WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/M/138 
29 November 2004 
 (04-5182) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
11 and 13 October 2004  
 
 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
NORWAY 
 
Minutes of Meeting  
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Mrs. Puangrat Asavapisit (Thailand) 
 
 
Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 3  
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY  4  
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 9  
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 11  
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY AND ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS  19  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 24  
 
 
Note:   Advance written questions by WTO Memb ers and the replies provided by Norway are 
reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/138/Ad d.1 and will be available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tr atop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm. WT/TPR/M/138 
 Page 3 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
1. The fourth Trade Policy Review of Norw ay was held on 11 and 13 October 2004  The 
Chairperson (H.E. Mrs. Puangrat Asavapisit) we lcomed the delegation of Norway, headed by 
Mr. Harald Neple, and the discussant Mr. Alexande r Gross (Germany).  As usual, the discussant 
would speak in his personal capacity and, in accordance with established procedures, had made 
available in advance a broad outline of the them es he intended to raise (document WT/TPR/D/113). 
2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trad e Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures of the meeting.  The Report by th e Government of Norway was contained in document 
WT/TPR/G/138 and that of the Secretariat in doc ument WT/TPR/S/138.  Copies of advance written 
questions, submitted by:  Canada;  Japan;  Hong K ong, China; the United States;  New Zealand;  
Switzerland;  Australia;  the European Communities;  the Republic of Korea;  Indonesia;  Turkey;  
and Brazil had been transmitted to the delegati on of Norway.  These questions and the replies 
provided by the delegation of Norway are reproduced in WT/TPR/M/138/Add.1.  
3. The Chairperson stated that the documentation prepared for the Review illustrated Norway's 
good macroeconomic performance since its last TPR .  Both the Secretariat and the Government 
Report highlighted Norway's commitment to trade liberalization  through multilateral, regional, 
bilateral, and unilateral initiatives.  Norway had improved access to its already generally open market, 
with some 94% of non-agricultural tariff lines (84% of all lines) now carrying the zero rate.  Nevertheless, tariffs on agricultura l goods remained high, and were compounded by a complex system 
of domestic support and internal taxes on the prod ucts.  These policies contrasted with Norway's 
generosity as an important donor for WTO technical  assistance activities in favour of developing 
countries with key interest in agriculture. WT/TPR/M/138 
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II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY 
4. The representative of Norway
 thanked the Chairperson, the S ecretariat, the discussant, and the 
delegations that had raised advan ce written questions and comments.  This TPR was a useful exercise 
and an excellent opportunity to understa nd Norway's trade related policies.   
(i) Norway's trade and economy 
5. The Norwegian economy was highly dependent on international trade, which accounted for 
over 75% of its GDP.  Norway's trade and economic  policies were designed to promote sustainable 
economic growth and to secure an equitable distri bution of trade and economic growth benefits.  
Norway's economy was one of the most open in the world;  with largely no tariffs for industrial 
products, and liberal access for foreign service provi ders this benefited Norway and its trading 
partners.  Due to a limited domestic market, Norwegian companies needed to participate in 
international markets to benefit from comparative advantages and economies of scale.  Norway's open 
economy exposed its producers to an increasingly globalized environment.  Thus, a Government 
priority was to ensure that the business envir onment remained competitive and conducive to 
innovation, investment, and growth.  Agricultura l production was disadvantaged by geographic and 
climatic reasons;  high levels of  support and protection were therefor e required to safeguard non-trade 
concerns, such as food security, agricultural landscapes, and viable rural communities.   
6. Economic diversity came from a nd was dependent on natural resources.  Norway was the 
world's third largest oil exporter and the petroleu m sector (oil and gas) accounted for 45% of total 
export revenues.  Fish and fish products accounted  for around 5%;  commodities, such as machinery, 
ships, metals, chemicals, pulp, and paper, for 25%, and the services sector another 25% (half from 
international shipping).  Trade with the EC – Norw ay's main trading partner – had fallen since 2000.  
In 2003, 76% of total Norway's exports went to the EC-15, 13% to North America, and 6% to developing countries (mainly in Asia).  Norway 's imports came from the EC-15 (67%), North 
America (8%), and developing countries – mainly in Asia (13%).  Norway's trade and foreign policies 
were closely linked, and Norway attached great im portance to integrating developing countries into 
the world economy.  
7. Growth rates had picked up since 2003, and ma inland GDP was expected to increase by over 
3% in 2004 and 2005.  Growth was driven by privat e consumption, fuelled by low interest rates and 
high real wage growth.  Inflation had been we ll below its 2.5% target, and unemployment had 
decreased moderately to 3.7% and was likely to furt her decline.  Over the last few years, the general 
Government balance had shown a surplus of 8% to 10%  of GDP due to the petroleum sector revenues.  
The Government's net assets were estimated to be NKr 1,360 billion (81% of GDP) by the end of 
2004.  
8. Net revenues from the petroleum sector were tr ansferred to the Petroleum Fund (PF), which 
was the Government's instrument for transferring wealth from oil and gas reserves to a broad-based 
portfolio of international securities.  It was ai med at buffering fluctuating revenues from the sector, 
and helping to maintain a fair distribution of wea lth across generations.  The PF made the use of oil 
revenues more transparent, and might help to address the situation of an increasingly ageing population and decreasing petroleum revenues.  Projected expenses to pensions would increase from 10% of mainland GDP in 2004 to 20% in 2050, and petroleum sector revenues were expected to fall 
from 17% to 1% during the same period.   
9. To further improve the present high standard of  living, reforms in the National Insurance 
scheme (proposals were being discussed) and c ontinued productivity growth, through further 
liberalization efforts, remained essential.  WT/TPR/M/138 
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(ii) Legal and institutional framework 
10. In recent years, important structural reforms had been implemented to improve market 
efficiency through increased competition, and to e nhance user-orientation and efficiency in the 
production of public services.  Competition had been  enhanced through market liberalization and 
modernization of the regulatory framework.  Priva tization had been pursued gradually.  Cooperation 
within the European Economic Area (EEA) agre ement had promoted reviews and reforms of a 
number of regulations.  The new Competition Ac t, which entered into force on 1 May 2004 
introduced, inter alia , tighter rules on abuse of dominant pos ition and agreements that restricted or 
distorted competition, and a general obliga tion to report mergers and acquisitions. 
11. Although the State still participated exte nsively in the business sector, significant 
privatization had taken place since 2000, particularly in telecommunications, energy, and 
manufacturing.  The Government's policy was to priv atize when there was no valid reason to maintain 
an enterprise in the public sector while main taining share values and contributing to positive 
developments for the enterprises.  Decisions to pr ivatize were thus taken on a case-by-case basis.  
Since 2000, structural and legislative reforms had been undertaken to ensu re a strict separation 
between the management of ownership interest s and the Government's roles of policymaker, 
regulator, and enforcer.  Rules on corporate governan ce had been declared to ensure that the State 
would not abuse dominant ownership.  Equal treatme nt of all shareholders, transparency in state 
ownership, and decisions to be taken in the shar eholders' general assembly  were thus important.  
Government officials did not take seats on the board of directors;  directors were independent and 
selected for their competence.  Th e Government's efforts and practice had been well recognized by the 
international investment community.   
12. In March 2004, a white paper on tax reform pr oposed to cut taxes by NKr 12 billion over the 
period 2005-07;  the main objectives were to achi eve a fairer taxation of labour income and to 
stimulate labour force participation.  The proposal s  also included reducing tax on labour income and 
taxing dividends and capital gains exceeding a risk -free return on the personal shareholder's hand.  
13. Norway was finalizing new customs legislation aimed at increasing transparency and 
availability to the economic operators as well as th e general public, and creating a robust and better 
designed legal framework for jurisprudence and interp retation by national courts.  This act would be 
the legal basis for measures taken under the Dis pute Settlement Understanding regarding trade in 
goods, and would be notified to the WTO. 
(iii) Main features of Norway's trade policy  
14. An open economy, based on liberal trade policy, helped economic growth and adaptability in 
an increasingly globalized economy.  However, Norway remained committed to a domestic and global policy of sustainable development to ensu re that trade and environmental policies were 
mutually supportive.  Norway pursued multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO;  regional 
liberalization through the EEA with its EFTA/EEA partners and the EU;  and bilateral free-trade 
agreements in cooperation with its EFTA partners.  Norway had also unilaterally liberalized trade in 
goods and services to harvest the economic benefits of  such measures.  Norway's tariff system and 
administrative procedures for import had been computerized and simplified over the last few years. 
(a) WTO 15. Norway was an original WTO Member and re mained strongly committed to the multilateral 
trading system.  A strong, rule-based system wa s the best guarantee against unilateralism and 
protectionism, and provided stability, security, transparency, and pr edictability for traders.  Norway 
believed that a stronger multilateral trading sy stem and improved market access for goods and 
services would benefit all Members.  Economic growth  and development in all nations – particularly WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 6  
 
