WT/TPR/OV/26  
23 November 2023  
(23-7873) Page: 1/94 
Trade Policy Review Body   
 
OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS  IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT  
ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR -GENERAL1 
(Mid-October  2022 to mid -October  2023) 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 2 
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  5 
2   RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS  ................................ ........................  8 
2.1   Merchandise trade volume and outlook  ................................ ................................ .........  8 
2.2   Trade development in value terms  ................................ ................................ ..............  12 
3   TRADE AND TRADE -RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  ................................ ..............  18 
3.1   Overview of  trends identified during the review period  ................................ ...................  18 
3.1.1   Regular trade measures  ................................ ................................ ..........................  18 
3.1.2   COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures  ................................ .............................  25 
3.1.3   Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis  ...........................  27 
3.2   Trade remedy trends  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 30 
3.3   Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures  ................................ ................................ . 36 
3.4   Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  ................................ ................................ ................  43 
3.5   Policy developments in agriculture  ................................ ................................ ..............  45 
3.6   General economic support  ................................ ................................ .........................  48 
3.7   Other selected trade policy issues  ................................ ................................ ...............  51 
4   POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES  ................................ ........................  71 
5   POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  ..........................  79 
6   TRANSPARENCY OF TRADE POLICIES  ................................ ................................ ........  82 
 
 
 
 
1 This Report covers the period mid -October 2022 to mid -October 2023. It is presented pursuant to 
Paragraph G of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate and aims to assist the Trade Policy Review Body to 
undertake its annual overview of developments in the international trading environment that are having an 
impact on the multilateral trading system. The Report is issued under the sole responsibility of the 
Director -General. It has no  legal effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor does it have any legal 
implications with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any WTO Agreements or 
any provisions thereof.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1. This WTO Trade Monitoring Report on trade -related developments arrives with multiple crises 
affecting the global economy. Inflation and large external debts in many countries, the war in 
Ukraine, climate change, high food and energy prices, as well as persistent pandemic -related 
ramifications , are all impacting the global economic environment. The recent outbr eak of hostilities 
in parts of the Middle East is also adding to the uncertainty for the global economy.  
2. The findings of this Report, as further detailed below, reveal that between mid -October 2022 
and mid -October 2023, WTO Members introduced more trade -facilitating than trade -restrictive 
measures on goods, unrelated to the pandemic. Most of the facilitation happened on the import side 
while most restrictions took place on the export side. In the area of services trade , the trend was 
also mostly towards fur ther liberalization. New general economic support measures by governments, 
including various environmental impact reduction programmes , were also introduced. Overall, 
implementation of new COVID -19 trade -related measures slowed significantly.  
3. The number of  export restrictions by WTO Members has risen significantly since 2020, first in 
the context of the pandemic and more recently because of the war in Ukraine and the food security 
crisis.  
4. World trade growth continued to slow, as high inflation and rising i nterest rates weighed on 
trade and output in advanced economies, and as property market strains prevented a stronger 
post-pandemic recovery in China. World merchandise trade volume growth is expected to slow to 
0.8% in 2023 (down from the previous estimate  of 1.7%), before picking up to 3.3% in 2024.  
5. Preparations for the WTO's 13th Ministerial Conference in February 2024 are entering their 
final phase with the recent Senior Officials Meeting in Geneva providing an important opportunity to 
build further mom entum. In this context, WTO Members must work collectively towards ensuring a 
successful and substantive outcome at MC13, reinvigorating the multilateral trading system and 
boosting the world economy.  
Specific findings  
6. This Report is set against a backdrop  of continued slow growth in world trade . The volume 
of world merchandise trade was down 0.5% year -on-year in the first half of 2023 as high inflation 
and rising interest rates weighed on trade and output in advanced economies, and as property 
market strai ns prevented a stronger post -pandemic recovery in China. The WTO's latest forecast (on 
5 October 2023) estimated merchandise trade volume growth of 0.8% in 2023 (down from the 
previous estimate of 1.7%) and 3.3% in 2024 (nearly unchanged from 3.2% previous ly). Risks to 
the forecast include a sharper -than-expected slowing of the Chinese economy, resurgent inflation in 
advanced economies and rising geopolitical tensions. The above forecast was made before the 
outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. A wide ning Middle East crisis could exacerbate the downside 
risks to the October forecast.  
7. The US dollar value of merchandise trade was down 5% year -on-year, partly because of falling 
global commodity prices, but this was balanced by an 8% rise in commercial ser vices trade due to 
increased spending on travel, goods -related services, and other commercial services. There are signs 
that trade is reorienting along geopolitical lines, including a decline in the share of parts and 
components in world trade and increasi ng trade between politically like -minded countries. However, 
evidence of a broad trend towards de -globalization remains scant. The WTO will continue to monitor 
the incoming data for further proof of possible fragmentation.   
8. Recent crises, including the CO VID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, rising geopolitical 
tensions and events related to climate change have caused disruption of global supply chains . 
Economies have increasingly looked for ways to develop resilience and diversify their trading 
networks.  
9. The pace of implementation of new export restrictions  by WTO Members has increased 
significantly since 2020. Although some of these have been rolled back, as of mid-October 2023 , 
75 export restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers were still in place globally, in addition to 
20 COVID -19-related export restrictions.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  10. During the review period, WTO Members introduced more trade -facilitating (303) than 
trade -restrictive (193) measures on goods, unrelated to the pandemic . Most of the 
trade-facilitating measu res were on the import side, while most restrictions were on the export side. 
For the third time since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise, the number of new export 
restrictions (99 or 51% of all) outpaced that of import restrictions (93 or 48%) . The trade coverage 
of the trade -facilitating measures was estimated at USD 977.2 billion (down from USD 1,160.5 billion 
in the last annual report), and that of the trade -restrictive measures at USD  337.1  billion (up from 
USD 278.0  billion in the last rep ort). 
11. The stockpile of import restrictions  implemented since 2009 shows little meaningful 
roll-back. For 2023, the trade covered by import restrictions in force was estimated at USD 2,480 
billion, representing almost one  tenth of total world imports.  
12. The average number of trade remedy initiations  by WTO Members was 12.1 per month 
during the review period, down from its highest peak so far in 2020 (36.1 initiations per month). 
The monthly average of trade remedy terminations during the same period was 8 .3, the lowest 
average since 2012. Trade remedy actions, especially anti -dumping measures, remain an important 
trade policy tool for many WTO Members, accounting for 33% of all non -COVID -19-related trade 
measures on goods recorded in this Report.  
13. In the s ervices sectors , 123 new measures were introduced by WTO Members, a sharp 
decline compared to the last two years. Most of these measures were trade -facilitating, either 
liberalizing or moving towards an improved regulatory framework. Half of th ese were hor izontal 
policies affecting trade for many services sectors and/or multiple modes of supply . About 30% of 
measures  related to communications  and Internet - and other network -enabled services, and 15% 
to financial services. About 20% of measures affected various services sectors, such as business, 
health -related , tourism and recreational , and transport services.   
14. The review period saw a significant increase in the number of new general  economic 
support measures  by WTO Members. These included environmental impa ct reduction 
programmes, renewable -energy production schemes, support for energy efficiency and 
decarbonization and for clean - and renewable -energy projects. Other measures included various 
support programmes for the agricultural sector, tourism, aviation,  and transport.  
15. The implementation of new COVID -19 trade -related measures by WTO Members  
decelerated further during the review period. These measures included extensions, renewals, or 
terminations of measures. In the services sectors, no new COVID -19-related measure s were 
reported. The number of new COVID -19-related support measures by WTO Members and Observers 
fell sharply.  
16. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, 458 trade and trade -related measures in goods have 
been implemented by WTO Members and Observers.  Most of these were trade -facilitating (255 or 
56%), while the rest could be considered trade -restrictive (203 or 44%).  Members continued to 
phase out the pandemic -related measures, especially restrictive ones. As of mid -October 2023, 
84.7% of the COVID -19-related trade restrictions had been repealed, leaving 20 export restrictions 
and 9 import restrictions in place. The trade coverage of the pandemic -related trade restrictions still 
in place was estimated at USD  15.6 billion (down from USD 134.6 billion in  the previous annual 
report). In the area of services, 156 COVID -19-related measures have been introduced since the 
beginning of the pandemic, most of which are still in place (22 have been terminated, and 
3 partially).  
17. WTO Members continued to use the  SPS and TBT Committees' transparency mechanisms 
to notify their sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and 
to discuss and often resolve specific trade concerns (STCs) non -litigiously. Food safety was the most 
frequent objective identified in the regular SPS notifications submitted by WTO Members during the 
review period. Most new STCs raised in the SPS Committee concerned animal health/animal diseases 
and food safety. Since 1995, 55% of all STCs raised in the SPS Commit tee have been reported as 
resolved or partially resolved. Overall, WTO Members have submitted 133 SPS notifications and 
communications on measures taken in response to the pandemic.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  18. Most of the new regular TBT notifications submitted by WTO Members during the review period 
indicated the protection of human health or safety as their principal objective. A total of 223 STCs 
were discussed during the review period. Overall, WTO Members h ave submitted 
229 COVID -19-related TBT notifications to the WTO. Members have made references to the 
COVID -19 pandemic in 55 STCs.  
19. The number of trade concerns raised  in WTO Committees and bodies has been increasing 
yearly, in some cases sharply. During th e review period, WTO Members continued to use WTO bodies 
to address their trade concerns and engage trading partners on real or potential areas of friction.  
20. In the Committee on Agriculture (CoA),  Members posed 677 questions on specific 
implementation matte rs (SIMs), individual notifications, overdue notifications, and in relation to the 
follow -up to the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. Most of these (82% of questions and 56% 
of SIMs) focused on domestic support notifications.  Pursuant to the mandate  in paragraph 8 of the 
Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity, the CoA approved a work 
programme to consider food security concerns of least developed countries (LDCs) and 
net-food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs).  
21. WTO Members continued to fine -tune their intellectual property (IP) regimes. Although 
many pandemic -related IP measures have been phased out, some Members have formalized online 
procedures created during lockdowns. During the review period, WTO Members discuss ed the 
possible extension of the MC12 TRIPS Decision on COVID -19 Vaccines to diagnostics and 
therapeutics and shared national experiences and best practices on IP and innovation.  
22. Discussions on global environmental issues , including the circular economy an d plastics 
pollution, trade and climate change, and biodiversity intensified at the WTO. During the review 
period, some WTO Members continued their work through other platforms, including the Fossil Fuel 
Subsidy Reform, the Trade and Environmental Sustaina bility Structured Discussions, and the 
Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade.  
23. This Report also covers several other important trade -related developments and discussions 
that took place during the review period, inclu ding fisheries subsidies; e -commerce; Aid for 
Trade; government procurement; dispute settlement; trade facilitation; trade finance; 
micro, small and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs); regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
and trade and gender . 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  This Report is submitted to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) pursuant to Paragraph G of 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement. This provides for 
an annual Report by the Director -General t o assist the TPRB in undertaking its annual overview of 
developments in the international trading environment that are having an impact on the multilateral 
trading system. It builds on the Director -General's Report to the TPRB on trade -related 
developments  circulated to Members on  14 July 202 3.1 
1.2.  This Trade Monitoring Report covers the period from 16 October 20 22 to 15 October 20 23, 
unless otherwise indicated.2 The Report is issued under the sole responsibility of the 
Director -General and is intended to be factual. It has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of 
Members, nor does it have any legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure  noted 
in the Report with any WTO  Agreement. Specifically, the Report does not question the explicit right 
of Members to resort to trade  remedy measures and is without prejudice to Members' negotiating 
positions  (Box 1.2) . The Trade Monitoring Reports aim to provide transparency across the 
multilateral trading system on the very latest trends and developments in the implementation of a 
broad range of trade policy measures and offer an update on the main indicators of the world 
economy and on the state of gl obal trade. The regular discussions of the Reports among Members 
in the TPRB provide important input and perspective to the Trade Monitoring Exercise, including on 
the coverage and analysis of trade -related issues.  
1.3.  At the WTO's 8th Ministerial Conference in December 2011, Ministers recognized the regular 
work undertaken by the TPRB through the monitoring exercise of trade and trade -related measures, 
took note of the work initially done in the context of the global financial and econ omic crisis , and 
directed it to be continued and strengthened. They invited the Director -General to continue 
presenting the Trade Monitoring Reports on a regular basis and asked the TPRB to consider these 
Reports in addition to the meeting dedicated to und ertaking the annual overview of developments 
in the international trading environment. Ministers committed to duly comply with the existing 
transparency obligations and reporting requirements needed for the preparation of these Reports, 
and to continue to support and cooperate with the WTO Secretariat in a constructive fashion.3  
1.4.  This Trade Monitoring Report again arrives with the global econom y facing multiple challenges. 
Although COVID -19 related issues no longer capture headlines, access to vaccines is still lagging in 
some parts of the world and new variants will inevitably appear. The humanitarian crisis and general 
instability caused by the war in Ukraine remain and threats related to energy security  and food 
security and to the world economy at large  persist. The recent outbreak of hostilities in parts of the 
Middle East is also adding to the uncertainty for the global economy.  
1.5.  Information on measures included in this Report and its Annexes has been collated from inputs 
submitted by WTO Members and O bservers and from other official and public sources. Overall, 
responses to the Director -General's request for information and to the subsequent verification 
request were received from 79 Members (counting the European  Union and its member States 
separately ) (Box 1. 1), which represents 48% of the membership, and covers around 92.9%  of world 
imports. Three  Observers also replied to the request for information. Where it has not been possible 
to confirm the information, this is noted in the Annexes.  
1.6.  In early 20 23, the WTO Secretariat introduced a digital platform for submitting and verifying 
trade measure s. The principal objectives of this platform are to further participation in the Trade 
Monitoring Exercise and to facilitate the exchange of information between  the Secretariat and 
delegations, particularly during the verification process. In April  and September 2023 , the 
Secretariat hosted dedicated information sessions  regarding  the platform, including the presentation 
of tutorials to guide Members and Observer s through the process of submitting and verifying 
measures. Overall, the new digital platform has performed well with an increasing number of 
delegations opting to submit and verify trade measures online. The digital platform remains a work 
 
1 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/17 , 14 July 20 23. 
2 In addition to the trade policy measures implemented during the period under review and recorded by 
this Report, other measures that impact trade flows may have been taken by WTO Members and Observers.  
3 WTO document WT/L/848 , 19 December 2011.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  in progress , and some features will undergo further modification and improvement in line with the 
inputs and suggestions of delegations . 
1.7.  Section  2 of th is Report provides a brief account of recent economic and trade developments 
and includes the most recent forecasts for world trade growth. Section  3 presents selected trade 
and trade -related policy trends for the review period. Policy developments in trade in services and 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights  (TRIPS) are included in Sections  4 and 5, 
respectively.  
1.8.  A separate Addendum to this Report contains Annexes with new regular measures recorded 
during the review period. Measures implemen ted outside of this period are not included in these 
Annexes . Information on all regular trade measures recorded since the beginning of the Trade 
Monitoring Exercise in October  2008 with an indication of their status, as updated by 
WTO delegations, is avai lable through the Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB).4 
1.9.  Preparations for WTO's 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) to be held in late February 2024 in 
Abu Dhabi are entering their final months. The recent Senior Officials Meeting in Geneva held on 
23-24 Octob er, where 100 high -level officials and nearly 1,000 delegates participated, provided an 
important opportunity to advance these preparations. There is a genuine sense of determination 
that all delegations must work together collectively towards ensuring the  success of MC13 and for 
reinvigorating the multilateral trading system and boosting the world economy.  
1.10.  The Organization for Economic Development (OECD), the International Trade Centre (ITC), 
and the Digital  Trade Alert ( DTA) have kindly contributed topica l boxes to this Report.  
Box 1.1 Participation in the preparation of this Report  
1. Albania  
2. Argentina  
3. Australia  
4. Azerbaijana 
5. Bangladesh  
6. Brazil  
7. Cambodia  
8. Canada  
9. Chile 
10. China  
11. Colombia  
12. Costa Rica  
13. Dominican Republic  
14. Democratic Republic of  the Congo  
15. Ecuador  
16. Egypt  
17. El Salvador  
18. Ethiopiaa 
19. European Union  
20. Guatemala  
21. Hong Kong, China  
22. India 
23. Indonesia  
24. Jamaica  
25. Japan  
26. Korea, Republic of  
27. Kuwait, the State of  
28. Macao, China  29. Malaysia  
30. Mauritius  
31. Mexico  
32. Moldova, Republic of  
33. Mongolia  
34. Montenegro  
35. Mozambique  
36. Myanmar  
37. New Zealand  
38. Norway  
39. Philippines  
40. Russian Federation  
41. Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  
42. Serbiaa 
43. Seychelles  
44. Singapore  
45. South Africa  
46. Sri Lanka  
47. Switzerland  
48. Chinese Taipei  
49. Thailand  
50. Türkiye  
51. Ukraine  
52. United Kingdom  
53. United States  
54. Uruguay  
55. Viet Nam  
a Observer.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
4 WTO, Trade Monitoring Database . Viewed at: http://tmdb.wto.org . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Box 1.2 About the WTO Trade Monitoring Report  
The Trade Monitoring Report is first and foremost a transparency exercise. It is intended to be purely factual 
and has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of WTO Members. It is without prejudice to Members' 
negotiating positions and has no legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the 
Report with any WTO Agreement or any provision thereof.  
The Report aims to shed light on the latest trends in the implementation of a broad range of policy measures 
that facilitate as well as restrict the flow of trade and provide an update on the state of global trade. The 
Report neither seeks to pronounce itself on whether a trade measure is protectionist, nor does it question the 
right of Members to take certain trade measures. The R eports continue to evolve in terms of the coverage 
and analysis of trade -related issues and take into account discussions among WTO Members in the Trade 
Policy Review Body (TPRB).  
Regarding trade remedy actions, it has been highlighted in discussions among  WTO Members that some of 
these measures are taken to address what is perceived by some as a market distortion resulting from trade 
practices of entities in another trading partner. The Anti -Dumping  Agreement and the Subsidies  and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement  permit WTO  Members to impose anti -dumping (AD) or countervailing 
(CVD) duties to offset what is perceived to be injurious dumping or subsidization of products exported from 
one Member to another. The Reports are not in a position to establish if, where or when such perceived 
distortive practices have taken place. The Reports have never categorized the use of trade remedies as 
protectionist or WTO -inconsistent or criticized governments for utilizing them. The main objective of 
monitoring these measu res is to provide additional transparency and to identify emerging trends in the 
application of trade policy measures.  
With respect to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures covered in 
the Report, it is important to  emphasize that they are neither classified nor counted as trade -restrictive or 
trade -facilitating, and the increasing trend with respect to the number of notifications of such measures is 
carefully linked to the transparency provisions of the Agreements o nly. The Reports have consistently 
underlined the basic premise that an increased number of SPS and TBT notifications does not automatically 
imply greater use of protectionist or unnecessarily trade -restrictive measures, but rather enhanced 
transparency re garding these measures. Finally, the Reports clearly emphasize that the SPS and 
TBT Agreements specifically allow Members to take measures in the pursuit of a number of legitimate policy 
objectives.  
The WTO Secretariat strives to ensure that the Trade Mon itoring Reports are factual and objective. Since 
2009, the Reports have sought to provide a nuanced perspective to developments in international trade. For 
example,  the Reports  have consistently  emphasized  that although  the number  of specific  and often long-term 
restrictive  trade  measures  remain  a source  of serious  concern,  other  key factors  may influence  trade  
developments.  During discussions of the Trade Monitoring Reports at the TPRB, Members have also drawn 
attention to this point and to the fact that, with respect to both, vigilance remains imperative.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  2  RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS  
2.1  Merchandise t rade volume and outlook  
2.1.  Merchandise trade statistics for the first half of 2023  came in weaker than expected, prompting 
the WTO to lower its  goods trade projections for 2023 while maintaining a stable  outlook for 2024.1 
The downgrade came as inflation and high interest rates weighed on manufacturing in advanced 
economies, and as distressed  property markets prevented a stronger economic recovery from 
emerging in China.  
2.2.  World merchandise trade volume growth is now expected to slow to 0.8% in 2023, below the 
WTO's previous forecast of 1.7% from last April. The pace of trade expansion should then pick up to  
3.3% in 2024, nearly unchanged from 3.2% forecasted previously. Trade growth should be 
accompanied by real GDP growth at market exchange rates of 2.6% in 2023 and 2.5% in 2024.   
2.3.  The outlook for trade remains clouded by downside risks , including a stronger  than expected  
slowdown in China,  a resurgence of inflation  in advanced economies,  large external debts in 
developing countries, and further aftershocks from the war in Ukraine. There is also some upside 
potential if inflationary pressures recede quickly, or if the Chinese economy accelerates . In its latest 
forecast, the WTO saw risks evenly balanced between the upside and the downside, but a widening 
Middle East conflict could tip the balance in a more negative direction.   
2.4.  Chart 2.1 shows world merchandise trade volume developments through 2023Q2 and 
projections through 2024Q4. The shaded region represents an approximate 85% confidence interval 
around the trade forecast while the dotted lines represent the confidence interva l from the previous 
forecast s. Recent developments are within the range of expected variation from last April. The 
volume of world trade remained below trend in Q2 , but was up 0.7% compared to Q1, suggesting 
that the trade slump may have bottomed out. If c urrent assumptions hold, trade growth for the 
whole of 2023 could be as low as -1.2% or as high as +1.5%.  
Chart 2.1 Volume of world merchandise trade, 2019Q1 -2024Q4  
(Seasonally  adjusted volume index, 2015=100)  
 
Note:  The shaded region represents both random variation and subjective assessment of risk. The dotted 
lines represent the confidence interval of the April 2023 trade forecast.  
Source:  WTO and UNCTAD for historical data ; WTO Secretariat estima tes for forecasts.  
2.5.  Commodity prices have fallen from their peaks in 2022 but remain high by historical standards. 
The average price of crude oil in September  2023 was up  50% compared to  2019, while European 
 
1 WTO (2023), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, Update: 5 October  2023. 
9095100105110115120125130135
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
2021Q1
2021Q2
2021Q3
2021Q4
2022Q1
2022Q2
2022Q3
2022Q4
2023Q1
2023Q2
2023Q3
2023Q4
2024Q1
2024Q2
2024Q3
2024Q4Volume of world merchandise trade, 2019Q1 -2024Q4
(Seasonally -adjusted volume index, 2015=100)
Note: The shaded region represents both random variation and subjective assessment of risk.  The dotted lines represent the 
confidence interval of the April 2023 trade forecast.
Source: WTO and UNCTAD for historical data, WTO Secretariat estimates for forecasts.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  natural gas prices were up 1 40%. Spikes in energy  prices during winter in the northern hemisphere 
could again undermine trade and output growth as they did in 2022 (Chart 2.2).   
Chart 2.2 Global primary commodity prices, January 2019 -September 2023  
(Index 2 019=100 and USD per million Btu)  
 
Source:  World Bank.  
2.6.  Falling  commodity  prices helped bring down headline inflation  in many economies , but core 
inflation (excluding volatile  food and energy prices ) remain ed sticky (Chart 2.3). In September , 
headline inflation  stood at  3.7%  in the United States and 4.3% in the Euro Area, well above central 
bank targets. Meanwhile, China approached deflation.  
050100150200250300350400
2019M01
2019M04
2019M07
2019M10
2020M01
2020M04
2020M07
2020M10
2021M01
2021M04
2021M07
2021M10
2022M01
2022M04
2022M07
2022M10
2023M01
2023M04
2023M07Index, 2019=100
Energy Crude Oil Food
Grains Fertilizers01020304050607080
2019M01
2019M04
2019M07
2019M10
2020M01
2020M04
2020M07
2020M10
2021M01
2021M04
2021M07
2021M10
2022M01
2022M04
2022M07
2022M10
2023M01
2023M04
2023M07USD/MMBtu
Natural Gas, US Natural Gas, Europe
Natural Gas, JapanGlobal primary commodity prices, January 2019 -September 2023
(Index 2019=100 and USD per million Btu)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Chart 2.3 Consumer price inflation in selected economie s, 
January  2021 -September  2023  
(Year -on-year % change)  
 
Source:  OECD ; and National Bureau of Statistics China.  
2.7.  Regional trade volume developments and projections are shown in Chart 2.4. North America 
recorded the fastest export growth of any region in the  first half of 2023 (+5.4%) while Europe 
stagnated (+0.5%) and Asia declined ( -2.3%). The fastest growth on the import side was recorded 
by regions that export fuels disproportionately (e.g. Middle East +12.2%) while more industrialized 
regions recorded de clines (Europe -1.9%, Asia -2.0%, North America -2.8%).  
1.49.1
3.03.7
1.45.9
4.1
024681012
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  Jan-2023
  Mar-2023
  May-2023
Jul-2023
  Sep-2023United States
All items Non-food, non-energy0.910.6
4.3
1.45.0
4.5
024681012
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All items Non-food, non-energy
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3.0
0.0
-1.72.8
-4-202468
  Jan-2021
  Mar-2021
  May-2021
  Jul-2021
  Sep-2021
  Nov-2021
  Jan-2022
  Mar-2022
  May-2022
  Jul-2022
  Sep-2022
  Nov-2022
  Jan-2023
  Mar-2023
  May-2023
Jul-2023
  Sep-2023Japan
All items Non-food, non-energy-0.32.8
-0.30.0
-4-202468
  Jan-2021
  Mar-2021
  May-2021
  Jul-2021
  Sep-2021
  Nov-2021
  Jan-2022
  Mar-2022
  May-2022
  Jul-2022
  Sep-2022
  Nov-2022
  Jan-2023
  Mar-2023
  May-2023
Jul-2023
  Sep-2023China
All itemsWT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 11 - 
 
  Chart 2.4 Merchandise exports and imports by region, 2019Q1 -2024Q2  
(Volume index, 2019=100)  
 
a Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.  
b Commonwealth of Independent States, including certain associate and former member States.  
Source:  WTO and UNCTAD . 
2.8.  Table 2.1 summarizes the current  WTO trade forecast. The relatively strong rate of trade 
growth predicted for 2024 (3.3%) can  be partly explained by the larger  share  of goods that are 
sensitive to business cycles  in trade compared to GDP, which causes trade to slow more than output 
during downturns, then rebound strongly when output stabilizes.  
2.9.  North America should see  moderate export growth in 2023 (+3.6%) while other regions grow 
more slowly . Oil exporting regions are  expected to record strong import volume growth , while more 
industrialized regions  should  see small declines . Stronger trade  growth should resume in 2024 in all 
regions except the CIS2 region , where imports are expected to contract . If the forecast for 2024 is 
realized, Asia would be the fastest growing region on both the export and import sides.  
2.10.  World GDP growth is projected to remain steady at 2.5% in 2024. Howev er, Chinese GDP 
growth in Q3 has already exceeded expectations with a 1.3% quarter -on-quarter increase. If growth 
continues to strengthen in China, trade and output could outperform forecasts.  
Table 2.1 Merch andise trade volume and GDP growth, 2019 -24a 
(Annual % change)  
World merchandise trade volumeb 2019  2020  2021  2022  2023P  2024P  
0.4 -5.0 9.6 3.0 0.8 3.3 
Exports              
North America  0.4 -8.9 6.5 4.2 3.6 2.7 
South Americac -1.6 -4.9 6.5 2.2 1.7 0.6 
Europe  0.4 -7.7 8.0 3.4 0.4 2.2 
CIS d 0.0 -1.0 -1.8 -4.5 3.0 1.9 
Africa  0.1 -6.8 5.2 -0.8 -1.5 4.1 
Middle East  -1.0 -6.5 -0.4 7.7 2.0 3.8 
Asia 0.8 0.6 13.1 0.4 0.6 5.1 
Imports              
North America  -0.6 -5.9 12.5 6.0 -1.2 2.2 
 
2 Commonwealth of Independent States, including certain associate and former member States.  
708090100110120130
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
2021Q1
2021Q2
2021Q3
2021Q4
2022Q1
2022Q2
2022Q3
2022Q4
2023Q1
2023Q2
2023Q3
2023Q4
2024Q1
2024Q2
2024Q3
2024Q4Exports
North America South America a Europe
CIS b Africa Middle East
Asia708090100110120130
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2
2020Q3
2020Q4
2021Q1
2021Q2
2021Q3
2021Q4
2022Q1
2022Q2
2022Q3
2022Q4
2023Q1
2023Q2
2023Q3
2023Q4
2024Q1
2024Q2
2024Q3
2024Q4Imports
North America South America a Europe
CIS b Africa Middle East
AsiaWT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 12 - 
 
  World merchandise trade volumeb 2019  2020  2021  2022  2023P  2024P  
0.4 -5.0 9.6 3.0 0.8 3.3 
South Americac -2.0 -10.5 26.2 3.6 -1.0 3.3 
Europe  0.2 -7.2 8.5 5.7 -0.7 1.6 
CISd 8.5 -5.4 10.3 -5.5 25.0 -4.0 
Africa  4.4 -15.2 8.3 6.3 5.1 3.1 
Middle East  11.4 -9.0 12.8 13.7 12.5 4.6 
Asia -0.5 -0.8 10.6 -0.5 -0.4 5.8 
World GDP at market exchange rates  2.6 -3.1 6.1 3.1 2.6 2.5 
North America  2.1 -3.2 5.7 2.3 2.2 1.4 
South Americac 0.5 -6.3 7.6 4.0 1.9 1.7 
Europe  1.7 -5.9 5.9 3.6 1.0 1.4 
CISd 2.6 -2.4 5.5 -0.5 1.7 1.9 
Africa  2.6 -2.4 4.7 3.6 3.3 3.4 
Middle East  0.8 -4.2 4.4 6.4 2.6 3.0 
Asia 4.0 -0.7 6.5 3.3 4.1 4.0 
Memo: least developed countries 
(LDCs)              
Volume of merchandise exports  0.4 -0.9 -1.0 1.1 2.2 5.6 
Volume of merchandise imports  2.4 -8.9 9.9 1.8 1.2 3.1 
Real GDP at market exchange rates  5.0 -2.1 3.7 5.3 4.9 5.2 
a Figures for 2023 and 2024 are projections.  
b Average of exports and imports.  
c Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.  
d Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member States.  
Note:  These proje ctions incorporate mixed -data sampling (MIDAS) techniques for selected countries to 
take advantage of higher -frequency data such as container throughput and financial risk ind exes. 
Source:  WTO for trade, consensus estimates for GDP.  
2.2  Trade development in va lue terms  
2.11.  Charts 2.5 and 2.6 show year -on-year growth in the US dollar value of merchandise and 
commercial services trade. Merchandise trade was down 5% in the first half of 2023, partly due to 
falling commodity prices and partly to falling quantities of t raded manufactured goods. The slowdown 
in manufactures affected a wide array of products  including  steel, electronics , textiles, and clothing. 
The main exception was  passenger vehicles, the production of which jumped  18% in the first half of 
the year .  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 13 - 
 
  Chart 2.5 Year -on-year merchandise trade growth by product in the first half of 2023  
(% change in USD values)  
 
* Includes electrical machinery, non -electrical machinery , and power -generating equipment.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
2.12.  In contrast to merchandise, trade in commercial services was up 8% year -on-year in the first 
half of 2023. Spending on transport services was down 8%, mostly due to plunging shipping rates, 
while expenditure on travel ro se 46% as tourism continued to revive following the COVID -19 
pandemic. Other commercial services, including financial services, rose 7% in the first half of 2023 
while goods -related services increased by 5%.  
Chart 2.6 Year -on-year growth in world commercial services trade, 2022Q3 -2023Q2  
(% change in USD values)  
 
Note:  Trade refers to average of exports and imports.  
Source:  WTO; and UNCTAD . 
-5
1
3
-15
-15
-4
-17
-10
-13
18
6
-16
-827
35
40
43
43
21
29
30
18
16
28
0
8-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Total merchandise
Agricultural products
of which: Food
Fuels and mining products
of which: Fuels
Manufactures
Iron and steel
Chemicals
Office and telecom. equip.
Automotive products
Other machinery*
Textiles
Clothing
2023/2022 (January-June) 2023/2019 (January-June)Year-on-year merchandise trade growth by product in the first half of 2023
*Other machinery includes electrical machinery, non -electrical machinery and power generating equipment.(% change in USD values)
142357
165
249
-1210
-558
757
-1135
8
4
-20-10010203040506070
Total commercial
servicesTransport Travel Other commercial
servicesGoods-related services
2022Q3 2022Q4 2023Q1 2023Q2Year-on-year growth in world commercial services trade, 2022Q3 -2023Q2
(% change in USD values)
Note:   Trade refers to average of exports and imports.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 14 - 
 
  Evidence of fragmentation  
2.13.  Geopolitical tensions are rising , spark ing concerns that trade might reorient along regional 
and political lines. While  some changes in trad e patterns  have been observed , evidence of wider 
deglobalization remains scant . One indicator of the extent of global supply chains is the share of 
interme diate goods in world trade ( Chart 2.7).  This ratio has fallen below 50% in 2023, but the 
change is not dramatic (48.5% in the first half of the year compared to 51% over the previous three 
years).  
2.14.  Shifts in trade shares with possible political motives are  also discernible in recent data, 
although the causes are uncertain. For example, total US trade in parts and components with 
like-minded countries as measured by UN voting patterns fell from 77% in 2019 to 73% in 2020 
before rebounding to 77% in 2023. The se changes could reflect geopolitical tensions, but they could 
equally signal a reversion to pre -pandemic trade patterns. These and other indicators of 
fragmentation will be monitored closely by the WTO going forward.  
Chart 2.7 Intermediate goods share in world merchandise trade excl uding  fuels, 
2020Q1 -2023Q2  
(% share)  
 
* Preliminary data based on 100 available reporters in Trade Data Monitor ( TDM). 
Source:  WTO estimates based on data from TDM.   
2.15.  The following  box takes a closer look at potential bottleneck products or highly concentrated 
products in international trade that seem to prevent firms' diversification efforts around the world. 
According to the WTO 's World Trade Report 2023 , while shocks can severely  impact the availability 
of these goods, this concerns only a few products considered essential according to this relatively 
broad list .3 
Box 2.1 Is concentration in global trade flows a risk to supply chain resilience?  
Diversification is a useful strategy to ensure continuity of supply, even during crises (WTO, 2023). 
Being able to rely on a broad network of different suppliers, optimally in diffe rent regions, limits 
exposure to localized shocks, such as natural disasters. Recent crises have highlighted the value 
of having multiple options of supply. Localized lockdowns during the COVID -19 pandemic, the 
blockage of the Suez Canal by a container shi p, or the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami all 
led to severe temporary shortages in critical goods because they hit major trading hubs. A more 
diversified trading network could have softened these impacts.  
 
