RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/WGTCP/W/21
29July1997
ORGANIZATION(97-3191)
Original: English Working Group ontheInteraction
between Trade andCompetition Policy
COMMUNICATION FROM OECD
Introduction
Inthesame wayastheinteraction between tradeandcompetition policies hasbeenrecognised
foralongtimeintheinternational tradearena, therehavebeennumerous contacts inthepastbetween
theOECD Trade Committee andtheCommittee onCompetition LawandPolicy (CLP). Examples
ofOECD Recommendations concerned theeffects oftrademeasures oncompetition [C(86)65 (Final)]
andtheneedforinternational antitrust cooperation totackle anti-competitive business practices affecting
trade [C(95)130(Final) (formerly C(86)44 (Final)], attached asAnnexes IVandV.
Developments overthelastdecade haveledMinisters torecognise theneedformoresystematic
review oftheinteraction between trade, investment andcompetition policies withaviewtoimproving
policy coherence andtosupport theproper functioning ofthemultilateral trading system. Work on
trade andcompetition issues hasbeen underway intheOECD since theearly 1980s intheCLP
Committee, theTrade Committee and,inthe1990s, injointworkinvolving bothcommittees. Recently,
thejointwork hastaken onanewdimension withaspecific twoyearprogramme ofwork. TheOECD
alsoconducts numerous projects ofinterest totheissue butofmore specific focus.
Thisnoteprovides anoverview ofthiswork. Section Idescribes thejointwork ontrade and
competition, Section IIdescribes relevant work intheTrade Committee, Section IIIrelevant work
intheCLPCommittee andSection IVrelevant work inother parts oftheOrganisation. Annexes I,
IIandIIIsetforthOECD Ministerial reports ontradeandcompetition issued in1996, 1994and1993.
Annexes IVandVsetsforththetwoCouncil Recommendations mentioned above, Annex VIprovides
abibliography andAnnex VIIprovides anoverview ofwork bytheOECD withnon-Member countries
seeking toestablish effective national competition authorities.
I. JOINT GROUP ’SACTIVITIES
TheJointGroup ’sactivities arebased onthreepremises: thatprivate anticompetitive practices
canrestrain market access, thattrademeasures canrestrain competition andthatgovernment regulation
canrestrain bothmarket access andcompetition. Within thatframework aretheactivities setforth
below.
(a) Scope andCoverage
Theeffectiveness ofcompetition lawincurbing anticompetitive practices thatimpede market
access depends onanumber offactors, oneofwhich isthescope andcoverage ofcompetition law.
Animportant study published in1996(known astheHawk study1)focused onthescope andcoverage
1Antitrust andMarket Access: TheScope andCoverage ofCompetition Laws andImplications
forTrade, OECD 1996.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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ofcompetition lawsineleven countries orregional groupings anddrew attention toexisting sectoral
andother exceptions/exemptions thatcancreate loopholes inthelawsonanticompetitive practices.
Afollow-up project aimsatfurther promoting transparency ofregulatory exceptions to,or
exemptions fromcountries ’competition laws. Atthesametimethisworkseeks toassess theimportance
ofsuchexceptions/exemptions interms oftrade frictions thatmaybeattributable tothem e.g.where
firms mayallege access difficulties onimportant foreign markets. Thejointwork hasrecommended
thattheentire orpartial exclusion ofsectors oractivities (e.g.where competition lawdoesnotapply)
shouldberegularlyreviewedandtestedagainstup-to-dateanalysisofeconomicandtechnologicalfactors.2
Inanumber ofOECD countries, legislation regulating asector orestablishing monopolies
(e.g.inthecaseofutilities) mayoverride general competition law.Alternatively, general regulations
(e.g.pricefixing forcertain goods) maylimititsapplication withregard toparticular goods orpractices.
Thejointprogramme ofwork includes projects toclarify theapplication ofcompetition lawtostate
owned enterprises inthevarious member countries. Another areaunder examination iswhere
competition lawshavelimited application togovernment encouraged orsanctioned business practices
(anissue which mayextend todelegation ofregulatory powers e.g.inthestandardisation area).
Therecent horizontal project within theOECD onregulatory reform maybehighly beneficial
inencouraging countries toderegulate their economies andcorrespondingly expand thescope of
competition lawapplication andhashighlighted themarket access dimension ofsuchreform. The
regulatory reform project isdiscussed ingreater detail inSection IVbelow.
(b) Enforcement oflaw
Even ifcompetition lawinprinciple applies, itsdegree ofactual enforcement iscrucial in
determining whether iteffectively addresses anticompetitive practices.
Inthisveinajoint brainstorming hasbeen heldonthepossibility ofassessing effective
enforcement ofthelaw.Thisisacomplex issuewhich includes suchparameters asdiscretionary powers
ofcompetition authorities togrant casebycaseexemptions ornottoinvestigate (theabsence ofcases
mayalsomean thatthere arenoviolations; anddifferent competition authorities mayplace different
interpretations onsimilar facts). Enforcement priorities evolve depending oncountries andovertime
andtherange ofavailable enforcement toolsalsovaries greatly. Enforcement indicators havenotbeen
defined, although thekindofstatistics collected byOECD antitrust agencies hasbeenconsidered useful
ingeneral terms.
Asanother approach totheissue, astudy ofrights offoreign anddomestic firms under
competition lawshasbeenlaunched toassess transparency, dueprocess andnondiscrimination in
domestic enforcement ofcompetition law. Thestudy based onaquestionnaire towhich Member
countries andobservers were invited toreply, enquires intotheextent towhich there maybeany
differential treatment asbetween “foreign ”and“domestic ”firms under competition law,insuchareas
asavailability ofprivate suit,rights topetition thecompetition authority, appeal oftheirdecisions,
rights toareply, costs ofaction etc.Thisstudy isongoing andwillbesubmitted tototheprivate
sector fortheirviews. Itisconsidered asapotentially quite substantive contribution.
Relatedtotheabovestudies,workisscheduledtocompareOECDmembercountries’experience
withregardtoinstitutionalsetting,organisationandpowersofantitrustauthorities,theroleofthejudicial
2Forthissection see1996 Joint report Annex Iparas 17to21.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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system etc., given thattheyconstitute thebasic parameters forensuring adequate competition
enforcement.
(c) Practices tobeaddressed bynational lawsandfeasibility ofcorestandards/convergence
Work onidentifying practices potentially affecting international tradeorinvestment ledbythe
Trade Committee inthecourse ofvarious brainstormings hadsingled outsuchcategories as(i)horizontal
agreements including international cartels, export cartels, other jointventures orstrategic alliances,
mergers (ii)vertical restraints orintegration and(iii)abuse ofdominance asbeing ofpriority interest.
Various joint“roundtables ”involving Trade andCompetition officials havebeenheldtoexplore
thetrade andcompetition interface inthose areas.
(i) Horizontal agreements, agreements between actual orpotential competitors3canreduce,
eliminate orincrease competition. Theeffects oncompetition canbeparalleled by
effects ontrade. Among thetwobroad categories ofhorizontal agreements, thatof
hardcorecartels, (forinstance market sharing, bidrigging etc.)elicits asimilar
enforcement posture inOECD countries, (i.e.prohibition) andtrade officials concur
ontheappropriateness ofthistreatment. Thequestion ofhardcoreexport cartels raises
particular enforcement issues, astheyareoften immunised from theapplication of
competition lawintheexporting country. (There isconsensus thatexport arrangements
which falloutside thecategory ofhardcorecartels areappropriate forcasebycase
treatment). Itisrecognized thatthedevelopment oflegalmechanisms forinternational
enforcement cooperation against export andother cartels would benecessary, given
thatthejurisdiction inwhich theeffects arefeltmaydiffer fromtheoneinwhich the
information necessary forprosecution maybelocated. Given theshared interests in
curbing suchpractices world-wide, various options arebeing examined andexplored.
These include thepossible option ofelaborating acommon ruleprohibiting hardcore
cartels, complemented byprocedural provisions forenforcement cooperation inthis
respect. (Current work intheCLPCommittee onhardcorecartels isdiscussed in
Section IIIbelow.)
(ii) Ajointroundtableonabuseofadominantpositionbyfirms4exploredthecircumstances
under which abuse ofdominance canraiseproblems ofaninternational ortransborder
nature andcompared tradeandcompetition policy approaches totheissueunder certain
scenarios e.g.(i)denial ofmarket access byadominant firmand(ii)leveraging into
export markets andprice predation. Deepening thiswork forms partofthefuture
agenda oftheJoint Group.
(iii) Ajointroundtable onvertical relationships5between firms focused oncontractual
arrangements other thanresale pricemaintenance (which isprohibited perseinnearly
allOECD countries). Nonprice vertical restraints suchasexclusive territories and
exclusive dealing agreements canhaveavariety ofeffects onbothcompetition and
trade. They mayenhance efficiency andhaveparallel positive effects inincreasing
market access. Exclusive dealing mayforinstance facilitate newentry byaforeign
firmwhich mayfindithelpful tooffersuchanarrangement asanincentive toapotential
distributor inanewmarket. Theymayalsoinothercircumstances haveanticompetitive
3See1994 Joint Report (Annex IISection IIb.)
4Seecontribution byProf. Janow inOECD/GD(96)31.
5See1994 Joint Report (Annex IISection IIa).WT/WGTCP/W/21
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effects since theymaycreate orenhance barriers toentry. Newentry byaforeign
firmmaybeconsiderably more difficult ifnonpricevertical restraints suchasexclusive
dealing tieupdomestic distribution systems.
Itisrecognized thatsucharrangements deserve casebycaseevaluation astheeffects depend
heavily onthefacts, andmayvaryovertime. Even ifallthefactsareconsidered, there maybea
tension between competition andtradepolicy perceptions, astheneteffect ofarestraint maybeperceived
ashaving noanti-competitive effects under competition lawcriteria inacountry, while itmight be
perceived asanticompetitive ortrade distortive byanother country.
Afollow upproject under thecurrent jointprogramme aimsatenhancing mutual understanding
ofhowmember countries ’competition authorities assess similar typesofrestraints. Relevant assessment
factors (such astheneedforwelldefining themarket, widespread nature ofrestraints inamarket,
whether thefirmusing them isdominant intheupstream ordownstream market, etc)have been
highlighted.
Anumber ofcasestudies (seef)below) haveprovided empirical backing totheabove analyses.
(d) Studies ofavailable response/need forimproved mechanisms orinternational rules
(i) Aninitial review ofprovisions ininternational agreements (whether bilateral, regional,
multilateral) wasconducted ina1994 Roundtable onCompetition Elements in
International Agreements andinaconsultant ’spaper onCompetition Aspects ofthe
Uruguay Round. Theroundtable surveyed these agreements andanalysed selected
competition elements inselected agreements. Therange ofsuchagreements isbroad,
andthetrade andcompetition provisions varygreatly depending onthecontext and
nature oftheagreements, whether purely cooperative orofabinding nature, and
whether ofspecific focus oraimed ateconomic integration. Theroundtable wasan
initial stepinthelightofthemandate given bythe1993OECD Ministerial to“explore
thedesirability andfeasibility ofintegrating competition rules intoamultilateral
framework ”.
(ii) Asanalytical work developed, alistofoptions tostrengthen thecoherence oftrade
andcompetition policies intheinternational context hasbegun tobeidentified.
Forinstance, discussions havetaken place tocompare howtrade andcompetition policies are
related inregional groupings. TheEUexample provides aunique example ofstrong integration of
market access andcompetition policies. Attention hasbeengiven alsototheways inwhich various
regional groupings oragreements treat antidumping inthecontext oftheir regional integration
agreements, eachcaseappearing tobesomewhat distinct. More generally there aredifferences due
tovaried integration, harmonisation andconvergence objectives.
There already existanumber ofbilateral antitrust cooperation agreements which constitute
anapproach toaddress business practices ofcross border dimension, while avoiding problems of
jurisdiction. Anewgeneration ofsuchagreements containing suchprinciples aspositive comity offers
scope forenhanced andstrengthened cooperation. (Under “Positive Comity ”,onecompetition agency
canaskanother toopen aproceeding iftheinterests ofthefirstcountry seem tobeaffected by
anticompetitive conduct within thejurisdiction ofthesecond authority.) Theprospects offered bysuch
agreements andtheeventual limitations (including theextent towhich competition authorities willbe
empowered toexchange confidential information) willbereviewed asoneimportant avenue. Work
intheCLPCommittee oncooperation among competition authorities isdescribed ingreater detail in
Section IIIbelow.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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Finally arange ofother options including theelaboration ofacomprehensive multilateral
framework willbethesubject ofinitial assessment inanopennoncommittal way. Theillustrative
listofoptions tobeconsidered isasfollows:
Convergence, peerreview, expanded Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) etc.;
Enhanced bilateral cooperation, including thepossibility ofstrengthening bilateral cooperation
agreements;
Development ofcoreprinciples andelements, including thepossibility ofagreed minimum
common standards, e.g.onhardcorecartels;
Development ofplurilateral agreement onaspects ofcompetition law;
Development ofamultilateral framework, including possible relationship totheWTO;
Desirability andfeasibility ofdispute settlement incompetition related disputes;
Institutional setting (whoshould apply competition law,roleofjudicial system, rights offirms
etc).
(e) Overview ofconsistencies/inconsistencies between trade andcompetition polices, andother
conceptual work comparing objectives, keyprinciples andtools ofthetwopolicies
Since anearlystage inthework, theinterrelationships ofthetwopolicies havebeendiscussed
bearing inmind notonlyhowcompetition policies mayaffect trade6butalsoonthecompetition effects
oftrade measures.7
Abibliography ofacademic studies onthese consistencies orinconsistencies isbeing keptup
todate. Asanalyses haveprogressed, andthedegree ofmutual understanding hasimproved, itis
intended toresume conceptual work focusing onkeyprinciples relevant tobothpolicies.
(f) Empirical work: casestudies
Continuousresorthasbeenmadetojointcasestudiesasameanstopromotemutualunderstanding
ofterminology andofthewayinwhich eachpolicy community would tackle theanalysis ofgiven
situations. Cases ofarealorhypothetical nature haveillustrated thetrade, competition andregulation
interface within thecategories ofpractices covered bythejointroundtables above. Asuccinct review
oftheapproach appears intheAnnex tothe1996JointReport. Thestudy ofautomobile distribution
isnoted below.Further analysis hascontinued, covering e.g. practices ofprivate standards and
certification bodies, various types ofexport cartels andvertical relationships. Asynthesis ofthiswork
isexpected tobecompleted shortly.
6InterAlia,see1994JointReport, (Annex IISection III)which illustrated categories offrictions
andsynergies between thetwopolicies.
7Aconsultant paper onTrade andCompetition Policies: Comparing Objectives andMethods
wasalsopublished asNo4intheTrade Policy Issues series, OECD, 1994.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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II. TRADE COMMITTEE
Thesubject matter hasbeenconsidered bytheTrade Committee anditsworking parties over
anumber ofyears including specific work inareas suchassafeguards, voluntary export restraints,
services andintellectual property. Ithasalsobeencovered inwork withnon-member economies such
astheworkshop heldinSantiago in1995 (“Trade Policy foraGlobalising Economy ”andinSt.
Petersburg “Trade Policy andtheTransitition Process ”).Thisnotefocuses, however, onmore recent
work ofpotential interest,
(a) Work oninternational market contestability
Work carried outwithin theTrade Committee ontheso-called “newdimensions ofmarket
access ”hasfocused onthebenefits ofpolicy-makers approaching theissueofmarket access inabroader
manner.Thisbroaderapproachencompassesthecontinuumoftrade,investmentandcompetitionpolicies
aswellasthedomestic regulatory conduct ofnations, itschief focus being ontheneedtoidentify,
priorize andprogressively rollbackarange ofgovernment measures andprivate practices thatimpair
theefficient functioning ofmarkets andrestrict theopenness ofnational markets toglobal competition.
Inthiscontext, theTrade Committee hasexplored inaseries ofbrainstorming session theextent
towhich theobjective ofpromoting more internationally contestable markets could helpunderpin
discussionsofthebroaderpolicy-andrule-makingchallengesconfrontingthemultilateraltradingsystem.
Promoting international market contestability requires efforts aimed atensuring thatthecompetitive
process prevailing inadomestic market isnotunduly distorted byanti-competitive activities whether
governmental orprivate inorigin, sothatforeign goods, services, ideas, investments andbusiness
people canbenefit fromopportunities tocompete inthatmarket onterms equal orcomparable tothose
enjoyed bylocalproducers.
Theterm“international market contestability ”signifies animportant qualitative deepening in
thenature anddegree ofopenness thatshould nowbesought forinternational competition. Trade
Committee work hasmade clearthatevenwhen mostborder barriers areremoved (which hasclearly
notyetbeenachieved despite themarket progress registered during theUruguay Round), genuine market
openness, letalone market integration, maystillbefarfrombeing achieved. Awiderange of“behind
theborder ”obstacles maycontinue toimpede ordistort theinternational flowofgoods, services, ideas,
capital andpeople. Thefocus oninternational market contestability represents aperspective whereby
policy-makers could takeabalanced andcomprehensive approach tothebroad range ofpotential
impediments inanyoneareaisinformed by,co-ordinated withandcomplementary toefforts inother
areas.
Inthecontext ofpreparing theground forpossible future policy- andrule-making initiatives,
theTrade Committee feltitneeded toidentify andbetter understand relevant private anti-competitive
practices. TheCommittee devoted aninformal brainstorming session tothissubject intheSpring of
1995. Discussions revealed theusefulness ofidentifying categories ofprivate behaviour mostlikely
toexert significant effects ofmarket access andmarket presence. Exclusionary practices, predation
andforeclosure effects stood outasissues deserving particular attention. Various types ofvertical
behaviour, particularly when engaged inbyfirms withmarket power, were viewed aspotentially
restraining international competition anddistort trade andinvestment flows. Suchconduct includes,
interaliaexclusive dealing arrangements, restrictions onpricing through resale price maintenance
schemes, exclusive territory andtying arrangements.
Itwasnoted thatvarious market structure issues alsoneeded tobeconsidered, including the
growing importance ofmergers andacquisitions, strategic alliances andjointventures, especially in
high-technology sectors. Attention tointeractions between private andgovernment action, includingWT/WGTCP/W/21
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theoperationofpublic(orstate-sanctioned)monopolies,nationaltechnicalstandards,regulatorycontrols
andstateaidswere alsodeemed essential inorder toensure thattheeconomy-side benefits oftrade
andinvestment regime liberalisation werenotnullified orimpaired byprivate orgovernmentally support
anti-competitive conduct.
(b) Specific Analysis oftheAutomobile Sector
Throughout1996and1997,theTradeCommitteeundertookstudiesonseveralaspectsofmarket
access issues intheautomobile sector. Anoverview document wasconsidered covering trade and
trade-related policies andbusiness practices which affect access toforeign markets forautomobiles
andautoparts. Separate analyses covering automobile andautopartsdistribution issues wereconsidered
inthecontext ofthejointmeeting oftheWorking Party oftheTrade Committee andtheWorking
Party No.1oftheCommittee onCompetition LawandPolicy. Standards andcertification procedures
intheautomobile sector werealsoassessed inthecontext ofthehorizontal work onregulatory reform.
Toreflect therelative importance oftheautomobile sector andtrade inautomobiles andauto
parts, theTrade Committee hasagreed toorganise aWorkshop onmarket access issues intheautomobile
sector tobeheldon10-11 July1997. Itisplanned inthecontext oftheOECD work programme for
Emerging Market Economy Forum (EMEF) andwillbring together representatives fromthe29OECD
Member countries, 15non-member countries anddrawonindustry specialists fromtheprivate sector.
