RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/DSB/M/163 
1 March 2004 
 (04-0799) 
Dispute Settlement Body 
23 January 2004  
 
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 23 January 2004  
 
Acting Chairperson:  Mrs. Mary Whelan (Ireland) 
 
 Subjects discussed
: Page  
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.........................2  
(a) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States.......................2  
(b) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998:  Status report by 
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........3  
(c) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from 
Japan:  Status report by  the United States...................................................................................4  
(d) Chile – Price band system and safeguard measures relating to certain agricultural 
products:  Status report by Chile.............................................................................................. ...4 
(e) United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000:  Status report 
by the Unite d States ........................................................................................................... .........5  
2. United States – Countervailing duty in vestigation on dynamic random access 
memory semiconductors ( DRAMS) from Korea ...................................................................9  
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Korea.....................................................................9  
3. European Communities – Countervailin g measures on dynamic random access 
memory chips from Korea .......................................................................................................9  
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Korea.....................................................................9  
4. Argentina – Definitive safeguard measu re on imports of preserved peaches ...................10  
(a) Statement by Argentina......................................................................................................... ....10  
 
 WT/DSB/M/163 
Page 2  
 
 1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB 
(a) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:   Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS136/14/Add.22 - WT/DS162/17/Add.22) 
 (b) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.15) 
 (c) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.15) 
 
(d) Chile – Price band system and safeguard measu res relating to certain agricultural products:  
Status report by Chile (WT/DS207/15/Add.3) 
 (e) United States – Continued Dumping and Subsid y Offset Act of 2000:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS217/16 – WT/DS234/24) 
 
1. The Chairperson
 recalled that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that "unless the DSB decides 
otherwise, the issue of implementation of the re commendations or rulings shall be placed on the 
agenda of the DSB meeting after six months follo wing the date of establishment of the reasonable 
period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is 
resolved".  She proposed that the five sub-items  to which she had just referred be considered 
separately. 
(a) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States 
(WT/DS136/14/Add.22 - WT/DS162/17/Add.22) 
2. The Chairperson  drew attention to document WT/D S136/14/Add.22 – WT/DS162/17/Add.22, 
which contained the status report by the United St ates on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. 
3. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided an additional status 
report in these disputes on 12 January 2004, in accordan ce with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in 
the report, legislation repealing the 1916 Act was pending in both the US Senate and US House of 
Representatives. The House legislation had been scheduled for consideration by the relevant 
committee for action this month.  The US administ ration was continuing to work with Congress to 
achieve further progress in resolving th ese disputes with the EC and Japan. 
4. The representative of Japan  said that her country deeply regretted that the status report by the 
United States offered no prospect for implementati on of the recommendations and rulings three years 
and four months after the adoption of the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports in this proceeding.  
This lengthy period of non-compliance by the United States continued to damage the credibility of the 
WTO dispute settlement system.  Japan, once again, strongly urged the US administration to make 
utmost efforts to secure the passage of bills repea ling the 1916 Act at the earliest juncture during the 
second session of the 108th Congress.  In addition, the Congress must pass the repealing bills with 
proper retroactive effect, not those without it.  Japan  could not tolerate the fact that its companies 
involved in the cases brought under the WTO-inconsiste nt Act were being forced  to incur substantial 
damages including significant legal costs.  Japa n sincerely hoped that the United States would do 
much better this year than just "to continue to work  with the US Congress to enact legislation" so that 
the Act would be repealed and the pending cases be terminated.  The United States should also report 
more details to the DSB when and how exactly the implementation would take place.  She noted that Japan had not yet made a final decision on whethe r to reactivate the DSU Article 22 arbitration.   WT/DSB/M/163 
 Page 3 
 
