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WT/CTE/M/75  
 
3 October  2022 
  
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Committee on Trade and Environment    
 
  
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 2 JUNE  2022  
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE Regular) met on 2 June 2022, chaired by   
H.E. Mr. Simon MANLEY (United Kingdom) . The Committee adopted the Airgram  
WTO/AIR/CTE/18 , dated 13 April  2022. The Report of the last CTE meeting, held on  
2 February 2022 , is contained in WT/CTE/M/7 4. 
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Contents  
1   ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES AND MARKET ACCESS, PARAGRAPH 32(I) OF THE 
DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION – ITEM 6 OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME  ...............  4 
1.1   European Union (EU) Green Deal  ................................ ................................ ..................  4 
1.2   Fossil fuel subsidy reform (FFSR)  ................................ ................................ ................  11 
1.3   Circular economy and plastics pollution  ................................ ................................ ....... 12 
1.3.1    Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade 
(IDP)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............................  12 
1.3.2    Briefing by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on the UNEA -5  
resolution on negotiations towards an international agreement on plastics  ..............................  13 
1.4   Other  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  16 
1.4.1    Presentation by the United States on its discussion paper "Climate Change and  
Circular Economy"  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  16 
1.4.2    Update by the United Kingdom on activities related to making supply chains more 
sustainable  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  19 
2   TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  AND CAPACITY BUILDING, PARAGRAPH 33 OF THE  
DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION  ................................ ................................ ..............  20 
2.1   Overview by the WTO Secretariat of the preparations for the Aid for Trade Global Review 
(27-29 July 2022)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  20 
2.2   Briefing by the WTO Secretariat on the ongoing joint webinar series with the World  Bank 
that focused on the developmental dimension of the nexus between trade and climate change  .. 23 
2.3   Briefing by the United Nations Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) on its 
contribution to the transfer of climate technologies  ................................ ..............................  23 
2.4   Briefing by the WTO Secretariat on recent activities related to the 19th annual review  
of the implementatio n of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property  
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) Article  66.2: incentives for technology transfer to LDCs  ..................  25 
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice to 
the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  3   MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (MEAS), ITEMS 1 AND 5 OF THE 
CTE WORK PROGRAMME  ................................ ................................ ...............................  27 
3.1   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  .............................  27 
3.1.1    United Kingdom's update on the 26th session of the Conference of the Parties  
(COP26) presidency year  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 27 
3.1.2    Update b y Egypt on the preparations for the 27th session of the Conference of  
the Parties (COP27)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  28 
3.1.3    Briefing by the UNFCCC on CO P26 and COP27  ................................ ...........................  29 
3.1.4    Update on negotiations towards the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and 
Sustainability (ACCTS)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 30 
3.2   Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)  ................................ ................................ ..... 31 
3.2.1    Update by the CBD Secretariat on recent meetings and activities  ................................ . 31 
3.2.2   Presentation by the United Kingdom on "Biodiversity and Nature Positivity"  ..................  33 
3.2.3    Presentation by Portugal on the UN Ocean  Conference June 2022  ................................  34 
4   MEMBERS' SUGGESTIONS AND PROPOSALS  ................................ .............................  36 
4.1   Update on the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD)  .... 36 
4.2   12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12)  ................................ ................................ ..... 39 
5   RELATIONS WITH I NTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON -GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, ITEM 10 ................................ ................................ ............................  40 
5.1   Briefing by Thailand on the Asia -Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2022  ....................  40 
5.2   Update by the United Nations Environment Progr amme (UNEP)  ................................ ...... 41 
6   DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING  ................................ ................................ ...................  42 
 
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  ACRONYMS  
  
 ACCTS  Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability  
AFT Aid for Trade  
APEC Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation  
BBI Bio-Bridge Initiative  
BCG Bio-Circular -Green  
CBAM  Carbon border adjustment mechanism  
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity  
CEAP Circular Economy Action Plan  
COP Conference of the Parties  
CTCN  Climate Technology Centre and Network  
CTE Committee on Trade and Environment  
ESPR Ecodesign  for Sustainable Products Regulation  
ETS Emissions trading scheme  
FACT Forest, Agriculture and Commodity Trade dialogue  
FFS Fossil fuel subsid ies 
FFSR Fossil fuel subsidy reform  
GCF Green Climate Fund  
GHG Greenhouse gas  
IDP Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally 
Sustainable Plastics Trade  
IMF International Monetary Fund  
INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee  
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
IRENA  International Renewable Energy Agency  
ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization  
LCA Life cycle analyses  
LDCs Least developed countries  
M&E Monitoring and evaluation  
MC Ministerial Conference  
MEAs  Multilateral Environmental Agreements  
MoCA  Ministerial on Climate Action  
MRT Ministers responsible for trade  
MSME  Micro, Small and Medium -sized Enterprises  
NDC Nationally determined contribution  
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development  
OEWG  Open -ended working group  
SBI Subsidiary Body on Implementation  
SBSTTA  Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice  
SDG Sustainable Development Goal  
SIDS Small, Vulnerable Economies, Small Island Developing States  
SMEs  Small and Medium -sized Enterprises  
SPS Agreement  Agreement o n the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
T&M Trade and markets  
TBT Agreement  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  
TESSD  Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions  
TrCM  Trade -related climate measure  
TRIPS  Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property  
TrPM Trade -related plastics measure  
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
UNEA  United Nations Environment Assembly  
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme  
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
WCO World Customs Organization  
WEF World Economic Forum  
WMO World Meteorological Organization  
WSR Waste Shipment Regulation  
  
 
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  1  ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES AND MARKET ACCESS, PARAGRAPH 32(I) OF THE DOHA 
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION – ITEM 6 OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME  
"The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least -developed among them, and those 
situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions 
would benefit trade, the environment and development".  
1.1  European Union (EU) Green Deal 
1.1.  The representative of the European Union  (EU) condemned Russia 's war of aggression against 
Ukraine. The hostile act of the Russian Federation  was a flagrant violation of international law and 
the rules -based international order, with effects that ha d spread well beyond Ukraine's borders.  She 
noted that the European Union was deeply concerned about the global consequences of this 
aggression relating to trade, food security and the environment. It was causing widespread damage, 
pollution and harm to bio diversity, thereby intensifying the triple planetary crisis of climate change, 
pollution and biodiversity loss.  The European Union ha d, therefore,  adopted its sixth package of 
sanctions against Russia. The European Union  urged Russia to immediately stop it s indiscriminate 
attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure  and to immediately and unconditionally withdraw 
its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally 
recogni zed borders.  
1.2.  The representative of the European Union provided an update on trade -relevant aspects of the 
European Green Deal. The  European Union  was continuing to implement the European Green Deal, 
which  was a comprehensive  plan to  make the economy and society ready for a climate -neutral 
future.  On 30 March 2022, the Commission had adopted a package of measures to make sust ainable 
products the norm in the European Union . These measures would  contribute to reaching the EU 's 
environmental and climate goals, doubling the circularity r ate of material use and achieving energy 
efficiency targets by 2030. On 17 November, the European Union proposed  to revise the regulation 
on waste shipments by proposing stronger rules on waste exports, a more efficient system for the 
circulation of waste and action against waste trafficking.  
1.3.  Under the 2020 Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP), a  few more initiatives with relevance to 
trade were planned for later 2022, including, inter alia , a legislative proposal for substantiating green 
claims made by companies ; a review of requirements on packaging and packaging waste in the EU ; 
new policy framework on bio -based, biodegradable and compostable plastics;  and measures to 
reduce the impact of micro -plastic pollution on the environment . 
1.4.  The European Commiss ion had adopted a set of proposals to implement a part of its CEAP at 
the end of March 2022. Central to  these proposals was the Ecodesign  for Sustainable Products  
Regulation ( ESPR) , which was done in conjunction with  other s to improve consumer protection i n 
relation to sustainable products; proposals to improve Construction Products Regulation  (CPR) ; and  
the EU strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles.  
1.5.  Despite  a multitude of efforts at the global level through Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs ), the SDG Agenda  and existing EU legislation, the global extraction of materials  had tripled 
since 1970 and was on an upward trend. Over 90% of biodiversity loss and water stress  result ed 
from resource extraction  and processing.  Waste generation was set to increase 70% by 2050 . The 
European Union  had established clear links between consumption and some of these impacts . The 
European Union made up  less than 10% of the world population, yet its consumption -based imp acts 
were close to or  exceed ed boundaries for climate change, particulate matter, land use and mineral 
resources . 
1.6.   The Ecodesign  Directive  regulat ed the rules pertaining to the performance and design of 
products before they c ould be put on sale in European markets. This Directive ha d been implemented 
for several  years and was  working well. The proposal was to build on th e existing Ecodesign Directive 
for framework legislation.  Based on rough estimates, t he legislation would be adopted within 
18 months and two and a half years. The  ESPR would extend the  approach of the current Ecodesign  
Directive  and move  beyond energy -related products to a wide r product scope . Most of  the rules were 
product -specific , meaning that t here was an  individual legal measure that deal t with a product group. 
There was also an increased focus on product information. Some of the key product aspects under WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  ESPR to be  covered by this regulation  included  durability, reliability , reusability, upgradability, 
energy use or energy efficiency, resource  use or resource efficiency, recycled content, the possibility 
of remanufacturing and recycling and environmental impacts, including carbon and environmental 
footprint among others. Once the ESPR legislation was negotiated and adopted by the European 
Parliament , the E uropean Commission  would prepare  and present  individual proposals  based on a 
thorough  impact assessment and public consultation open to all, including  the EU's international 
partners. The process would  be transparent  and based on science and international standards  to 
increase predictability for economic operators. The novelty of this legislation was the introduction of 
a so-called Digital Product Passport  (DPP), which  would be a means of a structured collection of 
product data conveyed through a unique identifier, based on a decentralized system designed in a 
way that w ould respect business security. Data would be on a need-to-know  basis and would largely 
deal with issues connected to the sustainability of products, their environmental impacts, circularity, 
substances of concern and others.  The ESPR  was expected to help achieve the EU's environmental 
goals and SDGs  and t arget product -related environmental impacts . The expected ESPR outcomes 
also include d benefits for consumers through improved product performance  and longer lifetimes. 
Public consultation had demonstrated that there was a strong demand from supply chain actors to 
bring about policy measures that could reduce material costs, hel p them reap reputational benefits 
and increase transparency across supply chains.  
1.7.  Another deliverable of the EU Green Deal was the new EU rules on the treatment of waste 
shipment s. The starting point for these rules was a Waste Shipment Regulation  (WSR ) from 2006  
whose main objective was to  implement the international commitments concerning  waste shipment s 
which stem med from the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal  and the Organisation for Econ omic Co -operation and 
Development (OECD ) Decision on shipment of waste . The regulation aimed  to set up a control 
procedure for shipment of waste  that depended on , inter alia , the characteristics of the waste , the 
countries of destination  and the final trea tment operation of the waste in question . There were  three 
main types of control procedures , which included : (i) general information requirement  for 
"green -listed " waste destined for recovery (non -hazardous, such as paper or metal) ; (ii) procedure 
of prior written notification and consent  for hazardous or problematic wastes, as well waste destined 
to landfills ; and (iii) prohibition on the export of hazardous waste outside the OECD or waste for 
landfilling outside EFTA . 
1.8.  The E uropean Union export ed around 33 million tonnes of waste every year at a value of about 
13 billion euros, while its import s were about 16 million tonnes at a value of 13.5 billion euros. About  
70 million tonnes of waste was shipped within the E uropean Union every year. The most t raded  
waste streams were ferrous metals and non -ferrous metals, paper, plastic, textiles and glass to a 
lesser extent. There had been a very steep increase in the export of waste from the E uropean Union  
to third countries. The European Union had moved from  20 million tonnes in 2004 to 33 million 
tonnes in 2020  for the export of wastes , while on the import side, volumes ha d remained relatively 
stable  at around 15  million tonnes.  
1.9.  Three main challenges linked to the implementation of the regulation had been  identified. First, 
concerning  shipments within the European Union , the WSR was too burdensome on shipments of 
waste for recycling and d id not support the transition to circular economy  models . Second, 
concerning  the export of waste , there were several  negative impacts on the environment and public 
health in destination countries, which also c ame with some reputational risks for the EU . The third 
challenge was linked  to the illegal shipm ent of waste, which was also an important issue  within the 
European Union . 
1.10.   There had been clear recommendations stemming from the EU Green Deal and the EU Circular 
Economy Action Plan  to revive the current regulation to ensure that the European Union was n ot 
transferring  its waste  challenges to third countries  and to facilitate shipments of waste destined for 
reuse and recycling of waste in the European Union . 
1.11.   There were several m easures  in the proposals linked to exports outside the European Union. 
First, with regards to e xports to non -OECD countries , it would only allow exports to those countries 
that notif ied the Commission of their willingness to import EU waste and their ability to deal with it 
sustainably . These countries would ne ed to demonstrate that they ha d the legislation and control 
system s in place to manage waste in an environmentally sound manner . The Commission would 
verify this  and include th ose countries  in a list of countries authori zed to import such waste . Second, 
concerning  exports to OECD countries , the measures that had been proposed included monitor ing WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  the export of waste and launch ing a specific procedure towards an OECD country to mitigate 
environmental problems that might be caused by such exports . There was al so another proposed 
measure on s pecific  obligations for EU companies exporting waste outside the European Union . 
According to this measure, EU exporting companies  would need to set up third -party audit schemes 
to ensure that the facilities treating their waste manage d it in an environmentally sound manner . 
The fourth  proposed mea sure to establish specific binding criteria to differentiate between used 
goods and waste for specific waste streams raise d particular export challenges . The EU 's rules on 
the shipment of waste were not in place yet and were under negotiation s within the EU institutions . 
The E uropean Union was hopeful that  a conclusion  of these negotiations  could be reached by the 
end of 2023 followed by  a three -year transition period  for the entry into force of these rules . 
1.12.   The representative of Australia  said that Australia condemn ed in the strongest possible terms 
Russia's unprovoked, unjust and illegal invasion of Ukraine. The invasion was a gross violation of 
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. Australia strongly support ed Ukraine's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. His delegation called on Russia to immediately withdraw forces 
from Ukrainian territory, consistent with the legally binding decision  of the International Court of 
Justice on 16 March.  Turning to the presentation on the EU Green Deal, Australia thank ed the 
European Union for its ongoing efforts and commitment to transparency and guidance to th e 
Committee on its efforts to address import ant issues on the nexus between trade and the 
environment. Australia looked for ward to continued engagement with the European Union on its 
EU Green Deal. 
1.13.   The representative of the United States  reiterate d his delegation's  position  on Russia's  actions 
and referred  delegations  to the Joint Statement on aggression by the Russian Federation against 
Ukraine with the support of  Belarus2, which condemn ed Russia's actions as a violation of international 
law, the UN Charter and fundamental  principles of international peace and security. Russia 's actions  
undermine d the rules-based  system and the United State s reiterate d its support for Ukraine during 
this difficult time.  
1.14.   Next, t he representative of the  United States thank ed the European Union for its presentation 
on the trade -related Green Deal initiatives. He encourage d the European Union to further consult 
with Members in the spirit of transparency and minimizing any disruption to trade. The United States 
would welcome add itional, detailed information and fulsome engagement by the E uropean Union on 
these trade-related initiatives to prevent trade disruptions and restrictions. His delegation would  
welcome a better understanding of how several initiatives planned under the Gr een Deal w ould 
intersect with transatlantic  trade to avoid any potential unintended disruptions. The United States 
remained  concerned that, for example, the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM ) would  
unnecessarily penalize goods that were produced in countries without an explicit price on carbon, 
regardless of associated emissions intensity. His delegation was hopeful that  the E uropean Union 
would  consider non -price-based  approaches,  so the CBAM did not lead to trade conflicts or 
disruptions of transatlantic trade.  The United States was concerned that the proposed revisions to 
the EU 's Waste Shipment Regulation m ight pose an unfair burden to international trade for both 
OECD and non -OECD members. The c urrent draft language appear ed to limit exports, and treat 
those EU permitted scrap exports more strictly than internal shipments. Reliable access to recyclable 
materials was essential to meet circular economy and decarbonization goals, particularly in the  steel 
sector, and the language in the EU 's proposal could restrict the international trade of these key 
low carbon inputs. An export restriction with respect to EU ferrous scrap w ould create a global 
distortion which, among other things, w ould put a strai n on US and other steel producers ' access to 
high-quality, low  carbon inputs. The United States thanked the  European Union  for notifying its 
proposed revisions to the TBT Committee. The United States plan ned to submit a response to the 
notification and  was interested to  understand how the E uropean Union planned to take into account 
WTO Member responses.  
1.15.   The representative of Argentina  underscored the need for the agenda of th e CTE  to continue 
to reflect the agreed mandate for its work, through  the analysis of the effect of environmental 
measures on market access, especially for developing countries.  There was a need to ensure that 
environmental mechanisms and measures, such as certification and labelling schemes, were 
consistent with WTO rules and d id not  constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on international trade.  Measures should be duly based on scientific evidence 
and consider  the capacities and needs of developing countries. Initiatives should be designed 
 
