RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/WGTCP/W/55
15December 1997
ORGANIZATION(97-5489)
Original: Spanish Working Group ontheInteraction
between Trade andCompetition Policy
SUBMISSION FROM ARGENTINA
Thefollowing communication reproduces thestatement made bytherepresentative ofthe
Permanent Mission oftheRepublic ofArgentina atthemeeting of16-17 September 1997.
_______________
Competition LawinArgentina
Jorge Bogo1
1. Brief historical summary
Anti-trust legislation firstappeared inArgentina shortly aftertheadoption oftheSherman Act.
Owing tothemeagre practical results obtained, ithassince beenamended onanumber ofoccasions,
always withtheaimofgiving theExecutive greater authority inorder toensure more effective
implementation ofthelaw.
Thelatest substantial legislative revision involved theadoption ofanewlawin1980, oneof
whosemostimportantfeatureswastheestablishmentofaNationalAnti-TrustCommission,agovernment
bodywiththedualfunction ofexercising control andacting asanadministrative court offirstinstance.
Notwithstanding thebroad powers given totheCommission, itwasonlyin1997thatitstarted
toplayasignificant role: virtually forthefirsttimesince legislation toprotect competitive markets
inArgentina wasadopted, theCommission hasheard cases thatwere sufficiently important forits
intervention tobring about changes intheoperation ofcertain markets essential fortheimproved
functioning oftheeconomy.
Themain explanation forthelonggapbetween thelastapproval ofananti-trust lawandits
effective implementation in1997isthechange intheeconomic regime thathasoccurred overthepast
decade. Inorder tounderstand theimportance ofthisasadetermining factor intheconduct ofeconomic
agents, itmustbeemphasized that,untilthe1991Stability Plan, Argentina wasclosed tointernational
trade, price formation washeavily regulated, andthere wasahighdegree ofState ownership inthe
economy. Asaresult, inmany oftheensuing markets resource allocation depended toagreater extent
onofficial decisions thanonprivate decisions, andinmany instances thelatter were influenced by
prices distorted bygovernment interference.
1Chairman oftheArgentine National Anti-Trust Commission.WT/WGTCP/W/55
Page2
Moreover, there wasanother important factor hindering theeffective implementation ofthe
law.Inthe1970s, theStatefinanced itsbudget deficits withevenhigher ratesofinflationary taxation,
andprivate agents therefore increasingly tookprecautionary measures todefend theirearnings. The
endresult wastwobouts ofhyperinflation indicating thatthissource offinancing hadbeenexhausted.
Inthepastdecade inparticular, thisanticipatory action tooktheform ofanincreasing tendency for
businesses tomake preventive price hikes based oninflationary expectations, which thegovernment
triedtoremedy bymeans ofpriceagreements withbusiness chambers. TheStateitselfthusencouraged
violation ofthelawbypromoting these income policies which encouraged thespread ofcorporatism
inbusiness activity.
Insuchacontext, there waslittleroom forabody responsible forimplementing ananti-trust
lawbecause, asmentioned, ithadfewincentives toact.Thismeant thattheCommission wasmore
orlessaformal bodyunder theMinistry ofIndustry and,withscarce resources, itspent itstimesettling
minor disputes among parties thatcould havelittleimpact ontheoverall economic interest. Thisalso
distorted theCommission 'srolebecause itsroleunder Argentine lawisnottodecide onrights in
disputes among parties butrather toactincases where market competition needed tobeprotected.
2. Theprocess ofchange
Thefar-reaching andnumerous changes made toArgentine economic institutions canbasically
beclassified intofourtypes ofaction:
(a) Deregulation ofmarkets;
(b) privatization ofstateenterprises andassets;
(c) opening upofmarkets tocompetition from imports;
(d) stabilization oftheeconomy, withthedismantling ofprice indexing mechanisms.
