the U .S. explain its current policy on BITs, and in particular its intentions with regard to 
the stock of its old BITs?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The United  States  is not currently negotiating any new BITs. Regarding future plans, 
the United  States  reminds Member s that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Would NAFTA modernisation set a precedent for other BITs re -negotiation process?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are re trospective exercises.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.2 MEASURES DIRECTLY AFFECTING IMPORTS  
 
Page  64, Paragraph  3.21 
 
"The United  States continues to offer advance rulings on customs matters, including classification, 
marking, origin, valuation, and carriers, and on the applicability of trade programs. Advance rulings, 
or Ruling Letters as they are called, are issued pursuant to CBP regulations in 19  C.F.R.  Part 177, 
and can be submitted electronically through a template, with the excep tion for rulings on valuation 
and carriers which must be submitted in the form of a letter. As a matter of policy, CBP generally 
makes these rulings available to the public after 90  days from issuance through a searchable 
database known as the Customs Ruli ngs Online Search System (CROSS). The regulations, however, 
do not specify a deadline for the issuance of rulings nor the length of their duration or validity. 
Rulings remain valid unless modified or revoked by CBP or changed by operation of law. As at 
December  2021, there were 209,848 searchable rulings available in CROSS. In 2021, CBP issued 
3,230  rulings of which classification rulings were the most numerous."  
 
QUESTION 12:  Does the U .S. administration not consider that this absence of an established 
deadline for the issuance of rulings and of validity could affect and create uncertainty for commercial 
operators?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The U.S. does not set forth deadlines for advance rulings as t he issuance of a ruling 
depends on the submission of information to CBP, which could come later than the initial ruling 
request. The lack of a mandated deadline also reflects the necessary balance between the desire to 
issue advance rulings in an expeditio us manner and the occasional need to take more time to issue 
rulings on more complicated matters. Both categories promote certainty among commercial 
operators. The United  States  endeavors to issue rulings within 90  days of receipt of information 
necessary to issue the ruling and classification rulings within 30  days of receipt.  
 
Page  71, Paragraphs  3.43-3.44 
 
"Temporary duty suspensions of tariffs have long been a regular feature of U.S. tariff policy and are 
implemented through Chapter  99, Subchapter  2, of the HTSUS. Since 2016, the procedures for 
temporary duty suspensions through Miscellaneous Tariff Bills (MTBs) have been carried out 
pursuant to the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 (AMCA), which established an 
open and transparent pro cess for consideration of duty suspensions and reductions. (…) There is 
currently no legislation to commence future MTB cycles as the AMCA only envisioned two cycles in 
2016 and 2019.  
The 2016 MTB cycle was carried out pursuant to the new procedures outlin ed in the AMCA and 
resulted in the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018 (MTB Act of 2018) which provided for duty WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 228 - 
 
  reductions or suspensions on 1,655 tariff lines during the period 
13 October  2018-31 December  2020. (…) In 2016 there were 2,524 petitions re sulting in 1,655 duty 
suspensions and in 2019 there were 3,442 petitions (Table  3.7). The majority of requests (over 
50%) were in the chemicals sector, with significant requests also in the machinery and equipment, 
and textiles, apparel, and footwear secto rs. As of March  2022, there had not been any legislation 
passed pursuant to the 2019 cycle. Therefore, there were no temporary duty suspensions in place 
as of March  2022."  
 
QUESTION 13:  On 31 December  2020, temporary U .S. duty suspensions or reductions on more 
than 3 ,000 imported products expired. These duty suspensions were granted by the Miscellaneous 
Tariff bill Act of 2018. Several MTBs have been introduced in the Congress but none of them has 
been approved. Does the U .S. consider reinstating by other l egal procedures the suspension of the 
duties for the products included in the previous Miscellaneous Tariff Bill?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  We refrain from commenting on proposals or speculating on possible future actions 
or policies given the retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
QUESTION 14:  Are there any temporary duty suspensions of tariffs envisaged in the future?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  We refrain from commenting on proposals or speculating on possible future actions 
or policies given the retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
QUESTION 15:  If not, what is the reason given it has been a regular feature of U .S. trade policy?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  We refrain from commenting on proposals or speculating on possible future actions 
or pol icies given the retrospective orientation of trade policy reviews.  
 
QUESTION 16:  Has the U .S. tobacco industry submitted any petition to reduce or suspend tariffs 
for the imports of tobacco?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  No, neither the U.S. tobacco industry nor any other party submitted a petition to 
reduce or suspend tariffs for tobacco products under the MTB process carried out pursuant to the 
American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016.  
 
Page  73, Paragraph  3.47 
 
"The United  States has regularly reported its utilization of agricultural TRQs to the WTO  Committee 
on Agriculture. The quota fill rate averaged around 50% across all categories during 2018 -20 with 
little variation each year, i.e. 51% -55%..."  
 
QUESTION 17:  In the last 10 years, according to U.S.'s MA:2 notifications, the tariff quota fill for 
the tobacco TRQ (Additional U.S. Note  5 to Chapter  24) has been at best 62%, while in the past two 
years it has hardly reached 43%.  
Could the U .S.: 
 
a) Indicate the quota fill by country allocations for the period 2016 -2021?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Quota data is publicly available at U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) 
website under Commodity Status Reports.  That information can be found by following this 
link - https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/tariff -rate-quotas . 
 
QUESTION 18:  
 
b) Specify the reasons behind the lower fill in recent years?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market 
factors, including price trends, exchange rates, the recent global COVID -19 pandemic, supply and 
demand.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 229 - 
 
  QUESTION 19:  
 
c) Indicate when the U .S. will notify to WTO the changes to its Schedule following 
Article  XXVIII renegotiation on tobacco.  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The United  States  is working to notify modifications to Schedule  XX and will provide 
the relevant information to the Committee on Market Access  in due course.  
 
Page  79, Paragraph  3.62 
 
"In April  2020, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Marine 
Fisheries Service imposed import restrictions on shrimp and other fish and fish products caught in 
the Upper Gulf of California due to unsustainable bycatch of vaquita, a species of porpoise on the 
brink of extinction. The restrictions were imposed under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 
which includes provisions to reduce marine mammal bycatch associated with fis heries that supply 
imports to the United  States . Specifically, the MMPA requires that the United  States  ban imports of 
commercial fish or fish products caught in commercial fisheries resulting in the accidental killing or 
serious injury (bycatch) of marine  mammals in excess of U.S. standards."  
 
QUESTION 20 : Currently National Marine Fisheries Service renewed its affirmative findings under 
MMPA to allow six countries, for the importation into the U .S. of yellowfin tuna and yellowfin products 
until 31 March  2023. Does the U .S. administration intend to extend this allowance beyond 
31 March  2023, in case of further affirmative findings?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  An affirmative finding under the MMPA allows the importation into the United  States  
of yellowfin tuna and yellowf in tuna products harvested by purse seine vessels operating under a 
nation's jurisdiction in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) or exported from that nation. NOAA 
annually reviews affirmative findings. Renewals are valid for one year.  
 
Page  81, Parag raph  3.71-3.72 
 
"3.71. The main U.S. legislation with respect to anti -dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) 
is contained in Title  VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. The main regulations governing AD 
and CVD investigations (including reviews) are included in 19  C.F.R.  Parts 201, 207, and 351. The 
Trade Preferences Extension Act (TPEA) of 2015 (P.L.  114-27)106, and in the Trade Facilitation and 
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L.  114-125) introduced further amendments to trade enforcement 
legislation. In particular, Title  IV of the Act, known also as the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015 
(EAPA), contains provisions to prevent the evasion of the pay ment of duties. To this end, the EAPA 
created a new framework for CBP to investigate allegations of evasion of AD/CVD orders, under 
Section  517 (Procedures for Investigating Claims of Evasion of AD and CVD orders) and established 
the Trade Remedy Law Enfor cement Directorate (TRLED) within CBP, to carry out the investigations.  
3.72. During the period under review, the United  States  Department of Commerce (USDOC) 
introduced important changes to its Trade Enforcement Regulations to strengthen and make more 
efficient the administration and enforcement of AD/CVD laws, and to better address circumvention 
and evasion of trade remedies. On 20  September  2021, USDOC issued Final Regulations to Improve 
Administration and Enforcement of Anti -dumping and Countervailing D uty Laws.107 The new 
regulations, which were notified to the WTO on adoption, establish new procedures for scope, 
circumvention and covered merchandise inquiries, and make a number of substantive and technical 
revisions with respect to other areas, such as  new shipper reviews."  
 
QUESTION 21:  The practice of U .S. investigations and reviews in recent years has demonstrated a 
very low threshold for applying "adverse facts available" (AFAs), leading to the application of AFAs 
in many instances where companies d id their utmost to cooperate, and resulting in very high 
dumping or subsidy margins for these companies. Could the U .S. explain the circumstances in which 
they use "adverse facts available ", which is often in breach of Annex  2, Art.  5 of the ADA?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  The United  States  disagrees with the characterization of this question. The 
United  States  conducts its proceedings in accordance with the obligations contained in the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade 1994 and 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The determinations made in each AD/CVD 
segment are available on the U.S. Department of Commerce's website WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 230 - 
 
  (https://access.trade .gov/login.aspx ). From here, Members can obtain, on a case -by-case- basis, 
information about the rationale for the determination.  
 
QUESTION 22:  Article  6.5.1 of the Anti -dumping Agreement requires parties providing confidential 
information to provide non -confidential summaries of the confidential information, sufficiently 
detailed to allow a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in 
confidence. However, in practice there are many instances where such summaries ar e not provided, 
and neither an explanation why such a summary is missing is provided. This also applies to the 
authorities' own reports and determinations. Could the U .S. explain why they continue with this 
practice, although it is in breach of WTO  rules a nd jurisprudence?  
 
RESPONSE 22: Once again, the United  States  disagrees with the characterization of this question. 
The United  States  conducts its procee dings in accordance with the obligations contained in the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
Page  84, Paragraph  2.81-2.82 
 
"On 20  September  2021, USDOC introduced important changes to its Trade Enforcement 
Regulations and issued Final Regulations to Improve Administration and Enforcement of 
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws. (…) The stated purpose of the modifications and 
additions to USDOC's regulations is to strengthen the administration and enforcement of AD/CVD 
laws, make su ch administration and enforcement more efficient, and create new enforcement tools 
for USDOC to address circumvention and evasion of trade remedies.  
(…) Through the new regulations USDOC: (i)  modified the time for submission of comments 
pertaining to indus try support in AD and CVD proceedings; (ii)  modified its regulation regarding new 
shipper reviews; (iii)  modified its regulation concerning scope matters in AD and CVD proceedings; 
(iv) promulgated a new regulation concerning circumvention of AD and CVD or ders; (v)  promulgated 
a new regulation concerning covered merchandise referrals received from CBP; (vi)  promulgated a 
new regulation pertaining to USDOC requests for certifications from interested parties to establish 
whether merchandise is subject to an A D or CVD order; (vii)  modified its regulation regarding 
importer reimbursement certifications filed with CBP; and (viii)  modified its regulations regarding 
service lists, entries of appearance, and importer filing requirements for access to business 
propri etary information in AD and CVD proceedings."  
 
QUESTION 23:  The U .S. continue to be an active user of anti -dumping and countervailing duties. 
There was an increase in the number of AD and CVD measures in force during the period under 
review. Following the WTO panel report in case DS577 on olives, could the U .S. explain how and 
when it intends to implement the panel findings on the main subjects of the disputes, i.e. the 
erroneous determination by the U .S. Department of Commerce that the subsid ies were targeted to 
Spanish Olives producers, and the "as applied" and "as such" violation of WTO  law by the U .S. law 
providing the pass through of the subsidies from the olive growers to the processors of ripe olives?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  Please see response to Question  9. 
 
Page  86, Paragraph  3.85 
 
"The new rules introduce the possibility of retroactive application of AD/CVD duties in scope and 
covered merchandise inquiries in certain cases. (…) USDOC will consider retroactive application on 
a case -by-case basis and may consider arguments and evidence from parties as appropriate."  
 
QUESTION 24:  Retroactive application of AD/CVD may create a great amount of unpredictability 
for importers. Did the U .S. use this approach in any of the cases investigated according to the new 
rules?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The determinations made in each AD/CVD segment  - including circumvention 
determinations  - are available  on the U.S. Department  of Commerce's  website  (https://access.trad
e.gov/login.aspx ). From here, Members can obtain, on a case -by-case basis, information about the 
approaches applied and the rationale for the determination.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  86, Paragraph  3.86 
 
"The new regulations provide USDOC with authority to require importers and other interested parties 
to certify whether a particular product is subject to an AD/CVD order. If a party fails to provide the 
certification upon request, or the certification is false , USDOC may order CBP to collect AD/CVD 
duties from the importer at the applicable rate."  
 
QUESTION 25:  Could the U .S. explain who must issue this certification?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  The issue of who needs to issue a certification will depend on the facts and 
circumstances in each segment of a proceeding. The determinations made in each AD/CVD 
segment  - including circumvention determinations  - are available on the U.S. Department of 
Commerce's website ( https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx ). 
 
Page  87, Paragraphs  3.89-3.90 
 
"3.89. An administrative review of an AD or CVD order is a process that determines the amount of 
duties that need to be paid on the entries of a particular product subject to an order entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption, during a given period. An administrative review also 
establishes a new cash deposit rate for estimated AD/CVDs collected for f uture entries made by each 
of the companies for which the review is initiated. (…) . 
3.90. Administrative reviews of orders and suspension agreements in effect may be requested each 
year by interested parties during the anniversary month of the publication of the order 
(19 C.F.R.  351.213). (…) An interested party must specify the individual producer or exporter 
covered by the order for which they are requesting a review, and the basis for the request. For 
suspension agreements, USDOC reviews the status of, a nd compliance with, the agreement. In 
reviews of AD/CVD orders, the USDOC examines a particular company's entries, exports, or sales 
made 12  months immediately preceding the anniversary month in which the review was requested. 
The review determines the act ual weighted -average amount of dumping or subsidy and AD/CVD 
assessments for that period, and the future cash deposit rate. Requests for duty absorption rulings 
may also be made in an administrative review."  
 
QUESTION 26:  The U .S. system of yearly administ rative reviews is very burdensome for the 
investigated parties to comply with: it creates a very high amount of work outside their core business 
to comply with the high volume of information requests, and in many cases a new administrative 
review is initia ted before the previous review is finished. How does the U .S. justify such a 
burdensome process?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  Once again, the United  States  disagrees with the characterization of this question. 
The United  States  conducts  its proceedings in accordance with  the obligations contained in the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
QUESTION 27:  Does the U .S. intend to revisit this system in future changes to its trade remedies 
legislation?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Pages  113-114, Paragraphs  3.159 and 3.161  
 
"3.159 On 18  August  2017, USTR initiated a Section  301 investigation into the Government of 
China's acts, policies, and practices related to  technology transfer, intellectual property, and 
innovation. In March  2018, USTR issued a report that concluded that the acts, policies, and practices 
of the Chinese Government related to technology transfer, IP, and innovation were unreasonable or 
discrim inatory, and burdened or restricted U.S. commerce, resulting in harm to the U.S. economy 
of at least USD  50 billion  a year.243 As a result of the report's findings, in a Memorandum signed 
on 22  March  2018, the President directed the USTR to take a range of actions responding to China's 
acts, policies, and practices, including preparing a list of proposed additional tar iffs.244 The 
President also directed USTR to present a complaint with respect to China's technology licensing 
practices before the WTO  DSB. On 23  March  2018, the United  States  requested consultations with 
China concerning certain measures pertaining to the  protection of IPRs.245 On 15  June 2018, USTR WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  issued a list of products covering 1,102 separate U.S. tariff lines valued at some USD  50 billion  in 
2018 trade values.246 The additional duties were imposed in two tranches: in July  2018, the 
additional 25% du ty was imposed on the first tranche, or List  1, which covered 818 tariff 
subheadings with an approximate annual trade value of USD  34 billion . In August  2018, an 
additional 25% duty was imposed on the second tranche, or List  2, which covered 279  tariff 
subheadings with an annual trade value of USD  16 billion . The lists included products from industrial 
sectors that contribute to, or benefit from, the 'Made in China 2025 ' industrial policy. CBP was 
instructed to begin to collect the additional duties on 6  July 2018.247 USTR received and reviewed 
approximately 11,000 and 2,900 exclusion requests pertaining to Lists  1 and 2, respectively, 
approving approximately 3,700 and 1,100 of them.  
 
3.161 On 15  January  2020, the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Gov ernment of the 
United  States  of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China (Phase One 
Agreement) was signed.251 The Agreement entered into force on 14  February  2020. The Phase One 
Agreement requires changes to China's economic and trade r egime, including with respect to certain 
issues covered in the Section  301 investigation. Chapter  1 of the Agreement, Intellectual Property, 
calls for various improvements in IP protection and enforcement. Chapter  2 of the Agreement, 
Technology Transfer, a ffirms the importance of ensuring that the transfer of technology occurs on 
voluntary, market -based terms.252 As a result of the Agreement, the USTR determined to suspend 
indefinitely the imposition of the 15% additional duties on products of China covered by List 4B, and 
to reduce the rate of additional duties on products of China covered by List  4A, from 15% to 7.5% 
effective 14  February  2020. USTR established an exclusion process for products of China covered 
under List  4A, received approximately 8,800 requests and approved 575 of them. In response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic, the USTR extended 137  exclusions covered under List  1, 59  exclusions on 
List 2, 266  exclusions on List  3, and 87  exclusions on List  4. On 22  December  2020, the USTR 
determined t o further extend certain product exclusions on medical -care products and to make 
further modifications to remove Section  301 duties from additional medical -care products to address 
the COVID -19 pandemic. On 5  October  2021, USTR announced the start of a rev iew to possibly 
reinstate 549  previously extended exclusions (86  FR 56345)."  
 
QUESTION 28:  Please describe the functioning of the automatic listening of establishments 
producing beef, pork, poultry or pet food  - agreed in the Phase One Agreement implemente d with 
regard to the GACC Decree  248, which requires the registration of individual establishments based 
on specific guarantees by the competent authorities.  
 
RESPONSE 28:  The text of the Phase One Agreement is publicly available on the website of the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The facility registration processes described therein are not 
automatic, and U.S. competent authorities generally transmit lists of eligible facilities to the General 
Administration of Customs of China (GACC) on a month ly basis. The United  States  recommends that 
questions regarding details of implementation of China's Decree  248 be directed to GACC, 
particularly given the fast -changing and unclear requirements of the Decree.  
 
QUESTION 29:  Did China accept regionalisation in the event of an outbreak of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, as envisaged in the Phase One Agreement? If so, what are the boundaries of 
restricted zones?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  On 23 March  2020, the U.S. Department of Agricult ure's Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) announced a regionalization agreement with China for safe trade of 
poultry products. The text of this agreement is publicly available on the APHIS website. According 
to the agreement, the restriction s are to the state level.  
 
Page  118, Paragraph  3.173  
 
"The signature of the Joint Statement by the United  States, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the 
United  Kingdom Regarding a Compromise on a Transitional Approach to Existing Unilateral Measures 
During the Interim Period Before Pillar  1 Is in Effect, on 21  October  2021, led to a suspension of the 
measures. The Joint Statement followed the agreement reached between 136  countries regarding 
digital taxation under the auspices of the OECD. On  8 October  2021, the United  States, Austria, 
France, Italy, Spain, and the United  Kingdom joined other members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive 
Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (IF) in reaching political agreement on the Statement 
on a Two -Pillar Sol ution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the 
Economy. The Two -Pillar Solution is expected to ensure that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 233 - 
 
  subject to a minimum tax rate of 15%, and is expected to eliminate double taxation. A Detailed 
Implementation Plan was agreed, with deadlines to complete work on the rules and instruments 
needed to bring the Two -Pillar Solution into effect by 2023. The Implementation of Pillar  1 will lead 
to a Multilateral Convention (MLC), resulting in t he allocation of tax to the jurisdiction where it is 
generated, and the removal of all DSTs and other relevant similar measures on all companies. Under 
the Joint Statement, no newly enacted DSTs or other similar measures will be imposed on any 
company from  8 October  2021 and until the earlier of 31  December  2023 or the coming into force 
of the MLC. In line with the IF, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United  Kingdom agreed that as 
part of Pillar  1, they will withdraw all unilateral measures on all com panies and refrain from imposing 
new ones. The Joint Statement contains a transitional approach to existing unilateral measures while 
implementing Pillar  1, the Unilateral Measures Compromise, under which Austria, France, Italy, 
Spain, and the United  Kingd om are not required to withdraw their unilateral measures until Pillar  1 
is in place. As part of the Unilateral Measures Compromise, the United States agreed to terminate 
proposed trade actions and commit not to impose further trade actions against Austria , France, Italy, 
Spain, and the United  Kingdom with respect to their existing DST until the end of the Interim Period ." 
 
QUESTION 30 : Has the U .S. completed any action to implement Pillar  I? 
 
RESPONSE 30:  Multilateral work is ongoing on the development of both Pillar  1 and Pillar  2. No 
country, including the United  States , has yet adopted  Pillar 1 or Pillar  2 in domestic legislation.  
 
3.3 MEASURES DIRECTLY AFFECTING EXPORTS  
 
Page  70, Paragraph  3.41 
 
"The U.S. schedule contains 10  tariff lines over 300%, including 2  tariff lines over 400%. All but two 
of these are out -of-quota. With the exception of one out -of-quota dairy line, these extremely high 
tariffs are almost solely attributed to tobacco, in pa rticular unprocessed, semi -processed, or refuse 
tobacco…"  
 
QUESTION 31 : Could the United  States  provide the reason for maintaining high tariffs on these 
products and explain if there are plans to improve the market access for tobacco?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  The Uni ted States , on average, has some of the lowest bound and applied tariffs 
among all WTO  Members. The referenced tariff rates reflect the U.S. market access commitments 
made during the Uruguay Round. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  126, Table  3.24 
 
QUESTION 32:  The amount of long -term guarantees and working capital under the EXIM 
authorizations has increased substantially during the 2020 -2021 years. Can you elaborate which 
specific regions were targeted with the increased export credits? When do you expect these new 
export support measures to be phased out?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  EXIM does not target regions or sectors. Although Section  2(b)(9)(A) of the The 
Charter o f the Export -Import Bank of the United  States , as amended through P.L.  116–94, 
20 December  2019 directs the Board of Directors of the Bank to "take prompt measures…to promote 
the expansion of the Bank's financial commitments in sub -Saharan Africa under the  loan, guarantee, 
and insurance programs of the Bank" the Charter also states that such actions should be "consistent 
with the credit standards otherwise required by law".  
 
EXIM activity rose in 2020 -2021 relative to 2019 because in May 2019, EXIM's Board of Directors 
was confirmed by the U.S. Senate and sworn into office (returning a Board quorum for the first time 
in nearly four years, and, with it, authority to approve transactions over USD 10 million ). 
 
On 29 April 2022 EXIM Board of Directors unanimous ly voted to extend specific COVID -19 relief 
measures through 30 April 2023.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 234 - 
 
  Page  126, Paragraph  3.209  
 
"The law reauthorizing EXIM directs the agency to establish a Program on China and 
Transformational Exports and reserves 20% of its total financing authority (i.e. USD  27 billion) to 
this end. The purpose is to support U.S. leadership, innovation, employment, and technological 
standards in 10 transformational industries: (i)  artificial intelligence; (ii)  biotechnology; 
(iii) biomedical scien ces; (iv)  wireless communications equipment (including 5G); (v)  quantum 
computing; (vi)  renewable energy, energy efficiency, and energy storage; (vii)  semiconductor and 
semiconductor -machinery; (viii)  emerging financial technologies; (ix)  water treatment and 
sanitation; and (x)  high-performance computing. The proposed transaction must have minimum 
51% U.S. content to qualify for EXIM financing, at which point up to 85% of the value of eligible 
goods and services in the U.S. contract may be suppor ted.306 EXIM formed a Subcommittee on 
Strategic Competition with China in September  2020. In FY2021, USD  141.3  million was authorized 
in direct support of this program."  
 
QUESTION 33:  The law reauthorizing EXIM establishes a Program on China and Transforma tional 
Exports to finance certain industries. The program requires that the proposed transactions have a 
minimum 51% U .S. content to qualify for EXIM financing. How has it been ensured that such local 
content requirements do not create unnecessary trade ba rriers and undermine competitiveness . 
 
RESPONSE 33:  EXIM would typically require at least 51% of the net contract price be U.S. content, 
with local costs ( i.e. costs incurred in the buyer's country) excluded from the net contract price.  The 
rest of the con tract price could be foreign content except for costs incurred in the buyer's country. 
EXIM local cost policy remains unchanged as it pertains to the China and Transformational Export 
Program, that is, EXIM can support up to 30% local cost support needed f or the US exporter's 
project.  
 
Page  127, Paragraph  3.211  
 
"The legislation reauthorizing EXIM in 2019 maintained a provision introduced in 2015 that, 
inter alia, instructed the United  States to initiate and pursue negotiations with other major exporting 
countries, including members of the OECD, to reduce substantially and possibly eliminate subsidized 
export -financing programs and other forms of export subsidies. The Department of the Treasury 
updates Congress annually on progress achieved in im plementing these instructions."  
 
QUESTION 34:  The law reauthorizing EXIM in 2019 instructed the U .S. to initiate and pursue 
negotiations with other major exporters to reduce substantially and possibly eliminate subsidised 
export -financing programs and other forms of export subsidies. However, the actions of EXIM in the 
2020-2021 period rather indicate an  increase of export -financing on the U .S. part. How does the 
U.S. aim to fulfil this objective to reduce and possibly eliminate export financing programs?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  EXIM activity rose in 2020 -2021 relative to 2019 because in May  2019, EXIM's 
Board of Directors was confirmed by the U.S. Senate and sworn into office (returning a Board quorum 
for the first time in nearly four years, and, with it, authority to approve transactions over 
USD 10 million ). As such, the increased activity is not inconsistent with the referenced mandate.  
 
Page  131, Table  3.26 
 
QUESTION 35:  On top of subsidies for trade in goods, does the U .S. collect data on subsidies for 
trade in services at both federal and sub -federal levels?  
 
RESPONSE 35: No. 
 
3.4 MEASURES AFFECTING PRODUCTION AND TRADE  
 
Page  132, P aragraph  3.228  
 
"In the United  States, the private sector leads the development of voluntary consensus standards 
(VCS), which are based on needs or concerns identified by industry, government, and consumers. 
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private non -profit organization, has a central 
role in coordinating the private sector in this demand -driven system, but does not develop standards. 
This responsibility is entrusted to the hund reds of standards developing organizations (SDOs) located WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 235 - 
 
  within the United  States. The United  States considers any VCS developed in accordance with the 
Committee Decision on International Standards to be an international standard under the 
WTO TBT Agreeme nt regardless of the specific SDO or its location."  
 
QUESTION 36:  Is the U .S. considering developing certain standards and technical regulations in 
the area of AI? Could the U .S. provide additional information on these standards and technical 
regulations?  
 
RESPONSE 36 : Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. For more information on the resources that the U.S. 
government has produced to help federal agencies plan for AI, see  Executive  Order  13859, 
"Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence ", OMB Memorandum  21-06 on Guidance 
for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications, and the AI Risk Management Framework at: 
www.nist.gov/itl/ai -risk-management -framework . 
 
QUESTION 37:  Is the U .S. considering developing certain standards and technical regulations 
relating to emissions levels as well as test me thods for stationary and non -road engines?  
 
RESPONSE 37 : Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 38:  Could the U .S. provide additional information on these standards and technical 
regulations?  
 
RESPONSE 38 : See response to Question  37. 
 
Page  134, Paragraph  3.235  
 
"The TAA restricts government agencies from engaging in any standards -related activity that creates 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United  States and ensures that imported 
goods are treated no less favorably than like domestic products in the application of 
standards -related activities. " 
 
QUESTION 39:  Is this affected by the ''Buy Am erica'' policy?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  It is not clear how Buy America procurement rules would impact standards related 
activity.  
 
Pages  137-138, Paragraphs  3.249 -3.254  
 
3.249. According to the product and the type of risk inherent to products, responsibilities for  the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of SPS measures are split among federal 
agencies.351 In general, SPS measures are subject to the same administrative rulemaking 
procedures as technical regulations (see above). FDA is responsible for the re gulation of a broad 
range of products, including food (except food products regulated by the Department of Agriculture); 
food additives; dietary supplements; human and veterinary drugs; medical devices; human 
biologics; tobacco; and cosmetics, including im ported goods.352 FSIS within the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for ensuring a safe, wholesome, and correctly labelled and 
packaged commercial supply of meat, poultry, Siluriformes fish and fish products (catfish), and some 
egg products in  the United  States , including imported goods.353 The Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) at USDA protects the health of U.S. agriculture and natural resources 
against invasive pests and diseases, and regulates genetically engineered crops wh ile promoting 
exports of U.S. plant and animal products.354 In cases where requirements by APHIS and FSIS 
simultaneously apply to imported goods, APHIS evaluates the animal and plant health risks while 
FSIS ensures the enforcement of food safety requiremen ts. The responsibilities of EPA include, 
inter alia, the registration of pesticides, including herbicides and fungicides, and the establishment 
of tolerances (maximum residue limits (MRLs)) for pesticides in food.  
3.250. Other agencies involved in SPS issues include the Agricultural Marketing Service, the 
Agricultural Research Service, and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture in the Department 
of Agriculture, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 236 - 
 
  Commerce, CBP in the Department of Homeland Security, and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and 
Trade Bureau in the Department of the Treasur y. 
3.251. Agencies have jurisdiction over imported products at the time of entry and after the products 
have entered the country. When a food does not meet FDA food safety requirements, such as when 
the food contains organisms of public health significance , foreign objects, or a major food allergen, 
firms may recall products; on average, some 1,000 recalls of FDA -regulated products have been 
conducted every year since 2018. Of these recalls, 248 were related to imported human food and 
animal feed. Since Jul y 2018, the FDA has reported nearly 45,000  import refusals at the border. In 
case of a refusal, the owner or consignee is entitled to an informal hearing regarding the admissibility 
of the product and can submit a plan to bring the product into compliance.  A non -compliant product 
must be re -exported or destroyed within 90  days of FDA's notice of intent to refuse the goods. 
Similarly, whenever a health hazard situation with a reasonable probability that the use of the 
product will cause serious, adverse heal th consequences or death arises, FSIS recommends the 
voluntary recall of the product. From January  2018 to January  2022, there were 330  recalls, and 
38 recalls involved imported meat, poultry, or egg products. Compared to the period 2015 -19, there 
were few er recalls in 2020 and 2021; factors including societal disruptions and consumer behavior 
during the pandemic, explain this decrease . 
3.254. Equivalence determinations of an exporting country's regulatory food safety inspection 
system for products regulate d by FSIS are a prerequisite for trade with the United  States . The only 
FDA-regulated food products requiring an assessment as a precondition to import into the 
United  States  are Grade A dairy products and raw bivalve molluscan shellfish. On 
24 September  2020, FDA announced its first -ever equivalence determination, which recognizes the 
control systems of Spain and the Netherlands on raw bivalve molluscan shellfish as equivalent to 
the U.S. National Shellfish Sanitation Program. Imports from Spanish and Dutc h establishments 
listed by FDA on the Interstate Certified Shellfish Shippers List are now allowed. FSIS has also 
determined equivalent certified and approved producers in 34  countries and the product scope of 
these equivalences varies from country to coun try. Following a regulatory change in 2019, a single 
list of eligible foreign countries to import FSIS -regulated goods is kept on the FSIS website. During 
the review period, FSIS notified the adoption of seven equivalence determinations on poultry 
products , Siluriformes fish and fish products, and egg products. FDA has also concluded Systems 
Recognition Arrangements with food safety agencies in three trading partners. The authorities 
indicate that these arrangements do not constitute trade -facilitating meas ures and that they are not 
the same as equivalence determinations.  
 
QUESTION 40 : Could the United  States  indicate when FDA is going to conclude on the Systems 
Recognition Arrangement with the EU for Grade A dairy products, which is a longstanding request 
of the EU?  
 
RESPONSE 40 : The Systems Recognition Arrangement is a bilateral arrangement that establishes 
a regulatory partnership between the U .S. FDA and a foreign regulatory counterpart (referred to as 
participating agency or agencies), in which the agencies have concluded that they operate 
comparable food regulatory programs that yield similar food safety outcomes.  The System 
Recognition Arrangement excludes several commodities including Grade A milk and Grade A milk 
products. Conclusion of such a Systems Recognition Arrangement is not a matter of trade policy.  
 
QUESTION 41:  Since the last WTO  TPR review, t he United  States  responded it was streamlining 
the import and export process through the implementation of the Single Window. However, the EU 
does not experience that the import authorisation procedures of the U .S. have been simplified to 
shorten significa ntly the overall time these procedures take. Moreover, it does not seem that the 
U.S. has made these procedures more predictable by providing the anticipated processing periods 
of all steps in the procedure and the standard processing period of each proced ure. In the plant 
health area, for instance, there are 19  steps to follow before an application can be approved, and 
this process can take more than 20  years. A clear example is the EU pear and apple dossier, which 
started in 2008. In the area of animal he alth, equally long procedures are followed. Could the U .S. 
clarify how it is going to address this concern from the EU?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  CBP uses the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) as the "Single Window" 
for processing import and export data, but the Single Window concept is unrelated to procedures for 
granting market access, which is what the apple and pear reference refers to. Procedures for granting 
and finalizing market access involves a number of steps with no clear timeframe.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 237 - 
 
  QUESTION 42:  Could the U .S. provide indicative timelines for each of the steps required for the 
approval of animal and plant products?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  The only fixed timelines for approval of market access are the statutory 60 -day 
comment periods, although some market access requests may be subject to a 30 -day stakeholder 
review for PRAs. No other step in the process has a fixed timeline, nor could it be expected to when 
market access requests have widely varying levels of scope and complexity.  
 
QUESTION 43:  U.S. legislation in this matter it is very complex, involving many departments and 
agencies. This makes that in most cases it is really complicated to find out all the requirements that 
a product must meet for import. This is one of the main concerns of European expo rters. In addition, 
the mandatory registration of exporters and importers of agri food products before the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) must be renewed every even year representing a major bureaucratic 
burden for our companies.  
 
a) Does the U .S. intend to establish a single point of information for all the regulations and 
requirements that must be met by imported products?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  It remains the responsibility of affected industry to understand and comply with the 
regulations and requiremen ts applicable to their specific products before placing them on the U.S. 
market. Affected industry is urged to consult the U.S. Code of applicable laws (such as Title  21 
containing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) and the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (such as 
Title 21, Subchapter  B applicable to food for human consumption) as centralized codified references 
for regulations and requirements applicable to imported food products. More specifically, FDA also 
offers a website on Importing Food Products into  the United  States  and staffs a Food and Cosmetics 
Information Center to provide affected industry with information on the regulations and 
requirements applicable to their specific food products.  
 
QUESTION 44:  
 
b) Has the U .S. considered simplifying FDA registration renewal procedures and extending 
deadlines?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  FDA Food Facility Registration renewal requirements are mandated by the Food 
Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) passed by Congress in 2011. During implementatio n of this 
requirement FDA  undertook consultations with stakeholders, including small businesses, to simplify 
and streamline the procedure for registration renewal to the greatest extent possible while ensuring 
data integrity, such as direct verification of  the identity of U .S. agents for foreign food facilities. The 
registration renewal window from 1 October  to 31 December of each even -numbered year is 
mandated under FSMA as passed by Congress and therefore FDA has no discretion to extend this 
window.  
 
QUES TION 45:  
 
c) Would it be possible to at least establish a term of validity of more than two years for 
those companies that have a flawless track record?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  As noted above, the term of validity of two years for FDA food facility registration 
is mand ated within FSMA passed by Congress and FDA has no discretion to adjust this two -year 
period.  
 
Paragraph  3.255, Page 139 
 
"The FSMA requires that U.S. importers develop a Foreign Supplier Verification Programs (FSVP) for 
each type of human and animal food product and each foreign supplier they import to confirm that 
the imported good complies with FDA requirements, has the same level of public health protection 
as in the United  States, including preventive controls, produce safety regulations, and cont rols 
against adulteration or misbranding. On 10  May 2021, FDA launched the FSVP Importer Portal for 
FSVP Records Submission as a means for importers to upload FSVP records electronically to FDA.365 
More specifically, the FSVP rule requires importers to per form risk -based foreign supplier verification 
activities to verify that: (i)  the food is produced in a manner that provides the same level of public 
health protection concerning hazard analysis and risk -based preventive controls, or standards for WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 238 - 
 
  the safe production and harvesting of certain fruits and vegetables than U.S. -produced food; (ii)  the 
food is not adulterated; and (iii)  the human food is not misbranded (concerning food allergen 
labelling). Moreover, U.S. importers may request to participate in th e Voluntary Qualified Importer 
Program (VQIP), an expedited review and entry program for food. Four U.S. importers are approved 
to participate in VQIP for fiscal year 2022 (1  October  2021-30 September  2022)."  
 
QUESTION 46:  The new Foreign Supplier Verifica tion Program (FSVP) has created some doubts as 
to whether its implementation is really being effective for the purposes for which it was designed. 
Have these new programmes (FSVP) and procedures accelerated approvals compared to the 
previous period?  
 
RESPO NSE 46:  The purpose of the FSVP regulations under FSMA are to ensure that foreign food 
facilities are implementing processes and procedures that provide the same level of public health 
protection as preventive controls and produce safety regulations applicable to domestic food 
facilities. Since this requirement did not exist before the passage of FSMA, the regulations have 
provided a new outcome -based food safety prevention standard applicable to foreign facilities that 
is protective of pu blic health while being flexible on the approach that foreign facilities may take to 
achieve these outcomes. The FDA does not approve food facilities or products.  
 
QUESTION 47:  As the programme has been in place for several years, can the United  States  
provide data to demonstrate to what extent the import procedures have been simplified and 
streamlined and if it has accelerated approvals originating from the EU?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  The FDA does not approve food facilities or products.  
 
Page  141, Paragraph  3.263  
 
"During the period under review, three new specific trade concerns (STCs) were raised in the 
WTO SPS Committee relating to measures maintained by the United  States. In addition, three 
previously raised concerns continued to be discussed in the SPS  Committee; one of them raised by 
the European  Union concerning beef exports was reported as partially resolved."  
 
QUESTION 48:  The necessary evaluation for lifting restrictions  on the import of apples and pears 
from the European  Union  has been satisfactorily concluded since more than 5  years. The only 
missing step for allowing trade of these products under the agreed systems approach is the 
publication of the Final Notice by the  United  States . Although in 2018 the USDA re -confirmed that 
work for this publication was ongoing, 4  years later the import of apples and pears from the 
European  Union  according to the systems approach is still not allowed without any scientific 
justificat ion being provided. In addition, already in 2019, the United  States  has finalised its 
assessment positively to recognise 21  EU Member  States to be free of the pests Asian and Citrus 
long horned beetles (ALB and CLB). The only remaining step is the publicat ion of its final notice 
which has been put on hold for 3  years without a justification based on science. The EU would like 
to receive information on the foreseen date of publication of the Final Notices on the import of apples 
and pears from the European  Union and on the recognition of country pest free status for ALB and 
CLB? 
 
RESPONSE 48:  The U.S. Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on the request from eight European  Union  Member  States to export apples and pe ars 
under a systems approach to the United  States . The United  States  appreciates the interest of the 
EU in the status of our work to grant to the EU pest free status from Asian Longhorned Beetle and 
Citrus Longhorned Beetle. The U.S. Department of Agriculture is working through its administrative 
procedures to process this  request. The United  States  and the EU have engaged in bilateral technical 
discussions on this matter, including during the October  2022 Plant Health Working Group meeting.  
 
Paragraph  3.275, Page 144 
 
"During the review period, DOJ launched initiatives aim ed at enhancing actions and activities against 
anti-competitive practices. In November  2019, the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) was 
created to investigate and prosecute antitrust and other crimes that undermine competition in 
government procurem ent, grant, and program funding. PCSF has prosecuted collusion in security 
services contracts to U.S. and NATO military installations. The Judgment Termination Initiative, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 239 - 
 
  announced in May  2018, seeks to terminate antitrust judgments that no longer protect  competition 
through a review and a consultation procedure with the public.  " 
 
QUESTION 49:  Is the PCSF investigating anti competitive  practices with reference to both 
procurement covered by the US in the WTO  GPA and procurement non -covered in the WTO  GPA? 
 
RESPONSE 49:  The Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) leads a coordinated national 
response to combat antitrust crimes and rela ted schemes in government procurement, grant, and 
program funding at all levels of government  - Federal, state, and local. The PCSF is comprised of 
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, multiple U.S. Attorneys' Offices around the 
countr y, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Inspectors General for multiple Federal 
agencies. The PCSF seeks to prevent and investigate all instances of anti -competitive fraud against 
federal contracts, regardless of GPA coverage.  
 
QUESTION 50:  Is there any publicly available database or other information including reports or 
statistics on the investigations?  
 
RESPONSE 50 : For more information on the PCSF, see https://ww w.justice.gov/procurement -
collusion -strike -force or visit https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fbi -and-strike -force-target -fraud-
against -federal -contracts -051221 . The federal government does not publish statistics regarding 
PCSF investigations.  
 
Page  149, Paragraph  3.287  
 
"Regulatory changes to procurement were introduced by E.O.  14005 of 25  January  2021, which put 
in place the new Made in America initiative and established the Made in America Office (MIAO) within 
the OMB (Box  3.3).416 The E.O. also established a requirement for agencies to submit applicable 
waivers to the MIAO for review and directed the creation of a new website for public  transparency. 
This review of waivers does not affect the existing waivers already granted under the Trade 
Agreements Act for GPA parties and certain trade agreements. The new policy aims at  … reducing 
the number of waivers by making them subject to review ." 
 
QUESTION 51 : In the implementation of E.O.  14005 of 25  January  2021, how does the U.S. make 
sure that compliance with the U .S. international obligations within the WTO  GPA is ensured?  
 
RESPONSE 51 : Executive  Order  14005 is implemented through the U.S. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) in line with existing U.S. trade agreement obligations. FAR  Subpart  25.4 provides 
the policies and procedures applicable to federal acquisitions that are covered by trade 
agreements,  including  the WTO Agreement  on Gover nment  Procurement  (GPA).  See: https://www.
acquis ition.gov/far/subpart -25.4#:~:text=Subpart%2025.4%20 -%20Trade%20Agreements%202
5.400%20Scope%20of,procedures%20applicable%20to%20acquisitions%20that%20are%20cover
ed%20by -.. 
 
QUESTION 52:  Or example, how concretely it is ensured that the review of waivers does not affect 
existing waivers under TAA for GPA parties?  
 
RESPONSE 52:  In acquisitions covered by the WTO  Agreement  on Government Procurement (GPA), 
Free Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative has waived the Bu y 
American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products. These waiver designations 
granted under the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) are reflected in the FAR. Offers of eligible products 
receive equal consideration with domestic offers. See  FAR 25.402 
(https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). Existing waivers based on the TAA are not submitted to 
MIAO for review. For more information on procedures relating to procurement covered by the T AA, 
including the GPA, please refer to FAR  25.408 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.408 ). 
 
QUESTION 53 : What has been the experience so far with review of waivers by MIAO?  
 
RESPONSE 53 : Currently the  MIAO office is only reviewing waivers of Buy America provisions for 
non-availability of goods. For more information on these waivers, please visit the Made in America 
Office website at: www.madeinamerica.gov/waivers . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 240 - 
 
  Page  153, Paragraph  3.299  
 
"On 25  January  2021, the President signed E.O.  14005, which defined a new procurement policy 
(Box 3.3). Section  8 of E.O.  14005 requires the FAR Council to amend the FAR to: (i)  replace the 
component test used to identify domestic end products and domestic construction materials with a 
test under which domestic content is measured by the value that is added to the product through 
U.S.-based production or U.S. job -supporting economic activity."  
 
QUESTION 54 : Could the U.S. clarify how the value that is added to the product through U.S. -based 
production or U.S. job -supporting economic activity is measu red? 
 
RESPONSE 54 : The final rule, published as FAC  2022-05, amends the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) to implement Section  8 of E.O.  14005. Upon the 25 October  2022, effective date, the final 
FAR rule changes the domestic content threshold to 60 % immediately, then to 65 % for items 
delivered starting in calendar year 2024, and then to 75 % for items delivered starting in calendar 
year 2029. Notably, the final rule concerns procurements in which the Buy American Act applies, 
which are those below the  Trade Agreements Act threshold and above the micro -purchase threshold. 
Procurement opportunities covered by the GPA are unaffected by the rule change.  
 
Page  153, Paragraph  3.300  
 
"The Final Rule provide for a framework through which higher price preferenc es will be applied to 
end products and construction material deemed to be critical or made up of critical components. The 
definitions for critical component and/or critical item are added to the FAR: critical component is 
defined as a component that is min ed, produced, or manufactured in the United  States and deemed 
critical to the U.S. supply chain; critical item means a domestic construction material or domestic 
end product that is deemed critical to the U.S. supply chain. The list of critical items and c omponents 
will be added to newly designated FAR  25.105. The products that will receive a price preference will 
be determined in a separate rule. Once the list is established in the FAR, it will be published in the 
Federal Register for public comment no les s frequently than once every four years to reflect changes. 
For end products that are critical items or contain critical components, the reasonableness of the 
cost of the domestic offer is determined by adding to the price of the low offer, inclusive of du ty, 
20% plus the additional preference factor identified for the critical item or end product containing 
critical components, if the lowest domestic offer is from a large business concern, or 30% plus the 
additional preference factor if the lowest domestic  offer is from a small business concern.443 The 
Final Rule did not replace the component test in FAR  Part 25. Instead, the FAR Council decided to 
seek additional information regarding the current component test and requested public comment. 
Currently, unde r FAR  Part 25, the determination of whether a manufactured end product or 
construction material qualifies as domestic is made using a two -part test: (i)  the end product or 
construction material must be manufactured in the United  States; and (ii)  a certain percentage of 
all component parts (determined by cost of the components) must also be mined, produced, or 
manufactured in the United  States; this requirement was known as the 'component test' until early 
2021, when it was redesignated as the 'domes tic content test '." 
 
QUESTION 55:  Has the U .S. considered the option of clarifying the concept of what exactly 
constitutes a critical component/critical item or which products may receive a price preference , 
including what operations must be performed in t he United  States  to constitute domestic 
manufacturing?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  As stated in the 7 March  2022, Federal Register Notice (87  FR 12780), the final rule 
amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) creates a framework for application of an 
enhanced p rice preference for a domestic product/domestic construction material that is considered 
a critical item or made up of critical components. The list of critical items and critical components, 
along with the associated enhanced price preference, will be inc orporated in the FAR through a 
separate rulemaking. More information on the rule is available at the Office of the 
Federal  Register,  National  Archives  and Records  Administration  website  at: https://www.govinfo.g
ov/content/pkg/FR -2022-03-07/pdf/2022 -04173.pdf#page=1 . 
 
QUESTION 56:  As for determining what exactly constitutes a manufactured product in the U .S., 
could the U .S. state whether it intends to unify the slightly different definitions or standards, that 
the courts, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and federal  regulations have 
articulated, seeing as they are all slightly different?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 241 - 
 
  RESPONSE 56: Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. For purposes of federal procurement, please see definiti ons in 
federal regulations, see FAR  25.003 ( https://login.acquisition.gov/far/25.003 ). 
 
QUESTION 57 : What are the U.S. plans with regard to the establishment of a list of critical items 
and components?  
 
RESPONSE 5 7: Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. The list of critical items and critical components, along with the 
associated enhanced price preference, will be incorporated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) through a separate rulemaking. More information on the rule (87  FR 12780) is available at 
the Office of the Feder al Register, National Archives and Records Administration website at: 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR -2022-03-07/pdf/2022 -04173.pdf#page=1 . 
 
QUESTION 58:  How do the U.S. intend to ensure compliance with GPA in case end -products and 
construction material were to be covered by U .S. commitments in GPA, if any?  
 
RESPONSE 5 8: Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are  retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  156, Paragraph  3.310  
 
"Federal agencies submit contract, grant, loan, direct payment, and other award data at least twice 
a month, to be published on USAspend ing.gov . Data are [also] pulled or derived from other 
government systems, such as GSA's Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation 
(FPDS -NG)."  
 
QUESTION 59 : Does this FPDS -NG provide public information on all federal procurements 
independent of coverage and threshold?  
 
RESPONSE 5 9: Yes. FPDS data can be accessed through the System for Award Management (SAM) 
website at: https://sam.gov . 
 
Page  157, Paragraph  3.313  
 
"U.S. government procurement policy i s based on reciprocity with respect to market access; it is 
governed by specific trade agreements, including the GPA. Domestic purchasing requirements are 
maintained for procurement not covered by the GPA, the WTO plurilateral Agreement on Trade in 
Civil A ircraft, or preferential trade agreements."  
 
QUESTION 60 : While the Inflation Reduction Act ("IRA ") does not change federal procurement 
provisions, the legislation does include significant provisions related to federal spending. Do you 
have an estimation o f how much procurement funded by IRA is covered by the US commitments in 
WTO GPA, and how much is not?  
 
RESPONSE 60 : Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. To the extent that the IRA includes appropriations for federal 
agencies, federal acquisition regulations apply, unless otherwise provided.  
 
QUESTION 61 : The IRA includes tax credits wi th domestic content provisions. The provisions apply 
to steel, iron and manufactured products  - a terminology used in Buy America(n) provision. Can you 
explain how the language used in IRA for tax credits relates to Buy American/Procurement 
provisions?  
 
RESPONSE 61:  Implementing regulations are being developed. Regarding future reforms, the 
United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 62:  Do these provisions apply if the tax credit is granted for an investment in a 
procurement project?  
 
RESPONSE 62:  It is unclear what is meant by the phrase "investment in a procurement project".  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 242 - 
 
  Page  161, Paragraph 3.325  
 
"A government -wide procurement goal stipulates that at least 23% of all federal government 
contracting dollars should be awarded to small businesses. As part of this general goal, there are 
targeted sub -goals for the following small business categories: WOSB:  6%; SDB:  11%; 
SDVOSBC:  3%; and HUBZone:  3%. These sub -goals are not in addit ion to the 23% but are counted 
as part of the overall goals. Goals previously set were met overall in FY2017 to FY2020; for SDBs 
and SDVOSBCs, the goal was amply exceeded, but for the women -owned and HUBZone programs, 
they have generally not been met (Tabl e 3.36). The goals for subcontracting were also achieved. 
The goal for small business sub -contracting is 29.43%; the results achieved were 33.27% in FY2019 
and 32.46% in FY2020, for a total of USD  82.8 billion."  
 
QUESTION 63:  How does the U.S. make sure th at 23% target is respected by federal government 
entities?  
 
RESPONSE 63:  It is the policy of the Federal Government to provide maximum practicable 
opportunities in its acquisitions to small business, veteran -owned small business, service -disabled 
veteran -owned small business, HUBZone small business, small disadvantaged business, and 
women -owned small business concerns. Such concerns must also have the maximum practicable 
opportunity to participate as subcontractors in the contracts awarded by any executive agency, 
consistent with efficient contract performance. The Small Business Administration (SBA) counsels 
and assists small business concerns and assists contracting personnel to ensure that a fair proportion 
of contracts for supplies and services is placed  with small business. U.S. federal acquisition 
regulations also include small business preferences and set -asides, as well as procedures designed 
to promote the participation of small business in federal procurement opportunities. For more 
information, see  the SBA website at: www.sba.gov  and FAR  Part 19 
(https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part -19). 
 
QUESTION 64:  What are the consequences if the 23% is not met?  
 
RESPONSE 64 : The 23 % target is a goal not a mandatory measure. Each agency's final number is 
published on the small business procurement scorecard, av ailable at: https://sba.gov . Heads of 
contracting activities are responsible for effectively implementing the small business programs within 
their activities, including achieving program goals. They are to ensure that contra cting and technical 
personnel maintain knowledge of small business program requirements and take all reasonable 
action to increase participation in their activities' contracting processes by these businesses.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 AGRICULTURE AND  FISHERIES  
 
Page  203, Paragraph  4.67 
 
"Most U.S. food aid is provided in -kind, and U.S. laws stipulate a number of conditions for in -kind 
food aid. Title  II of the Food for Peace Act funds food assistance to meet emergency needs as well 
as development activities, i.e. non -emergencies, to address the root causes of food insecurity. The 
2018 Farm Act raised the minimum level of Title  II funds for non -emergency assistance from 
USD 350 million to USD  365 million per year, while maintaining annua l non-emergency assistance 
capped at 30% of Title  II funds. Title II resources are predominantly U.S. commodities purchased 
on the commercial market; they should preferably (minimum 50%) be shipped on U.S. -flagged 
vessels. The 2018 Farm Act amended the McG overn -Dole program to allow up to 10% (of the value) 
of the food to be distributed to be procured locally or regionally."  
 
QUESTION 65:  
 
a) Could the U .S. clarify how the Food for Peace Act meets the Nairobi commitments 
undertaken by U .S. in relation to the International Food Aid?  
 
RESPONSE  65: The United  States  implements its food aid programs consistent with the 
2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, Paragraph  23, by ensuring that all international food 
aid is needs -driven, in fully grant form, not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of 
agricultural products or other goods and services, not linked to the market development objectives 
of donor Members, and that agricultural food aid products are not re -exported. In addition, the U.S. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 243 - 
 
  Government conducts needs assessments and market analyses an d allows for local and regional 
procurement.  
 
QUESTION 66:  
 
b) Could the U .S. share how it sees its food aid policy developing in future and whether it 
intends to stop the practice of monetization of food aid?  
 
RESPONSE  66: Regarding future reforms, the Unite d States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. We look forward to keeping the Membership informed as 
appropriate if there are changes by the U.S. Congress in the future.  
 
QUESTION 67:  
 
c) How does the U .S. ensure that this practice does not have trade distorting effects?  
 
RESPONSE 67:  The United  States  implements its food aid programs consistent with the 
2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, including by conducting needs assessments and 
market analys es and allowing for local and regional procurement.  
 
U.S. relief agencies plan for and respond to humanitarian crises based on objective, evidence -based 
analysis provided by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network or FEWS NET (for more 
information, see: http://fews.net/about -us), and all U.S. food aid responses to humanitarian 
emergencies are provided through the United Nations' World Food Program, private voluntary 
organizations, and other qualified responders to e mergencies. The organizations work closely with 
the national and local governments in the recipient countries to identify the recipient regions and 
beneficiaries who need the programs to save lives, reduce suffering, and support recovery for 
millions in bo th acute and chronic emergencies.  
 
CFR 7 Part 1733 prohibits the distribution of U.S. commodities in a recipient country if the food aid 
would result in substantial disincentive to, or interference with, domestic production or marketing of 
agricultural com modities in that country. U.S. food aid for non -emergency development or capacity 
building is provided by private voluntary organizations, cooperatives, governments of developing 
countries and their agencies, universities, the United Nation's World Food Pr ogram, and other 
international organizations. The organizations providing U.S. food aid must conduct a "Bellmon 
analysis" and other market assessments before monetized food aid is provided. The local and 
regional market analysis of the Bellmon Determinatio n is conducted through market analysis that 
considers various market information such as quantitative and qualitative information, timing of 
harvests or a close substitute of the commodity in the country, suitability of commodity, and 
potential policy issu es.  
 
Page  203, Paragraph  4.68 
 
The paragraph mentions: "Agricultural reform has also been characterized by a significant shift 
towards forms of support that are less distortive of production and trade. At 32%, the share of the 
potentially most trade -distorting transfers has declined and is below the OECD average".  
 
QUESTION 68:  At what rate did the most trade -distorting transfers for refined sugar decline in the 
period 2016 -2020?  
 
RESPONSE 68 : Please see Table  4.5 on Page 204 for data on single commod ity transfers (SCTs) 
for refined sugar, in absolute terms and as a share of gross farm receipts. In value terms, the refined 
sugar SCT has been relatively stable, although the share of gross farm receipts has fluctuated 
between 38 and 57 percent during tha t period.  
 
Page  204, Table  4.5 
 
QUESTION 69:  In Table 4.5 on the total Producer Support Estimate (PSE) and single commodity 
transfer values for selected commodities for the period 2016 -20, the amount of PSE for refined sugar 
has increased by 46% in the period 2016 to 2020 from USD  907 million  to 1,327 million . What are 
the reasons for the increase in the PSE amount for refined sugar in the period 2016 -2020 and what 
has been the impact on the US domestic sugar price?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 244 - 
 
  RESPONSE 69 : The single commodity transfer (SCT) for refined sugar has been fairly stable during 
the period and reflects the difference between the farmgate price and the world price. Farmgate 
prices have risen in recent years due to market conditions (e.g.  production shortfalls) . There has 
been no significant change in the U.S. sugar market price support program during this period.  
 
Pages  205-206, Paragraph  4.72 and Chart 4.4 
 
"The U.S. commitment level on Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support 
(AMS)  - USD 19.1 billion, which excludes de minimis product -specific and non -product -specific 
support  - was therefore significantly higher than the Current Total AMS reported for the 2016 
(USD  3.8 billion) and 2017/18 (USD  4 billion) marketing years. This changed markedly in 2018/19, 
when MFP payments pushed product -specific support for key commodities (notably maize and 
soybeans) above the de minimis level, resulting in a Current Total AMS of USD  13.1 billion in that 
marketing year. Although the reported product -specific M FP payments were significantly lower in 
2019/20, the pandemic relief measures under the CFAP, in particular, resulted in a current total AMS 
of USD  18.25  billion in 2019/20, just USD  856 million below the U.S. commitment level."  
 
QUESTION 70:  
 
a) According to  the data provided by U .S., the current total AMS plus de -minimis was 
reported as USD 12.6 billion  in 2017 and is in most recent DS:1 2020/21 notification 
increased to USD 36.7 billion  or nearly double of its AMS limit of USD 19.1 billion . 
AMS+de -minimis in 2018 and 2019 was notified as USD 23.4 and USD 36.0 respectively. 
The NPS de -minimis arrive at 4.34%, which is in fact very near to 5% limit. The EU 
recognises that the U .S. respects  its commitment according to the Agreement on 
Agriculture, but can the U .S. elaborate more in detail on how this continued increase in 
Trade Distorting Support is in line with the Agreement on Agriculture (Article  20 which 
requires members to decrease the use of trade distorting support measures)?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  The United  States  remains committed to abiding by its WTO  commitments. 
Increased expenditures in 2018 through 2020 have been designed to be targeted, temporary, and 
to minimize or remove any impacts on producer decisions and markets.  The United  States  is actively 
engaged in advancing agricultural reform at the WTO and looks forward to working with other 
Members to find solutions that reduce distortions in agricultural markets, while also increasing th e 
resiliency and sustainability of food systems to reduce global food insecurity.  
 
QUESTION 71:  
 
b) Furthermore, taking into account the growing need for sustainable agricultural practices, 
can the U .S. explain whether any measures related to climate mitigating effects or 
reducing environmental impact have been implemented, and if so, what is the share in 
the total support covered by such measures?  
 
RESPONSE 71:  The United  States  is committed to building  sustainable agricultural practices and 
has implemented environmental and conservation programs. Some programs that have broader 
goals may have components or activities that mitigate the effects of climate change or reduce 
environmental impact. Given this caveat, "payments under environmental measures", notified under 
the Agreement on Agriculture, Annex  2, Paragraph  12 in 2020/21 accounted for 2.39% of total green 
box expenditures. (See G/AG/N/USA/166) . 
 
QUESTION 72:  
 
c) Can the U .S. give examples and the amou nts concerned by such climate mitigating 
measures?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  U.S. conservation and environmental programs cover a wide range of programs, 
including working lands programs, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), 
land retirement programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), as well as easement 
programs, partnership, and grant programs. In addition, most U.S. farm programs include 
conservation compliance requirements, such as those for highly -erodible lands a nd wetlands. In 
terms of funding, the projected 2018 Farm bill cost for conservation programs is USD 60 billion  over 
10 years, accounting for 7 % of the total projected 2018 Farm Bill cost.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 245 - 
 
  Page  216, Paragraph  4.102  
 
"The importation of fish or seafood is controlled at the border by CBP, but other government agencies 
also have a role, in particular the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), NMFS, and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS). FWS regulates the importation, exportation, and transport of ce rtain wildlife 
species through a licensing and declaration process. FWS also issues permits and certificates to 
ensure compliance with CITES and the Endangered Species Act. FDA play a role with respect to the 
safety of products; foreign processors that shi p fish or fish products must conform with the provisions 
in the Seafood Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) Regulation for fish or the National 
Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP) for bivalves. The regulatory aspects of aquaculture fall under 
state jurisdiction. NMFS's Seafood Inspection Program provides export certification services to 
exporters and works in cooperation with FDA through an MOU on a number of fish safety matters 
including standards, inspections, evaluations, certifications, and i nformation sharing."  
 
QUESTION 73:  Regarding notification (G/MA/QR/N/USA/2)  - in particular whether the restrictions 
notified under Measures No  10 and 11 relate to trade in sturgeons products and compliance with 
CITES  – U.S. restrictions go beyond the requ irements of the CITES convention, which prohibits the 
trade of certain wild sturgeon species but considers that international trade in captive -bred (farmed) 
specimen or produce of these species is not detrimental to the survival of wild stocks. In fact, 
commercial captive breeding of sturgeons helps ensure the survival of wild stocks. Is the U .S. 
considering revising its restrictions to make it more compatible with actual survival of wild stocks of 
sturgeon?  
 
RESPONSE 73:  Measures No  10 and 11 relate to the  prohibition on the importation and exportation 
of endangered and threatened species pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, and to the 
prohibition on the importation and exportation of certain species pursuant to CITES. The various 
species are identified in the links provided in the notification.  
 
With respect to CITES, Article  XIV, Paragraph  1, of the Convention states that the provisions of 
CITES shall in no way affect the right of Parties to adopt:  (a) stricter domestic measures regarding 
the conditions for trade, taking, possession or transport of specimens of species included in 
Appendices  I, II and III, or the complete prohibition thereof; or  (b) domestic measures restricting 
or prohibiting trade, taking, possession or transport of species n ot included in Appendix  I, II or III.  
 
With regard to distinguishing captive -bred populations from wild ones, the United  States  Endangered 
Species Act does not allow for captive -bred populations to be assigned separate legal status from 
their wild counterp arts on the basis of their captive state.  Please refer to the listing 
determination  and analysis  for Chimpanzees  in 2015 for more information,  available  at: https://w
ww.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/06/16/2015 -14232/endangered -and-threatened -wildlife -
and-plants -listing -all-chimpanzees -as-endangered -species . Though the analysis was de veloped to 
address Chimpanzees, and before that three antelope species, it applies generally.  
 
With respect to finalizing proposed listing rules under the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service reviews and fully considers all comments r eceived during open public comment 
periods and public hearings on proposed listing rules in order to base the final determinations on the 
best scientific and commercial information available.  
 
4.3 ENERGY  
 
Page  223, Paragraph  4.129  
 
"The United  States is a  global leader in energy -related research, development, and demonstration. 
In 2017, some USD  7.3 billion in federal funds were allocated to basic energy research (31%), 
energy efficiency (24%), renewable energy (16%), nuclear energy (11%), fossil fuels (6% ), and 
electric power systems (5%)."  
 
QUESTION 74:  Could the U .S. please update and specify the date source used in this paragraph?  
 
RESPONSE 74:  It appears that the Secretariat used data from the International Energy Agency's 
Energy Policies of IEA Countr ies: United  States  2019 Review , Page 107. According to this report, 
"IEA calculations [are] based on budgetary approvals for five agencies: DOE, Department of WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 246 - 
 
  Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, U .S. Agricultural Department, and 
Department of Transportation."  
 
4.4 MANUFACT URING  
 
Pages  228-229, Paragraphs  4.148 -4.149  
 
"(…) Steel and aluminum  products generally face low or zero MFN tariff rates, but many are subject 
to AD and CV duties, as well as Section  232 measures (Sections  3.1.6 and 3.1.7). Since 2018,  
USDOC has conducted and completed seven Section  232 investigations. (…) An investigatio n with 
respect to imports of neodymium -iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets was initiated in 
September  2021. The investigation was ongoing in February  2022."  
 
QUESTION 75:  The report notes that an investigation with respect to imports of 
neodymium -iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets ( "neodymium magnets ") was initiated in 
September  2021. The U.S. administration concluded the investigation in September  2022: the U.S. 
report concluded that  U.S. imports of neodymium magnets threaten U .S. national security. Whi le 
the EU disagrees that neodymium magnets constitute a national security threat, the EU welcomes 
the U.S. decision not to impose additional duties vis -a-vis imports from the EU. Rather the U.S. 
administration report recommends five types of recommendation s: notably engaging with allies; to 
bolster the U.S. neodymium magnet industry by targeting domestic supply; to promote the 
development of a domestic industry by enhancing domestic demand; to support the medium - to 
long-term development of the U.S. neodymi um magnet industry and enhance the resiliency of the 
U.S. NdFeB magnet supply chain; to continue to monitor the neodymium magnet value chain to 
ensure that U.S. and ally firms are not adversely impacted by non -market factors or unfair trade 
actions, such a s intellectual property violations or dumping. Would the U .S. be able to provide an 
update on the implementation of these recommendations?  
 
RESPONSE 75:  The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security published a fact 
sheet detailing the furth er actions the Biden -Harris Administration is taking to secure the NdFeB 
supply chain. It is available at: https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/section -232-
investigati ons/3142 -2022-09-fact-sheet -biden -harris -administration -announces -actions -to-secure -
rare-earth -element/file . 
 
Page  232, Paragraph  4.161  
 
"The measures taken worldwide to the counter the COVID -19 pandemic caused disruptions in the 
supply chains of several U .S. (sub)sectors operating under a just -in-time logistic. Disruptions in the 
production and delivery of semiconductors created problems for several domestic manufacturing 
activities, including vehicles, medical devices, and other products in 2021. Lawmaker s enacted the 
Creating Helpful Incentives To Produce Semiconductors For America Act, or CHIPS for America Act, 
Title XCIX of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021, which authorizes USDOC, to award financial  assistance to private entities or public -private 
consortia to finance, construct, expand, or modernize facilities to support the fabrication; assembly, 
test, and packaging; and advanced packaging of semiconductors. However, the Act does not 
appropriate fu nding for the law."  
 
QUESTION 76:  a) While the paragraph states that "However, the Act does not appropriate funding 
for the law", can the U .S. explain where the "financial assistance " is coming from?  
 
RESPONSE 76:  The appropriations were subsequently provided by the CHIPS and Science Act of 
2022, which was signed into law on 9 August  2022.  
 
QUESTION 77:  b) What are the criteria for awarding such assistance?  
 
RESPONSE 77:  The CHIPS Act sets forth the criteria for su ch assistance. Additional information 
about the selecting criteria for proposals for CHIPS incentives under the Section  9902 program will 
be provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce's CHIPS Program Office (CPO) in the future. Part 
IV of the implementati on strategy available on chips.gov provides early guidance on some evaluation 
factors the CPO will consider that require long -term planning on the part of potential applicants as 
they prepare to submit projects for consideration.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 247 - 
 
  QUESTION 78:  c) How much is involved in the fund and are there limits to the amounts to be 
granted to individual companies?  
 
RESPONSE 78:  The CHIPS Act appropriates USD 39 billion  for financial incentives to eligible entities 
to invest in facilities and equipment in t he United  States  for the fabrication, assembly, testing, 
advanced packaging, production or research and development (R&D) of semiconductors, materials 
used to manufacture semiconductors, or semiconductor manufacturing equipment.  
 
Per Public Law 116 –283, Se ction 9902 (a)(3)(B) of Title  XCIX - Creating Helpful Incentives to 
Produce Semiconductors for America, an investment in any individual project shall not exceed 
USD 3,000,000,000 unless the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of National Intelligence, recommends to the President, and the President certifies and 
reports to the appropriate committees of Congress, that a larger investment is necessary.  
 
The CHIPS Act of 2022 also appropriates USD 11 billion  for conduct res earch and prototyping of 
advanced semiconductor technology; to establish a National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing 
Program; and to establish one or more Manufacturing USA institute(s) to advance research and 
commercialization of semiconductor manufacturi ng technologies, and create an R&D program to 
advance measurement science, standards, material characterization, instrumentation, testing, and 
manufacturing capabilities.  
 
QUESTION 79:  d) Will the financial assistance granted under the objectives of this Act be notified 
to the WTO in accordance with Ar ticle 25 of the ASCM?  
 
RESPONSE 79:  If the assistance meets the criteria in Article  25.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing  Measures, we will notify it.  
 
Page  232, Paragraph  4.162  
 
"Other supply chains of interest for U.S. authorities mentioned in E.O.  14017 are (i)  high capacity 
batteries, including electric -vehicle (EV) batteries, and (ii)  critical minerals and other identified 
strategic materials, including rare earth elements. The authorities support the development of clean 
cars and trucks and have set up an objective of 50% of passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 
to be zero -emission vehicles.159 The EV Char ging Action Plan outlines steps federal agencies are 
taking to support the establishment of a national network of EV chargers (USD  7.5 billion  allocated 
by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, to replace old school buses with U.S. -made, 
zero-emissio n buses (additional USD  7.5 billion  allocated)), to promote the manufacturing of battery 
minerals, refined materials, battery components and batteries (USD  6 billion  allocated), and to foster 
the manufacturing of qualifying components for eligible vehicles  (USD  17 billion  in direct loans 
available through the Department of Energy Loan Programs Office's Advanced Technology Vehicles 
Manufacturing Program), among others. As concerns minerals and other strategic materials, the List 
of 35 Critical Minerals, esta blished in 2018 following E.O.  13817160, served as a basis for the 2021 
review, which extends the analysis to strategic products other than minerals. Similar to what was 
stated in E.O.  13953161, the recent review highlights the dependence on imports of sev eral products 
and suggests adopting an environmentally and socially responsible production; expanding domestic 
production and processing capacity, including recycling; using DPA Title  III and similar programs to 
support domestic capacities and emerging tec hnologies; and strengthening U.S. stockpiles, among 
others. An updated List of Critical Minerals covering 50  minerals was published in February  2022."  
 
QUESTION 80:  a) Can the U .S. explain how the funding mentioned in relation to battery 
manufacture is allocated?  
 
RESPONSE 80:  The first phase of US D 6 billion in funding for the domestic battery supply chain 
was split among 21  awards with US D 1.5 billion for upstream (processing) and  USD 1.6 billion for 
downstream (manufacturing and recycling). Upstream investments support separation of critical 
cathode materials, battery grade precursors, innovation separation, etc. The downstream funding 
supported projects in cathode and separator m anufacturing battery recycling, anode and electrode 
manufacturing, etc. Notable community benefits include: minority and/or DAC hiring goals, training 
programs and internships, engagement community colleges and trade schools, dedicated workforce 
specialist s, inclusion managers, and Tribal engagement. A fact sheet of awardees is available at the 
following Internet address: https:// www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -11/DOE BIL Battery 
FOA-2678 Selectee Fact Sheets.pdf . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 248 - 
 
  QUESTION 81:  b) What are the criteria for receiving funding?  
 
RESPONSE 81:  Criteria for the first tranche of funding (now closed) can be found in the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law (BIL) Battery Materials Processing and Battery Manufacturing Funding 
Opportunity Announcement (FOA) (Number: DE -FOA-0002678), published 2 May 2022, and 
available  at: https://eere -exchange.energy.gov/Default.aspx#FoaIdc53b6390 -dfb8-480a-9265-
3ffdec6c97b3 . 
 
QUESTION 82:  c) What conditions are associated with the direct loans to be provided for the 
Advanced Vehicles Manufacturing Program?  
 
RESPONSE 82:  A project must meet all of the following requirements to be eligible for an ATVM 
loan: 
 
• Manufacture eligible vehicles or comp onents that are used in eligible vehicles. Advanced 
technology vehicles were originally defined as light -duty vehicles that meet or exceed a 
25% improvement in fuel efficiency beyond a 2005 model year base -line of comparable 
vehicles; and/or ultra -efficien t vehicles which achieve a fuel efficiency of 75  miles per 
gallon or equivalent using alternative fuels. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law expanded 
the definition to include medium - and heavy -duty vehicles, locomotives, maritime vessels 
including offshore wind vessels, aviation, and hyperloop ; 
• Build new facilities; reequip, modernize, or expand existing facilities; and/or for 
engineering integration performed in the United  States  related to the manufacturing of 
eligible vehicles or components ; 
• Be located in  the United  States . Foreign ownership or sponsorship of the projects is 
permissible as long as the project is located in one of the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, or a U.S. territory ; 
• Provide a reasonable prospect of repayment ; 
• Other  requirements  as specified  in ATVM  guidance , available  at: 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2019/05/f62/Guidance_for_Potentia l_ATVM_
Applicants_May2019.pdf . 
 
In addition, an applicant must demonstrate that it has sufficient funds to carry out the project and 
is not dependent on other federal support as described in the Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007, as amended, as well as applicable federal regul ations. Please view the ATVM Home 
Page to see more details: https://www.energy.gov/lpo/advanced -technology -vehicles -
manufacturing -loan-program . 
 
QUESTION 83:  d) What amounts of funding will be provided under DPA Title  III and similar 
programs to support domestic capacities and emerging technologies?  
 
RESPONSE 83:  The Inflation Reduction Act provided US D 500 million related to DPA. Of the funds 
to use DPA as a  tool, US D 250 million went to the Department of Defense for critical mineral 
investments, and US D 250 million went to the Department of Energy (DOE) to support domestic 
heat pump production and deployment. Further DPA funding will be subject to additional  
Congressional appropriations. DOE's Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC) has 
multiple programs to support domestic energy manufacturing capacities and updated program 
notifications can be found on the MESC webpage ( https://www.energy.gov/mesc/office -
manufacturing -and-energy -supply -chains ). 
 
QUESTION 84:  e) Who will benefit?  
 
RESPONSE 84:  DPA will benefit energy manufacturing industries, communities,  consumers, and 
the U.S. economy and national security. More specifically, this action will benefit industrial producers 
and manufacturers who meet the criteria and are awarded funding. More details can be found in 
DOE's recently released Notice of Intent and Request for Information regarding establishment of a 
Program to Use Defense Production Act to Support Electric Heat Pump 
Manufacturing  and Deployment,  which  is available  at: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2
022-11/Heat  pumps  NOI_RFI_Final_Clean_FINAL110122_0.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 85:  f) Will the financial assistance mentioned under this paragraph be notified to the 
WTO in accordance wit h Article  25 of the ASCM?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 249 - 
 
  RESPONSE 85:  If the assistance meets the criteria in Article  27.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, the United  States  will notify it.  
 
QUESTION 86 : g) Is the funding mentioned in this context separate from that to be granted under 
the Inflation Reduction Act?  
 
RESPONSE 86:  Yes. 
 
4.5 SERVICES  
 
Page  249, Paragraph  4.226  
 
"Common carriers are generally required to interconnect with each other, either directly or through 
other common carriers' facilities. Interconnection agreements may be regulated at both the state 
and federal levels and FCC has the authority to address interconnection issues for such common 
carriers. Since the release of the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order238, providers of broadband 
Internet access services are regulated as information services."  
 
QUESTION 87:  The report states that broadband Internet access services are no longer governed 
as common carriers and implies that this reduces the regulator's powers. Has the U .S. taken any 
steps to ensure that fair competition is not harmed following the adoption of the 2017 Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order?  
 
RESPONSE 87:  The rationale for reintroduction of net neutrality rules is offered in the 
Executive  Order and the accompanying fact sheet. See:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -
room/statements -releases/2021/07/09/fact -sheet -executive -order -on-promoting -competition -in-
the-american -economy/ .. 
 
Additionally, per Mozilla v. FCC (D.C.  Cir. 2019) and ACA Connects v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2022), the 
California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act i s currently in effect in the most 
populous U.S. state.  
 
Page  252, Paragraph  4.233  
 
"The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established by P.L.  115-278 in 
November 2018 to lead cybersecurity and critical infrastructure security programs, operations, and 
associated policy. CISA's mandate includes providing guidance and recommendations on the security 
of underseas cables, which carry the bulk of international data traffic; however, CISA has no 
formalized policy or procedur e regarding data traffic on the grounds of cybersecurity. The 
Department of Homeland Security Data Framework Act of 2018 (P.L.  115-331) and the 
Strengthening, and the Enhancing Cyber -capabilities by Utilizing Risk Exposure (SECURE) 
Technology Act (P.L.  115-390) were enacted in December  2018. They aim at enhancing the 
cybersecurity framework and at mitigating supply chain risks in the acquisition of technology and 
equipment through a strategic plan to be developed by the Federal Acquisition Security Council.  
E.O. 13873 of 15  May 2019, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services 
Supply Chain, declared a national emergency to deal with the threat constituted by the unrestricted 
acquisition and use of certain information and communication s technology and services transactions. 
E.O. 14028 of 12  May 2021, Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, sought to widen cybersecurity 
efforts throughout all government agencies, and to enhance the security of the supply chain for 
critical software used by  the Federal Government."  
 
QUESTION 88:  Are Federal agencies required to comply with FedRAMP principles when selecting a 
cloud services provider?  
 
RESPONSE 88:  FedRAMP is mandatory for all executive agency cloud deployments and service 
models at the Low, M oderate, and High risk impact levels. Please refer to the FedRAMP Policy 
memo  for further  information  pertaining  to FedRAMP's  applicability:  https://www.fedramp.gov/ ass
ets/resources/documents/FedRAMP_Policy_Memo.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 89:  Would FedRAMP also be required or recommended for the supply of cloud services 
to private users?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 250 - 
 
  RESPONSE 89:  FedRAMP does not apply to private cloud deployment models, which is a cloud 
provisioned for exclusive use by a single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g.  business 
units).  
 
QUESTION 90:  What are the criteria according to which Federal agencies assess the risk impact 
level under FedRAMP?  
 
RESPONSE 90:  Please refer  to the NIST Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information 
Systems to Security Categories:  https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB -C13-
9af73460e5ff9ede8820abdf3a50041d/pdf/GOVPUB -C13-9af73460e5ff9ede8820abdf3a50041d.pdf . 
 
QUESTION  91: Do FedRAMP principles for any risk impact level include requirements regarding the 
nationality of the cloud service p rovider or its staff, and regarding the localization of data?  
 
RESPONSE 91:  FedRAMP requirements do not contain restrictions on nationality of persons. Within 
the High Baseline only, the SA -9(5) control parameters restrict data locality to the United  State s. 
 
Page  257, Paragraph  4.259 and Page  258, Paragraph 4.263  
 
"4.259 The United  States  considers its Marine Transportation System (MTS) as critical to national 
security and economic prosperity. The MTS is an integrated network that consists of 25,000  miles 
of coastal and inland waters and rivers serving 361  ports, supports USD  5.4 trillion  of economic 
activity each year, and accounts for the employment of more than 31  million  people.293 The size of 
the U.S. -flagged, privately owned fleet of self -propelled, cargo -carrying vessels of 1,000  gross tons 
and above continued to decline over the per iod under review: as of October  2021, there were a total 
of 180  privately owned vessels with a capacity of 8.2  million  dead weight tons, down from 
181 vessels in 2018.294 Of these, 96 were Jones Act eligible. The composition of the fleet was 
65 tankers, 62  container ships, 26  Ro/Ro, 20  general cargo ships, 4  dry bulk ships, and 3  vehicle 
carriers. Some 70% of the volume and 40% of the value of goods that the United  States  imports 
and exports move by water transportation.295 However, it is estimat ed that just 1.5% of U.S. 
waterborne imports and exports by tonnage move on oceangoing commercial vessels registered 
under the flag of the United  States . Although, the U.S. domestic water transportation (Jones  Act) 
market is served by approximately 41,000  vessels, only about 96 are above 1,000  tons; the rest 
are small ships, mainly tugs and barges, work and supply vessels used in the offshore oil industry, 
and specialty vessels such as pilot boats, dredge vessels, and others.  
4.263. Accordingly, one of the main DOT policy objectives is to keep the MTS strong in international 
trade, and, to this end, government programs under the DOT seek to partially compensate carriers 
for the operating cost differential between U.S. -flagged and foreign -flagged vessels. The  DOT 
considers that U.S. regulatory compliance is not a major impediment to the competitiveness of the 
U.S. flag registry, but future improvements in the regulatory process and policy may reduce costs 
without decreasing safety risk. To this end, legislatio n has been enacted requiring the DOT to 
collaborate with other agencies to address challenges within the MTS. Section  169 of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 provided that the DOT, in collaboration with the DOD, 
further develop a national sealif t strategy that ensures the long -term viability of the Merchant 
Marine; Section  603 of the Howard Coble Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 
(Coble Act) directed the DOT in consultation with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to submit to Congress 
a national maritime strategy to: (i)  identify federal regulations and policies that reduce the 
competitiveness of U.S. -flagged vessels in international transportation markets; and (ii)  include 
recommendations to make U.S. -flagged vessels more competitive i n shipping routes between the 
United  States  and foreign ports, increase the use of U.S. -flagged vessels to carry cargo imported to 
and exported from the United  States , and enhance the United  States ' shipbuilding capability. More 
recently, Section  3513(b) o f the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2019 amended Section  603(a) of the Coble Act to set a deadline of not later than 18  months after 
its enactment for the submission of the report. DOT issued a report to Congress with 
recommendations to improve competitiveness and the regulatory framework in early 2020."  
 
QUESTION 92:  Given the declining number of U .S.-flagged vessels, the limited tonnage of the U .S. 
fleet and its low volume share in maritime transport services to and from the USA, on what basis 
does the U .S. consider that compliance with the U .S. regulatory framework is not an impediment to 
the competitiveness of the U .S. fleet?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 251 - 
 
  RESPONSE 92:  The Uni ted States  does not consider that compliance with the U .S. regulatory 
framework is an impediment to the competitiveness of the U .S. fleet. There continues to be strong 
support for the Jones Act in the Administration and Congress.  
 
QUESTION 93:  The DOT report does not appear to "identify the federal regulations and policies 
that reduce the competitiveness of U.S. -flag vessels in international transportation markets" and 
indicates that the DOT "will provide a supplemental report at a later date".  Has this report been 
submitted?  
 
RESPONSE 93:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 94:  If so, could the U .S. provide the relevant access details? If not, can the U .S. provide 
some indication of the fields of legislation that could be amended to improve the competitiveness of 
the U .S. fleet?  
 
RESPONSE 94:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  259, Paragraph  4.264  
 
"Although the Jones Act limits cargo services to companies that use U.S. -built ships and U.S. 
mariners, it does not prevent foreign companies from establishing shipping companies in the 
United  States  if their U.S. affiliates can meet the law's requirements regarding citizenship, crew, and 
operation of domestic -built vessels. Foreign -owned U.S. companies may also own and operate ships 
flying the U.S. flag in inter national service."  
 
QUESTION 95 and 96:  Could the United  States  share data on the number of foreign companies 
providing shipping services established in the United  States ? How does this number compare to the 
number of U.S. -owned shipping companies?  
 
RESPON SE 95 and 96:  In 2021, approximately 1,900 distinct vessel operators were responsible 
for at least one ocean -going, merchant vessel call into a United  States  or Puerto Rican port. 
Approximately 130 of these vessel operators were domiciled in the United  States, and approximately 
1,780 were foreign -domiciled (not the United  States  or Puerto Rico). Of the foreign -domiciled 
operators, 6  operated at least one United  States -flagged vessel. In terms of proportion of vessel 
calls, MARAD estimates about 78% of total  merchant vessel calls were by vessels with foreign 
operators under foreign flags, 12% were by vessels with U.S. operators under U.S. flags, 9% were 
by U.S. operators under foreign flags, and about 1% were by foreign operators under foreign flags.  
 
MARAD a lso examined available data for 2022, from January through May. We find similar numbers:  
 
• About 120 domestic operators;  
• About 1,440 foreign operators, of which 5 operated U.S. -flagged vessels;  
• About 79% of vessel calls by foreign operators under foreign fl ags, less than 1% by foreign 
operators under U.S. flag;  
• About 10% of vessel calls by U.S. operators under U.S. flag, and 10% by U.S. operators 
under foreign flags.  
 
However, as of late November  2022, there were 8,470 non -vessel operating common carriers 
(NVOCC) in the United  States . Of them, approximately 4,169 (49%) are foreign operated and 4 ,301 
(51%) are domestic operators. Similarly, there were 3,216 domestic OFFs.  
 
There are a few points to note:  
Assigning commercial responsibility to a particular country can be difficult, as many shipping vessels 
in the international fleet have owners and managers that are different from the vessel operator, and 
often are located in different countries. Further, vessel operators themselves may be domicil ed in 
one country, but have ownership in a different country, or have multiple owners across different 
countries. MARAD has used the vessel operator country of domicile to identify whether the shipping 
company is U.S. or foreign, as this data point is typi cally publicly available and consistent across 
time. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 252 - 
 
  A related difficulty is that many of the vessel operators appear to be subsidiaries of one larger 
operation, or a group of related operations. Unfortunately, there is not a simple and reliable way to 
identify different vessel operators that might be operating under a single legal entity, as the vessels 
in question are also often owned and managed by distinct subsidiary companies.  
 
Finally, note that the measure of activity for this analysis is merchant v essel calls into U.S. and 
Puerto Rican ports. This was measured by MARAD using AIS and other historical data. Though this 
is a reliable measure of vessel activity, it is not a direct measure of commercial activity, and does 
not necessarily reflect data on,  for instance, the volume, quantity, tonnage, or value of cargo, 
imports, or exports that are delivered to/from U.S. ports by foreign or domestic operators. Rather, 
this is an attempt to answer the more simple question of the number of shipping companies d oing 
business at U.S. ports.  
 
Page  260, Paragraph  4.267  
 
"Waivers may also be exceptionally granted under the Launch Barge Exemption Program. This waiver 
is granted on rare occasions, when the launch of an exceptionally large oil rig or offshore platform 
requires the use of a foreign -built launch barge. 46  U.S.C.  55108 allows MARAD to make 
determinations allowing the use of these launch barges when no U.S. -built launch barge is available 
or technically capable. Regulations require that the platfor m owner or operator notify MARAD at least 
21 months prior to the contemplated use of a foreign -built launch barge. No new exemptions have 
been requested or granted during the period under review; one exemption was granted in 2014. 
MARAD may also grant waiv ers under the Anchor Handling Exemption Program. MARAD is authorized 
to make determinations under P.L.  111-281, allowing the use of foreign anchor -handling vessels 
(used to position mobile offshore drilling units) if no U.S. -flagged vessels are available. This program 
only applies to operations in the Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea, adjacent to Alaska. Since 2006, 
MARAD has issued decision letters allowing three foreign -flagged vessels into service for a limited 
length of time. No new exemptions have been gra nted since 2015."  
 
Page  260, Paragraph  4.268  
 
"Under the Aquaculture Program, implemented following the enactment of the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2010, 46  U.S.C.  12102, the Secretary of Transportation has the discretionary 
authority to issue exempt ions allowing documented vessels with registry endorsements or 
foreign -flagged vessels to be used in operations that treat aquaculture fish to protect the fish from 
disease, parasitic infestation, or other threats to their health when suitable U.S. vessels  are not 
available. The authority has been delegated to MARAD, which has recently been granting 
approximately four exemptions of this type per year. MARAD is responsible for determining 
U.S.-flagged Oil Spill Response Vessel (OSRV) availability before deci ding to use a foreign vessel."  
 
QUESTION 97:  Could the United  States  clarify whether ownership requirements exist for the 
following objects, e.g. whether an eligible vessel has to be wholly owned by a U.S. citizen:  
 
a) A foreign -built launch barge to be eligible for a waiver under the Launch Barge Exemption 
Program?  
 
RESPONSE  97: U.S. citizenship requirements are not applied to Launch Barges utilized under a 
waiver scenario.  
 
QUESTION 98:  
 
b) A foreign -flagged anchor -handling vessel to be eligible for a waiver under the Anchor 
Handling Exemption Program?  
 
RESPONSE 98:  The waiver authority for anchor handling vessels expired in 2017.  
 
QUESTION 99:  
 
c) Foreign -flagged vessel to be eligible for a waiver under the Aquaculture Program?  
 
RESPONSE 99:  U.S. citizenship requirements are not applied to aquaculture vessels utilized under 
a waiver scenario.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 253 - 
 
  Page  260, Paragraph  4.269  
 
"Under 10  U.S.C.  2631 Preference for United  States Vessels in Transporting Supplies by Sea (2021), 
100% of military supplies must be transported in available U.S. -flagged vessels at rates that are fair 
and reason able for U.S. commercial vessels. If availability or cost conditions cannot be met, the 
DOD can issue a waiver."  
 
QUESTION 100:  
 
a) Could the United  States  clarify the requirements and conditions under which a 
foreign -flagged vessel can be granted a waiver to transport military supplies due to the 
lack of availability of U.S. -flagged vessels?  
 
RESPONSE 100:  Waivers are 'in the interest of national defense. 4 6 U.S. Code § 501 permits 
waivers:  
 
• Upon request of the Secretary of Defense, when the waiver is necessary in the interest 
of national defense ; 
• If the United  States  Maritime Administration (MARAD) determines that no coastwise 
vessels are available and capa ble to provide the proposed transportation and a 
determination is made that the proposed transportation is "in the interest of national 
defense ". 
 
The maritime industry may request a Jones  Act waiver from U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), which is an agency of the Department of Homeland Security. Upon receipt of a waiver request, 
CBP forwards the request to MARAD, the Secretary of DHS, DOD, and  - if the transportation is energy 
related —the Department of Energy. To determine if there are U.S. -flag ve ssels available to meet the 
needs, MARAD surveys the maritime industry to establish the capability and availability of coastwise 
vessels to meet the needs of the requested transportation.  
 
QUESTION 101:  
 
b) Could the United  States  share data on the number of foreign -flagged vessels that have been 
granted such waiver since the entry into force of 10  U.S.C.  2631 Preference for United  States  
Vessels in Transporting Supplies by Sea (2021)?  
 
RESPONSE 101:  Data since the entry into force  of 10  U.S.C.  2631 Preference for United  States  
Vessels in Transporting Supplies by Sea (2021) is not yet available.  
 
Page  261, Paragraph  4.272  
 
"The maritime transport sector enjoys antitrust immunity for certain operations. U.S. and foreign 
operators of liner shipping services and marine terminal operators in the United  States benefit from 
exemptions to antitrust laws, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts, with respect to their 
operations in U.S. -foreign ocean -borne trade. Under the Shippin g Act of 1984, as amended by the 
Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998, agreements among liner operators and marine terminal 
operators (MTOs) to discuss, fix, or regulate transportation rates, and other conditions of service, 
or cooperate on operational  matters must be filed with and examined by the FMC. Privately owned 
ocean carriers must publish tariff rates and charges for carriage for trade with foreign countries. 
These rates are reviewed by the FMC, which also reviews the rates of government -control led ocean 
carriers to ensure that they are not unreasonably low."  
 
QUESTION 102:  The OSRA was reformed in 2022 to mitigate disruptions in international supply 
chains. Have the new powers granted to the FMC under the new act been used, and, if so, can the 
US provide details on the impact of the FMC's actions?  
 
RESPONSE 102:  The Federal Maritime Commission maintains a page on its website that is devoted 
to implementation of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022: https://www.fmc.gov/osra -2022-
implementation/ . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 254 - 
 
  Page  262, Paragraph  4.274  
 
"Support is also provided through the America's Marine Highway Project Grants program. The first 
round of Marine Highway Grants was awarded in September 2010. Since t hen, Congress has 
periodically appropriated funds for subsequent rounds, which are advertised through Notices of 
Funding Opportunity published in the Federal Register. Between 2010 and December  2021, 
44 grants were given, for USD  51,704,000."  
 
Page  263-264, Paragraph  4.281  
 
"The Office manages the Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP), a discretionary grant 
program. Funds for the PIDP are awarded on a competitive basis to projects that improve the safety, 
efficiency, or reliability of t he movement of goods into, out of, around, or within a port."  
 
QUESTION 103:  Could the United  States  clarify whether foreign -owned operators/companies or 
foreign -flagged vessels are eligible for the Marine Highway Project Grant, and whether 
foreign -owned c ompanies are eligible to receive funding under the Port Infrastructure Development 
Program?  
 
RESPONSE 103:  MARAD's Marine Highway Program has one major goal: expand the use of 
America's navigable waters. According to statute, funds are made available for m arine highway 
transportation projects that use vessels documented under 46  U.S.C. Chapter  121. Further, as cited 
in 46  U.S.C.  § 55605 the term "marine highway transportation" means "the carriage by a 
documented vessel of cargo". Eligible Applicants for the Port Infrastructure Development 
Program  - An eligible applicant for a FY 2022 PIDP discretionary grant is a port authority, a 
commission or its subdivision or agent under existing authority, a State or political subdivision of a 
State or  local government, an Indian Tribe, a public agency or publicly chartered authority 
established by one or more States, a special purpose district with a transportation function, a 
multistate or multijurisdictional group of entities, or a lead entity descri bed above jointly with a 
private entity or group of private entities (including the owners or operators of a facility, or collection 
of facilities, at a port). Federal agencies are not eligible applicants for the FY 2022 PIDP.  
 
Page  264-265, Paragraph  4.285 
 
"Title XI, by offering long -term debt repayment guarantees, encourages U.S. and foreign shipowners 
to obtain new vessels from U.S. shipyards. However, applicants for a project involving a vessel to 
be operated in the U.S. coastwise trade must demonstrate U.S. citizenship for the owner and any 
bareboat charterer. Additionally, if the applicant is a partnership or limited liability company, 
governing agreements for the entities must be in a form and substance satisfactory to MARAD. […] 
The approx imate subsidy available for Title  XI was USD  35.4 million, as of April  2021. Loan 
guarantees based on the average risk for projects MARAD previously guaranteed could support some 
USD 487 million in loan guarantees. As of January  2022, there were six applic ations pending for a 
total of USD  569.2  million; in five cases, the review was in progress; in one case, it had been 
completed and was pending recommendation. As of end -December  2020, Title  XI guarantees 
totaling USD  2.49 billion were outstanding."  
 
QUESTION 104:  Could the United  States  share data on the number of foreign shipowners who have 
been granted a loan guarantee under Title  XI during the period under review?  
 
RESPONSE 104:  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 revoked th e Maritime 
Administration's authority to provide loan guarantees for eligible export vessels. Therefore, no 
foreign shipowners received a loan guarantee under Title  XI. One U.S. shipowner received a loan 
guarantee during FY2020 and one U.S. shipowner recei ved a Title  XI loan guarantee in FY 2022.  
 
QUESTION 105:  How does this number compare to the number of U.S. shipowners who have been 
granted the loan?  
 
RESPONSE 105:  See Response  104. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 255 - 
 
  Page  265, Paragraph  4.287  
 
"The CRF scheme provides tax -deferral benefits to U.S. -flagged operators with respect to gains 
attributable to the sale or loss of a vessel, provided the proceeds are used to expand or modernize 
the U.S. merchant fleet. Its main purpose is to promote the construction, reconstruction, 
reconditioning, or acquisition of merchant vessels that are necessary for national defense and to the 
development of U.S. commerce. A CRF may be established by any U.S. citizen who owns, in whole 
or in part, a vessel or vessels operating in the foreign or domestic commerce of the United  States 
or in the fisheries. Owners of vessels operating in the fisheries of the United  States, its territories, 
and possessions are also eligible."  
 
QUESTION 106:  
 
a) Could the United  States  clarify whether there is a citizensh ip requirement for owners of 
vessels operating in the fisheries of the United  States , its territories and possessions to 
benefit from the CRF scheme?  
 
RESPONSE 106:  In order to establish a CRF, a U.S. citizen must have an ownership share in excess 
of one h alf. 
 
QUESTION 107:  
 
b) Could the United  States  clarify whether there is a minimum ownership share by a U.S. 
citizen required for a partially foreign -owned vessel operating in the foreign or domestic 
commerce of the United  States  or in the fisheries to benefi t from the CRF scheme?  
 
RESPONSE 107:  In order to establish a CRF, a U.S. citizen must have an ownership share in excess 
of one half.  
 
Page  275, Paragraph  4.322  
 
"Three E.O.s issued in August  2020 and January  2021 took actions to limit the functionalities of a 
dozen mobile applications identified as posing a threat to the privacy of U.S. citizens and 
residents.372 These decisions were later revoked by E.O.  14034 in June  2021373; however, this 
directive required instead that, not later than 1 80 days after the date of the order, the Secretary of 
Commerce provide a report to the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor 
recommending additional executive and legislative actions to address the risk associated with 
connected software  applications that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons 
owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of, a foreign adversary. The 
Department of Commerce continues to work with the National Security Council an d the Assistant to 
the President and National Security Advisor on those recommendations."  
 
QUESTION 108:  
 
a) What is to be understood by "connected software applications"?  
 
RESPONSE 108:  "Connected software applications" is defined in E.O.  14034 and in a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking amending 15  C.F.R.  § 7.2 published on 23 November  2021 as "software, a 
software program, or a group of software programs, that is designed to be used on an end -point 
computing device and includes as an integral functionality, the ability to collect, process, or transmit 
data via the internet ". As of December  2022, the Department of Commerce has not yet published a 
final rule implementing this definition.  
 
QUESTION 109:  
 
b) What is the concept of a "foreign adversary"?  
 
RESPONSE 10 9: "Foreign adversaries" is defined in E.O.  13873 and 15  C.F.R.  § 7.2 as "any foreign 
government or foreign non -government person engaged in a long -term pattern or serious instances 
of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United  States  or security and safety 
of United  States  persons ". 15  C.F.R.  § 7.4 lists the following foreign governments and 
non-government persons that the Secretary of Commerce has determined to be foreign adversaries WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 256 - 
 
  based upon this definition: The Peopl e's Republic of China, including the Hong  Kong Special 
Administrative Region; the Republic of Cuba; the Islamic  Republic  of Iran; the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea; the Russian  Federation ; and Venezuelan politician Nicolás  Maduro. This list 
identif ies foreign adversaries solely for the purposes of E.O.  13873, 15  C.F.R.  Part 7, and any 
subsequent rules implementing those authorities. It does not reflect a determination by the 
United  States  about the nature of such foreign governments or foreign non -government persons for 
any other purpose. Additional information about foreign adversaries, including certain factors and 
sources of information that the Secretary of Commerce considers when designating foreign 
adversaries pursuant to these authorities, is reflected in regulations published in the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulations (15  C.F.R.  Part 7) and on the U.S. Department of Commerce's website at : 
https: //www.commerce.gov/issues/ict -supply -chain . 
 
QUESTION 110:  
 
c) What recommendations are being considered or have been made for additional executive 
and legislative actions?  
 
RESPONSE 110:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 111:  
 
d) What is the status of the discussions led by the Department of Commerce on these issues?  
 
RESPONSE 111:  The Department of Commerce continues to work with the National Security Council 
and the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor on implementation of EO  14034.  
 
Page  275, Paragraph  4.323  
 
"The Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2020 (P.L.  116-207) required NIST 
to develop and publish standards and guidelines for the Federal Government on the appropriate use 
and management of IoT devices. The OMB must update policies and principles to be consistent with 
standards and guidelines established by NIST. Subsequently, NIST  developed IoT -specific guidelines 
for federal agencies and a collection of technical and non -technical cybersecurity capabilities required 
to implement the cybersecurity controls."  
 
QUESTION 112:  
 
a) Is there is a requirement on Federal agencies to comply wi th the standards and guidelines 
developed by NIST for the use and management of IoT devices?  
 
RESPONSE 112:  Under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), NIST develops 
security standards and guidelines for non -national security federal agency systems, which may be 
mandatory for federal agencies. The IoT Cybersecurity Act of 2020 requires NIST to provide guidance 
for federal agencies on "the appropriate use and management by agencies of [IoT] devices" 
connected to information syst ems. NIST's security guidance for federal systems and applies as much 
to IoT devices as to any other information, communications, or operational technology. NIST has a 
range of specific guidelines on IoT that can be found here:  https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied -
cybersecurity/nist -cybersecurity -iot-program . 
 
QUESTION 113:  
 
b) Do any such standards and guidelines include requirements regarding the nationality of 
the IoT device/service supplier or its staff, and regarding the localization of data?  
 
RESPONSE 113:  No. 
 
QUESTION 114:  
 
c) Are these standards and guidelines also required or recommended for the supply of IoT 
devices for private users?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 257 - 
 
  RESPONSE 114:  NIST's guidance  is not required for the private sector or private users, though 
many of the recommendations are relevant and available for voluntary use.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
1 THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM  
 
Page  4, Paragraph  1.2 
 
"The United  States recognizes that trade can  - and should  - be a force for good. Done right, and in 
coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle class, redress inequality, and level 
the playing field by promoting fair c ompetition. We remain committed to upholding a fair and open 
global trading system  - one that follows through on our partners' longstanding commitment to 
conduct economic relations with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, and 
promoting sustainable development."  
 
QUESTION 115:  Can the U .S. explain how it will ensure upholding an open global trading system 
in view of the increase in Buy America(n) policies?  
 
RESPONSE 115 : Buy American policies are consistent with global trade rules and with the 
Administration's trade agenda to strengthen the  resiliency of supply chains to promote economic 
security, national security, good -paying jobs, and the health of small and medium sized business 
with strong standards for environmental sustainability and community engagement.  
 
QUESTION 116:  Can the U .S. explain how increasing domestic content thresholds initially from 
55% to 75% in calendar year 2029 is consistent with U .S. calls to adopt policies that promote true 
market competition?  
 
RESPONSE 116:  The change in domestic content rules is expected to creat e more opportunities for 
small - and medium -sized manufacturers and their employees, including small and disadvantaged 
enterprises, from all parts of the country.  For more information, please see the fact sheet on the 
rule change, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -
releases/2021/07/28/fact -sheet -biden -harris -administration -issues -proposed -buy-american -rule-
advancing -the-presidents -commitment -to-ensuring -the-future -of-america -is-made -in-america -by-
all-of-americas/ . 
 
2 THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT  
2.3 FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT  
 
Page  5, Paragraph  2.6 
 
"U.S. fiscal support measures (including additional spending and discretionary tax cuts), which 
ultimately exceeded 25% of U.S. GDP through the third qu arter of 2021, were a key factor in the 
quick recovery of the U.S. economy that was faster than that of most of our trading partners. U.S. 
federal government spending, which directly supported firms and workers as well as state and local 
governments, was s ubstantially larger than comparable efforts in other major economies. The UK 
response was under 20% of GDP and average spending in the euro area was 12% of GDP."  
 
QUESTION 117:  How much direct support was given to firms?  
 
QUESTION 118:  How were firms selected for the support?  
 
QUESTION 119:  Will this support be notified to the WTO under Article  27 of the ASCM?  
 
RESPONSE to Questions 117, 118, and 119:  Fiscal support to firms was primarily given in the 
form of forgivable Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. These were pandemic emergency loans 
to small businesses structured like a furlough program and designed to scale with payroll expenses, 
with the objective of helping small businesses retain workers rather than lay them off. Businesses 
who maintained staffing over their loan period got some or all of their PPP loan forgiven. While 
specific eligibility varied somewhat over the course of the program a nd by industry, sole proprietors 
and small businesses with fewer than 500  employees were generally eligible. According to the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office, the total cost of the PPP program reached $900  billion  over several WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 258 - 
 
  rounds of funding throughout  2020. The United  States  will make the proper notification to the WTO, 
as it always has.  
 
Page  6, Paragraph  2.8 
 
"According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget Mid -Session Review of the FY2023 Budget, 
the federal budget deficit is projected to be USD  1.3 trillion (4.9% of GDP) in FY2023 and then to 
stabilize in the 4.2 -to-4.5% of GDP range during the final years of the Budget window (2028 -32). 
The gross Federal debt -to-GDP ratio is projected at 125.4% in FY2022 before declining to 1 16.4% 
in FY2032."  
 
QUESTION 120:  What will be the estimated impact of the increase in interest payments on the 
U.S. public deficit and debt, following the ongoing increase in U .S. interest rates?  
 
RESPONSE 120:  See response to Question  3. 
 
3 ADVANCING A WORKER CENTRIC TRADE POLICY  
3.3 STANDING UP FOR WORKER RIGHTS  
3.4 ACCELLERATING DECARBONIZATION AND PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES  
 
Page  9, Paragraph  3.7 
 
"The traditional approach to climate and environmental issues within trade has primarily focused on 
advancing levels of environmental protection for our trading partners. The United  States will 
continue this work to strengthen and expand those commitments, but we also recognize that this 
singular approach will not fully ach ieve our climate goals. To this end, the United  States is pursuing 
a new generation of trade policies that will more affirmatively promote the decarbonization necessary 
to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius."  
 
QUESTION 121:  The U .S. has promoted the domestic use of maritime highway services to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions through the Marine Highway Programme. Has the U .S. assessed whether 
removing restrictions on access to its maritime transport services market could also support th e 
decarbonisation of freight transport on its territory, by increasing the modal share of waterborne 
transport?  
 
RESPONSE 121:  The America's Marine Highway Program (AMHP) has one major goal of increasing 
the modal share of waterborne transport through expa nding the use of America's navigable waters, 
and facilitating their further integration into the current U.S. surface transportation system, 
especially where water -based transport is the most efficient, effective, and sustainable option. The 
AMHP has prove n track record of substantial public benefits since its inception in 2010, including but 
not limited to reduced greenhouse gas emissions, relieved landside congestion and road 
maintenance savings, and improved public safety and transportation system resili ency.  
 
4 TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  
4.5 OTHER MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES  
 
Pages  17-18, Paragraph  5.17 
 
"Addressing foreign subsidies that affect U.S. businesses is another critical trade enforcement 
activity. USTR and U.S. Department of Commerce Enforcement and Compliance staff researched 
foreign subsidies and met with representatives of U.S. industries concerned with the subsidization 
of foreign competitors. The United  States examines the complaints and concerns raised by U .S. 
exporting companies and monitors the foreign subsidy practices in question to determine if there is 
reason to believe they are impeding U.S. exports and are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement."  
 
QUESTION 122:  Do USTR and other U .S. authorities collect  systematically and publish data on 
subsidies beyond the purpose of trade defence instruments?  
 
RESPONSE 122:  The United  States  does not systematically collect and publish such data.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 259 - 
 
  4.7 OTHER INITIATIVES  
 
Page  26, Paragraph  5.80 
 
"In 2017, the United  States  launched an investigation into China's acts, policies and practices 
relating to technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation under Section  301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. The findings made in this investigation led to substantial U .S. tariffs on imports from 
China as well as corresponding retaliation by China. Against this backdrop, in January  2020, the two 
sides signed the U.S. -China Economic and Trade Agreement, commonly referred to as the 'Phase 
One Agreement '. This Agreement inc luded commitments from China to improve market access for 
the agriculture and financial services sectors, along with commitments relating to intellectual 
property and technology transfer and a commitment by China to increase its purchases of U.S. goods 
and services."  
 
Page  26, Paragraph  5.81 
 
"China has not yet implemented some of the more significant commitments that it made in the Phase 
One Agreement, such as commitments in the area of agricultural biotechnology and the required 
risk assessment that China  is to conduct relating to the use of ractopamine in cattle and swine. China 
has also fallen far short of implementing its commitments to purchase U.S. goods and services in 
2020 and 2021. Meanwhile, other commitments that China made, such as in the area o f technology 
transfer, are difficult to verify given the tactics that China uses to obscure its activities. Importantly, 
this Agreement did not meaningfully address the more fundamental concerns that the United  States  
has with China's state -directed, non -market policies and practices and their harmful impact on the 
U.S. economy and U.S. workers and businesses. The United  States  is exploring appropriate next 
steps."  
 
Page  29, Paragraph  5.100  
 
"… The United  States requested consultations with China in March of 2018 under the WTO  dispute 
settlement process in DS542:  China  - Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights. (...) The United  States also actively relies upon relevant enforcement provisions in 
its domestic law, incl uding Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974, border enforcement measures 
(including in cooperation with foreign customs authorities), and criminal statutes as they may apply, 
including as to the misappropriation of trade secrets."  
 
QUESTION 123 : Given the s hortcomings of the Phase One Agreement and the indication that said 
Agreement " did not meaningfully address the more fundamental concerns that the United  States  
has with China's state -directed, non -market policies and practices and their harmful impact on the 
U.S. economy and U.S. workers and businesses ", can the U .S. elaborate on what could be the next 
steps to address these concerns?  
 
RESPONSE 123:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospect ive exercises.  
 
QUESTION 124 : As a result of the Section  301 investigation into China's acts, policies, and practices 
related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and Innovation that the USTR initiated on 
18 August  2017, the U .S. started to impos e additional tariffs on imports from China (in 4  rounds) as 
from July  2018. In May  2022, USTR began the statutorily required review of the tariffs  - four years 
after they that have been imposed. As USTR received requests for continuation of the tariffs, these 
have been extended while the review is conducted. Can the U .S. provide more information on this 
process, including with regards to timelines?  
 
RESPONSE 124 : USTR recently released information regarding the four -year review process. This 
information is publicly available on the USTR website, and a notice regarding the next steps in the 
review process was published in the Federal Register at 87  Fed. Reg. 62,914 on 17 October  2022.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 260 - 
 
  4.8 OTHER TRADE ACTIVITIES  
 
Page  29, Paragraph  5.97 
 
"Additionally, inappropriate protection of geographical indications, including the lack of transparency 
and due process in some systems, limits the scope of trademarks and other IP rights held by U.S. 
producers and imposes barriers on market access for U.S .-made goods and services that rely on the 
use of common names, such as 'feta' cheese."  
 
QUESTION 125:  What is the U .S. view on how "inappropriate protection of geographical indications" 
can be improved in order to remove barriers for U .S. goods using comm on names which otherwise 
are protected as GIs outside of U .S. market?  
 
RESPONSE:  In the United  States , when an applied -for GI includes a generic term, a statement must 
be in the record to show that the generic term is free for use by other producers. The disclaimer 
statement printed on a registration certificate provides helpful transparency and public notice 
regarding the non -protectability of generic terms in compound geographical indications. Disclaimers 
also provide certainty as to what part is protected, and what is not. Moreover, U.S. trademark 
examining attorneys consider the term's primary significance to consumers (i.e.  that the relevant 
consumers would use or understand the applied -for matter as indicating a class of goods or servic es 
with which it is used). The sources of evidence used include standards of identity, dictionary 
meaning, usage by consumers and competitors, and any other source of evidence bearing on how 
consumers perceive a term's meaning, including relevant and proba tive consumer surveys.  
Appropriate protection in regard to the protection of GIs include:  
 
• Ensuring that the grant of GI protection does not violate prior rights (for example, in cases 
in which a U.S. company has a trademark that includes a place name);  
• Ensuring that the grant of GI protection does not deprive interested parties of the ability 
to use common names, such as parmesan or feta;  
• Ensuring that interested persons have notice of, and opportunity to oppose or to seek 
cancellation of, any GI protectio n that is sought or granted; and  
• Ensuring that notices issued when granting a GI consisting of multiple terms identify its 
common name components.  
 
General considerations on IRA  
 
The United  States  recently enacted the Inflation Reduction Act. This statute was thoroughly 
conceived and discussed by the U .S. during the trade policy review period 
(October  2018 - June 2022). The European  Union  considers that several financial subsidy schemes 
contained in this Act are clearly incompatible with the WTO  Agreement s. Specifically, the 
European  Union  believes that:  
 
1) The regional content and assembly requirements of the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit amount 
to less favourable treatment of automotive vehicles, critical minerals, batteries and battery 
components imported from t he European  Union  compared to the identical goods 
originating in the United  States , in breach of the national treatment obligation in 
Article  III:4 of the GATT  1994, and identical Canadian and Mexican goods, in breach of 
the most -favoured nation (MFN) obligation in Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994; 
2) The domestic content requirements of the Extension and Modification of credit for 
Electricity from Certain Renewable Resources Tax Credit, the Extension and Modification 
of Energy Tax Credit, Clean Electricity Pr oduction Tax Credit, and the Clean Electricity 
Investment Tax Credit amount to less favourable treatment of steel, iron and energy 
technology components imported from the European  Union  compared to the identical 
goods originating in the United  States , in b reach of the national treatment obligation in 
Article  III:4 of the GATT  1994; and  
3) The Sustainable Aviation Fuel Tax Credit, the Tax Credit for Production of Clean Hydrogen, 
the Advanced Manufacturing Production Tax Credit, and the Clean Fuel Production Tax 
Credit could amount to adverse effects.  
 
QUESTION 126:  The European  Union  would therefore like to inquire how the United  States  intends 
to bring itself into full compliance with its obligations under the WTO  Agreement s, and remove the 
econom ic damage inflicted on its trading partners?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 261 - 
 
  RESPONSE 126:  The United  States  intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION – FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS  
WT/TPR/S/434  - The WTO Secretariat Report  
 
Page 26, table 1.4  
 
QUESTION 2:  As a general category. What does this category consist of and what definition of 
subsidy is used? For example, does this table include relocation subsidies such as tax breaks granted 
to Amazon t o build a New York -based warehouse  (https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily -tax-report -
state/amazon -gets-124-million -tax-break -for-new-york-warehouse )? 
 
RESPONSE 2:  Table  1.4 of the Secretariat's report covers total U.S. federal government revenues 
and expenditure from 2017 through 2021. According to the BEA glossary, subsidies are the 
"monetary grants paid by government agencies to priv ate business or to government enterprises at 
another level of government". Tax breaks would not be included in this measure or Table  1.4 more 
generally as they are foregone revenues rather than payments. With respect to the example given, 
that would not ap ply to Table  1.4 as that is a state/local government policy rather than a federal 
one. 
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 1:  As the subsidy definition only applies to the federal level, what is then 
the definition used at sub -federal level and where are such amounts repo rted in the Report?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 1:  Table  1.4 of the Secretariat's report appears to have been compiled by 
the Secretariat based on information from the BEA. The BEA definition of "subsidy" is obviously not 
the same as the definition in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, so may not 
be particularly relevant in the context of a trade policy review. We are not aware of any place in the 
Secretariat Report that has comparable data for the sub -federal levels of government.  
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 2 and 3:  How is forgone revenue reported in the Report, both at federal 
and state level? Is this notified to the WTO under the ASCM?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 2 and 3:  We are not aware of where foregone revenue might be found in 
the Secretariat R eport. All tax benefits entailing revenue foregone at the federal and sub -federal 
levels can be found in our most recent subsidy notification (see, G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021).  
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 4 and 5:  Does the U.S. keep track of relocation subsidie s (i.e. tax breaks 
to attract enterprises to a certain jurisdiction) at sub -federal level? How does the U.S. make sure 
that a subsidy race is avoided at sub -federal level?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 4 and 5:  Location or relocation subsidies to producers of goods provided 
at sub -federal levels of government can be found in our subsidy notifications. States have significant 
leeway to decide how they wish to attract investment.  
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 6 and 7:  Are there any state/local government policies, which ar e 
considered subsidies within the meaning of the SCM agreement, and are therefore notified to the 
WTO? Which ones?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 6 and 7:  As noted in the Secretariat Report, the most recent subsidy 
notification of the  United  States includes nearly 75 0 programs at sub -federal levels of government.  
 
Page 40, paragraph 2.9  
 
"In 2021, the Administration launched its American Rescue Plan, which was signed into law in March, 
with the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117 -2). While the impetus of the Am erican Rescue 
Plan was a massive stimulus package focused on the pandemic, it also addressed supply chain 
resilience, provided funding for COVID -19 vaccines, and more broadly tackled medical supply chain 
issues. The Administration continued to address the issue of critical supply chains through its 
100-day assessment for four critical products in particular: semiconductor manufacturing and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 262 - 
 
  advanced packaging, large -capacity batteries, critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals 
and active pharmaceu tical ingredients.  11 As part of this assessment, recommendations were made 
on strengthening international trade rules through trade enforcement mechanisms, i.e. 
establishment of a trade strike force, and pursuing a Section  232 investigation on neodymium 
magnets, and also working with allies to decrease vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Thereafter, 
in response, USTR established the interagency Supply Chain Trade Task Force 12, a Section  232 
investigation on neodymium was launched, and discussions were  held with trading partners on 
addressing supply chain vulnerabilities. Modifications to Buy American provisions were introduced 
by the Build America, Buy America Act, Subtitle A - Build America, Buy America of Title IX of Division 
G of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 15  November  2021 (P.L. 117 -58) 
(Section  3.3.6)."  
 
QUESTION 4:  Buy America requirements traditionally extend to public works transportation and 
water -related infrastructure. The IIJA expands Buy America coverage to other infrastru cture projects 
funded by federal grants, including transmission facilities; structures and equipment of electric 
utilities; broadband infrastructure; and real property and buildings. Other projects may be covered; 
for example, the IIJA authorizes federal f unding for an expanded clean school bus program. Although 
the program authorized in the IIJA to fund purchases of electric school buses by local school districts 
contains no explicit Buy America references, EPA may determine that Buy America requirements w ill 
extend to these items as well. Furthermore, Buy America requirements previously applied to iron, 
steel, and certain manufactured goods. The IIJA broadens coverage to include nonferrous metals, 
such as copper used in electric wiring; plastic - and polyme r-based products; glass, including optical 
fiber; and certain other construction materials, such as lumber and drywall. How will the U.S. make 
sure that the above -described expansion is compatible with U.S. commitments in the 
WTO Agreement on Government Pr ocurement ("GPA")?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  See initial guidance Office of Management and Budget Memorandum for Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (M -22-11), issued on 18  April 2022. The memorandum 
provides that the guidance must be applied in a manner consis tent with the obligations of 
the United  States under international agreements, pursuant to section 70914(e) of the Build 
America, Buy America Act. See: https://www.whiteho use.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/04/M -22-
11.pdf . 
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 8:  Does the U.S. consider that the phrase: "the guidance must be applied 
in a manner consistent with the obligations of the  United  States under international agreements" 
provides sufficient clarity, considering that it might be complex for a procuring entity  to determine 
whether the GPA applies in a specific case under the IIJA (and therefore the Buy America provisions 
do not apply)?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 8:  In addition to noting the statutory and regulatory requirement that the 
IIJA would be applied in a manne r consistent with international trade obligations, the EU was 
additionally directed and provided a link to the Initial Implementation Guidance on Application of 
Buy America Preference in Federal Financial Assistance Programs for Infrastructure. The 
memoran dum provides 14 -pages of guidance for agencies, as well as procurement examples and 
definitions.  
 
In response to the closely related Advanced Written Question #5 from the EU, the  United  States 
previously noted that Buy American Act waiver designations gran ted under the Trade Agreements 
Act are reflected in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and in required procedures for agency 
procurement. See FAR 25.402 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). For additional information 
on procedures  designed  to ensure  fairness,  please  see FAR 25.408  (https://www.acquisition.gov/fa
r/25.408 ) and FAR subpart 14.400, generally for opening of bids and awards of  contracts, including 
standard operating procedures for notification ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/14.400 ). 
 
With respect to the possibility of future guidance, the  United  States reminds Members tha t Trade 
Policy Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
Page 131, table 3.26  
 
QUESTION 35:  On top of subsidies for trade in goods, does the U.S. collect data on subsidies for 
trade in services at both federal and sub -federal levels?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 263 - 
 
  RESPONSE 35:  No. 
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 9, 10 and 11:  What is the reach and legal value of the BEA glossary in 
terms of reporting on subsidy measures? Is this definition only used for the purpose of this Table 
and Report? Or more broadly for notifications to the WTO?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 9, 10 and 11:  The BEA definition of a subsidy is not pertinent to the 
subsidy notification the  United  States submits to the WTO.  
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 12 and 13:  The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 comprises a number 
of measures, including direct grants and subsidies, tax credits and other investment incentives. 
Which of the IRA measures will fall within the scope of the SCM  Agreement and will therefore be 
notified to the WTO? Which ones would not be considered subsidies within the meaning of the SCM 
and will therefore not be notified?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 12 and 13:  Subsidies that meet the criteria of Article  25.2 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervaili ng Measures will be notified.  
 
Page 232, paragraph 4.162  
 
"Other supply chains of interest for U.S. authorities mentioned in E.O. 14017 are (i)  high capacity 
batteries, including electric -vehicle (EV) batteries, and (ii)  critical minerals and other identif ied 
strategic materials, including rare earth elements. The authorities support the development of clean 
cars and trucks and have set up an objective of 50% of passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 
to be zero -emission vehicles.  159 The EV Charging A ction Plan outlines steps federal agencies are 
taking to support the establishment of a national network of EV chargers (USD  7.5 billion allocated 
by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, to replace old school buses with U.S. -made, 
zero-emission buse s (additional USD  7.5 billion allocated)), to promote the manufacturing of battery 
minerals, refined materials, battery components and batteries (USD  6 billion allocated), and to foster 
the manufacturing of qualifying components for eligible vehicles (USD  17 billion in direct loans 
available through the Department of Energy Loan Programs Office's Advanced Technology Vehicles 
Manufacturing Program), among others. As concerns minerals and other strategic materials, the List 
of 35 Critical Minerals, establishe d in 2018 following E.O. 13817160, served as a basis for the 2021 
review, which extends the analysis to strategic products other than minerals. Similar to what was 
stated in E.O. 13953161, the recent review highlights the dependence on imports of several p roducts 
and suggests adopting an environmentally and socially responsible production; expanding domestic 
production and processing capacity, including recycling; using DPA Title III and similar programs to 
support domestic capacities and emerging technolog ies; and strengthening U.S. stockpiles, among 
others. An updated List of Critical Minerals covering 50  minerals was published in February  2022."  
 
QUESTION 84:  e) Who will benefit?  
 
RESPONSE 84:  DPA will benefit energy manufacturing industries, communities,  consumers, and 
the U.S. economy and national security. More specifically, this action will benefit industrial producers 
and manufacturers who meet the criteria and are awarded funding. More details can be found in 
DOE's recently released Notice of Intent and Request for Information regarding establishment of a 
Program to Use Defense Production Act to Support Electric Heat Pump 
Manufacturing  and Deployment,  which  is available  at: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2
02211/Heat  pumps  NOI_RFI_Final_Clean_FINAL110122_0.pdf . 
 
FOLLOW -UP QUESTION 14:  Are foreign suppliers able to meet the criteria which would lead to 
awarded funding, as deta iled in the Notice of Intent and Request for Information regarding 
establishment of a Program to Use Production Act to Support Electric Heat Pump Manufacturing and 
Deployment?  
 
FOLLOW -UP RESPONSE 14:  The heat pump program is based on the Presidential Determination  
(https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/09/2022 -12586/presidential -determination -
pursuant -to-section -303-of-the-defense -production -act-of-1950-as-amended ) on heat pumps 
(No. 2022-18), the core policy of which is to " [ensure ] a robust, resilient, and sustainable domestic 
industrial base "with the goal of expanding" domestic production capability. "Project eligibility and 
selection criteria have been designed to align with the Presidential Determination's policy and goal. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 264 - 
 
  If "foreign suppliers" mean s manufacturing outside the  United  States, such suppliers would most 
likely not satisfy those criteria.  
  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 265 - 
 
  GUATEMALA  
QUESTION(S) REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/434)  
 
Page  4, Para graph  1.5 
 
We know that alone we cannot effectively promote our work er-focused trade policy. Many of the 
Members of the WTO share our goal of a fairer and more sustainable international economic 
regime, and we are constantly building the alliances necessary to update and enforce the rules 
that govern the world economy and trade. An example of this is the agreement we reached with 
the European  Union  (EU) to combat the global excess supply in the steel and aluminium  industry 
and to negotiate a trade agreement, the first of its kind, that provides for access to markets for 
greenhouse gas emissions from imported steel and aluminium . Another example is the 
agreements we reached with the EU and the UK to resolve longstan ding aircraft disputes 
involving Airbus and Boeing. These agreements allowed us to move past constant friction and 
focus on common interests, including financing on market terms and the challenges posed by 
non-market economies. We are building on this mome ntum to advance broader fair competition 
goals through all available avenues, be it bilateral, regional or multilateral discussions, existing 
trade agreements and frameworks, or new initiatives. When the scope of the problem requires 
new tools, we will als o use them.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Taking into consideration that the United  States  will not apply the tariffs of 
Section  232 of the trade expansion act and will allow the duty -free import of steel and aluminium  
from the European  Union  in a historical volume. How will this impact trading partners that export 
these products to the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 1:  The United  States  notes that Guatemala and other countries may continue to 
export steel and aluminium  articles to the United  States  under the existing Section  232 
measures. These measures were taken because the United  States  considered these measures 
necessary for the prot ection of its essential security interests.  
 
The United  States  successfully concluded discussions with the EU (on behalf of its member 
countries) on satisfactory alternative means to address the threatened impairment of the 
national security posed by steel  and aluminium  article imports from the EU. The United  States  
and the EU agreed to expand coordination involving trade remedies and customs matters, 
monitor bilateral steel and aluminium  trade, cooperate on addressing non -market excess 
capacity, and annual ly review their arrangement for alternative means and their ongoing 
cooperation. In addition, the United  States  and the EU will seek to conclude, by 
31 October  2023, negotiations on global steel and aluminium  arrangements to restore 
market -oriented conditi ons and support the reduction of carbon intensity of steel and aluminium  
across modes of production.  
 
QUESTION 2:  In what percentage will the commercial flow of these products, coming from 
countries like Guatemala, be reduced?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The United  States  notes that Guatemala may continue to export steel and aluminium  
articles to the United  States  under the existing Section  232 measures. These measures were taken 
because the United  States  considered these measures necessary for the protection of its  essential 
security interests.  
 
Beginning on 13 June 2019, the United  States  implemented an exclusions process from the 
Section  232 duties on steel and aluminium  for products not produced in the United  States  in a 
sufficient and reasonably available amount  or of a satisfactory quality, or based upon specific 
national security considerations. Guatemalan exporters can work through their U.S. customers to 
request exclusions under this process.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Will they give Guatemala and the rest of the Central A merican countries the same 
treatment?  
 
RESPONSE 3 : In 2017, the Secretary of Commerce initiated investigations into the effects of steel 
and aluminium  imports on the national security of the United  States  pursuant to Section  232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In 2018, the Secretary submitted to the President reports on the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 266 - 
 
  findings of such investigations, concluding that steel and aluminium  articles are being imported into 
the United  States  in such quantities and under su ch circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security of the United  States  and recommending actions to adjust the imports of steel and 
aluminium  articles so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
In Proclamation 970 5 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United  States ) and 
Proclamation 9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminium  Into the United  States ), the 
President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided to adju st the imports 
of steel and aluminium  articles by imposing a 25 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of steel articles and 
imposing a 10 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminium  articles, so that such imports will not 
threaten to impair the U.S. national securi ty. The proclamations also stated that any country with 
which the United  States  has a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the United  States  
alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports 
from t hat country. Should the United  States  and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative 
means to address the threat to the national security such that the President determines that imports 
from that country no longer threaten to impair the national  security, the President may remove or 
modify the restriction on such imports from that country and, if necessary, make any corresponding 
adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries as U.S. national security interests require.  
 
Page  8, Para graph  3.4 
 
The United  States  has raised the issue of forced labor in supply chains with its trading partners. 
On 25 January  2022, the United  States  announced that it would develop its first dedicated 
business strategy to combat forced labor. In this re gard, a comprehensive inter -agency review 
of existing USTR Office trade policies and tools will be conducted to identify areas that may need 
strengthening and identify gaps that need to be filled. For more information on the work of the 
USTR Office to comb at forced labor, see Section  5.3.3 combat forced labor.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Guatemala would like to know what this "specific trade strategy to combat forced 
labor" that the United  States  will be developing consists of and how it intends to implement it?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The focused trade strategy to combat forced labor will lay out the U.S. 
government's trade approach to addressing forced labor in global supply chains. Work to develop 
the str ategy is ongoing. The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises . 
 
Page  9, Para graph  3.7 
 
The traditional approach to climate and environmental issues in trade has been primarily to raise 
levels of environmental protection for U .S. trading partners. The United  States  will continue to 
work on it to strengthen and expand these commitments, but it also recognizes that this single 
approach will not lead to the full achievement of its climate goals. So th ey are embracing a new 
generation of trade policies that will more strongly promote the decarbonisation needed to limit 
the global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.  
 
QUESTION 5:  What are these Trade Policies that the United  States  is adopting?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The United  States  is taking innovative approaches through our existing and 
future trade tools to advance our climate and environment goals. We are using a range of 
available tools to avoid environmental degradation due to trade, and we are prio ritizing a 
worker -centered trade policy as critical for achieving the United  States ' ambitious climate goals.  
 
Through regional engagements, such as the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework, we are pursuing 
opportunities to increase climate ambition, including actions to decarbonize our respective 
economies.  
 
Bilaterally, the United  States  is seeking to strengthen environmental protections with our trading 
partners, including to achieve climate goals. For example, unsustainable deforestation is a critical 
trade-related environment and climate concern, and illegally harvested timber has no place in 
our supply chains. We are pressing for sustainable resource management by our trading 
partners, and we seek opportunities to keep illegally harvested or sourced product s, including 
timber, fisheries and wildlife, out of our supply chains.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 267 - 
 
  Recognizing the role that energy intensive industries like steel and aluminium  play in greenhouse 
gas emissions, the United  States  announced, alongside the EU, a commitment to negotiate  the 
world's first emissions -based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminium  trade.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Will they have an impact on trade with partner countries of the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 6:  The United  States  continues to work with trading partners to purs ue high levels 
of environmental protection and effective enforcement of environmental laws to fully implement 
the commitments made under relevant trade agreements. We encourage like -minded trading 
partners to work with us to address climate change through existing trade tools and consider 
opportunities to advance the role that trade can play in addressing climate change.  
 
Page  9, Para graph  3.9 
 
In October  2021, the United  States  and the EU announced their commitment to negotiate an 
emissions -based g lobal steel and aluminium  sector deal. The United  States  and the EU are 
working together to correct the carbon intensity of steel and aluminium  sold in their markets, 
as well as in countries that adopt non -trade practices that contribute to oversupply arou nd the 
world. The agreement will boost investments in green steel and aluminium  production in the 
United  States , Europe and around the world, which will reduce emissions in two of the most 
carbon -intensive industrial sectors.  
 
QUESTION 7:  What carbon provisions does this Agreement between the United  States  and 
Europe establish on trade in steel and aluminium ? 
 
RESPONSE 7:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium  are 
under discussion, and no agreement has been reached on the  provisions that may be established 
under the Arrangement. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade 
Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Taking into consideration that they are trying to solve the climate cri sis and at 
the same time better protect workers so that they do not have to choose between the climate 
and the economy. How will these provisions be reflected in trade with partner countries?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Climate change poses an existential threat, but responding to this threat offers 
an opportunity to support good -paying jobs, protect public health, and advance environmental 
justice. The United  States  is pursuing opportunities to maintain and improve envi ronmental 
protection of our trading partners and increase climate ambition, including to decarbonize our 
respective economies. We seek to enable and mobilize the technologies, public and private 
investment, and technical resources needed to scale up clean energy infrastructure and facilitate 
trade in climate -friendly goods, services, and technologies, while generating high -quality jobs 
that power economic growth and advance our Paris Agreement commitments.  
 
Page  10, Para graph  3.13 
 
The United  States  is also trying to protect the oceans and marine resources, and the people whose 
livelihoods depend on them, from harm caused by plastic pollution. In 2022, the United  States  
supported the initiation of multilateral negotiations for an international agreem ent on plastic 
pollution. The United  States  recognizes the critical role that trade plays both in contributing to the 
problem of plastic pollution in the environment, including the marine environment, and in its 
potential to be an important part of the sol ution.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Is the Agreement that the United  States  supported related to Resolution 5/14 of 
the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA)?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Yes, the Agreement referenced is Resolution 5/14 of UNEA.  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.23 
 
The United  States  has engaged in bilateral and multilateral dialogue with its trading partners and 
other stakeholders to, among other things, identify bottlenecks in suppl y chains; ensure that they WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 268 - 
 
  incorporate sound environmental and labor standards; and facilitate trade in the context of 
disruptions in supply chains.  
 
