RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/DSB/M/143
20 March 2003
(03-1617)
Dispute Settlement Body
19 February 2003
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 19 February 2003
Chairman:  Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay)
Subjects discussed: Page
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.........................2
(a) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United
States......................................................................................................................... ..................2
(b) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States.......................2
(c) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Approp riations Act of 1998:  Status report by
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........3
(d) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from
Japan:  Status report by the United States...................................................................................4
2. United States – Subsidi es on upland cotton............................................................................4
(a) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Brazil.....................................................................4
3. Proposed nominations for the indicative list of governmental and
non-governmental  pane lists..................................................................................................... 6
4. United States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on steel plate from
India .......................................................................................................................... .................7
(a) Statement by the United States .............................................................................................. .....7
5. Questions raised by the United Stat es concerning the meeting of the DSB
scheduled for 26 February 2003 ..............................................................................................8
6. Election of Chairperson...................................................................................................... ....10WT/DSB/M/143
Page 2
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB
(a) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copy right Act:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS160/18/Add.12)
(b) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS136/14/Add.12 - WT/DS162/17/Add.12)
(c) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropri ations Act of 1998:  Status report by the
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.5)
(d) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:
Status report by the Unit ed States (WT/DS184/15/Add.5)
1. The Chairman recalled that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that "unless the DSB decides
otherwise, the issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the
agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable
period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue isresolved".  He  proposed that the four sub-items to which he had just referred be considered
separately.
(a) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyri ght Act:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS160/18/Add.12)
2. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS160/18/Add.12 which contained the status
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the
case concerning Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act.
3. The representative of the United States said that his country had provided an additional status
report in this dispute on 6 February 2003, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in
that report, the United States and the EC had been seeking a positive and mutually acceptableresolution of the dispute.  The US administration would continue to engage the US Congress on this
issue with a view to concluding a mutually acceptable resolution consistent with WTO rules.
4. The representative of the European Communities said that, once more, his delegation had to
express its disappointment with the lack of action by the United States thus far.  The EC would expect
a greater commitment of the United States to the DSB's rulings, out of respect for the multilateral
mechanism for the resolution of disputes.  The EC urged the United States to take rapid and concrete
action to settle this dispute and to comply with the DSB's recommendations.
5. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(b) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS136/14/Add.12 – WT/DS162/17/Add.12)
6. The Chairman drew attention to docume nt WT/DS136/14/Add.12 – WT/DS162/17/Add.12
which contained the status report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's
recommendations in the case concerning the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916.
7. The representative of the United States said that his country had provided an additional status
report in this dispute on 6 February 2003, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  The US
administration would continue to work with the US  Congress to achieve further progress in resolving
this dispute with the EC and Japan.WT/DSB/M/143
Page 3
8. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation could only repeat its
statement made at the previous regular DSB meeting.  The US administration should make clear to the
US Congress that the continuous lack of implementation of the ruling was seriously affecting the
credibility of the United States' commitment to the WTO dispute settlement system.  The EC also
recalled that a proper implementation should not only repeal the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, but shouldalso terminate the pending court cases.  A repeal with effects limited to future cases only would serve
to prolong the dispute.
9. The representative of Japan said that his delegation deeply regretted that the United States
still had to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings even though more than two years had
passed since the adoption of the Reports of the Appellate Body and the Panel.  As Japan had
repeatedly stated in the previous DSB meetings, such a lack of implementation damaged the
confidence in the WTO dispute settlement system.  Japan strongly urged the United States toimplement the DSB's recommendations and rulings at the earliest possible time.  Japan expected the
US administration to make its utmost efforts to have the repealing bills of the 1916 Act submitted to
and passed in the first session of the 108th Congress currently under session.  Japan noted that there
should be no difficulty in this task, as the bills had been indeed submitted to the 107th Congress.  He
stressed that, due to the reopened proceedings in the US domestic courts, the respondent Japanesecompanies were suffering real financial consequences, including litigation costs.  Therefore, the
repealing bills had to terminate any proceedings under the 1916 Act.  Japan reminded the United
States of Japan's right to suspend concessions or other obligations.
10. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(c) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriat ions Act of 1998:  Status report by the
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.5)
11. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS176/11/Add.5 which contained the status
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the
case concerning US Section 211 Om nibus Appropriations Act of 1998.
12. The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in
this dispute on 6 February 2003, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  He said that the US
administration would work with the new Congress with a view to resolving this dispute.
13. The representative of the European Communities sa id that first he wished to stress that two
months had already elapsed since the EC had agreed to give another six months to the United States to
comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations.  The EC hoped that the US administration and
the US Congress were actively taking advantage of this extra time and would ensure that fullimplementation was reached by the new deadline.  He also wished to recall the EC's position on
abandoned trademarks.  The Panel had relied on the affirmations made by the US representatives that
Section 211 would not apply to a new trademark after a former trademark, to which Section 211
might have applied, had been abandoned.  This interpretation was not accepted by US Federal Courts,
which applied Section 211 to trademarks succeeding to an abandoned trademark.  Therefore, the ECcould not accept the US administration's position that there was no need to clarify that Section 211 did
not apply in cases where the trademark had been abandoned by the original owner.
14. The representative of Cuba said that her delegation wished to stress, once again, the lack of
progress by the United States in implementing th e DSB's recommendations and rulings with regard to
Section 211 of the Omnibus Appr opriations Act of 1998.  Her delegation wished, once again, to
reiterate that the United States had an obligation to comply with the DSB's recommendations and
rulings within the new agreed deadline.  In Cuba's view, such compliance had to entail repeal of theWT/DSB/M/143
Page 4
above-mentioned Act, which would be the best outcome from both the legal and the ethical
standpoint.
15. The representative of the United States said that his delegation had noted the comments made
by the EC with respect to its position on abandoned trademarks and its view on the US position in this
regard.  His delegation would be happy to refer the EC's claims concerning the application ofSection 211 back to capital for review.
16. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(d) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:
Status report by the Unit ed States (WT/DS184/15/Add.5)
17. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS184/15/Add.5 which contained the status
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the
case concerning US anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan.
18. The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in
this dispute on 6 February 2003, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  With respect to the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB that ha d not been addressed in the 22 November 2002
anti-dumping duty determination of the US Depart ment of Commerce, the US administration would
continue to consult and to work with the US Congress with a view to resolving this matter with Japan
in a mutually satisfactory manner.
19. The representative of Japan said that although his delegation would prefer not to repeat the
same statements, it had to express regret and concern, once again, about the delay in implementation
by the United States.  He said that the United States had not complied with the DSB'srecommendations and rulings within the original reasonable period of time (RPT) and had requested
the extension of the RPT with its commitment for implementation.  Following its request, the United
States had been given additional time until the end of the first session of the 108th US Congress or
31 December 2003, whichever would be earlier.  This commitment would have to be fulfilled.  As
pointed out under the previous sub-item, such a lack of implementation by the United Statesundermined the confidence in the WTO dispute settlement system.  The United States had to
implement the DSB's recommendations and ruling as soon as possible, including having the necessary
legislation introduced and passed in the first session of the 108th Congress.  Japan expected the
United States to continue to consult closely with Japan on the status and content of implementation.
20. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
2. United States – Subsidies on upland cotton
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Brazil (WT/DS267/7)
21. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Brazil contained in document
WT/DS267/7.
22. The representative of Brazil said that on 27 September 2002, pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU
and Article XXII of the GATT 1994,  Brazil had requested consultations with the United States
(WT/DS267/1, dated 3 October 2002) concerning prohibited and actionable subsidies provided to US
producers, users and exporters of upland cotton.  Brazil raised concerns that these subsidies violated
the Agreement on Agriculture, the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994.  Furthermore, consistent
with Articles 4.2 and 7.2 of the SCM Agreement, Brazil had set forth statements of available evidenceWT/DSB/M/143
Page 5
regarding the existence of and adverse effects generated by such subsidies.  Three rounds of
consultations concerning these subsidies had been held between 3 December 2002 and
17 January 2003.  Despite a cordial exchange of views and the exchange of factual information
between Brazil and the United States, these consultations had not resulted in a mutually acceptable
solution to the problem.
23. The US 2002 Farm Bill and other US legislation guaranteed and mandated the payment of a
wide variety of export and domestic subsidies for the production, use and export of US upland cotton.