Theextentofthesechangescanbeseenfromafewexamples:foreigninvestmentwascompletely
deregulated andassimilated todomestic investment, pricecontrols wereabolished evenformedicines,
postal services wereprivatized, andimports arenowsubject onlytotariffs andthose fromMERCOSUR
paynoduty, while today forallpractical purposes inflation iszeropercent. Thescope ofthesereforms
shows thatwhathappened inArgentina represented aradical change intheeconomic regime established
inthepost-war period andkeptinplace withminor changes untilthebeginning ofthe1990s ,when
twobouts ofhyperinflation marked itsfinalcollapse.
Itisinteresting tonoteinpassing thesimilarities between thisdecisive institutional change
andthechange afterthewarbecause bothwere strongly supported bypublic opinion, which sawin
them achance toresolve chronic problems thataffected thequality oftheirdaily lives. Ofcourse,
ideologically speaking thedifference wasthatthenexpectations wereprompted bydisappointment at
theState'sfailuretoregulatethemonopoliesandoligopoliesthatoperatedincertainkeymarkets,whereas
onthisoccasion there wassimilar disillusionment withtheState'sroleasowner andmanager of
enterprises. Thisillustrates thefactthat,although themainoutcome ofthisredefinition oftheeconomic
rulesofthegame isthechange intheroleoftheprivate sector inallocating andmanaging resources,
theroleofthepublic sector hasalsochanged asithastaken overcontrol functions soastoensure
thattheresults expected bythepublic from thefunctioning ofmarkets areobtained.
Amajor feature ofthestructural change process wasthatthere wasnospecific account taken
oftheneedforchange tobeaccompanied byaproactive policy toguarantee thatunregulated markets
worked efficiently. Regulatory bodies weresetupandspecial regulations adopted forthese marketsWT/WGTCP/W/55
Page3
inorder toensure thatconsumers obtained satisfactory results. Forother markets, however, itwas
expected thatthereforms would discipline supply. Events showed thatthisconfidence wasmisplaced
andthatitwasnecessary toimplement existing legislation more vigorously.
Thiswasthecasebecause some ofthese reforms implied newdemands foraction onthepart
oftheCommission. Firstly, deregulation meant thatsome practices thathadformerly beenallowed
under special rules (andconsequently felloutside thescope ofthelaw)became infringements ofthe
anti-trust law.Among thesewerethefixing ofminimum feesbyprofessional associations andagreement
among competitors onmaximum prices. Inother cases, withtheprivatization ofbenchmark businesses
which implicitly regulated theirmarkets, itsuddenly became necessary toverify whether privatization
hadbeenconfined totheirassets orhadhadtheundesirable effect ofprivatizing adominant market
power, withthefailure ofimport priceparity toactasapriceceiling. Inother instances, some markets
underwent sweeping structural changes asaresult oftheprivatization ofgovernment enterprises
concerned. Thiswasthecaseintheinsurance market following privatization oftherelevant government
enterprise, andinthepetroleum market afterprivatization oftheStatepetroleum enterprise. Inmost
cases, thisneedforcontrol subsequently tooktheformofdemands bylarge sectors ofthepublic and
ledtocomplaints totheCommission when itreassumed therolewhich thelawhadsought togiveit
when ithadbeensetup.
Anothereffectofthestructuralchanges,whichbecameincreasinglyimportantastheyprogressed,
waseconomic concentration. Theneedforeconomic efficiency caused bytheintroduction ofimports
andthereinforcement ofMERCOSUR asafree-trade arealedtobigger scales andthesaleof
locally-owned companies totransnationals. Thiscombination ofconcentration ofsupply andnewmarket
players made itnecessary tocontrol company mergers andacquisitions andtoamend thecurrent law
correspondingly, because itonlypunished types ofbehaviour.
Together withthese demands, ofcourse, alarge number ofsectoral demands alsoarose for
therestoration ofsome form ofprotection astheregulations thatpreviously protected these sectors
disappeared withderegulation andliberalization. Claims ofunfair competition therefore increased
asthecosylifeformerly enjoyed byentrepreneurs started tocrumble.
