G/AG/GEN/209  
 
15 November 2022  
(22-8497) Page: 1/8 
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
 
103RD MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
21-22 NOVEMBER 2022  
ANNUAL MONITORING OF THE FOLLOW -UP TO THE MARRAKESH MINISTERIAL DECISION  
Submission by FAO  
The following submission, dated 14 November  2022, is  being circulated at the request of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  
 
_______________  
 
 
1  BACKGROUND  
1.1.  According to the latest "State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022" (SOFI), 
the number of people affected by chronic hunger globally  rose to as many as 828 million in 2021, 
an increase of about 46 million since 2020, and 150 million since the outbreak of the COVID -19. 
The prevalence of undernourishment jumped from 8.0% to 9.3% from 2019 to 2020 and rose at a 
slower pace in 2021 to 9.8%  (Figure 1). Considering the regional patterns, Africa bears the heaviest 
burden, with one in five people (20.2% of the population) facing chronic hunger in 2021, compared 
to 9.1% in Asia, 8.6% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 5.8% in Oceania, and less than 2.5% in 
Northern America and Europe.1 
Figure 1. Prevalence of Undernourishment and Number of Undernourished  
 
Notes: *  Projected values for 2021 are illustrated by dotted lines. Shaded areas show lower and upper bounds 
of the estimated range.  
Source : FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2022. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 
2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable . Rome, FAO. 
https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0639en . 
 
1 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2022. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022 . 
Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable . Rome, FAO. 
https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0639en .  
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  1.2.  Moreover, according to the recently published Hunger Hotspot report ,2 during the outlook 
period from  October 2022 to January 2023, acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 
24 hotspot countries. Of these, 21 are Net Food -Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs). 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen are the countri es at the highest 
alert level, as they all have populations that are facing or projected to face starvation or at risk of 
deterioration towards catastrophic conditions. According to the report, organized violence and armed 
conflict remain the primary drive r of acute food insecurity, followed by economic shocks, weather 
extremes and climate variability, and animal and plant pests and diseases.  
2  FOOD: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS  
2.1  Global food prices  
2.1.  Fueling the 2021 hunger numbers, food prices increased in  the past year due to bottlenecks in 
supply chains, soaring energy and transport costs, poor weather in several major producing 
countries and other disruptions caused by the COVID -19 pandemic.3 The war in Ukraine further 
exacerbated the situation and push ed prices in early 2022 further up, with the FAO Food Price Index 
reaching a record high in March 2022. This peak was followed by successive months of reductions 
in global food prices (left graph in Figure 2). In October 2022, the Food Price Index averaged  
135.9  point, virtually unchanged from September, with the price indices of all the covered 
commodity groups, except cereals, down month -on-month. An upturn in the Cereal Price Index 
countered drops in the indices for vegetable oils, dairy, meat and sugar. With this latest update, 
the Food Price Index dropped 23.8 points (14.9 %) from its peak in March this year. Nonetheless, 
the index remained 2.7 points (2.0 %) above its value in the corresponding month last year.4 
Furthermore, markets have been very  volatile, with the prices of many staple commodities reaching 
record or near -record highs. One factor in the high volatility has been the low level of stocks held 
by the major exporting countries. The other factor that could be at play is the increasing g eopolitical 
tensions and the associated risks.  
Figure 2. FAO Food Price Index (left) and Price Indices for individual commodities 
(right)  
  
Source : FAO. 2022. Food Price Index . https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/  
 
