RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/M/35
30 March 1999
(99-1253)
General Council
15 and 16 February 1999
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 15 and 16 February 1999
Chairman:  Mr. John M. Weekes (Canada)
1. Appointment of the next Director-General ........................................................................1
2. Work Programme on Electronic Commerce .....................................................................2
3. Agreements between the WTO and the IMF and the World Bank..................................3
(a) Annotated checklist of issues raised by delegations:  Forum for discussion
with Members ................................................................................................................... ......3
4. Promotion of the institut ional image of the WTO .............................................................5
(a) Communication fr om Venezuela ............................................................................................5
5. Request for an authoritative int erpretation pursuant to Article IX:2
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization .................13
(a) Communication from the European Communities ...............................................................13
6. Procedures for amendment and interpretation of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding:  Response to the European Communities' request for an
authoritative interpretation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding pursuant to
Article IX:2 of th e WTO Agreement.................................................................................13
(a) Communication from the United States................................................................................13
7. Election of the Chairman, members and alternates of the Management
Board of the WTO Pension Plan .......................................................................................32
8. Review of procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO documents .........32
(a) Statement by Chairman....................................................................................................... ..32
9. Guidelines for the sche duling of WTO meetings..............................................................34
10. Developing countries and the WTO dispute settlement  mechanism..............................34
11. Observer status for interg overnmental or ganizations.....................................................36
12. Appointment of office rs to WTO bodies...........................................................................37
13. Election of Chairperson of the General Council..............................................................38
1. Appointment of the next Director-General
The Chairman said that he had had some contact with delegations over the past few days, and
that he had recently received a very encouraging signal from one delegation, which led him to believe
that progress could be made quickly on determining how to proceed with the process of selecting the
next Director-General.  In order to fully clarify the situation, an informal consultation would be
necessary.  He therefore proposed that the present meeting be suspended after consideration of the last
item on the agenda and that the present item be taken up at a resumed meeting of the General Council.
Before that meeting, the Chairman of the General Council would hold consultations to try to come up
with an agreed way to proceed.WT/GC/M/35
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The General Council took note of the statement and agreed  to the Chairman's proposal.
2. Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (WT/GC/274)
The Chairman recalled that this matter had been discussed at the Special Session of the
General Council on 24 and 25 September, at which a Work Programme on Electronic Commerce had
been established.  Paragraph 1.2 of the work programme provided that the General Council "shall playa central role in the whole process and keep th e work programme under continuous review through a
standing item on its agenda".  He recalled that in accordance with the work programme "The General
Council will conduct an interim review of progress in the implementation of the work programme by
31 March 1999".  As the next regular meeting of the General Council was scheduled for 14 April, and
in order to give more time to the bodies carrying out work in relation to electronic commerce, he
proposed that the interim review be undertaken by the General Council at its meeting on 14 April
1999.  He also drew attention to the submission by the United States addressed to the General Counciland other WTO bodies involved in the implementation of the work programme (WT/GC/16).
The representative of the United States said that her delegation was pleased with the work of
the various WTO bodies examining the trade aspects of electronic commerce.  Of particular note was
the seminar on E-Commerce and Development organized by the Committee on Trade andDevelopment to take place in the next days.  The whole purpose of the exercise was to stimulate a
healthy debate in the WTO, which was now occurring.  To further advance this discussion the United
States had circulated a paper designed to target specific issues that it was hoped would lead to
solutions, and welcomed comments on it in the various WTO fora.  As an interim report was due to
the General Council on progress made in the work programme, the General Council might at that timebegin discussion of cross-cutting issues.  Further, in July 1999 the designated WTO bodies were to
provide information to the General Council to assist it in its report to the Ministerial Conference, as
required by the May Declaration on E-Commerce.  She made the following comments introducing
document WT/GC/16.  Electronic commerce was itself nothing new.  Firms had relied on faxes,
electronic fund transfers, and electronic links with their suppliers and customers for decades.  Many,if not most of these forms of electronic commerce were covered under existing WTO disciplines.
What was new was the advent of the Internet and other "networks of networks" which opened up
broad new vistas of commerce, sometimes referred to as "net commerce".  While in the past,
electronic commerce had been mainly the preserve of private networks, these were now being thrown
wide open, drawing in consumers and producers from around the globe.  Because of vast new
opportunities for this event in trade, there was a need to re-examine assumptions about what was
possible in the electronic world and how WTO trade disciplines could best support the growth of
electronic commerce.  To ensure maximum liberalization the starting-point had to be that where there
were existing commitments, for example in specific service sectors, the electronic delivery of such
services was already subject to international trade obligations.  The fact that some aspects of
electronic commerce did not fit neatly into existing categories provided an opportunity to examine
whether WTO trade disciplines could be applied in a more targeted manner, to provide electroniccommerce with a framework supportive of its enormous potential.  The many questions involved were
an opportunity, not a threat.  Trying to fit all of electronic commerce into the limited range of existing
categories could undermine the essence of this new form of trade.  Even services disciplines were new
and had only come about at the conclusion of th e Uruguay Round.  There was as yet no electronic
commerce business model and thus no consensus about the market requirements for electroniccommerce.  While it would be difficult in the work  programme to fully describe a framework for what
was needed to enable electronic commerce to thri ve, Members could and should focus on pushing for
the most broad-based liberalization possible, since it was clear that electronic commerce needed a
liberalized environment to benefit developed and developing countries alike.  It would be useful to
hear the views of other institutions working on electronic commerce, and the OECD Secretariatshould be invited to report on the work of its Trade Committee.  The first step the WTO should take
was to make the duty-free cyberspace declaration permanent.  This would give electronic commerceWT/GC/M/35
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providers, and the firms that funded the enormous investments required by electronic commerce, a
degree of certainty that governments would not undermine the innovation and creativity now driving
the global digital economy.  On the definitional question and the standstill, many had asked whether
transmissions fell into a goods or services category.  In many instances it would be clear that certain
transmissions were services falling under the Services Agreement.  In others, for duty purposes it
would have to be examined whether there had been an importation.  At that stage the character of the
"product" was less significant.  One could at least say that because there had been no importation in
the GATT sense, no duties could be imposed.  The United States looked forward to the next stage of
examination in the work programme, and hoped that Members would also engage in informal
discussions amongst themselves in order to encourage more substantive debate in the subsidiary
bodies.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed  to the Chairman's proposal that
the General Council undertake the interim review of progress in the implementation of the work
programme at its meeting on 14 April 1999.
3. Agreements between the WTO and the IMF and the World Bank
(a) Annotated checklist of issues raised by delegations (WT/GC/W/140:  Forum for discussion
with Members
The Chairman recalled that at its meeting in December 1998, the General Council discussed
this item, agreed that the Secretariat should be asked to do a checklist of the key points raised in the
discussion, and agreed to revert to this item at its next meeting in order to consider how to organize
the follow-up to the discussion as well as to take up any comments Members might have on theIntegrated Framework for Least-Developed Countries.  The Annotated Checklist of Issues was
contained in document WT/GC/W/140.  He drew attention to item 1 of the checklist, which recorded
the views of some Members that a less formal proces s of discussion of "Coherence" would be useful.
It was proposed in the checklist that the General Council consider authorizing its Chairman to
convene informal meetings from time to time, at the request of delegations or the Director-General, todiscuss coherence issues in a less formal setting so as to allow for a free exchange of views.  This
would supplement periodic discussion of the topic at regular General Council meetings.  Such
informal meetings would be limited to no more than  one half day each.  He suggested that an informal
meeting be convened in the near future, perhaps in March, and that it take up the issue of
"Autonomous Liberalization" as the first item of business at the meeting.  The Secretariat could beasked to prepare and circulate a background technical paper to assist discussions on this issue.  Other
points for discussion at that and subsequent meetings could be proposed by delegations or by the
Director-General.  Those interested in raising issues for discussion were encouraged to prepare and
circulate short non-papers on the topic in question.  Depending on the subject-matter scheduled for
discussion,  representatives of the IMF, the World Bank and UNCTAD could be invited to participate.
Regarding the Integrated Framework for Leas t-Developed Countries, he recalled the Second
Progress Report on the Follow-Up to the Hi gh-Level Meeting (WT/COMTD/LDC/W/12).
References to this document had been made at the December 1998 meeting, and it had been discussed
in the Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries in the fall of 1998.  He recalled that while
Members could raise any issue in the General Council, the Sub-Committee on Least-Developed
Countries had been designated by Members as the principle forum for discussions and briefings on theIntegrated Framework.  He also noted that representatives of the IMF, ITC, UNDP, UNCTAD, World
Bank and WTO met regularly in the Inter-Agency Working Group to ensure the effective operation of
the Integrated Framework.  This Working Group wa s meeting at the present time, and following its
meeting, the WTO Secretariat would prepare an updated progress report which would be distributed
for discussion at the next meeting of the Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries in March.WT/GC/M/35
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The representative of Canada said that the Chairman's proposal on how to proceed on this
issue was a good one.  The issues of coherence and cooperation between the WTO and the IMF and
the World Bank were particularly important in the context of current global financial turmoil, the need
to continue progress on trade liberalization, and the need to improve surveillance and enhance the
capacity of countries to participate more actively in the world trading system.  The WTO should
strengthen its relationship with the IMF and the Wo rld Bank with a view to providing advice on the
trade policy elements of any balanced package of economic measures, and to ensuring that developing
countries were supported in their efforts to fulfil their obligations as WTO Members.  It might be
useful for the Secretariat to undertake further technical work on the issue of the relationship between
investment, capital account liberalization and the GATS.  This would enable countries to develop a
better understanding of what capital account liberalization meant for WTO commitments on trade in
services and possible investment rules, and of the importance of  this issue for the trading system.
The representative of Japan welcomed the annotated checklist.  Under Section VIII
concerning the balance-of-payments provisions  of GATT 1994, it was suggested that the WTO
discuss with the IMF the possibility of undertaking joint technical work on how to take account of the
impact of volatile capital movements when describing the adequacy of monetary reserves of a WTO
Member invoking balance-of-payments provisions.  Such an exercise would be useful in securing
policy coherence.  Inputs from the IMF and the World Bank to the Third Ministerial Meeting would
also be useful.  Japan had specific interest in the preparation of a list of specific issues on which WTO
Members would request analytical input from those institutions.
The representative of India said that his delegation could go along with the Chairman's
proposal.  Regarding Section VIII of the checklist, India had stated at the December 1998 meeting of
the General Council that the traditional methodology of assessing the adequacy or inadequacy of
balance-of-payments reserves by just measuring the results in terms of months of imports was no
longer relevant or valid.  There should be no problem for the WTO or the IMF to look into the
technical aspects of this issue and to produce a paper on the basis of which there could be adiscussion.  This important topic should be given appropriate priority.  Regarding Section XI, he
suggested that the WTO Secretariat and the World Bank might discuss the issue of intellectual
property rights and produce a technical paper on which there could be discussion.  There should be an
honest debate on the issue of public interest versus private property.
The representative of the United States said that her delegation could support the Chairman's
suggested approach.  It was important to ensure that the WTO along with the IMF and the World
Bank made the appropriate contribution to addressing the challenges confronting the international
economic system.  Greater and more effective coherence in the policy-making of the IMF and the
World Bank and the WTO would be particularly critical in 1999, as economies continued to deal with
the country-specific consequences of the financial crisis, as the international institutions assessed
alternative policy responses to the causes of that crisis, and as Members considered the guidance thatwould be provided to the future work of the international trading system by the Third Ministerial
meeting.
The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation could go along with the proposals
under this item.  In the context of the developing countries it was important to underline the point
made under Section IV that the trade policy advice and conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank
should be WTO-consistent.  Regarding Section VIII, Pakistan expected that the WTO Secretariat
would pull its weight regarding the impact of any trade measures proposed in this context, and that
these measures would take into account the difficulties faced by developing countries.  Regarding
Section III, Pakistan supported the crediting of future unilateral trade liberalization initiatives bycountries.  However, under this section or separately the possibility should be emphasized of crediting
developing countries who had undertaken liberalization measures in the context of structuralWT/GC/M/35
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adjustment programmes.  Such liberalization measures, already undertaken or in the process of being
undertaken, should be credited to those countries in the context of future trade negotiations.
The representative of Korea said that the checklist would provide a good basis for further
deliberations on the coherence mandate and welcomed the suggestion for informal meetings to discuss
matters relating to coherence.  It was important for the WTO to devise ways to enable financial andtrade policies to reinforce and complement each other.  Korea agreed that a priority topic was
autonomous liberalization, especially in view of the likelihood of another round of market access
negotiations starting in 2000.  Regarding the paper the Secretariat would prepare, it would be useful
for the Secretariat to conduct a survey of Members' experience, especially the modalities used in
giving credit for autonomous trade liberalization during previous trade negotiations, and to include
such information in the paper.
The representative of the European Commun ities said that the Community welcomed the
proposal outlined and looked forward to contributing actively to that process.  Coherence was an
acutely relevant issue in the current international economic environment and as preparations
intensified for the launch of a new round of multila teral negotiations.   The Community attached the
greatest importance to the full implementation of the Ministerial mandate on coherence and toenhance cooperation between the WTO and the IMF and the World Bank.  Such cooperation should
not imply the introduction of any form of cross-conditionality.  There was a need for collective
reflection on how the WTO could contribute to global coherence, as well on how to enhance
cooperation between the WTO and other international organizations.  The Community also attached
great importance to issues relating to technical as sistance and capacity-building.  The Integrated
Framework was an example of how different international organizations could work together towards
the achievement of common goals.  The Community in tended to come back to this question within the
context of the High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed
 to authorize the Chairman of the
General Council to convene special informal meetings  from time to time, at the request of delegations
or the Director-General, to discuss coherence issues, and agreed to request the Secretariat to prepare
and circulate a background technical paper to assist discussions for the first meeting on "AutonomousLiberalization".  Delegations wishing to place other issues on the table for discussion at that first
meeting were invited to inform the Secretariat (Trade and Finance Division/Council Division)accordingly.
4. Promotion of the institutional image of the WTO
(a) Communication from Venezuela (WT/GC/W/142
The representative of Venezuela, introducing the proposal in WT/GC/W/142, said that the need to
improve relations between the WTO and civil society had been recognized in paragraph 4 of the
Geneva Ministerial Declaration.  Similarly, in the proceedings of the working sessions held within the
framework of the second Ministerial Conference of the WTO, various delegations of both developed
and developing countries had made clear reference to the distorted opinion people had of this
organization and to the need to improve public under standing of the multilateral trading system.  He
recalled the initiative by the Director General to strengthen links with non-governmental
organizations.  Ways of promoting the WTO corporate image should be defined in order to reach awider public.  Venezuela expressed concern at the incr easing number of references to this organization
in the various media which gave a largely inaccurate idea of the WTO, distorting its role and the scope
of its activities.  This negative and erroneous perception could affect the WTO's future development.
Governments, particularly in the developing countries, could have difficulty in securing the domestic
legislative approval needed for the adoption of future initiatives, irrespective of whether they had beenapproved by consensus.  The General Council should instruct the Secretariat to look into theWT/GC/M/35
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possibility of developing a draft institutional image for the WTO, which would stress aspects such as
the importance to the international community of having  a set of stable rules to govern trade, the fact
that the organization was directed by its Members, that decisions were adopted by consensus, and the
advantages of a forum in which the many aspects of international trade, including dispute settlement,
were regulated.  Venezuela proposed two courses of action to achieve this objective.  First, an
extensive campaign similar to those brought to Members' attention by other internationalorganizations, and second, action directed more specifically at decision-makers, mass media and other
sectors with the ability to influence public opinion.  Members should explore ways for the WTO to
organize courses on the dissemination of its disciplines for the benefit of the specialized press,
parliamentarians and trade associations, among others, thereby contributing to efforts to publicize the
multilateral trading system.  This proposal should be kept separate from other issues covered by the
current debate, such as transparency or the derestriction of classified documents, since no consensus
had been reached on them.