QUESTION 10:  Does this refer to requesting product traceability, environmental and labor 
aspects of produc tion? 
 
RESPONSE 10:  The United  States  recognizes that supply chains face disruption, strain, 
compromise, or elimination due to a variety of risks, including climate, environmental, 
human -rights, or forced labor. Through its dialogues with trading partners and stakeholders, the 
United  States  seeks to enhance its understanding of the specific factors that contribute risk to 
critical supply chains and to share best practices in reducing or eliminating those risks.  
 
QUESTION 11:  If so, how do you plan to request this traceability?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The United  States  is collaborating with trading partners and 
stakeholders  - including industry, labor, and civil society stakeholders  - to exchange ideas and 
develop best practices to advance sound environmental and labor standards in critical supply 
chains.  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises . 
 
Page  20, Para graph  5. 32  
 
The United  States  has also engaged and worked with allies and trading partners to promote a fair, 
rules-based international trading system that respects workers' rights and affirms that there is no 
place for forced labor in such a system, including state -sponsored forced l abor. For example, in 
June 2021, President  Biden pushed for the inclusion of forced labor in the G7 Leaders' Statement, 
which paved the way for U.S. Trade Representative Tai to negotiate the October  2021 Trade 
Ministers' Forced Labor Statement that recogni zed the importance of working together to protect 
individuals from forced labor and to ensure that global supply chains are free from the use of forced 
labor.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Does this mean that the United  States  will propose rules that reflect the 
commitmen ts made in the Declaration and that require its trading partners to establish higher 
levels of labor protection that do not allow forced labor?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospect ive exercises . 
 
QUESTION 13:  If so, would this lead the United  States  to request labor traceability of products 
entering the country from trading partner countries?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 269 - 
 
  HONDURAS  
PART  I: REGARDING  THE SECRETARIAT  REPORT  (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
Paragraph 3.266 states that "CAARA, enacted in December  2020, strengthens the protection of 
employees who report criminal violations of antitrust laws ("whistleblowers") or who cooperate with 
the federal government in any investigation or proceeding related to an criminal violation of antitrust 
law. 
 
QUESTION 1:  Could you elaborate on the type of protection en joyed by employees who report and 
how said protection was strengthened?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Among other things, the law sets forth provisions that authorize an employee to seek 
relief by filing a complaint with the Department of Labor or to bring an action in U.S . district court if 
the individual alleges discharge or other discrimination by an employer who violates the prohibition 
against retaliation.  
 
QUESTION 2:  How "participation" in the planning and initiation of the infringement of the legislation 
is defined.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  "Participation" is not a term of art that appears in the legislation and so it is not 
specifically defined.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 270 - 
 
  HONG KONG, CHINA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Section  232 Measures on Steel and Aluminium  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Pages  104-109, Paragraph s 3.133 -3.145)  
 
The U .S. has put in place mechanism to request exemption of products from the Section  232 tariffs 
on steel and aluminium.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Without prejudice to HKC's position on the U .S.' Section  232 tariff measures on steel 
and aluminium, could the U .S. update us on its major efforts in the past two years in streamlining 
and processing the exemption approval applications?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  On 14 December  2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and 
Security published an interim rule on the Section  232 Steel and Aluminium  Tariff Exclusions Process. 
This interim final rule revised aspects of the process for requesting exclusions fro m the duties and 
quantitative limitations on imports of aluminium  and steel discussed in three previous Department 
of Commerce interim final rules implementing the exclusion process authorized by the President 
under Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. The interim rule addressed the 
need to create a more efficient method for approving exclusions where objections have not been 
received in the past for certain steel or aluminium  articles. It also addresse d a trend identified by 
commenters and validated in data reviewed by Commerce  - that certain exclusion requesters may 
have requested more volume than they may have needed for their own business purposes compared 
to past usage. Additional information on the  exclusions process can be found at 
https://www.commerce.gov/page/section -232-investigations . 
 
QUESTION 2:  We are also interested to know if there are any further planned improvement 
measures in the near future.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Antidumping and Countervailing Measures  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  12, Paragraph  11; Pages  93-97, Paragraph s 3.110 -3.117)  
 
It is noted that the U .S. continues to be an active user of AD measures and there is often long 
duration of AD measures (average duration at the end of 2021 was 10.4  years).  
 
QUESTION 3:  Will the U .S. critically review the necessity of those AD measures that have been in 
place over 10  years and ensure such AD measures are not used to become protectionist measures 
in disguise?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States  administers its trade remedy laws in accordanc e with the 
applicable WTO  agreements. In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or an 
antidumping order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury within a 
reasonably foreseeable time, the U.S. Internati onal Trade Commission considers the factors set out 
in U.S. law at 19  U.S.C.  § 1675a(a). The USITC considers these factors in the context of the record 
of the five -year review; it establishes a new record for each five -year review of an order.  
 
In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or antidumping duty order would 
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy or sales of the subject 
merchandise at less than fair value, the U.S. Department of C ommerce considers the factors set out 
in U.S. law at 19  U.S.C.  §§ 1675a(b) and (c), respectively.  
 
The determinations in each sunset review conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission or 
U.S. Department of Commerce are case -specific. The results f or all sunset reviews can be found on 
the U.S. International Trade Commission's website ( http://pubapps2.usitc.gov/sunset/ ). The U.S. 
Department of Commerce publishes its sunset review determinations in the  Federal Register and 
also makes them available on its website  at https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . From these sources, 
Members can obtain, on a case -by-case basis, information about the rationale for either the 
continuation or termination of a countervailing duty or an antidumping duty order.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 271 - 
 
  Trade Policies by Sector  
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) Import Provisions  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  218, Paragraph  4.108  
 
The provisions of the MMPA have wide -ranging requirements that prohibit importation of fish and 
fish products in relation to injury or death of marine mammals. It requires foreign fish harvesters to 
seek and receive a comparability finding from the U .S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) demonstrating they meet this criterion to export fish to the United  States . 
Intermediary economies identified by the United  States  that may import, and re -export to the 
United  States  fish and fish pro ducts from a fishery subject to a U.S. import prohibition must have 
procedures that can reliably certify that the product for export does not contain fish and fish products 
that are subject to the import restriction.  
 
We understand that the NOAA has recent ly notified U.S. trading partners that the exemption period 
for implementing the MMPA import provisions will be extended for one year to end 
31 December  2023 due to the need for more time to consult with nations and to review the 
comparability findings app lications received from foreign fisheries.  
 
QUESTION 4:  
We would like to know the updated timelines as a result of the postponement, such as:  
 
a) Whether 1  January  2024 can be assumed as the new enforcement timeline. Is the 
same timeline applicable to identif ied intermediary nations?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Yes, 1 January  2024, is the new enforcement deadline when export fisheries on the 
List of Foreign Fisheries must have received a comparability finding to export to the United  States . 
Please see response to Question  6 below for the timeline for intermediary nations.  
 
QUESTION 5:  
 
b) When harvesting nations will be notified of their comparability findings applications 
results and when NOAA will publish the list of fish and fish products subject to import 
ban; and . 
 
RESPONSE 5:  NOAA Fisheries will be evaluating all applications and making determinations for all 
fisheries before announcing any results. The United  States  has to be fair and consistent for all 
nations, so decisions for individual nations and individual fisheries will not be publicly announced 
until all evaluations have been completed. The MMPA regulations, as amended, require notification 
to exporting natio ns by 30 November  2023, prior to implementing trade restrictions, if any, by 
1 January  2024. NOAA Fisheries will endeavor  to complete its work in advance of the deadline, and 
to provide exporting nations and the trade community with sufficient notice to make adjustments, 
where possible, to supply chains affected by decisions on comparability findings.  
 
QUESTION 6:  
 
c) When iden tified intermediary nations will be notified by NOAA, the timeline for them 
to provide information in response to NOAA's notification and when they will be 
notified of NOAA's determination.  
 
RESPONSE 6:  After any necessary trade restrictions are applied to  harvesting nations' fisheries, 
NOAA Fisheries will then consider whether the products embargoed are transshipped or processed 
and then re -exported to the United  States  through intermediary nations.  
 
• Those intermediary nations will be contacted within 30  days of a harvest nation embargo 
to confirm the origin of products that may also be subject to embargo from the 
re-exporter ; 
• The intermediary nations then have 60  days to respond to NOAA Fisheries with information 
about their procedures to ensure  that embargoed products are not re -exported to the 
United  States . The procedures can vary, but must be effective and include documentary 
evidence. Documentation of procedures can include confirmation that the intermediary 
nation does not import the embarg oed products from the harvesting nation, or has 
procedures to reliably certify that exports of fish and fish products from the intermediary WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 272 - 
 
  nation to the United  States  do not contain fish or fish products caught or harvested in a 
fishery subject to an impo rt prohibition ; 
• Within 120  days of the original notification to the intermediary nation, NOAA Fisheries will 
make a determination whether the procedures implemented by the intermediary can 
reliably certify that exports of fish and fish products from the in termediary nation to the 
United  States  do not contain fish or fish products subject to import prohibitions.  
 
Please note that the exact dates for these actions are determined by the date that NOAA Fisheries 
sends out the official notifications.  
 
So far, th e United  States  has not issued any detailed guidelines regarding compliance on 
intermediary fisheries, e.g. guidelines on the tracking and verification scheme.  
 
QUESTION 7:  We would like to know whether and when the U .S. NOAA would issue detailed 
compliance guidelines to facilitate intermediary economies in implementing the requirements 
regarding intermediary fisheries.  
 
RESPONSE 7:  NOAA Fisheries does not have guidelines for traceability and certification schemes 
and doe s not plan to develop such guidelines. As traceability systems vary widely across nations 
(such as for food safety, for example), NOAA Fisheries believes the best approach is to provide 
nations with flexibility to meet the MMPA standard based on the specif ic products and circumstances. 
It is up to the nation to demonstrate that products subject to an import restriction are not exported 
or commingled with other seafood products exported to the United  States . 
 
Fisheries Subsidies  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  221, Table  4.13)  
(WT/TPR/G/434: Pages  9-10, Paragraph  3.12)  
 
The U .S. has been taking proactive measures in promoting sustainable fisheries and combatting 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing both domestically and internationally. It is also an active 
participant in the WTO  Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations . It is not ed that the U .S. is committed to 
working with all WTO  Members to ensure that the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies concluded 
in June  2022 promptly enters into force and to further enhance the disciplines.  
 
QUESTION 8:  What is the U .S.' plan and target timeframe to implement and accept the Agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The United  States  is consulting internally with regard to acceptance of the Protocol 
and implementation of the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies.  
 
QUESTION 9 : What are the U .S.' priority interests in the second wave of the WTO  Fisheries 
Subsidies Negotiations?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The United  States  urges Members to support additional, ambitious disciplines to 
discipline harmful fisheries subsidies, including subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing. The United  States  also urges Members to support greater transparency with respect to 
the use of forced labor on fishing vessels.  
 
Banking Services  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  240, Paragraph  4.192  
 
Foreign persons may establish or acquire a nationally chartered bank subsidiary in all states, subject 
to commercial presence requirements. Initial entry or expansion by a foreign person through the 
acquisition or establishment of a state -chartered commercial bank  subsidiary is prohibited or limited 
in 22 states; other limitations also apply at the state level.  
 
QUESTION 10:  For the 22  states still maintaining prohibition or restrictions on the acquisition or 
establishment of a state -chartered commercial bank subsidiary by foreign persons, are there any 
plans for these states to relax the restrictions and open up for foreign participation?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercis es. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Securities Services  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  247, Paragraph  4.218  
 
The Dodd -Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFA) governs consumer 
protection, trading restrictions, credit ratings, regulation of financial products, corporate governance 
and disclosure, and transparency of financial services related activities. The DFA amended the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act (SEC  Act), whereby the SEC, when considering the 
application of a foreign person or an affiliate of a  foreign person to register in the U .S. as a broker 
or a dealer, must consider if the applicant poses a risk to the stability of the U .S. financial system 
and whether the applicant's home country has legislation in place that would mitigate such risk. 
Furthermore, the SEC is authorised to revoke the authorization of foreign brokers and dealers if their 
home country has not taken appropriate steps to mitigate risk.  
 
QUESTION 11:  What are the objective criteria for assessing if a foreign broker or dealer pose s a 
risk to the stability of the U .S. financial system and whether the applicant's home country has 
legislation in place that would mitigate such risk?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The statutory language in Sections  15(k) and 15(l) of the Exchange Act provides 
the relevant criteria that the Commission may consider in determining whether (1)  to permit a 
foreign person or an affiliate of a foreign person to register as a United  States  broker or dealer, or 
succeed to the registration of a United  States  broker or dealer  (Section  15(k)), or (2)  to terminate 
the registration of such foreign person or an affiliate of such foreign person as a broker or dealer in 
the United  States  (Section  15(l)).  See 15 USC 78o(k)  and 78o(l)  (https://www.govinfo.gov/conten
t/pkg/USCODE -2020-title15/pdf/USCODE -2020-title15 -chap2B -sec78o.pdf ). Namely, the 
Commission may consider whether,  for a foreign person or an affiliate of a foreign person that 
presents a risk to the stability of the United  States  financial system, the home country of the foreign 
person has adopted, or made demonstrable progress toward adopting, an appropriate system of 
financial regulation to mitigate such risk. See id  (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE -
2020-title15/pdf/USCODE -2020-title15 -chap2B -sec78o.pdf ). 
 
The criteria provided in Sections  15(k) and 15(l) would be applied to the specific facts and 
circumstances presented by the relevant foreign person or an affiliate of such foreign person at 
issue.  To date, however, we are not aware of any Com mission action being brought under or in 
reliance on either Exchange Act Sections  15(k) or 15(l).  
 
For your convenience, please also see the following links which provide a helpful overview of 
broker -dealer registration in general, including the requiremen ts to register with the SEC and 
become members of at least one SRO, such as a national securities exchange or a registered 
securities association (FINRA), as well as the process under Sections  15(b)(1) and 15(b)(2) for the 
Commission to commence proceeding s to determine whether registration should be denied, which 
include notice of the grounds for denial and opportunity for a hearing.  See U.S. FSAP SEC Self -
Assessment (2014/2015)  (https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/IMF -2015-US-FSAP-SEC-
Self-Assessment.pdf ) (see, e.g.  pp. 99-104) and U.S. FSAP SEC Self -Assessment (2019/2020) 
(https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Securities -SEC-FSAP-Self-Assessment -
09.05.2019.pdf ) (see, e.g.  pp. 115-16). 
 
QUESTION 12:  During the reporting period, how many authorisations of foreign brokers and dealers 
were revoked or their applications for registration rejected?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  As noted above, we are not aware of any Commission action  under or in reliance 
on Section  15(k) or 15(l) to date.  
 
QUESTION 13:  Are there any appeal/review mechanisms in place? Please provide more details.  
 
RESPONSE 13:  Section  25 of the Exchange Act provides that a person aggrieved by a final order 
of the Commission may obtain review of the order in the United  State s Court of Appeals for the 
circuit in which such person resides or has its principal place of business, or for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, by filing in such court, within 60 days of the ent ry of the Commissions' order, a 
written petition requesting that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.  
 
The following links provide general information regarding FINRA's internal processes for the review 
of membership application decision s. See FINRA 1015. Review by National Adjudicatory Council WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 274 - 
 
  (https://www.finra.org/rules -guidance/rulebooks/finra -rules/1015 ) and FINRA Rule 1016. 
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY FINRA BOARD  (https://www.finra.org/rules -guidance/rulebooks/finra -
rules/1016 ). In addition to FINRA's internal review processes, a person aggrieved by final action of 
FINRA und er its Rule 1000 Series (Member Application and Associated Person Registration) 
(https://www.finra.org/rules -guidance/rulebooks/finra -rules/1000 ) may apply for review by the SE C 
pursuant to Section  19(d)(2) of the Exchange  Act (15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)  
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE -2011-title15/pdf/USCODE -2011-title15 -chap2B -
sec78s.pdf )). See FINRA 1019. APPLICATION TO THE SEC FOR REVIEW  
(https://www.finra.org/rules -guidance/rulebooks/finra -rules/1019 ). See also Commission Rule of 
Practice 420 (Appeal of determinations by self -regulatory organizations)  
(https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -17/chapter -II/part -201) and 421 (Commission consideration of 
determinatio ns by self -regulatory organizations)  (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -17/chapter -
II/part -201). 
 
Telecommunications  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Pages  249-250, Paragraph  4.228  
 
To deter conduct by a foreign carrier that could result in harm to competition in the U .S. 
telecommunications market, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains regulatory 
safeguards such as the "no special concessions" rule, the benchmark settlement rat es policy, and 
dominant carrier requirements. Under the no special concessions rule (47  C.F.R.  63.14), U .S. 
international carriers are prohibited from agreeing to enter into exclusive arrangements with foreign 
carriers with sufficient market power to affect competition adversely in the U .S. market. The Foreign 
Participation Order adopts a presumption that carri ers with a market share of less than 50% in the 
foreign market lack such market power. The rules concerning foreign ownership limitations in the 
telecommunications sector remained unchanged during the review period. Foreign ownership in 
some services, such  as wireline -based carriers and submarine cable landing licensees, must comply 
with restrictions in the FCC's general obligations and qualifications for ownership of such businesses. 
Under Section  310 of the Communications Act, foreign ownership in common carriers is limited, 
unless FCC approves otherwise, to 20% direct investment and 25% indirect investment for common 
carrier wireless licensees.  
 
QUESTION  14: For the rules concerning foreign ownership limitations in the telecommunications 
services market t hat remained unchanged during the review period, we would like to know if the 
U.S. has any plan to relax some of these limitations to encourage more foreign participation.  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Could the U .S. share with us the current market share of foreign investment in the 
telecommunications market?  
 
RESPONSE  15: Every  two years,  the Federal  Communications  Commission  publishes  a Communic
ations  Marketplace  Report.  The 2020 report  is available  here:  https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachme
nts/FCC -20-188A1.pdf . 
 
Maritime Transport  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  259, Paragraph  4.264 
 
The United  States  maintains restrictions to cabotage services of both cargo and passengers under 
the coastwise laws. Section  27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly referred to as the 
Jones  Act (46  U.S.C.  55102), reserves cargo service between two points in the United  States  
(including its territories and possessions), either directly or via a foreign port, for ships that are 
registered and built (or repaired) in the United  States  and that are at least 75% owned by a U.S. 
corporation, and on which 100% of the officers and 75% of the crew are U.S. citizens.  
 
QUESTION 16:  We note that there is a consistent decline in the number of ships ordered and 
delivered in the U .S. over the past years. Besides, the requir ements of the Jones  Act have 
aggravated shortages in some energy products, thus driving up energy prices. There have been 
domestic voices calling for the Jones Act to be repealed to lower transportation costs. Does the U .S. 
have any plan to reform or repea l the Jones  Act? 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 275 - 
 
  RESPONSE 16:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 17:  Does the U .S. consider that the Jones Act could still fulfil the original objectives of 
maintaining shipbuilding capacity for the military and for national security?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Yes, the United  States  considers that the domestic cabotage regime continues to 
be an imp ortant means of ensuring the availability of experienced seafarers and maintaining 
domestic shipbuilding capability, which are important national security objectives.  
 
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  262, Paragraph  4.275  
 
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is engaged in regulatory reform. In 2020, the FMC issued 
Federal Maritime Commission Proposed FY 2022 -2026 Strategic Goals and Stewardship. Among the 
strategic goals are: (i)  maintaining a competitive and reliable international ocean transportation 
supply sys tem; (ii)  developing and implementing a comprehensive monitoring program to assess 
covered services; (iii)  protecting the public from unlawful, unfair, and deceptive ocean transportation 
practices, by identifying them and preventing public harm through lic ensing and financial 
responsibility requirements; and (iv)  resolving international shipping disputes through alternative 
dispute resolution and adjudication.  
 
QUESTION 18:  As regards the Federal Maritime Commission's Proposed FY 2022 -2026 Strategic 
Goals a nd Stewardship, we are interested to know more details of the measures and current progress 
of the implementation plan to achieve the strategic goals. In particular, are there any measures 
specific to foreign -flagged vessels or foreign companies providing shipping services in the U .S.? 
 
RESPONSE 18:  At the end of each fiscal year, the Federal Maritime Commission publishes an annual 
report that highlights the key accomplishments, initiatives, and relevant events of that fiscal year.  
The report identifies the Commission's stated strategic goals and how its work 
achieved  these  goals.  The Commission  publishes  these  annual  reports  on its website:  https://www
.fmc.gov/about -the-fmc/annu al-reports/ . 
 
E-commerce  
(WT/TPR/S/434: Page  275, Paragraph  4.323  
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2020 (P.L.  116-207) required the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop and publish standards and 
guidelines for the Federal Government on the appropriate use and management of IoT devices. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must update policies and principles to be consistent with 
standards and guidelines established by NIST. Subs equently, NIST developed IoT -specific guidelines 
for federal agencies and a collection of technical and non -technical cybersecurity capabilities required 
to implement the cybersecurity controls.  
 
QUESTION 19:  What are the major standards for and guidelines  on the use and management of 
IoT devices established by the NIST?  
 
RESPONSE  19: In its guidance  to federal  agencies,  NIST has developed  a Risk Management  
Framework  (RMF),  which  can be accessed  here:  https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/risk -
management/publications . Federal  agencies  must apply  the RMF, along  with other  relevant  guidance  
such as SP 800-82, SP 800-181, and the NIST Cybersecurity  Framework  in their selection,  
acquisition,  deployment,  and use of IoT technology.  More information  on NIST's  guidance  for federal  
agencies  looking  to deploy  IoT devices  in their systems  can be found  here:  
https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied -cybersecurity/nist -cybersecurity -iot-program/sp -800-213-series . 
 
QUESTION 20:  Are there any standards and guideli nes restricting or affecting foreign service 
providers in the market?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  NIST has not developed IoT technical standards or guidelines restricting service 
providers due to country of origin or status as a foreign provider.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
General  
(WT/TPR/G/434: Page  4, Paragraph s 1.4-1.7 
 
As noted in the Government Report, the U .S. continues to advance its worker -centered  trade policy 
so as to promote a broader agenda of fair competition to ensure that workers are competing on the 
basis of skills and creativity, not exploitative cost advantages.  
 
QUESTION 21:  Could the U .S. provide update on how such worker -centered trade policy re -shapes 
its major international trade policies as compared to the past?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  The worker -centered trade policy means that the United  States  is focused on 
ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and that the benefits of  trade are broadly 
shared by all people. The United  States  recognizes that trade can  - and should  - be a force for good. 
Done right, and in coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow the middle class, redress 
inequality, and promote fair compe tition.  We remain committed to upholding a fair and open global 
trading system  - one that follows through on our partners' longstanding commitment to conduct 
economic relations with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, and 
promo ting sustainable development. We are developing new tools and implementing existing 
commitments to achieve these goals.  
 
QUESTION 22:  How does the U .S. ensure that such worker -centered  trade policy will not be used 
as protectionist measures to undermine the interests of other economies?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The Marrakesh Declaration and Agreement, on which the WTO is founded, begins 
with the recognition that trade should raise living standards , ensure full employment, pursue 
sustainable development, and protect and preserve the environment.  In that spirit, the United  States  
is committed to upholding a fair and open global trading system  - one that follows through on our 
partners' longstanding c ommitment to conduct economic relations with a view to raising standards 
of living, ensuring full employment, and promoting sustainable development. Doing so can help 
promote fair competition and grow all of our economies from the bottom up and the middle out. 
 
Trade and Environment  
(WT/TPR/G/434: Page  9, Paragraph  3.6; Page  37, Paragraph  8.6 
 
Combating the climate crisis and promoting sustainable environmental practices are top priorities 
for the U .S. In this regard, the U .S. considers trade an indispensable tool in addressing the climate 
crisis. At the WTO, the U .S. is collaborating with trading partners to forge new partnerships to 
promote an environmentally sustainable trade agenda, and is working collaboratively through su ch 
initiatives as the WTO Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD).  
 
QUESTION 23:  In formulating environmental policies and measures, has the U .S. given any 
consideration to how to ensure that such measures, while aiming to ach ieve the environmental goals, 
would not create barriers hampering international trade and competition?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  When the United  States  develops policies and measures aimed at protecting the 
environment, it considers the aim of the policy and seeks to ensure that the measures are not more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill the objective of environmental protection.  
 
QUESTION 24:  What are the priority interests of the U .S. in the multilateral or plurilateral trade 
and environment discussions?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The United  States  continues to support mutually supportive trade and 
environmental policies and encourage high levels of enviro nmental protection. It continues to 
prioritize actions to address climate change, counter wildlife trafficking, and combat illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing, as well as illegal logging and associated trade.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  ICELAND  
PART  I: REGARDING  THE SECRETARIAT  REPORT  (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
QUESTION 1:  What is the participation of women in the economy of the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  According to the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, the civilian 
labor force participation rate of women is 56.5%  as of November  2022.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Have specific barriers that limit women's participation in trade been identified?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The Biden -Harris Administration's National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality  
(October  2021)  provides examples of systemic  barriers that women in the American workforce 
encounter: such as lack of affordable and accessible child, elder, and home care; harassment, 
discrimination, and gender -based violence; concentration of women in informal sectors; gender 
wage gaps; unpaid fam ily and medical leave; inadequate workforce protections; and limited financial 
literacy, education, and access to resources and capital. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) also 
requested that the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), an independen t federal agency, 
investigate the distributional effects of goods and services trade and trade policy on U.S. workers 
by various demographic characteristics, including gender. On 14  November  2022, the USITC publicly 
released the resulting report, which cat alogues barriers to women's participation in the workforce 
and further finds that trade appears to have had some disproportionate negative impact on certain 
demographic groups, including women.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Has the U.S. implemented any specific measures to  encourage women's participation 
in trade and promote women's entrepreneurship, or are such measures being developed?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  In October  2021, the  United  States released its inaugural National Strategy on 
Gender Equity and Equality . The whole -of-gover nment strategy adopts an intersectional, 
interconnected approach in 10 cross -cutting, strategic areas: (1)  improving economic security and 
accelerating economic growth; (2)  eliminating gender -based violence; (3)  protecting, improving, 
and expanding access to health care, including sexual and reproductive health care; (4)  ensuring 
equal opportunity and equity in education; (5)  advancing gender equity and fairness in the justice 
and immigration systems; (6)  advancing human rights and gender equality under the  law; 
(7) elevating gender equality in security and humanitarian relief; (8)  promoting gender equity in 
mitigating and responding to climate change; (9)  closing gender gaps in science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields; and (10)  advanc ing full participation in democracy, 
representation, and leadership. Consistent with this National Strategy , the United  States has been 
working with like -minded trade partners to address gender equity, equality, and women's economic 
empowerment in trade po licy. Please see Chapter  III.A.3. Initiatives to Advance an Inclusive and 
Equitable Worker -Centered Trade Policy, Trade and Gender of the 2021 Annual Report of the 
President on the Trade Agreements Program for some examples of U.S. Government activities in  
these areas 
(https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20An
nual%20Report%20(1).pdf ). 
 
QUESTION 4:  Are the effects of trade policy on women and men measured and monitored, and if 
so, how?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  As previously noted, the USTR requested that the USITC conduct an investigation of  
the distributional effects of goods and services trade and trade policy on U.S. workers by skill, wage 
and salary level, gender, race/ethnicity, age, and income level, especially as they affect 
under -represented and under -served communities in the  United  States. During the investigation, 
the USITC held seven round tables, an academic symposium, a public hearing, and a public comment 
period, and prepared a literature review on the distributional effects of trade and trade policy on 
workers. The resulting findings was released on 14  November  2022. The second part of t he 
investigation recommends that the USITC expand and develop new research and analysis capabilities 
so that future probable economic effects advice includes estimates of the potential distributional 
effects of trade agreements and trade policy on U.S. wor kers. 
 
QUESTION 5:  The U.S. lists a number of concerns with the WTO's dispute settlement function and 
supports a reform discussion to achieve a durable, lasting reform. In the meantime, would WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 278 - 
 
  the United  States consider supporting the widely supported propo sal on the Appellate  Body 
Appointments to ensure that the WTO has a fully functional dispute settlement system in place?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  For more than 18 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the  United  States 
has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate  Body. Furthermore, the U.S. concerns with 
WTO dispute settlement are well known and have been articulated in the DSB and in various 
materials. These concerns remain unaddressed. For these reasons, the  United  States supports 
fundamental WTO di spute settlement reform and does not support the proposal to proceed with AB 
appointments and restore the Appellate  Body.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Does the U.S. expect to negotiate free trade agreements in the coming period (that 
require congressional review)?  
 
RESPON SE 6:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 7:  With respect to recent regional trade initiatives and platforms (e.g. TTC and the 
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), how does  the U.S. foresee addressing core trade issues like 
market access, or legally binding and enforceable commitments through such mechanisms?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The Indo -Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is under negotiation. Regarding future 
plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises. 
For more information on the IPEF, see here: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/agreements -under -
negotiation/indo -pacific -economic -framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
QUESTION 8:  Could the U.S. please  provide an update on the status of Comparability Findings for 
trading partners and the likely repercussions for failure to fulfill the extensive import requirements?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  NOAA Fisheries is currently evaluating all applications and will be making 
determinations for all fisheries before announcing any results. Results will be published in the Federal 
Register. NOAA Fisheries will not be publicly announcing decisions for individual nations and 
individual fisheries until all evaluations have been compl eted. The MMPA Import Provisions 
regulation, as amended, requires notification to exporting nations by 30  November  2023, prior to 
implementing trade restrictions, if any, by 1  January  2024. NOAA Fisheries will endeavor to complete 
its work in advance of th e deadline, and to provide exporting nations and the trade community with 
sufficient notice to make adjustments, where possible, to supply chains affected by decisions on 
comparability findings. During the review process, NOAA Fisheries is reaching out to nations with 
any questions or areas of concern and providing opportunities for nations to address these concerns 
prior to any decisions being taken. Foreign fisheries on the List of Foreign Fisheries that do not 
receive a finding of comparability for their  commercial fishing operations by 1  January  2024, will no 
longer be able to export fish and fish products to the  United  States after that date. A nation can 
reapply for a comparability finding for any of its fisheries at any time.  
 
QUESTION 9:  How does the U.S. respond to concerns by trade partners that certain provisions of 
the IRA, namely tax credits for electric cars made in the USA intended to support U.S. electric battery 
supply chains, risks creating an uneven competitive environment, upsetting sup ply chains and may 
not be compatible with WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 279 - 
 
  INDIA  
PART  I: REGARDING  THE SECRETARIAT  REPOR T (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
Page 14, 21  
 
USDA received funding for measures to mitigate or prevent the effects of the COVID -19 pandemic 
in FY2020 to which nearly USD  87 billion of supplementary appropriations were added in FY2021.  
 
QUESTION 1:  How was the amount of USD 87 billion of supplementary appropriations utilised in 
FY2021?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  USDA received funding for measures to mitigate or prevent the effects of the 
COVID -19 pandemic in FY2020 to which nearly USD  87 billion of supplementary appropriations were 
added in FY2021. Almost USD  50 billion of the USD  78.5 billion in total COVID -19 outlays in FY2021 
were spent to boost the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The initial Coronavirus Food 
Assistance Program (CFAP) announced in Ap ril 2020 comprised USD  16 billion in direct support to 
eligible farmers and ranchers and USD  3 billion for food purchases. As additional funding became 
available through the USDA Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), CFAP 2 was launched in 
summer  2020. CFAP (1 and 2) payments totalled USD  23.5 billion in 2020 and USD  9.3 billion in 
2021 (projected); CCC -funded payments, some USD  12 billion, were mostly paid in FY2021.  
 
QUESTION 2: Who are the beneficiaries of the measures undertaken to mitigate and prevent th e 
effects of the pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 2: Eligible beneficiaries varied by measure, but included both consumers and producers.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Are there any such supplementary appropriations added in FY2022?  
 
RESPONSE 3: There were no such supplemental appropri ations added in FY 2022.  
 
QUESTION 4: Under which provisions of the WTO  Agreement on Agriculture does the  United  States 
intend to notify these measures?  
 
RESPONSE 4: All relevant agricultural measures for FY2020 have already been notified by 
the United  States in its notifications to the Committee on Agriculture. Regarding future plans, 
the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 15, 21  
 
The initial Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) an nounced in April  2020 comprised 
USD 16 billion in direct support to eligible farmers and ranchers and USD  3 billion for food purchases.  
 
QUESTION 5:  In the context of the above information, the  United  States is requested to explain 
how this sum of USD  19 billion is consistent with the U.S. commitments under the AMS.  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The United  States remains fully committed to remaining consistent with its WTO 
obligations and encourages Members to reference its domestic support notification for details on 
how C FAP has been notified.  
 
Page 20, 1.10  
 
The IMF considers that the policy program proposed by the Administration to deal with the effect of 
the pandemic may be viewed as an opportunity to remake the economy with higher productivity, 
increased labor force participation, and a less polarized distr ibution of income and wealth.  
 
QUESTION 6:  The U.S. is requested by India to share the following details:  
What are the policies proposed by the administration to address the suggestions made by the IMF 
to restore economic growth, increase labour force part icipation and reduce inequality in the 
post-pandemic phase?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 280 - 
 
  RESPONSE 6:  The Administration is vigorously pursuing "modern supply -side" policies. For 
example, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is modernizing our nation's physical and digital 
infrastructure  to increase productivity, promote business activity, and increase economic growth. 
The Administration recently announced a Permitting Action Plan to speed up investments while 
upholding current standards and laws. The CHIPS Act is growing domestic U.S. se miconductor 
manufacturing while the Inflation Reduction Act is the largest -ever U.S. investment in clean energy. 
The Administration is also working with employers, labor unions, and training providers to build a 
robust talent pipeline of skilled workers in  sectors like construction and electrification. The 
Administration is investing in underserved communities to broaden economic opportunities and raise 
the U.S. economy's economic potential.  
 
QUESTION 7 and 8:  It is also requested to justify as to why labou r productivity falls as the 
participation of the labour force increase. Are they negatively correlated, does it suggest any sectoral 
patterns?  
 
RESPONSE to Question 7 and 8:  Like many advanced economies, the  United  States has 
experienced slower productivit y growth in the last decade. Labor supply growth has also slowed, 
due to lower fertility and an aging population. To recharge economic growth and raise living 
standards over time, improvements in productivity and labor force participation will be necessary  to 
counteract the impact of demographic trends on output growth. The decline in productivity growth 
has been attributed to many factors. Explanations include that growth is being mismeasured, that 
sectoral shifts in industries and labor composition drive declines, or that the well of easily attained 
innovations is tapped. A single clear rational for slowing productivity growth has proved evasive and 
likely multiple factors are contributing to measured declines.  
 
Page 22, 1.15  
 
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) (P.L. 116 -136), enacted on 
27 March  2020, put in place a number of measures and programs to deal with the emergency 
situation created by the COVID -19 pandemic and counter some of its negative effects in the short 
term.  The CARES Act provided a broad range of emergency funding benefits, totaling some 
USD 2.3 trillion (some 11% of GDP), including a USD  349 billion Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), 
administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA) (Box 1.1). Under t he PPP, eligible 
businesses could receive guaranteed loans during a prescribed period that, under certain 
circumstances, could be forgiven and become grants. Another important feature of the CARES Act 
was the USD  500 billion authorization for the Departmen t of the Treasury (through the Federal 
Reserve) to support loans and guarantees and provide other financial support to eligible businesses 
and non -profits, as well as state and local governments. The Act also provided USD  293 billion as 
one-time tax rebate s to individuals; USD  268 billion to expand unemployment benefits; 
USD 150 billion in transfers to state and local governments; and USD  100 billion for hospitals. The 
main provisions are listed in Box 1.1, many of which lapsed at the end of December  2020, but some 
were prolonged by the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP Act) (Box 1.2).  
 
QUESTION 9:  India seeks clarification from the U.S. on the following:  
How do the measures of the CARES Act applicable to SMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) was enacted on 
27 March  2020, to alleviate the severe economic hardships and public health threat created by the 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID -19) pandemic.  Please see the CARES Act terms and con ditions 
provided by SBA at  https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020 -
05/2020_CARES_Act_Terms_and_Conditions.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 10:  Is Small Business Admi nistration the same as SME?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  No. The Small Business Administration is an agency of the U.S. federal government. 
SME is a common abbreviation for the term Small and Medium -Sized Enterprise (SME).  
 
QUESTION 11:  How far the Paycheck Protection Pr ogram (PPP) applicable to SMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  For the period under review, the Paycheck Protection Program established by the 
CARES Act is implemented by the Small Business Administration  (https://www.sba.gov/ )with 
support from the Department of the Treasury. This program provides small businesses with funds WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 281 - 
 
  to pay up to 8  weeks of payroll costs including benefits. Funds can also be used to pay interest on 
mortgages, rent, and utilities. The Paycheck Protection Program prioritizes  millions of Americans 
employed by small businesses by authorizing up to USD  659 billion toward job retention and certain 
other expenses.  
 
Page 24, 1.17  
 
The USD  483 billion package contained in the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care 
Enhancement Act of 24  April 2020 (P.L. 116 -139) responded to COVID -19-related needs by 
providi ng additional funding for small business loans, health care providers, and COVID -19 testing. 
The Act provided additional lending authority for the Paycheck Protection Program, under which the 
SBA may guarantee certain loans to small businesses during the C OVID -19 pandemic, and expanded 
eligibility for Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) and advances to include agricultural 
enterprises. Funds provided under this Act include: (i)  USD 321 billion for additional forgivable SBA 
loans and guarantees to help re tain workers; (ii)  USD 62.1 billion for the SBA to provide grants and 
loans to assist small businesses (EIDL loans and grants); (iii)  USD 75 billion for hospitals; and 
(iv) USD 25 billion for expanding testing.  
 
QUESTION 12:  What does "expanded eligibility " imply? What was the before and after eligibility 
criteria?  
 
RESPONSE  12: For the period under review, small businesses and eligible non -profit organizations, 
Veterans organizations, and Tribal businesses described in the Small Business Act, as well as 
individuals who are self -employed or are independent contractors, are eligible if they also meet 
program size standards. Please see the eligibility criteria for particular stages of the program at 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/coronavirus/assistance -for-small -businesses/paycheck -
protection -program . 
 
QUESTION 13:  How are "Agricultural Enterprises" defined for taking benefit of Economic Injury 
Disaster Loans? For what activities such loans are utilized?  
 
RESPONSE 13 : The Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, enacted on 
24 April 2020, expanded the eligibility of agricultural enterprises for U.S. Small Bus iness 
Administration (SBA) Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) and Advances (grants) for COVID -19. 
As a result of this legislation, agricultural businesses with 500 or fewer employees became eligible 
for EIDL assistance in response to the COVID -19 pande mic. For the purposes of this program, 17 
U.S.C. 647(b) establishes the definition of an agricultural enterprise: …the term "agricultural 
enterprises" means those small business concerns engaged in the production of food and fibre, 
ranching, and raising of  livestock, aquaculture, and all other farming and agricultural -related 
industries.  
 
QUESTION 14:  At what rates are these loans provided and is there any subsidy provided on the 
interest on loans?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  The interest rate for COVID -19 EIDL loans to all eligible businesses, including 
agricultural businesses, was 3.75% fixed.  
 
Page 24, 1.18  
 
On 8 August  2020, an Executive Order was issued to address the expiration of certain Coronavirus 
relief measures prov ided by previous legislation, including the provision of additional extra 
unemployment benefits (using USD  44 billion from the Disaster Relief Fund), continuing student loan 
payment relief, and deferring collections of employee social security payroll taxe s. 
 
QUESTION 15:  In the wake of the COVID pandemic, the importance of well -designed and fair social 
security nets has assumed renewed salience. Given today's globalized world with a high degree of 
labor mobility, fair and equitable international social sec urity agreements are a must. What is the 
progress by the U.S. on eliminating the unfair burden of dual Social Security taxation via Totalization 
agreements especially concerning to developing countries?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  The United  States is willing to engage with its diplomatic and trade partners in 
discussions on Social Security Totalization Agreements within the bounds of U.S. statutory authority. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 282 - 
 
  For example, and as noted in the Joint Statement following the November  2021 United  States -India 
Trade Policy Fo rum, both the  United  States and India agreed that the movement of professional and 
skilled workers contributes to the economic and technological partnership between the two countries, 
and both sides welcomed further engagement on the topic.  
 
Page 24, 1.18  
 
On 8 August  2020, an Executive Order was issued to address the expiration of certain Coronavirus 
relief measures provided by previous legislation, including the provision of additional extra 
unemployment benefits (using USD  44 billion from the Disaster Re lief Fund), continuing student loan 
payment relief, and deferring collections of employee social security payroll taxes.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 25, Box 1.2  
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021: summary  
 
QUESTION 16:  Did the U.S. government launch any Coronavirus relief measures exclusively for 
SMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  Please see COVID -19 economic relief measures for small business at  
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/coronavirus/assistance -for-small -businesses . 
 
QUESTION 17:  India seeks more detailed information for Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs), 
State Small Business Credit Initiatives for all categories like the Tribal,  Indian and Native American 
Provisions.  
 
RESPONSE 17:  For Economic Injury Disaster Loans information, please see 
https://www.sba.gov/funding -programs/loans/covid -19-relief-options/eidl . For Small Business Tax 
Credit Programs and assistance for State, Local and Tribal Governments, please see  
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/coronavirus/assistance -for-small -businesses/small -
business -tax-credit -programs  and https://home .treasury.gov/policy -issues/coronavirus/assistance -
for-state-local-and-tribal-governments . 
 
WT/TPR/S/434, page 26, 1.22  
 
Despite economic growth and the resulting increase in current receipts, the federal government 
deficit rose from 2.8% of GDP in calenda r year 2017 to 5.4% of GDP in 2019. The economic rescue 
packages put in place between March  2020 and March  2021 to counter the effects of COVID -19 
amounted overall to some USD  5.8 billion, or 28% of GDP, and consequently led to a substantial 
increase of th e deficit to 14.9% of GDP for FY2020 and 15.4% for calendar year 2020, and 13.9% 
of GDP in FY2021 and 13.0% for calendar year 2021 (Tables 1.4 and 1.5). Current expenditures 
increased by some 43% in 2020, while receipts declined. The increase of expenditur e was more 
moderate in 2021 (3.3%), but expenditure levels were almost 50% higher than in 2019. Reflecting 
the higher deficits, public debt as a share of GDP continued to rise, to 100%, and is expected to 
exceed 110% of GDP in FY2022 (Table  1.4). The overa ll government deficit (including sub -federal 
entities) reached an estimated 15.3% of GDP in 2020 and 13.0% in 2021.19.  
 
QUESTION 18:  Observing the increasing deficit as a result of the expansionary fiscal policy that the 
U.S. has undertaken to revive the economy from recession, India seeks clarification on the measures 
that the U.S. contemplates to finance the deficit. Is the U.S. prop osing to float more debt to tackle 
the deficit financing?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  The Administration reduced the deficit by more than 50% (USD  1.4 trillion) in 
FY2022 (compared to FY2021) and is focused on improving the long -term fiscal outlook through 
smart, target ed investments designed to spur durable economic growth, create jobs, reduce cost 
pressures, and foster shared prosperity. The Treasury market is the deepest, most liquid market in 
the world and Treasury issues securities in a transparent, regular, and pre dictable manner in order 
to meet the government's borrowing needs.  
 
QUESTION 19:  Is the debt burden a major concern for the lender of the last resort, when it can 
create additional legal tender without altering significantly the exchange rates and other ex ternal 
parameters and linkages?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 283 - 
 
  RESPONSE 19:  There are many factors that can influence whether the level of sovereign debt for 
a particular country is concerning, and a full discussion of these factors is beyond the scope of this 
Q&A. 
 
Page 28, 1.25  
 
In the authorities' view, the plans set in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the proposed 
Build Back Better Act are transformational investments to rebuild the U.S. economy. The policies 
would also help reverse the pandemic's impact on labor f orce participation. The cost of the additional 
federal spending is expected to be partially offset by raising taxes on corporations and high -income 
households and closing loopholes that allow high -income individuals to recharacterize labor income 
and escap e tax on capital gains.  
 
QUESTION 20:  India seeks clarification from the U.S. on the following:  
Is the U.S. proposing to introduce capital gains tax as suggested by James Tobin?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  There is no proposal to offset the federal spending envisaged by  the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act and the proposed Build Back Better Act by introducing a capital gains tax 
on currency speculation.  
 
QUESTION 21:  Additionally, how does the U.S. propose to offset the COVID -19 impact by increasing 
expenditure on infrastructure investments and through the "Jobs  Act" and "Build Back Better Act"? 
Would it provide a market for its trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Economic research has long established that investment in basic infrastructure 
increases productivity, attr acts business activity, and is associated with higher rates of economic 
growth. Our policies will expand U.S. supply and support global economic growth through a wide 
array of investments ranging from climate change mitigation to healthcare to childcare.  
 
QUESTION 22:  Can the U.S. list a few of the trading partners who would gain access from the surge 
in spending activities within the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The United  States does not have a forecast on who may benefit from increased U.S. 
spending.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 29, 1.26  
 
The Federal Reserve is responsible for monetary policy in the  United  States. The Legislation specifies 
that, in conducting monetary policy, the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) should seek "to  promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long -term interest rates". 25 The Federal Reserve adjusts the key tools of 
monetary policy – open market operations, the discount rate, and interest on reserves – to influence  
demand and supply conditions in the federal funds market, and keep the federal funds rate within 
the target range established by the FOMC and to influence longer -term interest rates.  
 
QUESTION 23:  According to the UNCTAD 2022 report ( https://unctad.org/tdr2022 ), interest rate 
hikes by advanced economies are hitting the most vulnerable countries hardest. Some 90 developing 
countries have seen their currenci es weaken against the dollar this year and over a third of them by 
more than 10%. The report says that this year's (2022) interest rate hikes in the  United  States, for 
example, could cut USD  360 billion of future income for developing countries (excluding China). A 
stronger dollar makes food, fertilisers and fuel import prices go up in developing countries, with 
devastating consequences for the poor across the world. Was the U.S. government aware of the fact 
that the decision may cause serious problems for the countries that are facing economic problems? 
How would the U.S. justify the decision of the interest rate hike in 2022?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The Federal Reserve acts in accordance with its legal mandate from the U.S. 
Congress. For information on policies impl emented by the Federal Reserve, please refer to the 
FOMC  statements,  minutes,  and other  materials  at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolic
y/fomccalendars.htm . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 284 - 
 
  Page 30,  1.31 
 
Price inflation accelerated in the second half of 2021 and in early 2022, encompassing price increases 
in areas other than energy. The CPI increased 1.2% at a monthly rate in March  2022; over the 
12 months ending March  2022, CPI inflation was 8.5%. Increases in prices of food, electricity, and 
shelter were the largest contributors to higher inflation. Core inflation (CPI excluding food and 
energy) rose 6.5% in the 12  months ending March  2022, the largest 12 -month change since the 
period ending August  1982; over the same 12 -month period, the energy index rose 32%, and the 
food index increased 8.8%.  
 
QUESTION 24:  The price inflation in the U.S. increased rapidly in the post -pandemic phase. India 
seeks clarification on the following:  
How is the new senat e draft proposal titled "SENATE OF THE  UNITED  STATES — 117th Cong., 1st 
Session H. R. 5376 relevant for controlling inflation?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The Inflation Reduction Act aims to tackle inflation by lowering the costs of expenses 
like prescription drugs, health care premiums, and energy, making historic climate investments that 
will boost domestic manufacturing and create good -paying jobs, reducing the deficit, and making 
the tax code fairer by ensuring that the wealthiest Americans and  large corporations pay their fair 
share.  
 
QUESTION 25:  Are there any other trade -related measures which the U.S. is considering for 
controlling Inflation other than the traditional monetary tools like the revision of interest rates and 
raising bank reserv e requirements?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 33, 1.38  
 
In 2020, U.S. exports to all major markets declined, with the exception of China, where exports 
increased by about 17% from 2019 levels, on account of increases in agricultural products, 
particularly soybeans, which more than tripled from 2018 levels. In 2021, there were no major shifts 
with respect to export destinations, except that exports to Canad a and the European  Union 
accounted for a slightly lower percentage compared to the previous year.  
 
QUESTION 26:  What are the factors that led to more than the triple increase in exports of Soybeans 
by the U.S., from 2018?  
 
RESPONSE 26: The volume of U.S. s oybean exports in 2021 is on par with the volume of exports 
prior to 2018, when exports fell significantly due to retaliatory tariffs. The record value of exports in 
2021 is primarily due to higher commodity prices, including for soybeans, resulting from m arket 
conditions.  
 
QUESTION 27:  Which other agriculture crops witnessed an increase in exports from 2019 onwards?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Of the selected commodities in Table  4.2 of the Report by the Secretariat, the 
volume of exports increased from 2019/20 through 2021/22 for maize, soybeans, beef and veal, 
and poultry meat. Export data on other commodities can be found at USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service  (FAS),  Production,  Supply  and Distribution  database,  which  is available  at: https://apps.fa
s.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/advQuery . 
 
Page 36, 1.44  
 
The United  States remained the top destination of foreign direct investment in 2020 despite the 
global downturn in foreign investment and the significant decline in FDI inflows. In 2020, inflows 
were USD  151 billion, the lowest value in the past four years . The decline since 2019 has been 
mainly attributable to a decline in reinvested earnings by foreign affiliates associated with the 
economic downturn. U.S. direct investment abroad sustained a significant drop in 2018 due to a 
decline in reinvested earning s attributable to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA). The TCJA 
lowered or eliminated taxes on dividends or foreign earnings of U.S. companies' repatriated earnings. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 285 - 
 
  This led to a record repatriation of USD  853 billion in 2018. This level stabilized a t USD  281 billion 
in 2020. Preliminary estimates for 2021 indicate a slight upturn, as corporate profits recover.  
 
QUESTION 28:  India seeks clarification on the following:  
Given that the FDI flows decreased as a consequence of the same in 2019 how does the  U.S. propose 
to enhance FDI flows under a new scenario which has two proposals the "inflation control act" along 
with the "Jobs  Act". 
 
RESPONSE 28: The Inflation Reduction Act is the most forceful action the  United  States has taken 
to confront the climate  crisis, representing meaningful progress on our shared climate goals. By 
growing our economy from the bottom up, supporting energy -saving investments, and bolstering 
supply chain resiliency, this historic legislation strengthens the essential foundation f or further 
international cooperation and mutually beneficial investment.  
 
QUESTION 29: What other measures is the U.S. contemplating to boost investment in the 
post-pandemic phase?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  The United  States is considering a variety of options to boos t investment, both 
through direct public investments as well as by spurring additional investments from the private 
sector. Recently passed legislation has already encouraged private companies to invest in new 
manufacturing capacity across the  United  State s while also laying the path for historic investments 
in cutting -edge research in science and technology — including on topics of energy and climate — 
by working with labs, research institutions, and universities across the nation. The  United  States is 
also doubling down on infrastructure projects. This includes both investments in physical 
infrastructure — such as revitalizing the country's roads, bridges, and railways — as well as 
investments in human infrastructure like ensuring more equitable and access ible education and 
workforce opportunities. Looking ahead, the  United  States continues to explore ways to boost 
investments, especially to support economically disadvantaged communities and regions, including 
by bringing in private sector dollars through p ublic-private partnerships.  
 
Page 39, 2.8  
 
It is mentioned in the report that in 2021, the Administration launched its American Rescue Plan, 
which was signed into law in March, with the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117 -2). While 
the impetus of th e American Rescue Plan was a massive stimulus package focused on the pandemic, 
it also addressed supply chain resilience, provided funding for COVID -19 vaccines, and more broadly 
tackled medical supply chain issues.  
 
QUESTION 30:  The U.S. is requested to p rovide the statistics on the rise in unemployment during 
the COVID -19 pandemic and post -COVID -19 pandemic. How the American Rescue Plan helps in 
restoring employment after the COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  The U.S. unemployment rate increased from 3.5% in February  2020 
(pre-pandemic) to a high of 14.7% in April  2020. Since April, the unemployment rate trended 
downward through the rest of 2020, 2021, and the beginning of 2022, ending in a range of 3.5% to 
3.7% between March  2022 and November  2022.  The American Rescue Plan was crafted to address 
both the COVID -19 pandemic and support the economy by trying to avoid many of the long -term 
harmful effects that often follow an economic shock. It contributed to much higher growth than 
anticipated, with over 6 million jobs added to the U.S. economy in 2021, the largest percentage rise 
during a calendar year since 1978.  
 
Page 40, 2.9  
 
In 2021, the Administration launched its American Rescue Plan, which was signed into law in March, 
with the American Rescue Plan  Act of 2021 (P.L. 117 -2). While the impetus of the American Rescue 
Plan was a massive stimulus package focused on the pandemic, it also addressed supply chain 
resilience, provided funding for COVID -19 vaccines, and more broadly tackled medical supply chai n 
issues. The Administration continued to address the issue of critical supply chains through its 
100-day assessment for four critical products in particular: semiconductor manufacturing and 
advanced packaging, large -capacity batteries, critical minerals a nd materials, and pharmaceuticals 
and active pharmaceutical ingredients.11 As part of this assessment, recommendations were made 
on strengthening international trade rules through trade enforcement mechanisms, i.e. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 286 - 
 
  establishment of a trade strike force, an d pursuing a Section  232 investigation on neodymium 
magnets, and also working with allies to decrease vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Thereafter, 
in response, USTR established the interagency Supply Chain Trade Task Force12, a Section  232 
investig ation on neodymium was launched, and discussions were held with trading partners on 
addressing supply chain vulnerabilities. Modifications to Buy American provisions were introduced 
by the Build America, Buy America Act, Subtitle A – Build America, Buy Ame rica of Title IX of Division 
G of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 15  November  2021 (P.L. 117 -58) (Section  3.3.6).  
 
QUESTION 31:  What has been specific measures that the U.S. Government has taken to strengthen 
supply chain resilience with frie nds and partner countries?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  The United  States has engaged with partner countries on supply chain issues 
bilaterally and multilaterally. The Fact Sheet "One Year In, the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative Marks the Anniversary of the Supply Chain Task Force with Key Accomplishmen ts 
and Continued Efforts to Strengthen Supply Chain Resiliency" provides more details. It is available 
at: https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -offices/press -office/fact -sheets/2022/june/fact -sheet -one-
year-office -us-trade-representative -marks -anniversary -supply -chain -task-force-key. 
 
QUESTION 32:  What has been the outcome of  these measures and what metrics does the U.S. use 
to assess the same?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  See the response to question 31.  
 
Page 41, 2.13  
 
It is stated that in the October  2021 letter USTR requested USITC two -part investigation, USTR 
noted the Administration's equity initiatives and Congressional requests for U.S. trade policy to have 
a positive and equitable impact on underserved and marginalized communities.  
 
QUESTION 33:  The U.S. is requested to share the report of the USITC investigation on the positive 
and equitable impact on underserved and marginalized communities. Providing a detailed list of all 
communities which are helped by the process?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) investigation included two parts. 
The first part catal ogues existing information regarding the distributional effects of goods and 
services trade and trade policy on U.S. workers. The resulting and unprecedented public report 
compiles input from nation -wide roundtable discussions, an academic symposium, publi c hearing, 
and literature review. The vast findings will inform the development of an intersectional, 
interconnected approach to advancing inclusive trade policy that advances the well -being of workers. 
The second part of the investigation requested that t he USITC expand and develop new research 
and analysis capabilities so that future probable economic effects advice includes estimates of the 
potential distributional 
effects  of trade and trade  policy  on U.S. workers.  The ITC report  can be found  here:  https://usitc.g
ov/publications/332/pub5374.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 34:  Does it provide provisions for tracing the progress made for these communities like 
race, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, physical ability, language, and/or immigration status?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  See response to Question  33. 
 
Page 41, 2.14  
 
In January  2021, the Administration launched its initiative on Buy American policies with an 
Executive Order outlining a gov ernment -wide proposal to use government procurement as one 
method to strengthen American manufacturing. It provides for a number of measures including 
review of agency actions inconsistent with administration policy, updating the Made in America 
waiver pro cess, and promoting transparency in federal procurement. Thereafter, in April  2021, the 
Made in America Office was established under the Office of Management and Budget to provide 
centralized, strategic, and holistic management of domestic sourcing activit ies across Federal 
procurement. Following on these initiatives, a new proposed Rule was announced in July  2021 that 
would make the most significant changes to the Buy American Act in many years. One of the key 
proposed changes would raise the domestic cont ent threshold from 55% to 60% immediately, and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 287 - 
 
  then gradually increase it to 75% (Section  3.3.6). Procurement covered under the WTO  Agreement 
on Government Procurement (GPA) continues to be waived from these requirements.  
 
QUESTION 35:  Whether the Buy Amer ican Policies initiative to strengthen American manufacturing 
compliant with Article  III: 8 (a) of GATT, 1994? Kindly elaborate on it.  
 
RESPONSE 35: The final rule, published as FAC 2022 -05, amends the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) to implement sect ion 8 of E.O. 14005. Upon the 25  October  2022, effective date, the final FAR 
rule changes the domestic content threshold to 60% immediately, then to 65% for items delivered 
starting in calendar year 2024, and then to 75% for items delivered starting in cal endar year 2029. 
Notably, the final rule concerns procurements in which the Buy American Act applies, which are 
those below the Trade Agreements Act threshold and above the micro -purchase threshold. 
Procurement opportunities covered by the GPA are unaffect ed by the rule change.  
 
QUESTION 36:  The U.S. Government has announced plans to "Buy American" in January  2021. 
May elaborate on whether this initiative is in line with principles on non -discriminatory treatment for 
foreign companies.  
 
RESPONSE 36:  Procurement opportunities covered by the GPA are unaffected by the rule change.  
 
Page 42, 2.22  
 
The United  States has 14  FTAs with 20  countries.20 The main development during the review period 
was the conclusion and implementation of the revised agreement with Canada and Mexico, replacing 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), now known as 
the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA). It was the first time the  United  States has 
comprehensively amended or updated an existing FTA. The  FTAs with the  Republic  of Korea and 
Morocco also underwent some modifications during the period. There were no changes to other 
agreements although the  United  States continued to have ongoing dialogues with FTA partners on 
implementation matters, labor an d environment provisions, and other matters relating to the smooth 
functioning of the agreements. Negotiations towards new FTAs were announced or launched in 
recent years with the  European  Union, the  United  Kingdom, and Kenya, but have not been 
completed t o date (July  2022). In mid -2022, the Administration was reviewing the objectives of the 
negotiations with the  United  Kingdom begun under the prior Administration; active negotiations are 
paused while the review is being conducted. USTR is also reviewing wi th the Kenyan government 
the path forward for deepening the U.S. -Kenya trade and investment relationship. The current 
Administration is not pursuing negotiations on an FTA with the  European  Union.  
 
QUESTION 37: In the last decade, how many new FTAs has the  U.S. operationalized? How many 
of these have been with developing countries?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  Since 2020, the  United  States has entered into one free trade agreement, the 
Agreement between the  United  States  of America, the  United  Mexican  States, and Canada ( USMCA) 
(entry into force 1  July 2020).  
 
QUESTION 38:  Has the U.S. Government adopted a policy change in its approach to FTAs?  
 
RESPONSE 38:  The past few years have underscored the importance of resiliency in the face of 
unpredictable economic shocks.  To ac hieve a more resilient and just global economy, reform is 
necessary. The policies of the past contributed to contemporary challenges; we need different 
policies to achieve a different outcome.  The United  States shares the goals of many economies – 
growing the middle class, creating good -paying jobs, redressing inequality, and incentivizing climate 
and environmental action. Within the broader economic policy toolbox, with intentionality and 
innovation, trade policy can be a tool to achieve these mutual prior ities of addressing contemporary 
challenges, applying the lessons of history, and building for a more equitable and prosperous future. 
Working with others to craft trade policies that realize these principles – whether with trading 
partners, key allies, or  multilateral institutions and organizations – is a priority. There are a number 
of different I and structures to advance the goal of ensuring that existing trade agreements, including 
free trade agreements, trade and investment framework agreements, and o ther trade 
arrangements, maximize their full potential to be a positive force for people seeking security, 
self-sufficiency, and opportunity in a complex and evolving global economy.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 288 - 
 
  QUESTION  39: What are the guiding principles that govern the decision to  begin FTA negotiations?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  The Administration's worker -centered approach to trade policy is grounded in the 
principles of growing the middle class, redressing inequality, and levelling the playing field by 
promoting fair competition. Identifyin g and addressing data and research gaps to have an accounting 
of the impact of past trade and trade policies on workers is also a key component to be able to 
implement these principles.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, page 43, 2.23  
 
Trade under the 14 FTAs accounted for US D 417 billion of duty -free21 imports in 2021, and an 
additional USD  426 billion entered without duties due to MFN duty -free status, thus in total about 
USD 843 billion, i.e. 29% of total U.S. merchandise imports (Table 2.1). Canada and Mexico 
continued as the dominant main trading partners under FTAs, while the Republic of Korea was ranked 
a distant third, albeit with growing levels of trade over the period. The  United  States maintained 
trade surpluses with a majority of FTA partners, but significant defici ts with the largest FTA partners. 
As a result, thus the  United  States had an overall trade deficit of USD  148 billion with FTA partners.  
 
QUESTION 40:  United  States had an overall trade deficit of USD  148 billion with FTA partners. 
What is the impact of FT A on the USA's FDI outflow in these countries?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  The U.S. FDI in its FTA partners totalled USD 1.1 trillion in 2021 on a historic cost 
basis. This represented 17% of total U.S. FDI abroad. Since 2000, this stock has increased by 275%.  
 
Page 46, 2.31  
 
The U.S. GSP Program is the  United  States' longest -running preference program and provides the 
majority of the preferential imports into the  United  States; however, it expired on 
31 December  2020. New legislation has been proposed to reinstate th e GSP, but to date 
(January  2022) it has not been approved. Prior to the expiry of the GSP, USTR initiated a new 
process where it assesses each GSP beneficiary country's compliance with the statutory criteria on 
a triennial basis to improve monitoring and enforcement.  28 For example, in 2020 there were 10 
country eligibility reviews in progress to examine, inter alia, workers rights' issues, child labor, 
arbitral awards, market access, IPR protection and enforcement. The main resulting changes during 
this r eporting period were the loss of beneficiary status for certain countries, the reduction of the 
scope of benefits for certain beneficiary countries by the removal of certain eligible tariff lines, and 
restored eligibility in certain cases (Table  2.3). Ther e have also been certain changes regarding the 
general coverage of GSP eligible products. In 2020, fresh cut roses were added to the list of eligible 
products and parboiled rice was removed.  
 
QUESTION 41:  What is the current status of the process to reinstate the GSP?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  The U.S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GSP and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program.  
 
QUESTION 42:  In the absence of reinstatement, are any other bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements being considered for developing countries?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  There are not currently any alternative bilateral or multilateral arrangements being 
considered at this time related to the lapse of GSP reauthorization.  
 
Page 50, 2.38  
 
On 15  January  2020, the  United  States and China concluded an Economic and Trade Agreement 
covering a variety of trade and related matters; it entered into force on 14  February  2020.  38 The 
Agreement include s operational chapters on IP, technology transfer, trade in food and agricultural 
products, financial services, macroeconomic policies and exchange rate matters and transparency, 
expanding trade, and bilateral evaluation and dispute resolution.  39 Contrary  to other trade 
agreements the  United  States has negotiated in the past with other parties, this agreement stands 
out for having few if any liberalizing measures by the  United  States, such as scheduled reductions 
in tariffs or services commitments; rather,  it is mainly a compilation of specific commitments 
requiring China to issue new or revised measures or take other actions. A number of provisions WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 289 - 
 
  mention or directly cite WTO rules or obligations; many of these have to do with transparency, 
notification, and compliance matters. The chapter on expanding trade requires China to purchase 
certain categories and subcategories of U.S. goods and services – manufactured goods, agriculture, 
energy, and services – at specified levels above 2017 baseline amounts in 2 020 and 2021. The total 
amount of purchases is to exceed the overall 2017 baseline amount by no less than USD  200 billion 
by the end of 2021. According to a 2021 USTR report to Congress on compliance, some commitments 
were implemented while others were not . 40 Data compiled by the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics indicates China's imports of U.S. goods fell short of what was agreed in 
2020 and 2021; this was the case in all categories of goods.  
 
QUESTION 43:  What has been the assessment of com pliance with the Economic and Trade 
Agreement with China, concluded in January 2020?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  Please see paragraph 5.81 of the U.S. Government Report prepared for the U.S. 
Trade Policy Review.  
 
QUESTION 44:  What is the status of the review process und erway on the agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  The United  States continues to review and monitor China's implementation of the 
agreement.  
 
Page 50, 2.39  
 
A second agreement with Japan was reached at the – same time as the USJTA, covering digital 
trade, known as the  United  States -Japan Digital Trade Agreement (USJDTA). This Agreement did 
not require any changes in U.S. law, thus it was treated as an Executive Agreement. It covers 
customs duties on digital products transmitted electronically, cross -border transfer of data, access 
to computer source code and algorithms, and other provisions (Box 2.2). There is also a side letter 
that governs interactive computer services from Japan that clarifies that certain laws of Japan are 
not inconsistent with Article  18 of the USJ DTA. 43 The USJDTA entered into force on 1  January  2020.  
 
QUESTION 45:  What is the objective of the  United  States -Japan Digital Trade Agreement 
(USJDTA)?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  As two of the most digitally advanced countries in the world, the United  States and 
Japan share a deep common interest in establishing enforceable rules that will support digitally 
enabled suppliers from every sector of their economies to innovate and prosper, and in setting 
standards for other economies to emulate. The United  States -Japan Digital Trade Agreement is one 
of the most comprehensive and high -standard trade agreements addressing digital trade ever 
negotiated. This agreement helps to drive economic prosperity, promote fairer and more balanced 
trade, and hel ps ensure that shared rules support businesses in key sectors where both countries 
lead the world in innovation. The provisions in the agreement set predictable rules of the road and 
encourage a robust market in digital trade between the two countries – developments that support 
increased prosperity and well -paying jobs in the  United  States and Japan.  
 
QUESTION 46:  Why the U.S. felt the need for this agreement when United  States -Japan Digital 
Trade Agreement (USJDTA) was enforced at the same time?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  This question is unclear, because it appears to be referring to the same agreement 
twice. As noted, the  United  States -Japan Digital Trade Agreement helps to drive economic 
prosperity, promote fairer and more balanced trade, and helps ensure th at shared rules support 
businesses in key sectors where both countries lead the world in innovation.  
 
QUESTION 47:  How this agreement is contributing to the economic growth of the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  The agreement helps to ensure that shared rules support businesses in key sectors 
where both countries lead the world in innovation. The provisions in the agreement set predictable 
rules of the road and encourage a robust market in digital trade between the two countries.  
 
QUESTION 48:  How does the U.S. regulat e digital trade with other countries under the FTAs/PTAs?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 290 - 
 
  RESPONSE 48:  The United  States raises digital trade issues in many bilateral and multilateral 
engagements, including in consultations with free trade agreement partners, in Trade and 
Investment Fra mework Agreement meetings, and in the WTO, where appropriate. The  United  States 
remains committed to advancing digital trade disciplines that benefit workers, businesses, and 
consumers, and to removing barriers to their participation in the digital economy . 
 
Page 54, 2.52  
 
Pursuant to FIRRMA, CFIUS also introduced the concepts of "excepted foreign state", "excepted real 
estate foreign state", "excepted investor", and "excepted real estate investor". Qualification as an 
excepted foreign state requires, inter alia , that the Co mmittee determines that the state has 
established and is effectively utilizing a robust process to assess foreign investments for national 
security risks and to facilitate coordination with the  United  States on matters relating to investment 
security. As o f January  2022, CFIUS has identified Australia, Canada, New  Zealand, and 
the United  Kingdom as excepted foreign states.  52 To qualify as an excepted investor, a foreign 
investor must have certain ties to an excepted foreign state, as described in the relev ant regulations.  
53 Excepted investors and excepted real estate investors are not subject to CFIUS jurisdiction over 
non-controlling investments in TID U.S. businesses and are exempted from certain mandatory filing 
requirements for investments in U.S. busi nesses involving critical technologies.  
 
QUESTION 49:  Please give details regarding conditions to qualify as "excepted foreign state", 
"excepted real estate foreign state", "excepted investor", and "excepted real estate investor" under 
the CFIUS.  
 
RESPONSE  49: The terms "excepted foreign state" and "excepted real estate foreign state" are 
each defined by a two -criteria conjunctive test, with delayed effectiveness for the second criterion. 
The first criterion is identification by the Committee as an eligible  foreign state. The second criterion 
is, by the end of the delayed effectiveness period on 13  February  2023, a determination by the 
Committee under §   800.1001(a) that the eligible foreign state has established and is effectively 
utilizing a robust process  to analyse foreign investments for national security risks and to facilitate 
coordination with the  United  States on matters relating to investment security (for an excepted 
foreign state) or, under §   802.1001(a), that the eligible foreign state has made significant progress 
toward establishing and effectively utilizing the review process and coordination (for an excepted 
real estate foreign state).  
 
The CFIUS regulations limit the application of the Committee's jurisdiction over non -controlling, 
non-passive investments and certain real estate transactions by certain "excepted investors" and 
"excepted real estate investors", which are defined in part based on their close ties to excepted 
foreign states and excepted real estate foreign states and described i n more detail at 31 C.F.R. § 
800.219 and 31 C.F.R. § 802.215, respectively.  
 
These authorities, as well as a list of factors that the Committee will generally take into consideration 
when making determinations under §   800.1001(a) and §  802.1001(a), are f urther reflected in 
regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 800 and 31 C.F.R. 
Part 802) and on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's website at: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-
the-united -states -cfius/cfius -laws-and-guidance  and https://home.treasury.gov/policy -
issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -
excepted -foreign -states . 
 
Page 55, 2.55  
 
While the  United  States encourages foreign investment, there remain 14 categories of long -standing 
requirements and restrictions in a variety of sectors that place special requirements on  investors or 
curtail foreign ownership (Table  2.7). These impact sectors such as transport, natural resources, 
and investment/financial services. According to the OECD's FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, 
the United  States ranks above the OECD average in terms of restrictiveness.  
The sectors that were indicated by the OECD as having the highest barriers were the maritime and 
fisheries sectors, and by type of restriction were mainly in the category of equity restrictions.  
 
QUESTION 50:  What is the rationale for the investment restrictions on the maritime and fisheries 
sector?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 291 - 
 
  RESPONSE 50:  The American Fisheries Act (AFA) is the law that places restrictions on the types of 
entities allowed to hold mortgages on (or share ownership of) ves sels with a registered length of 
100 feet or more that seek entry into U.S. fisheries. Specifically, to operate as a fishing vessel in 
U.S. waters, or have a documented 46 U.S.C. § 12113 (2006) Fishery endorsement, 75% of a 
vessel's ownership and control m ust be vested in United  States -held mortgages. Further information 
on the AFA can be found at:  https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/american -fisheries -act/americ an-
fisheries -act. 
 
QUESTION 51:  Are there any restrictions as per current U.S. policy on outward investments?  
 
RESPONSE 51:  Certain outbound investments may be subject to sanctions programs administered 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Fo reign Assets Control (OFAC) in furtherance of 
U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. OFAC administers and enforces nearly 30 
programs that involve economic and trade sanctions directed against specific countries or measures 
generally designe d to counter terrorism, transnational criminal organizations, cyber -related crimes, 
drugs trafficking, human rights abuses, corruption, trade in rough diamonds, or the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. These authorities are further reflected by  OFAC in its regulations which 
are published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (Title 31, Chapter V of the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations), and on OFAC's website at: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac . 
 
Page s 58 & 60, 3.4 & 3.9  
 
It is noted in the report that CBP launched a pilot project on "E -Commerce 'Section  321' Data Pilot" 
in September  2019. The pilot aims to test the collection of certain advance data related to shipments 
of these goods eligible under S ection  321 so as to reduce CBP's information gap on these shipments 
and reduce high -risk shipments.  
 
QUESTION 52:  The U.S. is requested to provide the details of the Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) pilot project, India seeks the following details:  
In the context of e -commerce, explain the non -compliant shipment consignment data.  
 
RESPONSE 52:  CBP does not distinguish its data collection in a way that permits an answer to the 
question.  
 
QUESTION 53:  Section  321, allows the shipment of goods up to USD  800 without import duty, 
India would like to know the beneficiaries of such shipment.  
 
RESPONSE 53:  Section  321 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1321), provides for 
an exemption of "duty and of any tax imposed on or by reason of importation" for goods imported 
by one person on one day, where the aggregate fair retail value in the country of shipment does not 
exceed USD  800 (the "de minimis" exemption).  
 
QUESTION 54:  Provide these as break -ups in values and volumes besides the consignment 
numbe r – which is provided in the import refusal by the FDA (OASIS).  
 
RESPONSE 54:  CBP does not distinguish its data collection in a way that permits an answer to the 
question.  
 
QUESTION 55 : How is it different from the existing system of import refusal – the O ASIS?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  To clarify, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is the U.S. single window 
and CBP system of record for import and export transactions. ACE is the system through which the 
trade community reports imports and exports, and the government determines admissibility. All 
transactions, including e -commerce transactions, are processed via ACE. OASIS is specific to FDA 
shipments.  
 
Page 60,  3.9 
 
It is noted in the report that CBP has developed an E -Commerce Strategy in response to the growing 
trade volumes of e -commerce, non -compliant shipments, and to raise consumer awareness. The 
Strategy responds with four main goals. The Strategy responds with four main goals: facilitating 
international trade standards for e -commerce to support economic prosperity; driving private sector WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 292 - 
 
  compliance through enforcement resources and incentives; enhancing and adapting all affected CBP 
operations to respond to emerging supply chain dynamics created by the rapid growth of 
e-commerce; and enhancing le gal and regulatory authorities to better posture CBP and interagency 
partners to address emerging threats.  
 
QUESTION 56:  The U.S. is requested to provide the implications of growing trade volumes of 
e-Commerce and the actions implemented concerning the fou r goals of the strategy, India seeks the 
U.S. to provide details of:  
How has it facilitated international trade standards for e -commerce to support economic prosperity?  
 
RESPONSE 56 : CBP engages with the World Customs Organization (WCO) and interagency par tners 
to establish standards and best practices, continues to explore technology options to increase the 
exchange of e -commerce information, and works to educate the e -commerce community to promote 
an understanding of applicable cross -border trade rights a nd responsibilities.  
 
QUESTION 57 : Can the U.S. have provided details on driving private -sector compliance through 
enforcement resources and incentives?  
 
RESPONSE 57 : The Entry Type 86 and Section  321 Data Pilot programs have reduced the burden 
on the trad e community by creating pathways for trade facilitation benefits, such as time and cost 
savings, in the e -commerce environment.  
 
QUESTION 58:  Provide details of these resource enhancements and incentives.  
 
RESPONSE 58 : Section  321 Data Pilot participants, who are providing seller information, product 
pictures, and other transactional details, benefited from fewer CBP holds. Feedback received from 
the trade community in response to the Entry Type 86 capabilities survey indicated there is an 
estimated USD  2.5 billion in time and cost savings for that program. Survey respondents also found 
electronic release offered by Entry Type 86 highly beneficial.  
 
QUESTION 59:  How has it enhanced the process of adaption of all affected by the CBP operations 
to respond to e merging supply chain dynamics created by the rapid growth of e -commerce?  
 
RESPONSE 59 : The Entry Type 86 and Section  321 Data Pilots were created to address the changing 
dynamics caused by the rapid growth of e -commerce. CBP is working to expand the Sectio n 321 
Data Pilot to include additional participants. The available data shows that these two pilot programs 
have reduced the burden on the trade community by creating pathways for trade facilitation benefits 
such as time and cost savings in the e -commerce environment.  
 
QUESTION 60:  Can the U.S. explain the impact of the environment driven by smaller consignment 
sizes?  
 
RESPONSE 60 : The increasing volume of small packages and lack of actionable data limits CBP's 
ability to identify and interdict high -risk shipments that may contain narcotics, merchandise that 
poses a risk to public safety, counterfeits, or other contraband. In Fiscal Year 2021, Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) cleared over 771  million de minimis shipments with minimal data, which 
made it difficult to assess risk. While CBP receives some advance electronic data for Section  321 
shipments from carriers, the transmitted data often does not adequately identify the entity causing 
the shipment to cross the border, the final recipient, or th e contents of the package. To address this 
unique risk environment, CBP has been focusing its efforts on risk management and working closely 
with the trade community.  
 
QUESTION 61:  What has been the impact on imports as a direct consequence of enhancing le gal 
and regulatory authorities to better posture CBP and interagency partners to address emerging 
threats?  
 
RESPONSE 61 : In the context of e -commerce, CBP is exploring options to enhance regulatory 
authorities and formalize aspects of the Entry Type 86 and Section  321 Data Pilots. This work is 
ongoing and not yet complete.  
 
QUESTION 62:  Did it lead to a fall in imports?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 293 - 
 
  RESPONSE 62 : CBP has not seen a decrease in imports because of e -commerce efforts.  
 
Page 64, 3.22  
 
The Customs Trade Partnership Agains t Terrorism (CTPAT) continued to be CBP's most important 
trusted trader program, with 11,000 certified partners in FY2021, accounting for 52% of all cargo 
imported into the  United  States (Table  3.4).31 As CTPAT is a voluntary public -private sector 
partners hip program, CBP works closely with the private sector to improve cargo security and secure 
international supply chains. The benefits of becoming a certified partner are numerous and include 
reduced customs examinations, shorter wait times at the border, a nd access to FAST lanes at the 
land borders. CBP also has Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) with 14 foreign partner 
customs administrations to collaborate and recognize validation findings of the partners and thereby 
facilitating the work. 32These MRA s indicate that the security requirements or standards of the 
foreign industry partnership program, as well as its verification procedures, are the same or similar 
to those of the CTPAT program.  
 
QUESTION 63:  What policies and measures does the CBP underta ke to enhance security and 
counter -terrorism in import procedures?  
 
RESPONSE 63:  CBP's overall strategy to secure imports into the  United  States uses a risk -based 
approach to focus resources on targeting and examining cargo shipments that pose a potential risk 
while allowing other cargo shipments to proceed without unduly disrupting commerce into 
the United  States.  
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program is but one layer in CBP's 
multi-layered cargo enforcement strategy. Through the CTPAT program, CBP works with the trade 
community to strengthen international supply chains and improve United  States border security. 
CTPAT is a voluntary public -private sector partnership program which recognizes that CBP can 
provide the highest level of  cargo security only through close cooperation with the principle 
stakeholders of the international supply chain such as importers, carriers, consolidators, licensed 
customs brokers, and manufacturers. When an entity joins CTPAT, an agreement is made to wo rk 
with CBP to protect the supply chain, identify security gaps, and implement specific security 
measures and best practices. Applicants must address a broad range of security topics and present 
security profiles that list action plans to align security th roughout the supply chain.  
 
Participation in CTPAT is voluntary and CBP does not assess any charges or fees for joining the 
program. The first step in the certification process is for the company to review the CTPAT Minimum 
Security Criteria for their busi ness entity to determine eligibility for the program. The second step is 
for the company to submit a basic application via the CTPAT Portal system and to agree to voluntarily 
participate. The third step is for the company to complete a supply chain securit y profile. The security 
profile explains how the company is meeting CTPAT's minimum security criteria. In order to do this, 
the company should have already conducted a risk assessment. Upon satisfactory completion of the 
application and supply chain securi ty profile, the applicant company is assigned a CTPAT Supply 
Chain Security Specialist to review the submitted materials and to provide program guidance on an 
on-going basis. The CTPAT program will then have up to 90 days to certify the company into the 
program or to reject the application. If certified, the company will be validated within a year of 
certification.  
 
QUESTION 64:  Does the CBP have information sharing under the various MRAs with counterpart 
organizations?  
 
RESPONSE 64:  Yes. Because each Custo ms administration under an MRA intends to treat members 
of the other program in a manner comparable to the way it treats its own member companies (to 
the extent possible and practicable), each Customs administration (Participant) is committed to 
providing the other Participant with sufficient information regarding its members to support the other 
Customs administration's risk assessment process. Under an MRA, both Customs  are expected to 
achieve a high degree of communication by:  
 
• Providing updates on their  respective Program's operation;  
• Engaging in mutually beneficial information exchanges regarding supply chain security;  
• Sharing information regarding Members of their Programs, as appropriate, in connection 
with mutual recognition efforts; such information  is expected to include the names, 
addresses, unique identifiers, authorization status and other relevant information and;  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 294 - 
 
  • Designating and providing the contact points of their respective Program to the other 
Participant.  
 
Information sharing activities, i ncluding the designation and protection of confidential information 
and disclosure of information to third parties, are expected to be conducted consistent with the 
terms of the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) between the U.S. and the other 
country's Customs administration. CMAAs is a pre -requisite for any MRA. In case of any 
inconsistencies between the CMAA and the national laws of either of the two countries, the national 
laws prevail.  
 
QUESTION 65:  Has there been an increase in the percentage of good transited as part of the trusted 
supply chain process of the CBP over the last five years?  
 
RESPONSE 65:  It is difficult to answer this question as CBP does not distinguish its data collection 
in a way that permits a ready answer . Howeve r, as a result of an MRA with the  United  States, 
especially MRAs with countries that the  United  States is the main or one of the main trading partners, 
foreign supply chain security programs tend to see an increase in the number of companies applying 
to an d getting certified. This increased participation, in turn, leads to a greater culture of security 
among the business sector in that country, which translates into greater supply chain security 
overall.  
 
Page 67, 3.32  
 
In one new development, the USMCA est ablishes a labour value content (LVC) criterion for conferring 
origin in the automotive sector. Other new provisions were added on "recovered materials", "sets, 
kits, and composite goods", and updated measures on accumulation, transit, and transhipment.  
 
QUESTION 66:  How does the USA verify the authenticity of a remanufactured good or a recovered 
material?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  The USMCA product -specific rules of origin do not differentiate between goods 
produced through the use of recovered goods and those produce d from entirely new inputs. As a 
result, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not have specific rules or procedures related 
to goods produced through remanufacturing. All goods entering the  United  States that claim a tariff 
preference under an FTA  are subject to verification. During such a verification, the importer may be 
asked to produce documentation that supports the claim of preference.  
 
QUESTION 67:  How does the Customs department in the U.S. differentiate recovered material or 
remanufactured  goods from newly manufactured goods?  
 
RESPONSE 67:  As noted above, CBP does not differentiate between goods produced through 
remanufacturing and goods produced from entirely new inputs.  
 
QUESTION 68:  Is a certification by an exporter as "remanufactured go od" or "recovered material" 
sufficient to qualify as originating under the FTA?  
 
RESPONSE 68:  In order to receive the tariff preference under an FTA, the importer must be able 
to demonstrate that the good satisfies the applicable rule of origin.  
 
Page 78, 3.59  
 
CBP is responsible for enforcing laws on behalf of other agencies that restrict or otherwise prohibit 
importation of a number of goods, often to protect human, animal, plant life and health, or to 
conserve exhaustible natural resources. As at Mar ch 2022, 32 categories of goods were subject to 
prohibitions or restrictions, most of which had been in force for many years (Table  A3.3). Many of 
the measures are codified in CBP statutes (19 C.F.R. Part 12 – Special classes of merchandise), 
contained in various trade legislation, i.e. the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, or in legislation of 
other agencies, e.g. the Clean Air Act.91 A few new measures were put in place or amended during 
the review period.  
 
The Secretariat Report lists a number of import re strictions that the U.S. Government administers 
but is not exhaustive. Whether the current import restrictions based on principles extraneous to WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 295 - 
 
  WTO guidelines, particularly in the extra -territorial application of environmental/conservations 
legislation wo uld constitute non -tariff barriers to trade. (Background: S. 609 Restrictions on export 
of wild caught shrimp).  
 
Page 81, 3.71  
 
The main U.S. legislation with respect to anti -dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD). Is 
contained in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. The main regulations governing AD 
and CVD investigations (including reviews) are included in 19 C.F.R. Parts 201, 207, and 351.  The 
Trade Preferences Extension Act (TPEA) of 2015 (P.L. 114 -27) 106, and in the Trade Facilitation and 
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114 -125) introduced further amendments to trade enforcement 
legislation. In particular, Title IV of the Act, known also as the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015 
(EAPA), contains provisions to prevent the evasion of the payment of duties. To this end, the EAPA 
created a new framework for CBP to investigate allegations of evasion of AD/CVD orders, under 
Section  517 (Proced ures for Investigating Claims of Evasion of AD and CVD orders) and established 
the Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Directorate (TRLED) within CBP, to carry out the investigations.  
 
QUESTION 69:  AD/CVD cases often make determinations on the basis of a small sa mple size. If 
one party is eliminated due to procedural challenges, excessive duties are placed on the remaining 
party. This also impacts the outlook for the industry in the sector, even while a final determination 
is made. What safeguards are in place to ensure expedited review where there has been a significant 
error or miscalculation? (Background: AD Case on Quartz from India).  
 
RESPONSE 69:  The United  States disagrees with India's characterization of this issue. Each party's 
dumping margin or countervai ling duty rate is determined in accordance with the obligations 
contained in the Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade  1994 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as implemented by U.S.  
law. Where the U.S. Department of Commerce finds it made a ministerial error or miscalculation, 
the regulations provide procedures to correct such errors quickly and without resort to judicial 
review  — normally within 30 days after the date of public anno uncement or publication of the 
decision pursuant to 19  C.F.R.  § 351.224 I. Additionally, parties have the opportunity to  raise 
perceived errors or miscalculations in case briefs before the U.S. Department of Commerce, which 
the U.S. Department of Commerce addresses for the final results.  
 
Page 104, 3.133  
 
Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862) grant s the Secretary of Commerce 
the authority to conduct investigations to determine the effects of imports of any article on the 
national security of the  United  States. Section  232 investigations may be initiated on request from 
an interested party, or from t he head of any department or agency, or may be self -initiated by the 
Secretary of Commerce who must notify the Secretary of Defense that an investigation has been 
initiated.197 USDOC may hold public hearings or afford interested parties an opportunity to p resent 
information and advice relevant to the investigation. Requests for a Section  232 investigation must 
be submitted in writing and must contain, among other things: (i)  a description of the domestic 
industry affected, including information regarding co mpanies and their plants, locations, capacity 
and current output of the industry; (ii)  statistics on imports and domestic production, showing 
quantities and values; (iii)  the nature, sources, and degree of the competition created by imports of 
the article;  and (iv)  the effect that imports of the article may have upon the restoration of domestic 
production capacity in the event of national emergency. Requests must also contain information 
about the extent to which the economy, employment, investment, special ized skills, and productive 
capacity is, or will be, adversely affected, as well as regarding the revenues of federal, state, or local 
governments that are, or may be, adversely affected, and with respect to national security 
supporting uses of the article , including data on applicable contracts or subcontracts.  
 
QUESTION 70:  The tariffs imposed by the U.S. under Section  232 still largely remain in place, 
although relaxations have been offered to some countries. What is the progress and likely timeline 
for removal of these trade -distorting tariffs, especially with respect to affected developing countries?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 296 - 
 
  QUESTION 71:  On what princi ples has the U.S. Government entered into discussions and relaxed 
tariffs under S. 232 with certain countries and not with others?  
 
RESPONSE 71:  In Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States) and Proclamation 9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminium  Into 
the United  States), the President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and 
decided to adjust the imports of steel and aluminium  articles by imposing a 25% ad valorem  tariff 
on import s of steel articles and imposing a 10% ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminium  articles, 
so that such imports will not threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations also 
stated that any country with which the  United  States has a security relationship is welcome to 
discuss with the  United  States alternative ways to  address the threatened impairment of the national 
security caused by imports from that country. Should the  United  States and any such country arrive 
at a satisfactory alternative means to address the threat to the national security such that the 
President  determines that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national 
security, the President may remove or modify the restriction on such imports from that country and, 
if necessary, make any corresponding adjustments to the tariff as it ap plies to other countries as 
U.S. national security interests require.  
 
Page 106, 3.138  
 
In 2019, the disputes with Canada and Mexico were terminated after the parties notified that they 
had reached a mutually agreed solution. In 2021, the dispute with the  European  Union was 
terminated. For the remaining disputes, on 4  February  2021, the Chair of the Panel informed the 
DSB that due to delays caused by the COVID -19 pandemic, the Panel expected to issue its final 
report no earlier than the second half of 2021.  
 
QUESTION 72:  Regarding Section  232 additional duties on steel and aluminium, the U.S. has 
reached a mutually agreed solution with countries like Canada, Mexico and the EU. If the U.S. had 
invoked "security exceptions" to defend the imposition of duties a gainst many such countries, on 
what grounds has the U.S. chosen to mutually settle the dispute with only a few countries?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  In Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States) and Proclamation 9704 of 8  March 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminium  Into 
the United  States), the President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and 
decided to adjust the imports of steel and aluminium  articles by imposing a 25% ad valorem  tariff 
on imports of stee l articles and imposing a 10% ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminium  articles, 
so that such imports will not threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations also 
stated that any country with which the  United  States has a security relati onship is welcome to 
discuss with the  United  States alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national 
security caused by imports from that country. Should the  United  States and any such country arrive 
at a satisfactory alternative means  to address the threat to the national security such that the 
President determines that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national 
security, the President may remove or modify the restriction on such imports from that country and, 
if necessary, make any corresponding adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries as 
U.S. national security interests require. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members 
that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 73:  Will the U.S. agree to mutually settle all its disputes pertaining to the imposition of 
Section  232 additional duties against all countries?  
 
RESPONSE 73:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 74:  The U.S. has cemented deep economic and strategic relationships with its partners 
in Europe and the Asia -Pacific region with countries like Norway, Switzerland, Australia and Japan, 
especially as part of m ulti-lateral groupings like the Quad and IPEF (Indo -Pacific Economic 
Framework). Will the U.S. be willing to settle the disputes relating to Section  232 duties amicably 
with all its partners and allies?  
 
RESPONSE 74:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 297 - 
 
  Page 110, 3.150  
 
Section  301(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 requires the U.S. Trade Representative (the USTR) to take 
action in cases where, as a result of an investigation, it is dete rmined that a foreign government is 
engaging in (i)  trade agreement violations; (ii)  or acts, policies, or practices that are inconsistent 
with U.S. international legal rights and that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.236 Section  301(b) of 
the Trade Act of  1974 authorizes the USTR to take action in cases where, as a result of an 
investigation, it is determined that a foreign government is engaging in acts, policies, or practices 
that are unreasonable or discriminatory, and that burden or restrict U.S. comme rce. 237 Under 
Section  301(b), unreasonable practices include the denial of: (i)  fair opportunities for the 
establishment of enterprises; (ii)  adequate and effective intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
protection; (iii)  fair and equitable market access opportuniti es for U.S. persons that rely on IPR 
protection; (iv)  fair and equitable market opportunities, including a foreign government's toleration 
of anti -competitive activities that restrict access of U.S. goods or services to a foreign market; and 
(v) worker rig hts. Unreasonable practices may also include export targeting.  
 
QUESTION 75:  How many Section  301 investigations have been undertaken by the U.S. over the 
review period?  
 
RESPONSE 75:  All section 301 investigations initiated during the reporting period are  listed on the 
USTR website, which can be accessed here: https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/enforcement/section -301-
investigations . 
 
QUESTION 76:  What steps are followed by USTR in determining whether an investigation is initiated 
within the stipulated 45  days?  
 
RESPONSE 76:  This question appears to concern Section  302(a)(2) of the Trade Act which provides 
that the Trade Representative determine whether to initiate an investigatio n within 45  days following 
the receipt of a petition. The statutory provision directs the Trade Representative to undertake a 
review of the allegations in the petition, and then to make a determination on whether to initiate an 
investigation.  
 
QUESTION 77:  What steps will the U.S. take to implement the decisions on the two pillar solution 
to the challenges arising from the digitization of the economy, as agreed under the OECD 
Framework? (Background – closing of the 301 investigation on India for the DST too k place following 
the conclusion of this agreement).  
 
RESPONSE 77:  Multilateral work is ongoing on the development of both Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. No 
country, including the  United  States, has yet adopted Pillar 1 or Pillar 2 in domestic legislation. 
Regardi ng future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 121, 3.183  
 
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115 -232) (ECRA) is the principal implementing statute 
for export controls on dual -use and less sensitive military items; it is administered by the BIS. The 
BIS also enforces U.S. anti -boycott legislation. Export controls on nuclear materials, facilities and 
equipment for civilian purposes are administered by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm ission in 
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83 -703). 292 The Arms Export Control Act of 
1976 (P.L. 94 -329) provides the President with the statutory authority to control exports of defense 
articles and services. Short supply controls may b e maintained under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) or other regulatory authority. Economic sanctions or embargoes may 
be imposed by the President pursuant to the IEEPA or by specific acts of Congress. Export controls 
are administere d and enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the State Department 
(Table  3.23).  
 
QUESTION 78:  Please elaborate on the application of new export control regulations in the review 
period, particularly in 2022 following the Ukraine Conflict and the use of the Foreign Direct Product 
Rule. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 298 - 
 
  RESPONSE 78:  For details on export controls implemented in response to Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine, including Foreign Direct Product rules, please see the website of the Bureau of Industry and 
Security at: https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy -guidance/country -guidance/russia -belarus . 
 
Page 133, 3.230  
 
SDOs that adhere to the Essential Requirements may be accredited by ANSI to develop American 
National Standards (ANS) related to products, processes, services, systems, or personnel. In 
March  2022, there were 237 ANSI -accredited standard developers (ASDs); 18 organizations became 
ASDs during the review period. By the same date, ANSI listed more than 13,600 standards devel oped 
by ASDs, of which 1,075 new standards were issued between July  2018 and March  2022. In addition 
to the thousands of VCS developed by SDOs, consortia standards also help to fill the need for 
standards used by industry, especially in technology areas wh ere a more rapid development pace is 
needed to meet market needs.  
 
QUESTION 79:  The U.S. is requested to explain the criteria employed for accrediting such SDOs, 
and in which cases such SDOs are refused accreditation under the ANSI's essential requirement of 
national standards. How are the new standards developed by the US, are these purely driven by the 
domestic Industries' technological capability?  
 
RESPONSE 79:  The U.S. government does not accredit standard development organizations. An 
ANSI-Accredited Standards Developer is an organization that has voluntarily submitted its standards 
development procedures to ANSI for review and accreditation. An ASDs' procedur es must comply 
with ANSI's Essential Requirements, including provisions for demonstrating openness, balance, lack 
of dominance, due process, and consensus. Once accredited, an ASD agrees to comply with ANSI's 
oversight when submitting individual standards for approval as ANS, including provisions for 
demonstrating openness, balance, lack of dominance, due process, and consensus. For more on 
ANSI's Essential Requirements, please see https://www.ansi.org/american -national -standards/ans -
introduction/essential -requirements . 
 
Voluntary consensus standards that are developed by ANSI -accredited standards developing 
organizations are based on a process that is co llaborative, balanced and consensus -based. In respect 
of standards, ANSI has accepted the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and 
Application of Standards, included at Annex  III of the WTO TBT  Agreement on behalf of 
ANSI-Accredited Standard s Developers. The Code of Good Practice states that participating 
standards bodies shall accord treatment to products originating in the territory of any other Member 
of the WTO no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like 
products originating in any other country.  
 
QUESTION 80:  If yes, does it provide scope for MNCs, and does it allow the participation of such 
firms in the process of standardization?  
 
RESPONSE 80:  See response to Question  79. ANSI's essential requir ements for due process are 
designed to ensure that any party (organization, company, government agency, individual, etc.) 
with a direct and material interest has a right to participate by: a) expressing a position and its 
basis, b) having that position con sidered, and c) having the right to appeal. Further, openness 
signifies that participation shall be open to all parties who are directly and materially interested in 
the activity in question. There shall be no undue financial barriers to participation. Vot ing 
membership on the consensus body shall not be conditional upon membership in any organization, 
nor unreasonably restricted on the basis of technical qualifications or other such requirements.  
 
QUESTION 81:  Can the U.S. provide the details on the firm o wnership status of participation across 
the 18 organizations which became ASDs?  
 
RESPONSE 81:  The U.S. government does not collect information regarding the management 
details of organizations accredited by ANSI. A full list of such organizations is availa ble on the ANSI 
website, here:  https://www.ansi.org/american -national -standards/info -for-standards -
developers/accredited -standards -developers#sort=%40titlecomputed%20ascending . 
 
QUESTION 82:  What is the process of isolation of MNCs standards -driven and influenced by other 
manufacturing countries, if any?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 299 - 
 
  RESPONSE 82:  The question is not clear.  A voluntary consensus standard is developed in a 
specifically defined open and fair environment with general agreement by stakeholders. See OMB 
A-119 and National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA). Among other features, 
ANSI-accredited stand ards development emphasizes openness, balance, and a lack of dominance 
by any single interest category.  
 
QUESTION 83:  How sound is the process of documentation in the case of national standards?  
 
RESPONSE 83:  The United  States government does not accredit standards development bodies. 
For more information on the operating procedures by ANSI's Board of Standards Review, please 
see: https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/About%20ANSI/Current_Versions_Proc_Docs_f
or_Website/BSR_Pro_current.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 84:  Is there a mechanism to isolate the primary driver of technological standard, and 
that of innovation that is over and above t he foundational technology – a process similar to one seen 
in the case of evergreening of patents?  
 
RESPONSE 84:  The question is not clear. Among other features, ANSI -accredited standards 
development emphasizes openness, balance, and a lack of dominance by any single interest 
category.  
 
Page 133, 3.231  
 
In the  United  States, technical regulations can be established at the federal or sub -federal level, and 
rely heavily on VCS developed by the private sector making them mandatory by reference; technical 
regulations cover mostly products but can also concern processes or services. While Congress can 
establish product regulations legislatively, it usually delegates enabling legislation to regulatory 
agencies, generally pursuant to broad  guidance as to the factors to be considered and policy goals 
to be achieved. The majority of rulemaking involves three steps: issuance of a notice of proposed 
rulemaking soliciting public comment, agency consideration of all relevant information, and the 
issuance of a final rule after consideration of the relevant information. Executive Order (E.O.) 13563 
requires the use of the Internet for the consultation procedure and the publication of rules to the 
extent possible and establishes a 60 -day period for c onsultations. Any interested person can submit 
petitions for reconsideration after final rules have been issued. All final rules may be judicially 
reviewed. All regulations issued by agencies as final rules are subject to Congressional review under 
the Con gressional Review Act (CRA).  
 
QUESTION 85:  The U.S. is requested to provide some examples of technical regulations concerning 
processes and services, and the details on the process and procedure for establishing such 
regulations, otherwise known as domesti c regulations. Is this process of petitions for reconsideration 
open to foreign firms operating outside the territory and not registered as legal entities in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 85:  In general, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes procedural 
requirements that U.S. government agencies must follow when conducting a rulemaking, including 
those proposing to initiate, amend, or withdraw, technical regulations. The most relevant portions 
of the APA can be found at 5 USC 553, et seq., available at: https://www.archives.gov/federal -
register/laws/administrative -procedure/553.html . Each agency incorporates the requirements of the 
APA and other relevant laws i nto its own procedures, which can be found in the Code of Federal 
Regulations. See, for example, 46 CFR 502 (rulemaking procedures for the Federal Maritime 
Commission), available at: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -46/chapter -IV/subchapter -A/part -
502/subpart -D?toc=1 . See reginfo.gov for additional resources on U.S. regulation.  
 
In preparing technical regulations, agencies are directed to use voluntary c onsensus standards (VCS) 
in lieu of government -unique standards, except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical. 
Regulating agencies are directed to ensure that technical regulation(s) reflect the best available 
method  of achieving  the regulat ory objective.  See Circular  A-119, available  at: https://obamawhit
ehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a119 . In addition, U.S. law directs Federal agencies, in 
developing standards, to ba se the standards on international standards if appropriate. See 19 USC 
2532.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 300 - 
 
  With respect to petitions for reconsideration of a rule, the APA states that each agency shall give an 
"interested person" the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or r epeal of a rule. 
See 5 CFR 553(e).  
 
Page 134, 3.233  
 
OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is responsible for regulatory oversight 
and leads interagency review of significant regulation pursuant to E.O. 12866. The agency or 
agencies res ponsible for developing technical regulations depend on the product in question. 
Agencies may adopt technical regulations only after thoroughly analyzing their potential impact, 
typically by means of an assessment and comparison of either the benefits and costs or the 
cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches. OIRA keeps an updated repository of 
ongoing reviews and those completed since 1981. Final rules are published in the Federal Register 
and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations; a u nified agenda for regulatory and deregulatory 
actions is also available on OIRA's website. A memorandum, issued on 20  January  2021, initiated 
consultations to improve and modernize the regulatory review.  
 
QUESTION 86:  The U.S. is requested to explain if an  impact assessment is mandatory for all 
proposed technical regulations or if there are exceptions where technical regulations may be adopted 
without an impact assessment.  
 
RESPONSE 86:  In general, all significant regulations must be published as proposed r ules and 
subject to notice and comment period, as outlined in the APA. See 5 USC 553. In some cases, 
agencies may be required to prepare an impact statement, such as an environmental impact 
statement for major federal actions significantly affecting the qu ality of the human environment. 
See 40 CFR 1502.3.  
 
QUESTION 87:  In the context of SDGs, India would seek information on the following aspects:  
Is the OIRA having an assessment of the environmental impact of these technical regulations and 
the product prod uced using these standards?  
 
RESPONSE 87:  As stated in Response  85, above, agencies are directed to use voluntary consensus 
standards (VCS) in lieu of government -unique standards, except where inconsistent with law or 
otherwise impractical. In addition, federal regulations direct Federal agencies, in developing 
standards, to base the standards on international standards if appropriate. 19 U.S.C. 2532. Relevant 
agencies draft proposed technical regulations and are directed to ensure that technica l regulation(s) 
reflect the best available method of achieving the regulatory objective. Regulatory objectives may 
include environmental considerations, where appropriate.  
 
QUESTION 88:  Does the process initiated on 20  January  2021 have such an environment al impact 
assessment?  
 
RESPONSE 88:  A memorandum, issued on 20  January  2021, initiated consultations to improve and 
modernize the regulatory review. Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 134, 3.236  
 
Agencies ar e not required to rely only on VCSs available free of cost for their rules; however, a 
principle of "reasonable availability" of the information is applied. Federal agencies are also required, 
when developing technical regulations, to take into account int ernational standards and, if 
appropriate, base their regulations on those international standards. Title IV of the TAA of 1979 as 
amended (19  U.S.C.  2531) provides that the reasons for which it may not be appropriate to base a 
U.S. technical regulation on an international standard include, but are not limited to, the protection 
of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.  
 
QUESTION 89:  The U.S. is requested to provide information on what could be the other reasons 
for possi ble deviations from international standards as the basis for technical regulations. In case of 
deviations from international standards, does USA, on request, identify the parts which deviate from 
international standards?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 301 - 
 
  RESPONSE 89:  When developing a tec hnical regulation, a U.S. regulatory authority is required to 
explain the regulation, including its objectives, how the regulation achieves its objectives, the 
rationale for the material features of the regulation, any major alternatives considered, and th e 
information and analyses the regulatory authority relied upon to support the regulation.  
 
U.S. law states that basing a standard on an international standard may not be appropriate in cases 
not limited to the following: (I)  national security requirements ; (II)  the prevention of deceptive 
practices; (III)  the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment; (IV)  fundamental climatic or other geographical factors; or (V)  fundamental 
technological problems. See 19 USC  2532.  
 
All proposed technical regulations at the Federal (central) government level are published in the 
Federal Register and, as appropriate, notified to the WTO TBT Secretariat and circulated via ePing 
(https://epingalert.org/en/Search/Index?domainIds=1&countryIds=C840 ). The  United  States 
follows the TBT Committee Recommendation on the Coherent Use of Notification Formats (Revision 
adopted at the meeting of 13 -15 November  2019 as G/TBT/35/Rev.1), which describes what and 
when Members should notify.  
 
QUESTION 90:  It is further, requested to provide details on whether a technical regulation was 
notified in the early 1970s and has not been withdrawn:  
Is it a valid technical re gulation considered for the conformity assessment procedure?  
 
RESPONSE 90: A technical regulation is valid until withdrawn or amended. Final technical 
regulations published in the Federal Register that were notified in the draft rulemaking stage are 
notified to the WTO and are also published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). All 
regulations in force can also be found online at ecfr.gov.  
 
QUESTION 91:  What is the legal validity of such standards in the case of high -tech industries, 
which require  continuous upgradation of their technical regulation?  
 
RESPONSE 91:  A technical regulation is valid until withdrawn or amended.  
 
Page 135, paragraph 3.240  
 
The U.S. conformity assessment system utilizes a variety of mechanisms depending on the product 
and assessed risk. Standards and technical regulations that rely on supplier's self -declaration are 
also supported, to a large extent, through product -liability laws. It is generally the responsibility of 
the supplier (producer or importer) to ensu re compliance with existing technical regulations or with 
standards when such compliance is required by the purchaser. In the case of imports, it is primarily 
the responsibility of importers representing foreign manufacturers to meet technical regulations and 
to ensure that permits, if required, have been obtained in advance of the goods arriving in 
the United  States. For some products, a declaration or proof of conformity or compliance must be 
submitted by the manufacturer or the importer upon or prior to importation.  
 
QUESTION 92:  The U.S. is requested to provide information relating to the category of products 
for which a supplier's self -declaration of conformity is accepted.  
 
RESPONSE 92:  The United  States does not maintain a consolidated list related to the category of 
products sorted by method of conformity assessment.  
 
QUESTION 93:  It is also requested in which specific cases of imports; the declaration is required 
to be submitted befor e importation.  
 
RESPONSE 93:  Each agency retains broad discretion in its selection and use of conformity 
assessment activities and may elect not to use or recognize alternative conformity assessment 
approaches if the agency deems the alternatives to be ina ppropriate, inadequate, or inconsistent 
with statutory criteria or programmatic objectives and requirements. The  United  States does not 
collect information related to the category of products sorted by method of conformity assessment.  
 
QUESTION 94:  Are the se based on any internal assessment of the risk of the products?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 302 - 
 
  RESPONSE 94:  All conformity assessment methods utilized by U.S. regulatory agencies are based 
on an assessment of risk. More information related to considerations for federal agencies can be  
found  at Conformity  Assessment  Considerations  for Federal  Agencies,  available  at: https://nvlpubs
.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.2000 -02.pdf . 
 
QUESTIO N 95:  If yes, are these harmonised with the international SDOs, like the CODEX, OIE and 
IPPC and other UN bodies like the WHO and FAO?  
 
RESPONSE 95:  U.S. experts are engaged in all of the international organizations noted and 
contribute to the development of the many and varied risk assessment resources developed by these 
bodies.  
 
Page 137, 3.248  
 
The United  States has numerous laws and regulations pe rtaining to food safety, animal health, and 
plant health. Major, and long -standing, pieces of SPS legislation include the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, the Egg 
Products In spection Act, the Plant Protection Act, the Animal Health Protection Act, and the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and the Rodenticide Act.  350 Since the promulgation of the FDA Food Safety 
Modernization Act (FSMA) in 2011, the  United  States has not made a comparable large -scale update 
to its SPS legislation. However, some changes took place during the review period in relation with 
implementing regulations which accompany this overall regulatory framework (see below).  
 
QUESTION 96:  The multitude of agencies  and rules involved in implementing sanitary and 
phytosanitary requirements lead to a significant compliance burden, especially for developing 
countries. Hence, these requirements translate into a significant non -tariff barrier to trade. What are 
the steps  being taken by the U.S. in streamlining these processes and reducing the compliance 
burden?  
 
RESPONSE 96:  The United  States develops and implements SPS measures as required by domestic 
laws and regulations and in a manner consistent with its international  obligations.  
 
QUESTION 97:  Given the large number of import refusals that take place as a result of SPS 
measures, does the U.S. conduct awareness sessions about various FDA procedures?  
 
RESPONSE 97:  Based on FDA data during Fiscal Year 2022, fewer than 7, 000 imported entry lines 
of human food were refused by FDA out of over 15,000,000 total lines of human food imported. FDA 
has a large amount of information available on the agency's website, including a page dedicated to 
Importing Food Products into the  United States. Compliance with U.S. laws and regulations remains 
the responsibility of industry, and exporters are advised to work with their U.S. -based importers to 
understand the requirements applicable to the specific foods they import.  
 
Pages 138 -139, 3. 254 
 
Paragraph 3.254 notes that the FDA has concluded Systems Recognition Arrangements with food 
safety agencies in three trading partners. The authorities indicate that these arrangements do not 
constitute trade -facilitating measures and that they are not the same as equivalence determinations.  
 
QUESTION 98:  The U.S. is requested to explain how these Systems Recognition Arrangements 
function and what benefits accrue out of these arrangements to the trading partners with whom the 
arrangements are entered  into. 
 
RESPONSE 98:  A Systems Recognition Arrangement (SRA) is a partnership between the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) and a foreign regulatory counterpart (referred to as participating 
agency or agencies), in which the FDA and participating age ncies have concluded that they operate 
comparable regulatory programs that yield similar food safety outcomes. SRAs allow the FDA and 
participating agencies to prioritize resources in a more risk -based manner and improve and expand 
information sharing on f ood safety issues.  
 
QUESTION 99:  Additionally, why Systems Recognition Arrangements with food safety agencies is 
not considered a trade -facilitating measure?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 303 - 
 
  RESPONSE 99:  The outcome of a positive Systems Recognition (SR) assessment by both agencies 
is the creation of a regulatory partnership. SR is a voluntary program and not required for access to 
the U.S. market.  
 
Page 139, 3.256  
 
On 1 August  2018, new U.S. standards for barley under the U.S. Grain Standards Act entered into 
force. In June  2019, APHIS issued a final rule clarifying and further detailing the criteria to be used 
when assessing risks related to plant pests for the importation, interstate movement, and release of 
biological control organisms. On 18  May 2020, APHIS made public t he first comprehensive revision 
of regulations on genetically engineered organisms since 1987 to facilitate the development of 
genetically engineered organisms that are unlikely to pose plant pest risks. On 17  September  2020, 
the regulations governing the importation of cattle and bison in regards to bovine tuberculosis and 
brucellosis were amended. In December  2020, FDA issued a final regulation for accreditation of 
laboratories that perform food testing. When fully implemented, laboratory analysis of food  for 
import purposes or when subject to food testing orders will be required to be performed by accredited 
laboratories. In April  2021, label requirements for allergens in food products were extended to 
sesame (P.L. 117 -11). 
 
QUESTION 100:  India seeks from  the U.S. the following details:  
The U.S. is requested to explain its current system of food testing. How is food testing different from 
risk assessment?  
 
RESPONSE 100:  Risk assessment is the process by which exposure to a food safety hazard is 
calculated through the process of hazard identification, hazard characterization, exposure 
assessment, and risk characterization to inform risk management. In contrast, food product testing 
is a risk management tool used to determine the compliance of a given food pr oduct with applicable 
regulations and standards. FDA's food safety regulatory system does not depend on end -product 
testing to ensure food safety but rather emphasizes preventive controls and good manufacturing 
practices to mitigate food safety hazards. Ho wever, on a risk - and for cause case -by-case basis, FDA 
does collect samples for testing during import entry and food facility inspections to determine if food 
products meet FDA public health standards.  
 
QUESTION 101:  Does this deviate from the internation ally harmonised process suggested by the 
CODEX?  
 
RESPONSE 101:  The Codex Guidelines for Food Import Control Systems (CAC/GL 47 -2003), 
Paragraph  22, state that "the nature and frequency of inspection, sampling, and testing of imported 
foods should be based on the risk to human health and the safety presented by the product, its 
origin and the history of conformance to requirements and other relevant information". FDA operates 
a risk -based import entry evaluation system known as PREDICT. This system takes int o 
consideration the inherent risk of the imported product and also information about the previous 
history of importers, manufacturers, and shippers. PREDICT presents shipments for further review 
and potential sampling and testing by FDA personnel based on this risk -based analysis.  
 
QUESTION 102:  If yes, indicate the additions and eliminations from the standardised process 
already available as an international template.  
 
RESPONSE 102:  FDA's risk -based analytical and data -driven approach to evaluating the foo d safety 
risk of imported foods through the PREDICT system is consistent with relevant Codex Guidelines as 
explained above.  
 
QUESTION 103:  Whether the testing of food by accredited laboratories applies to all food products 
or only in certain circumstances?  
 
RESPONSE 103:  Food testing, including environmental testing, is only required to be conducted by 
an accredited laboratory under certain circumstances specified in the Laboratory Accreditation for 
Analyses of Foods (LAAF) rule. After the LAAF final rule is fully implemen ted, owners and consignees WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  will be required to use a LAAF -accredited laboratory for food testing in the following circumstances 
(see Title  21 Code of Federal Regulations § 1.1107):  
 
• to support removal from an import alert through successful consecutive tes ting (e.g. to 
get a food product or firm removed from the red list);  
• to support admission of an imported food (e.g. articles of human or animal food, and U.S. 
goods returned that are articles of food) detained at the border because it is or appears 
to be i n violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (e.g. products that contain 
or appear to contain unapproved food additives, including unauthorized food contact 
substances);  
• required by existing FDA food safety regulations, when applied to address a n identified or 
suspected food safety problem (i.e. certain tests related to shell eggs, sprouts, and bottled 
drinking water);  
• required by a directed food laboratory order, a new procedure being implemented in this 
final rule that will allow FDA to require  use of a LAAF -accredited laboratory to address an 
identified or suspected food safety problem in certain, rare circumstances and;  
• conducted in connection with certain administrative processes (e.g. testing submitted in 
connection with an appeal of an admi nistrative detention order).  
 
QUESTION 104:  Additionally, does USA accept the accreditation of other trading partners whose 
accreditation bodies are member of ILAC/IAF, if not, why not?  
 
RESPONSE 104:  Within the LAAF final rule, FDA has established that be ing an ILAC signatory is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for accreditation bodies to be recognized by FDA to 
LAAF-accredit laboratories. FDA has determined it necessary and appropriate to set additional 
standards for accreditation bodies, such a s the conflict -of-interest requirements in Title 21 CFR 
§ 1.1119. FDA must also evaluate the work of the accreditation bodies to ensure the integrity of the 
program. Further, the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) directs the FDA to periodically review 
a recognized accreditation body's compliance with the requirements of the program.  
 
Page 141, 3.265  
 
Regarding international trade, the Wilson Tariff Act prohibits any arrangements by importers whose 
aim is to restrain trade or to incre ase the price of imported goods. The Webb -Pomerene Export Trade 
Act allows businesses to form export trade associations to engage in the collective exports of goods 
provided there are no anti -competitive effects, or injury to competitors, within the  United  States. 
The Export Trading Company Act creates a procedure whereby persons engaged in export may 
obtain, under certain circumstances, an export certificate of review providing, inter alia , for limited 
antitrust immunity. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improv ements Act provides that the Sherman Act 
and the FTC Act apply to conduct involving non -import foreign trade with a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect on the trade or commerce activities of a person in the  United  States.  
 
QUESTION 105:  Some of the major domestic companies of the U.S. like Google, Amazon, Meta 
and Apple are facing antitrust lawsuits in other member states. For example, Google has been fined 
in the EU's PriceRunner EUR 2.1 billion suits, EUR  1.49 billion online advertising  suit, India's 
USD 1.9 million Google play store policy suit and South Korea's USD  177 million suit for abusing 
market dominance etc. Is there any legal policy to regulate anti -competitive practices by domestic 
companies of the U.S. abroad?  
 
RESPONSE 105:  Additional information regarding this issue can be found in the Antitrust 
International  Enforcement  Guidelines,  which  can be found  at: https://www.justice.gov/atr/internati
onalgui delines/download . 
 
QUESTION 106:  Are there any steps taken w.r.t regulating anti -competitive practices by domestic 
companies abroad?  
 
RESPONSE 106:  See response to Question  105 above.  
 
Page 148, 3.284  
 
Government procurement at the federal and state levels is decentralized. At the federal level, 
procurement is carried out through the procurement systems of the various executive agencies. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 305 - 
 
  Despite being decentralized, federal procurement follows general gu idelines and is overseen and 
coordinated by the OMB through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). In accordance 
with E.O. 12866 of 30  September  1993, coordinated review of agency rulemaking is necessary to 
ensure that regulations are consistent with applicable law. Within OMB, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the repository of expertise concerning regulatory issues, including 
methodologies and procedures that affect more than one agency, and the President's regulatory 
policies. OMB provides guidance to agencies and assists the President, the Vice President, and other 
policy advisors to the President in regulatory planning and reviews individual regulations. 411 The 
OFPP, headed by an Administrator, provides overall directi on for government -wide procurement 
policies and plays a central role in shaping the policies and practices used by federal agencies to 
acquire goods and services; it also reviews proposed regulations for compliance with policy 
guidance. 412 The OFPP Adminis trator may prescribe government -wide procurement policies and 
may issue policy letters stating principles that must be followed by the agencies; implementation 
takes place through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 413 The OFPP also prescribes polici es 
through the OFPP Memoranda. In 2021, the Made in America Office was created within OMB, and 
memoranda were issued with respect to "Made in America" waivers and deviation.  
 
3.309. The USAspending.gov website, created following the requirements of the Fed eral Funding 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), provides information on total federal 
government spending, principally in relation to federal contracts, grants, loans, and other financial 
assistance awards of more than USD  25,000. The Dig ital Accountability and Transparency Act of 
9 May 2014 (DATA Act) (P.L. 113 -101) expanded the scope of the FFATA by requiring the disclosure 
of direct agency expenditures and linking federal contract, loan, and grant spending information to 
federal agency programs, and improving the quality of data submitted to USAspending.gov.  
 
QUESTION 107:  What is the procedure for the non -discriminatory treatment for foreign enterprises 
in the U.S. Government procurement process?  
 
RESPONSE 107:  It is unclear what the qu estion is asking. However, foreign and domestic 
enterprises share the same opportunities and procedures in competing for contracts covered by the 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  
 
QUESTION 108:  Why has the U.S. Government decided to enhance t he domestic content 
requirement and price preference in the FAR in January  2021 for Government procurement?  
 
RESPONSE 108:  The Federal government is a major buyer in a number of markets for goods and 
services, including the single largest purchaser of cons umer goods in the world. Leveraging that 
purchasing power to shape markets and accelerate innovation is a key part of the Administration's 
strategy to grow the industries of the future to support U.S. workers, communities, and firms. As 
the pandemic has de monstrated, federal procurement can strengthen the resiliency of domestic 
supply chains, and reduce the risk of Americans being adversely impacted by the actions of 
competitor nations during a time of crisis. For more information, please see the Fact Sheet  on the 
Proposed Buy American rule, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -
releases/2021/07/28/fact -sheet -biden -harris -administration -issues -proposed -buy-american -rule-
advancing -the-presidents -commitment -to-ensuring -the-future -of-america -is-made -in-america -by-
all-of-americas/ . 
 
QUESTION 109:  Is the U.S. considering exceptions to its general principles of government 
procurement in view of strategic priorities?  
 
RESPONSE 109:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States r eminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews.  
 
Page 162, 3.328  
 
The United  States is a top producer and exporter of goods and services that embody intellectual 
property (IP). It is estimated that IP is present in some 60% of U.S. goods exports and that 
IP-intensive industries account for over one third of U.S. GDP.473 USDOC has designated 81 
industries, out of a total of 313 (25.9% of the total), as IP -intensive, which collectively accounted 
for some 40% of GDP. According to a 2018  study, the  United  States accounts for 31% of global 
commercial knowledge and technology intensive services and is the largest global producer of 
high-technology manufactures (also 31%). 474 During the period under review, the  United  States WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 306 - 
 
  has continued to  post its traditional balance -of-payments surplus in IP -related payments, as 
measured by the category "charges for the use of IP". In 2020, net receipts were USD  70.8 billion, 
with receipts totaling USD  113.8  billion and payments reaching USD  43 billion. 475 In the first three 
quarters of 2021, receipts totaled USD  91 billion, and payments were USD  34.7 billion, resulting in 
a USD  56.3 billion surplus.  
 
QUESTION 110:  What are the opportunities and challenges identified by U.S. innovative and 
creative industr ies in foreign markets with regards to IPR protection?  
 
RESPONSE 110:  USTR receives submissions from U.S. stakeholders in response to notices 
published in the Federal Register  for the Special 301 review, the Review of Notorious Markets for 
Counterfeiting a nd Piracy, and the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. 
Opportunities and challenges identified by U.S. innovative and creative industries in foreign markets 
with regards to IP protection can be found in those submissions, which are pu blicly available at 
www.regulations.gov . 
 
QUESTION 111:  What is the nature of public interest exceptions provided for IPRs that may be 
required for use in health, climate change mitigation, and other critical sect ors? 
 
RESPONSE 111:  Section  I of the Special 301 Report  discusses broad global trends and issues in IP 
that the U.S. Government works to address on a daily basis. These include the positive role of IP in 
promoting green technology innovation. Trade is one of the key conduits for innovation, which plays 
a fundamental role in transferring technology and diffusing know how. IP is also an indispensable 
catalyst in driving green technology innovation and in promoting technology transfer in these goods 
and servic es. Such protection is essential to facilitate access to, and transfer of, today's technologies 
and to promote tomorrow's innovation.  
 
QUESTION 112:  The U.S. currently has no provisions for the protection of Geographical Indicators 
as a separate category. Instead, it is covered under trademark protection. Given the unique nature 
of GIs and specific challenges associated with using trademarks to protect  GIs, is there consideration 
of providing GI as a separate class of IP protection? (Background: Basmati rice, in addition to various 
other Indian products do not enjoy GI protection in the US)  
 
RESPONSE 112:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States remind s Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 113:  What is the procedure for removing countries from the Special 301 Priority Watch 
list status? What is the review procedure in cases where countries have demonstrated significan t 
progress? (Background: India has been on the Priority Watch List since 1990s).  
 
RESPONSE 113:  The Special 301 listings are the result of intensive deliberations among all relevant 
agencies within the U.S. Government, informed by extensive consultations w ith participating 
stakeholders, foreign governments, the U.S. Congress, and other interested parties. USTR, together 
with the Special 301 Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), conducts a broad 
and balanced assessment of U.S. trading part ners' IP protection and enforcement, as well as related 
market access issues affecting IP -intensive industries, in accordance with the statutory criteria. The 
Special 301 Subcommittee, through the TPSC, provides advice on country placement to USTR based 
on this assessment. This assessment is conducted on a case -by-case basis, taking into account 
diverse factors such as a trading partner's level of development, its international obligations and 
commitments, the concerns of right holders and other interested parties, and the trade and 
investment policies of the  United  States. It is informed by the various cross -cutting issues and trends 
identified in Section  I of the Special 301 Report . Each assessment is based upon the specific facts 
and circumstances that sh ape IP protection and enforcement in a particular trading partner.  
 
Page 163, 3.330  
 
A major feature in recent years has been the increase in the number of patents linked to artificial 
intelligence (AI). A recent report by the  United  States Patent Office ( USPTO) shows that AI is 
increasingly important for invention, diffusing broadly across technologies, inventor -patentees, 
organizations, and geography. The report shows that, between 2002 and 2018, annual AI patent 
applications increased by more than 100%, rising from 30,000 to more than 60,000 annually, while 
the share of all patent applications that contain AI grew from 9% to nearly 16%. Also, patents WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 307 - 
 
  containing AI appeared in about 42% of all technology subclasses used by USPTO in 2018 and the 
percentage of inventor -patentees who are active in AI was approximately 25%. There had also been 
an important growth in the percentage of organizations patenting in AI.  
 
QUESTION 114:  India seeks from the U.S. the following details:  
Are there any criteria for the pat entability of computer software in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 114:  AI-related inventions can be viewed as a subset of computer -implemented 
inventions. Therefore, guidance from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office regarding 
computer -implemented inventions can be a  useful resource: 
https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial -intelligence/artificial -intelligence -resources . 
 
QUESTION 115:  What is the U.S. position concerning the patentability of inventions by an AI?  
 
RESPONSE 115:  An AI cannot be an inventor in a United  States Patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed 
decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Eastern District of Virginia that  an 
AI system cannot be an inventor. See Thaler v. Vidal , No.  21-2347 (Fed. Cir. 2022). See the 
USPTO's  published  decision  at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/fi les/documents/16524350_2
2apr2020.pdf . 
 
Page 164, 3.333  
 
Led by USTR, the  United  States makes use of several mechanisms and channels at the bilateral, 
plurilateral, or multilateral levels for addressing IP protection and enforcement issues with its trading 
partners. In this respect, the  United  States seeks to secure binding IPR -related commitments as 
part of bilateral and plurilateral FTAs, bilateral agreements and MOUs, bilateral investment treaties, 
and trade and investment framework agreements. The  United  States has also actively pursued 
enhanced standards of IP protection through its engagement with countries seeking accession to the 
WTO. Other instruments used by the  United  States for IPR protection and enforcement include the 
annual "Special 301" review  and report (see below) and IP dialogues with trading partners; 
multilateral engagement on IP issues through the WTO, WIPO, APEC, and other organizations; 
implementation of trade policy in support of U.S. innovations; and providing interagency trade policy  
leadership.  
The U.S. FTAs, like the CPTPP and USMCA, contain enhanced standards of protection like patent 
linkage, patent term extension and patent term adjustment. What is the U.S. position with respect 
to the public health implications of such enhanced standards of protection that inhibit timely access 
to affordable medicines - which could impede federal allocation and consumer welfare?  
 
QUESTION 116:  Further, India seeks additional information on the following aspects:  
Does the U.S. seek to enshrine high er standards under its FTAs with respect to issues related to the 
TRIPS -CBD linkage?  
 
RESPONSE 116:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 117:  What is the process of validation of bio -material sourced from the partner's 
territory?  
 
RESPONSE 117:  For patenting purposes, the  United  States requires a deposit of biological material 
at a designated depository for certain types of patent claims. The applicants have the duty of candor 
and are required to provide the information about the deposits to the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office. See: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2403.html . 
 
QUESTION 118:  What scientific tests are performed for the identification of the origin of 
bio-material?  
 
RESPONSE 118:  For patent purposes, the  United  States does not require the disclosure of origin of 
biological material used in an invention. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office does not conduct any 
scientific test to identify the origin of material.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page 166, 3.342  
 
The Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 1980 (Bayh -Dole Act) (P.L. 96 -517) a nd the 
Stevenson -Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96 -480), as well as implementing 
regulations, define a framework for facilitating innovation through IP and R&D funding. The 
Bayh-Dole Act authorizes USDOC to create standard patent rights cla uses to be included in federal 
funding agreements with non -profits, including universities, and small businesses. The authority to 
promulgate implementing regulations for Bayh -Dole was delegated to NIST. The Bayh -Dole Act and 
its regulations require any pe rson, non -profit organization, small business firm, or large business to 
disclose each "subject invention" (performed under a funding agreement), within a reasonable time 
after the invention becomes known to the contractor; they mandate contractors to noti fy the federal 
funding agency whether or not they elect to retain the title to a subject invention within two years 
of disclosure, and file an initial patent application on a subject invention to which the contractor 
elects to retain title within one year after election or before the end of any statutory period for 
obtaining patent protection. The patent application must include a statement that the invention was 
made with government support under the grant or contract awarded by the federal agency, and tha t 
the Government has certain rights in the invention. A contractor is obligated to submit periodic 
reports on the utilization of a subject invention; and to agree not to grant the exclusive right to use 
or sell any subject inventions in the  United  States u nless any products embodying it or produced by 
using it are manufactured substantially in the  United  States, subject to waiver. Recipients of federal 
funding and federal laboratories are also expected to give small businesses preference over other 
applican ts for licenses and must grant or reserve a license to the Federal Government to use the 
invention on or on behalf of the  United  States. Bayh -Dole and its regulations also specify certain 
conditions applicable to licenses granted by federal agencies in any  federally owned invention.  
 
QUESTION 119:  To what extent did the U.S. government resort to the government use exception 
under the Bayh - Dole Act and other emergency legislations for scaling up the local production of 
vaccines, therapeutics and other healt h products during COVID -19? 
 
RESPONSE 119:  The U.S. Government did not rely on the government use exception under the 
Bayh-Dole Act or other legislation when making programmatic and contract award decisions for 
scaling up the local production of vaccines, therapeutics, and other health products during 
COVID -19. The government use license is a nonexclusive, irrevocable, paid -up license to the U.S. 
Government granted by the institution holding title to inventions made under government funding 
agreements. The license is for use "for or on behalf of the U.S. Government" and can be applied to 
U.S. Government funding agreements for the production of products. The government may use the 
license as a defense to a lawsuit directed at the government or at a contractor  that was authorized 
to use the patents to conduct work under a government funded agreement.  
 
Page 166, 3.343  
 
NIST rule changes with respect to the Bayh -Dole Act went into effect on 14  May 2018 to reduce 
regulatory burdens on recipients of federal R&D fun ding. NIST issued updates to sections of the 
C.F.R. that implement the 1980 Bayh -Dole Act (37 C.F.R. Parts 401 and 404). The changes clarify 
certain definitions, reduce compliance burdens, address co -inventions between funding recipients 
and federal agenci es, and simplify the electronic reporting process. They also provide for automatic 
extensions of the requirement to file non -provisional patent applications and permit a business, 
university or other collaborator to rely on its Cooperative Research and Dev elopment Agreement 
(CRADA) with a federal laboratory to support an application for a license to a federal invention 
developed under that CRADA. In January  2021, NIST issued a notice of a proposed rulemaking to 
further streamline and reduce regulatory burde ns, improve compliance, enhance a contractor's 
ability to commercialize subject inventions, and increase the return on investment of federal funding. 
The Stevenson -Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96 -48021), as amended through 
Title II -Resear ch, Development, Test, and Evaluation, of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116 -92), enacted 20  December  2019, requires federal laboratories to actively 
participate in and budget for, technology transfer activities, understo od as passing information from 
federal agencies to the public to encourage the practical and commercial application of R&D. The 
law requires laboratories to set apart a percentage of the laboratory budget specifically for 
technology transfer activities. P. L. 116 -92 introduced amendments regarding regional public or 
non-profit innovation initiatives, in order to promote innovation -driven industry, strengthen its 
competitiveness through new product innovation and new technology adoption, accelerate the pace 
of commercialization of innovative research, and stimulate and enhance the overall innovation WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 309 - 
 
  capacity and long -term resilience of a region. To this end, NIST's Technology Partnerships Office 
(TPO) works with stakeholders on prioritizing technology transfer  issues and improving the process 
to enhance innovation, and technology commercialization.  
 
QUESTION 120:  What kind of cross -border arrangements has the U.S. concluded to facilitate 
technology transfer with its trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 120:  Please refer  to the "Report on the Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement: United  States  of America", document number IP/C/R/TTI/USA/3 (21  September  2022).  
 
QUESTION 121:  What was the U.S. contribution to the multilateral technology transfer 
arrangements during COVID -19 such as the COVID -19 Technology Access Pool (C -TAP) and the 
COVID -19 mRNA vaccine technology hub?  
 
RESPONSE 121:  The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), has licensed 11 COVID -19 research 
tools and early -stage vaccine and diagnostic candidate to the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) through 
the World Health Organization's COVID -19 Technology Access Pool (C -TAP). The licenses will allow 
manufacturers from all around the world to work with MPP and C -TAP to use these technologies fo r 
the potential development of COVID -19 vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics to benefit people 
living in low - and middle -income countries. Included in the technologies licensed is the SARS -CoV-2 
stabilized spike protein — a patented invention included in multiple COVID -19 vaccines.  
 
