WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/W/129
12 July 1999
(99-2878)
Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition PolicyOriginal:  English
COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND ITS MEMBER STATES
The following communication, dated 1 June 1999, has been received from the Permanent
Delegation of the European Commission with the request that it be circulated to Members.
_______________
Approaches to promoting cooperation and communication among WTO Members,
including in the field of technical cooperation
Enhanced international cooperation is essential both to promote the enforcement of
competition law in a manner which limits the risk of jurisdictional conflicts and to better address anti-
competitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and investment.  Cooperation is
also crucial to support the capacity of developing countries for a progressive reinforcement of a
domestic competition law framework.  The European Community and its member States are therefore
convinced that cooperation must be a key component of a multilateral framework on competition
within the WTO.  In a globalized economy, competition law is an issue of common concern andcooperation should not be limited to countries which have entered into bilateral agreements.
The first part of this submission presents a brief overview of current EC cooperation
activities, including cooperation under bilateral competition agreements, regional integration
agreements and technical assistance.  The second part of the submission presents ideas on how
modalities for international cooperation could be developed within a WTO framework.
I. OUTLINE OF EC EXPERIENCE AS REGARDS INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE COMPETITION POLICY FIELD
A. C
OOPERATION UNDER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Following the spirit of the Recommendations  of the Council of the OECD concerning
cooperation between member Countries on restrictive business practices affecting international trade,several countries have concluded bilateral agreements on the application of their competition laws.
The purpose of these agreements is to facilitate effective application of their respective competition
laws and to promote better understanding of economic conditions and theories relevant to their
competition authorities' enforcement activities.  The European Community and the United States haveWT/WGTCP/W/129
Page 2
concluded such an agreement in 1991.1  A similar agreement, between the EC and Canada is expected
to be signed in June 1999.  These two agreements contain the following provisions.2
1. Notification and cooperation in individual cases
Each Party notifies the other whenever its competition authorities become aware that their
enforcement activities may affect important interests of the other Party.  Enforcement activities withregard to which notifications are normally appropriate include those that:
• are relevant to enforcement activities of the other Party;
• involve anti-competitive activities carried out in significant part in the other Party's
territory;
• involve a merger or acquisition in which one or more of the parties to the transaction,
or a company controlling one or more of the parties to the transaction, is a company
incorporated or organized under the laws of the other Party;
• involve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by the other
Party;  or
• involve remedies that would, in significant respects, require or prohibit conduct in the
other Party's territory.
Successive notification may occur in the same case: e.g. in a merger case the Commission
notifies at the outset of the case, then, when appropriate, when the Commission decides to initiate
proceedings and, eventually, "far enough in advance to enable the other Party's views to be taken into
account", before a final decision is adopted.
Moreover, each Party renders assistance to the competition authorities of the other Party in
their enforcement activities and in cases where both Parties have an interest in pursuing enforcementactivities with regard to related situations, they coordinate these activities.
A recent example of successful EU/US cooperation is the Dresser/Halliburton merger cleared by
the Commission in July 1998.  The merger involved  two US based companies.  Halliburton is one
of the largest energy services companies in the world.  Dresser, which is active in the same range
of activities, is smaller in size and more specialized.  The parties had overlapping activities in the
oilfield services industry.  As far as the market for drilling fluids was concerned, the concentration
would result in significant accumulation of market share.  The parties had already negotiated a
project of divestiture with the US Department of Justice, as a result of which the market overlap
would be removed.  On this basis, the Commission did not have any further concerns with respect
to the drilling fluids market.  This case offers a good example of coordinated merger review
procedures in the EU and the US, and to some  extent of work allocation between the two
authorities.
                                                     
1 Following a decision by the European Court of Justice, this Agreement and the exchange of
interpretative letters dated 31 May and 31 July 1995 were subsequently approved on behalf of the EuropeanCommunity and the European Coal and Steel Community by a joint decision of the Council and theCommission of 10 April 1995 (OJ No L 95, 27.4.1995, pp. 45 - 50).
2 For other types of agreements concluded by the European Community or its Member States see our
submission of 2 March 1998 .WT/WGTCP/W/129
Page 3
2. Negative Comity
The 1991 Agreement provides that each Party will seek at all stages in its enforcement
activities, to take into account the important interests of the other Party.