3 WTO (2023),  World Trade Report 2023: Re -globalization for a Secure, Inclusive and Sustainable 
Future . Viewed  at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr23_e/wtr23_e.pdf .  
50.650.7
49.3
48.851.352.352.5
51.2
50.050.3
48.9
46.947.9
47.251.852.1
50.7
50.052.654.054.3
52.8
51.251.9
50.9
48.649.6 49.5
4244464850525456
2020Q1 2020Q2 2020Q3 2020Q4 2021Q1 2021Q2 2021Q3 2021Q4 2022Q1 2022Q2 2022Q3 2022Q4 2023Q1* 2023Q2*
Exports ImportsIntermediate goods share in world merchandise trade excl. fuels, 2020Q1 -2023Q2
(% share)
* Preliminary data based on 100 available reporters in TDM.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 15 - 
 
  However, a recent trend in international trade is putting a stumbling block in front of firms' 
diversification efforts: a growing share of trade is concentrated among a small number of big 
exporting economies. WTO research assesses exporter's market shares at the product level 
(HS 6-digit). It defines products as concentrated when they have on average not more than four 
major exporting economies while exceeding a threshold in terms of trade volume to exclude niche 
products.  
This research shows that concentration has become an importa nt aspect of international trade. 
While the share of concentrated products in total trade remained fairly low and stable until 2009, 
it jumped sharply during the global financial crisis and has been growing since. In numbers, the 
share of global trade that  can be considered concentrated has more than doubled in about a 
decade from 9% to 19%. This increase is partly driven by a decline of competition within products, 
i.e. a falling number of suppliers per product. But this explains only about half of the tre nd. 
Figure  1 shows that the number of concentrated products increased from 778 in 2000 to 1 ,075 in 
2021. In terms of the share in the total number of products traded (about 5 ,400), this implies an 
increase from only 14% to 19%. The other half is explained by a shift of trade towards highly 
concentrated products, most importantly cell phones and semiconductors.  
Economies from the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) regions are by far the most important source of 
potential bottlenecks, accounting for over 60% of thes e products in 2021. China accounts for over 
half of this as it is the exporter of 36% of all concentrated products in terms of value. However, 
its role has declined over the past years from a peak of close to 40% in 2017. This highlights that 
firms have be en actively trying to reduce overconcentration in trade, even in the absence of policy 
incentives.  
Figure 1: Number of potential bottleneck products in the world, 2000 -2021  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat calculations based on UN Comtrade data from 2000 -2021. Ba sed on: Majune, 
S. K. and Stolzenburg, V. (forthcoming),  Mapping Global Concentration in Trade Flows , WTO Staff 
Working Paper ; and  WTO (2023), World Trade Report 2023: Reglobalization for a Secure, 
Inclusive and Sustainable Future . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat .  
2.16.  The following box takes  a brief historical  at the downward trend in applied tariffs since the 
creation of WTO in 1995,  according to available information.  
Box 2.2 Tariffs applied by WTO Members have almost halved since 1996  
Since 1996, global trade in goods has more than quadrupled, reaching a total of USD  18.6 trillion  
for imports in 2021, compared to USD  4.4 trillion  in 1996.  
778
742
730
777
791
822
853
841
852
866
951
978
1,030
1,004
1,002
1,040
1,030
1,060
1,073
1,032
1,002
1,075
02004006008001,0001,200
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021Bottleneck.1   Number of potential bottleneck products in the world, 2000 -2021WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 16 - 
 
  Over the same period, available data indicate that the simple average tariff applied by 
WTO Member s on a most -favoured nation (MFN) basis – by which WTO  Member s extend the same 
trade treatment, including tariff rates and market access, to all other Members – has declined by 
44%, falling from 13.2% to 7.4%, as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: WTO  Member s' average applied tariffs, 1996 -2021  
(Average in percentage)  
 
Note:  Calculations are based on available tariff and import data from 74 WTO  Member s (counting the 
European  Union  as one, and excluding intra -EU trade), which account for 93% of total world 
imports. The effective applied tariffs are the lowest of the MFN and preferential tariffs applied by 
one Member to another. For some WTO  Member s, missing annual tariffs or trade o r ad valorem  
equivalent (AVE) data were replaced by the data of the closest year available. For more 
information, visit https://stats.wto.org/ . 
Source:  WTO Analytical Database.  
A similar trend emerges for tariffs applied on a trade -weighted basis, with the average MFN tariff 
dropping by 47%, from 7.1% to 3.7%.  
Taking into account preferential tariff regimes, including those offered by developed countries to 
developing a nd least developed countries (LDCs), and those in regional trade agreements (RTAs), 
an even steeper decline is visible. Between 1996 and 2021, the trade -weighted average of 
effectively applied tariffs – based on the assumption of full utilization of prefer ential tariffs – 
dropped from 6.8% to 2.5%. The reason for this larger decline was due to the increased trade in 
products subject to lower tariffs provided by these trade agreements.  
Figure 2 illustrates changes by sector between 1996 and 2021. Notably, th e tariffs on agricultural 
products declined more than on industrial products, which were already low in 1996. For example, 
the largest decrease in trade -weighted MFN applied tariffs on agricultural goods was for animal 
products, which fell from 37.4% to 17 .5% between 1996 and 2021, while on industrial goods the 
largest decline was recorded for textiles, from 11.7% in 1996 to 7.6% in 2021.  
The changes in trade -weighted averages could be attributed not only to changes in tariffs, but 
also to changes in trade flows. For instance, an increase in trade in goods combined with a lower 
tariff within a product group will result in a decrease in the trade -weighted average.  
WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 17 - 
 
  Figure 2: WTO  Member s' average applied tariffs by product group, 1996 and 2021  
(Trade -weighted a verage in percentage)  
 
Note:  The effective applied tariffs are the lowest of the MFN and preferential tariffs applied by one 
Member to another. The product groups are based on the WTO multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTN) categories.  
Source:  WTO Analytica l Database.  
It is difficult to predict the future direction of tariffs as a range of factors can influence 
WTO Member s' actions. However, the WTO remains committed to helping its Members ensure 
that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
 
 
 
WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 18 - 
 
  3  TRADE AND TRADE -RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  
3.1  Overview  of trends identified during the review period  
3.1.  This Section  provides analysis of selected trade and trade -related policy developments in the 
area of goods during the period from mid -October  2022 to mid -October 20 23. It is divided into three 
parts. The first part looks at regular, i.e. non -COVID -19-related measures implemented during the 
review period, including calculations on trade coverage. The s econd part, in Section  3.1.2, covers 
measures taken in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic. These COVID -19-related measures are 
not included in the trade coverage calculations and are not counted towards the aggregate numbers 
in part 1. The third part, in Section  3.1.3, provides an overview of trade -related developments in 
the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis since the beginning of the conflict.  
3.2.  A separate Addendum1 to this Report contains Annexes 1, 2 and 3 on recorded trade and 
trade-related measures taken by WTO Members and Observers from 16  October  2022 to 15  October 
2023, in the area of trade in goods. Services  measures are analysed in Section  4 of this Report and  
are listed in Annex  4 of the Addendum.  This separate Addendum lists new regular 
(non-COVID -19-related) measures recorded during the review period.  
3.1.1   Regular trade measures  
3.3.  A total of 740 trade measures were recorded for WTO Members and Observers during the 
review period (Chart  3.1).2 This figure includes measures facilitating  trade, trade remedy measures 
and other trade and trade -related measures, i.e. trade -restrictive measures. Chart  3.2 illustrates 
the trade coverage3 of the measures recorded for WTO Me mbers and Observers during the review 
period. These figures include measures on food, feed, and fertilizers.  
Chart 3.1 Number of measures introduced between mid -October 2022 and 
mid-October  2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
1 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/26/Add.1 , 23 November 2023.  
2 These Annexes do not include SPS and TBT measures, which are covered in Sections  3.3 and 3.4.  
3 The trade coverage does not include trade for measures that have been implemented and terminated 
within the review period. Trade coverage estimates for the review period were based on 2022 merchandise trade, 
when availabl e. For several countries, 2021 merchandise trade was used as 2022 data were not available at the 
time of calculations.  
145 99 303 193 
Trade remedy initiations Trade remedy terminations
Measures facilitating trade Measures restricting trade740Number of measures introduced between mid-October2022 and mid -October 2023
Source: WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 19 - 
 
  Chart 3.2 Trade coverage of import and export measures introduced between 
mid-October 2022 and mid -October 2023 in USD billion   
 
Note:  Values are rounded. Trade -facilitating and trad e-restrictive measures cover import and 
export -facilitating measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Measures facilitating trade  
3.4.  During the review period, 303 new trade -facilitating measures were recorded for WTO Members 
and Observers.4 This represents 40.9% o f the total number of measures recorded.  
3.5.  Most of the trade -facilitating measures were on the import side. The reduction or elimination 
of import tariffs made up the bulk of trade -facilitating measures, followed by the elimination or 
simplification of impor t and export quantitative restrictions (QRs). The monthly average of 
25.3 facilitating measures recorded for the period was the third highest since 2015 (Table  3.1).  
Table 3.1 Measures facilitating trade (Annex 1), 2015 to mid -October 2023  
Type of measure  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/25)  
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-Oct 23 
(WT/TPR/OV/26)  
Import  205 148 113 144 100 96 138 351 351 235 
- Tariff 154 112 93 119 85 84 114 284 289 151 
- Customs procedures  30 27 17 15 2 3 6 23 21 16 
- Tax 5 4 3 6 5 8 8 6 8 7 
- QRs 5 1 0 3 1 1 8 33 27 46 
- Other  11 4 0 1 7 0 2 5 6 15 
Export  40 32 24 18 14 7 14 71 54 66 
- Duties  18 5 1 6 10 5 10 14 12 6 
- Quantitative Restrictions (QRs)  3 1 2 0 1 1 3 47 39 41 
- Other  19 26 21 12 3 1 1 10 3 19 
Other  4 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 
Total  249 183 137 162 115 104 154 424 406 303 
Average per month  20.8 15.3 11.4 13.5 9.6 8.7 12.8 35.3 33.8 25.3 
Note:  Revisions of the data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine -tune and update the available 
information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.6.  The trade coverage of the import -facilitating measures introduced during the review period was 
estimated at USD  955.0  billion (down from USD 1,038.4  billion in the last annual report), i.e.  3.8% 
 
4 This figure also includes measures taken in response to the war in Ukraine and terminations of 
restrictive measures that were implemented during the review period.  
25 15 
977 337 
Trade remedy initiations Trade remedy terminations
Trade-facilitating measures Trade restrictive measures1,354Trade coverage of export and import measures introduced between mid -October 2022 and 
mid-October 2023
(USD billion)
Source: WTO Secretariat.Note:  [see text]WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 20 - 
 
  of the value of world merchandise imports (Table  3.2 and Chart  3.3). This includes 11 measures 
under the ITA expansion scheme, estimated at USD 83.9 billion.5  
3.7.  Based on trade coverage, the HS Chapters within which most of the import -facilitating 
measures were taken include mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) (27.5%), electrical machinery and parts 
thereof (HS 85) (10.3%), machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (8 .0%), and copper and 
articles thereof (HS 74) (6.9%).  
Table 3.2 Share of trade covered by import -facilitating measures, mid -October 2014 to 
mid-October 2023   
(%)   
Mid-Oct 14 to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19  to 
mid-Oct 20 
Mid-Oct 20  to 
mid-Oct 21 
Mid-Oct 21  to 
mid-Oct 22 
Mid-Oct 22  to 
mid-Oct 23 
Share in total world 
imports  0.91 1.51 1.07 1.68 2.80 3.88 2.74 4.72 3.80 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
Chart 3.3 Trade coverage of new import -facilitating measures in each reporting period 
(not cumulative) in USD billion   
 
Note:  These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e.  annual imports 
of the products concerned from economies  affected by the measures) introduced during each 
reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.8.  The trade coverage of the export -facilitating measures introduced during the review period was 
estimated at US D 22.2 billion (down from USD  122.1  billion in last report), i.e., 0.1% of the value 
of world merchandise exports. The HS Chapters within which most of the export -facilitating 
measures were taken, in terms of trade coverage, include cereals (HS 10) (41.7%) , iron and steel 
 
5 The main measures in terms of trade coverage were introduced by China ( USD 66.3 billion ), 
European  Union ( USD 8.5 billion ), Republic of Korea ( USD 4.8 billion ), Malaysia  (USD 2.1 billion ) and Thailand 
(USD 1.8 billion ). 
2581,183
170249
169296545731
4821,038
955
02004006008001,0001,2001,400
mid-Oct12
to mid-
Oct13mid-Oct13
to mid-
Oct14mid-Oct14
to mid-
Oct15mid-Oct15
to mid-
Oct16mid-Oct16
to mid-
Oct17mid-Oct17
to mid-
Oct18mid-Oct18
to mid-
Oct19mid-Oct19
to mid-
Oct20mid-Oct20
to mid-
Oct21mid-Oct21
to mid-
Oct22mid-Oct22
to mid-
Oct23Trade coverage of new import -facilitating measures in each reporting period (not cumulative)
(USD billion)
Note:  [see original text]WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 21 - 
 
  (HS 72) (29.5%), motor vehicles including parts and accessories thereof (HS 87) (15.1%), and ores, 
slag and ash (HS 26) (7.1%).  
3.9.  Overall, the trade coverage of the import - and export -facilitating measures introduced during 
the review period  was estimated at USD  977.2  billion (down from USD  1,160.5  billion in the last 
report).  
Trade remedy actions  
3.10.  During the period under review, 244 trade remedy actions (145 initiations and 
99 terminations) were recorded for WTO Members and Observers (Annex  2 of the Addendum), 
accounting for 33.0% of all trade -related measures covered in this Report. Anti -dumping continued  
to be the most frequent trade remedy action, accounting for 87.6 % of all  initiations and 90.9 % of 
all terminations.  
3.11.  After reaching its highest peak so far in 2020 (36.1), the average number of trade remedy 
initiations during the review period was 12.1 per month, the third lowest since 2012. The monthly 
average of trade remedy  terminations recorded during the review period was 8.3, the lowest since 
2012 (Table  3.3 and Chart  3.4). 
Table 3.3 Trade remedy actions (Annex 2), 2015 to mid -October 2023   
Type of measure  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/25)  
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-MOct 23 
(WT/TPR/OV/2 6) 
Initiations  277 343 298 273 281 433 213 112 142 145 
 - AD 229 298 249 202 215 355 186 89 113 127 
 - CVD 31 34 41 55 36 56 18 19 23 12 
 - SG 17 11 8 16 30 22 9 4 6 6 
Average per month  23.1 28.6 24.8 22.8 23.4 36.1 17.8 9.3 11.8 12.1 
Terminations  212 171 158 225 184 216 302 237 264 99 
 - AD 167 141 129 201 167 184 258 203 233 90 
 - CVD 25 15 12 24 7 13 23 23 24 7 
 - SGa 20 15 17 0 10 19 21 11 7 2 
Average per month  17.7 14.3 13.2 18.8 15.3 18.0 25.2 19.8 22.0 8.3 
a The figure for a specific year is the sum of the following: (i)  all ongoing investigations terminated 
during the course of that specific year, normally as of late October, without any measure; and (ii)  all 
imposed measures expired during the course of that specific year, normally as of late October.  
Note:  The information on trade remedy actions for 2015 to 2022 is based on the semi -annual notifications. 
For the present review period, the information is also based on the responses and the verifications 
received directly from Members. Anti -dumping and countervailing investigations ar e counted based on 
the number ( n) of exporting countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one 
anti-dumping or countervailing investigation involving imports from (n) countries/customs territories 
is counted as (n) investigations.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.12.  Over the past couple of years, significant fluctuations have been observed in the number of 
initiations of trade remedy investigations and in the number of terminations of trade remedy 
instruments (Chart 3.4). There might be severa l reasons for this.   For example, in the case of both 
the pandemic, and the war in Ukraine, countries appear to have focused on supply chain resilience 
by making sure that their territories remained accessible for a wide range of products. More recently, 
inflation and high interest rates as well as large external debts in many countries have made imports 
more expensive. This, in turn, may have resulted in less of a need for protection of domestic 
industries and may have influenced the use of trade remedy in struments.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 22 - 
 
  3.13.  The trade coverage of all trade remedy investigations initiated during the review period was 
USD 24.6 billion (up from USD  8.3 billion in last report), i.e. , 0.10% of the value of world 
merchandise imports. For terminations, the trade coverage was valued at USD  15.5 billion (up from 
USD 14.0 billion in the last report), i.e. , 0.06% of the value of world merchandise imports  
(Table  3.4). 
3.14.  Trade remedy actions taken during the review period, in terms of trade coverage, included 
initiations of investigations on furniture, mattresses, mattresses support (HS 94) (37.8%), plastics 
and articles thereof (HS 39) (13.0%), iron and steel (HS 72) (11.5%), and electrical machinery and 
parts thereof (HS 85) (7.1%).  
Chart 3.4 Trade remedies initiations and terminations, average number per month   
 
Note:  Values are rounded.  The blue and red lines show the average of the last two periods (2 period 
moving average).  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Table 3.4 Share of trade covered by trade remedy initiations, mid -October 2014 to 
mid-October 2023   
(%) 
 
Mid-Oct 14 to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19 to 
mid-Oct 20 
Mid-Oct 20 to 
mid-Oct 21 
Mid-Oct 21 to 
mid-Oct 22 
Mid-Oct 22 to 
mid-Oct 23 
Share in total 
world imports  0.17 0.55 0.48 0.53 0.24 0.36 0.15 0.04 0.10 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
Other trade and trade -related measures  
3.15.  Annex  3 of the Addendum to this Report lists measures that may be considered to have a 
trade-restrictive effect.  A total of 193 new trade -restrictive measures were recorded for 
WTO Members and Observers during the review period. Most  of the trade -restrictive measures 
recorded were export measures. For the third time since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring 
23 29 
25 
23 23 36 
18 
9 12 12 18 
14 
13 19 
15 18 25 
20 22 
8 
0510152025303540
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 mid-Oct21
to mid-Oct22mid-Oct22
to mid-Oct23Trade remedies intitiations and terminations, average number per month
 Initiations avg per month  Terminations avg per month
2 per Mov. Avg. (Initiations avg per month) 2 per Mov. Avg. (Terminations avg per month)
Note: Values are rounded.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 23 - 
 
  Exercise the number of new export restrictions (99 or 51.3% of all) outpaced that of import 
restrictions (93 or 48.2%).  
3.16.  Export restrictions mainly included the imposition of QRs and increases of export duties. 
Import restrictions consisted mainly of increases of import tariffs, followed by stricter customs 
procedures and the imposition of QRs. The average of 16.1 trade -restrictive  measures per month is 
the fourth highest recorded since 2012 (Table  3.5). 
Table 3.5 Other trade and trade -related measures (Annex 3), 2015 to mid -October 2023   
Type of measure  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/25)  
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-Oct 23 
(WT/TPR/OV/2 6) 
Import  167 98 84 115 77 73 78 79 90 93 
- Tariff 106 63 47 70 46 40 36 44 54 43 
- Customs procedures  32 16 19 6 6 11 24 11 10 20 
- Tax 10 6 9 13 6 6 5 0 0 1 
- QRs 13 12 7 17 14 10 11 18 20 20 
- Other  6 1 2 9 5 6 2 6 6 9 
Export  44 20 18 17 19 27 67 146 137 99 
- Duties  13 6 4 8 7 4 14 16 16 17 
- QRs 7 10 8 4 3 11 27 113 103 67 
- Other  24 4 6 5 9 12 26 17 18 15 
Other  13 11 14 0 2 0 5 0 0 1 
- Local content  13 7 12 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 
- Other  0 4 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Total  224 129 116 132 98 100 150 225 227 193 
Average per month  18.7 10.8 9.7 11.0 8.2 8.3 12.5 18.8 18.9 16.1 
Note:  Revised data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine -tune and update the available 
information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.17.  The trade coverage of the import -restrictive measures implemented during the review period 
was estimated at USD  178.0  billion (up from USD  163.5  billion in last annual report), i.e., 0.7% of 
the value of world merchandise imports (Table  3.6 and Chart  3.5). 
Table 3.6 Share of trade cov ered by import -restrictive measures (Annex 3), 
mid-Oct 2014 to mid Oct -2023   
(%) 
 
Mid-Oct 14  to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19 to  
mid-Oct 20 
Mid-Oct 20 to  
mid-Oct 21 
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-Oct 23 
Share in total 
world imports  1.23 0.62 0.50 3.33 3.84 2.40 0.60 0.74 0.71 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
3.18.  The import -restrictive measures recorded during the review period cover a range of products. 
The main sectors affected (HS  Chapters), in terms of trade coverage, were machinery and 
mechanical appliances (HS 84) (17.3% ), motor vehicles including parts and a ccessories thereof (HS 
87) (15.3%), pharmaceutical products (HS 30) (10.4%), and iron and steel (HS 72) (9.9%).  
3.19.  The trade coverage of the export -restrictive measures implemented during the review period 
was estimated at USD  159.1  billion (up from USD 114.5  billion in last report), i.e., 0. 7% of the value 
of world merchandise exports. The export -restrictive measures recorded cover a range of products. WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 24 - 
 
  The main sectors affected (HS Chapters), in terms of trade coverage, were mineral fuels and oils 
(HS 27) (44.1%), aluminium and articles thereof (HS 76) ( 11.5%), cereals (HS 10) (11.4%), and 
organic chemicals (HS 29) (9.4%).  
3.20.  Overall, the trade coverage of the import - and export -restrictive measures implemented 
during the review period was estimated at U SD 337.1  billion (up from USD  278.0  billion in the last 
report).  
Chart 3.5 Trade coverage of new import -restrictive measures in each reporting period 
(not cumulative) in USD billion   
 
Note:  These figures are  estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e.  annual imports 
of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each 
reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.  
Source:  WTO Se cretariat.  
Stockpile of import -restrictive measures  
3.21.  Estimating the roll -back of import -restrictive measures, and eventually the overall stockpile, 
is made complex by the fact that many temporary measures remain in place beyond the envisaged 
termination dat e. In addition , the Secretariat does not always receive timely and accurate 
information on changes to recorded measures. As a result, the figures below are estimates based 
on the information recorded in the TMDB since 2009. These estimates are also conditi oned by the 
availability of termination dates of the import -restrictive measures and of the HS  codes of products 
covered.6 
3.22.  Table 3.7 and Chart  3.6 show that the stockpile of import restrictions in force has grown 
steadily since 2009 – in value terms and as a percentage of world imports – and that a significant 
increase in both took place from 2017 to 2018. This particular  jump is largely explained by measures 
introduced on steel and aluminium, and by various tariff increases introduced as part of bilateral 
trade tensions. Global imports decreased substantially in 2020 compared to 2019. The decline was 
also reflected in total im ports and in the value of import restrictions in force. Global trade grew again 
in 2021 and 2022, due to rising export and import prices as inflation  took hold across most countries . 
For 2023, the trade covered by import restrictions in force was estimated  at USD 2,480 billion7, 
representing 9.9% of total world imports.  
 
6 Only import measures where HS codes were available are included in the calculation.  Cumulative 
figures exclude measures having an initiation and termination date within the same review period.  
7 Based on import restrictions recorded up to 15  October  2023. 
201214228
101
79588747
441
106164178
0100200300400500600700800
mid-Oct12
to mid-
Oct13mid-Oct13
to mid-
Oct14mid-Oct14
to mid-
Oct15mid-Oct15
to mid-
Oct16mid-Oct16
to mid-
Oct17mid-Oct17
to mid-
Oct18mid-Oct18
to mid-
Oct19mid-Oct19
to mid-
Oct20mid-Oct20
to mid-
Oct21mid-Oct21
to mid-
Oct22mid-Oct22
to mid-
Oct23Trade coverage of new import -restrictive measures in each reporting period (not 
cumulative)
(USD billion)
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Note:  [see text].WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 25 - 
 
  Table 3.7 Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive trade -related measures, 
2015 -22  
(USD  billion, unless otherwise indicated)   
2015 2016 2017 2018  2019  2020  2021 2022a 
Total imports (world)  16,360  15,812  17,587  19,402  18,883  17,625  22,08 1 25,120 
Total import restrictions in force  598 570 814 1,457  1,646  1,516  2,042  2,359 
Share in world imports (%)  3.66 3.61 4.63 7.51 8.72 8.60 9.25 9.39 
Total import restrictions  
terminated  1.51 38.09  3.88 5.45 13.12  n.a. n.a n.a 
Share in world imports (%)  0.01 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.07 n.a. n.a n.a 
n.a. Not applicable. In 2022, for two measures the date of termination is 31 December. These will be 
taken into account as terminated in 2023.  
a 2022 figures are provisional.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat calculations, based on UN Comtrade database.  
Chart 3.6 Cumulative trade coverage of  import -restrictive measures on goods since 2009   
 
Note:  The cumulative trade coverage estimated by the Secretariat is based on information available in the 
TMDB on import measures recorded since 2009 and considered to have a trade -restrictive effect. 
The estimates include import measures for which HS codes were available. The figures do not 
include trade remedy measures. The import values were sourced by the UN Comtrade database.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.1.2   COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures  
3.23.  Since the  outbreak of the pandemic, 458 trade and trade -related measures in the area of 
goods have been implemented by WTO Members and Observers (Table  3.8)8, of which 255 (55.7%) 
were of a trade -facilitating nature and 203 (44.3%) were trade-restrictive.  
 
8 Measures implemented in the context of the pandemic up can be viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm .  
73126234306407467598 5708141,4571,646
1,5162,0422,3592,480
0.60.81.31.72.22.53.7 3.64.67.58.78.69.39.49.9
024681012
05001,0001,5002,0002,500
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Import restrictions in force (left axis) % of world imports (right axis)Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive measures on goods since 2009
(USD billion)
Source:  WTO Secretariat.(%)
Note:  [See original].WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 26 - 
 
  3.24.  During the review period, 24 COVID -19 measures on goods – mostly facilitating measures – 
were communicated by 38 Members and 1 Observer.9 Most of these measures were new 
measures  (19) with several (14) being implemented during the revie w period. Out of the 24 
pandemic -related measures, 16 targeted imports, 7 were export measures and 1  was a more general 
measure. Most of these pandemic -related measures (14 out of 24) were temporary in nature and 
either have been already terminated or will  be phased out.  
3.25.  Members continued to phase out pandemic -related measures, and in particular the restrictive 
ones. According to information received by the Secretariat, as of mid -October  2023, 133 (52.2%) 
of the COVID -19 trade -facilitating and 172 (84.7%) o f the trade -restrictive measures have been 
repealed.  
Table 3.8 Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures since the outbreak of 
the pandemic  
 Facilitating  Phased out  Restrictive  Phased out  Total  
Import  211 115 20 11 231 
Export  28 12 174 154 202 
Other  16 6 9 7 25 
Total  255 133 203 172 458 
Note:  Revised data reflect changes to fine -tune and update available information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Chart 3.7 Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by 
mid-October 2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.26.  Most of the COVID -19 trade -facilitating measures (82.7%) introduced since the beginning of 
the pandemic were import measures while most of the trade -restrictive measures (85.7%) target ed 
exports.  
3.27.  These import -facilitating measures aim ed to reduce or eliminate import tariffs and import 
taxes. Certain WTO  Members and Observers reduced their import tariffs on a variety of goods such 
as personal protective equipment (PPE), sanitizers, disinfectants, medical equipment, and 
medicine/drugs. In many cases, tariff reductions were also accompanied by exemptions from VAT 
and other taxes. Extensions, often more than once, of some measures were introduced, while other 
measures have simply remained in force.  
3.28.  The COVID -19 export -restrictive measures cam e in the form of temporary export bans or 
prohibitions, export licence requirements or export authorization mechanisms targeting a variety of 
goods such as PPEs, drugs, vaccines, diagnostics, medical supplies and products, and certain food 
products. The ro ll-back of these export restrictions taken in the early stages of the pandemic 
continued during the review period. As of mid -October 2023, 20 COVID -19-related export 
 
9 Australia, Azerbaijan (Observer), Brazil, Costa  Rica, European  Union  (EU-27 and its member States 
are counted separately), India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Chinese Taipei,  Thailand, and Türkiye.  
122 133 31 172 
Trade-facilitating measures in force Trade-facilitating measures phased out
Trade-restrictive measures in force Trade-restrictive measures phased out458Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by mid-October 
2023
(by number)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 27 - 
 
  restrictions related were still in place according to information either identified by the  Secretariat or 
received from delegations.  
3.29.  The trade coverage of the COVID -19 trade -facilitating measures implemented since the 
outbreak of the pandemic was estimated at USD 432.6 billion, and that of trade -restrictive at 
USD 276.7  billion.10 Members and O bservers have continued to phase out the measures 
implemented in response to the pandemic. The trade coverage of the COVID -19-related  
trade-facilitating measures terminated since the beginning of the pandemic was estimated at 
USD 296.8  billion and that of trade-restrictive measures at USD 261.1 billion (Chart  3.8). 
Chart 3.8 Trade coverage of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by 
mid-October 2023 in USD billion  
 
Note:  Values are rounded.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.1.3   Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis  
3.30.  The war in Ukraine continues to impact the global economy and in particular the trade of 
agricultural products. Since 16 October 2022, several WTO Members and Ob servers have extended 
existing measures and introduced new measures affecting export and import of food, feed, and 
fertilizers. The war has continued to be one of the major drivers for the continuation of food insecurity 
given the importance of the Russian  Federation and Ukraine in global agricultural markets. Indeed, 
some of the export restrictions introduced in the first months of the war, i.e. in the spring and 
summer of 2022, remain in place, were extended, or were reintroduced.  
3.31.  During the review perio d, however, a broader range of export restrictions affecting food and 
feed items has been imposed , and those restrictions are more difficult to link directly to the war in 
Ukraine. Certain climate -change -related events have resulted in devastating losses o f harvests 
leading to a rise of export restrictions. Other factors, including concerns about El Niño, inflationary 
pressures, and supply uncertainty have all likely contributed to the rise of export restrictions. 
Throughout the review period , there was ample evidence of WTO  Member s adapting to supply 
challenges and finding alternative sources for their imports.  
Export restrictions on food, feed, and fertilizers  
3.32.  Since the outbreak of the war in late February 2022, the WTO Secretariat has identified 
122 expor t trade -restrictive measures introduced by 32 WTO Members and 8 Observers11 on 
agricultural commodities, of which 113 applied to food and feed (92.6%) and 9 targeted fertilizer 
 
10 Including imports and exports and based on annual 2022 trade figures , except for Algeria, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, The Gambia, Honduras, Mali, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia, Seychelles, and Viet Nam . For those listed , the most recent year available is used for 
the calculations.  The concordance to HS22 nomenclature was applied to the best extent possible.  
11 Afghanistan, Algeria (Observer), Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan (Observer), Bangladesh, Belarus 
(Observer), Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  China, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia,  Islamic Republic of Iran (Observer), Kazakhstan, State of Kuwait, Kyrgyz  Republic, Lebanon 
(Observer), Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, North Macedonia, Pakistan, 
Russian  Federation, Serbia (Observer), Syrian Arab Republic (Observer), Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Türkiye, 
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan (Observer).  
136 297 16 261 
Trade-facilitating measures in force Trade-facilitating measures phased out
Trade-restrictive measures in force Trade-restrictive measures phased out709Trade coverage of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by mid-October 2023
(USD billion)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.Note:   Values are rounded.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 28 - 
 
  exports (7.4%). As of mid -October 2023, 47 of all identified export restriction s had been phased 
out, bringing the number of restrictions in force to 75.12 
3.33.  Since 24 February 2022, the trade coverage of the export restrictive measures introduced by 
all WTO Members and Observers is estimated at USD 133.9 billion , out of which USD 12.3 billion 
referred to fertilizers. The trade coverage  of the repealed export restrictions is estimated at 
USD 104.2 billion, of which USD 7.5 billion on fertilizers. Thus, th e trade coverage of export 
restrictions that are still in place is estimated at USD 29.6 billion.  
3.34.  During the past 12 months, export restrictions targeted a wide range of agricultural products. 
However, the beginning of 2023 saw a rise in export restrictions on onion, garlic, and other root 
vegetables. Further, as of summer 2023, the most common products falling under export restrictions 
were rice and olive oil.  The nature of the export restrictions remained diverse. The introduced 
measures included export bans, quotas, duties, licensing requirements and other restrictions  
(Chart  3.9). 
Chart 3.9 Number of export restrictions on food, feed, and fertilizers in force, 
January  2022 to mid -October 2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Import -facilitating measures on food, feed, and fertilizers  
3.35.  Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the WTO Secretariat has also identified a number 
of import -facilitating measures on food, feed, and fertilizers. As of mid -October  2023, 
100 import -facilitating measures on various agricultural product s were recorded for 
65 WTO Members and 3 Observers.13 Out of these, 43 were new measures. Out of all identified 
 
