WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTI/W/78
26 May 1999
(99-2111)
Working Group on the Relationship
between Trade and InvestmentOriginal:  English
COMMUNICATION FROM UNCTAD
Reproduced hereunder is the UNCTAD Secretariat report of the Expert Meeting on
"International Investment Agreements:  Concepts allo wing for a certain flexibility in the interest of
promoting growth and development" which was held on 24-26 March 1999.
_______________
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Commission on Investment, Technology
and Related Financial Issues
REPORT OF THE EXPERT MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS:
CONCEPTS ALLOWING FOR A CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN THE INTEREST OF
PROMOTING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 24 to 26 March 1999
CONTENTS
I. Agreed conclusions
II. Chairperson’s summary
III. Organizational matters
Annex
AttendanceWT/WGTI/W/78
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(UNCTAD document TD/B/COM.2/17, TD/B/COM.2/EM.5/3)
I. AGREED CONCLUSIONS1
1. The Expert Meeting  reviewed the ways and means by which existing international investment
agreements (IIAs) provide for flexibility for the purpose of promoting growth and development and
discussed pertinent experiences, including various concepts applied at different levels of IIAs.  It
noted that flexibility, including with regard to a Government’s normal ability to regulate, can be
reflected, inter alia , in the objectives, content, implementation and structure of IIAs.  It also noted that
a key issue involves finding the proper balance between flexibility on the one hand and predictability
and security on the other.  The Expert Meeting noted the role that IIAs can play as one of the factorscontributing to confidence-building in investment relations.
2. The Expert Meeting observed in this connection that the three expert meetings convened by
the Commission on the development dimension of IIA s have assisted in clarifying some of the
concepts and mechanisms available for IIAs so as to be responsive to development concerns, first by
looking at bilateral investment agreements and their development dimension and implications for apossible multilateral framework on investment
2 then by examining regional and multilateral
investment agreements from the same perspective3 and finally - building on the work of the preceding
expert meetings - by discussing ways in which flexibility with respect to development concerns can be
given effect in IIAs.
3. The Expert Meeting also observed that, given the complex issue of flexibility in IIAs, there is
a need for more work to shed further light on the interrelationships between IIAs and the promotion of
growth and development.
4. In this context, the Expert Meeting noted fav ourably the work carried out by UNCTAD in the
framework of its programme on a possible multilateral framework on investment, in particular as
regards capacity-building, including through traini ng, seminars and the like.  It welcomed the
integrated nature of this programme, as it co mbines policy analysis (as exemplified in the IIA Issues
Papers4), technical cooperation and consensus-building.  It also recognized the usefulness of informal
discussions aimed at dialogue and consensus-building on matters concerning IIAs and their
development dimension.
5. The Expert Meeting recommended that the report5 submitted by the secretariat should be
revised in light of the discussions during the Expert Meeting.  The revised paper should be submitted
to the next session of the Commission, with a view  to informing it about the issues involved and
policy options.
                                                     
1 As adopted by the Expert Meeting at its closing plenary meeting on 26 March 1999.
2 See "Report of the Expert Meeting on Bilatera l Investment Agreements and their Development
Dimension", TD/B/COM.2/5-TD/B/COM.2/EM.1/3.
3 See "Report of the Expert Meeting on Bilatera l Investment Agreements and their Development
Dimension", TD/B/COM.2/5-TD/B/COM.2/EM.1/3.
4 Foreign direct investment and development (Sales  No. E.98.II.D.15); Scope and definition (Sales No.
E.99.II.D.9); Admission and establishment (Sales No.E .99.II.D.10); Investment-related trade measures (IRTMs)
(Sales No. E.99.II.D.12); Most-favoured -nation treatment (Sales No. E.99.II. D.11); and Transfer pricing (Sales
No. E.99.II.D.8).