 The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case shows how this principle can be applied.  On 26 June 1998 the
European Commission requested the US authorities to take into consideration the EU's important
interests, i.e.  the maintenance of competition on the market for large commercial jet aircraft and the
US government drew the Commission's attention to so me of its concerns, including US interests in the
field of defence.  Consideration of these interests played an important part in the consultation which
subsequently took place between the EU and US regarding the case.  After intensive consultations
with the US authorities, and following the acceptanc e by Boeing of undertakings which addressed the
EC competition concerns, the Commission cleared the merger.  Even in such a difficult and
challenging case, the existence of a well-established framework of cooperation was instrumental in
ensuring that a solution could be found that took into account the important interests of both parties.
3. Exchange of information
The United States and the EC share non-confidential information in various circumstances.
For example:
• officials from the competition authorities of each Party meet at least twice each year,
to:  (a) exchange information on their current enforcement activities and priorities;(b) exchange information on economic sectors of common interest;  (c) discuss policy
changes which they are considering;  and (d) discuss other matters of mutual interestrelating to the application of competition laws.
• each Party provides the other Party with an y significant information that comes to its
attention about anti-competitive activities that it believes are relevant to, or maywarrant, enforcement activity by the other Party's competition authorities.
• upon receiving a request from the other Party, a Party provides to the requesting Party
such information within its possession that  is relevant to an enforcement activity
being considered or conducted by the requesting Party's competition authorities.
4. Confidentiality of information
Neither Party is required to provide information to the other Party if disclosure of that
information:  (a) is prohibited by the law of th e Party possessing the information;  or (b) would be
incompatible with important interests of the Party possessing the information.
Moreover, each Party maintains the confidenti ality of any information provided to it in
confidence by the other Party and must oppose, to the fullest extent possible, any application for
disclosure of such information by a third party who is not authorized by the Party that supplied the
information.  Confidential information may be provided with the agreement of the private party which
has supplied the information.WT/WGTCP/W/129
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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION:
1. Information covered by professional secrecy
Information acquired by the Commission and the authorities of the member States in the course of an
investigation and which is of the kind covered by professional secrecy is subject to Article 20 of
Council Regulation 17/623 and to similar provisions in the equivalent implementing Regulations.
Essentially, this refers to information which is not in the public domain and which may be discovered
during the course of an investigation or which ma y be voluntarily notified to the Commission under
Regulation 17/62 or in reply to a request for information.  This information also includes business or
trade secrets.  Such information is not disclosed to the US antitrust authorities except with the express
agreement of the source concerned.
2. Information related to the conduct of an investigation
Information which relates to the conduct of an investigation or the possible conduct of an
investigation and which is not subject to Article 20 of Regulation 17/62 or to similar provisions in the
equivalent implementing Regulations includes the fact that the investigation is taking place, the
subject-matter of the investigation (for example, an  agreement on prices or sharing of markets, the
identity of the undertaking being investigated and the steps which it is proposed to take in the course
of the investigation).  This information is kept confidential to ensure the proper handling of the
investigation.  However, it may be communicated to the US competition authorities, as these are
obliged to maintain the confid entiality of the information.
5. Positive Comity
• The 1991 Agreement provisions
The 1991 Agreement provides that a Party adversely affected by anti-competitive behaviour
carried out in the territory of the other Party may request that other Party to take enforcement action.
This procedure has been extended by a new Agreement in 1998.
• Experience with positive comity
Practical experience with positive comity instruments is limited.  The US Department of
Justice asked the Commission to investigate specific allegations that a computerised reservationsystem (CRS) set up by a number of European airlines was operated in an anti-competitive manner to
prevent US-based CRS's from competing in European markets.  The European Commission is
currently investigating the case and has issued a Statement of Objections against Air France in March
1999.  The Department of Justice is kept  closely informed of developments.
                                                     
3 Article 20: Professional secrecy:
1. Information acquired as a result of the application of Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 shall
be used only for the purpose of the relevant request or investigation.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 19 and 21, the Commission and thecompetent authorities of the Member States, their officials and other servants shall notdisclose information acquired by them as a result of the application of this Regulation and ofthe kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not prevent publication of general
information or surveys which do not contain information relating to particular undertakings or
associations of undertakings.WT/WGTCP/W/129
Page 5
An earlier case regarding the investigation into the practices of AC Nielsen Company
("Nielsen"), a provider of retail tracking services, demonstrates how positive comity is expected to
work in practice.  Both the Commission and the  Department of Justice received a complaint from IRI
that Nielsen was abusing its dominant position in Europe and thus prevented IRI from establishing a
competitive presence there.  As the complaint was primarily addressed to contractual practicesimplemented in Europe and had its greatest impact within Europe, the Department of Justice let the
Commission take the lead once it was confident that it had a firm intention to act.  The Commission
conducted negotiations with Nielsen to arrive at an acceptable solution ensuring that competition was
not distorted (the substantive outcome of this case  is discussed in document W/115).  At every stage
during negotiations the Department of Justice was informed of progress and given an opportunity to
comment on the undertakings being sought from Nielsen.  Once the Commission had secured the
necessary undertakings from Nielsen, the Department of Justice was able to conclude that thepractices it had been investigating would not contin ue, and thus it closed its investigation.  Although
the US did not formally request the Commission to take action in the IRI/Nielsen case, the approach
taken by the US of standing back and awaiting the results of the Commission's investigation may
provide an example of how positive comity may operate.