Separately, the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), which is part of 
the National Institutes of Health, has entered into a research collaboration agreement with Afrigen 
Biologics and Vaccines, a biotechnology company based in Cape Town, South  Africa that has been 
identified by the WHO as the first mRNA Hub. Through this partnership, NIAID and Afrigen will share 
knowledge, expertise, and data on mRNA vaccine production processes. The mutually benef icial 
scientific collaboration will advance each institutions' work toward establishing mRNA vaccine 
production capabilities to support their respective missions.  
 
Page 167, 3.344  
 
The Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing Engineering and Science Succe ss Act of 2018 
(SUCCESS Act) directs the Director of USPTO, in consultation with the Administrator of the SBA, to 
provide recommendations to promote the participation of women, minorities, and veterans in 
entrepreneurship activities and the patent system. In its report pursuant to the requirements of the 
SUCCESS Act, USPTO submitted a number of legislative recommendations for increasing the 
participation of women, minorities, and veterans as inventor -patentees and entrepreneurs.  
 
QUESTION 122:  What are some  of the legislative recommendations submitted by the USPTO for 
increasing the participation of women, minorities, and veterans as inventor -patentees and 
entrepreneurs?  
 
RESPONSE 122:  See the Report to Congress – Legislative Recommendations, Section  5, page  26, 
at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOSuccessAct.pdf . 
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 168, 3.347  
 
USPTO's Strategic Plan for FY2018/22 contains the main elements with respect to current and future 
IP policy. The Plan maintains the three goals set for the 2014 -18 period: optimizing patent quality 
and timeliness; optimizing trademark quality and timeliness; and providing domestic and global 
leadership to imp rove IP policy, protection, and enforcement. It identifies a role for USPTO in the 
strengthening of IP protection, both in the  United  States and abroad. USPTO's Strategic Plan aims 
to continue to improve the quality of issued patents and registered tradema rks, and shorten the 
time it takes to get a patent. To enhance patent quality, USPTO has introduced a new patent search 
system that provides examiners with increased access to prior art. It has also implemented a number 
of AI updates that more closely alig n the time allotted for the examination of patent applications 
with the technology described in the application and its specific attributes.  
 
QUESTION 123:  Has the U.S. benefited from concluding patent prosecution highway arrangements 
with trading partners ? 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 310 - 
 
  RESPONSE 123:  The applicants benefitted from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent 
Prosecution Highway (PPH) programs with partners. The statistics show, on average: fewer office 
actions, higher first action allowance rate, higher grant rate, lowe r request for Continuing 
Examination (RCE filing rates), lower appeal rates, and lower overall pendency. Additional 
information on PPH may be found at: https://www.uspto.gov/patents/basics/international -
protection/patent -prosecution -highway -pph-fast-track. 
 
Page 172, 3.359  
 
The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 modified a number of aspects of trademark law, including 
providing for the third-party submission of evidence during the examination, flexible response 
periods, ex parte expungement and re -examination, new grounds for cancellation, a rebuttable 
presumption of irreparable harm, decluttering initiatives, and amendments to confirm t he authority 
of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of USPTO. The main points 
of the Act are summarized in Box 3.4. The expungement, re -examination, and new grounds for 
cancellation provisions of the Act entered into effe ct on 18  December  2021, when a final rule issued 
by USPTO became effective.  
 
QUESTION 124:  Does the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 include provisions to protect the 
Trademarks and Copyright in the metaverse?  
 
RESPONSE 124:  There is no specific provision in the Trademark Modernization Act related to the 
metaverse.  
 
QUESTION 125:  Are the present U.S. laws sufficient to protect the IPR in the metaverse?  
 
RESPONSE 125:  Under U.S. trademark law, both goods and services offered in online virtual 
environments are registrable. Moreover, the likelihood of confusion analysis applies to trademark 
infringement activities in online virtual environments.  
 
Page 175, 3.366  
 
The United  States provides protection to foreign and domestic geographical i ndications (GIs) 
through its trademark system for all classes of goods and services where a given quality, reputation, 
or other characteristic is essentially attributable to their geographic origin. Protection to Gis is usually 
granted in the form of certi fication marks and collective marks indicating regional origin. Gis are 
considered a subset of trademarks, as in the U.S. view, they serve the same source -identifying 
functions as trademarks but are specific to geographic source identification and are guar antees of 
quality, and valuable business interests. The U.S. GI system uses administrative trademark 
structures. USPTO's Trademark organization processes applications for Gis. USPTO examines 
applications for Gis as trademarks, or certification or collectiv e marks indicating regional origin. 
Applications for Gis at USPTO are published so that interested parties have an opportunity to oppose 
registration.  
 
QUESTION 126:  Are there any reasons why the U.S. does not provide GI protection through a 
sui generis  legislation, given that the latter provides a higher standard of protection to Gis than the 
collective and certification mark scheme?  
 
RESPONSE 126:  The most common way to protect Gis in the  United  States is through "certifications 
marks indicating regional origin". While there are two other types of certification marks in 
the United  States, this is a specific type of certification mark used only for Gis. The applications for 
these certification marks indicating regional origin include the standards required for production of 
the product and the demarcated geographical area where the product can only be produced. 
The United  States' GI system uses administrative trademark structures already in place that provide 
important due process procedures for recognizing Gis and provide opportunities for any interested 
party to oppose or cancel a registered GI if that party believes that it will be damaged by the 
registration or continued existence of a registration. Protecting Gis through the trademark system 
eliminates c onflict and uncertainties when both systems are working in parallel. This confers clear 
benefits to both trademark and GI owners.  
 
QUESTION 127:  Why does the U.S. give primacy to trade marks protection over GI protection, 
unlike the practice in many jurisd ictions like the EU?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 311 - 
 
  RESPONSE 127:  See Response  126. 
 
QUESTION 128: Does the U.S. extend its collective and certification marks scheme to cover 
non-agricultural GIs, such as handicrafts?  
 
RESPONSE 128:  The universe of protectable GIs in the  United  States i ncludes those for use on a 
variety of products, such as textiles, handicrafts, cutlery, as well as services, as long as a nexus to 
the geographic area can be established. See WIPO IP Statistics Data Center for Geographical 
Indications Statistics reported b y the United  States  of America, WIPO IP Statistics Data Center.  
 
Page 176, 3.371  
 
Trade secrets are protected at both state and federal levels. The main federal legislation with respect 
to the protection of trade secrets in the  United  States is contained i n the Economic Espionage Act 
(EEA) of 1996 (P.L. 104 -294) (as amended by the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012), 
and the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) of 2016 (P.L. 114 -153). Since the passage of the DTSA in 
2016, U.S. federal trade secret  protection legislation focuses both on criminal acts and on civil 
enforcement of trade secret protection, which was previously addressed only through state law. The 
provisions of the EEA do not apply to lawful activity by government entities. The Theft of  Trade 
Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 expanded the scope of the EEA to apply to products or services 
used, or intended for use, in interstate or foreign commerce.  
 
QUESTION 129:  Does the U.S. trade secrets legislation provide exceptions to trade secrets  
protection to protect public order and other legitimate interests?  
 
RESPONSE 129:  The Economic Espionage Act provides penalties for certain unauthorized 
disclosures of trade secrets, but includes exceptions from civil or criminal penalties for otherwise 
lawful government activities. DTSA provides immunity to individuals who misappropriate trade 
secrets for the purpose of whistleblowing. The disclosure of the trade secret must be made in 
confidence to Federal, State or local government officials solely for the purpose or reporting or 
investigating a suspected violation of law or be provided under seal as a complaint or other document 
filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding. An employee is also expressly permitted to use trade secrets 
in an anti -retaliation la wsuit, provided that the employee file any document containing a trade secret 
under seal and does not disclose the trade secret except pursuant to court order.  
 
QUESTION 130:  If yes, in what instances has the U.S. government made use of such exceptions?  
 
RESPONSE 130:  See Response  132. 
 
Page 177, 3.374  
 
Section  1637 of the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708), Actions 
to Address Economic or Industrial Espionage in Cyberspace, directed the President to submit 
annua lly through 2020, a report on foreign economic and industrial espionage in cyberspace during 
the 12 -month period preceding the submission of the report, that identifies foreign countries that 
engage in economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace with re spect to trade secrets or proprietary 
information owned by U.S. persons, as well as categories of technologies or proprietary information 
developed by U.S. persons that are targeted for economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace. The 
NDAA also authoriz es the President to prohibit all transactions in property of any (foreign) person 
who the President determines knowingly engages in economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace. 
The latest report prepared under the NDAA is the 2018 Foreign Economic Espio nage in Cyberspace 
Report, which identified a number of "Targeted Technologies", including: energy/alternative energy; 
biotechnology; defence technology; environmental protection; high -end manufacturing; and 
information and communications technology.  
 
QUES TION 131:  What form of remedy is provided under the National Defence Authorization Act 
(NDAA) against espionage in cyberspace concerning trade secrets?  
 
RESPONSE 131:  50 U.S.C. Section  1708 (b)(1) provides for the imposition of sanctions: " [t]he 
President may, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of each person WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 312 - 
 
  described in paragraph  (2), if such property and interests in property a re in the  United  States, come 
within the  United  States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United  States person".  
 
Page 177, 3.375  
 
The Federal Government has jurisdiction over copyright protection, as spelled out in the Constitution. 
U.S. copyright law is contained in Chapters 1 -8, 10_12, 14, and 15 of Title 17 of the  United  States 
Code. The Copyright Act of 1976 (P.L. 94 -553), as amended, which took effect on 1  January  1978, 
provides the basic framework for the current copyright law. The  Act pre -empts any state law that 
provides equivalent rights in copyrightable subject matter. The Copyright Act provides for protection 
of authors' economic and moral rights in the artistic, literary, and scientific domains, including 
attribution and integ rity rights for authors of works of visual art. Other federal and state laws address 
additional parts of the protection for the attribution and integrity of other works and authors. To 
benefit from copyright protection, a work must be an original creation.  Registration is not required 
for protection. The term of protection is life of author plus 70 years for works created on or after 
1 January  1978. Anonymous and pseudonymous works and works made for hire are protected for 
95 years after publication or 120  years after creation, whichever is shorter.  
 
QUESTION 132:  What would be the impact of a TRIPS -plus term of copyright protection on the 
dissemination of knowledge and accessibility to copyrighted works?  
 
RESPONSE 132:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 177, 3.376  
 
The United  States is a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(1989), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (2002), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (2002) 
(WPPT), the Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Program -Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite (1985), the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
Against Unauthorized Dupli cation of their Phonograms (1974), and the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled 
(2019). The  United  States is not a party to the Rome Convention (17 U.S.C. Section  106). 
The United  States is also a party to the Geneva Phonograms Convention.  
 
QUESTION 133:  Does the U.S. follow the regime of single equitable remuneration as provided 
under the Rome Convention?  
 
RESPONSE 133:  The United  States is not a signatory to the R ome Convention. The  United  States 
has signed and implemented the WPPT. The  United  States applies national treatment to all Treaty 
partners, which would include WPPT Treaty signatories.  
 
Page 178, 3.378  
 
The Copyright Act provides for several types of statutory licenses, consistent with the Berne 
Convention. Licenses may be obtained for certain types of uses of certain types of copyrighted 
products if certain requirements are satisfied, for example for secondary transmissions by cable and 
satellite, the  use of certain works in connection with non -commercial broadcasting, the public 
performance of a sound recording by means of a digital audio transmission, and the making and 
distributing of phonorecords of nondramatic musical works. In the absence of a vo luntary 
agreement, rates and terms of royalty payments for the Copyright Act's statutory licenses are 
determined or adjusted by the CRJs. Since its enactment in 1976, the Copyright Act has been 
amended on several occasions. During the period under review, amendments included those 
required to implement the Marrakesh Treaty.  
 
QUESTION 134:  On what types of works are statutory licensing available in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 134:  An overview of the various statutory licenses and the relevant rate -setting 
procedures  may be found on the Copyright Office website at: https://www.copyright.gov/licensing/ . 
 
QUESTION 135:  Which is the authority for fixation of the royalty under the statutory licensing 
route?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 313 - 
 
  RESPONSE 135 : See Response  134. 
 
QUESTION 136:  What is the procedure to ensure that the royalty fixed under the statutory licensing 
route is equitable and does not discriminate between U.S. origin and those that are non -native?  
 
RESPONSE 136:  See Response  134. 
 
QUESTION 137:  How is the U.S. ensuring the conformity with electronic transmission of 
Copywrite -protected products?  
 
RESPONSE 137:  We do not understand this question.  
 
Page 178, 3.379  
 
Some of the main changes to copyright law during the per iod under review were introduced by the 
Orrin G. Hatch –Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (MMA) (P.L. 115 -264), 132 Stat. 3676, 
enacted 11  October  2018. The MMA updated U.S. copyright law primarily with respect to three 
music -specific issues, each inclu ded in a different Title of the MMA Act. The Act updated copyright 
law primarily by overhauling the Section  115 compulsory licensing system for digital music services 
that transmit sound recordings of nondramatic musical works. It also provided for federal  protection 
to sound recordings fixed before 15  February  1972, which were previously only subject to certain 
state laws. The MMA also facilitated distribution to producers, mixers, and sound engineers of 
royalties collected under the Section  114 statutory license to publicly perform a sound recording by 
means of a digital audio transmission.  
 
QUESTION 138:  How is the equitable determination and distribution of royalties ensured under the 
compulsory licensing route?  
 
RESPONSE 138:  The MMA implicates the sect ion 112, 114, and 115 statutory licenses. For 
information on these statutory licenses, please see the response to Question  134 above.  
 
QUESTION 139:  In a scenario of growing e -commerce and growing international trade through 
online modes, what mechanisms have the U.S. put to ensure equitable determination and royalties 
sharing?  
 
RESPONSE 139:  In addition to the royalty -setting mechanisms described on the Copyright Office 
website at https://www .copyright.gov/licensing/ , United  States PROs have reciprocal agreements 
with PROs abroad and distribute the royalties they owe.  
 
Page 179, 3.380  
 
Title I of the MMA, the Musical Works Modernization Act, made significant changes to the compulsory 
"mechanic al" license for making and distributing phonorecords of nondramatic musical works. It did 
so by switching from a song -by-song licensing system to a blanket licensing regime with respect to 
making digital phonorecord deliveries of musical works (e.g. digita l downloads and streams). The 
MMA established a new blanket license that, as of 1  January  2021, is available to digital music 
providers to make digital phonorecord deliveries of eligible musical works. A musical work is eligible 
for compulsory licensing in  two cases: after phonorecords of the musical work have been publicly 
distributed in the  United  States under the authority of the musical work copyright owner; or where 
a digital music provider obtains the requisite authority from a sound recording copyrig ht owner who 
in turn has appropriate authority from the musical work copyright owner. The new blanket license 
covers all musical works available for compulsory licensing and includes the making and distribution 
of server, intermediate, archival, and incide ntal musical work reproductions that are reasonably 
necessary. As was the case previously, digital music providers and musical work copyright owners 
may enter into privately negotiated voluntary licenses in lieu of using the compulsory license. 
Generally s peaking, on 1  January  2021, a new blanket license automatically replaced any 
compulsory licenses that a digital music service provider had previously obtained, while pre -existing 
voluntary licenses remained in effect.  
 
QUESTION 140:  How is the royalty dete rmined under the blanket licensing route?  
 
RESPONSE 140:  See Response  134. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 314 - 
 
  QUESTION 141:  Does a blanket license prejudice the negotiation of new compulsory or voluntary 
licenses on a song -by-song basis?  
 
RESPONSE 141:  See Response  134. The use of any statutory license is not required by law. Parties 
may also directly negotiate voluntary licenses on a song -by-song or blanket basis. A new statutory 
(or "compulsory") license can only be created by an act of Congress.  
 
Page 182, 3.391  
 
U.S. copyright law h as anti -circumvention rules contained in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA). However, the DMCA allows possible temporary exemptions to its prohibition against 
circumvention of technological measures that control access to, or unauthorized use of, copyrighted 
works. 17 U.S.C. 1201 requires that the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the 
Register of Copyrights, determine in a public rulemaking every three years whether to adopt any 
proposed exemptions to the prohibition on circumventin g technological access controls. Petitioners 
submit evidence and arguments for the Copyright Office to consider. The Librarian reviews the 
recommendation before issuing any exemptions.  
 
QUESTION 142:  Does the U.S. apply anti -circumvention rules on devices that may facilitate 
copyright infringement?  
 
RESPONSE 142:  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) and 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) prohibit manufacturing, 
importing, offering to the public, or otherwise trafficking in any device that is (i)  primarily designed 
or produced for th e purpose of circumventing a technological measure ("TPM") that effectively 
controls access to a copyrighted work or protects a copyright owner's rights, (b) has only limited 
commercially significant purpose other than to circumvent a TPM, or (c) is market ed for use in 
circumventing a TPM.  
 
Page 182, 3.393  
 
Provisions with respect to enforcement of IPRs are contained in all main IP laws. Additionally, the 
Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act of 2006 (P.L. 109 -181) prohibits the trafficking in 
count erfeit goods and services, including labels or similar packaging of any type intended to be used 
on, or in connection with, the goods or services for which the genuine mark is registered. There are 
several agencies involved in the enforcement of IPRs and e nforcement policy development of IPRs, 
including USDOC, in particular USPTO, DOJ, Treasury, Homeland Security, State, Agriculture, Health 
and Human Services, the Copyright Office, and the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator (IP EC). IPEC is a component in the Executive Office of the President, that 
engages with stakeholders and international partners to address IP issues, impacting infringement, 
market access, competition, digital trade, cybersecurity, and rule of law concerns ar ound the world. 
IPEC also works to expand coordination within the Government on IP enforcement, and chairs two 
interagency committees. In November  2020, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies 
involved with the enforcement of IPRs, IPEC issued the fourth Joint Strategic Plan on IP Enforcement 
under Section  303 of the PRO IP Act (15 U.S.C. 8113) for 2020 -23. The Plan is composed of four 
parts: (i)  engagement with U.S. trading partners; (ii)  effective use of all U.S. legal authorities, 
including t rade tools; (iii)  expanded law enforcement action and cooperation; and (iv)  engagement 
and partnership with the private sector and other stakeholders. Additionally, under Section  304 of 
the PRO IP Act (15 U.S.C. 8114), IPEC issues an annual report focusing  on the IP enforcement 
activities of the Federal Government. IPEC issued its annual report for FY2020 in January  2021.  
 
QUESTION 143:  What types of trade tools does the IPEC use for IP enforcement? Are these trade 
measures taken unilaterally?  
 
RESPONSE 143:  IPEC does not use trade tools for IP enforcement.  
 
QUESTION 144:  If yes, what is their consistency with the WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 144:  See Response  143. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 315 - 
 
  Page 183, 3.394  
 
DOJ enforces IPRs through both criminal and civil actions. It investigates and prosecutes a wide 
range of IP crimes, including those involving copyright piracy, trademark counterfeiting, and trade 
secret theft. Primary investigative and prosecutorial responsibility within DOJ rests with the Federal 
Bureau of Investig ation (FBI), the  United  States Attorneys' Offices, the Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section  (CCIPS) in the Criminal Division, the Counterintelligence and Export 
Control Section  (CES) in the National Security Division, and the Consumer Protectio n Branch of the 
Civil Division with regard to offences arising under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. DOJ also 
coordinates and supports the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Network, which consists 
of prosecutors who are specially trained in the investigation and prosecution of IP and computer 
crimes. DOJ's Civil Division also deals with IPR enforcement: the IP Section  brings affirmative cases 
when U.S. IP is infringed; the National Courts Section  initiates civil actions to recover various 
penalti es or customs duties arising from negligent or fraudulent import transactions, and defends 
CBP enforcement of USITC's exclusion orders under Section  337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended (19 U.S.C. 1337); and the Consumer Protection Branch conducts civ il and criminal 
litigation under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The PRO IP Act of 2008 (15 U.S.C. 8114) required 
the Attorney General to produce an annual report detailing actions DOJ has taken to implement Title 
IV of the Act; the most recent report wa s published for FY2020.  
 
QUESTION 145:  What regime does the U.S. have for IP enforcement in the digital environment?  
 
RESPONSE 145: All relevant intellectual property laws can be utilized to enforce IP in the digital 
environment. For instance, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides for a 
notice -and-takedown system for the digital environment, which allows copyright owners to inform 
online service providers about infringing materials so it can be taken down. The DMCA incorporates 
protections fo r online service providers in certain situations if their users engage in copyright 
infringement. 17 U.S.C. Section  512 shields online service providers from monetary liability for 
copyright infringement  – referred to as "safe harbor" from liability – in exchange for cooperating 
with copyright owners to expeditiously remove infringing content and meeting certain conditions.  
 
Page 184, 3.398  
 
It is noted in the report that, CBP has created an enforcement and facilitation framework for 
e-commerce through the administration of Section  321 Data Pilot and Entry Type 86 Test.  
 
QUESTION 146:  The U.S. is requested to provide the details of the Entry type 86 test respective 
to e-commerce.  
 
RESPONSE 146:  Launched in August  2019, Entry Type 86 is a voluntary test of a Section  321 de 
minimis entry process. Entry Type 86 allows Customs Brokers and Self -Filers to electronically submit 
de minimis entries to the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), through Automated Broker 
Interface (ABI), including those subject to clear ance requirements from other U.S. government 
agencies. The Entry Type 86 provides an automated release mechanism and visibility into the 
contents of de minimis shipments.  
 
Page 185, 3.402  
 
USTR also conducts out -of-cycle Notorious Markets reviews. The Revi ew of Notorious Markets for 
Counterfeiting and Piracy, also known as the Notorious Markets List, identifies selected markets, 
including those on the Internet, that reportedly engage in and facilitate copyright piracy and 
trademark counterfeiting. The List is non -exhaustive, and may include previously identified markets 
where owners, operators, and governments have failed to address concerns. The List does not make 
findings of legal violations, nor does it reflect the U.S. Government's analysis of the genera l IP 
protection and enforcement climate in the countries connected with the listed markets. The 2020 
Notorious Markets List included for the first time a section addressing the role of Internet platforms 
in facilitating the importation of counterfeit and p irated goods into the United  States. The List 
highlighted 39 online markets, and 34 physical markets in 17 trading partners, reported to be 
engaging in and facilitating substantial copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting.  
 
QUESTION 147:  What actions does the U.S. take based on the Notorious Markets review 
considering the review does not make findings of legal violations nor reflect the U.S. Government's WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 316 - 
 
  analysis of the general IP protection by way of enforcement of climate mitigation measures in the 
countries under review?  
 
RESPONSE 147:  The Notorious Markets List identifies illustrative examples of online and physical 
markets that reportedly engage in, facilitate, turn a blind eye to, or benefit from substantial copyright 
piracy and trademark counterfeiting, according to information submitted to USTR in response to  a 
notice published in the Federal Register requesting public comments. USTR highlights certain online 
and physical markets because they exemplify global counterfeiting and piracy concerns and because 
the scale of infringing activity in these markets can c ause significant harm to U.S. IP owners, 
workers, consumers, and the economy. The  United  States encourages governments, right holders, 
service providers, and the owners and operators of these and other markets to engage in sustained 
and meaningful efforts to combat piracy and counterfeiting.  
 
Owners and operators of notorious markets that are willing to address counterfeiting and piracy 
have many options for doing so. Such owners and operators can, for example, adopt business models 
that rely on the license d distribution of legitimate content and can negotiate appropriate licenses 
with right holders. If an otherwise legitimate business has become a platform for piracy or 
counterfeiting, the owner or operator can work with right holders and law enforcement of ficials to 
help discourage and curtail acts of infringement. Industry groups have developed a variety of best 
practices that can help combat counterfeiting and piracy. In the absence of good faith efforts, 
responsible government authorities should investig ate reports of piracy and counterfeiting in these 
and similar markets and pursue appropriate action against such markets and their owners and 
operators. Governments should also ensure that appropriate enforcement tools are at the disposal 
of right holders and government authorities, which may require closing loopholes that permit 
operators to evade enforcement actions.  
 
QUESTION 148:  Is it just like the Special Section  301 Report, a tool meant for use for strategic 
negotiation purposes?  
 
RESPONSE 148:  The Special 301 Report  serves a critical function by identifying opportunities and 
challenges facing U.S. innovative and creative industries in foreign markets and by promoting job 
creation, economic development, and many other benefits that effective IP p rotection and 
enforcement support. The Special 301 Report  informs the public and our trading partners and seeks 
to be a positive catalyst for change. The  United  States looks forward to working closely with the 
governments of the trading partners that are i dentified in the Special 301 Report  to address both 
emerging and continuing concerns, and to build on the positive results that many of these 
governments have achieved.  
 
The Special 301 Report  has played a valuable role in helping the U.S. government and o ur trading 
partners to focus on improvements in IP protection and enforcement that support innovation, 
exports, access to diverse goods and services, and job creation. Over the course of the Special 301 
Report 's 34-year history we have seen remarkable impr ovements in markets all around the world. 
The Special 301 Report  alone is not the cause but we believe that it has made a positive contribution 
to this progress.  
 
Since February  2011, USTR has published annually the Notorious Markets List  separately from t he 
Special 301 Report , to increase public awareness and help market operators and governments 
prioritize intellectual property enforcement efforts that protect American businesses and their 
workers.  
 
Page 188, 4.6  
 
As the  United  States is a major exporter of bulk commodities, its trade surplus in agricultural 
products widened between 2006 and 2014 on the back of strong commodity prices, and then 
narrowed as these prices weakened.  
 
QUESTION 149:  How does the  United  States see its rising trade distorting dome stic support to 
specific agriculture products and its correlation with exports of these products?  
 
RESPONSE 149:  U.S. exports in any given year are affected by a variety of market factors, including 
price trends, exchange rates, supply, and demand. The inc rease in U.S. agricultural exports in 
calendar year 2021 compared to calendar year 2020 generally reflects higher agricultural prices and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 317 - 
 
  increased export volumes, reflecting market conditions in 2021, and is unrelated to U.S. farm 
programs.  
 
Page 189, 4.7  
 
Since 2018, U.S. agricultural producers have faced extraordinary disruptions due to trade tensions, 
followed by the COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
QUESTION 150:  Please elaborate on the determination of "extraordinary disruptions" faced by the 
U.S. Agricultural prod ucers?  
 
RESPONSE 150:  The term "extraordinary disruptions" was utilized by the Secretariat and is not a 
determination made by the  United  States. That said, U.S. agricultural producers have faced 
unprecedented challenges since 2018 including negative effects of retaliatory tariffs, including lost 
export sales, and disruptions caused by the COVID -19 pandemic on all aspects of agricultural 
production and trade.  
 
QUESTION 151:  Is there any official document specifying such disruptions?  
 
RESPONSE 151:  See response to Question  150. 
 
QUESTION 152:  How did the disruptions affect the production of agricultural commodities in the 
U.S. economy? Please provide the production figures before and after such disruptions.  
 
RESPONSE 152:  It is not possible to say how these disruptions affected production of agricultural 
commodities given that market disruptions are ongoing.  
 
QUESTION 153:  Which specific products faced the maximum impact of the disruptions?  
 
RESPONSE 153:  See response to Qu estion  152. 
 
Page 190, 4.8  
 
The sugar program continued with an increase in non -recourse loan rates. The Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) was amended and reauthorized through FY2023, and funding 
for the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TE FAP) was increased.  
 
QUESTION 154:  What does the term "non -recourse loan rates" imply? How does it differ from 
normal loan rates?  
 
RESPONSE 154:  A nonrecourse marketing assistance loan can be redeemed by repayment, or by 
delivering the agricultural commodi ty that was pledged as collateral to the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) as full payment for the loan upon maturity. The loans are valued at the 
commodity -specific loan rates established in the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018.  
 
QUESTION 155:  It is m entioned that the funding of "Emergency Food Assistance Program" 
increased. How much is the incremental funding and why was it necessitated?  
 
RESPONSE 155:  Funding is established using an inflationary funding formula, known as Thrifty 
Food Plan (TFP), esta blished in the 2008 Farm Bill that is indexed to the cost of a nutritious, practical, 
cost-effective diet prepared at home for a "reference" family and additional funding authorized  by 
the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 to carry out the objectives of the program.  
Total TEFAP food funding amounts are calculated as follows, by fiscal year:  
 
• FY 2019: The FY 2009 TFP -adjusted funding level, plus an additional USD  23 million;  
• FY 2020 -23: The FY 2009 TFP -adjusted funding level, plus an addition al USD  35 million.  
 
QUESTION 156:  What amendments have been carried out in the "Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program"?  
 
RESPONSE 156:  The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 reauthorized the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) with few changes. New programs and provisions included increased WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 318 - 
 
  funding for the SNAP Employment and Training Program, designed to help SNAP recipien ts gain 
skills, training or work experience, and a requirement for USDA to revise the Thrifty Food Plan, which 
is the basis for SNAP benefit amounts starting in fiscal year 2022 and at five -year intervals 
thereafter.  
 
Page 191, 4.11 & 4.12  
 
The PLC program  provides payments on 85% of historical base acres multiplied by historical yields 
for each historically produced covered commodity on a farm when the national price is less than the 
statutory effective reference price for the commodity.  
USDA Farm Service Agency data indicates that PLC payments to nearly 1.4  million farms totalled 
USD 4.95 billion for the 2019 crop year, and USD  2.07 billion in the 2020 crop year to 
800,000  farms. Over the two years combined, the highest PLC payments were paid on base acres  
with historical production of wheat (USD  2,529  million), seed cotton (USD  1,439  million), maize 
(USD  1,099  million), peanuts (USD  779 million), and long grain rice (USD  626 million).  
 
QUESTION 157:  India would seek the following explanations:  
What are the  factors taken into consideration to determine the statutory effective reference price of 
a covered product?  
 
RESPONSE 157:  The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 established the definition of the effective 
reference price (Sec. 1101). The legislative lan guage does not provide explanations for what factors 
were taken into consideration in the determination.  
 
QUESTION 158:  As per the domestic support notification (G/AG/N/USA/166), the PLC payments 
have been notified as non -product -specific support. However,  the PLC payments vary and have 
specific statutory effective reference prices across covered products. What is the basis for 
categorising the PLC payments as non -product -specific support instead of product -specific support?  
 
RESPONSE 158:  PLC payments are made on historical base acres with fixed base and yields that 
are determined on historical production parameters and remain in place for the life of the 2014 Farm 
Bill. Producers are not required to plant the historically produced commodity or  any commodity to 
receive payments. As a result, those payments are reported as non -product specific.  
 
QUESTION 159:  How is the national price of specific covered products determined for PLC 
payments?  
 
RESPONSE 159:  The marketing year average (MYA) price i s the national average price received by 
producers during the 12 -month marketing year. The source of this data is the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS).  
 
QUESTION 160:  The U.S. is requested to provide additional information sought by India:  
It is requested to provide annual specific PLC payments to producers of wheat, seed cotton, rice, 
soybean, peanut and maize for the years 2019, 2020 and 2021.  
 
RESPONSE 160:  PLC payments are made to producers who own and/or operate farms with 
historical bas e acres of those crops. While payment rates are calculated for each covered commodity 
according to the provisions of the 2018 Farm Bill, the base acreage and yields are fixed and based 
on historical production and no production of the covered commodity or other commodity is required 
to receive payment. Therefore, the payments (if any) cannot be associated with current production 
of a specific commodity.  
 
QUESTION 161:  Whether the U.S. intends to implement the PLC in the forthcoming Farm Bill 2023?  
 
RESPONSE 161:  Regarding future plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 162:  Whether the product covered under the programme will be expanded in Farm Bill 
2023?  
 
RESPONSE 162:  Regarding futur e plans, the  United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 319 - 
 
  Page 191, 4.15  
 
The 2014 Farm Act, which introduced the PLC and ARC programs, did not allow farmers to switch 
between the programs after the initial election had been made. The 2018 Farm Act allows farmers 
to change their program elections annually as from the 2021 crop year. The Act also changes the 
primary source for county average yield data used for ARC -CO from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Services to the USDA Risk Management Agency to minimize disparities in payments 
observed in certain neighbouring counties.  
 
QUESTION 163:  In this context, India seeks explanations for the following:  
What were the disparities observed using the National Agr icultural Statistics Services data for county 
average yield?  
 
RESPONSE 163:  The Secretariat is the source for the statement that the Act changed the primary 
source for county average yield data used for ARC -CO to minimize disparities in payments observed 
in certain neighbouring counties  
 
QUESTION 164:  Further, elaborate on the steps taken to mitigate the disparities in payments 
observed in certain neighbouring counties.  
 
RESPONSE 164:  The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 established that Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) yields will have priority in determining ARC -CO yields.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, page 191, 4.16  
 
According to the USDA FSA, ARC payments for the 2019 crop year totalled USD  1.26 billion to some 
648,000  farms and were primarily ARC -CO payments (USD  952 million). In the 2020 crop year, ARC 
payments declined to USD  87 million, with ARC -CO payments accounting for 70% of the total. The 
largest ARC payments over the two years were made on base acres of soybeans (USD  718 million), 
maize (USD  505 million), and w heat (USD  89 million).  
 
QUESTION 165:  In this context, could the U.S. please explain the reasons and factors for the 
decline in ARC payments from USD  1.26 billion in 2019 to USD  87 million in 2020?  
 
RESPONSE 165:  ARC payments are triggered if actual revenu e is below the ARC revenue guarantee. 
Based on market conditions in crop year 2020/21, fewer participants experienced actual revenue 
levels that were below the ARC guarantee.  
 
Page 192, 4.18  
 
Marketing assistance loans for covered commodities are non -recourse; the commodity is pledged as 
loan collateral and producers have the option of forfeiting the pledged collateral to the CCC in lieu 
of repayment of the outstanding loan. Repayment provisions, which allow a producer to repay the 
loan at less than th e loan rate and earn a marketing loan gain (MLG), help minimize potential 
forfeiture of loan collateral to the CCC. Producers may also elect to receive a loan deficiency payment 
(LDP) in lieu of securing a marketing assistance loan. Gross income limitation s apply, all conservation 
and wetland protection requirements must be complied with, and producers must report all crop 
acreage planted to be eligible for LDP or marketing loans. MLGs and LDPs occurring in crop years 
2019-23 are not subject to payment limi tations.  
 
QUESTION 166:  The U.S. is requested to provide the responses to the following questions: How is 
the national average loan rate for the purposes of marketing assistance loans determined?  
 
RESPONSE 166:  The national average loan rates by commodity are established by the Agriculture 
Act of 2018 and are presented in Table  4.3. 
 
QUESTION 167:  The producers of covered crops have a choice to receive a loan deficiency payment 
(LDP) in lieu of securing a marketing assistance loan. What is the percentage of wheat, maize and 
soybean producers who have elected LDP over the market assistance loan?  
 
RESPONSE 167:  No LDPs were paid for wheat, maize, or soybean in recent years.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 320 - 
 
  QUESTION 168:  Why are the MLGs and LDPs occurring in crop years 2019 -23 not subject to 
payment limitations?  
 
RESPONSE 168:  The Agriculture Act of 2018 excludes marketing assistance loan program benefits 
from payment limits.  
 
Page 193, 4.20  
 
Policies under the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) insure against losses in yield,  crop 
revenue, margin, whole -farm revenue, and other types of losses. The USDA Risk Management 
Agency administers the FCIP, including the establishment of premium rates and other provisions. 
The insurance policies are contracts between farmers and Approved  Insurance Providers (AIP), sold 
by private insurance agents, and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) provides 
reinsurance to the AIPs. A policy is renewed automatically every year, unless cancelled by the farmer 
within a prescribed deadline.  
 
QUESTION 169:  U.S. is requested to provide the details and elaborate on how the mechanism of 
"The insurance policies are contracts between farmers and Approved Insurance Providers (AIP), sold 
by private insurance agents, and the Federal Crop Insurance Corpor ation (FCIC) provides 
reinsurance to the AIPs"  works.  
 
RESPONSE 169:  The Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) is a cooperative financial agreement 
between the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) and approved insurance providers to deliver 
crop insura nce contracts to farmers and ranchers on behalf of the  United  States government. 
Approved insurance providers are private insurance providers that have been approved by FCIC. 
The SRA does not affect the policy premiums paid by farmers and by law must be bu dget-neutral.  
Crop insurance rates are determined with actuarial models for soundness of the crop insurance 
policies, and premium rates are regularly re -evaluated. The federal government subsidizes the 
premiums that farmers pay to approved insurance provid ers for insurance policies to encourage 
farmer participation.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, page 195, 4.32  
 
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of 
Agriculture to issue federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) under certain conditions. These 
marketing orders establish minimum uniform prices that handlers (processors) are required to pay 
for fluid milk purchased from producers. The FMMO regulates the processors of fluid milk, while the 
manufacturing handlers (Classes II, III, and IV) typically participate when it is economically 
beneficial.  
 
QUESTION 170:  In this context, please provide the following information:  
What are the factors taken into consideration to establish minimum uniform prices for fluid milk?  
 
RESPONSE 170:  See response to Question  171. 
 
QUESTION 171:  How is the support to fluid milk through these marketing orders notified under the 
domestic support notification?  
 
RESPONSE 171:  FMMOs are not included in the calculation of dairy domestic support. Federal 
orders establish minimum prices that are based on actual market prices. They do not guarantee a 
fixed price and they fluctuate with market conditions. They neither provide price support nor result 
in any budget outlay.  
 
Page 195, 4.28  
 
Small and mid -size dairy  operations already enrolled in the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program 
were offered Supplemental DMC for 2021 provided they had increased milk production over time 
prior to 2020, and subject to the following conditions: (i)  a DMC production history of les s than 
5 million  pounds; (ii)  2019 milk sales exceeding the established DMC production history; and (iii)  an 
approved supplemental production for the dairy operation.  
 
QUESTION 172:  India seeks clarifications on the following:  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 321 - 
 
  How many dairy operators were  offered Supplemental DMC for 2021?  
 
RESPONSE 172:  Supplemental DMC was offered to any dairy operator who qualified for this 
coverage.  
 
QUESTION 173:  How much assistance was provided under the Supplemental DMC for the same 
year?  
 
RESPONSE 173:  Supplemental  DMC payments in 2021 were USD  42.8 million.  
 
Page 196, 4.34  
 
The 2018 Farm Act repealed the Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP) that had allowed the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to purchase dairy products when milk margins were depressed, 
and subs equently donate them to public and private non -profit organizations that provide nutrition 
assistance to low -income households. Instead, the Act established the Milk Donation Reimbursement 
Program (MDRP) to facilitate the donation of fluid milk products an d avoid food waste, and Congress 
authorized program expenditures of USD  9 million in FY2019 and USD  5 million for each FY 
thereafter. As the COVID -19 pandemic disrupted dairy supply chains, and dairy products were 
included in food donations under the Coron avirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) 
(P.L. 116 -136), Section  762 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (P.L. 116 -260) called for 
the establishment of a Dairy Donation Program (DDP), in addition to the MDRP and other purchase 
programs of the USDA.  
 
QUESTION 174:  In this regard, elaborate on the difference between the MDRP and the repealed 
DPDP. Furthermore, how is the reimbursement determined under the MDRP?  
 
RESPONSE 174:  The Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP) was administer ed by the Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) until it was repealed.  The Milk 
Donation Reimbursement Programme (MDRP) is administered by the Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA ). 
 
Under DPDP, FSA would purchase dairy products at current market prices if the dairy margin 
(difference between milk price and feed costs) fell below USD  4 per cwt. for two consecutive months. 
No dairy purchases were made under this program. The MDRP reimburses eligible dairy organizations 
to offset a portion of the raw milk cost for fluid milk products donated directly to eligible non -profit 
organizations for distribution to individuals in low -income groups. Eligible dairy organizations must 
partner with an eligible non -profit distributing organization to participate in the programme.  
 
Page 196, 4.35  
 
The United  States is one of the world's largest sugar producers, producing somewhat more beet 
(55% -60%) than cane sugar. As a result of domestic policies, U.S. sugar prices have consistently 
remained above world future contract prices. The CCC extends non -recourse marketing loans to the 
sugar processors who, in turn, pay the growers of sugar beet and sugarcane at a rate proportional 
to the  loan. As per the domestic support notifications, as a percentage of the value of production, 
the product specific support for sugar in the USA was 65.51% in 2019 and 56.2% in 2020 of Other 
mechanisms, such as the Feedstock Flexibility Program (FFP), is us ed to divert surpluses of sugar 
for human consumption. FFP participants convert sugar into ethanol.  
 
QUESTION 175:  The USA is requested to provide the responses to the following questions:  
What percentage of total sugar production was diverted for ethanol production in 2020?  
 
RESPONSE 175:  No sugar production was diverted for ethanol production under the Feedstock 
Flexibility Program in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 176:  What is the reason for the decline in product -specific support for sugar between 
2019 and 2020?  
 
RESP ONSE 176:  In value terms, product -specific support for sugar has been fairly stable between 
2019 and 2020. Farmgate prices have risen in recent years due to market conditions (e.g. 
production).  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 322 - 
 
  Page 198, 4.43  
 
The Non -insured Crop Disaster Assistance Progr am (NAP) compensates enrolled agricultural 
producers for natural disaster damage to crops where crop insurance is not available. The 2018 Farm 
Act amended NAP to allow NAP eligibility for crops that may be covered by crop insurance, but only 
under whole -farm or weather index policies. It is observed that expenditure on the Non -Insured 
Crop Disaster Program (NAP) has increased by 31% from USD  129 Million in 2019/2020 to 
USD 170 Million in 2020/21.  
 
QUESTION 177:  What is the reason behind the sharp increase i n expenditure under NAP? Whether 
this increased expenditure is due to the addition of some new crops.  
 
RESPONSE 177:  Any increase or decrease in expenditures under the Noninsured Crop Disaster 
Assistance Program (NAP) in a given year reflects payments for approved losses (minus NAP fees) 
of commodities that are covered by the program. Given that the data is notified on a fiscal year 
basis, it can include approved payments for losses in multiple crop years. The primary reasons for 
the increase in FY 2021 out lays from FY 2020 are: 1) the prevalence of drought, particularly in the 
Western  United  States, which has increased losses of crops used for forage and grazing, and 2) an 
increase in NAP participation, which in part is due to the requirement under the prev ious Wildfires 
and Hurricanes Indemnity Program (WHIP) to purchase NAP or crop insurance for two years after 
receiving a WHIP (or WHIP+) payment. To date, there has not been an observed increase in NAP 
enrolment of crops that were made eligible for NAP und er the provisions of the Agriculture 
Improvement Act of 2018 that are cited in the question.  
 
QUESTION 178:  If yes, specify the commodities.  
 
RESPONSE 178:  See response to Question  177. 
 
Page 198, 4.46  
 
In 2018, the  United  States began to impose a series of adjustments on imports of steel and 
aluminium as well as on a broad range of products from China. Claiming that the  United  States had 
taken measures that were inconsistent with its WTO commitments, seven trading partners 
responded with retaliator y tariffs on imports from the  United  States, including agricultural and food 
products. The  European  Union and Türkiye initiated their retaliatory measures in June  2018, 
followed by China, Mexico, Canada, and the  Russian  Federation in July  2018. Türkiye mod ified its 
retaliatory tariffs in October  2018. In addition, India imposed retaliatory tariffs from June  2019, 
notably affecting U.S. sales to India of almonds, walnuts, fresh apples, lentils, and chickpeas. In 
January  2021, the  United  Kingdom carried over EU retaliatory tariffs upon its departure from the EU 
trading regime.  
 
QUESTION 179:  USA is requested for clarification on the following:  
Kindly provide detailed information about the retaliatory tariff. How is it calculated and the 
methodology adopted?  
 
RESPONSE 179:  The United  States cannot comment on the methodology used by other countries 
to calculate retaliatory tariffs in its trade policy review. These trading partners imposed retaliatory 
tariffs under a baseless theory that Section  232 mea sures are safeguard measures. However, 
Section  232 measures are not safeguard measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards does not 
apply. Section  232 measures are national security measures taken pursuant to Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994. These retaliatory ta riffs are inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
 
QUESTION 180:  What are the parameters which define the retaliatory tariff rate, are these tariffs 
compliant with the WTO schedule of concessions?  
 
RESPONSE 180:  The United  States cannot comment on the methodo logy used by other countries 
to calculate retaliatory tariffs in its trade policy review.  These trading partners imposed retaliatory 
tariffs under a baseless theory that Section  232 measures are safeguard measures. However, 
Section  232 measures are not saf eguard measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards does not 
apply. Section  232 measures are national security measures taken pursuant to Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994. These retaliatory tariffs are inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 323 - 
 
  Page 199, 4.49  
 
The MFP provided direct payments to eligible producers using CCC Charter Act authorities. In 2018, 
commodity -specific payment rates, paid on actual production, were established for almonds, fresh 
sweet cherries, maize, cotton, milk, hogs, soybeans, sorghum, a nd wheat, based on the level of 
estimated trade lost due to retaliation. Milk payments were made on production during a specified 
historical period, while hog payments were made on the number of hogs in a specific time period. 
The MFP covered additional sp ecialty and non -specialty crops in 2019. 26 Payments for non -specialty 
crops were based on a single -county payment rate (USD  15 to USD  150 per acre) multiplied by a 
farm's aggregate plantings of MFP -eligible crops, irrespective of which of those crops were planted 
in 2019. 27 However, the total payment for eligible plantings could not exceed the total 2018 
plantings on each farm. A single rate was applicable for all eligible tree nuts, i.e. almonds, hazelnuts, 
macadamia nuts, pecans, pistachios, and walnuts. Payments under the MFP amounted to 
USD 8.6 billion in 2018, USD  14.5 billion in 2019, and USD  3.8 billion in 2020 (calendar year). 
Payments in February  2020, which represented 25% of the authorized payment total, were the last 
tranche of MFP payments. Fore cast outlays in calendar year 2021 (USD  42.1 million) refer to minimal 
residual payments to cover errors, omissions, and appeals.  
 
QUESTION 181:  USA is requested for clarification on the following:  
In the MFP who compensates (government/buyer) for the incr eased cost due to delayed marketing?  
 
RESPONSE 181:  The Market Facilitation Program (MFP) provided assistance through a direct 
payment to producers negatively impacted by retaliatory tariffs.  
 
QUESTION 182: What are the parameters that define eligible prod ucers?  
 
RESPONSE 182:  Eligibility criteria for the 2018 MFP and the 2019 MFP are established 
in Title 7 CFR Part 1409,  available  at: https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi -bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=8c3bf
772cc93509b7bb9795493b48cf6&mc=true&n=pt7.10.1409&r=PART&ty=HTML%23se7.10.1409_1
3 (U.S. Code of Federal Regulations).  
 
QUESTION 183:  Kindly provide detailed information on CCC Charter Act.  
 
RESPONSE 183:  The U.S. Congress first passed the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act in 
1948. The act has been amended several times since then. The current provisions of this act are 
codified  at 15 USC §§714 -714p.:  https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title15/cha
pter15/subchapter2&edition=prelim . 
 
Page 199, 4.49  
 
The MFP provided direct payments to eligible producers using CCC Charter Act authorities. In 2018, 
commodity -specific payment rates, paid on actual production, were established for almonds, fresh 
sweet cherries, maize, cotton, milk, hogs, soybeans, sorghum, and wheat, based on the level of 
estimated trade lost due to retaliation. Milk payments were made on production during a specified 
historical period, while hog payments were made on the number of hogs in a specific time period. 
The MFP covered additional specialty and non -specialty crops i n 2019. Payments under the MFP 
amounted to USD  8.6 billion in 2018, USD  14.5 billion in 2019, and USD  3.8 billion in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 184:  India seeks the following information:  
What factors are used to determine the loss incurred because of foreign retalia tory action under the 
MFP Program?  
 
RESPONSE 184:  The overall level of trade damage was established using the methodology detailed 
in the reports made by the USDA Office of the Chief Economist, available at 
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USDA_Trade_Methodology_Report_2019.pdf  
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USDA_Trade_Methodology_Report_2018.pdf . 
Further, USDA designed the 2018 and 2019 Market Facilitation Programs to limit potential impacts 
on farmers' decisions.  
 
QUESTION 185:  What is the reason for a decline in the MFP payments from USD  14.5 billion in 
2019 to USD  3.8 billion in 2020.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 324 - 
 
  RESPONSE 185:  The last MFP payments were made in early 2020. Funding for MFP is no longer 
available, and the program is no longer in effect.  
 
QUESTION 186:  Given that the MFP payments were made for specific products, then what is the 
basis for notifying the MFP as non -product specific support in the domestic support notification 
No. G/AG/N/USA/157?  
 
RESPONSE 186:  The MFP payments reported in Supporting Table DS: 9 were for non -specialty 
crops. The 2019 MFP payments for non -specialty crops were paid on a producer's total acreage of 
all eligible crops, with payments made at a single county -level payment rate per acre based on 
county -level aggregate historical acreage and yields. B ecause the payments were on a per -acre, 
non-product specific basis, they were notified as non -product specific. While a producer's eligibility 
for per -acre payments required information on total plantings of eligible crops, the mix of crops had 
no bearing on a producer's payments.  
 
Page 200 -201, 4.54 -4.56 
 
The Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) announced in April  2020 had two major 
components: (i)  USD 16 billion in direct support to farmers and ranchers affected by price declines 
and supply chain di sruptions; and (ii)  USD 3 billion provided to purchase dairy, meat, and fresh 
produce to donate to people in need. Payments under CFAP 1 were capped at USD  250,000 per 
person or legal entity, or USD  250,000 per shareholder in a corporate entity, at most US D 750,000 
per corporate entity. The FSA accepted applications for participation in CFAP 1 from 26  May to 
11 September  2020. As additional funding became available from the CCC, the CFAP 2 was launched 
in the summer of 2020.  
 
QUESTION 187:  The USA is reques ted to elaborate on how the prices at which dairy, meat and 
fresh produce were determined under the CFAP payments.  
 
RESPONSE 187:  Please refer to the Cost Benefit Analysis for CFAP 1 and CFAP 2 for more 
information on how prices were calculated for this br oad range of commodities: 
https://www.farmers.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CFAP%20CBA%205%2015%202020.pdf   
https://www.farmers.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CFAP2 -CBA-09252020.pdf . 
 
Page 201, 4.55  
 
Additionally, the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service established the Farmers to Families Food Box 
Program to purchase eligible products (dairy, meat, and fresh fruit and vegetables), packaged in 
boxes, for donation to those in need. According to USDA information, more than 173  million boxes 
with a purchase value of about US D 6 billion had been distributed under the Program by 
end-May 2021.  
 
QUESTION 188:  How does this program fulfil the provisions of Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export 
Competition?  
 
RESPONSE 188:  The Farmers to Families Food Box Program was a domestic food aid program and 
has no relation to the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.  
 
QUESTION 189:  Are these food boxes distributed within the U.S. economy or across the globe?  
 
RESPONSE 189: Food boxes were distributed only domestically to eligible beneficiaries.  
 
QUESTION 190:  Please elaborate more about the program, specifying its eligibility criteria, 
implementation period, cost of the program?  
 
RESPONSE 190:  The Farmers to Families Fo od Box Program (FFFBP) was a limited -duration 
program introduced during the COVID -19 pandemic to purchase and distribute U.S. agricultural 
products to those in need. The FFFBP was administered in accordance with the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, which in cludes contracting regulations to ensure fair and reasonable pricing. The food 
boxes supplied through this program were contracted through a competitive bid process, and pricing 
incorporated delivery costs such as assembly and transportation. Food boxes we re delivered to 
low-income households through established service networks, including food banks, community and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 325 - 
 
  faith-based organizations, and other non -profit organizations. The FFFBP ended on 31  May 2021. 
Outlays under the program have been and will be n otified in the  United  States' Table DS:1 
notification.  
 
QUESTION 191:  How is the product basket decided for this programme?  
 
RESPONSE 191:  The food boxes contained fresh, nutritional products consistent with the types of 
products purchased for USDA feeding  programs.  
 
Page 202, 4.60  
 
The United  States has WTO tariff quota commitments that cover 45 product categories representing 
178 agricultural tariff lines at present. The main TRQs concern cheese and other dairy products, 
sugar and sugar -containing products, beef, sheep meat, tobacco, and cotton. Quota fill rates, which 
are reported to the WTO Committee on Agriculture, may vary little overall though with significant 
year-to-year changes for some individual product categories (Section  3.1.3.5 and Table  A3.2). 
Certain dairy products and sugar have separate licensing procedures and quota allocation 
mechanisms. As explained above, the sugar TRQs are allocated to exporting countries, rather than 
to importers, based on historical supply data. A m arket allocation mechanism applies to domestic 
sugar, and the import regime may thus be adjusted to take account of changes in U.S. market 
conditions.  
 
QUESTION 192:  India seeks clarification on the following:  
Kindly provide the details on the deviated SPS  measure from the international standards (Codex) 
that the USA imposes on agricultural imports.  
For the review period for the last five years.  
It shares in the total SPS notifications.  
 
RESPONSE 192:  The United  States notifies measurers that are not aligne d with international 
standards or where no relevant international standard exists. The  United  States also notifies 
measures that are aligned with international standards, or when international standards, guidelines, 
or recommendations are partially applica ble. In cases where there are deviations, the  United  States 
provides a scientific justification for its measures.  
 
In the last two years, the  United  States has notified 175 measures, 95% of which corresponded to 
cases where international standards did not exist, two percent were U.S. measures that did not 
conform with international standards, two percent were U.S. measures conformed to international 
standards, and one percent of notified measures were related to equivalence determinations.  
 
QUESTION 193:  Explain the applicability of MRL as protection for agricultural imports.  
 
RESPONSE 193:  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for setting 
pesticide maximum residue limits (MRLs) for the amount of pesticides that may remain in or on 
foods marketed in the  United  States. EPA establishes crop - and pesticide -specific MRLs after 
completing a human health risk assessment.  
 
Page 203, 4.67  
 
Most U.S. food aid is provided in -kind, and U.S. laws stipulate a number of conditions for in -kind 
food aid.  
 
QUESTION 194:  What are the conditions which U.S. laws stipulate for in -kind food  aid? Please 
elaborate.  
 
RESPONSE 194:  The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) administer three different international food assistance programs that provide 
in-kind food aid sourced in the  United  States. Common features and requirements  include the 
following:  
 
• 7 U.S.C. §1733 prohibits the distribution of U.S. commodities in a recipient country if the 
food aid would result in substantial disincentive to, or interference with, domestic 
production or  marketing of agricultural commodities in that country. U.S. law requires a WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 326 - 
 
  positive determination prior to the distribution of any in -kind food aid that certifies both 
market appropriateness and that there are adequate storage facilities in -country to 
prevent spoilage and waste. This determination is informed by analysis of local and 
regional markets that considers various market information such as quantitative and 
qualitative information, timing of harvests or a close substitute of the commodity in the 
country, suitability of commodity, and potential policy issues.  
 
The Food for Peace Act (FFPA, 7 U.S.C. §1691 et. seq.) contains a number of requirements that 
dictate how USAID must implement Food for Peace (FFP) Title II programming. These requirements 
include the following:  
 
• USAID must allocate a minimum of USD  365 million towards non -emergency food 
assistance programs authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Act. This can be waived 
if emergency needs require it.  
• The FFPA [7 U.S.C. §1733(f)] require s foreign governments, non -governmental 
organizations (NGOs), or international organizations (IOs) receiving U.S. commodities to 
label to the extent possible, "that such commodities are being provided through the 
friendship of the American people as food f or peace". In particular, governments and 
organizations must label FFP Title II [7 U.S.C. §1722(g)] commodities, "in the language 
of the locality in which such commodities are distributed, as being furnished by the people 
of the  United  States  of America".  
• In-kind commodities are also accompanied by funds to cover associated costs, which are 
defined in the Food for Peace Act as administrative costs, indirect cost recovery, internal 
transportation, storage and handling, and associated distribution costs.  
 
The McGovern -Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, established in the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107 -171) and reauthorized in the Agriculture 
Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115 -334), requires that the prog ram aims to advance food security, 
nutrition, and education for children — especially girls — by providing in -kind aid to be distributed 
in school meals in priority countries. USDA prioritises countries for projects each year based on 
criteria including pe r capita income, literacy, and malnutrition rates. The 2018 law amended the 
McGovern -Dole program to allow up to 10% (of the value) of the food to be distributed to be procured 
locally or regionally.  
 
The Food for Progress program, established in the Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99 -198), requires 
that: 
 
• USDA donate U.S. agricultural commodities to international organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), foreign governments, or private entities, which 
can then distribute the commodities to be neficiaries or monetize the commodities by 
selling them locally to raise funds for development projects;  
• The program provides a minimum of 400,000  metric  tons of commodities each fiscal year. 
(However, this minimum has not been met in recent years, with ac tual totals averaging 
253,269  metric  tons per year between FY2010 and FY2019) and;  
• The program pays no more than USD  40 million annually for freight costs, which limits the 
quantity/amount of shipped commodities, particularly in years with high shipping costs.  
 
Page 203, 4.68  
 
The OECD notes that the support the  United  States provides to its agricultural producers is 
consistently below the OECD average.41 Its Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for the  United  States 
declined from 19.5% of gross farm receipts in 2000 -02 to 12% in 2018 -20, or USD  44.9 billion on 
average over the three years (Table  4.5). Agricultural reform has also been characterized by a 
significant shift towards forms of support that are less distortive of production and trade. At 32% , 
the share of the potentially most trade -distorting transfers has declined and is below the OECD 
average. Producer prices mostly align with border prices with the notable exceptions of milk, sugar, 
and (to some extent) sheep meat, due to market price supp ort and border measures, including tariff 
rate quotas.  
 
QUESTION 195:  What is the methodology to assess level of support offered to agriculture in the 
U.S.? Assessments on the basis of individuals indicate that U.S. support is significantly higher than 
many countries in the developing world.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 327 - 
 
  RESPONSE 195:  Please refer to the OECD for information and documentation of the methodology 
used to calculate the Producer Support Estimate (PSE).  
 
Page 206, 4.74  
 
Land covered by forests has remained relatively stable for the last 100 years and, in 2017, there 
were 765.5  million acres of forests or about 34% of U.S. total land area.49 Most forests (58%) are 
private forests; 42% are public forests of which the Federal Government has the most ownership, 
with smaller amounts owned by states and counties/municipalities.50 The majority of private forests 
are owned by almost 10  million private owners, with the top percentage being "family and individual" 
owned parcels of forest lands averaging less than 10  ha in size.51 There have been some ownership 
shifts in recent years with less private corporate ownership and more non -corporate ownership. 
Additionally, fewer forests are now owned by integrated wood product manufacturers, and more are 
owned by real estate investment trusts and timber investment management organizations. This shift 
has been driven by tax laws that make such ownership more favorable. Forests are roughly divided 
equally between east and west with Eastern forests dominated by oak, hickory, mapl e, and beech 
species and Western forests by fir, pine, and spruce species, with some tropical forests existing in 
Hawaii and certain U.S. territories. Furthermore, Eastern forests tend to be privately owned, whereas 
those in the West are often on public la nds. Forest volumes are almost evenly split between soft and 
hardwoods.  
 
QUESTION 196:  USA is requested for clarification on the following:  
How does the government regulate the extraction of wood and wood products from privately -owned 
forests?  
 
RESPONSE 19 6: In the  United  States, a wide range of federal, state, local government, and tribal 
laws, regulations, policy instruments, capacity building programs, and best management practices 
are used to promote and enforce legal and sustainable forest management. While there are certain 
federal laws that regulate all forest land, timber harvesting laws and regulations for non -federal 
forests (which includes privately -owned forests) are mainly enacted, implemented, and enforced at 
the state level. These laws and reg ulations vary and depend on the state in which the timber is 
harvested and where the wood products businesses operate.  
 
QUESTION 197:  For forest conservation, India operates a Joint Forest Management program. Is 
there any kind of similar program in the USA  that applies to privately -owned forest?  
 
RESPONSE 197 : There are a range of programs at the federal, state, and local levels that promote 
responsible forest management. For example, the U.S. Forest Service's Forest Stewardship Program 
works in partnership  with state forestry agencies, cooperative extension, and conservation districts 
to connect private landowners with the information and tools they need to manage their forests and 
woodlands.  
 
Page 222, 4.127  
 
Total greenhouse gas emissions in the  United  States amounted to 6,457  million tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent in 2017, or about 12% of global emissions. Emissions of carbon dioxide, mostly 
from combustion processes, accounted for 82% of the total. The remainder – primarily methane and 
nitrous oxide e missions – originated from agriculture, waste management, and the production of oil 
and gas.125 The  United  States has been party to the United  Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) since it entered into force in 1994 and signed the Paris Agreement on 
3 September  2016. The  United  States withdrew from the Paris Agreement in November  2020, but 
its absence was brief. The new U.S. administration announced that the United  States was re -entering 
the Paris Agreement in January  2021. In April  2021,  the United  States submitted its Nationally 
Determined Contribution to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 50 to 52% below 2005 levels 
by 2030, create a carbon -pollution -free electric power sector by 2035, and achieve net -zero 
emissions economy -wide by no later than 2050.126 A National Climate Task Force has been formed 
to mobilize action on climate change by all federal government agencies.  
 
QUESTION 198:  USA is requested for clarification on the following:  
Does dose USA impose a direct tax on carbon emissions during production?  
 
RESPONSE 198 : No, the  United  States does not have a direct tax on carbon emissions.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 328 - 
 
  QUESTION 199: What are the indirect measures that encounter the price of carbon emission?  
 
RESPONSE  199: The United  States is focused on measuring embedded emissions. Emissions -based 
economic policies should not restrict the method in which countries achieve emissions reductions — 
whether th rough carbon pricing, regulatory policy, or other means. For more information, please see 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's website on Climate Economic Analysis, available at: 
https://www.epa.gov/climate -change/climate -economic -analysis . 
 
Page 224, 4.137  
 
About 12.6% of the production of primary energy was derived from renewable sources in 2021, 
compared to 9.3% in 2005. Among renewables, biomass (including renewable waste ) has for many 
years accounted for 50% (or more) of the energy output, but its share is slowly declining. Solid 
biomass is used in electricity generation as well as in certain industries, in particular pulp and paper. 
Another important bio -component is eth anol, mainly produced from maize, which is blended to make 
transport biofuel. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), 
further expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The RFS mandates the 
incorporatio n of renewable fuels into the domestic transportation fuel supply. Each year, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues RFS rulemakings with increasing volume 
requirements specific to certain renewable fuel categories. For example, the RFS sets  a target of 
36 billion gallons per year of renewable fuel by 2022, with conventional (maize) ethanol accounted 
for in the RFS limited to 15  billion gallons per year.  
 
QUESTION 200:  USA is requested for clarification on the following:  
Does the U.S. provide  incentives (subsidies) to promote renewable energy production and use?  
 
RESPONSE 200 : Yes, please see the last subsidy notification of the  United  States 
(G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021).  
 
Page 225, 4.138  
 
Incentives are also provided in the form of investm ent tax credits for the installation of solar panels, 
and production tax credits for power generated by wind turbines. Although wind and solar power 
still accounted for 3.4% and 1.5%, respectively, of primary energy production in 2021, their growth 
rates h ave been high, and generation from wind power has in general exceeded that from 
hydroelectric sources since August  2019. Renewable portfolio standards have been enacted by 
31 states and the District of Columbia, each with their own specific policies, eligi ble sources and 
technologies, trading rules, and targets.  
 
QUESTION 201:  Can the U.S. provide a brief description regarding the various tax and non -tax 
incentives provided by the states at the federal level for manufacturing renewable energy 
equipment?  
 
RESPONSE 201:  Please see the last subsidy notification of the  United  States (G/SCM/N/372/USA; 
14 July 2021).  
 
QUESTION 202:  Do any of these incentives involve any local content requirement as a pre -condition 
for their granting?  
 
RESPONSE  202: Please see th e last subsidy notification of the  United  States (G/SCM/N/372/USA; 
14 July 2021).  
 
Page 227, 4.146  
 
The contribution of manufacturing to U.S. GDP has continued to decline since the last Review in 
2018. This trend, as well as the related decline of manufacturing jobs, has been well documented 
since the beginning of the 2000s136 and it has been behind some policy decisions, e.g. on 
procurement, by the U.S. authorities during the review period. In 2021, the manufacturing sector 
contributed 11.1% of the  total value added produced in the  United  States, a mild recovery 
(+0.2  percentage points) following the negative shock in 2020 related to the COVID -19 pandemic, 
and down from 11.7% in 2015 (Table  4.14). The contribution of durable goods to national output  
has fallen by almost half a percentage point since 2015; durable goods accounted for 6.1% of GDP WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 329 - 
 
  in 2021. The manufacturing of durable goods witnessed a loss of more than half a million jobs 
between 2019 and 2020, and employment levels in 2020 were below their respective values in 2015. 
As for non -durable goods, their decline in GDP participation was limited to 0.18  percentage points 
since 2015. In terms of employment, non -durable manufacturing showed higher resilience to the 
COVID -19 recession and kept em ployment levels similar to those observed in 2015.  
 
QUESTION 203:  What are the reasons for the decline of U.S. manufacturing, as reported from 2015 
to 2020?  
 
RESPONSE 203:  While the contributing share of manufacturing to the U.S. economy has declined 
relative to that of the services sector, U.S. manufacturing production has continued to grow. The 
U.S. manufacturing sector remains the second largest in the world at USD  2.5 trillion.  
 
QUESTION 204:  Is U.S. Government taking policy measures to revive the manuf acturing sector?  
 
RESPONSE 204:  U.S. government policy related to improving the manufacturing sector (and other 
sectors) can be viewed in depth in the 2022 Economic Report of the President, which can be viewed 
at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/04/ERP -2022.pdf . Further information 
on initiatives specifically related to manufacturing is contained in the 2022 Manufacturing USA 
Highlights Report, which is ava ilable at: https://www.manufacturingusa.com/reports/2022 -
manufacturing -usa-highlights -report . 
 
QUESTION 205:  The Secretariat Report indicates the contribution of manufacturing to the U.S. 
GDP has continued to decline since the last Review in 2018 as well as the related decline of 
manufacturing jobs. What policy changes have led to the decline?  
 
RESPONSE 205:  See response to Question  203. 
 
Page 228, 4.147  
 
U.S. manufacturing exports in 2020 were dominated by motor vehicles for the transport of persons, 
and their parts and accessories; electronic integrated circuits; petroleum gases; telephone sets, 
including mobile phones; medical instruments and appl iances; medicaments, including 
immunological products such as vaccines; and automatic data processing machines. On the other 
hand, parts and accessories for vehicles, motor cars, and telephone sets have cumulated a decrease 
of USD  27.3 billion in U.S. expo rts since 2015.  
 
QUESTION 206:  The Secretariat Report mentions that U.S. manufacturing exports in 2020 were 
dominated by motor vehicles for the transport of persons, and their parts and accessories; telephone 
sets, including mobile phones. Parts and access ories for vehicles, motor cars, and telephone sets 
have cumulated a decrease of USD  27.3 billion in U.S. exports since 2015. Are the parts and 
accessories exports inclusive of the advancements seen in the Automobile sector?  
 
RESPONSE 206:  Although automobi les and their parts are among the largest categories of U.S. 
manufacturing exports, both autos and their parts saw declines in 2020 due to the COVID -19 
disruptions to the global economy.  
 
QUESTION 207:  Are there separate tariff lines for the parts and acce ssories exclusively used in 
e-vehicles?  
 
RESPONSE 207:  The United  States maintains a tariff line specific to the electric motors used as the 
primary source of mechanical power for certain electrically powered vehicles of subheadings 
8703.40 -8703.80.  
 
QUESTION 208:  Is it suggestive of the world moving to higher usage of electric vehicles?  
 
RESPONSE 208:  No, the presence (or absence) of tariff lines dedicated to parts and accessories 
used exclusively in electric vehicles is not suggestive of the future t rends of electric vehicles.  
 
QUESTION 209:  Can the U.S. attribute what factors be leading to a decline in exports of these 
products?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 330 - 
 
  RESPONSE 209:  U.S. exports increase and decrease according to market decisions, including the 
global disruption to trade d ue to the COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
Page 228, 4.147  
 
U.S. manufacturing exports in 2020 were dominated by motor vehicles for the transport of persons, 
and their parts and accessories; electronic integrated circuits; petroleum gases; telephone sets, 
including mobile phones; medical instruments and appliances; medicaments, including 
immunological products such as vaccines; and automatic data processing machines. On the other 
hand, parts and accessories for vehicles, motor cars, and telephone sets have cumulated a decrease 
of USD  27.3 billion in U.S. exports since 2015.  
 
QUESTION 210:  Additionally, how does the U.S. plan to address the cumulated decrease of 
USD 27.3 billion in U.S. exports since 2015 of parts and accessories for vehicles, motor cars, and  
telephone sets?  
 
RESPONSE 210:  See response to Question  209. 
 
Page 229, 4.150  
 
During the review period, authorities actively sought to foster the development of the manufacturing 
sector in the United  States through policies oriented in different areas, s uch as intensifying regional 
trade integration, COVID -19-related policy responses facilitating the vaccines' development, 
strengthening the domestic resilience of supply chains in pharmaceuticals and semi -conductors, 
incentives to advance manufacturing, do mestic purchase programs including for government 
procurement, and other measures covered in other sections of this report.  
 
QUESTION 211:  The U.S. is requested to share the following details: Please elaborate on policies 
taken to strengthen the domestic r esilience of supply chains in pharmaceuticals and semiconductors.  
 
RESPONSE 211:  The 100-day supply chain reports, including those for pharmaceuticals and 
semiconductors, are available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/100 -
day-supply -chain -review -report.pdf . The reports contain policy recommendations to strengthen the 
supply chain resilience of those industries.  
 
QUESTION 212:  What has been the outcome of these policies?  
 
RESPONSE 212:  Many of the recommendations made in the 100 -day supply chain reports are still 
being implemented at this time.  
 
Page 229, 4.150  
 
During the review period, authorities actively sought to foster the development of the manufacturing 
sector in the United  States through policies oriented in different areas, such as intensifying regional 
trade integration, COVID -19-related policy responses facilitating the vaccines' development, 
strengthening t he domestic resilience of supply chains in pharmaceuticals and semi -conductors, 
incentives to advance manufacturing, domestic purchase programs including for government 
procurement, and other measures covered in other sections of this report.  
 
QUESTION 213 : The U.S. is requested to share the following details:  
What incentives were provided to advance the manufacturing sector?  
 
RESPONSE  213: Please  see the websites  of Manufacturing  USA 
(https://www.manufacturingusa.com/  and https://www.manufacturing.gov/ ) for more information 
on the United  States' work to advance the manufacturing sector.  
 
QUEST ION 214:  Which all products within the manufacturing sector were included in the ambit of 
incentives?  
 
RESPONSE 214:  See the response to Question  213. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 331 - 
 
  Page 230, 4.156  
 
On 24  February  2021, the President issued E.O. 14017 on America's Supply Chains. The E. O. calls 
for more resilient, diverse, and secure U.S. supply chains to ensure prosperity and national security, 
which would support domestic production and promote a world -class U.S. manufacturing base and 
workforce, and the E.O. declares that it is the po licy of the current Administration to strengthen the 
resilience of U.S. supply chains.  
 
QUESTION 215:  The U.S. is requested to elaborate on how do they define the terms "resilient", 
and "diverse"?  
 
RESPONSE  215: As noted in the 100 -day supply chain reports (available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/100 -day-supply -chain -review -
report.pdf ), a resilient supply chain is one that recovers quickly from an unexpected event and a 
diverse supply chain is one that reduces geographic concentration risk.  
 
Page 230, 4.156  
 
The E.O. instructed: (i)  the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report identifying risks and p olicy 
recommendations in the semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging supply chains; 
(ii) the Secretary of Energy to submit a report identifying risks and policy recommendations in the 
supply chain for high -capacity batteries, including electric -vehicle batteries; (iii)  the Secretary of 
Defence to submit a report identifying risks in the supply chain for critical minerals and other 
identified strategic materials, including rare earth elements; and (iv)  the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (H HS) to submit a report identifying risks and policy recommendations in the supply 
chain for pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients. The 100 -day reports were 
published on 8  June 2021.  
 
QUESTION 216:  The U.S. is requested to share the followin g details by the Secretaries of 
Commerce, Energy, Defence and Health & Human Services:  
What were the findings of the report submitted by the Secretary of Commerce?  
 
RESPONSE 216:  The full 100 -day reports (including findings and methodologies) are available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/100 -day-supply -chain -review-
report.pdf . A summary of the one -year industrial base reports, including links to each report, is 
available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/upload s/2022/02/Capstone -Report -
Biden.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 217:  What was the methodology used to identify risks in semiconductor manufacturing 
and advanced packaging supply chains?  
 
RESPONSE 217:  See the response to Question  216. 
 
QUESTION 218:  What were the findings of the report submitted by the Secretary of Energy?  
 
RESPONSE 218:  See the response to Question  216. 
 
QUESTION 219:  What was the methodology used to identify risks in the supply chain for 
high-capacity batteries, including electric -vehicle batteries?  
 
RESPONSE 219:  See the response to Question  216. 
 
QUESTION 220:  What were the findings of the report submitted by the Secretary of Defence?  
 
RESPONSE 220:  See the response to Question  216. 
 
QUESTION 221:  What was the methodology used to identify risks in the supply chain for critical 
minerals and other identified strategic materials, including rare earth elements?  
 
RESPONSE 221:  See the response to Question  216. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 332 - 
 
  QUESTION 222:  What were the findings of the report submitted by the Secretar y of Health & 
Human Services?  
 
RESPONSE 222:  See the response to Question  216. 
 
QUESTION 223:  What was the methodology used to identify risks in the supply chain for 
pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients?  
 
RESPONSE 223:  See the response to Question  216. 
 
Page 230, 4.156  
 
In February  2022, seven one -year agency reports and a capstone report detailing actions taken to 
support supply chains since the E.O. and plans for continuing work were released.  
 
QUESTION 224:  The U.S. is requested to share the next steps to be taken in the report released.  
 
RESPONSE 224:  See the response to Question  216. 
 
Page 233, 4.165  
 
Recommendations resulting from the E.O. 14017 review call for: (i)  investing in small, medium, and 
disadva ntaged businesses in critical supply chains; (ii)  developing an ecosystem that includes 
growing innovative small, medium, and disadvantaged businesses; and (iii)  examining the ability of 
the U.S. Export -Import Bank to use existing authorities to support U. S. manufacturing. Other policies 
such as government procurement set -asides and preferences promote economic opportunities for 
small businesses, including those in manufacturing.  
 
QUESTION 225:  The U.S. is requested to share the following details: Can the U .S. elaborate on 
how many MSMEs at present are involved across critical supply chains?  
 
RESPONSE 225: Small, medium, and disadvantaged businesses are throughout, and at all levels 
of U.S. supply chains.  
 
QUESTION 226:  Within the ambit of critical supply ch ains, across which sectors are MSMEs present?  
 
RESPONSE 226:  See response to Question  225. 
 
QUESTION 227:  What are the challenges are faced by the MSMEs involved in critical supply chains?  
 
RESPONSE 227:  The Biden -Harris Administration's 100 -day reports on  supply chains (available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/100 -day-supply -chain -review -
report.pdf ) discuss the challenges faced by small, medium, and disadvantaged businesses 
throughout critical supply chains.  
 
QUESTION 228:  Are the challenges as mentioned in part c)  [QUESTION 230 ] any different than 
those challenges faced by large firms in critical supply chains?  
 
RESPONSE 228:  As noted in the report referenced in the response to Question  227, the challenges 
faced by small, medium, and disadvantaged businesses are largely the same as those faced by larger 
businesses. However, SMEs are often less productive than larger manufacturers and many SMEs are 
underinvesting in new technology to increase their productivity.  
 
Page 233, 4.165  
 
Recommendations resulting from the E.O. 14017 r eview call for (i)  investing in small, medium, and 
disadvantaged businesses in critical supply chains; (ii)  developing an ecosystem that includes 
growing innovative small, medium, and disadvantaged businesses; and (iii)  examining the ability of 
the U.S. Ex port-Import Bank to use existing authorities to support U.S. manufacturing. Other policies 
such as government procurement set asides and preferences promote economic opportunities for 
small businesses, including those in manufacturing.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 333 - 
 
  QUESTION 229:  How d oes the U.S. plan to develop an ecosystem that includes growing innovative 
small, medium, and disadvantaged businesses?  
 
RESPONSE 229:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTIO N 230:  Can the U.S. elaborate on policies to promote economic opportunities for small 
businesses in services?  
 
RESPONSE 230:  We refer you to the website of the U.S. Small Business Administration 
(https://www.sba.gov/ ) as well as the websites referenced in the response to Question  213. 
 
Page 248, 4.221  
 
The telecommunications market in the United  States is valued at USD  583.4  billion in 2021 in terms 
of revenue. In 2020, the United  States had a USD  18.1 billion trade sur plus in telecommunications, 
computer, and information services, with exports totalling USD  56.7 billion, and imports reaching 
USD 38.6 billion.231 Export growth (36.8%) between 2015 and 2020 denoted a dynamic exporting 
sector; imports remained almost uncha nged over the same period, mainly due to a sharp decline of 
USD 4 billion in imports of computer services between 2019 and 2020. Export growth was driven by 
increases in exports of computer services whose export values more than doubled since 2015 to 
USD 42.1 billion in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 231:  What is U.S. Government policy on collaboration with partner countries on 
telecommunications standards development, and encouraging investment in the equipment 
manufacturing sector?  
 
RESPONSE 231:  United  States participa tes in standards development through national delegations 
to organizations like the International Telecommunications Union, which is led by the State 
Department, or though memberships in standards bodies such as ATIS, that allow for participation 
in organi zations such as 3GPP. Those national delegations, which are often comprised of experts, 
representing public and private organizations, interact with like delegations from other countries 
participating in those activities. There may be additional interactio n with the American National 
Standards Institute, which may have bilateral arrangements such as the ANSI -BIS-CII Memorandum 
of Understanding.  
 
NIST has taken a stronger role recently in providing support to USG participation in standards 
activities, and ma y offer support of investment activities though the Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership. Through its collaborations at the federal, state and local level, MEP Centers work  with 
manufacturers to develop new products and customers, expand and diversify marke ts, adopt new 
technology, and enhance value within supply chains. The MEP Program serves as a bridge to other 
organizations and federal research labs that share a passion for enhancing the manufacturing 
community.  
 
QUESTION 232:  What is the procedure for M utual Recognition Agreements in the telecom sector?  
 
RESPONSE 232:  Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) for conformity assessment are 
government -to-government agreements to facilitate trade of telecommunications equipment. MRAs 
establish procedures enablin g the Parties to recognize each other's competent conformity 
assessment bodies (CABs – such as testing laboratories or certification bodies) and to accept the 
conformity assessment results of those CABs for regulatory purposes. FCC's procedures for the 
implementation of  the Telecom  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  are available  
at: https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/kdb/forms/FTSSearchResultPage.cfm?switch=P&id=203873 . 
 
QUESTION 233:  Whether the U.S. government has adopted any policy to promote Open  RAN 
technologies?  
 
RESPONSE 233:  The U.S. Government supports industry's development and adoption of Open 
Radio Access Networks (Open RAN). Coordination with global partners is a key aspect of U.S. 
engagement on this priority. The Implementation Plan for the March  2020 National Strategy to 
Secure 5G indicates that the United  States seeks to "collaborate with like -minded countries on policy 
options to advance the development and deployment of open interfaced, standards -based, and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 334 - 
 
  interoperable 5G networks as a means  to create  innovation,  spur competition,  and expand  the 5G 
supply  chain ". See: https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/2021 -1-12_115445_national_strat
egy_to_secure_5g_implementati on_plan_and_annexes_a_f_final.pdf . 
 
Numerous U.S. agencies are now engaged on domestic and/or internationally oriented activities 
relating to Open RAN. Some of these were highlighted in a July  2021 submission by the National 
Telecommunications and Informat ion Administration (NTIA), on behalf of the Executive Branch of 
the U.S. Government, to a Notice of Inquiry on Open RAN issued by the Federal Communications 
Commission.  See: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/fcc -filing/2021/ntia -comments -promoting -
deployment -5g-open-radio-access -networks . 
 
Page 264, 4.283  
 
Under U.S. law, only U.S. -built ships qualify for domestic service; the United  States was g ranted an 
exemption from GATT rules for measures prohibiting the use, sale, or lease of foreign -built or 
foreign -reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between points in national waters or the 
waters of an exclusive economic zone. There are no re strictions on foreign investment in U.S. 
shipyards or ship -repair facilities but floating dry -docks are eligible for loan guarantees under the 
Federal Ship Financing Program only if owned by U.S. citizens.  
 
QUESTION 234:  Whether the US is considering allow ing for foreign built ships or other foreign 
carriers to operate in the U.S. given current policy being a waiver of WTO rules.  
 
RESPONSE 234:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 235:  Whether there are expansion of waivers under Jones Act being considered.  
 
RESPONSE 235:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 273, 4.311  
 
It is noted in the report that, the Internet Tax Freedom Act (P.L. 105 -277) prohibits state and local 
taxation of Internet access and multiple and discriminatory taxation on e -commerce; this prohibition 
has been indefinitely extended by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enfor cement Act (P.L.  114-125). 
However, regarding taxation on sales online, the states may compel online retailers to charge sales 
tax regardless of a physical presence in the state.  
 
QUESTION 236:  The U.S. is requested to give its input on the state -imposed s ales tax and how 
this state -imposed sales tax is different from digital services tax as most of the U.S. states -imposed 
sales tax on electronically transmitted products also.  
 
RESPONSE 236:  The Internet Tax Freedom Act applies only to state and local taxes , and not Federal 
taxes assessed by the United  States government.  In general, it requires that a state or locality apply 
the same tax obligations to non -electronic commerce transactions as it applies to electronic 
commerce transactions involving the same o r similar goods or services.   
 
Page 275, 4.324  
 
At the multilateral level, the United  States is actively engaged in e -commerce issues in the WTO. It 
is a party to the expanded Information Technology Agreement, participates in WTO programs 
covering certain aspects of e -commerce and digital trade, and adheres to the WTO moratorium on 
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions. With 85 other parties, the United  States 
participates in the ongoing plurilateral negotiation on e -commerce aiming to establi sh a global 
framework for a global digital market.  
 
In 2021 a document (WT/COMTD/W/264) titled  "GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE FOR INCLUSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT" was submitted to WTO. Most of the WTO High -Income members do not support the 
document.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 335 - 
 
  QUESTION 237:  What can be the best way forward to address the problems faced by developing 
& LDCs related to e -commerce?  
 
RESPONSE 237:  The United  States remains committed to advancing digital trade disciplines that 
support inclusive economic growth and to the removal  of barriers to the participation of workers, 
businesses, and consumers in the digital economy, including for those in developed and least 
developed countries.  
 
QUESTION 238:  How can the financial implications arising out of cross -border E -commerce for 
developing countries be addressed?  
 
RESPONSE 238:  Digital trade policies that support innovation and take into account the needs of 
workers, businesses, and consumers will support the growth of the digital economy. MSMEs are a 
driving force of economic growth , and developing countries should increase their opportunities to 
engage in cross -border digital trade by removing barriers to their participation in the digital 
economy.  
 
QUESTION 239:  What has been your experience of promoting and governing MSMEs who hav e sold 
their products through online retail platforms?  
 
RESPONSE 239:  The United  States remains committed to advancing opportunities for MSME 
participation in the digital economy, including through the removal of barriers to their ability to 
engage in cross-border digital trade. The United  States recognizes that MSMEs are a driving force of 
economic growth and promotes policies that enable MSMEs to engage in cross -border digital trade.  
 
QUESTION 240:  What favourable conditions if any have the U.S. put i n place to support sustainable 
participation of MSME in digital trade?  
 
RESPONSE 240:  The United  States remains committed to advancing opportunities for MSME 
participation in the digital economy, including through the removal of barriers to their ability t o 
engage in cross -border digital trade. The United  States recognizes that MSMEs are a driving force of 
economic growth and promotes policies that enable MSMEs to engage in cross -border digital trade.  
 
PART  II: REGARDING  THE GOVERNMENT  REPORT  (WT/TPR/G/434)  
 
Page 5, 2.2  
 
The United  States maintains one of the world's most open trade regimes, with the WTO reporting 
the U.S. simple average MFN tariff at 3.34% in 2021 on a bound basis and 2.34% in 2020 on a trade 
weighted average basis. On an applied basis (con sidering GSP and other tariff preferences, as well 
as increased duties from Section  232 and Section  301 actions), the U.S. trade -weighted average 
tariff was 3.0% in 2021. By comparison, simple average final bound tariffs in our top five trading 
partners (E U, Canada, Mexico, China, and Japan) ranged from 4.6% to 36.5%, simple average 
applied tariffs ranged from 4.0% to 7.5%, and trade -weighted average tariffs ranged from 2.4% to 
4.1%. In 2021, 66% of all U.S. imports (including under preference programs) ent ered the 
United  States duty free. The United  States also has among the lowest non -tariff barriers of any 
country in the world. U.S. service markets are open to foreign providers with limited exceptions, and 
U.S. regulatory processes are transparent, access ible, and open to public input.  
 
QUESTION 241:  The United  States is requested to explain the statement of comparing simple 
averages (bound and applied tariffs), is it meaningful when much of the tariffs of some members 
are in non -ad valorem  terms:  
 
RESPONSE 241:  According to WTO reporting, 8.4% of U.S. MFN applied tariffs (8.7% for bound 
tariffs) are non -ad valorem  tariffs. For comparison, the share of non -ad valorem  MFN applied tariffs 
ranges from 0 to 68% among WTO members. The simple averages pres ented on pg. 5, 2.2., are 
taken from WTO World Tariff Profiles. The WTO methodology for calculating the simple average of 
bound tariffs incorporates the ad valorem  equivalent of non -ad valorem  tariffs to the extent possible. 
The WTO prepares the standardiz ed metrics to facilitate comparisons across countries and sectors 
and between bound and applied rates. [For methods see Annex  B of WTO, World Tariff Profiles, 
2022]. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 336 - 
 
  QUESTION 242: What is the impact of these non -ad valorem  tariffs applied by the U.S. and others 
like Japan, the EU, Canada and China on imports?  
 
RESPONSE 242: Like ad valorem  tariffs, non -ad valorem  tariffs raise the price of imported goods. 
The impact of a particular tariff ( ad valorem  or non -ad valorem ) will depend on the value of the duty 
imposed and product -specific features such as substitutability with other goods. The U .S. 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) is accessible and tariffs are transparent and predictable. Some 
non-ad valorem  tariffs, (e.g. specific tariffs), can be easier to predict (and apply) in circumstances 
where transaction values are difficult to ascertain bec ause they are applied by unit and not by value.  
 
QUESTION 243: Do they impact imports by making them uncompetitive in the domestic market  - in 
some cases these have been imposed on items/KG/litre.  
 
RESPONSE 243:  Like ad valorem  tariffs, non -ad valorem  tariffs can raise the price of imported 
goods in the domestic market. Price, however, is only one factor that affects demand for a given 
product; product characteristics are also important. Consumers in the United  States continue to 
demand imported goods, incl uding those that are subject to ad valorem  and non -ad valorem  duties. 
In 2021, 44% of U.S. imports were subject to a duty. The unit (e.g. item, kilogram, or litre) of a 
non-ad valorem  tariff does not affect its impact.  
 
QUESTION 244: In principle, the U.S.  is requested to explain how is it different from the minimum 
import price imposed.  
 
RESPONSE 244: A tariff is applied to the imported value of a good, either by a set amount per unit 
(a specific tariff) or by a percent of the value of the good ( ad valorem  tariff). The resulting domestic 
price after importation might be higher or lower than the price for similar goods on the market, 
depending on the price in the exporting country and other transaction costs. Under a minimum -price 
regime, the minimum price s ets a price floor that determines the minimum price at which an 
imported good can be sold on the domestic market. Thus, the import price would necessarily be 
higher, and never lower than the price floor independent of the price in the exporting country and  
other transaction costs.  
 
Tariffs, including non -ad valorem  tariffs applied by the United  States, are transparent and 
predictable, and the bound rates were negotiated. In contrast, minimum import prices are set by 
the implementer, not via negotiations.  
 
QUESTION 245:  Do the forex variations impact the assessment of market access barriers in 
non-ad valorem  forms more susceptible to unpredictability, and therefore make it a non -transparent 
form of a duty imposed on international trade flows?  
 
RESPONSE 245:  The United  States provides transparent and predictable information on tariffs in 
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. Foreign exchange rate movements can affect the foreign currency 
value of duties imposed by both ad valorem  and non -ad valorem  tariffs; however, they affect duties 
imposed by these types of tariffs differently.  
Foreign exchange rate movements may affect the domestic (i.e. U.S. dollar) value of the duty 
imposed under an ad valorem  tariff, if the exchange rate movement affects the U.S.  value of the 
imported good against which the ad valorem  rate is applied. However, foreign exchange rate 
movements may not affect the domestic value of the duty imposed under a specific tariff, which is 
valued in U.S. dollars.  
Foreign exchange movements ma y affect the foreign currency value of the duty imposed under a 
specific tariff. Foreign exchange rate movements may also affect the foreign -currency value of the 
duty imposed under an ad valorem  tariff.  
 
QUESTION 246:  Finally, how relevant is it to discus s the market access based on a comparison of 
simple averages, when the ad valorem  equivalents (AVEs) have not progressed beyond the Doha 
Round negotiations?  
 
RESPONSE 246:  U.S. tariffs do not exceed the levels negotiated in the Doha  Round. Please see the 
response to Question  241, which notes that the WTO incorporates ad valorem  equivalents of 
non-ad valorem  tariffs into its simple average tariff calculations.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 337 - 
 
  Pages 5 & 6, 2.6  
 
U.S. fiscal support measures (including additional spending and discretionary tax cuts), which 
ultimately exceeded 25% of U.S. GDP through the third quarter of 2021, were a key factor in the 
quick recovery of the U.S. economy that was faster than that of most of our trading partners. U.S. 
federal government spending, w hich directly supported firms and workers as well as state and local 
governments, was substantially larger than comparable efforts in other major economies. The UK 
response was under 20% of GDP and average spending in the euro area was 12% of GDP.  
 
QUESTION 247:  The U.S. is requested to explain how these efforts match up with various 
commitments under the WTO. For example, under Articles  1 & 2 of ASCM, many of these measures 
can be challenged, and the U.S. is requested to provide the status of these programs undertaken.  
 
RESPONSE 247:  Fiscal support to firms was primarily given in the form of forgivable Paycheck 
Protection Program (PPP) loans. These were pandemic emergency loans to a broad range of small 
businesses structured like a furlough program a nd designed to scale with payroll expenses, with the 
objective of helping small businesses retain workers rather than lay them off. Businesses that 
maintained staffing over their loan period got some or all of their PPP loan forgiven. While specific 
eligib ility varied somewhat over the course of the program and by industry, sole proprietors and 
small businesses with fewer than 500  employees were generally eligible. According to the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office, the total cost of the PPP program reached USD 900 billion over several 
rounds of funding throughout 2020. The United  States considers that all of the actions taken during 
the pandemic have been consistent with our WTO obligations. In its next subsidy notification, the 
United  States will notify any  subsidies that meet the criteria of Article  25.2 of the SCM  Agreement.  
 
QUESTION 248:  The U.S. is requested to provide a detailed break up of such measures undertaken 
at the federal and by the counties.  
 
RESPONSE 248:  See response to Question  247. 
 
QUESTI ON 249:  Finally, the U.S. is requested as to how these measures encourage the flow of 
goods and services, and what additional measures have been adopted to provide minimum market 
access for the WTO members.  
 
RESPONSE 249:  The United  States is the largest w orld importer of goods and services and has 
remained among the world's most open economies throughout the pandemic.  
 
Page 6, 2.10  
 
The onset of the pandemic in the United  States resulted in a decline in U.S. employment of 
1.5 million in March  2020 and 20.5  million in April  2020 (down 14.4% between February  2020 and 
April 2020). As of July  2022, U.S. employment was 32,000 higher than the pre -pandemic peak of 
February  2020. Private employment declined 21.0  million (16.2%) from February thro ugh 
April 2020, and as of July  2022, it was 629,000 higher than the pre -pandemic peak. Manufacturing 
employment payrolls declined by nearly 1.4  million (10.7%) between February and April  2020, but 
was 41,000 above the February  2020 level, as of July  2022. Employment in the service -providing 
sector (including government), accounting for 86% of total employment in July  2022, was 40,000 
lower than the pre -pandemic peak of February  2020.  
 
QUESTION 250:  Why did the U.S. employment decline despite a large infusio n by way of financial 
support measures (including additional spending and discretionary tax cuts) which exceeded 25% 
of the U.S. GDP?  
 
RESPONSE 250:  U.S. employment significantly declined at the onset of the pandemic due to the 
shutdowns that occurred thro ughout the economy as a response to trying to curb the pandemic. 
Fiscal and monetary support was provided to address both the COVID -19 pandemic and support the 
economy by trying to avoid many of the long -term harmful effects that often follow an economic 
shock. These support measures contributed to a much higher growth than anticipated and 
employment recovered more quickly than initially anticipated.  
 
QUESTION 251:  The impact of the service sector does raise some concerns, is the U.S. economy 
going for a sl owdown?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 338 - 
 
  RESPONSE 251:  As of November  2022, services providing employment is up 816,000 over its level 
in February  2020 (the month prior to the onset of the pandemic), however employment in the leisure 
and hospitality services sector is still down 5.8% (980 ,000).  
 
QUESTION 252:  The increase which is recorded is provided in terms of percentages, the U.S. is 
requested to provide the absolute numbers.  
 
RESPONSE 252:  U.S. employment information can be found at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
of the U.S. Depa rtment of Labor ( www.bls.gov ). For the specific months cited above including revised 
data (in millions), seasonally adj usted, and the most recent month, November  2022.  
 
Total U.S. employment was:  
 
• February  2020: 152.5 ; 
• March  2020: 151.0 ; 
• April 2020: 130.5 ; 
• July 2022: 152.4 ; 
• November  2022: 153.5 . 
 
Total private employment was:  
 
• February  2020: 129.6 ; 
• March  2020: 128.2 ; 
• April 2020: 108.6 ; 
• July 2022: 130.2 ; 
• November  2022: 131.1 . 
 
Total manufacturing employment was:  
 
• February  2020: 12.785 ; 
• March  2020: 12.717 ; 
• April 2020: 11.423 ; 
• July 2022: 12.831 ; 
• November  2022: 12.934 . 
 
Services -providing sector (including government) employment was:  
 
• February  2020: 131.4 ; 
• July 2022: 131.3 ; 
• November  2022: 132.2 . 
 
Page 7, 2.17  
 
In part due to the speed of the U.S. recovery relative to the rest of the world and amidst strong U.S. 
domestic demand, the U.S. trade deficit has widened. Goods imports have been particularly strong, 
as working and staying at home led to a surge in demand for things like computer equipment, 
games, and cooking supplies. Although exports have hit record nominal highs, they increased at a 
slower pace t han imports because many of the economies of countries that buy U.S. goods have not 
recovered as fast. At the same time, new waves of COVID -19 infections depressed international 
travel and weighed on the recovery of some services that are important for U.S . exports such as 
tourism.  
 
QUESTION 253:  Despite a large infusion by way of financial support measures (including additional 
spending and discretionary tax cuts) as suggested in Paragraph 2.10 of this document, the trade 
deficit widened for the US  – expla in this phenomenon. Is it because of the incentives being routed 
to support directed towards the Food Stamp Programme, which led to the consumer having surpluses 
for boosting demand for computer equipment, games, and cooking supplies?  
 
RESPONSE 253:  The U. S. trade deficit increased beginning in the second half of 2020 due to U.S. 
domestic demand recovering more quickly than demand in the rest of the world. As inflation 
persisted into 2022 and Russia's war against Ukraine injected fresh uncertainty over crit ical 
commodities, monetary tightening in the United  States responded to stabilize rising prices. The WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 339 - 
 
  divergence of monetary policy between the United  Sates and other countries on top of growing fears 
of a global slowdown, contributed to dollar strength, an d the U.S. trade deficit increased through 
2022.  
 
QUESTION 254:  How has the imports of agricultural value -added products performed for 2019, 
2020, 2021 and 2022 up to November, this would have helped developing countries and LDCs?  
 
RESPONSE 254:  U.S. imports of consumer -oriented, high -value products have increased nearly 
60% in value terms from USD  85 billion in FY 2016 to a record USD  134 billion in FY 2022, the most 
recent year for which data is available. Developing countries, including LDCs, accoun ted for over 
half of total U.S. imports of consumer -oriented, high -value products in FY 2022.  
 
Page 8, 2.21  
 
Inflation remains a global challenge. Many factors contributed to higher prices, including a slow 
recovery in global energy production, supply -chain disruptions and related shortages of specific 
inputs, persistently strong demand for durable goods, rising food costs in part due to supply chain 
issues, brisk growth in house prices, and increased demand for services (such as travel, leisure, and 
hospit ality) as the economy reopened.  
 
QUESTION 255:  The U.S. is requested to explain how the action of the U.S. Fed of raising interest 
rates, a tighter monetary policy, would help support global growth.  
 
RESPONSE 255:  See response to Question  23. 
 
QUESTION 256:  In this context, the United  States is requested to share its assessment of the 
overall global growth scenarios.  
 
RESPONSE 256:  See response to Question  23. 
 
Page 8, 3.2  
 
One of the United  States' top priorities is effective implementation and  enforcement of existing trade 
commitments, including the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA). The United  States 
reported on the USMCA negotiations in our 2018  report. The Agreement, which entered into force in 
July 2020, includes the strongest l abor provisions in any trade agreement, as well as a 
ground -breaking labor enforcement tool, the rapid response labor mechanism (RRM). The RRM 
allows the United  States to quickly take action and target specific facilities in Mexico where workers 
are being denied their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The United  States 
has triggered the mechanism five times and has secured concrete wins for workers. For more 
information on how the United  States is promoting compliance with the labo r commitments included 
in our trade instruments, see 5.2 Trade Enforcement Activities. For more information on the USMCA, 
see Section  5.4.9 United  States -Mexico -Canada  Agreement.  
 
QUESTION 257:  The United  States is requested to explain how it proposes to e nforce the 
labour -related violation under the new trade agreement.  
 
RESPONSE 257:  The USMCA's robust and comprehensive labor provisions are fully incorporated 
into the text of the Agreement and fully enforceable under the Agreement's dispute settlement 
mechanism. The USMCA also has a ground -breaking labor enforcement tool, the rapid response 
labor mechanism (RRM), which allows the United  States to take action at specific facilities in Mexico, 
where workers are being denied their rights to freedom of associa tion and collective bargaining. The 
United  States has devoted significant resources to monitoring labor issues in Mexico and has utilized 
the RRM five times, to date.  
 
QUESTION 258:  India would like to understand in detail the various provisions of the rapid response 
labour mechanism RRM proposal, is it targeting any particular sectors?  
 
RESPONSE 258:  The RRM applies to "covered facilities" which are facilities that have a trade 
connection and are in a "priority sector". A "Priority Sector" currently mea ns a sector that produces 
manufactured goods, supplies services, or involves mining.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 340 - 
 
  QUESTION 259:  Would it only lead to the denial of preferential access for the bilateral trade partner 
of the U.S. or are there any other additional measures  – provide det ails. 
 
RESPONSE 259:  The RRM in Annex  31-A applies only to the United  States and Mexico. The text 
of the Annex  is publicly  available  on USTR's  website  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agr
eements/FTA/USMCA/Text/31%20Dispute%20Settlement.pdf . In certain situations, the mechanism 
provides for panelists to assess complaints about conditions at specific facilities, and, in cases of 
non-compliance with key labor obligations, provides for the suspension of USMCA tariff benefits or 
the imposition of other penalties, such as denial of entry of goods from businesses that are repeat 
offenders.  
 
QUESTION 260:  The U.S. is requested for details like does it have a sectoral priority. If yes what 
are the yardsticks for the identification of these sectors?  
 
RESPONSE 260:  A "Priority Sector" as defined in Annex  31-A means a sector that produces 
manufactured goods, supplies services, or involves minin g. 
 
Page 9, 3.7  
 
The traditional approach to climate and environmental issues within trade has primarily focused on 
advancing levels of environmental protection for our trading partners. The United  States will 
continue this work to strengthen and expand th ose commitments, but we also recognize that this 
singular approach will not fully achieve our climate goals. To this end, the United  States is pursuing 
a new generation of trade policies that will more affirmatively promote the decarbonization necessary 
to limit global temperature increase to 1.5°C.  
 
QUESTION 261:  The U.S. is requested to explain the new generation of trade policies:  
What provision of these new generation agreements goes beyond the traditional approach to climate 
and environmental issues?  
 
RESPONSE 261:  Our modern trade agreements include ambitious environment commitments that 
are subject to dispute settlement, including a core commitment that trading partners not waive or 
derogate environmental laws to attract trade a nd investment. Our trade agreements also include 
robust opportunities for public participation. For example, members of the public can support 
implementation and compliance by supplying information regarding potential non -compliance. 
Additionally, the Unit ed States recognizes the trade paradigm of the past is unlikely to effectively 
address current global environmental challenges as well as challenges we anticipate in the future, 
including climate change. We are leveraging trade policy tools to advance a ne w paradigm that is 
inclusive, goes beyond traditional approaches to environment and climate, fosters long -term 
resilience and sustainability, and reflects our core values.  
 
QUESTION 262:  What is the primary focus of these environmental protection measures?  
 
RESPONSE 262:  The United  States seeks to advance trade policies that contribute to long -term 
resilience and sustainability, reflect our core values, and are inclusive. We seek to establish 
ambitious environment commitments that incentivize trade and inve stment, raise our respective 
levels of environmental protection, ensure trading partners effectively enforce their environment 
laws and do not waive or derogate from their environmental laws.  
 
QUESTION 263:  Do these measures also control the use or restric t certain raw materials?  
 
RESPONSE 263:  The United  States seeks to establish ambitious environment commitments that 
raise trading partners' respective levels of environmental protection, ensures that trading partners 
do not waive or derogate from their env ironmental laws, and includes the commitment to conserve 
and sustainably manage natural resources for present and future generations.  
 
Page 11, 3.21  
 
Further, in February  2022, the United  States released the results of year -long reviews of six 
industrial b ase supply chains: defence, transportation, energy, information and communications 
technology, public health, and agriculture and food. As part of these reviews, agencies looked at 
new policies and investments across a number of sectors to address the supp ly chain vulnerabilities WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 341 - 
 
  that come from geographically concentrated sourcing and to spur the transition to a low carbon 
economy.  
 
QUESTION 264:  What steps is the United  States taking in the agriculture and food sector for 
transition to low carbon economy?  
 
RESPONSE 264:  The United  States is committed to building medium - to long -term sustainable 
resilient food systems while maintaining open and predictable markets. The United  States employs 
an approach that is grounded in science, market -driven, equitable, v oluntary, and incentive -based 
to help farmers adopt and build resilience to a changing climate while sustainably increasing 
agricultural productivity. For example, USDA's Partnerships for Climate -Smart Commodities Program 
will build and expand market oppor tunities for commodities produced using climate -smart production 
practices via a set of pilot projects spanning up to five years. Accepted projects from applicants (e.g. 
higher education institutions, non -profits, local governments, small businesses, etc…)  will provide 
technical and financial assistance to producers to implement climate -smart production practices, 
pilot innovative and cost -effective methods of quantifying, monitoring, reporting, and verifying 
greenhouse gas benefits, and develop, market and  promote the resulting climate -smart 
commodities.  
 
Page 11, 3.24  
 
It is mentioned in the report that digital trade and digitally supported services helps in meeting the 
challenges of COVID -19 pandemic and supports economic resilience and USTR recognized th e critical 
role of digital trade and digitally supported services and will continue to work to ensure that these 
flows are not obstructed.  
 
QUESTION 265:  The U.S. is requested to provide data on digital trade during the COVID -19 
pandemic and post -COVID -19 pandemic. Small transactions under Section  321 and bulk transactions 
(others).  
 
RESPONSE 265:  The United  States has no one measure for digital trade. Comprehensive data on 
the U.S. digital economy through 2021 can be found in this report on New and Revised Statistics of 
the U.S. Digital Economy: https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2022 -11/new -and-revised -statistics -
of-the-us-digital -economy -2005-2021.pdf . 
 
For data specific to international trade, BEA details trade in ICT services and potential ICT services: 
ICT services are those used to facilitate information processing and communication; potentially 
ICT-enabled services are services that can predominantly  be delivered remotely over ICT networks.  
Data over the requested t ime period can be found in Tables  3.1-3.3 
at: https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqid=62&step=9&isuri=1&6210=4 . For Section  321 trade data, 
please see CBP Trade Statistics at:  https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade . 
 
Page 23, 5.58  
 
It is noted in the report that, the USMCA contains strong commitments on digital trade. It modernizes 
the NAFTA agreement to include provisions covering digital trade, etc.  
 
QUESTION 266:  The USA is requested to explain the Article  19.3 (Custom duties) provision under 
USMC  Agreement. Whether Mexico or Canada imposes any internal taxes on digital products 
transmitted electronically or no t? And if so, then what's the USA stand on it?  
 
RESPONSE 266:  Article  19.3 prohibits the imposition of customs duties on digital products, thereby 
making the WTO moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions permanent for parties 
to the agreemen t. The United  States is currently not aware of any internal tax imposed by a party 
to USMCA that would be contrary to this commitment.  
 
Page 30, 5.102  
 
Also critical to U.S. trade policy in the arena of IP protection and enforcement is the provision of 
technical assistance and capacity building. The U.S. Government collaborates with various trading 
partners on IP -related training and capacity building around the world. Domestically and abroad, 
bilaterally, and in regional groupings, the U.S. Government rema ins engaged in building stronger WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 342 - 
 
  and more effective systems for the protection and enforcement of IP. Various U.S. government 
agencies provide sustained and valuable contributions, such as the Department of Commerce's 
Commercial Law Development Program; th e STOP fakes program managed by the International 
Trade Administration; the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, through its Office of Policy and 
International Affairs, which includes the Global Intellectual Property Academy and the Intellectual 
Property Atta ché Program; the U.S. Department of State's Office of Intellectual Property 
Enforcement, International Visitors Leadership Program, and its Global Intellectual Property Law 
Enforcement Coordinator program; as well as trainings provided by the joint Departm ent of Justice 
and State's International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (ICHIP) program, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations ( HIS) through the HIS-led 
National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Cent re, and the United  States Copyright Office. 
Through these combined efforts, the United  States is committed to ensuring that American 
innovation and creativity is protected in foreign markets.  
 
QUESTION 267:  Has the U.S. undertaken capacity -building and tec hnical assistance measures 
relating to cross -border technology transfer with its trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 267:  Please refer to the "Report on the Implementation of Article  66.2 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement: The  United  States  of America," document number IP/C/ R/TTI/USA/3 
(21 September  2022), and "Technical Cooperation Activities: Information from Members, 
the United  States  of America," document number IP/C/R/TC/USA/3 (22  September  2022).  
 
Page 30, 5.104  
 
It is stated in the report that, at the WTO's 12th Ministerial Conference in June  2022, the 
United  States also joined a consensus among WTO  Members to maintain a moratorium on duties on 
electronic transmissions.  
 
QUESTION 268:  The U.S. is requested to provide the data on its calculation of the Revenue Los s 
from the Moratorium on electronic transfers for India and other developing countries.  
 
RESPONSE 268:  The United  States does not impose customs duties on electronic transmissions 
and therefore does not record data on the absence of such customs duties.  
 
QUESTION 269:  If yes, provide the details of the authority which has produced it, like the status 
of the institution and other relevant details.  
 
RESPONSE 269:  See answer to 268.  
 
Page 32, 6.8  
 
The Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) is a technical assistance, multi -donor trust fund that 
operates as a coordination mechanism for trade -related assistance exclusively to least -developed 
countries (LDCs), with the overall objective of integrating trade into national development plans and 
integrating LDCs into the multilateral trading system.  
 
QUESTION 270:  What kind of trade -related assistance is provided to the LDCs under the EIF?  
 
RESPONSE 270:  The United  States has supported the EIF primarily through complementary 
bilateral assistance to LDC countries b y the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 
Additional information on the EIF can be consulted on the official website: https://enhancedif.org/en . 
 
QUESTION 271:  Has any impact assessment study(ies) been undertaken on the said assistance 
programmes? Please provide details.  
 
RESPONSE 271:  An external evaluation is currently underway of Phase  Two (2016 -2022) of the 
EIF program, which ended in 2022, and donors  continued informal discussions on the future  of the 
program.  
 
QUESTION 272:  Who donates/contributes to the multi -donor trust fund?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 343 - 
 
  RESPONSE 272:  The EIF program is currently supported by 24  country donors through 
contributions to EIF's Trust Fund. The EIF Trust Fund donors include the following cou ntries: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, the European  Commission, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the Republic  of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, the Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türk iye, the United  Kingdom, 
and the United  States.  
 
Page 38, 9.1  
 
USTR has implemented a Small and Medium -Sized Business Initiative to increase export 
opportunities for U.S. small and medium -sized businesses (SMEs) and has expanded efforts to 
address the spec ific export challenges and priorities of SMEs and their workers in U.S. trade policy 
and enforcement activities.  
 
QUESTION 273:  The USA is requested to provide the following details: List the export challenges 
that the American MSMEs are facing.  
 
RESPONSE 273: Tariff and non -tariff barriers, burdensome customs procedures, discriminatory or 
arbitrary standards, lack of transparency relating to relevant regulations, restrictions on digital trade, 
and insufficient intellectual property (IP) rights protection i n foreign markets present particular 
challenges for U.S. SMEs exporting abroad. Under the SME Initiative, USTR's small business office, 
regional offices, and functional offices pursued initiatives and advanced efforts to address these 
issues. Small busines s also face export challenges such as lack of financing, access to information, 
and the need for counselling and financing related to exports.  
 
QUESTION 274:  What efforts have been undertaken to address these specific export challenges?  
 
RESPONSE 274:  The United  States engages with trading partners around the world to address 
trade barriers which can be particularly burdensome to small exporters with fewer financial 
resources, including non -tariff barriers, discriminatory or arbitrary standards, lack of transparency 
relating to relevant regulations, restrictions on digital trade, and insufficient intellectual property 
(IP) rights protection. Please see the 2022 Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report for furthe r details. 
The United  States also provides an array of export tools and solutions for U.S. SMEs to address 
challenges such as trade data information and analysis, financing, and counselling services. Please 
see: www.tra de.gov . 
 
Page 38, 9.2  
 
U.S. small businesses are key engines for U.S. economic growth, jobs, and innovation. USTR focused 
on making trade work for the benefit of U.S. SMEs, helping them take advantage of new markets 
abroad, access and participate in global supply chains, and support jobs at home.  
 
QUESTION 275:  The USA is requested to provide the following details: What trade -related efforts 
have been taken to aid MSMEs to take advantage of new markets abroad?  
 
RESPONSE 275: The United  States provides local export assistance as well as an array of online 
export tools and solutions for U.S. SMEs to take advantage of new markets abroad. These include 
export basics, researching foreign markets, trade events, finding partners and buyers, eco mmerce 
resources, financing, and navigating shipping and logistics. Please see: www.trade.gov . 
 
QUESTION 276:  Do the authorities provide any measures to ensure the price competitiveness of 
SME products in the global mar ket? 
 
RESPONSE 276:  No. 
 
QUESTION 277:  While participating in Global Supply Chains, what are the challenges faced by the 
MSMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 277:  The issue of supply chain resiliency is a key priority for the Biden -Harris 
Administration, as evidenced by the E xecutive Order (EO) 14017 on "America's Supply Chains" that 
President Biden issued on 24  February  2021, to launch a comprehensive review of U.S. supply chains 
and direct federal departments and agencies to identify ways to secure U.S. supply chains against  a WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 344 - 
 
  wide range of risks and vulnerabilities, including for small business. The Administration is working 
across agencies to support principles for supply chain resilience: transparency; diversity, openness, 
and predictability; security; and sustainability.  
 
QUESTION 278:  Which are the dominant markets and the prominent products of MSME exports?  
 
RESPONSE 278:  Nearly 97% of U.S. exporters are small and medium -sized firms. During the period 
under review, the top five SME export destinations are Mexico, Canada,  China, the United  Kingdom, 
and Japan. SME top 5 exporting industries (3 -Digit NAICS Code) are durable goods merchant 
wholesalers, nondurable goods merchant wholesalers, chemical manufacturers, primary metal 
manufacturing, and computer and electronic produ ct manufacturers.  
 
Page 38, 9.3  
 
USTR worked closely with the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce), and other agencies that help provide 
U.S. SMEs with information, assista nce, and counselling on specific export opportunities.  
 
QUESTION 279:  The USA is requested to provide the following details:  
European  Union plans to implement its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) proposal by 
2026, and the transition period will ki ck in from 2023. Against this background, how do the 
authorities plan to proceed to aid its MSMEs in complying with the EU's ETS regimes and other 
commitments?  
 
RESPONSE 279:  U.S. SMEs that require specific assistance with trade questions may contact their 
nearest U.S. Export Assistance Center (U.S. EAC) at 109 locations around the United  States. U.S. 
EACs can be located  at the following  website:  https://www.sba.gov/local -assistance/find?type=U.S
.%20Export%20Assistance%20Center&pageNumber=1 . 
 
QUESTIONS BASED ON GENERAL OBSERVATION  
 
QUESTION 280:  How has the new Trade Policy, announced by the U.S. Administration in 
March  2021, impacted the U.S. approach to trade agreements and bilateral engagements with 
trading partners?  
 
RESPONSE 280:  The United  States is advancing its trade policy goals through all available avenues, 
including trade agreements and bilateral engagements.  
 
QUESTION 281:  The current slow pace of visa appointments in many countries, sometimes running 
into multiple -year wait times i.e. around 900  days for applicants in India. The dela y is not only 
affecting labour mobility but also coming in the way of fulfilling export order commitments both in 
goods and services. Further this also falls under the purview of trade facilitation. What steps are 
being taken by the U.S. administration to address the situation?  
 
RESPONSE 281:  Although wait times for visitor (B1/B2) visas are rapidly improving, we recognize 
that some embassies and consulates are still experiencing longer wait times for visitor visas, and we 
are actively working to reduce the se wait times. One step we are taking is to waive the in -person 
interviews requirement whenever possible. The State Department has worked in coordination with 
the Department of Homeland Security to expand authorities which allow us to waive the in -person 
interview for many students, applicants renewing prior visas, and other low risk travelers. We have 
also expanded our staffing worldwide by onboarding and training new employees. This past fiscal 
year, the State  Department has doubled its hiring of U.S. dir ect hire consular adjudicators over the 
previous year, and newly trained employees are now making their way to overseas posts. While it 
takes time to hire, train, and deploy these personnel, State is on track to fill all the overseas visa 
adjudicator posit ions that were impacted by the pandemic by next September. And finally, we have 
used innovative technological solutions to electronically redistribute non -immigrant visa interview 
waiver workloads from overseas posts with high visa appointment wait times t o other posts that 
with additional capacity. Each day, for example, U.S. consular officers in China remotely adjudicate 
hundreds of interview -waived non -immigrant visas for applicants in India where there are longer 
interview appointment wait times. This a llows our consular officers to focus on first -time and other 
visa applicants who do require an in -person interview.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 282:  What steps are being taken to improve access to the U.S. labor market for skilled 
and unskilled professionals from developing  countries?  
 
RESPONSE 282: It is not clear what is meant by the term "unskilled professional", but the 
United  States offers robust options for qualified professionals to work in the United  States, on both 
a temporary and non -temporary basis. See: https://www.uscis.gov/working -in-the-united -states . 
 
QUESTION 283:  Question based on Recent Policy Developments.  
 
Recently passed domestic legislation in the U.S. (Chips Act, IRA) incentivizes domes tic production 
of semiconductors, EV batteries, and other high -tech equipment by offering incentives to producers 
within the country supposed to be violating the provisions of GATT  1994 and TRIMS  Agreement. This 
puts more competitive manufacturers globally  at a distinct disadvantage.  
What steps are proposed to be taken to create an even playing field for global manufacturers in 
these areas, especially from the developing world?  
 
RESPONSE 283:  The United  States disagrees with the characterization in this que stion. Like all 
other WTO  Members, the United  States may provide support in a manner that is consistent with its 
commitments under the WTO  Agreement. The United  States intends to administer the two 
referenced Acts in a manner that is consistent with U.S. l aw and with U.S. commitments under the 
WTO Agreement. In addition, the CHIPS and Science Act includes an International Technology 
Security and Innovation Fund to support international information and communication technology 
security and semiconductor supp ly chain activities.  
 
QUESTION 284:  The U.S. has announced the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity 
(IPEF) as an important plank of its trade agenda. What objectives does the IPEF seek to achieve in 
the absence of market access commitments among partner countries?  
 
RESPONSE 284:  The IPEF will advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, 
fairness, and competitiveness for our economies. Through IPEF, the partners aim to contribute to 
cooperation, stability, p rosperity, development, and peace within the region. The Framework will 
also offer tangible benefits that fuel economic activity and investment, promote sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth, and benefit workers and consumers across the region. For mor e 
information, see here: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/agreements -under -negotiation/indo -
pacific -economic -framew ork-prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
QUESTION 285:  What policy measures has the U.S. taken to promote start up and 
entrepreneurship partnerships with other countries? Does the U.S. promote investments in 
start-ups/support to start -ups in other countries?  
 
RESPONSE 285:  The U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) 
helps U.S. companies, including U.S. start -ups, navigate foreign markets. The U.S. Commercial 
Service, the trade promotion arm of ITA, offers U.S. companies a full ran ge of expertise in 
international trade. U.S. companies can find assistance locally in more than 100 U.S. Commerce 
Service offices nationwide and in more than 70 international offices. Further information on the U.S. 
Commercial Service and the services it p rovides U.S. companies can be found 
at: https://www.trade.gov/us -commercial -service . The Department of Commerce's SelectUSA Tech 
program connects international early -stage and start -up technology companies to prospects for 
advancement in the U.S. market. For more information on the SelectUSA Tech program, please see: 
https://www.trade.gov/selectusa -tech. 
The USA accounts for only about five per c ent of the global population and it is responsible for 28% 
of global carbon emissions. The United  States' Environmental Protection Agency publication 
(https://www.epa.gov/ghg emissions/sources -greenhouse -gas-emissions ) shows that Total GHG 
Emission was around 6,500  MMT (Million Metric Tons of CO2 Equivalents) that keeps on increasing 
during the period 1991 -2019. In the year 2019, it was around 6600 MMT.  
 
QUESTION 286:  What were  the sustainable environment policies for cutting GHG during the period 
1992-2019?  
 
RESPONSE 286: The U.S. Government is working to improve the public's understanding of climate 
change and its impacts on human health and the environment. This work ranges from policy and 
regulatory measures to reduce domestic (and international) emissions, quantifying a nd improving WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 346 - 
 
  data, and advancing science and working directly with communities to reduce emissions and adapt 
to impending changes. Additional information on these measures can be found on the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency's climate change website, a vailable at 
https://www.epa.gov/climate -change/what -epa-doing -about -climate -change . 
 
QUESTION 287:  What are the future policies of the USA under the third Trade policy a genda to cut 
GHG emissions?  
 
RESPONSE 287:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 288:  According to the 2019  UNCTAD  publication, the Potential Tariff Revenue Loss for 
the following categories of countries due to the Moratorium in 2017 was as follows:  
 
WTO Developing Members  10,075  
Sub-Saharan Africa  2,630  
WTO LDC Members  1,506  
WTO High -Income Members  289 
Source:  https://unctad.org/system/files/official -document/ser -rp-2019d1_en.pdf . 
The tariff loss for the developed countries is negligible as compared to developing and LDCs. WTO 
in the MC12 decided to extend (WT/MIN(22)/W/23) the current status of not imposing customs 
duties on electronic transmission till MC13. The U.S. support the current status of not applying tariff 
related to e -commerce keeping in mind its own interests only. Whereas the tariff loss for developing 
countries and LDCs would keep increasing as the e -commerce market is continuously growing. This 
approach of the U.S. to support the moratorium is contrary to its Trade policy agenda number VIII 
which is to " promote eq uitable economic growth around the world " especially for the developing 
countries and LDCs . How would the U.S. justify that?  
 
RESPONSE 288:  The U.S. view on the WTO e -commerce customs duty moratorium is informed, in 
part, by recent studies demonstrating the significant economic and consumer benefits for the 
United  States and developing countries in continuing the current practice of not imposing customs 
duties on electronic transmissions. In particular, they include the OECD's "Electronic tr ansmissions 
and international trade -shedding new light on the moratorium debate", which sheds light on the 
significant consumer benefits to facilitating trade electronically. In addition, the European Centre for 
International Political Economy 's 2019 study , "The Economic Losses from Ending the WTO 
Moratorium on Electronic Transmissions", studied four countries and determined that if they were to 
impose customs duties on electronic transmissions, they would "lose considerably more in gross 
domestic product t han they would gain in tariffs". We remain interested in deepening our discussion 
on this issue, including through the Work Program on Electronic Commerce at the WTO.  
 
 
INDIA  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
The Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page  11, 4  
 
The U.S. current account deficit continued increasing during the period under review, moving from 
2.1% to 2.9% of GDP in 2020 and 3.6% in 2021. The increase in the deficit partly reflects the 
disruption in trade fl ows due to the pandemic. U.S. imports and exports of goods declined during 
the initial part of the review period, but exports declined more significantly, by 14.1%, while imports 
declined by about half that level, by 7.9%. Thereafter, in 2021, both imports  and exports recovered 
significantly, reaching their highest level during the period. The merchandise trade deficit, at 
USD 946 billion in 2018, increased to USD  1.18 trillion in 2021, its highest level during the period 
due to a large surge in imports. Th e main products traded, as well as the main sources and 
destinations for U.S. trade, did not change significantly during the period. Despite significant declines 
during the review period, the United  States maintained a surplus in cross -border services trad e, 
although it fell to USD  230 billion in 2021, the lowest level since 2012. Travel and transport were in 
particular negatively impacted by the COVID -19 pandemic. The European  Union and the 
United  Kingdom were the United  States' main services trading partn ers during the period.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 347 - 
 
  QUESTION 1:  What are the major factors responsible for the increase in trade deficit during the 
period 2020 -2021?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The trade deficit reflects a number of macroeconomic factors, such as patterns of 
saving, spending and inv estment as well as growth differentials between trade partners. Beginning 
in the second half of 2020, U.S. domestic demand recovered quickly, while demand in the rest of 
the world did so more moderately resulting in a widening trade deficit  - both in nominal terms and 
as a share of GDP. The growth in U.S. goods and services imports outpaced export growth, resulting 
in rising goods deficit and lower services surpluses. As inflation persisted into 2022 and Russia's war 
against Ukraine injected fresh unce rtainty over critical commodities supply, monetary tightening in 
the United  States responded to stabilize rising prices. The divergence in monetary policy between 
the United  States and other countries, on top of growing fears of a global slowdown, contribu ted to 
dollar strength, and the U.S. trade deficit increased in the first half of 2022.  
 
QUESTION 2:  How many times the deficit has been assigned to imports?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Between 2019 and 2021, the U.S. goods and services deficit increased by 
USD 285 billion (51%). The goods deficit increased by USD  233 billion (27%), due to goods imports 
growing faster than goods exports (USD  339 billion to USD  106 billion). The services surplus 
declined by USD  52 billion (18%) due to services exports declining more than t he decline in services 
imports (exports falling USD  96 billion as compared to imports falling USD  44 billion).  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 40, 2.9 
 
Modifications to Buy American provisions were introduced by the Build America, Buy America Act, 
Subtitle a  - Build A merica, Buy America of Title  IX of Division  G of the Infrastructure Investment and 
Jobs Act of 15  November  2021. 
 
QUESTION 3:  India would like the U.S. to explain how this measure is not a local content 
requirement, and also explain the WTO compatibility o f the measure with the Principles of 
Non-Discrimination and National Treatment.  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The text of the WTO  Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) establishes rules 
requiring that open, fair and transparent conditions of competition be ensured in g overnment 
procurement. However, only those procurement activities that are carried out by covered entities 
purchasing listed goods, services or construction services of a value exceeding specified threshold 
values are covered by the Agreement. These schedu les are publicly available here: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm . 
 
In acquisitions covered by the GPA, and other relevant international trade agreements, the U.S. 
Trade Representative has waived the Buy American statute and other discriminatory provisions for 
eligible products. See FAR  25.402 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/ far/25.402 ). For more information 
on procedures relating to procurement covered by the TAA, including the GPA, please refer to 
FAR 25.408 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.408 ). 
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page  82, 3.76 
 
A determination on whether or not to initiate an investigation is generally made within 20  days from 
the date of filing of the petition. USITC has 45  days from the filing of the petition or self -initiation 
by USDOC or, if the time has been extende d, 25 days after USDOC informs it of the initiation of the 
investigation, to make a preliminary determination of reasonable indication of material injury, threat 
thereof, or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. If USITC's injur y 
determination is negative, the investigation is terminated; if it is affirmative, the investigation 
continues. After a determination of injury has been made by USITC, USDOC has 115  days (160  days 
after petition) to issue a preliminary AD determination, o r 40 days (85  days after petition) to issue 
a preliminary CVD determination. The investigation continues whether USDOC's preliminary 
determination is affirmative or negative, even if no margin of dumping or subsidization is found, or 
the margin found is be low the de minimis threshold. USDOC has an additional 75  days to determine 
the final margin of dumping. In case of an affirmative determination by USITC and a preliminary 
affirmative determination by USDOC, preliminary AD or CVD measures may be applied for  a period 
no longer than four months, which may be extended to six  months. They generally consist of a cash 
deposit equivalent to the preliminary estimated margin of dumping or subsidy rate.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 348 - 
 
  QUESTION 4:  Article  6.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and Article  12.7 of the SCM  Agreement 
state that if an interested party refuses access to or does not provide necessary information within 
a reasonable period of time or significantly impedes the investigation, the investigating authority 
may apply the facts availabl e. In this respect, India has the following questions:  
 
Please explain the basis for the application of adverse facts available (AFA) in case of 
non-cooperation of the interested party since the Anti -Dumping Agreement and SCM  Agreement 
only permit the application of facts available.  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The details regarding the rationale behind the application of adverse facts in a specific 
segment of a proceeding can be found at:  https://access.trade.gov/log in.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 5:  If a party makes a submission after the deadline, would the USDOC apply AFA against 
that party regardless of the reasons/justification for the delay in submission?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  See response to Question  4 above.  
 
QUESTION 6:  If a party submits its confidential version of a response within the deadline but 
submits its non -confidential version after the deadline, would the USDOC treat such a party as 
non-cooperative and apply AFA?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  See response to Question  4 above.  
 
QUEST ION 7:  In case a sampled exporter files its response after the deadline and the USDOC treats 
this sampled exporter as non -cooperative, how would the USDOC establish the dumping margin for 
cooperating non -sample exporters?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  See response to Quest ion 4 above.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 85, 3.83 
 
The new regulations introduce new rules for scope, circumvention, and covered merchandise 
inquiries. They establish timelines for the initiation of the proceeding and the issuance of a final 
determination and prov ide that USDOC may initiate scope and circumvention inquiries either based 
on a request from an interested party or by self -initiation instead of performing either a formal or 
informal scope inquiry.  
 
QUESTION 8:  What are the factors that the USDOC conside rs before self -initiating an 
anti-circumvention inquiry?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The determination whether or not to self -initiate an Anti -dumping or countervailing 
duty segment depends on the facts and circumstances present in that segment. Factors which 
Commerce wi ll consider in determining whether or not a circumvention inquiry should be 
self-initiated are described within Section  781 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and more specifically, 
19 CFR 351.226(c). With regard to self -initiation in particular segments, details regarding those 
segments can be found at https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx/ . 
 
QUESTION 9:  On what basis does the USDOC decide to self -initiate anti -circumvent ion inquiries?  
 
RESPONSE 9 : See response to Question  8 above.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 86, 3.84 
 
Regarding new shipper reviews, the modifications clarify the circumstances under which USDOC will 
grant a new shipper review and establish specific factors to be considered in determining whether 
the sales at issue constitute bona fide sales for purposes of the AD and CVD laws. The new regulation 
requires that new shipper applicants provide evidence to support the assertion that the sale or sales 
subject to a new s hipper review are bona fide sales for purposes of determining AD margins.  
 
QUESTION 10:  What is the meaning of "bona fide sales" under the recent new shipper review 
regulations?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 349 - 
 
  RESPONSE 10:  Section  351.214 of 19 C.F.R. establishes specific factors to be considered in 
determining whether the sales at issue constitute bona fide sales for purposes of the AD/CVD laws.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Why are new shippers required to establish that their sales are "bona fide" before 
seeking a new shipper review?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  Under U.S. law, only bona fide sales can be used by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce to determine whether dumping exists during a specific period of review.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page  86, 3.85 
 
The new rules introduce the possibility of retroactive application of AD/CVD duties in scope and 
covered merchandise inquiries. In the previous regulations, the date of initiation of a scope inquiry 
was a cut -off date, before which no unsuspended entries were subject to duties even if they involved 
merchandise subsequently d etermined to be within the scope of an AD/CVD order.  
 
QUESTION 12:  How would retroactive orders be implemented by the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The U.S. Department of Commerce cannot instruct U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection to apply duties to entries that hav e already been liquidated. However, if there are 
unliquidated entries outstanding that entered the United  States before Commerce issued a scope 
ruling finding a particular product to be covered by the scope of an AD or CVD Order, Commerce will 
instruct CBP  to apply the results of that scope ruling to that unliquidated merchandise.  
 
QUESTION 13:  Also, at what date it would be applicable?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The applicable date of application would depend on the findings made in the specific 
segment of a proceeding . 19 CFR 351.225(l) provides descriptions, specifically, as to the situations 
in which a scope ruling will apply to particular entries.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 86, 3.87 
 
U.S. law allows USDOC to enter an agreement to suspend an AD and/or CVD investigation unde r 
certain circumstances and when certain statutory and policy criteria are met. The suspension is 
based on an agreement by the relevant parties to the case -to-case exports, or to eliminate the 
injurious effect. These agreements are generally voluntary limi ts on exports or price undertakings; 
or involve the elimination of subsidies or dumping by the foreign producers/exporters or 
government, as relevant.  
 
QUESTION 14:  What criteria are adopted by the U.S. for entering into an agreement to suspend 
AD/CVD duti es and how these actions by the U.S. will be relevant and justifiable with the provisions 
of the Anti -dumping agreement or SCM agreement, especially related to "voluntary limits" on 
exports?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Suspension agreements are generally proposed by respondents in a specific 
investigation (or may include the government if it is a countervailing duty investigation). The 
determination of whether to enter into a suspension agreement with these parties is case specific 
and based on the facts a nd circumstances in the investigation. If a suspension agreement is put into 
place, the U.S. Department of Commerce does so consistent with U.S. obligations under the relevant 
WTO agreement.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page 91, 3.103  
 
Title IV of TFTEA, Prevention of E vasion of Anti -dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, known as 
EAPA, allows CBP to investigate whether a company or other entity has evaded AD/CVD duties.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Explain, with examples what could be considered as "evasion" of AD/CVD Duties.  
 
RESPON SE 15:  "Evasion" of AD/CVD duties refers to entering covered merchandise into the 
customs territory of the United  States by means of any document or electronically transmitted data 
or information, written or oral statement, or act that is material and fals e, or any omission that is 
material, and that results in any cash deposit or other security or any amount of applicable WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 350 - 
 
  Anti-dumping or countervailing duties being reduced or not being applied with respect to the 
merchandise (19  U.S.C.  1517(a)(5)).  
 