5 See "International investment agreements and concepts allowing for flexibility in the interest of
promoting growth and development", TD/B/COM.2/EM.5/2.WT/WGTI/W/78
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(UNCTAD document TD/B/COM.2/17, TD/B/COM.2/EM.5/3)
II.   CHAIRPERSON'S SUMMARY
1. In his opening address, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD affirmed that flexibility is at the
heart of the debate on negotiations of internationa l investment agreements (IIAs) at the multilateral
and regional levels.  He noted that, although the flexibility debate in turn focuses on development, it
actually leads to the broader question of the powers of the nation-State in the face of the transnational
nature of corporations and, of course, the questio n of the growing role of civil society in the
international debate.  The recent negotiations on a multilateral investment agreement (MAI) in theOECD have shown there are important differen ces even among developed countries regarding
investment rules and in areas which do not necessa rily reflect North-South concerns but broader
concerns of all countries about international investment rule-making.  In this context, he observed that
the present pace of rapid change in investment rela tions makes it difficult to pursue efforts towards
codifying international investment law.  Such codification needs to take place when there is certaintyand reasonable agreement by the majority of countries about the content and nature of the rules.
Therefore, in his view, the drafting of investment rules in times of change must reflect a sense of
flexibility in order to allow for possible different outcomes.  This is not only because, as demonstrated
by the MAI negotiations, there has been a lack of consensus in this area, but also because the
empirical evidence about the impact of foreign inve stment on development is at times inconclusive.
The Secretary-General asked the expert meeting to consider what developing countries expect to get
out of IIAs.  In his view, they expect two basi c things:  more greenfield investment to generate
technology, finance and access to markets, and more flexibility to deal with foreign investment,
because it is such a complex phenomenon and no one can foresee what kind of policies may be
needed to deal with it in unforeseen circumstances.  In this respect, he noted that three recentinternational trade initiatives - the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (particularly in
relation to trade-related investment measures and subsidies), the IMF initiative in pursuing its recent
mandate to amend the Articles of Agreement, and the OECD MAI, seeking high standards of
treatment and liberalization for FDI flows - soug ht to impose limits on flexibility in national
policy-making.  One should ask what the purposes are of such limitations and whether these proposals
would lead to the realization of sought after objectives.  Finally, he suggested that one possible
method of organizing the discussions of the Expert  Meeting could be to start by agreeing on what
types of limitations to national policy flexibility are already accepted and then to consider in what
other areas these limitations should also apply.
2. The Chief of the International Investment, Transnationals and Technology Flows Branch,
introducing the discussion on agenda item 3, "Concepts - such as exceptions and other mechanisms -
allowing for a certain flexibility, including in th e field of technological capacity-building, in the
interest of promoting growth and development - to allow countries in different stages of development
to benefit from international investment agreements ", drew attention to the impressive investment
treaty-making activity that has taken place during the 1990s at all levels.  It was precisely because of
the demands of this treaty-making activity that the Commission and its expert meetings were paying
attention to this matter.  After explaining the rationale and objectives of the Expert Meeting, heobserved that, as growth and development are the ultimate goals of IIAs, the challenge facing
countries is how to ensure that such agreem ents adequately serve the development needs of
developing countries.  Often the question becomes one of what are the means by which IIAs can
provide the flexibility needed by developing countries to pursue development policies in light of their
specific circumstances.  He outlined the Note prepared by the secretariat (TD/B/COM.2/EM.5/2),which aims at providing examples of ways and means by which flexibility in existing IIAs have been
given expression, and suggested that during the discussions experts should point out other ways and
means that are also relevant in this context.  Finally, he noted that finding the proper balance betweenWT/WGTI/W/78
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obligations and flexibility is indeed a difficult challenge, and the Meeting provided an opportunity tocontribute to a better understanding of how this challenge can be met.
3. In his closing summary, the Chairperson commended experts and participants for a successful
meeting.  He said that participation in the open discussions was extensive and that the debate wasinformative and insightful.  The Chairperson emphasized that the revised secretariat paper will further
elucidate the concept of flexibility, in particular as it reflects the development dimension.  He noted
that IIAs address the rights and responsibilities of the signatories and that it is important to provide for
an appropriate balance between the two.  He also noted the importance of transparency with respect to
the rules and practices of international investments and said that IIAs address issues related to existingeconomic and information asymmetries, including through technical assistance provisions.  Finally,
he emphasized the importance of other positive elements, such as financial packages and technical
assistance clauses, which may be included in IIAs so as to address existing asymmetries.
4. The discussions of the Expert Meeting on agenda item 3 on were structured around the
following themes:
-   Objectives and substantive provisions;
-   Modalities of implementation; and-   Overall structure.
