WT/TPR/OV/25  
22 November 2022  
(22-8661) Page: 1/109 
Trade Policy Review Body   
 
OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS  IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT  
ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR -GENERAL1 
(Mid-October  2021 to mid -October  2022) 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 2 
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  5 
2   RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS  ................................ ........................  8 
2.1   Economic outlook and trade volume developments  ................................ ..........................  8 
2.2   Trade developments in value terms  ................................ ................................ .............. 12 
2.3   Trade -related indicators  ................................ ................................ .............................. 13 
3   TRADE AND TRADE -RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  ................................ ..............  19 
3.1   Overview of trends identified during the review period  ................................ .................... 19 
3.1.1    Regular trade measures  ................................ ................................ ............................ 19 
3.1.2    COVID -19 tra de and trade -related measures  ................................ ............................... 26 
3.1.3    Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis  ............................ 28 
3.2   Trade remedy trends  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..30 
3.3   Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures  ................................ ................................ ..37 
3.4   Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  ................................ ................................ .................. 43 
3.5   Trade concerns raised in other WTO bodies  ................................ ................................ ....48 
3.6   Policy developments in agriculture  ................................ ................................ ................ 61 
3.7   General economic support  ................................ ................................ ........................... 64 
3.8   Other selected trade policy issues  ................................ ................................ ................. 66 
4   POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES  ................................ ........................  83 
5   POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  ..........................  92 
6   TRANSPARENCY OF TRADE POLICIES  ................................ ................................ ........  96 
 
 
 
 
1 This Report covers the period mid -October 2021 to mid -October 2022. It is presented pursuant to 
Paragraph G of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate and aims to assist the Trade Policy Review Body to 
undertake its annual overview of developments in th e international trading environment that are having an 
impact on the multilateral trading system. The Report is issued under the sole responsibility of the 
Director -General. It has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor does it have any legal 
implications with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any WTO Agreements or 
any provisions thereof.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1. This WTO Trade Monitoring Report on trade -related developments comes at a time when the 
global economy continues to face multiple challenges. The war in Ukraine, events related to climate 
change , soaring of food and energy prices as well as the continuing ramificat ions of the COVID -19 
pandemic are having serious implications for the global economy .  
2. Since 2020, the pace of implementation of new restrictions  by WTO Members, in particular on 
the export side,  has increased, first in the context of the pandemic and more  recently in the context 
of the war in Ukraine and the food security crisis. Between mid -October 2021 and mid -October 2022, 
WTO Members have lift ed some of the se export restrictions . As of mid -October 2022 , 52 export 
restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers and 27 COVID -19-related export restrictions on essential 
products to combat the spread of the virus were still in place.   
3. During the review period , WTO Members introduced more trade -facilitating ( 376) than  
trade -restrictive ( 214) measures on goods (these numbers exclude measures related to the 
pandemic).  The average number of trade -facilitating measures per month was the highest recorded 
since 2012. Most of the facilitation happened on the import side while  most of restrictions took place 
on the export side. For the first time since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise, the 
number of export restrictions have outpaced that of import restrictions. Initiations  of trade remedy 
investigations declined s harply during the review period.  The average number of trade remedy 
initiations per month was the lowest recorded since 2012.  
4. The successful conclusion of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) on 17 June 2022 in 
Geneva secured a series of unprecedente d multilaterally agreed  outcomes on fisheries subsidies, on 
the WTO response to the current and future pandemics, including a waiver of certain intellectual 
property  (IP) requirements concerning compulsory licensing for COVID -19 vaccines, on food 
security,  and on WTO reform. The moratorium on e -commerce customs duties was also extended. 
The MC12 outcome s underline the critical role of the WTO in addressing the world's most pressing 
issues, especially at a time when global solutions are necessary to respond to global challenges and 
foster greater socio -economic  inclusion.  
5. WTO Members must build on the momentum achieved at MC12 and collectively cooperate to 
keep markets open and predictable to allow goods to flow to where they are needed the most, 
remove supp ly chains bottlenecks and get global value chains ( GVCs ) back to the disinflationary role 
that they have played in the past.  
Specific findings  
6. This Report is set against a backdrop of slowing international trade  as the global economy 
struggles with severa l interconnected shocks, including the war in Ukraine, high inflation, 
devastation left by several climate change -related events, and lingering side -effects from the 
COVID -19 pandemic. The volume of world merchandise trade is expected to increase by 3.5% in 
2022, with the pace of growth slowing in the second half of the year. Trade is estimated to further 
decelerate in 2023, with an expansion of just 1.0% for the year, down sharply from the previous 
estimate of 3.4%. Global GDP growth is estimated at 2.8% in 2022 and 2.3% in 2023 . Low -income 
countries are among the most vulnerable to these developments, as increased costs and reduced 
supplies of food and energy raise concerns  about food security and debt distress.  
7. Inflation  in 2022 was the highest some countries have experienced in decades. Increasing 
interest rates is the prevalent instrument used by some C entral Banks to control inflation, but not 
without risks  or repercussi ons. Under -tightening monetary policy may cause continued increases in 
inflation, while over -tightening may tip economies into recession. The cross -country potential 
inflationary effect from divergent policies and the appreciation of the US dollar are sour ces of 
inflationary pressures for some economies.  
8. The COVID -19 pandemic has brought attention to potential market failures in value chain 
organization and disruptions to GVCs  have been headline news since then. While industries and 
regions were affected i n different ways, supply chains proved to be resilient during the pandemic 
and since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine .  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  9. The pace of implementation of export restrictions  by WTO Members has increased  since 
2020, first in the context of the pandemic and subsequently  by the war in Ukraine and the food 
crisis. Between mid -October 2021 and mid -October 2022, WTO Members gradually lift ed some of 
these export restrictions. As of mid -October 2022 , 52 export restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers 
and 27 COVID -19-related export restrictions on essential products to combat the spread of the virus  
were still in place.  
10. During the review period, WTO Members introduced more trade -facilitating (376) than 
trade -restrictive (214) measures on goods, unrelated to the pand emic . The average number 
of trade -facilitating measures per month was the highest recorded since 2012. Most of the facilitation 
happened on the import side while most of restriction s were on the export side. For the first time 
since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise, the number of export restrictions have 
outpaced that of import restrictions. The trade coverage of the trade -facilitating measures was 
estimated at USD 1,160.5 billion, and that of the trade -restrictive measures at USD 278.0  billion. 
11. The stockpile of import restrictions  in force continues to grow. By mid-October 2022, some 
9.3% of global imports continue to be affected by import restrictions implemented since 2009 and 
which are still in force.  
12. Initiations of trade remedy  investiga tions by WTO Members declined sharply during the 
review period (10.9 initiations per month, the lowest since 2012) after reaching its highest peak in 
2020 (36.1 initiations per month) . Trade remedy actions remain an important trade policy tool for 
many WTO  Members , accounting for 37.4% of all non -COVID -19-related trade measures on goods 
recorded in this Report. Anti-dumping continues to be the most frequent trade remedy action in 
terms of initiations and terminations.  
13. In the services sectors , 174 new measur es were introduced by WTO Members, a third of 
which targeted tele communication , computer, and Internet - and other network - enabled services  
and a quarter affected financial services. Although most  new measures were of a trade -facilitating 
nature a signific ant number was trade -restrictive.  
14. The implementation of new COVID -19 trade -related measures by WTO Members  has 
decelerated over the past 12 months, with 45 such measures recorded on goods and 4 on services. 
Additional information communicated by WTO Members mainly consisted of termination of existing 
measures or amendments of others. Many COVID -19-related measu res affecting trade in services 
are still in force. The number of new COVID -19-related support measures by WTO Members and 
Observers to mitigate the social and economic impacts of the pandemic fell sharply over the review 
period .  
15. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, 443 COVID -19-related trade and trade -related measures 
in the area of goods have been introduced by WTO Members and Observers . Most were 
trade -facilitating (246 or 56%) , while the rest were trade -restrictive  (197 or 44%).  Members 
continued to phase out the pandemic -related measurers, and in particular the restrictive ones, 
during the review period. A ccording to information received by the Secretariat , as of mid -October 
2022,  79.2% of the COVID -19-related trade restricti ons have been repealed, leaving 27 export  
restrictions and 14 import restrictions in place. Although the number of the pandemic -related trade 
restrictions still in place has decreased, their trade coverage remains important at USD 134.6 billion . 
16. WTO Members co ntinued to use the  SPS and TBT Committees' transparency mechanisms 
to notify their sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and 
to discuss and often resolve specific trade concerns (STCs ) non -litigiously. Food safety was the most 
frequent objective identified in the regular SPS notifications submitted by WTO Members during the 
review period. Most of the new specific trade concerns (STCs) raised in the SPS Committee during 
the review perio d also concerned food safety. WTO Members submitted 127 SPS notifications and 
communications on measures taken in response to the pandemic.  
17. Most of the new regular TBT notifications submitted by WTO Members during the review 
period, indicated the protecti on of human health or safety as their main objective. A total of 
249 STCs were discussed during the review period . Members submitted 225 COVID -19-related TBT 
notifications to the WTO  in response to the pandemic . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  18. Members continued to use WTO bodies to addre ss their  trade concerns  and engage trading 
partners on real or potential areas of trade friction.  
19. In the Committee on Agriculture (CoA),  Members posed 344 questions  regarding  
individual notifications , overdue notifications,  and specific implementation matt ers (SIMs) under 
Article 18.6 . Most of these (64%) focused on Members domestic support notifications or policies.  
20. WTO Members continued to fin e-tune their IP domestic frameworks  and to implement  
specific IP measures to facilitate the development and dissemination of COVID -19-related health 
technologies. The pace of implementation of specific measures related to COVID -19 health 
technologies slowed during the review period . 
21. The Report also covers s everal other important trade -related developments and discussions 
that took place during the review period, including domestic regulation in services, electronic 
commerce, investment facilitation for development, micro, small and medium -sized enterprises 
(MSMEs), trade finance, and women's economic empowerment.  
 
 
 WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  This Report is submitted to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB ) pursuant to Paragraph  G of 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement. This provides for 
an annual Report by the Director -General to assist the TPRB in undertaking its annual overview of 
developments in the international tr ading environment that are having an impact on the multilateral 
trading system. It builds on the Director -General's Report to the TPRB on trade -related 
developments circulated to Members on  13 July 202 2.1 
1.2.  This Report covers the period from 16 October 20 21 to 15 October 20 22, unless otherwise 
indicated.2 The Report is issued under the sole responsibility of the Director -General and is intended 
to be purely factual. It has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor does it have 
any legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any 
WTO Agreement. Specifically, the Report does not question the explicit right of Members to resort 
to trade  remedy measures and is without prejudice to Members' negotiati ng positions  (Box 1.2) . 
1.3.  At the WTO's 8th Ministerial Conference in December 2011, Ministers recognized the regular 
work undertaken by the TPRB  through the monitoring exercise of trade and trade -related measures, 
took note of the work initially done in the context of the global financial and economic crisis , and 
directed it to be continued and strengthened. They invited the Director -General to co ntinue 
presenting the Trade Monitoring Reports on a regular basis and asked the TPRB to consider these 
Reports in addition to the meeting dedicated to undertaking the annual overview of developments 
in the international trading environment. Ministers commi tted to duly comply with the existing 
transparency obligations and reporting requirements needed for the preparation of these Reports, 
and to continue to support and cooperate with the WTO Secretariat in a constructive fashion.3  
1.4.  This end-of-year Trade Mo nitoring Report comes  at a time when the global  economy faces 
multiple challenges. The fight against the COVID -19 pandemic with new variants emerging 
continues. Despite some progress, access to vaccines is still lagging in some parts of the world. At 
the s ame time, the severe humanitarian crisis caused by the war in Ukraine remains . The 
repercussions of the war are wide and manifold and include serious blows to energy security, food 
security and to the world economy  at large.  Under its trade monitoring mand ate, the WTO 
Secretariat continues to monitor and provide transparency around the wide range of trade -related 
measures taken in response to these crises.  
1.5.  Since the outbreak of the COVID -19 pandemic, a consistent feature of the trade  and trade -
related measu res taken in response  to the COVID -19 crisis has been the frequent changes, 
adjustments, and gradual  roll-back of such measures to reflect the evolving situation. The updated 
lists of measures implemented in the context of the current pandemic  are availabl e on the COVID -19 
page of the WTO website4 and cover the areas of goods, services, and intellectual property, as well 
as measures communicated by Members on general economic support.  The lists presented on the 
website are updated regularly and are not exhaustive . This information is  provided for transparency 
purposes and do es not question or pass judg ement on the right of WTO Members  to implement any 
of the measures listed.  The full list of notifications received by the WTO  Secretariat in the context of 
the COVID -19 pandemic is also available on the  COVID -19 page of the WTO website.5 
1.6.  In accordance with the practice of the WTO Trade Monitoring Exercise of verifying information 
and measures with Members, the WTO Secretariat i mplemented an ad hoc  verification process of 
COVID -19-related measures. In recognition of the fact that some measures did not initially have 
official government sources, the regular update of these measures was listed only on the dedicated 
COVID -19 page of  the WTO Members ' website, pending verification by the relevant delegation. For 
those trade and trade -related goods, services and intellectual property measures submitted directly 
 
1 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1 6, 13 July 20 21. 
2 In addition to the trade policy measures implemented during the period under review and recorded by 
this Report, other measures which impact trade flows may have been taken by WTO Members and Observers.  
3 WTO document WT/L/848, 19 December 2011.  
4 WTO, COVID-19 and World Trade . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm . 
5 WTO,  WTO Members' Notifications on COVID -19. Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/notifications_e.htm . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  by delegations, or where official sources were found, a separate list was ma de available on the WTO 
public website.  
1.7.  The structure  of this Trade Monitoring Report  is similar to the November 2020 version. Each 
Section, except Section 2, will first cover the regular monitoring of trade and trade -related measures 
implemented during th e review period. Where relevant, specific developments in the context of the 
COVID -19 pandemic , including specific work and activities undertaken in various WTO committees, 
will also be covered. Developments related to the war in Ukraine will also be cover ed. 
1.8.  A separate Addendum6 to this Report contains Annexes on recorded trade and trade -related 
measures taken by WTO Members and Observers  in the areas of goods and services from 16 October  
2021 to 15 October  2022. This separate Addendum lists new regular ( non-COVID -19-related) 
measures recorded during the review period. Measures implemented outside of this period are not 
included in these Annexes . This information is also publicly available through the Trade Monitoring 
Database (TMDB).7 
1.9.  Information on the measures included in this Report has been collected from inputs submitted 
by WTO Members and Observers, as well as from other official and public sources. Replies to the 
initial  request for information on measures taken during the period  under review and replies to the 
request s for verification were received from 81 Members8 (Box 1.1), which represents 49.4% of the 
Membership, and covers around 91.1% of world imports.9 Four Observers also replied to the request 
for information.   
1.10.   On 17 J une 2022, WTO Members successfully concluded the 12th Ministerial Conference 
(MC12) in Geneva, securing multilaterally negotiated outcomes on a series of key trade initiatives, 
including fisheries subsidies, WTO response to emergencies, including a waiver of certain 
requirements concerning compulsory licensing for COVID -19 vaccines, food safety and agriculture, 
and WTO reform. The moratorium on e -commerce customs duties was also extended.  These 
important achievements are also be covered in this Report.  
1.11.   The Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development (OECD) has contributed a 
topical box to this Report on critical raw materials for the green transition. The International Trade 
Centre (ITC) has contributed a box on perspectives on connect ed services and competitiveness.  
Box 1.1 Participation in the Preparation of this Report  
1. Albania  
2. Algeriaa 
3. Angola  
4. Argentina  
5. Australia  
6. Azerbaijana 
7. Bangladesh  
8. Belize  
9. Brazil  
10. Brunei Darussalam  
11. Canada  
12. Chile 
13. China  
14. Colombia  
15. Costa Rica  
16. Cuba 
17. Dominican Republic  
18. Ecuador  
19. Egypt  
20. El Salvador  
21. European Union  
22. Georgia  
23. Guatemala  
24. Honduras  30. Kyrgyz Republic  
31. Macao, China  
32. Mauritius  
33. Mexico  
34. Republic of Moldova  
35. Myanmar  
36. New Zealand  
37. Nicaragua  
38. North Macedonia  
39. Norway  
40. Pakistan  
41. Paraguay  
42. Philippines  
43. Russian Federation  
44. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
45. Serbiaa 
46. Singapore  
47. South Africa  
48. Sri Lanka  
49. Switzerland  
50. Chinese Taipei  
51. Thailand  
52. Türkiye  
53. United Arab Emirates  
 
6 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/2 5/Add.1, 22 November 202 2. 
7 WTO, Trade Monitoring Database . Viewed at: http://tmdb.wto.org . 
8 The European Union and its member States counted separately.  
9 This figure includes intra -EU trade.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  25. Hong-Kong, China  
26. Iraqa 
27. Israel  
28. Japan  
29. Republic of Korea  54. United Kingdom  
55. Ukraine  
56. United States  
57. Uruguay  
58. Viet Nam  
a Observer.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Box 1.2 About the WTO Trade Monitoring Report  
The Trade Monitoring Report is first and foremost a transparency exercise. It is intended to be purely factual 
and has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of WTO Members. It is without prejudice to Members' 
negotiating positions and has no legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the 
Report with any WTO Agreement or any provision thereof.  
The Report aims to shed light on the latest trends in the implementation of a broad range of policy measures 
that facilitate as well as restrict the flow of trade and provide an update on the state of global trade. The 
Report neither seeks to pronounce itself on whether a trade measure is protectionist, nor does it question the 
right of Members to take certain trade measures. The R eports continue to evolve in terms of the coverage 
and analysis of trade -related issues and take into account discussions among WTO Members in the Trade 
Policy Review Body (TPRB).  
Regarding trade remedy actions, it has been highlighted in discussions among  WTO Members that some of 
these measures are taken to address what is perceived by some as a market distortion resulting from trade 
practices of entities in another trading partner. The Anti -Dumping  and the Subsidies  Agreement s and 
Countervailing Measures permit WTO  Members to impose anti -dumping (AD) or countervailing (CVD) duties 
to offset what is perceived to be injurious dumping or subsidization of products exported from one Member to 
another. The Reports are not in a position to establish if, where or when such perceived distortive practices 
have taken place. The Reports have never categorized the use of trade remedies as protectionist or WTO -
inconsistent or criticized governments for utilizing them. The main objective of monitoring these measures is 
to provide additional transparency and to identify emerging trends in the application of trade policy measures.  
With respect to Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures covered in 
the Report, it is important to emphasiz e that they are neither classified nor counted as trade -restrictive or 
trade -facilitating, and the increasing trend with respect to the number of notifications of such measures is 
carefully linked to the transparency provisions of the Agreements only. The Reports have consistently 
underlined the basic premise that an increased number of SPS and TBT notifications does not automatically 
imply greater use of protectionist or unnecessarily trade -restrictive measures, but rather enhanced 
transparency regarding t hese measures. Finally, the Reports clearly emphasize that the SPS and 
TBT Agreements specifically allow Members to take measures in the pursuit of a number of legitimate policy 
objectives.  
The WTO Secretariat strives to ensure that the Trade Monitoring R eports are factual and objective. Since 
2009, the Reports have sought to provide a nuanced perspective to developments in international trade. For 
example,  the Reports  have consistently  emphasized  that although  the number  of specific  and often long-term 
restrictive  trade measures  remain  a source  of serious  concern,  other key factors  may influence  trade 
developments.  During discussions of the Trade Monitoring Reports at the TPRB, Members have also drawn 
attention to this point and to the fact that, with resp ect to both, vigilance remains imperative.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  2  RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS  
2.1  Economic outlook and trade volume developments  
2.1.  The medium -term outlook for trade has deteriorated after a series of related shocks hit the 
global economy during the review period, prompting the WTO to downgrade its projections for the 
next 18 months.1 Merchandise t rade is now expected to slow in the second half of 2022 and to 
remain subdu ed in 2023 as the war in Ukraine, high inflation, and lingering side -effects from the 
COVID -19 pandemic weigh on global economic growth. The WTO expects world merchandise trade 
volume growth of 3.5% in 2022 (up slightly from the previous estimate of 3.0%) followed by a 1.0 % 
increase in 2023 (down sharply from 3.4% previously) (Chart 2.1).  
2.2.  Import demand is expected to cool as growth decelerates in major economies for different 
reasons . In Europe, high energy prices stemming from the war in Ukraine will conti nue to squeeze 
household  budgets  and raise production costs in manufacturing. In the United States, tighter 
monetary policy is likely to reduce  interest -sensitive spending on housing, motor vehicles and fixed 
investment. China faces the prospect of further  COVID -19 outbreaks and production disruptions 
coupled with weak external demand, while low -income countries face the possibility of food 
insecurity and debt distress  due to rising import bills for  fuels, food , and fertilizer s. 
Chart 2.1 Volume of world merchandise trade, 2015Q1 -2023Q4  
(Seasonally -adjusted volume index, 20 15=100)  
 
Note:  Each shaded region represents a ±0.5 standard error band around the central forecast.  
Source:  WTO Secreta riat estimates ; and UNCTAD.  
2.3.  Risks to the forecasts are mostly on the downside. Central banks are raising interest rates in a 
bid to tame inflation, but rapid tightening could trigger recessions in some countries, which would 
weigh on imports. Alternatively, central banks might not do  enough to bring down inflation, possibly 
necessitating stronger interventions later. High interest rates in advanced economies could trigger 
capital flight from emerging economies, unsettling financial flows. Escalation of the war in Ukraine 
could further  damage economic confidence, while trade restrictions on food and other  necessities  
could exacerbate inflation and  ultimately  reduce  trade and GDP growth.  
2.4.  Hard data on the impact of the Russian Federation -Ukraine war were scarce at the time of the 
WTO's Ap ril 2022 trade forecast, forcing WTO economists to rely on simulations to generate plausible 
GDP assumptions. As events unfolded, the WTO's GDP projections for 2022 were broadly correct, 
but estimates for 2023 turned out to be overly optimistic, as inflati on became more broad -based, 
and the war in Ukraine continued. The current forecast issued on 5 October 2022 is premised on 
 
1 WTO (2022), "Trade growth to slow sharply in 2023 as global economy faces strong headwinds", pres s 
release 909, 5  October. Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres22_e/pr909_e.htm . 
8090100110120130140
2015Q1
2015Q3
2016Q1
2016Q3
2017Q1
2017Q3
2018Q1
2018Q3
2019Q1
2019Q3
2020Q1
2020Q3
2021Q1
2021Q3
2022Q1
2022Q3
2023Q1
2023Q3
2023Q4G20_ECO.1   World merchandise trade volume, 2015Q1 -2023Q4
(Seasonally -adjusted volume index, 2015=100)
Note: Each shaded region represents a + -0.5 standard error band around the central forecast.
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UNCTAD ; WTO Secretariat estimates.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  world GDP growth at market exchange rates of 2.8% in 2022 (unchanged from the previous forecast) 
and 2.3% in 2023 (1.0 percentage poi nts lower than previously estimated).  
2.5.  Trade growth will slow sharply but remain positive in 2023  if the current forecast is  realized , 
but all projections should be taken with a grain of salt given the unpredictable nature of the war and 
the shifting stanc e of monetary policy in leading economies . Uncertainty about the forecast is 
represented by error bands in Chart 2.1.  If current assumptions hold, trade growth in 2022 could 
end-up between 2.0% and 4.9%. The volume of trade  in 2023 could contract by as muc h as 2.8%  
if downside risks materialize, and if not, it could rise by as much as 4.6%. Trade could also finish 
outside of these bounds if any of the underlying assumptions change.  
2.6.  The war in  Ukraine has pushed up prices for primary commodities, particularly fuels, food, and 
fertilizers. These are illustrated by Chart 2.2 , which shows global commodity price indices on the left 
and natural gas prices by region on the right .  
2.7.  Energy prices in September were up 47% year -on-year and 125% compared to January 2021. 
The increase was led by  natural gas, prices of which rose 118% year -on-year and  433% since 
January 2021 . The 19% year-on-year increase in the price of crude oil in September is  small 
compa red to rise in natural gas, but it is still significant for consumers.  Crude oil prices remain high, 
having risen 64% since January 2021.  
Chart 2.2 Monthly average prices for primary commodities, January 2019 -September 
2022  
(Index 2019=100 and USD per million Btu)  
 
Source:  World Bank.  
2.8.  Natural gas prices have diverged strongly across regions  since 2021.  In September 2022, 
European gas prices were more than eight times higher than their level in January last yea r. Prices 
in the United States nearly tripled over the same period, but  they remained low compared to Europe 
(USD 7.76 per million Btu compared to US D 59.10 ). European purchases of natural gas from other 
countries to supplement reduced supplies from the Russian Federation have also pushed up the cost 
of liquified natural gas (LNG) in Asia, where the price of LNG has risen 141% since January 2021 . 
European gas prices mode rated in September (down  15.6% compared to August)  but they remain 
high by historical standards. Oil prices have also receded from their recent peak  (down 25% since 
June) , possibly indicating weaker global demand rather than an improved supply situation.  
0100200300400500600700800
2019M01
2019M03
2019M05
2019M07
2019M09
2019M11
2020M01
2020M03
2020M05
2020M07
2020M09
2020M11
2021M01
2021M03
2021M05
2021M07
2021M09
2021M11
2022M01
2022M03
2022M05
2022M07
2022M09Index, 2019=100
Energy Crude Oil Natural Gas
Food Grains Fertilizers01020304050607080
2019M01
2019M03
2019M05
2019M07
2019M09
2019M11
2020M01
2020M03
2020M05
2020M07
2020M09
2020M11
2021M01
2021M03
2021M05
2021M07
2021M09
2021M11
2022M01
2022M03
2022M05
2022M07
2022M09USD per million Btu
Natural Gas, US Natural Gas, Europe
Natural Gas, JapanMonthly average prices for primary commodities; January 2019 -September 2022
(Index 2019=100 and USD per million Btu)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 10 - 
 
  2.9.  Food prices in US dollar terms have also risen sharply due to the fact that the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine are both major suppliers of grains and fertilizers. This has raised food 
security concerns, especially in low -income countries that tend to spend a large fraction of household 
income on food. Many currencies have also depreciated against the US dollar in recent months, 
making imports of food and fuels more expensive in national currency terms.  
2.10.   Global grain prices were up 21% year -on-year in Septembe r 2022 while wheat alone was up 
24%. This marks an improvement over April, when grains were up 33% and wheat had risen 76%. 
Potentially more worrying for the future is the average price of fertilizer, which was up 75% year -
on-year in September after tripli ng since 2020. Reduced supplies and higher prices could cause 
farmers to use less fertilizer or do without, with negative consequences for crop yields and food 
security in the coming year.  
2.11.   While the supply situation for grains may not be as dire as at the start of the war in Ukraine, 
it is still a cause for concern. This is illustrated by Chart 2.3,  which shows the estimated value and 
volume of world trade in wheat. In July the volume of traded wheat was down nearly 20% compared 
to March but it was only dow n 4% compared to July 2021. Underlying data suggest that some 
countries have responded to higher prices by reducing consumption and imports. Since March, 
quantities of imported wheat are down year -on-year in the Plurinational State of Bolivia ( -69%), 
Jorda n (-41%), Zambia ( -38%), Nigeria ( -37%), and Ecuador ( -30%), among others.  
Chart 2.3 Estimated value and volume of world wheat exports, January 2020 -July 2022  
(Index, January 2020=100)  
 
Source:  WTO Secretaria t estimates based on partner statistics.  
2.12.   Chart 2.4  shows quarterly merchandise trade volume developments and projections by region 
from 2019 to 2023. The Commonwealth of Independent States  (CIS) , including certain associate 
and former member States , regist ered a strong 10.4% quarter -on-quarter decline in exports in Q2 
as sanctions against the Russian Federation were introduced . Exports from South America, Africa 
and especially the Middle East beat expectations in the first half of the year, helping to make up for 
reduced shipments from the CIS region. Exports from North America, Europe, and Asia in the first 
half of the year were broadly in line with expectations.  
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- 11 - 
 
  Chart 2.4 Merchandise exports and imports by reg ion, 2019Q1 -2023Q4  
(Volume index, 2019=100)  
 
a South and Central America and the Caribbean.  
b Commonwealth of Independent States, including certain associate and former member States.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UNCTAD.  
2.13.   On the import side, the CIS region plunged 21.7% during the second quarter of 2022, partly 
as a result of the economic sanctions against the Russian Federation. Imports of other resource -rich 
regions (South America, Africa, and the Middle East) came in stronger than expected, as high  
commodity prices inflated export revenues, allowing countries in these regions to import more. 
North  America and Europe recorded stronger than expected import growth in the first half of 2022, 
but imports of Asian economies stagnated with year -on-year gro wth of just 0.7%.  
2.14.   Table 2.1 provides details on the current trade forecasts for 2022 and 2023. The forecast of 
3.5% for world merchandise trade volume growth in 2022 is slightly stronger than the previous 
estimate of 3.0% from April 2022, with the differen ce mostly explained by statistical revisions and 
greater availability of data.  
2.15.   The Middle East is expected to record the strongest export growth of any WTO region in 2022 
(14.6%), followed by Africa (6.0%), North America (3.4%), Asia (2.9%), Europe (1.8%)  and 
South  America (1.6%). By contrast, CIS exports should decline by 5.8%. The Middle East should 
also have the fastest trade volume growth on the import side (11.1%), followed by North America 
(8.5%), Africa (7.2%), South America (5.9%), Europe (5.4%), A sia (0.9%) and CIS ( -24.7%).  
2.16.   One notable feature of Table 2.1 is the resilience of trade growth in Africa and the Middle East 
in 2022. These regions should see small declines in exports in 2023, but imports will remain strong, 
each set to grow by 5.7%. The  CIS region is expected to post a large growth rate for imports next 
year of over 9%, but if this happens it will be mostly due to a reduced base in 2022.  
Table 2.1 Merchandise trade volume and real GDP, 2018 -23a 
(Annual % change)   
2018  2019  2020  2021  2022a 2023a 
Volume of world merchandise 
tradeb 3.2 0.5 -5.2 9.7 3.5 1.0 
Exports        
North America  3.9 0.4 -8.9 6.5 3.4 1.4 
South Americac 0.6 -1.3 -4.9 5.6 1.6 0.3 
Europe  1.8 0.6 -7.8 7.9 1.8 0.8 
CISd 4.1 -0.1 -1.7 0.5 -5.8 3.3 
Africa  3.2 -0.4 -8.1 5.2 6.0 -1.0 
Middle East  4.8 -1.3 -8.9 1.4 14.6 -1.5 
Asia 3.7 0.9 0.5 13.3 2.9 1.1 
Imports        
North America  5.1 -0.6 -5.9 12.3 8.5 0.8 
South Americac 4.6 -1.8 -10.7 25.4 5.9 -1.0 
Europe  1.9 0.3 -7.3 8.3 5.4 -0.7 
708090100110120130
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2018  2019  2020  2021  2022a 2023a 
CIS d 4.0 8.3 -5.5 9.1 -24.7 9.4 
Africa  5.5 3.1 -14.7 7.7 7.2 5.7 
Middle East  -4.4 11.2 -10.1 8.4 11.1 5.7 
Asia 5.0 -0.4 -1.0 11.1 0.9 2.2 
Real GDP at market exchange rates  3.2 2.6 -3.4 5.8 2.8 2.3 
North America  2.8 2.1 -3.8 5.5 1.7 1.0 
South Americac 0.4 -0.6 -6.9 7.2 3.7 1.6 
Europe  2.1 1.7 -5.8 5.8 2.7 0.9 
CISd 3.1 2.6 -2.5 4.9 -3.2 -2.1 
Africa  3.2 3.0 -2.5 5.1 3.5 3.6 
Middle East  1.6 1.3 -4.5 3.5 5.7 3.4 
Asia 4.9 4.0 -0.9 6.2 3.7 4.2 
Memo: Least -Developed countries 
(LDCs)        
Volume of merchandise exports  5.4 0.0 -1.8 4.9 7.1 3.8 
Volume of merchandise imports  4.9 3.1 -10.9 9.5 6.6 8.9 
Real GDP at market exchange rates  4.6 4.9 0.4 2.1 4.4 4.4 
a Figures for 2022 and 2023 are projections.  
b Average of exports and imports.  
c South and Central America and the Caribbean.  
d Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member States.  
Note:  These projections incorporate mixed -data sampling (MIDAS) techniques for selected countries to 
take advantage of higher -frequency data such as container throughput and financial risk indices.  
Sources:  WTO Secretariat for trade, consensus estimates for GDP.  
2.2  Trade developments  in value terms  
2.17.   Statistics on merchandise and commerci al services trade in value terms are also of interest 
since they reflect countries' earnings from exports and cost of imports. These are shown in 
Charts  2.5 and 2.6 in current US dollar terms.  
2.18.   Chart 2.5  shows year -on-year growth in merchandise exports over  the last three quarters. It 
also compares the value of exports in the first half of 2022 to exports in the first half of 2019, before 
the pandemic. Total merchandise trade was up 17% year -on-year in the second quarter of 2022, 
down slightly from 22% in th e fourth quarter of 2021. Meanwhile, trade in the first half of 2022 was 
up 32% compared to 2019. The fact that merchandise trade values are growing at double digit rates 
while trade growth in volume terms remains in the low single digits indicates strong increases in 
prices of traded goods.  
2.19.   Exports of primary products were up more than manufactures in the second quarter of 2022 
compared to the same period in the previous year, especially so for fuels and mining products. Trade 
in manufactures was up 10% ye ar-on-year in the latest quarter while agricultural products were up 
13% and fuels and mining products were up 60%. The value of merchandise trade also rose 32% 
between the first half of 2019 and the first half of 2022 while the value of fuels and mining p roducts 
was up nearly 70%.  
2.20.   Quarterly statistics on world commercial services trade for the first half of 2022 have not been 
released yet, but data for the five largest exporting economies are available (January -July for the 
United States and China, January -June for the others). Exports of these economies are shown in 
Chart 2.6, which provides an indication of global trends. Exports of travel and transport services 
rebounded strongly in 2022 as pandemic -related restrictions have eased. China is the main 
exception, with travel spending held back by the country's zero -COVID policy. Exports of other 
services (a category that includes financial and other business services) only grew at a modest pace 
due to the fact that they did not decline much during the pandem ic. WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 13 - 
 
  Chart 2.5 Year-on-year growth in world merchandise exports through 2022Q2  
(% change in USD values)  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UNCTAD.  
Chart 2.6 Year-on-year growth in commercial services exports by category, 
January -June 2022  
(% change in USD terms)  
 
Note:  United States and China data refer to January -July. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and national statistics.  
2.3  Trade -related indicators  
2.21.   The WTO tracks a number of trade -related indicators to identify trends and turning points in 
merchandise and commercial services trade. Some of these are presented below to provide 
additional context to the forecast.  
2.22.   Chart 2.7  shows purc hasing managers' indices (PMIs), which are monthly economic indicators 
based on business surveys. J.P. Morgan aggregates PMIs from over 40 countries into a global 
manufacturing PMI, with values greater than 50 indicating expansion and values less than 50 
denoting contraction. The headline PMI index fell from 50.3 in August 2022 to 49.8 in September 
2022, marking the first contraction since June 2020. Meanwhile, the sub -index representing new 
export orders continued to drop, falling from 47.0 in August to 45 .9 in September. Overall, these 
suggest that global manufacturing activity has stalled, and that goods trade will continue to slow in 
the coming months.  
22
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productsFuels and mining
productsManufactures
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Note:   United States and China data refer to January -July.Year-on-year growth in commercial services exports by category, January -June 2022
(% change in USD terms)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 14 - 
 
  2.23.   Other sub -indices of the PMI cast light on the state of global supply chains. An index 
representing inp ut prices fell from 71.6 in April to 61.2 in September. Another showing final goods 
prices dropped from 63.8 to 56.6 over the same period. Together, these suggest that inflationary 
pressures, while still high, may have peaked. Delivery times also shortened  in August and stocks of 
finished goods rose. A few months ago, these would have been seen as positive indications that 
supply chain pressures were easing, but today they can just as easily be interpreted as signs that 
global demand is weakening.  
Chart 2.7 Global manufacturing PMIs, January 2018 to September 2022  
(Diffusion index, base = 50)  
 
Note:  Values greater than 50 indicate expansion while values less than 50 denote contraction.  
Source:  J.P. Morgan and S &P Global.  
2.24.   The RWI/ISL container throughput index tracks global goods trade quite closely. Although the  
shipping  index reached an  all-time high in August 2022 , it has been mostly flat since October 2020  
(Chart 2.8) . Throughput of Chinese ports dipped in th e spring due to pandemic -related lockdowns, 
but traffic rebounded again after these measures were relaxed. The decline in China was partly made 
up for  by increased container handling at US ports, which had previously experienced severe 
congestion. Overall,  the index suggests continued slow growth  in merchandise trade.  
2.25.   The WTO does not forecast commercial services trade, but Chart 2.6 shows that travel and 
transport services are two of its most dynamic components. This is backed up by Chart 2.9 , showing 
international flights, which are categorized as transport services but are closely related to travel 
expenditures by international tourists. Daily commercial flights (including those within 
the European  Union) finally exceeded pre -pandemic levels this summer, but by late August they had 
turned down slightly. Whether this pause is temporary or long -lasting remains to be seen.  
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- 15 - 
 
  Chart 2.8 RWI/ISL  global container throughput index, January 2015 to August 2022  
(Index 2015=100)  
 
Note:  The index is based on data gathered from 94 ports accounting for 64 % of global container traffic.  
Source:  Leibniz Institute for Economic Research and the Institute for Shipping Economics and Logistics.  
Chart 2.9 International commercial flights, 1 January 2020 to 22 August 2022  
(Index, week of 1 January = 100, 7 -day moving average ) 
 
