WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/MIN(99)/5
16 November 1999
(99-4947)
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
Third SessionSeattle, 30 November - 3 December 1999
ANNUAL REPORTS (1999)
The annual reports for 1999 of the General Council, Dispute Settlement Body, Trade Policy
Review Body, Sectoral Councils, Committees on Trade and Development, Balance-of-Payments
Restrictions, Budget, Finance and Administrati on, Regional Trade Agreements, and Trade and
Environment, the Working Groups on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interactionbetween Trade and Competition Policy, and Transparency in Government Procurement, and the
Committees under the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, are reproduced hereunder.  Each report is
reproduced as a separate section with its own page numbering.
Reports
Document Symbol
Section I: General Council WT/GC/28 and Add.1
Section II: Dispute Settlement B ody WT/DSB/16 and Corr.1 and Add.1
Section III: Trade Policy Review Body WT/TPR/69Section IV: Council for Trade in Goods
1G/L/337
Section V: Council for Trade in Services S/C/10
Section VI: Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)IP/C/19
Section VII: Committee on Trade and Development WT/COMTD/22
Section VIII: Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions WT/BOP/R/47
Section IX: Committee on Budget, Finance and
AdministrationWT/BFA/43
Section X: Committee on Regional Trade Agreements WT/REG/8
Section XI: Committee on Trade and Environment WT/CTE/4Section XII: Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and InvestmentWT/WGTI/3
Section XIII: Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and Competition PolicyWT/WGTCP/3
                                                     
1 The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods are listed in the Annex to this
report and will be available separately at the Ministerial Conference.WT/MIN(99)/5
Page 2
Section XIV: Working Group on Transparency in Government
ProcurementWT/WGTGP/3
Section XV: Committees under the Plurilateral Trade Agreements
- Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft
- Committee on Government ProcurementJob No. 6358
GPA/30
Annex List of reports of subsidiary bodies of the
Council for Trade in GoodsSECTION I
GENERAL COUNCILWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/28
12 November 1999
(99-4902)
General Council
GENERAL COUNCIL
Annual Report (1999)
The present report has been prepared in pursuance of the Procedures for an Annual Overview
of WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO (WT/L/105), and sets out the actions taken bythe General Council in the period since its previous annual report.
1
In carrying out its tasks, the General Council has held 182 meetings since the period covered
by the previous report.  The minutes of these meetings, which remain the record of the General
Council's work, are contained in documents WT/GC/M/33, 35, 36 and Add.1-4, 37, 38, 40 andAdd.1-4, 41, 45, 48 and 50.
The following subjects are included in the report:
Page
1. Committee on Balance-of -Payments Restrictions..................................................................3
(a) Consul tations ............................................................................................................... ...............3
2. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration .............................................................3
(a) Reports..................................................................................................................... ...................3
3. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection – Review under Article 6 of the
Agreement...................................................................................................................... ............4
(a) Report of the Working Party................................................................................................. ......4
4. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement................................................................4
(a) Harmonize d System........................................................................................................... .........4
(i) Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka............................................................................................ .4
(b) Renegotiation of Schedule ................................................................................................... .......5
(i) Zambia ...................................................................................................................... ..................5
(c) Decision on the introduction of Harmonized System changes into WTO schedules of
tariff concessions on 1 January 1996..........................................................................................5
(d) Preferential tariff treatment for least- developed countries – decision on waiver .......................6
(e) Peru – Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 – Request for
waiver......................................................................................................................... .................6
(f) Review of waivers pursuant to Ar ticle IX:4 of the WTO Agreement ........................................6
(i) Canada – CARIBCAN, granted on 14 October 1996 until 31 December 2006..........................6
(ii) Cuba – Article XV:6, granted on 14 October 1996 until 31 December 2001.............................6
(iii) EC – The Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé, granted on 14 October 1996 until
29 February 2000 ............................................................................................................... ........6
(iv) EC/France – Trading arrangements with Morocco, granted on 9-11 December 1998
until 31 December 2001......................................................................................................... .....6
                                                     
1The annual report of the General Council for 1998 was circulated as WT/GC/15 and Corr.1.
2This number does not include the meetings of the General Council devoted to preparations for the
1999 Ministerial Conference, which are covered in an Addendum to the present report.WT/GC/28
Page 2
(v) Hungary – Agricultural export subsidies, granted on 22 October 1997 until
31 December 2001............................................................................................................... .......6
(vi) United States – Andean Trade Preference Act, granted on 14 October 1996 until
4 December 2001................................................................................................................ ........6
(vii) United States – Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, granted on 15 November
1995 until 31 December 2005.................................................................................................... .6
(viii) United States – Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, granted on 14 October
1996 until 31 December 2006.................................................................................................... .6
5. Accession.................................................................................................................... ................7
(a) Bosnia and Herzegovina ...................................................................................................... .......7
(b) Bhutan...................................................................................................................... ...................7
(c) Est onia ..................................................................................................................... ...................8
(d) Former Yugoslav Re public of Macedonia..................................................................................8
(e) Geo rgia..................................................................................................................... ...................8
(f) Lebanon ..................................................................................................................... .................8
(g) Nepal....................................................................................................................... ....................9
(h) Accession to the WTO:  Process and procedures .......................................................................9
6. Trade facilitation – status report on wo rk carried out by the Council for Trade
in Goods under Paragraph 21 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration............................9
7. Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding................................................................10
8. Request for an authoritative interpreta tion pursuant to Article IX:2 of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ................................10
9. Procedures for amendment and interpretation of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding:  response to the European Communities' request for an
authoritative interpretation of the Di spute Settlement Understanding pursuant
 to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement ................................................................................10
10. Trade measures taken by the United States on 3 March 1999 against European
Communities' imports ........................................................................................................... .11
11. Five-year review of the exemption provided in Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994..............11
12. United States restrictions on imports of lamb from Australia............................................12
13. Change in United States Trade Relations with Mongolia ...................................................12
14. Global electr onic commerce.................................................................................................. .12
15. Guidelines for the sc heduling of meetings ............................................................................13
16. Transparency and derestriction ............................................................................................14
17. Developing countries and the WTO dispute settlement  mechanism..................................14
18. Promotion of the institut ional image of the WTO ...............................................................14
19. International Trade Centre UNCT AD/WTO.......................................................................15
(a) Reports of the Jo int Advisory Group........................................................................................1 5
20. Arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental
organizations .................................................................................................................. .........15
(a) Agreements between the WTO and the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank........................................................................................................................... ...............15
21. Submission of end-of-year reports by WTO bodies.............................................................16
22. Establishment of the Global Trust Fund for WTO Technical Cooperation......................16
23. Administrati ve ma tters...................................................................................................... .....16
(a) Appointment of the ne xt Director -General ...............................................................................16
(b) Offices of Deputy Directors-General........................................................................................2 0
(c) Management Board of the WTO Pension Plan.........................................................................21
(i) Election of the Chairman, members and alternates..................................................................21
24. Observer status ............................................................................................................. ..........21
(a) Gover nments................................................................................................................. ............21
(i) Yemen ...................................................................................................................... .................21
(b) International intergover nmental orga nizations .........................................................................21WT/GC/28
Page 3
25. 1999 Ministeria l Conference ................................................................................................. .22
(a) Organization of work  for the Conference .................................................................................22
(b) Participation in  the Conference............................................................................................. ....22
(i) Participation of acceding countries as observers in the preparatory work for the 1999
Ministerial Conference ......................................................................................................... ....22
(ii) Attendance of governments as observers at the 1999 Ministerial Conference.........................23
(iii) Attendance of international intergovernmental organizations as observers at the
1999 Ministerial Conference .................................................................................................... 23
(iv) Attendance of non-governmental organizations at the 1999 Ministerial Conference ..............24
26. Chairmanship of the Dispute Settlement Body ....................................................................24
27. Appointment of office rs to WTO bodies...............................................................................24
28. Election of Chairperson..................................................................................................... .....25
29. Parting statement by the Director-General..........................................................................25
30. Review of WTO activities.................................................................................................... ...25
1. Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions
(a) Consultations (WT/GC/M/40/Ad d.3, WT/GC/M/45, WT/GC/M/50)
At the General Council meeting on 15 June 1999, the Chairman of the Committee on
Balance-of-Payments Restrictions introduced the Committee's report on its consultations with
Romania (WT/BOP/R/45).
The representative of Romania spoke.The General Council took note of the statemen ts and adopted the report in WT/BOP/R/45.
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman of the Committee on Balance-
of-Payments Restrictions introduced the Committee's report on its consultations with Bangladesh
(WT/BOP/R/46).
The General Council took note of the statement and of the communication in
WT/BOP/R/46/Add.1, and adopted the report in WT/BOP/R/46.
At the General Council meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, Mr. Jenkins (United Kingdom),
on behalf of the Chairman of the Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, introduced the
Committee's report on its consultations with the Slovak Republic.
The General Council took note of the statement and adopted the report in WT/BOP/R/48.
2. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration
(a) Reports (WT/GC/M/45, 50)
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman of the Committee on Budget,
Finance and Administration introduced the Committee's reports in WT/BFA/39 and 40.
The representatives of Jamaica and Haiti spoke.WT/GC/28
Page 4
The General Council took note of the statements, approved the Committee's specific
recommendations in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its report in WT/BFA/39 and in paragraph 15 of its report
in WT/BFA/40, and adopted the reports.
At the General Council meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the Chairperson of the
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration announced that the Committee had not yet
reached a final decision on the WTO's budget for 2000.
The General Council took note of the statement, and agreed to adjourn after consideration of
the remaining items on its agenda and to reconvene3 as soon as possible to consider this item.
3. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection – Review under Article 6 of the Agreement
(a) Report of the Working Party (WT/GC/M/40/Add.3)
At the General Council meeting on 15 June 1999, the Chairman of the Working Party on
Preshipment Inspection introduced the Working Party's report (G/L/300).
The General Council took note of the statement and adopted the report in G/L/300.
4. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement
(a) Harmonized System
(i) Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka (WT/GC/M/40/Add.3, WT/GC/M/50)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council considered requests by Bangladesh
(G/L/298), Nicaragua (G/L/297) and Sri Lanka (G /L/296) for extensions of waivers previously
granted in connection with their implementation of the Harmonized System, and draft decisions to this
effect (Bangladesh - G/C/W/142;  Nicaragua - G/C/W/141/Rev.1;  Sri Lanka - G/C/W/140).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of these
requests by that Council.
The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted the decisions(Bangladesh - WT/L/299;  Nicaragua - WT/L/300;  Sri Lanka - WT/L/301) with retroactive effect to
30 April 1999.
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council considered requests by
Bangladesh (G/L/324), Nicaragua (G/L/320) and Sri Lanka (G/L/321) for extensions of waivers
previously granted in connection with their im plementation of the Harmonized System, and draft
decisions to this effect (Bangladesh - G/C/W/162 ;  Nicaragua - G/C/W/160;  Sri Lanka - G/C/W/161).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of these
requests by that Council.
                                                     
3The General Council's subsequent consideration of this item will be carried in an addendum to the
present report.WT/GC/28
Page 5
The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted the decisions
(Bangladesh - WT/L/336;  Nicaragua - WT/L/334;  Sri Lanka - WT/L/335).
(b) Renegotiation of Schedule
(i) Zambia (WT/GC/M/40/Add.3, WT/GC/M/50)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council considered a request by Zambia
(G/L/295) for an extension of a waiver previously granted in connection with the renegotiation of its
schedule, and a draft decision to this effect (G/C/W/139).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of this request
by the Council.
The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted the decision
(WT/L/302) with retroactive effect to 30 April 1999.
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council considered a request by
Zambia (G/L/329) for an extension of a waiver previously granted in connection with the
renegotiation of its schedule, and a draft decision to this effect (G/C/W/163).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of this request
by that Council.
The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted the decision
(WT/L/337).
(c) Decision on the introduction of Harmonized System changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions on 1 January 1996 (WT/GC/M/40/Add.3, WT/GC/M/50)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council considered a draft decision extending the
time-limit of the Decision on the introduction of Harmonized System changes into WTO schedules of
tariff concessions on 1 January 1996 (G/C/W/145).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of this matter
by the Council.
The representative of Japan spoke.The General Council took note of the statement and of the report and, in accordance with the
Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted
the decision (WT/L/303) with retroactive effect to 30 April 1999.
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council considered a draft decision
extending the time-limit of the Decision on the introduction of Harmonized System changes into
WTO schedules of tariff concessions on 1 January 1996 (G/C/W/165).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of this matter
by that Council.WT/GC/28
Page 6
The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted the decision
(WT/L/338).
(d) Preferential tariff treatment for least-developed countries – decision on waiver
(WT/GC/M/40/Add.3)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council considered a draft decision on
preferential tariff treatment for least-developed countries (G/C/W/135/Rev.1).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of this matter
by the Council.
The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted the decision
(WT/L/304).
(e) Peru – Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 – Request for waiver
(WT/GC/M/45)
At its meeting on 15 July 1999, the General Council considered a request by Peru (G/L/311)
for a waiver regarding the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994, and a
draft decision to this effect (G/C/W/155).
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported on the consideration of this matter
by the Council.
The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement (WT/L/93), adopted the decision
(WT/L/307).
(f) Review of waivers pursuant to Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement (WT/GC/M/50)
(i) Canada – CARIBCAN, granted on 14 Octobe r 1996 until 31 December 2006  (WT/L/185,
WT/L/323)
(ii) Cuba – Article XV:6, granted on 14 Octobe r 1996 until 31 December 2001  (WT/L/182,
WT/L/320)
(iii) EC – The Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé, granted on 14 October 1996 until
29 February 2000  (WT/L/186, WT /L/325 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1)
(iv) EC/France – Trading arrangements with Morocco, granted on 9-11 December 1998 until
31 December 2001 (WT/L/294)
(v) Hungary – Agricultural export subsidies, granted on 22 October 1997 until
31 December 2001  (WT/L/238, WT/L/322)
(vi) United States – Andean Trade Preference Act, granted on 14 October 1996 until
4 December 2001  (WT/L/184, WT/L/328)
(vii) United States – Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, granted on 15 November 1995
until 31 December 2005  (WT/L/104, WT/L/329)
(viii) United States – Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, granted on 14 October 1996
until 31 December 2006  (WT/L/183, WT/L/327)
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council reviewed the above eight
waivers.WT/GC/28
Page 7
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and of the reports in documents WT/L/320,
322, 323, 325 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1, 327, 328 and 329.
5. Accession
(a) Bosnia and Herzegovina (WT/GC/M/45, 48)
At its meeting on 15 July 1999, the General Council considered a communication from
Bosnia and Herzegovina (WT/ACC/BIH/1) concer ning its interest in acceding to the WTO
Agreement pursuant to Article XII.
The representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina (as an observer), Myanmar (on behalf of the
ASEAN Members), Turkey, Pakistan, European Communities, Hungary (on behalf of the CEFTA4
Members and Latvia), Japan, Brazil, Slovenia and Jamaica spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to establish a working party to
examine the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and authorized its Chairman to designate the
Chairperson of the Working Party in consultation with representatives of Members and with the
representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Chairman invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on behalf of the General
Council, to attend meetings of the General Council and, as appropriate, meetings of other WTO
bodies as an observer during the period in which the Working Party was carrying out its work.
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman informed the General Council that
Mr. Peter Jenkins (United Kingdom) had agreed to chair the Working Party.
(b) Bhutan (WT/GC/M/48)
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council considered a communication from
Bhutan (WT/ACC/BTN/1/Rev .1) concerning its interest in acceding to the WTO Agreement pursuant
to Article XII.
The representatives of India, Japan, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, European Communities, Bolivia (on behalf of GRULAC), Pakistan, Norway, Kuwait,Australia, Colombia, United States, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Uganda, Switzerland,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Canada, New Zealand, Cyprus, and Bhutan (as an observer) and the Chairman
spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to establish a working party to
examine the application of Bhutan, and authorized its Chairman to designate the Chairperson of the
Working Party in consultation with representatives of Members and with the representative of Bhutan.
The Chairman invited the representative of Bhutan, on behalf of the General Council, to
attend meetings of the General Council and, as appropriate, meetings of other WTO bodies as an
observer during the period in which the Working Party was carrying out its work.
                                                     
4The CEFTA Members include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic and Slovenia.WT/GC/28
Page 8
(c) Estonia (WT/GC/M/41)
In March 1994 the GATT 1947 Council had established a Working Party to examine Estonia's
request for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  Subsequently, in pursuance of
the decision regarding requests for WTO accession adopted by the WTO General Council on
31 January 19955, the GATT 1947 Accession Working Party had been transformed into a WTO
Accession Working Party.
At its meeting on 21 May 1999, the General Council approved the text of the Protocol of
Accession (WT/ACC/EST/30) and the text of the dr aft Decision on the Accession of Estonia and, in
accordance with the Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement
agreed in November 1995 (WT/L/93), adopted the Decision on the Accession of Estonia
(WT/ACC/EST/29).  The General Council also adopted the report of the Working Party
(WT/ACC/EST/28 and Add.1, Add.2 and Add.2/Corr.1).
The representatives of Estonia, European Communities, Canada, Hungary (on behalf of the
CEFTA Members), United States, Australia, Tu rkey, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Mexico,
Switzerland, Latvia, Jamaica, Japan, India, Paki stan, Cuba, Thailand (on behalf of the ASEAN
Members) and Kyrgyz Republic, and the Chairman of the Working Party spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.
(d) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (WT/GC/M/48)
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman informed the General Council that
Mr. Kåre Bryn (Norway) had agreed to chair the Working Party on the accession of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
(e) Georgia (WT/GC/M/48)
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council approved the text of the Protocol of
Accession (WT/ACC/GEO/33) and the text of the draft Decision on the Accession of Georgia and, in
accordance with the Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement
agreed in November 1995 (WT/L/93), adopted the Decision on the Accession of Georgia
(WT/ACC/GEO/32).  The General Council also adopted the report of the Working Party
(WT/ACC/GEO/31 and Add.1 and 2).
The representatives of Hungary (on behalf of the CEFTA Members and Latvia), Japan,
United States, Turkey, European Communities, Boliv ia (on behalf of GRULAC), Philippines (on
behalf of the ASEAN Members), Pakistan, India, Norway,  Switzerland, Canada, Cyprus, and Georgia
(as an observer), and the Chairman of the Working Party spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.
(f) Lebanon (WT/GC/M/40)
At its meeting on 14 April 1999, the General Council considered a communication from
Lebanon (WT/ACC/LBN/1) concerning its interest  in acceding to the WTO Agreement pursuant to
Article XII.
                                                     
5See WT/GC/M/1, item 4(g).WT/GC/28
Page 9
The representatives of Lebanon (as an observer), Egypt, Kuwait, Tunisia, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Cuba, United States, European Communities, Pakistan, Malaysia (on behalf of the
ASEAN Members), Qatar, Japan, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Senegal, Nigeria, Czech Republic, Bulgaria
and Turkey spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to establish a working party to
examine the application by Lebanon, and appointed Mrs. Laurence Dubois-Destrizais (France) as
Chairperson of the Working Party.
The Chairman invited Lebanon, on behalf of the General Council, to attend meetings of the
General Council and, as appropriate, meetings of other WTO bodies as an observer during the period
in which the Working Party was carrying out its work.
(g) Nepal (WT/GC/M/40/Add.3)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the Chairman informed the General Council that Mr. Roger
Farrell (New Zealand) had agreed to Chair the Working Party on the Accession of Nepal, replacing
Mr. G. C. Fortune.
The General Council took note of this information.
(h) Accession to the WTO:  Process and procedures (WT/GC/M/40/Add.3)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council considered a Technical Note by the
Secretariat on the accession process (WT/ACC/7 and Corr.1) and a submission by the European
Communities on the question of accession (WT/GC/W/153).  It also heard an oral report – prepared
by the former Director-General, Mr. Ruggiero, a nd read out by the Chairman – on the informal
meeting on 23 March 1999 with Chairpersons of Accession Working Parties.
The representatives of the European Communities, Egypt, Hungary (on behalf of the CEFTA
Members), Jamaica, India, Japan, Korea, Costa Rica, Bangladesh, Switzerland, Australia, Turkey,
United States, Canada, Pakistan and Hong Kong, China, and the Russian Federation (as an observer)
spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements, agreed to revert to this matter at its next
meeting6, agreed to circulate the oral report on the meeting of 23 March as a document7, and noted the
fact that delegations in general supported the idea that the process of accession should be accelerated
as much as possible, in particular in the course of 1999, prior to the launching of a new round of trade
negotiations.
6. Trade facilitation – status report on work ca rried out by the Council for Trade in Goods
under Paragraph 21 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration (WT/GC/M/50)
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999 the General Council heard a status report on the
work carried out by the Council for Trade in Goods under Paragraph 21 of the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration .
The General Council took note of the status report (G/L/333).
                                                     
6See Item 25(b)(i) of the present report.
7Circulated in WT/GC/W/212.WT/GC/28
Page 10
7. Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (WT/GC/M/48, 50)
At the General Council meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman read out a statement on
behalf of the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body in which the latter described the evolution and
present state of the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
The representatives of Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, United States, Canada,
Hungary, European Communities, Japan, Egypt, India, Brazil, New Zealand, Indonesia, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Australia, Uruguay, Singapore, Guatemal a, Switzerland, Korea, Costa Rica, Bulgaria and
Hong Kong, China, and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council heard a report by the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body on his own responsibility regarding the review of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, in which he proposed that the General Council:  "(a) take note of
all the discussions that had taken place during the review;  and (b) note that in the context of the
informal consultations among some interested delegations mentioned above, it was still possible thatproposals to amend the Dispute Settlement Understanding which might constitute a consensus could
emerge in time for a decision at the Third Ministerial Conference"
.
The representatives of Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, United States, Guatemala, Thailand, Turkey,
Venezuela, Switzerland, European Communities, Hungary, Canada, Czech Republic, Colombia,
Japan, Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, India, Peru, Singapore and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statement by the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement
Body and of the proposals contained therein and agreed to submit them to Ministers for their
consideration at the Third Ministerial Conference, and took note of the statements by delegations
which would also be conveyed to Ministers.
8. Request for an authoritative interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization8 (WT/GC/M/35)
9. Procedures for amendment and interpretation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding:
Response to the European Communities' re quest for an authoritative interpretation of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement9
(WT/GC/M/35)
At its meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the General Council considered communications
from the European Communities (WT/GC/W/133 and 143) and from the United States
(WT/GC/W/144).
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, Japan, India, Mexico,
Hungary (on behalf of the CEFT A Members), Chile, Australia, Canada, Argentina, Brazil,
Switzerland, Korea, Barbados, Panama, Belize, H onduras, Jamaica, Malaysia (on behalf of the
ASEAN Members), New Zealand, Uruguay, Guatemala,  Mauritius, Cyprus, Norway, Ecuador, Israel,
Venezuela and Hong Kong, China, and the Chairman spoke.
                                                     
8At the Chairman's suggestion the matters under points 8 and 9 were taken up together and the
discussion thereof is reflected accordingly in the minutes of the meeting.
9See footnote 8.WT/GC/28
Page 11
The General Council took note of the statements.
10. Trade measures taken by the United States on 3 March 1999 against European
Communities' imports (WT/GC/M/37)
At a special meeting of the General Council on 8 March 1999, the General Council discussed
this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, St. Lucia, Canada,
Dominica, Japan, Hungary (on behalf of the CEFT A Members), Panama, Korea, Guatemala, India,
Honduras, Indonesia, Barbados, Switzerland, Norway, Colombia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore,
Malaysia, Trinidad and Tobago, Australia, Ecuador, Egypt, New Zealand, Brazil, Senegal, Argentina,
Côte d'Ivoire, Venezuela, Uruguay, Jamaica, Turkey, Cyprus and Hong Kong, China, and theDirector-General spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.
11. Five-year review of the exemption provided in Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994
(WT/GC/M/45, 48, 50)
At its meeting on 15 July 1999, the General Council considered a communication from the
United States (WT/GC/W/228) concerning the exem ption provided in paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994.
The representatives of the United States, European Communities, Myanmar (on behalf of the
ASEAN Members), Japan, Australia, Norway, Pana ma, Jamaica, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines and
Hong Kong, China, and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council considered this matter.
The representatives of Malaysia, Japan, European Communities, Panama, Norway, Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, Korea, Dominican Republic, India and Hong Kong, China, and the Chairman
spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council considered this matter.
The representatives of the United States, Panama, Japan, European Communities, Korea,
Australia and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.WT/GC/28
Page 12
12. United States restrictions on imports of lamb from Australia (WT/GC/M/45)
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the representative of Australia said that the
United States had imposed restrictions on imports of lamb meat under the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards on the basis of only a threat of serious injury, and to a degree that was more punitive than
the recommendation of the US International Trade Commission.
The representative of New Zealand spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.
13. Change in United States Trade Relations with Mongolia (WT/GC/M/45)
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the representative of the United States said
that his country had notified the Chairman (WT/L/306) that it had rescinded its invocation of
Article XIII of the WTO Agreement vis-à-vis  Mongolia, and that it therefore consented to the
application, as between it and Mongolia, of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 thereto.
The General Council took note of the statement.
14. Global electronic commerce10 (WT/GC/M/35, WT/GC/M/40/Add.3, WT/GC/M/45, 48)
At its meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the General Council considered a submission by
the United States regarding global electronic commerce (WT/GC/16).
The representative of the United States and the Chairman spoke.The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to undertake the interim review
of progress in implementation of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce at its meeting on
14 April 1999.
11
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council conducted an interim review of progress
in the implementation of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce.
The representatives of Venezuela, Japan, United States, India, Canada, Egypt, European
Communities, Australia, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Bangladesh, Norway and
Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and of the inputs from the relevant WTO
bodies, and agreed to revert to the issue of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce at its nextmeeting.
At its meeting on 15 July 1999, the General Council considered a submission from Australia
(WT/GC/25).
                                                     
10In the relevant minutes the item is called "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce".
11Consideration of most of the items on the General Council's agenda for 14 April 1999 was postponed
to 15 June 1999.WT/GC/28
Page 13
The representatives of Australia, Japan, Jama ica, United States, Pakistan, India, Brazil,
Malaysia, Argentina, Uruguay, European Communities, Mexico and Hong Kong, China, and the
Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this item at its next
meeting.
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council considered reports of the relevant
WTO bodies charged with implementing the Work Programme and discussed how to take this matter
forward.
The representatives of Malaysia, Australia, Brazil, Hungary (on behalf of the CEFTA
Members), Dominican Republic, India, Mexic o, United States, Pakistan, Japan, European
Communities, Venezuela, Jamaica, Egypt, Philippines, and Hong Kong, China and the Chairman
spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to forward the reports of the
WTO bodies examining this issue to Ministers at the Third Ministerial Conference and to revert tothis matter after that meeting.
15. Guidelines for the scheduling of me etings (WT/GC/M/35, WT/GC/M/40/Add.3
12,
WT/GC/M/4513, 4814)
At its meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the General Council discussed this matter.
The representative of Mexico and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed that the Chairman would hold
consultations on this matter.
At the General Council meeting on 15 June 1999, the representative of Mexico said that the
Informal Group of Developing Countries had made a submission (Job No. 2122) that provided ideas
on how to rationalize the formal and informal meetings in the WTO.
The General Council took note of the statement, ag reed that this matter be subject to informal
consultations, and agreed to revert to it at its next meeting.
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman said that it was his intention
to conduct informal consultations on this matter at the earliest opportunity, based on the submission
from Mexico on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing Countries.
The General Council took note of the statement and agreed to revert to this matter at a future
meeting, in light of the consultations to be held.
At the General Council meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman said that he had as yet not
been able to convene consultations on this matter and that it was his intention to do so at the earliest
possible date.
                                                     
12At this meeting the item was called "Frequency and scheduling of WTO meetings".
13See footnote 12.
14See footnote 12.WT/GC/28
Page 14
The General Council took note of this information.
16. Transparency and derestriction15 (WT/GC/M/35, 45)
At its meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the General Council considered this matter.
The representatives of Mexico, Pakistan, United  States, Canada, Australia, India, European
Communities, New Zealand and Japan, and the Chairman and the Secretary of the General Council
spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman said that once the new senior
management was in place, he intended to ask one of the Deputy Directors-General to continue the
consultations on this matter.
The General Council took note of the statement.
17. Developing countries and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (WT/GC/M/35)
At the General Council meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the representative of the
European Communities introduced a proposal (WT/GC/W/148) to create a new unit in the WTO to
assist developing countries in relation to the dispute settlement mechanism.
The representatives of the United States, Colombia, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Egypt, Uruguay,
Bolivia, Japan, Mexico, Mauritius and Norway spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.
18. Promotion of the institutional image of the WTO (WT/GC/M/35, WT/GC/M/40/Add.3,
WT/GC/M/45, 48)
At its meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the General Council considered a communication
from Venezuela (WT/GC/W/142) on this matter.
The representatives of Venezuela, Tunisia, Mexico, Switzerland, Canada, United States,
Japan, European Communities, Egypt, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Peru, Norway, Uruguay, Pakistan, Australia,
Malaysia, India, Brazil and New Zealand, and the Director-General and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements, agreed that the Secretariat would prepare a
document as proposed by Venezuela, and agreed to revert to this matter at a subsequent meeting.
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council considered a Note prepared by the
Secretariat (WT/GC/W/158 and Corr.1) on this matter.
                                                     
15In the minutes this item is called "Review of procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO
documents".WT/GC/28
Page 15
The representatives of Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Venezuela, Egypt,
Mexico, Canada, Switzerland, United States, European Communities, Japan, Australia, Jamaica,
India, Korea, Hungary, Norway, Brazil, Pakistan and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and of the Note prepared by the Secretariat
and agreed to revert to this matter at its next meeting.
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman said that he intended to invite
Mr. Suzuki (Japan) to chair informal consultations on this matter and to report back to the General
Council.
The representatives of Egypt, India, Malaysia, Venezuela, United States, Pakistan, Mexico,
Switzerland, Mauritius, Canada, Turkey and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to hold informal consultations on
this matter.
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council heard a report on the informal
consultations held on this matter as of that date.
The General Council took note of this information.
19. International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO
(a) Reports of the Joint Advisory Group (WT/GC/M/48)
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council considered the report of the Joint
Advisory Group of the International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO on its thirty-second session
(ITC/AG(XXXII)/173).
The Chairman said that the Committee on Trade and Development had examined the report at
its meeting in July 1999 and had forwarded it to the General Council for adoption.
The General Council took note of the statement and adopted the report.
20. Arrangements for effective cooperation wi th other intergovernmental organizations
(a) Agreements between the WTO and the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
(WT/GC/M/35)
At its meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the General Council considered an annotated
checklist of issues raised in the General Council's discussion of this matter in December 1998
(WT/GC/W/140).
The representatives of Canada, Japan, India, United States, Pakistan, Korea and the European
Communities spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements, agreed to authorize the Chairman to
convene special informal meetings from time to time, at the request of delegations or the Director-
General, to discuss coherence issues, and agreed to request the Secretariat to prepare and circulate aWT/GC/28
Page 16
background technical paper to assist discussions for the first meeting on "Autonomous
Liberalization".
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman informed the General Council that an
informal meeting of the General Council would be convened on 28 October 1999 to discuss coherence
issues.
The General Council took note of this information.
21. Submission of end-of-year reports  by WTO bodies (WT/GC/M/45)
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman said that in order for the
annual reports of the subsidiary bodies reporting to the General Council to be forwarded to the
1999 Ministerial Conference as part of the report of the General Council, all of these reports would
have to be in circulation by 22 October.
The General Council took note of the statement.
22. Establishment of the Global Trust Fund for WTO Technical Cooperation
(WT/GC/M/45)
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman announced the establishment
of a Global Trust Fund for WTO Technical Cooperation (Job No. 3788/Rev.1), which had been open
to receive voluntary financial contributions since 1 July 1999.
The General Council took note of the statement.
23. Administrative matters
(a) Appointment of the next Director-Gener al (WT/GC/M/33, 35, 36, 36/Add.1, 36/Add.2,
36/Add.3, 36/Add.4, WT/GC/M/40, 40/Add .1, 40/Add.2, 40/Add.4, WT/GC/M/46)
At its meeting on 12, 20, 26 and 27 January 1999, the General Council considered this matter.
On 12 January, the Chairman informed the Gene ral Council that, as indicated to delegations
in a fax of 4 January, Mr. Lafer would be unable to continue in his role of facilitator.  He proposed
that Mr. Rossier proceed alone with the consultations in the week of 11 January and report to the
General Council on 20 January, and that Mr. Rossier proceed in the manner set out in the
communication of 23 December 1998 which Mr. Ro ssier and Mr. Lafer had jointly agreed.
The representatives of Brazil and Pakistan spoke.The General Council took note of the statements.On 20 January, Mr. Rossier made a report on the consultations (Job. No. 258).
The representatives of Mexico (on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing Countries),
Jamaica, Egypt, European Communities, Zimbabwe (on behalf of the African Group) and Pakistan,
and the Chairman spoke.WT/GC/28
Page 17
The General Council took note of the statements.
On 26 January, the Chairman suggested that a new round of consultations be held.The representatives of Mexico (on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing Countries),
Egypt, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), United States, Pakistan, EuropeanCommunities, Japan, Colombia, Slovak Republic, India, Australia, Korea, Bangladesh, and
Hong Kong, China, and Mr. Rossier spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter the
following day.
On 27 January, the Chairman made a proposal concerning the continuation of the process of
consultations.
The representatives of Egypt, Morocco, Mexico (on behalf of the Informal Group of
Developing Countries), Uruguay, Turkey, Pakista n, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members),
Zimbabwe (on behalf of the African Group) and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.At the General Council meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the Chairman proposed that the
General Council revert to this item at a resumed meeting.
The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed.At the General Council meeting on 1 March 1999, the Chairman made a statement
(WT/GC/17) outlining how he intended to continue the process of selection of the next Director-
General, and Mr. Rossier made a progress report (WT/GC/18).
The representatives of Egypt, United States, Mexico (on behalf of the Informal Group of
Developing Countries), Pakistan, Jamaica, Malays ia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Venezuela,
Japan, Australia, Argentina, European Communities and Turkey spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and of the report by Mr. Rossier and
adjourned.
At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 17 March 1999, the Chairman made a
statement (Job No. 1563) and a progress report on his consultations, stating that it had been
determined that there was no possibility of promoting a consensus on the Canadian candidate and thatthe consultations would proceed in the light of this new situation.
The representatives of Canada, Zimbabwe ( on behalf of the African Group), Mexico,
Pakistan, India, Egypt, Uruguay, United States, Colombia and Turkey spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.
At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 24 March 1999, the Chairman reported
that on 22 March the Government of Morocco had announced the withdrawal of its candidate to the
post of Director-General.  He proposed that he and Mr. Rossier continue their intensive consultationswith delegations and report back to the General Council by the end of March.
Mr. Rossier made a statement (Job No. 1705E) on behalf of the Chairman and himself.WT/GC/28
Page 18
The representatives of Morocco, European Communities, Tunisia, Egypt, Pakistan, Australia,
Senegal, Argentina, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), India, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Chile,
Hungary, Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico, Japan, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Brazil, Czech Republic, Côte d'Ivoire,
United States, Turkey, Jamaica, Colombia and Canada, and the Secretary spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and of the Chairman's proposal and
adjourned.
At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 27 March 1999, the Chairman made a
progress report (Job No. 1814) on the consultations.
The representatives of Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members),
Mexico, Cuba, Jamaica and Zimbabwe spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 31 March 1999, the Chairman made a
further progress report on the consultations (Job No. 1914).
The representative of Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members) spoke.The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.
At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 14 April 1999, the Chairman recalled that
at an informal meeting of the General Council on 9 April, he had indicated that the difficulties
preventing consensus on either of the remaining candidates were still unresolved.
The representatives of Sri Lanka, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Panama,
Argentina, Kenya, Mexico, Korea, Australia, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, European Communities,
El Salvador, Zimbabwe, Hungary (on behalf of  the CEFTA Members), Norway, Uruguay, United
States, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Morocco, Colombia, India, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Chile,
Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Turkey, Ecuador, Vene zuela, Mauritius, Japan and Hong Kong, China
spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.At its meeting on 30 April and 1, 4 and 6 May 1999, the General Council considered this
matter.
On 30 April, the Chairman proposed that the General Council agree to appoint
Mr. Mike Moore as the Director-General of the WTO for a term of office of four years as from
1 May 1999.
The representatives of Mexico, Argentina, I ndia, Uruguay, Malaysia (on behalf of the
ASEAN Members), Japan, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Ge rmany (on behalf of the member States of
European Communities), Canada, Kenya, Bolivia, Egypt, Haiti, Norway, Romania, Nigeria, Hungary,
Argentina , Pakistan, Chile, Belize, Cuba, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Switzerland,
Israel, Poland, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Australia, United States, Japan, New Zealand,
Bulgaria, Brazil, Peru, Turkey, Slovenia, Cameroon and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The Chairman proposed that the clock be stopped in order to allow more time to reach a
consensus on his proposal.WT/GC/28
Page 19
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.
On 1 May, the Chairman said that the possibilities for reaching a consensus had not been
exhausted and that he was optimistic that consensus could be achieved.
The representatives of Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Mexico, Zimbabwe,
Colombia, Bangladesh, United States, Dominican Repub lic, Nigeria, Uruguay, Japan, Korea, Canada,
India, Egypt, Kenya, Turkey, Pakistan, Bolivia, Morocco, Israel, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Jamaica, Argentina and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.On 4 May, the Chairman made a statement (Job No. 2635) in which he said that in proposing
Mr. Moore on 30 April as the name to be considered by the General Council, he and the facilitator had
eliminated Mr. Supachai from the race.
The representatives of Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Kenya, Uruguay, South
Africa, Peru, Morocco, Ecuador, Mexico, India, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Colombia, Japan,Brazil, Korea, Sri Lanka, Chile, United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Romania, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia,
Australia, Malta, Ghana, Lesotho Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cameroon,
Turkey and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.On 6 May, the Chairman made a statement (Job No. 2719).The representatives of Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), New Zealand, Mexico,
Kenya, Colombia, Chile, Lesotho (also on behalf of Mozambique), Argentina, Japan, Korea, UnitedStates, India, Dominican Republic,  Romania, Nigeria, Norway, Czech Republic, Bolivia, Cuba, Costa
Rica, Ghana, Pakistan, Guatemala, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Uganda, Panama, Haiti, Turkey,
Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Hungary, Venezu ela, Sir Lanka, Egypt, Jamaica, Zimbabwe,
Kyrgyz Republic and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.
At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 26 May 1999, the Chairman made a
statement (Job No. 3029).
The representatives of Japan, Belize, Costa Rica, Mexico, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN
Members), India, Uruguay, Zimbabwe, New Zeal and, Lesotho (also on behalf of Botswana,
Mozambique and Swaziland), Czech Republic, Haiti,  Uganda, Romania, Nigeria, Kenya, Guatemala,
Korea, Bolivia, Cuba, Pakistan, Chile, Egypt, Bulgaria, Colombia, United States, Australia, Norway,
Cameroon, Israel and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.
At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 18 June 1999, the Chairman made a
statement (Job No. 3502).
The representatives of Norway, Australia, Turkey, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN
Members), Haiti, Peru, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Uganda , Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Kenya, Ghana, India,
Dominican Republic, Brazil, Bolivia, Pakistan, Ve nezuela, United States, New Zealand, Uruguay,WT/GC/28
Page 20
Morocco, Japan, Korea, Czech Republic, Egypt, Nige ria, Mexico, Slovenia, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile,
Mauritius, Romania, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Argentina and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adjourned.At the resumed meeting of the General Council on 22 July 1999, the Chairman proposed for
consideration and adoption a draft decision on the appointment of the next Director-General
(WT/GC/W/258).
The representatives of Bangladesh, Brazil, Argentina, New Zealand, Morocco, United States,
Bolivia, Panama, Japan, Bulgaria, Uruguay, Nigeria, Korea, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic,
Colombia, European Communities, Slovak Republic, Kenya, Chile, Venezuela, Pakistan, Guatemala,
Mexico, India, Zimbabwe, Malta, Mongolia, Israel , Cuba, Honduras, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Paraguay,
Egypt, Jamaica, South Africa, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Canada, Myanmar (onbehalf of the ASEAN Members), Australia, Hungary (on behalf of the CEFTA Members and Latvia),
Thailand and Hong Kong, China, and the Chairman and the Secretary of the General Council spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and adopted the draft decision in
WT/GC/W/258.
(b) Offices of Deputy Directors-General (WT/GC/M/48)
At the General Council meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman made a statement
(WT/GC/27) in which he described the consultations on this matter and proposed that:
(a) the General Council take note of all views expressed by delegations concerning the
senior management structure of the Secretariat and the number of posts of DeputyDirectors-General;
(b) the General Council agree to revert to this matter at the earliest possible opportunity;
and
(c) in light of the above, the General Council take note that the present senior
management structure of the Secretariat, consisting of one Director-General and four
Deputy Directors-General, is maintained, pending the conclusions to be reached in
the context of the review of the WTO Secretariat and Senior Management Structure.
(d) the General Council agree that the review of the WTO Secretariat and Senior
Management Structure be carried out in conjunction with the review of the current
Rules and Procedures for appointment of Di rectors-General, to be concluded by the
end of September 2000, as provided for in the decision of 22 July 1999 on the
appointment of the next Director-General (WT/L/308), it being understood that the
review of the WTO Secretariat and Senior Management Structure shall be carried out
in the light of the earlier discussions held in the General Council on this matter in1997 and 1998, based on the decision adopted by the General Council on
24 April 1997 (WT/L/207).
The representatives of Mexico (also on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing
Countries), Morocco, Japan, Tunisia, Uganda, India, Venezuela, Pakistan, European Communities,United States, Panama, Australia, Jamaica, Kenya (also on behalf of the African Group), Malaysia,
Canada, Poland, Hungary, Uruguay, Philippines, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Sri Lanka, Brazil,
New Zealand, Turkey and Hong Kong, China, and the Director-General spoke.WT/GC/28
Page 21
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed that if no objection was received
by the Secretariat by 11 October 1999, the Chairman's proposal would be considered as agreed.16
(c) Management Board of the WTO Pension Plan
(i) Election of the Chairman, membe rs and alternates (WT/GC/M/35, 38)
At the General Council meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the Chairman said that
consultations were under way on the designation of representatives for election to the Management
Board of the WTO Pension Plan.
The General Council took note of the statement.At the General Council meeting on 26 March 1999, the Chairman proposed candidates for
election to the Management Board of the WTO Pension Plan.
The representatives of Turkey and Bulgaria spoke.The General Council took note of the statements and agreed on the election of the candidates
proposed (WT/L/297).
24. Observer status
(a) Governments
(i) Yemen (WT/GC/M/40)
At its meeting on 14 April 1999, the General Council considered a request from Yemen for
observer status in the General Council and its subsidiary bodies (WT/L/296).
The representative of Egypt spoke.
The General Council took note of the statement and agreed to grant the request.
(b) International intergovernmental organiza tions (WT/GC/M/35, 40/Add.3, WT/GC/M/45, 48)
At the General Council meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the representative of the
United States raised the issue of pending requests for observer status by several international
organizations.
The representatives of Pakistan, Egypt and Uruguay, and the Chairman spoke.The General Council took note of the statements and agreed that the Chairman would hold
consultations on this matter.
At its meeting on 15 June 1999 the General Council considered this matter.
The representatives of the United States, European Communities, Canada, Egypt, Japan,
Mexico, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Australia, Cuba, Pakistan, Brazil, Venezuela, Malaysia (on behalf of
the ASEAN Members), Hungary, Senegal, Burundi and Korea spoke.
                                                     
16No objections were received.WT/GC/28
Page 22
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed that the Chairman would
undertake further consultations on this matter.
At its meeting on 15 July 1999, the General Council considered a communication from the
United States (WT/GC/22/Rev.1).
The representatives of the United States, Mexico, Korea, Japan, Hungary, Brazil, Australia,
Switzerland, European Communities, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Israel, Chile, Egypt, Ghana,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Myanmar (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements , agreed that if there were no objection by
31 July 1999, the supplementary guidelines cont ained in WT/GC/22/Rev.1, as amended, would be
considered at that date as agreed, agreed that the Chairman would hold informal consultations on thepending requests for observer status in the General Council from international intergovernmental
organizations, and agreed to revert to this matter at a future meeting in the light of those consultations.
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman informed the General Council that
consultations on this matter had not as yet produced any agreement, and that he would conduct further
consultations at the earliest possible opportunity and would keep the General Council informed of any
developments.
The General Council took note of this information.
25. 1999 Ministerial Conference
(a) Organization of work for the Conference (WT/GC/M/50)
At the General Council meeting on 3 and 4 November 199917, the Chairman made a statement
outlining the organization of work at the 1999 Ministerial Conference.18
The representatives of Bolivia, Panama, Mauritius, Cuba, Uganda, and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and of the organization of work.
(b) Participation in the Conference
(i) Participation of acceding countries as observers in the preparatory work for the 1999
Ministerial Conference (WT/GC/M/45)
At the General Council meeting on 15 July 1999, the Chairman proposed that the General
Council agree that acceding governments be exceptionally invited to attend, as observers, the General
Council's informal preparatory meetings for the 1999 Ministerial Conference.
The representatives of Egypt, Myanmar (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Panama, Brazil,
Japan and Mexico, and the Chairman and the Secretary of the General Council spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed that observer governments be
exceptionally invited to attend the General C ouncil's informal preparatory meetings for the
1999 Ministerial Conference.
                                                     
17In these Minutes the item is called "Organization of work for the Third Ministerial Conference".
18This information was subsequently circulated in WT/MIN(99)/4.WT/GC/28
Page 23
(ii) Attendance of governments as observers at th e 1999 Ministerial Conference (WT/GC/M/48,
50)
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council agreed to invite the Governments of
Sao Tomé and Principe, Equatorial Guinea and San Marino to attend as observers the 1999
Ministerial Conference.
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the Chairman proposed that the General Council
agree that unless any objection was received by the Secretariat from any Member by
8 November 1999, the following governments be invited to attend as observers the 1999 Ministerial
Conference: the Bahamas, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Eritrea and Comoros.
The representative Egypt spoke.
The General Council took note of the statement and agreed to the Chairman's proposal.19
(iii) Attendance of international intergovernmental organizations as observers at the
1999 Ministerial Conference (WT/GC/M/ 40Add.3, WT/GC/M/45, WT/GC/M/48 and Corr.1,
WT/GC/M/50)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council agreed to procedures for attendance, as
observers, of international intergovernmental organizations at the 1999 Ministerial Conference.
At its meeting on 15 July 1999, the General Council agreed that, unless any objection was
received by the Secretariat from any Member by  29 July, the Economic Cooperation Organization and
the Energy Charter Conference be granted observer status at the 1999 Ministerial Conference.
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the General Council agreed that, unless any objection was
received by the Secretariat from any Member by 21 October, the League of Arab States, the World
Tourism Organization, the Latin American Organization for Fisheries Development, and the Inter-
American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture be granted observer status at the 1999 Ministerial
Conference.20
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council agreed that unless any
objection was received by the Secretariat from any Member by 8 November 1999, the followinginternational intergovernmental organizations be granted observer status at the 1999 Ministerial
Conference:  the International Civil Aviation Organization, the West African Economic and Monetary
Union, the Conference of Ministers of Agricultur e of West and Central Africa, the Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, and the United
Nations University.
21
The representatives of Egypt, Philippines, Bulgaria, United States, Israel and Tunisia, and the
Chairman, the Secretary of the General Council and the Director of the External Relations Division
spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.
                                                     
19No objections were received to the requests by the Bahamas, Eritrea and Comoros.  The period for
consideration of the request from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was extended until 19 November 1999.
20Subsequent to the meeting, the S ecretariat received two objections to the granting of observer status
to the League of Arab States at the 1999 Ministerial Conference.
21No objections were received.WT/GC/28
Page 24
(iv) Attendance of non-governmental organizations at the 1999 Ministerial Conference
(WT/GC/M/40/Add.3)
At its meeting on 15 June 1999, the General Council agreed to procedures for the attendance
of non-governmental organizations at the 1999 Ministerial Conference.
26. Chairmanship of the Dispute Settlement Body (WT/GC/M/48)
At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the Chairman informed the General Council that
Mr. Kåre Bryn (Norway) had agreed to replace Mr . Akao, who had left Geneva, for the remainder of
the latter's term as Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body.
27. Appointment of officers to WTO bodies (WT/GC/M/35, 50)
At the General Council meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the Chairman said that in
accordance with the guidelines for appointment of officers to WTO bodies approved by the General
Council in January 1995 (WT/L/31), he had held informal consultations on this matter, on the basis of
which he considered that there was a consensus on the following slate of names:
General Council Mr. Ali Said Mchumo (Tanzania)
Dispute Settlement Body Mr. Nobutoshi Akao (Japan)
Trade Policy Review Body Mr. Jean-Marie Noirfalisse (Belgium)
Council for Trade in Goods Mr.  Roger Farrell (New Zealand)
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights (TRIPs)Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay)
Council for Trade in Services Mr. Stuart Harbinson (Hong Kong, China)
Committee on Trade and Environment Mr. István Major (Hungary)
Committee on Trade and Development Mr. Absa Claude Diallo (Senegal)
Committee on Budget, Finance andAdministrationMrs. Laurence Dubois-Destrizais (France)
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions Mr. Tomasz Jodko (Poland)
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements Mr. Krirk-Krai Jirapaet (Thailand)
Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and InvestmentMr. Man Soon Chang (Korea)
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade
and Competition PolicyMr. Frédéric Jenny (France)
Working Group on Transparency in Government
ProcurementMr. Ronald Saborío Soto (Costa Rica)
The Chairman said that there was also a consensus on the re-appointment of Mr. Nestor
Osorio Londoño as the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture.
The General Council took note of the statement and of the consensus on the above slate of
names.
At the General Council meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the Chairman said that due to the
intensity of preparations for the Third Ministeria l Conference, it had not been possible to carry out
consultations on this matter, and that these would be held as soon as possible after that Conference.
The General Council took note of this information.WT/GC/28
Page 25
28. Election of Chairperson (WT/GC/M/35)
At the General Council meeting on 15 and 16 February 1999, the Chairman, as the outgoing
presiding officer of the General Council, made a statement (WT/GC(99)/ST/1).
The General Council then unanimously elected Mr. A. Mchumo (Tanzania) to the Chair, who
also made a statement (WT/GC(99)/ST/2).
29. Parting statement by the Director-General (WT/GC/M/40)
At the General Council meeting on 14 April 1999, the Director-General made a parting
statement (WT/GC/(99)/ST/3).
The representatives of Canada, Switzerland, Egypt, Jamaica, Hungary, Colombia, Japan,
United States, Turkey, European Communities, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Haiti, Chile, Korea, India,
Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Malaysia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Barbados, Paraguay, Senegal, Malta
and Hong Kong, China and the Russian Federation (as an observer) spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.
30. Review of WTO activities (WT/GC/M/50)
At its meeting on 3 and 4 November 1999, the General Council conducted a review of WTO
activities in pursuance of the Decision concerning procedures for the overview of WTO activities and
for reporting under the WTO (WT/L/105).  In so doing, the General Council considered annual
reports for 1999 from WTO bodies.
Chairpersons of various WTO bodies presented the annual reports submitted by those bodies.
The General Council adopted the report of the Committee on Trade and Development
(WT/COMTD/22), took note of the reports from WTO bodies22 in documents WT/DSB/16 and Add.1
and Corr.1, WT/TPR/69, G/L/337, S/C/10, IP/C/ 19, WT/BOP/R/47, WT/B FA/43, WT/REG/8,
WT/CTE/4, WT/WGTI/3, WT/WGTCP/3, WT/WGTGP /3 and GPA/30, and took note of the
statements.
The representatives of Australia, Malaysia and India, and the Chairman spoke.The General Council took note of the statements and adopted its draft report (WT/GC/W/345
and Add.1) on the understanding that the Secretariat would make the necessary adjustments to it so as
to include matters discussed at this meeting.
__________
                                                     
22A communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft to the Chairman of
the General Council reporting on the Committee's activities was circulated in document Job No. 6358.WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/28/Add.1
12 November 1999
(99-4886)
GENERAL COUNCIL
Annual Report (1999)
Addendum
The present Addendum contains the portion of the General Council's report relating to the
preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference.  Th is report has been prepared in pursuance of the
Procedures for an Annual Overview of WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO
(WT/L/105), and sets out the actions taken by the General Council in the period since its previous
annual report1 regarding the preparations for the Ministerial Conference.
In carrying out its task, the General Council has held 7 Special Sessions since the period
covered by the previous report.2  The minutes of these Special Sessions, which remain the record of
the General Council's work, are contained in documents WT/GC/M/34, 39, 42, 43, 44, 47 and 49.
_______________
- Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference (WT/GC/M/34, 39, 42, 43, 44, 47 and
49)
At the Second Session of the Ministerial Conference in May 1998, Ministers decided that a
process would be established under the direction of the General Council to ensure the full and faithful
implementation of existing agreements, and to prepare for the Third Session of the Ministerial
Conference.  Ministers also decided that, in this regard, the General Council would meet in Special
Session in September 1998 and periodically thereafter to ensure full and timely completion of its work
(WT/MIN(98)/DEC/1).
At its Special Session in September 1998, the General Council held an initial discussion on
the substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, in particular
paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, including proposals by Members, and agreed to establish a schedule of
monthly informal intersessional meetings in the last quarter of 1998 and the beginning of 1999 tofurther address these issues.  The General Council also  agreed to meet again in Special Session in the
second half of February 1999 to take stock and decide on further work in the preparatory process.
At its Special Session on 25 February 1999, the General Council held a further discussion of
the substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members.  In so doing, the General Council considered an oral report by the outgoing Chairman on
the work done in the informal intersessional meetings held since the September 1998 Special Session,
                                                     
1The annual report of the General Council for 1998 was circulated as WT/GC/15 and Corr.1.
2An addendum to the present report will reflect the proceedings of any further meetings of the General
Council in special session in November 1999 in preparation for the Ministerial Conference.WT/GC/28/Add.1
Page 2
at which Members pursued a discussion of the issues identified in paragraph 9 of the Ministerial
Declaration sequentially.3
The General Council also considered the organization of further work on these issues on the
basis of a proposal by the Chairman.
The representatives of New Zealand, Uruguay, Norway, the European Communities, Japan,
Bolivia, Guatemala, Korea, Hungary (also on beha lf of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania,
Slovak Republic and Slovenia), El Salvador (also on behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras
and Nicaragua), Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Costa Rica, Australia, Egypt,
Argentina, India, the United States, Pakistan, Brazil, Colombia, Switzerland, Canada, Venezuela,
South Africa, Morocco, Tanzania, Mauritius, Chile, Mexico, Iceland, Uganda and Hong Kong, China
and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and of the report by the outgoing Chairman
on the work done since the September 1998 Special Session, and agreed to the following indicative
programme for the organization of further work in the second phase, covering the period March to
July:
24 and 26 March Special Session: Suggested focus – Proposals on
paragraph 9(a) of the Ministerial Declaration
12-13 April Informal meeting
22-23 April Special Session: Suggested focus – Proposals on
paragraphs 9(b)-9(d) of the Ministerial Declaration
3-4 May Informal meeting
20-21 May Special Session:  Suggested focus – Further discussion of
proposals on paragraphs 9(a)-9(d) of the Ministerial
Declaration
7-8 June Informal meeting21-22 June Special Session: Suggested focus – Proposals on
paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration
6-7 July Informal meeting9 July Special Session:  Suggested focus – Further discussion of
proposals on paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Ministerial
Declaration
28-29 July Special Session:  Suggested focus – Further discussion of
proposals on paragraphs 9 and 10, and the organization of
future work
                                                     
3Checklists of issues raised by delegations pertaining to items discussed at each meeting were
circulated by the Secretariat under its own responsib ility as the following informal Job No. documents:  6155,
7095, 7123, 434, 441, 920 and 1023.WT/GC/28/Add.1
Page 3
It was understood that, in addition to the suggested focus for each meeting, delegations would
have the right to revert to any issue at any meetin g, and that the programme might be reviewed and if
necessary modified in the light of developments.
At its Special Session on 24 March 1999, the General Council continued its discussion of the
substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, with a focus on proposals on paragraph 9(a) of the Ministerial Declaration.
The representatives of Uruguay, Australia, th e Dominican Republic (also on behalf of Cuba,
Honduras and Nicaragua), Cuba (also on behalf  of the Dominican Republic, Honduras and
Nicaragua), the United States, El Salvador (also on behalf of Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Honduras and Nicaragua), Egypt, Honduras (also on behalf of Cuba and the Dominican Republic),
India, Hungary (also on behalf of Bulgaria, Czech  Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and
Slovenia), Nicaragua (also on behalf of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Honduras), Japan, Costa
Rica, Pakistan, Argentina, the European Communities, Venezuela, Mauritius, New Zealand, the
Dominican Republic (also on behalf of Cuba, El  Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Pakistan),
Switzerland, Norway, Sri Lanka, Canada, Korea, Brazil, Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN
Members) and Hong Kong, China and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements, and agreed to a proposal by the Chairman
that the Special Session scheduled for 22-23 April be rescheduled for 3-4 May, and that the informal
meeting scheduled for 3-4 May be rescheduled for 10-11 May.
At its Special Session on 20 May 1999, the General Council continued its discussion of the
substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, with a focus on proposals on paragraphs 9(a)-9(d) of the Ministerial Declaration.  It also
discussed, under "Other Business", the role of the General Council in the preparation of the
negotiating guidelines and procedures for the mandated negotiations on services.
The representatives of Hungary, Norway, Australia, European Communities, the United
States, Zambia (also on behalf of Pakistan, Jamaica, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Sri Lanka), Japan,
Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Hungary (on behalf of the CEFTA countries),
Uruguay, New Zealand, Chile, Switzerland, Argentin a, Iceland, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Turkey,
Costa Rica, Singapore, Indonesia, Egypt, Guatem ala, Thailand, Cuba, India, Venezuela, Mexico,
Bolivia, Colombia and Hong Kong, China and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.At its Special Session on 17 June 1999, the General Council continued its discussion of the
substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, with a focus on proposals on paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration.  It further
considered the indicative schedule of meetings agreed in February.
The representatives of Mexico, Hungary (on behalf of the CEFTA countries and Latvia),
Egypt, Uruguay, Australia, Norway, Chile, Cost a Rica, Switzerland, Cuba, Korea, Singapore (also on
behalf of the Philippines), Canada, India, Pakista n, United States, Guatemala (also on behalf of the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua), the European Communities, Jamaica,
Malaysia (on behalf of the ASEAN Members), Japan, Sri Lanka, Dominican Republic, Turkey, Czech
Republic, New Zealand, Brazil and Hong Kong, China and the Chairman spoke.WT/GC/28/Add.1
Page 4
The General Council took note of the statements, and agreed that the formal Special Session
scheduled for 9 July be brought forward to 7 July, and that the informal meeting scheduled for 6-7
July be held only on 6 July.
At its Special Session on 7 July 1999, the General Council continued its discussion of the
substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, with a focus on proposals on paragra phs 9 and 10 of the Ministerial Declaration.
The representatives of New Zealand (on behalf  of the APEC Members), Brazil, Argentina,
Bangladesh (on behalf of the least-developed country Members), Japan, the European Communities,
Norway, Korea, India, Uruguay, Hungary (also on behalf of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovak
Republic and Slovenia), Turkey, Australia, Pakistan, Egypt, Cuba, Chile, Costa Rica, Philippines (on
behalf of the ASEAN Members), Czech Republic, Iceland, the United States, Morocco, Singapore,Thailand, Mauritius and Hong Kong, China and the Chairman spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements.At its Special Session on 29 July 1999, the General Council continued its discussion of the
substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, with a focus on proposals on paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Ministerial Declaration, and the
organization of future work.
With regard to the organization of future work, the Chairman said that the next phase of work
would require the General Council to produce the text or texts and the recommendations to be sent to
Ministers at Seattle for their decision.  Clearly, there was now a substantial amount of material on the
table from which to distil recommendations to Ministers, and that the process of distillation had
already begun in recent informal meetings.  In view of the task ahead, the next phase might be
characterized as recommendation-driven and multi-layered.  Recommendation-driven in the sense thatits main aim was to produce recommendations to Ministers, and because it would be important to
focus the work around draft recommendations as soon as possible.  Multi-layered because Phase 3
should be structured with maximum flexibility in order to make the most efficient use of the limited
time available.  This entailed a process which, firstly, combined frequent informal General Council
meetings - hopefully more and more at the Head-o f-Delegation level - with less frequent Special
Sessions.  This level of meetings would be the guarantee of transparency and full participation, and all
results in other fora would have to be brought back to it.  Secondly, there would be a need, as on all
past occasions, to hold other informal consultations at short notice to take up specific issues, and for
detailed drafting work.  Such consultations were an essential part of a result-oriented process.  They
should, of course, be conducted in full respect of transparency and non-discrimination.  It might, if
Members agreed, be useful to associate the Director-General with such consultations.  Thirdly, he
would be stepping up his own consultations with delegations at the individual level, and he expectedthat delegations would also be intensifying the pace of their own multilateral and plurilateral
discussion.  Clearly, the General Council would be the body to which the work in this multi-layered
process would all come back to.  While he had noted the emphasis that delegations had placed on the
primacy of the General Council in the preparatory pr ocess, in all the past experience a multi-layer
structure such as he had outlined had been proven indispensable to enabling the work at the level ofthe General Council to reach a successful outcome.  Since the core of work in Phase 3 would be the
recommendations to be submitted to Ministers, it was important to get a draft setting out possible
elements on the table as soon as possible, and he understood that some delegations were actively
considering possible language.  On his own responsibility as Chairman, he intended to circulate a
draft outline of a Ministerial text or texts to delegations in the first week of September.  This would bean outline, and without prejudice to Members' positions regarding the elements that might eventually
be included in the text or texts that would go fo rward from the process to Ministers.  His intended
outline would take into account the work in Phases 1 and 2 and could serve as a basis for assisting theWT/GC/28/Add.1
Page 5
work in Phase 3.  With this aim in mind, he would circulate shortly to delegations a schedule of work
in Phase 3 beginning with an informal General Council meeting on 8 September. He suggested that at
that meeting Members continue their examination of specific proposals, including any that might have
been submitted over the summer break, and undertake a first reading of the draft outline.   The process
in the next phase would clearly have to be flexible, with more meetings added as necessary.  He
suggested that the General Council aim to finish its work in Phase 3 in Geneva by the beginning ofNovember in order to allow time for consideration of the resulting text in capitals, as well as time for
translation and processing.  The Special Session that he would propose be scheduled at the beginning
of November could, however, remain on call so that any necessary amendments could be made.
The representatives of Venezuela, Brazil, Hungary (also on behalf of the CEFTA countries
and Latvia), Japan, Kenya, the United States, Singapore, Panama, Korea, the European Communities,
India, Norway, Canada, Mauritius, Australia, Pe ru, Mexico, Uganda, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, Bolivia
and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to the Chairman's suggestions for
the organization of further work in the process.
At its Special Session on 23 September 1999, the General Council continued its discussion of
the substantive issues arising from the Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, as well as the further organization of work.  It also held a discussion on the basis of a draft
outline of a Ministerial text circulated by the Chairman on 8 September under his own responsibility
(Job(99)/5230).
The representatives of New Zealand, Canada, Uruguay, Brazil, Japan, Hungary (on behalf of
the CEFTA countries and Latvia), Bolivia, Pakistan, the European Communities, Australia,
Guatemala, India, Colombia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Switzerland,
Malaysia, Mexico, Honduras, Egypt, Romania, Indone sia, Argentina, Norway, Uganda, El Salvador,
Iceland, Bangladesh, Thailand, Bulgaria, Mauritius, Venezuela, South Africa and Hong Kong, China
spoke.
With regard to the organization of further work, the Chairman said he sensed that the large
majority of delegations were agreed that one should move forward with a sense of urgency towardsthe drafting of a text for Ministers, and that all the inputs that had been made should be taken fully
into account in the further process that all would be embarking on.  Having listened carefully to all the
points of view that had been expressed, including that the immediate process should be inclusive and
allow the opportunity for all delegations to participate in the building up of an initial overall text for
further consideration, it was his intention to conduct in the following week an intensive process of
informal consultations at the Heads-of-Delegation le vel.  His aim in conducting this process would be
to circulate, on the basis of the discussions at thos e consultations as well as the work thus far, an
initial text of a draft declaration immediately ther eafter.  The discussion the following week would be
open-ended as regards participation, and would be the opportunity for delegations to indicate to him
what they wished to see in the first draft that he in tended to circulate.  Clearly, the intensive informal
meetings could not be a repeat of the discussion th at had been held thus far in the second phase, but
would have to focus on the content of the text to be  submitted to Ministers.  On this basis, heintended to circulate to delegations as soon as possible a programme for these meetings setting out the
times and the subjects for discussion on each of the elements that I will intend to take up.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed to the Chairman's suggestions for
the organization of further work in the process.
The General Council further considered, under "Other Business", a proposal by the United
States regarding a WTO Symposium, to be held at Seattle on 29 November, on International TradeWT/GC/28/Add.1
Page 6
Issues in the First Decades of the Next Century which, consistent with Article V:2 of the WTO
Agreement, would aim at encouraging an informal dialogue between WTO Members and
representatives of non-governmental organizations on issues likely to affect the international trading
system of the WTO in the next century in order to  (i) enhance awareness of the issues involved; (ii)
provide a forum for exchange of ideas;  and (iii) increase the understanding of the WTO's
contributions in these areas.
The representatives of the United States, Costa Rica, Egypt, Korea, the European
Communities, Japan, Bolivia, Argentina, Canada, Australia, Brazil and Mexico spoke.
The General Council took note of the statements and endorsed the proposal by the United
States ad referendum to allow the delegation that had expressed difficulty with it a few days' time to
consult with its capital.4
__________
                                                     
4The delegation concerned having removed its reservation, the proposal was considered endorsed.SECTION II
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODYWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/DSB/16
22 October 1999
(99-4589)
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
Annual Report (1999)1
The present report has been prepared in pursuance of the Procedures for an Annual Overview
of WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO (WT/L/105), and sets out the actions taken by
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the period since its previous annual report.2
In carrying out its task, the DSB has held 17 meetings since the period covered by the
previous report.  The minutes of these meetings, which remain the record of the DSB's work, arecontained in documents WT /DSB/M/53 - WT/DSB/M/69.
The following subjects are included in the report:
Page
1. Election of Chairperson...................................................................................................... ......3
2. Appointment of Appellate Body members .............................................................................3
3. Rules of Conduct............................................................................................................. ..........3
4. Review of the DSU ............................................................................................................ ........4
5. Adoption of the 1999 Draft Annual Report of the DSB.........................................................46. Indicative list of governmental and non-governmental panelists.........................................4
7. Adoption of panel reports .................................................................................................... ....5
8. Time-periods under Article 16.4 of the DSU expiring in the month of August...................5
9. Argentina - Measures affecting imports of footwear:  Request for the
establishment of a panel by  the United States .......................................................................6
10. European Communities - Measures affecting differential and favourable
treatment of coffee:  Request for consultations by Brazil .....................................................6
11. European Communities - Measures affecting the importation of certain poultry
products ....................................................................................................................... ..............6
12. European Communities - Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of
bananas ........................................................................................................................ ..............7
13. Recourse to dispute settlement procedures ............................................................................7
(a) Argen tina ................................................................................................................... .................7
(i) Measures affecting im ports of footwear .....................................................................................7
(ii) Measures affecting the export of bovine hi des and the import of  finished leather .....................7
(iii) Safeguard measures on imports of footwear ..............................................................................8
                                                     
1The Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes since 1 January 1995 to 31 August 1999 prepared
by the Secretariat on its own responsibility is included, for practical purposes, in an Addendum to this report.
2WT/DSB/14, Add.1, Add.1/Corr.1 and Add.2.WT/DSB/16
Page 2
(b) Austr alia................................................................................................................... ...................8
(i) Measures affecting im portation of salmon .................................................................................8
(ii) Measures affecting the importation of salmonids.......................................................................8
(iii) Subsidies provided to producers an d exporters of auto motive leather.......................................9
(c) Brazil...................................................................................................................... .....................9
(i) Export financing programme for aircraft ...................................................................................9
(d) Canada ...................................................................................................................... ................10
(i) Certain measures affecti ng the automotive industry.................................................................10
(ii) Measures affecting the ex port of civili an aircraft.....................................................................10
(iii) Patent protection of pharmaceutical products..........................................................................10
(iv) Term of pate nt protection .................................................................................................. .......11
(e) Colombia.................................................................................................................... ...............11
(i) Safeguard measure on imports of plain polyester filaments from Thailand.............................11
(f) European Commun ities........................................................................................................ .....11
(i) Anti-dumping duties on imports of cotton-type bed-linen from India.......................................11
(ii) Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones) .....................................................11
(iii) Regime for the importation, sa le and distribution of bananas .................................................12
(iv) Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas - Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador ..................................................................................................... 13
(g) Guate mala ................................................................................................................... ..............14
(i) Definitive anti-dumping measure on grey Portland cement from Mexico................................14
(h) India ....................................................................................................................... ...................14
(i) Quantitative restrictions on imports of agr icultural, textile and industrial products...............14
(i) Japan ....................................................................................................................... ..................15
(i) Measures affecting ag ricultural products.................................................................................15
(j) Korea....................................................................................................................... ..................16
(i) Measures affecting go vernment procurement...........................................................................16
(ii) Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef ...................................................16
(iii) Taxes on alc oholic beverages .............................................................................................. .....17
(k) United States............................................................................................................... ..............17
(i) Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 .................................................................................................... ....17
(ii) Anti-dumping duty on dynamic random access memory semiconductors (DRAMS) of
one megabit or above from Korea ............................................................................................18
(iii) Definitive safeguard measures on imports of wheat gluten from the European
Communities .................................................................................................................... .........19
(iv) Import measures on certain products from the European Communities ..................................19
(v) Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products ......................................................19
(vi) Imposition of countervailing duties on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon
steel products originating in the United Kingdom....................................................................20
(vii) Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act.................................................................................... 20
(viii) Sections 301 - 310 of th e Trade Act of 1974.............................................................................2 0
14. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.......................21
(a) Argen tina ................................................................................................................... ...............21
(i) Measures affecting imports of footwear, textiles, apparel and other items..............................21
(b) European Commun ities........................................................................................................ .....22
(i) Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones) .....................................................22
(ii) Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas - Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador ..................................................................................................... 23
(iii) Regime for the importation, sa le and distribution of bananas .................................................23
(c) India ....................................................................................................................... ...................24WT/DSB/16
Page 3
(i) Patent protection for pharmaceutical  and agricultural chem ical products .............................24
(d) Indonesia................................................................................................................... ................24
(i) Certain measures affecti ng the automobile industry ................................................................24
(e) United States............................................................................................................... ..............25
(i) Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products ......................................................25
1. Election of Chairperson (WT/DSB/M/55 and Corr.1, 69)
At the DSB meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB elected Mr. Nobutoshi Akao (Japan) as
Chairman by acclamation.
The representatives of Canada, United States, Ecuador, Australia, Turkey, Argentina, Japan,
European Communities, Philippines, also on behalf of the ASEAN Members, and the outgoingChairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.At its meeting on 14 October 1999, the DSB elected Mr. Kåre Bryn (Norway) as Chairman by
acclamation in order to serve out the remaining term of office of Mr. Nobutoshi Akao (Japan).
2. Appointment of Appellate Body members (WT/DSB/M/68)
At the DSB meeting on 22 and 24 September 19993, the Chairman recalled that the terms of
office of four of the original Appellate Body members would expire on 11 December 1999.  He had
been informed that two Appellate Body members would leave at the end of their terms of office;  i.e.
11 December.  Two other members had expressed their interest in being reappointed for a second
four-year term.  In the light of these developm ents, the DSB would have to take two separate
decisions:  (i) to extend the terms of office of the two members who were available for reappointment;and (ii) to decide on a selection process to replace the two departing members.  Consultations had
already begun on this matter and would continue in the next few days.
The DSB took note of the statement.
3. Rules of Conduct (WT/DSB/M/54)
At the DSB meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the Chairman recalled
that at the DSB meeting on 25 November 1998, he had made a statement to the effect that, in
accordance with Section IX of the Rules of Conduct, "the Rules of Conduct shall be reviewed within
two years of their adoption and a decision shall be taken by the DSB as to whether to continue,
modify or terminate these Rules".  At that meeting he had proposed that, if delegations had noobjections, the DSB, at its next regular meeting, w ould decide to continue to apply the current Rules
of Conduct (WT/DSB/ RC/1) and to review them at a later stage, as necessary.  Since he had not
received any objections, he proposed that the DSB decide to continue to apply the current Rules of
Conduct as contained in WT/DSB/RC/1 and revi ew them at a later stage, as necessary.
The DSB so agreed.
                                                     