2 WFP and FAO. 2022.  Hunger Hotspots. FAO -WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity:  
October  2022 to January 2023 Outlook . Rome.  
3 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2022.  The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. 
Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more afforda ble. Rome, FAO. 
https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0639en  
4 FAO. 2022. Food Price Index . https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesind ex/en/  
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  2.2.  The rise in the FAO Food Price Index reflects higher world prices of individual commodities, 
which, in parallel to the price index, have declined over the course of the past months while mostly 
remaining elevated. Regarding sub -indices for individual commodity groups (right graph in Figure  2), 
the FAO Cereal Price Index  averaged 152.3 points in October, 15.2 points (11.1 %) above its value 
a year ago. International prices of all major cereals, includ ing wheat, maize and rice, increased in 
October. The  FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index  averaged 150.1 points in October, standing nearly 
20% below its year -earlier level. The continued decrease of the index was driven by world lower 
prices of palm, soy and rap eseed oils, which more than offset higher sunflower  seed oil quotations. 
The FAO Dairy Price Index  averaged 140.1 points in October, nevertheless remaining 18.7 points 
(15.4 %) above its value a year ago. In October, international prices of all dairy produc ts covered by 
the index fell.  The FAO Meat Price Index  averaged 118.4 points in October, remaining 6.4 points 
(5.8%) above its value a year ago. The  FAO Sugar Price Index  averaged 109 points in October, 
down 10.1 points (8.5 %) from its value in the corresp onding month last year.5  
2.2  Trends in domestic food prices  
2.3.  According to FAO 's most recent analysis, domestic staple food prices in October remained at 
higher levels year -on-year in most monitored countries, though, compared to the previous month, 
prices softened in areas where harvests were recently concluded or ongoing. The underlying drivers 
of the higher year -on-year domestic food prices continue to include, among others, higher world 
prices, reduced domestic supplies of some commodities, nation al macroeconomic difficulties, 
currency depreciations, adverse weather conditions, insecurity as well as near -record to record high 
energy and fertilizer prices.6  
2.4.  Regarding sub-Saharan Africa , prices of coarse grains followed mixed trends in October and 
remained well above their year -earlier levels in most countries, while in Southern Africa cereal prices 
continued to rise but at a lower pace. In East Africa, prices of coarse grains are generally declining, 
but remain at exceptionally high levels in South  Sudan, the Sudan and Somalia, where famine is 
projected in late 2022 in the absence of an immediate scaling up of humanitarian assistance. In  these 
countries, prices remain underpinned by insufficient supplies and severe macroeconomic difficulties, 
includ ing currency weakness. Prices were also significantly higher year -on-year in Ethiopia, mainly 
as a result of macroeconomic difficulties and localized trade disruptions from insecurity. Across the 
subregion, the upward pressure on prices continues to be exa cerbated by the impact of the war in 
Ukraine on international food, fuel and fertilizer markets.  
2.5.  Among the Far East Asia domestic prices of rice and wheat showed mixed trends in October, 
while remaining at high levels in most countries. In Bangladesh, sign ificant price increases were 
registered for wheat grain and flour, where October quotations reached record levels and were 
almost 80 % above their year -earlier levels, due to a slowdown in imports and elevated 
transportation costs.  
2.6.  As for Central America an d the Caribbean  prices of red beans rose sharply in October in 
El Salvador and Honduras with the main crops affected by unfavourable weather conditions. 
The passage of Tropical Storm Julia affected the main season crops of red beans at germination 
stage in  early October and exerted strong upward pressure on prices in El Salvador and Honduras. 
In Honduras, prices of red beans rose more than 30 % month -on-month, while they increased by 
10% in El Salvador. In the Caribbean, prices of domestically produced maize  meal and black beans 
rose in September in most markets of Haiti, as seasonal downward pressure was more than offset 
by the below -average main crop output. Sharp price increases were registered in the capital, 
Port-au-Prince, where the blockage of a main p ort of fuel entry caused fuel shortages.  
 
5 FAO. 2022. Food Price Index.  https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/  
6 FAO. 2022. FPMA Bulletin: Monthly Report on Food Price Trends  (11 November 2022). 
https://www.fao.org/3/cc2905en/cc2905en.pdf   G/AG/GEN/209  
 
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  Figure 3. Domestic price developments in the Sudan (top) and Bangladesh (bottom).  
 