Source:  OpenSky Network and  WTO Secretariat calculations.  
2.26.   Box 2.1 provides information and empirical research on inflation and the threat to food 
security.  
Box 2.1 Inflation – a threat to food security and the risk of recession – keeping markets 
open can be part of the solution  
Inflation in 2022 is the highest some countries have experienced in decades. In August 2022, year -on-year 
inflation in the United States was at 8.3%  the highest since 1982 . Year -on-year inflation 9. 1% was in the eur o 
area, and 9.9% in the United Kingdom. Similarly, developing, and emerging market economies recorded 
inflation of 10.1% (on annual basis) in the second quarter of 2022 and will face 10.8% in the third quarter  – 
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Original series (Index 2015=100) Seasonally and working day adjustedRWI/ISL global container trhoughput index, January 2015 -August 2022
(Index 2015=100)
Note:  The index is based on data gathered from 94 ports accounting for 64 of global container traffic.
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- 16 - 
 
  the highest since 1999. The IMFa forecasts a gradual decline of global headline inflationb from 8.7% in 2022 
to 6.4% in 2023 and 4.1% in 2024.c 
Several factors have led to the current situation. First, inflationary pressures in 2021 were initially prompted 
by a mismatch in demand and sup ply, consequently amplified by supply chain disruptions. At the onset of the 
pandemic, most firms anticipated a sustained decline in consumer demand, prompting them to reduce 
production capacity and cancel orders along their supply chains. However, as lock downs and associated 
restrictions weighed down on demand for services, there was a shift towards demand for consumer goods  – 
the latter being more traded. Demand for consumer goods was further stimulated as governments rolled out 
fiscal support programmes to mitigate the economic fallout from COVID -19. Firms faced a windfall of consumer 
demand as capacity constraints remained due to the resurgence of new COVID -19 variants in key production 
and transportation hubs. The IMF acknowledged in its fall 2022 World  Economic Outlook that the demand 
windfall had been the principal factor of inflation during the 2021 recovery. Supply -side bottlenecks related 
to the COVID -19 omicron variant and the war in Ukraine have, nonetheless, contributed to the resurgence of 
impor ted inflation as of the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022. Historically, global value chains (GVCs) 
have rather proved to be a disinflationary force, keeping market s open is key for their correct functioning and 
for capturing their beneficial effects.  
Second , reduced transport capacities, followed by the fast economic recovery in 2021 fuelled inflation though 
increasing transportation costs. The pandemic caused a sharp decline in passenger flights that carry cargo in 
the airplane belly. This, along with  the consolidation of the shipping industry and logistic bottlenecks created 
by the strong demand recovery , limited transportation capacities and pushed cargo freight rates to record 
highs. For instance, between 2020 and 2021, freight rates increased by as  much as 200 % to over 500 % on 
major shipping routes.d Although air and maritime cargo prices remain above pre -pandemic levels, freight 
rates have recently started to fall amid a decline in consumer demand, and supply shortages and logistic 
bottlenecks have  started to subside.e  
Third, inflationary pressures are fuelled by the fast increase of energy prices. Reduced exports of natural gas 
from the Russia n Federation  to Europe caused European gas prices to almost double between the first and 
second quarters o f 2022, and more than triple by the third quarter.f The effects spilled over globally as Europe 
sought alternative sources of natural gas to make up for the shortfall. Oil prices also experienced surges amid 
fears of supply disruptions  – the cost of brent crude oil peaked at over USD 120/barrel in March 2022, 
compared to USD 80/barrel in January, and has remained volatile throughout the year.g Higher energy prices, 
rising input costs and continued supply chain disruptions have slowed down the recovery in ma nufacturing 
industries, thus alimenting supply -driven inflation.  
Looking forward, the IMF has highlighted the risk of divergent or overly restrictive monetary policies further 
fuelling the fire. Increasing interest rates is the prevalent instruments centra l banks use to control inflation. 
This policy is, however, not without risks. Under -tightening monetary policy may cause continued increases 
in inflation, while over -tightening may cause economies to go into recession. There is also a cross -country 
potenti al inflationary effect from divergent policies. The appreciation of the US dollar, as the Federal Reserve 
raised interest rates before other major central banks, is one source of inflationary pressures for some 
economies. Since the US dollar is the dominan t trade invoicing currency, the increase in the price of the dollar 
(in local currency terms) is likely to pass -through to prices of both intermediate inputs and consumer goods 
outside the U nited States.  
Emerging market s and developing economies are also expected to suffer higher inflation through 2023 -24, 
compared to advanced economies, because of the market's lower responsiveness to monetary policy in these 
economies. Divergent monetary policy trajectories and the resulting market responses may cause the  
US dollar to further appreciate relative to some currencies prompting further exchange rate pass -through of 
inflation.  
A major concern with current inflationary pressure is food security . According to the World Food Programme 
(WFP), 345 million people are  now at risk of acute food insecurity  – up from 135 million in 2019.h Since the 
third quarter of 2020, prices of major grains and cereals (with the exception of rice) have been increasing due 
to factors including supply chain disruptions, high transport, e nergy and fertilizer costs, extreme weather -
related supply shocks, and export restrictions. During early 2022 , these prices skyrocketed amid growing 
uncertainty about the supply of grains from Ukraine and the Russia n Federation  due to the ongoing conflict.  
While they have returned to pre -war levels, they continue to remain considerably above pre -pandemic levels 
(Figure 1).  
Even as inflationary pressures begin to decrease, prices remain high. Economies with higher consumption 
shares of foods with large pric e increases, large food importers (especially net food importing developing 
countries), and economies with higher pass -through from international to domestic prices are likely to suffer 
the most. This includes low -income and developing economies  – where up  to 50 % of total consumption 
expenditure is on food  – as well as regions like Sub -Saharan Africa, where food makes up 40 % of the 
consumption basket and the pass -through from international to domestic prices is relatively high at 30 %.i  
It is important that markets remain open to allow goods to flow to where they are needed the most. In this 
regard, WTO Members' agreement at MC12 on exempting the WFP's food purchases from export restrictions, 
therefore saving the agency time and money as it delivers food to the world's most vulnerable populations, is 
an important step in the right direction. More can be done to remove supply c hains bottlenecks and get GVCs WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 17 - 
 
  back to the disinflationary role that have played in the past. WTO Members have reduced the number of export 
restrictions in place. This is also a welcome trend.  
Figure 1 IGC grains and oilseeds inde x and sub -indices (daily)  
 
a IMF World Economic Outlook: October 2022.  
b Headline inflation is the change in prices of all goods included in the CPI basket of goods.  
c These forecasts are subject to various assumptions, including no further reductions in natural gas flows 
from the Russia n Federation  to Europe beyond the 80% reduction compared to last year, stable 
long-term inflation expectations, and that disinflationary  monetary tightening does not cause a 
widespread recession or disorderly adjustments in the financial markets.  
d Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ e/serv_e/covid_and_rising_shipping_rates.pdf .  
e Viewed at: https://www.economist.com/graphic -detail/2022/09/30/global -shipping -costs-are-plunging -
as-the-world -economy -slows; https://www.wsj.com/articles/freight -rates-are-starting -to-fall-as-
shipping -deman d-wavers -11657454400; https://www.aircargonews.net/business/jumpy -airfreight -
market -sees-spot-rates-fall-again/ .  
f Viewed at: https://www.ft.com/content/ef02dd38 -7cc6-4c13-914e-e2b6b2b8ee9d . 
g Viewed at: https://markets.ft.com/data/c ommodities/tearsheet/summary?c=Brent+Crude+Oil .  
h Viewed at: https://www.wfp.org/global -hunger -crisis. 
i IMF World Economic Outlook October 2022.   
Note:  Jan 20 = 100 . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
2.27.   Box 2.2 provides perspectives on the importance of diversification and GVCs resilience.  
Box 2.2 Global supply chain resilience during the pandemic and the importance of 
diversification to deal with  future shocks  
Disruptions to global supply chains have been headline news since the beginning of the pandemic. Lockdowns 
and other policies enacted to combat the pandemic  have caused sharp increases in delivery times and shipping 
costs for essential and e veryday goods. The FBX Global Container Freight Index, a measure of global shipping 
costs across major routes in the world, increased by eight times, from about USD 1,300 per container to a 
peak of USD 11,000 in September 2021.a This was reinforced by majo r changes in the composition of demand 
from services to goods.  
The focus on disruptions ignores that global supply chains were surprisingly resilient.  While intermediate trade 
decreased by 10 % in the first half of 2020b, it recovered quickly and was key to sustain the surge in demand 
for goods. Solutions such as the increased  use of digital tools, from platforms to e -signatures, emerged soon 
after the shock of the pandemic and kept trade going. Already by the third quarter of 2020 , intermediate 
trade reac hed pre -pandemic levels and by the end of 2021 it grew by more than 55% relative to its 2020 
trough.c While delivery lead times remain elevated, much of this is caused by demand shifts and policy 
interventions that were not foreseen by businesses rather th an by the international nature of supply chains.  
Global value chains have played a key role in the production and distribution of personal protective equipment 
and vaccine components.  The pandemic caused an unexpected and dramatic increase in demand for various 
items from face masks to COVID -19 test and vaccine components. Over just three months in 2020, imports 
of face masks increased more than 15 times in the United States. Exports of  laboratory reagents were up to 
77% higher relative to pre -crisis levels.d None of this would have been possible without highly resilient and 
agile supply chains spread across the world to balance out local lockdowns and demand volatility.  
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  Yet the C OVID -19 pandemic has highlighted that increased diversification, or re -globalization, can improve 
the preparedness of global supply chains.  Trade enables firms to diversify sources of demand and supply, thus 
reducing a country 's exposure to country -specific shocks. Empirical evidence shows that firms with more 
diversified suppliers display a lower volatility and are more resilient to epidemics.e Businesses have realized 
this already before the pandemic. In the past decade, diffe rent factors from rising wages in emerging markets 
to increased trade policy uncertainty caused them to shift assembly from China to countries like Viet  Nam or 
Cambodia.f The pandemic has accelerated this phenomenon offering countries that were on the marg ins of 
global supply chains chances to participate. An example in this regard is India, which  might produce by 2025 
up to 25% of all Apple iPhones after being outside of manufacturing supply chains for years.g 
To benefit, countries must invest in open and predictable markets. The COVID -19 pandemic has brought 
attention to potential market failures in value chain organization. These may be caused by firms not investing 
sufficiently in strategies to mitigate the risk of extreme events because they do not cons ider the impact of 
their decisions on firms upstream or downstream.h The optimal response to this is providing open and 
predictable markets rather than separating the world into blocs or relying on purely domestic supply networks. 
Empirical research has sh own that openness reduces macroeconomic volatility through diversification.i In 
addition, restrictions to foreign inputs hurt a country's own exports and limit product innovations.j Even more, 
such policies risk to put an end to decades of trade -induced po verty reduction and development.  
a Viewed at: International Shipping Costs During and After COVID -19 (stlouisfed.org) .  
b Viewed at: World Trade Statistical Review 2021 (wto.org) .  
c Viewed at: Information note on trade in interm ediate goods (wto.org) .  
d Viewed at: Global supply chains at work: A tale of three products to fight COVID -19 (oecd.org) .  
e Herskovic, B., Kelly, B., Lustig, H. and Van Nieuwerburgh, S. (2020) , Firm volatility in granular 
networks, NBER Working Paper 19466; Huang, H. (2019), 'Germs, roads and trade: Theory and 
evidence on the value of diversification in global  sourcing', SSRN Electronic Journal . 
f Viewed at: GVC Development Report 2021 (wto.org) . 
g Viewed at: Apple may move a quarter of iPhone production to India by 2025 -JPM (reuters.com) .  
h Bacchetta, M., et al. (2021) 'COVID -19 and global value chains' WTO Staff Working Paper 2021 -3.  
i Caselli, F., Ko ren, M., Lisicky, M. and Tenreyro, S. (2020), 'Diversification Through Trade', The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics  135(1):449 -502. 
j Handley, K., Kamal, F., and Monarch, R. (2020), "Rising Import Tariffs, Falling Export Growth ", NBER 
Working Paper 26611; Goldberg, P., et al. (2010) 'Imported Intermediate Inputs and Domestic Product 
Growth: Evidence from India', Quarterly Journal of Economics  125(4):1727 -1767.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
 WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 19 - 
 
  3  TRADE AND TRADE -RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  
3.1  Overview  of trends identified during the review period  
3.1.  This Section provides analysis of selected trade and trade -related policy developments in the 
area of goods during the period from mid -October 2021 to mid -October  2022. It is divided into three 
parts. The first part looks at regular, i.e., non -COVID -related measures implemented during the 
review period, including calculations on trade coverage. The second part, in Section 3.1.2, covers 
measures taken in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic. These COVID -19 related measures are 
not included in the trade coverage calculations and are not counted towards the aggregate numbers 
in part 1. The third part, in Section 3.1.3, provides an overview of trade -related developments in 
the conte xt of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis, since the beginning of the conflict .  
3.2.  A separate Addendum1 to this Report contains Annexes 1, 2 and 3 on recorded trade and 
trade -related measures taken by WTO Members and Observers from 16 October 2021 to 
15 October  2022, in the area of trade in goods . Services measures are analysed in Section 4 of this 
Report and are listed in Annex  4 of the Addendum.  
3.3.  This separate Addendum lists new regular (non -COVID -19-related) measures recorded during 
the review period.  
3.1.1   Regular trade measures  
3.4.  A total of 943 trade measures were recorded for WTO Members and Observers during the 
review period (Chart 3.1).2 This figure includes measures facilitating trade, trade remedy measures 
and other trade and trade -related measures, i. e., trade -restrictive measures.  
3.5.  Chart 3.2 illustrates the trade coverage3 of the measures  recorded for WTO Members and 
Observers during the review period. These figures also include measures on food, feed and fertili zers. 
Chart 3.1 Number  of measures  introduced between mid-October 2021 and 
mid-October  2022  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
1 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/25/Add.1, 22 November 2022.  
2 These Annexes do not include SPS an d TBT measures, which are covered in Sections  3.3 and 3.4.  
3 The trade coverage does not include trade for measures that have been implemented and terminated 
within the review period. Trade coverage estimates for the review period were based on 202 1 merchandise 
trade . 
131 222 376 214 
Trade remedy initiations Trade remedy terminations
Measures facilitating trade Measures restricting trade943Overview of measures, mid -October 2021 to mid -October 2022
(Number)
Source: WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 20 - 
 
  Chart 3.2 Trade coverage of import and export measures  introducing between  
mid-October 2021 and mid-October 2022  in USD billion  
 
Note:  Trade -facilitating measures cover import and export -facilitating measures. Trade -restrictive 
measures cover import and export restrictive measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Measures facilitating trade  
3.6.  During the review period, 376 new trade -facilitating measures were recorded for WTO Members 
and Observers. 4 This represents  39.9% of the total number of measures recorded.  
3.7.  Most of the trade -facilitating measures are on the import side (Table 3.1). The reduction or 
elimination of import tariffs (257 measures or 68 .4%) make up the bulk of trade -facilitating 
measures, followed by the elimination or simplification of export quantitative restrictions (QRs) 
(38 measures  or 10 .1%) and import QRs (32 measures or 8.5%). The monthly average of 
31.3 facilitating measures recorded for the period is the highest since 2012.  
Table 3.1 Measures facilitating trade (Annex 1)   
Type of measure  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
Mid-Oct 20 to  
mid-Oct 21  
(WT/TPR/OV/24)  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/245)  
Import  181 205 148 113 144 100 96 136 117 324 
- Tariff 150 154 112 93 119 85 84 112 100 257 
- Customs procedures  17 30 27 17 15 2 3 6 5 21 
- Tax 2 5 4 3 6 5 8 8 6 8 
- QRs 11 5 1 0 3 1 1 8 6 32 
- Other  1 11 4 0 1 7 0 2 0 6 
Export  9 40 32 24 18 14 7 15 15 52 
- Duties  3 18 5 1 6 10 5 11 11 12 
- QRs 3 3 1 2 0 1 1 3 3 38 
- Other  3 19 26 21 12 3 1 1 1 2 
Other  1 4 3 0 0 1 1 2 3 0 
Total  191 249 183 137 162 115 104 153 135 376 
Average per month  15.9 20.8 15.3 11.4 13.5 9.6 8.7 12.8 11.3 31.3 
Note:  Revisions of the data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB  to fine -tune and update the available 
information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.8.  The trade coverage of the import -facilitating measures introduced during the review period was 
estimated at USD 1,038.4 billion, i.e., 4.7% of the value of world merchandise imports. Th e trade 
coverage is the second highest re corded for this type of measures since October 2012 (Table 3.2 
and Chart  3.3).  
 
4 This figure also includes measures taken in response to the conflict and terminations of restrictive 
measures that were implemented during the review period.  
8 14 
1161 278 
Trade remedy initiations Trade remedy terminations
Trade-facilitating measures Trade restrictive measures1,461Trade coverage of import and export measures, mid -October 2021 to mid -October 
2022
(USD billion)
Source: WTO Secretariat.Note: Trade -facilitating measures cover import and export facilitating measures. Trade restrictive measures cover 
import and export restrictive measures.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 21 - 
 
  3.9.  The HS Chapters within which most of the import -facilitating measures were taken, in terms of 
trade coverage, in clude mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) (20.5%), electrical machinery and parts 
thereof (HS  85) (11.8%), machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (9.3%), and organic 
chemicals (HS  29) (8.2%).  
Table 3.2 Share of trade covered by trade -facilitating measures   
(%)   
Mid-Oct 13 to 
mid-Oct 14 
Mid-Oct 14  to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19  to 
mid-Oct 20 
Mid-Oct 20  to 
mid-Oct 21 
Mid-Oct 21  to 
mid-Oct 22 
Share in total world 
imports  6.40 0.91 1.51 1.07 1.68 2.80 3.88 2.74 4.72 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
Chart 3.3 Trade coverage of new import -facilitating measures in each reporting period 
(not cumulative)  in USD billion  
 
Note:  These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e ,. annual imports 
of the produ cts concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each 
reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.10.   The trade coverage of the export -facilitating measures introduced during the revi ew period 
was estimated at USD 122.1  billion, i.e., 0.6% of the value of world merchandise imports. The HS 
Chapters within which most of the export -facilitating measures were taken, in terms of trade 
coverage, include mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) ( 46.4%), vegetable oils (HS 15) (26.7%), and 
cereals (HS 10 ) (10.0%). 
3.11.   Overall, t he trade coverage of the import - and export -facilitating measures introduced during 
the review period was estimated at USD 1,160.5  billion . 
Trade remedy actions  
3.12.   During the period under review, 353 trade remedy actions (131 initiations and 222 
terminations) were recorded for WTO Members  and Observer s (Annex 2 of the Addendum), 
accounting for 37 .4% of all trade -related measures recorded in this Report.  
2581,183
170249
169296545731
4821,038
02004006008001,0001,2001,400
mid-Oct12-
mid-Oct13mid-Oct13-
mid-Oct14mid-Oct14-
mid-Oct15mid-Oct15-
mid-Oct16mid-Oct16-
mid-Oct17mid-Oct17-
mid-Oct18mid-Oct18-
mid-Oct19mid-Oct19-
mid-Oct20mid-Oct20-
mid-Oct21mid-Oct21-
mid-Oct22Trade coverage of new import -facilitating measures in each reporting period (not cumulative)
(USD billion)
Note:  [see original text]WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 22 - 
 
  3.13.   After reaching its highest peak so far in 2020, the average number of trade remedy initiations 
during the review period was 10.9 per month, the lowest since 2012. The monthly average of trade  
remedy terminations recorded during the review period was 18.5, slightly higher than that of 2020 
(Table 3.3 and Chart 3.4) . 
Table 3.3 Trade remedy actions (Annex 2)   
Type of Measure  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
Mid-Oct 20 to  
mid-Oct 21  
(WT/TPR/OV/24)  
Mid-Oct 2 1 to 
mid-Oct 2 2 
(WT/TPR/OV/2 5) 
Initiations  304 277 343 298 273 281 433 213 248 131 
 - AD 236 229 298 249 202 215 355 186 214 103 
 - CVD 45 31 34 41 55 36 56 18 25 22 
 - SG 23 17 11 8 16 30 22 9 9 6 
Average per month  25.3 23.1 28.6 24.8 22.8 23.4 36.1 17.8 20.7 10.9 
Terminations  220 212 171 158 225 184 216 302 311 222 
 - AD 185 167 141 129 201 167 185 258 275 199 
 - CVD 23 25 15 12 24 7 12 23 23 16 
 - SGa 12 20 15 17 0 10 19 21 13 7 
Average per month  18.3 17.7 14.3 13.2 18.8 15.3 18 25.2 25.9 18.5 
Note:  The information on trade remedy actions for 2014 to 2021 is based on the semi -annual notifications. 
For the present review period, the information is also based on the responses and the verifications 
received directl y from Members. Anti -dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on 
the number ( n) of exporting countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one 
anti-dumping or countervailing investigation involving imports from (n) countries/customs territories 
is counted as (n) investigations.  
a The figure for a specific year is the sum of the following: (i) all ongoing investigations terminated 
during that specific year without any measure; and (ii) all imposed measures expired during the course 
of that specific year.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.14.   The trade coverage of all trade remedy investigations initiated during the review period was 
USD 8.3 billion, i.e., 0.04% of the value of world merchandise imports, the lowest regist ered since 
2013 (Table  3.4). For terminations, the trade coverage was valued at USD  14.0 billion (0.06% of 
the value of world merchandise imports).  
3.15.   Trade remedy actions taken during the review period, in terms of trade coverage, included 
initiations of inv estigations on articles of iron and steel (HS 73) (22.6%), miscellaneous chemical 
products (HS 38) (18.6%), ceramic products (HS 69) (7.6%) and plastic and articles thereof (HS  39) 
(7.5%).  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 23 - 
 
  Chart 3.4 Trade reme dies initiations and terminations, average  number per month  
 
Note:  Values are rounded.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Table 3.4 Share of trade covered by trade remedy initiations   
(%) 
 
Mid-Oct 13 to 
mid-Oct 14 
Mid-Oct 14  to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19 to 
mid-Oct 20  
Mid-Oct 20 to 
mid-Oct 2 1 
Mid-Oct 2 0 to 
mid-Oct 21  
Share in total 
world imports  0.20 0.17 0.55 0.48 0.53 0.24 0.36 0.15 0.04 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
Other trade and trade -related measures  
3.16.   Annex 3 of the Addendum to this Report lists measures that may be considered to have a 
trade -restrictive effect.  A total of 214 new trade -restrictive measures were recorded for WTO 
Members and Observers  during the review period.  Most of the trade -restrictive measures recorded 
are export measures . For the first tim e since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise the 
number of new export restrictions (129 or 60.3% of all) has outpaced that of import restrictions 
(85 or 39.7%).  
3.17.   Export restrictions mainly included the imposition of quantitative restrictions and increases of 
export duties. Import restrictions consisted of increases of import tariffs mainly , followed by the 
imposition of quantitative restrictions.  The average of 17.8 trade -restrictive measures per month is 
the highest recorded since 201 6 (Table  3.5). 
21 28 
25 
23 29 
25 
23 23 36 
18 21 
11 17 
16 18 18 
14 
13 19 
15 18 25 26 
19 
0510152025303540
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Mid-Oct 20 to
mid-Oct 21Mid-Oct 21 to
mid-Oct 22Trade remedies intitiations and terminations 
Initiations avg per month Terminations avg per month
Source:   WTO Secretariat.Values are rounded.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 24 - 
 
  Table 3.5 Other trade and trade -related measures (Annex 3)   
Type of measure  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
Mid-Oct 20 to  
mid-Oct 21 
(WT/TPR/OV/24)  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/25 ) 
Import  132 166 98 84 114 77 72 75 63 85 
- Tariff  83 106 63 47 70 46 40 36 24 50 
- Customs procedures  19 32 16 19 6 6 10 21 21 9 
- Tax 8 10 6 9 13 6 6 5 6 0 
- QRs 7 12 12 7 16 14 10 11 8 20 
- Other  15 6 1 2 9 5 6 2 4 6 
Export  26 44 20 18 18 19 27 66 62 129 
- Duties  12 13 6 4 9 7 4 14 14 17 
- QRs 8 7 10 8 4 3 11 27 23 96 
- Other  6 24 4 6 5 9 12 25 25 16 
Other  12 13 11 14 0 2 0 5 5 0 
- Local content  11 13 7 12 0 1 0 4 4 0 
- Other  1 0 4 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Total  170 223 129 116 132 98 99 146 130 214 
Average per month  14.2 18.6 10.8 9.7 11.0 8.2 8.3 12.2 10.8 17.8 
Note:  Revisions of the data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine -tune and update the available 
information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.18.   The trade coverage of the import -restrictive measures implemented during the review period 
was estimated at USD  163.5  billion, i.e., 0.7% of the value of world merchandise imports (Table 3.6 
and Chart  3.5). These figures  are slightly  higher  than those  of the previous  period  but remain  below  
the average  trend  observed  since 2012. 
3.19.   The import -restrictive measures recorded during the review period cover a wide range of 
products. The main sectors affected (HS  Chapters), in terms of trade coverage, were precious metals 
and stones (HS 71) (35.8%), machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (10.7% ), electrical 
machinery and parts thereof (HS 85) (10.2%) and iron and steel (HS 72) (7.5%).  
Table 3.6 Share of trade covered by import -restrictive measures (Annex 3)   
(%) 
 
Mid-Oct 13 to 
mid-Oct 14 
Mid-Oct 14  to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19 to  
mid-Oct 20  
Mid-Oct 20 to  
mid-Oct 21  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-May 22  
Share in total 
world imports  1.17 1.23 0.62 0.50 3.33 3.84 2.40 0.60 0.74 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.   
3.20.   The trade coverage of the export -restrictive measures implemented during the review period 
was estimated at USD  114.5 billion, i.e., 0. 5% of the value of world merchandise exports. The 
export -restrictive measures recorded cover a wide range of products. The main sectors affected 
(HS Chapters), in terms of trade coverage, were vegetable oils (HS15) (28.0%), cereals (HS10) 
(21.6%), machinery  and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (9.7%) and e lectrical machinery and parts 
thereof (HS 85) (5.6 %). 
3.21.   Overall, t he trade coverage of the import - and export -restrictive measures implemented 
during the review period was estimated at USD  278.0  billion . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 25 - 
 
  Chart 3.5 Trade coverage of new import -restrictive measures in each reporting period 
(not cumulative)  in USD billion  
 
Note:  These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e. a nnual imports 
of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each 
reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Stockpile of import -restrictive measures  
3.22.   Estimating the  roll-back of import -restrictive measures, and eventually the overall stockpile, 
is made complex by the fact that many temporary measures remain in place beyond the envisaged 
termination date. Moreover, the Secretariat does not always receive accurate info rmation on 
changes to reported measures. As a result, the figures below are estimates based on the information 
recorded in the TMDB since 2009. These estimates are conditioned by the availability of termination 
dates of the import -restrictive measures and of the HS  codes of products covered.5 
3.23.   Table 3.7 and Chart 3.6 show that the stockpile of import restrictions in force has grown 
steadily (and in fact since 2009) – in value terms and as a percentage of world imports – and that 
a significant increase in bo th took place from 2017 to 2018. This specific jump is largely explained 
by measures introduced on steel and aluminium, and by various tariff increases  introduced as part 
of bilateral trade tensions. Global imports decreased substantially in 2020 compared to 2019 . The 
decline was also reflected in total imports and in the value of the import restrictions in force. Global 
trade grew again in 2021, due to rising export and import prices as inflation became a global 
phenomenon.  
3.24.   For 20226, the trade covered by import restrictions in force  was estimated at 
USD 2,070  billion, representin g 9.3% of world merchandise imports.  
3.25.   For this Report, no information was received  from Members about the termination of import 
restrictions.  
 
5 Only import measures where HS codes were available are included in the calc ulation.  
6 Tentative figures based on 2021 import data and measures recorded up to 15 October 2022.  
201 214 228 
101 
79 588 747 
441 
106 164 
0100200300400500600700800
mid-Oct12-
mid-Oct13mid-Oct13-
mid-Oct14mid-Oct14-
mid-Oct15mid-Oct15-
mid-Oct16mid-Oct16-
mid-Oct17mid-Oct17-
mid-Oct18mid-Oct18-
mid-Oct19mid-Oct19-
mid-Oct20mid-Oct20-
mid-Oct21mid-Oct21-
mid-Oct22Trade coverage of new import -restrictive measures in each reporting period (not 
cumulative)
(USD billion)
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Note:  [see text].WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 26 - 
 
  Table 3.7 Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive measures since 2010 to 2021  
(USD billion, unless otherwise indicated)   
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018  2019  2020  2021 
Total imports 
(world)  18,109  18,193  18,483  18,654  16,360  15,812  17,587  19,402  18,883  17,625  22,020  
Total import 
restrictions in 
force  234 306 407 467 598 570 814 1,457  1,646  1,516  2,041  
Share in world 
imports (%)  1.29 1.68 2.20 2.51 3.66 3.61 4.63 7.51 8.72 8.60 9.27 
Total import 
restrictions  
terminated  15.43  59.41  37.15  34.05  1.51 38.09  3.88 5.45 13.12  n.a. n.a 
Share in world 
imports (%)  0.09 0.33 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.07 n.a. n.a 
n.a. Not applicable.  
Source:  WTO calculations, based on UN Comtrade database.  
Chart 3.6 Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive measures on goods since 2009  
 
Note:  The cumulative trade coverage estimated by the Secretariat is based on information available in the 
TMDB on import measures recorded since 2009 and considered to have a t rade-restrictive effect. The 
estimates include import measures for which HS codes were available. The figures do not include trade 
remedy measures. The import values were sourced by the UN Comtrade database.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.1.2   COVID -19 trade and tra de-related measures  
3.26.   During the review period 45 COVID -19 measures on goods – mostly facilitating measures - 
were communicated by 49 Members . 7 Of these, 4 2 measures were implemented during the review 
period and 3 referred to 2020. Most of the 45 pandemic -related measures  target ed imports ( 35 or 
 
7 Australia, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cambodia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
European Union (EU(27) and its member States are coun ted separately), Honduras, India, Kazakhstan, Mali, 
Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and United 
Kingdom.  
73126234306407467598 5708141,4571,646
1,5162,041
0.60.81.31.72.22.53.7 3.64.67.58.78.69.3
012345678910
05001,0001,5002,000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Import restrictions in force (left axis) % of world imports (right axis)Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive measures on goods since 2009
(USD billion)
Source:  WTO Secretariat.(%)
Note:  [See original].WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 27 - 
 
  77.7%) while the remaining were export  measure s (10 or 22.2%). Of these, 1 5 (33.3%) measures 
were temporary in nature and have been already terminated.  
3.27.   Overall, since the outbreak of the pandemic, 443 trade and trad e-related measures in the 
area of goods have been implemented by WTO Members and Observers (Table 3.8)8, of which 246 
(55.5%) were of a trade -facilitating nature and 197 (44 .5%) were trade -restrictive.  
3.28.   Members continued to phase out the pandemic -related m easurers, and in particular the 
restrictive ones. A ccording to information received by the Secretariat , as of mid -October 2022,  134 
(54.5%) of the COVID -19 trade -facilitating and 156 (79 .2%) of the trade -restrictive measures have 
been repealed . 
Table 3.8 Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures since the outbreak  
 Facilitating  Phased out  Restrictive  Phased out  Total  
Import  201 113 20 10 221 
Export  29 16 168 141 197 
Other  16 5 9 5 25 
Total  246 134 197 156 443 
Note:  Revisions of the data reflect changes to fine -tune and update available information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Chart 3.7 Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by 
mid-October 2022   
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.29.   The reduction or elimination of import tariffs and import taxes make almost 8 1.7% of 
trade -facilitating measures taken since the beginning of the pandemic. Certain WTO Members and 
Observers reduced their tariffs on a variety of goods such as personal protective equipment  (PPE), 
sanitizers, disinfectants, medical equipment, and medicine/drugs. In  many cases, tariff reductions 
were also accompanied by exemptions from VAT and other taxes. Extensions, often more than once, 
of some measures were implemented, while other measures have simply remained in force.  
3.30.   About 85 .3% of all COVID -19 trade -restrict ive measures are export -related. The roll -back of 
trade -restrictive measures taken in the early stages of the pandemic continued during the review 
period especially on the export side. As of mid -October 2022, 27 COVID -19-related  export 
restrictions were st ill in place.   
 
8 Measures implemented in the context of the pandemic up can be viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm .  
112 134 41 156 
Trade-facilitating measures in force Trade-facilitating measures phased out
Trade-restrictive measures in force Trade-restrictive measures phased out443Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by mid-October 
2022
(by number)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 28 - 
 
  Chart 3.8 Trade coverage of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by 
mid-October 2022  in USD billion  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.31.   The trade coverage of the COVID -19 trade -facilitating measures implemented since the 
outbreak of the pandemic was estimated to amount to USD  389.8 billion, and th at of trade -restrictive 
to USD 253.5 billion.9 Members and Observers have continued repealing the measures implemented 
in res ponse to the pandemic. The trade coverage of the COVID -19 trade -restrictive measures 
repealed since the beginning of the pandemic was estimated at USD  118.9 billion and that of 
trade -facilitating measures at USD 217.4 billion.  
3.32.   Although the number of the p andemic -related trade restrictions that are still in place has 
decreased, their trade coverage remains important (41 import and export 
restrictions -USD 134.6  billion ) compared to that of trade -facilitating measures (112 import and 
export measures -USD 172.4  billion ) (Chart 3.8).  
3.1.3   Developments  in the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis  
3.33.   The war in Ukraine has severely impacted a global economy confronted with multipl e 
interlinked crises, including on food, energy and climate  change , compounding the aftermath of the 
COVID -19 pandemic . 
Export restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers  
3.34.   Since the outbreak of the war, the WTO Secretariat has identified 7 2 trade -restrictive 
measures introduced by 2 6 WTO Members and 5 Observers10 on essential agricultural commodities, 
of which 66 applied to food and feed (90.4%) and 6 targeted fertilizer exports (9.6%). 
As of mid-October  2022, 20 of these export restrictions have been phased out, bringing the number 
of restrictions currently in force to 52.11 
3.35.   The trade coverage12 of the export restrictive measures introduced during the review period 
was estimated at USD 110.0 billion, out of which USD 8.0 billion referred to fertilizers. Several export 
restrictions hav e been repealed and their trade coverage have been estimated at USD 53.4 billion, 
of which USD 7.3 billion on fertilizers. Thus, the trade coverage of export restrictions that are still in 
place was estimated at USD 56.6 billion.  
 
9 Including imports and exports and based on annual 202 1 trade figures. For Albania, Algeria, Kingdom 
of Bahrain, Bangladesh, the Gambi a, Kazakhstan, Mali, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and  Viet Nam  data 
for previous full calendar year s were used , as 2021 data were not yet available.  
10 Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Plurinational State of Bolivia , 
Burkina Faso, China, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, State of  Kuwait , 
Kyrgyz  Republic, Lebanon, Malaysia, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, North Macedonia, Pakistan, 
Russian  Federation, Serbia, Tanzania, Tunisia, Türkiye , Uganda, and Ukraine.  
11 Implemented by 22 Members and 5 Observers: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Plurinational State of Bolivia , Burkina Faso, China, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary , India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, State of  Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, T ürkiye , Uganda, and Ukraine.  
12 Based on 2021 data except for Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, and Kazakhstan.  
172 217 135 119 
Trade-facilitating measures in force Trade-facilitating measures phased out
Trade-restrictive measures in force Trade-restrictive measures phased out643Trade coverage of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by mid-October 2022
(USD billion)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 29 - 
 
  3.36.   During the first three  months since the outbreak of the war, export restrictions mainly 
targeted a relatively limited range  of ag ricultural  products, includ ing grains (both for human 
consumption and animal feed), sugar, vegetable oils and fertilizers.  Subsequently, the scope of 
export restrictions expanded to also include, for example, rice, poultry , and poultry products (eggs), 
meat, and milk . 
3.37.   Most of these export restrictions  had a direct reference in their implementing regulations to 
the war during the first months of the conflic t, while later, they rather referred to domestic supply 
security and to price stability.  This may seem to indicate that the most recent export restrictions 
were introduced to respond to the growing food crisis, which has been exacerbated by the war in 
Ukraine . These restrictive measures may have been introduced to protect domestic markets in the 
context of the multiple interconnected crises derived from decreasing agricultural yields due to the 
adverse effect of climate change, the COVID -19 pandemic, rising energy costs and inflation.  
3.38.   Despite a surge of export restrictions associated with the war in Ukraine, some Members had 
already implemented measures restricting the export of essential agricultural products in the late 
2021 and early 2022, before 24 February 2022. For example, temporary bans of exports on various 
agricultural products were i ntroduced due to abnormal drought or higher prices for agricultural 
products in the domestic market in several countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  
3.39.   The nature of the export restrictions also became more diverse  over time . Initially most 
restrictio ns came in the form of export bans, while later they included export licensing requirements, 
quotas  or export duties. Often , such less restrictive measures replaced the earlier imposed bans on 
the same products (Chart 3.9).  
Chart 3.9 Number of e xport restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers, in force by 
mid-October 2022  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Import -facilitati ng measures on food, feed, and fertilizers  
3.40.   Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, import -facilitating measures on food, feed, and 
fertilizers have been also introduced. As of mid -October 2022 , 59 import -facilitating measures on 
various agricultural products were recorded for 5 6 Members and 2 Observers.13 Three of these 
measures have been phased out, bringing the number of import -facilitating measures in force to 56. 
 
