JOB/AG/243  
 
9 June 2023  
(23-3975) Page: 1/27 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session  Original: English  
 
TOWARDS A STRENGTHENED NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK  
IN THE DOMESTIC SUPPORT PILLAR  
BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO  
NEGOTIATIONS ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
COMMUNICATION BY COSTA RICA  
The following communication, dated 6 June 2023, is being circulated at the request of the delegation 
of Costa Rica . 
 
_______________  
 
 
BACKGROUND  
1.   Agriculture is the most distorted sector in global trade and the one that requires more substantial 
reforms in  WTO rules. It is urgent that Members continue the reform process as set out in the 
objective established in the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), and its Article 20, 
which clearly defines within the scope of the negotiations, that Members mu st achieve substantial 
progressive reductions in support and protection in agriculture. Success has been elusive, and 
innovative approaches are necessary to advance the reform in domestic support as agreed in 1995.  
2.   Costa Rica's analytical work, embedded in  RD/AG/75, RD/AG/76 and JOB/AG/199, shows that 
the current disciplines in the AoA do not provide the necessary level of granularity to address the 
wide disparity in access and use of the available amount and type of entitlements for domestic 
support. Any d iscipline that attempts to move the reform process by replicating the current 
architecture of the AoA would not solve these issues.  
3.   New approaches require the development of methodological principles, analytical tools, and 
testing exercises that use text and data -based scenarios and simulations. Costa Rica embarked in 
this daunting task, that has required several years of continuous work in the valuation of all the 
necessary elements, with continuous iterations and analysis of different combinations o f ideas and 
variables. This process would not have been possible without the input and constructive suggestions 
of many WTO Members.  
4.   In this document, Costa Rica presents its main findings, while exploring the possible 
implementation of a comprehensive app roach for the reform of the domestic support pillar and the 
different policy and methodological choices that would be required to ensure a coherent and balanced 
outcome. Section A describes the main design decisions and methodological choices taken and 
provides additional elements for further discussion. Section B suggests a set of text -based modalities 
for further consideration. Section C contains the preliminary analytical tables that would be required 
to run the initial simulations.  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  SECTION A: BUILDING MODALITIES  
I.   ABOUT THE METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES, DIMENSIONS AND CONCEPTS  
1.   Costa Rica has previously explored the implementation of several methodological principles in 
JOB/AG/199 presented in May 2021. Since then, Costa Rica has condensed the core principles that 
should guide the development of modalities into two main ideas: proportionality in the contributions 
and universality in the regulatory framework.  
2.   Proportionality is the practical application of the principle of fairness in the reform process 
under which those that are entitled to provide more trade -distorting subsidies contribute accordingly 
to the reform process. Proper implementation of this principle in the design of modalities would also 
decrease the concentration on Members ' future entitlements and limit their overall potential to 
distort global markets.  
3.   Universality is the regulatory approach  where all Members follow the same rules and have 
equal access to policy instruments. Currently, access and use of entitlements under Article 6 are 
uneven, particularly in relation to product -specific support. Costa Rica deems necessary to develop 
modalitie s that appropriately "level the regulatory playing field ", while recognizing Members ' 
different development needs and objectives. A new regulatory framework would need to effectively 
address the diverse circumstances and evolving conditions under which a M ember may need more 
flexibility to implement certain policies or be subject to more ambitious disciplines.  
4.   The two main principles presented above can be linked to two core issues that must be addressed 
simultaneously in the reform process. The first one relates to the size of entitlements and is more 
quantitative in nature ( How much can Members spend ?). The second one is more qualitative and 
relates to elements like concentration of support in specific products, types of programmes, and 
their associated f lexibilities ( How can Members allocate their spending ?). Addressing these two 
questions requires the development of a specific toolkit for each one, in what constitutes the two 
reform dimensions  in the design of modalities.  
II.   REDUCING THE SIZE OF ENTITLEMEN TS 
5.   Addressing this dimension requires the development of a set of modalities based on quantitative 
limitations. The different methodological alternatives have been extensively discussed in the past 
and were effectively summarized in JOB/AG/160. Costa Rica also conducted an analysis on this issue 
and presented its conclusions in JOB/AG/199. In Costa Rica 's view, the design process must establish 
a global cap first, and then design modalities for its reduction.  
A.   Capping modalities  
1.   First step: defining a basel ine for analytical and negotiation purposes  
6.   The baseline is a general estimate, an imperfect reflection of the status quo that serves as an 
initial scenario so that Members can test and compare the effectiveness of different combinations of 
modalities. Und er the current AoA architecture, Members can grant trade -distorting domestic 
agricultural subsidies for an amount equivalent to 5% of their value of agricultural production under 
de minimis , both to product -specific and non -product -specific subsidies, whil e for developing 
Members such threshold increases to 10% for each type.1 Also, a group of Members has access to 
an additional fixed amount, known as the Aggregate Measure of Support beyond de minimis  
(hereinafter FBTAMS). Limits are determined by the Valu e of Production ( de minimis ) and the 
FBTAMS (Part IV of Schedule). Unbound support (Article 6.2 and Article 6.5) is limited in terms of 
programmes and characteristics, but unlimited in monetary terms and only subject to Member -
specific constraints that are  beyond the current scope of the AoA, such as national budgets. As each 
 
1 Some Members bound a de minimis  of 8.5% for product specific support and a de minimis  of 8.5% for 
non-product specific support.  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  category is treated differently, it becomes necessary to estimate a baseline using a common 
monetary value in current United States dollars.  
7.   The estimated common monetary value serves as a measure of the  potential expenditure on 
trade distorting domestic support (known as  PE-TDDS ) that Members are entitled to spend 
under the current WTO rules. The PE -TDDS includes all trade -distorting domestic support that could 
be provided under Articl e 6.2, Article 6.3, Article 6.4 and Article 6.5 of the AoA. Costa Rica - aided 
by Canada 's work in JOB/AG/219 and RD/AG/74  - had to develop its own database to calculate a 
PE-TDDS for all 164 WTO Members (see Annex 1 of JOB/AG/199 for more details on the 
methodology). Costa Rica estimated a total minimum amount of USD 910.3 billion that could be 
collectively spent on trade -distorting domestic support every year. This estimate, both in global and 
individual terms, shall serve as a baseline for comparison pur poses.  
8.   The baseline was created in monetized values and could be used to build a fixed cap (see 
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, JOB/AG/112, JOB/AG/120, JOB/AG/124) , but it could also be used to build 
modalities based on relative variables, such as mobile caps (as in JOB/ AG/99  and JOB/AG/127 ). 
However, it is Costa Rica's strong view that a fixed monetized global limit would guarantee a real 
reduction of trade -distorting support in the long term, would address the existing inequities in the 
current Agreement and fulfill the  reform mandate. The preference for a fixed cap approach is 
grounded on several reasons that are explored in detail in JOB/AG/100, JOB/AG/114, JOB/AG/160 
and in JOB/AG/199, that can be summarized next.  
9.   First, Costa Rica's analysis revealed that - in aggregate  - the current annual potential 
expenditure in trade -distorting domestic support allowed under the AoA2 stands at a minimum of 
USD 910 billion, most of it under the so -called "Amber Box" entitlements. In comparison, total actual 
support effective ly granted notified in 2016 was comparatively low with USD 121.7 billion, out of 
which 35% corresponds to Article 6.2 and Article 6.5 provisions. While only 10 Members concentrate 
almost 80% of the trade -distorting potential expenditure of the entire WTO, those 10 Members 
together accounted for more than 90% of total notified effective support in 2016.  
10.   Second, from a systemic point of view, current de minimis  entitlements represent a trade -
distorting potential close to USD 689.5 billion and this amount wil l continue to grow as the global 
Value of Production (VoP) grows.3 
11.   Third, from a negotiating perspective, trade -distorting programmes that result in an increase 
in production will also contribute to augment the de minimis  entitlements, thus granting an 
exponential advantage to those Members that have more resources, while also deterring any 
remaining incentive to change the status quo .  
12.   Fourth, current disciplines in the AoA do not consider the impact of climate change and other 
exogenous events in future access to and use of necessary domestic support policies, especially for 
smaller economies with increased vulnerability. Moving towards a monetized global limit would 
create a more resilient regulatory framework for domestic support policies. New limits sh ould be 
monetized and not be linked to any variable that could lead to uneven sharp decreases in available 
policy space or unduly target those Members with lower levels of trade -distorting potential.  
13.   Finally, on the possible limitations of a monetized fix ed cap, Members already recognized the  
possible influence of excessive rates of inflation on the ability of any Member to abide by its current 
domestic support commitments in Article 18.4 of the AoA and provided for due consideration in the 
review of the i mplementation of commitments under such circumstances.  
2.   Second step: adjusting the baseline  
14.   Costa Rica used the PE -TDDS estimates to establish a base cap. However, discussions with 
other WTO Members on the implementation of the principle of proportionality  and its calculation, 
revealed several concerns about the establishment of a base cap that would underestimate the final 
 
2 As Article 6.2 and Article 6.5 potential expenditure was estimated using historical notified expenditure, 
the total TDP E must be considered as a minimum. It must also be noted that several Members have expressed 
concerns regarding the non -distorting nature of the so called " Green Box " subsidies, an issue that deserves 
further analysis.  
3 In JOB/AG/171 Australia and New Zealand estimate USD 2 trillion in Amber Box entitlements by 2030.  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  values. For instance, the baseline used by Costa Rica in JOB/AG/199 recognizes past expenditure 
but does not recognize non -provided exp enditure in the context of Article 6.2 and Article 6.5. 
Adjusting for this situation can be quite difficult, as there is no perfect parameter, but thorough 
analysis and consultations with other WTO Members rendered a possible solution.  
15.   It is important to n ote that most WTO Members have a baseline that ranges between 20% and 
30% of their VoP ( see Figure 1). All of these Members are developing and least -developed country 
Members (LDCs). Seven Members - five of which are developed  - can subsidize more than 30%  of 
their VoP, but despite their number, they concentrate nearly a quarter (23%) of the total baseline 
amount. Meanwhile, 18 Members have access to entitlements equivalent to less than 20% of their 
VoP, but jointly account for 39% of the total baseline. Me mbers with less than 20% are a mix of 
founding Members of the WTO with access to a 10% de minimis  (5% on PSS and 5% on NPSS), and 
of Members that acceded under Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.  
Figure 1: WTO Members ' baseline (PE -TTDS) as a percentage of their VoP  
 
