JOB/AG/170  
 
22 November 2019  
(19-7988) Page: 1/12 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session  Original: English  
 
 
OBSERVATIONS ON EXPO RT FINANCING AND AGR ICULTURAL EXPORTING 
STATE  TRADING ENTERPRISES:  AN ANALYSIS OF T RANSPARENCY  
AND DISCIPLINES FROM THE NAIROBI DECISION  
DISCUSSION PAPER  
SUBMISSION FROM CANADA, NORWAY AND S WITZERLAND  
The following submission , dated 2 2 November 2019, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation s of Canada , Norway  and Switzerland . 
 
_______________  
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  The Bali Ministerial Declaration on Export Competition (WT/MIN(13)/40  – WT/L/915) 
recognized that a ll forms of export subsidies, and all export measures with equivalent effect, are 
highly trade distorting and protectionist forms of support. Ministers also recognized the importance 
of enhancing transparency and improving monitoring in relation to all for ms of export subsidies and 
all export measures with equivalent effect in order to support the agricultural reform process. To 
this end, Ministers established a dedicated annual examination process in the Committee on 
Agriculture to assess developments in t he export competition pillar. The examination is based on 
timely information submitted by Members to the Secretariat based on an annual export competition 
questionnaire (ECQ), and complemented by information compiled by the Secretariat based on 
Members ' responses to the questionnaire.   
1.2.  The ECQ seeks to gather valuable information on the current status of measures in key areas 
under the pillar, including export subsidies, export financing (i.e., export credits, export credit 
guarantees and insurance or risk  coverage programs), international food aid and agriculture 
exporting state trading enterprises (STEs). The first session dedicated to the examination based on 
Members ' responses to the annual ECQ was held in June 2014, and a total of six annual dedicated 
sessions have taken place since. The most recent dedicated session took place in June 2019.  
1.3.  The 2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(15)/45  – WT/L/980) marked 
progress in the reform of agriculture trade, whereby Ministers agreed to eliminate  export subsidies 
and related annual quantity and outlay -based entitlements from their Goods Schedules. The Nairobi 
Decision also introduced new disciplines in other areas, including on export financing, where a 
maximum repayment term was set, as well as o n agricultural exporting STEs, whereby Members are 
to ensure that such STEs do not operate in a manner that circumvents any other disciplines in the 
Nairobi Decision. WTO Ministers also reaffirmed the usefulness of the annual dedicated sessions, 
continued the annual examination and agreed to continue negotiations on export competition, along 
with domestic support and market access.  
1.4.  Both the Bali Decision and Nairobi Decision identified the potential for export financing 
measures and agricultural exporting STEs to have the equivalent effect to an export subsidy and 
highlighted the importance of transparency in the monitoring of those measures.  
1.5.  Export financing measures can enable trade by helping to address export market risks; 
however, longer repayment ter ms on loans or credit, longer risk coverage periods as well as other JOB/AG/170  
 