13 Azerbaijan, A rmenia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Eswatini, European Union (EU  (27) and its member States are counted separately), Guatemala, 
113333351521262631313235424244
414044434445494948484949505153535453525352525252
0510152025303540
0102030405060
Exports / Ban Exports / Quantitative restrictions (QRs)
Exports / Duties Exports / Other
Export measures total applied on fertilizers
Number of Members and Observers (right axis)Export restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers, in force by mid -October 2022
(Number) (Number)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 30 - 
 
  3.41.   The trade coverage14 of the import -facilitating measures introduced during the review period 
was estimated at USD 75.4 billion, out of which USD 11.9 billion referred to fertilizers.  Some import -
facilitating measures have been repealed and their trade coverage was estimated at USD 1.7 billion 
(no measure on fertilizers has been repealed during the period of review ). Therefore, the trade 
coverage of import -facilitating measures on food feed and fertilizers that are still in place was 
estimated at USD 73.7 billion.  
3.42.   Import -facilitating measures mainly targeted essential agricultural products, including 
vegetable oils, cer eals, rice, meats, poultry as well as fertilizers. These measures came in the form 
of reduction of import tariffs, increases of import quotas and introduction of tariff free quotas. Other 
measures include exemptions from value added taxes and lifting of im port permit requirements 
(Chart 3.10).  
Chart 3.10 Number of i mport -facilitating measures on food, feed and fertilizers, in force 
by mid -October 2022  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.2  Trade remedy trends15 
3.43.   This Secti on provides an assessment of trends in trade  remedy actions over three periods: 
July 2019 to June 2020, July 2020 to June 2021, and July 2021 to June 2022.16 
Anti-dumping measures17 
3.44.   The number of initiations of anti -dumping investigations has decreased over the three periods, 
from 304 (July 2019 to June 2020) to 282 (July 2020 to June 2021), and then to 119 in the last 
 
India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, L esotho, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Chinese Taipei, Türkiye, Ukraine and  Viet Nam.  
14 Based on 2021 data except for Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Namibia, and Viet Nam.  
15 This Section is without prejudice to Members' right to take trade remedy actions under the WTO.  
16 These periods coincide with the Member's semi -annual reporting periods.  
17 Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on the number ( n) of exporting 
countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one anti -dumping or countervailing 
investigation involving imports from (n) countries/customs territories is counted as (n) investigations.  
34446111213141617182425262932343536414444475051525254565960606060
5…575656
000000000000000000000000000111111111111111100.20.40.60.811.2
010203040506070
Imports / Tariff Imports / Tax
Imports / Quantitative restrictions (QRs) Imports / Customs procedures
Imports / Other import facilitating measures total
applied on fertilizersImport -facilitating measures on food, feed and fertilizers, by type of measure
(Number)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 31 - 
 
  period. Table 3.9 provides  information on which Members initiated anti-dumping investigations and 
applied measures over the three periods.  
3.45.   While anti -dumping investigations do not necessarily lead to the imposition of measures , an 
increase in the number of investigations initiated is an early indicator of a likely increa se in the 
number of measures applied. Over the three periods, a total of 517 anti -dumping measures were 
applied. As it can take up to 18 months for an anti -dumping investigation to be concluded, the 
measures applied in a given period may not necessarily be  the result of investigations initiated in 
the same period.  
Table 3.9 Number of i nitiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, by 
Member  
Member  July 2019 – June 2020  July 2020 – June 2021  July 2021 – June 2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Argentina  11 12 8 13 14 7 
Australia  15 2 9 2 3 6 
Bahrain, Kingdom of; 
Kuwait, State of; Oman; 
Qatar; Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of; United Arab 
Emiratesa 1 2 3 1 9 0 
Brazil  4 6 13 3 4 3 
Canada  12 3 23 11 3 14 
Chile 1 0 1 0 0 0 
China  4 10 4 30 1 2 
Colombia  1 0 3 1 0 2 
Dominican Republic  0 1 0 0 0 0 
Egypt  8 2 6 9 0 3 
European Unionb 8 6 15 6 7 14 
Ghana  1 0 0 1 0 0 
India 98 9 60 32 13 26 
Indonesia  8 1 0 0 0 2 
Israel  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan  2 0 2 2 0 0 
Republic of Korea  1 0 7 1 8 4 
Madagascar  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia  4 7 9 5 0 1 
Mexico  7 3 3 6 5 5 
Morocco  0 0 3 1 1 0 
New Zealand  2 0 4 1 0 1 
Pakistan  7 2 9 7 1 12 
Peru 1 0 2 0 1 2 
Philippines  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Russian Federationc 4 4 4 5 0 3 
South Africad 0 3 10 0 8 4 
Chinese Taipei  0 2 5 0 3 5 
Thailand  10 1 7 2 1 13 
Türkiye  4 0 9 2 1 3 
Ukraine  7 10 10 2 6 7 WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 32 - 
 
  Member  July 2019 – June 2020  July 2020 – June 2021  July 2021 – June 2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
United Kingdome 0f 0f 1 0 1 0 
United States  71 29 42 59 27 42 
Uruguay  0 0 1 0 0 1 
Viet Nam  12 3 8 7 2 8 
Total  304 118 282 209 119 190 
a Notified by all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member States collectively, as investigations are 
initiated by the GCC regional investigating authority on behalf of all GCC member States.  
b The European Union is counted as one (28 member States until 31 January 2020 , 27 member States 
thereafter ). 
c  Notified by the Russian Federation , but investigations are initiated by the Eurasian Economic Union 
on behalf of all of its members, i.e. , Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (non -WTO 
Member) collectively.  
d Notified by South Africa, but investigations are initiated at the le vel of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) on behalf of its member States (also for Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia).  
e The United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union as of 1 February 2020. The European Union 
and the United Kingdom commu nicated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European Union law, with a few limited exceptions, continues to be applicable to 
and in the United Kingdom. See WTO documents WT/LET/1462, 29 January 2020; and WT/GC/206, 
1 Februar y 2020.  
f Member State of the European Union until 1 February 2020.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.46.   Chart 3.11 shows that the number of initiations of anti -dumping investigations increased 
significantly in 2020 compared with the previous years. The 355 initiation s in 2020 represent the 
peak since 2002 but are lower than the all -time high of 372 in 2001. The number of initiations 
decreased significantly to 186 in 2021.  
3.47.   There was little change in terms of the products affected by anti -dumping  investigations 
initiate d during the three periods examined, with the majority of initiations focused on products in 
the metals, chemicals, plastics and rubber sectors.  
3.48.   In terms of countries or customs territories affected by new anti -dumping investigations, 50 
exporting Members were affected during the first period, while 56 were affected during the second 
period and 38 in the last period. China remained , by far, the Member most frequently subject to 
anti-dumping initiations during the three reporting periods, accounting for 25% of all investigations. 
China was followed by the Republic of Korea, which accounted for 7% of the total initiations, and by 
Viet Nam , Malaysia  and Indonesia , with 5%, each . 
3.49.   As of 14 October 2022, four Members had notified anti -dumping ac tions referring to the 
COVID -19 pandemic. In this regard, Argentina  suspended anti -dumping measures on syringes and 
parenteral solutions; Brazil suspended anti -dumping measures on syringes and vacuum plastic tubes 
for blood collection; Mexico suspended ant i-dumping measures on textured polyester filament; and 
New Zealand suspended anti -dumping measures on aluminium -zinc coated steel.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 33 - 
 
  Chart 3.11 Number of i nitiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, 
2008 -22 
 
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to June . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Countervailing measures  
3.50.   While the number of global initiations of countervailing duty investigations decreased  in the 
last period, the number of countervailing measures remained  stable. Table 3.10 provides information 
on which Members initiated countervailing investigations and applied final measures during the 
review period.  
3.51.   As with anti -dumping, countervailing d uty investigations do not necessarily lead to measures  
being applied . However, an increase or decrease in the number of investigations initiated may be an 
early indicator of a likely increase or decrease in the number of measures applied. As it can take up  
to 18 months for an investigation to be concluded, these measures may not necessarily be the result 
of initiations in the same period.  
Table 3.10 Number of i nitiations of countervailing investigations and me asures applied, 
by Member  
Member  July 2019 – June 2020  July 2020 – June 2021  July 2021 – June 2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Australia  6 0 2 0 0 2 
Brazil  0 0 2 0 0 0 
Canada  4 0 4 2 2 4 
China  1 1 4 2 0 0 
Colombia  0 1 0 0 0 0 
European Uniona 3 4 4 0 2 4 
India 11 8 5 1 3 4 
Chinese Taipei  0 5 0 0 0 0 
United Kingdomb 0c 0c 0 0 2 0 
United States  23 15 19 25 14 15 
Viet Nam  0 0 1 1 0 0 
218 217
173165208287
236229298
249
202215355
186
48143 143
134
99121161 159182
171192204
146
114286
53
050100150200250300350400
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Inititations Measures
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Initiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, 2008 -22
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to June.(Number)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 34 - 
 
  Member  July 2019 – June 2020  July 2020 – June 2021  July 2021 – June 2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Total 48 34 41 31 23 29 
a The European Union is counted as one (28 member States until 31 January 2020).  
b The United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union as of 1 February 2020. The European Union 
and the United Kingdom communicated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European Union law , with a few limited exceptions, continues to be applicable to 
and in the United Kingdom. See WTO documents WT/LET/1462, 29 January 2020; and WT/GC/206, 
1 February 2020.  
c Member State of the European Union until 1 February 2020.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.52.   Chart 3.12 provides reflecting annual figures for 2008 -2021, plus first -half 2022, shows an 
upward trend in countervailing initiations from 2015 to 2020, notwithstanding some fluctuation in 
2019. Following its peak in 2020, the number  of countervailing init iations decreased to the lowest 
that has been observed since 2011.  
3.53.   During the review period, 27 exporting countries or customs territories were affected  by new 
countervailing investigations.  China was the most frequent subject of investigations (33), accounting 
for 29% of all investigations during the three periods. India (11), the second most frequent  subject, 
accounted for 10% of initiations, followed by Malaysia (9) and Viet Nam (9), both of which accounted 
for 8% of the total.  
3.54.   Concerning the products affected by countervailing investigations, metals  (51%)  accounted 
for the largest share of the initi ations reported over the three reporting periods  followed by chemicals 
(15%), and machinery products (7%).  
3.55.   As of 14 October  2022, no Member had notified any countervailing duty action referring to 
the COVID -19 pandemic.   
Chart 3.12 Number of i nitiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 
2008 -22 
 
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to June . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
1628
925
233345
31344155
3656
1817
11
919
91013
111524
182835
2441
12
0102030405060
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Initiations Measures
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 2008 -22
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to June.(Number)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 35 - 
 
  Safeguard  measures  
3.56.   Safeguard measures are temporary measures applied in response to increased imports of 
goods that are causing serious injury, and are applied on products from all sources, i.e., all exporting 
countries/customs territories.18 Safeguard measures are subject to different rules and timelines than 
anti-dumping and  countervailing measures and are, therefore, not directly comparable to these other 
types of trade remedies. Table 3.11 shows the Members that initiated investigations and applied 
measures in the review period.  
Table 3.11 Number of i nitiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, by 
Member  
Member  July 2019 - June 2020  July 2020 - June 2021  July 2021 - June 2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Bahrain, Kingdom 
of; Kuwait, State 
of; Oman; Qatar; 
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of; 
United Arab 
Emiratesa 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Canada  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica  0 0 0 1 0 0 
Ecuador  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt  1 1 0 1 0 0 
European Unionb 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala  1 0 0 0 0 0 
India 3 0 0 0 0 1 
Indonesia  5 5 3 5 0 3 
Jordan  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Madagascar  4 1 0 3 1 0 
Malaysia  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Morocco  1 2 1 1 0 0 
Panama  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Philippines  5 1 1 0 0 0 
Russian 
Federationc 0 1 0 0 0 0 
South Africad 2 1 0 0 0 1 
Thailand  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Tunisia  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Türkiye  2 1 0 1 1 1 
Ukraine  6 0 3 2 3 1 
United Kingdome 0f 0f 0 1 0 0 
United States  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total  33 13 12 16 7 7 
a Notified by all GCC member States collectively as investigations are initiated by the GCC regional 
investigating authority on behalf of all GCC member States.  
 
18 With the exception of exporting Members covered by the special and differential treatment provided 
for developing countries in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.   WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 36 - 
 
  b The European Union is counted as one (28 member States until 31 January 2020 , 27 member States 
thereafter ). 
c  Notified by the Russian Federation , but investigations are initiated by the Eurasian Economic Union 
on behalf of all of its members, i.e. Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan (which became a WTO 
Member on 30 November 2015), and Belarus (non -WTO Member) collectively.  
d Notified by South Afr ica, but investigations are initiated at the level of the Southern African Customs 
Union, i.e. also in respect of Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia.  
e The United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union as of 1 February 2020. The European Union 
and the United Kingdom communicated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European Union law, with a few limited exceptions, continues to be applicable to 
and in the United Kingdom. See WTO documents WT/LET/1462, 29 January 2020; and WT/GC/206, 
1 February 2020.  
f Member State of the European Union until 1 February 2020.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.57.   Chart 3.13 shows the number of initiations of safeguard investigations and the number of 
application of measures on a calendar  year basis for 2008 -2021, plus for the first-half 2022. In the 
latest period , January -June 2022 , one investigation was initiated and one measure  was applied .19 
As of 14 October 2022  two initiations and two application of measures have been recorded for 2022. 
These are among the lowest numbers since 1995. They represent a significant decline, especially in 
terms of initiations, since the most recent peak of 30 initiations in 2019, whi ch was the second 
highest since 1995.20 From that high level, a sharp decline was observed over the last three years 
to the current lowest level.   
Chart 3.13 Number of i nitiations of safeguard investigations a nd measures applied, 
2008 -22 
 
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to June . Some notifications are ambiguous about the timing when 
measures took effect. For those, an additional notification clarifying, ex post, the effective date of 
the measure is sometimes  filed. For this reason, the number of applications of measures in a given 
period indicated in past reports may differ from the figures indicated in the most recent Report.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
19 Since an investigation initiated in a specific year can result in application of a  measure in the 
subsequent year, the number of initiations can be smaller than the number of applications in some years.  
20 The highest number was recorded in 2002, with 34 initiations.  
1025
20
1224
1823
17
11
81630
22
9
1610
411
6811 11
69
712 12
9
1
05101520253035
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Initiations MeasuresInitiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, 2008 -22
Source:    WTO Secretariat.Note:    [see original](Number)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 37 - 
 
  3.58.   In terms of products affected by safeguard initiations, while the subject products varied, 
metals accounted for laregst sahre of initiations  during the review period.  
3.59.   No Member ha s notified any safeguard action referring to the COVID -19 pandemic.  
3.3  Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures21 
3.60.   This Section covers SPS transparency -related matters, including specific trade concerns 
(STCs) discussed in SPS Committee meetings  between 1 October 2021 to 3 0 September  2022. A 
separate Section covering the period from 1  February 2020 to 30 September  2022 refers to SPS 
measures taken in response to the COVID -19 pandemic.  The last Section refers to developments in 
the work of the SPS Committee in relation to the war in Ukraine.  
3.61.   Under the SPS  Agreement, WTO Members are obliged to provide an advance notice of 
intention to introduce new or modified SPS measures22, or to notify immediately when emergency 
measures are imposed. The main objective of complying with SPS notification obligations is to inform 
other Members about new or changed regulations that may significantly affect international trade.  
Therefore, an increase in the number of notifications does not automatically imply greater 
protectionism but can be due to enhanced transparency and/or a greater number of legiti mate 
health -protection measures . 
3.62.   Between 1 October 2021 and 30 September 2022  (the review period) , 1,932 SPS notifications 
(regular and emergency, including revisions and addenda) were submitted23 to the WTO, a 6% 
decrease compared with the previous 12 -month period. The share of notifications from developing -
country Members, accounting for 63%  (1,224  notifications ) of the total number, was slightly lower 
than that observed in the previous 12 -month period (Chart 3.15).  
3.63.   During the review period, WTO Members s ubmitted 1,488  regular SPS notifications (including  
revisions and  addenda), 65% (961 notifications ) of which were submitted by developing -country 
Members. Compared with the previous 12-month period, the total number of regular notifications 
decreased by 1 1%, while those submitted by developing -country Members decreased by 12%. 
3.64.   The total number of emergency notifications (including addenda) increased by 14% in the 
current review period ( 444 compared  with 389 during the previous 12-month period) . The proportion 
of all emergency notifications (including addenda) submitted by developing Members  remained 
higher than that of developed Members , constituting 59% of all emergency notifications . However, 
during the review period a decrease of 22% in the num ber of emergency notifications by developing 
Members  was observer (263 compared to 339 in the previous 12-month period). The h igh 
percentage  of emergency notifications by developing Members  may be because they have less 
extensive SPS  regulatory systems com pared with those of developed -country Members. 
Consequently, when facing emergency challenges, developing -country Members are more likely than 
developed -country Members to introduce new regulations or change existing ones.  
3.65.   Many Members follow the recommend ation to notify SPS measures even when they are based 
on a relevant international standard24, as this substantially increases transparency. In this context, 
of the 998  regular notifications (excluding addenda) submitted during the review period , 52% 
indica ted that at least one international standard, guideline or recommendation was applicable to 
the notified measure (Chart  3.16). Of these , about 77% indicated that the proposed measure was 
in conformity with the applicable international standard.  
 
21 Information presented in this Section was retrieved from the ePing SPS&TBT Platform , Viewed at: 
https://eping.wto.org/ . This Section is based on notifications to the WTO for the period 1  October  2021 to 30 
September  2022. Specific  trade concerns (STCs) are raised at SPS Committee meetings, and this Section 
summarizes the STCs raised at the 3 -5 November 2021 , 23-25 March 20 22, and 22 -24 June  SPS Committee 
meetings . More detailed searches on STCs have been retrieved from the Trade Concern s Database , viewed at: 
https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en . 
22 Transparency obligations are contained in Article  7 and Annex B of the SPS  Agreement.  
23 For this Report, "submission" refers to the date of circulation.  
24 WTO document  G/SPS/7/Rev.4, 4 June 2018, para.  2.3. WTO Document G/SPS/7/Rev.4  will be 
updated to reflect relevant changes in the set of tools available for Members to search for SPS related 
information, namely the new ePing SPS&TBT Platform . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 38 - 
 
  Chart 3.14 Number of SPS notifications, including regular, emergency, revisions and 
addenda  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Chart 3.15 Regular and emergency SPS notifications (excluding addenda) and 
international standards  
 
Note:  Codex Alimentarius (Codex), World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, founded as OIE) and 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).  
Source:  WTO Secre tariat.  
3.66.   International standards often provide useful guidance regarding measures to address disease 
outbreaks and other emergency situations. About 9 9% (376 out of 381) of emergency notifications 
(excluding addenda) submitted during the review  period indicated that an international standard, 
guideline, or recommendation was applicable to the notified measure (Chart  3.16). All, but six 
indicated that the measure was in conformity with the applicable international standard.  
1,664
1,0941,488
961389
339444
263
02004006008001,0001,2001,4001,6001,8002,0002,200
All Members Developing-country
MembersAll Members Developing-country
MembersNumber of SPS notifications, including regular, emergency, revisions and addenda
Source: WTO Secretariat.Regular notifications Emergency notificationsOct. 2020 -Sep. 2021 Oct. 2021 -Sep. 2022
48%
1%28%
1%8%95%
16%3%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
None International
standardNone International
standard
Regular notifications Emergency notifications
None Codex WOAH IPPCRegular and emergency SPS notifications (excluding addenda) and international standards
Note:  [see original]WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 39 - 
 
  3.67.   Of the 998 regular notifications (excluding addenda) submitted during the review period, the 
majority ( 70%) were related to food safety.25 The remain der related to plant protection and animal 
health and, to a lesser extent, the protection of humans from animal disea ses or plant pests, and 
the protection of the Member's territory from other damage from pests. Regular notifications usually 
contain more than one objective.  
3.68.   Of the 381 emergency measures (excluding addenda) notified in the same period, the 
majority ( 92%) related to animal health, followed by those related to food safety, the protection of 
humans from animal diseases or plant pests, plant protection, and the protection of the Member's 
territory from other damage from pests.  Emergency notifications may also  contain more than one 
objective.  
3.69.   The WTO Secretariat prepares annual transparency reports containing detailed information 
on the implementation of the transparency provisions of the SPS  Agreement.26 
3.70.   While there is no formal provision for "counter notification", concerns regarding the failure to 
notify an SPS measure, or regarding a notified measure, can be raised as a n STC at any of the 
regular meetings of the SPS Committee each year.  
3.71.   Although most capital -based delegates were not able to travel to  Geneva due to COVID -19 
restrictions, the margins of the SPS Committee meetings27 still provide d important opportunities for 
delegations to discuss and resolve concerns bilaterally. For example, during the review period, China 
withdrew three STCs : 1) conce rns regarding EU detection of bitter ginseng alkaloids in honey; 2) 
Thailand's suspension of imports of live poultry, pigs, and their carcasses and 3) Brazil's frequent 
adjustments of technical regulations affecting fishery trade, which had been included i n the proposed 
agenda for the March 2022 meeting28, because bilateral progress was made.  
3.72.   In the SPS Committee meetings of 3 -5 November 2021 , 23-25 March 2022  and 22 -24 June 
2022,  23 STCs were raised for the first time (Table 3.1 2), and 43 previously raised  STCs were 
discussed again , of which 28  previously raised STCs were raised in the three  meetings.29 Of these, 
four addressed persistent problems that have been discussed 15 times or more (Table  3.13). In 
addition, 12 STCs raised for the first time in the r eview period were discussed again  in March or June 
2022.30  
Table 3.12 New STCs  raised in the SPS Committee meetings November 2021, March, or 
June 2022 meetings  
ID New STCs  
526 European Union delays in authorizing imports of Samgyetang (Korean ginse ng chicken soup) - 
raised by the Republic of Korea  
527 Delays in Thailand 's approval procedures for animal products - raised by the Russian Federation  
528 Peru's undue delays in the authorization of dairy product enterprises - raised by Panama  
529 Qatar 's new import rules for dairy products - raised by European Union  
530 Plurinational State of Bolivia 's import restrictions on agricultural and livestock products - raised 
by Peru  
531 China 's import restrictions on fishery products - raised by Mexico  
532 China ’s import suspension of fresh fruits - raised by Chinese Taipei  
533 European U nion restrictions on spice imports and other food products due to European Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2246 of 15 December 2021 - raised by India  
534 European Union's  import tolerances for certain pesticides to achieve environmental outcomes in 
third countries - raised by Australia  
 
25 The objective of an SPS measure falls under one or more of the following categories: (i)  food safety; 
(ii) animal health; (iii)  plant protection; (iv)  protection of humans from animal/plant pests or diseases; and 
(v) protection of territory from other damage from pests. Members are required to identify the  purpose of the 
measure in their notifications. It is common for more than one objective to be identified for a measure.  
26 WTO document G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.14, 28 February 2022.  
27 The November 2021 , March and June 2022 meetings were held in person, and Membe rs were also 
able to participate remotely via a virtual conferencing platform (WTO documents JOB/SPS/17, 15 October 
2021, JOB/SPS/19, 4 March 2022 , and JOB/SPS/21, 3 June 2022 ).  
28 WTO document JOB /SPS/19, 4 March 2022 . See also the summary of the meeting of 23-25 March 
contained in document G/SPS/R/105 . 
29 The 2 8 STCs that were raised in the three  meetings are 193, 382, 392, 406, 413, 431, 439, 441, 446, 
448, 466, 471, 484, 485, 486, 487, 489, 497, 498, 501, 503, 504, 509, 512, 516, 519, 521 and 524. 
30 These were STCs 526, 527, 529, 530, 532, 533, 534, 535, 537, 538, 539 and 542.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  ID New STCs  
535 European Union's  restrictions on the  importation of collagen for human consumption - raised by 
China  
536 European Union's  residue limits of ethylene oxide and dichloroethanol - raised by China  
537 Indonesia 's draft regulation on heavy metals contaminants in processed food - raised by China  
538 Chinese Taipei 's new procedure for the recognition of infectious animal disease -free status of a 
foreign country - raised by the European Union  
539 Thailand 's sanitary requirements on "wet blue" leather imports - raised by Brazil  
540 Russian Federation 's SPS notification G/SPS/N/RUS/241 regarding 11 new quarantine pests - 
raised by India.  
541 Russian Federatio n's phytosanitary certificate requirements for groundnut and sesame seeds - 
raised by India.  
542 United States'  undue delays in opening its citrus market - raised by Brazil  
543 European Union  recognition of Mexico as a country with WOAH negligible BSE risk - raised by 
Mexico.  
544 Peru’s non -application of regionalization for African swine fever  - raised by the European Union  
545 European Union  regulation on animal health/off icial certificates for animal origin foods  - raised by 
China.  
546 European Union  notifications of matrine and oxymatrine in honey  - raised by China.  
547 Egypt 's Customs Circular Decision No. 4060: Radioactivity checks on imported foo d - raised by the 
European Union  
548 Morocco' s import ban on ornamental plant s - raised by the European Union  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Table 3.13 Previously r aised SPS STCs discussed in the November 2021, March or June 
2022 meetings, raised 15 times or more31 
STC Title of the STC  Member(s)  
responding  Member(s) raising the 
concern (total number of 
Members supporting)  First date 
raised (times 
subsequently 
raised)  Primary 
objective  
193 General import 
restrictions due to Bovine 
Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE)  Several Members, 
including China  European  Union, 
United  States (3 Members)  01/06/2004  
(44 times)  Animal 
health  
382  European  Union 
legislation on endocrine 
disruptors  European  Union  Argentina, China, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, India, Panama, 
Paraguay, United States (39 
Members)  25/03/2014  
(22 times)  Food 
safety  
406  China's import 
restrictions due to highly 
pathogenic avian 
influenza  China  European  Union, 
United  States  16/03/2016  
(16 times)  Animal 
health  
390 Russian Federation's 
import restrictions on 
processed fishery 
products from Estonia 
and Latvia  Russian Federation  European Union  15/07/2015 
(14 times)  Food 
safety  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.73.   Of the 23 STCs raised for the first time in the three  SPS Committee meetings, 6 (29%) 
concerned food safety, 4 concerned measures covering animal  health, 6 related to plant health  and 
7 covered other concerns .32 Out of the 43 previously raised STCs,  15 concerned food safety  
measures , 10 animal health, 4 plant health and  14 covered other types of concerns.  
3.74.   Discussions among Members in the SPS Committee continue to be multifaceted and dynamic. 
While pesticide maximum residue limits ( MRLs) continue to be a topic of concern for Members, 
several STCs related to approval procedures, were also raised in the current review period.  
3.75.   The WTO Secretariat prepares annual reports containing detailed information on STCs 
discussed in the SPS Commit tee. Since 1995,  50% of all STCs raised in the Committee have been 
 
31 Further information on the STCs previously raised during the review period is available in the ePing 
SPS&TBT Platform . Viewed at: https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en/stcs?searchParameterDomainIds=2 . 
32 These concerns include control, inspection and approval procedures, and administrative measures.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  reported as resolved or partially resolved.33 In November 2021, Mexico reported on the resolution 
of STC 515 regarding Panama´s authorization of Federal Inspection Types establishments.  
COVID-19-related SPS measures (1 February 202034 - 30 September  2022)  
3.76.   The SPS  Agreement requires Members to base SPS -related trade measures on international 
standards, guidelines, and recommendations, specifically those developed by the FAO/WHO Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for food safety, the World Organisation for Animal Health ( WOAH, 
founded as OIE) for animal health and zoonoses and the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC) for plant health. The three standard -setting bodies and  the WHO are monitoring the 
COVID -19 situation and, so far, have not recommended any trade restrictions. In the absence of 
relevant international standards, SPS measures must be based on a risk assessment. However, it 
may take some time before sufficient s cientific evidence becomes available. Following the outbreak 
of the pandemic, some Members believed they had to act quickly  to ensure appropriate health 
protection. Under the SPS  Agreement, Members have the right to adopt provisional measures based 
on avai lable information. As more scientific evidence emerges and risk assessments can be carried 
out, these measures must be reviewed within a reasonable period of time.  
3.77.   Between 1 February 2020 and 30 September 2022, 31 Members (counting the 
European  Union as on e) submitted 127 notifications and communications on 67 SPS measures 
related to the COVID -19 pandemic. The most recent SPS COVID -19-related document was received 
on 8 July 2022. Submitted documents are displayed by month and trade effect in Chart 3.1 6.  
3.78.   Twenty-seven measures were notified as regular notifications. Additionally, 28 addenda to 
regular notifications were submitted, mostly extending both implementation periods of temporary 
measures and comment periods and dates of adoption of previously notifie d regulations. Twenty 
measures were notified as emergency measures. Additionally, 10 emergency addenda were notified, 
seven lifting (or partially lifting) temporary restrictions previously imposed and 3 extending the 
validity of temporary trade -facilitatin g measures. Nine Members submitted their measures through 
an information communication (GEN document), and one additional GEN document35 was submitted 
by 40 Members. Overall, 26% of all COVID -19 notifications were SPS measures.36 
Two COVID -19-related STCs were raised in the period under review.37 
 
33 Information is available in the latest revision of the annual re port on STCs (WTO document 
G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.22, 28 February 2022).  
34 The first COVID -19-related notifications were received in February 2020.  
35 WTO document G/SPS/GEN/1778/Rev.5 , 14 Januar y 2021 (also circulated as WTO document 
G/TBT/GEN/296/Rev.5, 14 January 2021).  
36 WTO, COVID -19 and World Trade . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e .htm. 
37 STCs 487 and 506.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Chart 3.16 Number of submitted SPS documents related to COVID -19, by date and trade 
effect, 1 February 2020 -8 July 22 
 
Note:  TF measures = trade facilitating measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.79.   Initially, these measures mainly related to restrictions on animal imports and/or transit from 
affected areas (some of these measures were subsequently lifted) , and increased certification 
requirements. While  some restrictions were still imposed at a later stage, most notifications and 
communications submitted since the beginning of April 2020 relate to measures taken to facilitate 
trade, by allowing temporary flexibility for control authorities to use electro nic versions of veterinary 
and/or phytosanitary certificates, since the COVID -19 situation has made the transmission of original 
paper certificates problematic. Overall, about two  thirds of the 59 notifications (excluding addenda) 
and communications submit ted were measures considered to be trade -facilitating.  
Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine  
3.80.   At the March and June 2022 SPS Committee meeting, Ukraine and several other Members 
(Australia, Canada , European  Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Z ealand, Norway, Paraguay, 
Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, United Kingdom and United  States ) condemned  the Russian 
Federation's military action in Ukraine, noting that it violated constituted a violation of international 
law and the UN Charter.38 The Russian F ederation noted that politically motivated  trade -restrictive 
actions imposed by several WTO Members had led to serious damage to the global economy, 
including rises in world food and fertili zer prices and disruptions in global food supply, and underlined 
that the matter was not within the scope of the WTO.  
 
38 WTO document G/SPS/R/107 , 26 September 2022.  
0510152025
Restrictions Lifting of restrictions TF measures Extension of TF measures Other SPS measuresNumber of submitted SPS documents related to COVID -19, by date and trade 
effect, 1 February 2020 -8 July 2022
Source:   WTO Secretariat.Note:   TF measures = trade facilitating measures .WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Box 3.1 Enhancing monitoring and transparency in SPS and TBT  
Accessing relevant information on SPS or TBT product requirements in export markets can represent a 
significant challenge, in particular for SMEs. WTO Members are required to notify SPS and TBT measures, still 
in draft form, that may have a significant effect on trade and that are not in accordance with existing 
international standards. Each year, the WTO receives around 5,000  SPS and TBT notifications.  
The WTO facilitates the fulfilment of the transparency provisions contained in the SPS and TBT Agreements 
and provides easy access to information. Timely access to notifications is crucial, given the 60 -day period that 
should normally be provided for submitting comments on the proposed regulations. The new ePing SPS&TBT 
Platform , officially launched in July  2022, is an integrated online tool that assists stakeholders in finding 
notifications of relevance to their trade and thus contributing to avoid and address potential trade barriers.  
The ePing SPS&TBT Platform  helps users (governments, economic operators,  and civil society) browse SPS or 
TBT notifications and trade concerns raised by Members in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees using 
parameters such as product, notifying Member and objective. Additionally, information on enquiry points and 
notification author ities can be located in the new Platform. Registered users can also sign up to receive daily 
or weekly email alerts and to follow notifications on products and/or markets of interest and reach out to 
national and international counterparts. This also facil itates dialogue among the public and private sectors to 
discuss and share information on notifications of concern, allowing stakeholders to address potential trade 
problems at an early stage of the regulatory lifecycle.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.4  Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Notifications  submitted to the TBT Committee  
3.81.   Under the TBT Agreement , WTO Members are required to notify their intention to introduce 
new or modified TBT measures, or to notify adopted emergency measures immediately. The principal 
objective of complying with the TBT notification obligations is to inform other Members about new 
or changed regulations that may  significantly affect trade.  
3.82.   From 1 October 2021 to 1 October 2022 (the review period), WTO Members submitted 2,405  
new regular notifications of TBT measures.39 Around 60 % of all new regular notifications  came from 
Uganda (225), Brazil (184), Tanzania (175), Rwanda (166), Kenya (149), United States (144), 
Burundi (110), Republic of Korea (106), European Union (89) and Ch ina (73). The majority o f these 
2,405 TBT notifications  indicated as their main objective the protection of human health or safety. 
Various other  notifications related to quality requirements, consumer information, labelling, 
prevention of deceptive practi ces and consumer protection, reducing trade barriers and facilitating 
trade and harmonization .  
3.83.   A total of 1,516  follow -up notifications (i.e. , addenda, corrigenda, or supplements) were 
submitted during the review  period. The continuing  and frequent use by Members of follow -up 
notification s is a positive development, as it increases transparency and predictability across the 
measures' regulatory lifecycle.  
Measures discussed in the TBT Committee (STCs)40 
3.84.   WTO Members use the  TBT Committee as a forum for discussing trade issues related to 
specific TBT measures (technical regulations, standards, or conformity assessment procedures) 
maintained by oth er Members. These STCs normally relate to proposed draft measures notified to 
the TBT  Committee or to the implementation of existing  measures. Issues can range from requests 
for additional information and clarification to questions on the consistency of me asures with TBT 
Agreement disciplines.  
3.85.   A total of 249 (58  new and 191  previously raised) STCs were discussed during the three TBT 
Committee meetings that fell within the review period: 89 (25 new  and 64 previously raised)  at the 
November  2021 meeting,  80 (20 new and 60 previously raised) at the March  2022 meeting , and 80 
(13 new and 67 previously raised) at the July 2022 meeting .  
 
39 Source : ePing SPS&TBT platform .  
40 This Section takes account of the STCs raised in the TBT Committee meetings of 10-12 November 2021, 
8-11 March 2022, and  12-15 July 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  3.86.   As depicted in Table  3.14, these 58 new STCs concerned TBT measures by the European 
Union (11); India (7); United States (7); C hina (4); Canada (3); France (3);  Indonesia (3); Republic 
of Korea (2); South Africa  (2); Sri Lanka (2); Viet Nam ( 2); one each by Belgium , Brazil, Chile, 
Egypt, Guatemala, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Spain, and United 
Kingdom . The se new STCs  covered regulations on a range of products ( e.g. artificial intelligence 
systems, information and communication devic es, solar modules, household goods, electrical 
appliances, spices, vehicles, alcoholic beverages, mineral oils, cosmetics, plastic, food products, 
etc.), and deal t with a variety of issues (e.g. cybersecurity reequipments, labelling and packaging, 
conformi ty assessment procedures, remote factory  audits, technical regulation or specifications, life 
cycle assessment, halal certification, and energy efficiency).  
3.87.   The overall  trend suggests an increasing use of the TBT Committee as a forum for Members 
to raise a nd resolve trade concerns non -litigiously. In 202 2, for example, WTO Members have 
already reviewed 160 STCs, including 33 new concerns, one of  the highest numbers on record since 
1995.  The next TBT Committee meeting will be held in November 2022.  
3.88.   During th e three Committee meetings covered by the review period, 14 persistent  STCs 
(those previously raised STCs more than 16 times in Committee meetings ) were discussed 
(Table  3.15).  
Table 3.14 New STCs raised in t he TBT Committee meetings of November 2021, 
March  2022 and July 2022  
New STCs  
Chile:  Efficiency analysis and/or test protocol for electrical products ( ID 704 ) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
European Union:  Draft Commission Delegated Regulation amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and 
scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling 
and packaging of substances an d mixtures ( ID 705 ) (raised by Chinese Taipei)  
China:  National Standard of the P.R.C., Lithium -Ion Cells and Batteries Used in Portable Electronic Equipments - Safety 
Technical Specification ( ID 706 ) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
Viet Nam:  Draft National  Technical Regulation on the fifth level of gaseous pollutants emissions for new assembled, 
manufactured and imported automobiles ( ID 707 ) (raised by Thailand)  
European Union:  Draft Commission Regulation laying down ecodesign requirements for light source s and separate 
control gears pursuant to Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 244/2009, (EC) No. 245/2009 and (EU) No. 1194/2012 ( ID 708 ) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
United Stat es: Energy Conservation Program: Test Procedures for Residential and Commercial Clothes Washers ( ID 709 ) 
(raised by China)  
India:  Important Instruction regarding Voluntary Star Labelling Programme for UHD (4K, 8K) Televisions ( ID 710 ) (raised 
by Republic of Korea)  
Sri Lanka:  National Environmental (Plastic Material Identification Standards) Regulations No. 01 of 2021 ( ID 711 ) (raised 
by United States)  
Brazil:  MAPA Ordinance No. 208, 26 February 2021 – revision of the Decree No. 6.87 of 4 June 2009 on the 
standardisation, classification, registration, inspection, production and supervision of alcoholic beverages ( ID 712 ) (raised 
by European Union)  
Belgium:  Draft law introducing additional security measures for the provision of mobile 5G services ( ID 713 ) (raised by 
China)  
United States:  Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equi pment 
Authorization Program and the Competitive Bidding Program ( ID 714 ) (raised by China)  
Pakistan:  Safety of amusement rides and amusement devices ( ID 715 ) (raised by United States)  
United States:  Energy Conservation Program: Test Procedure for Metal Halide Lamp Fixtures ( ID 716 ) (raised by China)  
India:  Chemical Fibers and Yarns: PSY, IDY, FDY, POY, PSF, and SMF for use in Cement -Based Matrix (Quality Control) 
Orders, 2020 ( ID 717 ) (raised by Rep ublic of Korea)  
Egypt:  Halal Certification Measure, based on Egyptian Standard ES 4249/2014 General Requirements for Halal Food 
According to Islamic Sharia ( ID 718 ) (raised by Canada, European Union, and United States)  
India:  Plastic Waste Management (Amendment) Rules, 2021 ( ID 719 ) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
Sri Lanka:  Imports (Standardization and Quality Control) Regulations 2017 ( ID 720 ) (raised by Indonesia)  
Guatemala:  Technical Standard 84 -2021 for the Sanitary Regis tration of Repellent Products for External Use in Humans 
and Spatial Repellent Products ( ID 721 ) (raised by Mexico)  
Canada:  Regulatory requirements for the import and marketing of cannabis and cannabis -based products for medicinal 
use (ID 722 ) (raised by Colombia)  
France:  LOI n° 2020 -105: Anti -Waste Law for a Circular Economy (AGEC Law) ( ID 723 ) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
Indonesia:  Government Regulation 28 of 2021 – Implementing Regulation (for the Manufacturing/Industry Sector) to 
Law No. 11 of 2020  the "Job Creation Act" ( ID 724 ) (raised by European Union and United States)  
Republic of Korea:  Proposal for revision of the implementation rules and operation notification of the electrical 
appliances and consumer goods safety control act ( ID 725 ) (raised by China)  
United States:  Energy efficiency requirements for general service lamps (GSL) ( ID 726) (raised by China)  
Spain:  Amendment of Royal Decree 1521/1984 by the Secretariat for Fisheries of Spain ( ID 727 ) (raised by Chile)  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  New STCs  
Indonesia:  Import quota and SNI certification requirements ( ID 728 ) (raised by China)  
Malaysia:  Guideline for Approval of Electrical Equipment (Electricity Regulation 1994) Information Booklet 2018 Edition 
(GP/ST/N0.14/2017) (ID 729) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
Mongolia:  Draft Law on controlling the circulation of alcohol beverages, and fight aga inst alcoholism (ID 730) (raised by 
Mexico)  
United States:  Energy conservation program: test procedure for circulator pumps (ID 731) (raised by China)  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:  Corporate average fuel economy standard (SAUDI CAFE) for all light duty vehicl es (ID 732) 
(raised by China)  
South Africa:  Regulations relating to the composition, production and labelling of wine and spirits intended for sale in the 
Republic of South Africa (ID 733) (raised by Mexico)  
European Union:  Specific test procedures and technical requirements for the type -approval of motor vehicles with regard 
to their event data recorder and for the type -approval of those systems as separate technical units (ID 734) (raised by 
China)  
Canada:  Pest control pr oducts regulations (ultraviolet radiation -emitting devices and ozone -generating devices) (ID 735) 
(raised by China)  
European Union:  Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council laying down harmoni zed rules on 
artificial intelligenc e (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain union legislative acts (ID 736) (raised by China)  
United States:  Secure equipment act of 2021 (ID 737) (raised by China)  
European Union:  Regulations affecting spices (Regulation number EU 2021/2246, da ted 15 December 2021) (ID 738) 
(raised by India)  
European Union:  Implementation of access regulation regarding collagen for human consumption (ID 739) (raised by 
China)  
United Kingdom:  EC marking certificate for export of home textile items (ID 740) (raised by India)  
European Union:  Commission implementing decision (EU) 2017/1357 on a restriction of Standard EN 60335 -2-9-2003+A 
13-2010 (ID 741) (raised by China)  
India:  Approved models and manufacturers of solar photovoltaic modules order, 2019 (ID 742) (raised by China)  
European Union:  Regulation (EU) 2022/30 on network protection, safeguards for the protection of personal data and 
privacy and protection from fraud (ID  743) (raised by China)  
Republic of Korea:  Regulation for supporting low carbon solar module product (ID 744) (raised by China)  
European Union:  Regulation (EU) 2019/320 on caller location in emergency communications from mobile devices (ID 
745) (raised b y China)  
Indonesia:  Remote factory audit for air conditioners (ID 746) (raised by Thailand)  
Japan:  Inspection system for sports goods and toys and non -acceptance of test reports from Indian test houses (ID 747) 
(raised by India)  
India:  Import Policy of  Air Conditioners with Refrigerants (ID 748) (raised by Thailand)  
China:  Key Points and Judgment Principles of GMP  Inspection for Cosmetics; Safety and Technical Standards for Cosmetics 
(2022); Technical Guidelines for Children's Cosmetics (ID 749) (raised by United States)  
European Union:  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amendin g Directive 2014/53/EU 
on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment 
(COM/2021/547 final) (ID 750)  (raised by United States)  
China:  Measures for the Administration of Data Security in the Field of Industrial and Information Technology Sectors (For 
Trial Implementation) (ID 751) (raised by Japan)  
European Union:  Draft Commission delegated regulation amending regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council to t ake into account technical progress and regulatory developments concerning amendments to vehicle 
regulations adopted in the context of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ID 752) (raised by China)  
Canada:  Proposed Prohibition of Certain Tox ic Substances Regulations, 2022 (ID 753) (raised by Japan)  
South Africa : Regulations Relating to the Labelling of Alcoholic Beverages – revision (ID 754) (raised by European Union, 
Mexico and United States)  
United States:  Energy conservation program: ene rgy conservation standards for room air conditioners (ID 755) (raised by 
China)  
France:  Order specifying the substances contained in mineral oils the use of which is prohibited in packaging and in printed 
matter distributed to the public (ID 756) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
India:  Alert Regarding Implementation of QR Code for Refrigerators (ID 757) (raised by Republic of Korea)  
France:  Decree on the minimum proportion of re -used packaging to be placed on the market annually (ID 758) (raised by 
United States)  
Viet Nam:  Draft national technical regulation on 5G user equipment - radio access; draft national technical regulation on 
non-standalone 5G user equipment - radio access (ID 759) (raised by China)  
India:  Amendment to notification on mandatory testing and certifica tion of telecommunication systems (MTCTE) – Phase 
III & IV (ID 760) (raised by China)  
China:  Recommended National Standard (GB/T) for Office Devices (Information security technology – Security specification 
for office devices) (ID 761) (raised by Japan ) 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 46 - 
 
