RESTRICTED  
  
G/MA/M/78  
 
15 September 2023 
(23-6163) Page: 1/82 
Committee on Market Access  Original: English  
 
MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON MARKET ACCESS  
26 AND 27  APRIL  2023  
CHAIRPERSON:  MR KENYA UEHARA  (JAPAN)  
The Committee on Market Access (CMA, or the Committee) adopted the agenda as reproduced in 
document  WTO/AIR/MA/18/Rev.1 , with the inclusion of the following item under Other Business: 
"Canada – Continued Concerns  with Indian Restrictions on the Imports of Certain Pulses". In 
addition, Paraguay noted that Items  19 and 20 covered the same subject and could be taken 
together. Accordingly, Paraguay requested to be added as a co -sponsor of Agenda Item  19, and for 
Agend a Item  20, in contrast, to be withdrawn. At the same time, Paraguay requested that the same 
ID for this specific trade concern (STC) be maintained as that used for this item in the Committee's 
previous meeting. Finally, the Russian Federation requested to be added as a co -sponsor of Agenda 
Item 24, and for Agenda Item  23, in contrast, to be withdrawn. An annotated agenda had been 
circulated in document  JOB/MA/159 . 
 
1   INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF 
CONCESSIONS – STATUS REPORT (G/MA/W/158/REV.6)  ................................ ...............  3 
− HS96 (L/6905)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  3 
− HS2002 (WT/L/605 AND WT/L/807)  ................................ ................................ .............  4 
− HS2007  (WT/L/673 AND WT/L/830)  ................................ ................................ .............  4 
− HS2012 (WT/L/831)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 4 
− HS2017 (WT/L/995)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 4 
2   TRANSPOSITION OF MEMBERS' CTS  FILES TO THE HS  2022 NOMENCLATURE: NOTES 
ON METHODOLOGY (JOB/MA/157)  ................................ ................................ ..................  5 
3   THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  .. 5 
4   OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATA BASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED TARIFF 
SCHEDULES (CTS) DATABASE  ................................ ................................ ..........................  9 
4.1   Status of implementation of the 2019  IDB decision (G/MA/367)  ................................ ........  9 
4.2   Status of IDB notifications (G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.57)  ................................ ............................  9 
4.3   List of Members' official websites with tariff information and import statistics 
(G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.8)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 10 
4.4   Status of the CTS  database  ................................ ................................ .........................  11 
5   NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS (G/L/59/REV.1)  ................................ ...........................  11 
5.1   Notifications  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  11 
5.2   Quantitative Restrictions - Factual Information on Notifications Received – Report by the 
Secretariat (G/MA/W/114/Rev.5)  ................................ ................................ ........................  19 
6   SITUATION OF SCHEDULES OF WTO MEMBERS (G/MA/W/23/REV.19)  ....................  23 
7   REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT ON THE STATUS OF RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII OF THE GATT  1994 (G/MA/W/123/REV.10)  ................................ ........  24 G/MA/M/78  
 
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  8   TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  ......................  25 
9   REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE EXPERIENCE -SHARING SESSIONS IN 
RELATION TO TRADE IN COVID -19 RELATED GOODS (G/MA/409)  ................................  26 
10   MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS  ................................ ................................ .........  28 
10.1   WTO Response to the Pandemic (G/L/1459)  ................................ ................................  29 
10.2   Improving the Functioning of the Committee on Market Access (G/L/1460; 
G/C/W/824/Rev.1) - Communication from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay 
(JOB/MA/158/Rev.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  29 
11   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES (ID 46) – STATEMENTS BY THE 
EUROPEAN  UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ . 32 
12   AUSTRALIA – MATURATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED ALCOHOL (ID  94) – 
STATEMENT BY BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 33 
13   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITI ON ON 5G  EQUIPMENT 
(ID 39) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....................  34 
14   CANADA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PR OHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT 
(ID 79) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....................  35 
15   CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTR ICTIVE MEASURES (ID  58) – STATEMENT 
BY AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  35 
16   CHINA – DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW (ID  81) – 
STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 37 
17   CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECU RITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES) (ID  80) – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ................................ ................  38 
18   DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION ON SOME FOOD IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (ID  82) – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ........  39 
19   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING ANNEXES  II AND 
V TO REGULATION (EC) NO.  396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL AS REGARD MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND 
THIAMETHOXAM IN CER TAIN PRODUCTS (ID  86) – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA AND 
PARAGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  41 
20   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSAL FO R A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON SHIPMENTS OF WASTE AND AMENDING 
REGULATION (EU)  NO. 1257/2013 AND (EU) NO.  2020/1056 (ID  96) – STATEMENT BY 
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  46 
21   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (ID  69) – 
STATEMENTS BY CHINA, INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  .........................  49 
22   EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION -FREE COMMODITIES (DFC) (ID  84) – 
STATEMENT BY INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ........  55 
23   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (ID  35) – STATEMENTS BY SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  ..........  58 
24   INDIA – QUALITY CONTROL ORDER FOR CHEMICAL AND PETROCHEMICAL 
SUBSTANCES (ID  98) – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  ................................ ......................  59 
25   INDIA – BASIC CUSTOMS DUTY (BCD) ON SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND 
MODULES (ID  87) – STATEMENT BY CHINA ................................ ................................ .... 60 
26   INDIA – APPROVED LIST OF MODELS AND MANUFACTURERS (ALMM) OF SOLAR 
PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULES (ID  88) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ..........  60 
27   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES (ID  61) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, 
KINMEN AND MATSU AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ .............  61 G/MA/M/78  
 
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  28   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS (ID  62) – STATEMENTS BY 
JAPAN AND THAILAN D ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 63 
29   INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM (ID  99) – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  65 
30   INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS 
(ID 42) – STATEMENTS BY THE  EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ...............  66 
31   MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE (ID  64) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED 
STATES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  68 
32   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS (ID  50) – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  ... 69 
33   PERU – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO (ID  74) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM
 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 70 
34   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS (ID  56) – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  71 
35   TÜRKIYE – DISCRIMINATORY ADDITIONAL TARIFFS ON ELECTRIC VEHICLES 
(ID 100) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ..................  73 
36   UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY (ID  101) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ...............  73 
37   UNITED STATES, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS AGREEMENT ON 
CHIP EXPORT RESTRI CTIONS (ID  102) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ... 75 
38   UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN (ID  103) – STATEMENT BY 
CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  76 
39   UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA (ID  90) 
– STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................  78 
40   UNITED STATES – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF STURGEON 
(ID 91) – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ..........................  79 
41   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 81 
41.1   India – Continued Concerns with Indian Restrictions on the Imports of Certain Pulses 
(ID 36) – Statement by Canada  ................................ ................................ ..........................  81 
41.2   Dates of next meetings ................................ ................................ .............................  81 
42   ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON  ................................ ................................ ...................  82 
 
1  INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM  CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF CONCESSIONS 
– STATUS REPORT ( G/MA/W/158/REV.6 ) 
1.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the Secretariat report which had been circulated 
in docume nt G/MA/W/158/Rev.6 . The report provided an overview of the status of work regarding 
the introduction of Harmonized System ( HS) changes in Members' Schedules. The full version of the 
Secretariat's report and presentation on the various transpositions of WTO Schedules had been made 
available in document  RD/MA/115  and on eAgenda  prior to the meeting.  The Secretariat presented 
the main highl ights of the report.  
1.2.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) reported the following:  
1.3.  A revised version of the status report ha s been circulated in document  G/MA/W/158/Rev.6 . It 
provide s, in one  single document, an overview of the state of play of the different HS  transposition 
exercises as of 11  April 2023, including the results of the previous multilateral review held on 
21 February  2023.  
− HS96 (L/6905)  
1.4.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja)  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  1.5.  There is one  file that remain s pending since February  2009 in HS  1996, which is the file of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.1 
1.6.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2002 ( WT/L/605  AND WT/L/807 ) 
1.7.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja)  indicated the following:  
1.8.  A revised written repor t was issued as document  JOB/MA/42/Rev.26 , dated 
11 September  2019. According to this report, there are  116 files that have  been transposed and 
certified , or which are in the process of certification . Only one  file remain s pending, which  is the file 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, while another file is awaiting completion of domestic 
procedures, which is the file of China.  
1.9.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2007 ( WT/L/673  AND WT/L/830 ) 
1.10.   The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) indicated the following:  
1.11.   A revised written report was issued as document  JOB/MA/104/Rev.32 , dated 
9 February  2023. As detailed in this report , 113 files have been transposed and certified or are in 
the process of certification . The file of Malaysia has been released for  multilateral review and will be 
examined at future meetings in light of Malaysia's  comments on its file. Only 11  files remain pending, 
including the following files: Argentina; th e Dominican Republic; Iceland; Indonesia; Japan; and 
Tunisia. In addition, the Secretariat replied to Türkiye's latest submission with a detailed verification 
report on 21  April 2023.  
1.12.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2012 ( WT/L/831 ) 
1.13.   The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja)  indicated the following:  
1.14.    A revised written report was issued as document  JOB/MA/129 /Rev.18 , dated 
9 February  2023. As detailed in this report , 103 files ha ve been transposed and  certified or are in 
the process of certification . Work remains ongoing for 26  files. Comments in multilateral review 
remain p ending for the following files: Armenia; Colombia; Ecuador; and India. The Secretariat is 
waiting for the Republic of Korea to approve its file , and work is ongoing on the file of the United 
States.  
1.15.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2017 ( WT/L/995 ) 
1.16.   The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) indicate d the following:  
1.17.   A revised written report  was issued as document  JOB/MA/143/Rev.9 , dated 9 February  2023. 
As detailed in this report , 84 files have been transposed and  certified or are in the process of 
certification . There are eight HS  2017 files that have been released for multilateral review , and which 
have received comments from other Members. One HS  2017 file has been released for multilateral 
review and will be examined at the Committee's next informal meeting , in June. The Secretariat has 
sent detailed veri fication reports to El Salvador; Norway; Oman; Switzerland; and Chinese Taipei . 
In the case of El Salvador, the Secretariat is almost ready to send a final file for approval. Finally, 
37 draft files remain to be prepared.  
 
1 Ongoing separate procedures, GATT  document  L/6905.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  1.18.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following : 
1.19.   We thank the Secretariat for its report on the current status of the HS  transposition. Japan  
believe s that expediting this exercise would greatly contribute to businesses improving their 
predictability . Japan appreciates the many p ositive reactions from Members to the HS  multiple 
transposition proposal, as well as the Secretariat 's support on the technical aspect s. We are happy 
to continue this discussion.  
1.20.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat 's report and statement made.  
2  TRANS POSITION OF MEMBERS' CTS  FILES TO THE HS  2022 NOMENCLATURE: NOTES ON 
METHODOLOGY ( JOB/MA/157 ) 
2.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the document prepared by the Secretariat titled 
"Transposition of Members' CTS  Files to the HS2022  Nomenclature: Notes on Methodology", which 
had been  circulated in document  JOB/MA/157 . This document was presented by the Secretariat at 
the last informal meeting of the Committee , on 21  February  2023.2 He explained that t his document 
was similar in nature to the notes on methodology prepared for previous transpositions, with the 
latest one (for HS  2017) contained in document  G/MA/366 . 
2.2.  The Chairperson  informed the Committee that , following the Committee's last informal 
meeting , in February , no Member ha d provided comments on the document. He therefore prop osed 
that the Committee approve the notes on methodology as contained in document  JOB/MA/157 . 
2.3.  It was so agreed .3 
3  THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
3.1.  The Chairperson  welcomed Ms  Gael Grooby, Deputy Director of Tariff and Trade Affairs at the 
World Customs Organization (WCO) , who reported  on the meeting of the Harmonized System 
Commit tee (HSC)  that had taken  place in March  2023.  
3.2.  The representative of the World Customs Organization  indicated the following:  
3.3.  The H SC held its 71st session as an in -person meeting , from 13 to 22  March  2023, at the 
WCO Headquarters in Brussels, with the repor t-reading held virtually on 24  March. 
Sixty-two Contracting Parties (61  countries and one Customs and Economic Union) were 
represented during the in -person meeting. We were also pleased to welcome the WTO as an 
observer.  The meeting had a long agenda , with nine  reports for note or comment , and ninety -two 
substantive agenda items for decision.  
3.4.  Regarding the item on the communication  from the CMA  Chair to the HSC  Chair, it was noted 
that two of the proposals for amendments to the Nomenclature in th at letter had already been 
accepted for discussion in the HS  Review Sub -Committee (the RSC).  
3.5.  The proposal for amendments regarding ambulances and mobile clinics had resulted in the RSC 
proposing two  new subheadings, one at 8703.12 for "Ambulances ", and one at 87 05.50 for "Mobile 
clinics for medical, dental or veterinary purposes (including radiological or medical laboratory units) ". 
It was noted that these had been provisionally approved by the HSC earlier in the Session. This 
means that these amendments will be part of the package of provisionally approved amendments 
that will go to the WCO  Council for formal acceptance , and which will , once accepted, be incorporated 
into the next edition  of the HS.  
3.6.  It was noted that the proposal regarding face masks and respirat ors was still under discussion 
and would be discussed again at the next session of the RSC.  
3.7.  The HSC Chairperson welcomed the Observer from the World Trade Organization , Mr Simon 
Neumueller, representing the WTO Secretariat for the C MA. Mr Neumueller 's address, giving 
 
2 The presentation by the Secretariat was circulated in document  RD/MA/111 . 
3 See document  G/MA/410 . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  appreciation of progress on the amendments and further information on the importance of the issues 
in the CMA communication , was well received by the HSC  delegates. The usefulness of the 
amendments to help monitor trade in these critical goods , as well as to adopt targeted trade policies 
where necessary in times of health emergencies , was well noted by the HSC. As a result, the HSC 
agreed to the WCO Secretariat supplementing this work , at the next RSC  meeting,  with further types 
of goods that ha d been listed as important during the pandemic . In addition, it did not rule out 
looking again at the other goods in the CMA  communication . 
3.8.  The HSC again discussed with interest the suggestion regarding the possibility of ad hoc 
meetings of the HSC during a global emergency , and appreciated that this would provide possibilities 
to act in a more flexible way , and to provide guidance and support to Members when they need ed 
it the most.  However, the HSC was divided on whether ad hoc meetings were feasible. Whi le a 
number of Members supported the idea , and others were willing to consider it, some countries were 
not in favour of additional meetings, referring to the risk of hasty decisions and an additional 
administrative burden.  The WTO  Observer noted that the C MA had only exceptional circumstances 
in mind for its proposal, situations demanding an immediate reaction when working conditions were 
disrupted in the trade of goods.  After some discussion, it was agreed to continue the discussion on 
the basis of the Nom enclature Secretariat providing a definition of a global emergency, a proposed 
procedure in writing , and a paper on possible ways forward for further consideration at the next 
session.  
3.9.  Overall, t here was an appreciation of the cooperation between the CMA a nd HSC expressed 
from both the WTO  Observer and from the HSC  itself. In this spirit, the HSC supported the 
Nomenclature Secretariat continuing to enhance it cooperation with the CMA  Secretariat , with access  
to additional information sources for the purposes of its work on the transposition of WTO Schedules.  
The interactions between the CMA and the HSC have continued to strengthen the HSC 's 
understanding and appreciation of the work of the CMA.  
3.10.   I would add , of course , that, speaking for the WCO  Secretariat, we see this relationship 
between the WCO and WTO as vitally important. The need for Trade and Customs to work together 
in their common interest of having a well-functioning cross -border trade is so obvious and undeniable 
that I do not really need to explain why this relationship between our organizations and Members is 
so valued.  I am sure that we will continue this relationship and strengthen this cooperation into the 
future.  
3.11.   In terms of other mutual intere sts, I would note that the Nomenclature Secretariat reported 
to the HSC on the outcomes of the symposia series on "Visualizing a Greener HS ". Thanks to the 
generous contribution of the European Union, a series comprising five symposia on this theme was 
organized between October  2022 and January  2023 to discuss the issues around putting new 
environmentally motivated provisions in the HS , and seek ing new perspectives to assist Members in 
their reflections on potential changes, both in terms of new or amended provisions , and in terms of 
identifying other actionable ideas that may make the HS increasingly green in its future editions.  
3.12.   More than 25  distinguished speakers joined in person or online, from Customs 
administrations, international governmental organiza tions, including the WTO, non -governmental 
organizations, academia , and the private sector. In addition to opening the discussion space, the 
series also clarified many of the issues that will need to be addressed if we are effectively to meet 
the future ne eds from environmental policy that are being projected onto the HS.  Many of the types 
of products that are of interest could be incorporated into named provisions in the HS. For these it 
is a matter of how the needs and, importantly, the priorities can be properly communicated to the 
HS working bodies by the policymakers  concerned . The principal issues around these more easily 
incorporated goods are how the goods are defined, including the longevity and the compliance 
testability of the definition, and also what the priorities  are, recognizing that not all goods can be 
separately ide ntified  since the HS has limitations in terms of size . This again comes down  to needing 
better communication and connection between the policymakers and the HS  bodies before 
definitions are locked into agreements.  
3.13.   However, for some  types of goods there are  more fundamental problems.  Chief among these 
are the difficulties that arise from environmental considerations often being based on "whole of 
product life " considerations , while the HS deals only with "product as presented ". This creates major 
problems wi th requests to incorporate provisions into the HS which can only be verified by 
certification or verification of end-use. It creates a gap between the expectations of policymakers G/MA/M/78  
 
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  and the realities of what the HS can offer today.  The primary challenge will  be addressing this gap , 
and there is no single solution . Further discussion, work , and research are required on these 
fundamental issues. The HS itself may need to expand its capabilities to be able to meet these rising 
needs, which is part of the brief o f the HS Study  to consider.  However, even if work can be done on 
this, the HS alone will never be able to address all of the needs. To bridge the gap between the 
needs of other policy areas to identify goods at the border , and what can be done within the H S, a 
broader range of Customs solutions will need to be used in concert with one an other , and with the 
HS. 
3.14.   The major point to be taken from this work to date is that there needs to be greater 
communication and collaboration between Customs, including the W CO HS bodies, and other policy 
administrations , such as trade and environment , including representative intergovernmental 
organizations ( IGOs), on trade and environmental issues. Sharing understanding of the issues and 
the potential ways that these might b e addressed at the border between these parties will help to 
develop strong and effective strategies for implementation.  The HSC expressed the importance of 
work in this area, along with an appreciation of the difficulties as well. The work that has already 
been done on environmentally -motivated proposals was acknowledged , and practical ideas on what 
could be added to this were also discussed. The high motivation levels to address this policy area 
were clear from many members . 
3.15.   I am certain , given that this is an important area of work for both the WTO and the WCO, that 
we will be undertaking many more conversations on addressing the linkages between trade and 
environmental policy.  I look forward to being able to update the CMA with further p ositive news after 
the next HSC.  
3.16.   The Chairperson  informed the Committee that , on 16  March  2023, he had attended, together 
with a representative from the WTO  Secretariat, the meeting of the  HSC where  possible amendments 
to the Harmonized System for the clas sification of essential medical goods based on the 
CMA communication4 had been discussed . He thanked  Ms Grooby , on behalf of the Committee, for 
sharing the working document that the WCO  Secretariat ha d elaborated to support the consideration 
of the CMA  items by the HSC. In his view, t his work had contributed  to establish ing or reinforc ing 
internal coordination and collaboration between the trade departments and the customs 
administrations  of WTO  Members . It was also  encouraging to see that progress was being made on 
many of the issues raised in the CMA  communication that would hopefully produce tangible results. 
The Committee would  therefore continue to follow the HSC  work with great interest , and would be 
kept infor med of the latest developments.  
3.17.   The Chairperson  also reinforced  Ms Grooby's message about the importance of further 
strengthening the collaboration between the two  Organizations. He stressed that t he cooperation 
that ha d been established between the CMA an d the HSC in the area of COVID -19 should ideally 
continue and be extended to cover other critical topics which were of relevance to the work and 
mandate of the two  bodies. In this regard, he believe d that it was important for the Committee to 
hear about th e WCO's initiative on "Greening the HS" , and how the HS could be amended to better 
track trade in environment -related products. He observed that u nderstanding how the HS w ould be 
changed to better respond to environmental concerns , including what were the possible implications 
of such changes on Members' tariffs and trade -related measures , was of key importance to this 
Committee.  
3.18.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
3.19.   It is heartening to hear that the Committee had some success  in terms of pr oviding 
information to the WCO around different products , and that there has been a decision on the 
classification of  mobile clinics and ambulances. I would also wholeheartedly support the continued 
collaboration between the WCO and WTO  Secretariats, as well as  between  this Committee and the 
HSC in Brussels. It has  been,  and continue s to be, a worthwhile and informative relationship , which 
is improving our ability to understand what is happening in terms of the data on trade.  
3.20.   One element, Chair, that I would  like to suggest on our behalf  is that  you, in your role as 
Chair, share with the WCO, and ask if the HSC could shar e with its delegates, the lessons learned 
 
4 See document  G/MA/40 6. G/MA/M/78  
 
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  document to which this Committee has agreed5, so that they can at least see some of the results, 
for their information regarding progress made on tariff classifications and the tariff-type actions that 
Members too k during the pandemic, as well as see ing that their work in Brussels has helped us in 
our work here in Geneva.  I make this request in light, too, of the fact that the delegates of this 
Committee are not always in direct contact with the WCO's delegates.  
3.21.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
3.22.   We would fully subscribe to Canada's intervention and very much echo , on our side as well , 
the value of enhanced cooperation between the WCO and this Committee. It was very interesting  to 
get this update on follow -up work on COVID -19. We understand that on some issues the 
conversation will continue , notably on this issue of ad hoc cooperation. We would be interested to 
receive updates on that. We were also very interested by the information provided on the work 
related to a greener HS. We would agree that this is an area where we could typically have more 
collaboration.  And it would be very useful if we could get more details about these topics. As you 
know, t his is an area where we consider tha t there is room for more cross -cutting work in the 
Organization, so we would be interested in working together with other WTO  bodies, on these issues , 
including, in particular, the Committee on Trade and Environment . 
3.23.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated  the following:  
3.24.   We also thank the WCO for this report. We welcome that the work that beg an in this 
Committee is bearing fruit , and I refer in particular to the proposed HS  amendment s for the 
classification of  ambulances and mobile clinics. On this item , we would like to request more 
information on the progress made on the other items. The CMA communication  to the HS C included 
other products, such as facemasks  and vaccines, so we would like to request information about how 
this analysis has progressed. We al so agree that we must harness and strengthen cooperation 
between both organizations, particularly because this analysis has identified other challenges. The 
HS has been very useful, but the challenges that we face today are new and diverse. Ms Grooby 
menti oned something that we completely agree with, which is that the HS must expand its capacities  
in order to address current challenges. For this very reason, we feel that there is room to do a more 
detailed  analysis of the links between trade and environmental policies specifically. We would also 
like to express Ecuador's  interest in continuing this analysis within this Committee, and 
strengthen ing our exchanges with the WCO to continue this work.  
3.25.   The representative of the World Customs Organizatio n indicated the following:  
3.26.   Regarding Ecuador' s question, i n terms of the masks and respirators, we are very close to 
getting provision s. The RSC will meet in June , and I am very hopeful that we will  have a conclusion 
on that , and go to the HSC in September  for the provisional adoption  of these items . Indeed, once 
an item has been provisionally adopted by the HSC , you can be almost  certain that it will go through 
to the next edition  of the Harmonized System. It would be incredibly unusual for an objection to  be 
raised at the Council of the WCO. Therefore , we will certainly have subheadings  for ambulances and 
mobile clinic s, and I believe also for masks and respirators. In terms of vaccines, it is a little more 
difficult. We were going to put them back in the next RSC in June , and to see if our members will 
take them up this time. The protective equipment and textiles are always sensitive, but we will once 
again try.  In addition, we are going to add proposals in relation to some of the other equipment that 
was identified, such as oximeters, and some of the other critical equipment for dealing with 
respiratory pandemics. Hopefully we will soon have a few more to report to you.  
3.27.   The other aspect I would note is  that I am sending a public report on the "Visualizing a 
Greener  HS" Symposia series to the WCO  Secretary General , and this report will be  sent directly to 
the CMA  Secretariat as well , for the interest of WTO Members . In addition, the WCO  has also been 
working  on a Green Action Plan, and has been asked to write a position statement on that . Therefore, 
there will be a number of doc uments  produced by the WCO on this topic , as well as ongoing work 
within the HS  Study, the Facilitation and Compliance area , and the HS. In sum , the environment is 
a major issue , and you will be hearing a lot from the WCO concerning how we can do our part in our 
customs administration on this critical issue.  
 