in developing countries – depended on a strong an d fair multilateral trading system.  Norway was 
therefore strongly committed to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). 
16. In the Doha negotiations, Norway was looking  for substantial market access improvements 
for industrial goods (including fish and fish products) with the long-term goal of abolishing tariffs.  
Improving market access meant tightening rules for imposing anti-dumping measures, which were 
increasingly being abused to restrict trade.  Member s needed to ensure that only genuine anti-dumping 
cases were initiated, that they made a fair and correct assessment of dum ping and injury, and the 
causal link between the two, and that anti-dum ping measures were term inated when no longer 
justified.  Norway believed that the liberalizati on of services directly related to trade and economic 
activity infrastructures (for instance, transport, te lecommunication, computer and computer-related, 
financial, and energy services) was particular ly important.  Norway remained committed to 
substantial market access improvements in agricultu re, taking into account non-trade concerns, such 
as environmental benefits, long-te rm food production to ensure food security, and viability of rural 
communities.  
(b) Norwegian trade policy towards developing countries 
17. Norway's trade policy towards developing countries played a central role in the formulation of 
its foreign and development coopera tion policies.  Norway would continue to promote improvements 
to the multilateral trading system and encourage greater integration of developing countries, especially LDCs, by improved market access, trans itional arrangements, and technical and financial 
support.  Norway had unilaterally promoted trade with developing countries by improving its GSP.  To this end, it had abolished ta riffs and quotas on all products from LDCs on 1 July 2002.  Although a 
special safeguard mechanism remained for certa in agricultural products, safeguard measures had 
never been invoked.  The 2005 budget proposal incl uded tariff reductions on cer tain textile products 
by including them in the GSP-system.  From 1 January 2001, Norway had abolished its three 
remaining quantitative restrictions on textiles and cl othing.  Norway had been one of the biggest 
voluntary contributors (Sw F 8.7 million) to WTO technical assistance activities since 1995, and was 
a major sponsor of the Legal Advisory Centre on WTO Law. 
(c) EEA 
18. The EEA agreement extended the 25 EC members internal market to Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein.  The agreement, which accounted for tw o thirds of Norway's foreign trade, covered free 
movement of goods, persons, capital, and services, in cluding applicable rules in areas that affected the 
internal market.  However, it did not include the EC common agricultural and fisheries policies, but 
contained provisions on various aspects of trade in agricultural and fish products, such as rules on 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  As the EEA  agreement was not a customs union, trade policy 
towards third countries was not included.  Its co mmon rules were continuously updated by adding 
new EC legislation;  over 4,000 EC lega l acts had been incorporated since 1994. 
(d) Free-trade agreements 
19. Norway participated in 13 free-trade agreem ents (FTAs) within the EFTA framework;  
several agreements were under negotiation.  FTAs were initially aimed at regional economic 
integration, but had been extended to Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.  FTAs had 
traditionally covered trade of industrial (including  fish and fish products) and processed agricultural 
products;  each EFTA member had also concluded b ilateral agricultural protocols with each of the 
third country partners.  The FTAs had been expanded to incorporat e trade in services, provisions on 
competition, state aid, protection of intellectual property, investments, and public procurement.  
Regional trade arrangements and FTAs complemented but could never replace the need for a strong, 
rules-based multilateral trade regime.   WT/TPR/M/138 
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(iv) Sectoral and specific topics  
(a) Agriculture  
20. Arable land represented only 3% of Norway's tota l area;  the arctic and sub-arctic conditions 
were characterised by a harsh climate, low temperatures, and a short growing season.  Agricultural production covered a narrow range of  products that was protected by tariffs, and a wide range of 
agricultural products was imported duty free.  Maintain ing a viable agriculture sector enjoyed a broad 
political support in the country.  Norway's agricu ltural policy took into account non-trade concerns, 
such as long-term food security, viability of rura l areas, cultural heritage, land conservation, and 
maintenance of agricultural landscapes and agri -biological diversity.  Agriculture was highly 
protected because of its high costs and ambitious  goals in respect of its multifunctional role. 
21. Since the early 1990s, significant reforms had b een made in the agricultural policy and in 
making agriculture more market-oriented.  Budgeta ry subsidies to farmers had shifted from price 
support (down from 30% in 1990 to 16% in 2002) to  support with less impact on production.  From 
1995 to 2003, the number of farms had decreased by 30% and the average farm size had increased by 
40%.  Further structural adjustment to save produc tion costs had been encouraged, but, in terms of 
large-scale production, was limited by natural condi tions;  in addition, there was a balance between 
structural adjustment and the need  to safeguard non-trade concerns.  
22. The high tariff levels applied reflected agri cultural domestic production cost and resulted 
from the Uruguay Round tariffication process.  Tariffs  applied to less sensitive products were zero 
duty or at a very low level.  One of Norway's  main priorities in the ongoing negotiations was 
continued tariff protection for its sensitive produc ts.  Referring the calculation in the Secretariat 
Report of an ad valorem equivalent of 2,356% on meat offal, the representative noted that the AVE 
calculations were based on the quantity and value of  imports in a limited period of time, and this 
specific calculation was based on imports that entered at zero duty.  The few kilos of imports subject to the applied tariff rate would constitute an AVE of  about 100%.  The representative also referred to 
the higher consumer prices in Norway which, accord ing to the Secretariat Report, resulted from high 
border protection;  he said that general cost level n eeded to be taken into account.  In addition, high 
costs in agricultural production resulted from geogra phic, topographic, and climatic conditions, and 
political priorities.  Some points raised by the S ecretariat and some Members belonged  to the ongoing 
negotiations.  Members followed different, but equall y legitimate, policies.  Norway's measures were 
fully consistent with its WTO obligations, and it would fully implement the Doha Round outcome. 
(b) Fish and aquaculture  
23. Norway's natural conditions made the fishing industry important.  Norway followed a strict 
policy that limited catches.  It did not subsidize its fishing industry, except for certain decommissioning programmes to reduce capacity.  The fjords offered excellent conditions for 
aquaculture, and technological development had in creased the quality, quantity, and variety of 
seafood produced.  Over 150 countries were impor ting Norwegian seafood, and the growth potential 
could be realized only through further trade liberaliz ation in fish and fish products, WTO limitations 
on fisheries subsidies, and strict er disciplines for anti-dumping measures, which had hit this industry 
hard repeatedly and unjustifiably.  
(v) Summary   
24. Norway's economy was in a very sound shape.  Due to its small domestic market, Norway 
depended highly on trade and internationalization.  Access to international markets was of utmost 
importance to achieve employment and welfare goals .  Norway had an open, market-based economy.  
Important recent structural reforms included:  deregulating markets, increasing international 
competitiveness, and reducing support to business and i ndustry.  Norway's agriculture sector had also WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 8  
 