Source:  Costa Rica.  
16.   Based on this information, those Members whose baseline is located between 20% and 30% of 
the VoP could be subject to an adjustment, so that their base cap is adjusted to 30% of their VoP. 
Such an adjustment would provide not only for a recognition of potential expenditure (however 
imperfect it may be), but it would also narrow the gaps between Members while retaining coherence 
with the proportionality principle. This upward adjustment would increase the total accumulated 
base cap of this group of Members by USD 110 billion. It would also render the addition of any past 
expenditure under Article 6.2 unnecessary, as almost all developing Members that have notified 
expenditure under Articl e 6.2 in the past are within the 20% -30% VoP range. Having said that, 
situations where a Member benefits more than expected from the adjustment ( "the design leakage ") 
can be important in the case of developing Members with high entitlements in absolute ter ms (see 
Table 1).  
17.   A similar correction might be envisaged for those Members with a baseline equivalent to less 
than 20% of their VoP, so that their base cap reaches 20%. However, this adjustment would also 
dramatically increase their share in the total bas e cap. To address this possibility, a hybrid approach 
could be contemplated in the form of a monetary adjustment (i.e. USD  1 billion), or a correction to 
the baseline to an amount equivalent to 20% of the VoP, whichever is the lowest. This adjustment 
would  allow all Members to ensure a recognition of their potential expenditure while distinguishing 
between those Members with higher potential expenditure in absolute terms, from those with small 
levels of potential expenditure, both in absolute and in relativ e terms (see Table 1). Members with 
a baseline lower than 20% would see a collective total adjustment of USD 10.4 billion.  
JOB/AG/243  
 
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  Table 1: Changes in WTO Members ' baseline and adjustments towards the base cap  
BL/VOP   BL in USD BILLION  Count  Baseline (BL)  
Average in USD M  Base Cap (BC)  
Average in USD M  Average of  
BL/VoP  Average of  
 BC/VoP  
BL<20%  BL<USD 1B  8 158.3  307.5  9.1%  20.0%  
USD 1B≤BL<USD 5B  6 2,542.1  3,405.9  12.2%  16.7%  
USD 5B≤BL<USD 10B  1 7,984.7  8,984.7  16.7%  18.8%  
BL ≥USD 10B  3 110,860.5  111,860.5  15.9%  16.4%  
 
20%≤BL<30%  BL<USD 1B  42 207.2  295.5  20.9%  30.0%  
USD 1B≤BL<USD 5B  19 2,382.0  3,364.7  21.4%  30.0%  
USD 5B≤BL<USD 10 B  7 7,007.4  9,371.7  22.4%  30.0%  
BL≥USD 10B  6 34,377.7  43,532.9  22.3%  30.0%  
 
BL≥30%  BL<USD 1B  2 154.4  154.4  126.1%  126.1%  
USD 1B≤BL<USD 5B  1 2,353.8  2,353.8  57.0%  57.0%  
USD 5B≤BL<USD 10B  1 5,612.5  5,612.5  52.1%  52.1%  
BL≥USD 10B  3 67,305.6  67,305.6  43.1%  43.1%  
Source:  Costa Rica . 
18.   The hybrid approach is particularly useful, but it is not exempt from design leakages, especially 
in the case of middle -sized Members with low entitlement levels relative to their VoP, but with high 
enough absolute values. Having said that, Costa Rica foun d that the design leakage was the 
exception in the corrections carried out for the 10% -20% range and could be partially corrected 
later on through reduction modalities. An expansion of this hybrid approach could also be envisaged 
for the 20 -30% range in th e context of broader balancing discussions.  
3.   Third  step: establishing a fixed base cap  
19.   Once the baseline has been adjusted, the result can be used as a fixed base cap. The 
adjustments would increase the initial collective estimate by USD 120.4 billion, for  a total collective 
base cap of USD 1 ,030.7 billion. Fixing th e individual  base cap for all WTO Members through a 
monetized value would serve as a first reform commitment and would also be used as a cornerstone 
for the reduction commitments to follow.  
B.   Redu ction Modalities  
1.   First step: applying the formula  
20.   Members would reduce their base cap  proportionally to their share in the total base cap as a 
measure for reductions. The  total base cap being the aggregate of base caps estimated in the 
previous step for all Members. Therefore, the following formula is used to calculate individual 
reductions:  
NCi = BC i*(1-Ai) 
 
where:  
 
 
NCi is the new cap after reductions for Member "i";  
BCi is the base cap  for Member "i";  
Ai is the share of Member "i", in the total base cap , so 𝐴𝑖=𝐵𝐶𝑖
∑𝐵𝐶164
𝑖=1 
21.   From a theoretical perspective and for illustrative purposes only, the impact of a one -shot 
application of this formula could be visualized using a fictitious world comprising on ly five WTO 
Members (see Table 2 below). In this scenario, Member A would reduce 30% of its initial base cap 
as it concentrates 30% of the global amount. Proportionality is respected as Member E would reduce 
10%, mirroring its share in the total. The one -time application of the formula also has an immediate JOB/AG/243  
 
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  impact in the rebalancing of entitlements, as Member A goes from 30% to 27.1% and Member E 
goes from a relative share of 10% to 11.6% under the new cap.  
Table 2: Application of the Formula with only one iteration (in Monetary Units)  
Member  Base Cap  
(1) Share  
(2) Reduction  New Cap  New share  
Member A  30 30% -30% 21.0 27,1%  
Member B  25 25% -25% 18.8 24,2%  
Member C  20 20% -20% 16.0 20,6%  
Member D  15 15% -15% 12.8 16,5%  
Member E  10 10% -10% 9.0 11,6%  
Total  100 100%  -22.5%  77.5 100,0%  
Source:  Costa Rica.  
2.   Second Step: Iterative approach  
22.   While the formula is consistent with the principles of proportionality and progressiveness, it is 
unlikely to fully achieve the desired global objectives of the reform process with just a one -time 
application. For instance, in JOB/AG/177, co -sponsors propo sed a global reduction of at least 50% 
of the sum of current global agricultural trade - and production -distorting domestic support 
entitlements. However, according to Costa Rica's estimates, a one -time application of the formula 
would fall short of that go al. An iterative approach where the formula is applied several times and 
recalculated using the new shares and the new total as a basis for the next iteration, can effectively 
address this issue.  
23.   Costa Rica estimates that achieving at least a 50% global r eduction in the global base cap 
would require at least nine iterations of the proposed formula (see Table 3 below). Under this 
scenario, global entitlements - excluding LDCs  - would be reduced from USD 980.8 billion to 
USD 491.8 billion by 2034. That is, a  reduction of 49.9%. As a negotiation tool, the iterative 
approach can be used to achieve the global reduction objective, but its intermediate results can also 
be considered for scheduling annual reduction commitments.  
Table 3: Iterative Application of th e Formula – A simulation  
 Global base cap  
(Billion USD)  Global new Cap  
(Billion USD)  Accumulated 
Reduction  
(Billion USD)  Accum. reduction 
(%) 
Starting point   980.8   -      -    
Iteration 1   980.8   864.6   -116.2  -11.8%  
Iteration 2   864.6   780.8   -200.0  -20.4%  
Iteration 3   780.8   715.5   -265.3  -27.0%  
Iteration 4   715.5   662.5   -318.3  -32.5%  
Iteration 5   662.5   618.0   -362.7  -37.0%  
Iteration 6   618.0   580.0   -400.8  -40.9%  
Iteration 7   580.0   546.9   -433.8  -44.2%  
Iteration 8   546.9   517.8   -463.0  -47.2%  
Iteration 9   517.8   491.8   -489.0  -49.9%  
Source:  Costa Rica. Global base cap estimated using the methodology described in JOB/AG/199 and 
information from JOB/AG/219. LDCs are excluded from the calculations.  
3.   Adjusting the new cap: considering Members' special needs  
24.   For Costa Rica, a sustainable negotiati on framework requires flexibilities that remain in line 
with the reform 's objectives. Along these lines, any flexibility should be designed considering the 
distorting potential of each Member and the embedded flexibilities already present in the proposed 
formula. Also, over the years, Members have explored negotiation tools that could effectively 
accommodate the Members' special needs (such as LDC Members) in the establishment of new 
disciplines and that could be of use in the reform process.  
25.   On LDCs, Costa  Rica is of the view that exemptions to the cap and reduction approach should 
be granted to LDC Members given their specific circumstances. For the issue of graduating Members, 
a phase -out mechanism that creates an additional transitional period for furthe r adjustments would 
allow for a single, unified, and coherent regulatory framework for all WTO Members in the long term.  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  26.   On smaller Members, the implementation of the reduction formula points towards a 
USD 1 billion threshold where Members would not be req uired to undertake any reduction 
commitments beyond the capping exercise. Costa Rica also envisages a three -tiered approach with 
upward adjustments towards USD 250 million, USD 500 million and USD 750 million. For example, 
the Maldives, with barely USD 1.4  million base cap (already adjusted to 30% of their VoP), would 
have a final entitlement of USD 250 million. Mauritius, with an adjusted base cap of USD 461 million, 
would receive a final adjustment of 8.3%, reaching USD 500 million. Jamaica with USD 524 m illion, 
would see a 43.1% increase, reaching USD 750 million, equivalent to 42.9% of their VoP.  
27.   On domestic support to encourage agricultural and rural development, several 
Members have presented options (see JOB/AG/160, JOB/AG/163 and JOB/AG/195). These o ptions 
include placing limits on the amount of support that could be provided under Article 6.2, on the basis 
of either VoP or a fixed monetary value; the inclusion of support under Article 6.2 into an overall 
limit; or further clarifying the meaning and e xtent of terms such as "low -income or resource -poor 
producers". Enhanced transparency where Members provide more information on how they 
implement their Article 6.2 programmes could also be considered, including by outlining the eligibility 
criteria and a detailed breakdown of expenditure. Costa Rica considers that including Article 6.2 
expenditure into the overall limit set through the final cap should allow for enough policy space, 
especially if there is a new balance on product -specific support. In that context, hybrid approaches 
could be envisaged, where the product -specific support and the non -product specific support under 
Article 6.2 are treated differently and would be subject to different limitations. The term "generally 
available", may also be furt her clarified.  
III.   RESHAPING  PRODUCT -SPECIFIC SUPPORT DISCIPLINES  
28.   Product -Specific Support (PSS) has proven to be the most contentious aspect of the reform 
process to date, as it seems that no solution would be able to accommodate users and non -users of 
PSS. While Members have found approaches to modalities for PSS that could work on the side of 
export -oriented producers, the same solutions very quickly prove unsuitable on the side of 
domestically -oriented producers. First, because non -exporting agricultu ral producers by definition 
cater for domestic markets, tend to function on another scale and face different challenges than 
export -oriented agricultural producers. Second, because many WTO Members - both developing and 
developed ones  - have expressed thei r interest in retaining or increasing PSS -related flexibilities so 
that they can respond to a diverse set of concerns, including food security, rural development, 
poverty alleviation and climate change. Third, because the current balance of concessions on PSS is 
part of the overall balance achieved in the Uruguay Round, and for some Members any change in 
PSS flexibilities would need to be accompanied by balancing elements in other negotiation areas. 
Fourth, because on the side of agricultural exporters one of the main objectives of the reform process 
relates to addressing their concerns about the import substitution effect created by PSS. Fifth, 
because many WTO Members have both export -oriented and domestically -oriented agricultural 
producers, a duality tha t creates a complex, and sometimes contradictory negotiation landscape.  
29.   In Costa Rica 's view, the issue of PSS needs to be addressed by developing a regulatory toolkit 
that can effectively differentiate between export -oriented and domestically -oriented ag ricultural 
sectors. Therefore, designing more ambitious disciplines on the side of exporting sectors with 
additional and balanced flexibilities on the side of non -exporters may address most PSS -related 
issues. The consideration of this approach is only via ble in the context of a global fixed monetized 
cap like the one envisaged in the first section of this document. Additionally, a comprehensive 
solution on PSS would advance the reform of the cotton market and would provide for a permanent 
solution for Publ ic Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSH).  
A.   PSS and participation in international markets  
30.   The idea of linking subsidies and participation in international markets is not new. Notification 
requirements were established for significant exporters in the context of the monitoring of the 
Uruguay Round export subsidy commitments for 21 agricultural p roducts or groups of products (as 
can be seen in page 24 of G/AG/2). While there is a direct linkage between export subsidies and 
market participation that may be more difficult to establish in other contexts, Members have drawn 
inspiration from this type of provision in the context of domestic support negotiations and most 
particularly towards the MC11 (see JOB/AG/118 and JOB/AG/127).  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  31.   During the first semester of 2019, the Committee on Agriculture in Special Session (CoA -SS) 
conducted informal conversatio ns where it was suggested that limits for domestic support could be 
linked to trade, and most particularly to exports. Back then, Members noted the complexity of 
designing modalities that could achieve this, as there is no tool in the AoA to distinguish be tween 
subsidized products that are consumed in the domestic market and those that are exported, and 
such a distortion takes place in both instances. It was also pointed out that the AoA disciplines both 
distortions to trade and distortions to production, w hich in turn has direct implications in addressing 
the import substitution and trade diversion effects of PSS -related programmes.  
32.   These discussions were later captured in the Report by the Chairman in JOB/AG/163 of 
31 July 2019, where he indicated that "a suggestion has also been made to inversely link domestic 
support entitlements to exports (e.g. exports would be limited to an average quantity during a 
reference period if the DS granted was above a certain threshold in terms of the Value of Production 
(VoP) for that relevant product(s)).  It has also been suggested to commence by focusing on domestic 
support provided to most traded products among Members or to the products that are considered 
less sensitive. It has also been suggested that more flexibility could be provided to products in 
respect of which domestic production constitutes a minor share of domestic consumption ” 
(paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3).  
33.   Towards the MC12, the idea of linking domestic support modalities and trade was used by the 
African Group in JOB/AG/203 under a specific reduction modality. While this approach has not been 
fully explored since then, Costa Rica is of the view that its full development may offer solutions to 
the missing granularity in PSS modalities. This requires an analysis of t he relationship between trade 
and access to PSS flexibilities on a product -by-product basis, which in turn requires a general 
overview of PSS flexibilities as they are currently understood.  
B.   PSS-Subsidy concentration and concurrent provision of domestic sup port 
34.   The issue of subsidy concentration tends to be centered around FBTAMS entitlements, as it is 
the most obvious - but not the only  - difference in terms of access to PSS flexibilities. One key 
feature of FBTAMS entitlements is that almost all Members co nstrained by the 5% PSS de minimis  
provision under Article 6.4 have access to it. In fact, only four WTO Members are constrained by the 
5% PSS de minimis  provision. This difference in access and use of FBTAMS entitlements in very few 
Members, mostly develo ped ones, has been subject to extensive scrutiny in the past (see 
JOB/AG/102, JOB/AG/137 and JOB/AG/150), including more recently in proposals for its elimination 
in JOB/AG/203 and JOB/AG/216. Acknowledging its importance, Costa Rica used the information 
provided in G/AG/W/32/Rev.20 to analyze Members ' participation in international markets, and then 
linked these results to access to FBTAMS (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Access to FBTAMS and its potential coverage in exports (accumulated 
2016 -2020)  
 