 
 Finally, Japan wished to remind the United States  of its right to suspend concessions or other 
obligations. 
5. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC regretted that its first 
statement in 2004 regarding this subject had to be s ubstantially the same as the previous one and, in 
fact, as all other statements in 2003.  The repeali ng bills mentioned in the US report had been pending 
for months and yet to date discussion on them had not even started.  Two years had passed since the 
expiry of the implementation period and one had still been waiting for a sign that the DSB's 
recommendations would be implemented.  The failure of the United States to stand by its obligations 
had caused substantial costs to EC companies i nvolved in lawsuits based on the 1916 Anti-Dumping 
Act.  Moreover, EC companies remained under th e constant threat of new actions being brought 
against them in blatant violation of WTO rules.  Th e persistent inaction of the United States in this 
case set a very damaging precedent. 
6. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(b) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropria tions Act of 1998:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.15) 
7. The Chairperson  drew attention to document WT/DS176/11/Add.15, which contained the 
status report by the United States on progress in th e implementation of the DSB's recommendations in 
the case concerning US Section 211 Om nibus Appropriations Act of 1998. 
8. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 12 January 2004, in accordance with  Article 21.6 of the DSU.  On 19 December 2003, 
the United States and the EC had informed the DSB that they had agreed to extend the reasonable 
period of time to implement the recommendations and rulings in this dispute until 31 December 2004.  
The US administration would continue to work wi th the US Congress with respect to appropriate 
statutory measures that would resolve this matter. 
9. The representative of the European Communities  said that the EC had agreed with the United 
States to extend the implementation period and e xpected that this would result in the full 
implementation of the DSB's rulings and recommen dations.  On 9 December 2003, a bill had been 
introduced in the Senate to repeal Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 as part of a 
whole scheme of measures that would ensure an ef fective protection of intellectual property rights 
both in Cuba and in the United States.  That bill was identical to a bill introdu ced in June 2003 in the 
House.  This offered a basis to resolve this disput e to the benefit of all and would also show the US 
commitment to the effective and non-discriminat ory protection of intellectual property rights. 
10. The representative of Cuba  said that, on 24 December 2003, a communication had been 
circulated in which the United States and the EC ha d notified the DSB that th ey had agreed to a new 
period of time for implementation of the DSB's re commendations pertaining to the Section 211 case.  
This was the third time that the United States had requ ested an extension of the period of time in order 
to meet its obligations as a WTO Member, to comp ly with the DSB's decisions and to bring its 
legislation into conformity with WTO rules.  Twenty-three months had passed since the Appellate 
Body's ruling of 2 February in relation to this dispute settlement process.  This new extension 
reflected not only an overweening and arrogant absence of political will to comply with the 
commitments it had entered into, but also one more delay in complying with the decisions of the DSB to be added to the series of requests for postponeme nt that the United States had already submitted in 
connection with rulings that were not to its liki ng.  The United States had, on a number of occasions, 
given notice of its intention and apparent willi ngness to repeal Section 211.  However, these 
affirmations had proved to be yet another instance of  empty rhetoric, with no  concrete results.  Her WT/DSB/M/163 
Page 4  
 
 delegation noted with concern the US lack of inte rest and undue delay in complying with WTO rules 
and disciplines, to the detriment of the rights of its Members, including, in this case, Cuba.  Her 
country regarded this as a deplorable act of  obfuscation which disrupted the balance between 
Members' rights and obligations under the TRIPS Ag reement and the basic principles of the WTO.  
Consequently, Cuba requested the US authorities to desist from violating the rules governing the 
multilateral trade system and to repeal Section 211  forthwith, as the only genuine solution to this 
dispute. 
11. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(c) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:  
Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add.15) 
12. The Chairperson  drew attention to document WT/D S184/15/Add.15 which contained the 
status report by the United States on progress in th e implementation of the DSB's recommendations in 
the case concerning US anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan. 
13. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report in 
this dispute on 12 January 2004, in accordance with  Article 21.6 of the DSU.  On 10 December 2003, 
the DSB had extended the reasonable period of time to  implement the recommendations and rulings in 
this dispute until 31 July 2004.  The US administra tion would continue to work with the US Congress 
to address the recommendations and rulings of the DSB that had not been addressed by 23 November 2002. 
14. The representative of Japan
 said that the reasonable period of time in this proceeding had 
been extended to 31 July 2004.  It was a great disappointment to Japan that the United States could 
not comply with these DSB's recommendations and rulings before the first session of the 108th Congress had ended.  In fact, no "specific le gislative amendments" had been introduced. Japan 
strongly requested the United States to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings, including 
securing the introduction and passage of the ne cessary bills during the second session of the 
108th Congress. 
15. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(d) Chile – Price band system and safeguard measure s relating to certain agricultural products:  
Status report by Chile (WT/DS207/15/Add.3) 
16. The Chairperson  drew attention to document WT/DS207/15/Add.3, which contained the 
status report by Chile on progress in the implem entation of the DSB's recommendations in the case 
concerning price band system and safeguard measu res relating to certain agricultural products. 
17. The representative of Chile  said that the new price band system for wheat and wheat flour had 
entered into force on 16 December 2003, as indicated  in previous status reports.  Although Chile 
considered the new system to be consistent, in form and substance, with  the DSB's recommendations 
and rulings, there was disagreement on this matter within the meaning of Article 21.5 of the DSU.  
Accordingly, upon expiry of the reasonable period of  time, Argentina and Chile had signed a bilateral 
agreement regarding the procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU, which had been circulated 
to Members.  In this regard, he wished to point out  that Chile still considered that the problem of the 
sequence between Articles 21 and 22 of the DS U called for a multilateral solution.  Ad hoc 
agreements of the kind signed with Argentina we re no substitute in any event for a multilateral 
solution.  Such agreements only provided a transitio nal solution applicable exclusively to the dispute  WT/DSB/M/163 
 Page 5 
 