2 See document WT/GC/244 .  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  inclusively , through a process of consultation with all interested and potentially affected parties, 
avoiding unilater al implementation without multilateral efforts.  Efforts should also be made to avoid 
multiple certification requirements in different markets, as this would increase export costs, in 
particular for developing countries and Micro, Small and Medium -sized Enterprises  (MSMEs) . Her 
delegation thank ed the European Union for the update on relevant aspects of the European Green 
Deal. She reiterated that some of the measures generate d concern among the membership . The 
fight against climate change was a glob al challenge  and actions  to address it had to consider 
international commitments and n either  restrict international trade more than necessary  nor 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. The EU's intention to impose the same level 
of ambi tion at the global level, without considering  the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities  was a reason for  concern.  Argentina drew the EU's attention to the importance of 
avoiding unilateral actions without due legal support. Her delegation  would  closely follow the 
evolution of this initiative and look ed forward to receiving detailed information on its eventual design, 
the methodology that would be used to calculate carbon, the sectors targeted, as well as the possible 
scope of the mechanism . 
1.16.   The representative of Norway  joined previous speakers and condemn ed Russia's attack on its 
neighbour  Ukraine. The attack was unjustified, unprovoked and irresponsible  – a clear violation of 
international law. She reiterate d Norway's unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.  Her delegation thank ed the  
European Union for useful information about the  European Green Deal. Norway a ppreciate d the 
continued  effort to update the Committee in line with transparency . 
1.17.   The representative of Costa Rica  joined other delegations in  the expressions of support and 
solidarity with the people of Ukraine in the face of Russia's unjustified aggression. There were no 
winne rs in war. The human tragedy that millions of families were suffering was unthinkable for a 
country like Costa Rica, a democracy without an army and with a pacifist tradition. The 
environmental impact of this war was of great concern, as the contamination of soil, water and air 
would have long -term consequences, affecting human and animal life as well as crops and harvests. 
The impact on world trade was evident and therefore a matter for the WTO to address.  Costa Rica 
was a fervent defender of multilaterali sm and an international architecture at the service of peace, 
security, sustainable development and the protection of human rights. Trade could  and should 
contribute to the stability and peace of nations. Her delegation called  for dialogue and cessation of  
hostilities, respecting the rule of law.  Costa Rica thank ed the E uropean Union for  the presentation  
noting that it  continue d to be interested in deepening its understanding of the different elements 
that comprise d the European Green Deal  as well as the possible effects it could have on producers 
and exporters . Costa Rica looked forward to continuing talks at the WTO and bilaterally . 
1.18.   The representative  of India said that his delegation had been raising concerns about  the 
proposed rules und er the EU Green Deal in various WTO for a. Trade and sustainability policy needed 
to create a just and inclusive global green economy where all countries – developed and developing  – 
had equal, competitive opportunities to supply goods and services. Trade a nd sustainability policy 
needed to  avoid establishing a two -tier economy where developed countries ha d the resources and 
capacity to transition to a green economy while the rest of the world was left in a brown economy.  
The world was coming together in an unprecedented manner in addressing the challenges of 
environment and climate change. This had been  demonstrated in COP26 in Glasgow and more 
recently in Nairobi at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP ) summit. In Glasgow, the 
world  had kept the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above pre -industrial levels within reach. 
The Indian Prime Minister had announced India's  net zero plans by 2070, had presented the 
five-point agenda called Panchamrit , which contain ed some  near-term 2030 commitments , and 
stressed the importance of the acronym LIFE – Lifestyle For Environment.  In Nairobi, members of 
the UNEP  had adopted  a landmark resolution launching negotiations of a legally binding international 
instrument to end p lastic pollution . 
1.19.   The principles enshrined in international environment law had to be fully reflect ed in the 
measures proposed under international trade law. WTO Members should tackle transboundary 
environmental problems based on  international cooperation.  India continue d to study the various 
provisions of the European Green Deal and the CBAM . These measures encroach ed upon the 
sovereign policy making  rights of Membe r. The proposed measures also violate d the basic principles 
of international environment al law, namely the principle of c ommon but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capacities.  India remained  opposed to such externalization of domestic laws an d 
continue d to analyse the substantive aspect of the proposed legislations.  India looked  forward to WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  engaging with the European Union bilaterally to understand the details and the impact on trade  of 
the presented measures . 
1.20.   The representative of the Russian Federation  said that consideration of matters of global or 
regional security concerns, UN Charter enforcement , or compliance d id not fall under the mandate 
of the CTE  and the WTO. His delegation urged the CTE Chair  to moderate the discussion accordingly  
and not allow interventions from delegations negligent to this  consideration. He noted that t here 
were environmental implications  in relation to the situation in Ukraine  due to unilateral measures 
that had been introduced. Fossil fu el prices had skyrocketed. In theory, this had to lead to a decrease 
in consumption, which also could have positive environmental implications. There had also been an 
effect on the level of prices across the full board of goods globally.  As for the present ation on the 
European  Green Deal, his delegation supported  those delegations that s aw the CTE as a tool that 
helped to avoid protectionist trade measures and ensure d compliance with WTO obligations.  Any 
environmental measures planned to be adopted by Membe rs had to also be thoroughly explained 
and examined at meetings and over correspondence at the specialized WTO body. His delegation 
welcome d Members' efforts to contribute to this CTE task. As to specific elements of the EU Green 
Deal, the Russian Federation  joined the concerns raised by several  delegations and reiterate d its 
statement  made at the Council of Trade in Goods in respect of the initiatives envisaged by the 
EU Green Deal.  
1.21.   The representative of Switzerland  echoe d other Members in condemni ng Russia's military 
aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms and call ed on Russia to deescalate the 
situation immediately, cease all hostilities , and withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory without 
delay. This was a serious violatio n of international law. Russia's action violate d the prohibition of the 
use of force and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine as enshrined in international law. 
Russia's large -scale military aggression against Ukraine represent ed a massive security risk for the 
entire continent , which was a matter of deep concern for  Switzerland . His delegation also call ed on 
all actors to respect international law including international humanitarian law. With regards to the 
European Green Deal, he  thank ed the E uropean Union  for the presentation. Switzerland follow ed 
with great interest the E uropean Union's proposal and this contribution was very helpful for its 
ongoing internal consultations.  
1.22.   The representative of Brazil  said t he European Union was not only a major trading partner for 
Brazil but a Member with wh om it share d a common perspective on the importance and future of 
the WTO. Brazil support ed the adoption of policies that achieve d legitimate environmental objectives 
but was concerned by the adoption of unilateral measures that result ed in an unnecessary negative 
impact on international trade. The European  Green Deal needed to  comply with core WTO rules but 
also with the fundamental principles  of international environmental law. In both the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change  (UNFCCC ) and the Paris Agreement, the EU had agreed 
to take into account historical responsibilities and respective capabilities  and not impose its 
standards on other countries. While these core princip les ha d been fundamental to the environmental 
framework in the past 50 years, the E uropean Union  had consistently engaged in watering down any 
reference to its responsibilities. The claim that the European Green Deal and its subsequent 
measures would achieve an ambitious agenda had to  be taken with a few grains of salt.  
1.23.    First, historical contributions me ant that countries that industriali zed first  should bear a larger 
brunt o f the cost of emission reduction. The European Union 's fiscal capacity to invest in green 
technology and policies derive d in good measure from the unsustainable activities  that it had 
practiced in the developing world for over two centuries.  
1.24.   Second, access to finance was a fundamental aspect. A country with a debt to GDP ratio o f 
more than 100% that could  borrow at a very low cost was not necessarily more ambitious in its 
investments or policies than a country with a much lower debt to GDP ratio but facing the challenge  
of financ ing its investments in sustainability. Fiscal capac ities were cent red different ly, and the 
European Union had a moral and legal obligation to consider that each country should contribute 
according to its capability. Therefore, although the E uropean Union  sought  to advance in several 
fora that an agricultur al model based on years of subsidies needed to  be a benchmark for 
sustainability, its model was simply not replicable in developing countries with limited fiscal 
capabilities. It was, therefore, not sustainable per the European Union's  commitments in MEAs . 
1.25.   Third, if each Member was to use criteria that were more advantageous to itself, Brazil could 
impose taxes on countries that d id not match Brazil's ambition o f having an electricity grid with 80% WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  renewables, or Brazil could  classify countries according to how their demand for illegal drugs, 
minerals and timber  were provoking  violence and environmental degradation in the Amazon  and tax 
and ban their products accordingly. This would be a legitimate concern and other Members co uld 
similarly choose other concerns. But unless the core principles and norms of the WTO  were 
respected, the  multilateral framework  would  be further weakened . Moreover , despite its high level 
of per capita income, the European Union could  not overhaul its energy import sources in the short 
or medium term . It needed to have  more consideration of the difficulties developing countries face d 
in overcoming challenges such as reducing deforestation. Fourth, with regard to CBAM specifically, 
despite having a large  number of delegates, interns and experts from capital, the E uropean  Union  
had not been able to present an answer as to how the granting of free emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) allowances concurrently with the entry into force of CBAM would be compatible wi th WTO 
rules. 
1.26.   As a final comment, Brazil observe d that many stakeholders ha d called for trade negotiators 
to work closely with environmental experts. In this context, Brazil believe d that the best way to 
move forward in these discussions was through respec t for not only WTO rules but also for the 
concepts, principles and commitments agreed in other  fora. Measures such as the CBAM, due 
diligence requirements, non -tariff barriers in addition to SPS requirements , and the granting of more 
than 2 ,000 emergency authorizations for substances under Maximum Residu e Levels ( MRLs) and 
others suggest ed a very concerning pattern where the EU acted unilaterally and in clear opposition 
of the principles in both the trade and environmental regimes. Brazil was very proud of the 
constructive role it played in both regimes and urge d the EU to consider the systemic impact of its 
unilateral actions.  
1.27.   The representative of Indonesia  thanked  the European Union for the update on the 
environmental measures , which were of  concern to many WTO Members. Indonesia h ad been paying 
close attention to the European  Green Deal. The E uropean Union  was a substantial market for 
Indonesia's agricultural products, namely, palm oil, coffee, as well as ro ot and derivative products, 
whose market  access could be highly affected by these policies. The centrality of the multilateral 
trading system and the WTO  in driving resilient, inclusive , and sustainable growth in the 
post-pandemic era was unquestionable. It was important to maintain the contribution of the 
multilateral trading system  to the  UN 2030  Agenda  and to support the UNFCCC and the 
Paris Agreement. Members increasingly rel ied on trade policy instruments to pursue many public 
object ives, including environmental and climate goals. To restore trust and build a stronger 
multilateral trading system, WTO Members had to ensure that the system was able to contribute to 
SDGs in the areas of poverty reduction, preventing hunger, health, educa tion, job creation  and 
environmental protection as well as reduc ing inequalities. Indonesia was committed to mitigating 
climate change. His delegation  emphasi zed that any measures or policies to pursue environmental 
and climate goals s hould  not create unne cessary trade barriers . It was pertinent to explore policies 
that serve d overall SDGs while leaving  no one behind. Indonesia recall ed the preamble to the 
Marrakesh Agreement , which stipulated that  relation s in the field of trade and economic endeavo ur 
should be conducted to raise standards of living, ensure  full employment and a large and steadily 
growing real income. He underscored that the achievement  of environmental and climate goals 
should go along with raising standards of living and real income.  His delegation expressed its  concern 
about  the European Green Deal concerning  those measures that potentially harm ed and endanger ed 
the livelihood of thousands of farmers  and were inconsistent with the WTO  principle  of 
non-discrimination. It was important to consider the different levels of development  and the  common 
but differentiated responsibilities when pursuing environmental and climate goals. Any measure 
should be based on scientific evidence and objective findings, otherwise , those measures were 
arbitra ry and m ight become unnecessary trade barriers . Finally, Indonesia emphasi zed that trade 
measures purs uing environmental and climate goals should not create unnecessary trade barriers . 
Trade needed to be beneficial  for all and contribute to  achieving  the SDGs. Hence, domestic policies 
had to respect the right to develop ment of other countries.  
1.28.   The representative of Paraguay  reiterate d that environmental measures with a trade impact 
needed to conform to multilateral regulations to prevent them from becoming disguised barriers to 
trade, take into account common but differentiated responsibilities  and not hinder  the capacity of 
developing countries to export and develop. As a developing country, Paraguay was  concerned about 
the extra costs that the pro vision of these measures w ould have on its exports. While some 
developed countries ha d gone through industrialization and ha d reached their level of development 
based on  highly polluting methods contributing to climate change, it was the developing countri es 
that ha d contributed to a lesser extent, and were now  penalized and forced to comply with the same WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  measures without having reached the same level of development.  Paraguay shared the view of  Brazil 
that the best way to advance the d iscussions  on sustaina ble development in the WTO was through 
full respect not only for the WTO rules but also for the concepts , principles and commitments that 
had been agreed upon in other for a. 
1.29.   The representative of China  encourage d the  European Union  to enhance transparency and 
ensure that the proposed Green Deal measures were compatible with WTO rules and MEAs . He noted 
that his  delegation  would continue to follow this issue.  
1.30.   The representative of Canada  joined other  delegations and  condemn ed Russia's unjustifiable 
and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The attacks were causing widespread humanitarian 
consequences and result ing the senseless death of innocent people. This was not only an attack on 
Ukraine  but an attack on international law, inclu ding the UN Charter, as well as democracy, freedom 
and human rights. Canada thank ed the E uropean Union  for th e presentation , noting that  such 
exchanges enhance d transparency and increase d the knowledge level of the membership. Her  
delegation encouraged  all Members to engage in these sorts of presentation s to enhance the work 
of the Committee.  
1.31.   The representative of Thailand  share d the concerns expressed by other delegations regarding 
several  measures under the European Green Deal, notably the CBAM, which see med to be 
problematic in the light of international rules and principles, including those under the WTO and the 
UNFCCC. His delegation appreciate d the updates by the E uropean Union and urge d it to continue to 
engage  with all stakeholders and trade partners . Thailand strongly urge d the E uropean Uni on to 
pursue its environmental agenda based on  cooperation, rather than coercion.  
1.32.   The representative of the Philippine s thanked  the European Union  for its comprehensive 
briefing on updates related to the European Green Deal. The Philippines remain ed interested to learn 
how the CBAM regulation w ould interact with the EU Emissions Trading System  (EU ETS), particularly 
concerning  the existing policies to award free allowances. His delegation remain ed concerned about 
the narrow phase -in of the CBAM by 2030 and proposals to include a broader scope to its coverages. 
The Philippines  was interested  to hear whether there was an intention for revenues obtained from 
the CBAM to  be used to  support international climate finance.  
1.33.   The representative of the European Union  responded to the questions raised by delegations. 
On the proposal on waste shipments , the representative noted that the objective was to ensure  
better guarantees that , when waste was exported outside of the E uropean Union , it would be 
managed according to standards comparable to those in the E uropean Union. The representative 
clarified that the measure  would apply to all waste  and the European  Union would be  building on 
international efforts on waste management  and looked forward  to coordinating with all Parties to the 
Basel Convention . The representative further noted that the  measures aimed  to tackle the triple 
planetary  crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution by contributing to a more circular 
economy and sustainable consumption and production.  WTO computability was part of the 
considerations when developing th em. The E uropean Union  sought to ensure there was  full equality 
between the treatment of domestic and imported products  from outside the European Union . The 
legislation was  also based on internationally agreed standards,  so it was easy for the EU's trading 
partners  to comply . The le gislation include d transitio n periods so that markets and the EU's trading 
partners could adapt to them . To ensure transparency regarding these measures, the 
European  Union was  presenting them at the CTE  as well  as in the bilateral context of its Free Trad e 
Agreements  (FTAs) . These policies  had been developed  based on a comprehensive assessment of 
environmental, social and economic impact  and open public consultations . 
1.34.   Responding to questions about the EU ETS and the CBAM , the representative noted that the 
CBAM was designed in a way  that would not penali ze other countries' exporters. The EU ETS would 
be phase d out while phasing in the CBAM  in a way that one of the mechanisms would replace the 
other.  
1.35.   Concerning  the final outc omes o f the CBAM proposal,  the European Union wa s going to have 
a final vote in  the European  Parliament, where it w ould make a final decision on its position. The 
European Council had adopted its position on 15 March . In September  2022,  it was expected to 
negotiate the outcome of the agreement with legislators , including all the measures that  had been 
presented at the CTE s o far.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  1.36.   The representative noted that there had been several comments made  by delegations that 
the EU had built its economy by  polluting and no w it was trying  to impose its high standard s on 
developing countries. The representative underscored that the European  Union was engaged  in 
working with partners at the WTO  and in other multilateral fora to tackle glob al challenges  and trade 
policy ha d a role to play in contributing  to addressing them.  
1.2  Fossil fuel subsidy reform (FFSR)  
1.37.   The representative of New Zealand  joined other Members in unequivocally condemning the 
unprovoked and unjustified attack by Russia on Ukraine.  These actions were a grave breach of 
international rules – the use of force to change borders was strictly prohibited under international 
law. Russia 's invasion ha d implications for global peace, security and economic stability. The efforts 
to adv ance trade and environment objectives were critical to all people, but multilateral cooperation 
in this and other fora continue d to be profoundly undermined by Russian action.  
1.38.   As to this agenda item, New Zealand provide d the Committee with an update on the  joint 
Ministerial Statement on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform  (FFSR)3 issued in December  2021. New Zealand 
was pleased to welcome Samoa who had joined the 46 co -sponsors in calling for the rationalization 
and phase -out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies  (FFS) and committing to sharing information and 
experiences to advance discussion s at the WTO.  
1.39.   New Zealand informed delegations  that a high -level work plan was currently being consulted 
with co -sponsors to guide  their efforts over the coming months. Followin g consultation,  the intention 
was to circulate the high -level work  plan ahead of MC12.  Coordinators of the three trade and 
environment initiatives w ould look to provide stakeholders with an update on their efforts during 
MC12 to keep up the momentum and profile of these initiatives.  As set out in the Joint Ministerial 
Statement, co -sponsors  recognize d that FFSR needed to take fully into account the specific needs 
and conditions of developing countries and  minimize the possible adverse impacts on their 
development. A key focus of the high -level work plan w ould be on the development issues associated 
with FFSR and lessons learned from reform efforts to ensure a just transition. He reiterated  that 
there was cle ar empirical evidence supporting the need for action on FFS to meet the climate change 
and sustainable development objectives.  
1.40.   The WTO was the appropriate forum to translate into concrete action the commitments on 
FFSR made by world l eaders at COP26 and in  the UN Sustainable Development Goals  (SDGs) . 
New Zealand looked  forward to advancing this  work under the Joint Ministerial Statement and  
contributing to other processes where relevant.  He recalled that t he Joint Ministerial Statement 
remain ed open to new co-sponsors and e ncourage d Members to sign it . 
1.41.   The representative of Switzerland  reiterated her delegation's support for the intention of 
rationalizing and phasing out FFS that encouraged wasteful consumption. To achieve the goals set 
out in the Paris Agreement or the SDGs, action was needed now. In addition to being a member of 
the Friends Group on FFSR, Switzerland was en gaged on this very important issue with New Zealand 
and four other WTO Members in negotiations on the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and 
Sustainability (ACCTS) , which aimed, among other things, to establish measures to eliminate FFS 
harmful to the envi ronment.  Her delegation welcomed Samoa as a co -sponsor. Th e FFSR  initiative 
was essential to achieve the climate goals set by the international community.  Switzerland  was 
grateful to New Zealand  for initiating the work programme for MC12  and support ed any future 
projects under this initiative.  Switzerland also supported the engagement of stakeholders who  could  
move the work forward  through their expertise . She reiterated that  the WTO c ould play a central 
role in identifying the specific trade interest in di scussing FFS in the multilateral trading system.  Her 
delegation encourage d all other Members to join  the FFSR initiative . 
1.42.   The representative of Venezuela  reiterated the position that her de legation did not support 
the inclusion of this item on the WTO agen da. 
 