Thisexplains why, inthelastquarter of1996 andfollowing achange ingovernment, the
Argentine Government started torevitalize theNational Anti-Trust Commission, which hasradically
changed itspublic image inthecourse ofoneyear. Atthesame time, Parliament hasbefore itanew
anti-trust lawthatwillextend theroleoftheCommission, mainly bygiving itcontrol ofmergers and
concentrations.
Unlike thepast,details ofthenewcases brought before theCommission anddecisions settling
outstanding cases, aswellasthesuccessive textsofthenewlawasitwasbeing drafted inparliamentary
commissions, havebecome headline news. Thesubject hasalsobecome anelectoral campaign issue
forpolitical parties, eventhough todateopinions onthereforms inParliament havebeenunanimous.
3. Overview oftheobjectives andprovisions oftheLaw
Thefollowing isabriefdescription oftheprovisions ofLaw22.262, which currently regulates
anti-trust matters inArgentina. Thebasic objective oftheLawistoprevent anyanti-competitive
behaviour orpractices which, bylimiting, restricting ordistorting markets, might affect thepublic 's
general well-being. Thetarget oftheLawistherefore behaviour andnotmarket structures. Itdeals
withconsequences andnotcauses.
Tobemore precise, theLawcomprises 48Articles divided intofourchapters. Thefirstchapter
(Articles 1to5)concerns theLaw'sscope ofapplication. Thesecond chapter (Articles 6to31)specifiesWT/WGTCP/W/55
Page4
thepowers given totheNational Anti-Trust Commission (CNDC) andtheadministrative procedure
tobefollowed incases covered bytheLaw. Thethird chapter (Articles 32to42)refers tothe
jurisdiction empowered tohearcases ofanti-competitive practices andacts,andalsolistspossible
offences. Lastly, Chapter IV(Articles 43to48)contains transitional andcomplementary provisions.
Because ofitsstructure, Law22.262 isbothasubstantive andaprocedural law.Itssubstantive
provisions areessentially Articles 1,2,3,and5(currently repealed) and41,which setoutitsobject
anddefine offences. Articles 6to16,ontheother hand, setuptheCNDC andestablish itsstructure,
powers andfunctions, while Article 42specifies thepenalties imposed foroffences. Virtually thewhole
oftherestoftheLaw(Articles 4,17-31, 32-40) isprocedural andregulates theprocedures tobefollowed
attheadministrative andjudicial levels.
Article 1,which clearly hasEuropean roots, isthemostimportant Article oftheLawanddefines
theLaw'sobjective asprohibition of"acts orpractices (...)thatlimit, restrict ordistort competition
orconstituteabuseofadominantmarketpositioninawaythatmayadverselyaffectthegeneraleconomic
interest". Article 2supplements thedefinition inArticle 1bydefining whatismeant by"adominant
market position" byaperson orgroup ofpersons.
ThethreeelementscontainedinArticle1(distortionofcompetition,abuseofadominantposition
andadverse effect onthegeneral economic interest) constitute thethreepillars onwhich theLawbases
adecision astowhether aparticular practice ispunishable ornot. Thefirsttwoelements are
alternatives -oneortheother mayoccur -butthelastisanecessary condition fortheretobeaviolation
within themeaning ofthelaw. Accordingly, foraparticular practice tobepunishable under the
Anti-Trust Law, itmustfirstly beanti-competitive (bydistorting theoperation ofthemarket orabusing
adominant market position), andsecondly beprejudicial tothepublic (against thegeneral economic
interest). Theprejudice maynevertheless bepotential eventhough, astherationale fortheLawmakes
clear, thepotential must involve anactual danger andnotsimply alogical, abstract possibility. As
canbeseen, theLawclearly applies onthebasis of"theruleofreason", sothatitiscloser tothe
American approach inthisregard.