The representative of Tunisia shared the views expressed by Venezuela and welcomed the
proposal.  It was true that the WTO's public image was a negative one.  It was perceived as a
shadowy, anti-social organization because its role, its workings and its objectives were poorly or
inaccurately understood.  It was paradoxical that an organization responsible for world trade could not
sell itself effectively.  Public opinion continued in some degree to be influenced by the GATT, whichhad been described at one time as a "club for the rich".  The consensual, contractual, universal and
jurisdictional nature of the WTO was largely unknown to the public or poorly presented by the
organization.  Moreover, as the first international or ganization to come into existence after the end of
the Cold War, the WTO operated in an internatio nal environment subject to upheavals and social
changes.  In this context, the WTO was the obvious choice to take the blame for everything that wentwrong.  Excessive media coverage of certain WTO issues also fuelled this negative and sometimes
hostile perception.  The WTO was facing a problem  of a communication and interaction gap, hence
the need to establish a genuine communication policy with an adequate level of resources.  He
proposed the following to supplement Venezuela's proposal:  (1) improvement of the WTO's
information tools;  (2) establishment of a study and discussion unit connected with a network of studyand research centres;  (3) launching of publications and campaigns aimed at the general public.  While
the WTO was beginning to move in this direction, much remained to be done;  the WTO library
should be made a genuine communication channel and reference centre;  (4) the Swiss authorities had
provided for the establishment of institutions and agencies which could contribute to a better
understanding between Swiss public opinion and the in ternational organizations.  Links between these
agencies and the WTO could help the latter to influence opinion in Switzerland and, consequently, in
other countries.  It was clear that the promotion of the WTO's image involved a number of issues and
raised various questions.  However, it was first necessary to make a proper assessment of the
situation.  In 1994, the Deloitte and Touche company had been commissioned to examine the
institutional structure of the Secretariat.  Th e same procedure, which was today proposed by
Venezuela, should be recommended.  Moreover, the practical points and proposals Venezuela had
made could only be useful and effective if they were linked and combined with more transparency notonly within the WTO and between its Members, but in relation to the outside world as well.  Closer
cooperation with international and regional organizations, including by means of observer status, and
regular contacts with civil society would constitute  an essential guarantee for more openness to the
outside world and more harmonious relations with public opinion.  This promotion exercise would
require budgetary resources.  Thus, the necessary funds to promote a genuine marketing,communication and interaction policy should first be raised.
The representative of Mexico said that his delegation also believed there was an institutional
image problem in the WTO and that it was urgent that something be done.  A promotion of WTO's
institutional image was the best way to address civil society, which was not necessarily non-governmental organizations.  Venezuela's approach to civil society was more effective than an
approach purely limited to derestriction of documents.  Venezuela rightly stressed that derestrictionWT/GC/M/35
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and the institutional image of the WTO should not be linked.  A campaign for institutional promotion
of the WTO was needed, and promotion of the virtues of free trade.  Other international organizations
had done excellent work in demystifying a series of arguments which were prevalent in certain sectors
and in certain countries to the detriment of trade liberalization.  Mexico fully supported Venezuela's
position on this issue, and in particular that some kind of results should be operative well before the
Third Ministerial Conference.  However, before any decision was taken on this matter, consultationsshould be held promptly, so as to join with Venezuela's initiative the ideas mentioned by Tunisia as
well as ideas of other Members.
The representative of Switzerland said that his delegation supported Venezuela's initiative in
its principles as well as its modality.  This initiative came at a very opportune moment.  Time and
energy had to be dedicated to the problem of WTO's image;  however, one should not be too
influenced by recent events.  The WTO image was not negative world-wide.  Many sectors had apositive image of the WTO, though it was true that there were many misunderstandings and
simplifications which would increase if Members did not act.  There was certainly a deficit of general
information to the public at national and international levels.  The promotion of WTO's image was
indispensable and urgent.  Switzerland welcomed Venezuela's proposal to study the setting up of a
marketing campaign.  In this respect, his delegatio n believed that first, an enquiry point in Geneva
should be set up so that all interested parties could direct themselves to this centre to obtain
information on the WTO.  This enquiry point would centralise the information and promote the image
of WTO at the international level.  Second, more targeted actions would be indispensable and should
first focus on economic operators, non-governmental organizations and agricultural circles.  Third, the
most appropriate approach for these targeted actions would be through a symposium.  It was clear thatthe financial aspects would have to be examined in depth.  He stressed that action should be carried
out at the national level to promote the WTO image.  Information adapted to a national public would
be better conceived, more efficient and would use the right language and the right channels in order to
modify WTO's image.  It would be a mistake not to support Venezuela's initiative, but it would be a
greater mistake to believe that everything could be done in Geneva.  National authorities should not
escape their duty towards WTO and should explain what the WTO represented for the economic
development of their country.
The representative of Canada welcomed Venezuela's initiative and shared its views on the
importance of developing and building public understanding and support, in all countries, for the trade
liberalization mandate of the WTO.  It was the success of the GATT and the WTO over the past 50
years that had led to the public awareness of the linkages between trade policy and domestic interest.
Public concerns in many countries, however, reflecte d a lack of understanding of the nature of the
WTO.  Members had to demonstrate that the WTO had no secrets.  As Members were preparing for
the Third Ministerial Conference and further negotiations, informed debate and domestic support
would be central to success.  The WTO should focus its efforts on transparency issues, including
improved document derestriction.  The development of effective outreach materials and strategies wasimportant.  While a better understanding of the WTO and the benefits of trade and investment
liberalization could be achieved through efforts to  enhance transparency, the organization should be
proactive in communicating the value of a rules-based system and the benefits of liberalization.
The representative of the United States said that Venezuela's initiative highlighted the issue of
a growing negative perception of international trade and the WTO.  Regarding where the
responsibility lay, there was an institutional issue in the WTO and also a national issue.  Her
delegation supported the idea that the Secretariat explore ways to develop positive and useful
information material within existing resources.   With respect to the institutional issue, credit had to
be given to the Director-General for his vision and his efforts in making sure that what had been
accomplished was understood.  There had been some achievements, such as seminars, high-levelsymposia on trade and development and trade and the environment, and the establishment of the
WTO website, but more would have to be done and the problem of funds would have to be solved.WT/GC/M/35
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With regard to the national issue, each WTO Memb er should address its own domestic constituency.
This was an issue of the attitude each Member should have with respect to increasing transparency,
openness in the organization and providing ways for stakeholders to be heard.  In its submission to the
inter-sessional meeting of the General Council on 29 January and 2 February, the US had outlined
items for improving access to information and institutionalising a consultative process with non-
governmental and other international organizations.  Her delegation hoped that some of the issuesresulting from this discussion would be dealt with.
The representative of Japan welcomed Venezuela's paper and agreed that the institutional
image of the organization as well as communication with the public should be improved in order for
the WTO to have greater support.  In order to improve access to information on WTO-related
activities, his Government had opened websites in Japanese.  These websites provided basic
information on WTO activities, including such inform ation as what was trade in services, or Japan's
interest in the next round of negotiations.  To disseminate this information, his Government was also
holding a first series of meetings with the civil societies in Japan, and had distributed booklets to high
school students and nationwide to the schools.  His delegation looked forward to working with
Venezuela to find the most effective way of improv ing the institutional image of this organization as
well as to provide necessary elements for all Members to carry out national information campaigns.His delegation particularly welcomed such points as seeking the services of corporate image
specialists, or trying to present a more digestib le format for the public.   This task should be
undertaken as early as possible, before the Third Ministerial Conference.  At the same time,
workloads and financial aspects should be examined so as not to overburden the Secretariat.
The representative of the European Communities welcomed Venezuela's proposal and
supported its objectives of a better public image and a better public presentation of the WTO.  At the
same time, Members should acknowledge the work which the Secretariat had already undertaken and
continued to carry out in this connection.  Members should assess the implications of Venezuela's
proposal, including the financial ones.  Nothing in the proposal modified the responsibility whichnational governments had in this area, or the way in which the WTO was promoted in their countries.
Each Member clearly knew its own constituen cy best and how to approach the question of
presentation of the WTO on a national level.  The experience of individual Members in this area
should be studied, and an exchange of views on their respective experience would be beneficial.  He
looked forward to working with colleagues on this issue.
The representative of Egypt thanked Venezuela for having brought this issue to Members'
attention.  The image of the organization, particularly in developing countries, was not that bright.
The reasons were evident, i.e., the marginalizati on of the developing countries in the multilateral
trading system and the lack of integration of many developing countries therein.  A negative image of
the WTO also prevailed in developed countries.  The best way to improve that image was the full
implementation of the agreements and decisions adopted in Marrakesh and the full integration of the
developing countries in the multilateral trading system.  In particular, developed countries shouldfulfill their obligations pursuant to the WTO Agreem ent, and implement the provisions relating to the
special and differential treatment in favour of developing countries.  The negative image of the WTO
also resulted from not granting observer status to some regional organizations such as the OAU, the
Organization of Islamic Conference, the Islamic Development Bank and the Arab League.  These
organizations and in particular those belonging to developing countries could not participate asobservers because of delaying tactics.  The political will, particularly on the part of the developed
countries, to fully integrate developing countries would be the best course of action in order to
improve the image of the WTO.  His delegation welcomed any campaign to improve the image of the
organization, however, the full integration of developing countries in the multilateral trading system
should first take place.  Moreover, the financing of  such a campaign should not be at the expense of
the technical cooperation budget.WT/GC/M/35
Page 9
The representative of Uruguay said that in his country there was not as drastic and negative a
perception of the institutional image of WTO as indicated in paragraph 1 of Venezuela's paper.  He
agreed with Venezuela that there was a lack of dissemination of information and a lack of
communication of the objectives, the results and the benefits of WTO.  Involving more developing
countries in this multilateral process would help improve this image.  This deterioration of image had
been reinforced through the global crisis Member countries had suffered from in recent years, whichhad led to challenging and doubting the liberalization which had taken place.  Efforts to promote the
institutional image of this organization should be carried out by Governments at domestic level, in the
first place, but there was also an important role for the organization to play.  Uruguay supported
paragraph 7 of Venezuela's proposal, and hoped that the Secretariat would include in the document to
be circulated the positive ideas expressed by previous speakers, and in particular Tunisia.
The representative of Pakistan said that Venezuela's proposal had enabled Members to open a
discussion which could only be to the benefit of the organization.  However, one should be very
careful to distinguish the issues involved.  The WTO had come under criticism on the one hand
because of what was perceived to be the ill effects of the unhampered globalization process and on the
other hand for certain shortcomings that were either real or perceived.  The image of the organization
would improve as the process of globalization wa s humanised, which hopefully would take place in
the coming years.  Meanwhile, one should focus on analysing what the reasons were for the onslaught
on the organization.  As mentioned by Egypt, one reason was the sense of marginalization in the
developing countries.  Another reason was the criticism from those who understood that their interests
were threatened by liberalization, and in that case the criticism against the WTO was certainly
unjustified.  [Whereas the Venezuelan proposal addressed mostly the media, one should also send amessage promoting the WTO.]  Developing countries had to send one message, which would be
different from the one sent in developed countries, and this was primarily the responsibility of
national governments, of regional organizations and of the institution itself.  In this respect the
Director-General had been doing a marvellous job, as an active defender of the WTO.  Pakistan
looked forward to examining proposals by Venezuela, Tunisia and others on the structure of themessage.  The content of such a message should also be a substantive part of the discussion.
The representative of Australia said that Venezuela had correctly identified the problem.
However, it was primarily up to national governments to address this question since the message to be
elaborated would have to reflect their respective national interests and approaches.  To be mosteffective, these messages would have to be sent at the national level.  He expressed his delegation's
appreciation for the tireless efforts of the Director-General on behalf of the organization in explaining
world-wide the functioning of the WTO.  Many ot her organizations were trying to deal with this
problem, for example APEC which had a major programme to explain the benefits of trade
liberalization.  In Australia, a programme had been set up to explain the benefits of the WTO within
the country, and the benefit of trade liberalization in general.  His delegation was ready to join with
others in sharing information on their respective experience at the national and/or regional level, andurged the convening of an information-sharing exercise.
The representative of Malaysia expressed appreciation for Venezuela's submission, which
contained proposals pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration.  While Malaysia
could agree with the thrust of the proposal, which was to enhance the transparency of the WTO'soperations, his delegation saw more merit at present in pursuing the proposal on the WTO website for
a more digestible format for a broader public with little knowledge of international trade issues.
Malaysia had reservations regarding the proposal to employ the services of corporate image
specialists, and regarding the launching of information campaigns purportedly aimed at individuals or
groups of persons with decision-making authority and/or able to influence public opinion in Membercountries.  His delegation did not understand how the employment of corporate image specialists
would contribute to the enhancement of transparency of the WTO's operations.  More likely, this
exercise could result in the very opposite – it could boost the image of the WTO as an elitistWT/GC/M/35
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organization with little transparency in its operations.  Furthermore, it could result in increased annual
contributions from Members.  Similarly, interaction with organizations such as consumer
associations, business associations and the like was undertaken on a regular basis, using national
budgetary allocations.  It was the responsibility of each Member to sell to its constituents the virtues
and the benefits of the multilateral trading system and the WTO, without imposing on other WTO
Members.  He wondered whether these information campaigns would enhance the transparency of theWTO's operations, other than enhancing public awareness of its existence and functions.  In the light
of these reservations, Malaysia preferred to revisit this proposal at a future date.
The representative of India said that the negative image of the WTO resulted from three
elements.  First, the WTO was the most powerful international organization in the world. It had the
fastest dispute settlement resolution system and had enforcement capability.  As a powerful
organization, it had powerful enemies.  Second, the advent of the WTO coincided with the period ofglobalization.  Some believed that globalization and the WTO were more or less synonymous.  In fact,
the WTO's multilateral disciplines and globalization were having effects on each other.  Third, many
qualified people in his country perceived the WTO to be an organization which served the interests of
the more powerful countries as opposed to the less powerful ones.  He recalled that in the run-up to
the Singapore Ministerial Conference, India had suggested that the Declaration contain equityconsiderations in the working of  the WTO.  However, at that time some delegations had said that
equity had to be dealt with by national governments.  One of the important ways to improve the image
of the WTO would be to ensure that in the working of this organization and in the process of
negotiating multilateral disciplines, there was greater sensitivity to equity considerations and greater
attention given to the interests of the less powerful Members.  As to Venezuela's proposal to promotethe image of the WTO through a marketing and advertisement campaign, national interests were
different;  therefore, promoting the image of the WTO should be essentially a national responsibility.
Moreover, in paragraph 4 of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration, Ministers had committed themselves
to improving the image of the WTO by working in their national government and had recognized the
importance of enhancing public understanding of the benefits of the multilateral trading system.  Inhis country, a number of programmes had been set up to promote awareness of the WTO and more
would have to be done to interact with non-governmental organizations.  Promoting the image of the
WTO through some corporate marketing technique might give the impression that the WTO was more
sensitive to the concerns of business interests than to those of the common man.  India was prepared
to continue the exchange of views on this issue.