undergone significant changes.  However, maintain ing agricultural production all over Norway 
remained a key concern, due to its multifunctional role.  The Government attached great importance 
to domestic and global sustainable development.  Norway believed that all Members stood to gain 
significantly from strengthening the multilateral trading system and improving market access for goods and services.  Economic growth and developmen t in all nations – in particular developing 
countries – depended on a strong and fair multilateral trading system.  Norway was therefore strongly 
committed to the Doha negotiations.   WT/TPR/M/138 
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III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 
25. The discussant  complimented the Secretariat for its comprehensive and detailed report, and 
Norway for its very positive economic performance, on an already very high level, over the last years.   
26. Norway not only had one of the world's highest GDP levels per capita but had also achieved 
economic growth over the last years that exceeded  the EC average.  Extremely low unemployment 
was coupled with a very high labour participation ra te.  The trade and investment regime was very 
open, with the important exception of agriculture.  Norway was clearly committed to multilateralism 
and participated actively and constructively in th e WTO works.  It was among the leading countries 
for direct aid.  This positive background was importa nt when discussing the more difficult aspects of 
Norway's economic and trade policies.   
27. The discussant stated that discussions on Norway centred on three core issues.  The first one 
was oil.  Norway was the world's third largest o il exporter.  Oil accounted for almost 20% of GDP, 
60% of exports, but only slightly above 1% of empl oyment.  This low employment share showed that, 
already, and even more in the fu ture when income from oil resour ces diminished, living standard in 
Norway would rely mainly on increased productivit y and employment in the non-oil private sector.  
Second, the Government played a strong role in the economy especially through the high level of 
public ownership.  The third issue was the obvious gap between a very liberal  regime for industrial 
goods and a high degree of protection for the agriculture sector.   
28. These three issues were strongly interrelated, and it would be difficult and misleading to 
discuss trade issues without regard to the general economic development.  It was the "policy mix" 
with regard to all three core issues that de termined productivity and competitiveness of the overall 
economy, and a high degree of competitiveness made it easier to maintain or pursue an open-trade 
policy.   
(i) Macroeconomic development 
29. Norway, like other European countries, show ed modest performance in 2003.  Growth 
reached 0.4% but was expected to be stronger (around  3%) in 2004.  That could be explained because 
private investment had been declining over the last  years, and private consumption, which seemed to 
be the major driving force, had not been driven by an increase in employment but seemed to have 
been fuelled by strong wage increase s that led to a considerable rise in unit labour costs and a decline 
in competitiveness, especially in the internati onally exposed non-oil business sector.  Economic 
growth was then paid for by a loss in competitiven ess.  Wage moderation had already kicked in and 
started, and the situation was improving.  The di scussant asked whether it was possible for investment 
and trade to take over, and for growth and dynamics  to be maintained at the level already reached.  
30. Over the last years, there had been large swi ngs in krone-euro exchange  rate (around 20% up 
and down).  Since almost 80% of Norway's exports  went to the EU, this would probably have an 
impact on Norway's competitiveness and trade perfo rmance.  However, since 2001, the monetary 
policy had been aimed at stabilizing the inflation ra te at 2.5% and, consequently, had not stabilized 
the exchange rate, which seemed sensible for a small open economy, like Norway.  If greater 
exchange rate stability was desirable to preserve  competitiveness and price stability, and monetary 
policy was not an available tool, the discussant wo ndered whether stronger m onetary integration in 
the European context would provide a solution.  He was aware that this was a highly political 
question, nevertheless he was looking forward to No rway's remarks from an economic point of view. 
31. In the mid-1990s, Norway decided to set aside fiscal income from oil in a State Petroleum 
Fund as a reserve for future expenditures and to gua rantee inter-generational fairness.  In 2001, new 
fiscal guidelines were introduced to use only the long -term income stream from oil-wealth (estimated 
at 4% of the Fund per year) to finance budgetary  purposes.  However, over the past two years WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 10  
 
spending pressure had been high and it had been impo ssible to adhere to this rule.  While the overall 
general budget showed a 12% surplus of GDP, the st ructural non-oil deficit rose to above 3% and was 
expected to further increase in 2004.  Norway wo uld face considerable additional spending pressure 
linked to demography and to the welfare state, and according to some estimates, oil income would not 
be sufficient to provide a sustainable solution in th e long run.  To prepare for the challenges ahead and 
to preserve fiscal sustainability and internati onal competitiveness of the private sector, a more 
restrictive spending policy and enhanced structural  reforms seemed to be sensible recommendations.  
Through various reform efforts, Norway was alr eady aiming in this direction.  The discussant was 
interested to hear whether Norway  shared this analysis of fiscal sustainability and what additional 
measures might be necessary for the long run.   
(ii) Structural policy 
32. Norway was clearly committed to competitive and open markets.  Nevertheless, the public 
sector still played a very strong role, and efficiency  and productivity might be  lifted through allowing 
more room for private initiatives, private invest ments, and market incentives.  The public sector 
employed almost a third of Norway's labour force (the OECD's highest public employment share).  
Over 100 enterprises were fully or partly state- owned and played an important and, sometimes, 
dominant role in the economy.  There had be en considerable efforts and progress towards 
privatization and regulatory reform.  Nevertheless,  in 2002, a white paper proposing an ambitious 
general reduction in public ow nership was not approved by the Norwegian Parliament, which 
preferred a more traditional case-by-case approach.  The discussant was interested to know whether 
increased privatization efforts could be expected.   
33. Norway maintained a very open trade regime for industrial goods;  94% of tariff lines were 
duty-free and the average MFN tariff of about 1% did not constitute a serious barrier to trade, apart from some tariff peaks for textiles and clothing.  Like wise, the investment regime seemed to be very 
liberal.  There were some restrictions in fishi ng and maritime transport and investment opportunities 
were limited to some extent by high public investment.   
34. Protection in the agriculture sector – through tariffs, tariff quotas, an extensive system of 
internal support, and export subsidies and cred its below market rates – was probably among the 
highest in the OECD.  The system  was maintained with the understa ndable view to secure the sector's 
non-trade functions;  it was extremely costly fo r Norwegian consumers and taxpayers, and for 
potential trading partners, except for LDCs, which had duty- and quota-free access to the agricultural 
market since mid 2002.  The real challenge seemed to  be how to achieve a given political goal with 
less costs and less distortions both for the Norwegia n economy and the international trade.  One way 
would be to redirect protection from farm products to farmers income.  According to the OECD, 80% 
of producer support to farmers was linked directly to output or the use of farm inputs, and price 
support measures still played a prominent role;  there seemed to be scope for further reform.  Over the 
last years, the Government had made progress in cutting subsidies and, to some degree, in 
"decoupling".  The discussant was interested in No rway's judgement of the chances for even more 
fundamental reform along the same lines, especially within the ongoing Doha negotiations.  More 
openness in agriculture would also fit much better with Norway's general policy toward developing 
countries.  Norway had one of the highest ratios of development aid to national income (0.9%) amongst donor nations, and mainta ined one of the most wide-ranging GSP schemes among developed 
countries.    WT/TPR/M/138 
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IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 
35. The representative of Canada  noted that the Trade Policy Review Mechanism celebrated its 
10th anniversary and had proven its po tential for enhancing transparency in Members' trade policies.  
Canada commended Norway's efforts towards trade policy liberalization reflected in its several 
proposals for advancing the DDA, and in its ge nerous donations to WTO technical assistance 
activities.  Trade liberalization at the regional level had been achieved through extending the EEA 
with EFTA/EEA partners and the enlarged EU. 
36. Norway's economy continued to be strong, driv en by global oil and gas demand.  It was 
estimated that the Petroleum Fund would soon break  the one trillion NKr point.  General government 
finances were sound with an expected surplus of 6.9% of GDP in 2004.  Sustainable development 
remained a governing principle for both domestic and foreign policies, and mutually supportive trade 
and environmental policies would continue to be pursued.   
37. There had been three actions of special interest during the review period.  In May 2004, 
Norway and Canada were the first two Members to amend their patent legislation, in accordance with 
the General Council agreement, to facilitate gr eater access to pharmaceutical products for public 
health problems in countries in need.  Norway ha d expanded its GSP and gr anted duty-free and quota-
free market access for all products from LDCs from 1 July 2002.  Norway had communicated that it 
saw no legal conflict between the TRIPS Agreemen t and the U.N. Biodiversity Convention on 
preservation of traditional knowledge.  Canada was interested in learning more about the Competition 
Act and the white paper on tax reform for 2005-07;  and what additional transparency would result 
from these new measures.     
38. The representative of Japan  said that his country and Norway enjoyed a long and amicable 
relationship.  Maritime transport and fishery were important for both countries.  Japan was the leading 
importer of Norway's fish and fish products e xports.  The two countries shared the common position 
in the negotiations on agriculture that non-trade c oncerns should be taken into account, as well as  the 
same views in areas such as anti-dumping, trad e facilitation, and services.  Japan appreciated 
Norway's active participation and contribution to the WTO and hoped that it would continue. 
39. Japan welcomed Norway's economic recovery afte r its recent years' slowdown.  It hoped that 
Norway continued to promote trade and investment  liberalization towards further development.  
Norway depended highly on petroleum and natural g as exports, and could exploit resources in the 
North Sea thanks to its advanced technology.  Japan supported Norway's efforts to diversify its 
exports to further strengthen its trade and economic structure.  State-owned enterprises were playing 
key roles in areas such as energy and telecommuni cations, and Japan welcomed Norway's efforts to 
enhance their competitiveness and productivity. 
40. Norway was a non-EC country but had adopt ed over 4,000 EC rules within its EEA 
membership.  EC common agricultural and fisher y policies were excluded from EEA, and Japan was 
interested in Norway's policy coordination with the EC common rules and policies.   
41. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that his country enjoyed harmonious trade 
relations with Norway.  In 2003, total trade w ith Norway amounted to US$0.5 billion and could 
probably be expanded.  
42. Hong Kong, China appreciated Norway's strong commitment to the WTO multilateral trading 
framework and active participation in the multilate ral negotiations.  Norway had fully implemented 
the ATC liberalization of textiles and clothing.  The two countries had been working closely and 
cooperatively to help move the DDA negotiations forw ard.  Norway maintained generally low tariffs 
for non-agricultural products.  Hong Kong, China en couraged Norway to consider liberalizing its 
agricultural tariffs in the DDA context to help to move the negotiations forward.  The two countries WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 12  
 