5 See document  G/MA/409 . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  3.28.   The Chairperson  thank ed the WCO  representative for this information and, based on Canada's 
suggestion, agreed to send t he Committee  document on lessons learned  from the pandemic to the 
WCO and the HSC. He looked  forward to continuing and strengthening the collaboration between 
the two  organ izations and Committees, including through the technical discussions on 
HS amendments, environmental policies, and trade.  
3.29.   The Committee took note  of the WCO  report and statements made.  
4  OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATA BASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED TARIFF 
SCHEDULES (CTS) DATABASE  
4.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were four  issues to discuss under this agenda item, 
namely: (i)  the status of implementation of the IDB  Decision; (ii)  the status of IDB  notifications; 
(iii) the document with  the list of Members' official websites; and (iv)  the status of the CTS  database. 
He recalled that a full version of the Secretariat's report and the presentation had been made 
available in document  RD/MA/115  and on eAgenda  prior to the meeting . 
4.1  Status of implementation of the 2019  IDB decision ( G/MA/367 ) 
4.2.  The Secretariat  (Ms Jung-Ah Kang ) reported the following:  
4.3.  First, regarding the automatic transmission of IDB  data, the Capital experts in Norway have 
initially used an Application Programming Interface (API) to send tariff data to the Secretariat. On 
the project for  ASYCUDA  Members, which are Côte d'Ivoire,  Madagascar, and Togo , a module 
desig ned to streamline data processing is now in its final stage. The Secretariat also held meetings 
with 13  delegates who expressed interest in this automatic data transmission arrangement.  
4.4.  On the redesign of the Tariff Analysis Online (TAO)  portal, we have been working on a prototype 
to assess its design, functionality,  performance , and cost , before proceeding to full -scale production. 
We hope to demonstrate part of the prototype early next year.  
4.5.  The representative of Norway  indicated the fol lowing:  
4.6.  We just wanted to thank the Secretariat , and also other Members , for giving us assistance in 
setting up the automatic  submi ssion of information to the IDB.  
4.7.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat report and statement made.  
4.2  Status of IDB notifications  (G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.57 ) 
4.8.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to the Secretariat's report on Members ' tariffs and 
imports , which had been  circulated in document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.5 7. A full version of the 
Secretariat's report and presentation had been made available in document  RD/MA/115  and on 
eAgenda  prior to the meeting.  
4.9.  The Secretariat  (Ms Jung-Ah Kang ) reported the following:  
4.10.   According to the latest data, the overall completion rate of tariffs since 1996 is 82%. In terms 
of 2023  applied tariffs, 43  Members have al ready notified, accounting for 32% of the expected 
notifications. Nonetheless, there are still 93  Members who are yet to provide the tariffs for the same 
year. For imports up to 2021, currently the IDB is 75% complete. Specifically, for the 2021  imports, 
we have received notifications from 59  Members, while the remaining 77  Members have yet to 
notify. In the meantime, we have received 12  early notifications for imports in 2022. These 
notifications arrived almost six  months before the deadline of 31  October  2023.  
4.11.   In response to the comments at the last CMA  meeting  on how the IDB  reporting had changed 
since the recent IDB  decision, I would like to report on the progress of Members' IDB  notification. 
The chart shows the status of tariff notifications over the l ast 10  years. I would like to draw your 
attention to the green line on the chart that indicates the notification rate of Members before the 
deadline of March  of each year . This rate has shown a significant increase, rising from an average 
of 13% prior to t he 2019  IDB Decision , to 31% in 2022.  G/MA/M/78  
 
- 10 - 
 
  4.12.   Notification by Members may be delayed due to conditions like fiscal year application or 
amendments to HS  nomenclature. As a result, pending notifications are often received after the 
deadline. In this regard, the yellow line in the chart shows the total notifications that have been 
notified or included from alternative sources through the framework process on e year after the 
deadline. Before the 2019  IDB decision, the total average coverage was 54%, but it increased to 
68% in 2022. This is a positive trend that shows the important role played by Members in improving 
timeliness and completeness. The list in sli de four presents the submissions which have been 
received since the cut -off date for document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.57 , which was 5  April 2023. Today, 
New Zealand notified its 2022 imports.  
4.13.   Lastly, I would like to inform you that the Secretariat has recently published , on the WTO  Data 
Blog6, a concise analysis of the tariffs applied by WTO  Members. The Members' IDB  notificati ons are 
essential for conducting this type of analysis.  
4.14.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
4.15.   In terms of the report on the status of notifications, it is great to see that there are many 
"yes" responses in the columns, which means that we all understand the importance of providing 
our applied tariffs to the WTO , and the usage and usefulness that that information has, not just for 
us here at the WTO, but also for outside organizations that are able to use that information for 
analysis.  
4.16.   I wish to suggest here perhaps to consider adding to this document a list of Members that 
have availed themselves of paragraph  8 under the IDB  Decision. Specifically, for those that are not 
aware, it provides an opportunity for Members to voluntarily speak with  the Secretariat about setting 
up an automatic transmission of both applied tariff information and trade data. Norway just spoke 
to the work that they are doing right now. A few years ago , Canada  agreed to set up such an 
agreement with the Secretariat , such that we no longer  submit our tariff data  ourselves; instead, 
the Secretariat does this for us automatically, which places less of a burden on our Capital -based 
delegates , and which is very helpful for me as well , as I do not have to do it either. I wonder if there 
is space in the report to indicate and see which Members have done that, allowing the Secretariat 
to automatically upload their applied tariff data or their trade data.  
4.17.   I suggest this, in part, to provide some transp arency , because we only get to hear who has 
done this at each meeting , and also , in part, to encourage others , our neighbours,  who might also 
be interested. We had a good presentation , and I  am sure you  will speak to it later in the meeting , 
around quantit ative restriction ( QR) notifications and Members' work and efforts towards submitting 
their notifications. I recall from that conversation what a neighbour of one of the presenters said 
well, namely that if you can do it, then we can do it too. Perhaps thi s is an encouragement for 
Members to see that paragraph  8 of the IDB Decision is being used , and can be used , and maybe 
encourage them to reach out to the Secretariat. This is just a suggestion to add to the next version 
of that report.  
4.18.   The Committee took note of the Secretariat report and statement made.  
4.3  List of Members' official websites with tariff information and import statistics 
(G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.8)  
4.19.   The Chairperson  recalled that the 2019  IDB Decision required the Secretariat to prepare a list 
of Members' official websites containing tariff information and import statistics. A revision of this 
document had been  prepared by the Secretariat,  after consulting with Membe rs informally, and had 
been circulated in document  G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.8 . 
4.20.   The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) indic ated the following:  
4.21.   Information on the list of Members' official websites is shown, in addition to the document, in 
a separate website linked to the Market Access for Goods gateway of the WTO  website .7 On this 
webpage , it is possible to see and access all  the different weblinks provided by Members. This 
 
6 https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/data_blog_e.htm   
7 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/tariffandimpofwebsites_e.htm  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  information is also accessible from each Member's profile webpage of the WTO  website. Let me 
remind Members to please inform the Secretariat of any change to the weblinks so that we can 
update them in the n ext revision.  
4.22.   The Chairperson  urged Members  to test the links and inform the Secretariat as soon as 
possible of any change so that this information was kept up to date. In particular , those Members 
should get in touch with the Secretariat where information  was missing.  
4.23.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat report.  
4.4  Status of the CTS  database  
4.24.   The Chairperson  drew the Committee's attention to the Secretariat's report on the status of 
the CTS  database. A full version of the Secretariat's report and presentation had been made available 
in document  RD/MA/115  and on eAgenda  prior to the meeting.  
4.25.   The Secretariat  (Ms Alya Belkhodja) indicated the following:  
4.26.   The Secretariat ha s made CTS  files available to all Members on the T AO.8 Out of the 135  CTS 
files: 75 are available in HS  2017; 29  are available in HS  2012; 18 in HS  2007; 11  in HS  2002; and 
two remained in HS  1996. All legal instruments  which are used to prepare the CTS  files are available 
through the Goods Schedule e -Library .9 
4.27.   In addition, the Secretariat has published on TAO , in June 2021, the complete CTS  database 
in MS  Excel. Each Member's file reflects the latest information on its bound commitments , as included 
in the CTS  MS Access files. However, the CTS  files in Excel follow the presentation used in the legal 
instruments, as  in, for example, the Uruguay Round Schedule of concessions. The CTS  files in Excel 
are also available on each Member 's page of the Goods Schedule e -Library website. An updated 
version of the CTS  Excel files was posted to TAO on 25  April 2023.  
4.28.   The Committe e took note  of the Secretariat report.  
5  NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ( G/L/59/REV.1 ) 
5.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the notifications of QRs from 17 Members. He 
propose d that the Committee examine  each notification following the order indicated in the airgram , 
and that, a fter that, the Committee consider the Secretariat's annual report , which had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/W/114/Rev.5 . 
5.2.  He recall ed that if a connection problem prevent ed any Member from indicating that it wishe d 
to have more time to examine a notification, and thus keep the notification on the agenda for the 
next formal meeting, that Member w ould have until 5  May 2023 to inform the  Secretariat  
accordingly . 
5.1  Notifications  
− Australia  
5.3.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a notification from Australia that had been  
circulated in  document  G/MA/QR/N/AUS/5/Add.5 . This notification  contain ed information on the 
termination of a measure introduced in respons e to COVID -19. 
5.4.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
5.5.  I would like to thank Australia for providing that information in terms of the termination of its 
measure that it took in relation to COVID -19. I think that this is a great practice that we should all 
 
8 https://tao.wto.org  
9 https://goods -schedules.wto.org  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  be emulating when we take these measures and then remove them. If I am not mistaken, this is 
one of the lessons learned that will be reflected in the document that we will be looking at a little 
later.  
5.6.  The Committee took note  of this notifica tion and the statement made . 
− Costa Rica  
5.7.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification by Costa Rica for the 
biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/CRI/5 . The notification  
also contain ed information on the termination of a COVID -19-related measure.  
5.8.  The Com mittee took note  of this notification . 
− Georgia  
5.9.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Georgia for the 
biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/GEO/3 . 
5.10.   The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Hong Kong, China  
5.11.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attentio n to a new complete notification from Hong Kong, 
China  for the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/HKG/6 . 
5.12.   The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Japan  
5.13.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Japan  for the 
biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/JPN/6 . 
5.14.   The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Kyrgyz Republic  
5.15.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention  to seven  new notifications from the Kyrgyz Republic 
that had been  circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/ Add.18 -G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.24  . 
5.16.   The Committee took note  of these notification s. 
− Malaysia  
5.17.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Malaysia for 
the biennial period 2020 -2022 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/MYS/2 . The 
notification also contain ed a measure introduced in response to COVID -19. 
5.18.   The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− New Zealand  
5.19.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from New Zealand 
for the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/NZL/6 . The 
notification also contain ed a COVID -19-related measure.  
5.20.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  − Nicaragua  
5.21.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Nicaragua for 
the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/NIC/5 . 
5.22.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Philippines  
5.23.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from the Philippines 
for the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/PHL/3 . 
5.24.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Singapore  
5.25.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notif ication from Singapore for 
the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/SGP/6 . 
5.26.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Thailand  
5.27.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous  meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by Thailand in document  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 /Add.1 -G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.7 . 
Questions remained by the European Union. Since then, Thailand ha d submitted a new  complete 
notification for the biennial periods 2020 -2022 and 202 2-2024 that had been  circulated in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/THA/3 , which also contain ed information on the extension of a 
COVID -19-related measure.  
5.28.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.29.   We thank Thailand for its latest biennial notification on QR. As noted in previous meetings,  
we would like to reiterate our conce rns with  Thailand's import licensing requirements for feed wheat , 
which  in our view are non -automatic licensing requirements.  
5.30.   The European Union also reiterates our concerns about the import procedures for feed wheat, 
including the local corn purchase requ irement, introduced by Thailand in late 2016. These have been 
in place for more than six  years , although they were presented as being of "temporary nature ", and 
remain despite the increase in average domestic corn prices over the last years.  Thailand put i n 
place temporary suspensions of the local corn purchase requirement from May to July  2022, and for 
imports of 130,000  tonnes of feed wheat in 2023 for seven  shrimp feed millers , in response to 
complaints on increasing production costs. These are a clear i ndication that the measure is not 
temporary.  The system in place raises questions in terms of its WTO -compatibility , as well as in 
terms of transparency in the decision -making  process.  
5.31.   The European Union refers to the detailed points raised in the last meeting of the Committee 
on Import Licensing .10 We urge Thailand to address the concerns we have repeatedly expressed.  
5.32.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
5.33.   Thailand would like to thank the European Union for its continued interest and questions 
regarding Thailand 's import policy on feed wheat.  Thailand takes good note of the concerns raised 
by the EU today , as well as those it raised in previous meeting s of the C MA and the Committee on 
Import Licensing , which have already b een forwarded to our Capital for consideration.  
 
10 See document  G/LIC/M/55 , Agenda Item 11. G/MA/M/78  
 
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  5.34.   We would like to reaffirm our commitment to the WTO  obligations , refer to our statements 
delivered in the previous meetings of the C MA and Committee on Import Licensing , and reiterate 
that the review of the f eed wheat import measure is still ongoing.  
5.35.   The Committee took note  of the statements made and agreed  to revert  to these notification s 
at its next meeting . 
− Türkiye  
5.36.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification from Türkiye  that had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add.4 . 
5.37.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Ukraine  
5.38.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to four new notifications from Ukraine  that had 
been circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/ Add.1 -G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/Add.4 . 
5.39.   The representative of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
5.40.   Despite the full -scale war unleashed by Russia, that has lasted now for over 14  months, we 
would like to underline that Ukraine remains strongly committed to the fundamental rules of t his 
Organization and makes every effort to ensure the transparency of measures adopted by the 
Government of Ukraine under martial law.  
5.41.   During this winter, Ukraine's energy system was subject to numerous barbaric missile and 
drone attacks by Russia. In orde r to ensure a proper preparation for the autumn -winter heating 
period of 2022/2023 , the Government of Ukraine introduced a coking coal licensing and quota 
regime , which was notified in document  G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/Add.1 . This was a necessary step also 
to ensure balance in the energy sector under martial law. As the situation slowly stabilized , an 
additional quota for coking coal export was introduced ( G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/Add.2  and 
G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/Add.4 ). 
5.42.   For the same reason , fuel wood and wood in chips or particles had also become subject to 
export restriction ( G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6/Add.3 ). However, this measure was in effect for only 
three  months , and has not been applied since 1 March  2023.  
5.43.   Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine remains committed to transparency and keeps on notifying 
Members of its measures taken. Ukraine ensures that such measu res are regularly reviewed and, to 
the extent possible, replaced by less restrictive ones, or abolished altogether.  
5.44.   We appreciate all the assistance provided by countries around the globe to support the 
restoration of Ukraine 's energy grid , which has been  severely damaged by Russia's war against 
Ukraine.  We reiterate our sincerest gratitude to all WTO  Members that stand with Ukraine in the face 
of the unprecedented, illegal, and terrifying aggression of Russia.  
5.45.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
5.46.   As there were some parts of Ukraine's statement that fall outside the mandate of the 
Committee, I wanted to remind Members of the Terms of Reference of the C ommittee on Market 
Access , as adopted by the General Council. According to the document , the Committee on Market 
Access shall:  (a) in relation to market access issues not covered by any other WTO  body: supervise 
the implementation of concessions relating to tariffs and non -tariff meas ures; provide a forum for 
consultation on matters relating to tariffs and non -tariff measures;  (b) oversee the application of 
procedures for modification or withdrawal of tariff concessions;  (c) ensure that GATT  Schedules are 
kept up  to date, and that modi fications, including those resulting from changes in tariff 
nomenclature, are reflected;  (d) conduct the updating and analysis of the documentation on QR and 
other non -tariff measures, in accordance with the timetable and procedures agreed by the 
Contracti ng Parties;  (e) oversee the content and operation of the I DB; and (f) report periodically to 
the Council for Trade in Goods.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  5.47.   Mr Chairman, let me particularly underscore that consideration of matters of global or regional 
security concerns, UN  Charter enfor cement or compliance does not fall under the mandate of the 
present Committee. As there were some parts of Ukraine's statement that fall outside the mandate , 
and due to the fact that usually under this agenda item a number of delegation s take the floor, I 
urge those delegations to exercise self -restrain t on this item, in this regard , and to respect the 
decisions previously taken by WTO  Members, and specifically as concerns the Terms of Reference of 
the Committee, as well as the time of the delegates who are  convened here for the present meeting 
to talk trade rather than politics.  
5.48.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
5.49.   Canada is extremely grateful to Ukraine for continuing to update their quantitative restriction 
notifications to the WTO , and for carrying out their obligations while under an illegal invasion.  Canada 
continues to unequivocally condemn Russia 's illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of 
Ukraine, which is a blatant violation of international law and the rules -based int ernational  system.  
It continues to threaten Ukraine's participation at the WTO, directly affecting its participation, 
including in the C MA, which Ukraine continues to carry out as best it can. 
5.50.   Ukraine's commitment to the multilateral trading system while u nder attack is commendable 
and an example to us all.  Canada's support for Ukraine and its people is unwavering, and we will 
work to find ways to use trade to support Ukraine as it rebuild s its economy and its society.  Finally, 
Canada urges Russia to immedi ately cease all hostile actions against Ukraine.  
5.51.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.52.   The European Union would like to thank Ukraine for its effort and commitment to 
transparency , through the notification procedure for QR, even at a time when the country continues 
to suffer daily from Russia's unprovoked and unjustified aggression.  We also thank Ukraine for its 
statement today, which we think is relevant in full, highlighting both the state of play due to the war 
and its origin,  which is Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine's  commitment to 
following WTO  rules even in these extremely difficult circumstances is highly commendable and 
underscores the continued fundamental importance of the rules -based international tr ading system, 
based on international law.  
5.53.   The European Union once again expresses its full solidarity with Ukraine and reiterates its 
resolute condemnation of the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine, which 
undermines international securi ty and stability and clearly has no place in the 21st century.  The 
European Union's support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity , and right of 
self-defence is unwavering.  
5.54.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
5.55.   Japan thanks Ukraine for its notification and for sharing their information. Given that this 
effort is relevant to the work of this Committee, we appreciate Ukraine 's commitment to 
transparency , despite its current circumstances.  
5.56.   Japan strongly condemns Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its missile attacks against 
civilian infrastructure and cities across Ukraine.  Japan once again strongly urges Russia immediately 
to stop its aggression and withdraw its forces from the territ ory of Ukraine to within its internationally 
recognized borders. Japan will also continue to work firmly on the two  pillars of imposing strong 
sanctions against Russia and providing robust support to Ukraine, in cooperation with the 
international community . 
5.57.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
5.58.   New Zealand would also like to echo those that have commended Ukraine for its 
QR notification, in view of the challenges that it faces as a result of Russia's unprovoked and illegal 
war in Ukrain e. QR  notifications are a critical part of Members ' commitment to transparency and 
predictable trade, and the CMA also provides an opportunity for Members to outline the context in 
which they have QRs in place, and in this case, we welcome Ukraine's effort  to maintain its 
WTO obligations in the face of Russian aggression.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  5.59.   New Zealand remains united with the international community to hold Russia to account for 
its violations of humanitarian and international law, and for its unprovoked and illegal invasion of 
Ukraine. We stand in full solidarity with Ukraine and its people and reaffirm our unwavering support 
for the independent sovereignty  and territorial integrity  of Ukraine.  
5.60.   The representative of Norway  indicated the following:  
5.61.   Norway thanks Ukraine for it s notification. We are grateful for their commitment to fulfilling 
their notification obligations even under the extremely difficult circumstances that they are facing. 
Norway condemns , in the strongest possible terms , the military aggression of the Russian Federation 
against Ukraine,  and reiterates its full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people . 
5.62.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
5.63.   The United States again commends Ukraine on its Q R notifications and its steadfast efforts to 
maintain its WTO  obligations in the face of Russia 's deadly, brutal, unprovoked, and unjustified war 
of aggression against Ukraine.  
5.64.   The United States continues to support Ukraine's courageous effort to defend it self, uphold 
its territorial integrity, and protect its population. And we applaud Ukraine for its commitment to 
transparency in this body, in light of all the challenges it faces.  
5.65.   The representative of the Republic of Moldova  indicated the following:  
5.66.   We w ould also like to thank Ukraine for their update in this Committee , and to add our voice 
of support , along with that of the European Union and other Members that have spoken before us. 
Indeed , from the first  day of the war, the Republic of Moldova has condemned Russia's aggression 
in Ukraine, and a war that causes destruction and suffering in our neighbouring country.  
5.67.   The economic and social repercussions of this war are strongly felt in and around Ukraine, 
including in Moldova. From the market access persp ective, it should be noted that , due to the war 
initiated by Russia against Ukraine, Moldov a's economic agents and exporters have lost access to 
an important share of market and transit routes to Asian partners. Some of the exports have been 
totally blocke d, such as  those,  for ex ample , of fresh apples, and other fresh vegetables, and our 
exporters must either face going  bankrupt or else reorient their trade flows. Full or partial loss of 
export markets has also been exacerbated by the energy crisis and high  inflationary pressures.  
5.68.   Despite these challenges , Moldova,  with the help of its donor partners , has been able to 
withstand these crises  and to offer the necessary shelter and assistance to people fleeing from the 
war, and also to facilitate transit routes for Ukraine's trade . In this context, we would like to reiterate 
our support and will continue to stand in solidarity with Ukraine,  and the Ukrainian people , for as 
long as it takes.  
5.69.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
5.70.   Switzerland would like to thank Ukraine for the efforts they are making in comply ing with 
their notification  obligations , notwithstanding the ir current situa tion. Like proceeding delegations, 
Switzerland condemn s the illegal aggression of Russia against Ukraine in the strongest possible 
terms . It is a flagrant violation of international law, especially that of the use of force and the 
principle of territorial integrity  of States . Switzerland would like to appeal to Russia to comply with 
its international obligations , to bring an end to the hostilities , to immediately withdraw their troops 
from the territory of Ukraine,  and to contribute to de -escalating the sit uation.  
5.71.   Switzerland call s upon all of the parties to comply strictly with international law , and especially 
humanitarian law. The parties must guarantee protection of the civilian population and persons who 
are not involved in the conflict , and also comply with the rules of war. Attacks against civilians or 
against  civilian infrastructure are pro hibited , and they must immediately be brought  to an end. The 
only way to bring this conflict to an end is through diplomacy and dialogue. Switzerland  is worried 
by the consequences of this military aggression , which affects all Members, especially the most  
vulnerable.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  5.72.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
5.73.   The Republic of Korea joins others in commending Ukraine for its continued efforts and 
commitments to transparency through its QR  notifications , despite its devastating situa tion. Korea 
also strongly condemns Russia's armed invasion against Ukraine. Ukraine's sovereignty , territorial 
integrity , and independence should be respected.  
5.74.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
5.75.   Australia  would like to thank Ukraine f or its notification. It is very relevant to the work of this 
Committee . I would also like to welcome  the Republic of  Moldova's statement about the market 
access implications for Ukraine's neighbours. We commend Ukraine's continued commitment and 
demonstrat ion of its commitment to WTO  transparency , noting the very difficult circumstances that 
it faces due to Russia's illegal and immoral invasion. Russia's invasion is a gross violation of 
international law and the U N Charter. Australia strong ly supports Ukrai ne's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and we again call upon Russia to cease its aggression.  
5.76.   The representative of the  Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
5.77.   Once again the delegations that have taken the floor have decided to violate the mandate of 
the Committee to remind the Membership that the WTO is a rules-based  organization. All the 
interventions that we have just listened to are clearly irrelevant to the mandate of the  Committee.  
5.78.   One of the aims of these interventions is to justify the measures that these Members have 
introduced in clear violation of their basic WTO  commitments. Such measures have consequences 
for world trade and the world economy.  Such consequences cou ld have been avoided if the 
WTO Members that have just taken the floor had not breached basic WTO  rules. Specifically, the 
following measures are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of the WTO:  (i) implementation of 
import tariffs above most-favoured -nation ( MFN) rates;  (ii) import bans on products of Russian 
origin, including energy products; (iii) restrictions on export to Russia of various goods; (iv) blocking 
of Russian financial institutions, transportation companies, and export support agencies;  and (v)  ban 
on the use of seaports . All of the additional costs due to these unilateral measures are passed on to 
global consumers , resulting in growing glob al price level s. 
5.79.   The Committee took note  of these notification s and the statements made . 
− United Kingdom  
5.80.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification from the United Kingdom  that 
had been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/GBR/2/Add .1. The notification contain ed information 
on a modified measure in relation to COVID -19. 
5.81.   The rep resentative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
5.82.   The United Kingdom will intervene on QRs covering both Ukraine and the United Kingdom  
together . 
5.83.   Firstly, we wanted to thank the Delegation of Ukraine for their intervention just now, including 
the helpful explanation around the rationale behind the measures represented by their notifications 
on the agenda today. Indeed, within this Committee, Members sharing details on the context 
underpinning their own measures enhances overall transparency and awa reness around QR s more 
broadly.  
5.84.   And separately , like others , we wanted to underline how much the United Kingdom values 
Ukraine 's continued steadfast commitment to the rules of this Organi zation, including on 
transparency. This is aptly demonstrated by the fact that , despite relentless, illegal, bombardment , 
Ukraine keeps on relentlessly notifying, reviewing , and replacing its measures , as appropriate.  
5.85.   Secondly, we wanted to provide transparency on some UK  measures. The UK  QR listed here 
represents the remov al of various measures  on essential medicines, noting that we review each 
UK medical restriction tri -monthly to ensure that we are keeping up to date.  Also, for transparency, G/MA/M/78  
 