 
Source :  FAO. 2022. FPMA Bulletin:  Monthly Report on Food Price Trends  (11 November 2022). 
https://www.fao.org/3/cc2905en/cc2905en.pdf  
3  CEREAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND  
Production  
3.1.  According to the latest FAO estimates, world cereal production in 2022 is pegged at 
2,764 million tonnes, down 1.8 % (50.8 million tonnes) year -on-year. Global wheat production is 
forecast at 783.8 million tonnes in 2022, 0.6 % (4.5 million tonnes) above the 2021 outturn and an 
all-time high. Global coarse grain production forecast for 2022 stands at 1 467 million tonnes, 
2.8% lower on a yearly basis, marking the first production downturn in four years. In Ukraine, where 
the maize harvest is underway, the production forecast has been raised recently compared to earlier 
estimates, underpinned by expectations of a larger harv ested area, as the country 's exports from 
the Black Sea ports has partially eased storage constraints. As for rice, world production in 2022/23 
is forecast at 512.6 million tonnes (milled basis), 2.4 % below the 2021 all -time peak, but still an 
overall aver age crop.  
Utilization  
3.2.  At 2 778 million tonnes, world cereal utilization in 2022/23 is forecast to decline by 0.7 % from 
the 2021/22 level. The global coarse grain utilization forecast for 2022/23 stands at 1 485 million 
tonnes, down 1.2 % from 2021/22, repre senting the first fall in over a decade. Meanwhile, global 
total wheat utilization is forecast to rise marginally in 2022/23, by 0.3 %, to 775 million tonnes, with 
growth in food consumption and other uses seen offsetting a likely fall in feed use. Global u tilization 
of rice in 2022/23 is pegged at 518.3 million tonnes, down 0.7 % year-on-year due to expected 
contractions in feed and industrial uses.  
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  Stocks  
3.3.  World cereal stocks are forecast to contract by 2.0 % below opening levels by the end of seasons 
in 2023, to 841 million tonnes. World cereals stocks -to-use ratio is foreseen to decline from 30.9 % 
in 2021/22 to 29.4 % in 2022/23, indicating a relatively comfortable supply situation from a historical 
perspecti ve. Global wheat stocks are forecast to rise by 2.0 % above their opening levels, while global 
stocks of coarse grains, now forecast at 347 million tonnes, are seen falling by 5.3 % below their 
opening levels to reach their lowest level since 2013/14. FAO 's forecast for world rice stocks at the 
end of the 2022/23 marketing years stands at 193.4 million tonnes, down 1.8 % from their record 
opening levels.  
Trade  
3.4.  Forecast at 469 million tonnes, world trade in cereals in 2022/23 is predicted to register a 
2.2% contraction from the 2021/22 level. Based on a stronger shipment pace until late October 
under the Black Sea Grain Initiative, expected higher wheat export prospects for Ukraine have lifted 
the global wheat trade forecast for 2022/23 (July/June) by 1.9 milli on tonnes in October. 
Nevertheless, now pegged at 194 million tonnes, FAO 's global wheat trade forecast points to a 
1.0% decline from the 2021/22 level. Global trade in coarse grains is also forecast to decline in 
2022/23 (July/June) by 3.4 %, mostly reflec ting contractions in global barley and sorghum trade, 
while maize trade is seen falling only marginally. After three successive years of expansion, 
international trade in rice could subside by 1.6 % in 2023 (January -December) to 52.9 million tonnes. 
With th e exception of the Americas and Oceania, most regions are expected to import less rice 
year-on-year. However, the largest retreat in absolute terms could concern imports by 
Asian  countries.  
Table 1. Global cereal market at a glance  
 
2018/19  2019/20  2020/21  2021/22  2022/23  
(forecast)  
Production (mln tonnes)  2,644.1  2,713.6  2,776.6  2,814.3  2,763.5  
Utilization (mln tonnes)  2,686.3  2,710.8  2,758.6  2,798.1  2,778.3  
Trade (mln tonnes)  441.6  439.1  479.9  467.2  468.9  
World stocks -to-use ratio  % 30.7 30.0 29.9 30.9 29.4 
Source : FAO (2022) . 
4  CROP PROSPECTS AND FOOD SITUATION IN LOW -INCOME FOOD -DEFICIT COUNTRIES 
(LIFDCS)7 
4.1.  FAO assesses that globally 45 countries, including 33 in Africa, nine in Asia, two in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and one in Europe, are in need of external assistance for food. In East Africa, 
the food insecurity situation is grave and unless humanitarian assistance is scaled up.  
4.2.  According to the latest estimates from FAO's Crop Prospects and Food Situation report 
(September 2 022),8 aggregate cereal production among LIFDCs is forecast to be moderately 
below  the outturn of 2021. The expected result mostly reflects reduced harvests in the LIFDCs of 
the East Africa and Near East subregions.  
 
7 The inclusion of a country in the low -income food -deficit countries (LIFDCs) group is based on three 
criteria:  1) the level of the an nual per capita Gross National Income (GNI);  
 2) the net food trade position; and  
 3) self -exclusion (when countries that meet the first two criteria request to be excluded from the 
category).  
For full details see: www.fao.org/countryprofiles/lifdc . 
8 FAO. 2022. Crop Prospects and Food Situation – Quarterly Global Report No. 3, September 2022. 
Rome. https://doi.org /10.4060/cc2300en . G/AG/GEN/209  
 