Some e xamples of evasion include failure to file AD/CVD entries, misclassifying merchandise so that 
it falls outside an AD/CVD order, and transhipment  whereby an importer claims an incorrect country 
of origin by transhipping  the merchandise through a third count ry to avoid AD/CVD. Details regarding 
duty evasion investigations  - including specific examples of evasion  - can be found 
at: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade -enforcement/tftea/eapa . 
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page  99, 3.120  
 
Sections 201 -204 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (collectively, Section  201), provide the legal 
framework through which the President may provide import relief under safeguard action. A 
petitioner may submit to USITC an adjustment plan detailing steps to facilitate adjustment to import 
competition.  
 
QUESTION 16:  What is the basis on which the USDOC examines the adjustment plan?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC)  - not the U.S. Department of 
Comm erce - examine adjustment plans submitted as part of a safeguard proceeding. Specifics 
regarding the USITC's discussion of a domestic industry's adjustment plan can be found 
at: http://www.usitc.gov . 
 
QUESTION 17:  What are the factors that the USDOC considers while assessing the appropriateness 
of the adjustment plan?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  See response to Question  16 above.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page  187, 4.1 & Table  4.1 (Value of production, 2016 -20) 
 
The Census of Agriculture is cond ucted every five years. It provides a detailed picture of U.S. farms 
and ranches. The last Census (2017) was published in April  2019.1 At the time of the Census, the 
United  States had 2.04  million farms, a decline of 3.2% since 2012. At 441  acres, the aver age size 
of a farm was larger than in the two previous reports, although exactly the same size as in the 
2002 Census. Almost 86% of all U.S. farms were owned by families or individuals, followed by 
agricultural partnerships (6.3%). Since 2007, such types o f farms have been declining, while the 
number of farming corporations is increasing (to 5.7% of all farms in 2017).  
 
QUESTION 18:  The total value of production have been increased from USD  355.5  billion to 
USD 373.5  billion from the year 2016 -2020.  
 
What are the major factors that have led to increase in productivity?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  The U.S. Department of Agriculture has been monitoring U.S. agriculture's 
productivity performance for decades. Annual growth in total factor productivity (TFP), which take s 
into account the use of all inputs to the production process, is the key measure used to evaluate 
agricultural productivity. USDA research has found that TFP is the primary driver in the growth of 
U.S. agricultural output. Agricultural productivity is dr iven by innovations in on -farm tasks, changes 
in the organization and structure of the farm sector, and research and development investment by 
public and private sectors aimed at improvements in farm production. For more information, please 
refer to https://www.ers.usda.gov/data -products/agricultural -productivity -in-the-u-s/. 
 
QUESTION 19:  Can the U.S. state the magnitude and forms of government support for the same.  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The United  States encourages Members to reference its domestic support 
notifications for the values and types of government support provided for agriculture. The most 
recent domestic support notification is G/AG/N/USA/166 and can be fou nd 
at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/G/AG/NUSA166.pdf&Open=
True. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  WT/TPR/S/434, Page  190, 4.8 
 
Agricultural policy is primarily governed by omnibus legislative packages (Farm Bills) that terminate, 
continue, or amend prior policies and establish new policies and programs over a five -year cycle. 
The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L.  115-334), also known as the 2 018 Farm Act, was 
signed into law on 20  December  2018. It extended most of the existing support programs, with 
modifications in some instances. Notably, the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss 
Coverage (PLC) revenue support programs were reautho rized, with minor changes, and a new option 
for producers to choose between the two programs annually. The crop insurance program is 
continued, with some expansion in livestock insurance options. The Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) 
program superseded the earli er Margin Protection Program for Dairy Producers and offered new 
options for dairy farmers, especially smaller -scale producers, to purchase coverage for a specified 
level of a nationally determined milk -to-feed margin. The sugar program continued with an i ncrease 
in non -recourse loan rates.  
 
QUESTION 20:  What is the nature of subsidy provided by the Federal government on the implication 
of change in program [PLC (Price Loss Coverage & ARC (Agriculture Risk Coverage)) ]. 
 
RESPONSE 20:  The 2018 Farm Act (P.L. 115-334) reauthorized PLC, ARC -County (ARC -CO), and 
ARC-individual farm (ARC -IC) with minor changes. ARC -CO and PLC could be elected separately for 
base acres of each historical commodity on a farm. No production is required to receive ARC -CO or 
PLC payments. ARC -CO provides payments when county -level revenue for the covered commodity 
falls below the rolling average benchmark; PLC provides payments when the national average price 
for the covered commodity falls below the statutory reference price for that commodity. In both 
cases, payments, if triggered, are made on 85% of base acres of the covered commodity. ARC -IC 
election automatically covered all historical base on a farm. ARC -IC provides payments when a farm's 
total revenue for all covered commodi ties on the farm falls below the farm's benchmark. Payments, 
if triggered, are made on 65% of base acres. While the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 included 
minor changes (e.g. with respect to program election options and payment formulas), the PLC and  
ARC program continue to operate as a safety -net program for U.S. farmers.  
 
WT/TPR/S/434, Page  204, 4.69  
 
The OECD considers the U.S. emphasis on insurance and risk management to be a useful tool to 
assist producers in times of need. However, a move toward s whole -farm revenue coverage, and less 
resort to commodity -specific insurance, would better exploit differences in yield and price 
fluctuations across products, and remove distortions in their production. Risk management 
instruments should also be evaluat ed to ensure that the public budget does not needlessly carry 
risks that should be borne by farmers. Voluntary conservation programs appear to be effective in 
addressing soil erosion and water pollution but could be better leveraged to improve natural haza rd 
risk management ex-ante and more resilient recovery in the aftermath of disasters. It will also be 
important for the United  States to ensure that the recent resort to ad hoc support against market 
shocks and natural disasters does not become entrenched.  Finally, the resolution of current trade 
uncertainties would ease farmers' pursuit of market opportunities.  
 
QUESTION 21:  Can the U.S. provide the details about the governmental support against market 
shocks and natural disasters in the agricultural secto r? 
 
RESPONSE 21:  The United  States has included information about assistance to farmers in response 
to market shocks and natural disasters in its annual domestic support notifications. For example, in 
G/AG/N/USA/166, the United  States included expenditures  under the Market Facilitation Program 
(MFP) and the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP). Both the MFP and CFAP programs are 
no longer in effect and notified expenditures will eventually reduce to zero. CFAP was a temporary 
program designed to minim ize the negative economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture, 
while MFP was a temporary program designed to help assist producers with meeting the additional 
costs associated with disrupted markets for commodities targeted by retaliatory tariffs. Also , in 
G/AG/N/USA/166, page  6 includes a section on payments for relief from natural disasters.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTIONS BASED ON GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/434)  
 
WT/TPR/G/434, Page  10, 3.18  
 
The United  States will continue using our enforcement tools to ensure that our trading partners 
deliver on their commitments and that U.S. agricultural producers receive the benefits negotiated in 
existing FTAs. The United  States supports U.S. farmers by insisting that trading partners implement 
fair and science -based policies fo r U.S. agriculture products, including those grown and developed 
through innovative technologies, in order to ensure that U.S. farmers can continue supplying safe, 
nutritious and cost -competitive food and agricultural products around the world.  
 
QUESTION 2 2: Please provide information on sanitary and phytosanitary measures imposed on 
commodities like fresh or chilled vegetables.  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The United  States has issued 141  SPS notifications covering fresh or chilled 
vegetables. Further information on these notifications is available on e -Ping and we are available to 
answer follow -up questions on specific notifications of interest.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  INDONESIA  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
SUMMARY  
 
Page  14, Paragraph  18 
 
During the rev iew period, the United  States continued to actively notify its proposed and adopted 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures in the respective 
WTO Committees. The private sector leads the development of voluntary cons ensus standards 
(VCS), which are based on needs or concerns identified by industry, government, and consumers. 
Technical regulations can be established at the federal or sub -federal level and rely heavily on VCS 
developed by the private sector making them mandatory by reference. When developing technical 
regulations, government agencies are requested to ensure that imported goods are treated no less 
favorably than like domestic products. Regarding SPS  requirements, the adoption of equivalence 
determinations  for food products, the issuance of a regulation regarding laboratory accreditation, 
and a further digitalization of procedures, including the exchange of electronic phytosanitary 
certificates, were the main developments during the review period.  
 
QUESTION  1: Regarding to the market access of our fresh pineapples, could United  States explain 
the latest development of the public hearing process of Pest Risk Assessment by the Animal & Plant 
Health Inspection Service, U.S Department of Agriculture (APHIS USDA) , which should have been 
completed in 2021?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  APHIS has prepared a notice, not yet published, that will advise the public that the 
United  States has prepared a pest risk analysis that evaluates the risks associated with the 
importation of fresh pineapple fruit from Indonesia into the United  States.  
 
QUESTION 2:  How the United  States could further facilitate in opening market access of Indonesian 
fresh pineapple? What is the main reason behind the lack of substantial progress on this matter, 
considering Indonesia has initiated the process since 2017?  
 
RESPONSE 2: The United  States utilizes a non -discriminatory regulatory process to assess and 
grant market access requests for new products from trading partners. The United  States appreciates 
Indonesia's continued engagement in on -going bilateral trading i ssues.  
 
Page  15, Paragraph  25 
 
The financial services sector is a substantial contributor to the U.S. economy, accounting for some 
8.5% of GDP in 2021. The United  States continued to run a significant surplus in trade in financial 
services during the perio d under review. As of end -2021, there were 2,129 "large" commercial banks 
in the United  States, each with consolidated assets of USD  300 million or more. At the same date, 
total banking system assets were USD  21.6 trillion. The United  States is the largest  insurance 
market in the world, with net insurance premiums that amounted to USD  1.28 trillion in 2020. U.S. 
financial markets were strongly impacted by the onset of the COVID -19 pandemic. The Federal 
Reserve responded by adopting temporary measures such a s the reduction of the primary credit 
rate by 150  basis points to 0.25%, and a reduction of the reserve requirement ratios to 0% effective 
in March  2020. It also encouraged banks to use their capital and liquidity buffers. Measures to 
support credit alloca tion were also put in place.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Could the United  States explain how effective were the reductions of the primary 
credit rate and the reserve requirement to boost loan growth during the pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The Federal Reserve took a broad range of actions  to directly support the flow of 
credit in the economy and to promote the stability of the financial system at the onset of the 
pandemic. These actions, taken together, helped support businesses large and small, non -profits, 
and state and local governments. More information on the Federal Reserve's response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic can be found at: https://www.federalreser<ve.gov/covid -19.htm . 
 
QUESTION 4:  What is United  States' plan on those temporary measures, with regar d to the 
transition to post -pandemic situation?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 4:  See Response to Question  3 and the latest FOMC statements at: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccal endars.htm . 
 
1.2.2. Fiscal Policy  
Page  22, Box  1.1, The CARES Act  
Title IV-Economic Stabilization and Assistance to Severely Distressed Sectors of the 
United  States Economy  
 
Community bank assistance: The Act required federal banking agencies by interim fi nal rule to 
temporarily reduce the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) for qualifying community banks to 
8%. 
 
QUESTION 5:  Based on our understanding, Federal Banking Agencies are comprised of OCC, the 
Fed, and FDIC. With regard to the relaxation of CBLR u nder the CARES Act, could the United  States 
elaborate more on the coordination and decision -making process between these agencies?  
 
RESPONSE 5: On 6 April 2020 the federal bank regulatory agencies (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) 
jointly announced two interim final rules to provide temporary relief to community banking 
organizations. The agencies acted to implement Section  4012 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,  and 
Economic Security Act, which required the agencies to temporarily lower the community bank 
leverage ratio  from 9% to 8%  in 2020.  The ratio moved  to 8.5% for calendar year 2021, and 9% 
thereafter. The rules can be accessed at:  
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/04/23/2020 -07449/regulatory -capital -rule-
temporary -changes -to-the-community -bank-leverage -ratio-framework  and 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/0 4/23/2020 -07448/regulatory -capital -rule-
transition -for-the-community -bank-leverage -ratio-framework . 
 
1.2.3 Monetary policy  
Page  29, Paragraph  1.29 
 
Also in response to the crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced facilities to support the flow of credit, 
in some cases backed by the Treasury using funds appropriated under the CARES Act 
(Section  4.4.1). The Federal Reserve and the other two federal banking supervisors encouraged 
depository institutions to use their capital and liquidity buffers to lend and rela xed some accounting 
rules so that COVID -19-related loan modifications would not be classified as troubled debt 
restructurings. This was implemented together with other regulatory reporting relief and relaxation 
of accounting standards to allow credit insti tutions more room to maneuver. Furthermore, holdings 
of U.S. Treasury securities and deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks were temporarily excluded 
from the calculation of the supplementary leverage ratio for holding companies. The Community 
Bank Leverage  Ratio was temporarily lowered to 8%.  
 
QUESTION 6:  With regard to the COVID -19-related loan modifications (with some relaxed 
accounting rules), could the United  States clarify whether the modification is to record loan as 
"current" after the loan restructu ring process?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  For regulatory reporting purposes, past due status is governed by the contractual 
terms of a loan, or if modified, the modified terms of the loan. When a payment deferral has resulted 
in a modification of the loan's payment terms, the financial institution would generally "freeze" the 
loan's past due status during the deferral period. Upon the loan exiting the deferral period, the 
institution would determine the loan's past due status in accordance with the revised lo an terms.  
Additional related FAQs can be accessed at:  https://www.federalreserve.gov/covid -19-supervisory -
regulatory -faqs.htm . 
 
QUESTION 7:  Is there any requirement for  the modification of COVID -19-related loan or all debtors' 
loan are entitled to the rules?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The CARES Act created a forbearance program for federally backed mortgage loans, 
protected borrowers from negative credit reporting due to loan accommodations related to the 
National Emergency, and provided financial institutions the option to temporarily suspend certain 
requirements under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) related to troubled debt 
restructurings (TDR) for a limi ted period of time to account for the effects of COVID -19. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 355 - 
 
  To be an eligible loan under for Loan Modifications Section  4013 of the CARES Act, a loan 
modification must be (1)  related to COVID -19; (2)  executed on a loan that was not more than 
30 days past du e as of 31  December  2019; and (3)  executed between 1  March  2020, and the earlier 
of (A)  60 days after the date of termination of the National Emergency or (B)  31 December  2020 
(applicable period). See:  Interagency Statement on Loan Modifications and Report ing for Financial 
Institutions Working  with Customers  Affected  by the Coronavirus  (Revised)  of 7 April 2020,  
at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pre ssreleases/files/bcreg20200407a1.pdf . 
 
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
Page  41, Paragraph  2.18 
 
In the area of dispute settlement, the United  States' participation, as measured by the number of 
cases it has filed as a complainant, declined significantly during the review period compared to 
previous periods. The United  States raised 2  complaints, was a respondent in 8  cases, was involved 
in 2 active arbitrations, appealed 6  cases to the Appellate  Body, and exercised thir d-party rights in 
29 cases (Table  A2.1). In the DSB, the United  States continued to raise its systemic concerns with 
Appellate  Body overreach.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Regarding the informal meeting aims to discuss dispute settlement system initiated 
by the U.S. in Ge neve, Indonesia seeks your clarification on the expected outcome of this meeting?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The United  States believes that the first step towards reform is to better understand 
the interests of all Members in WTO  dispute settlement. An approach centere d on the interests of 
Members can facilitate greater mutual understanding without resorting to the same positions that 
have slowed the reform discussion for many years. The United  States is not prejudging what this 
reformed system would look like, and we h ave asked other Members to likewise approach the 
conversation with an open mind.  We believe this approach  - working collectively towards a system 
that meets the needs of all Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving 
durable, lasting reform.  
 
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
Page  42, Paragraph  2.20 
 
In a statement in October  2021 about the WTO, the USTR confirmed the United  States' continued 
commitment to the WTO and recognized its importance. Emphasis was placed on the core values of 
the WTO as noted in the Marrakesh Declaration, achieving meaningful outcomes at MC12, engaging 
in productive conversations on WTO  reform, and revitalizing the WTO's negotiating function. The 
USTR also stated that reforming the three pillars of the WTO  - monitoring, negotiations, and dispute 
settlement  - required a commitment to transparency, and encouraged Members to work together to 
find acceptable solutions to increasingly difficult global issues.  
 
QUESTION 9:  We seek your views on what kind of revitalization of the WTO's negotiation function 
that the U .S. wants to restore the member trust in WTO as a multilateral trading system?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  To be viable as a negotiating forum, the WTO must be a venue where interested 
Members can work to gether to negotiate solutions to shared challenges. We look forward to an 
inclusive and open conversation among Members to discuss reforms that might achieve that end.  
 
QUESTION 10:  Are revitalizing for negotiations referring to seeking the solution of a s ingle 
undertaking approach or integrating plurilateral agreement in the WTO  framework?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  In our view, revitalizing the WTO's negotiating function is about deliberating and 
undertaking reforms so that the WTO is a relevant venue for interested M embers to negotiate 
meaningful solutions to shared challenges.  
 
QUESTION 11:  What are the U.S.'s strategies in carrying out its commitment to work towards 
having a well -functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all members by 2024 as mandated 
by MC12?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 356 - 
 
  RESPONSE 11:  The United  States believes that the first step towards reform is to better understand 
the interests of all Members in WTO dispute settlement. An approach centered on the interests of 
Members can facilitate greater mutual understanding without resorting to the same positions that 
have slowed the reform discussion for many years. The United  States is not prejudging what this 
reformed system would look like, and we have asked other Members to likewise approach the 
conversation with an open mind. We believe thi s approach  - working collectively towards a system 
that meets the needs of all Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving 
durable, lasting reform.  
 
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.2.2 Unilateral preferences  
Page  45, Paragrap h 2.31 
 
The U.S. GSP Program is the United  States' longest -running preference program and provides the 
majority of the preferential imports into the United  States; however, it expired on 
31 December  2020. New legislation has been proposed to reinstate the GSP, but to date 
(January  2022) it has not been approved. Prior to the expiry of the GSP, USTR initiated a new 
process where it assesses each GSP beneficiary country's compliance with the statutory criteria on 
a triennial basis to improve monitoring and en forcement. For example, in 2020 there were 
10 country eligibility reviews in progress to examine, inter alia, workers rights' issues, child labor, 
arbitral awards, market access, IPR protection and enforcement. The main resulting changes during 
this reporting period were the loss of beneficiary status for certain countries, the reduction of the 
scope of benefits for certain beneficiary countries by the removal of certain eligible tariff lines, and 
restored eligibility in certain cases (Table  2.3). The re have also been certain changes regarding the 
general coverage of GSP eligible products. In 2020, fresh cut roses were added to the list of eligible 
products and parboiled rice was removed.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Regarding Table  2.3, there is redesignated 3  produ cts (Indonesia and Thailand), 
and the removal of GSP eligibility for 2  products. Could the United  States elaborate on which 
Indonesia product should be redesignated and remove GSP eligibility?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  
 
Product Redesignations:  
In 2018, (based on 2017 trade data), the following products were petitioned for redesignation for 
Indonesia: Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) code  2909.50.40, Odoriferous or flavoring compounds 
of ether -phenols, ether -alcohol -phenols & their halogenated, sulfonated, nitrated, nitro sated 
derivatives; and HTS  code 4412.31.41, Plywood sheets n/o 6mm thick, with specified tropical wood 
outer ply, with face ply nesoi, not surface covered beyond clear/transparent. The petitions were not 
granted and therefore these products from Indonesia remain ineligible under GSP. 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/11/15/2018 -24919/results -of-the-20172018 -
annual -generalized -system -of-preferences -review . 
In 2019 (based on 2018 trade data), the following products from Indonesia were redesignated and 
therefore became eligible again for benefits under GSP: HTS  44121005 plywood, veneered panels 
and similar laminated wood, of bamboo; 44123141  plywood sheets n/o 6mm thick, with specified 
tropical wood outer ply, with face ply nesoi, not surface covered beyond clear/transparent; and 
HTS 44187340 assembled flooring panels of bamboo, other than for mos aic, multilayer, having a 
face ply more than 6mm in thickness. 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/ 2019/11/20/2019 -25095/results -of-the-2019-annual -
generalized -system -of-preferences -review . 
 
Product Removals:  
In 2019 (based on 2018 trade data), the following product from Indonesia was removed from GSP 
for exceeding the competitive need limitation (CNL):  stearic acid (HTS  3823.11.00). 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/20/2019 -25095/results -of-the-2019-annual -
generalized -system -of-preferences -review . 
In 2020 (based on 2019 trade data), the following product from Indonesia was removed from GSP 
for exceeding the competition need limitation: HTS  code 7113.19.29, gold necklaces and neck chains 
(o/than of rope or mixed links). 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/GSP%20Annual%20Product%20Review %2
0-%20Final%20Decisions.pdf . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 357 - 
 
  QUESTION 13:  Are insulated ignition wiring sets for vehicles (also known as "wiring harnesses") G 
(HTS 8544.3000) still considered to be redesignated?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  HTS 8544.3000, insulated ignition wiring sets for vehicles from eligible under GSP.  
 
2.4 Investment Regime  
Investment restrictions  
2.4.3.2 Table  2.7 Foreign investment restrictions, 2022  
 
 
 
QUESTION 14:  Could the United  States share the rationale of having this provision in place and 
how long is the term of this restriction?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act) was enacted to limit the 
expansion of banking institutions into nonban king activities. A bank holding company was defined 
in the BHC Act as an entity that owned or controlled 25% or more of the voting shares of two or 
more banks; companies owning only one bank were exempted from regulation under the BHC Act.  
During the 1960s , the number of commercial enterprises that purchased one bank, engaged in 
nonbanking activities, and remained exempt from regulation grew dramatically. As a result of this 
change in the structure of bank ownership, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Compan y Act 
Amendments of 1970. Of these amendments, the most significant is the extension of the act to grant 
to the Federal Reserve Board the authority to regulate the activities of one -bank holding companies.  
In 1978, Congress passed the International Banking Act (IBA). Section  8 of the IBA expanded the 
nonbanking prohibitions of the BHC Act to foreign banks that engage in the business of banking in 
the United  States directly through a branch or agency or indirectly through a subsidiary co mmercial 
lending company. This expanded the nonbanking restrictions beyond simply covering foreign banks 
that own or control U.S. banks or bank holding companies. However, a bank holding company has 
greater leeway to perform nonbanking activities abroad th an in the United  States in that it may 
engage in nonbanking activities abroad that would not be permissible in the United  States, subject 
to certain limitations.  
As the primary regulator for bank holding companies and their directly held nonbank subsidiari es, 
the Federal Reserve System conducts inspections of their operations, financial condition, and 
compliance with appropriate banking and other related statutes and regulations. For more 
information, please see the Federal Reserve System's website at: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/foreign -banking -organizations.htm . 
 
3.3. Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.4 Competition policy  
Page  143, Paragraph  3.273  
 
In the period between FY2018 and FY2021, DOJ initiated 187  Sherman  Act 1 (restraint of trade 
investigations), 10  Sherman  Act 2 (monopolistic practices), 271  Clayton Act investigations, and 
228 HSR investigations, out of a total of 9,364 pre -merger notifications received (2.4% of the total). 
During FY2021, when 3,527 transactions were reported under the HSR Act (Table  3.27), a 
substantial increase compared to the FY2020, the Antitrust Division challenged 11 merger 
transactions. The mergers cha llenged by DOJ in FY2020 were in a variety of industries, including 
healthcare, defense, financial services, food, commercial vehicle manufacturing, and education. The 
DOJ resolved horizontal and vertical concerns raised by the merger of United Technologie s 
Corporation and Raytheon Company by requiring the parties to divest three separate business units, 
while competitive concerns raised by the proposed acquisition by Communications and Power 
Industries LLC's of General Dynamics SATCOM Technologies Inc. wer e resolved by divestment. 
Another prominent case was the divestiture in a banking merger between BB&T Corporation and 
SunTrust Banks Inc. that would have substantially lessened competition in seven markets for retail 
banking and/or small business banking. The banks agreed to divest 28 branches in 3 different states 
with approximately USD  2.3 billion in deposits.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Could the United  States elaborate on the analytical process that led to banking 
merger?  
 
WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 358 - 
 
  RESPONSE 15:  The order and basis for approva l of the banking merger between BB&T Corporation  
and SunTrust  Banks  Inc. can be found  on the FDIC website:  https://www.fdic.gov/news/press -
releases/2019/pr19111a.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 16: Was the merger encouraged or ordered by authority, and on what regulatory basis?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  The merger was privately negotiated by the parties.  
 
4 Trade Policies by Sector  
4.1 Agr iculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3 Fisheries  
Page  213, Paragraph  4.96 
 
The U.S. fisheries sector comprises marine, inland, and aquaculture sources of fish and seafood. The 
marine sector, including nearshore and coastal fisheries, benefits from the largest Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world  - 13,000 miles of coastline and 3.4  million square nautical miles 
of ocean  - thus marine capture fishing remains the dominant source of fish for the United  States. 
The sector has shared competencies betwee n federal, state, and territorial governments. The 
nearshore, defined as 3  nautical miles of the shoreline, is under state/territorial jurisdiction, whereas 
coastal waters, defined beyond the 3  nautical miles to the limit of the EEZ at 200  nautical miles f rom 
the coast is under federal control, specifically, the National Marine Fisheries Service, within USDOC's 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), hereinafter NOAA Fisheries. U.S. states 
also have jurisdiction over much of the Great Lakes and other inland freshwater lakes (there are 
some 250), as well as over regulation of parts of the aquaculture sector.  
 
Page  221, Paragraph  4.121  
 
In its annual notification to the WTO pursuant to Article  XVI: 1 of GATT  1994 and Article  25 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the United  States notified eight programs in 
the fisheries area (Table  4.13).  
 
QUESTION 17:  In the marine fisheries sector, the U.S. has shared competencies between three 
levels of government: i.e. federa l, state, and territorial governments. In light of this, Indonesia 
would like to seek more clarification from U.S. on:  
How can these three levels of government coordinate with each other? especially in providing 
subsidies for the fisheries sector.  
 
RESPONS E 17:  As noted above, waters up to 3  nautical miles (nm) seaward from the baseline are 
largely under state/territorial jurisdiction, whereas the federal government largely has primary 
jurisdiction in U.S. waters from 3nm to out to 200nm, and over U.S. vess els fishing in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, specifically, the National Marine Fisheries Service, within USDOC's National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  
NOAA works with interstate fisheries commissions to manage shared coastal fishery  resources and 
collect data. NOAA also works closely with state and territory partners to collect data, conserve fish 
habitat, assess the status of stocks, and implement effective management programs to ensure the 
sustainability of U.S. fisheries.  
 
QUESTIO N 18:  Is there any overlapping policy in providing subsidies among those levels of 
government? If so, how does The U.S. manage this?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  Details concerning the policy objective and/or purpose of each program referenced 
in Paragraph  4.121 of the S ecretariat's Report can be found in the most recent subsidies notification 
of the United  States (G/SCM/N/372/USA).  
 
QUESTION 19:  The required WTO subsidies notification, is there any practical problem faced by 
these three levels of government in obtaining subsidies data or information for the needs of 
notifications?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The collection of information at multiple levels of government can be challenging 
and takes a significant amount of time, resources, communication, and cooperation. However, over 
time, procedures have been established by the federal government that are now well -known, 
expected, and accepted. Nonetheless, challenges remain. For example, getting complete budget WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 359 - 
 
  information for all programs and capturing new programs in a timely manner remains difficult. 
However, as noted in the Secretariat's report, sustained efforts at the federal level of government 
over many years have led to the notification of nearly 750  sub-central programs in the latest 
notification of the United  States.  
 
QUESTION 20:  If so, how does the U.S. manage to get the data or information?  
 
RESPONSE 20: See answer above.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
3 Advancing a worker -centered trade policy  
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promot ing Sustainable Environmental Practices  
Page 9, Paragraph  3.12 
 
In addition, in June  2022, the United  States joined other WTO  Members to reach agreement on the 
first multilateral trade agreement with environment at its core  - the WTO  Agreement on Fisheries  
Subsidies. The Agreement prohibits subsidies to those engaged in illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing or fishing related activities in support of IUU fishing, subsidies for fishing 
on overfished stocks, and subsidies for fishing on the unreg ulated high seas. It also includes 
enhanced transparency provisions, which will provide important additional information regarding 
Members' fisheries and subsidies programs. Negotiations will continue in order to reach agreement 
on additional disciplines o n subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. The 
United  States is committed to working with all WTO members to ensure this agreement promptly 
enters into force, and to further enhance the disciplines, to improve the sustainability of our fi sheries 
resources and the lives of fishers.  
 
QUESTION 21:  The WTO  Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, adopted at the 
12th Ministerial  Conference (MC12) on June  2022, marks a major step forward for ocean 
sustainability. The Agreement are the first WTO agreement to focus on the environment. 
Nevertheless, the negotiation will continue to achieve a Comprehensive Agreement. In light of that, 
Indonesia would like to seek The United  States views on:  
U.S.'s view on the Agreement (Ministerial Decision No WT /MIN(22)/33)?; and.  
 
RESPONSE 21:  The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies is the first multilateral trade agreement with 
environmental sustainability at its core and an important step in disciplining harmful fisheries 
subsidies. It contains several important disciplines, including prohibitions on granting or maintaining 
fisheries subsidies to: vessels or operators engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing or fishing related activities in support of IUU fishing; fishing or fishing related ac tivities 
regarding stocks that are overfished; and fishing or fishing related activities on the unregulated high 
seas. The Agreement also includes robust transparency requirements aimed at strengthening WTO 
Members' notifications of fisheries subsidies and  enabling effective surveillance of the 
implementation of the obligations in the Agreement.  
 
QUESTION 22:  U.S.'s view on the future negotiations? Especially on the issue of overfishing and 
overcapacity, as well as special and differential treatment.  
 
RESPONSE 22:  At MC12, WTO  Members committed to continue negotiations to build on the 
Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies with additional disciplines on fisheries subsidies that contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing. The United  States continue s to urge Members to support additional, 
ambitious disciplines to discipline harmful fisheries subsidies, including subsidies that contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing. The United  States also continues to urge Members to support greater 
transparency with respect to the use of forced labor on fishing vessels.  
 
5.5 Other Initiatives  
5.5.3 United  States -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  
Page  26, paragraph  5.76 
 
The United  States continued to work under the auspices of the United  States -ASEAN TIFA to further 
enhance economic ties between the United  States and ASEAN, which collectively represents the 
United  States' fourth largest trading partner. At the annual ASEAN Economic Ministers -USTR 
Consultations in September  2021, the United  States an d ASEAN agreed to enhance cooperation on 
labor, environment, and SMEs. The United  States is also continuing cooperation with ASEAN on WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 360 - 
 
  digital trade, intellectual property, standards, competition, trade facilitation, and agriculture 
biotechnology.  
 
QUESTION  23: Based on the Government Report Sub -Chapter 5.5.3 stated that the United  States 
and ASEAN agreed to boost cooperation in the labor and employment sector. Are there any 
developments related to the cooperation that has been carried out between ASEAN and the 
United  States?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The United  States and ASEAN organized a second ASEAN -U.S. Trade and Labor 
Dialogue on 22  March  2022 with the ASEAN senior economic and labor officials. The dialogue 
addressed the importance of upholding worker rights throug h trade agreements; the role of tripartite 
and bipartite dialogues to promoting inclusive growth and business competitiveness; and policies 
that support workforce development and social protections in the digital economy.  
 
QUESTION 24:  In addition, can Ind onesia carry out bilateral cooperation directly with the 
United  States in the field of placement and protection of Indonesian migrant workers?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospecti ve exercises.  
 
QUESTION 25:  Is there any job opportunity for Indonesian Migrant Workers to fill the gap on health 
sector (nurse or caregiver), construction sector (welder), art sector, mechanical sector and 
hospitality sector (crew land -based cruise)?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 26:  The Government of Indonesia regulates the ability of Indonesian migrant workers 
to work in placement countries that have regulations that protect foreign workers, as well as social 
security or insurance that protects foreign workers. Could you please provide us with the U .S. Law 
and Regulations governing the protection of foreign workers, along with brief summary?  
 
RESP ONSE 26:  Please find information regarding U.S. laws and regulations for non -immigrant 
workers  in the following  links:  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h1b ; 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h2b ; and https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/agri
culture/h2a/final -rule. 
 
5.4 Free Trade Agreem ents and Initiatives  
5.5.10 Indo -Pacific Economic Framework  
Page  28, Paragraph  5.92 
 
The United  States will use this framework to address a range of important areas of economic 
cooperation, including: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and 
tax and anti -corruption. USTR will lead efforts to craft a trade arrangement that includes 
high-standard commitments in the following areas: labor; environment; digital and emerging 
technology; agriculture; transpar ency and good regulatory practices; competition policy; and trade 
facilitation. The U.S. Department of Commerce will lead U.S. efforts to expand cooperation on supply 
chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and tax and anti -corruption.  
 
QUESTION 27:  What is the main purpose of the establishment of IPEF in the context of trade, 
especially on the market access?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  The IPEF will advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, 
fairness, and competitiveness for o ur economies. Through IPEF, the partners aim to contribute to 
cooperation, stability, prosperity, development, and peace within the region. The Framework will 
also offer tangible benefits that fuel economic activity and investment, promote sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth, and benefit workers and consumers across the region. For more 
information, see:  https://u str.gov/trade -agreements/agreements -under -negotiation/indo -pacific -
economic -framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
QUESTION 28:  What is the main concern of United  States in the Trade Pillar?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 361 - 
 
  RESPONSE 28:  In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministe rial Statements on all four IPEF 
pillars. The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future negotiations. 
Please see here for more information: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -
09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEAS
E%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 29:  How the United  States will utilize IPEF in delivering concrete outcomes to its 
Indo-Pacific partners?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  The IPEF will advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, 
fairness, and competitiveness for our economies. Through IPEF, the partners aim to co ntribute to 
cooperation, stability, prosperity, development, and peace within the region. The Framework will 
also offer tangible benefits that fuel economic activity and investment, promote sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth, and benefit workers and  consumers across the region. For more 
information, see: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/agreements -under -negotiat ion/indo -pacific -
economic -framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
QUESTION 30:  How the United  States ensure IPEF will not overlap with commitments in other 
multilateral fora, including WTO?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministeri al Statements on all four IPEF 
pillars. The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future negotiations, 
including a commitment to build upon the rules -based multilateral trading system. Please see here 
for more information:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -
09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20P UBLIC%20RELEAS
E%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 31:  Could the United  States thoroughly explain the legally binding aspects of IPEF?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises. In September  2022, IPEF Partners  released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF pillars. 
The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future negotiations. Please see 
here for  more information:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -
09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEAS
E%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 32:  If the negotiation cannot be finished by the end of current presidency era and turns 
out the other party is elected, what will be the status of the IPEF?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
7 UNITED  STATES PREFERENCE PROGRAMS  
7.1 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)  
Page  34, Paragraph  7.2 
 
USTR makes recommendations to the President regarding which countries are eligible for benefits 
based on beneficiary countries' compliance w ith the 15  GSP eligibility criteria established by 
Congress. These criteria include, but are not limited to: taking steps to respect internationally 
recognized worker rights, providing the United  States with equitable and reasonable market access, 
reducing  trade -distorting investment practices, providing adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property (IP) rights to U.S. rights holders, and enforcing arbitral awards in favor of U.S. 
citizens or corporations. In 2018, USTR implemented a new monito ring process that assesses all 
GSP beneficiaries' compliance with all eligibility criteria on a triennial basis. During the reporting 
period, USTR and the GSP Subcommittee assessed GSP beneficiary countries in the 
Western  Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle  East, North  Africa, and Sub -Saharan  Africa.  
 
QUESTION 33:  The U .S. government c.q. USTR has approved a Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) facility extension for Indonesia by November  2020. However, the extension has yet to be 
authorized by the Congress, two years after the decision. What is the main reason behind this delay?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 362 - 
 
  RESPONSE 33:  The U.S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GSP and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program.  
 
5.6 Other Trade Activit ies 
5.6.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (Including China -Related 301)  
Page  30, Paragraph  5.101  
 
An important additional avenue for bilateral engagement is USTR's annual Special  301 Report and 
the related Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. Pursuant to statute, USTR 
must identify those countries that deny adequate and effective protection for IP rights or deny fair 
and equitable market access for persons that rely on IP protection, which may lead to designation 
as a "Priority Foreign Country". In addition, USTR created a Special  301 "Priority Watch List" (PWL) 
and "Watch List" (WL), placement on which indicates that particular problems exist in the listed 
country with respect to IP protection, enforcement, or market access for persons relying on IP. 
Countries placed on the PWL receive increased attention in bilateral discussions with the 
United  States concerning the identified problem areas. USTR develops an action plan for each foreign 
country identified on the PWL f or at least one year. USTR also conducts an annual Review of 
Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy focused on online and physical marketplaces that 
reportedly engage in or facilitate substantial piracy or counterfeiting.  
 
QUESTION 34:  After numbe rs of consultations and discussions with the United  States, Indonesia 
remains on the Priority Watch List (PWL) on the Special  301 Report, despite the various progressive 
measures undertaken by US -Indonesia IP Task Force. Could the United  States explain the  concrete 
steps to assist the removal of states from the PWL?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  The Special  301 Report listings and actions are the result of intensive deliberations 
among all relevant agencies within the U.S. Government, informed by extensive consultations wi th 
participating stakeholders, foreign governments, the U.S. Congress, and other interested parties.  
USTR, together with the Special  301 Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), 
conducts a broad and balanced assessment of U.S. trading partn ers' IP protection and enforcement, 
as well as related market access issues affecting IP -intensive industries, in accordance with the 
statutory criteria. The Special  301 Subcommittee, through the TPSC, provides advice on country 
placement to USTR based on this assessment. This assessment is conducted on a case -by-case 
basis, taking into account diverse factors such as a trading partner's level of development, its 
international obligations and commitments, the concerns of right holders and other interested 
parties, and the trade and investment policies of the United  States. It is informed by the various 
cross-cutting issues and trends identified in Section  I. Each assessment is based upon the specific 
facts and circumstances that shape IP protection and enfor cement in a particular trading partner.  
 
QUESTION 35:  In regards to the inclusion of Indonesian marketplaces in the Notorious Market List, 
Indonesia marketplaces are ready to work together in the system improvement to detect counterfeit 
products. Could the  United  States also explain the next steps to support Indonesian marketplaces 
in the eradicating counterfeit products being sold on e -commerce platforms?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  The Notorious Markets List identifies prominent and illustrative examples of online 
and physical markets in which pirated or counterfeit goods and services reportedly are available or 
that facilitate, turn a blind eye to, or benefit from substantial piracy and counterfeiting. It does not 
constitute a legal finding of a violation or an analysi s of the general IP protection and enforcement 
environment in any country or economy. The NML is not an exhaustive inventory of all notorious 
markets around the world. Markets on the NML are drawn from the many nominations received as 
well as other input, such as from U.S. embassies, in order to highlight prominent examples of both 
online and physical markets where pirated or counterfeit goods and services reportedly are trafficked 
to the detriment of legitimate trade in IP -intensive goods and services.  
Owners and operators of notorious markets that are willing to address counterfeiting and piracy 
have many options for doing so. Such owners and operators can, for example, adopt business models 
that rely on the licensed distribution of legitimate content a nd can negotiate appropriate licenses 
with right holders. If an otherwise legitimate business has become a platform for piracy or 
counterfeiting, the owner or operator can work with right holders and law enforcement officials to 
help discourage and curtail  acts of infringement. Industry groups have developed a variety of best 
practices that can help combat counterfeiting and piracy. In the absence of good faith efforts, 
responsible government authorities should investigate reports of piracy and counterfeiti ng in these 
and similar markets and pursue appropriate action against such markets and their owners and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 363 - 
 
  operators. Governments should also ensure that appropriate enforcement tools are at the disposal 
of right holders and government authorities, which may require closing loopholes that permit 
operators to evade enforcement actions.  
Many e -commerce and social commerce platforms file public submissions during the NML process 
that describe how they are implementing some common anti -counterfeiting practices and  creating 
innovative tools and processes to combat the global trade in counterfeit goods. Other submissions, 
such as those by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Apparel & Footwear Association, 
identify best practices for e -commerce platforms to implement. As e -commerce platforms and 
industry associations become more transparent and forward -leaning with their anti -counterfeiting 
practices, an opportunity exists to collaboratively establish industry best practices, create standard 
counterfeit -related measurements, and find ways to counteract the ever -changing methods of those 
that manufacture, distribute, and sell counterfeit goods. Reducing counterfeit goods across the 
Internet should be viewed as an industry -wide goal.  
 
QUESTION 36:  As you may rec all from our Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 
3 October  2014 related the retaliation of Clove Cigarette matter, we would like to reiterate the 
United  States' commitment to intensify negotiations through action plan on IPR for the purpose of 
achievin g improved protection and enforcement of IPR rights in Indonesia to support the removal of 
Indonesia in the Priority Watch List/Watch List in Special  301 Reports.  
 
RESPONSE 36:  The United  States has taken note of your statement.  
 
5 Trade Policy Developments Since 2018  
5.1 WTO  Agreement and Initiatives  
Page  15, Paragraph  5.4 
 
Another aspect of reform is the WTO's dispute settlement function. For many years, WTO  dispute 
settlement has not met the needs of WTO  Members, including the United  States, f or example, due 
to its complexity, delays, lack of transparency, and interpretive overreach. Many Members share 
U.S. concerns with the functioning of the system and its negative impact on the WTO's negotiating 
and monitoring functions. This fact underscore s the importance of understanding better the interests 
of all Members in dispute settlement. The United  States supports a reform discussion that aims to 
ensure that WTO dispute settlement reflects the real interests of Members. The United  States has 
been a nd will continue to be, engaging with Members with the aim of achieving durable, lasting 
reform.  
 
QUESTION 37:  For many years, WTO  dispute settlement has not met the needs of WTO  Members, 
including the United  States, for example, due to its complexity, del ays, lack of transparency, and 
interpretive overreach. Could the United  States explain what kind of WTO  dispute settlement the 
United  States wants in aiming at accommodating all interests of members, narrowing the negative 
impact in the short run and long run, achieving durable, and lasting reform?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  The United  States is not prejudging what the reformed system would look like  - and 
have asked other Members to likewise approach the conversation with an open mind. We believe 
this approach  - workin g collectively towards a system that meets the needs of all 
Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving durable, lasting reform.  
 
8. Trade and Environment  
Page  36, Paragraph  8.2 
 
In February  2022, the United  States launched consultatio ns with Mexico under the Environment 
Chapter Article  24.29.2 regarding Mexico's obligations to effectively enforce its fisheries -related 
laws, regulations, and other measures designed to prevent illegal fishing in the Upper Gulf of 
California, to prevent t rafficking of protected species such as the totoaba fish, and to protect and 
conserve the critically endangered vaquita porpoise. Through these consultations United  States is 
working closely with the Government of Mexico to strengthen Mexico's fisheries en forcement and 
ensure effective enforcement of USMCA environment commitments.  
 
QUESTION 38:  Would United  States give updates regarding dispute case of Vaquita Porpoise with 
Mexico?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 364 - 
 
  RESPONSE 38:  The USMCA consultations, as noted, were requested under USMCA Article  24.29.2 
Environment Consultations, not under Chapter  31 Dispute Settlement. As such, these are technical 
level consultations, not a dispute case. The United  States is continuing to work with the Government 
of Mexico with the aim of resolving throug h the consultations process the United  States' concerns 
related to the effective enforcement of USMCA environment commitments. There are multiple levels 
of consultations under USMCA Chapter  24 and, should those consultative steps fail to yield a 
satisfacto ry result, the USMCA also provides the option of moving to dispute settlement under 
Chapter 31.  
 
9. Small and Medium Business Trade  
Page  38, Paragraph  9.5 
 
For the first time in a U.S. trade agreement, the United  States included a dedicated chapter on SMEs 
in the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA), in recognition of the fundamental role of 
SMEs as engines of the North -American economy. The USMCA also contains key provisions 
supporting SMEs throughout the Agreement. The SME chapter promotes on going cooperation among 
the Parties to increase SME trade and investment opportunities. It establishes information -sharing 
tools that help SMEs better understand the benefits of the Agreement and provides other information 
useful for SMEs doing business in  the region. The chapter also established a committee on SME 
issues comprised of government officials from each country. The committee cooperated on webinars 
for small businesses and small business counselors, including fostering on underserved communities , 
in 2021 and 2022. Furthermore, the chapter launched a new framework for an ongoing SME 
Dialogue, which is open to participation by SMEs, including those owned by diverse and 
underrepresented groups. The Dialogue will enable participants to provide views and information to 
government officials on the implementation of the Agreement to help ensure that SMEs continue to 
benefit. The first USMCA SME Dialogue was convened in San Antonio, Texas in April  2022.  
 
QUESTION 39:  What kind of platform is information -sharing tools?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  USMCA information -sharing tools for SMEs may be found at the SBA Trade Tools 
for International Sales and the International Trade Administration websites.  
 
QUESTION 40:  What do the impacts of this platform?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  SMEs hav e access to trade data, market research, counseling services, trade finance 
and other resources to assist with their export plans to take advantage of USMCA.  
 
QUESTION 41:  Is it impacted positive? Please explain.  
 
RESPONSE 41:  Research shows that SMEs whic h export grow faster, add jobs faster, and pay higher 
wages than SMEs that serve purely domestic markets, benefitting communities across the 
United  States. Canada and Mexico are the top two export markets for U.S. SMEs.  
 
9. Small and Medium Business Trade  
Page  38-39, Paragraph  9.6 
 
SMEs also benefit from other obligations throughout the USMCA, including: (1)  cutting costs and red 
tape for customs and border procedures, (2)  supporting Internet enabled small businesses and 
electronic commerce exports; (3)  protecting the intellectual property of innovators; (4)  supporting 
cross-border trade in services for small business; and (5)  supporting small businesses through good 
regulatory practices to promote transparency and accountability when developing and implemen ting 
regulations.  
 
QUESTION 42:  SMEs get benefit from obligations in the USMCA such as cutting costs and red tape 
for customs and border procedures. Would you explain about this policy whether it is applied for all 
SMEs or only SMEs with certain criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  It is applied for all SMEs.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 365 - 
 
  PART III: GENERAL QUESTIONS  
 
Manpower  
 
On 31  October  2022, the Indonesian government sent an official letter to the U.S. Embassy in 
Jakarta regarding a "Petition Based Visa Information Request". The letter's aims to request a joint 
discussion on the issue of Visa  H2-A and H2 -B utilization. Due to a shortage of local workforce in the 
United  States, Indonesia wishes to be able to take advantage of the visa, and also hopes that 
Indonesian workers will be  able to fill these job openings. However, Indonesia is still required to use 
a petitioner because it has been excluded from the list of countries eligible for H2 -A and H2 -B visas 
since 2011.  
 
QUESTION 43:  In this regard, could the U.S. provide Indonesia w ith information on what criteria 
Indonesia must meet in order to be included in the list of countries eligible for H2 -A and H2 -B Visas?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  Information on country eligibility criteria for H -2A visas can be found in the "H -2A 
Eligible Countries Li st" section at:  https://www.uscis.gov/working -in-the-united -states/temporary -
workers/h -2a-temporary -agricultural -workers . 
Information o n country eligibility criteria for H -2B visas can be found in the "H -2B Eligible Countries 
List" section at:  https://www.uscis.gov/ working -in-the-united -states/temporary -workers/h -2b-
temporary -non-agricultural -workers . 
 
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT SUMMARY  
 
Page  11, Paragraph  5 
 
In 2021 the U.S. Administration put in place its "Build Back Better" agenda, which includes, inter alia, 
putting workers at the center of trade policy, tackling the COVID -19 pandemic, promoting a 
sustainable environment and climate path, promoting equitabl e economic growth around the world, 
and addressing main trading partners' economic trade practices through a comprehensive strategy. 
Recent legislation and initiatives have included the ARP  Act that provided funding for COVID -19 
vaccines and addressed medi cal supply chains, and several other initiatives that address supply 
chains more generally as well as critical infrastructure. In the WTO, the United  States continues to 
push a robust reform agenda that has focused on reinforcing the WTO's negotiating func tion and on 
systemic issues. The United  States has been active in making proposals in the fisheries subsidies 
and agriculture negotiations, as well as in its participation in the Joint Statement Initiatives and in 
the different WTO  committees.  
 
QUESTION 44 : Please explain the context and direction of the U.S. trade partnership.  
 
RESPONSE 44:  It is not clear which trade partnership is the subject of the question. For questions 
about the context and direction of U.S. trade policy, we invite Members to review the U.S. 
Government Report for this Trade Policy Review ( WT/TPR/G/434) , and the annual 2022 Trade Policy  
Agenda  of the President  of the United  States,  found  here:  
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20An
nual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 45:  Indonesia  has taken note of the G7's introduction of the Build Back Better World 
(B3W) initiative; could you please explain what the actual projects are and the role of infrastructure 
in the Asian region?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  The B3W initiative was informally relaunched i n June  2022 as the Partnership for 
Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). At the G20  Leaders'  Summit in November, 
President  Biden, Indonesian  President  Widodo, and European  Commission  President  Von der Leyen 
co-hosted a PGII  Side-Event. For more info rmation on PGII, please see: 
https: //www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -releases/2022/11/15/fact -sheet -
presidents -biden -widodo -von-der-leyen -and-g20-announce -g20-partnership -for-global -
infrastructure -and-investment -projects/ , https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -
releases/2022/11/15/united -states -indonesia -eu-joint-statement -on-partne rship-for-global -
infrastructure -and-investment/ , and https://www.white house.gov/briefing -room/speeches -
remarks/2022/11/15/remarks -by-president -biden -at-the-partnership -for-global -infrastructure -
and-investment -pgii-meeting/ . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.1 Prohibitions, restrictions, and quantit ative measures  
Page  78, Paragraph  3.59 
 
CBP is responsible for enforcing laws on behalf of other agencies that restrict or otherwise prohibit 
importation of a number of goods, often to protect human, animal, plant life and health, or to 
conserve exhaustibl e natural resources. As at March  2022, 32  categories of goods were subject to 
prohibitions or restrictions, most of which had been in force for many years (Table  A3.3). Many of 
the measures are codified in CBP statutes (19  C.F.R.  Part 12 - Special classes of merchandise), 
contained in various trade legislation, i.e. the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, or in legislation of 
other agencies, e.g. the Clean Air Act  91 A few new measures were put in place or amended during 
the review period.  
 
QUESTION 46:  What criteria are used to classify a product as being subject to import prohibitions 
and restrictions?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The criteria used to identify a product as being subject to import prohibitions and 
restrictions are typically established by the U.S. government agency that regulates the product and 
are often provided in regulations or other guidance materials. There are a range of criteria employed, 
including the HS classification of the product.  
 
QUESTION 47:  Under what conditions can the government m odify import prohibitions and 
restrictions for each of the 32  product categories?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  The conditions to modify import prohibitions and restrictions are a function of the 
underlying import prohibition or restriction. Prohibitions and restrictions set out in statute may be 
modified by changes to a statute. Modifications to regulations made by made by agencies according 
to processes described in the original report.  
 
QUESTION 48:  How does the U.S. view the consistency of the import restriction and pr ohibition 
measures with GATT Article  XI:I on Quantitative Restrictions?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  The United  States has various laws or provisions that allow for quantitative 
restrictions or prohibitions on imported products. These are often maintained to protect the security 
or economy of the United  States, or safeguard the health or well -being of plant or animal life. The 
import restrictions and prohibition measures maintained by the United  States are consistent with 
WTO obligations, including GATT Article  XI: I. 
 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures  
Page  81, Paragraph  3.71 
 
The main U.S. legislation with respect to Anti -dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD). Is 
contained in Title  VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agree ments Act of 1979 
and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. The main regulations governing AD 
and CVD investigations (including reviews) are included in 19  C.F.R.  Parts 201, 207, and 351. The 
Trade Preferences Extension Act (TPEA) of 2015 (P.L.  114-27)106, and in the Trade Facilitation and 
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L.  114-125) introduced further amendments to trade enforcement 
legislation. In particular, Title  IV of the  Act, known also as the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015 
(EAPA), contains provisions to prevent the evasion of the payment of duties. To this end, the EAPA 
created a new framework for CBP to investigate allegations of evasion of AD/CVD orders, under 
Section  517 (Procedures for Investigating Claims of Evasion of AD a nd CVD orders) and established 
the Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Directorate (TRLED) within CBP, to carry out the investigations.  
 
QUESTION 49:  Please provide brief information about the new procedure for scope, circumvention, 
and substantive and technical revisions to the policy.  
 
RESPONSE 49:  Details regarding EAPA can be found at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade -
enforcement/tftea/eapa . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  4.2.5 Renewable energy  
Page  224-225, Paragraph  4.138 
 
The United  States does not have a national target for renewable energy nor an explicit federal 
support mechanism. However, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 requires regulated 
utilities to purchase power from alternative energy sourc es produced by "qualified facilities" at rates 
that cover their costs of such production. Incentives are also provided in the form of investment tax 
credits for the installation of solar panels, and production tax credits for power generated by wind 
turbin es. Although wind and solar power still accounted for 3.4% and 1.5%, respectively, of primary 
energy production in 2021, their growth rates have been high, and generation from wind power has 
in general exceeded that from hydroelectric sources since August  2019. Renewable portfolio 
standards have been enacted by 31  states and the District of Columbia, each with their own specific 
policies, eligible sources and technologies, trading rules, and targets.  
 
QUESTION 50:  Please clarify the direction of the energy transition policy aforementioned, especially 
with regard to specific policies in each state.  
 
RESPONSE 50:  U.S. energy transition policy is focused on reducing carbon emissions in line with 
our climate objectives through a broad range of policies, r anging from infrastructure investment to 
consumer incentives. For more information, please see the most recent subsidy notification of the 
United  States (G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021). PURPA was enacted to increase conservation of 
electricity and increase  efficiency of facilities, and sets electrical utility standards for consideration 
by state regulatory authorities and non -regulated utilities. For more information on U.S. policy on 
clean energy, please see Executive  Order  14057,  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -
room/presidential -actions/2021/12/08/executive -order -on-catalyzing -clean-energy -industries -and-
jobs-through -federal -sustainability/ . 
 
4.4.2 Telecommunications  
Page  251, Paragraph  4.232  
 
In October  2018, a Presidential Memorandum on Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy for 
America's Future, requested federal agencies to coordinate efforts regarding the spectrum 
repurposing (reassignment) for 5G deployment. Since then, FCC has taken several actions, including 
the reallocation of already established license holders, to make additional spectrum at high, mid, 
and low bands available for 5G services either for exclusive or shared use. The attribution, by 
auction, of several of these bands was completed over the 2019 -21 period. For instance, the auction 
of the new flexible -use overlay licenses (gran ted for up to 15  years from the date of issuance) in the 
3.7 GHz band was concluded in February  2021, and raised a record amount of USD  81 billion in bids. 
In January  2021, NTIA released the National Strategy to Secure 5G and Next Generation Wireless 
Commu nications, as required by the Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2020 (P.L.  116-184). The second 
Annual Report on the Status of Spectrum Repurposing, issued in January  2021, highlighted the 
progress done while recognizing that additional spectrum repurposing is s till needed. At the same 
time, FCC has modernized its rules to accelerate the deployment of next -generation networks and 
services by removing barriers to infrastructure investment, streamlining rules on the use of utility 
poles for new network equipment, s etting deadlines for the review of modifications of the wireless 
infrastructure, and stating its opposition to state and local moratoriums on telecommunications 
services and facilities deployment.  
 
QUESTION 51:  What are Best Practices in Auction Mechanism for 5G?  
 
RESPONSE 51:  The Federal Communications Commission's approach to spectrum auctions are 
described at: https://www.fcc.gov/auctions/about -auctions . We note that these are the policies and 
processes of the FCC and the description is not intended to represent a guide to best practices, which 
is outside the scope of the TPR.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustaina ble Environmental Practices  
Page  9, Paragraph  3.7 
 
The traditional approach to climate and environmental issues within trade has primarily focused on 
advancing levels of environmental protection for our trading partners. The United  States will 
continue thi s work to strengthen and expand those commitments, but we also recognize that this WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 368 - 
 
  singular approach will not fully achieve our climate goals. To this end, the United  States is pursuing 
a new generation of trade policies that will more affirmatively promot e the decarbonization necessary 
to limit global temperature increase to 1.5°C.  
 
QUESTION 52:  Please explain in detail how the U.S. new generation of trade policies are regulated 
and implemented, and are there any other plans in this regard.  
 
RESPONSE 52:  Please refer to the section, New Agreements and Approaches to Advancing Our 
Climate Goals and Protecting the Environment in the President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda, at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20An
nual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
5.5.3 United  States -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  
Page  26, Paragraph  5.76 
 
The United  States continued to work under the auspices of the United  States -ASEAN TIFA to further 
enhance economic ties between the United  States and ASEAN, which collectively represents the 
United  States' fourth largest trading partner. At the annual ASEAN Ec onomic Ministers -USTR 
Consultations in September  2021, the United  States and ASEAN agreed to enhance cooperation on 
labor, environment, and SMEs. The United  States is also continuing cooperation with ASEAN on 
digital trade, intellectual property, standards , competition, trade facilitation, and agriculture 
biotechnology.  
 
QUESTION 53:  Under U.S. -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA), How 
does the future projection of U.S. Trade and Investment Policy on Digital Trade to ASEAN Countries?  
 
RESPONSE 53:  The United  States consults with ASEAN member states regularly on potential trade 
and investment priorities for collaboration under the U.S. -ASEAN  TIFA as appropriate, and, in that 
context, we welcome suggestions from ASEAN members on future areas  of cooperation.  
 
5.5.10 Indo -Pacific Economic Framework  
Page  27-28, Paragraph  5.88 
 
The United  States is committed to engaging economically with partners in the Indo -Pacific region. 
In the coming decades, we believe that competitiveness will be defined largely by how well countries 
are able to harness technology and digital sectors of our economies and on our ability to adapt to 
the coming energy and climate transition. The United  States is also committed to promoting inclusive 
growth.  
 
QUESTION 54: Please describes the United  States' efforts to improve and engage economic 
relations with Indo -Pacific countries, particularly in trade, supply chains, clean energy, and 
infrastructure.  
 
RESPONSE 54:  In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministeria l Statements on all four IPEF  
pillars. The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future negotiations. 
Please see here for more information:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -
09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar)_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEAS
E%20(1).pdf . 
 
PART III: GENERAL QUESTIONS  
Finished Drug  
 
QUESTION 55:  Please provide information on market potential as well as policies governing import 
requirements and flexibility offered by the U.S. for finished drug products.  
 
RESPONSE 55:  The United  States is committed to promoting a more resilient and sustainable 
international public health supply chain that encompasses pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and 
ancillary supplies, and has adopted policies that mitigate risks to the global supply chain.  
For information related to import requirements, visit: https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidance -
compliance -regulatory -information/human -drug-imports .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  ISRAEL  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  40, Paragraph  2.9 
 
Paragraph  2.9 of the Report of the Secretariat notes "Thereafter, in response, USTR established the 
interagency Supply Chain Trade Task Force12, a Section  232 investigation on neodymium was 
launched, and discussions were held with trading partners on add ressing supply chain 
vulnerabilities ". 
 
QUESTION 1:  Can the U.S. share details on how it intends to address supply chain resilience in fora 
such as the IPEF and TTC?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Improving supply chains is a key priority of the Biden -Harris Administration. As such, 
supply chains are a key pillar in the Indo -Pacific Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and are subject to 
their own working group under the U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council. Through these and similar 
fora, the United  States  is enga ging with partners and allies to exchange information on supply chain 
challenges and opportunities, and to share best practices on how to make our collective supply 
chains more secure, diverse, and resilient.  
 
Page  53, Paragraph  2.50 
 
Paragraph  50 of the Report of the Secretariat notes "These changes were authorized in the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), P.L.  115-23, enacted on 
13 August  2018". 
 
QUESTION 2:  The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 has introduced new 
requirements for Foreign -owned American companies. CIFIUS may also approve or disapprove 
certain activities within the framework of ongoing projects undertaken by the company in addition 
to the approval of transactions. As an example, ce rtain infrastructure projects fall into this category. 
Would it be possible for the U.S. to share the parallel procedures for American companies dealing 
with the same infrastructure projects?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  CFIUS exclusively exercises jurisdiction over "cove red transactions" and "covered 
real estate transactions," which are defined at 31  C.F.R.  Parts 800 and 802, respectively. The 
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) expanded CFIUS's jurisdiction over 
"covered transactions" beyond transac tions that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business to 
also include certain non -controlling, non -passive investments into certain businesses involved in 
critical technology, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data. FIRRMA also extended CFIUS's 
jurisdiction to "covered real estate transactions ", which involve the purchase or lease by, or 
concession to, a foreign person of certain real estate in the United  States . CFIUS only has jurisdiction 
over infrastructure projects (including  such projects involving the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation) to the extent that they are involved in a transaction that is a "covered transaction" or 
a "covered real estate transaction" as defined in regulation. CFIUS is authorized to mitigate an y risk 
to the national security of the United  States  that arises as a result of the transaction under 
consideration.  
 
These authorities are further reflected in regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations (31  C.F.R.  Part 800 and 31  C.F.R.  Part 802) and on the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury's website at: https://home.treasury.gov/polic y-issues/international/the -committee -on-
foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -laws-and-guidance . 
 
Page  107, Paragraph  3.141  
 
Paragraph  3.141 of the Report by the Secretariat notes "As noted in Box  3.2, as part of the 
arrangement, the United  States and the European  Union intend to negotiate for the first time, a 
global arrangement to address carbon intensity and global overcapacity ". 
 
QUESTION 3:  Can the U.S. provide additional details about the trade arrangement on greenhouse 
gas emissions, how it will impact third -party countries, and how it will be implemented in compliance 
with WTO  rules?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 370 - 
 
  RESPONSE 3:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Susta inable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  231, Paragraph  4.160  
 
Paragraph  4.160 of the Report of the Secretariat notes "Following E .O. 14017, a review of 
pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients, prepared by the Department of HHS and 
published in June  2021, calls for continued financial incentives or investments in domestic production 
capacity under the DPA, and suggests a focus on the 50 -100 most critical drugs (Critical Drug List) ". 
 
QUESTION 4:  Which measures does the U.S. intend to take, or has taken, in order to strengthen 
medical supply chains?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The United  States  has issued several reports analyzing medic al supply chains. 
These  include  the 100-day supply  chain  report  (available  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -cont
ent/uploads/2021/06/100 -day-supply -chain -review -report.pdf ) for pharmaceutical and active 
pharmaceutical ingredients; the one -year report on the Public Health Supply Chain and Industrial 
Base (available at: https://aspr.hhs.gov/MCM/IBx/2022Report/Pages/default.aspx ); and the 
National  Strategy  for a Resilient  Public  Health  Supply  Chain  (available  at: https://www.phe.gov/Pr
eparedness/legal/Documents/National -Strategy -for-Resilient -Public -Health -Supply -Chain.pdf ). 
 
Page  232, Paragraph  4.161  
 
Paragraph  4.161 of the R eport of the Secretariat notes "Lawmakers enacted the Creating Helpful 
Incentives To Produce Semiconductors For America Act, or CHIPS for America Act, Title  XCIX of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, wh ich 
authorizes USDOC, to award financial assistance to private entities or public -private consortia to 
finance, construct, expand, or modernize facilities to support the fabrication; assembly, test, and 
packaging; and advanced packaging of semiconductors ". 
 
QUESTION 5:  Could the U.S. confirm that obtaining financial assistance under the CHIPS Act does 
not require companies to use local content? Is the U.S. engaged in any international efforts to 
coordinate semiconductor incentives and avoid adverse trade effects?  
 
RESPO NSE 5:  The CHIPS Act does make financial assistance contingent on the use of domestic over 
imported goods. The United  States  will continue to engage with partners that are providing funding 
for semiconductor production or developing critical R&D, workforce , and supply chain capability.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 371 - 
 
  JAPAN  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  87, Paragraph  3.92 
 
QUESTION 1: With regard to the anti -dumping measures against Japanese products, the oldest 
existing measure was imposed in 1978, and the average length of the measures is about 20  years. 
Anti-dumping measures must be terminated in 5  years in principle, in accordance with the 
WTO Agreement . Only if the lifting of the measures may cause continued/renewed dumping and 
damages, the period of the  measures may be extended as an exception. The Government of Japan 
would like to know the U.S. view on this, and call for the U.S. to quickly remove unfairly 
long-continued anti -dumping measures.  
 
RESPONSE 1: The United  States  administers its trade remedy laws in accordance with the applicable 
WTO agreements.  In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or an 
antidumping order would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury within a 
reasonably foreseeable time, the U.S. International Trade Commission considers the factors set out 
in U.S. law at 19  U.S.C.  § 1675a(a).  The USITC considers these factors in the context of the record 
of the five -year review; it establishes a new record for each five -year review of an order.  
 
In determining whether revocation of a countervailing duty order or antidumping duty order would 
be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy or sales of the subject 
merchandise at less th an fair value, the U.S. Department of Commerce considers the factors set out 
in U.S. law at 19  U.S.C.  §§ 1675a(b) and (c), respectively.  
 
The determinations in each sunset review conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission or 
U.S. Department of Co mmerce are case -specific.  The results for all sunset reviews can be found on 
the U.S. International Trade Commission's website ( http://pubapps2.usitc.gov/sunset/ ). Commerce 
publishes its sunset review determinations in the Federal Register and also makes them 
available  on Commerce's  website  (http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/index.html ) and https://acces
s.trade.gov/login.aspx . From these sources, Members can obtain, on a case -by-case basis, 
information about the rationale for either the continuation or termination of a countervailing duty or 
an antidumping duty order.  
 
Page  87, Paragraph  3.89 
 
QUESTION 2: According to the Administrative Review under the Antidumping Duty Order on Glycine 
from Japan, we requested that the U.S. Department of Commerce appropriately calculates the price 
difference in the review based on a fair comparison in accordanc e with Article  VI, Paragraph  1 of the 
GATT 1994 and Article  2.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, taking into consideration the approval 
and registration system related to pharmaceutical products and the fact that there are two different 
grades of glycine.  
 
RESPONSE 2: We take note of Japan's comment.  
 
3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
 
Page  114, Paragraph  3.161  
 
QUESTION 3: USTR is conducting a four -year review of the two actions, as modified, taken under 
the Section  301 in the investigation of China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology 
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. As part of the review, USTR is seeking public 
comments from 15  November  2022 to 17  January  2023. Could the U .S. explain the timeline for the 
four-year review after the implementation of public comments.  
 
RESPONSE 3: The United  States  is not in a position to predict the amount of time it will take to 
complete the review as the timeline will depend on a number of factors, including the number of 
comme nts received . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.2 Forestry  
 
Page  209, Paragraph  4.79 
 
QUESTION 4: The Lacy Act is mentioned in the Section  4.79. How many enforcement cases does 
the US have so far regarding imported wood products?  
 
RESPONSE 4: Since the U.S. Lacey Act was amended in 2008 to criminalize the trafficking of plant 
and plant products taken in violation of foreign law, the United  States  has collaborated with its 
foreign counterparts in Africa, the Americas, and Asia to prosecute these transnational crimes. From 
2008 to 2021, the United  States ' commitment to enforcing the Lacey Act and combatting illegal 
logging has resulted in four feder al criminal prosecutions that resulted in criminal fines, forfeiture, 
and community service valued in excess of USD 14 million . 
 
In February  2023, a trial is scheduled in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in 
the matter of the U.S. v. Quintana et al . on a seven -count indictment for the alleged importation of 
wood products in violation of the Lacey Act and other crimes under Title  18 of the United  States  
Code (Dkt.  No. 1:21cr20245).  There are also five other Lacey Act wood and wood products 
investigations pending.  
 
QUESTION 5: Japan would like to request the U .S. to provide a summery for each case.  
 
RESPONSE 5: Please refer to the following press releases issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
which summarize the allegations and resolutions for the criminal matters of (1)  U.S. v. Gibson  Guitar , 
U.S. v. Lumber  Liquidators, Inc. , (2)  U.S. v. Young  Living  Essential  Oils, and (3)  U.S. v. Global 
Plywood and Lumber Trading, LLC : 
 
1) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/gibson -guitar -corp-agrees -resolve -investigation -lacey-
act-violations ; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/lumber -liquidators -inc-sentenced -illegal -
importation -hardwood -and-related -environmental ; 
2) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/essential -oils-company -sentenced -lacey-act-and-
endangered -species -act-violations -pay-760000 ; and  
3) https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us -corporation -sentenced -importing -illegally -sourced -
wood -amazon . 
 
4.4 Services  
4.4.2 Telecommunications  
 
Page  249, Paragraph  4.228  
 
QUESTION 6: No special concessions rule (47  C.F.R.  63.14) prohibits U.S. international 
telecommunications carriers from agreeing to exclusive arrangements with foreign 
telecommunications carriers that have market power that would adversely affect competition in the 
U.S. market. We believe that this treats foreign telecommunications carriers less favorably than U.S. 
telecommunications carriers and may be in non -compliance with the WTO's national treatment 
obligation. We would like to know how this is consistent with the WTO  agreement.  
 
RESPONSE 6: The United  States  notes that Japan has withdrawn this question.  
 
QUESTION 7: In addition, we believe that there are restrictions on foreign investment in the wireline 
telecommunications and submarine cable businesses, and we would like to know the details of these 
obligations.  
 
RESPONSE 7: The United  States  notes that Japan has withdrawn this question.  
 
Page  252, Paragraph  4.234  
 
QUESTION 8: In accordance with the John S. McCain National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019 (P.L.  115-232), we are aware that you have prohibited the use of universal service funds 
for the purchase of products and services of two manufacturers (Huawei and ZTE). We would like to WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 373 - 
 
  know specifically the reasons  for this prohibition and the provisions on which it is based.  
 
RESPONSE 8: The United  States  notes that Japan has withdrawn this question.  
 
QUESTION 9: Please also explain the consistency with the WTO  Agreement . 
 
RESPONSE 9: The United  States  notes that Japan has withdrawn this question.  
 
Page  252, Paragraph  4.234  
 
QUESTION 1 0: This report says The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 
(P.L. 116-352) established a mechanism to prevent the entry of foreign service providers that would 
pose a national security risk and require their removal if currently in use. However, we believe that 
this may violate the WTO's market access obligations. We would like to know how it is determined 
whether or not they pose a national security risk, and what institutional design is in place to ensure 
consistency with the WTO  Agreement . 
 
RESPONSE 1 0: The United  States  notes that Japan has withdrawn this question.  
 
4.4.3 Transport  
4.264 Page 259 
 
QUESTION 1 1: The obligation to use U.S. -built ships concerning cargo service between two points 
in the United  States  stipulated in the Jones Act (the Merchant Marine Act of 1920) is inconsistent 
with basic principles of the WTO  Agreement s such as National Treatment and General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions. Although the United  States  has repeated its argument that the Jones  Act 
is necessary for national security and claimed that the Act should be treated as an exception of the 
WTO Agreement s, rea sonable explanation for the necessity of the Act has not been provided yet. 
Therefore, Japan has a view that the Jones  Act should be abolished. Japan would like to know why 
and how this law contributes to its national security.  
 
RESPONSE 1 1: The Jones  Act ensures the availability of experienced seafarers and domestic 
shipbuilding and repair capability, which are important U.S. national security objectives.  
 
QUESTION 1 2: Also, Japan would like to know if the United  States  has plan to expand the scope of 
exception of the restrictions under the Jones  Act and to limit the scope of the law to the extent 
essentially necessary for national security.  
 
RESPONSE 1 2: Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Report by the Government  
5.5 Other Initiatives  
5.5.5 Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of The 
United  States  of Americ a and the Government of The People's Republic of China (Phase 
One Agreement)  
 
Page  26, Paragraph  5.81 
 
QUESTION 1 3: According to the report by the Government, since the Phase One Agreement did 
not meaningfully address the more fundamental concerns that the U .S. has with China's 
state-directed, non -market policies and practices and their harmful impact on the U.S. economy and 
U.S. workers and businesses, the U .S. is exploring appropriate next steps. Could the U .S. explain 
what kind of measures will be implemented?  
 
RESPONSE 1 3: Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 374 - 
 
  JAPAN  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
Report by the Secretariat  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures  
Page 82, paragraph 3.8  
 
Question 1:  The Government of Japan is of the view that the past cases made it clear that Zeroing 
should be completely abolished as it is not permitted no matter what form it takes, and that no 
alternative methods should be applied to continue Zeroing practices. Japa n would like to know the 
US's opinion on this point and request that U.S. should not apply Zeroing practices in any AD 
procedure including target dumping.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The United  States disagrees with the premise behind Japan's comment, but 
nevertheless ta kes note of it.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
Page 259, paragraph 4.3  
 
Question 2:  According to your response  13, the Jones Act ensures "repair capability".  
If our understanding is correct, the Jones  Act requires marine transport between points within the 
United  States by vessels built in the U.S., the U.S. flagged, owned by the U.S. citizens and also 
crewed by the U.S. citizens/permanent residents, but we do not know the requirements for "repair 
in the U.S.".  
If there are any regulations regardi ng "repair", please provide the information concerning the 
regulations."  
 
RESPONSE 2:  There are requirements for repairing coastwise qualified vessels overseas. In advance 
of such repairs, the Jones  Act vessel owner and foreign shipyard need to make sure t hey do not 
violate the "built in the U.S ". requirement of the coastwise laws. The U.S. Coast Guard has oversight 
over this requirement and reviews overseas shipyard repair work preliminarily to ensure the built in 
the U.S. requirement is maintained. The sp ecifics on this repair review requirement are at 
46 CFR § 67.177  - Application  for foreign  rebuilding  determination.  https://www.ecfr.gov/current/ t
itle-46/chapter -I/subchapter -G/part -67/subpart -M/section -67.177 . 
 
Question 3:  Under the IRA, there are provisions that require clean vehicles to be manufactured in 
North  America, or to use battery components and critical materials from certain countries i n order 
to qualify for the tax credits. Could the U.S. explain how these subsidies are consistent with the 
WTO agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments u nder the WTO  Agreement.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 375 - 
 
  KAZAKHSTAN  
QUESTION 1:  Please indicate if the USA took any measures regarding intellectual property rights 
protection to ensure access to COVID -19 medicine.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) COVID -19 pilot program prioritizes 
examination of certain patent applications claiming a product or process subject to an applicable 
Food and Drug Authority (FDA) approval for COVID -19 use, and a companion Fast -Track Pilot 
Program for Appeals Related to COVID -19. As of 29 November  2022, 1024  applications have 
requested prioritized examination status in the USPTO's COVID -19 Prioritized Examination Pilot 
Program, 663 of which have thus far been granted. The pilot pr ogram was originally set to expire 
after the USPTO accepted 500  applications into the program, but this application limit has been 
removed.  More information  about  USPTO's  COVID -19 Prioritized  Examination  Pilot program  can be 
found  at: https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/covid -19-prioritized -examination -pilot. Further  inform
ation on USPTO's  initiatives  on life science  technologies  can be found  at: https://www.uspto.gov/c
oronavirus/uspto -covid-19-response -resource -center . 
 
In 2021 the USPTO launched a category of its Patents for Humanity Program for inventions that 
address the COVID -19 pand emic. This new category will provide business incentives for patent 
applicants, holders, and licensees whose inventions track, prevent, diagnose, or treat COVID -19. 
 
The United  States  supported negotiations that resulted in the World  Trade  Organization  (WTO) 
issuing the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS  Agreement  at the Twelfth Ministerial Conference on 
17 June 2022. The text -based negotiations with other WTO  Members that we called for have 
produced accommodations to the intellectual property rules for COVID -19 vaccines that can facilitate 
a global health recovery.  
 
 
KAZAKHSTAN  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
Paragraph 3.1.6.1.1.5 of the Secretariat Report  
 
QUESTION 1:  Please explain in which cases an administrative review could be suspended.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The United  States believes that Questions 1 and 2 are asking about the suspension 
of original investigations and not administrative reviews. Instances of when an ongoing investigation 
could be suspended depend on the facts and circumstances of the individ ual investigation. Details 
of suspended investigations can be found at:  https://www.trade.gov/suspension -agreements . 
 
QUESTION 2:  Please explain when or within which timeframe a decision should be made to suspend 
the administrative review.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  According to U.S. Department of Commerce's regulations, a proposed suspension 
agreement may be submitted to the U.S. Department of Commerce within seven  days of a CVD 
preliminary determinati on and with 15  days of an AD preliminary determination.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Please clarify whether an administrative review could be conducted with regard to 
this product if a particular product is no longer exported to the U.S. (due to reasons unrelated to 
the applied AD/CVD) . 
 
RESPONSE 3:  An administrative review can only be conducted for a specific product subject to an 
AD/CVD order if there are sales or entries that take place during the applicable administrative review 
period.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 376 - 
 
  KOREA , REPUBLIC OF  
PART I: REPO RT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  150, Paragraph  3.289  
 
In October  2021, the OMB issued a Memorandum providing specific guidance on the use of a digital 
waiver portal to submit proposed Made in America waivers to MIAO. In accordance with the new 
guidelines, proposed waivers will be posted to MadeinAmerica.gov prior to agencies making awards, 
beginning with waivers for procurement non -availability; later phases will cover additional types of 
waivers. The website seeks to establish a domestic suppli er base, reducing the need for waivers. 
Starting 1  January  2022, all agencies covered by E.O.  14005 must submit proposed waivers via the 
site SAM.gov. Agencies must not make an award until they have received confirmation that MIAO 
has completed its review of the proposed waiver, has waived the requirement for a review, or an 
exception applies; they must ensure that the proposed waiver is necessary, and secure approval at 
a level not lower than the head of the contracting activity if the waiver is for an acq uisition above 
USD 25,000.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Please provide an additional explanation of the legal and institutional status of MIAO, 
including the following:  
 
(i) According to the report, agencies must not make an award until they have received 
confirmation from MIAO. Could we understand this "confirmation" as a non-binding 
guideline and not a legal approval?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Under guidance provided by GSA, the agency m akes the final determination on 
whether to grant a waiver. For more information, please refer to 16 November  2021 Memorandum 
for Civilian Agencies regarding requirements for nonavailability determinations under the Buy 
American statute, available at: 
https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/page_file_uploads/CAAC -Letter -
2022-01-Made -in-America -Nonavailability -Waivers -under -EO-14005 -11.16.21.pdf#:~:text=%28b
%29%20Nonavailability.%20The% 20Buy%20American%20statute%20does%20not,available%20
commercial%20quantities%20and%20of%20a%20satisfactory%20quality . 
 
QUESTION 2:  
 
(ii) Are the federal agencies not allowed to make any procurement decisions regarding waivers 
without the final approval of MIAO?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Please see response under Question  1 above. Currently, the Made in America Office 
(MIAO) office is only reviewing waivers of Buy American provisions for non -availability of goods. 
For more information  on these  waivers,  please  visit MIAO  website  at: www.madeinamerica.gov/wai
vers. Further guidance and instructions will be issued as MIAO expands its waiver review process to 
cover add itional types of waivers from covered Made in America Laws, as defined in Section  2(b) of 
Executive  Order  14005.  
 
QUESTION 3 : 
 
(iii) In case agencies use waivers at their discretion, what kind of sanctions would follow?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Agency procurement officers follow prescribed procedures, detailed in federal 
acquisition regulations and agency rules, to make procurement decisions, including waiver 
determinations, subject to oversight and transparency measures. Agencies are required b y U.S. law 
to prescribe standards of conduct which contain disciplinary measures for persons violating 
standards of conduct.  
 
Page  153, Paragraph  3.300  
 
Currently, under FAR  Part 25, the determination of whether a manufactured end product or 
construction material qualifies as domestic is made using a two -part test: (i)  the end product or 
construction material must be manufactured in the United  States ; and (ii)  a certain percentage of 
all component parts (determined by cost of the components) m ust also be mined, produced, or WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 377 - 
 
  manufactured in the United  States ; this requirement was known as the ''component test'' until early 
2021, when it was redesignated as the ''domestic content test''.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Does the United  States  have any plans to issue a follow -up regulation to enhance 
the predictability on how the "two -part test" is applied at the implementation stage?  If so, when 
would it be issued?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are re trospective 
exercises.  
 
QUESTION 5:  We are specifically curious about how the test is applied at the implementation stage, 
including the following, for example: In the case of COTS (commercial, off -the-shelf), while the 
domestic content test is exempted, d o COTS still have to meet the "end product or construction 
must be manufactured in the United States" requirement?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  For manufactured end products, the Buy American statute, E.O.  13881, and 
E.O. 14005 use a two -part test to define a domestic end product. The article must be manufactured 
in the United  States ; and (except for an end product that consists wholly or predominantly of iron 
or steel or a combination of both) the cost of domestic components shall exceed 60 % of the cost of 
all the components, except that the percentage will be 65 % for items delivered in calendar 
years  2024 through 2028 and 75 % for items delivered starting in calendar year  2029.  
 
The domestic content test has been waived for acquisition of commercially available  off-the-shelf 
(COTS) items, except a product that consists wholly or predominantly of iron or steel or a 
combination  of both (excluding  COTS  fasteners)  (see FAR 25.101(a)  (https://www.acquisition.gov/
far/25.101 ) and 25.201(b) ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.201 ). 
 
Page  150, Paragraph  3.289  
 
Since its establishment until the beginning of February  2022, 25  requests for non -availability Made 
in America waivers have been presented, and 20  determinations have been made. In all cases the 
waiver was granted as the requests were found to be consistent with policy. The length of the waiver 
varied between instant delivery and more t han five years.  
 
QUESTION 6:  According to the report by the Secretariat, there were 25  requests for exceptions 
from federal procurement agencies,  since MIAO's establishment until the beginning of 
February  2022. Could you provide updated statistics on the number of requests for waivers from 
agencies as of November  2022?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  As of early December, the Made in America Office website : www.madeinamerica.gov  
lists 444 waivers submitted for review. Additional information on the individual waivers and review 
outcomes are available on the site for download.  
 
Page  123, Paragraph  3.190  
 
The export control regime was subject to numerous modifications in the period under review. These 
reflect, for example, changes in the international export controls of the United  States  and its partners 
regarding munitions, dual -use goods and technologies, and missile technology; national security 
concerns; frequent changes in the E ntity List and Unverified List of the BIS; the creation of a Military 
End User (MEU) List; and modifications of sanctions and embargoes towards specific countries or 
entities (Table  A3.2.1). Notably, new controls affect the export of U.S. origin items to China (or 
Hong Kong,  China) and to Chinese -owned companies, such as Huawei and its affiliates. Economic 
sanctions were revised and tightened (e.g.  the Russian  Federation , the 
Bolivarian  Republic  of Venezuela, Cuba, and Cambodia), or reintroduced (Myanmar).  
 
QUESTION 7:  According to the recent amendments to the EAR published on 13 October  2022, new 
products outlined in ECCN  3A090 or 4A090 cover a broad range of products. To better understand 
this regulation, we would appreciate a more detailed explanation of  how to determine whether such 
products have significant military applications which can be distinguished from their general 
non-military usage.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 378 - 
 
  RESPONSE 7:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and does so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Also, we would like to ask for an explanation about if and how the specific criteria of 
EAR §744.23 (a) General Prohibition  - (2) End -use Scope  - (iii) - (A), (B), (C) relate to military 
purposes, especially compared to other circuits. We intend to refer to your reply in relation to the 
possibility that the scope of restriction might change due to future technological advances.  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Consistent with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA), U.S. export controls 
are based on national security and foreign policy interests.  The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) administers U.S. export controls for items that are subject to the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), and do es so in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and obligations under 
the WTO  agreements.  
 
Page  107, Box 3.2 
U.S-EU joint statement on steel and aluminum, 31  October  2021  
 
QUESTION 9:  Regarding the United  States ' commitment to pursuing a high -ambition Global 
Sustainable Steel and Aluminum Arrangement (GSSA) with the European  Union  to address carbon 
intensity and overcapacity in the steel and aluminum industries, is there a possibility that the 
arrangement would be concluded earlier than the tar get timeline?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  We cannot speculate at this time if the arrangement will conclude earlier than the 
October  2023 deadline.  
 
QUESTION 10:  The GSSA implies restriction on market access for non -participants through the 
application of appropriate mea sures including trade defence instruments. What specific kinds of 
restrictive measures are under consideration? (For example, imposing tariffs according to the level 
of carbon intensity or the production method of imported steel, etc.) . 
 
RESPONSE 10:  Optio ns for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  132 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
 
QUESTION 11:  Regarding the conformity assessment especially with IEC  61526, PNNL (Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory), the competent agency designated by the U.S. Department of 
Energy, specifies in its contract with its client that the pro cess requires up to 37  months. Would this 
prolonged period be attributed to the specific characteristics of IEC  61526?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  It is the understanding of the U.S. Department of Energy that the initial proposal 
by PNNL identified a period of time that  would permit discussion and agreement on a specific scope 
of work and allow sufficient time to address potential nonconformities discovered during the testing 
process. Once the scope of work is understood and agreed, it is expected that the timeline could  be 
shortened.  
 
QUESTION 12:  And would there be any room to consider a partial reduction of the period?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  As referenced in Response  11, above, the suggested timeline could be shortened 
once there is a clear understanding and agreement on a scope of work.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  MALAYSIA  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  28, Para graph  5.92 
 
The United  States  will use this framework to address a range of important areas of economic 
cooperation, including: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; 
and tax and anti -corruption. USTR will lead efforts to craft a trade arrangement tha t includes 
high-standard commitments in the following areas: labor; environment; digital and emerging 
technology; agriculture; transparency and good regulatory practices; competition policy; and 
trade facilitation. The U.S. Department of Commerce will lead  U.S. efforts to expand cooperation 
on supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and tax and anti -corruption.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Please elaborate on the aspiration, standards and economic cooperation the U .S. 
envisages with IPEF partners for the areas of clean energy and decarbonisation.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The U.S. Department of Commerce will lead negotiations on Pillar  III (Clean 
Econom y), which will include U.S. efforts to expand cooperation on clean energy and 
decarbonization.  In September  2022,  IPEF Partners  released  Ministerial  Statements  on all four IPE
F pillars.  Please  see https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -09/Pillar -III-Ministerial -
Statement.pdf  to view the Ministerial Statement on Pillar  III (Clean Economy). The IPEF is under 
negotiation and no agreement has bee n reached on what provisions will be incorporated into the 
Framework. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  15, Para graph  26 
 
In telecommunications, the steady increase of broadband subscriptions was matched by significant 
decreases of mobile and fixed phone subscriptions. A consolidation of U.S. telecommunication 
providers and the deployment of the 5G commercial networ ks, including the spectrum reallocation, 
were among the salient market developments during the review period. On the policy side, efforts 
seeking to reduce the digital divide in services, the establishment of the Committee for the 
Assessment of Foreign Par ticipation in the United  States  Telecommunications Services Sector, and 
a growing interest among policymakers in the security and protection of telecommunications 
infrastructure shaped the main regulatory changes.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Other than telecommunications  infrastructure and connectivity efforts, how does the 
U.S. reduce digital divide?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The United  States  government has an extensive range of educational, social, and 
fiscal policies and programs that support the goal of reducing the digital divide.  
 
QUESTION 3:  How does the U .S. measure the digital adoption rate?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The NTIA Internet Use Survey is  a central resource for data and analysis on computer 
and Internet use in the United  States . For more information, see: 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/data -central . 
 
Page  51, Para graph  2.40 
 
The United  States  maintains an open investment regime and has benefited for decades as one of 
the world's single -largest recipients and suppliers of FDI. The President issued a statement on the 
United  States ' commitment to open investment on 8  June 2021. In recent years, the United  States  
has expanded and refined its review of FDI through national security -based screening. U.S. 
investment policy has undergone a number of changes during the review period; due to U.S. 
predominance in world investment markets, U.S. policy has an important influence on world 
investment flows.  
 
QUESTION 4: Please elaborate the national security -based screening for FDI.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 380 - 
 
  RESPONSE 4:  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United  States  (CFIUS) is an interagency 
committee of the U.S. Government authorized by law to review certain transactions involving foreign 
investment in the United  States  in order to determine the effect of such transactions on U.S. national 
security. CFIUS reviews tr ansactions solely on the basis of national security. CFIUS was established 
more than 45  years ago, and the statutes and regulations governing CFIUS have been amended 
several times, most recently with the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modern ization 
Act of 2018 (FIRRMA). FIRRMA strengthened and modernized CFIUS, including by expanding the 
scope of foreign investment  transactions  reviewable  by CFIUS.  More information  on CFIUS  is 
available  at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -
investment -in-the-united -states -cfius. 
 
Page  57, Para graph  3.3 
 
During the review period, CBP was active in examining and pursuing new ways to modernize its 
trade systems. As part of this initiative, it launched several pilot projects using blockchain in order 
to test the feasibility of using it in different scenarios to facilitate the movement of legitimate trade 
securely.3 During FY2018/19, CBP advance -tested blockchain for intellectual property rights and 
certain FTAs (the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Dominican  Republic -Central America FTA (CAFTA -DR)). Thereafter, CBP moved  towards multi -tech 
solutions and not exclusively blockchain to track supply chains and improve transparency. As of 
2022, five projects were underway with the Silicon Valley Innovation Program (SVIP) using a mix of 
technological solutions to track goods fr om origin to delivery on steel, pipeline oil, pipeline natural 
gas, e -commerce, and food safety. CBP has also been active in responding to specific 
COVID -19-pandemic -related matters. A COVID -19 Cargo Resolution Team (CCRT) was established 
as a coordinating  group of experts to help facilitate imports and queries on pandemic -related trade 
matters and a dedicated webpage was set up on these matters.4 Some of the activities of the CCRT 
included facilitating inbound shipments through ports of entry, expediting i mportation of critical 
medical supplies, and providing responses to inquiries about the importation of personal protective 
equipment, COVID -19 test kits, ventilators, and other medical supplies. Early in the pandemic there 
was also the possibility to postp one payment of estimated duties, taxes, and fees for 90  days for 
importers experiencing a significant hardship.5 Over 2,600  importers deferred over USD  574 million  
during this period.  
 
QUESTION 5:  In moving towards multi -tech solutions to track supply chains and improve 
transparency, has CBP tried to emulate any other countries that has such technologies?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) along with the Department of Homeland 
Security, Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S &T) forged a new path using global 
interoperability standards that will communicate across multiple technologies. Our specifications 
were standardized and are in international working groups at the W3C (Worldwide Web Consortium). 
CBP has been discussing th is approach with many countries, and we recently met with the 
European  Union  who has very similar goals and whom we understand is now heading down the path 
of global interoperability. Some countries are exclusively testing blockchain technology, and 
althou gh CBP has not gone down a similar path, our standards will integrate well with their 
technology choice. CBP is also experimenting with different forms of distributed ledger technology 
including blockchain as part of its modernization efforts, which focus on facilitation of legitimate 
trade.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Please share any particular issues faced by CCRT (which are similar to any other 
countries) and the steps taken to resolve the issues.  
 
RESPONSE 6:  The biggest challenge faced by the CCRT was the management  and tracking of 
numerous requests for assistance from government agencies (federal, state, and local), companies 
of all sizes, and the general public regarding PPE.  At the creation of the CCRT, requests for 
information for PPE were tracked via EXCEL spreadsheets.  This process was very time consuming 
and, at times, confusing.  
 
Once the CCRT moved to web -based communication (CCRT Portal) utilizing Salesforce, assignment 
of requests to various subject matter experts (SMEs) in CBP and partner government a gencies 
(PGAs) was more accurate and less time consuming.  In addition to enhanced internal and external 
communication, the Portal greatly enhanced the CCRTs ability to list and track shipments in response 
to inquiries from various stakeholders.  For example , the Portal was instrumental in sorting and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 381 - 
 
  tracking  data such as communications with ports of unlading to ensure timely release of critical PPE 
and COVID relief commodities, and ensuring necessary documents were received in ACE for review 
by ports of unl ading and PGAs.  
 
Page  129, Para graph  3.221  
 
Federal government agencies and departments may provide grants, loans, scholarships, 
insurance, property, counselling, or other assistance. The official website at which interested 
parties register to do business  with the Federal Government (www.sam.gov) presents information 
on federal assistance available to States and Territories, local administrations, private profit and 
non-profit organizations, and individuals. Users may employ an online tool to search the federal 
assistance information database maintained by the General Services Administration for up -to-date 
information on available programs at: https://sam.gov/content/assistance -listings . Altern atively, 
an annual publication serves as a government -wide compendium of federal programs, projects, 
services, and activities that provide financial (and non -financial) benefits or assistance to the 
public.  
 
QUESTION 7:  What types of incentives, grants and loans are available for foreign investors?  
 
QUESTION 8:  What are the eligibility criteria for foreign investors to apply for incentives, grants 
and loans in the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSES 7 and 8:  The types of incentives available to foreign investors and the eligibility criteria 
for those incentives depends on the individual incentive program.  
 
Page  148, Para graph  3.284  
 
Government procurement at the federal and state levels is decentralized. At th e federal level, 
procurement is carried out through the procurement systems of the various executive agencies. 
Despite being decentralized, federal procurement follows general guidelines and is overseen and 
coordinated by the OMB through the Office of Fede ral Procurement Policy (OFPP). In accordance 
with E.O.  12866 of 30  September  1993, coordinated review of agency rulemaking is necessary to 
ensure that regulations are consistent with applicable law. Within OMB, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affa irs (OIRA) is the repository of expertise concerning regulatory issues, including 
methodologies and procedures that affect more than one agency, and the President's regulatory 
policies. OMB provides guidance to agencies and assists the President, the Vice  President, and other 
policy advisors to the President in regulatory planning and reviews individual regulations.  
 
QUESTION 9:  According to E.O.  12866 of 30  September  1993, coordinated review of agency 
rulemaking is necessary to ensure that regulations are consistent with applicable law. Could the U .S. 
provide further explanation on the implementation of the coordinated review of agency rulemaking 
at federal and state level agencies with examples on how it is carried out?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Executi ve Order  12866, "Regulatory Planning and Review ", issued on 
30 September  1993, establishes and governs the process under which the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reviews agency draft and proposed final regulatory actions. The objective s 
of the Executive  Order are to enhance planning and coordination with respect to both new and 
existing regulations; to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies in the regulatory decision -making 
process; to restore the integrity and legitimacy of regulator y review and oversight; and to make the 
process more accessible and open to the public. For all significant regulatory actions, the 
Executive  Order requires OIRA review before the actions take effect. On the part of the agencies, 
Executive  Order  12866 requ ires an analysis of the costs and benefits of rules and, to the extent 
permitted by law, action only on the basis of a reasoned determination that the benefits justify the 
costs.  
 
Executive  Order  12866 assigns OIRA the responsibility of coordinating intera gency Executive Branch 
review of significant regulations before publication. This is to ensure agency compliance with the 
principles in Executive  Order  12866, which include incorporating public comment, considering 
alternatives to the rulemaking, and analy zing both costs and benefits.  
 
For more information  on the rulemaking  process,  see: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/
faq.jsp#reg_rule . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 382 - 
 
  Additionally, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council was established to assist in the direction and 
coordination of Government -wide procurement policy and Government -wide procurement regula tory 
activities in the Federal Government, in accordance with Title  41, Chapter  7, Section  421 of the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act. The Administrator, in consultation with the Council, 
shall ensure that procurement regulations, promulgat ed by executive agencies, are consistent with 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and in accordance with any policies issued pursuant to 
Section  405 of Title  41. The Council manages coordinates controls and monitors the maintenance 
and issuance of cha nges in the FAR.  
 
The FAR Council meets quarterly or as needed, during the fiscal year, to discuss complex and 
controversial acquisition issues and to resolve any disagreements between FAR members on 
implementation of FAR changes and to provide direction t o the eight FAR Teams.  
 
For more information on the FAR Council, see: https://www.acquisition.gov/far -council . 
 
QUESTION 10:  How frequently do agencies undergo this review exercise?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  Agencies must undergo a rulemaking review for every significant regulatory action.  
 
Paragraph  148, Para graph  3.284  
 
The OFPP, headed by an Administrator, provides overall direction for government -wide 
procurement policies and plays a central role in shaping the policies and practices used by federal 
agencies to acquire goods and services; it also reviews proposed regulations for compliance with 
policy guidance. The OFPP Adm inistrator may prescribe government -wide procurement policies 
and may issue policy letters stating principles that must be followed by the agencies; 
implementation takes place through the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The OFPP also 
prescribes polic ies through the OFPP Memoranda. In 2021, the Made in America Office was created 
within OMB, and memoranda were issued with respect to "Made in America" waivers and deviation.  
 
QUESTION 11:  In Paragraph  3.284, it is stated that the OFPP Administrator may prescribe 
government -wide procurement policies and may issue policy letters stating principles that must 
be followed by the agencies.  Are agencies given the liberty and policy space to use their own 
prescribed procurement policies in the event that the OFPP Administrator does not issue policy 
letters pertaining to specific principles that go beyond what has been prescribed?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  In general, subject to government -wide procurement laws and guidance, U.S. 
federal government agencies exercise authority to procure needed goods and services and to 
establish the procedural rules, conditions, and standards for agency -specific procurement.  
 
OFPP provides overall direction to shape the government's procurement regulations. The Office's 
prima ry focus is on the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the government -wide regulation 
governing agency acquisitions of goods and services.  
 
The OFPP Administrator is authorized to issue policy letters stating principles that must be followed 
by the agenc ies and incorporated into the FAR, as necessary. In addition, the Administrator may, 
with the concurrence of OMB, rescind agency acquisition rules that are inconsistent with 
Administration policy.  
OFPP's statutory authorities and responsibilities are set f orth in the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act, 41  U.S.C.  401, et seq.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Or would the agencies still have to consult with the OFPP Administrator for 
procurement policies that go beyond what has been prescribed?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  Please see response to Question  11, above.  
 
Page  149, Para graph  3.287  
 
Regulatory changes to procurement were introduced by E.O.  14005 of 25  January  2021, which 
put in place the new Made in America initiative and established the Made in America Office (MIAO) 
within the OMB (Box  3.3). The E.O. also established a requirement for agencies to submit 
applicable waivers to the MIAO for review and directed the creation of a new website for public WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 383 - 
 
  transparency. This review of waivers does not affect the existing waivers already granted under 
the Trade Agreements Act for GPA parties and certain trade agreements. The OMB subsequently 
issued guidance on how to implement the Made in America E.O. Regulatory actions related to this 
E.O. are publicly available o n the Acquisition.gov website. The new policy aims at increasing 
procurement from domestic sources and reducing the number of waivers by making them subject 
to review.  
 
QUESTION 13:  In Paragraph  3.287, it is stated that regulatory changes to procurement were 
introduced by E.O.  14005 of 25  January  2021, which put in place the new Made in America initiative 
and established the Made in America Office (MIAO) within the OMB. The new policy aims at increasing 
procurement from domestic sources and re ducing the number of waivers by making them subject 
to review.  Could the U .S. explain how the new Made in America initiative (which maximizes the 
procurement of goods, products, materials and services from U .S. businesses and sources) does not 
contravene w ith and/or violate its commitments under the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement which requires members to agree to rules on open competition and allow market access 
into their procurement regimes?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The text of the WTO  Agreement  on Government  Procurement (GPA) establishes 
rules requiring that open, fair and transparent conditions of competition be ensured in government 
procurement. However, only those procurement activities that are carried out by covered entities 
purchasing listed goods, serv ices or construction services of a value exceeding specified threshold 
values are covered by the Agreement. These schedules are publicly available here: 
https://www.wto.org/eng lish/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm . 
 
Executive  Order  14005 is implemented through the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in line 
with existing U.S. trade agreement obligations. FAR  Part 25.4 provides the policies and procedures 
applicable to federal acquisitions that are covered by trade agreements, including the WTO  GPA. The 
Trade Agreements Act provides the authority for the President to waive the Buy American statute 
and other discriminatory provisions for eligible projects fr om countries that have signed an 
international trade agreement with the United  States , or that meet certain other criteria.  
 
Page  150, Para graph  3.289  
 
In October  2021, the OMB issued a Memorandum providing specific guidance on the use of a 
digital waiver portal to submit proposed Made in America waivers to MIAO. In accordance with the 
new guidelines, proposed waivers will be posted to MadeinAmerica.gov prior to agencies making 
awards, beginning with waivers for procurement non -availability; later ph ases will cover additional 
types of waivers. The website seeks to establish a domestic supplier base, reducing the need for 
waivers. Starting 1  January  2022, all agencies covered by E.O.  14005 must submit proposed 
waivers via the site SAM.gov. Agencies mus t not make an award until they have received 
confirmation that MIAO has completed its review of the proposed waiver, has waived the 
requirement for a review, or an exception applies; they must ensure that the proposed waiver is 
necessary, and secure approv al at a level not lower than the head of the contracting activity if the 
waiver is for an acquisition above USD  25,000. Since its establishment until the beginning of 
February  2022, 25  requests for non -availability Made in America waivers have been present ed, 
and 20  determinations have been made. In all cases the waiver was granted as the requests were 
found to be consistent with policy. The length of the waiver varied between instant delivery and 
more than five years.  
 
QUESTION 14:  In Paragraph  3.289, it i s stated that proposed non -availability Made in America 
waivers are allowed to be requested to the Made in America Office (MIAO) subject to specific 
guidelines. In later phases, the guidelines are expected to cover additional types of waivers. Could 
the U .S. explain:  
What other additional types of waivers are expected to be allowed by the MIAO and what would their 
requirements entail for an agency to be eligible for such waiver?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises. Further guidance and instructions will be issued as MIAO expands its waiver review 
process to cover all types of waivers from covered Made in America Laws, as defined in Section  2(b) 
of the Executive  Order.  
 
QUESTION 15:  When are the additional types of waivers expected to be enforced by the MIAO?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 384 - 
 
  RESPONSE 15:  The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
Page  159, Para graph  3.319  
 
U.S. procurement policy makes use of set -aside programs to foster the participation of small 
businesses, veteran -owned small businesses, small -disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), HUBZone 
businesses, and women -owned small businesses in the procurement process. Unde r the Small 
Business Act (P.L.  85-536), as amended, most recently through P.L.  117-6, enacted on 
30 March  2021, government purchases within certain thresholds, are to be automatically and 
exclusively set aside for small businesses, while others are subject  to set -aside requirements 
provided there are at least two or more (Rule of Two) small business concerns that are competitive 
in terms of market prices, quality, and delivery. If market research determines that there are 
fewer than two small business offer ors, recourse to sole -source contract may be made, or 
otherwise the contract may be subject to full and open competition. The relevant set -aside 
programs are referenced in the U.S. schedules under the GPA.  
 
QUESTION 16:  The U .S.'s schedules under the WTO GPA, Annex  7 of its General Notes state that:  
"1. This Agreement does not apply to any set aside on behalf of a small - or minority -owned business. 
A set-aside may include any form of preference, such as the exclusive right to provide a good or 
service,  or any price preference ". Would the U .S. be able to provide a comprehensive definition of 
"minority -owned business ", that benefit from the set aside programs?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  In general, federal contract "set -asides" refer to Small Business Administration 
(SBA) programs to foster participation in the federal procurement process by small disadvantaged 
businesses (SDBs), or small businesses owned and controlled by "socially and economically 
disadvantaged" individuals. Specific minority group members and women are presumed to be 
socially and economically disadvantaged under the Small Business Act. More information on SBA 
programs and eligibility can be found at 13  CFR 124, available at: 
https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -13/chapter -I/part -124. 
 
QUESTION 17:  Does it include any minority -owned businesses that are not predominantly 
Caucasian -owned (or fit the definition of a White Anglo -Saxon Protestant -owned business) such as 
a Muslim -owned or Southeast Asian -owned business?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  See response to Question  16 above. Under the federal SBA program regulations, 
socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice 
or cultural bias within American society because of their identities as members of groups and without 
regard to their individual qualities. The social disadvantage must stem from circumstances beyond 
their control. According to regulation, there is a rebuttable presumption that t he following individuals 
are socially disadvantaged: Black Americans; Hispanic Americans; Native Americans (Alaska 
Natives, Native Hawaiians, or enrolled members of a Federally or State recognized Indian Tribe); 
Asian Pacific Americans (persons with origin s from Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Brunei  Darussalam , Japan, China (including Hong  Kong,  China), Chinese  Taipei , the 
Lao People's  Democratic  Republic , Cambodia (Kampuchea), Viet  Nam, Korea , the Philippines, 
U.S. Trust Territory  of the Pacific  Islands  (the Republic  of Palau), the 
Republic  of the Marshall  Islands, the Federated  States  of Micronesia, the 
Commonwealth  of the Northern  Mariana  Islands, Guam, Samoa, Macao, Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
or Nauru); Subcontinent Asian Americans (persons with origins from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives Islands or Nepal); and members of other groups designated from 
time to time by SBA according to procedures set forth in federal regulations . See 13  CFR 124, 
available at: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -13/chapter -I/part -124. 
 
QUESTION 18:  Should the small business be at least 51% equity -owned and controlled by the 
minority to be eligible for this set aside program or can it be lower than that?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  See responses to Questions  16 and 17 above. Under the federal SBA program 
regulations, an applicant or Participant must be at least 51 % unconditionally and directl y owned by 
one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are citizens of the 
United  States , except for concerns owned by Indian tribes, Alaska Native Corporations, Native 
Hawaiian Organizations, or Community Development Corporations (CDCs). See 13  CFR 124.3 for 
definition of unconditional ownership; and §§  124.109, 124.110, and 124.111, respectively, for WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 385 - 
 
  special ownership requirements for concerns owned by Indian tribes, ANCs, Native Hawaiian 
Organizations, and CDCs.  
 
Page 159-160, Para graph  3.320  
 
The SBA is in charge of overseeing and encouraging federal government procurement with small 
businesses whenever possible. Contracting officials are encouraged to use small business 
set-aside and sole -source contracts to help their agencies meet their small business contracting 
goals. Under the Small Business Act (P.L.  85-536), as amended, government purchases with an 
anticipated value above the micro -purchase threshold of USD  10,000, and up to the SAT of 
USD 250,000, are to be automatically and exclusively set aside for small businesses, provided 
there are at least two or more (Rule of Two) small business concerns that are competitive in terms 
of market prices, quality, and delivery. Preference is given to socio -economic p rograms (see 
below). Non -construction contracts with a value of USD  700,000 or more, if not set aside for small 
business, must have a subcontracting plan that includes small businesses, if awarded to a 
non-small business. The same applies for construction contracts with a value of USD  1.5 million  
or more.  
 
QUESTION 19:  According to Paragraph  3.320, non -construction contracts with a value of 
USD 700,000 or more, if not set aside for small business, must have a subcontracting plan that 
includes small businesses, if awarded to a non -small business. The same applies for construction 
contracts with a value of USD  1.5 million  or more. Could the U .S. please explain further on: What 
percentage or value of the non -construction contract and construction contra ct that are required to 
be subcontracted to a small business?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  Information on subcontracting plan requirements and additional information on the 
SBA programs are available at 19.7 of the FAR, available at: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part -
19#FAR_Subpart_19_7 . 
 
QUESTION 20:  Is the non -small business required to subcontract using the set aside mechanism 
or can it directly subcontract to a sole -source supply small bu siness in the event there is only one 
supplier available to deliver or specialised in the delivery of such goods or services?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  Information on subcontracting plan requirements and additional information on the 
SBA programs are available at 19.7 of the FAR, available at: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/pa rt-
19#FAR_Subpart_19_7 . 
 
Page  161, Para graph  3.323  
 
The WOSB Program is geared to help increase women's participation in federal government 
procurements to 5% of the total. It consists of set -asides for WOSBs in procurement contracts 
and granting sole -source contracts under specific circumstances. Some contracts are restricted 
further to Economically Disadvantaged Women -Owned Small Businesses (EDWOSBs). The 
program's regulations were modified in 2020, to make SBA certification as a WOSB or EDWOSB a 
requirement; previously, self -certification was sufficient. The 8(a) Business Development Program 
is directed to SDBs. The 8(a) certification qualifies a business as eligible to compete for the 
program's sole -source and competitive set -aside contracts. Partici pation in this program by an 
SDB is limited to nine years. The SDVOSBC Program allows federal contracting officers, if certain 
criteria are met, to restrict competition in a procurement to SDVOSBCs and award a sole -source 
or set -aside contract. In the case  of the HUBZone Program, the Government limits competition 
for certain contracts to businesses in historically underutilized business zones. It also gives 
HUBZone -certified businesses a 10% price evaluation preference in full and open contract 
competitions , as well as subcontracting opportunities.  
 
QUESTION 21:  Paragraph  3.323 states that businesses located within historically underutilized 
business zones are eligible for the HUBZone small business procurement program. Could the U .S. 
further explain on how a 10% price evaluation preference in full and open contract competitions, as 
well as subcontracting opportunities affect the bid of a HUBZone -certified business and provide an 
example of how it is implemented?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  For a de scription, including examples, of how a price evaluation preference affects 
the bid of a certified HUBZone small business concern in full and open competition, please refer to WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 386 - 
 
  13 CFR 126.613, available at: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -13/chapter -I/part -126/subpart -
F/section -126.613 . 
 
Page  161, Para graph  3.325  
 
A government -wide procurement goal stipulates that at least 23% of all federal government 
contracting dollars should be awarded to small businesses. As part of this general goal, there are 
targeted sub -goals for the following small business categories: WOSB:  6%; SDB:  11%; 
SDVOSBC:  3%; and HUBZone:  3%. These sub -goals are not in addit ion to the 23% but are 
counted as part of the overall goals. Goals previously set were met overall in FY2017 to FY2020; 
for SDBs and SDVOSBCs, the goal was amply exceeded, but for the women -owned and HUBZone 
programs, they have generally not been met (Tabl e 3.36). The goals for subcontracting were also 
achieved. The goal for small business sub -contracting is 29.43%; the results achieved were 
33.27% in FY2019 and 32.46% in FY2020, for a total of USD  82.8 billion . 
 
QUESTION 22:  Based on Table  3.36, for the period of FY2017 until FY2020, only the sub -goal of 
5% for women -owned small businesses in FY2019 were met while HUBZone Programs have failed 
to meet the 3% sub -goal throughout the four years duration. Could the U .S. explain why both 
categories of small bu siness programs have generally failed to meet its sub -goals and what 
contributed to the success of meeting the goal in FY2019 for women -owned small businesses?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The literature suggests that women -owned businesses are underrepresented in 
federa l contracting due to a number of barriers, including potential discrimination, lack of knowledge 
about or disinterest in government contracting, difficulties with federal certifications, smaller size, 
reduced capacities, limited government and business net works, and other unfavorable social, policy, 
and regulatory environments. Another factor accounting for the lower access to federal contracting 
among women is that they tend to own businesses in industry sectors that are more crowded and 
competitive and th at have higher failure rates. Furthermore, government agencies are prone to 
bundle contracts, purchase from larger firms, and procure from industries outside of sectors in which 
women tend to concentrate.  
For more information, see the SBA Women -Owned Small  Business NAICS Analysis Final Report, 
available at: www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2 022-03/WOSB%20NAICS%20Analysis%20 -
%20FINAL%20VERSION%20%283%29%20%281%29%20%281%29%20%283%29%28R%29%
20%282%29.pdf . 
 
Page  161-162, Para graph  3.326  
 
The AbilityOne Program, administered by the U.S. AbilityOne  Commission, an independent federal 
agency, employs people who are blind or have significant disabilities in the manufacture and 
delivery of products and services to the Federal Government. The Program employs some 
42,000  people and operates nationwide wit h some 500  non-profit agencies representing 
40 government agencies. The Program supplied USD  3.9 billion  in products and services to the 
Federal Government in FY2020, of which USD  2.3 billion  in products and services annually to DOD, 
the largest customer o f the AbilityOne Program. Procurement under the Program has been 
particularly important during the COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
QUESTION 23:  Paragraph  3.326 indicates that the AbilityOne Program supplied USD  3.9 billion  in 
products and services to the Federal Government in FY2020, of which USD  2.3 billion  in products 
and services annually to Department of Defense (DOD), the largest customer of the AbilityOne 
Program.  
What other procuring federal agencies are involved in the AbilityOne Program that round up the top 
5 procuring federal agencies besides the DOD?  
 
RESPONSE  23: For more information  on the AbilityOne  Program,  please  see the Agency's  most re
cent annual  report,  available  at: https://www.abilityone.gov/docum ents/U.S.%20AbilityOne%20Co
mmission%20FY2022%20PAR%20Final.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 24:  What is the percentage or share of procurement conducted under the AbilityOne 
Program compared against the overall total procurement undertaken by the U .S. Federal 
Government?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 387 - 
 
  RESPONSE  24: For more information  on the AbilityOne  Program,  please  see the Agency's  most re
cent annual  report,  available  at: https://www.abilityone.gov/documents/U.S.%20AbilityOne%20Co
mmission%20FY2022%20PAR%20Final.pdf . 
 
Page  227, Para graph  4.146  
 
The contribution of manufacturing to U.S. GDP has continued to decline since the last Review in 
2018. This trend, as well as the related decline of manufacturing jobs, has been well documented 
since the beginning of the 2000s and it has been behind some policy decisions, e.g.  on 
procurement, by the U.S. authorities during the review period. In 2021, the manufacturing sector 
contributed 11.1% of the total value added produced in the United  States , a mild recovery 
(+0.2  percentage point s) following the negative shock in 2020 related to the COVID -19 pandemic, 
and down from 11.7% in 2015 (Table  4.14). The contribution of durable goods to national output 
has fallen by almost half a  percentage point  since 2015; durable goods accounted for 6.1% of 
GDP in 2021. The manufacturing of durable goods witnessed a loss of more than half a million 
jobs between 2019 and 2020, and employment le vels in 2020 were below their respective values 
in 2015. As for non -durable goods, their decline in GDP participation was limited to 
0.18 percentage point s since 2015. In terms of employment, non -durable manufacturing showed 
higher resilience to the COVID -19 recession and kept employment levels similar to those observed 
in 2015.  
 
QUESTION 25:  What types of value -added products are produced in the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 25:  As noted in Table  4.14 of the Secretariat Report, total manufacturing output in the 
United  States  totaled US D 2,484  billion in 2021. A wide range of value -added goods are 
manufactured in the United  States , such as semiconductors, electronics, motor vehicles, passenger 
aircraft, and motor vehicles.  
 
QUESTION 26:  What are the initiative s to create more job opportunities in the United  States  despite 
the loss of more than half a million jobs in the manufacturing of durable goods?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  Please refer to Sections  4.3.2 through 4.2.4 of the Secretariat Report for a summary 
of some U.S.  initiatives to create more job opportunities in the United  States , including initiatives 
intended to help protect jobs during the COVID -19 pandemic.  
 
Page  251, Para graph  4.233  
 
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established by P.L.  115-278 in 
November  2018 to lead cybersecurity and critical infrastructure security programs, operations, 
and associated policy. CISA's mandate includes providing guidance and recommendations on the 
security of underseas cables, which c arry the bulk of international data traffic; however, CISA has 
no formalized policy or procedure regarding data traffic on the grounds of cybersecurity. The 
Department of Homeland Security Data Framework Act of 2018 (P.L.  115-331) and the 
Strengthening, an d the Enhancing Cyber -capabilities by Utilizing Risk Exposure (SECURE) 
Technology Act (P.L.  115-390) were enacted in December 2018. They aim at enhancing the 
cybersecurity framework and at mitigating supply chain risks in the acquisition of technology and 
equipment through a strategic plan to be developed by the Federal Acquisition Security Council. 
E.O. 13873 of 15  May 2019, Securing the Information and Communications Technology and 
Services Supply Chain, declared a national emergency to deal with the threat constituted by the 
unrestricted acquisition and use of certain information and communications technology and 
services  
 
QUESTION 27:  Is there any ongoing plan by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
(CISA) to undertake a study in deve loping a policy or procedure to resolve the cybersecurity data 
traffic issue?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  253, Para graph  4.238  
 
In 2019, civil aviation in the United  States  accounted for 6.5  million  jobs, contributed WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 388 - 
 
  USD 779 billion  annually to the U.S. economy, and was responsible for 4.2% of GDP. In FY2019, 
and prior to any COVID -19-related travel restrictions, FAA guided 27.7  million  flights every year, 
consisting of 16.4  million  instrument flight rule flights (radar assisted) and  11.3 million  
visual -flight-rule flights (low -flying planes). It manages 520  control towers and 21  air route traffic 
control centres, with more than 14,000  air traffic controllers.  
 
QUESTION 28:  Please share the number of jobs and GDP during and post COVID -19 (year 2020 
and 2021).  
 
RESPONSE 28:  The Secretariat cited the most recent report from IATA. The FAA has produced its 
own reports,  but the most recent  report  does not include  data from 2020 or 2021.  Please  see: http
s://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/media/2020_jan_economic_impact_report.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 29:  Were they affected?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  Please see response to Question  28. 
 
QUESTION 30:  In what ways?  
 
RESPONSE 30: Please see response to Question  28. 
 
Page  262, Para graph  4.275  
 
Under the Foreign Shipping Practices Act of 1988 (FSPA) (46  U.S.C.  42302), the FMC is required 
to investigate and take action in response to conditions arising from foreign government measures 
or business practices in the U.S. -foreign shipping trades that adversely affect U.S. carriers but do 
not apply to foreign carriers in the United  States . Section  19 of the Mercha nt Marine Act of 1920 
authorizes the FMC to investigate and take action to address "unfavourable shipping conditions in 
U.S. foreign commerce and may impose penalties". No action was taken during the period under 
review. The FMC maintains a Passenger Vesse l (Cruise) Operator program, with some 200  cruise 
vessels registered in it and monitored by FMC. The FMC is also engaged in regulatory reform.313 
In 2020, the FMC issued Federal Maritime Commission Proposed FY 2022 -2026 Strategic Goals 
and Stewardship. Amo ng the strategic goals are: (i)  maintaining a competitive and reliable 
international ocean transportation supply system; (ii)  developing and implementing a 
comprehensive monitoring program to assess covered services; (iii)  protecting the public from 
unlawf ul, unfair, and deceptive ocean transportation practices, by identifying them and preventing 
public harm through licensing and financial responsibility requirements; and (iv)  resolving 
international shipping disputes through alternative dispute resolution and adjudication.  
 
QUESTION 31:  Please explain further on the types of unfavourable shipping conditions in US foreign 
commerce that results in penalties.  
 
RESPONSE 31:  The Federal Maritime Commission finds conditions created by foreign governmental 
action or competitive methods, pricing practices, or other practices of owners, operators, agents or 
masters of foreign vessels unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade of  the United  States , if such 
conditions:  
 
1) Impose upon vessels in the foreign trade of the United  States  fees, charges, requirements, 
or restrictions different from those imposed on other vessels competing in the trade, or 
preclude vessels in the foreign trade of the United  States  from competing in the trade on 
the same basis as any other vessel;  
2) Reserve sub stantial cargoes to the national flag or other vessels and fail to provide, on 
reasonable terms, for effective and equal access to such cargo by vessels in the foreign 
trade of the United  States ; 
3) Are discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports 
or between exporters from the United  States  and their foreign competitors and which 
cannot be justified under generally accepted international agreements or practices and 
which operate to the detriment of the foreign commerce  or the public interest of the 
United  States ; 
4) Restrict or burden a carrier's intermodal movements or shore -based maritime activities, 
including terminal operations and cargo solicitation; agency services; ocean transportation WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 389 - 
 
  intermediary services and oper ations; or other activities and services integral to 
transportation systems; or  
5) Are otherwise unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade of the United  States . 
 
46 C.F.R.  § 550.301.  
 
Page  274, Para graph  4.315  
 
The United  States  keeps a decentralized, market -driven approach to regulate digital services 
through policies, regulations, and laws on specific issues and/or sectors that together support the 
progression of digital transformation. Although there is no general consensus on the contours of 
the digital economy or of digital trade, concerns regarding data security as well as an open, 
non-discriminatory, and fair competition in the digital economy have been rising.  
 
QUESTION 32:  What are the concerns regarding data security and how does the U .S. plan to 
address these concerns?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  Protection of cybersecurity is regulated mainly by state laws and federal regulations, 
which provide industry -specific mandates with respect to data security. One of the main Fede ral 
Government initiatives has been the development of the Cybersecurity Framework through the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The NIST Cybersecurity Framework consists 
of standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes that alig n policy, business, and 
technological approaches to reduce cybersecurity risks. It is used widely by private and public sector 
organizations in and outside of the United  States . 
 
 
MALAYSIA  - ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
Page  7 
2.7 Exports, Imports, and the Trade Balance  
 
2.19. Though trade in goods broadly recovered in 2021, supply bottlenecks slowed the recovery of 
both imports and exports of such products as automotive and capital goods that are at the heart of 
global value chains that were disrupted by pandemic -related challenges. Meanwhile, waves of 
COVID -19 infections weighed down the recovery of cross -border trade in services. Although trade in 
services that are less reliant on personal contact followed a recovery pattern  similar to goods, others, 
particularly travel and transportation services, continue to be impaired by the persistence of the 
virus. The sharp contraction of trade in travel services was a notable drag on the U.S. trade balance 
in 2021. Exports of these se rvices in the form of foreign tourists, students, and business travellers 
are typically a significant contributor to the surplus in the U.S. trade balance in services.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Appreciate if the U.S. could indicate the measures taken to address global value 
chain disruptions for the automotive sector.  
 
RESPONSE  1: The issue of supply chain resiliency is a key priority for the Biden -Harris 
Administration, as evidenced by the Executive Order (EO) 14017, issued on 24  February  2021, to 
launch a comprehensiv e review of U.S. supply chains and direct federal departments and agencies 
to identify ways to secure U.S. supply chains against a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities.  The 
Administration is working across agencies to support principles for supply chain  resilience: 
transparency; diversity, openness, and predictability; security; and sustainability.  
 
Supporting this effort, the White  House and the Departments of Commerce and State established 
the Microelectronics Early Alert System to collect information and mitigate disruption to the supply 
of chips and components around the world. As a result of this work, U.S. auto vehicle assembly 
plants that rely on these chips were able to remain operational. Further, the Minerals Security 
Partnership, led by the Sta te Department, brings key economies together to build robust and reliable 
critical mineral supply chains. The MSP will help ensure electric vehicle battery plants and 
automakers have the inputs they need to keep production lines open.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 390 - 
 
  Page  8 
 
2.8 Challenges to the U.S. and Global Economy  
 
2.22. The Russian  Federation's unprovoked and unjustifiable war with Ukraine has further challenged 
the global outlook. It has exacerbated supply disruptions, driven up energy costs and increased food 
insecurity. The IMF projects global growth to slow from an estimated 6.1% in 2021 to 3.2% in 2022 
and 2.9% in 2023, which is 1.2 and 0.9  percentage points lower for 2022 and 2023 than the IMF's 
projections in January  2022.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Appreciate if the U.S. could ind icate how it would help its allies mitigate spiralling 
energy fuel costs especially gas and coal.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The United  States is closely monitoring energy issues resulting from Russia's 
unprovoked and unjustifiable war with Ukraine, including impacts on  allies and partners in Europe 
and elsewhere.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Would export of indigenous US's LNG could be accelerated to critical regions and 
zones especially Europe and what sort of hurdles would it face? And what sort of time frame could 
it be achieved?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States is closely monitoring energy issues resulting from Russia's 
unprovoked and unjustifiable war with Ukraine, including impacts on allies and partners in Europe 
and elsewhere.  
 
Page  10 
 
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoti ng Sustainable Environmental Practices  
 
3.14. Finally, the United  States will continue to support and promote more circular and 
resource -efficient approaches in other international fora, including the WTO's Committee on Trade 
and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, and at the 
OECD. In the APEC forum, we are leading a Recyclable Materials Policy Program under the Committee 
on Trade and Investment. We will continue to support and expand this work, to help d evelop the 
capacity of APEC economies to identify and frame domestic policies that promote solid waste 
management and recycling infrastructure.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Will the U.S. consider extending greater involvement with ASEAN  Member  States to 
deep dive in suppo rting and promoting more circular and resource -efficient approaches in the various 
major fora such as APEC?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The United  States welcomes participation by all APEC economies, including 
ASEAN  Member  States, in its Recyclable Materials Policy Program (RMPP). The RMPP is a U.S. 
self-funded project endorsed by the APEC Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) that seeks to 
develop the capacity of APEC economies to identify and frame domestic policies that promote waste 
management and recycling inf rastructure, as well as address barriers to trade and increase markets 
for recyclable materials, while respecting economies' domestic laws and regulations. In 2021 -22, 
the program included a webinar and survey of economies that were incorporated into a pub lished 
study of the waste management and recycling -related policy landscape in the Asia Pacific region, 
available at:  https://www.apec.org/publications/2022/05/promoting -recyclable -materials -policies -
in-the-asia-pacific -region -a-study -of-the-policy -landscape -in-the-asia-pacific -region . In 2022, the 
CTI also endorsed an RMPP pr oject on Promoting Compostable Bioplastics in the Asia -Pacific Region, 
which included a survey of economy -level information that will inform the content of a study 
exploring the challenge of plastic pollution, and presenting best practices for compostable bioplastics 
and suitable policy responses, including alternatives to fossil fuel derived plastics. Please see the 
APEC Project Database for more information about the RMPP and the Compostable Bioplastics 
project, available at:  https://aimp2.apec.org/sites/PDB/default.aspx . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 391 - 
 
  Page  11 
 
3.4 Bolstering Supply Chain Resiliency  
3.21. Further, in February  2022, the United  States released the results of year -long reviews of six 
industrial base supply chai ns: defense, transportation, energy, information and communications 
technology, public health, and agriculture and food. As part of these reviews, agencies looked at 
new policies and investments across a number of sectors to address the supply chain vulner abilities 
that come from geographically concentrated sourcing and to spur the transition to a low carbon 
economy.  
 
QUESTION 5:  How will the U.S. manage its priorities in safeguarding and ensuring jobs for its 
workers in traditional sectors in the country's  pursuit of low carbon economy?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The United  States recognizes that tackling climate change and building a more 
healthy and vibrant economy with good -paying jobs go hand -in-hand. As we take steps to put the 
United  States on a path to achieve a net -zero emissions economy by no later than 2050, we are 
simultaneously bolstering and supporting our workforce in myriad ways, including through skilling 
and re -skilling programs. For example, the Inflation Reduction Act provides a number of inc entives 
and investments to achieve our clean energy goals; one of the conditions of receiving those 
incentives for specific clean energy projects is to use a certain percentage of labor from apprentices 
in registered programs under our National Apprentices hip Act. In addition, our Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act invests hundreds of millions in workforce development and 
training in cutting -edge technologies that will provide career opportunities for years to come.  
 
QUESTION 6: How will the country manage its existing pacts with countries and entities, for 
instance, energy -related suppliers in its transition to a decarbonised environment?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  The intent behind this question and what is meant by "pacts" is unclear. However, 
as this qu estion seems to be asking about future plans, the United  States reminds Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 7:  In the case of existing sanctions against certain countries and entities, how flexible 
would the U.S. shift from one position to another and made it known to WTO  members in due 
advance notice?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
administers sanctions programs in furtherance of U.S. national security and fore ign policy objectives. 
OFAC administers and enforces nearly 30  programs that involve economic and trade sanctions 
directed against specific countries or measures generally designed to counter terrorism, 
transnational criminal organizations, cyber -related c rimes, drugs trafficking, human rights abuses, 
corruption, trade in rough diamonds, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These 
authorities are further reflected by OFAC in its regulations which are published in the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regu lations (Title  31, Chapter  V of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), and on OFAC's 
website at: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac . Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Review s are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  26 
 
5.5.3 United  States -ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement  
 
5.76. The United  States continued to work under the auspices of the United  States -ASEAN  TIFA to 
further enhance economic ties between the United  States and ASEAN, which collectively represents 
the United  States' fourth largest trading partner. At the annual ASEAN Economic Ministers -USTR 
Consultations in September  2021, the United  States and ASEAN agreed to enhance cooperation on 
labor, environment,  and SMEs. The United  States is also continuing cooperation with ASEAN on 
digital trade, intellectual property, standards, competition, trade facilitation, and agriculture 
biotechnology.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Would the U.S. be receptive to the idea of crystalising greater collaboration in energy 
sector and include it among areas of priority in the U.S. -ASEAN  TIFA context?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 392 - 
 
  RESPONSE 8:  The United  States consults with ASEAN member states regularly on potential t rade 
and investment priorities for collaboration under the U.S. -ASEAN  TIFA as appropriate, and, in that 
context, we welcome suggestions from ASEAN members on areas to prioritize.  
 
Page  27-28 
5.5.10 Indo -Pacific Economic Framework  
 
5.91. On 23  May the Unite d States launched the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity 
(IPEF). In addition to the United  States, IPEF includes 13  partners: Australia, Brunei  Darussalam, 
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic  of Korea, Malaysia, New  Zealand, Philippines, Si ngapore, 
Thailand, and Viet  Nam.  
 
5.92. The United  States will use this framework to address a range of important areas of economic 
cooperation, including: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and 
tax and anti -corruption . USTR will lead efforts to craft a trade arrangement that includes 
high-standard commitments in the following areas: labor; environment; digital and emerging 
technology; agriculture; transparency and good regulatory practices; competition policy; and trad e 
facilitation. The U.S. Department of Commerce will lead U.S. efforts to expand cooperation on supply 
chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and tax and anti -corruption.  
 
QUESTION 9:  Is it safe to say that the U.S. will take leadership  of the Indo -Pacific Economic 
Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and how immediate would the U.S. start the ball rolling in achieving 
the IPEF's objectives particularly in clean energy and decarbonization?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The United  States reminds Members that T rade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises. In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF pillars. 
The Trade and Clean Economy Pillar statements include overviews of our intention for future 
environment negotiations , including clean energy and decarbonization efforts. Please see here for 
more information: https://ustr.gov/trade -agreements/agreements -under -negotiation/indo -pacific -
economic -framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
QUESTION 10:  How would a U.S. -led IPEF streamline with goals of COP27 and other climate 
mitigation goals and navigate around complex issues such as over -reliance on fossil fuel especially 
coal during short to medium -term periods?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises. In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF pillars. 
The Trade and Clean Economy Pillar statements include overviews of our intention for future 
environment  negotiations.  Please  see here for more information:  https://ustr.gov/trade -agreement
s/agreements -under -negotiation/indo -pacific -economic -framework -prosperity -ipef/trade -pillar. 
 
Page  36 
8. Trade and Environment  
 
8.1. Since the last U.S. Trade Policy Review, the United  States made significant progress on a range 
of trade and environment matters in multiple fora, including through multilateral, regional and 
bilateral trade in itiatives.  
 
8.2 The USMCA Environment chapter (Chapter  24) includes the most comprehensive set of 
enforceable environmental obligations of any previous U.S. free trade agreement. These include 
commitments relating to harmful fisheries subsidies; wildlife t rafficking; illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing; the protection of marine species; marine litter; sustainable forest 
management; air quality; and public participation and environmental cooperation. Full 
implementation, monitoring, and enforc ement of the USMCA Chapter  24 continues to be a key 
priority. In June  2021, the United  States, with its Mexican and Canadian counterparts, organized the 
inaugural meeting of the trilateral Environment Committee during which the Parties provided 
updates on respective efforts to implement.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Appreciate if the U.S. could provide further details on what constituted as "harmful 
fisheries subsidies" under the USMCA?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 393 - 
 
  RESPONSE 11:  Article  24.20 of the USMCA concerns fisheries subsidies and provides that no Party 
shall grant or maintain any of the following subsidies within the meaning of Article  1.1 of the 
SCM Agreement that are specific within the meaning of Article  2 of the SCM  Agreement:  
(a) subsidies provided to a fishing vessel or operator while listed for IUU fishing by the flag State, 
the subsidizing Party, or a relevant RFMO or RFMA in accordance with the rules and procedures of 
that organization or arrangement and in confor mity with international law; and  (b) subsidies for 
fishing that negatively affect fish stocks that are in an overfished condition.  
 