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  the United Kingdom wanted to note that we have in fact submitted a further UK  QR covering certain 
measures implemented since our biennial Q R notification was filed in September. This extra 
addendum covers UK  measures with regards to bilateral trade with the Russian Federation. Such 
measures were necessary because of the egregious vi olations of international law and the 
UN Charter committed by Russia against Ukraine.  
5.86.   While  Russia continues to violate international law, human rights , and multiple commitments 
to peace and security , the United Kingdom will continue to take any necessary measures aimed at 
cutting off the funding of Putin 's illegal and unprovoked war. And, until Russia withdraws to end its 
unilateral invasion, the UK will continue to stand alongside Ukraine for as long as it takes.  In closing , 
should any Members have any qu estions on either the United Kingdom 's medical or Russia measures, 
our delegation remains fully at Members ' disposal to provide any extra information.  
5.87.   The Committee took note  of this notification  and the statement made . 
− United States  
5.88.   The Chairperson  recall ed that , at its last meeting , the Committee had agreed to revert to the 
notifications from the United States, which had been  circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/USA/2 ; 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/3 ; G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 ; G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/Add .1 and G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/Add. 2; 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5 , G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add .1, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add. 2, and 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add. 3; and G/MA/QR/N/USA/6 . Questions remained pending from the European 
Union, which had been circulated in documents  G/MA/W/116  and G/MA/W/127 , and from China.  
5.89.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
5.90.   In March  2018, the United States imposed Section  232 tariffs on imported steel and 
aluminium  products on the grounds of so -called national security , and then selectively lowered tariffs 
on some trading partners. This practice has set a dangerous precedent and fully demonstra ted the 
arbitrary and discriminatory nature of the implementation of U S trade policy. It contradicts the letter 
and spirit of the WTO  Agreement and the history of the multilateral trading system.  
5.91.   Recently, according to a Bloomberg report, the United States  is seeking an end to the 
Section  232 tariffs on steel and aluminium  in exchange for an exemption from the European Union's 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). As China has mentioned the background to this issue 
many times in this Committee, the U S and the EU reached a TRQ  agreement on steel and aluminium  
in 2021. As part of the arrangement, the EU suspended litigation under the WTO  dispute settlement 
mechanism on the legality of Section  232 tariffs. The U S and the EU will negotiate the so -called 
sustainable global steel and aluminium  arrangement under the EU -US Trade and Technology Council 
(TTC) framework.  
5.92.   According to the U S 2023 trade policy agenda, sustainable global steel and aluminium  
arrangements are essential to the U S' accelerated decarboniza tion and environmentally sustainable 
trade policies. However, this arrangement now carries too many tasks, including addressing the 
national security concerns of the U S in steel and aluminium  products, reducing the emission s of the 
global steel and alumini um trade, and seeking exemptions for its own steel and aluminium  products 
from the EU 's CBAM.  How can a measure designed to address environmental concerns be 
transformed into an effort to alleviate national security concerns? We do not deny the importance of 
climate change, but it must be pointed out that the U S implementation document for the Section  232 
tariffs was silent on climate change.  
5.93.   The WTO Dispute Settlement Body has previously ruled that the U S' Section  232 tariffs on 
steel and aluminium  products do not comply with the WTO's rules. In consequence , its derivative 
measures, including exemptions for specific trading partners, may also be suspected of violating 
WTO rules. The U S aims to legitimize trade prote ction measures in the name of national security 
and address ing climate change. This violates the WTO 's interpretation of the national security 
exception provision and seriously affects global cooperation on climate change. Accordingly, we call 
on all WTO  Members to strengthen the oversight and scrutiny of such measures.  
5.94.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  5.95.   I am taking the floor because we used to raise concerns and comments on US  quantitative 
restrictions on imports of s turgeon when discussing the QR  notifications by the United States. Just 
to clarify that these comments and concerns remain, and we will address them under Agenda 
Item 42. 
5.96.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
5.97.   We take note of the comments  and questions raised by China regarding the WTO-consistency 
of the Section  232 quotas. The United States has invoked Article  XXI:(b) of the GATT  1994 and the 
actions are therefore wholly consistent with the WTO. Regarding questions related to the operatio n 
of the Section  232 quotas, we refer Members to the relevant proclamations issued under 
Section  232, and to quota implementation information published on the website of US  Customs and 
Border Protection.  We also thank the EU for its comment  on sturgeon , and we are prepared to 
respond in full to this question under the later agenda item.  
5.98.   The Committee took note  of the statements made and agreed  to revert  to these notification s 
at the next meeting.  
− Uruguay  
5.99.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from Uruguay  that had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/URY/4/Add .1. 
5.100.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
5.2  Quantitative Restrictions - Factual Information on Notifications Received  – Report by 
the Secretariat (G/MA/W/114/Rev.5 ) 
5.101.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to document  G/MA/W/114/Rev.5 , entitled 
"Quantitative Restrictions: Factual Information on Notifications Received" , where the Secretariat 
summarize d the content of the QR  notific ations that had been received.  
5.102.   The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) reported the following:  
5.103.   This report provides an overview about the latest notifications, including the types of 
restrictions that are contained in the quantitative restriction notificatio ns, the products most 
concerned, what were the WTO  justifications used, what were other justifications that were used in 
relation to international conventions, and some resources for those Members that have not yet  
notified . 
5.104.   Since the report 's last update , one  additional Member has submitted a QR  notification, which 
was Nepal. This results in a total of 1,926  notified QRs, corresponding to 2,406  measures. This 
means that some of the QRs can have more than one  measure attached. For example, there can  be 
a non -automatic licence, both for imports and for exports, which is implementing a conditional 
prohibition. In this case, there would be four  measures attached to one  QR. 
5.105.   Of those 1,926  QRs, there are 1,247 of what we call "active" quantitative restric tions. 
Imagine a case where a given quantitative restriction was notified in a first  complete notification , 
and then was again notified in a further notification. We would then only consider, for the purpose 
of this report, the latest version of the quanti tative restriction. As we have had many notifications 
since 2012, there are around 1,250  QRs that are "active" of the 1,926  QRs that we have information 
on in total. All of the report 's information , and also the information in this presentation, can be 
accessed on the QR  database.11 
5.106.   In terms of types of restrictions, we see that 59% of measures relate  to imports , and 41% 
to exports, with the most predominate measures being in relation to non -automatic licensing, 
followed by prohibitions and prohibitions  under certain conditions. We have a few other measures in 
 
11 https://qr.wto.org/en#/home  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  relation to different types of quotas, state -trading  enterprises , and minimum price requirements 
triggering QRs. 
5.107.   In terms of the top HS  chapters affected, we see that 17% of QRs are in relation to 
chapter  29, which is about organic chemicals , and chapter s 38 and 28 , which also relate to chemical 
products, as well as pharmaceuticals , which is chapter  30. Accordingly , we can see that most 
restrictions relate to chemicals and pharmaceuticals . 
5.108.   On a positive note, the quantitative restrictions that do not have information on HS  codes  
have dramatically reduced in number, to only 3% of the active QRs , whereas in the past, we had 
16% of QRs not including information on HS  codes . This represents a big improvement in how 
HS codes are reflected in the notifications.  
5.109.   In terms of the WTO justifications that are mentioned in the notifications, the vast majority , 
at 95% of the measures , refer to the GATT, of which a vast majority , at almost 50% of the measures , 
refer specifically to Article  XX(b)  of the GATT . Other justifications that are often cited  include 
Article  XX(a) , Article  XX(g) , and Article  XXI of the GATT . We also have 45  QRs that do not mention 
a specific WTO  justification.  
5.110.   In terms of other justifications, 59 of the active QRs are in relation to CITES , 54 relate to 
the Montreal Protocol, while others relate to the Basel, Rotterdam , and Stockholm Conventions, and 
the three  UN Conventions on narcotics, as well as several others.  
5.111.   Members can find useful references  and information on how to prepare QR  notifications  in 
document  JOB/MA/101/ Rev.2 , in the  QR database , as well as in the Trade Policy Review reports.  
5.112.   The Chairperson  emphasized that QR  notifications were an important transparency tool in 
the WTO. The experience with this notification during the COVID -19 pandemic was a case in point. 
The notifications submitted by Members under the QR  Decision effectively contributed to increasing 
transparency on trade measures taken in response to the COVID -19 pandemic, and spurred more 
Members to notify. Despite  this, the compliance level with the QR  Decision was far from being 
satisfactory.  
5.113.   The deadline to notify for the current biennial period 2022 -2024 was 30  September  2022. 
As of 26  April 2023, 79  Members had never notified their QRs. In addition, there were also Members 
that had notified measures introduced in response to the COVID -19 pandemic , and that had 
indicated that they would submit a complete notification with all QR s in force at a later da te, but 
that had not yet done so. Therefore, the Chairperson urged Members to comply with this notification 
obligation , and to get in touch with the Secretariat in case Members need ed any assistance.  
5.114.   In this regard, the Chairperson  took the opportunity to make a brief report about the 
Capacity -Building Workshop on Notification of Quantitative Restrictions that had been organized by 
the Secretariat .12 The objective of this workshop had been to train Capital -based officials in charge 
of QR  notifications on ho w to prepare such notifications for the first  time, or how to improve on their 
existing notifications . The Secretariat had indicated that there had been more than 80  applications , 
from 57  Members , and that the WTO had been able to finance the participation  of 29 Capital -based 
officials in charge of their QR  notifications, who were also present at that day's  meeting.  
5.115.   The Chairperson informed the Committee that he had chaired the first  part of the workshop , 
on the previous Monday morning . The workshop had also been open to Geneva -based delegates , 
and had featured presentations by the Secretariat, as well as experience -sharing by five  Members. 
The workshop had been well attended , demonstrating Members' strong interest in better 
understanding  and improving the quality and timeliness of their QR  notifications.  
5.116.   The workshop had been structured around three  main sessions. During the first  session, the 
Secretariat had introduced the WTO  rules on QRs and their notification requirements. Since 2022 
had marked the 10th anniversary of the QR  Decision's implementation , the session had looked at 
the evolution of notifications under this Decision. The second  session had  explored the linkages 
between QRs and import licensing and discussed the WTO's Trade Policy Reviews as sources of 
 
12 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/qres_2404202310_e/qres_240420231 0_e.htm   G/MA/M/78  
 
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  information for QR  notifications. Finally, in the third  session , Canada, Colombia, Mali, Thailand,  and 
the United States had shared their experience s concerning how they coordinate d the preparation 
and work on these notificatio ns at the national level.  
5.117.   From discussions held at the workshop, it had seemed that Members continue d to face 
challenges with respect to the identification of QRs and internal coordination among all the 
government agencies involved in this process. A numbe r of ideas had been shared by participants 
concerning how to overcome some of these challenges. For instance, participants noted that 
information on QRs could be found in other Members' notifications, Trade Policy Review reports, the 
QR database, as well a s through other resources present in the QR  database, such as the link to the 
Environmental Database and the WCO  Interconnection Table. It was also mentioned that single 
windows could be used as a source of information to prepare the QR  notification  as they usually 
consolidated in one  place all the regulations issued by the country that contained some type of 
quantitative restriction.  
5.118.   In terms of how to improve internal coordination, it had been suggested to identify 
appropriate contact points in other ministries that were responsible for measures falling under the 
purview of the QR  Decision. This could be done , for instance , in the context of the preparatory work 
for the Trade Policy Review , where a national coordinating committee was usually put in pla ce to 
gather all the necessary information for the report. Some participants had also suggested  using the 
National Committees on Trade Facilitation, which consisted of several agencies tasked with the 
implementation of import and export regulations, identi fying and contacting the relevant agencies, 
as well as reaching out to the teams working on negotiating free trade agreements on trade in goods. 
It was also highlighted that it was important to clarify QR  concepts and notification requirements to 
domestic stakeholders, who might not be familiar with this specific issue, and to consider more 
streamlined processes to notify quantitative restrictions, for instance through online notification 
systems or portals.  
5.119.   The Chairperson  expressed his appreciation to the  speakers for their valuable contributions 
in helping make the Capacity -Building Workshop on the Notification of Quantitative Restrictions a 
successful event. He also thanked all those who attended the workshop, particularly Capital -based 
delegates travel ling from near and far. Finally, he thanked the Secretariat staff from the Market 
Access Division for delivering the course , and the Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation 
for supporting it with the logistics.  
5.120.   The representative of the European Un ion indicated the following:  
5.121.   The European Union thanks the Chairperson for this feedback on the workshop that has just 
been organized. It was also interesting to receive feedback from colleagues on the possible 
improvements. The EU thanks the Secretariat f or the update as well , and for the Chairperson's 
update on the situation on notifications.  
5.122.   The European Union took part in some of the Monday morning session , which was very 
interesting. Some of the comments were especially interesting, such as on the impo rtance of 
transparency, the fact that notifications of QRs are complex to issue, and possible thoughts for the 
future. The EU observes  that substantive progress has been made with the submission of 
notifications, specifically in terms of the digital tools and the notification portal on QRs. There are 
other changes that could also be made, including improvements to facilitate information on 
notifications more generally connected with quantitative restrictions.  
5.123.   Some examples could be shared  to help to facilit ate the submission of notifications , focusing  
in particular  on the notification s portal. We have a template for submitting notifications , but 
sometimes it is difficult to find it on the website. A clear link that is more visible would be helpful. 
In fact, some colleagues from LDCs , in particular , had asked for that, and asked , too,  whether they 
could submit notifications online , as is possible in some other Committees, for example in the 
Committee on Import Licensing.  With a stage -by-stage assistance, just with the overall objective of 
facilitating information, some information that was received on Monday and shared in other sessions 
of the workshop could be added to the notification s portal , which would  ensure that everything is 
consistent with the QR  database.  
5.124.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  5.125.   Canada wanted to express its sincere thanks to the Secretariat and to the Chairperson, but 
most directly for the interest from the delegates that are here from Capitals, and those who joined 
online. It is very heartening that there is such an interest in learning about and providing the 
QR notifications that we are all supposed to provide every couple of  years.  
5.126.   In some respects, this notification is one of the most important at the WTO. The information 
that is contained in this notification has a direct impact on trade. The subsidy notification is important 
and interesting, and it is useful to understand that some of the other notifications are also important. 
Beyond this, one can on ly think of import licensing and customs valuation  notifications  that might 
be more important , and that provide information to Members, to the private sector, and to traders 
on the situation that they face.  
5.127.   Canada also wanted to thank specifically the gent leman from Mali who joined online. Mali's 
presentation was excellent and stood out because it was a different voice. It was a well thought 
through and well-presented  explanation of the challenges that Mali faced in pulling together this 
notification. As me ntioned at the meeting that morning, it is heartening to see that we , big and small 
delegations,  all have the same job ; and we all have the same challenges in many ways, in terms of 
pulling together this notification. Canada thanks Mali and the power of te chnology that brought the 
delegate here from his Capital. Canada thinks that it is a testament to one of the significant benefits  
of the Interprefy platform to the WTO, which allows much more Capital -based participation in our 
meetings.  
5.128.   Canada finds  the nu mbers that the Secretariat presented  to be very useful. The one  number 
that sticks out is the 79 Members that have not notified. That is very good  if one looks back and 
reads the minutes of Council and Committee meetings in the 1970s and 1980s, because this issue 
of QR  notifications has been a "bugbear" of this Organization for a long time. Canada considers that 
this is thanks to the Decision that was taken in 2012 by the Committee to modernize the notification 
process. If anyone has seen or looked at what happened before 2012, they will know that it was a 
file report in the WTO  building , where the pieces of paper that we all submitted were kept. If a 
delegate wanted to look at the information, he or she had to go to the file room and get an actual 
copy of it. Canada thinks that the 2012 decision represents  a huge step forward in terms of the 
information , and the ability of Members to pr ovide that information. In fact, the notification template  
itself is an update, as perhaps there was no such template  before 2012.  
5.129.   It is an i terative  process, it takes time, and the actual notification itself takes time, but 
Canada  thinks that the number o f Members that have not yet notified will decrease. The expressions 
of interest from the delegates that have come is a testament to that. Canada hopes that it will be a 
lot smaller next time. To reduce that number , one has to initiate the process to do tha t notification. 
This is one of the things that Canada found, as we improve our notification : each year it gets better , 
and it is also easier as we have a base to work from, and something there to build upon. In many 
respects, as the Secretariat has mention ed, there are a number of QRs that continue, there are 
long-standing ones, so it is not all that difficult to update the notification. It is then just a 
"copy /paste" exercise which may include an update of a reference or a link to some legislation that 
may have changed.  
5.130.   Canada also wanted to commend the Secretariat for continuing these workshops. They are  
important. And this is one of those things , in the context of improving the functioning of the 
Committee , that we are also considering , including how  we can continue to ensure that delegates , 
both here in Geneva and in Capitals, will understand the role of the Committee, the responsibilities 
they have as a delegate, and a Member, and provide the access to the training that enables us  to 
do our jobs.  Canada appreciates the interest of the people that are here. It is great to have this 
room full of people. Thanks go especially to the Secretariat and the Chairperson for holding these 
workshops , and for continuing to do so.  
5.131.   The representative of Ecuador  indicate d the following:  
5.132.   Ecuador thanks the Secretariat for this activity. Ecuador enjoyed good participation and had 
experts from Capital here as well, which is one of the best things for the notification that we had to 
do. This activity is extremely useful, because it clarifies a number of doubts that we ha ve in Capital 
and in Geneva. I also want to highlight the importance of allowing the participation of d elegates in 
Geneva to one  part of the workshop . This is very important because we are the ones who guide the G/MA/M/78  
 
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  process very often, and sometimes we do not have all the information that we need. This type of 
workshop is also useful for Geneva -based missions. Ecuador would recommend continuing this 
practice so that colleagues from Geneva can come and li sten to the presentations , and clarify the 
doubts that they may have.  
5.133.   Ecuador also has a logistical suggestion. Most participants arrived in Geneva late on Sunday, 
and then on Monday they had quite a technical session that lasted all day on Monday. Therefo re, 
Ecuador suggests that participants could arrive a day earlier. Ecuador understands that there are 
budgetary constraints, but the objective is to get the most out of these activities, especially when  
Capital -based participants  are involved. The session on Monday morning was very difficult for some 
participants , and we hope that this option could be considered . 
5.134.   The representative of the Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
5.135.   The Dominican Republic wanted to thank the Secretariat for the workshop. We also had a 
Capital -based delegate who attended the workshop. She has a lot of experience to share with 
colleagues who have to notify quantitative restrictions, even with those who are not involved in 
agriculture, because we are very much involved in that a rea. What is also important is that this 
workshop has allowed delegates from missions to participate in the first  introductory session , which 
looked at the overall framework for QR  notifications. Given such great efforts to organize this 
workshop , a possib le suggestion for future is to have a larger room , so that Geneva -based delegates 
can also participate in the entir e workshop. The Dominican Republic does not think that it would be 
a major cost for the Secretariat in this case, because there would be no n eed to support developing 
country delegates with travel. The Dominican Republic would appreciate this suggestion be ing taken 
into account.  
5.136.   The representative of Nepal  indicated the following:  
5.137.   Nepal thanks the Market Access team  and the Institute for Traini ng and Technical 
Cooperation ( ITTC) for organizing this important workshop. For the Capital -based officials, the 
workshop was important as it allowed them to learn about the WTO  provisions on quantitative 
restrictions. The morning session of the first  day, which was attended by Geneva -based delegates , 
was also useful to understand quantitative restrictions. The experience -sharing session was quite 
helpful to understand other practices, especially the part on the coordination among agencies. Nepal 
would like to ask the WTO to continue this type of activity in the future.  
5.138.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
5.139.   Thailand thanks the Chairperson and the Secretariat for organizing the workshop. Our 
participant from Capital can attest to the ben efits she received when it comes to the comments on 
her presentation, and also the presentations by other colleagues. We acknowledge that with our 
QR notification there is some room for improvement. We will use the advice that we have received 
from the wor kshop to improve our QR notifications. Thailand would also like to thank the Secretariat 
for the advice that was provided to us in preparation for the QR  notification workshop.  
5.140.   The Committee took note  of the report by the Secretariat, the Chairperson's rep ort on the 
QR workshop, and the statements made.  
6  SITUATION OF SCHEDULES OF WTO MEMBERS ( G/MA/W/23/REV.19 ) 
6.1.  The Chairpe rson drew Members' attention to a new revision of the report by the Secretariat 
describing the current situation of Members' WTO  Schedules of concessions  that had been circulated 
in document  G/MA/W/23/Rev.19 . The full version of the Secretariat's  report  and prese ntation  was 
available in document  RD/MA/11 3, and had been uploaded on eAgenda  prior to  the meeting.  
6.2.  The Secretariat  (Ms Roberta Lascari) reported the following:  
6.3.  The document  "Situation of Schedules of WTO  Members" ( G/MA/W/23/Rev.19 ) provides an 
overview of the  procedures that have been undertaken by Members to rectify or modify their 
Schedules of concessions.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  6.4.  As of 13  April 2023, Members have submitted 699 notifications pursuant to the Decision of 
26 March  1980 on Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions 
(the "1980  Procedures") .13 This figure has not changed since the circulation of the report.  
6.5.  Of the current 699  procedures, th e vast majority o f changes to  WTO Schedules 
(497 procedures) were the result of the different HS  transposition s. When the HS  transposition files 
are approved by this Committee in the HS  multilateral review process, the subsequent step is to 
submit them under the 1980  Proce dures so that the changes can be certified. Other types of changes 
include the results of sectoral negotiations, such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), 
the ITA  Expansion, and the Agreement on Pharmaceuticals (Pharma ), which also have to underg o 
the 1980  Procedures for their certification and formal inclusion in the Schedules of concessions. 
There are also other type s of changes that need to be introduced in the Schedules from time to time , 
at the request of Members, or also as a result of negot iations that Members undertake in the context 
of GATT  Article  XXVIII negotiations (see Agenda Item  7). 
6.6.  Despite the high number of procedures, the vast majority of them ( 665 procedures ) have been  
concluded and  certified (i.e. 95%) , while  34 procedures are ongoing.  Leaving aside those procedures 
that are currently within  the three -month period for review (12  procedures) , and the four procedures 
that have been withdrawn, there remain 18 procedures which are pending either because of existing 
reservations raised on these procedures by some Members ( 15 procedures) , or because the Member 
proposing the change ha s not yet completed its domestic procedures ( three  procedures).  
6.7.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat 's report.  
7  REPORT BY THE SECRETARI AT ON THE STATUS OF RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII OF THE GATT  1994  (G/MA/W/123/REV.10 ) 
7.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention t o a new revision of the "Factual Report on the Status 
of Renegotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994"  that had been circulated in 
document  G/MA/W/123/Rev.10 . The full version of the Secretariat's  report  and prese ntation  was 
available in document  RD/MA/114 , and had been uploaded on eAgenda  prior to the meeting.  
7.2.  The Secretariat  (Ms Roberta Lascari) indicated the following:  
7.3.  Under this agenda item I will make a brief report on the s tatus of renegotiations under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994. The revision prepared by the Secretariat  provides an overview of 
all the renegotiations which have be en undertaken by WTO  Members pursuant to Article  XXVIII of 
the GATT  1994 since the establishment of the WTO , from 1995 to 2023 . 
7.4.  As of 11 April 2023,  Members have undertaken  a total of  49 renegotiations, which are at 
different stages. Since the last report , in 2022, two  more procedures have been concluded and 
certified. Therefore, t he overall status of Article  XXVIII renegotiations is as follows . The re were 
nine procedures that were initially notified by the Members but were subsequently withdrawn . There 
was one request to initiate a renegotiation under paragraph  4 of Article  XXVIII of the GATT that has 
not been approved  by the C ouncil for Trade Goods (CTG) . There are nine  renegotiations that remain 
ongoing , and 30 that have been concluded.  
7.5.  Of the 30  conclude d renegotiations: four  renegotiations have been concluded (step  1), and the 
draft changes to the Schedules have been submitted by the relevant Members under the 
1980 Procedures (step  2), but they have not yet been certified . The remaining 26 renegotiation 
procedures are considered to be fully completed since the negotiations have been concluded and the 
modifications to the WTO  Schedules have been certified  by the Director -General under the 
1980 Procedures.  
7.6.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat report.  
 