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  flexibilities can also provide an undue financial advantage to exporters, which can be used to lower 
their export prices. Agricultural exporting STEs can facilitate the commercialization and distribution 
of agriculture products, but can also use their exclusive or special right or privilege to undercut 
competitors in third markets, including on prices. In both instances, this can increase the potential 
for trade distortions in export marke ts, have an effect equivalent to that of an export subsidy, and 
serve to circumvent the export subsidy elimination commitment made in the Nairobi Decision.  
1.6.  The annual export competition dedicated sessions, as well as the accuracy, completeness and 
the tim eliness of Members ' responses that support it, are an essential tool to monitor the trade 
impacts of export financing measures and agriculture exporting STEs, and to address the 
circumvention risks identified above.  
1.7.  This paper examines how transparency co uld be further enhanced by looking at current 
practices with regards to repayment terms under export financing schemes 
(G/AG/W/125/Rev.11/Add.2) as well as exports under agricultural exporting STEs 
(G/AG/W/125/Rev.11/Add.4) based on the responses provided by Members to the ECQ circulated in 
October 2018.  
1.8.  From this analysis, the paper identifies potential areas where further commitments could be 
taken to strengthen the disciplines contained in the Nairobi Decision and to minimize the potential 
for circumvent ion. 
2  EXPORT FINANCING  
2.1.  The Nairobi Decision establishes a set of disciplines on export financing support (export credits, 
export credit guarantees and insurance programmes) for exports of agricultural products. As of 
1 January 2018, developed Members are re quired to maintain maximum repayment terms of 
18 months or less for export financing measures for which agriculture products are eligible. 
Developing Members have a longer implementation period, and as of 1 January 2018, are subject 
to a 27 months or less maximum repayment term requirement (down from the 36 months or less 
requirement which applied from 1 January 2016). By 1 January 2020, all Members providing export 
financing support will be required to maintain maximum repayment terms of 18 months or less.  
Self-financing requirements applied from 1 January 2016.  
2.2.  In addition to information related to maximum repayment terms and average repayment 
terms, Members with export financing measures in place are also required to provide detailed 
information on the e xport financing measures, including a description of the program, the export 
financing entity, premium rates and fees, the export destinations of products receiving export 
financing support, and program use by product or product group. Unless they are in a  position to do 
so at an earlier date, developing Members have five years from the date of implementation of the 
Decision for these transparency requirements to apply, i.e., 1 January 2021.  
2.3.  According to the latest background document by the Secretariat (G /AG/W/125/Rev.11) of 
September 2019, 20 Members1 (counting the European Union as one Member) have provided 
responses to the export financing section indicating that they had export financing entities and 
programs in place, as per the most recent Secretaria t background document 
(G/AG/W/125/Rev.11/Add.2). In its response, the European Union provided information regarding 
export financing measures for 19 of its 28 member States, while nine member States were marked 
as "nil".2 Of those Members that have not provided information on export financing measures in any 
ECQ, a total of 36 Members have responded at least once with a nil, of which 16 Members replied to 
the ECQ circulated in October 2018 with a nil.  
2.1  Analysis  
2.4.  To support the observations in this paper, and as it relates to the monitoring of Nairobi Decision 
obligations, the most recent responses from Members regarding maximum repayment terms and 
average repayment period under export financing schemes have been compiled und er "Table 1: 
 
1 Paraguay provided information on financial products that are made available to domestic livestock 
production that do not appear to be export financing measures (i.e., export credits, export credit guarantees 
and insurance or risk coverage programs) and has been counted as a nil reply to the October 2018 ECQ.  
2 This includes Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Port ugal and Spain.  JOB/AG/170  
 
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  Maximum Repayment Terms per Program or Entity ". Whenever available, the type of program has 
also been compiled in the same table.  
2.5.  Some Members have voluntarily provided information on self -financing in the description of its 
export financing entity.    
2.6.  The absence of specific term -related information or an unclear response is denoted by "N/A". 
An unclear response can include, for exa mple, instances where more than one program is described 
under question 1 and the information provided under questions 5 or 6 of the export financing section 
of the ECQ is not clearly attributed to a specific program, or where one response is attributed to  a 
specific program and no other response attributed to other programs.  
2.7.  Where more than one average repayment period was provided for a particular program , 
including when a range is provided,  the longest is considered.  In some instances, the information 
related to the average repayment period is the same as the information related to the maximum 
repayment term.  
2.8.  Where the agriculture -specific maximum repayment term was provided in a Member 's 
response, the table shows those terms; otherwise, the terms related  to general programs (not 
specific to agriculture but for which agriculture products are eligible) are shown, when provided in 
the response. Where Members applied substantially different repayment terms between programs, 
conditions per program are shown.  
2.9.  Programs for which agriculture products have been specified to be ineligible have been omitted 
from the table.  
Table 1: Maximum Repayment Terms per Program or Entity  
Member  Response 
Month/Year  Entity(ies) and/or Programs  Type of 
Program  Maximum 
Repayment 
Term Average 
Repayment 
Period  
Argentina  10/2018  Bank of the Argentine Nation  Direct 
Financing  N/A N/A 
Investment and Foreign Trade 
Bank Direct 
Financing  360 days  180 days  
Australia  10/2018  EFIC – Bond Risk Cover  N/A N/A 
EFIC – Risk Participation 
Agreements  Risk Cover  270 days  54 days  
EFIC – Documentary Credit 
Guarantee  Risk Cover  180 days  N/A 
Brazil  10/2018  PROEX Direct Financing  Direct 
Financing  12 months  6 months  
18 months for 
Cuba 34 months for 
Cuba 
PROEX Interest Rate Support  Direct 
Financing  N/A N/A 
Canada  10/2018  Export Development Canada 
Credit Insurance  Risk Cover  180 days  62 days  
China  10/2016  Agriculture Development Bank of 
China  Direct 
Financing  6 Months  4 Months  
ExIm Bank of China  Direct 
Financing  250 days  200 days  
SinoSURE  Risk Cover  18 months  12 months  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European 
Union  
 