The representative of Brazil thanked Venezuela for having separated with clarity its proposal
from other proposals concerning transparency and derestriction of documents.  As previously
discussed, transparency was a concept that had different significance to different delegations.  His
delegation would carefully study Venezuela's proposal.  The issue of the perception of the WTO's
work related to the perception of the consequences of globalization, the problem of marginalization,
and the financial crisis and the way developing countries were affected and their difficulties in coping.These issues would not be solved by a marketing campaign.  The merit of Venezuela's proposal was
in raising the issue and provoking reflection on the work of the organization.  This exercise of
reflection should remain on the agenda and the issue should be addressed regularly.  The Director-
General had done an important job in trying to  promote world-wide the work of the WTO and
explaining the importance of trade liberalization. However, it was the national responsibility ofMembers to promote the image of the WTO and to explain the benefits of trade liberalization.
The representative of New Zealand said that WTO media and NGO relations under the
Director General's leadership had improved markedly in recent times.  The challenge was nonetheless
an ongoing one.  New Zealand welcomed Venezuela' s initiative in producing a series of ideas to
advance the institutional image of the WTO.  These were an excellent stimulus to the thinking of
Members and of the Secretariat.  There was real value in a continuing dialogue within the WTO on
initiatives in this area.  New Zealand attached particular importance to efforts to broadenWT/GC/M/35
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understanding in its communities of the benefits of trade liberalization.  This was a particular theme of
New Zealand's present year chairing APEC.  It was vital that the WTO projected itself well and
positively.  But, as others had stressed, activity at the national level would always be most critical and
determining.  For this reason the WTO Secretariat should provide clear and highly accessible
information for use by WTO Members at the national level.  New Zealand expressed appreciation for
the progress made in the WTO homepage which was an excellent site.  As with electronic commerce,there would be enormous  further potential to be realized via this powerful communication medium.
In short, Members should work together contributing ideas building on the solid communication base
already established by the Director General and the Secretariat.  Efforts should be immediate and
relevant and should focus on the imminent Third Ministerial Conference and the launch of fresh
negotiations.  New Zealand would be ready to make an active contribution, along with other
Members, to addressing communication to people of the benefits of the work of the WTO.  Its
perspective would include the experience New Zealand was currently gaining from hosting a series ofmajor APEC meetings throughout 1999.
The representative of Mexico said that the Director-General and the Secretariat had done
excellent work with regard to communication with civil society.  He suggested that a document be
prepared by the Secretariat summing up what was be ing done in this context so that Members would
be fully aware.  They would then be in a positi on to complement Venezuela's proposal as necessary.
The representative of Cuba said that while Venezuela's proposal was very constructive, the
WTO image depended on the organization's actions and not so much on a publicity campaign.  Such
campaigns might not give the results expected. Many developing countries, including Cuba, haddoubts regarding the final result of the WTO's work, i.e. how the organization would provide means to
developing countries to develop through trade, to avoid marginalization and to integrate into the
multilateral trading system more promptly.  These were the relevant points that would have to be dealt
with.  The negative image of the WTO also resulted from the organization's practice of applying to
acceding countries - and particularly developing ones - higher standards than those established in therespective Agreement.  Publicity campaigns should not be undertaken to the detriment of technical
assistance or any training requirements of developing countries.  Such campaigns should be the result
of domestic decisions, as each government had its own interest in the organization and would address
its own public opinion in the most appropriate and adequate way. Although he did not oppose the
continuation of this debate, he wished to place on record his delegation's concern in this respect.
The representative of Zimbabwe said that there seemed to be a view that dissemination of
information would solve the image problem of the WTO.  Recipients of such information should also
be provided with tools in order to understand and thus support the work of the WTO.  It would only
be through such technical assistance that most of the public as well as the stakeholders would be in a
position to understand the work of the WTO.  The question of perceptions also had to be addressed
and solutions would have to be found.  One of the most disturbing perceptions was that weaker WTO
Members were being pushed into making rules without fully understanding their implications.
Therefore, one should ensure that Members fully understood each other and that rule-making and
predictability remained the strength of the WTO.  The composition of the Secretariat did not reflect its
universality and could be improved by involving more developing countries in the administration and
in the staffing of the organization.
The representative of Peru said that part of the image problem was the reality of substantive
progress, frustration, limitations and the political will to do things better.  The handling of the
organization's image was a very complex matter and should be dealt with at the national level. There
were three fundamental problems.  First, dissemination of the information accessible to all on the roleand the functioning of the organization.  The Director-General had done an excellent job in this
regard.  However, there was more to be done at the organization level as well as at the national level.
For example, the WTO annual report which provided an assessment of WTO activities could beWT/GC/M/35
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published in a version accessible to the broader public.  Second, there were groups of people that had
an accurate understanding of the WTO but did not agree with its objectives.  Third, there was an
asymmetry in the benefits resulting from the work of the WTO.  Action would have to be taken to
deal with these problems and precise targets set.  His delegation supported the proposal that this issue
remain on the agenda.
The representative of Norway said that her delegation recognized the efforts made by the
Director-General in promoting the image of the WTO.  The prime responsibility lay at the national
level where one was best equipped to tailor-make targeted information.  Her delegation looked
forward to discussing this issue further once info rmation on the costs involved and the financial
means were available.  It could be useful to draw on experience from other intergovernmental
organizations regarding costs and benefits and to hear the views of the Director-General thereon.
The Director-General said that the fact that there had been such a lively, long and interesting
discussion proved that Venezuela's initiative was needed.  The work he and the Secretariat had done
and were continuing to do was important.  The WT O website was particularly appreciated, including
by least-developed countries which, within the WTO technical assistance framework, had been
equipped with the necessary hardware and software to access that site.  A distinction should be madebetween the image of the WTO as an organization and the image of the WTO within the wider debate
on globalization.  Regarding the WTO as an organization, its image did not have many negative
aspects.  In his contacts with governments, including from developing and least-developed countries,
he had found there was a positive judgement on the role of the WTO, of the market economy and of
trade liberalization.  While there were points on which people were not satisfied, the fact thatparliaments of countries representing 90 per cent of trade in financial services had recently ratified the
Financial Services Agreement was clear evidence that there was a solid consensus around the
organization.  On the other hand, he was concerned by the fact that a vast majority of people,
including in governments, did not know anything about the WTO.  Many qualified people only knew
about the WTO from what they read in the newspapers.  The real issue in this context was thesignificant lack of information.  Regarding the negative perception of the WTO by minorities who
rejected the society in which they lived, the WTO was an easy target.  As these minorities were not
interested in knowing anything about the WTO, ther e was nothing that could be done in that respect.
Regarding the WTO and globalization, there was a direct link between the two in the minds of many
people who believed that all that was happening in the world was a consequence of the work of theWTO.  It was also true that there were still many situations in the world which were unacceptable.
The opponents of globalization were ready to accept the positive points of globalization, but refused
the negative points.  The real issue was the problem of improving the management of globalization.
Such improvement was vital from the WTO's perspective.  Many believed that the issues of labour
standards, environment, health, cultural diversity and social injustice should be handled within the
framework of the trade system.  That was not possible.  These issues should be dealt with within the
general debate on improvement of the management of globalization.  The WTO was ready tocooperate in that context, but these issues could be solved only in other fora.  The ideas expressed at
the present meeting were important and would have to be studied.  These efforts would have to be
strengthened and diversified, taking into account the different national sensitivities, and would have to
be supported by national efforts.  Delegations in Geneva also had a responsibility and he counted on
them to support him should any untrue statements be made at the upcoming high-level symposia ontrade and environment and trade and development.
The Chairman welcomed and supported the suggestions for an exchange of information on
Members' experience in promoting the WTO and fo r holding an informal consultation to see how
these matters could be approached.  He proposed that the General Council agree that the Secretariatprepare a document as proposed by Venezuela within 60 days, taking into account the views
expressed by delegations, and that the General Council revert to this matter at a subsequent meeting.WT/GC/M/35
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The General Council took note of the statements and so agreed .
5. Request for an authoritative interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(a) Communication from the European Communities (WT/GC/W/133, WT/GC/W/143)
and
6. Procedures for amendment and interpretation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding:
Response to the European Communities' re quest for an authoritative interpretation of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement
(a) Communication from the United States (WT/GC/W/144)
The Chairman explained that Item 5 was on the agenda of the present meeting at the request
of the European Communities, and Item 6 at the request of the United States.
The representative of the European Communitie s said that this was not a matter of the EC
versus the US, had nothing to do with bananas and was not an issue the EC and the US could settle
between them, as many might have hoped.  This matter involved a fundamental systemic issue that
directly affected each and every WTO Member.  Any Member could find itself in a situation similarto that of the EC – having lost a dispute settlement procedure, having taken all the measures it
considered necessary to correctly implement the DSB's recommendations, and being faced with
unilateral sanctions simply because the complaining party was not satisfied with the measures taken.
There was a fundamental difference between interpretation and amendment:  an interpretation merely
determined what a text meant, and an amendment m odified that text.  The EC had not proposed that a
single word in the DSU text be modified, but had merely asked the General Council to interpret the
DSU provisions.  The basic question the EC had put was:  taking account of the entire set of DSU
provisions governing implementation, could the DSB grant authorization to suspend concessions
before it had determined that a Member had fail ed to implement the DSB's recommendations?  The
US had proposed that the General Council should consider the EC request as a proposal foramendment of the DSU.  During the 25 January to 1 February DSB meeting, the US had repeatedly
claimed that it had the right to request authorization by the DSB to suspend concessions and that this
right could only be denied by consensus.  The EC too had a right under Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement to seek an interpretation, and was prepared to assert that right.  The questions the EC had
put to Members had to be answered.  Shortly the DSB would have to consider a request forauthorization to suspend concessions which was based on a determination by one party, or possibly
two, that another Member had failed to comply w ith DSB recommendations.  Either that request was
admissible and should be granted, or it was not admissible and should not be granted.  WTO
Members, and the WTO as an institution, had to assume their responsibilities. Because of the negative
consensus rule in the DSU - an approach which had been adopted for good reasons - inaction on the
part of the General Council would mean, in practice, that a single Member could force the DSB to
authorize it to apply trade sanctions even though, objectively speaking, its right to do so was far fromclear.  The right under Article 22 was conditional, and at this stage its conditions had not been met.
Were the General Council, through inaction, to endorse this situation, it would imply that the
multilateral approach in the DSU was being replaced  with a unilateral approach to determining non-
compliance.  For these reasons, the EC was seeking the views of all Members on this important
question.  It was important that the General Council send a clear message that the rule of law in theWTO had to be upheld and that it was not in favour of unilateralism.  He asked the Chairman to draw
the necessary conclusions from the statements made and to convey them to the Chairman of the DSB,
and through him, to those involved in the panel and arbitration processes. The EC would not insist atWT/GC/M/35
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the present meeting on its right to a formal decision under Article IX:2, although it reserved its right
to revert to this matter at a future meeting.
He made the following points to address arguments which he said were likely to be heard.
First, regarding the argument that a debate abou t interpretation risked interfering with a current
dispute, he said that wherever there were ambiguities in WTO provisions which had led - as they hadin the present case - to important disagreements, it was likely that these would arise out of a dispute.
A discussion in the General Council could be useful as a way of diffusing the dispute.  In a prolonged
and deep-rooted dispute such as the bananas case, due attention to the problem, a good debate and
proper action might be the beginning of the solution.  To take the contrary view would be to put
consideration of the procedure ahead of considerations of general interest regarding the substance of
the issue.  WTO procedures were there to serve th e interests of the Members and not to prevent them
from taking action.  Thus, any risk of interference was far outweighed by the possibility that adiscussion in the General Council could contribute to greater clarity in the situation and lead to a way
forward.  Second, Article IX of the WTO Agreement required that a recommendation for
interpretation be submitted by the Council overseeing the functioning of the agreement in question.
There were two reasons in the present case why this had not happened:  First, the responsible Council
was the DSB, and that was the General Council under another hat.  It was thus clear the GeneralCouncil had the competence to discuss this question.  Second, there had been a series of very difficult
meetings of the DSB in late November, December and January in which no consensus or compromise
had been reached.  The substance of the issue at hand was the various DSU provisions as a whole.
They could not be looked at in isolation from each other.  While Article 21.5 was obligatory, Article
22 provided conditional rights.  In the case in question those conditions had not been met.  Non-compliance could in no case be asserted on the unsupported basis of the opinion of one Member, or
even of several, since that was clearly contrary to Article 23.  Finally, beyond the letter of those
provisions what was at issue was the core system established in the DSU and its multilateral nature.
Beyond the particulars of the present case, the question was whether a Member could ignore
obligatory DSU provisions and base itself on its ow n reading of the DSU and on its own views as to
non-compliance.  In other words, whether a Member could take unilateral action and then request
authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions.  The answer had to be an unequivocal no.  One
of the fundamental principles negotiated and enshrined in the DSU was that unilateral approaches to
settling disputes were no longer to be permitted.  This was the problem his delegation was asking theGeneral Council to consider in accordance with its authority under Article IX:2.  How the outcome
was to be achieved was another matter.  Procedures and processes could be discussed further.  It had
been said that in making this request, the EC was somehow seeking to circumvent the DSU review
process which many felt was a natural place for dealing with such issues.  He recalled that in recent
DSB meetings it had been almost impossible to r each any agreement, let alone any compromises, in
the matter under dispute.  It thus seemed unlikely that the DSU review process would come up with a
solution without some assistance from the General Council.  The General Council should discuss thismatter and arrive at some sort of view - perhaps a majority opinion - on the correct answer to the
problem posed by the EC, and its conclusions should then be conveyed to the DSB in order to be
taken into account in its further discussions.  One could consider that there were two phases:  first, a
general discussion in the General Council of all the issues, and then a more detailed phase when the
result of that discussion was acted upon in considering clarifications, or even amendments, to the text.The EC had no intention to circumvent any process, but simply desired to move the discussion
forward from where it stood some  two weeks earlier in the DSB.
The representative of the United States said it was clear from the submission in
WT/GC/W/144 that the United States took issue with the EC's purported request for a General
Council interpretation of the DSU.  While the EC's request had been styled as a request for an
"authoritative interpretation", in reality the EC sought to have the General Council amend the
provisions of the DSU.  Such a request could not legally be considered except pursuant to theWT/GC/M/35
Page 15
provisions of Article X:8 of the WTO Agreement.  The appropriate forum in which to address the
issues raised in the EC's document had to be the DSB in its review of the DSU, and not the General
Council hastily convened to decide on an improperly described request for interpretation of the DSU.
At the informal meeting of the DSB on 11 February 1999, the leading view had been that this work
had to take place in the DSB.  Even the EC, in a letter of 11 February, had acknowledged that the
General Council should not take a decision at the present meeting, but that this matter was to besettled in the DSU review.  She would address this problem in three parts:  first, why the EC request
for General Council action had to be seen as a request for amendment of the DSU;  second, why the
issue was much more complicated than presented by the EC in its document;  and third, why this issue
deserved to be treated not in the General Council but rather as a matter for the review of the DSU.