12 Implemented by 28 Members and 8 Observers: Afghanistan, Algeria (Observer), Argentina,  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan (Observer), Bangladesh, Belarus (Observer), Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Egypt, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia,  Islamic Republic of Iran (Observer), Kazakhstan, State of Kuwait, 
Kyrgyz  Republic, Lebanon (Ob server), Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, 
Serbia (Observer), Syrian Arab Republic (Observer), Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan (Observer).  
13 Azerbaijan  (Observer) , Armenia, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus (Observer), Brazil, Botswana, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, European Union (EU -27 and its 
member States are counted separately), Guatemala, India, Iraq  (Observer) , Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz  Republic , 
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, New  Zealand, 
13372229323543454747535253545863
5960
586059616169
6362686768
66
63
616261616363646768707373747575
01020304050607080
Exports / Ban Exports / Quantitative restrictions (QRs)
Exports / Duties Exports / Other
Export measures totalNumber of export restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers, in force by mid -October 2023WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 29 - 
 
  import -facilitating measures, 33 have been phased out or expired by mid -October 2023. Currently, 
67 import -facilitating measures remain in place . 
3.36.  Since 24 February 2022, the trade coverage of the import -facilitating measures introduced is 
estimated at USD 128.4 billion, out of which USD 2.7 billion was related  to fertilizers. The trade 
coverage of terminated import -facilitating measures is estimat ed at USD 45.6 billion, out of which 
USD 1.2 billion was related  to fertilizers. Therefore, the trade coverage of import -facilitating 
measures on food , feed, and fertilizers that are still in place is estimated at USD 82.9 billion.  
3.37.  Import -facilitating measures targeted a wide range of agricultural products, including 
vegetable oils, cereals, rice, meats, and poultry , as well as fertilizers. These measures came  in the 
form of reduction of import tariffs, increases of import quotas and introduction of tariff -free quotas. 
Other measures include d exemptions from value added taxes and the lifting of import permit 
requirements (Chart  3.10).  
Chart 3.10 Number of import -facilitating measures on food, feed and fertilizers in force, 
January 2022 to mid -October 2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Import -restrictive measures on food, feed, and fertilizers  
3.38.  Since mid -October 2022, s everal measures restricting imports of various agricultural 
products, including wheat, were identified. Similar to what was reported in July 2023, some of the 
current import restrictions appear to be designed to prevent excess supply of imported agricultur al 
commodities and to protect domestic producers of these products. Such measures included the 
European  Union 's exceptional and temporary preventive measure on imports of wheat, maize, 
rapeseed, and sunflower seed from Ukraine adopted on 2 May 2023. Althou gh this EU -wide measure 
expired on 15  September  2023, Poland, Hungary, and Slovak Republic  introduced individual bans 
on imports of various agricultural products from Ukraine. These measures are currently covered by 
a Ukrainian request for consultations in  the context of WTO dispute settlement.  
3.39.  In the weeks and months after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, many sanctions were 
imposed on the Russian Federation as well as on Belarus. Several countermeasures were 
implemented by the Russian Federation and B elarus in response to these sanctions. The 
 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei , Türkiye, 
Ukraine, and Viet Nam.  
114411131517242833364447515357626262636465666676
656669687071717071
6971
6970
686767696968676767
01020304050607080
Imports / Tariff Imports / Tax
Imports / Quantitative restrictions (QRs) Imports / Customs procedures
Imports / Other Import measures totalNumber  of import -facilitating measures on food, feed and fertilizers, in force by mid -
October 2023WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 30 - 
 
  overwhelming majority of these measures were not specifically trade -related, and applied to the 
financial, military, civil aviation, and energy sectors, as well as to specific entities and individuals. 
Most of the se sanctions were generally announced and implemented with reference to security 
considerations.  
3.40.  In recent meetings of the TPRB to discuss the Director -General's Trade Monitoring Reports, 
delegations have stressed their right to implement sanctions, often with reference to the essential 
security interests listed in Article XXI(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. Furthermore, delegations have 
consistently articulated that they do not wish for the Trade Monitoring Reports to cover these 
sanctions substantively.   
3.2  Trade remedy trends14 
3.41.  This Section provides an assessment of trends in trade -remedy actions over three periods: 
July 2020 to June 2021, July 2021 to June 2022, and July 2022 to June 2023.15 
3.42.  WTO Members initiated 136 trade remedies investigations (i.e.  anti-dumping, countervailing 
duty, and safeguards investigations) in the la test period  (July 2022 to June 2023) , a drop of nearly 
60% from the 335 initiations in the first period  (July 2020 to June 2021) . Following a similar trend, 
the total number of trade re medy measures applied by Members in the la test period  (125) decreased 
by almost 50% from the 248 measures applied in the first period.  
3.43.  Anti-dumping actions are the most numerous among trade remedy initiations and measures 
applied. Since the first period (July 2020 to June 2021), most anti -dumping actions have targeted 
products in the metals, chemicals, and plastics and rubber sectors. Metals, chemical s, and machinery 
products accounted for the largest share of countervailing initiations in the review period .  
3.44.  Safeguard measures are subject to different rules and timelines compar ed to anti -dumping 
and countervailing actions, as they apply to all exporting countries/customs territories. Since they 
peaked in 2019, initiations of safeguard investigations have de creas ed significantly.  
Anti-dumping measures16  
3.45.  The total number of anti -dumping initiations decreased by 59% between the first and la test 
period s. While anti -dumping investigations do not necessarily lead to the applica tion of measures, a 
decrease in the number of investigations initiated is an early indicator of a likely decrease in the 
number of new measures  applie d. Between July 2020 and June 2023 , a total of 508 anti -dumping 
measures were applied. As it can take up to 18 months for an anti -dumping inve stigation to be 
concluded, the measures applied in a given period may not necessarily be the result of investigations 
initiated in the same period.  
Table 3.9 Number of initiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied , by 
Member, July 2020 to June 2023  
Reporting Member  July 2020 -June 2021  July 2021 -June 2022  July 2022 -June 2023  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Argentina  8 13 14 7 10 9 
Australia  9 2 3 6 0 1 
Bahrain, Kingdom of; 
Kuwait, State of; 
Oman; Qatar; Saudi 
Arabia, Kingdom of; 
United Arab Emiratesa 3 1 9 0 1 7 
 
14 This Section is without prejudice to Members' right to take trade remedy actions under the WTO.  
15 These periods coincide with the periods covered by Members' semi -annual reports of anti -dumping 
and countervailing actions.  
16 Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on the number ( n) of exporting 
countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one anti -dumping or countervailing 
investigation involving imports from n countries/customs territo ries is counted as n investigations.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 31 - 
 
  Reporting Member  July 2020 -June 2021  July 2021 -June 2022  July 2022 -June 2023  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Brazil  13 3 4 3 4 8 
Canada  23 11 3 14 1 1 
Chile 1 0 0 0 0 0 
China  4 30 1 2 1 1 
Colombia  3 1 0 2 0 0 
Egypt  6 9 0 3 1 0 
European Unionb 15 6 7 14 3 8 
Ghana  0 1 0 0 0 0 
India 60 32 13 26 37 9 
Indonesia  0 0 0 2 4 0 
Japan  2 2 0 0 0 2 
Korea, Republic of  7 1 8 4 3 9 
Malaysia  9 5 0 1 1 0 
Mexico  3 6 5 5 5 5 
Morocco  3 1 1 0 0 3 
New Zealand  4 1 0 1 1 0 
Pakistan  9 7 1 12 0 0 
Paraguay  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Peru 2 0 1 2 1 1 
Philippines  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Russian Federationc 4 5 0 4 4 2 
South Africad 10 0 8 4 2 12 
Chinese Taipei  5 0 3 5 1 3 
Thailand  7 2 1 13 0 2 
Türkiye  9 2 1 3 0 6 
Ukraine  10 2 6 7 0 0 
United Kingdome 1 0 1 0 0 1 
United States  42 59 27 42 36 13 
Uruguay  1 0 0 1 0 0 
Viet Nam  8 7 2 8 0 4 
Total  282 209 119 191 117 108 
a Notified by all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member States collectively, as investigations are 
initiated by the GCC regional investigating authority on behalf of all GCC member States.  
b The European Union is counted as one (28 member States until 31 January 2020, 27 member States 
thereafter).  
c  Notified by the Russian Federation , but investigations are initiated by the Eurasian Economic Union 
on behalf of all of its members, i.e.  Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Belarus 
(non-WTO Member) collectively.  
d Notified by South Africa, but investigations are initiated at the lev el of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) on behalf of its member States (also for Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia).  
e The United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union as of 1 February 2020. The European Union 
and the United Kingdom commun icated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European Union law, with a few limited exceptions, continued to be applicable to 
and in the United Kingdom. See WTO documents WT/LET/1462 , 29 January 2020; and WT/GC/206 , 
1 February 2020 . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.46.  Fifty exporting Members were affected by new anti -dumping investigations during the first 
period, while 37 were affected during the second period and 31 in the last period. China remained, 
by far, the most frequent subject of anti-dumping initiations during the three reporting periods, WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 32 - 
 
  accounting for 28% of all investigations. India and the Republic  of Korea were each the subjects of 
5% of all initiations .  
3.47.  Chart 3.11 shows  annual numbers on initiations of anti -dumping investi gations and measures 
applied. The number of anti -dumping initiations increased significantly in 2020 compared with the 
previous years. The 355 initiations in 2020 represent the peak since 2002 but  this level  is lower than 
the all -time high of 372 seen in 2 001. The increase in the initiations in 2020 also led to an increase 
in total number of measures applied in 2021.  
Chart 3.11 Initiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, 2008 -23 
(Number)  
 
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to June.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.48.  There was little change in terms of the products affected by anti -dumping investigations 
initiated between 2020 and June 2023 , with most initiations target ed products in the metals, 
chemicals, and plastics and rubber sectors.  
3.49.  At the regular meetings of the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices on  26 October  2022 and 
3 May 202317, 40 trade concerns were raised with respect to anti -dumping practices. Most of these  
concerns (70%) were raised on anti-dumping actions by China (6), the  European  Union  (4), 
the Republic of Korea (3), Viet  Nam (3), Egypt (2), the United  States  (3), India (2), Morocco (2), 
South  Africa (2), and Ukraine  (2). The remaining trade concerns wer e raised on anti-dumping  
actions by Australia (1), Brazil (1), Canada (1), EAEU member States (Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz  Republic , and the Russian  Federation ) (1)), Egypt (1), Israel (1), Malaysia (1), 
the Philippines  (1), Chinese  Taipei  (1), Thailand (1 ), and the United  Kingdom  (1). 
3.50.  Other additional issues and concerns were raised with respect to (i)  the continued application 
of anti -dumping measures resulting from sunset reviews; (ii)  the length of US anti -dumping 
measures  – prolonged measures ; (iii) sunset reviews conducted by the European  Union  leading to 
the continued imposition of prolonged anti -dumping measures; (iv)  the European  Union 's Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU) 2018/825; (v)  the United  States ' non-market economy (NME) 
treatment  of certain countries in anti -dumping investigations; (vi) the NME methodology in 
anti-dumping investigations; (vii) the importance of prompt notifications for transparency purposes; 
(viii) the transitional reviews, continued application by the United  Kingdom of the European  Union 's 
anti-dumping measures conducted after Brexit and lengthy transitional reviews; (ix) the 
anti-circumvention inquiries frequently initiated in recent years by the U.S. Department of 
 
17 WTO documents G/ADP/M/62 , 18 January  2023; and G/ADP/M/63 , 16 June 2023, respectively .  
218 217
173165208287
236229298
249
202215355
186
89
76143 143
134
99121161 159182
162201205
152
107287
108
53
050100150200250300350400
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Initiations Measures
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Initiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, 2008 -23
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to June.(Number)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 33 - 
 
  Commerce; (x) the negative effects of the geopol itical situation on the Ukrainian economy, its 
infrastructure, vital production facilities, capacities, cost of production, production, export potential 
and the ability of the interested parties to defend their interests in anti -dumping investigations; and  
(xi) the United  States ' sunset reviews attributing single country rates.  
Countervailing measures  
3.51.  Both the overall number of initiations of countervailing duty investigations and the number of 
new countervailing measures decreased significantly in the latest period  compared with the two 
previous periods . As with anti -dumping, countervailing duty investigations do not necessarily lead 
to measures being applied. Also, similarly to anti -dumping , it can take up to 18 months for a 
countervailing duty investigation to be concluded, and as such, the measures applied in a given 
period may not necessarily result from investigations initiated in the same period.  This may explain 
the relative stability in the number of measures applied in the first and second periods, 
notwithstanding the substantial decline in the number of initiations between these periods.  
3.52.  During the latest  period, 19 exporting Members  were affected  by new countervailing 
investigations. China was the most frequent sub ject of investigations (24), accounting for 32% of 
all investigations during the three periods. India (12), the second most frequent subject, accounted 
for 16% of initiations, followed by the Russian Federation (6) and Malaysia (5), which accounted for 
8% and 7% of the total, respectively.  
Table 3.10 Number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 
by Member, July 2020 to June 2023  
Reporting Member  July 2020 -June 2021  July 2021 -June  2022  July 2022 -June 2023  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Australia  2 0 0 2 0 0 
Brazil  2 0 0 0 1 2 
Canada  4 2 2 4 1 1 
China  4 2 0 0 0 0 
European Uniona 4 0 2 4 0 0 
India 5 1 3 4 0 3 
United Kingdomb 0 0 2 0 0 0 
United States  19 25 14 15 10 6 
Viet Nam  1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total  41 31 23 29 12 12 
a The European Union is counted as one (28 member States until 31 January 2020, 27 member States 
thereafter).  
b The United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union as of 1 February 2020. The European Union 
and the United Kingdom communicated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European Union law, with a few limited exceptions, continu ed to be applicable to 
and in the United Kingdom. See WTO documents WT/LET/1462 , 29 January 2020; and WT/GC/206 , 
1 February 2020.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.53.  Chart 3.12 reflect s annual figures for 2008 -22, plus  the first half of 2023, and shows an 
upward trend in  countervailing initiations from 2015 to 2020, notwithstanding some fluctuation in 
2019. Following its peak in 2020, the number of countervailing initiations decreased to the lowest 
that has been observed since 2010.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 34 - 
 
  Chart 3.12 Initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 2008 -23 
(Number)  
 
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to June . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.54.  At the regular meetings of the  Committee on Subsidies and Countervaili ng Measures  on 
25 October  2022 and 2  May 202318, 11 trade concerns were raised with respect to countervailing 
duty actions by Brazil (1), China (1), the European  Union  (3), India (2), the United  States  (3) and 
Viet Nam (1). 
3.55.  Additional concerns were raised with respect to (i)  the elimination of export subsidies by 
Members that received extensions under Article  27.4 of the SCM  Agreement ; (ii) the low and 
declining level of compliance with the notification and transparency obligations in the 
SCM Agreeme nt; (iii) the requests for information pursuant to Articles  25.8 and 25.9 (proposal on 
procedures from the United  States ); (iv)  the request for information on allegedly discriminatory 
subsidies policies and measures of the United  States ; (v) subsidies and overcapacity; (vi) the use of 
adverse facts available by the United  States  in various CVD investigations; (vii) the 
CVD investigations by the European  Union  regarding the so -called transnational subsidies; (viii) the 
subsidy transparency and China's public ation and inquiry point obligations under China's protocol of 
accession; (ix) the proposed amendment to procedures for review of new and full subsidy 
notifications; and (x) the European  Union  Foreign Subsidies Regulation.  
Safeguard measures  
3.56.  Safeguard measu res are temporary measures applied in response to increased imports of 
goods that are causing serious injury, and are applied  on products from all sources, i.e. all exporting 
countries/customs territories.19 Safeguard measures are subject to different rule s and timelines than 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures and are, therefore, not directly comparable to these other 
types of trade remedies.  
 
18 WTO documents G/SCM/M/121 , 2 February  2023; and G/SCM/M/123 , 27 June 2023,  respectively.  
19 With the exception of exporting Members covered by the special and differential treatment provided 
for developing countries in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.   
1628
925
233345
31344155
3656
1819
1011
919
91013121523
182835
2441
18
6
0102030405060
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Initiations Measures
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 2008 -23
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to June.(Number)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 35 - 
 
  Table 3.11 Number of initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, by 
Member, July 2020 to June 2023  
Reporting 
Member  July 2020 -June 2021  July 2021 -June 2022  July 2022 -June 2023  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Costa Rica  0 1 0 0 0 0 
Egypt  0 1 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala  0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Indonesia  3 2 0 3 0 0 
Madagascar  0 0 1 0 2 1 
Malaysia  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Morocco  1 1 0 0 1 0 
Peru 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Philippines  1 0 0 0 1 1 
South Africaa 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Thailand  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia  0 0 1 0 1 0 
Türkiye  0 1 1 1 0 1 
Ukraine  3 2 3 1 0 0 
United States  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  12 8 7 6 7 5 
a Notified by South Africa, but investigations are initiated at the level of the Southern African Customs 
Union, i.e.  also in respect of Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia.  
Note:  Some notifications are ambiguous about the timing when the measures took effect. For those, an 
additional notification clarifying, ex post , the effective date of the measure is sometimes fi led. For 
this reason, the number of applications of measures in a given period indicated in past reports may 
differ from the figures indicated in the most recent report. The same applies to the following 
Chart 3.13.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.57.  Between January  and June 2023, four investigations were initiated, and three measures were 
applied. The figures for 2022 (four initiations and two measures) were among the lowest since 1995.  
The recent low level of activity seem s to be continu ing in 2023 , as shown  in Table  3.11 and 
Chart  3.13. WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 36 - 
 
  Chart 3.13 Initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, 2008 -2023  
(Number)  
 
Note:  Data for 2023 cover  January to June . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.58.  At the regular meetings of the Committee on Safeguards on 24  October  2022 and 
1 May 202320, 18 concerns  were raised on safeguard investigations by Costa  Rica (1), 
the European  Union  (1), India (2), Indonesia (3), Madagascar (3), Morocco (2), the Philippines (1), 
Tunisia (1), Türkiye (1), the United  Kingdom  (1), the United  States  (1) and Viet  Nam (1). 
3.3  Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures21 
3.59.  This Section covers SPS transparency -related matters, including specific trade concerns 
discussed in SPS Committee meetings, for the period from 1 October 2022 to 30 September  2023. 
In addition, new SPS measures taken in re lation  to the COVID -19 pandemic are reported in a  
separate  section covering the period from 1 February 2020 to 30 September  2023. The last two 
sections refer to the impact of the Ukraine conflict in the work of the SPS Committee and to the 
work on the MC12 SPS Declaration.  
3.60.  Under the SPS  Agreement, WTO Me mbers are obliged to provide an advance notice of 
intention to introduce new or modified SPS measures22, or to notify immediately when emergency 
measures are imposed. The main objective of complying with SPS notification obligations is to inform 
other Members about new or changed regulations  that may significantly affect international trade. 
Therefore, an increased number of notifications does not automatic ally signal  greater use of 
protectionist measures, but rather enhanced transparency regarding food safety and animal and 
plant health measures, most of which are, presumably, legitimate health -protection measures.  
 
20 WTO documents G/SG/M/61 , 1 February 2023 ; and G/SG/M/62 , 19 June 2023 , respectively.  
21 Information presented in this Section was retrieved from the ePing SPS&TBT Platform . Viewed at:  
https://eping.wto.org/ . This Section is based on notifications to the WTO for the period 1  October  2022 to 
30 September  2023. Specific  trade concerns (STCs ) are raised at SPS Committee meetings, and this Section 
summarizes the STCs raised at the 9-11 November 202 2, 22-24 March 202 3, and 12 -14 July 2023 SPS 
Committee meetings . More detailed searches on STCs have been retrieved from the Trade Concern s Database . 
Viewed at:  https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en . 
22 Transparency obligations are contained in Article  7 and Annex B to the SPS  Agreement.  
1025
20
1224
1823
17
11
81630
22
9
4 4610
411
6811 11
69
712 12
9
23
05101520253035
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Initiations MeasuresInitiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, 2008 -23
Source:    WTO Secretariat.Note:    Data for 2023 cover January to June.(Number)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 37 - 
 
  3.61.  In the period from 1 October 2022 to 30 Se ptember 2023, 2,088  SPS notifications (regular 
and emergency, including revisions and addenda) were submitted23 to the WTO, a n 8% increase 
compared with the previous 12 -month period (1,932 notifications from 1  October  2021 to 
30 September  2022). The share of notifications from developing -country Members, accounting for 
66% (1,378 notifications) of the total number, was  higher than the 62% (1,2 04 notifications) 
corresponding to the previous 12 -month period (Chart 3.1 4). 
3.62.  During the review period, WTO Members submitted 1, 807 regular SPS notifications (including 
revisions and addenda), 6 4% (1, 162 notifications) of which were submitted by developing -country 
Members. Compared with the previous 12 -month period, the total number of regular notifications 
increased by  21%, while those submitted by developing -country Members  increased by  about  23%. 
3.63.  The total number of emergency notifications (including addenda) decreased by 3 7% in the 
current review period (2 81 compared with 444 during the previous 12 -month period); how ever, 
while the proportion of all emergency notifications (including addenda) submitted by 
developing -country Members remained higher than the proportion of emergency notifications 
submitted by developed -country Members, constituting 77% of the total of em ergency notifications, 
there has been a decrease of 16% in the total of notifications submitted by developing -country 
Members compared with the previous 12 -month period (21 6 compared with 258). High percentages 
of emergency notifications by developing -country Members have been considered consistent with 
the general trend of most emergency measures being notified by developing -country Members, i.e. 
as a result of less extensive SPS  regulatory systems compared with those of developed -country 
Members. Conseque ntly, when facing emergency challenges, developing -country Members are more 
likely than developed -country Members to introduce new regulations or change existing ones.  
3.64.  Many Members follow the recommendation to notify SPS measures even when they are based 
on a relevant international standard24, as this substantially increases transparency. In this context, 
of the 1,339 regular notifications (excluding addenda ) submitted from 1 October 2022 to 
30 September 2023, 43% indicated that at least one international standard, guideline or 
recommendation was applicable to the notified measure (Chart  3.15). Of these, about 74% indicated 
that the proposed measure was in conformity with the applicable international standard.  
Chart 3.14 Number of SPS notifications, including regular,  emergency , revisions  and 
addenda  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
23 For this Report, "submission" refers to the date of circulation.  
24 WTO document G/SPS/7/Rev.5 , 16 January 2023, para.  2.3. WTO document  G/SPS/7/Rev.5  was 
update d in January 2023  to reflect relevant changes in the set of tools available for Members to search for SPS 
related information, namely the ePing SPS&TBT Platform . 
1,807
1,1621,488
946281
216444
258
02004006008001,0001,2001,4001,6001,8002,0002,200
All Members Developing-country
MembersAll Members Developing-country
MembersNumber of SPS notifications, including regular, emergency, revisions and addenda
Source: WTO Secretariat.Regular notifications Emergency notificationsOct. 2022 -Sep. 2023 Oct. 2021 -Sep. 2022WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 38 - 
 
  Chart 3.15 Regular and emergency SPS notifications (excluding addenda) and 
international standards  
 
Note:  Codex - Codex Alimentarius ; WOAH  (founded as OIE ) - World Organisation for Animal Health ; and 
IPPC - International Plant Protection Convention.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.65.  International standards often provide useful guidance regarding measures to address disease 
outbreaks and other emergency situations. Indeed, 23 7 out of 24 4 (about 9 7%) emergency 
notifications (excluding addenda) submitted during the review pe riod indicated that an international 
standard, guideline, or recommendation was applicable  to the notified measure.   
3.66.  Of the 1, 339 regular notifications (excluding addenda) submitted during the review period, 
the majority (76%) were related to food safety.25 The remainder related to plant protection and 
animal health and, to a lesser extent, the protection of the Member's territory from other damage 
from pests and the protection of humans from animal diseases or plant pests. Regular  notifications 
usually con tain more than one objective.  
3.67.  Of the 24 4 emergency measures (excluding addenda) notified in the same period, the 
majority (8 7%) related to animal health, followed by those related to food safety, the protection of 
humans from animal diseases or plant pest s, plant protection , and the protection of the Member's 
territory from other damage from pests.  Emergency notifications may also contain more than one 
objective.  
3.68.  The WTO Secretariat prepares  annual transparency reports containing detailed information 
on the implementation of the transparency  provisions of the SPS  Agreement.26 
3.69.  While there is no formal provision for "counter notification", concerns regarding the failure to 
notify an SPS measure, or regarding a notified measure, can be raised as a specific trade concern 
(STC) at any of the regular meetings of the SPS Committee each year.  
3.70.  Three SPS Committee meetings were held during the review period, on 9 -11 November 202 2, 
22-24 March 202 3 and 12 -14 July 2023. More  capital -based delegates were able to travel to Geneva 
 
25 The objective of an S PS measure falls under one or more of the following categories: (i)  food safety; 
(ii) animal health; (iii)  plant protection; (iv)  protection of humans from animal/plant pests or diseases; and 
(v) protection of territory from other damage from pests. Member s are required to identify the purpose of the 
measure in their notifications. It is common for more than one objective to be identified for a measure.  
26 See the  latest revision of WTO document G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.15 , 1 March 2023 . 
57%
3%23%5%89%
15%8%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
None International
standardNone International
standard
Regular notifications Emergency notifications
None Codex WOAH IPPCRegular and emergency SPS notifications (excluding addenda) and international standards
Note:  [see original]WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 39 - 
 
  due to the easing of COVID -19 restrictions, and the margins of the SPS Committee meetings27 
provide important opportunities for delegations to discuss and resolve trade concerns bilaterally. 
Several STCs had been withdrawn or not raise d by certain Members during the review period.  
3.71.  At the November 2022 SPS Committee meeting , before adoption of the agenda, India 
withdrew two new STCs: Japan's compulsory  inspection of farmed shrimps; and Canada's SPS 
notification the requirement for aquat ic animals being exported to Canada to have a zoosanitary 
certification . Brazil withdrew the previously raised STC ID 542, US undue delays in opening its citrus 
market; and China did not raise STC ID 519, EU regulatory approach to maximum levels for 
contam inants, which was only raised by Canada.28  
3.72.  At the March 2023 SPS Committee meeting, before adoption of the agenda, India withdrew 
four new STCs: Brazil's MRLs for prothioconazole (G/SPS/N/BRA/2054); Brazil's modifications of 
MRLs and pre -harvest intervals  (PHI) inconsistent with established risk assessment guidelines by 
the FAO (G/SPS/N/BRA/2029/Add.2);  and South Africa's MRLs for abamectin, pyraclostrobin and 
chlorpyrifos (G/SPS/N/ZAF/78). Chinese Taipei did not raise the previously raised STC ID 487, 
China's actions related to COVID -19 that affect trade in food and agricultural products, which was 
only raised by Australia, the European Union, and Japan.29 
3.73.  At the July 2023 SPS Committee meeting, before adoption of the agenda, Brazil withdrew STC 
ID 521, Ch inese Taipei's import restrictions on poultry and beef; India removed STC ID 525, the 
Russian Federation's classification of tea as "fruits and vegetables"; and the Russian Federation 
withdrew STC ID 527, delays in Thailand's approval procedures for animal  products .30  
3.74.  In the SPS Committee meetings of 9-11 November 202 2, 22 -24 March 202 3 and 
12-14 July 2023,  20 STCs were raised for the first time ( Table 3.1 2), and 47 previously raised STCs 
were discussed again .31 Twenty -six previously raised STCs were raised in the three  meetings.32 Of 
these, seven  addressed persistent problems that have been discussed 15 times or more 
(Table  3.13). In addition, 13  STCs raised for the first time in the review period were discussed again  
in March or July 2023 .33  
Table 3.12 New STCs raised in the SPS Committee meetings of November 2022, March 
2023 or July 2023  
ID New STCs  
549 EU regulation No 396/2005 setting pesticide MRLs in food and feed of plant and animal origin  
550 EU Commission proposal for reduction of the current MRL for "nicotine" for imported tea from India 
(G/SPS/N/EU/581)  
551 EU Regulations 2021/405 and 2017/185 on vitamin D3  
552 EU increased sampling frequency for inspection of farmed shrimps and newly listed fishery establishments not 
permitted t o export aquaculture products  
553 India's Draft Food Safety and Standards (Import) Amendment Regulation  
554 India's Order related to requirement of health certificate accompanied with imported food consignment of milk, 
pork, fish and related pr oducts  
555 Namibia's approval procedures for beef and meat of small ruminants  
556 Japan's approval procedures for poultry products  
557 Korea's requirement of a health certificate with a declaration of aquatic disease status  
558 EU import restrictions on ostrich meat  
559 Australia's MRLs stricter than Codex standards in products of interest to India – request to share risk 
assessments (G/SPS/N/AUS/555)  
560 New Zealand's amendment of MRLs for cyantraniliprole, tetracyclines and trichlorfon (G/SPS/N/NZL/695)  
561 China's suspension of beef imports due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) restrictions  
 
27 The November 202 2, March 2023 and July 2023 meetings were held in person, and Members were 
also able to participate remotely via a virtual conferencing platform (WTO documents JOB/SPS/23 , 
21 October  2022; JOB/SPS/26 , 3 March 202 3; and JOB/SPS/29 , 23 June 2023 ).  
28 See summary of the 9 -11 November 2022 SPS Committee meeting in WTO document G/SPS/R/108 , 
16 December 2022.  
29 See summary of the 22 -24 March 2023 SPS Committee meeting in WTO document G/SPS/R/109 , 
5 May 2023.  
30 See summary of the 12 -14 July 2023 SPS Committee meeting in WTO document G/SPS/R/110 , 
13 September 2023.  
31 The 47 previously raised STCs that were discusse d again were  STC IDs 193, 373, 382, 392, 393, 406, 
431, 439, 441, 446, 448, 456, 466, 471, 482, 485, 486, 487, 489, 490, 493, 498, 501, 503, 506, 508, 509, 
512, 516, 518, 519, 521, 523, 524, 525, 526, 529, 530, 532, 533, 534, 538, 539, 543, 544, 545, 548. 
32 These were STC IDs 193, 382, 392, 406, 431, 439, 441, 446, 448, 466, 471, 485, 487, 490, 501, 
503, 509, 516, 523, 526, 529, 530, 532, 534, 539, 544 . 
33 These were STC  IDs 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 557, 561, 562, 563, 565, 566, 567 .  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 40 - 
 
  ID New STCs  
562 China's import restrictions on heat -treated pet food containing poultry ingredients due to highly pathogenic avian 
influenza  
563 Mexico's import restrictions due to African swine fever  
564 South Africa's delays in granting SPS access for poultry, beef, pork, fish and seafood  
565 India's approval procedures to import plants, animals and their products  
566 India's undue delay in importing 12 species of fresh mushrooms  
567 Japan's approval procedures to import plant products  
568 Canada's restrictions on Brazilian pork from internationally recognized FMD free zones without vaccination  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Table 3.13 Previously raised SPS STCs discussed in the November 2022, March 2023 or 
July 2023 meetings, raised 15 times or more34 
STC ID Title of the STC  Member(s)  
responding  Member(s) raising the 
concern  First date 
raised (times 
subsequently 
raised)  Primary 
objecti ve 
193 General import restrictions 
due to bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE)  Several Members, 
including China  European  Union, 
United  States  22/06/2004  
(48 times)  Animal 
health/Animal 
diseases  
382  European  Union legislation 
on endocrine disruptors  European  Union  Argentina , China , 
Dominican  Republic , Ecuador , 
Guatemala , India, Panama , 
Paraguay , United States  25/03/2014  
(26 times)  Food safety  
406  China's import restrictions 
due to highly pathogenic 
avian influenza  China  European  Union, 
United  States   16/03/2016  
(20 times)  Animal 
health/Animal 
diseases  
392 China's import restrictions 
due to African swine fever  China  European  Union  15/07/2015  
(18 times)  Animal 
health/Animal 
diseases  
431 South Africa's import 
restrictions on poultry due 
to highly pathogenic avian 
influenza  South Africa  European Union  02/11/2017  
(16 times)  Animal 
health/Animal 
diseases  
439 United States  import 
restrictions on apples and 
pears  United  States  European  Union  01/03/2018  
(16 times)  Plant health  
441 Indonesia's approval 
procedures for animal and 
plant products  Indonesia  European Union, 
Russian  Federation  12/07/2018  
(15 times)  Other 
concerns  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.75.  Of the 20 STCs raised for the first time in the three SPS Committee meetings, 6 (30%) 
concerned food safety, 8 concerned measures covering animal  health /animal diseases (40%) , 
1 related to plant health (5%)  and 5 covered other concerns (25%) .35 Regarding the 47 previously 
raised STCs during the review period,  13 concerned measures covering food safety, 12 concerned  
animal health /animal diseases , 6 related to plant health and  16 covered  other types of concerns. Of 
the 67 STCs raised or discussed during the review period, 19 concerned measures covering food 
safety, 20 covered animal health /animal diseases , 7 concerned plant health and 21 related to other 
types of concerns.  Discussion s among Members in the SPS Committee continue to be multifaceted 
and dynamic.  
3.76.  The WTO Secretariat prepares annual reports containing detailed information on STCs 
discussed in the SPS Committee.36 Since 1995,  55% of all STCs raised in the Committee have be en 
reported as resolved or partially resolved.  At the November 2022 SPS Committee meeting, t he 
Secretariat informed the Committee that it had contacted 37 Members to seek information regarding 
the status (resolved, partially resolved, or not reported as resolved) of STCs that had not been 
discussed since November 2020. As a follow -up to the exercise, 31 of these STCs had been reporte d 
as resolved and 14 STCs as partially resolved. For transparency purposes, the information provided 
by Members to the Secretariat was circulated in document G/SPS/GEN/2062/Rev.1  in November 
2022, and included the results of similar exerci ses undertaken in 2013, 2017 and 2020. At the March 
2023 meeting, the European Union announced the partial resolution of STC ID 493, non-publication 
of US final rule on importation of sheep, goats and certain other ruminants. At the July 2023 SPS 
 
34 Further information on the STCs previously raised during the review period is available in the ePing 
SPS&TBT Platform . Viewed at: https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en/stcs?searchParameterDomainIds=2 . 
35 These concerns include  pesticide maximum residue limits,  approval procedures, and  undue delay . 
36 See the latest revision of the  annual report on STCs G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.23 , 1 March 2023  and the 
Trade Concerns Database . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Committee meeting, Brazil provided information about the resolution of STC ID 489, Mexico's import 
restrictions on pork, and STC ID 482, Peru's import restrictions on pork.  
3.77.  During the November 2022 SPS Committee meeting, the Committee held a thematic session 
on international standards and best practices in pest risk identification, assessment, and 
management  in close collab oration with the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). Among 
the topics discussed were the use of technology for pest identification, addressing plant health 
hazards in different parts of the food system for food safety and food security, and t he importance 
of communication including among trading partners as well as with the private sector.37 
3.78.  In March 2023, t he SPS Committee adopted WTO document  G/SPS/67 , which lists existing 
tools and resources to enhance the implementation of the SPS Agreement relating to SPS approval 
procedures for food, animal and plant products. It also adopted WTO document  G/SPS/68 , which 
provides recommendations on SPS approval procedures.  Approval procedures cover any procedure 
to check and ensure the fulfilment of SPS measures.38 The documents were the outcome of work 
from the Working Group on Approval Procedures , which was established fo llowing a recommendation 
from the Fifth Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement, in 2020.39   
COVID -19-related SPS measures  (1 February 202040-30 September  2023) 
3.79.  Between 1 February 2020 and 30 September 2023, 31 Members (counting th e 
European  Union as one) notified 68 SPS measures related to the COVID -19 pandemic. The most 
recent SPS COVID -19-related document s were received  on 16 January  2023, when t wo addenda 
were notified lifting previous temporary restrictions .41 Twenty -seven  measures were notified as 
regular notifications. Additionally, 2 9 addenda to regular notifications were submitted, mostly 
extending both implementation periods of temporary measures and comment periods and dates of 
adoption of previously notified regulati ons. Twenty measures were notified as emergency measures. 
Additionally, 1 2 emergency addenda were notified, 9 lifting (or partially lifting) temporary 
restrictions previously imposed and 3 extending the validity of temporary trade -facilitating 
measures. Ni ne Members submitted their measures through  an information communication (GEN 
document), and one additional GEN document42 was submitted by 40 Members. Overall, 2 4% of 
notifications on COVID -19 were SPS measures.43 One previously raised STC related to COVI D-19 
was again discussed at the November  2022, March 2023, and July 2023  SPS Committee meetings.44 
Overall, two SPS STCs related to COVID -19 had been  discussed in the SPS Committee since the 
start of the pandemic.45  
3.80.  Initially, the measures  notified  mainly  related to restrictions on animal imports and/or transit 
from affected areas (some of these measures were subsequently lifted), and increased certification 
requirements. While some restrictions were still imposed at a later stage, most notifications and 
communications submitted since the beginning of April 2020 relate to measures taken to facilitate 
trade, by allowing temporary flexibility for control authorities to use electronic versions of veterinary 
and/or phytosanitary certificates, since the COVID -19 situation made the transmission of original 
paper certificates problematic. Overall, about two -thirds of notifications (excluding addenda) and 
communications submitted were measures considered to be trade -facilitating.  
 