 
 
 
 
 10/2018  Austria (OeKB)  Risk Cover  N/A N/A 
Bulgaria (BAEZ)  Risk Cover  N/A N/A 
Croatia (HBOR)  Direct 
Financing 
and Risk 
Cover  18 months  N/A 
Czech Republic (EGAP)  Risk Cover  12 months  11.2 months  
Czech Republic (CEB)  Direct 
Financing  18 months  12 months  
Denmark (EKF) Export Credits - 
breeding animals  Direct 
Financing  18 months  18 months  
Denmark (EKF) Export Credits - 
others  Direct 
Financing  12 months  12 months  JOB/AG/170  
 
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  Member  Response 
Month/Year  Entity(ies) and/or Programs  Type of 
Program  Maximum 
Repayment 
Term Average 
Repayment 
Period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European 
Union  Denmark (EKF) Reinsurance  Risk Cover  180 days  180 days  
Estonia (KredEX)  Risk Cover  12 months  2 months  
Finland (Finnvera)  Risk Cover  180 days  20-90 days  
France (BPI)  Risk Cover  18 months  360 days  
Germany (Euler Hermes 
Aktiengesellschaft)  Risk Cover  N/A N/A 
Hungary (HECI)  Risk Cover  18 months  16 months  
Hungary (HEIB)  Direct 
Financing 
and Risk 
Cover  18 months  N/A 
Latvia (Altum)  Risk Cover  18 months  79 days 
Lithuania (Invega)  Risk Cover  45 days  45 days  
Netherlands (Export Credit 
Insurance, Export Credit 
Guarantee, Dutch Good Growth 
Fund & Dutch Trade and 
Investment Fund)  Direct 
Financing 
and Risk 
Cover  180 days  180 days  
Poland (KUKE) - Trade 
receivables  Risk Cover  540 days  62 days  
Poland (KUKE) - Bonds 
concerning LCs  Risk Cover  540 days  338 days  
Romania (ExImBank)  Risk Cover  18 months  18 months  
Slovak Republic (EXIMBANKA)  Direct 
Financing 
and Risk 
Cover  18 months  12 months  
Slovenia (SID Bank)  Risk Cover  N/A N/A 
Sweden (EKN)  Risk Cover  180 days  90 days  
United Kingdom (EXIP)  Risk Cover  18 months  N/A 
Hong Kong, 
China  10/2018  HKECIC  Risk Cover  180 days  90 days  
Iceland  10/2016  IECG N/A N/A N/A 
Indonesia  10/2018  EximBank  Direct 
Financing 
and Risk 
Cover  More than 5 
years  Monthly  
ASEI Risk Cover  N/A N/A 
Jamaica  01/2016  EXIM Bank  Direct 
Financing 
and Risk 
Cover  120 days  120 days  
Japan  10/2018  NEXI Risk Cover  18 months  N/A 
Malaysia  10/2018  EXIM Malaysia  Direct 
Financing 
and Risk 
Cover  N/A Monthly  
New Zealand  10/2018  NZEC Short Term  Risk Cover  12 months  100 days  
NZEC Loan Guarantee  Risk Cover  7 months  3 months 
(unclear if for a 
specific program 
or all)  NZEC Export Credit Guarantee  Risk Cover  15 years  
Russian 
Federation  10/2018  REC Group - EXIAR  Risk Cover  12 months  N/A 
REC Group - REB Direct 
Financing  9 months  5 months  
Switzerland  10/2018  SERV  Risk Cover  180 days  N/A JOB/AG/170  
 