Theobjective ofthisWorkshop istodeepen understanding oftherange ofissues arising withrespect
tointernational tradeandcompetition intheincreasingly globalised automobile industry andtheoptions
available forpolicy-makers.
(c) Regulatory Reform
TheTrade Committee work hascovered regulatory issues fromatrade perspective formany
years. More recently, since1995, theTrade Committee hasbeenengaged inOECD regulatory reform
workendorsed byMinisters in1997. Itspurpose hasbeentodeepen theunderstanding ofthebehind-the-
border obstacles tomarket access which havebecome significant especially aftertheUruguay Round.
Thework hasidentified, andrecommended OECD countries tostrengthen, international principles
tobeapplied todomestic regulations. Such principles include, interalia,attention tocompetition
principles ascontained e.g.intheWTO Agreement onBasic Telecommunication Services. Follow-up
work bytheTrade Committee willinclude thefurther development ofthisprinciple.
III. CLPWORK ONTRADE AND COMPETITION ISSUES
Beginning intheearly1980s, theOECD ’sCommittee onCompetition LawandPolicy (CLP)
hasexamined anumber ofaspects oftheinteraction oftrade andcompetition policies. Inaddition,
several other CLPprojects, although not“tradeandcompetition ”perse,arealsopertinent tothedebate
byshowing howvarious private practices canaidorimpede newentry inamarket andtheeffects
ofvarious government regulations onentry andcompetition. Themainlinesofthiswork aresetout
below.
Many ofthesetopics resulted inpublications, details forwhich canbefound inthebibliography
which appears asAnnex VI.Inaddition, much oftherecent work intheCommittee isnowavailable
forfreethrough theInternet (http://oecd.org/daf/ccp/). ThisInternet sitealsoincludes linkstoanumber
ofother competition policy sitesaround theworld, including bothanumber ofantitrust agencies and
academic sites.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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(a) Thefirstsurvey andchecklist
Intheearly 1980s, theCLP Committee diditsfirstsurvey oftheinteraction oftrade and
competition policies. Many oftheconclusions ofthatwork remain relevant. Inparticular, thesurvey
focussed ontheimpact oncompetition oftrademeasures andtheimpact ontradeofcompetition issues.
Topics included measures against unfair trade, voluntary export restraints, export andimport cartels.
Thesurvey ledtoanOECD Council Recommendation in1986 forco-operation inareas ofpotential
conflict between trade andcompetition policies. ThisCouncil Recommendation, attached asAnnex
V,urged countries toapply achecklist toassess trade policy measures. Under thischecklist policy
makers would review thebenefits ofthemeasure inincreasing jobs,government revenues andproducer
surplus against thecosts interms ofdecreased consumer surplus andharm tomarket structure and
thecompetitive process.
(b) VERs andexport andimport cartels
Twofollow-up studies focussed onactions which reduced export activity tothedetriment of
competition andconsumers intheimporting countries. Thefirstfocussed onVERs thenprevalent
intheautomobile industry anddocumented thecosttoconsumers oftheseVERs. Thestudies showed
thattherestraints increased concentration, reduced competition andincreased thedanger ofwidespread
collusion.Thestudiesalsodemonstratedthatthecoststoconsumersofthesetraderestraintsfarexceeded
thevalue ofthejobssaved. TheCLPrenewed itscallfortrade restricting measures tobesubject to
systematic review fortheirstatic anddynamic effects onconsumers, trade investment, competition
andemployment.
Thesecond study focussed ontheeffects ofVERs andexport andimport cartels oncompetition,
international trade andeconomic welfare. Theconsultants whoprepared thisstudy concluded that
thethencurrent standards fortheexemption ofexport cartels areinadequate andinconsistent withthe
objective ofwelfare maximization inboththeexporting andimporting countries, arguing thatsuch
cartels should besubject tocompetition lawworldwide, subject toanefficiency defense. Concerning
import cartels, theconsultants argued thatlicensing cartels canhavenegative long-term economic
consequences ifusedtoundermine thevalue ofintellectual property rights (IPRs) andthatmarket access
fortheproduct inquestion could limitthepower ofsuchcartels. Concerning VERs, theconsultants
concluded thatthecoverage ofVERs suggested thatefficiency based (antitrust-type) policy concerns
arenotgiven thesame consideration intheformualtion andimplementation oftrade policies. They
argued thattheOECD checklist (referred toabove) provided asound foundation forintroducing
efficiency considerations intotrade policy.
(c) Predatory pricing
Inthelate1980s theCLPreviewed theeconomic literature andnational enforcement practices
against predatory pricing. Itconcluded thatcompetition offices should bewaryofcomplaints byone
firmofanother ’sagressive pricing, thatclaims ofpredatory pricing were often unfounded andthat
giving them toomuch credence would stifle healthy, vigorous price competition. Itrecommended
thatgovernements screen claims ofpredation byapplying asimple market structure test:ifthemarket
structure werenotconducive tothecreation andexercise ofmarket power inthepost-predation period
(i.e., ifthepredator were unlikely tobeabletocharge monopoly prices later), theconduct should
notbechallenged.
(d) International mergers
International mergers arenowcommonly reviewed simultanteously byanumber ofnational
antitrustauthorities.Becausethepre-mergernotificationrequirementsofnationalcompetitionauthoritiesWT/WGTCP/W/21
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arenotconsistent, merging firms facesignificants compliance burdens. Acurrent project intheCLP
examines possibilities forharmonising reporting requirements toreduce thisburden.
(e) Vertical relationships
Recent CLPwork onvertical relationships hasbeendoneinparticular contexts, suchaspatent
andknow-how licensing andfranchising andinparticular sectors, suchasbroadcasting, filmdistribution
andnewspaper distribution. Certain themes, however, runthroughout thiswork. Theprimary theme
isthattheeffect oncompetition ofaparticular vertical restraint depends onthemarket conditions in
which itisimposed. Depending onthose conditions, aparticular vertical restraint suchasexclusive
dealing orexclusive territories canbeeither pro-oranticompetitive. Likewise, depending onmarket
conditions, arestaint caneither helporhinder newentry. Inshort, acase-by-case analysis isrequired
examining suchfactors asthemarket share ofthefirmimposing therestraint, thestructure ofthemarket,
entry conditions andefficiency justifications. Ingeneral, vertical restraints posefewer concerns if
theyareusedbyafirmwithalower market share orwhen entry conditions favor newentry.
Thiswork intheCLPhasnotfocussed onmarket access concerns perse.Rather, ithaslooked
attheextent towhich vertical restraints create barriers toentry forallpotential entrants, foreign and
domestic. Similarly, theextent towhich vertical restraints canpromote newentry wasexamined for
allpotential entrants, notforeign firms inparticular. Thediscussions intheJoint Group onTrade
andCompetition discussed inPartIabove arefocussing onthemarket access issue.
(f) Lawenforcement cooperation
TheCLPhaslongpromoted increased cooperation among competition agencies, asreflected
inaseries ofRecommendations bytheOECD ’sgoverning Council. Several principles come through
thiswork, inparticular thatcompetition agencies should:
inform eachother ofpossible violations oftheother’slaw
forwarn eachother ofcases which mayaffect theother’sinterests
request theother agency toactagainst practices which affect therequesting country ’sinterests
collect andshare information totheextent permitted under national confidentiality laws
coordinate investigations
coordinate remedial actions
Thecurrent Council Recommendation, revised in1995, isattached asAnnex IV.
Over time, OECD Council Recommendations intheantitrust field havebecome reflected in
bilateral cooperation agreements between competition agencies, inlegislation andmore generally in
closer contacts andcooperation among thestaffofnational authorities. Such cooperation creates a
positive dynamic ofbetter mutual understanding andconfidence, analytical convergence, andstillcloser
cooperation.
Currently, theCLP isconsidering taking these efforts stillfurther inthefight against
international cartels, discussed below.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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(g) International Cartels
Cartel conduct impoverishes economies, andisprohibited bycompetition lawsinOECD
countries. Insome countries, theconduct iscriminal andtypically inothers itissubject toheavy
financial penalties. International cartels bydefinition restrict ordistort international trade. TheCLP
ismoving tostrengthen enforcement against international cartels. Inthiswork, Member countries
areconsidering acallto:
reaffirm theircondemnation ofhardcorecartels
make transparent anyremaining exceptions tothecartel prohibition
introduce effective investigative procedures andsanctions against hardcorecartels
co-operate effectively inthedetection, investigation andprosecution ofsuchcartels, based on
principles ofpositive comity andjointaction
review national obstacles tosucheffective co-operation.
(h) Competition andeconomic development
In1989, theCLPhelditsfirstmajor conference withnon-Member countries inAfrica, Asia
andLatinAmericaontheimportanceofeffectivecompetitionpoliciesinspurringeconomicdevelopment.
Thatconferencefocussedontheimportanceofproperlyfunctioningmarketmechanismsbasedongenuine
competition. Contributions dealtwithderegulation, tradeliberalisation, technology, andtheelements
ofcompetition policy, including control ofcollusion, abuse ofdominance andanticompetitive mergers.
In1994, theCLPheldanother major session withnon-Member countries inAsiaandLatin
America. Thisinformal competition policy workshop covered theeconomic rationale forcompetition
policy, itsrelationship withtradepolicy andtheregulation ofspecific sectors, theobjectives andscope
ofcompetition policy including sector coverage andtheenforcement ofcompetition laws, including
thecreation ofappropriate institutions. Several themes from thediscussion areworth noting:
strong interfirm rivalry promotes economic efficiency andgrowth
anopeneconomy promotes rivalry, atleastintradeable sectors
domestic competition policy iscrucial inmaintaining anopeneconomy
- competition authorities should advocate within theirgovernments forderegulation and
serve asacountervailing power tothepossibility ofregulatory capture inparticular
sectors.
(i) Regulatory reform
Finally, fortwodecades theCLPhaspromoted deregulation andprivatisation inthepursuit
ofincreased competition andefficiency. During thisperiod, theCLPhasconducted studies covering
suchdiverse sectors astheliberal professions, airandroadtransport, telecommunications, electricity
andinternationalsatelliteorganisations.Inaddition,ithasbeenheavilyinvolvedintheOECD’ssoon-to-
be-published study onregulatory reform. Thatstudy, presented atthe1997OECD Ministerial meeting,
concludes thatgovernments should establish processes toexamine existing andproposed regulations
toremove unnecessary restraints oncompetition, market access andtrade. Thereport further concludesWT/WGTCP/W/21
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thatcompetition authorities andtrade officials should become effective advocates forderegulation.
Follow-up work tothestudy iscurrently intheplanning process. Itisanticipated thatcompetition,
market access andtrade issues willfigure prominently inthisfuture work.
The1997study onregulatory reform isdescribed ingreater detail inSection IVofthisnote.
(j) Technical assistance tonon-Member countries
TheSecretariat,oftenassistedbyCLPDelegates,hasconductedanextensivetechnicalassistance
programme withnon-Member countries since 1990, helping inthedrafting ofcompetition lawsand
theireffective implementation. Anoverview ofthiswork issetforth inAnnex VII.
IV. RELATED WORK
(a) Regulatory Reform
TheOECDcompletedinMay1997aseriesofstudiesonregulatoryreformthatexamine,among
other issues, various aspects ofthelinksbetween regulation, market access, andcompetition policy.
Asynthesis report, theOECD Report onRegulatory Reform8,wasaccepted byMinisters ofOECD
countries attheirmeeting inMay1997, anditspolicy recommendations wereendorsed. TheOECD
report concluded thatthere isample evidence thatregulatory reform, properly carried outandwith
anadequate understanding ofpolicy linkages, canimprove significantly sectoral andeconomy-wide
economic performance, andatthesametimeenhance thecapacity ofgovernments toprotect important
public interests suchasenvironmental andconsumer protection.
TheOECD recommendations areaimed bothatspeeding upderegulations where itisjustified,
andatimproving thequality ofthose regulations andadministrative formalities thatareneeded toprotect
importance public interests. Reform canalsoinclude useofmarket incentives asanalternative to
regulation. Therecommendations takeabroad viewtoimproving theoverall environment foreconomic
performance bylinking effective regulatory reform withtradepolicy andwithstrengthened competition
lawandenforcement.
In1998and1999, theOECD willcarry outreviews ofcountry progress inregulatory reform
inMembercountries,basedontheOECDpolicyrecommendations.Thesereviewswillgeneratecountry-
specific policy recommendations. Theframework andcontent ofthese reviews arecurrently under
discussion within theOECD. Itispossible, however, thatbothgeneral issues ofcompetition lawand
enforcementandsomeaspectsofmarketopennessrelatedtothedesignandimplementationofregulations
would beincluded inthesereviews. TheOECD Secretariat intend toconsult withtheWTO Secretariat
astheframework forthese reviews isdeveloped incoming months.
(b) Maritime Transport
In1994,theMaritimeTransportCommitteeinitiatedareviewofpotentialconflictsincompetition
laworpolicies applied tointernational maritime linershipping (including themaritime legofmultimodal
operations).
Therationale forthework wasthatthelackofcompatibility ofcompetition rules canbe
detrimentalbothtointernationaltradeandtotheorganisationofinternationallinershipping,byincreasing
8Regulatory Reform: Overview andProposed OECD Work Plan[OCDE/GD(96)115].WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page12
firms’operating costs andhampering commercial andeconomic innovations.
Theobjective ofthework istopromote compatibility ofcompetition policy inlinershipping
including themaritime legofmultimodal operations through practical solutions. Thestandardisation
ofcompetition rules world-wide isconsidered nottobearealistic target.
Inconsultation withother relevant committees oftheOrganisation andwithrepresentatives
oftheshipping industry, theMTC isconsidering asetofprinciples towhich Member countries should
subscribe. Indoing so,theMTC doesnotattempt tofavour anyparticular legalregime butessentially
aimsto:
setupanumber ofgeneral principles which Member countries should observe when reviewing
orimplement competition rules; and
define rules andmethods forconsultations among Member countries andbetween Member
countries andtheindustry when problems linked totheincompatibility ofcompetition regimes
arise.
Theintention isthattheMTC should finalise itwork inNovember 1997 orearly 1998.
(c) International AirTransport
TheAdvisory UnittotheSecretary-General oftheOECD recently completed atwoyearproject
ontheFuture ofInternational AirTransport. Ahighlevel Steering Group, withparticipants from
governments andthebusiness community (airlines, aircraft manufacturers, airport authorities, fuel
suppliers andthetourism sector) accompanied theproject. During itslatter stages, Ministers ofOECD
countries attheirmeeting inMay1996 committed to“further work forliberalising, intheinterests
ofall,international airtransport within bilateral andmultilateral frameworks inorder toensure that
theaviation sector contributes fullytoeconomic development inOECD countries andintheworld
more generally ”.Thefinalreport waspublished in1997.9
Theaimoftheproject wastoprovide OECD member governments, theEuropean Commission
andmajor players intheindustry withacomprehensive picture ofpossible future developments in
thisfieldandwithacommon assessment ofthepolicies needed toensure thatairtransport cancontribute
fullytothesound evolution oftheOECD areaandoftheworld economy atlarge overthecoming
decades. Thefocus ofthestudy wasontheanalysis oftheinteraction between government policy
andeconomic efficiency -andinparticular ontheimpediments toefficiency inthefieldofairtransport,
andonthesearch forpolicies thatcould enhance theadaptability oftheairtransport sector. Great
importance wastherefore attached totheanalysis ofissues ofmarket entry andexit,distortions of
competition, andproblems ofrestructuring. Precedence wasgiven throughout totheeconomy-wide
perspective overthemore industry-specific viewpoint.
Thereportproposes,onthebasisofthisanalysis,asetofwide-rangingpolicyrecommendations.
Itnotes thatthere hasbeenabroad recognition intherecent past, particularly inOECD countries,
oftheneedtoshiftthefocus ofaviation policy fromprotecting existing airlines toenhancing efficiency,
responding toconsumer interest andasaresult, establishing aviation markets which allow formuch
more useofcompetitive processes. Thusthepolicy recommendations include thefurther liberalisation
9TheFuture ofInternational AirTransport: Responding toGlobal Change, OECD, Paris, 1997WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page13
ofdomestic andinternational aviation markets, thereduction ofmarket-distorting subsidies andother
stateaids, theencouragement ofprivatisation ofairlines aswellastherelaxation ofrestrictions on
foreign ownership.
(d) Agro-Food Sector
Lastyearastudy on“Competition Policy andtheAgro-Food Sector ”waspublished bythe
Agricultural Directorate theOECD10.Thiswasacontribution totheongoing work onpolicies and
adjustment intheagro-food sector asawhole. Theimpetus forthisoverview evolved from earlier
workbytheSecretariat which highlighted theimportance oflinking agricultural policy reform initiatives
withmeasures toensure effective competition.
InthecontextofthehorizontalprojectonRegulatoryReform,abackgroundstudyon“Regulatory
Reform andtheAgro-Food Sector ”wasprepared bytheAgricultural Directorate. Theimportance
ofeffectivecompetitionandtheroleofcompetitionpolicyisemphasised-inparticularwhereagricultural
policies thataimatensuring balance ofmarket powers areremoved orreformed.
Anumber ofDirectorate studies arerelated tocompetitive markets -suchaswork oncontracts
inthefruits andvegetables markets, reforms ofdailypolicy aswellascountry reviews ofagricultural
markets andpolicy frameworks.
(e) Other
TheEconomics Department ofOECD reviewed thesubject oftradeandcompetition in1996.
Itiscurrently working intwoareas which mayberelevant to“Trade andCompetition ”.AWorking
Paper withthetitle“Measurement ofnon-tariff barriers ”,byProfessors AlanDeardorff andRobert
Stern (University ofMichigan) willshortly bedistributed viaInternet. ThisWorking Paper analyses
theconditions under which itispossible tocalculate tariff equivalents ofnon-tariff barriers, andlays
down asetofrules astohowtodosoinpractice, depending ontheinformation tohand.
Itishoped alsotopublish soonanupdated version ofa1996publication “Indications oftariff
andnon-tariff trade barriers ”,asetofcalculations oftheheight oftariff barriers andthefrequency
onnon-tariff barriers. Theupdate gives actual datafor1996, showing howsuchbarriers haveevolved
since theUruguay Round.
Inrecentyears,aspartofworkonproductmarketcompetition,examinationhasbeenundertaken
ontheimpact ofinternational tradeontheintensity ofdomestic competition inselected sectors inOECD
countries. Some ofthiswork willbepublished inthenextissue oftheOECD “Economic Studies ”,
no.27,inarticles byDirkPilat, andbyJoaquim Oliveira-Martins andStefano Scarpetta.
TheOECD Industry Committee hasundertaken workon“Globalisation andthechanging nature
ofthefirm”.Partofthework willlookattherelationships between openness totradeandinvestment
andsectoral performance across manufacturing sectors. Itwillbeextended where possible to“new”
industries, including theenvironment industry, business services, andpossibly thehealth-care industry.