Within theoverall structure ofLaw22.262, theroleofArticle 5,subsequently repealed, was
toexclude fromtheLaw'sscope actsandpractices specifically subject tospecial regimes, forexample,
legislation onstateenterprises, legalmonopolies, economic promotion regimes, markets withchronic
excess supply andsubject toregulation, etc.Article 41(towhich Article 3hasacross reference) deals
withcases which, inasmuch astheyfallwithin thegeneral definition ofArticle 1andwithasingle
exceptionimplycollusion,constituteoffencespunishableundertheLaw.Fromtheanalyticalstandpoint,
these canbeviewed asexamples ofactsandpractices specified intheLawasbeing contrary toits
protection objectives.
Although abuse ofadominant position isdefined asalegaloffence, itisimportant toemphasize
thatinArgentina market power isnotpenalized; whatisillegal istheabuse ofadominant position
through theexercise ofmonopolistic oroligopolistic power byanenterprise.
Themostimportant feature oftheNational Anti-Trust Commission isthatitisanindependent
agency which delivers opinions incases instituted exofficio orbyaparty toallow theMinistry of
Industry, Trade andMining totakeadecision. TheCommission 'sopinions areadopted byacollegiate
body composed ofachairperson andfourmembers. TheCommission isalsoempowered tomonitor
markets andissue guidelines ontheLawsoastohelptoforestall anti-competitive practices.
Thefollowing action maybetaken against basicanti-competitive practices through resolutions
bytheMinistry ofIndustry, Trade andMining:WT/WGTCP/W/55
Page5
- Reject thecomplaint;
- Accept theexplanations ofthedefendant (acquittal):
(a) Order termination ofthepractice;
(b) impose fines.
Lastly, itshould bepointed outthatappeals against anyresolution canbemade totheFederal
Chambers ofAppeal ineachjurisdiction.
4. Thechanges intheNational Anti-Trust Commission
Asalready mentioned, untilthelastquarter of1996 theCommission wasasmall agency that
settled minor disputes among individuals. Thissituation wasessentially duetothree factors: (a)the
existence ofaprotectionist economic system which allowed theconcentration ofsupply andprovided
strong incentives forconcerted practices; (b)theCommission 'sblatant lackofhuman andmaterial
resources; and(c)theclear absence ofpolitical willtoapply thelaw. Even though thefirstfactor
began toalterin1989, theother twoonlyfinally changed ayearago,thusrevitalizing theCommission.
Today itcanbestated thatthere isaneconomic situation which callsfortheeffective implementation
ofthistypeofpolicy inorder topreserve market efficiency andequity, thattheagency hasthehuman
andmaterial resources needed, andthatfinally theMinistry ofIndustry, Trade andMining hasclearly
shown itspolitical determination toapply thelaw. Inparliamentary discussions onthelaw,there has
beenaclearmulti-party political willtomove fromcontrolling practices tocontrolling market structures.
Themost obvious signofthisistheattached listofcases settled orstillunder investigation
during thethirdquarter oftheyear. Thelistincludes YPF, theprivatized Statepetroleum enterprise,
which isthelargest inArgentina, aswellassome transnational enterprises which haveshown their
confidence intheCommission 'sindependence ofaction bybringing casesagainst competitors indulging
inanti-competitive practices. Moreover, thelistofmarkets shows thattheCommission isnowstudying
theoperationofcertainmarketsthatareofrealimportanceforenhancingtheeconomy'scompetitiveness.
Thisisparticularly significant nowthateconomic policy hasrenounced theuseofdevaluation asa
tool. Although thepractices reported aredescribed verysuccinctly, inmany cases theCommission
hashadtoundertake anin-depth analysis, using alltheanalytical toolsavailable inmicroeconomics
andconsidering similar cases bothinArgentina andabroad. Inthelattercase,international cooperation
plays anextremely important role.
Astatistical analysis ofthenature andoutcome ofcases considered bytheNational Anti-Trust
Commission sofarserves toshow theimpact ofthestructural changes onanti-trust policy inArgentina.
Wehavesingled outthemajor cases considered bytheCommission throughout itsexistence (which
began in1981), anddivided them intofourperiods (1981-83, 1984-89, 1990-95 and1996-97).