Regarding the first part, the EC's first question to the General Council was whether the DSB was
empowered to grant authorization for suspension of concessions in the absence of a panel or Appellate
Body report adopted by the DSB indicating that  a Member had failed to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.  The "inter pretation" sought by the EC in this case was
"no".  To reach the reading of the text sought by the EC would require amendments to the current
language of the DSU.  In the first instance, nowhere  in any of the provisions of the DSU cited by the
EC was there wording which mandated an additional finding by a panel or the Appellate Body as a
precondition to the exercise of a Member's rights under Article 22.  Secondly, as the US hadrepeatedly said, the existence in Article 22 of time periods tied expressly to "the expiry of the
reasonable period of time" would render Article 22 i noperative, if the EC's preferred "interpretation"
were applied to the text, unless the process referred to in Article 21.5 could take place within the
reasonable period of time.  To suggest that an Article 21.5 process was required, no matter when it
was initiated, amounted to reading Article 22 out of th e DSU.  She asked if the EC considered that the
DSB could be empowered to authorize suspension of  concessions without a panel finding, even where
a Member did nothing to implement recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of
time.  What about changes which were little more than cosmetic?  Given that the possible degrees
between doing nothing and full compliance were seemingly endless, what should be the trigger for
requiring another panel action?  The second question to the General Council posed by the EC could becharacterized as whether the DSB was prevented from taking, as the point of departure for the time
periods mentioned in Article 22.6, the adoption of  a panel or Appellate Body Report under the
procedures pursuant to an Article 21.5 DSU finding that a WTO Member had failed to comply with
the recommendations and rulings.  The interpretation sought by the EC in answer to this question was
"no".
For the text of the DSU to be read as the EC would like it to be read, the text would need to
be amended.  This could not be done through interpretation.  Only one single date could be referred to
as "the expiry of the reasonable period of time".  The negotiators of the DSU clearly wanted to link
recourse to Article 22 to a hard and fast date in an effort to guarantee timely justice.  No other date
could be substituted for this date.  An extension of the period referred to in Article 22.6 would amount
to an important extension in the "reasonable period of time" given for compliance.  The EC talkedabout both a panel action under Article 21.5 and an Appellate Body report, although there was no
reference to an appeal possibility in Article 21.5.  Since the EC was reading "recourse to these dispute
settlement procedures" as comprising a panel and Appellate Body process, the EC apparently also
held the view that there had to be another "reasonable period of time" as per Article 21.3 in which to
comply.  Once again, the meaning the EC was trying to read into the text through an "interpretation"would require amendment of a DSU text which was absolutely clear as to the date which triggered
recourse to Article 22.  Regarding why the issue was more complicated than depicted by the EC, first
there were the questions just addressed with respect to the reading to be given to the phrase in Article
21.5 "recourse to these dispute settlement procedures".  If that was to be read as including not only
consultations and a panel process, but also the possibility of appeal to the Appellate Body, one had toconsider that it should also mean the provision of another "reasonable period of time" at the end of the
process.  From the EC's suggested reading of the text, the next effort at compliance would also have to
be deemed as bringing the Member into compliance with its obligations, unless found by a panel, etc.WT/GC/M/35
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not to be in compliance.  Logically, the EC interpretation created an endless loop of litigation where a
losing party persisted in bad faith implementation efforts and the dispute never reached compensation
or suspension of concessions.  Any clarification of the relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22 had
to clearly and finally deal with the potential for an endless loop of litigation.  Secondly, a large part of
the problem arising from the bananas case had come about because the EC had taken the position
during the "reasonable period of time" that it ha d no obligation whatsoever to consult with the
winning parties on its implementation plans.  If the provisions of the DSU in this critical
implementation area were to be clarified, shouldn't it be made clear that the losing Member had to
keep the winning Member informed of its implementation plans over the course of the reasonable
period of time?  It was not right for the losing party to keep the aggrieved party in the dark for the
whole period of the "reasonable period of time".  Third, given the clear text reference in Article 22 to
the "expiry of the reasonable period of time" as the trigger for further actions under Article 22, why
was it unreasonable to read Article 21.5 as applying within that reasonable period of time?  Where inthe text of the DSU did it suggest that an Article 21.5 panel could not or should not operate in this
time-frame?  To ignore issues like these and others – and in particular not to demand that the EC state
its own position on these issues in the debate – was to vastly oversimplify the questions before the
General Council at the present meeting.  With only the immediate bananas dispute in mind, the EC
had sought a rush to judgement in response to WTO Members' dislike of unilateralism.  Such ajudgement would hold as many, if not more, pitfalls for the membership of the WTO than the current
situation.
Regarding the DSU review as the appropriate forum, the United States did not deny that the
relationship between Articles 21 and 22 deserved clarification.  However, this was a complicatedissue which deserved deliberative debate and examination.  To address only one aspect of the
procedures without dealing with the others would be a mistake.  The United States was not unwilling
to take up the issues which had come to the forefront in the course of the bananas case.  However,
these issues needed to be taken up in a way which separated the broad-based questions from the
instant dispute.  An approach was needed which dea lt with all the related issues.  It also had to be
recognized that amendments to the DSU, which lay at the core of the WTO system, had to be
negotiated and agreed by consensus as provided in the WTO Agreement.  Regarding the letter
circulated to some delegations by the EC on 11 February, she said that this first attempt to seek an
"authoritative interpretation" under Article IX:2  had highlighted the need to have any such
interpretation preceded by a structured process that would provide for thorough debate andexploration of all the legal and practical consequences of a proposed interpretation.  One needed to
think ahead and to prevent any future attempts to rewrite the results of the Uruguay Round on the
basis of ten days' notice.  The WTO Agreement was too important to be hastily manipulated for the
sake of the immediate needs of one Member.  Second, the Community's textual criticism of the US
paper admitted that the Community's real objective had been to interfere with an ongoing proceeding
– the arbitration by the original panel in the bananas dispute, which was now moving forward under
Article 22.7 of the DSU.  Her delegation remained convinced that such actions were not correct.  TheGeneral Council should not send the message that a Member could have a WTO dispute resolved by
voting.  The DSU rules were designed to avoid this.  She hoped that Members would reflect carefully
on the points she had made.
The representative of Japan recalled that at the DSB meeting which had started on 25 January
1998, under the agenda item requested by the US for the authorization to suspend concessions under
Article 22, Japan had asked the Chairman of the DSB when the DSB had determined that the failure
to comply, as stipulated in Articles 22.1 and 22.2, had occurred.  There had been no reply from the
Chairman or the Secretariat.  Both the Chairman and the Secretariat sensed that there was a difference
in interpretation among the Members, and it was not for the Chairman or the Secretariat to give anauthoritative interpretation.  That was the exclusive right of the Members.  At that meeting of the
DSB, the US had stated its interpretation that there was no need for the DSB to make a determination
as to the compliance or not by the losing party, in order for the prevailing party to resort toWT/GC/M/35
Page 17
Article 22.2 and 22.6 procedures.  Japan disagreed with this interpretation.  Where there was a
disagreement as to whether a party had complied or not with a panel or Appellate Body ruling or
recommendation, the parties had to resort to the Article 21.5 procedures.  This was a precondition to
the Article 22 procedures where there was a disagreement.  This was clear from the general structure
of the DSU, as well as from its drafting history.  It was precisely for the purpose of dealing with a
situation where there was such a disagreement that th is provision had been inserted in the DSU.  The
written text could be interpreted in many ways.  One had to go back to the fundamental principle
governing this organization.  Any other reading w ould undermine the multilateral nature of the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism as stipulated in Article 23 of the DSU.  What was being discussed was
not a mere procedural question but whether Members wanted to safeguard the multilateral character
of the system the organization represented.  It was not a mere legal argument, but a fundamental
political will of all Members that was at issue.
Japan did not agree that Article 22.6 provided for arbitration, that this arbitration would
provide the occasion to collectively check the issue of compliance, and that the arbitrator would
pronounce its judgement on compliance, which would then be sanctioned by the DSB.  As was clearly
stipulated in Article 22.6 and 22.7, arbitrators under this Article were not asked whether a Member
was guilty or not but how guilty it was.  Arbitration under Article 22.6 was already prejudicial, andthis was clear from the language of the DSU.  The whole of Article 22 had been drafted on the
understanding that non-compliance was determined beforehand, either through the Article 21.5
procedure or by the self determination of the losing party.  Some might argue that the losing party
could always come back with yet another new measure which again was short of compliance, and that
one would have to resort to the Article 21.5 process again, hence the endless loop of litigation if thelosing party did not act in good faith.  Such a view  completely negated the contractual nature of this
organization.  If Members thought this way, the organization would not function.  Once the
panel/Appellate Body ruling was made, if the losing party was found to be not in compliance with the
original panel/Appellate Body ruling, there were on ly two options left to this party, if it had no
intention or capacity to comply immediately.  One was to negotiate and agree on compensation withthe prevailing party, and the other was to accept its retaliation as long as it took to comply.
Retaliation was certainly not the preferred solution, because it was trade-restricting, not trade-
creating, but there was no endless loop of litigation.  Another important point was that the Article 21.5
procedure should be an expedited procedure.  The aim of this Article was to bring as quickly as
possible a remedy to the prevailing party, if its legitimate benefits were impaired or nullified.  Theimplementation period had been set up in order to allow the time necessary for the losing party to
bring its WTO-inconsistent measures into conformity.  The proper reading of Article 21 suggested
that any disagreement between the parties on compliance should also be settled before the
implementation period was over.  This would allo w a much more consistent reading of the whole
procedure.  However, a permissible interpretation was that the adoption of the report by the DSB
could be taken as the point of departure for the time-period mentioned in Article 22.6.  The
multilateral nature of the dispute settlement system under the WTO as stipulated in the DSU could besafeguarded only by the interpretation that Article 21.5 was a precondition to Article 22.  When there
was a disagreement as to whether a party had failed to comply with the panel/Appellate Body rulings
as stipulated in Article 22.2, such determination could only be made through the procedures laid down
in Article 21.5.  If one proceeded to the procedure of Article 22.6 without a collective determination
by the DSB and based only on an assertion by the prevailing party, the negative consensus approachwould leave no other option but to approve such a "unilateral" assertion, and would seriously
undermine the multilateral character of the dispute settlement system stipulated in Article 23 of the
DSU.  This was not the way to read the relevant Articles of the DSU.
The representative of India said that the General Council was dealing with an issue of great
systemic importance to all Members.  Paragraph 9 of Article 3 of the DSU clearly stated that the
provisions of the DSU were without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek interpretations of the
provisions of a covered agreement.  The EC was therefore well within its legal right to seekWT/GC/M/35
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authoritative interpretation of DSU provisions from the General Council.  The US response should
therefore be deemed as comments on the issue, which deserved consideration.  The EC request had
highlighted an issue that went far beyond the dispute that had engendered it in the first place.  The
crux of the issue raised by the EC was whether the multilateral trading system could allow a unilateral
determination by one Member of alleged non-compliance by another Member and allow the former to
take recourse to retaliatory provisions under the DSU against the alleged erring Member.  Article 22did confer on all WTO Members the right to suspend concessions vis-à-vis another Member under
certain carefully defined circumstances.  Among other things, it made it clear that Article 22 could be
invoked only as a last resort.  Article 21.5 preceded Article 22 and the provisions of the two Articles
were closely intertwined.  Therefore, the sequencing was beyond any doubt;  what was unclear were
the time-frames provided in the two Articles.  These needed clarification and elucidation through an
authoritative interpretation.  An amendment would not be appropriate, because the provisions were
already there in Articles 21.5 and 22.  In this regard, Japan's statement deserved special consideration.While some had said that the request for authoritative interpretation could undermine the amendment
provisions of Article X, the fact was that if the General Council did not take a decision on
authoritative interpretation, the multilateral tradin g system would be undermined.  After the issuance
of the Appellate Body Report and the DSB's reco mmendations in the matter, the two parties had
decided on a reasonable period of time for implementation.  This period was for implementation andnot for conducting negotiations with the winning party as to whether or not it was satisfied with
progress being made.  At the end of the day, there might well be situations, such as those outlined in
Article 21.5, where there was disagreement as to the existence or consistency of measures taken to
comply with the DSB's recommendations.  In those circumstances, the procedures set out in Article
21.5 had to be followed.  It would be an amendment of the DSU if one argued that either Article 21.5should be done away with or that Article 21.5 should be resorted to within the reasonable period of
time for implementation, or that Articles 21.5 and 22 could proceed side by side.  Article 21.5 should
precede Article 22, even if that necessitated certain changes to the time-frames in Article 22.  To
simply render Article 21.5 null and void was against the letter and spirit of the DSU.
One of the keystones of the DSU was its explicitly multilateral character, which in turn was
supposed to lend security and predictability to WTO Members.  If the winning party was given the
unfettered right to proceed straight to Article 22.6 based on what it believed was non-compliance, it
would deprive the DSU of its multilateral character.  More specifically, it would neither lend stability
nor predictability to the multilateral trading system.  India had noted that the EC had only proposed adiscussion at the present meeting and had reserved its right to revert to this matter.  India hoped that
good sense would prevail and that the General Council would be able to agree on an authoritative
interpretation based on consensus.  However, if at some point it happened that the choice was between
acquiescing in multilateralism and voting, India might have no option in the matter, as the alternative
would be to read unilateralism into Article 22.  This was unacceptable.  The General Council at its
present meeting could decide that Article 21.5 was an indispensable and integral part of the DSU and
a necessary step to be followed before resort to Article 22.6.  Having taken that decision, it could thendirect the DSB to make the necessary alteration in the time-frames so that clarity was achieved in the
dispute settlement procedures.  That was the right way forward.  Failure to act on the matter correctly
and promptly could lead to a collapse of the multilateral nature of the dispute settlement mechanism.
The representative of Mexico said that his delegation's reading of the situation was that
something was not right in the DSU.  One of the key factors in the differing views of the EC and the
US was whether or not Articles 21.5 and 22 were sequential.  If one followed a straightforward
reasoning using the sequential approach, there might be circumstances where if the reasonable period
of time were less than 90 days, it would be difficult to comply with this sequence.  If in other
circumstances, the sequential approach were adopted subsequent to the expiry of the reasonableperiod of time, there was another time conflict, which was the 30 days provided for under Article
22.6.  If there was no sequential approach to these two Articles, there was a problem of what the
ruling was on the regime set up by the Member claiming to comply with the recommendations of theWT/GC/M/35
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panel or Appellate Body.  Therefore, Mexico drew the conclusion that there was something wrong
with the DSU.  This would have to be settled.  Currently there were three channels for resolution of
this issue:  it could be taken up as part of the overall review of the DSU in the DSB;  an interpretation
could be made, as requested by the EC;  or there could be an amendment as argued by the US.  It
would be very difficult to decide, with the few elem ents available at present, whether an interpretation
or amendment would be the most appropriate approach.  Before Members took a position on this, theyneeded to have a clearer picture of what Article 21.5 contained and the procedures it provided for.
Once all of the necessary elements were available, one would have to look at the time period and
determine when it started.  No further steps should be taken before all the elements were clear.
The representative of Hungary, also on behalf of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland,
Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, said that Article 22.2 of the DSU made authorization by
the DSB of the suspension of concessions or other obligations under Article 22.6 conditional upon the
existence of a determination of non-compliance by a Member with the recommendations and rulings
in a given case.  Article 22.2 did not explicitly identify the form of such a determination, by virtue of
Article 21.5 which stipulated that disputes over th e existence or WTO-consistency of measures taken
to comply with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB shall be decided through recourse to the
dispute settlement procedures, i.e. to a panel.  Nor did Article 23.2 (a) allow for a determination ofcompliance or non-compliance with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB, except through
recourse to the dispute settlement procedure, i.e. to a panel.  However, it was within the exclusive
competence of the DSB to make such a determination.  A different interpretation would be contrary to
the provisions of Articles 21 and 23 and would lead to a situation where a complaining party could
assume the role of the judge in its own case, and where a complaining party could enjoy an absoluteright to retaliate against the defendant party, irrespective of the steps taken by the latter to comply
with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB.  As to the point of departure for the time periods
mentioned in Article 22.6, it had to be emphasized that  the procedure  under this Article could only be
triggered if the conditions described in paragraph 2 thereof were fulfilled, i.e. a determination of non-
compliance had been made.  Such a determination could only be multilateral in nature.  The timeneeded to conclude the Article 21.5 procedure should not deprive Members of their right to take
action pursuant to Article 22.6.