3 See document WT/MIN(21)/9/Rev.1 . WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  1.3  Circular economy and plastics pollution  
1.3.1   Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics 
Trade (IDP)  
1.43.   On behalf of the co -coordinators4, the representative of Ecuador  briefed the Committee on 
the work of the Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics 
Trade (IDP) . Since the last CTE  in February 2022 , the IDP h ad held pre -plenary and plenary meetings 
spurring robust dialogues with stakeholders and other international organiz ations on its three 
workstreams : (i) crosscutting issues ; (ii) promoting trade to tackle plastic pollution ; and 
(iii) reducing plastic pollution and a circular economy for plastics .5 Delegations,  stakeholders and 
other representatives of international organizations had engaged in discussions to identify ways to 
improve the understanding of the global economy of plastics, sharing experiences of respective 
approaches to common challenges  and d eepening the understandi ng of trade -related technical 
assistance and capacity  building needs for developing Members, particularly for LDCs and Small 
Island and Developing States (SIDS). Discussions had also looked at enhancing cooperation with 
other relevant international organiz ations.  
1.44.   On cross cutting  issues , the IDP was identifying ways to include plastic considerations in the 
next Aid for Trade cycle. In this regard, it had launched the Aid for Trade Needs Assessment Survey6, 
which would provide substantive inputs for future e ngagements in the Aid for Trade process. A side 
event at the upcoming Aid for Trade Global Review in July 2022 was also planned by IDP coordinators 
and facilitators. Ecuador underscored that d eepen ing the IDP's engagement with the United Nations 
Environmen t Assembly (UNEA ) process on the negotiations of a new global instrument to address 
plastic pollution was  another  priority for many Members of the IDP.  
1.45.   Ecuador  also informed delegations that the IDP had shared a communication7 addressed to 
the World Customs Organization (WCO) which had included a call for the WTO Secretariat to enhance 
its cooperation with the WCO Secretariat, notably on plastics customs classification and 
implementation challenges. It had also included a pledg e by co -sponsors to actively engage in 
support of efforts at the WCO to better identify plastics flows. This could include, inter alia , the 
organization of joint symposium or workshops with WCO and other relevant stakeholders; 
identification of relevant va lue chain actors and Trade -related Plastics Measures (TrPMs); 
identification of goods and services for customs officials to effectively identify plastics; and 
identification of customs implementation facilitation measures. The representative noted that 
cooperation between the WCO and the WTO could also contribute to the negotiations of the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) in the UNEA process.  She informed that delegations 
had welcomed the Aid for Trade Needs Assessment Survey, the WCO -WTO coope ration , and the 
IDP's active participation in the UNEA process. The importance of the IDP to engage in different 
process es such as UNEA, the C onference of the Parties (C OP) of the B asel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
(BRS) Conventions, the COP of the Convention on Biological D iversity (CBD) and the United  Nations 
Oceans Conference had also been underscored by delegations.  
1.46.   On promoting trade to tackle plastic pollution , there was ongoing and robust work on plastic 
substitutes on HS codes and life cycle analyses  (LCA) . With respect to this workstream , the 
United  Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD ) had briefed delegations about its 
work on plastics substitutes, HS codes, LCA and tariff considerations . UNCTAD had also presented 
information on plastic substitutes and alternatives and the importance of these areas for developing 
countries. She informed that the IDP, together with UNCTAD,  would organize  an exploratory 
workshop on plastics substitutes in the second quarter of 2022 to move discus sions forward on a 
range of issues including, inter alia , working definitions, minimum criteria for LCA, an illustrative list 
of material substitutes, a material identification exercise, an HS code identification exercise, and 
trade -related measures enabli ng single -use plastics products substitution by sustainable materials . 
1.47.   The representative noted that Members ha d engaged in discussions based on the  technical 
information  that had been  shared by different stakeholders  during IDP  meetings . Members and 
 
4 Australia, Barbados, China, Ecuador, Fiji, and Morocco . 
5 See document INF/TE/IDP/W/5 .  
6 See document INF/TE/IDP/W/8 .  
7 See document INF/TE/IDP/W/6 .  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  stakeholders had suggested that the work on standards could be a nother  point of consideration in 
the IDP as well as other issues such as non -tariffs barriers , financing and tech nology  transfer . 
1.48.   On the workstream on r eduction of plastic pollution and a circular economy for plastic s, the 
IDP had put together a survey to identify Member 's TrPMs .8 The survey was intended to improve 
collective knowledge and outlined several questions regarding: (i) title and description of the policy 
or measure; ( ii) the type of measures covered (providing some guiding options); (iii) the main 
objective of the policy; (iv) stage of the life cycle or value chain that the policy was intended for; 
(v) products and services covered; (vi) relevant HS/ICS codes; (vii) da te of entry into force; and 
(viii) challenges identified in the implementation phase. The survey was voluntary and would help 
to improve the collective understanding, map policies and identify gaps and potential opportunities . 
1.49.   Ecuador noted that another  key action for the IDP was contribution s to other international 
processes of common interests such as the UNEA -5 negotiations and the work of the ad hoc 
open-ended working group (OEWG) that had met recently in Dakar . Finally, Ecuador i nforme d 
delegations  that the IDP would hold two plenary meetings in October and December 2022 . 
1.3.2   Briefing by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP ) on the UNEA -5 
resolution on negotiations towards an international agreement on plastics  
1.50.   The representative of  the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP ) briefed delegations 
on the UNEA -5 resolution on negotiations  towards an international agreement on plastic . She recalled 
that UNEA had adopted resolution 5/14  in March 2022 . The resolution request ed UNEP to convene 
an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop an international legally binding 
instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment. The resolution specifie d that 
the instrument  would be  based on a comprehensi ve approach that addresse d the full life cycle of 
plastic, taking into account the Rio Declaration and national circumstances and capabilities.  
1.51.   By way of  the resolution, member states had affirmed the urgent need to strengthen global 
coordination, cooperat ion and governance to take immediate actions toward the long -term 
elimination of plastic pollution in marine and other environments.  UNEA gave guidance on what the 
INC was  to consider, including , inter alia , the promotion of sustainable production and cons umption 
of plastics (including product design , environmentally sound waste management , and through 
resource efficiency and circular economy approaches); technical and capacity means of 
implementation; finance mechanism to support the implementation; dedica ted multilateral fund s; 
data, monitoring , and reporting; compliance; National Action Plans ; and scientific and socio economic  
information and assessment. While the  word "trade " was not specifically mentioned in the resolution , 
it was clear that the plastics economy was transboundary. With 400 million tonnes of plastic 
estimated to be produced annually, producers and consumers around the world were connected 
through international supply chains and through international trade and investm ent that occur red 
across the life cycle of plastics. Therefore , solutions to the plastic crisis also needed to be 
transboundary and w ould r equire a system change approach.  
1.52.   To have a successful new circular plastics economy , there  would be a need to encoura ge 
innovation and solutions. New business models w ould need to be fostered to respond to new market 
opportunities. There w ould also be a need to create new market opportunities for recycled plastic 
and products with recycled content, and investment opportu nities w ould have to be generated that 
enable d waste to be collected, sorted, recycled and reused. The representative noted that t he trade 
community was an important player in driving this change and its engagement in this process w ould 
facilitate the deve lopment of a strong instrument.  She further underscored that the WTO Ministerial 
Statement sen t a strong and important political message  and that UNEP welcomed  the IDP efforts. 
She urged delegations to  continue to stay ahead of the curve to  encourage volun tary cooperation at 
global and regional levels , share best practices and lessons learned , and support countries to build 
capacity.  
1.53.   The representative  further  informed delegations that t he ad hoc OEWG  to prepare for the 
intergovernmental negotiating committee process had been held in Dakar, Senegal , from 
30 May-1 June. The group had a greed to a timetable for the negotiating process and that the first 
negotiating meeting w ould take place during the week  of 28 November 2022 in Uruguay. The group 
 
8 See document INF/TE/IDP/W/7/Rev.1 . WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  had d eliberated on the rules of procedure for the INC and ha d forwarded its outcome to its first 
meeting in November . UNEP was grateful that the WTO was part of the OEWG multi -stakeholder 
dialogues, where trade wa s featured as a discussion topic . The OEWG ha d demonstrated the global 
level of momentum and ha d laid the foundation for work to start at the first INC meeting in 
November.  
1.54.   In moving forward to build a global instrument, it was needed to  learn from what ex isted, 
build on this and be swift and efficient in  the actions in order to meet the timeline that ha d been set.  
UNEP  concluded by underscoring that, by working together, the ambitious timeframe  for an 
agreement to end plastics pollution  could become a reality  by the end of 2024.  
1.55.   The representative of the United Kingdom  (UK) condemned  Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As 
the UN  Secretary -General ha d said, such unilateral measures conflict ed directly with the UN Charter. 
Russia's attack was resulting in immea surable harm to the p eople  of Ukraine and to the environmen t 
with damage to land, air , and water of wide geographical scope.  As to the agenda item, s he thanked 
the representatives of UNEP and Ecuador for their reports. The United Kingdom  was working with 
China and Fiji to facilitate the workstream on crosscutting issues , which include d discussions on the 
negotiations of a global plastics agreement  – a key UK priority.  The United  Kingdom w as pleased 
that the IDP had been represented at the OEWG  meeting in Da kar. She encourage d all WTO Members 
to engage with th e important and inclusive work taking place in the IDP . Plastic pollution and 
sustainable management of plastics across its life  cycle was a challenge faced by all countries and 
there were key insights for trade policy measures and opportunities for collective action.  
1.56.   The representative of Japan  echoed other Members and condemned Russia's aggression 
against Ukraine in the strongest terms as  it infringe d upon Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and constitute d a serious violation of international law. Japan strongly urge d Russia to 
cease the attack and to withdraw its forces immediately. As to the agenda item, Japan ha d been 
worki ng on the issue of circular economic policy and plastic pollution both domestically and 
internationally.  In April 2022, the "Plastic Resource Recycling Promotion Law" had been  enforced to 
promote the recycling of plastics throughout the ir life cycle from d esign and manufacturing to the 
disposal of plastic products.  Japan ha d proposed the "Osaka -Blue Ocean Vision " framework, which 
set the target of reducing additional pollution from marine plastic litter to zero by 2050. Japan had 
been actively working on me asures against marine plastic waste to play a leading role in the new 
treaty negotiations scheduled to start later this year.  As co -facilitator of the Working Group  on 
Circular Economy  – Circularity  in TESSD, Japan looked forward to engaging constructively  in the 
discussions.  
1.57.   The representative of Norway  said that a milestone had been  reached when UNEA  had agreed 
to develop an international legally binding agreement to end plastic pollution. The 
UN Secretary -General had called this the most important global environmental deal since the 
Paris Agreement. This issue ha d been a Norwegian priority for several years. The resolution specifie d 
the mandate for this process and set a goal of completing the work by the end of 2024. A key to 
success in m odern treatymaking was the early and effective involvement of the business community 
and voices in civil society. Norway was ready to support this work and s aw the IDP 's efforts as 
relevant input.  
1.58.   The representative of  Canada  said plastic pollution was a g lobal environmental issue that 
continue d to gain momentum for action, with UNEA launching negotiations for a legally binding 
international instrument to tackle plastic pollution. Canada support ed work by countries, 
organizations and other stakeholders to t ackle the issue of plastic pollution and move towards a 
plastics circular economy, while work advanced on develop ing a new global agreement on plastics.  
Canada was of the view that any proposal or outcome of the IDP should support the WTO mandate 
and complement the global and regional initiatives underway, in particular recognizing the 
negotiation process for an ambitious new international agreement to end plastic pollution, without 
prejudging its outcome. It should be kept  in mind that there were other environmental 
sustainability -related efforts underway at the WTO where discussions on the circular economy w ould 
also take place . In that sense, Canada encouraged  increased cooperation between IDP and TESSD 
to avoid duplicating efforts and find synergy.  On 2 March 2022, the international community had 
gathered, online and in -person in Nairobi, Kenya, at UNEA 5.2. Over 170 member states  had agreed 
to a historic mandate  aimed at ending plastic pollution globally. At UNEA -5.2, countries had agreed 
to launch an INC with the ambitious mandate of develop ing an international legally binding 
agreement on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, based on a comprehensive WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  approach that address ed the full life  cycle of plastics, by 2024.  Canada was proud to have worked 
tirelessly in advance of, and during , the recent UNEA -5.2 meetings to help deliver this historic 
outcome, both as one of the co -facilitators guiding the UNEA negotiations and in its national capacity.  
Canada also recognize d that ambition by governments alone w ould not be enough to deli ver 
meaningful reductions in plastic pollution. Inclusive action by actors at all levels, including 
governments, industry, civil society, Indigenous Peoples, and youth, among others, was needed to 
tackle plastic pollution  and help drive us toward a more circular economy . UNEA -5.2 was only the 
starting point  – the process to determine what the agreement w ould actually look like, and what it 
would do, was starting now.  It would be  during these substantive negotiations that Canada w ould 
consult with par tners domestically, including with provinces and territories, industries, Indigenous 
Peoples, youth, women, and civil society, among others, to help ensure the progress of ambitious 
action that reflect ed the diverse views across the entire value  chain of t he plastics life  cycle.  
1.59.   The representative of Guatemala  raised a question regarding the procedure of these 
negotiations . She requested details on how exactly these negotiations would take place and who 
could participate  in them.  She also enquired  whether this was  an open -ended meeting or whether 
the INC  was going to prepare a document and send it to Members . 
1.60.   The representative of the European Union  noted  that t here was another UNEA -5 resolution 
worth mentioning in this context related to "Enhancing circular economy as a contribution to 
achieving sustainable consumption and production".  This include d actions addressing resource use 
through the entire life cycle of products, from desig n to recycling and sound management of waste, 
focusing on keeping resources in the economy and limiting the extraction of raw materials. The 
resolution also recogni zed the importance of inclusive multilateral and multi -stakeholder dialogues 
on sustainable consumption and production, resource efficiency and the circular economy to promote 
sustainable development. This was also  under consideration at  the upcoming  Stockholm+50 
International Meeting. The E uropean Union and its Member states  support ed the establ ishment of a 
sustainable consumption and production (SCP) forum or dialogue to accelerate the achievement of 
SDG 12 and related SDG s. The European Union was committed to transitioning to a climate -neutral, 
nature -positive and resource -efficient circular economy. The European Union  wanted to move from 
linear plastic production and consumption to a circular plastic cycle. Changing the way plastics were 
designed, produced and used c ould greatly contribute to reducing plastic pollution and marine litter, 
by preventing waste or turning used plastics into secondary resources . The EU's actions ha d included 
measures on single -use plastics products and micro -plastics intentionally added to products, e.g. in 
cosmetics. The European Union was  also working on micro -plastics generated by wear and tear in 
e.g. tyres and paints. Product design and product sustainability criteria were key for the 
European  Union.  The E uropean Union  focuse d on prevention and on tackling all sources and 
pathways of plastic pollution in an integrated way. It covered  the whole value chain of a range of 
plastic products from product design, extended producer responsibility, market restrictions, and 
consumer info rmation campaigns to waste management.  In this context, engagement in negotiating 
a global plastics agreement was critical. The trade community was an important player and c ould 
bring contributions that w ould be important for the INC meetings, the first on e of which had been  
held earlier this week in Dakar , Senegal.  Trade policy and the work in the IDP and the CTE had to 
accompany the circular economy transition of the plastic sector by facilitating the adoption of 
measures on e.g. single -use plastic produc ts and micro -plastics intentionally added to products, and 
related technical standards.  He concluded by underscoring the need to facilitate the implementation 
of relevant MEAs, notably plastic -related decisions by the Basel Convention concerning  the shipme nt 
of certain types of plastic waste.  
1.61.   The representative of Switzerland  said that Switzerland was an active Member of the IDP and 
thank ed the co -coven ors for their leadership and efforts in underscoring  the need to take further 
action throughout the life cycle to combat plastic pollution, including through a circular economy 
approach. Switzerland strongly supported the UNEA 5.2 resolution to start negotiations on a binding 
instrument by 2024 to end plast ic pollution and had been very much engaged in Dakar in this 
framework.  In the negotiation process that w ould follow this resolution, the IDP w ould have a role 
to play in providing its expertise on plastics value chains. These value chains were complex and  the 
IDP was ideally placed to provide the necessary data and answer the trade -related questions that 
would  arise during the negotiations. The WTO needed to contribute  to a future global treaty  while 
not duplicating  efforts . Switzerland saw a particular role for the WTO in the global effort to reduce 
plastic pollution. Focusing the work  on the unique added value of the IDP would allow better  
contribut ion to the negotiation process.  Switzerland encourage d all Members to join the IDP's 
Ministerial Declaration , which also supported  the work in other fora such as the UNEA.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  1.62.   The representative of Colombia  thank ed Ecuador for the briefing on the IDP and UNEP for the 
update on the negotiations that were underway on a binding instrument for plastics. These were  
two very important initiatives  for Colombia , which w ere participating in both discussions . Colombia 
invited all Members to participate in the completion of the voluntary surveys. Having more 
inform ation and greater clarity about the measures that countries  were adopting in these areas 
would allow for better decisions and more comprehensive work within this organization.  She 
reiterate d the importance for Colombia of the issues of circular economy and  the reduction of 
unnecessary plastics, especially single -use plastics. These two issues required  important work and 
the WTO ha d a particular role to play . She underscored that such  briefings  from UNEP and other 
organizations were important for the CTE as they allowed the WTO to be updated  and coordinate 
efforts  with other actors.  
1.63.   The representative of Korea  said that his delegation was pleased that domestic efforts to 
reduce plastic pollution were being shared, as it w ould a ct as a stimulus for other countries to follow 
suit. Korea ha d also formulated a circular economy implementation plan and would  share the results 
arising from the implementation of these measures at an appropriate time. His delegation  supported 
the efforts  the IDP was making with other international institutions . Korea  would also make 
contributions in international fora to fight plastic pollution.  
1.64.   The repre sentative of UNEP  responded to the question raised by Guatemala regarding the 
rules of engagement in t he INC process . She clarified that  the OEWG  had agreed to the rules of 
procedure for the INC with one outstanding issue that remain ed to be solved  before starting the  
process. UNEP  informed delegations that it would share this information with  the WTO Secretariat 
so they could understand these rules and have access to them. The rules were  also available on 
UNEP's  website. Finally, she  thanked the European Union for the reminder of the important link of 
plastic pollution to the UNEA resolution 5/11 on circular economy . 
1.65.   The representative of Ecuador  thanked delegations for  the insightful  comments and 
suggestions . She also thanked the facilitators of the IDP workstreams,  namely Australia , Philippines, 
United Kingdom , Fiji, China, and Colombia , for their work. Ecuador looked  forward to engaging with 
all Members and invite d delegations  to join the IDP.  
1.4  Other  
1.4.1   Presentation by the United States  on its discussion paper "Climate Change and 
Circula r Economy " 
1.66.   The representative of the United States  provided an overview of the discussion paper on 
Climate Change and Circular Economy9 that his delegation had submitted,  and which had been  
circulated to the Membership. The representative noted that the Biden -Harris administration had 
made combatting climate change a key priority and called upon the whole of the US government to 
contribute to this effort. As part of this effort, the United St ates continued to consider how trade 
tools could make a positive contribution to climate change objectives.  
1.67.   The United States had drafted this paper, in part, to outline the key questions regarding 
trade -related issues related to climate change, environmen tal goods, and circular economy. 
According to the United States, such questions were worthwhile for consideration and discussion 
among WTO Members together, not only in TESSD but also in the CTE regular. Some of these points 
had been elaborated within the submission, and the representative of the United States wanted to 
outline why they were thinking about these questions.  
1.68.   He noted that the themes and questions that were raised in the submission were not only 
questions that were relevant for the United Stat es, but also for consideration by the full 
WTO Membership. Addressing climate change was not a siloed endeavour, and the topics of circular 
economy, preventing carbon leakage, and promoting trade in certain environmental goods and 
services all had  a signif icant nexus to each other.  
1.69.   Turning to the paper, it started by asking policy and technical questions about trade and 
climate change. There were several  ongoing efforts to promote low -emission trade. This  concept had 
 
