WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/RL/W/81
23 April 2003
(03-2154)
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:  Spanish
COMMUNICATION FROM ARGENTINA
The following communication, dated 15 April 2003, has been received from the Permanent
Mission of Argentina.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. In the light of experience and the increasing application of trade defence instruments, the
Doha Ministerial Declaration provided for negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines
under the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping
Agreement), while preserving the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of the Agreement and
its instruments and objectives, and taking into account the needs of developing and least-developed
participants.
2. The Anti-Dumping Agreement constitutes an instrument of defence against "unfair" trading
practices, but it can in fact be employed to provide additional protection, particularly - but not
necessarily - in a context of tariff reduction.
3. The initiation of anti-dumping actions, or even the possibility of initiating them, discourages
trade, since even applications which do not eventually give rise to the imposition of duties may have
an inhibitive effect and produce price increases of the kind that would be engendered by the
imposition of such duties.
4. At the same time, the increasing application of such instruments increases in turn the
possibility that specific interests might influence their administration or implementation.  Moreover,
taking advantage of the discretion inherent in the current discipline, Members may use these
instruments as mechanisms to evade or postpone the necessary structural adjustments.
5. Although the Anti-Dumping Agreement produced by the Uruguay Round represented an
improvement over previous codes, given the fact that its provisions were refined and transformed into
commitments of a compulsory nature for all WTO Members, the concepts on which its application is
based need to be clarified, since they have not preven ted disputes arising in this area.  For this reason,
we agree with the interpretation that the primary objective of the negotiating group must be to clarify
and improve the disciplines of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to minimize the possibilities oftheir discretionary application.
6. During the first phase of negotiations, Members made a considerable number of contributions
aimed at identifying those aspects of the Anti -Dumping Agreement which, in their view, would
require improvement or clarification.  In this connection, the purpose of this communication is to list a
set of questions which - without being intended to  be comprehensive - should in Argentina's view be
tackled in the negotiations and which would contribute to that objective.TN/RL/W/81
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II. ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF PROVISIONS REQUIRING CONSIDERATION1
(a) Sales between related parties (Article 2.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
Article 2.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads as follows:
"In cases where there is no export price or where it appears to the authorities concerned that
the export price is unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between
the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price may be constructed on the
basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or
if the products are not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as
imported, on such reasonable basis as the authorities may determine. "
It would be desirable to establish criteria for the determination of association and the resale
price.
(b) Normal value - sales between related parties in the domestic market of the exporting country
The sales relationship on the domestic market of the producer/exporter should be analysed
and criteria established for such analysis, since the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for this
formula only in respect of the relationship between exporters and importers.
(c) Construction of the export price (Articles 2.3 and 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
The Anti-Dumping Agreement does not specify the factors that would determine the
unreliability of an export price and justify construction of that price.  The situations in which an
export price could be considered to be unreliable should be identified.
(d) Like product (Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads as follows:
"Throughout this Agreement the term 'like product' ('produit similaire') shall be interpreted to
mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration,
or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects,has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration".
It is proposed that criteria be established for determining the like product.  The following
criteria, among others, could be suggested as part of a non-exhaustive list:  physical characteristics
and uses, degree of substitutability, considerations of quality, function, technical specifications, tariffclassification, users' perceptions, common distri bution channels, overlapping geographical areas of
the domestic market and price levels.
(e) Cumulative imports (Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
Article 3.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement reads as follows:
"Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-
dumping investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of
such imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to
                                                     
1 This list is not claimed to be exhaustive, nor does it prejudge the particular position to be adopted by
the Argentine Republic on each of the provisions concerned in the course of the negotiations.TN/RL/W/81
Page 3
the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5
and the volume of imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative
assessment of the effects of the import is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition
between the imported products and the cond itions of competition between the imported
products and the like domestic product ".
It is proposed that criteria be established for considering the conditions of competition
between the imported products of different origins and the conditions of competition between the
imported products and the like domestic product.
The Agreement lays down no criterion and offers no guidelines concerning the conditions of
competition that might be relevant for the purpose of determining whether a cumulative assessment ofthe effects of the imports is appropriate.  However, it would be helpful to have guidelines on this
question.
Similar criteria to those set out in the previous section are suggested.
(f) Ex officio initiation of an anti-dumping investigation (Article 5.6 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement)
Article 5.6 states that in "special circumstances" the authorities concerned may decide to
initiate an investigation "without having received a written application by or on behalf of a domesticindustry", and establishes as a requirement for that purpose the existence of "sufficient evidence of
dumping, injury and a causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation of an
investigation".
An analysis should be made of the appropriateness of establishing guidelines for the
definition of a "special" situation justifying the ex officio initiation of an investigation.
(g) Confidential information (Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
Nature.  Treatment.  Domestic legislation of countries on the different types of information.
Criteria for the preparation of non-confidential summaries.
(h) Price undertakings (Article 8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
It is proposed that an outline be given of the procedure to be followed in cases where only
some exporters submit price undertakings, and of the treatment applicable to the others.
(i) Reviews (Articles 9.5, 11.2 and 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement).
Elements, time-limits and procedures for the conduct of reviews.  New exporter procedure.Generally speaking, the procedures applicable to reviews have given rise to controversy, since
they are not set out in any detail in the Agreemen t.  It would be necessary to examine minimum
standards of information for the initiation of revi ews and elements of analysis in relation to the
recurrence of dumping and injury.  It would also be  useful to explore the differences between reviews
under Articles 11.2 and 11.3, going beyond the issue of the point in time at which such reviews may
be conducted and the parties that may request them.
Under paragraph 3 of Article 11 ("Duration and review of anti-dumping duties and price
undertakings"), the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that " … any definitive anti-dumping duty
shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the mostTN/RL/W/81
Page 4
recent review … ), unless the authorities determine … that the expiry of the duty would be likely to
lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury".
In the context of the Group's discussions, a number of Members pointed out in their
contributions that this general rule has in practice resulted in the possibility of applying an anti-dumping measure for excessively lengthy periods, given the non-existence of a maximum time-limit.
Regarding the new exporter  review, detailed procedural guidelines on how to conduct such a
review would be desirable, with particular emphasi s on situations where export prices are not known
because the company concerned has not yet effected exports but intends to sell to the country which
imposed an anti-dumping measure.
(j) Best information available (Annex II to the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
Objective criteria should be established fo r determining when the implementing authority
considers that the best information available should be used.
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