RESTRICTEDWORLD  TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/TPR/S/113
5 March 2003
(03-1128)
Trade Policy Review Body
TRADE POLICY REVIEW
BURUNDI
Report by the Secretariat
This report, prepared for the first Trade Policy Review of Burundi, has been
drawn up by the WTO Secretariat on its own responsibility.  The Secretariat has,
as required by the Agreement establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization), sought clarification from the Government of Burundi on its trade
policies and practices.
Any technical questions arising from this report may be addressed to
Mr Amar Breckenridge (tel:  022/73 9 5449) and Mr Jacques Degbelo (tel:
022/739 5583).
Document WT/TPR/G/113 contains the policy statement submitted by the
Government of Burundi.
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the meeting
of the Trade Policy Review Body on Burundi.Burundi WT/TPR/S/113
Page iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS vii
(1) ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT vii
(2) INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK viii
(3) TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS ix
(4) SECTORAL POLICIES xi
(5) TRADE POLICIES AND TRADING PARTNERS xii
I. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 1
(1) MAJOR FEATURES OF THE ECONOMY 1
(2) RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 2
(3) FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 5
(i) Trade in Goods and Services 5
(ii) Investment 9
(4) OUTLOOK 10
II. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES 12
(1) INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 12
(2) POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 13
(3) TRADE POLICY OBJECTIVES 15
(4) LAWS AND REGULATIONS 15
(5) TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS 17
(i) World Trade Organization (WTO) 18
(ii) Regional agreements 19
(iii) Other agreements and arrangements 21
(6) TRADE -RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 22
(i) Implementation of agreements, formulation of policies, and
negotiations 22
(ii) Supply constraints 24
(iii) Integration of trade into development strategies 25
III. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE 26
(1) I NTRODUCTION 26
(2) M EASURES DIRECTLY AFFECTING IMPORTS 27
(i) Registration and documentation 27
(ii) Customs procedures 28
(iii) Tariffs, other duties and charges 29
(iv) Import prohibitions, quantitative restrictions, and licensing 36(v) Anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures 38WT/TPR/S/113 Trade Policy Review
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(vi) Standards and other technical requirements 38
(vii) Government procurement 40
(viii) Local content requirements 41
(ix) Other measures 41
(3) MEASURES DIRECTLY AFFECTING EXPORTS 41
(i) Registration and documents 41
(ii) Export taxes 42
(iii) Export prohibitions, limitations and controls 42
(iv) Subsidies and export duty and tariff concessions 42(v) Free zones 43
(vi) Export promotion and financing 44
(4)
MEASURES AFFECTING PRODUCTION AND TRADE 44
(i) Incentives 44
(ii) State enterprises and privatization 45(iii) Competition and price control policy 51
(iv) Intellectual property 52
IV. ANALYSIS OF TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY SECTOR 54
(1)
OVERVIEW 54
(2) AGRICULTURE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 55
(i) Evolution of agricultural policy 56
(ii) Trade policy by main category of products 58
(3) MINING AND QUARRYING AND ENERGY 69
(i) Mining and Quarrying 69
(ii) Energy 72
(4) MANUFACTURING 74
(5) SERVICES 76
(i) Financial services 76
(ii) Telecommunications 79
(iii) Transport 82
(iv) Tourism 87
REFERENCES 89
APPENDIX TABLES 91Burundi WT/TPR/S/113
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CHARTS
Page
I. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTI.1 Share of foreign trade in goods in the GDP, 1995-2001 6
I.2 Structure of exports, 1994-00 7
I.3 Exports by destination, 1994-00 8
I.4 Structure of imports, 1997 and 2000 8
I.5 Imports by origin, 1994-2000 10
III TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE
III.1 Breakdown of applied MFN duties, 2002 and 2003 30
III.2 Breakdown of applied MFN duties by sector, 2002 and 2003 32
III.3 Tariff escalation, 2003 and 2003 33III.4 Exemptions from customs duty, by  category of beneficiaries,1991-2001 37
IV ANALYSIS OF TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY SECTORIV.1 Real prices for coffee producers, 1994-2001 61
IV.2 Income distribution per kg. of coffee, 1991/92-2001/02 62
IV.3 Profit margin per kg. of coffee produced, 1997-2002 63
TABLES
I. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