13 BISD 275/25 . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  8  TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were three  issues listed under this agenda item. The 
first issue concerned the updated list of all notifications and communications rel ating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic , which had been submitted by Members to this Committee as of 1 1 April 2023, 
as contained in document  G/MA/W/157/Rev.6 . The second  item concerned the revised summary 
report on export restrictions and prohibitions and trade -easing measures relating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic, which had been circulated in document  G/MA/W/168/Rev.4 . The third  item 
related to a communication submitted by Niger , which had been circulated in 
document  G/MA/W/183 . He suggested  that the Committee consider the three sub-items together . 
8.2.  The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) indicated the following:  
8.3.  The update w ith respect to the summary report o f export restrictions  and trade -easing 
measures relating to the COVID -19 pandemic will be brief. As background, from the Secretariat side, 
in early March  2023, we reached out to all those Member s that, according to our information, still 
had COVID -19 export restrictions in force , either formally notified or also based on information from 
the WTO's trade monitoring exercise . We then encouraged these Members to verify whether these 
measures were in fact still in force, and if not, to notify the termination of these measures.  As a 
result, Australia notified the termination of an export restriction. The Secretariat would like to 
encourage all Members that still have export restrictions in place  to notify any changes to those 
measures  so that the report can be further updated . 
8.4.  The report contains no change in the number of export restrictions . However, three measures 
have been phased out , and one  measure has been extended  since the previous versi on of the report.  
As a result of the COVID -19 experience -sharing sessions by LDCs, Niger sent a unilateral 
communication on trade-easing measures, which had been circulated as document  G/MA/W/183 . 
Overall, there are only very minor changes. Based on  the inform ation in the report, 25  export 
restrictions are still in force , and there is a slight change with regard to the status of the measures 
since the autumn  of 2022. 24%  appear still to be in force, 33% have been notified as terminated , 
and 43% appear to have e xpired. For the trade -easing measures, there has only been one  additional 
communication. Hence, overall numbers have not change d significantly , and no detailed update on 
this section  can be reported . 
8.5.  The Chair person  thanked  those Members that ha d contacted the Secretariat about  updating 
the information contained in the document, which was very important in terms of having  an accurate 
picture of the ir situation . He also remind ed those that ha d not yet done so to notify the te rmination 
of their COVID -19 measures.  
8.6.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.7.  The European Union  would like to t hank the Secretariat for the update with the latest 
developments. Just a few general comments to highlight how useful it has been to have this regular 
reporting , throughout the crisis, about the status and character of the measures taken in response 
to the pandemic. We acknowledge  the fact  that this reporting was not really complete because it 
was based on measures that w ere notified or submitted in the context of the trade monitoring 
exercise , and also that there were a number of measures that were not notified or submitted for 
information ; but at least we had a basis for discuss ion, and that was welcome. Since the beginn ing 
of the pandemic, there were calls for trade restrictive measures to be proportionate, targeted , and 
time-bound , and I think that this reporting was very useful to incentivize Members to check how we 
had translated these principles in practice , and to assess whether, and how , we had done so. We 
also reiterate our appreciation to Members who voluntarily notified  or informed  the Committee about 
a measure that facilitated trade , or continue s to facilitate trade, because I understand from the 
report that a n umber of the measures have been made permanent , and this is also a useful source 
of inspiration. We do believe that this kind of reporting will assist Members in case of similar future 
crises. 
8.8.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.9.  Just to a dd my voice to the comments from the EU. This has been a very good ongoing exercise. 
I will pick up on the Secretariat's  point,  namely that I appreciate  the active outreach to delegations G/MA/M/78  
 
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  that at least had notified the ir export restrictions , but had not ye t notified the ir termination . I think 
it is useful for the Secretariat to remind Members of the fact  that the notification exists , and when 
there are updates to provide . It is also useful to remind delegates that the QR  Decision  from 2012  
(G/L/59/Rev.1 ) actually calls for  Members to notify  changes to  a quantitative restriction  as soon as 
possible , but not later than six months from their entry into force. I draw our attention to one of the 
next agenda items , regarding lessons learned from COVID -19, which was to keep trading partners,  
as much and as quickly as possible, up to date  on the measures that Members were  taking, especially 
in the context  of a crisis. It was a good  reminder for us to keep track of , and review , what measures 
we have taken , and when the re are  changes to them.  
8.10.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.11.   I wanted to thank the Secretariat  on the outreach regarding our notification , which was a 
temporary measure around rapid ant igen tests . Just for the record, that measure was adopted in 
January  2022 and withdrawn on 17  April 2022. It was our intention to notify that cessation , and this 
was an oversight on our part. I would also like to thank Canada for its earlier comments aroun d that 
notification. I would encourage others that have any notification that has been revoked to advise 
the Committee accordingly.  
8.12.   The Chair person  proposed that, g iven the current situation of these measures, this report 
would only be update d if the Secretariat received additional  information from Members about the 
measures contained in Annex  1 of the document.  
8.13.   The Committee  took note of the report by the Secretariat , the communication by Niger,  and 
the statements made . 
9  REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERS ON ON THE EXPERIENCE -SHARING SESSIONS IN RELATION 
TO TRADE IN COVID -19 RELATED GOODS  (G/MA/409 ) 
9.1.  The Chairperson  reporte d to the Committee on the recent developments in the Committee's 
activities in the area of trade in COVID -19-related goods and possible next steps. He recalled that 
the full version of the report ha d been circulated in document  JOB/MA/161 , and that it had also been 
included on the eAgenda. Therefore, in the interest s of time, he only highl ighted a few elements of 
the report.  
9.2.  On 9 February  2023, he had  invited all Members to informal open -ended consultations with the 
objective of hearing Members' views on : (i) the next steps in relation to the Committee's work on 
trade in COVID -19-related go ods, including on lessons learned ; and ( ii) on whether the Committee 
should engage in additional technical dialogues, either through experience -sharing sessions or other 
formats, on other topics and, if so, which. The consultations were attended by more than 
50 delegations , including with the active participation of several least developed countries (LDC s).14 
9.3.  The main outcome of these consultations was the request by LDC  Members to organi ze an 
additional experience -sharing session on trade in COVID -19-related goods , focusing on their own 
experience, which took place on 24  March  2023.15 The following topics were addressed at the 
session: (i)  the identification of COVID -19 essential goods; (ii)  measures used by LDCs to ease trade 
in these goods; (iii)  LDCs' practices and experiences with respect to export restrictions; and 
(iv) lessons learned from the pandemic. In addition, the second  part of the session focused on 
Members' reflections across the entire series of experience -sharing sessions , and the mai n lessons 
learned.  Eight LDC Members participated as speakers at the session to share their national 
experiences on these topics , and eleven  additional Members took the floor to contribute to the 
discussions.  
9.4.  The Chairperson thanked the representatives from these Members for enriching the 
Committee's discussions on this important topic. He also echoed the general sentiment that the 
CMA experience -sharing sessions on trade in COVID -19-related goods ha d been very  useful for 
Members to better understand how they had collectively reacted during such an  unprecedented 
 
14 The Chair's follow -up email to the informal consultations on 9  February  2023 was circulated in 
document  RD/MA/110 . 
15 https://www.wto.org/ english/news_e/news23_e/mark_24mar23_e.htm . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  situation , and also how they could do better in the future, both as individual Members and as an 
Organization .16 
9.5.  Regarding next steps concerning the Committee's work on trade in COVID -19-related goods , 
he noted that  Members recogni zed that the experience -sharing sessions had been thorough , and 
had helped them to identify best practices. They also appreciated the flexible and bottom -up 
approach used by the CMA in conducting these sessions. At the same time, some delegations pointed 
to the fact that this workstream was quite demanding , and suggested to make better use of the 
formal and informal meetings to hold similar discussions in the fu ture. 
9.6.  The Chairperson  encourage d interested Members to continue to share information with the 
Committee on the actions t hat they ha d taken in response to the pandemic, for example through 
voluntary written submissions , or by including specific agenda items  in either formal or informal 
meetings of the CMA. This was a continuous process from which they could  all learn something new 
that c ould be applied in the case of future crises.  
9.7.  Regarding  the document on lessons learned, the Chairperson recall ed that, dur ing the informal 
consultations of 9  February  2023, several Members were of the view that this document provided a 
good reflection  of the discussions that had taken place during the experience -sharing sessions , and 
that it reflected the practices that Members might want to consider in the event of future 
emergencies. There was also wide support among Members for convert ing the note by the 
Secretariat into a document by the Committee that could be used for future  reference.  
9.8.  He recalled that, o n this basis, at the last experience -sharing session of 24  March  2023, he had  
proposed that the Secretariat update the document with the inputs shared by the LDCs , and use a 
written procedure to adopt and circulate the docume nt on lessons learned as a Committee document.  
On 31 March  2023, the Chairperson  had emailed the draft document on lessons learned to all 
Members , with a deadline for comments of 14 April 2023. He informed the Committee that, b efore 
the deadline, one  Membe r had provided written comments , which had been  incorporated by the 
Secretariat in to a revised version of the document, which had been emailed to Members on 
17 April 2023. He recalled that , in that email , it had been  indicated that, in the absence of objec tions 
by 19  April 2023, the document would be circulated as a Committee document.  
9.9.  The Chairperson  reported that , since no objections had been  received on the revised draft, on 
20 April 2023 the document on lessons learned had been  circulated in document  G/MA/409 , as 
agreed by Members. Following the circulation of the document, t he Chairperson informed the 
Committee that one  Member had sent additional comments on the document. Since this was a living 
document that was intended  to be updated based on contributions from Members, the Chairperson 
asked the Secretariat to prepare a revise d draft with the  proposed changes, which w ould be shared 
with Members , for their consideration , after this meeting.  
9.10.   The Chairperson c ongratulate d all Members for their active engagement throughout this very 
significant process , and for the document on lessons learned, whi ch contain ed a rich set of 
information and practices that w ould certainly prove useful in supporting Members' response to this 
pandemic and to future emergencies.  
9.11.   Finally, with respect to the additional technical dialogues to be held by the Committee on ne w 
topics, the Chairperson observed that Members were of the view that the flexible approach that had 
been used by the CMA in discussing COVID -19-related issues had worked well , and could be 
replicated in other areas, provided that they were of relevance to  the Committee's work. In this 
regard, he recall ed that some preliminary topics had been  suggested by Members and compiled in 
documents  RD/MA/109  and RD/MA/110 . He therefore  suggested  that Members further consider 
these proposals and then discuss , at the Committee's next informal meeting , under which topic they 
would like to undertake additional technical dialogues.  
9.12.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicate d the following:  
 
16 The summary reports of all the sessions are available in 
document  JOB/MA/152 /Add.1 -JOB/MA/152/Add.5 . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  9.13.   The United Kingdom welcomes the Chairperson's report and expresses how valuable this 
process has been. The stakeholder session last November , and the recent session with LDCs on 
24 March , exemplifies the wide range of engagement this exerc ise has received throughout.  
9.14.   The creation of the Committee document from the Secretariat's lessons learned report is, in 
the UK's view, a key success of this process. We hope that, in time, this document can act as a 
playbook of best practices, which summa rizes key reflections for use as a reference point for future 
pandemics and crises. The UK also wishes to reiterate the importance of continuing to reflect on 
lessons learn t from the pandemic at the WTO. There are real -world practical implications to 
condu cting this work. The socio -economic impacts of the pandemic were, particularly among 
developing countries, devastating. When a future crisis hits, this work will help us to address shocks 
to global trade at the multilateral level by coordinating more effec tively through the WTO. Because 
of its success, we would welcome the CMA process being shared across the WTO as a model for 
pandemic lessons learnt work, and to potentially utilize when another crisis emerges.  
9.15.   We look forward to hearing and reflecting on any further ideas that Members may have on 
lessons learnt from the pandemic. Moving ahead, the UK would be interested in a more 
forward -looking discussion on supporting sustainable supply chains , taking into account 
crisis-preparedness more broadly, and aga in incorporating the crucial development angle. Given the 
unstable global trading environment we are all facing, in an interconnected world, this really does 
feel like an area that could benefit from further technical and expert analysis through this Commi ttee. 
Therefore, we welcome the input from other delegations on potential thematic topics of mutual 
interest , including on sustainable supply chains. The UK will continue to reflect  on this , and we look 
forward to continuing that conversation.  The UK thank s the Chairperson, the previous Chairperson , 
and the Secretariat for facilitating this process and taking forward actions on the important issues 
raised.  
9.16.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
9.17.   Colombia would like to highlight this collective effort , involving a very high level of interaction 
between Members, the WTO  Secretariat , and other international organizations. Colombia 's 
understanding is that this work, which involved reviewing the trade -related rules adopted by 
Members in re sponse to the COVID -19 pandemic, extended over almost two  years. As part of this 
work, experience -sharing sessions were held and the Secretariat compiled the document you have 
mentioned, which compiles  the lessons learn ed, the measures taken , and the pract ices of some 
Members. We hope that all this work will serve as a reference point and be useful for future crises 
or pandemics.  
9.18.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
9.19.   The United States thinks that the COVID -19 experience -sharing se ssions have been really 
successful and helpful in identifying best practices that we should consider if we are ever faced with 
another global pandemic. We are glad to have taken part in them.  
9.20.   The Committee took note  of the Chairperson's report, the adoptio n of the document on lessons 
learned from the experience -sharing session s on trade in COVID -19 goods , as circulated in 
document  G/MA/409 , and the statements made . 
10  MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS  
10.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that there  were two sub-items for consideration by the Committee  
under this agenda item . The first  sub-item was about the CMA  report to the CTG  on the 
WTO response to the pandemic. The second  sub-item was about ongoing discussions on improving 
the functioning of the Committee , and included the communication from Argentina, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay,  and Uruguay circulated in document  JOB/MA/158/Rev.1 . He suggested  that the 
Committee consider the two  sub-items separately.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  10.1  WTO  Response  to the Pandemic  (G/L/1459 ) 
10.2.   The Chairperson  recalled that , on 24 October  2022, the Chairperson of the C TG had requested 
the 14  Chairpersons of its subsidiary bodies to prepare two  reports, under their own responsibility 
and with the assistance of the Secretariat.  
10.3.   The first  report related to the Committee's work in relation to the COVID -19 pandemic. He 
recalled that, w ith a view to  ensuring transparency , and to avoid any possible error, the draft version 
of this report had been circulated to Members on 23  November  2022, with a week for comments. 
Since no comments had been received by the deadline, he had submitted the CMA  report on the 
WTO response to the pandemic to the CTG on 1  December  2022, in document  G/L/1459 . He also 
recalled that , together with the other Committee Chairs, he had taken  the opportunity to present 
this report at the informal CTG  meeting of 31  January  2023.  
10.4.   The Chairperson  noted that , since the report had been submitted at the end of 2022, it did 
not contain information about the Committee's most recent work in relation to COVID -19. For 
example, there was no reference to the sixth  experience -sharing session that had taken  place in 
March  2023, or to the Committee document on lessons learned. Therefore, in light of the impo rtance 
of these developments, and under the guidance of the CTG  Chair, he informed Members that he 
intended  to update his report in document  G/L/1459  to reflect these new developments . As was 
done with the report's previous version, he would  circulate a draft to Members for their comment 
before submitting  the revised report to the CTG.  
10.5.   It was so agreed . 
10.2  Improving the Functioning of the Committee on Market Access  (G/L/1460 ; 
G/C/W/824/Rev.1 ) - Communication from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and 
Uruguay ( JOB/MA/158/R ev.1) 
10.6.   The Chairperson  recalled that the second  report that he  had prepared with the assistance of 
the Secretariat , at the request of the Chairperson of the CTG , had been a report describing the 
current functioning of the CMA. A draft  version of this  report had also been  emailed to Members for 
comments on 23  November  2022 and, since no comments had been  received, it had been submitted 
to the CTG for its consideration , and had been circulated in document  G/L/1460 . The Chairperson 
had also presented the main highlights of this report at the CTG 's informal meeting of 
31 January  2023.  
10.7.   He recalled that, at the informal meeting of the Committee that had taken  place on 
21 February  2023, following January's  CTG meeting , he had invited Member s to reflect on whether 
the CMA should begin a process for discuss ing improvements to its functioning and, if so, what areas 
should be improved. A number of ideas had been raised at the meeting, and he had been  asked by 
Members to compile them in a documen t that could be used as a reference for future discussions.  
10.8.   He informed Members that, o n 9 March  2023, the Chairperson of the CTG had sent a 
communication to the Chairpersons of the CTG's subsidiary bodies asking them to organize 
discussions on how to impr ove the functioning of their committee with a view to allowing Members 
to identify possible areas for improvement, and taking into account the comparative matrix that had 
been prepared by the Secretariat . On this basis, on 4  April 2023, he had  sent an emai l to Members 
with a preliminary list of issues that had been raised by Members on how to improve the functioning 
of the CMA , and asked them to provide additional inputs by 19  April 2023.  
10.9.   The Chairperson recalled that a revised version of the preliminary li st, including inputs 
received , had been  circulated before the meeting in document  JOB/MA/162 , and that it was also 
available on eAgenda. The list also reflect ed the communication from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Uruguay on the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies, circulated in 
document  JOB/MA/158/Rev.1 , which ha d been included on the agenda of this formal meeting at the 
request of the co -sponsors of this document. He clarified that t his list was not exhaustive and c ould 
be updated as necessary.  
10.10.   The Chairperson further highligh ted that , as had been mentioned by many delegations on 
previous occasions, the CMA ha d already taken action on a number of issues that had been identified G/MA/M/78  
 