3This meeting of the DSB was adjourned.WT/DSB/16
Page 4
4. Review of the DSU (WT/DSB/M/67, 68)
At the DSB meeting on 20 August 1999, the Chairman recalled that at the 30 July informal
DSB meeting on the DSU Review, Members had not been in a position to reach consensus with
regard to a possible recommendation on the DSU Review.  He noted that since the deadline for
completion of the Review had expired on 31 July 1999, further informal discussions to be held would
have to be ratified retroactively by the General Council at its meeting on 6 October.  He wouldtherefore carry out informal consultations in the beginning of September with a view to finalizing a
report on the DSU Review to be presented to the General Council at its meeting scheduled for
6 October.
The DSB took note of the statement.At the DSB meeting on 22 and 24 September 1999
4, the Chairman said that intensive
consultations had been held on the DSU Review, and in particular on the possibility to extend the
31 July deadline for completion of the Review.  Since no agreement has been reached, he proposed
that the DSB meeting be adjourned and reconvened at a later date.
The DSB took note of the statement.
5. Adoption of the 1999 Draft Annual Report of the DSB (WT/DSB/M/68)
At the DSB meeting on 22 and 24 September 19995, the Chairman submitted for adoption a
draft text of the 1999 Annual Report of the DSB contained in WT/DSB/W/111 and Add.1.  He
proposed that, following the adoption, the Secretariat be authorized to update the Annual Report
under its own responsibility in order to include th e actions taken by the DSB at the present meeting.
The updated Annual Report would be submitted for consideration by the General Council at its
meeting on 4 November.
The DSB adopted the draft Annual Report contained in WT/DSB/W/111 and Add.1 on the
understanding that it would be further updated by the Secretariat as proposed by the Chairman.
6. Indicative list of governmental and non- governmental panelists (WT/DSB/M/54, 55 and
Corr.1, 60, 62, 68)
At its meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the DSB approved the names
contained in document WT/DSB/W/89 proposed for inclusion on the indicative list in accordance
with Article 8.4 of the DSU.
At its meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB approved the names contained in document
WT/DSB/W/92 proposed for inclusion on the indicativ e list in accordance with Article 8.4 of the
DSU.
At its meeting on 28 April 1999, the DSB approved the names contained in document
WT/DSB/W/99 proposed for inclusion on the indicativ e list in accordance with Article 8.4 of the
DSU.
                                                     
4See footnote 3.
5Idem.WT/DSB/16
Page 5
At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB approved the names contained in document
WT/DSB/W/103 proposed for inclusion on the indicativ e list in accordance with Article 8.4 of the
DSU.
At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 19996, the DSB approved the names contained in
document WT/DSB/W/110 proposed for inclusion on the indicative list in accordance with Article 8.4
of the DSU.
The Chairman recalled that in accordance with the proposals for the administration of the
indicative list of panelists approved by the DSB on 31 May 1995, the list should be completely
updated every two years.  He therefore proposed that Members provide the Secretariat with any
modifications they might wish to make to the indicative list by the end of December 1999.
The DSB took note of the statement.
7. Adoption of panel reports (WT/DSB/M/62, 63)
At the DSB meeting on 26 May 1999, the Chairman sought Members' views on the question
of how to deal with a situation in which a panel report was not placed on the DSB agenda within the
60-day time-period required under the DSU.
The representative of the European Communities, United States, India and Ecuador spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.
At the DSB meeting on 3 June 1999, the Chairman reported on the outcome of his
consultations on the question of the adoption of the Report of the original Panel on "European
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse toArticle 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities (WT/DS27/RW/EEC and Corr.1).
The representatives of Panama, Philippines, Un ited States, Turkey, Uruguay, Brazil, India and
Hong Kong, China spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.
8. Time-periods under Article 16.4 of the DSU expiring in the month of August
(WT/DSB/M/65)
At the DSB meeting on 26 July 1999, the EC represen tative drew attention to the fact that the
60-day time-period under Article 16.4 of the DSU for adoption of three Panel Reports7 would expire
in August.  For practical purposes, the EC proposed that the DSB agree to postpone consideration of
these Panel Reports on the understanding that the rights of the parties to appeal would be fully
preserved.
The representatives of the European Communities, Korea, Argentina, Chile, Mexico and the
Philippines spoke.
                                                     
6See footnote 3.
7Panel Reports on:  "Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages" (WT/DS87/R - WT/DS110/R);
"Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear" (WT/DS121/R);  and "Korea - Definitive SafeguardMeasure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products" (WT/DS98/R).WT/DSB/16
Page 6
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to the proposal made by the EC to postpone
the consideration of the three Panel Reports referred to by the EC.
9. Argentina - Measures affecting imports of footwear:  Request for the establishment of a
panel by the United States (WT/DSB/M/62)
At the DSB meeting on 26 May 1999, the representative of Argentina expressed his country's
concern with regard to the inclusion on the agenda of the special DSB meeting scheduled for 3 June
of the US request for the establishment of a panel on this matter (WT/DS164/3).  In Argentina's view,
the US action violated the current practice to limit the agendas of special meetings to those matters
which required the convening of special meetings and could not be postponed due to strict time-
periods under the DSU.
The representative of the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.
10. European Communities - Measures affectin g differential and favourable treatment of
coffee:  Request for consultations by Brazil (WT/DSB/M/54)
At the DSB meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the representative of
Colombia expressed his delegation's concern about Brazil's request for consultations with the EC on
this matter (WT/DS154/1).  Colombia was concerned that Brazil had made its request forconsultations under Article XXIII of GATT 1994, thereby preventing other interested parties from
participating therein.  Colombia believed that the request should have been made under Article XXII
of GATT 1994 which would allow interested countries to join in the consultations.
The representative of Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Venezuela, Bolivia and Brazil spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.
11. European Communities - Measures affecting the importation of certain poultry
products (WT/DSB/M/55 and Corr.1, 57)
At the DSB meeting on 17 February 1999, the representative of Brazil made a statement
concerning the implementation by the EC of th e DSB's recommendations on this matter (WT/DS69).
The representatives of Brazil and the European Communities spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.
At the DSB meeting on 19 March 1999, the representative of Brazil made a statement
concerning the implementation by the EC of the DSB's recommendations on this matter.
The representative of Brazil and the European Communities spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.WT/DSB/16
Page 7
12. European Communities - Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas
(WT/DSB/M/54)
At the DSB meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the representative of
Panama sought clarification from the Secretariat as to why a status report on the EC's banana import
regime had not been placed on the agenda of the meeting under the item concerning the surveillance
of implementation of the recommendations adopted by the DSB.
The representative of the Secretariat spoke.The DSB took note of the statements.
13. Recourse to dispute settlement procedures
(a) Argentina
(i) Measures affecting imports of footwear (WT/DSB/M/65)
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered a request by the United States for the
establishment of a panel to examine its complaint with regard to certain measures implemented by
Argentina affecting imports of footwear (WT/DS164/4).
The representatives of the United States, Argentina and Indonesia spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
8
(ii) Measures affecting the export of bovine hides and the import of finished leather
(WT/DSB/M/64, 65)
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB considered a request by the European Communities
for the establishment of a panel to examine its complaint concerning certain measures taken by
Argentina on the export of bovine hides and the imports of finished leather (WT/DS155/2).
The representatives of the European Communities and Argentina spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities and Argentina spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
9
                                                     
8After the meeting Indonesia reserved its third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
9After the meeting the United States reserved its third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.WT/DSB/16
Page 8
(iii) Safeguard measures on imports  of footwear (WT/DSB/M/60)
At its meeting on 28 April 1999, the DSB considered a request by Indonesia for the
establishment of a panel to examine the provisional and definitive safeguard measures and the
subsequent modifications imposed by Arge ntina on imports of footwear (WT/DS123/3).
The representatives of Indonesia, Argentina, European Communities, Uruguay, Venezuela
and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at a later date.
(b) Australia
(i) Measures affecting importat ion of salmon (WT/DSB/M/66)
At the DSB meeting on 27 and 28 July 1999 the DSB considered a request by Canada under
Article 22.2 of the DSU to suspend the application to Australia of tariff concessions and related
obligations under the GATT 1994 (WT/DS18/12).  Also at that meeting, the DSB considered a
request by Canada under Article 21.5 of the DSU fo r determination of consistency of implementation
measures in the salmon case (WT/DS18/14)
The representatives of Canada, Australia, European Communities, Japan, United States, India
and Indonesia spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed that, as requested by Australia pursuant to
Article 22.6 of the DSU, the matter be referred to arbitration to determine the level of suspension ofconcessions requested by Canada in document WT/DS18/12.  The DSB further agreed that the
Article 21.5 request by Canada be referred to the original Panel.
(ii) Measures affecting the importation of salmonids (WT/DSB/M/62, 64)
At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB considered a request by the United States for the
establishment of a panel to examine its complaint with regard to Australia's import prohibition on
fresh, chilled or frozen salmonids, including salmon (WT/DS21/4).
The representative of the United States, Australia and Canada spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.
At its meeting on 16 June 1999 the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the United States, Australia, Philippines, India, Malaysia, Korea,
European Communities, Canada, Hong Kong, China and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU.  With regard to  the terms of reference, the Chairman said that the
parties to the dispute would make efforts to try to reach agreement on the terms of reference of the
Panel.  The DSB took note of the statement made by Australia to the effect that under Article 7.3 of
the DSU "the DSB might authorize its Chairman to  draw up the terms of reference of a panel in
consultation with the parties to the dispute".WT/DSB/16
Page 9
The representatives of Canada, European Communities, India, Norway and Hong Kong,
China reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.10
(iii) Subsidies provided to producers and exporters of automotive leather (WT/DSB/M/64, 69)
In June 199811, the DSB had established a panel to examine the complaint by the United
States with regard to certain subsidies provided by Australia to its producers and exporters ofautomotive leather.
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB considered the Panel Report contained in
WT/DS126/R pertaining to the complaint by the United States.
The representatives of Australia, United States and the European Communities spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements a nd adopted the Panel Report contained in
WT/DS126/R.
At its meeting on 14 October 1999, the DSB considered a request by the United States under
Article 21.5 of the DSU to examine Australia's im plementation of the DSB's recommendations on this
matter (WT/DS126/8).
The representatives of the United States, Australia, European Communities, India, Mexico
and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to refer to the original Panel, pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, the matter raised by the United States in document WT/DS126/8.  It was
agreed that the Panel would have standard terms of reference.
The European Communities reserved its third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.12
(c) Brazil
(i) Export financing programme fo r aircraft (WT/DSB/M/67)
In July 199813 the DSB had established a panel to examine the complaint by Canada with
regard to certain export subsidies granted under the Brazilian Programa de Financiamento às
Exportações  (PROEX).  In May 1999 Brazil and Canada had notified the DSB of their decisions to
appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.
At its meeting on 20 August 1999, the DSB considered the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS46/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS46/R pertaining to the complaint by Canada.
The representatives of Canada and Brazil spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS46/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS46/ R as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
                                                     
10After the meeting Iceland reserved its third-party rights to participate in  the Panel's proceedings.
11WT/DSB/M/46.
12After the meeting Mexico reserved its third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
13WT/DSB/M/47.WT/DSB/16
Page 10
(d) Canada
(i) Certain measures affecting the automotive industry (WT/DSB/M/54)
At its meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the DSB considered two
requests for the establishment of a panel to examine the complaints by Japan (WT/DS139/2) and the
European Communities (WT/DS142/2) with regard to certain aspects of Canada's automotive trade
regime.
The representatives of Japan, European Communities and Canada spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a single panel in accordance with
the provisions of Article 9.1 of the DSU, with standard terms of reference.
India, Korea and the United States reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.
(ii) Measures affecting the export of civilian aircraft (WT/DSB/M/67)
In July 1998
14 the DSB had established a panel to examine the complaint by Brazil with
regard to certain subsidies granted by Canada to support its export of civilian aircraft.  In May 1999Canada and Brazil had notified the DSB of their decisions to appeal certain issues of law and legal
interpretations developed by the Panel.
At its meeting on 20 August 1999, the DSB considered the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS70/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS70/R pertaining to the complaint by Brazil.
The representatives of Brazil, Canada, European Communities, United States and the
Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS70/AB/R and the Panel Re port in WT/DS70/R as upheld by the Appellate Body Report.
(iii) Patent protection of pharmaceutical products (WT/DSB/M/54)
At its meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the DSB considered a request
by the European Communities for the establishment of  a panel to examine its complaint with regard to
certain aspects of Canada's patent laws and regulations (WT/DS114/5).
The representative of the European Communities and Canada spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU, with standard terms of reference.
Australia, Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel, Japan, Poland, Switzerland and the United States
reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
15
                                                     
14WT/DSB/M/47.
15After the meeting Colombia and Thailand reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.WT/DSB/16
Page 11
(iv) Term of patent protection (WT/DSB/M/65, 68)
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered a request by the United States for the
establishment of a panel to examine its complaint wi th regard to the grant of patent terms in Canada
(WT/DS170/2).
The representatives of the United States, Canada and the Philippines spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 1999
16, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the United States and Canada spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU, with standard terms of reference.
(e) Colombia
(i) Safeguard measure on imports of plain polyes ter filaments from Thailand (WT/DSB/M/68)
At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 199917, the DSB considered a request by Thailand for
the establishment of a panel to examine its compla int with regard to the safeguard measure imposed
by Colombia on imports of plain polyester filaments from Thailand (WT/DS181/1).
The representatives of Thailand, Colombia, Korea, India and the Chairman spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.
(f) European Communities
(i) Anti-dumping duties on imports of cotton- type bed-linen from India (WT/DSB/M/68)
At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 1999
18, the DSB considered a request from India for
the establishment of a panel to examine its compla int with regard to anti-dumping duties imposed by
the EC on imports of cotton-type bed-linen from India (WT/DS141/3).
The representatives of India and the European Communities spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.
(ii) Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones) (WT/DSB/M/63, 65)
At its meeting on 3 June 1999, the DSB considered the requests by the United States
(WT/DS26/19) and Canada (WT/DS48/17) under Article 22.2 of the DSU for suspension of the
application to the European Communities and its member States of tariff concessions and relatedobligations under the GATT 1994.
                                                     
16See footnote 3.
17Idem.
18Idem.WT/DSB/16
Page 12
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, Canada, Philippines, India,
Bulgaria, Uruguay and Hong Kong, China spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and that, in light of the EC's request, each matter shall
be referred to arbitration by the original Panel in accordance with Article 22.6 of the DSU.
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered the requests under Article 22.7 of the
DSU by the United States (WT/DS26/21) and Canada (WT/DS48/19) for suspension of the
application to the European Communities and its member States of tariff concessions and related
obligations under the GATT 1994.
The representatives of the United States, Canada, European Communities and Australia
spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and, pursuant to the requests under Article 22.7 of the
DSU by the United States (WT/DS26/21) and Canada (WT/DS48/19), agreed to grant authorization to
suspend the application to the European Communities and its member States of tariff concessions and
related obligations under the GATT 1994, consistent wi th the Decisions of the Arbitrators contained
in documents WT/DS26/ARB an d WT/DS48/ARB, respectively.
(iii) Regime for the importation, sale and di stribution of bananas (WT/DSB/M/53, 54, 59)
At its meeting on 12 January 1999, the DSB considered Ecuador's request to reconvene the
original Panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU to examine the implementation of the DSB's
recommendations in the matter "European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27/41).
The representatives of Ecuador, European Communities, Mexico, Japan and the Chairman
spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to refer to the original Panel, pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, the matter raised by Ecuador in document WT/DS27/41.  It was agreed that
the panel would have standard terms of reference.
Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Domini ca, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mauritius,
Nicaragua, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines reserved their third-party rights to
participate in the Panel's proceedings.19
Also at its meeting on 12 January 1999, the DSB considered the EC's request to reconvene the
original Panel, under Article 21.5 of the DSU to examine the implementation of the DSB'srecommendations in the matter, "European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale andDistribution of Bananas" (WT/DS27/40).
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, Panama, Guatemala,
Honduras, Saint Lucia, Philippines, Mexico, Ecuador, India and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to refer to the original Panel, pursuant to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, the matter raised by the European Communities in document WT/DS27/40.
It was agreed that the panel would have standard terms of reference.
                                                     
19After the meeting Belize, Brazil, Cameroon, Grenada and Haiti reserved their third-party rights to
participate in the Panel's proceedings.WT/DSB/16
Page 13
Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Domi nica, Dominican Republic, India, Jamaica,
Mauritius, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincen t and the Grenadines reserved their third-party
rights to participate in the panel's proceedings.20
At the DSB meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, prior to the adoption of
the agenda, there was a procedural debate on the question of whether the DSB was competent to deal
with the US request for suspension of concessions (WT/DS27/43).
The representatives of Dominica, United States, Colombia, India, Saint Lucia, Honduras,
European Communities, Côte d'Ivoire, Panama, Guatemala, Turkey, Japan, Philippines, Ecuador,
Canada, Mexico, the Director-General and the Chairman spoke.
Following the adoption of the agenda, the DSB considered the US request under Article 22.2
of the DSU for suspension of the application to the European Communities and its member States of
tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994 (WT/DS27/43).
The representatives of Saint Lucia, United States, European Communities, Mauritius, Japan,
Philippines, Dominica, India, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, Hungary, also on behalf of Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, and the representatives of
Switzerland, Norway, Panama, Barbados, Indonesia, Canada, Colombia, Jamaica, Korea, Brazil,
Guatemala, Australia, Argentina, New Zealand, Egypt, Turkey, Malaysia and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed that the matter be referred to arbitration by
the original Panel in accordance with Article 22.6 of the DSU.
At its meeting on 19 April 1999, the DSB considered the request by the United States under
Article 22.7 of the DSU for suspension of the application to the European Communities and its
member States of tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994 (WT/DS27/49).
The representatives of the United States, European Communities, Japan, Panama, Brazil,
India, Mexico, Guatemala, Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Philippines, Egypt, Australia, Mauritius, Indonesia,
Norway and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and pursuant to the US request under Article 22.7 of the
DSU, agreed to grant authorization to suspend the application to the European Communities of tariff
concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994, consistent with the Decision of the
Arbitrators contained in document WT/DS27/ARB.
(iv) Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Ecuador (WT/DSB/M/61, 63)
At its meeting on 6 May 1999, the DSB considered the Report of the original Panel
reconvened in accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU at the request of Ecuador to examine the
implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the matter of "European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distributi on of Bananas" (WT/DS27/RW/ECU).
The representatives of Ecuador, European Communities, United States, Guatemala, Panama,
Costa Rica, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Japan, Mexico, India, Jamaica, Côte d'Ivoire, Turkey and
Hong Kong, China spoke.
                                                     
20After the meeting, Belize, Cameroon, Grenada, Haiti and Japan reserved their third-party rights to
participate in the Panel's proceedings.WT/DSB/16
Page 14
The DSB took note of the statements a nd adopted the Panel Report contained in
WT/DS27/RW/ECU.
At the DSB meeting on 3 June 1999, the representative of Ecuador made a statement
concerning the implementation by the EC of the DSB's recommendations on this matter.  He
requested the EC to report on its progress towards implementation.
The representatives of Ecuador, European Communities, United States, Guatemala, Panama,
Mexico, Colombia, Honduras and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.
(g) Guatemala
(i) Definitive anti-dumping measure on grey Po rtland cement from Mexico (WT/DSB/M/65, 68)
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered a request by Mexico for the
establishment of a panel to examine its complaint with regard to Guatemala's definitive anti-dumping
measure on grey Portland cement from Mexico (WT/DS156/2 and Corr.1).
The representatives of Mexico and Guatemala spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 1999
21, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of Mexico, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
The European Communities, Honduras and the United States reserved their third-party rights
to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
22
(h) India
(i) Quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural, textile and industrial products
(WT/DSB/M/68, 69)
In November 199723, the DSB had established a panel to examine the complaint by the United
States with regard to quantitative restrictions maintained by India on the importation of a number of
agricultural, textile and industrial products.  In  May 1999, India had notified the DSB of its decision
to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.
At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 199924, the DSB considered the Appellate Body
Report in WT/DS90/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS90/R pertaining to the complaint by the
United States.
                                                     
21See footnote 3.
22After the meeting Ecuador and El Salvador reserved their third-party rights to participate in the
Panel's proceedings.
23WT/DSB/M/39.
24See footnote 3.WT/DSB/16
Page 15
The representatives of the United States, India, European Communities, Dominican Republic,
Malaysia, Cuba, Egypt, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Jamaica spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS90/AB/R and the Panel Re port in WT/DS90/R as upheld by the Appellate Body Report.
At the DSB meeting on 14 October 1999, the representative of India informed the DSB of his
country's intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter,
pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU.  He said that India would require a reasonable period of time in
order to comply with the DSB's recommendations.
The representatives of India and the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and of the information provided by India regarding its
intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations.
(i) Japan
(i) Measures affecting agricultur al products (WT/DSB/M/57, 58)
In November 199725, the DSB had established a panel to examine the complaint by the United
States with regard to Japan's prohibition of imports of agricultural products.  In November 1998,
Japan had notified the DSB of its decision to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations
developed by the Panel.
At its meeting on 19 March 1999, the DSB considered the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS76/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS76/R pertaining to the complaint by the United
States.
The representatives of the United States, Japan, European Communities, Brazil and Hungary
spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS76/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS76/ R as modified by the Appellate Body Report.
At the DSB meeting on 15 April 1999, the representative of Japan informed the DSB of his
country's intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter,
pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU.  He said that  Japan would consult with the United States on a
reasonable period of time for implementation.
The representatives of Japan, United States and Australia spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and of the information provided by Japan regarding its
intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations.
                                                     
25WT/DSB/M/39.WT/DSB/16
Page 16
(j) Korea
(i) Measures affecting government procurement (WT/DSB/M/62, 64)
At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB considered a request by the United States for the
establishment of a panel to examine its complaint wi th regard to Korea's airport procurement practices
(WT/DS163/4).
The representatives of the United States and Korea spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the United States and Korea spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
The European Communities and Japan reserved thei r third-party rights to participate in the
Panel's proceedings.
(ii) Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef (WT/DSB/M/60, 62, 65)
At its meeting on 28 April 1999, the DSB considered a request by the United States for the
establishment of a panel to examine its complaint with regard to Korea's restrictions on imports of
beef (WT/DS161/5).
The representatives of the United States and Korea spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the United States and Korea spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
Australia, Canada and New Zealand reserved their third-party rights to participate in the
Panel's proceedings.
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered a request by Australia for the
establishment of a panel to examine its complaint on Korea's restrictions on imports of beef
(WT/DS169/5).
The representatives of Australia, Korea and the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed that Australia's request for the establishment
of a panel with standard terms of reference be accepted, and that as provided for in Article 9 of the
DSU in respect of multiple complainants, the Panel established on 26 May 1999 to examine the
complaint by the United States contained in WT/D S161/5 would also examine Australia's complaint
in document WT/DS169/5.WT/DSB/16
Page 17
Canada, New Zealand and the United States reserved their third-party rights to participate in
the proceedings of the Panel established at the request of Australia.
(iii) Taxes on alcoholic beverages (WT/DSB/M/55 and Corr.1, 57, 60)
In October 199726, the DSB agreed to establish a single panel to examine the complaints by
the European Communities and the United States.  In October 1998, Korea notified the DSB of itsdecision to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the Panel.
At its meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB considered the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS75/AB/R - WT/DS84/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS75/R - WT/DS84/R pertaining to
the complaints by the European Communities and the United States.
The representatives of Korea, United States and the European Communities spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and adopted the Appellate Body Report in
WT/DS75/AB/R - WT/DS84/AB/R and the Panel Report in WT/DS75/R - WT/DS84/R as upheld by
the Appellate Body Report.
At the DSB meeting on 19 March 1999, the representative of Korea informed the DSB of his
country's intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations pursuant to
Article 21.3 of the DSU.  He said that in light of its legislative process, Korea would require a
reasonable period of time in order to comply with the DSB's recommendations.
The representatives of Korea, European Communities and the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and of the information provided by Korea regarding its
intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations.
At the DSB meeting on 28 April 1999, the representative of Korea informed the DSB that the
United States and Korea had agreed on 23 April 1999 to appoint Mr. C.-D. Ehlermann as arbitrator to
determine a reasonable period of time for implementation of the DSB's recommendation in the case:
"Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages".
The DSB took note of the statement.
(k) United States
(i) Anti-Dumping Act of 1 916 (WT/DSB/M/54, 64, 65)
At its meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the DSB considered a request
by the European Communities for the establishment of  a panel to examine its complaint with respect
to the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (WT/DS136/2).
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
India, Japan and Mexico reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.
                                                     
26WT/DSB/M/38.WT/DSB/16
Page 18
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB considered a request by Japan for the establishment
of a panel to examine its complaint with respect  to the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (WT/DS162/3).
The representatives of Japan, United States and the European Communities spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of Japan and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
The European Communities and India reserved their third-party rights to participate in the
Panel's proceedings.
(ii) Anti-dumping duty on dynamic random access memory semiconductors (DRAMS) of one 
megabit or above from Korea (WT/DSB/M/57, 58, 65)
In January 1998
27, the DSB had agreed to establish a panel to examine the complaint by
Korea with regard to a decision by the US Department of Commerce not to revoke the anti-dumping
duty on dynamic random access memory semiconductors (DRAMS) of one megabit or above from
Korea.
At its meeting on 19 March 1999, the DSB considered the Panel Report in WT/DS99/R
pertaining to the complaint by Korea.
The representatives of Korea, United States and Hong Kong, China spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and adop ted the Panel Report contained in WT/DS99/R.
At the DSB meeting on 15 April 1999, the representative of the United States informed the
DSB of her country's intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this
matter.  She said that the United States would require a reasonable period of time to comply with the
DSB's recommendations.
The representatives of the United States and Korea spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and of the information provided by the United States
regarding its intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB's recommendations.
At the DSB meeting on 26 July 1999, the US representative informed the DSB that her
country and Korea had agreed that the United States would have eight months, until
19 November 1999, as a reasonable period of time for implementation of the DSB's recommendations
in this matter.
The representatives of the United States and Korea spoke.The DSB took note of the statements.
                                                     
27WT/DSB/M/40.WT/DSB/16
Page 19
(iii) Definitive safeguard measures on imports of wheat gluten from the European Communities
(WT/DSB/M/64, 65)
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB considered a request by the European Communities
for the establishment of a panel to examine its complaint with respect to definitive safeguard measures
imposed by the United States on imports of wheat gluten from the EC (WT/DS166/3)
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
Australia and New Zealand reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.
28
(iv) Import measures on certain products from  the European Communities (WT/DSB/M/62, 64)
At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB considered a request by the European Communities
to examine its complaint with respect to the US decision, effective from 3 March 1999, to withhold
liquidation on imports from the EC of certain products, and to impose a contingent liability for
100 per cent duties on individual importation of affected products (WT/DS165/8).
The representatives of the European Communities and United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities, United States and the Philippines spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
Ecuador, India, Jamaica and Japan reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.
(v) Import prohibition of certain shrimp  and shrimp products (WT/DSB/M/54)
At the DSB meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the representative of
India, speaking also on behalf of Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, informed the DSB that on
21 January 1999 the parties to the dispute had agreed that the United States would have 13 months
from 6 November 1998, the date of the adoption of the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports, tocomply with the DSB's recommendations on this matter.
                                                     
28After the meeting Canada reserved its third-party rights to participate in  the panel's proceedings.WT/DSB/16
Page 20
The representative of the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements.
(vi) Imposition of countervailing duties on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel 
products originating in the United Kingdom (WT/DSB/M/54, 55 and Corr.1)
At its meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the DSB considered a request
by the European Communities for the establishment of a panel to examine the US countervailing
duties on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel products originating in the United Kingdom
(WT/DS138/3 and Corr.1)
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.
At its meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities, United States and Mexico spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
The representatives of Brazil and Mexico reserved  their third-party rights to participate in the
Panel's proceedings.
(vii) Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (WT/DSB/M/60, 62)
At its meeting on 28 April 1999, the DSB considered a request by the European Communities
and their member States for the establishment of a panel to examine Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act, as amended by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (WT/DS160/5).
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
Australia, Japan and Switzerland reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.
29
(viii) Sections 301 - 310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DSB/M/55 and Corr.1, 56)
At its meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB considered a request by the European
Communities for the establishment of a panel to examine its complaint with regard to Sections 301 -
310 of the US Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DS152/11).
                                                     
29After the meeting Brazil and Canada reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's
proceedings.WT/DSB/16
Page 21
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, Cuba and Ecuador spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter.At its meeting on 2 March 1999, the DSB again considered this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Dominica, Ecuador, India, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Saint Lucia
and Thailand reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
30
14. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB
Matters considered by the DSB under this item are included on the agenda pursuant to
Article 21.6 of the DSU which provides that:  "U nless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of
implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting
after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable time-period pursuant to
paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved.  At least 10 days prior to
each such DSB meeting, the Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report in writing
of its progress in the implementation of the recommendations or rulings."
(a) Argentina
(i) Measures affecting imports of footwear, text iles, apparel and other items (WT/DSB/M/54, 55
and Corr.1, 57, 60, 62, 64)
At the DSB meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, Argentina informed the
DSB that the parties to the dispute had agreed that Argentina's first status report on its progress in the
implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter would be submitted at the next regular
DSB meeting (WT/DS56/15).
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB considered the first status report by Argentina
contained in WT/DS56/15/Add.1.
The representative of Argentina spoke.
The DSB took note of the statement and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 19 March 1999, the DSB considered the second status report by Argentina
contained in WT/DS56/15/Add.2.
                                                     
30Subsequently Cameroon notified the Secretariat of its withdrawal.  After the meeting Brazil,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Israel and Hong Kong, China reserved their third-party rights toparticipate in the Panel's proceedings.WT/DSB/16
Page 22
The representatives of Argentina and the United States spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 28 April 1999, the DSB considered the third status report by Argentina
contained in WT/DS56/15/Add.3.
The representative of Argentina spoke.The DSB took note of the statement and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB considered the fourth status report by Argentina
contained in WT/DS56/15/Add.4.
The representative of Argentina spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB considered the final status report by Argentina
contained in WT/DS56/15/Add.5.
The representative of Argentina spoke.The DSB took note of the statement.
(b) European Communities
(i) Measures concerning meat and meat produc ts (hormones) (WT/DSB/M/54, 55 and Corr.1,
57, 60, 62).
At its meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the DSB considered the first
status report by the EC on its progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this
matter (WT/DS26/17 - WT/DS48/15).
The representatives of the European Communities, United States and Canada spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB considered the second status report by the
European Communities contained in WT/DS26/17/Add.1 - WT/DS48/15/Add.1.
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter next regular meeting.At its meeting on 19 March 1999, the DSB considered the third status report by the European
Communities contained in WT/DS26/17/Add.2 - WT/DS48/15/Add.2).
The representatives of the European Communities, United States and Canada spoke.WT/DSB/16
Page 23
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 28 April 1999, the DSB considered the fourth status report by the European
Communities contained in WT/DS26/17/Add.3 - WT/DS48/15/Add.3.
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, Canada, Australia and
Japan spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB considered the fifth status report by the European
Communities contained in WT/DS26/17/Add.4 - WT/DS48/15/Add.4.
The representatives of the European Communities, United States, Canada and Australia
spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its meeting on
3 June.
(ii) Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Ecuador (WT/DSB/M/64, 65)
At the DSB meeting on 16 June 1999, the EC representative made an oral report on the EC's
progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter.
The representatives of the European Communities, Ecuador, Panama, Guatemala, Colombia,
Honduras, Philippines and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered the EC's status report on its progress in
the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter (WT/DS27/51).
The representatives of the European Communities, Panama, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Japan, Mexico, United States, Colombia, Philippines and the Chairman spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(iii) Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas (WT/DSB/M/68)
At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 199931, the DSB considered the EC's status report on
its progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter
(WT/DS27/51/Add.1).
The representatives of the European Communities, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Guatemala,
Honduras, United States and Mexico spoke.
                                                     
31See footnote 3.WT/DSB/16
Page 24
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(c) India
(i) Patent protection for pharmaceutical and agric ultural chemical products (WT/DSB/M/54, 55
and Corr.1, 57, 60)
At its meeting on 25, 28 and 29 January and 1 February 1999, the DSB considered India's
second status report on its progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this
matter (WT/DS50/10/Add.1).
The representatives of India and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 17 February 1999, the DSB considered the third status report by India
contained in WT/DS50/10/Add.2.
The representatives of India, United States and the European Communities spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 19 March 1999, the DSB considered the fourth status report by India
contained in WT/DS50/10/Add.3.
The representatives of India, United States and the European Communities spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 28 April 1999, the DSB considered the final status report by India contained
in WT/DS50/10/Add.4 - WT/DS79/6.
The representatives of India, United States and the European Communities spoke.The DSB took note of the statements.
(d) Indonesia
(i) Certain measures affecting the automobile industry (WT/DSB/M/64, 65)
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the DSB considered the first status report by Indonesia on its
progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter (WT/DS54/17 -
WT/DS55/16 - WT/DS59/ 15 - WT/DS64/14).
The representatives of Indonesia, European Communities and Japan spoke.The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.WT/DSB/16
Page 25
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered the second status report by Indonesia
contained in WT/DS54/17/Add.1 - WT/DS55/16 /Add.1 - WT/DS59/15/Add.1  - WT/DS64/14/Add.1.
The representatives of Indonesia, European Communities, Japan and the United States spoke.The DSB took note of the statements.
(e) United States
(i) Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products (WT/DSB/M/65, 68)
At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSB considered the first status report by the United States
on its progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this matter (WT/DS58/15).
The representatives of the United States, Thailand, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Australia and
Ecuador spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
At its meeting on 22 and 24 September 199932, the DSB considered the second status report
by the United States on its progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations on this
matter (WT/DS58/15/Add.1).
The representatives of the United States, Thailand, Australia, Malaysia, India and Pakistan
spoke.
The DSB took note of the statements and agreed to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
__________
                                                     
32See footnote 3.WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/DSB/16/Corr.1
3 November 1999
(99-4763)
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
Annual Report (1999)
Corrigendum
Page 3, item 2, the fourth sentence should read as follows:
"In the light of these developments, the Chairman believed that it was important to take two
separate decisions:  (i) to extend the terms of office of the two members who were available
for reappointment;  and (ii) to decide on a selection process to replace the two departingmembers".
Page 4, item 4, third paragraph, after the reference to the DSB meeting on 22 and 24 September 1999,
the first sentence should read as follows:
"… the Chairman said that intensive consultati ons had been held on a draft statement by the
Chairman on the DSU Review, and in particular on the possibility to extend the 31 July
deadline for completion of the Review".
__________WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/DSB/16/Add.1
22 October 1999
(99-4593)
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
Annual Report (1999)
Addendum
Overview of the State of  Play of WTO Disputes
The attached overview, which reflects the state of play of WTO disputes from 1 January 1995
to 31 August 1999, has been prepared by the Secretariat on its own responsibility.  Section Isummarizes the developments from the initial requests for consultations until the establishment of
panels, including the cases where mutually agreed solutions were found.  Section II deals with the
stages covering the establishment of panels, circulation of panel reports, appeals and reports of the
Appellate Body and finally the adoption of the reports.  Section III covers the stage dealing with the
monitoring of the implementation of the DSB's recommendations.  Finally, Section IV(i) and (ii)covers recourse to Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU, respectively.WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 2/3SECTION I
Requests for Consultations, Mutually Agreed Solutions
and Panels Established
(1 January 1995 – 31 August 1999)
DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
1. Malaysia - Prohibition of Imports of
Polyethylene and Polypropylene13.01.95
Singapore
WT/DS1/110.01.95 11.03.95 19.07.95
DSB/M/6
(withdrawal of
request)17.03.95
Singapore
WT/DS1/2
2. United States - Standards for
Reformulated and ConventionalGasoline02.02.95
Venezuela
WT/DS2/124.01.95 25.03.95 27.03.95
Venezuela
WT/DS2/210.04.95
WT/DSB/M/3
3. Korea - Measures Concerning the
Testing and Inspection of AgriculturalProducts06.04.95
US
WT/DS3/104.04.95 03.06.95 09.06.95
Japan
WT/DS3/2
4. United States - Standards for
Reformulated and ConventionalGasoline12.04.95
Brazil
WT/DS4/110.04.95 09.06.95 22.05.95
Brazil
WT/DS4/231.05.95
WT/DSB/M/5WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 4 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
5. Korea - Measures Concerning the Shelf-
Life of Products05.05.95
US
WT/DS5/103.05.95 02.07.95 24.05.95
Canada
WT/DS5/2
09.06.95
Japan
WT/DS5/431.07.95
WT/DS5/5 &
Corr.1
24.11.95
Add.1
22.04.96
Add.1/Rev.1
22.04.96
Add.2
22.04.96
Add.3
19.07.96
Add.4
20.09.96
Add.5
6. United States - Imposition of Import
Duties on Automobiles from Japan under
Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of
197422.05.95
Japan
WT/DS6/117.05.95 16.07.95 02.06.95
EC
WT/DS6/2
12.06.95
Australia
WT/DS6/319.07.95
 WT/DSB/M/6
7. EC - Trade Description of Scallops 24.05.95
Canada
WT/DS7/119.05.95 18.07.95 09.06.95
Chile
WT/DS7/2
09.06.95
Iceland
WT/DS7/3
09.06.96
 Japan
WT/DS7/4
12.06.95
Peru
WT/DS7/519.07.96
WT/DS7/1210.07.95
Canada
WT/DS7/7 &
Corr.119.07.95
WT/DSB/M/6WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 5DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
8. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 29.06.95
EC
WT/DS8/121.06.95 20.08.95 17.07.95
US
WT/DS8/2
17.07.95
 Canada
WT/DS8/315.09.95
EC
WT/DS8/527.09.95
WT/DSB/M/7
9. EC - Duties on Imports of Cereals 10.07.95
Canada
WT/DS9/130.06.95 29.08.95 15.09.95
Canada
WT/DS9/211.10.95
WT/DSB/M/8
10. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 17.07.95
Canada
WT/DS10/107.07.95 05.09.95 21.07.95
US
WT/DS10/2
27.07.95
 EC
WT/DS10/315.09.95
Canada
WT/DS10/527.09.95
WT/DSB/M/7
11. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 17.07.95
US
WT/DS11/107.07.95 05.09.95 15.09.95
USA
WT/DS11/2 &
Corr.127.09.95
WT/DSB/M/7
12. EC - Trade Description of Scallops 25.07.95
Peru
WT/DS12/118.07.95 15.09.95 09.08.95
Canada
WT/DS12/3
11.08.95
Chile
WT/DS12/2 &
Rev.1
17.08.95
Japan
WT/DS12/519.07.96
WT/DS12/1215.09.95
Peru
WT/DS12/6
Annex
22.09.95
Peru
WT/DS12/711.10.95
WT/DSB/M/8WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 6 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
13. EC - Duties on Imports of Grains 26.07.95
US
WT/DS13/119.07.95 17.09.95 02.05.97
WTDS13/8
(withdrawal of
request)29.09.95
US
WT/DS13/2
22.11.96
WT/DS13/2/
Add.1
13.02.97
WT/DS13/5
27.03.97
WT/DS13/6
14. EC - Trade Description of Scallops 31.07.95
Chile
WT/DS14/124.07.95 22.09.95 07.08.95
Canada
WT/DS14/2
11.08.95
Peru
WT/DS14/3
17.08.95
Japan
WT/DS14/419.07.96
WT/DS14/1115.09.95
Chile
WT/DS14/5
Annex
27.09.95
Chile
WT/DS14/6
Annex11.10.95
WT/DSB/M/8
15. Japan - Measures Affecting the Purchase
of Telecommunications
Equipment24.08.95
EC
WT/DS15/118.08.95 17.10.95 31.08.95
US
WT/DS15/2WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 7DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
16. EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas04.10.95
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
US
WT/DS16/128.09.95 26.11.95 13.10.95
St. Lucia
WT/DS16/2
20.10.95
Colombia
WT/DS16/3
24.10.95
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS16/4
25.10.95
Venezuela
WT/DS16/5
20.10.95
Nicaragua
WT/DS16/6
30.10.95
Costa Rica
WT/DS16/7
17. EC - Duties on Imports of Rice 11.10.95
Thailand
WT/DS17/105.10.95 04.12.95
18. Australia - Measures Affecting
Importation of Salmon11.10.95
Canada
WT/DS18/105.10.95 04.12.95 10.03.97
WT/DS18/210.04.97
WT/DSB/M/31
19. Poland - Import Regime for Automobiles 18.10.95
India
WT/DS19/128.09.95 27.11.95 11.09.96
WT/DS19/2WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 8 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
20. Korea - Measures Concerning  Bottled
Water22.11.95
Canada
WT/DS20/108.11.95 08.01.96 30.11.95
US
WT/DS20/2
14.12.95
EC
WT/DS20/424.04.96
WT/DS20/6
21. Australia - Measures Affecting the
Importation of Salmonids23.11.95
US
WT/DS21/120.11.95 19.01.96 13.12.95
Canada
WT/DS21/211.05.99
US
WT/DS21/416.06.99
WT/DSB/M/64
22. Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated
Coconut20.12.95
Philippines
WT/DS22/130.11.95 29.01.96 08.02.96
Philippines
WT/DS22/505.03.96
WT/DSB/M/12
23. Venezuela - Anti-Dumping Investigation
in Respect of Imports of Certain OilCountry Tubular Goods OCTG04.01.96
Mexico
WT/DS23/105.12.95 03.02.96 26.05.97
WT/DS23/3
(termination of
investigation)
24. United States - Restriction on Imports of
Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear15.01.96
Costa Rica
WT/DS24/122.12.95 20.02.96 27.02.96
Costa Rica
WT/DS24/205.03.96
WT/DSB/M/12
25. EC - Implementation of the Uruguay
Round Commitments Concerning Rice19.01.96
Uruguay
WT/DS25/114.12.95 12.02.96
26. EC - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones)31.01.96
US
WT/DS26/126.01.96 26.03.96 08.02.96
New Zealand
WT/DS26/2
09.02.96
Australia
WT/DS26/3
13.02.96
Canada
WT/DS26/425.04.96
US
WT/DS26/620.05.96
WT/DSB/M/17WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 9DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
27. EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas13.02.96
Ecuador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
US
WT/DS27/105.02.96 05.04.96 28.02.96
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS27/2
28.02.96
St. Lucia
WT/DS27/3
28.02.96
Nicaragua
WT/DS27/4
01.03.96
Jamaica
WT/DS/27/512.04.06
Ecuador,
Guatemala,
Honduras,
Mexico,
US
WT/DS27/608.05.96
WT/DSB/M/16WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 10 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
27. EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas31.08.98
Ecuador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
US
WT/DS27/1818.08.98 17.10.98 04.09.98
Panama
WT/DS27/19
15.09.98
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS27/20
09.09.98
Jamaica
WT/DS27/22
09.09.98
Costa Rica
WT/DS27/23
09.09.98
Colombia
WT/DS27/24
14.09.98
Brazil
WT/DS27/25
17.09.98
Saint Lucia
WT/DS27/26
17.09.98
Dominica
WT/DS27/27
14.09.98
Côte d'Ivoire
WT/DS27/28
01.10.98
Cameroon
WT/DS27/29
28. Japan - Measures Concerning Sound
Recordings14.02.96
US
WT/DS28/109.02.96 09.04.96 28.02.96
EC
WT/DS28/224.01.97
WT/DS28/4WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 11DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
29. Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of
Textile and Clothing Products15.02.96
Hong Kong
WT/DS29/112.02.96 12.04.96 01.03.96
EC
WT/DS29/2
28.02.96
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
WT/DS29/3
28.02.96
Peru
WT/DS29/4
29.02.96
India
WT/DS29/5
01.03.96
Brazil
WT/DS29/7
01.03.96
Canada
WT/DS29/8
30. Brazil - Countervailing Duties on
Imports of Desiccated Coconut andCoconut Milk Powder from Sri Lanka05.03.96
Sri Lanka
WT/DS30/123.02.96 23.04.96
31. Canada - Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals14.03.96
US
WT/DS31/111.03.96 10.05.96 24.05.96
US
WT/DS31/219.06.96
WT/DSB/M/19
32. United States - Measures Affecting
Imports of Women's and Girls' WoolCoats30.04.96
WT/DS32/2
(termination of
further action in
pursuance of theDSB decision of
17.04.96)15.03.96
India
WT/DS32/117.04.96
WT/DSB/M/14WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 12 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
33. United States - Measures Affecting
Imports of Woven Wool Shirts andBlouses15.03.96
India
WT/DS33/1
& Corr.117.04.96
WT/DSB/M/14
34. Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of
Textile and Clothing Products25.03.96
India
WT/DS34/121.03.96 20.05.96 02.02.98
WT/DS34/213.03.98
WT/DSB/M/43
35. Hungary - Export Subsidies in Respect
of Agricultural Products02.04.96
Argentina
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
Thailand
US
WT/DS35/127.03.96 26.05.96 12.04.96
Japan
WT/DS35/230.07.97
WT/DSB/M/3610.01.97
Australia
WT/DS35/4
10.01.97
New Zealand
WT/DS/35/5
10.01.97
US
WT/DS35/6
10.01.97
Argentina
WT/DS35/725.02.97
WT/DSB/M/29
36. Pakistan - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and AgriculturalChemical Products06.05.96
US
WT/DS36/130.04.96 29.06.96 28.05.96
EC
WT/DS36/207.03.97
WT/DS36/404.07.96
US
WT/DS36/3
37. Portugal - Patent Protection under the
Industrial Property Act06.05.96
US
WT/DS37/130.04.96 29.06.96 15.10.96
WT/DS37/2 &
Corr.1
38. United States - The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act13.05.96
EC
WT/DS38/103.05.96 02.07.96 08.10.96
EC
WT/DS38/2
14.10.96
 Corr.120.11.96
WT/DSB/M/26
 Panel lapsed on
22.04.98 pursuant
to Article 12.12 of
the DSUWT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 13DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
39. United States - Tariff Increases on
Products from the EuropeanCommunities29.05.96
EC
WT/DS39/118.04.96 17.06.96 24.06.96
EC
WT/DS39/2
40. Korea - Laws, Regulations and Practices
in the Telecommunications Procurement
Sector20.05.96
EC
WT/DS40/109.05.96 08.07.96 29.10.97
WT/DS40/2
41. Korea - Measures Concerning Inspection
of Agricultural Products31.05.96
US
WT/DS41/124.05.96 23.07.96
42. Japan - Measures Concerning Sound
Recordings04.06.96
EC
WT/DS42/128.05.96 27.07.96 11.06.96
US
WT/DS42/27.11.97
WT/DS42/4
43. Turkey - Taxation of Foreign Film
Revenues17.06.96
US
WT/DS43/112.06.96 11.08.96 24.07.97
WT/DS43/310.01.97
US
WT/DS43/225.02.97
WT/DSB/M/29
44. Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper21.06.96
US
WT/DS44/113.06.96 12.08.96 20.09.96
US
WT/DS44/216.10.96
WT/DSB/M/24
45. Japan - Measures Affecting Distribution
Services20.06.96
US
WT/DS45/1
24.09.96
Add.113.06.96 12.08.96
46. Brazil - Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft21.06.96
Canada
WT/DS46/119.06.96 18.08.96 17.09.96
Canada
WT/DS46/2
04.10.96
WT/DS46/4
13.07.98
WT/DS46/523.07.98
WT/DSB/M/47WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 14 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
47. Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of
Textile and Clothing Products26.06.96
Thailand
WT/DS47/120.06.96 19.08.96
48. European Communities - Measures
Affecting Livestock and Meat
(Hormones)08.07.96
Canada
WT/DS48/128.06.96 27.08.96 22.07.96
Australia
WT/DS48/2
23.07.96
US
WT/DS48/3
23.07.96
New Zealand
WT/DS48/417.09.96
Canada
WT/DS48/516.10.96
WT/DSB/M/24
49. United States - Anti-Dumping
Investigation Regarding Imports of Freshor Chilled Tomatoes from Mexico08.07.96
Mexico
WT/DS49/101.07.96 30.08.96
50. India - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and AgriculturalChemical Products09.07.96
US
WT/DS50/1
14.01.99
US
WT/DS50/1102.07.96 31.08.96 22.07.96
EC
WT/DS50/2
29.01.99
EC
WT/DS50/1208.11.96
US
WT/DS50/420.11.96
WT/DSB/M/26
51. Brazil - Certain Automotive Investment
Measures06.08.96
Japan
WT/DS51/130.07.96 28.09.96 13.08.96
Korea
WT/DS51/2
15.08.96
EC
WT/DS51/3
15.08.96
US
WT/DS51/4
19.08.96
Canada
WT/DS51/6WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 15DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
52. Brazil - Certain Measures Affecting
Trade and Investment in the AutomotiveSector14.08.96
US
WT/DS52/109.08.96 08.10.96 19.08.96
Canada
WT/DS52/2
19.08.96
Japan
WT/DS52/3
28.08.96
Korea
WT/DS52/4
02.09.96
EC
WT/DS52/5
53. Mexico - Customs Valuation of Imports 09.09.96
EC
WT/DS53/127.08.96 26.10.96 18.09.96
Norway
WT/DS53/2
30.09.96
Switzerland
WT/DS53/3
54. Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting
the Automobile Industry14.10.96
EC
WT/DS54/103.10.96 02.12.96 23.10.96
US
WT/DS54/2
28.10.96
Japan
WT/DS54/3
29.10.96
Korea
WT/DS54/4
30.10.96
Canada
WT/DS54/512.05.97
EC
WT/DS54/612.06.97
EC
WT/DSB/M/34WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 16 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
55. Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting
the Automobile Industry10.10.96
Japan
WT/DS55/104.10.96 03.12.96 23.10.96
US
WT/DS55/2
25.10.96
EC
WT/DS55/3
30.10.96
Korea
WT/DS55/4
29.10.96
Canada
WT/DS55/518.04.97
Japan
WT/DS55/6 -
WT/DS64/412.06.97
WT/DSB/M/34
56. Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports
of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and OtherItems15.10.96
US
WT/DS56/104.10.96 03.12.96 29.10.96
Hungary
WT/DS56/2
04.11.96
EC
WT/DS56/310.01.97
US
WT/DS56/525.02.97
WT/DSB/M/29
57. Australia - Textile, Clothing and
Footwear Import Credit Scheme09.10.96
US
WT/DS57/107.10.96 06.11.96
58. United States - Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products14.10.96
India, Malaysia,
Pakistan,
Thailand
WT/DS58/108.10.96 07.12.96 30.10.96
Hong Kong
WT/DS58/2
30.10.96
EC
WT/DS58/3
01.11.96
Japan
WT/DS58/4
06.11.96
Australia
WT/DS58/510.01.97
Malaysia
Thailand
WT/DS58/6
07.02.97
Pakistan
WT/DS58/7
04.03.97
India
WT/DS58/825.02.97
WT/DSB/M/29
(Malaysia,
Thailand,
Pakistan)
10.04.97
WT/DSB/M/31
IndiaWT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 17DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
59. Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting
the Automobile Industry 15.10.96
US
WT/DS59/108.10.96 07.12.96 28.10.96
Japan
WT/DS59/2
30.10.96
EC
WT/DS59/3
30.10.96
Korea
WT/DS59/4
31.10.96
Canada
WT/DS59/513.06.97
US
WT/DS59/630.07.97
WT/DSB/M/36
60. Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement fromMexico24.10.96
Mexico
WT/DS60/117.10.96 16.12.96 13.02.97
Mexico
WT/DS60/220.03.97
WT/DSB/M/30
61. United States - Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products04.11.96
Philippines
WT/DS61/125.10.96 24.12.96 19.11.96
Australia
WT/DS61/2
22.11.96
Japan
WT/DS61/3
62. EC - Customs Classification of Some
Computer Equipment14.11.96
US
WT/DS62/108.11.96 07.01.97 28.11.96
Korea
WT/DS62/2
29.11.96
Canada
WT/DS62/313.02.97
US
WT/DS62/425.02.97
WT/DSB/M/29
63. United States - Anti-Dumping Measures
on Imports of Solid Urea from theFormer German Democratic Republic09.12.96
EC
WT/DS63/128.11.96 27.01.97WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 18 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
64. Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting
the Automobile Industry05.12.96
Japan
WT/DS64/129.11.96 28.01.97 17.12.96
US
WT/DS64/2
18.12.96
EC
WT/DS64/318.04.97
Japan
WT/DS55/6-
WT/DS64/412.06.97
WT/DSB/M/34
65. Brazil - Certain Measures Affecting
Trade and Investment in the AutomotiveSector17.01.97
US
WT/DS65/110.01.97 11.03.97
66. Japan - Measures Affecting Imports of
Pork22.01.97
EC
WT/DS66/115.01.97 16.03.97 31.01.97
Canada
WT/DS66/2
67. United Kingdom - Customs
Classification of Certain ComputerEquipment20.02.97
US
WT/DS67/114.02.97 15.04.97 04.03.97
Korea
WT/DS67/210.03.97
US
WT/DS67/320.03.97
 DSB decided  that
this matter be
examined by the
panel  established
on
25 February 1997
WT/DSB/M/30
68. Ireland - Customs Classification of
Certain Computer Equipment19.02.97
US
WT/DS68/114.02.97 15.04.97 10.03.97
US
WT/DS68/220.03.97
 DSB decided  that
this matter be
examined by the
panel  established
on
25 February 1997
WT/DSB/M/30
69. European Communities - Measures
Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry
Products04.03.97
Brazil
WT/DS69/124.02.97 25.04.97 12.06.97
Brazil
WT/DS69/230.07.97
WT/DSB/M/36WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 19DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
70. Canada - Measures Affecting the Export
of Civilian Aircraft14.03.97
Brazil
WT/DS70/110.03.97 09.04.97 13.07.98
Brazil
WT/DS70/223.07.98
WT/DSB/M/47
71. Canada - Measures Affecting the Export
of Civilian Aircraft14.03.97
Brazil
WT/DS71/110.03.97 09.05.97
72. European Communities - Measures
Affecting Butter Products03.04.97
New Zealand
WT/DS72/124.03.97 23.05.97 7.11.97
New Zealand
WT/DS72/218.11.97
WT/DSB/M/39
73. Japan - Procurement of a Navigation
Satellite01.04.97
EC
WT/DS73/126.03.97 25.05.97 11.04.97
US
WT/DS73/214.08.97
WT/DS73/4
/Rev.1
74. Philippines - Measures Affecting Pork
and Poultry07.04.97
US
WT/DS74/101.04.97 31.05.97 22.04.97
EC
WT/DS74/2
24.04.97
Canada
WT/DS74/313.03.98
WT/DS74/5 -
WT/DS102/6
75. Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 09.04.97
EC
WT/DS75/102.04.97 01.06.97 22.04.97
US
WT/DS75/2
24.04.37
Canada
WT/DS75/315.09.97
EC
WT/DS75/616.10.97
WT/DSB/M/38
76. Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products09.04.97
US
WT/DS76/107.04.97 06.06.97 06.10.97
US
WT/DS76/218.11.97
WT/DSB/M/39WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 20 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
77. Argentina - Measures Affecting Textiles
and Clothing28.04.97
EC
WT/DS77/121.04.97 20.06.97 14.05.97
US
WT/DS77/215.09.97
EC
WT/DS77/3
06.10.97
Rev.1
16.10.97
Rev.1/Corr.116.10.97
WT/DSB/M/38
29.07.98
WT/DS77/5
 Panel suspended
its proceedings
78. United States - Safeguard Measure
Against Imports of Broom Corn Brooms 01.05.97
Colombia
WT/DS78/128.04.97 27.06.97
79. India - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products06.05.97
EC
WT/DS79/128.04.97 27.06.97 15.09.97
EC
WT/DS79/216.10.97
WT/DSB/M/38
80. Belgium - Measures Affecting
Commercial Telephone DirectoryServices13.05.97
US
WT/DS80/102.05.97 01.07.97
81. Brazil - Certain Measures Affecting
Trade and Investment in the Automotive
Sector20.05.97
EC
WT/DS81/107.05.97 06.07.97
82. Ireland - Measures Affecting the Grant
of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights22.05.97
US
WT/DS82/114.05.97 13.07.97 12.01.98
US
WT/DS82/2
83. Denmark - Measures Affecting the
Enforcement of Intellectual PropertyRights21.05.97
US
WT/DS83/114.05.97 13.07.97WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 21DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
84. Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 28.05.97
US
WT/DS84/123.05.97 22.07.97 02.06.97
Canada
WT/DS/84/2
13.06.97
EC
WT/DS84/315.09.97
US
WT/DS84/416.10.97
WT/DSB/M/38
85. United States - Measures Affecting
Textiles and Apparel Products03.06.97
EC
WT/DS85/122.05.97 21.07.97 11.06.97
Switzerland
WT/DS85/2
18.06.97
Honduras
WT/DS85/3
17.06.97
Hong Kong
WT/DS85/4
18.06.97
Pakistan
WT/DS85/5
18.06.97
India
WT/DS85/6
19.06.97
Japan
WT/DS85/7
25.06.97
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS85/811.02.98
WT/DS85/9
86. Sweden - Measures Affecting the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights02.06.97
US
WT/DS86/128.05.97 27.07.97 02.12.98
WT/DS86/2WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 22 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
87. Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 11.06.97
EC
WT/DS87/104.06.97 03.08.97 30.06.97
Peru
WT/DS87/2
25.06.97
US
WT/DS87/3
30.06.97
Mexico
WT/DS87/406.10.97
EC
WT/DS87/518.11.97
WT/DSB/M/39
88. United States - Measure Affecting
Government Procurement26.06.97
EC
WT/DS88/120.06.97 19.08.97 02.07.97
Japan
WT/DS88/209.09.98
EC
WT/DS88/321.10.98
WT/DSB/M/49
89. United States - Imposition of Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of ColourTelevision Receivers from Korea16.07.97
Korea
WT/DS89/1
04.08.97
WT/DS89/1 &
Corr.110.07.97 09.09.97 28.07.97
Mexico
WT/DS89/2
01.08.97
Thailand
WT/DS89/3
01.08.97
Japan
WT/DS89/4
04.08.97
HongKong,
China
WT/DS89/5
04.08.97
EC
WT/DS89/605.01.98
WT/DS89/8
18.09.98
WT/DS89/9
(withdrawal of
request)07.11.97
Korea
WT/DS89/7
28.11.97
WT/DS89/7/
Corr.1WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 23DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
90. India - Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile andIndustrial Products22.07.97
US
WT/DS90/115.07.97 13.09.97 30.07.97
Japan
WT/DS90/2
05.08.97
EC
WT/DS90/3
05.08.97
Canada
WT/DS90/4
05.08.97
Australia
WT/DS90/5
05.08.97
Switzerland
WT/DS90/6
08.08.97
New Zealand
WT/DS90/706.10.97
US
WT/DS90/8
07.11.97
WT/DS90/8/
Corr.118.11.97
WT/DSB/M/39
91. India - Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile andIndustrial Products22.07.97
Australia
WT/DS91/116.07.97 14.09.97 30.07.97
Japan
WT/DS91/2
05.08.97
US
WT/DS91/3
05.08.97
EC
WT/DS91/4
05.08.97
Canada
WT/DS91/5
05.08.97
Switzerland
WT/DS91/6
08.08.97
New Zealand
WT/DS91/717.03.98
WT/DS91/8
17.08.98
WT/DS91/8
Corr.1WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 24 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
92. India - Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile andIndustrial Products22.07.97
Canada
WT/DS92/116.07.97 14.09.97 30.07.97
Japan
WT/DS92/2
05.08.97
US
WT/DS92/3
05.08.97
EC
WT/DS92/4
05.08.97
Australia
WT/DS92/5
05.08.97
Switzerland
WT/DS92/6
08.08.97
New Zealand
WT/DS92/718.03.98
WT/DS92/8
25.09.98
WT/DS92/8/
Corr. 1
93. India - Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile andIndustrial Products22.07.97
New Zealand
WT/DS93/116.07.97 14.09.97 30.07.97
Japan
WT/DS93/2
05.08.97
US
WT/DS93/3
05.08.97
EC
WT/DS93/4
05.08.97
Canada
WT/DS93/5
05.08.97
Australia
WT/DS93/6
05.08.97
Switzerland
WT/DS93/701.12.98
WT/DS93/8WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 25DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
94. India - Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile andIndustrial Products23.07.97
Switzerland
WT/DS94/1
05.08.97
WT/DS94/1 &
Corr.117.07.97 15.09.97 30.07.97
Japan
WT/DS94/2
05.08.97
US
WT/DS94/3
05.08.97
EC
WT/DS94/4
05.08.97
Canada
WT/DS94/5
05.08.97
Australia
WT/DS94/6
08.08.97
New Zealand
WT/DS94/723.02.98
WT/DS94/9
18.09.98
WT/DS94/9/
Corr. 1
95. United States - Measure Affecting
Government Procurement21.07.97
Japan
WT/DS95/118.07.97 16.09.97 30.07.97
EC
WT/DS95/209.09.98
Japan
WT/DS95/321.10.98
WT/DSB/M/49WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 26 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
96. India - Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textiles andIndustrial Products24.07.97
EC
WT/DS96/118.07.97 16.09.97 30.07.97
Japan
WT/DS96/2
05.08.97
US
WT/DS96/3
05.08.97
Canada
WT/DS96/4
05.08.97
Australia
WT/DS96/5
05.08.97
Switzerland
WT/DS96/6
08.08.97
New Zealand
WT/DS96/707.04.98
WT/DS96/8
28.09.98
WT/DS96/8/
Corr. 1
97. United States - Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Imports of Salmon fromChile12.08.97
Chile
WT/DS97/105.08.97 04.10.97
98. Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Certain Dairy Products15.08.97
EC
WT/DS/98/112.08.97 11.10.97 03.09.97
Australia
WT/DS98/212.01.98
EC
WT/DS98/423.07.98
WT/DSB/M/47
99. United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on
Dynamic Random Access MemorySemiconductors (DRAMS) of OneMegabit or Above from Korea15.08.97
Korea
WT/DS99/1
25.08.97
WT/DS99/1 &
Corr.1
30.03.98
WT/DS99/1/
Corr. 214.08.97 13.10.97 07.11.97
Korea
WT/DS99/216.01.98
WT/DSB/M/40WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 27DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
100. United States - Measures Affecting
Imports of Poultry Products25.08.97
EC
WT/DS100/118.08.97 17.10.97
101. Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of
High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from
the United States15.09.97
US
WT/DS101/104.09.97 03.11.97
102. Philippines - Measures Affecting Pork
and Poultry09.10.97
US
WT/DS102/107.10.97 06.12.97 23.10.97
Canada
WT/DS102/3
28.10.97
EC
WT/DS102/413.03.98
WT/DS74/5 -
WT/DS102/6
103. Canada – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Milk and the Exportationof Dairy Products13.10.97
US
WT/DS103/108.10.97 07.12.97 24.10.97
Japan
WT/DS103/2
27.10.97
Australia
WT/DS103/303.02.98
WT/DS103/425.03.98
WT/DSB/M/44
104. European Communities - Measures
Affecting the Exportation of ProcessedCheese13.10.97
US
WT/DS104/108.10.97 07.12.97 24.10.97
Japan
WT/DS104/2
27.10.97
Australia
WT/DS104/3
28.10.97
Canada
WT/DS104/4WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 28 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
105. European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas25.10.97
Panama
WT/DS105/1
09.01.98
WT/DS105/1
Add.1
30.04.98
WT/DS105/1/
Add. 224.10.97 23.12.97 31.01.97
Colombia
WT/DS105/2
08.05.98
WT/DS105/2/
Add. 1
07.11.97
Guatemala
WT/DS105/3
10.11.97
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS105/4
07.11.97
Mexico
WT/DS105/5
10.11.97
Costa Rica
WT/DS105/6
07.11.97
Honduras
WT/DS105/7
14.05.98
WT/DS105/7/
Add. 1
11.11.97
Ecuador
WT/DS105/8
10.11.97
US
WT/DS105/9
10.11.97
Côte d'Ivoire
WT/DS105/10
106. Australia – Subsidies Provided to
Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather17.11.97
US
WT/DS106/110.11.97 09.01.98 11.06.98
WT/DS126/2
(panel request
withdrawn)12.01.98
US
WT/DS106/222.01.98
WT/DSB/M/41WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 29DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
107. Pakistan – Export Measures Affecting
Hides and Skins20.11.97
EC
WT/DS107/107.11.97 06.01.98
108. United States - Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations"28.11.97
EC
WT/DS108/1
12.03.98
WT/DS108/1/
Add.1.18.11.97 17.01.98 09.07.98
EC
WT/DS108/222.09.98
WT/DSB/M/48
109. Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 16.12.97
US
WT/DS109/1
05.02.98
WT/DS109/1
Corr.111.12.97 09.02.98 17.12.97
Peru
WT/DS109/2
27.01.98
Mexico
WT/DS/109/3
110. Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 18.12.97
EC
WT/DS110/115.12.97 13.02.98 23.12.97
US
WT/DS110/2
27.12.97
Mexico
WT/DS110/313.03.98
WT/DS110/425.03.98
WT/DSB/M/44
111. US - Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of
Groundnuts08.01.98
Argentina
WT/DS111/119.12.97 17.02.98 16.01.98
Canada
WT/DS111/2
19.01.98
Japan
WT/DS111/3
112. Peru – Countervailing Duty Investigation
Against Imports of Buses from Brazil09.01.98
Brazil
WT/DS112/123.12.97 21.02.98WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 30 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
113. Canada – Measures Affecting Dairy
Exports08.01.98
New Zealand
WT/DS113/129.12.97 27.02.98 16.01.98
US
WT/DS113/2
19.01.98
Japan
WT/DS113/312.03.98
WT/DS113/425.03.98
WT/DSB/M/44
114. Canada – Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products12.01.98
EC
WT/DS114/119.12.97 17.02.98 22.01.98
US
WT/DS114/2
27.01.98
Australia
WT/DS114/3
21.01.98
Switzerland
WT/DS114/412.11.98
WT/DS114/501.02.99
WT/DSB/M/54
115. EC - Measures Affecting the Grant of
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights12.01.98
US
WT/DS115/106.01.98 07.03.98 12.01.98
US
WT/DS115/2
116. Brazil - Measures Affecting Payment
Terms for Imports13.01.98
EC
WT/DS116/108.01.98 09.03.98 21.01.98
Switzerland
WT/DS116/2
23.01.98
Japan
WT/DS116/3
23.01.98
Australia
WT/DS116/4
30.01.98
US
WT/DS116/5
09.02.98
Korea
WT/DS116/6WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 31DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
117. Canada - Measures Affecting Film
Distribution Services22.01.98
EC
WT/DS117/120.01.98 21.03.98
118. United States - Harbour Maintenance
Tax16.02.98
EC
WT/DS118/106.02.98 07.04.98 26.02.98
Canada
WT/DS118/2
26.02.98
Japan
WT/DS118/3
03.03.98
Norway
WT/DS118/4
119. Australia - Anti-Dumping Measures of
Coated Woodfree Paper Sheets03.09.98
Switzerland
WT/DS119/120.02.98 21.04.98 13.03.98
Japan
WT/DS119/2
12.03.98
EC
WT/DS119/313.05.98
WT/DS119/4
120. India - Measures Affecting Export of
Certain Commodities23.09.98
EC
WT/DS120/111.03.98 10.05.98
121. Argentina - Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Footwear08.04.98
EC
WT/DS121/106.04.98 05.06.98 16.04.98
US
WT/DS121/211.04.98
EC
WT/DS121/323.07.98
WT/DSB/M/47
122. Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on
Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron andIron-Alloy Steel and H-Beams fromPoland15.04.98
Poland
WT/DS122/106.04.98 05.06.98WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 32 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
123. Argentina – Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Footwear27.04.98
Indonesia
WT/DS123/122.04.98 20.06.98 07.05.98
US
WT/DS123/216.04.99
WT/DS123/3
On 10.05.99,
Indonesia requestedthe withdrawal of
the panel request
from the DSBagenda and reservedits rights to includethat request at afuture DSB meeting
(WT/DS123/4)
124. European Communities – Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights forMotion Pictures and TelevisionProgrammes07.05.98
US
WT/DS124/130.04.98 29.06.98
125. Greece – Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights for Motion Pictures and
Television Programmes07.05.98
US
WT/DS125/104.05.98 03.07.98
126. Australia – Subsidies Provided to
Producers and Exporters of AutomotiveLeather08.05.98
US
WT/DS126/104.05.98 03.07.98 11.04.98
US
WT/DS126/222.06.98
WT/DSB/M/46
127. Belgium – Certain Income Tax Measures
Constituting Subsidies11.05.98
US
WT/DS127/105.05.98 04.07.98
128. Netherlands – Certain Income Tax
Measures Constituting Subsidies11.05.98
US
WT/DS128/105.05.98 04.07.98
129. Greece – Certain Income Tax Measures
Constituting Subsidies11.05.98
US
WT/DS129/105.05.98 04.07.98WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 33DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
130. Ireland – Certain Income Tax Measures
Constituting Subsidies11.05.98
US
WT/DS130/105.05.98 04.07.98
131. France – Certain Income Tax Measures
Constituting Subsidies11.05.98
US
WT/DS131/105.05.98 04.07.98
132. Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of
High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) fromthe United States15.05.98
US
WT/DS132/108.05.98 07.07.98 14.10.98
US
WT/DS132/225.11.98
WT/DSB/M/51
133. Slovak Republic – Measures Concerning
the Importation of Dairy Products andthe Transit of Cattle18.05.98
Switzerland
WT/DS133/107.05.98 06.07.98 28.05.98
US
WT/DS133/2
134. European Communities – Restrictions on
Certain Import Duties on Rice08.06.98
India
WT/DS134/1
19.06.98
WT/DS134/1
and Corr. 127.05.98 26.07.98
135. European Communities – Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Products
Containing Asbestos03.06.98
Canada
WT/DS135/128.05.98 27.07.98 12.06.98
Brazil
WT/DS135/209.10.98
Canada
WT/DS135/325.11.98
WT/DSB/M/51
136. United States – Anti-Dumping Act of
191624.06.98
EC
WT/DS136/104.06.98 03.08.98 12.11.98
EC
WT/DS136/201.02.99
WT/DSB/M/54
137. European Communities – Measures
Affecting Imports of Wood of Conifers
from Canada24.06.98
Canada
WT/DS137/117.06.98 16.08.98WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 34 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
138. United States – Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled and Bismuth Carbon SteelProducts Originating in the UnitedKingdom06.07.98
EC
WT/DS138/112.06.98 11.08.98 16.07.98
Canada
WT/DS138/214.01.99
WT/DS138/3
25.01.99
WT/DS138/3 &
Corr.117.02.99
WT/DSB/M/55 &
Corr.1
139. Canada – Certain Automotive Industry
Measures08.07.98
Japan
WT/DS139/103.07.98 01.09.98 13.11.98
WT/DS139/201.02.99
WT/DSB/M/54
140. European Communities – Anti-Dumping
Investigations Regarding UnbleachedCotton Fabrics from India07.08.98
India
WT/DS140/103.08.98 02.10.98 17.08.98
Pakistan
WT/DS140/2
141. European Communities – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed-
Linen from India07.08.98
India
WT/DS141/103.08.98 02.10.98 17.08.98
Pakistan
WT/DS141/2
142. Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry21.08.98
EC
WT/DS142/117.08.98 16.10.98 14.01.99
WT/DS142/201.02.99
WT/DSB/M/54
143. Slovak Republic – Measure Affecting
Import Duty on Wheat from Hungary21.09.98
Hungary
WT/DS143/118.09.98
(20 days)08.10.98 09.10.98
Hungary
WT/DS143/2
144. United States – Certain Measures
Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swineand Grain from Canada29.09.98
Canada
WT/DS144/125.09.98 24.11.98
145. Argentina – Countervailing Duties on
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the
European Communities29.09.98
EC
WT/DS145/1
12.10.98
WT/DS145/1
Rev.123.09.98 22.11.98WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 35DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
146. India – Measures Affecting the
Automotive Sector12.10.98
EC
WT/DS146/1  &
Corr.106.10.98 05.12.98 21.10.98
Japan
WT/DS146/2
22.10.98
US
WT/DS146/3
147. Japan – Tariff Quotas and Subsidies
Affecting Leather14.10.98
EC
WT/DS147/108.10.98 07.12.98
148. Czech Republic – Measure Affecting
Import Duty on Wheat from Hungary15.10.98
Hungary
WT/DS148/112.10.98
(20 days)01.11.98
149. India – Import Restrictions 12.11.98
EC
WT/DS149/128.10.98 27.12.98 19.11.98
US
WT/DS149/2
20.11.98
Japan
WT/DS149/3
23.11.98
Switzerland
WT/DS149/4
23.11.98
Australia
WT/DS149/5WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 36 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
150. India – Measures Affecting Customs
Duties03.11.98
EC
WT/DS150/131.10.98 30.12.98 09.11.98
US
WT/DS150/2
12.11.98
Canada
WT/DS150/3
13.11.98
Japan
WT/DS150/4
13.11.98
Switzerland
WT/DS150/5
12.11.98
Australia
WT/DS150/6WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 37DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
151. United States – Measures Affecting
Textiles and Apparel Products (II)25.11.98
EC
WT/DS151/119.11.98 18.01.99 03.12.98
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS151/2
04.12.98
Hong Kong,
China
WT/DS151/3
04.12.98
Pakistan
WT/DS151/4
04.12.98
Honduras
WT/DS151/5
07.12.98
Japan
WT/DS151/6
07.12.98
Switzerland
WT/DS151/7
07.12.98
El Salvador
WT/DS151/8
07.12.98
India
WT/DS151/9WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 38 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
152. United States – Sections 301-310 of the
Trade Act of 197430.11.98
EC
WT/DS152/125.11.98 24.01.98 07.12.98
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS152/2
04.12.98
Panama
WT/DS152/3
09.12.98
Guatemala
WT/DS152/4
09.12.98
Mexico
WT/DS152/5
09.12.98
Jamaica
WT/DS152/6
07.12.98
Honduras
WT/DS152/7
10.12.98
Japan
WT/DS152/8
14.12.98
Colombia
WT/DS152/9
10.12.98
Ecuador
WT/DS152/1002.02.99
EC
WT/DS152/1102.03.99
WT/DSB/M/56WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 39DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
153. EC – Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and AgriculturalChemical Products07.12.98
Canada
WT/DS153/102.12.98 31.01.99 17.12.98
US
WT/DS153/2
17.12.98
Australia
WT/DS153/3
17.12.98
Switzerland
WT/DS153/4
154. EC – Measures Affecting Differential
and Favourable Treatment of Coffee11.12.98
Brazil
WT/DS154/107.12.98 05.02.99 16.12.98
Colombia
WT/DS154/2
17.12.98
Peru
WT/DS154/3
18.12.98
Costa Rica
WT/DS154/4
21.12.98
Bolivia
WT/DS154/5
155. Argentina – Measures on the Export of
Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished
Leather04.01.99
EC
WT/DS155/123.12.98 21.02.99 04.06.99
EC
WT/DS155/226.07.99
WT/DSB/M/65
156. Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measure on Grey Portland Cement fromMexico08.01.99
Mexico
WT/DS156/1
15.01.99
Corr.1
18.02.99
Corr.205.01.99 06.03.99 15.07.99
Mexico
WT/DS156/2
05.08.99
WT/DS156/2 &
Corr.1WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 40 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
157. Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Imports of Drill Bits fromItaly19.01.99
EC
WT/DS157/114.01.99 15.03.99
158. European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas25.08.99
Guatemala,
Honduras,
Mexico, Panama
and the United
States
WT/DS158/120.01.99 21.03.99 25.01.99
Ecuador
WT/DS158/2
04.01.99
Belize
WT/DS158/3
159. Hungary – Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Steel Products from the
Czech Republic27.01.99
Czech Republic
WT/DS159/121.01.99 22.03.99
160. United States – Section 110(5) of US
Copyright Act04.02.99
EC
WT/DS160/126.01.99 27.03.99 11.02.99
Australia
WT/DS160/2
12.02.99
Canada
WT/DS160/3
15.02.99
Switzerland
WT/DS160/416.04.99
EC
WT/DS160/526.05.99
WT/DSB/M/62
161. Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef04.02.99
US
WT/DS161/101.02.99 02.04.99 11.02.99
New Zealand
WT/DS161/2
11.02.99
Australia
WT/DS161/3
12.02.99
Canada
WT/DS161/416.04.99
US
WT/DS161/526.05.99
WT/DSB/M/62WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 41DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
162. United States – Anti-Dumping Act of
191616.02.99
Japan
WT/DS162/110.02.99 11.04.99 17.02.99
EC
WT/DS162/204.06.99
Japan
WT/DS162/326.07.99
WT/DSB/M/65
163. Korea – Measures Affecting
Government Procurement22.02.99
US
WT/DS163/116.02.99 17.04.99 03.03.99
EC
WT/DS163/2
04.03.99
Japan
WT/DS163/311.05.99
US
WT/DS163/416.06.99
WT/DSB/M/64
164. Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports
of Footwear04.03.99
US
WT/DS164/101.03.99 30.04.99 12.03.99
EC
WT/DS164/220.05.99
US
WT/DS164/3
15.07.99
WT/DS164/426.07.99
WT/DSB/M/65
165. United States – Import Measures on
Certain Products from the EuropeanCommunities05.03.99
EC
WT/DS165/104.03.99 24.03.99
(20 days)11.03.99
Dominican
Republic
WT/DS165/2
12.03.99
Japan
WT/DS165/3
15.03.99
Honduras
WT/DS165/4
15.03.99
Guatemala
WT/DS165/5
15.03.99
Ecuador
WT/DS165/6
15.03.99
Panama
WT/DS165/7
and Corr.111.05.99
EC
WT/DS165/816.06.99
WT/DSB/M/64WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 42 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
166. United States – Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Wheat Glutenfrom the European Communities23.03.99
EC
WT/DS166/117.03.99 16.05.99 01.04.99
Australia
WT/DS166/204.06.99
EC
WT/DS166/326.07.99
WT/DSB/M/65
167. United States – Countervailing Duty
Investigation with respect to Live Cattle
from Canada25.03.99
Canada
WT/DS167/119.03.99 18.05.99 06.04.99
Mexico
WT/DS167/2
168. South Africa – Anti-Dumping Duties on
Certain Pharmaceutical Products fromIndia13.04.99
India
WT/DS168/101.04.99 31.05.99
169. Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef19.04.99
Australia
WT/DS169/113.04.99 12.06.99 22.04.99
New Zealand
WT/DS169/2
23.04.99
US
WT/DS169/3
28.04.99
Canada
WT/DS169/4
and Corr.115.07.99
Australia
WT/DS169/526.07.99
WT/DSB/M/65
170. Canada – Term of Patent Protection 10.05.99
US
WT/DS170/106.05.99 05.07.99 15.07.99
US
WT/DS170/2
171. Argentina – Patent Protection for
Pharmaceuticals and Test Data
Protection for Agricultural Chemicals10.05.99
US
WT/DS171/106.05.99 05.07.99 20.05.99
Switzerland
WT/DS171/2
172. EC – Measures Relating to the
Development of a Flight ManagementSystem31.05.99
US
WT/DS172/121.05.99 20.07.99WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 43DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
173. France – Measures Relating to the
Development of a Flight ManagementSystem31.05.99
US
WT/DS173/121.05.99 20.07.99
174. EC – Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs07.06.99
US
WT/DS174/101.06.99 31.07.99 17.06.99
Canada
WT/DS174/3
175. India – Measures Affecting Trade and
Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector07.06.99 02.06.99 01.08.99 16.06.99
Japan
WT/DS175/2
16.06.99
EC
WT/DS175/3
176. United States – Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act15.07.99
EC
WT/DS176/108.07.99 06.09.99
177. United States - Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Fresh, Chilled or FrozenLamb from New Zealand22.07.99
New Zealand
WT/DS177/116.07.99 14.09.99 23.07.99
Australia
WT/DS177/2
24.08.99
Canada
WT/DS177/3WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 44 DisputeRequest for
Consultations
(date of
circulation)Date of Receipt
of the Request
for
ConsultationExpiration of
Consultation
PeriodRequest to Join
ConsultationsMutually Agreed
SolutionRequest for
Establishment of a
PanelPanel Established
178. United States - Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Lamb Meat from Australia29.07.99
Australia
WT/DS178/1
and
05.08.99
WT/DS178/1 &
Corr.123.07.99 21.09.99 02.08.99
New Zealand
WT/DS178/2
and
13.08.99
WT/DS178/2 &
Corr.1
09.08.99
EC
WT/DS178/3
24.08.99
Canada
WT/DS178/4
179. United States - Anti-Dumping Measures
on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils andStainless Steel Sheet and Strip fromKorea06.08.99
Korea
WT/DS179/130.07.99 28.09.99WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 45SECTION II
Panel and Appellate Body Reports
Circulation and Adoption
(1 January 1995 – 31 August 1999 )
Dispute Panel
EstablishedPanel Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 20-Day
PeriodExpiration
of 60-Day
PeriodNotice of
AppealPanel Report
AdoptedAppellate Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 30-Day
PeriodAppellate Report
Adopted
1. US - Standards for
Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline10.04.95
Venezuela
WT/DS2
31.05.95
Brazil
WT/DS429.01.96
WT/DS2/R18.02.96 29.03.96 21.02.96
US
WT/DS2/620.05.96
WT/DS2/929.04.96
WT/DS2/AB/R29.05.96 20.05.96
WT/DS2/9
2. Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages27.09.95
EC
WT/DS8
Canada
WT/DS10
US
WT/DS1111.07.96
EC
WT/DS8/R
Canada
WT/DS10/R
US
WT/DS11/R31.07.96 09.09.96 08.08.96
Japan
WT/DS8/9
WT/DS10/9WT/DS11/601.11.96
WT/DS8/11
WT/DS10/11
WT/DS11/804.10.96
WT/DS8/AB/R
WT/DS10/AB/RWT/DS11/AB/R03.11.96 01.11.96
WT/DS8/11
WT/DS10/11
WT/DS11/8
3. EC - Trade Description o f
Scallops19.07.95
Canada
WT/DS705.08.96
WT/DS7/RN.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
4. EC - Trade Description o f
Scallops11.10.95
Peru
WT/DS12
Chile
WT/DS1405.08.96
WT/DS12/R
WT/DS14/RN.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
5. Brazil - Measures
Affecting DesiccatedCoconut05.03.96
Philippines
WT/DS2217.10.96
WT/DS22/R06.11.96 16.12.96 16.12.96
Philippines
WT/DS22/820.03.97
WT/DS22/11/
Rev.221.02.97
WT/DS22/AB/R23.03.97 20.03.97
WT/DS22/11/
Rev.2WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 46Dispute Panel
EstablishedPanel Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 20-Day
PeriodExpiration
of 60-Day
PeriodNotice of
AppealPanel Report
AdoptedAppellate Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 30-Day
PeriodAppellate Report
Adopted
6. US - Restrictions on
Imports of Cotton andMan-Made FibreUnderwear05.03.96
Costa Rica
WT/DS2408.11.96
WT/DS24/R28.11.96 07.01.97 11.11.96
Costa Rica
WT/DS24/525.02.97
WT/DS24/810.02.97
WT/DS24/AB/R12.03.97 25.02.97
WT/DS24/8
7. US - Measure Affecting
Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from
India17.04.96
India
WT/DS3306.01.97
WT/DS33/R26.01.97 07.03.97 24.02.97
WT/DS33/323.05.97
WT/DS33/525.04.97
WT/DS33/AB/R
and Corr.125.05.97 23.05.97
WT/DS33/5
8. Canada - Certain
Measures ConcerningPeriodicals19.06.96
US
WT/DS3114.03.97
WT/DS31/R &
Corr.103.04.97 13.05.97 29.04.97
WT/DS31/530.07.97
WT/DS31/730.06.97
WT/DS31/AB/R31.07.97 30.07.97
WT/DS31/7
9. EC - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas08.05.96
Ecuador,
Guatemala,
Honduras,
Mexico,
 US
WT/DS2722.05.97
WT/DS27/R/ECU
WT/DS27/R/GTM
WT/DS27/R/HND
WT/DS27/R/MEX
WT/DS27/R/USA11.06.97 21.07.97 11.06.97
WT/DS27/925.09.97
WT/DS27/1209.09.97
WT/DS27/AB/R09.10.97 25.09.97
WT/DS27/12
10. EC - Measures
Concerning Meat and
Meat Products(Hormones)20.05.96
US
WT/DS26
16.10.96
Canada
WT/DS4818.08.97
WT/DS26/R/USA
WT/DS48/R/CAN07.09.97 17.10.97 24.09.97
WT/DS26/9
WT/DS48/713.02.98
WT/DS26/13
WT/DS48/1116.01.98
WT/DS26/AB/R
WT/DS48/AB/R15.02.98 13.02.98
WT/DS26/13
WT/DS48/11
11. India - Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural ChemicalProducts20.11.96
US
WT/DS5005.09.97
WT/DS50/R25.09.97 04.11.97 15.10.97
WT/DS50/616.01.98
WT/DS50/919.12.97
WT/DS50/AB/R18.01.98 16.01.98
WT/DS50/9WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 47Dispute Panel
EstablishedPanel Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 20-Day
PeriodExpiration
of 60-Day
PeriodNotice of
AppealPanel Report
AdoptedAppellate Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 30-Day
PeriodAppellate Report
Adopted
12. Argentina - Measures
Affecting Imports o f
Footwear, Textiles,Apparel and other Items25.02.97
US
WT/DS5625.11.97
WT/DS56/R16.12.97 25.01.98 21.01.98
WT/DS56/822.04.98
WT/DS56/1127.03.98
WT/DS56/AB/R
20.04.98
WT/DS56/AB/R/
Corr. 126.04.98 22.04.98
WT/DS56/11
13. EC - Customs
Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment25.02.97
US
WT/DS62
30.03.97
WT/DS67
WT/DS6805.02.98
WT/DS62/R
WT/DS67/RWT/DS68/R25.02.98 06.04.98 24.03.98
WT/DS62/8
WT/DS67/6WT/DS68/522.06.98
WT/DS62/11
WT/DS64/9WT/DS68/805.06.98
WT/DS62/AB/R
WT/DS67/AB/RWT/DS68/AB/R05.07.98 22.06.98
WT/DS62/11
WT/DS67/9
WT/DS68/10
14. EC - Measures Affecting
the Importation of Certain
Poultry Products30.07.97
Brazil
WT/DS6912.03.98
WT/DS69/R01.04.98 11.05.98 29.04.98
WT/DS69/423.07.98
WT/DS69/713.07.98
WT/DS69/AB/R12.08.98 23.07.98
WT/DS69/7
15. Japan - Measures
Affecting ConsumerPhotographic Film andPaper16.10.96
US
WT/DS4431.03.98
WT/DS44/R20.04.98 30.05.98 N.A. 22.04.98
WT/DS44/5N.A. N.A. N.A.
16. United States - Import
Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and ShrimpProducts25.02.97
Malaysia,
Thailand,
Pakistan
10.04.97
India
WT/DS5815.05.98
WT/DS58/R
09.11.98
WT/DS58/R/
Corr. 104.06.98 14.07.98 13.07.98
WT/DS58/1106.11.98
WT/DS58/1412.10.98
WT/DS58/AB/R11.11.98 06.11.98
WT/DS58/14
17. Australia - Measures
Affecting Importation o f
Salmon10.04.97
Canada
WT/DS1812.06.98
WT/DS18/R
13.07.98
WT/DS18/R/
Corr. 102.07.98 11.08.98 22.07.98
WT/DS18/506.11.98
WT/DS18/1120.10.98
WT/DS18/AB/R19.11.98 06.11.98
WT/DS18/11WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 48Dispute Panel
EstablishedPanel Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 20-Day
PeriodExpiration
of 60-Day
PeriodNotice of
AppealPanel Report
AdoptedAppellate Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 30-Day
PeriodAppellate Report
Adopted
18. Guatemala - Anti-
Dumping InvestigationRegarding PortlandCement from Mexico20.09.97
Mexico
WT/DS6019.06.98
WT/DS60/R09.07.98 18.08.98 04.08.98
WT/DS60/925.11.98
WT/DS60/1202.11.98
WT/DS60/AB/R02.12.98 25.11.98
WT/DS60/12
19. Indonesia - Certain
Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry12.06.98
Japan
WT/DS55
WT/DS64
EC
WT/DS54
30.06.97
US
WT/DS5902.07.98
WT/DS54/R
WT/DS55/R
WT/DS59/RWT/DS64/R
and Corr.222.07.98 01.09.98 N.A. 23.07.98
WT/DS54/10
WT/DS55/10
WT/DS59/9WT/DS64/8N.A. N.A. N.A.
20. India - Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical andAgricultural ChemicalProducts16.10.97
EC
WT/DS7924.08.98
WT/DS79/R13.09.98 23.10.98 N.A. 22.09.98
WT/DS79/5
&Corr.1N.A. N.A. N.A.
21. Korea - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages16.10.97
EC
WT/DS75
US
WT/DS8417.09.98
WT/DS75/R –
WT/DS84/R07.10.98 16.11.98 20.10.98
WT/DS75/9–
WT/DS84/717.02.99
WT/DS75/12–
WT/DS84/1018.01.99
WT/DS75/AB/R-
WT/DS84/AB/R17.02.99 17.02.99
WT/DS75/12-
WT/DS84/10
22. Japan - Measures
Affecting Agricultural 
Products18.11.97
US
WT/DS7627.10.98
WT/DS76/R16.11.98 26.12.98 24.11.98
WT/DS76/519.03.99
WT/DS76/822.02.99
WT/DS76/AB/R24.03.99 19.03.99
WT/DS76/8
23. United States - Anti-
Dumping Duty onDynamic Random AccessMemory Semi-Conductors (DRAMS) o
f
one Megabit or above
from Korea16.01.98
Korea
WT/DS9929.01.99
WT/DS99/R18.02.99 30.03.99 N.A. 19.03.99
WT/DS99/5N.A. N.A. N.A.WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 49Dispute Panel
EstablishedPanel Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 20-Day
PeriodExpiration
of 60-Day
PeriodNotice of
AppealPanel Report
AdoptedAppellate Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 30-Day
PeriodAppellate Report
Adopted
24. India – Quantitative
Restrictions on Imports o f
Agricultural, Textile andIndustrial Products18.11.97
US
WT/DS9006.04.99
WT/DS90/R26.04.99 05.06.99 25.05.99
WT/DS90/1123.08.99
WT/DS90/AB/R22.09.99
25. Brazil - Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft23.07.98
Canada
WT/DS4614.04.99
WT/DS46/R24.04.99
(10 days)14.05.99
(30 days)03.05.99
WT/DS46/820.08.99
WT/DS46/1002.08.99
WT/DS46/AB/R22.08.99
(20 days)20.08.99
WT/DS46/10
26. Canada - Measures
Affecting the Export o f
Civilian Aircraft23.07.98
Brazil
WT/DS7014.04.99
WT/DS70/R24.04.99
(10 days)14.05.99
(30 days)03.05.99
WT/DS70/420.08.99
WT/DS70/602.08.99
WT/DS70/AB/R22.08.99
(20 days)20.08.99
WT/DS70/6
27. Canada - Measures
Affecting the Importationof Milk and the
Exportation of Dairy
Products25.03.98
US
WT/DS103
New Zealand
WT/DS11317.05.99
WT/DS103/R
WT/DS113/R06.05.99 16.07.99 15.07.99
WT/DS103/6
WT/DS113/6
28. Australia - Subsidies
Provided to Producers andExporters of AutomotiveLeather22.06.98
US
WT/DS12625.05.99
WT/DS126/R04.06.99
(10 days)24.06.99
(30 days)N.A. 16.06.99
WT/DSB/M/64N.A. N.A. N.A.
29. Turkey - Restrictions on
Imports of Textiles and
Clothing Products13.03.98
India
WT/DS3431.05.99
WT/DS34/R20.06.99 30.07.99 26.07.99
WT/DS35/6
30. Chile - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages18.11.97
EC
WT/DS87
25.03.98
EC
WT/DS11015.06.99
WT/DS87/R-
WT/DS110/R05.07.99 14.08.99WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 50Dispute Panel
EstablishedPanel Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 20-Day
PeriodExpiration
of 60-Day
PeriodNotice of
AppealPanel Report
AdoptedAppellate Report
CirculatedExpiration
of 30-Day
PeriodAppellate Report
Adopted
31. Korea - Definitive
Safeguard Measure onImports of Certain DairyProducts22.07.98
EC
WT/DS9821.06.99
WT/DS98/R11.07.99 20.08.99
32. Argentina - Safeguard
Measures on Imports o f
Footwear23.07.98
WT/DS12125.06.99
WT/DS121/R15.07.99 24.08.99WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 51SECTION III
Implementation of DSB Recommendations
(1 January 1995 – 31 August 1999)
DisputeAdoption of
Panel/Appellate Body
ReportsNotification of Intentions on
Implementation of DSB
Recommendations
(Within 30 days after the date of
adoption of the panel/Appellate Body
report )Date of Determination
of Reasonable Period
of TimeReasonable Period
of Time
(Article 21.3
of the DSU)Surveillance by the
DSB pursuant to
Article 21.6 of the DSU
(six months after a
reasonable period of
time is established)
1. US - Standards for
Reformulated andConventional Gasoline20.05.96
WT/DS2/919.06.96
WT/DSB/M/1903.12.96
WT/DSB/M/2720.05.96 - 20.08.97
(15 months)WT/DS2/10 and
Add.1 to Add.7
2. Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages01.11.96
WT/DS8/11
WT/DS10/11
WT/DS11/820.11.96
WT/DSB/M/2614.02.97
WT/DS8/15
WT/DS10/15
WT/DS11/1314.02.97 - 14.05.98
(15 months)(WT/DS8/18-
WT/DS10/18-
WT/DS11/16)
(WT/DS8/18/Add.1-
WT/DS10/18/Add.1-WT/DS11/16/Add.1)
(WT/DS18/Add.2-
WT/DS10/18/Add.2-WT/DS11/16/Add.2)
3. US - Restrictions on Imports
of Cotton and Man-madeFibre Underwear25.02.97
WT/DS24/820.03.97
WT/DSB/M/30N.A. N.A. The measure expired on
28.03.97
WT/DSB/M/31
4. Brazil - Measures Affecting
Desiccated Coconut20.03.97
WT/DS22/11/Rev.2N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
5. US - Measure Affecting
Imports of Woven WoolShirts and Blouses fromIndia23.05.97
WT/DS33/5N.A. N.A. N.A. The restraint rescinded
on 03.12.96
WT/DSB/M/33WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 52
DisputeAdoption of
Panel/Appellate Body
ReportsNotification of Intentions on
Implementation of DSB
Recommendations
(Within 30 days after the date of
adoption of the panel/Appellate Body
report )Date of Determination
of Reasonable Period
of TimeReasonable Period
of Time
(Article 21.3
of the DSU)Surveillance by the
DSB pursuant to
Article 21.6 of the DSU
(six months after a
reasonable period of
time is established)
6. Canada - Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals30.07.97
WT/DS31/729.08.97
WT/DS31/815.09.97 30.07.97 - 30.10.98
(15 months)WT/DS31/9 & Add.1
to Add.5
.
7. EC - Regime for the
Importation, Sale andDistribution of Bananas25.09.97
WT/DS27/1216.10.97
WT/DSB/M/3807.01.98
WT/DS27/15
(arbitration)25.09.97 - 01.01.99
(15 months)WT/DS27/17 & Add.1
to Add.3
8. India - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical andAgricultural Chemical
Products16.01.98
WT/DS50/913.02.98
WT/DSB/M/4221.04.98
WT/DSB/M/4516.01.98 – 19.04.99
(15 months)WT/DS50/10 & Add.1
to Add.4
9. EC - Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products(Hormones)13.02.98
WT/DS26/13
WT/DS48/1113.03.98
WT/DSB/M/4329.05.98
WT/DS26/15
WT/DS48/13
(arbitration)13.02.98 – 13.05.99
(15 months)WT/DS26/17 -
WT/DS48/15 Add.1 to
Add.4
10. Argentina - Measures
Affecting Imports of
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel
and Other Items22.04.98
WT/DS56/1108.05.98
WT/DS56/1215.06.98
WT/DSB/M/4622.04.98 - 19.10.98
(180 days to conform
specific duties on
textiles and apparel tothe findings)
22.04.98 – 01.01.99
(242 days to conform
statistical tax to the
findings)WT/DS56/15 & Add.1
to Add.4
11. Japan - Measures Affecting
Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper22.04.98
WT/DS44/5N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 53DisputeAdoption of
Panel/Appellate Body
ReportsNotification of Intentions on
Implementation of DSB
Recommendations
(Within 30 days after the date of
adoption of the panel/Appellate Body
report )Date of Determination
of Reasonable Period
of TimeReasonable Period
of Time
(Article 21.3
of the DSU)Surveillance by the
DSB pursuant to
Article 21.6 of the DSU
(six months after a
reasonable period of
time is established)
12. EC - Customs Classification
of Certain Computer
Equipment22.06.98
WT/DS62/11
WT/DS67/9
WT/DS68/8N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
13. EC - Measures Affecting
Importation of CertainPoultry Products23.07.98
WT/DS69/727.08.98
WT/DS69/8Until 31.03.99
WT/DS69/9
14. Indonesia - Certain
Measures Affecting theAutomobile Industry23.07.98
WT/DS54/10 –
WT/DS55/10 –
WT/DS59/9 –
WT/DS64/821.08.98
WT/DS54/12 –
WT/DS55/11 –
WT/DS59/10
WT/DS64/907.12.98
WT/DS54/15 -
WT/DS55/14 -
WT/DS59/13 -
WT/DS64/12 -
(arbitration)23.07.98 - 23.07.99
(12 months)WT/DS54/17 -
WT/DS55/16 -WT/DS59/15 -
WT/DS64/14 -
and Add.1
15. India - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical andAgricultural Chemical
Products22.09.98
WT/DS79/5 & Corr.121.10.98
WT/DSB/M/4924.11.98
WT/DSB/M/51until 19.04.99 WT/DS79/6
16. United States.- Import
Prohibition of  CertainShrimp and Shrimp products06.11.98
WT/DS58/1425.11.98
WT/DSB/M/5121.01.99
WT/DSB/M/5406.11.98 - 06.12.99
(13 months)WT/DS58/15
17. Australia - Measures
Affecting Importation of
Salmon06.11.98
WT/DS18/1125.11.98
WT/DSB/M/5123.02.99
WT/DS18/9
(arbitration)06.11.98 - 06.07.99
(8 months)
18. Guatemala - Anti-Dumping
Investigation regardingPortland Cement fromMexico25.11.98
WT/DS60/12N.A N.A N.A N.A.WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 54
DisputeAdoption of
Panel/Appellate Body
ReportsNotification of Intentions on
Implementation of DSB
Recommendations
(Within 30 days after the date of
adoption of the panel/Appellate Body
report )Date of Determination
of Reasonable Period
of TimeReasonable Period
of Time
(Article 21.3
of the DSU)Surveillance by the
DSB pursuant to
Article 21.6 of the DSU
(six months after a
reasonable period of
time is established)
19. Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages17.02.99
WT/DS75/12 -
WT/DS84/1019.03.99
WT/DSB/M/5704.06.99
WT/DS75/16 -
WT/DS84/14
(arbitration)17.02.99 - 31.01.2000
(11 months and
2 weeks)
20. Japan - Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products19.03.99
WT/DS76/815.04.99
WT/DSB/M/5815.06.99
WT/DS76/919.03.99 - 31.12.99
(9 months and
12 days)
21. United States - Anti-
Dumping Duty on DynamicRandom Access Memory
Semiconductors (DRAMS)
of one Megabit or Abovefrom Korea19.03.99
WT/DS99/515.04.99
WT/DSB/M/5819.05.99
WT/DSB/M/6519.03.99 - 19.11.99
(8 months)
22. Australia - Subsidies
Provided to Producers andExporters of Automotive
Leather16.06.99
WT/DS126/506.07.99
WT/DS126/6In accordance with
Article 4.7 of theSCM Agreement, the
Panel recommended
that the measures bewithdrawn within a90-day period fromthe date of adoption
of the report.WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 55SECTION IV
(i)  Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
(1 January 1995 - 31 August 1999)
Dispute Recourse to
Article 21.5Referral to
Original Panel
by the DSBPanel Report
CirculatedPanel Report
Adopted
1. EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27)15.12.98
EC
WT/DS27/40
18.12.98
Ecuador
WT/DS27/4112.01.99
WT/DSB/M/53
EC, Ecuador12.04.99
WT/DS27/RW/ECU
WT/DS27/RW/EEC &
Corr.106.05.99
WT/DS27/RW/ECU
2. Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon  (WT/DS18)28.07.99
Canada
WT/DS18/1428.07.99
WT/DSB/M/66WT/DSB/16/Add.1
Page 56/57SECTION IV
(ii)  Recourse to Article 22 of the DSU
(1 January 1995 - 31 August 1999)
DisputeRecourse to
Article 22.2Arbitration
under
Article 22.6Report
of the
ArbitratorAuthorization
by the DSB
to Suspend
Concessions
1. EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27)14.01.99
US
WT/DS27/4329.01.99
EC
WT/DS27/4609.04.99
WT/DS27/ARBPursuant to the US request
(WT/DS27/49)
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on19.04.99 (WT/DSB/M/59)
2. EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) (WT/DS26;  WT/DS48)17.05.99
US
WT/DS26/19
20.05.99
Canada
WT/DS48/1702.06.99
EC
WT/DS26/20
WT/DS48/1812.07.99
WT/DS26/ARB
WT/DS48/ARBPursuant to the US request
(WT/DS26/21) and
Canada's request
(WT/DS48/19)
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on26.07.99 (WT/DSB/M/65)
3. Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon (WT/DS18)15.07.99
Canada
WT/DS18/1227.07.99
Australia
WT/DS18/13
__________SECTION III
TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODYWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/TPR/69
7 October 1999
(99-4207)
Trade Policy Review Body
TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM
Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 1999
Chairman:  H.E. Mr. Jean-Marie Noirfalisse
1. This report by the Trade Policy Review Body  seeks to provide an annual assessment of the
manner and extent in which the TPRM is fulfilling its objectives as stated in the Marrakesh
Agreement.  The Report discusses the Reviews conducted in 1999 and the main issues arising from
them.  Tables are annexed showing the Members reviewed to the end of 1999, the geographicalcoverage of the reviews as well as the proposed programme of reviews for the year 2000.
Fulfilling its objectives
2. The objectives of the TPRM, as described in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, are "to
contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under
the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, andhence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater
transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members."
3. In this regard, the TPRM is required to periodically review the trade policies and practices of
all Member countries.  By the end of 1999, the TPRM will have conducted 120 reviews (113 if
grouped reviews are counted as single reviews) si nce its formation (Annex I).  The reviews have
covered 71 Members, counting the European Union (EU) as one, and represent around 84% of the
share of world trade and around 63% of the total WTO Membership.  The increased importance given
to the reviews of least developed countries (LDCs) has led to 10 such reviews since 1989
1, six in the
past two years.
4. In 1999, the Trade Policy Review Body will have conducted 12 reviews:  Argentina, Bolivia,
Egypt, Guinea, Israel, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Romania, Thailand, Togo and the
United States (Annex II).  Guinea, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea and Togo were reviewed for the
first time.  The Secretariat reports for the reviews of Guinea, Papua New Guinea and Togo were
prepared with the assistance of consultants under the supervision of Secretariat staff;  Australia and
Denmark provided the funding for these consultancies.  The Secretariat's reports continue to bewritten in close collaboration with the authorities of the relevant Member under review.
5. Overall, procedures for the reviews have r un smoothly.  Members are regularly consulted on
the programme of reviews and documentation has been provided within, or close to, appropriate times
in most cases.  In consequence, the TPRB has been successful in more evenly spacing reviews
throughout the year.  In preparing its reports, the Secretariat has attempted to reduce the burden on
Members by using, to the extent possible, alternative sources of documentation, particularly publicly
provided official information.  Secretariat visits to capitals have been productive and comments
                                                     