I.1 Main socio-economic indicators 1
I.2 Economic performance, 1994-2001 3
I.3 Balance-of-payments, 1994-2001 5
II. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMESII.1 Main trade laws and regulations, December 2002 16
II.2 Status of WTO notification obligations, December 2002 18
III TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASUREIII.1 MFN tariff structure in Burundi, 2002-2003 26
III.2 Taxes on trade:  share of Burundi's total tax revenue, 1995-2001 29
III.3 List of companies by legal category 46
III.4 Privatization programme, 2002-05 47
III.5 Privatized companies 49
III.6 Liquidations, 1985-2002 51
IV ANALYSIS OF TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY SECTORIV.1 Trends in the main food crops, 1990-99 56
IV.2 Trends in livestock, 1992-99 56IV.3 Coffee production, 1995/96 to 2000/01 58WT/TPR/S/113 Trade Policy Review
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IV.4 Tea production, 1997-2001 63
IV.5 Cotton sector:  principal indicators, 1993-2001 64
IV.6 Sugar:  production, imports, exports, and domestic sales, 1997-2001 66
IV.7 Issuing and renewal costs for mining permits 70IV.8 Ordinary mining royalty rates 71
IV.9 Taxes, royalties, duties, and percentages of foreign currency earnings to be surrendered 72
IV.10 Electricity rates 73
IV.11 Production of the main industries, 1997-2001 75
IV.12 Weighted average borrowing and lending rates, 1998-July 2002 78IV.13 Telecommunications:  basic indicators, 1993-2000 79
IV.14 Tariffs supplied by the mobile operator Telecel 81
IV.15 Tariffs applied by USAN and CBINET 82
IV.16 Tariffs for lake transport, December 2002 84
IV.17 Operating tariffs in the Port of the Bujumbura, December 2002 85IV.18 Charges and taxes applied by SOBUGEA, December 2002 86
APPENDIX TABLES
AIII.1 MFN tariff statistics by HS chapter, 2002 93Burundi WT/TPR/S/113
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SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
(1) ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
1. The economic reforms undertaken by
Burundi following the signature of the Peace
and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000 have in
all likelihood contributed to the first signs of a
recovery in the economy in 2001, with agrowth rate of 2.1 per cent in real GDP.
Burundi's economy nevertheless remains
marked by the impact of the sociopolitical
crisis that has prevailed since 1993, with
sporadic new outbreaks of tension.  The crisisbrought to a halt the reforms initiated at the
end of the 1980s and has hindered Burundi's
development:  Burundi's real GDP fell by
almost 30 per cent between 1993 and 2000
and over two thirds of its population arecurrently living below the poverty threshold.
2. The increase in military spending,
mainly due to the crisis (25 to 30 per cent of
overall government expenditure), subsidies to
State enterprises in difficulty and the loss of
revenue caused by exemptions from duties and
taxes have resulted in relatively high budgetdeficits.  Together with the successive
devaluations of the Burundi franc, the increase
in production costs as a result of the crisis,
and a monetary policy that has been adapted
to the fiscal policy, these deficits have keptinflation at a high level (at an average annual
rate of 18 per cent between 1995 and 2001).
Such an environment has hardly been
conducive to investment, 60 per cent of the
US$47 million invested at the end of 2002dated from prior to 1990.  Public investment
has also stagnated at around 6 per cent of the
GDP.
3. This economic situation is the reason
for the priorities fixed by the Government inits new economic reform programme, namely,
improved macroeconomic management and
the achievement of a growth rate that will
allow poverty to be reduced.  To achieve this,
a system for the monthly control of spendingand special units to monitor the granting of
exemptions from duties and taxes have been
set up.  The Government is considering
establishing an independent court of audit anda strategy for the reduction of its external
debt, whose current net value amounts to
1,061 per cent of Burundi's exports in 2001.Consideration is being given to including
Burundi among the beneficiaries of the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.  In
addition, reform of the exchange policy,
particularly the abolition of the system basedon a positive list of goods eligible for foreign
currency kept by the Bank of the Republic of
Burundi and the frequent holding of currency
auctions for the purpose of determining the
exchange rate for the Burundi franc, havehelped to bridge the gap between the official
and black market exchange rates.