10Competition Policy andtheAgro-Food Sector [OECD/GD(96)81]WT/WGTCP/W/21
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Annex I
General Distribution OCDE/GD(96)90
STRENGTHENING THE COHERENCE
BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES
Joint Report bytheTrade Committee
andtheCommittee onCompetition LawandPolicyWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page15
JOINT REPORT
STRENGTHENING THE COHERENCE
BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES
1. Successive rounds oftrade negotiations haveincreasingly limited thescope forgovernmental
measures thatrestrict ordistort theconditions ofinternational competition. Following theconclusion
oftheUruguay Round, theinteraction oftrade andcompetition policies hasattracted attention and
ledtosome callsforaframework ofmultilateral rulestobedrawn up.There arethree keyproblem
areas:
(a) Anticompetitive private practices canimpede effective market access aswellasthe
competitive process .Forexample, domestic producers mayenterintoanticompetitive exclusive dealing
agreements thatforeclose foreign firms fromdistributing and/or selling competing products, orengage
inajointboycott ofdomestic distributors ofimports orpurchasers ofimports Alocally dominant firm
canabuse itsposition, e.g.,through loyalty discounts, toexclude competitors. Thepractical effect
isthatforeign suppliers ofcompeting products cannot actually sellintothedomestic market. Moreover,
international cartels maydivide upworld markets.
(b) Trade measures canimpede thecompetitive process aswellasblock effective market
access .Forexample, tariffpeaks, quantitative restrictions andother non-tariff measures which remain
maystillinsulate producers ofgoods from competition andraisecosts toconsumers. Measures to
combat unfair tradepractices may,intheviewofsome, impair bothmarket access andthecompetitive
process.
Regulations canfrustrate bothmarket access andthecompetitive process. Forexample, a
monopoly position through regulation canbeperpetuated although itisnolonger justified bythe
economic characteristics ofthemarket. Product standards canbeusedtoblock imports ornewentry.
2. Tradeandcompetitionauthoritiessometimesdifferontheappropriateroleofnationalcompetition
policies inaddressing themarket access concerns oftrading partners. Despite some different
perspectives, theTrade andCompetition Policy Committees agree thatthecoreobjectives oftrade
andcompetition policies aremutually reinforcing. Bothseektoenhance welfare through economic
efficiency andencourage competitive, market-oriented directions. Further specific progress hasbeen
made:
- Amajor jointstudy hasidentified differences inscope andcoverage ofcompetition
policies;
- Theimportance ofactual enforcement ofcompetition policies hasbeenrecognised;
- Aninitial review hasbeenmade ofthecompetition aspects oftheUruguay Round
outcome;
- Arevised Recommendation oninternational competition lawenforcement co-operation
hasbeenadopted;
- Thecompetition policy perspective onthenature oftrade remedies andtheactions
theyaddress wasreviewed.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page16
3. Itisimportant tocontinue building onthatwork. Many delegations alsobelieve thatthe
Singapore WTO Ministerial inDecember 1996should examine thescope forcommencing exploratory
work. Accordingly, theOECD will,inconsolidating andadvancing thework already undertaken,
playanessential preparatory roleinthiscontext. Itwillprovide asound analytical basis toassist
Ministers inmaking adecision onwhether WTO work inthisareaiswarranted.
4. Further work intheOECD willtakestock ofanalysis undertaken sofar,andwillwork to
strengthen thecoherence between trade andcompetition policies. Itwillfocus on,andevaluate the
feasibility anddesirability of,various options thathavebeenputforward formaking progress onthe
problems identified above. Those options, which arenotmutually exclusive, may,among otherthings,
include:
- Enhanced bilateral co-operation
- Development ofagreed minimum common standards
- Multilateral agreement.
5. TothisendtheCLPandTChaveagreed tocreate aJointGroup onTrade andCompetition
andhaveagreed onaJointWork Programme inorder toenhance theefficiency oftheirwork. Itwill
report asappropriate toOECD Ministerial meetings.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page17
ANNEX
I. Introduction
1. Againstabackgroundofglobalisationoftheworldeconomy,theneedtostrengthenthecoherence
between trade andcompetition policies hasbeen widely recognised. Inthislight, wide-ranging
discussionshavebeenengagedintheOrganisationforseveralyears.Ajointprogrammeofworkbetween
theTrade andtheCompetition LawandPolicy Committees wasthesubject ofreports tothe1992,
1993 and1994 Ministerials. Thisreport covers theprogress achieved since the1994 report.1
2. Thework oftheJointMeeting between Working Party No.1andtheWorking Party ofthe
Trade Committee concerns theinterrelationship oftrade policy andcompetition policy. There are
different aspects oftherelationship. First, thefreeflowoftrade between countries, andinparticular
thebenefits oftrade liberalisation, canbefrustrated byanticompetitive practices oftheprivate sector
andbythelackofaneffective competition policy inimporting countries. Thestudy ofthismatter
isanactivity oftheJoint Meeting. Second, government-imposed restrictions ontrade canaffect
competition ininternational anddomestic markets andsotheJoint Meeting alsofocuses onthe
anticompetitive effects oftraderestrictions. Finally various regulations canfrustrate bothmarket access
andthecompetitive process. Theaimistoachieve anappropriate balance among these activities.
II. Market Access andCompetition Policy
3. Successive rounds oftrade negotiations haveincreasingly limited thescope forgovernmental
measures thatrestrict ordistort theconditions ofinternational competition. Following theconclusion
oftheUruguay Round, many analysts havefocused onthepotential forprivate anticompetitive practices
tokeepforeign comp titors outofdomestic markets --thepotential forprivate practices toreplace
governmental barriers. Theefficacy ofcompetition policy asapossible remedy, therefore, isakey
issueunder consideration inthisjointwork. Forthisreason, theTrade andCLPCommittees strongly
supportjointanalysisofthesectoralcoverage,substantivescopeandenforcementofnationalcompetition
laws.
4. Tradeandcompetitionauthoritiessometimesdifferontheappropriateroleofnationalcompetition
policies inaddressing themarket access concerns oftrading partners. Buttheyagree thatthepicture
which isemerging fromthejointworkismorecomplex andnuanced thaneither sideoriginally imagined
andthatanyremedies takeintoaccount theneedtoinstilconfidence inthecompetition process. They
alsoagree thatthecoreobjectives oftrade andcompetition policies aremutually reinforcing. Both
seektoenhance welfare through economic efficiency andencourage competitive, market-oriented
directions.
5. Casestudies inrecent years havebeenparticularly enlightening. While market access depends
onanumber ofvariables, some cases haveindeed shown thateffective enforcement ofcompetition
lawdoesreduce barriers tomarket access. Other cases described below haveshown thattheunderlying
source oftrade friction canlieoutside thedomain ofcompetition lawenforcement foravariety of
reasons
6. TheHawk study onscope andcoverage, discussed inmore detail inSection IIIbelow, has
shownthattherearesignificantexceptionstocompetitionlawcoverage.Suchexceptionsineconomically
significant sectors mayimpede effective market access. Follow-up tothisstudy, possibly through case
studies, willlookatactual enforcement ofcompetition laws, including thesubstantive norms applied.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page18
7. Efforts havebeendevoted intheTrade Committee toidentifying andpossibly ranking thetypes
ofanticompetitive practices thatmayaffect market access bycreating trade orinvestment barriers.
Bothtrade andcompetition authorities concurred thatitmaynotbeuseful tocontinue work onthe
ranking ofanticompetitive practices withrespect totheireffect ontrade, unless anempirical basisfor
suchwork canbefound.
8. ATrade Committee roundtable discussed practices potentially having aninternational trade
orinvestment impact, e.g.:i)horizontal agreements including international cartels, export cartels,
strategic alliances, mergers, etc.;ii)vertical restraints orintegration; andiii)abuse ofdominance.
TheHawk study setoutthefactors which affect thestrength ofcompetition laws. These include
coverage, enforcement andsubstantive rulesastheyrelate tothepractices above. Assessment ofco-
operativeorrulemakingoptionstowardsimprovingpolicyresponsestoanticompetitivepracticesaffecting
market access hasalsobeen given initial attention. Thiswork should continue, withthegoalof
identifying problems andgapsinprevailing solutions, betheynational, bilateral orotherwise andshould
bediscussed withcompetition authorities.
9. Asafollow uptoa1994Jointround tableoncompetition elements ininternational agreements,
areview ofcompetition policy provisions contained intheUruguay Round agreements hasbeenprepared
fortheTrade Committee. Discussions willcontinue torelate thecurrent international orregional rules
andapproaches totheinterface oftrade andcompetition, including thefeasibility anddesirability of
aunified approach.
10. Thework ofcompetition officials hasfocused onthepotential fortrade measures torestrain
tradeandcompetition. Particular attention waspaidtosuchmeasures asVERs andtheneedtoensure
thattheyarenotusedinthefuture which mayrequire closer involvement ofcompetition authorities.
TheCLPhashadextensive discussions onthenature oftrade remedies inresponse to“unfair trade”
andtheactions theyaddress. Inregard totrademeasures which continue toaffect tradeandcompetition
inthepostUruguayRoundperiod,theTradeCommitteehasindicatedinits1995reporttotheMinisterial
itsintent of“monitoring theUruguay Round Agreements toensure theirfullimplementation bothin
letter andinspirit”.Theassessment ofgovernmental andprivate barriers totrade andcompetition
isalsopartoftheTrade Committee 'sprogramme designed topromote theopenness ofnational markets
toglobal competition.
III. More effective application ofcompetition laws
11. Work proceeds toimprove theeffectiveness ofnational competition lawsandtoenhance their
application ininternational markets. Thiswork should reduce tradefrictions while serving toincrease
economic efficiency. Thiswork iscomposed ofseveral major elements: (a)improving co-operation
among national competition authorities; (b)increasing convergence ofcompetition lawsandpolicies;
(c)extending scope andcoverage ofcompetition laws; (d)assessing actual enforcement ofcompetition
laws; and(e)examining from bothtrade andcompetition perspectives, particular cases involving
competition andregulatory issues andtheirpossible effect onmarket access.
(a) Improving co-operation among national competition authorities
12. Efforts toincrease co-operation among national competition authorities areintensifying, co-
operation which isessential inaneraofglobal business. Major strides arebeing made. Inthejoint
work, competition authorities havereported onanumber ofcases inwhich investigations havebeen
brought jointly bytwoauthorities. Insome instances international co-operation inenforcement efforts
hasallowed national competition authorities toremedy violations ofaninternational dimension that
otherwise might nothavebeenaddressed aseffectively, orpossibly atall,without suchco-operativeWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page19
efforts. TheOECD ’semphasis onthishasstimulated increased contact between authorities inindividual
cases.
13. Sharingconfidentiallawenforcementinformationisakeytoeffectiveinternationalenforcement.
Recentyearshaveseentwocompetitionauthoritieswithcriminalpowersshareinformationundercriminal
lawenforcementco-operationtreaties.But,asmostcompetitionproceedingsarenotcriminal,mechanisms
toshare information incivilaswellascriminal proceedings mustbeexamined. Inother cases, firms
havewaived confidentiality provisions innational lawsintheinterests ofsecuring compatible outcomes
inseparate jurisdictions. TheCouncil 'sadoption lastyearofitsRevised Recommendation Concerning
Co-operation between Member Countries onAnticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade
setforth principles forsuchinformation sharing.2
14. "Positive comity" isanother toolbeing developed bycompetition authorities which canhelp
toreduce certain trade frictions. Under positive comity, onecompetition agency canaskanother to
openaproceeding iftheinterests ofthefirstcountry seem tobeaffected byanticompetitive conduct
within thejurisdiction ofthesecond authority. Principles ofpositive comity aresetforthbothinexisting
bilateral agreements andinthe1995 Recommendation, andtheCLPCommittee isactively working
topromote thisconcept.
(b) Increasing convergence ofcompetition lawsandpolicies
15. TheCLPCommittee hasfocused onpromoting theconvergence ofnational competition laws
andpolicies forseveral years now, producing aninterim report forthe1994 Ministerial meeting.3
Thiswork continues andhasbecome acentral andongoing feature oftheCLP work programme.
Thiseffort tomove towards consensus benefits national competition authorities butalsoserves tohelp
clarify inquiries intotheeffectiveness ofcompetition lawsandtheirenforcement. Discussing the
adequacy ofcompetition lawenforcement presupposes acommon understanding about thenature and
objectives ofcompetition lawitself. Moreover, since many nonMember countries areadopting or
considering adopting competition lawsthisOECD work islikely tohavesubstantial spin-offs tothe
benefit oftradeandcompetition. Hence, moving forward ontheCLP'sconvergence project isapriority
forthatCommittee andsupports theevolution ofthejointwork.
16. Since the1994 Ministerial, theCLPhasembarked onadditional areas ofstudy suchasabuse
ofdominance/monopolisation, access toessential facilities, andprocedural andsubstantive aspects of
merger review. TheCLP'snextinterim report onconvergence willbeprovided forthe1997Ministerial
meeting. Trade officials often attend convergence-related discussions, e.g.,therecent roundtable on
abuse ofdominance, atwhich international trade perspectives were identified.
(c) Extending scope andcoverage ofcompetition laws
17. Since thelastjointreport, amajor study hasrevealed theexistence ofnumerous exceptions
tothescope andcoverage ofnational competition laws. Thisstudy4,conducted withtheco-operation
of12competition authorities,5revealed thatthelegalcoverage ofcompetition lawisincomplete; sectors
areoftenentirely orpartially excluded, creating parallel exceptions inenforcement.6Sometimes, cartels
within sectors (for,example, maritime transport conferences) havebeenlegislatively protected from
consideration under competition law. Oneconclusion ofthejointwork sofaristhatsuchexceptions
tothelegalcoverage ofcompetition lawshould beconstantly reviewed andtested against uptodate
analysis ofeconomic andtechnological factors withaviewtotheirprogressive elimination.
18. Stillother exceptions arecreated bylegalprinciples which dictate thatlegislation ofgeneral
applicability, suchascompetition law,defers tospecific legislation. Thus, legislation regulating a
sector mayoverride general competition law. Inmany countries, national regulation ofsectors (forWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page20
example, airtransport, communications) precludes thecompetition authority from acting against
price-fixing oranticompetitive mergers. Inthisvein, recent moves toreform andnarrow thescope
ofregulations arehighly beneficial inthattheycorrespondingly expand thescope ofcompetition law
application though insome cases acompetition assessment bytheregulatory body issubstituted for
application ofcompetition law.
19. Arelated source ofexception incoverage isthatcompetition lawshavehadlimited application
togovernment-encouraged orsanctioned business practices. Thisisanother areawhere governments
should agree toassess thefeasibility anddesirability oflimiting asmuch aspossible nonapplication
ofcompetition law.
20. Yetother exceptions existduetothelimited ornon-existent application ofcompetition law
insome countries tostate-owned enterprises. Thecoverage ofcompetition lawstostateenterprises
should beclarified andMember countries should consider whether toapply competition lawtosuch
enterprises withthesame vigour asitisapplied toprivate firms.
21. Thejointwork willcontinue toexplore whether, andtheextent towhich, trade frictions are
associated withthese exceptions tocoverage.
(d) Assessing actual enforcement ofcompetition laws
22. Competition lawsmustnotonlyhavebroad legalcoverage, theymustalsobeapplied infact.
Anticompetitive practices should notescape infactfrom competition law.
23. Assessing actual application iscomplex andfactintensive. Forexample, theabsence ofcases
inaparticular sector could mean inter aliaeither thatthecompetition agency ischoosing notto
investigate orsimply thatthere arenoviolations ofthelaw. Todetermine which infactisthecase
mayrequire aninquiry intotheunderlying facts; moreover, different authorities mayplace different
interpretations onsimilar facts. Thejointwork hasbegun tostudy themethodology ofassessing actual
enforcement. Ifaworkable methodology canbedeveloped, astudy willthenbelaunched.
24. Future work willalsoinclude astudy ofexemption procedures andcriteria.
(e) Examining particular cases involving trade andcompetition
25. Atheme ofthejointwork hasbeentoexamine thetradeandcompetition interface inthecontext
ofparticular cases andmarket access implications ofenforcement. Thecasestudy methodology has
beenparticularly illuminating since thelastjointreport.
26. Several casestudies demonstrated thatwhere theenforcement ofnational competition laws
takes place inanon-discriminatory andtransparent manner, thiscanremove barriers tomarket access
andhelpprevent purchasers inother countries frombecoming victimised byanticompetitive conduct.7
These casestudies alsoshowed theimportance offactual context when applying competition law.8
Inaddition, therewerereports ofincreasingly successful co-operation among major competition offices,
resulting insomecasesinjointinvestigation ofconduct potentially affecting consumers inmany markets.
27. Onestandards caseillustrated where theapplication ofcompetition lawandpolicy prompted
pro-competitive regulatory reforms.9Acaseinvolving regulated monopolies showed that,evenwhere
competition lawisnotviolated, competition authorities canplayauseful roleasadvocates forregulatory
reform.10WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page21
28. Adistribution caserevealed thecomplex interaction between trade andcompetition policies.
Studying thedistribution ofaproduct subject totrade measures, thejointwork showed howthe
competitive effects ofdistribution arrangements canbedistorted bylimitations oncompetition imposed
bytrade measures. Thework alsoshowed thatexclusive distribution canbeanaidtoentering anew
market.Whenanexclusivedistributionsystemisallegedtocausetradeproblems,competitionauthorities
should beattentive andundertake toassess whether thespecific arrangements areonbalance
anticompetitive andviolate national competition laws.
29. These cases alsoserved toillustrate more general points such asthecriteria used in
decision-making andtheimportance ofnon-discrimination, neutrality andtransparency.
IV. Competition advocacy, regulation andtrade
30. Thejointwork shows thatexpanding theroleofcompetition principles ingovernment policy-
making canreduce barriers tobothtradeandcompetition. Competition andtradeofficials, inaddition
totheirlawenforcement roles, canserve asadvocates forregulatory reform within governments.
31. Technical standards areonesuchsource ofbarrier. Standards regimes ofalltypes areanarea
where competition principles need tobetaken intoaccount inefforts toreduce trade- and
competition-restricting effects ofsuchregulations. Regulated monopolies areanother, notonlyfor
competition inthemonopolised sector butalsoforcompetition among suppliers; regulated monopolies
mayinsome regulatory frameworks havelessincentive toshopcompetitively forinputs thanfirms
subject tocompetitive pressures. Here, governments canpushforchange inprocurement practices
andminimise thescope ofmonopoly.
32. However,theseregulatorycasesarenotordinarilyareaswhereimprovedcompetitionenforcement
canreduce trade frictions; theconduct didnotviolate competition law. Buttheydoshow that
competition agencies canusefully argue within their governments forpro-competition and
trade-liberalising regulatory reforms. Within theOrganisation, theCLPCommittee already informally
worksforsuchsolutionsinvarioustypesofhorizontalworkandprovidesexpertiseincompetition-related
studies. Theadvocacy roleofcompetition authorities incapitals should beformally recognised and
institutionalised unless itisclear thatthisroleisbeing performed effectively byother Government
agencies. Tothisend,theCLPCommittee willcontribute areport onadvocacy efforts tothe1997
Ministerial report onregulatory reform.
33. TheTrade Committee 'swork willfocus onanexploration oftherelationship between domestic
regulatory reform andmarket access. Itwillseektodocument theways inwhich thepro-competitive
effects ofdomestic regulatory reform improves themarket access andpresence offoreign partners.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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ANNEX II
JOINT REPORT BYTHE COMMITTEE ONCOMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY AND THE TRADE COMMITTEE
OCDE/GD(94)63
Atthe1993Ministerial meeting, theCommittee onCompetition LawandPolicy andtheTrade
Committee submitted ajointprogress report ontrade andcompetition policies. They agreed that
"globalization should produce more efficient production andmarketing, lower prices andimproved
product quality andvariety butwillfailtodosounless market access andcompetition canbepreserved
andenhanced".11
Inthesubsequent Ministerial Communique, Ministers reaffirmed "theOECD governments '
strong commitment tostrengthen theopen multilateral trading system soastoletitplayitscentral
roleinpromotingfurthernon-inflationarygrowthandsustainabledevelopmentaroundtheworld,fostering
international trade within anagreed framework ofmultilateral rules covering access tomarkets and
faircompetition".12
I. Background
1. Increasing globalisation ofbusiness mayreflect thesuccess oftrade policy butalsocreates
newchallenges. Traditional trade instruments maynotbewelladapted tomeeting these challenges.