 
 in question.  Even if such a solution had been r eached with Argentina on an amicable basis, the 
bilateral nature of the agreement was no guarant ee that the same solution could be found in all 
disputes.  Consequently, Chile would continue, in particular within the process of negotiations on 
clarifications and improvements of the DSU, to s upport the need for finding a multilateral solution to 
the problem of the sequence between Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU. 
18. The representative of Argentina  said that, as indicated in previous statements, Argentina 
considered that Law No. 19.897 and Supreme Decree No. 831 of the Ministry of Finance had not brought into conformity the Chilean measure found to be inconsistent in this dispute.  Following the 
expiry of the reasonable period of time on 23 Dece mber 2003, and given that there was disagreement 
between Argentina and Chile as to the existence of measures taken to comply with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings, the two countries had signed an agreement regarding the procedures 
under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU.  That agreement had been notified to the DSB and circulated in 
document WT/DS207/16. As stated in the text of the agreement, Argentina would, in due course, 
request Chile to hold consultations in good faith with a view to resolving that disagreement. 
19. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
(e) United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000:  Status report by the 
United States (WT/DS217/16 – WT/DS234/24) 
20. The Chairperson  drew attention to document WT/DS217/16 – WT/DS234/24 which 
contained the status report by the United Stat es on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning the US Conti nued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. 
21. The representative of the United States  said that his country had provided a status report on 
12 January 2004, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in the report, on 
19 June 2003, legislation to bring the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act into conformity 
with the WTO obligations of the Un ited States had been introduced in  the US Senate (S. 1299).  In 
addition, the US administration had proposed repeal  of this Act in its budget proposal for fiscal year 
2004.  This remained the position of the US administ ration. The US administration was continuing to 
work with Congress to achieve further progress in resolving these disputes with the complaining 
parties. 
22. The representative of Canada  said that his country noted the status report of the United States, 
and was disappointed that the United States had failed  to bring itself into compliance with the DSB's 
rulings and recommendations.  Canada noted that the United States had had ample time to bring itself 
into compliance – fully eleven months.  In its st atus report, the United States had suggested that 
implementation measures were before Congress, tho ugh it had given no time-line for the passage of 
such measure.  In the meantime, the Byrd Amendmen t continued to inflict both systemic and direct 
harm to Canadian trade interests.  As the Panel a nd the Appellate Body had found, the very existence 
of the Byrd Amendment created instability in the in ternational trading system.  But, there was more. 
Already some US$800 million had been disbursed unde r this measure.  These payments, which the 
WTO had ruled to be illegal, were  being provided directly to US companies that competed against 
exporters in Canada and elsewhe re.  Moreover, approximately US $1.7 billion in cash deposits had 
now been collected by the United States from Canadi an exporters in one industry alone, and these 
deposits remained at risk of being disbursed in the future unless the Byrd Amendment was repealed.  
In this case, the collection of th e duties was itself the subject of ongoi ng trade litigation.  Therefore, 
not only had the affected Canadian companies been forced to pay punishing, and in Canada's view 
unjustified, duties on their exports to the United Stat es, but now they faced the threat of having those 
payments handed over directly to their US competitors .  In the circumstances,  Canada was obliged to 
move to protect its rights by seeking authori zation from the DSB for retaliation pursuant to WT/DSB/M/163 
Page 6  
 
