RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/TPR/G/108
30 October 2002
(02-5915)
Trade Policy Review Body Original:  Spanish
TRADE POLICY REVIEW
VENEZUELA
Report by the Government
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization), the policy statement by the Government of Venezuela is attached.
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the meeting
of the Trade Policy Review Body on Venezuela.Venezuela WT/TPR/G/108
Page 3
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 5
I. ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 5II. TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 1996-2002 8
(A)
ANDEAN COMMUNITY 8
(B) GROUP OF THREE 9
(C) PARTICIPATION IN THE LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION SCHEME (LAIA )9
(D) MERCOSUR 10
(E) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 10
(F) VENEZUELA AND OTHER COUNTRIES 10
(G) FREE -TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA )1 0
III. INVESTMENT MEASURES 10
IV. PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICY 11V. TRADE POLICY OUTLOOK 12Venezuela WT/TPR/G/108
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INTRODUCTION
1. Since its first Trade Policy Review in 1996, Venezuela has undertaken a necessary process of
structural reform in the economic and trade spheres,  which has been conducted in conformity with the
WTO Agreements.  This has led to sweeping changes, including the promulgation in 1999 of a new
Constitution, on which Venezuela's political, economic and social system is now based.  The new
Constitution guarantees free competition, equal treatment for investors and observance of theinternational agreements validly concluded by the Venezuelan Republic.
2. The economic model set out in the 1999 Constitution is geared towards the establishment of a
diversified and competitive production system, based on the pivotal role of private enterprise, together
with State presence in strategic industries a nd private investment in downstream industrial
development, thus promoting and preserving the social economy as a strategy for the democratisationof both markets and capital.  The economic measures adopted in February 2002 represented the first
step in progressively adjusting Venezuela's macroeconomic policies so as to achieve a sustainable
improvement in the standard of living of the Ve nezuelan people, while combating the poverty and
social inequality confronting the country today.
3. Despite this strategy aimed at ensuring that economic benefits were shared in a more balanced
manner across society, Venezuela’s democratic institutions were threatened by the coup d'état against
President Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías and the ensuing events of 11, 12 and 13 April 2002.  These
events had an extremely adverse impact on Venezuela's macroeconomic variables, compelling the
Government to take economic and social measures in order to check the decline in GDP, restore
confidence on international markets and stop the slide in domestic poverty indices.  It is important to
note, however, that participation in a globalized world and the benefits of a transparent and fair
trading system are basic principles enshrined in the domestic legal order, and that full integration inthe world economy is one of Venezuela's primary objectives in pursuit of a better standard of living
for its people.
4. In Venezuela's view, trade is a policy instrument for economic development, and accordingly
its actions in the international trade sphere are directed towards securing recognition of Venezuela's
status as a developing country and of its legitimate right actively to pursue economic development,social justice and poverty reduction policies, im plemented in accordance with international
commitments and the principle of non-discrimination.
5. This document is divided into five sections:  (I) Economic and Trade Policy Environment;
(II) Trade Policy Developments 1996-2002;  (III) Investment Measures;  (IV) Productive
Development Policy;  and (V) Trade Policy Outlook.
I. ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY ENVIRONMENT
6. In early 1996, Venezuela adopted a macroeconomic adjustment programme, the "Agenda
Venezuela", primarily aimed at restoring the country's external balances and achieving sustained
growth, while seeking more effective integration of the domestic economy in global flows of goods
and services.  The objective was to stabilize the Venezuelan economy, and the policies pursued soughtto restrain demand through budget deficit correctives and a tight monetary policy.
7. As an initial result, the programme had a strong impact on the general price level, following
the liberalization of relative prices, which drove inflation up to a record level of 103.2 per cent in
1996.  Nevertheless, GDP shrank by only 0.2 per cent, reflecting a decline in consumption and
investment which was, however, offset by favourab le export performance, primarily in the petroleumWT/TPR/G/108 Trade Policy Review
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sector.  With labour-force growth outstripping employment capacity, unemployment stood at 12.4 per
cent in December 1996.  Data are unavailable for informal employment that year.
8. In 1997, Venezuelan economic policy continued along the lines laid down in "Agenda
Venezuela", with the drafting of the legislation needed to advance in the structural reform programme.