Trade policy officials havesuggested thatbusiness practices andmarket structures maycreate barriers
totheaccess offoreign firms toparticular markets bymeans oftrade ordirect investment andthat
concepts andinstruments available under competition lawmayprove more effective thantraditional
trade instruments inovercoming these barriers. Certain business practices mayfrustrate trade
liberalisation andmaycreate barriers tomarket access which tradepolicy officials feelmight notalways
becovered bycompetition laws. Clarification oftheseissues andofhowcompetition policy approaches
might berelevant areamong thetasks being addressed byjointwork.
2. Competition policy alsofaces newchallenges. National markets areincreasingly affected by
international factors. Trade liberalisation andglobalisation change thebasic features ofcompetition
inways thatincrease thepotential benefits tobederived fromgreater competition policy convergence
andgreater international cooperation. Developing acceptable mechanisms ofcooperation, which ensure
thatdistortions orrestrictions which affect competition andinternational trade areadequately dealt
with, isachallenging taskforcompetition offices.
3. Trade policy officials haveconcerns thatthere areprivate barriers tomarket access (with or
without government involvement) thatmaynotbeaddressed bycompetition laws. Competition policy
officials haveconcerns regarding thepossible market effects ofcertain trade policy measures.
4. The1993JointReport identified competition policy issues affecting trade, trade policy issues
affecting competition andathirdcategory ofissues forwhich policies other thantradeandcompetition
mayalsobeconcerned. Thejointreport alsoproposed elements ofaprogramme ofwork.
5. Theremainder ofthisreport setsforththeprogress achieved since thelastMinisterial intwo
sections. Section IIcovers particular issues orthemes identified inthe1993JointReport which were
thesubjectofdiscussionsintwojointmeetingsandthreeroundtables.Thejointmeetingsalsoconsidered
various contributions toaframework approach oftheinterrelationships between tradeandcompetitionWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page23
policies andvarious delegations made proposals regarding theelements which could beconsidered
inthiscontext: thisisreflected inSection IIIbelow.
II. Main issues considered since thelastMinisterial
6. Thissection reports ondiscussions onthree main topics: a)vertical relationships andmarket
access; b)horizontal agreements; c)work begun oncompetition elements ininternational agreements.
Work onvertical relationships andhorizontal agreements hasadvanced tothepoint where policy
orientations canbepresented while thediscussions oncompetition elements ininternational agreements
havejustgotten underway. These policy orientations andthestatus ofthese discussions aresetforth
below.
Vertical relationships andmarket access
7. Vertical relationships range fromtransactions between completely independent enterprises to
theintegration oftwoormore levels within asingle enterprise. Between theseextremes fallcontractual
arrangements which restrict thefreedom ofaction oftheupstream ordownstream firm(orboth). These
contractual relationships canbeofparticular concern tobothtrade andcompetition officials.
8. Policy discussions concerning thesecontractual relationships havefocused onnon-price vertical
restraints, asvertical price restraints --resale price maintenance --areprohibited perseinnearly all
OECD Member countries.
9. Non-price vertical restraints suchasexclusive territories andexclusive dealing agreements can
haveavariety ofeffects onbothtrade andcompetition. Interms ofprocompetitive effects, vertical
restraints canbeefficiency-enhancing through such means asimproved co-operation andmutual
commitment, reduced free-riding, thecertification ofquality toconsumers, reduced costofentry and
improved sharing ofrisk. Inthisway,these procompetitive effects canhaveparallel positive effects
ontrade through thelowering ofbarriers toentry andincre^Osing market access.
10. Ontheother hand, non-price vertical restraints decrease intra-brand competition andmayhave
anticompetitive effects sincetheymaycreate orenhance barriers toentry byraising rivals'costs. The
riskofanticompetitive effects isincreased when these restraints arewidespread orareusedbyafirm
which isdominant ineither theupstream ordownstream market.
11. When analysing theeffects ofvertical restraints fromacompetition perspective, thelikely pro-
andanticompetitive effects needtobeweighed.. Because these effects depend heavily onthefacts
andmayvaryovertime, itisdifficult torecommend apriori thatagiven non-price vertical restraint
should beconsidered tobeeither legalorillegal inalljurisdictions. Rather, acase-by-case evaluation
iscalled for.Inthisevaluation, thebehaviour ofthefirm, itsposition onthemarket inwhich the
restraint occurs aswellasthestructure ofthatmarket arefactors tobetaken intoaccount.
12. When analysing theeffects ofvertical restraints from atrade perspective, afocus onmarket
position, thenature ofthemarket andtheduration oftherestraint iscalled for.Newentry byaforeign
firmmaybeconsiderably more difficult ifnon-price vertical restraints suchasexclusive dealing tie
updomestic distribution systems. Thisdifficulty isincreased iftherestraints willrunformany years
butwould bedecreased ifthemarket isexpanding oralternative distribution systems arebeing created.
Vertical restraints suchasexclusive dealing mayfacilitate newentry, forexample anewentrant may
findithelpful toofferanexclusive arrangement asanincentive toapotential distributor inanewmarket.
13. When analysing vertical restraints fromeither perspective, thedistinction between static and
dynamic effects should bekeptinmind. Itmayoccur, however, thattheneteffect ofavertical restraintWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page24
isperceived asprocompetitive under thestandards ofcompetition lawinonecountry while itmight
beperceived asanticompetitive ortradedistortive byanother country (e.g., when adistribution system
isregarded asefficient anddulycompetitive between brands butitisnotpossible forpotential
competitors, including foreign ones, toenter).
Horizontal agreements
14. Horizontalagreements,agreementsbetweenactualorpotentialcompetitors,canreduce,eliminate
orincrease competition. Theeffects ofhorizontal agreements oncompetition areoften paralleled by
effects ontrade.
15. There isastrong consensus among competition officials ontheproper enforcement posture
towards horizontal agreements eventhough legalstructures andterminology differ across jurisdictions.
Twobroad categories aredrawn. Thefirstis"hard corecartels" or"naked restraints" suchasprice
fixing, output restraints, market division, customer allocation andbidrigging which canbenormally
expected toreduce oreliminate competition andtolackredeeming effects oneconomic efficiency.
Once anagreement issocharacterised, itisprohibited outright inalmost allOECD Member countries.
16. Second, agreements mayinvolve co-operation among competitors which maynotharm
competition inthemarket overall orinwhich theharm tocompetition maybecounterbalanced byother
considerations. Insome jurisdictions, thelegality ofthese agreements depends ontheoutcome ofa
potentially extensive case-by-case or"rule ofreason" examination. Inothers, guidelines, regulations
orblock exemptions areusedtogiveguidance inatleastaportion ofthecases. Among thekinds
ofco-operationamongcompetitorswhichfallintothissecondcategoryarestandardsetting,jointresearch
anddevelopment, certain jointventures, and,inmostinstances, jointpurchasing. There issomeconcern
onthepartoftrade policy representatives thattheinfluence inparticular cases ofpolitical orother
non-competitive factors maynotbeeasily identified.
17. Export cartels areoften immunised from theapplication ofcompetition lawintheexporting
country. There isgrowing consensus thatexport cartel inappropriate beggar-thy-neighbour policies.
Atthesame time, itisrecognised thatevenwiththeexemption eliminated, theexporting country may
finditdifficult orlacktheincentive toassert jurisdiction overanexport cartel whose anticompetitive
effects arefeltonlyinforeign markets.
18. There isconsensus thatexport arrangements which falloutside thecategory ofhardcorecartels
areappropriate forcase-by-case treatment. Trade andcompetition officials agree thatthiscase-by-case
analysis willapprove many instances ofexport co-operation; suchco-operation isoften required
particularly forsmall andmedium-sized enterprises iftheyaretobeabletoexport atall.Inthecourse
ofdiscussions, thetradecommunity expressed itsinterest inincreased convergence ofthecriteria used
under national competition lawsforthetreatment ofco-operation among competitors.
19. Effectiveenforcementagainstexportandothercartelswillnecessarilycentreonthejurisdiction(s)
inwhich theanticompetitive effects arefeltalthough much oftheinformation necessary forsuccessful
prosecution willoften belocated inanother country. Thismeans inturnthatifMember countries
wishtofacilitate action against suchagreements, theywould needtofocus ondeveloping forcompetition
officials thelegalmechanisms forco-operation ininternational cartel investigations andespecially for
thesharing ofinformation among national competition offices.
20. Withtheconclusion oftheUruguay Round, officially sanctioned Voluntary Export Restraints
(VERs) areprohibited andmust bephased out.Thebeneficial effects ofsuchprohibition would be
undermined ifprivate VERs (ineffect, hardcorecartels byanother name) were tobepermitted to
replace them. Private VERs should therefore bevigorously challenged withthefullco-operation ofWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page25
competition andtrade officials inbothexporting andimporting countries. Itshould betaken into
consideration thatVERs impede freetrade, decrease welfare andharm theconsumer interest ofthe
importing country.
21. Voluntary import expansion arrangements (VIEs), conceived bytheirproponents asameans
ofopening certain markets, areanewareaofattention. There areconcerns thattheymayundermine
multilateral approaches andtheMFN principle aswellaspossibly distort trade and/or competition.
Competition elements ininternational agreements
22. Intheir1993JointReport, bothCommittees agreed that"acomparative analysis oftherelevant
provisions ininternational, bilateral, regional andmultilateral agreements andinstruments should be
undertaken"13Asafirststep,ajointroundtable wasorganised inApril 1994toidentify "competition
elementsininternationalagreements"14.Thisroundtablesurveyedtheseagreementsandanalysedselected
competition elements inselected agreements. Theobjective wastofocus oncommon elements found
throughout theseagreements. Thisexercise isongoing andwillcontinue under themandate toexplore
thedesirability andfeasibility ofintegrating competition rulesintoamultilateral framework asrequested
bythe1993 Ministerial.
III. Identification ofthemain elements ofacommon approach tofrictions andsynergies between
thetwopolicies
23. Themainelements ofacommon approach tofrictions andsynergies between thetwopolicies
relate tothecategories below. These categories areillustrative ofsome oftheissues forfurther joint
work (seetheproposed jointprogramme ofwork, Section IVbelow):
Efforts toimprove themutual understanding oftheterminology, objectives, methods andtools
ofanalysis ofcompetition andtrade policies areneeded toincrease thecomplementarity of
bothpolicies aswellastoavoid frictions andtoestablish whether policy instruments ofone
setofrules canassist intheachievement oftheobjectives oftheother;
Differences among countries inthescope, coverage andenforcement ofcompetition lawsare
animportant areaforinvestigation (seefurther work) astheymayaccount insome instances
fordifficulties ininternational trade. Besides coverage, certain differences inother substantive
provisions orenforcement practices mayalsoconstitute anissue;
Basic principles suchastransparency, nondiscrimination andnational treatment arekeyissues
inthecontext ofbothpolicies;
International co-operation inenforcement appears toholdconsiderable potential forbetter
achievement oftheobjectives ofbothareas aswellasforreducing frictions;
Additional frictions areattributed tothewayinwhich antidumping andother trade remedies,
intended tolimitunfair tradepractices, maylimitmarket competition. These matters willneed
tobereviewed inlightoftheoutcome oftheUruguay Round.
IV. Proposed jointprogramme ofwork afterthe1994 Ministerial
24. Theabove overview ofissues goeswellbeyond whatcanbeaccomplished inthenearterm.
Inlightofthelimited number ofmeeting daysandstaffresources available in1994 andthecoming
year,theremainder ofthisnotedetails theprogramme ofwork following the1994Ministerial meeting.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page26
25. Thisprogramme should continue tofollow abalanced approach. Theaimcontinues tobeto
identify ways inwhich competition policy approaches canbeusedtoensure thatbusiness practices
donotunduly impede market access andtoanalyse thepotential benefits oftighter disciplines regarding
government intervention intradehaving anti-competitive effects onnational andinternational markets.
26. Work following the1994 Ministerial willinclude thefollowing themes infurtherance ofthe
mandate given inthe1993 Joint Report:
Asynthesis notewillbedrafted onthejointroundtable oncompetition elements ininternational
agreements. Itwillnotdraw policy conclusions butcould beusedinsubsequent work, e.g.
exploring thequestion ofthedesirability andfeasibility ofintegrating aspects ofcompetition
policy inamultilateral framework. Such subsequent work might alsodraw upon work by
tradeorcompetition authorities inother fora. Thiswork willremain ofanexploratory nature
andwillaimtoidentify several possible approaches;
Areview ofthecompetition implications oftherevised disciplines contained intheFinal Act
oftheUruguay Round willbeconducted;
Thestudyoftheinterrelationsamongtrade,competitionandinvestmentpolicieswillbedeepened
through aTrade Committee workshop onthemeaning ofmarket access inthepostUruguay
Round period;
TheCLPAntidumping Study, which focuses ontheeconomiceffects ofantidumping, willbe
continued andcompleted. Thepolicy implications ofthisstudy willbediscussed following
itscompletion;
Acomparative study ofthecoverage, scope andenforcement ofcertain Member countries '
competition laws, including exemptions andderogations willbeconducted. Thestudy will
include asurvey ofsectors covered bycompetition laws, partial exemptions forcertain activities
andthetreatment ofstateandstate-conferred monopolies. Inaddition, itwillreview the
treatmentofexportandimportagreements(includingVERs,VIEs).Exemptionsandderogations
identified asaffecting tradeorcompetition willbejointly discussed. Bothcommunities would
trytobuild aconsensus foreliminating ornarrowing exemptions andderogations wherever
possible;
Roundtable discussions ofenforcement issues willbeorganised bytheCLP withTrade
Delegates 'attendance.
27. Further work: ifprogress andresources permit, additional activities might beundertaken
following the1995 Ministerial. They willbedrawn from thelistofissues inParagraph 23above.
28. ThetwoCommittees willkeepeachother informed ofwork ofmutual interest, including on
thepossible trade implications oftheCLPongoing work onconvergence.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page27
ANNEX III
JOINT REPORT BYTHE TRADE COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE ONCOMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
OCDE/GD(93)101
Intheirjointreport ontrade andcompetition policies submitted lastyeartotheOECD Council
atMinisterial Level, theCLPandTrade Committees agreed that"liberal trade andcompetition policy
share acommon objective: theuseofmarket-place competition toachieve anefficient allocation of
resources andmaximum economic growth andwelfare benefits".11Thisviewwasechoed inthe
subsequent Ministerial Communique, which stated that"thefunctioning ofanopenmultilateral trading
system wascapable ofunderpinning aninternational environment ofcompetition, structural reform
andgrowth".12
I. Introduction
1. Overthelasttwenty years, therehasbeenaremarkable growth inbothinternational tradeand
investment, atrendreferred toasglobalization ofbusiness. Globalization should produce moreefficient
production andmarketing, lower prices andimproved product quality andvariety, butwillfailtodo
sounless market access andcompetition canbepreserved andenhanced. Trade andcompetition officials
arewellaware ofthisaswellasofgapsintheirrespective disciplines. They haveattempted tocounter
pressures forgreater protection andlessrigorous enforcement ofantitrust laws. Often theirefforts
aremutually reinforcing. Toincrease synergies andtoavoid conflict, trade andcompetition officials
havecome toappreciate theneed forgreater mutual understanding andco-operation. They have
accordinglybeguntocarefullyexaminetheinterrelationshipsbetweentheirdisciplinesandthepossibility
forjointaction toeliminate obstacles tomarket access andcompetition.
2. Atthe1992meeting referred toabove, Ministers recommended that"OECD governments ...
seekto:"improve consistency between thesepolicies toenhance competition andmarket access; provide
afoundation forconvergence ofsubstantive rules andenforcement practices incompetition policy;
identifybetterproceduresforthesurveillanceoftradeandcompetitionpolicies;andenhancetheinterests
ofconsumers"13Thisreport setsforth progress achieved sofarbytheCLPandTrade Committees,
anidentification ofissues attheinterface oftradeandcompetition policies andaproposed programme
ofjointwork.
II. Joint work bytheCLPandTrade Committees
3. Pursuant totheMinisterial mandate, theTrade Committee andtheCommittee onCompetition
LawandPolicy haveproceeded onthebasis ofthejointprogramme ofwork which included:
11Trade andCompetition Policies -May1992 -OECD, Paris, 1992
12SG/Press(92)43, OECD, Paris.
13Seenote(1)WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page28
Study ofthepossibility ofacommon analysis oftheinterrelationships between trade and
competition policies. Work isprooceeding todevelop aframework paper ontheinteraction
ofthetwopolicy areas.
Discussion ofcases submitted byDelegations asillustrative examples ofgeneric issues raised
bytheinteractionbetweentradeandcompetitionpolicies.AcontributionfromtheTCChairman
categorising these issues andsetting outfurther questions fortheiranalysis hasalsobegun to
bediscussed jointly. Other contributions from Delegates havebeenputforward recently to
stimulate thetwocommunities 'reflections.
More specific exchanges ofviews. Forinstance, theexperience withtheOECD Checklist
fortheassessment oftradepolicy measures wasreviewed. According tocompetition officials,
thereisagrowing trend towards amore systematic useoftheprinciples ofthechecklist. Trade
officials observed, however, thatthelistdidnotaddress theeffects ofcompetition policy on
trade. Suggestions weremade toexpand andstrengthen thesystematic evaluation ofbothtrade
andcompetition policies inaccordance withthechecklist approach. Itwasagreed thatthe
situation should bereviewed later.
Inaddition, eachCommittee, inclose co-operation withtheother, carried outanumber of
studies oninterrelated trade andcompetition issues.
III. Areas forconsideration atthetrade andcompetition interface
5. Theactivities setforth above represent thebeginning ofabroad programme tomeet the
challenges identified inthisreport. Discussion between trade andcompetition officials havealready
shown thatthese challenges mayresult frompossible divergences inpolicy perspectives. Inaddition,
difficulties mayresult from differences interminology andanalytical approaches. Inanumber of
areas, insufficient coherence between trade, competition andother policies hasbeenasserted togive
risetotensions inworld economic relations. There isaneedtoreview theextent towhich competition
policies canaffect trade andmarket access. Inthetrade area, theUruguay Round should alleviate
certain ofthenegative effects oftrade measures oncompetition, butother areas ofconcern remain.
Finally, tradeandcompetition canbeaffected byother policy issues which areoutside theimmediate
competence ofthetwopolicy areas. Some examples aresetoutbelow.
A. Competition policy issues affecting trade
{a) Horizontal agreements}
6. Cartel activities canserve asaserious barrier tobothtrade andcompetition. Thus, vigorous
enforcement against cartels which restrain competition isapriority forcompetition officials.