The representative of Chile commented on two aspects of the multilateral trading system:  the
authority of the DSB to take a decision on a request for suspension of concessions while a panel
report was pending under Article 21.5; and enforcement of the right to request the suspension of
concessions.  Regarding the DSB's authority, Article 22 lay down a precondition for authorization by
the DSB of the suspension of concessions.  This precondition was that the Member concerned had to
have failed to comply with the DSB's recomme ndations.  Where there was disagreement regarding
compliance, the DSU expressly provided for the intervention of a panel on a mandatory basis.  In such
cases the DSB, before authorizing the suspension, had to approve the panel report stating that the
Member concerned had failed to comply with its obligations.  As long as the panel report had not beenapproved, the DSB lacked jurisdiction to take a decision on a request for suspension of concessions.
If a Member had made a request in due form for the suspension of concessions to be authorized within
the period of time indicated in Article 22, that claim could not be disregarded on the grounds that the
DSB had not taken a decision within the period of time stipulated in that Article.  The conflict that
had developed between Articles 21.5 and Article 22 called for a definition of the meaning and scopeof the rules on the basis of their content, as well as  of other rules dealing with the same issue, such as
Articles 3.7 and 23 of the DSU, since the provisions of an international agreement had to be
interpreted in accordance with its terms in their cont ext and in the light of its object and purpose.  The
context of the rules referred to led to a determinat ion that the DSB could only grant the authorization
to suspend concessions once the panel report under Article 21.5 had been adopted.  At the same time,however, if the right to request retaliation had been exercised within the time allowed, it had to remain
in force pending adoption of the corresponding panel report.  In other words, if the DSB had failed to
take a decision on suspension within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time - becauseWT/GC/M/35
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it was awaiting the findings of the panel - this f act did not prejudice the right of the Member which
had requested retaliation at the proper time.  This conclusion flowed from a process of interpretation
of the DSU rules.  It was important to determine whether one was dealing with a process of
interpretation or amendment, because different procedures would flow from that determination.
Although Chile was convinced of the need to foll ow the interpretation procedure - and agreed in
substance with Japan's statement - its position was flexible on whether interpretation or amendmentwas required.  This matter required proper consideration by all Members.  Negotiating texts should be
studied before any decision was taken.
The representative of Australia said that he wanted to make four points.  First, this issue
involved systemic issues, and Australia's comments were not related to the bananas dispute.  Second,
the best avenue for discussion of the relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22 was the DSU review.
Third, no hasty action should be taken, given the complexity of the issues and their importance to thesystem.  Fourth, there was a logic to the sequencing of Article 21.5 before Article 22 where there was
disagreement over implementation;  however, it was important to clarify the procedures in order to
avoid a legal procedural loop developing.  Australia had proposed a structured debate on the
relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22, including the need to clarify the procedures to be followed
in applying Article 21.5.  The issue at hand should be discussed in a calm environment, separate fromthe legal intricacies and artifices that had become attached to the bananas dispute.  Australia did not
favour putting this issue to a vote in the General Council at any time.  There did not seem any
prospect for a structured debate or for informed discussions in the General Council on the substance
of the relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22, pending the completion of the current Article 21.5
and 22.6 procedures on bananas.  Article 21.5 procedures would appear to have specific application tocircumstances where there was disagreement about the WTO consistency of implementing measures
which had been completed within the agreed or arbitrated time-periods.  In such circumstances there
was a logic in sequencing Article 21.5 procedures before those of Article 22.  The effective
functioning of Article 21.5 and the appropriate relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22 were, at
their most fundamental, dependent on a good-faith approach to implementation.  The system would
break down if legal artifice was employed to subvert the underlying purpose of the provisions of
Articles 21 and 22.  Australia supported a structured and detailed debate in the DSU review on the
many-faceted aspects of the relationship between these Articles, including the need for clarity in
procedural rules, bearing in mind the predictability and security to recourse to Articles 4, 6 and 16,
and associated with the detailed DSU procedural provisions applying to those Articles.  Absent astructured debate in the DSU, it was difficult to imagine informed decision-making by Members, and
decisions that would not be continually re-opene d, whether through General Council or Ministerial
Conference processes.
The representative of Canada said that her delegation supported the notion that an Article 21.5
panel determination should precede any request for retaliation under Article 22.  The EC's request for
an authoritative interpretation and the US response thereto demonstrated that the issues involved werecomplex and multifaceted and did not lend themselves to a simple yes or no answer.  These issues
needed to be examined in the framework of the DSU review.  It was imperative that the relationship
between Articles 21, 22 and 23 be considered in a broad institutional framewor k rather than in the
context of a specific dispute.  Canada had a systemic interest in seeing these issues resolved.  Given
the ambiguities of the DSU as currently worded, Canada was not hopeful that the differences could beresolved by attempting a narrow legal construction of the existing text.  Instead, one needed to
determine the fundamental policy objectives of these Articles - what they should provide - and if need
be, amend the text to meet these objectives.  These Articles had to be seen as a whole.  Article 23
clearly provided that Members shall not make a determination that a violation had occurred except
through recourse to dispute settlement.  Article 21.5, which provided such recourse, allowed for amultilateral determination of non-compliance.  This was a logical precondition to the invocation of
Article 22.  In order to avoid future disputes over implementation, it was necessary to clarify a range
of issues related to the invocation of Article 21 and 22.  Mexico had raised a number of issues relatedWT/GC/M/35
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thereto.  For example, should consultations have to precede a request for a panel under Article 21.5 ?
Should a responding party be entitled to self-initiate an Article 21.5 panel?  Should the findings of the
Article 21.5 panel be subject to appeal?  Would a responding party be entitled to another reasonable
period of time to implement the determinations of the panel?  What time lines should apply to each
step of the process?  Her delegation had the following  preliminary views on these questions, but
might wish to revert to some of them in future discussions.  New Article 4 consultations should not bea mandatory precondition to a request for a panel under Article 21.5, particularly given the tight time
frames involved.  A responding party should be entitled to self-initiate an Article 21.5 panel in order
to demonstrate the WTO consistency of its measures, especially when faced with a complaining party
that wanted to proceed directly to retaliation.  As an alternative to providing for a right of appeal, one
could examine whether the Appellate Body in the first instance served as the body that made an
expedited determination of compliance under Article 21.5 or which served as the arbitrator under
Article 22.6.  This would greatly expedite either pr ocess.  Moreover, under current DSU rules, the
Appellate Body was already required to operate under expedited time frames for normal appeals and
thus should be able to complete either proceeding  within 60 days.  If the Appellate Body served at
such a function, then the right to retaliate would fl ow as a matter of right immediately following its
determination under Articles 21.5 or 22.6.  There should be no further reasonable period of time.
These were not issues that could be resolved easily.  Nevertheless, it was imperative to pursue thesequestions as a critical priority in the DSU review. The events of the past few weeks had proved that
unresolved implementation disputes could pose grave systemic threats to the WTO.  It was essential
that Members embark on this exercise in good faith and with a sense of urgency in order to find
solutions that would protect the institutional integrity of the organization.
The representative of Argentina said that there were gaps in the text of the DSU regarding the
sequential relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22.6, which allowed diverse interpretations.  The
nature of the question raised by the request for interpretation by the General Council was obscure.
The answer could take the form of an amendmen t to the DSU by way of interpretation of its
provisions, in which case Article X.8 of the WTO Agreement would be applicable, which stipulatedthat amendments shall be adopted by consensus and approved by the Ministerial Conference.  The
method selected to resolve this problem was not the right one.  It was not desirable to compel a
General Council interpretation on DSU rules when th e DSU was under review.  It was in that review
process that Members were contributing their opinions on the problems of implementation that had
arisen.  Nor should the General Council produce a hurried interpretation in order to resolve a specificproblem rather than to establish general guidelines.  Such an approach would involve the following
difficulties:  First, it was politically impossible for Members to achieve the necessary agreement to
resolve this issue through the traditional WTO decision-making mechanism, which was consensus.
Second, an authoritative interpretation by the General Council with regard to a DSU rule should be
preceded by a DSB recommendation on the subject.  Accordingly, the appropriate forum for
discussion of this matter was the DSU review process currently under way.  The interpretation in due
form of a treaty had to take account of the ordinary  meaning of its terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose, in accordance with  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.  The analysis of these factors for the pu rpose of interpreting rules contained in the DSU, an
exercise bound to have significant implications for the future functioning of the WTO, could not be
carried out in the course of a single meeting of the General Council without the benefit of prior DSB
recommendations based on rigorous legal analysis.  Furthermore, a decision could not be taken bymeans of a premature vote.  Third, it was impossible in practice for the interpretation requested to
determine, on the basis of a simple decision, which of the articles referred to should apply to the
present dispute.  The General Council would have to take a decision on a set of questions aimed at
defining the precise meaning, in procedural terms, of Article 21.5.  This provision raised a number of
important questions:  Were consultations necessary?  How were they proposed?  Was the decision toset up a panel under Article 21.5 appealable to the Appellate Body?  Was a reasonable period of time
allowed for bringing into conformity measures found inconsistent by the Article 21.5 panel?  If not,
did this mean the Member complained against was not entitled to organize compliance with the DSBWT/GC/M/35
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recommendations?  Was recourse to Article 21.5 possible before expiry of the reasonable period of
time?  Were the 90 days referred to in Article 21.5 included in the reasonable period of time?  These
questions defined the length of time entailed by the procedures under Article 21.5, which was a factor
of enormous importance for defining the relationship with Article 22 and its consistency or
inconsistency with the time-limits established by the latter Article.  He asked how much time the
General Council would require to make this interpre tation, assuming that it was indeed an exercise in
interpretation, which Argentina doubted.  Any decision designed to establish a permanent definition
of the scope of the agreed rules had to be taken in the context of the DSU review process and could
not be reached on an ad hoc basis to resolve one particular dispute.  A vote on a proposal of this
nature would be a serious error, since it was only after difficult and protracted negotiations that a
consensus had emerged on setting up the dispute settlement mechanism.  A vote would destroy that
mechanism, which was a cornerstone of the multilateral trading system.  Article IX.2 of the WTO
Agreement could not be used to break the rule of consensus - a rule which guaranteed the adoption ofdecisions by the DSB, in accordance with Article 2.4 of the DSU.  If Members considered it necessary
to adapt the disciplines of the DSU and to remedy any existing gaps or ambiguities, the most
appropriate way to do so was by amending the DSU in the wake of the review process currently
underway.
The representative of Brazil said that Brazil's position in favour of the logic of sequencing
between Articles 21.5 and 22.2 was clear and had already been expressed.  Many questions had been
raised regarding the implementation of Article 21.5, and Brazil was ready to work on clarifying those
problems which reflected an existing ambiguity in the DSB.  The DSU review was probably the best
place to do this.  In that exercise, a guiding principle should be the multilateral character of the DSU.Brazil preferred a decision by consensus or a negotiated solution if possible.  However, if a decision
were to be taken by the General Council, Brazil would act in accordance with its principle position.
The representative of Switzerland said that this issue was of the utmost importance for the
functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system and the multilateral trading system.  Switzerland
had expressed its views on the legal aspects of this issue in meetings of the DSB, and those views had
not changed.  Its position had always been guided by a determination to preserve the multilateral
character of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and an analysis of the wording of the relevant
legal provisions, their context and the objectives pursued.  Regarding recourse to Articles 21.5 and 22
of the DSU, Article 21.5 should be applied whenever the parties to a dispute had diverging views onthe consistency of measures taken to implement the recommendations of a panel or of the Appellate
Body.  In such cases, a panel had to be established in accordance with the provisions of Article 21.5.
The context in which the relevant provisions were set showed that recourse to the Article 21.5
procedure was a precondition for the invocation of Article 22.  Clarification of the sequence of
procedures did not solve all aspects of the relationship between Articles 21 and 22, particularly
regarding the time-limits for the procedures and the means of recourse available.  These aspects
related to the objectives of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and thus to the balance ofMembers' rights and obligations.  In this regard, the DSU clearly stipulated that the prompt settlement
of disputes in good faith was essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.  Therefore, in solving
the problem at hand the WTO also had to bear in mind the aspects relating to the clarification of the
sequence of procedures.  A structured discussion of these aspects in the framework of the review of
the DSU would provide useful clarifications in  connection with any decision Members might be
called upon to take in the General Council.
The representative of Korea said that his delegation had made its view clear on previous
occasions that Article 21.5 procedures of the DSU should be exhausted before a Member could
invoke Article 22 provisions.  There was no ambiguity as to the logical sequence of the twoprocedures of the DSU.  The text itself, as well as the drafters' intention, was clear enough in this
regard.  However, there was a lack of clarity c oncerning the relationship between Articles 21.5 and
22.6, particularly in terms of time-frames.  The DSU was silent on whether or not Article 21.5WT/GC/M/35
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procedures should be completed prior to the expiry of the reasonable period of time.  Taking the
relevant provisions of the DSU in their entirety, one could only reasonably assume that the time-frame
envisioned by the drafters required the completion of Article 21.5 procedures within the reasonable
time-period.  However, given the ambiguity of the text, more work should be done to clarify the
linkage between the time-frames in the relevant provisions of the DSU.  An authoritative
interpretation of this issue would be premature.  Korea recognized the rights of Members under theDSU to seek an authoritative interpretation, but was not sure whether an authoritative interpretation
by the General Council was the best option for a solution in the current circumstances.  The WTO was
not a purely judicial institution, but one that stood firmly on the established practices of consensus and
compromise, as well as on the tradition of pragma tism inherited from the GATT era.  Given the nature
of this dispute, which was politically charged, no solution was feasible without the political will to
compromise on both sides.  Hasty decisions should be avoided.  Any decision on these matters would
affect all Members and might have serious effects on future cases.  Thorough examination of all therelated issues and concerns in the context of the DSU review was necessary before a final decision
was taken.
The representative of Barbados said that a comparison could be made between Articles 21.5
and 22.6 of the DSU.  Under Article 21.5 a dispute as to whether a Member had complied with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB required th e following of dispute settlement procedures,
including, where possible, resort to the original panel.  Under this Article the panel was allowed a 90-
day period to provide a report.  Under Article 22.6, a failure to comply with recommendations or
rulings, that is, a failure as determined by th e DSB, allowed for the authorisation to suspend
concessions or other obligations to be given within a period of 30 days of the expiry of the reasonableperiod of time in cases where the request for such suspension was not rejected by consensus.  The
issue was whether Article 22.6 read together with Article 22.2 allowed a complaining party to
automatically suspend concessions or other obligations to the offending party provided that a
reasonable time, determined under Article 21.3, had elapsed.  The question to be asked was whether
the words of Article 22.6 "the DSB upon request shall grant authorisation… within 30 days of theexpiry of the reasonable period…" should be read as facilitating a process so that redress could be
obtained expeditiously, or whether these words should be read as a limitation period excluding an
action unless it fell within the reasonable period.  If the former interpretation was correct, the Member
who did not come within the reasonable period was not prejudiced.  However, if the latter was correct
it would mean that the DSB would not possess the competence after the reasonable period plus the 30-day period to grant authorisation, and the Member was thereby prejudiced.  Since the provisions were
not clear and since there was an absence of agreement on the procedure for recourse to Articles 21
and 22, this matter should properly be submitted for interpretation.  That interpretation could only be
given by the General Council as one of the two bodies with exclusive authority under Article IX:2 of
the WTO Agreement to make interpretations.  The general principle of international law was that
states could not unilaterally determine infractions of an agreement and could not unilaterally take
remedial or consequential action.  An independent determination by an authoritative forum was inkeeping with the requirement of fairness and impartiality.  It was therefore of fundamental importance
that authoritative interpretations were given where there were doubts or difficulties as to the actual
meaning of an agreement.  The intention was not to modify the text to include a new concept, but
rather to clarify what the existing text sought to provide.  An interpretation of an agreement to make
clear exactly what the relevant procedure and time periods were should not, if possible, interfere with
the desirability of consensus.  The dispute settlement mechanism was pivotal to the WTO agreements.