- 30 - 
 
  through this process. Indeed, the CMA was a committee that was constantly improving its working 
proce dures , and appear ed to be in a relatively good position.  
10.11.   In this regard, he indicated some of the areas where the Committee had already taken  action 
with respect to the issues identified in document  JOB/MA/162 . For example, under  item 1 
"Assistance to delegates", paragraph  (a), the Secretariat had already h eld regular introductory 
sessions on its functioning for delegates, both in Geneva and in Capitals . The presentation that the 
Secretariat ha d used in the past for these sessions could be found in document  RD/MA/89 . 
10.12.   Under item  3, "Work procedures", with respect to the Annotated Agenda , he recalled that 
the CMA ha d been using an annotated agenda  for many years. The la test version used for this 
meeting had been  circulated in document  JOB/MA/159 , and included  direct weblinks to t he 
WTO Trade Concerns Database for those concerns that had been previously raised in other meetings, 
so that Members c ould have access to the full record of past discussions.  
10.13.   Under item  3.2, "informal meeting", he observed that the Secretariat ha d also cir culated 
follow -up emails by the Chairperson with a document symbol, as suggested by Members at the last 
informal meeting. The most recent had been  circulated as document  ICN/MA/9/Add.1 . Under  
item 3.3, "Other", paragraph  (d), the Secretariat had already includ ed hyperlinks in all the 
document s circulated by the CMA.  Finally, u nder item  4, "Digital tools ", para graph  (d), he noted that  
the CMA had alread y use d the official WTO  e-Registration system for contacting delegates.  
10.14.    This being said, he noted that there were certainly  areas where the CMA could  improve its 
functioning. On the other hand, the list also contain ed issues that seem ed to be cross -cuttin g, or 
that applied to the Organization as a whole, which might deserve a more horizontal discussion, as 
well as issues that depend ed on actions by Members rather than the Secretariat.  
10.15.   Due to the long agenda of the formal meeting , he suggested to organize substantive 
discussions on this topic at the next informal meeting of the Committee , which had been scheduled 
to take  place on 13  June 2023, so that Members could have more time to consider the list, propose 
new ideas, and have a more thorough discussion under each item.  
10.16.   The representative of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
10.17.   Uruguay thanks the  Chair person  for including this item on the agenda and for presenting a 
preliminary  list of issues for discussion in this Committee.  I would like to recall that , at the last 
meeting of the CTG, the delegation of Brazil  had indicated that they wished to co -sponsor this 
document.  
10.18.   Uruguay recognizes that these discussions will take place in informal mode, and  that this 
Committee has made progress as regards many of the issues  identified. Nevertheless, the 
co-sponsors request ed the inclusion of the communication  circulated in  document  JOB/CTG/21 , so 
as to make Members aware of it, and have duly submitted the document for consideration by the 
Chair of this Committee.  
10.19.   The communication was drawn up on the basis of the matrix presented by the Secretariat 
to the CTG (G/C/W/824 ), which includes reports submitted by the 14  subsidiary bodies. It identifies 
challenges that could hinder the work of delegations and thus hamper progress on issues in what is 
a consensus -based Organization . The aforementioned communication  seeks to create a common 
dialogue in the various subsidiary  bodies in order to align their practices and avoid the risk of 
increasing disparities in their working procedures . In this regard, in the context of the extensive 
discussions that are taking place at the CTG, both in informal and formal mode s, we understa nd that 
there seems to be support for discuss ing proposals in certain areas in the subsidiary bodies (see 
document  RD/CTG/19 ). These include, for example, issues relating to : (i) assistance to delegates in 
Capitals and in Geneva ; (ii) improvements in the planning and organization of meetings , and in the 
working procedures ; and (iii)  improvements  in the preparatio n of the agenda s of meetings . These 
are issues that , as has been mentioned, have already been implemented , to a great extent,  by the 
CMA. 
10.20.   We, the co -sponsors, will continue to closely follow and actively participate in the 
continuation of these discussions  at the Committee's next informal meeting.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  10.21.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
10.22.   We welcome the paper submitted by Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay,  and Uruguay, 
which focuses on improving the functioning of the C MA. We have ourselves made similar suggestions 
in various forums , including the CTG and this Committee.  We would prefer that the CMA meet in 
informal mode and take up each Member 's suggestion individually. This approach will give the 
Members an opportunity to discuss and debate each point , and help to develop consensus.  
10.23.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
10.24.   I support the proposal  to hold informal consultations to go through the list. As I also sit on 
the CTG, and if I understood correctly  from the last CTG meeting , there would be some sort of 
communication coming  from the CTG  Chair to the subsidiary body Chairs. I think it would be useful 
for CMA  delegates who do not sit on the CTG to be made aware of the results of the CTG meeting 
held earlier in April , and the document it stemmed from, about  some of the trial changes that we 
are working through in the Council. Not all of them will be applicable to the CMA , obviously, but it 
would be useful for  CMA delegates to know what is happening in the Council when we consider  how 
to improve the functioning of the CMA when we meet in June . 
10.25.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
10.26.   Paraguay welcomes that the C MA is one of the best functioning subsidiary bodies of the CTG, 
and of the WTO in general , and that it is already implementing  many of the issues identified in the 
list. 
10.27.   However, I wish to reiterate that Paraguay,  and other delegations, such as those that have 
co-sponsored  the document presented today by Uruguay, place great value on aligning , as much as 
possible, the procedures and documents relating to regular Committee work , while taking into 
account the specificities of the various subsidiary bodies . Efficient and appropriate procedures are 
useful , and what we aspire to, but if they are ver y different to those of other subsidiary bodies , or 
those of the CTG, this still poses an additional difficulty for delegates covering several committees.  
10.28.   With regard to trade concerns and the use of eAgenda , I have a personal suggestion for 
Members. As it is difficult to follow -up on trade concerns  raised  in the CMA , owing to the multiple 
concerns that deal with the same issues , it would be useful , in my view,  to try to consolidate these 
concerns under the s ame ID  number , where possible . This is what Paraguay did at this meeting w ith 
a trade concern that we submitted. Please do not misunderstand me . As you are aware , Paraguay 
is the first  delegation  to complain  about,  and reject , any mandatory element that re stricts Members' 
freedom to submit their concerns as they see fit . This is simply a suggestion for  consideration by 
those  Members  that submit trade concerns, in order to keep better track of the same concern over 
time, and also to have a clearer understand ing of which Members raise or support a specific concern . 
For example, in the case of Paraguay , I noticed that my delegation had to make several interventions 
under different agenda items in previous meetings , and this makes it difficult to understand the 
position of Paraguay on a specific concern.  
10.29.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
10.30.   The United Kingdom would very much support India's suggestion regarding covering these 
issues individually in a  next CMA informal  meeting . We would also like  to reiterate our appreciation 
to the co -sponsors of document  JOB/MA/158/R ev.1 for a really pragmat ic paper. Also, we reiterate 
our thanks to the LDC  Group for what are, in some  cases, complementary ideas reflected in 
document  JOB/GC/223 /Rev.1 . 
10.31.   Many ideas on the table have been talked through already during some really productive 
CMA informal discussions, and we commend the Chair and Secretariat for collating the various ideas 
for ease of consideration.  As said before , the UK is approaching this work through the dual lens  of 
efficiency and inclusivity. We think that , the more inclusive this Organization is, the richer the 
dialogue will be , which  will be  to everyone 's benefit.  
10.32.   In terms of th e overview from the Chair , and reflecting on the discussions across 
Committees, we wanted firstly to underline how impressed we are by the CMA 's functioning already . G/MA/M/78  
 
- 32 - 
 
  To cherry -pick just a few examples of first -rate CMA  processes, the UK would  highlight:  (i) the 
circulation of rapid, concise and neutral reports following informal  meetings . These are exceptionally 
useful for transparency, especially for those who cannot attend. While the Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade ( TBT Committee ) does likewise, we would  like to see this practice extended ; (ii) the 
use of the eAgenda, to facilitate the sharing of statements and help delegations provide input to the 
Secretariat to assist with the minutes. Again , we think that this could be helpful across other 
WTO bodies ; and (iii) the digital tools (including the QR  Database) , as well as the brilliant proactive 
training, the likes of which we have seen this week. This should be an enduring example of best 
practice across the WTO.  
10.33.   In terms of preparation for the upcoming June informal  meeting , the UK has just circulated 
document  JOB/MA/163 , which represents our views on t he functioning of the CMA specifically, 
including on possible ideas for improvement. It builds on the UK CTG Communication as circulated 
in document  JOB/CTG/26 . 
10.34.   Our paper also makes some reflections on CMA  Committee culture. Here we wanted to 
mention how imp ressed we were with the efficacy of the most recent CTG. In fact, we were so 
inspired by the approach of other delegations in that meeting of the CTG that we redrafted several 
STC interventions on the spot to shorten them. With such succinctness in mind , I will end my 
statement there.  
10.35.   The representative of Chile indicated the following:  
10.36.   Chile would like to thank Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay for the 
document,  as we consider that this has a number of useful elements that could guide  our discussion s 
towards  strengthening the work of this Committee , bearing in mind  its own operation and specificity . 
Even if the objective is not to have formal horizontal procedures for all the bodies, we consider that 
the Committee can identify areas where its functioning  can be improved. I t would  therefore  be 
interesting to look at those  practices that have proven t o be useful  in other committees  to see if 
they can be relevant to the work carried out in this Committee.  
10.37.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
10.38.   We think this is a helpful compilation of ideas and issues to help improve the functi oning of 
the CMA.  We are open to considering changes both large and small. For example, re -ordering the 
agenda to differentiate between "new" STCs and "previously raised" STCs could be a big change in 
the operation of these meetings.  
10.39.   On the other hand, sma ll changes already being implemented are impactful: my colleagues 
in Capital noted that the annotated agenda  for today 's meeting included direct links to the trade 
concerns database for many STCs. Being able to quickly reference past discussions on each tr ade 
concern helped streamline the preparation of my instructions for the meeting.  The United States 
remains ready to work with Members and the Secretariat to implement meaningful improvements.  
10.40.   The Chairperson  confirmed that the Committee  will continue its discussions on this topic at 
its next informal meeting , on 13  June, and invited  Members to share their  ideas in writing for 
inclusion on the list.  
10.41.   The Committee took note  of the Chairperson 's report ; the Communication from Argentina, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay,  and Uruguay ( JOB/MA/158/Rev.1 ); and the statements made.  
11  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES ( ID 46 ) – STATEMENTS BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
11.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union and the United States . 
11.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.3.   To recall , on 14  January  2019, Angola published Presidential Decree  No. 23/19 in its official 
journal. One  core element of the Decree is a set of quantitative restrictions and import licensing G/MA/M/78  
 
- 33 - 
 
  requirements on a list of various products.  In view of the lack of progr ess on this issue, including at 
the bilateral level , the European Union underscores once again its concerns about the compatibility 
of Presidential Decree  No. 23/19 with WTO  rules.  The European Union strongly urges Angola to 
review the relevant measures in  order to ensure their compliance with WTO  rules.  
11.4.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
11.5.   Despite raising our concerns for seven  consecutive meetings of the C MA, the United States 
has not seen tangible progress on this measure and will be raising our concerns with Angola's 
Presidential Decree No. 23/19 for the eighth and final time in this Committee.  
11.6.   While the United States has appreciated Angola's past engagement on this issue through the 
US Embassy in Luanda , and through Angola's consideration of revisions to this decree, we have 
failed to see any concrete changes since first  raising this measure in November  2019.  US exporters 
remain concerned by the un certainty this decree creates in the Angolan market, particularly for 
perishable goods.  
11.7.   The United States once again urges Angola to either repeal or revise this decree to address 
Member concerns and ensure that this decree is in compliance with WTO  rules and obligations. We 
remain willing to work with Angola to resolve our concerns.  
11.8.   The representative of  Angola indicated the following:  
11.9.   Angola maintain s the same position a s at the Committee on Import Licensing last year. Angola  
does not apply restrictive me asures and the objective of Angola is  only to diversify exports.  
11.10.   These are longer -term considerations.  Angola is still working to gradually change this 
situation. Angola has tried to promote an increase in domestic production , and to stimulate the 
developm ent of national  products. Nevertheless, Angola is firmly commit ted to transparency , and to 
fulfilling its WTO  commitments. Our hope is to abide by all of the WTO  Agreements. In this regard, 
we try to be more and more transparent. We would like to reinforce that our country has great 
potential. In spite of the overall social challenges, including  the need for qualified human resources. 
More than just importing , we would like to be your partner.  For this reason, we would like to invite 
you to invest in our country. We still have some challenges in the agricultural , economic, educational, 
industrial, mining and technology sector s; indeed , we have many challenges, and this is why we are 
trying to tel l you that we do not restrict trade, but rather, we are trying to grow our economy.  
11.11.   Next year, Angola will revise all of its commercial decrees and the scope of the revision of 
its commercial polic ies, and we are ready to provide the data that you need to prove Angola's  
imports. We are not importing the same volume, the same quantity ; rather , we are trying to be 
more diversified in terms of exports. This is our focus now, but we are here to give any declaration 
that you need for this . 
11.12.   The Committee took not e of the statements made.  
12  AUSTRALIA – MATURATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED ALCOHOL (ID 94) – 
STATEMENT BY BRAZIL  
12.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Brazil.  
12.2.   The representative of Brazil  indicated the following:  
12.3.   Brazil makes reference to STC 636 of the TBT  Committee  regarding Australian Customs Notice 
No. 2007/19 on technical requirements on the importation of alcoholic beverages . This regulation 
imposes  a minimum period of  two years of m aturation for imp ortation  of sugar cane alcohol 
beverages , including cachaça from Brazil . This  technical requirement has no exceptions and is not 
linked to any sanitary standard applicable to the Brazilian cachaça, which creates several difficulties 
for Bra zilian exporters to access the Australian market. Although Brazil has raised this STC in the 
TBT Committee nine  times , starting in May  2020, Australia has failed to update the relevant 
legislation. The absence of a timely and concrete response to the conce rn raised by Brazil in the 
TBT Committee , and the maintenance of the two -year maturation requirement for sugarcane G/MA/M/78  
 
- 34 - 
 
  alcoholic beverages constitutes a ban on the importation of cachaça , and therefore a quantitative 
restriction under the terms of Article  XI:1 of the GATT . 
12.4.   Brazil acknowledge s that the Australian border force has explored a possible update in the 
Customs Act  1901, to include a list of exceptions under section  105A, without eliminating the 
maturation requirement.  
12.5.   After more than three years of discussion s, there is an absence of evolution in the adoption 
of the new regulation. Brazil has therefore decided to raise this STC under the C MA, as the Brazilian 
exporters of cachaça are facing a quantitative restriction to have access to the Australian market. 
This leads us to pose a question , namely, does Australia intend to notify its current regulation on 
the maturation requirement as a QR under the relevant notification obligations in this Committee ? 
Brazil thanks Australia for the bilateral meeting that we had prior to this Committee meeting. Brazil 
is ready to engage with Australia on achieving a timely and concrete solution to this concern.  
12.6.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
12.7.   We acknowledge Brazil's interest in Australia's revi ew of maturation requirements for certain 
imported alcohol products. We acknowledge that this is a matter that Brazil has raised on a number 
of occasions in the TBT  Committee. We thank Brazil for their proactive engagement with Australia 
on this topic.  
12.8.   Australia established a whole -of-government working group in 2022 to consider trading 
partners' concerns regarding the maturation requirements for the importation of certain alcohol 
products, and the domestic maturation requirements of brandy, whisky , and rum . The working group 
is considering the legislative framework for the importation of certain unmatured alcohol products 
under section  105A of the Customs Act. The working group will also consider whether any 
corresponding changes are required for domestic m aturation requirements. This year, in 2023, the 
working group is continuing to work through the policy and legislative complexities, and stakeholder 
views , in order to make progress on a way forward.  
12.9.   We understand Brazil's particular interest in the time -frames for any changes which may 
occur, and just to make a reference to the TBT  discussions recently, on any implications for labelling 
requirements. The Australian government will notify the TBT  Committee of any proposed legislative 
changes to section  105A of the Customs Act , and of any other changes to alcohol import 
requirements, in accordance with Australia's obligation under the TBT  Agreement.  
12.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
13  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITIO N ON 5G  EQUIPMENT 
(ID 39) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
13.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
13.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
13.3.   Without any evidence, Australia has imposed a ban on Chinese commu nications equipment 
enterprises. It has prohibited the purchase of relevant Chinese products, which seriously violates 
the WTO's fundamental principles of MFN  treatment and the General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions.  
13.4.   To date, Australia has not pr ovided a rationale for this measure. We believe that this 
discriminatory measure is inconsistent with the WTO rules. We urge Australia to bring its action in to 
line with the WTO rules, and to provide Chinese enterprises with a fair, transparent, and 
non-discriminatory business environment.  
13.5.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
13.6.   China first raised this issue elsewhere in the WTO in 2018. Since that time , Australia  has 
engaged constructively and in good faith to explain the rationale for our position. We reiterate that 
our position on 5G  networks is country -agnostic, transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory , and G/MA/M/78  
 
- 35 - 
 
  fully WTO-consistent. Australia also notes that oth er WTO  Members have made similar decisions in 
their national interest on equipment for national 5G  networks.  
13.7.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
14  CANADA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT 
(ID 79) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
14.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
14.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following : 
14.3.   Without any eviden ce, Canada has imposed a ban on Chinese communications equipment 
enterprises. It has prohibited the purchase of relevant Chinese products, which seriously violates 
the WTO's fundamental principles of MFN  treatment and the General Elimination of Quantitativ e 
Restrictions.  
14.4.   Canada has still not provided a rationale for this measure. We believe that this discriminatory 
measure is inconsistent with the WTO rules. We urge Canada to bring its action in to line with the 
WTO rules, and to provide Chinese enterprises with a fair, transparent, and non -discriminatory 
business environment.  
14.5.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
14.6.   The Government of Canada takes the security of Canadians, their data and information, and 
its telecommunications system  very seriously. Canada's decision to amend the Telecommunications 
Act was carefully considered and took into account a changing technological and global environment.  
14.7.   Canada's critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly interconnected, interdependent,  and 
integrated with cyber systems, particularly with the emergence of new technologies , such as 5G.  
14.8.   Every country, including China, has its own domestic laws and regulations on 
telecommunications. The Government of Canada is taking important steps to furt her protect 
Canada's critical infrastructure systems in a way that is consistent with Canada's WTO  commitments, 
while championing emerging technologies , such as 5G.  
14.9.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
15  CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES ( ID 58) – STATEMENT BY 
AUSTRALIA  
15.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Australia.  
15.2.   The representative of  Australia  indicated the following : 
15.3.   Australia appreciates the opportunity to update the Committee on recent developments 
relevant to this item. Australia values our mutually beneficial trade relationship with China. We are 
free trade partners through the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. We share the  benefits, as do all WTO  Members, of a stable, 
predictable and open global trading system. This is why we wish to see the removal of all the trade 
disruptive and restrictive measures that Australia has faced in recent years.  
15.4.   Members are well aware of Austr alia's concerns regarding these measures on a wide range of 
Australian products, which have been applied without adequate transparency or justification for over 
two years. These measures continue to impact a range of products.  
15.5.   Australia acknowledges recent  positive developments in our bilateral and trade relationship 
with China, including agreement to enhance dialogue at all levels on the path to resumption of 
normal trade. We have seen some trade in certain Australian products begin again, specifically coa l, 
copper ores and concentrates , and cotton. We also welcome the agreement recently reached with G/MA/M/78  
 
- 36 - 
 
  China to review its duties on Australian barley. These developments are in both Australia's and 
China's interests. Notwithstanding these developments, measures  impeding our trade in other 
commodities remain. Whil e they do, Australia will continue to raise its concerns here, and in other 
WTO bodies.  
15.6.   We look forward to continuing to work constructively with China, through the WTO and our 
Comprehensive Strategic Pa rtnership, to build on the progress made thus far.  
15.7.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following : 
15.8.   We will keep this statement short . However, we want to continue supporting Australia's 
concerns about trade restrictive measures taken by China. We appreciate that some measures have 
been lifted. This is a welcome step in the right direction,  and we hope full resolution will follow.  
15.9.   The representati ve of the European Union  indicated the following : 
15.10.   As stated in previous meetings, including the Council for Trade in Goods three  weeks ago, 
the European Union shares Australia's concerns with regard to the matters it is once again raising 
in this Committee  on China's implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures. Australia 
has reported some progress on a number of products and measures, while others , however , have 
remain ed unresolved now for a very long time.  
15.11.   In this respect, the European Unio n wishes to reiterate the points it has made before. The 
form, number , and wide -ranging effects which China's measures seem to have is in itself a cause 
for concern. Informal, unpublished , and non -transparent trade restrictions are not in line with the 
WTO's rules and spirit.  A separate problem is the alleged purpose of the measures in question, which 
seem coercive, placing those measures into incompatibility with general international law.  
15.12.   In addition , the European Union is continuing to pursue a WTO dispu te with China in relation 
to a range of measures negatively affecting its trade with China,  where the facts indicate that there 
has also been such a coercive intention.  
15.13.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following : 
15.14.   New Zealand also continues t o have systemic interest in the concerns raised by Australia 
and others, and we note and also welcome the positive updates and steps that have been taken to 
resume trade in some commodities. We will refer to our previous statements made on this matter, 
mainly on the need for transparency in trade measures , and to ensure that trade continues to take 
place predictably, efficiently , and with the least friction possible.  
15.15.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following : 
15.16.   Japan shares the concerns expressed by Australia with respect to China's trade measures, 
including trade remedy measures.  If China is implementing its trade measures in an arbitrary 
manner as reported, this runs counter to a free, fair and rules -based international trading system. 
We call on China to respond to Australia's concerns in good faith and in a timely manner.  
15.17.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following : 
15.18.   The United States takes note of Australia's intervention, including its report of recent bilateral 
developments and its concern that China continues to apply trade restrictive measures on a wide 
range of products without adequate transparency or justification.  The United States reiterates that 
it shares Australia's concerns. We remain deeply t roubled by the information provided by Australia 
and that we have heard from other, credible sources.  
15.19.   We again register systemic concern with the broad range of restrictive measures, both formal 
and informal, that China has imposed on certain Australian go ods in an abusive, arbitrary, or 
pretextual manner. In this connection, we reiterate our concern with reports that Chinese authorities 
have instructed importers not to purchase certain goods.  G/MA/M/78  
 
- 37 - 
 
  15.20.   As noted previously, China 's actions are not isolated to Austral ia. There are many instances 
of China using these harmful non -market practices against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation for 
unconnected bilateral issues, including China 's discrimination against Lithuanian goods, EU  products 
with Lithuanian content, Chi nese Taipei pineapples, and Canadian barley.  
15.21.   It is important to identify similarly coercive actions taken by China against other Members, 
as they demonstrate a broader pattern of behaviour. Specifically, China uses, or threatens to use, 
arbitrary or unjust ifiable trade actions to pressure or influence the legitimate decision -making of 
other governments.  
15.22.   China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system ", but its actions speak 
for themselves. China continues to exploit the rules -based syste m to its advantage, ignoring or 
breaking rules and exploiting gr ey zones in order to inflict harm on others to advance its geopolitical 
ends.  
15.23.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
15.24.   My delegation wishes to echo the concerns raised by Australia regarding China's 
implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures targeting a broad range of Australian 
goods.  
15.25.   China's trade measures, which appear to hamper certain Members' trade interests , and seem 
to be based on unrelate d bilateral issues, whether imposed formally or taken by the direction or 
instruction of its authorities, have systemically undermined the rule s-based multilateral trading 
system, and created a negative trade impact, not only on Australia's export s, but al so on exports 
from all other Members.  
15.26.   We therefore urge China to engage in dialogue with the relevant Members,  in good faith and 
in a constructive manner , aiming to address Members' legitimate trade concerns, and to uphold ing 
China's commitments to the pri nciples and obligations of the WTO  rules.  
15.27.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
15.28.   Canada thanks Australia for raising this issue again.  Canada remains concerned with the 
ongoing, long -term challenges posed by China's continued adoption of tra de disruptive and 
restrictive measures.  China's repeated use of discriminatory trade restrictions that are inconsistent 
with established international practices negatively impact Canad ian exports  as well . 
15.29.   Canada calls on China to facilitate technical engag ement to address and resolve these 
ongoing trade concerns.  The use of trade disruptive and restrictive measures challenges and 
destabilizes the rules -based international trading system. We encourage all WTO  Members, including 
China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  
15.30.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
15.31.   We want to reiterate that the relevant measures taken by China against some of the 
Australian products at issue aim to protect the legitimate rights and interests of domestic industries 
and t he health and safety of consumers. The business decisions made by Chinese enterprises are 
based on market and demand conditions. All these measures align with Chinese laws and 
regulations, international practices, and the China -Australia Free Trade Agreeme nt. 
15.32.   In 2022,  our bilateral trade exceeded USD 220 billion, bringing tangible benefits to Chinese 
and Australian businesses and people. We look forward to working with Australia to strengthen our 
economic and trade cooperation.  
15.33.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
16  CHINA – DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW ( ID 81) – 
STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
16.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan.  G/MA/M/78  
 
- 38 - 
 
  16.2.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
16.3.   In July of last year, China published a draft for revision of the Government Procurement Law. 
As for the scope of the revised la w, "other procurement entities" has been added in Article  2 and 
Article  12. As a result of this revision, if local content requirement s are made , including even 
procurement beyond "procurement by governmental agencies", which is stipulated in Article  III:8(a) 
of the GATT, we are concerned that this may violate GATT  Article  III:4. Therefore, the State Council's 
definition of what constitutes "other procurement entities" based on Article  12 of the revised bill 
should not be expanded without limit.  
16.4.   In addition , Article  23 of the revised bill, which clearly includes "support for domestic 
industries", adds a new local content requirement that gives preferential treatment in government 
procurement for products with a high added value ratio within China. Japan poin ts out that this can 
also not be accommodated under the government procurement exception of Article  III:8(a) of the 
GATT . 
16.5.   At the meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods in November of last year, China  stated that , 
with regard to government procurement, it treats foreign and domestic companies equally, except 
for government procurement related to national security. However, these new provisions in the draft 
amendments do not meet the standards required by the WTO  Government Procurement Agreement, 
which Chi na has already been negotiating to join for many years. Rather, these new provisions in 
fact represent a move in the opposite direction. Given this fact, we must question whether China is 
willing to meet the standards of the Government Procurement Agreemen t and other high -standard 
agreements to which it has applied for membership.  
16.6.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
16.7.   We thank Japan for its interest in this issue. Supporting domestic products through 
government procurement is a common international practice. In drafting the amendment to China's 
Government Procurement Law , we have considered other Members' relevant pract ices and 
experience.  
16.8.   China is also willing to communicate with Japan on related issues within the framework of its 
accession negotiation to the Government Procurement Agreement. China is also keen to strengthen 
its engagement with relevant Members to accel erate China's Government Procurement Agreement 
accession process.  
16.9.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
17  CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR O FFICE DEVICES ) (ID 80) – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
17.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan.  
17.2.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following :17 
17.3.   As we have pointed out at this Committee and some other bodies in the past, Japan has 
learned that the draft amendment of the Recommended National Standards in China requires as 
follows:  (i) office devices such as multifunction peripherals and printers including their components 
are required to be developed, de signed and produced in China;  and (ii)  to disclose information to 
prove that office devices and/or their components are developed, designed , and produced in China.  
17.4.   If the recommended national standards including such requirements are introduced and 
practic ally enforced as mandatory, imports of finished products, such as multifunction peripherals 
and printers, will not be permitted. Furthermore, the use of imported components will not be 
permitted, but the use of the components made in China will be forced. Thus, it will be inevitable 
that foreign products, including Japanese imports, will be treated in a discriminatory manner 
 
