Risk Management Proposal  
 
Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes   
ZOOMAMON.AUS  
 
 
 
 
[Document Date]   
 
 
Disclaimer  
This risk management proposal does not constitute,  and should not be regarded as, legal advice. While every 
effort has been made to ensure the information in this document is accurate, the Ministry for Primary Industries 
does not accept any responsibility or liability whatsoever for any error of fact, omi ssion, interpretation or opinion 
that may be present, however it may have occurred.  
© Crown Copyright - Ministry for Primary Industries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact for further information : 
Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI )  
Agriculture and Investment Services  
Animal Imports  
PO Box 2526  
Wellington 6140  
Email: animal.imports@mpi.govt.nz  
Telephone:  04 890 0134  
 Risk Management Proposal:  Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes  [Document Date ] 
Ministry for Primary Industries   Page 1 Contents  
1 Purpose  3 
2 Background  3 
3 Objective  3 
4 Options assessment  3 
5 Recommendations for identified risk organisms  4 
5.1 Leptospira  species  4 
5.2 Seeds  4 
5.3 External parasites  5 
5.4 Internal parasites  5 
5.5 Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)  6 
5.6 Macropod herpesvirus  7 
5.7 Koala retrovirus  8 
5.8 Orphaned animals  8 
5.9 Eligible species  8 
 
 Risk Management Proposal:  Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes  [Document Date ] 
Ministry for Primary Industries   Page 3 1 Purpose  
The purpose of this document is to:  
 Show how options for the management of risk o rganisms have been assessed.  
 Provide recommendations for import requirements.  
2 Background  
Marsupials and monotremes are considered risk commodities, with the potential to harbour exotic viral, bacterial 
and parasitic diseases which could become established in New Zealand.  
In November 2014, the Import Risk Analysis (IRA) Specified Marsupials and Monotremes from Australia was 
completed by the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).  
Subsequently the Import Health Standard for Zoo Marsupials and Monot remes from Australia was issued in 2015, 
supported by the 2015 Risk Management Proposal.  
The zoo industry has since requested that the approved species list in the IHS is expanded to include all species 
of marsupials and monotremes holding a containment ap proval by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA).  
The MPI Risk team reassessed the original risk decisions in the IRA: Specified Marsupials and Monotremes from 
Australia, and concluded that none of the risk organisms identified in the IRA are manage d by restricting imports 
to certain species of monotremes and marsupials. Thus, the findings of the 2015 IRA can be applied to all EPA -
approved species of monotremes and marsupials from Australia.  
Risk mitigation measures discussed in the 2015 RMP will the refore remain unchanged.  
The decisions from that document are also repeated in the remainder of this document. These decisions 
accompany the current draft IHS for consultation.  
3 Objective  
The objective of the risk management measures proposed for the IHS is  to manage, to an acceptable level, the 
biosecurity risks posed by the import of marsupials and monotremes into New Zealand from Australia.  
4 Options assessment  
Under Article 3.3 of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement), risk management measures which provide a level of protection 
greater than provided international standards may be imposed only when they can scientifically justified on the 
basis of a risk assessm ent. 
For a detailed analysis of hazards and their risks please refer to the supporting document the Import Risk 
Analysis (IRA)  Specified  Marsupials and Monotremes from Australia . 
From the IRA, the following organisms were classified as hazards in the commodity and identified for risk 
management:  
 Leptospira spp  
 Seeds  
 External parasites  
 Internal parasites  
 Q fever  (Coxiella burnetii)  Risk Management Proposal:  Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes  [Document Date ] 
Ministry for Primary Industries   Page 4  Macropod  herpesvirus  
 Koala retrovirus  
5 Recommendations for identified risk organisms  
5.1 Leptospira  species  
(1) A range of Leptospira  serovars can subclinically infect marsupials. Antibodies against leptospires have 
been demonstrated in various macropods, but no clinical disease or lesions have been reported.  
Introduction of new serovars of Leptospira  is unlikely to have a significant impact on the New Zealand 
animal population.  
5.1.1 Risk management options for Leptospira  species from risk assessment  
(1) Individuals could be imported without restrictions.  
(2) Animals could be quarantined for 4 weeks and tested serologically upon entry into quarantin e and again 
after 2 weeks. Those that are serologically negative or clearly identifiable as having antibodies that 
indicate infection or previous infection only with a serovar that occurs in New Zealand could be imported.  