It was of the utmost importance that all parties to these agreements, and especially small Member
states like Barbados, were able to know precisely what a procedure entailed.  It was therefore of the
greatest importance that the procedure pertaining to Articles 21 and 22 was made clear by
interpretation.
The representative of Hong Kong, China said that his delegation did not favour any voting on
this important and complex issue.  Discussions at the present meeting and at the relevant DSU reviewWT/GC/M/35
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meetings should not be coloured by the ongoing specific dispute case.  Regarding the drafting
intention of Articles 21 and 22, there were five guiding principles underlying their drafting:  prompt
compliance;  the provision of an effective surveillance mechanism by the DSB;  the multilateral
character in any decision-making and determination process by the DSB;  the provision of effective
remedies granted upon a multilateral decision by the DSB;  and, more specifically, that Article 21.5
procedures should precede Article 22 as a matter of principle.  The question at hand was whetherthese principles had been fully and accurately translated into the existing provisions of the DSU.  The
answer, regrettably, was no.  The relevant Articles of the existing DSU were poorly drafted and were
full of gaps and ambiguities.  Examples were:  First, Article 21.5 which was not clear on the exact
procedures to be followed, whether there should be any Appellate Body procedure, whether there
should be consultations before making a panel request, what the proper timing of making the panel
request was, whether the panel proceedings should be completed within the reasonable period of time
or should commence after the expiry of the reasonable period of time.  Second, Article 22 did notmake any explicit reference to Article 21.5.  The original drafters should have provided such an
explicit link, if the issue of sequencing had been a clear consensus decision.  Third, there was the
difficulty in reconciling the timing conflicts in the Article 21.5 reference to "90 days" and the
Article 22.6 reference to "30 days" and "60 days".  His delegation did not find any interpretations on
the existing provisions credible or fully defensible, and therefore concluded that the only solution wasto redraft the relevant provisions of the DSU through the DSU review.  The DSB had already agreed
to give priority to complete this task by the e nd of July 1999.  Therefore, the General Council should,
at the present meeting, send a strong signal to the DSB to urge it to come up with a consensus
recommendation as soon as possible for consideration by the Ministerial Conference or the General
Council.  His delegation urged the EC, the US and all parties involved in the dispute to find a
mutually agreeable solution and to subject their national interests to the overall interests of the
multilateral trading system.
The representative of Panama said that the suggestion for an interpretation of the DSU should
not be taken lightly, and that the possible outcomes of any decision in this area should be studied
carefully.  The appropriate forum for discussion of these issues was the DSU review process.  He
urged the EC to take all of the statements made at the present meeting into consideration and to
maintain an open mind about the way to make the necessary clarification.
The representative of Belize said that there was broad consensus that the WTO dispute
settlement system should be a central element in providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system.  It would be a travesty of the most fundamental principles of law and
justice if a Member were allowed to be both a prosecutor and judge in the same case.  For this reason,
the answer to the questions put by the EC had to be an emphatic no.  Article 22.4 required that the
level of suspension of concessions authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment.  The spirit and the letter of this text made it clear that only the DSB was
empowered to determine the level of nullification or impairment.  No single Member or group ofMembers had that authority.  Before doing so, however, the DSB had to first determine whether the
implementing measures conformed to WTO rules, and if not, to what extent.  Only the DSB could do
this.  Where there was disagreement on implementing measures, Article 21.5 allowed resort to the
original panel to determine whether or not the measures complied with WTO rules.  The important
requirement of non-compliance and a reasonable period of time was met by the requirement that theoriginal panel circulate its report within 90 days af ter the date of referral of the matter to it.  The
purpose and design of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was to strengthen the multilateral
trading system.  In seeking redress of a violation of obligations Article 23 required that members
abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.  Further, it specifically prohibited Members from
making a unilateral determination that a violation, nullification or impairment had occurred.  Thespirit and letter of the DSU shunned all unilateralism in favour of the rules-based multilateralism
embodied in this organization.  This approach to the settlement of disputes was essential to theWT/GC/M/35
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effectiveness of the WTO.  The General Council had to preserve the integrity of the  rules-based
multilateral system and guard against unilateralism.
The representative of Honduras said that when the text of a provision was unambiguous, it
could not be disregarded on the pretext that its spirit needed interpretation.  The text of Article 22 did
not set out the procedural steps described by the EC and did not stipulate that the review provided for
in Article 21.5 was a compulsory stage to be completed before a request was made under Article 22.
Nor was it foreseen under Article 22 that the review stage under Article 21.5 should include an appeal
and adoption of a decision by the DSB.  The fact that some Members in meetings of the DSB had
suggested that Articles 21.5 and 22 should be amended so as to make the mechanism under Article
21.5 a prerequisite for recourse to the Article 22 procedure only confirmed that the current text did not
provide for the steps the EC wanted to introduce.  This debate could have the undesirable effect of
giving rise to amendments that would weaken Article 22 and impair possible compliance with
decisions and, as a corollary, the legal certainty and predictability required by any Member who
submitted a dispute to the DSB.  Care should be taken not to lay the groundwork for an interminable
series of procedures.  The problem at hand stemmed from an initiative to amend the DSU on the basis
of an interpretation of the texts.  If the matter we re considered from the standpoint of an amendment
of the DSU, practically all Members could agree that it was necessary and logical to include time-limits, procedural steps and requirements.  However, this was an interpretative exercise, and Honduras
could not support such time-limits and procedural steps.
The representative of Jamaica said that this matter went beyond a mere dispute between the
EC and the US.  The General Council was dealing with the effective functioning of the DSB and the
multilateral trading system.  In its document, the EC was asking whether the DSB could authorizesuspension of concessions against a Member on the basis of a unilateral determination by anotherMember.  The answer was no.  The EC's question gave rise to several other questions against thebackground of a conflict between Members over compliance of implementing measures:  by whomor how could one determine compliance or non-compliance of an implementing measure?  If acorrective measure or implementing measure was thought to be not in compliance, what time-frames should be used to further rectify this situation under the DSU procedures?  Was there a needfor the original panel, any panel, the Appellate Body or the DSB to pronounce on the implementingmeasure before a further decision could be taken by the DSB?  Not having examined or determined
the conformity or non-conformity of an implem enting measure, could the DSB use as its point of
reference the time-periods, set out in Article 22.6, of the adopted panel recommendations andrulings of the DSB on the original complaint?  The answer had to be no.  Jamaica supported theview that an objective determination within the DSB of the compliance of the implementing measurewas necessary before the DSB could authorize any Member to take action under Article 22.  Anyunilateral action would not only undermine the credibility and integrity of the WTO but would lead
to anarchy in the trading system.  Her delegation did not believe the EC was seeking an amendment
to the DSU or WTO provisions, but rather respect for the rules.  Where existing rules were clearthey should be upheld, and where ambiguities existe d there was need for clarification.  The EC's
request should be seen in the context of the need for clarification regarding the operation of Articles21 and 22.  For Article 22.2 and 22.6 to operate, the new measure had to qualify as having been"found to be inconsistent".  Could a complainant unilaterally declare that in its opinion the newmeasures were not consistent?  Such unilateral action was contrary to the spirit of decision-makingon a multilateral consensual basis.  Further, Members had committed themselves to uphold theprecepts expressed in Article 23.  In light of this direction, there had to be recourse to theprovisions which allowed for an assessment of new measures.  That provision was Article 21.5.The term "these dispute settlement procedures" in Article 21.5 clearly referred to the entire disputesettlement process of the DSU, from the consultative process through recourse to an Appellate Bodyhearing.  The assessment might even employ the expedited form of an arbitration under Article 25.WT/GC/M/35
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If the decision of the panel/Appellate Body adopted by the DSB found that the new measures were
inconsistent, the offending Member would be entitled to invoke its rights under Article 22.2 and22.6.  Jamaica agreed with the EC's arguments that the "only logical sequence and the onlyreasonable interpretation of the set of DSU provisions governing implementation… is that the DSBis not empowered to grant authorization until such time as the DSB had first adopted a ruling on theWTO conformity of the EC… measures pursuant to Article 21.5".  Regarding the proper WTOforum in which to conduct this debate, while it was clear that there was need for clarity on anumber of provisions of the DSU, and that some of these provisions were currently being discussedwithin the context of the review of the DSU, the EC's request for authoritative interpretation inrespect of Articles 21 and 22 could be dealt with independently of that review process.  On the issueraised by the US as to whether the General Council should discuss this issue or whether it should bedealt with in the review of the DSU, she said that the present discussion emanated from longdeliberations within the DSB.  The placing of these items on the General Council's agenda was alsoan indication that the DSB could not resolve the points of divergence among Members on therelationship between these two Articles.  It was now up to the General Council to deliberate and toshed some interpretative light on these matters to guide the DSB in its future work.  In the case ofthe current dispute over the EC Banana Regime, the lack of clarity in the interpretation of Articles21 and 22 was a major contributory factor to the impasse in resolving this dispute.  Consequently,the need for clarification of the procedures under these Articles was essential and need not await theDSU review process.
The representative of Malaysia, on behalf of the ASEAN Members, recalled that as parties to
the Marrakesh Agreement, all Members were bound to act in a manner which did not defeat the object
and purpose of that Agreement.  This cardinal principle had to guide any decision the General Council
was called to upon to take.  The Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement was clear:  Members were to
develop and preserve an integrated, viable and durable multilateral trading system.  All decisions andall courses of action, as a matter of principle, had to be guided by this object and purpose, which had
been negotiated and accepted as binding on all Members.  The substance of the EC's request was of
prime importance, and the matter was very complex.  It would be difficult and perhaps too simplistic
to decide it by a simple yes or no.  Members should examine the matter in detail and in a calm
manner.  The ASEAN Members were not in a position to decide on this matter - which should bedecided by consensus - at the present meeting.  The relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22.6
required further work, which would best be left to the DSU review.
The representative of New Zealand said that the questions involved were very serious ones,
both for individual members and for the collective membership of a rule-based and rule-enforcing
institution.  There was a serious risk of over-simplifying the issues and all the elements involved, their
inter-relationship, and the interplay between them .  New Zealand wanted all the complex elements
involved to be addressed in a calm and responsible way with emphasis on a sound and durable
solution and with a minimum of delay, consistent with careful thought and discussion.  Articles 21
and 22 should be addressed, as a matter of priority, in the current DSU review exercise.  That
approach should lead to the adoption of a solution, be it an interpretation, amendment or clarified
working procedure, based on the consensus resolution of these vitally important substantive issues.He noted that others who wished to see the matter handled in the DSU review held a variety of views
on Articles 21 and 22.  It was clear that there was a strong diversity of opinion on these Articles.  The
fact was that the DSU itself was the product of the collective effort of the membership.  New Zealand
therefore asked all Members to take up the issues, in the context of the DSU review, with a sense of
collective responsibility.
The representative of Uruguay said that these important issues should be considered
separately from the specific trade problems which had given rise to them.  Members had to consider
carefully the repercussions which this debate - and particularly the decisions to which it would giveWT/GC/M/35
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rise - would have on the multilateral trading system and in particular on the dispute settlement system.
Those decisions would establish precedents for future assessment of requests for interpretation or
amendment, and for the difference between unilatera lism and full compliance with current and future
agreements.  This was the first time the General Council had been called upon to fulfil its functions
under Articles IX and X of the WTO Agreement.  The outcome would indicate whether there was any
practical way to compel understandings on specific articles of an agreement for the temporaryconvenience of one or another Member, particularly those whose commercial power and political
weight enabled them to obtain decisions in their favour.  First, the issue at hand was not the only
problem regarding the text of the DSU, as had been shown by the review of the DSU currently
underway.  That was the context in which Members were looking at ways of solving the current
problems as a whole. Uruguay made a clear distinction between what it considered to be procedural
aspects and more substantive aspects.  Regarding the procedural aspects, the manner in which the
respective parties had raised this issue in the General Council required Members to consider whetherit was necessary to amend the DSU or merely to inte rpret the relationship between two of its articles.
According to the dictionary definition, an interpre tation consisted in explaining abstruse points or
providing grammatical or etymological  clarification, without altering the meaning or spirit of the text,
while an amendment required a modification of the text in question.  In Uruguay's view, the
relationship between Articles 21 and 22 fell within th e second category.  This view was based on two
considerations:  first, the text of the articles in question needed to be recast to give it the meaning
which Members attributed to it;  second, if that m eaning was to be what Uruguay thought it should be,
it was essential to reword various aspects of these and other articles of the DSU so as to ensure that
they combined to form a harmonious set of provisions with no contradictions, duplications or legal
gaps which might enable a party to a dispute to evade compliance with its obligations or impedeanother party from enjoying its rights under the Agreement.  A process of amendment of the DSU
should be initiated in order to achieve those goal s, and should be conducted under Article X of the
WTO Agreement.  However, given the DSU review process which was underway, a more
constructive approach would be to study and resolve the issue within the framework of that exercise,
which would doubtless include other reforms to deal with problems previously identified.  Otherimportant considerations were that any amendment to a treaty, once agreed, had to be submitted for
parliamentary ratification in Members whose domestic legislation so required.  Further, it would only
enter into force once ratification had been completed and would have no retroactive effect.  All
disputes up to that point should be resolved on the basis of the existing texts, with whatever
inadequacies they contained.
Regarding the substantive aspects of this matter and how the relationship between Articles 21
and 22 should be reflected in any amended text, there was a logical continuity between the steps
provided for in Articles 21 and 22, i.e. before a request was made for authorization to withdraw
concessions, the procedures provided for in Article 21 should be exhausted.  However, in order to
maintain the balance between those two Articles, and in  particular to prevent their being used to delay
compliance with obligations, it was necessary to define a set of additional elements that should becovered, including the following:  an indicative reasonable period of time for arbitration, shorter than
the period currently provided for in Article 21.3(c);  the holding of consultations between the parties
during the reasonable period of time, rather than afterwards, in order to avoid any subsequent dispute;
the procedure under Article 21.5 should be accepted by the DSB automatically when it was first
included in the agenda;  the procedure currently covered by Article 21.5 should be carried out with theparticipation of the panel which originally considered the case without appeal, or under the direct
responsibility of the Appellate Body if the case had reached that level, with the same time-limits in
either event;  the time-limits and procedures applicable to Article 21.5 should be established clearly
and in detail;  the decision taken should be final, and if a new reasonable period of time was granted,
it should not exceed 30 days;  this procedure could be used only once;  the authorization provided forin Article 22 with regard to withdrawal of concessions should be granted automatically from the point
in time marking the end of the reasonable period of time following a determination under Article 21.5.
These points should be supplemented by consideration of the many issues raised during the DSUWT/GC/M/35
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review process, including those relating to special and differential treatment for developing countries.
Lastly, Uruguay was categorically opposed to voting as a procedural option, since it would lead to
voting in all the WTO bodies, thereby detracting from the WTO's essential role as an organization
based on consensus for the benefit of all Members.