One of the more significant achievements was the strengthening of the public and private financial
sectors.  In the public sector, efforts focused on strengthening the institutions in charge of regulatingand overseeing the country’s financial system.  In the private sector, banks taken over during the 1994
crisis were sold off, leading to a growing presence of foreign banks in the Venezuelan financial
system.  In December 1997, unemployment stood at 10.6 per cent and informal employment at
47.7 per cent.
9. In 1998, economic performance was influenced mainly by the international environment and
the very difficult conditions in terms of access to external financing for emerging economies in
general.  For Venezuela, the central feature was a decline in the prices of raw materials, including
petroleum, which impacted on the behaviour of the country’s fiscal and external balances and the
expectations of its economic operators.  Domestic economic policy was therefore directed towards
reining in the fiscal imbalances and calming economic operators in the context of that year's elections.The trend in the general price level in 1998 reflected the Venezuelan economy's contractionary
environment.
10. Inflation, at 29.9 per cent, reached its lowest po int since 1986 as a result of aggregate supply
and demand trends.  On the demand side, public spending cuts and the impact of interest rates on
consumption and investment helped ease inflationary pressure;  on the supply side, the main
contributing factor was the lower cost of imports resulting from the system of exchange rate bands
introduced in 1996.  GDP grew by only 0.2 per cent, wi th modest growth in the oil sector offsetting a
decline in the non-oil sector.
11. The slight growth in the oil sector stemmed from oversupply on the international oil market
and its direct impact on prices, mainly as a result of the South East Asian crisis.  The downturn in the
non-oil sector was due to the tight public spending policy in response to the fall in oil revenues, as
well as the economic policy measures taken to address the effects of the highly volatile internationalsituation on the domestic economy.  As a direct consequence of this context, by December 1998
unemployment had risen slightly to 11 per cent while informal employment stood at 49.8 per cent.
12. On the international scene, 1999 was marked by disturbances at the regional level (Brazil,
Colombia and Ecuador).  On the other hand, the South East Asian countries were back on the path to
economic growth.  Along with the policy to squeeze world oil supply adopted by the main oilproducing countries, this contributed to the recovery of oil prices and global demand for oil over the
course of the year.  Meanwhile, Venezuelan economic performance was affected by the policy aimed
at driving up oil prices, which had been sliding since late 1997 and had plummeted to an historical
low in early 1999, with the result that GDP fell by 6.1 per cent.  The behaviour of the non-oil sector
reflected weak aggregate demand and under-investment in the public and private sectors in particular.
13. As a consequence, Venezuelan economic policy had to cope with the imbalances in its fiscal
and external accounts and apply a series of emergency measures in order to redress the situation.
Public spending was cut by about 7.2 per cent of the total budget.  Other measures included a
temporary 0.5 per cent tax on bank debits, and the replacement of the wholesale and luxury
consumption tax ( Impuesto al Consumo Suntuario y a las Ventas al Mayor – ICSVM ) by VAT,
applied at a rate of 15.5 per cent and using a broader tax base than the ICSVM.  The Income Tax Law
was thoroughly overhauled.  One of its most salient features is the application of the residenceVenezuela WT/TPR/G/108
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principle to the notion of taxable income, thus introducing the concept of "world income" into
Venezuelan legislation (this came into force in 2001 and facilitated the signature of a double taxation
agreement with the United States).  The movement  of the general price index continued the downward
trend recorded since 1998 and reached 20 per cent.
14. The behaviour of the consumer price index reflects both the drop in aggregate domestic
demand and that year's fiscal restraints.  By December 1999, domestic economic conditions hadpushed unemployment up to 14.5 per cent, with informal employment standing at 52.4 per cent.  In
the external sector, Venezuela's oil policy was targeted at restoring the balance between world supply
and demand for crude, which had been out of kilter since late 1997.  In these circumstances, the price
of oil rose steadily in the course of 1999 as the inventories built up in consumer countries dwindled
while their energy consumption levels remained unchanged.
15. During 2000, the main features of economic performance were a balanced external account
position, underpinned by stable world oil prices, against a backdrop of a slight contraction in
economic activity in the industrialized countries, and the culmination of the domestic institutional,
political and constitutional reform process initiated in 1999.  GDP moved up by 3.2 per cent, on the
back of growth in both the oil and the non-oil se ctors.  This was mainly triggered by a distinctly
expansionary fiscal policy in 2000, with public spending recording nominal growth of 61.8 per cent.
Among the fiscal measures taken to stimulate domestic economic growth, VAT was cut by 1 per cent
to 14.5 per cent.