4. The crisis, the imposition of
international economic sanctions between
1996 and 1999, and the distortions caused bycertain government policies, have fostered the
emergence of parallel trade and subsistence
activities.  Exports (except for re-exports of
gold) strongly focus on primary products,
particularly coffee, and to a lesser degree tea.
Although the share of exports of manufactures
rose from 2 per cent in 1999 to 11 per cent in2001, the Government's desire to promote
exports of non-traditional products has not led
to any noticeable diversification, even though
coffee prices fell by around 57 per cent
between 1999 and 2002.  Europe and NorthAmerica are the major markets for Burundi's
exports.  The share of African countries has
increased since the lifting of economic
sanctions in 1999;  African countries are
presently the main importers of manufacturesproduced by Burundi.
5. Burundi's principal imports are
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods,
capital goods, foodstuffs, petroleum and
chemical products.  European Unioncountries, notably France and Belgium, are
the major sources of imports.  The share of
African countries, especially those belonging
to the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA), in Burundi'simports gradually rose from 1994 onwards
and these countries are now the second source
of imports.  Burundi is a net importer of
services, especially trade-related services (for
example, freight and insurance).  The sharpWT/TPR/S/113 Trade Policy Review
Page viii
fall in imports of these services – imports of
freight services currently only amount to one
third of the figure for 1994-95 – is indicative
of the impact of the crisis on Burundi's trade.
(2) INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
6. Burundi's institutions are governed by
a transitional Constitution adopted in
October 2001 for a period of 36 months, which
should lead to a post-transition Constitution to
be adopted by referendum in compliance with
the principles set out in the Arusha Agreement.Executive power is entrusted to a transitional
government, whose President must hand his
office over to the Vice-President after
18 months.  The President is also the Head of
State;  he appoints the Ministers who composethe Council of Ministers.  Legislative power
has been given to a parliament, composed of a
National Assembly and a Senate.
7. The most important ministries
participating in the formulation and
implementation of trade policies are those of
trade and industry, finance, planning andreconstruction, agriculture and livestock.
Other ministries or State bodies may have
certain responsibilities for sectoral matters
such as coffee and tea, mining and quarrying,
or the reform of State enterprises, which areclosely related to trade policies. A permanent
secretariat follows up economic and social
reforms under the direction of the Vice-
President's Office and is responsible for
supervising and coordinating all mattersrelated to the economic reform and structural
adjustment programmes.  The Economic and
Social Council is an advisory body with
competence for all areas of economic and
social development and it must be consultedon any draft development plan or any regional
or subregional integration project.  The
Government has also taken the opportunity of
its trade policy review by the WTO to re-
establish an interministerial committee for the
coordination of trade matter, which could help
to make the formulation of trade policies moreconsistent.8. The Government sees trade as a
catalyst for economic growth.  With this in
mind, the main objective of its trade policy is
to diversify exports, particularly by exploiting
non-traditional agricultural subsectors.
Reaching this objective will require large-scale reform of trade policy, sectoral reforms,
and measures to alleviate supply constraints
and upgrade the infrastructure.  Trade policy
therefore needs to be integrated within a
broader strategic framework, is a process thatcould be facilitated by the implementation of
the Integrated Framework for LDCs in
Burundi.
9. Burundi is one of the original
Members of the WTO and as a minimumgrants MFN treatment to all its trade partners.
It has not signed the various plurilateral
agreements negotiated within the WTO.
Burundi needs substantial technical assistance
from the international community in order to
derive maximum benefit from its participation
in the WTO, particularly as regards standardsand the implementation of customs reforms.  It
also requires support in formulating policies
in certain sectors, for example,  in
telecommunications, financial services, and
energy, so that the liberalization envisaged inthese sectors proves beneficial to it.  Burundi
would also like technical assistance in areas
such as contingency trade measures and the
protection of intellectual property, for which
there is little or no legislation.  Burundi couldmake better use of the potential afforded by
the opening of markets including recourse to
preferential schemes, if its capacity to analyse
and disseminate trade information was
bolstered.