1 The least developed countries reviewed since the establishment of the Mechanism are: Bangladesh,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Lesotho, Mali, the Solomon Islands, Togo, Uganda and ZambiaWT/TPR/69
Page 2
provided to Secretariat drafts have been pertinent.  The result is that the quality, content and style of
the reviews has been maintained.  Improved inte rnal arrangements and a new cooperative publishing
agreement reached with an international publishing company have shortened considerably the lag
between review meetings and the publication of reviews.
6. The programme of reviews for the year 2000 includes 14 countries:  Canada, the
European Union and Japan, on the 2 year cycle;  Brazil, Norway, Korea, Singapore and Switzerland,on the four year cycle;  Iceland, Kenya, Peru and Poland, on the six year cycle;  and two least
developed countries, Bangladesh and Tanzania (Annex III).  The Secretariat report on Tanzania will
be drafted by a consultant, with funding provid ed by Denmark, under close supervision of the
Secretariat.
Appraisal of the operation of the TPRM
7. The TPRB undertook in 1999 an appraisal of the operation of the TPRM, as required by
Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement.  The TPRB agreed on 27 January 1999 on a procedure for theappraisal and subsequently held 12 informal meetings in the period to September 1999.  The TPRB
adopted its Report to Ministers, for the Third Ministerial Conference, on 5 October 1999.  The Report
to Ministers is in WTO document WT/MIN(99)/2.
Utility of the TPRM
8. The TPRM continues to be a valuable forum in which Members can openly discuss and
provide an objective analysis of each others' trade policies, which is separate from the compliance and
legal work of the WTO.  Individual Members under re view also benefit from the exercise in that it
provides an independent and objective analysis of their trade policies and measures.  The reports
provide an overall picture of the relevant Member's institutional interaction and the effect of different
policies across sectors, which has often been appreciated by Members.  In addition, severaldeveloping and least developed country Members have found the reviews valuable in providing
technical assistance.
9. The coverage offered by the reports and by the review process also places individual
Members' trade and economic regimes within the wider context of developments in their regions.
Given the growing importance of regional trade agreem ents and groupings, the analysis in the reports
has proved useful in discussing the wider impact of recent economic developments in certain regions,
as well as the more general question of the impact of regionalism on the multilateral trading system.
Points emerging from the 1999 reviews
10. While each review highlights the issues and measures facing individual countries, certain
common themes emerged during the course of the reviews conducted in 1999.  These included:
• transparency in policy-making and policy implementation;
• continued trade liberalization and economic reform;
• implementation of WTO Agreements;
• impact of the financial crisis on emerging economies and the importance of maintaining
openness to ensure recovery;
• regional trade agreements and their interaction with the multilateral trading system;
• applied and bound tariffs;
• non-tariff measures;WT/TPR/69
Page 3
• the use of anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures;
• technical and sanitary measures and market access;
• standards and equivalence with international norms;
• intellectual property rights;
• the growing importance of services sectors;
• special and differential treatment for developing countries;  and
• technical assistance in implementing the WTO Agreements.
Coverage of Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
11. The Trade Policy Review Body's Report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference suggested
that greater attention be paid to the coverage of least developed countries in the TPRB programme.
Two LDCs, Guinea and Togo, were reviewed in 1999, bringing to seven the number of LDCs
reviewed since the Ministerial and to ten the number of LDCs that have been reviewed since theinception of the TPRM.
2 Two LDCs, Bangladesh and Tanzania, are scheduled to be reviewed in 2000.
12. Trade Policy Reviews of LDCs have been useful in understanding the trade policy structure in
place and its relationship with the WTO Agreements.  The reviews have also provided technical
assistance to the relevant Members, especially in enhancing their understanding of the WTO
Agreements and enabling better compliance;  in some cases, better interaction between governmentagencies has been facilitated by the reviews.  The wide coverage of the Secretariat reports also
enables Members to recognize any shortcomings in policy and to identify specific areas where further
technical assistance may be required.
Conclusion
13. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism continues to function effectively in meeting its
transparency goals as outlined in Annex 3 of th e WTO Agreement.  The TPRM provides a forum that
is unique to the WTO in that it allows an open and frank peer review of individual Members' trade
policies and practices separate from legal issues relating to compliance with the WTO Agreements.
The reviews conducted in 1999 have in general been satisfactory, without postponements and delays.
In addition, the tendency towards a concentration of reviews at the end of the year has been
eliminated.  The programme for 2000 also aims to avoid delays and concentrations of reviews.
14. Although the TPRM continues to meet its goals, limited resources and a growing list of
countries to be reviewed annually makes it important to keep the Mechanism functioning as
efficiently as possible.  In particular, the continued active cooperation between Members and the
Secretariat plays an essential role in the success of the Mechanism and must be maintained to ensure
that the review process remains smooth;  that deadlines are met;  and that the quality of the reports is
maintained.
                                                     
2 At the end of 1999, the LDC Members of the WTO still to be reviewed by the TPRM will be: Angola,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Re public of Congo, Djibouti, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and
Tanzania.WT/TPR/69
Page 4
Annex I
TRADE POLICY REVIEWS
WTO members reviewed under GATT 1947 and WTO provisions, 1989-1999
Europe/Middle East Asia/Pacific Africa America
Austria1aAustralia (3)cBeninb, dArgentina (2)c
Czech RepublicbBangladesha, dBotswanabBolivia (2)c
CyprusbFijibBurkina Fasob, dBrazil (2)c
European Union (4)cHong Kong, China (3)cCameroonaCanada (5)c
Finland1aIndia (2)cCôte d'IvoirebChile (2)c
Hungary (2)cIndonesia (3)cEgypt (2)cColombia (2)c
IcelandaJapan (4)cGhanaaCosta Ricab
Israel (2)cKorea (2)cGuineab, dDominican Republicb
Norway (2)cMacauaKenyaaEl Salvadorb
PolandaMalaysia (2)cLesothob, dJamaicab
Romania (2)cNew Zealand (2)cMalib, dMexico (2)c
SlovakiabPakistanaMauritiusbNicaraguab
Sweden1a (2) Papua New GuineabMorocco (2)cParaguayb
Switzerland (2)cPhilippines (2)cNamibiabPerua
Turkey (2)cSingapore (2)cNigeria (2)cTrinidad and Tobagob
Solomon Islandsb, dSenegalaUnited States (5)c
Sri LankabSouth Africa (2)cUruguay (2)c
Thailand (3)cSwazilandbVenezuelab
Togob, d
Tunisiaa
Ugandab, d
Zambiab, d
Zimbabwea
15 18 23 18
( ) Figures in brackets show the number of reviews where this is greater than 1
1Included in EU from 1995
a Reviewed under GATT 1947b Reviewed under the WTOc Reviewed under GATT 1947 and the WTOd Least developed country
Number of reviews conducted at end-1999 = 120
Number of WTO Members reviewed = 85 out of 134 (counting EU as 15)
= 63% of WTO Members (of which, 26 in Europe,
18 in Asia/Pacific, 23 in Africa and 18 in America)
Number of WTO Members reviewed = 71 out of 120 (counting EU as 1)
Number of least-developed WTO Members = 10Share of world trade of WTO Members reviewed(excluding significant double counting, re-exportsfrom Hong Kong, China and Singapore and intra-EU trade) = 84%WT/TPR/69
Page 5
Annex II
TPR Reviews Conducted in 1999
CountryaMeeting Date Review Cycle (years)
Argentina (2) 20.01.99 6
Togo 27.01.99 6 b
Guinea 25.02.99 6 b
Egypt (2) 24.06.99 6
United States (5) 12.07.99 2
Bolivia (2) 19.07.99 6
Israel (2) 14.09.99 4
Philippines (2) 27.09.99 6
Romania (2) 04.10.99 6
Nicaragua 25.10.99 6
Papua New Guinea 15.11.99 6
Thailand (3) 15.12.99 6
aFigures in parenthesis indicate number of reviews completed
bLeast developed country
Annex III
Proposed programme of reviews for 2000
Two-year cycle Canada, European Union, Japan
Four-year cycle Brazil, Norway, Korea, Singapore, Switzerland
Six-year cycle Iceland, Kenya, Peru, Poland
Least-developed countries Bangladesh, Tanzania
__________SECTION IV
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODSWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/L/337
25 October 1999
(99-4631)
REPORT (1999) OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS
In accordance with the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of WTO Activities and for
Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), the Council for Trade in Goods is to report each year to theGeneral Council on the activities in the Council as well as in the subsidiary bodies. The reports are tobe "factual in nature, containing an indication of actions and decisions taken, with cross references toreports of subordinate bodies and could follow the model of the GATT 1947 Council reports to theCONTRACTING PARTIES" respectively.
Since the last annual report, the Council for Trade in Goods met on 25 and 30 March,
12 April, 2 July and 15 October1999. The minutes of these meetings are contained in documentsG/C/M/38, 39, 40 and 41 respectively.
The following subject matters which were raised and/or acted upon in the Council are
included in the report:
1. Election of Chairperson for the Counc il for Trade in Good s  (G/C/M/38)..........................3
2. Appointment of Officers for the subsidiary bodies of the Council (G/C/M/38) ..................3
3. Report of the Working Party on Preshipment Inspection (G/C/M/38)................................3
4. Status of Notifications under the Provisions of the Agreements in Annex 1A of
the WTO Agreement (G /C/M/38 and 41) ...............................................................................3
5. Trade Facilitation (paragraph 21 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration)
(WT/MIN(96)Dec) (G/C/M/40 and 41)....................................................................................4
6. Continuation of the Harmonization Work Programme provided for in Part IV of
the Agreement on Rules of Origin (G/C/M /38 and 40)..........................................................4
7. Periodic Reports of the Committee on Market Access (G/C/M/38, 40 and 41)...................4
8. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement................................................................4
(a) Harmonized System - Requests for extensions of waivers from Bangladesh,
Nicaragua and Sri Lanka  (G/C/M/38 and 41)............................................................................4
(b) Zambia - Renegotiation of Sche dule LXXVIII (G/C /M/38 and 41)...........................................5
(c) Decision on the Introduction of Harmonized System (HS) Changes into WTO
Schedules of Tariff Concessions on 1 January 1996 - Extension of the time-limit
(G/C/M/38 and 41).............................................................................................................. ........5
(d) Draft decision on waiver for preferential tariff treatment in favour of least-developed
countries (G /C/M/39)........................................................................................................... .......5
(e) Application of the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation – Request for waiver by
Peru (G/C/M/40)................................................................................................................ .........5
9. Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas:  regional agreements............................................6
(a) Free Trade Agreement between Cr oatia and Slovenia (G/C/M/38)............................................6G/L/337
Page 2
(b) Free Trade Agreement between Estoni a and the Faroe Isla nds (G/C/M /38) ..............................6
(c) Free Trade Agreement between Is rael and Slovenia  (G/C/M/38) ..............................................6
(d) Free Trade Agreement between Turkey  and the Czech Republic (G/C/M/38) ..........................6
(e) Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and the Slovak Republic (G/C/M/38) .........................6
(f) Free Trade Agreement between Tu rkey and Estonia (G/C/M/38)..............................................6
(g) Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Communities and Tunisia
(G/C/M/38) ..................................................................................................................... ............6
(h) Central European Free Trade Agreement – Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria
(G/C/M/38) ..................................................................................................................... ............7
(i) Free Trade Agreement between Israel  and Poland (G/C/M/38 and 41)......................................7
(j) Accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Customs Union between the Russian
Federation, Belarus and Ka zakhstan (G /C/M/ 40).......................................................................7
(k) Free Trade Agreement between Tu rkey and Bulgaria  (G/C/M/40)............................................7
(l) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation
(G/C/M/40) ..................................................................................................................... ............7
(m) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrg yz Republic and Ukraine (G/C/M/40) .......................7
(n) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan (G/C/M/40) ..................7
(o) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrg yz Republic and Moldova (G/C/M/40)......................8
(p) Agreements between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the
Republic of Lithuania (G/C/M/40) .............................................................................................8
(q) Agreement between Poland and the Government of Denmark and the Home
Government of the Faro e Islands (G /C/M/ 41)............................................................................8
(r) Free Trade Agreement between Po land and Latvia (G/C/M/41)................................................8
(s) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrgyz  Republic and Kazakhstan (G/C/W/41) .................8
(t) Free Trade Agreement between Azerbaija n, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Kazakhstan, The Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz
Republic (G/C/W/41)............................................................................................................ ......8
(u) Interim Agreement between the EFTA States and the Palestine Liberation
Organization for the benefit of the Palestinian Author ity (G/C/W /41).......................................9
10. Understanding on the int erpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994 (G/C/W/41) .............9
11. TRIMS Agreement (G/C/W/41)...............................................................................................9
12. Consideration of Annual Reports of subsidiary bodies of the Council for Trade
in Goods G/C/W/41)............................................................................................................. .....9G/L/337
Page 3
1. Election of Chairperson for the Council for Trade in Goods  (G/C/M/38)
1.1 At its resumed meeting of 30 March 1999, the Council elected H.E. Ambassador R. Farrell
(New Zealand) as its Chairman for 1999.
2. Appointment of Officers for the subsidiary bodies of the Council (G/C/M/38)
2.1 At its resumed meeting of 30 March 1999, the Council took note of the consensus on the
following persons nominated for el ection as Chairpersons of its  subsidiary bodies: Committee on
Agriculture: H.E. Ambassador Nestor Osorio Londoño (Colombi a);  Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices:  Mr. Milan Hovorka (Czech Republic);  Committee on Customs Va luation: Mr. Edward
Brown (United Kingdom);  Committ ee on Import Licensing:  Mme Ma rie Gosset (Côte d'Ivoire);
Committee on Rules of Origin:  Mr. Sandy Moroz (Canada);  Committee on Market Access:  Mr.
Pedro da Costa e Silva (Brazil);  Committee on Sa feguards:  Mr. Hamish McCormick (Australia);
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:  Mr. Attie Swart (South Africa);  Committee onSubsidies and Countervailing Measures:  Mr. Ja n Söderberg (Sweden);  Committee on Technical
Barriers to Trade:  Mr. Mohan Kumar (India);  Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures:Mr. Leo Palma (Philippines).   The Council also appointed Mr. Bernard Kutten (the Netherlands) asChairman of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (which did not have provisions onelection of Chairpersons).
 1
2.2 At the same meeting, the Council agreed to proceed on the understanding that in the case ofVice-Chairpersons, it would be for the subsidiary bodies to decide if they needed a Vice-Chairpersonin cases where the option existed under the respective Agreement and/or rules of procedure, and forthe respective Chairperson to hold the necessary consultations.
3. Report of the Working Party on Preshipment Inspection (G/C/M/38)
3.1 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Chairman  noted that the Work ing Party had submitted
its report to the General Council (G/L/273), through the CTG, in December 1998, which
recommended that its life be exte nded until 31 Marc h 1999 in order to conclude its work.  The work
had now been concluded and the final report of the Working Party containing its furtherrecommendations was contained in document G/L/300.  The Council took note of the report and
forwarded it to the General Council for adoption.
4. Status of Notifications under the Provisions of the Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO
Agreement (G/C/M/38 and 41)
4.1 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Counc il took note of document G/L/223/Rev.2 which
updated the situation with respect to the status of notifications and Members' compliance therewith
and included notifications made up to and on 31 December 1998.
4.2 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council took note of document G/L/223/Rev.3 which
updated the situation with respect to the status of notifications and Members' compliance therewith
and included notifications made up to and on 30 June 1999.
                                                     
1 The Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products
elected Mr. Yair Shiran (Israel) as Chairman for 1999.G/L/337
Page 4
5. Trade Facilitation (paragraph 21 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration)
(WT/MIN(96)Dec) (G/C/M/40 and 41)
5.1 At the Council's meeting on 2 July 1999, the Chairman proposed to delegations to consider
accepting a draft status report on work carried out in four dedicated informal meetings of the CTG.
The report was contained in document G/C/W/156.  As there was no consensus for the adoption of
the report, the Council agreed to the Chairman's proposal that the Council resume the discussion at itsnext meeting.
5.2 At its meeting on 15 October 1999 the Council adopted the draft status report contained in
G/C/W156 following agreement on a number of changes to the text.
6. Continuation of the Harmonization Work Programme provided for in Part IV of the
Agreement on Rules of Origin (G/C/M/38 and 40)
6.1 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the progress report of the
Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) (G/RO/33) and of the statement of the CRO Chairman.
6.2 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council took note of the progress report of the CRO
(G/RO/38) and of the statement of the CRO Chairman.
7. Periodic Reports of the Committee on Market Access (G/C/M/38, 40 and 41)
7.1 At its meeting of 25 March 1999 the Council took note of the oral report by the Chairman of
the Market Access Committee on the requests for waiver extensions and/or waivers made in
connection with the transposition or renegotiation of schedules of tariff concessions and/or inconnection with the introduction of harmonized system changes into schedules of tariff concessions on1 January 1996.  The Council was informed of the situation with respect to the operation of theIntegrated Data Base (IDB) and the status of IDB submissions.  The Council also took note of theperiodic report summarizing the activities of the Committee (G/MA/61).
7.2 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council took note of the report of the Chairman of the
Market Access Committee (G/MA/62) that agreement had been reache d on guidelines concerning the
dissemination of the IDB (G/MA/IDB/3 ).
7.3 At its meeting of  15 October 1999 the Council took note of the oral report by the Chairman
of the Market Access Committee on the requests for waiver extens ions and/or waivers made in
connection with the transposition or renegotiation of schedules of tariff concessions and/or inconnection with the introduction of harmonized system changes into schedules of tariff concessions on1 January 1996.  The Council was informed of the situation with respect to the operation of theIntegrated Data Base (IDB) and the status of IDB submissions.  The Council also took note of theperiodic report summarizing the activities of the Committee in 1999 (G/MA/71).
8. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement
(a) Harmonized System - Requests for extensions of waivers from Bangladesh, Nicaragua and
Sri Lanka  (G/C/M/38 and 41)
8.1 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council considered requests by Bangladesh (G/L/298),
Nicaragua (G/L/297) and Sri Lanka (G/L/296) fo r an extension until 31 October 1999 of waivers
already granted in connection with the transposition of their schedules into the Harmonized System.G/L/337
Page 5
The Council approved the texts of the draft decisions on the waiver extensions in G/C/W/142
(Bangladesh),  G/C/W/141 (Nicaragua) and G/C/W/140 (Sri Lanka), and agreed to transmit them tothe General Council for adoption.
8.2 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council considered requests by Bangladesh (G/L/324),
Nicaragua (G/L/320) and Sri Lanka (G/L/321) for an extension until 30 April 2000 of waivers already
granted in connection with the transposition of their schedules into the Harmonized System.   TheCouncil approved the texts of the draft decisions on the waiver extensions in G/C/W/162(Bangladesh),  G/C/W/160 (Nicaragua) and G/C/W/161 (Sri Lanka), and agreed to transmit them tothe General Council for adoption.
(b) Zambia - Renegotiation of Schedule LXXVIII (G/C/M/38 and 41)
8.3 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council considered a request by Zambia (G/L/295) for
an extension, until 31 Oct ober 1999, of the waiver granted to it in connection with the renegotiation of
its schedule.  The Council approved the text of the draft decision (G/C/W/139), and agreed totransmit it to the General Council for adoption.
8.4 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council considered a request by Zambia (G/L/329) for
an extension, until 30 April 2000,  of the waiver gr anted to it in connecti on with the renegotiation of
its schedule.  The Council approved the text of the draft decision (G/C/W/163), and agreed totransmit it to the General Council for adoption.
(c) Decision on the Introduction of Harmonized Sy stem (HS) Changes into WTO Schedules of
Tariff Concessions on 1 January 1996 - Extension of the time-limit (G/C/M/38 and 41)
8.5 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council approved the text of the draft decision
(G/MA/W/19/Rev.1) granting an extension of individual waivers to Members listed in the annex to
that document until 31 October 1999 with an amendment proposed by Canada, and agreed to transmit
it to the General Council for adoption.  These waivers had been requested by those Members finding
it necessary to consult or negotiate under Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 as a result of the HS96
changes introduced in their schedules.
8.6 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council approved the text of the draft decision
(G/MA/W/21/Rev.1) granting an extension of individual waivers to Members listed in the annex to
that document until 30 April 2000 with a revision to include Bolivia in the  list  and agreed to transmit
it to the General Council for adoption.  These waivers had been requested by those Members finding
it necessary to consult or negotiate under Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 as a result of the HS96
changes introduced in their schedules.
(d) Draft decision on waiver for preferential tariff treatment in favour of least-developed
countries (G/C/M/39)
8.7 At its meeting on 12 April 1999, the Council approved the text of the draft decision
(G/C/W/35/Rev.1) and agreed to forwar d it to the General Council for adoption.
(e) Application of the WTO Agreement on Custom s Valuation – Request for waiver by Peru
(G/C/M/40)
8.8 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council considered a request by Peru (G/L/311) for an
extension of the delay until 1 April 2000 in implementing the Customs Valuation Agreement.  TheG/L/337
Page 6
Council approved the request and agreed that the draft decision granting this waiver (G/C/W/155) be
transmitted to the General Council for adoption.
9. Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas:  regional agreements
(a) Free Trade Agreement between Croatia and Slovenia (G/C/M/38)
9.1 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG55/N/1) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG55/1.
(b) Free Trade Agreement between Estonia and the Faroe Islands (G/C/M/38)
9.2 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG64/N/1) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG64/1.
(c) Free Trade Agreement between Israel and Slovenia (G/C/M/38)
9.3 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG66/N/1) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG66/1.
(d) Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and the Czech Republic (G/C/M/38)
9.4 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG67/N/1) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG67/1.
(e) Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and the Slovak Republic (G/C/M/38)
9.5 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG68/N/1) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG68/1.
(f) Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Estonia (G/C/M/38)
9.6 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG70/N/1) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG70/1.
(g) Euro-Mediterranean Agreement between the European Communities and Tunisia (G/C/M/38)
9.7 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG69/N/1) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG69/1.G/L/337
Page 7
(h) Central European Free Trade Agreement – Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria (G/C/M/38)
9.8 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council took note of the communication
(WT/REG11/N/5) from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG11/10.
(i) Free Trade Agreement between Israel  and Poland (G/C/M/38 and 41)
9.9 At its meeting of 25 March 1999, the Council t ook note of the notification (WT/REG/65/N/1)
from the parties to the Agreement and of the information provided by the representative of Poland that
a Free Trade Agreement between Israel and Poland was awaiting its entry into force and that the text
of the Agreement had been made available for circulation (WT/REG65/1).
9.10 At its meeting of 15 October1999, the Council took note of the notification (WT/REG65/N/1)
from the parties to the Agreement. The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated in
document WT/REG65/1.
(j) Accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Customs Union between the Russian Federation,
Belarus and Kazakhstan (G/C/M/40)
9.11 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council t ook note of the communication (WT/REG71/N/1)
from the Kyrgyz Republic.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the Committee
on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated in document
WT/REG71/2.
(k) Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria (G/C/M/40)
9.12 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council t ook note of the communication (WT/REG72/N/1)
from the parties to the Agreement.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated indocument WT/REG72/1.
(l) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation (G/C/M/40)
9.13 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council took  note of the notification (WT/REG73/N/1) by
the Kyrgyz Republic.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated in document
WT/REG73/1.
(m) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and Ukraine (G/C/M/40)
9.14 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council took  note of the notification (WT/REG74/N/1) by
the Kyrgyz Republic.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated in documentWT/REG74/1.
(n) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan (G/C/M/40)
9.15 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council took  note of the notification (WT/REG75/N/1) by
the Kyrgyz Republic.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the Committee onG/L/337
Page 8
Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated in document
WT/REG75/1.
(o) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrg yz Republic and Moldova (G/C/M/40)
9.16 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council took  note of the notification (WT/REG76/N/1) by
the Kyrgyz Republic.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated in document
WT/REG76/1.
(p) Agreements between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of
Lithuania (G/C/M/40)
9.17 At its meeting of 2 July 1999, the Council took note of the notification (WT/REG77/N/1)
from Latvia.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated in document WT/REG77/1.
(q) Agreement between Poland and the Government  of Denmark and the Home Government of
the Faroe Islands (G/C/M/41)
9.18 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council took note of the notification (WT/REG78/N/1
and WT/REG78/1)from the parties to the Agreement. The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG78/1.
(r) Free Trade Agreement between Poland and Latvia (G/C/M/41)
9.19 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council took note of the notification
(WT/REG80/N/1) from the parties to the Agreemen t. The Council adopted the terms of reference
under which the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which
was circulated in document WT/REG80/1.
(s) Free Trade Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan (G/C/W/41)
9.20 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council took note of the notification
(WT/REG81/N/1) by the Kyrgyz Republic.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulated
in document WT/REG81/1.
(t) Free Trade Agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Kazakhstan, The Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic
(G/C/W/41)
9.21 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council took note of the notification
(WT/REG82/N/1) by the Kyrgyz Republic.  The Council adopted the terms of reference under which
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements should examine this Agreement, which was circulatedin document WT/REG82/1.G/L/337
Page 9
(u) Interim Agreement between the EFTA States and the Palestine Liberation Organization for
the benefit of the Palestinian Authority (G/C/W/41)
 9.22 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Chairman postponed consideration of this Agreement,
notified by the EFTA States in WT/REG79/N/1, to a future meeting of the Council following informal
consultations with the EFTA States.
10. Understanding on the int erpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994 (G/C/W/41)
10.1 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council adopted an Illustrative List of Relationships
between Governments and State-trading Enterprises and the kinds of activities engaged in by these
enterprises (G/STR/4).
11. TRIMS Agreement (G/C/W/41)
11.1 At its meeting of 15 October 1999, the Council considered a request by the Philippines for
extension of the transition period pursuant to Article 5.3 (G/L/325) and agreed to hold informal
consultations on the matter.  At the same meetin g, the Council began the review of the operation of
the TRIMS Agreement provided for in Article 9 and agr eed to revert to the matter at its next meeting.
12. Consideration of Annual Reports of subsidiary bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods
G/C/W/41)
12.1 At its meeting on 15 October 1999, the Council took note of the reports of the following
bodies:  Committees on Agriculture (G/L/322), Customs Valuation (G/L/323), Market Access
(G/L/331), Rules of Origin (G/L/326), Sanitary and  Phytosanitary Measures PS (G/L/315), Technical
Barriers to Trade (G/L/327), TRIMS (G/L/319), Participants on the Expansion of Trade inInformation Technology Products (G/L/332); Text iles Monitoring Body (G/L/318), Independent
Entity (G/L/330), Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (G/STR/W/36); and the interim reports
of the Committees on Import Licensing (G/LIC/W/12), Anti-Dumping Practices (Job. no. 5970),
Safeguards (Job no. 5969) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Job no. 5972).
__________SECTION V
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICESWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/C/10
26 October 1999
(99-4661)
REPORT (1999) OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES
TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
1. Since its last report to the General Council, dated 7 December 1998, the Council for Trade in
Services has held eight formal meetings.  Reports on the meetings are contained in documents
S/C/M/32-39 and should be read in conjunction with this report.  The Council addressed the followingmatters:
I. MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC REGULATION IN THE
ACCOUNTANCY SECTOR
2. At the Council meeting of 14 and 15 December 1998, the Council discussed the report of the
Working Party on Professional Services concerning its work on the development of multilateraldisciplines in the accountancy sector.  The report had four documents annexed to it: a Draft Council
Decision (Job No. 6481/Rev.1); the text of the Disciplines (S/WPPS/W/21); a Chairman’s Note on
discussion of Articles VI, XVI and XVII (Job No. 6496); and the Decision on Professional Services
(S/L/3).  The Council adopted the draft decision attached to the report (S/L/63) and the text of the
disciplines (S/L/64).
II. REOPENING OF THE FOURTH PROTOCOL FOR ACCEPTANCE
3. At the Council meeting of 14 and 15 December 1998, following a request from Ghana, the
Council adopted a decision to re-open the Fourth Protocol for acceptance by Ghana.  Members
welcomed as a positive development the fact that Ghana could accept the protocol, but stressed that
deadlines had an important function and that they must be observed.  They agreed that the re-opening
in this case should not constitute a precedent.
III. NOTIFICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL PURSUANT TO GATS PROVISIONS
4. At its meeting of 14 and 15 December 1998 the Council took note of the following
notifications:
(i) Notifications pursuant to Article III:3 of the GATS concerning modifications to
services regulations in sectors where specific commitments had been undertaken:
Nigeria (S/C/N/69)
Switzerland (S/C/N/70)
Peru (S/C/N/71)
Thailand (S/C/N/72)
Thailand (S/C/N/73)Japan (S/C/N/74)
Japan (S/C/N/77)
Indonesia (S/C/N/78)S/C/10
Page 2
Indonesia (S/C/N/79)
Indonesia (S/C/N/80)
Indonesia (S/C/N/81)
Japan (S/C/N/82)
Japan (S/C/N/83)
Japan (S/C/N/84)United Kingdom (S/C/N/85)
(ii) Notifications pursuant to Article VII:4 of the GATS concerning recognition measures
and agreements or agreements:
Australia (S/C/N/67)
United States (S/C/N/68)Switzerland (S/C/N/75)
Liechtenstein (S/C/N/76)
IV. ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE FIFTH PROTOCOL
5. By the deadline of 29 January 1999, the Fifth Protocol had been accepted by 53 out of
71 participating Members.  Those who had accepted the Protocol had to decide on its entry into force
within 30 days, that is by 1 March 1999.  The accepting Members decided on 11 February 1999 that
the Protocol should enter into force on 1 March, as would automatically have been the case if all
Members concerned had accepted it by the deadline.
6. The Services Council subsequently agreed that the Protocol should be open for acceptance by
those Members who had not yet done so from 15 February until 15 June 1999 (5 Members accepted
within that time period).  It also agreed to re new the standstill commitment not to take any measures
inconsistent with the Schedules annexed to the Prot ocol (Decision on Acceptance of the Fifth Protocol
to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/68 of 15 February 1999).
7. At the meeting held on 21 September 1999, following a request from Costa Rica and
Nicaragua, the Council adopted a decision to re-open the Fifth Protocol for acceptance by these two
Members.  Members welcomed as a positive development the fact that Costa Rica and Nicaragua
could accept the Fifth Protocol, but stressed that deadlines had an important function and that they
must be observed.  They agreed that the re-opening in this case should not constitute a precedent.
V. PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE XIX OF THE GATS:
THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
8. At the Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996, Ministers endorsed a
recommendation in  paragraph 47 of document S/C/3 calling upon the Council for Trade in Services
to develop an information exchange programme with the aim of facilitating the access of all
Members, in particular developing country Members, to information regarding laws, regulations and
administrative guidelines and policies affecting trade in services.S/C/10
Page 3
9. As part of the information exchange exercise, a series of discussions was held on specific
services sectors.  The focus of these discussions was on the manner in which the services in question
were defined, traded and regulated as well as on the existing trade barriers.  The discussions were
aimed at enabling Members to identify negotiating issues and priorities.  The Council agreed on five
questions which constituted a useful, but not exhaustive, framework for the discussions.  These
questions were:
(i) What are the regulatory authorities, governmental and/or non-governmental?
(ii) Are there any special or common problems encountered as regards transparency or 
the application of the most-favoured-nation principle?
(iii) What are the most prevalent types of restriction on market access or national 
treatment?
(iv) Are there other types of regulation - for example in the areas of licensing, technical 
standards or qualification requirements - which commonly restrict trade in the sector?
(v) What are the main barriers exports face in the markets of other Members?
10. The Council asked the Secretariat to prepare background papers on the sectors to be discussed
at each meeting.  These papers were based on information available on each sector and on the analysis
of specific commitments.  They contained information on the economic importance of the service,issues of definition, the main ways in which the service was traded and regulated, existing regulatory
barriers to trade, limitations commonly found in schedules and sources of further information.
11. Discussions on specific services sectors were held between June 1998 and March 1999.
During the period covered by this report, the Council held discussions on Financial, Accountancy and
Telecommunication Services, Temporary Movement  of Natural Persons and the Structure of
Commitments for Modes 1, 2 and 3.
VI. ASSESSMENT OF TRADE IN SERVICES – ARTICLE XIX:3 OF THE GATS
12. Paragraph 3 of Article XIX of the GATS provides that for each round of negotiations,
guidelines and procedures shall be established.  For this purpose, the same provision calls upon the
Council to carry out an assessment of trade in services in overall terms and on a sectoral basis withreference to the objectives of the GATS, including those set out in paragraph 1 of Article IV.
13. In the discussions on the assessment it was pointed out that trade in services suffered from a
serious lack of statistical information which could constitute a proper basis for a quantitative
assessment.  This made it very difficult to envisage an assessment exercise which would lead to
precise or quantified conclusions.  A strong element of subjectivity was therefore inevitable in theassessment by each Member of how trade in services had developed in general or on a sectoral basis.
14. The Council requested the Secretariat to prepare a background note on the assessment of
trade, to complement its work on statistics (S/C/W/27) and the economic effects of services
liberalisation (S/C/W/26 and S/C/W/26/Add.1).  A ccordingly, the Secretariat prepared a note on
Recent Developments in Services Trade (S/W/C/94), which together with other existing documents
was meant to assist the Council in its assessment of  trade in services.  The Secretariat also produced
an informal note on “Developmental Aspects of Services Liberalization.”  Several delegations alsopresented written submission.  On the basis of these documents Members have been conducting an
assessment of trade at the Council meetings held between December 1998 and October 1999.  At the
July 1999 meeting, the UNCTAD Secretariat was invited to provide an overview of their work in the
services area with a view to identifying material that might be relevant to the assessment by the
Services Council.  The UNCTAD Secretariat made a presentation to the Council and submitted apaper entitled "Assessment of Trade in Services: Possible contribution by UNCTAD".  The paper was
discussed at the Council meetings on 16 July and 21 September 1999.  The view of many delegationsS/C/10
Page 4
was that the assessment of trade in services should be regarded as an on-going process rather than as a
concluded exercise.  It was therefore concluded that the Council would revert to it at an appropriate
time in 2000.
VII. PREPARATION OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE XIX – NEGOTIATING
GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
15. At its meetings in April, May, June, July and September 1999 the Services Council held
substantive discussions on the negotiating guidelines and procedures required by Article XIX of the
GATS.  Written submission were presented by vari ous delegations.  In addition, several delegations
also expressed their views at the meetings on what the negotiating guidelines should contain.
16. Members considered it useful to hold discussions on negotiating guidelines in the Services
Council, without prejudice to decisions in the General Council.  The discussions revealed a high
degree of convergence between the views expressed by delegations.
VIII.  SUBMISSION OF SCHEDULES OF COMMITMENTS UNDER THE
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
17. At meeting of the Services Council held on 14 and 15 December 1998, Côte d’Ivoire
submitted a schedule of commitments in financial services and a list of Article II exemptions under
the certification procedure.  At the same meeting Guatemala submitted a schedule of commitments in
telecommunications services.  At the meeting of the Services Council held on 9 and 15 February1999, Korea submitted an improved schedule of commitments in Financial Services.  The procedure
was concluded for Côte d Ivoire on 18 March 1999, for Guatemala on 12 March 1999, and for Korea
on 13 September 1999.
IX. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ITU AND THE WTO
18. The question of a cooperation agreement between the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) and the WTO was discussed at several meetings of the Services Council during 1998.
The Council mandated the Secretariat to consult with  the ITU Secretariat on the possible form and
content of such an agreement.  On the basis of these consultations, the WTO Secretariat produced a
draft which was discussed by Members in the Services Council.  Members approved the text of the
agreement with the ITU at the meeting of the Se rvices Council held on 22 and 23 March 1999.  The
text was forwarded to the ITU.
X. SPECIAL SESSION ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
19. On 25 June 1999, the Services Council held a special Information Session on
Telecommunication Services.  The Information Session examined in depth technical assistance to
developing countries on regulatory issues such as the establishment of an independent regulator,interconnection and competitive safeguards.  Experts from other international intergovernmental
organizations including the International Telecomm unications Union and the World Bank participated
as well as national regulators from capitals.
XI. TRADE FACILITATION
20. On 1 September 1998 the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Services received a letter
from the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods requesting the Services Council to include
“trade facilitation” as an item on the agenda of its following meeting to address its relationship withthe GATS and provide the results of such discussions by March 1999, to the Goods Council as an
input to its further discussions on the subject.S/C/10
Page 5
21. At its meeting of 22 and 23 March 1999, the Services Council discussed the subject of trade
facilitation.  It was the general view that the concep t of trade facilitation as originally raised in the
context of trade in goods, i.e. mainly concerned with simplifying, streamlining and modernising
customs formalities and administrative procedures, was not as such applicable to trade in services.
However, in a broader sense, it was felt that liberalization of trade in services could play an important
role in facilitating trade in goods.  It was also su ggested that issues of trade facilitation in services
could be taken up in the context of the exchange of information exercise, while specific issues relating
to Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) could be taken up in the context of the work programme on
Electronic Commerce.  The main points raised by delegations in discussions on trade facilitation held
in the Services Council were communicated in a letter from the Chairman of the Services Council to
the Chairman of the Goods Council.
XII. WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
22. The Services Council addressed the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce at its
meetings held between October 1998 and July 1999.  Discussions focused on the twelve issues
contained in paragraph 2.1 of the work programme adopted by the General Council on 25 September
1998 namely: (i) scope (including modes of supply) (Article I);  (ii) MFN (Article II);
(iii) transparency (Article III);  (iv) increasing participation of developing countries (Article IV);
(v) domestic regulation, standards, and recognition (Articles VI and VII);  (vi) competition(Articles VIII and IX);  (vii) protection of privacy and public morals and the prevention of fraud
(Article XIV);  (viii) market-access commitments on electronic supply of services (including
commitments on basic and value added telecommunications services and on distribution services)
(Article XVI);  (ix) national treatment (Article XVII);  (x) access to and use of public
telecommunications transport networks and servi ces (Annex on Telecommunications);  (xi) customs
duties;  (xii) classification issues.
23. At its meeting on 22 and 23 March 1999, the Council approved an Interim Report to the
General Council (S/C/8), as required by the Work Programme.  At the meeting held on 19 and 20 July
1999, the Services Council agreed on a Progress Report to the General Council (S/L/74) as mandated
by the Work Programme.
XIII.  SYSTEMIC ISSUES ARISING FROM ARTICLE V OF THE GATS
24. At the meetings held on 26 April 1999, on 22 and 24 June 1999 and on 19 September 1999
the Council discussed issues relating to Article V of the GATS (Economic integration).  Some
delegations submitted written communications on this subject.  Several delegations expressed interest
in the issues raised and in clarifying certain aspects of Article V.  Some suggested that these issuescould be taken up in the context of the next round of negotiations.  Other delegations, however,
maintained that there was no need to revise or modify Article V, whose requirements and parameters
were clear enough.  The importance of adhering to the notification obligations contained in Article V
was also stressed.  Although delegations had a useful debate on these issues, there was no common
view on how to advance discussions in the Services Council.  Proposals had been made in the General
Council on clarifying and reinforcing WTO rules on regional and economic integration agreements in
the next round of negotiations.  The Council took note of the debate and of the statements made bydelegations and agreed to wait for direction on this issue from the General Council.
XIV. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION
25. At the meeting held on 26 April 1999, the Council discussed the issue of how to manage the
two overlapping mandates, of paragraph 4 of Article VI, which called upon the Council to develop
disciplines on domestic regulation on all services sectors, and the Decision on Professional Serviceswhich called upon the Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS) to fulfill the same task forS/C/10
Page 6
professional services.  For this purpose, at the same meeting, the Council adopted a decision
establishing the Working Party on Domestic Regula tion (S/L/70).  This replaces the WPPS and will
be responsible for carrying out all the work foreseen under Article VI:4, including the tasks of the
WPPS.  The Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR) would give priority to the development
of horizontal disciplines applicable to all services sectors, while retaining the possibility of developing
further disciplines applicable to specific sectors or groups of sectors, including the development ofgeneral disciplines for professional services.
XV. EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE X OF
THE GATS (EMERGENCY SAFEGUARD MEASURES)
26. At the meeting of the Council held on 22 and 24 June 1999, the Council received a proposal
from the Chairperson of the Working Party on GATS Rules to extend the deadline for the negotiations
under Article X of the GATS on the question of emergency safeguards measures (document
S/C/W/111).  The Chairman of the Working Party on GATS Rules presented the proposal, which setthe date for the conclusion of the negotiations on emergency safeguards measures at 15 December
2000, and provided that the final date for the entry into effect of the results of these negotiations  shall
be no later than the date of entry into force of the results of the next services round.  The Chairman of
the Working Party on GATS Rules also pointed out that the extension did not prejudice any country's
position on the desirability and feasibility of an emergency safeguard mechanism in services.  TheCouncil adopted the Decision proposed by the Chairman of the Working Party (S/L/73).
XVI. PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE XXI OF THE GATS –
DRAFT PROCEDURES PROPOSED BY THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIFIC
COMMITMENTS
27. Article XXI:5 of the GATS calls upon the Council for Trade in Services to establish
procedures for the modification of schedules.  At its meeting on 29 May 1997, the Council had
decided to refer this task to the Committee on Specific Commitments.  At the meeting held on 19 and
20 July 1999, the Council received the draft procedures from the Committee, which were contained in
document S/CSC/W/21. The Council adopted the Decision proposed by the Chairman of the
Committee (S/L/79).
XVII.  REVIEW OF THE ANNEX ON AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES UNDER
PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE ANNEX
28. At the Council meetings held on 19 and 20 July, on 21 September and on 18 October 1999,
Members began discussions on the review of the Annex on air transport services pursuant to
paragraph 5 of the Annex.  The Council asked the Secretariat to gather information on the workcarried out by other bodies in this area.  In response the Secretariat prepared a note contained in
document S/C/W/129.
XVIII.  REVIEW OF ARTICLE II (MFN) EXEMPTIONS
29. At the Council meetings held on 21 September and on 18 October 1999, the Council began
discussions on the review of MFN exemptions as ma ndated by paragraph 3 of the Annex on Article II
exemptions.  The Secretariat prepared an informal note, Job No. 6116, containing an updated
compilation of existing MFN exemptions as background material for the review.S/C/10
Page 7
XIX. REQUESTS FOR OBSERVER STATUS
30. At the meeting held on 18 October 1999, the Council noted requests for observer status from
the Islamic Development Bank, from the League of Arab States and from the World Health
Organization with a view to taking up the question at a subsequent meeting.
XX. WORK OF SUBSIDIARY BODIES
31. The activities of Subsidiary bodies are reflected in their respective reports which are annexed
to this report as follows:
Annex I - Report of the Committee on Specific Commitments (S/CSC/4)
Annex II - Report of the Committee on Trade in Financial Services (S/FIN/4)
Annex III - Report of the Working Party on Domestic Regulation (S/WPDR/1)
Annex IV - Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules (S/WPGR /4)S/C/10
Page 8/9
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/CSC/4
26 October 1999
(99-4646)
Committee on Specific Commitments
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS
TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES
1. The Committee on Specific Commitments has held six formal meetings in 1999.  The minutes
of these meetings appear in documents S/CSC/M/7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.  In its meeting held on
23 March 1999, the Committee re-elected Mr. Juan A. Marchetti of Argentina as its Chairman.  The
discussions of the Committee focused on four items:  the procedures for the implementation of
Article XXI of the GATS (modification of schedules) , classification issues, the institution of a system
of electronically consolidated and updated schedules, and the revision of the scheduling guidelines.
I. PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE XXI OF THE GATS
2. Following consultations on the finalization of the procedures for the implementation of GATS
Article XXI (modification of schedules) conducted by the Chairman throughout the year, the
Committee recommended at its meeting of 19 July, the adoption of these procedures.  Subsequently,
the procedures were adopted by the Council for Trade in Services at its meeting of 20 July.  The textof the procedures and a declaration of the Chairman referring to its adoption appear respectively in
documents S/CSC/W/21 and S/CSC/W/23.  The Committee has also held consultations on the text of
a draft decision by the Council for Trade in Services on certification of rectification or improvements
to schedules of specific commitments.
II. CLASSIFICATION
3. As far as classification issues are concerned, the Committee began the examination of the
points on classification raised during the Exchange of Information Programme conducted by theCouncil for Trade in Services, on the basis of a compilation of these points drawn up by the
Secretariat and of working documents submitted by delegations.  It was agreed that, at each meeting
of the Committee dedicated to classification, the Secretariat would produce an informal document
listing and updating the suggestions and solutions proposed by Members with regard to the various
sectors.  The Committee agreed on a Member-driven process based on concrete proposals made bydelegations.  In this context it undertook a detailed examination of environmental and
environmentally-related services and began similar work on legal services, energy services, postal
services and construction services.
4. Secondly, the Committee began discussions on the question of the definition and treatment of
new services.  There was broad agreement that this was more a question of classification than ofcoverage and that a pragmatic approach, based on concrete examples identified during the Exchange
of Information Programme of the Council, was needed.S/C/10
Page 10
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON BINDING ELECTRONIC COMPILATION OF 
SCHEDULES OF COMMITMENTS
5. The Committee approved the establishment of a system of electronically consolidated and
updated schedules of commitments.  It was agreed that these electronic schedules would not have
legal status.  The Committee approved the propositions made by the Secretariat with regard to
calendar, format, circulation, language, prices and verification procedure for this project.  It agreed inparticular that the outcome of this work should be published and sold to the general public in a CD-
ROM format and that, in view of budgetary constrai nts, the elaboration of a CD-ROM version was a
priority as compared to an online version.
IV. REVISION OF THE SCHEDULING GUIDELINES
6. On scheduling guidelines the Committee requested the Secretariat to produce, as a basis for a
future examination of the guidelines, an informal and technical document on scheduling problems
emerging from the guidelines themselves and from their implementation (S/CSC/W/19).  On thisbasis, the Committee has been discussing the issues raised by the Secretariat as well as alternatives to
address them.  Subsequently, the Committee began the examination of a first revised draft of the
scheduling guidelines containing the points on which there is an emerging understanding.  The
Committee also asked the Secretariat to produce a checklist of outstanding problems on scheduling
matters and began its examination.S/C/10
Page 11
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/FIN/4
26 October 1999
(99-4642)
Committee on Trade in Financial Services
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES
1. The Committee on Trade in Financial Services held three formal meetings during 1999 on
19 January, 7 May and 11 June which focused principally on two issues; the acceptance of the Fifth
Protocol to the GATS and the organisation of future work.
2. With regard to the acceptance of the Fifth Protocol, it was clear at the meeting of 19 January
that the ratification deadline of 29 January would not be met by a considerable number of Members.
Following a decision by the Council for Trade in Services on 15 February to extend the deadline until
15 June, the discussions focused on obtaining information on the ratification processes of Members
who had not up to that point accepted the Protocol.  A letter from the Chairman, dated 17 May, was
sent to those Members requesting such information, so me of which have responded in writing.  At the
meeting of 11 June, the Committee was of the view that there should not be a further extension of the
deadline, but that windows of opportunity for acceptance by Members could be considered at a later
stage and on a case-by-case basis.
3. On the organisation of future work, a number of issues were raised for potential future
discussion and it was suggested that some issues, namely the distinction between modes 1 and 2  and
the sectoral classification of financial services be given priority.  Although there were differences of
opinion voiced by Members about items to be considered, there was a general feeling that any workundertaken on these items in the Committee should not duplicate but add to discussions in other
bodies.  At the request of the Committee, the Secretariat produced a non-exhaustive checklist of issues
for discussion (S/FIN/W/14).  It was also proposed that future discussions under the agenda item
"Recent developments in financial services trade" should be expanded to stimulate more interactive
discussions on the application of the Agreement and the commitments made thereunder by Membersand important recent changes in Members' laws and regulations which affect international trade in
financial services.S/C/10
Page 12/13
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/WPDR/1
20 October 1999
(99-4591)
Working Party on Domestic Regulation
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION
TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES
1. In December 1998, the Council for Trade in Services adopted the  Disciplines on Domestic
Regulation in the Accountancy Sector  (S/L/64, 17 December 1998).  The Council Decision is in WTO
document S/L/63 (15 December 1998), and the fina l report of the Working Party on Professional
Services to the Council, recommending adoption of the accountancy disciplines, is contained withinWTO document S/WPPS/4 (10 December 1998).
2. The Council Decision establishing the Working Party on Domestic Regulation (S/L/70, 28
April 1999), mandated that the activities of the previous WPPS be incorporated into those of the new
WPDR.  In the period December 1998 to April 1999, the WPPS had held two  formal meetings under
the chairpersonship of Michael Stone of Hong Kong , China.  Minutes of the formal meetings are
contained in WPPS documents M/24 and M/25.
3. Through November 1999, the Working Party on Domestic Regulation has held three formal
meetings, and one informal meeting, under the chairpersonship of Paul Robertson of Canada since the
Working Party was created in April 1999.  Minutes of the formal meetings are contained in WPDR
documents M/1 through M/3.
4. Discussions of the WPDR  have focused mainly on issues related to the development of
multilateral disciplines on domestic regulation, to be horizontally applicable.  To facilitatediscussions, the Secretariat prepared two background papers at the request of the Council for Trade in
Services (S/C/W/96 and /W/97, both dated 1 March 1999).  Informal papers were submitted by the
Chairperson and the Secretariat (Job No. 2800, 12 May 1999, and Job No. 5929, 8 October 1999).  A
formal paper was also submitted by Australia (S/WPDR/W/1, 19 July 1999).  The issues of necessity
and transparency have received the greatest attention to date by Members.
5. To help advance the work on professional services, the delegation of Hong, Kong, China
submitted two informal papers (Job No. 2784, 12 May 1999, and Job No. 3547, 21 June 1999).
Following discussions, the WPDR decided at its second meeting on 14 July that Members would
consult on a voluntary basis with their domestic professional associations concerning the potential
applicability of the accountancy disciplines for their professions, while the Secretariat would consultwith relevant international organizations to be id entified by Members.  Agreed deadlines for the
voluntary consultations by Members were 31 December 1999 to complete domestic consultations, and
31 March 2000 for Members to notify the WTO of the results of their consultations.S/C/10
Page 14/15
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/WPGR/4
26 October 1999
(99-4639)
Working Party on GATS Rules
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON GATS RULES
TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES
1. The Working Party on GATS Rules held six formal meetings in 1999 (S/WPGR/M/20-25).
In each meeting, the Working Party considered all three negotiating mandates:  emergency safeguard
measures under Article X;  government procurement under Article XIII; and subsidies under
Article XV.
Negotiations on emergency safeguard measures under Article X of the GATS
2. Differing views continued to be expressed by Members  on the desirability, feasibility and
possible form of an emergency safeguard mechanism in services.  The contributions made and theissues thought to require further consideration are recorded in document S/WPGR/W/27/Rev.2.  In
recent meetings, Members focused in particular on:  (i) possible indicators to underpin trade-related
injury concepts (an informal Secretariat paper, Job No. 5294 gives an overview of such indicators,
drawing on a previous submission by Venezuela, J ob No.2860);  (ii) basic disciplines which would
need to govern any future safeguard action, regardless of the mechanism which may finally beadopted (including MFN treatment, advance notice, temporary and degressive application, clear
specification of the measures envisaged, protection of "acquired rights" of established suppliers);  and
(iii) the range of applicable measures and other relevant issues.
3. On recommendation by the Working Party, the Council for Trade in Services decided in
June 1999 to extend the negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard measures
until 15 December 2000;  the results shall enter into effect on a date not later than the date of entry
into force of the results of the next round of mandated services negotiations (S/L/73).
Negotiations on government procurement under Article XIII of GATS
4. Discussions focused on the range of activities and entities which may be covered by
Article XIII of GATS.  An informal paper by  Japan contains a typology of such activities
(Job No. 2867), and a Secretariat Note compiles background information on the interpretation of
procurement-related provisions under GATT which might be relevant for the interpretation of similar
GATS provisions (S/WPGR/W/29).  Recently, Members started giving thought to the scope and depth
of procurement disciplines, if any, which might be agreed upon at the end of the negotiating process.S/C/10
Page 16
Negotiations on subsidies under Article XV of GATS
5. Hong Kong, China made a submission under the information exchange programme mandated
under Article XV (S/WPGR/W/16/Add.13), adding to two other submissions received in 1997.  A
proposal that Members provide information on subsidy-related access problems encountered in
foreign markets is being considered by Members .  Discussions have continued on the potential for
subsidies, which are extended under one mode  (e.g. investment aid under mode 3)  to distort trade
under other modes, and  the effects  on trade of export subsidies in services.
__________SECTION VI
COUNCIL FOR TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS)WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONIP/C/19
22 October 1999
(99-4590)
ANNUAL REPORT (1999) OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRIPS
I. GENERAL
1. Since the period covered by its last report1, the Council for TRIPS has held four formal
meetings, on 17 February, 21-22 May, 7-8 July and 20-21 October 1999.  The minutes of these
meetings are to be found in documents IP/C/M/22-25.2
2. The meetings referred to above were chaired by Ambassador Carlos Perez del Castillo
(Uruguay).
3. The meetings of the Council were open to all WTO Members, other governments with
observer status in WTO bodies and international intergovernmental organizations with regular
observer status in the Council.  Decisions on requests for observer status from 15 organizations are
pending.3
II. NOTIFICATIONS AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
(i) Article 63.24
4. The notification procedures, adopted by the Council at its meeting in November 1995, require
that, as of the time that a Member is obliged to start applying a provision of the TRIPS Agreement,
the corresponding laws and regulations shall be noti fied without delay (IP/C/2).  To date, 36 Members
have made such notifications under Article 63.2 with respect to all or most of their implementing
legislation relating to all provisions of the Agreement.  Ten other Members have made notificationsrelating specifically to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Agreement.
5  Notifications
concerning the implementation of Article 70.8 and, in some cases, Article 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement have been received from 23 Members;  some of them indicate that product patent
protection for pharmaceutical and/or agricultural chemical products is already available in their
territories.
5. The notification procedures also specify that a Member who has amended a law or regulation
to bring it into conformity with provisions of th e TRIPS Agreement in advance of its obligation under
the TRIPS Agreement to start applying these provisions will use its best endeavours to notify such
law or regulation as soon as possible after its entry into force.  Three Members have made such
notifications.  Other notifications indicating that they are made without prejudice to a transition periodunder the provisions of Article 65 have been received from five Members.
                                                     