Footnote 28 provides that, for the purposes of Article  24.20, a fish stock is overfished if the stock is 
at such a low level  that mortality from fishing needs to be restricted to allow the stock to rebuild to 
a level that produces maximum sustainable yield or alternative reference points based on the best 
scientific evidence available. Fish stocks that are recognized as overfis hed by the national jurisdiction 
where the fishing is taking place or by a relevant RFMO or RFMA shall also be considered overfished 
for the purposes of Article  24.20.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Is there potential between the U.S. and Malaysia to strengthen cooperation  and 
coordination in promoting responsible fishing practices including combating illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing, in ensuring sustainable use of marine resources and advancing the Blue 
Economy agenda.  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The Maritime Security a nd Fisheries Enforcement (SAFE) Act called for 
establishment of the U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing. This working group takes a 
whole -of-government approach to strengthen maritime security and combat IUU fishing. In 
December, the working grou p released its National 5 -Year Strategy for Combating IUU Fishing, 
available  at: https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2022 -10/2022_NationalStrategyReport_USIWGonIU
Ufishing.pdf . This strategy includes a list of priority regions at risk fo r IUU fishing. Southeast Asia, 
including Malaysia, was included as a Tier One region, indicating that there was both clear 
information about the challenges resulting from IUU fishing and ample existing opportunities for U.S. 
partnerships and activities tha t could address those challenges.  
SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
Page  15 
SUMMARY  
 
22. The forestry sector accounts for between 2% and 3% of U.S. merchandise trade, while trade in 
fish and fish products is slightly above 1% of the total. While the United  States is a m ajor producer 
and exporter of roundwood, it has an overall trade deficit in wood and wood -related products. 
Overall, the sector does not have high tariffs except for AD and CVD duties on certain products but 
maintains certain import/export prohibitions or controls. During the review period, the United  States 
undertook a number of forest -related initiatives related to the environment such as launching its 
Plan to Conserve Global Forests. As the largest importer and second -largest consumer of fish and 
fish pr oducts in 2018, the United  States maintained a trade deficit over the period although 
remaining a significant producer of marine, inland, and aquaculture fish. The United  States maintains 
verification or monitoring programs that require additional procedur es upon importation, such as the 
Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP).  
 
QUESTION 13:  Appreciate if the U.S. could further explain initiatives that will be implemented and 
targets set under the Plan to Conserve Global Forests?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  On 2 Novembe r 2021, the United  States announced the Plan to Conserve Global 
Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks. Further details concerning the Plan to Conserve Global Forests, 
including an explanation of plan objectives, is available here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -
content/uploads/2021/11/Plan_to_Conserve_Global_Forests_final.pdf . 
 
Please also see the progress report on implementing this plan here: https://www.state.gov/ u-s-
leadership -advances -global -efforts -to-conserve -critical -ecosystems -and-protect -carbon -sinks-a-
progress -report -on-implementing -u-s-efforts -on-the-plan-to-conserve -global -forests -critical -
carbon/ . 
 
23. Fossil fuels constitute nearly 80% of the domestic s upply of primary energy as rising output of 
crude oil and natural gas has outstripped declining production of coal. The United  States became the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 394 - 
 
  world's largest producer of crude oil in July  2018 and has consistently been the world's number -one 
producer of  natural gas since 2011. It became a net energy exporter during 2019. In April  2021, the 
administration announced a new target for U.S. economy -wide net GHG pollution: it should equal 
50% to 52% of the 2005 level by 2030, and net zero emissions should be r eached no later than 
2050. A National Climate Task Force has been formed to mobilize action on climate change by all 
federal agencies. Regarding electricity generation, natural gas and renewable energy sources are 
gradually replacing coal -fired power plant s. Federal tax credit programs play a key role in the 
construction of new generation capacity in renewables.  
 
QUESTION 14:  Normal electricity grid operations require sufficient generation inertia, energy stored 
in large rotating generators and some industr ial motors, which gives them the tendency to remain 
rotating and ensure grid stability, from base load plants comprising for instance gas -fired and 
coal-fired units. How would the U.S.' power plants ensure they have sufficient inertias to ensure 
system sta bility in its operations as natural gas and RE gradually replacing coal -fired power plants?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  The Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act make a historic investment 
in the modernization, sustainability, and security of our domestic in frastructure. Among these 
investments is a USD  3 billion expansion of the Smart Grid Investment Matching Grant Program that 
is designed to improve the flexibility of the grid by upgrading existing transmission and distribution 
systems, and improving energy  storage. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members 
that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Would an increase in the planting -up of nuclear power plants are also being 
considered to fill the gap?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  The Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act make a historic investment 
in the modernization, sustainability, and security of our domestic infrastructure. Among these 
investments is a USD  6 billion investment in the Civilian Nuclear C redit program to prevent 
premature retirement of existing zero -carbon nuclear plants, as well as USD  2.5 billion in advanced 
nuclear demonstrations and research. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members 
that Trade Policy Reviews are retros pective exercises.  
 
Page  26 
1.2.2 Fiscal policy  
 
1.21. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117 -58), enacted on 15  November  2021, 
contains appropriations for USD  1.2 trillion, of which some USD  550 billion is new spending. The new 
spending incl udes USD  100 billion for roads and bridges; USD  66 billion for railroads; USD  65 billion 
for the power grid; USD  65 billion for broadband in rural areas and in low -income communities; 
USD 55 billion for water infrastructure; over USD  50 billion for cyberse curity and climate change (to 
protect infrastructure from cybersecurity attacks and address flooding, wildfires, and droughts and 
other extreme weather events); USD  39 billion for public transit; USD  25 billion for airports 
(upgrades and expansions); USD  21 billion for the environment; USD  17 billion for ports; 
USD 11 billion for safety (highway, pedestrian, pipeline, and other safety areas); USD  8 billion for 
western water infrastructure (water treatment, storage, and reuse facilities); USD  7.5 billion for  
electric vehicle charging stations; and USD  7.5 billion for electric school buses.  
 
QUESTION 16:  To date, how much of actual spending have been made by the U.S. to build electric 
vehicle charging stations.  
 
RESPONSE 16:  On 27  September  2022 fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023 funds amounting to 
USD 1.5 billion were obligated for all 50  states and D C and Puerto Rico for the National Electric 
Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program, which amounts to a total of USD  5 billion over five 
years.  
 
QUESTION 17:  How many units of charging stations were built based on the allocation?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Throug h the NEVI Formula Program, states are currently creating and/or issuing  
competitive solicitations to select vendors to build the charging stations. As a result, no units of 
charging stations have been built to date based on the allocation.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 395 - 
 
  QUESTION 18:  Besides government spending, what are the measures and incentives introduced 
by the U.S. to promote electric vehicle infrastructure development?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  There are a variety of approaches that have been employed by the U.S. to promote 
EV infrastructure  deployment, and these approaches differ by jurisdiction. A comprehensive list of 
laws and incentives can be found at the following resource provided by the U.S. Department of 
Energy: https://afdc.energy.gov/law s. 
 
Page  55-56 
2.4.3.2  Investment restrictions  
 
2.55 While the United  States encourages foreign investment, there remain 14  categories of 
long-standing requirements and restrictions in a variety of sectors that place special requirements 
on investors or curtail foreign ownership (Table  2.7). These impact sectors such as transport, natural 
resources, and investment/financial services. According to the OECD's FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index, the United  States ranks above the OECD average i n terms of restrictiveness.  
 
The sectors that were indicated by the OECD as having the highest barriers were the maritime and 
fisheries sectors, and by type of restriction were mainly in the category of equity restrictions.  
 
Excerpts from Table  2.7 Foreign  investment restrictions, 2022.  
Provision of energy:  
 
• Licenses for the construction, operation, or maintenance of facilities for the transmission 
and utilization of power on land and water of which the Federal Government has control, 
is limited to U.S. citizens and domestic corporations;  
• A license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is required for commercial nuclear 
power and atomic energy; this applies to interstate commerce, manufacture, production, 
transfer, use, import, or export. Licensing for n uclear use in medical therapy, industrial 
and commercial purposes, and R&D activities also has nearly identical restrictions.  
QUESTION 19:  Will the U.S. be in a position to relax its regulatory and ownership rules in energy 
sector to admit greater competit ion and foreign investment/involvement?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 20:  Is the regulatory oversight for civilian and commercial nuclear plants and other 
peaceful applications is as tight as for nuclear military use and other mandated use?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  Civil and military uses of nuclear science are overseen by two separate agencies of 
the U.S. Government with distinct processes and policies. The U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) licenses and regulates the nation's civilian use of radioactive materials to provide reasonable 
assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and 
security, and to protect th e environment.  
 
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) maintains and enhances the safety, security, 
and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, among other responsibilities. NNSA 
maintains and enhances the safety, security, and ef fectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile; works to reduce the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. 
Navy with safe and militarily effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological 
emergencies in the  United  States and abroad. Each agency performs its respective mission with 
utmost stringency.  
 
Page  110-111 
3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
 
3.147. In its report issued in February  2019, the Secretary of Commerce found that the impact of 
excessive imports on the domestic automobile and automobile parts industry and the displacement 
of production in the United  States was causing a weakening of the U.S. internal economy that could 
impair the national security as set forth in Section  232. USDOC found t hat significant import 
penetration over the past three decades had severely weakened the U.S. automotive industry, as WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 396 - 
 
  U.S.-owned production of automobiles and automobile parts had been reduced by imports and the 
domestic manufacturing base had weakened. Ov erall, the share of global R&D investments in the 
automotive sector attributable to the United  States had significantly declined and was a fraction of 
the share conducted by foreign competitors. A further decline in domestic production volumes would 
furthe r weaken U.S. contribution to automotive R&D and impede the industry's ability to invest in 
the development of technologies needed to maintain a leading edge in U.S. military capabilities. The 
Secretary of Commerce concluded that current quantities and cir cumstances of imports of 
automobiles and certain automobile parts were weakening the U.S. internal economy and 
threatening to impair national security as set forth in Section  232 and recommended negotiating an 
agreement or imposing tariffs of up to 35%. Th e President agreed with the Secretary's finding and 
directed the USTR to pursue negotiation of agreements to address the threatened national security 
impairment.  
 
QUESTION 21:  Appreciate if the U.S. could indicate whether the recommendation to impose tarif f 
of up to 35% following investigation under Section  232 will be implemented for the automotive 
sector.  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  131 
3.3.1 Incentives  
 
3.227. The United  States notifies subsidy programs to the WTO  Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures on a regular basis. The notifications are provided as a matter of 
transparency without prejudice to the legal status of the program s under the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures. The most recent notification, circulated in July  2021, covers FY2019 
and FY2020. The notification includes nearly 750  programs maintained at the sub -federal level. The 
estimated expenditures o n federal non -agricultural programs are summarized in Table  3.26. 
 
Excerpts from Table  3.26. 
Table  3.26 Federal subsidy programs (non -agriculture), FY2018 -20: 
 
• Energy and fuels;  
• Advanced Research Projects;  
• Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems;  
• Resilie nt Distribution Systems;  
• Nuclear Energy: Small Modular Reactor Licensing Technical Support;  
• Nuclear Energy: Supercritical Transformational Electric Power;  
• Nuclear Energy: Fuel Cycle R&D;  
• Nuclear Energy: Enabling Technologies;  
• Nuclear Energy: Reactor Concep ts R&D and;  
• Demonstration – Advanced Reactor Technologies;  
• Renewable Energy Resources;  
• Energy Conservation Programs – Transportation Sector;  
• Energy Conservation Programs – Building Technologies Office;  
• Energy Conservation – Advanced Manufacturing;  
• Fossil E nergy R&D;  
• Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program;  
• Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program (ATVM);  
• Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program;  
• Other energy and fuels;  
• Expensing of Exploration and Development (E&D);  
• Costs for Oil, Gas and other Fuels;  
• Excess of Percentage over Cost Depletion for Oil, Gas and Other Fuels;  
• Capital Gains Treatment of Royalties on Coal;  
• Second Generation Biofuel Credit;  
• Biodiesel and Renewable Diesel Credit;  
• Alternative Fuel Mixture Credit;  
• Credits for Investme nt in Advanced Coal Facilities and Advanced Gasification Facilities;  
• Advanced Energy Property Credit;  
• Two-year Amortization of Geological and Geophysical Expenditures;  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 397 - 
 
  • Energy Production Credit;  
• Energy Investment Credit;  
• Energy Grant in lieu of the Energy P roduction Credit or the Energy Investment Credit;  
• Credit for Holding New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds;  
• Credit for Holding Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds;  
• Carbon Oxide Sequestration Credit;  
• Enhanced Oil Recovery Credit;  
• Accelerated Depreciation for Ren ewable Energy.  
 
QUESTION 22:  The detailed breakdown and roll out of tasks are impressive, coherent and  
systematic. Would the U.S. be in a position to provide assistance to its trading allies like ASEAN  
to indulge and pivot on similar initiatives?  
 
RESPONSE  22: The United  States is prepared to discuss any issue with its trading partners, 
including with respect to notification of support programs to the WTO.  
 
Page  146-147 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
 
3.280. Governmental ownership or control over enterprises that engage in commercial activities are 
exceptions to the rule in the United  States. The Federal Government does not have a general 
incorporation statute, and each entity is thus chartered through an act of Congress with a clear and 
transparent mandate to perform a public purpose and in many cases not to compete with private 
enterprises. Many present -day government corporations were originally created in the 1930s and 
1940s (Table  3.30). Their legal person ality is separate from the Federal  Government, but they may 
receive federal appropriations to complement their own sources of revenue. At the sub -federal level, 
states, municipalities, and tribal governments have the power to charter corporations that they  own, 
control, fund, or regulate. For example, 45  states and 3  territories organize lotteries, and some 
widely offered games are de facto run as national lotteries.  
 
QUESTION 23:  How big is the contribution by the U.S. SOEs to the national GDP and economy?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  Although statistics on the contribution by U.S.  SOEs to the national GDP are not 
separately maintained, given the small number of U.S.  SOEs relative to the overall size of the U.S. 
economy, the contribution of SOEs is likely marginal.  
 
Page  190 
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
 
Chart  4.2 Farm sector income, 2000 -22. 
 
QUESTION 24:  There is a rise of Federal Government direct farm program payments in 2019 and 
even more sharply in 2020. Could the U.S. provide more details on these.  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The increase in the direct payments in 2018/19 and 2019/20 was due to two ad hoc, 
temporary programs: the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) and the Coronavirus Food Assistance 
Program (CFAP). Both the MFP and CFAP programs are no longer in eff ect and notified expenditures 
will eventually reduce to zero. CFAP was a temporary program designed to minimize the negative 
economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture, while MFP was a temporary program designed 
to help assist producers with meeting the additional costs associated with disrupted markets for 
commodities targeted by retaliatory tariffs.  
 
Page  211 
4.1.2.2 Framework, policy, and forest management  
 
4.87. Although laws and regulations that promote or regulate certain forestry aspects exist at the 
state level, their outreach, with some exceptions, is mainly limited to voluntary guidelines and best 
management practices, as the majority of forests under state jurisdiction are private forests. Certain 
incentives, such as lower tax rates/incentiv es, advisory services, and outreach programs may be 
used by states to encourage private landowners to comply with voluntary provisions. While the 
Federal Government has limited control over management and use of private forests, it may still 
have some infl uence on them through cooperative programs with states to provide technical WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 398 - 
 
  assistance to private landowners, by producing and disseminating forest research materials, and by 
providing funding or incentives. The Forest Inventory and Analysis (FIA) Program of the Forest 
Service (part of USDA) collects data and reports on the status of U.S. forests.  
 
QUESTION 25:  What is the impact of introduction of certain incentives, such as lower tax 
rates/incentives, advisory services, and outreach programs on conservati on of forest? Is there any 
increase in private landowners adhering to voluntary guidelines and adopting best management 
practices?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  There are a range of programs at the federal, state, and local levels that promote 
responsible forest management. For example, the U.S. Forest Service's Forest Stewardship Program 
works in partnership with state forestry agencies, cooperative extension, and conservation districts 
to connect private landowners with the information and tools they need to man age their forests and 
woodlands. At the state level, regulatory measures vary. Some states have mandatory regulatory 
forest management requirements, while others rely on voluntary best management practices. 
However, even where a program relies on voluntary  practices, it is unlikely to receive additional 
funding in future years if program objectives are not being achieved ( e.g. if additional lands are not 
being set aside for conservation or forest management best practice targets are not met).  
 
QUESTION 26:  Appreciate if the U.S. could further explain what type and the rate of incentives 
offered to private landowners?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  See the response above.  
 
Page  222-227 
4.2 Energy  
 
QUESTION 27:  Are there other mitigative measures, besides new resource field findings and 
technological breakthrough in the production of shale oil and gas, to reduce energy imports?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Ongoing and new investments in renewable energy are a priority for reducing 
energy imports and meeting U.S. climate objectives.  
 
QUESTION 28:  Appreciate if the U.S. could indicate plans to strengthen access to transition 
financing and to ensure a sustainable supply of energy in an equitable manner in the Asia -Pacific.  
 
RESPONSE 28:  In November, the United  States announced the Energy Transition Accelerator to 
catalyze private capital to accelerate the clean energy transition in developing countries. Information 
is available here: https://www.state.gov/u -s-government -and-foundations -announce -new-public -
private -effort -to-unlock -finance -to-accelerate -the-energy -transition -2/. 
 
QUESTION 29:  What are the incentives provided for new i nvestments in energy sector?  
 
RESPONSE 29: Please see the most recent subsidy notification of the United  States 
(G/SCM/N/372/USA; 14  July 2021).  
 
Page  223 
4.2.6 Nuclear energy  
 
4.139. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for industry oversight, including 
reactor safety, materials safety and materials licensing, waste management, and the issuance and 
renewal of reactor licenses. The NRC is required by law to recover approximately 90% of its annual 
budget from the nuclear indust ry. Reactor licenses are issued for an initial term of 40  years and may 
be extended for an unlimited number of 20 -year periods.  
 
4.140. The United  States is the world's largest producer of nuclear power. Its 56  commercially 
operating nuclear power plants, comprising 93  light water reactor units across 28  states, generate 
about one third of the world's nuclear electricity. Most of the reactors were built between 1967 and 
1990. Units 3 and 4 at the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in Georgia, planned  for 
completion in 2022 and 2023, are the first new nuclear units to be built in the United  States in more 
than 30  years. Federal loan guarantees and tax credits similar to those granted for renewable 
projects have been provided to support the project.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 399 - 
 
  4.141. Facing competition from shale gas and subsidized wind power, several nuclear plants have 
shut down before the end of their operating licenses in recent years. High costs for repair and 
refurbishment, and compliance with stricter environmental requireme nts, have also been 
contributing factors. Three states (New York, Illinois, and New Jersey) have introduced 
zero-emissions credit programs to provide subsidies to their nuclear energy producers and thereby 
secure the long -term operation of the reactors. Th e Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 made the final 
repository of such waste a federal responsibility, and a charge is levied on all generated nuclear 
power for the benefit of the Nuclear Waste Fund. More than USD  44 billion has been accumulated in 
the fund to date. As no central repository is available, nuclear waste continues to be stored on -site, 
and nuclear utilities receive some USD  800 million per year in compensation for their storage costs.  
 
QUESTION 30:  How is nuclear energy supported by electricity tariff formulation?  
 
RESPONSE  30: Information on U.S. nuclear energy programs is available at the U.S. Department 
of Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/ne/office -nuclear -energy . 
 
QUESTION 31:  Are there specific state/federal subsidy allocations built in the tariff and financial 
models?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  Information on U.S. nuclear energy programs is available at the U.S. Department 
of Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/ne/office -nuclear -energy . 
 
QUESTION 32:  Taking into consideration the significant geopolitical challenges arising from the 
Ukraine conflict that have resulted in spiraling fuel and energy prices, how would nuclear energy 
planning measure up against other options such as renewable energy and gas?   
 
RESPONSE 32:  Information on U.S. nuclear energy programs is available at the U.S. Department 
of Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/ne/office -nuclear -energy . 
 
QUESTION 33:  What are the aspira tions of the nuclear manufacturers in the U.S. in global nuclear 
landscape? Would small modular reactors (SMR) become the new focus and sales pitch?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  Information on U.S. nuclear energy programs is available at the U.S. Department 
of Energy at:  https://www.energy.gov/ne/office -nuclear -energy . 
 
QUESTION 34:  What would be the main focus of manufacturers for large or conventional nuclear 
power plants?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  Information on U.S. nuclear energy programs is available at the U.S. Department 
of Energy at: https://www.energy.gov/ne/office -nuclear -energy . 
 
QUESTION 35:  Does the U.S.'s DOE and nuclear fraternity foresee a ti mely relaxation of some rules 
such as 123  Agreement in enhancing its market outreach to potential nuclear newcomer countries?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  Section  123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act specifies the criteria for 123  Agreements. 
Information on these agreements  is available here:  
 
• https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/123 -agreements -peaceful -cooperation ; 
• https://www. nrc.gov/about -nrc/governing -laws.html#atomic ; 
• https://www.state.gov/fact -sheets -bureau -of-international -security -and-
nonproliferation/12 3-agreements/ . 
 
Page  232 
4.3.3 COVID -related measures and other support  
 
4.162. Other supply chains of interest for U.S. authorities mentioned in E.O.  14017 are (i)  high 
capacity batteries, including electric -vehicle (EV) batteries, and (ii) critical minerals and other 
identified strategic materials, including rare earth elements. The authorities support the 
development of clean cars and trucks and have set up an objective of 50% of passenger cars and 
light trucks sold in 2030 to be zero -emission vehicles. The EV Charging Action Plan outlines steps 
federal agencies are taking to support the establishment of a national network of EV chargers 
(USD  7.5 billion allocated by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs  Act, to replace old school buse s WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 400 - 
 
  with U.S. -made, zero -emission buses (additional USD  7.5 billion allocated)), to promote the 
manufacturing of battery minerals, refined materials, battery components and batteries 
(USD  6 billion allocated), and to foster the manufacturing of qualifying co mponents for eligible 
vehicles (USD  17 billion in direct loans available through the Department of Energy Loan Programs 
Office's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Program), among others. As concerns 
minerals and other strategic materials, the List  of 35 Critical Minerals, established in 2018 following 
E.O. 13817, served as a basis for the 2021 review, which extends the analysis to strategic products 
other than minerals. Similar to what was stated in E.O.  13953, the recent review highlights the 
dependence on imports of several products and suggests adopting an environmentally and socially 
responsible production; expanding domestic production and processing capacity, including recycling; 
using DPA Title  III and similar programs to support domestic cap acities and emerging technologies; 
and strengthening U.S. stockpiles, among others. An updated List of Critical Minerals covering 
50 minerals was published in February  2022.  
 
QUESTION 36:  Appreciate if the U.S. can share on the initiatives undertaken in adopting an 
environmentally and socially responsible production with regard to minerals.  
 
RESPONSE 36:  For more information, please see the United  States' "Federal Strategy to Ensure 
Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals" found he re: 
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020 -01/Critical_Minerals_Strategy_Final.pdf .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 401 - 
 
  MEXICO  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  29, Box  1.2 
 
QUESTION 1:  More detailed information regarding U.S. Rescue Plan Act of 2021 supports for 
agriculture is requested.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Provisions of the American Rescue Plan within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) were designed to reduce hunger across the United  States , strengthen the food 
supply chain, invest in rural America, and provide support to underserved, socially disadvantaged 
farmers. For more information on specific activities, please s ee https://www.usda.gov/arp . 
 
Page  41, Figure  1.2 
 
QUESTION 2:  According to the data provided in the report, the "overall decline" in U.S. trade in the 
period under review was mainly due to supply - and demand -related factors that were attributable 
to the COVID -19 pandemic, for the specific case of Mexico, where trade operations remained 
downward, going from 15.9% to 15.8% in the case of exports, and 13.4% to 13.2% for imports, 
outside the health contingency, does the United  States  identify any factor for the decrease in trade 
with Mexico (imports and exports)?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The figures cited by Mexico are its share of overall U.S. goods exports and goods 
imports between 2018 and 2021  - which both slightly declined because overall U.S. goods exports 
and goods imports with the world increased faster. In fact, U.S. goods exports to Mexico increased 
4% between 2018 and 2021 to USD 276.5  billion , and U.S. goods imports increased 12 % to 
USD 384.6  billion . Mexico is the United  States ' second largest goods trade partner, its second largest 
goods export market, and its second largest goods import supplier.  
 
Page  49, Para graph  2.15 
 
QUESTION 3:  In tariff terms, what kind of agreement have the Parties reached at the mo ment 
within the framework of this joint agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  49, Para graph  2.15 
 
QUESTION 4:  Do the Parties intend to apply carbon taxes instead of tariffs on steel and aluminium 
imports at a later stage?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page 49, Para graph  2.15 
 
QUESTION 5:  In addition, what is the volume of trade that benefits from this agreement and, if it 
will be subject to annual growth?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  Options for  the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  52, Para graph  2.26 
 
QUESTION 6:  Could the U .S. specify which six tariff lines the tariff elimination period for certain 
trucks was extended?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 402 - 
 
  RESPONSE 6:  Under the amendments to KORUS, the tariff elimination period was extended for U.S. 
subheadings 8704.21.00, 8704.22.50, 8704.23.00, 8704.31.00, 8704.3 2.00, and 8704.90.00.  
 
Page  52, Para graph  2.26 
 
QUESTION 7:  In addition, please elaborate on the access that was obtained for vehicles that meet 
safety standards in the Korean market.  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Under the amendments to KORUS, Korea  agreed to double the n umber of originating 
vehicles exported from the United  States , to 50,000 cars per manufacturer per year, that can meet 
U.S. safety standards in lieu of Korean standards.  
 
Page  70, Para graph  3.1 
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a unified border in tervention agency under the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), monitors and enforces customs procedures, facilitation 
measures, and related requirements. CBP oversees trade and customs operations at 328  ports of 
entry across the country (i.e.  land, sea, and air entry points), as well as various operations in 50 
other countries. CBP is the government's second largest revenue collector and is preparing its 
"Twenty -first Century Customs Framework" to keep up and adapt to a difficult new business 
environment.  
 
QUESTION 8:  What are the main challenges CBP foresees in a near -term trading environment?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Supply chain visibility is one of the main challenges of the modern trading 
environment. Today's supply chains are comprised of multiple act ors from the point of production to 
the sale of goods, making it difficult for CBP to:  
 
• Detect violative behavior such as transshipment, intellectual property rights infringement, 
and natural resource crimes;  
• Identify and allocate risk to the appropriate parties; and  
• Prevent the exchange of hazardous or illegitimate goods.  
 
Further, the rapidly -expanding small package environment continues to serve as a haven for those 
who seek to exploit the high -volume landscape in order to import violative g oods.  
 
CBP seeks to better position the U.S government for the future of trade by updating CBP's statutory 
authorities via the 21st Century Customs Framework (21CCF) initiative and by implementing a 
reimagined, technology -enabled entry process. These effor ts will improve CBP's ability to collect, 
disseminate, and utilize data throughout supply chains for the purposes of making timely risk and 
admissibility determinations —which would in turn protect the United  States  from merchandise that 
poses a risk to pub lic health and safety, and undercuts legitimate trade.  
 
Page  70, Para graph  3.2 
 
CBP's revenue collection nearly doubled during the period under review, rising from USD 52 billion  
in fiscal year 2018 to USD 93.8 billion  in fiscal year 2021 (the highest figure ever recorded). This 
increase can be attributed mainly to the additional special duties introduced during the period under 
review. CBP's workload increased during the period, largely due to these special provisions and 
related work to review exclusions, which have also increased dramatically since 2018, from 28,556 
to 100,000. The implementation of the provisions of the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement 
(USMCA) has also been an important part of CBP's work during  the period. However, the number of 
imports processed and their value have not changed significantly.  
 
QUESTION 9:  In addition to the imposition of additional excise duties, what specific data other than 
those stipulated in the Report are considered attrib utable to a significant increase in revenue during 
the period under review?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  As was stated in the report, the increase is attributable mainly to the additional 
special duties introduced during the period under review, and to some small extent t he increase in 
e-commerce shipments. We have no further data to report.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 403 - 
 
  QUESTION 10:  What were the specific results of investigations conducted under Section  301 of the 
1974 Trade Law, which resulted in the imposition of duties on imports from China in the  period 
2019-2021?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The 22 March  2018 report detailing the results of the investigation into certain acts, 
policies, and practices of China under Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974 can be found here: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF . The executive summary 
of the report  can be found  here:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations
/301%20Draft%20Exec%20Summary%203.22.ustrfinal.pdf . 
 
Page  72, Para graph  3.7 
 
CBP's automated procedures also include an Electronic Certification System (eCERT) that enables 
the secure transfer of customs information from foreign governments. This system is mainly used in 
certain customs processes related to licens ing, certificates of origin and administration of quotas 
subject to tariff preference levels, which require the approval of a foreign entity. For example, in 
order to benefit from preferential duties, CBP requires the use of eCERT.9 For certain textiles 
imported under preference programs or quantitative limitations, the authorized foreign official must 
issue the so -called "textile visa ", which is an export document that certifies the details of a textile 
shipment.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Where in customs procedures i s the Electronic Certification System (eCERT) 
established?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The eCERT  visa program (formerly known as ELVIS) was established under the 
Department of Commerce Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA) in 1996.  
See 60  Fed. Reg. 56576  (1996) (establishing original ELVIS visa).  eCERT/ELVIS is for those 
commo dities where an endorsement by a foreign government or its representative is required to 
signify that  the shipments  are authorized  for export  to the United  States  
(https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/ecert ). 
 
Page  74, Para graph  3.9 
 
CBP has also developed an E -Commerce Strategy in response to growing volumes of e -commerce 
and non -compliant shipments and to raise consume r awareness.  
 
QUESTION 12:  What do you mean by "non -compliant shipments"?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The majority of e -commerce shipments in the U.S. enter under United  States  
"de minimis " exemptions.  De minimis  is an informal reference to the exemption from duty and tax 
that is provided for eligible importations under 19  U.S.C.  § 1321(a)(2)(C) and 19  C.F.R.  § 10.151.  
Eligibility for the exemption is determined by the fair retail value of the imported merchandise  in the 
country of shipment, as evidenced by the bill of lading, manifest, or other supporting documentation.  
De minimis  eligibility is based on the value of all goods imported by one person in one day.  If the 
total value exceeds USD 800, then none of the shipments for that day are eligible.  Non-compliant 
shipments in the E -Commerce Strategy refer to those shipments that do not meet the eligibility 
requirements in the provisions cited above.  
 
Page  74, Para graph  3.10 
 
CBP monitors free zones through audits a nd inspections. Other local, state, or federal standards 
regarding environmental, safety, and labor measures, among others, apply.  
 
QUESTION 13:  CBP states that it monitors free zones through audits and inspections, so it is 
requested to indicate: what is the procedure for inspections authorized by CBP?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  CBP compliance reviews of bonded facilities are conducted as prescribed by various 
compliance review handbooks, standard operating procedures and informed compliance 
publications. See, e.g . https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/bonded -warehouse -manual -cbp-
officers -and-bonded -warehouse -proprietors  and https://www.cbp.gov/document/guides/foreign -
trade-zones -manual ). Specifically, every fiscal year, each port of entry is required to conduct 
compliance reviews of all foreign -trade zone and bonded war ehouse facilities within its area of WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 404 - 
 
  responsibility, using a risk -based approach. Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) regulations for FTZ audit and 
inspection protocols are provided in 19  C.F.R.  Part 146. Past proprietor performance and 
compliance, along with the spe cific type of commodity involved, also play important roles in 
determining audit frequency.  Audits may be scheduled or occur in unannounced spot checks to 
ensure regulatory compliance and inventory accuracy.  
 
Page  78, Para graph  3.17 
 
TFTEA also established  the Public Sector Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee 
(COAC) to advise CBP on any issues related to its business operations. The COAC holds public 
meetings every quarter and consists of several subcommittees, some of which specifically addres s 
trade facilitation issues.  
 
QUESTION 14:  What are the main achievements of the Advisory Committee on Customs Trade 
Operations (COAC)?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Section  109 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) 
established the Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC). The COAC, a statutory 
advisory committee, is established in accordance with, and operates under the provisions of, the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5  U.S.C. Appendix. The COAC was established to:  
 
• Advise the Secretaries of the Treasury and DHS on all matters involving the commercial 
operations of CBP, including advising with respect to significant changes tha t are proposed 
with respect to regulations, policies, or practices of CBP ; 
• Provide recommendations to the Secretaries of the Treasury and DHS on improvements 
to the commercial operations of CBP.  
 
This industry private sector advice comes in the form of recommendations submitted by COAC 
subcommittees that cover a range of topics that are important to the trade community, partner 
government agencies, and CBP.  The recommendations are used to improve processes and 
procedures that impact policy development an d implementation.  The COAC has developed several 
working groups and subcommittees to include the following:  
 
• The 21st Century Customs Framework (21CCF) addresses current and future trade 
challenges and modernization barriers.  In pursuing 21CCF, CBP envisio ns a trading system 
where: legitimate goods move swiftly and securely; ethical production methods are used 
throughout the global supply chain; domestic industries compete on a level playing field; 
and the U.S. leads the world with innovative trade practice s. CBP has prioritized drafting 
21CCF legislative discussion drafts structured around what the agency views as the biggest 
impediments to trade modernization.  Throughout the 21CCF initiative, CBP has placed a 
strong emphasis on collaboration with stakehold ers across the customs environment, 
including Partner Government Agencies (PGAs), and trade industry representatives with a 
variety of roles and equities. Collaborative efforts with stakeholders have included  
feedback on legislative discussion drafts that addresses trade enforcement and facilitation 
via the 21CCF Task Force and the COAC.  
 
• COAC's E -Commerce Task Force (ETF) of industry participants covering all equities of 
e-commerce to more accurately identify the nature and origin of Section  321 shipments. 
In coordination with the ETF, CBP has mapped business models specific to e -commerce, 
identified parties responsible for the sale and movement of goods, and established which 
parties had access to and could provide additional data with which to b etter assess 
e-commerce risk. This information served as the foundation for both the Section  321 Data 
Pilot and the Entry Type 86 Test.  The goal of the test programs was to collect data that 
CBP could use to identify:  
 
o The entities responsible for the move ment of Section  321 shipments;  
o The exact contents of these shipments, i.e.  "what's in the box"; and  
o Their final destination after arriving in the United  States . 
 
CBP has met with the COAC E -Commerce Task Force to outline the success of the Section  321 Data 
Pilot and Entry Type 86 Test and outlined the next steps to include integrating aspects of the 321 
Data Pilot and the Entry Type 86 Test into a new entry process through a notice of proposed WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 405 - 
 
  rulemaking (NPRM). This process would provide automated release of Section  321 shipments for 
importers who submit the new advance data, which will:  
 
• Bring de minimis  into the 21st Century ; 
• Leverage results from both the Section  321 Data Pilot and Entry Type 86 Test.  
 
• The Northern Triangle Working Group was crea ted to develop recommendations on 
reducing nontariff trade barriers and improving customs processes in the Northern 
Triangle region of Central America, comprised of Guatemala, El  Salvador, and Honduras. 
The objectives of these trade facilitation recommenda tions are to improve the economic 
well-being of those in the Northern Triangle and address the factors impacting migration 
to the United  States . The group leveraged industry stakeholders and the COAC with 
operations specifically in that region to provide a white paper outlining ways CBP could 
affect capacity building efforts.  
 
• COAC's rules and regulations modernization efforts include:  
o The In -bond Working Group (IBWG) continues to refine recommendations for 
regulations and policy changes and assist in implementing recommendations.  Focus 
areas include refining regulatory recommendations and assisting CBP in the 
development of recommended regulatory change, assistance with outreach for new 
implementations and aligning the current recommendations  to the Inspector 
General's recommendations for in -bond improvement where applicable.  
o Export Modernization Working Group was established to identify ways to assist CBP 
to enforce export laws and regulations while leading more effectively to a facilitative 
export environment that benefits the U.S. economy.  Issues identified in the Export 
Working Group include: advanced electronic export manifest use by a larger 
percentage of the exporting carrier community, advising CBP and developing tactics 
to assist CBP i n development and implementation of regulations mandating 
electronic export manifest, continuing engagement with Census and BIS to ensure 
compliance, remake requirements and regulations to accommodate the potential 
changes brought about by CBP electronic e xport manifest, working with the working 
group to develop an advanced electronic manifest program and pilot for land border 
truck shipments in cooperation with Mexico and Canada; and continuing work on 
the strategic vision for future changes to implement a  21st Century solution set for 
exports.  
 
• The COAC and industry representatives have provided valuable advisory input towards 
CBP's modernization efforts regarding: Inbond cargo movements, export facilitation and 
enforcement modernization, broker regulatory  and process modernization, Automated 
Commercial Environment (ACE) processing and modernization, air passenger and cargo 
operations.  
 
• The USMCA COAC Working Group is gathering private sector input on the USMCA's 
Customs Administration and Trade Facilitatio n (Chapter  7) provisions.  CBP will serve as a 
conduit to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), which is the U.S. 
government lead on trade policy matters, such as free trade agreements.  It allows industry 
stakeholders to provide input on Chapt er 7 provisions, and alerts on identified challenges 
and opportunities on public -private sector collaboration.  
 
• The Cross -Border Recognition Working Group reviews, provides feedback and formulates 
strategic recommendations in the following areas: potential  improvements to physical, 
technical, and operational aspects of border infrastructure; improvements and/or potential 
changes to operations of the current joint inspection program (Unified Cargo Processing); 
and the further development of the Customs Trade  Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) 
program  while considering Mexico's Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program to 
verify that the programs are aligned with  the mutual recognition arrangement (MRA) 
signed in 2014.  The working group is focusing on the following strategic objectives:  
 
o Considering possibilities of technologies that could potentially modernize, simplify, 
and/or harmonize customs procedures to the greatest extent possible ; 
o Proposing enhanced data sharing ; 
o Reviewing operational procedures at  selected land ports of entry ; WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 406 - 
 
  o Providing input regarding the scope of the Unified Cargo Processing program ; 
o Considering ways to maximize the current MRA with Mexico Customs.  
 
• The COAC recommended CBP establish "Centers  of Expertise" for specific industry sectors 
and trade associations in concert with the National Account Manager program.  CBP leaders 
agreed and established what are known now as "Centers of Excellence and Expertise ". 
This was significant to CBP as this ch anged its overall organizational structure and 
realigned its workforce to support account management, partnership, and enforcement.  
CBP also modified many of its policies and regulations to support this new alignment.  
There are 10 Centers located in ports across the United  States  that support specific 
industry sectors: Agriculture and Prepared Products (Miami); Apparel, Footwear and 
Textiles (San  Francisco); Automotive and Aerospace (Detroit); Base Metals (Chicago); 
Consumer Products and Mass Merchandising (Atlanta); Electronics (Los  Angeles); 
Industrial and Manufacturing Materials (Buffalo); Machinery (Laredo); Petroleum, Natural 
Gas and Minerals (Houston); and Pharmaceuticals, Health and Chemicals (New  York).  The 
Centers of Excellence and Expertise transfo rmed the way CBP approaches trade operations 
and works with the international trade community.  The Centers represent CBP's expanded 
focus on "Trade in the 21st Century" by aligning with modern business practices, focusing 
on industry -specific issues, and b y providing tailored support to unique trading 
environments. The Centers were established to increase uniformity of practices across 
ports of entry, facilitate the timely resolution of trade compliance issues nationwide, and 
further strengthen critical age ncy knowledge on key industry practices.  
 
Page  79, Para graph  3.21 
 
The United  States  continues to provide advance rulings on customs issues, including classification, 
marking, origin, valuation, and carriers, as well as on the applicability of trade programs. Advance 
rulings, or resolution letters, as they are called, are issued pursuant to CBP regulations listed in 
19 C.F.R.  Part 177, and may be filed electronically using a template, except for valuation and carrier 
rulings, which must be filed in letter form. It is CBP's general policy to make these rulings publicly 
available within 90  days of their issuance through a searchable database known as the Online 
Customs Decision Search System (CROSS). However, the regulations do not specify a deadline for 
the issuance of resolutions or their duration or period of validity. Resolutions remain i n effect unless 
modified or revoked by CBP or changed by law enforcement. In December  2021, CROSS was 
searchable in 209,848  resolutions. In 2021, CBP issued 3,230  resolutions; the most numerous 
concerned classification.  
 
QUESTION 15:  CBP mentions that resolutions remain in effect unless they are modified or revoked 
by CBP or changed by law enforcement, so it is necessary to detail: what are the criteria that CBP 
takes to modify or revoke advance rulings?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  A ruling is modi fied/revoked if it is found to be in error or is inconsistent with the 
current views of CBP.  See 19 C.F.R.  § 177.12(a).  In certain situations, a ruling may be modified or 
revoked by operation of law, without any action required by CBP.  This action occurs w hen a ruling 
is contrary to a recently issued Court decision, recently enacted legislation, or a Presidential 
Proclamation.  See 19 C.F.R.  § 177.12(d).  
 
QUESTION 16:  It is indicated that the regulations do not specify a deadline for the issuance of the 
resolution, duration, or period, so it is requested to explain: when issuing the resolution, does it 
comply with the provisions of article 7.5  [paragraph  6, c)] of the USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  Yes, CBP is in compliance with the provisions of article 7.5 [para.  6(c)] and issues 
USMCA advanced rulings within 120  days if all necessary information has been provided consistent 
with the provisions of Article  7.5. The U.S . endeavors to issue rulings within 90  days of receipt of 
information necessary to issue a ruling and issues classification rulings within 30  days of receipt of 
information necessary to issue a ruling.  
 
In the Report they mention that the number of advance rulings decreased and certain trade remedies 
were established, so the following questions arise. 
 
QUESTION 17:  What were these measures and why were they implemented?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 407 - 
 
  RESPONSE 17:  Additional duties on Chinese imports were put into place starting July  2018 following 
the initiation of the Section  301 Investigation of China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to 
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation. The Section  301 Measures were 
discussed in the Report and are referenced in Response  10 above.  
 
QUESTION 18:  What are the reasons why a resolution can be overturned?  
 
RESPONSE  18: A ruling can be overturned if found to be in error or is inconsistent with the current 
views of CBP. A ruling may also be modified or revoked by operation of law, without any action by 
CBP; this occurs when a ruling is contrary to a recently issued co urt decision, a statutory change, or 
a Presidential Proclamation.  See 19 C.F.R.  § 177.12(d).  
 
QUESTION 19:  How long does it take to issue an early ruling?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The U.S . endeavors to issue rulings within 90  days of receipt of information 
necessary to issue a ruling and issues classification rulings within 30  days of receipt.  CBP will 
normally process requests for rulings in the order they are received and as expeditiously as possible.  
However, a request that a particular matter be given consideratio n ahead of its regular order, if 
made in writing at the time the request is submitted, or subsequent thereto, and showing a clear 
need for such treatment, will be given consideration as the particular circumstances warrant and 
permit.  See 19 C.F.R.  § 177.2 (d). 
 
QUESTION 20:  When a resolution is modified, does it apply retroactively?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  If a ruling that has been in effect for less than 60  calendar days is modified, it is 
effective on the day of issuance and is applicable to merchandise entered or withdrawn from 
warehouse for consumption on or after the date of issuance.  If a ruling that has been in effect for 
60 or more days is modified, the modifying notice will, provided the liquidation of the entry has not 
become final, apply to merch andise entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption 
60 calendar days after the date of publication of the modifying notice in the Customs Bulletin.  See 
19 C.F.R.  § 177.12(e).  
 
Page  80, Para graph  3.23 
 
QUESTION 21:  What percentage reduces inspections  for a CTPAT company?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  CBP does not have a set percentage of reduced inspections, other than noting that 
inspections are generally reduced for CTPAT companies compared to non -CTPAT companies.  
 
QUESTION 22:  It indicates that due to the COVID -19 pandemic, CBP implemented the virt ual 
validation program, so the CTPAT has maintained that validation under a risk management model, 
so it is requested to indicate: inwhat way is that model in risk management?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  CTPAT developed a Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) which identif ied low, 
medium, and high risk partners within the program. Virtual validations would only be conducted on 
low or medium risk companies.  
 
QUESTION 23:  Is the virtual application of that risk model as effective as the face -to-face one?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  Since C BP only conducted virtual validations of low or medium risk validated 
partners, it believes that it was just as effective as in -person validations.  
 
Page  80, Para graph  3.24 
 
Another novelty of the period under review was the phasing out of the Importer Self -Assessment 
Programme (ISA) to be replaced by the newly created CTPAT Trade Compliance Programme in 
March  2020. The Programme aims to continue to provide benefits to selected importers who 
demonstrate enhanced compliance measures, and guides t he CTPAT to trade compliance, so it is not 
limited to security measures. Importers participating in the CTPAT that take part in the CTPAT Trade 
Compliance Program will be subject to requirements other than the Social Compliance Program, and 
will enjoy addi tional benefits. In March  2022, in order to participate, companies already had to be 
part of the CTPAT.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 408 - 
 
  QUESTION 24:  How many companies are currently participating in the current Program?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  293. 
 
QUESTION 25:  Have incidents been identified on i mproved compliance measures implemented by 
companies?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  CBP/CTPAT does not track that information specifically to trade compliance 
partners.  
 
QUESTION 26:  What are the other requirements that companies participating in the Compliance 
Program ar e subject to, and what are the additional benefits?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  This link will provide all the info requested on CTPAT Trade 
Compliance  - https://www.cbp.gov/document/g uidance/ctpat -trade-compliance -handbook .. 
 
Page  81, Table  3.4 
 
QUESTION 27:  To what do you attribute the decrease in the number of certified companies between 
2019 and 2021 ( -600), and also the certificates to foreign authorized economic operators (MRAs) 
(338 to 150)?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  The Covid -19 pandemic was the main reason for the decrease in CTPAT partners. 
Many companies went out of business during that time. As for MRAs, CTPAT accepts AEO certificates 
from our AEO partners that CBP would normally visit as part of its work. It is believed that the 
decrease in the number of cer tificates is a reversion to normal levels as there was an uptick in 
operator certifications in 2019 and 2020.  
 
Page  82, Para graph  3.28 
 
In June  2016, CBP produced an "Encyclopedia of Valuation" that provided guidance on interpretation 
or judicial review is sues that influenced CBP's customs valuation decisions or proceedings.37 An 
update of the Encyclopedia is planned for publication in 2022. CBP has also published since 2006 a 
Customs Valuation Informed Compliance Publication that provides valuation informa tion to the 
trading community. This post was also being updated in March  2022. The United  States  offers 
advance rulings on customs valuation through CROSS.  
 
QUESTION 28:  What legal value does this Encyclopedia have in customs valuation procedures?  
 
RESPONS E 28:  The "Valuation Encyclopedia" is a digest containing a compilation of decisions that 
CBP, the Federal Courts, and the World Customs Organization (WCO) Technical Committee have 
previously issued concerning customs valuation.  It is intended to give guid ance and to aid the public 
in doing research for finding decisions and precedent on valuation issues.  It is indexed by the subject 
areas of the various issues that are involved with the administration of customs valuation law.  It 
contains citations and a s ynopses of prior valuation decisions, such as CBP Headquarters rulings and 
decisions, federal court cases, and WCO Technical Committee Decisions.  However, the Valuation 
Encyclopedia should only be viewed as a guidance document.  
 
QUESTION 29:  It is necessar y to know if, from the elaboration of the Valuation Encyclopedia, the 
negative resolutions or judgments of the jurisdictional bodies in terms of issues of value were 
reduced.  
 
RESPONSE 29:  The United  States  is not aware that the "Valuation Encyclopedia" ha s been cited in 
any ruling or court decision to indicate CBP's official position on any customs valuation issue. The 
Valuation Encyclopedia has no precedential value as it is only a guidance document to allow 
importers to more easily identify rulings appli cable to their scenarios. CBP does not have access to 
any tools to quantify if fewer court cases occur because of access to the "Valuation Encyclopedia ". 
 
Page  84, Para graph  3.37 
 
The USMCA does not contain marking standards. However, through preliminary provisions 
concerning marking standards, tariff quotas and other provisions of the USMCA, published in the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 409 - 
 
  Federal Register on 6 July 2021 (86  FR 35566), Article  102.0 of title 19 o f the C.F.R. was modified, 
so that the rules established in Articles 102.1 to 102.18 and 102.20 continue to determine the 
country of origin for marking purposes with respect to imported goods. Canada and Mexico. The 
rules referred to in Article  102.21 alre ady governed country of origin marking for textiles and 
clothing. This preliminary final rule became effective 1 July 2021, and the relevant changes were 
already reflected in the U.S. marking regulations at 19  C.F.R.  134 and 19  C.F.R.  102. Final rules had 
not yet been issued by March  2022.  
 
QUESTION 30:  When will the defining marking standards be issued?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  The question seems to confuse two separate notices published by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) in the same edition of the Federal R egister . 
 
Regarding the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Non -Preferential Origin Determinations for 
Merchandise Imported from Canada or Mexico for Implementation of the Agreement Between the 
United  States  of America, the United  Mexican  States, and Canada (USMCA), published in the Federal 
Register  on 6 July 2021, (86  FR 35422), the comment period closed on 7 September  2021.  CBP 
received 32  comments.  CBP is analyzing those comments in consultation with the Department of the 
Treasury and is  developing a final rule taking those comments into consideration.  Given the 
complexities of the review process, the United  States  does not have a date as to when the final rule 
would publish.  
 
The Interim Final Rule on Agreement Between the United  States  of America, the 
United  Mexican  States, and Canada (USMCA) Implementing Regulations Related to the Marking 
Rules, Tariff -Rate Quotas, and Other USMCA Provisions, also published in the Federal Register  on 
6 July 2021 (86  FR 35566) became effective 1 July 2021, and the relevant changes were already 
reflected in the U.S. marking regulations at 19  C.F.R.  134 and 19  C.F.R.  102. While interim final 
rules are effective upon publication, there is a comment period that allows the public to submit 
comments.  Based on those comments, the United  States  may make adjustments to the regulations 
as part of a final rule.  The United  States  does not have a date as to when the final rule would publish.  
 
Page  88, Para graph  3.44 
 
QUESTION 31:  Regarding the different temporary suspensions of sectoral unilateral duties that 
were applied and taking into account the recommendations of the industry requesting permanent 
reductions; Could the United  States  comment on whether it envisages a revision o f its tariff rate 
with a phased approach?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  Duty reductions under the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 
are temporary. Congress has not authorized the President to revise U.S. bound or applied tariff rates 
on a permanent basis.  
 
QUESTION 32:  Could the United  States  also comment on whether it has conducted a supply 
analysis in these sectors that can be covered by trading partners (FTA partners)?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  It was not necessary for the United  States  to conduct a supply analysis  of these 
sectors because the duty reductions under the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 
are applied on an MFN basis.  
 
Page  92, Para graph  3.53 
 
In order to offset port maintenance costs, and especially dredging activities, certain U.S. ports 
continue to apply the Port Maintenance Tax (HMT) to loading or unloading goods from commercial 
vessels. HMT does not apply to air cargo. The rate remains at 0.125 % of the value of goods and 
applies to imports, domestic shipments, free zone admis sions and passengers. Some exemptions 
apply, for example, to ship fuel, fish catches, aquatic animals and cargo under customs control. In 
fiscal year  2021, HMT collection amounted to USD  1.56 billion , mostly (88%) derived from imports; 
in fiscal year  2020 the collection was slightly lower (USD  1.31 billion , of which 85% corresponded 
to imports). In fiscal year  2019, the collection was USD  1,550  million , of which 82% came from 
imports.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 410 - 
 
  QUESTION 33:  How does the United  States  consider that a Port Maintenance  Tax, calculated as a 
percentage of the value of goods, is consistent with the discipline established in the TFA, in the case 
of customs processing fees and charges, in the sense that such charges should be established in a 
manner limited to the approximat e cost of the services provided by the foreign trade operation, in 
accordance with GATT principles?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  The Harbor Maintenance Fee is imposed on use of port facilities pursuant to the 
Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (Pub.  L. 99-662; 100  Stat. 4082, 4266; 
26 U.S.C.  § 4461 et seq.).  Port use is defined as the loading of commercial cargo on, or the 
unloading of commercial cargo from, a commercial vessel at a port, regardless of the origin of the 
cargo.  See 26 U.S.C.  §§ 4461(a) and 4462(a)(1) . The fee is applied based on the value of the cargo 
declared by the user.  The fee is consistent with U.S. obligations.  
 
Page  99, Footnote  106 
 
Title V of the TPEA, also known as the U .S. Trade Enforcement Effectiveness Act, introduced, 
inter alia, amendme nts to the provisions on information that may be used in applying facts available 
in an anti -dumping or countervailing duty proceeding, as well as certain aspects relating to 
determinations of "material injury" or "threat thereof". It also amended the defi nition of "ordinary 
course of trade" and the provisions governing the treatment of a "special market situation" in 
anti-dumping proceedings.  
 
QUESTION 34:  Could the United  States  explain what the amendments to the definition of "ordinary 
course of trade" and the provisions governing the treatment of a "special market situation" consist 
of, and why it was considered necessary to make such modifications?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  The details of  the legislation were notified to the WTO at 
G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.23 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.23 (dated 1  April 2016).  
 
Page  102, Para graph  3.78 
 
If USDOC makes a negative final determination of dumping or subsidization, the investigation is 
terminated, the provisional measures are removed, and all cash deposits are returned with interest. 
If USDOC makes a final affirmative determination and finds a margin of dumping or subsidy rate 
above de minimis levels, the investigation is referred back t o the USITC, which has 45 days to make 
a final injury determination. If the USITC's final determination is affirmative, USDOC issues an order 
imposing anti -dumping or countervailing duties; If it is negative, the investigation is terminated, no 
order is is sued, provisional measures are annulled and all cash deposits are returned, with interest. 
The imposition of an order, in the case of an affirmative determination, or the revocation of the 
application of provisional measures in the case of a negative deter mination, are carried out within 
287 days (212  days in the case of countervailing measures), and are published in the Federal 
Register. Affirmative determinations are subject to sunset reviews after five years . 
 
QUESTION 35:  Could the United  States  indicat e the rate at which interest payable is determined in 
the event of repayment of deposits?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  Further guidance with regard to this issue can be found at 19  USC 1677g.  
 
Page  104, Table  3.12 
 
QUESTION 36:  Is there currently any procedure equivalent  or similar to that of "informal 
investigation" removed?  
 
RESPONSE 36:  The United  States  does not understand this question, so it cannot provide an 
answer.  
 
QUESTION 37:  If so, what does this procedure consist of, broadly speaking, and what are the 
differences with formal research?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  See response to Question  36 above.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 411 - 
 
  Page  106, Para graph  3.84 
 
With respect to reviews of new exporters, the amendments clarify t he circumstances in which USDOC 
will agree to conduct a review of new exporters and set out the specific factors to be taken into 
account in determining whether the sales at issue constitute bona fide sales for purposes of 
anti-dumping and countervailing d uty legislation. The new Regulation requires applicants for the 
examination of new exporters to provide evidence to support the assertion that the sale or sales 
subject to a new exporter examination are sales in good faith for the purpose of determining du mping 
margins. This is a new requirement that did not exist under the previous regulation. With these 
amendments, the Regulation is now in conformity with Section  433 of the EAPA, which nullified the 
ability of importers to post specific bonds or guarantee s instead of cash deposits for anti -dumping 
and countervailing duties, and added a provision that the individual dumping margin or 
countervailing duty rate determined for a new exporter must be based on sales made in good 
standing. faith in the United  States. In this regard, the new rules codify the factors that USDOC has 
been using to determine whether a sale is bona fide.  
 
QUESTION 38:  Could the United  States  clarify whether, within the universe of such "specific 
factors" that USDOC will establish to dete rmine whether sales are bona fide, there are some that 
have greater specific weight than others in determining whether sales are bona fide?  
 
RESPONSE 38:  The United  States  cannot answer this question due to its speculative nature. The 
United  States  reminds  Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 39:  If so, could you say what they are and explain why they are given greater 
importance?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  See response to Question  38 above.  
 
Page  110, Para graph  3.98 
 
Table  3.13 presents, grouped by anti -dumping or countervailing duty orders, the 27  circumvention 
determinations made by USDOC between 1 January  2018 and 31 January  2022. Several of them are 
linked to investigations concerning steel products; others relate to chemicals, wood and paper. In 
most cases, these are investigations initiated as a result of an application filed by the industry, but 
a few were initiated ex officio by USDOC. In most of the determinations made by USDOC during the 
period under review, circ umvention of the order(s) was found, and the order(s) was imposed on 
imports from the investigated supplier(s), or on imports from the country as a whole. During the 
period under review, some anti -dumping or countervailing duty orders were the subject of m ore 
than one investigation.  
 
QUESTION 40:  With respect to the circumvention investigations that were initiated ex officio by 
the United  States , could you indicate, by way of example and in a general manner, the main factors 
that led to initiation ex offici o in any of these cases?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  The details of those investigations can be found on the U.S. Department of 
Commerce's website, at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Page  174, Para graph  3.267  
 
Government measures and institutions, including those related to business activities, are exempt 
from the application of federal antitrust legislation when authorized by state policy. Certain aspects 
relating to agriculture, fisheries, the press, insurance,  and shipping and transport activities are also 
partially exempt.  
 
QUESTION 41:  What kind of government measures or institutions are or may be included in this 
waiver?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  The "state action" doctrine provides that the federal antitrust laws do not apply to 
situations where a state government clearly articulates an affirmative policy to displace competition 
in a particular sector, and actively supervises the implementation of  its policy. See, e.g.  Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The "clear articulation" factor ensures that a political choice has been 
made which voters can later reject. The "active supervision" factor ensures fairness in operation and WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 412 - 
 
  an actual state comm itment to its choice of displacing market forces. This doctrine does not displace 
the antitrust laws where a sub -federal agency merely tolerates, but does not actually authorize and 
supervise, conduct inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws. The U.S. antitrust agencies have a 
strong interest in ensuring that such a defense is applied properly and not overly broadly, and the 
antitrust agencies will challenge such a defense where appropriate and engage in advocacy where 
necessary to ensure proper applica tion. For further information on the state action doctrine and the 
limited and strictly construed statutory exemptions to U.S. competition law, see 
WT/TPR/S/307/Rev.1 at §3.3.3.  
 
QUESTION 42:  What is the legal basis for such exemptions?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  The s tate action doctrine was articulated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341 (1943) . 
 
Page  175, Para graph  3.271  
 
Pre-merger notifications pursuant to the Hart -Scott-Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvement Act of 
1976 (P.L.  94-435) may be investigated at the request of consumers or businesses.  
 
QUESTION 43:  Are antitrust agencies required to comply with private requests to review notified 
mergers?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  A private party's request to review a transaction does not create a separate leg al 
obligation for the antitrust agencies to review a transaction.  
 
QUESTION 44:  Do consumers or businesses have any recourse to request that the antitrust 
agencies' decision not to investigate a notified merger be reconsidered?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  Parties can petition the antitrust agencies to dedicate resources to further 
investigate or c hallenge a notified transaction. Private parties also have the ability to directly 
challenge a proposed merger in court, without antitrust agency participation, under Section  16 of 
the Clayton Act.  
 
Page  178, Para graph  3.277  
 
Regarding enforcement actions in merger -related matters, on 9 December  2020, the FTC sued 
Facebook for maintaining its monopoly on personal social networks through a policy of systematic 
acquisition and imposing anticompetitive conditions on computer programmers.404 During the 
period u nder review, the FTC also filed complaints against several companies in the semiconductor 
sector (Qualcomm Incorporated and Broadcom). Incorporated) for its use of anti -competitive tactics. 
In fiscal years 2021, 2020, and 2019, the FTC's enforcement activi ties (both merger -related and 
other matters) resulted in estimated savings for U.S. consumers of USD 2.4 billion , USD 2.1 billion , 
and USD 6.2 billion , respectively.405 Despite strong enforcement action by the DOJ and FTC, these 
agencies are involved in on ly a small percentage (less than 5%) of the nearly 600 civil cases initiated 
each year on antitrust matters in U.S. federal courts.406 On average, the DoJ has filed 15 civil cases 
a year since 2016, and the FTC fewer than 10 cases a year during the same pe riod. 
 
QUESTION 45:  In relation to the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) complaint to Facebook, can the 
FTC assert this as unlawful, even though the various acquisitions have not been objected to or 
investigated at the time by U .S. authorities?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  The U.S. antitrust agencies do not "clear" or "approve" mergers. If, after an 
investigation, the agencies later conclude that a merger had or may have anticompetitive 
consequences, they can file a complaint challenging the transaction. The Fed eral Trade Commission 
sued Facebook in federal court, alleging that the company is illegally maintaining its personal social 
networking monopoly through a years -long course of anticompetitive conduct.  The FTC's complaint 
includes a request for a final judg ment ordering divestiture of previously acquired assets and 
businesses in order to restore the competition that would exist absent the conduct alleged in the 
complaint.  Section  13(b) of the FTC Act, 15  U.S.C.  § 53(b), empowers the court to issue a 
permanent injunction against violations of the FTC Act and, in the exercise of its equitable 
jurisdiction, to order equitable relief to remedy the injury caused by Facebook's violations. In WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 413 - 
 
  January  2022, the federal cou rt denied Facebook's motion to dismiss the FTC's case and the lawsuit 
is ongoing, see Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Facebook Inc. , 581 F. Supp.  3d 34, 40 (D.D.C.  2022).  
 
QUESTION 46:  What powers do antitrust agencies have to intervene or participate in civil 
compet ition cases?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The U.S. antitrust agencies can participate in third party civil cases by filing amicus 
briefs in either the district or appellate courts.  In addition, the United  States  can file statements of 
interest in district court and state  courts under 28  U.S.C.  517. Additionally, in some circumstances, 
the antitrust agencies can intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  24. For instance, in 
Seaman v. Duke University (M.D.N.C.), the United  States  intervened for settlement purposes aft er 
earlier filing a Statement of Interest under 28  U.S.C.  517. 
 
QUESTION 47:  What implications does this high number of civil competition cases have for the 
workload of antitrust agencies?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  Any case participation requires staffing, which may result in staffing shortfalls. The 
antitrust agencies consider staffing implications when determining whether to become actively 
involved in a matter.  
 
Page  179, Para graph  3.278  
 
In September  2020, U.S. antitrust agencies signed the Multilateral Framework for Mutual Assistance 
to Competition Authorities with their cou nterparts in Australia, Canada, New  Zealand , and the 
United  Kingdom. The Framework forms the basis for bilateral investigative assistance agreements, 
including the exchange of confidential information and the cross -border taking of evidence. It 
includes a memorandum of understanding aimed at strengthening and improving tools for 
coordination and collaboration in cases between different agencies, as well as a model agreement.  
 
QUESTION 48:  What kind of activities have been carried out under the Multilateral Framework for 
Mutual Assistance?  
 
RESPONSE 4 8: The Multilateral Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Framework for Competition 
Authorities (MMAC) provides a basis for further strengthening cooperation and engagement among 
the six signatory competition enforce rs. Since signing the MMAC in 2020, the agencies have met to 
promote deeper understanding of their respective approaches to various competition policy issues, 
and, as outlined in the MMAC, have commenced bilateral discussions aimed at entering into 
agreeme nts that would allow for the sharing of confidential information and cross -border evidence 
gathering in individual competition law matters, while recognizing the importance of confidentiality.  
 
3.3.7.8 Copyright  
Page  218, Table  3.43 
 
In the document, they point out the modifications made to harmonize with the Marrakesh Treaty 
that allow the export and import of works published in accessible formats to people who have print 
reading difficulties, however, they refer to the fulfillment of  certain conditions.  
 
QUESTION 49:  Can you indicate what these conditions are, where they are regulated and how they 
are applied?  
 
RESPONSE 49:  Section  121A of the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act specifies the conditions 
which authorized entities must establish to engage in either import or export activities under the 
Act. Further information on the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act is available at: 
https://copyright.gov/legisla tion/2018_marrakesh_faqs.pdf . 
 
Page  218, Table  3.43 
 
From the analysis to the report, the way in which cultural heritage is protected or intended to be 
protected is not observed, for this reason it is considered important to know:  
 
QUESTION 50:  Whether there is or planning to have specific legislation for the protection of cultural 
heritage?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 414 - 
 
  RESPONSE 50:  The United  States  does not have specific legislation for the intellectual property 
protection of cultural heritage. Regarding future plans, the  United  States  reminds Members that 
Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  218, Table  3.43 
According to your legal system:  
 
QUESTION 51:  What is meant by cultural heritage?  
 
RESPONSE 51:  Cultural heritage is not a defined term in U.S. law.  
 
QUESTION 52:  Is ownership of rights to cultural heritage recognized?  
 
RESPONSE 52:  See Response  51. 
 
QUESTION 53:  If so, to which person or persons is such ownership recognized?  
 
RESPONSE 53:  See Respo nse 51. 
 
Page  190, Section  4.1.1.1.1  
 
New features of the 2018 Farm Act include the implementation of additional programmes for 
specialty crops, organic farmers, local and regional markets, and novice, ex -combatant or minority 
farmers.  
 
QUESTION 54:  Could the United  States  elaborate on additional support programmes for specialty 
crops and indicate which products are covered by specialty crops?  
 
RESPONSE 54:  The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 reauthorized a number of existing 
programs that support resea rch, extension, and marketing services related to specialty crops. New 
provisions include: programs to promote increased consumption of fruit and vegetables within 
existing food assistance programs, research and grants to support education and extension fo r 
urban, rooftop, and indoor farming, and a study on mechanization and automation for specialty 
crops. Specialty crops is defined by the Act as "fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, and 
horticulture and nursery crops (including floriculture) ". 
 
Section  4.1.1.6  
 
Eligible participants in the DMC Program may also participate in the Dairy Cattle Gross Profit Margin 
Protection Program (LGM -Dairy) and the Dairy Farm Income Protection Program (DRP), administered 
by the USDA Risk Management Agency.  
 
QUESTION 55:  What are the programs to which producers in the dairy sector can enroll and what 
benefits do these programs provide?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  Current programs authorized by the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 that dairy 
farmers may utilize include the following programs:  
 
Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC): The DMC program is a voluntary program that provides dairy 
operations with risk management coverage that will pay producers when the difference (the margin) 
between the national price of milk an d the average cost of feed falls below a certain level selected 
by the program participants.  
 
Dairy Indemnity Program: The Dairy Indemnity Program provides compensation to dairy producers 
when a regulatory agency requires that raw milk be removed from the market because of 
contamination (e.g.  pesticides or other residues).  
 
Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy (LGM -Dairy): The Livestock Gross Margin Insurance Plan for Dairy 
Cattle (LGM -Dairy) is a voluntary program that allows eligible producers to purchase an insurance 
policy that provides protection when feed costs rise or milk prices drop and can be tailored to any 
size farm.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 415 - 
 
  Dairy Revenue Protection (Dairy -RP): Dairy -RP is a voluntary risk management program designed 
to insure against unexpected declines in  the quarterly revenue from milk sales relative to a 
guaranteed coverage level.  
 
Page  283, Para graph  4.165  
 
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) tracks in an annual report the savings generated by 
reducing the regulatory burden on small businesses.165 For policymakers, improving the ability of 
small businesses to participate in the global marketplace is a key objective. The recommendations 
arising from the review under Executive  Order  14017 require the following: (i)  investing in SMEs 
and disadvantaged businesses in critical supply chains; (ii)  developing an ecosystem that integrates 
innovative SMEs and disadvantaged enterprises; and (iii)  review the ability of the U.S. Export -Import 
Bank to use existing authority to support the U.S. manuf acturing sector. Other policies, such as 
reservations and preferences in government procurement, promote economic opportunities for small 
businesses, including manufacturing.  
 
QUESTION 56:  It notes that the manufacturing sector currently accounts for 4 % of SMEs: what 
other business sectors are SMEs and what percentage do they represent for the purposes of 
providing the above -mentioned policies and opportunities?  
 
RESPONSE 56:  According to 2018 U.S. Census data cited in the Secretariat report, SMEs are emplo yers 
in a variety of industries in the United  States  other than manufacturing, including professional, scientific, 
and technical services (13.50%); construction (11.86%); other services (except public administration) 
(11.56%); health care and social assist ance (10.89%); retail trade (10.58%); accommodation and food 
services (9.03%); administration, support, and waste management (5.75%); real estate and rental and 
leasing (5.28%); wholesale trade (4.80%); finance and insurance (3.92%); transportation and 
warehousing (3.14%); arts, entertainment, and recreation (2.21%); educational services (1.56%); 
information (1.34%); agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (0.37%); mining, quarrying, and oil and 
gas extraction (0.31%); management of companies and enterp rises (0.31%); industries not classified 
(0.20%); and utilities (0.10%). See SBA, Office of Advocacy, 2021 Small Business Profile, p. 4; viewed at: 
https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/08/30144808/2021 -Small -Business -Profiles -
For-The-States.pdf . 
 
Page  303, Para graph  4.227  
 
During the period under review, the FCC has conditionally approved T -Mobile's acquisition of Sprint, 
respectively the fourth and third largest wireless carriers in the United  States  at the time of the 
application. While the FCC tries to complete the exams within 180  days, large operations, such as 
the one cited, may require more tim e. 
 
QUESTION 57:  Is there a maximum period of days for the completion of the exams?  
 
RESPONSE 57:  The FCC's timeline for consideration of major transactions is set forth on two pages 
of the FCC's Mergers & Transactions webpage: https://www.fcc.go v/reports -
research/guides/review -of-significant -transactions , and https://www.fcc.gov/reports -
research/guides/mergers -frequently -asked -questions . 
 
Page 305, Para graph  4.230  
 
Since 2018, at least seven states have enacted net neutrality laws, which have led to ongoing 
challenges by litigants alleging a conflict with the Restoration or Internet Freedom Order. In 
July 2021, the FCC was encouraged by Executive  Order  14036 to reinstate net neutrality rules.  
 
QUESTION 58:  Based on the instruction to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to 
reinstate net neutrality rules, could the United  States  indicate whether there is any progress on the 
development and implementation of net neutrality regulations at the national level?  
 
RESPONSE 58:  Please see the Executive  Order and the accompanying fact 
sheet:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -releases/2021/07/09/fact -sheet -
executive -order -on-promoting -competition -in-the-america n-economy/ . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 416 - 
 
  Page  306, Paragraph  4.233  
 
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established in November  2018 
under P.L.  115-278 to lead programs, operations, and related policies on cybersecurity and critical 
infrastructure security.  
 
QUESTION 59:  Please share whether the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
already has policies/guidelines regarding cybersecurity in data traffic, or if the Laws indicated in this 
paragraph contribute to this e ffort. 
 
RESPONSE 59:  CISA has no formalized policy or procedure regarding data traffic on the grounds 
of cybersecurity.  
 
Page  307, Paragraph  4.235  
 
As part of its response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the FCC launched a USD 3.2 billion  Broadband 
Emergency Ser vice Delivery (EBB) program, which was replaced by the Connectivity Program on 
31 December  2021; Both provide direct support for the payment of broadband connection to eligible 
households. Other FCC programs aimed at mitigating the negative effects of the pandemic include 
the USD 7.2 billion  Emergency Connectivity Fund (ECF), which is earmarked for schools and libraries, 
and the USD 450 million  Telehealth Program263 initiated by the CARES Act.  
 
QUESTION 60:  The FCC could share the results of the two programs (listed in this section) aimed 
at mitigating the negative effects of the pandemic.  
 
RESPO NSE 60:  The Emergency Broadband Benefit (EBB) program was launched on an expedited 
basis on 12 May 2021 following the enactment of the authorizing law on 27 December  2020. The 
EBB provided USD 1.8 billion  in broadband support to more than 9  million  households by 
31 December  2021 when it was replaced by the Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP). More 
information data the EBB program is available here: https://www.usac.org/about/emergency -
broadband -benefit -program/emergency -broadband -benefit -program -enrollments -and-claims -
tracker/#claimed -support . 
 
The Emergency Connectivity Fund program was created by the Commission on 10 May 2021, 
following the enactment of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 on 11 March  2021. The Emergency 
Connectivity Fund program provides USD 7.17 billion  in support to eligible schools and libraries, and 
will reimburse 100% of the reasonable costs of eligible equipment and services provided to students, 
school staff, and library patrons who would otherwise lack the resources to be able to engage in 
remote learning during  the COVID -19 pandemic. The Commission opened three application filing 
windows and demand received during the third application filing window exceeded available funds. 
(It is not expected that there will be any additional application filing windows for the  program.) To 
date, the Commission has committed over USD 6.4 billion  in support to approximately 
10,000  schools, 900  libraries, and 100  consortia (made up of eligible schools and libraries), and the 
program has provided funding for approximately 12  million  connected devices and 8  million  
broadband connections. Additional information about the program is available at:  
https://www.fcc.gov/emergency -connectivity -fund and at 
https://www.emergencyconnectivityfund.org/ . 
 
Page  318, Para graph  4.272  
 
Certain operations in the shipping sector enjoy immunity from antitrust laws. Both U.S. and foreign 
companies operating liner services and ocean terminal operators in the United  States  benefit from 
exemptions from antitrust laws, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts, with respect to their 
operations in U.S. maritime foreign trade. Under the Shipping Act 1984, as  amended by the Ocean 
Navigation Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998, agreements between liner service companies and marine 
terminal operators to study, fix or regulate transport tariffs, as well as other conditions of service, 
or to cooperate on matters relating to  operation, they must be submitted for examination by the 
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) examination.  
 
QUESTION 61:  Do antitrust agencies collaborate in any way with the Federal Maritime Commission 
in reviewing agreements between companies in the sector?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 417 - 
 
  RESPONSE 61:  Both the Commission and the U .S. Department of Justice (DOJ) exercise oversight 
over their respective areas of expertise. Commission staff and the DOJ have shared industry insights 
for many years and continue to do so.  
 
QUESTION 62:  Does this exemption mean that U.S. antitrust agencies cannot collaborate with 
foreign counterparts conducting investigations into cross -border cartels between shipping 
companies?  
 
RESPONSE 62:  The Federal Maritime Commission has an important enforcement role as an 
economic regulator of the ocean liner shipping industry. The Commission regularly meets with 
antitrust and competiti on experts in the European  Commission and the People's  Republic  of China 
at the biennial Global Regulatory Summits, where participants discuss competition issues related to 
the shipping industry. The Commission also meets with its foreign counterparts to d iscuss antitrust 
and competition issues.  
 
Page  332, Para graph  4.311  
 
The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (P.L.  106-229) provides 
that, generally speaking, a signature, contract or other electronic document may not be denie d legal 
effect on the sole ground that its format is electronic. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 
harmonized state laws in electronic transactions and established a model law that  states can adopt. 
The Internet Tax Exemption Act (P.L.  105-277) prohi bits state and local taxes on Internet access 
and multiple discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce; that prohibition has been extended 
indefinitely under the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (P.L.  114-125). However, when 
it comes to online sales taxes, states may require online sellers to apply sales tax regardless of 
whether or not there is a physical presence on the site; the exemption of small sales from registration 
for sales tax purposes depends on economic thresholds. that vary substan tially between different 
states.  
 
It indicates that, under Action  1 of the OECD's BEPS scheme on addressing the tax challenges posed 
by the digital economy, the fact that new ways of doing business may result in a relocation of 
essential business functions  and, consequently, in a different distribution of tax rights, may lead to 
low taxation. In this sense, it is necessary to know:  
 
QUESTION 63:  How does it comply with the principle of neutrality? Taking into account that tax 
systems must try to be neutral and equitable between the different forms of electronic commerce 
and between it and traditional conventional commerce.  
 
RESPONSE 63:  The Internet Tax Freedom Act, as made permanent under the Trade Facilitation and 
Trade Enforcement Act applies only to stat e and local taxes, and not Federal taxes assessed by the 
United  States  government.  In general, it requires that a state or locality apply the same tax 
obligations to non -electronic commerce transactions as it applies to electronic commerce 
transactions inv olving the same or similar goods or services.  
 
QUESTION 64:  What are the measures that allow the government to have control over the 
collection of taxes by participants in the digital economy?  
 
RESPONSE 64:  In general, the United  States  subjects income to tax at the Federal level when 
income is earned by a U.S. company/resident or citizen, a foreign corporation with a taxable 
presence in the United  States , or the income earned from the activity is U.S. source income.  States 
generally require taxation of any person or entity with sufficient nexus or taxable connection to the 
state.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  7, Para graph  2.6 
 
U.S. fiscal support measures (including increased spending and discretionary tax cuts), which 
through the third quarter of 2021 accounted for more than 25% of GDP, were key to the early 
recovery of the U.S. economy, which was faster than that of most of ou r trading partners. U.S. 
federal government spending, which went directly to businesses, workers, and state and local WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 418 - 
 
  governments, was considerably higher than in other major economies. The UK's response was less 
than 20% of GDP and, in the euro area, aver age spending amounted to 12% of GDP.  
 
QUESTION 65:  Explain in detail what the discretionary tax reductions, which were fiscal support 
measures provided by the United  States  to taxpayers, helped the economic recovery after the 
lockdowns caused by the COVID -19 virus, consisted of?  
 
RESPONSE 65:  In response to the COVID -19 pandemic, the United  States  provided a variety of tax 
relief to both individuals and families as well as businesses. This included Economic Impact Payments 
and an expanded Child Tax Credit a nd Child and Dependent Care Credit for individuals, as well as 
paid sick and family leave credits and an Employee Retention Credit for businesses. Changes to net 
operating loss carryback periods and other eligibility requirements provided additional relief . A 
summary of COVID -related tax relief is available on the Internal Revenue Service website here: 
https://www.irs.gov/coronavirus -tax-relief-and-economic -impact -payments . 
 
Page  10, Para graph  3.1 
 
Labor  issues have been an important part of U.S. trade policy throughout the period under review. 
In 2021, the United  States  made it a priority objective to put labor issues and issues important to 
workers at the forefront of trade policy. The USTR Office worke d with governments around the world 
to readjust trade policy so that people can reap the benefits of international trade.  
 
QUESTION 66:  Could the U.S. government provide more information about the USTR office's work 
to combat forced labor?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  USTR has made the work of addressing forced labor in and through trade not just 
as a moral imperative, but an economic necessity. Doing so helps protect workers from unfair 
competition and raises global labor standards. In addition to monitoring and upholdin g the U.S. 
forced labor obligations under the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement to prohibit the 
importation of goods produced by forced labor, the United  States  has been working with trade 
partners and allies to elevate the issue of forced labor global ly. Please see the following link regarding 
additional information about USTR's work to combat forced labor: https://ustr.gov/about -us/policy -
offices/press -office/press -releases/2022/january/ustr -announces -development -focused -trade -
strategy -combat -forced -labor. 
 
Page  13, Para graph  3.23 
 
The United  States  has established a bilateral and multil ateral dialogue with its trading partners and 
other stakeholders to, inter alia, identify bottlenecks and bottlenecks in supply chains; ensure that 
they incorporate sound environmental and labour standards; and facilitating trade in the context of 
supply chain disruptions.  
 
QUESTION 67:  With which trading partners has the United  States  established a dialogue to identify 
bottlenecks and bottlenecks in supply chains and facilitate trade in the context of supply chain 
disruptions?  
 
RESPONSE 67:  Improvi ng supply chains is a key priority of the Biden -Harris Administration.  As 
such, supply chains are a key pillar in the Indo -Pacific Framework for Prosperity and it subject to its 
own working group under the U.S. -EU Trade and Technology Council.  Through thes e and similar 
fora, the United  States  is engaging with partners and allies to exchange information on supply chain 
challenges and opportunities and to share best practices on how to make our collective supply chains 
more secure, diverse, and resilient.  
 
Page 23, Para graph  5.30 
 
In addition, in 2020, the United  States  established an Interagency Forced Labor  Prohibition 
Enforcement Group (FLETF) to monitor U.S. enforcement of the prohibition set forth in Section  307 
of the Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended). This section prohibits the importation into the United  States  
of "all goods, effects, articles, and merchandise extracted, produced, or manufactured, in whole or 
in part, in any foreign country by convicted labor and/or forcibly or/or by workers under contract of 
enforced performance ". In June  2022, the Department o f Homeland Security (which holds the FLETF 
chairmanship) published the FLETF strategy to support the implementation of the Prevention of WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 419 - 
 
  Forced Labour Act in Uygur. This Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that the importation of 
any goods, effects, a rticles or merchandise extracted, produced or manufactured, in whole or in 
part, by forced labour into the Xinjiang  Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's  Republic  of China, 
or produced by certain entities appearing on a list maintained by the United  States, it is prohibited 
under Section  307 of the Tariff Act 1930 (as amended).  
 
QUESTION 68:  It could explain the difference between the sanctions applied in a WRO un Finding 
and those goods or merchandise produced or manufactured in the Xinjiang  Uygur autono mous 
region of the People's  Republic  of China.  
 
RESPONSE 68:  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has issued "Frequently Asked 
Questions" ( https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa -frequently -asked -questions ) regarding the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act, including a discussion of how the UFLPA differs from withhold release orders.  
 
QUESTION 69:  How will the United  States  ensure a non -discriminatory application of such a 
measure?  
 
RESPONSE 69:  The United  States  has reviewed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act's measures 
and considers that they are consistent with our WTO  obligations.  
 
QUESTION 70:  Are there currently any goods or identified goods produced or manufactured 
through forced labour in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region that have been banned from 
importing?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  For information related to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,  please see the 
"Frequently Asked Questions" that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has issued to assist 
with understanding its implementation: https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa -frequently -asked -questions . 
You can find the answer to your question under the following question: "What is the scope of the 
UFLPA?" . 
For more Information related to the enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, please 
visit https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced -labor/UFLPA  or https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa . 
 
QUESTION 71:  Is the United  States  designing any evaluation mechanism for the operation of the 
UFLPA?  
 
RESPONSE 71:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
QUESTION 72:  Did the United  States  conduct any previous studies on the impact that this Act may 
have on international trade?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  The United  States  reviewed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act's measures 
before it was signed into law.  
 
Page  24, Para graph  5.31 
 
In January  2022, the United  States  announced that it would develop its first trade strategy focused 
on combating forced labor. The development of this strategy envisages a comprehensive 
inter-agency review of existing trade policies and the tools used to combat forced labo r (including 
child labor) in order to identify areas that may need to be strengthened and gaps that need to be 
addressed. The United  States  will use this analysis to establish goals, priorities, new tools, and key 
actions to advance its goals to combat for ced labor.  
 
QUESTION 73:  Could the United  States  share the results of the comprehensive interagency review 
of existing trade policies and tools used to combat forced labor (including child labor) to identify 
areas that may need to be strengthened and gaps that need to be addressed?  
 
RESPONSE 73:  Regardi ng future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. The focused trade strategy to combat forced labor will lay out 
the U.S. government's trade approach to addressing forced labor in global supply chains . Work to 
develop the strategy is ongoing.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  NEW ZEALAND  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  48, Para graph  2.18 
 
Paragraph  2.18 states, "In the area of dispute settlement, the United  States' participation, as 
measured by the number of cases it has filed as a complainant, declined significantly during the 
review period compared to previous periods. The United  States  raised 2  complaints, was a 
respondent in 8  cases, was involved in 2  active arbitrations, appealed 6  cases to the Appellate  Body, 
and exercised third party rights in 29  cases (Table  A2.1). In the DSB, the United  States  continued 
to raise its systemic concerns with Appellate  Body overreach ". 
 
QUESTION 1:  In light of the direction from Ministers at MC12, how does the U .S. see a fully and 
well-functioning dispute settlement system operating to serve the interests of WTO  Members?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The United  States  is not prejudging what the reformed system would look like and 
have asked other Members to likewise approach the con versation with an open mind.  We believe 
this approach  - working collectively towards a system that meets the needs of all 
Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving durable, lasting reform.  The 
United  States  believes that the first st ep towards reform is to better understand the interests of all 
Members in WTO dispute settlement.  An approach centered on the interests of Members can facilitate 
greater mutual understanding without resorting to the same positions that have slowed the refo rm 
discussion for many years.  
 
Page  50, Para graph  2.39 
 
Paragraph  2.39 of the United  States  Secretariat Report notes that the United  States -Japan Digital 
Trade Agreement (USJDTA) contains a provision on customs duties on digital products transmitted 
electronically.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Could the United  States  please share any experiences on the contributions of USJDTA 
Article  7 (Customs Duties) towards discussions at the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic 
Commerce or the WTO Moratorium o n Customs Duties more broadly?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Article  7 prohibits the imposition of customs duties on digital products, thereby 
making the WTO moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions permanent for parties 
to the agreement. This discipline is  a good example of how to incorporate the WTO moratorium into 
a country's trade practice.  The United  States  believes all WTO  Members should be ready to agree to 
make the WTO moratorium permanent.  
 
Page  60, Para graph  3.10 
 
Paragraph  3.10 relating to Foreign Trade Zones and bonded warehouses notes: "… FTZs remain 
governed by the 1934 Foreign Trade Zones Act, as amended, and CBP regulations 
(19 C.F.R.  Part 146). There were 195  active FTZs in 2020 and every U.S. state maintained at least 
one zone; they r emain outside the U.S. customs territory for duty and prohibited merchandise 
purposes only [emphasis added]. CBP oversees FTZs through audit and inspection…" . 
 
While New  Zealand  appreciates the fact that the Foreign Trade Zones remain outside the U.S 
customs territory for duty purpose, it is not clear how enforcement of prohibited merchandise within 
an FTZ could be carried when they are not subject to customs control. There may b e other legislative 
provisions that deal with prohibited merchandise if they are imported within the FTZ.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Could the United  States  elaborate how enforcement action is taken against prohibited 
merchandise, if imported within an FTZ?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Imported merchandise admitted into a FTZ contrary to law is subject to seizure. 
See: 19 U.S.C.  1595a(c),  https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE -2010-title19/pdf/USCOD
E-2010-title19 -chap4 -subtitleIII -partV -sec1595a.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  191, Para graph  4.11 
 
Section  4.1.1.1.2, Paragraph  4.11 states "The PLC program provides payments on 85% of historical 
base acres mul tiplied by historical yields for each historically produced covered commodity on a farm 
when the national price (defined in legislation) is less than the statutory effective reference price for 
the commodity. There is no requirement to produce the covered commodity, or any other 
commodity, to be eligible for payments ". 
 
QUESTION 4:  Can the U .S. expand on why the PLC program is justified as non -product specific 
support when it only applies for specific historically produced commodities?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Payments under PLC and ARC -CO are made to farms with historical base acres of 
eligible historically produced crops. While payment triggers under the 2018 Farm Act incorporate 
reference prices and revenue guarantees for the historically produced covered co mmodities, farm 
operators are not required to produce the historically -covered commodity or any other commodity 
to receive ARC -CO or PLC payments. Thus, these payments are not tied to specific commodities.  
 
Page  191, Para graph  4.16 
 
Section  4.1.1.1.3, Paragraph  4.16 of the Secretariat Report states that "ARC payments for the 2019 
crop year totaled USD  1.26 billion to some 648,000 farms and were primarily ARC -CO payments 
(USD  952 million). In the 2020 crop year, ARC payments declined to USD  87 million, with ARC -CO 
payments accounting for 70% of the total. The largest ARC payments over the two years were made 
on base acres of soybeans (USD  718 million), maize (USD  505 million), and wheat 
(USD  89 million) ". 
 
QUESTION 5:  New Zealand  would welcome f urther explanation from the U .S. regarding how the 
ARC and ARC -CO payments comply with the requirement for non -product specific support. 
New Zealand  would welcome further information on the safeguards that the U .S. has in place to 
ensure that through the p rovision of this support, these programs do not encourage over -production 
of historically produced products contrary to market forces.  
 
RESPONSE 5:  Payments under ARC -CO are made to farms with historical base acres of eligible 
historically -produced crops. While payment triggers under the 2018 Farm Act incorporate reference 
prices and revenue guarantees for the historically -produced covered commodities, farm operators 
are not required to produce the historically -covered commodity or any other commodity to re ceive 
ARC-CO or PLC payments. Thus, these payments are not tied to specific commodities.  ARC Individual 
Coverage (ARC -IC) payments are based on the combined revenues for all covered commodities 
produced on the farm and are also therefore not tied to specific commodities.  
 
QUESTION 6:  For what reasons did the payments under the ARC or ARC -CO programs decline 
between 2019 and 2020? Was it due to the COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  ARC payments are triggered if actual revenue is below the ARC revenue gua rantee. 
Based on market conditions in crop year 2020/21, fewer participants experienced actual revenue 
levels that were below the ARC guarantee, and therefore outlays were lower.  
 
Page  198, Para graph  4.41 
 
Section  4.1.1.1.8, Paragraph  4.41 of the secretariat report states "The USDA FSA administers 
various programs that address conservation issues such as the protection of drinking water, 
preservation of wildlife habitats, reduced soil erosion, preservation and restoration of forests and 
wetlands, a nd assistance to farmers facing damage from natural disasters ". 
 
QUESTION 7:  New Zealand  welcomes the United  States ' efforts to administer programs that 
address conservation issues. Can the U .S. expand on how the success of these programs is 
measured, and how successful they have been since their introduction?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  USDA regularly conducts program monitoring and assessment activities related to 
conservation programs in order to quantify trends in conservation practices, and associated 
outcomes, over time. The Conservation Effects Assessment Project (CEAP) is one such tool, and 
CEAP findings are used to guide conservation program development and support conservationalists, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 422 - 
 
  agricultural producers, and partners in choosing the most effective conservation  actions and making 
informed management decisions backed by data and science. CEAP assessments are carried out at 
national, regional, and watershed scales for conservation efforts related to croplands, grazing lands, 
wetlands, and wildlife. USDA also works  with academic and other partners on Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) assessments that quantify outcomes and inform policy.  
 
Pages  206-213 
 
Paragraph  4.89 notes that "In January  2021, the President issued an Executive  Order, which put the 
climate crisis at the center of U.S. foreign policy and national security.74 The E.O. puts in place 
multiple actions across the Administration to address the climate crisis, with several points impacting 
the forest sector, including de veloping a Climate -Smart Agriculture and Forestry (CSAF) strategy. 
Based on comments received regarding the CSAF strategy, in February  2022 USDA launched the 
Partnerships for Climate -Smart Commodities, to provide support for the production and marketing 
of climate -smart commodities via a set of pilot projects lasting one to five years.  
 
QUESTION 8:  New Zealand welcomes the U .S.' commitment to the reform of fossil fuel subsidies, 
including commitments made under the auspices of the G7, G20, and APEC, as wel l as in President 
Biden's Executive  Order dated 27  January  2021. Does the U .S. see trade disciplines as a potential 
tool to turn international ambition on the reform of fossil fuel subsidies into collective action?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The United  States  recognizes  the role of the WTO SCM  Agreement  in disciplining 
subsidies. Any future use of subsidy disciplines to reform fossil fuel subsidies would need to be 
carefully scoped and considered.  
 
Pages  213-214, Para graphs  4.96-4.123  
 
Paragraph  4.97 notes that "the United  States has taken a leadership role in many international 
initiatives, in particular to promote sustainable fishing; combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing". It also outlines that in the past the United  States  has previously been b oth a 
significant importer and exporter of fish and seafood products.  
 
QUESTION 9:  One significant international initiative this year has been work in the 
World  Trade  Organization to develop a meaningful agreement to prohibit harmful fish subsidies, 
including those that support IUU fishing. New Zealand would welcome an update from the 
United  States  on its progress towards depositing its instrument of acceptance of the 
World Trade  Organization's Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The United  States  is consulting internally with regard to acceptance of the Protocol 
and implementation of the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT  WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  10, Para graph  3.15 
 
Section  3.3, Paragraph  3.15 of the U .S. Government report states that the United  States  is 
committed to standing up for American farmers, ranchers, food manufacturers, and fishers by 
pursuing trade policies that are inclusive and work for all producers, and, by enforcing global 
agricultural trade rules.  
 
QUESTION 10:  Does the U .S. intend to reduce the levels of trade and production distorting domestic 
support provided to farmers?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. That said, the Coronavirus Food Assist ance Program and the 
Market Facilitation Program accounted for much of the increase in expenditures in support to 
producers in recent years. Both programs had a specific amount of funding authorized; funding is 
no longer available, and the programs are no longer in effect.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Or repurposing support with a shift towards encouraging more environmentally 
sustainable practices in farming?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 423 - 
 
  RESPONSE 11:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospectiv e exercises.  
 
Page  12, Para graphs  4.1 and 4.2  
 
Sections  4.1 and 4.2 recognise the importance of equity in designing inclusive and durable trade 
policy. They further note that the U .S. Trade Representative has requested that the U .S. 
International Trade Commission explore gaps in existing data regarding the effect of trade policy on 
workers, especially underrepresented and underserved communities.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Acknowledging that there is work underway to obtain intersectional data on 
distributional impacts of trade policy, what targeted investment/outreach is currently in place to 
ensure that members of under -represented groups, including women, have equitable access to the 
benefits of trade?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  On his first day in office, President  Biden signed  the Executive  Order on  Advancing 
Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government  
(EO 13985). Over 90  agencies across the federal government, including all Cabinet -level agencies 
as well as over 50  independent agencies, mobilized quickly and effectively to implement the 
Executive  Order.  The resulting equity action plans are publicly available: 
https://www.performance.gov/equity . The Office of the United  States  Trade Representative 
(USTR)'s Equity Action Plan, which is available at https://ustr.gov/equity , included the goal of 
strengthening data to consider and improve the distributional effects of trade.  
 
USTR's Equity Action Plan also included advisory committee administration and guidance. As USTR 
recharters and requests applications for its various trade advisory committees, USTR has been 
underscoring the request that advisory committee members provide " advice and recommendations 
on trade policies that eliminate social and economic structural barriers to equality and economic 
opportunity, and to better understand the projected impact of proposed trade policies on 
communities of color and underserved commu nities ". In addition, the advisory committee charters 
now specifically mention diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility when inviting candidates to 
apply.  
 
To inform trade and investment policy and affirm the Nation -to-Nation relationship with 
Ameri can Indian and Alaska  Native Tribal Nations, USTR also hosts annual Tribal consultation 
meetings, in a manner that is consistent with the President's Memorandum on Uniform Standards 
for Tribal Consultation released in November  2022.  
 
Furthermore, USTR's St rategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022 -2026 includes the goal of "develop[ing] 
equitable trade policy through inclusive processes ". This ensures that as part of the agency's annual 
performance assessment process, every single employee has a duty to strive to a dvance equity in 
every aspect of trade policy and build trusted relationships with underserved, underrepresented, 
and marginalized communities. USTR conducts robust domestic travel and engagements with Tribal, 
state, and local officials, community -based an d nongovernmental organizations, civil, human, and 
labor rights advocates, academics, think tanks, and minority, women, veteran owned, and micro -, 
small and medium -sized businesses. USTR also strives to visit Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities (H BCUs), Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs), Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs), 
Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander -Serving Institutions (AANAPISIs), and other 
minority serving institutions (MSIs).  
 
Finally, the United  States  uses its  convening authority to ensure that whether in domestic 
engagements or in designing stakeholder sessions with trading partners, racial and gender equity, 
equality, and economic empowerment are included in developing, implementing, and enforcing 
inclusive, worker -centered trade policy.  
 
Page  25, Para graphs  5.71 and 5.72  
 
Section  5.5 outlines the role of the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in promoting 
regional and global trade and investment, and the role of the United  States  as a crucial player in 
this forum, including as host in 2023.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 424 - 
 
  QUESTION 13:  Acknowledging the important contribution that the U .S. makes to APEC as a major 
regional economy, and the role of APEC as a pathfinder for innovative approaches to bolstering the 
prosperity and stability of its members, how will the U .S. use its host year of APEC to promote and 
enhance the multilateral rules -based trading system?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  APEC has a long and proud tradition of supporting the WTO. We see 2023 as a 
unique opport unity to underscore that role by both advancing implementation of MC12 outcomes 
and by supporting capacity building opportunities to help ensure WTO Members better fulfil existing 
obligations.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 425 - 
 
  NORWAY  
PART  I: REGARDING  THE SECRETARIAT  REPORT  (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
Maritime transport  
 
The report by the Secretariat mentions on page  264 the U.S.' exemption from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT  1994) rules for measures prohibiting the use, sale, or 
lease of foreign -built or foreign -reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between points in 
national waters or the waters of an exclusive economic zone. Norway has underlined its concern 
during the biennial reviews of this exemption, as the waiver in essence makes it impossible to sell 
vessels to the United  States.  
 
QUESTION  1: Could the U.S. please provide information on whether there is any calculation on the 
economic effects of the restrictions on buying or even repairing vessels abroad contained in the 
Jones  Act. 
 
RESPONSE 1:  See the Maritime Administration report, The Economic Importance of the U.S. 
Shipbuilding  and Repairing  Industry,  November  2015:  https://www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/pu
blications/economic -importance -us-shipbuilding -and-repairing -industry -november -2015. 
 
QUESTION  2: On what basis does the U.S. consider the exemption to be necessary today?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The United  States continues to apply the provisions of the "Jones  Act" in accordance 
with the exception to Part  II of the GATT  1994 provided in paragraph  3 of the GATT  1994. The 
Jones  Act ensures the availability of experienced seafarers and domestic shipbuilding and repair 
capability, which are important U.S. national security objectives. Moreover, it prevents foreign 
control and influence over U.S. internal supply  chains, as well as the transportation of minerals and 
energy resources extracted from its seabed. The fleet of U.S. -flagged, privately owned, and 
commercially operated vessels, along with government -owned vessels, provides critical sealift surge 
and susta inment capacity to move military personnel, equipment, and materials. These military 
transport operations rely on the mariner labour pool supported by the Jones  Act. Further, the 
Jones  Act assists in providing a pool of qualified mariners to address potent ial shortages of 
U.S.-citizen mariners. See U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Maritime 
Workforce Working Group Report (Washington, D.C., 29  September  2017), at: 
https://www .gao.gov/assets/700/693802.pdf . Demand for vessels qualified for Jones  Act trade 
plays an important role in ensuring that there is adequate American expertise and capacity to meet 
national shipbuilding and repair needs and that these shipyards remain avail able when the military 
needs them. See: https://www.transportation.gov/content/state -us-flag-maritime -industry ; and 
the Maritime Administration report The Economic Impor tance of the U.S. Shipbuilding and 
Repairing  Industry,  November  2015:  https://www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/publicati ons/econom
ic-importance -us-shipbuilding -and-repairing -industry -november -2015. 
 
QUESTION  3: The U.S. has previously explained that the continued application of the provisions of 
the Jones  Act relates to several national policy objectives, including ensuring  available shipbuilding 
capacity. Is the United  States considering implementing alternative measures to reach these 
objectives?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Seafood  
 
With reference to the report by the Secretariat (4.111, p.  218) regarding the Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program (SIMP).  
 
QUESTION  4: Has the U.S. experienced challenges that have affected the trade in seafood based 
on the monitoring programme?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  NOAA evaluates U.S. import data and trends as part of the ongoing maintenance of 
its trade monitoring programs. NOAA did not see any significant disruptions to seafood trade during 
the initial implementation of SIMP for the initial 11  species in 2 018 and shrimp and abalone in 2019.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 426 - 
 
  QUESTION  5: Are there any plans to expand the Seafood Import Monitoring Program?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The Presidential National Security Memorandum on Combating Illegal, Unreported, 
and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor A buses (NSM -11, 2022) directed NOAA to initiate a 
rulemaking to expand SIMP to include additional species and species groups, as appropriate, by the 
end of 2022. NOAA reviewed the SIMP regulations and is developing a proposed rule to modify select 
provision s to improve their efficacy and is considering additional species that are at risk of IUU 
fishing and seafood fraud.  
 
QUESTION  6: If the Seafood Import Monitoring Program is intended to be risk -based to combat 
IUU and seafood fraud, will an eventual process of expanding the scope of the program also be used 
to remove from the program species that do not represent such risks?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Yes. SIMP is a risk -based traceability program and NOAA evaluates the listed species 
as part of its overal l species review. NOAA proposes any changes to the species listed under SIMP 
through a formal, evidence -based rulemaking process and encourages participation from nations 
and public stakeholders in that process.  
 
Decarbonisation  
 
Addressing issues related to trade in carbon -intense products is an important dimension of global 
climate policy. In paragraphs  3.9 – 3.11 the U.S. report describes efforts to negotiate an 
emissions -based sectoral agreement on steel and aluminium trade.  
 
QUESTION  7: Could the U.S. provide an update on these efforts, including whether and how other 
partners could be included in such an arrangement?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Labour strategy  
 
The U.S. report (paragraph  5.31) refers to the development of a focused trade strategy to combat 
forced labour.  
 
QUESTION  8: Could the U.S. el aborate on the status and timeline for this strategy?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The United  States is in the process of developing its focused trade strategy to combat 
forced labor. The strategy will lay out the U.S. Government's trade approach to addressing forced 
labor in global supply chains. The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
Inflation Reduction Act  
 
Many of the tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act contain local content or local production 
requirements, inc luding tax credits for electric vehicles (4  different types of requirements: final 
assembly requirement, critical minerals, batteries, battery parts), "domestic content bonus credit 
amount" in the production of clean energy and investments in renewable ene rgy installations, 
including wind, offshore wind, solar, and so on. Each and every one of these numerous requirements 
will favour domestic goods over imported goods.  
 
QUESTION  9: How does the USA intend to uphold its obligations under GATT  art. III: 4 when  its 
legislation is seemingly in breach of the National Treatment obligation in art. GATT  art. III: 4? 
The tax credits for the production of clean energy and the building of renewable energy installations, 
such as wind or solar, seem to be in breach of the  USA's obligations under art.  2.1. and 2.2. of the 
TRIMS agreement.  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The United  States intends to administer the Inflation Reduction Act in a manner that 
is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 427 - 
 
  QUESTION  10: How does the USA intend to uphold its obligations under the TRIMS agreement 
when its legislation is seemingly in breach of the above -mentioned obligations?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The United  States intends to administer the Inflation Reduction Act in a manner 
that is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement.  
 
The tax credits for EVs and use of domestic input materials such as steel, iron etc in the building of 
renewable energy installations in the IRA seem to be in breach with the  USA's obligations under the 
SCM agreement's art.  3.1. relating to "subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic goods".  
 
QUESTION  11: How does the USA intend to uphold its obligations on the SCM  agreement when its 
legislation is seemingly in breach of its obligations under the SCM agreement?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The United  States intends to administer the Inflation Reduction Act in a manner 
that is consistent with U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement.  
 
Regarding safeguard measure on imports of CSPV products  
 
The report from the Secretariat (3.126.  p. 101) references the extension of safeguard measures on 
import of  certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (CSPV products) for four years beginning on 
7 February  2022. Safeguard measures may only be exceptionally applied temporarily as an 
emergency measure to prevent or remedy serious injury to domestic industry, in accordance with 
the WTO  Agreement of Safeguards.  
 
QUESTION  12: What is the U.S. assessment of the conditions to continue to apply this safeguard 
measure?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The rationale to continue to apply this safeguard measure was notified to the WTO 
at G/SG/N/10/USA/7/Suppl.13 (dated 8  February  2022) and G/SG/N/10/USA/7/Suppl.13/Corr.1 
(dated 10  February  2022).  
 
 
NORWAY  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTION  
Regarding safeguard measure on imports of CSPV products  
 
The report from the Secretariat (3.126.  p. 101) r eferences the extension of safeguard measures on 
import of certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (CSPV products) for four years beginning on 
7 February  2022. Safeguard measures may only be exceptionally applied temporarily as an 
emergency measure to prevent or remedy serious injury to domestic industry, in accordance with 
the WTO  Agreement of Safeguards.  
 
QUESTION  1: What is the U.S. assessment of the conditions to continue to apply this safeguard 
measure?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The rationale to continue to apply this safeguard measure was notified to the WTO 
at G/SG/N/10/USA/7/Suppl.13 (dated 8  February  2022) and G/SG/N/10/USA/7/Suppl.13/Corr.1 
(dated 10  February  2022).   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 428 - 
 
  OMAN  
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
The secretariat report states in Para . 11 in regarding to the Additional tariffs applied on steel and 
aluminum imports resulting from Section  232 investigations initiated in 2018 remain in place; that 
the United  States  reached an agreement with the European  Union  in October  2021 to suspend the 
additional tariffs and replace them by tariff quotas. More recently, similar agreements were reached 
with Japan and the United  Kingdom.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Could the United  States  elaborate on details the criteria which has been taken to 
suspend the additional ta riffs with such countries mentioned in above para .? 
 
RESPONSE 1:  The United  States  successfully concluded discussions with the EU (on behalf of its 
member countries), Japan, and the United  Kingdom (UK) on satisfactory alternative means to 
address the threatened impairment of the national security posed by steel article imports from the 
EU, the UK, and Japan. The United  States  successfully concluded discussions with the EU and the 
UK to address the threatened impairment of the national security posed by aluminum article imports 
from the EU and the UK.  
 
The United  States  and the EU agreed to expand coordination involving trade remedies and customs 
matters, monitor bilateral steel and aluminum trade, cooperate on addressing non -market excess 
capacity, and annually review their arrangement for alternative means and their ongoing 
cooperation. In addition, the United  States  and the EU will seek to conclude, by 31 October  2023, 
negotiations on global steel and aluminum arrangements to restore market -oriented conditions and 
support the reduction of carbon intensity of steel and aluminum across mod es of production.  
 
The United  States  and Japan agreed to expand coordination involving trade remedies and customs 
matters, monitor bilateral steel and aluminum trade, cooperate on addressing non -market excess 
capacity and carbon intensity in these sectors,  and annually review their arrangement and their 
ongoing cooperation.  
 
The United  States  and the UK agreed to expand coordination involving trade remedies and customs 
matters, monitor bilateral steel and aluminum trade, cooperate on addressing non -market e xcess 
capacity and carbon intensity in these sectors, annually review their arrangement and their ongoing 
cooperation, and confer on market -distorting influence or ownership in the steel and aluminum 
industries, among other things.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Is the implementation of Section  232 on Aluminum and steel in conformity with the 
principles of Free Trade Agreement which U .S. has signed?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  In 2017, the Secretary of Commerce initiated investigations into the effects of steel 
and aluminum impo rts on the national security of the United  States  pursuant to Section  232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In 2018, the Secretary submitted to the President reports on the 
findings of such investigations, concluding that steel and aluminum articles are being imported into 
the United  States  in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security of the United  States  and recommending actions to adjust the imports of steel and 
aluminum articles so that such imports wil l not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
In Proclamation 9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United  States ) and 
Proclamation 9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United  States ), the 
President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided to adjust the imports 
of steel and aluminum articles by imposing a 25 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of steel articles and 
imposing a 10 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminum articles, so that such imports will not 
threaten to impair the U.S. national security. Section  232 measures were taken because the 
United  States  considered these measures necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests, and theref ore Section  232 measures are wholly consistent with U.S. obligations under its 
FTAs.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 429 - 
 
  THE PHILIPPINES  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
I. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
Page  20, Para graph  1.8 
 
Labor  productivity growth averaged 1.5% in 2018 and 2019, and increased to 2.4% in both 2020 
and 2021 . A decline in productivity growth is expected for 2022 and beyond, as the labor market 
recovers . In its 2020 Survey, the OECD suggests that reforms are essenti al to lift productivity growth 
and ensure that all benefit from future growth. Productivity has been sluggish for a variety of 
reasons, and policies are needed to support labor mobility and competition to help workers and 
businesses avoid scarring effects and fully recover from the crisis.  
 
QUESTION 1:  What were the key reforms and strategic measures undertaken/being undertaken by 
the U .S. in its path to recovery in order to avoid economic scarring, aside from extensive fiscal 
support packages?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Outside of fiscal support for citizens and businesses during the pandemic, the most 
effective policies have concerned the development and deployment of effective COVID -19 vaccines.  
See, for instance, the discussion of the impact of vaccines on output prov ided by this IMF analysis: 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/10/19/The -Effects -of-COVID -19-Vaccines -
on-Economic -Activity -494714 . The United  States  is proud to have helped fund the development of 
the ground breaking MRNA.  However, developing vaccines was not enough : deployment and 
inoculation required a whole -of-government coordination . Because citizens now feel safe from the 
virus, mobility measures and spending have exceeded previous trends, as citizens take advantage 
of the protection provided by the vaccines.  Avoiding deaths and disability through effective use of 
vaccines has been given the U.S. economy a tremendous ability to avoid the worst economic scarring 
effects seen elsewhere.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Which reforms are seen to have the most impact in lifting productivity growth and 
labor mobility as workers and businesses navigate the scarring eff ects of the pandemic?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Lifting productivity growth and labor  mobility is always a hard task, especially after 
a dislocation the size of the pandemic. However, the rise of "work from home" and teleworking for 
employees has had salutatory effects on both productivity and mobility. Before the pandemic, 
teleworking was  a small and slow growing characteristic of the U.S. labor force. While some theorized 
it would grow in the future, none could foresee the rapid rise of teleworking during the pandemic, 
and subsequent widespread availability.  
 
With regards to labor mobilit y, teleworking allows workers to live further from the location of their 
place of work. This distance enables greater freedom in availability of jobs, and allows workers to 
find employment in roles that better suit their characteristics. With regards to pr oductivity, 
teleworking directly saves valuable time previously spent on commuting. Research shows about half 
the time saved is spent on work. Furthermore, workers may be more productive at some tasks when 
working from home than they are in an office.  
 
Page  32-33, Paragraph  1.35 
 
U.S. imports and exports of goods declined during the initial part of the review period, but exports 
declined more significantly by 14.1%, while imports declined by about half that level, by 7.9%. 
Thereafter, in 2021, both impor ts and exports recovered significantly, reaching their highest level 
during the period. The merchandise trade deficit, at USD  946 million  in 2018, increased to 
USD 1.18 trillion  in 2021, its highest level during the period due to a larger surge in imports.  
 
QUESTION 3:  What were the main trade policies implemented by the US government which 
contributed to the significant recovery of its imports and exports production in 2021, considering 
that its trade partners have not bounced back as fast?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  U.S. trade policy continued to support open markets, and as the U.S. economy 
recovered (assisted by fiscal and monetary policy), so did U.S. goods and services trade.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 430 - 
 
  Page  34, Para graph  1.39 
 
China, the European  Union , and Mexico were the main sources of U. S. imports during the 
period  2018-21. Even with a decline in imports over the period and a fall in its percentage share, 
China remained the United  States ' largest single source of imports in 2021. The European  Union  
accounted for a slightly higher share of imports in 2021 compared to 2018. There were some 
significant increases in imports from mid -sized Asian economies, most notably Viet  Nam, the 
Republic  of Korea, and Chinese  Taipei , particularly for electronics, sem iconductors, and 
telecommunication products.  
 
QUESTION 4:  U.S. key imports from the Philippines are semiconductor devices and computer 
peripherals, automobile parts, electric machinery, textiles and garments, wheat and animal feeds, 
coconut oil, and inform ation technology/business process outsourcing services. Key U.S. exports to 
the Philippines are agriculture goods, machinery, cereals, raw and semi -processed materials for the 
manufacture of semiconductors, electronics, and transport equipment.  
 
While this  trade has resulted to over USD  18.9 billion  in goods and services traded, what are U .S. 
key considerations in providing more Built -Operate -Transfer businesses in the Philippines?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  The United  States  has a range of programs to help U.S. companies export and do 
business overseas, including in the Philippines. However, the U.S. government does not direct the 
nature of specific business activities abroad. Private entities have their own considerations fo r 
undertaking foreign operations and activities.  
 
QUESTION 5:  How does the addition of research and development incentives provide greater 
impetus for these investments?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  Private companies take a variety of factors into consideration when deter mining 
foreign investment, including business certainty, rule of law, and ease of doing business.  
 
II. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
Page  40, Para graph  2.9 
 
In 2021, the Administration launched its American Rescue Plan, which was signed into law in March, 
with the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L . 117-2). While the impetus of the American Rescue 
Plan was a massive stimulus package focused on the pandemic, it also addressed supply chain 
resilience, provided funding for COVID -19 vaccines, and more  broadly tackled medical supply chain 
issues. The Administration continued to address the issue of critical supply chains through its 
100-day assessment for four critical products in particular: semiconductor manufacturing and 
advanced packaging, large -capacity batteries, critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals 
and active pharmaceutical ingredients. As part of this assessment, recommendations were made on 
strengthening international trade rules through trade enforcement mechanisms, i.e. establi shment 
of a trade strike force, and pursuing a Section  232 investigation on neodymium magnets, and also 
working with allies to decrease vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Thereafter, in response, USTR 
established the interagency Supply Chain Trade Ta sk Force12, a Section  232 investigation on 
neodymium was launched, and discussions were held with trading partners on addressing supply 
chain vulnerabilities. Modifications to Buy American provisions were introduced by the Build America, 
Buy America Act, S ubtitle A - Build America, Buy America of Title IX of Division  G of the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 15 November  2021 (P.L . 117-58) (Section  3.3.6).  
 
QUESTION 6:  Please expound on the U .S. administration's measures/targets (quantitative, 
e.g. 1,000MT of processed minerals, etc.) in relation to addressing the vulnerabilities in critical 
minerals and materials?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Specific recommendations on how to address vulnerabilities in the U.S . critical 
minerals and materials supply chain are contained in the 100 -day Supply Chain Review report, 
available at:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/100 -day-supply -chain -
review -report.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 431 - 
 
  Page  41, Para graph  2.14 
 
In January  2021, the Administration launched its initiative on Buy American policies with an 
Executive Order outlining a government -wide proposal to use government p rocurement as one 
method to strengthen American manufacturing. It provides for a number of measures including 
review of agency actions inconsistent with administration policy, updating the Made in America 
waiver process, and promoting transparency in feder al procurement. Thereafter, in April 2021, the 
Made in America Office was established under the Office of Management and Budget to provide 
centralized, strategic, and holistic management of domestic sourcing activities across Federal 
procurement. Following  on these initiatives, a new proposed Rule was announced in July 2021 that 
would make the most significant changes to the Buy American Act in many years. One of the key 
proposed changes would raise the domestic content threshold from 55% to 60% immediately, and 
then gradually increase it to 75% (Section  3.3.6). Procurement covered under the WTO  Agreement  
on Government Procurement (GPA) continues to be waived from these requirements.  
 
QUESTION 7:  The Secretariat Report mentioned that, in January  2021, the U .S. Administration 
launched its initiative on Buy American policies where it was proposed that government procurement 
would be used as one method to strengthen American manufacturing. One of the key proposed 
changes would raise the domestic conte nt threshold from 55% to 60%. Could the United  States  
please specify the rationale behind such an initiative and key features of the Buy American policies, 
including the challenges and best practices in implementing these policies?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The Federal  government is a major buyer in a number of markets for goods and 
services, including the single largest purchaser of consumer goods in the world. Leveraging that 
purchasing power to shape markets and accelerate innovation is a key part of the Administrati on's 
strategy to grow the industries of the future to support U.S. workers, communities, and firms. As 
the pandemic has demonstrated, federal procurement can strengthen the resiliency of domestic 
supply chains and reduce the risk of Americans being adverse ly impacted by the actions of 
competitor nations during a time of crisis. For more information, please see the Fact Sheet on the 
Proposed Buy American rule, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -
releases/2021/07/28 /fact-sheet -biden -harris -administration -issues -proposed -buy-american -rule-
advancing -the-presidents -commitment -to-ensuring -the-future -of-america -is-made -in-america -by-
all-of-americas/ . 
 
A key feature of Buy American policies is that, in acquisitions covered  by the WTO  Agreement  on 
Government Procurement (GPA), Free Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade Act, the U.S. Trade 
Representative has waived the Buy American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible 
products. These waiver designations g ranted under the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) are reflected in 
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Offers of eligible products receive equal consideration 
with domestic offers. See FAR 25.402 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). 
 
Page  42, Para graph  2.18 
 
In the area of dispute settlement, the United  States ' participation, as measured by the number of 
cases it has filed as a complainant, declined significantly during the review period compared to 
previous periods. The United  States  raised 2 complaints, was a respondent in 8 cases, was involved 
in 2 active arbitrations, appealed 6 cases to the Appellate  Body, and exercised third party rights in 
29 cases (Table  A2.1). In the DSB, the Unit ed States  continued to raise its systemic concerns with 
Appellate  Body overreach.  
 
QUESTION 8:  What alternative modes of resolution did the U .S. engage in to address some of its 
dispute settlement cases?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  The United  States  and its trading partn ers reached agreement through bilateral 
negotiations in a number of instances.  The aim of dispute  settlement is to facilitate the prompt 
settlement of a dispute between Members and the United  States  welcomes engagement between 
parties in order to achieve t hat end.  
 
QUESTION 9:  What would be the next steps after coming up with a text proposal from the U .S.-led 
consultations on dispute settlement system reforms?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 432 - 
 
  RESPONSE 9:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
III. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
Page  73, Para graph  3.47 
 
The United  States  has regularly reported its utilization of agricultural TRQs to the WTO Committee 
on Agriculture. The quota fill rate averaged around 50% across all categories during 2018 -20 with 
little variation each year, i.e. 51 %-55%. TRQs were not utilized or very lit tle utilized for certain 
cotton categories, animal feed containin g milk, chocolate, and certain U.S. cheeses.  
 
QUESTION 10:  May we request the U .S. to provide details on the reasons for the unutilized or low 
utilization of TRQ on certain agricultural prod ucts? 
 
RESPONSE 10:  The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market 
factors, including price trends, exchange rates, the recent global COVID -19 pandemic, supply, and 
demand.  
 
Page  84, Para graph  3.82 
 
Specifically, through the new regulations USDOC: (i)  modified the time for submission of comments 
pertaining to industry support in AD and CVD proceedings;  (ii) modified its regulation regarding new 
shipper reviews; (iii)  modified its regulation concerning  scope matters in AD and CVD proceedings; 
(iv) promulgated a new regulation concerning circumvention of AD and CVD orders; (v)  promulgated 
a new regulation concerning covered merchandise referrals received from CBP; (vi ) promulgated a 
new regulation pertai ning to USDOC requests for certifications from interested parties to establish 
whether merchandise is subject to an AD or CVD order; (vii ) modified its regulation regarding 
importer reimbursement certifications  filed with CBP; and (viii ) modified its regul ations regarding 
service lists, entries of appearance, and importer filing requirements for access to business 
proprietary information in AD and CVD proceedings.123 All amendments were effective by 
4 November  2021 (some were effective as of 20 October  2021). 
 
QUESTION 11:  With its new regulations on the administration and enforcement of AD and CV laws, 
can the U .S. provide information on what stages in the investigation can interested parties submit 
their position/comments and make a proper representation?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The submission of comments and presentations was not changed by the regulations 
per se. However, the specifics regarding the new regulations, including any procedural changes, 
were notified to the WTO at: G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.31 and G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.32 (dated 
1 October  2021).  
 
Page  144, Paragraph  3.275  
 
During the review period, DOJ l aunched initiatives aimed at enhancing actions and activities against 
anti-competitive practices. In November  2019, the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) was 
created to investigate and prosecute antitrust and other crimes that undermine competition  in 
government procurement, grant, and program funding. PCSF has prosecuted collusion in security 
services contracts to U.S. and NATO military installations. The Judgment Termination Initiative, 
announced in May 2018, seeks to terminate antitrust judgments  that no longer protect competition 
through a review and a consultation procedure with the public.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Based on the Secretariat Report, the Procurement Collusion Strike Force was 
created to investigate and prosecute antitrust and other crimes tha t undermine competition in 
government procurement, among others. Could the United  States  expound on how it determines 
those practices which undermine competition, especially those involving conflicts of interest or 
beneficial ownership in government procur ement and the corresponding penalties imposed?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The PCSF's mission is to deter, detect, investigate, and prosecute criminal violations 
of the antitrust laws, notable the Sherman Act, and other criminal offenses that undermine 
competition in go vernment procurement, grant and program funding. A fair, open, and competitive 
marketplace has long been a cornerstone of the American economy, while excessive market 
concentration threatens basic economic liberties, democratic accountability, and the welf are of WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 433 - 
 
  workers, farmers, small businesses, startups, and consumers. In addition to the traditional antitrust 
laws, the Congress has also enacted industry -specific fair competition and anti -monopolization laws 
that often provide additional protections. Such  enactments include the Packers and Stockyards Act, 
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act ( Public  Law 74-401, 49 Stat. 977, 27 U.S.C . 201 et seq.), the 
Bank Merger Act, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(Public  Law 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585), the Shipping Act of 1984 (Public  Law 98-237, 98 Stat. 67, 
46 U.S.C . 40101 et seq.) ( Shipping  Act), the ICC Termination Act of 1995 (Public  Law 104-88, 
109 Stat. 803), the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers Act 
(Public  Law 108-164, 117 Stat. 2024, 15 U.S.C . 7601 et seq.), and the Dodd -Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Public  Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376) (Dodd -Frank Act). These 
statutes independently charge a number of executive d epartments and agencies (agencies) to 
protect conditions of fair competition in one or more ways, including by: (i)  policing unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive business practices; (ii)  resisting consolidation and promoting competition within 
industries through  the independent oversight of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures; 
(iii) promulgating rules that promote competition, including the market entry of new competitors; 
and (iv)  promoting market transparency through compelled disclosure of information.  
 
The agencies that administer such or similar authorities include the Department of the Treasury, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of 
Transportation, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Trade Com mission (FTC), the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, th e Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Surface 
Transportation Board. Agencies can influence the conditions of competition through their exercise of 
regulatory authority or through the procurement process. See 41 U.S.C . 1705.  
 
A whole -of-government approach is necessary to address overconcentration, monopolization, and 
unfair competition in the American economy. Such an approach is supported by existing statutory 
mandates.  
 
Page  159, Paragraph  3.319  
 
U.S. procurement policy makes use of set-aside programs to foster the participation of small 
businesses, veteran -owned small businesses, small -disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), HUBZone 
businesses, and women -owned small businesses in the procurement process.457 Under the Small 
Business Act (P.L . 85-536), as amended, most recently through P.L . 117-6, enacted on 
30 March  2021, government purchases within certain thresholds, are to be automatically and 
exclusively set aside for small businesses, while others are subject to set -aside requirements 
provided there are at least two or more (Rule of Two) small business concerns that are competitive 
in terms of market prices, quality, and delivery.458 If market research determines that there are 
fewer than two small business offerors, recourse to sole -source contract may be made, or otherwise 
the contract may be subject to full and open competition. The relevant set -aside programs are 
referenced in the U.S. schedules under the GPA.  
 
QUESTION 13:  The Secretariat Report provides that the U .S. procurement poli cy makes use of 
socio-economic procurement that encourages small businesses, veteran -owned small business, 
small -disadvantage business, HUBZone business, and women -owned small businesses in the 
procurement process. Could the United  States  explain the key f eatures and challenges confronted 
in its socio -economic procurement?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The Administration is working to ensure that the small business set -aside program 
continues to achieve best value for money, promote competition, and stimulate innovation among 
small and medium enterprises while advancing equity and building wealth in underserved 
communities. For more on the Administration's plans to incre ase contracting opportunities for 
underserved small business owners, please see: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -
room/statements -releases/2021/12/02/fact -sheet -biden -harris -administration -announces -reforms -
to-increase -equity -and-level-the-playing -field-for-underserved -small -business -owners/ . 
 
Each socio economic  program cited above features different features and challenges. In general, the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) continues to study and address key challenges, including 
through transparent program evaluation reports.  See, e.g.  Evaluation of Factors for Reaching the WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 434 - 
 
  HUBZone Contracting  Goal, available  at: https://www.sba.gov/document/report -evaluation -
factors -reachi ng-hubzone -contracting -goal. 
 
One recent study, prepared for the SBA, on the overall process for establishing agency procurement 
goals can be found  at: https://www.sba.gov/document/report -evaluation -sbas-small-business -
procurement -scorecard . 
 
QUESTION 14:  What are the thresholds considered for these groups so that these businesses would 
be given priority?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Most federal procurement contracts with a value between USD 10,000 and 
USD 250,000 are automatically and exclusively set aside for small businesses. Contracts exceeding 
USD 250,000, in many cases, may be set aside if there are two or more small businesses that could 
do the work. For more in formation on small business set -asides, please see: 
https://www.sba.gov/document/report -evaluation -sbas-small-business -procurement -scorecard . 
 
Page  168, Paragraph  3.347  
 
USPTO's Strategic Plan for FY2018/2 2 contains the main elements with respect to current and future 
IP policy. The Plan maintains the three goals set for the 2014 -18 period: optimizing patent quality 
and timeliness; optimizing trademark quality and timeliness; and providing domestic and glob al 
leadership to improve IP policy, protection, and enforcement. It identifies a role for USPTO in the 
strengthening of IP protection, both in the United  States  and abroad. USPTO's Strategic Plan aims 
to continue to improve the quality of issued patents an d registered trademarks, and shorten the 
time it takes to get a patent. To enhance patent quality, USPTO has introduced a new patent search 
system that provides examiners with increased access to prior art. It has also implemented a number 
of AI updates th at more closely align the time allotted for the examination of patent applications 
with the technology described in the application and its specific attributes.  
 
QUESTION 15: What is the current turn -around -time for the patent and trademark examination 
process of the USPTO?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  As of October  2022, the traditional total pendency for patent applications is 
25.5 months. Historically, pendency has been measured as the average number of months from the 
patent application filing date to the date the application has reached final disposition (e.g.  issued as 
a patent or abandoned). The traditional total pendency is the average for all applications  - excluding 
applications in which a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) has been filed  - which are 
"disposed" over a three -month period. See: 
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboard/patents/pendency.html . 
 
The trademark registration process can take between 12 -18 months, depending on the 
circumst ances of an application. Also, this time -frame depends on how quickly the applicant 
responds to the office actions. For up -to-date information on trademark pendency in the U.S., see 
the USPTO's Trademark dashboard located at: https://www.uspto.gov/dashboard/trademarks/ . 
 
QUESTION 16:  For FY2022/26, does the USPTO aim to retain the three goals set since the 
FY2014/18 Strategic Plan, or are there any new goals identified?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  170-171, Para graph  3.354  
 
USPTO has traditionally considered that design patents provide protection for designs  embodied in 
or applied to  an article of manufacture (or portion thereof) and not for the article itself; applicants 
have been required to show the design as applied to or embodied in an article of manufacture. To 
be eligible for protection, USPTO currently requires that a design f or a computer -generated icon be: 
(i) embodied in a computer screen, monitor, other display panel, or portion thereof; (ii)  more than 
a mere picture on a screen; and (iii)  integral to the operation of the computer displaying the design. 
However, recent tech nological advances have allowed the development of designs that are not 
applied to or embodied in a physical product but can perform a utilitarian function, rather than just 
serving as merely a displayed picture. New designs in the digital economy in the f orms of projections, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 435 - 
 
  holograms, and virtual and augmented reality (PHVAR) present new challenges for industrial design 
protection systems as they do not require a physical display screen or other tangible article to be 
viewable. To deal with this issue, on  21 December  2020, USPTO published a Federal Register Notice 
seeking public input on whether USPTO's interpretation of the "article of manufacture" requirement 
in 35  U.S.C.  171 should be revised to protect digital designs that encompass new and emerging 
technologies.  
 
QUESTION 17:  What was the result of the request for public input on whether USPTO's 
interpretation of the "article of manufacture" requirement in 35  U.S.C.  171 should be revised to 
protect digital designs that encompass new and emer ging technologies?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  The USPTO received 19  comments. Fourteen comments were in favor of revising 
the "article of manufacture" requirement and 5  comments were against revising the "article of 
manufacture"  requirement.  See: https://www.regulations.gov/document/PTO -C-2020-0068-0001/
comment . 
 
Page  177, Paragraph  3.376  
 
The United  States  is a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic  Works 
(1989), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (2002), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (2002) 
(WPPT), the Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Program -Carry ing Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite (1985), the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms (1974), and the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blin d, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled 
(2019). The United  States  is not a party to the Rome Convention (17  U.S.C. Section  106). The 
United  States  is also a party to the Geneva Phonograms Convention.  
 
QUESTION 18:  Are there any plans for the US to  become a party to the Rome Convention? Why or 
why not?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Pages  182-183, Para graph  3.393  
 
Provisions with respect to enforcement o f IPRs are contained in all main IP laws. Additionally,  the 
Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act of 2006 (P.L.  109-181) prohibits the trafficking in 
counterfeit goods and services, including labels or similar packaging of any type intended to be u sed 
on, or in connection with, the goods or services for which the genuine mark is registered. There are 
several agencies involved in the enforcement of IPRs and enforcement policy development of IPRs, 
including USDOC, in particular USPTO, DOJ, Treasury, H omeland Security, State, Agriculture, Health 
and Human Services, the Copyright Office, and the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC). IPEC is a component in the Executive Office of the President, that 
engages with stakehol ders and international partners to address IP issues, impacting infringement, 
market access, competition, digital trade, cybersecurity, and rule of law concerns around the world. 
IPEC also works to expand coordination within the Government on IP enforcemen t, and chairs two 
interagency committees. In November  2020, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies 
involved with the enforcement of IPRs, IPEC issued the fourth Joint Strategic Plan on IP Enforcement 
under Section  303 of the PRO IP Act (15  U.S.C. 8113) for 2020 -23. The Plan is composed of four 
parts: (i)  engagement with U.S. trading partners; (ii)  effective use of all U.S. legal authorities, 
including trade tools; (iii)  expanded law enforcement action and cooperation; and (iv)  engagement 
and partnership with the private sector and other stakeholders. Additionally, under Section  304 of 
the PRO IP Act (15  U.S.C.  8114), IPEC issues an annual report focusing on the IP enforcement 
activities of the Federal Government. IPEC issued its  annual report for FY2020 in January  2021.  
 
QUESTION 19:  What are the specific roles of each of the agencies enumerated as regards IP 
enforcement?  
 
RESPONSE  19: The IPEC Annual  Report,  available  at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/u
ploads/2022/09/2021 -IPEC-Annual -Report -April-2022.pdf , provides  an overview  of the U.S. 
Government's work for Fiscal Year  2021 related to IP Enforcement and capacity build ing. The report 
includes a section for each of the departments/agencies enumerated above.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  IV. TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
Page  194, Paragraph  4.26 
 
The 2018 Farm Act authorized the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program, replacing the Margin 
Protection Program for Dairy (MPP). Like the MPP, the DMC program is a voluntary risk management 
program providing payments to participating dairy producers on enrolled average historical 
production when the national milk -to-feed cost margin, i.e. the difference between the monthly U.S. 
all- milk price and the monthly national average feed cost (calculated according to a statutory 
formula), falls below the margin coverage level they have selected.  
 
QUESTION 20:  Is the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) a form of subsidy from the U .S. government 
to its local dairy farmers, and how will it affect the competition policy within and outside the country?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  The DMC is a risk management program. The programme is based on historical 
production and designed n ot to influence the level of U.S. milk production.  
 
QUESTION 21:  Can the U .S. provide details on the requisite qualifications for the admission to the 
DMC?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  To be eligible for DMC, a dairy operation must: a)  Produce and commercially market 
milk from cows located in the United  States ; and b)  Provide proof of milk production at the time of 
registration. Dairy operations must be incompliance with highly erodible land and wetland 
conservation provisions.  
 