17 The delegation of Japan indicated at the meeting that a  longer written version of the statement would 
be provided  for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/78  
 
- 39 - 
 
  compared with domestic products. This would be inconsistent with the Article  3:4 of the GATT . In 
addition, there is also a possible vi olation of Articles  2.1 and 2.2, and Article  5.1.2 of the 
TBT Agreement, and Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement. Also, we are concerned that the 
implementation of this transfer of technology would be forced through this National Standard if the 
technology has to be provided to China for development and production within China. This could also 
violate Artic le 7.3 of China's Protocol of Accession.  
17.5.   We understand that the process for revision is under  way under the instruction of the National 
Information Security Standardization Technical Committee (TC260). At this juncture, we would like 
to request China to sh are the following information: (i) the status of consideration of the draft 
National Standard and its contents ; (ii) the schedule for its enactment, including the timing for public 
comment ; and (iii) the contents of the draft National Standard, especially the scope of application 
of the National Standard , including the definition of critical information infrastructure operators, the 
requirements for the development and production of office equipment and its components in China, 
and the provisions requiring information proving that they were developed and produced in China.  
17.6.   So far, China has not provided any convincing explanations in response to the concerns raised 
by Japan and other Members at several meetings, such as the CTG, the TRIMs Committee, and the 
TBT Committee , as well as in this Committee. At the last CMA  meeting , in October, China stated 
that, "China has no plans to revise the recommended national standards related to printers and 
copiers in the near future." However, on 30  October —only one  week later—the National Information 
Security Standardization Technical Committee (TC260) notified that the drafting process for this 
matter had been completed. Also, at the last CTG , on the third of this month, China stated that , 
"[T]he recommended standard is currently under application for revision and the notice for its 
revision application was published on 22 December  2022. So far, no objections have been received." 
On the other hand, we recognize that the announcement of 22  December  2022 was a notice of int ent 
to revise the standard in question, and that the proposed revisions themselves were not published.  
17.7.   Although China did not refer to public comments at the last CTG  meeting, we believe that if 
the public comment process carries on without the aforementio ned concerns being resolved, this 
could raise doubts about China's commitment to the WTO. Moreover, if such an announcement is 
made suddenly , and without any explanation or notice, as was the case at the last CMA  meeting, we 
believe that these doubts will be deepened even further. We hope that the concerns raised here will 
be well taken care of before public comment.  
17.8.   Japan strongly hopes that the amendment of these national standards will not be realized in 
a form raising  concerns over discrimination agains t foreign and domestic products or producers, and 
effectively forcing technology transfer. We also call on China to ensure that measures incorporating 
similar requirements will not be planned and introduced in other areas, either.  
17.9.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
17.10.   Regarding the recommended national standards for office devices, the Standardization 
Administration of China has received a project application for revision , and publicized it on the 
website of the National Standard Informati on Public Service Platform , from 22  December  2022 to 
5 January  2023. No objections have been received during that period.  
17.11.   The project was officially established on 21  March of this year. The national standard revision 
plan is named "Information Security Te chnology Office Equipment Safety Specifications" and is 
currently in the drafting stage. The formulation and revision of Chinese national standards have 
always been based on openness and transparency. If Japan has any comments, it is welcome to 
submit them  through the routine procedures and channels for revising Chinese national standards 
in the following public consultation stage.  
17.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
18  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION ON SOME FOOD IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (ID 82) – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
18.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  18.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following : 
18.3.   We would like to thank the Dominican Republic fo r the bilateral contacts we have had on this 
issue. This is an issue where there are expectations that some positive progress would be possible 
in the near future.  
18.4.   The European Union raised this issue for the first time at the Committee in October  2022. To  
recall, the concern relates to the discriminatory application of the Tax on the Transfer of 
Industrialized Goods and Services (ITBIS in Spanish) or  VAT) of 18% on imported products, mostly 
on imported matured and cream cheeses, hams, canned vegetables and  some other food products. 
The tax does not apply to the "like" domestic products, resulting in a discriminatory treatment of 
imported products. Although we were told that there is no legal basis for the discriminatory 
application of the tax, evidence at r etailers indicate s that such discrimination unfortunately does 
happen on the ground. We have therefore insisted that the principle of national treatment must be 
observed both de jure and de facto. 
18.5.   The European Union has been raising the issue with the authorities of the Dominican Republic 
since 2015.  Last week, we have been informed by some stakeholders , and through the local press , 
that the Directorate General of Internal Taxes had instructed local ham processors and retailers to 
apply ITBIS to domesti c hams in order to respect international commitments and guarantee equal 
treatment. To date, the measure has not been officially communicated by the Dominican 
government , nor has it been possible to verify its implementation in points of sale. If confirmed , this 
would be a positive development in the case of hams , as discrimination would be terminated. A final 
solution will only happen once this is replicated for the remainder of the affected products. We look 
forward to receiving confirmation from the Domi nican Republic that progress has been made on this 
issue, which we would welcome.  We request the Dominican Republic to terminate its discriminatory 
taxation for all types of imported products , and we will continue to monitor the matter closely.  
18.6.   The represe ntative of the United States  indicated the following : 
18.7.   The United States continues to share the concerns raised today by the European Union. We 
seek clarification from the Dominican Republic on the taxes applied to some food products , and 
answers to the que stions raised today.  
18.8.   The representative of the Dominican Republic  indicated the following : 
18.9.   As we stated at the meeting of 18 -19 October  2022, the Dominican Republic's legal system 
does not include any discriminatory tax measures. Accordingly, we reiterate that the Tax on the 
Transfer of Industrialized Goods and Services (ITBIS) is levied at rates of 18% and 16% on goods 
and services that have been produced or leased domestically , and on those that have been imported.  
18.10.   Following the multiple communications an d statements from the European Union, the 
Dominican government has begun to conduct assessments of how this tax is being implemented in 
the country's various commercial sectors.  As we indicated at the previous meeting, this assessment 
showed that certain l ocal food producers had been claiming exemptions for goods that are not eligible 
for such exemptions under the Tax Code. Changes have therefore been made to their tax returns, 
with sanctions applied, where appropriate, in line with the Dominican legal syst em. 
18.11.   Lastly, we reiterate the Dominican government's commitment to complying with the 
agreements signed by the country and working with the European Union and all our trading partners 
to resolve any difficulties identified in the area of trade, which we vie w as a fundamental instrument 
for promoting our country's development.  
18.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  19  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION AMENDING ANNEXES  II AND 
V TO REGULATION (EC) NO.  396/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL AS REGARD MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND 
THIAMETHOXAM IN CERTAIN PRODUCTS (ID 86) – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA AND 
PARAGUAY  
19.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia 
and Paraguay . 
19.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
19.3.   Indonesia intends to convey its concern to the European Union regarding the Draft 
Commission Regulation as regards the Maximum Residue Levels (MRL s) for Clothianidin and 
Thiamethoxam. Indonesia is of the view that the draft regulation could potentially limit international 
trade, particularly for products containing these substances.  
19.4.   Indonesia understands that the European Union's environmental concerns are not part of 
Regulation (EC) No.  396/2005, because these aspects have been fully covered by Regulation (EC) 
No. 1107/2009 regarding the use of pesticides in the Euro pean Union. Therefore, Indonesia is of the 
view that data related to environmental impacts cannot be used by the European Union as a basis 
for implementing an MRL which is more stringent than international standards, and nor as a basis 
for setting import r estrictions.  
19.5.   Furthermore, Regulation (EC) No.  396/2005 cannot regulate the use of pesticides outside the 
territory and jurisdiction of the European Union. Thus, this can conflict with the rights and 
sovereignty of other WTO  Members, resulting in the draft EU regulation being extra -territorial in 
nature, which has the potential to be inconsistent with EU  commitments in the WTO and other 
international agreements.  
19.6.   Therefore, Indonesia hopes that the European Union may consider referring the application 
of the MRL to international standards, for example the international Codex Alimentarius , as a 
reference for clothianidin and thiamethoxam standards in or on certain products.  
19.7.   Indonesia also asks the European Union to review the draft MRL  regulation, so that it co mplies 
with WTO  principles and regulations, especially Article  XI of the GATT  1994 regarding the General 
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.  
19.8.   The representative of Paraguay indicated the following:  
19.9.   My delegation reiterates its concerns as to the incom patibility of the measure notified by the 
European Union with the market access and non -discrimination obligations set out in Articles  XI and 
III of the GATT  1994.  
19.10.   The imposition of restrictions on international trade as set out in this Regulation will mak e 
farmers in Paraguay and the region less competitive than farmers in Europe, who do not have to 
deal with the same pests and climatic conditions when producing food and can benefit from 
emergency authorizations to continue using these substances.  
19.11.   Paraguay  shares a genuine interest in environmental conservation and biodiversity and 
prioritizes the protection of human, animal and plant health, as well as the protection of pollinators, 
which play a key role in global food production and biodiversity and boost  yields of important crops. 
However, each country has particular needs and challenges in its agricultural production, on the 
basis of its geography, ecosystem and local scientific capacities, as part of the quest to attain and 
maintain sustainability in ag riculture. This situation is reflected in regulatory frameworks based on 
sound scientific evidence that are applied to registration processes to assess the risks of pesticides 
and their uses, including the assessment of risk to the environment and pollinat ors. 
19.12.   In this regard, my delegation, like several other Members, submitted comments on 
notification G/TBT/N/EU/908  within the established deadline. However, only 23  days after the end 
of the comment period, the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (ScoPAFF) of 
the EU approve d the proposal to reduce the MRLs for these substances, without any modification. G/MA/M/78  
 
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  This proposal was then approved again on 3  February  2023, through Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2023/334 , without taking into account comments from Members.  
19.13.   I would like to point out that this Regulation mentions Paraguay  among the several countries 
"outside the Union" that have restricted the use of these products to protect pollinators, including 
bees, whic h is not true. The resolution cited in footnote  19 does not exist in Paraguay . We hope that 
this can be corrected, as the EU responded to our representation in Brussels that it would do so 
almost 50  days ago, more than twice as long as it took to consider Members' comments.  
19.14.   Paraguay, like other Members, has submitted , in this and other Committees , questions on 
the emergency authorization  mechanism  to understand : (i) how this is  consistent with the obligation 
of non -discrimination ; (ii) how long it takes to approve an emergency authorization ; and (iii) what 
the average cost of the approval process for an emergency authorization  is. However, we have still 
not received detailed responses.  
19.15.   There are now additional questions on the scope and implications of the r ecent ruling of 
19 January  2023 of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) , which confirmed that EU  member States 
cannot derogate from the use of seeds treated with plant protection products expressly prohibited 
by EU  legislation with emergency authorization . I would like to know the scope of this for emergency 
authorizations in general , as well as for other uses of these same substances , especially considering 
that we identified at least five new emergency authorizations with validity periods after the 
CJEU judgement , and even authorized after the CJEU judgement . We will continue to wait to receive 
answers  to these questions , but we hope to get sufficient clarification as soon as possible . 
19.16.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
19.17.   There is neither sufficient scientific evidence nor international consensus to support claims 
that environmental problems such as bee colony decline can be addressed through MRL  measures. 
The scientific basis for the EU to revoke and lower the MRLs of clothianidin and thiamethoxam due 
to the risk to bees is insufficient. It is still a matter of academic debate whether neonicotinoid 
pesticides are the leading cause of the decline in bee colonies. Some studies have concluded that 
the combination of parasites, pesticides, pollen deficiency, and climate change is the real reason.  
19.18.   In the face of increasing restrictions on various active compounds, which may be the basis 
of agricultural production, the proposed EU  regulation would create an unnecessary barrier to 
international trade as it would significantly impact upon WTO Members. China recommends that the 
EU provide data and reports on the risk assessment of neonicotinoid pesticides on bees to confirm 
the assessment's scientific validit y and completeness.  
19.19.   The MRLs should be formulated to protect consumer health and promote fair trade in food. 
As per Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not 
prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to , or with the effect of , creating unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade. Revoking or lowering MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam will not affect 
the EU's agricultural production , since their approvals expired earlier. However, the proposed 
EU regulati on will create unnecessary obstacles and de facto trade barriers that will significantly 
affect WTO  Members that export food to the EU.  
19.20.   In addition, as per Article  5.1 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures ( SPS Agreemen t), China believes that it would be better if the EU could fully 
consider the differences in various pesticide products, application periods, and treated crops when 
conducting risk assessments of neonicotinoid pesticides on bees. Clothianidin and thiametho xam can 
also be applied to non -nectar or flowering crops. In particular, the limit of crops harvested before 
flowering or being cultivated indoors should be revoked, and a complete and reasonable risk 
assessment should be considered. The EU's measures expa nd the scope beyond the purpose of 
protecting bees and create unnecessary trade barriers for other Members , especially for developing 
Members . Therefore, China suggests that the EU formulate MRLs reasonably , and in line with the 
Codex Alimentarius Commissi on, while effectively safeguarding the safety of bees and other 
non-target organisms.  
19.21.   The representative of Argentina  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  19.22.   We thank proponents for including this item on the agenda as we also share this concern . 
Argentina would like to repeat the statement made by my delegation at the last meeting of the 
TBT Committee , in March  2023, and we ask the Secretar iat to reflect it in the minutes .18  
19.23.   We thank the European Union for the replies provided, without prejudice to which, the 
concerns and the substantive issues raised by Argentina remain valid. The measure adopted by the 
EU, establishing MRLs for these neonicotinoids, is not clearly justified and constitutes a disguised 
restriction to international trade because it is disproportionate to the objective that it claims to 
protect, and unduly restricts trade as it prevents marketing of any product that has been treated 
with these neonicotinoids that may exceed the maximum lim its, even though the EU cannot 
demonstrate that the MRLs at the level established by the Codex may affect the health of consumers, 
which ultimately is the intended purpose of an MRL.  
19.24.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
19.25.   India will make a co nsolidated statement for Agenda Items  19 and 20. We have been raising 
the issue of the European Union's measures regarding clothianidin and thiamethoxam in various 
forums , including the Council for Trade in Goods, the Committee on Agriculture, the Committe e on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures , and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
19.26.   There is a broader issue that we observe in several instances, including this one, of the 
European Union establishing demanding standards for its own producers , and then exporting their 
standards to others. The EU is making effectively regulatory choices for third countries. This 
EU measure results in an economy -wide choice for third  countries in the name of managing their 
imports, which are a fraction of what the ot her countries are producing.  
19.27.   The European Union ignores differences in production conditions in third  countries. For 
example, imported products will be disproportionately affected where the local environmental 
conditions make it more challenging to produce food and feed without the covered active substances, 
or safe, effective, and affordable alternatives.  
19.28.   Through the proposed measure, the EU seeks to impose its own policy choices and priorities 
regarding agricultural yields and pollinator protection  on third countries. The EU is hence taking 
away the right of Members to make sovereign decisions with regards to the regulation of agricultural 
production and pollinator protection within their territory. The decisions that Members may not be 
able to make  due to the EU  regulation include the chosen level of protection, risk assessment 
methods , and risk management procedures.  
19.29.   The responsible use of active substances long used in agriculture , but which now the 
European Union seeks effectively to ban, improve s agricultural yields. Higher yields are important 
to combat poverty in developing countries, increase food security, combat climate change, and 
reduce global pressure on land -use change and thereby deforestation. Members should make their 
own determinatio n of balancing these legitimate and critical policy objectives with pollinator 
protection.  
19.30.   For trans -boundary measures, the European Union needs to focus on cooperation and not 
on the imposition of its regulatory choices on others.  
19.31.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
19.32.   Australia shares the concerns raised by Paraguay, Indonesia , and other Members about the 
European Union's use of maximum residue limits to implement environmental objectives in 
third countries , and the impact that TBT  notification G/TBT/N/EU/908  will have on market access for 
agricultural products to the EU. Australia notes that it will be raising these concerns within the TBT 
and SPS  Committee meetings in June and July.  
19.33.   The representative of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
 
18 See document  G/TBT/M/89 , paragraphs  2.313 -2.315.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  19.34.   Uruguay thanks Indonesia and Par aguay for including this item on the agenda and reiterates 
its concern regarding the approval, without substantive amendments, of EU Regulation 
No. 2023/334 amending the MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam, despite the numerous 
comments submitted by som e 21 trading partners in the aforementioned consultation process, and 
made by many WTO  Members in recent meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods and the SPS, 
TBT, and Market Access Committees.  
19.35.   As regards this Committee's scope of action, we understand t hat there are arguments that 
the measure concerned could contravene the provisions of Article  XI of the GATT  1994, which forbids 
the introduction  of import prohibitions or restrictions made effective through quotas, import licences , 
or other measures.  
19.36.   In addition to this, and without prejudice to the potential impact of the recent ruling on this 
topic of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) of 19  January  2023, we understand that certain points 
that have been raised by the delegation of Paraguay in rela tion to the institution of emergency 
authorizations, which have been available for producers in European countries without a similar 
mechanism being in place for producers in third  countries, and this mechanism's link to the principle 
of non -discrimination  laid down in Article  III of the GATT, merit further consideration.  
19.37.   In view of the foregoing , and without prejudice to the various elements that have been raised 
with respect to this measure in other WTO  bodies, Uruguay would appreciate hearing the EU's 
comments or observations regarding the consistency of the measure with , and its justification under , 
the provisions of the GATT  1994.  
19.38.   Lastly, we reiterate that Uruguay shares concerns about promoting the protection of 
pollinators, in line with protecting the  environment and biodiversity, and supports the establishment 
of regulatory environments based on scientific criteria, so as to avoid putting food security at risk 
and erecting barriers to trade. In this connection, Uruguay reaffirms that it stands ready t o work 
cooperatively with other Members to identify mechanisms that can be used to achieve these 
objectives without unnecessarily restricting trade, while also ensuring the conservation of the 
environment and the protection of human, animal and plant healt h. 
19.39.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
19.40.   Ecuador  would also like to reiterate its concern in relation to this matter, in line with what 
we have already expressed at the Council for Trade in Goods and the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosani tary Measures.  
19.41.   We stress that the proposed  regulation would distort the objective of Regulation  396/2005, 
since it would shift the approach to "European consumer" protection and add unilateral consideration 
of "environmental factors" in countries outside t he territory and jurisdiction of the European 
authorities.  
19.42.   Such an approach invalidates the adequacy of the regulatory policies of other countries, 
disregarding their processes and internal technical analyses for establishing the conditions for food 
produc tion and agricultural activity in their jurisdictions.  
19.43.   Furthermore, and as we have already indicated, the even heavier burden placed on small 
producers is a cause for greater concern, as adapting to new MRLs would increase the cost or 
quantity of fertilize rs and pesticides.  
19.44.   Ecuador firmly believes that sustainability rests on three pillars: social ; economic ; and 
environmental. When adopting measures on MRLs, the negative effects they will have on the other 
sustainability pillars in the European Union's trad ing partners, particularly developing countries, 
should be considered.  For these reasons, we once again urge the European Union to maintain the 
current maximum levels for third  countries, as import tolerances.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  19.45.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following .19 
19.46.   The European Union takes note of the comments by Paraguay, Indonesia,  and other 
Members on this issue.  
19.47.   The European Union informed WTO  Members for the first  time about this matter already 
more than two  years ago , through WTO  document  G/SPS/GEN/1797  of June  2020. Since then, the 
European Union has regularly updated the SPS and TBT  Committees on all the relevant 
developments. The European Union has organized information sessions and provided detailed 
information through various communications. The EU also remains op en to engage and provide 
further information.  
19.48.   As announced in the European Union Farm to Fork Strategy, the European Union has 
committed to taking environmental objectives into account when setting MRLs for substances no 
longer approved in the European Uni on due to environmental concerns of a global nature, while 
respecting WTO  standards and other international obligations. As explained, the European Union 
addresses this matter on an incremental basis, considering and reviewing the position of each 
particul ar active substance on a case -by-case basis, founded on the best available scientific evidence 
and ensuring that its measures are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their 
objective.  
19.49.   On the specific case s of clothianidin and thiamethoxam , the draft Regulation on lowering the 
maximum reside levels for these two  neonicotinoid substances was notified to the TBT  Committee 
on 6 July 2022 ( G/TBT/N/EU/908 ). A communication , for information , was also submitted to the 
SPS Committee. The European Union has carefully studied and replied to all of the comments 
received from WTO  Members during the notification pro cess. 
19.50.   Last February, the new rules were adopted through Commission Regulation (EU)  2023/334. 
This Regulation is the first  one implementing the new policy announced in the European Union Farm 
to Fork Strategy on imported food in relation to pesticides resid ues. 
19.51.   The European Union has extensively explained in previous meetings the rationale for the se 
measures , and refers to those explanations. The environmental objectives of global concern that 
this Regulation targets are those related to the protection of po llinators. This is an issue of global 
concern, which goes beyond national boundaries and cannot be solved through actions at EU  level 
alone.  
19.52.   The European Union's objective is to ensure that food and feed consumed in the EU do not 
contribute to the global d ecline of pollinators, independently of whether the product is produced in 
the European Union or imported from third  countries.  
19.53.   The European Union considers that currently there is no alternative to the lowering of the 
MRLs of clothianidin and thiamethoxam  which would be less trade restrictive and equally contribute 
to the objective of protecting pollinators. Based on current knowledge, reducing the use of 
neonicotinoids is an effective action to tackle pollinator decline. The European Union is acting in fu ll 
compliance with WTO  rules, which allow Members to adopt measures if they are necessary to achieve 
a legitimate objective.  
19.54.   Regarding  possible trade impacts, firstly, the Regulation defers the application date to 
36 months after entry into force (instead of six months, which is the standard period given in the 
European Union). It allows products placed on the market before the applicati on date to remain on 
the market until the end of their shelf life. The Regulation will therefore become applicable only at 
the beginning of 2026.  
19.55.   Secondly, the European Union acknowledges that third  countries may face production 
conditions and pest pressur es different from those in mainland Europe. Therefore, import tolerances 
 
19 The delegation of the European Union indicated at the meeting that a longer written  version of the ir 
statement would be provided for inclusion in the minutes . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  can be granted to active substances not authorized in the European Union provided that the 
submitted information demonstrates that the use is safe to pollinators.  
19.56.   Thirdly, the Europea n Union continues to provide technical assistance to developing 
countries and LDCs in improving SPS  capacity and market access, directly or through other 
international organizations and partnerships, such as the WTO-hosted Standards and Trade 
Development Facility (STDF).  
19.57.   Regarding emergency authorizations , the European Union has already provided general 
information and clarifications regarding emergency authorizations, as in 
documents  G/SPS/GEN/1970  and G/SPS/GEN/2038 . In addition, more information is available in 
guidance document  SANCO/10087/2013/Rev.1.  
19.58.   Briefly, the purpose of an emergency authorizat ion is to allow serious dangers for plant 
health to be dealt with in emergency situations where there are no better alternatives. In this regard, 
the European Commission has taken action to verify whether such emergency authorizations granted 
by member States are justified , and if not, the case, the European Union has taken measures to 
prevent the repetition of any such emergency authorizations . 
19.59.   According to a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice (case  C-162/21), European 
Union member States may n o longer grant anymore emergency authorizations for any outdoor use 
of thiamethoxam or clothianidin, whether these are for coating seeds for outdoor sowing or for other 
any other outdoor uses , such as foliar spraying. Nor can they grant emergency authoriza tions for 
the sowing of seeds that have already been coated with either of these substances.  
19.60.   The Commission is considering the implications of the judg ement  for the granting of other 
emergency authorizations, for example,  for other substances or for substa nces that have not been 
approved or have not been renewed in the European Union because of risk to human/animal health 
or the environment.  
19.61.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
20  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
AND OF THE COUNCIL ON SHIPMENTS OF WASTE AND AMENDING REGULATION 
(EU)  NO. 1257/2013 AND (EU) NO.  2020/1056  (ID 96) – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
20.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia.  
20.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following :20 
20.3.   Indonesia repeat s its previous statement delivered at the meeting of the TBT  Committee held 
in March  2023. Indonesia thanks the European Union for its notification  in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/893 , on the proposed  European Parliament Regulation on the transfer of 
waste , including  amendments to Regulation (EU)  No. 1257/2013 and (EU)  No. 2020/1056 
(COM  (2021)  709 final) ("proposal "), which was submitted on 25  May 2022. Indonesia submitted a n 
enquiry to the EU on 23  December  2022, requesting further clarification and detailed information on 
the action on the regulation in question. However, to date, we have not yet received an y answer to 
this question.  
20.4.   Indonesia appreciates the European Union's intention to take serious action to minimize risks 
of harm to public health , as well as the environ mental impacts that may arise from the delivery of 
unmanaged waste. However, Indonesia wishes  to echo the discourse contained in the 
TBT Agreement that the steps prepared to achieve legitimate goals are assumed not to create 
unnecessary obstacles to intern ational trade.  
20.5.   Indonesia is concerned that there are indications of discrimination in this proposed regulation, 
in which the European Union  will restrain exports of non -hazardous waste by establishing excessive 
administrative arrangements for export destin ations outside EU  member States  and OECD  countries. 
 
