RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/CTD/W/3/Rev.1/Add.1
5 July 2002
(02-3752)
Committee on Trade and Development
Special SessionOriginal:  English
SUPPLEMENTARY PROPOSAL ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
OF THE AFRICAN GROUP IN THE WTO
Addendum
The following joint communication dated 14 June 2002, has been received from the African
Group.
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I. BACKGROUND
1. At the informal Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) on
Monday (10 June 2002), the Africa Group introduced a comprehensive proposal to assist the CTD in
discharging its mandate on special and differential treatment provisions.  We are grateful to
delegations for the useful and enriching discussion we had.  In this regard, some delegations soughtclarification on some elements in our proposal, such as the thinking behind the proposed principles
and objectives, the working of the proposed Monitoring Mechanism, and some background to Part III
of our proposal (dealing with specific special and differential treatment provisions).  The Africa
Group would like to respond to these requests for clarification, through this statement, which we
request to be circulated to Members.
II. OBJECTIVES
2. Trade is not an end in itself, at least that is  what the WTO Agreement states in the objectives
agreed by Members in setting up GATT and now the WTO.  Trade is to contribute to the
improvement of living standards, especially in developing and least-developed country Members.  It
is a welfare generating activity.  It is recognised in this regard that special measures are necessary to
assist developing and least-developed country Members achieve a share in international trade that iscommensurate with their development needs.  Th is embodiment of special treatment in the core
objectives and functions of the WTO as an institution, has recognised special and differential
treatment as a right for developing and least-developed country Members.  The broad context could
be the right of developing and least-developed country Members to economic development.
3. One major benefit and function, among others and by way of illustration, of the WTO
framework is that it provides a framework for market access for products.  Trade is recognised as a
significant engine of economic development, a contributor in the attainment of economic
development.  However, as is well recognised, developing and least-developed country Members do
face difficulties in using the WTO framework, in taking up the market access opportunities created;
due to their resource and supply side constraints.  Also, in implementing new obligations and incomplying with many obligations, developing and least-developed country Members operate under
enormous financial, institutional, and human resource constraints.  They therefore need assistance;
and they need flexibility in implementing and co mplying with obligations.  In other words, WTOTN/CTD/W/3/Rev.1/Add.1
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Members are not at equal levels in terms of resources and capacity in their participation in the WTO
framework, especially with regard to meeting th e implementation and compliance burdens resulting
from the obligations, as well as in sharing in the benefits of the market opportunities supposedly
opened up.
4. Against this background, special and differential treatment has been accorded to developing
and least-developed country Members as a means of assistance, as a recognition of their development
needs and the important role of the WTO framework in providing some of the market access solutions
required for economic development, with the primary objective of ensuring the improvement of living
standards through trade growth and economic development, and through providing for appropriate
flexibility in governmental measures and the comm encement of or compliance with obligations.  This
is necessary to support satisfactory or viable rates and levels of economic development.  That is the
primary objective of special and differential treatment, but this primary objective needs to be stated inmore detail and in terms that demonstrate its quite broad scope.  The Africa Group proposal attempts
to do this in Part II on cross cutting issues.
III. PRINCIPLES
5. In seeking to attain this primary objective, cert ain principles could be helpful, bearing in mind
that the Ministers have recognised the need fo r strengthening special and differential treatment
provisions, making them more effective, precise and operational;  and need to look into ways of
including special and differential treatment in the architecture of WTO Agreements.  Principles
provide helpful parameters in the way forward, in the process forward of pursuing objectives;  they
indicate the understanding or premise behind the pursuance of certain objectives.  The primaryprinciples for special and differential treatment could be that it is accorded to developing and
least-developed country Members but this taking into account their development needs, that is, special
and differential treatment is to be meaningful and relevant to the development needs.  The details of
such needs may be indicated as specific objectives to be attained in the short, medium or long term.
6. In the context of the exercise of discharging the mandate to the CTD, another primary
principle is the position that special and differential treatment provisions should be binding, either in
the sense that they are mandatory or made mandatory obligations on Members, which they therefore
are required to implement, for instance in the sense of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement;  and, in
the sense that all Members should respect special and differential treatment provisions where they
accord developing and least-developed country Members certain rights, that is, the provisions should
be binding on all Members, and the provisions should therefore not be undermined.  This second
meaning of binding, is relevant also to coherence in global economic policymaking, in ensuring thatthe rights Members enjoy under the WTO Agreement in the form of special and differential treatment,
should not be rendered meaningless or less available due to incoherence in global economic
policymaking.