 Article 22.2 of the DSU. This request, along with  those of seven other WTO Members that were 
taking comparable action, would be considered at  a special DSB meeting on 26 January 2004.  He 
wished to be clear that retaliation was not Canada's  preferred option – far fro m it.  Canada would far 
rather see the United States eliminate the need for re taliation by moving promptly to bring itself into 
compliance with its WTO obligations.  And that was what Canada was asking the United States to do.  
It was time now for the United States to implem ent the DSB's rulings and recommendations and to 
uphold the integrity of the rules-based trading system under the WTO. 
23. The representative of Australia
 noted his country's regret that the United States had been 
unable to comply with the Panel and the Appella te Body's rulings and recommendations in this 
dispute by 27 December 2003.  Australia noted the steps taken to date by the US administration 
towards implementation and encouraged the Unite d States to continue its efforts to achieve 
compliance with its WTO obligations. 
24. The representative of Chile  thanked the United States for its  status report of 12 January 2004 
and for the statement made at the present meeting.   Unfortunately, both the report and the statement 
confirmed that the United States had not brought the CDSOA into conformity with the covered 
agreements, nor had it otherwise complied with th e recommendations or rulings within the reasonable 
period of time which had expired al most one month ago.  Furthermore, Chile was seriously concerned 
about the lack of movement on the legislative front  and of the necessary impetus to resolve this issue 
as a matter of priority.  The measure co mmonly known as the Byrd Amendment was causing 
economic damage to Chilean firms as it constitu ted a "perverse" anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
measure which was not sanctioned by the WTO Agre ements.  The lack of timely compliance by the 
United States had obliged Chile to reserve its rights under Article 22 of the DSU, and Chile had joined 
a large group of co-complainants in requesting th e DSB's authorization to suspend concessions or 
other obligations to the United States. 
25. Chile hoped that the United States would be able to bring its measure into conformity in the 
coming days so as to avoid the use of this ultimate  recourse.  Chile also wished to express its concern 
that, at the present meeting, four status reports ha d been submitted by the United States with regard to 
four different disputes.  In all those cases, the original deadlines for compliance had passed with no 
solution in sight.  Furthermore, the DSB had  been  repeatedly told that the US administration was 
continuing to work with Congress in the search for a solution.  However, there were no bills under 
consideration, or if there were, they had not been discussed seriously.  The repeated lack of 
compliance by one of the main Members of the WTO cast serious doubt on its commitment to the 
multilateral system and the latter's credibility.  For this reason, Chile called for redoubled efforts and 
dialogue between the US administration and the Congress in order to find a solution to all these outstanding issues. 
26. The representative of the European Communities
 said that the EC was extremely worried by 
the increasing number of disputes where the sa me scenario recurred.  The time-period for 
implementation in this dispute had expired on 27 December 2003 and yet the EC had still been 
waiting for a sign that the United States was seriously  working on implementation.  Indeed, the bill 
introduced in the Senate to ensure complian ce had only two sponsors and had not even been 
discussed.  Worse, the EC had heard statements to the effect that the WTO would have "acted beyond 
the scope of its mandate" and called for express re cognition of the US right to distribute monies 
collected from anti-dumping and countervailing duti es.  This dispute had never been and was not 
about the sovereign right of the United States to sp end its resources.  The issue raised by the Byrd 
Amendment was about respecting an obligation voluntarily accepted by WTO Members that permissible response to dumping or subsidization was limited.  And this response was the imposition 
of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties.  For more  than three years, the United States had, in 
addition, forced dumped or subsidized imports into subsidizing the US competing products.  The total 
amount of payments made under the Byrd Amendm ent had now come up to around US$800 millions.   WT/DSB/M/163 
 Page 7 
 