1 Document IP/C/15
2 Document IP/C/M/25 to be circulated.
3 The organizations in question are listed in document IP/C/W/52/Rev.7.
4  Circulation of notifications referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 below takes place in the
IP/N/1/COUNTRY/- series of documents.  Those referred to in paragraph 6 below have been circulated in the
IP/N/6/COUNTRY/- series of documents.
5 A practical aid to assist delegations making the required notification is available in document IP/C/9.IP/C/19
Page 2
6. At its November 1995 meeting, the Council also agreed that Members would provide
responses to a checklist of issues on enforcement (IP/C/5).  To date, 38  Members have notified
responses, two of which have been made without prejudice to entitlements under Article 65.
(ii) Articles 1.3 and 3.16
7. Articles 1.3 and 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, re lating to the definition of beneficiary persons
under the Agreement and to national treatment, allow certain exceptions to the normal rules on thesematters, provided that notifications are made to the Council for TRIPS.  Under these provisions, 25
Members have submitted such notifications.
(iii) Article 4(d)
7
8. Article 4(d) of the TRIPS Agreement requires a Member seeking to justify an exception to the
MFN rule on the basis of an international agreemen t relating to the protection of intellectual property
which had entered into force prior to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement to notify that
agreement to the Council for TRIPS.8  To date, 49 notifications have been received under this
provision from 34 Members.
(iv) Article 699
9. Article 69 of the TRIPS Agreement requires Members to establish and notify contact points
for the purposes of cooperating with each other with a view to eliminating international trade in goods
infringing intellectual property rights.  Procedures for such notifications were agreed by the Councilin September 1995.  To date, 94  Members have notified contact points.
(v) Notifications under other provisions of the Agreement
10. A number of notification provisions of the Berne and the Rome Conventions are incorporated
by reference into the TRIPS Agreement but without being explicitly referred to in it.
10  To date, three
Members have made notifications under the provisions of Article 14 bis(2)(c) as applicable under the
TRIPS Agreement and two Members have made notifications under provisions of the Appendix to the
Berne Convention so applicable.11
(vi) Other
11. The Council has also received a number of communications from Members providing
information concerning their status under the transitional provisions of Article 65 of the Agreement.Some of these communications were made in conjunction with notifications made under Article 63.2
(see under (i) above).  Six other communications were made separately from any such notification.
12
                                                     
6 Circulation of these notifications takes place in the IP/N/2/COUNTRY/- series of documents.
7 Circulation of these notifications takes place in the IP/N/4/COUNTRY/- series of documents.
8 An informal guideline to assist individual Members in making or reviewing their notifications under
Article 4(d) is available in the Annex to document IP/C/M/12.
9 The most recent compilation of these contact points is contained in document IP/N/3/Rev.3.
10 Circulation of  these notifications takes pl ace in the IP/N/5/COUNTRY/- series of documents.
11 For the calculation of the renewable ten-year period for which notifications under the Appendix
remain valid, reference is made to document IP/C/14.
12 To the extent that these notifications were made in conjunction with a notification under Article 63.2,
they have been circulated in the IP/N/1/COUNTRY/- series of documents.  When made separately, they are
available in an IP/C/- or IP/C/W/- document.IP/C/19
Page 3
III. REVIEW OF NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
12. The Council completed work on outstanding questions arising from the review of the
legislation of the 33 Members taken up in the period between 1996 and the first part of 1998 as well
as from the review of the legislation of three Members taken up in the autumn of 1998.13  T h e
legislation of two other Members was addressed at the Council's meeting in October 1999.
13. At its meeting in September 1998, the Council agreed that the Chair would consult with other
individual Members, which had availed themselves of a transitional period ending on 1 January 2000,
to see if they would be in a position to have their le gislation reviewed in the first part of 2000, so as to
initiate the post-2000 review of legislation.  It was also agreed that consultations would be held on the
practical arrangements that would need to be put in place for the reviews of the national implementing
legislation of developing countries in 2000 and 2001.  At the Council's meetings in July and October
1999, the Chair informed the Council which Members had agreed to have their legislation reviewed in
2000 -  now amounting to 13 volunteering to be taken up in the first part of the year and a further 14 in
the second - and that these reviews would address all areas of intellectual property at the same time.
The procedures as employed in the reviews of national legislation by the Council so far will be used.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 70.8 AND 70.9
14. The Council continued its consideration of the implementation of Article 70.8 and the related
provisions of Article 70.9.14  At the Council's meeting in July 1999, the Council was informed that
responses to questions15 previously put to certain Members about the implementation of Article 70.8
and 70.9 had been received from the Members in question.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 66.2
15. This Article requires developed country Members to provide incentives to enterprises and
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to
least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological
base.  At its meeting in December 1998, the Council agreed that a question put by the delegation of
Haiti requesting information on how Article 66.2 was being implemented be circulated in an informal
document of the TRIPS Council to all Members and that developed country Members be invited to
supply information in response to this question.  To date, information has been submitted by 16Members.  The matter was addressed at each meeting of the Council during the period covered by this
report.  In the discussions that took place on it additional information was provided by some Members
and comments made on the adequacy of the submissions received.
VI. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES RAISED IN THE COUNCIL
16. At each meeting of the Council during the period  covered by this report, the issue of whether
United States law on the protection of trademarks and trade names was in conformity with the
Agreement was addressed, in the light of Section 211 of the United States Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998.
                                                     
13 The records of the introductory statements made by delegations, the questions put to them and the
responses given, including follow-up questions and res ponses thereto, are circulated in, respectively, the
IP/Q/COUNTRY/- (copyright and related rights), IP/Q2/COUNTRY/- (trademarks, geographical indications
and industrial designs), IP/Q3/COUNTRY/- (patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, undisclosedinformation and the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licences) and IP/Q4/COUNTRY/-(enforcement) series of documents.  The responses to the Checklist of Issues on Enforcement are circulated inthe IP/N/6/- series of documents.  These documents reflect responses to some 5000 questions and amount tosome 3000 pages of documentation
14 As regards notifications relating to Article 70.8 and 70.9, reference is made to paragraph 4 above.
15 Document IP/C/W/113IP/C/19
Page 4
17. At the Council's meetings in April and October 1999, the issue of whether Slovenian law was
in conformity with Article 22 of the Agreement was raised, in the light of the Slovenian decree on
Lippizaner horses notified by Slovenia under Article 63.2 of the Agreement.
VII. RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE WTO
18. During the period under review, the Council was informed of five actions under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding relevant to the TRIPS Agreement, as reflected in documents IP/D/16-20.
In three disputes, panels were established and panel procedures are on-going.  These disputes concern
provisions affecting patent protection of pharmaceutical products (IP/D/11);  Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act (IP/D/16);  and the term of patent protection (IP/D/17).  Consultations are still pending
on disputes concerning certain measures affecting the grant of copyright and related rights (IP/D/8
and 12);  measures affecting the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IP/D/9);  measures
affecting the enforcement of intellectual property rights for motion pictures and television broadcasts
(IP/D/13 and 14);  patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products (IP/D/15);patent protection for pharmaceuticals and test data protection for agricultural chemicals (IP/D/18);
the protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs;
and Section 211 of the US Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (IP/D/20).
VIII.  TECHNICAL COOPERATION
19. The Council has continued its work in this area on the basis of the procedures agreed at its
meeting in February 1996.  During the period under review, several delegations informed the Council
of specific technical cooperation activities made available to them or by them, or which had taken
place in their territories.  The Council agreed that this year developed country Members would update
the information on their technical and financial cooperation activities pursuant to Article 67 of the
Agreement in time for the Council's meeting in October 1999, which had a special focus on technicalcooperation.  For the sake of transparency, intergovernmental organizations observers to the TRIPS
Council also presented, on the invitation of the Coun cil, information on their activities.  In addition,
the WTO Secretariat provided information on its technical cooperation in the TRIPS area.  This
information can be found in documents IP/C/W/154-156 and Addenda.
16
20. The Secretariat cooperates with a number of intergovernmental organizations, notably with
WIPO pursuant to the Agreement Between WIPO and the WTO which entered into force on
1 January 1996 and the joint initiative on technical cooperation of the Directors-General of the two
Organizations of July 1998.  Both Secretariats provided information at each meeting since on progress
in the implementation of the joint initiative.
IX. REVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECTION ON
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 24.2
21. The Council continued its consideration of this matter in 1999.  At its meeting in July 1999,
the Council requested the Secretariat to prepare a paper summarizing, on the basis of an agreed
outline17, the responses to the Checklist of Questions adopted in 199818, in order to facilitate an
understanding of the more detailed information that had been provided in these responses.  So far,
such responses have been received from the European Communities and 12 of their member States
and from 19 other Members.19
                                                     
16 Contact points in developed country Members' administrations which can be addressed by
developing countries seeking technical cooperation on TRIPS are contained in document IP/N/7/Rev.2 andaddenda.
17 Informal document No. 2104 of 13 April 1999
18 Document IP/C/13 and addendum
19 Document IP/C/W/117 and addendaIP/C/19
Page 5
X. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 23.4
22. The Council continued its preliminary work in itiated in 1997 on issues relevant to the
negotiations specified in Article 23.4 of the Agreement concerning the establishment of a multilateral
system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines, and on issues relevant to
a notification and registration system for spirits, in accordance with paragraph 34 of the Council’s
report (1996).20  The information-gathering process agreed by the Council in 1997 had generated
12 submissions from Members on systems for the registration of geographical indications which they
operated21 and a background note, prepared by the Secretariat, on existing notification and registration
systems for geographical indications relating to wines and spirits.22  Since then, further discussions
have been held on what the next step should be for carrying forward this work.  Proposals on the
matter received from delegations in wr iting in July 1998 (European Communities23) and February
1999 (Japan and the United States jointly24) were discussed extensively in the Council.  In July 1999,
the Council had before it a background note it had requested the Secretariat to prepare on internationalnotification and registration systems for geographical indications relating to products other than wines
and spirits.
25  It also received, at that time, a joint proposal from Canada, Chile, Japan and the
United States.26
XI. TRADE FACILITATION
23. In September 1998, the Council agreed to consider the issue of trade facilitation, which was a
matter on the agenda of the Council for Trade in G oods as a result of a decision at the Singapore
Ministerial Conference in December 1996, following a letter the Council had received in
September 1998 from the Chair of the Council for Tr ade in Goods.  This letter requested the Council
for TRIPS to address those aspects of trade facilitation which the TRIPS Council regarded as being
related to the TRIPS Agreement.  The Council took up the issue in December 1998 and had before it,
at its meeting in February 1999, a non-paper submitted by the European Communities as well as aSecretariat background note on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and trade
facilitation
27.  The Council agreed, at that meeting, that the Chair should convey to the Council for
Trade in Goods the record of the discussions that it had held on the matter, as reflected in the minutes
of the Council's meetings, together with copies of the texts that had been presented to the Council on
it.
XII. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
24. In September 1998, the General Council adopted a Work Programme on Electronic
Commerce28, as a follow-up to the Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce adopted by Ministers
at the Ministerial Conference in May 1998.  As part of this work programme, the Council for TRIPS
was to examine and report - by 30 July 1999 - on the intellectual property issues arising in connectionwith electronic commerce, including issues concerning the protection and enforcement of copyright
and related rights;  the protection and enforcement of trademarks;  and new technologies and access to
technology.  The issue was taken up by the Council for TRIPS at its meeting in December 1998 and
further discussed in February, April and July 1999 on the basis of a factual background note the
Council had requested the Secretariat to prepare examining the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
                                                     
20 Document IP/C/8
21 Document IP/C/W/76 and addenda
22 Document IP/C/W/85
23 Document IP/C/W/107
24 Document IP/C/W/133
25 Document IP/C/W/85/Add.1
26 Document IP/C/W/133/Rev.1
27 Document IP/C/W/123
28 Document WT/L/274IP/C/19
Page 6
relevant to paragraph 4.1 of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce.29  It also received
communications on the matter in April (the European Communities30) and in July (Australia, India,
Japan and the United States31).  The Council heard presentations from the observer of WIPO at its
meetings in December 1998 and July 1999 on the work of that Organization in this area.  The Council
sent an agreed progress report to the General Council on 30 July 1999.32
XIII.  REVIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 27.3(b)
25. In December 1998, the Council initiated the review  of the provisions of Article 27.3(b) of the
Agreement.  Members that were already under an obligation to apply Article 27.3(b) were invited to
provide information on how the matters addressed in this provision were presently treated in their
national law.  Other Members were invited to provide such information on a best endeavours basis.
While it was left to each Member to provide information as it would see fit, having regard to the
specific provisions of Article 27.3(b), the Secretariat was requested to provide an illustrative list of
questions relevant in this regard in order to  assist Members to prepare their contributions.33  T h e
Secretariat was also requested to contact the FAO, the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity and UPOV, to request factual information on their activities of relevance.  By the time of
the Council's meeting in October 1999, information had been received from 33 Members as well as
from the three intergovernmental organizations referred to.  The Council had before it,  in July, an
informal note containing a structured summary overview of the information presented by theseMembers, which the Secretariat had prepared in response to a request from the Council.
34  S o m e
Members commented on the contents of this overview.  Views were expressed on the present
provisions of Article 27.3(b), including on their relation to the protection and use of biodiversity, and
on possible changes to these provisions that might be considered.  In October, the Council received
submissions from two Members, had a further exchange of views and agreed to revert to the matter atits next meeting, taking into account the outcome of the Seattle Ministerial Conference.
XIV. ARTICLE 64.3
26. Under Article 64.3, the Council is required to examine, before the end of 1999, the scope and
modalities for complaints of the type provided for under Article XXIII:1(b) and (c) of GATT 1994
(so-called "non-violation" disputes) made pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement.  The Secretariatprepared a factual background note as requested by the Council on the experience with disputes so far
under the TRIPS Agreement, including any references made to non-violation issues, the negotiating
history of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement, the experience with non-
violation complaints under the GATT/WTO, and any information available on the use of the non-
violation concept in disputes on intellectual property matters elsewhere.
35  The Council discussed the
matter at each of its meetings during the period covered by this report, on the basis of this note as well
as a discussion paper submitted by Canada in February 1999,36 a written proposal received from the
delegations of  Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan jointly in
writing in April 199937 and a non-paper from the United States (July 1999). Most Members have
expressed themselves in favour of recommending to the Ministerial Conference an extension of the
period referred to in Article 64.2 of the Agreement,  in order to allow the Council to further examine
the scope and modalities of "non-violation" complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.  One Memberhas made it clear that it is not in a position to join a consensus to that effect.  Some Members were of                                                     
29 Document IP/C/W/128
30 Document IP/C/W/140
31 Documents IP/C/W/144, 145, 147 and 149
32 Document IP/C/18
33 Document IP/C/W/122
34 Informal document No. 2689 of 7 May 1999
35 Document IP/C/W/124
36 Document IP/C/W/127
37 Document IP/C/W/141IP/C/19
Page 7
the view that, in the absence of a decision of the Ministerial Conference pursuant to Article 64.3, there
would be no scope for "non-violation" complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.  Some other Members
were not in a position to share this view.
XV. REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 71.1
27. At its meeting in October 1999, the Chair in formed the Council th at, following informal
consultations that he had held on the matter, the Council would, in the light of the outcome of the
Seattle Ministerial Conference, take up this issue at its first meeting in 2000 and that, prior to that
meeting, the Chair would hold further informal consultations on it.
__________SECTION VII
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENTWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/COMTD/22
20 October 1999
(99-4531)
REPORT (1999) OF THE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
Chairman:  Mrs. Absa Claude Diallo (Senegal)
I. INTRODUCTION1. This report covers the activities of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) and the
Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries (SCLDC ) for the period 25 November up to the date
of issue.  The last annual report of the Committee is contained in document WT/COMTD/W/52 of25 November 1998.
2. The Committee held five sessions during the period, on 7 December 1998, 2 March 1999,
4 June 1999, 7 July 1999 and 18 October 1999.  The Minutes of these meetings are contained in
documents WT/COMTD/M/23, WT/COMTD/M/24, WT/COMTD/M/25, WT/COMTD/M/26 and
WT/COMTD/M/27 (to be issued).  The CTD also held several informal consultations.  The23
rd Session was chaired, and the 24th Session opened, by Mr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury
(Bangladesh).  At the 24th Session, Mrs. Absa Claude Diallo (Senegal) was elected Chairperson of the
CTD, and chaired that and the subsequent sessions.
3. The Sub-Committee held four formal meetings, on 25 November 1998, 1 March 1999,
12 July 1999 and 28 September 1999.  The Minutes of these meetings are contained in documents
WT/COMTD/LDC/M/14, WT/COMTD/L DC/M/15, WT/COMTD/LDC/M/16  and
WT/COMTD/LDC/M/17 (to be issued).  An informal session was held on 28 July 1999 to discussissues related to the Integrated Framework.  The SCLDC was chaired by Mr. Hans-Henrik Bruun
(Denmark) until June 1999 and subsequently by Mr. Benedikt Jónsson (Iceland).
4. At its 24
th and 25th Sessions, the CTD agreed to grant observer status to 11 intergovernmental
organizations, on an ad hoc , meeting by meeting basis, pending a final decision of the
General Council on observer status for intergovernmental organizations.  The organizations inquestion are:  the Arab Maghreb Union; the Economic Community of West African States; the
Economic Cooperation Organization;  the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation;  the Islamic
Development Bank;  the Organization of African Un ity; the Organization of the Islamic Conference;
the South Centre; the South Pacific Forum; the West African Economic and Monetary Union; and the
World Intellectual Property Organization.  A full list of intergovernmental organizations withobserver status in the Committee is contained in document WT/COMTD/W/22/Rev.3.  At its
27
th Session the CTD noted a request for observer status from the League of Arab States with a view
to making a decision at a subsequent meeting.WT/COMTD/22
Page 2
II. WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
5. The principal themes addressed by the Committee since its previous report were as follows:
(a) Trade and Development: High Level Symposium on Trade and Development;
(b) Review of the application of special provisions in the Multilateral Trading
Agreements and related Ministerial Decisions in favour of developing country
Members, in particular least-developed countries;
(c) Concerns and problems of small economies;
(d) Development dimension of trade facilitation;
(e) Development dimension of electronic commerce;
(f) Technical assistance and training;
(g) Possible input by the Committee into the 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference;  and
(h) Market access:  preferential tariff treatment for least-developed countries.
(a) Trade and Development:  High Level Symposium on Trade and Development
6. The need to clarify the positive relationship between trade and development was repeatedly
emphasized by Members at formal and informal CTD meetings.  Among issues raised were
implementation of the WTO Agreements, in particular provisions relating to differential and more
favourable treatment of developing countries, technical assistance, and the timing and sequencing of
trade liberalization.
7. The General Council on 14 October 1998 accepted a proposal by Egypt for a High Level
Meeting on Trade and Development.  Following consultations, a High Level Symposium (HLS) on
Trade and Development took place on 17 and 18 March 1999.  The purpose of the HLS was to hold
an informal, high-level dialogue on trade and development which would provide a forum for an
exchange of views on trade and development issues, address the development dimension ofinternational trade issues and trade-related concerns of developing countries, including LDCs, and
highlight the role of the WTO in promoting developm ental objectives set out in the Preamble to the
Marrakesh Agreement. A Secretariat background document was prepared for the HLS,
1 and an
informal   compilation of the points raised was made available to WTO Members.
                                                     
1 High Level Symposium on Trade and Development, Geneva, 17-18 March 1999.  Background
document.  (Job No.1232)WT/COMTD/22
Page 3
(b) Review of the Application of Special Provisions in the Multilateral Trading Agreements and
related Ministerial Decisions in Favour of Developing Country Members, in particular
Least-Developed Countries
8. The CTD continued its review, initiated in 1996, of the application of special provisions for
differential and more favourable treatment of developing countries, in particular the least-developedcountries.  At its 22
nd Session,  the CTD requested the Secretariat to undertake a review of the
implementation of "special and differential treatment" provisions by compiling information, in a
formal Secretariat Note, on the difficulties, if any, that Members may have experienced in the
implementation of these provisions.  It was agreed that this review would be conducted on the basis of
a questionnaire to be circulated by the Secretariat and completed by Members, and on the basis of
information contained in documentation available in the Secretariat.
9. At the 25th Session, notwithstanding the low rate of returns by Members to the questionnaire
circulated by the Secretariat, it was agreed, following a proposal by the Secretariat, that the Secretariat
would circulate information that it had compiled, thus far, as an informal document.  Responses
received both from the informal Note and the questionnaire would be used in revising the Informal
Note for final circulation as a working document.
10. At the 25th Session of the CTD, one Member proposed convening a Seminar to assess the
impact of special and differential treatment provisions.
(c) Concerns and Problems of Small Economies
11. During its 23rd, 24th and 26th Sessions, the CTD continued its discussion, begun at its
22nd Session, of the concerns and problems of small economies, on the basis of a paper circulated by
six members (Barbados, Jamaica, Lesotho , Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Trinidad and Tobago).2 Fiji,
Mauritius and Guatemala circulated individual papers.3 Several Members made statements describing
their national experiences as small economies .
12. Following a proposal from the Chair, representatives from the Commonwealth Secretariat and
the World Bank made a joint presentation to the CTD, at its 26th Session in June 1999, of the draft
recommendations and conclusions of the World Bank/Commonwealth Advisory Task Force on Small
States, on which the WTO Secretariat is represented.
(d) Development Dimension of Trade Facilitation
13. The CTD's work on trade facilitation was initiated by an invitation from the Chairman of the
Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) who invited the Chairpersons of all relevant subsidiary bodies of
the CTG, as well as the Chairpersons of the Counc il for Trade in Services, the Council for TRIPS and
the CTD, to contribute to the CTG's work programme on trade facilitation by addressing aspects
related to the work undertaken under their mandates.  At its 23rd Session in December 1998, the CTD
requested the Secretariat to produce a draft document for its contribution.  A note entitled"Development Aspects of Trade Facilitation"
4 aimed at meeting that request.  The issue of trade
facilitation was then discussed at a number of formal and informal meetings of the CTD.  The
Committee's contribution was forwarded to the Chai rman of the Council on Trade in Goods by letter
from the Chair in April 1999.
                                                     
2 WT/COMTD/W/50 and Corr.1
3 WT/COMTD/W/54-56
4 WT/COMTD/W/57 and Corr.1WT/COMTD/22
Page 4
(e) Development Dimension of Electronic Commerce
14. The CTD continued its discussion on electronic commerce, which had been initiated by a
Working Paper submitted by Egypt.5  The discussions in the CTD were part of a comprehensive Work
Programme on Electronic Commerce adopted by the General Council on 25 September 1998.6
Implementation of the Work Programme was assigned to four WTO bodies,  namely. the Council for
Trade in Services; the Council for Trade in Goods; the Council for TRIPS; and the CTD.
15. At the request of the CTD, the WTO Secretariat prepared a background note on Development
Implications of Electronic Commerce.7  The issue of electronic commerce was discussed extensively
at informal consultations on 23 November 1998, and at the 23rd Session of the CTD in December
1998.  Members touched upon a large range of issues relating to electronic commerce and
development including potential benefits from electronic commerce for developing countries and
potential problems developing countries might face with respect to electronic commerce.
16. A one-day seminar on Electronic Commerce and Development was held on
19 February 19998 to allow for  informal exchanges of views on Electronic Commerce and
Development.  The discussions on developmental aspects of electronic commerce in the CTD
continued at its 24th 25th  and 26th Sessions.  In a communication from the Chairman of the CTD,
dated 7 April 1999, and addressed to the Chairman of the General Council, the CTD transmitted itsinterim report on progress made in the implementation of the WTO Work Programme on Electronic
Commerce.
9  At its 26th Session, the CTD adopted its contribution10 in accordance with the mandate
set out in the September 1998  Work Programme.
(f) Technical Assistance and Training
17. At the 25th Session, the Secretariat drew attention to serious budgetary difficulties relating to
the delivery of WTO technical assistance.  These difficulties stemmed from the expanded work
programme of the WTO, in relation to developing and transition economies, including issues arising
from implementation of the WTO Agreements.  As much as 90 per cent of WTO technical assistance
was expected to be covered through extra-budgetary resources.  Uncertainty of funding presentedenormous difficulties for efficient and predictable planning.
18. In response to the Secretariat presentation, Members requested the Chairperson of the CTD to
write to the Chairperson of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, informing the
Budget Committee of the situation and requesting the Budget Committee to revisit the funding of
WTO technical cooperation on an urgent basis.  The Chairperson of the CTD and the Secretariat madea presentation to an informal joint meeting of the Budget Committee and CTD on September 1999.
The issue was further discussed at the 27th Session of the CTD on the basis of a Note by the
Secretariat concerning technical assistance activities and their financing.
11
19. There was a strong consensus amongst Members on the necessity for evaluation of technicalassistance activities, on the basis of clear, identifiable criteria.  At the 24
th Session, the CTD reached
an understanding that the Secretariat should proceed, on its own responsibility, with an evaluation of
                                                     
5 WT/COMTD/W/38
6 WT/L/274
7 WT/COMTD/W/51
8 WT/COMTD/18
9 WT/GC/23
10 WT/COMTD/19
11 Joint document WT/BFA/42 and WT/COMTD/20WT/COMTD/22
Page 5
technical assistance, based on two questionnaires  attached to a Secretariat Background Note on
"Evaluating WTO's Technical Cooperation".12  An initial evaluation by the Secretariat, based on the
responses to the two questionnaires, is to be  communicated to the CTD in the spring of 2000.
(g) Possible Input by the Committee into the 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference
20. The possible input by the CTD into the Seattle Ministerial Conference was identified by the
Chairperson, on her election, as deserving of priority attention by the Committee. Members held an
initial exchange of views on this item at informal consultations on 5 May 1999.  The issue was further
considered by Members at the 25th and 26th Sessions of the CTD13.  
21. At the 26th Session the Secretariat was invited to develop an ongoing Work Programme.  A
draft Work Programme was presented to the 27th Session of the CTD and is under consideration.
(h) Market Access:  Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries
22. At the High-Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least-Developed Countries' Trade
Development, 27-28 October 1997, WTO Members, including developing country Members, had
announced autonomous market access offers in favour of least-developed countries (LDCs).Following these announcements of autonomous market access offers, several developing country
Members considered it necessary to establish a clear legal basis for preferential market access by
developing countries in favour of least-developed countries.  To this end, the Secretariat, on
23 July 1998, initiated informal consultations within the framework of the CTD for the purpose of
examining options for an appropriate legal framework on the basis of which developing countriescould grant preferential market access to LDCs.  These consultations resulted in a waiver on
"Preferential Tariff Treatment For Least-Developed Countries", which was agreed in the CTD at its
24ths Session and adopted by the General Council on 15 June 1999.
14
III. WORK OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(SCLDC)
23. The principal themes addressed by the Sub-Committee since its previous report were:
(a) Follow-up to the 1997 High-Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least-
Developed Countries' Trade Development;
(b) Market access for products originating in least-developed countries;  and(c) Difficulties faced by least-developed countries in implementing WTO Agreements.
                                                     
12 WT/COMTD/W/58
13 Job No. 3578 – "CTD:  Possible Input to the Third Ministerial Conference" Informal Note by the
Secretariat.
14 WT/L/304WT/COMTD/22
Page 6
(a) Follow-up to the 1997 High-Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least-Developed
Countries' Trade Development
24. Work in the Sub-Committee on the follow-up to the 1997 High-Level Meeting focussed on
monitoring the implementation of the Integrated Framework for trade-related technical assistance to
LDCs.  During the period under review, presentations were made before the Sub-Committee byrepresentatives of UNCTAD, IMF and UNDP.  With those presentations, the Sub-Committee
achieved the goal of having invited all the other five core Agencies of the Integrated Framework and
the Administrative Unit.  In addition, the Sub-Committee invited representatives of the WTO
Secretariat to provide regular up-dates on WTO's activities in this respect.  These progress reports are
noted in the Minutes of the Sub-Committee.  Particular attention has been given to difficulties
encountered in implementing the Integrated Framework in individual LDCs and ways to move
forward have been sought.  An informal session was arranged on 28 July 1999 at which participantssupported the Integrated Framework and put forw ard numerous proposals for its strengthening and
improvement.  It should be noted that four "round-table" meetings under the Integrated Framework
are to be held before December 1999.  The Sub-Committee will meet again on 19 November 1999 to
review progress in the meetings held.
(b) Market Access for Products Originating in Least-Developed Countries
25. To assist the Sub-Committee's discussions on market access for products originating in LDCs,
the Secretariat prepared a background paper entitled "Market Access for Exports of Goods and
Services of the Least-Developed Countries: Barriers and Constraints"
15.  The discussions in the Sub-
Committee concentrated on the relationship between the supply-side constraints faced by the least-
developed countries and their possibility of making use of market access opportunities.  The
discussions resulted in the Sub-Committee forwarding  to the General Council, through the CTD, the
document prepared by the Secretariat together with a list of points raised.16
26. The Sub-Committee also requested the Secretariat to compile existing information on marketaccess barriers faced by the exports of the least-developed countries.  At the 17
th meeting of the
Sub-Committee in September 1999, the Secretariat distributed to the delegations concerned (the LDCs
and the major markets for their products), with a request for verification by 1 November 1999, draft
tables showing information on trade flows, tariffs and non-tariff measures applicable to imports into
23 main markets from individual LDCs.  The Sub- Committee requested the Secretariat to produce a
summary overview of the voluminous product by product data, for final publication.
(c) Difficulties Faced by Least-Developed Countries in Implementing WTO Agreements
27. With respect to difficulties faced by least-developed countries in implementing WTO
Agreements, the Secretariat, upon request by the Sub-Committee, prepared a background document
entitled "Implementation of WTO Agreements: Survey of the Difficulties Faced by Least-Developed
Countries and the Current Response".17  The discussions of this item led the Sub-Committee to
forward to the General Council, through the CTD, the document prepared by the Secretariataccompanied by a list of points raised during Sub-Committee discussions.
__________
                                                     
15 WT/COMTD/LDC/W/11/Rev.1
16 Job No. 6915
17 WT/COMTD/LDC/W/10.SECTION VIII
COMMITTEE ON BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS RESTRICTIONSWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/BOP/R/47
27 September 1999
(99-3980)
REPORT (1999) OF THE COMMITTEE ON
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS RESTRICTIONS
1. The Committee consulted with Romania on 1 and 2 February 1999.  Members sympathized
with the economic difficulties faced by Romania and the seriousness of the balance-of-payments
problem.  They welcomed the trade liberalization efforts already undertaken by the Government as
well as the recent measures introduced to accelerate restructuring and privatization.  Memberswelcomed the fact that the surcharge was a price-based measure, which had been notified promptly,
and that a timetable for phase out had been presented.  However, Members, noting the number of
exemptions, sought clarification regarding the coverage of the surcharge, which affected some
63 per cent of imports.  While the conformity of the measure with Article XII of GATT 1994 was
recognized, Members recommended that Romania pursue a lasting solution to its balance-of-payments difficulties through fundamental macro economic reform, including fiscal tightening, an
appropriate exchange rate policy and rapid economic restructuring.  Noting the intention of the
Romanian authorities to keep the measure under review and their understanding that the timetable for
its elimination might be modified in the light of significant improvement in the balance of payments,
the Committee found Romania in conformity with its obligations under Article XII of GATT 1994.
1
2. On  7 May 1999, the Committee consulted with Bangladesh under simplified procedures.
Members expressed sympathy for the natural disaster suffered by Bangladesh in 1998.  Theyconsidered that the conditions of Article XVIII:B had been met.  They noted that the full
consultations, scheduled for next year, could be held at the same time as the Trade Policy Review of
Bangladesh, in May 2000.  Members continued to express their desire for clarification of the criteria
used, and the rationale behind, the restriction of imports, noting that balance of payments measures
are intended to control the general level of imports.  Bangladesh was also encouraged to submit atimetable for phase out of the restrictions, as required by the Understanding, as soon as possible, and
preferably before the summer break.
2
3. On 20 and 21 September 1999, the Committee consulted with the Slovak Republic.  Members
recognized that the Slovak Republic faced serious economic difficulties and a fragile balance-of-
payments situation.  Fiscal and current account deficits were unsustainable, external debt had nearlydoubled in the last three years and foreign exchange reserves, at less than three months of import
coverage, remained at uncomfortably low levels.  Me mbers considered that the import surcharge, as a
price-based measure accompanied by a phase-out schedule, was consistent with the provisions of
GATT 1994.  Several Members noted the number of exem ptions, designed to promote investment and
meet basic needs;  some members expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the measure to solvethe present economic difficulties.  The Committee welcomed the fact that the trade measure was part
of a larger package aimed at financial stabilization and accompanied by a concerted effort to
undertake macroeconomic and structural reform, which Members recognized as painful and
courageous but necessary and long overdue.  Member s encouraged the Slovak Republic to ensure that
the reform process be implemented as planned and even accelerated, if possible.  Such a fundamental
                                                     
1 WT/BOP/R/45, 24 February 1999.
2 WT/BOP/R/46, 28 May 1999.WT/BOP/R/47
Page 2
reform was vital to bringing about lasting stabilit y and would allow the surcharge to be eliminated in
line with the proposed timetable, if not ahead of schedule.3
4. Pakistan will consult with the Committee on 17 and 18 November 1999.  It has presented a
three-year timetable for removal of its remaining import restrictions by fiscal year 2001.
5. Bulgaria eliminated its surcharge on 1 January 1999, in accordance with the timetable.4
Tunisia submitted the list of products still subject to restrictions, in accordance with its phase-out
schedule which concludes on 1 July 2000.5  Nigeria circulated its phase-out schedule, terminating on
1 January 2000, and notified the products freed from prohibition.6
__________
                                                     
3 WT/BOP/R/48.
4 WT/BOP/N/38, 7 September 1998.
5 WT/BOP/N/43, 28 January 1999.
6 WT/BOP/N/44, 10 March 1999, and WT/BOP/N/45, 11 March 1999.SECTION IX
COMMITTEE ON BUDGET, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION./.RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/BFA/43
25 October 1999
(99-4624)
ANNUAL REPORT (1999)
1. In accordance with the procedures for an annual overview of WTO activities and for reporting under
the WTO, adopted by the General Council on 15 November 1995 (WT/GC/M/8, item 11), a report on
the activities of the WTO Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration in 1999 is hereby
submitted.
2. It will be recalled that the Committee met on a number of occasions and has presented reports to the
General Council on a regular basis.1  This report will then cover the major areas the Committee has dealt
with in the course of the year to date.
I. ON-GOING RESPONSIBILITIES
3. The Committee monitored on a regular basis the financial and budgetary situation of the
Organization, the receipt of contri butions including the implementation of the related schemes and
measures pertaining to receipt of  contributions.  It examined the Final Position of the 1998 Budget and
the Director-General's Financial Report on the 1998 Accounts and Report of the External Auditor as
well as the Director-General's budget proposals for 2000.2  In addition, it considered the personnel
management situation and the developments on the establishment of the WTO Secretariat.
II. MAJOR AREAS OF ACTIVITIES
A. NEW WTO M EMBER
4. In the course of 1999, the Committee formulated recommendations to the General Council on
assessment to the budget and advance to the Wo rking Capital Fund upon the accession to the WTO of
Latvia on 10 February 1999.
B. MINIMUM CONTRIBUTION TO THE WTO B UDGET
5. The Committee continued the debate on the level of the minimum contribution to the WTO budget
in the course of 1999.  The Chairperson had pres ented a proposal that the level of the minimum
contribution be reduced from 0.03 per cent to 0.015 per cent from the year 2000.  After extensive
discussions and consultations, th e Committee noted that a consensus to pass from 0.03 per cent to 0.015
per cent as the minimum contribution, with exception of the reservation expressed by one Member, was
                                                     
1 Reports: WT/BFA/39 covering the meetings of 19 March and 22 April 1999; and WT/BFA/40 covering
the meeting of 16 June 1999.
2 At the time of writing the present report, discussions on the 2000 budget proposals, as well as on the
other items contained in WTO/AIR/1175, were continuing.WT/BFA/43
Page 2
reached and that the Secretariat should use the minimum contribution of 0.015 per cent for preparation
of the 2000 budget estimates and proposed Members’ assessments.
C. UN/WTO C O-OPERATION WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE 'S (ITC)
BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS
6. The Committee recalled that, following the decision of the General Council on 3 April 1995
(WT/GC/M/3) the International Trade Centre UNC TAD/WTO presented its budget in compliance with
the requirements of both the UN and the WTO i.e. both in  US dollars and in Swiss francs.  However, the
presentations of budget for two different systems creat ed considerable technical difficulties and resulted
in inefficient use of existing resources.  The Chairm an of the Committee together with the Secretariat of
the WTO and the ITC had met with the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions (ACA BQ) in 1998 in order to identify a solution.  In December 1998, the United
Nations General Assembly endorsed the revised ad ministrative arrangements (document A/53/7/Add.3).
The new administrative arrangements establishes that a budget outline should be submitted by the ITC
to the WTO and the United Nations in spring of th e year preceding the budget biennium of the United
Nations.  Furthermore, the annualized requirements ar e to be presented in Swiss francs in conformity
with the WTO budget process.
D. DOCUMENTATION
7. The Committee examined the policy with regard  to the provision of WTO documents to WTO
Member Missions, Observers, Libraries, Journalists, as well as individuals during the course of 1999.
The Secretariat would undertake an exercise to (i) pr ovide information on the availability of electronic
sources of documents and (ii) verify addresses with a view to lowering document reproduction and
mailing costs.
E. PUBLICATIONS
8. In the course of 1999, the Committee examined the policy with regard to the provision of WTO
publications (printed or electronic), free of charge, for sale.  It is recalled that the policy consists of
providing to each WTO Member delegation two free copi es of print publications destined to be sold.
Thereafter, delegations receive a 30 per cent discount  on all publications purchased.  With regard to
electronic publications, the policy has been to provid e two free copies only to LDCs delegations.  The
Committee was of the opinion that , upon request, developing countri es could receive one copy of
publications in electronic form, free of charge.  The matter would be reviewed in a year’s time to
evaluate new procedure.
F. JOINT INFORMAL MEETING
9. A joint informal meeting of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration with the
Committee on Trade and Development was held on 14 September 1999 on Technical Assistance
Activities (TAA).  Information regarding the financial aspect of TAA in 1999 as well as the evolutionof TAA since 1995 was presented.  The Committees were informed on the activities by geographical
areas, modes of delivery, and planning and programming functions. It was noted that the basic
concerns of the Secretariat relate to putting TAA on a financially sound and sustainable basis and to
enhance the capacity of the Secretariat to respond to ever-expanding requirements.
__________./.SECTION X
COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTSWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/REG/8
11 October 1999
(99-4279)
REPORT (1999) OF THE
COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
Chairman:  Mr. Krirk-Krai Jirapaet (Thailand)
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The terms of reference of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) are:
"(a) to carry out the examination of agreements in accordance with the procedures and
terms of reference adopted by the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Tradein Services or the Committee on Trade and Development, as the case may be, andthereafter present its report to the relevant body for appropriate action;
(b) to consider how the required reporting on the operation of such agreements should be
carried out and make appropriate recommendations to the relevant body;
(c) to develop, as appropriate, procedures to facilitate and improve the examination
process;
(d) to consider the systemic implications of such agreements and regional initiatives for
the multilateral trading system and the relationship between them, and makeappropriate recommendations to the General Council;  and
(e) to carry out any additional functions assigned to it by the General Council."
1
2. At its first meeting in 1999, the CRTA elected Mr. Krirk-Krai Jirapaet (Thailand) as
Chairman of the Committee.  Mr. Chul-Ki Ju (Korea) continued to serve as Vice-Chairman until his
departure from Geneva in Summer 1999.  The two other Vice-Chairmen were
Mr. Guillermo González (Argentina) and Mr. Andrew Stoler (United States).
3. During 1999, the Committee held four sessions, each including examinations of some
individual regional trade agreements (RTAs) and discussions of systemic and general matters (see
Attachment 1).  A number of informal consultation s have also been held, in an effort to reach
conclusions on agreements under review.
II. OBSERVER STATUS
4. The Committee agreed to grant observer status in the CRTA to the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA), on an ad hoc  basis.  Definitive decisions on the requests for observer
status listed in document WT/REG/W/11/Add.1 will be made in accordance with the guidelines to be
defined by the General Council.
                                                     
1 Document WT/L/127, paragraph 1.  The footnote attached to that paragraph is not reproduced here.WT/REG/8
Page 2
III. EXAMINATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
5. To date, 118 RTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO:  93 under GATT Article XXIV;
14 under the Enabling Clause;2 and eleven under GATS Article V.  The Committee has currently
under review a total of 72 agreements.3  The examination of 64  of these agreements has been referred
to the Committee by the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG), seven by the Council for Trade in
Services (CTS) and one by the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).  Draft reports on theexamination of 30 agreements are currently under consideration; for 31 other agreements, reports are
being drafted or factual examinations are currently underway.  There are eleven RTAs for which
factual examination has not yet started
4 (see Attachment 2).
6. In the context of the examination of 41 individual agreements, the Committee also considered
the System of European Cumulation of Origin, whic h modified or replaced earlier rules of origin
provisions in those agreements.
7. At the 23rd Session of the CRTA, held in July 1999, the Chairman stressed the urgency of
completing the reports on the examination of 30 RTAs for which the drafting process was already
engaged.  The drafting of six of these reports made progress during 1999, but the Committee has so
far been unable to finalize any of them.
IV. REPORTING ON THE OPERATION OF AGREEMENTS
8. To fulfil item 1(b) of its Terms of Reference, the Committee had adopted, on
20 February 1998, recommendations to the CTG, CTS and CTD, later adopted by these three bodies,
with respect to how required reporting on the operatio n of RTAs should be carried out.  In order to
operationalize the reporting on RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV, the Committee accepted
the Secretariat's proposed timetable for biennial reporting in 1999 (see Attachment 3).
9. By October 1999, the Secretariat had received (and was processing for distribution) the
biennial reports of the following RTAs:  Ca ribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM),
Central American Common Market (CACM), Czech  Republic-Slovak Republic Customs Union, and
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), EFTA-Czech Republic, EFTA-Slovak Republic, and
EFTA-Turkey.
V. PROCEDURES TO FACILITATE AND IMPROVE THE EXAMINATION PROCESS
10. Regarding item 1(c) of the Committee's Terms of Reference, it can be noted that both the
"Standard Format for Information on Regional Trade Agreements", in the area of goods, and the
"Standard Format for Information on Economic Integration Agreements", in the area of services, havebeen used by the parties of all RTAs newly refe rred to the Committee as a preliminary step in the
examination process.
                                                     
2 Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fulle r Participation of Developing
Countries , Decision of 28 November 1979.
3 This last figure is not strictly comparable to  the total of notified RTAs, since it takes into account
agreements of accession to existing RTAs, as well as agreements on trade in services parallel to existing RTAsin the goods area.
4 Six RTAs recently notified under GATT Article XXIV are yet to be transmitted to the Committee for
examination.WT/REG/8
Page 3
VI. SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
INITIATIVES FOR THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM
11. Under item 1(d) of the Committee's Terms of Reference, the Committee made use of
Members' written submissions and informal papers prepared by the Secretariat (see Attachment 4).
12. In 1999, the work of the Committee under this item was built upon questions raised in written
contributions by the delegations of Hong Kong, China and Japan, which attempted to identify the
issues that have arisen from the interpretation and application of individual provisions of GATS
Article V and considered possible linkages be tween GATS Article V and GATT Article XXIV.  A
further submission on GATS Article V by the European Communities and their Member States was
circulated on 21 September 1999.  Discussions in the Committee focussed primarily on the
interpretation of individual provisions in GATS Article V, particularly in regard to the scope of
"substantial sectoral coverage" and "substantially all discrimination".  Some Members noted thatsome of these issues were also being considered in the Council for Trade in Services;  however, other
Members felt that they should be considered in the Committee as part of the systemic debate.
13. At the CRTA's 22
nd Session, it was agreed that a synoptic paper would be prepared by the
Secretariat, based on the "Checklist of Systemic Issues" (document WT/REG/W/12) and
summarising, on a factual basis, the discussion that had already taken place on the issues.  A first draftwas circulated to Members by the Secretariat on 22 September 1999.
14. As a further contribution to the work of the CRTA, the Secretariat has distributed two updates
of the informal paper entitled "Basic Information on Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the
GATT/WTO and in Force" (updated on 22 April and 22 
 September 1999).
VII. FINAL REMARKS
15. The Committee has made substantial headway in the factual examination of a number of
RTAs, but has been unable to finalize reports on any of these examinations.  Progress in this regard
was slowed, inter alia , by disagreement among Members on the interpretation of certain elements of
those rules relating to RTAs, as well as on procedural aspects.  Similarly, the Committee is not in aposition to make recommendations to the General Council under item 1(d) of its Terms of Reference.WT/REG/8
Page 4
ATTACHMENT 1
Individual RTAs examined in 1999
Twenty-First Session – 10-11 February 1999
EC-Principality of Andorra Turkey-Hungary
Hungary-Israel Turkey-Romania
Israel-Czech Republic Turkey-Israel
Israel-Slovak Republic Turkey-Lithuania
Twenty-Second Session – 29-30 April and 3 May 1999
EC-Slovenia (Interim Agreement) Israel-Slovak Republic
Slovenia-Latvia Turkey-Hungary
Slovenia-Lithuania Turkey-RomaniaSlovenia-Estonia Turkey-Israel
EC-Principality of Andorra Turkey-Lithuania
Hungary-Israel CEFTA
Israel-Czech Republic
Twenty-Third Session – 1-2 July 1999
Slovenia-Latvia Turkey-Hungary
Slovenia-Estonia Turkey-RomaniaLatvia- Czech Republic Turkey-Israel
Lithuania-Czech Republic Turkey-Lithuania
Latvia-Slovak Republic Estonia- Czech Republic
Lithuania-Slovak Republic Estonia- Slovak Republic
Hungary-Israel Turkey-Czech RepublicCroatia-Slovenia Turkey-Slovak Republic
Israel-Czech Republic EU-Tunisia (Med. Agreement)
Israel-Slovak Republic Turkey-Estonia
Twenty-Fourth Session – 22 September and 8 October 1999
EC-Slovenia (Interim Agreement) EC-Principality of Andorra
Latvia- Czech Republic Croatia-Slovenia
Lithuania-Czech Republic Estonia- Czech Republic
Latvia-Slovak Republic Estonia- Slovak Republic
Lithuania-Slovak Republic EU-Tunisia (Med. Agreement)WT/REG/8
Page 5
ATTACHMENT 2
RTAs for which draft reports on the examination are currently under consideration (30):
ANZCERTA (Services) EC-Bulgaria IA
EC-Czech Republic IA EC-Enlargement (Goods)
EC-Enlargement (Services) EC-Estonia FTA
EC-Hungary IA EC-Hungary EA (Services)
EC-Latvia FTA EC- Lithuania FTA
EC-Poland IA EC-Poland EA (Services)
EC-Romania IA EC-Slovak Republic IA
EC-Slovak Republic EA (Services) CEFTAEFTA-Bulgaria FTA EFTA-Estonia FTA
EFTA-Hungary FTA EFTA-Israel FTA
EFTA-Latvia FTA EFTA-Lithuania FTA
EFTA-Poland FTA EFTA-Romania FTA
EFTA-Slovenia FTA Iceland-Faroe IslandsNAFTA (Goods) NAFTA (Services)
Norway-Faroe Islands Switzerland-Faroe Islands
RTAs for which reports are being drafted or factual examinations are well engaged (31):
Canada-Chile FTA Canada-Israel FTA
Czech Republic-Estonia FTA Czech Republic-Latvia FTA
Czech Republic-Lithuania FTA Czech Republic-Turkey FTA
EC-Faroe Islands EC-P. of Andorra CUEC-Slovenia IA EC-Turkey CU
EU-Tunisia Euro-Mediterranean Agr. European Union (Services)
Israel-Czech Republic FTA Israel-Hungary FTA
Israel-Slovak Republic FTA MERCOSUR
Poland-Lithuania FTA Romania-Moldova FTASlovak Republic-Estonia FTA Slovak Republic-Latvia FTA
Slovak Republic-Lithuania FTA Slovak Republic-Turkey FTA
Slovenia-Croatia FTA Slovenia-Estonia FTA
Slovenia-Latvia FTA Slovenia-Lithuania FTA
Turkey-Estonia FTA Turkey-Hungary FTA
Turkey-Israel FTA Turkey-Lithuania FTA
Turkey-Romania FTA
RTAs for which factual examination has not yet commenced (11):
EC-Palestinian Authority FTA Faroe Islands-Estonia
Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania FTA Israel-Slovenia FTA
Kyrgyz Republic-Moldova FTA Kyrgyz Republic-Russian Fed. FTA
Kyrgyz Rep.- CU Russian Fed./Belarus/Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic-Ukraine FTA
Kyrgyz Republic-Uzbekistan FTA Slovenia-F.Y.R.O.M. FTA
Turkey-Bulgaria FTAWT/REG/8
Page 6
ATTACHMENT 3
Schedule for the Submission of Biennial Reports on RTAs in the Course of 1999
Reports due on 15 May 1999 (10)
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)
Australia-Papua New Guinea Agreement (PATCRA)
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)
Central American Common Market (CACM)
Czech Rep./Slovak Rep. Customs UnionEuropean Free Trade Association (EFTA)
EFTA/Czech Rep.
EFTA/Slovak Rep.
EFTA/Turkey
United States/Israel
Reports due on 15 October 1999 (14)
European Communities (EC)/Algeria
EC/CyprusEC/Egypt
EC/Iceland
EC/Israel
EC/Jordan
EC/LebanonEC/Malta
EC/Morocco
EC/Norway
EC/Certain Non-Europ ean Countries and Territories II (PTOM II)
EC/SyriaEC/Switzerland and Liechtenstein
EC/TunisiaWT/REG/8
Page 7
ATTACHMENT 4
List of Documents on Sy stemic Issues (1999)
WT/REG/W/34 Communicati on from Hong Kong, China on "Systemic Issues
Arising from Article V of the GATS"
WT/REG/W/35 Communication from the European Communities and their Member
States on "Article V of the GATS:  Systemic Issues"
Informal Papers
- Non-paper by Japan on "Interpretative Remarks on Article V:1 of GATS", distributed in the
22nd Session of the CRTA on 29 April 1999.
- Japan's Comments on document WT/REG/W/34, distributed in the 23rd Session of the CRTA
on 1 July 1999.
- Informal Paper by Hong Kong, China on "Systemic Issues Arising from Article V of the
GATS", on 28 June 1999.
- Informal Paper by the Secretariat, "Basic Information on Regional Trade Agreements
Notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force", updated on 22 April and 22 September 1999.
__________SECTION XI
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/CTE/4
14 October 1999
(99-4414)
REPORT (1999) OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
1. The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) continued to analyze the work programme
set out in the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment following the cluster
approach, under the themes of market access and the linkages between the multilateral environment
and trade agendas.  Discussions in the CTE took place under the Chairmanship of
Ambassador Chak Mun See (Singapore), followed by the Chairmanship of Ambassador István Major
(Hungary).
2. The CTE held three meetings in 1999 (see attached Annex).  The 18-19 February meeting
addressed those items of the work programme relevant to the theme of market access, items 2, 3, 4
and 6.  The discussions focused primarily on the sectors of agriculture and fisheries, while there were
also discussions on energy, forestry, non-ferrous metals, textiles and clothing, leather and
environmental services. The sectoral discussions and the working papers submitted by Membershighlighted areas where the removal of trade restrictions and distortions can be both environmentally
and economically beneficial.
3. The focus of the meeting held on 29-30 June was on those items related to the multilateral
environment and trade agendas, including items 1, 5, 7 and 8.  On 29 June, the CTE held an
Information Session with five Secretariats of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)relevant to the work of the CTE in order to in form Members on the trade-related developments in
these agreements. Presentations and papers were provided by the Convention on the International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Fl ora;  the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer;  the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change;  the
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests;  and the In ternational Tropical Timber Organization.  This
meeting illustrated how trade-related measures function in MEAs and helped to deepen the
understanding of the MEA relationship to the multilateral trading system.  The 12-13 October meetingfocused on Items 9 and 10, reviewed both thematic clusters, and adopted this report of the CTE to the
General Council.
4. The CTE extended observer status to the following international intergovernmental
organizations in 1999:  the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas;  the
Islamic Development Bank;  the South Pacific Forum;  the Southeast Asian Fisheries DevelopmentCentre;  and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
5. In 1999, the WTO Environmental Database (EDB) was updated by the Secretariat in
document WT/CTE/W/118.  The EDB was established in 1998 in fulfilment of the recommendation
in the 1996 Report of the CTE to the Singapore Ministerial Conference (WT/CTE/1) to compile and
update annually all environment-related notifications to the WTO.
6. A High-Level Symposium on Trade and Environment was held on 15-16 March 1999.
Participation included senior level representa tives from trade, environment, and development
ministries as well as other government agencies of WTO Members which deal with matters related to
sustainable development.  Participation included representation from approximately 130 environment,
development, consumer and industry NGOs as well as academia, from developed and developingcountries.  The Symposium included presentations by the Director-General of the WTO, theWT/CTE/4
Page 2
Executive Secretary of UNEP, and representatives  from the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the
World Bank and UNCTAD.  This meeting provided a forum for a useful exchange of views and
information between the trade and environment communities.  Funding from donor governments
provided for the participation of representatives from least-developed Member countries and
developing country NGOs.
7. In continuation of last year's initiative, the Secretariat organized regional seminars on trade
and environment for government officials from developing and least-developed countries in
Zimbabwe and Djibouti in 1999.  The objective of these seminars was to raise awareness on the
linkages between trade, environment and sustai nable development and to enhance the dialogue
between policymakers from Ministries of both trade and environment in WTO Member Governments.
8. Pending the future work programme of the WTO, the CTE agreed to hold three meetings in
2000 and to continue to deepen the analysis of all items on the work programme based on the
thematic clusters with the objective of fulfilling the mandate of the CTE.WT/CTE/4
Page 3
ANNEX
Work Programme and Schedule of Meetings for 1999
1. The 1998 Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment (WT/CTE/3) sets out that the
CTE will advance the analysis of all the items on its work programme based on the "cluster approach"
under the themes of market access and the linkages between the multilateral environment and trade
agendas.  The contribution of Members, including where possible their national experience, on the
items of the work programme should enrich these discussions and move forward the process offulfilling the tasks mandated in the terms of reference of the CTE.  Time will be allotted for Members,
if they so wish, to return to Items discussed at the previous meeting.
2. The CTE meeting of 18-19 February will address those Items relevant to the theme of market
access, including:
Item 2: the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental
measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading
system;
Item 3: the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and:
(a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes;
(b) requirements for environmental purp oses relating to products, including
standards and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling;
Item 4: the provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of
trade measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and
requirements which have significant trade effects;  and
Item 6: the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to
developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions.
3. At a meeting on 29-30 June the CTE will discuss the Items related to the linkages between the
multilateral environment and trade agendas, including:
Information session with selected Secretariats of Multilateral Environmental Agreements;
Item 1: the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral
environmental agreements;
Item 5: the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading
system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements;
Item 7: the issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods;  and
Item 8: the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights.
4. On 12-13 October, the CTE's discussions will include:Items under the market access cluster (Items 2, 3, 4 and 6);
Items under the linkages between the multilateral environment and trade agendas cluster (Items 1, 5, 7
and 8);
Item 9: the work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the
Environment;
Item 10: input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations with
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in Article V of the
WTO;  and
adoption of the 1999 Report of the CTE
__________SECTION XII
WORKING GROUP ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TRADE AND INVESTMENTWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTI/3
22 October 1999
(99-4592)
REPORT (1999) OF THE WORKING GR OUP ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TRADE AND INVESTMENT TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
A. INTRODUCTION 1
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S 2 - 4
ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work 2
(b) Meetings held in 1999 3
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations 4
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999 5 - 107
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 7 - 33
TRADE AND INVESTMNET FOR DEVELOPMENT AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
II. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE 34 - 49
AND INVESTMENT
III. EXISTING INTERNATOINAL INSTRUMENTS AND 50 - 69
ACTIVITIES REGARDING TRADE AND INVESTMENT
(a) WTO provisions on matters related to investment 51 - 60
(b) Bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements 61 - 69
and initiatives;  implications for trade and investment flows
of existing international instruments
IV. ITEM IV OF THE CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED 70 - 107
FOR STUDY
ANNEX 1: TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL
DECLARATION, PARAGRAPH 20
ANNEX 2: CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED  FOR STUDY
ANNEX 3: TABULAR SUMMARY OF WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS
PROVIDED TO THE WORKING GROUP ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IN 1999WT/WGTI/3
Page 2
A. INTRODUCTION
1. At its meeting held on 9-11 and 18 December 1998, the General Council had before it in
document WT/WGTI/2 the Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade
and Investment and took the following decision with respect to the continuation of the work of thisWorking Group:
"The General Council decides that the Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and Investment shall continue the educational work that it has been
undertaking on the basis of the mandate contained in paragraph 20 of the Singapore
Ministerial Declaration. The work of the Working Group, which shall be reviewed by
the General Council, shall continue to be based on issues raised by Members with
respect to the subjects identified in the Checklist of Issues Suggested for Study.  It isunderstood that this decision is without prejudice to any future decision that might be
taken by the General Council, including in the context of its existing work
programme."
1
This report provides an overview of the work done by the Working Group in 1999 pursuant to theGeneral Council's decision.
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work
2. As was the case in 1997 and 1998, the work of the Working Group in 1999 has been based on
written contributions by Members and on oral statements, questions and answers by Members in the
Group. This material has been supplemented by information received from observerintergovernmental organizations and notes prepared by the Secretariat.  A tabular summary of written
contributions provided to the Group in 1999 is attached as Annex 3.
(b) Meetings held in 1999
3. The Working Group has held three formal meetings in 1999, on 22-23 March, 3 June and
24 September.  The dates of these meetings were determined in the light of the instruction inparagraph 22 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration that careful attention be given to coordinating
meetings of the Working Groups established under paragraphs 20 and 21 with those of relevant
UNCTAD bodies.  At both meetings, consideration was given to all Items of the Checklist of Issues
Suggested for Study. Reports on these meetings have been circulated in documents WT/WGTI/M/8, 9
and 10.
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations
4. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 20) encouraged the Working Group to
undertake its work in cooperation with UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora in
order to make the best use of available resources and to ensure that the development dimension is
taken fully into account.  In this regard, the IMF and the World Bank attended the Working Group's
meetings in an observer capacity, pursuant to the cooperation agreements concluded between the
WTO and these organizations.  UNCTAD, OECD and UNIDO also attended the meetings asobservers, on the basis of an invitation from the Working Group.  In the course of the Group's
                                                     