These subsidy payments for the marketing year ending on 31 July 2002 alone totaled almost
US$4 billion.  The value of the US upland cotton production for the same period was US$3 billion.
This represented a subsidization rate of over 130 per cent.  US upland cotton producers were among
the highest-cost producers of upland cotton in the world with average total costs far exceeding US and
world market prices over the past five years.  Since 1998, those costs had increased but at the same
time world cotton prices had fallen significantly.  Economic theory suggested that with high costs far
in excess of market prices, failing prices, and a high-valued currency relative to other cotton
exporters, US producers would have drastically cut back the acreage dedicated to the production of
upland cotton.  But this had not happened.  Instead, since 1998, US production of upland cotton had
increased from 14 million bales to a record 20.3 million bales in marketing year 2001.
24. This subsidy-stimulated excess production would be bad enough for world prices and the
export marketing opportunities of other producers even if the US had not exported much of its upland
cotton.  But unfortunately for Brazilian and other lower-cost and efficient producers such as those in
Africa, most of this high-cost subsidy-generated cotton was not consumed in the United States.
Instead, the percentage of US production exported had accelerated as had the US share of worldexports which had increased from 25 per cent of world share in 1998 to 38 per cent of total world
exports by the mid-2002.  This made the United States by far the largest exporter of upland in the
world.  Brazil's interests had suffered serious prejudice from lower world prices and excess US export
market share from at least 1999 to the present.  Significantly depressed and suppressed Brazilian and
world prices due to the effects of US upland cotton subsidies had impacted negatively on Brazilianfarm income, trade balance, cotton-related services, federal and state revenues, and employment,
among other factors.  Since 1999, Brazil estimated that these effects had cost Brazil and its upland
cotton producers hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenue.  The mandated US subsidies would
continue to result in fewer acres being planted to upland cotton in Brazil and fewer exports of
Brazilian upland cotton.  Furthermore,  these revenue and market share losses would continue in the
future.  The 2002 Farm Bill and other US laws mandated the payment of these numerous subsidies
until 2007.  These guaranteed levels of subsidies meant that the United States would continue toproduce massive volumes of upland cotton regardless of US costs of production and regardless of
world prices for upland cotton.  The United States' projections released recently demonstrated that
during the remaining life of the 2002 US Farm Bill , US production would remain at very high levels
and the expected world price level would remain far below the US cost of production.
25. The United States also provided prohibited subsidies in the form of the so-called "Step-2
Programme".  This programme paid cash to exporters of US cotton and US domestic mill users of US
cotton to cover the difference between the high US price and the lower world price.  The current cash
payments represented more than 110 per cent of the market value of US upland cotton.  In addition,
the United States provided export credit guarantee subsidies that had made possible long-term
financing for the export sale of US cotton.  These subsidies harmed the exports of Brazilian and otherdeveloping and least developed countries competin g for sales into the same markets without any
opportunity to offer guaranteed financing.  A ccordingly, Brazil drew attention to document
WT/DS267/7 of 7 February 2003, and requested that a panel be established at the present meeting,
with standard terms of reference as set out in Article 7 of the DSU.  Finally, he noted that, in its
request for the establishment of a panel, Brazil had invoked the Annex V procedures under theSCM Agreement.  Brazil looked forward to cooperating with the United States in the collection of
factual information concerning Brazil's claims in the weeks ahead.WT/DSB/M/143
Page 6
26. The representative of the United States said that his country was disappointed that Brazil had
chosen to move forward with a request for panel establishment at this time.  The United States had
approached these consultations in good faith and had made enormous efforts to provide information in
response to Brazil's approximately 125 consultation questions.  Nonetheless, Brazil had chosen to
terminate those ongoing consultations, despite the fact that the United States and Brazil were planningto meet again.  The United States regretted Brazil's decision and suggested that further consultations
could have been fruitful.  At the present meeting, he wished to state the US position clearly:  US
cotton support programmes were within the United States' allowable WTO limits and consistent with
the United States' WTO obligations.  Therefore, should this dispute move forward, the United States
would vigorously defend its cotton support programmes.  The United States noted that it shared with
Brazil many of the same goals for the Doha De velopment Round agriculture talks, including the
objectives of negotiating significantly lower domestic subsidies and agricultural tariffs andeliminating agricultural export subsidies.  However, it appeared that Brazil was attempting to litigate
for a reduction in US cotton support that was not embodied in US commitments under the Uruguay
Round Agreements, and in particular the Agreement on Agriculture.  The United States said that
Brazil's and the United States' energies would be better spent ensuring that the WTO talks were
successful rather than litigating a dispute that would not provide Brazil with the result it desired.