Page  195, Paragraph  4.30 
 
Eligible program participants in DMC may also participate in the Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy 
Producers Program (LGM -Dairy) and in the Dairy Revenue Protection (DRP) program administered 
by the Risk Management Agency. Dairy farmers may use LGM -Dairy insurance p olicies to protect 
against the loss of gross margin (market value of milk minus feed costs) on milk produced from 
dairy cows and sold for commercial or private sale primarily for final human consumption. The prices 
used in LGM -Dairy are derived from simple  average daily settlement prices for future contracts for 
maize, soybean meal, and milk at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and not what a producer may 
obtain at the local market. There is no minimum or maximum quantity that may be insured by dairy 
farmers  in the 48  contiguous states. The insurance premium is subsidized, and the premium subsidy 
ranges from 18% to 50% depending on the deductible chosen by the farmer. The premium and the 
indemnity, provided the actual gross margin is lower than selected the m argin guarantee, is paid at 
the end of the 11 -month insurance period.  
 
QUESTION 22:  How are the Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy Producers Program (LGM -Dairy) and 
Dairy Revenue Protection implemented?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The Livestock Gross Margin Insurance Plan  for Dairy Cattle (LGM -Dairy) allows 
eligible producers to purchase an insurance policy that provides protection when feed costs rise or 
milk prices drop and can be tailored to any size farm. Dairy Revenue Protection (Dairy -RP) is 
designed to insure agains t unexpected declines in the quarterly revenue from milk sales relative to 
a guaranteed coverage level.  
 
QUESTION 23:  Under the LGM -Dairy insurance policies  - "there is no minimum or maximum 
quantity that may be insured by the dairy farmers in the 48  contiguous states ". Does this mean that 
even large dairy corporations may participate in this program?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  Any producer who owns dairy cattle in any of the 50  states is eligible for LGM -Dairy 
insurance coverage.  
 
Page  197, Paragraph  4.37 
 
Imports of raw cane sugar, refined sugar, and sugar -containing products are regulated under 
multilateral (WTO) and bilateral tariff rate quotas. Relatively high MFN tariffs normally discourage 
above -quota imports. The annual WTO TRQ minimum of 1,117,195  metric tons raw value (MTRV) of 
raw cane sugar is allocated among 40  countries, based on patterns observed when trade was WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 437 - 
 
  relatively unrestricted (1975 -81), with the Dominican  Republic , Brazil, the Philippines, and Australia 
taking the largest shares.  
 
QUEST ION 24:  Did the failure to deliver the previous years' sugar TRQ affect the volume of sugar 
TRQ that was given to the specific countries, such as the Philippines, in future quota years?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The United  States  regularly reallocates the raw sugar TRQ and consults with foreign 
governments during the process in order to facilitate utilization of the TRQ.  
 
Page  213, Paragraph  4.95 
 
The United  States  has been a long -standing and active member of the UN  Forum on Forests and the 
FAO Committee on Forestry. It is also a member of the 2006 International Tropical Timber 
Agreement (ITTO) that supports sustainable management and conservation of tropical forests. The 
United  States  also participates in the Asia -Pacific Eco nomic Cooperation (APEC) Experts Group on 
Illegal Logging and Associated Trade (EGILAT). At the recent COP26, the United  States  undertook a 
number of forest -related initiatives. The United  States  announced its Plan to Conserve Global 
Forests, launched the Forest Investor Club and the Forest Finance Risk Consortium (FFRC), endorsed 
the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use, and joined the Global Forest Finance 
Pledge. The Plan to Conserve Global Forests pledges USD  9 billion  for international climate funding, 
subject to Congressional appropriations.  
 
QUESTION 25:  The United  States  undertook a number of forest -related initiatives on environment 
such as launching its Plan to Conserve Global Forests. What are the relevant updates/progress of 
this plan and who are the stakeholders involved in partner countries?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  On 2 November  2021, the United  States  announced the Plan to Conserve Global 
Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks. Please see the progress report on implementing this plan here: 
https://www.state.gov/u -s-leadership -advances -global -efforts -to-conserve -critical -ecosystems -
and-protect -carbon -sinks-a-progress -report -on-implementing -u-s-efforts -on-the-plan-to-conserve -
global -forests -critical -carbon/ . 
 
Page  222, Paragraph  4.127  
 
Total greenhouse gas emissions in the United  States  amounted to 6,457  million  tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent in 2017, or about 12% of global emiss ions. Emissions of carbon dioxide, mostly 
from combustion processes, accounted for 82% of the total. The remainder  - primarily methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions  - originated from agriculture, waste management, and the production of oil 
and gas.125 The Un ited States  has been party to the United  Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) since it entered into force in 1994 and signed the Paris Agreement on 
3 September  2016. The United  States  withdrew from the Paris Agreement in November  2020, but 
its absence was brief. The new U.S. administration announced that the United  States  was re -entering 
the Paris Agreement in January  2021. In April  2021, the United  States  submitted its Nationally 
Determined Contribution to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 50% to 52% below 2005 levels 
by 2030, create a carbon -pollution -free electric power sector by 2035, and achieve net -zero 
emissions economy -wide by no later than 2050.126 A National Climate Task Force has been formed 
to mobilize action on climate change by all federal government agencies.  
 
QUESTION 26:  What are the long -term strategies the U .S. government has set to be able to achieve 
the GHG reduction target of 50 -52% (below 2005  levels) by 2030 and net zero by 2050?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  For more information on the United  States ' approach to achieve a GHG reduction 
target  of 50-52% below  2005 levels , please  refer to the following  link: https://www.whitehouse.go
v/briefing -room/presidential -actions/2021/01/27/executive -order -on-tackling -the-climate -crisis-
at-home -and-abroad/ . 
 
For more information on sectoral strategies, please see the United  States ' Nationally Determined 
Contribution ( 21 April 2021), available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022 -
06/United%20States%20NDC%20April%2021%202021%20Final.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  225, Paragraph  4.139  
 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for industry oversight, including reactor 
safety, materials safety and  materials licensing, waste management, and the issuance and renewal 
of reactor licenses. The NRC is required by law to recover approximately 90% of its annual budget 
from the nuclear industry. Reactor licenses are issued for an initial term of 40  years an d may be 
extended for an unlimited number of 20 -year periods.  
 
QUESTION 27:  It was mentioned that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is mandated to 
recover approximately 90% of its annual budget from the nuclear industry. What are the practices 
being done in the nuclear power industry to achieve this mandate?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  The NRC receives revenues from licensing, inspection, and other service fees. 
Details  are available  in the NRC's  website:  https://www.nrc.gov/about -nrc/regulatory/licensing/ge
neral-fee-questions.pdf . 
 
Page  226-227, Para graph  4.144  
 
Federal tax credit programs play a key role in new generation capacity. These programs include the 
Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), the Investment Tax Credit (ITC), and the 
Residential Energy -Efficient Property Credit (REEPC). Renewable energy developers may choose to 
benefit from the PTC or the ITC but cannot receive the two benefits.  The PTC provides eligible 
generation facilities with a tax credit per kWh for the first 10  years a facility is in operation. The 
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 (P.L.  116-94) and the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2021 extended the PTC  tax benefit for wind and other renewables facilities that began 
construction before the end of 2021. Similarly, the ITC, introduced in 2005, has been extended 
several times since then. Solar and geothermal energy has a permanent 10% ITC; however, the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L.  115-123) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 
increased the ITC temporarily to 30% through 2021. The REEPC is a tax credit for residential owners 
for qualifying properties, such as, inter alia, solar electric prop erty, solar water heaters, geothermal 
heat pumps, small wind turbines, and fuel cell property. Estimated revenue losses related to these 
tax provisions amounted to USD  13.2 billion  and USD  12.6 billion  in FY2020 and FY2021, 
respectively.  
 
QUESTION 28:  Estimated revenue from the current Federal Tax Programs in the power generation 
sector decreased between FY2020 to FY 2021 by USD  0.6 billion . How do the programs attract more 
investors for new generation capacity?  
 
RESPONSE 28: The deployment of clean power plants in the United  States  varies from year to year 
due to a variety of factors, including supply chain pressures, utility and corporate clean energy 
contracting, state policy changes, transmission investment and, over this specific period, COVID -19. 
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 is expected to, in the years ahead, incentivize clean power 
growth through extensions and expansions of clean energy tax credits. The newly revised tax credits 
also embed design changes such as the ability to transfer or convert tax credits to cash that are 
intended to expand the types of investors able to participate in the clean power transition. The U.S. 
Department of the Treasury publishes guidance for investors and utilities on 
how to qualify  for and utilize  the tax credits,  with information  on recent  initiatives  available  here:  h
ttps://www.whitehouse.gov/cleanenergy/clea n-energy -updates/2022/11/29/how -to-engage -with-
treasury -on-clean-energy -tax-incentives/ . 
 
Page  232, Paragraph  4.161  
 
The measures taken worldwide to the counter the COVID -19 pandemic caused disruptions in the 
supply chains of several U.S. (sub)sectors operating under a just -in-time logistic. Disruptions in the 
production and delivery of semiconductors created problems for several domestic manufacturing 
activities, including vehicles, medical devices, and other products in 2021. Lawmakers en acted the 
Creating Helpful Incentives To Produce Semiconductors For America Act, or CHIPS for America Act, 
Title XCIX of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021, which authorizes USDOC, to award financial ass istance to private entities or public -private 
consortia to finance, construct, expand, or modernize facilities to support the fabrication; assembly, 
test, and packaging; and advanced packaging of semiconductors. However, the Act does not 
appropriate fundin g for the law.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 439 - 
 
  QUESTION 29 : It is our understanding that the CHIPS Act aims to bolster U .S. leadership in 
semiconductors through an estimated USD 52.7billion  for research and development, including 
manufacturing incentives. In addition, tax credits for cap ital expenses for manufacturing of 
semiconductors and related equipment would also apply. Could the United  States  explain how the 
CHIPS Act aligns with the WTO  Agreement s on Anti -Dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. 
 
QUEST ION 30:  Could the U .S. also share the types of business incentives the CHIPS Act provides?  
 
RESPONSE 30 : The U.S. Department of Commerce may provide funding under the CHIPS Act in 
various forms, including grants, cooperative agreements, loans, and loan guarantees.  
 
Page  234, Paragraph  4.168  
 
The financial services sector is a substantial contributor to the U.S. econom y. In 2021 (third quarter), 
the share of financial services in GDP was 8.5%, up from 7.5% in 2017, as reported in the previous 
Review. Banking services generated 3.7% of GDP; insurance and related services 2.9%; securities, 
commodity contracts, and investm ent 1.7%; and funds trusts and other financial vehicles 0.1%. The 
United  States  continued to run a significant surplus in trade in financial services during the period 
under review. In 2020, exports of financial services excluding insurance services were 
USD 144.34  billion , a 6% increase from 2019 levels, while imports of financial services amounted to 
USD 42.26  billion . On the other hand, it runs a deficit on insurance services, with exports of 
USD 20.43  billion  compared with imports of USD  55.62  billion  in 2020.  
 
QUES TION 31:  The Philippines noted that there was no mention on financial technologies in the 
report considering that most of fintech companies are from the USA. Other countries are geared 
towards developing a mature FinTech ecosystem and establis hing to become a global FinTech hub. 
Hence, what are the updates on the U .S. Financial Technologies including recent innovations?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  The U.S. financial technology landscape is quickly growing and evolving.  Originally, 
many financial technology companies (fintechs) set out to disrupt incumbent firms in the financial 
services sector. However, more recently fintechs have increasingly sought to partner with traditional 
financial institutions to collaborate on the delivery of financial pro ducts and services. This has 
resulted in financial institutions recognizing some of the benefits of innovative technologies; 
however, there are also associated risks that need to be managed.  
 
Page  235, Paragraph  4.174  
 
Under Section  113 of the DFA, the FSOC is authorized to make a determination as to whether a 
non-bank financial company must be supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and be subject to enhanced prudential standards if material financial distress at the company 
could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.  
 
QUESTION 32:  What are the specific considerations/set of criteria in determining if a non -bank 
financial company should be supervised by the Federal Reserve?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  FSOC (the Council) may subject a no n-bank financial company to supervision by 
the Federal Reserve and enhanced prudential standards if the company's material financial 
distress  - or nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of its 
activities  - could pose a threat  to U.S. financial stability. Section  113 of the DFA sets forth the 
standard for the Council's determinations regarding non -bank financial companies and requires the 
Council to consider 10 specific criteria and any other risk -related factors that it deems appropriate 
when evaluating those companies. The Council's financial interpretive guidance, issued in 2019, 
makes modifications to the processes the Council intends to follow if it were to consider making a 
determination to subject a non -bank financial com pany to supervision by the Federal Reserve.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 440 - 
 
  Page  236, Paragraph  4.175  
 
Section  804 of the DFA authorizes the FSOC to designate a Financial Market Utility (FMU) as 
systemically important if it determines that the failure of, or a disruption to the function ing of, the 
FMU could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems spreading among 
financial institutions or markets and thereby threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system. 
Designated FMUs are subject to heightened prude ntial and supervisory provisions; must provide 
advance notice and review of changes to their rules, procedures, and operations; and are subject to 
relevant examination and enforcement provisions.  
 
QUESTION 33:  What are some examples of the heightened prude ntial and supervisory provisions 
that are imposed on Financial Market Utilities and how are these more stringent compared to banking 
regulations?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  Financial market utilities (FMUs) that the Financial Stability Oversight Council has 
designated as systemically important are subject to heightened supervision and regulation. The 
regulations that apply to systemically important FMUs impose comprehensive risk-management 
requirements governing (among other things) financial resources, operational risk, settlement 
procedures, and governance.  In some cases, systemically important FMUs are generally subject to 
more stringent regulations than banking organizati ons. For example, a systemically important FMU 
(i) must provide advance notice to its primary regulator of any material change to its rules, 
procedures, or operations; and (ii)  cannot implement such a material change if its primary regulator 
objects.  
 
Page  242, Paragraph  4.199  
 
Despite the negative effects of the pandemic, the U.S. insurance industry was able to maintain its 
financial health in 2020. Although there were increased balance sheet pressures, the L&H segment 
achieved an increase in its capital a nd surplus, boosted by growth in cash and invested assets. Also, 
and despite the effects of COVID -19, the P/C segment also increased its policyholder surplus, 
reflecting steady leverage ratios and improved liquidity levels. On the other hand, the sustained  low 
interest rate environment continued to affect the insurance industry's performance. Both the L&H 
and P/C segments exhibited declining operating margins and some deterioration in the quality of 
their investment portfolios in 2020. The L&H segment's und erwriting performance was mainly 
impacted by negative premium growth. The P/C segment's reduced net investment income largely 
drove negative operating growth. The industry continued to seek higher yields, increasing its 
non-investment -grade bond holdings a nd alternative investments in 2020.  
 
QUESTION 34:  With the ongoing health crisis, the importance of having a health insurance is critical 
to ensure financial support provision to the family of the deceased or to the affected member, 
whichever is applicable . Hence, what are the strategies that the U .S. put in place to increase 
insurance provision, especially to the most vulnerable sector.  
 
RESPONSE 34:  Paragraphs  4.291 -4.292 and 4.297 -4.298 identify a number of measures the 
United  States  took to respond to t he pandemic, including with respect to the availability of insurance 
and funding for medically underserved populations.  
 
Pages  268-269, Para graph  4.295 -296 
 
4.295. The regulation of telemedicine or telehealth is particularly important as it can influence t he 
mode and cross -border tradability of healthcare services beyond state or national borders. Since the 
COVID -19 pandemic, the United  States  has liberalized many domestic telehealth restrictions, mostly 
on a temporary basis. The Federal Government has several laws or statutes that define telemedicine 
or telehealth and its role in the provision of healthcare. The Health Care Safety Net Amendmen ts 
Act of 2002 (P.L.  107-251) introduced the term "telehealth" when it directed the Department of HHS 
to establish demonstration projects on the use of telehealth care services. Provisions in the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act (P.L.  94-437) also used t he term "telemedicine" but without 
specifically indicating its use. The rules under the Veterans Administration allow for telehealth by its 
healthcare professionals and in particular allow it across state borders (38  U.S.C.  1730C). The 
federal rules of Med icare have increased its use recently (see section below) but do not allow 
payment for health services that are not furnished within the United  States . This payment exclusion 
remains in effect during a public health emergency and is not affected by telehea lth flexibilities put WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 441 - 
 
  in place for the COVID -19 pandemic. Medicaid, as regulated by the Federal Government and 
implemented by the states may cover services while a beneficiary is abroad. However, states are 
prohibited from making direct payments to foreign  institutions or entities.  
 
4.296. All U.S. states have some type of telehealth/telemedicine policy and regulation; however, 
they differ by state. Telemedicine is generally limited by regulations in the type of healthcare service; 
by modality, i.e. using video, telephone, or other technologies; and by whether prescribing controlled 
substances is allowed, limited, or prohibited. Forty -nine states require that telemedicine be 
conducted by physicians licensed in the state where the patient is located. S ome states require 
special licenses or authorizations to conduct telemedicine specifically. Most states also have detailed 
rules on the practice of telemedicine by out -of-state physicians. As of 2021, all states except three 
required a full license or tele medicine permit in that state to perform telemedicine. However, some 
of these requirements were suspended due to temporary COVID -19 measures (see below). Since 
2020, many states are considering making some arrangements permanent. For example, in 2021, 
43 state bills were enacted that addressed cross -state licensing. A recent study by the industry on 
regulatory overload in the healthcare sector notes that hospitals, health systems, and post -acute 
care providers must comply with at least 629  separate regulato ry measures, across 9  domains at 
the federal level, leading to regulatory compliance costs of USD  39 billion  annually.  
 
QUESTION 35:  What are the telehealth restrictions that the U .S. has liberalized during the 
pandemic and the permanent measures considere d in the practice of telehealth system specifically 
in the data privacy of patients that the Philippines and other countries can adopt.  
 
RESPONSE 35:  Paragraph  4.299 and Box  4.2 summarize the main changes to telehealth policy the 
United  States  enacted during the pandemic. With respect to consideration of permanent measures, 
the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  272, Paragraph  4.307  
 
4.307. The U.S. retail e -commerce is the second largest in the world with an estimated revenue of 
USD 870.8  billion  in 2021. In the United  States , e-commerce accounts for approximately 12.5% of 
the trade of physical goods, i.e. business -to-business and business -to-consumer sales considered 
together. A small num ber of online platforms (Amazon, Facebook, eBay, Walmart) concentrate 
several hundred million monthly visitors to their websites; online platforms have also specialized 
themselves in different categories of products according to their business strategies. Licensed as a 
money transmitter at the state level, PayPal is the most used online payment service in the 
United  States . 
 
QUEST ION 36:  We note that PayPal is licensed at the state level. Please clarify if payment service 
providers such as PayPal are not subject to federal regulations? Kindly share applicable laws and 
regulations on payment service providers such as PayPal in the retail payments landscape of the 
U.S. 
 
RESPONSE 36:  Money transmitters are licensed at the state level and are generally not sub ject to 
federal supervision, although the CFPB supervises some large money transmitters for compliance 
with CFPB rules governing cross -border consumer payments.  Money transmitters are subject to 
federal AML/sanctions laws and regulations, and they are requ ired to register with the U.S. 
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.  Depending on their business models, money 
transmitters may also be subject to certain federal consumer -protection laws and regulations.  
 
QUESTION 37:  What are the benefits and obligations of a licensed money transmitter?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  United  States  law requires certain money services businesses (MSBs), which include 
money transmitters, to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), of the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, within 180  days after the date on which the MSB is established. 
Money transmitters must also register or comply with laws in each state where residents use their 
services. These businesses are also required to prepare and maintain a list of a gents.  For more 
information  on MSBs  and money  transmitter  regulations  at the U.S. Federal  level,  see: 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCENfactsheet.pdf . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 442 - 
 
  Page  274, Paragraph  4.315  
 
4.315. The United  States  keeps a decentralized, market -driven approach to  regulate digital services 
through policies, regulations, and laws on specific issues and/or sectors that together support the 
progression of digital transformation.  
 
QUESTION 38:  Please provide more information on the regulations/policies/laws applicable to 
digital services, specifically those governing retail payment systems such as governance 
arrangements, as well as any relevant clearing switch fee, interchange fee and consumer pricing 
mechanisms.  
 
RESPONSE 38:  Financial institutions that provide retail  payment services may be subject to a 
variety of consumer -protection laws and regulations, including the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and 
the Truth in Lending Act. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation  II establishes rules 
concerning interch ange fees for debit cards.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
II. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT  
Page  5, Para graph  2.5 
 
The strong economic recovery to date has been primarily driven by increases in consumption and 
investment. However, pandemic -induced changes in behavior led to relatively more demand for 
goods than services, both domestically produced and imported. The increase in domestic demand 
along with production disruptions reduced the available supply for exp orts, while increasing demand 
for imports, adversely affecting the overall U.S. trade balance. U.S. trade in services has taken 
longer to recover, and the pandemic has affected U.S. services exports to a greater extent than U.S. 
services imports.  
 
QUESTION  39: How did the U.S. resolve the adverse effect in trade in services to calibrate the 
overall U.S. trade balance and lift up the services exports?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  As the pandemic subsided in the United  States , trade in services recovered, with 
imports recov ering faster than exports. U.S. services exports are 3 % higher in 2022 (annualized 
based on January to September data) than in 2019, and U.S. services imports are 15 % higher in 
2022. Accordingly, the U.S. services surplus declined 22 % between 2019 and annu alized 2022. 
However, one major U.S. services export sector, travel services, has not fully recovered  - with 
exports still down roughly 14 %. 
 
Page  6, Para graph  2.7 
 
The U.S. Federal budget deficit increased from USD  779 billion  (3.8% of GDP) in fiscal year (FY) 
2018 and USD  984 billion  (4.7% of GDP) in FY2019 to USD  3.1 trillion  (15.0% of GDP) in FY2020 
before decreasing to USD  2.8 trillion  (12.4% of GDP) in FY2021. For FY2022, the deficit is estimated 
to be USD  1.0 trillion  (4.2% of GDP). Notably, the deficit will be more than USD  1.7 trillion  lower 
than FY2021, making it the largest ever one -year decline in U.S. history to less than a third of the 
FY2020 deficit.  
 
QUESTION 40:  How does the U.S. de -clog the supply bottlenecks wh ich slows down the recovery 
of both imports and exports, particularly automotive and capital goods?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  President  Biden has taken swift action to address the supply chain crisis confronting 
the country since he took office. This started with his Executive  Order  14017 directing various supply 
chain assessments and continued with his creating the Supply Chain Disruption Task Force. Since 
that time, the Administration has worked together with business and labor leaders to help alleviate 
supply chain bottlenecks. For example, the Task Force has moved ports toward 24/7 operations, 
reduced long -dwelling containers sitting on the docks, convened stakeholders to discuss how to 
strengthen the trucking workforce, and worked to increase freight rail service. In response to the 
Executive  Order, the U.S. Department of Transportation published a Supply Chain Assessment of 
the Transportation Industrial Base, found here:  https://www.transportation.gov/supp lychains . 
Additionally, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law includes significant funding to improve America's WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 443 - 
 
  supply chain infrastructure, such as USD 450 million  of funding the Department of Transportation 
made available to ports for infrastructure upgrades . 
 
Page  8, Para graph  2.23 
 
Global current account imbalances have also widened due to the trade distortions associated with 
the pandemic. In general, and especi ally at a time of recovering global growth, adjustments to 
reduce excessive imbalances should occur through a symmetric rebalancing process that sustains 
global growth momentum rather than through asymmetric compression of demand in deficit 
economies  - the channel which too often has dominated in the past.  
 
QUESTION 41:  The Philippines notes that the pandemic and the Ukraine -Russia conflict 
exacerbated supply disruptions, drove up energy costs, and threatened food security. Aside from 
the U .S. government's large-scale fiscal support programs, what are the other key strategic 
measures being undertaken by the U .S. government to reduce excessive imbalances brought about 
by trade distortions?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  To tackle the formidable trade disruptions, the United  States has put resources into 
facilitating trade at the U.S. border. Making transportation efficient so that when goods are available 
they can be swiftly processed and distributed in the United  States  has been a key objective of the 
U.S. Administration. The United  States  is working with allies to share information on critical supply 
chains and develop crisis responses to trade disruptions in the future.  
 
QUESTION 42:  With divergent economic recovery in  the foreground, which policies are most 
effective in promoting equitable economic growth across sectors? What policy options and responses 
are being considered to mitigate the risks posed by supply chain constraints and rising inflation to 
key sectors?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  The U.S. recovery resulted from broad fiscal and monetary policies that had 
differential effects across sectors. As today's world is different from the pre -pandemic world, it is 
important to carefully judge whether each sector recovered in a wa y that is efficient. Some sectors 
may have grown or shrunk due to persistent changes in consumer and business preferences. The 
United  States  is making a once -in-a-generation investment in upgrading our infrastructure and 
competitiveness through the Biparti san Infrastructure Law, supporting the development of advanced 
technology through the CHIPS and Science Act, and facilitating the clean energy transition through 
the Inflation Reduction Act. These investments will strengthen supply chains and lower costs f or 
American businesses.  
 
QUESTION 43:  How effective was the extension of Bilateral Swap Facilities in alleviating risks to 
Financial Stability?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  The Federal Reserve's dollar liquidity swap lines are designed to improve conditions 
in dollar funding markets in the United  States  and abroad by providing foreign central banks with 
the capacity to deliver U.S. dollar funding to institutions in their jurisdictions during times of market 
stress. The swap lines have helped to ease strains in f inancial markets and mitigate their effects on 
economic conditions.  The FIMA Repo facility, which allows central banks and monetary authorities 
with accounts at the New York Fed to use their Treasury holdings to obtain temporary dollar liquidity, 
has also played a role in supporting the smooth functioning of financial markets. Both the swap lines 
and FIMA Repo facility have been effective tools in 
mitigating  financial  stability  risks.  (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquiditysw
aps.htm , https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/central -bank-liquidity -swaps.htm , https:
//www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2022/epr_2022_fima -repo_choi.pdf .). 
 
III. ADVANCING A WORKER -CENTERED TRADE POLICY  
Page  10, Para graph  3.13 
 
The United  States  also seeks to protect our oceans and marine resou rces, and those whose 
livelihoods depend on them, from the harm caused by plastic pollution. In 2022, the United  States  
supported the launch of multilateral negotiations on an international agreement on plastic pollution. 
The United  States  recognizes the k ey role that trade plays as both a contributor to the problem of 
plastic pollution in the environment, including the marine environment, and its potential to serve as 
an important part of the solution.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 444 - 
 
  QUESTION 44:  Cognizant of the key role that trade play s in the problem of plastic pollution, what 
are the possible changes in the U .S. policies and domestic regulations that the U .S. trading partner 
should look out for?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  Regarding possible changes to U.S. policies and domestic regulations, the 
United States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises. The 
United  States  has integrated plastics pollutions considerations in trade policy objectives. For 
example, for the first time in a U.S. trade agreement, the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement 
(USMCA) includes a provision to address marine litter (Article  24.12). Addit ionally, the Save Our 
Seas Act 2.0  seeks to strengthen U.S. domestic marine debris response capabilities, enhance global 
engagement to combat marine debris, including through international cooperation and outreach by 
federal agencies to other countries, an d improve U.S. waste management and recycling 
infrastructure to help prevent plastic litter from entering the environment. The United  States  also is 
actively engaged in negotiations together with representatives from over 150  countries to develop 
a global agreement on plastic pollution.  
 
QUESTION 45:  What are the measures and best practices being undertaken in reducing plastic 
pollution in the country?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  The United  States  has taken a number of domestically -focused actions to address 
plastic poll ution. These include implementing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (U.S.  EPA) 
National Recycling Strategy, and its Sustainable Materials Management, WasteWise, and Trash Free 
Waters Programs. More information about U.S. actions to address plastic  pollution is available here: 
https://www.state.gov/u -s-actions -to-address -plastic -pollution/ . 
 
VII UNITED STATES PREFERENCE PROGRAMS  
Page  34, Para graph  7.1 
 
The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program was authorized by the Trade Act of 1974 
(19 U.S.C.  §§ 2461 et seq.) and has subsequently been renewed 14  times, most recently in 
March  2018. Authorization for the program lapsed on 31  December  2020. The GSP p rogram is a 
non-reciprocal trade preference program that allows eligible exports from designated developing 
countries to enter the United  States  duty-free. It was designed to support the creation of trade 
opportunities for developing countries and encourag e broad -based economic development. As of 
31 December  2020, there were 119  designated GSP beneficiary developing countries (BDCs) and 
territories . 
 
QUESTION 46:  The Philippines' preferential U .S. GSP expired on 31  December  2020. What are the 
current update s/developments on the renewal of the GSP program for the Philippines?  
 
RESPONSE 46:  The U.S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GSP and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program.  
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
 
QUESTION 47:  Aside from the creation of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force, could the 
United  States  expound on its existing procurement measures which adhere to principles like 
transparency, accountability, fairness, and integrity? What criteria do the country use to maximize 
its undertaking in government procurement?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  An essential consider ation in every aspect of the procurement system is maintaining 
the public's trust. Not only must the system have integrity, but the actions of each member of the 
procurement team must reflect integrity, fairness, and openness. The foundation of integrity w ithin 
the system is a competent, experienced, well -trained, and professional workforce. Accordingly, each 
member of the procurement team is responsible and accountable for the wise use of public resources 
as well as acting in a manner which maintains the p ublic's trust. Fairness and openness require open 
communication among team members, internal and external customers, and the public.  
 
The 2018 Farm Bill is set to expire in September  2023. According to some reports, the U .S. Congress 
have already on the pr ocess of creating a new one.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 445 - 
 
  QUESTION 48:  May we request the U .S. to provide an update and timeframe when the U .S. 
Congress will be able to pass the 2023 Farm Bill?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospectiv e 
exercises.  
 
QUESTION 49:  May we request the U .S. to provide details on the new possible support programs 
planned in the next farm bill?  
 
RESPONSE 49:  The United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 446 - 
 
  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
U.S. RESPONSE:  In light of Russia's full -scale invasion of Ukraine, the United  States  will not engage 
in business -as-usual activity in the WTO with the delegation o f the Russian  Federation , including 
direct engagement related to the U.S. Trade Policy Review.  
 
Questions by the Russian  Federation  
 
REPORT BY THE UNITED  STATES  
 
2 THE UNITED  STATES ECONOMIC AND TRADE ENVIRONMENT  
2.3 Federal Budget Deficit  
 
Page  6, Paragraph  2.8 
 
The Report states that "the gross Federal debt -to-GDP ratio is projected at 125.4% in FY2022 before 
declining to 116.4% in FY2032".  
 
QUESTION  №1: Could the U.S.  elaborate more on the factors leading to the persistence of the 
gross Federal debt till 2032?  
 
QUESTION  №2: Does the U.S. have any specific program for the period 2022 -2032 aimed at 
reducing the gross Federal debt? If so, please provide more details on th is program. If not, what 
measures does the U.S. plan to take in order to reduce its Federal debt?  
 
2.8 Challenges to the U.S. and Global Economy  
 
Page  8, Para graph s 2.21-2.22 
 
The U.S. reports that "The Russian  Federation 's unprovoked and unjustifiable war with Ukraine has 
further challenged the global outlook. It has exacerbated supply disruptions, driven up energy costs 
and increased food insecurity. The IMF projects global growth to slow from an estimated 6.1% in 
2021 to 3.2% in 2022 and  2.9% in 2023, which is 1.2 and 0.9  percentage point s lower for 2022 and 
2023 than the IMF's projections in January  2022".  
 
QUESTION  №3: Can the U.S. provide the data on the direct effect of "the Russian  Federation 's…war 
with Ukraine" on global and U.S. su pply chains, as well as global energy costs and food security?  
 
QUESTION  №4: Can the U.S. confirm that the unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. against the 
Russian  Federation  in 2022 (including but not limited to numerous import and exports prohibition s, 
restrictions on services (including in the financial, transport and logistic sectors, investments etc.) 
do not disrupt global and regional supply chains and do not lead to the supply shortages?  
 
QUESTION  №5: Can the U.S. confirm that the unilateral sanc tions imposed by the U.S. against the 
Russian  Federation  in 2022 do not lead to the increased world prices on food, fertilizers and fuels, 
and increased inflation? Please, explain the rationale.  
 
QUESTION  №6: Can the U.S. confirm that the unilateral sancti ons imposed by the U.S. against the 
Russian  Federation  in 2022 do not disrupt trade routes and do not create additional trade costs for 
economic operators? Please, explain the rationale.  
 
QUESTION  №7: Please, comment  on the impact of unilateral restrictions imposed by the U.S. 
against the Russian  Federation  (including the import prohibition on fish, seafood, and preparations 
thereof of Russian  Federation  origin) on the increased food security.  
 
QUESTION  №8: How does the U.S. justify these measure s in light of the U.S. WTO obligations?  
 
QUESTION  №9: The "Suspending normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus Act" ( H.R. 7108) 
suspends normal trade relations with Russia.  It means that the U.S. has decided to unilaterally deny 
MFN tariff treatment accorded to the Russian  Federation . Moreover, it directs the U.S. Trade 
Representative, inter alia, to use "voice and influence" of the U.S. at the WTO to "encourage other 
WTO members to suspend trade concessions to the Russian  Federation " and "consider fu rther steps WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 447 - 
 
  with the view to suspend the Russian  Federation 's participation in the WTO". The United State s Trade 
Representative commented this step: " Over the last three months, President  Biden has united our 
allies and partners to impose severe economic sanctions on Russia. Today's announcement on tariffs, 
granted under the authority of the  Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act , 
will further restrict Russia's economy, while minimizing costs to U.S. consumers ". 
Could the U. S. provide information and data on minimized costs to U.S. consumers due to the 
suspension of normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus, as prescribed by the abovementioned 
act? 
 
QUESTION  №10:  How does the U.S. justify the unilateral suspension of concessions under the 
"Suspending normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus Act" in light of the U.S. WTO obligations?  
 
QUESTION  №11:  In the U.S. view, does the WTO provide opportunity legal right  to influence, 
directly or indirectly, a foreign government to act in a particular way? Please provide examples of 
such instruments of influence. In the U.S. view, is such conduct (i.e. to use voice and influence to 
encourage certain types of actions by a foreign government) permissible under international law?  
 
3 ADVANCING A WORKER -CENTERED TRADE POLICY  
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  
 
Page  9, Paragraph  3.6 - Paragraph  3.8 
 
The Report notes that the United  States  considers trade an indispensable tool in addressing the 
climate crisis. It is also noted that "[t]he traditional approach to climate and environmental issues 
within trade has primarily focused on advancing levels of environmental protection f or our trading 
partners. The United  States  will continue this work to strengthen and expand those commitments, 
but we also recognize that this singular approach will not fully achieve our climate goals. To this 
end, the United  States  is pursuing a new gene ration of trade policies that will more affirmatively 
promote the decarbonization necessary to limit global temperature increase to 1. 5 degrees  Celsius.  
 
QUESTION  №12:  In the U.S. view, what is the role of the WTO in enabling trade as an indispensable 
tool in addressing the climate crisis? How does the U.S. see the development of the WTO rules in 
terms of combating the climate crisis and promoting sustainable environmental practices?  
 
QUESTION  №13:  Please give further detail on the U.S. planned timeline for energy transition, and 
what sort of mechanisms and tools it is considering.  
 
QUESTION  №14:  Will the U.S. seek to raise its commitments under its Nationally Determined 
Contribution?  
 
QUESTION  №15:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on the environmen tal/sustainability criteria that 
the foreign economic operators need to comply with? Which documents do set these criteria?  
 
QUESTION  №16:  Please provide a comprehensive list of trade measures adopted by the U.S. since 
its last Trade Policy Review with an aim to promote decarbonization and environmental protection.  
 
QUESTION  №17:  What specific range of trade measures and "trade policies of new generation" is 
the U.S. considering to reduce emissions, promote decarbonization and address the climate crisis?  
 
QUESTION  №18:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the status of the Clean Competition Act, its purpose 
and the expected date of its adoption?  
 
QUESTION  №19:  Under what conditions will the covered imports, or a country/territory, be 
exempted or excluded from carbon price charges under this Act? Please provide references to 
relevant provisions.  
 
QUESTION  №20:  With respect to the proposed Clean Competition Act, what criteria will be used 
by the Secretary of the Treasury to determine that a country is "a transparent market economy in 
which inter -firm resource shuffling is unlikely to occur" and for which "transparent, verifiable, and 
reliable information is available with respect to any covered national industry"? What legal act 
provides criteria for such determination?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 448 - 
 
  Why, under the proposed Clean Competition Act, will a carbon intensity charge have wider 
application for imported products in comparison with domestic products? In the case of American 
products, a carbon intensity charge will be applicable o nly to covered primary goods. However, in 
the case of imported products, a carbon intensity charge will be applicable to covered primary goods, 
covered primary goods used as inputs and to finished goods (with respect to any covered primary 
good which is a component part of an imported finished good).  
 
QUESTION  №21:  Will the U.S. take into account a carbon price paid in a country of origin while 
establishing carbon price for imports?  
 
QUESTION  №22:  How does the U.S. explain the expectation that the Clean Com petition Act has 
the ability to create trade barriers which would affect the conditions of competitions between 
imported and like domestic products in the U.S. , benefiting American producers of the covered 
products and at the same time hurting exporters/fo reign manufacturers of the covered imported like 
products?  
 
QUESTION  №23:  How will the U.S. ensure compliance of the Clean Competition Act and other 
related acts with the U.S. tariff commitments and obligations under the GATT  1994, in particular 
non-discrimination requirements, and its obligations under the SCM  Agreement ? 
 
QUESTION  №24:  How does the U.S. see the role of agricultural policies in promoting the necessary 
decarbonisation? Please, elaborate more on the programmes, strategies and applicable legis lation 
aimed to promote increased carbon sequestration and reducing greenhouse gas emissions through 
agriculture -related policies, including the United  States  Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry 
Strategy (CSAF). Can the U.S. confirm that the domestic support measures envisaged in these 
documents are not trade -distorting?  
 
QUESTION  №25:  Please, confirm that the domestic support measures envisaged under the 
Inflation Reduction Act with an aim to promote climate -smart agriculture and renewable en ergy are 
not trade -distorting. Please, provide the rationale.  
 
Page  9, Paragraph  3.9 
 
The Report states that "[i]n October  2021, the United  States  and the EU further announced their 
commitment to negotiate the world's first emissions -based sectoral arrangement on steel and 
aluminum trade. Together, the United  States  and EU are working to address the carbon intensity of 
steel and aluminum traded into their market, as well as countries that adopt non -market practices 
that contribute to w orldwide over -supply. The arrangement will drive investment in green steel and 
aluminum production in the United  States , Europe, and around the world, reducing emissions in two 
of the most carbon -intensive industrial sectors.  
 
QUESTION  №26:  Please elaborat e on the stage these negotiations have reached.  
 
QUESTION  №27:  What concrete outcomes does the U.S. anticipate as a result of these 
negotiations.  
 
QUESTION  №28:  Can the U.S. confirm that the U.S. seeks to find mutually agreed solution on the 
EU's Carbon Bo rder Adjustment Mechanism in the framework of these negotiations?  
 
QUESTION  №29:  Does the U.S. have any plans to conclude similar agreements in respect to other 
products? If so, please elaborate.  
 
QUESTION  №30:  What specific trade tools does the U.S. plan to use and/or have decided,  including 
jointly with the EU, to use to address the emissions intensity of steel and aluminum production and 
so-called "non -market excess capacity" in the steel and aluminum sectors?  
 
QUESTION  №31:  What factors, characteristics and level of emissions does the U.S. intend/propose 
to use for determination of the "dirty" steel?  
What factors, characteristics and level of emissions does the U.S. intend/propose to use while 
determining that excess capacity of a foreign country is "non -market"?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 449 - 
 
  QUESTION  №32:  Will this sectoral arrangement establish conditional market access for impo rted 
steel and aluminum? If so, could the U.S. specify what conditions are proposed and under what 
terms?  
 
Page  9, Paragraph  3.10 
 
According to the Report, the U.S .-EU trade agreement on steel and aluminum " is proof that trade 
policy is an important part of the U.S. climate agenda, and that effective climate action can —and 
must—support good -paying, quality jobs. It is also a first in the fight against climate change: never 
before have two global partners aligned their trade policies to confr ont the joint threats of climate 
change and global market distortions, ensuring that trade works to solve the challenges of the 21st 
century".  
 
QUESTION  №33:  Can the U.S. elaborate more on the United  States  Climate Leadership in 
international Mitigation, A daptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021, which provides for 
the bilateral and regional multilateral climate diplomacy and cooperation between the U.S., Mexico 
and Canada?  
 
QUESTION  №34:  According to the United  States  Climate Leadership in interna tional Mitigation, 
Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021, the trilateral strategy "shall include efforts 
to engage international partners in an existing multilateral forum or, if necessary, establish a new 
multilateral forum to improve global cooperation". Could the U.S. elaborate more on a new 
multilateral forum that could be created? Could the U.S. explain why, in its view, already existing 
multilateral forums are not sufficient for achieving global climate goals?  
 
QUESTION  №35:  The United  States Climate Leadership in international Mitigation, Adaptation, and 
Technology Enhancement Act of 2021 stipulates that China should revise its long -term pledge; seek 
to immediately peak its emissions; begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions significan tly to meet 
a more ambitious long -term 2050 reduction target; and update its nationally determined contribution 
along trajectory that aligns with achieving a more ambitious net -zero by 2050 emission target. Does 
the U.S. intend to conclude a climate agreem ent with China that promotes the development of 
low-carbon technology, carbon capture and storage or any other issues aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions? If not, what mechanisms does the U.S. intend to apply in order to 
implement this provision of its Act?  
 
QUESTION  №36:  According to the United  States  Climate Leadership in international Mitigation, 
Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021, the U.S. and its allies should work together, 
using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold China acco untable for any failure by China; to increase 
ambition in its 2030 nationally determined contribution, in line with net zero greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050; to work faithfully to uphold the principles, goals, and rules of the Paris 
Agreement; avoid and p rohibit efforts to undermine or devolve the Paris Agreement's rule or 
underlying framework, particularly within areas of accountability transparency, and shared 
responsibility among all parties; to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects from China's B elt 
and Road Initiative and other overseas investments. Could the U.S. elaborate more on the economic 
tools that it intends to use?  Could the U.S. provide legal basis for the implementation of such 
economic tools? Could the U.S. justify this approach in th e light of the WTO rules and provisions of 
international climate agreements, and in particular the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement?  
 
Page  9, Paragraph  3.11 
 
The Report states that "[t]he United States continues to encourage like -minded trading partners to 
work with the U.S. to address the emissions intensity of steel and aluminum production and 
non-market excess capacity in the steel and aluminum sectors. For example, through regional 
engagements, the United  States plans to pursue  opportunities to maintain and improve 
environmental protection of our trading partners and increase climate ambition, including 
decarbonization of our respective economies. The U.S. will seek to enable and mobilize the 
technologies, public and private inv estment, and technical resources needed to scale up clean energy 
infrastructure and facilitate trade in climate -friendly goods, services, and technologies, while 
generating high -quality jobs that power economic growth and advance our Paris Agreement 
commit ments".  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 450 - 
 
  QUESTION  №37:  Please provide information on support programs of the U.S. in force covering 
energy transition, deployment of renewables, manufacturing of clean transport, etc.  
 
QUESTION  №38:  What is the purpose of these measures? How do these measu res contribute to 
reducing inflation or fulfillment of the commitments of the U.S. to the Paris Agreement?  
 
QUESTION  №39:  What is the scope of application of these measures? Who can be considered as 
their beneficiaries?  
 
QUESTION  №40:  Who is considered to be "taxpayers" for the purposes of these measures?  
 
QUESTION  №41:  As per Section  13401 of the IRA, the taxpayers who place in service a new "clean 
vehicle" are allowed to get a tax credit. What action of the taxpayer is referred to by the wording 
"place in service"?  
 
QUESTION  №42:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on how the domestic content of 40% of the total 
costs will be determined? What is the reason for choosing 40% level?  
 
QUESTION  №43:  Why is it necessary for the U.S. to establish domestic cont ent requirements?  
Could the U.S. elaborate on its plans to maintain the level of fair competition in its domestic market?  
 
QUESTION  №44:  Does the U.S. consider such measures to be distorting market conditions? If not, 
please provide an explanation.  
 
QUEST ION №45:  How does the U.S. ensure the compatibility of these programs with Article  2 of 
the Agreement on TRIMs, Article  3.1 (b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM), and Article  III of the GATT -1994?  
 
QUESTION  №46:  Does the U.S.  plan to notify to the WTO these measures in accordance with 
Article  25 of the ASCM?  
 
QUESTION  №47:  The Section  3.2 of the Report mentions only the Paris Agreement commitments. 
Please, provide rationale for not mentioning the UNFCCC.  
 
Pages  9-10, Paragraph  3.12 
 
The Report states that "[t] he WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies prohibits subsidies to those 
engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing or fishing related activities in support 
of IUU fishing, subsidies for fishing on over fished stocks, and subsidies for fishing on the unregulated 
high seas] . 
 
QUESTION  №48:  What actions does the U.S. implement to bring overfished stock to a biologically 
sustainable level?  
 
Page  10, Paragraph  3.13 
 
The U.S. reports that it recognizes the key role that trade plays as both a contributor to the problem 
of plastic pollution in the environment, including the marine environment, and its potential to serve 
as an important part of the solution.  
 
QUESTION  №49:  In the view of the U.S. , what are the examples of trade measures that could 
contribute to the problem of plastic pollution?  
 
QUESTION  №50:  Please, provide further information on the trade measures applied by the U.S. to 
tackle plastic pollution.  
 
Page  10, Paragraph  3.14 
 
The Report states that "the United  States  will continue to support and promote more circular and 
resource -efficient approaches in other international fora, including the WTO's Committee on Trade 
and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, and at the 
OECD. In the APEC forum, we are leading a Recyclable Materials Policy  Program under the Committee WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 451 - 
 
  on Trade and Investment. We will continue to support and expand this work, to help develop the 
capacity of APEC economies to identify and frame domestic policies that promote solid waste 
management and recycling infrastructure" . 
 
QUESTION  №51:  Could the U.S. provide sufficient data regarding the rate of recycled products 
manufactured in the U.S. comparing to the virgin ones.  
 
QUESTION  №52:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the priority sectors to promote recycling and re -use. 
 
QUESTIO N №53:  Could the U.S. elaborate on its views on the perspectives of reaching the 
outcomes during the negotiation process in the dimension of the listed international platforms.  
 
QUESTION  №54:  Please, elaborate on the U.S. domestic policies that promote solid waste 
management and recycling infrastructure. Please, provide the definition and the scope for "solid 
waste" according to the U.S. legislation.  
 
QUESTION  №55:  Please, provide the examples of more circular and resource -efficient approaches 
promoted by the U.S. in international fora, including the OECD.  
 
3.3 Supporting U.S. Agriculture  
 
Page  10, Paragraph  3.15 
 
The Report states that the "U.S. farmers, ranchers, food manufacturers, and fishers compete in 
global markets, and expanded market access raises incomes, expands employment, and enables 
farms, ranches, manufacturing plants, and fishing operations to thrive. The United  States is 
commi tted to standing up for American farmers, ranchers, food manufacturers, and fishers by 
pursuing trade policies that are inclusive and work for all producers, and, by enforcing global 
agricultural trade rules".  
 
QUESTION  №56:  Could the U.S. clarify what is the rationale for the state support of competitive 
export oriented U .S. agricultural producers and farmers?  
 
QUESTION  №57:  Could the U.S. elaborate on how particularly Global Food Security objectives are 
reflected in the U.S. agricultural policies?  
 
QUESTI ON №58:  What is the role of sustainable agricultural practices in the U.S. agricultural 
policies?  
 
QUESTION  №59:  What is their main goal and how the balance between climate mitigation 
objectives and economic and social needs is struck?  
 
3.4 Bolstering Supply Chain Resiliency  
 
Page  11, Para graph  3.20 
 
According to Executive  Order  14017 of February  2021 "Securing America's Supply Chains", the U.S. 
conducted a 100 -day review for four priority product areas: semiconductors, large capacity batteries, 
critical minerals and materials, and pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients.  
 
QUESTION  №60:  Please provide rationale for selecting these four particular priority product areas. 
What are the criteria for the "priority products area " in the context of the "Securing America's Supply 
Chains" act?  
 
Page  10, Para graph  3.23 
 
The Report states that "the United  States is engaging bilaterally and multilaterally with its trading 
partners and stakeholders to, inter alia, identify supply chain bottlenecks and chokepoints; ensure 
supply chains embody strong environmental and labor standards; and facilitate trade in th e context 
of supply chain shocks".  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 452 - 
 
  QUESTION  №61:  Please, provide information on trade -related measures to address supply chain 
bottlenecks and chokepoints.  
 
QUESTION  №62:  Please, provide the examples of environmental and labor standards that the U.S. 
tends to embody in the supply chains.  
 
4 OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE  
4.1 Promoting Equitable, Inclusive, and Durable Trade Policy  
 
Page  12, Paragraph  4.1 
 
According to the Report, "in coordination with other economic policies, trade policy can have positive 
and equitable impact on marginalized, underserved, and disadvantaged communities,  including and 
especially workers in the United  States and abroad, grow the middle class, redress inequality, and 
level the playing field by promoting fair competition. The United  States recognizes that an 
intersectional, interconnected framework in trade and investment policy advances the United  States' 
economic competitivene ss and resiliency while expanding the benefits of trade. Thus, equity is 
critical when designing inclusive and durable trade policy. Consistent with USTR's Fiscal Year 
2022-2026 Strategic Plan, whole -of-government Presidential policy directives, and the 
United States ' National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, advancing racial and gender equity 
is mainstreamed in U.S. trade policy".  
 
QUESTION  №63:  Could the U.S. clarify what criteria are used to define "marginalized, underserved, 
and disadvantaged com munities"?  
 
QUESTION  №64:  What trade and investment policy measures does the U.S. take or plans to take 
to enhance commercial opportunities for marginalized, underserved, and disadvantaged 
communities?  
 
QUESTION  №65:  Please, elaborate more on the methodology used to estimate the effects of trade 
policies on "underrepresented and underserved workers and communities", and the key effects 
revealed so far.  
 
QUESTION  №66:  Does the U.S. legislation provide for any restrictions for participation of 
margin alized, disadvantaged, underserved or underrepresented communities (including women, 
indigenous peoples, youth and minorities) in any services sectors? If so, are these restrictions 
equally applied to the U.S. and foreign service providers?  
 
5 TRADE POLICY  DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  
5.1 WTO  Agreement s and Initiatives  
 
Page  15, Paragraph  5.3 
 
The Report states: "That is why the United  States supports a WTO reform agenda that reflects the 
priorities of a worker -centered approach  - one that protects our planet, supports improved labor 
conditions and living standards, and contributes to shared prosperity. This reform agenda includes 
restoring efficacy to the negotiating arm and promoting transparency; improving compliance with 
and enf orcement of Members' WTO commitments; and equipping the organization to effectively 
address the unfair practices of non -market economies  - such as economic coercion  - and global 
market distortions ". 
 
QUESTION  №67:  In the U.S. view, what specific instrument s would effectively address the unfair 
practices, in particular, economic coercion?  
 
QUESTION  №68:  According to the Report, "the WTO's current rules are not able to effectively 
constrain unfair trade and economic practices. The WTO reform agenda includes, among other, 
equipping the organization to effectively address the unfair practices of non -market 
economies  - such as economic coercion  - and global market distortions". What changes in the WTO 
rules does the U.S. propose with a view to better equip the WTO for effectively addressing such 
unfair trade and economic practices?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 453 - 
 
  QUESTION  №69:  How does the U.S. define "unfair trade practices"? I s there are internationally 
recognized definition? Please, describe the scope of "unfair trade practices".  
 
Page  15, Paragraph s 5.4-5.5 
 
According to the Report, the U.S. recognizes the importance of holding open and inclusive reform 
conversations that pro mote equity and fairness among all WTO Members. Meanwhile, the U.S. will 
continue to work constructively with other Members to deliver results on achievable outcomes at the 
WTO.  
 
QUESTION  №70:  Based on this description, it is our understanding that in parallel with the 
multilateral process on the WTO reform, the U.S. will engage in plurilateral processes with the "other 
Members to deliver results on achievable outcomes at the WTO". Is this under standing correct? If 
so, how will the results of such plurilateral processes correlate with the multilateral and 
consensus -based process on the WTO reform?  
 
QUESTION  №71:  Which specific elements of the dispute settlement system is the U.S. interested 
in improving? What specific steps is the U.S. proposing to take in order to achieve this?  
 
QUESTION  №72:  What is the value for the U.S. of joint position of 127 Members still urging the 
DSB to launch the selection process and to appoint the Appellate  Body members, i.e. to follow the 
dispute  settlement procedures as currently enshrined in the DSU?  
 
5.3 Other Monitoring and Enforcement Activities  
5.3.1 Addressing Non -market Policies and Practices  
 
Page  18, Paragraph  5.19 
 
The Report lists a number of examples of non -market policies and practices, which include 
discriminatory non -tariff barriers, forced technology transfers, excess capacity, economic coercion, 
forced labor, industrial subsidies, and other forms of support by governments and related enti ties. 
Such non -market policies and practices distort markets and harm workers and businesses in the 
U.S. and in other countries, as well as undermine supply chain resilience and harm consumers who, 
in the long run, are deprived of the innovation and choice  that fair competition would produce.  
 
QUESTION  №73:  Could the U.S. clarify why only industrial subsidies are mentioned as an example 
of non -market policies and practices that distort trade and harm competition? In the U.S. view, can 
agriculture domestic support be qualified as an unfair trade practice/non -market practice that distort 
market and/or harm competition,? If so, what are the criteria for qualifying agriculture domestic 
support as trade - or market -distorting one?  
 
QUESTION  №74:  Accordin g to the Report, "forced technology transfer" is considered by the U.S. 
as an example of non -market policies and practices. Does the U.S. consider restricted access to 
civilian technology (in particular, restrictions imposed by government) as a non -market 
practice/policy, as well? Please, explain why.  
 
Page  18, Paragraphs  5.21 and 5.22  
 
The Report States that "In 2021 the United  States and the EU launched the Trade and Technology 
Council to promote U.S. and EU competitiveness and prosperity and the spread of democratic, 
market -oriented values by improving transatlantic trade and investment in products and services of 
emerging technology, strengthening technological and industrial leadership, boosting innovation, 
and protecting and promoting critical and emerging technologies and infrastructure. In addition, the 
United  States, the EU, and Japan will continue discussions under the Trilateral partnership to address 
the global challenges posed by the non -market policies and practices of third countries".  
 
QUESTION  №75:  Could the U.S. provide information regarding the adopted measures within such 
collaboration mechanisms in order to achieve the above -mentioned goals?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 454 - 
 
  5.5 Other Initiatives  
5.5.10 Indo -Pacific Economic Framework  
 
Pages  27-28, Paragraphs  5.88-5.92 
 
According to the Report, the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework aims to deepen economic 
relationships with allies and partners in the region. This framework will promote resilient, 
sustainable, and inclusive growth for workers and businesses, including by advancing strong labor 
standards and addressing climate change. The framework is central to the U.S. economic strategy 
in the Indo -Pacific and complements our national security goals in the region.  
The Report also states that the U.S. will use this framework to address a range of important ar eas 
of economic cooperation, including: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and 
infrastructure; and tax and anti -corruption. USTR will lead efforts to craft a trade arrangement that 
includes high -standard commitments in the following areas : labor; environment; digital and 
emerging technology; agriculture; transparency and good regulatory practices; competition policy; 
and trade facilitation.  
 
QUESTION  №76:  Can the U.S. confirm our understanding that the mentioned trade arrangement 
with high -level commitments will precede a deepening of economic relationship under a free trade 
agreement in the meaning of Article  XXIV GATT or Article  V GATS?  
 
QUESTION  №77:  By which means does the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework "complement  the 
U.S. national security goals", in particular?  
 
QUESTION  №78:  How will the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework correspond with other regional 
undertakings and fora, including APEC?  
 
5.6 Other Trade Activities  
5.6.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (Including China -Related 301)  
 
Page  29, Paragraph  5.99 
 
The Report indicates that the U.S. works with many trading partners to strengthen IP protection and 
enforcement through the provisions of bilateral instruments, including trade agreements and 
memorand a of understanding.  
 
QUESTION  №79:  Could the U.S. clarify the criteria for choosing trading partners to engage with in 
order to advocate for strong IP protection and enforcement in other countries?  
 
QUESTION  №80:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the bilateral intellectual property work plans, in 
particular:  
 
• Goals of these plans;  
• Their structure ; and 
• Instruments employed?  
 
5.6.2 Promoting Digital Trade  
 
Page  30, Paragraph  5.103  
 
The Government's Report states that the U.S. places great importance on electronic commerce (or 
"digital trade"), which plays a crucial role in strengthening and supporting firms in every sector of 
the economy.  
 
QUESTION  №81:  Could the United  States  clarify its understanding of the terms "electronic 
commerce" and "digital trade"? Please, provide respective definitions and the difference between 
these two terms, including by providing examples for their appropriate usage.  
 
Page  30, Paragraphs  5.103 -5.105 
 
According to the Report, the U.S. is an active participant to a number of undertakings in the area of 
e-commerce/digital trade.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 455 - 
 
  QUESTION  №82:  Does the U.S. consider to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement 
(DEPA)?  
 
9 SMALL AND MEDIUM -SIZED BUSINESS TRADE  
 
Page  38, Paragraph  9.4 
 
The Report states that under the SME Initiative, USTR's small business office, regional offices, and 
functional offices pursued initiatives and advanced efforts to address these issues.  
 
QUESTION  №83:  Could the  U.S. provide the list of concrete measures to eliminate such barriers 
for U.S. SMEs in foreign markets?  
 
Pages  38-39, Para graphs  9.1-9.11 
 
QUESTION  №84:  Please, confirm whether the U.S. domestic laws and regulations provide for any 
limitations on foreign ownership of SMEs. Are there any restrictions applied only to foreign -owned 
SMEs?  
 
QUESTION  №85:  Please, provide more information on the state support measures (financial and 
non-financial) applied to increase exports by SMEs.  
 
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT  
 
SUMMARY  
 
Page  11, Paragraph  2 
 
The Secretariat reports that "[r]eflecting the higher deficits, public debt as a share of GDP continued 
to rise, to some 100%".  
 
Question №1:  What steps does the U.S. take to reduce its public debt?  
 
Page  11, Paragraph  3 
 
According to the Report, in 2021 the PCE index rose rapidly, by 5.8%, reflecting in part a sharp 
increase in energy prices.  
 
Question №2:  What, in the  U.S. view, are the reasons for the increase in energy prices in 2021?  
 
Page  15, Paragrap h 23 
 
The Report indicates that in April 2021, the administration announced a new target for U.S. 
economy -wide net GHG pollution: it should equal 50% to 52% of the 2005 level by 2030, and net 
zero emissions should be reached no later than 2050.  
 
Question №3: Could the U.S. elaborate on the steps it is taking to achieve these goals?  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1 Main Features of the Economy  
 
Page  18, Table  1.1 
 
According to Table  1.1, total employment in 2020 decreased by 3% compared to 2017.  
 
Question №4:  Taking into account that "in response to the effects of the pandemic, the Federal 
Reserve committed to using its full range of policy tools to support the U.S. economy, promoting its 
maximum -employment" what are the other main reasons for the employment reduction?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 456 - 
 
  1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.1 GDP and employment  
 
Page  19, Paragraph  1.4 
 
According to the Report, the U.S. "economy experienced a swift rebound in 2021, aided by the 
support packages put in place by the Government and by an  easing of monetary conditions".  
 
Question №5:  Could the United  States  please elaborate on the mentioned support packages and 
measures to ease monetary conditions, taken by the Government during the pandemic?  
 
1.2.2 Fiscal policy  
 
Page  22, Paragraph  1.13 
 
According to the Report, as an initial response to the pandemic, the U .S. authorities put in place the 
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 6  March  2020 
(P.L. 116-123), which provided USD  8.3 billion  in emergency funding for federal agencies to respond 
to the COVID -19 outbreak.  
 
Question №6:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on how the USD  8.3 billion  has been distributed 
among the 4 indicated programs, including the information on the amount of funds allocated among 
them?  
 
Pages  24-25, Paragraph  1.20, Box 1.2 
 
As the Government's Report notes, in March  2021, Congress passed the ARP Act, signed by the 
President on 11  March  2021, to continue some of the benefits provided for in the CARES Act and 
grant some new ones.  
 
Question №7:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the conditions for obtaining these benefits?  
 
Question №8:  Could the U.S. clarify whether there are any domestic content requirements of 
obtaining these benefits?  
 
Page  26, Paragraph  1.21 
 
The Report states that the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L.  117-58), enacted on 
15 November  2021, contains appropriations for over USD  50 billion  for cybersecurity and climate 
change.  
 
Question №9:  Could the U.S. explain the connection between "cybersecurity" and "climate 
change"?  
 
Question №10:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the amount of appropriations for climate change?  
 
Question №11:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the distribution of the allocated amount of 
appropriations between different climate change issues?  
 
Page  28, Paragraph  1.24 
 
The Report provides information on the proposed Build Back Better Act (H.R.  5376), passed by the 
House of Representatives on 18  November  2021 but not enacted by the Senate. It is stated that the 
proposed Act included provisions to impose a 15% minimum tax on the profits of large corporations 
(based on the agreement with 136  countries), that is, those with over USD  1 billion  in profits, and a 
1% surcharge on corporate stock buybacks. It also contained provisions to create a new surtax of 
5% for income above USD  10 million , and an additional 3% surtax on income above USD  25 million . 
 
Question №12:  Could the U.S. clarify whether the proposed Build Back Better Act (H.R.  5376) is 
set to be passed in the future? If yes, please elaborate on the likely timeline. What is the current 
stage of its discussion?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 457 - 
 
  Question №13:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on the amount of appropriations to be allocated for 
climate change issues?  
 
Question №14:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the possible distribution of the amount of 
appropriations between different climate issues?  
 
Question №15:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the condit ions for receiving subsidies related to climate 
issues under this law?  
 
Question №16:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on the reasons for introducing a new surtax on 
income of certain companies?  
 
Question №17:  Could the U.S. confirm that a new surtax for the income above USD  25 million  will 
be 8%?  
 
Page  25, Box  1.2 
 
Question №18:  Could the U.S. clarify what requirements have been imposed on the imported 
products or services in order to mitigate the risks related to the security in the ICT sector?  
 
1.2.3 Monetary policy  
 
Page  29, Paragraph  1.27 
 
The Report indicates that in August  2020, the Federal Reserve announced changes to its policy 
framework. The announcement that the FOMC would seek to achieve inflation that averages 2% 
over time implied a mov e to a more flexible average inflation targeting framework.  
 
Question №19:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on the specific changes in the Federal Reserve policy 
framework?  
 
Question №20:  Could the U.S. clarify the specific mechanisms that, in the view of the U.S. , will 
allow maintaining inflation at the specific level?  
 
Page  30, Paragraph  1.31 
 
According to the Report, price inflation accelerated in the second half of 2021 and in early 2022, 
encompassing price increases in areas other than energy.  
 
Question №21:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on the reasons for inflation acceleration in the 
second half of 2021?  
 
Question №22:  Could the U.S. specify measures that it has introduced in order to combat inflation?  
 
1.2.4 Balance of payments  
 
Page  31, Paragraph  1.32 
 
The Secretariat's Report states that the U.S. current account deficit continued increasing during the 
period under review, rising from USD  438.2  billion  in 2018 (2.1% of GDP) to USD  616.1 billion  (2.9% 
of GDP) in 2020 and USD  821.6  billion  (3.6% of GDP) in 2021.  
 
Question №23:  Could the U.S. elaborate on measures that are taken in order to reduce its trade 
deficit and secure the balance of payments?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 458 - 
 
  2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
 
Pages  41-42, Paragraph  2.16 
 
"As an original WTO  Member and largest single trading country18, the United  States  has always 
played a key role in the operation of the WTO and participates in all of its major functions, i.e. 
disputes, committee work, and negotiations. It is also involved in technical assistance and 
capacity -building measures (contributions to the Glob al Trust Fund, Aid -for-Trade, and Standards 
and Trade Development Facility (STDF)). The United  States  is a party to a number of plurilateral 
initiatives or agreements under the WTO (including the GPA, the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, 
the Informati on Technology Agreement (ITA), and the ITA Expansion) and more recently has joined 
a number of the Joint Statement Initiatives (domestic regulation, e -commerce, and trade and 
environmental stability). The United  States  is also a party to the Joint Minister ial Declaration on the 
Advancement of Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment within Trade".  
 
Question №24:  Is there a rule in international law (customary or treaty -based) on the basis of 
which the benefits guaranteed by virtue of the WTO membership may be limited to certain Members 
according to unilateral assessments and decisions by another Member? If yes, please indicate this 
norm.  
 
Page  42, Paragraph  2.19 
 
"The notification record of the United  States under various bodies was exemplary during the review 
period. The United  States made notifications in the areas of, inter alia, agriculture, GATS, trade 
remedies, SPS, TBT, trade facilitation, rules of origin, subsidies, state trading, IPRs, import licensing, 
the enabling clause, q uantitative restrictions, and government procurement (Table  A2.2). The 
largest numbers of notifications were made on SPS, TBT, and trade remedy matters. U.S. trade 
policies have been reviewed 14  times at the WTO; the last one was in December  2018". 
 
Questi on №25:  Could the U.S. explain the absence of any notifications of laws significantly affecting 
trade on services so far since 2010? Does that mean that the U.S. has not enacted any such law 
since that year?  
 
2.3.2 Regional and preferential agreements  
2.3.2.1 Reciprocal agreements  
 
Pages  42-43, Paragraph  2.22 
 
The Report states that "In mid -2022, the Administration was reviewing the objectives of the 
negotiations with the United  Kingdom begun under the prior Administration; active negotiations are 
paused while the review is being conducted. USTR is also reviewing with the Kenyan government 
the path forward for deepening the U.S. -Kenya trade and investment relationship. The current 
Administration is not pursuing negotiations on an FTA with the Europe an Union . 
 
Question №26:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the reasons for suspending and reviewing the 
negotiation processes launched by prior Administration?  
 
Question №27:  Does the U.S. have any plans to conclude FTAs with other countries in the near 
future?  
 
Question №28:  According to USTR Press Release as of 14 July 2022 the United  States -Kenya 
Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership, "with high standard commitments in a wide range of 
areas of investment", thus, the U.S. and Kenya will consider measures to facilitate agricultural trade. 
Does this strategic partnership consider measures on manufacturing development investments in 
Kenya?  
 
Question №29:  Will this strategic partnership precede a deepening of the U.S. -Kenya trade and 
investment relati onship under a free trade agreement?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 459 - 
 
  2.3.2.1.1 United  States -Mexico -Canada  Agreement (USMCA)  
 
Page  44, Paragraph  2.25 
 
"Because the USMCA carried over market access provisions under NAFTA, most U.S. tariffs on 
imports from Mexico and Canada already had been eliminated. Nevertheless, the USMCA was 
expected to increase trade with Canada and Mexico by about 5% and lead to a higher concentration 
of U.S. trade with those two countries.23 The Agreement is expected to have a particular impact on 
the automotive sector due to the significant increase in the regional content necessary to confer 
origin, which in turn is expected to increase U.S. employment in the sector."  
 
Question №30:  Could the U.S. confirm that USMCA establishes less liberal market access conditi ons 
for automotive products compared to NAFTA? If so, could the U.S. elaborate on the reasons for the 
deterioration of the market access conditions in the framework of the free trade agreement?  
 
2.3.2.1.2 Amendments to the FTAs with the Republic  of Korea a nd with Morocco  
 
Page  44, Paragraph  2.26 
 
According to the Report, "In 2017, the United  States launched discussions with the Republic  of Korea 
to amend or modify the FTA that entered into force in 2012. Since the inception of the FTA, the 
United  States has exhibited increasing trade deficits with the Republic  of Korea; the deficit rose from 
USD 13.2 billion in 2012 to USD  24.1 billion in 2020, thus the United  States sought to amend the 
Agreement so as to secure changes to reduce the trade deficit" . 
 
Question №31:  Could the U.S. clarify whether a trade deficit will always be a reason for 
renegotiating FTAs towards conditions that are worse than the already established ones?  
 
Question №32:  Taking into account that the FTA with the Republic  of Korea e ntered into force in 
2012 and provided a transitional period  for tracks till 2021,  could the U.S. explain why this 
transitional period was insufficient to adapt the economy to the terms of the Agreement?  
 
Question №33:  Could the U.S. explain how, in its vi ew, additional transitional period of 20  years 
will facilitate the adaptation of the U.S. producers to free trade regime with the Republic  of Korea?  
 
Question №34:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the measures that it intends to take in order to adapt 
its automotive industry and eliminate tariffs in accordance with the agreement?  
 
Question №35:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the actual effects of the amendments introduced to 
the so as to secure changes to reduce the trade deficit between the U.S. and Korea , as well as how 
these effects correspond to the estimations made prior to the introduction of the changes to the 
Agreement?  
 
2.3.2.2 Unilateral preferences  
 
Page  45, Paragraph  2.30 
 
According to the report, there were "significant declines in the two largest programs  - the AGOA and 
the GSP. AGOA imports declined by about two thirds, mainly on account of significantly reduced 
crude petroleum imports (in terms of value) from Nigeria and Angola, in large part due to lower 
prices".  
 
Question №36:  What other products' imports declined under the AGOA program within the review 
period?  
 
Page  46, Paragraph  2.31 
 
According to the Report, "[t]he U.S. GSP Program is the United  States' longest -running preference 
program and provides the majority of the preferent ial imports into the United  States ; however, it 
expired on 31  December  2020. New legislation has been proposed to reinstate the GSP, but to date 
(January  2022) it has not been approved. Prior to the expiry of the GSP, USTR initiated a new WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 460 - 
 
  process where it assesses each GSP beneficiary country's compliance with the statutory criteria on 
a triennial basis to improve monitoring and enforcement".  
 
Question №37:  Will a new legislation mentioned by the Secretariat in para.  2.31 provide for the 
same statutory criteria for assessment of each GSP beneficiary country's compliance thereto? Are 
there any plans to re-examine  the existing statutory criteria?  
 
Question №38:  What is the expected timeframe for adoption of a new legisla tion to reinstate the 
GSP? 
 
2.3.3 Other agreements and arrangements  
 
Page  49, Paragraph  2.37 
 
"In December  2019 pursuant to Section  103(a)(2) of the Trade Priorities Act, a Presidential 
Proclamation was issued announcing modifications to certain duties as a result of an arrangement 
concluded between the United  States and Japan, which has been referred to as the U.S. -Japan Trade 
Agreement (USJTA).34 The USJTA, which was signed on 7  October  2019 and entered into force on 
1 January  2020, reduces or e liminates tariffs on 241 tariffs lines for originating goods of Japan, 
either upon entry into force or during an implementation period up until 2029. The tariff rate quota 
(TRQ) quantity for Japanese beef was eliminated and merged into the general quota al location for 
all other countries (Box  2.2).35 As at July  2022, this arrangement had not been notified to the WTO. 
A similar Presidential Proclamation was issued in December  2020 under the same provisions of the 
Trade Priorities Act in order to announce red uctions in tariff barriers agreed with the European  Union 
on 20  November  2020.36 This agreement covers MFN duty reductions on six tariff lines that were 
implemented as of 1  August  2020 and a further reduction on five of them on 1  August  2021 
(Box 2.2). App roximately USD  192 million of imports of these products entered from the 
European  Union at reduced rates in 2021 compared to USD  132 million in 2020. In return, the 
European  Union agreed to eliminate duties on an MFN basis on four tariff lines of frozen an d live 
lobster for a five -year period, from 1  August  2020 to 31  July 2025."  
 
Question №39:  According to Paragraph  2.37 of the Secretariat's report, the USJTA arrangement 
has not been notified to the WTO as of July  2022. Please clarify whether the U.S. has already notified 
the USJTA deal to the WTO since the abovementioned period?  
 
Question №40:  If there was no notification regarding the mentioned Agreement please clarify when 
the missing notification will be provided by the U.S.?  
 
Page  49, Paragraph  2.38 
 
The Report states, "On 15  January  2020, the United  States and China concluded an Economic and 
Trade Agreement covering a variety of trade and related matters; it entered into force on 
14 February  2020".  
 
Question №41:  Considering that such arrangements may harm competition on world markets, how 
does the U.S. justify the mentioned agreement in the light of the WTO rules?  
 
Question №42:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on the enforcement mechanism that insures the 
implementation of this provision?  
 
Question №43:  Could the U.S. clarify how can the implementation of agreement be ensured, if 
according to commercial consideration it will be more profitable for China to purchase products 
originating in other countries?  
 
2.4 Investment Regime  
 
Page  51, Paragraph  2.40 
 
"The United  States  maintains an open investment regime and has benefited for decades as one of 
the world's single -largest recipients and suppliers of FDI. The President issued a statement on the 
United  States ' commitment to open investment on 8  June 2021. In recent years, t he United  States  
has expanded and refined its review of FDI through national security -based screening. U.S. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 461 - 
 
  investment policy has undergone a number of changes during the review period; due to U.S. 
predominance in world investment markets, U.S. policy has an important influence on world 
investment flows."  
 
Question №44 :  Could the U.S. outline "national security" requirements regarding investment 
activities?  
 
2.4.3 Investment screening and restrictions  
2.4.3.1 Investment screening  
 
Pages  53-55, Paragraph s 2.50-2.54 
 
The Secretariat's report states that the Government in 2018 introduced a several changes in foreign 
investment screening mechanism. Meanwhile, we note the report does not describe this mechanism 
(even in a general way).  
 
Question №45:  What are the main features of the U.S. foreign investment screening mechanism 
with respect to : 
 
a) The kinds of investments required to be screened,  
b) The sectoral coverage of investments required to be screened ; and 
c) The procedure for the screening of investments?  
 
2.4.3.1.1 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United  States  (CFIUS)  
 
Pages  53-54, Paragraph  2.50 and Paragraph  2.51 
 
According to the Report, FIRRMA provides quite broad definition for the term "united  states business " 
meaning "a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United  States ". 
 
Question №46:  Could the U.S. explain the exact criteria for defining a company as engaged in 
interstate commerce in the U.S. and thus subject to this FIRRMA regulation, and not engaged in 
inters tate commerce in the U.S.  - thus not being subject to the regulation?  
 
Question №47:  Could the U.S. clarify what countries "are allies or partners of the U.S. within the 
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018"?  
 
Question №48:  Do these cou ntries have any preference in foreign investments' review procedure 
or is there a particular foreign investments' review procedure for these countries that are allies or 
partners of the U.S. ? If yes, what are peculiarities of this review procedure?  
 
Questi on №49:  After the introduction of FIRRMA in 2018, the jurisdiction of CFIUS was further 
expanded in September  2022. According to the information presented on the official website of the 
White  House, on 15 September  2022 the U.S.  President  Joe Biden issued Executive  Order  14083 
reflecting the evolving national security threat landscape and underscoring the critical role of CFIUS 
in responding to new and emerging threats and vulnerabilities in the context of foreign investment. 
The Executive  Order elab orates and further expands on the existing list of factors that CFIUS 
considers, as appropriate, when reviewing transactions for national security risks, and describes 
potential national security implications in key areas. The Executive  Order defines five specific sets 
of factors to be considered by CFIUS:  
 
− A given transaction's effect on the resilience of critical U.S. supply chains that may have 
national security implications, including those outside of the defense industrial base;  
− A given transaction's e ffect on U.S. technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. 
national security, including but not limited to microelectronics, artificial intelligence, 
biotechnology and biomanufacturing, quantum computing, advanced clean energy, and 
climate adaptation t echnologies;  
− Industry investment trends that may have consequences for a given transaction's impact 
on U.S. national security;  
− Cybersecurity risks that threaten to impair national security;  
− Risks to U.S. persons' sensitive data.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 462 - 
 
  Could U.S. clarify on what ground the provisions of this Executive  order are consistent with U.S.'s 
commitments at the WTO?  
 
Question №50:  Could the U.S. elaborate how the rights and interests of foreign investors are 
ensured, given the fact that the Executive  Order accords sig nificant discretion to CFIUS and expands 
on the existing list of factors that CFIUS considers?  
 
Question №51:  How would the U.S. ensure that respective interventions by CFIUS do not act as 
barriers to foreign investments, given that the Executive  Order ext ends authority of CFIUS to deny 
access of foreign investors to the U.S.'s domestic market and could potentially disincentivizes foreign 
investments in general?  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.1 Customs procedures and operations  
 
Page  57, Paragraph  3.2 
 
The Report highlights "the special additional duties that were introduced during the review period 
(Table  3.1)".  
 
Question №52:  Could the U.S . clarify the reasons for introducing additional duties?  
 
3.1.1.6 Trade facilitation  
3.1.1.6.3 Trusted trader/Authorized economic operator/Advance security programs  
 
Page  65, Paragraph  3.24 
 
"Another development during the review period was the phase -out of the Importer Self -Assessment 
(ISA) program into the newly created CTPAT Trade Compliance Program in March  2020. The Program 
aims to continue providing certain importers with benefits when they demonstrate enhanced 
compliance measures and moves CTPAT  towards trade compliance, therefore not limited to only 
security measures. CTPAT importers who participate in the CTPAT Trade Compliance program will 
have additional requirements beyond the social compliance program, with additional benefits. As of 
March  2022, to participate, a company had to already be part of CTPAT.33 However, new 
applications are expected after the issuance of the Federal Register notice on the Importer 
Self-Assessment program and the closeout of the Trusted Trader Pilot."  
 
Question №53 : Could the U.S. clarify the benefits that the importers derive from the CTPAT Trade 
Compliance Program?  
 
3.1.3 Tariffs  
3.1.3.2 Applied rates  
 
Page  69, Paragraph  3.40 
 
The Report states, "The U.S. MFN applied tariff rates did not change significantly during the review 
period, and essentially remain the same as the levels in 2018".  
 
Question: №54 : During the COVID -19 pandemic many countries temporary reduced their tariffs 
on the WCO list of essential goods. Could the U.S. provide informati on on the reduction of duties on 
COVID -19 essential goods?  
 
Page  70, Paragraph  3.41 
 
According to the report, "The U.S. schedule contains 10 tariff lines over 300%, including 2 tariff lines 
over 400%".  
 
Question №55:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the reasons for maintaining such high duties, in 
particular during the crisis of the COVID -19? 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 463 - 
 
  3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.1 Prohibitions, restrictions, and quantitative measures  
 
Page  79, Paragraph  3.64 
 
According to the Secretariat's report, "[i]n October  2021, the United  States  and the European  Union  
issued a joint statement announcing, inter alia, that they were resolved to negotiate future 
arrangements for trade in steel and aluminum that take account of both global no n-market excess 
capacity and the carbon intensity of these industries".  
 
Question №56:  According to Joint Statement "steel and aluminium manufacturing is one of the 
highest carbon emission sources globally. Excess capacity generates unnecessary greenhouse gas 
emissions, deflates prices of high emissions products and hinders the development and scaling up 
of competitive solutions for lower emissions production". Could the U.S. explain what steel and 
aluminium products are considered as high emissions product s according to the Joint Statement?  
 
Question №57:  Could the U.S. provide the following data:  
 
− Data demonstrating that steel and aluminium manufacturing is one of the highest carbon 
emission sources globally;  
− Number of excess capacity and amount of CO2 generated by them at the global level;  
− Data demonstrating relationship between prices of high emissions products and 
developments of lower emissions production.  
 
Question №58:  Could the U.S. provide data on its amount of production of high emissions steel 
and aluminium products, as well as the share of these products in the total U.S. production of steel 
and aluminium products?  
 
Question №59:  Through the sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminum trade, the U.S. and the 
European  Union  intend "to confront th e joint threats of climate change and global market 
distortions".3 Could the U.S. explain its reasoning for combining two different issues ("climate 
change" and "global market distortions") in one arrangement?  
 
Question №60:  The Joint Statement stipulates : "the EU and the United  States will seek to conclude 
the negotiations on the arrangements within two years". Could the U.S. provide an update on the 
status of these negotiations?  
 
Question №61:  According to Joint Statement, each participant in the arrangements would 
undertake, inter alia, the following actions:  
 
− Restrict market access for non -participants that do not meet conditions of market 
orientation and that contribute to non -market excess c apacity, through application of 
appropriate measures including trade defence instruments;  
− restrict market access for non -participants that do not meet standards for low -carbon 
intensity;  
− refrain from non -market practices that contribute to carbon -intensive , 
non-market -oriented capacity.  
 
How does the U.S. justify these measures  in light of the U.S. WTO obligations?  
 
Question №62:  With reference to the phrase "restrict market access for non -participants that do 
not meet standards for low carbon intensity" in the Joint Statement, could the U.S. explain to which 
particular "standards for low carbon intensity" they refer?  
 
Question №63:  How does the U.S. intend to maintain a fair competition in case of realization of 
these provisions?  
 
 
3 The President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda, Chapter B. Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Env ironmental Practices, p. 15, online: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20Annual%20Re p
ort%20(1).pdf . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 464 - 
 
  Question №64:  How will the U.S. ensure that this and any other sectoral arrangements related to 
trade in goods will be in full compliance with the WTO  Agreement s, including Articles I, II, III and 
XI of the GATT  1994? 
 
3.1.5.3 Other restrictions on imports  
 
Page  81, Paragraph  3.69 
 
According to the Report  "The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) and the U.S. State Department administer and enforce a variety of economic and trade 
sanctions programs designed to protect U.S. national security interests. The programs include 
outright prohibitions or restrictions on transactions involving certain sanctioned jurisdictions, 
governments, companies, and individuals that may affect import and export activities. The number 
of sanction ed programs and parties changes from time to time, and OFAC may issue licenses to 
permit otherwise prohibited transactions".  
 
Question №65:  We would like to know the U.S. views on the legal basis in international law for 
imposition of unilateral extraterri torial prohibitions and restrictions.  
 
Question №66:  We would like to know how do the U.S. reconcile its threats of secondary sanctions 
with the principle of the sovereign equality of states enshrined in the UN Charter?  
 
Question №67:  Anti-Russian unilater al restrictive measures [sanctions] are not in compliance with 
Articles  1, 2 and Chapter  VII of the UN Charter, hence United  States  should either immediately bear 
responsibility for severe violation of international law. Does the U.S. agree with this state ment?  
 
Question №68:  The U.S. White House declared that sanctions against Russia are aimed at putting 
"immediate and intense pressure on [Russia's] economy, isolat[ing Russia] from the global financial 
system, global trade, and cutting -edge technology". These aims are not in l ine with the objectives 
enshrined in the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement. How do these measures [sanctions] against 
Russia contribute, in particular, to such objectives, expanding the production of and trade in goods 
and services? Is the U.S. of the vi ew that the unilateral restrictive measures [sanctions] against 
Russia are conducive to attainment of these objectives in relation to the U.S. citizens or to the 
citizens of other WTO  Members?  
 
Question №69:  What is the U.S. view on the WTO consistency of prohibitions and restrictions 
imposed on Russian intellectual property rights [holders], particularly with respect to TRIPS Articles 
1, 2, 3 and 4 (e.g. the freeze of their economic resources, including intellectual property)?  
 
Question №70:  Could the U.S.  provide the international legal basis for programs aimed at 
prohibiting or restricting transactions involving certain sanctioned jurisdictions, governments, 
companies, and individuals that may affect import and export activities?  
 
Question №71:  Could the U.S. give more details on the benefits of anti -Russian unilateral 
restrictive measures [sanctions] for American citizens?  
 
Question №72:  Could the U.S. describe particular criteria and legal procedures for making a 
decision on the imposition of a nti-Russian unilateral restrictive measures [sanctions]? Does this 
procedure include transparent and settled legal criteria or the decision is made on a case -by-case 
basis?  
 
Question №73:  Russia would appreciate information as to how the U.S. ensures the a bsence of 
negative economic effects from anti -Russian unilateral restrictive measures [sanctions] for third 
countries? Has the U.S. undertaken any concrete measures to ensure the absence of the mentioned 
negative economic effects? If yes, Russia would appr eciate if the U.S. pinpoints any of those concrete 
measures and describes their positive effects.  
 
Question №74:  Could the U.S. explain whether the economic effects of the anti -Russian unilateral 
restrictions [sanctions] were calculated for the economy of the European  Union ? The question 
concerns, in particular, but not limited to, the U.S. ban on energy imports from Russia and its effect 
on energy markets in light of the European Council's recent acknowledg ment of "an unusual increase 
in energy prices". If  yes, please provide the relevant calculations.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 465 - 
 
  Question №75:  The IMF underlined that following the imposition of anti -Russian unilateral 
restrictions, the food prices surged 17% between February in March this year in comparison to the 
surge 23% during the  whole 2021 year. Could the U.S.  explain whether these economic effects of 
the anti -Russian unilateral restrictions [sanctions], including in respect of less developed countries, 
are in line with U.S. prior estimations? If any such calculations have been made, please provide 
them.  
 
Question №76:  Could the U.S. elaborate:  
 
a) What specific factors are taken into account when designing a specific "economic and trade 
sanctions program"?  
b) What evidence is used to establish the existence of such factors?  
c) What methodologies are used in the assessment of such factors?  
d) What internal procedures are used to discuss and decide on the imposition of "economic 
and trade sanctions"?  
 
Other questions:  
 
Question №77:  Executive  Order  13920 of 1  May 2020, imposes a ban on bu lk electric power 
system equipment that poses an undue risk to the U.S. bulk -power system, economy or national 
security.  
 
Could the U.S. clarify the exact criteria for defining:  
 
• a person that is "owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a 
foreign adversary " and thus subject to the Executive  order at issue ; 
• Bulk electric power system equipment that is subject to the Executive  order at issue.  
 
What are the factors that determine a transaction as posing an unacce ptable risk? What does the 
term "unacceptable riskmean " within this Executive  order?  
 
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping and countervailing measures  
3.1.6.1.1 Legal and administrative framework  
3.1.6.1.1.1 Main laws and regulations  
 
Page  81, Paragraph  3.71 
 
The main U.S. legislation with respect to anti -dumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD). Is 
contained in Title  VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. The main r egulations governing AD 
and CVD investigations (including reviews) are included in 19  C.F.R.  Parts 201, 207, and 351. The 
Trade Preferences Extension Act (TPEA) of 2015 (P.L.  114-27)106, and in the Trade Facilitation and 
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L.  114-125) introduced further amendments to trade enforcement 
legislation. In particular, Title  IV of the Act, known also as the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015 
(EAPA), contains provisions to prevent the evasion of the payment of duties. To this end, the EA PA 
created a new framework for CBP to investigate allegations of evasion of AD/CVD orders, under 
Section  517 (Procedures for Investigating Claims of Evasion of AD and CVD orders) and established 
the Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Directorate (TRLED) within C BP, to carry out the investigations.  
 
Question №78:  In accordance with Section  776 of the Tariff Act of 1930 the Department of 
Commerce (hereinafter  - "Commerce") may make determinations in anti -dumping and CVD 
investigations on the basis of the facts avai lable. In particular, the respective provision envisages:  
 
(a) In General. If  
(1) necessary information is not available on the record, or  
(2) an interested party or any other person  
(A) withholds information that has been requested by the administering authority or the Commission 
under this title,  
(B) fails to provide such information by the deadlines for submission of the information or in the 
form and manner requested, subject to subsections (c)(1) and (e) of section 782,  
(C) significantly impedes a pr oceeding under this title, or  
(D) provides such information but the information cannot be verified as provided in section 782(i),  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 466 - 
 
   the administering authority and the Commission shall, subject to section 782(d), use the facts 
otherwise available in reachin g the applicable determination under this title.  
 
(b) Adverse Inferences. If the administering authority or the Commission (as the case may be) finds 
that an interested party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with 
a request for information from the administering authority or the Commission, the administering 
authority or the Commission (as the case may be), in reaching the applicable determination under 
this title, may use an inference that is adverse to the interest s of that party in selecting from among 
the facts otherwise available. Such adverse inference may include reliance on information derived 
from: 
 
(1) The petition ; 
(2) A final determination in the investigation under this title ; 
(3) Any previous review under  Section  751 or determination under Section  753, or  
(4) Any other information placed on the record.  
 
Based on these provisions of the U.S. legislation and on the experience obtained from the AD and 
CVD duty investigations of Commerce concerning imports from Russia, there is an understanding 
that the approach of Commerce to the use of facts available may differ in situations when "necessary 
information is not availa ble on the record" and when an interested party withholds necessary 
information, fails to provide it in time, significantly impedes the investigation or provides the 
unverifiable information. Hence, depending on the situation, Commerce may use either "fact s 
available", i.e. the facts that simply fill in the lacunas on the record, or "adverse facts available" 
(AFA), i.e. the facts causing maximum punishment of non -cooperating party at the end of the 
proceeding, i.e. the highest possible dumping margin or sub sidy rate.  
Please explain, what difference, if any, Commerce sees between the two following situations:  
 
− When necessary information is not available on the record ; 
− When an interested party or any other person withholds necessary information, fails to 
provide it by the deadlines, significantly impedes the proceeding or provides the 
information that cannot be verified?  
 
Question №79:  Please explain whether AFA would be used in a case when an interested party fails 
to cooperate to the best of its ability, but another interested party puts the requested information 
on the record within the appropriate deadline in a way that Commerce has all the requested 
information to conclude the investigation in time and without undue difficulties? If so, what would 
be the ra tionale for the use of AFA?  
 
Question №80:  In order to obtain "necessary information which is not available on the record", 
would Commerce use the same sources of information envisaged in the U.S. legislation for "adverse 
inference"? If not, what other sou rces of information would Commerce use?  
 
Question №81:  Is there any difference in Commerce's practices of using the facts available in AD 
as it compared to CVD proceedings? If so, please explain the difference.  
 
Question №82:  Para. 7 of Annex  II to the Agr eement on Implementation of Article  VI of the 
GATT  1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) requires investigating authorities to base their findings on 
information from secondary source with special circumspection. How does Commerce ensure that it 
complies with this requirement when in its AD proceeding it has to choose between non -adverse 
facts available and AFA?  
 
Question №83:  Could the U.S. explain in what cases Commerce can use other facts available in 
CVD investigations? If the information is duly presented by the interested party of the investigation, 
either by the government or by a company, in what instances the information could be disregarded?  
 
Question №84:  The countervailing duty law requires a subsidy to be "specific" in order to be 
countervailable. C ould the U.S. describe in detail the approach of Commerce to the term "limited in 
number" in applying the de facto  specificity test?  
 
Question №85:  Pursuant to CFR  19 § 351.511(a)(2)(i), the tier -one benchmark is defined as "a 
market  - determined price for the good or service resulting from actual transactions in the country 
in question". Nevertheless, for the determination of a benefit Commerce in some instances uses WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 467 - 
 
  out-of-country benchmarks. Could the U.S. provide the instances where Commerce may disregard 
the prices for goods or services resulting from actual transactions in the country in question and use 
the world prices?  
 
Question №86:  According to 19  CFR 351.511(a)(2)(ii)  "{w}here there is more than one 
commercially available worl d market price, {Commerce} will average such prices to the extent 
practicable ". If parties in a CVD proceeding provide information on a few of world market prices 
from, for example, two countries, is it Commerce's practice to average these prices from diff erent 
sources to constrict a benchmark price?  
 
Question №87:  Under Section  771(18)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930 Commerce may determine that 
any foreign country "does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales 
of merchandi se in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise". For such 
non-market economies (NMEs) the Tariff Act envisages special rules for determination of the normal 
value in the AD proceedings. Are the provisions of Section  771(18)(A) applicab le only to the U.S. 
AD proceedings, or to CVD proceedings as well? Does a decision of Commerce that a country is an 
NME for the purposes of AD proceedings automatically imply that a country is NME for CVD 
proceedings? If not, is any additional analysis and  corresponding decision necessary for the purposes 
of CVD proceedings?  
 
Question №88:  Does Commerce in its current practice conduct CVD investigations in respect of 
NMEs? Does the analysis within these proceedings differ from the analysis within the CVD 
investigations in respect of market -economy countries, and if so, what is the difference? Is there 
any difference in questionnaires used within CVD investigations in respect of market economies and 
NMEs?  
 
Question №89:  Does the U.S. , in accordance with the  current practice of its authorities, apply 
countervailing measures to NMEs? If so, how does the investigating authority ensure that the product 
originating in a NME is not subject to both anti -dumping and countervailing duties to compensate 
for the same s ituation of dumping and subsidization?  
 
Question №90:  In two CVD investigations in respect of imports of carbon steel wire rod from Poland 
and Czechoslovakia concluded in 1984, Commerce made negative subsidies' determinations. 
Commerce explained that it co uld not identify or determine subsidies in Poland and Czechoslovakia 
because they were found to be NMEs for the purposes of the US CVD law. In particular, Commerce 
determined that in those countries prices were centrally administered, resource allocations were 
centrally directed, and the currencies exhibited extremely limited convertibility. Later, in 1986, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Georgetown Steel Corporation v. the United  States  
upheld the reasoning of Commerce. Therefore, ther e were no cases of application CVD measures to 
imports originating in NMEs until 2006.  
In 2006, in a CVD investigation against China with respect to coated free -sheet paper, Commerce 
made affirmative determination of subsidization. That determination was a ccompanied by the 
Memorandum titled "Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the 
People's  Republic  of China  - Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel  Opinion are 
Applicable to China's Present -Day Economy ". In the M emorandum it was explained why the U.S. 
CVD law was applicable to China. Noteworthy, it did not reverse the designation of China as an NME 
for the purposes of the U.S. AD law. Nevertheless, it contained numerous explanations why the 
China's economy is sign ificantly different from the Soviet -style economies at issue in Georgetown 
Steel. 
One of the statements included in the concluding part of the Memorandum was the following:  
Nevertheless, China's economy, though distorted, is observably more flexible than t he Soviet -style 
economies. While the traditional command economies at issue in Georgetown Steel , such as 
Czechoslovakia's and the USSR's, were most notably characterized by the absence of market forces, 
China's economy is best characterized as one in which  constrained market mechanisms operate 
alongside (and sometimes, in spite of) government plans. As stated above, the limits the PRC 
Government has placed on the role of market forces are not consistent with recognition of China as 
a market economy under th e U.S. antidumping law.  
Accordingly, it may be understood that, for the purposes of application of the U.S. CVD law, and 
probably of the U.S. AD law, Commerce makes a difference between so -called "Soviet -style" NMEs 
and certain other NMEs characterized by the existence of market forces which are nevertheless WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 468 - 
 
  insufficient for redesignation of a country as a market economy. Should this understanding be 
correct, please explain:  
 
− Does Commerce d istinguish only two categories of NMEs for the purposes of application 
of the U.S. AD and/or CVD legislation, namely the "Soviet -style" NMEs and the NMEs 
characterized by the existence of market forces which are nevertheless insufficient for 
redesignation of a country as a market economy?  
− Is there any gradation among the NMEs where market forces exist, but they are 
insufficient to consider a country as a market economy? If so, please explain the gradation.  
 
Question №91:  Does Commerce have any guidance or t hresholds, which help to distinguish 
whether a country deserves to be designated as a market economy, or it is still an NME where 
market forces exist, but they are insufficient for a market economy designation? If such guidance or 
thresholds do not exist, how Commerce ensures that its designations of countries as market 
economies or NMEs are objective and impartial?  
 
Question №92:  In 2006 Commerce reaffirmed China's classification as a non -market economy in 
"Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Lined P aper Products from the 
People's  Republic  of China  - China's Status as a non -market Economy" (hereinafter  - AD NME 
Review). Seven months later in the "Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper 
from the People's  Republic  of China: Whether the Analytical Elements of the Georgetown Steel 
Opinion Are Applicable to China's Present -Day Economy" (hereinafter  - CVD NME Review) Commerce 
conducted the same analysis in accordance with 771(18)(А) of Tariff Act and made, inter alia, the 
following concl usions:  
 
− Private industry now dominates many sectors of the Chinese economy, and 
entrepreneurship is flourishing;  
− Foreign trading rights have been given to over 200,000 firms;  
− Many business entities in present -day China are generally free to direct most aspects of 
their operations, and to respond to (albeit limited) market forces;  
− The role of central planners is vastly smaller;  
− Many more companies' export activities are independent from the PRC government in 
comparison with the early - to mid -1990s.  
 
Nevertheless, the Decision Memorandum within the CVD NME Review also refers to the finding of 
Commerce "in its August 30 memorandum that despite the significant progress that China has made 
away from being a traditional command economy, the extent of gover nment control and direction 
over the country's economy warrants the continued designation of China as an NME ". 
Has Commerce established any changes in China's economy within 7  months between the AD NME 
Review and the CVD NME Review? If so, please indicate,  in which document did Commerce make 
the determination thereof. If not, please explain the reasons why the same characteristics of China's 
economy considered in AD NME Review and CVD NME Review were deemed by Commerce insufficient 
to reclassify China as a market economy for the purposes of anti -dumping investigations, but 
sufficient to apply the U.S. CVD law?  
 
Question №93:  Could the U.S. explain, whether it is possible under the U.S. law to transfer 
Nonmarket Economy investigations from one antidumping inv estigation to another? Which 
provisions of the U.S. law regulate this procedure?  
 
Question №94:  Could the U.S. provide a discussion of how the U.S. antidumping procedures 
designed for NMEs, if applied to imports from the Russian  Federation , would be consis tent with the 
provision(s) of the WTO  Agreement s, including, inter alia, Article  2.2.1.1 of the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994?  
 
Question №95:  Please clarify, how often does Commerce deem appropriate to review the status of 
the exporting country's economy? What conditions must be met for initiating a procedure of 
reconsideration of market status or non -market status of the exporting country's economy?  
 
Question №96:  Is there any judicial bo dy in the U.S. where ME/NME determinations of Commerce 
can be challenged? If so, please elaborate on such juridical body.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 469 - 
 
  3.1.6.1.1.2 Administrative procedures  
 
Page  82, Paragraph  3.75 
 
According to the report, "[t]he petition must provide information on value and volume of domestic 
production of the like product, and a statement indicating if the petitioner has filed for other forms 
of import relief for the same merchandise".  
 
Question №97:  Could the U.S. explain whether a petition for the initiation of anti -dumping 
investigation or review shall include evidence of the existence of the alleged dumping and its 
amount? Please elaborate what information on prices and what price comparisons are required to 
be included in such petition?  
 
Question №98:  Could the U.S. explain whether a petition for the initiation of CVD investigation or 
review shall include evidence of the existence of the alleged subsidy and its amount? Please clarify 
what information on prices and what price comparisons ar e required to be included in such petitions, 
for example, in the case of provision of goods by a government?  
 
Page  82, Paragraph  3.75, Footnote  112 
 
The U.S. Anti -dumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook states: In any event, staff at both 
Commerce and the  Commission welcome the opportunity to review a petition before it is filed. This 
review is performed in an expeditious manner, and the subject matter is kept in strict confidence. 
The petitioner benefits by being informed of any deficiencies in the petiti on which, if not corrected 
in time, may delay or prevent initiation of the investigation.4 
 
Question №99:  Could the U.S. confirm that the U.S. Department of Commerce ("Commerce") and 
the U.S. International Trade Commission ("Commission") assist petitioners by reviewing a petition 
before it is filed and indicating any deficiencies, and that such consulting/coaching increases the 
likelihood of the initiation of investigations/reviews? Does Commerce or the Commission provide 
other assistance to the petitioners in preparation of the petition, and if so, what can be such 
assistance? In case Commerce and the Commission provide assistance to the petitioners, could the 
U.S. explain how it ensures that Commerce and the Commission are unbiased and objective  in AD 
and CVD investigations and sunset reviews?  
 
3.1.6.1.1.2 Administrative procedures  
 
Pages  82-83, Paragraph  3.76 
 
According to the Report, "[a]  determination on whether or not to initiate an investigation is generally 
made within 20  days from the date  of filing of the petition. USITC has 45  days from the filing of the 
petition or self -initiation by USDOC or, if the time has been extended, 25  days after USDOC informs 
it of the initiation of the investigation, to make a preliminary determination of reaso nable indication 
of material injury, threat thereof, or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. 
If USITC's injury determination is negative, the investigation is terminated; if it is affirmative, the 
investigation continues. After  a determination of injury has been made by USITC, USDOC has 
115 days (160  days after petition) to issue a preliminary AD determination, or 40  days (85  days 
after petition) to issue a preliminary CVD determination.113 The investigation continues whether 
USDOC's preliminary determination is affirmative or negative, even if no margin of dumping or 
subsidization is found, or the margin found is below the de minimis  threshold. USDOC has an 
additional 75  days to determine the final margin of dumping. In case of an affirmative determination 
by USITC and a preliminary affirmative determination by USDOC, preliminary AD or CVD measures 
may be applied for a period no longer than four months, which may be extended to six months. 
They generally consist of a cash depo sit equivalent to the preliminary estimated margin of dumping 
or subsidy rate ". 
 
Question №100:  On 13 May 2022, Commerce published a notice on initiation of a changed 
circumstances review ("CCR") in the context of the urea ammonium nitrate ("UAN") proceedi ng to 
determine whether Russia remains a market economy for purposes of administration of the 
 
4 USITC (2015), Anti -dumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, 14th ed., June, pp.10 -11 (footnote 
omitted ), online: https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/handbook.pdf . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  anti-dumping ("AD") law. On 23 September  2022, following the negative injury determination of the 
U.S. International Trade Commission in the UAN case, Commerce pu blished a notification of the 
termination of the CCR and of the intent to continue the investigation into whether the 
Russian  Federation  is a market economy for the purposes of the AD law within the context of the 
emulsion styrene -butadiene rubber ("ESBR")  investigation from Russia.  
Could the U.S. indicate, which provision(s) of the WTO  Agreement s enable the U.S. to investigate 
whether the Russian  Federation  is a market economy for the purposes of the AD law?  
 
Question №101:  As stipulated in Section  751(b)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, a CCR may be initiated 
with respect to "a final affirmative determination that resulted in an antidumping duty order". 
Commerce initiated the CCR in the context of the UAN proceeding on 13 May 2022, i.e.  long before 
Commerce issued the corresponding final determination, which occurred on 24 June 2022.  
In this regard:  
 
a) Could the U.S. explain this discrepancy in detail?  
b) Could the United  State s clarify, in what instances a CCR may be initiated given the absence 
of a final a ffirmative determination that resulted in an AD order, as in the UAN case at 
hand?  
 
Question №102:  Article  5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement requires, inter alia, the immediate 
termination of investigations in cases where the authorities determine that the  margin of dumping 
is de minimis , or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. 
Article  7.1 permits the application of provisional measures only if  three conditions are satisfied, 
including the second one: "a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and 
consequent injury to a domestic industry". Articles  11.9 and 17.1(b) of the SCM  Agreement  contains 
similar provisions applicabl e to a subsidy in a CVD investigation.  
How does the U.S. comply with Articles  5.8 and 7.1(b) of the Anti -dumping Agreement and 
Articles  11.9 and 17.1(b) of the SCM  Agreement  if its investigating authorities continue 
investigations in situations when USDOC's preliminary determination is negative, no margin of 
dumping or subsidization is found, or the margin found is below the de minimis  threshold?  
 
Page  86, Paragraph  3.85 
 
The Report describes the new rules which introduce the possibility of retroactive application of 
AD/CVD duties in scope and covered merchandise inquiries.  
 
Question №103:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the legal basis in the Anti -Dumping and 
SCM Agreement s for Commerce to use retroactive application of AD/CVD in scope and covered 
merchandise inquiries?  
 
Question №104:  Will the U.S. establish a limit to how many years back the retroactive coverage 
of AD/CVD duties will apply? Are there any prohibi tions on enacting any laws and regulations with 
retroactive application in the federal and state legislation of the U.S. ? 
 
Question №105:  Moreover, these new regulations provide Commerce with the authority to require 
importers and other interested parties to certify whether an AD/CVD measure applies to imported 
goods. If a party fails to provide the required information or the certification is false, Commerce may 
direct the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to collect cash deposits from the importer at the  
applicable AD/CVD rate.  
How does this certification differ from the certification of origin? What are the form requirements for 
this document?  
 
3.1.6.1.1.4 Suspension agreements  
 
Page  86, Paragraph  3.87 
 
According to the Report, " U.S. law allows USDOC to enter an agreement to suspend an AD and/or 
CVD investigation under certain circumstances and when certain statutory and policy criteria are 
met. The suspension is based on an agreement by the relevant parties to the case to cease e xports, 
or to eliminate the injurious effect. These agreements are generally voluntary limits on exports or 
price undertakings; or involve the elimination of subsidies or dumping by the foreign 
producers/exporters or government, as relevant. Suspension agr eements are monitored by USDOC WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  to ensure compliance. For AD investigations, exporters may agree to accept price undertakings or 
to cease exports. AD suspension agreements reached with non -market economies (NMEs) may 
combine price undertakings and additiona l elements. In CVD investigations, a suspension agreement 
may be reached if the government alleged to be providing the subsidy agrees to eliminate the 
subsidy, to completely offset the net subsidy, or to cease or limit exports to the United  States. 
Suspens ion agreements with a WTO  Member considered a market economy may involve only price 
undertakings in the case of AD investigations. Agreements with respect to CVD investigations may 
involve quantitative restrictions. Notwithstanding the suspension agreement , a written request to 
the Secretary of Commerce may be filed for the continuation of the investigation. If USDOC and 
USITC make affirmative final determinations in an investigation that has been continued, the 
suspension agreement will remain in effect. I f either USDOC or USITC makes a negative final 
determination, the agreement will cease to have force or effect".  
 
Question №106:  Please provide a list of most recent cases when a suspension agreement with 
governments of the NME countries in AD and CVD inve stigations were concluded.  
 
Question №107:  Please list in detail the grounds on which a proposal on concluding suspension 
agreement with governments of the NME countries may be rejected.  
 
Question №108:  It is noted in this section that the suspension agree ments concluded with 
non-market economies (NMEs) may contain certain requirements in addition to price undertakings. 
At the same time, provisions of the Anti -Dumping Agreement on price undertakings are confined 
exclusively to prices and their comparison to  dumping margin. In view of the abovementioned, could 
the U.S. explain how such additional requirements comply with the Anti -Dumping Agreement.  
 
3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
3.1.7.1 Section  232 investigations  
3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation  
 
Pages  107-108, Paragraph  3.141 -3.142  
 
According to the Secretariat Report, the U.S has started discussions on a Global Arrangement on 
Sustainable Steel and Aluminium with a number of countries, including the EU and Japan. These 
agreements envisage, in particular, the abolition of steel and alu minum safeguard duties for products 
originating in these countries and provide for the other benefits and advantages in mutual trade.  
 
Question №109:  Could the U.S. explain how it reconciles these agreements with Article  I of the 
GATT, as well as Agreement  on safeguards?  
 
3.1.7.2 Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974  
 
Pages  110-113, Paragraph s 3.150 -3.158  
 
Question №110:  Currently, the Biden  Administration is facing rising pressure to lift Section  301 
tariffs with a view to ease inflationary pressure and the other supply chain disruptions. To review 
the effectiveness of the Trump Administration tariffs, the USTR announced 17 October that starting 
15 November  it will begin soliciting comments on the effectiveness of Section  301 tariffs (how they 
have impacted supply chain resilience, domestic manufacturing and technological innovation, etc.). 
Tariffs will remain in place as long as the USTR conducts its review. If the U.S. decides to maintain 
these ta riffs, could the U.S. elaborate on the respective legal ground for doing so, including how 
such a decision would comply with the provisions of the GATT?  
 
3.1.7.2.2 Section  301 cases  
3.1.7.2.2.1 China technology transfer regime  
 
Other questions:  
 
Question №111:  Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Modification, the Rule by the Industry and Security Bureau of 10/13/2022 ame nds the Export 
Administration Regulations and introduce inter alia the following measures:  
 
• Expands the scope of foreign -produced items subject to license requirements for 28 
existing entities on the Entity List that are located in China;  
• Introduces licensing for specific activities of "U.S. persons " that "support " the 
"development " or "production " of certain integrated circuits in China.  
 
How does the U.S. ensure the consistency of these measures concerning selective licensing 
requirements with the U.S. obligations under the GATT, in particular Article  1? 
 
3.1.7.2.2.5 DSTs in 10 economies  
 
Pages  118-119, Paragraph  3.173 -3.174  
 
3.173. The signature of the Joint Statement by the United  States , Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and 
the United  Kingdom, regarding a Compromise on a Transitional Approach to Existing Unilateral 
Measures During the Interim Peri od Before Pillar  1 Is in Effect, on 21  October  2021, led to a 
suspension of the measures. […] . 
3.174. The United  States  also completed similar agreements with India and with T ürkiye, the other 
two countries subject to the June  2021 determination on trade actions. As a result, these duties also 
were not put into effect.  
 
Question №112:  Could the U.S. clarify whether it considers digital service tax (DST) to be 
unreasonable or discriminatory and a burden or restriction for the U.S. com merce?  
 
Question №113:  Does the U.S. consider that the suspension of DST complies with the basic WTO 
principle of non -discrimination? Could the U.S. elaborate on this issue.  
 
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
 
Page  121, Paragraph  3.182  
 
"Export controls are guided by national security and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The 
United States currently restricts exports of certain goods, including defense  articles, dual -use 
(commercial and military) goods, and nuclear materials and technology, or to deter the proliferation 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. In many 
instances, the United States coope rates with other countries to control exports of such goods and 
technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Treaty on 
the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee), the 
Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group constitute the main elements of this system. 
Export controls also apply to countries subject to economic sanctions by the United States".  
 
Question №114:  Could the U.S. explain whether it is permitted to export  processed timber 
originating from Federal lands?  
 
Question №115:  Could the U.S. provide rationale for the possibility to export unprocessed timber 
that exceeds the needs of the U.S. timber manufacturing facilities?  
 
Pages  122-123, Paragraph  3.187  
 
According to the Report, "Reforms to reduce the complexity of export controls were launc hed by 
Presidential initiative in 2009. Many of the initial aims, including the establishment of a single control 
list for dual -use goods and munitions (i.e. merging the CCL and the USML), a single licensing agency, 
and a single export control enforcement agency have not been realized ". 
 
Question №116:  Could the U.S. elaborate on its plans to reduce the complexity of export controls 
and to establish a single control list in the future?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  123, Paragraph  3.191  
 
In April  2020, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued a temporary rule affecting 
exports of certain scarce critical health and medical resources. Due to the rapid spread of COVID -19, 
explicit FEMA approval was required for the export of five types of medical resources , including 
personal protective equipment (i.e. respirators, masks, and gloves). The product coverage was 
modified in August  2020, when certain respirators were eliminated from the list, and in 
December  2020, when syringes and hypodermic needles were added . The temporary measures 
remained in place until 30  June 2021, when they lapsed.  
 
Question №117:  Can the U.S. provide an update on the abolishment of these measures?  
 
3.2.4 Export support and promotion  
 
Page  124, Paragraph  3.196  
 
According to the Report, "[t]he President's Export Council (PEC) is an advisory body created in 1973 
to advise the President on U.S. export expansion. The PEC reports to the President through the 
Secretary of Commerce. It has not met since 2016. Although the current Admini stration renewed 
the PEC, which now has an active charter for the 2021 -23 term, it has not yet released its plans for 
the PEC going forward".  
 
Question №118:  Could the U.S. identify key measures of the PEC's alleged plan to develop export 
support mechanism ? 
 
Page  124, Paragraph  3.197  
 
The Report states that the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) was created in 1992 as an 
independent agency to advance economic development and U.S. commercial interests in developing 
and middle -income countries. The agency funds grant -based project preparation and partnership 
building activities that develop sustainable infrastructure and foster economic growth in partner 
countries. USTDA places particular emphasis on vital economic sectors where U.S. c ompanies are 
competitive, including clean energy, information and communications technology, transportation, 
healthcare infrastructure, and agri -business. In FY2021, USTDA identified more than USD  2.3 billion  
in U.S. exports to emerging economies as a resu lt of programming that facilitated quality 
infrastructure development.  
 
Question №119:  Could the U.S. provide its definition for the term "clean energy" and an exhaustive 
list of energy resources which are considered by the U.S. as "clean"?  
 
Question №120:  Up to what percentage of natural gas can be mixed with biogas or renewable 
natural gas for this blend to qualify as "clean energy"?  
 
Question №121:  Could the U.S. clarify what amount of grants the USTDA provided to U.S. 
companies in the sector of clean energy in the last four years and plan to provide in the next four 
years? Plea se include the allocation of grants on the basis of the energy resources.  
 
3.2.5 Export finance, insurance, and guarantees: This section indicates that the U.S. 
employs various forms of export support, including direct financing of export projects, 
loan gu arantees and export credit insurance.  
 
It is noted that the U.S. EXIM Bank provides export support in cases where commercial actors are 
unable or unwilling to take risks of dealing with the high -risk profile countries or schemes.  
 
Question №122:  Could the U.S. clarify how the EXIM Bank is being financed in order to be able to 
provide support for such projects?  
 
Question №123:  Could the U.S. provide information regarding the Board composition of the EXIM 
Bank?  
 
Question №124:  The section of the Secretariat R eport also addresses the other export -oriented 
programs of support. Could the U.S. clarify the eligibility criteria for receiving such export support?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Question №125:  Could the U.S. clarify what sectors of the U.S. economy benefit from such 
programs?  
 
Question №126:  What are the grounds for refusal in granting such export support?  
 
Page  127, Paragraph  3.211  
 
According to the Report "The legislation reauthorizing EXIM in 2019 maintained a provision 
introduced in 2015 that, inter alia, instructed the Unit ed States to initiate and pursue negotiations 
with other major exporting countries, including members of the OECD, to reduce substantially and 
possibly eliminate subsidized export -financing programs and other forms of export subsidies. The 
Department of th e Treasury updates Congress annually on progress achieved in implementing these 
instructions ". 
 
Question №127:  Could the US provide detailed information regarding the steps/approaches that 
have been taken to "reduce substantially and possibly eliminate" the national export support 
programs and other forms of export subsidies?  
 
3.2.5.3 The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)  
 
Page  129, Paragraph  3.218  
 
According to the Report, "[w] omen's economic empowerment, a strategic DFC priority, channeled 
USD 2.5 billion  (and catalyzed more than USD  4 billion  in capital) to projects that are owned or led 
by women, or offer products or services that benefit women, in FY2020. Some USD  7 billion  has 
been catalyzed towards gender -smart investments under the 2X Women's Initiative since its 
inception in 2017".  
 
Ques tion №128:  What are the results of the highlighted program?  
 
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
 
Question №129:  Could the U.S. specify the mandatory labelling requirements for food products?  
Please provide the relevant web link.  
 
Question №130:  Since 2021 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has been updating "Nutrition 
facts" ("Nutritional value") labels of packaged foods and drinks. FDA requires amendments to the 
Nutrition Facts label according to the updated scientific information, new research and public 
feedback. Could the U.S. clarify which groups of products these amendments cover? Could the U.S. 
also provide a list of the main amendments that have been introduced? Are the new requ irements 
applied both to domestic and imported food products?  
 
Page  132, Paragraph  3.228, Page 133, Paragraph  3.230, Page 134, Paragraph  3.235  
 
According to the Report, the U.S. considers any voluntary consensus standards (VCS) developed in 
accordance with  the Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International 
Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex  3 of the 
Agreement (Committee Decision on International Standards) "to be an international standard under 
the WTO  TBT Agreement regardless of the specific SDO or its location".  The Report indicates that 
the American National Standards Institute's Due Process Requirements for American National 
Standards (Essential Requirements) "ser ve as guidelines to develop VCSs and include principles for 
openness, balance, lack of dominance, due process, consensus, and the right to appeal. The 
procedural requirements outlined in the Essential Requirements align closely with the criteria for 
VCS ou tlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular  A-119 (discussed below) and 
also with the principles outlined in the Committee Decision on International Standards".  
The Report also states that standards developing organizations (SDOs) "that ad here to the Essential 
Requirements may be accredited by ANSI to develop American National Standards (ANS) related to 
products, processes, services, systems, or personnel". According to the Report, "[i]n March  2022, 
there were 237 ANSI -accredited standard d evelopers (ASDs)331; 18 organizations became ASDs 
during the review period. By the same date, ANSI listed more than 13,600 standards developed by 
ASDs332, of which 1,075 new standards were issued between July  2018 and March  2022".  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 475 - 
 
  In addition, the Report s tipulates that the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
(NTTAA) "directs federal agencies and departments to use VCS" and "to participate in the 
development of such standards to ensure that VCSs reflect government needs and to reduce 
government  reliance on government -unique standards".  
 
Question №131:  Could the U.S. confirm that the following understanding is correct? If not, please 
explain which particular part is incorrect:  the U.S. has a demand -driven system of developing 
standards. On the basis of demands from government, industry and consumers, the hundreds of 
American standards developing organizations develop American national standards, including 
"voluntary consensus standards". Government agencies participate in the development of such  
standards to ensure that they reflect government needs. The title "voluntary consensus standards" 
contain the terms "voluntary" and "consensus"; however, such standards can become "mandatory" 
by reference in technical regulations, and achieving a unanimou s decision is neither required nor 
necessary.  
In addition, the U.S. considers that Due Process Requirements for American National Standards 
(Essential Requirements) are "aligned" with some principles described in the Decision adopted by 
the TBT Committee i n 20005. On this basis, the U.S. considers that American national standards, 
including "voluntary consensus standards", which have been developed in accordance with the 
Essential Requirements, are "international standards" under the WTO TBT  Agreement . 
 
Question №132:  Is it correct that, in the U.S. view, as of March  2022, 237  ANSI-accredited 
standards developers developed more than 13,600  "international standards"?  
 
Question №133:  Could the U.S. explain whether it considers American "standards developing  
organizations" accredited by the American National Standards Institute as "international 
standardizing bodies" within the meaning of the TBT  Agreement  and the WTO  TBT Committee's 
Decision? If yes, please describe the legal basis for such consideration.  
 
Question №134:  Footnote  332 to Paragraph  3.230 of the Report states that "[s]ix ASDs sponsored 
more than 500 standards each, and they account for more than half (54.9%) of the total inventory 
of standards under ANSI". Could the U.S. please provide names of these ANSI -accredited standard 
developers and explain how they "sponsor" standards?  
 
Question №135:  We would appreciate it if the U.S. could provide detailed information regarding 
standard developing organizations. Which competent authority do they report to?  
 
Page  133, Paragraph  3.230  
 
The Report states that "[i]n addition to the thousands of VCS developed by SDOs, consortia 
standards also help to fill the need for standards used by industry, especially in technology areas 
where a more rapid develop ment pace is needed to meet market needs.  
 
Question №136:  Could the U.S. provide the current number of "consortia standards" and explain: 
a) what is their coverage; b)  what organizations develop them; c)  whether all of these organizations 
are accredited by  the American National Standards Institute; d)  whether consortia standards are 
voluntary or obligatory, including by reference in technical regulations.  
 
Page  133, Paragraph  3.231  
 
According to the Report, "[i]n the United  States , technical regulations can be established at the 
federal or sub -federal level, and rely heavily on VCS developed by the private sector making them 
mandatory by reference; technical regulations cover mostly products but can also concern processes 
or services.  
 
Questio n №137:  Could the U.S. explain whether reliance of a technical regulation on a domestic 
"voluntary consensus standard", developed in accordance with Due Process Requirements for 
American National Standards (Essential Requirements), is sufficient for the U. S. to conclude 
 
5 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and 
Recommendations with Rel ation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex  3 of the Agreement, online: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/principles_standards_tbt_e.htm .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 476 - 
 
  that: a) the used "voluntary consensus standard" becomes mandatory; b)  the technical regulation 
becomes consistent with an "international standard" under the WTO  TBT Agreement "? 
 
Page  134, Paragraph  3.233 and Footnote  334 
 
The Report states that "OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is responsible for 
regulatory oversight and leads interagency review of significant regulation pursuant to E.O. 
12866334". Footnote  334 explains the meaning of "economically 'significan t regulatory actions'".  
 
Question №138:  From Footnote  334 to Paragraph  3.233 of the Report it appears that the 
regulatory oversight by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is focused on the impact of 
regulatory actions on the economy and budget of the U.S. . Could the U.S. explain how it ensures 
that its "voluntary consen sus standards", "consortia standards", technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of 
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade?  
 
Page  135, Paragraph  3.240  
 
According to the Report, "[i]n the case of imports, it is primarily the responsibility of importers 
representing foreign manufacturers to meet technical regulations and to ensure that permits, if 
required, have been obtained in advance of the goods arrivin g in the United  States. For some 
products, a declaration or proof of conformity or compliance must be submitted by the manufacturer 
or the importer upon or prior to importation".  
 
Question №139:  Could the U.S. provide a list of products for which a declara tion or proof of 
conformity or compliance must be submitted upon or prior to importation and by the importer only? 
Please indicate whether an importer must meet certain requirements to obtain the right to import.  
 
Page  135, Para graph  3.241  
 
According to the report, "[w]hen assessment of conformity to a technical regulation is required, it 
may be done by the Federal Government, state or local governments, or an independent testing 
authority where the Government gives official recognition throu gh accreditation or similar measures. 
CBP, in cooperation with other agencies responsible for regulated products, such as the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), is responsible for enforcing technical regulations at the border, 
and taking enforcemen t actions when such regulations are violated, including refusing admission. 
The CPSC has jurisdiction over many types of consumer products. However, some types of consumer 
products are covered by other federal agencies. For example, automobiles, trucks, an d motorcycles 
are within the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation (DOT); food, drugs, and cosmetics 
are covered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); pesticides and fungicides are monitored by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); boa ts by the U.S. Coast Guard; and chemicals by the 
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB).341 Assessment of conformity with SPS 
requirements, especially for plants and animal products, is generally carried out by APHIS and Food 
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspectors located at the borders. The CPSC also controls 
labelling requirements, such as those of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), which 
requires precautionary labelling on the immediate container of hazardous househo ld products".  
 
Question №140:  Could the U.S. provide a detailed information on the roles of all agencies 
responsible for controlling the importation of food products containing components of animal origin?  
 
Question № 141:  Could the U.S. inform how it impl ements a risk -based approach at the border 
when importing food products containing components of animal origin?  
 
Page  136, Paragraph  3.244  
 
According to the Report, "[a]n increasing number of notifications, 18.4% of all notifications during 
the period under review, simultaneously refer to technical regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures. Moreover, an increasing proportion of notifications (19.1% over the review period, or 
246 notifications) does not specify its relationship with a speci fic article of the TBT  Agreement".  
 
Question №142:  Taking into account that the period of review covers COVID -years, could the U.S. 
elaborate on the reasons for an increasing number of notifications?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 477 - 
 
  Question №143:  Could the U.S. explain the reason for not  providing specific Articles of the 
TBT Agreement  in their notifications?  
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
 
Page  140, Paragraph  3.262  
 
According to the Report, "[d]uring the period July  2018-March  2022, the United  States  submitted 
365 SPS notifications to the WTO (including 6  corrigenda to earlier notifications) and 65  emergency 
notifications (including 50  addenda to earlier notifications). The main objective or rationale for 
notifications remain food safety (80.0%) and p lant protection (14.5%).380 One of every seven 
notifications (14%) indicates a related international standard or guideline381; however, 
harmonization with international standards is not always reported, as was the case for example of 
2021 EPA regulations r elated to the Codex Alimentarius Commission.  
 
Question №144:  Could the U.S. please provide information (including a link to an online resource, 
if available) regarding where the U.S. risk assessment and scientific justification of SPS measures 
deviating from international standards could be obtained?  
 
Question №145:  Could the U.S. provide risk assessment, prepared for 2021 EPA regulations, if 
any? 
 
Page  141, Paragraph  3.263  
 
"During the period under review, three new specific trade concerns (STCs) were raised in the 
WTO SPS Committee relating to measures maintained by the United  States.383 In addition, three 
previously raised concerns continued to be discussed in the SPS  Committee; one of them raised by 
the European  Union concerning beef exports was reported as partially resolved.384 During the same 
period , the United  States used the SPS  Committee to raise or support 20 new STCs regarding 
measures maintained by other Members. In February  2018, the SPS  Agreement was cited in a 
request for consultation concerning U.S. measures on pangasius seafood products. T he 
United  States takes part as a third party of two dispute settlement proceedings with reference to 
the SPS  Agreement initiated during the review period".  
 
Question №146:  Could the U.S. clarify the rules and procedures for the adaptation of 
SPS measures t o the regional condition (recognition of regionalization principle on pest or 
disease -free areas)? Please provide the relevant legislative act, if any.  
 
Question №147:  Could the U.S. clarify whether there is a requirement to provide FDA inspection 
and list ing for the producers of raw materials located in countries other than exporters in order to 
export to the U.S. the processed agricultural products?  
 
Question №148:  Could the U.S. clarify whether there is a specific registration procedure or 
requirements f or the exportation of GM products if such products do not contain genetic material of 
animal or plant pathogens (according to the American Plant Protection Act) or any other producer 
DNA structure (for vitamins and amino acids)?  
 
Question №149:  Could the U .S. clarify whether there is a requirement to notify the relevant U.S. 
authorities on the GM producer modification in case they do not fall under the U.S. regulations and 
in case they do. At what stage such notification should be made? Please provide respe ctive detailed 
information.  
 
Question №150:  Could the U.S. clarify whether registration procedure or specific import 
requirements are necessary to be fulfilled for shipments of seeds (planting material), including GM 
seeds, to the U.S.?  
 
Question №151:  Could the U.S. clarify how the cultivation and post -harvest separation of GM and 
non-GM crops is controlled? How is compliance of non -GM crops with import requirements ensured, 
if production is carried out at the same location (enterprise) where genetically m odified crops are 
produced?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Page  137, Para graph  3.249  
 
The Report states that "[a]ccording  to the product and the type of risk inherent to products, 
responsibilities for the development, implementation, and enforcement of SPS measures are split 
among federal agencies. In general, SPS measures are subject to the same administrative 
rulemaking pr ocedures as technical regulations (see above). FDA is responsible for the regulation of 
a broad range of products, including food (except food products regulated by the Department of 
Agriculture); food additives; dietary supplements; human and veterinary d rugs; medical devices; 
human biologics; tobacco; and cosmetics, including imported goods. FSIS within the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for ensuring a safe, wholesome, and correctly labelled and 
packaged commercial supply of meat, poultry , Siluriformes fish and fish products (catfish), and some 
egg products in the United  States, including imported goods. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) at USDA protects the health of U.S. agriculture and natural resources against 
invasive pests and diseases, and regulates genetically engineered crops while promoting exports of 
U.S. plant and animal products. In cases where requirements by APHIS and FSIS simultaneously 
apply to imported goods, APHIS evaluates the animal and plant health  risks while FSIS ensures the 
enforcement of food safety requirements. The responsibilities of EPA include , inter  alia, the 
registration of pesticides, including herbicides and fungicides, and the establishment of tolerances 
(maximum residue limits (MRLs))  for pesticides in food".  
 
Question №152:  Could the U.S. inform when the list mentioned under Footnote  354 comes into 
force and what document regulates the import of GM products?  
 
Question №153:  Could the U.S. provide a methodology for risk assessment of i mported plants and 
information on how it is applied in practice?  
 
Question №154:  Could the U.S. explain whether supplies of canned catfish products and 
wild-caught fish exported from the Russian  Federation  to the U.S. are covered by the requirement 
for the importation of FSIS -regulated products?  
 
Pages  138-139, Para graph  3.254  
 
According to the Report, "[e]quivalence  determinations of an exporting country's regulatory food 
safety inspection system for products regulated by FSIS are a prerequisite for trade with the 
United  States . The only FDA -regulated food products requiring an assessment as a precondition to 
import into the United  States  are Grade A dairy products and raw bivalve molluscan shellfish. On 
24 September  2020, FDA announced its first -ever equivalence determination, which recognizes the 
control systems of Spain and the Netherlands on raw bivalve molluscan shellfish as equivalent to 
the U.S. National Shellfish Sanitation Program.362 Imports from Spanish and Dutch establishments 
listed by FDA on the Interstate Certified Shellfish Shippers List are now allowed. FSIS has also 
determined equivalent certified and  approved producers in 34 countries and the product scope of 
these equivalences varies from country to country. Following a regulatory change in 2019, a single 
list of eligible foreign countries to import FSIS -regulated goods is kept on the FSIS website. D uring 
the review period, FSIS notified the adoption of seven equivalence determinations on poultry 
products, Siluriformes fish and fish products, and egg products. FDA has also concluded Systems 
Recognition Arrangements with food safety agencies in three t rading partners. The authorities 
indicate that these arrangements do not constitute trade -facilitating measures and that they are not 
the same as equivalence determinations".  
 
Question №155:  According to the Secretariat Report, Systems Recognition arrangem ents do not 
constitute trade -facilitating measures and they are not the same as equivalence determinations.  
Could the U.S. clarify what preferences are provided in the FDA Recognition Arrangements?  
 
Page  139, Para graph  3.255  
 
According to the Report, "[t]h e FSMA requires that U.S. importers develop a Foreign Supplier 
Verification Programs (FSVP) for each type of human and animal food product and each foreign 
supplier they import to confirm that the imported good complies with FDA requirements, has the 
same level of public health protection as in the United  States, including preventive controls, produce 
safety regulations, and controls against adulteration or misbranding. On 10  May 2021, FDA launched 
the FSVP Importer Portal for FSVP Records Submission as a m eans for importers to upload FSVP 
records electronically to FDA.365 More specifically, the FSVP rule requires importers to perform WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  risk-based foreign supplier verification activities to verify that: (i)  the food is produced in a manner 
that provides the same level of public health protection concerning hazard analysis and risk -based 
preventive controls, or standards for the safe production and harvesting of certain fruits and 
vegetables than U.S. -produced food; (ii)  the food is not adulterate d; and (iii)  the human food is not 
misbranded (concerning food allergen labelling). Moreover, U.S. importers may request to 
participate in the Voluntary Qualified Importer Program (VQIP), an expedited review and entry 
program for food. Four U.S. importers are approved to participate in VQIP for fiscal year 2022 
(1 October  2021-30 September  2022)".  
 
Question №156:  Could the U.S. explain why it condemns actions by the Russian competent 
authority aimed at preventing imports of animal feed into the Russian  Federation  that do not comply 
with the EAEU requirements, given the fact that the U.S. has similar regulation?  
 
Page  139, Para graph  3.256  
 
According to the Report, "[o]n 1  August  2018, new U.S. standards for barley under the U.S. Grain 
Standards Act entered in to force.367 In June  2019, APHIS issued a final rule clarifying and further 
detailing the criteria to be used when assessing risks related to plant pests for the importation, 
interstate movement, and release of biological control organisms.368 On 18  May 2020, APHIS made 
public the first comprehensive revision of regulations on genetically engineered organisms since 
1987 to facilitate the development of genetically engineered organisms that are unlikely to pose 
plant pest risks.369 On 17  September  2020, the regulations governing the importation of cattle and 
bison in regards to bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis were amended.370 In December  2020, FDA 
issued a final regulation for accreditation of laboratories that perform food testing. When fully 
implemented , laboratory analysis of food for import purposes or when subject to food testing orders 
will be required to be performed by accredited laboratories.371 In April  2021, label requirements for 
allergens in food products were extended to sesame (P.L.  117-11)". 
 
Question №157:  Could the U.S. explain which Russian laboratories (e.g.  ILAC members) do the 
U.S. competent authorities identify as suitable for testing products exported to the U.S.?  
 
Question №158:  Could the U.S. clarify whether non-accredited laboratories are allowed to conduct 
research suitable for testing products exported to the U.S.?  
 