1 WT/GC/M/32, p. 52.  The text of paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration is reproduced
in Annex 1. The Checklist of Issues Suggested for Study is reproduced in Annex 2.WT/WGTI/3
Page 3
meetings, these organizations have kept the Group updated on their relevant activities and contributed
to the debate.  The Working Group is highly appreciative of the valuable contributions to its work
made by the observers.
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999
5. This part of the report provides an overview of the substantive work done in the Working
Group, pursuant to the mandate given in paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration and tothe General Council's decision adopted in December 1998.  By its very nature, such an overview
cannot reflect everything that was said and capture all nuances, such as can be found in the detailed
records of the two meetings of the Working Group (WT/WGTI/M/8 and 9) and in the written
contributions of Members (see Annex 3).
6. As provided for in the General Council's decision, the work undertaken in 1999 was
structured on the basis of the Checklist of Issues Suggested for Study which the Group took note of at
its meeting on 2 and 3 June 1997.  This summary uses the same structure.
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOIMIC GROWTH
7. Written contributions on this Item of the Checklist were provided by Korea (W/69)
2 and India
(W/73).  Oral statements were made by Korea, Australia, the European Communities, India, Japan,
the United States, Canada, Pakistan, Venezuela, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Switzerland, Mexico, thePhilippines on behalf of ASEAN WTO Members, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and the observer for the
World Bank.
8. With reference to the experience of one Member regarding the role of foreign direct
investment ("FDI") in the context of the Asian financ ial crisis, attention was drawn to recent empirical
studies which had found a positive correlation between a low level of net FDI and the occurrence of acurrency crisis. This was due, inter alia,  to the fact that FDI flows were more stable than portfolio
investment flows. The point was also made that FDI had played a stabilizing role in the current
financial crisis, as evidenced by the significant increases of FDI inflows experienced by this Member
in recent years. Information was provided on recent  changes in this Member's policy towards inward
FDI which were part of a more general process of structural policy reforms adopted after the onset ofthe Asian financial crisis.
3
9. Comments made on this Member's experience highlighted the positive, stabilizing role playedby FDI in the context of the Asian financial crisis and the relationship between, on the one hand, the
weakness of a country's financial infrastructure and its vulnerability to financial instability in
international markets and, on the other, a low level of FDI. Interest was expressed in the experiencesof other Members with respect to the role of FDI in the context of the Asian financial crisis.
4
10. With respect to the observations made by this Member on the difference between FDI andportfolio investment, the question was raised how as an operational matter a distinction could be made
between FDI and portfolio investment.
5  Related to this, the observation was made that, while FDI
was more stable than portfolio investment because it involved assets which were not easily transferred
abroad, it was not easy to attract one type of investor while discouraging the other, and that FDI and
                                                     
2 Documents issued in the series WT/WGTI/W/- are referred to in this report as "W/-".  Documents
issued in the series WT/WGTI/M/- are referred to  as "M/-".
3 M/8, para. 4.
4 M/8, para. 8;  M/9, paras. 2-3.
5 M/8, para. 8.WT/WGTI/3
Page 4
portfolio investment tended to take place together. It was stated, in this regard, that portfolio
investment made an important economic contribution to host economies by adding to national
savings, by broadening the array of lending terms available to domestic businesses and by stabilizing
the local economy by spreading credit risk.6 It was also stated that the distinction between long- and
short-term investment was more relevant than th e distinction between FDI and portfolio investment,
and that portfolio investment was not by definition short-term and speculative.7
11. In response to the comment on the difficulty  of distinguishing between FDI and portfolio
investment, it was said that many countries made this distinction in practice.8 It was also argued that
important differences existed not only between FDI and portfolio investment, but also between
various kinds of FDI.  In particular, FDI in the fo rm of acquisitions of existing domestic enterprises
was clearly less beneficial in terms of its impact on development than FDI in the form of greenfield
investment.9 This view was questioned on the grounds that  FDI in the form of acquisitions entailed
benefits deriving from greater access to capital, managerial skills, technology, and internationalmarkets.
10
12. The negative effects of volatile capital movements were mentioned as an issue which requiredfurther study in the Working Group.
11
13. As an example of the stabilising role of FDI in the Asian financial crisis,  mention was madeof data on the overseas activities of firms of one Member which showed that, while the sales of thesubsidiaries of these firms in four Asian countries had declined, the level of employment at these
subsidiaries had remained stable.
12
14. A number of issues raised at the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and Developmentwhich had taken place in March 1999 were identified as relevant to the work of the Working Group.
15. With reference to the point made at that Symposium that trade liberalization could not take
place in a vacuum, it was observed that  an increase in FDI did not automatically lead to economic
growth, and that the Working Group needed to consider a range of factors impacting on the
contribution of FDI to economic growth.
13 In response to this comment, it was stated that the work in
this Working Group was valuable precisely because it had allowed for a consideration of the
relationship between investment and development from a wider perspective.14
16. It was noted that, while in the debate at the Symposium on the relationship between
development and trade openness views had differed on the desirable pace of trade liberalization, no
support had been expressed for closed markets, and that investment had often been included in
references to the value of openness for development. The importance of capacity building, which had
been stressed at the Symposium, should also be looked at from the perspective of investment.  Withreference to the argument advanced at the Symposium that bound, duty-free treatment of imports from
least-developed countries was important inter alia   because uncertainty regarding the tariff treatment
of their exports hampered FDI in these countries, it  was stated that the conditions for FDI in these
countries obviously could be even more directly affected by a lack of predictability of the regulatory
                                                     
6 M/9, para. 2.
7 M/8, para. 8.
8 M/8, para. 8.
9 M/8, para. 8.
10 M/8, para. 8.
11 M/8, para. 9.
12 M/10, para. 5.
13 M/8, para. 9.
14 M/8, para. 10.WT/WGTI/3
Page 5
framework for foreign investment.15 Enhancing the transparency of the regulatory framework was
important not only to attract foreign investment but also to foster domestic investment.16
17. It was noted that a number of speakers at the Symposium had pointed to the need forgovernment intervention.  Bearing in mind that th e contribution of FDI to development differed,
depending on the kind of economic activity concerned, the need for an active government role
appeared to be incompatible with the notion of a multilateral framework on investment which wouldinevitably reduce the policy discretion of governments.
17  In response to this comment, it was stated
that the appropriate extent of government intervention was for each individual country to decide, but
that this issue had little bearing on the shape of the investment regime for all investors, whether they
were government-owned or privately-owned, and thus did not detract from the importance of a
transparent and non-discriminatory investment regime.18 Reference was made to the experiences of
several Members with negative effects of excessive government intervention19 and to academic
studies which indicated that over time countries were departing from government intervention. Thus,empirical studies showed a trend toward the reduction of the use of performance requirements,
reflecting the experience of countries that these requirements, once seen as essential, in the end had
proved detrimental.
20 However, another view expressed was that, in light of the present financial
crisis, there was a growing opinion among scholars and practitioners in favour of government
intervention, and that performance requirements and incentives were used extensively by manydeveloping countries and were useful given their present stage of development.
21 Finally, the
observation was made that the discussions at the Symposium had shown that in recent years there had
been an important evolution in the debate on the role of governments in the process of economic
development in that it was now increasingly recognized that an active government role to pursue
specific development objectives was not incompatible with strategies based on openness tointernational integration and adherence to a framework of international, market-oriented rules.
22
18. Reference was made to the view expressed at the Symposium by some academic experts thatthe linkages between trade and investment did not me rit a consideration of rules on investment in the
WTO.
23
19. The relationship of FDI to technology development of host economies was another prominent
theme of debate under this Item of the Checklist. In this respect, the Working Group had before it a
Note by the Secretariat on "The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Development:  Technology
and other Know-How Transfers and Spillovers" (WT/WGTI/W/65).
20. Support was expressed for the analysis contained in this Note of the contribution of FDI to
economic development which resulted from the diff usion of technology and other know-how arising
from various kinds of spillover effects.24 Reference was made in this connection to empirical studies
which provided evidence of the contribution of FDI to technological development of one Member
through the transfer of technology from parent companies to their foreign affiliates, the diffusion of
                                                     
15 M/8, para. 10.
16 M/8, para. 11.
17 M/8, para. 9.
18 M/8, para. 10.
19 M/8, paras. 10 and 13.
20 M/8, para. 15.
21 M/8, para. 16.
22 M/8, para. 14.
23 M/8, para. 12.
24 M/8, paras. 17-18, 21-22.WT/WGTI/3
Page 6
technology arising from linkages between foreign affili ates and local firms, and through research and
development projects initiated by foreign affiliates.25
21. The point in the Secretariat Note that the most significant channels for the dissemination ofmodern, advanced technology were the spillover effect s of FDI, rather than formal technology transfer
agreements, was endorsed
26, but it was also stated that on this issue the Note did not adequately take
into consideration other views.27
22. The importance was emphasized of the conclusions drawn in the Secretariat Note that the
positive effects of FDI through technology and other know-how spillovers depended upon the
characteristics and policies of host economies, and that the existence of a competitive environment
and local technological capabilities were especially important in this regard.  It was argued that
optimal policies  to enhance the contribution of FDI to technological development of host countries
should aim at improving local technology capabilities, education and infrastructure and at ensuring an
adequate regulatory framework in areas such as competition policy and the protection of intellectualproperty. By contrast, policies involving government intervention in investors' decisions, such as
performance requirements and transfer of technology requirements had been demonstrated to be often
counterproductive. The point was also made that, in order for FDI liberalization to produce the
expected outcome, including technological advance, strong economic fundamentals and sound
management of macro-economic policies were essential.
28
23. The view was also expressed that, while the main message of the Secretariat Note seemed to
be that technology transfer might occur automatically as a result of FDI, and that where this was not
the case a range of policy measures were available to host countries to stimulate and secure such
transfers and spillovers,  the Note did not adequately analyze the need and scope for specific policies
to enhance the contribution of FDI to technologica l development of host countries.  Thus, the Note
failed to give due attention to the role of performance requirements, except that paragraph 71 pointed
to the costs of such requirements.  The observations made in paragraph 72 clearly had important
implications regarding the need for a certain role of  governments, but the Note failed to discuss these
implications. A more general point made in this connection was that the discussion so far in the
Working Group on FDI and technology transfers and spillovers was somewhat inconclusive andunsatisfactory because it was not informed by a su fficiently detailed analysis of the nature and
effectiveness of specific policies used by governments to promote the transfer of technology.  In this
regard, it was suggested that the Secretariat undertake an analysis of the relationship of performance
requirements and investment incentives to the transfer of technology.
29
24. The point was made that in discussions on the transfer of technology there was a tendency to
view technology flows through the prism of competitive markets, while in reality international
investment and technology flows were determined by decisions of multinational enterprises taken in a
context of oligopolistic equilibrium in which such enterprises sustained their strategic market
dominance through the systematic application of various policies, such as localization of individual
stages of production, the use of internal transfer prices and technological innovation.  These strategies
could not be adequately understood within a model of perfectly competitive markets in which any
active development policy was seen as per se  distorting investment, trade and technology flows.  The
strategic considerations underlying the investment decisions of multinational enterprises explained the
fact that such firms preferred to buy from their affiliates to protect their dominant market positions
even where efficient local suppliers existed.  This strategically-motivated conduct necessitated  policy
                                                     
25 M/8, para. 21.
26 M/8, paras. 17-18.
27 M/8, para. 20.
28 M/8, paras. 17-19, 21-22 , 26-27;  M/9, para. 5.
29 M/8, paras. 20-21.WT/WGTI/3
Page 7
responses on the part of host countries, for example through measures to encourage multinational
enterprises to conduct research and developmen t in host countries with a view to enhancing
productive capabilities of local suppliers. 30
25. It was stated that the conclusions drawn in the Secretariat Note were perhaps valid for somecountries in some circumstances, but that there were also other views. Since multinational enterprises
accounted for almost two-thirds of world trade and had a virtual monopoly on the transfer oftechnology, there was a basic asymmetry between the buyers and the sellers of technology, which was
a fundamental factor in regard to the type of technology available to host countries.  A number of
studies had shown that there were indirect costs associated with the transfer of technology, such as
confidentiality requirements and export restrictions.  In addition, the transfer of technology was not
facilitated by the fact that international agreements, such as the TRIPS Agreement, reflected the view
that technology was of a proprietary nature.  In view of these considerations, it was naïve to believe
that FDI would automatically lead to the transfer of technology.
31
26. In response to this observation, it was stated that,  in  the context of investment, the issue was
not the relations between buyers and sellers of technology but the inflow of technology into an
economy through investment.  Mention was made in this connection of the experience of one Member
regarding the tangible benefits from technology flow s associated with FDI. This Member had made a
commitment in a number of investment agreements not to impose transfer of technology requirementsas a condition for an investment because it believed that the imposition of such requirements had
negative consequences, in particular in the context of intense international competition for investment
and technology.
32
27. With regard to observations made in contributions by one Member regarding the importanceof policy intervention to enhance the contribution of  FDI to the transfer of technology and intangible
assets, mention was made of studies which had found examples of negative effects of such policy
intervention. While these studies did not necessarily indicate that policy intervention always resulted
in negative effects on the transfer of technology, they provided some empirical evidence that
technology transfer through non-market mechanisms could cause unexpected negative effects, and
that local conditions in host countries, such as a high level of technical skills, infrastructure and a
competitive environment, were more important determinants of technology transfer and spillovers.
33
With respect to the same contributions, it was stated  that they seemed to suggest that  governments
should step in and force technology transfer and it was argued that, given that the WTO rules placed
restraints on governmental intervention, this su ggestion was contrary to the disciplines and
motivations underlying the WTO.34
28. In response to these comments, it was stated that, while in some circumstances policy
intervention with respect to the transfer of technology might have adverse consequences, the
fundamental point made in these contributions was that it was for each country to decide what were
the appropriate policies to adopt in light of its ow n circumstances.  The contributions  did not suggest
that governments should intervene to ensure that transfer of technology took place at any cost.
Rather, the point was that, if one left it completely to market forces, transfer of technology might not
happen at all. A number of African countries had completely liberal investment regimes but had notexperienced any technology transfer.  Thus, to say that a liberal FDI regime would automatically give
rise to FDI and associated transfer of technology seemed a very simplistic approach.  Equally
simplistic would be to draw the conclusion from these contributions that there was only a role for
                                                     
30 M/8, para. 23.
31 M/8, para. 24.
32 M/8, para. 25.
33 M/9, para. 4.
34 M/9, para. 6.WT/WGTI/3
Page 8
governmental intervention.  While attracting FDI was important, the space for policy intervention
should not be severely restricted. In light of the existence of provisions on the transfer of technology
in several WTO agreements, for example in the TRI PS Agreement, it could not be said that the WTO
had nothing to do with the subject of technolo gy transfer. These existing WTO provisions on
technology transfer needed to be strengthened to encourage the transfer of technology on reasonable
terms.35
29. In response to the point that an open investment regime did not automatically lead to transfer
of technology, it was stated that one should distinguish between the issue of the factors which
determined a country's capacity to attract FDI, on the one hand, and the issue of appropriate policies
regarding the transfer of technology, on the other.  The capacity of a country to attract FDI depended
in the first place upon the existence of profitable investment opportunities.  While the existence of an
open investment regime did not mean that a coun try would automatically be able to attract FDI,
instability and lack of transparency of the investment regime could increase the perceived risk of theinvestment and thus deter investment decisions.  Policies involving the compulsory transfer of
technology which did not give sufficient guarantees to the investor that it would reap a legitimate
profit from using that technology could deter investment decisions.
36 However, the view was also
expressed that, while it could be argued that, if a country forced a company to transfer technology,
this would diminish a country's attractiveness for FDI, what was involved was a bilateral contract
between an enterprise and a government.  Sinc e a company would not engage in transfer of
technology if it felt that the conditions imposed were too strict, host-country governments knew
exactly the risk of applying such conditions.  The point was also made that a distinction should be
made between  the use of a particular technology in a country and the transfer of that technology.
Especially in regard to high technology, transfer of technology often did not occur even though thetechnology was actually being used in the country by a particular company.
37
30. Reference was made to the experience of some Members which had benefitted substantiallyfrom the transfer of technology associated with FDI, notwithstanding the absence of legislative
provisions requiring transfer of technology.  The positive impact of such transfer of technology was
evident in the growth and diversification of e xports and the improvement in the quality of the
domestic infrastructure.  Thus, the benefits of FDI that arose from its contribution to the transfer of
technology could be achieved through the operation of market forces.
38 It was also argued that the
process of globalization augmented the contribution of  FDI to the transfer of technology in that the
competitive pressures facing multinational enterprises in international markets compelled such
enterprises to enhance the efficiency of their operations.  An important example of this phenomenonwas the transfer of technology in the context of sub-contracting arrangements with local suppliers of
parts and components.
39
31. The view was expressed that the concept of government intervention with regard to the
transfer of technology was not necessarily incompatible with WTO rules and principles.40 It was
stated that while active policies to promote the transfer of technology were justified because of the
fact that markets for technology were not perfectly competitive, experience also demonstrated that
policies involving the compulsory transfer of technology did not achieve the intended results becausethe technology transferred was often limited to process technology instead of core technology.  It was
therefore necessary for governments to be able to implement active policies which were not
compulsory but which tended to promote the transf er of technology on reasonable commercial terms,
                                                     
35 M/9, para. 7.
36 M/9, para. 9.
37 M/9, para. 12.
38 M/9, para. 10.
39 M/9, para. 11.
40 M/9, paras. 12-13.WT/WGTI/3
Page 9
including promotion of research and development activities and the formation of productive clusters.
Mention was made of one Member's positive experience with this kind of policy in the petroleum
sector.  Rather than focusing on the question of whether or not countries should oblige multinational
enterprises to transfer technology, the Working Group should concentrate its study on the
identification of market-friendly and WTO-consistent policy instruments to promote the transfer of
technology.41
32. It was stated that there appeared to be two grounds on which there was opposition to
government policies aimed at encouraging the transfer of technology.  The first was that such policies
were not effective;  the second was that such policies might deter FDI.  Whether such policies were
effective was essentially an empirical question on which evidence appeared to be mixed and for which
further study was required.  There was no conclusive evidence to justify a sweeping assertion that
technology transfer measures taken by governments had in all cases been counterproductive.  As to
the argument that technology transfer policies would deter FDI, this was essentially a matter forgovernments to consider in light of their experience.  The experience of some developing countries
was that in certain cases it might be useful to institute policies which might encourage transfer of
technology.  If a country found that this had a negative impact on FDI inflows, it would obviously
reconsider its policies and seek to restore the balance between attracting investment and regulating
investment to promote development.
42
33. The Working Group was informed of studies prepared by the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service, a joint service of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, on criteria and
procedures for the screening of FDI and on backwa rd linkages between multinational enterprises and
suppliers in host countries.43
II. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
34. A written contribution was provided by India (W/72). Oral statements were made by Costa
Rica, the European Communities, Switzerland, Korea, Mexico, the United States, the Dominican
Republic, Singapore, India, Canada, Venezuela, E gypt, Argentina, Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN
WTO Members, Brazil and Hong Kong, China.
35. The discussions under this Item of the Checklist centred on the issue of investment incentives.36. The view was expressed that fiscal incentives to attract investment were a second-best
solution, and that a more efficient approach was to directly address the causes of market failures.  The
costs of fiscal incentives often exceeded their benefits, especially in the case of competition between
countries or regions to attract investment through the granting of incentives.  The effects of such
incentives were mainly negative as they reduced global welfare, distorted investment flows andrelated trade flows and delayed the necessary structural reform.  Moreover, most decisions of
investors appeared not to be affected by incentives.  While the legitimate concerns of countries which
needed to provide incentives to attract investment  should be recognized, the first-best policy for
countries wishing to attract FDI was to commit to  long-term reform of the regulatory and economic
environment.
 44
37. It was stated that  there appeared to be a view that, since investment incentives were second-best solutions, they should either be eliminated or be disciplined.  However, the granting of incentivesdid not mean that there was no recognition of the need to address underlying distortions through the
                                                     
41 M/9, para. 13.
42 M/9, para. 14.
43 M/10, paras. 3-4.
44 M/8, para. 30.WT/WGTI/3
Page 10
adoption of other policies.  Rather, incentives were an important additional tool, together with other
polices aimed at addressing distortions, and  they played an essential role in economic development.45
38. The point was made that the divergent views of Members on investment incentives illustrated
why Members were not yet ready to initiate negotiations on multilateral investment rules in the WTO.
If investment incentives were as distortive as had been argued by some Members, it was difficult to
understand that their use was widespread among de veloped countries. Mention was made of the
positive experience of one Member with the use of investment incentives, for example to promote
export diversification.46
39. In response to this observation, it was stated that the widespread use of investment incentives,including by developed countries, did not mean that there was no need to consider possible
disciplines.  A key argument which had motivated the creation of multilateral rules on subsidies in the
area of trade in goods was that developed countries with deep pockets had a greater capacity to grant
subsidies than developing countries.  The same argument was valid with respect to investmentincentives.
47 It was also stated that the granting of investment incentives amounted to a transfer of
money from the domestic tax payers to a foreign investor, which was especially unfair from the
perspective of developing countries in which the tax base was often quite limited.  It was likely that in
many cases decisions were made to invest in developed countries because investors received more
generous incentives than in developing countries.  It was suggested that the Secretariat attempt tomake a comparison between OECD and non-OECD countries with respect to their aggregate
expenditures on incentives.
48
40. The view was expressed that,  instead of focusing on whether incentives were good or bad,the first question to be asked was why both developing and developed countries granted investment
incentives.  While it was understandable that developing countries sometimes needed to useinvestment incentives, it was more difficult to understand why developed countries used incentives, in
particular in light of the fact that these countries generally took the view that market forces should
determine the allocation of resources.
49
41. The need for further work aimed at distinguishing between various kinds of investmentincentives was emphasized.  A specific proposal was made that the Secretariat undertake a studywhich would differentiate between various kinds of investment incentives, their effects, and the
possible disciplines that could apply to specific kinds of incentives.
50 It was suggested that a possible
classification of investment incentives might contain four categories:  (1) financial incentives;  (2)
fiscal incentives;  (3) subsidized services;  and (4) market privileges.51  The need to take into account
incentives granted at different levels of government was also mentioned.52
42. Regarding the proposal for a study of different types of investment incentives, the comment
was made that the Working Group also needed to pay more attention to the distorting impact of
various kinds of trade policy measures on investment flows, such as rules of origin in regional trade
agreements. The question of investment incentives should be considered within a broader conceptual
framework which encompassed a range of factors affecting locational decisions. In this respect,
                                                     
45 M/8, para. 36.
46 M/8, para. 34.
47 M/8, para. 35.
48 M/8, para. 39.
49 M/9, para. 25.
50 M/8, para. 32.
51 M/9, para. 28.
52 M/9, para. 28.WT/WGTI/3
Page 11
reference was made to the concept of "investment-related trade measures," which was the subject of a
recent UNCTAD publication.53
43. The view was expressed that there was a need to explore the possibility of multilateraldisciplines with respect to investment incentives. Such disciplines should not provide for a prohibition
of incentives but strike a balance between the recognition of important policy objectives served by
incentives and the need to minimize their distorting effects on investment flows. In this respect, the
proposal was made that the Working Group explore the possibility of classifying incentives into
allowable and prohibited incentives. In regard to the notion that different disciplines for different
kinds of incentives might be warranted, depending upon their distorting effects, the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was mentioned as an example.   It was also argued that
consideration of possible multilateral disciplines on incentives should be inspired by the fundamental
WTO principles of non-discrimination and transparency.
54
44. The suggestion that the Working Group atte mpt to distinguish between allowable and
prohibited incentives was opposed on the grounds that it would create difficulties in regard to the
distinction already contained in the SCM Agreement between allowable and prohibited subsidies, that
it was incompatible with the educational nature of the mandate of the Working Group, and that it was
inappropriate in light of the sensitivity of the subject. A further observation made in this connection
was that, while the developed countries provided very substantial up-front grants to firms, developingcountries, which did not have the financial resources to provide such grants, usually granted
performance-based incentives.  A comprehensive consideration of this subject should therefore
include the grants offered by developed countries.
55
45. In reaction to these objections, it was stated that the proposal to attempt to distinguishbetween allowable and prohibited incentives was not limited in scope to certain kinds of incentivesbut was intended to address all forms of incentiv es comprehensively. The point was made that the
term incentives should be understood to cover any actions by governments which provided a financial
advantage to a recipient.  In this sense, the conc ept of incentives was similar to the notion of subsidy
as defined in the SCM Agreement.  If the term in centives was interpreted in this manner, it was self-
evident that grants were included and that there was no basis for distinguishing between fiscalincentives and other kinds of incentives. It was also observed that an attempt to distinguish at a
conceptual level between desirable and undesirable incentives could further the Group's understanding
of this subject and was therefore not incompatible with the educational character of the Group's
work.
56
46. The point was made that the Working Group should adopt a more differentiated approach not
only with respect to incentives but also with respect to performance requirements.57
47. With respect to the indent of this Item of the Checklist concerning the degree of correlationbetween trade and investment flows, attention wa s drawn to a recent OECD study on the relationship
between trade and investment which had found, on the basis of an examination of data on 14 OECD
member countries, overwhelming evidence that FDI tended to be complementary to trade.  Intra-firm
trade was a central element of this complementary relationship.  For host countries, the immediate
result of FDI was an increase in imports but in the medium-term their export capacity increased due tothe inflow of capital and productive assets and the positive spillovers with respect to technology and
                                                     
53 M/8, paras. 34 and 66.
54 M/8, paras. 30-31 and 38;  M/9, paras. 17-19.
55 M/9, paras. 21-23 and 25.
56 M/9, paras. 24 and 26.
57 M/8, paras. 40-41.WT/WGTI/3
Page 12
management.  The study therefore found that countries which were both substantial outward and
inward investors stood to gain in trade terms from both outward and inward FDI.58
48. The comment was made that the findings in this OECD study appeared to differ somewhatfrom the conclusions drawn in the Note by the Se cretariat on the relationship between trade and FDI
(W/7), which had found that in some instances there was substitution between trade and investment.
59
49. Regarding the indent of this Item of the Checklist concerning the relationship between
investment and competition policy, the view was expressed that a competition-oriented reform of
WTO rules with a view to increasing the synergies between trade, competition and investment
policies was essential to ensure that WTO rules remained valid and credible in a technology-driven
globalized economy. In this connection it was proposed that , in order to ensure that trade policy and
investment policy were mutually reinforcing, these policies should be reviewed in light of the
competition policy concept of market contestability. Examples of measures which required attention
from this perspective were performance requirements, investment incentives, the abuse of anti-dupingpractices and the use of restrictive rules of origin.
60
III. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND ACTIVITIES REGARDINGTRADE AND INVESTMENT
50. A written contribution was provided by India (W /71).  Oral statements were made by India,
the European Communities, the United States, Egypt, Japan, Pakistan, Korea, Venezuela, Brazil,Hong Kong, China, and the observers for UNCTAD and the OECD.
(a) WTO provisions on matters related to investment
51. The view was expressed that existing WTO prov isions relevant to investment, as contained in
the TRIMs Agreement, the GATS and the SCM Agreement, were limited in scope and lacked
coherence.
61 The different treatment of investment in services and in manufacturing was highlighted
in this respect.  It was suggested that, in co nsidering possible future WTO rules on investment,
account should be taken of approaches reflected in existing WTO rules, such as the "positive list"
approach and the concept of a progressive development of rules under the GATS.62
52. Specific suggestions were made regarding themes meriting consideration in the WorkingGroup with respect to the TRIMs Agreement and the GATS.
53. With regard to the TRIMs Agreement, it was proposed that the Working Group study whether
and how the review of this Agreement provided for in Article 9 thereof  might contribute to achieving
investment liberalization in a multilateral context.  In this connection, it was proposed that the
Working Group consider proposals which had been made to prohibit certain performance
requirements, such as joint venture, local ownership and technology transfer requirements, and thatthe Working Group examine possible improvements  to the TRIMs Agreement with respect to
investment incentives. The point was made that, while it was unrealistic to call for the prohibition of
all investment incentives in the WTO at this stag e, there was merit in exploring ways to discourage
Members from engaging in unhealthy competition for investment and to minimize the distortive
effects of investment incentives.
63
                                                     
58 M/para. 42.
59 M/8, para. 43.
60 M/9, para. 29.
61 M/8, para. 52;  M/9, para. 32.
62 M/9, para. 33.
63 M/8, para. 52.WT/WGTI/3
Page 13
54. With regard to the GATS, it was proposed that the Working Group consider the feasibility of
expanding the scope of the GATS to encompass provisions on investment protection and to cover all
forms of FDI.  Reference was made in this regard to the negotiations foreseen in Article XIX of the
GATS.64
55. With respect to the suggestion that the Working Group consider proposals to proscribe certainperformance requirements, including transfer of technology requirements,  the observation was made
that there was an inconsistency between the view that an investment agreement should be promoted
on the grounds that FDI brought in technology to th e host country, and the view that host countries
should be denied the ability to require investors to transfer technology.
65 While FDI might entail a
transfer of technology from a parent to its foreign affiliate, this did not necessarily lead to diffusion of
such technology to the host economy more generally.66
56. A different view was that there was no inco nsistency between the view that FDI brought
technology to a host country and the view that foreign investors should not be forced to transfertechnology.  Rather, the real inconsistency was between the claim that forced technology transfer
helped the development process and the evidence which showed that, when forced to bring in a
particular type of technology, investors would either not enter a market at all or bring in less advanced
technology.
67
57. However, the view that firms would react to transfer of technology requirements by not
entering the market at all or by bringing in a lowe r level of technology was said to be contradicted by
one Member's experience which showed that firms used a certain level of technology in their global
operations and found it costly to use an inferior type of technology for the purpose of investing in a
particular country. The concept of a "forced" transfer of technology was questioned on the grounds
that in practice host countries encouraged the transfer of technology through a variety of incentivesrather than through compulsory measures.
68
58. It was stated that,  if the effect of performance requirements was that investors would bring inless advanced technology, this would be a compelling argument against the use of such requirements.
However, if, as had been argued, firms would br ing in the most advanced technology anyway, the
question arose as to why performance requirements were necessary.
69 The  observation was also made
that the effect of a technology transfer requirement on the level of technology used by a foreign
investor depended on many circumstances, including the nature of the industry.70
59. The suggestion that the Working Group study the issue of the review of the TRIMsAgreement under Article 9 attracted some support,
71  but it was also observed that, though the
Working Group could discuss substantive issues which might also be raised in the context of thereview under Article 9, the formal competence to co nduct this review rested with the Council for
Trade in Goods.
72 The point was made that the express reference made to the review of the TRIMs
Agreement in the decision establishing this Working Group served to highlight the interface between
                                                     
64 M/8, para. 52.
65 M/8, para. 53.
66 M/8, para. 55.
67 M/8, para. 54.
68 M/8, para. 56.
69 M/8, para. 57.
70 M/8, para. 58.
71 M/8, paras. 59-60.
72 M/8, paras. 61-62.WT/WGTI/3
Page 14
the work of the Working Group and the review of the TRIMs Agreement and underlined the need for
consistency in this regard.73
60. Scepticism was expressed as to the possibility of extending the GATS to all forms of FDI inview of the fact that the structure and obligations of the GATS specifically related to services.
74
(b) Bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives;  implications fortrade and investment flows of existing international instruments
61. In a statement on one Member's experience with bilateral investment treaties the main
features of such treaties were described, including provisions on the definition of investment, the
scope of the agreements, Most-Favoured-Nation treatment and national treatment, expropriation,
compensation and repatriation, dispute settlement and the duration and termination of the agreements.
The point was made that bilateral investment treaties had found favour with developing countries
because they did not restrict the ability of host countries to follow their own FDI policies in light of
their unique needs and circumstances.  Under these treaties, developing countries had the freedom togrant national treatment only in the post-establishmen t phase, subject to such qualifications as they
deemed necessary.
75
62. In respect of the latter observation, the question was raised as to what kind of qualifications tonational treatment this Member considered useful, and what was the relationship between this
Member's bilateral investment treaties and the Most-Favoured-Nation principle.
76  In response, it was
stated that the Member in question had consistently taken the position that it was not possible for
developing countries to accord a right of establishment or national treatment in the pre-establishment
phase and that the entry of foreign investment needed  to be regulated. The bilateral investment treaties
concluded by this Member accorded national treatment and MFN treatment once investments had
been admitted in accordance with the applicable policy framework.  Bilateral investment treatiesprovided protection of foreign investment and did not deal with market access issues.  By contrast, the
current discussion in this Working Group centred on the need and desirability of a possible
multilateral framework, the main focus of which was market access.  Because of this qualitative
difference between bilateral investment treaties and the proposed multilateral rules on investment, the
argument that multilateral rules were more efficient because they would obviate the need forconcluding a large number of bilateral treaties was without merit.
77
63. In a comment on these observations, it was stated that market access was only one of anumber of issues that had been discussed in the Working Group, along with investment protection and
development.
78
64. It was noted that in the description of this Member's bilateral investment treaties it was stated
that foreign investments were accorded the same treatment as domestic investments in the post-
establishment phase, but that such national treatm ent was not accorded to foreign investors.  An
explanation was requested of the rationale for this distinction between foreign investments  and foreign
investors  and of how this distinction operated in practice.  The question was also raised as to whether
the provisions in these bilateral investment treaties on repatriation facilities also covered payments,
                                                     
73 M/8, para. 63.
74 M/8, para. 61.
75 M/8, para. 47.
76 M/8, para. 48.
77 M/8, para. 49.
78 M/8, para. 50.WT/WGTI/3
Page 15
such as interest payments and payments for goods, and whether these treaties contained a structure for
exceptions.79
65. The view was expressed that not enough attention had been paid so far to the concreteimplications of principles such as national treatment and MFN treatment.
80
66. The Working Group was informed of relevant recent activities of UNCTAD and the OECD.
67. With respect to UNCTAD, information was provided on meetings organized by UNCTAD
with representatives of civil society which  were aimed at providing a forum for public-private sector
dialogue on issues related to international investment agreements;  a seminar organized at the request
of the Group of 15 at which a number of bilateral investment treaties had been concluded between G-
15 countries;  regional symposia in Egypt, Argentina and the People's Republic of China  on key
concepts and issues relevant to international investment agreements;  a joint WTO-UNCTAD seminar
on trade, investment and development for Geneva-based delegates; an Expert Meeting on the question
of how international investment agreements could provide for flexibility in the interest of promotinggrowth and development; and the publication of a new series of Issues Papers on concepts and issues
relevant to international investment agreements.
81
68. With respect to the OECD, the Working Group was informed that negotiations on a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") were no longer taking place and that further work in
the OECD on investment rules would be of an analytical nature. To this end, the OECD Committee onInternational Investment and Multinational Enterprises had recently adopted a new work programme
on international investment which envisaged analytical work on five specific issues:  (1) analysis of
OECD member countries' investment rules, including the definition of investment in relation to issues
raised by financial crises;  (2) non-discrimination and social policies;  (3) non-discrimination and
environmental policies;  (4) non-discrimination, investment protection and national sovereignty;  and(5) investment incentives and investment promotion.  The aim was to complete this work programme
by Spring 2000. OECD member countries were also undertaking the first review of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises since 1991 as  part of the normal follow-up process to ensure
that the Guidelines were effective and that necessa ry changes were made to ensure their continued
relevance.  The current review would address both  the implementation procedures and the substantive
provisions of the Guidelines.  The main issues in the review were the territorial scope of the
Guidelines, i.e. the question as to whether the Guidelines should apply to the global operations of
OECD-based multinational enterprises or only to their operations in OECD countries;  the possible
need to update the Guidelines in certain areas, notably labour and the environment;  and ways and
means to strengthen the procedures for implementation of the Guidelines, especially with regard to the
role of national contact points. A special working group had been established for the purpose of
considering the suggestions that had been made concerning possible changes to the scope of
application, substantive provisions and implementation procedures of the Guidelines.  In connection
with this review, there had also been a meeting with representatives of civil society.
82
69. It was observed that the fact that the further work envisaged in the OECD on internationalinvestment rules was of an exploratory and analytical nature underlined the need to proceed with
caution in this area.  It was proposed that, in order that the Working Group might benefit from theexperience gained by OECD member countries in the MAI negotiations, the Secretariat prepare a
                                                     
79 M/9, para. 36.
80 M/8, para. 48.
81 M/8, paras. 64;  M/9, para. 38.
82 M/8, para. 65;  M/9, para. 39.WT/WGTI/3
Page 16
factual account of the difficulties that had been encountered in these negotiations and of the positions
that had been taken on these issues.83
IV. ITEM IV OF THE CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED FOR STUDY
70. Written contributions were provided by India (W/74), Japan (W/75), Korea (W/70 and 79),
Australia (W/80), and the European Community and member States (W/81).  Oral statements were
made by India, Japan, Korea, Costa Rica, the European Communities, Egypt, Argentina, Canada,Chile, the Philippines on behalf of ASEAN WTO Members, the United States, Brazil, Venezuela,
Malaysia, India, Mexico, Singapore, Australia, Hong Kong, China, and the observer for UNCTAD.
A note was submitted by the Secretariat on issues raised and views expressed in the discussions in the
Working Group on the definition of the term investment in international investment agreements
(W/76).  Written contributions were provided by UNCTAD on the issue of how international
investment agreements can provide for flexibil ity in the interest of promoting growth and
development (W/77 and 78).
71. Referring to a contribution made by a Member, a statement was made which identified certain
themes which needed to be taken into account by the Working Group in its consideration of this Item.
First, the fundamental factors explaining decisions of multinational enterprises to invest in developing
countries were availability of natural resources, market size, and the existence of a suitable platform
for exports.  The strength of local institutions, the quality of local infrastructure and of the work forceand the degree of macro-economic stability also played a role.  Second, certain possible negative
effects of FDI needed to be addressed, including restrictions on the transfer of technology, the
negative impact of FDI on the balance of payments and exchange rates, and the crowding out of
domestic entrepreneurial activity. A number of studies had pointed out that countries at low levels of
development were likely to be able to induce FDI only to low technology activities.  Third, the
situation of developing countries as net importers of capital and technology and the competitive gap
which existed between their enterprises and multinational enterprises should be acknowledged. The
experience of developing countries showed that the building-up of domestic entrepreneurial, industrial
and technological capabilities was essential not only to cope with, but also to realize the full benefits
from FDI and foreign technology.  Fourth, capital and labour were complementary factors ofproduction which needed to be studied together. Fifth, the issue of obligations of foreign investors
should be dealt with, in which connection acc ount should be taken of relevant OECD and UN
instruments.  Finally, the development dimension should be placed at the centre of the work of the
Group.
84
72. In regard to a contribution on the role of inte rnational investment rules in ensuring stability
and transparency of the legal systems and policies of host countries,  the point was made that  lack of
such stability and transparency reduced the abilit y of foreign investors to develop their business
operations based on long-term plans, increased the costs of their investments, and distorted the
conditions of competition in favour of domestic firms.  Enhancing stability and transparency would
not only remove these problems faced by foreign investors, but would also benefit local firms and
would contribute overall to the development of host countries.  Based on existing international
agreements, certain provisions which were essential to enhancing transparency and stability ofinvestment laws and regulations could be identified, including rules on the publication of laws and
regulations and on the availability of enquiry points, due process requirements with regard to
authorization and licensing procedures, non-discrimination requirements, standstill requirements, and
dispute settlement procedures. Since rules designed to enhance transparency and stability could entail
administrative costs for host countries and might deprive them of some of their policy tools which
                                                     
83 M/8, para. 66.
84 M/8, para. 70.WT/WGTI/3
Page 17
provided necessary protection to their domestic industries,  developing countries needed to be given
sufficient time for the implementation of such rules.85
73. The view was expressed that it was doubtful that the alleged problems of lack of stability andtransparency described in the above-mentioned contribution warranted the creation of multilateral
rules on investment. In this respect, it was argued that in an era of globalization it was in each
country's self interest to improve its domestic regulatory framework in order to compete successfullyfor FDI. The point was also made that the contribution did not offer a sufficiently detailed  description
of these problems to make it possible to determine how prevalent they were in practice.  It was
possible that these problems were due to practices of the enterprises concerned, and that they might be
addressed more effectively through appropriate representation with individual governments of host
countries, including in the context of bilateral investment treaties. A further observation made in this
connection was that multilateral rules might compound problems arising in connection with FDI by
overly emphasizing the protection of foreign investment, and that such rules, if necessary,  shouldaddress in a balanced manner the diverse and evolving interests of all countries.  Any consideration of
benefits of multilateral investment rules could not be confined to the benefits of such rules for home
countries and foreign investors, but should also address the question of whether multilateral rules
would translate into more investment flows and cons equent net benefits for host countries.  Related to
this, it was stated that the multilateral rules on investment advocated in this contribution lacked adevelopment dimension. This development dimension should find concrete expression in specific
substantive aspects of investment rules, notably with respect to the discretion of host-country
governments with regard to the establishment of  foreign investment, their ability to use policy
instruments to pursue legitimate sectoral, locational and development objectives, and provisions on
the transfer of technology.  Consequently, an approach to the development dimension which only
centred on extended timeframes for implementation was inadequate.
86
74. With respect to another contribution on the role multilateral rules on investment in enhancingtransparency and stability of the legal environment for FDI, the point was made that, unlike bilateral
investment treaties, which had not been effective in addressing the issue of transparency, multilateral
rules could establish a set of common standards regarding the transparency of foreign investmentregimes. The very process of participating in the negotiation of such rules could improve the
transparency of a country's regulatory framework for foreign investment in that it necessitated a
comprehensive review of a country's laws and regulations affecting foreign investment. Multilateral
investment rules should provide for technical assistance to aid developing countries to establish a
comprehensive, yet focused list of all regula tions and rules governing foreign investment.
Transparency provisions as a core component of a multilateral investment treaty would serve as a
valuable reference for countries desiring to enhance the overall level of transparency of their
investment regime.
87
75. With respect to concerns which had been raised on previous occasions about the possiblenegative effects of FDI, the implications of  multilateral rules on investment for policy autonomy and
the uncertainty as to whether such rules on investment would actually lead to increased investment
flows which would benefit host countries,  the view was expressed that these concerns werelegitimate, but that they did not provide a compelli ng argument against the benefits of multilateral
rules on investment. It was stated in this connection  that no convincing arguments had been presented
so far regarding any real costs of a multilateral framework on investment and that it was important to
make a distinction between the issue of possible negative effects of FDI, on the one hand, and the
issue of possible costs of multilateral rules on investment, on the other.  However, the issues raised inthe Working Group regarding the need to view the implications of fore ign investment in light of the
                                                     
85 M/8, para. 71.
86 M/9, paras. 68-69.
87 M/8, para. 72.WT/WGTI/3
Page 18
particular development needs and polices of individual countries merited further consideration. A
basic consideration regarding the desirability of multilateral rules on investment was that, by
enhancing transparency and predictability, such rules would contribute to creating increased
opportunities for foreign investment and thus contribute to economic growth and development. In
order to strike a balance between the interests of capital exporting and capital importing countries,
multilateral investment rules should be investor-friendly, provide a sufficient degree of freedom andflexibility for host countries, and should address the issue of obligations of investors.
88
76. In other comments on the advantages of multilateral rules on investment, it was stated that, incomparison with existing international arrangements on investment, multilateral rules would be more
efficient, stable and predictable and easier to comply with for investors; they would ensure greater
consistency between trade and investment disciplines and would enshrine the principle of non-
discrimination in international investment relations. The point was also made that multilateral rules on
investment negotiated among countries at different levels of development would necessarily take intoaccount developmental aspects, and that such rules would entail a limitation of regulatory sovereignty
of countries only to the extent that this was acceptable to all participants in such a negotiation. It was
observed that, while multilateral rules on investment were necessary to address certain deficiencies in
the existing framework of bilateral and regional investment arrangements, multilateral rules would not
supplant bilateral and regional arrangements but would be complementary to such arrangements.
89
77.  The view was also expressed that the arguments advanced in favour of multilateral rules on
investment did not contribute anything new to the debate and were too general in nature to be
convincing. A more concrete identification of costs and benefits of such rules was necessary by
focusing upon the precise contents of such rules. In this respect, it was argued that, in view of the
nature of the rules being proposed the benefits seemed to be outweighed by the costs.  A first categoryof costs pertained to the loss of policy autonomy of developing countries to pursue their development
policies as a result of, for example, obligations with respect to incentives and performance
requirements.  A second category pertained to the possibility that such rules would unduly favour
multinational enterprises in their relationship with host countries.
90
78. In respect of the point made regarding the general character of arguments in favour of
multilateral investment rules, it was suggested th at it would be useful for the Working Group to
examine how existing investment agreements addressed certain matters.91
79. Views were expressed on the implications of the failure of the MAI negotiations for theconsideration of the possible creation of multilateral rules on investment in the WTO.  It was argued
that the Working Group should devote more time to a concrete examination of advantages anddisadvantages of multilateral rules on investment in the WTO, and that a useful starting point in this
respect might be to ask the question of what lessons could be learnt from the failure of the MAI
negotiations.
92  It was also observed, however, that investment negotiations in the WTO should be
guided by the WTO's own principles, philosophy and practice, and there was therefore no need to
seek guidance from the experience of OECD member countries with the MAI negotiations.93 The
view was expressed that, in light of the recent experience with the MAI negotiations, work in the
WTO should take a more incremental approach. In this regard, certain issues were identified whichmerited further attention, namely, whether the core obligations of a multilateral framework on
investment would include only MFN and national treatment or whether it should also include
                                                     
88 M/8, para. 82.
89 M/8, paras. 84 and  87-88.
90 M/8, paras. 85-86.
91 M/8, para. 88.
92 M/8, para. 85.
93 M/8, para. 88.WT/WGTI/3
Page 19
standards for the protection of investment; whether provisions should be included on incentives and
performance requirements; whether the existing dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO could
apply to disputes arising under a multilateral invest ment framework; whether private investors should
have standing under the dispute settlement procedures in a multilateral framework; and how
exceptions should be treated, in particular whether a "positive list" or "negative list" approach should
be followed.94 In connection with a proposal regarding key elements of a multilateral framework of
rules on investment in the WTO, the point was made that,  since the overall balance of interests
among Members was at the heart of all negotiations in the WTO, the feasibility of a multilateral
framework on investment in the WTO would largely depend on whether and how the different
realities faced by each Member could be reflected in an overall balance of concessions.  A multilateral
framework on investment in the WTO should therefore be different from the MAI, the standards of
which were unrealistically high and had failed to secure broad-based participation.95
80. It was observed that, while the possibility of multilateral negotiations on investment should be
considered, there were other possible avenues to promote investment liberalization and protection in a
multilateral setting, for example in the context of the TRIMs Agreement and the GATS.96
81. In regard to a contribution which contained a proposal on the main elements of a possiblemultilateral framework on investment in the WTO, the point was made that the differing views
expressed in the Working Group on the desirability of multilateral rules on investment could be seenas representing two different schools of thought on FDI:  a "globalization" school and an
"internalisation", school and that in order to reach agreement on multilateral rules on investment in the
WTO, the objectives of these different schools of thought needed to be reconciled.  This meant that an
equilibrium had to be reached between, on the one hand, the objective of enhancing global welfare
through freer flows of investment and, on the othe r, the need to respect the right of sovereign
countries to formulate their own policies, in particular with respect to economic development. In
relation to investment protection, the level of protection in a multilateral framework should be set at
the medium rather than the highest level and should be aimed at achieving an optimal standard of
protection that was reasonably high, based on a consensus among all participants.  With respect to
investment liberalization, the "bottom-up" approach adopted by the GATS, as opposed to the "top-down" approach envisaged in the MAI negotiations , should be favoured.  While these two basic
concepts might need to be developed further, they could offer ways to devise a multilateral framework
on investment which reconciled the need for policy flexibility with the need to enhance transparency
and predictability.
97
82. The discussion of this proposal can be briefly summarized by the following key points. First,
the comment was made that the proposal was an important contribution which helped focus the work
of the Working Group by offering concrete suggestions with regard to specific elements of a possible
multilateral framework of rules on investment in the WTO.98 However, it was also argued that the
proposal did not address the key question of why multilateral  rules on investment were necessary and
why the WTO was seen as the forum for the negotiation of such rules.99 Second, it was argued that the
categorization of countries with differing positions on the desirability of multilateral investment rules
into a globalization school and an internalisation school was too simplistic, and that the pursuit ofpolicies aimed at benefiting from closer integration into the global economy was not incompatible
with a belief in the need for government intervention and with a sceptical attitude toward the need for
                                                     
94 M/8, para. 84.
95 M/9, para. 41.
96 M/8, para. 84.
97 M/9, para. 41.
98 M/9, paras. 47, 52-53 and 55.
99 M/9, paras. 43 and 54.WT/WGTI/3
Page 20
multilateral investment rules.100  With respect to this point, it was also stated that, since most countries
were somewhere in between the extremes of the globalization school and the internalisation school, it
was possible to envisage a reconciliation of these different perspectives through a cautious approach
to the negotiation of multilateral rules on investment.101 Third, differing views were expressed on the
merits of the proposed method of achieving investment liberalization in a progressive manner through
a "positive list" approach.102  Fourth, it was pointed out that greater precision was necessary with
respect to the meaning of certain concepts used in this proposal, for example the concept of "a
reasonably high standard of protection."103 Fifth, the point was made that further consideration was
necessary of developmental aspects and of investment promotion.104  Finally,  concern was expressed
regarding the suggestion made in this proposal that account should be taken of industries with special
characteristics.105
83. In connection with the discussion on this proposal, the point was also made that, if somecountries belonged to a special multilateral agreement on investment and others did not, countrieswhich were parties to that particular agreement were in a better position to attract FDI.  However, if
all countries were parties to a multilateral agreement on investment, it was difficult to see how
adherence to such rules ensured that individual countries had a better chance of attracting FDI.
106
84. In response to this observation, it was argued that multilateral rules on investment wouldcontribute to an efficient allocation of resources by enhancing transparency and predictability for FDI;that such rules would prevent a country's ability  to attract FDI from being negated by distorting
practices of other countries, such as incentives and performance requirements; and that the alternative
to a common set of multilateral rules was the current patchwork of separate arrangements which
created confusion and lack of transparency.  The point was made that there could be no guarantee that
common investment rules would by themselves resu lt in increased investment flows, but that the
experience with the multilateral trading system suggested that by improving investment opportunities
such rules would impact positively on the level of international investment. It was also observed that
the existence of a set of common, multilateral rules would not necessarily mean that countries would
behave identically as there would be ample room for individual countries to enhance their
attractiveness to FDI, for example by improvin g the quality of their infrastructure and human
resources.
107
85. However, scepticism was voiced with regard to these arguments in favour of multilateralinvestment rules. It was argued that the need to address distorting practices, such as performance
requirements and incentives, did not constitute a convincing reason for the negotiation of multilateral
investment rules.  Thus, it was stated that one Member's experience demonstrated that its difficultiesin attracting FDI were due to internal factors rather than to distorting practices of other countries and
could be resolved only through domestic policy measures. Likewise, the idea that the existence of a
multitude of investment agreement resulted in confusion and lack of transparency and thus warranted
the establishment of a multilateral framework of rules on investment was contested.  Attention was
also drawn to the limited relevance of investment agreements as a determinant of investment
decisions.  Finally, it was argued that in reality the main objective of proposals for the creation of
multilateral investment rules was to secure market  access for foreign investment, and that in this
                                                     
100 M/9, paras. 43, 48 and 56.
101 M/9, para. 51.
102 M/9, paras. 44, 49-50 and 52.
103 M/9, para. 48.
104 M/9, paras. 48 and 52.
105 M/9, paras. 46 and 55.
106 M/9, para. 56.
107 M/9, paras. 57-60 and 62-63.WT/WGTI/3
Page 21
regard such rules would entail significant costs for host countries in terms of reduced policy
flexibility.108
86. A proposal was made on the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in a possiblemultilateral framework on investment in the WTO. The point was made that, since the essential
function of dispute settlement was to eliminate or modify measures found to be inconsistent with an
agreed set of rules, the WTO dispute settlement system could be applied to investment disputeswithout the need to make major adjustments. An important question was whether the WTO provisions
on compensation and suspension of concessions should be applied to investment disputes.  In this
regard, it was notable that these provisions were already applicable to investment-related disputes that
might arise under the GATS and the TRIMs Agreement.  Another question requiring attention was the
relationship between the application of WTO dispute settlement procedures to investment and the
application of dispute settlement provisions contained in the numerous existing bilateral and regional
investment agreements.  Since the WTO mechanism was more efficient, it appeared preferable to usethe WTO procedures, but this should not preclude recourse to provisions of bilateral or regional
investment agreements if the parties to a dispute so  decided.  In any case, the coexistence of various
dispute settlement procedures was not unique to investment but also occurred in the field of trade.
For example, regional trade agreements often contained their own dispute settlement procedures.  The
availability of various dispute settlement mechanisms in the area of trade did not appear to havecaused serious problems.  Indeed, the coexistence of dispute settlement procedures in different
agreements could enhance the complementarity of such procedures.  However, it might be necessary
to design specific rules to avoid inefficiency and duplication.
109
87. The Working Group continued its discussion on the definition of the term "investment" in
international investment agreements. In this connection, differing views continued to be expressed onthe merits of a definition confined to foreign direct investment as compared with a broader, asset-
based definition.
88. One view was  that the Working Group should limit its work to FDI and  should use the IMF's
definition of FDI, as described in document W/61. Mention was made of the possible negative
consequences of the volatility of portfolio investment. It was suggested in this regard that the precisecoverage of different components of the IMF definition needed to be better understood, and that the
benefits of FDI in relation to each of these components required further study.
110
89. The desirability and feasibility of limiting the definition of investment to FDI was questioned.First, a definition of investment only in terms of direct investment would be incompatible with the
basic objective of international investment rules to provide protection of investment.  In this regard, itwas stated that an investment usually consisted of a complex of different properties that were difficult
to separate;  that bilateral investment treaties for the protection of foreign investment typically
adopted broad definitions of investment; that, in view of the economic benefits deriving from both
direct and indirect investment, a distinction in  the treatment of foreign investors depending upon
whether their shareholdings constituted direct or indirect investment was difficult to justify;  that, as a
practical matter, any attempt to draw a clear line between direct and indirect investment would raise
very complex issues because of the difficulty of defining when a particular investor held a controllinginterest in an enterprise;  and that the distinction between investment and speculative capital
movements was more pertinent than the distinction between FDI and portfolio investment.  Second, it
was argued that concerns regarding the implicatio ns of including non-FDI forms of investment and
speculative capital movements should be dealt with through appropriate qualifications to substantive
obligations rather than through limitations of the definition of investment.  Specifically, the definition
                                                     
108 M/9, paras.  61, 66-67.
109 M/9, para. 42.
110 M/8, para. 75.WT/WGTI/3
Page 22
of investment should be considered in conjunction with provisions on the movement of capital.
Reference was made in this respect to provisions in  most investment agreements on transfers of funds,
which could be formulated to allow for a certain policy flexibility by permitting certain restrictions on
transfers, for example for macro-economic reasons or for the stability of the financial system.111
90. The need to view the definition of investment in relation to the scope and objectives of anagreement was stressed by some of the Members.  In  this connection, interest was expressed inexploring the possibility of applying  different definitions for purposes of different obligations.  In
particular, it was suggested that  a distinction might be warranted between a broad, asset-based
definition for purposes of obligations relating to the treatment of investment in the post-establishment
phase and a narrow definition, limited to FDI,  for purposes of the treatment of investment in the pre-
establishment phase.
112
91. The point was made that a broad definition of investment raised several questions thatrequired careful consideration:  first, whether it was feasible and practical to apply the same set ofinternational investment rules to different categories of investment, for example, direct investment,
portfolio investment and intangible assets;  second, whether the use of a broad definition might have
unintended consequences in terms of the scope of application of substantive rules;  third, whether it
was fair and desirable to give the same level of protection to short-term and long-term investors;  and,
fourth, whether a broad definition could adequate ly take care of the development needs of all
Members.
113
92. It was suggested that the Working Group study the implications of electronic commerce forthe treatment of commercial presence in the context of investment agreements.
114
93. The Working Group considered the development dimension of international investment
agreements. It had before it communications from UNCTAD on the question of how internationalinvestment agreements could provide for flexibil ity in the interest of promoting growth and
development.
94. The point was made by the observer for UNCTAD that the ultimate objective of international
investment agreements was to promote growth and development, and that a stable, transparent and
predictable framework for investment could help attr act foreign investment by providing security for
such investment. A basic challenge in the design of international investment agreements was how to
find a proper balance between the need to provide security for foreign investment and the need to
provide for the flexibility necessary for developing  countries to pursue development policies in light
of their specific circumstances.   This flexibility should not be used as a justification for unnecessarily
restrictive policies. Recent work in UNCTAD was aimed at identifying the means by whichinternational investment agreements could provide for such flexibility. A background Note by the
UNCTAD Secretariat, which had been made available to the Working Group, contained a detailed
analysis of how flexibility for development purposes was reflected in the objectives, substantive
provisions, implementation and structure of exis ting international investment agreements.  The
Agreed Conclusions adopted at the UNCTAD Expert Meeting at which this Note had been discussed
provided that UNCTAD would continue its work on this matter.
115
95.  The view was expressed that by providing for security for foreign investment, international
investment promoted investment and thus contribut ed to economic growth and development, but that
                                                     
111 M/8, paras. 73-74 and  79.
112 M/8, paras. 74 and 77-78;  M/9, para. 75.
113 M/8, para. 76.
114 M/8, paras. 75 and 80.
115 M/9, paras. 77-79.WT/WGTI/3
Page 23
such agreements should also contain flexibility to reflect the differing levels of development of
countries.116 The need for a proper balance between such flexibility for development purposes and the
role of investment agreements in securing stability and predictability of the conditions for foreign
investment was emphasized.117 The point was made that the development dimension should be taken
into account as an integral part of the design and structure of investment agreements, in which
connection the example was mentioned of the structure of the GATS which allowed Members tomake commitments commensurate with their levels of development.
118
96. It was stated that, while countries wished to retain a large degree of flexibility with respect tothe issue of the entry of foreign investment, at the post-establishment stage bilateral investment
treaties usually provided for national treatment for foreign investment.  This suggested that most
countries did not consider that discriminatory treatment of foreign investment in the post-
establishment stage was necessary for development purposes.
119 In this connection, the point was
made that existing international investment agreements showed that there were various possibleapproaches to provide a degree of flexibility in relation to obligations with respect to the entry of
foreign investment.
120 Attention was also drawn to other aspects of the development dimension which
needed to be addressed in investment agreements, such as the problem of lack of human resources
necessary to implement an agreement.121
97. It was argued that the issue of flexibil ity for development purposes should not only be
considered in relation to the objectives, substantive provisions, implementation and structure of an
agreement, but also in respect of the particular institutional framework in which an agreement was
concluded.  In this respect, the  question was raised whether, in view of the nature of obligations
undertaken in the WTO, an optimal balance between flexibility for development purposes and
predictability for investment could be achieved in a negotiation of investment rules in the WTO.122
98. The point was made that a careful definition of the notion of flexibility was necessary not
only to avoid the risk that this concept would undermine the fundamental objective of an investment
agreement but also to ensure that it would not be used to justify policies which were inefficient and
which, in a context of competition between countries to attract foreign investment, could have adverse
consequences for other countries. The example of fiscal incentives was mentioned in this respect.123
99. It was stated by some Members that  it would appear that a common assumption in recent
UNCTAD papers was that government intervention in investment would assist or enhance the
development process.  They pointed out that this  assumption was in contradiction with empirical
evidence which showed that development was sometimes better promoted by deregulation than by
regulation.124
100. The Working Group received a contribution by one Member on the issue of investors'
responsibilities. This contribution contained an overview of relevant international instruments
containing norms for the conduct of foreign investors and of corporate codes of conduct.  It identified
certain questions for further consideration regarding the impact of these international instruments and
corporate codes, the relative merits of guidelines adopted in the framework of international
organizations, as compared with corporate codes of conduct, the role of governments in the further
                                                     
116 M/9, paras. 80-81.
117 M/9, paras. 80-81, 83-88.
118 M/9, paras. 80 and 86.
119 M/9, para. 80.
120 M/9, paras. 81 and 86.
121 M/9, para. 81.
122 M/9, para. 84.
123 M/9, para. 85.
124 M/9, para. 82WT/WGTI/3
Page 24
development of norms for corporate conduct, and the relationship between instruments dealing with
corporate responsibility and existing or future ru les on investment. In the latter regard, it was
emphasized that this contribution was not intended to suggest that the issue of investors'
responsibilities should necessarily be dealt with in the WTO. 125  Related to this, the point was made
that foreign investment was a complex, multifaceted matter which needed to be addressed in different
fora and through different instruments.126
101. It was stated that the need to strike a balance between rights and responsibilities of foreign
investors had been recognized in the OECD Guide lines for Multinational Enterprises, the negotiations
on a draft United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations and in the linkage
established in the TRIMs Agreement between investment policy and competition policy as subjects
for future consideration in the WTO.127 Recent investment negotiations had given rise to renewed
interest in this matter among OECD member countries.128 In this regard,  the point was made that the
Working Group could benefit from the work under way in the OECD in the co ntext of the review of
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.129
102. The view was expressed that, while in the context of investment the obligations of foreigninvestors were commonly understood to relate to issues such as restrictive business practices, transfer
pricing and the transfer of technology,  the international instruments and corporate codes of conduct
discussed in this contribution also dealt with social and human rights issues that were not within themandate of the Working Group and were not relevant to the WTO.
130   In response to this observation,
it was stated that the aim of this contribution was to provide factual information on the wide range of
aspects of corporate behaviour covered by existing instruments without implying that these matters
should be taken up in the WTO. It was also observed that the instruments described in the
contribution contained norms for the conduct of enterprises, not governments.131
103. The point was made that international agreements should strike a balance rights and
obligations of foreign investors and that the statem ent made in this contribution that international
agreements cannot impose direct obligations on citizens or companies was too sweeping.132 In
response to these comments, it was stated that the contribution focused on the balance between the
rights of investors and the right of host countries to regulate economic activities in their territoriesbecause the responsibilities of investors were primarily, if not exclusively a mater for domestic law
and the role of international instruments and guidelines on corporate responsibility was to facilitate
the implementation of domestic laws. In addition, it was difficult to see how the concept of a balance
between rights and obligations of foreign investors could in practice be translated into international
rules. Thus, the approach that had evolved over the years was to rely on instruments of a voluntarynature which were complementary to the basic obligation of firms to respect the rules and regulations
of host countries.
133
104. The question was raised whether the voluntary character of the international instruments andguidelines discussed in this contribution had affected their implementation.
134   It was stated that a key
question was whether existing instruments and guidel ines had actually resulted in changes in the
behaviour of multinational enterprises in areas of interest to developing countries, such as competition
                                                     
125 M/10, paras. 9 and 25.
126 M/10, paras. 9, 19 and 22.
127 M/10, para. 10.
128 M/10, paras. 10 and 23.
129 M/10, para. 24.
130 M/10, paras. 11 and 22.
131 M/10, paras. 12, 17 and 25.
132 M/10, paras. 13 and 14.
133 M/10, para. 25.
134 M/10, paras. 14 and 15.WT/WGTI/3
Page 25
and the transfer of technology.135 The point was also made that there did not appear to be an effective
mechanism for the monitoring of the implemen tation of these instruments and guidelines.136  It was
observed that because of the lack of objective and verifiable data and of effective monitoring
mechanisms it was difficult to determine whether or  not the behaviour of multinational enterprises
had improved as a result of guidelines for corporate conduct.137
105. It was argued that the issue of investors' responsibilities was an important theme for
consideration with respect to a possible multilateral framework on investment, particularly as regards
the development dimension of such a framework. Pr ovisions contained in the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises on competition and on the role of foreign investors in the technological
development of host countries were particularly relevant in this regard.138
106. Interest was expressed in more detailed information and further discussion on certaininstruments and initiatives mentioned in the contribution.
139   In particular, it was proposed that there
be a discussion of the reasons of the failure of certain attempts to establish international norms forcorporate conduct, notably the draft United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations.
140
107. The view was expressed that the existing approach to corporate responsibility based onvoluntary commitments by investors had worked well and that there was therefore no need for a
different approach.
141 It was argued that the further development  of corporate codes of conduct
should be left to the private sector but that there might be a role for governments in developing
guidelines and recommendations.142 Doubts were voiced as to whether this should be done in the
WTO.143
                                                     
135 M/10, para. 13.
136 M/10, para. 13.
137 M/10, para. 15.
138 M/10, paras. 12 and 20.
139 M/10, paras. 14 and 22.
140 M/10, para. 13.
141 M/10, para. 19.
142 M/10, paras. 15 and 23.
143 M/10, para. 23.WT/WGTI/3
Page 26
ANNEX 1
TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, PARAGRAPH 20
"20. Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to investment and
competition policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including under the TRIMs Agreement, andon the understanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be
initiated in the future, we also agree to:
- establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment;
and
- establish a working group to study issues raised by Members relating to the
interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive
practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the
WTO framework.
These groups shall draw upon each other's work if necessary and also draw upon and be without
prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora.  As regards
UNCTAD, we welcome the work under way as provided for in the Midrand Declaration and the
contribution it can make to the understanding of issues.  In the conduct of the work of the working
groups, we encourage cooperation with the above organizations to make the best use of available
resources and to ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account.  The GeneralCouncil will keep the work of each body under revi ew, and will determine after two years how the
work of each body should proceed.  It is clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding
multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken
among WTO Members regarding such negotiations."WT/WGTI/3
Page 27
ANNEX 2
CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED FOR STUDY
Non-Paper by the Chair
Revision
It was widely recognized that the Working Group's work programme should be open, non-
prejudicial and capable of evolution as the work pr oceeds.  It was also emphasized that all elements,
not only category I, should be permeated by the de velopment dimension.  Particular attention should
be paid to the situation of least-developed countries.  In pursuing the items of its work programme, the
Working Group should avoid unnecessary duplication of work done in UNCTAD and otherorganizations.
_______________
I. Implications of the relationship between trade and investment for development and economic
growth, including:
- economic parameters relating to macroeconomic stability, such as domestic savings,
fiscal position and the balance of payments;
- industrialization, privatization, employment, income and wealth distribution,
competitiveness, transfer of technology and managerial skills;
- domestic conditions of competition and market structures.In this work, the Working Group should seek to benefit from the experience of Members at
different stages of development and take account of recent trends in foreign investment flows
and of the relationship between different kinds of foreign investment.
II. The economic relationship between trade and investment:
- the degree of correlation between trade and investment flows;- the determinants of the relationship between trade and investment;
- the impact of business strategies, practices and decision-making on trade and
investment, including through case studies;
- the relationship between the mobility of capital and the mobility of labour;
- the impact of trade policies and measures on investment flows, including the effect of
the growing number of bilateral and regional arrangements;
- the impact of investment policies and measures on trade;
- country experiences regarding national investment policies, including investment
incentives and disincentives;WT/WGTI/3
Page 28
- the relationship between foreign investment and competition policy.
III. Stocktaking and analysis of existing international instruments and activities regarding trade 
and investment:
- existing WTO provisions;- bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives;- implications for trade and investment flows of existing international instruments.
IV. On the basis of the work above:
144
- identification of common features and differences, including overlaps and possible
conflicts, as well as possible gaps in existing international instruments;
- advantages and disadvantages of entering into bilateral, regional and multilateral rules
on investment, including from a development perspective;
- the rights and obligations of home and host countries and of investors and host
countries;
- the relationship between existing and possible future international cooperation on
investment policy and existing and possible future international cooperation on
competition policy.
                                                     