27. As a procedural matter, the United States also noted that, in its panel request, Brazil had
referred to a measure which was not the subject of consultations.  Brazil's consultation request
concerning "[e]xport subsidies, exporter assistance, export credit guarantees, [and] export and market
access enhancement" was limited to upland cotton.  Brazil was now attempting to expand the
challenged measures to include measures for other eligible agricultural commodities.  There was nobasis for Brazil's panel request on these newly identified measures relating to "other eligible
agricultural commodities" on which Brazil had not requested consultations.  Because the United
States believed that its cotton support programmes were consistent with its WTO obligations and in
order to afford Brazil an opportunity to renew consultations on this matter, the United States was not
in a position to agree to the establishment of a panel at this time.
28. The representative of Argentina said that his country had requested, and had participated in,
the consultations on this matter.  Argentina wished to emphasize its serious concern regarding the
level of the US domestic support for cotton production, cotton export subsidies and export credit
guarantees for cotton and other products.  Argentina was concerned about the detrimental effects of
these policies on the world market, in particular for developing countries.  Argentina was also
concerned about the transparency of these measures, given that the United States, despite having
recently notified its domestic support for 1999, had yet to provide domestic support notifications for2000 and 2001.  Argentina was, therefore, in full agreement with the views expressed by Brazil and
was considering participating as a third party in this dispute.
29. The representative of India said that his country had both trade and systemic interests in this
dispute.  India had participated in the consultations requested by Brazil and once a panel was
established, it would reserve its third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
30. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter.
3. Proposed nominations for the indicative list of governmental and non-governmental
panelists (WT/DSB/W/220)
31. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DSB/W/220 which contained additional
names proposed for inclusion on the indicative list in accordance with Article 8.4 of the DSU.  He
proposed that the DSB approve the names contained in document WT/DSB/W/220.
32. The DSB so agreed.WT/DSB/M/143
Page 7
4. United States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on steel plate from India
(a) Statement by the United States
33. The representative of the United States, speaking under "Other Business", said that his
country was pleased to inform the DSB that it had implemented the DSB's recommendations and
rulings in "United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India"(DS206).  On 7 February 2003, the US administering authorities had issued a new determination in
the investigation at issue.  The authorities had examined and had considered all of the data on the
record and provided a thorough explanation of thei r treatment of this data, thereby fully complying
with the United States' WTO obligations.
34. The representative of India recalled that the Panel Report in the dispute on "United States -
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Steel Plate from India" had been adopted by the
DSB on 29 July 2002.  On 1 October 2002, pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of the DSU India and theUnited States had agreed that a reasonable period of time for implementation of the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in this dispute should be until 29 December 2002.  However, by mutual
agreement, the reasonable period of time had been extended until 31 January 2003.  Subsequently on
7 February 2003, the United States had issued a notice of determination under Section 129 of the
Uruguay Round Agreement Act purporting to impl ement the DSB's rulings and recommendations in
this dispute.  The methodology of re-determination had not yet been made available.  In these
circumstances it was not clear whether it could be considered that the United States had implemented
the DSB's rulings and recommendations within the extended reasonable period of time.  It was a
matter of disappointment that the United States could not implement the DSB's rulings and
recommendations within the extended reasonable period of time.  He recalled that in the underlyinganti-dumping investigation the United States had rejected information submitted by the Indian
exporters and had determined a dumping margin in excess of 72 per cent based on total facts
available.  Subsequently, the Panel had ruled in favour of India on the key issue in this dispute,
i.e. that the US had acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 6.8 and paragraph 3 of
Annex 11 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by refusing to take into account the US sales priceinformation in the anti-dumping investigation and by  relying entirely on facts available in determining
dumping margin on the steel plate producer, viz., the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL).