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  Member  Response 
Month/Year  Entity(ies) and/or Programs  Type of 
Program  Maximum 
Repayment 
Term Average 
Repayment 
Period  
Thailand  10/2018  Export Credit Programme  Direct 
financing  180 days  180 days 
Export Credit Insurance 
Programme  Risk Cover  180 days  180 days  
Trinidad and 
Tobago  10/2016  EXIMBANK Pre -shipment and 
Post-shipment facilities  Direct 
Financing  180 days  180 days  
EXIMBANK Demand Loan  Direct 
Financing  5 years  5 years  
EXIMBANK Export Credit 
Insurance  Risk Cover  N/A N/A 
Turkey  10/2018  Eximbank – Export Credits 
(short, medium, long -term)  Direct 
Financing  7 years  416 days  
Eximbank – Credit Insurance 
(short, medium, long -term)  Risk Cover  360 days  120 days  
Eximbank – International Loan 
Program  Direct 
Financing  12 months  N/A 
United 
States  10/2018  USDA GSM -102 Risk Cover  18 months  12.3 months  
ExIm Export Credit Insurance  Risk Cover  360 days  180 days  
Viet Nam  01/2016  Vietnam Development Bank  Direct 
Financing  12 months  N/A 
2.2  Observations  
2.2.1   Transparency  
2.10.   While six annual reviews have taken place since the implementation of the 2013 Bali Decision, 
Table 1 shows that information gaps remain in the most recent responses provided to the export 
financing sectio n of the ECQ. In many instances, information regarding maximum repayment terms 
or average repayment terms has not been provided for each entity or program notified under 
question  1. This includes incomplete responses for entities or programs which provide export 
financing services on a commercial basis, despite the fact that these still fall under the scope of 
definition of export financing in paragraph 13 of the Nairobi Decision.  
2.11.   This lack of complete information on export financing measures is exacerbate d by the low 
response rate to the questionnaire itself. As per the latest version of the Secretariat background 
document of September 2019, only 33 Members responded to the October 2018 ECQ, a response 
rate of less than 25 %, and a total of 83 Members have yet to provide at least one response.  
2.12.   These information gaps and the potential under -notification of entities and programs highlight 
transparency issues that may hinder the monitoring and surveillance of Members ' export competition 
commitments , including from the perspective of monitoring the implementation of Nairobi Decision 
requirements on export financing.  
2.13.   In addition, more comprehensive information on Members ' export financing programs would 
help Members achieve a more thorough understand ing of current trends and realities, which could 
further help in identifying potential options and proposals on export competition.  
2.14.   Ideas and suggestions on how to enhance transparency by improving the ECQ and the review 
process are regrouped in Section 4 of this paper, i.e., "Options to Enhance Transparency Under the 
Export Competition Pillar".   
2.2.2   Compliance with Nairobi Maximum Repayment Term Requirement  
2.15.   A few Members notified maximum repayment terms longer than 18 months, as shown by 
Graph 1 below. Also i n Graph 1, European Union member States are shown individually to give an 
idea of the overall distribution.  JOB/AG/170  
 
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  Graph 1: Longest Notified Maximum Repayment per Member  
 