16. Growth in 2000 was also spurred by exchange rate stability, which helped slow the increase
in the general price level.  There was a significant rebound in aggregate demand, especially in public
and private consumption.  This was not the case fo r investment, however.  The general price index
declined throughout 2000 to reach an inflation rate of 13.4 per cent, the lowest rate since 1986.  As aresult of the above factors, unemployment dropped to 13.2 per cent by December 2000, with informal
employment standing at 53 per cent.
17. In 2001, the global downturn and terrorism changed the economic outlook.  Although the
advanced economies were already showing signs of be ing in or about to enter recession (mainly the
United States and Japan), the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the United States ultimatelyaffected growth in the European Union, Latin Ameri ca and Asia.  All these factors combined led to a
decline in global demand for raw materials and finished goods and slackened the pace of economic
activity, creating oversupply in the international oil market, with its ensuing impact on prices.  The
Venezuelan economy was affected by the slowdown in the US economy, given the close trade ties
between the two countries.
18. As a consequence, Venezuelan economic growth amounted to 2.7 per cent (in fact reflecting
both a 1.3 per cent contraction in public GDP and a 5.1 per cent increase in pr ivate-sector GDP).  This
growth was achieved with an inflation rate that  was lower than the previous year, at 12.3 per cent,
confirming the continuing descent in price levels that began in 1997.  There was nevertheless a slight
drop in unemployment (12.8 per cent in December 2001), while informal employment stood at49.9 per cent.
19. In this review of macroeconomic variables, however, mention should also be made of the
acute decline in the Venezuelan human development index in recent years and the alarming
deterioration in the standard of living of Venezuelan families.  Poverty has significantly redrawn the
country's social map.  Out of five million Venezuelan households, a million lack the income to feed
themselves:  in other words, 1.3 million households are living in extreme poverty.  Improving living
conditions in Venezuela means halting and reversing the dramatic aggravation and spread of povertyWT/TPR/G/108 Trade Policy Review
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in recent decades.  A series of measures has therefore had to be taken in order to close the gap
between the "haves" and the "have-nots".
20. A strategy based on the implementation of a social investment policy and the creation of a
stable macroeconomic environment conducive to strong growth in terms of product per capita was
therefore adopted in order to narrow the human development gap.  Venezuela has launched policies
aimed at developing production structures that are more diversified and better able to generateemployment.  This involves participation by small- and medium-sized industries and informal
microenterprises and aimed at providing stable investment conditions and better access to training and
educational facilities.  All of this is set in the context of strengthening the country's institutions in
order to create an environment conducive to the expansion of production and trade, as a sound basis
for overcoming poverty and promoting human development through active development policies.
II. TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 1996-2002
21. Venezuela has been playing quite a dynamic international role in trade policy matters,
participating actively in various trade negotiations, both as a member of integration blocs (e.g. the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Andean Community – MERCOSUR, Andean Community
– European Union) and on an individual basis, managing its own trade relations with Asian, African,European and other countries, as well as in the framework of the G-15 and G-77, which discuss
economic and trade issues in a political context.
22. Pursuant to its Constitution, Venezuela promotes the strengthening of regional and
subregional integration schemes, working to achieve its full incorporation in those frameworks (and
thereby fostering its economic development and the prosperity of its people) and to enhance the
region's negotiating power vis-à-vis  other States or economic blocs.  It also seeks to promote the
dovetailing of these and other integration mechanisms in other parts of the world.
23. As part of the Venezuelan political and economic reform process, the Government's trade
policy over the past five years has been aimed at further diversifying the country's export supply and
gaining access to new markets.  This has led Venezuela to sign or amend various international trade
instruments, in conformity with the rules and principles governing the WTO multilateral trading
system.
24. The WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation came fully into force for Venezuela in 2000.
(A) 
ANDEAN COMMUNITY
25. Considerable headway has already been made in the Andean integration process, some of the
most significant achievements being the consolidation of a Free Trade Area1;  the partial adoption of a
Common External Tariff2;  the significant expansion of intraregional trade and of its manufacturing
component in particular;  the broadening of investment opportunities;  the diversification of foreign
relations;  the strengthening of a trade and investment promotion mechanism;  and the establishment
of the legal infrastructure to place the subregional integration process on a firm and reliable footing.
In 1999, the Andean Heads of State set the objective of establishing a Common Market by 2005.  The
goal is to ensure free movement of services, capital and persons by that date, in addition to the freecirculation of goods already in force under the Andean Community regime.