IV. MONITORING MECHANISM
7. The Africa Group has proposed the establishment of a Monitoring Mechanism to function
under the authority of the CTD.  We wish to thank other delegations that have expressed support for
the mechanism.  We have described in our proposal some elements for the mechanism.  At this stage
and in order to expedite and focus the discussion, we would like to propose that the Secretariat
prepare a note on the basis of our proposal and the views expressed so far, setting out possibleelements for a decision or instrument that would constitute such a mechanism.  The Committee could
then use the note in considering how to proceed on this issue. We would like to offer further ideas on
what the mechanism could look like.TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.1/Add.1
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8. The main reason for this proposal is that while some special and differential treatment
provisions are already mandatory or relatively precise, they have not been utilised or complied with,
as demonstrated in various trade policy reviews of Members and captured in the background Note that
the WTO Secretariat prepared (WT/COMTD/W/77). In relation to such special and differential
treatment provisions, the monitoring mechanism would assist in their operationalisation andutilisation.  And similarly in relation to other sp ecial and differential treatment provisions, the
mechanism would be a means of monitoring any di fficulties faced in their operationalisation and
utilisation.
V. ESTABLISHMENT
9. The Monitoring Mechanism would be established under the CTD as an open ended subsidiary
body.  It would therefore function under and report to the CTD.  But to ensure that an initiatingsystem is built into this mechanism, the CTD could have two Vice Chairs who together with the Chair
and the Secretary to the CTD would constitute a bureau responsible for ensuring that the Monitoring
Mechanism expeditiously carries out its functions and for facilitating special and differential
treatment related consultations among Members (such consultations could arise from time to time on
how to comply with recommendations made to Members).
VI. FUNCTIONS
10. Therefore, the main functions of the monitoring mechanism could include:
• Regular evaluation of the utilisation and effectiveness of the special and differential treatment
provisions, with a view to ensuring that the provisions are fully utilised and any problems
arising effectively addressed;
• Provision of a framework for initiating and considering recommendations that the CTD could
make to Members on complying with obligations under special and differential treatmentprovisions, as well as on best practice for utilisation of the provisions;
• Accordingly, drawing on among others (a) the reports of the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism;  (b) reports to be prepared by other international organisation on areas withintheir remit particularly UNCTAD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the
United Nations Development Programme;  and (c) proposals, statements and reports byMembers, the Monitoring mechanism would periodically evaluate the utilisation and
effectiveness of special and differential treatment provisions and prepare recommendations to
be made by the CTD or through the General Council to Members or the Secretariat as the case
may be;
• The Monitoring Mechanism could regularly prepare country profiles setting out detailed and
quantified needs, as well as opportunities and benefits, relating to special and differential
treatment provisions in order to assist their full utilisation;
• The CTD would regularly hold dedicated sessions on the utilisation and effectiveness of
special and differential treatment provisions, to among other things adopt and make
appropriate recommendations to Members or the Secretariat;
• The Monitoring Mechanism would specifically have the function of preparing
recommendations on whether proposed agreements and instruments to be adopted in the
WTO framework, comply with the rules on special and differential treatment (to be set out inthe Decision under the Doha mandate and as set out in the WTO Agreement).TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.1/Add.1
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VII. COMPLIANCE
11. Recommendations to Members or the Secretariat as the case may be, would give time frames
within which to comply with the recommendations and would require regular reports to the CTD on
measures adopted to implement the recommendations.
12. The Africa Group has proposed the establishment within the Doha Development Agenda
Global Trust Fund, of a facility to specifically provide the necessary financial underpinning for the
effectiveness and utilisation of special and differential treatment provisions under the various
Agreements.  This facility should be a standing and permanent financial arrangement for special and
differential treatment Provisions.
VIII.  RULES RELATING TO RECOMMENDATIONS
13. In the initiation, consideration, preparation and adoption of recommendations on the
utilisation and effectiveness of special and differential treatment provisions, the Monitoring
Mechanism and the CTD could be required to follow the rules set out in the proposal as cross cutting
issues, which cover, principles, objectives, capacity building, transition periods, and special and
differential treatment obligations.
IX. DECISION ON AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION
14. Part III of the proposal contains specific proposals on the meaning to be put to special and
differential treatment provisions in existing Agreements of the WTO.  As suggested in the proposal in
the section dealing with the Action to Take, the CTD could under its present mandate prepare a
Decision containing an authoritative interpretation of the various special and differential treatment
provisions, and recommend that the General Coun cil adopt the Decision, which would provide an
authoritative interpretation of the various special and differential treatment provisions.  The Decision
would additionally contain paragraphs with rules on the cross cutting issues as proposed in Part II of
the proposal.
15. In Part III of the proposal, we have proposed specific interpretations to be put to specific
provisions.  If adopted, the interpretations would be part and parcel of the provisions because the
provisions would always have to be read in light of the interpretations.  These interpretations together
with the cross cutting issues, would constitute the Decision that the CTD could recommend to the
General Council, to discharge its mandate on strengthening the special and differential treatment
provisions, and making them more effective, more precise and more operational, as well as including
them in the general architecture of WTO Agreements.
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