(3) Animals to be imported could be tr eated with suitable antibiotics before shipment.  
5.1.2 Recommended option  
(1) Because the zoo marsupial species covered in this risk analysis are not regarded as maintenance hosts 
for any Leptospira  serovars, the animals can be imported without restrictions. This is  consistent with other 
recent zoo standards.  
5.2 Seeds  
(1) Exotic species of seeds could be introduced by marsupials and monotremes attached to hair, within skin 
folds or in faeces.  
(2) The IRA  for the importation of weed species by live animals and unprocessed fibre of sheep and goats 
recommended that animals should be held, pre shipment, in areas free of weed species. Faeces produced 
during transport should be safely disposed of, either en rou te or on arrival in New Zealand. A copy can be 
viewed at the following link: www.mpi.govt.nz/document -vault/2827 . 
5.2.1 Risk management options for weed  seeds from risk assessment  
(1) Options are:  
a) The marsup ials and monotremes could be thoroughly groomed and inspected for contaminating 
plant material immediately prior to pre export isolation (PEI).  
b) The animals could be housed in a PEI facility free of environmental seeds. Feeding of processed 
pellets that ar e essentially free of seeds will ensure that the animals do not ingest new burdens of 
seeds.  
5.2.2 Recommended option  
(1) The above options are successive, and both are recommended to mitigate the risk.  
(2) However the timing of the examination will be flexible to mini mise the need for repeated anaesthesia.  
(3) It is also recommended that zoo marsupials and monotremes are certified as being clean and free from 
obvious contamination with dirt, plant material and other organic matter by the official veterinarian prior to 
export. These measures are consistent with c urrent IHS conditions for live animals, including zoo species.   
 Risk Management Proposal:  Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes  [Document Date ] 
Ministry for Primary Industries   Page 5 5.3 External parasites  
(1) Marsupials and monotremes can be affected by various species of lice, ticks, mites, flies and fleas.  
(2) Zoo animals are not considered a significant pathway for the introduc tion of exotic ticks due to the small 
numbers of animals imported as well as reduced exposure in captivity.  
5.3.1 Risk management options for external parasites from risk assessment  
(1) The following measures could be considered to mitigate the risk of importing exo tic external parasites:  
(2) Marsupials and monotremes could be treated with an acaricide, 7 -10 days prior to entering PEI.  
(3) Marsupials and monotremes could be treated during the 48 hours immediately prior to entering PEI with 
an insecticide/acaricide treatment regime that is effective against ticks, mites and fleas.  
(4) The quarantine premises in which the marsupials and monotremes are isolated for 30 days could have 
impervious washable floors and walls, or be on a fenced, impervious pad without walls and surrounded  by 
a cleared area free from vegetation. Bedding should not be straw or plant material that could contain tick 
eggs and larvae. Inert material such as wood shavings and sterilised peat could be considered suitable. 
The animals could be fed rations that are  free from potential contamination with ectoparasites, their eggs, 
larvae or nymphs.  
(5) Marsupials and monotremes could have all the bedding on which they are housed removed every ten 
days during the quarantine period and, at this time, the walls and floor co uld be thoroughly cleaned, and 
sprayed with an acaricide.  
(6) Marsupials and monotremes could be meticulously inspected for evidence of ectoparasites, at lea st 10 
days after entering PEI. If still infested, the treatment could be repeated and animals inspected  again at 
least 10 days later. Treatments and inspections could be repeated until the animals are found to be free 
from evidence of ectoparasites. The ectoparasiticide could be altered if the previously used treatment has 
not been effective.  
(7) Marsupials and  monotremes could be treated with an acaricide within the 3 days prior to shipment.  
5.3.2 Recommended option  
(1) The above options are successive and all are recommended, with some slight variations, to mitigate the 
risk of external parasites.  
(2) To be consistent with other current IHS conditions for zoo animals and to decrease the number of times 
the animals are handled, treatments must be given on arrival into PEI, and repeated 3 days prior to 
shipment. The timing of the  external parasite  inspection will also be flexi ble to reduce the number of times 
the a nimals have to be anaesthetised.  
(3) As per several recent zoo requests, a long acting acaricide can be used instead of retreating the premises 
every 10 days (see  clause 5  above).  