The representative of Guatemala agreed that the text of the DSU contained incompatible time-
frames.  However, the solution could not be found in an interpretation aimed at introducing changes to
Articles 21.5 and 22.  That exercise should be carried out in the review of the DSU in order to put an
end to inconsistencies between the two Articles rega rding time-periods.  In that review a decision also
had to be taken on the issue of the stages in the Article 21.5 procedure.  Guatemala supported the
statements by Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico and ot hers concerning the need to undertake a review
which clarified the relationship between these Articles without impairing the rights arising from
Article 22, which should serve the purpose of full and prompt compliance with panelrecommendations.  The relationship between Article s 21 and 22 was a complex issue which should be
tackled in the context of the review of the DSU.
The representative of Mauritius said that her delegation looked for good faith in the
consultations on this issue by the EC and US and equally in the manner in which the issue was
addressed by the General Council.  While it was the EC which had made a request for an
interpretation by the General Council, a number of Members had sought such an interpretation at the
DSB meeting held from 25 January to 1 February as a way forward from the impasse in which the
DSB then found itself.  Her delegation shared the view that the WTO should not become a legalistic
institution.  One way to avoid this was to strive fo r decisions by consensus without this affecting other
rights.  She reiterated her delegation's position that Articles 21.5 and 22 had been established in a
logical sequence and that their application was therefore sequential in nature.  Article 21.5 was
explicit in that whenever there was disagreement as to the existence of consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with DSB recommendations, the dispute shall be decided
through recourse to dispute settlement procedures in cluding, whenever possible, resort to the original
panel.  Use of the word "shall" highlighted the fact that Article 21.5 did not provide any other
alternative than panel proceedings in case of a dispute over compliance with panel or Appellate Body
recommendations.  This interpretation was further reinforced by Article 22 in which two conditions
were outlined:  that the situation in Article 22.2 had to occur, and that Article 22.2 itself started with
the proviso "If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be insistent with a coveredagreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with…".  The lack of conformity therefore
had to be established to the satisfaction of the entire DSB since it was the DSB as a whole which
granted, albeit in a negative manner, the authorization for suspension of concessions.  It was only after
non-compliance had been clearly established by the panel and agreed upon by Members, that the date
for expiry of the reasonable period of time could be set in order to enable the initiation of Article 22.6
procedures.  The application of Article 22.6 in the absence of a panel report under Article 21.5 would
imply that the party applying the provisions of Article 22.6 had taken upon itself the role of the paneland had determined the outcome of panel proceedings.  This would be contrary to Article 23 which
established Members' obligation to have recourse to DSU when seeking redress.  Article 23 clearly
stipulated that in such cases, Members shall "not make a determination to the effect that a violation
has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
the covered agreements has been impeded".  Application of Article 22.6 in such a context wouldequally nullify the purpose of Article 22.7, since any appointed arbitrator would be asked to arbitrate
in a situation of vacuum, not having any factual evidence on which to base his arbitration.  While
some issues relating to Articles 21 and 22 might require clarification or interpretation, this should not
cast doubt on the sequencing between Articles 21.5 and 22.6.  Mauritius agreed that questions raised
in this connection should be taken up in the broader context of the DSU review with the agreedobjective of preventing any abuse of the system.WT/GC/M/35
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The representative of Cyprus agreed with those who had said that the DSB had the exclusive
competence to determine compliance with its recomm endations or rulings, through recourse to the
dispute settlement procedure, i.e. a panel.  Cyprus firmly supported the multilateral, rules-based
approach within the DSB.  Any action undermining this approach should be avoided in order to
safeguard the WTO edifice.  Agreed procedures had to be fully respected in order for the membership
to continue to feel its interests were protected by the WTO.
The representative of Norway agreed with previous speakers that the spirit of multilateralism
as well as the letter of the DSU was not and could not be made consistent with a unilateral decision by
a party to a dispute on whether the recommendations and rulings of a panel had been implemented by
another party.  Consequently, the question of non-implementation had to be established through an
impartial procedure before a party could seek recourse to Article 22.  Such a procedure was provided
for in Article 21.5.  That Article did not, however, exclude the possibility of repeated resort to theoriginal panel.  Furthermore, there were no guidelines on what was to be considered as "timely"
implementation.  Addressing the question of non-implementation in accordance with Article 21.5
should not lead to perpetual delays in implementation, which would be contrary to the spirit of the
DSU.  There was an urgent need for clarification of the link between Articles 21.5 and 22.  The
discussion in the DSB the previous week and at the present General Council meeting withoutreference to the specifics of the banana case had contributed to this.  The proper forum for WTO
Members to fully review the various aspects of the links between, and the sequencing of, Articles 21.5
and 22, as well as other relevant articles of the DSU in need of clarification, would be the ongoing
review of the DSU.  Norway was grateful that the question of voting no longer seemed to be on the
present meeting's agenda.  Even though adopting decisions by consensus might prove to be time-consuming, this procedure should continue to take precedence.
The representative of Ecuador said that it was necessary to distinguish between two
situations:  first, when a Member decided to exer cise the rights provided by an agreement;  and
second, when actions were taken outside the agreed framework of multilateral rules.  The latter was aclear case of unilateralism.  Multilateralism was where a Member invoked its rights under Articles 21
and 22.  It could not be said that a Member was taking unilateral action when its efforts were aimed at
using those rights.  For example, Ecuador could not be accused of unilateralism if it decided to request
consultations or to initiate investigations to verify injury or threat of injury, or if it were to demand
compliance with clear and specific provisions, such as decisions of the DSU, which confirmed itsrights and which operated to its benefit.  Otherwise, it could equally be said that a Member was acting
unilaterally when it stated that its new implementing measures, adopted in response to DSB
recommendations, were compatible with the WTO. No party could unilaterally state that its
implementing measures were WTO-compatible, when it was obliged to take such measures as a result
of a dispute settlement process.  The new measures in question were subject to the entire process
defined in Article 21 which established a clear role and field of action for the DSB involving
surveillance and prompt compliance.  No losing party in a dispute had the right to decide unilaterallythat the surveillance period provided for in Article 21 had ended.  Members had to ensure that the
rights and obligations provided for in Article 21 were kept in balance.  A losing Member could not be
given the benefit of options which prevented the winning Member from securing a prompt remedy.  A
careful analysis was required of the relationship between Articles 21 and 22, covering all the elements
and principles involved.  However, Ecuador was not taking a position on whether or not there shouldbe a sequential link between Articles 21.5 and 22, because it was first necessary to know whether one
was moving towards an amendment or an interpre tation.  Members should examine this issue without
reference to a specific case.  However, it would be difficult for any assessment of the operation of
Article 21.5 to fail to take account of the process underway pursuant to that Article.  Ecuador had
already experienced problems implementing Article 21.5, and the General Council could not leaveaside the procedure initiated by Ecuador but should also consider whether there were grounds for a
broader treatment of the topic.  Therefore, the General Council should first decide whether it wasWT/GC/M/35
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necessary to consider requests for interpretation.  If so, the best approach might be to suggest drawing
up regulations to govern the two Articles.
The representative of Israel said that beyond the question of the relationship between Articles
21.5 and 22 and the time-frame involved - on which his delegation supported some of the points made
by Japan - the systemic aspects of the decision-making in this case were of even greater importancedue to their implications for the consensus-based character of the WTO.  Consensus-based decision-
making was a fundamental value of the WTO and it was critical to continue in the same tradition.
Due to the complexity of the issue at hand, more  time was needed to carefully examine the points
raised.  The proper forum for addressing and resolving the relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22
was the broader context of the review of the DSU.  For these reasons, a decision by vote would not be
appropriate.
The representative of Venezuela agreed that this was a delicate matter requiring careful
thought.  The text in question allowed too much la titude for the exercise of discretion and excessive
freedom of interpretation, if one of the parties to a dispute so required.  Freedom of interpretation
could give rise to the situation currently under consideration where the General Council was requested
to interpret a text outside the natural framework in which that interpretation should be carried out,namely the review of the DSU.  There was a clear and precise mandate to review the DSU  with a
view to ensuring that any weakness in the text  could be duly questioned by Members and be the
subject of recommendations for remedial action.  From the outset of the DSU review process, certain
Members had pointed to the emerging gap in the possible implementation of Article 21.5 and its
sequential relationship to Article 22.  This matter had to be one of the fundamental topics in theforthcoming discussions in the DSB review process.  This matter should be the subject of ongoing
study within the DSB.  He emphasized the followin g points:  First:  the time factor was of key
importance for compliance with Article 21.  Venezuela's understanding was that Article 21.5 was a
means of recourse within the process itself, and not a new process.  Hence, the time available to the
party having recourse to it should be limited.  The use of the word "prompt" was intended toguarantee compliance with the panel's recommendations.  Second, the existence of a sequential link
between the two Articles seemed obvious.  One procedure had to be completed before the next was
begun.  The DSB should complete its review as soon as possible, by examining drafting materials
with the help of the original drafters.  A satisfactory conclusion had to be reached, not so much for the
sake of the parties to the dispute, but for the maintenance and credibility of the system, so as to avoidsetting a negative precedent for the future.  Venezuela was not in favour of unilateral action by any
Member, but disagreed with excluding the possibility of remedies based on ex post facto
interpretation.  It could not support any motion for a vote on this issue.
The representative of the United States said that this had been a good and thoughtful
discussion.  Many had correctly pointed out the complexity and difficulty of the issues involved.  As
several delegations had said, there were many issues related to Articles 21 and 22, and only after all ofthese issues had been discussed in the DSU review could they be appropriately considered.  It was
clear from the discussion that delegations wanted to  look at Articles 21.5 and 22 and how to deal with
them.  Also, many had said that what should be the content of Article 21.5 procedures was a much
more complicated issue than the EC had portrayed it.  Because of the complexities and difficulties in
the issues raised, no delegation had supported dealing with the problem put forward by the EC.Nearly all who had spoken on this issue had said that this was a matter for careful and thorough
consideration in the context of the DSU review.  The US agreed that these issues should be addressed
there and looked forward to finding a solution in that review.  Her delegation was gratified that there
had been no support for deciding this issue by a vote.
The representative of the European Communities said that he wanted to address several
questions in the light of the discussion.  Regarding the endless loop of litigation mentioned by several
delegations should the EC's implementation measures be found to be non-compatible, the Community
saw no problem.  If that indeed happened, the EC had an obligation to come into conformity with theWT/GC/M/35
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WTO as soon as possible.  There was no need for any further panel process to prove that the EC's
banana regime had to be changed, nor was there any provision for a new reasonable period for
implementation.  The EC would have to change its regime quickly.  As soon as any panel report
condemning the EC regime might be issued, the EC would either have to pay compensation to the
other parties or they would be authorized to retaliate against the EC's trade, or some mixture of the
two.  This would continue until the EC could satisf y the other parties, and perhaps the DSB, that it
had made the necessary changes in its regime, whereupon the compensation or the suspension of
concessions had to end.  That would be a powerful incentive for the EC to make the changes quickly.
Second, some delegations had mentioned that there was, or should be, an obligation for a party which
had lost a panel or Appellate Body process, to cons ult with the complaining parties or even to agree
with them about implementation measures.  He agr eed with India that there was no provision which
said that implementation should be the subject of  negotiation.  This was currently being introduced as
an idea;  thus there might be some need for interpretation of Article 21.5.  That Article provided that ifthere was a disagreement about implementation, there was a procedure for it.  Third, it had been said
that nothing prevented the Article 21.5 process from being conducted and completed within the
reasonable period of time.  While that was true, the country implementing DSB recommendations
would have to take its decisions at least three to four months before the reasonable period agreed with
the parties or granted by the arbitrator under Article 21.3.  There was no indication that this periodshould be reduced in this way simply to accommodate a particular reading of Article 22 and insistence
on its timeframes, and a resistance to any compromise whereby those timeframes could be extended.
The presumption ought to be that if a Member asked for and received 15 months to carry out its
implementation, it should have that amount of time and nothing less.  There were cases where a
country had taken implementation measures on the very last day of the period allowed.  A reviewunder Article 21.5 had to be based on decisions or measures taken and not, as some had suggested, on
the basis of proposals.  There could be no review before a measure had been taken.  To insist that the
Article 21.5 process could or should take place within the reasonable period of time would in many
cases amount to rendering it null and void, as the time made available to carry out implementation
would be curtailed.  Fourth, some had argued that the process currently engaged in could not reopenany of the agreed texts.  The Community agreed.  What one was faced with was a situation of
ambiguity and lack of clarity, and where a certain sequence seemed logical in terms of reasoning - one
should reason about conformity before talking about retaliation – and the order in which the DSU
Articles were written.  However, the problem had arisen in part because Article 22 did not mention
Article 21. The different interpretations delegations were giving to this situation had given rise tourgent problems.  These had to be dealt with now, because the there was a negative consensus form of
decision-making in the DSU, and because panels were studying the conformity of the implementation
measures and there was an arbitration process underway.  Further, the relationship between the latter
processes was not clear.  Fifth, the Community was not looking for a formal decision at the present
meeting within the terms of Article IX, paragraph 2, which provided for deciding on interpretations by
a three-fourths majority of all Members.   Nevertheless, several delegations had said they did not want
a vote and one had said there should never be a vote.  He asked how it would be possible to obtain aninterpretation by a three-fourths majority without some form of vote, and asked those delegations who
did not want a vote to suggest some way to get a three-fourths majority without a vote.  The
interpretation process was a right of Members and could not be nullified.  However, he reiterated that
the Community was not pushing for a formal decision at the present meeting.  He reserved his
delegation's right to revert to this matter.
The Chairman said that the large number of Members who had expressed themselves on these
matters clearly viewed the issues as of fundamental  importance for the multilateral trading system and
the WTO.  Many delegations had said that these matters should be approached calmly and with
adequate time allowed for careful deliberation.  He had detected in the discussion very broadsubscription to the logic of the proposition that recourse to retaliation under Article 22 ought to be
sequentially preceded by a determination under Article 21.  Such sequencing had been seen as
important to safeguarding the integrity of the multilateral system.  Many delegations had suggestedWT/GC/M/35
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that there were also a number of procedural and substantive issues, particularly regarding the
relationship between Articles 21 and 22, which needed to be clarified.  Some delegations had
considered that these matters could appropriately be the subject of interpretation.  However, many
others clearly did not, and most had registered their concern about voting.  There had been a large
measure of support for taking these issues up in th e DSU review on an urgent basis.  He had heard no
delegation oppose this initiative.  He believed that the sense of the meeting was that he, as Chairman,should urge the DSB to consider these matters on an urgent basis and to endeavour to reach agreement
on how to clarify these provisions before the end of July.  It remained open for the General Council to
revert to these matters at a subsequent meeting if necessary.
The General Council took note of the statements.
7. Election of the Chairman, members and alternates of the Management Board of the
WTO Pension Plan
The Chairman recalled that under Article 4 of the Pension Plan Regulations, the General
Council was to elect a Chairman, four members and four alternates to the Management Board of the
WTO Pension Fund.  At the December 1998 General Council meeting, he informed the General
Council that he would soon begin consultations on the designation of General Council representativesfor election to this Board.  Consultations were underway and he hoped that the Chairman could soon
report on the representatives proposed for election to that Board.
The General Council took note of the statement.
8. Review of procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO documents
(WT/L/160/Rev.1, WT/GC/W/117/Rev.1)
(a) Statement by Chairman
The Chairman recalled that at the General Council meeting in December 1998, he had
informed Members that further proposals had been received from Mexico, the EC, and the US and
Canada on this subject, and that on the basis of Mr. Hoda's report on his consultations with Memberswho had made proposals and those who had expresse d a different view, he had thought it useful to
attempt to bridge the differences through a Chairman's proposal.  That proposal had subsequently
been circulated in document Job No. 6871 for the reflection of delegations.  Also at that meeting, he
had informed Members that the Note in document WT/GC/W/117 would be revised.  The revised note
(WT/GC/W/117/Rev.1) was now before Members a nd included not only all the written proposals
made by delegations but also proposals made orally at the formal General Council meeting in October
1998.  Subsequent to the circulation of the proposal in document Job No. 6871, a proposed change
had been received from Japan with respect to paragraph 4(ii) and consisted of adding the following
phrase to the last sentence in paragraph 4:  "unless a request to the contrary is made by a Member".