35. India was deeply disappointed by the recent  notice of the US Department of Commerce
purporting to implement the rulings and recommendati ons of the DSB in this dispute.  The United
States had, once again, failed to use the US sales data of the Indian exporter on the plea that such
information could not be used without undue difficulties and had arrived at a dumping margin in
excess of 42 per cent.  This re-determination did not take into account the observation of the Panelthat paragraph 5 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement could be understood to highlight that
the information that satisfied the requirements of paragraph 3, but which was not perfect, should
nevertheless not be disregarded.  India wished to draw attention to one particular aspect of the
re-determination.  In the re-determination it had been stated that "in cases such as this, given the
nature of the information available, it might be appropriate to rely on information that ensured that therespondent had not benefited from its failure to provide information under its control.  This was
particularly true in this case, where the limited amount of potentially usable data submitted by SAIL
raised basic questions owing to the respondent's control of the information relating to a dumping
proceeding".  India was unable to reconcile the above observation in the redetermination with the
obligation on the investigating authority to conduct an objective examination of the facts before it.  Asthe methodology of re-determination had not yet been made available by the United States, India
wished to reserve its rights under the DSU for taking further her action, as appropriate, in this dispute.
His delegation also wished to take this opportunity to inform Members that India and the United
States had agreed upon the procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU applicable in the
follow-up to this dispute.  The notification in this  regard had been conveyed to the DSB Chairman for
circulation to the Members.WT/DSB/M/143
Page 8
36. The DSB took note of the statements.
5. Questions raised by the United States con cerning the meeting of the DSB scheduled for
26 February 2003
37. The representative of the United States, speaking under "Other Business", said that his
delegation was surprised to see the airgram, dated 14 February 2003, announcing a DSB meeting for
26 February 2003 concerning the statements of intentions on implementation in the dispute regarding
the US Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Ac t of 2000.  The United States wondered if those
Members who had requested the meeting could explain the purpose for that meeting.  The United
States understood that no documentation had been circulated together with this meeting request.  It,
therefore, questioned whether its understanding was correct that there was no item for decision by the
DSB at that meeting.  The United States wondered whether it was common to have an unscheduled
meeting of the DSB for an item requiring no action by the DSB.
38. The representative of the European Communities said that Article 21.3 of the DSU clearly put
on the Member concerned an obligation to inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of
implementation of the DSB's recommendations within 30 days after the adoption of the Panel and the
Appellate Body Reports.  In the dispute concerni ng the US Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act, the DSB had adopted the Reports on 27 January 2003.  The United States was, therefore, underthe obligation to inform the DSB of its intentions in regard of implementation by 26 February 2003,
which implied a holding of a special meeting for this  purpose.  He said that last week it had become
apparent that the United States would not call for a special meeting.  The United States was
apparently of the opinion that the statement it had made at the 27 January DSB meeting upon the
adoption of the Reports would meet its obligation under Article 21.3 of the DSU.  The EC could notsubscribe to the US position.  The statement had been made by the United States prior to the adoption
of the Reports by the DSB and such an interpreta tion would render Article 21.3 of the DSU a nullity.
Furthermore, the United States also had to inform the DSB whether it could comply immediately, or if
this was not practicable it should propose a reasonable period of time for implementation.  The EC,
therefore, had joined the 10 other complaining par ties and had requested a special DSB meeting to be
held on 26 February 2003, pursuant to footnote 11 to Article 21.3 of the DSU.