Page  139, Para graph  3.257  
 
According to the Report,"[i]In line with the 2018 Agriculture Improvement Act, P.L.  115-334 (also 
known as the 2018 Farm Bill), APHIS maintains a list of animal and plant diseases and pests of 
concern posing a significant risk to U.S. food and agriculture resources and developed emergency 
response plans for these diseases and pests.372 This list is in addition to other disease, pest, or 
health statuses lists kept by APHIS's Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) and Veterinary Services 
(VS) for specific purposes, such as the U.S. Regulated Plant Pest List, the National List of Reportable 
Animal Diseases, or lists of APHIS -recognized animal health statuses of regions".  
 
Question №159:  The Russian  Federation  lacks the ability to access APHIS electronic services. What 
measures could be taken by the U.S. and Russia for opening access to the Service's website?  
 
Question №160:  Could the U.S. clarify to which list exactly it is referring to. Is it a signal list of 
pests or a list of regulated non -quarantine pests?  
 
Page  140, Para graph  3.259  
 
The Report states that "[i]n March  2020, APHIS launched the Veterinary Services Per mitting 
Assistant (VSPA), a search tool designed to guide applicants in determining their import 
requirements for animal products.374 Since September  2021, VSPA covers requirements on live 
animals and it is expected that in the future, all permits will be processed only through APHIS eFile, 
a more comprehensive platform replacing the previous APHIS ePermit platform. Since 2018, APHIS 
has contributed to and supported the development and launch of the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) global eP hyto system and started exchanging electronic phytosanitary 
certificates. Currently, 30  trading partners send ePhyto certificates to APHIS while 59  trading 
partners receive ePhyto  certificates issued by APHIS.375 To facilitate clearance of imported plants 
and plant products during the COVID -19 emergency, APHIS and CBP have accepted digital WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  phytosanitary certificates including since March  2020.376 This measure was extended until thr ough 
31 March  2022".  
 
Question №161:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the benefits of implementing electronic phytosanitary 
certificate system?  
 
Question №162:  Could the U.S. indicate whether the measure identified in this paragraph will be 
extended? If so, in accordance with which document?  
 
3.3.6 Government procurement  
3.3.6.1 Institutional framework and general policies  
 
Page  149, Box  3.3 E.O.  14005 of 25  January  2021  
 
The Executive  Order defines the Administration's policy as follows:[…]  - calls for amending  the 
provisions in the FAR, Title  48, C.F.R., to promote enforcement of the Buy American Act, by:  
 
(i) Replacing the "component test" used to identify domestic end products and domestic 
construction materials with a test under which domestic content is measured by the value 
that is added to the product through U.S. based production or U.S. job -supporting 
economic activity;  
(ii) Increasing the threshold for domestic content requirements for end products and 
construction materials; and  
(iii) Increasing the price pref erences for domestic end products and domestic construction 
materials.  
 
Question №163:  Could the U.S. clarify how the abovementioned amendments correspond to the 
U.S. commitments of non -discrimination under the GPA? Please, indicate any legal exemptions fo r 
the GPA Parties from these rules, if they are being enforced.  
 
3.3.6.2 Legal and regulatory framework  
 
Pages  153-154, Paragraph  3.300  
 
According to the Report, "[t]he Final Rule provide for a framework through which higher price 
preferences will be applied to end products and construction material deemed to be critical or made 
up of critical components. The definitions for critical component and/or critical item are added to the 
FAR: critical component is defined as a component that is mined, produce d, or manufactured in the 
United  States and deemed critical to the U.S. supply chain; critical item means a domestic 
construction material or domestic end product that is deemed critical to the U.S. supply chain. The 
list of critical items and components w ill be added to newly designated FAR  25.105. The products 
that will receive a price preference will be determined in a separate rule. Once the list is established 
in the FAR, it will be published in the Federal Register for public comment no less frequentl y than 
once every four years to reflect changes. For end products that are critical items or contain critical 
components, the reasonableness of the cost of the domestic offer is determined by adding to the 
price of the low offer, inclusive of duty, 20% plu s the additional preference factor identified for the 
critical item or end product containing critical components, if the lowest domestic offer is from a 
large business concern, or 30% plus the additional preference factor if the lowest domestic offer is 
from a small business concern".  
 
Question №164:  Could the U.S. clarify how price preferences mechanism corresponds to the U.S. 
commitments of non -discrimination under the GPA? Please, indicate any legal exemptions for the 
GPA Parties from these rules, if they are being enforced.  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
 
Other questions:  
 
Question №165:  Could the U.S. specify what IP rights exhaustion regime currently applies within 
the U.S.?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 481 - 
 
  Question №166:  Could the U.S. provide an update of its recent activit ies, in particular activities 
aimed at fighting COVID -19 pandemic in LDCs, pursuant to Article  66.26 of the TRIPS  Agreement ? 
 
Question №167:  Could the U.S. specify how sanction, which are introduced by the Russian Harmful 
Foreign Activities Sanctions Regu lations and aimed at blocking all property and interests in the 
property of some Russian entities including intellectual property, comply with the U.S. obligations 
under the TRIPS agreement, in particular Article  3 and Article  4? 
 
3.3.7.1 Overview  
 
Page  163, Paragraph  3.330  
 
Secretariat report states that the number of patents linked to artificial intelligence (AI) has recently 
increased. Additionally, it is stated that "a recent report by the United  States Patent Office (USPTO) 
shows that AI is increasin gly important for invention, diffusing broadly across technologies, 
inventor -patentees, organizations, and geography".  
 
Question №168:  Could the U.S. specify whether any amendments to patents and copyright 
legislation are currently being considered in rela tion to products generated by artificial intelligence? 
If yes, please provide detailed information with regards to any such amendments under 
consideration.  
 
3.3.7.9 Enforcement  
3.3.7.9.2 Special 301  
 
Page  184, Paragraph  3.399  
 
Secretariat Report states that "under Section  182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, USTR 
conducts an annual review of the state of IPR protection and enforcement in U.S. trading partners 
around the world, which is published as the Special  301 Report". In this Special  301 Annual Review, 
a trading partner may be identified as a Priority Foreign Country" (PFC) or listed on a Priority Watch 
List or Watch List. Additionally, it is stated that "for certain countries identified in USTR's Priority 
Watch List, the USTR is required  to develop an action plan with benchmarks to assist the foreign 
country to achieve adequate and effective IPR protection and fair and equitable market access for 
U.S. persons that rely upon IPR protection".  
 
Question №169:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the methodology used for listing a country as "Priority 
Foreign Country" (PFC) or under "Priority Watch List" (PWL) and "Watch List" (WL)?  
 
Pages  184-185, Paragraph  3.400  
 
Secretariat Report states that "as PFC is a statutory category, if a trading partner has been identified 
as such, the USTR is required to initiate a Section  301 investigation within 30  days of when the 
country was identified". Further, the USTR "must make a determination of actionability and decide 
what action to take, if any, with in six months of the initiation of the investigation, or nine months 
under certain specific conditions".  
 
Question №170:  Could the U.S. specify the legal grounds for these investigations and the 
subsequent actions. Are these investigations and subsequent a ctions compatible with the provisions 
of TRIPS  agreement?  
 
Page  185, Paragraph  3.402  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that "USTR also conducts out -of-cycle Notorious Markets 
reviews". Further, "the Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy, also known as the 
Notorious Markets List, identifies selected markets, including those on the Internet, that reportedly 
engage in and facilitate copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting".  
 
 
6 Article  66.22. Developed co untry Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in 
their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least -developed country 
Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technologic al base.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 482 - 
 
  Question №171:  Could the U.S. elabo rate on the methodology used for Notorious Markets reviews? 
Please identify the purpose of these reviews and any actions that might be implied in relation to the 
countries on the Notorious Markets List.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry , and Fisheries  
4.1.1 Main features  
 
Page  187, Paragraph  4.4 
 
Secretariat Report states that "The U.S. farm sector is also characterized by significant export 
orientation for certain commodities. Overall, about one fifth of U.S. agricultural production goe s to 
foreign markets, with particularly high export shares for cotton (more than 75%), and wheat and 
soybeans (about 50%) ". 
 
Question №172:  Which factors contribute to the export competitiveness of cotton, wheat and 
soybeans?  
 
Page  189, Paragraph  4.7 
 
In Paragraph  4.7 of the Secretariat Report it is stated that " Most current U.S. farm support programs 
are designed to help mitigate risk and provide a safety net when prices or revenue fall, or when 
producers experience crop or livestock losses ". 
 
Question  №173:  Could the U.S. clarify under which programs of support such payments were 
provided? How these programs were reflected in the calculations of the amount of the AMS?  
 
4.1.1.1.7 Sugar  
 
Page  196, Paragraph  4.35 
 
According to the Report, "[t]he United  States  is one of the world's largest sugar producers, producing 
somewhat more beet (55% -60%) than cane sugar" and provides government support for the sugar 
sector".  
 
Question №174:  Could the United  States  elaborate on the economic factors driving th e need for 
the government support of this sector, taking into account the abovementioned information?  
 
4.1.1.1.8 Other Farm Act and disaster programs  
 
Page  197, Paragraph  4.40 
 
According to the Report, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) has been offering 
assistance to eligible, low -income individuals and families since 1969. […] As monthly benefits 
increased to an average USD  155 per person in 2020 and USD  216 in 2021, total SNAP expenditures 
climbed from USD  60 billion  in 2019 to USD 79 billion  in 2020, and to USD  112.6  billion  in 2021 ". 
 
Question №175:  Could the United  States  further explain what are the exact criteria for food to be 
covered by SNAP?  
 
Question  №176:  The USDA website provides general information 
(https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligible -food-items ) stating that fruits and vegetables, meat, 
poultry, and fish, dairy products, breads and cereals, as well as some other products qualify to be 
covered by SNAP . 
In practice, are there any other limitations/additional criteria on the types of products that can be 
purchased in U.S. stores and online using SNAP?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 483 - 
 
  4.1.1.1.10 COVID -19 measures  
 
Page  200, Paragraph  4.54 
 
According to the Report, "[t]he Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) announced in 
April 2020 had two major components: (i)  USD 16 billion in direct support to farmers and ranchers 
affected by price declines and supply chain disruptions; and (ii)  USD 3 billion provided to purchase 
dairy, meat, and fresh produce to donate to people in need ". 
 
Question №177:  What is the total amount of funding under the Coronavirus Food Assistance 
Program (CFAP) in fiscal year  2022? We would appreciate it if the U .S. described the main results of 
the program implementation. To which extent the program was efficient? Is it planned to be 
continued?  
 
4.1.1.2 Trade measures  
4.1.1.2.1 Imports  
 
Page  202, Paragraph  4.60 
 
According to the Report, "[c]ertain dairy products and  sugar have separate licensing procedures and 
quota allocation mechanisms ". 
The Report also states that "[t]he United  States has WTO tariff quota commitments that cover 
45 product categories representing 178  agricultural tariff lines at present. The main TRQs concern 
cheese and other dairy products, sugar and sugar -containing products, beef, sheep meat, tobacco, 
and cotton. Quota fill rates, which are reported to the WTO  Committee on Agriculture, may vary 
little overall though with significant year -to-year changes for some individual product categories 
(Section  3.1.3.5 and Table  A3.2) ". 
 
Question №178:  What are the grounds and purposes for maintaining two separate licensing 
procedures and quota allocation mechanisms?  
 
Question №179:  Over the last 4  years the United  States  applied a number of tariff -rate quotas 
(about 43  annually) and the notified fill rates, in accordance with para . 3.47 of the 
Secretariat  Report, on average were only about 50%. On many occasions the United  States  has 
stated that the fi ll rates are affected by a variety of market factors, including price trends, exchange 
rates, supply and demand. Could the United  States  provide analysis of such factors by category in 
percentage (for the TRQs of the latest reporting period) and include ot her relevant factors, such as 
the administration of tariff -rate quotas?  
 
Page  201, Paragraph  4.61 
 
The Report states that "[t]he 194 tariff lines on which the United  States has reserved the right to 
use SSGs mainly concern milk and dairy products, sugar and sugar -containing products, and cotton. 
In 2020, price -based SSGs were taken on 33 tariff lines, down from 36 tariff lines in 2019, 37 tariff 
lines in 2018, 41 tariff lines in 2017, and 55 tariff lines in 2016".  
 
Question №180:  Meanwhile, in many cases, tariff -rate quotas and special agricultural safeguards 
were applied for one and the same product group (such as 0402, 0405, 0406, 2105, 2106, etc.) 
with situations where TRQ and SSG instruments "compliment" each other and cover various 
modifications  of the same type of product. For example, in 2021 a TRQ was applied on ice cream 
under the tariff line 2105.00.10, over the same period an SSG was invoked for edible ice except ice 
cream (2105.00.40). Also, TRQs covering various cheese types (0406.10.04; 0406.10.84; 
0406.20.89; 0406.30.89; 0406.90.95, etc.) were accompanied by SSGs applied for a wide range of 
cheese, including fresh, processed, Edam, Gouda, Cheddar, Romano, Parmesan, etc. (0406.10.88; 
0406.30.91; 0406.40.70; 0406.90.12; 0406.90.18; 0406.90 .42; 0406.90.78; 0406.90.97). Does 
the United  States  believe that such trade practice mirrors the declared adherence of the country to 
the open and predictable trade and liberalized market access and not a result of a trade protectionist 
approach to import s? 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 484 - 
 
  4.1.1.2.2 Exports  
 
Page  202, Paragraph  4.62 
 
According to the Secretariat Report "[t]he 2018 Farm Act consolidated four existing USDA export 
promotion programs", including "the Market Access Program (MAP) […] MAP focuses on promotion 
of U.S. agricultural commodities, and the contribution to the costs required from the beneficiaries is 
higher for brand -name goods (at least 50%) than for generic promotions (minimum 10%) ". 
 
Question №181:  Could the U .S. clarify whether the costs under MAP fall wi thin the scope of 
Article  9.1(d) of the AoA. Please provide explanation.  
 
4.1.1.2.3  Food aid  
 
Page  204, Paragraph  4.66 
 
In accordance with the Secretariat Report, "[t]he United  States  provides international food 
assistance through three main programs. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), as 
authorized under Title  II of the Food for Peace Act, distributes food aid. […] Title  II of the Food for 
Peace Act, which is the larges t program, receives annual appropriations of about USD  1.5 billion . 
The 2018 Farm Act eliminated a requirement to monetize at least 15% of Title  II commodities in the 
local recipient market ". 
 
Question №182:  In which way does the U .S. take account of the i nterests of food aid recipients?  
 
4.1.1.3 Levels of support  
 
Pages  204-205, Paragraph  4.70 and Chart  4.3 Green Box support in the United  States , 
2001/02  - 2019/20, Page 205 and Chart  4.4 Amber Box support in the United  States , 
2001/02  - 2019/20, Page 205 
 
According to the Secretariat report, Green Box programs constitute the main part of the reported 
assistance. Indeed, Green  box spending has increased significantly over the last several years, 
reaching USD  139.2  billion  in MY  2019/2020. However, Amber  box has also increased significantly 
over the last few years. Therefore, all the support provided under Article  6 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture may now exceed USD  170 billion  - a sum that can hardly have no or insignificant 
trade-distorting effect on th e markets, particularly taking into account that the total value of 
agricultural production in the United  States  was only twice that amount (USD  356 billion  in 2019 
and 373.5  billion  in 2020).  
 
Question №183:  Could the United  States  clarify whether it considers the levels of overall domestic 
support provided to be of minimal or no trade -distorting effect? Is this also true for the 
USD 139.2  billion  spending on the Green Box programs?  
 
Page  205, Paragraph  4.71 
and Chart  4.4 Amber Box support in the United  States , 2001/02  - 2019/20  
and Page 206, Paragraph  4.72 
 
According to para . 4.71 of the Secretariat Report, "[t]he United  States does not grant agricultural 
export subsidies (Red Box)".  
Paragraph  4.72 of the Secretariat Report describes the levels of trade -distorting domestic support 
provided by the United  States  over the last several years. The United  States  trade-distorting 
domestic support provided both under the de minimis threshold and above it, within AMS 
entitlements, rai sed from USD 26.1 billion in 2018/2019 to USD 34,5 billion in 2019/2020 marketing 
year (over 30 %). 
The current total AMS has increased by around 40% from USD 13,085.38  million in 2018/2019 to 
USD 18,247.48  million in 2019/2020 approaching AMS bound limits of USD 19,103.294  million and 
reached USD 15,984.088  million in 2020/2021. Product -specific support above de minimis  levels 
was provided to 26  agricultural products in 2020/2021.  
Given the total value of agricultur al production of USD 357,309  billion, there is on average 
USD 0.0965 of Amber Box support and USD 0.4862 of overall domestic support in each dollar of WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 485 - 
 
  agricultural goods produced, which is one of the highest levels among key agricultural subsidizers in 
the WTO.  
In addition to that, USD 2,1 billion worth of export credit guarantee programs have been provided 
in 2019/2020 and food aid has increased considerably for many product categories over the last 
several years, reflecting the need for displacing surplus es of subsidized production in foreign 
markets.  
 
Question №184:  Could the U.S. confirm that the trade -distorting domestic support is provided at 
such levels which increase domestic production so that it significantly exceeds domestic 
consumption, that lead s to spillover effects on the export performance of the country and de facto 
constitutes export subsidies?  
 
Page  206, Paragraph  4.72 and Page 211, Paragraph  4.89 
 
Para 4.72 of the Secretariat Report describes the levels of trade -distorting domestic support provided 
by the United  States  over the last several years. Para graph  4.89 of the Secretariat Report briefly 
mentions Climate -Smart Agriculture and Forestry (CSAF) strategy. Meanwhile, Para. 3.6 of the 
Government Report states that "Combating the cl imate crisis and promoting sustainable 
environmental practices are top priorities for the United  States. In this regard, the United  States 
considers trade an indispensable tool in addressing the climate crisis ". 
The United  States  Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry Strategy (CSAF), among other things, is 
aimed at increasing carbon sequestration and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of about USD 800 billion  is envisaged to, inter alia, drive 
climate -smart agriculture and renewable energy initiatives. It will invest in deploying climate -smart 
practices that should reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase storage of carbon in soils and trees, 
and so on. Under this act additional funding will be allocated for  existing conservation and renewable 
energy programs.  
Within the U.S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) a Climate Smart practices payment has been 
added to encourage establishment of practices related to carbon sequestration, and payments for 
water qualit y practices have been increased.  
 
Question №185:  Could the U.S. provide additional information on the total amount of support 
under the above mentioned or any other relevant programs aimed at ensuring climate -smart 
agriculture (including carbon sequestrati on and reducing greenhouse gas emissions) ? 
 
Question №186:  Could the U.S. confirm whether such support is provided in addition to the existing 
trade-distorting domestic support?  
 
Question №187:  Does the U.S. consider such programs to be trade -distorting?  
 
4.1.3 Fisheries: The Report states the U.S. "has taken a leadership role in many 
international initiatives, in particular to promote sustainable fishing; combat illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing". The U.S. also reports that "in recent year s, 
the United  States  has worked domestically and internationally to promote sustainable 
fisheries. It has improved domestic management schemes to prevent overfishing and 
promoted sustainable fishing".  
 
Question №188:  How does the U.S. ensure that the fishe ries subsidies do not contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing? How does the U.S. define overcapacity and overfishing in its 
legislation?  
 
Question №189:  How does the U.S. ensure effective monitoring and control of fishing vessels in 
order to tackle ille gal, unreported, and unregulated fishing? What measures and instruments are 
used?  
 
Question №190:  What changes have been made in the national legislation related to trade of fish 
and seafood products identified as being particularly at -risk of illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing?  
 
Question №191:  Please elaborate on the progress of ratification of the WTO  Agreement  on 
Fisheries Subsidies in the U.S. What is the estimated timeline for this process to be completed?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Question №192:  Please el aborate on the steps already taken or planned to be taken with a view 
to implement this Agreement.  
 
Question №193:  Please confirm that Table  4.13 "Fisheries subsidies notified to the WTO" contain 
a full and comprehensive list of the U.S. fisheries subsidies by date.  
 
Question №194:  With respect to Fisheries Finance Program, Capital Construction Fund (CCF), and 
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) Reimbursement Program listed in the notification 
G/SCM/N/372/USA of 14  July 2021, please elaborate how the U.S . ensures that the relevant fish 
stocks are not overfished?  
 
4.2.1 General  
 
Page  223, Paragraph  4.129  
 
According to the Report, "[t]he United  States is a global leader in energy -related research, 
development, and demonstration. In 2017, some USD  7.3 billion in federal funds were allocated to 
basic energy research (31%), energy efficiency (24%), renewable energy (16%), nuclear energy 
(11%), fossil fuels (6%), and electric power systems (5%)".  
 
Question №195:  Could the U.S. provide information on the an nual amounts of federal and state 
funds which have been provided to support the U.S. energy sector in the last four years? Please 
elaborate on the allocation of these funds.  
 
4.2.3 Natural gas  
 
Page  224, Paragraph  4.133  
 
The Report states that "[t]he Unite d States  has been the world's largest producer of natural gas 
since 2011. Shale gas is now the dominant source of supply. The growth in U.S. shale gas production 
is projected to continue through 2050".  
 
Question №196:  Could the U.S. elaborate on its plans to increase production of natural gas, 
including in light of the U.S. climate goals?  
 
Question №197:  Does the U.S. have any plans for the production of blue hydrogen? If so, please, 
elaborate on this issue.  
 
4.2.4 Coal  
 
Page  224, Paragraph  4.136  
 
The Report states that "[t]he combustion of coal generates greenhouse gases and other pollutants 
(e.g. mercury, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides) in larger quantities relative to other sources of 
fuel. The issue is being addressed through, inter alia, the funding of research on carbon capture, 
utilization, and storage technologies".  
 
Question №198:  Could the U.S. provide more information regarding its actions aimed at developing 
carbon capture and storage technologies?  
 
Question №199:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the future development of the coal industry in light 
of the U.S. climate targets?  
 
Question №200:  Does the U.S. have any plans to establish cooperation with third countries in the 
coal industry in relation to climate change issues?  
 
4.2.5 Renewab le energy  
 
Page  224, Paragraph  4.137  
 
As stated in the Report, "[a]nother  important bio -component is ethanol, mainly produced from 
maize, which is blended to make transport biofuel. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), further expanded by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007. Th e RFS mandates the incorporation of renewable fuels into the domestic transportation fuel 
supply. Each year, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues RFS rulemakings with 
increasing volume requirements specific to certain renewable fuel catego ries. For example, the RFS 
sets a target of 36 billion gallons per year of renewable fuel by 2022, with conventional (maize) 
ethanol accounted for in the RFS limited to 15 billion gallons per year".  
 
Question №201:  Could the U.S. list all inputs that are r equired to make transport biofuel, and 
explain whether the RFS rulemakings contain any requirement with respect to maize or another 
product used to produce conventional ethanol?  
 
Question №202:  What standards or regulations exist, if any, at federal or sta te levels requiring the 
use of locally produced conventional ethanol in the domestic transportation fuel supply?  
 
Question №203:  What other renewable fuels are covered in the RFS target of 36  billion  gallons per 
year of renewable fuel by 2022? Please indic ate target requirements for each covered category.  
 
Question №204:  Could the U.S. explain what federal and state support mechanisms cover 
renewable fuels? Please indicate forms and amounts of support.  
 
Pages  224-225, Paragraph  4.138  
 
According to the Report, "[t]he United  States  does not have a national target for renewable energy 
nor an explicit federal support mechanism. However, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978 requires regulated utilities to purchase power from alternative energ y sources produced by 
"qualified facilities" at rates that cover their costs of such production. Incentives are also provided 
in the form of investment tax credits for the installation of solar panels, and production tax credits 
for power generated by wind  turbines. Although wind and solar power still accounted for 3.4% and 
1.5%, respectively, of primary energy production in 2021, their growth rates have been high, and 
generation from wind power has in general exceeded that from hydroelectric sources since 
August  2019. Renewable portfolio standards have been enacted by 31  states and the District of 
Columbia, each with their own specific policies, eligible sources and technologies, trading rules, and 
targets".  
 
Question №205:  Could the U.S. provide detailed i nformation on the criteria for a facility to be 
considered as a "qualified facility" for the purposes of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978.  
 
Question №206:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the requirements for receiving investment tax credits  
for the installation of solar panels and production tax credits for power generated by wind turbines. 
Is it possible to receive an investment tax credit or a production tax credit in case some components 
of such solar panels or wind turbines do not origin ate from the U.S. ? 
 
Question №207:  Could the U.S. clarify, whether investment tax credits can be given for the 
installation of solar panels for the use in private households or for the use of industrial consumers? 
Please clarify whether such credits are av ailable for installation of solar panels for the use in pursuit 
of governmental purposes?  
 
Question №208:  What trade measures does the U.S. currently apply, and intend to apply in the 
future, to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels to "clean en ergy"?  
 
Question №209:  Which of these programs do contain provisions requiring the use of renewable 
and "clean energy", produced within a state or the U.S. ? 
 
Question №210:  What are the amounts of these subsidies and what are their current and/or 
expected number of beneficiaries , and in what industries?  
 
Question №211:  What percentage of energy consumption should come from renewable energy 
sources for an applicant to receive a subsidy under each of these programs?  
 
Question №212:  Could the U.S. provide the definitions for the ter ms "regulated utilities" and 
explain any requirements for such utilities?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Question №213:  Could the U.S. explain how the purchase prices of alternative energy sources are 
set and what costs of production are actually covered?  
 
Question №214:  Could the U.S. provide a list of the states, which enacted Renewable portfolio 
standards,  as well as eligible sources, targets, forms and amounts of support?  
 
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.3 COVID -related measures and other support  
 
Page  232, Paragraph  4.161  
 
"The measures taken worldwide to the counter the COVID -19 pandemic caused disruptions in the 
supply chains of several U.S. (sub)sectors operating under a just -in-time logistic. Disruptions in the 
production and delivery of semiconductors created problems for se veral domestic manufacturing 
activities, including vehicles, medical devices, and other products in 2021. Lawmakers enacted the 
Creating Helpful Incentives To Produce Semiconductors For America Act, or CHIPS for America Act, 
Title XCIX of the William M. (M ac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021, which authorizes USDOC, to award financial assistance to private entities or public -private 
consortia to finance, construct, expand, or modernize facilities to support the fabrication;  assembly, 
test, and packaging; and advanced packaging of semiconductors. However, the Act does not provide 
for appropriate funding for the law".  
 
Question №215:  The U.S. has passed CHIPS and Science Act prohibiting the U.S. companies 
from engaging in any "significant transaction" promoting the "material expansion of 
semiconductor manufacturing" in China or any "other foreign country of concern ". A "foreign 
country of concern" is defined to include China, North  Korea , Russia, and Iran.7 How does the 
U.S. justify these restrictions in light of its WTO obligations, in particular under GATT Article  I? 
 
Question №216:  Could the U.S. outline its future plans, if any, for expanding legislation similar to 
CHIPS and Science Act? What particular spheres are envi saged to be covered by this type of 
legislation?  
 
Question №217:  How does the U.S. ensure that the said restrictive measures under the CHIPS Act 
do not negatively affect the other countries around the globe (including Japan, South  Korea and 
Chinese  Taipei ), as well as the overall sustainability of the existing global supply chains?  
 
Question №218:  How do the goals, objectives and measures envisaged by the CHIPS and Science 
act relate to the Chip  4 alliance comprising the U.S., Japan, South  Korea and Chines e Taipei ? 
 
Question №219:  Could the U.S. explain the rationale behind forming the East -Asian Chip  4 alliance, 
the goals expected to be achieved through this initiative, as well as elaborate on the achieved 
progress, including the first meeting of the Chip -4 "working group" on 30 September  2022?  
 
Question №220:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the requirements for private or public -private entities 
to get financial assistance to finance activities related with construction/assembly/testing and 
packaging of semico nductors.  
 
4.4. Services  
4.4.1. Financial services  
Page  234 
 
Question №221:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the progress made towards the liberalization of the 
U.S. banking and insurance markets during the period under review?  
 
Question №222:  Does the U.S. have any plans to further liberalize its banking and insurance 
markets?  
 
 
7 https://science .house .gov/imo/media /doc/the_chips_and_science _act.pdf. WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  4.4.1.1 Overview  
 
Page  234, Paragraph  4.170  
 
"As of 30  September  2021, there were 2,127 "large" commercial banks in the United  States , each 
with consolidated assets of USD  300 million  or more, compared to 1,812 in 2017".  
 
Question №223:  What percentage, if any, of those commercial banks are privately -owned?  
 
Question №224:  Are there any banks with state participation? If yes, please, specify.  
 
Question №225:  What steps, if any, have been taken by the U.S. to reduce state participation in 
the banking sector?  
 
4.4.1.4 Banking services  
 
Page  240, Paragraph  4.189  
 
The report states that the U.S. provides national treatment with respect to all banking services, 
except that branches of foreign banks are not allowed to have FDIC deposit insurance and therefore 
cannot accept retail deposits (unless grandfathered) and agencies of foreign banks are not permitted 
to accept deposits from U.S. citizens and residents. the U.S. made GATS commitments in market 
access and national treatment for all subsectors included in the Annex on Financial Services, and in 
line with the Understanding on Commitments in Finan cial Services.206 Although geographic and 
other limitations are applied to foreign banks and foreign -owned bank subsidiaries generally on a 
national treatment basis, the U.S. GATS Schedule contains some exceptions to national treatment. 
For example, foreig n banks cannot be members of the Federal Reserve System, although 
foreign -owned U.S. bank subsidiaries are not subject to this limitation. Also, foreign ownership of 
Edge Act corporations is limited to foreign banks and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks, while 
domestic non -bank firms may own such corporations.  
 
Question №226:  Could the U.S. elaborate on the rationale behind restrictions with respect to 
branches of foreign banks?  
 
Question №227:  What are the functions of the agencies of foreign banks?  
 
4.4.2 Telecommunications  
 
Page  248, Paragraph  4.221  
 
"The telecommunications market in the United  States is valued at USD  583.4  billion in 2021 in terms 
of revenue. In 2020, the United  States had a USD  18.1 billion trade surplus in telecommunications, 
computer, and information services, with exports totaling USD  56.7 billion, and imports reaching 
USD 38.6 billion".  
 
Question №228:  Could the U.S. clarify which ICT services need to be licensed?  
 
Page  249, Paragraph  4.228  
 
According to the Report, the rules concerning foreign ownership limitations in the 
telecommunications sector remained unchanged during the review period. Foreign ownership in 
some services, such as wireline -based carriers and submarine cabl e landing licensees, must comply 
with restrictions in the FCC's general obligations and qualifications for ownership of such businesses. 
Under Section  310 of the Communications Act, foreign ownership in common carriers is limited, 
unless FCC approves other wise, to 20% direct investment and 25% indirect investment for common 
carrier wireless licensees. FCC conducts a public interest analysis when evaluating applications to 
receive authorization to exceed the 25% foreign ownership benchmark. The methodology u sed to 
assess compliance with foreign ownership statutory benchmarks is detailed in a 2016 FCC  Order.  
 
Question №229:  Does the U.S. plan to adjust its rules concerning foreign ownership limitations in 
the telecommunications sector? Are there are any plans to reduce restrictions envisaged by the 
Section  310 of the Communications Act.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Question №230:  Could the U.S. provide information regarding foreign investments into the telecom 
market during the reviewed period?  
 
Page  251, Paragraph  4.232  
 
According to the Report, the FCC has modernized its rules to accelerate the deployment of 
next-generation networks and services by removing barriers to infrastructure investment, 
streamlining rules on the use of utility poles for new network equipment, set ting deadlines for the 
review of modifications of the wireless infrastructure, and stating its opposition to state and local 
moratoriums on telecommunications services and facilities deployment.  
 
Question №231:  Could the U.S. provide additional details reg arding the removed barriers to 
infrastructure investments?  
 
Pages  251, Paragraph  4.233  
 
In this paragraph, the Secretariat Report refers to a number of cybersecurity and critical 
infrastructure security programs, operations, and associated policy.  
 
Question №232:  Please, elaborate on the requirements set for the telecommunication services 
imported into the U.S. with a view to deal with the threat constituted by the unrestricted acquisition 
and use of certain information and communications technology and services.  
 
Question №233:  The Report also refers to the Executive  Order  13873 of 15 May 2019, imposes a 
ban on foreign information and communications technology or service that poses an undue risk of 
sabotage to information and communications technolog y or services in the U.S., catastrophic effects 
on the security or resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure or the digital economy of the U.S., or other 
harm to the national security of the U.S. or the security and safety of U.S. persons.  
Could the U.S. please clarify the exact criteria for defining:  
 
− A person that is "owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a 
foreign adversary " and thus subject to the Executive  order at issue ; 
− Information and communications technology or service that is subject to the 
Executive  order at issue?  
− What are the factors determining that a transaction with the ICT technologies or services 
poses an unacceptable risk? What does the term "unacceptable risk " mean within the 
Executive  order 13873?  
 
Pages  252, Paragraph  4.234  
 
The Report states that "[i]n line with the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019 (P.L.  115-232), FCC prohibited the use of Universal Service Funds for the purchase of 
products and ser vices from two manufacturers (Huawei and ZTE) in November  2019.261 The Secure 
and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (P.L.  116-352) established a mechanism to 
prevent the entry of communications equipment or services that pose a national security risk to U.S. 
networks and to mandate their removal if in current use. FCC is responsible for publishing and 
maintaining a list of equipment or services prohibited to be purchased with federal funds. In 
March  2021, FCC published the list of equipment and se rvices covered by this legislation. The Secure 
Equipment Act of 2021 (P.L.  117-55) requires FCC not to review or approve products on this list".  
 
Question №234:  Could the U.S. clarify the criteria for defining communications equipment or 
services as those that pose a national security risk to U.S. networks?  
 
4.4.3 Transport  
4.4.3.2. Maritime transport, port services and shipbuilding  
 
4.4.3.2.1 Maritime transport  
Page  258, Paragraph  4.259  
 
Question №235:  Can a vessel owned by a foreign -invested enterprise in the U.S. fly the U.S. flag?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  4.4.3.2.2 Port services  
 
Question №236:  How does the U.S. justify the restrictions applied on the entry of Russia's ships 
to the ports in the U.S. in the light of its WTO obligations, particularly on the freedom of transit and 
the most -favored -nations treatment?  
 
Page  258, Paragraph  4.263  
 
According to the Report, one of the main DOT policy objectives is to keep the MTS strong in 
international trade, and, to this end, government programs under the DOT seek to partially 
compensate carriers for the operating cost differential between U.S. -flagged and foreign -flagged 
vessels.  
 
Question №237:  Please, provide additional information regarding support measures provided by 
the government programs under the DOT.  
 
Question №238:  Please identify criteria for company eligibility under such support measures, and 
a link to  the specific legislation which sets out these criteria.  
 
Pages  259-260, Paragraph  4.265  
 
According to the Report, waivers to the provisions of the Jones Act and other coastwise laws may 
be granted under limited circumstances. There are two types of Jones Act waiver request processes, 
one for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) regarding military operations and one for all other cases 
including Non -Military Operations (NMO) of DOD.  
 
Question №239:  What are the possibilities for foreign suppliers to obtain the  mentioned waivers 
to the provisions of the Jones Act?  
 
Pages  260-261, Paragraph  4.269  
 
The Report states that Public Resolution No.  17 of 1934 requires that exports of goods that benefit 
from export loans or credit guarantees from the Export -Import Bank be carried in U.S. -flagged 
vessels, although the vessels of a recipient country where there is no discriminatory treatment 
against U.S. -flagged carriers may be granted access to 50% of those cargoes. Waivers may be 
granted, subject to reciprocity treatment.  
 
Question №240:  Please substantiate the compliance of the abovementioned measures above with 
WTO commitments.  
 
4.4.5 E-commerce  
 
Page  273, Paragraph  4.312  
 
"Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47  U.S.C.  230) provides immunity to 
interactive computer service users and providers, including online platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter, from civil liability based on third-party content and for the removal of content in certain 
circumstances. Section  512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (P.L.  105-304) shields online 
service providers from monetary liability and limits other forms of liability for copyright 
infringement  - referred to as safe harbors  - in exchange for cooperating with copyright owners to 
expeditiously remove infringing content if the online service providers meet certain conditions".  
 
Question №241:  Regarding the "immunity" of online platforms (e.g . Facebook and Twitter), in 
2021 Facebook has banned ex -President of the United  States  Donald  Trump from using its social 
network or Instagram "indefinitely, including the last two weeks of his presidency", while Twitter has 
"permanently suspended" persona l account of the ex -President. This has demonstrated that the 
U.S.'s digital/technological companies have the flexibility and autonomy to dictate the terms of 
participation of various players in the digital sphere (e.g.  in the social media platforms), as w ell as 
of using their respective services.  
Could the U.S. clarify how it ensures that its digital companies respect the rights and interests of 
users (including in the light of the abovementioned recent cases of arbitrary suspension of personal WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  accounts in  the social media platforms), and not impose unjustified discriminatory measures against 
them, thus providing for equal and fair terms of participation in the sphere of digital economy?  
 
Question №242:  What policies/mechanisms are in place in the U.S. to keep corporate power of 
giant digital companies at check? Are there plans to modify the existing regulatory framework 
governing the activities of such technological or other transnational firms? If yes, please provide 
respective information.  
 
Page  273, par agraph  4.313  
 
According to the Report, there is no comprehensive federal consumer data protection and privacy 
regulation in the U.S.; however, there are sector -specific federal laws. For instance, HIPAA 
(P.L. 104-191) requires covered entities and their business associates to safeguard protected health 
information they collect or process. HIPAA prohibits the sale of protected health information by a 
covered entity or business associate without the prior written consent of the patient. The 
Gramm -Leach-Bliley Act (P.L.  106-102) requires financial institutions to inform consumers regarding 
their privacy practices, have processes in place to secure consumer financial information, and 
provide opt -out options if the institution shares consumer financial in formation with non -affiliated 
third parties. In addition, several states, including California and Virginia, have adopted horizontal 
data protection laws.  
 
Question №243:  Could the U.S. clarify whether there are sector -specific federal laws in place, 
which  include data localization provisions? If so, what is the mechanism for their implementation, 
including how do these laws correspond with the respective generally applicable federal laws and 
state laws, sector -specific state laws and common law norms?  
 
Pages 276, Paragraph  4.325  
 
"Since 2003, all trade agreements signed by the United  States include a chapter aimed at facilitating 
development of cross -border e -commerce. In line with the approach adopted for its domestic 
market, the priorities for U.S. trade policy concerning e -commerce were set in the Trade Priorities 
and Accountability Act of 2015 (P.L.  114-26), or Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). The recently 
signed USMCA, includes a chapter on digital trade that contains broad commitments on digital trade.  
Similar provisions are also reflected in the U.S. -Japan Digital Trade Agreement, an executive 
agreement entered into force in January  2020.  " 
 
Question №244:  Does the U.S. intend to notify these agreements to the WTO? If so, please indicate 
when.  
 
Question №245:  Could the U.S. clarify whether there are respective federal -level privacy and data 
governance policies in place in the U.S. or a formal strategy to guide respective policy development 
and implementation? If yes, could the U.S. provide a link  to such legislation/ program document?   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  SAUDI  ARABIA , KINGDOM OF  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Monetary policy  
Trends and patterns in FDI  
Reciprocal agreements  
Customs procedures and requirements  
Standards and other technical requirements  
E-commerce  
 
1.2.3 Monetary policy  
Page  29, Para graph  1.29 
 
Also in response to the crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced facilities to support the flow of credit, 
in some cases backed by the Treasury using funds appropriated under the CARES Act 
(Section  4.4.1). The Federal Reserve and the other two federal banking supervisors encouraged 
depository institutions to use their capital and liquidity buffers to lend and relaxed some accounting 
rules so that COVID -19-related loan modifications  would not be classified as troubled debt 
restructurings.  
 
QUESTION 1:  What are the measures and best practices that have been taken to support the flow 
of credit in the economy directly and that have contributed to enhancing the stability of the financial  
system in the United  States ? 
 
RESPONSE 1:  For information on the Federal Reserve's actions in response to COVID -19 and 
testimony related to the CARES Act, please see: https://www.federalreserve.gov/covid -19.htm . For 
reports summarizing the Federal Reserve Board's framework for assessing the resilience of the 
U.S. financial  system,  please  see: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/financial -stability -
report.htm . 
 
1.3.2 Trends and patterns in FDI  
Page  36, Para graph  1.44 
 
The United  States  remained the top destination of foreign direct investment in 2020 despite the 
global downturn in foreign investment and the significant decline in FDI inflows. In 2020, inflows 
were USD  151 billion , the lowest value in the past four years. The decline since 2019 has been 
mainly attributable to a decline in reinvested earnings by foreign affiliates associated with the 
economic downturn.39 U.S. direct investment abroad sustained a significant drop in 2018 due to a 
decline in reinvested earnings attributable to the Tax Cuts and Jobs  Act of 2017 (TCJA). The TCJA 
lowered or eliminated taxes on dividends or foreign earnings of U.S. companies' repatriated earnings. 
This led to a record repatriation of USD  853 billion  in 2018. This level stabilized at USD  281 billion  
in 2020. Preliminary estimates for 2021 indicate a slight upturn, as corporate profits recover.  
 
Page  36, Para graph  1.45 
 
U.S. FDI inflows accounted for 15% of total world inflows in 2020, a decline from 22% in 2016. In 
terms of outflows, the United  States  ranked fifth in the world in 2020, with USD  93 billion , essentially 
unchanged from 2019 (USD  94 billion ). U.S. investment inflows and outflows were both 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector, followed by financial services, although U.S. investment 
positions abroad often t ake the form of holding companies.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Did the antitrust law impose the primary motive behind the establishment of holding 
companies based on the idea of easing the restrictions?  
 
QUESTION 3: Could you identify procedures for legal concerns and wa ys to deal with them in the 
United  States  of America to protect the interest of American companies abroad?  
 
RESPONSE for Questions 2 and 3:  The reasons that privately held enterprises choose a particular 
corporate form to organize their activities are thei r own, and the U.S. Government is not in a position 
to speculate on their motives, or which of those motives is the primary one.  U.S. companies 
operating in foreign countries are subject to the laws of the jurisdictions in which they do business.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  2.3.2.1 R eciprocal agreements  
Page  42 ,Para graph  2.22 
 
The United  States  has 14 FTAs with 20  countries.20 The main development during the review period 
was the conclusion and implementation of the revised agreement with Canada and Mexico, replacing 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), now known as the 
United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA). It was the first time the United  States  has 
comprehensively amended or updated an existing FTA. The FTAs with the Republic of Korea and 
Morocco also unde rwent some modifications during the period. There were no changes to other 
agreements . 
 
3.2.1 Customs procedures and requirements  
Page  120, Paragraph  3.179  
 
CBP is responsible for ensuring that goods leaving the United  States  do so in conformity with all 
applicable laws, regulations, and rules governing exports. It may act on behalf of other government 
agencies in the enforcement of rules. All relevant export information is filed prior to the departure 
of cargo in the Automate d Export System (AES) or AES Direct, a portal within the single -window 
Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). Penalties may apply for the filing of incorrect export 
data, e.g. regarding the place and estimated date of shipment.290 Paper submissions are no  longer 
accepted. Foreign entities may not register for the filing of electronic information through ACE; they 
must choose and authorize a U.S. agent to file information on their behalf.  
 
Page  120, Paragraph  3.180  
 
The filing of data for shipments valued a t less than USD  2,500 is not necessary unless a license or 
license exemption is required for the export.291 It is the duty of the exporter to determine whether 
an export license is required due to the nature of the product, its destination, or possible end  uses. 
Applications for license or license exemption, if needed, are submitted electronically to the Bureau 
of Industry and Security (BIS) at USDOC for dual -use and less sensitive military items.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Could the U .S. please clarify what are the prod ucts that require "license exemption" 
for the export?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  There are a number of factors that determine whether a good can be exported with 
a license exception, including the nature of the product, its destination, or possible end uses. 
These  are detailed  by BIS on its website:  https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/complian
ce-training/export -administration -regulations -training/248 -licenseexceptions -pdf/file . 
 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
Page  133, Paragraph  3.231  
 
In the United  States , technical regulations can be established at the federal or sub -federal level, and 
rely heavily on VCS developed by the private sector making them mandatory by reference; technical 
regulations cover mostly products but can also concern processes or services. While Congress can 
establish product regulations legislatively, it usually delegates enabling legislation to regulatory 
agencies . 
 
QUESTION 5:  Kindly, can the United  States  provide a detailed procedure document for the 
preparation of technical regulations, highlighting the relationship between the Standards Institution, 
the federal legislative bodies and the Congress, specifying the time frame f or each stage of the 
procedure?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  In general, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes procedural 
requirements that U.S. government agencies must follow when conducting a rulemaking, including 
those proposing to initiate, amend, or wit hdraw technical regulations. The most relevant portions 
of the APA can be found  at 5 USC 553, et seq., available  at: https://www.archives.gov/federal -regi
ster/l aws/administrative -procedure/553.html . Each agency incorporates the requirements of the 
APA and other relevant laws into its own procedures, which can be found in the Code of Federal 
Regulations. See, for example, 46  CFR 502 (rulemaking procedures for the Federal Maritime 
Commission),  available  at: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -46/chapter -IV/subchapter -A/part -50
2/subpart -D?toc=1 . See reginfo.gov for additi onal resources on U.S. regulation.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 495 - 
 
  In preparing technical regulations, agencies are directed to use voluntary consensus standards (VCS) 
in lieu of government -unique standards, except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical. 
Regulating agencies  are directed to ensure that technical regulation(s) reflect the best 
available  method  of achieving  the regulatory  objective.  See Circular  A-119, available  at: https://ob
amawhitehouse. archives.gov/omb/circulars_a119 . In addition, U.S. law directs Federal agencies, in 
developing standards, to base the standards on international standards if appropriate. See 
19 USC 2532.  
 
The American National Standards Institute is a private, not -for-profit membership organization that 
serves as the administrator and coordinator for the U.S. private sector, voluntary standardization 
system. While ANSI serves an important role in coordinating VCS, and in accrediting U.S. standards 
developers using criteria  based on international requirements, ANSI plays no formal role in U.S. 
government regulatory procedures.  
 
In passing legislation, the U.S. Congress may also reference technical standards, but generally 
delegates technical regulations to expert agencies.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Will the United  States  of America publish in a transparent manner all relevant 
regulations instituting the products legislation and release the necessary guidelines so as to ensure 
an effective implementation?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Proposed technical regulations at the Federal (central) government level are 
published in the Federal Register and, as applicable, notified to the WTO  TBT Secretariat and 
circulated via ePing ( https://epingalert.org/en/Search/Index?domainIds=1&countryIds=C840 ). The 
United  States  follows the TBT  Committee Recommendation on the Coherent Use of Notification 
Formats (Revision adopted at the meeting of 13 -15 November  2019 as G/TB T/35/Rev.1), which 
describes what and when Members should notify.  
 
Final technical regulations published in the Federal Register that were notified in the draft rulemaking 
stage are notified to the WTO and are also published in the U.S. Code of Federal Reg ulations (CFR). 
Refer to the eCFR for online references ( https://www.ecfr.gov/ ). 
 
QUESTION 7:  In the assessment of its approach, would the United  States  of America consider the 
risks of products when elaborating the ap plicable conformity assessment procedures?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The conformity assessment scheme is generally derived from the agency's analysis 
in balancing the risk of non -conformity and the resources necessary by all participants to 
demonstrate conformity. For more information, please see Conformity Assessment Considerations 
for Federal  Agencies,  available  at: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.2
000-02.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 8:  As a member of ISO, does United  States  recognize assessments from internationall y 
accredited bodies of compliance with ISO standards (e.g. 9001, 14001)?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  In general, the United  States  accepts conformity assessment findings from bodies 
accredited by organizations which are members of international mutual recognition arrange ments, 
such as ILAC and IAF. However, specific programmatic requirements vary based on statutory and 
regulatory objectives. Please refer to relevant regulatory agencies for additional information 
regarding conformity assessment requirements for particular goods.  
 
4.4.5 E -commerce  
Page  272, Paragraph  4.307  
 
The U.S. retail e -commerce is the second largest in the world with an estimated revenue of 
USD 870.8  billion  in 2021.357 In the United  States , e-commerce accounts for approximately 12.5% 
of the trade of physical goods, i.e. business -to-business and business -to-consumer sales considered 
together. A small number of online platforms (Amazon, Facebook, eBay, Walmart) concentrate 
several hundred million monthly visitors to their websites; online platforms have  also specialized 
themselves in different categories of products according to their business strategies. Licensed as a 
money transmitter at the state level, PayPal is the most used online payment service in the 
United  States . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 9:  What is the Unite d States  approach regarding the government E -commerce measures 
in order to facilitate trade?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The United  States  remains committed to advancing digital trade policies that support 
inclusive economic growth and the removal of barriers to the part icipation of workers, businesses, 
and consumers in the digital economy, including for those in developed and least developed 
countries.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
5.5.4 Engagement with the Middle East and North Africa  
Page  26, Para graph  5.79 
 
The United  States  also sought further contact with additional partners in the region, including among 
Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi  Arabia, 
and the United  Arab Emirates). U.S. dial ogue with all MENA countries remains aimed at ensuring 
that U.S. interests, including the realization of a worker -centered trade policy and women's economic 
empowerment, are fully represented as they pursue the modernization and diversification of their 
economies. The United  States  will enhance its efforts to engage meaningfully with its regional 
partners as travel restrictions ease; U.S. officials visited Algiers in June 2022 for the first 
post-pandemic in -person meeting under the United  States  - Algeria T IFA 
 
5.6.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (Including China -Related 301)  
Page  29, Paragraph  5.99 
 
The United  States  seeks to address these concerns through multiple avenues. The United  States  
works with many trading partners to strengthen IP protection and enforcement through the 
provisions of bilateral instruments, including trade agreements and memoranda of understanding. 
This also includes engagement under Trade and Investment Framework Agr eements and through 
bilateral intellectual property work plans. In addition, the United  States  works with trading partners 
within regional or other initiatives, including the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Group of 7, 
the World Intellectual Propert y Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co -operation and 
Development, the World Customs Organization, and other fora.  
 
5.6.1 Protecting Intellectual Property (Including China -Related 301)  
Page  29, Paragraph  5.100  
 
The United  States  actively monitors and enforces trade commitments, which is critical to the success 
of negotiated outcomes. In one example, the United  States  requested consultations with China in 
March of 2018 under the WTO dispute settlement process in DS542: China  - Certain Measures 
Conce rning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. In March 2019, China revised the measures 
that the United  States  had challenged by deleting certain provisions in three measures, including 
the Administration of Technology Import/Export Regulations. Th e United  States  considered that 
China's actions had sufficiently addressed U.S. concerns, and after 12 months, the authority of the 
panel expired on 8 June 2021. The United  States  also actively relies upon relevant enforcement 
provisions in its domestic la w, including Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974, border enforcement 
measures (including in cooperation with foreign customs authorities), and criminal statutes as they 
may apply, including as to the misappropriation of trade secrets. (Section  5.2 above p rovides 
additional information on U.S. enforcement efforts, including the investigation into China's Acts, 
Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under 
Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974.) . 
 
QUESTION 10:  What are the mechanism and approach does the U .S. take to implement such 
strategy?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The United  States  uses all available means to resolve intellectual property (IP) 
concerns, including bilateral dialogue and enforcement tools such  as those provided under U.S. law, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other dispute settlement procedures, as appropriate. 
Under Section  301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended ( 19 U.S.C . § 2411) (Section  301), the 
Office of the United  States  Trade R epresentative (USTR) has been taking action to address a range 
of unfair and harmful Chinese acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, IP, and 
innovation. USTR has also successfully pursued dispute settlement proceedings at the WTO to WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  address discriminatory licensing practices, DS542 : China  - Certain Measures Concerning the 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. The United  States  and China signed the 
United  States -China Economic and Trade Agreement (Phase One Agreement) in January  2020, which 
included commitments to address numerous long -standing concerns in the areas of trade secrets, 
patents, pharmaceutical -related IP, trademarks, copyrights, geographical indications, and 
technology transfer. The United  States  has been closely moni toring China's progress in implementing 
its commitments.  
 
QUESTION 11:  What is the level of engagement does the US goverment aims to seek in monitors 
and enforces trade commitments?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The United  States  monitors the commitments of its trading partners and works 
closely with the governments of trading partners to address both emerging and continuing concerns, 
and to build on the positive results that many of these governments have achieved.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Could there be an elaboration of how the U .S. plans to protect copyrights and 
privacy in foreign countries?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  SINGAPORE  
PART I: RE PORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
3.1.6.2 Safeguards  
Page  102, Paragraph  3.128  
 
QUESTION 1:  The WTO Secretariat Report notes that imports from Canada and certain developing 
countries were excluded from the safeguard measure on large residential washers and certain parts 
implemented in 2018. Are there specific criteria for exclusions or exemption s to safeguard measures 
under Section  201 of the Trade Act of 1974, and if so, what are the criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  There are no specific criteria for exclusions or exemptions in Section  201 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. Criteria for exclusion of USMCA partners  appear in 19  USC 4551 and 4552. Criteria for 
exclusion of other countries appear in certain U.S. free trade agreements, implementing legislation, 
and in Article  9 of the WTO  Agreement  on Safeguards.  
 
QUESTION 2:  The WTO Secretariat Report notes that an ad ditional 25% ad valorem tariff on steel 
articles was imposed on imports from all countries, with the exception of certain countries. Are there 
specific criteria for exclusions or exemptions to measures taken under Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, and if so, what are the criteria?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  In 2017, the Secretary of Commerce initiated investigations into the effects of steel 
and aluminum imports on the national security of the United  States  pursuant to Section  232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act  of 1962. In 2018, the Secretary submitted to the President reports on the 
findings of such investigations, concluding that steel and aluminum articles are being imported into 
the United  States  in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten  to impair the 
national security of the United  States  and recommending actions to adjust the imports of steel and 
aluminum articles so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
In Proclamation 9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United  States ) and 
Proclamation 9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United  States ), the 
President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided to adjust the imports 
of steel and aluminum articles by imposing a 25 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of steel articles and 
imposing a 10 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminum articles, so that such imports will not 
threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations  also stated that any country with 
which the United  States  has a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the United  States  
alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports 
from that country. Should t he United  States  and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative 
means to address the threat to the national security such that the President determines that imports 
from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, the Presid ent may remove or 
modify the restriction on such imports from that country and, if necessary, make any corresponding 
adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries as U.S. national security interests require.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  
Page  9, Para graph  3.9 
 
QUESTION 3:  We note that the United  States  and EU announced in Oct ober 2021 the intention to 
negotiate an emissions -based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminium trade. How does the 
United  States  intend to determine the carbon intensity of steel and aluminium products?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion, and no agreement has been reached on the provisions that may be established under 
the Arrangement. Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Does the United  States -EU emiss ions-based sectoral arrangement on steel and 
aluminium trade consider carbon prices that may already be levied on its production in the exporting 
country, as well as any implicit carbon prices that arise from other climate policies (e.g. regulatory 
require ments) in the exporting country?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 4:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion, and no agreement has been reached on the provisions that may be established under 
the Arrangement. Regarding future plan s, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  SWITZERLAND  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
QUESTION 1 : Para. 5, Build Back Better agenda: "Putting workers at the center of trade policy" is 
mentioned as a core element of the agenda. The Report by the United  States  (WT/TPR/G/434,  1.5) 
mentions that the U .S. "…are promoting a broader agenda of fair competition to e nsure that workers 
are competing on the basis of skills and creativity, not exploitative cost advantages ". 
 
Could you elaborate on how which trade policy instruments can contribute to achieving this objective 
in a fair, equitable way (including "…available  avenues, whether bilateral, regional, or multilateral 
discussions; existing trade agreements and frameworks; or new initiatives.").  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement begins with the recognition that trade 
should raise living standards, ensure full employment, pursue sustainable development, and protect 
and preserve the environment. Improved labor conditions are interwoven among these enduring 
and ambitious goals.  The worker -centered trade policy means that the United  States  is focused on  
ensuring that our trade policy addresses workers' interests, and that the benefits of trade are broadly 
shared by all people. The United  States  recognizes that trade can  - and should  - be a force for good. 
Done right, and in coordination with other policy  disciplines, it can grow the middle class, redress 
inequality, and promote fair competition. We remain committed to upholding a fair and open global 
trading system  - one that follows through on our partners' longstanding commitment to conduct 
economic rel ations with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment, and 
promoting sustainable development. We are developing new tools and implementing existing 
commitments to achieve these goals.  
 
We are cooperating with trading partners around t he world to implement existing labor 
commitments. Additionally, we are prioritizing a range of labor issues in the 
United  States -European  Union  Trade and Technology Council (TTC), in the Indo -Pacific Economic 
Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), in the United  States  – United  Kingdom Dialogues on the Future of 
Atlantic Trade, and in discussions with Kenya on ways to enhance trade and investment relations.  
All of these initiatives are ongoing and specific policy proposals are under development. Regarding 
future p lans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
Question 2 : Para. 23. In the report from the Secretariat, it is stated in the Paragraph  23 that "Fossil 
fuels constitute nearly 80% of the domestic supply of pr imary energy as rising output of crude oil 
and natural gas has outstripped declining production of coal. The United  States  became the world's 
largest producer of crude oil in July  2018 and has consistently been the world's number -one producer 
of natural gas since 2011. It became a net energy exporter during 2019. In April  2021, the 
administration announced a new target for U.S. economy -wide net GHG pollution: it should equal 
50% to 52% of the 2005 level by 2030, and net zero emissions should be re ached no later than 
2050. A National Climate Task Force has been formed to mobilize action on climate change by all 
federal agencies. Regarding electricity generation, natural gas and renewable energy sources are 
gradually replacing coal -fired power plants . Federal tax credit programs play a key role in the 
construction of new generation capacity in renewables." . 
Taking into consideration Paragraph  3.6 of the government report and more specifically 
Paragraph  3.7 which states that "To this end, the United  States is pursuing a new generation of 
trade policies that will more affirmatively promote the decarbonization necessary to limit global 
temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius", how do the U .S. intend to reduce its consumption of 
the fossil fuel, to lim it global temperature to increase to 1.5 degrees celsius and to combat climate 
crisis? In this regard at the WTO there is the initiative on the reform of fossil fuel subsidy reform 
(FFSR). Do the U .S. intend to join this initiative?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  For more i nformation on the United  States ' approach to tackling the climate crisis, 
please refer to: https://w ww.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/presidential -
actions/2021/01/27/executive -order -on-tackling -the-climate -crisis-at-home -and-abroad/ . 
Regarding future plans, including the question of intent to join the FFSR initiative, the United  States  
reminds Members that  Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  1. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
 
Question 3:  Para. 1.21 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act: Could the U .S. elaborate on the 
framework within which appropriations for infrastructure will be realised, particula rly on which levels 
of government public tenders are foreseen?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Regarding future plans, the United  States  reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. With respect to the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs  Act, 
please see initial guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) providing that all 
provisions must be applied in a manner consistent with the obligations of the United  States  under 
international agreements: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2022/04/M -22-
11.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 4:  Also, how does this infrastructure spending relate to measures such as the 
Executive  Order on America's Supply Chains and Buy American, e.g. are local content requirements 
going to apply fully?  
 
RESPONSE 4 : Local content requirements under Buy America laws  apply fully to federal 
procurement contracts above the micro -purchase threshold, unless waived or excepted. All 
provisions relating to domestic content requirement are directed, by statute, to be applied in 
accordance with any applicable obligations of th e United  States  under international agreements.  
 
2. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIME  
2.2.1 Trade policy formulation  
 
QUESTION 5:  Para. 2.6 and 2.7: In para.  2.7, it is indicated that the latest TPA legislation expired 
in June  2021 and was not renewed since then. Could the United  States elaborate on the 
consequences of the absence of TPA for the trade agreements currently under negotiations?  
 
RESPONSE 5 : Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 6:  What are the respective roles and attributions of Government and Congress in that 
case, and how do they collaborate in practice?  
 
RESPONSE 6 : The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has primary responsibility for d eveloping 
and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade policy. Please see Chapter V.C. of the 2021 Annual 
Report on the President's Trade Agreements Program for a description of the Congressional 
Consultation process at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20An
nual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 7:  Para. 2.6 Trade Promotion Authority: T he report states that the TPA allows for a 
"simple yes or no vote in Congress without deliberation or amendment of the contents". 
Nevertheless, "recent cases where Congress has intervened" are mentioned, in particular on the 
USMCA concerning labor, environ ment, IPR and enforcement. Also, two separate options for denial 
of expedited consideration for "inadequate consultation or progress towards achieving negotiating 
objectives" are mentioned.  
 
How frequently have these "safeguards" been applied by the legisl ative branch, what conditions 
need to be fulfilled and can such interventions occur during or after international negotiations  - or 
both?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  The law referred to has expired.  We cannot speculate how any future law will be 
written or implemented.  
 
2.2.2 Trade policy objectives and direction  
2.2.2.1 New directions  
 
QUESTION 8:  Para. 2.13 New Directions: What results did the investigations by the USITC on the 
distributional effects of trade policy on UIS workers yield?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 502 - 
 
  RESPONSE 8:  The USITC has published a detailed report, which is publicly available on the ITC 
website at: https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5374.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 9:  Para. 2.13 "Whole of Governmen t"-approach: How does the approach change 
procedures and practice of the us government with regard to multilateral and bilateral trade 
negotiations, including approaches focusing on cooperation such as the Trade and Technology 
Council or the Indo -Pacific F ramework for Prosperity?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has primary responsibility for developing 
and coordinating the implementation of U.S. trade policy whether with respect to multilateral or 
bilateral trade negotiations.  
 
QUESTION 10:  Para. 2.14 Executive  Order " Buy American": What is the current status of the 
planned increase of the domestic content threshold under the EO (to be increased "gradually" to 
75%)? What can we expect for the future?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The final rule, published as FAC  2022-05, amends the Fed eral Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) to implement Section  8 of E.O.  14005. Upon the 25 October  2022, effective date, the final 
FAR rule changes the domestic content threshold to 60 % immediately, then to 65 % for items 
delivered starting in calendar year  2024, and then to 75 % for items delivered starting in calendar 
year 2029. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
 
QUESTION 11:  Para. 2.16 mentions the WTO plurilateral agreements and initiatives of which the 
US is a party. Does the U .S. intend to participates in the MSMEs joint statement initiative?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  The United  States believes that plurilateral negotiations at the WTO can b e a useful 
means to advance issues of interest to Members, foster new ideas and approaches, and build 
momentum toward multilateral outcomes.  The plurilateral nature of these negotiations implies that 
not every Member need participate in each negotiation.  Maintaining transparency of such 
negotiations, however, is key to enabling Members to assess their decision about whether to 
participate on an ongoing basis.  
 
2.3.2 Regional and preferential agreements  
2.3.2.1 Reciprocal agreements  
 
QUESTION 12:  Para. 2.22 states that "In mid -2022, the Administration was reviewing the 
objectives of the negotiations with the United  Kingdom begun under the prior Administration; active 
negotiations are paused while the review is being conducted. USTR is also reviewing with the Kenyan 
government the path forward for deepening the U.S. -Kenya trade and investment relationship." . 
 
When does the U.S. administration expect to complete reviewing the objectives of negotiations with 
the UK?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  In 2022, the United  States contin ued to engage with the UK on deepening trade 
relations. In March and April  2022, the United  States and the UK jointly held the Future of Atlantic 
Trade Dialogues in Baltimore, Maryland and Aberdeen, Scotland, respectively. In November  2022, 
the United  States and the UK held the 6th Small and Medium -sized Enterprises Dialogue. As the 
United  States and UK engage in areas of mutual interest, USTR is continuing to consider how best 
to advance the U.S. -UK trade and investment relationship . 
 
QUESTION 13:  Is the U .S. government still pursuing preferential trade negotiations, including with 
other members?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  Our various negotiating initiatives are described in detail in the U.S. Government 
Report, WT/TPR/G/434, starting on p. 25.  Information on U.S. trade initiatives can also be found in 
2022 President's Trade Agenda and 2021 Annual Report on the President's Trade Agreements 
Program.  Please see Chapter IV, Engaging with Key Trading Partners and Multilateral Institutions 
in the Trade  Agenda  and Chapter  I, Agreements  and Negotiations  in the 2021 Annual  Report  for fuWT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 503 - 
 
  rther details:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20 Policy%20Agenda%20and%2
02021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 14:  Is the decision to do so contingent on the TPA (cf.  2.6)? 
 
RESPONSE 14 : The law referred to has expired.  
 
2.3.2.1.1 United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA)  
 
QUESTION 15:  According to Para. 2.24, The USMCA also brought labor and environmental 
obligations into the core of the Agreement, making the provisions fully enforceable and subject to 
updated dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
How do you monitor the implementation of the new labor and environmental obligations in USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  The United  States takes a whole -of-government approach to implementing, 
monitoring, and enforcing environment and labor obligations in the USMCA. USTR chairs the 
Interagency Environment Commit tee for Monitoring and Enforcement (IECME) composed of 11 U.S. 
government agencies, and co -chairs the Interagency Labor  Committee for Monitoring and 
Enforcement (ILC) with the Department of Labor. Through these committees, the U.S. agencies 
collectively monitor implementation of the USMCA environmental and labor obligations, and share 
updates and progress of agency activit ies as they relate to USMCA. USTR and the Department of 
Labor have also dedicated a significant number of staff members to the implementation of the Rapid 
Response Mechanism, as well as both the Labor and Environment Chapters. Additionally, we have 
posted eight attachés from key U.S. government agencies in Mexico City. These attachés conduct 
research and outreach to assess Mexico's compliance with USMCA environment and labor 
obligations. The attachés also provide reports to the IECME and ILC on a quarterly basis. USTR also 
has two staff members on -the-ground in Mexico City to engage on USMCA -related issues. Finally, 
USMCA Parties established an Environment Committee and a Labor Council composed of senior 
government representatives to oversee the implementati on of the Environment and Labor Chapters.  
 
2.3.2.2 Unilateral preferences  
 
QUESTION 16 : the Report by the Secretariat describes that the U .S. GSP program  - including the 
GSP for LDCs  - expired in December  2020. What measures are foreseen by the U .S. to com ply with 
the obligation under the Decision in Favor of Least Developed Countries of the 2005 Hong  Kong 
Ministerial Conference to provide duty -free and quota -free market access on a lasting basis, for all 
products originating from all LDC in a manner that e nsures stability, security and predictability?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  Although the GSP program is currently lapsed, the U.S. House of Representatives 
and the U.S. Senate have each introduced bills to reauthorize GSP.  Additionally, the GSP program 
lapse does not aff ect the other preference programs the U.S. government administers.  
 
2.3.3 Other agreements and arrangements  
 
QUESTION 17:  Para. 2.39 It is mentioned that the United  States -Japan Digital Trade Agreement 
(USJDTA) did not require any changes in US law, thus i t was treated as an Executive Agreement. 
Can you elaborate on the legal nature of such "Executive Agreements"? Is the absence of changes 
to federal laws the only criterion for this characterisation? How do they differ from trade agreements 
concluded under the TPA including with regard to their legally binding character, including for future 
administrations? Can "Digital Trade Agreements" be expected to be concluded generally as 
"Executive Agreements"?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Based on statutory authority, USTR has negotiated and entered into agreements 
on behalf of the United  States for decades. Whether an agreement can be negotiated under that 
authority is based on the specific facts.  
 
2.4 Investment Regime  
 
QUESTION 18:  Para. 2.41 Investment Regime: How are "national security grounds" applied in 
practice? Are the criteria for such determinations based on sectorial differences, capital participation 
thresholds or other factors?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 18:  Each transaction that is notified to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United  States (CFIUS) is reviewed exclusively for national security purposes and based upon the 
specific facts and circumstances of the transaction. Although national security is not defined in the 
CFIUS statute, an illustrative list of factors that CFIUS considers in determining whether a particular 
transaction poses national security risk is available under Section  721(f) of the Defense Production 
Act of 1950, as amended, as well as in published guidance on the U .S. Department of the Treasury's 
website at: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUSGuidance.pdf . CFIUS's annual 
reports also include a detailed discussion of the perceiv ed adverse effects of covered transactions 
on the national security of the United  States, available here: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -
issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -reports -
and-tables . Finally, the President recently issued Executive  Order  14083 of 15 September  2022 on 
Ensuring Robust Consideration of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United  States, which provides direction to CFIUS by elaborating on existing 
statutory factors and adds several national security factors for CFIUS to con sider during its review 
process.  
 
QUESTION 19:  How does the system relate to rights of private actors, including U .S. sellers and 
foreign buyers/investors?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  The CFIUS process enhances confidence in the United  States' longstanding open 
investme nt policy by restricting only those foreign investments that pose unresolved national 
security concerns. Section  721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, as well as its 
implementing regulations at 31  C.F.R.  Parts 800 and 802, set forth the re quirements the Committee 
must meet in order to exercise its authorities with respect to a covered transaction. For example, 
any determination of the Committee to refer to the President to suspend or prohibit a covered 
transaction, or to negotiate, enter in to or impose, or enforce any agreement or condition with respect 
to a covered transaction must be based on a risk -based analysis, conducted by the Committee, of 
the effects on the national security of the United  States of the covered transaction, including  credible 
evidence demonstrating the risk and an assessment of the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences 
to national security related to the transaction. The underlying legal authorities provide transparency 
with respect to the timeframes and processes  for transaction reviews and related activities.  
 
3. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
 
3.1.1.7 Customs valuation  
 
QUESTION 20:  Para. 3.28. According to Paragraph  3.28 the Valuation Encyclopedia  and an 
Informed Compliance on Customs value have been updated in 2022.  
Could the U .S. confirm that these two documents have been updated and provide the Internet link 
where they can be viewed at?  
 
RESPONSE  20: The internet  link for the "Customs  Valuation  Encyclopedia  1908-2021"  is: 
https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/customs -valuation -encyclopedia -1980-2021. This is the 
latest version. CBP has not completed the  update to the Informed Compliance Publication 
"Customs  Value ". The current  version  may be found  via the following  link: https://www.cbp.gov/d
ocument/publications/customs -value . The su bstantive information, however, remains valid.  We note 
that some of the addresses at the end of the publication may have changed since the current version 
was issued.  
 
3.1.3 Tariffs  
3.1.3.4 Duty suspension  
 
QUESTION 21 : According to Paragraphs  3.43 and 3.44 there was no legislation passed to 
commence future Miscellaneous Tariff Bills (MTBs) cycles. Therefore, there were no temporary duty 
suspensions in place as of March  2022.  
As the US economy is facing a relatively high inflation, does the U .S. foresee to pass legislation in 
order to implement temporary duty suspensions in the near future?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Legislation to implement current MTBs and to initiate new MTB cycles was 
introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives in the 117th Congress. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 22:  Para. 3.45. USITC's report of October  2019 assessed that requests were made for 
permanent duty suspension or reduction on about two thirds of the products (1 ,014 tariff lines) 
subject to duty suspensions or reductions and that the effec t of the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill of 2018 
appears to have had a more immediate and stronger impact on SMEs.  
Could the U .S. indicate how Congress took these assessments into account to decide on future 
measures?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  Pursuant to the American Competitiveness Act of 2015, Congress must include all 
MTBs determined to be eligible by the USITC in its MTB legislation, but M embers can object to 
individual MTBs, which must then be removed from the final bill. Any internal Congressional 
deliberations surrounding the MTBs have not been shared with the Administration.  
 
3.1.3.5 Tariff -rate quotas (TRQs)  
 
QUESTION 23:  Para. 3.47 no tes that certain cheese TRQs had a low fill rate. This includes TRQs 
with country -specific allocations. Could the U.S. inform what concrete steps it is taking in order to 
promote full utilization of these TRQs?  
 
RESPONSE 23: The fill rates of U.S. TRQs in any particular year are affected by a variety of market 
factors, including price trends, exchange rates, the recent global COVID -19 pandemic, supply, and 
demand. Regarding steps to promote full utilization of U.S. cheese TRQs, please see the response 
to Question  24. 
 
QUESTION 24:  Can the U.S. provide information on whether and how unused entitlements that 
result from country -specific allocation arrangements are made available to other potential users, 
such as required by para . 9. of the Bali Decision on tariff rate quota administration?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  In the case of dairy TRQs, including cheese TRQs, unused entitlements resulting 
from country -specific allocation arrangements are reallocated and made available to other 
potential  users.  For more information  on the program,  please  see : https://www.fas.usda.gov/prog
rams/resources/dairy -import -licensing -2020-2021-program -information . 
 
3.1.4.2 Harbor Maintenance Tax  
 
QUESTION 25:  Paragraph  3.53 indicates that the Harbor Maintenance tax (HMT) is charged on 
imports, domestic shipments, Foreign -Trade Zone admissions and passengers. During the years 
2019 to 2021 more than 88% of the amount collected in HMT  was on imports.  
Could the U .S. provide more details on the reason why there is such a big difference on the amount 
of HMT collection between imports and the other sources?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  The Harbor  Maintenance Fee is imposed on use of port facilities pursuant to the 
Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (Pub.  L. 99-662; 100  Stat. 4082, 4266; 
26 U.S.C.  § 4461 et seq.).  Port use is defined as the loading of commercial cargo on, or the 
unloading of c ommercial cargo from, a commercial vessel at a port, regardless of the origin of the 
cargo.  See 26  U.S.C.  §§ 4461(a) and 4462(a)(1).  The fee is applied based on the value of the cargo 
declared by the user.  The fee is consistent with U.S. obligations.  
 
3.1.5.1 Prohibitions, restrictions, and quantitative measures  
 
QUESTION 26:  According to Paragraph  3.64, the U .S. and the EU issued a joint statement in 
October  2021 announcing that they were resolved to negotiate future agreements for trade in steel 
and alumi num that take into account of both non -market excess capacity and the carbon intensity 
of these industries.  
Could the U .S. provide more details on the state of play and the content of such agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  3.1.6.1.2 Anti -dumping measures  
 
Question 27:  Para. 3.110, 3.111 and 3.116: The Secretariat Report indicates that there was an 
increase in the number of AD and CVD investigations initiations in the period under review, as well 
as an increase of AD measures. How does the United  States explain these in creases?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  The United  States administers its trade remedy laws in strict accordance with 
WTO rules, and its antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are generally initiated in 
response to petitions filed by the U.S. industry. The deci sion to impose an antidumping or 
countervailing measure is based purely on a factual determination of whether the dumping or 
subsidization exists and whether that dumping or subsidization has caused or threatens to cause 
material injury to a domestic indus try. Where dumping (or subsidization), injury or threat thereof, 
and a causal link have been found, the United  States will impose an antidumping or countervailing 
duty measure.  
 
QUESTION 28:  Was there also an increase of CVD measures during the period unde r review?  
 
RESPONSE 28:  The United  States refers Switzerland to Subsection  3.1.6.1.3, on Page 97 of the 
Secretariat's Report, which discusses countervailing measures.  
 
3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation  
 
QUESTION 29:  Para. 3.141 and Government Report, Para. 1.5 and 3.9: The reports refer to the 
commitment of the United  States and the European  Union  to negotiate emissions -based sectoral 
arrangements on steel and aluminum trade. Could the United  States provide more details on these 
envisaged negotiations?  
 
RESPONS E 29: Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.1.7.2.1 Section  301 regulatory framework, p rocedures and determinations  
 
QUESTION 30 : Para. 3.153: The Report indicates that, if the USTR determines that the 
investigation under Section  301 involves a trade agreement and a mutually acceptable resolution is 
not reached, the USTR must request formal dispute settlement proceedings under the governing 
trade agreement (WTO or other relevant trade agreement). What is the relationship  - also in terms 
of timing  - between such dispute settlement proceedings and the actions listed in Para. 3.155 that 
may be taken under Section  301, i.e. suspension of trade agreement concessions, imposition of 
duties or other import restrictions, imposition of fees or restrictions on services and negotiations of 
agreements with the country concerned?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  Section  304 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides the timeframes for determinations 
on whether conduct by a trading partner may be actionable. Section  304(a)(1) provides that such a 
determination take into account "the proceedings, if applicable ", referring to dispute set tlement 
proceedings. Section  304(a)(2) provides the timeframes for determinations on "actionability". 
Building from Section  304, Section  305 of the Trade Act then provides timeframes for the 
implementation of actions to be taken (to include those listed in  Para. 3.155), if any. The timeframes 
for the implementation of actions generally range from 30 to 180  days after an affirmative 
determination of actionability, subject to exceptions.  
 
3.3.1 Incentives  
 
QUESTION 31:  Table  3.26. Regarding fossil fuel, the Table  3.26 Federal subsidy programs 
(non-agriculture), FY2018 -20, from the Secretariat report shows the amount of subsidies for the 
fossil fuel and energy sector.  
In relation to Paragraph 3.6 and 3.7 of the government report, do the U .S. intend to lower the 
amount fossil fuel subsidies which are known to be environmentally harmful and that contribute to 
the climate change crisis?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospe ctive exercises . WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  3.3.4 Competition policy  
 
QUESTION 32:  In Paragraph  3.278, it is mentioned that U.S. antitrust agencies have subscribed 
agreements on competition matters with 18  trading partners and that they signed the Multilateral 
Mutual Assistance and Cooperation (MMAC) Framework for Competition Authorities with 
counterparts of Australia, Canada, New  Zealand , and the United  Kingdom. Could the U.S. provide 
any background information on such negotiations on specific competition matters?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  Formal bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements exist with many countries, 
including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Eur opean  Commission, Germany, Israel, Japan, and 
Mexico. The Department of Justice and FTC have bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on 
cooperation with the competition agencies in Peru, Colombia, Korea, China, India, Russia , 
respectively. These agreem ents provide for cooperation between the parties on matters relating to 
each other's enforcement interests. These agreements, however, do not override domestic laws of 
either country, including confidentiality laws.  
 
The International Antitrust Enforcement  Assistance Act of 1994 (IAEAA), 15  U.S.C.  §§ 6201-6212, 
gives the Department of Justice and the FTC the authority to enter into bilateral agreements with 
non-U.S. antitrust authorities that would, among other things, allow the exchange of otherwise 
confid ential information. The United  States has one agreement on mutual antitrust enforcement 
assistance under the IAEAA with Australia.  
 
QUESTION 33:  Are they negotiated exclusively by the antitrust agencies on a mandate from 
Congress?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  The U.S. an titrust agencies directly negotiate such agreements on competition 
matters after obtaining approval from the State Department for entering an MOU or agreement with 
a foreign country/agency.  
 
QUESTION 34:  Do the negotiated agreements need to be approved by Congress?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  While Congress is notified of the negotiated agreements, it does not need to approve 
competition -related antitrust agreements mentioned above.  
 
3.3.6 Government Procurement  
3.3.6.1 Institutional Framework and general policies, Paragraphs  3.287 -3.289  
 
QUESTION 35:  Paragraphs  3.287 -3.289 provide information on the Executive  Order  14005 of 
25 January  2021 regarding the new Made in America initiative and the establishing of the Made in 
America office. According to the report, the new  policy aims at increasing procurement from domestic 
sources and reducing the number of waivers by making them subject to review.  
 
How do the United  States weigh the impact of this executive order with respect to the costs incurred 
in setting up a new admi nistrative structure?  
 
RESPONSE 35 : Executive  Order  14005 established the creation of the Made in America Office 
(MIAO) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For more information on MIAO, please 
visit www.madeinamerica.gov , or see OMB's initial guidance regarding MIAO's implementation of the 
Executive  Order, available at: the https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads /2021/06/M -
21-26.pdf . 
 
3.3.6.6 Set -asides and preferences, Paragraphs 3.319 -3.322  
 
QUESTION 36 : Paragraph  3.319 and following describe the different set -aside programs in place 
to foster the participation of different categories of businesses in the procurement processes under 
the Small Business Act.  
 
While Switzerland shares the general principle of offering good framework conditions to promote 
inclusive  participation in government procurement, are the United  States not of the opinion that 
set-aside programs can constitute a deterrent to promote competition and innovation within the 
SMEs and other concerned categories of business and ultimately undermine their competitiveness 
in the market?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 36:  Established by the Small Business Act of 1953, the set -aside program is firmly 
rooted in U.S. federal procurement policy. As such, the Administration is working to ensure that the 
program continues to achie ve best value for money, promote competition, and stimulate innovation 
among small and medium enterprises while advancing equity and building wealth in underserved 
communities. For more on the Administration's plans to increase contracting opportunities fo r 
underserved small business owners, please see: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -
room/statements -releases/2021/12/02/fact -sheet -biden -harris -administration -announces -reforms -
to-increase -equity -and-level-the-playing -field-for-underserved -small -business -owners/ . 
 
For more informatio n on small business  set asides,  please  see: https://www.sba.gov/partners/cont
racting -officials/small -business -procurement/set -aside-procurem ent. 
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.5 Trademarks  
 
QUESTION 37 : Pursuant to the report by the Secretariat, at Section  3.3.7.5, the U .S. trademark 
legislation and its respective regulations and manual underwent some amendments. Switzerland 
would be interested to hear whether the U .S. has undertaken any changes to its respective laws and 
regulations, in order to allow the registration of tr ademarks containing a national flag, coats of arms 
or any other national flag or insignia covered by Art.  6ter Paris Convention, where an applicant has 
received an official authorization from the competent government. Switzerland would welcome 
receiving fe edback from the U .S. on this matter.  
 
RESPONSE 37:  The recent Trademark Modernization Act amendments and respective laws, 
regulations, and manual updates did not involve any changes concerning trademarks containing a 
national flag, coats of arms, or any ot her national flag or insignia covered by Article  6ter of the Paris 
Convention.  
 
3.3.7.6 Geographical indications  
 
QUESTION 38:  Para. 3.370. As reported in the Secretariat Report, Para. 3.370 p.  176, referring to 
the WIPO World Intellectual Property Report 2021, there were 606 geographical indications in force 
in the U .S. as at late 2020.  
 
Could the U .S. provide more detailed information regarding the legal status of these geographical 
indications (trademarks, sui generis, bilateral agreements, others ) and the types of products to 
which they apply (wines, spirits, foodstuffs, others).  
 
RESPONSE 38:  Please see WIPO IP Statistics Data Center for Geographical Indications Statistics 
reported by the United  States  of America (for the 2022 Report, which conta ins 2021 year data, 
that is now available),  WIPO  IP Statistics  Data Center,  at: https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/index.ht
m?tab=geographical . 
 
QUESTION 39:  Do the geographical indications of all products benefit from the same level of 
protection?  
 
RESPONSE 39:  All GI products protected in the United  States receive the same level of intellectual 
property protection.  
 
QUESTION 40 : If these 606 GIs, or a part of them, are protected  as trademarks, could the U .S. 
explain how they can be distinguished from the trademarks which do not protect GIs?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  The most common way to protect GIs through the trademark system is as a 
"certification mark indicating regional origin ". While there are other types of certification marks in 
the United  States, this is a specific type of certification mark used only for GIs. The applications for 
these certification marks indicating regional origin include the standards required for production and 
the demarcated geographical area of origin.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHERIES  
4.1.1 Main features  
4.1.1.1 Major support programs  
4.1.1.1.8 Other Farm Act and disaster programs  
 
QUESTION 41:  According to Para . 4.41, the U .S. has different environmental programs in place 
that address conservation issues.  
 
The two latest DS:1 notifications indicate that payments for the principal land retirement program, 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), decreased from USD  2,886  Mio. i n the Marketing Year 
2019/2020 to USD  2,055  Mio in Marketing Year 2020/2021. Furthermore, the payments for the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) decreased from USD  1,814  Mio to USD  1,256  Mio 
in the same period.  
 
Can the U.S. provide an explan ation for the significant decrease in these payments for environmental 
programs?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  The United  States thanks the Switzerland for the question, is currently reviewing 
why there was a decrease in notified support for these programs, and will revert back at a later date 
with a response.  
 
4.1.1.2 Trade measures  
4.1.1.2.3 Food aid  
 
QUESTION 42 : Para. 4.66 and 4.67. Para.  4.66 mentions the programs the U .S. has in place in 
order to provide international food assistance.  
Could the U.S. provide an explanation as to why most U.S. food aid is provided in -kind instead of 
cash-based? What efforts is the U.S. making to move towards more untied cash -based international 
food aid, as provided by Para. 30 of the 2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  The U.S. Government uses a variety of modalities in its international food assistance 
programs, including in -kind and market -based assistance.  
 
Please note (WTO  document G/AG/W/125/Rev.16/Add.3) that for U.S. Fiscal Year 2 021, the 
United  States provided USD 2.5 billion  of food assistance through cash transfers, vouchers, or locally 
and regionally procured food through the Emergency Food Security Program, which is almost double 
the total value of USD 1.23 billion  provided by  the United  States in in -kind food aid.  
 
Regarding future reforms, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises. We look forward to keeping the Membership informed as appropriate if there 
are changes by Congress i n the future.  
 
QUESTION 43:  Para. 4.67 indicates that U.S. food aid should preferably (minimum 50%) be 
shipped on U.S. -flagged vessels. What is the rationale behind this requirement? Are there any plans 
to lower or eliminate this percentage in order to cut costs?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (P.L.  83-164) requires that at least 50 % of all 
civilian U.S. Government cargoes be shipped on U.S. -flagged vessels. U.S. -flagged commercial 
merchant marine can be called upon in times of war or nat ional emergencies. Congress has 
determined that the United  States have a merchant marine that is:  
 
• Sufficient to carry the waterborne domestic commerce and a substantial part of the 
waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the United  States ; 
• Capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency;  
• Owned and operated as vessels of the United  States by citizens of the United  States;  
• Composed of the best -equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels constru cted in 
the United  States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel; and  
• Supplemented by efficient facilities for building and repairing vessels.  
 
Because cargo preference requirements are enshrined in law, any changes to these requirements 
must be approved by both chambers of Congress and signed by the President of the United  States.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 510 - 
 
  Regarding future reforms, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises. We look forward to keeping the M embership informed as appropriate if there 
are changes to this legislation in the future.  
 
QUESTION 44:  Para. 4.67 informs that Title II resources are predominantly U.S. commodities. 
What amount of international food aid by the U.S. is procured from local or regional sources? Has 
the U.S. been making efforts to increasingly procure international food aid from local or regional 
sources, as provided by Para. 26 of the 2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  The United  States uses multiple f unding sources for international food assistance 
programs, offering flexibility to address food security needs as they arise. Humanitarian food 
assistance programs prioritize efficient and effective response options that meet the needs and 
preferences of a ffected people through a robust response analysis, including the selection of 
modalities (i.e.  cash, vouchers, U.S. in -kind, or local, regional or international procurement).  
 
As noted in the original submission, the United  States also provided nearly USD 2.5 billion  in Fiscal 
Year 2021 of food assistance through local, regional, and international procurement; vouchers; or 
cash-based transfers through the Emergency Food Security Program.  
 
QUESTION 45 : In Para. 4.66 the Secret ariat notes that the 2018 Farm Act eliminated a requirement 
to monetize at least 15% of Title  II commodities in the local recipient market. Can the U .S. indicate 
whether monetization of food aid has been reduced or even completely eliminated with this 
legislative reform?  
 
RESPONSE 45 : Monetization remains an option and the Food for Peace Act maintains a permissive 
authority allowing the monetization of commodities where appropriate. U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) is not currently implementing programs that include the monetization of food 
aid. Regarding future reforms, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises. We look forward to keeping the Membership informed as appropriate if there 
are changes by Congress in the future.  
 
4.1.1.3 Levels of support  
 
QUESTION 46 : Domestic support increased significantly over the last years, mainly due to the 
Market Facilitation Program (MFP) and the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP), and is clos e 
to the U.S . commitment level. Could the U .S. indicate whether this increase is temporary or whether 
it is expected to represent a permanent new level of support?  
 
RESPONSE 46: Both the MFP and CFAP programs are no longer in effect and notified expenditur es 
will eventually reduce to zero. CFAP was a temporary program designed to minimize the negative 
economic impacts of COVID -19 on U.S. agriculture, while MFP was a temporary program designed 
to help assist producers with meeting the additional costs associated with disrupted markets for 
commodities targeted by retaliatory tariffs. In both cases, a specific amount of funding was 
authorized for these programs. That funding is no longer available and as previously stated, both 
programs are no longer in e ffect. 
 
4.3 MANUFACTURING  
4.3.1 Border measures  
 
QUESTION 47:  Paragraph  4.148 indicates that a Section  232 investigation with respect to imports 
of neodymium -iron-boron (NdFeB) permament magnest was initiated in September  2021 and was 
still ongoing in Febr uary 2022.  
Could the U .S. provide more details as to the state of play of the investigation? When will a decision 
be taken?  
 
RESPONSE 47 : In September  2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued its findings in this 
investigation. Based on the findings, t he Secretary of Commerce concluded that the present 
quantities and circumstances of NdFeB magnet imports threaten to impair the national security of 
the United  States. Despite the heavy dependence of the United  States on direct and indirect imports 
of NdFe B magnets, the Department of Commerce recommended that the Administration not impose 
tariffs, quotas, or other import restrictions on NdFeB magnets or component products. The 
Department of Commerce also identified several actions that would help to ensure reliable domestic WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 511 - 
 
  sources of NdFeB magnets and lessen the risk that imports threaten the national security. The report 
is available at: https://www.bi s.doc.gov/index.php/documents/section -232-investigations/3141 -
report -1/file. 
 
A fact sheet of further actions to secure the NdFeB supply chain is available at: 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/section -232-investigati ons/3142 -2022-09-fact-
sheet -biden -harris -administration -announces -actions -to-secure -rare-earth -element/file . 
 
4.4 SERVICES  
4.4.2 Telecommunications  
 
QUESTION 48:  Para. 4.230. Since 2018, at least seven states have enacted net neutrality laws, 
which have ge nerated ongoing legal challenges from litigants arguing a conflict with the Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order. In July  2021, E.O.  14036 encouraged FCC to restore net neutrality rules.  
Can you explain how a comprehensive reintroduction of net neutrality coul d benefit broadband 
providers?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  The rationale for reintroduction of net neutrality rules is offered in the Executive 
Order and the accompanying fact sheet:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -
releases/2021/07/09/fact -sheet -executive -order -on-promoting -competition -in-the-american -
economy/ . Additionally, per Mozilla v. FCC (D.C.  Cir. 2019) and ACA Connects v. Bo nta 
(9th Cir. 2022), the California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act is currently in 
effect in the most populous U.S. state.  
 
QUESTION 49:  Do you see any disadvantages with regard to the willingness of providers to invest 
in infrastructure?  
 
RESPONSE 49:  The rationale for reintroduction of net neutrality rules is offered in the 
Executive  Order and the accompanying fact sheet:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -
room/statements -releases/2021/07/09/fact -sheet -executive -order -on-promoting -competition -in-
the-american -economy/ . 
 
4.4.5 E commerce  
 
QUESTION 50:  Para 4.308.  Currently, online platforms do not uniquely focus on sales of physical 
products, but also advertise the provision of services  - to be delivered physically or remotely, and 
the delivery of other digital services, such as streaming, digital marketing, and c loud computing.  
Can you explain in more detail which services reach customers primarily via intermediation by 
platforms? Are there any changes in demand?  
 
RESPONSE 50:  The United  States government does not publish statistics on platform mediation of 
servic es as described in the question.  Because the actual method of service delivery is often 
unknown, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis has developed a measure of potentially ICT -enabled 
services , which are services that  can predominantly  be delivered remotely over ICT networks.  BEA 
also measures trade in ICT services themselves. As can be seen in Table  3.1, trade 
in potentially  ICT-enabled  services  has been rising  steadily.  See: https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?reqi
d=62&step=9&isuri=1&6210=4 . 
 
For a complete look at digital trade in the U.S. economy, please view the report on New and Revised 
Statistics of the U.S. Digital Economy:  https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2022 -11/new -and-
revised -statistics -of-the-us-digital -economy -2005-2021.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 51:  Para. 4.309: This paragraph states that the U .S. does provide similar levels of 
consumer protection to consumers online and offline. However, the Report does not reference or 
discuss any of the underlying laws or statutes.  
 
Could the U .S. provide the relevant legislative measures and summarize them brie fly? 
 
RESPONSE 51: A summary of statutes the FTC enforces is listed here: https://www.ftc.gov/legal -
library/browse/statutes . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 512 - 
 
  QUESTION 52:  Do such levels of protection differ in law and prac tice, as both categories of 
consumers are natural persons?  
 
RESPONSE 52:  There may be some slight differences. For example, the Children's Online Privacy 
Protection Act applies to websites or online services, but not to data collected from children offline . 
 
QUESTION 53:  Para. 4.310  FTC: "…in 2020 and 2021, the FTC conducted 24  enforcement actions 
for alleged unfair or deceptive privacy and data security practices ". What kinds of practices are in 
the focus of such enforcement? What does "deceptive privacy p ractice" refer to?  
 
RESPONSE 53:  Specific information on why the FTC chooses to investigate conduct that results in 
enforcement actions is typically not public to the extent that it would reveal investigative tools or 
techniques.  As a general matter, howev er, FTC staff routinely monitor privacy and data security 
practices in digital trade to detect unfair or deceptive commercial conduct that may violate the FTC 
Act or other sector -specific laws that the FTC enforces.  
 
Section  5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce ". 
As the Commission set forth in its 1983 Policy Statement on Deception, a representation, omission, 
or practice is deceptive if it is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably u nder the circumstances 
and is material to consumers  - that is, it would likely affect the consumer's conduct or decisions with 
regard to a product or service. An example of a deceptive privacy practice is if a company offers an 
opt-out but then does not ho nor the opt -out request. Or if a company promises a certain level of 
privacy or data security and does not in fact provide such privacy or data security.  
 
QUESTION 54 : Has such enforcement been directed at U .S. based firms only, or also with regard 
to cross -border transactions?  
 
RESPONSE 54 : The FTC has remedial authority in cross -border cases. The FTC can redress harm 
in the United  States caused by foreign entities as well as harm abroad caused by material cond uct 
in the United  States.  See page 14 here for more information:  https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/file
s/documents/reports/us -safe-web-act-protecting -consumers -spam -spyware -and-fraud-legislative -r
ecommendation -congress/explanation -provisions -us-safe-web-act.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 55:  Para. 4.313: This paragraph discu sses sectoral legislation with regard to data 
protection and privacy in the U .S. 
 
Could the U .S. provide further  information on the impacts of HIPAA on cross -border transfers of 
information, and the protection of data and privacy for data transferred abroad?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) required 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop regulations 
protecting the privacy and security of certain  health information. To fulfill this requirement, HHS 
published what are commonly known as the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the HIPAA Security Rule. The 
Privacy Rule, or Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, establishes 
national standards for the protection of certain health information. The Security Standards for the 
Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information (the Security Rule) establish a national set of 
security standards for protecting certain health information th at is held or transferred in electronic 
form. Please  see https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for -professionals/security/laws -
regulations/index.html  for additional  inform ation on the HIPAA  Security  Rule and https://www.hhs.
gov/hipaa/for -professionals/privacy/index.html  for the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  
 
QUESTION 56:  The same paragraph also mentions the  sub-federal data protection laws in California 
and Virginia. Could the U .S. provide additional detals on the California Consumer Privacy Act?  
 
RESPONSE  56: Information can be found at https://oag.ca.gov/priv acy/ccpa . 
 
QUESTION 57:  How does this measure affect transfers of data within the U .S. and internationally?  
 
RESPONSE 57:  Information can be found at https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa . 
 
QUESTION 58 : Does the Act ensure data is protected both within and without the Borders of 
California/the U .S.? WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 513 - 
 
  RESPONSE 58:  Information can be found at https://oag.ca.gov/pri vacy/ccpa . 
 
QUESTION 59:  Could the U .S. elaborate on the differences and similarities between data protection 
legislation on the state level?  
 
RESPONSE  59: Information  can be found  at: https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/State_C
omp_Privacy_Law_Chart.pdf  or https: //pro.bloomberglaw.com/brief/data -privacy -laws-in-the-u-s/. 
 
QUESTION 60:  Are such rules applicable and enforced across state borders, e. g. in cases where a 
provider is based in another U .S. state or abroad?  
 
RESPONSE 60:  There are currently three baseline state laws, the California Consumer Protection 
Act (CCPA), Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA), and Colorado Privacy Act (CPA).  
 
The CCPA applies to for -profit businesses that do business in California and meet  any of the 
following:  
 
• Have a gross annual revenue of over USD 25 million ; 
• Buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, 
households, or devices; or  
• Derive 50% or more of their annual revenue from selling California  residents' personal 
information.  
 
The VCDPA applies to businesses that meet the following:  
 
• Conduct business in Virginia or market their goods and services to Virginia residents;  and 
• Either:  
- Control or process the personal data of at least 100,000 Virgini a residents;  or 
- Control or process the personal data of at least 25,000 Virginia residents and derive 
more than 50% of their gross revenue from the sale of personal data.  
 
The CPA will apply to the following:  
 
• Legal entities conducting business in Colorado or delivering products or services targeted 
to Colorado residents that either:  
- (1) control or process the personal data of 100,000 or more consumers during a 
year, or  
- (2) control or process the personal data of 25,000 or more consumers and derive 
revenue or receive a discount on the price of goods or services from the sale of 
personal data.  
 
QUESTION 61:  Para. 4.315: This paragraph is very general. The United  States keeps a 
decentralized, market -driven approach to regulate digital services t hrough policies, regulations, and 
laws on specific issues and/or sectors that together support the progression of digital transformation. 
Although there is no general consensus on the contours of the digital economy or of digital trade, 
concerns regarding data security as well as an open, non -discriminatory, and fair competition in the 
digital economy have been rising.  
Can you elaborate on when it was "decided" that the decentralized regulatory approach was the 
right approach and why?  
 
RESPONSE 61:  Given th e U.S. federal system, regulation on many matters are decentralized 
without the United  States making "a decision" to that effect.  
 
QUESTION 62:  Were there specific events that prompted this decentralized approach?  
 
RESPONSE  62: See the above response.  
 
QUESTION 63:  Could the U .S. provide examples of the "market -driven approach to regulation of 
digital services"?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 514 - 
 
  RESPONSE  63: As one example, the United  States has not presumed that most digital services 
need to be licensed.  As another example, the rates char ged by Internet Services Providers are not 
regulated.  
 
QUESTION 64:  Para. 4.317: Regarding the UPU self -declaration mechanism for rates for the U .S.: 
Could the U .S. provide further information on this mechanism and how it relates to MFN obligations 
under GATT and GATS?  
 
RESPONSE 64:  UPU self -declared rates have the same relationship to MFN obligations under GATT 
and GATS as the UPU terminal dues system.  
 
QUESTION 65:  Para. 4.318: Can you elaborate on how the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA) helps online providers of goods and services to do business in a secure 
environment?  
 
RESPONSE 65 : CISA has resources for businesses, including the Cyber Ess entials and Cybersecurity 
Resources Road Map, aimed to provide businesses useful cybersecurity best practices and resources.  
The Road Map provides Tier 1, 2, 3, and 4 resources for businesses to follow while implementing 
proper cybersecurity mechanisms. Se e: Resources for Small and Midsize Businesses (SMB) | CISA . 
 
QUESTION 66:  Are there special measures or programmes for SMEs and/or is there an 
institutionalized exchange with the business community?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  In 2021, CISA established the Joint Cyber Defense  Collaborative, with the purpose 
to combine the insight of the private sector with the federal cyber ecosystem. See the Joint Cyber 
Defense Collaborative | CISA . CISA is also working to mature already existing mech anisms to better 
position stakeholders for timely responses to incidents. See the CISA Strategic Plan 2023 -2025.  
 
QUESTION 67:  Para. 4.320: Regarding Cases brought by the FTC with regard to stalking apps: 
Could the U .S. explain what the legal basis for these cases was, for instance by referencing relevant 
laws of statutes?  
 
RESPONSE 67:  In these cases, the FTC alleged the apps were engaged in unfair practices, deceptive 
practices (both violations of section  5 of the FTC act) and violation of the Children's Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA) Rule. The apps sold monitoring products and services that required 
circumventing certain security protections implemented by the Mobile Device operating system or 
manu facturer, and did so without taking reasonable steps to ensure that the monitoring products 
and services will be used only for legitimate and lawful purposes by the purchaser. This was alleged 
to be an unfair practice. Further, the apps represented that pe rsonal information collected via the 
mobile device monitoring product and service, and stored in Respondents' databases, remains 
confidential, private, and safe. The information was not confidential, private, or safe and thus this 
was a deceptive practice.  Finally, at least one of the apps collected information from children under 
13 with actual knowledge that children were being monitored. The Respondents collected, used, 
and/or disclosed personal information from children in violation of the COPPA Rule, i ncluding by 
failing to establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and 
integrity of personal information collected from children. For more information see here: 
https://www.ftc.gov/legal -library/browse/cases -proceedings/172 -3118-retina -x-studios -llc-matter . 
 
Para. 4.322: "Three E.O.s issued in August  2020 and January  2021 took actions to limit the 
functio nalities of a dozen mobile applications identified as posing a threat to the privacy of U.S. 
citizens and residents ". How does this relate to the indication given under 4.313 that there is no 
data protection legislation on a federal level? Have these measu res been taken based on sectorial 
legislation or based on executive powers alone?  
 
QUESTION 68:  Para. 4.325: See question under 2.39: Can "Digital Trade Agreements" such as the 
U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement be expected to be concluded generally as "Ex ecutive 
Agreements"?  
 
RESPONSE 68:  The U.S. reminds Members that WTO Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 69:  Does this form with regard to internal procedures depend on the substance on those 
agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 69:  See response t o Question  68. 
 
QUESTION 70:  Para. 4.326: Regarding APEC CBPR: Can the U .S. provide further information on 
the APEC CPBR, both with regard to regard the substantive obligations and  the number of companies 
that have elected to be covered by these rules, as a percentage of all U .S. companies?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  All U.S. CBPR -certified c ompanies can be found at http://cbprs.org/compliance -
directory/cbpr -system/ . APEC CBPR Program Requirements can be found at: http://cbprs.org/wp -
content/uploads/2019/11/5. -Cross -Border -Privacy -Rules -Program -Requirements -updated -17-09-
2019.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 71:  Para. 4.237: Does the U .S. envisage similar cooperati on formats with other parties 
or are working groups such as the EU -US TTC intended to be accessible for third parties in part or 
as a whole?  
 
RESPONSE 71:  The TTC was conceived of as a bilateral mechanism to promote U.S. -EU cooperation 
on a range of trade and technology -related issues.  We have no current plans to expand the TTC 
membership, but we will remain open to the possibility of welcoming other trading partners into the 
process, or to specific parts of it.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/4 34 
 
3.1 Standing up for Worker Rights  
 
QUESTION 72 : Para. 3.2 states that the (USMCA) Agreement, which entered into force in 
July 2020, includes the strongest labor  provisions in any trade agreement, as well as a 
ground -breaking labor enforcement tool, the rapid response labor mechanism (RRM).  
 
What is the U .S. doing to abolish child labour and fulfill their commitment i.e. under the USMCA and 
other trade agreements?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  The United  States fulfills its labor -related commitments under Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA), including the USMCA.  For example, U.S. labor law, including the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, prohibits child labor.  In addition, we engage regularly wit h our trading partners to 
encourage them to ensure they are complying with their FTA commitments related to child labor.  
 
QUESTION 73:  Do the U .S. intend to ratify the ILO Convention No.  138 (Minimum Age Convention), 
and when, as well as the other fundamen tal conventions that have not yet been ratified, in order to 
subject themselves to the control mechanisms of the ILO, to show solidarity with the international 
community and thus create a level playing field?  
 
RESPONSE 73:  The United  States implements laws  and policies that give effect to the fundamental 
principles and rights at work irrespective of whether the related Conventions have been ratified. The 
United  States does not consider the ratification of Conventions to be a necessary precursor to the 
formulation of national laws and policies that are consistent with international labor standards.  
 
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Enviro nmental Practices  
 
QUESTION 74:  Para. 3.6 and 8.6. In the government report at the Paragraph  3.6, it is written that 
"Combating the climate crisis and promoting sustainable environmental practices are top priorities 
for the United  States. In this regard, t he United  States considers trade an indispensable tool in 
addressing the climate crisis ". In the Paragraph  8.6, it is stated that  "At the WTO, the United  States 
is collaborating with trading partners to forge new partnerships to promote an environmentally 
sustainable trade agenda, and is working collaboratively through such initiatives as the WTO Trade 
and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD), which the United  States formally 
joined in November  2021". 
 
We welcome the USA engagement in  trade and environmental issues at the WTO and we would like 
to know what trade tools the WTO and TESSD could be used to combat climate change?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 516 - 
 
  RESPONSE 74:  Please refer to the section, Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable 
Environmental P ractices at Page 4 of the President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda, 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%20
2021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
QUESTION 75:  Para. 3.13. In the government report in Paragraph  3.13, it is written that "In 2022, 
the United  States supported the launch of multilateral negotiations on an international agreement 
on plastic pollution. The United  States recognizes the key role that trade plays a s both a contributor 
to the problem of plastic pollution in the environment, including the marine environment, and its 
potential to serve as an important part of the solution ". 
 
At the WTO, one of the goals of the informal dialogue on plastics pollution (I DP) is to cooperate with 
the UNEA process on the binding treaty on plastics pollution, named "INC ", and to help reducing 
plastics pollution and promoting the transition to more environmentally sustainable trade in plastics.  
 
Taking into consideration Paragraph 8.6 of the government report, are the USA considering joining 
this initiative?  
 
RESPONSE 75:  The United  States is closely following the work on plastics at the WTO, including 
the work happening under the Dialogue on Plastic Pollution (DPP). Regarding future plans, the 
United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 76:  What kind of national measures have the USA implemented to combat plastic 
pollution? We believe that those measures could help enrich the environmental database of the WTO 
and the discussions at the CTE.  
 
RESPONSE 76:  The United  States has taken a number of domestically -focused actions to address 
plastic pollution. These actions include the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (U.S. EP A) 
National Recycling Strategy, and its Sustainable Materials Management, WasteWise, and Trash Free 
Waters Programs. Additionally, the Save Our Seas Act 2.0 seeks to strengthen U.S. domestic marine 
debris response capabilities, enhance global engagement to  combat marine debris, including through 
international cooperation and outreach by federal agencies to other countries, and improve U.S. 
waste management and recycling infrastructure to help prevent plastic litter from entering the 
environment. Please refe r to the following link for more information about U.S. actions to address 
plastic pollution:  https://www.state.gov/u -s-actions -to-address -plastic -pollution/ . 
 
QUESTION 77:  Para. 3.11. In the government report at the Paragraph  3.11, it is stated that "We 
will seek to enable and mobilize the technologies, public and private investment, and technical 
resources needed to scale up clean energy infrastructure and facilitate trade in climate -friendly 
goods, services, and technologies (…)" . 
 
How does the U .S. envisage to facilitate trade in climate -friendly goods, services and technologies 
at the WTO?  
 
RESPONSE 77:  Please refer to the section, Accelerating Decarbonization and P romoting Sustainable 
Environmental Practices  at Page 4 of the President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda, 
available  at: https://ustr.gov/ sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%20
2021%20Annual%20Report%20(1).pdf . Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
5.1 WTO  Agreement s and Initiatives  
 
QUESTION 78:  Para. 5.3. In the government report, regarding the reform of the dispute settlement 
mechanism, in Paragraph  5.3 it is written that "The United  States supports a reform discussion that 
aims to ensure that WTO dispute settlement reflects the real interests o f Members. The United  States 
has been, and will continue to be, engaging with Members with an aim to achieving durable, lasting 
reform ". And in Paragraph  5.4 that "These reform conversations will take time. (…) Meanwhile, the 
United  States will continue to  work constructively with other Members to deliver results on 
achievable outcomes at the WTO ". 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 517 - 
 
  As agreed by the Ministers at MC12, the aim is to achieve a fully and well -functioning dispute 
settlement system by 2024. How do you see the next concrete steps  concerning dispute settlement 
reform in order to fulfill the mandate?  
 
RESPONSE 78:  The United  States believes that the first step towards reform is to better understand 
the interests of all Members in WTO dispute settlement.  An approach centered on the i nterests of 
Members can facilitate greater mutual understanding without resorting to the same positions that 
have slowed the reform discussion for many years.  The United  States is not prejudging what this 
reformed system would look like, and we have asked other Members to likewise approach the 
conversation with an open mind.  We believe this approach  - working collectively towards a system 
that meets the needs of all Members  - provides Members with the greatest chance of achieving 
durable, lasting reform.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  CHINESE  TAIPEI  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.3 Investment screening and restrictions  
2.4.3.1 Investment screening  
2.4.3.1.1 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)  
 
Page  54, Paragraph  2.52 
 
CFIUS introduced the concepts of "excepted foreign state", "excepted real estate foreign state", 
"excepted investor", and "excepted real estate investor". Qualification as an excepted foreign state 
requires, inter alia, that the Committee determines that the state has established and is effectively 
utilizing a robust process to assess foreign investments for national security risks and to facilitate 
coordination with the United  States on matters relating to investment sec urity. As of January  2022, 
CFIUS has identified Australia, Canada, New  Zealand , and the United  Kingdom as excepted foreign 
states.  
 
QUESTION 1:  Could the United  States please explain the eligibility criteria to qualify as "excepted 
foreign state" and the b enefits for investors of the excepted foreign states to enjoy?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The terms "excepted foreign state" and "excepted real estate foreign state" are each 
defined by a two -criteria conjunctive test, with delayed effectiveness for the second criterion . The 
first criterion is identification by the Committee as an eligible foreign state. The second criterion is, 
by the end of the delayed effectiveness period on 13 February  2023, a determination by the 
Committee: under §  800.1001(a) that the eligible fore ign state has established and is effectively 
utilizing a robust process to analyze foreign investments for national security risks and to facilitate 
coordination with the United  States on matters relating to investment security (for an excepted 
foreign sta te); or under §  802.1001(a) that the eligible foreign state has made significant progress 
toward establishing and effectively utilizing the review process and coordination (for an excepted 
real estate foreign state).  
 
The CFIUS regulations limit the applic ation of the Committee's jurisdiction over non -controlling, 
non-passive investments and certain real estate transactions by certain "excepted investors ", which 
are defined in part based on their close ties to excepted foreign states and excepted real estat e 
foreign states. Excepted investors are also exempted from mandatory filings with respect to control 
transactions under CFIUS.  
 
These authorities are further reflected in regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations (31  C.F.R.  Part 800 an d 31  C.F.R.  Part 802) and on the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury's website at:  https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-
foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -laws-and-guidance  and https://home.treasury.
gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -
cfius/cfius -excepted -foreign -states . 
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.2 Import procedures and  formalities  
 
Page  58, Para graph  3.7 
 
CBP automated procedures also include an Electronic Certification System (eCERT ) component for 
secure transfer of customs information from foreign governments. This is used mainly for licenses, 
origin certificates, and TPL quota administration where endorsement by a foreign entity is needed 
for certain customs processes. For example,  in order to receive preferential duties, CBP requires the 
use of eCERT. In the case of certain textiles imported under preference programs or quantity 
limitations, a so -called "textile visa", i.e. an export document attesting to the details of a textile 
shipment, must be obtained from the foreign authorized official.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 519 - 
 
  QUESTION 2:  Could the United  States please elaborate on how the eCERT system works with other 
trading partners? Which countries are currently using eCERT? For what categories of products? Is 
there any data that shows how much of the United  States' trade volume is facilitated by eCERT?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The Electronic Certification System, or eCERT, is an electronic 
government -to-government system for transmitting a certificate, like an export licen se/certificate 
or a certificate of eligibility, used for imports into the United  States for specific commodities as a 
requirement  to qualify  for in-quota  or tariff preference  rates of duty. See: https:/ /www.cbp.gov/tr
ade/quota/ecert . Uruguay, Argentina, New  Zealand , and Australia are currently fully utilizing eCERT 
for certificate beef importations. In 2022 year -to-date, 116,739,701  kg of beef was imported from 
Australia that used eCERT, as well as 19,03 2,757 kg from Argentina, and 18,113,953 kg from 
Uruguay. New  Zealand  recently started sending certificate data through eCERT in September; 
13,130,482 kg of quota beef has been imported using the eCERT  program since then, out of a total 
of 115,046,408 kg. CBP is working toward implementation with Mexico and Canada related to USMCA 
textile goods.  CBP is working toward implementation with the Republic  of Korea related to 
Section  232 Steel and Aluminum impo rtations.  
 
QUESTION 3:  To clarify, are "textile visas" processed with eCERT or paper?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Textile visas are not currently processed via eCERT.  
 
QUESTION 4:  If they are processed by paper, how does the relevant agencies ensure the document 
provided  by the importer is authentic?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Visa arrangements include an agreed visa stamp that is issued and signed by 
authorized government officials of the exporting country.  Invoices of eligible goods must have this 
stamp and importers are required to provide the textile visa document to CBP, upon request.  
Importers submit invoices and visa numbers when they present goods for entry through the CBP 
automated system.  
 
QUESTION 5:  Is document authentication by the United  States consulates required for such  "textile 
visas"?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  No, U.S. consulates do not authenticate textile visas and they are not involved in the 
process.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.5 Violations and enforcement  
 
Page  62, Paragraph  3.15 
 
CBP undertook a number of initiatives in order to reduce IPR and other violations during the review 
period. Since 2015, CBP has facilitated the reporting of trade violations by establishing the 
e-Allegations Program, which allows for electronic submission of suspected violations to CBP. A 
dedicated website has been established for this reporting. The Donations Acceptance Program (DAP) 
was created in FY2015 as arrang ement to work more collaboratively with industry to improve trade 
facilitation and enforcement activities. In terms of IPR enforcement, since the Program's inception, 
CBP has entered into 43  DAP partnerships that were IPR -related in order to accept tools a nd 
technology to verify and authenticate merchandise.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Do donors under the DAP need to meet certain requirements before submitting a 
donation proposal to the CBP?  
 
RESPONSE  6: Full DAP program  criteria  can be found  on CBP's  website  at: https://www.cbp.gov/
border -security/ports -entry/resource -opt-strategy/public -private -partnerships/donation -
acceptance -program. 
 
QUESTION 7:  For example, do they need to meet a threshold trade volume, or have a minimum 
budget to provide for the needed tools and technology?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 520 - 
 
  RESPONSE 7:  DAP criteria is not based on trade volume.  Full DAP program criteria can be found on 
CBP's we bsite at:  https://www.cbp.gov/border -security/ports -entry/resource -opt-strategy/public -
private -partnerships/donati on-acceptance -program . 
 
QUESTION 8:  Is there available data that evaluates the effectiveness of DAP partnerships to 
facilitate IPR enforcement?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  Quantitative data currently is not available for the DAP partnerships; however, 
qualitative feedback has indicated that the IPR -related tools donated by rightsholders via the 
program have proven beneficial to personnel in verifying the authenticity of goods.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Im ports  
3.1.3 Tariffs  
3.1.3.4 Duty suspensions  
 
Page  71, Para graph  3.44 
 
The 2016 MTB cycle was carried out pursuant to the new procedures outlined in the AMCA and 
resulted in the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill Act of 2018 (MTB Act of 2018) which provided for duty 
reductions or suspensions on 1,655  tariff lines during the period 13  October  2018-31 
December  2020. The second MTB cycle of 2019 was launched in October  2019 by the USITC and 
followed the AMCA timeline and procedures with the respective reports submit ted to the U.S. 
Congress for consideration in 2020. The U.S. industry remains keen on and increasingly active in 
pursuing requests for duty suspensions as exemplified by their recent petitions. In 2016, there were 
2,524  petitions resulting in 1,655  duty su spensions and in 2019 there were 3,442  petitions. The 
majority of requests (over 50%) were in the chemicals sector, with significant requests also in the 
machinery and equipment, and textiles, apparel, and footwear sectors. As of March  2022, there had 
not been any legislation passed pursuant to the 2019  cycle. Therefore, there were no temporary 
duty suspensions in place as of March  2022.  
 
QUESTION 9:  According to Table  3.7, some petitions resulted in duty elimination, while others 
resulted in duty reduction . Could the United  States please explain on what criteria were the petitions 
evaluated?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Under the AMCA, the amount of estimated annual revenue loss to the United  States 
from the duty suspension or reduction may not exceed USD  500,000.  When a p etitioner requested 
a duty reduction or suspension that would have resulted in an annual estimated revenue loss of 
more than USD  500,000, the U.S. International Trade Commission staff adjusted the requested duty 
reduction in increments of 0.1  percentage point so the estimated annual revenue loss would not 
exceed USD  500,000.  As a result, some petitions resulted in duty elimination while others resulted 
in duty reduction.  
 
QUESTION 10:  What is the percentage of petitions denied, if any?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The A MCA directed the USITC to place each petition into one of six categories, 
depending upon whether the petition meets the requirements of the Act without modification 
(category  I), meets the requirements of the Act with certain modifications (categories  II-IV), or does 
not meet the requirements of the Act (categories V and VI). Petitions in categories V and VI in the 
USITC's Final Report are not eligible for inclusion in a miscellaneous tariff bill. In 2016, approximately 
28% of total petitions filed, and not  withdrawn, were in category V and VI. In 2019, approximately 
22% of total petitions filed, and not withdrawn, were in category V and VI.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Are there any plans to commence future MTB cycles?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  We are not able to speculate regarding the policy priorities of the legislative branch.  
 
QUESTION 12:  What are the major concerns in reviving these duty suspensions?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  We are not able to speculate regarding the policy priorities of the legislative branch.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures directly affecting imports  
3.1.6  Anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures  
 
Page  85, Table  3.12 covered  merchandise  referrals  
 
Introduction of a new Section  351.227 concerning "covered merchandise referrals" from CBP to 
USDOC to determine if the product at issue is covered by the scope of the order(s).  
 
QUESTION 13:  Could the United  States please elaborate on the necessity for the introduction of a 
new rule referred to as "covered merchandise inquiries", and the differences of that rule from those 
rules addressing scope and circumvention inquiries?  
 
RESPONSE  13: A detailed  explanation  of the new rule can be found  at: https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR -2021-09-20/pdf/2021 -17861.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 14:  Could the United  States please give some examples to illustrate how USDOC 
harmonized covered merchandise inquiries with circumvention and/or scope inquiries proceedings?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  The new regulations contain multiple provisions which allow for the harmonization 
of scope inquiries, circumvention inquiries  and covered merchandise inquiries.  For example, 
19 CFR 351.225(d)  (2) provides that Commerce may determine, upon review of a scope ruling 
application, that rather than initiate a scope ruling, the scope issue should instead be addressed in 
a "circumventio n inquiry under 351.226 or a covered merchandise inquiry under 351.227 ". In 
another example, 19  CFR 351.225(i)  allows for Commerce, if it determines such an action is 
appropriate, to "rescind a scope inquiry" and "determine if the product at issue is covered by the 
scope of the order in another segment of the proceeding ", such as a circumvention or covered 
merchandise inquiry.  Such determinations would be made on a case -specific basis, based on the 
facts and circumstances of that segment of the proceed ing, but in all cases, the new regulations 
allow for harmonization of the various segments of the proceedings.  Commerce makes its scope 
rulings, circumvention determinations and covered merchandise determinations all available on 
Commerce's website at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
3.1.7.1 Section 232 investigations  
3.1.7.1.2 Steel investigation  
 
Page  107, Paragraph  3.141  
 
In the U.S. EU joint statement on steel and aluminium issued on 31  October  2021, the United  States 
and the European  Union  intend to negotiate a global arrangement to address carbon intensity and 
global overcapacity. They will invite like -minded economies to participate in the arrangements and 
contribute to achieving the goals of restoring market -oriented conditions and suppo rting the 
reduction of carbon intensity of steel and aluminium across modes of production.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Could the United  States please provide the status of the negotiation and the plan 
to invite like -minded economies to participate in the arrangement s? 
 
RESPONSE 15:  The Global Arrangement is under negotiation and no final agreement has been 
reached on what provisions will be established under the Arrangement. Regarding future plans, the 
United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospec tive exercises.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports  
3.1.7.1 Section  232 investigations  
 
Page  107, Paragraph  3.141  
 
On 31  October  2021, the United  States and the European  Union  issued a joint statement with WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 522 - 
 
  respect to the steel and aluminum tariffs. In the statement, both parties express their joint desire 
to address non -market excess capacity so as to preserve their critical steel and aluminum industries, 
and agre e to ongoing cooperation, and promote arrangements to address global non -market excess 
capacity as well as the carbon intensity of the industries. They also agreed to terminate their 
DSB disputes. As noted in Box  3.2, as part of the arrangement, the United  States and the 
European  Union  intend to negotiate for the first time, a global arrangement to address carbon 
intensity and global overcapacity. As a result of the arrangement, the United  States will allow 
historically based volumes of EU steel and aluminu m products to enter the United  States without 
Section  232 duties and the European  Union  will suspend related tariffs on U.S. products. To 
implement the arrangement, the United  States and the European  Union  will create a technical 
working group charged with  developing a common methodology and share relevant data for 
assessing the embedded emissions of traded steel and aluminum. The global arrangement will be 
open to any interested country that shares the commitment to achieving the goals of restoring 
market orientation and reducing trade in carbon intensive steel and aluminum products.  
 
Page  108, Paragraph  3.142  
 
In November  2021, the United  States announced the start of consultations with Japan to address 
global steel and aluminum excess capacity and take effective measures to ensure the long -term 
viability of the steel and aluminum industries. In accordance with the announcement, the 
United  States and Japan will seek to resolve bilateral concerns in this area, including the application 
of Section  232 measures, trade flows, and the sufficiency of actions that address steel and aluminum 
excess capacity with the aim of taking mutually beneficial  and effective actions to restore 
market -oriented conditions and preserve their critical industries. On 7  February  2022, the 
United  States and Japan issued a joint statement. In the statement, both parties express their joint 
desire to address non -market e xcess capacity so as to preserve their critical steel and aluminum 
industries, and agree to ongoing cooperation. As a result of the arrangement, the United  States will 
allow historically based volumes of Japanese steel products to enter the United  States w ithout 
Section  232 duties.  
 
QUESTION 16:  How are trading partners selected for consultations and will the United  States 
engage in more consultations in the future after the EU, Japan and the United  Kingdom?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  In 2017, the Secretary of Commerce initiated investigations into the effects of steel 
and aluminum imports on the national security of the United  States pursuant to Section  232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In 2018, the Secretary submitted to the President reports on the 
findings of s uch investigations, concluding that steel and aluminum articles are being imported into 
the United  States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security of the United  States and recommending actions to adjust the imports of steel and 
aluminum articles so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.  
 
In Proclamation  9705 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United  States) and 
Proclamation  9704 of 8 March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United  States), the 
President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided to adjust the imports 
of steel and aluminum articles by imposing a 25 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of steel articles and 
imposing a 10 % ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminum articles, so that such imports will not 
threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations also stated that any country with 
which the United  States ha s a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the United  States 
alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports 
from that country. Should the United  States and any such country arrive at a satisfactor y alternative 
means to address the threat to the national security such that the President determines that imports 
from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, the President may remove or 
modify the restriction on such imports from  that country and, if necessary, make any corresponding 
adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries as U.S. national security interests require.  
 
Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrosp ective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  3 TRADE  POLICIES  AND PRACTICES  BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures  Affecting  Production  and Trade  
3.3.2  Standards  and other  technical  requirements  
 
Page  133, Paragraph  3.229  
 
NIST maintains a reference collection of technical regulations, specifications, test methods, codes, 
and recommended practices, and produces the U.S. Standard Reference Data (SRD).  
 
QUESTION 17:  Having browsed the content provided by the link to the SRD, the information seems 
to focus on quantitative or me asurable properties or characteristics of substances or systems of 
substances ( https://www.nist.gov/srd/srd -definition ). We seek clarification on the information 
maintained regarding "technical regula tions", which does not seem to be available at the SRD 
website. Does it mean technical regulations as defined in the WTO  TBT Agreement , such as those 
issued by the United  States agencies at federal level (Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Communications 
Commission, etc.)?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Consistent with the WTO  TBT Agreement , U.S. proposed technical regulations are 
notified to the WTO and published through ePing and the U. S. Federal Register. Proposed technical 
regulations are also published for comment on https://regulations.gov . Final technical regulations 
are notified to the WTO and published in the U.S. Federal Register and the U. S. Code of Federal 
Regulations. All regulations in force can also be found online at: https://ecfr.gov . 
For more information  on finding  standards,  please  see: https://www.nist.gov/standardsgov/learn -
how-find-standards . Some of the standards that are incorporated by reference into U.S. regulations 
can be viewed free of charge on the website of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 
available  at: http://ibr.ansi.org/ . Some standards developing organizations (SDOs) also make their 
standards available on a read - or view -only basis. Please check the websites of individual SDOs for 
specifics. Additionally, many  federal government agencies also offer databases and websites that 
aggregate and track their standards requirements and programs. Many of those are linked from the 
NIST website offered above.  
 
QUESTION 18:  How can these information be accessed more conven iently, other than the Federal 
Register?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  All regulations in force can be found online at ecfr.gov . 
 
3 TRADE  POLICIES  AND PRACTICES  BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures  Affecting  Production  and Trade  
3.3.2  Standards  and other  technical  requirements  
 
Page  133, Para graph  3.231  
 
All regulations  issued  by agencies as final rules are subject  to Congressional review under the 
Congressional Review Act (CRA).  
 
QUESTION 19:  Would the United  States notify a new addendum if there are significant changes to 
the final rules after Congressional Review for purpose of transparency?  
 
RESPONSE 19:  As a matter of practice, the U.S. Government notifies all significant revisions to 
regulations required to be notified under the TBT  Agreement , including withdrawals of regulations, 
regardless of the reason for their withdrawal.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRAC TICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6 Government Procurement  
3.3.6.1 Institutional framework and general policies  
 
Page  149, Paragraph  3.286  
 
The general policy with respect to federal government procurement is contained in the FAR, which 
includes all regulations pertinent to U.S. participation in the WTO  Agreement  on Government WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 524 - 
 
  Procurement (GPA), the USMCA, and other international agreements where government 
procurement is covered. For legal purposes, the phrase  "Made in America Laws" refers to all statutes, 
regulations, rules, and E.O.s relating to federal financial assistance awards or federal procurement, 
including those that refer to "Buy America" or "Buy American", that require, or provide a preference 
for, the purchase or acquisition of goods, products, or materials produced in the United  States, 
including iron, steel, and manufactured goods offered in the United  States. Made in America Laws 
include laws requiring domestic preference for maritime transport, including the Merchant Marine 
Act of 1920 (P.L.  66-261), also known as the Jones  Act. 
 
QUESTION 20:  Per U.S. procurement policy, a certain ratio of the United  States government 
procurement is guaranteed to small and medium -sized enterprises and underserved  groups, 
including foreign SMEs. What available resources are there for foreign SMEs to better participate in 
the United  States government procurement process?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  Foreign small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are welcome to participate in 
all U.S. government procurement opportunities covered by the GPA. U.S. government programs, 
such as small business set -asides, that are designed to promote participation by SM Es in U.S. federal 
procurement activities are reserved for business entities organized for profit (even if its ownership 
is in the hands of a non-profit  entity) with a place of business located in the United  States or its 
outlying areas and that makes a si gnificant contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of 
taxes and/or use of American products, material and/or labor, etc. See: FAR  subpart  19.001 
(https://www.acquisition.gov/far/19.001 ). For mo re information on the definition of a "small 
business concern", see 13  CFR 121.105. For more information on additional eligibility criteria, please 
visit the U.S. Small Business Administration's website: https://www.sba. gov. 
 
QUESTION 21:  Are there any available programs assisting foreign SMEs to participate in U.S. 
government procurement?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  For more information on SBA definitions and eligibility criteria, please visit the U.S. 
Small Business Administration's website: https://www.sba.gov . 
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.9 Enforcement  
3.3.7.9.1 Main provisions, institutions, and actions  
 
Page  182, Paragraph  3.393  
 
Provisions with respect to enforcement of IPRs are contained in all main IP laws. Additionally, the 
Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act of 2006 (P.L.  109-181) prohibits the trafficking in 
counterfeit goods and services, including labels or similar packaging of any type intended to be used 
on, or in connection with, the goods or services for which the genuine mark is registered. There are 
several agencies involved in the enfor cement of IPRs and enforcement policy development of IPRs, 
including USDOC, in particular USPTO, DOJ, Treasury, Homeland Security, State, Agriculture, Health 
and Human Services, the Copyright Office, and the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforce ment Coordinator (IPEC). IPEC is a component in the Executive Office of the President, that 
engages with stakeholders and international partners to address IP issues, impacting infringement, 
market access, competition, digital trade, cybersecurity, and rul e of law concerns around the world. 
IPEC also works to expand coordination within the Government on IP enforcement, and chairs two 
interagency committees. In November  2020, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies 
involved with the enforcement o f IPRs, IPEC issued the fourth Joint Strategic Plan on IP Enforcement 
under Section  303 of the PRO IP Act (15  U.S.C.  8113) for 2020 -23. The Plan is composed of four 
parts: (i)  engagement with U.S. trading partners; (ii)  effective use of all U.S. legal auth orities, 
including trade tools; (iii)  expanded law enforcement action and cooperation; and (iv)  engagement 
and partnership with the private sector and other stakeholders. Additionally, under Section  304 of 
the PRO IP Act (15  U.S.C.  8114), IPEC issues an an nual report focusing on the IP enforcement 
activities of the Federal Government. IPEC issued its annual report for FY2020 in January  2021.  
 
QUESTION 22:  For now, is there any mechanism which can shut down the pirated website or 
remove the pirated digital c ontent quickly and efficiently?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 525 - 
 
  RESPONSE 22:  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides for a notice -and-takedown 
system, which allows copyright owners to inform online service providers about infringing materials 
so it can be taken down.  The DM CA incorporates protections for online service providers in certain 
situations if their users engage in copyright infringement.  17 U.S.C. Section  512 shields online 
service providers from monetary liability for copyright infringement - referred to as "safe harbor" 
from liability  - in exchange for cooperating with copyright owners to expeditiously remove infringing 
content and meeting certain conditions.  
 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is empowered to bring criminal prosecutions for willful copyright 
infring ement, including online piracy, under certain circumstances.  DOJ has legal authority to seek 
a court order to seize and forfeit to the government property that is used in connection with criminal 
copyright infringement.  An example of the use of this author ity is a program entitled Operation in 
Our Sites, coordinated by the DOJ and Department of Homeland Security, in which domain names 
of websites used to distribute pirated content have been seized, effectively disrupting access to these 
pirated sites.  
 
QUES TION 23:  If so, is there any competent authority taking accounts there  from?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security have primary 
responsibility for criminal actions with investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations and Homeland Security Investigations.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agri culture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.1 Main features  
4.1.1.2  Trade  measures  
4.1.1.2.2  Exports  
Page  203, Paragraph  4.65 
 
Recently signed trade agreements include provisions to improve market access for U.S. agricultural 
producers. The Phase One Agreement with China lifts or modifies import restrictions on several U.S. 
agricultural products and targets purchasing from the United  States. Japan has committed to reduce 
tariffs on U.S. canola oil, wheat, beef, pork, feed grains, and oil seeds within a greed phase -in periods 
(5 to 15  years). The USMCA expands market access for some commodities relative to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and provides for new rules governing agricultural 
biotechnology and SPS measures. The United  States has  organic equivalence arrangements with 
Canada, Chinese  Taipei , the European  Union , Japan, the Republic  of Korea, and Switzerland. The 
arrangement with Japan was recently amended to include livestock products.  
 