Foreachperiod, thecases havebeenclassified according tothetypeofpractice reported and
theopinion adopted. Thecases havebeenclassified intounilateral abuse ofadominant position,
complaints ofcollusion, cases involving theexclusion ofcompetitors, andcomplaints ofpurely vertical
practices have been identified. Each group issubdivided intocases thatresulted inanopinion
recommending apenalty (fineoranorder toterminate thepractice reported), cases thatwererejected
(including those inwhich theexplanations afforded bythedefendant were accepted) andcases that
ended withacceptance ofanundertaking bythedefendant.
Thelistofcasesdoesnotinclude complaints thatwererejected because theyconcerned practices
notcovered bytheanti-trust laworwerefound tocontain factual errors orwererelated topracticesWT/WGTCP/W/55
Page6
thathadnoimpact onmarkets. In1997, there weremany suchcases andtheyalmost allconcerned
unfair competition. Theoutcome (penalty, rejection orundertaking) refers totheopinion ofthe
Commission, although incertain exceptional circumstances theoutcome wassubsequently modified
bythecourts ofappeal ortheSupreme Court ofJustice.
Theperiods intowhich theattached tableisbroken down areallrelated topolitical andeconomic
phases inArgentina. Theperiod 1981-83 corresponds tothecreation oftheCNDC andsawtheend
ofamilitary regime thathadattempted apolicy ofeconomic opening andstabilization, butwithout
privatization orin-depth regulatory reform; these efforts came toahaltwiththecollapse ofthe
Government thathadimplemented them. Theperiod 1984-1989 sawademocratic regime that
implemented various stabilization plans butagain shied away frommajor legislative reforms, merely
undertaking thefirsttentative beginnings ofprivatization andopening upintheregime 'sclosing stages.
Theperiod 1990-95, ontheother hand, wasoneinwhich almost allthestructural reforms mentioned
above occurred, sometimes withspectacular speed. Finally, theperiod 1996-97 hasbasically seen
theconsolidation ofthese reforms.
Ifweconsider allthecases contained inthestatistics, itcanbeseenthatduring theperiod
1981-83 theCommission made recommendations on10.3cases ayearonaverage, afigure which fell
to7.3during theperiod 1984-89 and4.2in1990-95. Inthepasttwoyears, thisaverage hasbounced
backto12cases peryear, mainly duetotheabove-mentioned revitalization oftheCommission. It
isalsointeresting tonotethatovertimethere hasbeenareduction inthenumber ofcases thatled
topenalties: theyfellfrom74percentintheperiod 1981-83, to39percentin1984-89, 36percent
in1990-95 andbarely 8percentintheperiod 1996-97.
Thechanges inthese figures aretoalarge extent duetothetypeofcaseconsidered. During
theperiod 1981-83, themajority ofopinions concerned collusion practices (45percent), andonly
26percentrelated toexclusion practices and16percenttounilateral abuse. These percentages have
changed significantly overtime, andduring theperiod 1996-97 only16percentofthecases settled
concerned collusion practices, 25percentrelated tounilateral abuse and50percentconcerned
complaintsofexclusion(impedingmarketaccessorpredatorypricing).ThischangeintheCommission's
work istoalarge extent theresult ofthestructural change intheeconomy, because deregulation and
pricestabilization haveledtoadecrease inthenumber ofcasesofopencollusion (which usually involved
business orprofessional associations), butatthesametimehaveresulted inanincrease inapplications
forprotection bybodies which, corroborating whatwassaidabove, tendtosee"unfair practices" on
thepartoftheircompetitors.
Anewactivity fortheCommission hasbeenthemonitoring ofmarkets. AstheLawhasgiven
theCommission thepower toactexofficio, itisobliged tokeepitselfinformed about thefunctioning
ofthevarious markets. Thewayinwhich itfulfils thistaskmaybeofinterest andisexplained below.