• Extension of positive comity procedure
On 4 June 1998, the EC and the United States concluded a new agreement which applies
where certain anti-competitive activities are occurring in whole or in a substantial part in the territory
of one Party and at the same time have adverse effects on the interests of the other Party 
4.  In such
cases, the latter Party may request the Party in whose territory the conduct is principally occurring to
take enforcement action pursuant to its own competition rules.  Such a request may be maderegardless of whether the activities also violate the Requesting Party's competition laws, and
regardless of whether the competition authorities of the Requesting Party have commenced or
contemplated taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws.
This second US/EC Agreement is an important step forward in relation to the 1991
Agreement as it not only provides details on how positive comity requests should be dealt with, but italso raises a presumption that in certain circumstances a Party will normally defer or suspend its own
enforcement activities.
The presumption of deferral or suspension arises where the anti-competitive activities at issue
do not have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on the Requesting Party's
consumers, or where the anti-competitive activities occur principally in and are directed principallytowards the other Party's territory.
There are a number of other conditions which also must be satisfied in order for the
presumption of deferral or suspension to arise, including a willingness on the part of the Requested
Party to deal with the matter, to keep the Requesting Party informed of all developments and to take
the latter's concerns on board prior to the conclusion of the investigation.  The Requested Party can
only act on the basis of its own competition rules and to the extent that the relevant behaviour is
caught by those rules.
The Agreement recognizes that there may be circumstances where it is appropriate for both
Parties to undertake parallel investigations, for example when the public interest requires that
particularly serious anti-competitive activity is subject to sanction in both jurisdictions.  This
recognition of the possible appropriateness of parallel investigations only applies where both markets
are harmed.
                                                     
4 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America
on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws.WT/WGTCP/W/129
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Mergers are not within the scope of the 1998 Agreement due to US and EC merger
legislation, which would not allow a deferral or suspension of action as envisaged by the Agreement,
due to the obligation to adopt a final decision within tight time-limits.
6. Cooperation in figures
CASES NOTIFIED
Year No. of EC No. of US No. of merger
notifications notifications notifications
(antitrust + mergers) (antitrust + mergers)
                                                                            FTC      DoJ                                                 
1991 5 10 2 (=12) 3 (EC)   + 9 (US)
1992 26 20 20 (=40) 11 (EC) + 31 (US)
1993 44 22 18 (=40) 20 (EC) + 20 (US)
1994 29 16 19 (=35) 18 (EC) + 20 (US)
1995 42 14 21 (=35) 31 (EC) + 18 (US)
1996 48 20 18 (=38) 35 (EC) + 27 (US)
1997 42 12 24 (=36) 30 (EC) + 20 (US)
1998 52 22 24 (=46) 43 (EC) + 39 (US)
B. COOPERATION UNDER REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS
Competition policy is an essential component of the different regional integration agreements
concluded by the European Community.  The competition provisions of these agreements follow
different models, which take into account the level of integration desired by the parties to theagreement.  The most far-reaching model of integration is provided by the European Economic Area.
This implies not only common rules, based on the provisions of the EC Treaty, but also common
institutions for enforcement.  The Europe Agreements and the customs union with Turkey also
include provisions on competition which are largely based on the provisions of the EC Treaty.
Detailed rules on implementation are established by the Association Councils.  The agreementsalready concluded or being negotiated with Mediterranean countries also aim at promoting
convergence between the competition laws of these countries and those of the EC.
An interesting new approach to competition prov isions in regional integration agreements is
provided by the soon to be concluded Trade, Development and Cooperation agreement with South
Africa.  Unlike other EC agreements, the competition provisions make no reference to articles 81 and82 of the EC Treaty.  Instead, the parties have agreed on a common definition of anti-competitive
practices which would negatively affect the operation of the agreement.  The parties have also agreed
on a cooperation procedure, which includes elements of both negative and positive comity.  The EC
will provide to South Africa technical assistance in the restructuring of its competition law and policy.