144 The question of the timing of work under section IV was the subject of a decision taken by the
Working Group at its meeting of 2-3 June 1997.WT/WGTI/3
Page 29
ANNEX 3
Summary of contributions received in the Working Group
on the Relationship between Trade and Investment in 1999
Symbol
(WT/WGTI/W/-)Member / Other
sourceWhere introduced
(Reference in Minutes)Topic
W/69 Korea M/8, Para. 4 FDI Flows and the Asian Financial
Crisis:  Korea's experience
W/70 Korea M/8, Para. 72 A Benefit of Multilateral
Investment Rules:  EnhancedTransparency
W/71 India M/8, Para. 47 Stocktaking of India Bilateral
Agreements for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments
W/72 India Relationship between Trade,
Investment and Development
W/73 India M/8, Para. 5 Investment, Development and
Technology Transfers
W/74 India M/8, Para. 70 Development dimension of the
international investmentagreement
W/75 Japan M/8, Para. 71 Ensuring Transparency Stability
W/76 M/9, Para. 74 Issues raised and points made on
the definition of investment – Noteby the Secretariat
W/77 UNCTAD M/9, Paras. 76-79 Note on International Investment
Agreements:  Concepts allowingfor a certain flexibility in theinterest of promoting growth and
development
W/78 UNCTAD M/9, Paras. 76-79 Report on the UNCTAD Expert
Meeting on InternationalInvestment Agreements:  Conceptsallowing for a certain flexibility inthe interest of promoting growthand development,
24-26  March  1999
W/79 Korea M/9, Para. 41 Multilateral Framework on
Investment:  A Realistic Approach
W/80 Australia M/9, Para. 75 Definition of Investment
W/81 European
Community andmember StatesM/10, Para. 9 Responsibilities of investors
__________SECTION XIII
WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICYWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/3
11 October 1999
(99-4245)
REPORT (1999) OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraph Nos.
A. INTRODUCTION 1-3
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S 
ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work 4
(b) Meetings held in 1999 5
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations 6-7
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999 8-9
I. THE RELEVANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL WTO PRINCIPLES OF
NATIONAL TREATMENT, TRANSPARENCY AND MOST-
FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT TO COMPETITION POLICY
AND VICE VERSA10-37
II. APPROACHES TO PROMOTING COOPERATION AND
COMMUNICATION AMONG MEMBERS, INCLUDING IN THE
FIELD OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION38-64
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF COMPETITION POLICY TO
ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WTO, INCLUDING THE
PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE65-84
IV. OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY MEMBERS RELATING TO THE
GROUP'S MANDATE TO STUDY THE INTERACTION BETWEENTRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY85-91
ANNEX 1:  TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL
                          DECLARATION, PARAGRAPH 20
ANNEX 2: CONTRIBUTIONS PROVIDED TO THE WORKING
GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE
AND COMPETITION POLICY IN 1999WT/WGTCP/3
Page 2
A. INTRODUCTION
1. In December 1998, the General Council decided that the Working Group, which had been
established pursuant to paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration1, should continue its
work in 1999.  The terms of the General Council's decision (WT/GC/M/32, page 52) read as follows:
The General Council decides that the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy shall continue the educative work that it has been undertaking pursuant to
paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration.  In the light of the limited number of
meetings that the Group will be able to hold in 1999, the Working Group, while continuing at
each meeting to base its work on the study of issues raised by Members relating to the
interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, would
benefit from a focused discussion on:  (i) the relevance of fundamental WTO principles of
national treatment, transparency, and most-favoured-nation treatment to competition policyand vice versa;  (ii) approaches to promoting cooperation and communication among
Members, including in the field of technical cooperation;  and (iii) the contribution of
competition policy to achieving the objectives of the WTO, including the promotion of
international trade.  The Working Group will continue to ensure that the development
dimension and the relationship with investment are fully taken into account.  It is understoodthat this decision is without prejudice to any future decision that might be taken by the
General Council, including in the context of its existing work programme.
2. This report provides an overview of the work done by the Working Group in 1999, pursuant
to the General Council's decision.  It constitutes a complement to the Working Group's previous report
on its activities in 1997 and 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2).
3. The report is organized as follows.  Part B provides a procedural summary of the Group's
activities in 1999.  Part C provides an overview of the substantive work done in the Group during the
year, pursuant to the General Council's decision.
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work
4. As was the case in 1997 and 1998, the work of the Working Group in 1999 has been based on
written contributions by Members and on oral statements, questions and answers by Members in the
Group.  This material has been supplemented by information received from observerintergovernmental organizations (see subsection (c) below) and notes prepared by the Secretariat.  A
tabular summary of written contributions to the Group in 1999 is attached as Annex 2.
(b) Meetings held in 1999
5. The Working Group held three formal meetings in 1999.  The dates of the meetings were:
19-20 April, 10-11 June and 14 September.  The dates of these meetings were determined in the light
of the instruction in paragraph  22 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration that careful attention begiven to coordinating meetings of the Working Groups established under paragraphs 20 and 21 with
those of relevant UNCTAD bodies.  At the meetings in April and June, consideration was given to the
full range of topics called for in the decision of the General Council referred to above.  The principal
purpose of the meeting held on 14 September was to review and adopt the Working Group's Report
(1999) to the General Council.  Reports on these meetings have been circulated indocuments WT/WGTCP/M/8, 9 and 10.
                                                     
1 The text of paragraph 20 is reproduced in Annex 1.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 3
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations
6. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 20) encouraged the Working Group to
undertake its work in cooperation with UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora, to
make the best use of available resources and to ensure that the development dimension was taken
fully into account.  In this regard, the IMF and the World Bank have continued to attend the Working
Group's meetings in an observer capacity, pursuant to the cooperation agreements concluded betweenthe WTO and these organizations.  UNCTAD and the OECD also attended the meetings as observers,
on the basis of an invitation from the Working Group.  In the course of the Group's meetings, they
have kept the Group updated on relevant activities of their organizations and contributed to the
debate.  The Working Group is highly appreciative of the valuable contributions to its work made by
the observers.
7. As a further aspect of cooperation, a third symposium, organized by the WTO Secretariat
jointly with UNCTAD and the World Bank, was held on 17 April 1999 in the Centre WilliamRappard.  The subject of the Symposium was Co mpetition Policy and the Multilateral Trading
System:  the Relevance of Fundamental WTO Principles, International Cooperation and the
Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectiv es.  A fourth Symposium, organized by the
WTO Secretariat with financial support from, and participation by staff of the Secretariats of,
UNCTAD and the World Bank, took place on 13 September 1999 at the WTO.  The subject of thisSymposium was Competition Policy and the Multilateral Trading System:  A Dialogue with Civil
Society.  Although formally se parate from the work programme of the Working Group, these events
were aimed at facilitating its work.
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999
8. This section of the report provides an over view of the substantive work done in the Group,
pursuant to the General Council's Decision in December 1998 (WT/GC/M/32, page 52).  By its very
nature, such an overview cannot reflect everything  that was said and capture all nuances of the
discussion, such as can be found in the detailed records of the two meetings of the Working Group
(WT/WGTCP/M/8 and 9) and in the written contributions of Members (see Annex 2).
9. The section is organized in accordance with the way in which the Group structured its
discussion of the issues, on the basis of the General Council's decision calling for the work to be done.
It will be noted that the discussion which took place on a number of issues cut across more than one
of the sub-headings used below.  This means that, in order to have a full appreciation of the discussion
that took place on these issues, it may be necessary to refer to more than one subsection of this Part of
the report.  It also means that some degree of repetition has been unavoidable in the preparation of thevarious subsections.
I. THE RELEVANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL WTO PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL
TREATMENT, TRANSPARENCY AND MOST-FAVOURED-NATION
TREATMENT TO COMPETITION POLICY AND VICE VERSA
10. The matter of the relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national treatment,
transparency and most-favoured-nation treatment to  competition policy and vice versa was discussed
by the Working Group at its meetings on 19-20 April and 10-11 June 1999.  Written submissions onthis item were provided by the representatives of the European Community and its member States,
Switzerland, Japan (two contributions), the United States and Turkey (documents W/115, W/117,
W/119, W/120 and W/131, respectively).
2  Turkey provided a non-paper.  Australia; Brazil; Canada;
the Czech Republic; the Dominican Republic; Egypt; the European Community and its member
                                                     
2 In this Part of the report, documents issued in the series WT/WGTCP/W/- are referred to as "W/…".
Documents issued in the series WT/WGTCP/M/- are referred as "M/…"WT/WGTCP/3
Page 4
States; Hong Kong, China; India; Japan; Korea;  Malaysia; Norway; Switzerland; and the United
States; and observers from Croatia and the Russian Federation provided oral comments or posed
questions on this item.  In addition, the Group had before it two background notes prepared by the
Secretariat, one dealing with the fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment and Transparency (W/ 114) and the other on the Fundamental Principles
of Competition Policy (W/127).
11. A major component of the discussion concerned the content and application of the
fundamental WTO principles of national treatment , most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency
and their significance for competition policy.  The point was made that the importance of these
principles was greater than ever in the current era of the globalization of world trade.  It was
suggested that they provided a basis for achieving the aims of competition policies and also for
effective international cooperation in this field.3  The view was also expressed that adherence to the
fundamental WTO principles of national treatment , most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency
was important for the sound application of competition law and for maintaining the effectiveness,
impartiality and credibility of such law4;  in fact, it would not be possible to conceive of a sound
national competition policy without much attention being paid to these principles.5  It was also
suggested that the principles of national treatme nt and most-favoured-nation treatment, on the one
hand, and transparency, on the other hand, were extensively intertwined, in that if a high degree oftransparency was maintained, this would make it difficult for a competition agency to discriminate in
any consistent way over any length of time, since, if it did, this would become publicly known, and it
would not be a sustainable position.
6
12. The point was made that, under GATT/WTO jurisprudence, a core objective of the principlesof national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment was to promote the equality of competitiveopportunities for Members and their respective goods, services and enterprises.
7  Moreover, these
principles were applicable in respect of both de jure and de facto discrimination.  They sought the
avoidance of distortions in the competitive process, not the guarantee of specific results in terms of
market access.8  In the light of this, it was said that there was an intrinsic relationship between
competition policy and the principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment, inthat competition policy provided a tool to address certain kinds of discriminatory policies and
arrangements which denied equal competitive opportunities to foreign competitors.
9  The view was
also expressed that the importance of the principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation
treatment in the area of competition policy reflected a basic tenet of such policy which was that it
protected competition rather than individual competitors.10  The nationality of individual competitors
was irrelevant in this regard.11
13. The view was expressed that the principle of transparency was critical to ensuring the fairapplication of national laws and policies, including those implementing Members' WTO obligations,
in demonstrating and promoting a Member's compliance with those obligations to other Members, and
in reinforcing support by the public at large for relevant laws and policies and for the operation and
objectives of the multilateral trading system.
12  The view was expressed that this was both a general
principle and a principle that acquired special aspects when applied to specific types of measures dealtwith in the WTO framework.  It had at least thr ee dimensions:  first, publication;  second, uniform,
                                                     
3 M/9, paragraph 19.
4 M/8, paragraphs 3, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22 an d 24; M/9, paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 19.
5 M/8, paragraph 15
6 M/8, paragraph 24.
7 M/8, paragraph 3.
8 M/8, paragraphs 3, 8 and 11.
9 M/8, paragraphs 3 and 8.
10 M/9, paragraph 13.
11 M/9, paragraphs 3 and 13; M/8, paragraphs 8 and 18.
12 M/8, paragraphs 15, 18 and 24.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 5
impartial and reasonable administration of measures that had an impact on trade;  and third, the rights
of parties to legal proceedings that might lead to the adoption of measures that had an impact on trade,
for example the right to be heard, and that needed to be recognized under domestic legislation.
Further, it was suggested that transparency in the application of competition law and policy fostered
confidence in an economy and increased its attractiveness as a location for investment.13  It was also
stressed that, as under the rules of the WTO, an important qualification concerning the principle oftransparency in competition law enforcement was the provision of appropriate safeguards for the
protection of confidential information; this was vi tal to maintaining confid ence in the administration
of justice, and therefore to public support for the law.
14
14. A number of points were made regarding the extent to which the WTO rules embodying thefundamental principles of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency were
already applicable in the field of competition law and policy.  The view was expressed that these
principles applied only in respect of government measures and not in regard to private practices, oreven hybrid practices, as had been amply demonstrated in the recent Fuji/Kodak matter.
15 A number
of examples were cited of anti-competitive practices which could have restrictive or discriminatory
effects, and which would not be reached by existing WTO instruments.  These included, inter alia,
collective boycotts, exclusionary actions by professional associations, abuses of a dominant position
which were intended to prevent the entry of new competitors, price-fixing cartels, export and importcartels, and market-sharing arrangements.
16  The view was also expressed that effective application of
the principles of national treatment, most-favoured -nation treatment and transparency in the sphere of
competition policy depended on the existence and active enforcement of a well-constituted national
competition law.  In cases where no such legislation existed or it was not effectively applied, or where
competition rules were applied through sector-specific legislation or where there were exceptions,exclusions and derogations from the competition laws, the relevance of the fundamental WTO
principles to competition rules was unclear.
17  The view was also expressed that Articles VIII and IX
of the GATS, which addressed monopolies and restrictive business practices in the services sector,
might be able to address private barriers to the market that could not be handled, at least not with
sufficient efficiency, within the GATT itself.18  This reflected the fact that trade in goods was
extensively intertwined with distribution services.  Distribution services that were within the regime
of the GATS included agency agreements, distribution agreements and franchising agreements.  It
was said, further, that the impact of the ideas that had been put forward for multilateral rules should
be examined with reference to the services se ctor, given the limited coverage of the GATS with
regard to competition and the concept of progressivi ty of commitments as had been floated in the
discussion.  Attention was drawn to the approach th at had been followed in the telecom negotiations,
i.e., a deadline had been set and gradual implementation provided for.19  Another view was that the
basic WTO principles were indeed already applicable to competition law and policy, to the extent that
they affected trade, by virtue of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.20
15. The view was expressed that effective application of the fundamental WTO principles ofnational treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency in the field of competition policy
would require the adaptation of the principles to the particular subject-matter.  Adaptation of theseprinciples had already proved necessary in the case of services and trade-related intellectual property
rights, in the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement, respectiv ely.  In this regard, it was suggested that the
Group look together into the development of common principles relating to the adoption and
                                                     
13 M/8, paragraph 13.
14 M/8, paragraphs 4, 7 and 13.
15 M/8, paragraph 7; M/9, paragraphs 9 and 11.
16 M/8, paragraph 6 and M/9, paragraph 9.
17 M/8, paragraph 7; M/9, paragraph 4.
18 M/8, paragraph 26.
19 M/8, paragraph 27.
20 M/9, paragraph 15.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 6
enforcement of competition law.  Such an exercise would not be aimed at the harmonization of
competition laws, as there were many reasons why competition laws had to be different in individual
countries.  Rather, what would be desirable would be to define the elements relating to transparency
and non-discrimination that were common to most jurisdictions and were most important for the
international trading system.21
16. The view was also expressed that, in many, if not most, jurisdictions having competition laws,
the content and application of such laws were already generally consistent with the fundamental WTO
principles of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency.22  Some Members
affirmed this as regards their own competition laws and policies.23  In this connection, the point was
made that this should not be understood to mean that differential treatment of arrangements or firms,
including between foreign and domestic firms, could not arise in some cases, but that such
differentiation would be attributable not to differences in nationality, but rather to factors such as
differences in the degree of culpability among parties in a particular case, the differing evidenceavailable with respect to such parties, or differences in the nature and extent of their cooperation in
the investigative context.
24  In the light of this, the view was expressed that the assessment that most
countries' competition laws and policies were consistent with basic WTO principles demonstrated
that, from a WTO standpoint, matters were fine as they stood and no action was needed at the
multilateral level in this regard.25
17. In response to this view, it was suggested that, if consideration was being given to certain
commitments at the multilateral level, it was not solely a question of determining whether existing
national laws or the laws of other countries created a problem in terms of those commitments.  Rather,
the starting-point should be a consideration of wh ether competition law was relevant for the trading
system.  On this point, the discussions that had taken place in the Group thus far had shown clearlythat there was a very large degree of agreement that the effective application of competition law
complemented and reinforced the process of trade liberalization.
26
18. The point was made that the interaction between trade and competition policy was bi-directional as was this item of the Group's work programme due to its "vice versa" element.
27
Therefore, in addition to the implications of fundamental WTO principles for competition policy, it
was important to give due consideration to the matter of how the principles of competition law and
policy could contribute to international trade.  Further to this suggestion, the Group, at its meeting on
10-11 June, had before it a Note by the Secretariat on the Fundamental Principles of Competition
Policy (W/127).  It was said that the categorization and explanation of principles that had been set out
in this Note were helpful.28  The suggestion was also made that it might have been preferable to make
                                                     
21 M/8, paragraphs 3, 4 and 7.
22 M/8, paragraphs 4, 8, 18 and 24;  M/9, paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 9 and 14.
23 M/8, paragraphs 4, 8, 15, 16 and 24;  M/9, paragraphs 3, 4 and 9.
24 M/9, paragraph 3.
25 M/9, paragraph 12;  see also M/8, paragraphs 17, 19, 24, 33 and M/8, paragraph 15.
26 M/9, paragraph 16.
27 M/8, paragraph 11.
28 M/9, paragraphs 7 and 13.  The first category of principles set out in the Note by the Secretariat
concerned principles in the sense of the overriding goals or objectives of competition policy - for example thepromotion of economic efficiency, the promotion of consumer welfare and economic development.  Theseobjectives served as important guide-posts for officials in applying diverse aspects of related laws and policies.
The second category of principles consisted of operational principles of policy design and application.
Examples of principles in this category included the promotion of market-opening measures, the identificationof situations in which market power was likely to be exer cised, and the distinction that was made in virtually all
competition law systems between arrangements that were primarily horizontal in nature and those that wereprimarily vertical in nature.  The third category of prin ciples related to the institutions and processes through
which competition policy was applied.  Examples of principles in this category included adherence to due
process in the application of competition law and policy, optimizing the scope of competition policy andWT/WGTCP/3
Page 7
a clearer distinction in the note between the objectives of competition policy and its operational
principles.29  Thus, the objectives of competition policy would be limited to achieving economic
efficiency, consumer welfare and economic development, whereby the maintenance of competition is
not a goal in itself but a means to achieve those objectives.  The point was made that the relevance of
the fundamental principles of competition policy to trade policy concerns had been clearly established
in the initial meetings of the Group.30  It was said, further, that such principles could contribute to
secure market access and provide predictability in markets; and that establishment of an orderly
relationship between these principles and those of the multilateral trading system would contribute
importantly to the core objectives of both competition policy and the WTO, namely efficiency,
consumer welfare and economic development.31
19. Particular emphasis was placed by some Members on the principle, noted in paragraph 34 ofthe Note by the Secretariat on the Fundamental Principles of Competition Policy, that competition
policy protects competition and not competitors.  The point that this implied that nationality wasirrelevant in well-constituted competition policies was recalled.
32
20. Reference was made to a "competition-oriented principle" as being a concept that placedmaximum emphasis on the market mechanism.  It was suggested that this concept was of direct
relevance to the WTO, whose primary objective was the optimal use of resources at a global level
through the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.  When considering the "competition-orientedprinciple" in the context of WTO competition disciplines, it was suggested that four implications
could be identified. The first was that the basic philosophy of a pro-active response to anti-
competitive practices would be assured.  The second was to extend the prevention of anti-competitive
practice across all sectors.  The third was to minimize sectors or areas exempted from national
competition laws.  The fourth was to introduce the competition policy perspective into governmentregulations and industries.
33
21. With regard to the further elaboration of the fundamental principles of competition policy, thesuggestion was made that, in order to ensure that the principles identified were capable of wide
application, core competition principles should first be agreed upon and then second-level principles
aimed at underpinning these core principles should be  identified.  In doing so, the Group should guard
against narrow, prescriptive rules with limited applicability.  The view was expressed that the work
under way in the context of APEC would be helpful in this regard.
34
22. The Group was informed that, at the APEC Competition Policy and Deregulation Workshopin Christchurch on 30 April and 1 May it had been agreed to develop a set of APEC competition and
regulatory principles.  Subsequent work had developed and refined the principles with the end resultbeing the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform  which were endorsed by
APEC Ministers and Leaders in September 1999.  Four core principles (non-discrimination,
comprehensiveness, transparency and accountability) and a set of action-oriented undertakings had
been endorsed, in this regard.  The aim of these non-binding principles was to provide a basis for
policy development rather than a stringent set of speci fic rules.  It was suggested that these principles
                                                                                                                                                                    
ensuring coherence between competition policy and dir ect economic regulation, adherence to the fundamental
WTO principles of non-discrimination and transparency, and international cooperation to the extent permitted
by national laws.
29 M/9, paragraph 13.
30 M/9, paragraph 9.
31 M/9, paragraph 13.
32 M/9, paragraphs 3 and 13.
33 M/8, paragraph 9.
34 M/9, paragraph 7.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 8
would assist in the process of introducing competitive markets within Member economies and
recognized the diverse circumstances of Member economies that sought to implement them.35
23. The view was expressed that the discussions which had taken place in the Working Groupover two years of discussion had shown clearly that anti-competitive practices could, under certain
circumstances, reduce market access and distort trade.
36  In order to deal effectively with these
barriers to international trade, it was necessary to develop rules.37  The report which the Working
Group had adopted in December 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2) provided explicit documentation of these
problems.  It was also suggested that a number of WTO instruments, including the GATS in general,
Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement and the results of the basic telecom negotiations, all suggested
that competition enhancement was an important aspect of trade liberalization.38  In the light of this,
the question was raised as to whether such rules had to be implemented by countries purely at the
domestic level, or whether such rules and the development of related institutions could usefully be
reinforced through common commitments and understandings.39
24. The suggestion was made that three possible approaches could be considered for addressing
anti-competitive practices that impacted adversel y on international trade.  First, Members could
attempt to eliminate these practices by making use of national trade and competition legislation to the
maximum extent.  This could be referred to as the unilateral approach.  The second possible approach
was the bilateral approach, which would involve greater use of cooperation arrangements.  Both theunilateral and bilateral approaches had their own problems.  In the case of the unilateral approach, this
often resulted in jurisdictional disputes or frictions as a result of the unilateral enforcement of
competition law by one State.  The bilateral approach also had significant institutional constraints.
Bilateral arrangements tended to be established only between countries with plenty of experience in
competition policy.  In the light of these considerations, the suggestion was made that the Groupconsider the possibility of introducing a further approach, namely a multilateral framework on
competition.
40
25. Various suggestions for action by the WTO were presented as based on strengthening theapplication of the fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment
and transparency in the field of competition law and policy, including in regard to anti-competitivepractices of enterprises that impacted adversely on international trade.
41  Although differing in some
respects, including the degree of detail in which they were set out, these suggestions envisioned
defining specific elements of competition law and policy relating to the fundamental WTO principles
which were common to most jurisdictions having such laws/policies and which were considered to be
important for the multilateral trading system.42
26. One view was that the following elements were relevant to the nexus between WTO
principles and competition law and policy.43  In regard to the existence and scope of application of
competition legislation, it was suggested that such legislation should cover, at least, the following
types of anti-competitive practices, as these were the practices that had the most significance for
international trade:  anti-competitive horizontal restraints, vertical restraints and abuses of a dominant
position that had a negative impact on competition.  With regard to the matter of mergers, it was
                                                     
35 M/10, paragraph 6.
36 M/9, paragraph 9.
37 M/9, paragraphs 9 and 17.
38 M/9, paragraph 17.
39 M/9, paragraph 16.
40 M/8, paragraph 10.
41 M/8, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18; M/9, paragraph 10.  To some extent, this discussion of
possible approaches to a framework agreement overlapped with discussions that took place in relation to other
aspects of the Group's work.  See, in this regard, Parts C(II) and (III), below.
42 M/8, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16 and 18; M/9, paragraphs 4, 9 and 10.
43 M/8, paragraph 4 and M/9, paragraph 10.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 9
suggested that the issue to be discussed was not so much whether individual countries should have
legislation to control mergers, but rather, where th ere was such legislation, how it could be applied in
a transparent and non-discriminatory manner and what the requirements were in terms of international
cooperation to guarantee this.  Another important issue was the matter of exclusions from the
application of competition law and policy.  Clearly, exclusions could contribute to discriminatory
practices and it was vital to restrict such exclusions to a minimum, for the sake of both non-discrimination and transparency. Another specific matter was that of export cartels which resulted in
discrimination between the domestic and the export market and, as such, could have a negative effect
on other WTO Members.  It was suggested that the correct approach to dealing with this issue would
be based on the principle of cooperation, since there were jurisdictional limits to the solution of the
problem solely through the application of competition legislation in the exporting country.  An
additional matter related to the application of competition policy.  Under this rubric, reference was
made to measures to promote the progressive development of institutional capacities, includingthrough enhanced international cooperation with developing countries, the existence of effective and
transparent enforcement powers and the appropriate protection of confidential information.  In
addition, measures could be developed to support the competition advocacy role of competition
authorities.  It was said that these elements could contribute importantly to promoting the equality of
competitive opportunities.
44
27. Another suggestion was that the Group could consider developing a principle that would call
for no less favourable treatment in terms of competition rights for citizens or firms of foreign
countries than that accorded to firms or nationals of the host country.  This could mean that national
competition legislation could be applied to anti-competitive behaviour that took place outside a
country's borders, on the basis of minimum standards or principles which would be agreed throughnegotiations, for example on the treatment of hard-core cartels, cooperation to deal with export cartels
or an agreed set of factors to be considered in the treatment of vertical market restraints.  From a
procedural standpoint, it could also involve the granting of no less favourable treatment to a foreign
product or company in the exercise of their rights in legal or administrative proceedings in the field of
competition law and policy.  The national treatment provision would apply in respect of any existinglegislative provisions.  To give the principle more practical application in this field, its application
could be based on substantive minimum standards or principles to be adopted at the multilateral level.
Matters that could be addressed in this regard w ould include the prohibition of hard-core cartels, the
treatment of export cartels and an agreed set of factors to be considered in the treatment of vertical
market restraints.
 45
28. With regard to the principle of transparency, three further considerations were said to be
relevant.46  First, it was important to ensure transpar ency as regards the legal framework, including
both the law itself and any related guidelines or administrative regulations.  Second, transparency
needed to be ensured in the enforcement process.  With regard to this aspect, it was also essential to
ensure due protection of confidential information.  Third, it was important to ensure due process in the
enforcement of the law.  This had at least two aspects:  first, the possibility for private firms to have
access to domestic competition law systems, whether through complaints presented to the competitionauthorities or through the judicial system.  Second, it was important to ensure fair treatment of parties
in the application of the law. The view was also expressed that adaptation of the principle of
transparency to the field of competition policy could involve, for example, requiring publication of
decisions relating to anti-competitive practices such as cartels, horizontal agreements, vertical
restrictions, abuses of a dominant position and mergers.  In framing any new provisions to enhance
                                                     
44 M/9, paragraph 10.
45 M/8, paragraph 7; see also M/9, paragraph 9.
46 M/9, paragraph 10.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 10
transparency, a key consideration would be to maintain appropriate safeguards for the protection of
confidential information whose disclosure would be prejudicial to the interests of private companies.47
29. The view was expressed that an important feature of any multilateral framework in the area ofcompetition law and policy would be its adaptation to the differing levels of development of
Members.  It was said that four aspects needed to be considered.
48  First, with regard to the application
of the principles to developing countries, it was important to take into consideration their differenteconomic realities and degrees of economic development.  This was relevant, for example, to the
question of the breadth of exemptions that would be  appropriate in particular economies.  The second
aspect was the different cultural conditions that prevailed in different countries, which were important
in view of the far-reaching social and economic changes that the introduction of competition policy
could entail.  The third aspect had to do with differences in resource endowments in the sense that
certain applications of competition policy required more human and material resources.  Again,
differences in levels of development had to be taken into account.  The fourth aspect concerned thedifferent degrees of institutional development that were present in Member countries.  In particular, it
had to be recognized that the more than 80 countries having, or in the process of introducing,
competition laws were at many different stages in their institutional development.
49  Recognition of
the development dimension in any agreement on competition policy should include, but not be limited
to, matters such as transition periods, progressivity of commitments and technical cooperation.50
30. A number of objections were raised and questions posed in response to the various
suggestions that had been put forward.  The vi ew was reiterated that in many, if not most,
jurisdictions having competition laws, the content and administration of such laws was already
broadly consistent with fundamental WTO principles and, consequently, no action was called for by
the WTO.51  In addition, the view was expressed that a competition law was not strictly necessary to
ensure effective application of fundamental WTO principles in the area of competition policy.  In this
regard, reference was made to the examples of Singapore and Hong Kong, China which, it was
suggested, had been regarded, for years, as being among the most, or perhaps the most, competitive
markets in the world, despite the fact that neither of these countries had a comprehensive competition
law.52  Furthermore, it was said that the proposal for a requirement for a comprehensive competition
law did not take into account the diversity of legal systems and the state of development of individual
WTO Members.53  For example, it was not clear why a sectoral approach could not work equally as
well as a comprehensive competition law approach, at least for some economies.54
31. In response, the point was made that no-one had called into question the fact that there weremany other policies which could contribute to promoting competition and enhancing economicwelfare.  However, as had been discussed extensively in the Group, there was plenty of evidence that
a competition law still had an important role to play from the perspectives of development and
international trade.  On the question of sectoral policies, while it could well be that, in some cases,
competition policy considerations might also have to be discussed at the sectoral level, the question of
the interaction between trade and competition policy in general was something that had to be
considered with reference to all sectors of the economy.  The view was also expressed that
competition policy was now a global phenomenon.  It was something that affected countries at all
                                                     
47 M/8, paragraph 7.
48 M/8, paragraph 15.
49 M/8, paragraphs 15, 21, 25 and 30.
50 M/8, paragraph 30.
51 M/8, paragraph 17; M/9, paragraph 12
52 M/8, paragraph 19.
53 M/8, paragraphs 19 and 23.
54 M/8, paragraph 19.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 11
stages of development and something on which there would, therefore, be benefits from working
together at the multilateral level.55
32. The question was posed as to whether the suggestions that had been made by somedelegations were intended to apply only in the international or also in the domestic context.  In this
regard, it was said that if, as appeared to be the case, they emphasized the international sphere of
application, this would not address many of th e most pressing competition problems facing
developing market economies.
56  In response, the point was made that the reason why the matter of
competition law and policy was being discussed in the WTO was precisely because anti-competitive
practices could have a significant impact on international trade, and that the type of rules that would
be the focus of discussions in the WTO would be t hose dealing with practices that had an impact on
trade.  However, when it came to the adoption and implementation of relevant elements of
competition law, one would not imagine that a country would introduce a rule which applied only to
those anti-competitive practices which had an impact on international trade.57
33. The points were also made that only some 70 countries had competition laws, that a number
of developing countries were still considering the possibility of enacting competition laws, that even
amongst countries having such legislation, there was a high degree of disparity in the scope and level
of national competition regimes which would reduce room for consensus on any possible multilateral
disciplines, and that a multilateral framework on competition in the WTO could put constraints onnational sovereignty and create difficulties in achieving the necessary balance between competition
policy and other economic policies and might also restrict the powers of competition authorities.
58
The view was expressed, further, that the proposals that had been outlined were inconsistent with the
culture of the WTO.  In the WTO, the requirement was for individual Members to ensure that their
laws, regulations and restrictive procedures, etc., were in conformity with the rights and obligations inthe relevant Agreements.  For example, the Anti-Dumping Agreement prescribed the principles and
steps and the requirements for individual Members who had or who wished to introduce anti-dumping
legislation, but it did not require individual Members to introduce anti-dumping legislation.  Subject
to this, it was up to individual Members to see whether and how they should put the rights and
obligations into effect in their own domestic legislative or administrative processes.  Some of theAgreements did not require any legislative means whatsoever.
59
34. The view was expressed that three alternative approaches to a mandatory requirement forcompetition legislation could be envisioned.  The first one was a sectoral approach.  It was not clear
why a sectoral approach could not work equally as well as a comprehensive competition law
approach.  The second alternative was a multilateral framework that did not specify or requireindividual Members to introduce any comprehensive competition law, but merely prescribed
principles to be followed if a Member wanted to  introduce competition law.  The third alternative
would be a plurilateral framework, like the existing Agreement on Government Procurement.
60
35. With regard to the point that only about 70 countries had competition laws, it was said that
this was a considerable improvement over the situation prevailing at the time of the drafting of the so-
called Havana Charter almost 50 years ago, when only a few countries had competition laws.  This
had gone a long way towards establishing a common background among WTO Members in this area,which would facilitate the development of an effective multilateral framework on competition.
61
                                                     
55 M/8, paragraph 32.
56 M/8, paragraph 17.
57 M/8, paragraph 31.
58 M/8, paragraphs 22 and 23.
59 M/8, paragraph 19.
60 M/8, paragraph 19.
61 M/8, paragraph 10.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 12
36. A further suggestion that was made to strengthen the application of the principle of
transparency concerned the adoption of a system of voluntary notification for countries regarding
national competition legislation and regulations.  It was said that a system of voluntary country
reviews could be a particularly useful tool for sharing and benchmarking different national
experiences.  Such a system could help to demonstrate the advantages of competition, and show how
good competition laws and good enforcement of such laws could help countries to achieveimprovements in economic welfare.  It was suggested, further, that the publication of world reports on
competition on a regular basis would also be a useful activity that could be undertaken by the WTO as
an aspect of the educational role that some delegations wished to see it take up in this area.
62
37. The view was expressed that further study was needed of the complex issues posed by theinteraction between trade and competition policy before it would be appropriate to commence
negotiation of a WTO framework agreement in this area.
63  In particular, it was said that the Group
was in an exploratory and educative process and was still a long way off from the point where it couldbe in a position to gauge the need for multilateral rules.
64
II. APPROACHES TO PROMOTING COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION
AMONG MEMBERS, INCLUDING IN THE FIELD OF TECHNICAL
COOPERATION
38. This item was discussed by the Working Group at its meetings of 19-20 April and 10-
11 June 1999.  Written submissions on this item were provided by the delegations of the United
States;  Japan;  Korea;  Australia;  Zimbabwe  on behalf of the African Group at the WTO; the
European Community and its member States ;  and Romania (documents W/116, W/121, W/124,
W/125, W/126, W/129 and W/132, respectively).  In addition, the representatives of Australia;
Brazil;  Canada;  the Czech Republic, Egypt;  the European Community and its member States;  HongKong, China;  India;  Japan;  Korea;  Morocco;  Peru;  Romania;  Singapore on behalf of ASEAN
WTO Members;  Switzerland;  and the United States made oral statements or posed questions on this
item.  Further, the observers from the OECD, the World Bank and UNCTAD provided information on
relevant activities of their organizations.
39. The view was expressed that globalization and falling trade barriers had resulted in a greater
need for cooperation and communication between WTO Members, on both the competition and the
trade fronts.
65  While the ultimate objective of cooperation was to protect and promote public welfare,
including consumer welfare, from a trade perspective, the purpose of cooperation on competition
matters was to ensure that anti-competitive practices did not adversely affect the commercial
advantages resulting from elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers.66  Areas of concern mentioned
in this regard included anti-competitive conduct by  firms in foreign markets, for example vertical
market restraints and cartels, in addition to anti-competitive market structures fostered by government
action or inaction.  The point was made that, while not every market access problem could be
attributed to the presence of anti-competitive private practices, or to anti-competitive regulatory
structures, where there had been a history of such conduct or structures, cooperation with foreign
competition authorities could help to address the problem.67  From a competition perspective,
cooperation was aimed at improving the coordination of national competition policies.68  T h a t  i s ,
given the growing interdependence of markets, th e enforcement work of competition authorities
                                                     
62 M/8, paragraph 16.
63 M/8, paragraphs 20 and 25.
64 M/8, paragraph 20.
65 M/8, paragraph 44.
66 M/8, paragraph 68.
67 M/8, paragraph 50.
68 M/9, paragraph 24.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 13
increasingly was no longer conducted in isolation but rather in a more coordinated fashion in
cooperation with foreign competition authorities.69
40. The point was made that cooperation could be conducted at a bilateral, a regional or amultilateral level.  It was said that bilateral cooperation was the most common form of international
cooperation on competition policy.
70  The simplest form of bilateral cooperation was ad hoc
consultations and sharing of public information.  This did not require a formal agreement.Competition authorities habitually consulted one another and exchanged publicly available
information with respect to a variety of administrative, procedural and policy issues.
71  While such
meetings did not specifically address trade problems, they served to improve understanding of the
competition laws and policies of trading partners.72
41. It was noted that a number of Members had signed or were involved in negotiating formalbilateral cooperation agreements amongst themselves.
73  These agreements had dual motivations and
functions:  one was to step up the level of cooperation per se ;  another was to avoid conflicts.  The
agreements could contain several common types of pr ovisions, including provisions for notification of
appropriate authorities of one country about actions to be taken by the national competition authority
of another country, where such actions could affect the important interest of the first country;  sharing
of information and coordination of investigations conducted by both competition authorities;  positive
comity;  and consultations on various issues.74
42. The uses and limitations of positive comity were discussed.  This concept involved a situation
where the competition agency in country A concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that
certain anti-competitive practices, causing it harm, also constituted a violation of the competition rules
of another country B.  In this case, the competition agency of country A would ask the competition
agency of country B to undertake an investigation of such practices and take whatever action wasappropriate.  The point was made that one important benefit of positive comity was that it allowed
cases to draw on evidence available in other jurisdictions, although these cases were conducted by a
foreign competition authority.  It could also serve as a tool for minimizing tensions involving
enforcement.  The point was made that positive comity  tended to be a more useful tool in situations
where competition agencies had developed a relationship of mutual trust and confidence, and wherethe agencies involved respected the principle of national treatment, had adequate investigative and
remedial powers, and had a sufficient degree of independence.
75  There was a risk of inaction, since it
was up to the requested country to decide whether to initiate an antitrust investigation on behalf of the
complaining country.  The requested country might be reluctant to enforce its competition law at the
expense of its own domestic industry and primarily for the benefit of the complaining country.Differences in the coverage and application of competition law could further constrain the role of
positive comity.
76  The point was also made that positive comity was unlikely to be an appropriate
tool for dealing with an export cartel.  In particular, the exporting country would not find it in its
interest to combat the export cartel and, even if  it did, its legislation might not allow it to take
measures against it.77
43. The view was expressed that the provision of technical assistance constituted anotherimportant form of cooperation in a bilateral context.  Competition agencies with substantialexperience helped others engage in the process of implementing a competition regime on issues
                                                     
69 M/9, paragraph 29.
70 M/8, paragraph 53.
71 M/8, paragraphs 44, 51 and 53.
72 M/8, paragraph 51.
73 M/8, paragraph 45 and M/9, paragraph 29.
74 M/8, paragraphs 45 and 46.
75 M/8, paragraph 46.
76 M/8, paragraph 54.
77 M/8, paragraph 72.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 14
ranging from drafting new laws and amendments to specific case analysis.78  The point was made that
the modalities of technical assistance were related to the stage of development of competition law in
the recipient country.  For instance, local training in the foreign country appeared to be most effective
once that country had legislation in place and was actively conducting investigations.  Prior to that,
for countries at the exploratory stage, it was more effective to bring officials to the host country to see
legislative and regulatory structures first-hand.  Programmes grouping together delegates fromdifferent countries tended to be fruitful in terms of exchange of information and experiences, and
helped form specialists' networks.
79  The point was made that the benefits from technical assistance
could be mutual.  On the one hand, developing countries welcomed technical assistance for setting up
their competition regimes because this helped them  ensure efficient competition in their markets and
the protection of the consumer.80  On the other hand, through the provision of technical assistance,
competition agencies from developed countries increased their sensitivity to conditions and concerns
in other countries.81
44. The view was expressed that effectiveness of bilateral cooperation agreements could be
constrained by a number of factors, including differences in substantive laws, the degree of
independence of competition agencies, whether a competition agency was adequately resourced, and
differences in national laws governing the exchange of confidential information.82  Another
significant constraint was the need to protect confidential information.83  This constraint could be
relaxed in two circumstances.  First, in certain cases private parties to a proceeding had waived this
right, because they recognized that it was in thei r own interest to facilitate cooperation between the
two competition agencies.84  Second, some cooperation agreements allowed the sharing of
confidential information and thus they did not involve this constraint.85  The point was made that a
broader limitation to bilateral cooperation, be it informal or formal, was that this type of cooperationtended to take place among countries economically interdependent and sharing a similar level of
experience in competition law enforcement
86, or countries that shared the same ideas in the field of
competition policy.  Furthermore, bilateral agreements were set up on a case-by-case basis and this
approach did not make it possible to take up all the challenges arising from globalization.  In this
regard, the point was made that, under a bilateral approach, countries affected by competitioninvestigations were consulted only if a bilateral agreement existed with that country.  However, it was
not feasible to set up a bilateral agreement with every country, since in many cases very few business
transactions were involved.
87
45. The view was also expressed that bilateral agreements could open the door for abuse, sincecountries could use such agreements to obtain evidence and information from foreign firms andgovernments, with a view to enforcing their competition law extraterritorially.  This observation was
said, however, to be analytical in nature rather than  being based on actual experience and not to be a
general aspect of the operation of bilateral cooperation agreements.
88
46. The view was expressed that regional fora on competition issues could be useful in promotingeffective policy development and enforcement.  Relevant examples cited included regular meetings on
competition matters held by APEC, NAFTA and the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
89  I n  s o m e
                                                     
78 M/8, paragraph 44.
79 M/8, paragraph 58.
80 M/9, paragraph 23.
81 M/8, paragraph 44.
82 M/9, paragraph 29.
83 M/8, paragraph 45 and M/9, paragraph 29.
84 M/8, paragraph 45.
85 M/8, paragraph 47.
86 M/8, paragraphs 53 and 75.
87 M/9, paragraph 22.
88 M/8, paragraph 53 and related comments in paragraph 47.
89 M/8, paragraphs 49, 51 and 55.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 15
cases, cooperative activities had grown into efforts to introduce competition law and policy into the
frameworks governing intraregional trade.  Fo r instance, APEC members had recently undertaken
studies on competition laws and policies and were now working on a set of non-binding principles to
enhance competition and regulatory reform.  In addition, many regional trade agreements such as the
European Union, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
(ANZCERTA) and NAFTA were concerned, to various degrees, with the harmonization of
competition policies.  The degree of harmonization was a function of the level of economic
integration.  For example, the European Union had established a supranational body to enforce
relevant competition provisions under the Treaty of Rome.  In contrast, NAFTA did not set forth
common standards on competition policy, but simply required parties to adopt or maintain measures
proscribing anti-competitive business practices and to take appropriate action with respect thereto.
Moreover, a high level of economic integration had led the European Union and ANZCERTA to
eliminate anti-dumping laws in regional trade, while anti-dumping laws continued to be maintained inthe context of NAFTA.
90
47. It was suggested that regional cooperation could also play a useful role in the provision oftechnical assistance.  This did not involve developed countries exclusively.  For instance, one
developing country with a fully functioning comp etition regime had run since 1996 an international
training programme for other developing countries.
91  It was pointed out that, through participation in
regional seminars, competition officials became familiar with and gained confidence in their
counterparts from other countries of human networks of competition.92
48. The point was made that cooperation on competition issues at the multilateral level often tookthe form of policy advice, technical assistance, and the preparation of specialized studies.  UNCTAD,
the World Bank and the OECD had been especially active in this regard.  More specifically, theGroup was informed that activities carried out by UNCTAD with respect to cooperation on
competition matters included the conduct of meetings of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
(IGE) and the provision of technical assistance, in addition to preparing research studies, and drafting
and reviewing guideline documents such as the Model Competition Law, the Handbook on
Competition Laws, and the UN Set on Restrictive Business Practices.  Issues currently addressed bythe IGE included the relationship between the competition authorities and relevant regulatory
agencies, especially in respect of privatization and demonopolization processes;  international merger
controls, in particular where they had an impact on developing countries;  and the creation of a culture
of competition.  UNCTAD had regularly held traini ng activities for national competition authorities,
sometimes in cooperation with institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD.  In addition,UNCTAD had assisted a number of countries in the process of drafting and adopting competition
legislation.  UNCTAD concurred with the view that cooperation should not be limited to assisting
national competition authorities, and that in parallel broader efforts were needed to help national
competition authorities educate all constituencies, including consumer organizations and businesses,
with respect to the benefits of competition policy.  Current research studies by UNCTAD focused on
experiences with international cooperation on competition policy and how competition policy
addressed the exercise of intellectual property rights.
93
49. It was noted that the World Bank had provided advice on the implementation of competition
policy in the context of country-specific structural adjustment programmes.  A number of national
governments had been assisted in addressing competition issues at times of economic crisis, with a
view to strengthening the role that competition policy could play in the revival of the domestic
economy.  In addition, the Bank had provided extensive technical assistance by organizingconferences, seminars and workshops.  The Bank had also prepared a number of specialized
                                                     
90 M/8, paragraph 55.
91 M/8, paragraph 55.
92 M/8, paragraph 60.
93 M/8, paragraphs 64 and 65.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 16
publications intended to disseminate best practices in the field.  A recent publication entitled "A
Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Policy"94 provided a comprehensive
overview of issues concerning the application of competition law in developing and transition
economies, together with various options reflecting different country circumstances.95  In performing
its cooperation activities in the area of competition policy, the Bank increasingly attempted to involve
the private sector in conferences, seminars and workshops, as well as in the provision of technicaladvice.
96
50. The Group was also informed that up to the end of 1998, the OECD had conducted andparticipated in over 90 programmes on competition policy, for both member and non-member
countries.  Most of these programmes had been organized and led by the OECD itself;  the remaining
programmes had been joint ventures, typically with the World Bank, a single country such as Korea,
or with a competition agency like the United States Federal Trade Commission.  In other cases, the
OECD had sent in experts to participate in events such as APEC conferences, and the trainingseminars organized by the Japan Fair Trade Commission.  In addition, the OECD had provided
technical assistance to non-member countries by way of preparing commentaries on draft competition
laws.  This had often been followed by seminars that examined case studies.  Typically, new
competition officers presented cases and a panel of very experienced enforcers from a number of
OECD countries discussed how those cases might be analysed.  Such seminars had proved to be oneof the most effective ways to convey the best competition practices.  Best practices were also
disseminated through publications, including the b ook prepared jointly with the World Bank on the
framework for the implementation of competition law.  Recently, the OECD had launched a journal
97
as a vehicle to make available to the public the extensive analytical work on competition issuescarried out by this organization.
98  Lastly, the OECD had held a conference on trade and competition
policy featuring participation by 30 non-OECD member countries and representatives of the
Secretariats of the WTO and UNCTAD, in addition to the 29 OECD member countries.  A report on
the conference had been published recently.99
51. Differing views were expressed as to whether cooperation on competition matters at themultilateral level should be formalized through an ag reement to be negotiated in the WTO.  The main
arguments in favour of setting up a multilateral agreement on competition issues were as follows.
First, the points were made that OECD a nd UNCTAD could not go beyond issuing non-binding
guidelines and recommendations and that, in contrast, the WTO was the best-suited forum for
undertaking discussions on multilateral competition rules, as it was equipped with legally binding
rules and an effective dispute settlement system, and had a long experience with multilateralnegotiations striking a balance of interests between developed and developing countries.
100
Competition-related provisions of existing WTO Agreements were inadequate for addressingcompetition problems across the board, including private anti-competitive practices.  The Kodak-Fuji
case had illustrated the lack of tools at the disposal of the WTO.  Hence, there was a need to reinforce
the WTO regime by the incorporation of competition-related norms.  The view was expressed that an
ideal model for an international competition fram ework would contain provisions on a supranational
competition authority, as well as unified substantive and procedural norms.  One model close to thisideal form was the 1993 Munich Code which had been proposed by the International Antitrust Code
Working Group (IACWG).  However, a TRIPS-type  agreement could be considered as a more
practical option.  Under this type of agreement, ev ery Member would be required to commit itself to
                                                     
94 A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Policy (World Bank and OECD,
1999).
95 M/8, paragraph 62.
96 M/8, paragraph 63.
97 OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy.
98 M/8, paragraphs 59 and 61.
99 OECD, Trade and Competition Policies:  Exploring the Interface (Paris:  1999).
100 M/8, paragraph 56.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 17
incorporate substantive norms of competition into its domestic law, and to establish independent
administrative and judicial bodies to oversee implementation and guarantee greater uniformity in
interpretation of the agreement.  The WTO dispute settlement procedures could be used as the
appropriate mechanism for addressing violations of the substantive norms.  This approach would not
presuppose the pre-existence of domestic competition laws, but would require the eventual
incorporation into the national legislation of provisions relating to competition.101
52. It was also suggested that a multilateral initiative through the WTO could augment and
reinforce bilateral and regional initiatives.  Through commitments on transparency and national
treatment, such an agreement would confirm the rules of business conduct in foreign markets and
ensure that firms were treated in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to the application of
competition policy.  The WTO provided the most appropriate forum for an effective and
comprehensive discussion of competition issues within a multilateral framework.  A multilateral
agreement on competition policy could serve to solidify the gains from trade liberalization bydisciplining private barriers to trade, improving cooperation and communication among Members on
competition policy matters, and promoting greater certainty as to the rules for conducting business in
foreign markets.
102
53. The view was expressed that an internationa l framework for competition policy rules could be
structured around the following three points.103  First, each WTO Member would commit itself to
adopting domestic competition rules.   Second, such rules would be based upon common principles.
Third, there would be some rules for cooperation.  There were two alternatives for developing rules
on cooperation.  Under the first approach, one would seek convergence and subsequently one would
envisage cooperation.  Under the second approach, lack of convergence would not delay cooperation;
rather, the degree of cooperation would be tailored to the degree of convergence already achieved.Both approaches could be applied concurrently.  This was a good illustration of the complementarity
between bilateral and multilateral approaches to c ooperation.  It was suggested that positive comity
should not enter this multilateral framework as a binding tool.  It had rarely been applied and could be
a problem for competition authorities closely attached to their work programme and priorities and
who did not wish to be overwhelmed by inquiry requ ests transmitted by other countries.  In contrast,
the multilateral framework could feature an obligation to notify investigations having an important
effect upon WTO Members.  In addition, the provisi on of technical assistance could play an important
role within a multilateral framework.  It was suggested that technical assistance would be provided
more efficiently if there was increased cooperation among the agencies performing this function.
104
54. The view that development of a multilateral agreement on competition matters was premature
and might prove unwarranted was also expressed.  In this connection, it had been suggested that an
adequate competition policy could in some countries reside basically in measures liberalizing trade
and investment flows, complemented by sectoral regulatory policies where appropriate, without a
competition law or enforcement authority. In this context, there was a question as to how such a
country could cooperate with other WTO Members on competition matters.  More generally, the point
was made that half of the WTO Members had still not adopted a competition law nor had they
established a competition authority.  Hence, proposals to set up a multilateral agreement oncompetition issues seemed premature.  In addition, it was suggested that proposals regarding a
multilateral framework agreement addressed the question of how to construct a WTO agreement on
competition policy, but not why such an agreement was necessary.  In addition, the proposals tabled
were not sufficiently clear in many aspects.  For instance, would the proposed agreement be binding?
Would it be limited to rules regarding cooperation?  Would it feature dispute settlement provisions?
105
                                                     
101 M/8, paragraph 57.
102 M/9, paragraph 29.
103 M/8, paragraph 70.
104 M/9, paragraph 22.
105 M/9, paragraph 30.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 18
In addition, it was suggested that notification of competition actions would make the burden of WTO
notifications even more onerous.  This was a serious concern for developing countries.  Moreover, it
was said that notification of competition actions could be unnecessary given that the firms concerned
would be better placed to inform their governments about such actions directly and this was a quicker
procedure than notification.  The point was also made that the dissemination of experiences in the
application of competition policy did not require a multilateral framework or a WTO agreement.106
55. Certain "markers" were put down in respect of the arguments made in favour of developing
WTO instruments addressing cooperation on compet ition law and policy.  The question was posed as
to whether anti-competitive practices with cross-border effects were all that prevalent? A few well-
publicized multi-jurisdictional cases did not make such problems global nor did they make a case for
a global solution.  Second, the view was expressed that bilateral and regional approaches had been
relatively more successful than multilateral ones.  None of the instruments that had been negotiated or
discussed at the multilateral level, such as UNCTAD's Set of Multilaterally Agreed EquitablePrinciples and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, or the numerous instruments
developed by the OECD, were binding.  They rema ined as recommendations or guidelines.  Third, did
the benefits of cooperation under the auspices of the WTO outweigh the considerable costs entailed in
achieving the degree of commonality of approach required to ensure the success of multilateral
cooperation?  Members would only be prepared to cooperate if there was a shared perception ofcommon interest and mutual benefit.
107  The view was also expressed that the notion that bilateral
agreements were of limited scope and had to be supplemented by a multilateral agreement was
directly contradicted by experience with respect to the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  In this case, the existence of a multilateral agreement had not
generated the expected benefits and it was now argued that such benefits were contingent upon theestablishment of bilateral agreements.
108
56. In addition, the view was expressed that the notification of competition law enforcementactions on a multilateral basis would be burdensome and unworkable.  Such notifications called for
great confidentiality and secrecy, given the due process protection that had to be accorded to
companies involved in antitrust investigations.  They  were made ordinarily on a bilateral basis;  that
is, only the affected country was notified.  Notifying upcoming enforcement actions on a multilateral
basis would be inconsistent with requirements of confidentiality and could seriously impair the
effectiveness of such actions.  Second, the justification for a multilateral agreement standardizing
country practices in the area of competition was not evident. There was nothing theoretically
inappropriate or offensive about having 80 plus competition laws in the world.  Third, centralizing theprovision of technical assistance to new competition agencies did not seem warranted.  Countries
seeking assistance usually had a clear idea of what they needed and who they needed it from, and thus
there was no point in having some centralized orga nization step in to provide overall coordination.
There was nothing wrong with a developing country seeking technical assistance and policy advice
from several countries at once.
109
57. In response to the foregoing observations, it was suggested that one of the main reasonsjustifying cooperation on competition matters within a WTO framework was that anti-competitivepractices increasingly had an international dimension and therefore affected the interests of a
multiplicity of WTO Members.  Second, the notion that anti-competitive practices with a global
dimension were unimportant was inaccurate.  On the contrary, investigations against international
cartels, merger reviews involving multiple jurisdictions, and anti-competitive practices with cross-
country effects were a frequent occurrence.  Third, if a WTO Member conducted a competitioninvestigation and this investigation affected the interests of other WTO Members, it seemed normal
                                                     
106 M/9, paragraph 31.
107 M/9, paragraph 26.
108 M/9, paragraph 31.
109 M/9, paragraph 25.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 19
that there should be some process for signalling that such investigation had taken place, as well as a
framework for consultations where other WTO Members could raise any particular concerns relating
to that investigation.  Fourth, the need to avoid overburdening the WTO system of notifications was
clear, and it was recognized that this called for a high degree of flexibility.  Fifth, while there were
obvious limits to the exchange of confidential information, it was important not to lose sight of the
fact that in every investigation there was a significant amount of non-confidential information whichcould be exchanged.  Sixth, it was important that the commitments with respect to cooperation
undertaken as part of a multilateral framework were seen as binding, although some aspects of those
commitments, for instance those relating to notifications and consultations, did not easily lend
themselves to dispute settlement.  Finally, awaiting a broader dissemination or development of
competition law across the world to engage in cooperation was not practical, because WTO Members
risked in fact never cooperating if they waited to have enough convergence.
110
58. The suggestion was also made that, independently of whether a multilateral framework on
competition issues materialized, as a further step in the dissemination of experiences regarding the
application of competition law, it would be worthw hile to launch regular reviews at the WTO in the
area of competition policy, including the handling of individual cases.  The WTO already had the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) in place but the TPRM dealt with broader trade issues and
one could not expect to have sufficient discussion of competition law and policy as part of the TPRMwork.  It was also said that technical assistance could make a substantial contribution towards helping
Members solve some of the difficulties involved in implementing a competition regime.  An option
worth considering was the creation of technical cooperation and competition advocacy support
systems within the WTO.
111
59. The point was also made that multilateral cooperation should not and would not absorb or
replace bilateral and regional cooperation schemes.  Rather, all three approaches could and should
develop in a mutually complementary and reinforcing way.112  It was also suggested that cooperation
on competition matters should have at its heart an educational purpose, instead of being driven by a
results-oriented agenda.  It was said in this regard that competition policy, despite its positive effects
on welfare, was not supported by strong constituencies.  As a result, the world was getting less thanthe optimum in terms of competition policy.  This "political market failure" could be remedied by
educating the public on the benefits of competition policy.  Any of the three basic approaches to
cooperation (bilateral, regional and multilateral) would be helpful to meet this purpose, although
cooperation at the level of the WTO could be especially helpful in addressing this problem.
Furthermore, the implementation of competition policy involved very large economies of learning andhence cooperation at the multilateral level was bound to be useful especially for countries beginning
to operate competition regimes.
113
60. The view was expressed that the nature of cooperation on competition matters varied with thedegree of institutional development.  Cooperation in this area seemed to follow a pattern consisting of
three stages.  At a very early stage, cooperation focused on the provision of technical assistance.  In a
second and perhaps intermediary stage, cooperation took the form of relatively simple agreements not
requiring the exchange of confidential information.  At a more advanced stage, cooperation took placethrough sophisticated agreements, including provisions on the exchange of confidential
information.
114  Another view was that cooperation should be structured into four stages.  The first
stage would be educational, in broad terms.  Th e second would involve the provision of technical
training, in order to allow a lesser developed competition regime to grow into a mature and
sophisticated system. The third would involve voluntary cooperation among competition authorities
                                                     
110 M/9, paragraph 34.
111 M/9, paragraph 27.
112 M/8, para 52.
113 M/8, paragraph 66.
114 M/8, paragraph 66 and M/9, paragraph 28.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 20
regarding, for instance, the exchange of ad hoc information.  The fourth stage would involve formal
cooperation on the basis of legally binding instruments.  This progressive approach would be
reflective of reality and would best address the actual needs of individual Members.115
61. It was suggested that there was a need to develop mechanisms, both regional and global, forcooperation and communication with other competition agencies.  The future design of international
cooperation mechanisms should be directed at meeting four specific needs: (i) technical assistance toMembers, especially those that still did not have competition systems in place or were at the initial
stages;  (ii) promotion of a culture of competition, in view of the fact that national competition
agencies and competition legislation were necessary but not sufficient to accomplish this objective;
(iii) the identification of priority areas with respec t to which the efforts of competition agencies could
be more effective;  and (iv) the dissemination of information concerning best practices in applying
competition policy, including institutional transparency.  Some of these ideas had been reflected
already in a Declaration of Principles issued in October 1998 by the countries participating in the FreeTrade Area of the Americas.  The generalized adoption of specific cooperation mechanisms, such as
positive comity, or the OECD Recommendation on Ha rd Core Cartels, could require some prior
efforts at harmonization.  This was the case because cartels, for instance, could be treated under the
per se  rule or under the rule of reason depending upon the jurisdiction.
116
62. The view was expressed that special attention should be accorded to the specific situation of
certain developing countries, including African countries, that had not yet adopted domestic
legislation on competition matters, or created institutions for the enforcement of competition policy.
Two levels of technical cooperation were potentially useful for such countries.  At the operational
level, countries could be assisted in developing their institutional capabilities on a bilateral, on a
regional and on a multilateral basis;  relevant institutions and organizations in this regard were theWorld Bank, the OECD, the European Commission as well as the UNCTAD and the WTO.  A second
level of cooperation related to the analysis of certain anti-competitive practices with cross-country
effects;  mega-mergers, for example.  Furthe r work was warranted on both of these aspects.
117
63. The view was also expressed that cooperation intrinsically had a bilateral, a regional and a
multilateral facet;  each of these approaches had some advantages and some inherent shortcomings.Countries could adopt one or more of these approaches in a non-exclusive manner, depending on their
own experience in implementing competition law and their level of economic development.
118  More
specifically, it appeared that bilateral cooperation tended to take place between countries with similar
competition policy regimes.  Since competition policy regimes were closely linked to the level of
economic development of Member countries, this implied that bilateral cooperation, or at least formalbilateral cooperation, was taking place predominantly between developed countries.  This also seemed
to be the case for regional cooperation.  It was important for the Working Group to examine more
closely how cooperation could be fostered amongst countries with different competition regimes, at
different levels of development.  This would make cooperation a global tool.  In fact, enhanced
cooperation with countries with nascent competition policy regimes would provide these countries
with valuable insights.  Similarly, enhanced communication with countries which did not yet have a
national competition policy regime would go a long way in convincing them of the benefits ofadopting such a regime.  The Working Group should focus on this aspect of cooperation.
Furthermore, multilateral cooperation on competition matters did not have to be based on a formal
framework of rules.  The view was also expressed that it was imperative to ensure that global welfare,
and not national welfare, was used for evaluating anti-competitive practices.  A national welfare
standard implied treating anti-competitive behaviour in the home market differently from anti-competitive behaviour in foreign markets.  Further, priority in international cooperation should be
                                                     
115 M/8, paragraph 77.
116 M/8, paragraph 67.
117 M/9, paragraph 23.
118 M/8, paragraph 74.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 21
accorded to the control of anti-competitive behavi our of firms with international market power.
Responsibility for such control would tend to fall on large economies, since firms with international
market power tended to be based in large economies.119
64. The view was also expressed that, by questioning the possibility of increasing degrees ofcooperation, some Members had already taken a position on what was the level of cooperation they
could accept.  This seemed prejudicial, however, since there was not a direct connection betweencooperation consisting of technical assistance and more developed and elaborate forms of
cooperation.  Besides, the context in which cooperation took place was evolving given the speed at
which developing countries and transitional econom ies were adopting competition policy.  Limiting
discussions to educational cooperation could mean failing to anticipate the real needs that developing
countries and transitional countries might face in the near future.  In other words, it did not seem
sensible to differentiate in a static way educational cooperation from more elaborate forms of
cooperation.
120
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF COMPETITION POLICY TO ACHIEVING THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE WTO, INCLUDING THE PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
65. This item was discussed by the Working Group at its meetings on 19-20 April and 10-
11 June 1999.  Written submissions on this item were provided by the delegations of Hong Kong,China;  Japan;  the European Community and its member States;  and Korea (documents W/118 in the
case of Hong Kong, China;  documents W/119, W/122, W/134 and W/135, in the case of Japan;
document W/130 in the case of the Community;  and document W/133 in the case of Korea).
Subsequent to the meeting of 10-11 June, a written submission on this item was provided by
Mauritius (W/137).  In addition, the representatives of the Dominican Republic;  Egypt;  the EuropeanCommunity and its member States;  Hong Kong, China;  Hungary;  India;  Japan;  Korea;  Malaysia;
Norway;  Pakistan;  Switzerland;  the United States;  and Zimbabwe, on behalf of the WTO African
Group, made oral statements or posed questions on this item during the two meetings.  The observer
from the OECD provided information on relevant activities of his organization.
66. The view was expressed that the application of certain WTO rules benefited import-
competing producers rather than promoting competition and consumer welfare.  This was an anomaly,
particularly in an increasingly globalized economy.  It was suggested that, to ensure that WTO rules
remained valid, credible and up to date, there was a need for a competition-oriented reform of the
WTO system.  The focus of this reform should be to link WTO rules to the broad competition
principles of open markets, non-discriminatory conditions of competition, and consumer welfare.
Along with the implementation of this approach, due attention needed to be directed to governmental
restraints, such as trade measures restricting import and export competition, and exemptions from
competition rules such as those concerning export cartels.
121 It was also suggested that it would be
unproductive to introduce into the WTO system a multilateral framework for competition policy,
without first addressing the anti-competitive elements built into the current WTO disciplines.  There
was no question that competition policy must be concerned with both governmental restraints and
private practices restricting competition and trade.122  The view was also expressed that the purpose of
the Working Group was to examine the interaction between trade and competition policy, with the
long-term goal of seeing how the WTO could strive  towards a greater convergence between these two
areas.123
                                                     
119 M/8, paragraphs 74-76.
120 M/9, paragraph 28.
121 M/8, paragraph 80 and W/9, paragraph 49.
122 M/8, paragraph 84.
123 M/8, paragraph 88.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 22
67. The suggestion was made that competition policy could contribute to achieving the objectives
of the WTO by helping to shape trade policy.  While competition policy perspectives could be
brought into sectoral regulatory schemes by including the competition agency in policy-making,
competition laws had no power to affect trade-restrictive measures taken by the government itself
directly impeding competition with foreign competit ors.  The view was expressed that trade remedies,
such as anti-dumping, were good candidates for reform;  therefore, the possibility of introducingcompetition policy perspectives into the agreemen ts governing such measures should be examined.
124
The view was expressed that anti-dumping measures had a greater distorting effect on trade than
safeguard measures, in that they did not require offsetting concessions or adherence to the WTO
principles of MFN treatment and non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions.  The
abuse of anti-dumping measures could be remedied by bringing such measures in line with their
original function.  In this regard, the view was expressed that anti-dumping measures had originally
been intended to regulate "predatory pricing" in international trade, while competition laws did so
with respect to the domestic market.  Article VI of the GATT, however, restricted "price
discrimination" in general, instead of regulating specifically "predatory pricing" in international
transactions.  Thus, there was a disparity between the wording of this provision and the original
objectives of anti-dumping measures.125  Economists generally agreed that, in the absence of
predatory intent, dumping was basically harmless for the importing country, because the benefitsconsumers gained from dumping were greater than any harm undergone by producers.
126
Accordingly, it was suggested that the focus of anti-dumping measures should be changed to bedirected at the regulation of "predatory pricing", rather than of "international price discrimination".
The above standard would require the following:  first, use of the concept of "marginal cost" or
"average variable cost" as the basis for the definition of normal value;  second, verifying theprobability of future success in predation prior to the application of anti-dumping measures, which
would require examination of the conditions of co mpetition in the domestic market of the importing
country;  and third, when considering the application of anti-dumping measures, the examination not
only of producer interests (reflected in injury to the domestic industry), but also of the benefits to
consumers that arose from low-priced imports and would be curtailed following the application of
such measures.  In other words, the application of anti-dumping measures should be assessed from the
viewpoint of the economy as a whole.
127  The view was also expressed that the mere initiation of an
anti-dumping investigation was in itself a large th reat to exporting companies, and that the trade
distortive effects of the filing of anti-dumping suits should be considered when reviewing anti-
dumping regimes from the perspective of competition policy.128
68. The argument was made that the WTO rules on safeguard measures also needed to be
reviewed from a competition perspective.  For example, Article 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards
did not address purely private business practices, which raised the question of whether measures such
as voluntary restraints initiated by private firms were prohibited under this Article.  The reason why
Article 11 banned grey-area measures such as voluntary export restraints and ordinary market
arrangements was that such measures adversely affected competition.  Therefore, whether or not
certain grey-area measures were prohibited under Article 11 should be decided on the basis of theeffects these measures had on competition rather than on the basis of whether the government was
involved in the establishment of such measures.  This interpretation appeared to be consistent with the
letter and the spirit of the Preamble to the Agreement on Safeguards, which emphasized the need to
enhance rather than limit competition in international markets.
129
                                                     
124 M/8, paragraph 81 and W/9, paragraph 52.
125 M/8, paragraphs 81 and 82.
126 M/8, paragraph 84.
127 M/8, paragraph 82.
128 M/8, paragraph 81.
129 M/9, paragraph 50.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 23
69. In response to the foregoing suggestions, the view was expressed that the development of
possible reforms of existing WTO rules was inconsistent with the mandate set for the Working Group
in the recommendation that had been approved by the General Council (WT/GC/M/32, page 52),
since this recommendation referred to the "contribution" of competition policy to the objectives of the
WTO.  In addition, if the Working Group were to make a decision to consider how competition
elements could be infused into WTO provisions, this examination should be holistic and non-discriminatory as between WTO provisions.  For instance, a theoretical argument could be made that
this review should include the issue of how comp etition elements could be infused into the WTO
provisions regarding special and differential treatment, among many others. It should not be neglected
that certain WTO rules, such as those on trade remedies, fulfilled a particular role in the balance of
concessions offered by Members and that any attempt to philosophically refashion those rules would
fundamentally disrupt the existing balance in the WTO system.
130  The view was also expressed that it
was an over-simplification to posit the convergence of trade policy and competition policy and it wasnot necessarily the case that one policy was superior to the other.
131  B y  w a y  o f  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e s e
points, the view was expressed that suggesting that WTO provisions on special and differential
treatment had an anti-competitive effect, and could therefore be subject to review, showed a lack of
clarity about what those provisions did, and how they contributed to increasing the competitiveness of
developing countries.132  Further, the mandate to study the interaction between trade and competition
policy had clear limits and could not possibly encompass themes such as labour or the environment,
since both themes were clearly unrelated to the mandate of the Group.133
70. The view was expressed that competition cases having an international dimension wererelevant to market access and thus to achieving the objectives of the WTO.  They were bound to
increase in numbers as globalization proceeded, posing a major challenge to the WTO.  However,actions to curb anti-competitive behaviour originating in a foreign country were difficult or at times
impossible to enforce.
134  This was an area of concern for developing countries and merited further
discussion by the Group.135  In such cases, the competition authorities of the country concerned had to
request the assistance of the competition authorities of the country where the anti-competitive
behaviour took place.  For a variety of reasons, however, such assistance was not alwaysforthcoming.
136  The Working Group should focus on anti-competitive practices with a significant
impact on international trade.  There was a common understanding that hard-core cartels were of
special significance both from the point of view of international trade and from the point of view of
competition law.137  The argument was made that the lack of multilateral rules and insufficient
cooperation among the relevant authorities in the field of competition affected negatively bothinternational trade and investment, since anti-competitive practices of a private or regulatory nature
could seriously restrain market access and market presence.
138
71. The impact of import cartels, export cartels and international cartels on international trade andmarket entry by foreign firms was considered.  It was said that the impact of import and export cartels
was fairly obvious.  Import cartels directly restricted competition in the domestic market between
domestic and foreign suppliers by restraining imports of goods and services.  Export cartels restricted
competition in the foreign market to which exports were directed.  International cartels, in turn,
prevented competition in global markets.  Of course, this had an effect upon the domestic market as it
generated a rise in the price of goods and services sold domestically and a reduction in consumer
                                                     