Source:  Costa Rica, based on information from G/AG/W/32/Rev.20 and JOB/AG/219.  
JOB/AG/243  
 
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  35.   While access to FBTAMS does not offer an indication of actual use, it can provide preliminary 
regulatory guidance. For instance, in Figure 2 it can be seen that more than 90% o f wheat and wheat 
flour is exported by Members with access to FBTAMS. In 17 out of 21 sectors, more than 50% of 
global exports are concentrated in Members with access to FBTAMS. This estimate  does not take 
into account access and use of flexibilities under  Article 6.2 and Article 6.5, which may be even more 
relevant in some specific sectors.  
36.   Another aspect of the question of concentration that has been less studied is related to the 
"stacking effect " created by the concurrent provision of PSS under more tha n one "box" in Article 6 
of the AoA. This stacking effect was noted by Brazil in JOB/AG/196 in their analysis of concurrent 
use of PSS under Blue Box and Amber Box. Brazil also carried out a similar exercise in JOB/AG/195 
for Article 6.2 support. Although heavily constrained by information gaps, Brazil identified 191 
(18.9%) out of 963 investment subsidies measures that had some sort of product -related specificity 
component included in the description provided in the notification, and out of the 696 agricul tural 
input subsidies measures, 326 (46.9%) had some sort of product -related specificity component.  
37.   Considering the above, it becomes clear that current de minimis  provisions under the AoA are 
not fulfilling their role in limiting product -specific support,  particularly - but not exclusively  - in those 
cases where Members have access to FBTAMS. It is also evident that current domestic support 
disciplines do not prevent distortions in global markets produced by the provision of PSS. Finally, 
given the possibi lity of concurrent provision of PSS, new disciplines should include anti -elusion 
mechanisms, particularly for PSS provided under Article 6.2 and Article 6.5. These subsidies should 
- as a bare minimum  - be subject to clearer monitoring and transparency pro visions. More 
importantly, the scope of product -specific AMS under paragraph 1 of Annex 3 of the AoA should be 
reviewed to include all types of PSS provided under Article 6.   
C.   Differentiating active exporters from non -exporters  
38.   At the methodological level,  there are some instances where it is easy to identify non -exporting 
sectors, but in most cases international statistics tend to capture at least some level of exports, 
especially where there is a high level of aggregation in the product definition. This a lso implies that 
any PSS modality that differentiates between exporters and non -exporters will need to establish de 
minimis  thresholds to differentiate between a consistent exporter that actively sells in international 
markets, from those that are non -exporters.  
39.   The design of a de minimis  threshold must consider that given the aggregation requirements, 
some products are currently monitored using the traded volume, while others use the value. Also, 
there are heavily traded products where insignificant share  of the global market could still represent 
an important volume or value exported in absolute terms. These elements led to the consideration 
of a hybrid approach. For instance, the de minimis threshold could combine both a share in global 
exports of a prod uct or a maximum value exported. Costa Rica tested the idea of a de minimis  that 
would apply to exports that represent less than 0.01% of global exports of a product, or less than 
USD 1 million annually of that product when traded values are used. When implementing this 
approach to the statistics on global exports for year 2020, Costa Rica found that in the 21 products 
monitored under G/AG/W/32 the regulatory fit was excellent, as it exc luded a small percentage of 
total exports and kept intact the proposed disciplines on more than  99% of traded values/volumes 
in all sectors. Not only that, it also effectively captured the export concentration already observed 
in most products. For example , in the pig meat market, out of 119 exporters, 92 with an individual 
share of less than 0.01%, collectively accounted for 0.06% of pig meat exports in 2020.  
D.   PSS modalities – the case of exporters  
40.   Using as a reference the data gathered in G/AG/W/32/Rev.20,  Costa Rica carried -out a 
simulation on possible parameters linking VoP -based limitations and market participation in global 
exports. After careful consideration of trade and subsidy concentration patterns, the thresholds 
identified are presented next in T able 4. 
  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  Table 4: Market participation thresholds and associated PSS limitations  
Market  Share in Global Exports (per product)  PSS LIMITATION  
Less than 0.5%  25% of the VoP  
More than 0.5% but less than 2%  20% of the VoP  
More than 2% but less than 5%  15% of the VoP  
5% or more  10% of the VoP  
Source:  Costa Rica . 
41.   As can be seen in Figure 3 below, the regulatory fit of this reform scenario would be remarkably 
high. If under current rules more than 90% of wheat and wheat flour exports could be subsidized  
beyond the de minimis limits, after the proposed reform scenario almost 90% of total global exports 
of that product would be subject to a limit of 10% of the VoP. The regulatory fit would be lower in 
the case of fruits and vegetables and tobacco, which ar e sectors where there is a bigger number of 
small exporters. These two sectors would benefit from further disaggregation, which may help to 
increase the regulatory fit.  
Figure 3 : regulatory fit of PSS limits (as a % of VoP) and market coverage (using 
accum ulated exports between 2016 -2020)  
 
Source:  Costa Rica, based on information from G/AG/W/32/Rev.20 and JOB/AG/219.  
42.   Costa Rica is of the view that this approach to exports would be consistent with the principles 
of proportionality and universality. It would "level the regulatory playing field " for all agricultural 
exporters and effectively advance the objective of estab lishing a fair and market -oriented 
agricultural trading system as established in the Preamble and Article 20 of the AoA.  
E.   Cotton  
43.   Cotton is an important subject for the reform process and deserves a more detailed analysis. 
If under current rules almost 70% of cotton exports could be covered by FBTAMS, after reform 
71.2% of cotton exports would be subject to a PSS limit of 10% of the VoP. Furthermore, smaller 
exporters, mostly from developing and LDC Members, may find enhanced flexibility in the provision 
of PSS for their cotton producers, going from 15% to 25% of their VoP, pending on their market 
share (see Table 5). 
JOB/AG/243  
 