The free trade agreement currently being negotiated with Mexico also envisages detailed procedures
for cooperation in the competition field.  The Commission proposal for negotiating directives for free
trade agreements with Mercosur and Chile also envisages the development of provisions oncompetition.
C. T
ECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Both the Community and its Member States are actively involved in providing technical
assistance in the competition field.  Much of the assistance provided by the Community takes place
within the context of broader agreements that  establish a framework for cooperation among the
parties.  What follows is an outline of the main components of such technical assistance:WT/WGTCP/W/129
Page 7
1. Technical assistance to countries candidates for joining the EU
While it is for the candidate countries themselves to devote the necessary resources to focused
and cost-efficient implementation of competition law, Community assistance serves as a catalyst.
Along with specific actions in the framework of the national  PHARE programmes, the Commission
has pursued a pro-active policy of further intensifying its contacts with the competition authorities ofthe candidate countries and between these authorities.
Most of the candidate countries have established some form of working group structure with
the Commission, which facilitates informal and technical discussions at the expert level on
competition approximation, institution building and enforcement.
The horizontal programme, which is mainly carried out on a yearly basis, includes the
following elements.
(a) Joint training sessions
With PHARE support, the Commission organizes multi-country technical assistance
programmes in the field of competition.
(b) Central European conference on competition policy
The Commission also organizes the so-called Central European conferences on competition
policy (the fourth Conference took place on 25-26 May 1998 in Bratislava).  The delegations includehigh level officials from the competition and State aid authorities of the candidate countries and the
Commission. 
2. Technical assistance to other third countries
The Community is increasingly active in fostering contact and cooperation with competition
authorities in third countries and providing technical assistance to developing countries.  Much of thisassistance has developed within the context of different forms of cooperation or Association
agreements.  Assistance has been mainly directed to Latin American and Mediterranean countries.
However, it should be noted that competition is one of the areas identified for technical cooperation
under the Lomé Convention.  The Commission is ready to intensify its technical cooperation in this
field vis-à-vis  ACP countries or other developing countries on the basis of requests put forward under
our current frameworks for cooperation.
• Latin America
The European Union has signed cooperation agreements with all the countries of the area and
with groups of countries (Mercosur, Andean Pact, Central America, Caribbean).  The European
Community has established contact with all the competition authorities of the region.
There is no "competition" technical assistance programme for Latin America as there is for
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  But technical assistance has been provided in many ways.
One example is the action developed in relation to the Mercosur.  For instance, in 1997, an inventory
mission in which the European Community took an active part was carried out.  Other specific actions
include:
- the compilation of Latin American and Caribbean competition rules;  andWT/WGTCP/W/129
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- the creation of a "Boletin latinoamericano de competencia", a journal
coordinated by the European Commission and distributed by Internet.
• The Euro-Mediterranean partnership
Euro-Mediterranean association agreements, having free trade as their objective, have been
signed with Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and the PLO.  Negotiations with Egypt, Lebanon and
Algeria are under way.  Competition provisions are essential elements in these agreements.
The Commission has received requests for technical assistance from some of these countries.
Subsequently, an identification mission has been carried out in 1998 in Tunisia.
Finally a European Commission notice, published on 23 September 1998, suggests, inter alia ,
to develop horizontal actions of assistance in the field of competition with Mediterranean countries.
II. THE WTO ROLE AS REGARDS PROMOTING COOPERATION TO BETTER
ADDRESS THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY
Today, many companies are operating worldwide or are concluding strategic alliances to have
a greater presence in foreign markets through an international partner.  Moreover, the economic
effects of mergers, restrictive practices or abuses of dominant positions are often felt in countries
other than those in which the firms concerned are incorporated or based.
This may result in conflicts of law and jurisdiction and excessive costs not only for firms which
are subject to the requirements of different jurisdictions, but also for competition agencies.
One way for competition authorities to deal with restrictive practices having an international
dimension is for them simply to apply domestic legislation.  Many jurisdictions, including the
European Community, seek to apply their competition rules, under certain circumstances, to
behaviour taking place in a foreign country, which may harm their markets.
A particular source of concern and political friction are claims to apply competition law to
behaviour occurring in a foreign country in order to address market access problems, regardless of
whether harm is being caused to consumers in the country claiming jurisdiction.
Practical problems are also encountered due to difficulty of obtaining evidence located
abroad.