 
 In these circumstances, the EC had decided to pr eserve its rights and had sent, on 15 January 2004, a 
request seeking the DSB's authorization to suspen d concessions to the United States.  The EC was 
very pleased that other complainants had made the same decision and hoped that prompt action by the 
US Congress would make retaliation unnecessary.  Th e Byrd Amendment had raised immediate and 
widespread concerns among WTO Members.  It wa s now time that the United States respond to them. 
The EC hoped that the US administration would convey to Congress the extent of the concern 
expressed at the present DSB meeting and the impor tance for the US credibility in the WTO to 
comply with its obligations without further delay. 
27. The representative of Japan  said that her delegation had taken note of the first status report by 
the United States in this proceeding with great frustration and disappointment.  The United States 
referred to the US administration's proposal to rep eal the CDSOA (the Byrd Amendment) in its fiscal 
year 2004 budget proposal and to the introduction of legislation in the US Senate in June 2003.  The 
United States was missing the point: the Byrd Ame ndment still existed, despite the expiry of the 
reasonable period of time on 27 December 2003.  The Panel and the Appellate Body had 
unequivocally found the Byrd Amendment to be WTO-inconsistent.  The Byrd Amendment was a 
grave breach of the WTO Agreement, and the United States should have repealed it before 
27 December 2003.  The co-complainants did not wish  2003 to be a lost year for implementation.  
Sadly enough, though, that was exactly what had happened with regard to the Byrd Amendment, 
because of the failure of the United States, the key player of the WTO.  This was a very serious 
situation that Japan could not overlook.  On 15 Ja nuary 2004, Japan, together with Brazil, Chile, the 
EC, India, Korea, Canada and Mexico, had re quested authorization from the DSB to suspend 
concessions or other obligations.   These requests were on the agenda of  the DSB meeting scheduled to 
take place on 26 January 2004.  Japan hoped that th e United States had taken seriously the fact that 
these eight Members had no other choice, but to request authorization for retaliation because of the US non-compliance, and would make every effort to have the Byrd Amendment repealed as soon as 
possible. 
28. The representative of Korea
 said that, like previous speakers, Korea had serious concerns 
about the US failure to implement the DSB' s recommendations and rulings in the case under 
consideration within the reasonable period of tim e which had expired on 27 December 2003.  Indeed, 
almost one year had passed since the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report had been adopted 
at the DSB meeting on 27 January 2003.  Still there was no specific indication from the US side when 
and how it would implement the DSB's rulings.  It  was not only a source of grave concern for the 
parties to the dispute, but also for the multilate ral trading system as a whole as non-compliance 
undermined the credibility of the WTO.  In order to  preserve the balance of concessions and its right 
under WTO Agreement, Korea had requested a special  DSB meeting to be held on 26 January 2004 in 
order to consider its retaliation request under Artic le 22 of the DSU.  Korea would detail its position 
in this regard at the 26 January DSB meeting, but  taking this opportunity at the present meeting, it 
wished to call on the United States to implemen t the DSB's recommendations as soon as possible. 
29. The representative of Brazil  said that at the DSB meeting on 27 January 2003, the United 
States had stated that it intended to implement th e DSB's recommendations in a manner that respected 
the WTO obligations of the United States.  Subsequently, the United States had confirmed those intentions at the DSB meeting on 19 February 2 003.  A reasonable period of time for implementation 
determined in this case had expired on 27 December  2003.  Thus, a "double hit" as described by the 
author of the Byrd Amendment: i.e. the collec tion of duties and its distribution to petitioners, 
continued to be in place and continued to harm fo reign competitors.  Brazil, like other Members, was 
disappointed and concerned with the lack of implementation by the United States.  Therefore, like others, Brazil had submitted, on 15 January 2004, its request for authorization to suspend concessions 
or other obligations to the United States. He noted th at the request would be considered by the DSB at 
its meeting on 26 January 2004. WT/DSB/M/163 
Page 8  
 