shared concern on the increasing use of anti-dumping (AD) and other trade remedy actions.  Norway had not applied nor initiated any AD actions in th e past decade and had dissolved its Advisory AD 
Committee in 2001.  Others could learn from this excellent example. 
43. Hong Kong, China noted that Norway was integr ated into the EC single market, through the 
EEA, and must apply EC legislation including technical regulations.  Nevertheless, Norway 
maintained stricter provisions for several substanc es (for example, mercury and cadmium content in 
batteries), as well as classification and labelling of dangerous substances.  Hong Kong, China urged 
Norway to harmonize these regulations that were more than merely a nuisance for traders.  A new 
Food Production and Food Safety Act had entered into force on  1 January 2004 to replace and 
simplify legislation on meat, fish and fishery prod ucts, animal diseases, and feedstuffs.  Norway was 
encouraged to file a relevant SPS notification as soon as possible. 
44. The representative of New Zealand
 noted that, despite a slowdown that coincided with a more 
global economic downturn, Norway's macroec onomic performance had been good since 2000 and 
growth had improved through 2003. 
45. Petroleum resources and resultant wealth had in sulated Norway from some of the economic 
challenges faced by other developed economies.  No rway had recognized that wealth in one sector 
could not guarantee prosperity for all, and New Zealand commended its efforts to liberalize its 
domestic economy to gain from market efficiencies in formerly closed and state-controlled sectors. 
46. Norway had one of the most open market for industrial goods, with average MFN tariffs of 
0.9%.  Its GSP scheme was ambitious, offering duty - and quota-free access for LDCs since July 2002.  
New Zealand was concerned about Norway's producti on subsidies for agriculture, the second-highest 
in the OECD;  70% of budgeted state support – so me NKr 10 billion – were spent on agriculture, 
which accounted for only 0.9% of its GDP, and 3% of  employment.  Meat products faced an average 
tariff of 136.6% and da iry products of 52.9%.  Some quotas granted under minimum market access 
commitments existed but were often so small as to be uneconomic to exploit,  and usually maintained 
high in-quota tariff rates.  These barriers to effectiv e utilization were reflected in the high rate of 
underfill on almost all dairy and meat quotas.  Norway was gradually moving to reduce domestic 
support on agricultural products, and shifting support towards non-trade-distorting mechanisms.  It had reduced its export subsidies at a faster rate th an set out in its Uruguay Round commitments;  New 
Zealand hoped that these processes would continue.   
47. The representative of Switzerland
 said that Norway was an important trading partner although 
trade volume had not evolved dramatically over the past years.  Swiss FDI in Norway amounted to 
Sw F 3 billion in 2002.  Bilateral trade relations , traditionally very good, were mainly based on WTO 
commitments and the EFTA framework.  Switzer land appreciated the close and constructive 
cooperation with Norway under the EFTA framework. 
48. Norway's macroeconomic performance had been good since 2000;  its real GDP had 
recovered from a slowdown between 2000 and 2003.  Its trade policy regime was generally very open:  
the average applied MFN tariff had fallen from 8.1% in 2000 to 7.2% in 2004;  the average MFN tariff on non-agricultural products was 0.9%;  and ta riffs on some non-agricultural products had been 
reduced to zero in 2002.  Some 94% of non-agricultural tariff lines were now duty free.   
49. Norway was an original WTO Member and ha d been strongly committed to the multilateral 
trading system.  A well-functioning multilateral fra mework was important for non-EU Members.  
Norway played an active role in the Doha nego tiations and sought to bring them to a successful 
conclusion, sharing interests and positions with Switzerland.  The two countries were G10 members 
and were concerned about a radical and too quick lib eralization of the agriculture sector;  non-trade 
concerns would need to be adequately safeguarded.  WT/TPR/M/138 
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50. The representative of Australia  said that his country enjoyed a sound and stable trading 
relationship with Norway;  total trade exceeded US $600 million in 2003.  Services trade, particularly 
in education and tourism, had shown a steady growth  over the last five years.  Australian companies 
had bought US$124 million worth of Norwegian services in 2003.   
51. Australia appreciated and encouraged Norway's efforts to open and reform various sectors.  
However, protection in agriculture was high:  the average bound tariff was 150%, compared with 
3.6% for non-agricultural products.  Norway had the largest number of TRQs;  the fill rates had 
historically been low and it was curious that Norw ay always claimed that the administrative system 
had nothing to do with the result.  Australia welcomed the 45% reduction in Norway's export 
subsidies between 1998 and 2003, but remained concerned at their ove rall levels for specific products, 
including dairy.  Australia was disappointed that Norway's use of trade distorting domestic support 
remained high (AMS accounted for 70% of agricultu re GDP in 2001) which, together with border 
protection, continued to undermine viable agricultu re in other countries.  Australia recognized that 
Norway had non-trade concerns, but trade and prod uction distorting measures were not a legitimate 
mean to address them.   
52. Australia appreciated Norway's active and cons tructive contribution in the Doha Round, and 
their close cooperation.  However, in agriculture, in ternational trade reform would provide developing 
countries with greater gains.  Norway's position on ag riculture contrasted with its always generous 
donation to development assistance.  Norway's co mmitment to the Doha Round would be reinforced 
when its Parliament had ratified the July  Framework Package in October 2004.   
53. The representative of the European Communities  (EC) said that the EC and Norway had a 
long-standing close relationship.  Norway had built a strong economic relationship with its European 
neighbours, through its EFTA membership and its asso ciation with the EC in the EEA framework.  
Norway was a close and strong EC trading partner.  The representative regretted that Norway was not 
yet an EC member. 
54. Norway's economy was highly liberalized through  multilateral, regional, plurilateral, and 
bilateral arrangements.  Norway had worked to ensure strong synergies between these tracks and had 
prepared almost all its economic sector s for this strong competitive pressure.  
55. Norway had played a very important role in launching and promoting the DDA;  it had  
pushed for greater market-opening for non-agricultu ral products and services and sought to strengthen 
rules.  A strong multilateral trading system remained the best way to ensure increased trade, growth 
and prosperity in medium-size and small economies:  Norway recognized that it was in the interest of 
all Members to seek global coverage of the system , and to address the challenges faced by developing 
countries;  developing countries were assisted in their efforts by extensive GSP regimes and targeted 
assistance.  Even though Norway was a relatively sm all country in terms of population, it had played 
an important role in helping to build the multilate ral trading system and bridging differing approaches 
and opinions.   
56. Trade and ongoing domestic reforms, in cluding the 2002-05 Long-Term Programme, 
improvement of public procurement legislation, and new telecommunications and services legislation, 
aimed at ensuring a continuing adaptation to the markets and economic changes, had played an 
important role in Norway's growth.  Norway's effo rts to diversify its exports and production remained 
important to guarantee less depende nce on natural resources and to strengthen its economy.  The State 
Petroleum Fund showed how, by investing oil inco me in financial markets, Norway was ensuring 
strong investments in the resource base and la ying foundations to strengthen other sectors.  
57. The representative of the Republic of Korea  said that economic and trade relations with 
Norway had been very positive since 2000.  Bilate ral trade had contracted in 2001, but had been 
recovering since 2002 and currently amounted to  around US$1 billion.  Between 1983 and 2003, WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 14  
 