It is becoming increasingly obvious that, in order to efficiently and effectively regulate the
anti-competitive behaviour of companies operating on the worldwide market, competition authorities
need to cooperate with each other.
As already mentioned, a number of countries have already concluded bilateral agreements on
cooperation between their competition authorities or are in the process of doing so.  Furthermore manyinternational agreements, either bilateral or sectoral, include provisions on competition.  The OECD has
also adopted a recommendation urging member countries to engage in more effective cooperation on
anti-competitive practices affecting international trade.  These are all positive developments, but at the
same time, real life cases show that these approaches are not sufficient to meet the challenges of
globalization.  A more comprehensive and coherent approach is therefore necessary.
The need for a multilateral approach to cooperation is based on two premises:  (a) Due to the
globalization of business activities, an increased number of anti-competitive practices affect the interestsof several countries;  (b) A large number of countries have adopted or are considering adoption of aWT/WGTCP/W/129
Page 9
competition law.  Flexible modalities of cooperation are required both to support the process of
progressive reinforcement of domestic capacities and to ensure that the interests of all countries can be
taken into account.  Such a multilateral framework would be complementary to bilateral competition
agreements through which countries can develop close cooperation in enforcement activities.  There is a
risk, however, that if only the bilateral option is pursued, the interest of countries which are not parties tosuch agreements would be neglected.  Nor does it appear to be feasible to envisage a very large network
of bilateral agreements, which would result in very high costs for competition authorities.  The European
Community and its member States therefore consider that it is essential to develop modalities of
cooperation at the multilateral level and would welcome suggestions from other WTO Members on how
such framework could be best developed.
We would suggest that a WTO agreement on competition could develop provisions on
cooperation at five levels: (a) Notification and cooperation in individual cases;  (b) Exchange ofinformation;  (c) Positive comity;  (d) Exchange of experiences relating to the application of competition
law;  and (e) Promoting a more integrated and coordinated approach to technical assistance.
A. N
OTIFICATION AND COOPERATION IN INDIVIDUAL CASES
A multilateral framework could include the following principles:
- When a WTO Member undertakes under its competition laws an investigation
or proceeding which may affect important interests of other WTO Members,
it should notify the case to the WTO.
- Where two or more WTO Members deal with an anti-competitive practice in
international trade or with an international merger, they should endeavour to
coordinate their action.
- Through consultation, WTO Members should cooperate in developing or
applying mutually satisfactory and beneficial measures for dealing with an
anti-competitive practice affecting international trade or investment, or with
an international merger.
A multilateral framework could also include principles of negative comity.  In other words, a
WTO Member should take into account the important and clearly stated interests of other Members
concerned before action is taken.
These principles could be further developed under a WTO agreement along similar lines to
those contained in the OECD 1995 recommendation5.  Indeed, there is no reason why the cooperation
which has been established among competition authorities in OECD countries could not also be
extended to other WTO Members.  Provisions on cooperation would, of course, have to be adapted to
the WTO framework.
B. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
There is no doubt that, from a pure competition law enforcement perspective, the ability to
receive information from whatever source relating to anti-competitive conduct would facilitate the
enforcement of competition rules.
                                                     
5 "Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning cooperation between member countries on anti-
competitive practices affecting international trade", July 1995.  The text is reproduced in the OECD
Communication to the Working Group (W/21).WT/WGTCP/W/129
Page 10
However, the exchange of confidential business information is controversial in most cases.
For instance, a large amount of information of a more or less confidential nature is submitted to the
European Commission by companies merging or entering into agreements, or by complainants who
fear retaliation and wish to remain anonymous.  Knowledge that such information could be shared
with other antitrust authorities might deter companies from notifying certain agreements or supplyingcertain items of information.  Such a development could be counterproductive for the enforcement of
competition rules.
Moreover, even between countries with developed systems of competition rules, a certain
degree of divergence exists, particularly as regards certain conduct which may be prohibited under
one set of rules but tolerated by another or the severity of sanctions.
For all the reasons above, it is premature to  include the issue of confidential information
sharing in a multilateral framework of competition rules.
On the other hand, WTO Members should supply each other all relevant non-confidential
information.  They should also supply confidential information whenever authorized to do so under
their existing laws.
C. P
OSITIVE COMITY
Positive comity has several advantages.  The procedure is beneficial for companies as it helps
to reduce the number of cases being examined by more than one competition authority, thus reducing
compliance costs and the possibility of conflicting decisions being made by different competition
authorities.  It also helps to reduce market access problems, caused by anti-competitive behaviour.