10. Burundi is a member of the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA).  It is also party to the Treaty on
the Economic Community of the Great Lakes
Countries (CEPGL), whose trade provisions
are not applied.  Burundi enjoys non-
reciprocal preferential access to the EuropeanUnion market under the "Everything But
Arms" initiative, and to the markets of other
industrialized countries under the Generalized
System of Preferences.  Burundi does not yetBurundi WT/TPR/S/113
Page ix
benefit from the provisions of the United States
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
(3) TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS
11. Burundi's major trade policy
instrument is customs duties.  The tariff
structure remained unchanged between 1993
and 1 January 2003, when the maximum rates
were lowered from 100 to 40 per cent.  Thisreform has caused the simple average rate of
MFN duties to fall from 30.8 to 23.5 per cent.
All duties are ad valorem and there are eight
rates.  The 10 per cent rate applies to "staple
goods" while the 40 per cent modal rateapplies to finished manufactures and
consumer goods and, since 1 January 2003, to
certain agricultural products such as meat,
fish, coffee and tea, which were previously
subject to a rate of 100 per cent.  The 0.61coefficient of variation indicates a relatively
moderate dispersion of rates.  Overall,
Burundi's tariff structure shows mixed
escalation;  setting aside incentives, such a
situation does little to encourage investment in
certain processing activities.
12. The Government tries to compensate
for the impact of customs duties on costs,
particularly of inputs, by granting exemptions
and reductions in duty under the Investment
Code, the Export Promotion Law, and the Tax
Code.  These incentives are particularly aimedat agricultural activities, small and medium
enterprises, cottage industries and promoting
the decentralization of economic activities out
Bujumbura.  Import substitution is one of the
objectives of the Investment Code.  The valueof the exemptions granted is substantial,
around 15 per cent of the overall value of
imports.  The relatively wide margin of
discretion for the granting of exemptions given
to the authorities and their scope make thenational tariff less transparent.  Distortions
and the resulting loss of financial resources
are considerable.  It would be more beneficial,
particularly for small producers, to import
inputs at uniformly lower customs dutiesrather than using exemption schemes.
13. During the Uruguay Round, Burundi
bound the rates for almost 20 per cent of itstariff lines.  All tariffs for agricultural
products (WTO definition) were bound at a
ceiling rate of 100 per cent, with the exceptionof some 6 per cent of lines that had already
been bound.  For non-agricultural products,
rates for less than 10 per cent of the tariff lines
were bound, 24.2 per cent for textiles and
clothing, 20.2 per cent for leather, rubber andfootwear, and 11.2 per cent for transport
equipment.
14. The positive list which identified
products deemed priorities for the purposes of
exchange policy has been abolished;  licencesare now only used for statistical purposes.
Burundi requires preshipment inspection for
all imports amounting to a minimum of
US$3,000 or US$5,000 depending on the
product, with the exception of petroleumproducts.  Importers are responsible for the
cost of inspection, which amounts to 1.5 per
cent of the customs value, with a flat rate
minimum fee varying from US$105 to
SwF 275.  The customs administration uses the
Brussels Definition to estimate the customs
value and uses the valuation made by theinspection companies for the purpose of
comparison with reference values.  Depending
on their nature, imports may be subject to
various internal taxes, the most important
being the transaction tax.  This applies tocertain types of products at rates that are
higher for imports than local goods, which is
contrary to the WTO principle of national
treatment.  The revenue earned by applying
this tax on imports is fairly substantial.
15. Burundi has abolished the majority of
quantitative import restrictions for all goods
with the exception of cotton duck.  It does not
have any national standards.  The standards of
the CODEX Alimentarius, the InternationalElectrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the
ISO are used by Burundi as a reference in
certain areas.  Burundi has not signed any
mutual recognition agreement.  A
phytosanitary law dating from 1993 on plantprotection is in force.  The current regulations
on sanitary measures date back to the colonial
era and apply to coffee, tea, rice and meat in
particular, but they are not accompanied by
any implementing provisions.  Burundi doesWT/TPR/S/113 Trade Policy Review
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not have any legislation on contingency trade
measures and has not undertaken any action
in this area.  Intellectual property legislation
is little developed and takes the form of a
fairly outdated law on industrial property and
another on copyright, which do not have anyimplementing provisions.