Norway's FDI in Korea reached US$162 million.  Th e two countries shared views in many areas of 
the DDA negotiations, in particular that the non-trad e concerns of agriculture should be taken into 
account.  Korea hoped and believed that their ac tive relationship would continue to improve. 
58. Korea commended Norway for its continued effort s at structural reforms.  Norway had an 
open trade policy regime and had long been committe d to the multilateral trading system.  Its real 
GDP growth had slowed in 2003, but was recoveri ng.  Since 2000, Norway's performance in other 
macroeconomic indicators had been good, due largel y to its commitment to the multilateral trading 
system and its efforts to put this into practice.  Korea commended Norway for its trade regime and its 
commitment to the multilateral trading system.   
59. The representative of the United States
 stressed Norway's high level of international 
cooperation.  As an founding member of the U.N. and NATO, Norway had always been a leader for 
peace.  It was a WTO original Member and had played an active role in the development of the GATT and WTO to ensure the necessary stability, security, transparency, and predictability for an open, 
export-oriented global trading system.  Norway ha d promoted trade-related technical assistance and 
cooperation by contributing to the global trust fund, as well as to a greater dialogue with NGOs. 
60. Norway had reduced its average non-agricultural tariffs from 2.3% to 0.9% since 2000;  over 
90% of all non-agricultural tariff lines were now dut y free.  Market-opening changes had been made 
in government procurement, gas transport, financ ial services, mergers and acquisitions, competition, 
and telecommunications;  the investment envir onment had been improved by eliminating some 
reporting requirements, abolishing a tax on purchases of business assets, and by fully or partially 
privatizing some state-owned entities.  The Unite d States was concerned by Norway's high level of 
protection for agriculture.  Average tariff rates were  38% for agriculture compared with less than 1% 
for non-agricultural products, although agriculture acc ounted for less than 1% of GDP.  Due to tariff 
peaks, escalation, dispersion, and seasonal tari ffs, food was more expensive in Norway, and 
competitive agricultural exporters had trouble expor ting to Norway's market.  The United States 
understood and shared many of the objectives of  these high levels of support and protection – 
promoting food security, protecting the environment,  and preserving a rich farming heritage – but 
action for non-trade concerns should not be taken in a manner that distorted trade.  The representative 
referred to U.S. advance written questions to Norw ay, regarding the variable tax on wheat imports;  
double health control fees on U.S. wheat imports;  and difficulties with the auctioning of tariff rate quotas and apparent lack of reallocating unused im port quotas.  Policies that banned or effectively 
banned imports of certain meat, poultry, grapes, a nd products of modern biotechnology should be a 
concern to all agricultural exporters. 
61. The United States was concerned that the State controlled over 40% of the Oslo Stock 
Exchange assets, and the example this set to other nations, particularly those struggling to cope with 
unprofitable state enterprises.  Nevertheless, Norway was making progress in reforming its state sector by privatizing some state-owned enterprises a nd by trying to put more distance between state 
managers and regulators.  The United Stated l ooked forward to seeing how these changes improved 
transparency and operations of Norway's state-ow ned enterprises, as well as attractiveness of FDI. 
62. The two countries supported the WTO system and,  in particular the desire to integrate 
developing countries into the international system to  see them benefit from trade liberalization.  The 
United States welcomed Norway's open market for industrial products, and hoped that improvements 
in agriculture could be achieved in the DDA negotiations. 
63. The representative of Turkey
 said that, since 2000, Norway had maintained a strong 
macroeconomic policy a nd performance, with, inter alia , low inflation and unemployment, and falling 
interest rates albeit with a slower  economic growth.  It had reduced inflation to 2.5%, and had adopted 
a long-term programme and structural reforms aime d at higher GDP growth.  Norway had one of the 
world's best managed oil funds, which served as  an important monetary, income, fiscal, and  WT/TPR/M/138 
 Page 15 
 
 
international economic policy instrument.  By successf ully investing oil and gas revenues directly in 
international assets abroad, Norway had not only used  its natural resource income prudently for the 
present and future generations, but had also avoided negative effects of possible Dutch disease on the 
non-oil sectors.  Norway had further reformed its economic legislation in several areas including 
public procurement, competition, telecommunicati ons, financial services, and IPRs, and had taken 
important measures to improve and liberalize th e investment framework.  Norway was strongly 
committed to the multilateral trading system and had actively contributed to the DDA.  Turkey appreciated Norway's substantial direct aid to de veloping countries, to the WTO technical assistance 
programmes, and its GSP treatment to LDCs.  
64. Norway avoided using trade defence measures, and its trade regime, with a 7.2% average 
applied tariff, was generally open.   However, the agriculture sector, which had a minor role in the 
economy, remained the most protected sector with high tariffs and a complex domestic support system;  further tariff reductions and a move to ad valorem  tariffs might further stabilize it.  An 
important tax reform had been made, and limited pr ivatizations had reduced the public sector share, 
although it still played an important role in the economy.   
65. Turkey had very good relations with Norway based on a 1991 FTA within the EFTA 
framework.  Turkey imported oil, vessels, aluminiu m, propylene, and fish products from Norway and 
exported vessels, textile, clothing, and automobile  and electronic products.  Turkey believed that a 
reduced State role in the economy and liberali zation of the agriculture sector would increase 
competitiveness of Norway's economy.  Turkey hoped to further enhance its trading relations with 
Norway, especially in FDI areas. 
66. The representative of Thailand, on behalf of the ASEAN
, noted Norway's economic recovery 
due to accelerating world demand and adoption of the Long-Term Programme for 2002-2005, aimed 
at sustainable economic stability, and efficient use of resources, as well as structural reforms.  GDP growth was expected to be 3% in 2004, up fro m 0.4 % in 2003;  inflation and unemployment 
remained low, and interest rates had fallen.  ASEAN appreciated the very sound government finances.  
The uptrend in oil prices in 2004 could boost Norway's economy. 
67. Norway's average applied MFN tariff had fallen from 8.1% in 2000 to 7.2% in 2004;  the 
average MFN tariff on non-agricultural products was 0.9%.  Reductions to zero on some non-
agricultural products meant that 94% of non-agricultural tariff lines were duty free.  Despite its low GDP contribution, agriculture remained the most prot ected sector with an average tariff of 38.2% in 
2004.  High border protection was compounded by a complex and extensive system of domestic 
support, and sensitive products were protected by tari ff quotas.  This resulted in high consumer prices 
for agricultural products.  Export subsidies for some agricultural products remained, even though 
outlays had declined by over 45% between 1998 and 200 3.  Norway maintained a high level of food 
safety standards. 
68. ASEAN commended Norway's commitment to enc ourage greater integration of developing 
countries, especially LDCs, into the multilateral tr ading system.  Norway had abolished tariffs and 
quotas on all products from LDCs on 1 July 2002, and had implemented its ATC commitment on 
1 January 2001.  In addition, in 2000, Norway ha d extended the product coverage of its GSP scheme, 
and simplified rules of origin requirements.  ASEAN commended Norway for not having carried out 
any antidumping or countervailing investigations si nce 2000, or having taken, maintained or initiated 
any safeguard measures.  New legislation on te lecommunications had entered into force, and 
ownership restrictions in financial services had been  relaxed.  However, state ownership in the two 
sectors remained substantial. 
69. ASEAN noted Norway's long-standing commitme nt to the multilateral trading system, and 
active and constructive participation in the DDA negotiations;  it welcomed Norway's important 
donor contribution to WTO technical assistance activ ities.  Norway participated actively in regional WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 16  
 
and bilateral fora, through its EFTA membership .  Along with its EFTA partners, Norway had 
established an extensive network of FTAs in Eur ope, the Mediterranean, Latin America, and Asia. 
70. Norway's trade policy regime remained gene rally open, except in agriculture.  ASEAN 
commended Norway for its continued efforts towards structural reforms and restraint from resort to 
trade remedial actions.  ASEAN also appreciated Norw ay's active and constructive role in the WTO.  
71. The representative of Brazil
 commended Norway's good economic performance, including 
low inflation and unemployment, falling interest ra tes, and current account surpluses, and its high 
UNDP human development index.  Norway was the wo rld's third largest exporter of oil;  external 
trade accounted for over 75% of its GDP .  
72. Its investment regime was liberal and its trade policy regime was generally open, except in 
agriculture.  Very low or no manufacturing protecti on contrasted with high levels of protection in 
agriculture.  The average MFN tariff on non-agricu ltural products was 0.9%, while the average on 
agricultural products was 38.2%.  Agriculture conti nued to be granted substa ntial export subsidies, 
which affected Norway's trading partners, undermin ed Norway's economic efficiency, and penalized 
Norwegian consumers and exporters.  In this connec tion, Brazil encouraged Norway to continue its 
structural reforms and further reduce tariffs to better allocate resources;  and  to move to ad valorem  
tariffs to stabilize the level of tariff protection.  The complex internal tax system on agricultural products would gain from reforms.   
73. The representative of China
 said that trade with Norway had developed strongly in recent 
years.  In 2003, total trade volume increased by 21.7% to US$1.76 billion;  from January to 
August 2004, it climbed to US$1.54 billion, a 27.7%  increase on 2003.  Imports from Norway rose by 
51.9% to US$880 million in 2004.  China had become No rway's largest trading partner in Asia since 
2002.  Furthermore, cooperation between the two countries progressed smoothly in other areas, for 
instance technology, finance, and quality inspection.  
74. China closely followed Norway's trade polic y and economic development, appreciating the 
openness of its trade regime, and highly commended No rway for its dedication and contribution to the 
multilateral trading system.  However, China was deeply concerned with Norway's trade policy on 
NTBs, particularly in agriculture.  An example was Norway's ban on importation of products of 
animal origin from China;  China hoped that No rway would implement its August 2004 commitments 
to lift this ban as soon as possible.   
75. The representative of Colombia  highlighted that the trade flows between Colombia and 
Norway were very small, but that the Norwegian ma rket held a great potential for Colombia's exports, 
particularly in industries where it had competitiv e advantages and high value added.  Colombia's 
development policy was aimed at strengthening its  exports and finding new markets for high value-
added products, which provided greater stability th an raw material exports, on which prices were 
volatile.  Colombia's exports to Norway had decr eased slightly over the 1990s due to lower coffee 
prices on the international market – coffee accounted  for 95% of Colombia's exports to Norway;  
nevertheless, they had increased slightly over the p ast four years to reach US$11 million in 2003.  It 
also exported flowers, extracts, essences and coffee concentrates, crafts, and clothing.  Imports from 
Norway, 53% of which were machinery and equi pments, accounted for roughly US$5 million.     
76. Norway's trade policy was open, except for agri culture, which made it possible for Norway to 
fulfil its WTO obligations.  Colombia commended Norway for its successful structural reforms aimed at maintaining competitiveness and increasing economic efficiency for key industries, through further 
liberalizing markets, introducing greater market competitiveness, and modernizing gradually its 
regulatory framework.  Norway had contributed grea tly to the WTO technical assistance programme, 
to strengthen the negotiation capacity of developing  countries and LDCs, and allow them to prepare 
well for the DDA negotiations.  Colombia considered  that non-trade concerns in agriculture were  WT/TPR/M/138 
 Page 17 
 