9 See document RD/CTE/207 .  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  been broken down into fundamental questions, asking how emissions could measure, account for, 
and track emissions. The main theme of the paper was to "measure what mattered ", which in this 
case was emissions since , without knowing what emissions were in tr ade, it was difficult to claim 
that an alternative was "lower emissions ". This question lent itself to asking if there were pre -existing 
means of tracing and measuring emissions, and how such emissions could be measured. The paper 
also considered the broad er policy questions of how to address emissions in trade. Border 
adjustments and carbon clubs had both been proposed or were under development. The 
representative highlighted so me questions for consideration such as  whether these concepts would 
effectively  reduce carbon emissions or if other opportunities  were yet to be identified  that might be 
more effective or efficient in achieving the same objective. He underscored  that it was essential to 
focus  on alignment of the objective , which was to increase the a mbition of the United States' climate 
change adaptation and mitigation goals and commitments and  improve the respective approaches. 
The paper also stated that it was important to look at the  embedded emissions of traded goods, and 
how to use trade policies  to incentivize decarbonization, to tackle the issue of embedded emissions 
in trade, rather than focusing on the merit of each other 's regulatory policies or whether a market 
explicitly priced carbon. Further, the representative of the United States also n oted that questions 
about what it meant for a good and service to be "low-emission " or "climate -aligned " had also been 
teed up. The landscape of available goods and services had changed dramatically in the past decade. 
Asking key questions, such as what the new and emerging technologies were, as well as technologies 
on the market now, and if these were in fa ct "environmental " was an important first discussion point 
in reconsidering how to facilitate trade or investment in these technologies. Tariff liberalization had 
been relied upon as the default and primary mechanism for trade facilitation. The paper was m aking 
a concerted effort to first ask if there were other matters like non -tariff barriers and supply chains 
that were key to facilitating a transition to increase the uptake of environmental goods and 
technologies.  
1.70.   Finally, on the issue of circular econom y, the United States noted that the transition to a 
net-zero future would continue to require access to critical minerals, recyclable materials, and a 
general re -think of how to move from a linear economic model to a model that enabled recovery, 
reuse, rep air, refurbishment, remanufacturing and recycling with minimal barriers in international 
markets.  
1.71.   The representative of the United States concluded by noting that the opportunity to explore 
the potential existing and future trade barriers to this transitio n would be invaluable, as 
WTO Members recovered from the COVID -19 pandemic and focus ed attention on the sustainable 
economic transitions necessary to achieve a net -zero future.  
1.72.   The representative of Canada  supported the United States ' proposal to organize a roundtable 
with stakeholders and experts to consider trade policy measures that could positively contribute to 
addressing climate change. The representative noted that international collaboration on mitigating 
carbon leakage was cri tical to advance shared interests of raising climate ambition without merely 
displacing emissions to other jurisdictions. There were several  ongoing initiatives in this space, 
including under the G7 Climate Mitigation Group, the OECD, World Bank and the In ternational 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Ongoing and planned work to develop methodologies to assess the 
equivalency of climate mitigation actions and account for embedded carbon emissions in traded 
goods would be key for laying the foundation for any potential tr ade policy measures. New 
discussions and areas of work should align and fill in gaps as much as possible, and identify the 
unique role of the WTO.  Addressing carbon leakage risks was important to ensure that WTO Members 
did not undermine ambitious climate policies for emissions reductions.  Several of the questions 
proposed by the United States identified key considerations for exploring tools to address carbon 
leakage risks.  Acknowledging that these questions could be complex, in particular when considered 
on an economy -wide basis versus a narrower sectoral basis, the representative noted that Canada 
would be interested in learning more from the United States on the range of trade tools that they 
considered could be used to address carbon leakage and  request ed the United States to elaborate 
on the tools that it was contemplating. Further, the representative noted that , in Canada's view, a 
greater understanding of the context and possible outcomes would be useful in assessing the 
questions that would guide fur ther considerations.  
1.73.   The representative of Switzerland  thanked the United States for their non -paper and noted 
that it could positively enhance discussions at the CTE. His delegation welcomed non -papers in 
general at this Committee and noted that this kind of discussion had not taken place at the CTE for 
a long time.  First, concerning  the proposal of the roundtable with stakeholders and experts , WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  Switzerland was open to discuss ing more with relevant stakeholders and experts. Nevertheless, the 
representat ive pointed out that such discussions should not duplicate the already ongoing process 
with other initiative s such as TESSD. The representative asked whether the United States could 
further elaborate on this roundtable and what would be envisaged.  Second, Switzerland was open 
to discuss ing a border adjustment or anything similar as long as there was an existent carbon 
leakage. In this regard, Switzerland welcomed the question on the carbon club and asked for details 
regarding the kind of carbon club envisag ed, the measures for decarbonizing that would be put in 
place, and who could be part of the club. Switzerland was ready to discuss this topic but also 
underscored the importance of having measures that were WTO compatible, more specifically that 
neither in creased distortions in competition nor led to unnecessary administrative and regulatory 
costs or trade barriers.  
1.74.   The representative of India noted that it was studying the US discussion paper and expected 
to make comments and observations on it in the later meetings of this Committee after the 
WTO Ministerial Conference.  
1.75.   The representative of the European Union  expressed his delegation's  general appreciation for 
the US submission. He noted that the U S non-paper had a clear focus on "Climate Change and 
Circular Economy " – two topics that were dear to the EU green agenda as reflected  in this Committee 
on numerous occasions. The representative said that the European Union could support the idea of 
the workshop that, in addition to looking into climate measu res, would also look into what could be 
considered as technologies, goods and services that would serve climate mitigation purposes. As to 
the idea of a carbon club, the representative noted the ongoing discussions in the context of the G7. 
These discussio ns should be delivering on ambitious emission reduction objectives in line with global 
goals. The representative further noted that carbon clubs should be consistent with international 
trade rules, non -discriminatory , and facilitate engagement with emergin g economies, plus promote 
synergies  and avoid overlaps with existing initiatives.  Turning to the circularity aspects briefly 
addressed in the paper, the European Union welcomed the attention given to the nexus of "climate 
change – circular economy". The In ternational Resource Panel defined remanufacturing , 
refurbishment, repair and direct re use as "value -retention processes" because they favoured 
maintaining within the economy the resources and energy needed to produce the original product. 
The European Union fully supported value -retention processes as a way of achieving a circular 
economy. However, the European Union was of the view that WTO work on remanufacturing, 
refurbishment, repair and direct re use should be cognisant and supportive of re quirements laid down 
in relevant MEAs, in particular the Basel Convention.  
 
1.76.   The representative of Norway  thanked the United States for their paper that encouraged 
discussions and exchange on different countries ' experiences on several topics that would be 
discussed in TESS D in the future . Her delegation took note of the suggestions and questions on 
environme ntal goods and services in the paper. Norway agreed that it was important to ensure 
integrity to promote and facilitate trade in environmental goods. Also, the representative noted that 
it was important that trade and trade policies were supportive of and contributed to achiev ing a 
more resource -efficient circular economy. Norway looked forward to further discussions and work to 
follow up on this paper.  
 
1.77.   The representative of the Philippines  noted that the United States ' submission raised 
important technica l considerations that needed to be addressed. Stating that his capital officials 
were reviewing this concept note, the representative made an initial observation noting that, while 
many developing Members had shown the political will to decarboni ze and pur sue green energy 
transition, developing countries were increasingly faced with limited fiscal space to support these 
shifts. In the case of the Philippines, while the Nationally Determined Contribution s (NDCs ) aimed 
to reduce greenhouse gas ( GHG) emissions by 75% by 2030, 72% of that pledge would be 
contingent on external financing. In considering the definitional issues related to low  carbon goods 
and services and methodologies concerning carbon accounting, an important consideration would be 
to evaluate what technical assistance, technology transfer and finance would make such a transition 
feasible.  
 
1.78.   The representative of the United Kingdom  thanked the United States for their discussion paper 
on climate change and circular economy and informed them that her delegation had submitted some WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  comments in writing. The United Kingdom welcomed the United States ' focus on limiting the risk of 
carbon leakage through trade -related actions such as incentivi zing trade in low -emission goods and 
services and enco uraging decarboni zation in production. The United Kingdom also welcomed the 
idea of a roundtable with stakeholders and experts to consider trade measures that could contribute 
to addressing climate change and promoting a more circular economy. The represen tative noted 
that the United Kingdom would be keen to engage in the specifics of what this proposal would 
involve.  
 
1.79.   The representative of Colombia  thanked the United States for sharing the non -paper , which 
was excellent and provided a detailed and in -depth  analysis. She  noted that , while there were many 
shared interests , there were also more questions than answers. WTO Members would be able to 
work towards a collective construction to address these issues. To answer these questions or to 
contribute to the d ebate, the representative noted that Colombia considered it important to take as 
a starting point and reference the concepts already developed and the obligations already agreed 
upon in MEAs. Her delegation also considered it relevant to analyse the measur es that countries 
were already adopting internally to meet the challenges of climate change and sustainability. For 
Colombia, the discussion on mechanisms to favo ur reuse, repair, remanufacturing and recycling was 
also relevant. These concepts were of grea t importance as long as they did not become mechanisms 
to justify the trade of waste or used goods that could not be reused and would finally be disposed 
of in the destination countries.  
 
1.80.   The representative of Guatemala  stated that her delegation's capital  officials were still 
evaluating the U S paper and hoped to come back with more comments. Guatemala supported this 
type of conversation at the CTE  and believed that the Committee had a broad mandate to discuss 
these issues. In particular, the representative  noted that Guatemala was very interested in 
discussing at the CTE the impact of trade -related measures for environmental purposes or 
objectives. Guatemala would also be evaluating the different questions that had been  proposed. 
Guatemala saw the usefulness of having a conversation in which all WTO Members participated.  
 
1.81.   The representative o f the United States  thanked those delegations that had provided their 
comments and inputs to the paper. The United States would certainly take note of the interest in 
the roundtable and looked forward to further elaborating those ideas moving forward. Simi larly, on 
questions and ideas on the carbon club, the United States looked forward to having more discussions.  
1.4.2   Update by the United Kingdom on activities related to making supply chains more 
sustainable  
1.82.   The representative of the United Kingdom  updated dele gations on the work of the Forest, 
Agriculture and Commodity Trade (FACT) Dialogue. The FACT Dialogue had been  established as a 
COP26 presidency initiative  and was co -chaired by Indonesia and the UK. It brought together over 
28 major consumer and producer countries of internationally traded agricultural commodities to 
deliver on an agreed roadmap of actions to protect forests and other vital ecosystems while 
promoting sustainable trade and development.  The FACT Dialogue was the only 
government -to-government forum solely dedicated to this purpose. The FACT Roadmap for action, 
launched by world leaders in Glasgow, contained 14  actions grouped into four themes: trade & 
markets; traceability and transparency; smallholder support; and research, developm ent and 
innovation.  
1.83.   The FACT Roadmap for action, which was endorsed by 28 countries at COP26, provided an 
ambitious path to break the link between forest loss and the production of, and trade in, agricultural 
commodities over the coming years . Now that the  roadmap had been agreed  upon, attention had 
turned to deliver ing the actions within it. In March 2022, the United Kingdom and Indonesia had 
convened FACT  senior officials  to agree on a work  plan for how countries would make progress over 
the next 9 -12 mon ths. The work  plan included priority deliverables and a suggested approach to 
delivery for each of the four themes.  
1.84.   Across the four themes, small, informal, and time -limited action groups, made up of 
self-selected groups of countries were being set up. The  groups would endeavour to meet two to 
three times per year for technical discussions and w ould be time -limited to the delivery of FACT 
Roadmap actions.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  1.85.   For the purposes of the CTE, the United Kingdom focus ed on the trade and markets theme 
(T&M). Discussions under the T&M theme aimed  to reach a collective understanding of how global 
markets could better incentivi ze sustainable agriculture and forest commodity production and trade, 
including how supply and dema nd-side policies could be mutually reinforcing to better incentivi ze 
sustainable production and consumption.  
1.86.   Two small, country -led action groups would sit beneath the T&M forum and concentrate on 
key focus areas. One action group would seek to build a col lective understanding of common factors 
of sustainable production. The other would seek to strengthen and broaden international market 
recognition of national approaches to assure  sustainability.  
1.87.   The FACT represented a policy incubator space, convening mee tings both on the political level 
to set ambition as well as technical discussions on how to take forward specific challenges. It had 
recogni zed that multilateral institutions like the WTO were relevant to these discussions and could 
play a key role in con sidering these technical challenges and how they might be addressed. As such, 
it would become increasingly important to build linkages between the two for a, understand if there 
would be any WTO workstreams that FACT T&M discussions should be docked into, a nd which 
WTO structures and for a would be suited to strengthen the cooperation and joint action envisioned 
in the FACT Dialogue.  
1.88.   The representative of the United Kingdom stated her delegation 's willingness to understand 
how to build bridges between activit y in FACT and the WTO . The United Kingdom welcomed further 
discussions on what might be required to lay the groundwork for more substantial engagement 
between the WTO and FACT.  
1.89.   The representative of Japan  said that forests played an essential role in the agricultural supply 
chain through their multifunctional role in the natural environment. Japan valued the importance of 
due diligence measures to build a sustainable food supply chain that separated agricu ltural 
production from deforestation. On the other hand, especially for forests, it was difficult to set uniform 
regulations or other principles. This was because each country had its unique circumstances, in 
terms of different environmental conditions and  different industries, based on geographical location. 
The representative further noted that it was necessary to seek and push ahead with a 
market -oriented approach that considered the importance of sustainable forest management for 
exporting countries. In  addition, efficient cooperation between organizations should be promoted to 
avoid the duplication of functions of existing international organizations and treaties. For example, 
the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) had been working on bui lding a sustainable 
supply chain for timber and timber products as one of its priorities. Therefore, there was a need to 
keep in mind that it was also effective to cooperate with these institutions and make use of the 
services they provided . 
1.90.   The representa tive of Brazil  stated that Brazil supported the adoption of legitimate policies 
with environmental objectives but was concerned about the possible adoption of unilateral 
environmental measures that resulted in unnecessary negative impacts on international trade. 
Environmental measures related to trade adopted by the United Kingdom needed to b e fully 
compatible with WTO rules, including the most favoured nation principle and national treatment, to 
avoid any potential protectionist bias or the adoption of dis criminatory measures. Furthermore, the 
representative urged the United Kingdom to take into consideration the many challenges Brazil faced 
in reducing deforestation. Finally, Brazil kindly requested the United Kingdom to take into 
consideration the concern s raised by the Embassy of Brazil in London in the bilateral dialogues on 
these issues.  
2  TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING, PAR AGRAPH  33 OF THE DOHA 
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION  
2.1  Overview by the WTO Secretariat of the preparations for the Aid for Trade G lobal 
Review (27 -29 July 2022)  
2.1.  The WTO Secretariat  provided an overview o f the analysis of the A id for Trade (AFT) m onitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) self -assessment exercise,  in particular the questions related to the 
environmental dimension of sustainable development. The Secretariat also updated delegations on WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  the preparations AFT Global Review that would be held from 27-29 July 2022 on the theme of 
"Empowering connected, su stainable trade" . 
2.2.  The Secretariat began by contextualizing the topic from a climate dimension. It was well 
understood that GHG emissions were at the highest levels recorded in history, and immediate and 
deep emission cuts were required to ensure that the 2 °C increase threshold was kept until 2050. A 
lot of progress could be seen in this regard. For example, COP26 had been held in November 2021 
and the Glasgow Climate Pact had been signed by 197 countries. Particularly, in the context of AFT, 
development fin ance and climate, the Pact had emphasized "the urgency of scaling up action and 
support, including finance, capacity building and technology transfer to enhance adaptive capacity, 
strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change …  taking in to account the priorities 
and needs of developing country Parties ". This was precisely what the Secretariat had endeavoured 
to do in the monitoring and evaluation exercise and this urgency had been  reflected in many of the 
responses to the exercise.  
2.3.  Next, the Secretariat gave a brief overview of what the questionnaire tried to do and the 
structure of responses. The AFT work programme was on empowering connected sustainable trade 
and the objective of the exercise was to ensure that there was a general harmon ization between the 
different AFT stakeholders in the objectives and to make sure that donors and developing country 
partners were aligned to these objectives. To this end, the current iteration of the M&E exercise had 
received around 96 responses, with a 60:40 ratio split between developing country respondents and 
donors. The number of responses was slightly lower than in previous years, as the responses were 
received during the height of the omicron COVID -19 variant, which had an impact on response rates.  
On observing a regional breakdown of responses received, a lot came from developing countries in 
Asia and Africa.  
2.4.  One of the preliminary questions was whether the environmental strategy was mainstreamed 
in developing strategies of AFT stakeholders. It was  noted that 51 of the 53 developing country 
respondents (i.e. 93% of the sample size) indicated that environmental objectives were indeed 
present in their domestic strategies. There was consistency across income groups – all LLDCs in the 
UN system responde d positively, as well as 93% of LDCs. Equally important, all donors observed 
that environmental objectives were included in their development donor AFT strategy as well.  
2.5.  The questionnaire next tried to see how the environment was mainstreamed into these 
development strategies. It was noted that climate change was indeed a spurrer of action, but a lot 
of the strategies were being enveloped within a broader environment -specific domain, particularly 
in the context of SDGs and environment -specific SDGs. More th an 70% of all donors and developing 
country partners indicated the presence of SDGs 7, 12 , and 13 in their domestic strategies. This was 
quite important in their climate context and was also quite visible in the 6 th Report released by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  (IPCC) this year, in which SDGs 7, 12 , and 13 were 
also explicitly mentioned.  
2.6.  Next, the analysis sought to understand how trade played into this nexus. Here, progress was 
also noted. Forty -five developing countries (88%) indicated that national strategies did cover 
environmental objectives. When examining the responses granularly, country respondents were 
often aligned with domestic factor endowments, in that countries dependant on forestry, fisheries, 
and agricultural exports particularly linked trade and sustainable development as integrated 
objectives. Broadly speaking, while everything sounded quite positive, some evaluation points were 
noted in this regard – in particular, most references  were structured as statements of intent and 
lacked specificity. In addition, there was a lack of clear measurable targets that could be used to 
ensure that objectives and strategies were complied with, and this was quite consistent across the 
board, and c ould perhaps be an avenue for further exploration.  
2.7.  The analysis also tracked a sense of what some of the factors holding back the mainstreaming 
could be. Access to finance was a pressing issue in the context of the sustainable development 
transition. Again , this was something that was echoed by donors and AFT developing partners alike. 
Other factors such as lack of technology enhancing infrastructure were also listed as key challenges 
and, interestingly, even in granular responses, escalating debt concerns caused by the pandemic 
were highlighted. To showcase one response to the exercise, the respondent from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo noted that it was in the process of setting up an institutional framework for climate 
change, but there was a deficit, w hich was primarily driven by a lack of funding capacity, a lack of WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  scientific knowledge and expected effects of climate change. Therefore, this demonstrated that 
access to finance was one of the principal issues, but several other issues  hindered the trans ition. 
2.8.  With regards to  how the circular economy was integrated in to this process, it was noted that 
circular economy was developing into an emerging area of focus, with 43% of developing country 
partners and 63% of donors indicating that circular economy s trategies were present, and 10 LDCs, 
or 30% of the LDC sample group, indicating that they had circular economy strategies in place. 
When observing the regional breakdown of this assessment, it was noted that progress remained at 
the formative stage for ana lysis, and that responses indicated that most circular economy strategies 
were observed from a waste management perspective. Other important aspects such as product life 
extension, products and services also needed to be further investigated in this contex t. 
2.9.  AFT stakeholders also appeared to understand the opportunities that a transition could provide. 
On a sectoral level, agriculture was highlighted by more than 97% of donors and partners as the 
sector with high economic and export diversification potentia l. Again, the perception aligned with 
factor endowment countries that ha d had a comparative advantage over the years in agriculture and 
therefore seemed to better understand the opportunities.  
2.10.   Regarding some of the sectoral challenges at play, it was noted  that industry, mining and 
agriculture were pointed to by 37 developing countries as potential hindrances to sustainable 
development. On granular examination of the responses, two streams of thought emerged: first, 
there seemed to be a difficulty in refram ing the contextual boundaries of sustainable development 
to assess the sectoral activities in a sustainable manner that was positive concerning  the value chain; 
and, additionally, the high primary product dependency was another role at play and the figures  that 
were provided illustrated that perspective. Here, more than 48% of LDCs were still primary product 
dependent in 2020, which pointed to potential issues at play.  
2.11.   The Secretariat provided a few trends that were indicated through responses. Common topic s 
indicated as challenges included environmental regulations, standards, certifications etc. required 
from an export perspective. Additionally, FTI or investments in a sustainable development transition 
were also observed to be a challenge.  
2.12.   Looking forward , it was observed that climate finance was intrinsically linked to AFT financing. 
As of 2020 AFT estimates, around 48.5 -49 billion worth of AFT had been dispersed and, of that, 
24% (about 12 billion) was for energy generation and supply. Therefore, it was easy to observe a 
general alignment between AFT and climate financing. Over the years, there had been an increase 
in climate financing. In COP15 in 2009, many donors had come together to set a 100 billion  dollar  
target and , clearly , this had not been  met l ast year. The WTO  Director -General had indicated on 
25 May in Davos  that development finance was increasingly important from a development 
perspective. However, there was positive momentum. Late last year, just before COP, there was an 
OECD declaration to align development and coordination with Paris Agreement goals that would  
hopefully provide acceleration in resource mobilization. Additionally, the climate finance delivery 
plan, which was a roadmap for many donors, if complied with, could help meet the 100 billion dollar 
target by 2023.  
2.13.   There had been no shortage of interest in the AFT Global Review, which would be held 
on 27-29 July. Nearly 50 requests had been received in the past few months. Initially, the idea had 
been to restrict the Global Review to a 30 -session event, but the Secretariat would try to ensure 
that all vie ws were included. The Secretariat was still in the process of working with the Chair of the 
Committee on Trade and Development to finalize the set of events and expected her to announce it 
in the coming weeks. Needless to say, sustainability was an importa nt part of the Global Review, 
and all sessions on the second day would be focused on this topic.  
2.14.   To conclude, the responses to the exercise revealed a growing awareness of the risks 
associated with climate change, and this awareness was causing a spur of c hange and effort to 
integrate the objectives into the domestic framework. The process remained at a formative stage, 
with limited specificity and objectives, but there was a greater understanding of the opportunities 
and challenges in play, and the circula r economy was an important area of focus. Finally, climate 
finance and AFT were increasingly intertwined and it was hoped that the AFT Global Review would 
provide more understanding of this nexus.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  2.2  Briefing by the WTO Secretariat on the on going  joint webina r series with the 
World  Bank that focuse d on the developmental dimension of the nexus between trade and 
climate change  
2.15.   The WTO Secretariat  briefed delegations on the  ongoing joint webinar series with the World 
Bank that focuse d on the developmental dimensi on of the nexus between trade and climate change . 
In March 2022, the WTO Secretariat and the World Bank launched a "Webinar Series on Trade and 
Climate Change" intending to reach  out to wider audience s on th is topic. Based on a common 
fundamental value shared by the two institutions, "inclusivity", the overarching theme of the series 
was the developmental dimension of the dialogue on trade and climate change, bringing in some  
lesser -known narratives o n trade and climate change.  
2.16.   In its inaugural webinar in March, entitled "The low carbon transition – how can LDCs 
demonstrate carbon competi tiveness?", the discussion evolved around  several issues including 
technical complexities of carbon measurement; building carbon competitiveness of SMEs; and 
private sector competitiveness challenges . 
2.17.   The second webinar, "How to unleash trade and scale -wide adoption of environmental goods 
and services in developing countries", would take place on 7 June. This session sought to illuminate 
the various ways in which developing countries could benefit if they participated in this sphere of 
global rulemaking. Us ing three case studies – Botswana, Bangladesh, and Uganda – the session 
would present findings on the challenges faced by firms in accessing environmental goods and 
services, particularly from the field perspectives. The Secretariat had widely shared the i nformation 
for registr ation and Members were encouraged to contact the Secretariat if they had not received it.  
Finally, delegations were invited to share their views and ideas on topics of interest for future 
webinars to shape this webinar series.  
2.18.   The rep resentative of the United Kingdom  thanked the Secretariat for the two reports.  As 
highlighted in the United Kingdom's response to the Aid for Trade M onitoring and Evaluation 
questionnaire, developing countries and emerging economies needed to b e supported to participate 
in the global trading system and reap the benefits of sustainable growth. The United Kingdom was 
working with partners, including least developed and developing countries, to host sessions at the 
AFT Global Review around the theme of empower ing connected and sustainable trade. The 
United  Kingdom believed that trade could be part of the solution and that well -designed trade policies 
could be a powerful tool in addressing the challenges of climate change, supporting green growth 
and incentivizi ng the uptake of green goods, services and technology. The representative noted that 
climate and environmental considerations were important in its Aid for Trade work. The 
United  Kingdom was adapting its programmes to support the green transition, includin g its 
partnerships with developing countries and its overseas development assistance.  
2.3  Briefing by the U nited Nations  Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) on its 
contribution to the transfer of climate technologies  
2.19.   The representative of the United Nations  Climate Technologies Centre & Network ( CTCN)  
briefed  the Committee on  its work  on transferring environmentally sound technologies. As a 
background, it was noted that the UN CTCN was one of two  mechanism s of the UNFC CC, the other 
being the finance mechanism . Its mandate , as described in the UNFCCC , was to facilitate the transfer 
of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries. It had  two arms – the 
implementation arm, which did the operational implementa tion at the country level, and the policy 
arm – the Technology Executive Committee – which was made up of experts that provide d the policy 
and normative guidance to the COP based on the work that  was being done  in countries. The CTCN  
also actively contribu ted to many of the constituent bodies of the UNFCCC.  
2.20.   The CTCN  reported directly to the COP each year on its work supporting the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies. Based on the report given to the COP, member states provided 
guidance that formed the COP decisions on technology. For a sense of how the CTC N was structured, 
it was hosted by UNEP and serviced by 13 consortium partners, which were 13 international 
organizations that it worked with to disseminate environmental technology. In addition, there were 
700 network members, i.e. organizations and insti tutions that were actual technology service 
providers. These were organizations willing to work with the CTCN  to disseminate the technologies WT/CTE/M/75  
 