  Table 3.15 Persistent STCs raised between 1 October 2021 and 1 October 2022  
Persistent STCs  
India:  Pneumatic tyres and tubes for automotive vehicles (ID 133) raised in 40 TBT Committee meetings  
since 2006  
China:  Requirements for information security products, including, inter alia , the Office of State Commercial 
Cryptography Administration (OSCCA) 1999 Regulation on commercial encryption products and its on going  
revision and the Multi -Level Protection Scheme (MLPS) (ID 294) raised in 35 TBT Committee meetings since 
2011 
Russian Federation:  Draft Technical Regulation on Alcohol Drinks Safety (published on 24 October 2011) 
(ID 332) raised in 30 TBT Committee meetings since 2012  
European Union:  Draft Implementing Regulations amending Regulation (EC) No. 607/2009 laying down 
detailed rules for  the application of Council Regulation (EC) No . 479/2008 as regards protected designations 
of origin and geographical indications, traditional terms, labelling and presentation of certain wine sector 
products (ID 345) raised in 30 TBT Committee meetings since 2012  
European Union: Hazard -based approach to plant protection products and setting of import tolerances (ID 
393) raised in 28 TBT Committee meetings since 2013  
India:  Electronics and Information Technology Goods (Requirements for Compulsory Registra tion) Order, 
2012 ( ID 367 ) raised in 27 TBT Committee meetings since 2013  
China:  Regulations for the Supervision and Administration of Medical Devices (Order No. 650 of the State 
Council) (ID 428) raised in 25 TBT Committee meetings since 2014  
China:  Registration Fees for Drugs and Medical Device Products (ID 466) raised in 21 TBT Co mmittee 
meetings since 2015  
Indonesia:  Halal Product Assurance Law No. 33 of 2014 and its implementing regulations (ID 502) raised in 
20 TBT Committee meetings since 2016  
Egypt:  Manufacturer Registration System (Decree No. 43/2016 and Decree No. 992/2015) ( ID 505 ) raised 
in 18 TBT Committee meetings since 2016  
Russian Federation:  Rules of cement certification ( ID 497 ) raised in 18 TBT Committee meetings since 
2016 
India:  Draft Food Safety and Standards (Alcoholic Beverages Standards) Regulations, 2015 ( ID 494 ) raised 
in 18 TBT Committee meetings since 2016  
India:  Mandatory Certification for Steel Products ( ID 224 ) raised in 18 TBT Committee meetings since 2009  
China:  Cybersecu rity Law (ID 526)  raised in 17 TBT Committee meetings since 2017  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
COVID -19-related TBT notifications and discussions at the TBT Committee  
3.89.   Since the beginning of the pandemic , 46% of all notifications submitted by WTO Members in 
response to COVID -19 were under the TBT Agreement .41 Thirty -four WTO Members submitted 225 
COVID -19-related TBT notifications to the WTO.  These notifications mostly dealt with extraordinary 
and temporary streamlining of certification and related  procedures , and the introduction of new 
regulatory requirements for medical goods . In addition, WTO Members made reference s to the 
COVID -19 pandemic in 55 STCs  in the TBT Committee . The vast majority of these STCs  were not 
linked to COVID -19-related notifications or medical goods. Instead , reference to COVID -19 in these 
discussion s was linked to  the significant impact of the pandemic on Members' economies.  
3.90.   Overall, 66 % of these  notifications were submitted under t he emergency/urgent notification 
provisions  of the TBT Agreement .42 Under these provisions, WTO Members can adopt measures 
immediately without first notifying the measure in draft form or providing the usual 60 -days 
comment period (or allowing the usual 6-month transition period prior to entry into force).  The 
majority (about 70%) of  these  notifications cover regulations on medical goods , such as personal 
protective equipment (PPE), pharmaceutical products, medical devices, other medical supplies, and 
other  products.43 
3.91.   In the context of the Ninth Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement, Members agreed to 
examine and compile best practices for future pandemic preparedness, including streamlining 
 
41 TBT notifications are classified as COVID -19-related if they contain the terms "coronavirus", "COVID", 
"SARS -COV-2" or "nCoV". These COVID -19-related notifications include not only regular notifications but also 
follow -up notifications.  
42 TBT Agreement, Articles 2.10.1 and 5.7. 1. 
43 The "pharmaceutical products" category includes, for example, vaccines, antibiotics and vitamins. The 
"medical devices" category includes, for example, lung ventilator equipment, ultraviolet radiation -emitting 
devices and vital signs monitors. The "PP E" category includes, for example, face masks and surgical gloves. 
The "other medical supplies" category includes, for example, gauzes, hand sanitizers and flocked swabs. The 
"other" category includes, for example, food, footwear and offices machines.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  conformity  assessment procedures during pandemics, and enhancing i nternational regulatory 
cooperation so as to facilitate trade in select essential medical goods like vaccines .44 The Ministerial 
Declaration on the WTO Response to the COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future 
Pandemics  also encouraged regulatory cooperation and instruct ed the TBT Committee to  continue 
analysing lessons learned and challenges encountered during the pandemic.45  
3.92.   In addition, the WTO Secretariat issued an information note46 "Overview of discussions in the 
Committee on Tech nical Barriers to Trade relating  to COVID -19" that explores how WTO Members 
used regulatory trade measures in responding to the COVID -19 pandemic.  
3.93.   A WTO  Member recently notified  to the TBT Committee a few extraordinary and temporary 
regulatory measures ta ken in the context of the Monkeypox  outbreak.47 
3.94.   There has been a recent trend of the TBT Committee receiving notifications of and discussi ng 
STCs about regulations on cybersecurity. Box 3.2 takes  a closer look at cybersecurity  regulatory 
measures discussed  in the TBT Committee.  
Box 3.2 TBT and cybersecurity  
Trade and technology are closely interlinked , and  technology has constantly played an important role in 
shaping the way we trade. The transformative impact of technology on international trade is even more evident 
today, when the current g lobal expansion of the Internet , fuelled by a combination of vast amount of data 
with unparallel levels of computational power, are enabl ing transforma tive innovations such as Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), Internet -of-Things (IoT) , blockchain, cloud computing , and quantum computing.  
These developments, however, not only unlock opportunities and benefits for those participating in 
international trade, but  also give rise to a number of concerns, including the risks of cyberattacks. To improve 
the cybersecurity of equipment, infrastructure, and software -enabled and network -connected goods, many 
governments are adopting various cybersecurity -related  regulatio ns, including those in the form of 
TBT measures, i.e., technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures . These 
cybersecurity -related  TBT measures have recently become one of the most prominent digital -related issues 
discussed in  the TBT Committee.  
To date, more than 70 cybersecurity -related  TBT measures  have been notified  to the TBT  Committee , 70% of 
which during the last three years . These dealt, inter alia , with the cybersecurity of IoT, 5G technology, 
telecommunication and radio eq uipment, and software -enabled and network -connected goods . The largest 
share of these measures indicate that they have been proposed or adopted for the  protect ion of  national 
security  requirements (Article  2.2 of the TBT Agreement) . Other notified objectives comprise the prevention 
of deceptive practices, protection of human health or safety, and quality. Among the most active notifying 
Members in this area are the European Union (and/or its member  States ), Brazil, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Viet  Nam, Uganda, Japan, China, Uganda,  and Chinese Taipei.  
In recent years, WTO Members have increasingly used TBT Committee meetings to raise and discuss STCs 
regarding various cybers ecurity -related  TBT measures. The measures subject to these STCs 
regulate,  inter alia, ITC products and network equipment, vehicles, civil aviation, banking, and insurance, 
among other s. To dat e, Members have raised at least 2 4 such STCs , the majority of w hich (60%) were raised 
during the last five years (2017 -22). Such STCs concerned  measures maintained mostly by China, European 
Union, United States and Viet Nam. Measures subject to these STCs took the form, inter alia , of mandatory 
market access requireme nts for Internet -connected radio equipment, restrictions on the use of network 
elements coming from manufacturers that pose a high risk in the context of 5G, or data localization 
requirements. Members' raising these STCs were concern ed, specifically,  with measures' failure to comply 
with transparency, non -discrimination obligations under the TBT Agreement, lack of clarity, broad scope of 
application, inconsistency with international standards, and unnecessary trade -restrictiveness. In response, 
Members subject to these STCs tended to  highlight that cybersecurity rules were needed to , inter alia , address 
national security issues and ensure consumer privacy.  
At the end of 2021 , TBT Committee members agreed to hold in 2022 and 2023 experience -sharing discussions 
on the relation of the TBT  Agreement with various  digital topics , including cybersecurity . A TBT Committee 
"Thematic Session" about " regulatory approaches on cybersecurity " is scheduled to take place in June  2023. 
The other r elated digital topics to be covered in separate Thematic  Sessions are: (i) the use of digital solutions 
for conformity assessment; (ii)  conformity assessment of goods obtained through e -commerce; and 
(iii) possible impacts of technical barriers on trade in  "intangible digital products " (including A I). 
 
44 WTO document G/TBT/46, 17 November 2021, para. 8.4.  
45 WTO document WT/L/1142, 22 June 2022, paras. 11 and 24.  
46 The note will be published on th e webpage WTO | WTO reports on COVID -19 and world trade   
47 WTO documents G/TBT/N/BRA/1440, 25 August 2022; G/TBT/N/BRA/1441, 25 August 2022; and 
G/TBT/N/BRA/1441/Corr.1, 26 August 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine  
3.95.   At the TBT Committee meeting s of 8-11 March and 12 -15 July 2022 , Ukraine and several 
other Members expressed their strong opposition to the war in Ukraine, with several Members noting 
that it violated international law and the UN Charter. The Russian Federation called on Members to 
refrain from interventions  on issues  and events which were outside the scope of the TBT Committee 
and the WTO itself.48  
3.96.   In April and May 2022, Lithuania submitted various notifications to the TBT Committee on 
construction products that, according to Lithuania, "were adopted in view of the fact that the Russian 
Federation was carrying out a military attack on Ukraine" and Belarus' "involvement in the attack."49 
These Lithuanian notifications concern modifications to previously notified regulatory measures on 
specifications for constructi on products that had entered into force between 2018 and January 2022. 
More specifically, these new measures intend to temporarily allow construction products which are 
not covered by EU harmonized technical specifications ("non -harmonized construction pro ducts"), 
to nonetheless be placed on the Lithuanian market without being certified by a body established in 
Lithuania, provided that they comply with certain special certification requirements. At the same 
time, and in light of the war in Ukraine, Lithuani a "suspended validity of certificates of constancy of 
performance of construction products, certificates of conformity of (internal) production control of 
construction products" so as "to ensure that [the Russian Federation and Belarus] are not directly 
or indirectly financed by the Republic of Lithuania and the European Union".50 
3.97.   In June 2022, Switzerland notified to the TBT Committee  a temporary facilitating measure to 
the foodstuff  information requirements "due to the situation in Ukrain e". The measure w as 
introduced due to the urgent need to replace sunflower oil and lecithin produced from Ukrainian  
sunflower with other oils and lecithin  which made it impossible to label the final products correctly.51 
3.98.   In the same context, Ukraine also notified to the TB T Committee a number of regulatory 
measures, including on conformity assessments, labelling, the relaxation of certain regulatory 
requirements and the postponement  of entry into force of certain regulatory measures.52 
3.5  Trade concerns raised in other WTO bod ies53 
3.99.   During the review period, several trade issues and concerns were raised by Members in formal 
meetings of various WTO bodies. This Section provides a factual overview of such concerns raised 
between mid -October 2021 and mid -October 2022.54 The trade concerns covered in this Section 
have neither the status nor the procedural framework of the STCs raised in the SPS and TBT 
Committees. Nevertheless, they provide an up -to-date insight into which trade issues are being 
discussed by Members acros s the WTO and, as such, add important transparency. This Section does 
not reproduce the full substantive description of the trade concerns outlined by WTO Members but 
provides a reference to the formal meeting(s) where a particular issue featured. A full a ccount and 
context of the concerns can be found in the formal meeting records of the respective WTO bodies. 
The list of concerns and issues mentioned in this Section is not exhaustiv e. 
 
48 WTO document s G/TBT/M/86, 24 May 2022  and G/TBT/M/87 , 30 September 2022 . 
49 Belarus is not a WTO Member. Information on Belarus' WTO accession process can be found here: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/blr_e/a1_belarus_e.htm .  
50 WTO docum ents G/TBT/N/LTU/44, 19 April 2022; G/TBT/N/LTU/45, 19 April 2022; 
G/TBT/N/LTU/45/Add.1, 19 May 2022; G/TBT/N/LTU/46/Rev.1 (submitted on 12 May 2022 as a revision of the 
original notification circulated on 19 April as G/TBT/N/LTU/46); and G/TBT/N/LTU/46/Re v.1/Add.1, 
19 May 2022.  
51 WTO document G/TBT/N/CHE/269, 3 June 2022.   
52 WTO documents G/TBT/N/UKR/162/Add.1, 28 March 2022; G/TBT/N/UKR/227, 13 September 2022, 
G/TBT/N/UKR/218, 9 August 2022 ; G/TBT/N/UKR/217, 4 August 2022; and G/TBT/N/UKR/199/Add.1, 
19 September 2022 .  
53 This Section does not include the SPS and TBT Committees (covered separately) . Issues raised in this 
Section may subsequently have become the subject of a dispute.  
54 Members are encouraged to communicate to the Trade Monitoring Section of the WTO trade issues 
which they have raised in WTO bodies and which they believe are relevant to the Monitoring Exercise.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  3.100.   At the 15 December 2021 Special  meeting of the General Council  (GC)55, trade concerns 
were raised under "Other Business"  by the European Union regarding the shipments of goods to 
China originating in Lithuania. At the 9 -10 May 2022 GC meeting56, trade concerns were raised on 
trade-disruptive practices of certain Members and t heir implications for the WTO (raised by the 
Russian Federation).57 
3.101.   During the review period, the Council for Trade in Goods  (CTG) on 1 -2 November  2021, on 
21-22 April 2022  and on 7 -8 July 2022 . Thirty -seven trade concerns, including five new, were raised 
at the CTG 1 -2 November 2021 meeting58 (Table 3.16 ).  
Table 3.16 Trade concerns raised at the CTG meeting of 1 -2 November 2021  
Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Angola  – Import Restricting Practices  Russian Federation  
Australia  – Discriminatory Market Access Prohibition on 
5G Equipment  China  
China  – Administrative Measures for Registration of Overseas 
Producers of Imported Foods  United States  
China  – Cosmetics Supervision and Administration 
Regulations (CSAR)  Australia, European Union, Japan, and 
United  States  
China  – Export Control Law  European Union and Japan  
China  – Implementation of Trade Disruptive and Restrictive 
Measures  Australia  
China  – Subsidy Transparency and China's Publication and 
Inquiry Point Obligations under China's Protocol of Accession  Australia, European Union, United 
Kingdom, and United States  
Egypt  – Manufacturer Registration System  European Union  
European Union  – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
(European Green Deal of December  2019)  China and Russian Federation  
European Union  – Implementation of Non -Tariff Barriers on 
Agricult ural Products  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Panama, Paraguay, United States, and 
Uruguay  
European Union  – Proposed Modification of 
TRQ Commitments: Systemic Concerns  Brazil, China, and Uruguay  
European Union  – Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products 
and Foodstuffs – the Registration of Certain Terms of Cheese 
as Geographical Indications  Uruguay  
European Union  – Regulation (EU)  2017/2321 and 
Regulation (EU)  2018/825  China and Russian Federation  
European Union  – Regulation EC  No. 1272/2008 
(CLP Regulation)  Russian Fe deration  
European Union  – Sweden's Discriminatory Market Access 
Prohibition on 5G  Equipment  China  
European Union  – The European Green Deal  Russian Federation  
India  – Import Policy on Tyres  European Union, Indonesia, 
Chinese  Taipei  
India  – Import Restriction on Air Conditioners  Japan  
India  – Indian Standards and Import Restriction in the 
Automotive Sector (Quality Control Orders): Wheel Rims, 
Safety Glass, Helmets  Indonesia  
India  – Mandatory Certification for Steel Products  Japan  
India  – Order Related to Requirement of Non -GM Cum GM 
Free Certificate Accompanied with Imported Food 
Consignment  United States  
India  – Plain Copier Paper Quality Order  2020 Indonesia  
India  – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Pulses  Australia, Canada, European Union, 
Russian  Federation, and United States  
Indonesia  – Import and Export Restricting Policies and 
Practices  European Union, Japan, New Zealand, 
United States  
Indonesia  – Import Substitution Programme  European Union  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  – Saber Conformity Assessment 
Online Platform/Saleem Product Safety Program  United States  
 
55 WTO document WT/GC/M/195 , 15 December 2021.  
56 WTO document WT/GC/M/198 , 21 July 2022.  
57 WTO document WT/GC/ 245, 16 March 2022.  
58 WTO document G/C/M/141, 28  February 2022. WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Bahrain, the 
United Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman, and 
Qatar  – Selective Tax on Certain Imported Products  European Union,  Switzerland, and 
United  States  
Mexico  – Conformity Assessment Procedure for Cheese 
Under Mexican Official Standard NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -
2018 United States  
Mongolia  – Measures Applied with Respect to Certain 
Agricultural Products  Russian Federation  
Panama  – Onions and Potatoes Harvest Life and Sprouting 
Requirements  United States  
Russian Federation  – Trade Restricting Practices  European Union and United States  
Sri Lanka  – Import Ban on Palm Oil  Indonesia  
Sri Lanka  – Import Ban on Various Products  Australia and European Union  
United Kingdom  – Draft Goods Schedule and Proposed 
UK TRQ Commitments: Systemic Concerns  Brazil, China, Russian Federation, 
Uruguay  
United States  – Export Control Measures for ICT  Products  China 
United States  – Import Restrictions on Apples and Pears  European Union  
United States  – Measures Regarding Market Access 
Prohibition for ICT  Products  China  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.102.   At the 21 -22 April 202259 CTG meeting, 41 trade concerns were raised (Table 3.17 ). 
Table 3.17 Trade concerns raised at CTG meeting of 21 -22 April 2022  
Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Australia  – Discriminatory Marke t Access Prohibition on 
5G Equipment  China  
Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States  – 
Unilateral Trade -Restrictive Measures Against Russia  Russian Federation  
China  – Administrative Measures for Registration of Overseas 
Producers of Imported Foods  Indonesia and United States  
China  – Cosmetics Supervision and Administration 
Regulations  (CSAR)  Australia, European Union, Japan, 
United States  
China  – Export Control Law  Japan  
China  – Implementation of Trade Disruptive and Restrictive 
Measures  Australia  
Ecuador  – Import Restrictions on Grapes and Onions  Peru 
European Union  – Belgium's Draft Law Introducing Additional 
Security Measures for the Provision of Mobile 5G  Services  China  
European Union  – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism  China and Russian Federation  
European Union  – Countervailing Duties (CVD) on Stainless  Steel 
Cold -Rolled Flat (SSCR)  Indonesia  
European Union  – European Green Deal (Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism and Deforestation Free Commodities)  Indonesia  
European Union  – Implementation of Non -Tariff Barriers on 
Agricultural Products (G/C/W/767/Rev.1)   Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, United States, 
Uruguay  
European Union  – Proposed Modification of TRQ Commitments: 
Systemic Concerns  China and Uruguay  
European Union  – Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs -the Registration of Certain Terms of Cheese as 
Geographical Indications  New Zealand and Uruguay  
European Union  – Regulation EC  No. 1272/2008 (CLP  Regulation)  Russian Federation  
European Union  – Regulation  (EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation 
(EU) 2018/825  Russian Federation  
European Union  – Sweden's Discriminatory Market Access 
Prohibition on 5G  Equipment  China  
European Union  –European Green Deal  Russian Federation  
India  – Import Policy on Tyres  European Union, Indonesia, 
Chinese  Taipei, Thailand  
India  – Import Restriction on Air Conditioners  Japan and Thailand  
 
59 WTO document G/C/M/142, 17 June 2022 . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
India  – Order Related to Requirement of Non -GM Cum GM Free 
Certificate Accompanied with Imported Food Consignment  United States  
India  – Plain Copier Paper Quality Order  2020  Indonesia  
India  – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Pulses  Australia, Canada, European Union, 
United States  
Indonesia  – Import and Export Restricting Policies and Practices  European Union, Japan, 
New Zealand, United  States  
Indonesia  – Import Substitution Programme  European Union  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  – SABER Conformity Assessment 
Online Platform/Saleem Product Safety Program  United States  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Bahrain, 
United  Arab  Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar  
– Selective Tax on C ertain Imported Products  Switzerland and United States  
Mexico  – Conformity Assessment Procedure for Cheese Under 
Mexican Official Standard Nom -223-Scfi/Sagarpa -2018  United States  
Nepal  – Import Ban on Energy Drinks  Thailand  
Nigeria  – Restrictive Policies on Agricultural Products  Brazil  
Panama  – Onions and Pota toes Harvest Life and Sprouting  United States  
Panama  – Undue Delays and Export Restrictions on Agricultural 
and Hydrobiological Products  Peru 
Philippines  – Special Safeguard on Instant Coffee  Indonesia  
Plurinational State of Bolivia  – Export Restrict ions on 
Agricultural and Hydrobiological Products  Peru 
Sri Lanka  – Import Ban on Various Products  Australia and Thailand  
United Kingdom  – Draft Goods Schedule and Proposed UK TRQ 
Commitments: Systemic Concerns  China and Uruguay  
United Kingdom  – Environmental Act: Forestry Commodities  Indonesia  
United States  – Discriminatory Quantitative Restriction on Steel 
and/or Aluminium Imports  China  
United States  – Export Control Measures for ICT Products  China  
United States  – Import Restrictions on  Apples and Pears  European Union  
United States  – Measures Regarding Market Access Prohibition for 
ICT Products  China  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.103.   During the CTG  21-22 April meeting, Ukraine raised concerns about Russian Federation's 
military actions, stating that some of which were targeting Ukraine's agricultural production capacity 
thus jeopardizing food security and risking a world food crisis. The Russian Fed eration raised 
concerns about unilateral measures introduced by Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, 
New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States aimed at attacking the Russian 
Federation's economy as a result of its special military ope ration in Ukraine.  
3.104.   Concerns were raised by a number of Members on the direct impact of the 
Russian  Federation's military action in Ukraine, which had prevented Ukraine's exports and also on 
the Russian Federation's measures to restrict its exports  of fert ilizers and other commodities, such 
as sugar, sunflower oil, wheat, meslin, rye, barley, corn, sunflower seeds, and rapeseed seeds 
(raised by Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uni ted States, and Ukraine).  
3.105.   At the 7-8 July 2022 CTG meeting60, three new trade concerns were raised  (Table  3.18).  
Table 3.18 New trade concerns raised at CTG meeting of 7 -8 July 2022  
Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Australia  – investigation and review of anti-dumping duties on 
A4 copy paper Indonesia  
Egypt  – Halal certification requirements for imported food and 
beverage products  Canada and United States  
Pakistan  – import restrictions on foodstuffs and consumer 
goods  European Union  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
60 WTO document G/C/M/143, 6 October 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  3.106.   At the same meeting, 41 previously  raised concerns were brought to the Council's attention 
(Table  3.19). 
Table 3.19 CTG meeting of 7 -8 July 2022: previously raised trade concerns  
Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Australia  – Discriminatory Market Access Prohibition on 5G 
Equipment  China  
Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, Lithuania, 
New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the 
United States  – Unilateral Trade -Restrictive Measures Against 
Russia  Russian Federation  
China  – Administrative Measures for Registration of Overseas 
Producers of Imported Foods  Australia and United States  
China  – Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulations 
(CSAR)  Australia , European Union , Japan , 
United  States  
China  – Export Control Law  Japan  
China  – Implementation of Trade Disruptive and Restrictive 
Measures  Australia  
China  – Subsidy Transparency and China's Publication and 
Inquiry Point Obligations Under China's Protocol of Accession  Australia , Canada , European Union , 
Japan , United Kingdom , and 
United States  
Ecuador  – Import Restrictions on Grapes and Onions  Peru 
European Union – Belgium's Law Introducing Additional 
Security Measures for the Provision of Mobile 5G Services  China  
European Union  – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
(CBAM)  China and the Russian Federation  
European Union  – Countervailing Duties (CVD) on Stainless 
Steel Cold -Rolled Flat (SSCR)  Indonesia  
European Union  – European Green Deal (Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism and D eforestation Free Commodities)  Brazil and Indonesia  
European Union  – Implementation of Non -Tariff Barriers on 
Agricultural Products  Australia , Brazil , Canada , Colombia , 
Costa Rica , Dominican Republic , 
Ecuador , Guatemala , Panama , Paraguay , 
Peru, United Sta tes, Uruguay  
European Union  – Proposed Modification of TRQ 
Commitments: Systemic Concerns  Brazil and Uruguay  
European Union – Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products 
and Foodstuffs – the Registration of Certain Terms of Cheese as 
Geographical Indications  New Zealand and Uruguay  
European Union  – Regulation EC No. 1272/2008 (CLP 
Regulation)  Russian Federation  
European Union  – Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation 
(EU) 2018/825  Russian Federation  
European Union  – Sweden's Discriminatory Market Access 
Prohibition on 5G Equipment  China  
European Union  – the European Green Deal  Russian Federation  
India – Import Policy on Tyres  European Union , Indonesia , Chinese 
Taipei , Thailand  
India  – Import Restriction on Air C onditioners  Japan and Thailand  
India  – Order Related to Requirement of Non -GG Cum GM Free 
Certificate Accompanied with Imported Food Consignment  United States  
India  – Plain Copier Paper Quality Order 2020  Indonesia  
India  – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Pulses  Australia , Canada , European Union 
United States  
Indonesia  – Import and Export Restricting Policies and 
Practices  European Union , Japan , New Zealand , 
United States  
Indonesia  – Import Substitution Programme  European Union  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Bahrain, United 
Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar  – 
Selective Tax on Certain Imported Products  Switzerland and the United States  
Mexico  – Conformity Assessment Procedure for Cheese Under 
Mexican Official Standard Nom 223 SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 United States  
Nepal  – Import Ban on Energy Drinks  Thailand  
Nigeria  – Restrictive Policies on Agricultural Products  Brazil  
Panama  – Onions and Potatoes Harvest Life and Sprouting  Canada and United States  
Panama  – Undue Delays and Export Restrictions on 
Agricultural and Hydrobiological Products  Peru 
Philippines  – Special Safeguard on Instant Coffee  Indonesia  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Plurinational State of Bolivia  – Export Restrictions on 
Agricultural and Hydrobiological Products  Peru 
Sri Lanka  – Import Ban on Various Products  Thailand  
United Kingdom  – Draft Goods Schedule and Proposed UK 
TRQ Commitments: Systemic Concerns  Brazil and Uruguay  
United Kingdom  – Environmental Act: Forestry Commodities  Brazil and Indonesia  
United States  – Discriminatory Quantitative Restriction on 
Steel and/or Aluminium Imports  China  
United States  – Export Control Measures for Chinese 
Enterprises  China  
United States  – Import Restrictions on Apples and Pears  European Union  
United States  – Measures Regarding Market Access 
Prohibition for ICT Products  China  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.107.   At the 3 0-31 March 2022 meeting of the Committee on Market Access  (CMA)61, 18 trade 
concerns were raised (Table 3.20 ). 
Table 3.20 Trade concerns raised at the CMA meeting of 30 -31 March 2022  
Measure implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Angola  – Import Restriction Practices  European Union and United States  
Canada  – Restrictions on the Commercial Importation of 
Cannabis and Cannabis Products for Medical Use  Colombia  
China  – Trade Disruptive and Restrictive Measures  Australia  
European Union  – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 
(CBAM)  Indonesia, Russian Federation  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Bahrain, United  Arab 
Emirates, State of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar  – Selective Tax 
on Certain Imported Products  European Union, Switzerland, 
United  States  
India  – Import Policies on Tyres  European Union, Indonesia, 
Chinese  Taipei, Thailand  
India  – Import Restriction on Air Conditioners  Japan, Thailand  
India  – Plain Copier Paper Quality Order 2020  Indonesia  
India  – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Certain Pulses  Australia, Canada, European Union, 
United  States  
Indonesia  – Import Substitution Programme  European Union  
Indonesia  – Customs Duties on Certain Telecommunication 
Products  United States, European Union  
Mexico  – Import Quota on Glyphosate  United States  
Nepal  – Import Ban on Energy Drinks  Thailand  
Peru – Tax Treatment of Pisco  United Kingdom  
Sri Lanka  – Import Ban on Various Products  Australia, European Union, Thailand  
Sri Lanka  – Import Ban on Palm Oil  Indonesia  
Philippines  – Special Safeguard on Instant Coffee  Indonesia  
United States  – Discriminatory Quantitative Restriction on Steel 
and/or Aluminium Imports  China  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.108.   At the CMA March 2022 meeting, Ukraine made reference to its notification62 of export 
restrictions on certain agricultural products which were nec essary to ensure national  food security. 
They noted that these measures were implemented as a result of the Russian Federation's actions. 
Ukraine denounced the detrimental effects that the war had on international trade in food products. 
Thirteen Members ( United  Kingdom, United States, Paraguay, New Zealand, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Norway, Türkiye, European Union, Chinese Taipei, Australia, Switzerland, and Canada) 
expressed support for Ukraine and noted the consequences of the Russian Federation's action s on 
global trade in goods. The Russian Federation stressed that the reasons for disruptions of global 
supply chains were the unilateral trade restricting measures introduced by Members, which were in 
direct violation of WTO rules. During that meeting, t he Committee reviewed the quantitative 
 
61 WTO document G/MA/M/76, forthcoming . 
62 WTO document G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/Add.2 , 25 March 2022 . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  restrictions (QR) notifications from 16 Members. One notification from the United States related to 
import and export prohibitions against the Russian Federation on the ground of national security.63 
3.109.   At the 8 April 2022  meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing  (CIL)64, new and 
persistent trade concerns were raised (Table  3.21). 
Table 3.21 Trade concerns raised at the CIL meeting of 8 April 2022  
Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Angola  – Import Licensing Requirements  European Union  
China  – Changes to Import Licensing for Certain Recoverable 
Materials  United States  
Egypt  – Import Licensing Requirements for Certain Agricultural 
and Processed Products  European Union  
India  – Quantitative Restrictions on Certain Pulses  Canada  
India  – Importation of Pneumatic Tyres  European Union, Indonesia, 
Chinese  Taipei, Thailand  
Indonesia  – Import Restrictions: Compulsory Registration by 
Importers of Steel Products  Japan  
Indonesia  – Import Licensing Regime for Certain Textile 
Products  European Union and Japan  
Indonesia  – Import Restrictions on Air Conditioners  European Union and Japan  
Thailand  – Importation of Feed Wheat  European Union  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.110.   At the 7 October 2022 CIL meeting65, new and persistent trade concerns were raised 
(Table  3.22). 
Table 3.22 Trade concerns raised at the CIL meeting of 7 October 2022  
Measures implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Angola  – Import Licensing Requirements  European Union  
Egypt – Import Licensing Requirements for Certain Agricultural 
and Processed Products  European Union  
India  – Importation of Pneumatic Tyres  European Union, Indonesia  
Indonesia  – Commodity Balancing Mechanism  European Union  
Indonesia  – Compulsory Registration by Importers of Steel 
Products  Japan  
Indonesia  – Import Licensing Regime for Certain Textile 
Products  European Union and Japan  
Indonesia  – Import Restrictions on Air Conditioners  Japan  
Thailand  – Importation of Feed Wheat  Europ ean Union  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.111.   At the 6 April and 11 October 2022 meetings of the Committee of Participants on the 
Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA Committee)66 an implementation issue 
was reiterated concerning Indonesia, cal ling for aligning the tariff treatment of certain ICT products 
classified under subheading 8517.62 with Indonesia's WTO commitments (raised by United States, 
European Union, and Japan).  
3.112.   At the  meetings of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) on 15 -16 March, 27-28 June and 14 -
15 September 202267, several questions and concerns were raised with respect to Members' 
individual notifications, and on specific implementation matters (SIMs) under Article  18.6. During 
the review period, a total of 344 questions were discussed on individual notifications (1 98 questions), 
 
63 WTO document G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add.3, 21 March 2022.  
64 WTO document G/LIC/M/54 , 20 June 2022 . 
65 WTO document G/LIC/M/55, forthcoming.  
66 WTO document s G/IT/M/76 , 2 August 2022  and G/IT/M/7 7 (forthcoming ). 
67 Questions raised under the review process in the CoA meetings on 15 -16 March, 27 -28 June and 
14-15 September 2022  are available in WTO document G/AG/W/217 and G/AG/W/217/Corr.1, G/AG/W/221 
and G/AG/W/222 . The questions, responses and follow -up comments are available through the Q&A section of 
the Agriculture Information Management System . Viewed at: http://agims.wto.org/ . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Article 18.6 matters (130 questions covering 83 SIMs ), and overdue notifications (16 questions). 
Additional details regarding these questions and concerns can be found in Section 3.6 of this Report.  
3.113.   At the meetings of the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices68 on 27 October 2021 and 
27 April 2022, 33 concerns were raised as  (Table 3.2 3). 
Table 3.23 Concerns raised on anti -dumping practices  
Measure(s) implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Argentina  – Initiation  – polymer profiles of vinyl chloride of 
the types used in the manufacture of openings or enclosures  Türkiye  
Argentina  – Initiation  – tiles of glass whether or not on a 
backing, for mosaics or similar decorative purposes  Türkiye 
Brazil  – Investigation – liquid caustic soda  United States  
Canada  – Investigation – preliminary and final determinations 
- concrete reinforcing bars  Egypt and Russian  Federation  
China  – Anti-dumping  measures  – Poultry  Brazil  
China  – Final determination and continued imposition of AD 
measures  – unbleached sack paper  Japan  
China  – Final determination and continued imposition of AD 
measures – Grain oriented flat rolled electrical steel  Japan  
Egypt  – Anti-dumping  measure  – prestress ed concrete steel 
strands  Tunisia  
European Union  – Initiation – corrosion resistant steel 
products  Türkiye  
European Union  – Initiation – ceramic tiles  Türkiye  
European Union  – Initiation – certain iron or steel fasteners  China  
European Union  – Initiation – alumin ium road wheels  Morocco  
European Union  – Reopening of investigation  – certain woven 
and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics  Egypt  
India  – Continued imposition of anti -dumping  measures  – 
hot-rolled flat products of alloy and non -alloy steel, and cold -
rolled/cold reduced flat products of iron or non -alloy steel  Japan  
India  – Anti-dumping  measures – electrogalvanized steel  Japan  
Korea, Republic of  – Final determination and continued 
imposition of AD duties based on the 4th sunset review  – 
stainless steel bar  Japan  
Korea, Republic of  – Expiry review – Butyl glycol ether  United States  
Mexico  – Initiation – type I and type H steel beams  United Kingdom  
Morocco  – Initiation – galvanized wire  Türkiye  
Philippines  – Sunset review and extension of measures – 
wheat flour  Türkiye  
South Africa  – Preliminary determination and imposition of 
provisional measures – Frozen bone -in portions of fowls of the 
species Gallus Domesticus  European Union  
South Africa  – Preliminary determination and imposition of 
provisional measures  – Frozen bone -in portions of fowls of the 
species Gallus Domesticus  Brazil  
South Africa  – Investigation – uncooked pasta  Egypt  
South Africa  – Initiation – frozen potato chips  European Union  
Thailand  – Final determination and continued imposition of AD 
duties  – flat hot -rolled steel in coils and not in coils  Japan  
Thailand  – Anti-dumping  investigation - hot-rolled steel coil  Egypt  
Ukraine  – Initiation  – certain articles of asphalt or of similar 
material  Russian Federation  
Ukraine  – Initiation – aluminium ladders  European Union  
United Kingdom  – Transitional review – cold-rolled flat steel 
products  Russian Federation  
United States  – Investigation – raw honey  Ukraine  
 
68 WTO documents G/ADP/M/60, 17 December 2021 and G/ADP/M/61, 14 September 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Measure(s) implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
United States  – Administrative review  – Glycine  Japan  
United States  – Review of Russian Federation's market 
economy status – urea ammonium nitrate solutions  Russian Federation  
United States  – Anti-dumping  measures - hot-rolled steel flat 
products  Türkiye  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.114.   Other issues and concerns were raised on: (i) Ukraine's undermined ability to fulfil its rights 
and obligations with respect to AD investigations both initiated by itself or by other Members due to 
the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine (raised by Ukraine); (ii) the length of the 
United  States anti -dumping  measures – prolonged measures (raised by China and Japan ); (iii) 
sunset reviews conducted by the European Union leading to continued imposition of prolonged 
anti-dumping  measurers (raised by China); (iv) European Union's Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 and 
Regulation (EU) 2018/825 ( raised by Russian Federation); (v) Overall importance  of prompt 
notifications for transparency purposes (raised by United  States); and (vi) T ransitional reviews and 
continued application by the United Kingdom of the European Union's anti -dumping  measures 
conducted after Brexit (raised by China and Russian Federation).  
3.115.   At the meetings of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  on 26 October 
2021 and 26 April 202269 17 concerns were raised on subsidies (Table 3.2 4). 
Table 3.24 Trade concerns raised at the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
measures  
Measure(s) implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
China  – Countervailing duty investigation  – n-Propanol (NPA)  United States  
European Union  – Anti-circumvention proceedings  – Glass fibre 
fabrics  Egypt and Morocco  
European Union  – Final countervailing measures  – Stainless 
steel cold -rolled flat products  Indonesia  
India  – Countervailing duty investigation  – Aluminium  primary 
foundry alloy ingot  Malaysia  
India  – Countervailing duty investigation  – Copper tubes and 
pipes Malaysia  
India  – Countervailing duty investigation  – Saturated fatty 
alcohols  Malaysia  
United Kingdom  – Countervailing duty investigation – Ironing  
boards  Türkiye  
United Kingdom  – Countervailing duty investigation – Optical 
fibre cables  China  
United States  – Countervailing duty investigation  – Phosphate 
fertilizers  Russian Federation  
United States  – Countervailing duty investigation & final 
measures  – Seamless carbon and alloy steel standard, line, and 
pressure pipe  Russian Federation  
United States  – Countervailing duty investigation & imposition 
of provisional measures and preliminary determinations - Urea 
ammonium nitrate solutions  Russia n Federation  
United States  – Preliminary findings and Provisional measures – 
Granular polytetrafluoroethylene resin  Russian Federation  
United States  – Initiation of countervailing duty investigation – 
Oil country tubular goods  Russian Federation  
United States  – Countervailing duty measures – Phosphate 
fertilizers  Morocco  
United States  – Preliminary or final determinations on "currency 
undervaluation" in countervailing duty investigations on Twist 
ties; Chassis; Pentafluoroethane; Mobi le access equipment; and 
Walk-behind snow throwers  China  
United States  – Expiry reviews  – Cold-rolled and hot -rolled 
steel sheets  Brazil  
United States  – Expiry review – Iron construction castings  Brazil  
 
69 WTO documents G/SCM/M/ 117, 4 March 2022 and G/SCM/M/119, forthcoming.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.116.   Additional concerns were raised on: (i) the undermining of Ukraine's ability to fulfil its rights 
and obligations under the SCM Agreement due to the war (raised by Ukraine); (ii) disruptions in 
international trade caused by unilateral measures  adopted against the Rus sian Federation and 
subsidies by the European Union to energy -intensive sectors (raised by Russian Federation); (iii) 
elimination of export subsidies by the Members that received extensions under Article 27.4 of the 
SCM Agreement; (iv) low and declining le vel of compliance with the notification and transparency 
obligations in the SCM Agreement; (v) requests for information pursuant to Article  25.8 and 25.9 
(proposal on procedures from the United States); (vi) subsidies and overcapacity (raised by 
Australia,  Canada, European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States); (vii) request for 
information on certain alleged subsidy programmes in the steel sector in China (raised by European 
Union and United States); (viii) request for information on certain all eged subsidy programmes in 
the United States (raised by China); (ix) countervailing  duty regulation of the United States 
regarding the assessment of currency undervaluation in CVD cases (raised by China); (x) use of 
adverse facts available by the United St ates in various CVD investigations (raised by China); (xi) 
transitional reviews and continued application by the United Kingdom of the European Union's CVD 
measures conducted after Brexit (raised by China); (xii) countervailing duty investigations by the 
European Union regarding the so -called transnational subsidies (raised by China); (xiii) increased 
trade protectionism through application of countervailing measures (raised by China); (xiv) subsidy 
transparency and China's publication and inquiry point obl igations under China's protocol of 
accession (raised by Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
United  States); (xv) proposed amendment to procedures for review of new and full subsidy 
notifications (raised by Australia, Canada, E uropean Union, Japan, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei, 
United Kingdom, and United States).  
3.117.   At the meetings of the Committee on Safeguards  held on 25 October 202170 and on 
25 April 202271, 23 concerns were raised on specific safeguard actions as  (Table 3.2 5). 
Table 3.25 Concerns raised at the Committee on Safeguards  
Measure implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Costa Rica  – investigation on refined white sugar Brazil  
European Union  – Investigation on certain steel products  China, Japan , Russian Federation, 
Brazil, India, Switzerland, Türkiye, 
Republic of Korea  
India  – Investigation on solar cells  Japan  
Indonesia  – Investigation on carpets and other textile floor 
coverings  Japan  
Indonesia  – Investigation on articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories  Japan, European Union  
Indonesia  – Investigation on cigarette paper  European Union  
Madagascar  – Investigation on pasta  Mauritius  
Morocco  – Investigation on wire rods and reinforcing bars  European Union  
Morocco  – Investigation on lighting columns  European Union, Türkiye  
Morocco  – Investigation on coated wood board  European Union  
Peru – Investigation on clothing  Brazil, Indonesia  
Philippines  – Investigation on motor vehicles  Japan  
Philippines  – Investigation on high -density polyethylene and 
linear low -density polyethylene pellets and granules  Brazil  
South Africa  – Investigation on screws fully threaded with 
hexagon heads made of steel  European Union  
Türkiye  – Investigation on polyester staple fibre  European Union, Egypt  
Türkiye  – Investigation on grinding balls and similar articles for 
mills European Union  
Türkiye  – Investigation on yarn of nylon or other polyamides  Indonesia, European Union  
Ukraine  – Investigation on fresh cut roses  Ecuador, Colombia  
 