 
2.16.   Despite the fact that developed Members are required to maintain maximum repayment terms 
of 18 months or less as of 1 January 2018, New Zealand has notified a risk cover program (NZEC 
Export Credit Guarantee) with maximum repayment terms of 15 years (180 months), noting that 
the term should not exceed the useful life of the exp orted goods and services, and that no export 
credit policies were issued in support of agriculture products in 2018.  
2.17.   While developing Members are required to maintain maximum repayment terms of 36 months 
or less as of 1 January 2016, Turkey and Indonesia n otified maximum repayment terms in excess 
of 36 months in response to the October 2018 ECQ (i.e., beyond the date of application of the 
36-month requirement). Trinidad and Tobago also notified maximum repayment terms in excess of 
36 months, in response to the 31 October 2016 ECQ. An up -to-date response from Trinidad and 
Tobago could provide a more accurate assessment of its export financing programs.  
2.2.3   Potential Areas for Further Commitments  
2.18.   Graph 2 shows the longest maximum repayment terms of Members which are 18 months or 
less (full implementation of Nairobi Decision requirements).  
Graph 2: Longest Maximum Repayment Terms per Member – 18 months or less  
 
JOB/AG/170  
 
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  2.19.   More than half the responding Members ( seven  out of 12) reporting maximum repayment 
terms of 18 months o r less have notified maximum repayment terms of 12 months or less, 
highlighting a potential area for further commitments.  
2.20.   As a general rule, Members are encouraged to take commitments when and where they are 
in a position to do so. Looking at notified ave rage repayment terms for the Members above, these 
tend to be closer to "12 months or less ", rather than the 18 -month requirement. This could suggest 
that fewer Members might be in a position to comply with a maximum repayment term requirement 
of 12 months or less.  
2.21.   Reducing maximum repayment terms would minimize the financial benefits that could, in 
turn, be used to lower export prices and, thus, the potential for export financing measures to act as 
an export subsidy. This would improve Nairobi Decision expo rt financing disciplines in a way that 
reinforces the export subsidy elimination commitment.  
2.22.   Other areas could also be explored to strengthen export financing disciplines, including 
interest rates, insurance premiums, conditions related to risk sharing arr angements, or debt 
rescheduling practices, including how debt rescheduling term length and repayment terms.  
3  AGRICULTURAL EXPORTI NG STATE TRADING ENT ERPRISES (STES)  
3.1.  Provisions contained in the Nairobi Decision that relate to agricultural exporting STEs requ ire 
Members to ensure that agricultural exporting STEs do not operate in a manner that circumvents 
any other disciplines in the Decision. Members are also required to make best efforts to ensure that 
monopoly export powers by agricultural exporting STEs ar e exercised in a manner that minimizes 
trade -distorting effects, and does not displace or impede exports of other Members. Members are 
also required to provide detailed information on each individual agricultural exporting STE in 
response to the ECQ, inclu ding on the special rights or privileges accorded, the export volumes, 
procurement prices, domestic prices and export prices.  
3.2.  The agricultural exporting STE section of the Secretariat 's most recent background document 
(G/AG/W/125/Rev.11/Add.4) indicates that 59 agricultural exporting STEs were notified by 
15 Members (including information sourced from notifications submitted to the Working Party on 
State Trade Enterprises). Of these, 46 agricultural exporting STEs were notified as being currently 
active and were accorded special or exclusive rights or privileges on 20 product groups .3 Of these 
46 STEs, 19 are regional agricultural exporting STEs notified by China involved in the export of 
tobacco. The remaining 27 agricu ltural exporting STEs are involved in the export of a wide range of 
agriculture products, with four Members having STEs involved in the export of rice, and three  
Members in the export of sugar.  
3.3.  The number of Members notifying and the number of agricultura l exporting STEs notified has 
remained stable since the June 2017 review. In addition to the 15 Members that provided information 
relative to their agricultural exporting STEs, 21 Members indicated they had no agricultural exporting 
STE in place.  
3.4.  Accordin g to the latest background document by the Secretariat (G/AG/W/125/Rev.11), of 
those Members that did not notify an agricultural exporting STE in response to the October 2018 
ECQ or through the Working Party on STEs, a total of 36 Members have responded at  least once 
with a nil, of which 16 Members replied to the October 2018 ECQ with a nil.  
3.1  Analysis  
3.5.  To support the observations of this paper on agricultural exporting STEs, the most recent 
responses from Members on exports under each of their agricultural ex porting STEs have been 
compiled under "Table 2: Notified Agricultural Exporting STE Export Volumes, 2017 -2018".  
 