7. Export cartels aregenerally considered tobearrangements between enterprises which have
substituted anagreement onprice, output orrelated matters forindependent decision-making inrelation
togoods andservices tobeexported toforeign markets. These cartels needtobedistinguished from
pro-competitive arrangements between firms which individually would notbeabletomarket theirgoods
abroad aseffectively oreconomically. Theexemption provided toexport cartels under many current
competition lawsisanareathatdeserves examination. Suchcartels areoften immunised fromattack
intheexporting country eventhough theyhaveanticompetitive effects inother jurisdictions. Further,
while suchcartel conduct istheoreticallyactionable bycompetition authorities intheimporting market,
practical andlegalbarriers mayexisttoeffective prosecution, including difficulties inthecollection
ofinformation inother jurisdictions andinthesupervision andenforcement ofanyeventual judgement.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page29
Ontheoccasion ofajointcasediscussion, theneedforabetter transparency ofexport cartels andan
increased co-operation between competition authorities wasstressed.
{b) Competition policy towards vertical arrangements}
8. Thecharacter ofcompetition rulesandtheirenforcement withrespect tovertical arrangements,
whether intrafirm (vertical integration through ownership) orbetween independent firms (vertical
agreements orrestraints), mayhaveeffects onentry orexpansion byforeign firms atoneoranother
levelofsupply,productionordistribution.Verticalarrangementsaffectingtheorganisationandoperation
ofdistribution systems orthesupply ofintermediate products (producer-supplier relationships) are
anareaofcurrent examination. Insome cases, toopermissive anenforcement posture towards existing
arrangements mayblock entry byforeign firms. Inother cases, atoorestrictive approach maylimit
theability ofpotential entrants toestablish distribution networks orproducer-supplier relationships.
{c) International mergers}
9. Internationalmergersrepresentanotherareaofinteractionbetweencompetitionandtradepolicies.
Theinternationalmergerprocessmaybeaffectedbytheburdensofmultiplereviewsindifferentcountries
which would beaffected bytheproposed merger.14Moreover, thereview ofinternational mergers
maybelesseffective andefficient duetorestrictions onthesharing ofconfidential information among
competition authorities.
B. Trade policy issues affecting competition
{a) Safeguards andgrey-area measures}
10. Concern hasbeenraised bythegrowing tendency inrecent years forgovernments toresort
togrey-area measures outside GATT rulesinorder toaddress problems raised byimport competition.
VERs ortheprospect ofVERs canstimulate collusion among domestic andforeign producers.
{b) Anti-dumping practices}
11. Theincreasing useofanti-dumping procedures overthelastdecade hasgiven risetoconflicts
between competition andtrade policies.
{c) Restrictive trade measures andpractices}
12. Itisrecognised thatarange ofother tradepolicy measures mayaffect competition, e.g.border
measuressuchastariffsandquotas;rulesoforigin;administrativeprocedures;governmentprocurement.
C. Other policy issues affecting trade andcompetition
Domestic policies intheareas ofsubsidies, standards orlocalcontent
14TheCLPCommittee hasproduced areport on{International Mergers andCompetition Policy,
OECD, Paris, 1988.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page30
13. Itiswellknownthatsubsidies,standardsorlocalcontentrulesusedfordomesticpolicypurposes
mayhaveeffects oncompetition ondomestic andforeign markets, thusdistorting trade. Certain aspects
ofthesemeasures areaddressed intheUruguay Round. Thecompetition aspects ought tobeconsidered.
Governmental rules affecting distribution systems
14. Bothtradeandcompetition officials canpress forchanges inlawsandregulations outside their
immediate areasofcompetence which restrain competition andhinder market access. Zoning, licensing
orpricing rules orsector-specific regulations, forexample, mayunduly restrict theestablishment of
newcompetitors withlikely effects ontrade andcompetition.
Abuse ofmonopoly power
15. Public andgovernment-sanctioned private monopolies candisrupt competition inrelated
competitive markets, particularly ifthemonopolies arepermitted toengage incompetitive activities
insuchmarkets. Theregulations ofmany butnotallOECD Member governments concerning the
activities ofparticular monopolies contain provisions designed toprevent theabuse ofmonopoly power
orthecross-subsidisationofcompetitiveactivitieswithsupra-competitiveprofitsgeneratedfrommonopoly
activities. Thepotentially traderestrictive effect oftheabuse ofmonopoly power hasbeenrecognised
andvarious trade agreements including theproposed General Agreement onTrade inServices anda
number offreetrade agreements include provisions todiscipline suchconduct. Related issues may
arisewithfirms indominant orjointly dominant positions.
{d) International agreements between firms}
16. There isconcern thatnewprivate international arrangements tomanage trade maybecome
increasingly prevalent. Sucharrangements maybehorizontal, i.e.between producers atthesamelevel
located indifferent countries, or,inexceptional circumstances, vertical, i.e.between firms atdifferent
stages ofproduction ordistribution indifferent countries. Thearrangements maywellrestrain
competition inoneorseveral markets aswellasinternational trade andthusbesubject toprosecution
under competition law. Cartel provisions, forexample, maycome intoplaywhen twoormore
competitors inonemarket become involved insuchanagreement. Theinternational aspects ofthe
arrangements citedheremaybe,however, different fromthepurely national export orimport cartels
discussed under A.a)above andneedtobestudied.
{e) Harassment ofcompetitors}
17 Insome cases, violence, intimidation andother actsofharassment haveoccurred toblock the
emergence ofnewcompetition. Suchconduct canraiseserious problems fortrade andcompetition.
IV. Proposed jointprogramme ofwork
18. Constructive exploratory work hasbeencarried outwithin thefirstyear. Valuable working
methods andapproaches were identified andthedialogue between trade andcompetition authorities
isnowunder way,atboth. Thebroad linesofthefuture jointprogramme ofwork aresuggested below.
19. Competition andtrade authorities willwork together tofurther evaluate theimplications of
interactions between thetwopolicies. Particular attention mayhavetobegiven toreviewing sectoral
exemptions andderogations fromtheoperation ofcompetition law,where theymaysignificantly impact
ontrade. Further work mayalsoinclude review oftheroleofcompetition policy considerations in
dealing withimportant issues suchasstateaidsandsubsidies orprocurement policies affecting both
trade andcompetition.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page31
20. Intheimmediate future, jointmeetings willbeincreased inlength topermit more in-depth
discussions. Thejointdialogue willcontinue putting emphasis onanalytical work intheareasidentified
inSection III.Generic issues willbeanalysed using casestudies asillustrations anddiscussion of
contributions byDelegations. Roundtables willbeorganised covering boththecompetition andtrade
aspects ofsubjects ofcommon concern. Forthe1994Ministerial, theCommittees willseektocomplete
adraft analytical framework ontheinteraction between competition andtrade policies. Particular
emphasiswillbegiventothoseissueswhichrequireacommoneffortbytradeandcompetitionauthorities
toeffectively dealwiththeproblems identified. Inaddition toareview ofadditional casestudies, joint
discussion might startafterthe1993 Ministerial oncomparisons ofterminology andconcepts such
asanti-dumping versus predatory pricing, andmarket access versus entry barriers.
21. Forwork under theresponsibility ofeachCommittee, exchanges ofrelevant draftreports by
eachCommittee (ortheirWorking Parties) willcontinue tobeorganised atastage early enough to
allow taking fullyintoconsideration thecomments received fromtheother side. Delegates fromeach
Committee willbeinvited toattend theother Committee 'smeetings onsubjects ofmutual interest and
some events ordiscussions willbeorganised jointly.
22. Atthe1994 Ministerial, theCLPCommittee willbeinaposition topresent areport onits
work todateaimed atachieving greater export andimport cartels, antidumping, vertical restraints,
international mergers andother areas.
23. Acomparative analysis oftherelevant provisions ininternational, bilateral, regional and
multilateral agreements andinstruments should beundertaken. Thequestion ofthedesirability and
feasibility ofintegrating competition rules intoamultilateral framework willbeexplored.
24. Forthe1994 Ministerial, theCommittee onCompetition LawandPolicy andtheTrade
Committee willsubmit ajointreport ontheprogress achieved inthecompletion oftheprogramme
ofwork described above.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page32
ANNEX IV
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL Paris, drafted: 17th November 1986 dist: 21stNovember 1986
C(86)65/Final
RECOMMENDATION OFTHE COUNCIL
forco-operation between Member countries inareas
ofpotential conflict between competition andtrade policies
(adopted bytheCouncil atits649th meeting on23rdOctober 1986)
THE COUNCIL,
Having regard toArticle 5b)oftheConvention oftheOECD of14thDecember 1960;
Having regard totheDecision oftheCouncil of10thand11thMay1982 requesting theCommittee
ofExperts onRestrictive Business Practices
"toexamine, inparticular, possible longer-term approaches todeveloping animproved
international framework fordealing withproblems arising atthefrontier ofcompetition and
trade policies. After consultation withtheTrade Committee, theresults ofthestudy should
bereported totheCouncil assoonaspossible." [C(82)58(Final)];
having regard totheRevised Recommendation oftheCouncil concerning co-operation between Member
countries onrestrictive business practices affecting international trade [C(86)44(Final)];
Having regard totheReport oftheCommittee ofExperts onRestrictive Business Practices on
"Competition Policy andInternational Trade: Their Interaction" derestricted. byCouncil Decision of
7thJune1984 andinparticular theconclusions contained inPartIofthisReport;
Having regard totheJointReport oftheCommittee ofExperts onRestrictive Business Practices and
theCommittee onConsumer Policy proposing anindicative checklist fortheassessment oftradepolicy
measures [C(85)321 andtheresolution oftheCouncil of30thApril 1985 calling upon Member
governments toundertake, onthebasisofthechecklist, assystematic andcomprehensive anevaluation
aspossible ofproposed tradeandtrade-related measures aswellasofexisting measures.when thelatter
atesubject toreview;
Recognising thatgovernment actions orpolicies which limit ordistort trade, inparticular,
through mechanisms orimport restrictions ofadiscriminatory nature, aswellasother trade-
related measures, mayaffect competition indomestic andinternational markets;
Recognising thatthe1984 Communiqué oftheCouncil meeting atMinisterial levelon17th
and18thMay1984acknowledgedtheimportanceofissuesarisinginrelationtobothcompetitionWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page33
andtrade policies, suchascartels andvoluntary export restraints, which havetheeffect of
inhibiting competition andtheproper functioning ofmarkets andcalled forcontinued work
andimproved international co-operation inthisarea;
Considering thattheeffective application ofcompetition policy plays avitalroleinpromoting
world trade byensuring dynamic national markets andencouraging thelowering orreducing
ofentry barriers toimports;
Considering theneedforincreased co-operation between competition andtrade authorities at
thenational andinternational levels toavoid orminimise conflicts between laws, regulations
andpolicies inthefieldoftrade andcompetition;
OntheproposaloftheCommitteeofExpertsonRestrictiveBusinessPractices,afterconsultation
withtheTrade Committee:
I. RECOMMENDS totheGovernments ofMember countries:
A. POLICY PRINCIPLES TOSTRENGTHEN COMPETITION INNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
(a) Trade policy measures affecting competition
1. Member governments should undertake, onthebasis oftheattached checklist, assystematic
andcomprehensive anevaluation aspossible ofproposed trade andtrade-related measures aswellas
ofexisting measures when thelatter aresubject toreview;
2. Inthecourse ofnegotiations ordiscussions concerning export limitation arrangements,
governments should takeintoaccount theinterests oftheirtrading partners andgiveconsideration to
theeffects ofsucharrangements oncompetition inthemarkets concerned, aswellastotheapplicability
ofcompetition laws;
3. They should respond aspositively aspossible torequests forconsultations byother Member
countries which express concern about theimpact oncompetition intheirmarkets ofmeasures referred
toinparagraphs 1and2above;
4. Because ofthepotential effects oncompetition, governments, when supplying orpurchasing
goods orservices orproviding subsidies toenterprises, whether privately owned orunder government
control, should make these practices andpolicies astransparent aspossible '.
5. Care should beexercised thatproceedings under lawsdealing withunfair trade practices,
especially proceedings initiated byenterprises, arenotmisused foranticompetitive purposes;
(b) Application ofcompetition laws torestrictive practices by.enteprises affecting
international trade
6. When considering action toapprove orotherwise exempt export cartels, export limitation
arrangements orimport cartels from theapplication oftheircompetition laws, governments should,
asfaraspossible, within existing national laws, takeintoaccount theimpact ofsuchpractices on
competition indomestic andforeign markets. Member countries which havenotyetdonesoshould
consider thepossibility ofrequiring thenotification ofexport cartels, export limitation arrangements
andimport cartels tocompetition authorities orsimilar procedures toobtain more information about
thenature andextent ofthese practices;WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page34
7. While recognising thatpolicies designed toallow interfi M,co-operation inexport trade can
stimulate trade flows, governments ingeneral should notencourage theexercise ofmarket power in
foreign markets through theuseofexport cartels. Norshould theyencourage other restrictive business
practices inexport orimport markets, e.g.,export limitation arrangements andimport cartels, which
restrain competition inthese markets;
8. Thegovernment ofthecountry where suchcartels orexport arrangements exist, should, without
prejudice toeachgovernment 'sfullfreedom ofaction andaccording totheprocedures oftheRevised
Council Recommendation concerning Co-operation between Member Countries onRestrictive Business
Practices Affecting International Trade, beready toco-operate within existing national lawswiththe
authorities ofother countries inanyinvestigation intopossible anticompetitive effects ofarrangements
locatedintheircountries,recognisingthejurisdictionaldifficultiesthatsometimesarisewheninformation
issought from abroad orwhere theparties toarestrictive agreement arelocated abroad;
9. When assessing restrictive business practices ofenterprises within relevant markets, therole
ofimports andtheexistence oftrade barriers should betaken intoaccount.
B. PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS TOAVOID ORMINIMIZE C0NFLICTS BETWEEN
TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES
(a) Atthenational level
10. Governments should seektoensure thatcompetition policy considerations aretaken intoaccount
intheformulationandimplementationoftradepolicies,includinglawsdealingwithunfairtradepractices;
(b) Attheinternational level
11. Where aMember country considers thattheimplementation ofatrade measure byanother
Member country ofwhich ithasnotice fromanysource would ormaysignificantly affect theapplication
ofitscompetition lawsorpolicies, theGovernment ofthefirstmentioned Member country may
communicate itsconcerns totheGovernment oftheother Wember country;
12. Where aMember country implements orproposes toimplement atrademeasure which may
leadtotheapplicationofcompetitionlawsinorbyanotherMembercountry,thefirstmentionedMember
country maynotify theother Member country;
13. Member countries should respond aspositively aspossible torequests theymayreceive for
consultations inrelation tosuchmeasures andtheirimplications fortheircompetition lawsorpolicies,
without prejudice toeachgovernment 'sfullfreedom ofaction;
14. Where thegovernments oftheMember countries concerned agree, theconsultations could be
amatter forreport anddiscussion within theCommittee ofExperts onRestrictive Business Practices,
inclose co-operation withtheTrade Committee;
II. INSTRUCTS theCommittee ofExperts onRestrictive Business Practices, inrelation toits
continuing work inanalysing theroleofcompetition policy instrengthening theinternational trading
system andincloseco-operation withtheTrade Committee onallmatters relating totradepolicy issues,
1. toexamine periodically developments intheimplementation oftheprovisions setoutinthis
Recommendation;
2. toreport totheCouncil asappropriate ontheimplementation ofthepresent Recommendation.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page35
APPENDIX
INDICATIVE CHECKLIST FOR THE ASSESSMENT
OFTRADE POLICY MEASURES(*)
(a) Isthemeasure inconformity withthecountry 'sinternational obligations andcommitments?
(b) What istheexpected effect ofthemeasure onthedomestic prices ofthegoods orservices
concerned andonthegeneral price level?
(c) What aretheexpected direct economic gainstothedomestic sector, industry orfirms inquestion
(technically, theincrease inproducers 'surplus)?
(d) What types ofjobsareexpected tobeaffected bythemeasure? Wbat arethenetemployment
effects ofthemeasure intheshort andlongterm?
(e) What aretheexpected (direct) gains togovernment revenues (e.g.fromtariffs, import licences,
taxreceipts) and/or increased goverment costs(e.g.export promotion, government subsidies,
losttaxrevenues)?
(f) What arethedirect costs ofthemeasure toconsumers duetotheresulting higher prices they
mustpayfortheproduct inquestion andthereduction inthelevelofconsumption oftheproduct
(technically, tilereduction inconsumers 'surplus)? Arethere specific groups ofconsumers
which areparticularly affected bythemeasure?
(g) What isthelikely impact ofthemeasure ontheavailability, choice, quality andsafety ofgoods
andservices?
(h) What isthelikely impact ofthemeasure onthestructure oftherelevant markets andthe
competitive process within those markets?
(i) Inthemedium andlonger termperspective, willthemeasure, onbalance, encourage orpermit
structural adaptation ofdomestic industry leading overtimetoincreased productivity and
international competitiveness orwillitfurther weaken anddelay pressures forsuchadaptation?
Isthemeasure ofatemporary nature? Isitcontingent on,orlinked to,other policy measures
designed tobring about thedesired structural adjustment?
(j) What willbetheexpected effect oninvestment bydomestic firms intheaffected sector, by
potential newentrants andbyforeign investors?
(k) What could betheexpected economic effects ofthemeasure onother sectors oftheeconomy,
inparticular, onfirms purchasing products from, andselling products to,theindustry in
question?
(l) What arethelikely effects ofthemeasure onother countries? Howcanprejudice totrading
partners beminimised?
(m) Howareother governments andforeign firms likely toreacttothemeasure andwhatwould
betheexpected effect ontheeconomy ofsuchactions? Isthemeasure aresponse tounfair
practices inother countries?
Thischecklist applies toalltrade policy measures other thanlawsrelating tounfair trade practices.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page36
ANNEX V
C(95)130/Final
REVISED RECOMMENDATION OFTHE COUNCIL
CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES
ONANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(adopted bytheCouncil atits856th Session on27and28July1995)
THE COUNCIL,
Having regard toArticle 5(b)oftheConvention ontheOrganization forEconomic Co-operation
andDevelopment of14December 1960;
Having regard tothefactthatinternational co-operation among OECD countries inthecontrol
ofanticompetitive practices affecting international trade haslong existed, based onsuccessive
Recommendations oftheCouncil of5October 1967 [C(67)53(Final)], 3July1973 [C(73)99(Final)],
25September 1979 [C(79)154(Final)] and21May1986 [C(86)44(Final)];
Having regard totherecommendations made inthestudy oftransnational mergers andmerger
control procedures prepared fortheCommittee onCompetition LawandPolicy;
Recognizing thatanticompetitive practices mayconstitute anobstacle totheachievement of
economic growth, trade expansion andother economic goals ofMember countries;
Recognizingthatthecontinuedgrowthininternationalizationofbusinessactivitiescorrespondingly
increases thelikelihood thatanticompetitive practices inonecountry orcoordinated behaviour offirms
located indifferent countries mayadversely affect theinterests ofMember countries andalsoincreases
thenumber oftransnational mergers thataresubject tothemerger control lawsofmorethanoneMember
country;
Recognizing thattheunilateral application ofnational legislation, incases where business
operations inother countries areinvolved, raises questions astotherespective spheres ofsovereignty
ofthecountries concerned;
Recognizing theneedforMember countries togiveeffect totheprinciples ofinternational
lawandcomity andtousemoderation andself-restraint intheinterest ofco-operation onthefieldof
anticompetitive practices;
RecognizingthatanticompetitivepracticesinvestigationsandproceedingsbyoneMembercountry
may, incertain cases, affect important interests ofother Member countries;
Considering therefore thatMember countries should cooperate intheimplementation oftheir
respective national legislation inorder tocombat theharmful effects ofanticompetitive practices;
Consideringalsothatcloserco-operationbetweenMembercountriesisneededtodealeffectively
withanticompetitive practices operated byenterprises situated inMember countries when theyaffect
theinterests ofoneormore other Member countries andhaveaharmful effect oninternational trade;
Considering moreover thatcloser co-operation between Member countries intheform of
notification, exchange ofinformation, co-ordination ofaction, consultation andconciliation, onafullyWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page37
voluntary basis, should beencouraged, itbeing understood thatsuchco-operation should not,inany
way, beconstrued toaffect thelegal positions ofMember countries withregard toquestions of
sovereignty, andinparticular, theextra-territorial application oflawsconcerning anticompetitive
practices, asmayarise;
Recognizing thedesirability ofsetting forth procedures bywhich theCompetition Lawand
Policy Committee canactasaforum forexchanges ofviews, consultations andconciliation onmatters
related toanticompetitive practices affecting international trade;
Considering thatifMember countries finditappropriate toenter intobilateral arrangements
forco-operation intheenforcement ofnational competition laws, theyshould takeintoaccount the
present Recommendation andGuiding Principles.