37 To access the report, presentations and recordings of the thematic session , visit the event webpage : 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/thematic_session_nov22_e.htm .  
38 They can, for ex ample, be used to assess products or categories of products before they are allowed 
into a market to ensure that imported products comply with SPS requirements of the importing country or to 
check that the SPS system of an exporting country provides necess ary assurances before a product enters a 
market.  
39 The full report is available in WTO document s G/SPS/64 and G/SPS/64/Add.1 , 3 August 2020 . 
40 The first COVID -19-related notifications were received in February 2020.  
41 WTO documents G/SPS/N/DNK/6/Add.1 , 16 January 2023 ; and G/SPS/N/HKG/47/Add.1 , 
16 January  2023. Search for information on notifications on the ePing SPS&TBT Platform . 
42 WTO document G/SPS/GEN/1778/Rev.5 , 14 January 2021 (also circulated as WTO document 
G/TBT/GEN/296/Rev.5 , 14 January 2021).  
43 WTO, COVID -19 and World Trade . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm . 
44 STC ID 487: China's actions related to COVID -19 that affect trade in food and agricultural products .  
45 STC IDs 487 and 488. Visit the Trade Concerns Database  for further information on STCs.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Impact of the Ukraine conflict in th e work of the SPS Committee  
3.81.  At the November 2022, March 2023 and July 2023 Committee meetings, Ukraine provided 
the Committee with information on its SPS situation and reported on its SPS activities. Several 
Members expressed their support and showed appre ciation for Ukraine's efforts to fulfil its SPS WTO 
obligations, strongly condemned the Russian  Federation 's military action in Ukraine as a violation of 
international law and the UN  Charter and stated that the invasion was further exacerbating the 
current food security crisis . The Russian Federation underlined that the matter was not within the 
mandate of the WTO and complained that the politically motivated trade -restrictive actions against 
the Russian Federation imposed by several WTO Members were  behind the possible shortages in 
net-food-importing countries. At the July 2023 meeting, Members called on the Russian Federation 
to renew the Black Sea Grain Initiative and cease military operations in Ukraine. The Russian 
Federation noted that the Black  Sea Grain Initiative had been prolonged under the condition of 
achieving tangible normalization of agricultural exports, but there had been no progress.46 
MC12 SPS Declaration on Responding to Modern SPS Challenges  
3.82.  During the reporting period, meetings we re held in October and November 2022, and in 
February, March, May, July and September 2023 to advance the Work Programme that emerged 
under the MC12 SPS Declaration on Responding to Modern SPS Challenges ( Box 3.1).47 Members 
have discussed the two draft ou tcome documents from the Work Programme:  a factual summary of 
the Work Programme  (WTO document G/SPS/GEN/2134 , 21 June 2023  and revisions)  and the SPS 
Committee 's draft report to the 13th Ministerial Conference (WTO document G/SPS/W/344 , 
21 June 2023 and revisions ). 
 
46 See further information in the summary reports of the November 2022, March 2023 and July 2023 
SPS Committee meetings in WTO documents G/SPS/R/108 , 16 December 2022 ; G/SPS/R/109 , 5 May 2023 ; 
and G/SPS/R/1 10, 13 September 2023.  
47 The proposed process for the Work Programme of the MC12 SPS Declaration is available in 
WTO document G/SPS/W/330/Rev.1 , 10 November 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Box 3.1 MC12 SPS Declaration Work Programme  
WTO Members and Observers , including the three international standard -setting bodies recognized in the SPS 
Agreement (Codex, WOAH, IPPC), are participating in discussions on the SPS Declaration , which was adopted 
at the WTO's 12th Ministerial Conference in 2022 (MC12 SPS Declaration). The MC12 SPS Declaration , 
recognizes new opportunities and emerging challenges brought about by the evolution of the global 
agricultural landscape since the adoption of the SPS Agreement in 1995. The Ministerial Conference instructed 
the SPS Committee to carry out a Work Programme to further enhance the implementation of the SPS 
Agreement in an effort to better manage issues related to international trade in food, animals and plants.  
The MC12 SPS Decla ration Work Programme was implemented through discussions in five thematic groups:  
1. How to facilitate global food security and more sustainable food systems, including through 
sustainable growth and innovation in agricultural production and international tr ade, and through the 
use of international standards, guidelines, and recommendations developed by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the WOAH and the IPPC as the basis of harmonized SPS measures to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.  
2. How to supp ort basing SPS measures on scientific evidence and principles, including where 
international standards, guidelines, or recommendations do not exist or are not appropriate; and 
how to promote the use by Members of principles employed by the international st andard setting 
bodies for considering scientific uncertainty in risk analysis.  
3. How to enhance the safe international trade in food, animals and plants and products thereof through 
the adaptation of SPS measures to regional conditions, including pest - or disease -free areas and 
areas of low pest or disease prevalence which can strengthen Members' ability to protect plant and 
animal life or health through efforts to limit the spread of pests such as the Mediterranean fruit fly, 
diseases such as African swine f ever, disease -carrying organisms, or disease -causing organisms.  
4. How to encourage cooperation with observer organizations that support the work of the SPS 
Committee and the international standard setting bodies through technical exchanges and assistance 
in the context of this Work Programme.  
5. How to increase participation of and support for the special needs of developing and least developed 
country Members in the development and application of SPS measures; and in particular, to increase 
awareness of and sen sitivity to the impacts of SPS measures on the export possibilities of such 
Members.  
The outcome of this Work Programme will be reported to Ministers at the WTO's 13th Ministerial Conference 
in February 2024. The text of the MC12 SPS Declaration is availab le in WTO document  WT/MIN(22)/27 , 
22 June 2022.  
Source:  WTO.  
3.4  Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  
3.83.  WTO Members continued to use the TBT Committee's transparency mechanisms to notify their 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and to discuss and often reso lve specific trade concerns 
(STCs) non -litigiously. Most of the new regular TBT notifications submitted by WTO Members during 
the review period referred to protection of human health or safety as their main objective. A total of 
223 STCs were discussed dur ing the review period. Members have submitted 229 COVID -19-related 
TBT notifications to the WTO in response to the COVID -19 pandemic since 2020.  Members have 
made references to the COVID -19 pandemic in 55 STCs . 
Notifications submitted to the TBT Committee  
3.84.  Under the TBT Agreement, WTO Members are required to notify their intention to introduce 
new or modified  technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures , or to notify adopted 
emergency  measures immediately. The principal objective of complying with the TBT notification 
obligations is to inform other Members about new or changed regulations that may  significantly 
affect trade  and provide an opportunity for comments . 
3.85.  From 1 October 2022 to 1 October 2023 (the TBT review period), WTO  Members submit ted 
2,373  new regular notifications of TBT measures.48 Members that notified the most measures during 
 
48 Source: ePing SPS&TBT platform .  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 44 - 
 
  the review period  - 59% of all new regular  notifications  – were Rwanda (233), Tanzania (217), 
Kenya (210), Uganda (173), Burundi (143), the United States (126), the European Union (84), 
India (84), China (63) and the Republic of Korea (63). Most of these new regular TBT notifications 
indicated as their main objective protection of human health or safety. Various other notifications 
related to quality requirements, consumer information, labelling, prevention of deceptive practices , 
consumer protection, reducing trade barriers and facilitating trade,  harmonization, and protection of 
the environment.   
3.86.  A total of 1,536  follow -up notifications (i.e. addenda, corrigenda, or supplements) were 
submitted during the review  period. The continuing and frequent use by Members of follow -up 
notification s is a posi tive development, as it increases transparency and predictability across the 
measures' regulatory lifecycle.  
Measures discussed  in the TBT Committee (STCs)49 
3.87.  WTO Members use the TBT Committee as a forum for discussing trade issues related to 
specific TBT measures  proposed or  maintained by other Members. Issues can range from requests 
for additional information and clarification to questions on the consistency of measures with TBT 
Agreement disciplines. The overall trend suggests an increasing use of the TB T Committee as a 
forum for Members to raise and resolve trade concerns non -litigiously.  
3.88.  A total of 223 (43 new and 180 previously raised) STCs  were discussed during the three 
Committee meetings that fell within the review period. The new STCs concerned TBT measures by 
the European Union (11); India (9); the United States (5); China (4); Angola (2); and one each by 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, I ndonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Spain, 
the United  Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Viet Nam. These new STCs covered regulations 
on a range of products (e.g.  washing machines, hazardous substances, chemicals, alcoholic 
beverages, electri c vehicles, digital products, footwear, textiles, medical, electrical and charging 
equipment), and dealt with a variety of issues (e.g. labelling and packaging, waste management, 
energy efficiency and conservation, cybersecurity, conformity assessment proc edures and technical 
regulations).  
3.89.  During the three Committee meetings covered by the review period, 10 persistent STCs were 
discussed ( these  STCs have each been previously raised on more than 16 occasions in the TBT 
Committee meetings).  
COVID -19-related T BT notifications  and discussions at the TBT Committee  
3.90.  Since the outbreak  of the COVID -19 pandemic , 34 WTO Members have submitted 229 
COVID -19-related TBT notifications to the WTO .50 These notifications mostly dealt with extraordinary 
and temporary streaml ining of certification and related procedures, and the introduction of new 
regulatory requirements for medical goods, in response to the pandemic . The majority (about 67%) 
of these notifications cover regulations on medical goods, such as PPE, pharmaceutical products, 
medical devices, other medical supplies, and other products . Members  have made references to the 
COVID -19 pandemic in 55 STCs . 
Develop ments in the context of the war in Ukraine  
3.91.  At the TBT Committee meetings of 8 -10 March 2023 and 21 -23 June 2023, Ukraine and 
several Members expressed  their strong opposition  to the war in Ukraine and noted  that it violated 
international law. The Russian F ederation called on Members to refrain from interventions on issues 
and events that were outside the scope of the TBT Committee and the WTO itself.51 
3.92.  At the TBT Committee meetings of 8 -10 March and 21 -23 June 2023, Ukraine provided an 
update of its TBT act ivities. Ukraine noted that it continued to take steps to ensure proper functioning 
of its technical regulatory system. In the same context, Ukraine also notified to the TBT Committee 
 
49 This Section takes account of the STCs raised in the TBT Committee meetings of 16 -18 November 2022 , 
8-10 March 2023  and 21 -23 June 2023 .  
50 TBT notifications are classified as COVID -19-related if they contain the terms "coronavirus", "COVID", 
"SARS -COV-2" or "nCoV".  
51 WTO document s G/TBT/M/89 , 11 May 2023 ; and G/TBT/M/90 , 21 September 2023 . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  (i) the postponement of entry into force of certain regulatory measures  in light of martial law in 
Ukraine52; (ii) relaxation of certain regulatory requirements53; and (iii) te rmination of certain 
regulatory flexibilities that had been introduced during martial law in Ukraine.54  
3.5  Policy d evelopments  in agriculture  
3.93.  The Committee on Agriculture ( CoA) provides a forum for Members to discuss matters related 
to agricultur al trade, and to consult on matters relat ed to Members' implementation of commitments 
under the Agreement on Agriculture ( AoA). The revi ew work of the CoA is based on notifications that 
Members make in relation to  their commitments  and on matter s raised under Article 18.6 of the AoA  
(i.e. Specific Implementation Matters (SIMs)) . The CoA has also been tasked with the monitoring of 
the imple mentation of specific outcomes reached under the agriculture negotiations.  Additionally, it 
takes up other matters, including the follow -up to the Marrakesh Decision on Least -developed and 
Net Food -Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs). Since 2020, the C ommittee has also hosted 
discussions on the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on global agriculture  and food systems and 
monitoring governments' policy responses to address its effects and aftershocks . Since MC12, this 
discussion has been guided by t he overall framework of the Ministerial Declaration  on the WTO 
Response to the COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics .55  
3.94.  During the review period, the CoA held four regular meetings, on 21 -22 November 2022, and 
27-28 March, 27 -28 June, and 2 7-28 September  2023.56 Members posed  a total of 677  questions , 
of which 348 questions concerned  SIMs under Article 18.6 , 285 questions regarding  individual 
notifications , 10 questions on overdue notifications, and 34 questions in relation to the follow -up to 
the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition.57  
3.95.  Domestic support continued  to be an area to which Members pay significant attention. About 
82% of questions under individual notifications and 56% of SIMs under Article 18.6 concerned 
domestic sup port policies. Close to half of the questions posed on notifications (122 questions) and 
on SIMs (36 SIMs) concerned domestic support measures by China, India and the United States.  Of 
the 78 SIMs raised during the review period, 60 were raised for the fir st time.  Members sought 
clarification on support policies targeting specific sectors or products, including cereals (Thailand's 
corn farmer income guarantee scheme; Mexico's domestic support programmes; India's annex to 
domestic support  notification pursua nt to the Bali PSH Decision; India's rice sale under the Open 
Market Sale Scheme; China's Blue Box support; China's purchase policy of grains and oils; China's 
wheat support; China's grain subsidies; U S expanded insurance coverage for soybean and grain 
sorghum; US corn support; Japan's structural transition programme for rice; and Pakistan's wheat 
policies), dairy (India's dairy subsidies and Japan's support system for milk), livestock (China's 
support to the beef cattle sector; China's pork reserve program me; and China's swine support), soya 
(US expanded insurance coverage for soybean and grain sorghum ), palm oil ( Thailand's palm oil 
price guarantee scheme ), and wine ( France's support to wine producer s). There were 40 SIMs raised 
on domestic support policie s with a wider sectoral scope.  
3.96.  Measures potentially limiting market access  was the second area of interest in the CoA. Some 
36 questions concerning notifications and 25 concerning SIMs were raised during the review period. 
On notifications, most questions (27) concerned imports under tariff rate quotas (TRQ s). Out of the 
25 SIMs  concerning market access policies, 14 were discussed for the first time. These new SIMs 
related to policies potentially affecting market access of specific products  or groups of products 
 
52 WTO documents G/TBT/N/UKR/233 , 27 October 2022 ; G/TBT/N/UKR/21 2/Add.1 , 15 November 2022; 
G/TBT/N/UKR/234/Add.1 , 23 November 2022; G/TBT/N/UKR/124/Add.2 , 25 November 2022; 
G/TBT/N/UKR/209/Rev.1 , 3 May 2023;  G/TBT/N/UKR/255 , 5 May 2023;  and G/TBT/N/UKR/239/Add.1 , 
16 August 2023.   
53 WTO documents G/TBT/N/UKR/254 , 5 May 2023 ; G/TBT/N/UKR/264 , 21 July 2023 ; and 
G/TBT/N/UKR/266 , 15 August 2023.  
54 WTO document G/TBT/N/UKR/258 , 31 May 2023.  
55 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/31 -WT/L/1142 . 
56 WTO documents G/AG/R/104 , 17 January 2023 ; G/AG/R/105 , 10 May 2023 ; G/AG/R/106 , 
22 August  2023; and G/AG/R/107 , 7 November 2023 . 
57 Questions can be accessed through the compilation of questions issued for each CoA meeting under 
WTO documents G/AG/W/226 , 11 November 2022 (21 -22 Novembe r meeting), G/AG/W/231 , 17 March 
(27-28 March meeting) ; G/AG/W/237 , 16 June (27 -28 June meeting) ; and G/AG/W/241 , 15 September 2023 
(27-28 September meeting). All questions and answers are available in the Agriculture Information 
Management System ( AG-IMS). WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  including cereals ( Türkiye's increased import tariffs ), livestock (C anada's country -specific allocation 
for beef and veal TRQ; the Republic of Korea' s tariff quotas), and dairy (Australia's SPS measures 
on dairy imports and Brazil's tariff increase on dairy products ), and poultry (Philippines' SSG trigger 
price for chicken ; Nicaragua's information about import quotas; South Africa's poultry TRQ 
administration; Philippines' calculation methodology for SSG trigger prices; and South Africa's import 
measures on poultry meat). The remaining SIMs concerned broader market access p olicies and 
commitments ( the United Kingdom 's tariff quota import arrangements; Philippines' inspection and 
testing of agricultural products; Cameroon's import substitution policy; Congo's import -limiting price 
measures; and Argentina's currency controls and import licensing rules).   
3.97.  Measures that potentially limited or restricted exports  of foodstuffs were also subject to 
several specific questions in the Committee during this period.  The new SIMs  raised  during the 
review period on this area conc erned the  United Arab Emirates 's rice export ban; Tanzania 's export 
restriction on maize; the Russian Federation's export ban o n rice; Malaysia's export restriction 
measure on chickens; Türkiye's export licensing requirement; China's export restrictions on  corn 
starch; Mexico's ban on exports of agricultural products; Morocco's export restriction of chickpea ; 
Mexico's export restriction on white corn; Morocco's export ban on certain vegetables; Tajikistan's 
export ban on onions and other vegetables; and Türkiye's export ban on onions and potatoes . The 
main thrust of all these questions was on assessing the consistency of these measures with the 
relevant WTO rules, ascertaining how the interests of affected importing Members  were taken into 
account and underlining the importance of timely ER notifications to the Committee. In some cases, 
the concerned Member subject to questions informed the CoA about an adjustment in the scope of 
the measure, its complete elimination or even  denied having applied the export restriction.  
3.98.  Members continued to express concerns about the European Union deforestation and forest 
degradation strategy , which has been under discussions in the CoA since July 2020. Two Joint Letters  
of July 2022 and Se ptember 202358 by a group of developing WTO Members addressed to the 
EU Parliament, Council and Commission on this matter were also shared with the Committee.  
Transparency  
3.99.  Members commenced discussions on the streamlining of notifications and transparenc y 
requirements in the area of export competition. In view of a long list of outstanding export subsidy 
notifications (Table ES:1), and simultaneously a majority of export subsidy notifications merely 
stating no recourse to such subsidies ( "nil" statements) , including  in the wake of the 2015 Nairobi 
Export Competition Decision , the Committee59 decided to allow Member s not using export subsidies 
to fulfil their outstanding export subsidy notifications simply by making an oral announcement to 
this effect in the CoA. This avenue to announce non -recourse to agricultural export subsidies was 
used for the first time by six LDCs (Guinea, Haiti, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone and Uganda) at 
the March 2023 CoA meeting and by Brunei Darussalam, Paraguay and Tanzania at the June 2023 
CoA meeting to fulfil their outstanding export subsidy obligations collectively for more than 
170 outstanding years.  
3.100.   In a continuing discussion on the transparency of TRQ administration and fill rates, and as 
a follow -up to the implementation of the 2013 Bali Ministerial Decision60 on TRQ  administration, the 
Committee meeting reached agreement61 in June 2023 on enhanced  transparency of TRQ imports 
in respect of country -specific quota allocations in the Schedule , and committed to review the 
notification format agreed in WTO document G/AG/2 , 30 June 1 995, for the reporting of TRQ import 
arrangements  so as to enable WTO Members to include information on the implementation of 
paragraphs 2 to 5 of the Bali Decision . 
Food security  
3.101.   Food security  has remained high on the agenda of the CoA, especially since t he outbreak  of 
the COVID -19 pandemic. Food security is also routinely referred to as a key theme for potential 
deliverables at MC13. Pursuant to the mandate in  paragraph 8 of the Ministerial Declaration on the 
 
58 WTO documents G/AG/G EN/213 , 29 November 2022 ; and G/AG/GEN/223/Rev.2 , 2 October 2023.  
59 WTO document WT/MIN(15)/45 , WT/L/980 , 21 December 2015.  
60 WTO document WT/MIN(13)/39 , WT/L/914 , 11 December 2013.  
61 WTO document G/AG/36 , 29 June 2023.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Emergency Response to Food Insecurity62, the C oA approved a  work programme63 to consider the 
food security concerns of LDCs and NFIDCs comprising the following four themes  – access to 
international food markets; financing of food imports; agricultural and production resilience of LDCs 
and NFIDCs; and horizontal issues, including collaboration with international organizations  – and 
established a Working Group to undertake thema tic deliberations. The Working Group aims to finalize 
its work and propose concrete solutions no later than end -November 2023.  The Working Group has 
met six times and organized dedicated discussions on several elements forming part of the work 
programme su pported by thematic workshops and expert session s involving international 
organizations, regional and corporate financial institutions, and farmer organizations. Based on 
inputs and discussions  by WTO Members , the Working Group coordinator released a repor t in July 
2023 containing the possible areas of convergence and recommendations emanating from the work 
programme .64 Based on comments on the report and discussions in the Working Group, including 
on the new submissions, the Working Group coordinator inten ded to circulate a revised report in the 
third week of October 2023. A dedicated webpage includes more details on discussions  under the 
work programme.65 
Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine  
3.102.   References to the war in Ukraine f eatured  routinely in CoA's discussions on food security and 
under specific matters dealing with trade in grains , where the Russian Federation and Ukraine were 
the first and fifth largest exporters of wheat globally, accounting together for 25% of global exports 
of this commodity in 2021.66 Several Members expressed concerns over the continuing war in 
Ukraine and its serious impact on global food security. The Russian Federation raised repeatedly the 
issue of economic and trade sanctions and port restrictions, incl uding by way of written questions or 
SIMs.  
3.103.   The following box on the environmental effects of support in agriculture has been contributed 
by the OECD.  
Box 3.2 Environmental effects of agricultural support  
Accor ding to the annual OECD Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation Report , total support to agriculture 
reached a record high of USD  851 billion per year in 2020 -22 across 54 OECD countries and major emerging 
economies. Most of this support (USD 630 bil lion per year) is provided directly to producers. The remainder 
is provided in the form of general services for the sector (USD 106 billion) and support to consumers 
(USD  115 billion). Much of the support to producers (USD 411 billion per year) takes the f orm of the potentially 
most market distorting support. This includes market price support policies which raise domestic commodity 
prices above relevant reference levels that would pertain in the absence of such policies (such as import 
barriers); payments based on output; and payments based on the unconstrained use of variable inputs (such 
as fuel or fertilisers) (OECD, 2023).a 
In addition to impacts on global markets, different ways of supporting agriculture also have consequences for 
the environment and natural resource use. Existing agricultural support policies can contribute to increasing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and encouraging the unsustainable use of natural resources (OECD, 2022). 
The potentially most market distorting policie s (those listed above, accounting for USD 411 billion per year) 
are also the potentially most environmentally harmful support policies. This is because they are linked to 
farmers ' production decisions and cannot be easily targeted to those most in need, an d they provide incentives 
for intensified use of inputs, for allocation of land to crops receiving support and for the entry of land into the 
agricultural sector (Henderson and Lankoski, 2019; Henderson and Lankoski, 2020; Lankoski and Thiem, 
2020; DeBoe, 2020). These policies can have negative impacts on water quality and direct agricultural GHG 
emissionsb, and negatively affect biodiversity by promoting less diverse agricultural systems (DeBoe, 2020; 
Henderson and Lankoski, 2019). In particular, payments based on the unconstrained use of variable inputs 
(USD  67 billion per year in 2020 -22) can encourage the excessive use of fertilisers, feed and fuel. 
Over-application of synthetic fertilisers leads to substantial nutrient surpluses and can cause severe dam age 
to freshwater ecosystems.  
Many of these policies also support the production of specific agricultural products. Such support accounted 
for three  fifths of all the support provided to producers, or USD  379 billion per year over 2020 -22 (out of total 
support to producers of USD 630 billion). This can have an impact on agricultural GHG emissions as emission 
intensities differ across commodities. Support for livestock products, which tend to have high emission 
 
62 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/28 , WT/L/1139 , 22 June 2022.  
63 WTO document G/AG/35 , 22 November 2022.  
64 WTO document G/AG/GEN/240 , 19 July 2023.  
65 Viewed at : https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/wrkprog -fsldcs_e.htm .  
66 WTO document G/AG/GEN/204 , 6 September 2022 , para. 5. WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  intensities, amounted to USD  123 billion per year over 2020 -22. Rice, a significant source of methane 
emissions and the most emission -intensive staple crop, received USD  46 billion per year in support.  
Other types of support policies can also impact the environment. Payments based on current land area create 
incentives to expand cropping areas and maintain marginal lands in production, but do not incentivise higher 
input intensities on that land. Payment s based on animal numbers without constraints will generally result in 
increased livestock numbers, either through increased stocking densities or increased area, and in either case 
are likely to cause negative environmental effects (DeBoe, 2020).  
Payment s based on non -current area, animal numbers, receipts or income (e.g. payments based on historical 
entitlements) are among the least environmentally harmful support policies (Henderson and Lankoski, 2019). 
These measures allow farmers to follow market sign als in their production decisions, and in some cases, 
production is not required for farmers to receive support payments. However, by supplementing farmer 
incomes and making agriculture more profitable relative to other land uses, such payments could still  stifle 
structural change and hinder the conversion of agricultural land to more sustainable land uses. Ultimately, 
the environmental impact of these payments depends on the type and effectiveness of mandatory 
environmental conditions and requirements (cro ss compliance) that accompany them (DeBoe, 2020).  
Agricultural policies can also be specifically designed to generate positive environmental outcomes, by paying 
farmers for providing environmental goods and services such as carbon sequestration, preservati on of rural 
landscapes, resilience to natural disasters, pollination, habitat provision, and control of invasive species. 
However, just USD 1.6 billion of the USD 297 billion per year of budgetary payments to producers in 2020 -22 
was linked clearly to the provision of environmental public goods (i.e. payments based on specific 
non-commodity outputs).  
More broadly, of the USD 851 billion in total support to agriculture over 2020 -22, only USD 106 billion went 
to general services for the sector, such as innov ation, biosecurity and infrastructure. Of this, only 
USD 24 billion per year went to R&D and innovation, which is critical for ensuring sustainable productivity 
growth in the sector. Sustainable productivity growth in turn is essential if the sector is to meet the triple 
challenge of providing adequate, affordable, safe and nutritious food for a growing global population, providing 
livelihoods all along the food chain, and doing so while increasing the environmental sustainability of the 
sector.  
a At the s ame time, some emerging economies implemented policies reducing domestic prices for some or 
most agricultural commodities below reference levels, thus implicitly taxing producers of these products. 
These negative transfers averaged USD  179 billion per year  in 2020 -22. 
b  The most distorting policies are expected to raise GHG emissions at the national level. However global 
effects may differ in the case of market price support (MPS); the relocation of production due to reforms 
could slightly increase global GHG emissions due to land use changes. A global elimination of MPS could 
continue to deliver important benefits to consumers, without increasing global GHG emissions from land 
use change, if implemented alongside an effective ban on deforestation (Guerrero  et al. 2022).  
Source:  DeBoe, G. (2020), "Impacts of agricultural policies on productivity and sustainability performance in 
agriculture: A literature review" , OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers , No. 141, OECD Publishing, 
Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/6bc916e7 -en. Guerrero, S., et al. (2022), "The impacts of agricultural 
trade and support policy reform on climate change adaptation and environmental performanc e: A model -
based analysis", OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 180, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/520dd70d -en. Henderson, B. and J. Lankos ki (2020), "Assessing the 
Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Policies", Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy , pp. 1 -16, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13081 . Henderson , B. and J. Lankoski (2019), "Evaluating the 
environmental impact of agricultural policies" , OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers , No. 130, 
OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/add0f27c -en. Lankoski, J. and A. Thiem (2020), 
"Linkages between agricultural policies, productivity and environmental sustainability", Ecological 
Economics , Vol. 178, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106809 . OECD (2023), Agricultural Policy 
Monitoring and Evaluation 2022: Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change , OECD Publishing, Paris, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/b14de474 -en. OECD (2022), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2022: 
Reforming Agricultural Policies for Climate Change Mitigation , OECD Publishi ng, Paris, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/7f4542bf -en. OECD (2021), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021: 
Addressing the Challenges Facing Food Systems , OECD Publis hing, Paris, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/2d810e01 -en. 
Source:  OECD .  
3.6  General economic support  
3.104.   At the 27 July 2023 informal TPRB  meeting dedicated to discussing the Director -General's 
Report on Trade -Related Developments , WTO Members engaged in a constructive exchange of 
views. Several highlighted the increasing number new general economic support measures 
introduced by governments , and some indicated the importance of reporting these measures to the 
Trade Monitoring Exercise. Members also took note of the decline in the number of new 
COVID -19-related general economic support by WTO Members durin g the period under review.   WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  3.105.   Since the  early stages of the COVID -19 pandemic, the online  list of support measures taken 
by WTO  Members and Observers in response to the pandemic  has been updated regularly by the 
WTO Secretariat .67 It aims to provide an informal and factual situation report and to enhance 
transparency around support measures taken in response to the pandemic. The list includes only 
information and measures communicated by delegations directly to the WTO Trade Monitoring 
Section  and only in the original langua ge of the submission.   
3.106.   Since the creation of the Trade Monitoring Exercise in late 2008, the Trade Monitoring 
Reports had included a separate Annex  on general economic support measures introduced by 
governments during the period under review. However, since July  2017, the Reports have not 
included this separate Annex, partly due to the low response rate of WTO Members to the  request 
for information on such measures, and partly because such an Annex  was biased against those 
Members that traditionally share and publish detailed information on such policies. Although 
discussions among delegations have addressed this issue with s everal emphasizing the need to 
preserve and strengthen transparency through the Trade Monitoring Exercise, the response rate to 
the general economic support information remains low.  
3.107.   The Trade Monitoring Exercise does not make any judgement as to the WTO -compatibility 
of any of the measures referred to in this Section. While it is possible that these measures, whether 
taken as part of a n overall commercial strategy or as part of the emergency response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic, may affect trade in some way, i t is often difficult  to conclude that they restrict 
or facilitate trade (and by how much), or that they distort competition. Nevertheless, providing a 
brief overview of such measures taken during the review period represents an important element of 
transpa rency regarding developments that impact the international trading system.  
3.108.   Recent studies emphasize that p hasing out environmentally harmful subsidies would make 
a major contribution to slowing climate change  and in creas ing government revenues while 
suppo rting the achievement of environmental policy goals  (see e.g.  Box 3.2 above) . According to 
the International Energy Agency 's (IEA) World Energy Investment 2023 report, global investment in 
clean energy will reach USD  1.7 trillion in 202368 and will significantly outpace spending on fossil 
fuels. At the same time, fossil fuel subsidies have surged to a record USD  7 trillion in 2022 according 
to the IMF69, as governments supported consumers and businesses during the global spike in energy 
prices caused by the war in Ukraine and the economic recovery from the pandemic. Other 
publications indicate that subsidies and support measures have proliferated, especially in G20 
economies where a significant number of subsidies to import -competing firms appear to have been 
introduced in 2023 .70 In addition, sectoral s upport has also risen in response to the different recent 
crises .71 Although the proliferation of subsidies and support programmes could lead to an increase 
of countervailing measures , this tr end has not yet materiali zed according to the latest numbers .  
Regular economic support measures (not related to COVID -19) 
3.109.   In response to the Director -General's 10  March  and 4 September 2023 request s for 
information for this Trade Monitoring Report, 44 WTO  Members72 volunteered information on 233 
regular general economic support measures unrelated to the COVID -19 pandemic. The Secretariat's 
 