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  Table 5: Top 10 exporters, market share and associated  PSS limitations for cotton  
Reporter  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  
United States  34.1%  39.7%  41.8%  38.9%  39.6%  
Brazil  11.0%  10.1%  11.3%  17.4%  22.1%  
India 12.8%  12.7%  14.1%  7.2%  10.9%  
European Union  2.7%  2.5%  2.2%  4.7%  3.9%  
Benin  1.7%  2.8%  3.2%  3.0%  3.0%  
Australia  9.8%  8.6%  5.5%  5.9%  1.8%  
Burkina Faso  4.5%  3.0%  2.3%  2.4%  1.7%  
Türkiye  2.5%  1.7%  2.3%  2.2%  1.4%  
Mexico  0.4%  0.3%  0.6%  0.8%  1.2%  
Argentina  0.8%  0.4%  1.2%  1.0%  1.2%  
Subtotal  80.1%  81.8%  84.5%  83.4%  86.7%  
 
Source:  Costa Rica, based on information from G/AG/W/32/Rev.20 and JOB/AG/219.  
F.   PSS modalities - the case of non -exporters  
44.   As discussed before, the conditions on the side of non -exporting agricultural producers are 
more challenging and require the consideration of different policy objectives. By add ing more 
variables , the regulatory approach can be more  flexib le while providin g some necessary limits and 
balancing elements to the import substitution effect. Along these lines, Costa Rica explored the 
relationship between production, imports and consumption. This relationship is not new in the AoA : 
the domestic consumption variabl e is used in the calculations for the Special Safeguard under 
Article  5 of the AoA and in Annex 5 on Special Treatment with respect to Paragraph 2 of Article 4. 
The use of the domestic consumptio n also adds some needed variability to the design, as Members  
facing demographic growth challenges would see an increase in their available policy space for PSS 
in absolute terms.  
45.   The main idea of using these three variables is to find a balance between the effect on 
production created by PSS expenditure, the conseq uent reduction on imports (and the associated 
import substitution effect), and the possible export of any excess into the international markets. 
Costa Rica identified three main scenarios that could be further developed or disaggregated.  
46.   First scenario:  the importing Member produces 50% or less of its annual consumption 
(equivalently, it imports 50% or more of its annual consumption) of the product that it wants to 
subsidize using PSS. In that context, Members could accept a higher tolerance level to the im port 
substitution effect created by the use of PSS. It may not be necessary to establish any limitation 
based on VoP or other criteria, as the impact that this scenario may have on international markets 
would be quite limited. Under this scenario, Members would have full flexibility in the policy mix they 
want to implement, and would have access to all types of programmes, including Market Price 
Support (MPS) and PSH for Food Security Purposes at administered prices (PSH) without any 
product -specific anti -concentration clause. As PSS expenditure would still be subject to a global cap, 
there would still be a level of certainty in the regulatory approach.  
47.   Second scenario:  the importing Member produces more than 50% but less than 80% of its 
annual consumption o f the subsidized product. This is a situation where the provision of PSS would 
lead to a higher degree of import substitution and the tolerance level would diminish significantly. 
Costa Rica consulted extensively on the introduction of limits and threshold s on this scenario and 
considered that a progressive approach to limits would be useful and serve as a more limited 
extension to the first scenario. This approach would also be technically feasible for those Members 
that are currently subsidizing beyond th eir de minimis , thanks to their access to FBTAMS. In that 
context, the introduction of VoP -based limits would be required, and a limit between 75% or 100% 
was considered. According to available notified data, some Members may reach these limits easily if 
their production levels are low enough. For that reason, Costa Rica also introduced a condition that 
a VoP -based limit would not apply if PSS is lower than USD 1 million.  
48.   Third scenario:  the importing Member produces 80% or more of its annual consumption. I n 
this scenario, the use of PSS may substantially crowd out imports. Under this scenario, PSS use 
would need to be subject to lower tolerance levels and additional balancing mechanisms would be 
JOB/AG/243  
 
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  required. In that context, Costa Rica continued the progressiv e reductions in the VoP -based limit to 
50%-75%. In addition, if the Member wants to have access to these limits, a minimum level of 
enhanced market access opportunities would need to be established. This same mechanism was also 
used in Annex 5 and Costa Ri ca is of the view that a duty -free tariff -quota (TRQ) equivalent to the 
difference with the annual consumption threshold (minimum of 80% annual consumption covered 
by PSS - 20% imports through duty -free TRQ) could be used as a reference point. The enhanced  
market -access opportunity could include existing MFN market -access commitments as long as they 
comply with the "duty-free" condition.  
49.   During its consultations, some Members expressed sensitivities on the issue of market access 
as a balancing mechanism. In  that regard, Costa Rica considers that access to PSS -levels as high as 
the ones being considered should have a balance, but if a Member does not want to maintain or 
establish market access opportunities as the ones being envisaged, it could still retain a  PSS 
flexibility at a lower level. In that sub -scenario, as the subsidized production could continue to grow 
to the point where exports may happen, PSS limits applicable to small exporters should apply in that 
case. Table 6 below compiles the general desig n decisions taken in the context of the three scenarios 
presented above.  
Table 6: Import thresholds and associated PSS limitations  
Import requirement  PSS-AMS limit as a % of VoP  Condition  
imports [50%] or more of its 
annual consumption of that 
product  None None (all PSS would still be subject to the 
base/final global cap)  
imports more than [20]% but 
less than [50]% of its annual 
consumption of that product  None If PSS lower than USD 1 million.  
[75]%[100]%  If PSS equal or higher than USD[1] million.  
imports less than [20]% of its 
annual consumption of that 
product,  [50]%[75]%  Must establish or maintain a duty -free 
tariff quota to a volume of imports 
equivalent to at least [20]% of its annual 
consumption of said product.  
If the Member does not wish to open a TRQ (tariff quota), the provisions for 
an exporter with a small market share (less than 0.5% market share for a PSS 
limit of 25% of the VoP) would apply.  
Source:  Costa Rica.  
IV.   BUILDING A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR IM PLEMENTATION OF PSS 
COMMITMENTS  
A.   A dynamic approach  
50.   The cotton example in Table 5 also serves to introduce another important aspect of the 
regulatory design: whether PSS disciplines would be fixed and use a base period or be dynamic and 
change as the participation in international markets change. A fixed pe riod has the advantage of 
providing full certainty about the regulatory outcome and would also be less burdensome in terms 
of monitoring and transparency requirements. On the other hand, a dynamic approach would also 
be more responsive to changes in the re lationship between agricultural producers and exporters, 
subsidies, and international markets, but in exchange it would require closer monitoring and stronger 
transparency requirements.  
51.   As an example of a dynamic approach in the case of cotton, if Members  go for a two -year period 
to assess structural changes in market participation, the regulatory situation of the biggest exporters 
would not change. However, it is more likely that smaller exporters will move across thresholds. This 
is the case of Argentina  in 2017, where its market share dropped below 0.5%. If the situation 
remained the same in 2018 - which was not the case  - by 2019 Argentina would have been subject 
to a 25% limit instead of 20%. As the opposite situation could also be possible and some ex porters 
may enjoy flexibilities longer than desired, this regulatory lag would also need to be addressed by 
including stronger anti -elusion provisions or short -term mechanisms for Members to deal with 
unwanted subsidized imports.  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  B.   Product definition  
52.   As per  Article 18.5 of the AoA, WTO Members already must consult annually in the Committee 
on Agriculture (CoA) with respect to their participation in the normal growth of world trade in 
agricultural products within the framework of the commitments on export sub sidies. In that context, 
the G/AG/2 notification requirements and the reports provided by the Secretariat under the 
G/AG/W/32 series present 21 products with different degrees of disaggregation. In that line, the 
Committee of Agriculture carried out a chai r-led consultation process to review the list of significant 
exporters and the products included in the monitoring exercise between 2009 and 2014. The 
conclusions of these consultations were reflected in a Report by the Chairperson under G/AG/W/123, 
which included in its Annex 3 a proposal for a more disaggregated configuration.  
53.   In Costa Rica 's view, while the current product aggregation contained in G/AG/W/32 should 
serve as a starting point, Members should move quickly towards the configuration proposed in 
Annex  3 of G/AG/W/123. This list would also need to be updated to include all products that are not 
currently monitored in G/AG/W/32, which according to the most recent report by the Secretariat 
under G/AG/W/32/Rev.21, constitute 37% of total World expo rts.  
C.   Disaggregating products - identifying value chains  
54.   Past discussions at the CoA provide some useful lessons in terms of updates (in G/AG/W/123 
a three -to-five-year review cycle was proposed), automaticity in the addition of new products and 
implementa tion and monitoring. The question of automaticity in the review of product disaggregation 
becomes a crucial element in the effective implementation of any PSS modality that would rely 
heavily on the use of statistics on market participation.  
55.   In order to p rovide some clarity on the envisaged process, Costa Rica carried out an analysis 
of the tobacco product group as an example of the type of assessment that would be required (see 
Tables 7 and 8). In this case, it is evident that cigarettes containing tobacc o under HS (Harmonized 
System) 240220 represent more than half of all trade under the "tobacco " product group, and this 
is a consistent pattern over time. By creating a specific product for this tariff line, PSS limits for 
subsidies provided for the produc tion of cigarettes containing tobacco would be enhanced and better 
monitored. At the same time, the other products that would now fall under the "other tobacco 
products " aggregation, would also see a change in their total shares, and market participation w ould 
therefore become more relevant in those products.  
Table 7: Tobacco product group, HS code participation in its total global exports as per 
G/AG/W/32/Rev.20  
HS code  HS description  2017  2018  2019  2020  
240220  Cigarettes containing tobacco  53.4%  58.4%  56.1%  52.2%  
240120  Tobacco, partly/wholly stemmed/stripped  20.8%  17.3%  16.5%  15.4%  
240310  Smoking tobacco …. 9.4%  8.9%  9.3%  11.0%  
240399  Manufactured tobacco & manufactured tobacco 
substitutes, n.e.s. (excl…); tobacco extracts & 
essences  4.7%  4.9%  7.7%  10.5%  
240210  Cigars, cheroots & cigarillos containing tobacco  5.6%  5.0%  5.1%  5.6%  
240110  Tobacco, not stemmed/stripped  4.4%  3.9%  3.5%  3.8%  
240391  Homogeni zed/reconstituted tobacco  0.8%  0.8%  0.9%  0.9%  
240130  Tobacco refuse  0.6%  0.4%  0.4%  0.5%  
240290  Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos & cigarettes of tobacco 
substitutes  0.2%  0.3%  0.4%  0.1%  
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  
Source:  Costa Rica, based on information from G/AG/W/32/Rev.20 . 
56.   The disaggregation effect can be better understood by looking at the changes in market 
participation. For instance, in the tobacco product group, Brazil appeared as the first exporter in 
2020, however, in the new  disaggregated cigarettes product, Brazil would not even appear among 
the top 10 exporters. This may entail a regulatory change for Brazil in relation to PSS access for 
tobacco products, as it would still be a significant exporter of other tobacco products  but now it 
would be subject to less stringent limits in the provision of PSS for cigarettes containing tobacco. On 
the other hand, the European Union would retain its position as a significant exporter and therefore 
the disaggregation would have no effect  on its access to PSS (see Table 8 below).  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  Table 8: Top 10 tobacco exporters, disaggregation effects on market participation (as a 
percentage of total global exports)  
Tobacco  product Group   
Cigarettes containing tobacco (HS 240220)  
Member  2020   
Member  2020  
Brazil  16.5%   
European Union extra -trade  46.8%  
European Union extra -trade  11.4%   
United Arab Emirates  19.0%  
United Arab Emirates  7.7%   
Korea, Republic of  3.9%  
China  7.0%   
Indonesia  3.7%  
India 6.6%   
Singapore  2.9%  
Indonesia  4.3%   
China, Hong Kong, China SAR  2.4%  
Türkiye  4.3%   
Türkiye  2.1%  
Zimbabwe  4.0%   
Switzerland  1.9%  
Malawi  3.6%   
Ukraine  1.5%  
United States  3.6%   
Philippines  1.3%  
Subtotal  69.1%   Subtotal  85.6%  
Source:  Costa Rica, based on information from G/AG/W/32/Rev.20 . 
57.   Another aspect of the product disaggregation that requires careful consideration is the one 
related to value chains. Subsidies provided to basic products could leak downstream into the value 
chain as the basic product is further processed  and transformed. Going back to the tobacco example, 
unless there is significant vertical integration, the two instances of production and manufacturing 
can be well defined. Therefore, it would make sense to separate the HS codes related to 
manufacturing, such as cigarettes under 240220 and 240399, from those that are closer to the basic 
production, such as tobacco under 240110 or 240120.  
58.   While splitting products within a value chain may improve the regulation of subsidies within 
exporting sectors, it may become more challenging when one of these two instances is mostly 
directed towards domestic consumption, while the other is directed towards exporting. Further 
discussions would be required on the provision of subsidies to products like live animals and th e 
subsequent effects on other products live bovine meat, sheep meat, pig meat or poultry meat. The 
same goes for dairy -related products and for cotton.  
V.   SPECIAL COUNTERVAILING MEASURE  
59.   As indicated before, the creation of new PSS disciplines based on market participation would 
introduce additional uncertainties in the regulatory process, and there may be situations where the 
implementation and monitoring of commitments could lag with respect to short -term market 
conditions. This could be the case when subsidi zed production that is not initially intended for 
international markets ends up being exported. This could happen in the case of public food stocks, 
but also in the context of price gaps created by short -term volatility in international markets. Given 
that this type of "regulatory " leakage is difficult to prevent, an additional tool must be created so 
that Members can address situations where they may be receiving unwanted subsidized imported 
products. This situation has been extensively discussed in the context of the Dedicated Ses sion on 
the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), as one of the reasons for its necessity, but it is indeed a 
longstanding concern still being discussed. Therefore, Costa Rica considers that a new, creative and 
out-of-the-box mechanism such as a Special Count ervailing Measure could be used as a basis to 
address the referred regulatory leakages.  
60.    A Special Countervailing Measure (SCM) would ensure that Members have a short -term tool 
to promptly tackle the most immediate unwanted effects from subsidized imports. Its "special " 
condition lies in that no investigation or demonstration of damage or cau sality would be required as 
it is the case for countervailing measures applied pursuant to Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Instead, the application of the SCM would be triggered by 
either of three conditions. The fi rst one would be that the exporting Member notifies the provision 
of PSS beyond a certain threshold. Costa Rica is of the view that such a threshold should be 10% of 
the VoP, so that it covers every instance of possible regulatory leakages in the new propo sed 
modalities. As the first condition is related to transparency, it could create disincentives for 
notification if the exporting Member is indeed providing PSS beyond 10% of the VoP. Therefore, a 
second condition would need to cover for that possibility,  so that if the exporting Member has not 
notified over a certain period, that would also suffice for the importing Member to start the JOB/AG/243  
 