I. RECOMMENDS toGovernments ofMember countries thatinsofar astheirlawspermit:
A. NOTIFICATION,EXCHANGEOFINFORMATIONANDCO-ORDINATIONOFACTION
1. When aMember country undertakes under itscompetition lawsaninvestigation orproceeding
which mayaffect important interests ofanother Member country orcountries, itshould notify such
Member country orcountries, ifpossible inadvance, and,inanyevent, atatimethatwould facilitate
comments orconsultations; suchadvance notification would enable theproceeding Member country,
while retaining fullfreedom ofultimate decision, totakeaccount ofsuchviews astheother Member
country maywishtoexpress andofsuchremedial action astheother Member country mayfindit
feasible totakeunder itsownlaws, todealwiththeanticompetitive practices;
2. WheretwoormoreMembercountriesproceedagainstananticompetitivepracticeininternational
trade, theyshould endeavour toco-ordinate theiraction insofar asappropriate andpracticable;
3. Through consultations orotherwise, theMember countries should co-operate indeveloping
orapplying mutually satisfactory andbeneficial measures fordealing withanticompetitive practices
ininternational trade. Inthisconnection, theyshould supply eachother withsuchrelevant information
onanticompetitive practices astheirlegitimate interests permit them todisclose; andshould allow,
subjecttoappropriatesafeguards,includingthoserelatingtoconfidentiality,thedisclosureofinformation
tothecompetent authorities ofMember countries bytheotherparties concerned, whether accomplished
unilaterally orinthecontext ofbilateral ormultilateral understandings, unless suchcooperation or
disclosure would becontrary tosignificant national interests.
B. CONSULTATION AND CONCILIATION
4. (a) AMember country which considers thataninvestigation orproceeding being conducted
byanother Member country under itscompetition lawsmayaffect itsimportant interests
should transmit itsviews onthematter toorrequest consultation withtheotherMember
country;
(b) Without prejudice tothecontinuation ofitsaction under itscompetition lawandto
itsfullfreedom ofultimate decision theMember country soaddressed should give
fullandsympathetic consideration totheviews expressed bytherequesting country,
andinparticular toanysuggestions astoalternative means offulfilling theneeds or
objectives ofthecompetition investigation orproceeding;
5. (a) AMember country which considers thatoneormore enterprises situated inoneor
more other Member countries areorhavebeenengaged inanticompetitive practicesWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page38
ofwhateveroriginthataresubstantiallyandadverselyaffectingitsinterests,mayrequest
consultation withsuchother Member country orcountries recognizing thatentering
intosuchconsultations iswithout prejudice toanyaction under itscompetition law
andtothefullfreedom ofultimate decision oftheMember countries concerned;
(b) AnyMember country soaddressed should givefullandsympathetic consideration to
suchviews andfactual materials asmaybeprovided bytherequesting country and,
inparticular, tothenature oftheanticompetitive practices inquestion theenterprises
involved andthealleged harmful effects ontheinterests oftherequesting country;
(c) TheMember country addressed which agrees thatenterprises situated initsterritory
areengagedinanticompetitivepracticesharmfultotheinterestsoftherequestingcountry
should attempt toensure thatthese enterprises takeremedial action, orshould itself
takewhatever remedial action itconsiders appropriate, including actions under its
legislation onanticompetitive practices oradministrative measures, onavoluntary basis
andconsidering itslegitimate interests;
6. Without prejudice toanyoftheirrights, theMember countries involved inconsultations under
paragraphs 4and5above should endeavour tofindamutually acceptable solution inthelightofthe
respective interests involved;
7. Intheevent ofasatisfactory conclusion totheconsultations under paragraphs 4and5above,
therequesting country, inagreement with,andintheformaccepted by,theMember country orcountries
addressed,shouldinformtheCompetitionLawandPolicyCommitteeofthenatureoftheanticompetitive
practices inquestion andofthesettlement reached;
8. Intheevent thatnosatisfactory conclusion canbereached, theMember countries concerned,
iftheysoagree, should consider having recourse tothegoodoffices oftheCompetition LawandPolicy
Committee withaviewtoconciliation. IftheMember countries concerned agree totheuseofanother
means ofsettlement, theyshould, iftheyconsider itappropriate, inform theCommittee ofsuchfeatures
ofthesettlement astheyfeeltheycandisclose.
II. RECOMMENDS thatMember countries takeintoaccount theguiding principles setoutin
theAppendix tothisRecommendation.
III. INSTRUCTS theCompetition LawandPolicy Committee:
1. ToexamineperiodicallytheprogressmadeintheimplementationofthepresentRecommendation
andtoserve periodically orattherequest ofaMember country asaforum forexchanges ofviews
onmatters related totheRecommendation ontheunderstanding thatitwillnotreach conclusions on
theconduct ofindividual enterprises orgovernments;
2. Toconsider thereports submitted byMember countries inaccordance withparagraph 7of
Section Iabove;
3. Toconsider therequests forconciliation submitted byMember countries inaccordance with
paragraph 8ofSection Iabove andtoassist, byoffering advice orbyanyother means, inthesettlement
ofthematter between theMember countries concerned;
4. Toreport totheCouncil asappropriate ontheapplication ofthepresent Recommendation.
IV. DECIDES thatthisRecommendation anditsAppendix cancel andreplace theRecommendation
oftheCouncil of21May1986 [C(86)44(Final)].WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page39
C(95)130/FINAL
APPENDIX
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR NOTIFICATIONS, EXCHANGES OFINFORMATION,
COOPERATION ININVESTIGATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS,
CONSULTATIONS AND CONCILIATION OFANTICOMPETITIVE
PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Purpose
1. Thepurpose ofthese principles istoclarify theprocedures laiddown intheRecommendation
andthereby tostrengthen co-operation andtominimize conflicts intheenforcement ofcompetition
laws. Itisrecognized thatimplementation oftherecommendations herein isfullysubject tothenational
lawsofMembercountries,aswellasinallcasestothejudgementofnationalauthoritiesthatco-operation
inaspecific matter isconsistent withtheMember country 'snational interests. Member countries may
wishtoconsider appropriate legalmeasures, consistent withtheirnational policies, togiveeffect to
thisRecommendation inappropriate cases.
Definitions
2. (a) "Investigation orproceeding" means anyofficial factual inquiry orenforcement action
authorized orundertaken byacompetition authority ofaMember country pursuant
tothecompetition lawsofthatcountry. Excluded, however, are(i)thereview of
business conduct orroutine filings, inadvance ofaformal orinformal determination
thatthematter maybeanticompetitive, or(ii)research, studies orsurveys theobjective
ofwhich istoexamine thegeneral economic situation orgeneral conditions inspecific
industries.
(b) "Merger" means merger, acquisition, jointventure andanyother form ofbusiness
amalgamation thatfallswithin thescope anddefinitions ofthecompetition lawsof
aMember country governing business concentrations orcombinations.
Notification
3. Thecircumstances inwhich anotification ofaninvestigation orproceeding should bemade,
asrecommended inparagraph I.A.1. oftheRecommendation, include:
(a) When itisproposed that,through awritten request, information willbesought from
theterritory ofanother Member country orcountries:
(b) When itconcerns apractice (other thanamerger) carried outwholly orinpartinthe
territory ofanother Member country orcountries, whether thepractice ispurely private
orwhether itisbelieved toberequired, encouraged orapproved bythegovernment
orgovernments ofanother country orcountries;
(c) When theinvestigation orproceeding previously notified mayreasonably beexpected
toleadtoaprosecution orother enforcement action which mayaffect animportant
interest ofanother Member country orcountries:WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page40
(d) When itinvolves remedies thatwould require orprohibit behaviour orconduct inthe
territory ofanother Member country;
(e) Inthecaseofaninvestigation orproceeding involving amerger, andinaddition to
thecircumstances described elsewhere inthisparagraph, when apartydirectly involved
inthemerger, oranenterprise controlling suchaparty, isincorporated ororganized
under thelawsofanother Member country.
(f) Inanyother situation where theinvestigation orproceeding mayinvolve important
interests ofanother Member country orcountries.
Procedure fornotifying
4. (a) Under theRecommendation notification ordinarily should beprovided atthefirststage
inaninvestigation orproceeding when itbecomes evident thatnotifiable circumstances
described inparagraph 3arepresent. However, theremaybecases where notification
atthatstage could prejudge theinvestigative action orproceeding. Insuchacase
notification and,when requested, consultation should takeplace assoonaspossible
andinsufficient timetoenable theviews oftheother Member country tobetaken
intoaccount. Before anyformal legaloradministrative action istaken, thenotifying
country should ensure, tothefullest extent possible inthecircumstances, thatitwould
notprejudice thisprocess.
(b) Notification ofaninvestigation orproceeding should bemade inwriting through the
channels requested byeach country asindicated inalisttobeestablished and
periodically updated bytheCompetition LawandPolicy Committee.
(c) Thecontent ofthenotification should besufficiently detailed topermit aninitial
evaluation bythenotified country ofthelikelihood ofanyeffects onitsnational
interests. Itshould include, ifpossible, thenames ofthepersons orenterprises
concerned, theactivities under investigation, thecharacter oftheinvestigation or
procedure andthelegal provisions concerned, andifapplicable, theneed toseek
information from theterritory ofanother Member country. Inthecaseofan
investigation orproceeding involving amerger, notification should alsoinclude:
(i) thefactofinitiation ofaninvestigation orproceeding;
(ii) thefactoftermination oftheinvestigation orproceeding, withadescription
ofanyremedial action ordered orvoluntary steps undertaken bytheparties;
(iii) adescription oftheissues ofinterest tothenotifying Member country, such
astherelevant markets affected, jurisdictional issues orremedial concerns;
(iv) astatementofthetimeperiodwithinwhichthenotifyingMembercountryeither
must actorisplanning toact.
Coordination ofinvestigations
5. Thecoordination ofconcurrent investigations, asrecommended inparagraph I.A.2. ofthe
Recommendation, should beundertaken onacase-by-case basis, where therelevant Member countries
agree thatitwould beintheirinterests todoso.Thiscoordination process shallnot,however, affectWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page41
eachMember country 'srighttotakeadecision independently based ontheinvestigation. Coordination
might include anyofthefollowing steps, consistent withthenational lawsofthecountries involved:
(a) providing notice ofapplicable timeperiods andschedules fordecision-making;
(b) sharing factual andanalytical information andmaterial, subject tonational laws
governing theconfidentiality ofinformation andtheprinciples relating toconfidential
information setforth inparagraph 10;
(c) requesting,inappropriatecircumstances,thatthesubjectsoftheinvestigationvoluntarily
permit thecooperating countries toshare some oralloftheinformation intheir
possession, totheextent permitted bynational laws;
(d) coordinating discussions ornegotiations regarding remedial actions, particularly when
suchremedies could require conduct orbehaviour intheterritory ofmore thanone
Member country;
(e) inthose Member countries inwhich advance notification ofmergers isrequired or
permitted, requesting thatthenotification include astatement identifying notifications
alsomade ortobemade toother countries.
Assistance inaninvestigation orproceeding ofaMember country
6. Cooperation among Member countries bymeans ofsupplying information onanticompetitive
practices inresponse toarequest from aMember country, asrecommended inparagraph I.A.3 of
theRecommendation, should beundertaken onacase-by-case basis, where itwould beintheinterests
oftherelevant Member countries todoso.Cooperation might include anyofthefollowing steps,
consistent withthenational lawsofthecountries involved:
(a) assisting inobtaining information onavoluntary basis from within theassisting
Member 'scountry;
(b) providingfactualandanalyticalmaterialfromitsfiles,subjecttonationallawsgoverning
confidentiality ofinformation andtheprinciples relating toconfidential information
setforth inparagraph 10;
(c) employing onbehalf oftherequesting Member country itsauthority tocompel the
production ofinformation intheformoftestimony ordocuments, where thenational
lawoftherequested Member country provides forsuchauthority;
(d) providing information inthepublic domain relating totherelevant conduct orpractice.
Tofacilitate theexchange ofsuchinformation, Member countries should consider
collecting andmaintaining dataabout thenature andsources ofsuchpublic information
towhich other Member countries could refer.
7. When aMember country learns ofananticompetitive practice occurring intheterritory of
another Member country thatcould violate thelawsofthelatter, theformer should consider informing
thelatter andproviding asmuch information aspracticable, subject tonational lawsgoverning the
confidentiality ofinformation andtheprinciples relating toconfidential information setforth in
paragraph 10,consistent withother applicable national lawsanditsnational interests.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page42
8. (a) Member countries should usemoderation andself-restraint andtakeintoaccount the
substantive lawsandprocedural rules intheforeign forum when exercising their
investigatory powers withaviewtoobtaining information located abroad;
(b) before seeking information located abroad, Member countries should consider whether
adequate information isconveniently available from sources within their national
territory;
(c) anyrequests forinformation located abroad should beframed interms thatareas
specific aspossible.
9. Theprovision ofassistance orcooperation between member countries maybesubject to
consultations regarding thesharing ofcosts ofthese activities.
Confidentiality
10. Theexchange ofinformation under thisRecommendation issubject tothelawsofparticipating
Member countries governing theconfidentiality ofinformation. AMember country mayspecify the
protection thatshallbeaccorded theinformation tobeprovided andanylimitations thatmayapply
totheuseofsuchinformation. Therequested Member country would bejustified indeclining tosupply
information iftherequesting Member country isunable toobserve those requests. Areceiving Member
country should takeallreasonable stepstoensure observance oftheconfidentiality anduselimitations
specified bythesending Member country, andifabreach ofconfidentiality oruselimitation occurs,
should notify thesending Member country ofthebreach andtakeappropriate stepstoremedy theeffects
ofthebreach.
Consultations between Member countries
11. (a) Thecountry notifying aninvestigation orproceeding should conduct itsinvestigation
orproceeding, totheextent possible under legalandpractical timeconstraints, ina
manner thatwould allow thenotified country torequest informal consultations orto
submit itsviews ontheinvestigation orproceeding;
(b) requests forconsultation under paragraphs I.B.4. andI.B.5. oftheRecommendation
should bemade assoonaspossible afternotification andexplanation ofthenational
interests affected should beprovided insufficient detail toenable fullconsideration
tobegiven tothem;
(c) thenotifiedMembercountryshould,whereappropriate,considertakingremedialaction
under itsownlegislation inresponse toanotification;
(d) allcountries involved inconsultations should givefullconsideration totheinterests
raised andtotheviews expressed during theconsultations soastoavoid orminimize
possible conflict.
Conciliation
12. (a) Iftheyagree totheuseoftheCommittee 'sgoodoffices forthepurpose ofconciliation
inaccordance withparagraph I.B.8 oftheRecommendation, Member countries should
inform theChairman oftheCommittee andtheSecretariat withaviewtoinvoking
conciliation.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page43
(b) theSecretariat should continue tocompile alistofpersons willing toactasconciliators;
(c) theprocedure forconciliation should bedetermined bytheChairman oftheCommittee
inagreement withtheMember countries concerned;
(d) anyconclusions drawn asaresult oftheconciliation arenotbinding ontheMember
countries concerned andtheproceeding oftheconciliation willbekeptconfidential
unless theMember countries concerned agree otherwise.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page44
ANNEX VI
BIBLIOGRAPHY ONTRADE AND COMPETITION
(Revised July30,1997)
OECD PUBLICATIONS AND DERESTRICTED DOCUMENTS
I. MINISTERIAL REPORTS (under general distribution)
CLPreport:
--Interim Report onConvergence ofCompetition Policies OCDE/GD(94)64 (1994)
Joint reports:
--Trade andCompetition OCDE/GD(93)101 (1993)
--Trade andCompetition OCDE/GD(94)63 (1994)
--Strengthening theCoherence between OCDE/GD(96)90 (1996)
Trade andCompetition Policies
II. OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS
(These Recommendations arealsoretrievable ontheCLPInternet site:
http//:www.oecd.org/daf/ccp)
Revised Recommendation oftheCouncil concerning Co-operation
between Member Countries onAnticompetitive Practices
affecting International Trade
27and28July1995 -C(95)130/Final
Recommendation oftheCouncil concerning theApplication
ofCompetition Laws andPolicy toPatent andKnow-How
Licensing Agreements
31March 1989 -C(89)32(Final)
Recommendation oftheCouncil forCo-operation between
Member Countries inAreas ofPotential Conflicts betweenWT/WGTCP/W/21
Page45
Competition andTrade Policies
23October 1986 -C(86)65(Final)
Recommendation oftheCouncil onCompetition Policy and
Exempted orRegulated Sectors
25September 1979 -C(79)155(Final)
Recommendation oftheCouncil concerning Action against
Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade
Including those Involving Multinational Enterprises
20July1978 -C(78)133(Final)
III. PUBLICATIONS
Antitrust andMarket Access:
theScope andCoverage ofCompetition Laws and
Implications forTrade
Study byProf. Barry Hawk
OECD, Paris, 1996 (ISBN 92-64-15274-1)
Market Access After theUruguay Round: Investment, Competition andTechnology
Perspectives
Seeespecially:
Donald Hay,“Anti-competitive Practices, Market Access andCompetition Policy inaGlobal Economy
(Chapter 4);
Merit Janow, “Public andPrivate Restraints thatLimit Access toMarkets (Chapter 5);and
Mark A.A. Warner, “Private andPublic Restraints onTrade: Effects onInvestment andPolicy
Approaches toThem (Chapter 6)
OECD, Paris, 1996
NewDimensions ofMarket Access inaGlobalising World Economy
Seeespecially:
Edward M.Graham, “Competition Policy andtheTrade Agenda ”(Chapter 12);WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page46
Claus D.Ehlermann, “TheRoleofCompetition Policy inaGlobal Economy ”(Chapter 13);
Mitsuo Matsushita, “Harmonisation ofCompetition Laws through Bilateral
Trade Negotiations: theJapanese Experience ”(Chapter 15);
Arthur Kaell, Derek Ireland andZulfi Sadeque, “Trade, Competition Policy and
Market Access ”(Chapter 14);and
Eleanor M.Fox,“Competition LawandtheNext Agenda fortheWTO ”(Chapter 18.