130 M/8, paragraph 85.
131 M/9, paragraph 46.
132 M/8, paragraphs 88 and 89.
133 M/8, paragraphs 87, 88 and 90.
134 M/8, paragraph 86.
135 M/8, paragraph 89.
136 M/8, paragraph 86.
137 M/8, paragraphs 91 and 92.
138 M/8, paragraph 83.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 24
welfare.  A complicated question was whether domes tic hard-core cartels, such as price-fixing, output
allocation, and the division of markets, had adverse effects on international trade.  Such cartels did not
distort international trade by themselves.  For example,  price-fixing would result in high prices in the
domestic market.  As high prices in the domestic market would attract entry by foreign firms, a
successful domestic cartel had to be accompanied by government measures excluding foreign
companies from the domestic market, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  Another possibility wasfor domestic firms to behave anti-competitively to jointly prevent the entry of foreign firms;  for
example by controlling the distribution of imported goods.
139
72. The view was expressed that functioning competition policies contributed to the fulfilment ofWTO objectives not only in the area of trade but also in that of investment.  Open policies toward
foreign direct investment and properly constituted and functioning competition policies were mutually
supportive.  On the one hand, liberal investment rules, by making the market contestable, could
challenge domestic oligopolies and reduce the likelihood of cartels and monopolies.  On the otherhand, effective competition policies could safeguard against possible abuses of market power by
foreign investors.  The decision of the General Council taken in December 1998 to extend the
mandates of the two Working Groups established in Singapore gave Members an opportunity to
prepare the ground for opening negotiations on establishing multilateral sets of rules for investment,
as well as for competition.
140
73. Views were expressed regarding the potential benefits of a multilateral framework agreement
on competition policy, and the choice of the WTO as the forum to address this issue.  It was said that,
while divergences between countries with respect to the substantive provisions of competition laws
and enforcement practices might pose difficulties for establishing a multilateral framework on
competition policy, they also heightened the potential benefits of an agreement.141  The absence of
competition laws in many Member countries should not be allowed to constitute a difficulty, just as
had not the fact that, at the time that the Uruguay Round negotiations on intellectual property had
begun, relatively few Members had had a functioning regime protecting intellectual property rights.142
74. The view was expressed that a multilateral framework on competition policy would make a
major contribution towards the promotion of international trade.  Such a framework should be soughtas part of a more general and balanced WTO agenda.  There were several benefits to be derived from
such a multilateral framework.  First, although it was generally recognized that anti-competitive
practices had a significant adverse impact on inte rnational trade and investment, especially in the
context of globalization, there was no mechanism at the WTO to address such practices.  A
multilateral framework on competition would play this role.  Second, because many countries hadadopted and were enforcing competition laws, and because anti-competitive practices increasingly
had an international dimension, there seemed to be a need for a multilateral framework of
cooperation, complementing cooperative efforts at the bilateral and at the regional levels.  Third, a
WTO agreement on competition would contribute towards the spread of a competition culture and this
would reinforce the WTO system overall.  Finally, a multilateral agreement on competition would be
very helpful in cases falling under a multiplicity of jurisdictions and this could help reduce
unnecessary costs to business regarding compliance with the competition regime.
143
75. The view was expressed that the principles/standards incorporated into such a framework of
rules had to be flexible enough to accommodate the differences in objectives, priorities, rules,
procedures and institutions in the competition regimes of Members.  This diversity called for the
adoption of a broad competition perspective rather than for harmonization.  Convergence should
                                                     
139 W/9, paragraph 45.
140 M/8, paragraph 83.
141 M/9, paragraph 43.
142 M/9, paragraph 48.
143 W/9, paragraph 40.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 25
occur only where convergence mattered and where it helped the process of international cooperation.
A WTO framework imposing rigid requirements would not only hinder meeting the specific
development needs of developing countries, but could also undermine the more sophisticated
competition policies/rules of developed economies.144
76. The point was made that, in examining proposals for multilateral rules, the developmentdimension should be firmly borne in mind.
145  While one of the objectives of a competition agreement
could be to gradually limit exclusions from competition law, the progressivity of this process would
have to take into account differences in levels of development.  Another example of the kind of
flexibility that was required was that a multilateral framework would not necessarily envisage
commitments regarding merger control.  A flexible  approach could also be adopted with respect to
small- and medium-sized enterprises.  Cooperation was another key aspect from a development
perspective.  It would provide sustained support for the process of progressive development of a
competition enforcement structure in developing countries.  Cooperation in individual cases andgeneral exchanges of experiences should be core components of a multilateral agreement on
competition and should be geared towards meeting the particular concerns that developing countries
had expressed in this field.  The WTO itself could become a significant provider of technical
assistance in the competition area.
146
77. The point was made that somewhat more specific guidance and support were needed for
small, open developing countries which were committed to market principles but lacked experience
with the administration of competition laws and policies.  In the light of this, the view was expressed
that the development of a possible WTO discipline preceded by voluntary guidance and support
regarding competition law and policy implementation could help to support ongoing liberalization
efforts and sustain the momentum for deepening the integration of small economies as well as thelarge number of developing countries who were looking forward to getting well entrenched in the
mainstream of the multilateral trading system.  This could also be viewed in the context of the
international coherence initiatives approach.  Taking account of these challenges and constraints, it
was suggested that future work on competition policy in the WTO could focus on the following
matters:  (a) the core elements of competition policy in a developing economy context, with particularreference to smaller economies;  (b) practical approaches to institution-building that would economize
on administrative costs and permit the exploitation of synergies with other relevant market-place
institutions;  (c) promotion of coherence between competition policy and related laws/policies and
WTO disciplines and also coherence in related activities and initiatives of the international
community;  and (d) practical approaches to cooperation and assistance in the implementation ofcompetition law and policy, both at the regional and multilateral levels.
147
78. The point was made that the analytical demands placed on developing countries regardingpreparations for the next Round of negotiations were huge.  In the light of this, certain conditions
should be established as a basis for possible negotiations regarding multilateral competition rules.  In
particular, technical assistance should be provid ed that would venture beyond the traditional support
to competition agencies in terms of development of competition laws and their enforcement and
include scrupulous assessment of the expected outcomes and the implications for developingcountries of multilateral competition rules.  A necessary condition for negotiating multilateral rules
should therefore be the conclusion of a thorough educative process (for a period of up to two years),
following which negotiations would be launched.
148
                                                     
144 M/8, paragraph 80 and W/9, paragraph 41.
145 M/8, paragraphs 89 and 90, and W/9, paragraph 42.
146 M/9, paragraph 42.
147 M/10, paragraph 4.
148 M/10, paragraph 5.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 26
79. A number of specific ideas regarding the elements of a multilateral framework on competition
policy were tabled for discussion.  According to one suggestion, a first element related to common
principles and rules on competition law and policy.  These would include principles such as
transparency and non-discrimination which were essential building blocks for both effective
competition law and the multilateral trading system.  A second element concerned measures to
address anti-competitive practices that had a significant impact on international trade and investment.The view was expressed that it was generally recognized that hard-core cartels fell in this category
and could be treated under a common rule.  In contrast, in areas where competition law relied on a
case-by-case assessment, such as abuse of dominant position or monopolization, and vertical
agreements, a common rule was not the right approach because it would eliminate the flexibility
which was essential for a proper assessment.  It was suggested that the Working Group could discuss
how other practices might be incorporated into the framework.  A third element suggested for
consideration concerned cooperation.  Fourthly, it was suggested that dispute settlement within a
multilateral agreement on competition was a very complex issue which would require further study.
It was clear, however, that dispute settlement in  the area of competition law and policy should not
involve the review of individual decisions taken by national competition authorities.
149
80. Another suggestion posited that non-discrimination and transparency should be two keyelements of a multilateral competition framewor k.  According to this proposal, the substantive
provisions of this multilateral framework should in clude commitments with respect to issues such as
the adoption of a competition law, the establishment of a competition authority, and the prohibition of
hard-core cartels.  A multilateral framework should also feature provisions on international
cooperation for better enforcement of competition law and policy.  However, there would not be any
commitments regarding positive comity.  Further, a number of specific provisions would address the
development dimension:  grace periods, exemptions from certain obligations, waivers, and
reservations.  Technical assistance would also be of importance in this connection.  Finally, while it
would be difficult to impose an obligation on competition agencies to assume a competition advocacy
role, positive support could be provided for competition advocacy to enhance the contestability of
markets.
150
81. A number of further suggestions were made regarding the implementation of a WTO
framework on competition policy.  First, it was suggested that transitional arrangements should be an
integral element of a multilateral framework.  A second suggestion was to prioritize anti-competitive
practices to be banned.  A third suggestion was to examine the appropriateness of exemptions
systems, particularly any adverse effects on economic development.  A fourth suggestion was to studyfurther whether competition law was a necessity.  In particular, it should be discussed whether there
were ways to render markets competitive without resorting to a competition law.  Fifth, it was
desirable to conduct regular reviews of competition policy, including the handling of individual cases
by Members.  Sixth, it was suggested that a tech nical cooperation and competition advocacy support
system be created within the WTO.
151
82. In response to the above proposals and observations, the view was expressed that amultilateral agreement of a binding nature would provide no assurance of doing a better job inpromoting mutual education, cooperation and understanding than the efforts that were taking place in
the Group and other international fora.  In fact, activities such as education, cooperation, technical
assistance, and further analytical exploration could occur quite naturally outside the bounds of a legal
framework.  In addition, such an agreement, even if it were relatively general in scope and content,
would still pose the risk of interfering seriously with the intelligent and dynamic evolution ofmethodologies and practices to address anti-competitive conduct.  At this stage there were many ways
in which the Working Group could continue to pursue many of the sensible goals motivating the
                                                     
149 M/9, paragraph 41.
150 M/9, paragraph 43.
151 M/9, paragraph 44.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 27
various suggestions made.  Whether the WTO could continue to host some or all of these activities
was to be settled elsewhere in the context of creating an agenda for the future work of the WTO.
According to this view, where appropriate and necessary, competition considerations would continue
to influence the development of WTO rules and market access provisions.  For instance, competition-
related measures had been integral to the achievement of a high-quality agreement on the
liberalization of trade on basic telecommunications services.  The means by which competition-related concerns became important for the purpose of ensuring market access was frequently a
function of the attributes of the trade involved, in particular the products or the particular markets
concerned, and it was not necessary or even desirable to consider such means on a general basis.
Thus, there was no need to undertake some sort of comprehensive review of all WTO provisions to
determine whether they needed to be infused with allegedly pro-competitive modifications.
152
83. The view was also expressed that competition policy could make an important contribution tothe WTO objective of promoting economic development.  In this regard, the point was made that,while limiting the number of the players in a given industry might be thought to facilitate the
attainment of economies of scale and the allocation of resources in accordance with policy priorities,
experience had shown that promoting rather than curbing competition in the domestic market was
more likely to improve international competitivenes s.  A second issue was the impact that exemptions
and exceptions from competition law had on economic development.  Again, experience had shownthat such regimes had had a negligible impact on i ndustrial development.  This suggested that careful
studies should be undertaken prior to the introduction of exemption systems, taking into consideration
the balance between the negative impacts of these systems on competition and other policy objectives.
In addition, after their introduction such systems shou ld be regularly reviewed in order to determine
whether they should be revised or abolished following changes in the domestic and global economies.A third issue meriting special consideration was the social effects of competition policy.  In inefficient
industries, the introduction of competition policy could result in heavy unemployment.  An optimal
approach to tackling this problem would be to combine the implementation of competition policy on
the one hand with policies to minimize its adverse effects on the other hand by way of creating new
industries, promoting job mobility and implementing relief measures for the unemployed.
153
84. The view was also expressed that, in considering any requirement to apply competition policy
in a non-discriminatory way, the "development caveat" should be borne in mind.154  It was also stated
that it was important to avoid reducing the discussion to one of the merits of two extreme positions;
the situation facing Members was more complicated and a spectrum of possibilities existed for
nurturing the existence of effective competition policies.155
IV. OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY MEMBERS RELATING TO THE GROUP'S
MANDATE TO STUDY THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND
COMPETITION POLICY
85. In the meetings held on both 19-20 April and 10-11 June 1999, a number of other issues were
raised by Members relating to the Group's mandate  to study the interaction between trade and
competition policy.  Japan and Mexico provided written contributions on this matter (documents
W/123 and W/136, respectively).  Argentina; Au stralia; Canada; the Dominican Republic; Hong
Kong, China; India; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Romania; Singapore; the United States; and the
observer from the Russian Federation made oral comments or posed questions on this item.  The
observers from UNCTAD and the OECD provided updates on relevant activities of their
organizations.  In addition, the Group had before it an Overview of Members' National Competition
Legislation (W/128) prepared by the Secretariat.
                                                     
152 M/9, paragraph 46.
153 M/9, paragraph 44.
154 M/8, paragraph 89.
155 M/8, paragraph 90.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 28
86. The view was expressed that further consideration was desirable in the Group of matters
concerning the interaction between trade and competition policy.156  In particular, it was said that,
given the differences between the underlying assumptions and perspectives of competition policy and
trade policy, it could be useful to consider the contrasting approaches of the two disciplines to several
issues that had a bearing on both trade policy and competition policy and that had been the subject of
some discussion in the meeting.  Matters that me rited consideration in this regard included the
competition and trade policy perspectives in regard to export cartels, extraterritorial enforcement of
competition laws and anti-dumping.157  Furthermore, it was important to search for ways to address
distortions of competition directly at their source, so as not to create further distortions of trade and
competition.158  Where appropriate, distortions could and should be addressed at source from the
perspective of competition policy.
87. With regard to views that had been put fo rward previously by a Member regarding the
purpose and effects of anti-dumping, the following views were expressed.159  First, regardless of the
original intention, the current WTO rules allowed anti-dumping measures to serve as protection for
domestic industries.  In particular, anti-dumping measures permitted under the current rules prohibited
low-price sales which were completely legitimate under domestic competition law.  Second, contrary
to a view which had been expressed in the course of the Group's discussion of anti-dumping in 1998,
it could not be maintained that the main objective of the anti-dumping system was to protect domesticindustries against exports by foreign competitors that had unfair advantages in their home markets,
since there was no requirement for an anti-dumping authority to stop the existence of such unfair
advantages or to identify a cause and effect relationship in this regard.  Third, the potential problems
in the home markets of exporting countries which were alleged to justify anti-dumping measures did
not, in fact, justify such measures since they either could be addressed by other WTO rules or werematters that should not be addressed by trade rules.  Clearly, international economic rules should not
in any way allow the invocation of sanctions based on differences in national economic systems.
Fourthly, while noting the existence of domestic political realities regarding anti-dumping in some
countries, imperfections in the current WTO rules should not be used as an excuse for imposing anti-
dumping measures, given the magnitude of the market-distortive effects of such measures.  The pointwas also made that anti-dumping actions were often taken by countries with relatively closed markets
against imports from countries with relatively open economies, such as the United States.
160
88. The view was expressed that certain principles of competition policy could contribute to theobjectives of the WTO, since the fundamental goal was to improve the well-being of the populations
of WTO Members through continuing liberalization and efforts to ensure the better functioning ofmarket forces.
161  In this context, further progress was desirable in the area of international
cooperation relating to predatory pricing and price discrimination, as a means of refining the
application of anti-dumping measures.  The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT set up a series of disciplines which covered the fundamental concepts of transparency, national
treatment and implied precepts or concepts which, in one way or another, guaranteed reciprocity in
dealing with these types of matters among Member countries.  A first objective of anti-dumping
measures was to protect the national firm from undue displacement.  A second objective, and this hadto be consistent with the previous criterion, was to avoid undue displacement without affecting the
functioning of other markets.  This necessitated the making of allowances for the necessary
adjustment of markets, which would require an assessment of the costs and benefits of possible
interventions.  To some extent, the costs and benefits were recognized in certain criteria which were
used in anti-dumping legislation.  From this, it might be inferred that the criteria specified permitted
                                                     
156 M/8, paragraphs 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 and 106; M/9, paragraphs 56, 57 and 58.
157 M/8, paragraph 103.
158 M/8, paragraph 104.
159 M/8, paragraph 98 and related comments in paragraphs 102, 103 and 104.
160 M/8, paragraph 98.
161 M/9, paragraphs 54 and 55.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 29
the assessment of the minimum costs that would be acceptable in order to achieve market adjustment
which in the long term would be of benefit to the entire population.  However, the definition of
dumping raised problems in terms of its effective application under the criteria described.  First of all,
the concept of dumping, as it was reflected in the law, was based on price differentiation related to
market power.  However, the practice of price differentiation was difficult to fit into general concepts
of protection of competition since it did not necessarily involve the undue displacement of economicagents.  The practice of predatory pricing was included in the broader concept of price discrimination.
The view was expressed that it would be important to specify these concepts clearly in the Agreement
on Article VI, to provide a more rational and economically sound basis for the administration of anti-
dumping measures.  The concept of price discrimination should be defined in terms of competition
theory, with reference to concepts of costs and market power.  Similarly, an effort would be made to
properly define the concept of predatory pricing, through specification of variables that would be
considered and the application of relevant tests.  A further element which merited consideration withreference to the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI and which could help to refine the
application of anti-dumping measures was that of injury.  Rather than the mere displacement of
competitors, this should be concerned with the displacement of efficient competitors.  It should not be
concerned with injury, which reflected medium- rather than long-term changes.  Adverse changes in
market structure should be part and parcel of the assessment of injury, as should be the considerationof net consumer welfare effects and the ability to abuse a dominant position.  The concepts of the
relevant market and market power as they were addressed under competition law and policy would
also be relevant.  The former, in particular, would facilitate assessment of the extent to which and
ways in which a particular practice was affecting the efficient functioning of markets.
162  The view
was also expressed that there was no reason why allegedly unfair price discrimination should betreated differently in the domestic and international settings.
163
89. In response to the above points, the view was expressed that the Working Group had been
formed with the aim of exploring, in a pedagogical way, a set of issues with which the trading system
had had very limited experience and understanding, primarily with respect to the structure, operationand implications of competition law and policy for trade in the broadest context.  Its purpose was not
to provide a focus for consideration of anti-dumping issues.  The rules on anti-dumping had been
negotiated at length and the question of any renegotiation was something that could not be taken up in
this Group.  Any suggestion to mutate anti-dumping rules into a different set of rules to govern
predatory pricing was misplaced and misguided.  It gave short shrift to the legitimate differences thatexisted between trade policy and competition policy objectives with respect to those issues.  As had
been discussed previously in the Group, anti-dumping and competition rules had different objectives –
they were founded on different principles and they sought to address different problems.  Article VI of
the GATT had never had anything to do with the issue of predatory pricing, even in 1948 when it had
been concluded.  If the anti-dumping rules were eliminated in favour of competition laws or if theywere modified to reflect competition principles, the problems which those rules had sought to remedy
would go unaddressed.  Anti-dumping rules were a remedial mechanism which was necessary to the
maintenance of the multilateral trading system, and they also reflected a broad consensus among
Members – developed and developing – which had been refined over many years.  The overall
understanding embodied in the WTO agreements had been achieved only because Members,particularly those with relatively open markets, had recourse to instruments such as anti-dumping
laws.  It was recognized that neither the GATT nor the Anti-Dumping Agreement specifically referred
to the existence of anti-competitive practices in the home market as a prerequisite for defining
dumping.  For this reason, anti-dumping had been described merely as an indirect response to such
practices, and not as a direct response or remedy for such practices.  There was a forum in which
WTO Members could take up these issues if it was j udged that they were worthy of being taken up,
and that forum was the Anti-Dumping Committee.  That Committee was in a position to address
                                                     
162 M/9, paragraph 55.
163 M/8, paragraph 104.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 30
alleged abuses of the anti-dumping rules, and, if deemed appropriate, to undertake a work programme
on the implementation of relevant WTO agreements, more generally.164  The view was also expressed
that, if the Group should follow a broad approach to its work which included the subject of anti-
dumping and other subjects that had an influence on the organization of markets, it would have to
consider also the impact on trade and competition of matters as diverse as state assistance, subsidies,
banking subsidies and subsidized interest rates.  Ho wever, this did not appear to be the intended role
of the Group.165
90. The view was expressed that the concerns that had been raised regarding the impact of anti-dumping would have to be addressed adequately in the WTO, though not necessarily in the Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy.
166  It was also suggested that direct
participation of competition authorities in the implementation of trade policy could contribute to
minimizing the anti-competitive effects of trade measures.167
91. The view was expressed that, alongside the work described in paragraph 88 above, a general
agreement as to the application of competition legislation on a national level would make an
important contribution to achieving the objectives of the WTO, since most countries had set
themselves the goal of drawing up this kind of legislation and of applying it in a manner consistent
with the principles of transparency and national treatment.  National systems for the protection of
competition should be strengthened through international cooperation agreements, some of which hadalready been established regionally.  Through such agreements, with better coordination and an
attempt to achieve integration, the effectiveness of existing national legislation had been maximized
and efforts had been made to eliminate restrictions affecting competition in markets, thereby ensuring
the benefits of liberalization.  Transparency, national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment
were essential principles for such cooperation.  Implicit in the concept of most-favoured-nation
treatment was the principle of reciprocity.  It needed to be expressed in substantive ways in
competition legislation.  This by no means implied a need for full convergence of competition law
among WTO Members.  However, much remained to be done to promote reciprocity in the
application of competition law and policy.  Perhaps the most problematic aspect concerned waivers
and exclusions from the application of national laws.  Fundamental criteria to be used in competitionlegislation should be specified.  For example, it would be possible to specify fundamental criteria used
by Members in addressing vertical market re strictions and abuse of a dominant position.  In
addressing these practices, all countries, to some extent or another, made use of concepts such as the
relevant market(s) and market power.  Further exploration and analysis of these concepts in the
international arena would contribute to promoting the use of common analytical tools acrossjurisdictions, which would promote reciprocity and the effective resolution of situations in which anti-
competitive practices distorted trade or impeded access to markets.
168
                                                     
164 M/8, paragraph 100.
165 M/9, paragraph 57.
166 M/9, paragraphs 56 and 58.
167 M/9, paragraph 61.
168 M/9, paragraph 54.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 31
ANNEX 1
TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION (WT/MIN(96)/DEC),
PARAGRAPH 20
(Adopted 13 December 1996)
20. Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to
investment and competition policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including
under the TRIMs Agreement, and on the understanding that the work undertaken
shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we also agree
to:
/g109 establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade
and investment;  and
/g109 establish a working group to study issues raised by Members relating
to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including
anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that maymerit further consideration in the WTO framework.
These groups shall draw upon each other's work if necessary and also draw upon and
be without prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate
intergovernmental fora.  As regards UNCTAD, we welcome the work under way as
provided for in the Midrand Declaration and the contribution it can make to theunderstanding of issues.  In the conduct of the work of the working groups, we
encourage cooperation with the above organizations to make the best use of available
resources and to ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account.
The General Council will keep the work of each body under review, and will
determine after two years how the work of each body should proceed.  It is clearlyunderstood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these
areas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO
Members regarding such negotiations.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 32
ANNEX 2
CONTRIBUTIONS PROVIDED TO THE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY IN 1999
Symbol
(WT/WGTCP/W/-)Member/other source Where introduced
(Reference in Minutes)Topic
W/112 Turkey M/6, paragraph 15 (originally
introduced as a non-paper)The Impact of State Monopolies, Exclusive Rights and Regulatory
Policies on Competition and International Trade
W/113 Turkey M/5, paragraph 10 (originally
introduced as a non-paper)Intellectual Property Rights and Competition
W/114 Secretariat M/8, paragra ph 2 Fundamental WTO Principles
W/115 EC and member States M/8, paragraphs 3-6 F undamental WTO Principles & Competition Policy
W/116 United States M/8, paragraphs 44-50 Interna tional cooperation in competition law/policy
W/117 Switzerland M/8, paragraph 7 Fundamental  WTO Principles & Competition Policy
W/118 Hong Kong, China M/8, paragraph 80 Contri bution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/119 Japan M/8, paragraphs 10, 81-82 Fundament al WTO Principles & Competition Policy;
Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/120 Japan M/8, paragraphs 8 and 9 Fundament al WTO Principles & Competition Policy
W/121 Japan M/8, paragraph 51 International cooperation in competition law/policy
W/122 Japan M/8, paragraphs 81-82 Contributio n of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/123 Japan M/8, paragraph 98 Respons e to US views on anti-dumping
W/124 Korea M/8, paragraphs 52-57 Internationa l cooperation in competition law/policy
W/125 Australia M/8, paragraph 58 Internationa l cooperation in competition law/policy
W/126 Zimbabwe (for the
WTO African Group)M/9, paragraph 23 International cooperation in competition law/policy
W/127 Secretariat M/9, paragraph 5 Fundament al Principles of Competition Policy
W/128 and
W/128/Rev.1Secretariat M/9, paragraph 53 Overview of Members' National Competition Legislation
W/129 EC and member States M/9, paragraph 22 Intern ational cooperation in competition law/policy
W/130 EC and member States M/9, paragraphs 40-42 C ontribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/131 United States M/9, paragraph 3 Fundamental  WTO Principles & Competition PolicyWT/WGTCP/3
Page 33Symbol
(WT/WGTCP/W/-)Member/other source Where introduced
(Reference in Minutes)Topic
W/132 Romania M/9, paragraph 24 Internationa l cooperation in competition law/policy
W/133 Korea M/9, paragraph 43 Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/134 Japan M/9, paragraph 44 Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/135 Japan M/9, paragraph 45 Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/136 Mexico M/9, paragraphs 54-55 Anti-Dumping Measures and Competition
W/137 Mauritius M/10, paragraph 4 Interaction betwee n Trade and Competition Policy:  Small Economy
Perspectives
W/138 South Africa M/10, paragraph 5 Contributio n of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/139 New Zealand M/10, paragraph 6 APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform
__________SECTION XIV
WORKING GROUP ON TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENTWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTGP/3
12 October 1999
(99-4277)
REPORT (1999) TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
1. The Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement was established by a
decision at the WTO Ministerial Conference held in December 1996 "to conduct a study on
transparency in government procurement practices, taking into account national policies, and, basedon this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement".
2. The period covered in this report is November 1998-October 1999.  The work of the Working
Group up to November 1998 is described in the reports of the Working Group for 1997 and 1998 to
the General Council (WT/WGTGP/1 and 2).  The Working Group held formal meetings on
24-25 February, 28 June and 6 October 1999 under the chairmanship ofAmbassador Ronald Saborío Soto (Costa Rica).  Reports on these meetings have been circulated in
documents WT/WGTGP/M/7-9.
1
3. At its meeting of 24-25 February 1999, the Working Group had a detailed discussion oftransparency-related provisions in existing intern ational instruments on government procurement and
national procedures and practices.  For its discussion of this item, the Working Group had before it theinformal note by the Chair, entitled "List of Issues Raised and Points Made", listing the issues that had
been raised, together with the points made on these issues, under each of the items that were discussed
by the Group at its meetings held since November 1997.  Under the relevant sections of the note,
written contributions were presented by the delegations of the European Community on methods of
procurement (Job No. 699), Norway on publication of information on national legislation and
procedures (Job No. 1067), the United States on evaluation criteria and technical specifications
(Job No. 1027) and Australia on rights and responsibilities of government as a buyer, value for moneyin government procurement, accountability and due process (Job No. 1043).  As an auxiliary informal
paper for the use of Members wanting to draw on it, delegations also had available to them a revision
of the informal note by the Secretariat, "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist" reflecting
the proposals made on items III-VII in a succinct form, which identified the source of the different
proposals and summarized the written and oral comments on these proposals.  Also under this itemthe representative of Venezuela introduced a non-paper on transparency in government procurement
and the fight against bribery (Job No. 481).  In response to the requests by some delegations, it was
agreed that the Secretariat would make available to delegations, upon request, the texts of the OAS
Inter-American Convention against Corruption a nd the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.  During the meeting, the Group alsoheard general statements made by a number of delegations expressing their views regarding the
discussion in the General Council intersessional meetings of January and February 1999 on the
subject of government procurement, the Singapore mandate and the relationship between the
substance of the Group's work on transparency and the rules of the plurilateral Agreement on
Government Procurement.
                                                     
1 WT/WGTGP/M/9 to be circulated shortlyWT/WGTGP/3
Page 2
4. At its meeting of 28 June 1999, the Working Group reverted to its discussion of
transparency-related provisions in existing intern ational instruments on government procurement and
national procedures and practices on the basis of a further revision of the informal note "List of the
Issues Raised and Points Made" which had been updated in the light of the discussion at the previous
meeting and the new papers submitted.  Under the relevant sections in the note, written contributions
were presented by the delegations of Poland on time-limits (Job No. 3777), Australia on transparencyof decisions on qualification (Job No. 1781), Canada on contract award information (Job No. 3131)
and the United States on domestic review mechanisms (WT/WGTGP/W/23).  Points made were
reflected in a revision of this document and also in a revised version of the "List of Proposals on Items
III-VII of the Checklist".  A communication from the Chairperson of the APEC Government
Procurement Experts Group containing APEC non-bi nding principles of accountability and due
process was also made available to the Group (WT/WGTGP/W/22).  In the context of the discussion
under the item on "definition and scope of government procurement", it was agreed that thedocumentation of the Working Party on GATS Rules relating to the subject of concessions would be
made available to the Group (WT/WGTGP/W/25).  Moreover, interested Members were invited to
make submissions providing information on their national legislation and practices in regard to
concessions from the perspective of government procurement.
5. At its meeting on 6 October 1999, the Working Group reverted to the issues before it on the
basis of a further revision of the Chairman's informal note, "List of the Issues Raised and Points
Made" (the latest version of which is attached to this report, Job (99)/5534).  The Group also had
before it non-papers submitted by the delegations of the European Community (Job No. 4519);
Hungary, Korea and the United States (Job No. 4510);  Japan (Job (99)/5239);  and Australia
(Job (99)/5803), containing draft texts of an agreement on transparency in government procurement.The Group received a communication from the Chairperson of the APEC Government Procurement
Experts Group, forwarding the APEC non-binding principles on government procurement recently
developed by the Experts Group (WT/WGTGP/W/24).
6. The IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations represented by the United Nations Commission
for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCTAD and the ITC have observer status in theWorking Group.  During the period covered in this report, the Working Group considered requests for
observer status from OECD, SELA and OIC (the Or ganization for Islamic Conference) and agreed to
revert to these requests in light of the consultations that are being held on this matter by the Chairman
of the General Council.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 3
ATTACHMENT
JOB(99)/5534
Working Group on Transparency
in Government Procurement
24 September 1999
LIST OF THE ISSUES RAISED AND POINTS MADE
Informal Note by the Chair
Fifth Revision
1. This note attempts to set out the issues that have been raised, together with the points made on
these issues, under each of the items that were discussed by the Working Group at its meetings of
3-4 November 1997, 19-20 February 1998, 22 June 1998, 8-9 October 1998 and 24-25 February and
28 June 1999.  This non-paper is without prejudice to the position of any delegation and, in particular,
to whether the Working Group would decide to include or exclude any particular aspect addressed in
it from the elements that it will develop for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.
_______________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT PR OCUREME NT...............................4
A.  WHO IS DOING THE PROCURING ?............................................................................................5
B.  WHAT IS BEING PROCURED ?...................................................................................................6
C.  WHAT TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS ARE COVERED ?...................................................................7
D.  OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO DEFINITION AND SCOPE ........................................................9
II. PROCUREMENT METHODS ...............................................................................................9
III. PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
PROCE DURES ..................................................................................................................... ..13
IV. INFORMATION ON PROCUREMENT OPPORTUNITIES, TENDERING
AND QUALIFICATION PROCEDURE S ...........................................................................15
A.  PUBLICATON ........................................................................................................................18
B.  CONTENTS OF INFORMATION ................................................................................................19
C.  EVALUATION CRITERIA ........................................................................................................20
D.  CLARIFICATION AND MODIFICATIONS ..................................................................................22
E.  LANGUAGE ...........................................................................................................................22
V. TIME-P ERIO DS................................................................................................................. ....23
VI. TRANSPARENCY OF DECISION S ON QUALIF ICATION...........................................24
VII. TRANSPARENCY OF DECISI ONS ON CONT RACT AW ARDS ..................................25WT/WGTGP/3
Page 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)
VIII. DOMESTIC REVI EW PROCE DURES...............................................................................29
IX. OTHER MATTERS RELA TED TO TRANS PARENCY ..................................................34
A.  MAINTENANCE OF RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS ......................................................................34
B.  INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ...............................................................................................34
C.  LANGUAGE ...........................................................................................................................35
D.  FIGHT AGAINST BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION ........................................................................36
X. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS
(NOTIFI CATIO N)................................................................................................................. .37
XI. WTO DISPUTE SETT LEMENT PROC EDURES .............................................................38
XII. TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT FOR DEVELO PING COUNT RIES...........................................................39
I. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
2. It has been recalled that the mandate of the Group is confined to issues of transparency in
government procurement practices.  The view has been expressed that a distinction should be made
between obligations on transparency and market access commitments in the area of governmentprocurement.  As regards national practices limiting market access, their transparency but not their
substance should be covered.  The view has also been held that rules on transparency in government
procurement should only apply on a non-discriminatory basis and obligations on transparency should
only be applicable to the extent that market access for foreign supplies and suppliers was permitted by
domestic law.  For example, procurement from local markets, to be paid in local currency, might be
distinguished from procurement from internatio nal markets, for which foreign exchange was
available.  The question has been asked whether transparency of procurement processes would be of
any interest to foreign suppliers when access was reserved to domestic suppliers. It has also been said
that the application of the rules of a transparency agreement to procurements, open only to domestic
suppliers, would be unduly burdensome.
3. Another view expressed in this connection ha s been that transparency disciplines should
apply to government procurement practices as broadl y as possible.  One of the purposes of developing
rules on transparency was to create national procurement systems that were not only transparent but
also perceived to be transparent;  if the scope of requirements on transparency would be limited to
open procurement markets, procurement systems would not be seen to be transparent.  It was in theinterest of all concerned, domestic as well as foreign suppliers and entities, that information on what
procurement was open to international competition and what was not should be readily available to
all.  The view has also been expressed that the distinction that had been suggested would give rise to
an imbalance in rights and obligations since transparency obligations would apply more widely in
those Members whose procurement markets were more open to international competition;  the
distinction would also narrow the scope of a transparency agreement.  Moreover, the point has also
been made that, given the variety of ways by which market access was limited in national practices,for example in the form of absolute exclusions of foreign suppliers and supplies, price preferences or
the awarding of contracts to foreign suppliers only in the absence of competitive bidding from
domestic suppliers, it would be technically difficult to identify those government practices that should
be exempted from transparency obligations.   It has also been said that, if the underlying reason for the
suggestion to limit the application of transparency disciplines to open procurement markets wasWT/WGTGP/3
Page 5
concerns about excessive burdens, these concerns should be addressed in their own right in the course
of the Group's work.
4. As regards the issue of the definition and scope of government procurement, a distinction has
been made between the definition and scope that should be used by the Working Group for working
purposes and those which might be used to govern the scope of application of the elements to be
developed for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.  In regard to the former aspect, a view has been
expressed that a broad approach, without preconceived limitations, should be employed, sufficiently
wide to accommodate the differing meanings and levels of detail given to the term "government
procurement" in national legislation and practices in individual Members and compatible with
innovative procurement procedures and new types of government structures.  This would enable the
Group to study the full range of issues relating to an eventual agreement on transparency in
government procurement and, as regards the latter aspect referred to above, to develop a more exact
definition for the purposes of the scope of an eventual agreement on transparency.  Another viewexpressed has been that there would be an interrelationship between the scope of a transparency
agreement and the level of detail that its elements would contain.  A transparency agreement,
incorporating simple and straightforward core principles, could have a very broad coverage.  It has
also been said that the work of the Group on th is issue would need to reflect the realities of
procurement practices in individual countries in order to guarantee an effective implementation of aneventual agreement.   In this connection, a range of issues that would need to be taken into account has
been identified.  These are summarized below.
5. It has been suggested that a useful way of approaching these issues was to draw a distinction
between the following questions:
- Who is doing the procuring?- What is being procured?
- What types of transactions are covered?
A. 
WHO IS DOING THE PROCURING ?
6. In regard to the first of these questions, who is doing the procuring, the following views have
been put forward:
- entities at all levels of government, including at sub-central levels of government and
enterprises owned or influenced by government, might be covered by a transparency
agreement;
- the rules of a transparency agreement should extend to procurement by entities at the
central and sub-central levels of government;
- the degree of coverage of sub-federal entities should take account of differences in
government structures;
- the rules of a transparency agreement should only extend to procurement by entities
at the central or federal government level.  It would be difficult to frame international
rules that would ensure transparency at su b-central levels in countries with complex
government structures.  In countries with federative administrative systems, the
authority of federal governments to undertake obligations on transparency in respectof entities at the state or local levels of government equivalent to those of the central
government level might be limited by the constitution.  Another view expressed hasWT/WGTGP/3
Page 6
been that a limitation of the obligations of  a transparency agreement only to central
government level would give rise to an issue of equity among countries with different
government structures.  A further point made has been that a number of provisions in
various WTO agreements, for instance GATS Article I:3(a)(i), addressed the issue of
obligations undertaken with respect to sub-central levels of government;
- the coverage of state enterprises should depend on how they were operated.   One
view that has been expressed is that public enterprises required to run on the basis of
the same economic considerations as private enterprises should not be subject to
requirements on transparency, at least where they did not fall within the ambit of
GATT Article XVII.  Another view has been  that a distinction should be drawn
between state enterprises that operated in a competitive environment and others, even
if run on the basis of commercial considerations;
- in the light of experience, consideration might be given to extending the coverage
further, for instance to public enterprises.
7. It has also been suggested that, in defining the scope of a transparency agreement, the Group
would need to define criteria for determining when  an entity should be considered as one engaged in
government procurement for the purposes of a tr ansparency agreement.  For example, it has been
suggested that government ownership of less than 50 per cent should mean that it was excluded. It hasalso been suggested that account should also be taken of national legislation which conferred on
entities the legal right to conduct government proc urement activities or gave governments the power
to exercise control over the procurement decisions of entities and enterprises.
8. Another suggestion has been that the substance of a relevant provision should determine the
scope of the application of the specific requirements in a transparency agreement.  For example,requirements on publication of laws and procedures might be applied across the board to entities at all
levels of government.
B. 
WHAT IS BEING PROCURED ?
9. In regard to the question of what is being procured, the suggestion has been made that the
scope of a transparency agreement might extend to all goods and services and any combination ofgoods and services.  It has been said that Article I of the plurilateral Agreement on Government
Procurement might be a useful reference in the discussion regarding this aspect of coverage.  The
view has also been expressed that the scope of a transparency agreement should extend only to the
goods sector.
10. With respect to the use of threshold values in determining the coverage of a transparency
agreement, the view has been expressed that, in principle, the coverage of a transparency agreement
should not be limited to contracts above a certain threshold level, but that certain provisions might be
more flexibly applied for smaller contracts.  Also, it would not be appropriate to exclude low-value
procurement from the requirements relating to the provision of information on national legislation or
to procedures for the qualification of suppliers on the basis of threshold values.  On the other hand,
requirements on the publication of tender notices, particularly in a foreign language, might be
relatively less strict for low-value procurement.  Suggestions have also been made that transparency
obligations should only apply to procurement above certain threshold levels in order to avoid
burdensome procedures and costs related to publication of all procurement opportunities and that the
work of the Group should take account of national practices in this respect.  Minimum threshold
values could vary according to the level of government and be used for defining the scope of
application of the rules to entities at sub-central levels of government.  The suggestion has also beenmade that thresholds might differ according to the level of development of Members.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 7
C. WHAT TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS ARE COVERED ?
11. As regards the issues relating to what types of transactions should be covered, it has been
suggested that acquisition by any contractual means, including, for example, through lease or rental,
might be covered.  Questions have been raised as to whether, and, if so, to what extent, concessions
and build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts should be covered.  The point has also been made that
privatization should not be covered.
12. Concerning concessions - in the sense of the grant of certain exclusive rights by a government
to a private party for a set period of time in order to produce a product or offer a service to the public
on its behalf (for example for building and operating motorways or airports) - one view expressed has
been that government consumption of certain services (for instance, contracts awarded to private
companies for the provision of cafeteria services or cleaning services in public buildings), although
sometimes referred to as concessions, should more appropriately be considered as government
procurement and should, therefore, be addressed in the discussion of definitions and scope of atransparency agreement.  A further view has been that, even if not considered as government
procurement transactions per se , concessions should be addressed under the scope of a transparency
agreement to the extent that principles of transp arency should apply to the procedures used for the
award of concessions.
13. The question has been asked whether concessions were more properly treated as a matter of
investment or the supply of services on behalf of the government and, therefore, should be covered
under the scope of other relevant agreements or initiatives.  Those concessions that fell within the
definition of GATS mode three supply of services might be subject to the disciplines of GATS
Article III.  In this connection, it has also been  said that GATS Article III would not apply to
concessions that were not within the scope of GATS Article I.
14. The view has been expressed that concessions should not be included in the coverage of a
transparency agreement.  Rules which governed concessions and government procurement were
separate sets of legislation in national practice.  National legislation on government procurement did
not apply to procurement by private companies that operated concessions granted by a government.
In this regard, the following comparisons betw een government procurement on the one hand and
concession-granting, awarding of BOT (build-operate-transfer) contracts and privatization on the
other have been made:
- with regard to definitions, government procurement was a procedure intended to
regulate the selection of contractors for the supply of goods, the execution of works
and the provision of services.  The granting of a concession took the form of aunilateral act of the State giving a private party the right to manage, on its behalf,
facilities, properties, public works  or resources that were under government
ownership or to offer a public service that was within the exclusive competence of a
government, for example for mining or exploitation of natural gas.  In the area of
public procurement, no such authorization was given to a private party supplying the
service.  Privatization involved a sale of a state-owned company or assets;
- with regard to legal form, government procurement was made effective through an
administrative act of the procuring entity.  Concessions and privatization were made
effective through a decree of the executive power at the level of the head of
government or State, and, in some cases, subject to authorization by the legislature;
- with regard to subject-matter, government procurement covered goods, public works
and services;  concessions covered public works or services;  and privatizationcovered state corporations, property and assets;WT/WGTGP/3
Page 8
- in the case of concessions, the State regulated the operation of the services under
concessions, set and controlled the prices that were paid by the public for those
services, defined the rights of users and ensured the effectiveness and continuity of
the services provided.  In government procurement, suppliers offered bid prices based
on their own calculation of estimated costs and profits;
- concessionaires were considered as owners of the goods affected to the exploitation
of the services during the period of concessions, whereas procurement contractors did
not have ownership of the procured goods, services or works carried out;
- with regard to the methods, open, restrictive or limited tendering methods were used
in the area of government procurement.  Open, restrictive or limited tendering or
auctioning were used in the granting of concessions.  Public sale or auctioning and
liquidation of debt in return for a share of the company were the methods used in
privatization;
- as regards the application of the GPA, procurement by concessionaires listed in
Appendix I was covered but the granting  of a concession was not.  The act of
privatization was not covered but enterprises in which government control or
influence had been withdrawn through privatization could be excluded from the
coverage of the GPA;
- as regards spending of funds, concessionaires were responsible for providing the
economic resources necessary for the expenses related to the operation and
exploitation of concessions, whereas the governmental authorities disbursed the state
funds related to government procurement transactions or the execution of public
works contracts.  Whether a service provided was a government procurement or aconcession was related to the question of who had the financial liability;
- governments did not necessarily enter into contracts with private parties in the
process of granting concessions;
- a BOT contract could be considered as a form of concession.  The distinction between
these two types of government action should be clarified;
- in general, concessions took the form of monopolies.  However, more than one
concession could be granted for the operation of a public service, for example for
different end-users, regions or types of exploitations.  Contracts for the procurement
of goods, services and works were awarded to one supplier who might use
sub-contractors to carry out parts of the contract;
- a distinction should be made between the granting of a concession or concluding a
BOT contract and transactions entered into by the concessionaires or BOT contractors
subsequent to the granting of concessions or awarding of BOT contracts;
- in some countries, only national companies were allowed to operate concessions;
15. It has been suggested that Members should provide information on national legislation and
practice as regards concessions in their countries.  A view has been expressed that the issue of
concessions raised complex questions to which the answers were not clear as yet.  It has been said thatsome concessions could be outside the scope of a government procurement.  Nevertheless, the Group
should maintain a broad approach to their coverage at this stage, pending further study of the issue.  InWT/WGTGP/3
Page 9
this connection, reference has been made to the information-gathering activities in the GATS Rules
Group.
D. OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO DEFINITON AND SCOPE
16. The issue of the exceptions that might be allowed to the basic coverage of a transparency
agreement has been raised.  One suggestion has been that there may be reason to allow the exclusion
of those areas that track general exceptions in GATT 1994, such as national security exceptions.  Ithas also been suggested that exceptions on development grounds might be envisaged.  The view has
been expressed that the question of permissible exem ptions was better left for discussion at a stage
when a better idea of the general definition that might be employed would be available.
17. In regard to developmental aspects, in addition to the points reflected above, the general point
has been made that the function of national laws in taking into account social and developmental
needs, for instance promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises, balanced regional development
or technological development, should be considered in the definition of government procurement tobe employed in a transparency agreement.  In this connection, it has been said that a transparency
agreement should not include provisions setting out the objectives that should be sought through
government procurement policies.  Rather, the purpose of a transparency agreement should be to
ensure that Members provided transparency of the domestic objectives sought through the use of their
various government procurement policies.  On the other hand, it has been said that a Member shouldnot be required to provide transparency of the ob jectives sought in procurement which was open only
to domestic suppliers.  A transparency agreement should not have provisions that could limit the
scope of procurement policy objectives or decisions.
II. PROCUREMENT METHODS
18. The point has been made that, from a transparency perspective, the method of procurement
employed was less important than ensuring that it conformed with basic principles on transparency
and maximized the level of competition feasible under the particular circumstances.  The point has
also been made that the method of procurement used should not undermine the principles and
objectives of a transparency agreement to encourage open and competitive regimes.  Other views
expressed have been that an eventual transparency agreement should aim at transparency with regardto the methods employed in different countries rather than seek to limit or modify those methods.
According to these views, specific circumstances governing a given procurement dictated the choice
of a particular method among alternative methods.  Rather than prescribing which method should be
the preferred method, a transparency agreement should allow procurement authorities to choose the
best method for meeting the objectives of the procurin g entity as well as in the interests of efficiency,
competition and transparency.  General principles of transparency should be developed with respect to
the choice and application of procurement methods.  Further disciplines might need to be developed
to cater for the particular circumstances of individual methods.  Whilst the methods used by WTO
Members - at least for larger value contracts - mostly seemed to be based on the principle of tendering
(open, selective, limited), they were not necessarily limited to this (e.g. purchase cards, electronic
catalogues).  In this connection, it has been said that setting forth provisions specifying the differences
inherent between various procurement methods as re gards transparency would allow more flexibility
in the use of those methods.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 10
19. The view has been expressed that the Group should consider the issue of procurement
methods from the perspective of transparency.  The Group's examination of the transparency aspects
of procurement methods could focus on the following three categories:  where information on the
procurement opportunity and selection criteria was made publicly available to all interested suppliers;
where a pre-selection of qualified suppliers was made and information was transmitted only to those
suppliers;  and where no information was made publicly available but the procuring entity negotiatedwith an individual supplier.  Such a categoriza tion, focused on transparency aspects, would avoid
getting into the details of procurement methods.  It has also been said that the method to be used in a
procurement process should be specified in advance, for instance by giving a reference to the relevant
provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  On this point, it has also been said that such a requirement
might be too prescriptive since only a few countries had adopted the Model Law.
20. With respect to the main procurement methods used, the view has been expressed that open or
international bidding in which there was no limit to the number of potential bidders was the mosttransparent method;  selective procedures were justifiable where it would not be feasible or efficient
to consider and evaluate a large number of potential bids, as long as all potential interested suppliers
were given the same opportunity to seek access to information on a procurement and seek to be
invited to bid.   Another view has been that open and selective tendering should be regarded as equally
transparent, provided selective tendering was conducted in accordance with the appropriate principles.One view has been that, while open tendering was the most transparent method, it might not be the
most cost-effective, in particular in the case of complex procurements.  As regards the third main
procurement method, limited tendering (e.g. individual, sole-source, single-source or direct
tendering), it has been suggested that, since information opportunities and selection criteria were not
made publicly available, this method should only be used in justified and exceptional circumstances.International instruments and national practice commonly accepted a range of circumstances and
conditions under which the use of limited tendering would be warranted.  A further point has been
that it might not be possible to provide information on procurement opportunities under each type of
tendering method.  It has been suggested that general principles of transparency regarding the choice
and application of procurement methods should be developed.  Should those procedures be deemedinadequate, further elements on transparency could be developed to cater for the particular
circumstances of individual procurement methods.
21. Based on the written and oral proposals, the following options and alternative approaches for
addressing the issue of procurement methods have been identified.  These various options and the
comments made on them are as follows:
- Option 1.  There should be sufficient flexibility to accommodate the differing
procurement methods used in national practice, and the possibility of using methods
which are not based on tendering should also be provided for.  As such there should
be no limitation on the choice of procurement method except limitations that exist in
domestic legislation.
It has been said that the scope of option 1 was too wide and would not contribute to
the objective of improved transparency in government procurement.
- Option 2 – first alternative.  Whilst wishing to ensure flexibility and providing for the
use of methods which are not based on tendering, there should be a requirement that
the method of procurement used should not undermine the principles and objectivesof a transparent procurement regime.
- Option 2 – second alternative.  Whilst wishing to ensure flexibility and providing for
the use of methods which are not based on tendering, there should be a requirement:
(i) that the procurement method used conforms  with basic transparency principles [toWT/WGTGP/3
Page 11
be defined];  and/or (ii) that transparency is maximized at each stage of the
procurement process for the particular method used.
Views have been expressed supporting this option.  It has also been said that the aim
of the provisions of a transparency agreement should not be to determine the validity
of the procurement methods chosen by entities but rather to guarantee that, wheninherently less transparent methods were used, circumstances justifying their use
should be made known to all interested part ies.  One view has been that this option
would also take into account national practices that determined the choice of
procurement methods based on threshold values.
- Option 3 – first alternative.  As for option 2, first or second alternative.  In addition,
there would be a further requirement that methods which are considered to beinherently less transparent (e.g. single-source procurement or limited tendering)
should only be used in exceptional and justifiable cases.
Views have been expressed supporting this alternative.
- Option 3 – second alternative.  As for option 3, first alternative, but the additional
requirement would be further developed through the use of an illustrative list
(examples which could be included in such a list are given in paragraph 24 below) of
such exceptional cases.
It has been said that this approach in this alternative was flexible enough to take
account of the existing and any future procurement practices.  It also provided
safeguards against loopholes in transparency by the choice of the method used.  From
this perspective, this option should be the preferred way of dealing with the issue of
procurement methods.  The use of methods, other than tendering, should be allowedonly in narrowly defined circumstances because of their potential for circumventing
transparency.  Other views have been expressed supporting this option.
Questions have been asked regarding the treatment of those circumstances that might
be envisaged in national legislation but not included in the illustrative list;  whether
the illustrative list would set some guide lines for justifying the use of limited
tendering or would consist of an exhaustive list of all possible exceptional
circumstances;  and the difference in practice between the first and second
alternatives of option 3.
- Option 4.  There should be greater prescription as to the type of procurement method
which can be used.  For example, there could be a requirement that methods based on
the so-called open and selective tendering procedures are used and that limitedtendering is only used in exceptional and justifiable cases (with or without the use of
an illustrative list as suggested in option 3, second alternative).
It has been said that this approach wa s far too prescriptive regarding the types of
procurement methods that could be used and did not sufficiently take into accountdiversity in the existing national practices.
22. Views have also been expressed stating that it would be premature to support any of the
options above before the principles and objectives of a transparency agreement were clearly defined.
23. The following approaches to how limited tendering should be dealt with in a transparency
agreement have been suggested:WT/WGTGP/3
Page 12
- since the use of the method permitted procurement authorities to dispense with many
of the procedural guarantees associated with transparency, a transparency agreement
should set forth an illustrative list of the specific circumstances and conditions
justifying the use of this method;
- provisions of a transparency agreement should not impinge upon the right of
procuring entities to use this method in circumstances that dictated its use.  Spellingout the exact circumstances and conditions justifying the use of this type of method
might go beyond the scope of a transparency agreement.  It had to be taken into
account that governments had other policy objectives apart from transparency;
- while not limiting the circumstances under which limited tendering might be allowed,
the Group should develop disciplines to be included in a transparency agreement to
ensure that, when used in appropriate circumstances, limited tendering procedures
should be employed in a way which maximized transparency at each stage of theprocurement process;
- rather than describing in detail the circumstances justifying the use of limited
tendering, disciplines should be developed ensuring transparency in the use of this
method;
- a distinction might be made between a situation in which the purpose of using this
method was precisely to avoid transparency, e.g. for national security reasons, and
other cases where the purpose of using limited tendering was to meet needs that
might arise from special circumstances of the procurement;
- a transparency agreement should not cover procurement not open to tendering.
24. A range of circumstances which might figure in an illustrative list or define the general
circumstances under which limited tendering would be justified has been referred to.  These are:
- for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by circumstances unforeseeable by the
procurement authority (e.g. natural disasters);  such circumstances should not be
caused by the procuring entity itself, for instance as a result of its negligence;
- in the absence of responsive tenders, under tendering procedures which do not restrict
competition;
- when tenders already submitted have been collusive;
- when it is clear at the outset of a procurement that only one supplier or a limited
group of suppliers has the proprietary rights to goods or services being procured,  for
example procurements involving the protection of patents, copyrights or otherexclusive rights, or for other technical or artistic considerations;
- in commodity markets where there may be no individual suppliers since the market is
the supplier;
- in so-called "fire sales" where the procurement authority can realize exceptional
savings at a one-time event (e.g. liquidation sales);
- when a product or a service is supplied by a supplier with a monopolistic position in
the market;WT/WGTGP/3
Page 13
- when a product or a service can only be procured in a specific geographical location
or place of production;
- when a procurement is for research or experimental purposes and not for commercial
use;
- for national security reasons;
- for other reasons which should be published in law or regulations.
25. Reference has also been made to the circumstances justifying the use of the limited tendering
method contained in Article XV:1(a)-(j) of the pl urilateral Agreement on Government Procurement.
26. With regard to ensuring that limited tendering, when employed, is used in a way which
maximizes transparency, the following suggestions have been made:
- a procuring entity should generally seek more than one bid if circumstances
permitted;
- a procuring entity should be required to document the specific circumstances giving
rise to the need for such limited tendering;
- public notices of contract awards should disclose the specific circumstances and
reasons for contacting a particular supplier.
III. PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
PROCEDURES
27. The point has been made that transparency meant ensuring that information on procurement
rules, practices and opportunities was made widely available in an easily usable form to all interested
parties (and particularly potential suppliers), as well as ensuring the right of access to that
information.  Publication of information regarding the general environment in which public
procurement took place and interested parties were expected to operate was an essential component oftransparency.  Publication of national legislation not only provided a clear roadmap for potential
suppliers but also a check against arbitrary practices within the procurement regime.  The resulting
procedural certainty also reduced costs in the procurement cycle.
28. The point has also been made that there were two questions regarding this matter:  the scope
of the information that should be made available and in what way.
29. On the first issue, it has been said that there a ppeared to be two approaches to establishing the
scope of the information that should be made available:  a formal approach that would require, for
example, that all laws, ministerial ordinances, administrative guides or internal rules and procedures
should be published;  and an approach that would consist of determining the substance of the
information that should be made available, irrespective of the legal form.  This second approach mightbe preferable since what was of importance was the substance of the information to be made
available.  The key substantive information that should be made available was that which defined
what rules of general application had to be follow ed in determining participation in the tender and
making the decision on the award of the tender and what remained at the discretion of the procuring
entity.  The second approach would have merit in that the objective of transparency would not be
achieved if the publications that contained the relevant laws and regulations did not cover important
aspects of national procurement practices and procedures.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 14
30. It has also been suggested that all laws, regu lations, judicial decisions, policy guidance, and
administrative and other procedures on government procurement should be published promptly or be
readily and easily accessible in a usable form to a ll interested parties, including potential foreign
suppliers and other Members.  Any changes to such laws and regulations should also be published
promptly or generally made available through an accessible source.  Concerning publication of
administrative guidelines, it has been said that it might not be appropriate to publish informationrelating to internal procedures of government agencies since their disclosure might prejudice the
position of a purchasing agency for instance in its negotiations with suppliers;  rather, the relevant
obligation should be limited to publication of administrative guides to the operation of the
procurement systems.  It has also been said that publication of regulations of each individual
procuring entity would incur burdensome administrative costs.
31. In regard to the second issue, how the inform ation should be made available, the following
points have been made:
- the important point was that information should be made publicly available, not how
it should be made available;
- a distinction should be made between publication of information and accessibility of
information.  It has been suggested that laws, regulations and measures having theforce and effect of law should be published.  Regarding judicial decisions, it has been
stated that publication requirements in an  agreement had to take into account the
different ways of developing national legislation and procedures.  For instance, in
judicial systems where laws were developed on the basis of case law, judicial
decisions could play a central role in defining national legislation and procedures;
- publishing information on judicial decisions, policy guidance and administrative
guides could be onerous.  But any judicial decisions that would have a bearing on
procurement practices and that were not customarily published should be made
accessible within the country;
- publication requirements could be met through publication in printed or electronic
media.  The choice should be left to the discretion of Members.  There should be no
mandatory provisions requiring the use of electronic media.  It has also been
suggested the two forms of publication should not be mutually exclusive.
32. The view has been expressed that publication obligations, including in the area of government
procurement, already existed in the goods area under Article X of GATT 1994 and in the services areaunder Article III of the GATS.  The provisions of these two Agreements which exempted government
procurement from the scope of certain GATT 1994 and GATS obligations (Articles III:8(a) and
XVII:2 of GATT 1994 and Article XIII of the GATS) did not apply to these transparency provisions.
33. The suggestion has also been made that information on national legislation and procedures
should be provided at no more than cost.  It has been said that the matter of fees charged was not
within the ambit of a transparency exercise.  Govern ment entities should have the discretion to charge
fees above cost price.  However, any fees for provision of information on national legislation andprocedures should be charged on a non-discriminatory basis.
34. The point has also been made in connection with the publication of laws and regulations that
the obligation to publish should be limited to publication in a national language and should not
involve burdensome and costly translation obligations.   It has been stated that some domestic public
agencies provided information on legislation in a foreign language or a summary of specificlegislation in a WTO language.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 15
35. The suggestion has been made that interested pa rties should know either where to go to locate
this information, or who to ask.  A transparency  agreement might provide for Members  to notify
either the source of this information and/or to establish and notify contact or enquiry points (which
could take the form of an Internet website), from which other Members and maybe interested
suppliers could obtain explanations about national legislation and procedures, including information
on the practical steps involved in tendering, any preferential treatment of national suppliers anddomestic review mechanisms.  In this connection, reference was made to the provision of Article III:4
of the GATS, and also to that of Article IV:2 of that Agreement which requires developed country
Members, and to the extent possible other Members, to establish contact points to facilitate the access
of developing countries suppliers to information.  It has been stated that the feasibility of providing
contact or enquiry points in respect of decentralized procurement systems, especially in federal States,
would have to be studied carefully.  Any obligations should be without prejudice to decentralized
procurement systems.  In this connection, the suggestion has been made that in decentralized nationalprocurement systems a central office should be designated for keeping a list of the contact points at
sub-central levels.  One view in this respect has been that the establishment of enquiry points at
sub-central levels might incur burdensome administrative costs.
36. In the discussion of this item, the relevance of the overall coverage of a transparency
agreement has been recalled.  In this regard, it has been suggested that the publication obligationshould only relate to situations where access was open to foreign supplies and suppliers.  The opposite
view has also been expressed, with the argument that  it would be essential to have information on any
policies including preferences in favour of national suppliers in order to determine whether
procurement markets were open to foreign suppliers.  In respect of the term "foreign suppliers", the
point has been made that in some national practices government procurement was used as aninstrument for the promotion of domestic supplies and suppliers and national treatment would not be
granted to those suppliers who did not have a commercial presence in the country of the procuring
entity.
37. The link between this item and that in Section X, concerning the provisions on notification of
information to other governments under an appropriate transparency agreement, has been referred to.
38. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
39. A non-paper synthesizing the alternative approaches that have been suggested in the Working
Group has been circulated as  Job No. 1067.
IV. INFORMATION ON PROCUREMENT OPPORTUNITIES, TENDERING AND
QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES
40. The point has been made that advance information on government procurement opportunities
enhanced the participation of potential bidders in a procurement procedure.  Broad participation of
bidders in the procuring process contributed to improved efficiency in government procurement.  In
order for the best level of participation from the market to be achieved, information about
procurement opportunities must be available in notices of invitation to tender and in tender
documents.
41. The point has also been made that information on procurement opportunities in notices of
invitation to tender should be sufficient to allow potential suppliers to assess their interests in
participating in the proposed procurement procedure and to seek tender documents; and that
information in tender documents should be sufficiently specific to enable suppliers to prepare
responsive bids if they participated in the procurement process.  The application of these coreWT/WGTGP/3
Page 16
principles would save efforts and resources of suppliers in preparing bids for procurements in which
they did not have sufficient interest and of procuring entities in considering unresponsive bids.
42. It has been recognized that national practices concerning the amount of detail included,
respectively, in initial tender notices and in the subsequent tender documentation, varied considerably
and that it might not be necessary to have precise minimum requirements concerning their specific
contents or to seek harmonization on this point.  It  would be sufficient for a transparency agreement to
develop elements in the form of general principles.
43. In this connection, views have been expressed suggesting that the level of detail of
information to be supplied might also vary among the different stages of tendering and procurement
methods used.  Whereas detailed information should be given under open procurement procedures,
the requirements to publish tendering information in a widely available medium under selective
tendering procedures should be flexible to enable tender documents to be sent directly to registered
suppliers.  Information provided to prequalified suppliers could be more specific than information inpublic notices available to all suppliers.  It has also been said that, notwithstanding the flexibility
regarding the amount of detail that should be provided in tender notices, certain basic types of
information should be provided under all methods for the purpose of achieving maximum
transparency whatever the method used.  Certain mi nimum standard requirements, reflecting the core
principles of transparency, should apply horizontally to all procurement methods.
44. In regard to tender documentation, it has been said that their contents should provide all
information relevant to submitting responsive bids th at was not provided in the tender notices.  They
should set forth the parameters for evaluating bids and awarding the contract, including requirements
in respect of technical specifications and any preferences granted to national supplies and suppliers
and on any other assessment criteria based on socio-economic considerations.  It has also been saidthat the information contained in tender documents should be comprehensive enough to lead to the
submission of bids that would enable procuring entities to compare them and to allocate their
resources efficiently.
45. The view has been expressed that rules on information on tendering opportunities in a
transparency agreement should apply on a non-discriminatory basis but only in cases where nationalmarkets were open to foreign suppliers;  otherwise domestic procedures would be applicable.
46. Another view expressed was that provision of information on procurement opportunities was
an essential element of transparency in procur ement irrespective of the entitlement of foreign
suppliers to participate and that such prior information had benefits both from domestic and from
foreign suppliers' perspectives.  Points made regarding this view have been:
- the obligations of a transparency agreement should apply to all procurement within its
scope, whether or not suppliers had access to procurement opportunities.  The
principle of non-discriminatory access to information would need to be observed
regardless of any policies excluding foreign suppliers from access to procurement
opportunities or the existence of preferences for domestic suppliers.  The
establishment of the conditions of competition and transparency in domestic markets
was essential to achieving transparency at the international level;
- access to information on any policies, including preferences in favour of domestic
suppliers, would allow suppliers to determine whether the procurement markets were
in fact open to foreign suppliers.  From the government's perspective, transparency in
the extent to which markets were open would prevent further requests for information
from foreign suppliers on market access matters.  Such information would alsoWT/WGTGP/3
Page 17
benefit suppliers who would know in adva nce whether it would be worthwhile for
them to prepare tenders;
- if the obligations on transparency applied only to the extent that foreign bidders were
provided access to procurement markets, this would give rise to inequity among
Members to a transparency agreement.  The end result would be an agreement which
would require those countries that had thei r markets fully open to foreign suppliers
and had no rules in place regarding national preference to undertake a much greater
level of obligations as regards transparency.  On the other hand, other countries that
had relatively closed markets and excluded foreign suppliers in a large number of
sectors would take on lesser obligations;
- since a transparency agreement would not prevent government procurement from
being limited to domestic suppliers, the rights of other Members would not be
breached by a Member limiting transparency obligations to government procurementopen to international competition because foreign suppliers would not have any
interest in obtaining information on a procurement that was not open to them;
- a requirement for transparency in procurement, irrespective of the openness of
markets, would result in a transposition of obligations on market access into a
transparency agreement.  The arguments in favour of transparency in all procurementwould imply that all Members should be required equally to provide access to their
markets since, by keeping their markets closed, they would assume lesser obligations
on transparency.  Any country was free to undertake greater obligations on
transparency by opening its markets if it chose to do so;
- a decision to open a country's market was independent of the requirements of an
agreement on transparency.  The balance in a transparency agreement was to be found
in obligations with respect to transparency  and not in those with respect to market
access.  In undertaking obligations on transparency, countries had to take into account
their individual national practices;
- this matter was better dealt with in regard to the overall scope of an agreement
(c.f. Section I);
- participants in the Working Group should be encouraged to provide information on
their national practices in regard to the provision of information in respect of
procurement not open to international competition.
47. The question has been raised as to whether openness would depend only on general criteria
prescribed by law or whether it could depend on a case-by-case decision of the procuring authority.
In this regard, the following views have been expressed:
- to the extent that procurement contracts would be decided on a case-by-case basis, it
would be the prerogative of a government authority not to open a specific
procurement contract to foreign suppliers;
- it would defeat the objective of a transparency agreement if the question of whether a
given procurement would be open to foreign suppliers were to be decided on acase-by-case basis;
- in those countries where decisions to open procurement to foreign suppliers were
made on a case-by-case basis, such decisions could be taken, either at the onset of aWT/WGTGP/3
Page 18
tendering process or at the time of the award of a contract.  With the latter type of
case-by-case decision, it would be significantly non-transparent should a
governmental authority decide to award contracts only to domestic suppliers.
Disciplines should be developed in order to provide maximum transparency in those
situations in which the decisions were taken on a case-by-case basis.
A. PUBLICATION
48. On advance information on tender opportunities, it has been suggested that there are two key
issues: where the information can be found (publication) and content.  With regard to where the
information can be found (publication) by potential suppliers,  the following points have been made:
- procurement opportunities and procedural requirements relating to those
opportunities should be made known and be generally available to interested parties,
including the general public and other Members, through an easily accessible source;
- the source used to make information on procurement opportunities generally available
should be left to the discretion of WTO Memb ers, but its level of availability should be
proportionate to the likely level of interest in  the procurement.  In other words, where a
procurement opportunity was likely to attr act international interest, procurement
opportunities should be published through a source which potential foreign suppliers
and service providers had access to, as opposed, for example, to posting a notice in a
town hall.  It has also been stated that it would not seem necessary to have a
requirement to publish tender notices in an international publication;  rather,
interested suppliers should be expected to keep track of national publications;
- publication of tender opportunities should be made available in printed and/or in
electronic media.  Printed media could be an official gazette or a national newspaper
of wide circulation;
- electronic publication should be used where feasible and taking into account the level
of development of individual WTO Members.  The internet address of electronic
publications could be made available. It has also been stated that electronic
publication offered significant benefits in terms of both time and costs, and based on
current trends would be used increasingly in the coming years (see also
Section IX B);
- the choice should be available to each WTO Member to publish in the appropriate
media and electronic publication should be an option rather than an obligation.  This
would permit account to be taken of the divergences in the capability to make use of
electronic means of publication between WTO Members and between regions within
a WTO Member and between suppliers;
- allowances should be made for systems by which information was furnished by
private sector service providers acting on behalf of procuring entities;
- under limited tendering procedures where a procuring entity contacted the
prequalified suppliers directly, advance publication of tender notices did not seem tobe necessary;
- some Members' notices of invitation to tender and to prequalify were published also
under selective procedures;WT/WGTGP/3
Page 19
- requirements for publication of tender notices might be less strict for low-value
procurements in order to avoid burdensome administrative costs;
- publication of tender opportunities should not be limited to contracts above a certain
threshold level (see also Section I).
49. The view has been expressed that exceptions to the obligation to publish procurement
opportunities (e.g. to take account of limited tendering in the case of some national practices) should
only be permitted in exceptional and justified cases.  These circumstances should be the same as those
set out for the use of procurement methods which severely restrict competition.  Some suggestions
have been made concerning situations where public ation should not be required.  This could be the
case for purchases below threshold levels and for purchases not made through open tendering
procedures for instance for limited tendering.  The point has been made that, in the latter instance, itwould be important that information on how to qualify for selective tendering procedures be
adequately available, and that post-contract awar d notices should be published. Another view has
been that, for transparency reasons, publication of procurement opportunities should in principle not
be limited to contracts above a certain threshold level.
B. 
CONTENTS OF INFORMATION
50. With regard to minimum requirements for the information to be published on procurement
opportunities, the point has been made that, while national practices with regard to the amount of
information to be included might differ, information on procurement opportunities in notices of
invitation to tender and tender documents notices should be sufficient to allow potential suppliers to
assess their interests in participating in the propo sed procurement or in a qualification system and
enable them to prepare responsive bids or proposals for qualification.   Members should be able to
decide whether the provision of in formation on procurement opportunities or its availability to interested
parties through an accessible source should be done just  through the use of tender notices, or whether the
bulk of information should be contained in the te nder documentation or be made available by other
means.
51. The suggestion has been made that an illustrative list of the types of information that such
documents should contain should be developed to provide at least:
regarding the procuring entity:
- full contact details (the name and the address) of the procuring entity (the buying
department or agency, the location of the responsible office and the division orbranch of the department or agency);
- coordinates of a contact point or document centre from which additional information
including on technical and commercial requirements and any other relevant
information or documents may be requested and obtained, the final date for making
such requests and, if applicable, the cost of such information; unique reference
number identifying the request in the department or agency's records;
regarding suppliers:
- any requirements relating to the supplier or service provider, for example economic
or qualification requirements;WT/WGTGP/3
Page 20
regarding the intended procurement:
- an identifiable description (nature) of the goods and/or services to be provided,
together with their quantity or an indication of their extent;
- the place of delivery, site or place of performance of the service and, if applicable, the
time-limit for delivery, completion or duration of the contract;
regarding evaluation of tenders:
- the procurement procedure envisaged to be used (open, selective, whether
negotiations are involved, etc.);
- the criteria for the award of the contract including factors other than the price that are
to be considered in the evaluation of tenders (economically most advantageous bid) in
the evaluation  of tenders;
- information on the existence of any conditions in favour of national suppliers in
awarding contracts, such as price preferences, local content requirements or any other
policies of discriminatory nature.  In this connection, it has also been said that
provision of such information would not be necessary if a description of national
preferences or discriminatory policies was already published in the Official Gazette;
- any technical specifications required;
- where applicable, the location, date and time of any public briefing on the
requirements;
regarding submission, receipt and opening of tenders:
- the final date for the submission/receipt of tenders or requests to be invited to
participate in a qualification system;
- the address to which submission of tenders or requests to be invited to participate in a
qualification system must be sent;
- details of any language requirements in respect of submission of tenders;
- date and place of opening of tenders.
52. The view has been expressed that such a list might be excessively burdensome and costly, in
particular in those countries in which the number of tenders issued by government entities was high.
53. In addition, it has been suggested that entities might publish, on a voluntary basis, a summary
of information on their intended procurements at regular intervals.  The point has been made that onlythose entities which could sufficiently plan their procurement activities ahead could have such
procedures.
C. 
EVALUATION CRITERIA
54. With regard to the specification of criteria for the evaluation of tenders and awarding of
contracts in public notices and/or tender documents, it has been said that all relevant evaluationcriteria should be accessible to interested suppliers, whether through publication of procurementWT/WGTGP/3
Page 21
opportunities, specifications laid down in tender documentation, or by giving references to applicable
laws and regulations.  It has been recalled that the question of whether national preferences, or other
policies underlying practices of a discriminatory nature should be part of such criteria, was not within
the scope of the work of the Group.  However, emphasis has been put on the importance of
information on such national preferences and other measures in favour of domestic supplies or
suppliers, for instance offsets, being made known in advance in the tender documents and/or tender
notices.  The point has been made that transparency in regard to the existence of preferences or other
discriminatory requirements would enable potential foreign tenderers to determine whether they had
an interest in entering a specific procurement process in spite of discriminatory national policies.
Interested suppliers would only be able to distinguish between procurement opportunities that were
reserved for domestic suppliers and those that were  open to international competition if information
on any discriminatory policies were made available to them in advance.  Provision of information
upfront on price preferences or qualification requirements favouring domestic suppliers would enablesuppliers to gauge their interest and assess the real opportunity to win a contract.  Such information
would also allow interested suppliers to make the appropriate decisions in preparing bids that would
be responsive to the conditions set out in this respect in tender documentation.  By avoiding
participation in procurement processes in which their bids would be ultimately dismissed, suppliers
would save not only their own resources but also those of procuring entities.  Moreover, the clearspecification of requirements based on socio-economic considerations in the tender documentation
would facilitate the implementation of such policies by providing transparency in respect of the nature
of the socio-economic needs applicable to specific procurements.
55. One view has been that information on preferences to national supplies and suppliers need
only be included in tender notices and/or tender documents when it was not adequately providedthrough laws or regulations of general application, either through setting out the relevant information
or through an explicit reference to the applicable le gislation.  It has also been said that, according to
national practice in one country, information on national preferences or other discriminatory policies
were supplied in response to requests by individual suppliers.  Another view has been that clear
references to any national policies, including any preferences applied, should always be included intender notices and/or tender documents.  In this regard, the point has been made that the establishment
of links between electronically published tender documents and relevant laws and regulations would
enable suppliers to search easily for further information on any applicable discriminatory policies.
56. In regard to offsets, for instance domestic content, technology transfer, export earnings or
similar requirements, the view has been expressed that, although procurement policies in manycountries incorporated such requirements, they had the effect of distorting procurement decisions.  It
was important to ensure that such requirements were  applied in a transparent manner.  If used at all,
they should form part of the qualification criteria rather than the criteria for evaluating tenders.
Suppliers should be informed of the offset requir ements laid out by the procurement entity at the
outset, which should define how such requirements could be met, for example certain percentage of
domestic content in total procurement or certain valu e of export earnings, before they participated in
the bidding.  Offset requirements that were used as part of evaluation criteria were inherentlynon-transparent because this would not give suppliers a clear indication at the outset of what
requirements they would be expected to meet so that they could prepare responsive bids.
57. Another view has been that a requirement regarding offsets might go beyond transparency
matters and appeared not to be a main element of transparency.  The comment has also been made
that, rather than an element of a transparency agr eement, the provisions relating to offsets should be
seen as measures against circumventing the non-discrimination principle.  However, since a
transparency agreement would confer on Members an explicit right to use discriminatory measures,
including conditions such as local content requirements, any such anti-circumvention provisions
would not be warranted.  A paradoxical result of more stringent obligations in a transparencyWT/WGTGP/3
Page 22
agreement might be to encourage Member countries to make their procurement markets less
accessible rather than be obliged to comply with obligations that might be too strict.
58. The point has been made that technical specifications were an important element of
evaluation criteria.  Only those bids that met the technical specifications included in the tender
documentation were considered as responsive bids.  The role of technical specifications in
procurement processes would become even more si gnificant in future with increasingly complex
procurements.  Technical specifications should avoid specifying one technology over others and
should not be developed in such a way as to require the use of technology only available to a limited
number of suppliers.  Another view in this connection has been that in certain circumstances, for
example advanced medical technology used in hospital s, entities should be allowed to specify their
preferred type of technology in order to fulfil the objectives of a given procurement, provided that this
was done in advance in notices of invitation to tender.  Further views have been expressed that a
transparency agreement should have provisions encouraging the use of performance-basedspecifications over those that were design-based;  and wherever possible, basing technical
specifications on existing internationally agreed or other relevant standards.  Comments have been
made questioning the relevance of the requirements to use performance-based specifications to
transparency.  It has also been said that any changes in technical specifications should be made known
to all interested suppliers.
59. It has also been said that any changes in evaluation criteria during the course of the
procurement should be communicated to all interested suppliers, or in the case of selective or limited
tendering, to all suppliers participating in the procurement process.
D. 
CLARIFICATION AND MODIFICATIONS
60. With respect to clarifications of tender documents given by procuring entities to potential
suppliers, it has been stated that any questions raised by interested suppliers should be responded to in
good faith by the procuring entity.  Any information provided in response to requests for clarification
from one supplier should be transmitted simultaneously to all other suppliers participating in the
procurement process.  Another view has been that it would be impracticable to provide the responses
to requests for information from suppliers that were received at different contact points disseminatedaround the country to all other suppliers participating in the procurement process.  This might only be
feasible in the case of high value procurements, for example in the context of projects financed under
the World Bank loans, in which the number of participants were usually limited.
61. It has also been said that all potential suppliers or all participants in selective tendering should
be informed of any changes to information contained in tender notices and tender documents,including those regarding evaluation criteria and technical specifications.  Another view has been that
such information should be made available to intere sted parties through an accessible source.  In this
connection, it has also been said that a transparency agreement should clearly specify that all those
suppliers who had originally ordered tender documents or had indicated an interest in the procurement
opportunity should have any additional information transmitted to them through the same means as
the one used for providing the original information.
E. 
LANGUAGE
62. The suggestion has been made that requirements concerning publication of notices of
invitation to tender should be limited to publication in an official national language.  The translation
of the whole publication into a WTO language could become too burdensome.  Another suggestion
has been that, where possible, tender notices should be published in a WTO language.  It has also
been suggested that procuring authorities should have the discretion to decide whether translation ofWT/WGTGP/3
Page 23
tender notices should be limited to those tendering opportunities that might be of interest to
international suppliers.
63. It has been suggested that, in addition to the publication of the whole information in the
official national language of the WTO Member conc erned, consideration might be given to whether a
summary of the main elements of the information in  an invitation to tender might also be published in
one of the official WTO languages.  Such a summary might contain the following elements:
- the name and address of the procuring entity;
- the nature (subject-matter) of the contract;- the time-limits for submission of tender or application to be invited to tender;- the address from where further information can be obtained.
64. It has also been suggested that there could be a limited requirement for giving a summary of
tender notices in one of the WTO official languages allowing, for example, the exemption of tender
notices for small-value procurements which might be of limited interest to international suppliers.
One view has been that providing a summary of every tender notice would incur undue administrativecosts (see also Section IX C).
65. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
V. TIME-PERIODS
66. In regard to minimum time-periods to be available to potential suppliers to fulfil the
requirements of the different stages of the procurement process, the point has been made that
time-periods in existing international instruments and national practice varied significantly.  A
transparency agreement should not be overly prescriptive in this respect.  Any provisions on
time-limits should be accepted only as recommendations.  A Member government or procuring entity
should retain the discretion for the establishment of appropriate time-limits on a case-by-case basisand in the light of the responses from the market.  On the other hand, it has been said that time-limits
should be specified in national legislation in order to avoid any subjective actions by entities in this
respect.  National legislation could set out a number of criteria relating to time-limits that would
define the parameters of discretion that entities could have in this respect.  This would provide
procuring entities with the flexibility for using shorter time-limits under certain circumstances, forinstance during the actual tendering procedures, if a prior tender notice with all the relevant
information had been issued.  The suggestion has been made that, rather than establishing specific
minimum time-periods in a transparency agreement, the Group might agree on a general principle, as
in the UNCITRAL Model Law or in Article XI:1 of the GPA.
1
67. It has been said that sufficient time should be allowed for the preparation, submission andreceipt of responsive bids to individual procurement opportunities.  Any time-limits which are set
                                                     