 
legitimate but must be carried out with minimu m distortions for farm production and worldwide 
agricultural trade.  Norway was committed, in the agriculture nego tiations, to substantially improve 
market access, and had already expresse d its will to reduce its tariffs.   
77. The representative of the Separate Customs Te rritory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  
noted Norway's long-standing commitment to the multilateral trading system as an original WTO 
Member.  It congratulated Norway for the success of its macroeconomic policy directed towards its 
recent economic recovery.  Since 2000, Norway ha d maintained low inflation and unemployment 
rates, and measures had been taken to improve the investment environment.  Its average applied MFN 
tariff had fallen and 94% of non-agricultural tariff lines were duty free.  Norway's updated legislation 
on government procurement and its new Competition Act were aimed at fully complying with its 
international obligations. 
78. Norway was a potential European trading part ner for the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.  Bilateral trade relations would be furthe r enhanced, taking into 
account Norway's commitment to the multilateral trad ing system.  In the context of DDA, the two 
delegations shared views on market access for industrial goods, stronger disciplines on anti-dumping 
measures, further liberalization of the services s ectors, and non-trade concerns in agriculture 
liberalization;  and both belonged to the G10 through which they had close working relations. 
79. The representative of Benin  referred to Norway's vision of  the international economy and 
multilateral trade, and its efforts to  favour its partners, in particul ar developing countries and LDCs.  
Norway had carried out successful economic reforms that  helped it to fully participate in international 
trade.  It had improved its macroeconomic, legal, and institutional frameworks, and, attached to the 
principle of production and trade liberalizati on, Norway promoted competitiveness based on 
sustainable development.  The results reflected Norway's commitment to reach its objectives:  3% 
GDP growth in 2004;  contained infl ation;  reassuring monetary polici es;  healthy public finances (the 
2003 balance had shown a surplus of 8.3% of GDP);   advanced reforms in financial markets;  
promotion of its participation in international tr ade; and further efforts towards achieving the Doha 
programme objectives, for its own benefit and that of  its developing-country partners, in particular 
LDCs.   
80. Norway was the world's third oil exporter.  Since oil resources would not last for ever, 
Norway had set up an oil fund to control fluctuations, and to distribute income fairly among generations.  Norway had given par ticular attention to LDCs by c ontributing to the Doha Programme 
Trust Fund since 2001, and improving its GSP scheme to grant tariff-free and quota-free access to all 
products from LDCs.  Norway had been sensitive to the position of  developing countries regarding 
access to medical drugs, and had strongly supporte d the General Council decision of August 2003 on 
TRIPS and public health.  Norway had been the fi rst Member to implement this decision in its 
domestic legislation.  It had understood the difficulti es of developing countries, in particular LDCs, in 
fully participating in international trade.  Norway  supported the request by developing countries for 
fairer and more equitable international trade rules,  principles, mechanisms, and procedures to promote 
trade and ensure development of these countries.  Benin appreciated Norway's support for developing 
countries' efforts.  
81. The representative of Pakistan
 said that Norway had a very open trade regime with average 
MFN tariffs on non-agricultural products of less th an 1%, and ensured that this was not diluted 
through anti-dumping or other trade remedy measures.   Norway had removed its quotas on textiles on 
1 January 2001, and had also abolished tariffs for LDCs.  Pakistan hoped the same could be applied 
for other low-income countries.   
82. Despite low average tariffs on industrial goods , a 6.3% tariff rate was applied on many 
textiles and clothing.  Pakistan welcomed the stat ement that tariff reductions on textiles, under a new 
GSP scheme, was being considered in the 2005 budg et proposals.  Norway had generously supported WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 18  
 
the WTO technical assistance programme.  Paki stan commended Norway's support of the Doha 
process.  The only improvement might be to furthe r lower tariffs on textiles and clothing, convert 
non-ad valorem  (almost 10% of total) to ad-valorem  rates, and reduce tariff escalation and other 
barriers in agriculture.  
83. The representative of India
 commended Norway's top rank in the UNDP human development 
index.  Since 2000, and despite a slowdown in ec onomic growth due to global recession, Norway had 
shown impressive economic performance with a st rong current account surplus, low inflation, 
decreasing unemployment, and falling interest rat es.  High world prices of petroleum products had 
also led to a surge in export receipts.  India hope d that the ongoing structural reforms would lead to 
further higher growth a nd development levels.  
84. Norway was an original WTO Member.  It ma intained a generally liberal trade regime.  
However, India hoped that Norway would consider addressing still high tariffs in sectors of crucial 
export interest to many of the developing countries, in cluding textiles, of particular interest to India.  
India appreciated Norway's attachment to the integration of the developing countries into the multilateral trading system.  India recalled Norw ay's positive contribution to the discussions on 
TRIPS and public health that had led to the A ugust 2003 General Council Deci sion.  India welcomed 
implementation of this Decision in Norway's domestic legislation.  India wished to work closely with 
Norway to achieve the DDA objectives.  India and No rway enjoyed a friendly b ilateral relationship.  
Although bilateral trade was not substantial, there was clearly potential for a closer trade and economic relationship.  WT/TPR/M/138 
 Page 19 
 
 
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY AND ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS 
85. The representative of Norway  thanked Members, the discussant, and the Secretariat.  The 
TPR Mechanism was aimed at achieving greater transparency in and understanding of Members trade policies and practices and did not serve as enforcement tool or to impose new commitments.  Norway 
had decided not to respond individually to questions  that dealt with the DDA negotiations.  Norway's 
negotiating positions were well known.  It was de eply committed to the DDA and would faithfully 
implement its results.  General questions raised dur ing the first day of the meeting would be dealt 
with, and written replies had been provided for other questions.  
86. In response to remarks by the discussant, a neut ral fiscal stance had, over the past couple of 
years, facilitated an expansionary monetary policy, and the krone exchange rate was back to its level 
prior to the strengthening starting in 2000.  Low in terest rates had fuelled domestic demand.  High 
growth was expected in Norway's non-oil exports due to a weak krone, moderate wage settlements 
from 2003, and increased international growth.  Growth  in traditional exports was expected to rise 
from 3% in 2004 to 5% in 2005.  Investments in  the non-oil sector, which started increasing in 2003, 
were expected to continue to grow at about 4%  in 2004 and 2005.  Although private consumption had 
been the main driving force in the economy recently , other factors were gaining importance.  The 
upswing was sustainable and quite robust.    
87. Norway had considerable financ ial wealth and large incomes from petroleum activities.  Thus 
it was difficult to conduct a prudent and sensible eco nomic policy.  However, Norway had set up the 
Petroleum Fund (PF) and guidelines, according to which fiscal policy would be geared towards a 
gradual and sustainable increase in the use of pe troleum revenues.  The structural, non-oil budget 
deficit would correspond to the real return on the PF, which was expected to be 4%.  However,  
implementation of fiscal policy must take into account output and employment fluctuations.  Implementation of monetary policy was aimed at main taining low and stable inflation with a targeted 
annual increase close to 2.5%;  it was expected that inflation would fall within +/- 1 percentage point 
of its target.  Monetary policy was aimed at provi ding the economy with a nominal anchor in the long 
term, and balancing the need for low and stable  inflation against the outlook for output and 
employment in the short and medium term. 
88. Norway's petroleum wealth was an advantage but would not solve the long-term challenges of 
an ageing population.  Reforming the pension system  to retain public finances and promoting reforms 
to ensure a sufficiently large labour-force, would be important.  In early 2004, a Pension Committee 
reported proposed changes aimed at attaining long-term  fiscal sustainability.  As a follow-up, a white 
paper on pension reform would also been pr esented to Parliament later this year.   
89. The proposed tax reform was aimed at stimul ating labour supply by reducing marginal tax 
rates on labour income, and exempting dividends and capital gains between companies from 2004.  A 28% share income tax on individuals would take e ffect from 2006, and would apply only to dividends 
and capital gains exceeding a risk-free rate of retu rn.  The reform also entailed reductions in the 
wealth tax.  Reversing growth in the number of  disability pensioners was aimed at maintaining 
Norway's very high labour force participation.  Significant reforms had already been adopted.  From 
2004, new entrants into the disability scheme would be  granted a temporary, rather than permanent, 
status.  A system of re-entering disabled persons into the labour force had been adopted, and work 
was in progress to re-evaluate the status of all disability pensioners, grante d their status before 
1 January 2004.  
90. The State's share in the Oslo Stock Exchange was quite high, and had increased as a direct 
result of the active privatization policy.  State-ow ned companies to be privatized were listed and 
partly privatized through an initial private offering (IPO) process.  The IPO was directed equally at 
national and international investors.  Since 2000, the privatization of Statoil – the OSE's largest WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 20  
 