OECD, .Paris, 1995
Trade andCompetition Policies: Comparing Objectives andMethods
Trade Policy Issues No.4
Consultant paper byProfessor Nicolaides
OECD, Paris, 1994
Competition Policy andVertical Restraints: Franchising Agreements
OECD, Paris, 1994 (ISBN 92-64-14053-0)
Merger cases intherealworld:
Astudy ofmerger control procedures
OECD, Paris, 1994 (ISBN 92-64-14100-6)
Obstacles toTrade andCompetition
OECD, Paris, 1993 (ISBN 92-64-238378-7)
Glossary ofIndustrial Organisation Economics andCompetition Laws
OECD Paris, 1993 (ISBN 92-64-13793-9)
Competition Policy andaChanging Broadcast Industry
OECD, Paris, 1993, (ISBN 92-64-13987-7)
Competition Policy andIntellectual Property Rights
OECD, Paris, 1989 (ISBN 92-64-13242-2)
International Mergers andCompetition Policy
OECD, Paris, 1988 (ISBN 92-64-03143-X)WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page47
Deregulation andCompetition inAirlines
OECD, Paris, 1988 (ISBN 92-64-23101-3)
TheCosts ofRestricting Imports:
TheAutomobile Industry
OECD, Paris, 1987 (ISBN 92-64-13037-3)
Competition Policy andJoint Ventures
OECD, Paris, 1986 (ISBN 92-64-12898-0)
Competition Policy andtheProfessions:
OECD, Paris, 1985 (ISBN 64-12685-6)
Merger Policies andRecent Trends inMergers
OECD, Paris, 1984 (ISBN 92-64-12624-4)
Competition andTrade Policies
Their Interaction
OECD, Paris, 1984 (ISBN 92-64-12625-2)
Competition LawEnforcement:
International Co-operation intheCollection ofInformation
OECD, Paris, 1984 (ISBN 92-64-12553-1)
Competition Policy inOECD countries
Annual country reports (series)
Lastedition: 1993-1994
OECD, Paris, 1997 (ISBN 92-64-15476-0)
IV. CLPDOCUMENTS UNDER GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
(These documents arealsoretrievable ontheCLPInternet site:
http//:www.oecd.org/daf/ccp)
1. Competition Policy andEnvironment
(Roundtable inMay1995, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)22WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page48
2. Failing Firm Defence
(Roundtable inMay1995, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)23
3. Competition Policy andFilmDistribution
(Roundtable inNovember 1995, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)60
4. Competition Policy andEfficiency Claims inHorizontal Agreements
(Roundtable inNovember 1995, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)65
5. TheEssential Facilities Concept
(Roundtable inFebruary 1996, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)113
6. Competition inTelecommunications
(Roundtable inNovember 1995, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)114
7. TheReform ofInternational Satellite Organisations
(Roundtable inNovember 1995, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)123
8. Abuse ofDominance andMonopolisation
(Roundtable inFebruary 1996, published in1996) OCDE/GD(96)131
9. Application ofCompetition Policy toHigh TechMarkets
(Roundtable inApril 1996, published in1997) OCDE/GD(97)44
10. General Cartel Bans: Criteria forExemption forSmall and
Medium-Sized Enterprises OCDE/GD(97)53
(Roundtable inOctober 1996, published in1997)
V. SELECTED TRADE COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS
1. Competition Policy Aspects oftheUruguay Round TD/TC/WP(94)32
2. Informal Workshop withDynamic Asian Economies
Seoul, June1992 SG/IW/TC(92)8
3. TheInternational Contestability ofMarkets andtheNewTrade Agenda:
APreliminary Outline TD/TC/WP(95)55/REV1
4. Labour Management Programme 1993WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page49
TheInteraction between Trade andCompetition Policies
inanIncreasingly Integrated World Economy SG/RE/LMP(93)9
5. Measuring theInternational Contestability ofMarkets:
AConceptual Approach TD/TC(96)7
6. TheScope, Implication andEconomic Rationale ofaCompetition
Oriented Approach toFuture Multilateral Trade Negotiations TD/TC(96)6
7. Trade andCompetition Policies -Howtheyinterrelate SG/IW/TC(92)8
8. TheUruguay Round Agreement onSubsidies:
AForward-Looking Assessment TD/TC/WP(95)13
SELECTED NON OECD PUBLICATIONS OFINTEREST
R.I.R.Abeyratne. “Competition Rules inCommercial Aviation andWTO Competition Rules:
AComparative Analysis. ”19World Competition 137-186 (March 1996).
P.D.Altrogge. “Competition Policy inAgriculture &FoodProcessing: Some Lessons forTransitional
Economies. ”18World Competition 71-98 (September 1994).
E.Andere. “TheMexican Antidumping Regime: Regulatory Framework, Policies &Practice. ”27
Journal ofWorld Trade 5-36(April 1993).
D.I.Baker. “Antitrust Enforcement andNon-Enforcement asaBarrier toImports. ”International
Business Lawyer (November 1996).
Berg. “AnEconomic Interpretation of‘Like-Product. ’”30Journal ofWorld Trade 195-209
(August 1996).
L.J.Bergstrom. “Should theGATT beModified toIncorporate aRestrictive Business Practices
Provision? ”17World Competition 121-135 (September 1993).
R.Blackhurst. “Competition Policies: National Versus Multilateral Jurisdiction: Comment. ”49
Aussenwirtschaft 223-29 (September 1994).
P.M.Boarman. “Antitrust Laws inaGlobal Market. ”36Challenge 30-36 (January 1993).
D.R.Boltuck andS.Kaplan. “Conflicting Entitlements: CanAntidumping andAntitrust Regulation
BeReconciled? ”61University ofCincinnati LawReview 903-918 (1993).
D.R. Boltuck andR.E. Litan. “Down intheDumps. ”Brookings 1991.
D.Brault. “Droit delaconcurrence comparé: versunordre concurrentiel mondial? ”Economica (1995).
SirL.Brittan,K.vanMiert.“TowardsanInternationalFrameworkofCompetitionRules.”International
Business Lawyer (November 1996).WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page50
D.Brockbank.“The1995InternationalAntitrustGuidelines:TheReachofU.S.AntitrustLawContinues
toExpand. ”2Journal ofInternational Legal Studies (Winter 1996).
M.C.E.J.Bronckers. “Rehabilitating Antidumping andOther Trade Remedies Through Cost-Benefit
Analyses. ”30Journal ofWorld Trade 5-37(April 1996).
D.A.Butz. “Ocean Shipping Economics: FreeTrade andAntitrust Implications. ”11Contemporary
Policy Issues 69-80 (July 1993).
W.A.Cann, Jr.“Internationalizing OurViews Toward Recoupment andMarket Power: Attacking
theAntidumping/AntitrustDichotomyThroughWTO-ConsistentGlobalWelfareTheory.”17University
ofPennsylvania Journal ofInternational Business Law69-231 (Spring 1996).
L.Cartou. “Etrevoici lesententes venues d’ailleurs; ententes, concertation d’entreprise, entreprises
extérieures àlaCommunauté. ”111Lespetites affiches 12-16 (15sept1993).
P.S.Crampton, C.L.Witterick. “Trade Distorting Private Restraints andMarket Access: Learning
toWalk Before WeRun.”International Business Lawyer (November 1996).
J.Davidow. “Keiretsu andU.S.Antitrust. ”24LawandPolicy inInternational Business 1035-1050
(Summer 1993).
J.Davidow. “Application ofU.S.Antitrust Laws toKeiretsu Practices. ”18World Competition 5-18
(September 1994).
P.J.DeRosa. “Cooperative JointVentures inEuropean Community Competition Law.”41Buffalo
LawReview 993(Fall1993).
D.Devgun. “Crossborder Joint Ventures: ASurvey ofInternational Antitrust Considerations. ”21
William Mitchell LawReview 681(Spring 1996).
C.Duchemin. “L’essor dudroit international delaconcurrence. ”4Revue deDroit desAffaires
Internationales 449-468 (1Juin1996).
A.Egger. “ThePrinciple ofProportionality inCommunity Anti-Dumping Law.”18European Law
Review 267-287 (October 1993).
C.-D. Ehlermann. “TheInternational Dimension ofCompetition Policy (Address ).”17Fordham
International LawJournal 833-845 (1994).
A.M.El-Agraa. “VERs asaProminent Feature ofJapanese Trade Policy: Their Rational Costs and
Benefits. ”18World Economy 219-35 (March 1995).
C.Falconer andP.Sauvé. “Mondialisation, échanges etconcurrence. ”201Observateur del’OCDE
(Août/Sept 1996).
-----------. “Globalisation, Trade andCompetition. ”201OECD Observer (August/September 1996).
D.Feaver, K.Wilson. “AnEvaluation ofAustralia 'sAnti-Dumping andCountervailing Lawand
Policy. ”
29Journal ofWorld Trade 207-237 (October 1995).WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page51
W.Fikentscher.“CompetitionRulesforPrivateAgentsintheGATT/WTOSystem.”49Aussenwirtschaft
281-325 (September 1994).
J.M.Finger, K.C.Fung. “CanCompetition Control ‘301’?”49Aussenwirtschaft 379-416 (September
1994).
J.M.Finger. “Dumping andAntidumping: TheRhetoric andtheReality ofProtection inIndustrial
Countries. ”7(2)TheWorld Bank Research Observer (1992).
J.M.Finger. “TheMeaning of‘Unfair ’inUnited States Import Policy. ”1(1)Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade (1992).
E.M.Fox.“Antitrust Trade andtheGlobal Economy: the21stCentury andWorld Competition. ”
NewYorkLawJournal (March 11,1993).
E.M.Fox.“Competition LawandtheAgenda fortheWTO: Forging theLinks ofCompetition and
Trade. ”4Pacific RimLawandPolicy Journal (March 1995).
E.M.FoxandJ.A.Ordover. “TheHarmonization ofCompetition andTrade Law: TheCasefor
Modest Linkages ofLawandLimits toParochial StateAction. ”19World Competition 5-34(December
1995).
E.M.Fox. “Trade, Competition, andIntellectual Property -TRIPS anditsAntitrust Counterparts. ”
29Vanderbilt Journal ofTransnational Law481-505 (May 1996).
E.M.Fox. “Internationalising Competition LawtoLimit Parochial StateAndPrivate Action: Moving
Towards theVision ofWorld Welfare. ”International Business Lawyer (November 1996).
D.J.Gerber. “Competition LawandInternational Trade: TheEuropean Union andtheNeo-Liberal
Factor. ”4Pacific RimLawandPolicy Journal (March 1995).
D.J.Gifford. “Antitrust andTrade Issues: Similarities, Differences, andRelationships. ”44DePaul
LawReview 1049 (Summer 1995).
J.P.Griffin. “EC/U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact onTransnational Business. ”24
LawandPolicy inInternational Business 1051-1065 (Summer 1993).
J.P.Griffin. “AnAnalysis oftheDraft Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines forInternational Operations ”
18World Competition 5-34(December 1994).
J.P.Griffin. “International Antitrust Guidelines Send Mixed Message ofRobust Enforcement and
Comity. ”18World Competition 5-11(June 1995).
J.O.Haley. “Competition andTrade Policy: Antitrust Enforcement: DoDifferences Matter? ”4Pacific
RimLawandPolicy Journal (March 1995).
H.Hauser andR.E.Schoene. “IsThere aNeed forInternational Competition Rules? ”49
Aussenwirtschaft 205-22 (September 1994).
D.W.Hayter. “Scapegoat fortheTrade Deficit: Does EEC Antitrust Treatment ofJoint Ventures
Place theUnited States ataCompetitive Disadvantage? ”16Hastings International andComparative
LawReview 391-424 (Spring 1993).WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page52
B.M.Hoekman andP.C.Mavroidis. “Competition, Competition Policy andtheGATT. ”17World
Economy 121-50 (March 1994).
B.M.Hoekman andP.C.Mavroidis. “Antitrust-based Remedies andDumping inInternational Trade. ”
IBRD Working Paper 1347 (August 1994).
B.M.Hoekman andP.C.Mavroidis. “Dumping, Antidumping andAntitrust. ”30Journal ofWorld
Trade 27-52 (February 1996).
B.M.Hoekman. “Trade andCompetition Policy intheWTO System. ”Centre forEconomic Policy
Research Discussion Paper 1501.
G.N.Horlick. “How theGATT Became Protectionist: AnAnalysis oftheUruguay Round Draft
Final Antidumping Code. ”27Journal ofWorld Trade 5-17(October 1993).
G.N.Horlick andE.C.Shea. “TheWorld Trade Organization Antidumping Agreement. ”29Journal
ofWorld Trade 5-31(February 1995).
G.N.Horlick, andM.A.Meyer. “TheInternational Convergence ofCompetition Policy. ”29
International Law65-76 (Spring 1995).
G.N.Horlick, Y.K.Kim. “Private Remedies forPrivate Anti-Competitive Barriers toTrade: the
Kodak-Fuji Example. ”International Business Lawyer (November 1996).
U.Immenga.“ExportCartelsandVoluntaryExportRestraintsBetweenTradeandCompetitionPolicy.”
4Pacific RimLawandPolicy Journal (March 1995).
K.Iwata. “Competition Policy andUnfair Trade Measures. ”Trade andTariffs (January 1997).
J.H.Jackson. “Alternative Approaches forImplementing Competition Rules inInternational Economic
Relations. ”49Aussenwirtschaft 177-200 (September 1994).
A.Jacquemin. “Towards anInternationalisation ofCompetition Policy. ”18World Economy 781-89
(November 1995).
M.Jerge. “Foreign Multinational Corporations andU.S.Antidumping Law: Defining a"Domestic"
Business. ”28Journal ofWorld Trade 67-82 (August 1994).
Kenneth Kelly. “Empirical Analysis forAntitrust andInternational Trade Law.”61University of
Cincinnati LawReview 889-902 (1993).
C.Kent. “TheUnsettled Business: Should Antidumping Laws BeReplaced byCompetition (Antitrust)
LawUnder FreeTrade? ”32Alberta LawReview 722(August 1994).
R.P.Kewalram. “TheAustralia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement: An
Experiment withtheReplacement ofAnti-Dumping Laws byTrade Practices Legislation. ”27Journal
ofWorld Trade 111-124 (October 1993).
K.Kiyono. “Anti-dumping Regulation under Strategic Interdependence. ”46Economic Review (Keizai-
Kenkyu) (January 1995).WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page53
P.Lloyd andGarySampson. “Competition andTrade Policy: Identifying theIssues aftertheUruguay
Round. ”18World Economy 681-705 (September 1995).
R.MacLaren. “TwoSteps Forward, andNoSteps Back: Charting aNew Course forTrade And
Competition Policy. ”International Business Lawyer (November 1996).
G.Marceau. “TheFullPotential oftheEurope Agreements: Trade andCompetition Issues: The
Case ofPoland. ”19World Competition 35-69 (December 1995).
S.Martin. “Non-Cooperative Agreement onCompetition Policy Institutions foranIntegrating World
Economy. ”International Business Lawyer (November 1996).
M.Matsushita. “Competition LawandPolicy intheContext oftheWTO System. ”44DePaul Law
Review 1097 (Summer 1995).
A.Mattoo andP.Mavroidis. “TheEC-Japan Consensus onCars: Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy. ”18World Economy 345-65 (May 1995).
P.A.Messerlin.“CompetitionPolicyandAntidumpingReform:AnExerciseinTransition.”Forthcoming
inTheWorld Trading System: Challenges Ahead ,edited byJ.Schott, Institute forInternational
Economics.
P.A.Messerlin. “Should Antidumping Rules beReplaced byNational orInternational Competition
Rules? ”18World Competition 37-54 (March 1995).
P.A.Messerlin. “Politiques Commerciale etdelaConcurrence. ”46Revue Economique 717-26 (May
1995).
G.Monti. “When Does Dumping Cause Injury? ”18World Competition 97-114 (March 1995).
D.J.Montpelier. “Diamonds areForever? Implications ofUnited States Antitrust Statutes on
International Trade andtheDeBeers Diamond Cartel. ”24California W.International LawJournal
277(Spring 1994).
C.Morgan. “Competition Policy andAnti-Dumping: IsitTime foraReality Check? ”30Journal of
World Trade (October 1996).
E.M.Morke andKenneth Kelly. “Perspectives ontheEffects ofUnfair Imports onDomestic
Industries. ”61University ofCincinnati LawReview 919-944 (1993).
J.R.Morris. “International Trade andAntitrust: Comments. ”61University ofCincinnati LawReview
945-953 (1993).
S.Nagaoka. “Antidumping Policy andCompetition. ”InC.R.Fritschtak, Regulatory Policies and
Reform: AComparative Perspective (World Bank 1996).
S.Nagaoka, A.Goto. “Vertical Restraints andMarket Access. ”International Business Lawyer
(November 1996).
P.Nicolaides andR.vanWijngaarden. “Reform ofAnti-Dumping Regulations: TheCaseoftheEC.”
27Journal ofWorld Trade 31-53 (June 1993).WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page54
P.Nicolaides. “Towards Multilateral Rules onCompetition: TheProblems inMutual Recognition
ofNational Rules. ”17World Competition 5-48(March 1994).
P.Nicolaides. “ForaWorld Competition Authority: TheRoleofCompetition Policy inEconomic
Integration andtheRoleofRegional Blocs inInternationalizing Competition Policy. ”30Journal of
World Trade 131-145 (August 1996).
OECD. “Interim Report onConvergence ofCompetition Policies. ”18World Competition 167-183
(September 1994).
OECD. “Trade andCompetition Policies. Joint Report bytheCommittee onCompetition Lawand
Policy andtheTrade Committee. ”18World Competition 185-191 (September 1994).
Y.Ohara. “TheNewU.S.Policy ontheExtraterritorial Application ofAntitrust Laws, andJapan's
Response. ”17World Competition 49-54 (March 1994).
G.Orcalli. “Dumping, antidumping epolitica dellaconcorrenza. ”49(1) Economia internazionale 41-76
(February 1996).
J.A.Ordover. “Competition Policies forHigh-Technology Industries. ”International Business Lawyer
(November 1996).
D.Palmeter andG.J.Spak. “Resolving Antidumping andCountervailing Duty Disputes: Defining
GATT 'sRoleinanEraofIncreasing Conflict. ”24LawandPolicy inInternational Business 1145-1156
(Summer 1993).
D.Palmeter. “Competition Policy and‘Unfair ’Trade: FirstDoNoHarm. ”49Aussenwirtschaft 417-22
(September 1994).
A.Pangratis andE.Vermulst. “Injury inAnti-Dumping Proceedings: TheNeed toLook Beyond
theUruguay Round Results. ”28Journal ofWorld Trade 61-96 (October 1994).
E.U.Petersmann. “Proposals forNegotiating International Competition Rules fortheGATT-WTO
World Trade andLegal System. ”49Aussenwirtschaft 231-77 (September 1994).
E.U.Petersmann. “International Competition Rules forGovernments andforPrivate Business: The
CaseforLinking Future WTO Negotiations onInvestment, Competition andEnvironmental Rules to
Reforms ofAnti-Dumping Laws. ”30Journal ofWorld Trade 5-35(June 1996).
R.E.Price. “Foreign Blocking Statutes andtheGATT: State Sovereignty andtheEnforcement of
U.S.Economic Laws Abroad. ”28George Washington Journal ofInternational LawandEconomics
315-343 (Spring 1995).
T.Prusa. “TheTrade Effects ofU.S.Antidumping Actions. ”NBER Working Paper 5440 (January
1996).
J.H.Reichman. “Beyond theHistorical Lines ofDemarcation: Competition Law,Intellectual Property
Rights,andInternationalTradeAftertheGATT'sUruguayRound.”20BrooklynJournalofInternational
Law75-119 (1993).WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page55
T.M.Reif. “Coming ofAgeinGeneva: Guiding theGATT Dispute Settlement System onReview
ofAntidumping andCountervailing Duty Proceedings. ”24LawandPolicy inInternational Business
1185-1199 (Summer 1993).