5. The session began with a panel discussion on "How to ensure that international investment
agreements are sufficiently flexible to serve adequa tely development needs, in addition to the specific
objectives of each instrument".  Ms. Magda Shahin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt,
speaking on the experience with the General Agreem ent on Trade in Services (GATS), said that the
GATS is one of the Uruguay Round Agreements in which the development dimension was not simply
paid lip service, but in which developing countries succeeded in making the development objective an
integral part of the Agreement.  This objectiv e was clearly spelled out in the preamble to the
Agreement, which also called for particular attention to be given to the developing countries,
recognizing the asymmetries existing with resp ect to their degree of development. Even more
important, the GATS was structured accordingly.  It s overall structure, dividing obligations into
specific and general commitments, is such as to allow countries to undertake commitmentscommensurate with their level of development. Unlike trade in goods, specific commitments on
market access and national treatment are negotiated and not acquired rights and obligations.  The
underlying principle of negotiations in the GATS, as in all the Uruguay Round Agreements, is that of
reciprocity.  Nevertheless, the elements of flexibility introduced in the Agreement allowed countries
to open fewer sectors and liberalize fewer types of transaction.  Implementation, however, hasrevealed a number of weaknesses, which have resulted among others in the liberalization of more
sectors of interest to developed countries.  The GATS also provides for priority access to technical
cooperation and information distribution channels and was the first WTO agreement to link business
practices and competition, although the relevant provision still needs to be expanded upon.  Overall,
however, developing countries should be more aware of their rights in the GATS and make more and
better use of the flexibility mechanisms available to them.
6. Prof. Jean-Luc Le Bideau of the University of Paris summarized the flexibility features of the
Lomé Convention, explaining that through the Conv ention the European Union undertook to help the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to improve their investment climate in order to foster
economic growth and sustainable development, es pecially through the implementation of economic
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to attracting private investment.  Measures to promote investment flows to ACP countries include
information regarding investment possibilities, legal guarantees and insurance mechanisms.  To
strengthen its contribution to development, a new Lomé Convention has been proposed to enhance
investment and trade relationships between the European Union and the countries concerned.  Theproposed Convention would be built on the following main pillars:  the creation of free trade zones,
building on existing regional groups to facilitate the liberalization process, and the granting of special
and differential treatment for the least developed ACP countries to facilitate their integration into the
multilateral trading system, reinforce their institutional capacity and create a favourable policy
framework to attract foreign investment and develop a dynamic private sector.  For that purpose, theConvention would provide two instruments of development cooperation - a grant facility to support
constructive development, and an investment facility to promote commercially viable enterprises,
primarily in the private sector.  The ongoing negotiations demonstrated a strong convergence of views
between the European Union and the ACP countries on this subject.
7. Mr. Philippe Campoaré of the Ministry of Trade and Finance of Burkina Faso elaborated on
these points and emphasized that the Lomé provisions on the protection and promotion of investments
are broad principles which do not constrain the deve lopment policies of ACP countries.  In addition,
there are built-in consultation mechanisms which facilitate the Convention's application.  Speaking on
the impact of the Lomé Convention on development in Burkina Faso, he noted that the improvement
of the investment environment through the Lomé process, notably by financing infrastructure,improving the legal, fiscal and investment regimes and the judicial system, and developing a code for
regional integration, had contributed to attracting foreign investment in all sectors.
8. Mr. Sheldon McDonald of the Attorney-General 's Department of Jamaica, speaking on his
country's experience with flexibility in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), said that Jamaica
approached BITs pragmatically.  Policy changes in the late 1980s and multilateral and regionalcommitments on trade and investment disciplines have also influenced Jamaica's BITs.  A margin of
flexibility is provided in the BITs negotiated with both developed and developing countries, and from
a capital-importing and capital-exporting perspective.  Of paramount consideration has been the
attempt to avoid BITs interfering with the Cari bbean Community (CARICOM) Agreement, so as to
ensure harmonious regional development.  An important consideration in negotiating exceptions to
national treatment with major home countries has been to ensure that they do not act as a disincentive
to foreign investors, while protecting actual and future Jamaican outward investments.  It mightconsider a unilateral grant of national treatment,  depending on the view taken of the strategic
importance of the BIT partner.  In a recent BIT negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD and the
Group of 15, the legal device of a protocol on national treatment was used.
9. During the ensuing discussion, the flexibility attributes of the GATS were further elaborated
upon, as were those of OECD instruments, notably the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements.It was observed that the concept of flexibility was not new to the OECD, where it had been a core
functional principle for many years, given expressi on in the OECD approach to gradual liberalization.