Thepoint ofdeparture wasthatthepurpose ofliberalizing Argentina 'sforeign trade wasto
make markets contestable byimporters. Theresult should bepricediscipline: inacompetitive market,
domestic prices would inthefirstinstance move closer toimport prices, following thesingle price
rule. Foranybuyer operating insuchamarket, afteraninitial period ofadjustment, buying alocal
orimported product should beamatter ofindifference, andinanyevent thedecision would depend
onacomparison ofthedifference between thetwoproducts. Inthelongterm, incases where there
were non-marginal exports, thedomestic price should falltoreach export parity, because selling in
oneortheother market would beamatter ofindifference forthelocal producer. Consequently,
irrespective ofthefinaloutcome, prices inthese markets should become lower thanthose prior to
liberalization,particularlybearinginmindthatinthefirstcaseMERCOSURprotectionlevelsaremodest
and,withafewexceptions, imports frommember countries oftheregional grouping donotpaycustoms
duties.WT/WGTCP/W/55
Page7
Thestudy covered 17sectors producing industrial inputs forintermediate useandextremely
important forthecompetitiveness ofdownstream industries. They ranged from steeltocement and
included anumber ofindustries which, inthemore "development-minded periods", were attributed
aleading role.Ingeneral, thefindings confirmed thefirsthypothesis, namely, thatwithsomeexceptions
domestic prices wereatimport parity level. Thefactthatnoneofthese products haddomestic prices
similar toexport prices israther anindication thattheirexports aremarginal. Inthecaseofimportable
goods, however, anexplanation must begiven forthefactthatinsome cases domestic prices were
higher thanparity.
Theexplanationsforthisareclearlyprovisionalbecausethestudyisstillgoingon.Nevertheless,
there areindications thatoneexplanation isthattheimporter andthemanufacturer areoften thesame
person, andthere arenoparallel imports. Paradoxically, thishasmeant thattheinclusion offoreign
trade intheHerfindahl calculations doesnotchange thevalues inthecalculation oftheexclusively
domestic supply andevenincreases them. Because these aremarkets inwhich thereisaconcentration
ofsupply forreasons ofscale, thishasmeant thatmanufacturers specialize andthusincrease their
economic rent,without anybenefit toconsumers. Onemight saythatthisisanyindustrialist 's"dream
come true".
Insome markets inwhich there hadbeennoimports during theprevious period ofeconomic
opening, simply because manufacturers made not-particularly-subtle threats ofretaliation ifmarkets
closed upagain, thistimegoods were infactimported asaresult ofthegreater perceived security
afforded bythemacroeconomic regime supported byastable exchange rate. Itisquite clearthatthe
leaders inthiswere thelargest firms, which could place purchase orders fortheminimum amount
required. Atleastinonecase,however, therearepreliminary indications thatthesethreats wererepeated
andweresuccessful because imports areverymarginal. TheCommission isofcourse investigating
thissecond explanation.
Ifanything could bedescribed asthesalient feature ofArgentina 'sprivatization experience,
itwould bethewidescope oftheactivities covered andthedecisiveness withwhich privatization was
implemented. When suchtraits aretypical oftheprocess, attention todetail isnotusually oneofits
virtues. Andindeed laxity didoccur, particularly withregard tomaintaining satisfactory levels of
competition.
Incontrast towhathappened inother countries thatwereabletoenjoy theadvantage ofplanning
privatization calmly, inArgentina fromtheoutset theprocess wasgoverned byurgent needs. Among
these, twoinparticular should bementioned. Thefirstwastheneedtoprove thatprivatization was
possible, following theunsuccessful attempts made attheendoftheprevious decade. Thesecond
wastheurgent needtofindfunds toresolve thebudget crisis, when hyperinflation hadtobekilled
off.