- 24 - 
 
  required by developing countries. The CTCN's services were mandated to cover both mitigation and 
adaptation.  
2.21.   Following the coming into force of the Paris Agreement in 2015, member states had created 
a technology framework under the Paris Agreement that would focus on support that targeted 
innovation; implementation, including technical assistance; and support for  enabling environment 
and capacity building. Therefore, despite the CTCN working with technology, in fact a large part of 
its work was supporting countries to set up policies, regulatory standards, and a whole range of 
incentive frameworks that countries n eeded to access the technology. In addition, there was 
collaboration and networking, because the CTCN required companies to voluntarily join the network 
and share their available technologies with developing countries. Lastly, the CTCN gave support, 
which required it to work with the finance mechanism of the UNFCCC, principally the Adaptation 
Fund, the Green Climate Fund, and the Global Environment Facility, to enable developing countries 
to access these funds to leverage the climate technologies that were environmentally sustainable 
and would allow them to meet their Paris Agreement goals.  
2.22.   At the country level, the CTCN's work to date had enabled the transfer of over 360 technology 
solutions to over 107 countries, so climate technology projects existed in o ver 107 countries. Such 
statistics gave a sense of its coverage – they were all developing countries, but also a large 
percentage of those countries covered were SIDS and LDCs. The CTCN equitably supported countries 
in Africa, Asia -Pacific and Latin Americ a. 
2.23.   In Africa, the CTCN had supported 43  countries with requests for environmentally sound 
technologies. It had provided 116  technology solutions based on those 43 requests and had worked 
with 77 network members, which were the technology service providers,  i.e. companies, SMEs, large 
multinationals, think tanks and research institutions that worked with these countries to develop 
their policy, regulatory environment, as well as standards that were required for different sectors. 
The CTCN was conducting seve ral technology needs assessments in Africa. In this region, the 
majority of requests covered the circular economy, especially in relation to supporting them develop 
circular economy roadmaps. A lot of African countries requested technology to help them use  
photovoltaic in the context of the energy -water -food nexus and several requests were for e -mobility 
regulations and incentive frameworks, as well as to understand their technology requirements.  
2.24.   In Asia, the CTCN had supported 37 countries, provided 86 tec hnology solutions through its 
technical assistance, and worked with over 220 technology service providers as part of its network. 
Based on the work done in these 37 countries, the majority of the requests focused on energy 
efficiency and low carbon transpo rt. The Asia -Pacific region was also interested in adaptation and 
cross-sectoral technologies, as well as green hydrogen and carbon capture technologies. 
Increasingly, in Asia, there were requests for decision -support tools for their policymaking as well 
as early warning systems based on forecasting. Here, the CTCN was using a lot of digital technologies 
and Apps developed specifically for easy access to information on early warnings. In Asia, the CT CN 
was also working in extremely high numbers on issues re lating to sustainable urban cities as well as 
roadmaps for circular economy and e -mobility.  
2.25.   In Latin America, the CTCN had supported 25 countries and provided over 54 technology 
solutions. It had worked with 80 companies that were technology service provid ers that had 
supported these countries with their technology solutions. In the Latin American and Caribbean 
region, countries were interested in technologies that helped them with better nature protection, 
whether that was conservation or restoration. Here , the CTCN was experimenting with a combination 
of the latest digital technologies to support nature -based solutions. These countries  were also 
interested in technologies that helped them monitor their adaptation measures and wate r resilience 
technologies.  
2.26.   Countries in the Caribbean region were very interested in e -mobility and resilient 
infrastructure systems as well as capacity building to help them create sustainability. The c ircular 
economy was a huge request from the Latin American region. The CTCN had  worked with countries 
there to set up, together with UNEP, the first large circular economy network in the region. It had 
also worked on another one in Africa. Latin American countries also requested technology transfer 
for the energy sector and, increasi ngly in the last two years, with the focus on green hydrogen.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
- 25 - 
 