39. The representative of Canada said that his country fully supported the statement made by the
EC.  As stated by the EC, the United States was apparently of the view that the statement that it had
made at the time of the adoption of the Reports was sufficient to discharge its obligation under
Article 21.3 of the DSU.  Like the EC, Canada did not share the US interpretation.  If the drafters of
the DSU intended that such a statement be made at the time of the adoption,  they clearly could have
provided for that, but they did not do so.  The wording of Article 21.3 was quite clear:  "At a DSBmeeting held within 30 days after the date of adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report, the
Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions" and footnote 11 to that Article stated that
"If a DSB meeting is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for
this purpose".  Canada, therefore, agreed with the EC that to assume that the statement made en
passant  at the time of the adoption of the Reports discharged Members of obligations under
Article 21.3 of the DSU, would effectively render that Article a nullity.  Canada did not view as a
minor issue  whether a statement was made at one meeting or another, but believed that a broader
principle was involved, namely, whether the DSB had a proper surveillance function or not.  It was
discouraging and disappointing that for the first time since the WTO Agreement had entered into
force, a Member had sought to avoid the obligation under Article 21.3 of the DSU.  In every singledispute since 1 January 1995 an implementing Member had met its obligations under Article 21.3 of
the DSU by placing the matter on the agenda within 30 days after the adoption of the Reports.  Many
of such statements had been made.  It was unclear why the United States had referred to the fact that
no decision was to be taken by the DSB in this regard.  When such statements of implementation were
made, no DSB decision was required.  It was simply a Member discharging its obligation underWT/DSB/M/143
Page 9
Article 21.3 of the DSU and the DSB was conducting  its surveillance function.  In Canada's view,
what the United States had done in this case did little to enhance the surveillance function of the DSB.
40. The representative of Korea said that as one of those Members who had requested a special
DSB meeting on 26 February, his country fully agreed with the statements made by the EC and
Canada.  The United States had stated that it would implement the DSB's recommendations and
rulings should the DSB adopt the Reports at the 27 January meeting.  He noted that the US statement
had been made at that meeting before the adoption of the Reports.  In terms of timing, the US
statement did not qualify as a statement of intentions in respect of the DSB's recommendations and
rulings under the meaning of Article 21.3 of the DSU.  Article 21.3 of the DSU simply stated that
"after the date of adoption of the panel or Appellate Body reports, the member concerned shall inform
the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation".  On the basis of this textual interpretation of
Article 21.3 of the DSU, Korea was of the view that the United States would still have to inform theDSB, at the latest on 26 February 2003, of its intentions together with its position regarding a
reasonable period of time.  For this purpose, the co-complainants had provided a forum on that date
for the United States to do so.
41. The representative of Japan said that, like previous speakers, his country did not agree with
the interpretation of Article 21.3 of the DSU by the United States.  That interpretation did not seem to
be consistent with the US past practice.
42. The representative of India said that his country was also one of those Members who had
requested a special DSB meeting on 26 February.  India fully shared the views of the EC and Canada
regarding the interpretation of Article 21.3 of the DSU.  In addition, he wished to state that the
Member concerned had to express its intentions in respect of the implementation of the DSB's rulingswithin 30 days after the adoption of the Reports.  As read out by Canada, in accordance with
footnote 11 to Article 21.3 of the DSU, "the DSB meeting shall be held for this purpose".  There had
been no precedent in any dispute thus far that the Member concerned did not express such an
intention.  Whenever, there was some inconvenience to hold a special meeting, by mutual agreement,
the Member concerned would circulate in writing, within 30 days after the adoption of reports, itsintention to implement the DSB's rulings.  This had been the practice since the establishment of the
WTO and, therefore, India hoped that the United States would abide by this practice as well as by the
letter and spirit of Article 21.3 of the DSU.
43. The representative of Brazil said that, notwithstanding the US interpretation of its statement
made when the Reports had been adopted, the clear mandatory nature of its obligation under
Article 21.3 of the DSU that "the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect
of implementation" did not allow for the circumvention of this obligation.  The text of Article 21.3 ofthe DSU was so clear that no other interpretation was possible.
44. The representative of the United States expressed his delegation's gratitude for the comments
made.  The United States considered that it had fulfilled its obligations under Article 21.3 of the DSU
through its statement of intentions at the 27 January 2003 DSB meeting.  The United States found it
puzzling that the complaining parties would object  to a Member acting immediately to fulfill its
obligations.  Even if one were to accept the complaining parties' contention that the DSU precluded a
Member from doing so, this still would not explain their decision to request a special meeting.  The
complaining parties were fully aware that, prior to  their request for a special meeting, the United
States had already offered to confirm its intentions to implement at the present meeting, if there were
any lingering questions.  Inexplicably, the complain ing parties had declined that offer.  The United
States reiterated that it had already stated its intentions concerning the implementation of the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in this dispute.  The United States could confirm those intentions at the
present meeting.  Despite having listened to the comments that Members had made at the present
meeting, the United States remained puzzled by one question:  why did the co-complainants considerWT/DSB/M/143
Page 10
it necessary to call an additional DSB meeting at a time when delegations were already hard pressed
to attend the numerous meetings of various bodies scheduled.