3 India' s notifications to the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises note that, since March 2014, 
the export of onions is free. As such, 13 previously notified agriculture export STEs no longer benefit from 
exclusive or special rights or privileges in the export of onions.   JOB/AG/170  
 
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  3.6.  The table shows agriculture exports for each STE for 2018, the most recent year for which data 
was notified by Members, by product or product g roup, while 2017 was also included as a proxy for 
the purposes of this paper in cases where the most recent data provided was for that year.  
3.7.  The absence of export information by STEs for either 2018 or 2017 is noted as N/A.  
Table 2: Reported Agricultural Exports by STEs 2017 -2018  
Member  Product Description  Year STE exports (metric tonnes, unless  
otherwise noted)  
Australia  Rice 2017 218,000  
2018 316,000  
China  Rice 2017 1,197,000  
2018 N/A 
Maize  2017 85,000  
2018 N/A 
Cotton  2017 17,000  
2018 N/A 
Tobacco and tobacco products  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Colombia  Liquor beverages  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Costa Rica  Sugar  2017 261,853  
2018 N/A 
Dominica  Bananas  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Ecuador  Maize  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Rice 2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Cereals  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Fiji Sugar  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Grenada  Cocoa beans  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
India  Sugar  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Indonesia  Rice 2017 0 
2018 0 
Israel  Ground Nuts  2017 7,159  
2018 6,364  
Eggs and Poultry  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Plants  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Moldova, 
Republic of  Wine 2017 N/A 
2018 N/A JOB/AG/170  
 
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  Member  Product Description  Year STE exports (metric tonnes, unless  
otherwise noted)  
New Zealand  Fresh Kiwifruit  2017 501,461  
2018 442,282  
Tunisia  Tobacco  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Soya bean oil, Palm oil, Olive oil  2017 N/A 
2018 N/A 
Ukraine  Undenatured Ethyl Alcohol 
(thousand litres)  2017 5,4604 
2018 7,851  
3.2  Observations  
3.2.1   Transparency  
3.8.  Six annual reviews have taken place since the implementation of the 2013 Bali Decision, and 
Members have been required to notify and provide detailed information on agricultural exporting 
STEs to the Working Party on STEs since the 1995 implementation of t he Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Despite this, 
Table 2 shows that up -to-date information regarding exports under agricultural exporting STEs has 
only been provided by seven  Members, either through the ECQ or the Working Party on STEs, and 
that amongst those seven  Members, not all products or product groups were covered.  
3.9.  While reviewing the Secretariat 's background document, some inconsistencies between the 
information provided in the  ECQ with the information provided as part of a Member 's Working Party 
on STEs notification were also noted. This includes statements in the ECQ that no export of a product 
under an STE took place in specified years, while the Working Party on STEs notific ation indicates 
that such exports did take place, with quantities notified.  
3.10.   In many instances, no information with regards to prices, including on procurement prices, 
domestic sale prices or average export price was provided in Members ' responses to the 
questionnaire. In addition to the absence of information on export quantities, any assessment of the 
potential impacts of agricultural exporting STEs on the trade of agriculture products covered by their 
special or exclusive rights or privileges becomes very  challenging. The potential for circumvention 
of export subsidy elimination commitments remains hard to assess for this reason.  
3.11.   This lack of complete information on exports under agricultural exporting STEs is exacerbated 
by the low response rate to the qu estionnaire itself. As per the latest version of the Secretariat 
background document of September 2019, only 24 Members responded to the agricultural exporting 
STE section of the October 2018 ECQ with a nil response, and a total of 83 Members have yet to 
provide at least one response.  
3.12.   More complete, accurate and timely information on Members ' export quantities and prices 
under agricultural exporting STEs would improve Members ' understanding of the practices of these 
entities and their potential to act as an  export subsidy. This could further help in identifying potential 
options and proposals to improve disciplines on export competition as they relate to agricultural 
exporting STEs. Members are strongly encouraged to support transparency and provide input to  the 
annual export competition questionnaire as well as provide up -to-date notifications on their 
respective state trading enterprises.  
3.13.   Ideas and suggestions on how to enhance transparency by improving the ECQ and the review 
process are regrouped in Secti on 4 of this paper, i.e., "Options to Enhance Transparency Under the 
Export Competition Pillar".   
 