 30. The representative of India
 said that his country was encour aged by the fact that the US 
administration had proposed repeal of CDSOA, whic h India believed, was the correct way to bring the 
infringing measure into conformity with the DS B's recommendations and rulings.  However, like 
previous speakers, India was disappointed by the fact  that the CDSOA had not thus far been repealed 
even though the reasonable period of time determined  by a binding arbitration had expired.  India 
wished to emphasize that prompt compliance wa s not only necessary for removing the adverse trade 
effects suffered by the WTO Members, including Indi a, due to the unauthorized measure remaining in 
place, it was also necessary to preserve the securi ty and predictability of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. In these circumstances, India had deci ded to preserve its rights and had sent a request on 
15 January 2004 seeking the DSB's authorization to suspend concessions to the United States.  India 
was pleased that other complainants in this case ha d also made the same decision.  It hoped that 
prompt action by the United States would make it unnecessary for India to suspend concessions or other obligations to the United States. 
31. The representative of Mexico
 said that, like previous speakers, his country wished to express 
its concern about the lack of compliance by the United States with respect to the Byrd Amendment 
case.  Mexico, together with the other co-complainant s in this case, after obtaining the satisfied results 
of the Panel and the Appellate Body, would seek au thorization from the DSB, at its meeting on 26 
January 2004, to suspend concessions or other obli gations to the United States.  Mexico underlined 
that the lack of compliance was the most serious problem in the functioning of the dispute settlement 
system. Mexico believed that if there was anything th at required to be solved in the DSU negotiations, 
it would be the problem of compliance. 
32. The representative of China  said that his delegation shared the comments made by previous 
speakers on this very important issue.  China had great concerns about the US practice of resorting 
often to anti-dumping investigations for the prot ection of its own market.  The Byrd Amendment 
played a negative role in this context.  As the Panel and the Appellate Body had rightly pointed out, 
the Byrd Amendment was an impermissible action ag ainst dumping and subsidies.  The United States 
had an obligation to implement the rulings of the Panel and the Appellate B ody and to adopt concrete 
measures to repeal the Byrd Amen dment within the reasonable period of time.  However, with the 
implementation period in this dispute having e xpired on 27 December 2003, the United States had 
failed to honour the DSB's recommendation and the rulings.  The United States was not the only 
country that required Congress to do legislative work .  While China recognized the fact that it needed 
time to comply with the WTO's rulings, the political will and the active approach of the US 
administration also had a role to play.  Therefore, as one of the most seriously affected  WTO 
Members by the Byrd Amendment, China strongly ur ged the United States to implement the DSB's 
rulings in a timely manner so as to set a good exam ple for other Members and to help maintain the 
integrity of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
33. The representative of Thailand  said that his country was a co-complainant in this dispute.  
Thailand noted the US status report before the DSB at the present meeting and, at the same time, it 
joined the other co-complainants, who had spoken be fore, in urging the United States to comply with 
its WTO obligations.  It was desirable that the United States double its efforts in doing so. 
34. The representative of Indonesia  said that his country regretted that the United States had 
failed to implement the DSB's recommendations and ru lings in the Byrd Amendment case.  Since the 
United States had failed to meet the deadline of 27 December 2003, Indonesia urged the US 
administration to continue its work with Congress in  order to repeal the Byrd Amendment as soon as 
possible. 
35. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  WT/DSB/M/163 
 Page 9 
 