20 The delegation of Indonesia indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of the ir statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  In addition, this  draft proposal does not differentiate the processing of B3  waste and non -B3 waste 
(green list) , which can be reused as industrial raw materials to support a circular economy.  
20.6.   The pulp an d paper industry will be one of the sectors that will be significantly affected by 
this proposed regulation. The provisions in this proposal also regulate export restrictions and the 
mechanism for recycled paper, which is the raw material for the Indonesia n paper industry. While 
domestic scavengers have not been able to meet the demand for recycled paper supply, both in 
quality and quantity, importing recycled paper from the EU is the preferred solution. The value of 
recycled paper imports has reached USD  17.4 billion , with a volume of 1.9  million  tonnes.  
20.7.   Indonesia has the same intention towards environmental preservation , which has become a 
global issue , and the need to increase the application of a circular economy, reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions (Net  Zero Emissions) , and others , in overcoming this problem. However, the recycling 
rate is still very low, so there is still a shortage of recycled materials, one of which is recycled paper. 
Indonesia's recycled paper is only able to meet industrial needs for  around 50% of the total demand, 
while the need for packaging paper in the country is increasing. Packaging paper is urgently needed 
as a supporting industry for other developing industrial sectors , such as the packaging industry, food 
and beverage industr y, shoe industry, electronics industry, and so on . 
20.8.   As for Indonesia's imports of recycled paper, most of it comes from the European Union , so if 
the EU implements this proposed regulation , which we believe can hinder our industry from obtaining 
raw materia ls, then this will not be in line with the circular economy program me, either in Indonesia,  
or in the EU  itself. We have received information that the total availability of recycled paper raw 
materials in the EU is 54.4  million  tonnes ; however, only 47.9  million tonnes can be absorbed by 
the EU  pulp and paper industry.  
20.9.   The Indonesian government has a strong commitment to managing climate change issues, 
reducing emissions, and improving environmental aspects. Gradually, Indonesia is committed to 
increasing i ts GHG  emission reduction target , in line with the Long -Term Strategy for Low Carbon 
and Climate Resilience (LTS -LCCR 2050) policy towards net -zero emissions in 2060 or sooner.  
20.10.   Indonesia's GHG  emission reduction target with its own capabilities in the Upda ted Nationally 
Determined Contribution (UNDC) increased to 31.89%, while the target with  international support 
in the UNDC increased to 43.20% in the Enhanced Nationally Determined Contribution   (ENDC) . 
20.11.   In light of  the above, and in order to minimize poten tial technical barriers to trade due to 
the EU  WSR proposal, Indonesia would like to urge the EU to respond to our questions. Indonesia 
urges the EU to respond to Indonesia's question s, and to list Indonesia as one of the "Registered 
Countries" to be exempted from time -consuming and costly administration and certification 
requirements. Furthermore, we are ready and eager to fulfil our commitment , as stated in enhancing 
NDC. Indonesia looks forwa rd to further engagement with the  EU on this matter.  
20.12.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
20.13.   We would also like to thank the European Union for their cooperation, as we have had a 
chance to exchange opinions on this issue both bilaterally, a nd also on the margins of meetings 
here. 
20.14.   That said, we still have concerns regarding this regulation that we would like to state today, 
as we did in the last meeting of the TBT Committee. In fact, Türkiye shares the state d EU objective 
of this regulation , namely supporting the transition to a green and circular economy. However, we 
believe that the monitoring and inspection requirements and measures envisaged in the draft for 
waste shipments, especially of recycled raw materials of certain industries, go be yond the stated 
legitimate environmental objectives. In this regard, we believe that the trade restrictive nature of 
these measures might be incompatible with the EU's international commitments.  
20.15.   First of all, the draft lacks clear conditions for the monito ring of export and safeguard 
procedure s, and for the inspection requirements of the importer facilities. These might lead to 
restriction s on waste  exports , imposing additional burden and cost on importers, while creating 
technical barriers to trade.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  20.16.   Second ly, the draft legislation does not distinguish potentially hazardous waste streams, 
such as mixed plastic waste , from secondary raw materials being used as a raw material in certain 
industries. This approach undermines the benefit s of trade in certain seco ndary materials, which 
contribute to low emission production and thus boost  global circularity. In this sense, we believe 
that draft legislation may endanger the supply of raw materials for third  countries ' recycling facilities, 
tampering the already funct ioning circular economy in these countries, such as in the case of the 
Turkish recycling industry and steel production , which is highly dependent on the EU in terms of the 
supply of ferrous scrap and non -metal waste.  
20.17.   On the other hand, it is important to underline that the Basel Convention , and related 
OECD  decision , already set the rules for trans -boundary movements of hazardous waste.  
20.18.   In that respect, Türkiye would kindly ask the European Union  what constitutes its basis for 
the implementati on of additional requirements in the draft , including imposing certain measures to 
monitor and , when necessary,  restrict trade of ferrous scrap and non -metal and non -hazardous 
waste for environmental protection concerns. We would also like to ask whether s imilar additional 
monitoring and auditing requirements will be introduced for the EU  member States as well.  
20.19.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following : 
20.20.   We have concerns that proposed revisions to the European Union's Waste Shipment 
Regulation may pose an unfair burden on international trade. The draft language appears to restrict 
non-hazardous waste and scrap exports and treat exports outside of the EU mo re strictly than 
internal shipments.  
20.21.   We have heard concerns that a restriction with respect to EU non -hazardous waste and scrap 
exports might create a global distortion which, among other things, will put a strain on producers' 
access to high -quality, low -carbon inputs.  
20.22.   The United States understands that the proposed Regulation would require that EU  exporters 
demonstrate, through regular independent inspections of facilities in importing countries, that their 
exports will be managed in an environmentally so und manner, regardless of destination country. 
This could prove burdensome for exporters, imposing additional financial and time -delay costs on 
them and their customers in other markets, and in turn discouraging exports and limit ing options 
for environment ally sound recovery. We encourage the EU to ensure that the auditing requirements 
do not impose an additional burden on EU  exporters and their customers in other markets.  
20.23.   Should the proposed Regulation move forward without consideration of these factors, i t could 
lead other countries to impose similar measures , which would further undermine global 
decarbonization objectives.  
20.24.   Legitimate trade in recycled commodities creates opportunities for economic growth and 
environmental sustainability by diverting end-of-life materials from landfills and providing 
high-quality, low carbon feedstock to manufacturing inputs. We encourage the EU to remove 
non-hazardous scrap materials, such as metals, that pose negligible risks to the environment , and 
that international pro ducers are reliant upon, from the scope of the regulation.  
20.25.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.26.   The European Union would like to thank Indonesia and other Members for their comments 
on the waste shipment regulation proposal. The European Union notified the proposal to the 
TBT Committee in May  2022 (EU  Notification  G/TBT/N/EU/893 ). 
20.27.   In line with the European Union's commitments under the European Green Deal, the Circular 
Economy Action Plan , and the Zero Pollut ion Action Plan, the proposal aims to ensure that the EU 
does not export its waste challenges to third  countries. It seeks to tackle illegal waste shipments 
and seeks to contribute to the circular economy by facilitating shipments of waste for reuse and 
recycling in the European Union.  
20.28.   The current waste shipment regulation already stipulates that waste can only be exported 
outside the European Union if it is managed at destination in an environmentally sound manner, to G/MA/M/78  
 
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  conditions that are broadly equivalent  to those of the European Union. The lack of detailed provisions 
and implementing mechanism s have led to weak enforcement , which the new waste shipment 
regulation is trying to remedy. The measure is necessary because the European Union exports a lot 
of was te (33  million  tonnes in 2020) , and this quantity has substantially increased in the last decade, 
by more than 75% since 2004.  
20.29.   The proposal lays down transparent, non -discriminatory , and proportionate criteria to 
demonstrate that exported waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner. The notified 
draft continue s to distinguish between hazardous and so-called "green -listed waste" relating to the 
applicable respective procedures for such wastes. The new requirements on the export of waste will 
apply th ree years after the entry into force of the new regulation, leaving enough time for all relevant 
actors to comply with the new regime.  
20.30.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
21  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM ( ID 69) – 
STATEMENTS BY CHINA, INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
21.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China , 
Indonesia and  the Russian Federation . 
21.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following : 
21.3.   China believes that to effectively respond to climate change, realize global sustainable 
development, and build a community with a shared future for humankind, Members need to 
earnestly implement the goals, principles, and requirements of the United Nation s Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, reducing barriers, and promoting 
trade and investment liberalization and facilitation.  
21.4.   The European Union's CBAM seems to have no scientific basis for its implementation. Many 
studies have pointed out that the European Emission Trading System ( EU ETS) does not lead to 
carbon leakage, and CBAM makes little contribution to global emission reduction s. Therefore , we 
believe that CBAM 's aim  is not to eliminate the so -called carbon leakage , but rather to protect 
European enterprises from international competition.  
21.5.   Meanwhile, the European Union is imposing an inadequate burden of measuring carbon 
emissions on exporters in other Members through its CBAM. Developing Members need more 
capacity and funding to collect the carbon emission data of their products. As UNCTAD has pointed 
out, developing Members are obliged to adopt the same environmental standards as developed 
Members through CBAM.  
21.6.   In the past, developed Members exported the ir emission s by outsourcing the carbon -intensive 
production to developing Members . With the advantage of owning and controlling green technology, 
developed Members are promoting production reshoring. This will hinder the green economic 
transition of developing Member s. 
21.7.   The unilateral CBAM deviates from the basic principles of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities and Nationally Determined Contribution Arrangements 
of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. In addition, it may not align with the fundamental 
WTO principle of non -discrimination.  
21.8.   We are willing to enhance our engagement with the European Union on its CBAM. We hope 
that the EU will actively participate in the thematic sessions relating to CBAM in the WTO to ensu re 
that any environmental measures comply with WTO  rules and avoid creating new trade barriers.  
21.9.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following : 
21.10.   Indonesia has once again submitted its objections to the European Union regarding the 
approval of the C BAM proposal.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  21.11.   We are of the view that the intention of the CBAM  policy is contrary to the principles of 
national treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) in the WTO ; therefore, it is discriminatory.  
21.12.   Regarding  the national treatment principle, Indonesia und erstands that the CBAM will refer 
to the European E TS, where each sector has a free allowance limit. Thus, the charges that will be 
applied to EU  domestic products will be cheaper than imported products. Even though the European 
Union promised to gradually  eliminate free allowances in all sectors, we have yet to obtain clarity 
on when and how the reduction in allowances will be carried out.  
21.13.   Regarding  the MFN  principle, we understand that not all WTO  Members have a good carbon 
market and carbon accounting sy stem, especially for those WTO  Members that do not apply the 
ETS scheme. Thus, the mechanism for determining carbon prices will differ from one WTO  Member 
to another. In addition, we are of the view that the grouping of WTO  Members with low or high 
emissio n reduction in determining carbon prices will likewise not be based on solid and clear criteria.  
21.14.   Regarding Article  II of the GATT  1994, Indonesia is of the view that the CBAM has the 
potential to create additional burdens for producers outside the European  Union, with additional 
levies that go beyond the tariffs set out in  the European Union's Schedule of Concession.  
21.15.   Regarding this issue, Indonesia requests  further clarification of the European Union's plans 
to expand the product sector s covered by CBAM. We would like to ask the European Union to 
re-evaluate this proposal so that it complies with WTO  regulations, specifically Article  II of the 
GATT  1994, as well as the WTO principles of MFN and national treatment.  
21.16.   We would also like to remind the European Union that every environment -related policy , 
including the CBAM, should be subject to the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC), as contained in the U NFCCC  and the Paris Agreement . This 
principle stipulates that developing countries have fundamental responsibilities, capabilities and 
obligations that are different from developed countries.  
21.17.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following : 
21.18.   On 18  April 2023, the European Parliament adopted the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism , on which an inter -institutional deal was reached last December.  
21.19.   Analysis of the text shows that the European Union has failed to make the CBAM compatible 
with the WTO 's rules. Cont rary to its declared aim of tackling climate change, the CBAM seems to 
pursue strictly economic goals. In this regard, we would like to make the following points.  
21.20.   First, the CBAM may constitute a systemic threat to the multilateral trading system. In fact,  
the EU will discriminate "like products" based on carbon footprint , and hence on the ways of 
production, i.e.  production processes. The foundation of the multilateral trading system, where there 
has been a long -standing consensus on the content and concep t of a "like product", will be 
threatened.  
21.21.   Second, speaking of the impact of the CBAM on climate change, the Members with fewer 
resources for modernizing their production to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will pay higher 
CBAM  charges. Thus, the CBAM will worsen the problem of climate change by depriving 
WTO Members of financial resources , thereby delay ing the  achievement of climate goals for many 
WTO Members.  
21.22.   Third, the product scope is questionable. Specifically, questions arise with regard , for 
example,  to the inclusion of hydrogen. Hydrogen is a key technology for low -carbon transition as it 
does not emit any greenhouse gas at the point of use. Thus, there is no doubt that the inclusion of 
hydrogen in the regulation aims to attract investment in renewab le hydrogen, decreasing 
competitiveness of other kinds of such energy sources, in particular those derived from natural gas, 
methane , and so on. Along with that, iron ores, which are primary raw materials for the 
manufacturing of steel products, were also added to the product scope , obviously  to protect the EU's 
domestic production of recycled steel products. Thus, the provisions of the CBAM aim at the 
discrimination of not only goods, but the production methods, as well.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  21.23.   Fourth, the CBAM violates the Europ ean Union's MFN  commitments by giving special 
treatment to Members with a carbon pricing mechanism, as well as to Members with emission s 
trading system s linked with the EU ETS, or which apply the EU ETS. 
21.24.   Finally, the European Union has stated on various oc casions that the CBAM 's intention is to 
reduce  so-called carbon leakages. It is noteworthy that no international organization, either the WTO 
itself, or those organizations under the auspices of the United Nations, has confirmed the link 
between carbon lea kage and globally determined climate goals. In fact, the Paris Agreement allows 
its Parties to decide on their own ways of achieving climate goals that are "most effective" for them , 
and each Party is responsible for its own emission level s. 
21.25.   Measures appli ed by one or more Parties to the Paris Agreement should not be imposed on 
the other parties as the only right way to combat climate change. Thus, even when there is a risk 
of carbon leakage, it may be the result of the EU's short -sighted policy leading to an increase in 
energy prices and creating a disadvantage for EU production. In this regard, one may ask the 
following fair question: why should other WTO  Members pay for the localization of production 
capacities on EU  territory? And what provisions of the WTO Agreement justify such measure s? 
21.26.   In sum, we call upon the European Union to respect its WTO  commitments.  
21.27.   The representative of India indicated the following : 
21.28.   This statement applies to Agenda  items  20, 21 , and 22  of the revised airgram  as they have 
some overlapping considerations.  
21.29.   India has been raising this issue as a systemic concern in various bodies , including the 
Council for Trade in Goods and the C MA. India has also presented a paper in the Committee on Trade 
and Environment, in document  JOB/TE/78 , which talks about India's broader con cern about 
WTO Members undertaking various trade -related climate measures.  
21.30.   The European Union's  CBAM is an example of one such measure , which we believe is 
unilateral, appears to have a protectionist design , and is being applied extra -territorially.  
21.31.   The European Union's  legislation on Deforestation -Free Commodities is another such 
example, where the European Union is imposing regulatory choices on other WTO  Members  using 
blunt measures that may not solve the problem of deforestation , but which may quite pos sibly lead 
to a massive disruption in trade flows. The proposed regulation does not account for national 
afforestation and other forestry measures that each Member undertakes as part of its sovereign 
policy choices.  
21.32.   India shares the global objective of add ressing environment al and climate change issues. 
India's own Nationally Determined Contributions make the policy and sectoral choices charting the 
pathway of emissions intensity reduction.  
21.33.   When we collectively address this key global issue, we need to ensu re that commitments 
made in one forum , like the UNFCCC , are not upended by policy choices being imposed by Members 
in other international bodies , like the WTO.  
21.34.   Since the European Union has clarified that both the CBAM and Deforestation -Free 
Commodities are climate or environment al measures , rather than trade measures, it should fully 
comply with the settled and long -held international environment law principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities.  
21.35.   Addition ally, we understand that the reporting obligations under these measures will be 
coming into force by 1  October  2023. However, the final version of the legislation has not been 
formally released. This unpredictability for businesses, especially micro, small  and medium -sized 
enterprises ( MSMEs ), creates a situation  that is itself trade -restrictive . This situation also undermines 
the gains made in certainty and predictability through the Trade Facilitation Agreement.  
21.36.   Specifically, the Deforestation measure as currently proposed will hurt agriculture exports in 
the chosen commodities to the EU. Its worst effects will be felt by small and marginal farmers in G/MA/M/78  
 
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  developing countries. The agriculture sector in developing countries, including India, is a key driver 
for the employment and economic well -being of a large part of the population, especially women 
and those associated with MSMEs. It is unfortunate that the EU is making policy choices that directly 
harm the economic interests of these socio -economic groups.  
21.37.   We welcome the European Union's offer made in the Committee on Trade and Environment 
of conducting technical sessions on these measures on the margins of the upcoming June  2023 
meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment.  
21.38.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated the following : 
21.39.   We welcome increased efforts at the global level to mitigate the impacts of climate change 
and deem it important to discuss how cooperation at the WTO could help facilitate the transformation 
to environmentally sustainable economic  growth globally, in an inclusive and just manner.  
21.40.   As such, we are closely following the ongoing legislative processes under the European Green 
Deal and the CBAM, and continue a cooperative bilateral dialogue with the EU on these issues.  
21.41.   We would also like  to take the opportunity provided by this multilateral platform to share 
some of our considerations regarding the CBAM while the European Commission is solidifying the 
implementation aspects of the transition period.  
21.42.   The most crucial issue with regard to C BAM is to make sure that it is designed and applied 
in a non -discriminative way that is not more burdensome than necessary to achieve its objectives , 
meaning not putting importers and imported goods at a competitive disadvantage compared to their 
EU counte rparts. For this to be achieved, there might be stumbling blocks in the design of the CBAM, 
some of which we would like to indicate here . 
21.43.   The first of these potential stumbling blocks is the difference between the scope of the 
EU ETS and that of the CBAM. As you may know, while CBAM applies to products identified by 
CN codes, the ETS applies to installations identified in terms of their activity/production process, 
subject to minimum capacity or total rated thermal input thresholds. Therefore, it is possibl e that 
some producers of CBAM  goods will be covered by the CBAM  regulation even though they would be 
exempt from EU ETS if they were EU  producers.  
21.44.   A second  issue is related to the treatment of precursors. We are not aware of a requirement 
brought under the  EU ETS on EU  producers to obtain and report the embedded emissions of the 
precursors they use. In our view, for any precursor identified for CBAM  goods, both the EU  producers 
and third  country producers using these in their production processes should be subject to the same 
monitoring, reporting , and verification (MRV) requirements.  
21.45.   On the other hand, in the EU ETS, due to such practices as over -allocation of free allowances 
and EU  companies' ability to trade allowances , the state aid provided by member States with regard 
to CO 2 costs related to electricity use, as well as funding opportunities through the Modernization 
and Innovation Funds, it seems to us that EU  producers would be nefit from a competitive advantage 
agains t third  country producers. Hence, remedies to address these imbalances should be sought.  
21.46.   In that sense, we believe that the allocation of CBAM  revenues to the financing of green 
transformation projects of developing countries and LDCs would be more in line  with the climate 
change mitigation objectives underlying the draft regulation. In this process, ensuring access by 
developing countries and LDCs to critical technologies will also be key to inclusivity and overall 
success.  
21.47.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
21.48.   Paraguay believes that these types of measures would probably have little or no impact on 
reducing emissions , but are rather aimed at levelling the playing field.  Most, if not all, developed 
countries have developed  their economies  using the highly polluting methods that they now wish to 
prohibit, and have generated  extra money t hat is now used to  subsidize production methods that  
comply with the measures. Demanding the same from developing countries does not level the 
playing field.  On the contrary, imposing such measures makes the situation even worse.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  21.49.   The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities must 
be taken into account, as well as current policies such as environmentally harmful subsidi es that the 
same developed countries that are seeking to implement carbon border adjustment measures 
provide.  As recent studies have shown, Paraguay contributed nothing to the current climate change 
crisis, rather , it is a carbon sink , which positively con tributes to carbon sequestration.  Despite this, 
Paraguay is severely affected by it due to its high dependence on agriculture.  
21.50.   Other political approaches and domestic conditions must be taken into account when 
analysing these types of measures. Paraguay, f or example, does not use carbon price measures, but 
it is still a carbon sink through sustainable farming practices and unpaid ecosystem services , among 
others . The industrial sector in Paraguay,  and in many other developing countries , is very small. 
Measu res such as carbon pricing at the border will not further green industrialization without other 
elements and policies ; rather , they will prevent it.  Even worse,  if they are  extended to agricultural 
products with a certain level of industrialization, profit margins will be reduced , which , as a result , 
will affect exports, production , and our economies in general at the expense not only of the required 
adjustment, but also  of our ability to move towards even more environmentally sustainable 
production systems.  
21.51.   Paraguay would like to know if, like the CBAM , the EU has  foreseen  any other  mechanism to 
provide preferential access for those with a lower carbon footprint , or from dev eloping countries like 
mine, which are carbon sinks , and which are greatly impacted by the negative effects of climate 
change.  We ask the EU to provide clarification as to when and how it intends to notify the se measure s 
to the WTO.  
21.52.   The representative of t he Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
21.53.   The Republic of Korea recognizes that climate change is one of the most pressing issues on 
which all WTO  Members should continue to jointly focus, with a view to finding effective ways of 
tackling it . Yet Korea  is concerned that, unlike in its original intent, the European Union's CBAM may 
impose an excessive administrative burden on exporters, while treating them less favourably than 
the EU -based businesses which are subject to the EU's E TS. To address the se concerns, Korea 
believes that it is essential to promote a common understanding regarding the design of relevant 
international standards through sufficient discussions in international for ums. 
21.54.   In an effort to implement rules targeting common global challenge s, an inclusive approach 
would be more effective than requiring trading partners to comply with specific standards, such as 
the methodology for calculating the emissions of products.  Korea will continue to engage closely 
with the EU with a view to resolving our concerns.  
21.55.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
21.56.   We thank the proponents for raising the subject matter of the CBAM.  
21.57.   From our perspective, while the European Union has  stated that the propose d mechanism 
will be in conformity with the WTO  rules and the EU's other international obligations, the EU has yet 
to explain how it aims to achieve this . While the EU 's stated intention  is to address the risk of 
investment leakage from the EU to other coun tries, its main objective is in fact to maintain the 
competitiveness of EU  industries. Our very preliminary review indicates that the proposed 
mechanism raises very serious concerns due to its potential medium and long -term negative 
implications for global  trade, and we believe that its measures are unilateral and trade -protectionist 
in nature , and provide specific protection to the EU's domestic industry.  
21.58.   The consistency of the CBAM with the fundamental rules of the WTO is questionable. 
Therefore, the burd en of proof to confirm that this mechanism is consistent with the EU 's obligations 
and commitments regarding MFN, national treatment, rules of origin , and non-tariff barriers ( NTBs), 
lies on the EU.  
21.59.   Furthermore, monitoring and calculating the carbon emissions embedded in the products 
covered by the CBAM is not a straightforward task , and many details of the calculation methodology 
are not yet clear. As far as we understand, the EU ETS implies effective financial contribution  
measures, while the EU  State Aid Guidelines provide compensation for the reduction of indirect G/MA/M/78  
 