  2.27.   The CTCN was working on several flagship projects. As mentioned, the CTCN was mandated 
to work with the finance mechanisms of the UNFCCC. With the Adaptation Fund, it had a 'Climate 
Innovation A ccelerator' focusing on adaptation technologies. With the Global Environment Facility, 
it had a pilot programme focusing on innovation financing for small and medium cities. Finally, the 
CTCN was now the largest user of the Green Climate Fund  (GCF) 's "read iness" funds; it spends 75% 
of the GCF's portfolio under readiness.  
2.28.    The CTCN was increasingly working with the private sector to leverage more resources for 
countries' climate actions and the West African Development Bank, which it had worked with to 
develop a multi -country programme for the GCF for around USD 250 million to leverage additional 
climate  financing for their member states on climate -resilient agriculture. It was also working with 
the Kenyan Development Bank to develop its USD  250 million clim ate-smart entrepreneurial and job 
creation programme for SMEs in that country.  
2.29.   With regard to services, in addition to the technical assistance provided, the CTCN also held 
several technology for a and events across the region. Additionally, the CTCN worked  with the private 
sector, for example, the Kenyan Development Bank, on the aforementioned USD 250 million project 
for the GCF to create green jobs by working with SMEs in that country and providing capacity 
building.  
2.30.   Another active workstream was women in technology. The CTCN ran a "Gender -Just Climate 
Solutions Award and Mentoring programme" at the COP where it called for submissions of innovative 
technological solutions for climate -smart investments from women's groups from around the world.  
Other work included youth engagement and focused on working with digital technologies that 
enhanced climate action. The CTCN also worked very closely with local communities and indigenous 
people.  
2.31.   Capacity building was one of the areas it was required to pr ovide to countries and a lot of the 
technologies the CTCN transferred required retraining, reskilling, or even just simply upgrading the 
skills of the government entities it worked with. This was accompanied by a large website of 
information, which was clo se to the largest online source of climate technology solutions in the world. 
Capacity building was provided for national focal points that were established under the UNFCCC 
and the finance mechanism to ensure that they worked together to design technical assistance, as 
well as resource mobilization strategies from both the finance mechanism and the private sector 
that met their national targets. The CTCN also provided capacity building on innovative approaches, 
for example, it had run a series of webinars on blockchain technologies for climate action that 
covered energy, agriculture, and carbon markets in order to introduce to developing countries the 
potential of such technologies and how they could integrate them in their climate action.  
2.32.   In concluding the  presentation, the speaker presented key figures which showed the CT CN at 
a glance. She noted that , on the CTCN website, by searching by country or region out of the 
107 countries that they worked in, people  could see the kind of support that the CTCN had provided, 
as well as which companies and government ministries that the CT CN had worked with. In the last 
10 years, the CTCN had leveraged over a billion dollars working with these countries.  
2.4  Briefing by the WTO Secretariat on recent activities related to the 19th annual review 
of the implementation of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS  Agreement ) Article  66.2: incentives for technology transfer to LDCs  
2.33.   The Secretariat began by noting that Article 66.2 of the Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS ) Agreement  specifically oblige d WTO developed country Members to provide 
incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories to promote and encourage technology 
transfer to LDC Members and  to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.  
2.34.   In 2021, eight developed country Members , including Australia, Canada, E uropean Union, 
Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdo m, and the United States, had submitted their 7 th set 
of new detailed reports under the Council's 2003 Decision. They had reported 449 technology 
transfer incentive programmes, which had benefitted 43 WTO LDC Members and observers. The top 
three  technology transfer programmes were environment/climate chan ge, public 
health/pharmaceuticals, and agriculture and food.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  2.35.   In 2021, 102 transfer technology programmes were environmental programmes, which had 
benefitted 41 LDC Members and Observers. The European Union , together with the U nited States 
and Norway, were the top three  providers, having provided 75% of programmes. The vast majority 
of programmes were in the category of climate change mitigation, followed by biodiversity and 
ecosystem, climate change adaptation, and waste management.  
2.36.   Noting the cumulative co unt of LDCs in different environment sectors, eight LDCs had 
benefitted from more than 15 programmes, including Uganda, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Zambia, 
Cambodia, Nepal, Madagascar, and Mali. Uganda had benefitted from 21 related to climate change 
mitigation,  and Cambodia had benefitted from eight in biodiversity/ecosystem. At the other end, 
16 LDCs had only benefitted from fewer  than five: Burkina Faso and Sudan had each benefitted from 
four related to climate change adaptation.  
2.37.   As for the cumulative count of  LDCs by reporting Members, Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Madagascar had each benefitted from six provided by Switzerland, while Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
Zambia had each benefitted from five provided by the EU. For instance, the programme by the Swiss 
Platform for  Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Resource Efficiency Promotion in International 
Cooperation, which focused on the transfer of knowledge and technology for developing renewable 
energy and energy efficiency, had been of long -term duration and had ben efitted at least 15 LDCs. 
Japan's Project for Strengthening Solid Waste Management in Bangladesh focused on developing a 
master plan for improving the waste collection and management system in several areas of 
Bangladesh. The Project also included medical waste, an important issue during the COVID -19 
pandemic.  
2.38.   Regarding the survey questionnaire, the Secretariat had conducted its first survey in 2020. 
This year, it continued this practice by conducting a more sophisticated survey questionnaire based 
on last year's experience. In the updated survey, LDC Members were not only requested to identify 
priority technology se ctors but also the specific types of technology relevant to the priority 
technology sectors for their countries. The Secretariat had circulated the survey questionnaire 
among all LDC Members and observers. It received 19 responses from 13 LDC Members, all of which 
identified agriculture/food and environment/climate change as priority technology sectors, followed 
by health, and Information and Communication Technology  (ICT) sectors. The results were very 
close to the 2021 survey results. The environmental te chnology needs were almost equal in three 
categories: climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation and waste management. The 
priority was climate change adaptation.  
2.39.   Regarding the 2022 Workshop, the structure and format had been improved by providin g an 
overview of the broader development and policy context of technology transfer to LDCs. The 
Workshop was attended by more than 75 capital - and Geneva -based experts from 21 LDC Members 
and seven developed country Members. Several international organizat ions were invited to report 
their current works on national technology needs assessments and technology transfer programme 
in LDC s – UNFCCC, UNEP, the CTCN, and the UN Technology Bank for LDCs, along with colleagues 
in the Trade and Environment Division. E xperts from both reporting countries and LDCs, including 
European Union , Japan, Norway, and Bangladesh, also took part in the Workshop as speakers. Their 
active participation significantly enriched this year's programme.  
2.40.   All capital -based participants atte nded the TRIPS Council meeting on their national 
delegations and made contributions to the Council's review process. In the meeting, the LDC Group 
made four concrete proposals for future work, including requesting the Secretariat to compile a list 
of prior ity technologies as identified in the Workshop, as well as in the survey questionnaire and to 
report this to the next TRIPS Council meeting. They also had requested that the information provided 
should be used by the Secretariat in designing future technic al assistance programmes and to the 
reporting countries for their attention.  
2.41.   Regarding next steps, the Secretariat would prepare the compilation of survey responses, as 
requested by the LDCs, and would continue to work with LDC Members, reporting Members a nd 
colleagues from partner organizations to further cooperation and coordination. It would continue to 
organize the Workshop that was tentatively scheduled for March 2023. The Secretariat expressed 
its gratitude to its colleagues in the Trade and Environme nt Division, as a valued traditional partner 
in its work.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  2.42.   The representative of India welcomed  discussions on technical assistance and capacity 
building with respect to the Doha Ministerial Declaration , Paragraph 33. In its view, t he CTE was an 
ideal forum  to discuss not just ideas but also to create a better tracking mechanism of how  such 
ideas on technical assistance and capacity building were being implemented. In the recently held 
meeting of the Working Group on Trade and Technology Transfer, several Members , including India , 
had spoke n about the need to focus more on this aspect of trade. India would  work on proposals to 
concreti ze this discussion within the CTE  and other relevant formal WTO bodies with like -minded 
Members.  
3  MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (MEAS), ITEMS 1 AND 5 OF THE 
CTE WORK PROGRAM ME 
3.1  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  
3.1.1   United Kingdom's update on the 26th session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP26)  presidency year 
3.1.  The representative of t he United Kingdom  provided an update on the progress made toward 
the outcomes of COP26 and the historic Glasgow Climate Pact. At COP 26, all 197 Parties had agreed 
to the historic Glasgow Climate Pact to take concerted and urgent action in this critical decade to 
keep the 1.5°C goal within reach. The Pact  had called on countries to phase  down unabated coal 
power and phase  out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. It requested countries, by the end of 2022, to 
revisit and strengthen their NDCs. It urged developed countries to scale  up climate finance, and to 
double finance for adaptation by 2025. It also underlined the central importance of adaptation, the 
dangers of loss and damage, and the need to boost action and support for both.  
3.2.  Much ha d happened in the seven  months since COP26. The geopolitical landscape had shifted 
dramatically, not least because of Russia 's unprovoked an d illegal invasion of Ukraine and rising 
global energy prices. These crises underscored the  need to accelerate the global transition to clean, 
reliable sources of power. Renewables and energy efficiency provide d the quickest, cheapest, most 
reliable route to long -term climate and energy security, and long -term prosperity. Now was the time 
to double down on the actions agreed at COP26 to tackle climate change and reduce our economies ' 
dependence on fossil fuels.  
3.3.  In May, the COP26 President, Alok Sharma, and COP27 President Designate, Egypt 's Foreign 
Minister Shoukry, had co-chaired a meeting of Ministers and representatives from over 
40 governments. This had focused on delivering on the commitments made as an international 
community, and there was a high degr ee of consensus on what must be deliver ed. 
3.4.  On mitigation , there were positive signals from countries considering how they c ould 
strengthen their NDCs, including by underpinning headline targets with sectoral action. The 
United  Kingdom continued  to urge countries to submit any outstanding NDCs and to revisit and 
strengthen existing NDCs in 2022, especially where they were not currently aligned with the 
Paris Agreement temperature goal. The United Kingdom asked all  countries that h ad not already 
done so to submit long -term strategies aligned with net zero, and urge d that all new submissions, 
including updates to NDCs, be communicated to the UNFCCC before the Synthesis Report deadline 
of 23 September.  
3.5.  On finance , the German and Canadian governments would coordinate a Progress Update ahead 
of COP27 on the USD 100 billion Delivery Plan published in 2021 . The Taskforce on Access to Climate 
Finance ha d launched trial projects in Bangladesh, Fiji, Jamaica, Rwanda and Uganda. Alongside the 
Egyptian incomin g COP27 Presidency and the UN Climate Change High -Level Champions, a new, 
independent High -Level Expert Group on investment in climate action, to be co -chaired by 
Vera Songwe and Lord Nick Stern , had also been announced . The Group would  develop policy opti ons 
to encourage and enable the investment and finance necessary for the delivery of the 
Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Climate Pact.  
3.6.  On adaptation  and loss and damage , Parties ha d submitted their views on the 
Glasgow -Sharm  el-Sheikh work programme on t he Global Goal on Adaptation (GlaSS) , which w ould 
help make progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation in advance of the first mandated workshop in 
June 2022 . More countries ha d submitted adaptation communications and national adaptation plans, WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  following a push to do so throughout the Presidency.  The United Kingdom had commenced work to 
kickstart the Santiago Network, to provide technical assistance on loss and damage. The Glasgow 
Dialogue on Loss and Damage w ould also begin their work in June to  discuss the arrangements for 
the funding of activities to enhance action to address loss and damage, concluding in 2024.  
3.7.  On road transport, the United Kingdom announced that  over 100 signatories , including Canada, 
Mexico, BY Autos, and GM , to the Zero Emi ssion Vehicle Declaration, which  committed to rapidly 
accelerate the transition to zero -emission vehicles so that all new cars and vans were zero -emission 
globally by 2040 or by 2035 in leading markets. Since COP26, momentum ha d continued to build, 
with a further 22 signatories to the Declaration.  
3.8.  MC12 was an important moment. Not only w ould it be the largest in -person gathering of Trade 
Ministers since 2017, but it was an opportunity to re -affirm the importance of the rules -based 
international system in fi nding solutions to the planet 's greatest challenges. Climate and 
environmental issues needed to be front and centre of the multilateral trade agenda.  
3.9.  The COP process was only as strong as the sum of its parts. The representative concluded  by 
underscoring t hat every country  had to pick up the pace, increase ambition, and deliver together. 
The United Kingdom would  remain resolutely focused on working with its international partners, and 
the incoming Egyptian Presidency, to realise the promises made in Glasgow.  
3.1.2   Update by Egypt  on the preparations for the 27th session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP2 7) 
3.10.   The representative of Egypt  updated delegations on the  preparations for the 27 th Session of 
the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP27). Egypt was keen to ensure the balance in messages 
coming out from the 27 th session of the UNFCCC conference between mitigation and the legitimate 
aspiration of developing an d least developed countries, especially African countries, to adapt to the 
current and short -term adverse impacts of climate change , achieve sustainable development , and 
build resilience with the transition as a core principle.  
3.11.   During  COP27 , to be held fro m 6-18 November 2022 in Sharm El -Sheikh , Egypt would  ensure 
that the outcomes established in Glasgow were in line with the upcoming mandate, especially the 
one on finance adaptation technology transfer and capacity building. In addition, several  substantive 
initiatives and priority areas were being formulated in cooperation with relevant international 
organiz ations  which would be  addressed during separate thematic sessions on the side lines  of the 
Conference.  
3.12.   Egypt ha d always shown commitment and seriousness toward climate change issues by 
approving and ratifying the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Ag reement. Egypt was  keen 
to highlight the related challenges and the importance of exchanging visions and experiences on 
aspects of implementing international climate action in various for a, the latest of which was a 
high-level ministerial meeting  co-chaire d by Egypt and the United  Kingdom and  held in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, in May  2022. 
3.13.   Despite the negative impact of climate change on strategic sectors in Egypt, such as 
agriculture, water resources, health, cultivation and infrastructure, and noting that the p ercentage 
of emissions issued by Egypt did not exceed 0.6% of global emissions, Egypt was making efforts  to 
contribute to emissions reduction by taking many steps, including the launch of its National Climate 
Change Strategy (NCCS) 2050 . The NCCS 2050  would enable the Egyptian government to plan and 
manage climate change on different levels, in addition to supporting the sustainable development 
goals of Egypt Vision 2030.  
3.14.   Egypt's Sustainable Energy Strategy 2035, which was adopted in October 2016, aim ed to 
raise the share of renewable energy to up to 43% of total electricity generation produced in 2035. 
As a result,  many energy projects and solar energy projects h ad already  been launched  such as the 
Benban Solar Park  project in Aswan. Egypt had also launched sustainable transport and construction 
projects, such as the new high -speed rail line, the monorail, and others. In addition , Egypt ha d 
recently signed several agreements and Memorandum s of Understandin g (MoUs ) with international 
companies to star t producing green hydrogen in the Suez Canal economic zone.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  3.15.   Egypt was working impartially on building the appropriate space for dialogue and 
confidence -building  as well as for incorporating  gender equality and women's empowerment in 
climate -related action.  Egypt was keen to coordinate and mobilize the necessary support for African 
countries to ensure their urgent adaptation to  the economic and social effects of climate change. In 
preparation for COP27, Egypt  held discussions at the end of March 2022 with several African 
countries to assess the continent's needs. Egypt stressed  the importance of building trust between 
the various parties and enhancing a common understanding of the challenges of others, especially 
developing and LDCs, to ensure that no one was left behind.  
3.16.   She concluded by saying that E gypt was prepared to work with all international partners to 
achieve the desired goals in a fair way that considered  the differing development abilities of 
countries.  
3.1.3   Briefing by the UNFCCC on COP26  and COP27  
3.17.   The representative of the  UNFCCC  briefed delegations  on its COP26 and COP27. The UNFCCC 
had been supporting the United Kingdom in its leadership role for COP26,  and had been now putting 
in place, in close cooperation with Egypt, arrangements for supporting  Egypt as the incoming COP27 
Presidency . He underlined that COP26 in Glasgow was held  at a moment when the urgency of 
upscaling action on climate change  was clear and  confirmed by the recent IPCC, the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), UNFCCC , and UN EP reports. On the other hand, the 
intergovernmental climate change process had been  delay ed because of the constraints and 
challenges introduced by the global pandemic.  
3.18.   There was  a clear sense of urgency in taking action, in particular concerning  keeping the 
temperature goals of the Paris Agreement, the 1.5°C goal , within reach. The motto of the 
Conference, "keeping 1.5°C alive ", selected by the COP26 Presidency, was well chosen in that 
context and it provided a forceful leading motive underpinning the neg otiations.  
3.19.   There was therefore no wonder about the  record numbers of participation at COP26 compared 
to any other COP . There were almost  40,000 participants , more than 4,000 media representatives , 
and m ore than one million visitors to the UNFCCC website during the COP . Moreover, 208  million 
people were reached across social media platforms, such as Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, 
and YouTube . There was also a broad media coverage: 891,000 online new s mention ed COP26.  
3.20.   COP26 in Glasgow had delivered  substantive positive outcomes on several key priority areas 
of the international climate change regime: finance, adaptation, loss and damage from climate 
change, mitigation, transparency, and Article 6. Success in these areas was needed for scaling up 
climate action in mitigation and adaptation, along with the related support, and for closing the 
pending  chapters of the "Paris rulebook " to enable full implementation of all parts of the 
Paris Agreement.  
3.21.   Looking forward to COP27, to be organized and convened  under the leadership of Egypt, 
discussions at all levels  showed  that the decisions taken last year in Glasgow were right and timely. 
But the challenge now was in the delivery o f these decisions . Ambition need ed to be shown in  the 
implementation of the "Glasgow Climate Pact ", especially concerning  the objective of limiting global 
warming to 1.5 °C. 
3.22.   As the implementation rules for the Paris Agreement were largely completed in Glasgow, 
COP27 would  be the first annual UNFCCC Conference fully focused on the implementation of climate 
action. The role of support needed for implementation w ould be part of th e discussions, especially 
as this COP would be  taking place in a developing country, for the first time since 2016.  
3.23.   2022 was different from 2021, in particular because of the well -known change in the 
international situation, with its high tension and the r elated political, economic and social challenges. 
But the global threat of climate change was still there and, as noted by  the United Kingdom and 
Egypt, climate change remain ed high on the political agenda in 2022. The importance of addressing 
climate chan ge urgently had not diminish ed but rather increased, in particular because of the very 
latest findings from the IPCC and the WMO.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  3.24.   The mid -year session of Subsidiary Bodies to the UNFCCC w ould start in Bonn soon. This was 
an important milestone on the road to COP27 in Sharm el -Sheikh. The session w ould be a key 
opportunity to advance work in all areas of implementation  – for adaptation, loss and damage, 
mitigation, technology, capacity building, finance and quite a few others. This session w ould also 
see the  start of technical assessment in the framework of the global stocktake. The UNFCCC 
Secretariat s tood ready to support Parties in advancing the deliberations as much as possible . 
3.25.   To be successful, COP27 should result in a balanced package of decisions acro ss all topical 
areas: adaptation, loss and damage, mitigation, and means of implementation, including, notably, 
finance. For some issues, such as  the mitigation work programme, the full outcome was expected 
in Sharm el -Sheikh whereas for others, such as the Global Goal on Adaptation, the outcome of work 
needed to be reported only in 2023 or, for some other issues, even later. But even for those issues 
which c ould not be completed at COP27 , it was important to  achiev e tangible, credible and visible 
progress to ensure a balanced outcome and demonstrate that implementation of climate action was 
unfolding swiftly and with the ambition required . Science show ed that a deep and swift 
transformation of the whole of society was required for adequate global climate response. 
International cooperation and multilateralism, in line with UN values, remain ed the key principles to 
help achiev e such transformation, with the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement being the guiding and 
enabling instruments. But the transformative action ha d to come from both Parties and non -Party 
stakeholders and it need ed to accelerate and expand. He concluded by underscoring  that COP27 
would be an opportunity to achieve that.  
3.26.   The representative of Canada  said t hat COP27 was a key opportunity to deliver on global 
climate ambition and for countries to demonstrate how they were implementing their commitments 
to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.  Canada was working hard to support a successful COP27  
and was taking action to implement the ambitious commitments, including through , inter alia , the 
2030 Emissions Reduction Plan, which outline d how Canada would meet its NDC;  developing 
Canada 's first National Adaptation Strategy; and delivering on Canada 's five -year USD 5.3 billion 
climate finance commitment.  Canada 's engagement at COP27 w ould be guided by the twin objectives 
of highlighting Canada 's ambitious domestic climate actions and advocating for ambitious and 
concrete global action by all, particularly ma jor emitters.  In the lead  up to COP27 , Canada had been  
pleased to host the 6th Ministerial on Climate Action (MoCA6) on 31 May 2022, co -convened with 
the EU and China in Stockholm, Sweden.  MoCA6 had convened 35 Ministers and/or their 
representatives to discuss issues that w ould feature at COP27. In this critical decade of action, the 
MoCA c ould help further shape the international agenda toward climate implementation, without 
losing focus on ambition.  
3.1.4   Update on negotiations towards the  Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and 
Sustainability (ACCTS)  
3.27.   On behalf of Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland that had been 
negotiating the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS), the representative 
of New Zealand  updated the Committee on the latest developments.  
3.28.   He recalled that  the ACCTS negotiations were initially concentrat ed on the liberali zation of 
environmental goods; new and binding commitments for environmental services; disciplines to 
eliminate  harmful fossil fuel subsidies; and best practice guidelines to inform the development and 
implementation of voluntary eco -labelling programmes and mechanisms.  
3.29.   Since the update to the CTE  in February, ACCTS partners ha d held two further negotiating 
rounds in March and May, with multiple sessions across each of the Working Groups and further 
intersessionals in key areas. This uptick in negotiating tempo respond ed to the urgency of the climate 
challenge , as reinforced by the latest IPCC Assessment Report, and  the seriousness with which 
ACCTS partners s ought  to respond.  
3.30.   Solid and constructive progress ha d been achieved including during rounds eight and nine. 
There were  real efforts to work towards consensus text across the working groups, alongside the 
establishment of frameworks for environmental services commitments and a growing environmental 
goods list. This work remain ed complex, challenging and rewarding. It conti nued to be informed by 
relevant ideas and expertise to ensure it was as up -to-date as possible. For example,  the Asia-Paciﬁc 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) work on environmental services continue d to be a useful input and , WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  in the Fossil Fuel Subsidy working G roup, the ACCTS partners h ad received helpful briefings from a 
range of international organi zations and domestic experts. ACCTS participants continue d to carefully 
evaluate the needs of Members to ensure that the ACCTS was fit for purpose. The group w ould 
continue to elaborate on specific and targeted flexibilities which m ight need to be incorporated into 
the ACCTS provisions. He noted that the initiative welcomed interest from WTO Members on the 
Agreement  and that they would  be kept informed on developmen ts. The objective was for the ACCTS 
to evolve into an 'open plurilateral ' agreement, available for other WTO Members to join if they were 
able to meet its obligations. The diversity of the ACCTS membership demonstrate d that a diverse 
range of economies, ge ographies and systems were motivated to proactively look at how trade and 
climate change issues c ould be taken forward. It was hoped that , once concluded, this diverse 
membership w ould also be a powerful tool for encouraging the agreement 's expansion.  
3.2  Conv ention on Bio logical D iversity (CBD)  
3.2.1   Update by the CBD Secretariat on recent meetings and activities  
3.31.   The representative of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)  Secretariat  provided an 
update on the process under the Convention , in particular concerning  the development of the 
Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework.  
3.32.   The representative recalled the decision to establish a dedicated open-ended working group 
(OEWG) to develop the Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework as a successor to the current strategic 
plan for biodiversity 2011 -2020. That process was led by two co -chairs (Mr. Francis Ogwal (Uganda) 
and Mr. Basile van Havre (Canada)).  
3.33.   At COP14, it had also been decided to develop a range of "comp lementary products", global 
policy guidance to be developed by the subsidiary bodies of the Convention, e.g. the Subsidiary Body 
on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA)  and the Subsidiary Body on 
Implementation (SBI), and , of course , these complementary products were supported or linked in 
one way or another to the post -2020 biodiversity framework.  
3.34.   As an overview of the process so far, in 2019 -2020, there had been extensive consultations 
in online for a, but also a range of global, regional , and thematic workshops. There had also been a 
meeting of the OEWG to discuss the emerging draft of the 2020 framework. The meeting had taken 
place before the pandemic physically in Rome and then there had been significant delays due to th e 
pandemic.  
3.35.   To keep up the political momentum and to further advance the discussion of the framework, 
it had arranged informal virtual meetings , including of the Subsidiary Bodies, during 2020 -2021. 
Formal virtual meetings of the subsidiary bodies and OEWG  had also taken place in mid -2021 to 
start negotiating. There had been a lot of discussion s and concern s vis-à-vis negotiating in an online 
format but discussions were started on the relevant agenda items and the draft of Post -2020 Global 
Biodiversity Fram ework that had been developed by the co -chairs. The first phase of the meeting of 
the COP15 had taken place in October 2021 in Kunming, China , in a hybrid format. Once the 
pandemic conditions relented, a physical meeting had taken place in March 2022 in Ge neva to make 
progress on the framework. Two major upcoming meetings were mentioned – the forthcoming 
meeting of the OEWG to be held in Nairobi in June 2022; and the second phase (the actual working 
phase) of COP15 that would see the final consideration and  adoption of the framework. COP15 was 
planned for the third quarter of 2022 and the dates would be announced soon.  
3.36.   Regarding the first part of COP15, which comprised the high -level segment, the ministerial 
segment and also the ecological civilization forum  organized by the incoming presidency of China, 
the COP decided on several  administrative measures, such as the budget, which was by then a 
pressing issue. A particular highlight was the Kunming Declaration, which was adopted by more than 
100 countries. Of  particular interest to the CTE, the Declaration contained a reference to 
cross-governmental groups to promote the mainstreaming of biodiversity in decision -making and 
strengthening cross -sectoral coordination mechanisms on biodiversity and that, of course , could also 
apply to trade policies and whenever there was an intersection with biodiversity. On the global level, 
there was also a recognition of the need to further enhance collaboration and coordinate action with 
related international and multilateral proces ses to promote biodiversity.  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  3.37.   In terms of implementation mechanisms, COP15 saw several  important announcements: the 
Kunming Biodiversity Fund was announced by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
with an envelope of around USD  230 million;  the Japan Biodiversity Fund, which supported the 
implementation of the Convention, was extended by another USD  17 million; the Global 
Environment Facility ( GEF), the United Nations Development Programme  (UNDP ), and UNEP 
announced a collaboration to support governments in the development of National Biodiversity 
Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) and associated national financial plans. Finally, several  
countries announced increased international funding to support biodiversity.  
3.38.   Regarding what was referred to as the "Geneva Meetings", these saw the second part of the 
OEWG of SBI -3.2 and SBSTTA -24.2 in an integrated manner. In terms of outcomes, work on the 
agenda of the SBSTTA and SBI was being finalized. There w as a range of recomme ndations including 
draft decisions for consideration by COP15 -2 and there was still considerable work to be done by the 
COP given that many of the decisions were heavily bracketed. To further progress on that, several  
intersessional workstreams were forese en, for instance, workshops on the monitoring framework. 
Informal consultations were  being held on resource organization and several  other issues. 
Specifically, concerning  the OEWG, the group task was the development of a Global Biodiversity 
Framework. Per haps, the most important progress that parties to the Convention took ownership of 
was the draft. Before the current draft, drafts were going back and forth and then there was an 
update by the co -chairs. Now, following the meeting in Geneva, the ball was i n the court of the 
parties. Similar to the recommendations of the subsidiary bodies, there was still considerable work 
to be done and the current draft was heavily bracketed.  
3.39.   There was a general broad agreement on the current structure of the framework as presented 
but there were several  new targets that were being proposed. A couple of them had not been 
negotiated but one contentious issue was the issue of milestones, i.e. whether to have interim 
targets before 2030, where exactly to have them and how to f ormulate them. Then there was the 
issue of numeric targets. There were several  targets where numbers or quantified targets were being 
proposed, so the discussion was whether to have these numbers in the first place and, if so, what 
kind of numbers should b e there. There were still quite divergent views on that.  
3.40.   The next issue on which there was divergency was packaging and granularity. The issue was 
not so contentious but there were several  proposals and divergent views on where to position it and 
in what l evel of detail. Then there were important horizontal issues, for instance, savings clauses, 
recognition of work in other international conventions/agreements, how to phrase them , and where 
to put these considerations. Several  new targets had been  proposed  and some segment s of the 
framework had not yet been negotiated. There was still a lot to do and hence the decision had been 
made to convene another meeting of the OEWG, which would take place in Nairobi later in June.  
3.41.   Ongoing work was being undertaken in the form of an OEWG contact group on digital 
sequence information related to genetic resources. He recalled that, in the last presentation, COP14 
had mandated this work. The OEWG contact group had made significant progr ess in the sense that 
it now had a clear recommendation, but the draft decision still contained a considerable amount of 
brackets. Again, there was much work to be done . The contentious issues revolved around the 
fundamental ly divergent views concerning  whether the digital sequence information fell under the 
scope of genetic resources (the third objective of the Convention). As a reminder, the third objective 
of the Convention foresaw the cause for access to genetic resources and equitable sharing of benefi ts 
rising out of the utilization. The fundamental question was therefore whether digital sequencing 
information related to genetic resources fell under the scope of objectives and then, of course, the 
scope of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit -sharing. 
3.42.   He focused on two concrete and specific technology transfer -related activities that were being 
pursued: the first was the Biodiversity Technology and Innovation Expo which would highlight 
opportunities  that could be offered by technology and innovation to achieve the objectives of the 
Convention and also give visibility to specific technologies to create approaches more broadly. The 
expo aimed  to provide access to state -of-the-art technology and innovat ion solutions for monitoring, 
identifying, and protecting from destroying biodiversity and its focus was on the five drivers of 
biodiversity loss. The  Biodiversity Technology and Innovation Expo provided 30 complimentary 
booths that could be manned by diff erent exhibitors, technology producers, and innovators each 
week (60 in total) and these exhibitors came from the public/private sector, academia, research 
institutions, indigenous people, local communities, women and youth , etc. WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  3.43.   The Bio -Bridge Initiative (BBI) was another initiative under the Convention, which had existed 
for several  years and was financed by the Republic of Korea. It promoted and facilitated technical 
and scientific cooperation among Parties to help them implement the Convention and its P rotocols. 
The BBI enabled countries to effectively harness science, technology and innovation for the effective 
implementation of the Convention as a whole while also looking at the implementation of the 
post-2020 Biodiversity Framework over the next decad es. So far, the BBI had supported 39 projects, 
four out of which were in the pilot phase, while other projects had had subsequent rounds. Over 
100 countries had been involved in th is technical and scientific cooperation (TSC) projects.  
3.44.   The representative o f the European Union  noted that the science was clear and that urgent 
actions were needed for emission reduction, the protection of biodiversity, and the restoration of 
degraded ecosystems. COP15 offered a key opportunity to the international community to agree on 
measurable goals and targets, addressing both direct and indirect drivers of biodiversity loss. These 
should be complemented with strong mechanisms for the monitoring of implementation and review 
of ambitions. High and aligned climate and biodiver sity ambitions were also needed and it should be 
ensure d that investment in nature -based solutions respected social and environmental safeguards. 
The package should  also cover the means of implementation in a broad sense. Financing from all 
sources, includ ing domestic financing, was key.  The representative noted that European Commission 
President Von der Leyen had announced in September 2021 the doubling of the E uropean Union's 
international financing for biodiversity to developing countries. The European  Union hoped that 
others would follow its example.  International finance institutions and multilateral development 
banks needed to also play their part by improving the way they tracked and reported nature -positive 
spending. The EU welcomed concrete pledges in view of COP15  that would build upon synergies with 
climate finance.  He concluded by stressing the importance of stepping up action to redirect or phase 
out incentives, including subsidies, that were harmful to biodiversity. According to the OECD, these 
ran to some USD  800 billion per year. This undermined policies to halt biodiversity loss and restore 
ecosystems. The European Union  believed that bold action was needed to set this right and such 
action was needed soon.  
3.2.2   Presentation by the United Kingdom on "Biodiversity and Nature Positivity"  
3.45.   The representative of the United Kingdom  gave a presentation on "Biodiversity and Nature 
Positivity". She noted that, as work on trade and climate at the WTO intensifie d, nature and  climate 
should  stay high on the agenda. To meet the long -term goal of the Paris Agreement , that was, to 
keep global warming well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C , 
it was essential t o protect, conserve and restore nature and ecosystems. The Glasgow Climate Pact 
adopted by nations at COP26 had highlighted the critical importance of protecting, conserving , and 
restoring nature and ecosystems , which act ed as sinks and reservoirs of GHG and protect ed 
biodiversity. Trade  could play an important role in incentivi zing the actions necessary to support 
delivering these essential outcomes.  
3.46.   In addition to the Glasgow Climate Pact,  an unprecedented variety of commitments on 
environment and land use had been  made at COP26, includ ing the Glasgow leaders Declaration on 
Forests and Land Use, where over 140 leaders had committed to work ing together to halt and reverse 
forest loss and land degradation by 2030. This Declaration included an action to facilitate trade and 
development poli cies, internationally and domestically, that promote d sustainable development and 
sustainable commodity production and consumption, that work ed to countries' mutual benefit, and 
that d id not drive deforestation and land degradation.  
3.47.   At this year's Conventi on on Biological Diversity Conference of the Parties, COP15, the world 
would go even further for nature, working to adopt an effective Post-2020 Global Biodiversity 
Framework that bent the curve of biodiversity loss. This was a chance  to agree a 'Paris moment' for 