70 WTO document G/SG/M/5 9, 21 February 2022 . 
71 WTO document G/SG/M/ 60, 16 September 2022 . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Measure implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Ukraine  – Investigation on sodium hypochlorite  European Union  
Ukraine  – Investigation on PVC profile  European Union  
United Kingdom  – Investigation on certain steel products  China, Japan, Türkiye, 
Russian  Federation, Brazil, 
Switzerland, Republic of Korea, India  
United States  – Investigation on crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
cells Japan, Singapore, Malaysia  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.118.   Additional concerns were raised at the 25 April 2022 meeting on: (i) Ukraine's ability to 
conduct safeguard investigations, with certain deadlines in ongoing proceedings already lapsed 
without the respective actions having taken place, and many more deadli nes were likely to be missed 
in the future (raised by Ukraine); (ii) disruptions in international trade caused by unilateral measures 
adopted against the Russian Federation (raised by the Russian Federation); (iii) WTO -inconsistency 
of the latest modificat ion of the safeguard measure on certain steel products by the European Union 
(see also the table above) adjusting the tariff rate quota to reflect the fact that it had banned the 
imports of steel products originating in the Russian Federation and Belarus ( raised by the Russian 
Federation); (iv) WTO -inconsistency of the latest notification of the safeguard measure on certain 
steel products by the United Kingdom (see also the table above) informing that it has initiated a 
process to review the safeguard measu re in light of the trade measures it has imposed on imports 
from the Russian Federation and Belarus (raised by the Russian Federation).  
3.119.   At the meetings of the Trade -Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)  Committee  on 
12 October 2021 , 23 March 2022  and 12 Oct ober 202272, new or returning issues were raised 
(Table  3.26).  
Table 3.26 Concerns raised at the TRIMs Committee  
Measure(s) implemented by  Member(s) raising the concern  
Indonesia  – Comprehensive review of localization measuresa European Union, Japan, United  States  
Indonesia  – Import restriction on carpets and other textilesb Japan, European Union  
Indonesia  – Import restriction on air conditionersc Japan, European Union  
India  – Import restriction on air conditionersd Japan  
China  – Draft of Chinese recommended national standard for 
office devices (information security technology -security 
specification for office devices)  Japan  
China  – The government procurement law of the People's 
Republic of China (the amendment draft)  Japan  
Russian Federation  – Measures implementing Russia's import 
substitution policye United States  
a WTO documents G/TRIMS/Q/IDN/5, 14 May 2019; G/TRIMS/Q/IDN/6, 13 March 2020; 
G/TRIMS/Q/IDN/7, 7 June 2020; and G/TRIMS/Q/IDN/8, 17 July 2020.  
b WTO document G/TRIMS/Q/IDN/9, 28 September 2021.  
c WTO document G/TRIMS/Q/IDN/10, 28 September 2021.  
d WTO document G/TRIMS/Q/IND/1, 28 September 2021.  
e WTO documents G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/4, 26 May 2016; G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/ 5, 27 September 2016; 
G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/6, 27 April 2017; G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/8, 24 January 2018; G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/7, 
8 November 2017 G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/9, 22 March 2018; G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/10, 2 September 2020; and 
G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/11, 22 March 2022.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.120.   At the meeting of the Working Party on State Trade Enterprises (STEs) of 13 May 202273, 
trade concerns were raised on: (i) information described as "not available" in the recent STE 
notification of China (raised by United States); (ii) the nature of the ac tivities of Malaysia's STE 
Padiberas Nasional Berhad relating to the importation of rice (raised by European Union); (iii) 
Australia's decision to continue maintaining a monopoly for the export of rice from the state of New 
 
72 WTO document s G/TRIMS/M/ 50, 2 December 2021; TRIMS/M/ 51, 25 April 2022 and TRIMS/M/ 52 
(forthcoming) . 
73 WTO document G/STR/M/ 40, 14 September 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  South Wales (raised by European Union); (iv) whether India should also notify Vijaya Dairy, located 
in the State of Telangana, as an STE (raised by European Union); (v) India's decision not to identify 
any STE for pulses in its notifications submitted  in 2019 (raised by Australia); (vi) the continued 
non-notification of STEs by the Russian Federation (raised by European Union, United  Kingdom and 
United States); (vii) and the low level of compliance with notification obligations (raised by European 
Union, Japan, United Kingdom and United S tates).  
3.121.   At the meetings of the Council for Trade in Services (CTS)  held on 22 October 2021, 
11 March  2022, and 16  May 202274, concerns were reiterated about: (i) cybersecurity measures of 
China and Viet Nam (raised by Japan and United States);  (ii) 5G -related measures of Australia 
(raised by China); (iii)  measures of the United States regarding Chinese services and service 
suppliers (raised by China); (iv) measures of India regarding Chinese services and service suppliers 
(raised by China); (v)  measures of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on localisation of customer services 
(raised by United States).   
3.122.   At the October 2021 meeting, concerns were also repeated about measures of the Russian 
Federation requiring software pre -installation (raised by Unite d States), and, at that occasion, the 
European Union also raised a concern about a measure of the Russian Federation related to Russian 
software. At the May 2022 meeting, concerns  were also raised about services trade measures of 
Albania, Australia, Canada , the European  Union, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, 
New Zealand, North  Macedonia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, the 
United  Kingdom, and the United  States (raised by Russian Federation).  
3.123.   At the meeting of the Committee on Trade and Development  (CTD) held on 
10 November  202175, the delegation of Chad, on behalf of the LDC Group, noted that the COVID -19 
pandemic had caused LDCs' exports of goods and services in 2020 to decline by more than the 
exports of the rest of the wo rld. This export decrease had left LDCs with very few options in terms 
of the budgetary requirements needed for economic stimulus. At the CTD meeting of 
25 March  202276, several delegations expressed concern with the economic, trade and humanitarian 
impact  of the war in Ukraine. At this meeting, as well as at the subsequent CTD meeting held on 
20 June 202277, a communication from India and South Africa titled "Global Electronic Commerce 
for Inclusive Development"78 was included in  the agenda. This communication states, inter alia, that 
the digital divide between developed and developing countries is a matter of considerable concern, 
and that the existing e -commerce moratorium on electronic transmissions limits the ability of 
develo ping countries to impose tariffs on the growing imports of electronic transmissions.  
3.124.   At the meeting of the CTD's Dedicated Session on Small Economies of 19 October 202179, 
several Members of the SVE Group pointed to the negative impact of the COVID -19 pan demic on 
small economies. The Committee agreed to a draft text, submitted by the SVE Group, for a Ministerial 
Decision at MC12 on the Work Programme on Small Economies80 which, inter alia , calls for work to 
be undertaken on "integrating small economies int o the post -COVID -19 economy: effects of the 
pandemic, challenges and opportunities".81 The Ministerial Decision on the Work Programme on 
Small Economies that was adopted at MC12 is contained in documents WT/MIN(22)/25 and 
WT/L/1136 of 22 June 2022.  
3.125.   The abo ve Section provides evidence of the numerous trade concerns raised in the various 
WTO bodies between mid -October 2021 and mid -October 2022. For most of the review period, WTO 
Committees and Councils continued to hold meetings in hybrid format due to COVID -19 restrictions. 
At many of these meetings, reference was also made to the war in Ukraine in various statements 
under several agenda items. Several new trade concerns were raised during the review period, and 
 
74 WTO d ocument s S/C/M/ 147, 19 November 2021 ; S/C/M/ 148, 14 April 2022 ; and S/C/M/149, 
24 June 2022. 
75 WTO document WT/COMTD/M/11 6, 15 December 2021 . 
76 WTO document WT/COMTD/M/117, 30 May  2022.  
77 WTO document WT/COMTD/M/118, 15 July 2022.  
78 WTO document WT/COMTD/W/264, 9 November 2021.  
79 WTO document WT/COMTD/SE/M/4 2, 24 November 2021.  
80 WTO document WT/COMTD/SE/W/42, 7 October 2021.  
81 Subsequently, at the meeting of the Dedicated Sessio n held on 20 May 2022  (WTO document 
WT/COMTD/SE/M/43, 3 June 2022) , the Committee agreed to a proposed outline, submitted by the SVE Group, 
of a background document to be prepared by the Secretariat on this topic (WTO document 
WT/COMTD/SE/W/44, 22 April 20 22). WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  several had already been raised in previous per iods, indicating persistent and unresolved issues. 
Also, some trade concerns were raised in more than one WTO body, suggesting that these concerns 
involve cross -cutting and technically complex issues. It may also suggest that WTO Members are 
continuing to use multiple platforms within the WTO committee structure to address various aspects 
of such concerns. The decision to raise a trade concern is systemically important because it brings 
added transparency. In addition, it demonstrates that Members are utili zing the WTO Committees 
to engage trading partners on real or potential areas of trade friction or, as has been witness during 
the latter part of the review period, more general issues of concern.  
3.126.   The repetition and non -resolution of the same trade concer ns and issues in various 
WTO bodies  remains  a source of concern , as it has been reiterated in previous Reports . The 
Secretariat will continue to closely monitor developments in this area.  
3.127.   Box 3.3 takes a closer look at environment -related trade concerns raised at WTO bodies.  
Box 3.3 Environment -related trade concerns are increasing in number  
With a growing awareness of the need to tackle environmental c hallenges, WTO Members have been increasingly 
adopting measures to address such challenges, some of which have an impact on trade. In parallel, some Members 
have questioned these measures' WTO -compatibility.  
Indeed, WTO bodies have been receiving an incre asing number of trade concerns addressed at unilateral 
environmental measures with a trade impact. While supportive of the objectives of environmental protection, some 
Members have characterized these measures as inconsistent with WTO  rules because they mi ght:  
• be of a protectionist nature (either because the rules do not apply in the same way to domestic producers 
or support granted to domestic producers but not to producers in other Members);  
• result in undue discrimination of other Members;  
• diverge from science -based standards set by international standard setting bodies recognized by WTO 
Agreements; and/or  
• seek to impose changes in production processes as market access conditions.  
In addition, these Members argue that some of these measures might re sult in an inconsistency with multilateral 
environmental agreements and their principles (e.g.  common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in the context 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)) and regret the lack of a dee per international 
cooperation to minimize these measures' trade -related effects. For some of the measures, they fear that the 
measures may end  up having a detrimental impact on the environmental policies of other Members with different 
development, socio -economic, and climate conditions.  
Some of these discussions have been brought to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG)a after being raised in some of 
its subsidiary bodies, including the Committee on Market Access, the Committee on Agriculture, the SPS Comm ittee, 
and the TBT Committee.  
At various CTG meetings, 46 Membersb from different regions and at various levels of development have expressed 
their concern over several measures. These include the European Green Deal in itself, and the measures deriving 
from it: the Carbon Border Adjustment Measure (CBAM); the implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural 
products; the Regulation on Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures (CLP Regulation); the 
Renewable Energy Directive; and the Deforestation Free Commodities Policy. The European Union, for its part, has 
explained its measures against the backdrop of the existential threats posed by climate change and biodiversity loss, 
and the need for a comprehensive plan to make the EU  economy and EU society ready to meet its Paris Agreement 
goals, and to facilitate the resetting of its economic policy to better respond to these challenges.  
Five Membersc have expressed similar concerns over the United Kingdom's Environmental Act and its forestry 
commodities policy, to which the United Kingdom has responded that its measures are part of a wider package of 
measures to improve the sustainability of supply chains and contribute to global, national and local efforts to protect 
forests and othe r ecosystems.  
Finally, two Membersd have taken the floor on India's import restrictions on air conditioners and refrigerants 
(hydrofluorocarbons), which India has explained as a measure to comply with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substa nces that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  
a The complete record of these discussions can be found in the Minutes of CTG meetings from April 2019 -July 
2022, contained in WTO documents G/C/M/134 -143. 
b Argentina; Armenia; Australia; the Kingdom of Bahrain; the Plur inational State of Bolivia; Brazil; Canada; 
China; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; 
Guatemala; Honduras; India; Indonesia; Jamaica; Japan; Kazakhstan; the Republic of Korea; the Kyrgyz 
Republic; M alaysia,; Mexico; Mozambique; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Panama; Pakistan; Paraguay; 
Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; the Russian Federation; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Sri Lanka; Chinese 
Taipei; Thailand; Türkiye; the United States; and Urug uay. 
c Argentina; Brazil; India; Indonesia; and Japan.  
d Japan and Thailand.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  3.6  Policy developments  in agriculture  
3.128.   The Committee on Agriculture ( CoA) provides a forum for Members to discuss matters 
related to agricultur al trade , and to consult on matters relat ed to Members' implementation of 
commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture ( AoA). The review work of the CoA is based on 
notifications that Members make in relation to  their commitments  and on matter s raised under 
Article 18.6 of the AoA  (i.e. Specific Implementation Matters (SIMs)) . The Committee has also been 
tasked with the monitoring of the implementation of specific outcomes reached under  the agriculture 
negotiations.  Additionally, the CoA takes up other matters, including the follow -up to the Marrakesh 
Decision on Least -developed and Net Food -Importing Developing countries (NFIDCs). Since 2020, 
the Committee has also hosted discussions on  "COVID -19 and Agriculture" to collectively review the 
impact of the pandemic on global agriculture  and food systems and to monitor governments' policy 
responses to address its effects and aftershocks .  
3.129.   The Committee at its March 2022 meeting conducted the annual follow -up to the Marrakesh 
Ministerial Decision where NFIDC Members raised the issue of financing challenges to safeguard 
vulnerabl e importing countries ' access to food through commercial imports . The issue of the 
importance of transparency of international food aid was also highlighted to assess the impact of 
adverse market conditions on LDCs and NFIDC s' access to food.  The follow -up to the Marrakesh 
Ministerial Decision also received a specific attention  at MC12 where Ministers mandated a work 
programme to examine how the NFIDC Decision could be made more effective and operational  (see 
below) .  
3.130.    During the period under review, the CoA held three regular meeting, on 15 -16 March, 27 -
28 June, and 14 -15 Septe mber 2022. Members posed 344 questions  regarding  individual 
notifications , overdue notifications,  and SIMs under Article 18.6 . Most questions concerning 
individual notifications were related to domestic support notifications (64%). For matters under 
Article 18.6 (SIMs), around half of those (47%) related to domestic support policies followed by 
SIMS on policies affecting market access (30%).   
3.131.   In total, 18 Members raised 130 questions on 83 SIMs in the meetings considered in this 
review.82 The average number  of questions raised under Article 18.6 per meeting has been on the 
rise since 2011 , reaching an all -time high of an average of 74 questions per meeting in 2020. These 
numbers declined in 2021 and 2022, but they remained higher than the average number of q uestions 
raised in the Committee meetings during 1995 to 2017 with an average of 51 and 43 questions per 
meeting, respectively . These numbers include questions that were repeated over more than one 
meeting.  
3.132.   Out of the 83 SIMs raised in the CoA during the p eriod under review, more than half 
(51) were discussed for the first time. Of these, half related to domestic support programmes, 25% 
to market access issues, 18% concerned policies prohibiting or restricting exports of foodstuffs, and 
the remaining 7% concerned export competition issues.   
3.133.   In the domestic support pillar, Members sought clarification on support policies targeting 
specific sectors or products, including cereals (China's grain reserve; Panama's compliance with its 
domestic supp ort commitments; and India's other support for rice), cotton (China's blue box support 
to cotton), dairy (Japan's stockpiles of skin milk powder and India's dairy Sahakar scheme), livestock 
(Canada's herd management and drought assistance programme and Can ada's support to the pork 
industry), vegetables (Canada's support to Prince Edward Island potato producers), wine (Canada's 
financial support for wine production) and biofuels (United States subsidies for biofuels from 
agricultural products and USD 800 mil lion subsidies for biofuels from agricultural products ). A couple 
of SIMs concerned domestic support policies with an environmental component (U S funding for 
environmental action and U S Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry strategy). There were also 
questions raised on domestic support policies with a wider sectoral scope (Egypt's increase in planted 
area; EU's new CAP; India's price support; Panama's support to rice, milk and maize; UK's bound 
AMS; China's agricultural input subsidies; US crop production  support; Russian Federation's 
compensation to farmers; Canada's support for the Next Gen Agriculture Mentorship programme; 
 
82 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, European Union, India , Indonesia , Japan , New Zealand , 
Paraguay , Republic of Korea , Russian Federation , Switzerland , Thailand , Ukraine , United Kingdom , 
United  States , and Uruguay .  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 62 - 
 
  US Market Facilitation Programme; India's  increased budget for subsidy support for farmers use of 
fertilizers; and EU's agricultural  policies funded by national resources).   
3.134.   SIMs in market access targeted measures that restricted, or had the potential to restrict, 
trade in agricultural products, including  coffee (Philippine's SSG application on instant coffee), 
champagne (Chinese Taipe i's import tariff on champagne), dairy (Ecuador's new milk law), rice 
(Malaysia's rice import system and Philippine's import regime  for rice) and mung beans (India's 
mung beans import restrictions). Several SIMs concerned policies with potential market imp lications 
with a broader scope (Saudi Arabia's tariff increases on agricultural goods; UK's SSG entitlements; 
Egypt's import requirements; and Italy's local content requirement) and two  SIMs related to 
potential market access implications of specific policies related to environmental objectives 
(Australia's ethanol tax and the UK's forest risk commodities provisions) . One SIM concerned a policy 
with trade -facilitating effects (Mexico's tariff reductions on foodstuffs to improve food security).   
3.135.   Nine SIMs re lated to measures restricting or prohibiting exports of agricultural products, 
including  cereals (Kazakhstan's export quotas on meslin, wheat, and wheat flour; India's export 
restriction measures on rice; India's export restrictions on rice and wheat; Guya na's prohibition of 
rice exports and Argentina's export restrictions of wheat), palm oil (Indonesia's palm oil export 
restrictions), poultry (Malaysian's chicken export prohibition) and multiple agricultural products 
(Kazakhstan's quantitative export restr ictions on agricultural products and Türkiye's  export 
restrictions on agricultural products ).  
3.136.   Three  SIMs sought  further information and clarification on policies that potentially subsidized 
exports of agricultural products ( Oman's Vision 2020 plan, Türkiye's freight support and the United 
States partnership to ease port congestion and restore disrupted shipping services to the United 
States growing agricultural commodities).   
3.137.   A total of 32  SIMs that were discussed during the review period were a follow -up to matters 
raised in previous Committee meetings . Some of these matters  have been raised multiple times in 
the CoA. For example, there were 9 SIMs that have been raised between  9 and 21 times in different 
CoA meetings  attracting as many as 67 que stions (Canada's new milk ingredient class -raised 21 
times; Canada's dairy policies - raised 19 times; India's pulses policies - raised 16 times; Mongolia's 
quota regime for importation - raised 13 times; China's cotton policies - raised 10 times; and Canada's  
review of its TRQ system, India's public stockpiling and India's skim milk powder export subsidies - 
raised 9 times each ). Similarly, matters related to Canada's compensation for farmers after trade 
concessions, EU's environmental policies and Nigeria's im port prohibitions on certain agricultural 
products and use of reference prices for customs valuation purposes have figured in the Committee's 
agenda on seven different occasions. Other agricultural p olicies of Angola, Argentina, China, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt , EU, India, Mongolia, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Tajikistan,  
and US were also the subject of repeated concerns under Article 18.6.  
3.138.   All 83 SIMs (new and repeated), including  questions , answers and follow -up comments can 
be accessed thro ugh the Agriculture Information Management System (AG IMS).83  
3.139.   Regarding steps taken by WTO Members to implement the December 2015 Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition , out of the 16 Members with positive export subsidy 
commitment levels in their schedules at the time of adoption of the Decision, 1 3 have had their 
revised export subsidy schedules certified (Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Iceland,  Indonesia,  Israel , 
Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Türkiye , United States,  and Uruguay); two (Canada and  
European Union ) circulated their draft revised schedules , which are pending certification; and one 
Member still ha s to circulate its revised draft schedule (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).   
COVID -19 pandemic, conflicts and foo d security  
3.140.   Food security has remained high on the agenda of the CoA especially since the onset of the 
COVID -19 pandemic. The pandemic and governments' policy responses to address its effects and 
aftershocks have significantly impacted on the global econom y and, agriculture and food systems 
have not been insulated from the crisis. It was against this background that the Committee convened 
a special meeting in June 2020 to collectively review the impact of COVID -19 on the agriculture 
 
83 By selecting the function "Se arch Q&A Submitted Since 1995 " on the AG IMS ( http://agims.wto.org/ ) 
and inputting meeting number 100, 101 and 102 in the search criteria.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  sector within the framew ork of the AoA.84 Global food security challenges and governmental policy 
responses in the agricultural sector to address these challenges have since dominated the 
Committee's discussions in its recent meetings.  Furthermore, the Committee has undertaken a 
targeted examination of Members' export -limiting measures on food to enhance transparency and 
provided an important forum for Members to collectively consult on these measures .  
3.141.   While the food security challenges resulting from the pandemic have been linge ring, the war 
in Ukraine and adverse weather conditions have further exacerbated the situation . Rising global 
food, agricultural inputs and energy prices having  severe food security implications, especially for 
LDCs and NFIDCs. At MC12 Ministers adopted a package containing multilateral rules and collective 
guidance on a wide range of matters, including food security.  
3.142.   The Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity85 reflects the 
collective resolve of the WTO membership that " any e mergency measures introduced to address 
food security concerns shall minimize trade distortions as far as possible; be temporary, targeted, 
and transparent; and be notified and implemented in accordance with WTO rules ". Ministers  also 
established a work pr ogramme to be elab orated under the auspices of the CoA to examine how the 
Marrakesh Ministerial Decision  could be  made more effective and operational to, inter alia , consider 
the needs of LDCs and NFIDCs and to increase their resilience in responding to acute food instability. 
The Committee has begun discussions on the work programme in its June and September 
meetings.  Enhancing agriculture production and product ivity in LDCs and NFIDCs, including by best 
utilizing the flexibilities in multilateral agricultural trade rules; enhancing accessibility to food 
markets , inter alia , by examining the international supply chain bottlenecks; and examining 
financing challenges to import food especially during uncertain an d volatile market conditions are 
some of the specific matters that have been put forth for examination.86 
3.143.   Ministers at MC 12 also adopted the Decision87 to exempt from export prohibitions or 
restrictions  food purchases by the World Food Programme (WFP) for non-commercial humanitarian 
purposes and thereby strengthening the WFP to fulfil its humanitarian mission to deliver emergency 
food assistance and nutritional support to millions of food insecure people across the globe. The 
MC12 Declaration88 on the WTO r esponse to the COVID -19 pandemic and preparedness for future 
pandemics also underscores the importance of global food security in resilience -building and 
responding to the current and future pandemics and espouses a multifaceted and comprehensive 
approach to address food security. This Declaration calls on relevant WTO bodies, including the CoA, 
to analy se lessons learned and challenges experienced during the COVID -19 pandemic. The Co A's 
ongoing discussion on COVID -19 and Agriculture should henceforth be an chored by the holistic 
guidance in the MC12 Declaration on the COVID -19 pandemic.  
3.144.   The Co A's deliberations89 have demonstrated that food security is a multifaceted challenge 
requiring a comprehensive policy response. There has been an appreciation of the importance of 
maintaining open and well -functioning global agricultural markets for food security; the discus sions 
have also underscored the potentially damaging effects of trade -restrictive measures, including 
export restrictions, which could exacerbate the existing market volatility and uncertainty and thereby 
jeopardize world food security. Simultaneously, the  importance of enhanced investment in the 
agricultural sector to unlock production capacities has been emphasized for the long -term resilience 
of the sector, especially in developing economies. Members have also appreciated the work of 
Observer Internation al Organizations in monitoring global food and input prices and other market 
developments, including through the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), to enhance 
transparency of agricultural markets and facilitate policy collaboration for food sec urity. Beginning 
with the March 2022 Committee meeting, the Russian -Ukraine war and its implications for food 
security worldwide have also taken centre stage in the discussions on food security. At the 
September 2022 meeting, Members welcomed the Black Sea  Grain Initiative to facilitate safe exports 
 
84 At that special meeting, Members also agreed to include "COVID -19 and Agriculture" as a standing 
item on the agenda of the CoA meetings and to also invite Observer International Organizations to contribute 
to the debate.  
85 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/28 , WT/L/1139, 22 June 2022.  
86 WTO documents G/AG/W/223, 12 September 2022 ; and G/AG/W/224, 14 September 2022 . 
87 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/29 , WT/L/1140, 17 June 2022.  
88 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/31 , WT/L/1142, 22 June 2022.  
89 The summary of discussions during 2022 ca n be found in the Summary Report of the March, June and 
September meetings of the Committee respectively in WTO documents G/AG/R/101 , 12 April 2022 ; 
G/AG/R/102 , 8 August 2022 ; and G/AG/R/103 (forthcoming).  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 64 - 
 
  of grain, foodstuffs, and fertilizer from Ukrainian ports and to help arrest the rising global food price 
inflation.   
Export restrictions  
3.145.   Some of the measures put in place by Members in response to the COVID -19 pandemic and 
the conflict included restriction or prohibition on exports of agricultural products. The AoA establishes 
disciplines for cases where  Member s institut e export prohibition s or restriction s to prevent or relieve 
critical shortages of foodstuffs (Article 12). Transparency is at the heart of these disciplines. The 
AoA states that (i) Members are to give due consideration to the effects of such prohibition or 
restriction on importing Members ' food security;  and (ii) before any Member institutes an export 
prohibition or restriction, it shall give notice in writing, as far in advance as practicable, to the CoA, 
comprising such information as the nature and the duration of such measure, and shall co nsult, upon 
request, with any other Member having a substantial interest as an importer with respect to any 
matter related to the measure in question.  Based on the agreed notification requirements and 
formats established by the CoA, these written notices a re referred to as ER:1 notifications. The AoA 
includes a special and differential treatment provision, whereby the above requirements do not apply 
to developing -country Members unless the measure is taken by a developing -country Member which 
is a net  food exporter of the specific foodstuff concerned.  
3.146.    In the period under review, there were 10 export restrictions or prohibitions notified to the 
CoA. Of these, one notified measure from Kazakhstan covering sunflower seeds and oil90 was 
attributed to the COVID -19 pandemic ; and one notified measure from the EU covering cereals91 was 
attributed to t he disruption of grain supplies from the Black Sea region .  
3.7  General economic  support  
3.147.   At the 27 July 2022 TPRB informal meeting dedicated to discussing the Director -General's 
Report on Trade -Related Developments92, WTO Members engaged in a comprehensive and 
constructive exchange of views. Some Members expressed strong support for the Secretariat 's 
coverage  on economic support measures and stressed the importance of enhanced transparency in 
this area. Others underlined the need for consensus on the scope of the exercise and called on 
Members to further participate in the Reports and to engage in discussions to improve the exercise, 
also as part of the 7th TPRM Appraisal.  
3.148.   Since July 2017, the Secretariat has been unable to justify the inclusion of a separate Annex 
on general economic support measures in the Trade Monitoring Reports. This has been partly due 
to the low participation and response rate of WTO Members to the request for information,  and partly 
because such an Annex would be biased against those Members that traditionally share and publish 
detailed information on such measures. Discussions among del egations at the past few meetings of 
the TPRB on the Trade Monitoring Reports have addressed this issue with several Members 
emphasizing the need to preserve and strengthen transparency through the monitoring exercise. 
Several Members welcomed the online C OVID -19 support measures list93 compiled by the WTO 
Secretariat, which was put in place in the early stages of the pandemic. The list provides an informal 
situation report and is an attempt to enhance transparency around support measures taken in 
response to the COVID -19 crisis. It includes only information and measures communicated by 
delegations directly to the WTO Trade Monitoring Section and only in the original language of the 
submission.  
Regular economic support measures (not related to COVID -19) 
3.149.   In response to Director -General's 7 March and 31 August 2022 request s for information for 
this Trade Monitoring Report, 39 WTO Members (Albania; Bangladesh; Brazil; Colombia; Costa Rica; 
European Union94; Hong -Kong, China; India; Thailand; Türkiye; Ukraine and  United Kingdom) 
 
90 WTO document G/AG/N/KAZ/15, 27 April 2022.  
91 WTO documents G/AG/N/EU/77 , 13 April 2022; G/AG/N/EU/77/Rev.1, 11 July 2022; and 
G/AG/N/EU/77/Rev.2, 23 September 2022.  
92 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W /16, 13 July 2022. 
93 WTO, COVID -19: Support Measures . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_support_measures_e.htm .  
94 Counting the EU  (27) and its members separately.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  volunteered information on  48 regular general economic support measures unrelated to the 
pandemic. The Secretariat's own research suggests that during the review period numerous other 
support measures with potential impact on trade flows w ere implemented by WTO Members. An 
upward trend was observed in the second part of the review period as governments  introduced 
several measures to cope with multiple interlinked crises in the energy sector, with respect to food 
security and with growing in flation . The introduction of these support measures appears to be linked 
to the economic repercussions of the war.   
3.150.   Measures included numerous energy -related support schemes such as support for 
renewable -energy production, investments in alternative energy  power plants and in clean - and 
renewable -energy projects, grants to renewable -energy businesses, financial support for electricity 
storage facilities, credits to energy firms to avoid the cash crisis, energy bills support schemes to 
households , and energy prices guarantees schemes.  
3.151.   Several measures were also introduced to support farmers and the agricultural sector, 
including production subsidies to cereals and oil seed farmers, direct grants to farmers, support 
measures to food production plan s, aid schemes to support the livestock sector and other specific 
agricultural sectors (seeds, wheat, beekeepers, wine), fundings for the purchase of machines and 
agricultural equipment, incentives to strengthening sustainable development and natural -based  
elements or technologies that increase agricultural productivity, grants to support agri -food 
companies and general programmes for the development of agriculture. Other support measures 
implemented during the review period included transport -related aid s chemes and measures to 
support the automotive sector, including investments in manufacturers of electric vehicles. Other 
measures included health -related financial grants, support to businesses and MSMEs including 
financial and tax incentives, inflation -fighting fiscal measures, investments to promote the use or 
development of digital technologies, draw -back regimes, and assistance to exporting businesses, 
including reductions or cancelation of fees in customs statements to empowering local industries' 
exports and credit guarantee schemes and R&D innovation measures.  
3.152.   As in the past, several of these economic  support measures were introduced as multi -year 
programmes, with financial disbursements staggered over the lifetime of a project. Others were 
one-off grants or aid schemes.  
COVID -19-related economic support measures  
3.153.   In response to Director -General's 7 March and 31 August 2022 requests for information 48 
Members95 volunteered information on 93 COVID -19-related support measures to the Secretariat, 
mainly r elated to extensions, renewals, or terminations of measures.  
3.154.   Since the beginning of the pandemic, at least 1,762 COVID -19-related economic support 
measures have been put in place by 113 Members and 7 Observers.96 Of these, by mid -October 
2022, 1,117 (63%)  were communicated directly to the WTO Secretariat. Overall, 702 
COVID -19-related economic support measures were implemented by G20 economies, of which 387 
(55%) were communicated directly to the Secretariat.  
3.155.   The unprecedented number of COVID -19-related su pport measures put in place since the 
beginning of the pandemic far exceeds the activity seen in the wake of the global financial crisis of 
2008-09. The se measures came in in the form of grants, loans or stimulus packages targeting sectors 
of the economy h eavily affected by the pandemic, including agriculture, health, aviation, transport, 
tourism, education, culture, as well as fiscal and financial measures to support businesses and 
MSMEs and broader stimulus packages. Another set of support measures in res ponse to the 
COVID -19 pandemic included various actions  by Central Banks. The responses of high -income 
economies have been significantly more generous in terms of the number and variety of measures 
implemented and funds allocated than those offered by lowe r-income economies.  
 
95 Albania; Australia;  Bangladesh; Belize; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; El Salvador; European Union 
(counting the EU (27) and its members separately); Honduras; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic 
of; Macao, China; Myanmar; Nepal; Norway; Philippines; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Thailand; Türkiye; and 
United Kingdom.  
96 Azerbaijan, Belarus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Serbia.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  3.156.   COVID -19-related support measures have generally appeared to be temporary in nature and 
most were put in place  in 2020 , in particular in the second, third and fourth quarters . Several of 
these support measures were one -off grants or aid  schemes and many were introduced for a fixed 
period covering a few months to a couple of years. Although numerous COVID -19-related support 
measures were implemented on a temporary basis, providing an accurate number of terminated 
measures is difficult.  Information about terminations , including specific legislative acts rolling back 
support programs entirely or partially, is often not displayed  on governmental websites , announced 
in the press and is not regularly communicated to the Secretariat  
3.157.   The Trade Monitoring Exercise does not make any judgement as to the WTO -compatibility 
of any of the measures referred to in this Section. While it is possible that these measures, whether 
taken as part of an overall commercial strategy or as part of an emergency response to the COVID -19 
pandemic, may affect trade in some way, it is not always straightforward to conclude that they 
restrict or facilitate trade (and by how much), or th at they distort competition.  
3.158.   Overall, the current review period saw the introduction of a large number of general 
economic support measures in response to multiple interlinked crises in the energy  and food sectors 
and as a result of surging inflation.  These came on top of the challenges posed by the COVID -19 
pandemic. As in the context of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 -09, the current uncertain 
international environment has seen a surge in trade measures by national governments and sub -
national govern mental entities to deal with a multitude of economic, social, and humanitarian 
challenges. In 2009, the WTO responded to the call by G20 Leaders to monitor measures taken in 
response to the crisis by reporting on the large number of  implemented government support and 
stimulus programs. At the time, it was widely recognized that many of those measures included 
provisions which affected trade flows. The COVID -19 pandemic as well as the various impacts felt 
because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine have again  created a global crisis environment to which 
governments are responding with a range of measures  that may affect trade directly or indirectly . 
Several WTO Members  have referred to the importance of monitoring  such measures , especially in 
the context of a crisis.  
3.8  Other selected trade policy issues  
3.159.   This Section provides a brief overview of the other selected trade policy issues where 
important developments took place during the review period . 
3.160.   On 17 June, WTO Members successfully concluded the 12th Ministeri al Conference (MC12) 
in Geneva with negotiated outcomes on a series of key trade initiatives which contains 
unprecedented decisions on fisheries subsidies, WTO response to health emergencies, including a 
patent waiver for COVID -19 vaccines, food security , e-commerce, and WTO reform. All documents 
related to the outcome of MC12 can be found on the WTO website .97 
Discussions at the General Council of developments in relation to COVID -19 and to the 
war in Ukraine  
3.161.   The General Council has seen WTO Members engage on COVID -19-related matters on 
several occasions during the review  period. Delegations have also referred to the war between 
the Russian  Federation and Ukraine as part of their statements under various other agenda items at 
regular meetings of the G eneral Council – including on 24 February , on 9-10 May, on 25-26 July and 
6-7 October 2022 as well as at the special meetings of the General Council on 31 March on 
7 June 2022.98 
3.162.   At the 22-23 November 2021, 23 -24 February, and 9 -10 May and 7 June 2022 Gene ral 
Council meetings99, the TRIPS Council Chair reported on the discussions on the proposed waiver on 
some TRIPS provisions by India, South Africa, and other co-sponsors in relation to the prevention, 
containment or treatment of COVID -19. At the May meetin g, the TRIPS Council Chair noted that, 
 
97 WTO Ministerial Conference , MC12: 
https://w ww.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc12_e/documents_e.htm .  
98 WTO documents WT/GC/M/196, 4 May 2022; WT/GC/M/198, 21 July 2022 ; WT/GC/M/197, 
5 May 2022, WT/GC/M/200, 6 September 2022  and WT/GC/M/201 (forthcoming).  
99 WTO documents WT/GC/M/194, 14 February  2022; WT/GC/M/196, 4 May 2022; WT/GC/M/198, 21 
July 2022; and WT/GC/M/199, 6 September 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  on 3 May, a communication containing the outcome  of informal discussions between a group of 
Ministers had been circulated for discussion in the TRIPS Council.100 At the June meeting, the TRIPS 
Council Chair updated Mem bers on these discussions including on the negotiations of the Outcome 
Text, the latest revision of which became the basis of the decision taken by Ministers and Heads of 
Delegation at MC12.101  
3.163.   At the 25 -26 July and 6 -7 October General Council meetings102, the co -sponsors of 
IP/C/W/669/Rev.1 requested the item " Paragraph 8 of the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS 
Agreement adopted on 17 June 2022 – document  WT/MIN(22)/30 " to be included in the agenda, 
which generated considerable discussion  and well as a  statement by the TRIPS Council Chair.  
3.164.   At the 22 -23 November 2021 General Council meeting, the General Council Chair -appointed 
Facilitator delivered his final Report on th e multilateral process on the WTO response to the 
pandemic. Subsequently, the General Council Chair continued to facilitate the discussions among 
Members and reported on this work at the 23 -24 February General Council meeting. The Facilitator 
provided a fu rther update to the General Council meeting  on 9-10 May. After the May General Council 
meeting, WTO documents JOB/GC/304, JOB/GC/305 and JOB/GC/306 were circulated on 13 May 
2022.  At the 7 June Special General Council meeting, the Facilitator updated Membe rs on these 
discussions. This resulted in an outcome document forwarded to Ministers and Heads of Delegation 
on 10 June for action and this, in turn, became the basis of the decision taken by them during 
MC12 .103  
3.165.   At the 9 -10 May 2022 General Council meetin g104, Brazil introduced its communication on 
Intellectual Property, Transfer  of Technology and Capacity Building for COVID -19 and Beyond .105 
3.166.   At the same meeting the United Kingdom, on behalf of the co -sponsors106, made a s tatement 
on Open  and Predictable Trad e in Agricultural and Food Products .107 Under this item several 
delegations referred to the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine . At the same 
meeting , the Russian Federation presented its communication  and made a statement on the 
Trade -Disruptive Practices of Certain Members and their Implications for the WTO .108 During the 
discussion, the following communications were also referred to by their respective co -sponsors : Joint 
statement on aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine with the support of Belarus109; 
Joint statement regarding the application from Belarus for accession to the WTO110; and a 
communication from the Russian Federation.111 
Aid for trade 
3.167.   The Aid for Trade initiative was launched at the WTO Ministerial Conference in December 
2005. The 2022 Global Review of Aid for Trade, held from 27 to 29 July 2022, focused on the theme 
"Empowering Connected Sustainable Trade". The 2022 conference  was held  against the backdrop of 
the COVID -19 pandemic and efforts by Members and the international community to contain the 
spread  of the virus,  respond to its impacts  and devise  measure s to improve resilience to future  
shocks. It provided an opportunity to discu ss the constraints facing developing  countries , and in 
particular LDCs, in areas of supply -side capacity and trade -related infrastructure , and how  Aid for 
Trade can help advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  A particular focus was placed 
on the opportunities that digital connectivity and sustainability offer for economic and export 
 