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  application of the SCM. The third and last condition would be that, pursuant to the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures  Governing the Settlement of Disputes, it has been determined the existence 
of product -specific domestic support beyond 10% of the Value of Production (or a circumvention of 
the relevant disciplines).  
61.   The SCM shall only be applied by a Member on the subsid ized imports for which the 
corresponding triggering condition has been verified no longer than the end of the calendar year in 
which its application started. That Member may be entitled to apply the SCM again on the same 
product in any year in which any of  the triggering conditions is verified. Upon such verification and 
before starting the application of the SCM, the Member must notify the CoA its intent to apply the 
SCM. 
VI.   FINAL REMARKS AND THE WAY FORWARD  
62.   Costa Rica proposes a "global " cap on trade and pro duction distorting domestic support 
entitlements and a global reduction objective of 50% with an implementation period of 10 years for 
individual reductions. This approach offers an ambitious and balanced way forward in the reform of 
the domestic support p illar in agriculture. The formula for reductions, along with its embedded 
proportionality and progressivity, limits the global growth of trade -distorting domestic support, while 
ensuring that Members retain a high degree of flexibility at the individual le vel. Costa Rica considers 
that additional upward adjustment from the calculated caps and reductions would ensure that 
developing Members retain sufficient policy space, and that smaller Members (i.e., those with 
entitlements under USD 1 billion) are not su bject to disproportionate contributions. In that line, LDCs 
would be exempted from any capping and reduction commitments and would enjoy a long transition 
period after graduation.  
63.   In terms of product -specific support, Costa Rica considers that new modaliti es should set new 
thresholds or limits for product -specific support based on participation in trade i.e., whether the 
Member accounts for a significant share of global exports of that product, or if its domestic 
production substitutes a significant share o f its national consumption. The proposed approach would 
also contribute to global food security, by providing balanced PSS flexibilities to non -exporters and 
more ambitious PSS disciplines for competitive exporters. This dynamic approach would both provide  
a permanent solution for PSH and for cotton.  
64.   In addition to these elements, Costa Rica envisages a SCM for unwanted subsidized imports, 
which would be applicable if a Member notifies product -specific support above 10% of its value of 
production for that product or does not notify its domestic support for two years. Enhanced 
transparency of domestic support notifications, including notification of value of production data 
would also be required to advance the reform process.  
65.   On the way forward, Costa Rica considers that the principles, objectives, and suggested 
modalities as presented in this proposal should be the basis for negotiations in the domestic support 
pillar. Achieving more robust rules in the domestic support pillar would be an important contribu tion 
to addressing global inequality, providing sustainable economic development opportunities, 
addressing overall global food security needs, and building an inclusive and effective global trading 
system. Therefore, Costa Rica cordially and respectfully i nvites all Members to work together towards 
these goals based on this proposal.  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  SECTION B 
 
DRAFT OF MODALITIES  
Since the Agreement on Agriculture is currently subject to negotiations, the proponent reserve the 
right to submit definitive mo dalities on this proposal at the appropriate moment according to the 
final modalities, which the current negotiations shall deliver and taking into account the result of the 
negotiations on other areas . 
 
The reference to certain parts of the actual Agreeme nt on Agriculture is an example of the definitive 
modalities necessary for the purpose of this proposal.  
MINISTERIAL DECISION ON MODALITIES FOR REFORM OF THE  
DOMESTIC SUPPORT PILLAR, FEBRUARY  2024  
The Ministerial Conference , 
  
Having regard  to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization;  
 
Recalling the long -term objective to establish a fair and market -oriented agricultural trading system 
and to provide for substantial progressive reduction s in agricultural support and protection sustained 
over an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting, and preventing restrictions and distortions in 
world agricultural markets as stated in the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA);  
 
Having regard  that special and differential treatment is an integral part of the agriculture 
negotiations as stated in the Preamble of the AoA;  
 
Considering  the importance of further levelling the playing field for global agricultural trade in order 
to realize the full potential of the agricultural reform process;  
 
Recognizing  the role that a fair and market -oriented agricultural trading system plays in supporting 
progress towards the targets set out under the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,  
including to end poverty and hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, promote 
sustainable agriculture and food systems, implement resilient agricultural practices, enhance 
production, and strengthen the policy response to climate change and n atural disasters through both 
mitigation and adaptation actions;  
 
Taking note  of the achievements in the negotiations to date, as well as the need to make further 
progress in order to fulfil existing mandates relevant to the agriculture negotiations, as s et out in 
Article 20 of the AoA, and the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial Decisions.  
Decides  as follows:  
 
I.   Capping Commitments  
1. Members shall not provide trade -distorting domestic support which taken in aggregate exceeds 
a monetary limit (hereafter " base cap ") as provided in Column 2 of Annex I of this Decision. 
This limit shall apply to all of domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers 
currently provided under Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture, with the exception of 
domestic measures w hich are not subject to limitations in terms of the criteria set out in this 
Decision and in Annex  2 to the Agreement on Agriculture.  For the purposes of the Agreement 
on Agriculture, the final commitment reached under this Decision shall continue to be ex pressed 
in terms of Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS).   
 
2. The base cap in Paragraph 1 shall be calculated as follows:  
 
a. A baseline, as provided in Column 1 of Annex I of this Decision, which shall be estimated 
as the sum of:  JOB/AG/243  
 
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i) The monetary value of de minimis entitlements for product -specific support and non -
product -specific AMS under Article 6.4, as estimated using the average value of total 
agricultural production for the last three years available; plus  
ii) Final Bound Total AMS as specified in Part IV of the Member 's Schedule; plus  
iii) The highest level of support provided under Article 6.2 during the most recent 
consecutive three years, as notified to the Committee on Agriculture; plus  
iv) The highest level of support provided under Art icle 6.5 during the most recent 
consecutive three years, as notified to the Committee on Agriculture.  
 
b. The baseline shall be adjusted as follows in order to obtain the base cap:  
 
i) Developing Members with a baseline equal or superior to 20 %, but lower than 3 0% of 
the average total value of agricultural production for the last three years available, 
shall receive an upward adjustment so that their base cap is equal to 30% of the 
average total value of agricultural production for the last three years available.  
ii) Any Member with a baseline inferior to 20 % of the average total value of agricultural 
production for the last three years available, shall receive an upward adjustment so 
that their base cap is equal to 20%, or shall receive an additional adjustment of 
[USD 1 billion], whichever adjustment is lower in monetary terms.  
II.   Reduction Commitments  
3. Members shall reduce their individual  base cap  using their relative participation in the total 
collective base cap . The total collective base cap being the aggregate of all the individual base 
caps estimated in paragraph 2. For certainty, the following formula shall be used when 
estimating individual reductions:  
NCi= BC i*(1-Ai), where:  
 
NCi is the new cap  after reductions for Member "i"; 
BCi is the base cap  for Member "i"; 
Ai is the share of Member "i", in the total base cap , so 𝐴𝑖=𝐵𝐶𝑖
∑𝐵𝐶164
𝑖=1 
 
4. The total collective base cap  shall be subject to a reduction of at least [50]% by 
31 December  2034.  
 
5. Members shall reduce their individual base cap in line with the objective set out in paragraph  4, 
by applying nine times the formula of paragraph 3.  
 