Positive comity can also provide an alternative to the extra-territorial application of jurisdiction.
The possible adaptation of a "positive comity instrument" to a WTO multilateral framework
on competition is an issue that would require careful consideration.  An important objective of WTO
negotiations on competition should be to generate enforcement by third country agencies in relation to
cases in which anti-competitive practices are having a negative impact on the exports or investment of
another WTO Member.
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the experience so far acquired with positive
comity is a limited one.  Competition authorities have a legitimate concern to avoid a proliferation of
requests to investigate submitted by other WTO Members, which would strain resources and may
detract attention from other enforcement priorities.  This appears to call for a step by step approach as
regards the introduction of binding elements to a multilateral positive comity instrument.
Two possible options to consider would be the following:  (a)  A multilateral agreement on
competition would limit itself to the establishment of general principles on positive comity, which
would be further developed under bilateral agreemen ts;  (b) A multilateral positive comity instrument
could be developed modelled on the EC/US agreemen t and subject to specific limitations in order to
avoid the risk of a proliferation of requests.  Under either of the two options, a WTO agreement would
not impose a binding obligation to investigate on behalf of a third country.
D. EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW
The modalities of international cooperation so far discussed have as their objective promoting
cooperation in relation to anti-competitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and
investment.  This is a core concern for the WTO, since such practices can have a negative impact on
the process of trade liberalization.  At the same time, considerable interest has been expressed in the
Working Group on a possible WTO contribution towards fostering a more general exchange ofWT/WGTCP/W/129
Page 11
experiences relating to the application of competition law.  Several developing countries have
highlighted the benefit for domestic competition authorities of being in a position to exchange
experiences multilaterally on issues of common concern relating to the application of competition law
to international transactions.
Several ideas have been put forward in this respect.  They could include:  (a) Multilateral
discussions on issues of common concern relating to the application of competition law in a
globalized world economy.  This could be particularly useful for fostering better understanding of the
interaction between trade and competition policy and gradual convergence of the approaches followed
by competition authorities.  It would also help newly established competition authorities to benefit
from the experiences of others;  (b) Facilitating the exchange of information on developments in the
law and jurisprudence of different WTO Members.  The establishment of "contact points", as well as
transparency provisions, could greatly help towards facilitating the flow of information at minimumtransaction costs;  (c) Voluntary processes of "peer review" through which WTO Members would
present their experiences relating to the applicatio n of competition law and benefit from the comments
of other WTO Members.  This could be of particular value both for transparency and to better
identifying capacity constraints in developing countries;  (d) The possibility of envisaging a periodic
report on major competition policy developments with an impact on a globalized world economy.
The Community and the member States see great merit in all the above ideas.  We would be
interested in further discussing with other WTO Members how they could be further developed and
integrated in a WTO agreement on competition.
E. P
ROMOTING ENHANCED AND BETTER COORDINATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Significant technical assistance is currently being provided in the competition policy field.
However, discussions in the Working Group have identified three areas where improvements are
needed:  (a) There is a limited interface between competition authorities and government agencies
responsible for technical assistance.  This may result in a situation where competition policies are not
identified as a priority area for cooperation;  (b) While a large number of seminars and technical
assistance missions are being organized by several international organizations and nationalauthorities, coordination among different initiatives could be improved;  (c) There is a need to ensure
that all technical assistance is well adapted to the specific needs of developing countries.
Technical assistance is not the primary function of the WTO.  Other international
organizations - such as UNCTAD, the World Bank and the OECD - command larger resources and
have a well-established experience in the competition policy field.  This does not mean, however, that
the WTO could not play an important role in promoting enhanced and better coordinated technical
assistance.  Several means could be considered to wards this goal:  (a) Agreement within the WTO on
common principles and rules would play a cataly tic role in enhancing the commitment towards
technical assistance in the competition field.  It would also provide the basis towards ensuring that
such assistance is based on commonly agreed goals and responds to the needs of individual
developing countries;  (b) In parallel to the negotiation of new rules, consideration could be given
towards the steps required to enhance coordination of technical assistance activities in the competitionfield.  The aim should be to ensure that, by the time such agreement has been concluded, there is a
well-established, coordinated and integrated framework for the provision of technical assistance.  This
should be based on cooperation among international organizations, bilateral donors and full
partnership with developing countries;  (c) After the entry into force of an agreement, the WTO could
provide a forum for monitoring the progress achieved under such coordinated framework.
__________