                                                     
1 Peru is due to become a full member in 2005.
2 Idem .Venezuela WT/TPR/G/108
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26. The undertaking to build a Common Market by 2005 was endorsed by Venezuela and the
other Andean countries in a series of Presidential Meetings.  By 2001, it was decided formally to
adopt the goal of establishing a fully-fledged A ndean Common Market:  the Customs Union was to be
perfected by drafting and adopting a Common External Tariff, strengthening the Common
Agricultural Policy, adopting a Community Government Procurement Regime, liberalizing trade in
services, and, in due course, harmonizing the respective regulatory systems.  Venezuelan trade withthe Andean countries has increased significantly, with a predominance of domestic products of high
added value, unlike most of Venezuela's international exports, which mainly consist of raw materials.
The Andean market has also proved an excellent destination for new exporters, who can expand their
businesses thanks to the advantages offered by geographical proximity, a common language and
similar customs.
(B) 
GROUP OF THREE
27. The Free Trade Agreement of the Group of Three (TLC G-3) entered into force on
1 January 1995.
28. This is a new-generation Economic Complementarity Agreement covering not only trade in
goods but also trade in services, intellectual property, government procurement and investment.  Fortrade in goods, it establishes a linear, automatic tariff-cutting process which, by 1 July 2004, will free
most products in the Customs Tariff from payment of customs duties.  It also provides for special
treatment for goods in the agriculture, textile and clothing and automotive sectors according to the
sensitivities identified in each case, for which the Agreement established a negotiation methodology.
29. For the purposes of implementation, the Agreement itself provides for the setting up of
committees and working groups in the relevant spheres, whose members are scheduled to meet at
least once a year.  A Commission made up of the three countries' foreign trade ministers (meeting onan annual basis) is in charge of overseeing the Agreement as a whole.  The signing of this instrument
enabled the Group of Three to advance in their negotiations on general services and investment,
which were formalized in Protocols.  The negotiations for Venezuela's accession to the Protocol on
Financial Services were completed in late 2001.
(C) 
PARTICIPATION IN THE LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION SCHEME (LAIA )
(i) Economic Complementarity Agreement with  Chile:  The Economic Complementarity
Agreement between Venezuela and Chile (ACE No. 23) was signed on 2 April 1993
with the principal objective of establishing a free-trade area.  The negotiated
Agreement covered around 97 per cent of the Customs Tariff and established an
exemption scheme providing (as of 1999) for duty-free entry of goods from eitherParty.  The remaining 3 per cent were excluded from the agreed liberalization (List of
Exceptions) and are currently being negotiated by the Parties.
(ii) Economic Complementarity Agreements with Brazil and Argentina:  Within the
framework of the LAIA, on 4 July 1999 the Andean Community member countriesand Brazil signed an Economic Compleme ntarity Agreement (ACE No. 39), which
replaced each Andean country's individual trade agreements with Brazil.  In
October 2000 and June 2001, several existing preferences were improved and the
range of products benefiting from preferential treatment was increased.
(iii) Regional Tariff Preferences Agreement
 (PAR):  This instrument, adopted by
Venezuela on 1 January 1995 in the framework of the LAIA, establishes aWT/TPR/G/108 Trade Policy Review
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preferential scheme for LAIA Members, with the exception of partners with whom
free-trade agreements have already been concluded (Andean Community, Chile and
Mexico).  The scheme takes account of each country's relative level of development –
a principle enshrined in the Montevideo Treaty under which the LAIA was
established.
(D) MERCOSUR
30. Joint negotiations between the Andean Co mmunity and MERCOSUR are still under way with
a view to signing a free-trade agreement between th e two integration schemes.  This agreement will
replace the Andean Community's trade agreements with Argentina and Brazil and those individually
concluded by the Andean countries with Paraguay and Uruguay.
(E) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
31. In September 1999, Venezuela and Cuba signed an Economic Complementarity Agreement
(ACE No. 40) establishing certain tariff preferen ces for goods and disciplines regarding investment,
technology, services, intellectual property, and so forth.  The Agreement entered into force in
August 2001.  A further stage in the deepening and broadening of tariff preferences was launched thatyear, leading to the signing of the First Amending Protocol on 10 July 2002.