6. Where the individual base cap  is less than or equal to [USD 1 billion], or the equivalent in the 
monetary te rms in which the binding is expressed, Members shall not be required to undertake 
any reduction commitment.  
 
7. The new cap, as provided in Column 3 of Annex I to this Decision, shall be adjusted before it 
becomes the final commitment (final cap), so that any Member with a new cap that is:  
 
a. less than or equal to USD 250 million, can schedule its final commitment to be equal to 
USD 250 million, or the equivalent in the monetary terms in which the binding is expressed; 
or 
b. more than USD 250 million but less than or equal to USD 500 million, can schedule its final 
commitment to be equal to USD 500 million, or the equivalent in the monetary terms in 
which the binding is expressed; or  
c. more than USD 500 million but less than or equal to USD 750 million, can schedule its final 
commitment to be equal to USD 750 million, or the equivalent in the monetary terms in 
which the binding  is expressed.  
 JOB/AG/243  
 
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  8. Least Developed Country Members shall be exempted from any capping or reduction 
commitments.  
 
9. Those Least Developed Co untry Members that have met the criteria for graduation shall be 
subject to paragraph 1 of this Decision, 10 years after graduation. At that moment they will be 
required to schedule their base cap  in monetary terms, in Part IV of their Schedules. For great er 
certainty, the provisions under paragraph 7 of this Decision shall apply in the scheduling of their 
final commitments.  
 
10. All Members, other than least -developed country Members, shall schedule their final 
commitments (hereafter final cap ) as provided in Column 4 of Annex I of this Decision, in 
monetary terms in Part IV of their Schedules. Final commitments shall enter into force no later 
than 31 December 2034.  
 
11. Members shall continue to respect the existing limits set out in the Agreement on Agriculture 
on the provision of domestic support until the new limits set out in this Decision enter into force. 
Access in advance to the new provisions shall be granted in accordance with the schedule of 
reductions that each Member established in paragraph 10 of this Decision.  
 
III.   Product Specific AMS Limits  
12. For the purposes of this Decision, a  product shall be defined in accordance with the categories 
established in Annex II of this Decision. The aggregation level for each product shall be reviewed 
every four years by the Committee of Agriculture. At the request of a Member, if in the course 
of the review, a tariff subheading concentrates more than 50% of total global exports of a given 
product for more than three years, a new product category shall be created for that specific 
tariff subheading.1  
 
13. Unless specified otherwise, all product -specific domestic support provided by a Member shall be 
accounted for in its final cap limit as set out in Paragraph 10 of this Decision and shall be 
aggregated into a Product -Specific Support AMS .2 
 
14. As per Paragraph 13, disciplines on Product -Specific Support AMS shall be defined as follows:  
 
a. A Member that does not actively engages in exports3 of a product and:  
 
i) imports [50%] or more of its annual consumption of that product, shall not be required 
to include its product -specific domest ic support into that Product -Specific AMS; or  
ii) imports more than [20]% but less than [50]% of its annual consumption of that 
product, shall not be required to include its product -specific domestic support into that 
Product -Specific AMS if it is lower than USD [1] million. Otherwise, a Product -Specific 
AMS limit of [75%] [100%] of the VoP of said product shall apply; or  
iii) imports less than [20]% of its annual consumption of that product, shall have access 
to Product -Specific AMS up to [50]% [75]% of the VoP of said product, as long as it 
establishes or mai ntains a duty -free tariff quota to a volume of imports equivalent to 
at least [20]% of its annual consumption of said product .4 The provisions under 
paragraph 14 (b)(i) of this Decision  shall apply otherwise.  
 
1 The WTO Secretariat shall keep track of the information necessary for this purpose. As per 
Article  18.5, Members agree to consult annually in the Committee on Agriculture with respect to their 
participation in the normal growth of world trade in agricultural products.  
2 The notifications formats under G/AG/2 shall be reviewed accordingly to improve monitoring of all 
product -specific support provided under Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
3 A Member with less than  0.01% of global exports of a product  (by volume or value  when applicable ), 
or that exports less than USD [one] million annually  when value is used for that product , shall not be 
considered to be an active exporter of said product.  
4 Least Developed Count ry Members shall be exempted from the duty -free tariff quota requirement.  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  b. A Member that actively engages in exports of a product and over two consecutive years:  
 
i) holds a share of less than [0.5] % of global exports of said product, shall have access 
to product -specific AMS up to [25] % of the value of that product 's total value of 
production; or  
ii) holds a share of at least [0.5] % but less than [2] % of global exports of said product, 
shall have access to product -specific AMS up to [20] % of the value of that product 's 
total value of production; or  
iii) holds a share of at least [2] % but less than [5] % of global exports of said product, 
shall have access to product -specific AMS up to [15] % of the value of that product 's 
total value of production; or  
iv) holds a share of 5 % or more of global exports of said product, shall have access to 
product -specific AMS up to 10 % of the value of that product 's total value of production.  
15. [Product -specific domestic support provided to producers in developing country Members to 
encourage di versification from growing illicit narcotic crops shall not be included in the limit set 
out in paragraph s 10 and 13 of this Decision.  
 
16. Non-product specific domestic support in the form of generally available investment or input 
subsidies provided to low -income or resource -poor producers in developing country Members, 
shall not be included in the limit set out in paragraph 10 of this Decis ion as long as it does not 
exceed US D [5] billion during the relevant year .] 
 
IV.   On Annex 2  
17. The provisions and transparency requirements in Annex 2 of the AoA and the Ministerial Decision 
of 7 December 2013 on General Services shall be reviewed and updated to  ensure that covered 
subsidies have no, or at most minimal, trade -distorting effects or effects on production. 
Consideration shall be given to concerns about environment protection and food security5, as 
well as to rural development and poverty alleviation objectives .  
 
V.   Special Countervailing Measures  
18. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article II of GATT 1994, any Member may 
take recourse to  a Special Countervailing Measure (SCM)  in connection with the importation of 
an agricultu ral product if any of the following conditions is verified:  
 
a. if in its notifications, as from 20[24], the exporting Member has provided any Product -
Specific AMS above 10% of its Value of Production in the previous notified year for that 
product or group of  products; or  
b. if in its notification obligations under paragraph 2 of Article 18, the exporting Member has 
not submitted to the Committee on Agriculture its notification on domestic support 2 years 
following the notification deadline; or  
c. if, pursuant to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, a determination has been made on the existence of product -specific domestic 
support beyond 10% of the Value of Production (or a circumvention of the relevant 
discip lines) by the exporting Member.  
 
19. The SCM shall only be maintained until the end of the calendar year in which it has been imposed 
and may only be levied at a level which shall not exceed [50]% of the level of the ordinary 
customs duty in effect in the year  in which the action is taken.  
 
20. The SCM shall only be applied to the imported agricultural products of the same origin and for 
which the corresponding triggering condition has been verified for the calendar year in which 
 
5 As defined by FAO: when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferen ces for an active and 
healthy life . JOB/AG/243  
 
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  the action is taken. Any recourse to the SCM beyond the calendar year in which the action is 
initially taken shall require a new verification on the continued existence of the triggering 
condition and a new communication to the Committee on Agriculture.  
 
21. The operation of the SCM shall be carried out in a transparent manner. Any Member taking 
action under the SCM shall give notice in writing to the Committee on Agriculture as far in 
advance as may be practicable and in any event within 10 days of the implementation of such 
action. A Member taking action under the SCM shall afford any interested Members the 
opportunity to consult with it in respect of the conditions of application of such action.  
 
22. Where measures are taken in conformity with the provisions above, Members undertake not to 
have recourse, in respect of such measures, to the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 3 of 
Article  XIX of GATT 1994, or paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards.   
 
VI.   Consultations  
23. Any Member seeking coverage of its support programmes under the provisions contained in this 
Decision shall ensure that its programmes do not adversely affect the food security of other 
Members and shall upon request hold consultations with other intereste d Members on the 
operation of its support programmes.   
 
VII.   Monitoring  
24. The Committee on Agriculture shall monitor and review the information submitted under this 
Decision.  
 
25. Members agree to hold dedicated discussions on an annual basis in the Committee on 
Agriculture to examine relevant developments in the field of domestic support. This examination 
process shall provide an opportunity for Members to raise any matter relevant to the domestic 
support pillar.  
 
26. The dedicated discussions shall be u ndertaken on the basis of factual information and data 
compiled by the WTO Secretariat from Members' notifications, complemented, as appropriate, 
by relevant information provided by Members to the WTO Secretariat.  
 
27. The Committee on Agriculture shall review  the implementation of the disciplines contained in 
this Decision and its operation every three years, taking into account the Dedicated Discussions 
and the experience gained up to that time, with the aim of making recommendations in a 
manner consistent wi th Article 20 of the AoA.  
 
VIII.    Transparency  
28. Members shall:  
 
a. Fulfil and continue to fulfil its domestic support notification requirements under the 
Agreement on Agriculture in accordance with document G/AG/2 of 30 June 1995 and its 
updates.  
b. Notify the Committee  on Agriculture of the total value of production and the value of 
production for each subsidized product. The value of production shall be updated annually 
on the basis of information provided by Members to the WTO Secretariat. The WTO 
Secretariat will wor k with other international organizations in providing technical assistance 
and support for capacity building to any WTO Member encountering difficulties in 
estimating their total value of agricultural production.  
c. Include in their notifications all programm es covered by the Bali Decision on General 
Services that are related to land reform and rural livelihood security provided in order to 
promote rural development and poverty alleviation, such as land rehabilitation, soil 
conservation and resource management , drought management and flood control, rural 
employment programmes, issuance of property titles, and farmer settlement programmes.  
d. Provide the measure type, name, and description for each measure notified in a complete 
and comprehensive manner, including , if possible, a URL for the related legislation that JOB/AG/243  
 
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  allows for the measure or programme and a URL for the data source where outlays are 
found. All product -specific support provided under Article 6 shall be disaggregated by 
product and type of programme.  
29. Members instruct the WTO Secretariat to assist developing country Members, particularly least 
developed Members, upon their request, to comply with notification and transparency 
requirements, including through ad hoc advice, technical assistance, and capac ity-building 
support. The Secretariat shall report on the activities in relation to the assistance provided.  
 