 
 2. United States – Countervailing duty inv estigation on dynami c random access memory 
semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea 
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Korea (WT/DS296/2) 
36. The Chairperson  recalled that the DSB had consider ed this matter at its meeting on 
1 December 2003 and had agreed to revert to it.  She drew attention to the communication from Korea 
contained in document WT/DS296/2. 
37. The representative of Korea  said that his country had serious concerns regarding the US 
erroneous countervailing duty order against DRAMS originating in Korea.  Indeed, the US imposition 
of 44.29 per cent definitive countervailing duty against Korean DRAMS virtually prohibited the 
Korean manufacturer from exporting its DRAMS to the US market.  The purpose of countervailing 
duties was not to close markets altogether.  As de tailed in the panel request  dated 19 November 2003, 
the Korean government considered the US provisi onal and final countervailing duty order regarding 
Korean DRAMS to be inconsistent with the US  obligations under relevant provisions of the 
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement.  For example, the US Department of Commerce's assumption 
that every Korean private financial institution invo lved was under the direction or entrustment of the 
Korean government was erroneous, because creditors  of the Korean DRAMS manufacturer included a 
number of privately-controlled creditors and also fo reign subsidiary banks, including Citibank of the 
United States.  The US Department of Commerce had also disregarded the market benchmarks for measuring benefit established by a foreign bank op erating in the Korean market that had extended 
financing to the Korean manufacturer.  For these reasons and others raised at the 1 December 2003 DSB meeting, Korea again requested  that the DSB establish a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, 
with standard terms of reference, to examine the matter set forth in Korea's panel request. 
38. The representative of the United States
 said that his delegation would not wish to repeat the 
points made at the 1 December DSB meeting concerning this matter.  The United States continued to be disappointed that Korea had chosen to pursue th is matter further by requesting the establishment of 
a panel, and that Korea had declined to cure the procedural defects regardi ng its panel request.  The 
United States was confident that the panel would find  that the determinations made by US authorities 
in the DRAMS investigation were consistent w ith the WTO obligations of the United States. 
39. The DSB took note
 of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU w ith standard terms of reference. 
40. The representatives of China , the European Communities , Japan  and Chinese Taipei  reserved 
their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
3. European Communities – Countervailing me asures on dynamic random access memory 
chips from Korea 
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Korea (WT/DS299/2) 
41. The Chairperson  recalled that the DSB had consider ed this matter at its meeting on 
1 December 2003 and had agreed to revert to it.  She drew attention to the communication from Korea 
contained in document WT/DS299/2. 
42. The representative of Korea  said that, as under the previous agenda item, Korea had serious 
concerns regarding the EC's erroneous counter vailing duty order against DRAMS originating in 
Korea.  In the case of the EC, 34.8 per cent defin itive countervailing duties had been imposed against 
Korean DRAMS. This high level of counterva iling duties virtually prohibited the Korean 
manufacturer from exporting its DRAMS to the EC market.  The purpose of countervailing duties was WT/DSB/M/163 
Page 10  
 
 not to close markets altogether.  As detailed in the panel request dated 19 November 2003, the Korean 
government considered the EC's provisional an d definitive countervailing duty order regarding 
Korean DRAMS to be inconsistent with the EC's  obligation under the relevant provisions of the 
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement.  For example, th e EC had failed to demonstrate the existence 
of a financial contribution by the Korean government  with respect to the financial transactions at 
issue in the subsidy investigation.  The EC had also  failed to demonstrate that a benefit was conferred 
on the Korean manufacturer, given available market benchmarks based on terms extended by commercial creditors.  For these and other reasons  mentioned at the 1 December 2003 DSB meeting, 
Korea again requested that the DSB establish a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, with standard 
terms of reference, to examine the matte r set forth in the Korea's panel request. 
43. The representative of th e European Communities
 said that the EC regretted to see that Korea 
wished to pursue this dispute in the WTO. Th e EC noted that another WTO Member, the United 
States, examining the same issues relating to the s ubsidization of the semiconductor industry in Korea 
had come to the very same conclusions.  The EC was certain that the measures identified by Korea 
would be found to be fully compatible with EC's obligations under the WTO. 
44. The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU w ith standard terms of reference. 
45. The representatives of China , Japan , Chinese Taipei  and the United States  reserved their 
third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings. 
4. Argentina – Definitive safeguard measure on imports of preserved peaches  
(a) Statement by Argentina 
46. The representative of Argentina  said that his country wished to announce that the safeguard 
measure subject to the dispute on "Argentina – De finitive Safeguard Measure  on Imports of Preserved 
Peaches" (WT/DS238) had been revoked on 31 Dece mber 2003, in accordance with Ministry of the 
Economy Resolution 91/2003, and as stipulated in th e bilateral agreement with Chile concerning the 
reasonable period of time for implementation, c ontained in document WT/DS238/7.  With the 
elimination of this measure, Argentina consid ered that it had fully complied with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute. 
47. The representative of Chile  said that his country wished to thank Argentina for its report 
regarding its actions and for its confirmation that the safeguard measure had been removed. This 
would enable Chile to resume its expor ts of the products in question.  
48. The DSB took note  of the statements. 
 
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