67 WTO, COVID -19: Support Measures . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_support_mea sures_e.htm .  
68 IEA (20 23), World Energy Investment 2023 . Viewed at: https://www.iea.org/news/clean -energy -
investment -is-extending -its-lead-over-fossil-fuels-boosted -by-energy -security -strengths .  
69 IMF (2023) Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data . Viewed at:  
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2023/08/22/IMF -Fossil -Fuel-Subsidies -Data-2023-Update -
537281 .  
70 GTA (2023), G20 Trade Policy  Factbook , 5 September 2023 . Viewed at: 
https://www.globaltradealert.org/reports/119 .  
71 OECD  (2022) "Support to agriculture has risen in response to global crises, while reforms to combat 
climate change and market distortions remain essential ", 23 June. Viewed at: 
https://www.oecd.org/agriculture/support -to-agriculture -has-risen-in-response -to-global -crises -while-reforms -
to-combat -climate -change -and-market -distortions -remain -essential.htm .  
72 Albania; Colombia; Costa Rica; European Union (c ounting the EU -27 and its member  States  
separately ); Hong  Kong, China; Indonesia; Jamaica; Mauritius; Mongolia; Montenegro; Mozambique; the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; South Africa; Switzerland; Thailand; Türkiye and United Kingdom.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  own research suggests that during the review period multiple  other support measures with 
potentially important implica tions for trade were implemented by WTO Members.  
3.110.   According to the regular support measures communicated by WTO Members and those 
identified by the Secretariat, the number of new support measures introduced by governments has 
increased significantly (an alm ost 5-fold increase) during the review period. Most measures were 
environmental impact reduction programmes, including renewable -energy production schemes 
through new technologies, support for energy efficiency and decarbonization, program mes to tackle 
methane emissions, and support for solar photovoltaic systems . Other measures included credits to 
energy firms, schemes to compensate companies for higher electricity prices and investments to 
expand productive capacities by reducing environmental impacts.  
3.111.   Several measures were introduced to support farmers and the agricultural sector, including 
support for crop prices and food production plans, and aid schemes to support the livestock sector 
and other specific agricultural sectors, such as wheat, barley, an d olive oil. Many  measures were 
linked to the effects of the war in Ukraine. Incentives were also provided for the use of technologies 
to increase agricultural productivity, grants to support agri -food companies and general programmes 
for the development o f bio-agriculture. Other support measures implemented during the review 
period targeted tourism, aviation, and transport. Certain measures also included support to cope 
with inflation, fiscal incentives, investments to promote innovation and digital develo pment, funds 
and incentives for electric and autonomous vehicles, support to high -tech strategic industries, 
including on semiconductors, secondary batteries, or biotech.  Several of these economic support 
measures were introduced as multi -year programmes, others were one -off grants or aid schemes . 
COVID -19-related economic support measures  
3.112.   In response to Director -General's request s for information, 10 Members73 volunteered 
information on 39 COVID -19-related support measures to the Secretariat, mainly relate d to 
extensions, renewals, or terminations of measures. The number of pandemic -related support 
measures introduced by governments during this review period remained low and significantly below 
the levels observed in the second, third and fourth quarters of  2020.  
3.113.   Since the outbreak  of the pandemic, at least 1,801 COVID -19-related economic support 
measures have been put in place by 113 WTO Members and 7 Observers.74 Of these, by 
mid-October  2023, 1,156 (64%) had been  communicated directly to the WTO Secretari at. More than 
half of these measures (58.2%) were introduced by G20 economies. The number of 
COVID -19-related support measures put in place since the beginning of the pandemic far exceeded 
the activity seen in the wake of the global financial crisis of 200 8-09. 
3.114.   Governments followed diverse approaches in introducing pandemic -related support to their 
economies. Measures came in the form of grants, loans or stimulus packages targeting sectors of 
the economy heavily impacted  by the pandemic as well as fiscal an d financial measures to support 
businesses and MSMEs and broader stimulus packages. Another set of support measures in response 
to the COVID -19 pandemic included various interventions by Central Banks.  
3.115.   The COVID -19-related support measures generally appea red to be  of a temporary nature. 
However, information about the time span of a measure, including its termination, is often not easily 
available as specific legislative acts rolling back support programmes entirely or partially are not 
regularly displayed on governmental websites, announced in the press, or communicated to the 
Secretariat. Therefore, providing an accurate number of terminated measures remains a difficult  
task. 
Developments in the context of the food crisis, the energy crisis, and the confli ct in 
Ukraine  
3.116.   The current review period saw several general economic support measures in response to 
the continuing interlinked crises in the energy and food sectors and because of surging inflation. 
Measures included support to specific industries and bus inesses to compensate  for increased costs 
 
73 Cambodia; Chile; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Mongolia; Montenegro; Myanmar; 
Kingdom  of Saudi Arabia; Thailand and the United  Kingdom . 
74 Azerbaijan, Belarus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Serbia.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  in the production of agricultural, food and energy products and assistance  to whole sectors of the 
economy (agriculture, food, feed and fertili zers, livestock, transport, and energy) directly affected 
by the multiple crises. The various impacts felt because of the war in Ukraine, the food crisis and 
climate -related events continued to weigh heavily on the global economy and governments 
responded with a range of measures that may affect trade directly or indire ctly. Several WTO 
Members have referred to the importance of monitoring such measures, especially in the context of 
a crisis.  
3.7  Other selected trade policy issues  
3.117.   This Section provides a brief overview of other trade policy issues where important 
development s took place during the review period . 
Discussions at the General Council of developments in relation to COVID -19, the war in 
Ukraine and the food crisis  
3.118.   The General Council has seen WTO Members engage on COVID -19-related matters  and the 
food crisis on se veral occasions during the review  period. Delegations have also referred to the war 
between the  Russian  Federation and Ukraine as part of their statements under various agenda 
items .75 At the request of the Russian Federation, the item entitled "Unilateral Trade -Restrictive 
Measures of Certain WTO Members - Statement by the Russian Federation " was taken up at the 
General Council in 6 -7 March 2023 .76 Canada and Australia circulated addend a to their respective 
communications77 concerning trade measures they have taken against imports from 
the  Russian  Federation . 
3.119.   Pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreemen t78, Ministers had  
decided that "No later than six months from the date of this Decision, Members will decide on its 
extension to cover the production and supply of COVID -19 diagnostics and therapeutics." In 
December 2022, the General Council agree d to the recommendation as  put forward by the TRIPS 
Council to extend the deadline, and the General Council agree d to revert to the matter of the duration 
of such deadline at its next meeting . An understanding emerged at the General Council meeting in 
March 2023 that  (i) this issue - of the duration of the deadline  - will remain on the General Council 
agenda; (ii) Members will provide an update on where they stand with their internal processes; and 
(iii) substantive discussions will continue in the TRIPS Council  "on its extension to  cover the 
production and supply of COVID -19 diagnostics and therapeutics ".79 This matter was discussed at 
the November meeting of the General Council. Pursuant to paragraph 6 , the General Council 
undert ook the annual review of this decision at its regular  session in July 2023.  
3.120.    Building on paragraphs 23 -24 of the Ministerial Declaration on the WTO Response to the 
COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics80, the African Group presented a 
communication81 requesting the General Council to call on the relevant  WTO bodies to identify issues 
and develop a work programme in line with th is Declaration . Likewise, India presented papers related 
to the expansion of telemedicine during the pandemic82 and how to hav e the pooling of healthcare 
resources in case of pandemics or natural disasters .83 The General Council Chairperson has also 
updated Members on pandemic response and preparedness work.84 Pursuant to paragraph 24, the 
 
75 WTO documents WT/GC/M/202 , 2 March 2023 ; WT/GC/M/203 , 25 May 2023 ; WT/GC/M/204 , 
23 June 2023; and WT/GC/M/205 , 2 October 2023 . 
76 WTO document WT/GC/M/203 , 25 May 2023 . 
77 WTO documents WT/L/1131/Add.1 , 6 February 2023 ; and WT/L/1134/Add.1 , 14 April 2023 and 
Add.2 , 6 October 2023 . 
78 The MC12 Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement of 17 June 2022 can be found in WTO 
document WT/MIN(22)/30 , WT/L/1141 , 22 June 2022 . 
79 WTO d ocuments WT/GC/M/202 , 2 March 2023 ; WT/GC/M/203 , 25 May 2023 ; and WT/GC/M/204 , 
23 June 2023 . 
80 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/31 , WT/L/1142 , 22 June 2022.  
81 "Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on the WTO Response to the Pandemic and Preparedness 
for Future Pandemics " (WT/GC/W/858 , 9 December 2022 ). 
82 "Role of Telemedicine Services in Response to the Pandemic " (WTO documents 
WT/GC/W/866  - S/C/W/426 , 24 February 2023) . 
83 "Building a Pool of Health Professionals to Respond Effectively to Pandemics/Natural Disast ers" (WTO 
documents WT/GC/W/867 – S/C/W/427 , 24 February 2023 ). 
84 WTO documents WT/GC/M/202 , 2 March 2023 ; WT/GC/M/203 , 25 May 2023 ; and WT/GC/M/204 , 
23 June 2023 . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  first stocktaking exercise  of the work b y WTO bodies took place at the regular session of the 
General  Council in July 2023 – with Members sharing their views on the matter.85 
3.121.   Members have discussed the food crisis within the context of MC13 preparations and the 
implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity86, 
where the General Council Chairperson provided updates on work that is ongoing in relevant bodies 
such as the CoA.87 During these discussions, reference was made to the Black Sea Grain Initiative 
and a call was made for a "food security and livelihood package" at MC13. At the request of 
Argentina , the Plurinational State of Bolivia , Brazil , Chile, Colombia , Costa Rica , the Dominican 
Republic , Ecuador , El Salvador , Guatemala , Honduras , Panama , Paraguay , Peru, and Uruguay , 
discussion took place on the communication entitled "Food Security through Agricultural Reform: 
Towards Agriculture Outcomes at the 13th Ministerial Conference "88 during the regular session of 
the General Council in July 2023.  In particular, the co -sponsors underscored, the importance of 
agriculture reform negotiations under Article 20 of the AoA to  ensure food security.89 A session on 
"Agriculture including Food Security" was held at the Senior Officials Meeting on 23 -24 Octob er 
2023.90 
3.122.   At the General Council meeting on 1 November, under Other Business, statements were 
made concerning the European Deforestation Regulation (EUDR ). 
Aid for Trade  
3.123.   The Aid -for-Trade (AfT) initiative was launched  at 2005 Ministerial Conference . The r ecent 
trends in  AfT flows, show that AfT disbursements totalled USD  47.8 billion in 20 21, down  4.7% from 
the previous year  but up 120.5% since the launch of the Initiative (Chart 3.16). Economic 
infrastructure accounted for 49% of total AfT support , with 4 8% going to building productive capacity 
and 3% to trade policy and regulations.  Africa and Asia remained the largest beneficiaries 
(Chart  3.17).  
Chart 3.16 Aid-for-Trade commitments and disbursements by income group  
(USD billion, 2021 constant prices)  
 
Source:  OECD -CRS (Creditor Reporting System).  
 
85 WTO documents WT/GC/M/205 , 2 October 2023 ; and JOB/GC/352 , 25 July 2023 . 
86 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/28 , WT/L/1139 , 22 June 2022.  
87 WTO documents WT/GC/M/203 , 25 May 2023 ; WT/GC/M/204 , 23 June 2023 ; and WT/GC/M/205 , 
2 October 2023 . 
88 WTO document WT/GC/W/893 , 13 July 2023 . 
89 WTO document WT/GC/M/205 , 2 October 2023 . 
90 WTO documents JOB/GC/358  - JOB/TNC/114 , 11 October 2023 ; and JOB/GC/357  – JOB/TNC/113 , 
11 October 2023 . 
5.56.57.58.99.5 10.0 9.911.2 10.712.011.113.514.6 15.0 14.613.57.59.911.913.013.9 13.612.518.8
14.719.6
16.120.622.0
17.920.5
18.7
21.623.727.030.333.637.238.541.143.345.644.448.5 49.149.7 50.1
47.8
28.331.441.542.345.0 44.753.456.655.562.0
56.963.8
60.8
57.567.1
52.5
01020304050607080
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Disbursements to LDCs Commitments to LDCs
Disbursements to all countries Commitments to all countriesChart AfT.1 Aid-for-Trade commitments and disbursements by income group, 2006 -21WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 53 - 
 
  Chart 3.17 Aid-for-Trade disbursements by continent  
(USD billion, 2021 constant prices)  
 
Source:  OECD -CRS (Creditor Reporting System).  
3.124.   In addition to monitoring AfT  flows, the WTO and OECD Secretariats are launching a new 
AfT Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) exercise. The exercise has four primary objectives: (i) 
gathering information on the evolving supply side and trade -related infrastructure constraints faced 
by de veloping countries, with a particular focus on the LDCs; (ii) understanding the provision of Aid -
for-Trade support by development partners and how this support aligns with the priority needs of 
developing countries; (iii) assessing the impact and outcomes of AfT support; and (iv) identifying 
and addressing the future needs of A fT support . It also seeks to promote policy coherence by 
examining how trade is integrated into national strategies , with a focus on how it can contribute to 
critical t hematic areas f or developing countries, such as food security, sustainable development, and 
digital connectivity . This M&E exercise is a key input deliverable for the 9th Global Review of Aid for 
Trade scheduled for 26 -28 June 2024 . The Global Review forms the centrepiec e of the 202 3-2024 
AfT Work Programme, themed " Partnerships for Mainstreaming Trade ".  
Committee on Import Licensing  
3.125.   At the 31 October  2023 meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing91, nine recurring  and 
one new  trade concerns were raised. Four concerns  were raised regarding Indonesia's Commodity 
Balancing Mechanism , import licensing regime for certain textile products , compulsory registration 
by importer of steel products , and import restriction s on air conditioners. Additionally, Members 
express ed concerns regarding Angola's import licensing requirements, Dominican  Republic 's new 
import licensing system , Egypt's import licensing  requirements for certain agricultural and processed 
products , India's importation of pneumatic tyres, and Thailand's importation of wheat feed.  
Furthermore, a new concern was raised regarding  India's import licensing measures on PCs, tablets, 
and other electronic products . 
Committee on Market Access  
3.126.   At the 18 -19 Oct ober 2022 meeting92 of the Committee on Market Access (CMA), 34 trade 
concerns were raised, of which 17 were new. The new trade concerns covered a broad range of trade 
policy measures, such as (i) unilateral measures adopted by Members in response to the war in 
Ukraine; (ii)  unilateral environmental measures with a trade impact; (iii) alleged inconsistency with 
specific WTO Agreements (Anti -Dumping Agreement, TRIMS); (iv) market access prohibitions for 
5G equipment; (v)  internal measures on some food produc ts; and (vi) tariff and non -tariff measures 
on a wide range of products.  
 
91 WTO document G/LIC/M/57  (forthcoming).  
92 WTO document G/MA/M/77 , 28 March  2023. 
0510152025
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania
2006-2009 2010-2013 2014-2017 2018-2021WTO_AfT.2   Aid -for-Trade disbursements by continent
(USD billion. 2021 constant prices)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 54 - 
 
  3.127.   Concerns were raised on measures by Angola (1); Australia (2); Canada (1); China (3); 
Dominican Republic (1); Egypt (1); the European  Union (5); India (5); Indonesia (2); Mexico (1);  
Nepal (1); Peru (1); the Philippines (1); Sri Lanka (1); Chinese Taipei (1); the United States (4); 
and Viet Nam (1). One concern was also raised on a measure adopted by the following Members as 
a group: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain , the United Arab Emirates, 
the State  of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar; and one concern on measures implemented by Australia, 
Canada, the  European  Union, Japan, New  Zealand, Switzerland, the United  Kingdom, and 
the United  States .  
3.128.   At the formal CMA meetings of 2 6-27 April93 and 16 -17 October 202394, the Committee 
continued to consider an increasing number of trade concerns. A total of 36 trade concerns were 
raised in 2023, of which 12 were new as compared to 2022. A growing number of concerns related 
to increased  political tensions and/or unilateral environmental measures. Trade concerns covered 
measures by Angola (1); Australia (2); Canada (1); China (4); Dominican Republic (1); the 
European  Union (4); India (7); Indonesia (2); Mexico (1); Nepal (1); Peru (1); Sr i Lanka (1); 
Thailand (1); Chinese Taipei (1); Türkiye (1); and the United States (4). One concern was also raised 
on a measure adopted by the following Members as a group: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom 
of Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, the State of  Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar; on one measure 
implemented by China; Hong Kong, China; and Macao, China ; and on e measure adopted by Japan 
the Netherlands and the United States . 
3.129.   During the review period, the CMA took note of three QR notifications from Australia (WTO 
document G/MA/QR/N/AUS/6/ADD.1 , 27 April 2023 ), the  United  Kingdom (WTO document  
G/MA/QR/N/GBR/2/ADD.2 , 12 June 2023),  and the  United  States (WTO document  
G/MA/QR/N/USA/6 , 10 October 2022), which conta ined import and/or export restrictions and 
prohibitions against the Russian Federation on the ground s of national security. The Committee also 
considered four QR notifications from Ukraine on export restrictions on sugar products , coking coal 
and fuel oil (WTO document s G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ADD.5 , 8 May 2023; G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ADD.6 , 8 
June 2023; G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ADD.7 , 20 July 2023; and G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ADD.8 , 25 September 
2023) . Eight Mem bers (Australia, Canada, the European  Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Switzerland, the United States and the United  Kingdom) took the floor to express support for 
Ukraine. The Russian Federation took the floor twice and recalled the Terms of Reference of the 
CMA.  
Council for Trade in Goods  
3.130.   At the 24 -25 November  2022 meeting95 of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG), 45 trade 
concerns were raised, the highest number of trade con cerns ever raised at a single meeting of the 
CTG. This number has more than doubled since 2019. Concerns were raised on measures by 
Australia (2) ; China (7) ; Egypt (2) ; the European  Union  (11); India (4) ; Indonesia (2) ; Mexico (1) ; 
Nigeria (1) ; Pakistan (1 ); Panama (1)  and the Philippines (1) . One concern was also raised by the 
following Members as a group: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
the United  Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar; and on one measure implemented 
by Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. Concerns were also raised on measures by the United Kingdom (2); 
the United States (7); and Viet Nam (1). Of the 45 trade concerns, 9 related to political tensions 
between China and the United States, and 7 to unilateral environmental measures with a trade 
impact.  
3.131.   At the 3 -4 April 2023 CTG meeting96, 41 trade concerns were raised, most related to 
increased political tensions and/or unilateral environmental measures. Trade concerns  concerned 
measures by Australia (1), China (7), Egypt (2), the European  Union  (9), India (5), Indonesia (2), 
Mexico (1), Nepal (1), Pakistan (1), Panama (1), the United  Kingdom  (2), the  United  States  (7) and 
on one measure implemented by the following Members  as a group : Australia, Canada, 
the European  Union , Japan, New  Zealand, Switzerland, the United  Kingdom , and the United  States . 
 
93 WTO document G/MA/M/78 , 15 September  2023.  
94 WTO document G/MA/M/79 , (forthcoming) . 
95 WTO document G/C/M/144 , 10 March  2023. 
96 WTO document G/C/M /145, 22 May 2023. WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  A concern was also raised by the following Members as a group: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar.  
3.132.   At the 6-7 July 2023 CTG meeting97, 37 trade concerns were ra ised, all of which had been 
previously raised and related to increased political tensions and/or unilateral environmental 
measures.  
Dispute settlement  
3.133.   Measures taken by a WTO Member can be the subject of dispute settlement proceedings 
when a nother  Member  believes that such measures violat e an agreement , or a commitment made 
in the WTO.98 As shown in Chart 3.18, the number of disputes initiated has fluctuated over the years 
with a significant slowdown since 2019. Between October 2022 and October 2023 (the r eview 
period), Members initiated seven new disputes, six of which were filed between January and October 
2023. In addition, the WTO dispute settlement system continued to deal with proceedings that were 
initiated between 2018 and early 2022. At the end of September 2023, panel proceedings in 
13 disputes and 1 arbitration under Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) on 
the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations were ongoing.  
3.134.   The subject matter of the new disputes initiate d during the review period spanned a range 
of issues covered under the GATT  1994,  the GATS,  the TRIPS Agreement, the Agreement on 
Agriculture,  the TRIMS Agreement, the Anti -Dumping Agreement , and the SCM  Agreement. As in 
previous years, both developed and developing Members were involved in dispute settlement 
proceedings, as complainants, respondents , or third parties.   
3.135.   During the review period, panels circulated reports in 15 disputes. In nine of these d isputes, 
the panel reports were appealed. Currently, these appeals cannot be considered, as in the absence 
of consensus among WTO Members to launch the selection process for Appellate Body members, all 
seven positions on the Appellate Body remain vacant.  
Chart 3.18 Disputes initiated, 1995 to September 2023  
 
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to September .  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.136.   In the absence of a functioning Appellate Body, WTO Members have resorted to o ther means 
to ensure effective resolution of disputes. Since the beginning of 2020, parties to 13 disputes have 
 
97 WTO document G/C/M/146 , 17 September  2023. 
98 Measures can also be challenged through dispute settlement proceedings if they nullify or impair 
benefits accruing to a Member under a WTO agreement, even without a violation.  
253950
41
3034
2337
26
19
1220
1319
1417
827
20
1413171738
20
598
6
0102030405060
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
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2021
2022
2023Chart XX -Disputes initiated, 1995 to September 2023
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to September.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  agreed to an alternative appeal mechanism based on arbitration proceedings under Article 25 of the 
DSU. One such appeal arbitration award was is sued during the review period. In addition , during the 
same period, the Dispute Settlement Body  (DSB) adopted panel reports in two disputes as none of 
the parties opted to appeal them.  Finally, in eight disputes, Members reached mutually agreed 
solutions that were notified to the DSB during the review period (Chart 3.19). 
Chart 3.19 Outcomes of panel proceedings, 2020 to September2023  
 
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to September . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Electronic commerce  
3.137.   Work under the Work Programme on e -commerce has intensified pursuant to the MC12 
Decision, which called for the reinvigoration of the Work Programme with particular emphasis on its 
development dimension. The Decision also r equested Members to intensify discussions on the scope, 
definition, and impact of the moratorium. Pursuant to that Decision, from January until September 
2023, eight dedicated discussions were held during which Members shared national and regional 
experien ces on several identified topics . The focus of the dedicated discussions was specifically on 
consumer protection ; digital divide ; legal and regulatory frameworks ; the moratorium on the 
imposition of customs duties on electronic transmissions ; digital trade  facilitation and facilitation of 
electronic transactions; digital industriali zation; and e -commerce related technology transfer . 
3.138.   Two of the dedicated discussions focused on the moratorium. Several delegations have 
circulated submissions as inputs to the d edicated discussions. In sharing views on what the WTO 
could do in these areas either on its own or in coordination with other organizations, many have 
highlighted the need for the WTO to use its convening power to bring together relevant 
intergovernmental  organizations (IGOs) working on e -commerce matters. In that regard, a 
workshop with IGOs was held on 1 and 2 June 2023  and focused on issues discussed in the first 
quarter of the year , i.e.  consumer protection, digital divide, the moratorium, and legal an d 
regulatory frameworks. The E -commerce Work Programme and Moratorium have also been 
discussed in all regular sessions of the General Council and the facilitator has made regular reports. 
In terms of the way forward, thematic sessions were concluded in Sep tember. From October, t he 
discussions will focus on identifying areas of convergence that could enable Members to develop 
possible outcomes and recommendations for MC13 with respect to the Work Programme and the 
moratorium.   
3.139.   Under the Joint Statement Initiative on E -commerce, the now 89 participants are 
accelerating work towards a substantial conclusion by the end of 2023. In that regard, there has 
been re -engagement on core issues, some of which had not been discussed for som e time, including 
024681012141618
2020 2021 2022 2023
Mutually agreed solutions/complaints withdrawn
Panel reports appealed
Panel reports subjecto to appeal arbitration under Article 25 DSU
Panel reports adopted with no appealChart YY -Outcomes of panel proceedings, 2020 to September 2023
Note:  Data for 2023 cover January to September.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  data flows and data localization, source code, and development. A revised consolidated text was 
issued in August 2023 reflecting progress made. To date, participants have reached convergence on 
12 articles, including open government data,  consumer protection, spam, e -signatures and e 
authentication, e -contracts, transparency, cybersecurity, open Internet access, paperless trading, 
electronic transactions frameworks, e -invoicing, and single windows. Small group discussions are 
active on pri vacy, data flows and data localization, Information, Communications, and Technology 
(ICT) products that use cryptography, telecommunications, development, and source code.  
3.140.   The following box on the implications of regulatory differences for digital trade ha s been 
contributed  by the Digital Policy Alert (DPA).  
Box 3.3 The implications of regulatory differences for digital trade: A global perspective  
Digital goods and services are important contributors to the post -pandemic recovery and to long -term growth. 
However, certain domestic regulatory choices impair the digital  economy 's potential by contributing to the 
fragmentation of the global internet. Restrictions on cross -border data flows and localisation requirements are 
held by some as roadblocks to digital trade. This emergent regulatory heterogeneity contributes to d igital 
fragmentation.  
Domestic regulatory choices can have cross -border spillovers as exporters of digital goods and services must 
comply with multiple regulatory regimes. Significant misalignment between regulatory environments 
influences market entry or exit decisions and reduces digital trade. To square the right to regulate with 
maximal international openness, regulators aim to build "interoperability " bridges between distinct domestic 
regulatory environments. The intensifying regulatory activity around  the digital economy worldwide raises the 
need for a common factual base to understand regulatory differences and to develop alignment processes 
that advance interoperability.  
The Digital Policy Alert (DPA), by systematically tracking governmental websites  for regulatory activity 
affecting the digital economy, has created a publicly available  inventory  that includes documents over 4,500 
legislative or regulatory developments  since 1 January 2020. The DPA monitors  binding regulation, compliance 
guidance, and enforcement actions with a focus on just under 50 of the world 's largest economies. To create 
a comprehensive description of the regulatory environment, the DPA collection covers all government 
branches, an ext ensive range of policy areas including data governance, content moderation, competition and 
taxation affecting the digital economy. Daily updates facilitate early stakeholder engagement as the DPA 
tracks regulatory developments across their entire lifecycl e, starting as soon as the first official drafts become 
available.  
In terms of discriminatory measures, the DPA database records 51 public procurement access restrictions 
related to digital goods and services, including business software and recreational applications. Since 
1 January 2020, 31 new data localisation requirements have been recorded, adding to a legacy stock of such 
obligations. Similarly frequent are local operation mandates, including content moderation or data privacy 
contact points. Furthe rmore, over a dozen distinct local content stipulations mandating quotas for domestically 
produced media or investment obligations in local content production were identified.  
Discriminatory measures are not limited to data  Instances since 1 January 2020  
Public procurement measures  51 
Data localisation requirements  31 
Local operation requirements  27 
Local content requirements  11 
Investment in local content obligations  5 
On non -discriminatory measures, data protection regulation is the most frequently deployed policy instrument 
recorded since 1 January 2020. Out of the 772 measures recorded, 489 are binding regulations and 283 
compliance guidance documents. The high priority assigned to protecting personal data is further illustrated 
by the f requency of measures mandating cybersecurity requirements (363) as well as conditions for 
cross-border data transfers (132). Online safety is a second salient policy objective: 295 measures demand 
online content moderation, while 137 measures require the p rotection of online consumers. Thirdly, 
governments emphasise the formalisation of digital business operations, as evidenced by the frequency of 
business registration requirements (88) and operational licence requirements (86). Governmental 
authorisation r equirements for specific goods and services are even more common (123). Novel algorithm 
design rules accompany the recent rise of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Notably, of the total 113 
measures, over half are compliance guidance documents, suggest ing that governments approach this novel 
regulatory object with caution.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  New regulatory measures and compliance guidance by policy instrument  
 
Source:  Digital Policy Alert, 21 October 2023.  
The regulatory landscape is evolving at varying speeds across different sectors. While a significant portion of 
recent policy advancements apply to all sectors (915), certain state measures affect distinct segments of the 
digital economy. User -generated content platforms are subject to 396 new measures, encomp assing content 
moderation mandates, particular data protection obligations, and provisions for minor safety. Digital payment 
providers are navigating 257 regulatory modifications, which include service authorisation stipulations, 
operational licensing requ irements, and online consumer protection measures. A noticeable trend is the 
increase in regulatory developments relating to AI, with 135 measures targeting AI developers, including data 
protection regulation and algorithm design requirements. In addition,  e-commerce platforms and online 
advertising services feature prominently among the digital economy activities coming under regulatory focus.  
Regulatory heterogeneity is advancing in parallel with increasing regulatory activity. For instance, domestic 
data protection regulators exhibit varied approaches toward lawful personal data processing but not every 
jurisdiction mandates a formal legal basis for data processing. Among those that do, there is a spectrum of 
what legal bases are recognised, such as indiv idual consent, contractual necessity, or the legitimate interest 
of the processor. Furthermore, within each of these legal bases, the definitions and requisites diverge on what 
qualifies as valid consent, what processing is deemed necessary for a contract,  and under which circumstances 
data processors possess legitimate interests. Such variance also exists in other digital policy realms, including 
the classifications of harmful online content or the emerging risk categories for AI applications.  
Regulatory i nteroperability, aiming to mitigate regulatory heterogeneity, is within reach through international 
cooperation. Numerous recent initiatives have sought to ease data flows, employing mechanisms such as 
internationally recognised certification and by inter -governmental agreements. Lately, domestic regulators 
are proactively coordinating their work on emerging AI frameworks. Besides a willingness to cooperate, 
domestic policymakers need transparency to learn from each other and craft interoperable policies. A ctive 
discussions among WTO Members on digital trade issues, the Joint Statement Initiative on E -commerce and 
deliberations on the Moratorium of Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions, contribute to forming a 
collaborative international environment and  remove roadblocks for digital trade. In the Trade Policy Review 
mechanism, WTO Members have already started to voluntarily document domestic digital policy 
developments. Further information -sharing regarding policies which affect digital market access, es pecially 
policies that raise the cost of foreign digital service delivery, is possible. Deliberating over a common factual 
base to find interoperable solutions is crucial to mitigating fragmentation and realising the digital economy's 
potential to generate  inclusive economic outcomes.  
Source:  Digital Policy Alert .  
Fisheries subsidies  
3.141.   Work on achieving comprehensive disciplines on fisheries subsidies intensified following the 
adoption in June 2022 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies at WTO MC12. Pursua nt to a request 
made by Members during an October 2022 brainstorming retreat on the substance and process of 
further negotiations on the issues that were not resolved at MC12 (in particular, subsidies 
contributing to overcapacity and overfishing and relate d special and differential treatment 
provisions), the Secretariat held two technical workshops. The first, in November 2022, addressed 
implementation of the Agreement and the evolution of the outstanding issues; and the second, in 
January 2023, addressed d ata on the state of fisheries resources and on fisheries subsidies.  
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800Operational license requirementBusiness registration requirementDirect taxes incl. digital service taxesAlgorithm design requirementsAuthorisation of goods or servicesCross-border data transfer regulationConsumer protection regulationContent moderation regulationCybersecurity regulationData protection regulationNew Regulatory Measures and Compliance Guidance by Policy Instrument
binding regulation compliance guidance
Source:   Digital Policy Alert, 21 October 2023WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  3.142.   Upon the appointment in February  2023 of the new Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules 
(NGR), the NGR adopted a work programme comprising a series of week -long clusters of meetings 
(so-called Fish Weeks) scheduled between March and December 2023 for the negotiations on 
outstanding issues. On the basis of this work programme, Members are working to reach agreement 
on new disciplines by December, for adoption at MC13.  
3.143.   The Fish Weeks held between March and July began with conceptual discussions and then 
progressed to discussion of specific textual proposals  submitted by Members. On 4 September, the 
Chair circulated a starting point text of draft disciplines on outstanding issues , drawing on  the 
previous negotiating texts99 and proposals from Members. In plenary meetings of the NGR in the 
September and October Fish Weeks, Members shared their reactions to the text, and  made textual 
suggestions for amending it.  
3.144.   Members have engaged in complementary workstreams as well. First, in addition to plenary 
sessions focused on the text, the NGR has held two interactive thematic discussions in October, 
aimed at deepening Members' understanding of specific technical issues in the draft text. Second, 
in parallel with the negotiating meetings of the NGR , Members have launched a technical workstream 
to develop the documents, procedures, and practices to be used by the Committee on Fisheries 
Subsidies upon the entry into force o f the current Agreement.  As of 27 October 2023, 52  WTO 
Members have accepted the Agreement100 representing  about 48% of the two  thirds of 
WTO Members required for the Agreement to enter into force.  
3.145.   The WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism ( so-called Fish Fund, o r Fund) was established in 
November 2022 to assist developing and LDC Members in implementing the Agreement. The Fund 
aims to become fully operational as soon as possible  and as of mid -October 2023  the Fund has 
received contributions amounting to CHF 7.3 m illion and commitments (signed agreements) of over 
CHF 2  million, a s well as pledges amounting to almost CHF 2  million. Donors that have either 
contributed or committed funds to the Fish Fund include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden.  
Government procurement  
3.146.   The plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 2012 (GPA 2012) is an 
important instrument for keeping GPA Parties' government procurement markets open and 
safeguarding their good governance in their government procurement markets. Currently, the 
GPA 2012 has 21 Parties, covering 48 WTO Members101 and there are 36 observers to the Committee 
on Government Procurement (CGP).  
3.147.   During the review period , there were significant positive developments with regard to 
accessions to the GPA 2012. First, following a decision adopted by the CGP on the terms of accession 
of North Macedonia, North Macedonia deposited its instrument of accession  and will therefore soon 
become the 22nd Party to the GPA 2012 and the 49th WTO Member to be covered by it . Second,  
Albania formally reactivated its accession process and has already taken steps to move the accession 
negotiations  forward . Third,  Costa Rica submitted its appli cation to accede to the GPA 2012 and is 
preparing technical documents to start the negotiations.  
3.148.   The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) became an international 
intergovernmental organization observer to the CGP. The EBRD runs a techni cal assistance facility 
and programme to support WTO Members in assessing the benefits of joining the GPA 2012 and 
negotiating accession to it.  
 