4 Taken from document G/AG/W/125/Rev.9/Add.4  JOB/AG/170  
 
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  3.2.2   Relative Market Power  
3.14.   As mentioned above, agricultural exporting STEs have been legally accorded an exclusive or 
special right or privilege to engage in the export of one or more products, and may act in a way that 
could have an equivalent effect to that of an export subsidy if an STE 's market power is used to 
influence the terms of trade (including prices). While the relative market power of an agricultural 
exporting STE may be depend ent on several factors, including shares in specific export markets and 
price-related dynamics, the STE export quantity information per product could be compared to global 
exports of the same product, which would show the relative  importance of the agricultural exporting 
STE in global trade.  
3.15.   Table 3 shows only Members and products for which STE export data was available in 
G/AG/W/125/Rev.11/Add.4 (and G/AG/W/125/Rev.9/Add.4 for 2007 in certain cases as noted), as 
well as the most recent year for which information is available, and compares it to global exports of 
the same products, with total global exports, percentage of STE exports as a share of global exports 
and the Harmonized System (HS) code used for global export provided in  the columns on the right.  
Table 3 : Products Exported by Agricultural Exporting STEs as a Share of Global Trade 
Member  Product 
Description  Year  STE exports 
(metric tonnes, 
unless otherwise 
noted)  Global Exports 
(metric tonnes, 
unless otherwise 
noted)5 Global 
Export 
(%) HS Code used 
for global 
exports  
Australia  Rice 2017 218,000  46,116,083  0.47%  
10.06  
2018 316,000  39,113,128  0.81%  
China  Rice 2017 1,197,000  46,116,083  2.60%  
10.06  
2018 N/A 39,113,128  - 
Maize  2017 85,000  145,882,998  0.06%  
10.05; 1104.23  
2018 N/A 156,290,324  - 
Cotton  2017 17,000  7,326,066  0.23%  
52.01; 52.03  
2018 N/A 7,695,036  - 
Costa Rica  Sugar  2017 261,853  58,142,624  0.45%  
17.01  
2018 N/A 50,356,656  - 
Indonesia  Rice 2017 0 46,116,083  0.00%  
10.06  
2018 0 39,113,128  0.00%  
Israel  Ground Nuts  2017 7,159  198,411  3.61%  
1202.41  
2018 6,364  132,505  4.80%  
New Zealand  Fresh Kiwifruit  2017 501,461  1,019,643  49.18%  
0810.50  
2018 442,282  1,155,030  38.29%  
Ukraine  Undenatured 
Ethyl Alcohol 
(thousand litres)  2017 5,4606 2,555,474  0.21%  
22.07  
2018 7,851  3,247,097  0.24%  
3.16.   Looking at the available data, few agricultural exporting STEs appear to have exported more 
than 5% of global exports in either 2017 or 2018. Further analysis may be needed better assess 
whether these STEs provide benefits to these exports in a way distorts trade.  
3.17.   Table 3 shows that the transparency of the export data provided could be enhanced if data 
on global trade in the product(s) was also included in the annual ECQ. Thi s would provide a clearer 
picture of the role of an agricultural exporting STE in the global trade of a product or products. 
 