Flexibility in the OECD is considered a means to  an end - namely, growth, development and deeper
economic integration.  In this respect, the OECD experience had been a success and had been
monitored through a review mechanism to ensure  that the liberalization process went ahead.
10. In the discussions during the rest of the meeting there was an attempt to clarify the meaning
and nature of the concept of flexibility  in relation to IIAs.  Participants noted that in the present
context, flexibility implied the notion of promoting development and applied to all investment
agreements.  However, it might have different functions when applied to BITs from those used in
regional and multilateral agreements.  For example, in the case of BITs it might be relevant in thesense of "negotiating flexibility", primarily because of the instruments' uniformity of content.  TheWT/WGTI/W/78
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subject could also be approached by looking at different kinds of flexibility, or flexibility for differenttypes of issues.  Some experts suggested that in order to address the concept of flexibility, it was first
necessary to define both development and "sustainable development", which was a different notion
from simple growth.  Others observed that, in or der to avoid connotations of arbitrariness and
excessive discretion, flexibility needed to be associated with other fundamental concepts, such as
transparency, stability and predictability of national regulation.  It was stressed that agreements were
about striking a balance between the interests and concerns of countries and between the elements of a
particular agreement.  However, not all possible future developments could be foreseen.  The issue,
therefore, was not so much whether IIAs should provide for flexibility, but rather how muchflexibility was consistent with the aims and functions of such agreements.  In other words, there was a
need to balance flexibility and commitments.  Ther e was broad consensus that the Expert Meeting had
not yet come to grips with all the dimensions of the subject of flexibility in IIAs and further work
needed to be undertaken, although it should be recognized that there might always be differences of
opinion on this issue.
11. With respect to flexibility in the objectives  of IIAs, experts stressed at the outset that
flexibility must have development as its purpose.  A key issue in this regard was what Governments
should do to ensure that flexibility leads to concrete results in the achievement of their development
objectives.  To that end, it should be directly related to the various development needs and objectives
of developing countries, which differ sharply from country to country depending on the relevantareas, sectors, activities and regions.  It was recognized that a paramount objective of investment
agreements is to promote investment flows as a means of obtaining technology, capital and access to
markets.  However, it must also be borne in mind that foreign investors will not invest in countries
unless they offer a predictable, stable and transparent investment climate.  The question of how much
protection and how much flexibility is needed to achieve the desired objectives also varies fromcountry to country, depending on their underlying economic conditions.  However, experts stressed
that flexibility alone is not enough to achieve development but is a means to an end.  Therefore, to
achieve their development objectives, countries need to formulate their own development strategies to
ensure an optimum use of flexibility in the interest  of development.  It was also suggested that in
today's globalized economy, such policies need to gi ve due consideration to the influence of outside
factors and economic forces on development.  The competitive pressures brought to bear by foreign
investors could indeed stimulate local companies to become more competitive.
12. Regarding the question of flexibility in relation to the  substantive provisions  of investment
agreements, experts suggested that one way to appro ach the topic was to try to identify the various
contexts and types of issues for which flexibility is relevant.  In this respect two broad perspectives
could be considered. First, flexibility could be understood in the sense of allowing the host country
additional possibilities for promoting its development.  This perspective applies primarily toadmission rules, performance requirements and rules on the treatment of foreign firms.  In another
sense, flexibility could be understood as a means to protect the right to regulate - that is, as a means
for not excessively restricting the Government's powers to regulate, for example, in the areas of
environmental protection, public health and social standards.  As to the protection of foreign property
from expropriation, one possible consequence of a broad understanding of the notion of the seizure ofproperty might be that the State's regulatory powers could become subject to third-party international
arbitration.  Also regarding the settlement of invest ment disputes, experts suggested that some flexible
means of resolving such disputes that have worked  well, such as the OECD system of consultation
and peer pressure, should be explored further.  In fact, in many respects the issue of flexibility was as
relevant for developed countries as for developing countries, as the multilateral agreement oninvestment (MAI) negotiations had demonstrated.  Some experts related the concept of flexibility to
the need for a balance of the rights and obligations of both countries and investors.  In this respect, it
was noted that IIAs were not a zero sum game of total liberalization or total protection; the reality wasWT/WGTI/W/78
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much more subtle.  A new agenda on flexibility issues could include such issues as goodgovernmental practices - for example, in environmental protection and labour standards aimed at
establishing a "level playing field".  Incentives disciplines are another area where international
cooperation might be needed, as is the question of competition and restrictive business practices.  In aglobal context, the issue of extraterritoriality should be addressed in order to avoid a mismatch
between the global operations of transnational corpora tions (TNCs) and national policy.  Finally, there
was the social dimension.  As civil society mobilizes to introduce codes on social responsibility, such
codes might constitute topics for examination.