nature by adopting a high ambition Global Biodiversity Framework  which it hoped members party to 
the CBD would support.  
3.48.   The UK was committed to ambitious action on nature and, in 2019 , the UK commissioned the 
Dasgupta Review on "The Economics of Biodiversity". The Review argued that nature was the  most 
precious asset and that significant declines in biodiversity were undermining the p roductivity, 
resilience and adaptability of nature. This, in turn, had put our economies, livelihoods and well -being 
at risk. The United Kingdom wished to draw Members' attention to some key insights of the report . WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  3.49.   First, increased international trade coul d have both beneficial and detrimental effects on 
biodiversity. Trade and trade liberalization could facilitate the spread and adoption of 
environmentally friendly technologies, such as those that enabled more efficient production 
processes. Conversely inc reased production from trade expansion could increase demands for 
natural capital and could lead to speciali zation in some commercial activities which significantly 
depleted local ecosystems and enabled the spread of invasive non -native species, pests, and  
pathogens.  
3.50.   Second, over the last few decades, global trade had grown in parallel with global GDP growth. 
This had considerably expanded our ecological footprint. To make the transition to more sustainable 
consumption and production habits, we must address  environmental factors throughout the entire 
supply chain  and this information should be reliable and support environmental due diligence. The 
United Kingdom was pursuing this in various ways including through multilateral initiatives with 
partners such as  the Traceability and Transparency branch of the Forest Agriculture and Commodity 
Trade Dialogue (FACT).  
3.51.   Third, sustainability clauses and measures in Regional Trade Agreements had also shown 
potential, with a promising indication that the number of such agreements had grown over time . 
Impact evaluations of trade agreements, which looked at environmental impacts, could  help improve 
understanding and transparency of potential implications, inform trade agreement design, and 
promote trade's positive imp acts on biodiversity and the environment.  
3.52.   Similarly, financial commitments to environmental objectives as part of assistance 
expenditure geared at facilitating trade had expanded, accounting for almost a third of total aid 
today.  
3.53.   The United Kingdom encoura ged all policymakers to consider the findings of the Dasgupta 
Review and the OECD paper, "Biodiversity, Natural Capital and the Economy: A Policy Guide for 
Finance, Economic and Environment Ministers", prepared by the OECD for the UK G7 Presidency, 
which t he UK would circulate among Members. Delivering a nature -positive future required 
integrating the natural environment into our economic and financial decision -making, and into the 
institutions and systems that underpinned and drove  those decisions. As trad e officials, we should 
be exploring how the multilateral trading system could  help, rather than hinder, this transition.  
3.54.   The United Kingdom was interested in working with CTE Members to further examine the 
opportunities and challenges international trade p resented in tackling biodiversity loss alongside 
climate change. It hoped that it could  explore with Members the opportunities to mainstream nature 
and create a nature -positive economy through trade.  
3.55.   Finally, the representative mentioned the event on "Fina ncing the Transition to a 
Nature -Positive Economy" held in association with Stockholm+50 on 1  June, which had brought 
together senior leaders from governments and the private sector to set out a vision for the strategic 
action needed to achieve our environ ment and development goals. The governance and equitability 
of the trade in nature's goods and services had been recognized as critical to creating better 
incentives and increased investment in sustainable production and consumption practices. Doing so 
would be essential if we were to successfully align with and deliver the outcomes of COP15. The 
United Kingdom looked forward to continued discussions on trade, the environment, and creating a 
nature -positive economy for present and future generations.  
3.2.3   Presen tation by Portugal on the UN Ocean Conference June 2022  
3.56.   The Ambassador of Portugal  updated the Committee on the upcoming UN Ocean Conference 
in June 2022. He began by noting that the o cean was essential even for countries without a coastline , 
since t he ocean produced  over half of the world's oxygen, absorb ed 50 times more carbon dioxide 
than our atmosphere, and ha d a vital role in climate regulation throughout the whole world.  The 
ocean  was also vital to the world's economy, as more than 90% of trade used sea routes; as a direct 
source of jobs for millions of people; and for a growing range of new ocean -related economic 
activities and innovations, for instance, renewable energies. The ocean provided not only food but 
also ingredients that helped fight cancer and Alzheimer's disease, to name a few.  However, the 
ocean was in danger. It was now known that warming waters could alter the currents; the rise of 
sea levels would affect the lives of tens of millions of people; and the ocean's biodiversity, 80% o f WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  all life on earth, was being harmed by acidification.  Portugal's relationship with the ocean was a long 
one. With about 2,500km of coastline, Portugal was home to 48% of all marine waters of the 
European Union. Counting its exclusive economic zone and th e extension of its continental shelf, 
Portugal was 43 times more ocean than land.  Promoting sustainable management of the ocean wa s 
a strategic priority for Portugal. It was therefore honoured to co -host, with Kenya, the 
2022 UN Ocean Conference, which wou ld take place in Lisbon from  27 June -1 July . The Conference 
theme was "Scaling up the ocean action based on science and innovation for the implementation of 
Goal 14: stocktaking, partnerships and solutions ". 
3.57.   This was the second UN Ocean Conference; the fir st took place in 2017. The Conference would 
include several plenary sessions and eight Interactive Dialogues on a wide range of issues, such as 
marine pollution, sustainable fisheries, science and marine technology transfer, as well as 
sustainable ocean -based economies. These eight Interactive Dialogues would follow up on the 
issues, gaps, challenges, opportunities, and partnerships identified and discussed at the 
2017 Conference. They would  also recommend further innovative, tangible, and measurable action  
to achieve all targets of SDG14.  Given the work of this Committee, he drew  attention to the 
interactive dialogue on marine pollution , which would address the new challenges related to marine 
litter, including macro and micro -plastics, among others . He also highlighted three other dialogues  
that may be of interest to the CTE, namely  (i) "Making fisheries sustainable and providing access for 
small -scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets"; (ii)"Strengthening sustainable 
ocean -based eco nomies, in particular for SIDS LDCs"; and (iii) "Increasing scientific knowledge and 
developing research capacity and transfer of marine technology".  All these  events w ould include the 
participation of national governments, the UN and other specialized org anizations, NGOs, civil 
society, industry, and academia. The triple nexus  of ocean-climate -biodiversity would  be at the heart 
of the discussions, supporting ambitious actions to minimize and mitigate the adverse effects of 
climate change. It was key to ens ure complementarity and coherence between the results of the 
different international processes underway, such as the UN Biodiversity Conference, UNEA 5.2 and 
the UN Climate Change Conference. It was expect ed that  the UN Ocean Conference would  contribute 
to COP27  taking place later this year.  
3.58.   In total, 72 virtual  side events and 78 in -person side events were taking place in Lisbon. In 
addition, four special events were planned. The special event for "Local and Regional Governments" 
would be an opportunity fo r governments and their networks, and other stakeholders, to exchange 
good practices and discuss opportunities and initiatives to support sustainable adaptation for coastal 
cities, including financing innovation and scaling up ocean protection.  The "UN Oce an Conference 
Youth and Innovation Forum"  would  mobilize youth participation in the implementation of SDG14, 
promote innovation, and facilitate the sharing of knowledge am ong new generations.  The 
"High -Level Symposium on Water"  would  explore interlinkages between fresh and salt water, 
promoting an integrated vision of the water cycle and discussing the link between SDGs 14 and 6 . 
The "Sustainable Blue Economy Investment Forum"  would  launch a process to design a framework  
global standard for sustainable blue economies to be used in financial instruments, investment 
decisions, and business. It would also be an opportunity to establish a common language for a 
sustainable ocean economy a nd explore synergies between integrated Ocean Management Plans, 
trade finance, marketing and value chains, and the private sector.  
3.59.   As for outcomes, the expectation was the adoption by consensus of a concise, action -oriented 
declaration based on science and  innovation to support the implementation of SDG14. A report with 
summaries prepared by the co -chairs of the Interactive Dialogues would also be adopted. Finally, a 
list of all voluntary commitments submitted toward the implementation of SDG14 would also b e 
prepared. So far, over 1,700 commitments had been submitted by national and local governments, 
civil society, NGOs, academia, and the private sector on the topics of plastic and blue economy, in 
particular, on the topic of fisheries. Signs were encouragi ng but everyone needed to be on board. 
The Conference was a "call to action". With the deadline set by Agenda 2030 fast approaching, 
countries needed to redouble efforts, seek partnerships and make ocean management policies more 
efficient and science -based . 
3.60.   The Ambassador invited delegations to check the "Geneva Blue Talks". Given that Geneva 
was a major hub for global environmental governance and trade, with the sustainability of the ocean 
addressed in many processes and negotiations, the Geneva Environmen t Network had collaborated 
with Kenya and Portugal in the organization of three Blue Talks, including one on  "Science and 
Decision Making "; another on "Fisheries Subsidies and Ocean Governance" ; and, finally, the WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  "High -Level Briefing on the 2022 UN Ocean C onference". Videos of these talks were available on the 
Geneva Environment Network website.  
3.61.   In conclusion, the Ambassador quoted the inspiring words of Secretary -General António 
Guterres and asked all delegations to "bring a plan, not a speech". Portugal l ooked forward to 
welcoming everyone in Lisbon at the Conference.  
3.62.   The representative of Ecuador  thanked the Ambassador of Portugal for the presentation. The 
UN Conference on Oceans was very important for Ecuador and the Ecuadorian President would be 
partici pating together with Ecuador's Minister of Environment and Vice -Chancellor. Ecuador thanked 
the work of Portugal, along with Kenya and other developing countries in the framework of UNCTAD, 
in feeding information on matters related to trade and sustainable  development goals towards the 
Conference of the Oceans.  
3.63.   The representative of Colombia  joined in thanking the Ambassador of Portugal and the 
Permanent Missions of Portugal and Kenya for organizing the Conference of the Oceans, which was 
of great importanc e for everyone. She reiterated the invitation to all Members to commit to the 
negotiations on fisheries subsidies so that the Oceans Conference would be an opportunity to present 
a positive result by the entire WTO Membership.  
4  MEMBERS' SUGGESTIONS AND PROPOSALS  
4.1  Update  on the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions 
(TESSD)  
4.1.  On behalf of the TESSD co -convenors, the representative of Costa Rica  provided an update o n 
the work undertaken at TESSD  over the past few months, since the last CTE meeting. TESSD had 
presented a Ministerial Declaration in December 2021, with the co -sponsorship of 71 WTO Members, 
in which Ministers set the path for the work that needed to be undertaken during 2022. The 
Ministerial Declaration had highlighted priority areas raised by Members, such as: holding dedicated 
discussions on trade -related climate measures and policies; promoting and facilitating  trade in 
environmental goods and services; achieving a more resource -efficient circular economy; promoting 
sustainable supply chains , and addressing challenges and opportunities arising from the use of 
sustainability standards and related measures, in particular for developing Members; the challenges 
and opportunities for sus tainable trade – capacity building and technical assistance (Aid  for Trade); 
and the environmental effects and trade impacts of relevant subsidies.  
4.2.  The identification of these areas had allowed the co -convenors to establish four thematic 
working groups to advance the discussions in a more efficient and targeted pace, based on the 
feedback and input provided by Members, co -sponsors and non -co-sponsors. These working groups 
would be expected to hold intersessional meetings in between TESSD 's regular meetings and might 
include participation and support of external stakeholders with expertise in the different areas, which 
were: (i) Environmental Goods and Services  (EGS) ; (ii) Trade -related climate measures (T rCMs); 
(iii) Circular Economy – Circularity ; and (iv) Subsidies.  
4.3.  During the first session of the working groups, held on 17 -18 May 2022, Members were able 
to present first  hand their priorities regarding the objectives, specific areas of interest, challenges 
and opportunities. For E GS, the International R enewable Energy Agency (IRENA) had provided an 
overview on the facilitation of trade of renewable technologies, the need to ensure that certain 
complimentary services were also available, and the role of trade and trade policy in the 
implementation of thes e technologies to foster job creation. On T rCMs, the World Bank had 
presented on carbon pricing and the mechanisms through which it was measured and  provided views 
for developing countries. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO ) had 
followed with a presentation of the challenges and opportunities for developing countries in 
decarbonizing their economies. The Circular Economy working group offered interesting perspectives 
from the private sector and the  World Economic Forum  (WEF). It was generally agreed that aspects 
such as traceability, financing, regulatory barriers, standards and technology transfer had to be part 
of a holistic approach to the circular economy and the full life cycle of value chains. In the fourth 
working group on subsidies, both fossil fuel and agricultural subsidies had been  discussed. 
Presentations from the OECD and UNEP had provided a broader understanding of the environmental 
impacts of these subsidies. It was also encouraging to see how Members consider that T ESSD could WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  be a space to discuss the environmental angle of these issues, without duplicating existing work in 
other WTO bodies.  
4.4.  The representative of Costa Rica further noted that the work program me for the Structured 
Discussions was intended to incubate and foster topics of interest to the Members. It was an 
inclusive, forward -looking and open platform, where all angles and perspectives w ere welcome. 
Being a co -sponsor and participating in the discussions would not imply an endorsement of all the 
topics. Rather, it would allow each Member to add value and enrich the exchanges with their realities 
and experiences. TESSD was a space for transparency and dialogue among participants, a place to 
learn more  – not only from experts and stakeholders but from each other  – by asking questions and 
trying to answer them collaboratively. The representative also reminded Members that in TESSD no 
new disciplines were or would be discussed. TESSD hosted exploratory talks and let the Members 
decide the speed and the track t hey wished to give to those talks.  
4.5.  The representative of Costa Rica announced that Tajikistan had joined TESSD, becoming 
co-sponsor number 72, and hoped that the road towards MC12 would allow for welcoming even 
more Members to the group. It was also noted that the Ministers of Canada and Costa Rica, as 
TESSD co -convenors, would hold a press conference on 13 July 2022 providing the state of play and 
views on the future work. The dates for both upcoming regular and working group meetings were 
also mentioned: regulars to be held on 19 -20 July 2022, and 26 and 27 October 2022); informal 
Working Group s to be held on 27 -28 September 2022); and the high-level stocktaking event to be  
held on 1 or 2 December 2022.  
4.6.  The representative of Switzerland  welcomed Tajikistan as the 72 nd co-sponsor of the initiative. 
The representative noted that Switzerland was an active member of the TESSD initiative and strongly 
believed that TESSD complemented and strengthened the work of this Committee. The 
representat ive further noted that , since the beginning of the year, there had been high -quality 
discussions between Members and stakeholders that provided a better understanding of what was 
at stake and how trade should and could contribute. This enhanced dialogue al so made it possible 
to understand the priorities of the Members as well as the private sector. The representative noted 
that Switzerland also welcomed the rich exchange that took place during the inaugural meetings of 
the informal working groups on the fol lowing themes: TrCMs, EGS, circular economy  – circularity , 
and subsidies. Switzerland strongly encouraged all WTO Members to join this initiative.  
4.7.  The representative of Japan  said that , at the TESSD informal working group meeting held last 
month, Japan and  Chile had co -facilitated the discussions on circular economy. Through sharing 
domestic policies from each country and presentations by WEF and companies , the importance of 
trade's role in promoting the circular economy had been highlighted. Japan would like to continue 
discussions in TESSD on environmental issues such as EGS, TrCMs, circular economy, and 
environmentally harmful industrial subsidies.  
4.8.  The re presentative of the Maldives  stated that , in the pursuit of sustainable supply chains, 
incentivizing the market access to sustainable and environmental goods was crucial. In this regard, 
the Maldives had taken measures to ensure its important fishing indus try had a sustainable supply 
chain by incentivizing the practice of intrinsically environmentally sustainable fishing methods like 
pole and line and hand line fishing. These methods had a significantly lower impact on the 
environment than indiscriminate me thods of fishing such as drift netting but were not given any 
preferential market access. The representative further drew attention to the current status of the 
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) , which focused on manufacturing and not on sustainable 
production methods. The inclusion of sustainably sourced fish products into the EGA would greatly 
benefit SIDS like the Maldives. Additionally, as the expiration of the current GSP regulation of the 
Maldives in December of 2023 approached, Maldives was thinkin g of ways the new GSP could 
contribute to environmental efforts and believe d it could do so through the prioritization of 
sustainably produced goods. The representative concluded by underscoring that the Maldives stood 
ready to work with others to further the trade and environment agenda and in particular in finding 
ways to promote goods that were sustainably sourced.  
4.9.  The representative of Ukraine  commended the TESSD coordinators and facilitators for their 
unwavering commitment and dedication to mak ing trade, environment and development mutually 
supportive, and for the work undertaken in this regard.  She noted that , since the very establishment 
of the WTO, its Members had agreed that sustainable development and the protection and 
preservation of the environm ent were fundamental goals of the organization. WTO Members had WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  consented to join forces to make trade policies more environment ally friendly and ensure the 
achievement of the SDGs.  Ukraine emphasized that the common actions of all WTO Members were 
important to guarantee sustainable development and mutual supportiveness of trade and 
environmental policies. There could be no discrepancy between one 's declared objectives and 
actions. It was important to ensure that all our measures, particularly within  the international trade 
framework, were beneficial for the environment and promote sustainability.  
4.10.   The representative noted that , regrettably after 24 February 2022, evidence of the differences 
in approaches to advancing sustainability and environmental p rotection had been  provided among 
Members. She further stated that with every passing day it became more evident that the Russian 
Federation's idea of ensuring its sustainable development included infliction of horrendous damage 
to the other Member's envir onment, threats of use of nuclear weapons, energy blackmailing , and 
others. She stated that , since the first day of the Russian Federation's full -scale invasion of Ukraine,  
Russian troops had been causing extreme damage to Ukraine's environment endangering  global 
ecological security and leading to trade distortions. The Russian Federation continued to destroy 
Ukrainian infrastructure, health facilities, fuel depots and gas lines, factories, agricultural 
enterprises, oil refineries and munitions depots , which had already resulted in the destruction of 
trade routes and rattled supply chains, price growth and artificial food shortage. Yet all these dreadful 
acts of aggression would have even more terrible and long -lasting impacts as they caused pollution 
of wat er, soil , and air by chemicals, including heavy metals, asbestos, etc.  
4.11.   The representative stated that the consequences of such pollution to the environment would 
last for years and would be transboundary. The representative further noted that WTO Members 
were engaged in discussions regarding trade -related measures aimed to protect the environment. 
She noted that ignoring  trade-related actions intended to harm one's environment was not an option. 
It would only lead to further escalation of this situation. Th e representative emphasi zed that the 
WTO Member that intentionally damaged the environment should not take part in the development 
of environmentally sustainable trade, should not reap benefits from the facilitation of trade in 
environmental goods and serv ices, and that this Member should not be a part of the WTO 
environmental initiatives at all.  
4.12.   The representative thanked those delegations who had stated their support for Ukraine. Her 
delegation hoped that WTO Members would continue to support Ukraine and reiterate their 
commitments to such fundamental goals of the WTO as sustainable development, and protection 
and preservation of the environment.  
4.13.   The representative of the United Kingdom  welcomed Tajikistan, the most recent member of 
TESSD. The United Kingd om also thanked Costa Rica for the report  and commended the 
co-convenors and the facilitators for all the work being done in organi zing TESSD. The 
United  Kingdom considered this forum to be very important in helping understand the role of trade 
in deliveri ng the shared environmental and climate objectives and thus complementing the work of 
the CTE. The representative also informed delegations that , during the recent informal working group 
on environmental goods and services, the United Kingdom had presented  findings from the 
stakeholder workshop that had been  held with relevant experts earlier this year. The United  Kingdom 
was very interested in continuing to work toward deepening collective understanding of how trade 
in goods and services could help achieve shared environmental and climate objectives in TESSD and 
in the CTE.  
4.14.   The representative of Türkiye  said that w ithin the framework of the discussion topics in this 
working group, a better understanding o f the multifaceted link between trade and the environment 
was developing. Her delegation valued discussions on technical specificities in this area, to formulate 
common principles and globally accepted calculation methods, which would in return guide the 
design of Türkiye's policies in a manner that would pursue sustainability in general. The 
representative noted the importance of examining the implicit carbon pricin g policies implemented 
by countries under different national conditions, as well as the explicit carbon pricing policies, which 
had also been emphasized in the presentation made by the World Bank at the previous meeting. 
Considering that countries carried out different climate policies within the context of their national 
conditions and development levels, a holistic perspective and a transparent basis should be created 
in which global heterogeneous climate policies could be compared regarding carbon pricin g policies.  
 WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  4.15.   The representative joined other delegations in saying that trade -related climate measures, 
including CBAM, should comply with the WTO Agreements and the basic principles of MEAs , 
especially the principle of common but differentiated responsibi lities. In this respect, it was essential 
that such unilateral measures, which would directly affect international trade and competitiveness, 
did not harm the level of development of developing countries and LDCs, and did not have a 
trade -distorting effect . Therefore, one of the issues to be worked on within the framework of this 
group was the environmental benefits of these measures, as well as their impact on the 
competitiveness of countries in international trade. It was necessary to present solutions to  minimize 
the negative effects of such measures on international competitiveness during the implementation 
process. In this sense, the issues that had been covered so far within this group had helped to 
deepen perspectives on trade -related climate measures  and had created an atmosphere for an 
exchange of views on how this issue could be addressed in more detail. For the work ahead, as 
stated by co -facilitators, the representative noted that it was valuable to cooperate with 
organizations such as the OECD an d the IMF at the next meeting. The studies there could feed 
discussions here. In addition, Türkiye had consider ed that the information -sharing planned with the 
International Organization of Standards (ISO) at the next meeting would enrich views on the 
characteristics of possible globally accepted carbon standards that could be used in the design of 
trade -related climate measures. The representative underscored the importance of the work on 
internationally accepted standards that were compatible with climate  targets.  
4.2  12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12)  
4.16.   The representative of Canada  said that , over the past two years, WTO Members had 
intensified discussions on trade and environmental sustainability at the WTO CTE, through informal 
groups like TESSD, IDP and FFSR and in other discussions and workshops.  These discussions show ed 
the potential that international trade and trade policy c ould play in support of efforts to address 
climate change.  At the last General Council meeting, the European Union had proposed a paragraph 
on the CTE for inclu sion in the MC12 Outcome Document.  Canada support ed the proposal and 
encourage d other WTO Members t o also do so.  In Canada's view, t he text reflect ed the current state 
of play at the CTE by recognizing the role that trade policy c ould and must play to address issues 
like climate change and biodiversity loss.  More importantly, the text also recognize d that the needs 
of developing countries should  be considered.  Beyond MC12, Canada encouraged WTO Members to 
maintain momentum and continue to identify and consider concrete ways to advance trade and 
environment goals within the WTO.  
4.17.   The representative of Switzerland  noted that t he challenges posed by climate change and 
other global environmental problems were broad and all policy areas, including trade policy, had to 
contribute to the solution. This was a difficult task that the WTO had to address at MC12 . Despite 
the current geopolitical situation, the triple planetary crises  – climate change, pollution  and 
biodiversity loss  – require d the commitment of all and the multilateral trading system had to make 
its contribution. It was essenti al that the WTO sen t a strong signal on the international scene and 
that it was relevant to address global challenges. Therefore, Switzerland support ed the reference in 
the MC12 Declaration to the WTO 's work on trade and environmental sustainability issues , including 
in the CTE, and the importance for the WTO  to intensify  its work on these issues after MC12 . 
4.18.   The representative of the United Kingdom  said tha t, in view of  MC12, in the context of the 
unprecedented and interdependent crises of climate change, e nvironmental degradation and 
biodiversity loss, pollution, and the existential threat they pose d to nature, people, prosperity and 
security, there was a critical role for the WTO to play in sharing experiences, promoting best practice, 
and providing recomm endations in the transition to net zero emissions. The United Kingdom was 
therefore  proud to co -sponsor the three plurilateral ministerial statements on trade and environment 
launched in  December  2021. As expressed throughout discussions on the ministerial outcomes 
document, her delegation was  keen to agree on language which recogni zed the role that the WTO 
and its Members ha d to play in addressing climate change and environmental issues . Her delegatio n 
continued  to engage and encourage Members to work collaboratively on achieving this.  
4.19.   The representative  of the  Philippines  thanked  those Members who ha d worked to refine a 
paragraph on the environment for inclusion in the political declaration which w ould be the first clear 
reference to trade and the environment since the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial  Conference . The 
Philippines was supportive of the content, which demonstrate d WTO's increased prioritization of WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  environmentally sustainable trade. As other dele gations had pointed  out, the successful conclusion 
of the fisheries subsidies agreement would be an example that  the WTO was prioritizing sustainable 
development as part of its core agenda.  
4.20.   The representative of the European Union  said that MC12 had to  give a strong indication that 
sustainability considerations should continue to feature on the WTO agenda, despite the current 
geopolitical situation.  WTO Members needed to continue to show determination in tackling the triple 
planetary crisis of climate c hange, biodiversity loss and pollution, which was compounded by 
unsustainable consumption and production.  Trade policy  had to  support the transition to a 
climate -neutral, nature -positive circular economy in which resources were kept in the economy for 
as long as possible, emissions were minimi zed and impacts on ecosystems were reduced.  The 
European Union invite d Members to support a paragraph on the environment in the Outcome 
Document at MC12.  
4.21.   The representative of Norway  underscored that MC12 should give a strong indication that 
sustainability considerations should be a part of the WTO agenda.  WTO Members  had to  continue to 
show determination in tackling the triple crisis of clima te change, biodiversity loss and pollution.  
Norway , therefore,  support ed sustainability as a part of the statement from MC12.  
5  RELATIONS WITH INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND NON -GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
ITEM 10  
5.1  Briefing by Thailand  on the Asia -Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2022  
5.1.  The representative of Thailand  briefed delegations on Asia -Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) 2022. Thailand was honoured  to be the host of APEC 2022. Established over 30 years ago, 
APEC's 21 member economies ha d long aimed  to create greater prosperity and economic well -being 
for the people of the Asia -Pacific region. In the now -extended COVID -19 era, APEC ha d had to 
grapple with unprecedented challenges confronting the region and the world economy at large. 
Against this bac kdrop, a document called the Putrajaya Vision 2040 was adopted in 2020 setting out 
APEC's vision for "an open, dynamic, resilient and peaceful Asia -Pacific community by 2040 " and, in 
2021, APEC member economies had developed the Aotearoa Plan of Action to implement the 
Putrajaya Vision.  
5.2.  These recent documents, which reflect ed leaders ' level guidance, reaffirm ed APEC's important 
role in supporting global efforts to address environmental challenges through promoting economic 
policies, cooperation and growth. This present ed Thailand with a solid foundation to build upon and 
leverage APEC 's strong track record as an incubator of ideas to advance the work on environmental 
sustainability, which was indeed a key thread that r an through Thailand 's host year theme of  "Open. 
Connect. Balance. " 
5.3.  Under the theme of "Balance in All Aspects ", Thailand hope d to accelerate APEC 's efforts toward 
sustainability through the concept of a Bio-Circular -Green (BCG) economy. In a nutshell, this concept 
encompasse d bio-economy as the production of renewable biological resources and their conversion 
into value -added products, the circular economy as the reuse and recycling of resources , and the 
green economy as keeping the economy, society and the environment in harmony, resulting i n 
sustainable development.  
5.4.  On 21-22 May 2022, APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade (MRT)  had met in Bangkok under 
the chairmanship of Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Commerce, H.E. Mr. Jurin 
Laksanawisit, with the virtual participation of the WTO Director -General. After the meeting, the Chair 
had issued a statement reflecting his assessment of the prevailing views of all APEC member 
economies as expressed during the course of the two -day meeting.  
5.5.  He pointed out some  key elements from the Ch air's statement that might be relevant to the 
CTE's work.  First of all, the MRT meeting had recognized the  important role that trade play ed in 
advancing sustainability and welcomed efforts at the WTO to intensify work on trade and the 
environment.  As for t he work within APEC, the meeting had taken  note of ongoing efforts, including 
the development of a standalone statement for leaders ' consideration, to support the BCG economy 
concept as an approach for achieving an inclusive, balanced and sustainable recov ery from 
COVID -19, long -term resilient economic growth, and environmental and climate objectives. Given WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  the urgency of tackling environmental challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss and 
plastic pollution, there had been  recognition of the need to promote economic policies that enable d 
ambitious and concrete actions aligned with global efforts, such as the achievement of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and the goals of the Paris Agreement, as well as the need to 
provide internati onal support including capacity building, technological and financial support , which 
were key enablers in this regard.  
5.6.  Next, in light of the current global energy situation, the meeting  had underscored the need to 
promote energy resilience, access and secu rity, and it was noted that the achievement of sustainable 
economic growth and climate objectives significantly rel ied on clean energy transitions that were 
sustainable and inclusive.  Furthermore, there had been  reaffirmation of APEC commitments on 
rationa lizing and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage d wasteful consumption 
while also recognizing the importance of providing those in need with essential energy services as 
well as capacity  building initiatives.  
5.7.  On environmental goods, the meeting had welcomed the progress made in connection with the 
2012 APEC List of Environmental Goods and  updating the list to the Harmoni zed System 2022 for 
reference purposes. In addition, the meeting had noted the progress in discussions to develop 
recommendations for potentially producing a voluntary, non -binding reference list of emerging 
environmental goods that would inform future discussions, and there had also been recognition of 
the importance of further discussions on the impact of non -tariff m easures on trade in environmental 
goods.  
5.8.  Last but not least, the meeting  had also stressed the importance of advancing work on 
enhancing trade in environmental services.  He encouraged delegations  to have a look at the full 
APEC MRT Chair 's Statement, which  was available on the APEC website.  
5.2  Update by the United Nations Environment Programme ( UNEP )  
5.9.  The representative of  the United Nations  Environment Programme ( UNEP ) provided  an update 
on its work on trade and the environment. UNEP was pleased  to hear the updates today from the 
European Union on the European Green Deal, and from the WTO Secretariat on the preparations for 
the Aid for Trade Global Review and the joint webinar series with the World Bank on trade and 
climate change.  UNEP commend ed Members on their  efforts to advance important discussions and 
work at the nexus of trade and environment, fossil fuel subsidy reform, climate change,  circular 
economy and plastics.  
5.10.    UNEP  update d the CTE on the latest relevant activities . On the circular e conomy , in 
March  2022, the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) had adopted a resolution aimed at 
enhancing the circular economy as a contribution to achieving sustainable consumption and 
production. Aligned to this UNEA resolution, UNEP was undertak ing a project to assess the role of 
trade policy in supporting circular and sustainable textile value chains, with two national case 
studies  – in Thailand and Kenya  – aiming to bring national and international trade and environment 
stakeholders in these countries.  This project buil t on the flagship report on Sustainability and 
Circularity in the Textile Value Chain, published by UNEP in 2020, which identifie d environmental 
and socioeconomic hotspots and impacts along the value chain, identifie d a plethora of initiatives to 
address these impacts, and outline d priority action areas. This project was also part of UNEP 's 
overarching work on how trade and trade policy could support the 'greening ' of high -impact value 
chains such as textiles, plastics and electronics. Two  main activities were undertaken in this project:  
(i) identify environmental hotspots in textile value chains linked to the triple planetary crises ; and 
(ii) identification and evaluation of trade policy and trade -related measures to suppor t textile value 
chains.  
5.11.   UNEP also updated delegations on trade and biodiversity -related work. The representative 
first informed about a  global project titled the "Trade, Development, and Environment Hub ", funded 
by the UK Research and Innovation Global Cha llenges Research Fund. Working with over 50 partner 
organizations and focused on countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America, the project ha d 
initiated global dialogues and cooperation and delivered knowledge products, studies, and tools 
aimed at reduc ing trade impacts on biodiversity and people while enhancing positive economic 
development. UNEP collaborate d with public sector stakeholders on making trade in agricultural 
commodities more sustainable, in close communication with the Convention on Biolog ical Diversity. WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  As a project partner, UNEP ha d produced research -based policy briefings on the trade linkages with 
biodiversity, sustainable agriculture and deforestation -free supply chains, and this year UNEP w ould 
launch a series of Regional Dialogues on  Trade, Environment and Biodiversity, which w ould convene 
key stakeholders from public and private sector, international trade organizations, academia and 
civil society to discuss, share and explore priorities, challenges, and opportunities to advance 
agendas at the intersection of trade and biodiversity. In light of the ongoing negotiations of the 
currently proposed Post -2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and the Biodiversity Conference COP15 
this year, the TRADE Hub project contribute d to how trade and th e WTO c ould play a role in the 
Global Biodiversity Framework and its objective to secure nature -positive commitments to halt and 
begin reversing biodiversity loss by 2030 and  ensure fulfilling its vision to "live in harmony with 
nature " by 2050.  
5.12.   Second, UN EP was undertaking work aimed at enhancing biodiversity -related trade policies 
and rules through digital transformation. This include d connecting transparency schemes in nature, 
value chains and the global trading system, and translating information -related governance 
challenges into questions of data science.  
5.13.   Currently, the initial research ha d revealed the opportunities of further operationalizing 
biodiversity provisions in trade agreements and ways of improving trade disciplines on harmful 
incentiv es and strengthening the green trade market. The resulting paper from this work w ould be 
available after this summer and UNEP would share it with Members.  
5.14.   UNEP looked  forward to continuing  to support  Members with environmental science, data, 
technological information, and initiatives arising from UNEP 's related work, to support the CTE efforts 
going forward.  
6  DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING  
6.1.  The Chairperson of the CTE informed Members that the next meeting of the CTE was scheduled 
to take place during the week of 17  October 2022  together with the WTO Third  Environment Week . 
_______________  
 