QUESTION 24:  Currently, market access negotiation is not a priority for the United  States trade 
policy agenda. Could the United  States please elaborate on the priorities and concerns for 
agricultural negotiations under this policy environment, as well as explain how it plans to benefit 
produce rs through trade initiatives and negotiations aside from the USMCA and organic equivalence 
arrangements mentioned in the TPR?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  The United  States is pressing trading partners to remove trade barriers and adopt 
science -based policies to facilita te the supply of U.S. food and agricultural commodities to meet 
demand all over the world. The United  States is also urging other WTO  Members to re -commit to 
transparency and adherence to a rules -based system, which are essential for creating and 
strengthe ning resiliency in global agricultural markets and achieving food security through trade in 
safe food and agricultural products. The United  States is also promoting sustainable agricultural 
practices and agricultural innovation as part of the solution to e nvironmental and food security 
challenges. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 526 - 
 
  4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.1 Main features  
4.1.1.3  Levels  of support  
 
Page  204, Paragraph  4.70 
 
Para. 4.70 indicates that "…The United  States notified Green Box support totaling USD  139.2  billion 
in marketing year 2019/20, an increase of USD  23 billion compared with the previous year, primarily 
due to increased spending on domestic nutrition assistance in response to the COVID -19 pandemic 
(Chart  4.3). Although expenditures on environmental programs are much smaller relative to food 
assistance, the funding of such programs (in particular  the CRP and EQIP) is gradually increasing ". 
 
QUESTION 25:  How does the United  States plan to continue to enlarge its environmental programs 
on agricultural production?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  U.S. environmental and conservation programs are authorized by the Agriculture 
Improvement Act of 2018 through Fiscal Year 2023. Separately, the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, 
which was enacted into law in August  2022, included increased funding for certai n existing 
environmental and conservation programs, including the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, 
the Regional Conservation Partnership Program, the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, 
and the Conservation Technical Assistance Program. Regarding future plans, the United  States 
reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
QUESTION 26:  Is there any evaluation on the impacts of those programs might have on the 
agricultural trades?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  These aforementioned programs in Question  25 are notified as green box support 
and are targeted at increasing adoption of environmental and conse rvation practices and do not 
have trade effects.  
 
QUESTION 27:  Or does the United  States plan to use any non -tariff methods (for example, 
environmentally friendly agricultural production standards) to promote its domestic environment 
goals regarding the ag ricultural production?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  The United  States is committed to building medium - to long -term sustainable, 
resilient food systems while maintaining open and predictable markets. The United  States employs 
an approach that is grounded in science, mark et-driven, equitable, voluntary, and incentive -based 
to help farmers adopt and build resilience to a changing climate while sustainably increasing 
agricultural productivity. For example, USDA's Partnerships for Climate -Smart Commodities Program 
will build and expand market opportunities for commodities produced using climate -smart production 
practices via a set of pilot projects spanning up to five years. Accepted projects from applicants (e.g.  
higher education institutions, non -profits, local governments, small businesses, etc.) will provide 
technical and financial assistance to producers to implement climate -smart production practices, 
pilot innovative and cost -effective methods of quantifying, monitoring, reporting, and verifying 
greenhouse gas benefits, and develop markets to promote the resulting climate -smart commodities. 
Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
2 THE UNITED  STATES  ECONOMIC  AND TRADE  ENVIRONMENT  
2.5 Labor  Markets  
 
Page  6, Para graph  2.10 
 
The onset of the pandemic in the United  States resulted in a decline in U.S. employment of 
1.5 million  in March  2020 and 20.5  million  in April  2020 (down 14.4% between February  2020 and 
April 2020). As of July  2022,  U.S. employment was 32,000 higher than the pre -pandemic peak of 
February  2020. Private employment declined 21  million  (16.2%) from February through April  2020, 
and as of July  2022, it was  629,000 higher than the pre -pandemic peak.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 527 - 
 
  QUESTION 28:  The epidemic has changed employment and consumption habits. How does your 
country view this trend?  
 
RESPONSE 28:  The United  States recovery from the COVID -19 pandemic has been strong, due 
primarily to an early and rapid vaccine rollout as well as significant fiscal and monetary policy 
support, but uneven.  Initially, the recovery skewed towards consumption of goods, but eventually 
included consumption of services as well.  As of November  2022, total U.S. employment is up 
1.0 million  from the pre -pandemic peak in February  2020 (private employment up 1.5  million ). 
Goods producing employment is up 228,000, while services providing employment is up 
816,000.  Most services sectors are higher than th eir pre -pandemic peaks, however employment in 
leisure and hospitality is still down 5.8% (980,000 from its pre -pandemic February  2020 level ). 
 
QUESTION 29:  Does the government propose any measures to support enterprises and labours to 
respond this change?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  The United  States provided significant fiscal and monetary policy support to support 
the significant and quick recovery from the pandemic. Regarding future plans, the United  States 
reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
4 OPENNESS  AND ACCOUNTABILITY:  BUILDING  SUPPORT  FOR TRADE  
4.2 Engagement  and Consultation  with Partners  and Stakeholders  
 
Page  12, Para graph  4.4 
 
Para. 4.4 indicates that "The United  States understands that in order to ensure durable robust 
outcomes, USTR must proactively seek input from stakeholders, including those from underserved, 
underrepresented, and marginalized communities, to ens ure that their concerns are considered in 
designing trade policy. USTR officials meet virtually and travel extensively across the country to 
listen, learn, and build trusted relationships and lines of communication with Members of Congress 
and their consti tuents, Tribal Nations, State and local elected officials, labor and civil society leaders, 
academia, communities, and entrepreneurs to inform the development of inclusive policy that 
delivers equitable results ". 
 
QUESTION 30:  Could the United  States pleas e explain when and how the stakeholder consultation 
to be utilized to improve the transparency of consultation with foreign partners?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  The United  States considers stakeholder consultations an integral part of our overall 
consultations with for eign partners. Stakeholder consultations lead to better outcomes with foreign 
partners because they provide the United  States detailed information about issues of critical 
importance to stakeholders generally, which in turn leads to more reasoned and trans parent 
interactions with our foreign partners.  
 
QUESTION 31:  Are there differences in the phrases of prior -negotiation, during negotiation or 
after-negotiation of a trade negotiation with foreign partners?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  Our consultations with stakeholders do not vary in any systemic way across the 
phases of a negotiation.  
 
5 TRADE  POLICY  DEVELOPMENTS  SINCE  2018  
5.3 Other  Monitoring  and Enforcement  Activities  
5.3.3  Addressing  Forced  Labor  
 
Page  20, Para graph  5.31 
 
In January  2022, the United  States announced that it will develop its first -ever focused trade 
strategy to combat forced labor.  
 
QUESTION 32:  Could the United  States please explain the status of the development of the trade 
strategy and the possible content of the strategy, such as what kin d of new tool and key action?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  The focused trade strategy to combat forced labor will lay out the U.S. government's 
trade approach to addressing forced labor in global supply chains. Work to develop the strategy is WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 528 - 
 
  ongoing. The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
5 TRADE  POLICY  DEVELOPMENTS  SINCE  2018  
5.6 Other  Trade  Activities  
5.6.2  Promoting  Digital  Trade  
 
Page 30, Paragraph  5.105  
 
Para. 5.105 indicates that "…The United  States regularly raises digital trade issues bilaterally, 
including in consultations with FTA  partners, in Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
meetings, and other engagements. The United  States also engages in conversation on digital trade 
issues in internat ional fora such as the G20, G7, APEC, and the OECD, using these platforms to 
address and bring attention to barriers to digital trade ". 
 
QUESTION 33:  Could the United  States please elaborate what the main issues it wants to purse or 
solve through the digital trade agreement or chapter and explain the elements that the United  States 
believes to be included in the E -commerce chapter?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  The United  States remains committed to advancing digital trade disciplines that 
benefit workers, businesses,  and consumers, and removing barriers to their participation in the 
digital economy. The United  States is also focused on how digital trade affects people as both 
workers and consumers and supports the participation of SMEs in the digital economy. Regardin g 
future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
5 TRADE  POLICY  DEVELOPMENTS  SINCE  2018  
5.6 Other  Trade  Activities  
5.6.2  Promoting  Digital  Trade  
 
Page  30, Para graph  5.103  
 
Since the last U.S. Trade Policy Review, the United  States has advanced engagement on digital trade 
issues across a range of fora to ensuring that digital trade benefits people as both workers and 
consumers, and worked to combat a rising tide of barriers to digital trade arou nd the world.  
 
QUESTION 34:  Could the United  States please elaborate or provide examples on how the digital 
trade agreements or related initiatives benefits workers?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  The United  States advances digital trade disciplines and policies that build  trust and 
advance opportunities in the digital economy for workers in the United  States and in foreign markets, 
including in the areas of consumer protection, the protection of personal information, and 
cybersecurity.  
 
PART  III: OTHER  QUESTIONS  
 
1. Chinese  Taipei  regulates the "basic wage" to protect the minimum wage standard of 
workers. Since 2016, Chinese  Taipei  has reviewed the basic wage every year and 
increased it year by year. From 2016 to 1 January  2023, the monthly basic wage was 
adjusted fro m NT$20,008 to NT$26,400, an increase of about 31.9%; the hourly wage 
was adjusted from NT$120 to NT$176, an increase of about 46.7%, in order to protect 
the livelihood of grassroots workers and maintain the real purchasing power of basic living ; 
1. The feder al minimum wage in the U.S. has not been raised for more than 13  years since 
it was increased to USD 7.25 in 2009. However, the living cost has skyrocketed in the past 
two years, and the U.S. is also suffering from the inflation problem. Are there any plan s 
for the U.S. to raise the federal minimum wage in the future to improve the working 
conditions of laborers and maintain the fairness of international trade?  
 
QUESTION 35:  Are there any plans for the United  States to adjust the federal minimum wage?  
 
RESPONSE 35:  The Biden  administration instituted a USD 15 minimum wage for federal contractors 
via an executive order, and President  Biden has called on Congress to use its legislative authority to 
raise the private sector minimum wage to USD 15 as well. See: WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 529 - 
 
  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -releases/2022/01/28/statement -by-
president -joe-biden -on-15-minimum -wage-for-federal -workers -and-contractors -going -into-effect/ . 
Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
Regarding labor rights linked to working hours, Chinese  Taipei 's Labor Standards Act states that the 
daily normal working hours together with extended w orking hours shall in principle not exceed 
12 hours, and the monthly extended working hours shall in principle be limited to a maximum of 
46 hours. In addition, it is clearly stipulated that there is one day off per week and one rest day. 
Except for natural disasters, accidents or emergencies, laborers are prohibited to work the one day 
off. The rules protect labor rights.  
 
QUESTION 36:  Does th e United  States labor law have relevant regulations on the upper limit of 
working (overtime) hours and non -work during one day off per week?  
 
RESPONSE 36:  The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets a weekly maximum of 40  hours for 
covered employees. Hours ex ceeding 40 must be considered overtime. Overtime hours are specified 
to be paid at 50 % above the normal hourly rate.  
 
The FLSA does not limit the number of hours in a day or days in a week an employee may be required 
or scheduled to work, including overtim e hours, if the employee is at least 16  years old.  
 
QUESTION 37:  If not, how does the United  States protect labor rights and avoid overwork?  
 
RESPONSE 37:  The FLSA sets a weekly maximum of 40  hours for covered employees. Hours 
exceeding 40 must be consider ed overtime. Overtime hours are specified to be paid at 50 % above 
the normal hourly rate.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 530 - 
 
  THAILAND  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Page  52, Para graph  2.46  
 
The Secretariat Report indicates that "Other USMCA changes on investment include clarification of 
certain concepts in the sections on MFN, national treatment, and minimum standard of treatment. 
[…]". 
 
QUESTION 1:  Could the U.S. elaborate more on the USMCA changes on the clarification of certain 
concepts in the sections on MFN, national treatment, and minimum standard of treatment?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  With respect to MFN and national treatment, USMCA —like NAFTA —requires each 
Party to accord the investors and covered investments of another Party treatment no less favorable 
than it accords, in like circumstances , to its own investors and their investments (in the case of 
national treatment), or to the investors and  investments of another Party or non -Party (in the case 
of MFN). The USMCA includes further language for greater certainty that whether treatment is 
accorded in "like circumstances" depends on the totality of the circumstances, including whether the 
treatm ent at issue distinguishes between investors or investments based on legitimate public welfare 
objectives.  
 
With respect to the minimum standard of treatment (MST), USMCA —like NAFTA —requires each Party 
to accord covered investments "treatment in accordance  with customary international law ". The 
USMCA clarified that the concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" 
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the minimum standard 
treatment of ali ens under customary international law, and do not create additional substantive 
rights. The USMCA includes further language for greater certainty that the mere fact that a Party 
takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor's e xpectations does not 
constitute a breach of MST, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.  
 
QUESTION 2:  What is the trend that the changes have moved towards?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The United  States considers the above -described additio nal language and 
clarifications in the USMCA to reflect its longstanding positions on the interpretation of MFN, national 
treatment, and MST in its investment agreements.  
 
Page  54, Para graphs  2.50 and 2.52  
 
The Secretariat Report indicates that "2.50. CFIUS is an interagency committee of the Government 
that is authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United  States 
and certain real estate transactions by foreign persons, to determine the effect of such transact ions 
on national security. […] . 
 
2.52. Pursuant to FIRRMA, CFIUS also introduced the concepts of "excepted foreign state", "excepted 
real estate foreign state", "excepted investor", and "excepted real estate investor". Qualification as 
an excepted foreign state requires, inter alia, that the Committee determines that the state has 
established and is effectively utilizing a robust process to assess foreign investments for national 
security risks and to facilitate coordination with the United  States on matter s relating to investment 
security. As of January  2022, CFIUS has identified Australia, Canada, New  Zealand , and the 
United  Kingdom as excepted foreign states. […]" . 
 
QUESTION 3:  How often does the review of "excepted foreign state" is taken place? Could the U.S. 
elaborate more on the requirement for a country to be qualified as "excepted foreign state"?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The terms "excepted foreign state" and "excepted real estate foreign state" are each 
defined by a two -criteria conjunctive test, with d elayed effectiveness for the second criterion. The 
first criterion is identification by the Committee as an eligible foreign state. The second criterion is, 
by the end of the delayed effectiveness period on 13 February  2023, a determination by the 
Committe e: under §  800.1001(a) that the eligible foreign state has established and is effectively 
utilizing a robust process to analyze foreign investments for national security risks and to facilitate 
coordination with the United  States on matters relating to inv estment security (for an excepted WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 531 - 
 
  foreign state); or under §  802.1001(a) that the eligible foreign state has made significant progress 
toward establishing and effectively utilizing the review process and coordination (for an excepted 
real estate foreign st ate). As the excepted foreign state concept has significant implications for the 
national security of the United  States, the Committee continues to identify a limited number of 
eligible foreign states and may expand the list in the future.  
 
These authoriti es, as well as a list of factors that the Committee will generally take into consideration 
when making determinations under §  800.1001(a) and § 802.1001(a), are further reflected in 
regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (31  C.F.R.  Part 800 and 
31 C.F.R.  Part 802) and on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's website at: 
https://h ome.treasury.gov/policy -issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-
the-united -states -cfius/cfius -laws-and-guidance  and https://home.treasury.gov/policy -
issues/international/the -committee -on-foreign -investment -in-the-united -states -cfius/cfius -
excepted -foreign -states . 
 
Page  276, Para graph  4.326  
 
The Secretariat Report indicates that  "[…] In 2019, the United  States initiated several Section  301 
investigations related to the implementation of digital services taxes on U.S. providers by some 
trading partners; in November  2021 the United  States agreed to suspend the proposed application 
of duties to seven trading partners during the interim period before Pillar  1 of the IF is fully 
implemented ". 
 
QUESTION 4:  What are the seven trading partners which the U.S. has agreed to suspend the 
application of investigations related to the implementation of digital services taxes?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  Information on the investigations of the digital services taxes of  Austria, France, 
India, Italy, Spain, T ürkiye , and the United  Kingdom is available on USTR's website at: 
https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/enforcement/section -301-investigations/section -301-digital -services -
taxes . 
 
QUESTION 5:  What are the criteria/thresholds applied in the consideration of which countries to be 
listed under the U.S. Section  301 investigations related to digital services taxes?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  Section  302(b)(1)(A) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Trade Act), authorizes 
the United  States Trade Representative (Trade Representative) to initiate an investigation to 
determine whether an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is actionable under Section  301 of 
the Trade Act. Actionable matters under Section  301 include, inter alia, acts, polices, and practices 
of a foreign country that are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. 
An act, policy, or practice is unreasonable if the act, policy, or practice, while not necessarily in 
violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United  States, is otherwise 
unfair and inequitable. In the Section  301 investigations related to digital services taxes, the U.S. 
determined that the taxes discriminated against U.S. c ompanies, were inconsistent with prevailing 
principles of international taxation, and burdened or restricted U.S. commerce.  
 
QUESTION 6:  What are the next steps to be taken by the U.S. to those countries?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  106, Para graph  3.139  
 
The secretariat report indicates that "On 9  December  2021, the DSB was informed that due to the 
complexity of the dispute and the delays caused by the  global COVID -19 pandemic, the remaining 
panels expected to issue its final report to the parties no earlier than the first half of 2022" . 
 
QUESTION 7:  Please provide an update on the release of the final report issued by the panels.  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Once circulated to WTO  members, the panel reports will become publicly available 
on the following  WTO websites:  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds544_e.h
tm; https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds552_e.htm ; https://www.wto.org/eWT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 532 - 
 
  nglish/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds556_e.htm ; and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_
e/cases_e/ds564_e.htm . 
 
Page  109, Para graph  3.147  
 
The secretariat report indicates th at "The Secretary of Commerce concluded that current quantities 
and circumstances of imports of automobiles and certain automobile parts were weakening the U.S. 
internal economy and threatening to impair national security as set forth in Section  232 and 
recommended negotiating an agreement or imposing tariffs of up to 35%. The President agreed with 
the Secretary's finding and directed the USTR to pursue negotiation of agreements to address the 
threatened national security impairment ". 
 
QUESTION 8:  Please elaborate on the development on this issue since 2019. Specifically, please 
indicate and provide more details whether there have been agreements that have resolved such 
issues.  
 
RESPONSE 8:  On 23 May 2018, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an inve stigation to determine 
the effects on the national security of imports of automobiles, including cars, SUVs, vans and light 
trucks, and automotive parts. This investigation was initiated under Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. On 17 February  2019, the Department of Commerce 
transmitted a report summarizing its findings and recommendations to the President. A public 
version of this report was published in July  2021.  In May  2019, President  Trump concurred with the 
Secretary's finding s and directed the United  States Trade Representative to pursue negotiation of 
agreements to address the threatened impairment of the national security. The President has not 
taken any other action under Section  232 to address the threat identified in the report.  
 
Page  216, Para graph  4.102  
 
The secretariat report indicates that there is Regulation for fish or the national shellfish Sanitation 
Program (NSSP) for bivalves and FDA has recently proposed a new rule that would require 
traceability for certain fish product, i.e.  finfish, crustacean, mollusks . 
 
QUESTION 9:  What are the benefits of the new rule and what are additional requirements that 
exporters have to follow?  
 
RESPONSE 9: The FDA final rule on Requirements for Additional Traceability Records for Certain 
Foods (Food Traceability Final Rule) establishes traceability recordkeeping requirements, beyond 
those in existing regulations, for persons who manufacture, process, pack, or hold foods included 
on the Food Traceability Lis t (FTL), which includes fresh and frozen finfish, crustaceans and bivalve 
molluscan shellfish, as well as refrigerated and frozen smoked finfish. The requirements in the final 
rule apply to all entities, domestic and foreign, that manufacture, process, pac k, or hold foods on 
the FTL (unless an exemption applies). At the core of this rule is a requirement that persons subject 
to the rule maintain records containing Key Data Elements (KDEs) associated with specific Critical 
Tracking Events (CTEs); and provide  information to the FDA within 24  hours or within some 
reasonable time to which the FDA has agreed. The new requirements identified in the final rule will 
allow for faster identification and rapid removal of potentially contaminated food from the market, 
resulting in fewer foodborne illnesses and/or deaths.  
 
Page  216, Para graph  4.103  
 
The secretariat report indicates that AD duties are applied on frozen warm -water shrimp and prawns 
from China, India, Thailand and Viet  Nam. 
 
QUESTION 10:  Could the United  States please disclose the rates of AD duties that apply on the 
frozen warm -water shrimp and prawns and what is the trend in the future?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The determinations for each segment of the proceedings related to frozen 
warm -water shrimp and pra wns are available at the U.S. Department of Commerce's website  at: 
https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . Regarding trends in the future, the United  States reminds 
Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 533 - 
 
  Page  218, Para graph  4.110  
 
The secretariat report indicates that the United  States has worked domestically and internationally 
to promote sustainable fisheries and the inclusion in FTAs of provisions to deal with IUU fishing.  
 
QUESTION 11:  Please indicate whether or not the United  States' future FTAs; for example, that 
with ASEAN, would also include provisions on combating IUU fishing?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  While the United  States is not currently negotiating FTAs with ASEAN, the 
United  States continues to work with trading partners on issues such as combatting IUU fishing and 
to support mutually supportive trade and environmental policies that encourage high levels of 
environmental protection and effective enforcement of environme ntal laws, including fisheries laws.  
 
Page  232, Para graph  4.161  
 
The measures taken worldwide to the counter the COVID -19 pandemic caused disruptions in the 
supply chains of several U.S. (sub) sectors operating under a just -in-time logistic. Disruptions in  the 
production and delivery of semiconductors created problems for several domestic manufacturing 
activities, including vehicles, medical devices, and other products in 2021. Lawmakers enacted the 
Creating Helpful Incentives To Produce Semiconductors For America Act, or CHIPS for America Act, 
Title XCIX of the William  M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021, which authorizes USDOC, to award financial assistance to private entities or 
public -private consortia to finance, construct, expand, or modernize facilities to support the 
fabrication; assembly, test, and packaging; and advanced packaging of semiconductors. However, 
the Act does not appropriate funding for the law.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Please provide more detail on the financial assistance that may be offered to private 
entities or public -private sectors under the "CHIPS for America Act"?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The CHIPS Act appropriates USD 39 billion  for financial incentives to eligible entities 
to invest in facilities and equi pment in the United  States for the fabrication, assembly, testing, 
advanced packaging, production, or research and development (R&D) of semiconductors, materials 
used to manufacture semiconductors, or semiconductor manufacturing equipment.  
 
The CHIPS Act a lso appropriates USD 11 billion  for research and prototyping of advanced 
semiconductor technology; to establish a National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program; to 
establish one or more Manufacturing USA institute(s) to advance research and commerciali zation of 
semiconductor manufacturing technologies and to create an R&D program to advance measurement 
science, standards, material characterization, instrumentation, testing, and manufacturing 
capabilities.  
 
QUESTION 13:  How would the United  States ensure that the financial assistance under the 
concerned Act is consistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and wi th U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement s. 
 
Context: Para.  3.71 (fn . 106) – Title V of the TPEA, known as the American Trade Enforcement 
Effectiveness Act, introduced, among others, amendments to the provisions addressing information 
that may be used as facts otherwise available in an AD or CVD proceeding, as well as certain aspects 
pertaining to determinations of ''material injury'' or "threat of material injury". It also modified the 
definition of ''ordinary course of trade'' and the provisions governing the treatment of a ''particular 
market situation (PMS)'' in AD proceedings. (Page  81). 
 
QUESTION 14:  Please explain how the United  States' implementation of the cost -based particular 
market situation ("PMS") provision accords with Article  2.2 of the AD  Agreement. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce recently announced proposed rulemaking relating to the PMS provision 
introduced under the TPEA, to clarify the factors it will consider in determining the existence of a 
PMS. See Determining the Existence o f a Particular Market Situation That Distorts Costs of 
Production, 87  Fed. Reg. 69,234 (Dep't Commerce 18 November  2022). In the absence of such a 
rule, please explain which market factors the Department would, or would not, consider as 
contributing to a P MS during the period under review.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 534 - 
 
  RESPONSE 14:  The United  States conducts its proceedings in accordance with its international 
obligations, including the Agreement on the Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. The base s for findings of a particular market situation are case -specific and 
based on the facts and circumstances on the administrative record in a specific segment of a 
proceeding. The determinations for each segment of a proceeding can be found on the U.S. 
Department of Commerce's website  at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
Context: Para.  3.119 – As of February  2022, CBP, through TRLED, had made a final determination 
in 51 [EAPA] cases, 1 of them involving 8  investigations (Table  3.19). CBP made 45  affirmative 
determinations of evasion and 5  negative determinations; one case was referred to USDOC because 
CBP could not make a determination, and USDOC made an affirmative determination of evasion. 
The products for which evasion was found were, to a large extent, steel products, but also aluminum 
products, plywood, furniture, glycine, hydrofluorocarbon blends, paper, hangers, garlic, pencils, 
xanthan gum, and polyethylene retail carrier bags. (Page  98). 
 
QUESTION 15:  Our understanding is that in EAPA investigations, the U.S. Government will conduct 
an initial investigation without providing notice to the affected parties, and on the basis of such 
investigation may impose interim measures. Please explain how the imposition of such measures 
without notice to the affected parties and without any opportunity to comment accords with the 
United  States' obligations under the AD  Agreement.  
 
RESPONSE 15:  The United  States will initiate an EAPA investigation based on an allegation if there 
is a reasonable suspicion of evasion. During the initial, internal investigation, the United  States 
collects sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an EAPA investigation and provides a public 
notice and explanation of th e interim measures determination. Additionally, during the initial 
investigation, the United  States may gather additional evidence as needed.  
 
QUESTION 16:  According to Table  3.14, EAPA investigations are typically concluded within one year 
of initiation. However, a review of the EAPA investigations listed in Table  3.19 reveals that for certain 
of the proceedings, including those involving Thailand (e.g.  Diamond Sawblades from China), the 
date of final determination follows up to three years following initiation. Please explain how this 
timeline  - during which interim measures may be imposed, with significant commercial implications 
for exporters and importers  - accords with the United  States' obligations under the AD  Agreement.  
 
RESPONSE  16: There are no timeline obligations under the AD  Agreement pertaining to evasion of 
antidumping duties. The antidumping duty order is in place pursuant to findings of injurious dumping 
(or threat thereof) on imports from a specific country. An EAPA investiga tion determines whether or 
not imports from a specific country are evading an existing antidumping duty order of a specific 
country. In other words, the order is already in place. Therefore, the timeline obligations under the 
AD agreement do not apply.  
 
QUESTION 17:  Please explain how the reviewing courts (e.g.  the U.S. Court of International Trade) 
have treated EAPA determinations. Has CBP modified or calibrated the criteria it considers in 
determining whether evasion has taken place, in response to an adv erse ruling on appeal or 
otherwise?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Findings of the U.S. Court of International Trade, and CBP's response to remand 
determinations  regarding  the same,  can be found  on the court's  website  at: https://www.cit.uscou
rts.gov/ . 
 
Page  124, Para graph  3.195  
 
The Secretariat report indicates that "In principle, the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee 
(TPCC) is required to publish an annual National Export Strategy document. However, the last such 
report was issued in December  2016". 
 
QUESTION 18:  Why has the U.S. refrained from publishing the annual National Export Strategy 
document  since 2017?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  Trade  promotion  priorities  and activities  were not substantially  changed  in the years  
following  the publication  of the 2016 National  Export  Strategy,  so it was not necessary  to release  an 
updated  strategy.  Economic  conditions  substantially  changed  during  the pandemic,  which  has WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 535 - 
 
  necessitated  reviewing  trade promotion  priorities,  and a new National  Export  Strategy  is currently  
under  development.  It is expected  to be publicly  released  in 2023.  
 
QUESTION  19: Are there  National  Export  Strategies/Plans  at the present  time?  If so, please  provide  
details.  
 
RESPONSE  19: A National  Export  Strategy  is currently  under  development.  The National  Export  
Strategy  will include  sector -specific  plans  to help the recovery  of industries  that were significantly  
impacted  by the COVID -19 pandemic,  such as travel  and tourism  and international  education.  The 
National  Export  Strategy  will also focus  on positioning  the U.S. clean technology  sector  to help 
address  the global  climate  crisis.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  20, Para graph  5.31 
 
The Government report indicates that "In January  2022, the United  States announced that it will 
develop its first -ever focused trade strategy to combat forced labor. The development of this strategy 
includes a thorough, interagency review of existing trade policies and tools used to combat forced 
labor, including forced child labor, to determine areas that may need st rengthening and gaps that 
need to be filled ". 
 
QUESTION 20:  Could the United  States please provide the update and details on the trade strategy 
to combat forced labor which is a part of the National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking 
including, if pos sible, the date of which the strategy is expected to be completed?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  The focused trade strategy to combat forced labor will lay out the U.S. government's 
trade approach to addressing forced labor in global supply chains.  Work to develop the str ategy is 
ongoing. The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
Context: Para.  5.5 – These [WTO] reform conversations will take time. The United  States recognizes 
the importance of holding open and inclusive refo rm conversations that promote equity and fairness 
among all WTO  Members. Meanwhile, the United  States will continue to work constructively with 
other Members to deliver results on achievable outcomes at the WTO. (Page  16). 
 
QUESTION 21:  Thailand considers that the reform efforts must be pursued with urgency in order 
to strengthen the WTO and the multilateral trading system, and that restoring a fully functioning 
Dispute Settlement System is a priority.  
 
Does the United  States share this sense of urgency, and if  so, what does it consider can be done to 
speed up the discussions and negotiations on these matters among WTO  Members?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  It was a noteworthy success that all WTO  Members acknowledged the need for 
WTO reform at the 12th Ministerial  Conference in June. This sent a positive signal that Members are 
committed to change. In this regard, we are both committed and optimistic about future work on 
WTO reforms. We believe that Members need to come up with ideas and harvest them as they are 
ready. In our view, an open and inclusive process is needed to encourage Members to bring new 
ideas and energy to reform discussions.  This should be a bottom -up, Member -driven process.  
 
Context: Para.  5.20 – To address these concerns [relating to non-market policies and practices], the 
United  States is considering all existing tools  – and will potentially seek new ones as needed  – to 
combat the harms of non -market policies and practices. Critically, we are bringing renewed focus to 
engagement with our partners and allies, who also suffer harm from non -market policies and 
practices. We share values and an essential interest in fair, market -based competition. The ability 
to defend against non -market policies and practices requires that market economies act in concert 
to confront policies and practices that are fundamentally at odds with a global trading system based 
on market competition. The United  States promotes cooperation to tackle harmful non -market 
policies and practices through bilatera l, plurilateral, and multilateral vehicles including relevant 
WTO committees, G7, G20, and other for a; existing trade agreements and frameworks; and new 
initiatives. (Page  18). 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 536 - 
 
  QUESTION 22:  Does the United  States consider that WTO  Members are equipped wi th adequate 
means to address non -market policies and practices under existing WTO  rules; and if not, could it 
indicate what further initiatives it considers might be necessary to reinforce those rules?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The United  States considers that it is i mportant to address the global challenges 
posed by harmful non -market policies and practices, a task which involves evaluating whether 
existing tools and rules are adequate and where further work, including relevant initiatives, is needed 
to address such p olicies and practices.  
 
Context: Para.  5.92 – The United  States will use [the lndo -Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity 
("IPEF")] to address a range of important areas of economic cooperation, including: trade; supply 
chains; clean energy, decarboniza tion, and infrastructure; and tax and anti -corruption. USTR will 
lead efforts to craft a trade arrangement that includes high -standard commitments in the following 
areas: labor; environment; digital and emerging technology; agriculture; transparency and good 
regulatory practices; competition policy; and trade facilitation. The U.S. Department of Commerce 
will lead U.S. efforts to expand cooperation on supply chains; clean energy, decarbonization, and 
infrastructure; and tax and anti -corruption. (Page  28). 
 
QUESTION 23:  Please describe the United  States' IPEF targets related to labor and environment, 
as compared to those negotiated in the Trans -Pacific Partnership (and now included in the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership).  
 
RESPONSE 23:  In September  2022, IPEF Partners released Ministerial Statements on all four IPEF 
pillars.  The Trade Pillar statement includes an overview of our intention for future labor negotiations.  
Please see here for more informatio n: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2022 -
09/IPEF%20Pillar%201%20Ministerial%20Text%20(Trade%20Pillar )_FOR%20PUBLIC%20RELEAS
E%20(1).pdf . Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Context: Para.  7.3 – In April  2020, the United  States suspended USD  1.3 billion  of Thailand's GSP 
benefits for failure to comply with GSP worker rights criteria; in December  2020, the U.S. suspended 
an additional USD  817 million  for failure to provide equitable and reasonable market access for U.S. 
pork products. (Page  34). 
 
QUESTION  24: Please provide an update regarding any ongoing or planned review/reconsideration 
of Thailand's GSP eligibility, in particular with respect to worker rights and market access criteria.  
 
RESPONSE 24:  Following any reauthorization of GSP by the U.S. Cong ress, USTR and the 
Interagency GSP Subcommittee will begin its triennial assessment of beneficiary countries' 
compliance with all GSP criteria, including any new criteria added by the U.S. Congress.  
 
Context: Para.  5.72 – The United  States is looking forwa rd to hosting APEC in 2023, underscoring 
our commitment to advance fair and open trade and investment, bolster American competitiveness, 
and ensure a free and open Indo -Pacific. (Page  25). 
 
QUESTION 25:  On 19 November  2022 in Bangkok, Thailand's Prime Minister Prayut Chan -o-cha 
symbolically passed the APEC chairmanship to U.S.  Vice President  Kamala  Harris.  
 
Please (1)  characterize the United  States' current adherence to the objectives enumerated in the 
recently -adopted Bangkok Goals on the Bio -Circular -Green (BCG) Economy . 
 
RESPONSE 25:  The United  States looks forward to using its APEC host year to build on Thailand's 
successful host year and advance work in APEC in support of the Bangkok Goals on the 
Bio-Circular -Green Economy.  
 
QUESTION 26:  And (2)  provide details regarding the United  States' priorities for its 2023 chair 
year, particularly as related to sustainable and inclusive development in the Indo -Pacific region.  
 
RESPONSE 26:  The U.S. host year will focus on the cross -cutting concepts of "resi liency ", 
"sustainability ", and "inclusivity ". These three factors directly impact APEC's economic drivers and 
are necessary to advance economic prosperity across the APEC region. In 2020, APEC Leaders 
endorsed the APEC Putrajaya Vision 2040 (PV 2040), whic h reflects our joint vision for an "open, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 537 - 
 
  dynamic, resilient and peaceful Asia -Pacific community by 2040, for the prosperity of all our people 
and future generations ". As APEC host in 2023, the United  States will continue to advance this vision 
through our  three streams of policy priorities:  Interconnected. Innovative. Inclusive. These priorities 
align with the PV 2040's three drivers of inclusive growth  - trade and investment; innovation and 
digitalization; and strong, balanced, secure, sustainable, and in clusive growth  - and will help 
implement the Aotearoa Plan of Action.  
 
 
THAILAND  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
Part I: Questions Regarding the report by WTO Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
Topic: Intellectual Property Rights  
 
Question 1: Special 301 (Page  185,  Paragraph  3.401)  
 
Background: The Secretariat report indicates that "USTR identified a range of concerns, including: 
… (vii)  other ongoing, systemic issues regarding IP protection and enforcement, as well as market 
access, in many trading partne rs around the world".  
 
QUESTION 1 : Please elaborate on other ongoing, systemic issues regarding IP protection and 
enforcement and give examples of the USTR's concerns as set forth in 3.401 (vii). Please also provide 
suggestions as to the adequate and effec tive nature of IP protection to that cases.  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Section  I of the Special 301 Report discusses global trends and issues in IP protection 
and enforcement and related market access that the U.S. Government works to address on a daily 
basis. Section  II of the Special 301 report includes descriptions of issues of concern with respect to 
particular trading partners.  
 
Question 2: Special 301 (Page  185,  Paragraph  3.401)  
 
Background:  The Secretariat report indicates that "The 2021 Special 301 report identif ied 
32 trading partners as failing to provide adequate and effective IP protection, and fair and equitable 
market access to persons that rely on such protection".  
 
QUESTION 2:  Please explain more about how the United  States considers countries have provide d 
adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  The Special  301 listings and actions announced in the Special  301 Report are the 
result of intensive deliberations among all relevant agencies within the U.S. Government, informed 
by exte nsive consultations with participating stakeholders, foreign governments, the U.S. Congress, 
and other interested parties.  
 
USTR, together with the Special  301 Subcommittee of the TPSC, conducts a broad and balanced 
assessment of U.S. trading partners' IP protection and enforcement, as well as related market access 
issues affecting IP -intensive industries, in accordance with the statutory criteria. The Special  301 
Subcommittee, through the TPSC, provides advice on country placement to USTR based on this 
assessment. This assessment is conducted on a case -by-case basis, taking into account diverse 
factors such as a trading partner's level of development, its international obligations and 
commitments, the concerns of right holders and other interested parties, and the trade and 
investment policies of the United  States. It is informed by the various cross -cutting issues and trends 
identified in Section  I of the Special 301 Report. Each assessment is based upon the specific facts 
and circumstances that shape IP pr otection and enforcement in a particular trading partner.  
 
Question 3: Special 301 (Page  185, Paragraph  3.401)  
 
Background: The Secretariat report indicates that "No trading partner was identified as a PFC as a 
result of the review. Nine trading partners were placed on the Priority Watch List556, and 23 on the 
Watch List557". 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  Question 3:  Please share any action plan, work plan, or measure that Kuwait; Lebanon; and 
Romania have taken resulting in their removal from WL in The 2022 Special  301 Report. 
Furthermore, what are the factors that the USTR considers adequate and effective IP protection.  
 
RESPONSE 3:  See Response  2. 
 
Kuwait made continued and significant progress on concerns that stakeholders identified with 
intellectual property (IP) en forcement and transparency. For example, the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (MOCI) and the Copyright Office each created online portals for streamlining the 
submission of trademark and copyright violation reports, respectively. Kuwait also increased 
engagement and transparency through meetings of the United  States -Kuwait Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA) Intellectual Property Working Group. Kuwait plans to continue 
improving its IP enforcement systems by providing specialized training for i ts investigators, 
prosecutors, and judiciary; by conducting IP -focused public awareness campaigns; and by linking 
information between the MOCI Trademarks and Patents Department and the Kuwait General 
Administration for Customs Intellectual Property Rights Unit. 
 
Stakeholders have not raised significant concerns about IP protection or enforcement in Lebanon 
during the Special 301 review. The United  States will continue to monitor Lebanon's IP protection 
and enforcement regime, including the ratification and implementation of international IP treaties.  
 
Romania took significant actions to improve IP protection and enforcement. In January  2022, 
Romania appointed its first -ever national IP enforcement coordinator, who has been charged with 
developing a national IP strategy and coordinating interagency efforts. Romania has also taken other 
actions to improve efforts to investigate and prosecute IP crime. For example, last year, the 
economic police established a new department dedicated to online piracy cases and a lso dedicated 
a minimum of two additional officers per county to IP investigations. Moreover, the General 
Prosecutor Office's Intellectual Property Coordination Department resumed coordination of IP 
working group sessions, holding meetings last year with r epresentatives of different ministries 
involved in IP as well as private sector representatives. The United  States will continue to monitor 
Romania's efforts to finalize a national IP strategy, to implement that strategy, and to take specific 
actions to pr ioritize IP protection and enforcement.  
 
Topic: Trade Policies by Sector  
Question 4: Main Features ( Page 189, Paragraph  4.7) 
 
Background: As in other countries, U.S. farmers may experience revenue stress due to natural 
disasters, market disruptions, and ot her events. Most current U.S. farm support programs are 
designed to help mitigate risk and provide a safety net when prices or revenue fall, or when 
producers experience crop or livestock losses. Support does not cover all losses, and agricultural 
producer s bear some of the risk and costs.  
 
QUESTION 4:  According to paragraph  4.7 of the WTO Secretariat Report, U.S. farm support 
programs, could U.S please provide explanations on how U.S. farm support programs are designed 
to help mitigate risk and provide a s afety net when prices of agricultural goods or farmer's revenue 
fall? 
 
RESPONSE 4:  U.S. farm programs help U.S. producers mitigate risk, recover losses from natural 
disasters, and provide an income safety net. Examples of these voluntary programs include F ederal 
crop insurance, natural disaster assistance, Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC), and Agriculture Risk 
Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC). The Federal crop insurance program helps farmers 
purchase crop insurance products that cover a broad range o f products and types of losses, while 
natural disaster relief is targeted at specific types of weather -related events. DMC provides dairy 
operations with margin protection, while ARC and PLC provide income support when farm prices or 
revenue fall below a c ertain level.  
 
Question 5: Manufacturing (page 229, paragraph 4.150)  
 
Background: The Secretariat report indicated that "During the review period, authorities actively 
sought to foster the development of the manufacturing sector in the United  States throug h policies 
oriented in different areas, such as intensifying regional trade integration, COVID -19-related policy 
responses facilitating the vaccines' development, strengthening the domestic resilience of supply WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  chains in pharmaceuticals and semi -conductors , incentives to advance manufacturing, domestic 
purchase programs including for government procurement, and other measures covered in other 
sections of this report".  
 
QUESTION 5:  Could the United  States please give some examples on projects or measures und er 
domestic purchase programs as well as domestic goods or products in which the U.S. provide special 
support?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The Federal government is a major buyer in a number of markets for goods and 
services, including the single largest purchaser of consumer goods in the world. Leveraging that 
purchasing power to shape markets and accelerate innovation is a key part of the Administration's 
strategy to grow the industries of the future to support U.S. workers, communities, and firms. As 
the pandemic has demonstrated, federal procurement can strengthen the resiliency of domestic 
supply chains, and reduce the risk of Americans being adversely impacted by the actions of 
competitor nations during a time of crisis. For more information, please s ee the Fact Sheet on the 
Proposed Buy American rule, available at:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing -room/statements -
releases/2021/07/28/fact -sheet -biden -harris -administration -issues -proposed -buy-american -rule-
advancing -the-presidents -commi tment -to-ensuring -the-future -of-america -is-made -in-america -by-
all-of-americas/ . 
 
Question 6: Manufacturing (page 229, paragraph 4.151)  
 
Background: The Secretariat report indicated that "The USMCA aims to reinforce economic 
interlinkages between signatorie s, particularly in motor vehicles (Section  2.3.2). For automotive 
goods, it raises the regional value content requirements to 75% (up from 62.5% under NAFTA), 
imposes mandatory production of core parts in the region, and requires steel and aluminum 
purchas es within the region of at least 70% for car manufacturers, among other measures".  
 
QUESTION 6:  Under paragraph  4.151 specified that the USMCA imposes mandatory production of 
core parts in the region, and requires steel and aluminum purchases within the re gion of at least 
70% for car manufacturers, among other measures. Could the United  States please give some 
examples about what kind of others measures to be applied in order to achieve the above -mentioned 
mandatory production beside raising the RVC and ste el and aluminum purchases requirement on 
automotive goods production under the USMCA?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  The USMCA contains new rules of origin for motor vehicles, which require a specific 
amount of North American content in the final vehicle in order to qualify  for duty -free treatment 
under the USMCA. In addition to the increase in the RVC, core parts, and the steel and aluminum 
requirements already cited, the USMCA introduced a new labor value content (LVC) rule that requires 
that a certain percentage of qualif ying vehicles be produced by employees making an average of 
USD 16 per hour.  
 
Collectively, these new requirements incentivize increased investment in auto and automotive parts 
production within North America. The USMCA also eliminated the NAFTA "deeming" rule whereby 
any auto part that was not specifically identified on a list created at the time the NAFTA was 
negotiated (in the early 1990s) was "deemed" to be originating in North America, regardless of 
where it was actually produced.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  TÜRKIYE  
PART  I: REGARDING  THE SECRETARIAT  REPORT  (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
4.4.5 E -commerce, 4.310, page 273  
 
On page 273 of the Secretariat Report, it is stated that "The enforcement authority of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) over unfair and deceptive practices in commerce extends to various aspects 
of electronic transactions such as online advertising, mobi le and in -app payments, online medical 
claims, and consumer privacy. Regarding e -commerce activities, in 2020 and 2021, the FTC 
conducted 24  enforcement actions for alleged unfair or deceptive privacy and data security practices. 
The Restore Online Shopper s' Confidence Act (P.L.  111-345) bans certain online negative option 
features358 unless sellers make appropriate disclosures, get proper consent, and provide simple 
ways to stop recurring charges. The FTC also takes actions to counter misleading online 
advertisements on the basis of regulations governing conventional advertisements. Commercial 
messaging through email, not only bulk emails, must comply with requirements established by the 
CAN-SPAM Act359, including providing an opt -out option; violations may  carry penalties and they 
can amount up to USD  46,517 for each separate non -complying email" . 
 
Question 1 : Could United  States give further information regarding The Restore Online Shopper' 
Confidence Act in terms of the enforcement authority of the Federa l Trade Commission (FTC) over 
unfair and deceptive practices in commerce?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  
 
The FTC Act  
The FTC derives its general enforcement authority in consumer protection matters from Section  5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits ''unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce". Under this general authority, the FTC has brought many 
enforcement actions in the context of negative options. For example, the FTC filed a complaint in 
Federal court aga inst DIRECTV, the country's largest provider of satellite television services, alleging 
that the company violated the FTC Act by deceptively advertising discounted monthly prices while 
failing to tell consumers about a two -year contract obligation with a s ignificant price increase in the 
second year and hefty cancellation fees if consumers cancel the package before the end of the 
two-year period. See Press Release, "FTC Charges DIRECTV with Deceptively Advertising the Cost 
of 
Its Satellite  Television  Service"  (Mar.  2015)  available  at: https://www.ftc.gov/news -events/news/p
ress-releases/2015/03/ftc -charges -directv -deceptively -advertising -cost-its-satellite -television -
service . The FTC also maintained that the company failed to disclose that its offer  of free premium 
channels for three months in fact constituted a deceptive negative option continuity plan in that it 
required consumers to proactively cancel to avoid automatic charges on their credit or debit cards.  
 
The FTC also relies on specific statu tes to bring enforcement actions against deceptive negative 
option marketing practices, including: the Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence Act (ROSCA), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 8401 -8405), the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310, the Use of Prenotification of 
Negative Plans Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 425, the Postal Reorganization Act (also known as the Unordered 
Merchandise Rule), 39 U.S.C. § 3009, and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1693-1693r.  
 
FTC Policy Statement on Negative Options  
In 2021, the FTC issued an enforcement policy statement explaining its approach to negative options 
and outlining its interpretation of various statutes and FTC regulations that apply to negative option 
marketing.  See: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1598063/negativ
e_option_policy_statement -10-22-2021-tobureau.pdf . In the Policy Statement, the FTC indicate s 
that " [n]egative option offers come in a variety of forms, but all share a central feature: each 
contains a term or condition under which the seller may interpret a consumer's silence or failure to 
take affirmative action to reject a good or service or t o cancel the agreement as acceptance or 
continuing acceptance of the offer". The Policy Statement explains that negative option offers can 
take the form of agreements or subscriptions that automatically renew, continuity plans (where a 
consumer agrees in a dvance to receive goods or services periodically), or free trial marketing (where 
a consumer receives goods or services for free or for a nominal price for a limited time period). The 
Policy Statement provides guidance as to the type of information that is  considered material to WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  negative options, such as dates for charges and deadlines for cancellations, and explains how 
companies can comply with the obligation to make disclosures "clear and conspicuous". The Policy 
Statement also provides examples of clear  and simple mechanisms for cancellation.  
 
ROSCA  
The Policy Statement also provides details regarding the obligations of businesses under the Restore 
Online Shoppers' Confidence Act (ROSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 8401 -8405. Enacted by Congress in 2010, 
ROSCA prohibi ts charging or attempting to charge consumers for goods or services sold on the 
internet through any negative option feature unless the marketer: (1)  Clearly and conspicuously 
discloses all material terms of the transaction before obtaining the consumer's billing information; 
(2) obtains a consumer's express informed consent before charging the consumer's account; and 
(3) provides simple mechanisms for the consumer to stop recurring charges.  
 
ROSCA also addresses offers made by, or on behalf of, third -party sellers during, or immediately 
following, a transaction with an initial merchant. Specifically, ROSCA prohibits post -transaction, 
third-party sellers from charging or attempting to charge consumers unless the seller: (1)  Before 
obtaining billing informati on, clearly and conspicuously discloses the offer's material terms; and 
(2) receives the consumer's express informed consent by obtaining the consumer's name, address, 
contact information, as well as the full account number to be charged, and requiring the  consumer 
to perform an additional affirmative action indicating consent. ROSCA also prohibits initial merchants 
from disclosing billing information to any post -transaction third -party seller for use in any 
internet -based sale of goods or services.  
 
Furthe rmore, the statute provides that a violation of ROSCA constitutes a violation of a Commission 
trade regulation rule under Section  18 of the FTC Act. Thus, the Commission may seek a variety of 
remedies for violations of ROSCA, including civil penalties unde r Section  5(m)(1)(A) of the FTC  Act; 
injunctive relief under Section  13(b) of the FTC  Act; and consumer redress, such as damages, and 
other relief under Section  19 of the FTC  Act. 
 
3. Trade Policies and Practices by Measure  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
Page 106, 3.138  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that "The additional tariffs were applied to Canada, Mexico, and 
the European  Union as from 1  June 2018. In 2018, the European  Union, Canada, Mexico, China, 
India, the Russian  Federa tion, Türkiye, Norway, and Switzerland requested WTO  DSB consultations 
with the United  States regarding the U.S. duties on certain imported steel and aluminum products 
and requested the establishment of a panel. Subsequently, the DSB established a panel fo r each of 
the nine disputes. In 2019, the disputes with Canada and Mexico were terminated after the parties 
notified that they had reached a mutually agreed solution. In 2021, the dispute with the 
European  Union was terminated. For the remaining disputes, on 4 February  2021, the Chair of the 
Panel informed the DSB that due to delays caused by the COVID -19 pandemic, the Panel expected 
to issue its final report no earlier than the second half of 2021".  
 
Question 2:  Considering that a lot of countries challeng ed U.S.' policies towards steel and aluminum 
sectors because of their protectionist nature and selective application, could the U.S. elaborate on 
its future plans towards these sectors?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members  that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
Question 3:  When does the U.S. plan to notify the WTO  Committee on Market Access (CMA) the 
tariff rate quotas imposed on steel and/or aluminum products from the EU, Japan and the UK which 
were previo usly subject to higher tariffs under Section  232? 
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
Question 4:  In what way, if any, these measures differ from previous tariff rate quotas received by 
Korea; Argentina and Brazil; which were notified to the WTO  CMA in scope of the US's notifications 
on quantitative restrictions (G/MA/QR/N/USA/4, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5)?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 542 - 
 
  RESPONSE 4:  In Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States) and Proclamation 9704 of 8  March  2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the 
United  States), the President concurred with the Secretary's national security findings and decided 
to adjust the imports of steel and aluminum articles by imposing a 25% ad valorem  tariff on imports 
of steel articles and imposing a 10% ad valorem  tariff on imports of aluminum articles, so that such 
imports will not threaten to impair the U.S. national security. The proclamations also stated that any 
country with which the United  States has a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the 
United  States alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused 
by imports from that country. Should the United  States and any such country arrive at a satisfactory 
alternative means to address the threat to the national security such that the President determines 
that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, the President may 
remove or modify the restriction on s uch imports from that country and, if necessary, make any 
corresponding adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries as U.S. national security 
interests require.  
 
The President determined that, in his judgment, the arrangements reached with the EU, Japan, and 
the UK will provide an effective, long -term alternative means to address any contribution by EU, 
Japanese, and UK steel articles and EU and UK aluminum articles imports to the threatened 
impairment to the national security of the Un ited States.  
 
3. Trade Policies and Practices by Measure  
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures  
Page 81  
Modifications and Additions in Title 19 of The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)  
 
Modifications in 19 CFR 351.502, which addresses sp ecificity of domestic subsidies . 
Addition of 19 CFR 351.528, to govern the determinations of undervaluation and benefit when 
examining potential subsidies resulting from the exchange of an undervalued currency.  
 
Question 5:  Could the USA explain how it app lies the modifications/additions in its Regulation 
(19 CFR 351) regarding determining the exchange of an undervalued currency as a potential 
subsidy, while:  
 
• Currency undervaluation and exchanges of currency do not constitute financial 
contributions  under Article  1.1(a)(1) of the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement);  
• Currency undervaluation and exchanges of currency are all -encompassing and broadly 
available throughout the economy and cannot be deemed specific  under Article  2.1 of the 
SCM Agreement;  
• There is a disagreement among many economists about the countries' ability to 
manipulate their currencies and what is the best model for estimating currency 
undervaluation, therefore there is not an objective and cl ear criterion in measuring the 
benefit?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The United  States addressed these and similar comments from WTO  Member 
governments and the public in the Federal Register  notice included in the United  States' notification 
of this regulation to the Subs idies Committee ("Modification of Regulations Regarding Benefit and 
Specificity in Countervailing Duty Proceedings"). That notification can be found on the WTO  website 
under document symbol G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.31.  
 
 
TÜRKIYE  – ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports , page 74, 3.51  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that ''The MPF continues to be applied on formal and informal 
imports to offset CBP commercial operations (19 C.F.R. 24.23(c)). The main fee on formal entries 
remained the same over the review period although the mini mum and maximum thresholds on how 
it is applied increased five times, in January  2018, October  2018, October  2019, October  2020, and 
October  2021. For formal entries, the ad valorem  fee of 0.3464% is applied on the basis of customs WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  value, f.o.b., subject t o a minimum value of USD  27.75 and a maximum cap of USD  528.40 as of 
October  2021.65 Informal entries, i.e. by air, ship, and international mail, are subject to a set fee 
of USD  2.22, USD  6.66, or USD  9.99 per shipment. Many preferential imports are genera lly exempt 
from the MPF.66 Following the FAST  Act of 2015 (P.L.  114-94), the MPF and COBRA fees are adjusted 
each year by the Treasury Secretary to reflect inflation".  
 
QUESTION 1:  Could the United  States provide with detailed information about the legal basis of 
Merchandise Processing Fee on imports and inform whether and when this implementation will cease 
to apply?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The Merchandise Processing Fee is provided for by th e Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, as amended by the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act 
(FAST Act) of 2015.  
 
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing , page 79, 3.64  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Repo rt that ''In October  2021, the United  States and the 
European  Union issued a joint statement announcing, inter alia, that they were resolved to negotiate 
future arrangements for trade in steel and aluminum that take account of both global non -market 
excess  capacity and the carbon intensity of these industries (Section  2.3.3). Thus, steel and 
aluminum Section  232 tariffs were replaced with a TRQ for EU imports as of 1  January  2022 with 
volumes based on historical trade levels. Absolute quotas on certain stee l products from Argentina, 
Brazil, and the Republic  of Korea and aluminum products from Argentina have been applied since 
mid-2018 pursuant to several Presidential Proclamations. These quotas are set out by product 
subheadings in Chapter  99 of the HTSUS" . 
 
QUESTION 2:  Could the United  States provide with detailed information about the legal basis of 
taking account of the carbon intensity of these industries which affects adversely the imports of steel 
and aluminum and further explain this from the perspecti ve of multilaterally accepted environmental 
principles and the WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 2: Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Re views 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.1.7 Other measures affecting imports , page 107, 3.141  
 
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that ''On 31  October  2021, the United  States and the 
European  Union issued a joint statement with respect to the steel and a luminum tariffs. In the 
statement, both parties express their joint desire to address non -market excess capacity so as to 
preserve their critical steel and aluminum industries, and agree to ongoing cooperation, and promote 
arrangements to address global no n-market excess capacity as well as the carbon intensity of the 
industries. They also agreed to terminate their DSB disputes.218 As noted in Box  3.2, as part of the 
arrangement, the United  States and the European  Union intend to negotiate for the first tim e, a 
global arrangement to address carbon intensity and global overcapacity. As a result of the 
arrangement, the United  States will allow historically based volumes of EU steel and aluminum 
products to enter the United  States without Section  232 duties and  the European  Union will suspend 
related tariffs on U.S. products. To implement the arrangement, the United  States and the 
European  Union will create a technical working group charged with developing a common 
methodology and share relevant data for assessi ng the embedded emissions of traded steel and 
aluminum. The global arrangement will be open to any interested country that shares the 
commitment to achieving the goals of restoring market orientation and reducing trade in carbon 
intensive steel and aluminu m products".219  
 
QUESTION 3:  Could The United  States provide with detailed information about the legal basis of 
taking account of the carbon intensity of these industries which affects adversely the imports of steel 
and aluminum and further explain this fr om the perspective of multilaterally accepted environmental 
principles and the WTO rules?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion. Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that  Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  UKRAINE  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Ukraine is very grateful to the United  States for standing with Ukraine in these terrifying times and 
not remaining indifferent in the face of the unprecedented and illegal aggression of the RF.  
 
Page  45, Paragraph  2.31 
 
The Report mentions the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that was the United  States' 
longest -running preference program providing the majority of the preferential imports into the 
United -States for a large number of developing and least developed countries throughout the world. 
The U.S. GSP expired in December  2020, and, according to the Report, it was proposed to be 
reinstated by new legislation that h ad not been approved as of January  2022. 
 
QUESTION 1:  Would the United  States kindly inform on the state of development of the relevant 
legislative act and possible renewal of the GSP?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The U.S. Congress has the legal authority to reauthorize GSP and is currently 
deliberating on when and how it will update and renew the program.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Ukraine is also interested in receiving more information on the scope of reinstated 
GSP, as well as to the list of countries that would be able  to benefit from it and the set of criteria to 
select the beneficiary countries.  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Different bills passed in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate 
propose additional eligibility criteria. However, there is no one agreed -upon bill  and it is unclear 
when Congress may act.  
 
Page  76, Paragraph  3.55 
 
According to the Report, the United  States applies a number of excise taxes on certain goods and 
services that are collected in a number of different ways, i.e. at the manufacturer, retail er, trade, or 
consumer levels.  
 
QUESTION 3:  Could the United  States, please, elucidate particularities of imposition of excise taxes 
on selected goods and services, in particular tax base, excise tax rates, the mechanism of 
administration and control over the circulation of firearms, cannabis, transport (water and air), 
ozone -depleting chemicals?  
 
RESPONSE 3: An excise tax is imposed on any ozone -depleting chemical that is sold or used by the 
manufacturer, producer, or importer. The tax is also imposed on a ny "imported taxable product" 
sold or used by the  importer  thereof. See IRC  4681. An "imported taxable product" means any 
product (other than an ozone -depleting chemical) entered into the United  States for consumption, 
use, or warehousing if any ozone -depleting chemical was used as material in the manufacture or 
production of such product. See IRC  4682(c)(1). The ozone -depleting chemicals and tax rates, 
adjusted for inflation, are prescribed by IRC  4681(b). The manufacturer, producer, or importer liable  
for the tax imposed on ozone -depleting chemicals must report and pay the tax on a quarterly basis.  
The tax is reported on Form  6627 Environmental Taxes, which is attached to Form  720, Quarterly 
Federal Excise Tax Return.  
 
QUESTION 4:  What are the specific s of excise taxes collection for transportation (carriage) services 
(tax base, excise tax rates, the mechanism of administration and control), considering that for air 
transportation services excise taxes are imposed on domestic air ticket s? 
 
RESPONSE 4:  For domestic air travel, a 7.5% excise tax is imposed on any amount paid for the 
taxable transportation of persons by air. See IRC  4261(a).  An excise tax is also imposed on each 
domestic segment of taxable transportation.  In 2022, the tax is USD 4.50; the t ax is indexed 
annually for inflation. See IRC  4261(b).  
 
There is also an excise tax of on the transportation of property by air.  The excise tax is 6.25% of 
any amount paid for the taxable transportation of property.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  The person paying for the air transporta tion is the taxpayer, and tax attaches at the time that 
payment for the transportation is made.  The person collecting the payment for air transportation is 
generally responsible for reporting and remitting the excise tax to the Internal Revenue Service.  The 
tax is reported on Form  720, Quarterly.  
 
Page  76, Paragraph  3.58 
 
The Report mentions changes occurred during the period under review that include the scheduled 
reductions of the tax rates on highway and aviation fuels.  
 
QUESTION 5:  Could the United  States inform more about provision of state support or preferential 
taxation with an excise tax when using fuel in certain sectors of the economy, with an indication of 
the mechanism of administration and control?  
 
RESPONSE  5: The bulk transfer/terminal system is a system that allows fuel to be transported 
through pipelines and vessels to various parts of the country tax free, and excise tax is imposed 
when fuel is removed from that system.  If the United  States wants to offer preferentia l treatment 
for a particular purpose, it uses one of two methods.  
 
The first method applies only to diesel fuel and kerosene, and that requires adding red dye to the 
fuel. If the fuel is dyed red, that means it can be removed from the bulk transfer/termina l system 
without the imposition of most taxes. Fuel dyed red can only be used for nontaxable purposes such 
as farming or off -highway business use.  If a person uses dyed fuel for a taxable purpose, the 
United  States imposes several penalties.  
 
The second me thod applies to all taxable fuel, and involves claiming a payment or credit for the use 
of previously -taxed fuel for a nontaxable purpose.  Under this method, tax is imposed when it is 
removed (like it is for all undyed fuel) and if a person uses it for a n ontaxable purpose, such as 
farming or off -highway business use, that person may make a claim for most of the tax that was 
imposed when the fuel was removed from the bulk transfer/terminal system.  The IRS has several 
different forms a person may use to make  these types of claims, and the IRS may audit such claims.  
 
Page  79, Para graph  3.64 
 
The Report informs that, the United  States and the European  Union  issued a joint statement in 
October  2021 announcing, inter alia, that they were resolved to negotiate future arrangements for 
trade in steel and aluminum that take account of both global non -market excess capacity and the 
carbon intensity of these industries.  
 
QUESTION 6:  Would the United  States, please, inform if the re is any plan to develop a system of 
restrictive measures in the nearest future for imported goods that are produced with significant 
carbon emissions?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Options for the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum are under 
discussion.  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews 
are retrospective exercises.  
 
Page  94, Para graph  3.111  
 
According to the Report, "There was an increase in the number of AD measures in force during the 
period under revie w. In accordance with information from the USITC, 489  AD measures were in 
place as of 31  December  2021. Of the 489  AD orders in place as of 31  December  2021, 233 (48% 
of the total) were applied on iron and steel products, 21 (4.3%) on miscellaneous manufac tured 
products, 68 (14%) on chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 51 (10.5%) on metals and minerals, 39 
(8%) on agricultural products, 24 (5%) on plastics and rubber, 11 on transportation (2.3%), 20 
(3.4%) on textiles and apparel, 15 (3.1%) on machinery and equip ment, and 2 (0.4%) on energy 
products ". 
Ukraine highly appreciates the decision to suspend the tariffs set forth in Proclamation  9705 for the 
import of steel articles and derivative steel articles from Ukraine for 1  year. However, as it is 
mentioned in Tab le 3.1 "Anti -dumping measures in force, by trading partner" of the Report currently 
there are 8  Anti-dumping measures in place  - on certain steel and ferroalloy products from Ukraine.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 546 - 
 
  QUESTION 7:  Ukraine would like to refer to the matter of 8 Anti-dumping measures on certain 
products originating in Ukraine (Silicomanganese; Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars; Hot -rolled Steel 
Products; Carbon and Alloy Steel Wire Rod; Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods ; Prestressed Concrete 
Steel Wire Strand; Seamless Carbon and Alloy Steel Standard, Line, and Tressure Pipe; Certain 
Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate).  
 
Could the United  States, please, consider whether there are any possible ways to terminate 
measures at issue to the extent defined by the U.S. legislation based on changed circumstances 
arising from the Russia 's military aggression against Ukraine?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  Interested parties desiring such consideration may submit a request for a changed 
circumstances r eview to the U.S. Department of Commerce, which will conduct such a review when 
it receives information sufficient to warrant review of an antidumping duty order.  Such 
determinations are case -specific and based on the facts and circumstances on the admini strative 
record in a specific segment of a proceeding.  
 
Page  133, Para graph  3.230  
 
Under the Report, standards developing organizations (SDOs) that adhere to the Essential 
Requirements may be accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to develop 
American National Standards (ANS) related to products, processes, services, systems, or personnel. 
In March  2022, there were 237  ANSI-accredited standard developers (ASDs); 18  organizations 
became ASDs during the review period. By the sam e date, ANSI listed more than 13,600  standards 
developed by ASDs, of which 1,075  new standards were issued between July  2018 and March  2022. 
In addition to the thousands of voluntary consensus standards (VCS) developed by SDOs, consortia 
standards also hel p to fill the need for standards used by industry, especially in technology areas 
where a more rapid development pace is needed to meet market needs.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Could the United  States, please, specify if there is a separate law in the field of 
standardi zation?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  OMB Circular  A-119 and the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
establish and clarify U.S. policy to increase Federal reliance on voluntary consensus standards.  
 
QUESTION 9:  What is the number of standardization bodies in the United  States and how do these 
U.S. standardization organizations cooperate with each other? What is the distribution of their 
spheres of activity?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  The U.S. standards system is primarily vol untary, private sector, and marketplace 
driven with multiple standards developers taking an active role. The U.S. system is tremendously 
diverse and the result is a system that is largely sectoral in its focus. This approach recognizes that 
each industrial  sector understands its own needs and knows what standards best meet those needs.  
 
ANSI has served as administrator and coordinator of the U.S. private sector, voluntary 
standardization system for almost 100  years. Among its standards -related activities, A NSI accredits 
U.S. standards developers using criteria based on international requirements. In March  2022, ANSI 
reported 237  ANSI-accredited standard developers.  
 
In addition to ANSI -accredited standard developing organizations (SDO), there are also indepe ndent 
SDOs, industry associations, professional societies, building code organizations, and private 
consortia that develop standards. The U.S. government does not gather information on the 
distribution of SDOs in spheres of activity or on the overall numbe rs of all organizations engaged in 
standards development.  
 
Page  133, Para graph  3.231  
 
The Report states that technical regulations can be established at the federal or sub -federal level in 
the United  States, and rely heavily on voluntary consensus standard s developed by the private 
sector making them mandatory by reference.  
 
QUESTION 10:  How are interested parties informed about the requirements of the standards that 
are referenced in technical regulations, which are mandatory for application?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 547 - 
 
  RESPONSE 10:  United  States proposed technical regulations are notified to the WTO and published 
through ePing and in the U.S. Federal Register. Proposed technical regulations are also published 
for comment on regulations.gov. Final technical regulations are notified to  the WTO and published 
in the Federal Register and the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The CFR is the official 
codification of the general and permanent rules published in the Federal Register. The Electronic 
Code of Federal Regulations is a contin uously updated online version of the CFR, but it is not an 
official legal edition of the CFR. It can be found online at ecfr.gov.  
 
Proposed and final regulations may include specific references to standards incorporated by 
reference. Many of these standard s can be viewed free of charge on the website of the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), available at: http://ibr.ansi.org/ . Some standards developing 
organizations (SDO) also make their standards available on a read - or view -only basis. Please check 
the websites of individual SDOs for specifics.  
 
Agencies are not required to rely only on voluntary consensus standards available free of cost for 
their rules; however, a principle of "reasonable availa bility" of the information is applied and agencies 
are required to provide a summary of the standard in the preamble of a proposed rule to allow 
readers to make an informed determination on whether to access a standard. See Federal 
Register  (2014),  Vol. 79, No. 216, 7 November,  p. 66267,  available  at: https://www.federalregiste
r.gov/documents/2014/11/07/2014 -26445/incorporation -by-reference . For more i nformation on 
accessing  standards  incorporated  by reference,  see: https://www.nist.gov/standardsgov/accessing
-standards -incorporated -reference . 
 
QUESTION 11:  Are the texts of mandatory standards publicly available to the interested party?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  Please see response to Question  10, above.  
 
Page  191, Para graph  4.12 
 
Ukraine observes that Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program had a rapid decrease in terms of payments 
and farms included: from USD  4.95 billion , 1.4  million  farms for the 2019 crop year to 
USD 2.07 billion , 0.8 million  farms for the 2020 crop year.  
 
QUESTION 12:  Could the United  States, please, provide information if there are any specific 
reasons  for the change of the quantity of farms included in the PLC program?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  The data presented in the report corresponds to the number of farms that received 
a PLC payment in those crop years. It does not correspond to the total number of farms tha t are 
participating in the program.  
 
Page  195, Para graph  4.29 
 
Ukraine notes that the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program expanded the margin coverage 
relatively to the Margin Protection Program for Dairy (MPP) and due to the higher feeding costs 
reached nearly USD  1.2 billion  in the2021 program year.  
 
QUESTION 13:  Could the United  States kindly provide information on practices that aim to reduce 
the cost variance from year to year within the DMC?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  The Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) progr am is a risk management program. Annual 
outlays will depend on participation rates, coverage levels, and market conditions that affect 
margins.  
 
Pages  235-236, Para graph  4.174  
 
Under the Report, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), is authoriz ed to make a 
determination as to whether a non -bank financial company must be supervised by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and be subject to enhanced prudential standards if 
material financial distress at the company could pose a thre at to U.S. financial stability. In 
December  2019, the FSOC approved the Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain 
Nonbank Financial Companies, its updated final rule and interpretive guidance for non -bank financial 
company determinations, which replaced prior guidance. The new guidance prioritizes the FSOC's WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 548 - 
 
  efforts to identify potential risks and threats to U.S. financial stability on a system -wide basis through 
an activities -based approach, rather th an through entity -specific determinations, as was before, to 
reduce the potential for competitive market distortions that could arise from entity -specific 
determinations.  
 
QUESTION 14:  What measures can the FSOC or the Board of Governors of the Federal Res erve 
System take in the course of supervision over non -bank financial institutions (in accordance with 
Section  113 of the Dodd -Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFA)) in 
order to eliminate factors related to the operation of the  institutions that can adversely affect U.S. 
financial stability?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Such measures are outlined in Section  165 of the DFA, which pertains to enhanced 
supervision and prudential standards of non -bank financial institutions, the entire text of whi ch can 
be found at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th -congress/house -bill/4173/text . 
 
QUESTION 15:  What is the duration of the supervision over such non -bank financial inst itutions, 
and what decision and measures can be taken based on the supervision results to ensure financial 
stability in the U.S.?  
 
RESPONSE 15:  The determination of the FSOC would remain in effect unless or until rescinded. 
Additional information, including frequently asked questions about FSOC designations and the results 
of such designations, can be found at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/financial -markets -
financial -institutions -and-fiscal-service/fsoc/designations . 
 
QUESTION 16:  What is the liability for non -bank financial institutions for evading registration in the 
course of supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as prescribed by 
the DFA?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  There is no registration requirement for FSOC designation. For more information 
on designation,  please  see: https://home.treasury.gov/policy -issues/financial -markets -financial -
institutions -and-fiscal-service/fsoc/designations . 
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Page  8, Para graph  3.1 
 
Under the Report, "Labor issues have been an important part of U.S. trade policy throughout the 
reporting period. In 2021, the United  States made it a priority to bring labor issues and topics 
important to working people to the forefront of trade policy. USTR engaged with governments around 
the world to recalibrate trade policy to ensure that real people can realize the benefits of internati onal 
trade. In addition, the United  States increased stakeholder consultations to ensure workers' voices 
are heard and considered throughout the policy -making process. Under this new policy approach, 
the United  States promoted respect for labor rights as part of engagement with trade partners in 
2021 through the formal mechanisms of trade agreements and trade preference programs, as well 
as through country -specific initiatives, capacity building, and technical as sistance ". 
 
QUESTION 17:  Would the United  States also kindly provide information on the powers of 
supervisory bodies when unregistered labor is detected (use of hired labor without registration)?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  U.S. law does not generally require employers to register use of hired labor with 
any government body, though employers are required to report wages to the Social Security 
Administration if taxes are withheld. The Internal Revenue Service imposes penalties for failure of 
employers to file correct tax information by the due date. Other supervisory bodies, such as the 
Department of Labor, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and National Labor Relations 
Board, address labor and employment law violations.  
 
QUESTION 18:  Ukraine would appreciate if the United  States could provide information on the 
regulation of relations that arise when an individual uses hired labor (one individual uses another 
person's hired labor). Please, inform us about the peculiarities of registration, taxation and social 
insuran ce of such relations.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 549 - 
 
  RESPONSE 18:  Payroll taxes are levied on the wages or earnings of workers, including Social 
Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance taxes. Additional information on these taxes can 
be found in Congressional Research Service, P ayroll Taxes: An Overview of Taxes Imposed and Past 
Payroll Tax Relief ( 4 April 2022), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R47062.pdf . 
 
QUESTION 19:  Could the United  States, please, provide information on the procedure for 
terminating an employment contract with an employee? In particular, Ukraine would appreciate to 
receive information on the grounds for terminating the employment contract at the initiative of the 
employer, the terms of warn ing about such termination, and penalties, if any.  
 
RESPONSE 19:  In general, employment in the United  States is "at will"; that is to say, it can be 
terminated at any time by either the employer or employee, unless employers have contractually 
agreed to ot her requirements for termination, such as through a collective agreement. However, the 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN  Act) requires employers with 100 or more 
full-time employees to provide at least 60  calendar days advance written  notice of a worksite closing 
affecting 50 or more employees, or a mass layoff affecting at least 50  employees and one -third of 
the worksite's total workforce or 500 or more employees at a single site of employment during any 
90-day period. An employer who violates the WARN Act notice requirement is liable to each affected 
employee for an amount equal to back pay and benefits for the period of violation up to 60  days.  
 
QUESTION 20:  What are the specifics of regulating the activities of gig and p latform workers?  
 
RESPONSE 20:  Different labor laws have different legal tests that determine their scope of 
coverage . For example, the Fair Labor  Standards Act, which governs the minimum wage and 
overtime pay, applies to employees but not to independent contractors. The Department of Labor 
(DOL) and courts generally apply some version of the "economic realities" test to determine whether 
workers ar e employees or independent contractors. The ultimate inquiry is whether, as a matter of 
economic reality, the worker is either economically dependent on the employer for work (and is thus 
an employee) or is in business for themselves (and is thus an indepe ndent contractor). Gig workers 
and platform workers who are deemed employees under the statute could be covered by its 
protections.  Similar tests apply to laws covering other labor rights, as well.  
 
QUESTION 21:  What are the specifics of the regulation of "on-call" labor contracts or "zero hours 
contracts", if such regulation exists?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  An employee who is required to remain on their employer's premises or so close by 
that they cannot use the time for their own purposes must generally be paid for those on -call hours. 
Employers are not generally required to provide a minimum number of guaranteed hours. Thus, zero 
hours contracts are generally permitted, as long as on -call hours are compensated.  
 
Page  12, Para graph  4.3 
 
The Report describes an intersectional, interconnected framework created in the United  States with 
the aim of designing equitable, inclusive and durable trade policy. It stresses importance of 
engagement and consultation with different branches of the Government and stakeholders for 
receiving input from them by the United  States Trade Representative (the USTR) and providing their 
participation in discussions of trade policy issues.  
Ukraine notes that the United  States places high value on the trade policy review process in the WTO  
and actively participates in all Members' trade policy reviews.  
 
QUESTION 22:  Could the United  States, please, share its experience regarding the process of its 
domestic consultations with different stakeholders while preparing to the WTO Members' trade p olicy 
reviews?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The United  States relies on one lead point of contact to collect and review written 
questions as submitted by a network of experts within the U.S. government. USTR's Office of WTO 
and Multilateral Affairs is the lead point of c ontact for overseeing the process of drafting U.S. advance 
written questions for other WTO Members' trade policy reviews. For a particular Member's review, 
USTR's lead for Trade Policy Reviews will send a request by email for advance written questions to 
functional and regional experts within USTR and across federal agencies. Those experts then 
leverage their own network and existing knowledge and expertise to provide written questions to 
USTR's lead point of contact for his or her review.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 550 - 
 
  QUESTION 23:  What practical tools and lines of communication are used to receive feedback from 
stakeholders, specifically private sector representatives (for instance, questionnaires, inviting 
written submissions via USTR's website before the trade policy review of a parti cular WTO Member, 
etc.) for formulation of written questions?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  The United  States' advance written questions often take into consideration the 
information the U.S. government has already collected, including from the National Trade Estimate 
and other information provided by cleared advisors.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 551 - 
 
  UNITED KINGDOM  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
Secretariat Report (S434)  
1 Economic Environment  
1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.2  Fiscal Policy  
Table  1.4 Federal government revenue and expenditure, 2017 -21 
 
QUESTION 1:  Could the United  States please clarify whether the expenditure figures in Table  1.4 
cover subsidies to both Goods and Services sectors?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  Table 1.4 of the Secretariat Report covers total U.S. federal government revenues 
and expenditure from 2017 through 2021. The subsidies line in Table  1.4 conceptually includes both 
service - and goods -producing sectors. According to the BEA glossary, subsidies are the "monetary 
grants paid by government agenci es to private business or to government enterprises 
at another  level of government ". Link to BEA glossary  definition  of subsidy  for reference:  https://w
ww.bea.gov/help/glossary/subsidies . 
 
2.2 Trade Policy Formulation and Objectives  
2.2.2  Trade policy objectives and direction  
Paragraph 2.14  
 
QUESTION 2:  Paragraph  2.14. sets out the U.S.' new initiatives on Buy American policies and states 
that procurement covered under the WTO  GPA continues to benefit from a waiver from these new 
requirements. Could the United  States please explain how they ensure that GPA  procurement 
continues to benefit from a waiver under these new initiative s? 
 
RESPONSE 2:  In general, the Trade Agreements Act (T AA) provides the authority for the President 
to waive the Buy American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products from 
countries that have signed an international trade agreement with the United  States, or that meet 
certain other cri teria, such as being a least developed country. The President has delegated this 
waiver authority to the U.S. Trade Representative. In acquisitions covered by the WTO  GPA, 
Free Trade  Agreements, or the Israeli  Trade  Act, the U.S.  Trade  Representative has w aived the Buy 
American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products. These waiver designations 
granted under the TAA are reflected in the FAR. Offers of eligible products receive equal consideration 
with domestic offers. See FAR  25.402  (https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). For additional 
information  on procedures  designed  to ensure  fairness,  see FAR 25.408  (https://www.acqui sition.g
ov/far/25.408 ) and FAR  subpart  14.400 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/14.400 ). For additional 
information  on appeal  and protest  procedures,  please  refer to FAR Part 33 (https://www.acquisitio
n.gov/far/part -33). 
 
2 Trade and Investment Regimes  
2.2 Trade Policy Formulation and Objectives  
2.2.2  Trade policy objectives and direction  
2.2.2.1  New directions  
 
QUESTION 3:  Could the United  States please clarify what assessment(s) it has made to ensure that 
tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) related to clean energy, including those for electric 
vehicles and renewable resources meet WTO  obligations?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement.  
 
QUESTION 4:  Could the United  States please clarify what assessment it has made of the impact of 
the IRA tax credits on fair competition in global trade, including regarding the impact that the tax 
credits introduced in the Inflation Reduction Act will have on international partner s? 
 
RESPONSE 4:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 552 - 
 
  2 Trade and Investment Regimes  
2.4 Investment Regime  
Paragraph 2.41  
 
QUESTION 5:  Could the United  States please provide information regarding how it is ensuring that 
this greater scrutiny is not deterring FDI?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The United  States welcomes foreign investment and remains committed to 
maintaining an open investment policy. The  developments noted in Paragraph  2.41 of the 
Secretariat  Report, specifically the expansion of authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United  States and the formalization of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign 
Participation in the  United  States Telecommunications Services Sector, are focused on protecting 
important U.S. national security interests and enhance confidence in the United  States' longstanding 
open investment policy by continuing to restrict only those foreign investment s that pose national 
security concerns.  
 
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.4  Export Support and Promotion  
Paragraph 3.194  
 
QUESTION 6:  With reference to the United  States' export solutions website, could the United  States 
please provide more info rmation on the levels of usage for the site?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Usage data for this site is not readily available . 
 
3.3.1  Incentives  
 
QUESTION 7:  Could the United  States please clarify how it ensures subsidies provided by its States 
and Territories meet all required obligations under the SCM  Agreement ? 
 
RESPONSE 7:  The federal government of the United  States coordinates with state governments on 
a range of international trade issues, including obligations under the SCM  Agreement . For example, 
the federal gove rnment works closely with state governments regarding the subsidy notification 
obligation under the SCM  Agreement . As noted in the Secretariat's report, this has resulted in nearly 
750 state support programs being notified, which has required very close co ordination between the 
federal and state governments often covering in -depth review of the SCM  Agreement provisions. 
The United  States Trade Representative also staffs an intergovernmental affairs office to maintain a 
communication link with the states to discuss any obligations under any of the United  States' trade 
agreements.  
 
QUESTION 8:  Could the United  States please clarify: a)  whether it has implemented any measures 
to regulate the provision of subsidies to its services sectors (including measures to ensure 
transparency) . 
 
RESPONSE 8:  The United  States does not maintain an overarching legal framework to regulate the 
provision of subsidies to its services sector.  
 
QUESTION 9:  and b)  how these measures are enforced at both the federal and State/Territory 
levels?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  See response to Question  8. 
 
3.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements  
Paragraph  3.241  Conformity with SPS requirements  
 
QUESTION 10:  Could the United  States please outline which animal welfare -related impacts they 
anticipate from the incorporation of fitness to travel standards and requirements for ocean vessels 
in the final rule covering Exportation of Live Animals, Hatching Eggs, and Animal Germplasm from 
the U.S. (in relation to which there were anim al welfare justifications in documentation supporting 
the rule and the WTO  notification for the rule)?  
 
RESPONSE 10:  The final rule as notified under G/SPS/N/USA/2734/Add.1  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 553 - 
 
  (https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.wto.org%2Fdol2fe%
2FPages%2FSS%2Fdirectdoc. aspx%3Ffilename%3Dq%3A%2FG%2FSPS%2FNUSA2734A1.pdf%26
Open%3DTrue&data=05%7C01%7C%7Cc9d69570f32743d4094608dad3a80502%7Ced5b36e701e
e4ebc867ee03cfa0d4697%7C0%7C0%7C638055015836928700%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8
eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiL CJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C
%7C&sdata=RiJZOCdk8YefMY5UskG5%2BTeVgxk1mK8FVBZKtnx80B8%3D&reserved=0 ), which is 
now in effect, conforms with the science -based World  Organisation  for Animal  Health's 
fitness -to-travel standards.  As such, ocean vessels are required to (1)  maintain a means of humanely 
euthanizing animals who become sick or injured during transport, (2)  separate hostile animals, 
(3) have replacement parts for major life support systems in case of malfunction, and (4)  submit a 
report after each  journey with the number of animals who died and the number who became injured 
or sick during transport.  
 
3.3.4 Competition Policy  
 
QUESTION 11:  Could the United  States please clarify how its federal competition laws are 
implemented and enforced at the State level, and whether federal competition law also applies to 
U.S. Territories?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  States and U.S. Territories can enforce the federal antitrust laws in federal district 
court. In addition, Section  4c of the Clayton Act specifically allows fo r any State Attorney General to 
bring civil antitrust parens patriae  claims in federal district court on behalf of natural persons residing 
in that state, and they can recover treble damages if successful. All 50  States and 6  U.S. Territories 
have an Attor ney General or Attorney -General equivalent legal officer who can bring antitrust actions 
under both state and federal antitrust law.  
 
QUESTION 12:  The Secretariat Report states that most U.S. States have antitrust laws. Could the 
United  States please clari fy how antitrust cases are handled in States which do not have antitrust 
laws?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  Every U.S. State except Pennsylvania has its own state antitrust statute. As stated 
above, all States, including Pennsylvania, can sue in federal court under the f ederal antitrust statutes. 
In state court, States can also bring claims under their state unfair competition or unfair practices 
statutes (often called "UDAP statutes ", for "unfair and deceptive acts and practices"). Pennsylvania 
often brings antitrust cla ims under its state UDAP statute.  
 
QUESTION 13:  Regarding vertical arrangements and other conducts related to competition, the 
report notes that a "rule of reason" standard is ordinarily applied to examine both the positive and 
negative effects of any agre ement before determining whether it violates antitrust laws. Could the 
United  States please provide additional detail on the criteria used in applying its "rule of reason" 
standard?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  U.S. antitrust law forbids certain specific categories of business conduct as illegal 
per se . Those categories, including naked price fixing, market division agreements, and some types 
of tying arrangements and group boycotts, are proscribed without regar d to the market power and 
without consideration of alleged procompetitive effects.  
 
U.S. courts evaluate most other conduct under the rule of reason, which only prohibits conduct that 
is undertaken by a firm with market power, and is demonstrably likely to  create anticompetitive 
effects. Rule of reason analysis proceeds as a burden -shifting exercise. At the first stage, an antitrust 
plaintiff or enforcement agency must establish a prima facie  case that (1)  the defendants have 
market power to enact a durable  anticompetitive restraint, and (2)  that the challenged conduct is 
one such restraint. Then the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a procompetitive 
justification for the conduct at issue. If the defendant provides a compelling procompetitive 
justification, the burden may shift a second time, allowing the plaintiff to present evidence of a less 
restrictive alternative to the challenged conduct that would provide similar benefits without the same 
risk of competitive harm.  
 
In practice, this exercis e often leads courts to balance the purported risks and benefits of the conduct 
at issue, and involves complex economic analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a party's 
economic argument becomes less conceptually compelling, that party must offe r more factual 
evidence in support in order to shift the burden. This sliding scale approach applies to each factual WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 554 - 
 
  issue in the case, including market definition, barriers to entry, and pro - and anticompetitive effects.  
 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
 
QUESTION 14:  Could the United  States please clarify how its laws and regulations governing the 
activities of its government corporations and government -sponsored enterprises are implemented 
and enforced at both the federal and State levels?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  Detailed information regarding each of the government corporations in the  
Secretariat' Report can be found in their respective governing statutes, which are listed in Table  3.30.  
The United  States does not maintain c omprehensive information on State -level entities.  
 
QUESTION 15:  Could the United  States please: a)  clarify whether its government corporations and 
government -sponsored enterprises benefit from any exemptions or immunities from its federal laws; 
and. 
 
RESPO NSE 15:  The United  States does not maintain a comprehensive list of any exemptions or 
immunities that government corporations and government -sponsored enterprises benefit from. In 
certain instances, the applicability of a particular law to government corporations depends heavily 
on the facts and circumstances of the case.  
 
QUESTION 16:  b) explain what these exemptions are, and which entities benefit from them?  
 
RESPONSE 16:  See response to Question  15. 
 
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
Paragraph  3.287  
 
QUESTION 17:  Paragraph  3.287. states that the new policy aims to reduce the number of waivers 
by making them subject to review. The paragraph states that the review of waivers does not affect 
the existing waivers already granted under the Trade Agr eements Act for GPA parties and certain 
trade agreements. Could the United  States please confirm whether under the new review system, 
waivers based on the GPA and/or FTA commitments must be submitted to the MIAO?  
 
RESPONSE 17:  Existing waivers based on the Trade Agreements Act are not submitted to MIAO. 
For more information on procedures relating to procurement covered by the Trade Agreements Act, 
including the GPA, please see FAR  25.408 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.408 ). 
 
QUESTION 18:  Could the United  States please explain how they are ensuring that the new review 
process is not discouraging legitimate waivers from being submitted/applied for?  
 
RESPONSE 18:  Currently  the MIAO office is only reviewing waivers of Buy American provisions for 
non-availability of goods. For more information on these waivers, please visit the Made in America 
Office website at: https://w ww.madeinamerica.gov/waivers/ . Existing waivers based on the Trade 
Agreements Act are not submitted to MIAO.  
 
QUESTION 19:  How are they ensuring the process is not too burdensome and therefore deterring 
agencies from applying for a waiver?  
 
RESPONSE 19: In certain circumstances, an agency may determine that it is required to act more 
quickly than the Made in America Office (MIAO) waiver review procedures allow. In those 
circumstances, agencies complete an "Urgent Requirements Report" to inform the MIAO that  a Made 
in America Law has been waived. Waiver submissions and Urgent Requirement Reports can 
be submitted  electronically  on the Made  in America  website  at: https://www.madeinamerica.gov/w
aivers/ . Exis ting waivers based on the Trade Agreements Act are not submitted to MIAO.  
 
Paragraph  3.288.  
 
QUESTION 20:  Paragraph  3.288. states that agencies must report to establish non -availability of 
domestically sourced products, including a description of the market research and outreach 
conducted.  Could the United  States please explain whether the MIAO implement an appeal process 
if an agency wishes to challenge a waiver being denied?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 555 - 
 
  RESPONSE 20:  Under guidance provided by GSA, the agency makes the final dete rmination on 
whether to grant a waiver. For more information, please refer to 16 November  2021 Memorandum 
for Civilian Agencies regarding requirements for nonavailability determinations under the Buy 
American  statute,  available  at: https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/page_file_uploads/C
AAC-Letter -2022-01-Made -in-America -Nonavailability -Waivers -under -EO-14005 -
11.16.21.pdf#:~:text=%28b%29%20Nonavailability.%20The%20Buy%20Amer ican%20statute%
20does%20not,available%20commercial%20quantities%20and%20of%20a%20satisfactory%20qu
ality. 
 
Paragraph  3.289  
 
QUESTION 21:  Paragraph  3.289. states that later phases will cover additional types of waivers. 
Beyond non -availability, could the United  States please indicate which other types of waivers will be 
introduced for review by the MIAO?  
 
RESPONSE 21:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises. Further guidance and instru ctions will be issued as MIAO 
expands its waiver review process to cover all types of waivers from covered Made in America Laws, 
as defined in Section  2(b) of Executive  Order  14005. For more information, please refer to 
26 October  2021 OMB Memorandum, Improving the Transparency of Made in America Waivers, 
available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -content/uploads/2021/10/Guidance -Memo -
Improving -the-Transparency -of-Made -in-America -Waivers.pdf . 
 
Paragraph  3.295  
 
QUESTION 22:  Paragraph  3.295. states that at the state level the GPA is implemented through 
laws and regulations in each of the 37  states partic ipating in it. Could the United  States please 
explain how the federal government monitor and ensure that the States participating in the GPA are 
implementing it effectively?  
 
RESPONSE 22:  The federal government does not collect such information. For states  covered under 
the WTO  Agreement  on Government Procurement (GPA), information on laws and regulations, 
including laws relating to Article  XVIII of the GPA on Domestic Review Procedures, can be found on 
the USTR website:  https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/government -procurement/additional -information -
on-US Procurement . 
 
QUESTION 23:  What processes, structures or systems a re in place?  
 
RESPONSE 23:  For states covered under the WTO  Agreement  on Government  Procurement  (GPA), 
information on laws and regulations, including laws relating to Article  XVIII of the GPA on Domestic 
Review Procedures, can be found on the USTR website:  https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/government -
procurement/additional -information -on-US Procurement . 
 
Paragraph  3.300  
 
QUESTION 24:  Paragraph  3.300. refers to a list of critical items and components that will receive 
a price preference. Could the United  States please indicate what types of goods will be included on 
this list?  
 
RESPONSE 24:  As stated in the 7 March  2022 Federal Register  Notice (87  FR 12780), the final rule 
amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) creates a framework for application of an 
enhanced price preference for a domestic product/domestic construction material that is considered 
a critical item or made up of critical compo nents. The list of critical items and critical components, 
along with the associated enhanced price preference, will be incorporated in the FAR through a 
separate rulemaking. For more information on the proposed rule is available at the 
Office  of the Feder al Register,  National  Archives  and Records  Administration  website  at: https://ww
w.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR -2022-03-07/pdf/2022 -04173.pdf#page=1 . 
 
Paragraph  3.301  
 
QUESTION 25:  Paragraph  3.301. explains that states covered by the GPA are required to publish 
invitations to tender in their own publications. Could the United  States please indicate whether they WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 556 - 
 
  have considered bringing together all the publication of notices from the federal government and 
states onto one platform?  
 
RESPONSE 25:  The federal government publishes invitations to tender on the System for Award 
Management (SAM) website at: www.SAM.gov . Each state and other sub -central entities publish 
procurement opportunities separately. Information on websites for all covered states and other 
entities are available at: https://ustr.gov/issue -areas/government -procurement/additional -
information -on-US-Procurement . 
 
Paragraphs  3.304  & 3.305  
 
QUESTION  26: Section  3.304  and 3.305 detail how the micro -purchase thresholds (now 
USD 10,000, up from USD 3,500) and the simplified acquisition thresholds [SAT] (now USD 250,000, 
up from USD 150,000) have been significantly increased since 2019. Could the United  States please 
outline what impact has this had on small business set asides or applications of other preference 
schemes?  
 
RESPONSE 26:  This threshold increase is expected to benefit small businesses by expanding their 
access to contract opportunities. Interested parties may search federal procurement data for analysis 
at the System f or Award Management (SAM) website: www.SAM.gov . 
 
Paragraph  3.304  
 
QUESTION 27:  Section  3.304. refers to various simplified acquisitions thresholds of supplies or 
services for supporting a contingency operation or facilitating defence against or recovery from 
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack. Could the United  States please indicate what 
supplies and services fall under this definition?  
 
RESPONSE 27:  Increased thresholds of the SAT for acquisitio ns of supplies or services to facilitate 
defense against or recovery from cyber, nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack are 
determined by the head of the agency.  
 
Paragraph  3.308  
 
QUESTION 28:  Section  3.308. refers to procurement at a sub -federal level. Could the United  States 
please indicate how the U.S. Federal Government determine whether a project receiving federal 
funding is covered or not by international procurement obligations?  
 
RESPONSE 28:  In general, the Trade Agreements Act (TAA ) provides the authority for the President 
to waive the Buy American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products from 
countries that have signed an international trade agreement with the United  States, or that meet 
certain other crite ria, such as being a least developed country. The President has delegated this 
waiver authority to the U.S. Trade Representative. In acquisitions covered by the WTO  GPA, Free 
Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade Act, the U.S. Trade Representative has wai ved the Buy 
American statute and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products. These waiver designations 
granted under the TAA are reflected in the FAR. Offers of eligible products receive equal consideration 
with domestic offers. See FAR  25.402 ( https://www.acquisition.gov/far/25.402 ). 
 
U.S. market access schedules identify the coverage of procurements at the sub -federal level and any 
exceptions to that coverage. For example, Annex  2, Note  5 of the U.S. GPA schedule indicates that 
the "Agreement does not apply to restrictions attached to federal funds for mass transit and highway 
projects" for state entities included in the agreement. Additional information regarding 
definitions  and exceptions  to the Buy American  Act are available  at FAR subpart  25.4 (https://www
.acquisition.gov/far/subpart -25.4#:~:text=Subpart%2025.4%20 -%20Trade%20Agreements%202
5.400%20Scope%20of,procedures%20applicable%20to%20acquisitions%20that%20are%20cover
ed%20by -). 
 
QUESTION 29:  Are there any movements towards greater harmonization of rules at a state and 
local government level?  
 
RESPONSE 29:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective reviews.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 557 - 
 
  Paragraph  3.320  
 
QUESTION 30:  Section  3.320. refers to measures that promote SME participation. Could the 
United  States please outline under what circumstances could an international small businesses 
become eligible for U.S. federal and State level SME set asides?  
 
RESPONSE 30:  In general, except for small agricultural cooperatives, a business concern eligible 
for assistance from Small Business Administration (SBA) as a small business is a business entity 
organized for profit, with a place of business located in the United  State s, and which operates 
primarily within the United  States or which makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy 
through payment of taxes or use of American products, materials or labor. For more information on 
SBA small business definitions and elig ibility criteria, please see: 13  CFR 124 
(https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -13/chapter -I/part -124?toc=1 ). 
 
QUESTION 31:  Are the same definitions of small businesses used for th e SME set 
asides/preferences and the definitions for the SME/minority programs?  
 
RESPONSE 31:  SBA's definitions of minority owned small businesses include additional criteria 
describing ownership or control by minority and disadvantaged groups. For more in formation on 
small disadvantaged groups, please see: 13  CFR 124 ( https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title -
13/chapter -I/part -124?toc=1 ). 
 
QUESTION 32:  What differences are there?  
 
RESPONSE 32:  Please see response to Question  31 above.  
 
Table  3.35, Paragraph  3.23 
 
QUESTION 33:  Table 3.35 and Section  3.23 refers to socio -economic procurement small business 
programs. Could the United  States please explain which of these programmes are open and 
accessible to foreign suppliers and service providers to participate in?  
 
RESPONSE 33:  Foreign small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are welcome to participate in 
all U.S. government procurement opportunities covered by the GPA. U.S. governmen t programs, 
such as small business set -asides, that are designed to promote participation by SMEs in U.S. federal 
procurement activities are reserved for business entities organized for profit (even if its ownership 
is in the hands of a non -profit entity) with a place of business located in the United  States or its 
outlying areas and that makes a significant contribution to the U.S. economy 
through  payment  of taxes  and/or  use of American  products,  material  and/or  labor,  etc. See: FAR 1
9.001  (https://www.acquisition.gov/far/19.001 ). For more information on the definition of a "small 
business concern", see 13  CFR 121.105.  For more information on additional eligibility criteria, please 
visit the U.S. Small Business Administration website: https://www.sba.gov . 
 
3.3.7  Intellectual Property Rights  
3.3.7.2  General Regulatory Framework  
Paragra ph 3.332  
 
QUESTION 34:  The Secretariat Report refers to international IP agreements and treaties that the 
United  States have ratified, namely TRIPS and Marrakesh. Could the United  States please outline 
any plans to ratify further international agreements, such as Locarno Agreement or Vienna 
Agreement, or other international conventions and treaties related to IPRs?  
 
RESPONSE 34:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.3.7.4  Industrial Designs  
Paragraph  3.352  
 
QUESTION 35:  This paragraph refers to the protection of Industrial Designs through U.S. Patent 
Law.2. Could the United  States please outline whether they have any plans to create a separate 
Industrial  Designs Legislation?  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 558 - 
 
  RESPONSE 35:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.3.7.4 Industrial Designs  
Paragraph  3.354  
 
QUESTION 36:  This section of the Secretariat's Report refers to the Federal Register Notice seeking 
public input on whether USPTO's interpretation of the "article of manufacture" requirement in 
35 U.S.C.  171 should be revised to protect digital designs that encompass new and emerging 
technologies. Could the United  States please indicate if the review has been concluded and if so, will 
the U.S. be revising their interpretation?  
 
RESPONSE 36:  Regarding the published Federal Register Notice of 21 December  2020, the USPTO 
has finished reviewing the public comments, and has published its summary of the public comments 
here: https://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/protecting -design-innovations -in-new. Regarding 
future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective 
exercises.  
 
3.3.7.5 Trademarks  
Paragraph  3.363  
 
QUESTION 37:  The Secretariat Report details how the average first action pendency was 
6.3 months, against the goal of 2.5 -4.5 months. Could the United  States please provide details on 
any plans they have in place to reduce the timeframe in line with their goals?  
 
RESP ONSE 37:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 
3.3.7.6  Geographical indications  
Paragraph  3.366  
 
QUESTION 38:  Could the United  States please outline the provisions within their sys tem that 
provide "guarantees of quality"?  
 
RESPONSE 38:  The U.S. registration system for GIs requires the submission to the public record 
include the standards governing use of the GIs. These standards include requirements that 
authorized users conform with the quality standards.  
 
Paragraph  3.366  
 
QUESTION 39:  The UK understands that the USPTO examines applications for Geographic 
Indications (GIs), and that applications are published so that there is an opportunity to oppose their 
registration. Could the United  States please confirm how a decision i s made if objections are made 
to the GI being registered?  
 
RESPONSE 39: The examiner makes a decision based on evidence in the record, rules and statutory 
requirements. That decision can be appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). In 
the ca se of oppositions, decisions are made by the TTAB after an inter partes proceeding and 
weighing the evidence of record. TTAB decisions are appealable –ex parte decisions are appealable 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and inter p artes decisions are appealable 
to federal district court or the CAFC.  
 
QUESTION 40:  Additionally, could the United  States please outlined which steps they are taking to 
ensure transparency and impartiality in this process, and is there any provision for ap peal to an 
independent body regarding the outcome?  
 
RESPONSE 40:  The entire application process is open and available on the website of the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, including appeals and oppositions. For a response to the remaining 
question concer ning appeals, see Response  39. 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 559 - 
 
  Paragraph  3.368  
 
QUESTION 41:  Could the United  States please elaborate on how GIs can be protected through 
Common law?  
 
RESPONSE 41:  Protections of rights under common law are acquired by virtue of use of the GI in 
the United  States. The extent of rights in an unregistered GI extend only to the geographic areas 
where the GI is actually used.  
 
QUESTION 42:  In particular:  In what circums tances would a GI be considered to be protected 
under common law?  
 
RESPONSE 42:  Protection is established through use in the United  States.  
 
QUESTION 43:  What evidence is required to demonstrate that a GI is "a valid common law regional 
certification or co llective mark"?  
 
RESPONSE 43:  The types of evidence would be evidence that establishes the factors that use of a 
GI is governed by a GI owner who exercises legitimate control and has the requisite authority over 
the GI, which is case specific and comports with the standards set forth.  
 
QUESTION 44:  How can a GI achieve a valid certification or collective mark status without being 
registered?  
 
RESPONSE 44:  See Response  42. 
 
QUESTION 45:  What rights does a GI protected under common law have?  
 
RESPONSE 45:  Common law GI owners are entitled to bring causes of action. The scope of 
protection is limited to the geographic area of actual use.  
 
QUESTION 46:  In what instances do Common law rights allow a user to challenge a registration or 
application?  
 
RESPONSE 4 6: If the common law GI owner has standing, namely, the GI owner is or would be 
damaged by registration of a mark, the GI owner is entitled to petition to cancel or file an opposition 
to prevent registration.  
 
Paragraph  3.370  
 
QUESTION 47:  Paragraph  3.370. of the Secretariat Report states that: "The enforcement of GIs is 
primarily the responsibility of mark owners". Could the United  States please confirm what other 
methods of enforcement of GI protection are available?  
 
RESPONSE 47:  Other m eans of enforcement include the American Viticultural Areas and distinctive 
products through the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB). The United  States also 
provides pre -label approval through TTB regulations.  
 
Paragraph  3.370  
 
QUESTION 48:  This paragraph mentions a report by WIPO indicating 606 GIs were in force in the 
United  States as at late 2020. Could the United  States please outline whether they have any more 
recent figures for in force GIs within the United  States?  
 
RESPONSE 48:  For 2021, there are 620 GIs in force in the United  States.  
 
3.3.7  Intellectual Property Rights  
3.3.7.8  Copyright  
Paragraph  3.375  
 
QUESTION 49:  Further to WTO  DS160 (adopted on 27  July 2000), could the United  States please 
provide an update on their work addressing s.110(5) of the United  States Copyright Act?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 560 - 
 
  RESPONSE 49: The United  States provided a status report on 17 November  2022, in accordance 
with Article  21.6 of the DSU.  
 
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.1  Main Features  
4.1.1.1  Major Support Programmes  
4.1.1.1.5  Crop insurance  
Para graph  4.20. Policies under the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) insure against 
losses in yield, crop revenue, margin, whole -farm revenue, and other types of losses.  
 
QUESTION 50:  Could the United  States please explain whether the insurance is only paid out in 
the case of natural disaster, or do they insure against any loss of crop?  
 
RESPONSE 50:  The Federal Crop Insurance Program provides a wide variety of crop insurance 
products that indemnify prod ucers against losses in yields, revenue, margins and other types of 
losses due to adverse growing and market conditions, such as drought, excess moisture, damaging 
freezes, hail, wind, disease, and price fluctuations.  
 
QUESTION 51:  What factors are conside red when margin, whole -farm revenue and other types of 
losses are assessed for pay out of insurance?  
 
RESPONSE 51:  Margin Protection for Federal Crop Insurance provides coverage against an 
unexpected decrease in operating margin (revenue less input costs). It is area -based, using 
county -level estimates of average revenue and input costs to establish the amount of coverage and 
indemnity payments. It is a new product that is available for certain crops (rice, corn, soybeans, and 
wheat) in select U.S. c ounties. Whole Farm Revenue Protection provides protection for all 
commodities on a single farm against the loss of insured revenue due to unavoidable natural causes, 
such as adverse weather, fire, insects, disease, etc. Generally speaking, the type of ins urance policy, 
and the terms of that policy, establish the basis for coverage and indemnities.  
 
4.1.2  Forestry  
4.1.2.4  International Cooperation and Agreements  
Paragraph  4.93 
 
QUESTION 52:  Paragraph  4.93. refers to "enhancing traceability; implementing for est monitoring 
and information systems to support legal trade" in the context of international sustainable forest 
management. Could the United  States please explain what specific actions it is undertaking to 
support traceability in the context of sustainab le forest management?  
 
RESPONSE 52:  The U.S. government works, in partnership with forest agencies in other countries, 
civil society and industry, to influence institutional reform and transparency in the forestry sector. 
This includes activities to promot e transparency related to the acquisition, harvesting, transport, 
and/or export of forest products; and support to partners in institutionalizing policy reforms, 
accountability protocols, community engagement, and other forest management measures to 
addres s illegal logging. Some examples include:  
 
• Developing tools that improve port screening processes, including: automated analysis of 
risk factors; improved processing of Lacey Act Declaration information; and improved 
technologies, databases, and capacity for rapid wood identification ; 
• Engaging in multilateral forums such as the International Tropical Timber Organization, 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Expert's Group on Illegal logging and Associated 
Trade, and Interpol to encourage strong p olicy frameworks that support legal trade and 
transparency, and to improve information sharing among countries ; 
• Working with government entities and the private sector to develop and launch a legality 
due care compliance training program for SMEs ; 
• Organizi ng trainings with partner countries to build the capacity of law enforcement 
officers, forensic investigators, prosecutors, judges and forestry officials to better track 
and deal with illegal logging ; 
• Collaborating with university and civil society on the development of early warning 
systems, which allow officials and organizations to detect illegal logging, improve forest 
management and law enforcement efforts by indicating where enforcement actions are 
most needed.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 561 - 
 
  • The United  States Forest Service Wood Id entification & Screening Center (WISC) also 
provides wood ID services to the U.S. government; offers training and capacity building 
in wood identification, including for several trading partners; and furthers wood ID 
technologies to be most efficient for m eeting law enforcement needs.  
 
Paragraphs  4.93 & 4.95 
 
QUESTION 53 : Could the United  States please provide an example of which international projects 
USAID is funding to support sustainable forestry and international law enforcement to combat illegal 
logging? 
 
RESPONSE 53:  USAID works to combat illegal logging and associated trade and address related 
threats to forest loss and livelihoods through a variety of global, regional, and bilateral activities and 
partnerships. USAID partners with the U.S. Forest Service and other U.S. agencies, NGOs, and the 
private sector to build law enforcement and regulatory capacity, assist Indigenous groups and local 
communities to protect forests and lands against illicit actors, support the development of traceabili ty 
and timber legality verification systems, and promote multi -stakeholder dialogue. Examples of 
current activities include: analyzing the extent of "grey" timber volumes and flows in Asia; working 
with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime to strengthen transn ational information exchange on nature 
crimes in South  America; and building capacity of subnational governments in the Peruvian  Amazon 
to understand and enforce Peruvian forestry regulations.  
 
4.1.3  Fisheries  
4.1.3.2  Import, export, and investment provisi ons 
Paragraph  4.104.  Tuna import measures  
 
QUESTION 54:  Relating to their dolphin -safe tune labelling regime and purse seine fishing 
prohibitions in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), could the United  States please explain 
whether they anticipate th at any animal welfare and consumer -related impacts will occur as a result 
and, if so, which?  
 
RESPONSE 54:  Below are ways the United  States has worked to address the impacts that ETP purse 
seine fishing activities have historically had on dolphin stocks, as well as consumer -related impacts.  
 
The Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP), to which the 
United  States is Party, was established to reduce incidental dolphin mortalities in the tuna 
purse -seine fishery with the go al of eliminating dolphin mortality through setting annual limits. As a 
result, Inter -American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) data shows a significant reduction in total 
dolphin mortality in the ETP purse seine fishery over the last several decades.  
 
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) addresses the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) 
tuna purse seine fishery and the importation of yellowfin tuna from nations participating in this 
fishery, due to the fishery's historical impact on dolphin stocks . Under the MMPA, the United  States 
maintains its embargo of yellowfin tuna from nations whose large purse seine vessels harvest ETP 
tuna, unless the harvesting nation obtains an affirmative finding from NOAA Fisheries.  
 
The Dolphin Protection Consumer Inf ormation Act (DPCIA) section on Congressional "findings", 
states that "dolphins and other marine mammals are frequently killed in the course of tuna fishing 
operations in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean and high seas driftnet fishing in other parts of t he 
world" and "consumers would like to know if the tuna they purchase is falsely labelled as to the 
effect of the harvesting of the tuna on dolphins". The DPCIA set the standards in which tuna 
product(s) may be labelled dolphin -safe in the United  States an d established a national tracking and 
verification program  - NOAA Fisheries' Tuna Tracking and Verification Program (TTVP)  - to monitor 
the dolphin -safe status of imported and domestically produced frozen and processed tuna (Genus 
Thunnus and Katsuwonus pe lamis). The TTVP is the only program recognized by the U.S. government 
that legally satisfies all applicable federal regulations regarding dolphin -safe certification for tuna.  
 
4.1.3.2  Import, export, and investment provisions  
Paragraph  4.108  
 
QUESTION 55:  In October  2022, the United  States issued a final rule to provide a one -year 
extension to foreign nations to receive a comparability finding (implementing the import provisions WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 562 - 
 
  of the MMPA) to 31  December  2023. Could the United  States please a dvise on when they are likely 
to publish the outcome of the comparability findings?  
 
RESPONSE 55:  NOAA Fisheries will be evaluating all applications and making our determinations 
for all fisheries before announcing any results. NOAA Fisheries has to be fai r and consistent for all 
nations, so they will not be publicly announcing decisions for individual nations and individual 
fisheries until they have completed all evaluations. The regulations, as amended, require notification 
to exporting nations by 30 November 2023, prior to implementing trade restrictions, if any, by 
1 January  2024. NOAA Fisheries will endeavor to complete its work in advance of the deadline, and 
to provide exporting nations and the trade community with sufficient notice to make adjustment s, 
where possible, to supply chains affected by decisions on comparability findings.  
 
Paragraph  4.108.  MMPA import prohibitions  
 
QUESTION 56:  Could the United  States please explain what animal welfare and consumer -related 
impacts it anticipates from the introduction of its ban on imports of seafood and seafood products 
caught or farmed in commercial fisheries resulting in the accidental killing or serious injury (bycatch) 
of marine mammals in excess of U.S. standards?  
 
RESPONSE 56:  NMFS prepared a final E nvironmental Assessment (EA), which provides an analysis 
of the impacts of implementation of the MMPA import provisions regulation on the human 
environment, including marine mammals, to accompany the MMPA Import Provisions final rule. The 
EA was developed as an integrated document that includes a Regulatory Impact Review (RIR) and 
a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA). The RIR and FRFA provide more information on the 
anticipated economic impacts of the import provisions regulation. Copies of the EA /RIR/FRFA 
analysis  are available  at: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1t1UZO1J -wlqKHMP_ehedk9JWjirJ
2bTE?usp=sharing . 
 
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.2  Main policy developments  
Paragraph  4.156  
 
QUESTION 57:  With reference to the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, and E.O.  14017 on America's 
Supply Chains, could the United  States please provide more information on how the Inflation 
Reduction Act will align with U .S. trade policy to remove market access barriers to create global 
opportunities in clean energy supply chains?  
 
RESPONSE 57:  The Inflation Reduction Act aligns with U.S. policy to build a more resilient and 
sustainable supply chain for critical minerals a nd batteries. The Inflation Reduction Act, inter alia, 
seeks to invest in secure supply for advanced batteries, invest in sustainable domestic and 
international production and processing of critical minerals, and rebuild America's production and 
innovation capabilities.  
 
4.4 Services  
 
QUESTION 58:  Could the United  States please provide information on the scope of universal 
occupational licensing or reciprocal occupational licensing laws across the services sector, for those 
states that have introd uced such legislation.  
 
RESPONSE 58:  The National Council of State Legislators monitors and maintains a database of 
state legislation related to universal occupational licensing. See: 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor -and-employment/universal -licensure -recognition.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 59:  Could the United  States please also indicate which further states are considering 
adoption of similar such legislation?  
 
RESPONSE 59:  Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective exercises.  
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
- 563 - 
 
  4.4.1  Financial Services  
4.4.1.4  Banking ser vices  
Paragraph  4.189  
 
QUESTION 60:  Could the United  States please expand on what limitations are applied to foreign 
banks and foreign -owned bank subsidiaries on a national treatment basis?  
 
RESPONSE 60:  Foreign banks with certain types of operations in the United  States are subject to 
nonbanking activity limitations applicable to U.S. banking organizations; however, certain 
exemptions apply to limit extraterritorial impact of such laws.  
 
PART II: REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT WT/TPR/G/434  
 
Government Report (G434)  
3 ADVANCING A WORKER -CENTERED TRADE POLICY  
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  
Paragraph  3.7 
 
QUESTION 61:  Could the United  States please provide more detail on how its new generation of 
trade policies will more affirmatively promote the decarbonisation necessary to limit global 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C? 
 
RESPONSE 61:  Please refer to the section, Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable 
Environmental Practices  in the President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda, available at: 
https://ustr.gov/sites/def ault/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20Ann
ual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
3.1 Standing up for Worker Rights  
Paragraph  3.1 
 
QUESTION 62:  Could the United  States please provide more information about its worker centred 
policy, including the types of stakeholders it engaged with in the development of the policy?  
 
RESPONSE 62:  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement begins with the recognition that trade 
should raise living standards, ensure full employment, pursue sustainable development, and protect 
and preserve the environment. Improved labor conditions are interwoven among these enduring and 
ambitious goals.  The United  States is implementing a worker -centered trade policy. This means we 
are focused on ensuring that our trade policy addresses  workers' interests, and that the benefits of 
trade are broadly shared by real people. The United  States recognizes that trade can  - and 
should  - be a force for good. Done right, and in coordination with other policy disciplines, it can grow 
the middle cla ss, redress inequality, and promote fair competition. We remain committed to 
upholding a fair and open global trading system  - one that follows through on our partners' 
longstanding commitment to conduct economic relations with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment, and promoting sustainable development. We are developing new tools 
and implementing existing commitments to achieve these goals. We think it is critical to include a 
wide range of stakeholders, including workers and the ir advocates, in the development and 
implementation of trade policy. We are regularly consulting with a range of labor stakeholders, both 
in the United  States and around the world, to hear their thoughts on how trade is affecting them 
and how they think it  can better serve real people.  
 
QUESTION 63 : If engagement included international as well as domestic stakeholders, could the 
United  States please provide further information on the engagement process with foreign trade 
bodies, governments and external sta keholders, and how this information was used to inform 
subsequent U.S. trade policy?  
 
RESPONSE 63:  The United  States consults regularly with a range of labor stakeholders, both in the 
United  States and around the world, to hear their thoughts on how trade is affecting them and how 
they think it can better serve real people. We are also in frequent communication with our trade 
partners to discuss implementation of trade commitments and collabor ate on ways to ensure the 
benefits of trade are shared broadly. That communication happens through a range of formal 
mechanisms, such as TIFAs and FTA Labor Council meetings, as well diplomatic engagement. We 
consider all of the information we receive from  stakeholders and trade partners in our policy making WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  process.  
 
3.1 Standing up for Worker Rights  
Paragraph  3.3 
 
QUESTION 64 : Could the United  States please clarify what the innovative trade tools cited in 3.3 
consist of, which will address topics importan t to working people?  
 
RESPONSE 64:  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement begins with the recognition that trade 
should raise living standards, ensure full employment, pursue sustainable development, and protect 
and preserve the environment. Improved labo r conditions are interwoven among these enduring and 
ambitious goals. The United  States is implementing a worker -centered  trade policy. This means we 
are putting worker interests at the heart of our trade policy development, our assessments of 
whether a particular policy position is working effectively, and our implementation and enforcement 
actions. We are doing so in order  to make sure the benefits of trade are widely shared by real people 
and that trade promotes the creation of decent work and good jobs. We are prioritizing a range of 
labor issues in the United  States -European  Union  Trade and Technology Council (TTC), in t he 
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), in the United  States  - United  Kingdom Dialogues on the 
Future of Atlantic Trade, and in discussions with Kenya on ways to enhance trade and investment 
relations.  All of these initiatives are ongoing and specific p olicy proposals are under development. 
Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are 
retrospective exercises.  
 
3.2 Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices  
Paragraph  3.11 
 
QUESTION 65 : Could the United  States please explain what mechanisms it sees as the main 
enablers in the facilitation of internationally trade climate -friendly or environmentally focused 
services?  
 
RESPONSE 65:  Please refer to the section, Accelerating Deca rbonization and Promoting Sustainable 
Environmental Practices  in the President's 2022 Trade Policy Agenda, available at 
https://ust r.gov/sites/default/files/2022%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202021%20Ann
ual%20Report%20(1).pdf . 
 
Government Report (G434)  
4 OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE  
4.1 Promoting Equitable, Inclusive, and Durable Trade Policy  
Paragraph  4.1 
 
QUESTION 66:  The report notes the investigation undertaken by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission on the potential distributional effects of goods and services trade and trade policy on 
U.S. workers. Could the United  States please explain how the findings of this investigation will be 
used to inform the U.S. trade policy?  
 
RESPONSE 66:  The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) investigation included two parts. 
The first part catalogues existing information regarding the distributional effects of goods and 
services trade and trade policy on U.S. workers. The resulting public report compiles input from 
nationwide roundtable discussions, an academic symposium, public hearing, and literature review. 
The vast findings of this unprecedented report will inform the development of an intersectional, 
interconnected approach to advancing inclusive trade policy that advances the well -being of workers. 
The second part of the investigation recommends that the USITC expand and develop ne w research 
and analysis capabilities so that future advice on probable economic effects includes estimates of 
the potential distributional effects of trade and trade policy on U.S. workers.  
 
Paragraph  4.1 
 
QUESTION 67:  The report notes the importance of ac curate and accessible economic data to assess 
the impact of trade on different types of U.S. workers. In addition to the U.S. International Trade 
Commission investigation, could the United  States please explain the steps is taking to ensure 
greater availab ility of disaggregated data and how better access to this data will inform work to 
address the distributional impacts of trade?  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  RESPONSE 67:  Executive  Order  13985 on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved 
Communities Through the Federal Government  (issued January  2021) established the Equitable Data 
Working Group which is "tasked with identifying inadequacies in our existing Federal data collection 
infras tructure and laying out a strategy for improving equitable data practices in the Federal 
government ." The United  States seeks to assess " whether its programs and policies produce 
consistently fair, just, and impartial treatment of all individuals, as well as identify opportunities for 
targeted actions that will result in improved outcomes for underserved and disadvantaged 
communities ". To inform this analysis,  the United  States consulted with key advocates and 
constituent communities and in April  2022 relea sed a report, "A Vision for Equitable Data: 
Recommendations from the Equitable Data working Group ". In addition, there is an ongoing 
coordinated interagency process to identify data gaps and make recommendations to address them. 
The findings from both the U.S. International Trade Commission investigation and the Equitable Data 
Working Group identify the need for disaggregating data by characteristics such as race and ethnicity, 
income, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, skill, and rural/urban geographies to inform 
trade policy and provide recommendations to address identified disparities.  
 
4 OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR TRADE  
4.6 State and Local Government Relations  
Paragraph  4.17 
 
QUESTION 68 : The United  States outlines the processes for USTR to communicate trade initiatives 
to the States. Could the United  States please explain further how trade related policies such as those 
in the Inflation Reduction Act will be implemented at the State level and their timeline  for providing 
guidance?  
 
RESPONSE 68:  The Inflation Reduction Act's tax incentives modify U.S. federal tax law and will be 
implemented at the federal level. It will not be implemented at the state level. The U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service will issue guidance in due course, in accordance with the Act.  
 
5 TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  
5.2 Trade Enforcement Activities  
Paragraph  5.16 
 
QUESTION 69 : Paragraph  5.16 states that the U.S. commits significant resources to identify and 
confront unjustified  barriers including on government procurement. Could the United  States please 
explain what they have done to identify and confront unjustified barriers on government 
procurement?  
 
RESPONSE 69: In general, USTR's activities in the WTO technical committees are at the forefront 
of these efforts. USTR also engages on these issues with U.S. trading partners through mechanisms 
established in free trade agreements and through regional and multilateral organizations, such as 
the Asia -Pacific Economic Co operation (APEC) forum and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
Development (OECD). For more information on the U.S. government's efforts to identify and confront 
non-tariff barriers in government procurement, please see USTR's 
2022 National  Trade  Estimate  Report  on Foreign  Trade  Barriers,  available  at: https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/2022%20National%20Trade%20Esti mate%20Report%20on%20Foreign%20Trade%20
Barriers.pdf . 
 
Government Report (G434)  
5 TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2018  
5.3 Other Monitoring and Enforcement Activities  
5.3.1  Addressing non -market policies and practices  
Paragraph  5.19 
 
QUESTION 70 : Could the United  States please provide more detail on how it will ensure that The 
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 continues to ensure that Government support does not negatively 
disadvantage workers and businesses who could struggle to meet the requiremen ts in the 
United  States and in other countries?  
 
RESPONSE 70:  The United  States intends to administer the Act in a manner that is consistent with 
U.S. law and with U.S. commitments under the WTO  Agreement . 
 WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  5.3.2  Ensuring Compliance with Labor Obligations  
Paragraph  5.24 
 
QUESTION 71 : Could the United  States please explain to what extent the USTR relies on national 
reporting to relevant international bodies such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and 
cooperation and dialogue with partners, to ensure compliance with labour requirement s? 
 
RESPONSE 71:  The United  States considers many sources of information when monitoring 
compliance with labor requirements of trade instruments.  
 
Paragraph  5.27 
 
QUESTION 72: Could the United  States please provide more detail on how they have promoted and 
improved compliance with labour obligations in U.S. trade preference programmes, and how effective 
these programmes have been?  
 
RESPONSE 72:  The United  States conducts rob ust monitoring of the labor obligations in U.S. trade 
preference programs. All of our trade preference programs have scheduled reviews under which we 
gather and review information related to compliance with program obligations and engage with 
beneficiary c ountries on compliance issues. We have found this review and engagement to be 
beneficial.  
 
5.3.3  Addressing Forced Labor  
Paragraph  5.31 
 
QUESTION 73 : Could the United  States please provide further information on the development of 
its focused trade strategy to combat forced labour?  
 
RESPONSE 73:  The focused trade strategy to combat forced labor will lay out the U.S. government's 
trade approach to addressing forced labor  in global supply chains. Work to develop the strategy is 
ongoing. The United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy Reviews are retrospective exercises . 
 
QUESTION 74:  As part of this, has the USTR reviewed existing trade policies and tools used by 
other countries to combat forced labour?  
 
RESPONSE 74:  The United  States is constantly evaluating whether there are ways to make its 
forced labor trade strategy as effective as possible, including by evaluating the actions that trading 
partners have taken to combat forced labor.  
 
5.4 Free Trade Agreements and Initiatives  
5.5.4  Engagement with the Middle East and North Africa  
Paragrap h 5.79 
 
QUESTION 75:  The Government Report notes that the United  States has sought further contact 
with Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Could the United  States please provide 
further information on the future ambition of engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Co uncil, and 
how it will seek to integrate its worker -centred trade policy and women's economic empowerment 
in developing trading relations?  
 
RESPONSE 75: Regarding future plans, the United  States reminds Members that Trade Policy 
Reviews are retrospective e xercises.  
 
9 SMALL AND MEDIUM -SIZED BUSINESS TRADE  
Paragraph  9.1 
 
QUESTION 76 : Could the United  States please provide more details on the types of initiatives that 
are being taken forward to increase export opportunities for SMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 76:  The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has implemented a Small and 
Medium -Sized Business Initiative to increase export opportunities for U.S. small and medium -sized 
businesses (SMEs) and has expanded efforts to address the specific export chal lenges and priorities 
of SMEs and their workers in U.S. trade policy and enforcement activities. In the period under review, WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  USTR continued to engage with its interagency partners and with trading partners to develop and 
implement new and ongoing initiativ es that support small business exports. Please see the 2022 
Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report for further details on the Small and Medium -Sized Business 
Initiative.  
 
QUESTION 77:  What is the United  States' approach to monitoring the impacts of these in itiatives 
on SMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 77: The U.S. periodically commissions reports from the U.S. International Trade 
Commission to analyze the impact on small businesses of trade barriers in foreign markets, such as 
the United  Kingdom. Trade data analysis on small business exports from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and the U.S. Small Business Administration and SME roundtables and listening sessions 
around the United  States with the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy also solicit 
input dir ectly from U.S. SME stakeholders on the impact of trade initiatives.   WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  URUGUAY  
PART I: REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT WT/TPR/S/434  
 
QUESTION 1:  Chapter 9 (Government report) on small and medium -sized business refers to the 
first dedicated chapter on SMEs in the United  States -Mexico -Canada Agreement (USMCA). Does the 
United  States conducted an assessment on the extent to which MSMEs use RTAs to engage in 
international trade, MSME challenges in utilizing RTAs, and potential benefits RTAs can have for 
MSMEs?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The U.S. periodically commissions reports from the U.S. International Trade 
Commission to analyse the impact on small businesses of trade barriers in foreign markets. Trade 
data analysis on small business exports from the U.S. Department of Comme rce and the U.S. Small 
Business Administration and SME roundtables and listening sessions around the United  States with 
the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy also solicit input directly from U.S. SME 
stakeholders on the impact of trade initiatives. SBA Advocacy conducts small business outreach with 
a diverse group of small businesses and thei r representatives and receives input from small 
businesses in the manufacturing, services, and agriculture industries on the potential economic 
effects of trade agreements.  
 
QUESTION 2:  Point 3.1.1.6.1 of the Secretariat´s report refers to the single windo w and the 
automated commercial environment (ACE) and the economic benefits for the trade community. 
Could the United  States elaborate on the benefits of the single window for small companies?  
 
RESPONSE 2:  Extensive information about the use and functionali ty of ACE, including user 
information, can be found on the CBP  website.  Furthermore, user satisfaction survey information 
can also be found online at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated .  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  VIET  NAM  
PART  I: REGARDING  THE SECRETARIAT  REPORT  (WT/TPR/S/434)  
 
(i) Regarding Anti -dumping/countervailing duty anti -circumvention investigations:  
 
QUESTION 1:  Based on what foundation, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) decide whether 
to initiate an anti -circumvention investigation on a country -wide (country -wide) basis or 
company -specific basis?  
 
RESPONSE 1:  The determination as to whether and on what basis to initiate a circumvention 
investigation is made on a case -specific basis and depends on the facts  and circumstances in that 
segment. The information which DOC will consider in determining whether or not to initiate a 
circumvention inquiry is found in 19 U.S.C. 1677j and in 19 CFR 351.226(c) of the regulations. 
Details of past circumvention determinati ons can be found at: https://access.trade.gov/login.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 2:  What are the final AD/CVD duty rates applied to foreign producers/exporters subject 
to an anti -circumvention investigation, in the ev ent that the original AD/CVD order comprises 
different duty rates for different respondents (i.e. mandatory respondent, separate -rate 
respondents, country -wide respondents)?  
 
RESPONSE  2: Examples  of past circumvention  determinations  can be found  at https://access.trad
e.gov/login.aspx . 
 
QUESTION 3:  What is the basis for a producer/exporter to be applied a different duty rate from 
others?  
 
RESPONSE 3:  There are two scenarios in which such treatment would be applied – either DOC 
determined that the producer/exporter combination was found to be circumventing, but no other 
company was likely circumventing, or DOC determined that the producer/exporter combination was 
not circumventing, while other exporters and p roducer combinations were circumventing.  
 
QUESTION 4:  According to the U.S. regulations on anti -circumvention investigations, the DOC 
provides a certification program for eligible exporters and importers to participate in the program to 
be excluded from the original AD/CVD measures. Do the U.S. customs have a mechanism to monitor 
whether exporters/importers have declared correctly?  
 
RESPONSE 4:  U.S. Customs and Border Protection reviews entries on a regular basis to ensure that 
the information made upon entry is correct.  
 
QUESTION 5:  In case of errors in the declaration, how do the U.S. customs handle it?  
 
RESPONSE 5:  The handling of errors is f act-specific and depends on the circumstances of the entries 
at issue.  
 
QUESTION 6:  The U.S. AD/CVD regulations require that one of the conditions for foreign exporters 
to participate in a new shipper review is that they demonstrate their unaffiliated rela tionship with a 
customer in the United  States. In case the U.S. customer does not agree to provide information 
about and confirm this non -affiliation, does this affect the foreign exporters' eligibility to participate 
in a new shipper review, if yes, how t o tackle this?  
 
RESPONSE 6:  Yes. DOC is not responsible for the business relationships between exporters and 
their unaffiliated importers. If an exporter wishes to demonstrate that it is a new shipper under 
19 CFR. 351.214, it must report the information r equired.  
 
QUESTION 7:  Are there administrative reviews for foreign producers/exporters subject to AD/CVD 
anti-circumvention investigations?  
 
RESPONSE 7:  If DOC determines that a producer or exporter has circumvented an Anti -dumping 
or countervailing duty o rder, once the circumvention inquiry is completed, the producer or exporter 
may request an administrative review of its merchandise under 19 U.S.C. 1675 when the time for 
an annual review is announced.  WT/TPR/M/434/Add.1  
 
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  QUESTION 8:  If yes, how do they request an annual admi nistrative review, what will be reviewed 
and what are specific procedures for such reviews?  
 
RESPONSE 8:  See 19  U.S.C.  1675 and 19 CFR 351.213 for further details on the annual 
administrative review procedures.  
 
(ii) Regarding CBP's AD/CVD duty evasion inv estigations:  
 
QUESTION 9:  On page  81 of the Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/434), it is mentioned that the U.S. 
introduced a new framework for CBP to investigate allegations of AD/CVD duty evasion under the 
Enforcement and Protection Act of 2015 (EAPA). Can the U.S. explain what this new framework is?  
 
RESPONSE 9:  Details of the duty evasion framework under EAPA were notified to the WTO at 
G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.23 G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.23 (dated 1  April 2016) and 
G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.25 G/SCM/N/1 /USA/1/Suppl.24 (dated 26  August  2016).  
 
QUESTION 10:  In CBP's AD/CVD duty evasion investigations, in case a foreign producer/exporter 
is determined to be involved in duty evasion, what is the mechanism for administrative review of 
the final measures?  
 
RESPONSE  10: Details  regarding  duty evasion  investigations  can be found  at: https://www.cbp.g
ov/trade/trade -enforcement/tftea/eapa . 
 
QUESTION 11:  Does the U.S. have a certification program  for such foreign producers/exporters 
who commits to stop the evasion?  
 
RESPONSE 11:  See response to Question  10 above.  
 
QUESTION 12:  In CBP's AD/CVD duty evasion investigations, is there any case where CBP defer all 
or part of the provisional measure?  
 
RESPONSE 12:  See response to Question  10 above.  
 
(iii) Regarding the issue of currency valuation of Viet  Nam:  
 
QUESTION 13:  Is there a link between the USTR currency valuation investigation and the currency 
exchange issue in DOC countervailing in vestigations?  
 
RESPONSE 13:  U.S. trade remedy proceedings are conducted under a different U.S. statute, with 
different criteria and for a purpose distinct from that of USTR's currency valuation investigation.  
 
QUESTION 14:  As mentioned in the report of the  WTO Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/434  – United  States, 
page 119), does the agreement between the U.S. Treasury and the State Bank of Viet  Nam affect 
the U.S. DOC's determinations on the issue of foreign currency exchange in countervailing duty 
investigations conc erning Vietnamese exports?  
 
RESPONSE 14:  U.S. trade remedy laws are separate and distinct from other bilateral agreements 
between U.S. agencies and foreign governments.  
 
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