Inorder tosumupassuccinctly aspossible asubject thatisextremely complex andhasmany
nuances, Iwould place themain emphasis onthefactthattheArgentine privatization process was
influenced bytwogoals thatoperated asopposing forces: onemicroeconomic andtheother
macroeconomic. Themicroeconomic goalisthemost obvious andconsisted ofseeing privatization
asatoolforincreasing thelong-term efficiency oftheeconomy, whereas themacroeconomic goal
wastouseprivatization asameans ofobtaining financial resources atacrucial juncture inthe
stabilization process. These wereopposing forces because inconcrete terms theformer implied the
needtointroduce thegreatest possible competition intomarkets, whereas thelatter implied restricting
competitioninordertomakethebusinessmoreattractivetoinvestorsandconsequentlyraisethepurchase
price.WT/WGTCP/W/55
Page8
Onewayofdescribing thistomake iteasier tounderstand would bethatthetwocontrasting
objectives inpractice ledtoa"trade-off" thatwasresolved infavour oftheefficiency objective, as
urgent financial needs diminished andstability wasreinforced. Thisiswhythelatest privatization,
inthegasandelectricity sectors, hasbeenthemostsophisticated: themarkets werecarefully divided
bothvertically andgeographically inorder tointroduce themaximum level ofcompetition intheir
operation. From theadministrative pointofview, thedivision ofpowers between theregulatory bodies
andtheCommission wasresolved bytotally excluding theformer fromthenon-monopolistic market
segments, andinthemonopolistic onesgiving theregulatory bodies responsibility forinvestigating
cases punishable under theanti-trust lawwhile theCommission fulfilled theroleofacourt.
5. Conclusions
Initially, inArgentina anti-trust policies werenotgiven anexplicit roleinthestructural reform
process, andreliance wasplaced onthedisciplinary virtues expected from theopening upofthe
economy,thederegulationofmarkets,andtheprivatizationofstateenterprises,inordertomakemarkets
work efficiently.
Astheresults became apparent, theneed formore effective implementation ofanti-trust
legislation wasfelt,together withtheneedtorevise thelegislation inorder tocontrol theconcentration
ofeconomic power. Although therevised lawhasnotyetbeenadopted, under current legislation a
radicalchangewaspossibleintheeffectivenessofimplementation,byrevitalizingtheagencyresponsible.
Asaresult, asubject thatwaspreviously ignored bypublic opinion hasbecome afrequent news item,
andthishelps todisseminate information onnewcases andtheopinions delivered bytheCommission,
which inturnincites individuals tosubmit complaints concerning anti-competitive practices.WT/WGTCP/W/55
Page9Defendant Claimant Claim Market
Cases stillopen
YPF National Anti-Trust Commission Abuse ofadominant position inorder to
obtain atransport rentLiquefied petroleum gas
Visa, Mastercard, Amex Shopkeepers 'Federation ofthe
Province ofBuenos AiresPrice discrimination incommercial
charges foradministering thesystem of
settling purchasesCredit cards
Aerolíneas Argentinas Association ofTravel Agents Agreement toreduce thecommission
paidtotravel agents andoffer torestore
itinexchange forexclusivityPassenger airtransport
EG3 (Repsol) Federation ofFuel Vendors (service
stations)Price discrimination insales toservice
stationsFuel
Savings andloanplans for
automobilesVarious Imposition ofaclosed listofinsurance
companiesSavings andloans
Unilever Procter &Gamble Obstacles totheentry ofcompetitive
productsCleaning products
Cellular telephone companies Various Abusive insurance andcancellation
clauses incontractsCellular telephones
Clarín Financial sector Abuse ofadominant position in
agreements onexclusive advertising
rightsAdvertising designs
Cable television companies Department ofTrade ofMisiones Abuse ofadominant position inpricing
policyCable television
Cases settled
Massalin Particulares; Nobleza
PiccardoVarious distributors Exclusive agreements withcigarette
distributorsCigarettes
Visa, Mastercard American Express Abuse ofadominant position bylaying
down exclusive conditionsCredit cards
MAKRO Supermarkets Argentine Association ofStationers,
Bookshops andSimilarSelling below costforpredatory purposes Bookshop products