99 WTO documents WT/MIN(21)/W/5 , 24 November 2021 ; and WT/MIN(22)/W/20 , 20 June 2022, both 
referred to in the Ministerial Decision adopting the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (WT/MIN(22)/33, 
17 June 2022).  
100 In order of r eceipt: Switzerland; Singapore; Seychelles; the United States; Canada; Iceland; 
the United Arab Emirates; the European Union for its 27 member States; Nigeria; Belize; China; Japan; Gabon; 
Peru; Ukraine; Hong Kong, China; New Zealand; Macao, China; Albania ; Australia; Botswana; Cote d'Ivoire; 
Cuba; Republic of Korea; Saint Lucia; and Fiji. 
101 The European Union and its 27 member States are covered by the Agreement as one Party.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Micro, small and medium -sized  enterprises  (MSME s) 
3.149.   The MSME Informal Working Group was l aunched by 88 WTO Member s at MC11 in December 
2017 as an inclusive group with the shared objective to improve MSME trade access. Participation 
grew to  98 Members in  2023. 
3.150.   During the review period, the  Group proceeded with its revised work programme based on 
five pil lars (1) promo ting MSME access to information ; (2) building MSME trade capacity ; 
(3) providing policy guidance ; (4) implementing the December 2020 package102; and 
(5) strengthening engagement with the private sector. Topics under discussion by the Group include 
MSME cyber readiness ; fostering trade digitalization through wider use of standards and encouraging 
adoption of UNCITRAL's model law on electronic transferable r ecords  (MLETR) ; low-value shipments; 
sustainability; informality; and MSME provisions in regional trade agreements . 
3.151.   The Group release d a revamped version of the  Trade4MSMEs website  together with The 
Trade Game on MSME Day 2023 . Trade4MSMEs  is an online res ource which aggregat es trade 
information for MSMEs and policymakers  with new country pages, improved searchability and 
updated visuals. The Trade Game, a joint undertaking with the Institute of Exports and International 
Trade (IOE&IT), is a "choose your ow n adventure" online export readiness tool to help players 
understand trade decisions.  
3.152.   Preparations for MC13 are under way. The Group will issue two handbooks based on the 
Trade4MSMEs Business and Policymaker guides; a joint compendium on A ccess to Finance  for 
Women -led MSMEs; and a compendium on national Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) MSME 
support program mes. The Group held a second Trade4MSMEs Network meeting with nine 
international organizations103; awarded winners in the  third ICC-ITC-WTO MSME Group Small 
Business Champions competition with the theme "helping smallholder farmers go global ; and 
concluded a call for academic papers on MSME provisions in regional trade agreements . 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs)  
3.153.   During the review period, WTO Members notified 10 RTAs ( 15 notifications) compared to 
11 RTAs ( 17 notifications)  during the previous period . Of the se RTAs, five include trade liberalization 
in both goods and services; two relate to trade in goods only, while for the  remaining three  RTAs, 
trade liberalization in services was added to complement agreements in trade in goods already  in 
place among the parties.104 
3.154.   As at 15 October  2023, the total number of RTAs notified to the WTO, and to the GATT 
before it , and currently  in force, amounted to 361 (194 covering  goods and services, 165 goods  
only, and 2  services only). The WTO Secretariat  has also identified and verified, through the 
respective parties, 56 RTAs that are in force, but have not yet been notified to the WTO.105  
3.155.   Based on notifications, RTA activity remains strongest in Europe (26% of RTAs in force), 
with successive EU enlargements, the United Kingdom's new agreements following its withdrawal 
from the European Union and agreements with trading partners in Eastern  Europe and around the 
Mediterranean basin, as well as RTAs notified by EFTA; this is followed by East Asia (16%) and 
South  America (11%) (Chart  3.20).  
 
102 WTO documents INF/MSME/4/Rev.1 , 18 March 2021 ; and INF/MSME/4/Rev.2 , 6 October 2021.  
103 WTO document INF/MSME/W/44 , 31 July 2023.  
104 The WTO RTA Database (viewed at: http://rtais.wto.org ) provides updated information on all RTA  
notifications submitted by WTO Members . 
105 WTO document WT/REG/W/181 , 14 September 2023 . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Chart 3.20 RTAs in force, by region  
 
 
a Commonwealth of Independent States, including certain associate and former member States.  
Note:  RTAs involving countries/territories in two (or more) regions are counted more than once.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.156.   The WTO Members  with the most RTAs in force are the European Union, the United Kingdom, 
the EFTA States, Chile,  and Singapore , with over 25 RTAs in force each, followed by Türkiye, Mexico , 
Peru, and the Republic of Korea , which have over 20  RTAs in force e ach. A number of other 
developing countries also have several RTAs in force, such as India , Malaysia,  and Panama . 
3.157.   Over the years, RTAs have become more complex, and many currently include provisions 
that go beyond market access in goods and services. Of 34 7 RTAs notified to the WTO and currently 
in force, the vast majority include dispute settlement mechanisms, followed by provisions related to 
trade in goods such as technical regulations, standards, and TBT and SPS measures. Other provisions 
frequently fou nd in RTAs include intellectual property rights and government procurement. More 
recent RTAs also include provisions on which there are few or no WTO rules, including competition, 
environment, labour, and SMEs (Chart 3.21).  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160EuropeEast AsiaSouth AmericaNorth AmericaAfricaCIS aCentral AmericaMiddle EastOceaniaWest AsiaCaribbean
Intra-Regional RTAs in force Cross-Regional RTAs in forceWTO_RTA.1 -RTAs in force, by region
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Note:  RTAs involving countries/territories in two (or more) regions are counted more than once.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 62 - 
 
  Chart 3.21 Key provisions in RTAs  
 
Note:  Figures are based on 347 RTAs (out of 361) notified to the WTO and currently in force.  For more 
details on these provisions , see: http://rtais.wto.org/ . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.158.   New initiatives or agreements which focus on regulatory rather than market access 
provisions have become features of the global preferential trade landscape. The digital e conomy 
partnership agreement (DEPA), bilateral digital economy agreements (DEAs) and bilateral 
environmental agreements are but a few examples. The DEPA, originally signed by three partners 
(Chile, New Zealand and Singapore) and in force since January 2021 , and which goes beyond the 
digital trade provisions in recent RTAs, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, to which all three are party) , has set up accession working groups 
for Canada and China.106 It inc ludes provisions on the adoption and use of technology  to facilitate 
trade, including through paperless trading and legal frameworks based on international models and 
confirms the WTO moratorium on customs duties; data issues, such as the protection of per sonal 
information, cross -border transfer of information electronically and location of computing facilities; 
issues related to safety such as cybersecurity  and consumer protection; and cooperation on SMEs 
and digital inclusion. DEAs are currently in force for Singapore with three other parties: Australia, 
the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. They aim to align digital rules and standards and 
facilitate interoperability between digital systems; support cross -border data flows and consumer 
rights; an d encourage cooperation in emerging areas such as digital identities, artificial intelligence, 
and data innovation.107 DEAs have also been signed by other WTO  Members; for example, the digital 
trade agreement between the United States and Japan was signed i n October 2019. This agreement 
prohibits certain taxes on digital products, disallows data localization measures, and guarantees 
consumer privacy protection.  
3.159.   There are also other types of bilateral agreements such as mutual recognition agreements 
(MRAs), w hich by recognizing the other party's technical standards or qualifications, provide better 
treatment than that provided on a multilateral basis; agreements  on intellectual property rights or 
 
106 An exchange of side letters between the Parties indicates that nothing in the DEPA  will derogate from 
commitments under their RTAs: New Zealand -Singapore FTA, the ASEAN -Australia -New Zealand FTA, and the 
Trans -Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement  and the CPTPP (both including all three Parties).  
107 Singapore Ministry of Trade  and Industry. Viewed  at: https://www.mti.gov.sg/Trade/Digital -
Economy -Agreements . 
27%84%87%66%51%95%65%72%71%59%35%35%53%23%59%27%
All tariffs eliminated by at least one PartySanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS)Technical regulations, standards, technical barriers
to trade (TBT)ServicesInvestment Liberalization ProvisionsDispute Settlement (DS)Government procurementIntellectual property rightsCompetitionEnvironmentLabourE-CommerceSmall and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)Subsidies (Services)Subsidies (Goods)GenderWTO_RTA.2 -Key provisions in RTAs
Source:    WTO Secretariat.Note:    Figures are based on 347 RTAs (out of 361) notified to the WTO and currently in force. For more 
details on these provisions: http://rtais.wto.org/WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 63 - 
 
  the environment; or agreements on investment. Information on man y of these agreements is not 
easily available.  
3.160.   Other plurilateral initiatives have also emerged such as the Indo -Pacific Economic Framework 
for Prosperity (IPEF) , which was launched in May 2022 by 13 partners.108 Discussions are taking 
place under four broa d pillars  - trade, supply chains, clean economy and fair economy  - and aim to 
reach agreement by the end of 2023.109 The America's Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP ), 
announced in June 2022, aims for discussions to try and reduce economic inequality, foster regional 
economic integration and employment, and restore faith in democracy. While RTA networks continue 
to expand, the growth of such regulatory agreements and discussions suggest that the global trade 
landscape is evolving and there is a need to better understand the implications of such agreements 
on the multilateral trading system.  
Committee on Rules of Origin  
3.161.   Since mid -October 2022 no specific trade concerns have been raised at the Committee on 
Rules of Origin. Members have continued to actively engage in discussions about specific aspects of 
preferential rules of origin and how such rules impact the ability of LDCs to utilize non -reciprocal 
trade preferences.  
State trade enterprises (STEs ) and trade -related investment measures  (TRIMs ) 
3.162.   At the 21  October  2022 and 28  April 2023 meetings of the Working Party on State Trade 
Enterprises (STEs)110, trade concerns were raised on STEs -related policies and measures by 
Australia  (1), China (3), Costa  Rica (1), India  (2), New  Zealand (1), Panama (1), the 
Russian  Federation  (2) and Thailand (2). At the 20 October 2023 STEs meeting111, trade concerns 
were raised on STEs-related policies , measures , and outstanding notifications by China (2), 
India (1), Mexico (1), Viet Nam (1) and the Russian Federation (1). At all three meetings the low 
level of compliance with notification obligations was also raised  by some Members.  
3.163.   During the review period , at the 23  February  2023 and 12 October 2023 meeting s of the 
TRIMs  Committee112, issues and trade concerns were raised on measures implemented by China (2), 
India (1) , Indonesia (3)  and Kazakhstan (1) . 
Committee on Trade and Development  
3.164.   At the meeting of the Committee on Trade and Development  (CTD) held on 17 November 
2022113, discussion continued on the communication from India and South Africa titled "Global 
Electronic Commerce for Inclusive Development" .114 This communication states, inter alia, that the 
digital divide between developed and developing countries is a matter of considerable concern, and 
that the existing e -commerce moratorium on electronic transmissions limits the ability of dev eloping 
countries to impose tariffs on the growing imports of electronic transmissions . A revised version of 
the document, which builds on the original communication, was considered at the CTD meetings of 
5 April 2023115 and 11 July 2023 .116 At these meeting s, developing Members  also raised concerns 
with the negative impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on their trade and economies. Suggestions 
were made on possible work that the CTD could do in the context of the MC12 Ministerial Declaration 
on the WTO response t o the pandemic and preparedness for future pandemic.117 A communication 
from the United States titled "Responding to the COVID -19 Pandemic and Supporting Resiliency"118 
was considered . The meetings of 5 April and 11 July 2023 additionally allowed for the con sideration 
of communications from the African Group under the theme of policy space for industrial 
 
108 Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, the United States and Viet Nam.  
109 India has opted out of the discussions on the Trade Pillar.  
110 WTO documents G/STR/M/41 , 22 December  2022; and G/STR/M/42 , 26 May 2023 . 
111 WTO document G/STR/M/43  (forthcoming) . 
112 WTO document s G/TRIMS/M/53 , 3 April 2023; and G/TRIMS/M/54  (forthcoming) . 
113 WTO document WT/COMTD/M/119 , 15 March 2023. 
114 WTO document WT/COMTD/W/264 , 9 November 2021.  
115 WTO document WT/COMTD/M/120 , 21 June 2023 . 
116 WTO document WT/COMTD/M/121 , 3 August 2023.  
117 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/31  - WT/L/1142 , 22 June 2022 . 
118 WTO document WT/COMTD/W/268 , 21 September 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  development.119 These communications , expressed concerns with the trade and economic situation 
of many developing country Members  and called for a rebalancing of trade rules to address the 
matter.  
3.165.   At the meeting of the CTD's Dedicated Session on Small Economies of 30 March 2023120, 
discussion began on the topic of "integrating small economies into the post COVID -19 economy: 
effects o f the pandemic, challenges and opportunities".121 A background note by the Secretariat on 
this topic was considered.122 Members of the Small, Vulnerable Economies ( SVE) Group highlighted 
the challenges their economies have faced since the COVID -19 pandemic , which have exacerbated 
many longstanding difficulties and vulnerabilities.  Discussions continued at the 19 October 2023 
meeting of the Dedicated Session123 with a focus on the challenges and opportunities for small 
economies in the post -COVID -19 recovery ph ase. Presentations were made by several  international 
organizations and some Members of the SVE Group . 
Trade and environment  
3.166.   At MC12, Ministers highlighted  the importance of the Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE) as a standing forum dedicated to dial ogue on the relationship between trade measures and 
environmental measures. This gave new impetus to environment -related discussions in the WTO. 
Since then, the CTE held three regular meetings, and its third124 and fourth125 Trade and Environment 
Weeks , and it continued to focus on important global issues, including the circular economy and 
plastics pollution, trade and climate change, and biodiversity. The March and July 2023 CTE meetings 
also discussed possible CTE contributions to MC13 and how to revi talize the work of the CTE with 
inputs from several delegations.126  
3.167.   Other briefings included topics such as the preparations for COP28  which, for the first time, 
would include a dedicated "Trade Day". In parallel, the WTO Secretariat also worked with vario us 
stakeholders, including the OECD (for the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches 
(IFCMA)), the World Bank and the World Economic Forum (jointly launching the "Action on Climate 
and Trade Initiative" (ACT)), the TRADE Hub (for a series of webina rs on trade and biodiversity), 
and the steel industry (for the first WTO forum on decarbonization standards127). 
3.168.   Some WTO Members continued their work through other platforms. For example, in July  
2023, the third meeting of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR)128 took place , deepening 
discussions on key areas where the WTO could contribute  to efforts to advance reform, both in the 
run-up to MC13 and beyond. The Trade and Environmental Sustainabilit y Structured  Discussions 
(TESSD )129 held a high -level stocktaking event in December 2022 and its four informal working 
groups made progress on possible outcomes for MC13, including on a compilation of Member 
practices in the development of trade -related cli mate measures; an analytical summary of 
discussions on environmental goods and services and renewable energy; a mapping of the trade 
aspects of the circular economy along the lifecycle of products; and a compilation of national 
experiences and consideratio ns regarding subsidy  design . The  Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and 
Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (DPP )130 organized a dedicated workshop on 
trade-related "reduction" strategies, in cooperation with UNEP ; finalized its two surveys (on 
 
119 WTO documents WT/COMTD/W/270 , 1 March 2023 ; and WT/COMTD/W/274 , 16 March 2023 . 
120 WTO document WT/COMTD/SE/M/44 , 23 May 2023.  
121 The MC12 Ministerial Decision on the Work Programme on Small Economies  
(WTO document  WT/MIN(22)/25  - WT/L/1136 , 22 June 2022 ) instructed the Dedicated Session to undertake 
work on this topic.  
122 WTO document WT/COMTD/SE/W/45 , 14 February 2023. 
123 WTO document WT/COMTD/SE/M/45  (forthcoming).  
124 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/tedweek2022_e.htm . 
125 Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_1206202310_e/envir_1206202310_e.htm .  
126 Annual Report 2022, WTO docume nt WT/CTE/29 , 16 December 2022 ; Minutes of the October 2022, 
and March and July 2023 CTE meetings in WTO documents WT/CTE/M/76 , 6 March 202 ;, WT/CTE/M/77 , 
5 June 2023; and WT/CTE/M/78 , 29 August 2023, respectively.  
127 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_09032023_e/tbt_09032023_e.htm . 
128 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/fossil_fuel_e.htm . 
129 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tessd_e/tessd_e.htm . 
130 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ppesp_e/ppesp_e.htm . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  trade-related plastic measures and plastic pollution -related AfT needs) ; and progressed towards 
their potential MC13 Statement and related outcomes.  
3.169.   Finally, as a sign of growing interest of TBT Committee Members in exchanging experiences 
on environmental standard s and regulations, in March 2023 the Committee organized two Thematic 
Sessions about regulatory cooperation: one on climate change and another on plastics .131 
3.170.   The following box on the exposure of small African businesses to climate change was 
contributed by the International Trade Centre (ITC).  
Box 3.4 Climate change and small African business  
Small firms struggle to  cope with climate crisis, and not just financially  
Climate change is a global crisis, affecting lives and businesses worldwide. Temperature variability, water 
scarcity and extreme weather conditions increasingly weigh on firms, particularly those in Afric a.  
Most small African companies are vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Though  the continent emits just 
4% of global greenhouse gases, it is exposed to more climate change -related shocks than any other 
continent.a Ensuring that firms understand r isks, adapt to them, and mitigate their own negative climate 
impacts will boost their resilience and create positive spill overs.  
A survey conducted in francophone Africa by the International Trade Centre and the Permanent Conference 
of African and Franco phone Consular Chambers (CPCCAF) reveals that 68% of firms saw shifts in temperatures 
and weather patterns as a threat to their operations.b Figures are even higher for those in the primary sector.  
Despite perceiving the risks, only 38% of firms had put i n place adaptation strategies to reduce their 
vulnerability to climate -related risks.c Similarly, only 36% had taken steps to reduce their own environmental 
footprint.  
Most businesses see climate change as a threat but few actd 
 
Lack of action is partiall y due to constrained financial resources. The survey shows that firms in a favourable 
economic situation were 13 percentage points more likely to put in place adaptation measures.e Those in good 
financial health or expanding their workforce were also more inclined to invest in mitigation measures. 
Providing support to financially constrained businesses is thus crucial to enable their investment in climate 
change adaptation and mitig ation.  
Still, not all barriers are financial. Small and medium -sized enterprises are twice less likely to invest in 
adaptation and mitigation measures compared to large businesses, even if their financial situation is solid .f 
This is because small firms te nd to lack the knowledge and skills needed to properly identify climate -related 
risks as well as the measures that can reduce their adverse effects.g 
Climate finance and technical assistance must go hand -in-hand  
Taking climate action can create opportunities for SMEs and strengthen their competitiveness. Indeed, 90% 
of survey respondents that greened their businesses benefited from these investments, above and beyond 
the reduction of climate risks.h Among the most  common opportunities reported were access to new markets, 
retaining of existing markets and improvement in product quality.  
 
131 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_0703202315_e/tbt_0703202315_e.htm  
and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_0703202310_e/tbt_0703202310_e.htm . 
68%
38%36%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
Facing climate-related risks Investing in adaptation Taking mitigation measuresShare of respondents (%)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Green investment  opens opportunitiesi 
 
Given the financial constraints faced by most firms, grants can play an important role, al ong with accreditation 
of national or regional financial institutions by multilateral climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund, and 
can facilitate companies ' access to loans. Business support organizations can also help enterprises in planning 
and dev eloping projects, thereby increasing their ability to attract investment.  
Financial support must nonetheless be complemented by technical assistance. Support in the form of climate 
strategy -building can assist SMEs in understanding where climate risks lie , which measures are most adequate 
to tackle these risks and how to implement them. In this regard, ITC developed the Green Performance Toolkit, 
an online solution designed to enhance the environmental performance of small businesses by allowing them 
to assess current operations, identify areas for improvement, and track progress.  
Additionally, the ITC GreenToCompete Hubs, hosted by local business support organizations in seven 
countries, play the role of field multipliers, helping the ITC reach a larger nu mber of SMEs. The hubs act as a 
one-stop shop, providing knowledge, practical expertise, and a global network, through which local 
stakeholders are empowered and enabled to support SMEs improve their competitiveness by going green.  
a Kaïré et al. (2015), E njeux des mécanismes de financement de l'adaptation au changement climatique 
pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest.  
b ITC and the CPCCAF surveyed 5,625 businesses in French -speaking Africa between April and July 2023. 
Data were gathered from companies in Benin, Burkin a Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, and Togo. For more 
information, see ITC, "SME Competitiveness in Francophone Africa 2023: Building resilience to climate 
change" (Geneva, Switzerland: International Trade Centre, forthcoming November 2023) . Viewed at: 
https://intracen.org/resources/publications/promoting -sme-competitiveness -in-francophone -africa -
Building -resilience -to-climate -change . 
c ITC. 
d The fi gure describes the responses of businesses to the question "Which of the following environmental 
risks are significant for your business?" If the respondent chose one or more environmental risk options 
(except "None" or "Do not know"), they are identified as facing significant environmental risks. 
Respondents were also asked "In the last three years, did your company invest in any of the following 
measures to reduce the environmental risks that your company is facing?" Those that chose any of the 
answer opt ions (except "None" and "Do not know") are identified as investing in adaptation. Finally, 
respondents were asked "In the last three years, did you invest in any of the following measures to 
reduce your company 's negative impact on the environment?". The d ata were weighted using the 
distribution of companies surveyed by country and the contribution of economic sectors to GDP in each 
country.  
e ITC. 
f ITC. 
g ITC, "SME Competitiveness Outlook 2021: Empowering the Green Recovery" (Geneva, Switzerland: 
Internat ional Trade Centre, June 2021). Viewed at: https://intracen.org/resources/publications/sme -
competitiveness -outlook -2021-empowering -the-green -recovery .  
h ITC. 
i The figure describes the responses of businesses to the question "Have these investments opened up 
any of the following opportunities for your company?", as percentages (%) of firms that say they  
invested in measures. The data were weighted using the distribution of companies surveyed by country 
and the contribution of economic sectors to GDP in each country.  
Source:  ITC. 
3.171.   The following box on the relationship between subsidies in the alumin ium and steel sectors 
and greenhouse gas emissions was contributed by the OECD.  
90%10%
Opportunities arising
No opportunities arising24%27%31%32%40%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% Increased production Lower input costs Increased product quality Keep existing markets Access to new markets
Share of respondents (%)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Box 3.5 Climate implications of government support in alumini um smelting and 
steelmaking  
The significant government support to the energy -intensive aluminium and steel industries are well 
documented (OECD, 2019), (OECD, 2021) . However, there is less evidence on the impact of such support 
on emissions of greenhouse g ases from these sectors. If these policies contribute to increased emissions, 
this would raise concerns in view of the climate emergency and recent pledges by many countries to reach 
to net zero on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050. Efficient and cohe rent government policies 
require that measures across programme areas support one another to reach overarching policy goals.  
A new report from the OECD combines novel datasets to shows that (OECD, 2023):  
• Government support has contributed to increased emi ssions from aluminium and steelmaking 
activities, mainly through an increase in production output – that is, a scale effect.  
• Government support has contributed to shifting production to more carbon -intensive plants, further 
increasing overall emissions fro m both sectors.  
• While technology improvements – i.e. reductions in plant emissions intensity – are found to have 
driven overall emissions downward, there is no evidence that government support in the sector 
was targeted at, or contributed to, the developme nt of techniques enabling this enhanced 
environmental performance.  
Using simulations from an Inter -Country Input -Output model, this report also provides evidence that 
removing government support in aluminium and steelmaking activities would imply large eff ects beyond 
these two industries, decreasing global emissions by 1% while reducing global output by 0.3% in 
aluminium and steel industries and downstream sectors.  
Removing government support for aluminium smelting and steelmaking activities might therefor e be a 
cost-effective strategy towards decarbonisation. For instance, for a comparable decline in output, 
removing government support to aluminium smelting and steel making worldwide would reduce carbon 
emissions by 75% more than the reduction observed in 2020 from COVID -19-related restrictions. 
Additionally, removal of such government support would free up scarce public resources for alternative 
uses.  
Further analysis could better identify the design features of government support that generate the most 
adverse effects from both a trade and environmental perspective. More research is also needed to better 
understand the distributional concerns that may arise from phasing out government support to 
energy -intensive industries.  
Source:  OECD (2019), Measuring distortions in international markets: the aluminium value chain . In OECD Trade 
Policy Papers. OECD Publishing, Paris. Viewed at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab -en. OECD 
(2021), Measuring distortions in international markets: Below -market finance . In OECD Trade Policy 
Papers. OECD Publishing, Paris. Viewed at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/a1a5aa8a -en. OECD (2023), The 
climate implications of government support in aluminium smelting and steelmaking . OECD Publishing, 
Paris. Viewed at: 
https://one.oecd.org/document/COM/TAD/ENV/JWPTE(2022)2/FINAL/en/pdf#:~:text=Results%20show
%20that%2C%20 if%20no,cost -effective%20strategy%20for%20decarbonisation . 
Source:  OECD.  
Trade and gender  
3.172.   WTO Members are progressively introducing g ender equality at the centre of their national 
trade policies, introduc ing dedicated s upport program mes for women entrepreneurs or for female 
farmers, and develop ing policies to support women's access to the labour force and 
gender -responsive trade policies.  
3.173.   WTO Members are increasingly including gender equality as part their development plans 
and trade policies, recogni zing that women's economic empowerment improves poverty reduction 
and contributes to their development as well as achieving SDGs (SDG 5 in particular). Some also 
recogni ze the benefit between gender equality and  the multilateral trading system, confirming that 
women's economic empowerment contributes to trade expansion and export growth.  Most national 
trade policies target women entrepreneurs and establish dedicated support programmes for 
small -scale businesswome n to develop their trading capacity, their access to finance and to 
government procurement markets. Some export  promotion programmes include measures to assist 
entrepreneurs in exporting for the first time or to further expand their presence on internation al 
markets. Other measures focus on carving dedicated quotas for small -scale female entrepreneurs 
to have access to government procurement markets.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  3.174.   Access to finance and credits with advantageous conditions is also a key focus of trade 
policies, which for  example may provide female entrepreneurs with medium - and long -term indirect 
credit lines or loan guarantees. In addition, some WTO Members provide such financial support 
targeting the green sector. To give businesswomen an advantage on foreign markets an d to allow 
them accessing to support schemes, some governments provide them with a certification (based on 
specific eligibility criteria) confirming their status as a female entrepreneur.  As part of their Trade 
Policy Review, some Members have started repo rting on measures, mostly financial support, put in 
place in favour of female entrepreneurs during the COVID -19 pandemic .  
3.175.   Several trade policies also seek to target female farmers, often smallholders, and some 
governments use their  domestic support and th eir green box subsidies for this purpose. Such support 
measures can include access to productive resources such as farming and processing equipment  as 
well as input subsidies . They also focus on providing women access to training or agricultural land. 
They also provide female farmers with financial support by, for example, creating dedicated funds 
providing grants to smallholders with a quota for women, often in specific agricultural sectors.  
3.176.   Some WTO Members have conducted analysis or data collection exer cises on wage 
discrimination in export sectors, mobility issues, discrimination on access to public transport or 
female employment in export -led sectors, with the purpose to better target their policies in support  
of women. Usually, trade policy measures a iming at fostering women's access to the job market and 
the labour force in internationali zed sectors include , for example, tax incentives to the private sector, 
with specific conditions.  The European Union has created a facility with the objective to fost er 
women's integration in the labour market and limit gender discrimination in employment . Several  
WTO Members have started integrating impact assessments as part of their policy implementation 
processes while some have developed specific "sustainability i mpact assessments" that include a 
gender perspective. Others have included an estimation of the impact of their policy initiatives that 
also incorporates a performance and achievement monitoring exercise. Impact assessments of 
gender provisions are increas ingly being negotiated in new free trade agreements. Djibouti has set 
up regular monitoring of the female beneficiaries of government -led programmes targeting women 
entrepreneurs and has created a centralized database managed and hosted by the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs.  
3.177.   In the policy -making process, a number of  governments organi ze internal consultations, 
including with officials responsible for women's affairs, to allow a cross -cutting integration of gender 
issues in trade policies. Also, remarkably, Ma laysia has reported that it has embarked in gender 
budgeting to ensure that the gender -responsive measures included in its national policies are 
supported financially. Overall, the key challenge highlighted by WTO Members in gender -responsive 
trade policy making is the lack of gender -disaggregated data in trade and the technical difficulty in 
collecting such data.  
Trade facilitation  
3.178.   The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force on 22  February  2017, when 
two thirds of WTO Members presented their instruments of acceptance  amending the Marrakesh 
Agreement to incorporate the TFA into Annex 1A (Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods) . At 
the conclusion of the review period, 15 6 Members had domestically ratified the TFA and deposited  
their instruments of acceptance to the WTO , representing  95.1% of the WTO membership.  
3.179.   The current global rate of implementation  commitments of the TFA stands at 7 7%. During 
the review period, Members submitted the notifications summari zed in Chart 3.22 below. These 
included notifications by 11 LDCs.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 69 - 
 
  Chart 3.22 Number of WTO Members that presented TFA notifications, 3 October 2022 to 
20 October 2023  
 
Source:  WTO, TFA  database. Viewed at: TFAD - Trade Facilitation Agreement Database (tfadatabase.org) .  
3.180.   During the review period, the TFA Facility (TFAF) organized the participation of 50 capital 
based officials in the 3 -5 October 2023 Committee on Trade Facilitation (CTF) meeting. The TFAF 
organized additional workshop sessions, including a donor roundtable and a session on digitalization, 
with both activities being inc luded in the 2023 workplan. The 2024 workplan is currently being 
finalized.   
3.181.   The TFAF also supported the attendance of 28 transit experts from Land Locked Developing 
Countries (LLDC) and transit Members to the  15-16 June 2023 meeting of the CTF, and its de dicated 
session on transit. The outcomes of the workshop were presented by participants from Eswatini, 
Gabon, Pakistan , and Zimbabwe. A detailed report was produced to capture these outputs and will 
be summari zed in the TFAF Annual Report 2023.  
Trade finan cing 
3.182.   The global trade finance gap has increased by 47% in the past two years, reaching 
USD 2.5 trillion in 2022, according to the latest Asian Development Bank survey released in 
September 2023.132 Multilateral development banks continue to see high demand for their trade 
finance facilitation programmes, reaching a combined support of nearly USD 50 billion last year.  
3.183.   The supply of international trade finance was negatively affected by the post -pandemic 
macro stress, the increase in geopolitical tensions, cou ntry risks, and by recent financial turbulence, 
which ha ve a knock -on effect on interbank market conditions. As trade finance is mostly short term, 
its availability is particularly sensitive to interbank market conditions, which impacts credit 
availability  and its costs.  Moreover, access to foreign exchange, which is indispensable for issuing 
trade finance instruments, has also been a growing problem for countries experiencing external 
sector constraints. For balance -of-payments -constrained countries, the i ncrease in the value of 
 
132 Asian Development Outlook (ADO) September 2023 . Viewed at: 
https://www.adb.org/publications/asian -development -outlook -september -
2023#:~:text=The%20economic%20outlook%20for%20Asia,2024%2C%20but%20risks%20remain%20elevat
ed.  
0
2
6
2
5
17
64
0
14
19
120 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Category A
Category B
Category C
Category shift from B to C
Category shift from C to B
Extension of time to implement
Transparency notifications
COVID-19-related transparency notifications
Arts. 22.1 and 22.2
Art. 22.3
TACB ArrangementsWT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 70 - 
 
  imports, notably food and energy, has been stretching the capacity of local financial sectors to 
provide higher levels of trade finance.  
3.184.   At the same time, d igitalization of trade finance processes, along with the emergence of 
non-bank financial actors in this market, should offer new opportunities in coming years for accessing 
trade finance at lower cost in emerging markets.  
3.185.   On 13 October, at the recent annual meeting of the World Bank Group and International 
Monetary Fund, the WTO D irector -General participated in a high -level discussion with senior officials 
from leading multilateral development banks , including the African Development Bank, the African 
Export –Import Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the EBRD 
and the Islamic Development Bank's International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation. Discussions 
focused on, among other things, ongoing initiatives aimed at capacity -building, narrowing trade 
finance gaps, and bolstering  financing for local supply chains.   
 