capitalized  company – and Telenor – the third larg est – had added significant volumes to OSE;  the 
State's share in these two companies accounted for 26%  of the OSE total capitalization.  Thus the size 
of the privatized companies was the main reason fo r the Government's increased share in the OSE.  
Other factors, including the collapse of the IT sector  and the de-listing of major banks and shipping 
companies, had had a negative impact on the size of the OSE.  The State had ownership in only seven 
companies out of 200 listed in the OSE, and since 2000, its ownership had been reduced considerably 
in some of the largest compani es (for example, Statoil, Telenor, and DnB NOR).  Other companies 
had been fully or partly privatized and further ownership reductions would be sought.  However, the 
values of companies had to be retained as well as  a contribution to the positive development of the 
companies involved.   
91. The State, like any shareholder, acted to maximize shareholder value over time.  A company 
with state-interest adhered to the same laws and regulations as any other private company, and did not 
benefit from any privilege.  The State adhered to go od corporate governance;  it did not take part in 
the companies' day-to-day management nor intervene with decisions taken by the boards of directors.  
The State may communicate performance targets to th e companies in line with other active owners.  
No State official was allowed to sit on these boa rds.  This system applied for all commercial 
companies with State ownership.   
92. The EEA Agreement was more than an FTA but different from a customs union.  It was 
aimed at creating a single internal market by harmonizing rules to ensure equal competition 
conditions, but did not harmonize exte rnal tariffs nor influence external trade policy, except indirectly 
through harmonized requirements for certain goods and service providers.  The EEA Agreement did 
not just abolish customs duties and trade remedies, but tackled the issue of the harmonization of 
product requirements, and common TBT and SPS re quirements for all goods covered by the 
Agreement.  This was not a 100% harmonization since individual countries were allowed differentiated approaches;  under its national exemp tions, Norway did not apply the EC requirements 
for certain GMOs.  Such flexibilities could be invok ed only to apply more stringent rules because 
once a product inside the EEA external borders, it coul d circulate freely within the 28 member states;  
they should not be used to threaten the protection level of other members, or force them to erect 
borders between them, but be borne by the member State requiring additional protection.  Norway's 
SPS requirements for certain meat products from Ch ina were harmonized within the EEA, and a 
solution common to the 28 members was needed.   
93. The EEA Agreement covered free movement of services and freedom of capital movements 
including investments, with scope for certain ex ceptions;  Norway's legislation on ownership of 
fishing vessels should be seen in that light.  Re garding questions raised on the financial services 
sector, these services were harmoni zed within the EEA.  Competition policy and state aid were not 
totally harmonized, but there was coordination a nd cooperation, with common minimum requirements 
and division of labour between the European Comm ission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority.  The 
EEA Agreement did not cover the EC common agricu ltural and fisheries policies.  Such goods might 
be subject to tariffs in Norway.  The EC comm on policies went beyond trade policy covering also 
culture, environment, justice and home affairs, immi gration, security policy, and other areas;  the EEA 
Agreement did not have the same reach despite cooperation within the EEA on certain horizontal 
trade-relevant and flanking policies, for example e nvironment regulations, many  of which would have 
an incidence on products.  Although other areas ha d not been included in the EEA Agreement, 
bilateral cooperation between each  EEA member and the EC may exist (for example, the Schengen 
Agreement). 
94. Non-trade concerns on agriculture were legitimat e concerns, not protectionist excuses, and as 
such should be taken into account in the DDA negotiations.  Many Me mbers had understood 
Norway's non-trade concerns but stressed that they should be safeguarded through green box 
measures only.  Norway agreed that green box measures – around 35% of its budgetary payments – 
were important, but alone they would not ensure deli very of the public goods since provision of non- WT/TPR/M/138 
 Page 21 
 
 
trade concerns was linked to an ongoing agricult ural production.  Farmers would not have an 
economic incentive to produce unless they at least covered their costs of production. 
95. Quota-fill rates had varied from one year to anot her, with an increase over recent years.  No 
clear correlation seemed to exist between low fill rates and specific allocation methods.  Exogenous 
factors (supply and demand, and fluctuating domestic or  international prices) may cause them to vary.   
96. Norway would notify the Act on Food Production and Food Safety in the near future.  The 
Act regulated the entire feed and food production chai n;  it provided the legal basis for the control 
fees and foodstuff tax.  Control fees, charged for sp ecific controls carried out by the Norwegian Food 
Safety Authority (NFSA), were related only to control of production ta king place in Norwegian 
establishments, expected for border control on plan ts for non-food use, feeding stuffs, live animals, 
and animal products.  The foodstuff tax was levied on both imported and dome stic products to cover 
costs resulting from regular NFSA inspections on produc ts not subject to control fees.  Control fees 
and foodstuff taxes were non-discriminatory, and sh ould not exceed the actual cost for the services 
associated with them. 
97. Norway maintained an elaborate and detailed syst em of control for the sustainable out-take of 
fisheries resources.  A major part of its resour ces were managed in c ooperation with neighbouring 
countries, and the Norwegian coastguards monitored 2.5 million square kilometres of sea.  Sea-based 
control was part of the overall surveillance of quotas and other fisheries regulations.  It was conducted 
by direct inspections on the fishing grounds, by a check-point system of entry and exit into the exclusive economic zone for vessels not landing in  Norwegian ports, and by a satellite monitoring 
system.  Norway also conducted a non-discriminatory system of control of landings in its ports:  
applicable vessel quotas were controlled for No rwegian vessels;  and total quota limitation was 
controlled for non-Norwegian vessels.  Other control parameters included, inter alia , the amount of 
fish taken, information pertaining to catch area, si zes, and value, etc.  Questions related to reduction 
of fishing capacity involved vessels gross registered  tonnage, as well as engine power, fishing gear 
and technology, and other important factors influencing vessel's ability to fish.  The major control 
parameter for the out-take of resources was quota c ontrol, as well as measures regulating fishing gear 
and other forms of output regulations.   
98. Norway regulated capacity expressed as cargo-hol d capacity to achieve a viable, sound, and 
realistic structure in its fishing fleet.  Laws rest ricting the level of owners hip concentration in the 
aquaculture sector had been enacted  to ensure healthy competition.  Applicants for an aquaculture 
licence must satisfy existing veterinary and envi ronmental standards as well as local and regional 
regulations.  Aquaculture licences were allocated  equally to national and foreign companies. 
99. The service sector remained the backbone of  Norway's economy;  among the largest sub-
sector were shipping, financial services, business services, telecommunications, and retailing.  High 
growth in production, employment, and productiv ity had been achieved through deregulation and 
liberalization, which explained why Norway had ha d one of the highest productivity growth rates 
among OECD countries in the last decade.  A competitive service sector was essential for a well 
functioning economy.   
100. In 2003, rules of ownership limitations in financial institutions had been amended and 
replaced by a fit and proper test of owners exceed ing certain thresholds.  The former 10% ownership 
limitation was no longer applicable to Norwegia n insurance companies, credit institutions, and 
financing undertakings.  The acquisition of qualif ying holdings must be officially authorized. A 
qualifying holding was any holding of 10% or more of  the capital or voting rights, or with significant 
influence in the institution's management and busines s.  The same applied to acquisitions whereby a 
qualifying holding reached or exceeded 20%, 25%, 33% , or 50%.  The fit and proper test was based 
on national treatment.  There was no explicit requireme nt that shares should be widely held, beyond 
the fit and proper test.  The new regime was open to  any shareholding size subject to the prudential fit WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 22  
 