13. A number of experts described their countries' experiences in dealing with flexibility in
investment rules.  Some countries had traditionally relied on their national policies to provide a
favourable investment climate.  Through unilateral actions they had introduced gradual liberalization
and protection standards at their own pace and in accordance with their own needs.  Other countries
had relied on international agreements to provide legal protection for foreign investment because they
felt it was necessary for attracting investment. However,  they also felt a need to provide for flexibility
in order to attract investment in certain areas and with certain development attributes.  Others noted
that although they had signed many investment agreements, these were not substantially relied upon
as a tool in the attainment of social and economic development, but only as a means of reassuring
investors of a predictable operating investment environment.  Still others felt that some investors had
moved to their countries because they could circumvent regulations.
14. The modalities of implementation  of IIAs varied considerably depending on whether the
agreement was bilateral, sectoral, multilateral or other, experts said.  Moreover, the texts of the
agreements did not always make all possibilities clear.  Regarding country experiences with
implementation mechanisms, it was noted that, despite the importance and complexity of investment
relations and the large number of investment agreements in force, there seemed to be few problemswith implementation, judging at least from the relati vely few international arbitration cases involving
investment disputes. However, implementation proble ms did sometimes arise, in particular over the
exercise of regulatory powers by subnational authorities and de facto discriminatory treatment of
foreign investors.  Development-friendly implementation mechanisms could involve the resolution of
information asymmetries through information-shar ing clauses and priority access to information
channels. In relation to economic asymmetries, some experts felt that the inclusion of exceptions to
general principles had served the purpose of allowing for policy flexibility with respect tonon-negotiable policy issues, while maintaining the commitment to the basic principles of the
agreement, especially regarding pre- and post-admission national treatment.  In other cases, "best
efforts" commitments had served the same purpose in, for example, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) countries.  Transitional implem entation periods were another way of resolving
development concerns related to implementation, which were to be found in many agreements.Another increasingly common approach to development-friendly implementation was the provision of
promotional measures to attract foreign investment, and technical assistance to enhance the capacity
of developing countries and assist them in meeting their commitments.  In all these cases,
performance monitoring was crucial for ensuring that the agreement was producing its expected
outcome, and if not, determining what could be done about it.  Monitoring mechanisms had oftenserved to resolve implementation difficulties, and in this respect it was essential to maintain a
cooperative attitude and explore the flexible options available.
15. Finally, a number of speakers stressed that development considerations should provide the
orientation for the overall structure  of IIAs.  The structure of an investment agreement must be
realistic, take into account the concerns of all ac tors participating in the investment and development
process, and provide a coherent set of interrelationships between all the elements of the agreement, so
that agreements are not just a listing of issues.  To achieve sustainable and balanced objectives theWT/WGTI/W/78
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structure of an investment agreement must be able to respond to the diversity and heterogeneity ofdeveloping countries and take into account macroeconomic factors and the need to preserve a policy
space that will enable policy makers to implement their development strategies.  The importance of
incorporating competition issues to ensure access to markets by national firms through internationalnetworks was also stressed.  All parties to an inve stment agreement look for flexibility.  Hence, the
structure of an agreement must be clear about the interactions and balance of interests between all
parties.  Some structural elements of flexibility discussed include the positive and negative lists
approach and the built-in agenda approach, each having its own advantages and disadvantages.  One
significant advantage of the positive list approach for developing countries that is not alwaysemphasized is its simplicity, which makes it easier to handle than the negative list.  Negative lists
often include the possibility of phasing out exceptions.