100 WTO document IP/C/W/688 , 3 May 2022.  
101 The MC12 Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement of 17 June 2022 can be found in WTO 
document WT/MIN(22)/30, WT/L/1141, 22 June 2022.  
102 WTO documents WT/GC/M/200, 6 September 2022  and WT/GC/M/201 (forthcoming).  
103 The MC12 Ministerial Declaration on the WTO Response to the COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness 
for Future Pandemics can be found in WTO d ocument WT/MIN(22)/W/13, 10 June 2022.  
104 WTO document WT/GC/M/198, 21 July 2022 . 
105 WTO document WT/GC/W/845 , 28 April 2022.  
106 Albania; Australia; Canada; Chile; Costa Rica; European Union; Georgia; Iceland; Israel; Japan; 
Republic of Korea; Liechtenstein; Mexico; Republic of Moldova; Montenegro; New Zealand; North Macedonia; 
Norway; Paraguay; Singapore; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei ; Ukraine; United Kingdom and United States . 
107 WTO document WT/GC/248, 6 May 2022.  
108 WTO document WT/GC/245 , 16 March 2022.  
109 WTO document WT/GC/244, 15 March 2022 . 
110 WTO document WT/GC/246, 24  March 2022 . 
111 WTO document WT/GC/247, 6 April 2022. WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  diversification – and how Aid for Trade can help empower different economic actors to realize these 
opportunities . The 2022 Global  Review was underpinned by an extensive monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) exercise .112 
3.168.   Key messages from the Review confirmed that trade remains a development priority despite 
the COVID -19 pandemic and highlighted the continued importance of several strategie s used to 
mitigate the impacts of the pandemic, including trade facilitation objectives, support to MSMEs, and 
women's economic empowerment. A growing awareness of climate change risks and a desire to 
develop the digital economy to foster resilience were a lso noted. Climate finance is increasingly 
intertwined with aid  for trade financing, notably in the area of renewable -energy infrastructures. 
Energy poverty is a critical supply -side constraint for many developing countries and engagement 
between the publi c and private sectors to help finance the transition to a low -carbon economy is on 
the rise.  
3.169.   Since 2006, a total of USD 556 billion has been disbursed for financing Aid for Trade 
programmes and projects, with disbursements to LDCs amounting to USD 152 bil lion. In 2020, an 
almost equal share of disbursements (49%) was allocated to building productive capacity and 
economic infrastructure. Africa (38%) and Asia (35%) remained the largest beneficiaries of Aid for 
Trade.  
Dispute settlement  
3.170.   Between the beginning  of October 2021 and the beginning of October 2022  Members 
initiated eight new disputes, seven of which were filed between January  and October 2022 
(Chart  3.17). In addition, the WTO dispute settlement system continued to deal with several 
proceedings init iated in the years 2018 -2019. As of the end of September 2022, panel proceedings 
in 26 disputes and one arbitration on the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations 
under Article 22.6 of the DSU were ongoing.  
3.171.   The subject matter of the new disputes initiated during the review period spanned a wide 
range of issues covered under the GATT  1994,  the GATS,  the SPS Agreement, the SCM Agreement, 
the Anti -Dumping Agreement , the TRIPS Agreement, the Import Licensing Agreement, and the A oA. 
As in previou s years, both developed and developing -country Members were involved in dispute 
settlement proceedings, as complainants, respondents , or third parties.  
Chart 3.17 New disputes initiated per calendar year 1995 -22 
 
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to September.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
112 The aid-for-trade reports published at the  2022 Global Review. Viewed at : www.wto.org/gr2022 .  
253950
41
3034
2337
26
19
1220
1319
1417
827
20
1413171738
20
59
7
0102030405060
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022Chart XX -New disputes initiated per calendar year 1995 -2022
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to September.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 69 - 
 
  3.172.   The easing of travel restrictions relating to the COVID -19 pandemic  in early 2022 saw  an 
increasing number of substantive meetings of panels and arbitrators in hybrid format  or in person 
in Geneva, as opposed to fully virtual  meetings . During the  review period  of October 2021 -October 
2022, panels held two substantive meetings exclusively through  remote participation ; ten in a hybrid 
format ; and three exclusively  in person.  
3.173.   Panels also circulated reports in seven disputes and arbitrators issued decisions on the level 
of suspension of concessions or other obligations under Article 22.6 of the  DSU in two proceedings. 
The Dispute Settlement Body adopted panel reports in three disputes, while Members appealed four 
panel reports (Chart  3.18). These appeals cannot be currently considered, as in the absence of 
consensus among WTO Members to launch t he selection process for Appellate Body members all 
seven positions on the Appellate Body remain vacant.  
3.174.   Parties to ten disputes have agreed to an alternative appeal mechanism based on arbitration 
proceedings under Article 25 of the DSU with a view to ensu ring review of panel reports in the 
absence of a functioning Appellate Body. The first such appeal arbitration award was issued during 
the review period.  
Chart 3.18 Panel reports appealed and adopted 2020 -22 
 
 
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to September.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Electronic commerce  
3.175.   Discussions on electronic commerce are continuing under two parallel tracks – multilaterally 
under the General Council and its relevant subsidiary bodies, and under the Joint Statement Initiative 
(JSI) on Electronic Commerce. In both settings, delegations are reiterating the need to address 
development -related challenges, including the digital divide.  
3.176.   At the multilateral level, discussions on the Work Programme  and on the moratorium on 
customs duties on electronic transmissions intensified ahead of MC12 . Ministers adopted a decision 
to reinvigorate the work under the Work Programme, intensify discussions on the moratorium – 
including on scope, definition, and im pact – and extend the moratorium until MC13 or March 2024, 
at the latest.  
3.177.   Since then, engagement has resumed at different levels. In September, the Chair of the 
General Council held initial consultations with Members on how to organize the work moving for ward 
and how to ensure complementarity between the work of the subsidiary bodies and that of the 
General Council. At a meeting in October, the Chair suggested holding dedicated discussions in the 
General Council to address horizontal issues, including the development dimension, and encouraged 
0246810
2020 2021 2022
Appealed Adopted with no appeal Appeal arbitration under Article 25 DSUChart XY -Panel reports appealed and adopted, 2020 -22
Note:  Data for 2022 cover January to September.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 70 - 
 
  all delegations to bring forward proposals. He also suggested that work in the subsidiary bodies 
should proceed based on Members' proposals. Discussions have also resumed in some of the regular 
bodies tasked with the i mplementation of the Work Programme. The Committee on Trade and 
Development continued to discuss a submission on global electronic commerce for inclusive 
development and the Chairs of the Council for Trade in Goods and the Council for Trade in Services 
will conduct consultations on how to implement the MC12 Decision.   
3.178.   In the context of the JSI on e -commerce, participants have reached convergence on eight 
articles: e -authentication and e -signatures; e -contracts; open government data; online consumer 
protecti on; unsolicited commercial electronic messages (spam); transparency; paperless trading; 
and open Internet access. Participants are continuing their negotiations in 2022 based on the 
September 2021 Consolidated text. Small group discussions are active on pr ivacy, cybersecurity, 
e-invoicing, telecommunications, electronic transactions frameworks, customs duties on electronic 
transmissions, and source code. At the September cluster of meetings, Mauritius announced its 
decision to join the Initiative, bringing the total number of participants to 87. The co -conveners 
(Australia, Japan, and Singapore) announced that they aim to circulate a revised consolidated text 
by the end of 2022 and consider that the overall agreement could be concluded by end of 2023 or 
early 2024.  
Fisheries subsidies  
3.179.   At MC12, WTO Members adopted and opened for acceptance the new WTO Agreement on 
Fisheries Subsidies.113 WTO Members are currently undertaking their domestic processes for 
accepting the Agreement. In accordance with Article X:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the WTO, the Agreement will enter into force when two  thirds of WTO Members have accepted 
it. Paragraph 4 of the Ministerial Decision adopted at MC12 mandates the Negotiating Group on Rules 
(NGR) to continue negotiating on outstanding issues, particularly on certain forms of subsidies that 
contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, including spe cial and differential treatment as an integral 
part of the negotiations. The aim of this "second wave" of negotiations is to make recommendations 
to MC13 for additional provisions that would achieve a comprehensive agreement on fisheries 
subsidies.  
3.180.   In Oct ober 2022, Members took part in a brainstorming retreat on the substance and process 
of these further negotiations on fisheries subsidies. Members suggested starting with a 
knowledge -building exercise to inform the negotiations and emphasized the importanc e of 
concluding them by MC13.  
Government procurement  
3.181.   The plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 2012 (GPA 2012) is an 
important instrument for keeping GPA Parties’ government procurement markets open and 
safeguarding good governance in their  government procurement markets. Currently, the Agreement 
has 21 Parties, covering 48 WTO Members114 Thirty -six WTO Members/Observers and four 
International Organizations participate as observers in the Committee on Government Procurement 
(CGP).  
3.182.   During the  reporting period, significant progress was made on the GPA 2012 accessions of 
Brazil and North Macedonia. The conclusion of these accessions, on mutually agreeable and 
appropriate terms, would be significant for the GPA 2012 and for the WTO. The Dominican  Republic 
became the first observer to the CGP from the Caribbean region.  
3.183.   Fifteen GPA Parties115 circulated a joint statement to the WTO General Council and the CGP 
"condemning" the Russian Federation's "military assault on Ukraine" while declaring that th ey "will 
 
113 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/33 , 22 June 2022.  
114 The European Union and its 27 member States are covered by the Agreement as one Party.  
115 Australia; Canada; European Union; Iceland; Japan; Republic of Korea; Republic of Moldova; 
Montenegro; the Netherlands with respect to Aruba; New Zealand; Norway; Chinese Taip ei; Ukraine; 
United  Kingdom and United  States.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 71 - 
 
  not participate in any work related to the Russian Federation's accession to the World Trade 
Organization's Agreement on Government Procurement and consider the process suspended".116  
Micro, small and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs)  
3.184.   The MSME Info rmal Working Group (MSME Group) includes 95 WTO Members from all 
regions of the world and all levels of development. Preparation for MC12 occupied much of the MSME 
Group's time throughout the reporting period. Although a finalized draft declaration117 was p ut 
forward by the Group in September 2021, changed circumstances prevented the Group from 
endorsing the document at MC12 and instead, a report on the progress the Group was presented by 
Group's Coordinator on the side -lines of the ministerial.  
3.185.   One concret e outcome of the Group's work has been the Trade4MSMEs platform, as website 
with trade guides for MSMEs and information on small business and trade issues for policymakers 
that was launched in December 2021 . The MSME Group further established a Trade4MSMEs  Network 
of 17 international organizations and development banks in June 2022 to ensure the site remains 
updated with the latest available content through annual meetings and mid -year check -ins. 
3.186.   The MSME Group agreed to hold its Small Business Champions in itiative annually, joint with 
the ICC and ITC.  This year's annual initiative had the theme "helping small businesses transition to 
a sustainable economy" and the organizers recognized two winners and two runners -up in 
September 2022.  
3.187.   Implementation of the December 2020 package with its recommendations and declarations 
remains a priority.118 Other work by the MSME Group is proceeding on the basis of proposals and 
presentations by Members on a variety of topics including provisions in regional trade agreements , 
cross-border payments, environmental sustainability, low -value shipments, paperless trade and 
cyber readiness. Direct communication with business remains important and the MSME Group's last 
annual dialogue with the private sector took place in February 2 022. 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs)  
3.188.   During the review period, WTO Members notified 11 RTAs ( 17 notifications) compared to 
51 RTAs ( 75 notifications)  during the previous period  which saw an unprecedent increase in 
notifications following the entry into force of agreements concluded by the United Kingdom after it 
withdrew  from the European Union . Of the se RTAs, six include trade liberalization in both goods and 
services; two rela te to trade in goods only, while for the remaining three RTAs, trade liberalization 
in services was added to complement agreements in trade in goods already  in place among the 
parties.119 
3.189.   As at 15 October  2022, the total number of RTAs notified to the WTO, and to the GATT 
before it , and currently in force, amounted to 355 (186 covering  goods and services, 167 goods  
only, and 2  services only). The WTO Secretariat has also identified and verified, through the 
respective parties, 62 RTAs that are in force, but have not yet been notified to the WTO.120  
3.190.   Based on notifications, RTA activity remains  strongest in Europe ( 26% of RTAs in force), 
with successive EU enlargements , the United Kingdom's new agreements  following its withdrawal 
from the EU  and agreements with  countries in Eastern Europe and around the Mediterranean basin, 
as well as RTAs notified by EFTA; this is followed by East Asia ( 16%) and South  America ( 11%) 
(Chart 3.19). 
 
116 WTO document GPA/155 , 20 Jun e 2022. 
117 WTO document INF/MSME/W/36, 28 September 2021.  
118 WTO document INF/MSME/4/Rev.2 , 6 October 2021 . 
119 The WTO RTA Database (viewed at: http://rtais.wto.org ) provides updated information on all RTA 
notifications submitted by WTO Members . 
120 WTO document WT/REG/W/ 169, 12 September 2022 . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 72 - 
 
  Chart 3.19 RTAs in force, by region  
 
Note:  RTAs involving countries/territories in two (or more) regions are counted more than once.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.191.   The WTO Members with the most RTAs in force are the European Union, the United Kingdom, 
the EFTA States, Ch ile and Singapore , with over 25 RTAs in force each, followed by Türkiye, Mexico , 
and Peru , which have over 20  RTAs in force each . A number of other developing countries also have 
several RTAs in force, such as the Republic of Korea, India and Panama . 
3.192.   Over the years RTAs have become more complex, and many currently include provisions 
that go beyond market access in goods and services. Of 341 RTAs notified to the WTO and currently 
in force, the vast majority include dispute settlement mechanisms, followed by provisions related to 
trade in goods such as technical regulations, standards, technical barriers to trade and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures. Other provisions frequently found in RTAs include intellectual property 
rights and government procurement. M ore recent RTAs also include provisions on which there are 
few or no WTO rules, including competition, environment, labour, and small and medium -sized 
enterprises (Chart 3. 20). 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160EuropeEast AsiaSouth AmericaNorth AmericaAfricaCISCentral AmericaMiddle EastOceaniaWest AsiaCaribbean
Intra-Regional RTAs in force Cross-Regional RTAs in forceWTO_RTA.1 -RTAs in force, by region
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Note:  RTAs involving countries/territories in two (or more) regions are counted more than once.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 73 - 
 
  Chart 3.20 Key provisions in RTA s 
 
Note:  Figures are based on 341 RTAs (out of 355) notified to the WTO and currently in force.  For more 
details on these provisions: http://rtais.wto.org/ . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
New initiatives  
3.193.   In recent years there has been an emergence of new initiatives or agreements which do not 
include market access provisions such as tariff concessions or focus on a particular sector or activity. 
These include the digital economy partnership agreement (DEPA), standal one digital economy 
agreements (DEAs) and other approaches to trade cooperation and liberalization. The DEPA, signed 
by three partners (Chile, New Zealand and Singapore) entered into force in January 2021 and goes 
beyond the digital trade provisions in rec ent RTAs, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, to which all three are party).121 It includes 
provisions on the adoption and use of technology to facilitate trade, including through paperless 
trading and l egal frameworks based on international models and confirms the WTO moratorium on 
customs duties; data issues, such as the protection of personal information, cross -border transfer 
of information electronically and location of computing facilities; issues  related to safety such as 
cybersecurity, consumer protection; and cooperation on small and medium -sized enterprises and 
digital inclusion. The DEPA is open for accession by other parties and China, Canada and 
the Republic  of Korea have applied to join. DEAs  are currently in force for Singapore with three other 
parties: Australia, Republic of Korea and United Kingdom. They aim to align digital rules and 
standards and facilitate interoperability between digital systems; support cross -border data flows 
and cons umer rights; and encourage cooperation in emerging areas such as digital identities, 
artificial intelligence and data innovation.122 Digital economy agreements have also been signed by 
other WTO Members; for example, the digital trade agreement between the United States and Japan 
was signed in October 2019.  
3.194.   The Indo -Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF ) was launched in May 2022 in 
Tokyo, Japan, by 13 partners (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam). Discussions take place under four 
broad pillars: trade, su pply chains, clean economy and fair economy. On the trade pillar the 
statement issued after a first meeting in September 2022, indicated that the partners would "seek 
 
121 An exchange of side letters betwe en the Parties indicates that nothing in the DEPA will derogate from 
commitments under their RTAs: New Zealand -Singapore FTA, the ASEAN -Australia -New Zealand FTA, and the 
Trans -Pacific SEP and the CPTPP (both including all three Parties).  
122 Viewed at: Digital Economy Agreements (mti.gov.sg) . 
26%83%87%65%50%94%66%72%72%59%35%35%54%
All tariffs eliminated by at least one PartySanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS)Technical regulations, standards, technical barriers
to trade (TBT)ServicesInvestment Liberalization ProvisionsDispute Settlement (DS)Government procurementIntellectual property rightsCompetitionEnvironmentLabourE-CommerceSmall and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)WTO_RTA.2 -Key provisions in RTAs
Source:    WTO Secretariat.Note:    Figures are based on 341 RTAs (out of 355) notified to the WTO and currently in force. For 
more details on these provisions: http://rtais.wto.org/WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 74 - 
 
  to craft high -standard, inclusive, free, fair, and open trade commitments that build upon  the rules -
based multilateral trading system." In particular, they intend  to focus on provisions and initiatives 
that relate to labour and environment, digital economy, agriculture, transparency and good 
regulatory practices, competition policy, trade faci litation, inclusivity and technical assistance and 
economic cooperation.  
3.195.   The Technology and Trade Council (TTC) is a forum that brings together the United States 
and the European Union and was established in June 2021. The TTC meets at the technical level in 
10 Working Groups. The Working  Group on Global Trade Challenges currently looks at a number of 
initiatives including avoiding unnecessary trade barriers, trade policy cooperation on non -market 
policies and practices, trade and labour, trade and environm ent, trade -related aspects of economic 
coercion, and trade, agriculture and food security.123  
Trade and environment  
3.196.   The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) continued to focus its discussion s on global 
multilateral issues at the intersection between tr ade and environmental policies . Dedicated 
discussions at the CTE covered circular economy  and plastics pollution ; trade and climate change ; 
biodiversity, transfer of technology, and capacity building .124 Members have also continued 
discussions on trade-related aspects of the EU Green Deal, including the plan to establish a Carbon 
Border Adjustment Mechanism  and the proposal for new rules to curb EU -driven deforestation  and 
few initiatives that were of relevance to trade u nder the 2020 Circular Econ omy Action Plan (CEAP), 
including, inter alia , a legislative proposal for substantiating green  claims made by companies; a 
review of requirements on packaging and packaging waste in the EU;  new policy framework on 
bio-based, biodegradable and compostable p lastics; and measures to  reduce the impact of 
micro -plastic pollution on the environment.   
3.197.   Other briefings included topics such as the preparations  for and results of  COP26,  and the 
subsequent preparations for COP27,  the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability 
initiative, Fossil Fuels Subsidy Reform as well as sustainable supply chains .  
3.198.   Ministers affirmed at the MC12 outcome document the role of the C TE as a standing forum 
dedicated to dialogue among Members on the relationship between trade measures  and 
environmental measures.  
3.199.   On 15 December 2021, the co -sponsors of the three environmental initiatives -the Trade and 
Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD125), the Dialogue on Plastics Pollution 
and Sustainable Plastics Trade ( Dialogue126), and Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR127) launched 
their respective ministerial statements  with a view to preparing technical work for concrete outcomes 
at MC13 . In February 2022, the Dialogue  and TESSD agreed on work plans to im plement objectives 
cited in the respective ministerial statements, while the FFSR work plan was issued in June 2022. 
TESSD held two sets of working group meetings in May and October 2022 to progress discussions 
on trade -related climate measures, environmen tal goods and services, circular economy and 
subsidies . During MC12, the Dialogue issued a Ministerial Statement by Coordinators, showcasing 
the early results achieved by the initiative (i.e. the launch of two surveys on trade -related plastic 
measures and on aid for trade global review and needs assessment, and a communication to the 
World Customs Organisation on enhanced cooperation to better identify plastics and substitutes 
trade flows) and indicating areas of future work.  
3.200.   Box 3.4 provides some perspecti ves on trade and climate change and on the necessity to 
plan for climate change adaptation.  
 
123 Viewed at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp -conte nt/uploads/2022/05/TTC -US-text-Final-May-
14.pdf . 
124 Annual Report 2021, WTO document WT/CTE/28/Rev.1, 22 November 2021; WTO document 
WT/CTE/M/73 (on the October 2021 CTE Meeting), 21 January 2022; WTO document WT/CTE/M/74 (on the 
February 2022 CTE Meeting),  25 May 2022; and, WTO document WT/CTE/M/75 (on the 2 June 2022 CTE 
Meeting), 3 October 2022.  
125 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tessd_e/tessd_e.htm .  
126 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ppesp_e/ppesp_e.htm .  
127 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/fossil_fuel_e.htm .  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Box 3.4 Climate change adaptation and trade  
Extreme weather induced by climate change will increase industrial producti on costs, test the resilience of 
global supply chains, and erect obstacles to smooth and efficient trade. From this year's drought in Europe, 
leading to record low water levels in rivers and crippling intra -European trade, to the monsoon in Pakistan 
result ing in the death of over 1 ,000 people and leaving millions homeless, the increasing occurrence of 
extreme weather events has negatively impacted people and businesses a round  the world.  
In the short term, the damage caused by climate change -related extreme  weather events can reduce 
productivity, increase trade costs, and cause supply chain disruptions. In the long term, it can affect trade by 
altering countries' comparative advantages and thus their production specialization. No region is immune to 
the nega tive impacts of climate change, but trade costs are likely to increase unevenly across regions leaving 
small economies and landlocked countries especially exposed to impacts on transport infrastructure. In the 
agricultural sector, Sub -Saharan Africa and So uth Asia are expected to experience larger negative yield shocks 
compared to other regions. Rising sea levels and extreme weather conditions could also permanently damage 
tourism infrastructure, for economies that are highly dependent on tourism. Equally, manufacturing sectors 
dependent on climate sensitive inputs (such as food processing), labour -intensive sectors, and sectors that 
are highly integrated into global value chains are more vulnerable to climate change. For all of these reasons, 
planning for c limate change adaptation is an urgent priority and necessity that should complement ongoing 
mitigation efforts.  
The forthcoming World Trade Report 2022 on trade and climate change and the related Policy Brief "Climate 
Change Adaptation and Trade"  make the case for why international trade plays an essential role in climate 
risk prevention, reduction and prepa redness. International trade can indirectly help economies to steer some 
of their financial resources towards climate change adaptation actions by encouraging economic growth and 
thus providing additional financial support to invest in adaptation strategie s. Trade and trade policy can also 
enhance economic resilience to climate change -related shocks both in terms of preparedness (e.g. trade in 
services like weather forecasting, telecommunications, transportation, and health), in providing access to 
essentia l goods and services once a shock hits, and by speeding up the economic recovery and reconstruction. 
At MC12, Members unanimously agreed to exempt purchases by the World Food Programme (WFP) from 
export prohibition s and restrictions in view of the need of critical humanitarian support. The WFP can thus 
continue to efficiently respond to humanitarian issues, including those induced by extreme weather, by using 
trade tools. Furthermore, trade can support efforts to alleviate climate change -induced food insecu rity by 
helping bridge supply -and-demand gaps in regions experiencing rising or falling crop yields, as a consequence 
of climate change. Finally, trade by encouraging innovation and driving down technological costs, facilitates 
the diffusion and developmen t of technologies that can help with adaptation to climate change. For instance, 
imports can increase access to technologies that offset negative agricultural yield shocks such as more 
resistant crop varieties, irrigation and water storage systems, or earl y warning systems for biopesticide use.  
The WTO, as a global forum for cooperation, can help to support climate adaptation efforts by promoting the 
transparency and predictability of trade policies related to climate change adaptation and by limiting 
unnec essarily trade -restrictive policies. The WTO supports the conditions underpinning the climate resilience 
of supply chains by reducing trade barriers, streamlining customs procedures, and encouraging the 
transparency and predictability of trade policies, in cluding those related to climate change adaptation. 
WTO bodies, in particular the CTE, provide the platform for policy dialogue and experience -sharing in 
trade -related climate change adaptation strategies. WTO Members also use informal dialogues, such as t he 
Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD) to promote concrete actions and 
support sustainable supply chains and trade -related climate change adaptation strategies. An increasing 
number of Aid for Trade projects, representing around USD 5.75 billion or 12 % of total Aid for Trade 
disbursements, have also been allocated to projects related to climate change adaptation. The WTO is actively 
demonstrating that it is part of the solution for climate change adaptation.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.201.   Box 3.5 on critical raw materials for the green transition has been contributed by the OECD.  
Box 3.5 Critical raw materials for the green transition  
The transition to a climate neutral economy will require a significant scaling up of production and international 
trade of selected raw materials that will be critical for the production of new technologies. This includes 
technologies that underpin electric mobility, renewable energy generation and energ y storage, such as 
lithium -ion batteries, permanent magnets for traction motors, wind turbines and photovoltaics, or fuel cells 
that turn hydrogen directly to electricity. Digitalization and automation, including robotics, 3D printing and 
information and communication technology (ICT) equipment also rely on critical raw materials and are 
essential for the green transition, as well as for modern industrial applications generally. However, necessary 
raw materials often display high market con centration and low substitutability.   
While the green transition will reduce global dependence on fossil fuels, it will generate pressure on the 
production of other raw materials. Production of clean technologies generally requires more minerals than for 
their fossil fuel counterparts (for example, up to six times more mineral inputs are required for an electric car 
compared to a conventional one; nine times more for an onshore wind plant compared to a gas -fired one).a WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 76 - 
 
  The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the scaling up of green technologies necessary to meet 
the Paris Agreement goals would increase the global demand for lithium 42 times between 2020 and 2040, 
25 times for graphite, 21 times for cobalt and magnesium, 19 times for nickel, 7 ti mes for rare earth minerals 
and 3.5 times for borates. The projected changes are even more striking for materials that are currently used 
in very small quantities in industrial applications, such as platinum group metals ( Figure 2).  
Figure 2 Projected global demand growth between 2020 and 2040, selected critical raw materials  
Index (2020 = 1)  
 
Note:  Projections are based on the International Energy Agency 's Sustainable Development Scenario, which 
indicates what would be required f or a trajectory consistent with meeting the Paris Agreement goals. 
Platinum group metals include palladium, platinum, ruthenium, rhodium, osmium, and iridium  
Source:  OECD calculations based on IEA data.  
The availability of critical raw materials that drive  industrial applications, digitali zation and the green transition 
may be limited by a number of factors, including production concentration, economic, political and social 
constraints in expanding production capacities and pervasive export restrictions.b Security of supply risks may 
be deepened by a lack of transparency in mineral supply chains and governance challenges in producing and 
processing countries. In addition, international investments may impact the political economy of producing 
countries and  can drive systemic risks and lead to major geopolitical destabili zation, fuelling local, regional 
and international conflicts.  
The production of some minerals critical to new technologies is more geographically concentrated than that 
of oil and gas. Ther efore, vulnerabilities generated by material reliance in the modern economy may be even 
more pronounced than in the fossil fuel -powered economy. For instance, 83% of global bismuth production 
and 82% of global magnesium production is in China, 78% of globa l lithium production is in Australia, and 
71% of global platinum production is in South Africa. Overall, for most critical raw materials more than 80% 
of global production is concentrated in only three countries ( Figure 2).  Processing of critical raw mater ials is 
also highly concentrated, albeit less than production. Notably, more than three quarters of global exports of 
lithium, borates and magnesium are concentrated among only three exporters. While 70% of processed 
borates exports are from the European U nion and the United States, processed lithium is mostly exported by 
Chile and China.  
151
42
25
21 2119 7
3.5Figure 1. Projected demand growth between 2020 and 2040, selected critical raw materials
(Index, 2020=1)
Note:  [see text]WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 77 - 
 
  Figure 3 Concentration of global production of critical raw materials  
The share of global production concentrated among three largest producers  
 
Note:  Data for 2020. Here, for ease of reading, the label Germanium has been used to denote the following 
group of materials: germanium, niobium, vanadium, gallium, indium and hafnium.  
Source : OECD calculations based on United States Geological  Survey data.  
Since the supply of critical raw materials is highly concentrated, export restrictions are the most widespread 
trade policy measure applied in these sectors. While they may be introduced for a variety of important policy 
objectives, such mea sures can have distortive effects on international markets by reducing global supply and 
raising prices and creating uncertainty for importers. Platinum, germanium, cobalt, bismuth, and palladium 
are among the materials that are most affected by export res trictions by volume (Figure 4) and cobalt and 
nickel sustain the most restrictive measures in the form of outright export prohibitions. Disciplining export 
restrictions through existing trade policy tools and new commitments at the multilateral, regional o r bilateral 
level can ensure that domestic -oriented policies of some countries are not detrimental to fair access to critical 
raw materials.  
Figure 4 Export restrictions on critical materials  
 
Note:  Data for 2020. Here, for ease o f reading, the label Germanium has been used to denote the following 
group of materials: germanium, niobium, vanadium, gallium, indium and hafnium.  
Source:  OECD calculations based on OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials data.  
Unexploited reserves of such raw materials provide potential alternatives for diversification. However, there 
may be several reasons why some reserves have remained untapped, notably environmental implications, 
95%
87%
76%
72%74%88% 89%
55%86%
68%91%
85%Figure 2. Concentration of global production of critical raw materials
Share of global prodcution concentrated among three largest producers
Note:  [see text]
82%
7%
84%
91%
3%
6%
8%
68%
82%
92%
65%
59%Bismuth
Borates
Cobalt
Germanium
Graphite
Lithium
Magnesium
Nickel
Palladium
Platinum
Phosphates
Rare earth minerals8%
0%
14%
52%
5%
5%
11%Export prohibition
Export quota
Price measures
Licensing requirement
Domestic market obligation
Restrictions on customs
clearance
Other export measuresShare of global exports of critical materials subject to 
export restrictions, by materialAverage share of global exports of critical materials 
subject to export restrictions, by type of restriction
Note:  [see text]WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 78 - 
 
  social concerns and economic viability. International investments will need to flow into existing and new 
producing countries in line with international standards on responsible business conduct. Longe r-term 
approaches to recycling, secondary raw materials and the circular economy also have the potential to mitigate 
supply concentration.  
a IEA (2021), The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions , International Energy Agency, 
Paris.  
b See, O ECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials,  available at:  
https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMa terials .  
Source:  OECD . 
Trade facilitation  
3.202.   The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force on 22  February  2017, when 
two thirds of WTO Members presented their corresponding instruments of acceptance. At the 
conclusion of the review period, 15 5 Members had domestically ratified the TFA and deposited their 
instruments of acceptance to the WTO, which represents 94 .5% of the WTO  membership.  
3.203.   During the review period, Members submitted notifications with their commitments under 
Section II  of the TFA (Chart 3. 21). These included implementation notifications by 18 LDCs.  
Chart 3.21 Number of WTO Members that presented TFA  notifications, 1 October 2021 to 
3 October 2022  
 
Source:  https://www.tfadatabase.org .  
3.204.   In the reporting period, the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility (the Facility, or 
TFAF) ended the moratorium (imp osed in October 2020) on the delivery of its technical assistance 
activities. This was enabled by the introduction of new transparency measures to support Members' 
visibility of technical assistance requests in October 2021. The new approach was formalised  in March 
2022 by the adoption in the WTO Committee on Trade Facilitation of a new governance framework, 
establishing , inter alia , the relationship between the Committee and the Facility.128 Since technical 
assistance activities restarted, 11 activities wer e requested by LDC Members  to prepare for the 
notification deadline for Category C definitive dates on 11 August 2022. Four Members and two 
regional groupings have requested activities under the new governance arrangements described 
 
128 WTO document G/TFA/3 , 5 April 2022.  
0
8
31
2
5
13
10
1
11
7
70 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
CATEGORY A
CATEGORY B
CATEGORY C
CATEGORY SHIFT FROM B TO C
CATEGORY SHIFT FROM C TO B
EXTENSION OF TIME TO IMPLEMENT
TRANSPARENCY NOTIFICATIONS
COVID -19 RELATED TRANSPARENCY NOTIFICATIONS
ARTICLE 22
TACB ARRANGEMENTS
EXTENSION OF TIME TO NOTIFYWT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  above.  In the same peri od the TFAF has administered three  project preparation grant and launched 
applications for two more.  
Trade finance  
3.205.   While the financial system overall has been resilient in the current  multi-crisis environment 
(environment, public health, food and energy se curity), the cost of trade finance has been affected 
by increasingly complex logistics for trade in certain areas of the world, and by inflation, which have 
increased the value of exported and imported goods to be financed. For balance -of-payments' 
constra ined countries, the increase in the value of imports, particularly of food, has been stretching 
the capacity of local financial sectors to provide higher levels of trade finance.  
3.206.   Against this background, multilateral development banks (MDBs) have continued  to face an 
excess demand for trade finance facilitation (guaranteeing the payment risk) in low -income 
countries, particularly in countries which have not seen their sovereign credit rating improve, 
countries experiencing high and/or growing  macroeconomic vulnerabilities, and net food -importing 
poor countries in the face of increasing food and energy bill s. Certain MDBs have put in place special 
working capital and trade finance windows to address challenges related to food imports. W hile 
financial sanctions related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have, to a large extent,  excluded trade 
in food products, practical difficulties in processing payments of suppliers, as a result of cautious 
financial operators, have been reported to affect comm ercial clients as well as the World Food 
Program.  This caution has  resulted in higher costs associated with processing transactions, including 
verification, compliance, and adaptation costs to changing trade logistics.  
Trade and gender  
3.207.   In the last decades,  governments have included gender issues in their national trade policies, 
making them more inclusive.129While many trade policies support women's access to the economy 
and foster their participation in the export -oriented sector through various means inclu ding financial 
incentives to the private sector, m ost focus on women entrepreneurs and female farmers. They 
include measures to support their access to international markets and in developing trade capacity. 
These programmes often provide business, trade, and financial literacy trainings.  
3.208.   Policies targeting women entrepreneurs mostly aim at giving them facilitated access to 
finance and to government procurement markets. Access to finance can take the form of a dedicated 
"women fund" to provide affordable a nd responsive finance or of a facilitated access to credit through 
subsidised financing or credit guarantees. Governments also give a special access to their public 
markets by establishing quotas in favour of women entrepreneurs, mostly targeting small bus iness 
owners or rural women.  
3.209.   Those trade policies targeting female farmers mostly focus on capacity building programmes 
to help them comply with sanitary and phyto -sanitary (SPS) measures, in order to export to regional 
and international markets. Some also look at giving rural women a ccess to finance, and productive 
resources. Both groups also benefit from e -commerce policies and strategies. According to the WTO 
regional surveys 2019 -2020 41% of women entrepreneurs expressed difficulties in accessing 
e-commerce  opportunities .130 Trade p olicies tend to facilitate access to such platforms  by providing 
them with assistance to create a website to sell products internationally and by building female 
entrepreneurs general capacity to e -trade.  
3.210.   Similarly, gender issues have been increasingly in tegrated into free trade agreements. In 
the last 25 years, governments have included g ender provisions in their RTAs. Out of 353 RTAs in 
force and notified to the WTO, 101 include at least one explicit reference to gender issues.131 The 
 
129 See "Trade Policies Supporting Women's Economic Empowerment: Trends in WTO Members ", Staff 
Working paper E RSD-2019-07 (WTO Economic Research and Statistics Di vision , 25 April 2019) 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201907_e.pdf .  
130 WTO survey, 'Assessing Women Entrepreneurs’ Knowledge Gap on Trade in East Africa, South Asia, 
and Latin America ', forthcoming, 2019 -2020. 
131 See Trade and Gender -Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreement  INF/TGE/COM/4 , 22 
September 2022.  Also see Laperle -Forget, L., WTO Database on gender provisions in regional trade 
agreements, World Tra de Organizatio n, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/womenandtrade_e/gender_responsive_trade_agreement_db_e.htm . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 80 - 
 
  first gender provisi on was included in the Treaty of Rome , in 1957 and in 1983, the second provision 
was adopted in the Treaty for the Establishment of the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS Treaty). A decade later, the first chapter on trade and gender was integrated  in the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).  
3.211.   While these provisions focus on a wide range of gender issues from economic empowerment 
through women's participation in the workforce and in business, to access to health, education , or 
food security, they are often included in the cooperation chapters . Most of gender provisions are not 
systematically  excluded from the dispute settlement process of RTAs.  
3.212.   Box 3. 6 provides a closer look at trade and gender activities in the context of the WTO Chairs 
Programme.  
Box 3.6 The WTO Chair s Programme: trade and gender activities  
The WTO Chair s Programme has supported various res earch and training initiatives on how to mainstream 
gender into trade policy and support the empowerment  of women . Indeed, several research and training 
projects were focused on trade and gender and were particularly relevant considering the Interim Report  
establishing the Informal Working Group on Trade and Gender in September 2020a and the MC12 outcome 
documentb, which recogni zes the importance of women's economic empowerment and the work of the WTO 
on this issue, at the multilateral level.  
The Chairs in Mexico, Barbados, and Chile conducted a series of seminars with the involvement of each of 
their Permanent Representatives to the WTO as well as Ministers and negotiators working in the governments 
of Mexico and Chile and the CARICOM Secretariat. The proje ct also included a course that was taught by 
experts in the field and senior experts from various international organi zations such as UNCTAD  and the 
World  Bank.  
The Chairs in Jordan and Türkiye, respectively, also conducted research and outreach on "Trade and Gender 
Gap (equality) in Jordan" and on "Inclusive Trade in Türkiye: Legal and Economic Perspectives on Gender and 
Employment" . 
Many of those projects were carried out in close coordination with the WTO's Trade and Gender Unit, which 
provided substantive contributions to the projects includ ing various contributions to book chapters, 
participation in webinar series, and using the WTO Gender Research Hub network to disseminate the calls, 
invitations, and exposure for all project -related outputs.  
In addition, many Chairs have been invited to join the WTO's Gender Research Hub, which provides a forum 
to collaborate with other trade and gender experts on various research and capacity -building projects. As an 
illustration, the co -chair from Mexico is currently advising the UNECA , sharing the Latin America experience 
with African countries. Specific research analysed the effects of COVID -19 on Mauritian MSMEs and also 
investigated the factors that prevent Mauritian women micro -entrepreneurs from shiftin g to digital trade and 
aim to empower MSMEs with the capacity to adopt e -commerce practices and expand their market base and 
visibility in the online trading environment.  
Below are a few specific examples of recent trade and gender research activities.  
Mauritius: Harnessing digital trade to curb COVID -19 impacts on MSMEs  
The research differentiates the impact of the pandemic on male - and female -headed enterprises. It then 
probes into the factors preventing women MSMEs from moving into the digital environmen t. The authors used 
the data to assess the impact of the pandemic on women entrepreneurs, the challenges they face and the 
constraints they encounter when attempting to adopt digital trade/e -commerce. It also compares the impact 
of COVID -19 on overall perf ormance of female - and male -led enterprises. It found that the second lockdown 
seems to have had a higher and more drastic negative effect on women entrepreneurs , with around 33.5% 
facing a severe contraction in their overall performance. For male -headed M SMEs, the first lockdown had a 
more severe impact on their activities , with around 41% facing a sever e contraction in performance.  
Mexico, Barbados, and Chile: Gender and trade in the Americas  
The three Chairs collaborated to work on this project with the aim of producing four different outputs: a course 
and a webinar series on trade and gender in the Americas, an edited book on trade and gender, and a special 
journal issue on the same topic. This collaboration enabled the Chairs to deliver outputs with hig h quality 
standards in such a span of time.  
Jordan : Trade and the gender gap (equality)  
The project developed by the Chair of Jordan analyses whether a more open trade policy helps bridge the 
gender gap in Jordan, what the key determinants of female partic ipation in the labour force are, and what the 
best policy practices to maximize the benefits gained by women from trade are. It also examines RTAs and 
their provisions on female participation in the labour force, drawing on research methodologies developed  by 
UNCTAD, which developed studies at the country level on the impact of trade policies on women as consumers 
and producers and on other dimensions of their lives.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Türkiye : Legal and economic perspectives on gender and employment  
The overarching aim of th is research project is to reflect upon the discussions on women and trade that take 
place within the larger WTO context and draw conclusions on how to better achieve inclusiveness in trade. 
Particularly, it examine s the relationship between international t rade and gender equality at the firm level in 
Türkiye and provide s a new approach to analysing gender equality in firms by bringing together economic and 
international legal frameworks; at the same time, it will contribute to gender equality in trade and e mployment 
policies at the national level, along with influencing firms' decision -making.  
a WTO document WT/L1095/Rev.1, 25  September  2020.  
b WTO document WT/MIN(22)/24; WT/L/1135, 22  June 2022, para. 13. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat .  
3.213.   Box 3. 7 provides information on the WTO Secretariat Survey about measures on COVID -19 
related -goods.  
Box 3.7 Experience -sharing on trade in COVID -19 related goods – WTO Secretariat 
Survey  
The Committee on Market Access  (CMA) engaged throughout 2022 in a series of experience -sharing sessions 
on trade in COVID -19-related goods, covering the following topics: identification and tariff classification of 
essential medical goods; how to measure trade in these goods; trade eas ing measures and export 
restrictions.a These sessions aimed at sharing experience among Members on these topics, and identifying 
lessons learned and common practices that could help them better prepare for future health emergencies or 
other challenges.  
To complement information shared during the first two sessions, the Secretariat conducted a survey with a 
view to collect and compile information by Members on trade in COVID -19 essential goods. The survey was 
divided into four sections:  
1) List of COVID -19 esse ntial goods : This section asked Members for information on the establishment of 
national lists for COVID -19 essential goods, including their purpose, references used to identify relevant 
products (e.g. the WCO-WTO Joint Indicative List of Critical COVID -19 Vaccine Inputs ), government agencies 
involved, and other information regarding the modification, publication, and official communication of such 
lists to the WTO.  
• Out of the 15 Membersb that responded the CMA survey, 12 indicated they had established national 
lists for COVID -19 essential goods, and 11 had published these lists on their websites. Six Members 
submitted their lists to the WTO for transparency.c 
• Respondents also indicated that they had used reference lists, such as those prepared by international 
organizations (such as the WTO, the WHO and the WCO) for establishing their own national lists of 
COVID -19 essential goods, as well as other internal sourc es of information, including from the private 
sector.  
• The purpose for establishing national lists of COVID -19 essential goods included reasons such as 
facilitating imports, temporarily restricting exports, and collecting statistical data, among others.  
• Seven respondents indicated that the list of COVID -19 essential goods had been updated as the 
pandemic evolved, for example to modify or expand the product coverage, clarify their tariff 
classification or because trade policy measures targeting specific produ cts were either extended or 
terminated.  
2) Classification of COVID -19 essential goods : This section asked Members to identify the types of 
products contained in the national lists, and how detailed the classification of such products had been at the 
national level (e.g. addition of national tariff lines or specific statistical codes).  The types of products generally 
contained in the list of essential goods mainly included personal protective equipment, vaccines, disinfectants, 
sanitizers and soap, pharmaceuticals and medical  consumables . In 10 cases, the lists specified customs codes 
for the  products at either the national tariff line level (i.e. beyond the standard classification based on the 
Harmonized System) and/or statistical codes (i.e.  codes beyond the national tariff line level that enable 
customs to differentiate imports or exports).  
3) Data collection for COVID -19 essential goods : Here, Members were asked how they collected trade 
statistics for COVID -19 essential goods, including questions on specific measures introduced to improve trade 
statistics, their publication, and use.  Six Membe rs indicated that they had introduced measures for 
strengthening their IT systems and amending customs nomenclature to improve collection of trade statistics 
on COVID -19 essential goods.  
4) International cooperation on data -sharing : In the last section, the s urvey asked Members to provide 
their views on the importance of more effective data collection and sharing at the international level for 
improving the response of WTO Members to emerging challenges. In particular, Members were asked to 
indicate how import ant the following would be:  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  • The establishment of data -sharing mechanism among Members ; 
• The compilation of a common model list of essential goods for health emergencies at the international 
level; 
• The creation of data repositories to pool trade statistics o f COVID -19 essential goods ; and 
• The submission by Members, on a voluntary basis, of temporary tariff changes and more detailed 
national statistics on COVID -19 essential goods to the WTO IDB.  
All the respondents believed that the above suggested measures we re important for improving international 
cooperation on data -sharing.  
Figure 5 Responding Members and purpose of the list(s) of COVID -19 essential goods  
 