(4) Some Australian zoos are unable to meet c lause 3 (having zoo animals in enclosures with impervious 
floors and walls for a 30 day PEI period) for animal welfare reasons.  
a) It has been assessed as acceptable that the animals are housed in enclosures without impervious 
washable floors for the first 2 0 days.  
i) The enclosure must be surrounded by a cleared area free from vegetation.  
ii) For the last 10 days of PEI the animals must be contained in premises with impervious floors.  
b) If option a) is chosen an additional tick inspection is required.  
5.4 Internal parasites  
Multiple genera of nematodes, trematodes, and cestodes have been identified in marsupials and monotremes. 
None of these are likely to be significant pathogens for monotremes and marsupials or for other animals in zoos. Risk Management Proposal:  Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes  [Document Date ] 
Ministry for Primary Industries   Page 6 However, it is possible that unknown parasites could be introduced and that the various host associations of the 
known parasites may not yet be fully understood, making internal parasites a non -negligible hazard.  
A range of internal parasites has been reported in marsupials and m onotremes. The below points have been 
considered when drafting options to manage the risks associated with the introduction of internal parasites in the 
commodity.  
5.4.1 Risk management options for internal parasites from risk assessment  
(1) Options are:  
a) The marsupi als and monotremes for export to New Zealand could be treated with an 
endoparasiticide effective against nematodes and cestodes 7 -10 days prior to entering PEI.  
b) Marsupials and monotremes for export to New Zealand could be treated with an endoparasiticide 
within 48 hours after entering PEI.  
c) The efficacy of the endoparasiticide could be checked 7 -14 days after the endoparasite treatment by 
examining faeces samples from the treated animals by the faecal floatation 
concentration/sedimentation method and be req uired to give a zero roundworm and tapeworm egg 
count.  
d) While being held in quarantine all soiled bedding could be removed at least every 10 days.  
e) Treatments and testing could be repeated on animals that have positive egg counts until they give a 
zero round worm and fluke egg count. The anthelmintic type should be changed as necessary.  
f) Within 3 days of export to New Zealand animals could again be treated with an endoparasiticide.  
5.4.2 Recommended option  
(1) An efficacious treatment for internal parasites must be given  twice during the PEI period, with an interval 
of not less than 14 days. These measures are consistent with current IHS conditions for live animals, 
including zoo species.   
5.5 Q fever  (Coxiella burnetii ) 
(1) Q fever is OIE listed but there is no Code  chapter wit h recommendations. Infections are of minimal 
economic importance but Coxiella burnetii  is a zoonotic organism that sometimes causes serious disease 
in humans.  
(2) Infection in wildlife is most likely to stem from direct contact with contaminated fomites, such  as faeces or 
birth products. A tick -vertebrate -tick cycle also exists. C. burnetii  can subclinically infect marsupials and 
monotremes. Even though marsupials and monotremes do not exhibit clinical signs they are capable of 
shedding the organism intermitte ntly over prolonged periods of time.  
(3) Imported marsupials and monotremes will be held in containment facilities, so the likelihood of exposure is 
limited to zoo staff, wild birds and rodents that may access their enclosures.  
5.5.1 Risk management options for Q f ever from risk assessment  
(1) Options are:  
a) The marsupials and monotremes could be imported without restrictions.  
b) Marsupials and monotremes for export could;  
i)  be maintained tick -free and quarantined in tick -free premises for at least 21 days ; and 
ii)  test negative by an antibody detection ELISA within 5 days prior to shipment.  
c) Marsupials and monotremes for export could;  
i) be maintained tick -free and quarantined in tick free premises for at least 21 days ; and 
ii) test negative by an antibody detection ELISA within the 5 days prior to shipment; and  
iii) have a faecal sample collected and tested by PCR within 5 days prior to shipment with 
negative results.  Risk Management Proposal:  Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes  [Document Date ] 
Ministry for Primary Industries   Page 7 5.5.2 Recommended option  
Since potentially infected humans and zoo animals have been imported into New Zealand from m any countries 
for many years, it may be likely that C. burnetii  has already been introduced into New Zealand.  
The importation of a small number of  marsupials and monotremes into a containment facility is not considered to 
be relevant from a biosecurity point of view and therefore does not warrant measures.  