IX.   Final provisions  
30. Pursuant  to the preamble  and Article  20 of the AoA, this Decision  shall not be construed  to 
impede  the Uruguay  Round  agricultural  reform  programme  aimed  at correcting  and preventing  
restrictions  and distortions  in world  agricultural  markets.  Members  are encouraged  to continue  
their reform  process  consistent  with that objective  and, to the extent  possible,  develop  and 
implement  programmes  that have the least distorting  effects  on international  agricultural  
markets.  
 
31. As of its adoption, for all intents and purposes this Decision constitutes a Permanent Solution 
on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes and replaces the interim solution 
(WT/MIN(13)/38 - WT/L/913) for Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes adopted in 
Bali, Indonesia in December 2013, as clarified in the General Council Decision of 
27 November  2014 (WT/L/939).  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  ANNEX I  
 
MEMBER  BASELINE  
IN USD MILLION  BASE CAP  NEW CAP  (IT.91) FINAL CAP  
COLUMN  1 2 3 4 
China  263,850  264,850  50,497  50,497  
European Union  131,929  131,929 43,956 43,956 
India 105,641  120,816 42,822 42,822 
United States  55,573  56,573 31,183 31,183 
Japan  46,370  46,370 27,916 27,916 
Brazil  32,069  45,637 27,657 27,657 
Indonesia  26,477  34,988 23,435 23,435 
Türkiye  19,308  27,493 19,863 19,863 
Mexico  23,617  23,617 17,778 17,778 
Pakistan  12,492  18,738 14,883 14,883 
Russian Federation  13,158  14,158 11,852 11,852 
Korea, Republic of  10,279  13,525 11,407 11,407 
Viet Nam  8,393  11,952 10,270 10,270 
Thailand  9,654  10,819 9,424 9,424 
Philippines  6,913  9,759 8,611 8,611 
Argentina  6,576  9,751 8,605 8,605 
Canada  7,985  8,985 8,003 8,003 
Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of  6,628  8,246 7,413 7,413 
Nigeria  5,481  8,199 7,375 7,375 
Colombia  5,407  6,876 6,288 6,288 
Egypt  4,485  6,652 6,100 6,100 
Malaysia  4,447  6,449 5,929 5,929 
Australia  4,860  5,860 5,428 5,428 
Switzerland  5,613  5,613 5,215 5,215 
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  4,316  5,187 4,846 4,846 
Chile 3,054 4,557 4,292 4,292 
Peru 3,122 4,514 4,253 4,253 
Kenya  2,967 4,450 4,197 4,197 
Ukraine  3,079 4,079 3,865 3,865 
Morocco  2,770 3,705 3,528 3,528 
Ghana  2,218 3,327 3,183 3,183 
Dominican Republic  2,177 3,237 3,101 3,101 
Côte d'Ivoire  2,080 3,120 2,994 2,994 
South Africa  2,113 3,113 2,987 2,987 
Cameroon  1,895 2,842 2,737 2,737 
Chinese Taipei  1,852 2,746 2,647 2,647 
New Zealand  1,710 2,710 2,615 2,615 
Israel  2,258 2,534 2,450 2,450 
Ecuador  1,687 2,531 2,447 2,447 
Norway  2,354 2,354 2,281 2,281 
Paraguay  1,560 2,335 2,264 2,264 
Kazakhstan  1,638 1,927 1,878 1,878 
Bolivia, Plurinational State 
of 1,260 1,890 1,843 1,843 
Uruguay  1,242 1,861 1,815 1,815 
Guatemala  1,207 1,762 1,721 1,721 
Tunisia  1,123 1,533 1,502 1,502 
Sri Lanka  1,389 1,443 1,416 1,416 
Costa Rica  948 1,398 1,372 1,372 
Cuba  667 1,000 987 1,000 
 
1 For greater certainty, the following formula was used when estimating individual reductions:  
NCi= BC i*(1-Ai), where:  
 
NCi is the new cap  after reductions for Member "i"; 
BCi is the base cap  for Member "i"; 
Ai is the share of Member "i", in the total base cap , so 𝐴𝑖=𝐵𝐶𝑖
∑𝐵𝐶164
𝑖=1 
The above formula was applied for nine iterations in order to obtain the results in Column 3. 
 JOB/AG/243  
 
- 23 - 
 
  MEMBER  BASELINE  
IN USD MILLION  BASE CAP  NEW CAP  (IT.91) FINAL CAP  
COLUMN  1 2 3 4 
Congo  634 951 939 951 
Honduras  629 938 926 938 
Papua New Guinea  619 877 867 877 
Zimbabwe  580 871 861 871 
Jordan  547 812 803 812 
Panama  582 777 769 777 
Albania  350 700 693 750 
Tajikistan  588 606 601 750 
Kyrgyz Republic  298 596 591 750 
Nicaragua  392 588 583 750 
El Salvador  427 547 543 750 
Jamaica  349 524 520 750 
Mauritius  308 462 459 500 
Mongolia  268 343 341 500 
Moldova, Republic of  171 306 305 500 
Armenia  151 301 300 500 
North Macedonia  155 272 271 500 
Iceland  216 216 215 250 
United Arab Emirates  141 212 211 250 
Georgia  85 169 169 250 
Guyana  105 158 157 250 
Fiji 93 140 140 250 
Montenegro  58 116 116 250 
Namibia  82 112 112 250 
Belize  66 98 98 250 
Gabon  65 97 97 250 
Eswatini  64 96 96 250 
Botswana  93 93 93 250 
Kuwait, the State of  56 84 84 250 
Oman  62 83 83 250 
Trinidad and Tobago  49 73 73 250 
Hong Kong, China  47 71 71 250 
Suriname  44 66 65 250 
Grenada  42 63 63 250 
Cabo Verde  38 57 57 250 
Qatar  40 57 57 250 
Barbados  30 44 44 250 
Brunei Darussalam  27 40 40 250 
Samoa  24 36 36 250 
Singapore  19 28 28 250 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines  18 27 27 250 
Saint Lucia  15 22 22 250 
Antigua and Barbuda  9 13 13 250 
Tonga  7 11 10 250 
Dominica  7 10 10 250 
Bahrain, Kingdom of  6 9 9 250 
Seychelles  5 5 5 250 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  2 4 4 250 
Maldives  1 1 1 250 
Macao, China  - - - 250 
GRAND TOTAL  876,553.98  980,791.58  491,811.80  499,372.07  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  ANNEX II (AS PER G/AG/W/32/REV.21)  
Product or product groups  Product composition  
(HS2017)  
Wheat and wheat flour  1001 
1101 
Coarse grains  1002 
1003 
1004 
1005 
1007 
1008 
Rice 1006 
Oilseeds  1201 
1202 
1203 
1204 
1205 
1206 
1207 
Vegetable oils  1507 
1508 
1509 
1510 
1511 
1512 
1513 
1514 
1515 
Oilcakes  2304 
2305 
2306 
Sugar  1701 
Butter and butter oil  0405 
Skim milk powder  040210  
Cheese  0406 
Other milk products  
(Whole milk powder)  040221  
040229  
Bovine meat  0201 
0202 
021020  
Pig meat  0203 
021011  
021012  
021019  
Poultry meat  0207 
Sheep meat  0204 
Live animals  01 
Eggs  0407 
Wine  2204 
2205 
Fruits and Vegetables  07 
08 
20 
Tobacco  24 
Cotton  5201 
5202 
5203 JOB/AG/243  
 
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  SECTION C  - ADDITIONAL ANALYTICAL TABLES  
Table 1: D ata on  Monetized  Entitlements  following Annex I of JOB/AG/199  
(In USD million ) 
MEMBER  AV. VOP1 SOURCE  DE 
MINIMIS2 FBTAMS3 ART.6.24 BLUE 
BOX4 BASE LINE  
China  1,517,502.5  REPORTED  25,975.4  - - 5,875.0  263,850.4  
European 
Union  436,867.5  REPORTED  43,686.7  82,669.9  - 5,572.5  131,929.1  
India  402,719.2  FAO 80,543.8  - 25,097.5  - 105,641.4  
United States  364,696.1  REPORTED  36,469.6  19,103.3  - - 55,572.9  
Japan  85,113.0  REPORTED  8,511.3  37,208.3  - 650.8  46,370.4  
Brazil  152,124.4  REPORTED  30,424.9  912.1  732.3  - 32,069.3  
Indonesia  116,625.2  FAO 23,325.0  - 3,151.6  - 26,476.6  
Mexico  52,986.6  REPORTED  10,597.3  12,385.0  634.8  - 23,617.2  
Türkiye   91,644.6  REPORTED  18,328.9  - 978.7  - 19,307.6  
Russian 
Federation  87,582.2  REPORTED  8,758.2  4,400.0  - - 13,158.2  
Pakistan  62,461.1  REPORTED  12,492.2  - - - 12,492.2  
Korea, 
Republic of  45,083.7  REPORTED  9,016.7  1,262.4  - - 10,279.2  
Thailand  36,062.3  FAO 7,212.5  608.1  1,833.4  - 9,653.9  
Viet Nam  39,840.0  REPORTED  7,968.0  170.7  254.1  - 8,392.8  
Canada  47,777.7  REPORTED  4,777.8  3,206.9  - - 7,984.7  
Philippines  32,531.3  FAO 6,506.3  - 407.0  - 6,913.2  
Venezuela, 
Bolivarian 
Republic of  27,487.0  FAO 5,497.4  1,130.7  N/A N/A 6,628.1  
Argentina  32,502.6  FAO 6,500.5  75.0 - - 6,575.5  
Switzerland  10,782.4  REPORTED  1,078.2  4,534.3  - - 5,612.5  
Nigeria  27,330.0  FAO 5,466.0  - 15.0 - 5,480.9  
Colombia  22,919.6  FAO 4,583.9  344.7  478.6  - 5,407.3  
Bangladesh  24,825.0  FAO 4,965.0  - 2.7 - 4,967.7  
Australia  45,354.8  REPORTED  4,535.5  324.7  - - 4,860.2  
Egypt  22,173.4  FAO 4,434.7  - 50.2 - 4,484.8  
Malaysia  21,495.5  FAO 4,299.1  - 147.6  - 4,446.7  
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  17,289.7  REPORTED  3,457.9  858.2  - - 4,316.2  
Myanmar  21,165.0  RD/AG/74  4,233.0  - - - 4,233.0  
Peru  15,045.5  FAO 3,009.1  - 112.7  - 3,121.8  
Ukraine  29,659.8  FAO 2,966.0  112.9  - - 3,078.9  
Chile  15,191.4  REPORTED  3,038.3  - 15.9 - 3,054.2  
Kenya  14,833.9  FAO 2,966.8  - N/A N/A 2,966.8  
Morocco  12,351.4  FAO 2,470.3  72.1 228.0  - 2,770.4  
Norway  4,129.8  REPORTED  413.0  1,215.9  - 724.9  2,353.8  
Israel  8,447.2  REPORTED  1,689.4  569.0  - - 2,258.4  
Ghana  11,089.2  FAO 2,217.8  - N/A N/A 2,217.8  
Dominican 
Republic  10,791.1  FAO 2,158.2  - 18.9 - 2,177.1  
South Africa  19,907.7  FAO 1,990.8  122.5  - - 2,113.2  
Côte d'Ivoire  10,400.1  FAO 2,080.0  - - - 2,080.0  
Cambodia  10,090.7  FAO 2,018.1  - - - 2,018.1  
Malawi  8,899.1  FAO 1,779.8  - 127.2  - 1,907.1  
Cameroon  9,473.2  FAO 1,894.6  - - - 1,894.6  
Nepal  8,982.8  FAO 1,796.6  - 76.9 - 1,873.5  
Chinese Taipei  13,728.5  FAO 1,372.9  478.8  - - 1,851.7  
Mali  8,439.6  FAO 1,687.9  - 65.1 - 1,753.0  
Tanzania  8,596.4  FAO 1,719.3  - N/A N/A 1,719.3  
New Zealand  15,235.1  FAO 1,523.5  186.9  - - 1,710.4  
Ecuador  8,435.2  FAO 1,687.0  - - - 1,687.0  
Kazakhstan  9,634.9  FAO 1,637.9  - N/A N/A 1,637.9  
Paraguay  7,783.5  FAO 1,556.7  - 3.0 - 1,559.7  
Sri Lanka  4,810.7  FAO 962.1  - 427.3  - 1,389.4  
Niger   6,486.7  FAO 1,297.3  - N/A N/A 1,297.3  JOB/AG/243  
 