45. The representative of Chile said that this matter deserved particular attention.  There was the
text of Article 21.3 of the DSU as well as an established practice and the United States appeared to
deviate from that established practice.  He believed that this matter could be appropriately dealt within the context of the negotiations in order to see what kind of proper action to take because Members
might reach a conclusion that Article 21.3 of the DSU was superfluous and they might find a
procedure which would be more effective.  However, at this stage, this was an established practice
and the United States had not complied with it.  The United States should fulfill its obligation in this
case.  However, Chile was satisfied that the United States had repeated its statement that it was going
to comply with its obligations and, of course, Chile would like to have, at an appropriate time, more
details as to when the United States was going to do this and how.
46. The Chairman noted the statements made by delegations regarding the reasons as to why a
DSB meeting had to be convened on 26 February.  The United States had stated that it was puzzled by
this course of action, but had not questioned the need for holding such a meeting.  He said that the
statements made by delegations would be reflected in the minutes of the present meeting and that a
special meeting of the DSB regarding this matter would be held on 26 February.
47. The representative of Canada said that his country wished to respond to the statement made
by the United States that it found inexplicable that the co-complainants had declined the US offer to
raise this issue under "Other Business" at the present meeting.  He reiterated that Article 21.3 of the
DSU imposed a specific obligation on implementing parties, in this case the United States, to make a
statement on implementation.  Canada failed to see how one could discharge a binding obligationunder the DSU under "Other Business".  It was required to be a separate item on the agenda.  The
importance ascribed by the drafters of the DSU to this matter was clear from footnote 11 which stated
that a separate DSB meeting would be held for this purpose.  Where the DSB required a Member to
take a specific action, Canada failed to see how this could be done under "Other Business".
48. The representative of the United States said that the suggestion raised by Canada that the
statement of intentions could not be made under "Other Business" had no support in the DSU.
Article 21.3 of the DSU merely provided that a statement had to be made at a DSB meeting without
specifying the agenda placement.  Moreover, inasmuch  as the statement of intentions did not involve
actions from Members, there was no reason that it would need to be a separate agenda item.
Separately, the United States wished to thank Ch ile for its point regarding the acceptance of the US
statement of intentions and urged the other complaining parties to reconsider whether another meeting
on this question was necessary.
49. The DSB took note of the statements.
6. Election of Chairperson
50. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting on 10 February 2003, the General Council had
taken note of the consensus on a slate of names for Chairpersons to a number of WTO bodies
including the DSB.  On the basis of the understanding reached by the General Council, he proposedthat the Dispute Settlement Body elect Amb. Oshima (Japan) as Chairman of this body by
acclamation.
51. The DSB so agreed.
52. Amb. Pérez del Castillo, the outgoing Chairman said that, on behalf of all Members, he
wished to welcome Amb. Oshima as Chairman of the DSB.  He said that Amb. Oshima who had
recently arrived to Geneva had already demonstrated his knowledge, experience and human qualitiesWT/DSB/M/143
Page 11
as well as his commitment to the multilateral trading system.  He expressed satisfaction that the DSB
would be left in good hands.  He thanked Members for the support that they had given him during the
past year,  which he hoped would be  equally extended to Amb. Oshima.
53. Amb. Oshima, the incoming Chairman thanked Members for his election, which he believed
was not only a great honour to him personally but also to his country.  He thanked the outgoing
Chairman for his leadership as the DSB Chairman for the past year.  He said that as his predecessor,
he would also appreciate continued support provided by the Secretariat and Members.  He drew
attention to Article 3.2 of the DSU which stated that the WTO dispute settlement system was an
essential element in providing security and predictabi lity to the multilateral trading system and served
to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement and to clarify the
existing provisions of those Agreements.  He sa id that it was incumbent upon Members to maintain
the confidence in the system.  He looked forward to Members' continued efforts and cooperation todeliver, serve and benefit the rule-based multilateral trading system through the work of the DSB.
54. The DSB took note of the statements.
__________