16. Government procurement of a value
exceeding the minimum threshold fixed by the
Minister for Finance, with the exception of
routine contracts awarded by Stateenterprises, must be examined by the
Directorate General of Government
Procurement.  Invitations to tender must be
the principal procedure followed in awarding
contracts.  Burundian enterprises are grantedpreferences:  10 per cent for construction
contracts, 15 per cent for supplies and
services contracts;  and 20 per cent for
contracts for studies.
17. Most exports are subject to a 5 per
cent export tax;  a 31 per cent tax on green
coffee has not been collected since 1999, giventhe difficulties encountered in this subsector.
The Government planned to eliminate export
taxes from 1 January 2003.  All foreign
currency earned from exports of coffee, tea
and cotton must be repatriated, whereas forother exports the proportion to be repatriated
is 70 per cent.  Sugar exports are subject to a
quota, which varies according to estimates of
local demand.  Coffee cherries may not be
exported and ivory exports are bannedpursuant to the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES).
18. There is a drawback system for the
refund of customs duties and tax credits for therefund of indirect taxes on inputs intended to
promote exports.  The overlapping of these
incentives and those granted under the Tax
Code and the Investment Code mean that
enterprises engaged in similar activities may
be eligible for different types of incentives,
which can lead to distortions.  The legislationon free zone enterprises grants total exemption
from all duties and taxes provided that the
value added created is at least 35 per cent andthat the enterprise exports its entire output.
Nevertheless, up to 10 per cent of its output
can be sold on the local market;  the goods
thus sold are treated as normal imports.  The
performance of enterprises benefiting from
these provisions has been mediocre and thevalue of their exports has been below 0.3 per
cent of Burundi's total exports.
19. The state is extensively involved in
economic activity through State-owned
enterprises;  the State has shares in48 enterprises covering 10 areas of activity.
In general, these enterprises are inefficient
and heavily indebted.  The majority of
enterprises involved in supplying services have
benefited from a de jure monopoly;  a largenumber of other branches and sectors of
activity have a dominant position de facto.  A
privatization programme was initiated in
1991, but the progress made so far has been
limited, to a large extent due to the political
instability in Burundi;  0.5 per cent of the
State's holdings have been privatized.  TheGovernment has drawn up a programme for
the period up to 2005 for the full or partial
privatization or restructuring of 19 state
enterprises, including those operating in
certain key areas such as telecommunicationsand electricity.  A draft law on competition is
currently under consideration.
20. Burundi could make its tariff more
predictable by narrowing the gap between the
bound and applied rates and by increasing thenumber of bindings.  Transposing its former
tariff bindings into the Harmonized System
and eliminating discrimination when imposing
internal taxes, more particularly the
transaction tax, would strengthen Burundi'sobservance of the WTO's principles.
Rationalizing the various exemptions granted
and measures to improve fiscal management
should offset any loss in earnings as a result of
tariff reforms.  The Government needs
appropriate technical assistance to underpin
its action in these areas.Burundi WT/TPR/S/113
Page xi
(4) SECTORAL POLICIES
21. Agriculture plays a key role in
Burundi's economy, employing 90 per cent ofthe labour force and accounting for 36 per
cent of the GDP.  Agricultural production has
been affected by the war and is still subject to
adverse climatic conditions.  Coffee is the
major export and provides over 50 per cent ofBurundi's total exports, followed by tea.  The
third most important export is cotton, but its
production has been particularly affected by
Burundi's socio-political instability.  These
products are usually grown by small farmers,but the State has a very strong hold over
processing and marketing through State
enterprises or semi-public entities.  Although
there has been some reform, in particular, the
implementation of training programmes andthe supply of subsidized or free inputs by the
state, overall the structure of these subsectors
has a negative impact.  The State enterprises
involved often have a buyer's monopoly;
planters are obliged to sell their production to
them at prices fixed in advance, which means
a relatively substantial loss of income incomparison with sales under competitive
conditions.  The real prices paid to planters
have also gradually decreased.  Enterprises in
these subsectors find it difficult to achieve
their commercial objectives while at the sametime supporting planters.  Their lack of
efficiency leads to large losses, particularly
when international markets are sluggish, and
these have to be financed from the State
budget.