5.5.3 Discussion 2019  
(1) In addition to the above, the zoo industry commented on the difficulties of te sting for C. burnetii in 
marsupials and monotremes. The following points were raised:  
a) Antibody responses to Coxiella burnetii  are highly variable.  
b) It is unknown how long antibodies persist in Australian wildlife and whether this differs between host 
speci es.   
c) There is very limited data on the epidemiology  including seroprevalence  of Coxiella burnetii  in 
marsupials  and or monotremes .  
d) It is unknown how long marsupial and or monotreme hosts shed the bacteria for, or whether infection 
is persistent or transi ent. 
e) There is limited availability for serological, commercial ly available tests in Australia.  
f) Given the lack of knowledge and accessibility , testing is unlikely to achieve  risk reduction.  
5.5.4 Recommended option  
(1) The animals are healthy, and originate from premises under permanent veterinary supervision; and follow 
a health monitoring programme including necropsies, and microbiological and parasitology testing.  
(2) Suitable measures are in pla ce to prevent tick importation.  
(3) No changes are required to be made to the IHS.  
5.6 Macropod herpesvirus  
(1) Macropod herpesviruses are assumed to occur Australia -wide, but disease attributable to herpesviruses 
has only been reported in captive macropods. A range of species has been affected including red, eastern 
and western grey ka ngaroos, several wallaby species and long -nosed potoroos.  
(2) There is a high prevalence of antibody titres to herpesviruses in captive macropods. Infection can be 
latent, and virus can be shed without the animal showing clinical signs.  
5.6.1 Risk management options for macropod herpesvirus from risk assessment  
(1) Options are:  
a) Macropods could be imported without restriction.  
b) Macropods could be certified as being born or permanently resident in establishments where no 
evidence of herpesvirus has been detected.  
c) Macropods could be held in quarantine for at leas t 30 days prior to shipment; and  
d) Macropods could be serologically tested for herpesvirus antibodies, and must test negative to be 
eligible for import due to the high likelihood of latent infection.  
5.6.2 Recommended  option  
(1) Animals can be imported without restrictions as there are no consequences for other animal or human 
populations in New Zealand. Individual zoo importers could choose to manage herpesvirus infection as a 
quality issue.  
 Risk Management Proposal:  Zoo Marsupials and Monotremes  [Document Date ] 
Ministry for Primary Industries   Page 8 5.7 Koala retrovirus  
5.7.1 Risk managem ent options for koala retrovirus from risk assessment  
(1) Koala retrovirus (KoRV) has a high prevalence amongst koala populations in some regions of Australia. 
Koalas infected with endogenous KoRV carry the virus for life.  As there is no existing koala popula tion in 
NZ zoos there are no immediate consequences  from the virus .  
(2) Options are:  
a) Koalas could be imported without restriction.  
b) Koalas could be certified as being born or permanently resident in establishments where no 
evidence of KoRV has been detected.  
c) Koalas could be certified as showing no clinical signs of disease suggestive of immunodeficiency 
prior to export. A complete (lifetime) health record could be provided for each koala.  
d) Koalas could be tested by PCR for KoRV RNA or DNA, and must test negative  to be eligible for 
import.  
5.7.2 Recommended option  
(1) As there are no existing koala populations in New Zealand, individual zoo importers could choose to 
manage KoRV infection as a quality issue and koalas could be imported without restrictions.  
5.8 Orphaned animals  
(1) The initial draft of the IHS sent to the zoo industry stated that marsupials and monotremes must have 
been born in, and remained in, a government registered or licensed zoo or wildlife park. At the zoo’s 
request and following consultation with MPI’s Risk A nalysis Team this has been  changed to include non -
zoo born marsupials and monotremes to enable the importation of rescued orphaned animals.  
(2) There are no risks identified in the IRA that are managed by restricting imports to individuals born in zoos. 
The fi ndings of the IRA could be applied to orphaned animals.  
5.9 Eligible species  
(1) At the zoo’s request and following consultation with MPI’s Risk Analysis team, the IHS has been amended 
to include all species of  monotremes and marsupials , provided the species has a  containment approval 
from the Environment Protection Authority (EPA).  
(2) There are no risks identified in the IRA that are managed by restricting the standard to certain species of 
monotremes and marsupials. The findings of the IRA can be applied to all spec ies.