1 Article XI.1(a) of the GPA reads as follows:
"Any prescribed time-limit shall be adequate to allow suppliers of other Parties as well as
domestic suppliers to prepare and submit tenders before th e closing of the tendering procedures.  In determining
any such time-limit, entities shall, consistent with their own reasonable needs, take into account such factors as
the complexity of the intended procurement, the extent  of subcontracting anticipated and the normal time for
transmitting tenders by mail from foreign as well as domestic points."WT/WGTGP/3
Page 24
should not undermine the principles and objectives of a transparency agreement.  They should be
determined with due consideration to the particular circumstances of the procurement (including the
likely level of interest), type of procurement method used and the capacity of the market to act on the
information in tender notices, as well as the complexity of the procurement.  In this connection it has
also been said that a balance should be found in setting any requirements on time-limits; with longer
time-periods, procuring entities might resort to limited tendering procedures more frequently.  Thepoint in this connection has been that Members should not be required to set time-periods to suit
foreign suppliers, who should be treated on a national treatment and MFN basis.  A further point has
been made that  time-periods should be sufficiently long to give both foreign and domestic suppliers a
meaningful opportunity to avail themselves of the relevant information and to submit responsive bids.
It has further been said that a  proposed requirement to provide adequate time-limits might be biased
towards allowing suppliers including foreign suppliers to prepare and submit bids.  The term
"reasonable" should be used to provide, for instan ce, for emergency situations in which it might not be
possible to provide for adequate or sufficient time-limits. Moreover, it has been said that there should
be non-discrimination between potential suppliers with respect to the application of time-limits.
Another view has been that the time-periods allowed for the preparation and submission of tenders
should be the same for all qualified suppliers provided they had access to procurement opportunity.  It
has further been said that any changes in the time- periods should be made known to all suppliers or
the relevant information be made generally accessible from an available source.
68. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
VI. TRANSPARENCY OF DECISIONS ON QUALIFICATION
69. The point has been made that registration and qualification systems had a useful role in the
procurement process provided that they were run in a fully transparent manner.  The qualification
procedures enabled purchasing entities to assess potential suppliers' capacities for meeting their
requirements and also expedited the tender review process by reducing costs to purchasers and
suppliers.  It has also been said that qualification procedures facilitated the achievement of the overall
government policy objectives of the community or the industry.  The transparency of criteria forqualification should reinforce the objective of an open, transparent, efficient and equitable selection
process;  ensure uniform provision of information to potential suppliers;  and encourage the receipt of
sufficient information from suppliers.  The key principle of transparency as regards this issue was that
decisions on registration and qualification of suppliers should be taken only on the basis of criteria
that had been identified early in the process and predisclosed to suppliers sufficiently in advance.Any changes in qualification requirements should be made known to all interested suppliers.
Qualification decisions should be taken in a ma nner that would build a two-way confidence between
the procuring entity and the market including potential suppliers.
70. The point has been made that prequalification systems should not be exclusive: new suppliers
meeting the qualification criteria in time to participat e in a tender should be given the same (or, in one
view, at least a reasonable) opportunity to be included on a qualification list as had been enjoyed by
those already qualified.
71. Moreover, a distinction has been made between qualification systems which potentially could
cover a number of different procurements and qualification on a procurement-by-procurement basis.
It has also been noted that the issue of qualification of suppliers could play a greater role in the
procurement of services than in the procurement of goods.
72. It has been said that the qualification of suppliers should be undertaken well in advance of the
tendering process involved in order to ensure the efficiency and fairness of the government
procurement process.  It has further been said that the criteria for qualification could include suchWT/WGTGP/3
Page 25
factors as:  technical capability;  client satisfaction;  financial capacity;  contracting and partnering
issues;  quality control;  performance requirements relating to occupational health and safety;
compliance with an associated code of practice for potential suppliers;  human resource management
(including skill formation);  compliance with domestic legislative requirements;  and commitment to
continuous improvement.  On the other hand, views have been expressed stating that there should be
sufficient flexibility to allow for the development of appropriate qualification criteria for differenttypes of procurement and sectors.  The point has been made that the establishment of any harmonized
qualification criteria at the multilateral level would not be feasible and was outside the ambit of the
Group's work.  The prescription of any binding criteria or an illustrative listing of criteria for
qualification in an agreement did not have any bearing on the work on transparency.
73. It has further been said that qualification decisions should be made by expert bodies
constituted for that purpose within procuring entities.  The basis for selecting members for such
bodies and the way in which the decision-making process was conducted should be publicly availableto all potential suppliers.  On the other hand, it has been said that the setting up of an expert body on
qualifications was a matter within the purview of national authorities.  Another issue with respect to
transparency to which attention has been drawn is the situation in which a supplier who had applied
under the predisclosed qualification criteria had received no decision on its application.  All applicants
should be informed of the qualification decision in advance of the call for tenders.
74. The point has been made that, once the qualification criteria were set out in invitations to
prequalify or tender documents, they should be applied in a non-discriminatory way as regards
transparency.  Prequalification criteria should be made known to all potential suppliers in a non-
discriminatory way.   This would not prevent preferential elements in favour of domestic supplies or
suppliers from other countries being built into the criteria themselves.
75. The point has also been made that transparency in qualification procedures involved matters
of due process.  Suppliers should have the right to challenge qualification decisions if the rules of the
system had not been followed.  The view has also b een expressed that application of the principles of
objectivity and non-discrimination to prequalification criteria extended beyond the concept of
transparency.  There could be non-discrimination as regards transparency notwithstandingdiscrimination in favour of national suppliers pursuant to preferences or other domestic sourcing
requirements.  It has been said that all decisions relating to qualification should be notified to all
interested parties.  It has also been said that, under certain tendering methods, it was not possible to
overturn decisions on qualification even if certain other suppliers could be considered to be qualified
in terms of the published criteria.
76. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
VII. TRANSPARENCY OF DECISIONS ON CONTRACT AWARDS
77. The point has been made that an essential feature of transparency in decision-making on the
award of procurement contracts was that such decisions be taken strictly on the basis of the evaluation
criteria (including in relation to technical specifi cations) which had been set forth in advance in the
tender documents and in accordance with the info rmation provided on how those criteria would be
applied.  Furthermore, in order to ensure that decisions were seen to be taken in this way, criteria
should be set out in such a way as to ensure as objective an application as possible.  The view has also
been expressed that a transparency agreement would not, as a general rule, set out what those criteria
should be.  The point has been made that allowance would need to be made for cases where, for
reasons of force majeure , for example in the case of the lifting or imposition of an embargo, the
criteria set out in tender documents could not be strictly adhered to.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 26
78. Concerning the receipt and opening of tenders, the view has been expressed that, while it may
not be necessary to require public opening of tenders to ensure transparency, procuring entities should
have procedures in place to ensure the regularity and impartiality of the procurement process and that
there was no opportunity to manipulate the specific elements of tenders or to provide a particular
tenderer with information on other tenders.  In this respect, the view has been expressed that the
details of the procedures on how tenders received by procuring entities should be handled were notwithin the ambit of the Group's work.  Another vi ew has been that further consideration should be
given to whether it would be sufficient to embody these concepts in general principles or whether
more specific requirements should be envisaged.
79. With respect to ex post  information on contract awards, the point has been made that the right
to such information was a crucial element of transparency in the area of government procurement.
The procurement procedures might provide for some form of public announcement of the contract
awards and also give tenderers the opportunity to be debriefed, for example on written request froman unsuccessful tenderer.  A  public announcement on contracts awarded was also of interest to
industry generally (as potential future bidders) and to other governments which would want to see the
transparency agreement working in practice.  One ap proach suggested to this matter has been that the
provision of ex post  information was particularly important in cases where certain information had not
been provided ex ante.  It has also been said that decisions on contract awards need not include the
types of information that had been included in the relevant notices of invitation to tender, provided
that a reference was made linking the ex post  information to the earlier information.
80. As to the purpose of ex post  information, it has been said that contract award information
provided unsuccessful tenderers and other Members with the opportunity to ensure that they had been
treated equitably according to the specific requiremen ts and the assurance that criteria set forth in the
tender documentation and the applicable national rules and procedures had indeed been properly
followed in the procurement proceedings; this type  of information also provided unsuccessful bidders
with the opportunity to improve their future bids.
81. Based on the written and oral proposals, a number of options and alternative approaches for
addressing the issue of the provision of information on contract awards have been identified.  Thesevarious options and the comments made on them are as follows:
- Option 1.  As provided in national legislation.  There would be no requirement to
make contract award information available, except that which existed in domestic
legislation.
It has been said that national practices would determine whether ex post  information
on contract awards should be given through prompt publication of contract award
notices or directly by writing to individual tenderers; unsuccessful bidders should be
informed but it would be burdensome and costly to publish this information or
otherwise make it publicly available.
It has also been said that the existing practice in some countries was to send a
standard regret letter to unsuccessful bidders and to give the reasons for rejecting
their offers only where possible.
Other views have been expressed questioning whether this option would meet
adequately the objectives sought by a transparency agreement.  An obligation to
provide ex post  information should be considered  as a powerful incentive to awarding
authorities to abide by the rules and procedures in national legislation.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 27
- Option 2.  There would be an option for individual Members to determine whether to
provide debriefs to unsuccessful tenderers or to publish contract award information.
The mechanism chosen should be made known to interested parties.  A provision
should be included safeguarding the confidentiality of information on contract awards
or debriefings, the release of which would prejudice the legitimate commercial
interests (whether general public or private).
A view expressed has been that debriefing should be a complementary measure rather
than a substitute for public availability of the contract award information.  Another
view expressed has been that it would be time-consuming and burdensome to inform
unsuccessful bidders individually of the outcome of their bids.
It has also been said that, with a view to striking a balance between the need for rules
on transparency and the administrative burden of providing ex post  information, the
information to be provided in contract award notices should be less detailed than that
provided through briefings.
With regard to protecting the confidentiality of tenders, it has been said that the
obligation to provide new information related to tenders, such as the name of the
winning supplier, the value of the contract and any technical details, need notundermine the confidentiality of information.  Entities could brief unsuccessful
tenderers without necessarily releasing confidential information supplied by
successful bidders.  Another view has been that requirements on debriefing of
unsuccessful tenderers would not be useful since most tender information was
commercially sensitive and could not be disclosed without the consent of the tendererconcerned.  Another point made has been th at a starting point for consideration of the
confidentiality of information could be the provisions of other WTO agreements on
the matter.
Other views have been expressed stating that debriefing of all unsuccessful tenderers
on the reasons why they had not obtained an award was unnecessary.
- Option 2(a).  Information provided would be in line with the principles and
objectives of a transparent procurement regime and provided within a fixed
time-frame (which may be different between countries).
Views have been expressed supporting this sub-option.
- Option 2(b).  Information would be based on an illustrative list
2 and provided
within a fixed time-frame.
                                                     
2 The following specific elements for contract award notices have been suggested:  the procuring
entity,  the location of the responsible office, division or branch of the department or agency and its address;description of the supplies including the department or ag ency for which they are required, if different from the
above, and in enough detail to identify their nature, quantity and any period that may be applicable;  a uniquereference number identifying the contract, purchase or agreement in the department or agency's records and the
date of the purchase or agreement;  the value of the winning bid or the total liability of the contract at the date of
entering into the contract;  or where it is not possible to predict accurately the total liability with precisionbecause of the basis of the contract, for example cost escal ation, labour and materials, or schedule of rates, the
total estimated value or liability;  the value of the lowest and the highest bid, the type of procurement methodused, the name of the winning supplier(s), their postal address and the date of the award should be published.Where a panel contract has been made, details of all suppliers should be notified.  However, if this is
impractical, a contact address within the agency should  be published for persons seeking further information;
and relevant product and service code.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 28
- Option 2(c).  Unsuccessful bidders should be informed of the outcome of
their bids and debriefed, when they themselves requested it, as to why their
bid had been rejected and/or the winning bid had been chosen.  Information
given to unsuccessful tenderers on where their bids were deficient and why
they were not selected would provide them with the assurance that they hadbeen treated fairly and equitably in accordance with the requirements and
criteria of the tender documentation and that proper procedures and rules had
been followed and would indicate where a bid was deficient and why it had
not been selected.  This was an important guarantee of transparency,
particularly in circumstances where limited information on the contract
awarded was provided.  Moreover, it has been said that debriefings had an
educational role.  Debriefings allowed unsuccessful tenderers to assess theirbids against the winning bid and to be informed about the shortcomings of
their bids.
- Option 3.  Publish contract award information.  There would be a requirement to
publish contract award information within a fixed time-frame, with the provisions for
making the mechanism known and confidentiality included in Option 2.
Views have been expressed supporting this option.
- Option 3(a).  Information included in a list (see footnote 2) would be
provided.
A view has been expressed supporting this sub-option.Another view has been expressed questioning the need for a prescriptive
listing of the type of information that contract award notices should contain.
The provision of this type of information would be outside the scope of a
transparency agreement.  The point has also been made that any illustrative
list to be annexed to a transparency agreement should be non-binding.  The
Group would need to consider whether laying down general principles wouldbe sufficient in this respect or whether the minimum types of information that
should be given on contract award notices should be set out in a transparency
agreement.
- Option 3(b).  There would be a requirement to provide the information based
on the list (see footnote 2) and, where the contract was awarded using a
method considered to be inherently less transparent (e.g. single-source
procurement or limited tendering), to explain why this method was used and,where applicable, to explain why the information was not given at the start of
the procurement process.
A view has been expressed supporting this sub-option.
Another comment has been that ex post  information on contract awards
should be given regardless of the procurement method used.
On the other hand, it has been said that the provisions suggested in this
sub-option were not within the ambit of a transparency agreement.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 29
82. A comment with respect to the operation of ex post  information has been that ex post
information on contract awards should be given regardless of the procurement method used.
83. It has been noted that a number of other WTO agreements, for example the Agreement on
Customs Valuation and the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, included requirements on the
provision of ex post  information to economic agents.  The link between the provision of ex post
information and item VII on review and item VIII(a) on maintenance of records of procurementproceedings has been referred to.
84. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
VIII.  DOMESTIC REVIEW PROCEDURES
85. The view has been expressed that it was not su fficient for rules to be introduced to ensure
transparency in government procurement practices; there must also be a domestic review mechanism
to introduce accountability into the process and to ensure that the rules were respected by everyoneinvolved in a procurement process.  The availability of an avenue for review of procurement
processes was a key element of transparency.  The mechanism for review of complaints by suppliers
or a bid challenge system guaranteed due process and public accountability throughout a procurement
process and enabled the process to be seen as transparent.  The existence of a review mechanism
might make public procurement authorities more awar e of the need to ensure the consistency of the
procedures used in a particular procurement with the applicable laws and regulations.  The view has
also been expressed that a well-defined and transparent bid challenge mechanism added to the
transparency of any decision-making process, ensured that procurement decisions were reviewed
openly and increased confidence in the effective functioning of the overall procurement system.  It
has also been said that a bid challenge system would be a last resort that occurred when, despite goodand transparent processes and best endeavours, a potential supplier alleged that the procedures had not
been applied correctly and a breach had occurred.
86. It has been suggested that precedents for review or appeal mechanisms could be found in a
number of WTO agreements, for example the Agreements on Countervailing Measures and Anti-
Dumping Practices, Customs Valuation, Import Licensing, Rules of Origin, Preshipment Inspectionand TRIPS.  Additionally, paragraph 3(b) of Article X of the GATT 1994 on publication and
administration of trade regulations provided for "judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or
procedures for the purpose, inter alia , of the prompt review and correction of administrative action
relating to customs matters" to ensure that complaints or appeals could be resolved under the
jurisdiction of individual WTO Members pursuant to national laws.  Other views expressed in thisconnection have been that issues involved in procurement practices could not be compared with the
issues that might constitute the grounds for the review provisions in other WTO agreements.  It might
not be feasible to transpose the provisions rega rding review mechanisms in other WTO agreements
into a transparency agreement since the scope of the rules under those agreements went beyond
simple transparency obligations.
87. Reference has also been made to the element of due process in the APEC non-binding
principles on transparency in government procurement.
3 It has been said that, in the APEC context,
the existence of a domestic bid challenge mechanism was viewed as an important element of a
transparent procurement system.  On the other hand, it has also been said that the substance of the
APEC non-binding principles went  beyond transparency matters.
                                                     
3 Circulated in document WT/WGTGP/W/11WT/WGTGP/3
Page 30
88. Moreover, the view has been expressed that governments should ensure that scrutiny
mechanisms were independent, appropriate to their circumstances, scope, topic and objectives,
including "internal" scrutiny of actions or decisions of a procurement official or area within a
government organization by another official or area of that organization, for instance, an organization
investigating a complaint by an aggrieved supplier; scrutiny by other "external" government
organizations, which may or may not be indepe ndent of government influence, such as an
ombudsman, government audit organization;  or representatives of an elected assembly;  or scrutiny
by judiciary, non-government bodies or bodi es independent of government influence.
89. It has also been suggested that elements of a future transparency agreement should include the
establishment of domestic legal mechanisms, whether administrative or judicial, available to any
national or foreign person in order to challenge government procurement procedures flawed by
bribery.
90. It has been stated that any obligation to provide for review procedures in a transparency
agreement should only concern actions within the scope of that agreement, not the substance of
preferential measures relating to market access in government procurement.  While it might often be
difficult to dissociate transparency aspects of government procurement from other aspects, the
mandate of the Group should guide its work on this matter as on others.
91. The point has been made that a domestic review mechanism could be achieved through a
variety of means.  It has been noted that administrative or judicial review procedures in the interest of
assuring due process and public accountability were common to most national regimes, which in
consequence already contained the main features that might be applicable to domestic review
procedures in a transparency agreement.  The view has been expressed that any obligation to provide
for domestic review procedures in a transparency agreement should take into account such nationalpractices and procedures;  no attempts should be made to develop special review mechanisms where
appropriate domestic administrative or judicial procedures already existed.  The view has also been
expressed that a transparency agreement should not have provisions requesting Members to adapt
their domestic systems to certain prescribed criteria and the existing national systems should be fully
respected.   The Group should guard against developing overly prescriptive provisions on the specific
characteristics that national systems must have.  Any provisions should be flexible enough to allow
Members to design their domestic review mechanisms in accordance with their national legislation
and to rely on administrative or judicial review mechanisms that were appropriate to their national
legal systems.  They could be in the form of an exhortation to Members of a transparency agreement
or a best endeavours obligation to provide for domestic review mechanisms.  The choice of reviewprocedure should be left to individual Members provided the review mechanism itself was transparent
and provided a guarantee of independence.  In this connection, the suggestion has been made that, as a
first step, Members should provide information on whether their domestic administrative or judicial
review systems addressed government procurement-related matters and, if so, under what conditions.
92. The point has also been made that domestic revi ew procedures could be used to review either
the consistency of the procurement practices or an individual procurement process with the domestic
laws or regulations in force or the consistency of the procurement practices with the rules of atransparency agreement.  Review of complaints or other dispute settlement mechanisms were often
initiated after the contract had been awarded, making it impossible to overturn a procurement
decision, cancel a contract and start the procurement process all over again.  A mechanism established
under the terms of a transparency agreement might be  limited to reviewing the consistency of the laws
and whether they should be amended or removed.  While WTO dispute settlement was available toresolve differences between WTO Members relating to the implementation of WTO obligations,
domestic review mechanisms were established with the purpose of addressing complaints by suppliers
under the domestic jurisdiction of a particular country.  Under a WTO enforcement system,
complaints should only relate to the complian ce of Members with their obligations under aWT/WGTGP/3
Page 31
transparency agreement whereas domestic reviews mostly concerned specific award decisions.  The
WTO review procedures should not give rise to situations in which the procurement decisions of
government authorities could be overturned.
93. The view has been expressed that the issue of review went beyond that of transparency and
therefore the mandate of the Working Group.  It has been said that domestic administrative or judicial
review mechanisms were in place in national systems for the purpose of public accountability at thedomestic level, a matter not within the ambit of a transparency agreement.  Concerns have been
expressed that review provisions in a transparency agreement might be used as a means by certain
vocal private parties to create complications in the domestic political arena;  and additional review
procedures might increase the number of challenges and give rise to unnecessary costs.  Since the
purpose of domestic procedures in many countries was to review whether procurement had been made
in accordance with domestic law and procedures, the scope of which went further than the obligations
that might be agreed in a transparency agreement, it might not be feasible to limit the application of
review procedures to specific transparency obligations in a WTO agreement on transparency.  It has
been suggested that transparency requirements in respect of review procedures, under the scope of a
transparency agreement, should be limited to the prov ision of information to suppliers in regard to the
domestic national review mechanisms and procedures.
94. The view has also been expressed that a review should be available to all potential suppliers
including suppliers from other WTO Members.  Another view has been that a review should be
available to all suppliers who were involved in the procurement process.  In this connection, the
question has been asked whether foreign interested parties could file complaints against domestic
governmental authorities under existing national administrative and judicial mechanisms or whether
there would be need for special procedures under a transparency agreement to guarantee thereceivability of complaints by foreign suppliers.
95. While some delegations have indicated that they had not yet formulated their views on the
specifics of a review mechanism, attention has been drawn to the following features of review
mechanisms that might be studied by the Working Group:
- encouraging suppliers, in the first instance,  to take up the matter directly with the
procuring entity for an early resolution.  Agencies might have procedures in place to
handle complaints directly;
- in some cases, the mediation or good offices of an independent authority might be
sought;
- if the matter was not resolved mutually, provisions enabling suppliers to bring an
action against the procuring entity before a judicial or administrative authority or
other independent body;  the point has been made that review provisions should allow
flexibility to Member governments to choose whether to designate judicial or
administrative bodies or both;
- review provisions should require that review bodies be impartial and independent of
the procurement process itself.  The point has also been made that Article X:3(b) of
GATT 1994 provided some guidance in this regard;
- account should be taken of such principles as objective legality, ex officio action and
material delegation in the review procedures;WT/WGTGP/3
Page 32
- in addition to procedures based on formal complaints, initiation of review procedures
by competent public authorities on an ex officio basis or national mechanisms for
monitoring procurement proceedings;
- the review procedure should result in a published and reasoned conclusion that should
be notified to interested suppliers in writing;
- review procedures should be published in a medium that is publicly available.
96. As regards the approach to be taken on the matter of domestic review in a transparency
agreement,  it has been said that an agreement should include a simple and flexible provision that
could accommodate different Members' existing independent administrative or judicial tribunals and
review procedures.  Such a provision should en sure that there were transparent, timely and
independent decisions on complaints or appeals relating to the transparency of procuring entities'
actions and procedures.  The scope of review of this provision under WTO procedures should be
limited to actions relating to the implementation, through domestic laws and procedures, of therequirements of the transparency agreement.
97. The view has been expressed that procurement decisions were different from many other
administrative decisions, in that review or dispute settlement mechanisms often had to function after
the contract had been awarded.  A review provision should ensure that claims from interested
suppliers could be heard and decided upon in a manner that did not prejudice their interests in theprocurements in question.  Such guarantees could be available through rapid decisions on challenges
or through suspension of the procurement process while claims were pending.  In this regard, the
point has been made that suspension of a procur ement process upon a challenge by a supplier could
hold up the whole procurement process until a decision had been reached concerning the challenge.
Since this could be detrimental to the public interest and create difficulties in cases of urgentprocurements, most national review procedures and the provisions of the GPA provided for
exceptions enabling, in circumstances so warranting, public interest considerations to override the
interest in suspending a procurement process.  In cases in which the procurement process might be
suspended, there could therefore be provisions in a transparency agreement for continuing nonetheless
with the award of procurement in the public interest.
98. In connection with remedies that might be provided under review provisions, the following
views have been expressed:
- most national review systems already provided remedies for suppliers whose rights
had been denied under the applicable laws and regulations;
- review provisions should provide for adequate remedies that would protect the
interests of suppliers and would deter procurement entities from engaging in future
actions that would be inconsistent with the provisions of an eventual agreement on
transparency;
- remedies should include the possibility of corrections including altering the
inconsistent procurement process, re-tendering for the procurement or awarding
damages to cover legitimate claims;
- an independent review should review compla ints about tendering procedures in order
to determine possible damages or administrative responsibility;
- account should be taken of the fact that review systems might provide for remedies
which could include compensation only after administrative or judicial proceduresWT/WGTGP/3
Page 33
had determined that an injury or an econom ic loss had flowed from the inconsistency
of a procurement process with the applicable legislation.
99. Another view expressed on remedies has been that a transparency agreement should not
specify them for the following reasons:
- provisions requiring adequate remedies would fall outside the scope of the work on
transparency.  It would be sufficient to have provisions requiring the establishment ofa review procedure without specifying the remedies that should be available;
- obligations on remedies might have counter-productive repercussions on the
procurement practices of governmental authorities; to the extent that procuring
authorities would be liable to remedies, they might have a tendency to restrict access
to foreign suppliers in order to minimize any such risks.
100. It has also been suggested that a transparency agreement should require procurement entities
to maintain written records of the procurement process in order to ensure that review bodies had anadequate factual basis for review (see Section IX A).  As another possible means of review
mechanism, provision of ex post information to unsuccessful suppliers and debriefing by procuring
authorities have also been mentioned (see also Section VII).
101. As regards the content of a domestic review provision in a transparency agreement, the
following text has been suggested:  "Members shal l maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative
tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt review and correction of procurement actions
that may be inconsistent with the requirements of this Agreement, as implemented in Members' laws.
Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the agencies responsible for procurements
covered under this Agreement and shall provide for rapid decisions that, as appropriate, can affect the
modification or reversal of any inconsistent actions."  The following comments have been madeconcerning this text:
- other types of remedial actions such as imposition of fines or banning suppliers from
participating in future procurements for a given period of time, could be envisaged;
- the word "correction" should be deleted in the first sentence.  Existing administrative
procedures were used for dealing with requests for the revision of formal or materialerrors;
- the phrase "as implemented in Members' laws" at the end of the first sentence
required clarification;
- the last phrase in the second sentence after the words "as appropriate" should be
replaced by the phrase "can provide appropriate relief in accordance with national lawor practice";
- the text suggested above was more complicated than the approach taken to this issue
in other WTO agreements.
102. The question has been asked how a review, modification or reversal of inconsistent
procurement actions could be envisaged in the context of an agreement on transparency in
government procurement.  In this connection, it has been said that, while sometimes impractical or
inappropriate, for example when contracts had alre ady been awarded or the public interest dictated
otherwise, corrective actions were often feasible.  For instance, upon a complaint lodged by a
supplier, a procuring entity that had not published a notice of procurement opportunity at the outset ofWT/WGTGP/3
Page 34
a procurement process could be asked to do so, or a procuring entity that had provided certain tender
information to one supplier could be asked to provide the same information to all interested suppliers.
IX. OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO TRANSPARENCY
A. MAINTENANCE OF RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
103. The view has been expressed that openness and transparency, through appropriate public
access to information for external scrutiny, are essential elements of accountability.  Governmentprocurement records and information and mechanisms for collecting, assessing and scrutinizing those
records and that information, should enable effec tive external scrutiny.  Information recorded on
authorizations, procurement systems, actions and decisions should be sufficient to justify decisions
taken in the procurement process and to demonstrate that procurement activity was consistent with
government requirements.
104. The view has also been expressed that procuring authorities should maintain a proper record
of decisions and actions taken during the procurement process and the reasons for them.  Themaintenance of a record of procurement proceedings and the availability of non-confidential
information contained in it to interested parties was one of the principal mechanisms for ensuring
adherence to agreed rules and was of particular importance in the functioning of an administrative or
judicial review process.  Such records provided the basis for an audit trail and supported any
evaluation of the procurement
4 and thus introduced an element of accountability into the process.  It
has also been said that maintenance of records for a pre-established minimum length of time was also
essential in order to enable bribery to be proved in legal proceedings.  With regard to the length of
time that records of proceedings should be maintained, it has been said that the requirements in this
respect could be linked to the time provided to domestic suppliers in domestic legislation to challenge
a procurement decision and to seek a review of a procurement process.  It might not be necessary tokeep a record of proceedings beyond that period.  Another view in this connection has been that a
transparency agreement should not have provisions stating explicitly in what form and for how long
records should be maintained by entities.  It has also been suggested that information should be
provided on the national practices of those Members in which procuring entities were required to
maintain records of procurement proceedings.
105. The question has been asked whether record maintenance should be treated as a separate
element providing an additional guarantee of transparency or whether this item would be sufficiently
addressed under other elements.
106. By way of general comments under this Section, a view has been expressed that prescription
of stringent rules on transparency and review could be counter-productive to market access.  Havingno obligations on market access in the area of government procurement, national governments would
have the tendency to close their procurement markets to foreign suppliers in order not to run the risk
of breaching these rules on transparency.
                                                     
4 The following details of the matters that should be documented have been suggested:  approval to
make the procurement;  the selection criteria upon which evaluation and selection decisions will be based;discussions with potential bidders before bids close;  details of clarification of bids during evaluations;  reasonsfor variations to a tender;  steps to provide all bidders with an equal opportunity to revise their bids;  agreements
reached during negotiations;  authorization and signing of a contract;  details of debriefings;  reasons for varying
a contract;  and records of contractor performance.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 35
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
107. It has been suggested that the work of the Group in developing a transparency agreement
should take full account of innovative government procurement practices.  Information technology
was already being rapidly adopted by procurement communities and offered tremendous opportunities
to level the playing field by increasing access to information at low cost to all suppliers.  To the
greatest extent possible, a transparency agreement should encourage the use of informationtechnology tools  to disseminate information on procurement opportunities and contracts awarded as
an alternative to more traditional methods of communication (see also Section IV above).  The view
has also been expressed that, for the time being, procuring entities should be able to continue to
maintain paper-based tendering procedures.
108. On the other hand, it has been suggested that, because of the lack of uniformity among
countries' stages of development in this area, any requirements for the use of information technology
in government procurement should be optional and that the use of information technology toolsshould not undermine the basic transparency principle of guaranteeing access to information for all,
including small and medium-sized suppliers and suppliers from countries less advanced in the use of
information technology.  A balance should be found whereby a transparency agreement would not
constitute an unnecessary barrier to progress in the area of information technology and would
accommodate the increasing use of information technology in government procurement in Members,while ensuring that the use of information tec hnology would not result in discrimination against
countries which did not have a competitive edge in this area.  Electronic tendering using Internet-
based systems facilitated access of suppliers worldwide with a minimum requirement of equipment
and technological know-how and was the most efficient way of ensuring non-discriminatory access to
tender information.
109. It has been said that one of the issues that had to be dealt with in electronic procurement
concerned procedures for opening tenders when they were submitted electronically.  It has been noted
that there was scope for international cooperation in  the area of information technology, for example
in developing electronic databases or maintaining lists of qualified suppliers.
5 The point has also been
made that procuring entities should be allowed to charge for electronic access to information andtender documentation and other tendering procedures, in particular if the information was supplied by
a private service provider.  It has also been said that the Group would need to consider at a later stage
whether it would be appropriate to cover such specific matters as information technology in a
transparency agreement.  In this connection, it has been noted that information technology was an area
where there was scope for technical cooperation (see Section XII).
C. 
LANGUAGE
110. It has been said that information on national practices showed that documents and other
information relating to tendering proceedings were generally provided in the official language(s) of
the country of the procuring entity.  As a rule, documents and other information relating to
procurement procedures and individual procurements should be allowed to be provided to potential
suppliers and service providers in an official language of the country of the procuring entity.  In
general, potential suppliers wishing to do business in another country would have the necessarylanguage facilities available to them;  there should not be a specific requirement to provide such
information in a WTO language.  Nevertheless, procuring entities could be encouraged to provide
information, where possible, in a WTO language where a particular procurement opportunity was
likely to attract international interest (see also Section IV).
                                                     
5 It has been mentioned that the APEC Group of Experts in Government Procurement has established a
Home Page with linkages to existing databases on government procurement in member economies
(www.apecsec.org.sg/govtproc/gphome.html).WT/WGTGP/3
Page 36
D. FIGHT AGAINST BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION
111. It has been said that all governments were committed to combatting corruption and were
engaged in efforts towards diminishing and, ultimately, eliminating bribery.  Bribery in government
procurement processes was currently a source of serious concern to the international community.  It
involved, not only political considerations such as legal insecurity, good governance and ethical
problems, but also considerations of an economic nature such as efficiency of resource management,the negative impact of bribery on investment and the ensuing distortions of national competitive
conditions.
112. The view has been held that there was an important relationship between transparency in
government procurement and reducing the incidence of bribery and corruption in government
procurement practices.  Because governments had recognized the importance of this matter, the
Working Group had been given the mandate by Members to develop elements relating to transparency
in this area.  Attention has been drawn to international instruments aimed at fighting corruption andbribery established by a number of international fora, including the OAS and the OECD.  The point
has been made that, while such initiatives had been useful in attacking the problem from various
angles, so far there had not been any studies, negotiations or agreements on the relationship between
the fight against bribery and transparency in government procurement in a specific and systematic
manner.  The view has also been expressed that transparency, by itself, was not enough and thereforeneeded to be supplemented by specific appropriate action and measures related, among others, to
bribery of public officials, transnational bribery, tax deductibility of bribes paid to foreign officials,
retention of records of procurement proceedings, establishment of bid challenge systems, lifting of
banking secrecy, mutual legal assistance and technical and financial cooperation.
113. Views have been expressed that an agreement on transparency in government procurement
would be an important and effective contribution to reducing the incidence of bribery and corruption
in procurement practices as well as to the broader efforts to fight bribery.  There was a real need to
address bribery in all its forms provided that any possible measures genuinely fell within the scope of
the WTO activities.  It has also been said that th e outcome of the work in other international fora as
well as in the Working Group could bring about systemic changes that would reduce opportunities forcorruption.  The task of the Working Group was to improve transparency by creating a rules-based
environment and the procedures that were necessary for that purpose.  As a secondary goal, the fight
against bribery and corruption could be achieved through increased transparency in government
procurement procedures.  The work in several WTO bodies that was aimed at achieving systemic
improvements and a rules-based environment in trade matters had already made a meaningfulcontribution to advancing the fight against corruption.  It has been suggested that, with the aim of
creating the necessary safeguards against corruption in this area, the Group should focus on those
aspects which most easily lent themselves to abuse in the area of government procurement.  For
instance, consideration should be given to requirements in regard to the retention of government
procurement records for a pre-established minimum period and establishment of domestic
administrative or judicial actions available to any national or foreign person in order to challenge
government procurement procedures flawed by bribery.  Such measures were common elements ofinternational instruments on government procurement as well as of national legislation (see
Sections IX A and VIII, respectively, above).  A future agreement on transparency in government
procurement should include such measures.
114. Views have been expressed questioning the appropriateness of expanding the scope of the
work of the Working Group to the matters of bribery and corruption.  Although its effects were oftenvery severe in government procurement, corruption was far from being strictly confined to this area of
economic activity.  While transparency in government procurement would contribute to the fight
against corruption and bribery, the issue itself was not within the mandate of the Group and was also
outside the ambit of the WTO.  The objective of the fight against corruption and bribery should not beWT/WGTGP/3
Page 37
stated explicitly in an agreement on transparency in government procurement.  Members should deal
with such issues through their own national legislation concerning this area.
115. Other views in this connection have been that the work of the Working Group should not be
overloaded with too many issues that, while important, might be dealt with more appropriately in
other fora.  Establishing a link between the issues of trade and corruption in the WTO might give
Members the possibility of justifying trade measures or sanctions on grounds of alleged corruptpractices in other Member countries.
X. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS
(NOTIFICATION)
116. The view has been expressed that it was somewhat premature to discuss in detail this aspect,
which might be better taken up once a clearer notion of the nature of a transparency agreement had
been generated.  Nonetheless, a number of issues ha ve been raised relating to the possible notification
arrangements under a transparency agreement and other mechanisms by which information can beexchanged between Member governments.
117. While some views expressed have put emphasis on the importance of adequate information
on relevant national legislation and any amendments thereof being notified to other Members of a
transparency agreement, other views have drawn at tention to difficulties that would have to be
addressed in this connection.  It has been suggested that the notification of all national laws,regulations and administrative guidelines, including those of sub-central and other levels of
government covered, might prove to be unduly burdensome.  This would particularly be the case if
they all had to be notified in a WTO language.  An additional concern that has been expressed was
that it was doubtful that Members would be ready to share confidential information.  A number of
possible ways of overcoming these difficulties have been put forward:
- Members might be expected to notify their basic law on government procurement, but
not each and every law and regulation;
- an approach of employing a checklist of points, or questionnaire, to elicit basic
information on how the national laws and regulations of each Member responded to
the requirements of a transparency agreement might be employed;
- each Member might be required to respond to requests from any other Member for
specific information on its laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
transparency in government procurement.  Contact points might be established by
each Member for this purpose.  In this connection, reference has been made to the
discussion on this point reflected in item III of this note;
- greater use of electronic databases might be made for providing information on
procurement procedures at sub-central levels;
- the government of an unsuccessful tenderer might be entitled to seek information on
the contract award in question from the government whose entity conducted the
procurement.  This could be a vehicle for forestalling disputes.  The view has also
been expressed that the information sought should relate to how the commitments on
transparency had been complied with in the contract award process.  Another viewwas that the provision of such post-contract award information might not be
necessary in an agreement on transparency, since it would not extend to matters of
market access;WT/WGTGP/3
Page 38
- enhanced use could be made of existing WTO transparency mechanisms, including
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism;
- the question has been raised as to whether the existing provisions of Article X of
GATT 1994 and Article III of the GATS were sufficient for the purposes of a
transparency agreement on government procurement or whether additional rules
should be provided for.  Should there be, for example, a requirement to specify wherethe relevant laws were published?  In this regard, the view has been expressed that the
provisions of the GATT 1994 and GATS that had been referred to would not be
adequate for the purposes of notification in an eventual transparency agreement.
118. It has also been suggested that Members might provide information identifying government
departments, agencies and enterprises subject to the rules in a transparency agreement.  The point has
been made that this could be done through notification of a positive list of such entities or through
notification of a negative list of those entities not su bject to the agreement.  It has been suggested that
the latter approach might have the advantage of avoiding the problem of frequent changes in lists
resulting from changes of a formal nature, such as the renaming or restructuring of departments.  The
issue of the most appropriate technique for the presentation of the coverage of entities would depend
on the outcome of discussions on the scope of the agreement, in particular which type of entities were
covered.  It has also been said that it was premature to consider the form in which the coverage ofentities should be presented.
119. On statistical reporting, the following points have been made:
- such provisions should not be included in a transparency agreement;
- there should not be an obligation, but governments might be invited to provide what
information they have available, for example on the size of their procurement market;
- the issue should be put aside for the time being.
120. The view has been expressed that any requirements relating to the provision to other
Members of information on and explanation of national procurement rules and procedures should
apply only to the extent that such rules and procedures were within the scope of a transparency
agreement.  Requirements on the provision of information and explanations should be limited to thoserelating to transparency matters, and not otherwise relate to market access questions.
XI. WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
121. With regard to dispute settlement between go vernments, the general view has been that it
would be premature to consider the applicability of provisions on dispute settlement before the
elements of a transparency agreement had been more clearly identified.  However, the view has alsobeen expressed that any commitments on transparency  should be subject to the DSU in the same way
as the existing clauses on transparency in any other WTO agreement.  Another view has been that it
was questionable that the dispute settlement system could apply, with significant results, to
obligations on transparency in the absence of co mmitments with respect to market access.  For
example, it has been asked whether any decision resulting from a dispute regarding the provision of
transparency in a government procurement process could apply retroactively.  A view has also been
expressed in this connection that the Group's mandate was to discuss the elements of an appropriateagreement on transparency which could be in the form of guidelines or a code;  only an agreement
with binding obligations should be subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.  It would be
sufficient to invoke Article X of GATT 1994 in dispute cases involving a violation of obligations onWT/WGTGP/3
Page 39
transparency.  The creation of a linkage between a transparency agreement and the WTO dispute
settlement procedures was not warranted.
122. Regarding the relationship between domes tic review procedures and the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, it was said that a distinction should be made between domestic review
mechanisms which involved responding to complaints by suppliers against procuring authorities
under the law of a country and dispute settlement procedures between governments under the law andprocedures of the WTO.  The legal criteria for domestic reviews and WTO dispute settlement were
different.  In the case of domestic procedures, a review related to the consistency of a procurement
process with the domestic laws and regulations, whereas in the case of WTO dispute settlement the
grounds for a dispute were an alleged breach of the commitments under a WTO agreement.  The view
has been expressed that the possibility for foreig n suppliers to have recourse to effective and
independent domestic review procedures, as a first avenue for resolving complaints, would minimize
the likelihood that such complaints might eventually  rise to the level of a government-to-government
dispute.
123. In regard to the way in which national review procedures and the WTO dispute settlement
procedures might interact, it has been suggested th at the Group might wish to examine the approach to
this matter adopted in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994.  Another view
expressed was that there should be no particular relationship between a domestic review process andgovernment-to-government dispute settlement.  WT O dispute settlement procedures should apply to
issues relating to the consistency of laws of general application with the rules of a transparency
agreement and should not be invoked with regard to decisions resulting from national review
procedures concerning a particular procurement.   The view has also been expressed that national
practices would not allow the WTO dispute settlement process to override a specific procurementdecision taken by a national judicial body.  In this connection, a further view has been that a
transparency agreement could have provisions setting minimum standards regarding the legal
framework for domestic review procedures.  The objective of WTO dispute settlement procedures
would be to enforce the effective implementation of such provisions.  WTO dispute settlement
procedures should only apply in respect of obligations of governments in their capacity as regulators.Any procurement decision taken by them, including contract award decisions, in their capacity as
purchasing entities should not be subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.  Any complaint in
this respect should be addressed under domestic review procedures.  The question has been asked
whether there had ever been a case in the history of GATT/WTO where dispute settlement procedures
had been invoked based on allegations of breach of the rules on transparency.  A comment has beenmade stating that challenges of individual award decisions under the provisions of a transparency
agreement were unlikely.  However, Members should be able to invoke dispute settlement procedures
with the objective of achieving improved transparency, if a purchasing entity had breached the rules
of a transparency agreement, for instance if it had persisted in not publishing notices of procurement
opportunities.  It has also been said that provisions should reflect the principle of exhaustion of
domestic judicial review mechanisms before recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedures.
Moreover, the point has been made that recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedures, being aprerogative of governments, could not be initia ted by suppliers who might challenge procurement
procedures of government entities.
XII. TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
124. The point has been made that technical cooperation was important for ensuring the successful
implementation of a future transparency agreement.  It could also play an important role in helping
Members to develop domestic procurement regimes and in taking practical steps to enhance
transparency of procurement policies and practices.  The view has been expressed that, in discussing a
framework for technical cooperation, inspiration might be drawn from the language of Article 67 ofWT/WGTGP/3
Page 40
the Agreement on TRIPS.  This required developed country Members to make available technical and
financial cooperation, on mutually agreed terms, in response to requests from developing country
Members.  It also listed specific areas where such cooperation should be provided, including
assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations and support regarding the establishment of
domestic offices and agencies, including the training of personnel.  Technical cooperation plans could
be drawn up identifying the needs of individual developing and least-developed countries in meetingtheir obligations under a transparency agreement and targeting technical cooperation activities to
specific purposes, for instance for the establishment of contact points.  The view has been expressed
that the provisions on technical cooperation should match the specific requirements in a transparency
agreement; compliance with the rules of a transpar ency agreement might require changes in national
legislation and procedures and the building up of new institutions in individual countries.  The
following types of areas in which technical cooperation would be beneficial have been suggested:
regarding development of national legislation and procedures:
- legal advice and assistance in drawing up national legislation;- administrative and policy option analysis and guidance;
- drawing up procedures on publication;
- establishment and implementation of bid challenge systems;- taking practical steps to make procurement more user-friendly by developing standard
forms for tender notices and fill-in-the-blank bid forms, as well as developing a
common procurement vocabulary;
regarding training:
- training for those who have to implement,  use or enforce new legislation, procedures
and/or practices, training the judiciary, a nd training local traine rs who would continue
training programmes in, for example,  business schools or colleges of public
administration in the beneficiary country;
- exchange of officers;
- training of purchasers and suppliers;
regarding institution building:
- administrative cooperation to enhance institution building and the exchange of
information;
regarding access to information by suppliers:
- workshops, seminars and the production of user guides, including the development of
Internet websites, search engines and databases, to help provide information about
opportunities to do business with governments at home and abroad, and to facilitateaccess to that information;  in particular, such assistance could benefit small and
medium-sized enterprises, by increasing their confidence and effectiveness in
successfully entering procurement markets at home and abroad;WT/WGTGP/3
Page 41
regarding use of information technology:
- the development of information technology tools which could be used to disseminate
information about procurement opportunities and practices, and/or to establish full
electronic tendering, as well as to facilitate the collection of relevant economic data
and statistics;
- the provision of office, information technology and/or other equipment necessary for
the implementation and enforcement of legislation, procedures and/or practices.
125. The view has been expressed that the practices under the TRIPS Agreement might also be
useful in assessing and monitoring assistance on an ongoing basis, while avoiding the creation of
additional bureaucratic structures and red tape.  The point has also been made that the issue oftechnical cooperation should be discussed not only in terms of ensuring compliance of developing
countries with the requirements of a future agreement, but also in terms of the practical steps that
could be taken to enhance transparency in developed as well as developing countries.
126. It has also been suggested that requirements similar to the provisions of Article 66.2 of the
Agreement on TRIPS might be included in an agreement on transparency.  Developed countryMembers might be required to provide incentives to en terprises and institutions in their territories for
the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to developing country suppliers in
order to enable them to participate in bidding for public contracts in developed countries.  In
comparison with Article 67 of that Agreement, under which technical cooperation depended on the
mutually agreed terms and conditions between developed and developing country Members, technicalcooperation under Article 66.2 was provided unilaterally and at the initiative of developed countries.
Technical cooperation could be useful in achieving the objective of economic efficiency in
government procurement.  For instance, providing information to developing countries as to what
governments usually procure and information as to worldwide sources would be relevant in this
regard.
127. The point has been made that the technical cooperation activities of international
intergovernmental organizations and fora, including international financial institutions and regional
development banks, in the field of government procurement could contribute to transparency and the
implementation of a transparency agreement.  It has been suggested that consideration should be
given to developing a framework under a transp arency agreement for rationalizing the various
activities in this area at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.  In this respect, it has been
suggested that the Secretariat would prepare a background paper containing information on technical
cooperation programmes of international and regional intergovernmental organizations related to
government procurement, so as to enable the Group to have as complete a picture as possible of the
availability of technical cooperation in this area.
6
128. It has been suggested that potential recipi ent and donor countries should be encouraged to
share their views on particular needs and the available forms of technical cooperation in the area ofgovernment procurement.  It has also been suggested that special attention should be paid to the
problems of institution building, in particular in least developed countries.  The Chair invited
Members to provide information in writing to the Working Group on their needs and on the technical
cooperation already available.
                                                     
6 The information communicated from UNCITRAL, OECD, the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, the African Development Bank, IMF, the APEC Government Procurement Experts Group, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ITC and UNDP on their respective technical cooperation activities
in the area of government procurement has been circulated in documents WT/WGTGP/W/20 and Addenda 1-8.WT/WGTGP/3
Page 42
129. With regard to special and differential treatm ent for developing countries, the view has been
expressed that this issue might be addressed once the elements of an eventual agreement were more
clearly defined.  In this connection, it has been said that the substantive provisions of a transparency
agreement should reflect in particular the special circumstances in developing country Members.  The
formulation of the provisions of a transparency agreement should not be too ambitious in order to
enable all Members to adhere to an eventual ag reement without the need for lengthy transitional
periods.
130. The suggestion has also been made that transitional periods in respect of developing countries
might be provided.  On the other hand, it has been said that provisions on transitional periods would
not be sufficient for special and differential treatment of developing countries.  In the light of the
divergence among individual Members' practices in this area, any meaningful special and differential
provisions should require developing countries to comply with the provisions in a transparency
agreement, only to the extent that they were capable  of undertaking the relevant obligations.  Certain
objective criteria should be developed for this purpose.
__________SECTION XV
COMMITTEES UNDER THE PLURILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS6358
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
The attached communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft
to the Chairman of the General Council is circulated for information of Members.
_______________WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DU COMMERCE
ORGANIZACIÓN MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO
Centre William Rappard    Rue de Lausanne 154    Case postale    CH - 1211 Genève 21
 Téléphone:  (+41 22) 739 51 11    Fax:  (+41 22) 731 42 06
Internet:  http://www.wto.orgH. E. Mr. Ali Said Mchumo
Chairman
General Council15 October 1999
Dear Mr. Chairman,
This letter reports on the activities of the Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft (the
"Committee") since it adopted its 1998 annual report.  I am submitting this report at this time on my
own responsibility as the Committee will not be in a position formally to adopt its 1999 annual report
prior to the November 1999 meeting of the General Council.
Since the adoption of the Committee's 1998 annual report (document WT/L/291), the
Committee has held one formal meeting, on 21 July 1999.  The agenda and the minutes of this
meeting can be found in TCA/M/8.  An informal meeting of the Committee took place on 20 July
1999 to consider the status of the 1979 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft under the WTO
Agreement.  My report to the Committee on the discussions at the informal meeting can be found in
TCA/M/8, item A.
Neither the Sub-Committee of the Committee nor the Technical Sub-Committee of the
Committee has met since the adoption of the Committee's 1998 annual report.
A meeting of the Technical Sub-Committee of the Committee is to be held on 16 December
1999, and the Committee will hold its next formal meeting on 17 December 1999.  At this meeting,
the Committee will adopt its 1999 annual report, which will be forwarded to the General Council
immediately thereafter.
Yours sincerely,
Didier Chambovey
Chairman
Committee on Trade in Civil AircraftWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONGPA/30
21 October 1999
(99-4569)
REPORT (1999) OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
I. GENERAL
1. This Report is submitted pursuant to Article XXIV:7(a) of the Agreement on Government
Procurement, which requires the Committee to revi ew annually the implementation and operation of
the Agreement and to inform annually the General Council of developments during the periods
covered by such reviews.
2. The Agreement on Government Procurement entered into force on 1 January 1996.  The
period covered in this Report is November 1998-October 1999, but the Report also reflects, where
necessary, the work of the Committee up to November 1998 (GPA/8 and Add.1, GPA/19 and
GPA/25).  The Committee on Government Procuremen t held two meetings in 1999:  on 23 February
and 5 October 1999 (GPA/M/11 and 12).1
3. The following WTO Members are Parties to the Agreement:  Canada; the European
Community and its fifteen member States;  Hong Kong, China;  Israel;  Japan;  Korea;  Liechtenstein;
the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to Aruba;  Norway;  Singapore;  Switzerland;  and the
United States.  Fourteen WTO Members have observer status:  Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, Estonia2, Iceland, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Slovenia and
Turkey.  Four non-WTO Members, Chinese Taipei, Croatia, Georgia and Lithuania, and three
intergovernmental organizations, the IMF, the ITC and the OECD, also have observer status.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
Modifications of Appendices to the Agreement
4. Article XXIV:6 of the Agreement requires Parties to notify rectifications of a purely formal
nature or other modifications relating to Appendices I through IV, which set out the mutually agreedcoverage provided under the Agreement.  Consequential rectifications or modifications become
effective once they are agreed to pursuant to the procedures under this Article.  Since the 1998 Report
of the Committee, modifications relating to their respective Appendices, in accordance with the
procedures of Article XXIV:6, were made by the European Community (GPA/W/51/Add.2) with
entry into force on 8 October 1998 (WT/Let/294), by Japan (GPA/W/78, 79 and 88) with entry into
force respectively on 13 November 1998 (WT/Let/274), on 27 November 1998 (WT/Let/275), and on
8 August 1999 (WT/Let/308) and by Singapore (GPA/W/82) with entry into force on 19 March 1999
(WT/Let/297).  Proposals for modifications relating to Appendix I have also been notified by Japan in
documents GPA/W/91, 93, 94 and 98.  With regard to the proposed modifications notified by Japan in
document GPA/W/91, Canada, the European Community and the United States communicated theirobjection to the proposed modifications taking effect pending further consultations with Japan
regarding the withdrawal of an entity from its  Annex 3, Appendix I.  Hong Kong, China and
Switzerland also asked for further clarifications from  Japan with regard to the proposed modification.
                                                     
1 GPA/M/12 will be circulated shortly.
2 Estonia will become a WTO Member as of 13 November 1999.GPA/30
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Loose-leaf system for Appendices
5. At its meeting of 4 June 1996, the Committee agreed to establish a loose-leaf system with
legal effect to maintain up to date the Appendices to the Agreement.  With a view to providing a
starting point for the loose-leaf system, the Secretariat circulated in February 1997 a draft of the
loose-leaf system of Appendices reflecting the Appendices attached to the Agreement as signed atMarrakesh and the subsequent rectifications, modifications and new concessions made under the
procedures adopted by the Interim Committee and under the Agreement itself (GPA/W/35).  This
draft was subsequently updated incorporating all the modifications effective on 1 July 1999
(GPA/W/35/Rev.1) and circulated to Parties for comments concerning the accuracy and completeness
of the consolidation of the Appendices.  The loose-leaf system for Appendices to the Agreement will
be certified by the Director-General  in accordance with the normal procedures in respect of
rectifications under WTO instruments.  Subsequent modifications to the loose-leaf system will bemade following the procedures agreed by the Committee (GPA/W/35/Rev.1, paragraph 4 and
GPA/M/5, paragraph 20).  In addition to being made available in hard copy form, the loose-leaf
system was circulated to Parties and other WTO Members in electronic form through the WTO
Document Dissemination Facility.  An up-to-date copy of the loose-leaf system is also available to the
general public through the government procurement site on the WTO Home Page on the Internet(http://www.wto.org/wto/gov t/loose.htm).  Any future new or replacement pages will be circulated in
electronic as well as hard copy form.
Thresholds
6. In accordance with the Decision on Modalities for Notifying Threshold Figures in National
Currencies (GPA/1, Annex 3), during the period under review, Korea notified threshold figures in its
national currency for the period 1999-2000 (GPA/W/81).
Notification and review of national implementing legislation
7. Pursuant to the Decision on the Procedures for the Notification of National Implementing
Legislation and the Checklist of Issues (GPA/1/A dd.1), seven delegations – Canada;  the European
Community;  Hong Kong, China;  Korea;  Norway;  Switzerland;  and the United States - have
notified their national implementing legislation including their responses to the Checklist of Issues
(GPA/10, GPA/20, GPA/27, GPA/12/ Rev.1, GPA/13, GPA/15 and Add.1 and GPA/23, respectively).
At its meetings on 23 February and 5 October 1999, the Committee continued the review of thenational implementing legislation, initiated in October 1998 (GPA/25), by taking up the legislation of
Switzerland, the United States and Canada, in addition to taking up the outstanding points relating to
the review of the national implementing legislat ion of the European Community and Korea.  In
accordance with the arrangements and the schedule for the review agreed by the Committee, the
review was conducted on the basis of responses provided by the Parties being reviewed to written
questions put by other Parties in advance of the review of the respective national legislation.
8. The Committee discussed the follow-up to Canada's offer, contained in its Appendix I,
Annexes 2 and 3, to cover sub-central government en tities and enterprises in all ten Provinces, on the
basis of commitments received from the Provinces,  with a final listing to be provided within
18 months after the conclusion of the Agreement.  Canada's stated position since the entry into force
of the Agreement, linking the tabling of its schedule at the sub-central level to achieving increased
market access in sectors of priority interest to Canadian suppliers and improving security of marketaccess through circumscribing the use of small business and other set-aside exceptions under the
Agreement, remained unchanged.  Some other Pa rties expressed their disappointment over the
situation, stressed the need for Canada to honour its commitments and considered that the problems
raised by Canada with respect to expanded coverage of the Agreement could only be addressed once
Canada had come forward with offers pursuant to  its commitments in its Annexes 2 and 3.  Canada
has asserted that it did not undertake obligations regarding Annexes 2 and 3, and has reiterated that itsGPA/30
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coverage was to be based on commitments received from the Provinces.  Canada has also asserted
that, as no commitments have been received, it is under no obligation to put forward an offer under
these Annexes.
Statistical reporting
9. Article XIX:5 requires Parties to collect and provide on an annual basis statistics on their
procurements covered by the Agreement.  During the period under review,  Switzerland provided
statistics for 1996 (GPA/21/Add.2 ), Norway for 1997 (GPA/22/A dd.1) and Hong Kong, China for
1998 (GPA/29).
Consultations and dispute settlement
(i) United States – Measures affecting government  procurement
10. In July 1997, the European Communities and Japan requested respectively consultations with
the United States, pursuant to Article XXII of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and
Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedur es Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
regarding the Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma
(Myanmar) enacted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on 25 June 1996(WT/DS88/1-GPA/D2/1 and WT/DS88/2;  WT /DS95/1-GPA/D3/1 and WT/DS95/2).  On
21 October 1998, pursuant to the requests of the European Communities (WT/DS88/3 of
8 September 1998) and Japan (WT/DS95/3 of 8 Sept ember 1998), the DSB established a single panel
in accordance with Article 9 of the DSU and with standard terms of reference pursuant to
Article XXII:4 of the Agreement on Government Procurement (WT/DSB/M/49).  The Panel wasconstituted on 6 January 1999.  In a communication to the Chairman of the DSB, dated
10 February 1999, the Chairman of the Panel stated that, in the context of a United States court ruling
barring the implementation of the measure at issue, the European Communities and Japan had
requested the Panel to suspend its work in accordance with Article 12.12 of the DSU and that the
Panel had agreed to this request (WT/DS88/5 and WT/DS95/5).
(ii) Korea – Measures affecting government procurement
11. In a communication dated 16 February 1999, the United States requested consultations with
Korea pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU and Article XXII of the GPA (WT/DS163/1 and GPA/D4/1)
with respect to certain procurement practices of the Korean Airport Construction Authority and otherentities concerned with the procurement of airport construction in Korea.  The European Community
and Japan requested to join these consultations (WT/DS163/2 of 4 March 1999 and WT/DS163/3 of
9 March 1999).  These requests were not accepted by Korea.   Pursuant to the request by the United
States, dated 11 May 1999 (WT/DS163/4), the DSB established a panel on 16 June 1999 in
accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the DSU and Article XXII of the GPA, with the
standard terms of reference provided for in Article XXII:4 of the GPA (WT/DSB/M/64).  The
European Community participates as a third  party in the Panel proceedings in relation to the
complaint raised by the United States and Japan rese rved its rights in this respect.  The Panel was
constituted on 30 August 1999 (WT/DS163/5).
Other matters raised in the Committee
12. During the period under review, the Committee considered the adoption of a declaration by
Parties extending the benefits of the Agreement to all the least developed WTO Members.GPA/30
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Procedural matters
13. In accordance with its Decision on Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of
Documents (GPA/1/Add.2), Parties are considering a proposal for the derestriction of the documents
listed in document GPA/W/92 as of 20 November 1999.
Government procurement site at the WTO home page
14. A site on government procurement was established at the WTO home page on the Internet in
order to provide information to the public at large on WTO activities relating to the area of
government procurement.  The section of the site on the Agreement on Government Procurement
includes an overview, the text of the Agreement, an up-to-date copy of the loose-leaf system for
Appendices, a list of Parties and observers, a table of thresholds of individual Parties and notifications
of threshold figures as expressed in national currencies, information on the work of the Committee(decisions of the Committee on procedural matters, notifications of national implementing legislation,
annual report to the General Council), statistics provided under Article XIX:5 and information on
dispute settlement.  Other sections on this site relate to the activities of the Working Group on
Transparency in Government Procurement and of the Working Party on GATS Rules.  Moreover,
hyperlinks have been established with internationa l and national websites containing information on
government procurement.  The site address is http://www.wto.org/wto/govt/govt.htm.
III. ACCESSIONS
15. Iceland applied for accession to the Agreement on 22 June 1998.  During the period under
review, Iceland carried out bilateral consultations with interested Parties on the basis of its draft offer(GPA/W/73).  A communication received from Icel and containing responses to questions put to
Iceland in connection with its accession and information on national legislation on government
procurement will be made available to Parties.
16. In accordance with a commitment undertaken by Panama in the Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of Panama to the WTO (WT/ACC/PAN/19, paragraphs 68 and 116 and Protocol,Part I, paragraph 2), Panama applied for accession to the Agreement and tabled an initial offer on
24 June 1997 (GPA/W/53 and GPA/SPE C/3).  During the period under review, Panama pursued the
bilateral consultations with interested Parties on the basis of a revised offer submitted on
10 December 1998 (GPA/SPEC/3/Rev.1).
17. Chinese Taipei applied for accession to the Agreement in June 1994 (GPA/IC/5) and
submitted a draft offer which was subsequently revised on 19 March 1997 (GPA/SPEC/1/Rev.1).
18. In accordance with a commitment undertaken by the Kyrgyz Republic in the Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the WTO (WT/ACC/KGZ/26,
paragraph 120), the Kyrgyz Republic applied for accession to the Agreement and tabled an initial
offer on 11 May 1999 (GPA/SPEC/4).
19. In accordance with a commitment undertaken by Latvia in the Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of Latvia to the WTO (WT/ACC/LVA/32, paragraph 99), Latvia applied foraccession to the Agreement and tabled an initial offer on 16 June 1999 (GPA/SPEC/5).  Information
on Latvia's national legislation on government procurement was made available to Parties in
document GPA/28.
20. During the period under review, the Committee discussed streamlining the overall process of
accessions.  At its request,  the Secretariat drew  up, for the consideration of the Committee, a draft
Checklist of Issues that the acceding countries could use in providing information on the mainGPA/30
Page 5
features of their national legislation and procurement regimes.  The Committee has requested the
Secretariat to prepare a draft indicative time-frame for the accession proceedings.
IV. NEGOTIATIONS UNDER ARTICLE XXIV:7
21. Article XXIV:7(b) and (c) of the Agreement calls on the Parties, not later than the end of the
third year from the date of its entry into force,  to undertake further negotiations, with a view to
improving the Agreement and achieving the greatest possible extension of its coverage among allParties and eliminating any remaining discriminatory measures and practices.  As stated in its
1996 Report to the General Council, the Committee agreed to undertake an early review which was
initiated in February 1997 in informal consultations, with an examination of modalities.  This review
has covered, in particular, the following elements:  simplification and improvement of the Agreement,
including, where appropriate, adaptation to advances in the area of information technology;  statistical
reporting;  expansion of the coverage of the Agreement;  and elimination of discriminatory measures
and practices which distort open procurement.  An objective of the negotiations under Article XXIV:7is the expansion of the membership of the Agreement by making it more accessible to non-Parties.  In
this connection, a communication was sent by the Chairman of the Committee to the WTO Members,
drawing their attention, as well as the attention of governments which are in the process of acceding
to the WTO, to this work and inviting them to participate as observers in the meetings of the
Committee (WT/L/206). During the period covered by this report, Parties pursued their consultationsin six informal meetings held between December 1998 and October 1999 on the basis of an informal
Checklist of Issues (the latest revision of which was circulated as Job No. 5189) and an informal note
reflecting the draft texts of the modifications to the Articles of the Agreement proposed by various
Parties side-by-side with the text of the Agreement (circulated as Job No. 5713).
22. Parties have also considered the timetable for the completion of the negotiations and the
overall work programme that should be envisaged within that time-frame.  There is agreement that
good progress has been made on improving the text of the Agreement, that the momentum of the
work needs to be maintained and that all three elements need to be covered.  Parties will revert to this
matter at their next meeting, to be held in March 2000.  At that time, Parties will also focus on:
framework and similar types of contracts, statistical reporting and the Article-by-Article review of theAgreement.  In addition, Parties will continue monitoring progress in the elimination of
discriminatory measures.
__________ANNEX
Reports of Subsidiary Bodies of  the Council for Trade in Goods1
Reports Document Symbol
Committee on Agriculture G/L/322
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices G/L/340Committee on Customs Valuation G/L/323
Committee on Import Licensing G/L/336
Committee on Market Access G/L/331Committee on Rules of Origin G/L/326Committee on Safeguards G/L/338Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures G/L/315
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures G/L/341
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade G/L/327Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures G/L/319Independent Entity established pursuant to the Agreement on Preshipment
InspectionG/L/330
Textiles Monitoring Body G/L/318
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises G/L/332Bodies established under the auspices  of the Council for Trade in Goods
- Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in 
Information Technology ProductsG/L/335
__________
                                                     
1 These reports will be available separately at the Ministerial Conference.