  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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  ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME (1994)  
Item 1:  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral 
environmental agreements.  
Item 2:  The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental 
measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multila teral trading 
system.  
Item 3(a):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
charges and taxes for environmental purposes.  
Item 3(b):  The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
requirem ents for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards 
and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling.  
Item 4:  The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of 
trade measures used for e nvironmental purposes and environmental measures and 
requirements which have significant trade effects.  
Item 5:  The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral 
trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agre ements.  
Item 6:  The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions.  
Item 7:  The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods.  
Item 8:  The relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade -related  Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights.  
Item 9:  The work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the 
Environment.  
Item 10: Input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations 
with intergovernmental and non -governmental organizations referred to in Article  V 
of the WTO.  
 
_______________  
  WT/CTE/M/75  
 
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ANNEX 2: DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION PARAGRAPHS  
32. We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in pursuing work on all items on its 
agenda within its current terms of reference, to give particular attention to:  
 
(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them, and those situations in 
which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, 
the environment and development;  
 
(ii) the r elevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights; and  
 
(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes.  
 
Work on these issues should include the identification of any need to clarify relevant WTO rules. T he 
Committee shall report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, and make 
recommendations, where appropriate, with respect to future action, including the desirability of 
negotiations. The outcome of this work as well as the negotiations carri ed out under paragraph  31 
(i) and  (ii) shall be compatible with the open and non -discriminatory nature of the multilateral 
trading system, shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of members under existing 
WTO agreements, in particular the A greement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, nor alter the balance of these rights and obligations, and will take into account the needs 
of developing and least  developed countries.  
 
33. We recogni se the importance of technical assis tance and capacity building in the field of trade 
and environment to developing countries, in particular the least  developed among them. We also 
encourage that expertise and experience be shared with members wishing to perform environmental 
reviews at the national level. A report shall be prepared on these activities for the Fifth Session.  
 
51. The Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade and Environment shall, 
within their respective mandates, each act as a forum to identify and debate  developmental and 
environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having 
sustainable development appropriately reflected.  
 
 
__________