16. In conclusion, many investment agreements were found to include ways of providing for
flexibility in the interest of economic and social development. Whether and how such flexibility had
worked out in the interest of development in practice was more difficult to ascertain, though therewere concrete examples of direct positive effects.  There was a sense that the potential for unravelling
the possibilities of flexible mechanisms to ensure maximum benefits and minimum negative effects
from IIAs for all parties has not yet been tapped.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS
A. Convening of the Expert Meeting
1. In accordance with the recommendation made by the Commission on Investment, Technology
and Related Financial Issues at the closing meeting of its second session on 3 October 1997
6, the
Expert Meeting on International Investment Agreements: Concepts Allowing for a Certain Flexibility
in the Interest of Promoting Growth and Developm ent was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 24 to 26 March 1999.  The meeting was opened on 24 March 1999 by Mr. Rubens Ricupero,
Secretary-General of UNCTAD.
B. Election of officers
(Agenda item 1)
2. At its opening meeting, the Expert Meeting elected the following officers to serve on its
Bureau:
Chairman: Mr. Jean-Luc Le Bideau (France)
Vice-Chairman-cum-Rapporteur: Mr. Mussie Delelegn (Ethiopia)
                                                     
6 See Report of the Commission on Investment, Technology and Related Financial Issues on its second
session (TD/B/44/14-TD/B/COM.2/7), paragraph 51.WT/WGTI/W/78
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C. Adoption of the agenda
(Agenda item 2)
3. At the same meeting, the Expert Meeting adopted the provisional agenda circulated in
TD/B/COM.2/EM.5/1.  Accordingly, the agenda for the Meeting was as follows:
1. Election of officers
2. Adoption of the agenda3. Concepts - such as exceptions and other mechanisms - allowing for a certain
flexibility, including in the field of technological capacity-building, in the interest of
promoting growth and development - to allow countries in different stages of
development to benefit from international investment agreements
4. Adoption of the report
D. Documentation
4. For its consideration of the substantive agenda item (item 3), the Expert Meeting had before it
a report by the UNCTAD secretariat entitled "International investment agreements: concepts allowing
for flexibility in the interest of promotin g growth and development" (TD/B/COM.2/EM.5/2).
E. Adoption of the report
(Agenda item 4)
5. At its closing meeting, on 26 March 1999, the Expert Meeting adopted the agreed conclusions
reproduced in section I above, and authorized the Chairperson to prepare a summary of the Meeting
(see section II above).WT/WGTI/W/78
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ANNEX
ATTENDANCE *
1. Experts from the following States members of UNCTAD, attended the meeting:Argentina
AustraliaAustria
Bangladesh
Belarus
Benin
BoliviaBrazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Cameroon
CanadaChile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Côte d’IvoireCroatia
Cuba
Czech Republic
Democratic People’s
  Republic of Korea
Egypt
El SalvadorEstonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
GeorgiaGermany
Guatemala
Haiti
India
Iran (Islamic Republic of)Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
LatviaMadagascar
MalaysiaMali
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
NepalNetherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Paraguay
PeruPhilippines
Poland
Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
Saudi ArabiaSenegal
Singapore
Slovakia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
SwedenSwitzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
TunisiaTurkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom of Great Britain
 and Northern Ireland
United States of AmericaVenezuela
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
________________
*For the list of participants, see TD/B/COM.2/EM.5/INF.1.WT/WGTI/W/78
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2. The following intergovernmental organizations were represented at the meeting:
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
Arab Labour Organization
European Community
League of Arab States
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Organization of African Unity
3. The following specialized agencies and related organization were represented at the meeting:
World Health Organization
International Monetary FundWorld Trade Organization
4. The following non-governmental organizations were represented at the meeting:
General Category
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
International Chamber of Commerce
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
World Federation of United Nations Associations
Panellists, Resource Persons and Specially Invited Participants
Panellists
Mr. Philippe Campaore, Director, Multil ateral Cooperation, Ministry of Trade
   and Finance, Burkina FasoMr. Jean-Luc Le Bideau, Professor, Université Paris I, France
Mr. Sheldon McDonald, Special Advisor, Attorney General’s Department, Jamaica
Ms. Magda Shahin, Deputy Assistant Minister, Head of International Economic
   Affairs, Egypt
Resource persons
Mr. A.A. Fatouros, Professor, University of Athens, Greece
Mr. P. Muchlinski, Professor, Queen Mary and Westfied College, University of
   London, United KingdomMr. Stephen Vasciannie, Professor, Un iversity of West Indies, Kingston,
   Jamaica
Specially Invited
Ms. Lise Weis, Senior Expert, Energy Charter Secretariat, Belgium
Ms. Marlies Filbri, Researcher, Centre for Research on Multinational
   Corporations, SOMO
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