5 Export data pulled using the Global Trade Tracker in November 2019, from national statistics data. 
Trade between European Union member States has been removed.  
6 Taken from document G/AG/W/125/Rev.9/Add.4.  JOB/AG/170  
 
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  Members could consider including global export data in the ECQ to provide a more complete picture 
of the role an agricultural expor ting STE in global trade.  
3.18.   Ideas and suggestions on how to enhance transparency by improving the ECQ and the review 
process are regrouped in Section 4 of this paper, i.e., "Options to Enhance Transparency Under the 
Export Competition Pillar".   
4  OPTIONS TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY  UNDER THE EXPORT CO MPETITION PILLAR  
4.1.  The observations presented above highlight three different areas where transparency could be 
enhanced under the Export Competition pillar, as well as a number of options that Members could 
consider.  
4.2.  In addition, the options contained in the Agriculture Negotiations Chair 's July 2019 Report, 
"Working Towards Doable Elements for Meaningful Outcomes" (JOB/AG/163), originating from the 
technical working group discussions, have been included as a reference.  
1. Increasing Members ' response rate to the annual ECQ.  
Options include:  
• Clarifying the scope of the questionnaire (e.g., entities and programs covered by the Nairobi 
Decision) and exploring issues Members may face in replying to the questionnaire , as well 
as means to address them, as part of the annual review process.  
o In exploring issues Members may face in replying to the questionnaires, explore the 
possibility of streamlining the ECQ process as one of the means to address the issues.  
• Clarifying that all Members that are in a position to provide information to the ECQ are 
currently required to do so, and that after 1 January  2021, all Nairobi Decision transparency 
requirements will apply to all Members.  
o During the review process, add a  standing agenda item whereby Members that did not 
respond to the ECQ are invited to provide the specific circumstances that prevented them 
from doing so.  
2. Improving the completeness and accuracy of Members ' responses, and improving 
the questionnaire.  
Options include:  
• In the export financing section:  
o Clarifying the scope of the maximum repayment period requirement (e.g., how it applies 
to both direct financing and risk cover programs) and related transparency requirements, 
which applies to all types of expo rt financing programs and/or entities.  
o From JOB/AG/163: Require data on operational costs and losses to monitor for the self -
financing requirement . 
• In the agricultural exporting STE section:  
o Clarifying that annual export data (value, volume, prices, destin ation) has to be provided . 
▪ This includes the fact that normal commercial confidentiality considerations may be 
used to justify the provision of aggregated data, but not necessarily the absence of 
data. 
o Expanding the section on "specification of exclusive or special rights or privileges enjoyed 
by the state trading enterprise " to include additional information on the operation of 
export monopoly powers, such as the rationale or objective for conferring such powers . 
o From JOB/AG/163: Requiring data and information on government participation in the 
agricultural export STE, including on:  JOB/AG/170  
 
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  ▪ government funding and underwriting of losses;  
▪ capital or finance -related privileges, as well as in -kind privileges provided by 
governments , and 
▪ government to governm ent contracts, potential subsidies and in -kind food aid 
provided by STEs.  
o From JOB/AG/163: Requiring disaggregated STE export data per country of destination . 
• Clarifying the scope of each section and question of the questionnaire, and exploring issues 
Memb ers may be facing in providing accurate and complete information on maximum 
repayment terms and exports of agricultural exporting STE, as well as means to address 
them.  
3. Enhancing the review process and adding key context information.   
In preparing its back ground document, the WTO Secretariat could:  
• In the Agricultural exporting STE section, add quantities exported globally as well as 
percentage of global exports per product or product group and per agricultural exporting 
STE, as it relates to sub -question 1  of the additional information subject to normal 
commercial confidentiality considerations, including to provide context on potential impacts 
of agriculture exporting STEs on global trade.  
• Similar to the above, in the Export financing section, add value of  global exports of products 
per product or product group, and per export financing program, as it relates to questions 
3, 7 and 8 of the export financing section of the ECQ; as well as percentage of global exports 
per product or product groups per export f inancing entity.  
 
 
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