Notwithstanding the limited number of responses received from the Members, the survey was useful in 
understanding and identifying commonalities in Members' responses, complementing the information 
gathered from earlier experience -sharing sessions and establishing a framework for future work in the area.  
a The Secretariat  prepared summary reports of each session , which were circulated in WTO document 
JOB/MA/152 and its addenda.  
b Counting the EU-27 as one.  
c WTO documents G/TFA/N/IDN/2/Rev.1 , G/MA/QR/N/MYS/1/Add.1 , G/MA/QR/N/PRY/1 , G/MA/W/153 , 
G/MA/W/154 , and G/MA/W/175 . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
Yes (12)
80%No (3)
20%
0 2 4 6 8 10Restrict exports of these
productsOther purposesCollect statistical dataFacilitate imports of these
productsFig. X: Responding Members who established 
national COVID -19 essential goods list(s)Fig. Y: Purpose of the list(s) of COVID -19 essential 
goodsWT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  4  POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES  
Regular measures affecting trade in services  
4.1.  During the review period, Members and Observers implemented 174 new measures affecting 
trade in services. Although, t he majority of the measures introduced  were of a trade -facilitating 
nature, there were still a significant number of trade -restrictive  measures . A third of t he new 
measures concerned tele communication , computer and Internet - and other network - enabled 
services  (including a significant number of tax measures), and a quarter were on financial services. 
The remaining measures were mostly horizontal measures, affe cting either the establishment of 
commercial presence or the presence of natural persons (19 and 22 measures respectively). Annex  4 
in the Addendum provides additional information on the 174 new measures, implemented by 70  
WTO Members and 5 Observer s durin g the review period.  
Measures affecting supply through commercial presence across various sectors  
4.2.  During the review period, several governments made  changes to their  investment policies , with 
implications to the supply of services through commercial presence (mode 3) across various sectors. 
For example, on 2 March 2022, the Philippines  made changes to the Foreign Investments Act , 
allowing foreign investors to fully own small and medium -sized businesses, except in sectors where 
foreign ownership is prohibited or limited by the Philippine Constitution or existing laws . The 
minimum paid -in equity capital threshold of USD  200,000 to medium -sized enterprise  is removed. 
The act also permits the reduction of the minimum capital  requirement to USD 100,000 for foreign 
investors under the condition that at least 15 local workers are hired, that they transfer technology, 
or are endorsed as a start -up or start -up enabler . In addition, an amendment to the Public Services 
Act, allows full foreign o wnership  in firms supplying telecommunication, logistics, railways  or 
domestic shipping services  (previously limited to 40%).  
4.3.  On 30 May 2022, Nepal  reduced the minimum threshold for foreign direct investment from 
Rs 50 million to Rs  20 million.  Uzbekistan  (Observer)  adopted measures  reducing, inter alia , the 
state's participation in banking, telecommunication, road transport and IT services.  Some Members 
and one Observer also introduced new measures to facilitate foreign investment (e.g. Algeria , 
Mongolia , Sri Lanka , Tunisia ).  
4.4.  Revised or new procedures pertaining to foreign investment screening were adopted by several 
Members.  For instance, o n 19 November 2021,  Moldova  adopted a new measure regulating the 
screening of investment in a number of sectors. Approval from the Council for Promotion of 
Investment Projects of National Importance  is required  before  any investment is made in relevant 
sectors, which include transpo rtation, exploitation of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, air traffic 
services, television broadcasts, audio -visual services, supply of networks and fixed or mobile 
electronic communication services and supply of services in national ports . A number  of EU Members, 
such as Italy, Netherlands  or Romania , also  introduced new legislation relating to  foreign investment 
screening mechanisms , in particular for national security purposes.  
Measures related to c ommunication services , e-commerce  and digitally enabled services  
4.5.  Fifty Members adopted new measures in relation to the communications sector, Internet - and 
other network -enabled services, or computer services.  For example, in China , the government issued 
New Measures for Cybersecurity Review , effective since 15 February 2022, amend ing the measures 
released on 10 July 2021. A cybersecurity review will be conducted for C ritical Information 
Infrastructure (CII) operators that purchase network products and services which affect or may 
affect national security, as well as network platform  operators that conduct data processing activity 
which affects or may affect national security or that hold p ersonal information of more than one 
million users and plan to list their shares overseas.  Also, a new measure set ting out the security 
assessment framework for cross -border data transfers, became effective on 1 September 2022. A 
business carrying out cros s-border transfers of personal information of China -based subjects is 
required to meet at least one of the following conditions: have an official security assessment 
conducted by the Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CAC); obtain a personal information protec tion 
certification from a recognised organization; or execute a contract with the data recipient, in a form 
prescribed by the CAC.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  4.6.  A number of Members introduced measures regulating cross -border data flows. For example, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  issued a  new law requesting that foreign companies that process 
personal data of Saudi residents appoint a local representative, licensed for that purpose. Transfers 
of data outside of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may be made for limited purposes specified in the 
law, or for "other purposes" to be set out in forthcoming regulations. Approval by the authorities 
must always be obtained  to transfer personal data abroad. Rwanda  adopted a new law  on data 
protection, effective 15 October 2021, which sets out requirements for controllers and processors in 
the jurisdiction  as well as , for those without local presence if they process personal data of individuals 
located in the country . It establishes conditions on cross -border transfer and storage of data abroad. 
Those withou t a local presence have to designate a representative in Rwanda . 
4.7.  Given their significant impact on the internal market and their role as gateway for business 
users to reach their end user, the European Union  introduced on 5 July 2022 the Digital Markets Ac t 
which includes rules for digital platforms that act as "gatekeepers" (i.e. , core platform services, such 
as social platforms or search engines,  that have a market capitalisation of at least EUR 75 billion or 
an annual turnover of EUR 7.5 billion, and hav e at least 45 million monthly end users in the EU 
and 10,000 annual business users). The act aims at preventing gatekeepers from imposing unfair 
conditions on businesses and end users, and at ensuring the openness of important digital services.  
For instanc e, gatekeepers will be restricted from imposing the use of their payment services 
platforms. They will also be required to provide access to price -setting conditions and algorithms  to 
third-party advertisers and publishers.  
4.8.  Some Members introduced new legi slation enabling the establishment of taxes on e -commerce 
transactions. For example, in Cambodia , as of 1 April 2022, a 10% VAT is applicable to all 
non-resident firms selling to Cambodia through business to consumer e -commerce . For 
business -to-business e -commerce, a Cambodia registered buyer is required to pay 10% VAT through 
a reverse charge mechanism, regardless of whether the non -resident supplier is VAT registered.  
Nigeria  requires, from 1 January 2022, digital  services suppliers to register  and collect a 7.5% VAT 
from their Nigerian customers. In addition, a 6% tax on the turnover of non -resident companies 
providing certain digital services to Nigerian consumers  will be levied. Nepal  adopted a new digital 
services tax of 2% on services provi ded over the Internet to Nepali consumers by non -resident 
persons. Electronic services such as gaming, video, music and app downloads, streaming services, 
cloud services and other services are taxable if the annual turnover exceeds NPR 2 million . Tanzania 's 
new Finance Act introduced a 2% tax on electronic services rendered by non -residents to residents.  
4.9.  A number of Members introduced measures which facilitate the supply of telecommunication 
services. In Israel , starting 2 October2022, most suppliers will o nly be required to register their 
services in a designated registry and will be subject to conditions set under a "general authorization"  
regime  instead of individual service -specific  licenses . In Uruguay , the quantitative limit on the 
number of  cable oper ators allowed to offer  broadband Internet services  was gradually lifted during 
the review period. In India, a new measure allows full foreign ownership under the automatic route 
in the telecommunication services sector , instead of  a maximum of 49% foreign ownership  in the 
past. However, a n entity from a country that shares a land border with India, or where the beneficial 
owner of an investment into India is from such country, can still only invest under the government 
route.   
4.10.   Several governments adopted new measures affecting the supply of audio -visual  services. 
For example, in Switzerland , a new measure adopted on 15 May 2022 requires that from 1 January 
2024 European - or Swiss -produced content represent at least 30% of offerings of streaming services 
in the country. It also proposes that platforms invest up to 4% of their revenue from Switzerland in 
Swiss films and series over a 4 -year cycle (also applicable to foreign television channels with 
broadcast advertising aimed at a Swis s public).  Viet Nam approved a new Cinema Law, effective on 
1 January 2023, which stipulates that foreigners producing movies in Viet  Nam should use services 
provided by Vietnamese cinema establishments. The new law, which also applies to films accessed 
online, lists the prohibited content featured in films which cannot  be disseminated in Viet  Nam.  
Financial services  
4.11.   In the insurance services sector, Ukraine  adopted on 18 November 2021 a new law  which 
redesigns and modernizes the insurance  framework, in line with EU Directive 2009/138/EC and the 
Insurance Core Principles of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. The new law 
authorizes cross -border supply of certain insurance serv ices (e.g. aircraft or vessel insurance, freight WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 85 - 
 
  and all reinsurance). Also, a ll classes of insurance and reinsurance can now be supplied by either 
subsidiaries or branches of foreign insurers, but the conditions on branching have been revised, 
providing i n particular for a reduction of minimal solvency capital requirements for a branch offering 
life insurance from EUR 10 million to approximately EUR 1.5 million . The new law will be effective 
on 1 January 2024. In China , a notice was issued that removes access conditions for overseas 
insurance brokerage companies to set up insurance brokerage companies and allow s foreign 
insurance groups to set up insurance professional intermediaries.  Also, a new measure removed the 
25% cap on foreign shareholding in insurance asset management companies.  
4.12.   Many policy changes occurred in ban king and other financial services.  For example, Mauritius  
adopted a new act, effective on 7 February 2022, which requires, inter alia, that virtual as sets 
services provider have a commercial presence in the country to conduct such business.  In Nepal , 
from 16 March 2022, only foreign banks or financial institutions with an "investment grade" rating 
can operate a branch office, subject to approval. Branch es are only allowed to engage in wholesale 
banking transactions related to deposit ‑taking, loans, credit, and certain other financial services . In 
addition, the new policy prohibits overseas institutions' representative  offices from any kind of 
banking tra nsactions in Nepal. Representative offices can only engage in liaising with the Nepali 
customers, research activities, providing information on products and services, promoting services, 
and liaising between the foreign bank's clients and other offices.  On 2 July 2022, the Central Bank 
of Somalia  (Observer), granted for the first time two licences to foreign banks.  
4.13.   In Kenya , the Finance Act, which was assented by the President on 21 June 2022, requires 
that for a non -resident institution entering into a fin ancial derivatives contract with a resident person, 
any gain shall be subject to withholding tax at a 15% rate.  
Transport services  
4.14.   A number of Members adopted new measures in the transport services sector. From 10 
January 2022 Brazil  relaxed cabotage rules  in the maritime transport services sector. Brazilian 
Navigation Companies are now allowed to bareboat charter foreign vessels for cabotage transport 
without the need for proof of tonnage. Initially, chartering will be limited to one vessel. After a 4 -
year transition period, such chartering will be unlimited . Authorisation will not be required for 
chartering of foreign vessels when replacing other vessels undergoing restoration. For time charter 
of foreign vessels, the number of movements will be unlimited.  For vessels flying the Brazilian flag, 
the Cabotage  Act maintains  the requirement that at least two -thirds of crew members, including the 
vessel 's captain and chief engineer , must be Brazilian nationals .  
4.15.   Costa Rica  enacted a new regulation for granting licenses for nautical charter , effective from 
5 August 2022, obliging v essels with foreign flags  to obtain a license to provide charter services for 
leisure and entertainment purposes in Costa Rican waters . Foreign fl ag vessels  must pay 2,5% of 
the gross income for each service provided. Furthermore, captain and crew members for nautical 
charter services can apply for the special category of nautical charter workers, if their stay does not 
entail activities remunerated  in the national territory. In Indonesia , a new regulation clarified in 
November 2021 the activities allowed to foreign vessels when operating in Indonesian waters : 
salvage and underwater works; offshore construction; oil and gas survey; drilling; dredging ; 
terminal construction; and offshore operational support.  
Other services sectors  
4.16.   Trade in other services sectors was affected by the introduction of some new measures during 
the review period. On 2 June 2022, Argentina  adopted a new tax regime for online gambling, 
introducing an indirect tax ranging from 2.5% for operators domiciled in the country to 15% for 
foreign operators not registered in the country.  From 21 January 2022, Philippines  eased the entry 
rules for foreign retailers by lowering the paid-up capital requirement , as well as removing certain 
prequalification requirements (e.g. USD 200 million net worth requirement, minimum 5 branches, 
and 5 -year retail track record ). The prequalification  process with the Board of Investment was also 
removed, allowing foreign enterprises to proceed directly to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) . However, the reciprocity requirement in 
the country of origin of the supplier is maintained.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 86 - 
 
  4.17.   In the area of health -related services, several measures were introduced during the review 
period. For example, in Brazil , the Federal Council of Pharmacy published a resolution aimed at 
regulating activities in the telepharmacy sector (covering teleconsultation, tele inter -consultation, 
teleconsulting and telemonitoring).  Companies that are platforms for or provide telepharmacy must 
have a representation established in Brazil, be registered in the Regional Council of Pharmacy and 
have a technical representative.  Also, the Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine (CFM) approved a 
new regulation establishing rules for the practice of telemedicine , which  is only allowed for service 
providers established or located in the national territory.  
Measures affecting supply through the moveme nt of natural persons  
4.18.   Various Members introduced many trade -facilitating measures affecting the supply of services 
through the movement of natural persons. For example, in Hong-Kong, China , foreigners  who are 
in possession of an "Invitation Letter", issued  by authorised organisations, are authorized to 
participate in the specified short -term activities in ten designated sectors , for up to 14 consecutive 
calendar days without having to obtain employment visas / entry permits.  In Estonia  the government 
introd uced a short -term work permit exempted from the immigration quota requirements. 
Individuals who previously had worked on a short-term work permit for a period of nine months with 
the same employer in the country  can now receive this short -term permit for a  maximum period of 
two years . 
4.19.    In Israel , authorities amended the existing procedure concerning Short -Term Employment 
Authorization (SEA) B -1 Work Visa, increasing the duration of stay from 45 days to up to 90 days in 
a calendar year  (applicable to citizen s of countries who have visa agreements with Israel ). New 
Zealand  introduced a new temporary work visa ( Accredited Employer Work Visa)  that simplifies the 
visa application process and streamlines labour market tests for higher -paid jobs .  
4.20.   Since 22 August 2022, the United Kingdom  launched a new visa category called the "scale -
up visa" for high -growth businesses.  Professionals can apply for the scale -up visa if they have 
sponsorship for six months from an eligible fast -growing business in the  country. This visa can 
initially be granted for a period of two years with an option to further extend it for three years, 
depending on the salary received by the professional. In addition, only graduate level, and 
professionals above graduate level, such  as intra -corporate transferees with a minimum  salary of 
£33,000 per year, can apply. Bahrain  introduced on 3 September 2022 a multi -entry e -visa for 
training purposes. The new temporary e -visa is available to foreigners for conducting or undergoing 
occupa tion-based training, for a period of six months with a possibility of further extension for the 
same duration.  Chile introduced a new consular short -term authorisation allowing business travellers 
multiple entries for up to 90 days per year for a 10 -year p eriod. 
4.21.   Some Members also introduced visas permitting natural persons to relocate and work 
remotely. These types of measures, initially implemented as a response to the COVID -19 pandemic, 
have been more widely implemented during the review period (Box 4.1).   
Box 4.1 Remote working visas  
First introduced in many Members in response to the COVID -19 pandemic, "remote working visas" 
are now being adopted more widely. Also known as "digital nomad visas" or "virtual wor king 
permits", they provide foreigners with a temporary stay permit that allows them to work remotely. 
Eligibility for remote working visas is usually limited to full -time, skilled and highly paid employees 
of foreign companies as well as independent profe ssionals meeting similar requirements. These 
individuals' family members are generally also granted resident permits. The permit holders and 
their dependants are not permitted to be employed, or to provide services, in the destination 
country.  
Members havi ng instituted such visas over the reporting period include Brazil, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Romania and Sri Lanka.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  COVID -19-related measures affecting trade in services1 
4.22.   Since the outbreak of the pandemic, the Secretariat recorded information on 157 
COVID -19-related measures affecting trade in services introduced by Members and Observers. Only 
four new such measures were reported since mid -October 20212 and 6 were reported as terminated, 
of which one, partially .3 Thus, the number of new COVID -19 trade in services -related measures has 
decreased significantly during the review period.  
4.23.   Many measures that were introduced  in 2020 were still in force at the time of writing of this 
Report , with some being extended, s uch as France  (extension of temporary FDI screening threshold 
by one year, until the end of 2022) and New Zealand  (maintaining  the international air connectivity 
scheme until 31 March 2023). The United Kingdom  reintroduced the temporary relaxation of the 
enforcement of some aspects of the drivers ' hours rules from 9 April to  8 May 2022 . Australia  
expanded an existing measure. From 16 March 2022, persons working in critical sectors4, who have 
their substantive temporary visa expiring, can apply for a tempor ary activity visa and therefore 
extend their stay.5 Poland  extended the s creening mechanism for foreign investments  until 24 July 
2025.  
4.24.   The full list of measures  compiled since the beginning  of the COVID -19 pandemic is available 
on the WTO website.6 
Development in the context of the war in Ukraine7 
4.25.   Some 134 trade in services and trade in services -related sanctions  were taken by 43 WTO 
Members in the context of the war in Ukraine during the review period. Approximately 25% of these 
 
1 The information in this Sect ion was compiled by the WTO Secretariat and is an informal situation 
report and an attempt to provide transparency with respect to measures affecting trade in services taken in the 
context of the COVID -19 crisis. It does not pass judgment on or question th e right of WTO Members to take 
such actions. The Secretariat has not sought to determine or indicate whether such measures have trade -
restrictive or trade -facilitating effects . The information is not exhaustive and does not include information on 
general s upport measures relating to services. Further, the objective is not to list all COVID -19-related 
measures taken by governments around the world to limit movement, nor all the measures taken to ease the 
impact of border restrictions or other limits on movem ent. 
2 Philippines  introduced two series of measures affecting banking and other financial services, Slovenia  
adopted a series of measures affecting the supply of health services and in China  a notice was issued on 20 
May 2022 stating that the effective implementation of more measures for opening up in the capital market 
shall be continuously promoted, and the demands and concerns of foreign investors shall be understood and 
responded to in a timely manner so as to ensure that support policies a re equally applicable to foreign -funded 
institutions.  
3 Estonia  terminated the financial services measure concerning the systemic risk buffer on 
5 December  2021. Bulgaria  ended the deferral and settlement of repayments to banks and other financial 
institut ions on 31 December 2021. In the context of the p ackage of measures aimed at preserving the stability 
of the banking system and strengthening its flexibility , the Bulgarian National Bank discontinue d the measure 
on the limit of banks’ foreign exposures  as of 1 April 2022.  It also now requires that banks intending to 
distribute dividends, buy back shares or implement other distributions, including from the 2021 profit, to 
present distribution plans, which will be subject to review . In the Czech Republic , the countercyclical capital 
buffer rate is no longer set as part of the covid -19 measures . Switzerland  terminated on 26 January 2022 the 
measure requesting that the countercyclical capital buffer be reduced . Costa Rica  repeal ed temporary  
COVID -19 migration me asures in the process of reopening borders . Netherlands  terminated the lower ing of  
the systemic buffer requirements for the three largest Dutch banks, and countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB).  
4 Agriculture and food processing ; health, aged and disability care; childcare , to which were added in 
the expanded provisions some tourism and related services and transport services.  
5 The length of stay will be granted for 12 months for Commonwealth Aged Care sector and key sectors 
(aged care, agriculture, childcare, disability care, food processing, health care and tourism and hospitality ) and 
6 months for any other sector. See Migration (LIN 22/046: COVID -19 Pandemic event for Subclass 408 
(Temporary Activity) visa and visa application  charge for Temporary Activity (Class GG) visa) Instrument 2022; 
available at https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2022L00316 .  
6 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_services_measure_e.htm . 
7 The information in this Section  was compiled by the WTO Secretariat and is an informal situation 
report and an attempt to provide a summary  with respect to measures affecting trade in services taken in the 
context of the conflict (whether on the supply of services in the Member or by the  Member) . It does not pass 
judgment on or question the right of WTO Members to take such actions. The Secretariat has not sought to 
determine or indicate whether the measures have trade -restrictive or trade -facilitating effects. The information 
is not exha ustive and does not include information on general support measures relating to services. The 
compilation exclud es measures only aimed at designated persons and entities.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  sanctions concern t ransport services (air, road or maritime), including various aviation prohibitions 
as well as restrictions on docking in ports. A third of the sanctions concern financial services and 
certain professional services, such as for example, the prohibition to p rovide credit rating services. 
Other sanctions include investment screening measures, as well as outward investment and visa 
restrictions. In response, the Russian Federation has adopted some countermeasures which mostly 
concern investment and visa restric tions. A few countermeasures also concern financial and air 
transport services.  The Secretariat will continue to  monitor developments on measures affecting 
trade in services taken in response to the crisis.  
Air services agreements  
4.26.   Table 4.1 presents inform ation on air services agreements (ASAs) concluded or amended 
during the period under review. These include both new ASAs and revisions of existing ones. As far 
as can be assessed from available sources, these ASAs provides for improved access conditions th an 
was previously the case. The air transport sector has been under severe strain because of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, and this may explain the fall in the number of ASAs concluded during the 
reporting period.  
Table 4.1 Air Transport Agreements8 concluded or amended between October 2021 and 
October 2022  
Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
European 
Union  Ukraine  12.10.2021  Air Transport News (atn.aero)  
European 
Union  Qatar  18.10.2021  Air Transport News (atn.aero)  
Brazil  Bahrain  10.2021  Brazil enacts air services agreement with Bahrain | 
MENAFN.COM  
Tanzania  Belgium  05.11.2021  https://allafrica.com/stories/202111050092.html  
Armenia  European Union  15.11.2021  Armenia, EU to sign Common 
Aviation  Area Agreement – Public Radio of Armenia 
(armradio.am)  
Dominican 
Republic  United Arab 
Emirates  22.11.2021  Dominican Republic’s air services agreement with 
Dubai will boost tourism (dominicantoday.com)  
Oman  European Union  1.12.2021  Oman, EU ink Comprehensive Air Transport 
agreement - Times of Oman  
Iceland  Ukraine  3.12.2021  Air Services Agreement Signed With Ukraine 
(icelandreview.com)  
Colombia  Guyana  8.12.2021  Guyana signs Air Services Agreement with 
Colombia  – News Room Guyana  
Guyana  Netherlands  8.12.2021  Greater tr avel between Guyana, Netherlands 
possible as agreement inked  – News Room Guyana  
Belize  Kenya  9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
Belize  Oman  9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
Belize  Latvia  9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
Belize  Argentina  9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
 
8 The term " air transport agreements " is used here to refer to air services agreement s, memoranda of 
understanding, exchange of notes , and other such relevant instruments.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
Belize  Chile 9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
Belize  Rwanda  9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
Belize  Switzerland  9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
Belize  Colombia  9.12.2021  Belize signs 13th air service agreement at ICAN 
2021 in Colombia (breakingbelizenews.com)  
United States  Ecuador  10.12.2021  US And Ecuador Finalize Open Skies Agreement - 
Simple Flying  
Colombia  UAE 10.12.2021  Emirates And Etihad Set To Fly To Colombi a - 
Simple Flying  
Qatar  Jordan  15.03.2022  Qatar, Jordan sign air services agreement 
(tradearabia.com)  
Philippines  Morocco  18.03.2022  PH, Morocco revitalize ties; ink air services deal, 2 
others | Philippine News Agency (pna.gov.ph)  
Antigua and 
Barbuda  France  15.04.2022  Antigua and Barbuda Sign Air Service Agreement 
with France - The St Kitts Nevis Observer  
Rwanda  Cuba 25.04.2022  https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda -cuba-
sign-air-service -agreement  
Guyana  Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  09.05.2022  Guyana & Saudi Arabia sign air service agreement | 
Loop Caribbean News (loopnews.com)  
Qatar  Eswatini  16.05.2022  Qatar, Eswatini Sign Air Services Pact | 
MENAFN.COM  
Cameroon  Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  01.06.2022  https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon -
and-canada -sign-air-transport -agreement -to-boost -
trade/  
Guatemala  Dominican 
Republic  06.06.2022  Guatemala and Dominican Republic sign open skies 
agreement - Aviacionline.com  
Oman  Indonesia  16.06.2022  Oman, Indonesia ink agreement on air transport 
(tradearabia.com)  
Azerbaijan  Israel  01.07.2022  Azerbaijan, Israel sign agreement on air services 
(PHOTO) (trend.az)  
Israel  Türkiye 07.07.2022  Israel and Türkiye to sign new bilateral air transport 
agreement (azernews.az)  
Rwanda  Austria  19.07.2022  https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda -austria -
sign-air-service -agreement  
United States  Colombia  27.07.2022  The United States and Colombia Add All -Cargo 
Rights to Air Transport Agreement - United States 
Department of State  
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  Poland  29.07.2022  Saudi Arabia, Poland Sign MOU In Air Transport 
Field | MENAFN.COM  
Nigeria  Kuwait, State of  07.09.2022  Nigerian govt approves bilateral air services 
agreement with Kuwait (premiumtimesng.com)  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  4.27.   Box 4.2 provides some perspectives on connected services and competitiveness and has been 
contributed by the ITC.  
Box 4.2 Connected services make all firms competitive  
Challenges from COVID -19, conflict and climate have led to constrained financial circumstances around the 
world. As countries seek a pathway out of this negative context, services are well placed to reignite g rowth. 
The sector was the main driver of GDP growth in more than three  quarters of countries in 2019. The latest 
ITC Report shows that a services -led economic transformation can also be more inclusive, given the 
prevalence of small, female - and youth -led companies in the sector.  
Not all service sectors are created equal, however. A set of four services are at the centre of contemporary 
economic trends. They provide a significant share of value into global supply chains, and also intensively 
deploy digital technologies. These services, which ITC calls ‘connected services’, are transport and logistics, 
financial services, information and communication technologies, and business and professional services.a  
Connected services provide important direct benefits to economies. Approximately one  quarter of people 
working in services globally are in these sectors, and this share is growing rapidly.  Connected service firms 
also export more often, attract more investment from abroad and reinvest a larger share of their  revenue in 
innovation.  
However, it is their contribution to overall competitiveness that makes these sectors so transformative. 
Connected services firms supply crucial inputs to other companies that encourage more competitive practices. 
For example, comp anies that used good logistics services were more than twice as likely to have efficient 
inventory management practices, according to data from ITC 's SME Competitiveness Surveys. Similarly, firms 
that were able to access high -quality banking services were 15 percentage points more likely to succeed in 
developing new products or processes.  
By making other companies more competitive, good connected services firms can also boost exports. ITC 
analysis shows that companies in regions with competiti ve connected services tend to be more competitive, 
and companies that are more competitive have a higher propensity to export. The share of companies that 
export was 25 percentage points higher when there were competitive connected services firms nearby.  
Figure 1 Regions with strong connected services have more exporters  
 
Source:   ITC, based on ITC SME Competitiveness Surveys conducted in 16 developing countries with 5504 firms 
between 2015 and 2021. Region is defined as within the same sub -national regio n, as defined by the 
government (e.g. state, province, etc.). The vertical axis measures the share of exporters for 
non-connected services companies.  Respondents were asked "In the last full calendar year, what 
percentage of this establishment's sales were  direct exports (e.g. products or services exported) by this 
establishment?". Firms that indicated a percentage higher than or equal to one are considered exporters. 
Firms that reported zero direct exports are considered non -exporters. "Competitive" is cal culated as the 
average of the capacity to compete, connect and change scores  of firms within the region, based on the 
ITC SME Competitiveness Survey data. The figure groups the regional competitiveness of connected 
services into three groups: low, medium, and high, according to the tertial in which the regional 
competitiveness of connected services belongs. The competitiveness indices are obtained by taking the 
simple average of the capacity to compete, capacity to connect and capacity to change indices.  
192244
05101520253035404550
Low Medium High
Competitiveness of connected services in the regionShare of non -connected services exporters 
in the region (%)Regions with strong connected services have more exporters
25 percentage pointsWT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Efficient payment solutions, reliable digital and physical connectivity, and cutting -edge business expertise – 
all these connected service inputs are crucial to disadvantaged firms, which can use them to connect to global 
markets. This is particularly the ca se in the services sector, where 9 out of 10 firms are small and 
medium -sized enterprises (SMEs), 44% of workers are women, and 16% of firms are led by young people.b 
Key services connect these businesses to global value chains, making trade more inclusive , and to digital 
technologies which transform how they produce and engage with buyers and suppliers.  
Turning services potential into a reality  
Connected services are a powerful force for economic transformation. Unfortunately, most small firms do not 
have easy access to these inputs. Connected services need to be more accessible, cheaper and of better 
quality for SMEs to be able to use them to export. One way to make this happen is to improve the 
competitiveness of connected services firms.  
ITC researc h identifies four competencies that are often lacking, but critical to the competitiveness of 
connected services providers. These are the ability to grow networks, innovate, deepen skills and use finance 
to diversify products and markets. Many aspects of t hese competitiveness shortcomings can be addressed by 
firms themselves. For example, they should craft trust -based, long -term relationships with buyers in a way 
that enables the firm to learn and improve its service offering.c  
Governments also play a crit ical role in strengthening access to competitive connected services. In some 
cases, these inputs can be sourced from neighbouring countries or abroad. Yet  trade costs tend to be higher 
in services than in manufacturing,d including because of non -tariff bar riers.f This suggests that a few strategic 
government interventions to reduce regulatory and procedural obstacles to trade in services can have 
widespread benefits.  
Services -led growth is a feasible and promising pathway for countries to re -emerge from the  dire 
macroeconomic situation they have faced. Connected services are poised to help SMEs take part in this 
change, by giving them the inputs they need to be competitive and trade. Through its recently launched 
Switch ON strategy, and other initiatives, th e International Trade Centre is helping to ensure that all 
companies have access to these important inputs.  
a ITC, "SME Competitiveness Outlook 2022: Connected Services, Competitive Businesses" (Geneva, 
Switzerland: International Trade Centre, September 2 022), 
https://intracen.org/resources/publications/sme -competitiveness -outlook -2022-connected -services -
competitive -busines ses.  
b ITC defines small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs) as firms with fewer than 100 employees. 
Youth -led firms are defined as being run by a top manager under the age of 35. See SME 
Competitiveness Outlook 2022 for more details.  
d Jane Drake -Brockma n, "Developing Export Competitiveness in Services" (National Workshop on 
Services, Advancing Philippines Services Sector in the Asia -Pacific Region and the 21st Century Global 
Economy, Manila, Philippines, June 2, 2014), 
https://pidswebs.pids.gov.ph/CDN/PUBLICATIONS/pidsdps1505.pdf .  
e WTO, "World Trade Report 2019: The Future of Services Trade," World Trade Report (Geneva: World 
Trade Organization, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/00_wtr19_e.pdf .  
f ICT, transport and logistics companies cited technical requirements, taxation, movement of natural 
persons and quality control measures as the m ost burdensome barriers to trade, according to 323 ICT 
and logistics/transport firms surveyed in 2019 and 2020 for the ITC Non -Tariff Measures Business 
Surveys in Viet Nam, Ghana, Niger and Bahrain.  
Source:  ITC. 
 
 WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  5  POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
5.1.  During the review period, WTO Members continued to fine -tune their intellectual property (IP) 
domestic frameworks, as shown by the ir communications to the Trade Monitoring Exercise and 
notifications to the TRIPS Council.  The pace of i mplementation of specific measures related to 
COVID -19 health technologies slowed down . At MC12,  Members adopted the Ministerial Decision on 
the TRIPS Agreement.  
Acceptance of the protocol amending the TRIPS agreement  
5.2.  During the review period, t hree Members deposited instruments of acceptance of the Protocol 
Amending the TRIPS Agreement1: Ecuador, on 8 March; Maldives, on 20  April; and Eswatini on 23 
May 2022 . To date, 13 6 Members are bound by the amended TRIPS Agreement, which incorporates 
an additional flexibility to address public health needs of countries with limited or no domestic 
capacity to produce pharmaceuticals.2 
IP-related i nternational , regional and bilateral agreements  
5.3.  During the review period, the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for 
Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled  entered into force for China, 
on 5 May 2022.  
5.4.  The Nairobi Treaty on the Protection o f the Olympic Symbol came into force for 
the Kingdom  of Saudi Arabia, on 8 November 2021. On 11 January 2022, 
the Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia deposited a  Declaration by which it avails itself of the faculties provided 
for in Articles II and III of the Appendix  to the Berne Convention concerning limitations on the rights 
of translation and of reproduction respectively with effect up to 10 October 2024.3  
5.5.  At the regional level, the amendments to the Patent Law of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of th e Gulf entered into force on 9 March 2022.4  
5.6.  The IP office of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (SAPI) designated the China National Intellectual 
Property Administration (CNIPA) and the United States Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO) as 
International Searchi ng Authority  (ISA) and International Preliminary Examining Authority (IPEA), 
as per the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).5  
National IP -related s trategies  
5.7.  In November 2021, Colombia approved its National IP Policy, which recognizes IP as a tool to 
foster creativity and innovation, transfer of knowledge and increasing productivity , and will be 
implemented between 2022 and 2031.6 
5.8.  Albania approved its new National IP Strategy 2022 –2025, with a view  to stimulate economic, 
scientific, and cultural devel opment  and to establish a balance of rights and obligations between IP 
holders and users, as well as strengthen the registration administration of IPRs.7  
 
1 WTO document WT/L/641, 8 December 2005.  
2 The complete list of Members that have accepted the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement is 
available on: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm   
3 Communication by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Trade Monitoring Exercise; and 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/ShowResults?search_what=C&treaty_id=22  
4 Communication  by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Trade Monitoring Exercise; and 
https://www.ncar.gov.sa/Documents/Det ails?Id=pWcjGCAyTJf1LvdTYyb%2BgQ%3D%3D  
5 Communication  by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Trade Monitoring Exercise.  
6 Communication  by Colombia for the WTO Trade Monitoring Exercise; and 
https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/4062.pdf   
7 Communication by Albania for the Trade Monitoring Exercise.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Developments in domestic legislation and administration  of IPRs  
5.9.  Domestically, WTO Members and Observ ers are working to streamline IP into their economies. 
The relationship between  IP and trade continued to develop and diversify, as Members continued to 
modernize and fine -tune their IP legislation and administration (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Domestic legislation and administrative developments  
Member  Measure  
Australia  The Industrial Property Act 2019, whereby "industrial property right" includes a patent, a 
utility model, a layout -design, a breeder's right, an industrial design, a mark, a trade 
name and a geographical indication, entered into force on 22 January 2022  
Chile • Decree  with Force of Law  No. 3 implements Law N o. 20.254 on the Creation of the 
Industrial Property Institute and was published on 21 July 2022.  
• Decree with Force of Law  No. 4 implements the Law N° 19.039  on Industrial Property  
and was published on 6 August 2022.  
• Supreme Decree N o. 82 approved the Regulations on  Law No. 19.039 on Industrial 
Property and wa s published on 9 May 2022.  
• Supreme Decree N o. 174 promulgates th e Protocol on the Madrid System and was 
published on 30 June 2022.  
• The National Institute of Industrial Property  issued Circular No. 524 and Resolutions 
No. 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 184 and 185 on several issues related to the 
management of IPRs . 
China  The China National Intellectual Property Administration  issued the following 
Announcement s:  
• No. 481 on the Interim Measures for the Handling of Relevant Affairs after China's 
Accession to the Hague Agreement, on 5 May 2022 ; and  
• No. 486 on Matters Concerning the Payment of Patent Annual Fees , on 10 June 2022  
Latvia  Amendments to Cabinet Regulatio ns No. 723 on the Price List of Paid Services of the 
Patent Office, exempted patent holders from fees for the extension of time limits, renewal 
of rights or continuation of proceedings, upon presenting evidence of having been 
affected by COVID -19 restricti ons and consequently not being able to meet the required 
deadlines. The amendment was in force from 11  October to 31 December 2021  
Mauritius  The Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2022  amended the Customs Act to enforce 
utility model s, layout design s, breeders ' rights, trade marks  and geographical indication s, 
both at the border and in the domestic market . It entered into force on 2 August 2022  
Myanmar  Launch of awareness campaign for MSMEs regarding trademark registrations took place 
on 25 February 2022 . 
Philippines  The process for copyright registration, transfer, assignment, exclusive license and 
mortgage, and resale rights registration has been streamlined, as of 20 October 2021. 
The issuance of Patent eCert  for inventions, utility models and industrial designs was 
established on 1 March 2022. The electronic Service of Orders and Notices for inter partes  
cases started delivering orders and notices on 14 May 2022  
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  The Regulation of Vol untary Copyright Registration was amended to include artistic works 
and applied arts; photographic works; schematic works and topographic sculptural works. 
It entered into force on 24 November 2021  
Singapore  The Copyright Act 2021 repealed and replaced th e previous Copyright Act 1987, 
overhauling the domestic copyright regime to address how the creation, distribution and 
use of content has changed. It entered into force on 21 November 2021  
Slovenia  Collective copyright management organizations were allowe d to donate part of the 
royalties collected during 2020 to pay extraordinary aid to their members, as of 31 
December 2020  
Thailand  The specification of plant as a new plant variety protection under Plant variety Protection 
Act was enacted on 26 October 20 21. The Research and Innovation Utilization Promotion 
Act entered into force on 7 May 2022  
Türkiye  The Copyright Law was amended to reflect the European Union Information Society 
Directive 2001/29/EC to cover all works, performances, phonograms, productions and 
broadcasts. It entered into force on 25 December 2021  
Ukraine  Law No. 2174 -IX was enacted to protect intellectual property interests of stakeholders 
during the martial law regime and includes provisions on maintenance, proper u se and 
enforcement. It entered into force on 13 April 2022  
Note:  The table contains communications by Members and Observers to the WTO Trade Monitoring 
Exercise.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  COVID -19-related measures  
5.10.   The implementation IP measures, designed to facilitate innovation and access to COVID -19 
health -related technologies or streamline procedures for the management of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) has decelerated during the review period.  The Secretariat maintains a non -exhaustive 
list of measures online.8 
TRIPS Council  
5.11.   During the review period, the TRIPS Council met formally on 13 -14 October, 29 November, 
and 16 December 2021; as well as on 22 February, 9 -10 March, 3, 6, 16 and 19 May , 6-7 July, and 
12-13 October 2022. It also  held numerous  informal open -ended meetings and consultations by the 
Chair.  
5.12.   During the meetings  of the TRIPS Council that took place before MC129, some Members 
focused on the  proposal by India and South Africa to waive parts of the TRIPS Agreement during the 
pandemic10; as well as the European Union's Communication on "Urgent Trade Policy Responses to 
the COVID -19 Crisis – Intellectual Property" and the proposed "Draft General Council Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the Circumstances of the Pandemic".11  
5.13.   In March 2022, a Workshop on  the Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement 
took place back -to-back with the formal meeting of the TRIPS Council, where Members concluded 
the review of the Annual Reports on ince ntives for technology transfer to LDC Members and technical 
cooperation activities and took note of the Secretariat Report on Notifications and Other Information 
Flows.12  
5.14.   Several Members continued to share information and best practices to bring more fema le 
creators and inventors, as well as other under -represented groups, into the IP ecosystem13; and, on 
domestic policies to boost innovation and microfinance.14  
MC12  
5.15.   Ministers at MC12 adopted the Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement15, which sets 
forth clarifications and a waiver for eligible WTO Members to authorize the use of the subject matter 
of a patent required for the production and supply of COVID -19 vaccines without the consent of the 
right holder. The Ministerial Decision also provid es that, no later than six months from the date of 
the Ministerial Decision, WTO Members will decide on its extension to cover the production and 
supply of COVID -19 diagnostics and therapeutics.   
5.16.   The Ministerial Decision on TRIPS Non -Violation and Situatio n Complaints16 contains the 
agreement to extend the moratorium until MC13 and instructs the TRIPS Council to continue 
discussions on the scope and modalities of these types of disputes to the TRIPS Agreement.  
TRIPS -related discussions in Trade Policy Revie ws 
5.17.   The Trade Policy Reviews of China, the Russian Federation, Mauritius, Oman, Kingdom of 
Bahrein, Tajikistan, Georgia, Panama, Guyana, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, 
Switzerland -Liechtenstein , New Zealand , Ghana, Moldova and Mexico  took place. During the se 
reviews, Members actively engaged and discussed a wide range of specific IP  issues with a bearing 
on trade policy.  
 