and proper test.  The intensity of the test would increase with the holding size and the resulting potential impact on financial stability and effective competition. 
101. The 2005 budget proposed to simplify customs tariffs by reducing the tariff on several types 
of garments from between 12% a nd 13.7% to 10.7%.  Men's apparels had been proposed for inclusion 
in Norway's GSP.   
102. Norway had undertaken measures to simplif y its regulations and procedures on border 
crossing.  The revised customs legislation would increase transparency and predictability for both the 
economic operators and the general public.  Internal provisions on customs valuation were adopted by 
the Ministry of Finance with guidelines issued by th e national customs authorities.  A pilot project had 
concluded that these provisions, as well as other cu stoms-related regulations , should be compiled and 
formally adopted in a new Act.  Such  improvements would increase availability, inter alia , by using 
digital search engines in the public internet system for legal documen ts, and would improve 
predictability by creating a robust legal framework fo r jurisprudence and interpretation by the national 
courts.  The Customs and Goods Transfer Act woul d be fully compatible with the WTO Agreements 
and the binding recommendations of the Wo rld Customs Organization committees.  Its 
implementation would take some time due to the pa rliamentary procedures, and its entry into force 
would depend on the necessary ministerial regulations.  Simplification of procedures would, for instance, offer traders the opportunity to cross th e border without inspection, communicating with the 
customs administration using an internet/GSM messaging system. 
103. Norway believed that the implementation of  the General Council decision on TRIPS and 
public health represented a significant contribution to  providing affordable access to essential drugs in 
countries with insufficient production capacity.  Norway hoped that its early implementation by 
Norway and Canada would be followed by others. 
104. The discussant
 thanked Norway for its very comprehensive answers.  Norway's economic 
outlook over the coming years would be positive, an d fiscal sustainability ranked high in Norway's 
agenda.  The discussant was impressed on how No rway had addressed disability pensions.  He 
strongly encouraged Norway to continue its privatization efforts.   
105. The representative of Australia  thanked Norway for its responses and comprehensive 
statements over the last two days.  He expressed di sappointment that some of most sensitive issues in 
Norway's trade policy had not been answered mere ly because they were under consideration in the 
Doha negotiations.  The representative thought that non-trade concerns on agriculture were legitimate 
but should be minimal or non-trade distorting; th at was why the green box existed.  Before the 
Uruguay Round, a number of countries had had quan titative restrictions on agriculture across the 
board.  Most imports into Norway had been s ubject to quantitative limits.  The Uruguay Round 
encouraged Members to move away from quantitative restrictions or, at least, to move to minimum 
import undertakings.  Norway was very reluctant to m ove to tariffication and so it maintained a large 
number of tariff rate quotas.  Fill rates were impr oving but quotas were often not filled because they 
were economically unsustainable and uninteresting to  suppliers.  The representative thought that the 
allocation system contributed to unfilled quotas.  There had been a strong resistance in the negotiations on agriculture to change the allocation system;  factors were needed to encourage fill 
rates, when the current system was not working.   That was why Australia had taken exception to 
auctioning.  Auctioning meant that importers had to pay another impost on top of the tariff to be able 
to import.  Auctioning did not encourage trader s to establish commercial relationships when small 
volumes were involved.  The representative reitera ted both his appreciation for Norway's responses 
and disappointment that more substantive exchange  had not taken place since it was an opportunity to 
look at trade policy in a broader sense.  
106. The representative of the EC
 thanked Norway for its replies and interesting and 
comprehensive closing statement.  Norway ha d demonstrated its strong commitment to the  WT/TPR/M/138 
 Page 23 
 
 
multilateral trading system;  the EC encouraged Norw ay to continue its important role in the DDA.  
The representative noted that Norway had taken st eps towards more trade facilitation:  increasing 
transparency and simplifying border-crossing proce dures.  The EC's question on a specific issue on 
trade in processed agricultural products had received the same answers as Australia's, that this was a 
matter under negotiation.  The EC was looking fo rward to the negotiations on this issue.   
107. The representative of China  thank Norway for its comprehensive responses, and especially to 
the Chinese concerns.  Norway's SPS requirements were harmonized within the EEA and a solution 
common to the member states was needed to addr ess Chinese concerns on imports of products of 
animal origin.  The EC had lifted the ban on Chinese imports of products of animal origin this year, 
and China hoped that Norway would do the same in conjunction with its domestic procedures and 
harmonization.  
108. The representative of Norway  thought that his country had clearly demonstrated that, even 
though all questions had not been answered, it was fruitful to undergo a TPR.  Answers had been provided on issues not included in the negotiating ag enda.  Norway had contributed very positively in 
this discussion.  The representative thought that some of the answers to some of the questions raised 
by Australia were included in his two interven tions.  The main problem was that Norway and 
Australia did not agree on the substance of the point s and that was why they were under negotiation in 
the DDA.  The representative rectified and clarifie d that, at the end of the Uruguay Round, Norway 
had tariffied all agriculture products in accordance  with the rules and procedures agreed, and had 
implemented quotas that were part of the package;  its schedules had been accepted and were part of 
the WTO.  Quota allocation methods were being di scussed in the undergoing negotiations.  Some of 
Norway's quota volumes were small, but Norway was also a very small market, and thus it might not 
be commercially interesting for la rge producers, such as Australia.  
109. The representative of the United States
 thanked Norway for its responses.  He sought 
clarification of the answer on the control fee for Ka rnal Bunt:  that there was no distinction in the 
operating legislation that allowed re gions free of Karnal Bunt to avoid the assessed control fee, even if 
exporters from these regions had relevant certificati on.  The United States was concerned that, if the 
measure covered countries as a whole, it would seem to disadvantage large countries where exporters 
in regions far from any incidence of Karnal Bunt may have to pay a higher control fee.  The representative asked whether there was no allowance for regional distinctions , and if not, what was 
the justification for not allowing exporters from regi ons free of Karnal Bunt from avoiding the higher 
control fee.   
110. The representative of Norway
 apologized for not being able to  answer that question but would 
refer to it in due course.  
 WT/TPR/M/138 
Page 24  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
111. We have conducted this fourth Trade Policy Review of Norway in a friendly and well-
informed manner, and our dialogue has been very co nstructive.  We have gr eatly benefited from the 
valuable contribution of the Norwegian delegation, le d by Mr. Harald Neple, Director General of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the very insightfu l comments by our discussant, Mr. Alexander Gross, 
and the active involvement of a large number of Members. 
112. At the outset, allow me to highlight the considerable support of Members for Norway's solid 
macroeconomic performance since its last Review in 2000, with low inflation and unemployment 
rates, generally open investment regime, and gr owth well above other industrialized countries.  
Members also recognized that oil and gas made a c onsiderable contribution to Norway's prosperity.  
Members welcomed Norway's firm commitment to and active participation in the multilateral trading 
system, including the Doha Development Agenda.  Members noted that Norway is also active in the regional and bilateral fora.  They expressed apprecia tion for its substantial direct aid to developing 
countries and to WTO technical assistance in partic ular, and for its far-reaching GSP scheme for least-
developed countries. 
113. Members commended Norway on its very liberal trade regime for non-agricultural products, 
and on its full implementation of the WTO Agreem ent on Textiles and Clothing well in advance of 
the timeline agreed.  However, divergent views we re expressed on its agricultural policy.  Indeed, 
some Members shared a common position on the c oncept of non-trade concerns which was at the 
heart of the justification for Norway's agricultural po licy.   By contrast, others expressed concerns on 
this issue and about Norway's high level of protec tion of agricultural products by means of a complex 
taxation system and large support, and urged Norway to  reform its policy.  They commented that such 
protection undermined economic efficiency and pena lized both Norwegian tax payers and consumers. 
114. Some Members shared Norway's concern on th e widespread tendency to resort to trade 
remedy actions, commending Norway on the renunciati on of any such measure over the past years.  
Questions were posed on public enterprises, with some Members urging Norway to further reduce the 
degree of public ownership in its  economy.  Members expressed concerns and requested information 
on administration of tariff quotas, SPS measures, and technical regulations.  They also sought further clarification on the foreign investment regime;  incentive schemes;  competition legislation;  government procurement;  protection of  intellectual property rights;  and on specific activities, such as 
fisheries, maritime transport and financial services. 
115. Members appreciated the responses provided by the Norwegian delegation, and looked 
forward to further written replies. 
116. In conclusion, it is my feeling that the wide interest shown by Members, with many advance 
written questions, interventions and hi gh attendance, reflects the important role that Norway plays in 
the multilateral trading system.  We now have a much better and updated und erstanding of its trade-
related policies and practices, and appreciate the chal lenges it faces and its efforts to address them in a 
way that is consistent with the multilateral trading system.  Further liberalization of Norway's 
agricultural sector would support its widely rec ognized actions in favour of developing countries, 
mainly those with a key interest in agriculture.  
 
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