J.D.Richards.“JapanFairTradeCommissionGuidelinesConcerningDistributionSystemsandBusiness
Practices: AnIllustration ofWhyAntitrust LawisaWeak Solution toUSTrade Problems WithJapan. ”
Wisconsin LawReview 921-960 (May-June 1993).
J.F.Rill“Competition Policy: AForce forOpen Markets. ”61Antitrust LawJournal 637-650 (Winter
1993).
J.F.Rill“AUSandCanadian Perspective onInternational Antitrust Enforcement. ”23International
Business Law495(November 1995).
D.E.Rosenthal andM.Matshushita. “Competition inJapan andtheWest: CantheApproaches be
Reconciled? ”19World Competition 5-27(March 1996).
W.J.Rowley.“GlobalWelfare:CompetitionPolicyandMarketAccess.”InternationalBusinessLawyer
(November 1996).
T.J.Schoenbaum. “TheInternational Trade Laws andtheNew Protectionism: TheNeed fora
Synthesis withAntitrust. ”19North Carolina Journal ofInternational LawandCommercial Regulation
393-436 (Summer 1994).
T.J.Schoenbaum. “TheTheory ofContestable Markets inInternational Trade: ARationale for
"Justifiable"UnilateralismtoCombatRestrictiveBusinessPractices?”30JournalofWorldTrade161-190
(June 1996).
A.Y.Seita. “U.S.-Japan Antitrust Cooperation. ”23LawandPolicy inInternational Business 1081-
1087 (Summer 1993).
A.Y.Seita, andJ.Tamura. “TheHistorical Background ofJapan’sAntimonopoly Law.”University
ofIllinois LawReview 115(1994).
F.Souty. “LesSources Théoriques delaPensée Economique Antitrust auxEtats Unis: LesEnjeux
Nationaux etMondiaux delaPolitique delaConcurrence. ”79Revue (May-June 1994).
F.Souty. “LaScience Economique etl’Action àlaFinduXXSiecle. ”Analyses delaS.E.D.E.I.S
(July 1994).
F.Souty. “Mutation Industrielle etPolitique delaConcurrence auJapon. ”Chroniques Economiques
(15May1995).
F.Souty. “Mondialisation Economique etPolitique delaConcurrence. ”Chroniques Economiques
(15October 1995).
F.Souty. “Lathéorie del’Effet: lesentreprises despaystiersetlerespect desrègles deconcurrence
surlemarché européen. ”65Revue delaconcurrence, Droits emarchés 6-12(Jan/Fev1992).
R.B.Starek,III.“InternationalAspectsofAntitrustEnforcement.”19WorldCompetition29-42(March
1996).WT/WGTCP/W/21
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C.Stark. “Antitrust intheInternational Business Environment. ”27NewYorkUniversity Journal of
International LawandPolitics 659-666 (Spring 1995).
B.Stern. “Desimples commentaires àuneaction commune: lanaissance d’unepolitique juridique
communautaire enmatière d’extraterritorialité. ”2Revue Europe 8-9(1Fev.1997).
T.P.Stewart, T.C.Brightbill. “Some Heretical Observations ontheInteraction ofUSTrade and
Competition Laws. ”4United States-Mexico LawJournal 35-48 (1996).
Symposium: “Intellectual Property andCompetition Law: Changing Views intheEuropean Community
andtheUnited States ofAmerica. ”20Brooklyn Journal ofInternational Law1-168 (1993).
J.Tamura. “U.S.Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust LawtoJapanese Keiretsu. ”25NewYork
University Journal ofInternational LawandPolitics 385(Winter 1993).
M.J.Trebilcock. “Competition Policy andTrade Policy: Mediating theInterface. ”30Journal of
World Trade 71-106 (August 1996).
USITC. “TheEconomic Effects ofAntidumping andCountervailing Duty Orders andSuspension
Agreements. ”Washington, D.C.(1995)
E.A.Vermulst. “AEuropean Practitioner 'sView oftheGATT System: Should Competition Law
Violations Distorting International Trade BeSubject toGATT Panels? ”16World Competition 5-25
(March 1993) and27Journal ofWorld Trade 55-74 (April 1993).
P.Waer andE.Vermulst. “ECAnti-Dumping LawandPractice aftertheUruguay Round: ANew
Lease ofLife?”28Journal ofWorld Trade 5-21(April 1994).
S.W.Waller. “Neo-Realism andtheInternational Harmonization ofLaw: Lessons from Antitrust. ”
42Kansas LawReview 557(Spring 1994).
S.W.Waller.“AntitrustandAmericanBusinessAbroadToday.”44DePaulLawReview1251(Summer
1995).
M.Weidenbaum. “Antitrust Policy fortheGlobal Market-Place. ”28Journal ofWorld Trade 27-31
(February 1994).
D.Wood. “United States Antitrust LawintheGlobal Market. ”1Indiana Journal ofGlobal Legal
Studies 409(Spring 1994).
D.Wood. “Unfair Trade Injury: ACompetition-Based Approach. ”41Stanford LawReview 1153-1200.
D.Wood. “TheInternationalization ofAntitrust Law: Options fortheFuture. ”44DePaul LawReview
1289-1299 (Summer 1995).
D.Wood.“WhenisMarketAccessReally‘MarketAccess’?”InternationalBusinessLawyer(November
1996).
N.Yacheistova. “TheInternational Competition Regulation: AShort Review ofaLong Evolution. ”
18World Competition 99-110 (September 1994).WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page57
ANNEX VII
OECD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REGARDING COMPETITION 1990 -1997
Setforthbelow arethemajor technical assistance projects conducted bytheOECD inthearea
ofcompetition policy since 1990. Some ofthese projects weredonejointly withtheWorld Bank and
many weredonewiththeassistance ofnational competition authorities, inparticular thecompetition
authorities ofAustralia, Canada, theEuropean Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New
Zealand, Sweden, theUnited Kingdom andtheUnited States. Thelistalsoincludes projects scheduled
fortherestof1997.
I. Major Conferences
28June-1 July1994 -(incollaboration withtheWorld Bank )Conference onNetwork
Industructure Industries (Electricity, Natural Gas,Railways, andTelecommunications) -attended by
competitionandregulatorypolicyofficialsfromBelarus,Bulgaria,Estonia,Latvia,Lithuania,Kazakstan,
Romania, Russia, Slovenia andUkraine.
9-12May1995-Competition andRegulation inNetwork Infrastructure Industries -attended
bycompetition officials andregulators fromCzech Republic, Hungary, Poland andSlovak Republic;
assisted bytheWorld Bank andtheEuropean Bank forReconstruction andDevelopment.
26-28 September 1995 -(jointly sponsored andprincipally organized bytheRussian
Antimonopoly Committee) International Conference onCompetition Policy inTransition Economies -
attended bycompetition officials from avariety ofcountries (particularly those ofEastern Europe
andtheCIS), representatives ofseveral international organisations, scholars, consultants andlaw
practitioners from Moscow firms andorganisations, andalarge number ofRussian Antimonpoly
Committee staffmembers from allparts ofRussia.
II. Seminars
Belarus
22-26 November 1993-Introduction totheLawandEconomics ofCompetition Policy -attended
bystaffoftheAntimonoply Committee.
Bulgaria
12-16 October 1992-Introduction toMicro Economics andAntitrust LawandPolicy -attended
primarily bystaffoftheCommission fortheProtection ofCompetition.
Czech Republic
3-7May1993-IntroductiontotheLawandEconomicsofCompetitionPolicy-attendedprimarily
bystaffoftheMinistry ofEconomic Competition.
Hungary
1-3April 1996 -Economic Issues Involved inAdjudicating Hungarian Competition Cases -
attended byjudges oftheSupreme Court andMetropolitan Court, andstaffoftheOffice ofEconomic
Competition.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page58
Kazakstan
26-30 October 1992-Introduction toMicro Economics andAntitrust LawandPolicy -attended
primarily bystaffoftheAntimonopoly Committee.
15-19 July1996 -Effective Competition Policy Enforcement (using casestudies) -attended
bycompetition enforcement officials primarily fromKazakstan butwithsubstantial representation as
wellfrom Kyrgyzstan.
Poland
23-26November1992-IntroductiontoMicroEconomicsandAntitrustLawandPolicy-attended
primarily bystaffoftheAntimonopoly Office.
11-13 December 1995-Economic Issues Involved inAdjudicating Polish Competition Cases -
attended byjudges oftheAntimonopoly Court andSupreme Administrative Court, andstaffofthe
Ministry ofJustice, Ombudsman Office, Antimonopoly Office; observed bytwoofficials oftheRussian
Supreme Arbitrazh Court.
Romania
2-6September 1991-Introduction toMicro Economics andAntitrust LawandPolicy -attended
bystaffoftheMinistry ofEconomy andFinance, Counsel forReform andother government officials
interested incompetition policy.
Russia
17-21 February 1992-Introduction toMicro Economics andAntitrust LawandPolicy -attended
bystaffoftheAntimonopoly Committee.
13-17 December 1993 -Topics inCompetition Policy -attended primarily bystaffofthe
Antimonopoly Committee butwithsome representation from other CIScountries.
December 1994-Topics inCompetition Policy -attended primarily bystaffoftheAntimonopoly
Committee butwithsome representation from other CIScountries.
Summer 1995 -(incollaboration withtheWorld Bank) missions toIrkutsk andNovosibirsk
todiscuss competition policy implementation withregional Antimonopoly Committee staff.
2-6December 1995 -Topics inCompetition Policy -attended primarily bystaffofthe
Antimonopoly Committee butwithsome representation from other CIScountries.
6-9May1996-Economic Issues Involved inAdjudicating Russian Competition Cases -attended
byjudges from theArbitrazh Court andofficials oftheAntimonopoly Committee.
18-20November1996-ImplementationofCompetitionLawintheRussianFederation-attended
byjudges oftheArbitrazh Court andofficials oftheAntimonopoly Committee.
2-6December 1996 -Topics inCompetition Policy -attended primarily bystaffofthe
AntimonopolyCommitteebutwithrepresentationaswellfrom:Azerbaijan,Belarus,Georgia,Kazakstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tadjikistan, Ukraine andUzbekistan.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page59
10-12 November 1997 -Implementation ofCompetition LawintheRussian
Federation
1-5December 1997 -Topics inCompetition Policy
Slovak Republic
19-23 April 1993 -Introduction totheLawandEconomics ofCompetition Policy -attended
bystaffoftheAntimonopoly Office.
28-30 October 1996-Economic Issues Involved inAdjudicating Slovak Republic Competition
Cases -attended byjudges oftheSupreme Court andstaffoftheAntimonopoly Office, including its
Commission.
Ukraine
10-14 January 1994-Introduction totheLawandEconomics ofCompetition Policy -attended
bystaffoftheAntimonopoly Committee.
2-6October 1995 -Effective Competition Policy Enforcement -attended bystaffofthe
Antimonopoly Committee.
24-28 June 1996 -Effective Competition Policy Enforcement -attended bystaffofthe
Antimonopoly Committee.
23-27 June 1997 -Effective Competition Policy Enforcement -attended bystaffofthe
Antimonopoly Committee.
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland andSlovak Republic
7May1992 -advised theCzech andSlovak Republic competition offices onprinciples and
guidelines forthecontrol ofnatural monopolies.
20-22 November 1995-Seminar onVertical Restraints -attended bycompetition officials from
thefourcountries.
Seminars attheJoint Vienna Institute
- Topics inCompetition Policy -these twoweek seminars have typically involved
delegates fromthecompetition offices ofBulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine, and,
lessfrequently Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan
andUzbekistan;
- theseminars arefocused onrealcompetition cases submitted bytheparticipating
countries;
- except forthefirstyear(when three shorter seminars were presented) theseminars
havebeenheldannually inVienna since 1992.WT/WGTCP/W/21
Page60
Seminars attheOECD 'sCentre forPrivate Sector Development (Istanbul)
11-15 July1994 -WhyisaCompetition LawNecessary andHow toFacilitate Adoption of
SuchaLawandtheCreation ofanEnforcement Agency -attended byhighlevelgovernment officials
from: Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia andUzbekistan.
26-30 June1995-Effective Competition LawEnforcement -attended bycompetition officials
from: Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Turkmenistan
andUzbekistan.
28-31 May 1996 -Merger Enforcement Issues -attended bycompetition officials from:
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia andUkraine.
8-11October 1996-Effective Competition LawEnforcement -attended bycompetition officials
from: Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan.
1-4April 1997 -Detecting, Investigating andProsecuting Cartels -attended bycompetition
officials from: Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Ukraine
andUzbekistan.
14-17 October 1997 -Deconcentration andDemonopolization.
4-7November 1997 -Institutional Aspects ofCompetition LawEnforcement.
Baltic RimEconomic Forum
10-13 June1997 -Competition Policy intheContext ofRegional Integration -attended by
competition officials ofEstonia, Latvia, Lithuania andSt.Petersburg.
Latin American Seminars
28-30 October 1996 -(organized inconjunction withtheGovernment ofArgentina andthe
World Bank) Emerging Market Economy Forum Workshop onCompetition Policy andEnforcement -
attendedbycompetitionofficialsfrom:Argentina,Brazil,Chile,Columbia,Peru,SouthAfrica,Uruguay
andVenezuela; withpanellists drawn fromtheOASandcompetition officials fromAustralia, Canada,
theEuropean Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Turkey,
andtheUnited States.
10-13 July1997 -(organized incooperation withtheWorld Bank, CADE -theBrazilian
competition agency -andIBRAC -aprivate economics institute) Competition Policy andEconomic
Reform (competition officials expected toattend from: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Rica, Peru, Uruguay
andVenezuela); panellists willbedrawn from competition agencies inCanada, theEuropean
Commission, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico andtheUnited States.
APEC region seminars
TheOECD hascontributed speakers andpanelists tovariety ofseminars oncompetition policy
intheAPEC region, including:
Chinese Taipei 1995 (PECC)WT/WGTCP/W/21
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NewZealand 1995 (APEC)
Philippines 1996 (APEC)
Korea 1996, 1997 (KFTC, KDI)
Thailand 1996 (APEC)
III. Advising onLaws, Commentaries andMethodologies
Belarus
1994 -commented oncompetition lawamendments.
Bulgaria
1992 -commented ondraftcompetition law.
Chile
1995 -commented oncompetition lawamendments.
Estonia
1993 -commented ondraftcompetition law.
Kazakstan
1992, 1995 and1996 -commented onamendments tocompetition law.
Lithuania
1992 -commented ondraftcompetition law.
1995 -commented ondraftamendments tocompetition law.
Malaysia
1995 -advised ondraftcompetition law.
Mexico
1992 -advised ondraftcompetition law.
Poland
1992 -commented ondraftcompetition law.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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Romania
28-31 July1992 -(incollaboration withtheWorld Bank) worked withgovernment officials
drafting aRomanian competition law(focused especially onprice control andneedforcompetition
office independence).
Russia
1990-1991-1992 -participated indrafting theRussian competition lawandthecommentary
tothebasic articles oftheadopted law.
1993-commented ondraftdemonopolization plan,natural monopolies lawandmethodologies
dealing withhorizontal agreements, market definition, andabuse ofdominance.
1994 -commented on:various methodologies anddraft merger guidelines; draft unfair
competition law;draftnatural monopolies law;amendments tothecompetition statute; draftmodel
competition lawforCIScountries.
1995-commented on:market power methodology; telecommunications restructuring plans;
draftstatute andPresidential Edict pertaining totheRussian Antimonopoly Committee; draftstatute
pertainingtotheterritorialadministrationoftheRussianAntimonopolyCommitee;draftstatutepertaining
totheregister ofeconomic subjects having market shares exceeding 35%.
1996-commented ondraftmethodologies concerning market definition andevaluating market
power andmerger review andoncommentaries relating tocartels; alsocomments onsomeCISInterstate
Council draftagreements oncooperation incompetition policy (including information sharing).
1997-commented ondraftlawonwholesale trading, draftcommentary tolawoncompetition,
anddraftmethodologies(abuseofdominance,actionsandagreementsofstateexecutivebodies,evaluation
oftheeffects ofrestrictive trademeasures oninternal competition, horizontal andvertical agreements,
andmerger review).
Slovak Republic
1993 -commented ondraftcompetition law.
Ukraine
20-24 September 1993-advised highlevelofficials working ontheadoption ofacompetition
law.
1997 -advised onamendments tothecompetition law.
IV. Other
Working jointly withtheWorld Bank on:arevised andup-dated Glossary ofthelegaland
economic terms fundamental tocompetition lawandpolicy (tobepublished in1997) -anearlier version
hasbeentranslated intoseveral languages including Russian andSpanish.
Working jointly withtheWorld Bank on:acompetition manual fortransition anddeveloping
countries (tobepublished in1997).WT/WGTCP/W/21
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1. Jointreports ontrade andcompetition weresubmitted bytheTrade andtheCLPCommittees
in1992, 1993 and1994.
2. C(95)130/FINAL.
3. Interim Report onConvergence ofCompetition Policies, OECD/GD(94)64.
4. Coverage ofCompetition Laws andPolicies, OECD, 1996 (forthcoming).
5. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Sweden, theUnited Kingdom,
theUnited States, theEuropean Union andHungary participated inthisstudy.
6. Exceptions tocoverage, which varied bycountry, were found inawide range ofsectors,
including labour/employment-related activities, agriculture, fishing, forestry, horticultural products,
energy, utilities, postal services, transport communications, defence, financial services, insurance,
securities, media, publishing, cosmetics, medicaments, pharmaceuticals, natural resources, spirits and
sports.
7. Amerger caseproved thatanational competition office could effectively enforce itslawagainst
aninternationalmergerwhichwouldhavehadanticompetitiveconsequencesforpurchasersoftheproduct
inmany countries, eventhough thenearmonopoly which would havebeencreated would havemeant
rents forthedomestic firmattheexpense offoreign purchasers.
Acaseinvolving dominant firmpractices showed thatanational competition office could
discipline thedistribution practices ofalocally dominant domestic supplier, eliminating arebate system
which acted asabarrier toentry intothedomestic market. Here, theimmediate beneficiaries ofthe
action were foreign suppliers anddomestic consumers, attheexpense oftheprofits ofthedomestic
dominant firm.
8. Forexample, whether rebate practices cause anticompetitive effects, forexample, depends
heavily onthemarket power ofthefirms employing them.
9. Inonecase,privately prepared product standards wereshown tooperate asabarrier tomarket
access. Inthiscase, thecompetition agency began tosupervise theactivity ofastandards body
composed ofdomestic firms inorder toensure thatproducts byforeign firms werenotunfairly denied
standards approval. Thisbothincreased competition andlowered abarrier tomarket access.
10. Inthiscase, equipment buying practices bynational monopoly service suppliers wereshown
nottoviolate competition law,thesolution tothetrade friction laying instead intheelimination of
thedownstream monopoly through regulatory reform.
11. OECD/GD(93)101, Paragraph 1.Both Committees alsoagreed that"thequestion ofthe
desirabilityandfeasibilityofintegratingcompetitionrulesintoamultilateralframeworkwillbeexplored".
Idem, Paragraph 23.WT/WGTCP/W/21
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12. Paragraph 10oftheCommunique C(93)87 adopted bytheOECD Council atits806th Session
on3June1993.13. OECD/GD(93)101, Paragraph 23.
14. Idem.