(F) 
VENEZUELA AND OTHER COUNTRIES
32. Venezuela has also signed trade agreements with Eastern European, African and Asian
countries, aimed at promoting, strengthening and boosting trade flows;  attracting investment capital;
fostering cooperation in areas of mutual interest; using trade promotion mechanisms to develop trade
activities;  and raising awareness of opportunities in Venezuela and in the other signatory countries,
having due regard to equality of rights and mutual benefits.  Some of these agreements also providefor most-favoured-nation treatment for products from the various partners.  Venezuela has supported
several countries in their endeavours to join th e WTO, and engaged with them in the bilateral
negotiations on access for goods and services to each other's markets.
(G) 
FREE -TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA )
33. Venezuela has been actively involved in every stage of the establishment of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), a process that has been under way since December 1994. It used
consultation with the public and private sectors and civil society as a mechanism for drawing up the
proposals made.  Venezuela's approach in the FTAA negotiations is based on the strategic premise,
enshrined in its Constitution of 1999, that trade is a tool of development and prosperity.  Venezuela
has supported and promoted key themes such as the handling of differences in development levels,particularly as regards the progressive liberalization of market-access commitments, and the need to
ensure that the future FTAA undertakings are comp atible with the commitm ents made within the
framework of the multilateral trading system and subregional integration mechanisms.
III. INVESTMENT MEASURES
34. The importance Venezuela attaches to investment policy is reflected in the 1999 Constitution:
private capital investment is recognized as a tool for harmonious development of the domestic
economy, with key constitutional provisions govern ing the handling of investment and providing
equal treatment for domestic and foreign private investment, thus promoting free competition for
capital.Venezuela WT/TPR/G/108
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35. That same year, Venezuela passed the Inve stment Promotion and Protection Law, which
offers guarantees of a high international standard for investment and domestic and foreign investors
alike.  Subsequent implementing regulations that gu arantee the legal stability of contract terms and
conditions made this the key instrument for promoting and protecting domestic and foreign
investment in Venezuela.
36. This legal framework has been supplemented by specific initiatives in various sectors of
economic activity.  The opening of the Venezuelan oil industry, for example, began in 1997 with
operational agreements for reactivating oil fields (the winning consortia being the United States,
United Kingdom, China, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Norway, Germany, Canada and Argentina);  strategic
partnerships for crude production in the Orinoco Belt (Maraven-Conoco, Maraven-Total-Estatoil-Norsk Hydro and Corpoven-ARCO-Texaco-Phillips);  the development of natural gas offshore
(Cristóbal Colón Project and Delta Platform);  join t ventures for the development of Orimulsion® and
other initiatives in association with domestic and foreign private capital in the petrochemical and coal
sectors and in the provision of industrial services.
37. Furthermore, enactment of the Basic Telecommunications Law in November 2000 completed
the opening of the telecommunications sector, not only turning it into a powerful magnet for
investment and new technologies but also fulfilling Venezuela's multilateral commitments in the field
of basic telecommunications.
38. As regards bilateral investment agreements, Venezuela has negotiated and signed a whole
series of bilateral promotion and protection agreements under its policy to promote and afford
substantive guarantees for the protection of foreign investment;  19 of these agreements are now in
force, 10 with European countries and the remainder with countries in the American Hemisphere.Another large set of such agreements is currently awaiting legislative approval.
IV. PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICY
39. In addition to promoting industrial intensification and the expansion of productive
employment, Venezuela's industrial policy is aimed at increasing the share of the industrial sector in
GDP.  To achieve these objectives, the country has designed a number of concurrent strategies tobuild synergies with the private sector so as to  stimulate performance and hence GDP and productive
employment growth;  develop a regulatory framework guaranteeing transparency and legal safety for
the players involved;  and set up the infrastructure to underpin production processes and domestic and
international marketing.
40. Industrial development policy is centred on the promotion of innovation and exports of
manufactured goods, in an approach based on broad consensus among all economic players
(entrepreneurs and investors, workers, consumers and the public sector).  The government has
planned a series of measures to stimulate process and product enhancement, with an eye to
penetrating more demanding markets while boosting productive investment and employment.  These
measures include improving public services and road  infrastructure;  promoting industrial activities
and investment;  stimulating research and development;  arranging for small- and medium-size
enterprises to receive technical assistance from major established industries in order to modernize the
country's industrial fabric;  and strengthening the "Antonio José de Sucre entrepreneurial plan" and
the production chains.