8 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_ip_measure_e.htm .  
9 During the review period, the TRIPS Council met formally on 3, 6, 16 and 19 May 2022, 6 -7 July, and 
12-13 October 2022. It also held several informal open -ended meetings and  consultations by the Chairperson.  
10 WTO document IP/C/W/669 , 2 October 2020 and addenda.  
11 WTO documents IP/C/W/680, 4 June 2021; and IP/C/W/681, 18 June 2021 respectively.  
12 WTO document IP/C/W/687, 1 March 2022.  
13 WTO document IP/C/W/685 , 1 October 2021.  
14 WTO document IP/C/W/686 , 25 February 2022.  
15 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/30, WT/L/1141, 22 June 2022.  
16 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/26 , WT/L/1137 , 17 June 2022 . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Development s in the context of the war in Ukraine  
5.18.   Since February 2022, several Members have implemented financial measures that might 
indirectly affect the maintenance and licensing of IPRs.17 When financial sanctions are applied to 
designated nationals (e.g. legal or natural persons), all economic assets, including IP rights, are 
frozen or affected.18 Some Members have adjusted their measur es to exclude transactions related 
to IPRs.19 Additionally, various national and regional IP offices have taken measures, which are  
mostly relevant for the maintenance of IP rights held by Ukrainian nationals, or those affected by 
the crisis.20  
5.19.   The Russian Federation enacted Decree No. 29921, which grants the option to use an invention, 
utility model or industrial design without the IP right holder's consent at short notice and for 
proportional compensation of 0.5%. This measure is of horizontal natu re and is applicable to Russian 
and non -Russian nationals from countries committing "unfriendly" actions against Russian legal 
entities and individuals or patent owners having such countries as a place of registration, a principal 
place of business activit ies or a principal place of receiving revenues .22 Decree No. 322 instructs 
Russian nationals to make payments for the use of IP to foreign right holders by transferring funds 
in rubles to a special O -type bank account opened in the name of the foreign IP r ight holder.23 
 
 
 
17 See, for example: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2021C00330 . 
18 Viewed at: https://www.mondaq.c om/unitedstates/export -controls -trade-investment -
sanctions/308040/implications -of-us-sanctions -program -on-intellectual -property -owners  and 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/faqs -
sanctions -russia -ipr_en.pdf . 
19 Viewed at: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl31.pdf .  
20 As seen, for example, in: https://euipo .europa.eu/ohimportal/en/news/ -/action/view/9237969  and 
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/live -updates-ip-offices -respond -and-implement -measures -in-
wake-of-invasion -of-ukraine . 
21 Viewed at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070005 .  
22 See official list at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001 .  
23 Viewed at: https://www.managingip.com/article/b1y9vbn25rmp23/this -week-in-ip-russia -restricts -ip-
payments -to-unfriendly -states -ukipo -chief-to-leave .  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  6  TRANSPARENCY OF TRADE POLICIES  
Notifications and surveillance  in WTO councils and committees1 
6.1.  This Section provides a factual overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' 
notifications to the WTO. Notifications are the primary instrument for ensuring transparency in the 
multilateral trading system. They are submitted by each Member and rev iewed by the relevant 
bodies of the WTO. The importance attached by WTO Members to this issue explains the very 
elaborate system of notifications and cross -notifications put in place under the terms of most 
agreements. Transparency in trade and in trade po licy making is fundamental for allowing trade 
policy makers and economic agents to make informed decisions , and markets to operate more 
efficiently.  
6.2.  The overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO illustrates 
that, with a few exceptions, compliance with notification requirements of the various 
WTO Agreements remains very uneven. Although there have been significant efforts by some 
delegations to bring the overall record of their notifications further up -to-date, the gener al sense is 
that progress on this front remains too slow. The lack of compliance with notification obligations 
across WTO bodies is problematic because it undermines individual agreements and , more generally , 
the operation of the multilateral trading syste m. There are several reasons for low compliance with 
notification requirements , and an important  one relates to the lack of capacity of many 
WTO Members , despite the continued efforts by the WTO Secretariat and the Committees . This lack 
of capacity, and th e other reasons behind the poor compliance , must be addressed collectively by 
the WTO membership.  
Anti-dumping  
6.3.  Pursuant to Article 16.4  of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 
(the Anti -Dumping Agreement), all Members are required  to submit to the Committee on 
Anti-Dumping Practices, on a semi -annual basis, reports of any anti -dumping actions taken within 
the preceding six months, using an agreed standard form.  Members that have not taken anti -
dumping actions during a given six -month period are required to submit a simple nil notification. 
Members that have not established an authority competent to conduct anti -dumping investigations 
have the option to make a one -time notification  indicating that fact , which remains valid unless and  
until they establish an investigating authority, in lieu of submitting nil notifications every six months.  
6.4.  During the six -month period January -June 202 2, 58 Members2 submitted semi -annual reports, 
either of anti -dumping actions taken, or of no actions having been taken.  To date, 53 Members have 
submitted one -time nil notifications.  The remaining 26 Members failed to submit semi -annual reports 
in respect of anti -dumping actions during the period  January -June 2022. Few of these  non-notifiers 
are likely to have taken anti -dumping  actions  as they have never notified the establishment of an 
investigating authority.  
Subsidies and countervailing measures  
6.5.  The trends in the status of compliance with the obligation to notify subsidies to the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under Article 25.1 during the period 1995 -2021 are shown 
in Table 6.1. Subsidy notifications are required every two years , and the deadline for Members to 
submit their 2021 new and full subsidy notifications was  30 Jun e 2021.  
6.6.  The share of WTO Members that notified subsidies remained between 40% and 50% between 
1995 and 20 21. The share of Members that made a "nil" notification fell significantly over the same 
period. Excluding 1995, the share of Members making the required notifications did not exceed 70%, 
and generally hovered around 60%. Conversely, the share of Members not making any notification 
registered a substantial increase since 1995, from 2 4% to 54%, albeit with some intervening 
fluctuations.  
 
1 Notifications in the SPS and TBT Committees are dealt wit h in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this Report.  
2 The European Union is counted as one (27  member States ). WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Table 6.1 Status of subsidy notifications  
New and full subsidy 
notification  
(due on 30 June of the 
years shown)  
1995  
1998  
2001  
2003  
2005  
2007  
2009  
2011  
2013  
2015  
2017  
2019  
2021  
% share of total  
Members that notified 
subsidies  50 39 44 45 47 48 48 47 49 48 46 46 40 
Members that made a "nil" 
notification  26 17 15 14 13 12 18 21 19 18 14 8 6 
Sub-total of notifying 
Members  76 56 59 59 60 60 66 68 68 66 60 54 46 
Members that did not make 
any notification  24 44 41 41 40 40 34 32 32 34 40 46 54 
Note:  As of 11 October 2022. Values are rounded.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
6.7.  Pursuant to Article 25.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, all 
Members are required to submit to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, on a 
semi-annual basis, reports of any countervailing actions taken within the preceding six  months, 
using an agreed standard form. Members that have not taken countervailing actions during a given 
six-month period ar e required to submit a simple nil notification. Members that have not established 
an authority competent to conduct countervailing duty  investigations have the option to make a 
one-time notification  indicating that fact , which remains valid unless and until they establish an 
investigating authority, in lieu of submitting  nil notifications every six months.  
6.8.  During the six -month period January -June 2022, 52 Members3 submitted semi -annual reports, 
either of countervailing actions taken, or of no actions having been taken . To date, 47 Members 
have submitted one -time nil notifications.  The remaining 38 Memb ers failed to submit  semi-annual 
reports in respect of countervailing actions  during the period  January -June 2022. Few, if any, of 
these  non-notifiers are likely to have taken countervailing actions  as they have never notified the 
establishment of an investigating authority .  
Safeguards  notifications  
6.9.  Unlike the Anti -Dumping Agreement or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measure s, the Agreement on Safeguards (SG) does not oblige Members to submit semi -annual 
reports. On the other hand, the SG Agreement obliges Members to notify individual SG actions, such 
as initiations of investigation or impositions of measure. The number of no tifications regarding 
initiations and impositions are explained in Section 3.2 of this Report. In addition, pursuant to Article  
12.6 of the SG Agreement, all Members are obliged to notify to the Committee on Safeguards their 
laws, regulations and administr ative procedures relating to safeguard measures. As of 
11 October  2022, 73 Members4 had notified  their legislations, 47 Members had notified that they 
had no such legislation, while 17 Members had not made such a notification.  
State trading enterprises  
6.10.   The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises reviews notifications of state trading 
enterprises on behalf of the CTG. Since 2004, these notifications have been due every two years. 
Table 6.2 presents notifications received for the years in whi ch a new and full notification was due.  
Table 6.2 Status of new and full STE notifications (due on 30 June of the year shown)  
Year  1995  1998  2001  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  2020  2022  
Number 
of 
Members 
that have 
notified  65 65 72 64 63 66 66 61 64 67 53 46 30 
Note:  As of 11 October 2022.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
 
3 The European Union is counted as one (27 member States).  
4 The European Union is counted as one (27 member States).  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Agriculture  
6.11.   The CoA continued its review of the implementation of commitments under the A oA primarily 
on the basis of notifications submitted by Members. T welve distinct notification requirements are 
applicable in the domain of agriculture , covering the following area s: market access, domestic 
support, export subsidies, export prohibitions or restrictions , and the follow -up to the NFIDC 
Decision. The applicability of a notification requirement is largely dependent on its specific 
commitments under the AoA. Out of the 1 2 notification requirements, the following 5 are "regular" 
or "annual" notification requirements: (i) imports under tariff and other quotas (MA:2) ; (ii) special 
SGs (MA:5) ; (iii) domestic support (DS:1) ; (iv)  export subsidies (ES:1) ; and (v)  total exports 
(ES:2).5  
6.12.   At each meeting, the Committee reviews Members' compliance with their notification 
requirements  under the AoA  based on a background document prepared by the Secretariat . The 
latest revision6 considered by the CoA at its September 2022 meeting showed that f or the period 
1995-2020, there were a total of 2,080  outstanding regular notifications which represent ed around 
25% of expected notifications.7 Out of the five annual notification requireme nts, Domestic Support 
(DS:1) and Export Subsidy (ES:1) notifications have the highest number of outstanding notifications 
with 948 and 958of notifications pending, respectively  (Chart 6.1). 
Chart 6.1 Outstandi ng notifications per type of notification requirement, 1995 -2020 
 
a This number represents the count of reported years and does not necessarily match the number of 
notifications submitted since some notifications covered more than one year.  
Source:  WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.4 6, 5 September 2022.  
6.13.   More than 6,180 questions were raised in connection with individual notifications under the 
CoA review process in the period 1995-2022 (up until 15 October 2022) . Throughout the years, most 
of these questi ons focused on domestic support notifications (DS:1 and DS:2) , followed by questions 
concerning market access, in particular TRQs (MA:1 and MA:2). Specifically, since 2010, the 
prevalence of questions concerning domestic support notifications has been cons iderably high, 
representing between 70% and 80% of all the questions raised in the CoA concerning individual 
notifications (Chart 6.2).  
 
5 Annual notifications are required to be submitted no later than a certain number of days following the 
end of the year in question, in accordance with the deadlines set out in the Committee's Notification 
Requirements and Formats in G/AG/2.  
6 WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.46, 5 September 2022.  
7 "Ad hoc " notification obligations applicable only upon maintenance of a specific measure 
(e.g. Table  ER:1 required upon the application of export restrictions) as well as the annual notifications where 
it was not pos sible to determine a priori  whether the concerned notification requirement would be applicable 
(e.g. Table NF:1 applicable to donor Members only) are excluded.  
Submitted (6,269a)MA:2 (52)
MA:5 (81)
DS:1 (948)
ES:1 (958)
ES:2 (41)Outstanding (2,080)WTO_Agri.1   Outstanding notifications per type of notification requirement, 1995 -2020
a   This number represents the count of reported years and does not necessarily match the number of 
notifications submitted since some notifications covered more than one year.
Source:  WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/rev.46, 5 September 2022.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 99 - 
 
  Chart 6.2 Questions raised on individual notifications, per topic per ye ar, 1995 -22 
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
6.14.   From 15 October 20 21 to 15 October 2 022, Members submitted 39 notifications (including 
addenda and corrigenda). A total of 198 questions were posed concerning individual notifications at 
the CoA meeting that took plac e during th is period. In line with the historical trend, most of the 
questions related to domestic support notifications ( 64%), with the  notifications from Israel, India, 
the European Union and the United States being subject to an extensive review based on multiple 
questions from other Members. A  total of 16 questions addressed overdue  notifications from 
Botswana, Canada, China, Egypt, European Union, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, South Africa and 
Türkiye.  
Balance -of-payments restrictions  
6.15.   Notificat ion obligations in relation to restrictions to safeguard a country's balance of payments 
stem from Articles XII and XVIII of the GATT  1994 and the Understanding on Balance -of-Payments 
(BOP) Provisions (Table 6. 3). 
Table 6.3 Notification procedures for BOPs restrictions  
Legal source  Notification requirement  Type  
GATT  
Article XII:4(a)  
 
GATT  
Article  XVIII:12(a)  Any Member applying new restrictions or raising the 
general level of restrictions by a su bstantial intensification 
of the measures applied under this Article shall 
immediately after instituting or intensifying such 
restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prior 
consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with 
Members as to the nat ure of its BOP difficulties, alternative 
corrective measures which may be available, and the 
possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of 
other Members.  Ad hoc, followed by annual 
consultations  
 
Ad hoc, followed by biennial 
consultations  
Understanding on 
BOP Provisions, 
para. 9  A Member shall notify to the General Council the 
introduction of, or any changes in, the application of 
restrictive import measures taken for BOP purposes, as 
well as any modifications in time -schedules for the 
removal of such measures as announced under paragraph 
1. Significant changes shall be notified to the General 
Council prior to, or not later than, 30 days after their 
announcement.  Ad hoc, followed by a yearly 
consolidated notification  
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
6.16.   The last BOP consultations were completed in July  2017 and no Member has notified the 
Secretariat of the imposition of measures for BOP purposes since then.  
050100150200250300
Domestic Support Market Access Export restrictions
Export competition NFIDC DecisionWTO_Agri.2
Questions raised on individual notifications, per topic, per year, 1995 -2022
Source:  WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Customs valuation  
6.17.   Notifications  in the area of customs valuation stem not only from the Agreement on Customs 
Valuation  itself, but also from a number  of Decisions that have been adopted by the C ommittee on 
Customs Valuation. There are four main not ification requirements . 
6.18.   Article 22 of t he Agreement on Customs Valuation and a Decision of the Committee contained 
in WTO document G/VAL/5, 13 October 1995, require the submission of the complete texts of 
national legislation (laws, regulations, etc.) that deal with customs valuation, as well a s any changes 
to such laws and regulations. During the period under review, one Member provided a notification 
regarding their customs valuation legislation, bringing  the total number of Members that have made 
this notification up to 111. Members must also  provide answers to the "Checklist of Issues" provided 
for in the Annex to document G/VAL/5. Two Members submitted a notification containing this 
checklist, for a total of 78 Members that have complied with this notification requirement.  
6.19.   Members are also required to notify to the Committee the date of application of the Decision 
on the treatment of interest charges in the customs value of imported goods.8 Fifty-eight Members 
have already provided this date to the Committee, with four Members having done s o since 
mid-October 2021. Finally, Members that apply paragraph 2 of the Decision on the valuation of 
carrier media bearing software for data processing equipment must also notify the Committee of 
their practice.9 Five Members made such notification durin g the period under review, bringing the 
total to 55 Members.  
Government procurement  
6.20.   To ensure the transparency and predictability of its Parties' procurement regimes, the 
Agreement on Government Procurement sets out notification obligations for its Partie s in five areas: 
(i) national implementing legislation on government procurement; (ii) procurement thresholds in 
national  currencies; (iii) statistics on procurement activities; (iv) modifications to schedules of 
commitments; and (v) media for the publicat ion of procurement -related information. Various 
notifications were made during the reporting period under these requirements.  
Import licensing  
6.21.   Notification requirements in the area of import licensing procedures result from the WTO 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. They are complemented by the "Procedures for 
Notification and Review under the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures" adopted by the 
Committee on Import Licensing in 1995 (G/LIC/3) and the "Understanding on Procedures for th e 
Review of Notifications submitted under the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures" adopted on 
23 October 1996 (G/LIC/4). The notification requirements are described in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 Notification pr ocedures for import licensing  
No. Notification requirement  Established in  Type  Notification  
category  
1 Submission of full texts of  
relevant laws and regulations  
and any changes thereto  Article 8.2(b) of the Agreement;  
G/LIC/3  One-off and  
ad hoc  N/1 
N/2 
2 Sources in which information  
concerning import licensing  
procedures are published  Article 1.4(a) of the Agreement;  
G/LIC/3  One-off and  
ad hoc  N/1 
N/2 
3 New import licensing procedures and 
changes to existing procedures  Articles 5.1 -5.4 of the Agreement  Ad hoc  N/2 
4 Reply to the Questionnaire on Import 
Licensing Procedures  Article 7.3 of the Agreement;  
G/LIC/3  Annual, by  
30 September  
each year  N/3 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
6.22.   The N/1 notification requires a WTO Member to notify all relevant laws and regulations with 
regard to import licensing procedures, as well as identify the source/publications containing such 
information. It contains both a one -off element (notification of existing laws and regulations and 
 
8 GATT document VAL/6/Rev.1, 1 October 1984.  
9 GATT document VAL/8, 10 October 1984.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 101 - 
 
  source/publications) and an ad hoc  element (changes to laws and regulations thereafter). In theory, 
a WTO Member should have at least one N/1 submission, providing its laws and regulations on 
import licensing or indicating  that its government does not maintain any import licensing regime.  
6.23.   The N/2 notification is an obligation for Members to notify new licensing laws/procedures or 
changes made to existing laws/procedures. It is ad hoc  in nature, and only due when specific 
circumstances occur. A new notification form (for notification under Articles 5.1 -5.4) was agreed at 
the Import Licensing Committee meeting held on 4 April 2019 for Members to use on a voluntary 
basis.10 WTO Members may use and are effectively using this no tification form for all notifications 
under Articles 1.4(a), 8.2(b) and 5.1 -5.4 (N/1 and N/2).11 The N/3 notification requires Members to 
reply to a Questionnaire describing all import licensing procedures in place by 30 September every 
year. 
6.24.   As of 7 Octob er 2022, 13 Members had not yet submitted any notification under any provision 
of the Agreement since joining the WTO. Twenty -three Members had not submitted any notifications 
regarding import licensing related laws or regulations and eight Members never r eplied to the Annual 
Questionnaire under Article 7.3. During the review period, as of 7 October 2022, 96 new notifications 
under the Agreement on Import Licensing were received and circulated by the Secretariat.12 The 
Committee reviewed 56 N/1and N/2 notif ications relating to the institution of new import licensing 
procedures or changes in these procedures from 15 Members and 40 N/3 notifications from 36 
Members. On 29 September the Dominican Republic, and 4 October 2022 Cambodia, submitted their 
first N/2 notifications, providing information on import licensing related laws and regulations.  
Integrated  database  (IDB)  
6.25.   Market access transparency is anchored on reliable and updated information. The IDB is the 
repository of Members'  officially  approved  data on tariffs  and imports  and other  market  access  
information, including applied internal taxes and other duties and charges.  
6.26.   Chart 6. 3 shows the  completeness  of tariff and import  notifications  to the IDB directly 
submitted by Members or collected by the Secreta riat. As of 28 September  2022,  the completeness 
of IDB notifications was 82% for tariffs and 76% for import statistics . The coverage of the 2022 tariff 
information which was due for 30 March 2022 was at 54%. The coverage of the 2020 import 
statistics, which is t he latest  outstanding year , was 56%. Of the 73 tariff notifications received for 
2022, 52 (71%) included preferential tariffs.  
6.27.   The IDB notifications' coverage varies among Members. As shown in Table 6.5, 49  Members 
(36%) have complete tariff information, and 46 Members (34%) have complete import statistics in 
the IDB. The table also shows high percentages of Members with at least 6 years of outstanding 
notifications - 34% for tariffs and 40% for imports.  
6.28.   The IDB data are disseminated in different WTO online portals and are used to calculate the 
statistics published in the World Tariff Profiles (WTP), a yearly compendium of comprehensive market 
access in dicators.  
 
10 WTO docum ent G/LIC/28, 1 May 2019.  
11 See footnote 1 to WTO document G/LIC/28, 1 May 2019.  
12 The European Union and its member States are counted as one.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 102 - 
 
  Chart 6.3 Completeness of IDB tariff and import notifications, 2006 -22 
 
Note:  Notifications  of imports  for 2020 and 2021 are not yet due. The completeness of notifications is 
calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules (i.e. , the European  Union  schedule 
includes the EU member  States,  and that of Switzerland includes Lichtenstein). For the period until 31 
December 2020, tariff information provided by the European Union also covers  the United Kingdom. 
Since 1 January 2021, the information provided by the European Union covers its 27 members.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat,  as of 28 September  2022.  
Table 6.5 Completeness of notifications among  Members  
Number  of Tariffs  (up to 2022)  Imports  (up to 2020)  
years  with outstanding  data No. of Members  % No. of Members  % 
None (complete  data) 49 36 46 34 
1-2 years  18 13 17 12 
3-5 years  23 17 19 14 
6 or more years  46 34 54 40 
Total number  of Members'  schedules  136 100 136 100 
Memo:  With at least one year of outstanding  data 87 64 90 66 
Note: The completeness of notifications is calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules 
(i.e. the European  Union  schedule includes the EU member  States,  and that of Switzerland includes 
Lichtenstein). For the period until 31 December 2020, tariff information provided by the European 
Union also covers the United Kingdom. Since 1 January 2021, the information provided by the 
European Union cov ers its 27 members.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat, as of 28 September  2022.  
Preshipment inspection  
6.29.   Article 5 of the Agreement on Preshipment  Inspection (PSI) provides that Members shall 
submit to the Secretariat copies of the laws and regulations under which they put the Agreement 
into force, as well as copies of any other laws and regulations relating to PSI. Changes in such laws 
and regulati ons shall also be notified immediately after their publication. Since the last Report, one 
Member submitted a notification relating to PSI, bringing the total number of Members that have 
made such a notification to 116.  
Preferential  trade arrangements  
6.30.   Under the Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs), which was 
established in December  201013, newly notified PTAs are to be considered in dedicated sessions of 
the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), on the basis of Secretariat -prepared factual 
 
13 WTO document WT/L/806 , 16 December 2010 . 
0102030405060708090100
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports
Tariff
Imports*
Tariff
Imports*
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Submitted Collected Missing
* data not yet due. Completeness of IDB tariff and imports notifications, 2005 -21
(%)WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 103 - 
 
  presentations. Since the establishment of the Transparency Mechanism, 12 PTAs have been notified 
to the WTO. Four of these have been considered by the CTD in dedicated sessions , while for several 
others , the notifying Member s have yet to provide the Secretariat with the information required for 
the preparation of the factual presentations. The CTD Chair provides an update at each meeting of 
the CTD's dedicated session regarding  the PTAs that are to be considered and urges the  notifying 
Members to provide the data and information as soon as possible . 
6.31.   The Transparency Mechanism for PTAs also stipulates that an electronic database on individual 
PTAs is to be maintained by the Secretariat. The Database on PTAs14 currently contains  information 
on 36 PTAs. Table 6.6 provides an overview of the PTAs included in the database, which is updated 
primarily on the basis of information provided by the Members implementing PTAs.  
Table 6.6 PTAs of  WTO Members  
WTO Member  Number of 
PTAs  Name or description of PTA  
Armenia  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Australia  2 Generalized System of Preferences    
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreementa 
Canada  2 Generalized System of Preferences    
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff  
Chile 1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
China  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
European Union  4 Generalized System of Preferences    
Trade preferences for countries of the Western Balkans    
Trade preferences for Pakistanb   
Trade preferences for the Republic of Moldovac 
Iceland  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
India 1 Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs  
Japan  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Kazakhstan  1 Generalized System of Preferences 
Republic of Korea  1 Preferential Tariff for LDCs  
Kyrgyz Republic  2 Duty-free treatment for LDCsd 
  Generalized System of Preferences  
Montenegro  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
Morocco  1 Duty-free treatment for African LDCs  
New Zealand  2 Generalized System of Preferences    
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreementa 
Norway  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Russian Federation  2 Generalized System of Preferences (1.1.2010 -10.10.2016)d 
  Generalized System of Preferences (as of 10.10.2016)  
Switzerland  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
Chinese Taipei  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
Tajikistan  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCs  
Thailand  1 Duty-free treatment for LDCse 
Türkiye  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
United Kingdom  1 Generalized System of Preferences  
United States  6 African Growth and Opportunity Act    
Andean Trade Preference Actf   
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act    
Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands    
Generalized System of Preferences  
  Trade preferences for Nepal  
a Australia and New Zealand both provide preferences under this PTA.  
b The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31  December  2013.  
c The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31  December  2015.  
d The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 10 October 2016.  
e The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2020.  
f The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31  July 2013.  
Source:  Database on PTAs.  
 
14 Viewed at: http://ptadb.wto.org . WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Quantitative restrictions  (QRs)  
6.32.   The notification of QRs to the Market Access Committee is an obligation established by the 
2012 Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions (WTO document 
G/L/59/Rev.1, 3 July 2012). The Decision requires Members, every two years, to notify the WTO 
Secretariat of the QRs they have in force, as well as any changes in the interim. As of 13 October 
2022, a total of 59 Members (counting the EU 27 as one) had submitted QR notifications and 78 
Members had never submitted a notification since  the requirement was established in 2012.15 The 
number of notifications for each biennial period is provided in Table  6.7. 
6.33.   As of 13 October 2022, 38 Members (counting the EU 27 as one), had submitted multiple 
notifications under the QR Decision informing of the introduction, modification or removal of 
temporary export prohibitions and restrictions as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic.16 In terms of 
the continued application of these measures, while some  Members have notified the extension of 
the temporary measures, and others have notified either the complete or partial elimination of the 
temporary export restrictions or have confirmed the expiration  of the measures, most Members have 
not notified additional information since their first QR notifi cation. According to the Secretariat Report 
"Summary of notified export restrictions and trade -facilitating measures relating to the COVID -19 
Pandemic "17 approximately 19 additional Members provided information on 30 additional measures 
to the Trade Monito ring Report as a result of the COVID -19 but did not notify these measures under 
the QR Decision as of the date of this Report.  
Table 6.7 Notification procedures for QRs  
No. Notification requirement  Total numbe r of notifications received as at 
13 October  2022, by biennial period  
1 QRs in force (regular notification)a 2012-14: 29 notifications from 23 Members  
2014-16: 34 notifications from 3 1 Members  
2016-18: 32 notifications from 32 Members  
2018-20: 89 notifications from 50 Members  
2020-22: 103 notifications from 44 Members  
2022-2024: 17 notifications from 16 Members  
2 Changes to the QRs maintained 
(ad hoc), or introduction of new QRs  2012-14: 2 Members notified changes to existing QRs  
2014-16: 3 Members notified changes to existing QRs  
2016-18: 1 Member notified changes to existing QRs  
2018-20: 17 Members notified changes to existing QRs, most 
of which related to measures introduced as a result of the 
COVID -19 pandemic  
2020-2022: 21 Members notifi ed changes to existing QRs, 
most of which related to measures introduced as a result of 
the COVID -19 pandemic  
2022-2024: 1 Member notified changes to existing QRs  
3 QRs maintained by other Members  
(reverse notification)  No Member submitted this type of no tification  
4 Non-tariff measures maintained by 
other Members  
(reverse notification)  No Member submitted this type of notification  
a Some of these notifications contain information only on COVID -19 measures. See Annex table in 
WTO document G/MA/QR/1 2, 28 October 202 2. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
15 WTO document G/MA/QR/1 2/Rev.1 , 28 October 202 2. 
16 WTO document  G/MA/W/157/Rev. 5, 17 October 2022 . 
17 WTO document G/MA/W/168/Rev.3, 17 October 2022.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Rules of origin  
6.34.   As of mid -October 2021, a total of 116 WTO Members18 submitted a notification on non -
preferential rules of origin under Article 5 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin. 53 Members informed 
the Committee that they implement non -preferential origin requirements, while 63 other Members 
notified that they do not.  Annex 1 of the WTO document G/RO/W/214/ Rev.1 contains a detailed 
report on notifications received or outstanding. However, as noted in previous Reports, the majority 
of these notifications were made in 1995 -96 and some are known to contain outdated or inc omplete 
information. As a result, some Members have proposed to update and standardize the information 
available by adopting a new notification template. Consultations are ongoing on this proposal.19 
6.35.   In relation to non -reciprocal preferences for LDCs, all WTO Members except three have 
notified their LDC -specific origin requirements . In addition, the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial  
Decisions20 also requires preference -granting Members to notify their preferential tariffs and import 
statistics from LDCs. Complia nce with these  obligations has significantly improved, even if some 
gaps remain, in particular concerning preferential imports under LDC preferential schemes.21 
Services  
6.36.   From mid -October 2021 to mid -October 2022, 47 new notifications were made under variou s 
GATS provisions.  
6.37.   Out of the new notifications submitted, 35 were made under GATS Article III:3. This Article 
requires Members to notify to the Council for Trade in Services, at least annually, of any regulatory 
changes that significantly affect trade in services covered by its specific commitments. During the 
reporting period, more notifications were submitted  under Article III:3 than in the previous two 
years.  
6.38.   Eight agreements concerning economic integration in services were notified under GATS 
Article V :7 between mid -October 2021 and mid -October 2022. These agreements were referred to 
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements for consideration. While the previous reporting  period 
saw the highest number of Economic Integration Agreements ever recorded22, the number of 
notifications has declined to the average level of the last six years.  
6.39.   Four notifications were made under GATS Article  VII:4. This Article requires Members to notify 
to the Council for Trade in Services any new or existing mutual  recognition  agreements or 
arrangements. Whereas the notifications received under Article VII:4 increased markedly since 2018 
in comparison to the previous two decades, the reporting period 2021 -2022 has not witnessed a 
continuance of this trend.  
6.40.   No notifications were  received under other GATS provisions  during this period.  
 
18 The European Union and its member States are counted as one.  
19 WTO document G/RO/W /182/Rev.4, 13 October 2021.  
20 WTO documents WT/L/917, 7 December 2013 and WT/L/917/Add.1, 19 December 2015 . 
21 WTO document G/RO/W/163/Rev.10 , 25 March 2022 provides a detailed overview of the notifications 
submitted and information gaps.  
22 In the previous  reporting period, 19  out of the 24 Economic Integration Agreements were notified by 
the United Kingdom and its trading partner s following the end of the transition period under the Withdrawal 
Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom on 31 December 2020.  WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Chart 6.4 Notifications pursuant to GATS Articles III:3, V:7 and VII:4, 1995 -22 
 
Note:  2022 data cover up to 30 September 2022. Changes to previously submitted notifications are not 
counted. Figures on Article V:7 include agreements of the EC/EU with its future member states and 
EU-enlargement agreements.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Transparency of TRIPS  
6.41.   The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to notify to the Council for TRIPS their IP laws 
and regulations (Article 63.2); to establish and notify contact points in their administrations for the 
purposes of cooperation with each other, aimed at the elimination of trade in infringing goods; and 
to notify the  Council if they wish to use certain options under the Agreement relating to substantive 
obligations.  
6.42.   Notifications peaked  in 1996, when developed -country Members notified existing laws or 
amendments that implemented the TRIPS  Agreement.  As of 2 000, notifications mainly  came from 
developing Members and recently acceded Members. The most recent rise in notifications reflects 
updat es in domestic  IP regimes in response to evolving  economic, technological , and social 
dimensions of IP, as well as the launch of e -TRIPS in 2019.23 
6.43.   During the review period, 22 WTO Members submitted 96 notifications to the TRIPS Council, 
under Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.24 Chart  6.5 shows the laws and regulations notified from 
1995 to 10 October 2022.  
 
23 The e -TRIPS System consists of: the Submission System that enables Members to easily submit 
TRIPS notifications, review materials, and reports; and the companion Gateway which is an online information 
portal that allows users to search the full range of TRIPS information managed by the Secretariat.  The 
Secretariat provides regular training sessions and updates to Members.  Viewed  at: https://e -trips.wto.org/ .  
24 Australia, Brazil, Croatia, G uatemala, Japan, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, 
the Kingdom  of Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, 
the United  Kingdom and the United States of America.  
0102030405060
Article III:3 Article V:7 Article VII:4Notifications pursuant to GATS Articles III:3, V:7 and VII:4, 1995 -2022
Note: 2022 data cover up to 30 September 2022. Changes to previously submitted notifications are not counted. 
Figures on Article V:7 include agreements of the EC/EU with its future member states and EU -enlargement 
agreements.WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
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  Chart 6.5 Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2, 1995 to 
10 October  2022  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat. e -TRIPS.  
6.44.   The cumulative total of laws and regulations notified until 10 October 2022  was 5725 legal 
texts. There continue to be  significant gaps in the coverage of more recent laws and legislative 
amendments, as several Members have not updated their initial notifi cations for well over a decade.  
Most of the submissions under Article 63.2 cover patent -related legal instruments, including on plant 
variety protection. Chart 6.6 below, shows the notifications by subject matter from 1995 to 
10 October 2022.  
Chart 6.6 Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 by subject matter, 
1995  to 10 October 2022  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat. e -TRIPS.  
6.45.   Transparency obligations also refer to final judicial decisions and administr ative rulings of a 
general application on the subject matter of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as to agreements between 
01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000
02004006008001,0001,200
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
First notification Amendment or revision to notified legal text(s)
Replacement or consolidation of legal text(s) Running TotalNotified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2, 1995 -10 October 2022
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Patents (including plant variety protection)
Copyright and related rights
Trademarks
Enforcement
Geographical indications
Other
Industrial property (general)
Industrial designs
Undisclosed information
Layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits
First notification
Amendment or revision to notified legal text(s)
Replacement or consolidation of legal text(s)Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 by subject matter, 1995 -10 October 2022WT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 108 - 
 
  governments or governmental agencies, as provided for by Article  63.1. So  far, very few Members 
have shared such information with the TRIP S Council.25 
6.46.   Following the recommendation made by the TRIPS Council in March 201026, WTO Members 
agreed to share information on, and notify bilateral agreements, related to the protection of 
geographical indications to which they are a party. The records i ndicate that few Members have 
shared or notified such agreements to the TRIPS Council, despite the conclusion of several such 
agreements.  
TRIPS checklists  
6.47.   The TRIPS Council agreed that to enable transparency on enforcement of IP Rights (i.e. 
Part III of th e TRIPS Agreement) Members should provide responses to an illustrative list of 
questions on their domestic systems, termed the Checklist on Enforcement.27 Similarly, 
questionnaires were agreed to implement the Agreement's built -in reviews under Article 24.2 on 
geographical indications;28 and Article 27.3(b) on biotech patenting and plant variety protection.29 
The information therein can have direct bearing on trade policy considerations and aspects of the 
global economy: for instance, the Checklist on Enforcement reports in detail on border measures. 
Chart 6.7 shows the Checklists on Enforcement; geographical indications; and biotech patenting and 
plant vari ety protection submitted from 1996 until 10 October 2022 .  
Chart 6.7 Checklist on enforcement; geographical indications; and biotech patenting and 
plant variety protection, 1996 to 10 October 2022  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat. e -TRIPS.  
 
25 See for example: WTO documents IP/N/1/PHL/2 , 27 Ju ly 2001 ; IP/N/1/GBR/1 , 9 April 1996 ; and 
IP/N/1/HKG/3 , 21 January 2003 . 
26 Paras . 73 and 74 of WTO document IP/C/M/62 , 1 June 2010 . 
27 WTO d ocument IP/C/5 , 30 November 1995 ; and responses circulated in the IP/N/6/* series of 
documents.  
28 WTO document IP/C/13 , 14 May 1998  and its Addendum; and responses circulated in the 
IP/C/W/117/* series of documents.  
29 See checklist in WTO documents IP/C/W/122, 22 December 1998; IP/C/W/273 , 5 June 2001  and its 
Rev.1; and responses circulated in the IP/C/W/125/* series of documents.  
05101520253035
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Enforcement checklist - first notification Enforcement checklist - Update
Art. 24.2 - First notification Art. 24.2 - Update
Art. 27.3(b) - First notification Art. 27.3(b) - UpdateChecklist on enforcement; geographical indications; and biotech patenting and plant variety protectionWT/TPR/OV/25  
 
- 109 - 
 
  6.48.   During the review period,  Switzerland submitted its revised responses to the Checklist s on 
Enforcement ,30 as well as on Geographical Indications.31 There were no other submissions.  Eight 
Members  notified and updated their contact points for IP enforcement under Article 69.  
6.49.   Since 1996, 112 Members have submitted their Checklists on Enforcement, and 21 of 
those  have submitted revisions; the Checklist on Geographical Indications has been submitted by 
only 53 Members , of which 7 notified updates; and the Checklist on Biotech Patenting and Plant 
Variety Protection has been submitted by 28 Members, and only one has provided an update. Several 
Members have never provided a Checklist, and many have not updated their report s for over 20 
years.32  
Technical cooperation and technology transfer  
6.50.   The TRIPS Council also agreed that developed Members should provide information on 
technical cooperation; and, on transfer of technology incentives for the benefit of LDCs. The resulting  
reports are circulated and reviewed by the TRIPS Council. They provide detailed information on 
measures taken to implement the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement at the national level. During 
the review period, Austria notified its Contact Point for Techni cal Cooperation.33 
__________  
 
30 WTO document IP/N/6/CHE/3, 4 March  2022.  
31 WTO document IP/C/R/GI/CHE/1 , 1 March 2022.  
32 Viewed at: https://e -trips.wto.org/ .  
33 WTO document IP/N/7/AUT/1, 29 September 2022.