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  4.3.  In East Africa , the downturn is largely on account of the effects of multi -season drought 
conditions, particularly affecting parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The substantial rainfall 
deficits resulted in widespread crop wilting and the aggregate cereal production in East African 
LIFDCs is forecast to decrease by 3 % in 2022 compared to the five -year average. In the Near East , 
in Afghanistan and the Syrian Arab Republic, the low harvest was caused by an erratic distribution 
of seasonal rains and persisting difficult economic conditions  that have constrained farmers ' ability 
to access sufficient agricultural inputs.  
5  IMPORT BILLS OF NFIDCS FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL INPUTS  
5.1  Food import bills of NF IDCs 
5.1.  Globally, the food import bill is set to increase at a slower pace in 2022, nevertheless reaching 
another record level, surpassing USD 1.9 trillion. While this represents another increase by 10 %, or 
USD 180 billion, over last year 's record level, the expansion is foreseen to slow significantly 
compared to the 18 % increase registered in 2021 re lative to 2020. The anticipated increase in the 
2022 import bill is almost entirely on account of higher prices with higher import bills mainly 
reflecting higher unit costs rather than higher volumes. Many regions or country groups are therefore 
set to fac e higher bills in return for lower or the same volumes and this development is much more 
pronounced for some economically vulnerable country groups.  
5.2.  For the group of NFIDCs, the total food import bill in 2022 is forecast to increase by 
USD 21.7 billion fr om 2021 to USD 148.1 billion, with merely USD 4 billion of extra imported food 
volumes, while the bulk of the rise is due to higher prices.9 This is putting increased fiscal pressure 
on the budget of these countries and balance -of-payment problems.  
5.2  Global  fertilizer prices and agricultural input import bills of NF IDCs 
5.3.  In parallel to the rising prices of food, world prices of key agricultural inputs have soared since 
2021. Agriculture is a highly energy -intensive sector and depends largely on fossil fuels. Much of 
today 's turmoil dates to 2021, when energy prices began to surge, adding to production costs. But 
higher energy prices have far more deleterious effects, raising the cost of key nitrogen fertilizers, 
which are primarily manufactured from natural gas and are by f ar the most important agricultural 
input for raising crop yields. Prices of nitrogen, N, in the form of urea or ammonium nitrate, reached 
record highs by the end of 2021. This price momentum carried into 2022, and the international 
prices of other importan t mineral fertilizers, such as phosphate, P, and potash, K, have joined suit, 
reaching multi -year highs in April 2022. Price peaks for nitrogen (urea) and phosphate (P, DAP) 
were followed by substantial reductions of international prices from May to Octobe r 2022, while 
global prices for potash, K, remained at the level of April 2022.10  
5.4.  In line with higher international prices of most agricultural inputs, the world agricultural input 
import bill is forecast to reach a new record high of USD 424 billion in 2 022, representing a leap of 
48% or USD 138 billion over the total reached in 2021. Relative to 2020, the 2022 agricultural input 
import bill is projected to rise by as much as 112 %, albeit from a depressed level of USD 200 billion.  
5.5.  For NFIDCs, the total a gricultural input bill is forecast to increase from USD 30.9 billion in 2021 
to USD 43.9 billion in 2022, representing an increase of around 42 %, driven mostly by higher bills 
for imported energy, and, to a lesser degree, fertilizers.11  
 
9 FAO. 2022. Food Outlook – Biannual Report on Global Food Markets. Food Outlook , November 2022. 
Rome.  
10 World Bank Commodity Markets ( https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity -markets ), 
accessed 9 November 2022. Urea (Ukraine), prill spot f.o.b. Middle East, beginning March 2022; previously, 
f.o.b. Black Sea; DAP  (diammonium phosphate), spot, f.o.b. US Gulf; Potassium chloride (muriate of potash), 
f.o.b. Vancouver.  
11 FAO. 2022. Food Outlook  – Biannual Report on Global Food Markets . Food Outlook, November 2022. 
Rome.  G/AG/GEN/209  
 