3
                                                     
3 The production chains provide opportunities for concerted cooperation between the public and private
sectors, along with the participation of workers and consumers.WT/TPR/G/108 Trade Policy Review
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41. In 2001, Venezuela established and strengthened the legal framework for the promotion and
development of small- and medium-size enterprises and the entrepreneurial incentive programme.
Since nine out of ten Venezuelan firms is a small- or medium-size enterprise, the new law provides
for a series of measures aimed at facilitating acces s to credit and technical assistance for such firms
and at promoting strategic partnerships among them.
42. Although Venezuela has a wealth of natural resources, the processing industry has always had
difficulty in obtaining raw materials for reason s ranging from environmental concerns to trade
practices of public and private enterprises.  In order to promote more extensive processing of raw
materials by strengthening the manufacturing sector, Venezuela has taken steps to prevent anti-
competitive practices on the part of primary suppliers by fostering direct contact between the
enterprises in question and those experiencing difficulties;  it has also arranged for technicalassistance by international agencies specialized in production and export capacity-building and with
expertise in all other aspects of international marketing.
43. In recent years, the domestic market has been plagued by numerous forms of unfair
competition, including under-invoicing (prices and quantities), smuggling, consumer fraud,
counterfeit trademarks, and violations of quality and health standards.  In order to address theseproblems, Venezuela has launched a customs automation programme, which is due to be completed in
2003, and has also set up a Presidential Anti-Smuggling Commission.  Other steps include the
establishment and strict enforcement of technical regulations;  the use of reference prices in customs
offices to check international price trends and minimize distortions resulting from customs fraud;
tariff increases within the commitments bound in the WTO;  and anti-dumping and safeguard
investigations, for example.  All these measures are being taken in strict compliance with the WTO
Agreements and other trade integration agreements.
44. Lastly, in a bid to increase the participation of industry in government procurement,
Venezuela recently strengthened the legal framework for State purchasing and contracting, with
special emphasis on the granting of commercial and financial advantages for suppliers engaged in
processing or value-added activities in order to boost formal employment.
V. TRADE POLICY OUTLOOK
45. We consider that the innovations introduced by the 1999 Constitution have laid the
foundations for a productive and, equitable economic model capable of generating sustainable
economic growth, promoting production diversification and achieving international competitiveness
in a stable macroeconomic context conducive to a fuller and more diversified reintegration of the
country into international trade.
46. The challenges facing the economy in 2002 are no less important than those faced in the
past – high volatility of public revenue and expenditure, deterioration in the standard of public
services, rising liabilities, and low tax revenues.  With the reform of the exchange rate regime and the
fiscal adjustment measures in force since 12 February 2002, there is an opportunity to correct the real
exchange rate.  This has not yet had any real impact on the Venezuelan economy or on internationaltrade flows, however.  On the contrary, Venezuelan manufacturing is still suffering the consequences
of sluggish growth due to the anchor role played by the exchange rate in recent years, which, coupled
with the effects of global and local recession, has led to severe contraction in the different production
sectors.
47. It would therefore be unreasonable to expect an immediate economic recovery.  For a
developing country like Venezuela, it is essential to continue implementing policies aimed atVenezuela WT/TPR/G/108
Page 13
stimulating domestic production and exports, because competition in international trade becomes
extremely difficult when major imbalances between different members of the multilateral trading
system are not properly taken into account.
48. Today, Venezuela hopes to improve the international competitiveness of its goods and
services, as its industry adjusts to the new system, with the ensuing impact on employment levels,
production and export capacity.
49. If Venezuela is to achieve sustainable economic growth and social development, the driving
force of the economy, which is currently the oil sector, will have to be joined by other sectors – such
as agriculture, industry and services – capable of generating a strong flow of exports to international
markets, underpinned by concerted efforts in the most competitive sectors.  The country's trade policy
seeks to establish a sound basis for greater domestic efficiency and productivity.  That is whyVenezuela advocates a multilateral trading system in which asymmetries are taken into account,
protectionist measures are substantially reduced and less favoured economies receive support for their
development so as to ensure an overall global balance of rights and obligations in the multilateral
framework.
50. Venezuela will have to pursue its process of far-reaching reform in order to adjust its legal
framework to the sweeping changes stemming from the dynamics of global economic relations.  We
therefore trust that the development policy objectiv es enshrined in the Doha Ministerial Declarations
will yield concrete results, for a globalized world in which poverty reigns is not the best possible
market for trade in goods and services.
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