 
 WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  4  POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES  
Regular measures affecting trade in services  
4.1.  During the review period 123 new trade in services measures were introduced, albeit 
significantly less than in p revious periods. Half of th ese were horizontal policies affecting trade for 
many services sectors and/or multiple modes of supply . Approximately 30% of measures  related to 
communications  and Internet - and other network -enabled services, and 15% to  financia l services. 
About 20% of measures affected various services sectors, such as business, health -related , tourism 
and recreational , and transport services. Overall, three quarters of the  123 measures could be 
considered either as liberalizing trade in service s or improving the regulatory framework. The 
remaining quarter were trade-restrictive . Half of these were horizontal policies affecting trade for 
many services sectors and/or multiple modes of supply. About 20% of measures affected various 
other services s ectors, such as business, health -related, tourism and recreational, and transport 
services, 15% of measures related to communications' services, and 15% to financial services .  
4.2.  Annex  4 of the Addendum provides additional information on the 123 new services  measures 
introduced by 60 WTO Members and 4 Observers.  
Measures affecting supply through multiple modes of supply across various sectors  
4.3.  Between October 2022 and October 2023, some Members introduced measures affecting 
supply through multiple modes of sup ply across various sectors.  For example, the State of Kuwait 
adopted on 16 July 2023 a new measure allowing foreign companies to establish branches to conduct 
operations directly. This removes the requirement to have a local agent to operate in the country . 
Brazil  introduced a new law, effective on 30  December  2022, which calls for a great er amount of 
currency allowed when traveling abroad (USD  10,000), as well as lifting the reciprocity requirement 
for foreign banks to acquire more than 30% of shares with voting rights in Brazilian banks. Argentina  
established a new wealth tax levy of 25% for purchases and expenses abroad that exceed a limit of 
USD 300 per month with credit and debit cards. This duty was introduced in addition to new rules 
and tax rates for foreign currency purchases of goods and services overseas and has added an 
increase from 35% to 45% on some purchases made abroad recently imposed by authorities.   
Measures affecting supply through commercial presence across various sectors  
4.4.  During the review period, many Members, in particular some EU member States (Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, France,  Luxembourg, Romania, Slovak  Republic , Slovenia, and Spain) , made 
changes to their legislation that affect the supply of services through commercial presence. These 
revised or new policies mainly relate to the  screening  of foreign direct i nvest ment (FDI) , which may 
impact many services sectors. For example, starting on 1 July 2023, non -EU investors investing in 
Belgium  are required to seek prior approval if they invest in areas that may affect national security, 
public order, or strategic intere sts. The mechanism covers the acquisition of at least 25 % of voting 
rights in Belgian companies engaged in sectors, such as critical  or digital  infrastructure  activities , 
media, data processing or storage, technologies, and resources essential for public safety (including 
health), artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, or access to strategically sensitive information and 
personal data . Acquisition of a minimum of 10 % of voting rights in Belgian target companies is also 
covered if those operate , inter alia , in the energy, cybersecurity, electronic communication, or digital 
infrastructures sectors, with a turnover over EUR 100 million in the year preceding the acquisition.  
4.5.  Starting 29  March  2023, the Slovak  Republic  introduced three screening procedures: 
obligatory screening, voluntary screening, and ex officio  screening. All foreign investments may be 
screened when there is a reasonable presumption that they may threaten or  disrupt security or 
public order, unlike the previous regime under which only investments into critical infrastructure 
were subject to screening procedures. Foreign investments falling under the category of critical 
investments should be made only after a pproval by the Ministry of Economy. The list of critical 
investments is to be determined by separate legislation.  Luxembourg  also adopted a new law 
establishing an FDI screening process for transactions affecting national security and public order, 
and targeting individuals who are not nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA), entities 
established outside the EEA, and entities who are ultimately controlled by a non -EEA entity or 
national.  The new law, effective on 1 September 2023, applies to investmen ts in critical activities, WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 72 - 
 
  covering , inter alia , the sectors of communications, energy, transport, health, finance, media, data 
processing and storage , or activities involving access to sensitive information.  
4.6.  Other Members also revised their FDI approval p olicies, to either increase thresholds above 
which foreign investments must be scrutinized ( Canada , 3 February 2023), or added new critical 
sectors to the existing review mechanism ( Japan , 24 April 2023).  
4.7.  Some Members introduced trade -facilitating measures  affecting the supply of services through 
commercial presence (mode 3) across various sectors. In Jordan , a new law published on 
16 October  2022 provides for non -discriminatory treatment, freedom of capital transfer and 
investment guarantees and incentives. The new law has, however, not repealed the Non -Jordanian 
Investments Regulation No.  77 of 2016, which provided for ownership restrictions in certain 
activities. On 1  January  2023, China  increased the number of sectors where foreign investment is 
encouraged. The list of sectors now covers modern services, such as recycling and processing 
services of retired  wind turbine blades and waste photovoltaic modules, technical services 
(e.g. advanced system integration technology and service of low carbon, environmental protection, 
green energy saving and water saving), construction engineering, language services or 
elder-care-related services. In Mozambique , a new decree, published on 6 June  2023, extends from 
11 to 66 the number of business activities that can be started without a licen ce. Most activities that 
do not require a technical overview or specific licen ces can be registered with an online notification 
process.  
Measures related to communication services, e -commerce and digitally enabled services  
4.8.  Almost a  third of measures reported since October 2022 concerned  trade in communications 
services, Internet - and other network -enabled services, or computer services. The European  Union 's 
Digital Services Act (DSA) became effective on 16  November  2022. It applies to online intermediary 
services, which include cloud com puting and webhosting services, intermediary services offering 
network infrastructure, online platforms bringing together sellers and consumers (e.g. app stores), 
and very large online platforms , as well as very large search engines reaching over 10% of th e total 
EU population. The DSA includes new obligations on the traceability of business users on online 
marketplaces, obligations for very large online platforms and search engines to prevent the misuse 
of systems, and transparency measures for all online platforms.  The European Union also adopted  
an adequacy decision for the European Union -United States Data Privacy Framework, which was 
published on 10 July 2023. It requires  the United States to ensure an adequate level of protection 
to transfer personal d ata from the European Union.  Companies participating in the Framework will 
not need to implement additional data protection safeguards.  
4.9.  Other Members also introduced policies affecting Internet - and other network -enabled services. 
India enacted on 11 Augus t 2023 a new law regulating the processing of digital personal data.  The 
law touches upon, inter alia , the transfer of digital personal data abroad . Transfers are permitted , 
except to countries identified by Indian authorities. The law empowers the governm ent to create a 
negative list of countries where personal data cannot be transferred. Such a list has not yet been 
published. The measure also allows sectoral regulations requiring data localization, such as in the 
payments sector.  On 12 June 2023, Nigeria  introduced the Nigerian Data Protection Act with 
provisions relating to the cross -border transfer of personal data and adequacy levels of protection 
in foreign jurisdictions.  Starting 27  March  2023, the Kingdom of Saudi  Arabia  made further 
allowance for international data transfers, which no longer require approval if they are implement ing 
obligations under international agreements to which the country is a party, if the transfer is made 
pursuant to a contract to which the data  subject is a party.  
4.10.  Many governments adopted new measures in the communications sector, covering postal and 
courier services, telecommunications , and audiovisual services. Seychelles  amended the Postal 
Sector Act on 14 August 2023, introducing changes to the licensing of postal and courier activities 
or their renewal . The Postal Regulator should consider, inter alia , the promotion of healthy 
competition, the likelihood of unfair practices and highlighting how the interest of the consumer 
would be best serv ed, as well as the public interest, public order , and national security . Kenya  
announced that in March  2023, foreign ICT companies were no longer required to relinquish 30% of 
their ownership to Kenyans, a requirement that had been established in 2020 in t he National 
Information, Communications, and Technology (ICT) Policy, with a 3 -year compliance requirement. 
Malaysia announced that it would allow a second 5G network operator from January 2024.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Financial services  
4.11.  Several M embers implemented new  policies affecting trade in financial service s. In the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , Qualified Foreign Investors have been  allowed since 27 March 2023 to 
engage with foreign capital market institutions, foreign portfolio managers, foreign custodians, or 
foreign advisors , for the purpose of investing in listed securities.  Starting on 18 October 2023 
the Republic  of Korea  will allow, on a non -discriminatory basis, Registered Foreign Institutions (RFIs) 
to buy and sell deliverable spots and forwards ( foreign exchange (FX) swaps and outright forwards) 
in the onshore interbank FX market and with their non -resident customers. The transactions must 
be conducted through government -approved  local brokers (including foreign brokers' branches in 
the Republic of  Korea). Previously,  the Korean won could only be directly traded with the US dollar 
through local banks, for just six -and-a-half hours a day.  
4.12.  The European  Union  adopted on 28  November  2022 the Digital Operational Resilience Act 
(DORA), which affects not o nly trade in financial services, but also the supply of third -party trade in 
ICT-related services to the financial sector. DORA sets rules for monitoring risks related to 
outsourced tasks and requires the outsourcing arrangements to comply with certain req uirements 
(e.g. access to, recovery and return of data; services levels). Under DORA, the supervisory 
authorities for the financial sector can directly supervise ICT third -party service providers that are 
themselves not engaged in regulated activities but deemed by the authorities to be "critical " to 
financial entities.  
Other services sectors  
4.13.  Other services sectors were also impacted by Members ' policy changes, such as business, 
health -related, tourism and travel -related, recreational and transport services . For example, on 11 
August 2023, Indonesia  enacted the Law on Health, which replaces 11 health -related laws, including  
the Law on Medical Practice, the Law on Hospitals or the Law on Healthcare Professionals. The new 
law requires, inter alia , that health service facilities must express their requests for the hiring of 
health professionals based on their needs or for the purpose of transfer of technology and knowledge . 
Also, t he new Law requires prior approval from the Ministry of Healt h for offshore transf ers of "health 
data and information" and specimens, which is a more stringent requirement than that of the 
Personal Data Protection Law.  Likewise, providers of a "health information system" must manage, 
process and/or store such system and "health informat ion data" within Indonesia, unless the 
necessary technology is not yet available, if prior approval is obtained from the M inistry .  
4.14.  Nigeria  adopted a new measure which liberalizes electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution activities. It also permits, inter alia , companies and individuals to generate, transmit and 
distribute electricity. However, interstate and transnational electricity distribution is not permitted. 
With respect to legal services, India released  new rules, effective on 10  March  2023, enabl ing foreign 
lawyers and law firms to provide services in the country, under reciprocal conditions. The areas of 
practice for foreign lawyers/law firms are yet to be lai d down by the Bar Council of India. The scope 
of practice will be limited to advisory services in foreign law, international law, international 
commercial arbitration, and transactional work/corporate work (such as joint ventures, mergers and 
acquisitions,  IP matters, drafting of contracts and other related matters ). Foreign service suppliers 
will only be permitted to advise foreign persons/entities on the laws of the country in which they 
have qualified but will be allowed to represent foreign entities in international arbitrations conducted 
in India, regardless of the involvement of foreign law in such arbitration.  
Services supplied through the movement of natural persons  
4.15.  Many Members adopted measures affecting the supply of services through the movement o f 
natural persons. Over 80% of these measures were trade -facilitating.  For exampl e, Costa Rica  
increased the maximum duration of stay  for business visitors to 180 days for each visit, up from the 
previous 90 days.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  extended on 8  November  2022 the maximum 
duration of stay for all categories of single -entry visit visas from one month to three months. 
Kazakhstan  adopted n ew rules for work permit s, modify ing the way the foreign -to-local worker ratio 
is calculated by requiring that out sourced foreign individuals providing services be accounted for. 
Furthermore, employers are no longer required to carry out a labour market test for intra -corporate 
transferee s. WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Trade concerns raised in the Council for Trade in Services  
4.16.  At the CTS meetings  held on 14 October 2022, 8 December 2022, 9 March 2023, 12 June 
2023 and 3 October 20231, concerns were reiterated about  (i) cybersecurity measures of China 
(raised by Japan and the United States) and cybersecurity measures of Viet Nam (raised by Japan 
and the United States); (ii) 5G -related measures of Australia (raised by China); (iii) measures of the 
United States regarding  Chinese services and service suppliers (raised by China); and (iv) measures 
of India regarding Chinese services and service suppliers (raised by China).  
Air services agreements  
4.17.  Table  4.1 presents information on air services agreements (ASAs) concluded or amended 
during the period under review. These include both new ASAs and revisions of existing ones. As far 
as can be assessed from available sources, these ASAs provide for improved access conditions than 
was previously the case.  
Table  4.1 Air transport agreements concluded or amended between October  2022 and 
October  2023  
Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
Barbados  Qatar  29/09/2022  Barbados Today , "Barbados signs air services 
agreement with Government of Qatar"  
https://barbadostoday.bb/2022/09/29/barbados -
signs-air-services -agreement -with-government -of-
qatar/  
Belize  Qatar  01/10/2022  Breaking Belize News , "Qatar and Belize sign air 
services agreement"  
https://www.breakingbelizenews.com/2022/10/01
/qatar -and-belize -sign-air-services -agreement/  
Ethiopia  Chad 01/10/202 2 2merkato.com, "Ethiopia Signs Aviation 
Agreements with Chad and Turkey"  
https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6783 -
ethiopia -signs-aviation -agreements -with-chad-
and-turkey  
Singapore  Palau  03/10/2022  The Straits Times , "Singapore signs open skies 
agreement with Palau"  
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapor
e-signs-open-skies-agreement -with-palau  
Seychelles  Kazakhstan  03/10/2022  Seychelles News Agency , "Seychelles signs air 
service agreement with Kazakhstan"  
http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/1
7504/Seychelles+signs+air+service+agreement+
with+Kazakhstan  
Tonga  United Arab 
Emirates  10/10/2022  Matangi Tonga Online , "Tonga signs Air Services 
Agreement with United Arab Emirates"  
https://matangitonga.to /2022/10/10/tonga -signs-
air-services -agreement -united -arab-emirates  
Guyana  China  13/10/2022  Caribbean National Weekly , "Guyana signs air 
agreement with China" 
https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/c
aribbean -news/guyana -signs-air-agreement -with-
china/  
ASEAN  European  Union  17/10/2022  The Business Times , "Comprehensive air transport 
pact inked between Asean and European  Union, 
Government and Economy"  
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government -
economy/comprehensive -air-transport -pact-inked -
between -asean -and-european -union  
Serbia  Türkiye  19/10/2022  EX-YU Aviation News , "Serbia - Turkey reach deal 
on new routes, frequencies and capacity"  
https://www.exyuaviation.com/2022/10/serbia -
turkey -reach -deal-on-new-routes.html  
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  Finland  02/11/2022  Arabian Business , "Saudi Arabia, Finland sign pact 
to provide air services between the two countries"  
 
1 WTO documents S/C/M/150 , 14 November 2022 ; S/C/M/151 , 31 Januar y 2023 ; S/C/M/152 , 
18 April 2023 S/C/M/153 , 28 July 2023 ; and S/C/M/154  (forthcoming).  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 75 - 
 
  Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/trans
port/saudi -arabia -finland -sign-pact-to-provide -air-
services -between -the-two-countries   
Bahrain, Kingdom of  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  09/11/2022  Sarajevo Times , "Kingdom of Bahrain and BiH sign 
the Agreement on Services in Air Transport"  
https://saraj evotimes.com/kingdom -of-bahrain -
and-bih-sign-the-agreement -on-services -in-air-
transport/  
Barbados  Rwanda  11/11/2022  St Kitts Nevis Observer , "Barbados and Rwanda 
Cement Closer Ties"  
https://www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com/barbado
s-and-rwanda -cement -closer -ties/ 
Canada  India 15/11/2022  Aviation Week , "Canada,  India Expand Air 
Services Agreement"  
https://aviationweek.com/air -transport/airports -
networks/canada -india-expand -air-services -
agreement -0 
United  States  Ecuador  17/11/2022  U.S. Department of State, "United  States and 
Ecuador Sign Open Skies Agreement" 
https://www.state.gov/united -states -and-
ecuador -sign-open-skies-agreement/  
Barbados  Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  29/11/2022  Loop News , "Barbados, Saudi Arabia sign air 
services agreement"  
https://barbados.loopnews.com/content/barbados
-saudi -arabia -sign-air-services -agreement  
Nigeria  Seychelles  09/12/2022  Daily Trust , "Nigeria, Seychelles sign BASA on 
direct flights"  
https://dailytrust.com/nigeria -seychelles -sign-
basa-on-direct -flights/   
Bangladesh  Rwanda  12/01/2023  MENAFN, "BD, Rwanda Ink Bilateral A ir Services 
Agreement"  
https://menafn.com/1105431666/BD -Rwanda -
Ink-Bilateral -Air-Services -Agreement  
Qatar  Saint Lucia 16/01/2023  MENAFN, "Qatar and Saint  Lucia Sign Air Services 
Agreement"  
https://menafn.com/1105435490/Qatar -And-
Saint-Lucia-Sign-Air-Services -Agreement  
Canada  Dominican  Republic  03/02/2023  Simple Flying, "Canada Signs Open Skies 
Agreement With Dominican  Republic"  
https://simpleflying.com/canada -open-skies-
agreement -dominican -republic/  
Peru Finland  03/02/2023 Ministry of External Relations, " Peru and Finland 
sign air services agreement "   
https://www.gob.pe/institucion/rree/noticias/6960
96-el-peru-y-finlandia -firman-acuerdo -de-
servicios -aereos  
 
Montenegro  Azerbaijan  06/02/2023  See News , "Montenegro signs air service 
agreement with Azerbaijan – report"  
https://seenews.com/news/montenegro -signs-air-
service -agreement -with-azerbaijan -report -813638   
European  Union  Japan 20/02/2023  Council of the European  Union, "External aviation 
policy: EU signs agreement boosting air services 
with Japan"  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press -
releases/2023/02/20/external -aviation -policy -eu-
signs-agreement -boosting -air-services -with-
japan/  
Guyana  India 22/02/2023  Loop News , "Air Servi ces Agreement between 
Guyana and India approved for signing"  
https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/air -
services -agreement -between -guyana -and-india-
approved -signing  
Sri Lanka  Netherlands  22/02/2023  Ada Derana Business , "Sri Lanka signs Air 
Services Agreement with the Netherlands"  
http://bizenglish.adaderana.lk/sri -lanka -signs-air-
services -agreement -with-the-netherlands/  
Ghana  Sao Tom é and 
Principe 08/03/2023  Graphic Online , "Ghana, Sao Tome and Príncipe 
sign air traffic agreement"  
https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/gene ral-
news/ghana -news-ghana -sao-tome-and-principe -
sign-air-traffic -agreement.html  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
Philippines  Türkiye  05/04/2023  Malaya Business Insight , "PH, Türkiye improve air 
services agreement"  
https://malaya.com.ph/news_business/ph -
turkiye -improve -air-services -agreement/  
Canada  United Arab 
Emirates  05/04/2023  Mirage New s, "Canada -UAE Air Transport 
Agreement Expanded for More Flights"  
https://www.miragenews.com/canada -uae-air-
transport -agreement -expanded -for-981899/  
Dominican  Republic  Brazil  14/04/2023  Dominican Today , "Dominican  Republic and Brazil 
update air transport agreement protocol"  
https://dominicantoday.com/dr/world/2023/04/14
/dominican -republic -and-brazil -update -air-
transport -agreement -protocol/  
Oman  Tajikistan  15/04/2023 Muscat Daily , "His Majesty issues two Royal 
Decrees "  
https://www.muscatdaily.com/2023/05/24/his -
majesty -issues -two-royal-decrees -3/ 
Peru Korea  18/04/2023 Yonhap Ne ws Agency , "South Korea, Peru sign 
aviation pact " 
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN2023041800750032
5#:~:te xt=SEOUL%2C%20April%2018%20(Yonh
ap),trade%2C%20Seoul%27s%20foreign%20mini
stry%20said.  
India Guyana  20/04/2023  The Economic Times , "India, Guyana sign Air 
Services Agreement to allow easier travel between 
the nations"  
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/indust ry/tr
ansportation/airlines -/-aviation/india -guyana -sign-
air-services -agreement -to-allow-easier -travel -
between -the-nations/articleshow/99711161.cms  
United Arab 
Emirates  Tajikistan  10/05/2023 The Print , "UAE, Tajikistan sign air transport 
services agreement "  
https://theprint.in/world/uae -tajikistan -sign-air-
transport -services -agreement/1565017/  
Serbia  Maldives  10/05/2023 SeeNews , "Serbia, Maldives agree to launch direct 
air link "  
https://seenews.com/news/serbia -maldives -
agree -to-launch -direct -air-link-822575  
United States  Modolva , Republic of  18/05/2023 U.S Department of State, " United States and 
Moldova Sign Open Skies Agreement " 
https://www.state.gov/united -states -and-
moldova -sign-open-skies-agreement/  
Cambodia  Switzerland  23/05/2023 Khmer Times , "Cambodia, Switzerland sign MoU 
on air transport service " 
https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501296322/cam
bodia -switzerland -sign-mou-on-air-transport -
service/  
Indonesia  Luxembo urg 25/05/2023 Tempo.co , "Indonesia, Luxembourg Ink Air 
Transportation Cooperation " 
https://en.tempo.co/read/1730112/indonesia -
luxembourg -ink-air-transportation -cooperation  
Qatar  Suriname  14/06/2023 Zawya, "Qatar, Suriname sign Air Services 
Agreement " 
https://www.zawya.com/en/business/aviation/qat
ar-suriname -sign-air-services -agreement -
ys9yjusm  
United Arab 
Emirates  Peru 16/06/2023 Travel Weekly,  "UAE and Peru sign air services 
agreement " 
https://www.travelweekly.com.au/article/uae -
and-peru-sign-air-services -agreement/  
Ethiopia  South Sudan  20/06/2023 Ethiopian Monitor,  "Ethiopia, South Sudan Sign Air 
Service Agreement " 
https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2023/06/20/ethiopi
a-south -sudan -sign-air-service -agree ment/  
Dominican Republic  Czech Republic  20/06/2023 Dominican  Today,  "Dominican Republic and Czech 
Republic modernize air transport agreement to 
strengthen commercial aviation " 
https://dominicantoday.com/dr/world/2023/06/20
/dominican -republic -and-czech -republic -
modernize -air-transport -agreement -to-
strengthe n-commercial -aviation/  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 77 - 
 
  Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
Cuba Dominican Republic  06/07/2023 Aviation Week Network,  "Cuba, Dominican 
Republic Reach New Air Services Agreement " 
https://aviationweek.com/air -transport/airports -
networks/cuba -dominican -republic -reach -new-air-
services -agreement  
United Arab 
Emirates  Austria  11/07/2023 Gulf Business,  "UAE, Austria sign air transport 
services agreement " 
https://gulfbusiness.com/uae -austria -sign-air-
transport -services -agreement/  
Belarus  Oman  25/07/2023 Belta, "Belarus, Oman sign air transport 
agreement " 
https://eng.belta.by/society/view/belarus -oman -
sign-air-transport -agreement -160514 -2023/  
Solomon Islands  New Zealand  25/07/2023 International Airport Review, "Solomon  Islands and 
New Zealand conclude negotiations on a new Air 
Service Agreement "  
https://www.internationalairportreview.com/news/
188195/solomon -islands -and-new-zealand -
conclude -negotiations -on-a-new-air-service -
agreement/  
Uzbekistan  Hungary  20/08/2023 Trend, "Uzbekistan, Hungary sign air service 
agreement " 
https://en.trend.az/world/3786547.html  
Pakistan  Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  21/08/2023 Arab News, "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia sign ‘Air 
Services Agreement ' to increase number of flights " 
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2358916/pakist
an 
Papua New Guinea  Palau  23/08/2023 Post Courier, "PNG and Palau sign air service 
agreement " 
https://www.postcourier.com.pg/png -and-palau -
sign-air-service -agreement/  
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  Poland  28/08/2023 The Star,  "Saudi Arabia, Poland sign air services 
agreement " 
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2023/08
/29/saudi -arabia -poland -sign-air-services -
agreement  
United Arab 
Emirates  Palau  31/08/2023 Arabian Business , "UAE, Republic of Palau sign 
bilateral air services agreement " 
https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/trans
port/uae -republic -of-palau -sign-bilateral -air-
services -agreement  
Kenya  Somalia  09/09/2023 Citizen Digital, "Kenya, Somalia sign bilateral air 
services agreement  - CS Murkomen " 
https:/ /www.citizen.digital/news/kenya -somalia -
sign-bilateral -air-services -agreement -cs-
murkomen -n325214  
Qatar  Bahamas  25/09/2023 Arab Air Carriers' Organization,  "Qatar and 
Bahamas sign air service agreement " 
https://www.aaco.org/media -
center/news/aeropolitical/qatar -and-bahamas -
sign-air-service -agreement  
India New Ze aland 29/09/2023 Ministry of Civil Aviation, "India and New Zealand 
sign MoU to boost cooperation in Civil Aviation"  
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1
953261  
Qatar  Grenada  03/10/2023 The Middle East North Africa Financial Network, 
Inc. (MENAFN) , "Qatar, Grenada Sign Air Services 
Agreement " 
https://menafn.com/1107179343/ Qatar -Grenada -
Sign-Air-Services -Agreement  
 
Note:  The term "Air Transport Agreements" is used here to refer to Air Services Agreements, Memoranda 
of Understanding, Exchange of Notes, and other such relevant instruments.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.   
COVID -19-related measures affecting trade in services  
4.18.  During the review period, no new COVID -19-related measure s affecting trade in services  were 
reported . Since the outbreak of the pandemic, the Secretariat has collected information on 
156 COVID -19-related measures affecting trade in services introduced by Members and Observers. WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 78 - 
 
  Twenty -two of those measures were reported as terminated over the past three years , and three 
additional ones were indic ated as being partially terminated, of which one during the reporting 
period . 2 The full list of measures compiled since the beginning of the COVID -19 pandemic is available 
on the WTO website.3 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Philippines partially terminated two measures affecting banking and other financial services.  
3 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/tr ade_related_services_measure_e.htm . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  5  POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INTE LLECTUAL PROPERTY  
5.1.  WTO Members continued to fine -tune their intellectual property (IP) regimes between 
mid-October 2022 and mid -October 2023. While many pandemic -related measures were phased 
out, some Members have formalized online procedures created during  lockdowns. IP measures taken 
as a result of the war in Ukraine continued to be implemented. Türkiye implemented measures for 
IP holders in the regions affected by the earthquake that took place in June 2022.  
5.2.  During the review period, WTO Members discusse d the possible extension of the MC12 TRIPS 
Decision on COVID -19 Vaccines to diagnostics and therapeutics and shared national experiences and 
best practices on IP and innovation.  
Acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement  
5.3.  During the review per iod, Namibia deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Protocol 
Amending the TRIPS Agreement, in April 2023 .1 
National IP -related strategies  
5.4.  Albania established the interagency working group to monitor and implement its Na tional IP 
Strategy 2022 –2025; and the Inter -institutional Working Group met to review the implementation, 
in June 2023 .2  
Developments in domestic legislation and administration  of IPRs  
5.5.  Domesticall y, WTO Members and Observers are working to streamline IP in their economies. 
The relationship between  IP and trade continued to develop and diversify, as Members continued to 
modernize and fine -tune their IP legislation and administration (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Domestic legislation and administrative developments  
Member  Measure  
Australia  The Australian  Border Force amended the claim for release of seized goods/copies to require 
evidence to support the rel ease, as of April 2023.a 
Chile The National Intellectual Property Institute (INAPI) updated its list of IP experts  and the 
appraisal fees, mandated the use of the online  form for submissions for trademark 
oppositions, and set the fees in the framework of the Madrid Protocol, between November 
2022 and June 2023.  
The Law on Economic Crimes entered into force in August 2023.b 
China  The National Copyright Administration issued 7 pre -warning lists of key works for copyright 
protection, covering a total of 38 works, including 6 theatrical films involving overseas  
rights holders, as of October 2022.c 
Colombia  The law of the National De velopment Plan 2022 -2026 amended the provisions regarding 
the utilization of the benefits obtained from IP rights derived from research and projects 
undertaken by public entities; and entered into force in June 2023.d 
Hong Kong, 
China  The Copyright (Amen dment) Bill 2022 was passed by the Legislative Council in December 
2022 to strengthen protection in the digital environment. It came into force in May 2023.e 
Italy The new Industrial Property Code entered into force on 23 August 2023.f 
Montenegro  Amendments to the Law on Trademarks and to the Law on Patents entered into force in 
January 2023.g 
 
1 The complete list of Members that have accepted the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement is 
available on: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm .  
2 Communication by Albania for the Trade Monitoring Report.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 80 - 
 
  Member  Measure  
Myanmar  The Law on Trademarks came into force in April 2023, and the IP Central Committee was 
reorganized in February 2023.  
The IP Central Commit tee was reorganized, as of June 2023.h 
Nigeria  The new Copyright Act was signed into Law in March 2022.i 
Norway  The new Customs Act and Regulations on the Movement of Goods were updated 
enforcement provisions that encompass  (i) interventions by customs a uthorities on transit 
shipments if the contents are protected by IP rights in Norway; and (ii) small consignments 
containing online purchases can be intercepted and detained by customs with a simplified 
procedure for seizure and destruction.j 
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  The National Intellectual Property Strategy was launched in December 2022; the 
compulsory licensing service for copyright works was launched in November 2022; and 
implemented enforcement campaigns in March 2023.k 
Chinese Taipei  The enfo rcement rules contained in the Patent Act were amended in October 2022.  
 
The Regulations Governing the Determination of Patent Term Extension were amended and 
entered into force in July 2023.l 
Ukraine  The functions of the National Intellectual Property Authority were updated in November 
2022; the Law on Geographical Indications for Spirits came partially into force in December 
2022; and the Law on Copyright and Related Rights came into force in January 2023.  
The provisions in civil, commercial, and intellectual property laws were aligned with the 
obligations resulting from the Association Agreement with the European Union; and entered 
into force in April 2023.  
The Procedure for the Payment of Fees for Actions Related to the Protection of Rights to 
Intellectual Property Objects  was updated and entered into force in September 2023.m 
Viet Nam  Provisions related to industrial designs, inventions related to security and national 
defense, compensation to  patent holders due to delays in marketing approval and 
management of geographical indications came into force in August 2023.n 
a Communication by Australia for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
b Communication by Chile for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
c Commu nication by China for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
d Communication by Colombia for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
e Communication by Hong  Kong, China for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
f Communication by Italy for the Trade  Monitoring Report.  
g Communication b y Montenegro for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
h Communication by Myanmar for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
i See WIPO (2023), "Nigeria Passes New Copyright Act 2022", 12  May. Viewed  at: 
https://www.wipo.int/about -wipo/en/offices/nigeria/news/2023/news_0011.html . 
j Communication by Norway for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
k Communication by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
l Communication by Chinese Taipei  for the Trade Monitoring Report ; and notifications to the TRIPS 
Council  IP/N/1/TPKM/36 , IP/N/1/TPKM/P/18 , IP/N/1/TPKM/37 , IP/N/1/TPKM/P/19 .  
m Communication by Ukraine for  the Trade Monitoring Report.  
n Communication by V iet Nam for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
COVID -19-related measures  
5.6.  The pace of implementation of specific measures related to COVID -19 health technologies 
slowed down. Some Members extended the duration of the availability of online procedures for 
registration and management of IP rights, and others phased out such measures. Some, including 
Chile, incorporated the use of online tools into their IP regimes.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  War-related measures  
5.7.  Several Members continue to apply a wide range of trade -related measures that cover both 
tangible and intangible assets, like IP rights. These measures, applied to legal or natural persons, 
might indirectly affect the maintenance and licensing of i ntellectual property rights (IPRs).3 
Emergency -related measures  
5.8.  Türkiye extended the administrative deadlines for IP right s holders and applicants from the 
provinces affected by the earthquake, in February 2023.4 
TRIPS Council  
5.9.  The TRIPS Council met forma lly in October 2022  and in  March and June 2023 and held several 
meetings in informal mode. Discussions focused on the possible extension of the MC12 TRIPS 
Decision  on COVID -19 Vaccines5 to diagnostics and therapeutics .  
5.10.  In March 2023, the Workshop on  the Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement 
took place back -to-back with the formal meeting of the TRIPS Council . During that meeting, 
Members concluded the review of the annual reports on incentives for technology transfer to LDC 
Members and tec hnical cooperation activities and took note of the Secretariat Report on Notifications 
and Other Information Flows.6 
5.11.  During the June 2023 meeting, WTO Members agreed to restart  the Council's review 
mechanism under Article 71.1, which foresees reviewing the implementation of the Agreement every 
two years .  
5.12.  Dynamic discussions on "IP and Innovation" continued to take place, as Members share d 
information and best practices regardin g the role of IP in raising finance  for start-ups7; cross-border 
cooperation among IP offices8; and  research collaboration across borders .9 
 
 
 
3 See, for example: https://www.l egislation.gov.au/Details/F2021C00330 . 
4 Communication by Türkiye for the Trade Monitoring Report.  
5 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/30 , 22 June 2022.   
6 WTO document IP/C/W/687 , 1 March 2022.  
7 WTO document IP/C/W/692 , 29 September 2022.  
8 WTO document IP/C/W/697 , 3 March 2023.  
9 WTO document IP/C/W/699 , 1 June 2023 . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  6  TRANSPARENCY OF TRADE POLICIES  
Notifications and surveillance in WTO Councils and Committees1 
6.1.  This Section provides a factual overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' 
notifications to the WTO. Notifications are the primary instrument for ensuring transparency in the 
multilateral trading system. They are submitted by each Member and reviewed by the relevant 
bodies of the WTO. The importance attached by WTO Members to this issue explains the very 
elaborate system of notifications and cross -notifications put in place under the terms of most 
agreements. Transparency in trade an d in trade policy  making is fundamental for allowing trade 
policy makers  and businesses  make informed decisions , and markets to operate more efficiently.  
6.2.  The overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO illustrates 
that, with a few exceptions, compliance with notification requirements of the various 
WTO Agreements continues to be  very uneven. Despite  efforts by some delegations to bring their 
notifications further up  to date , the general sense is that pro gress on this front remains too slow. 
The lack of compliance with notification obligations across WTO bodies is problematic because it 
undermines individual agreements and , more generally , the operation of the multilateral trading 
system. There are several  reasons for low compliance with notification requirements , and an 
important  one relates to  capacity constraints of many WTO  Members , despite the efforts by the WTO 
Secretariat and individual Committees . The poor notification compliance must be addressed 
collectively by the WTO membership.  
Anti-dumping  
6.3.  Pursuant to Article 16.4  of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 
(the Anti -Dumping Agreement), all Members are required to submit to the Committee on 
Anti-Dumping Practices, on a sem i-annual basis, reports of any anti -dumping actions taken within 
the preceding six months, using an agreed standard form.  Members that have not taken 
anti-dumping actions during a given six -month period are required to submit a simple "nil" 
notification. Members that have not established an authority competent to conduct anti -dumping 
investigations have the option to make a one -time notification  indicating that fact , which remains 
valid unless and until they establish an investigating authority, in lieu of submitting "nil" notifications 
every six months.  
6.4.  Fifty-eight Members2 submitted semi -annual reports, either of anti -dumping actions taken, or 
of no actions having been taken, during the six -month period January -June 2023.  To date, 
53 Members have submitted one -time "nil" notifications.  The remaining 26  Members failed to submit 
semi-annual reports in respect of anti -dumping actions during the period January -June 2023. Few  
of these  non-notifiers are likely to have taken anti -dumping actions  as they have never notified the 
establishment of an investigating authority.   
Subsidies and countervail ing measures  
6.5.  The trends in the status of compliance with the obligation to notify subsidies to the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing  Measures under Article 25.1 during the period 1995 -2021 are shown 
in Table 6.1. Subsidy  notifications are required every two years , and the deadline for Members to 
submit their 2023 new and full subsidy notifications was  30 June 20 23.  
6.6.  A significant decline is observed in the percentage of Members notifying subsidies, decreasing 
from 50% in 1995 to 31% by 2023. Simulta neously, the percentage of Members making a "nil" 
notification has also decreased , from 26% in 1995 to 5% in 2023. When combining the data for 
those that notified subsidies and those that made a "nil" notification, the overall rate of notifications 
has see n a notable decline. In 1995, 76% of Members provided some form of notification, and this 
fell to 36% by 2023. On the other hand, the percentage of Members that did not submit any form 
of notification has increased remarkably , from 24% in 1995  to 64% in 20 23. 
 