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  MEMBER  AV. VOP1 SOURCE  DE 
MINIMIS2 FBTAMS3 ART.6.24 BLUE 
BOX4 BASE LINE  
Bolivia, 
Plurinational 
State of  6,301.0  FAO 1,260.2  - - - 1,260.2  
Uruguay  6,203.6  REPORTED  1,240.7  - 1.6 - 1,242.3  
Yemen  6,037.8  FAO 1,207.6  - N/A N/A 1,207.6  
Guatemala  5,874.0  RD/AG/74  1,174.8  - 32.5 - 1,207.3  
Tunisia  5,110.6  REPORTED  1,022.1  21.1 79.9 - 1,123.1  
Uganda  5,240.0  RD/AG/74  1,048.0  - - - 1,048.0  
Costa Rica  4,659.3  FAO 931.9  15.9 - - 947.8  
Angola   4,442.9  FAO 888.6  - N/A N/A 888.6  
Mozambique  4,242.9  FAO 848.6  - N/A N/A 848.6  
Chad  4,206.7  FAO 841.3  - 0.1 - 841.5  
Zambia  3,678.1  FAO 735.6  - 97.2 - 832.8  
Madagascar  4,126.4  FAO 825.3  - 5.6 - 830.9  
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo  4,085.0  RD/AG/74  817.0  - N/A N/A 817.0  
Afghanistan  3,795.0  RD/AG/74  759.0  - - - 759.0  
Benin   3,548.4  FAO 709.7  - N/A N/A 709.7  
Lao PDR  3,408.0  REPORTED  681.6  - 1.8 - 683.4  
Rwanda  3,365.9  FAO 673.2  - N/A N/A 673.2  
Cuba  3,334.0  RD/AG/74  666.8  - - - 666.8  
Congo  3,170.6  FAO 634.1  - - - 634.1  
Burkina Faso  3,149.5  FAO 629.9  - - - 629.9  
Honduras  3,125.8  FAO 625.2  - 4.1 - 629.3  
Papua New 
Guinea  2,924.0  RD/AG/74  584.8  34.2 - - 619.0  
Tajikistan  2,020.0  FAO 404.0  183.7  - - 587.7  
Panama  2,590.2  FAO 518.0  - 63.5 - 581.5  
Zimbabwe  2,902.4  FAO 580.5  - N/A N/A 580.5  
Jordan  2,705.6  REPORTED  541.1  1.9 3.6 - 546.6  
Senegal  2,246.8  FAO 449.4  - 56.7 - 506.1  
Burundi  2,504.2  FAO 500.8  - - - 500.8  
El Salvador  1,822.7  FAO 364.5  - 62.0 - 426.5  
Togo  1,919.0  FAO 383.8  - 8.6 - 392.4  
Nicaragua  1,959.7  FAO 391.9  - - - 391.9  
Sierra Leone  1,752.0  FAO 350.4  - N/A N/A 350.4  
Albania  3,497.8  REPORTED  349.8  - - - 349.8  
Jamaica  1,747.2  FAO 349.4  - - - 349.4  
Guinea  1,560.6  FAO 312.1  - - - 312.1  
Haiti 1,544.0  RD/AG/74  308.8  - N/A N/A 308.8  
Mauritius  1,539.5  FAO 307.9  - 0.3 - 308.2  
Kyrgyz 
Republic  2,980.7  REPORTED  298.1  - - - 298.1  
Guinea -Bissau  1,390.2  FAO 278.0  - N/A N/A 278.0  
Mongolia  1,141.8  FAO 228.4  - 39.7 - 268.1  
Iceland  288.6  FAO 28.9 181.2  - 5.5 215.6  
Moldova, 
Republic of  1,529.4  FAO 152.9  17.8 - - 170.7  
North 
Macedonia  1,359.8  REPORTED  136.0  18.6 - - 154.6  
Armenia  1,505.2  FAO 150.5  - - - 150.5  
Central African 
Republic  741.5  FAO 148.3  - N/A N/A 148.3  
United Arab 
Emirates  707.0  RD/AG/74  141.4  - - - 141.4  
Mauritania  642.0  RD/AG/74  128.4  - N/A N/A 128.4  
Guyana  525.5  FAO 105.1  - - - 105.1  
Fiji  466.4  FAO 93.3 - - - 93.3 
Botswana  52.5 FAO 10.5 - 82.6 - 93.1 
Liberia  436.0  RD/AG/74  87.2 - N/A N/A 87.2 
Georgia  845.5  FAO 84.5 - - - 84.5 
Namibia  372.9  FAO 74.6 - 7.7 - 82.3 
Belize  328.1  FAO 65.6 - N/A N/A 65.6 
Gabon  323.0  RD/AG/74  64.6 - - - 64.6 
Eswatini  320.0  RD/AG/74  64.0 - N/A N/A 64.0 
Oman  276.8  FAO 55.4 - 6.3 - 61.7 
Montenegro  580.2  REPORTED  58.0 0.4 - - 58.4 JOB/AG/243  
 
- 27 - 
 
  MEMBER  AV. VOP1 SOURCE  DE 
MINIMIS2 FBTAMS3 ART.6.24 BLUE 
BOX4 BASE LINE  
Kuwait, the 
State of  279.6  FAO 55.9 - N/A N/A 55.9 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  245.0  FAO 49.0 - - - 49.0 
Hong Kong, 
China  235.3  FAO 47.1 - - - 47.1 
Suriname  218.4  FAO 43.7 - N/A N/A 43.7 
Grenada  209.3  FAO 41.9 - N/A N/A 41.9 
The Gambia  207.1  REPORTED  41.4 - - - 41.4 
Lesotho  159.0  RD/AG/74  31.8 - 8.9 - 40.7 
Qatar  189.5  FAO 37.9 - 2.5 - 40.4 
Cabo Verde  189.9  FAO 38.0 - N/A N/A 38.0 
Barbados  146.9  FAO 29.4 - 1.0 - 30.4 
Vanuatu  135.1  FAO 27.0 - - - 27.0 
Brunei 
Darussalam   133.4  FAO 26.7 - N/A N/A 26.7 
Samoa  118.6  FAO 23.7 - - - 23.7 
Solomon 
Islands  116.0  RD/AG/74  23.2 - N/A N/A 23.2 
Singapore  93.8 FAO 18.8 - - - 18.8 
Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines  90.5 FAO 18.1 - - - 18.1 
Saint Lucia  74.5 FAO 14.9 - N/A N/A 14.9 
Djibouti  73.0 RD/AG/74  14.6 - N/A N/A 14.6 
Antigua and 
Barbuda   43.7 FAO 8.7 - N/A N/A 8.7 
Tonga  35.0 RD/AG/74  7.0 - - - 7.0 
Dominica  33.0 RD/AG/74  6.6 - N/A N/A 6.6 
Bahrain, 
Kingdom of  30.8 FAO 6.2 - 0.1 - 6.2 
Seychelles  17.9 FAO 3.6 - 1.6 - 5.2 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis  11.7 FAO 2.3 - N/A N/A 2.3 
Maldives  4.6 FAO 0.9 - N/A N/A 0.9 
Macao, China  2.0 RD/AG/74  - - - - - 
Source:  Costa Rica. Based on the following information:  
1.  Average VoP  calculated using reported information as compiled by Canada in JOB/AG/219. When not 
available, the Value of Production compiled by FAO (October 2022 update) was used. If none of 
these databases had a reference value, calculations in RD/AG/74 were used. In  those cases where 
RD/AG/74 was used, the estimated VoP will only reflect data for 2016.  
2. De Minimis  calculations are based on Members ' entitlements in accordance with Article 6.4 of the 
AoA and any relevant Protocol of Accession. De minimis  estimates re flected in this table are without 
prejudice to the position of Costa Rica on the calculation that any Member may establish for its own 
de minimis  and should be used only as a reference.  
3. FBTAMS entitlements in accordance with JOB/AG/219 as of September 2 021. 
4. Article 6.2 and Article 6.5 expenditure calculated in accordance with JOB/AG/199 and as reflected in 
JOB/AG/219. The highest value of the last three years notified was chosen when available.  
 
 
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