22. Agriculture is still the most protected
sector of the economy, with an average
customs duty of 32.8 per cent.  The highest
level of protection applies to products such as
meat, fish, fisheries products, coffee, tea, andcacao, and some vegetables (tomatoes and
beans, for example).  This is not conducive to
investment in non-traditional products and
jeopardizes the other initiatives taken by the
Government to promote these subsectors.  Theagricultural sector is given a number of
exemptions and reductions of duties and taxes,
especially on inputs, but for small producers
the relevant procedures are complex and theywould be better served if customs duties on
inputs were reduced to zero.
23. The manufacturing sector is under
developed and in 2001 it accounted for around
16 per cent of the GDP.  Exports of
manufactures have been very low, even though
there has been some growth since 2000 as a
result of exports of beverages to neighbouringcountries.  The average customs duty is
23.2 per cent;  nevertheless, taking into
account customs duty concessions, the mixed
escalation of the tariff structure does not
encourage investment in certainmanufacturing industries.  Textiles and
clothing are deemed to be a nascent industry
and consequently benefit from certain
additional measures of protection (for
example, surcharges on certain imports and aban on imports of cotton duck);  the tariff
structure shows marked escalation.
24. In 2000, services accounted for almost
40 per cent of the GDP.  Most activities in this
sector concern transport, communications, or
trade.  The Government has liberalized mobile
telephony, which has led to an improvement inaccess to telephone services;  it is considering
opening up the capital of the fixed operator to
private entities.  The banking sector is
relatively undeveloped and the State is closely
involved.  Loans are mainly for the short termand the 8 to 10 percentage point difference
between borrowing and lending rates suggests
high transaction costs.  The rates imposed by
the electricity company penalize commercial
and industrial customers, whose consumptionsubsidizes household consumption.  Burundi's
commitments under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) concern business
services, construction and related engineering
services, distribution services, health-relatedservices, and social services.  For these
services, Burundi has bound, without
limitations on market access or national
treatment all the measures concerning their
cross-border supply;  their consumptionabroad and commercial presence with a view
to supplying those services.  The measures on
the presence of natural persons have not been
bound except in the case of medicalWT/TPR/S/113 Trade Policy Review
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specialists, managers and specialized senior
management (through horizontal concessions).
(5) TRADE POLICIES AND TRADING
PARTNERS
25. Socio-political stability remains
crucial for continued reform and the fullrealization of the benefits which Burundi
should obtain from its membership of the
WTO.  This situation explains to some extent
Burundi's delay in implementing some of its
multilateral commitments .
26. Despite the 2003 tariff reform, the
level of protection applied by Burundi is high
and is the source of inefficiency.  The
protection structure is not conducive to certain
non-traditional and processing activities,which is delaying economic diversification and
making Burundi increasingly vulnerable to
external shocks.  It is therefore important to
continue the tariff reform.  This should be
assisted by Burundi's full integration into the
COMESA, when it should align its MFN rates
and customs duties on the COMESA commonexternal tariff (once this has come into effect).
Making further commitments in terms of tariff
bindings, bridging the gap between the
consolidated and applied rates, transposing
the former list of tariff bindings into the HSnomenclature, rationalizing exemptions,
improving fiscal management, and eliminating
discrimination in the application of internal
taxes should make Burundi's trade regime
more transparent.
27. Boosting the economy's
competitiveness will also require the
continuation of the privatization programme
and the reform of some key sectors such as
telecommunications, energy, transport, andfinancial services.  Reforming the customs and
taking trade facilitation measures will lessen
the cost of trade transactions.  Implementing
the WTO's customs valuation provisions and
undertaking further commitments on trade in
services (under the GATS) could further
strengthen the reforms already undertaken inthese areas.  Reducing the State's role in
subsectors such as coffee, tea, and cottoncould make them more efficient and help to
alleviate poverty.  In order to carry out all
these reforms, Burundi will need substantial
technical assistance, including capacity-
building to allow entrepreneurs to exploit the
potential resulting from the reform and theopportunities afforded by foreign markets.
Burundi's partners could also help it by
guaranteeing stable access to their markets
and supporting its reconstruction efforts.