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  5.6.  As part of respons e to the ramifications from the war in Ukraine, FAO has developed several 
policy tools, for example to  facilitate the distribution of limited fertilizer volumes to priority countries 
in need. One of these tools is the fertilizer "neediness " indicator, prov iding a cross -country 
comparison of how much African countries are in need of fertilizers. The index shows that several 
African NFIDCs are highly in need of fertilizers, with some countries that are already highly distressed 
scoring high on the index (e.g. , Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan).12 
6  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND FAO 'S ROLE  
6.1.  In light of the persistently high world food, fuel and fertilizer prices, increasing financial 
constraints, and soaring food import bills, significant challenges remain for food security and 
livelihoods in LDCs and NFIDCs. In 2022, FAO has continued to scale up its humanitarian and 
resilience programming and aims to exceed the 30 million people reached in 2021 with urgently 
needed, life -saving and cost -effective agricultural assis tance. FAO advocates for placing investments 
in agriculture at the core of humanitarian response to the global food crisis. These should go hand 
in hand with measures to ensure that world agricultural markets continue to function properly as a 
reliable sou rce of food and crucial agricultural inputs at country level. These include:  
6.2.  Keeping food, feed and fertilizer markets open, in line with WTO 12th Ministerial 
Declaration on Emergency Response for Food Insecurity . Countries should refrain from 
imposing new export restrictions and, to the extent possible, withdraw any remaining export 
restrictions on food and fertilizers, in conformity with relevant WTO disciplines. FAO continues to 
support its Members in the area of trade and trade agreements th rough analysis and evidence 
building, fostering capacity development, and facilitating neutral and impartial dialogue on important 
policy subjects.  
6.3.  Trade facilitation measures also need to be stepped up to improve access to, and affordability 
of, food and agricultural inputs. Continued commitment to implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement and to digitalizing trade procedures, for example by adopting the ePhyto Solution 
developed by FAO that enables exchange of electronic phytosanitary certificates , have demonstrated 
benefits in cutting costs, saving time and facilitating movement of goods, and improving 
transparency and trust within supply chains.  
6.4.  Information to enhance food market and policy transparency. Increasing market 
transparency by providin g critical timely and objective data and information is crucial in reducing 
uncertainty and disruptions to global agrifood trade. As the host of the Agricultural Market 
Information System (AMIS), FAO, jointly with other nine international organizations inc luding the 
WTO, advanced and expanded its contribution to enhancing the transparency in global commodity 
markets by providing regular and timely updates on crop conditions, global supply and demand 
situations, price trends and policy developments. FAO also  has a market intelligence service that 
provides up -to-date and comprehensive market information and assessment for the major food 
commodities, through regular and frequent publication of reports. Furthermore, FAO 's Global 
Information and Early Warning Sys tem on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS) conducts regular market 
situation and food security assessments and issues alerts and warnings on impending food crises to 
national and international decision makers, with the objective to guide timely and proper 
interve ntions and reinforce resilience to shocks.  
 
12 FAO. 2022. Fertilizer Allocation for Africa . https://www.fao.org/3/cc2803en/cc2803en.pdf .  G/AG/GEN/209  
 
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  6.5.  Focus on identifying the needs of LDCs and NFIDCs to enhance their capacities to 
respond to acute food crises . FAO 's efforts in this area include:  
• Food Import Financing Facility  (FIFF) to support countries to shoulder the soaring costs of 
food imports and improve access to food at country level. Based on a comprehensive technical 
assessment, the FIFF covers 62 countries with a total population of 1.78 billion people. FAO 
welcomes  the adoption by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of a new Food Shock Window 
to provide access to emergency financing for countries facing balance -of-payment problems 
related to the global food crisis. FAO stands ready to provide all the needed techni cal support 
for the implementation of the Food Shock Window as well as other financial instruments to 
help LDCs and NFIDCs to be able to ensure sufficient supplies of food for their populations.  
• Fertilizer assessments and policy responses.  FAO developed a Fertilizer Trade Tracker, 
an online tool that allows countries to gauge remaining import needs and/or unrealized export 
availabilities for the current crop and calendar year. To inform, support and prioritise 
international initiatives that aim to ensure that African countries are able to access 
international fertilizer markets, FAO has developed a "neediness index " based on a number of 
criteria that shape the ability to purchase fertilizer at market conditions, including a country 's 
balance -of-payment sit uation and the severity of food insecurity. Furthermore, FAO and WTO 
have produced a joint report on fertilizers for the G20 Leaders, calling for action in a number 
of policy areas to avoid a global food availability crisis13. 
6.6.  Increasing productivity and l owering trade costs.  Programmes that promote productivity 
and infrastructure improvements are urgently needed in order to boost resilience of agrifood systems 
and safeguard food security in LDCs and NFIDCs. This requires boosting public investments in 
research and development (R&D), enhancing the transfer of technology and innovation, and 
promoting access to high quality inputs (seeds, fertilizers and machinery) as well as to finances. 
Advancements in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in agr iculture can play a 
pivotal role in the necessary transformation of agrifood systems to become more efficient, inclusive, 
resilient and sustainable. They can increase transparency and traceability in markets and value 
chains, improve agricultural productiv ity and crop yields, and reduce the use of inputs. FAO also 
supports countries in developing programmes, strategies and approaches to facilitate greater 
integration of small -scale actors into markets and value chains, undertakes activities to analyse and 
increase the resilience of agricultural supply chains, and supports the development of responsible 
agricultural value chains.  
 
__________  
 
13 FAO and WTO. 2022. Global Fertilizer Markets and Policies: A joint FAO/WTO Mapping Exercise . 
https://www.fao.org/3/cc2945en/cc2945en.pdf .