1 Notifications in the SPS and TBT Committees are dealt with in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this Report.  
2 The European Union is counted as one (27  member States ). WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Table 6.1 Status of subsidy notifications (due on 30 June of the year shown) 
New and full 
subsidy 
notification  % share of total  
 1995  1998  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017  2019  2021  2023  
Members that 
notified subsidies  50% 39% 44% 45% 47% 48% 48% 47% 49% 48% 46% 46% 40% 31% 
Members that 
made a "nil" 
notification  26% 17% 15% 14% 13% 12% 18% 22% 19% 19% 16% 10% 9% 5% 
Subtotal notifying 
Members  76% 56% 59% 59% 60% 60% 65% 69% 69% 67% 62% 55% 48% 36% 
Members that did 
not make any 
notification  24% 44% 41% 41% 40% 40% 35% 31% 31% 33% 38% 45% 52% 64% 
Note:  As of 13 October 2023.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
6.7.  Pursuant to Article 25.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, all 
Members are required to submit to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, on a 
semi-annual basis, reports of any countervailing actions taken within the preceding six  months, 
using an agreed standard form. Members that have no t taken countervailing actions during a given 
six-month period are required to submit  a simple "nil" notification. Members that have not 
established an authority competent to conduct countervailing duty  investigations have the option to 
make a one -time not ification  indicating that fact , which remains valid unless and until they establish 
an investigating authority, in lieu of submitting "nil" notifications every six months.  
6.8.  Fifty-five Members3 submitted semi -annual reports, either of countervailing actions taken, or 
of no actions having been taken, during the six -month period January -June 2023 . To date, 
49 Members have submitted one -time "nil" notifications.  The remaining 33 Members failed to submit 
semi-annua l reports in respect of countervailing actions during the period January -June 2023 . Few, 
if any, of these non -notifiers are likely to have taken countervailing actions as they have never 
notified the establishment of an investigating authority .  
Safeguards notifications  
6.9.  Unlike the Anti -Dumping Agreement or the SCM Agreement, the Agreement on Safeguards 
does not oblige Members to submit semi -annual reports. On the other hand, the Agreement on 
Safeguards obliges Members to notify individual safeguar d actions, such as initiations of 
investigation or impositions of measure. The number of notifications regarding initiations and 
impositions  are explained in Section 3.2 of  this Report. In addition, pursuant to Article 12.6 of the 
Agreement  on Safeguards , all Members are obliged to notify to the Committee on Safeguards their 
laws, regulations and administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures. As of 
13 October  2023, 75 Members4 had notified their legislations, while 46 Members had notified that 
they had no such legislation. Sixteen  Members had not made such a notification.  
State trading enterprises  
6.10.  The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises reviews notifications of state trading 
enterprises on behalf of the CTG. Since 2004, these notifications  have been due every two years. 
Table 6.2 presents notifications received for the years in which a new and full notification was due.  
 
3 The European Union is counted as one (27 member States).  
4 The European Union is counted as one (27 member States).  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  Table 6.2 Status of new and full STE notifications (due on 30 June of the year shown)  
Year  1995  1998  2001  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  2020  2022  
Number 
of 
Members 
that have 
notified  65 65 72 64 63 66 66 61 64 68 54 47 44 
Note:  As of 13 October 2023.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
Agriculture  
6.11.  The CoA continued its review of the implementation of commitments under the A oA primarily 
on the basis of notifications submitted by Members. T welve distinct notification requirements are 
applicable in the domain of agriculture , covering the following areas: market access, domestic 
support, export subsidies, export prohibitions or restrictions , and the follow -up to the NFIDC 
Decision. The applica bility of a notification requirement is largely dependent on its specific 
commitments under the AoA. Out of the 12 notification requirements, the following 5 are "regular" 
or "annual" notification requirements: (i) imports under tariff and other quotas (MA :2); (ii) special 
SGs (MA:5) ; (iii) domestic support (DS:1) ; (iv)  export subsidies (ES:1) ; and (v)  total exports 
(ES:2).5  
6.12.  At each meeting, the Committee reviews Members' compliance with their notification 
requirements  under the AoA  based on a background document prepared by the Secretariat . The 
latest revision6 considered by the CoA at its September 2023 meeting showed that f or the period 
1995-2021, there were a total of 1,963  outstanding regular notifications , which represent ed around 
23% of expected notifications.7 Out of the five annual notification requirements, Domestic Support 
(DS:1) and Export Subsidy (ES:1) notifications have the highest number of outstanding notifications 
with 982 and 790 of notifications pending, respectively  (Chart 6.1). 
Chart 6.1 Outstanding notifications per type of notification requirement, 1995 -21 
 
a This number represents the count of reported years and does not necessarily match the number of 
notifications submit ted since some notifications covered more than one year.  
Source:  WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.50 , 15 September 2023.  
 
5 Annual notifications are required to be submitted no later than a certain number of days following the 
end of the year in question, in acc ordance with the deadlines set out in the Committee's Notification 
Requirements and Formats in WTO document G/AG/2 , 30 June 1995 . 
6 WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.50 , 15 September 2023.  
7 "Ad hoc " notification obligations applicable only upon maintenance o f a specific measure 
(e.g. Table  ER:1 required upon the application of export restrictions) as well as the annual notifications where 
it was not possible to determine a priori  whether the concerned notification requirement would be applicable 
(e.g. Table NF:1 applicable to donor Members o nly) are excluded.  
Submitted (6,724a)MA:2 (59)
MA:5 (93)
DS:1 (982)
ES:1 (790)
ES:2 (39)Outstanding (1,963)WTO_Agri.1   Outstanding notifications per type of notification requirement, 1995 -2021
a   This number represents the count of reported years and does not necessarily match the number of 
notifications submitted since some notifications covered more than one year.
Source:  WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/rev.50, 15 September 2023.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  6.13.  From 15 October 20 22 to 15 October 2 023, Members submitted 452 notifications (including 
addenda and corrigenda). A total of 285 questions were posed concerning individual notifications at 
the 21-22 November  2022, and the 27-28 March, 27 -28 June and 27 -28 September 2023 CoA 
meeting s that took place during th is period. Most questions related to domestic support notifications 
(82%), with the  notifications from China, India, and the United States being subject t o an extensive 
review based on multiple questions from other Members. A  total of 10 questions addressed overdue  
notifications from Egypt, the European Union, India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Türkiye, and 
Uruguay.  
Balance -of-Payments Restrictions  
6.14.  Notification obligations in relation to restrictions to safeguard a country's balance of payments 
stem from Articles XII and XVIII of the GATT  1994 and the Understanding on Balance -of-Payments 
(BOP) Provisions ( described  in Table 6. 3). 
Table 6.3 Notification  procedures for BOPs restrictions  
Legal source  Notification requirement  Type 
GATT 
Article XII:4(a)  
 
GATT 
Article  XVIII:12(a)  Any Member applying new restrictions or raising the 
general level of restrictions by a substantial 
intensification of the measures applied under this Article 
shall immediately after instituting or intensifying such 
restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prior 
consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with 
Members as to the nature of its BOP difficulties, 
alternative corrective measures which may be available, 
and the possible effect of the restrictions on the 
economies of other Members  Ad hoc, followed by annual 
consultations  
 
Ad hoc, followed by biennial 
consultations  
Understanding on 
BOP Provisions, 
para. 9  A Member shall notify to the General Council the 
introduction of , or any changes in , the application of 
restrictive import measures taken for BOP purposes, as 
well as any modifications in time -schedules  for the 
removal of such measures as announced under 
paragraph 1. Significant changes shall be notified to the 
General Council prior to, or not later than, 30 days after 
their announcement  Ad hoc, followed by a yearly 
consolidated notification  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
6.15.  The last BOP consultations  were completed in July  2017 and no Member has notified the 
Secretariat of the imposition of measures for BOP purposes since then.  
Customs valuation  
6.16.  Notifications  in the area of customs valuation stem not only from the Agreement on Customs 
Valuation  itself, but also from several  Decisions that have been adopted by the C ommittee on 
Customs Valuation. There are four main not ification requirements . 
6.17.  Article 22 of the Agreement on Customs Valuation and a Decision of the Committee contained 
in WTO document G/VAL/5 , 13 October 1995, require the submission of the complete texts of 
national legislation (laws, regulations, etc.) that deal with customs valuation, as well as any changes 
to such laws and regulations. Members must also provide answers to a "Checklist of Issues" provided 
for in the Annex to WTO document G/VAL/5 . During the review period, several Members updated 
these notifications. The number of Members that have notified their customs valuation legislation 
stands at 111, whereas the number of Members that have provided their answers to the Checklist 
of Issues remains at 78.  
6.18.  In addition, Members are required to notify the Committee of the date of application of th e 
Decision on the treatment of interest charges in the customs value of imported goods8, and Members 
that apply paragraph 2 of the Decision on the valuation of carrier  media bearing software for data 
processing equipment must notify the Committee of their  practice.9 As of mi d-October 2023, 
60 Members have submitted notifications relating to the Decision on the treatment of interest 
 
8 GATT document VAL/6/Rev.1, 1 October 1984.  
9 GATT document VAL/8, 10 October 1984.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  charges, including 2 Members during the period of review, and a total of 55 Members have submitted 
notifications with regard to the Decision on the valuation of carrier media.  
Import licensing  
6.19.  Notification requirements in the area of import licensing procedures result from the WTO 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. They are complemented by the "Procedures for 
Notificatio n and Review under the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures" adopted by the 
Committee on Import Licensing in 1995 (G/LIC/3) and the "Understanding on Procedures for the 
Review of Notifications submitted under the Agreement on Import Licensing  Procedure s" adopted on 
23 October 1996 (G/LIC/4). The notification requirements are described in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 Notification procedures for import licensing  
No. Notification requirement  Established in  Type  Notification  
category  
1 Submission of full texts of  
relevant laws and regulations  
and any changes thereto  Article 8.2(b) of the 
Agreement;  
G/LIC/3  One-off and  
ad hoc  N/1 
N/2 
2 Sources in which information  
concerning import licensing  
procedures are published  Article 1.4(a) of the 
Agreement;  
G/LIC/3  One-off and  
ad hoc  N/1 
N/2 
3 New import licensing procedures 
and changes to existing procedures  Articles 5.1 -5.4 of the 
Agreement  Ad hoc  N/2 
4 Reply to the Questionnaire on 
Import Licensing Procedures  Article 7.3 of the Agreement;  
G/LIC/3  Annual, by  
30 September  
each year  N/3 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
6.20.  The N/1 notification requires a WTO Member to notify all relevant laws and regulations with 
regard to import licensing procedures, as well as identify the source/publications containing such 
information. It contains both a one -off element (notification of existing laws and regulations and 
source/publications) and an ad hoc  element (changes to laws and regulations thereafter). In theory, 
a WTO Member should have at least one N/1 submission, prov iding its laws and regulations on 
import licensing or indicating that its government does not maintain any import licensing regime.  
6.21.  The N/2 notification is an obligation for Members to notify new licensing laws/procedures or 
changes made to existing laws/ procedures. It is ad hoc  in nature, and only due when specific 
circumstances occur. A new notification form (for notification under Articles 5.1 -5.4) was agreed at 
the Import Licensing Committee meeting held on 4 April 2019 for Members to use on a voluntar y 
basis.10 WTO Members may use and are effectively using this notification form for all notifications 
under Articles 1.4(a), 8.2(b) and 5.1 -5.4 (N/1 and N/2).11 The N/3 notification requires Members to 
reply to a Questionnaire describing all import licensi ng procedures in place by 30 September every 
year. 
6.22.  As of 25 October 202 3, 13 Members had not yet submitted any notification under any 
provision of the Agreement since joining the WTO , while 21  Members never replied to the Annual 
Questionnaire under Article 7.3. During the review period, as of 25 October 202 3, 148 new 
notifications under the Agreement on Import Licensing were received and circulated by the 
Secretariat.12 The Committee reviewed 102 N/1 and N/2 notifications relating to the institution of 
new import licensing procedures or changes in these procedures from 13 Members and 
46 N/3 notifications from 34 Members. On 4 October 2023 Myanmar, submitted a notification of the 
annual questionn aire under Article 7.3 of the Agreement for the first time . 
Integrated  Database  (IDB)  
6.23.  Market access transparency is anchored in reliable and updated information. The IDB is the 
repository of WTO Members' notifications on tariffs, imports and other market access information at 
 
10 WTO document G/LIC/28 , 1 May 2019.  
11 See footnote 1 to WTO document G/LIC/28 , 1 May 2019.  
12 The European Union and its member States are counted as one.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 87 - 
 
  the tariff -line level. The IDB provides to the WTO membership officially approved information, 
including applied  internal taxes and other duties and charges.  
6.24.  Chart 6. 2 shows  the completeness of tariff and import notifications to the IDB directly 
submitted by Members or collected by the Secretariat. As of 25 September 2023, the completeness 
of IDB notifications stood at 83% for tariffs and 75% for import statistics. The covera ge of the 2023 
tariff information that was due for 30 March 2023 was at 49%. The coverage of the 2021 import 
statistics was 44%. Of the 67 tariff notifications received for 2023, 39 (58%) included preferential 
tariffs.  
6.25.  The IDB notifications coverage varie s among Members. As shown in Table 6. 5, 44 Members 
(32%) have complete tariff information, and 47 Members (35%) have complete import statistics in 
the IDB. The table also shows high percentages of Members with at least six years of outstanding 
notification s - 34% for tariffs and 43% for imports.  
6.26.  The IDB data are disseminated in different WTO online portals and are used to calculate the 
statistics published in the World Tariff Profiles (WTP), a yearly compendium of comprehensive market 
access indicators.  
Chart 6.2 Completeness of IDB tariff and import notifications, 200 6-23 
 
a Notifications  of imports  for 2022 and 2023 were not due at the time of reporting.  
Note:  The completeness of notifications is calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules 
(i.e. European  Union  member  States  are included  in the European  Union  schedule,  and Lichtenstein 
in Switzerland's). Information provided by the European Union on the period since 1 January 2021 
covers its current 27 Member States. For the period until 31 December 2020, tariff information 
provided by the European Union also covers the United Kingdom.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat,  as of 25 September  2023.  
0102030405060708090100
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports a
Tariff
Imports a
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Submitted Collected Missing
* data not yet due. Completeness of IDB tariff and imports notifications, 2006 -23
(%)WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 88 - 
 
  Table 6.5 Completenessa of notifications among Members  
Number  of Tariffs  (up to 2023)  Imports  (up to 2021)  
years  with outstanding  data No. of Members  % No. of Members  % 
None (complete  data) 44 32 47 35 
1-2 years  21 15 14 10 
3-5 years  25 18 16 12 
6 or more years  46 34 59 43 
Total number  of Members'  schedules  136 100 136 100 
a The completeness of notifications is calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules 
(i.e. EU member  States  are included  in the European  Union  schedule,  and Lichtenstein in 
Switzerland's). Information provided by the European Union on the period since 1 January 2021 
covers its current 27 member States. For the period until 31 December 2020, tariff information 
provided by the European Union also covers the Unit ed Kingdom.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat, as of 25 September  2023.  
Preshipment  inspection  
6.27.  Article 5 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI) provides that Members shall 
submit to the Secretariat copies of the laws and regulations  under which they put th e Agreement 
into force, as well as copies of any other laws and regulations relating to PSI. Changes in such laws 
and regulations shall also be notified immediately after their publication. Since the last report, three 
Members submitted notifications relat ing to PSI, bringing the total number of Members that have 
made such a notification to 118.  
Preferential  trade arrangements  
6.28.  Under the Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs), which was 
established in December  201013, newly notifie d PTAs are to be considered in dedicated sessions of 
the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), on the basis of Secretariat -prepared factual 
presentations. Since the establishment of the Transparency Mechanism, 13 PTAs have been notified 
to the WTO. Four of these have been considered by the CTD in dedicated sessions , while for several 
others , the notifying Members have yet to provide the Secretariat with the information required for 
the preparation of the factual presentations. The CTD Chair provides an update at each meeting of 
the CTD's dedicated session regarding  the PTAs that are to be considered and urges the notifying 
Members to provide the data and information as soon as possible . 
6.29.  The Transparency Mechanism for PTAs also stipulates that an electron ic database on individual 
PTAs is to be maintained by the Secretariat. The Database on PTAs14 currently contains information 
on 37 PTAs. Table 6.6 provides  an overview of the PTAs included  in the database, which is updated 
primarily on the basis of information provided by the Members implementing PTAs.  
Table 6.6 PTAs of WTO Members  
WTO Member  Number of 
PTAs  Name or description of PTA  
Armenia  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Australia  2 Generalized System of Preferences    
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreementa 
Canada  2 Generalized System of Preferences    
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff  
Chile 1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
China  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
European Union  4 Generalized System of Preferences    
Trade preferences for countries of the Western Balkans    
Trade preferences for Pakistanb   
Trade preferences for the Republic of Moldovac 
Iceland  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
India 1 Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs  
Japan  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Kazakhstan  1 Generalized System of Preferences 
Republic of Korea  1 Preferential Tariff for LDCs  
 
13 WTO docu ment WT/L/806 , 16 December 2010 . 
14 Viewed at: http://ptadb.wto.org . WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  WTO Member  Number of 
PTAs  Name or description of PTA  
Kyrgyz Republic  2 Duty-free treatment for LDCsd 
  Generalized System of Preferences  
Montenegro  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
Morocco  1 Duty-free treatment for African LDCs  
New Zealand  2 Generalized System of Preferences    
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreementa 
Norway  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Russian Federation  2 Generalized System of Preferences ( 01/01/2010-10/10/2016)d 
  Generalized System of Preferences (as of 10 /10/2016)  
Switzerland  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Chinese Taipei  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
Tajikistan  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
Thailand  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCse 
Türkiye  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
United Kingdom  2 Generalized System of Preferences (01/01/2021-18/06/2023)f 
  Developing Countries Trading Scheme  (as of 1 9/06/2023) 
United States  6 African Growth and Opportunity Act    
Andean Trade Preference Actg   
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act    
Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands    
Generalized System of Preferences  
  Trade preferences for Nepal  
a Australia and New Zealand both provide preferences under this PTA.  
b The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December  2013.  
c The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31  December  2015.  
d The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 10 October 2016.  
e The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2020.  
f The preferences granted und er this PTA expired on 18 June 2023.  
g The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31  July 2013.  
Source:  Database on PTAs.  
Quantitative restrictions  (QRs)  
6.30.  The notification of QRs to the Market Access Committee is an obligation established by the 
2012 Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions (WTO document 
G/L/59/Rev.1 , 3 July 2012). The Decision requires Members, every two years, to notify the 
WTO Secretariat of the QRs they have in force, as well as any changes in the interi m. As of 30 
October 2023, a total of 60 Members (counting the EU -27 as one) had submitted QR notifications 
and 78  Members had never submitted a notification since the requirement was established in 2012.15 
The number of notifications for each biennial peri od is provided in Table  6.7. 
6.31.  As of 30 October 2023, 38 Members (counting the EU -27 as one) had submitted multiple 
notifications under the QR Decision informing of the introduction, modification or removal of 
temporary export prohibitions and restrictions a s a result of the COVID -19 pandemic.16 In terms of 
the continued application of these measures, while some  Members have notified the extension of 
the temporary measures, and others have notified either the complete or partial elimination of the 
temporary export restrictions or have confirmed the expiration  of the measures, most Members have 
not notified additi onal information since their first QR notification. According to the Secretariat Report 
"Summary of notified export restrictions and trade -facilitating measures relating to the COVID -19 
Pandemic "17, approximately 19 Members provided information on 30 addit ional measures to the 
Trade Monitoring Report as a result of COVID -19 but did not notify these measures under the QR 
Decision as of the date of this Report.  
Table 6.7 Notification procedures for QRs  
No. Notification requirement  Total number of notifications received as at 
30 October  2023, by biennial period  
1 QRs in force (regular notification)a 2012-14: 28 notifications from 2 4 Members  
 
15 WTO document G/MA/QR/13 , 3 October 2023.  
16 WTO document  G/MA/W/157/Rev.5 , 17 October 2022 . 
17 WTO document G/MA/W/168/Rev.3 , 17 October 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  No. Notification requirement  Total number of notifications received as at 
30 October  2023, by biennial period  
2014-16: 37 notifications from 3 3 Members  
2016-18: 34 notifications from 33 Members  
2018-20: 91 notifications from 51 Members  
2020-22: 112 notifications from 48 Members  
2022-24: 53  notifications from 30 Members  
2 Changes to the QRs maintained 
(ad hoc), or introduction of new QRs  2012-14: 2 Members notified changes to existing QRs  
2014-16: 2 Members notified changes to existing QRs  
2016-18: No Member notified changes to existing QRs  
2018-20: 18 Members notified changes to existing QRs, most 
of which related to measures introduced as a result of the 
COVID -19 pandemic  
2020-22: 22 Members notified changes to existing QRs, most 
of which related to measures introduced as a result of the 
COVID -19 pandemic  
2022-24: 7 Member notified changes to existing QRs  
3 QRs maintained by other Members  
(reverse notification)  No Member submitted this type of notification  
4 Non-tariff measures maintained by 
other Members  
(reverse notification)  No Member submitted this type of notification  
a Some of these notifications contain information only on COVID -19 measures. See annex table in 
WTO document G/MA/QR/13 , 3 October 202 3. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Rules of origin  
6.32.  As of mid -October 2023, a total of 116 WTO Members18 submitted a notification on 
non-preferential rules of origin under Article 5 of the Agreement on Rules of Ori gin. Fifty-five 
Members informed the Committee that they implement non -preferential origin requirements, while 
61 other Members notified that they do not. Annex 1 to WTO document G/RO/W/225/Rev.1 , 
26 October  2023, contains a detailed report on no tifications received or outstanding. However, as 
noted in previous Reports, the majority of these notifications were made in 1995 -96 and some are 
known to contain outdated or incomplete information. As a result, some Members have proposed to 
update and sta ndardize the information available by adopting a new notification template. 
Consultations are ongoing on this proposal.19 
6.33.  In relation to non -reciprocal preferences for LDCs, all WTO Members  except three have 
notified their LDC -specific origin requirements.  In addition, the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial 
Decisions20 also require preference -granting Members to notify their preferential tariffs and import 
statistics from LDCs. Compliance with these obligations has significantly improved, even if some 
gaps remain , in particular concerning preferential imports under LDC preferential schemes.21 
Services  
6.34.  From mid -October 2022 to mid -October 2023, 31 new notifications were made under various 
GATS provisions.  
6.35.  Out of the new notifications submitted, 17 were made under GATS Article III:3. This Article 
requires Members to notify to the Council for Trade in Services, at least annually, of any regulatory 
 
18 The European Union and its member States are counted as one.  
19 See WTO document JOB/RO/8 , 18 April 2023 . 
20 WTO documents WT/L/917 , 11 December 2013 ; and WT/L/917/Add.1 , 21 December 2015.  
21 WTO document G/RO/W/163/Rev.12 , 2 October 2023 , provides a detailed overview of the 
notifications submitted and information gaps.  WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  changes that significantly affect trade in services  covered by  its specific commitments. During the 
reporting period, there was a significant decrease in  notifications compared to the previous four 
years . 
6.36.  Nine agreements concerning economic integration in services were notified under Article V:7  
of the GATS. These ag reements were referred to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements for 
consideration. The trend in annual  notifications  exhibited a continuous upward trajectory until 2012; 
however, the past decade experienced a relative slowdown, with the notable except ion of 2021, 
during which the highest number of Economic Integration Agreements ever recorded was 
observed .22 
6.37.  Five notifications were made under Article  VII:4 of the GATS. This Article requires Members 
to notify to the Council for Trade in Services any new  or existing mutual recognition agreements or 
arrangements. Since 2018, there has been a marked increase in the notifications received, in stark 
contrast to the trends observed in the previous two decades.  
6.38.  No notifications were received  under other GATS pr ovisions during this period.  
Chart 6.3 Notifications pursuant to Articles III:3, V:7 and VII:4, of the GATS  1995 -2023 
 
Note:  2023 data cover up to 10 October  2023. Changes to previously submitted notifications are not 
counted. Figures on Article V:7 include agreements of the EC/EU with its  future member States and 
EU-enlargement agreements.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Transparency of TRIPS  
6.39.  During the review period, 27 WTO Members submitted 327 notifications to the TRIPS Council, 
under Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.23 Chart  6.4 shows the laws and regulations notified from 
1995 to 10 October 2022.  
6.40.  Notifications peaked  in 1996, when devel oped-country Members notified existing laws or 
amendments that implemented the TRIPS  Agreement.  As of 2000 , notifications mainly  came from 
developing Members and recently acceded Members. The most recent rise in notifications reflects 
 
22 In 2021, 18 out of the 24 Eco nomic Integration Agreements were notified by the United Kingdom and 
its trading partners following the end of the transition period under the Withdrawal Agreement between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom on 31 December 2020.  
23 Australia ; Austria ; Bulgaria ; Canada ; Chile; Czech Republic ; Denmark ; Estonia ; France ; The Gambia; 
Germany ; Greece ; Hong Kong , China; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Republic of Korea; Latvia; Lithuania; Republic of 
Moldova; Montenegro; Portugal; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Slovenia; Türkiye; Ukraine and 
the United  Kingdom.   
0102030405060
Article III:3 Article V:7 Article VII:4Notifications pursuant to GATS Articles III:3, V:7 and VII:4, 1995 -2023
Note: 2023 data cover up to 10 October 2023. Changes to previously submitted notifications are not counted. 
Figures on Article V:7 include agreements of the EC/EU with its future member states and EU -enlargement 
agreements.WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
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  updat es in domestic  IP regimes in response to evolving  economic, technological , and social 
dimensions of IP, as well as the launch of e -TRIPS in 2019.24 
Chart 6.4 Notified laws and regulations under Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement from 
1995 to 10  October  2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat. e -TRIPS.  
6.41.  The cumulative total of laws and regulations notified until 10 October 202 3 was 6,050  legal 
texts. There continue to be significant gaps in the coverage of more recent laws and legislative 
amendments, as several Members have not updated their initial notifications for well over a decade.  
Most of the submissions under Article 63.2 cover patent -related legal instruments, i ncluding plant 
variety protection. Chart 6.5 shows the notifications by subject matter from 1995 to 
10 October  2023.  
 
24 The e -TRIPS System consists o f the Submission System that enables  Members to easily submit TRIPS 
notifications, review materials, and reports; and the companion Gateway , which is an online information portal 
that allows users to search the full range of TRIPS information managed by the Secretariat.  The Secretariat 
provides regular training sessions and updates to Members.  Viewed at : e-trips.wto.org .  
01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000
02004006008001,0001,200
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
First notification Amendment or revision to notified legal text(s)
Replacement or consolidation of legal text(s) Running Total (right-hand axis)Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 from 1995 to 10 October 2023WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 93 - 
 
  Chart 6.5 Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 by subject matter, 
from  1995 to 10 October 2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat. e -TRIPS.  
6.42.  Transparency obligations also refer to final judicial decisions and administrative rulings of a 
general application on the subject matter of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as to agreements between 
governments or governmental agencies, as provided for by Article  63.1. So  far, very few Members 
have shared such information with the TRIPS Council.25 
6.43.  Following the recommendation made by the TRIPS Council in March 201026, WTO Members 
agreed to sha re information on, and notify bilateral agreements, related to the protection of 
geographical indications to which they are a party. The records indicate that few Members have 
shared or notified such agreements to the TRIPS Council, despite the conclusion of several such 
agreements.  
TRIPS checklists  
6.44.  The TRIPS Council agreed that to enable transparency on enforcement of IP Rights 
(i.e. Part III of the TRIPS Agreement) Members should provide responses to an illustrative list of 
questions on their domestic sys tems, termed the Checklist on Enforcement.27 Similarly, 
questionnaires were agreed to implement the Agreement's built -in reviews under Article 24.2 on 
geographical indications28, and Article 27.3(b) on biotech patenting and plant variety protection.29 
The information therein can have direct bearing on trade policy considerations and aspects of the 
global economy: for instance, the Checklist on Enforcement reports in detail on border measures. 
Chart  6.6 shows the Checklists on Enforcement , geographical indic ations , and biotech patenting and 
plant variety protection submitted from 1996 until 10 October 202 3.  
 
25 See, for example , WTO documents IP/N/1/PHL/2 , 27 July 2001 ; IP/N/1/ GBR/1 , 9 April 1996 ; and 
IP/N/1/HKG/3 , 21 January 2003 . 
26 WTO document IP/C/M/62 , 1 June 2010 , paras. 73 and 74 . 
27 WTO d ocument IP/C/5 , 30 November 1995 ; and responses circulated in the IP/N/6/ * series of 
documents.  
28 WTO document IP/C/13 , 14 May 1998  and its Addendum; and responses circulated in the 
IP/C/W/117/ * series of documents.  
29 See checklist in WTO documents IP/C/W/122 , 22 December 1998; IP/C/W/273 , 5 June 2001  and its 
Rev.1; and responses circulated i n the IP/C/W/125/ * series of documents.  
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
Patents (including plant variety protection)
Copyright and related rights
Trademarks
Enforcement
Geographical indications
Other
Industrial property (general)
Industrial designs
Undisclosed information
Layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits
First notification
Amendment or revision to notified legal text(s)
Replacement or consolidation of legal text(s)Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 by subject matter, from 1995 to 10 October 2023WT/TPR/OV/26  
 
- 94 - 
 
  Chart 6.6 Checklist on enforcement , geographical indications , and biotech patenting and 
plant variety protection from 1996 to 10 October 202 3 
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat. e -TRIPS.  
6.45.  During the review period,  El Salvador, Austria, Botswana, and The Gambia submitted their 
respective responses to the Checklist s on Enforcement .30 There were no other submissions.  
Technical cooperation and technology transfer  
6.46.  The TRIPS Council also agreed that developed Members sho uld provide information on 
technical cooperation and on transfer of technology incentives for the benefit of LDCs. The resulting 
reports are circulated and reviewed by the TRIPS Council. They provide detailed information on 
measures taken to implement the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement at the national level.  
__________  
 
30 WTO documents IP/N/6/SLV/2 , 21 December 2022 ; IP/N/6/AUT/2 , 23 January 2023 ; IP/N/6/BWA/1 , 
9 February 2023 ; and IP/N/6/GMB/1 , 22 February 2023 . 
05101520253035
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Enforcement checklist - first notification Enforcement checklist - Update
Art. 24.2 - First notification Art. 24.2 - Update
Art. 27.3(b) - First notification Art. 27.3(b) - UpdateChecklist on enforcement; geographical indications; and biotech patenting and plant variety protection