Thus, the last sentence of that paragraph would read:  "Secretariat background notes which have been
so restricted, shall be automatically derestricted after six months, unless a request to the contrary is
made by a Member."  He asked whether the proposal in Job No. 6871 as amended by Japan wasacceptable.
The representative of Mexico said that the proposal was not acceptable.  His delegation had
not been invited to participate in any informal consultations on this matter since it had last been
considered, and could not accept any decision being taken in respect of document Job No.6871 at thepresent meeting.
The representative of Pakistan asked for clarification with regard to access to documents on
the WTO website.  He understood that a password was required to access the WTO website forWT/GC/M/35
Page 33
certain documents and that this password, while available to Members, was not available to observers
in the WTO.  He asked what the rationale was for this practice.
The Secretary said that the WTO website had two parallel systems in operation. One, which
was open to the public, comprised unrestricted or derestricted documents.  The other, requiring a
password, was available to governments and contained all documents including those restricted.Observer governments were entitled to all unrestricted and derestricted documents as well as selected
restricted WTO documents.  However, since the present system did not yet have the necessary tools
for selecting those restricted documents, observer governments did not have access to the non-public
WTO website.   These technical problems should be solved by the end of the year.
The representative of the United States said that this issue had been discussed since February
1998.  The United States, Canada and other delegations had proposed procedural improvements to the
circulation and derestriction of WTO documents.  The proposed changes in the procedures were not
as bold as the United States would have liked, but were in the direction of more openness of the WTO
system and covered very specific areas.  After months of negotiations a consensus had been achieved
on the procedures to be improved.  She asked those delegations who had not joined the consensus to
reconsider their position so as to achieve a small step toward enhancing the openness of the WTOwith respect to civil society.
The representative of Canada expressed disappointment that no agreement had been possible
on minor improvements in the procedures for circulation and derestriction of WTO documents.  This
issue had been on the table for over a  year.  Given that some delegations felt that additionalconsultations were required, Canada Mr. Hoda to hol d those consultations as soon as possible.  It was
a bad sign that Members had not been able to agree after over a year on minor amendments to
procedural issues.
The representative of Australia welcomed and supported Canada's proposal with respect to
early resumption of consultations by Mr. Hoda.  The proposed changes to the current procedures were
relatively small, and it would be useful to clear up the last remaining doubts as quickly as possible.
The representative of India asked whether two proposals could be taken up during the
proposed consultations, and suggested that should this not be possible,  the two points be the subject
of separate consultations.  First, the parties to a dispute should have access to any material given to
the panels by the Secretariat.  Second, any written proposal should mention the name of the delegation
making it.
The representative of the European Communities expressed disappointment that it did not
seem possible to achieve consensus on this issue at the present meeting, particularly as the
Community had had to dilute its proposal in order to reach what could have been the basis of aconsensus.  The Community would have liked to have  gone further, but was ready to join a consensus
subject to one or two points of clarification.  His delegation supported the idea that further
consultations should be carried out on this issue as a matter of urgency.
The representative of New Zealand said that his delegation too was disappointed that no
progress had been possible in what seemed to be a quite limited area.  There should be early informal
consultations to move this matter forward.
The representative of Japan said his delegation could fully support the proposal in document
Job. No. 6871 as amended by the Chairman.  He urged those delegations who had yet to agree to this
proposal to participate actively in the coming consultations so that a consensus on this issue could be
reached as quickly as possible.WT/GC/M/35
Page 34
The representative of Mexico said that should informal consultations take place on this issue,
they should be open to all Members.  Mexico would participate therein and would react to the
proposal in Job No.6871.
The Chairman said that because of other pressures, no consultations had been held since the
most recent General Council meeting.  He proposed that Mr Hoda hold these consultations on an
urgent basis, and that the General Council agree to revert to the matter at it next meeting.
The General Council took note of the statements and so agreed .
9. Guidelines for the scheduling of WTO meetings
The Chairman  recalled that at the December 1998 meeting of the General Council, the
delegation of Mexico, speaking on behalf of the In formal Group of Developing Countries, had raised
this matter under "Other Business" and had suggested th at the review called for in paragraph 9 of the
Guidelines on the Arrangements for Scheduling of Meetings of WTO Bodies (WT/L/106) be
undertaken as urgently as possible and that this item be included on the agenda of the General
Council's next regular meeting.
The representative of Mexico said his delegation understood that given the pressing nature of
other matters, consultations had not yet been held on this issue.  While at the outset it had been felt
that these consultations could start without any specific proposals, Mexico had drafted a document for
consideration by the Informal Group of  Develo ping Countries, and would put it forward on their
behalf should they accept it.  This matter had to be resolved rapidly in order to enhance efficiency ofwork in the WTO and to achieve the objectives Members had set for themselves for 1999.  Open-
ended consultations on this matter should be held as soon as possible.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed
 that the Chairman would hold
consultations on this matter.
10. Developing countries and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
The representative of the European Communities, speaking under "Other Business", said that
the Secretariat resources available to provide technical assistance in relation to the dispute settlement
mechanism were insufficient.  This point had been underlined in another proposal prepared by a groupof Members and was the core point in Venezuela's proposal.  At present, the WTO Technical
Cooperation and Training Division (TCTD) employed two full-time legal officers and two part-time
external consultants in order to provide legal advice to developing countries in accordance with
Article 27.2 of the DSU.  The Community's proposal
1 was to create a new unit with one permanent
and four consultancy posts in addition to the existing two permanent ones.  This new unit would be
separate from the TCTD, would report directly to the Director-General and would be financed by a
separate trust fund.  He described the functions such a unit could include.  The Community alsoproposed the creation of legal expertise in the developing countries themselves by means of training
lawyers especially for WTO dispute settlement.  The internship formula would be an appropriate way
of tackling this issue and he described the type of programmes envisioned.  He hoped that all
delegations would give the proposal the serious attention it deserved.
The representative of the United States said  that the most valuable assets of the WTO
Secretariat were its neutrality and objectivity.  Her delegation had no interest in changing the
character of the Secretariat.  As such, the Secretariat could never play more than a very limited role in
advising Members on specific cases under dispute settlement.  The US could not accept the role
                                                     
1 The proposal was subsequently circulated in document WT/GC/W/148.WT/GC/M/35
Page 35
foreseen for the Secretariat by the EC proposal.  Putting these resources into the Secretariat would
ignore the capacity-building features of alternative approaches to this problem, such as those
associated with the Advisory Centre on WTO La w, which the US supporte d.  Off-budget voluntary
contributions was not a wise way to fund ongoing WTO activities.
The representative of Colombia said that his delegation was pleased that the European
Communities had recognised that developing countries encountered real problems in obtaining
effective access to the dispute settlement mechanism.  Colombia was aware of the restrictions, based
on the principle of neutrality, that were placed on the WTO staff as stated in Article 27.2 of the DSU.
Accordingly, the EC's ideas had limited scope an d could only partially address the problem of
insufficient WTO technical assistance, without solving the problem developing and least-developed
countries faced regarding effective legal advice and counselling in WTO dispute settlement.  He
recalled that a proposal for an Advisory Centre on WTO Law had been developed by a group ofcountries working together.  That proposal had been circulated in October 1998.  The proposal
complemented the training and assistance efforts of the WTO Secretariat, and went further to address
needs that the WTO Secretariat could not meet.  The Centre was to be established outside the WTO
and funded on a voluntary basis.  He encouraged Members to consider the benefits of becoming a
founding member of this Centre and urged them to commit themselves financially so that it couldbecome a reality.
The representative of Venezuela said that the EC's recommendations encompassed most of
Venezuela's initial suggestions in the proposal it had circulated a year earlier.  However, the EC's
proposal was not timely.  He recalled that following intense efforts by a broad group of WTOMembers - including EC Member states - in which an assessment was made of all the implications of
the various alternatives presented by Venezuela, agreement had been reached on a draft model.  Thus,
the Community's proposal should be seen not as an alternative but as complementary to the proposal
for establishment of a Legal Advisory Centre.  Venezuela would like to see timely benefit derived
from the first concrete effort by a group of developed and developing countries from all regions tosolve a problem with profound implications for the future of the organization, i.e. that of guaranteeing
the right of participation of Members with weak economies when faced with trade disputes.
The representative of Bangladesh said that his country believed it could benefit from the
efforts undertaken on this matter by a group of some 13 developed and developing country Members.
The fact that with the EC proposal there were tw o complementary efforts in the same area underlined
the importance of this matter.  There were strong points in both proposals.  Bangladesh hoped that the
underlying inadequacies in the WTO dispute settlement system would be addressed fully by the wider
WTO membership.  The work done by the 13-Member working group should form the basis of further
work in this area.
The representative of Egypt said that is delegation had supported the initiative presented by
Colombia.  At the same time, it welcomed any initiative that had as its ultimate objective assisting
developing countries in the difficulties they faced in the multilateral trading system.  Egypt
recognized the limitations of the role of the Secretariat as pointed out by the United States and that
some of the elements in the EC proposal comp lemented the earlier initiative.  The internship
programme for lawyers from developing countrie s could be implemented immediately.  Egypt
welcomed the EC's initiative;  however, care should be taken in addressing the proposals on the table.
The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation welcomed any proposal that
strengthened the Secretariat's ability to provide tec hnical assistance to developing countries, be it in
the field of dispute settlement or elsewhere.  The EC proposal should not replace the proposal for aWTO Legal Advisory Centre because the latter offered considerable benefits to developing countries,
e.g. providing not only legal counsel but legal representation in dispute settlement.WT/GC/M/35
Page 36
The representative of Bolivia said that her de legation welcomed any initiative in this area and
supported Colombia's statement.  The EC's proposal indicated its recognition of the difficulties
encountered by developing countries and of the need to seek solutions.  The EC's efforts would no
doubt complement the efforts already undertaken by Colombia.
The representative of Japan said that his dele gation shared the EC's view that for the sound
development of this organization, the dispute settlement mechanism should be used by as many
Members as possible.  Many Members did not have the resources to engage in WTO dispute
settlement, and Japan welcomed any idea that would facilitate developing countries' access to this
mechanism.  Japan would study the EC's proposal carefully, particularly in view of the need, as
stipulated in Article 27.2 of the DSU, to ensure the continued impartiality of the WTO Secretariat.
The representative of Mexico said that anything that strengthened the possibility for
developing countries to participate more fully in dispute settlement that affected them was important.
Mexico was examining other proposals to which reference had been made by Colombia.  That
approach and the EC's approach could be comple mentary or independent.  In due course Mexico
would revert to its suggestion during the Uruguay Round that the Secretariat provide special courses
in dispute settlement and specific legal assistance for developing countries that was not impartial.
The representative of Mauritius said that his delegation welcomed any initiative that aimed at
helping developing countries to fully integrate into the multilateral trading system, and agreed in
principle to the EC's proposal which should be more fully discussed.
The representative of Norway said that her delegation would like to study the EC's proposal in
more detail.  It was important to find a speedy solution to how to integrate developing country
Members in the dispute settlement mechanism.  For that reason her government had pledged one
million dollars to the WTO Legal Advisory Centre.
The representative of the European Communities invited all Members to look at the proposal
in writing and to consider it carefully.  He clarified that the Community had not put forward its
proposal in the spirit of competition with existing proposals.  There was no reason why the various
proposals on the table could not be complementary, and this should be kept in mind when the General
Council reverted to this matter.
The General Council took note of the statements.
11. Observer status for intergovernmental organizations
The representative of the United States, speaking under "Other Business", said that the
General Council had pending before it requests for observer status from a number of international
organizations, as did a number of its subsidiary bodies.  Action on granting observer status to anumber of these organizations had been delayed due to the absence of satisfactory guidelines for
granting such status.  Progress could be made in this regard if it could be agreed that, as a starting-
point, observer status should be offered, where requested, to all intergovernmental organizations with
universal membership, and to those organizations – or specific agencies within them – which were
demonstrably economic in nature.  The United States hoped that the Chairman could quickly start theconsultation process on this matter.
The Chairman said that there seemed to be considerable interest among Members in seeing
consultations proceed expeditiously on this matter with a view to trying to find a solution that would
allow the number of international intergovernmental observers in the organization to be increased.WT/GC/M/35
Page 37
The representative of Pakistan said that the criterion of universal membership, if applied in
future, would discriminate against certain organizations since the WTO had already granted observer
status to organizations which did not have universal membership.  Similarly, the criterion of an
organization having a principally economic activity was a subjective judgment which had proved to
be difficult to make.  Future consultations should con tinue to look at all possibilities of  resolving this
matter and the solutions reached should be equitable to all applicants seeking observer status in the
WTO.
The representative of Egypt agreed with Pakistan's remarks about the two criteria suggested
by the United States;  however,  his delegation had always supported an early conclusion of issues
related to the observer status of intergovernmental organizations in the WTO and hoped that this
could be achieved as early as possible.
The representative of Uruguay welcomed the US proposal and hoped that this matter could be
resolved expeditiously.  Many of the regional organizations which had requested observer status in the
subsidiary bodies to the General Council, and had encountered problems, assisted the developing
countries in their participation in these bodies.
The General Council took note of the statements and agreed  that the Chairman would hold
consultations with a view to seeking a solution to this matter.
12. Appointment of officers to WTO bodies
The Chairman said that in accordance with th e guidelines for appointment of officers to WTO
bodies approved by the General Council in January 1995 (WT/L/31), he had held consultations on this
matter.  On the basis of those consultations, he considered that there was a consensus on the following
slate of names:
General Council Mr. Ali Said Mchumo (Tanzania)
Dispute Settlement Body Mr. Nobutoshi Akao (Japan)
Trade Policy Review Body Mr. Jean-Marie Noirfalisse (Belgium)
Council for Trade in Goods Mr.  Roger Farrell (New Zealand)
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs)Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay)
Council for Trade in Services Mr. Stuart Harbinson (Hong Kong, China)
Committee on Trade and Environment Mr. István Major (Hungary)
Committee on Trade and Development Mr. Absa Claude Diallo (Senegal)
Committee on Budget, Finance and
AdministrationMrs. Laurence Dubois-Destrizais (France)
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions Mr. Tomasz Jodko (Poland)
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements Mr. Krirk-Krai Jirapaet (Thailand)Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and InvestmentMr. Man Soon Chang (Korea)WT/GC/M/35
Page 38
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade
and Competition PolicyMr. Frédéric Jenny (France)
Working Group on Transparency in Government
ProcurementMr. Ronald Saborío Soto (Costa Rica)
He said that Members had expressed a desire in the consultations to decide on the
chairmanship of the Committee on Agriculture in the context of considering the chairpersons for the
subsidiary bodies of the General Council.  In that connection, he understood that there was also a
consensus on the re-appointment of Mr. Nestor Osorio Londoño as the Chairman of the Committee on
Agriculture.
The General Council took note of the statement and of the consensus.
13. Election of Chairperson of the General Council
As the outgoing presiding officer of the General Council, the Chairman made a statement
(WT/GC(99)/ST/1).
The General Council then unanimously elected Mr. A. Mchumo2 (Tanzania) to the Chair.
__________
                                                     
2 Mr. Mchumo made a statement which was subsequently circulated in document WT/GC(99)/ST/2.