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  GHG emissions. This scheme looks like a specific import  substitution subsidy that is prohibited by 
the WTO  Agreement. Therefore, we request the EU to provide fu rther clarification of this matter.  
21.60.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia kindly requests the European Union to specify the articles in 
the WTO  Agreements that allow it to adopt this unnecessar ily complicated mechanism. We also urge 
the EU to further engage in consu ltations with Members in order to ensure the full compliance of the 
CBAM with the WTO rules and Agreements , and to ensure that the proposed mechanism will not 
create any unnecessary barriers to trade, be used as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discri mination , act as a disguised restriction on international trade, or be applied in a manner that 
constitutes protection to EU  domestic industries.  
21.61.   Finally, we look forward for further details and reflections from the European Union on this 
proposed mechanis m, and the Kingdom is ready to engage with the EU and interested Members.  
21.62.   The representative of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
21.63.   Kazakhstan reiterates its position as expressed at the previous meeting of the C MA, and 
continues to follow the developments  around the EU's Carbon Borer Adjustment Mechanism. 
Kazakhstan again urges the European Union to fully consider the CBAM's compatibility with the 
WTO rules and regulations , and to ensure that any such mechanism does not create obstacles to 
trade.  
21.64.   The repre sentative of Japan  indicated the following :21 
21.65.   In order to achieve net -zero emissions worldwide by 2050, it is crucial to ensure a level  
playing field and prevent carbon leakage ; at the same time, policy coordination is integral to the 
production and introduction of products with low carbon intensity. Also, when discussing policy 
coordination, each country has been making reduction efforts in the past according to their own 
circum stances and , in principle, the focus should be on "carbon intensity" as the "result" of such 
efforts.  
21.66.   In other words, if the "carbon intensity" of a country or sector is low, this would be the result 
of that country or sector having taken sufficient measur es, such that there were no problems in 
terms of the level playing field or carbon leakage. In this regard, the EU's CBAM is designed to levy 
a charge at the border based on the level of specific policy in place, such as an explicit carbon price 
at the pre sent stage. In this case, even if the product has the same actual carbon intensity , and 
does not cause any carbon leakage, taxation will occur due to the explicit difference in carbon price. 
In this respect, the environmental objective itself cannot be jus tified from the viewpoint of 
preventing carbon leakage, but sufficient consideration is required from the viewpoint of ensuring 
fair, competitive conditions. In addition to the aforementioned institutional design issues, we 
reiterate that it is a prerequis ite that this measure be designed consistently with the WTO  rules, as 
has repeatedly been stated.  
21.67.   We acknowledge that the European Parliament recently approved the CBAM. Nevertheless, 
we would like to request the EU to fully discuss with each country, the measurement method of 
CO2 emissions of products, including through expert meetings, so as not to introduce the CBAM 
without sufficient international understanding and thereby cause trade disputes with other countries.  
21.68.   The representative of the European Uni on indicated the following:  
21.69.   The European Union would like to thank China, Indonesia, India, Türkiye, Paraguay, the 
Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,  and Kazakhstan for their interest in this important 
issue. During previous meetings, we had the opportunity to provide Members with an outline of the 
proposal, its objectives, and its interaction with other European Union policies targeted at achieving 
environmental sustainability and carbon neutrality.  
 
21 The delegation of Japan in dicated at the meeting that a longer written version of the ir statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  21.70.   Our engagement will continue. We will also be giving a technical presentation on European 
Union trade -related climate measures, including the CBAM and the Deforestation Regulation, during 
the WTO  trade and environment week in June.  
21.71.   The provisional political agreement on the European Union CBAM was reached in 
December  2022. Currently, the CBAM is still undergoing an internal legislative process before  it 
becomes law.  
21.72.   The CBAM  Regulation will enter into force in October  2023, with a two -year transitional 
period during which importers will have to report their emissions, but will not have any financial 
obligations. The border adjustment will enter into application with a gradual phase -in over 
nine years, from 20 26 to 2034, by when CBAM will be fully operational. As already explained in 
previous meetings, the phase -in of the border adjustment will be mirrored by a phase -out of free 
allowances in the European Union E TS for the sectors covered under the CBAM. It sho uld be noted 
that the rate of reduction of free allowances will be low in the first years, which will correspond to a 
proportionate and low border adjustment.  
21.73.   The introduction of a CBAM seeks to address the risk of carbon leakage and thereby avoid 
having E U climate action undermined. The CBAM  is only one of many components of the European 
Green Deal, which sets out a path towards achieving the European Union's climate targets. It aims 
to provide market incentives for the private sector to green their production.  
21.74.   It is in line with the European  Union's Paris Agreement commitments , and we need to 
implement our climate policies. The WTO does not reduce the right to regulate environmental 
measures.  
21.75.   As said, the CBAM is a purely climate -oriented, environmental policy tool. It will be applied 
in a no n-discriminatory and even -handed manner in compliance with our international obligations. 
The charge considers the actual carbon content of a product.  
21.76.   Nor does the CBAM target third  countries. It is addressed to companies as it applies to goods 
in certain carbon -intensive sectors , and it takes into consideration the application of carbon pricing 
systems by third  countries, opening possibilities for reduction or non -payment of the CBAM  charge. 
It also takes into consideration the carbon footprint of individu al producers, such that the CBAM will 
be charged according to the actual emissions of imported goods.  
21.77.   The European Union is ready to further engage with trade partners and international 
organizations to inform and, where possible, assist with the implement ation of the measure.  
21.78.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
22  EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION -FREE COMMODITIES (DFC ) (ID  84) – 
STATEMENT BY INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
22.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia 
and the Russian Federation.  
22.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following : 
22.3.   Russia notes that the European Parliament , on 19  April 2023, adopted the text of the so -called 
Deforestation Regulation , over which the m ain institutions of the European Union reached an 
agreement last December.  
22.4.   In this regard , we would like to point out the following . First, the regulation on 
deforestation -free commodities is a trivial quantitative restriction measure that discriminates 
products by their origin. The measure is incompatible with Article  XI and Article  I of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Despite the fact that this particular legal act establishes the concept 
of the mechanism to be imposed, there is no doubt that it will have a severe impact on trade across 
a wide range of agricultural produc ts. G/MA/M/78  
 
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  22.5.   Second, there is also a lack of clarity regarding the implementation of the measure. How is 
the European Union going to classify countries of origin depending on the situation with 
deforestation? How , and on what basis , is the EU is going to determine whether human rights are 
violated or not? What are the specific requirements to be applied to due diligence expertise , and so 
on? There are many questions to this regulation , and to how it is supposed to work.  
22.6.   To conclude, the Russian Federation would like  to note that the number of unilateral measures 
taken by the European Union under the environmental pretext is growing. Such measures ignore 
WTO rules and discussions at the United Nations, making all potential international arrangements in 
the field of co mbating common challenges, as well as the work itself at the global level , pointless.  
22.7.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
22.8.   Once again , we intend to voice our concerns regarding the European Union's DFC  policy 
proposal, which includes ma ndatory due diligence on seven products that are considered to have a 
potential impact on deforestation, namely soybeans, beef, palm oil, wood, cocoa, rubber , and coffee.  
22.9.   We are of the view that the intended DFC  proposal has the potential to provide differ ent 
treatment between European Union domestic products and imported products. With regard to the 
mandatory due diligence mechanism, we are of the view that the said due diligence has the potential 
to become a trade barrier, which could limit import access of the seven  listed products in to the 
European market.  
22.10.   Indonesia is very concerned that this DFC  proposal could interfere with the rights of 
developing countries to realize their development  potential , and believes they violate the legal 
sovereignty of oth er WTO  Members , considering that the regulations drawn up by the European 
Union cannot be imposed unilaterally on other WTO  Members.  
22.11.   With this issue, we intend to request further explanation and elaboration from the European 
Union of the solid basis for de termining the commodities covered by the DFC , of the plans to expand 
the list of DFC  commodity coverage, and of the  details of the mandatory due diligence mechanism. 
Furthermore, Indonesia urges the European Union to review its proposal to ensure that it d oes not 
interfere with international trade, nor conflict with Article  XI of the GATT  1994 regarding the General 
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.  
22.12.   Lastly, Indonesia emphasizes that the European Union should, in the process of preparing 
such a regula tion and proposal , as well as in its implementation , take into account the 
CBDR -RC principle, which provides different treatment between developed and developing countries.  
22.13.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
22.14.   Paraguay reiterates the importance of taking into account the economic, social , and 
environmental dimensions of sustainability , and ensuring that measures are implemented in 
accordance with international principles and standards, in particular those of this Organiz ation, 
relating to environmental measures with a trade impact . 
22.15.   The transition towards sustainability in productive systems needs to be gradual and 
determined by Members themselves , according to their economic and social development needs. 
Local circumstanc es in different regions and their specific productive, social , and environmental 
characteristics must also be respected.  
22.16.   A combination of penalties as well as incentives must be put in place so that Members are 
able to achieve their common objectives in the fight against global environmental challenges , such 
as climate change , the preservation of biodiversity, and pollution . However, while  only EU producers 
benefit from significant subsidies, whether directly to comply with these measures or  not, but 
certainly reducing their costs by doing so, producers from countries such as Paraguay,  which provide 
free ecosystem and environmental services and produce without subsidies , are being penalized by 
having to comply with the same measures.  For Para guayan producers, the costs of complying with 
these measures come out of their profits, as opposed to being a small fraction of the domestic 
support they receive.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  22.17.   We recall that , while some Members have industrialized and achieved their current level of 
development through highly polluting and environmentally damaging methods , and are responsible 
for climate change, other Members that have only marginally  or not at all  contributed to climate 
change , as in the current situation,  are being penalized and force d to comply with the same 
measures without the same level of support. This clearly disregards the principle enshrined in 
international environmental law of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 
Capabilities.  
22.18.   Paraguay therefore reiterate s the request  to the European Union  that it has made  in other 
committees , and the Council for Trade in Goods,  to explain how these measures are consistent with 
the principle of non -discrimination , and how the three  elements of sustainability and common but  
differentiated responsibilities can be reconciled, bearing in mind that the countries that contribute 
the least to climate change are those  most affected by it and, at the same time, are the main targets 
of measures such as deforestation , given the choice of commodities.  
22.19.   Lastly, we note that the Regulation was recently approved by the European Parliament after 
the internal negotiation process , and now just awaits formal endorsement by the Council before 
being published and entering into fo rce. We would like to know when and how the EU plans to notify 
these measures to the WTO.  
22.20.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
22.21.   Ecuador views with concern the development of policies under the Green Deal and rules on 
DFC, since they are un ilateral decisions that have international ramifications and could affect 
third countries. Decisions that affect other Members must take into account the views that other 
Members may have on a particular environmental matter.  
22.22.   Moreover, unilaterally imposin g environmental standards that have economic and trade 
implications for third  parties is inconsistent with the spirit, rules , and procedures of the multilateral 
trading system.  As we have already indicated, Ecuador  consider s the Paris Agreement to be a sol id 
basis for avoiding a situation where any standard that is adopted in relation to the control of 
greenhouse gases and deforestation is imposed on a specific country or established unilaterally with 
effects on third parties.  
22.23.   Ecuador would be grateful if t he European Union could provide information in response to 
the comments made at this meeting of the Committee.  
22.24.   The representative of Argentina  indicated the following:  
22.25.   Argentina is closely following the EU's legislative process on deforestation, and reiter ates its 
concern about the single model concept that the EU seeks to impose . In Argentina's view, this model 
does not take into account the different characteristics of the production models of the various 
countries. Argentina remains concerned about the c onsistency of this measure with WTO  principles.  
22.26.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
22.27.   We would like to refer to the statement we made at the last CTG  meeting , and indicate here 
certain points of importance with regard to the European Union 's proposed regulation on 
deforestation -free commodities.  
22.28.   In this context, we believe that it is important that the technical requirements of the 
proposed regulation , like certification or verification , which third  country operators will face when 
they place these products on the EU  market , should be the same as for EU operators. In that regard, 
it is considered critical that no additional administrative burden should be placed on third  countries.  
22.29.   Besides, in order for a regulation to serve its purpose without preventing the trade of any 
product, Türkiye believes that possible extensions in the scope of the legislation should be 
determined on the basis of solid data , showing that the products covere d are indeed the largest 
contributors to global deforestation.  
22.30.   The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  22.31.   The European Union would like to thank Indonesia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Argentina,  and 
Türkiye for their interventions and interes t. 
22.32.   The main driver of deforestation and forest degradation is the expansion of agricultural land, 
linked in particular to the production of a series of commodities of which the European Union is a 
major consumer.  The seven  commodities covered by the scope of the regulation – beef, wood, palm 
oil, soya, coffee, cocoa, and rubber, as well as some of their derived products, such as leather, 
furniture, print products , or chocolate – are the commodities through which the European Union has 
a greater impact on th e world's forest degradation.  These commodities have been selected 
objectively, based on the best available scientific data.  
22.33.   The Regulation will introduce mandatory due diligence rules for operators who place those 
commodities and their derived products on  the EU market , or export from it.  Only products that are 
both deforestation -free and legal according to the laws of the country of origin will be allowed on to 
the EU market.  
22.34.   The Regulation will apply equally to commodities produced inside and outside the European 
Union. It relies on concepts developed at the international level, and specifically on the work of the 
FAO, to determine what is to be considered a "forest" or "deforestation" under the Regulation.  There 
will be no ban on any country nor commodity . All countries, including those considered at high risk 
of deforestation, will be able to continue to sell their commodities on the EU  market – provided that 
the operators, so those who place them on the market, can demonstrate that those commodities 
are deforestation -free and legal.  
22.35.   The Regulation is an environmental measure that complements global and multilateral 
action, and is developed in compliance with the European Union's international commitments , 
including its trade agreements, and WTO  requiremen ts. Great importance has been given to the 
external dimension of this Regulation, both in its design stage , and currently , in the implementation 
phase.  
22.36.   The regulation is an opportunity to enhance trade in deforestation -free products and to boost 
opportunit ies for sustainable actors around the globe.  
22.37.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
23  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (ID  35) – STATEMENTS BY SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  
23.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of 
Switzerland and the United States.  
23.2.   The representative of  Switzerland  indicated the following:  
23.3.   My delegation is not in a position to report any progress on the selective tax since our meeting 
of last October, despite our requests for information in this Committee and in the Council for Trade 
in Goods . 
23.4.   According to  the information  available , the current  state of play is as follows : the selective 
tax is still an ad valorem  tax, whose rates are 100% in the case of energy drinks , and 50% for other 
sweetened beverages.  The Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) members have on several occasions 
underlined that they are reforming the tax. Thus, the current ad valorem  tax will be replaced by a 
volumetric tax.  
23.5.   We have acknowledged the explanation that we have received from our colleagues from the 
GCC members, namely that the proces s of reform is complex and will take time.  Nevertheless , we 
reiterate our request to the GCC  member States to clarify whether or not they have completed their 
domestic consultations , and for possible updates with regard to the reform.  
23.6.   Until the reform is a dopted and implemented, we reiterate our long -standing request, namely 
for an harmonization of the tax rate at 50% for all sweetened beverages , in contrast to the  current G/MA/M/78  
 
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  discrimination between energy drinks and other sweetened beverages , which has been in place since 
the implementation of the tax. We urge the GCC not to wait until the reform is implemented to 
address our concern.  
23.7.   We thank our colleagues here in Geneva for looking into possible time slots for a bilateral 
meeting, which we hope to hold soon in order to clarify certain  open issues.  
23.8.   The representative of  the United States  indicated the following:  
23.9.   The United States, along with Switzerland, the European Union,  and Japan, circulated 
questions in April  2021 to GCC  member State governments regarding the status of the selective tax 
on beverages.  
23.10.   While we appreciate the information provided during the last Committee meeting – as well 
as separate discussions with GCC  member State officials since then – we note that we still have yet  
to receive written responses to the questions from April  2021, and ask these Members to update us 
as to when such responses to those questions will be provided.  
23.11.   As we have conveyed before, we request a substantive update on revisions to the GCC  excise 
tax model and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement , and note the 
importance of timely engagement with interested parties regarding this issue.  
23.12.   The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.13.   The European Union a lready explained in detail our concerns, which remain, with regard to 
the GCC "Treaty on Excise Tax" of December  2016, including at the CTG at the beginning of this 
month. Today , the European Union would like to reiterate once again the importance of harmo nizing 
the implementation of the Excise Tax law , and urge the GCC  member States to ensure close 
engagement with private industry stakeholders in the process of revising the tax.  
23.14.   The European Union looks forward to further engaging with the GCC  member State s on this 
important issue.  
23.15.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
23.16.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait and Oman I would like to thank the delegations of 
Switzerland, the United States,  and the European Union for the ir interest in the GCC  excise tax 
regime and their communication on the application of the excise tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt 
beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other sweetened beverages.  
23.17.   Regarding the timeline of the ongoing process for the new GCC  excise tax model and its 
implementation, I would like to reiterate that the revision of the excise tax on beverages is still 
under  way, given that it is a complex exercise that requires significant efforts, extensive coordination 
between multiple entities , and comprehensive evaluation. The GCC  Working Group on Tax Issues is 
dedicated to completing this exercise in order to provide the GCC  member States with appropriate 
results and high standard excise tax models.  
23.18.   In conclusion, GCC  member States have adopted appropriate procedures and timeline s for 
the revision of their excise tax regime. Once the process is completed , the relevant informat ion will 
be immediately shared with WTO  Members.  
23.19.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
24  INDIA – QUALITY CONTROL ORDER FOR CHEMICAL AND PETROCHEMICAL 
SUBSTANCES (ID 98) – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
24.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had bee n included at the request of Indonesia.  
24.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  24.3.   Indonesia would like to repeat its previous statement at the TBT Committee meeting in 
March  2023, where we have not received adequate solutions and firm elabor ate explanations from 
India to be able to provide us with an adequate transition period to allow Indonesian industries to 
comply with the intended Indian regulations, which would be at least 1 2 months from publication  or 
until 23  October  2023.  
24.4.   In addition,  Indonesia will also request India to accept the conformity assessment results 
issued by foreign conformity assessment bodies , or inspection bodies , under the MRA/MLA and 
accreditation framework. Indonesia believes that this will accelerate the audit and certification 
process , while also reducing certification costs.  
24.5.   The representative of  the United States indicated the following:  
24.6.   We remain concerned by the proliferation of Quality Control Orders (QCO s) in India,  and in 
particular the increasing number  of chemicals for which India's Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers 
intends to mandate compliance with standards set by the Bureau of Indian Standards.  
24.7.   US industry remains concerned about the cost and administrative burdens these QCOs pose, 
and we encour age India to consult with stakeholders to determine a less trade  restrictive measure 
to fulfil the government's stated objectives.  
24.8.   The representative of  India indicated the following:  
24.9.   This is an issue related to the TBT  Agreement. It is being discussed in the TBT Committee , 
as well as in the Council for Trade in Goods. We are engaging with interested Members on this issue 
in the appropriate forums .  
24.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
25  INDIA – BASIC CUSTOMS DUTY (BCD) ON SO LAR PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND 
MODULES (ID  87) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
25.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
25.2.   The representative of  China  indicated the following:  
25.3.   As China pointed out in the last formal meeting of this Committee, India has significantly 
increased the BCD on solar photovoltaic (PV) cells and modules, exceeding the bound rates to which 
India had committed itself in the I TA. Implementing such measures has already disrupted the global 
industrial supply chain in solar PV , and will do nothing to achieve emission reduction targets.  
25.4.   China urges India immediately to correct its unlawful practices that are violating the 
WTO rules, and to revoke the BCD imposed  on solar PV  cells and modules.  
25.5.   The representative of  India indicated the following:  
25.6.   We thank the delegation of China for their interest in this issue. We are currently reviewing 
the questions raised by the delegation of China and will revert to them in due course.  
25.7.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
26  INDIA – APPROVED LIST OF MODELS AND MANUFACTURERS (ALMM) OF SOLAR 
PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULES (ID  88) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
26.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  China.  
26.2.   The representative of  China  indicated the following:  
26.3.   As China pointed out in the last formal meeting of this Committee, India has promoted the 
implementation of the approved list of models and manufacturers of solar PV  modules, which China G/MA/M/78  
 
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  believes  violates the principle of national treatment in the GATT  1994. Implementing such measures 
will disrupt the international trade order of solar PV  products and impose unnecessary burdens on 
solar PV  enterprises.  
26.4.   China urges India to implement the relevant measures fairly, transparently, and in a 
non-discriminatory manner, actively consider replacing on -site factory inspections with remote or 
third-party factory inspections, and reasonably levy applicable fees to avoid unnecessary obstacles 
to inter national trade.  
26.5.   The representative of  India indicated the following:  
26.6.   We thank the delegation of China for their interest in this issue. We request the delegation of 
China to explain what specific market access problems they have faced on account of this pr oposed 
standard, so the same may be examined.  
26.7.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
27  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES (ID  61) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN 
AND MATSU AND THA ILAND  
27.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei , and Thailand.  
27.2.   The representative of Indonesia22 indicated the following:  
27.3.   Indonesia again conveys its objections to India , since Indonesia has not received an adequate 
solution from India regarding the issue of limiting tyre imports. Moreover, exports of Indonesian tyre 
products to India are still hampered from entering the Indian market.  
27.4.   Indonesia asks for further clarifica tion from India regarding the policy of limiting tyre imports , 
and the policy of imposing a marking fee on the use of the Indian Standard Mark (IS  Mark) on tyre 
products exported to third  countries.  
27.5.   As stipulated in Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 by the Indian government on 12  June 2020, 
Indonesia understands that the Indian government has made amendments to its tyre import policy 
from "free" to "restricted". Furthermore, we are of the view that India's current import policy has 
become increasingly string ent, in which every container containing imported tyres sent to India 
needs to be sampled for customs purposes, to fulfil provisions related to warehouse registration 
where  the imported tyre products are stored.  
27.6.   Indonesia is aware that as a form of the sai d tyre import restriction policy, India has required 
importers to make separate statements via electronic mail (email) regarding import restrictions for 
certain types and size categories of tyres that can be produced domestically in India. Indonesia is of 
the view that the restriction on tyre imports based on certain types and sizes is a form of quantitative 
restriction , which is prohibited under Article  XI of the GATT regarding the General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions.  
27.7.   Indonesia is of the view that the restriction on imports of Indian tyres is discriminatory, 
because it is applied selectively, namely only to a certain number of WTO  Members that have the 
potential to become a threat to domestic Indian tyre manufacturers ; in this way, the said pol icy 
potential ly conflict s with one of the main principles of the WTO, namely the principle of 
non-discrimination . Not only that, Indonesia is also of the view that the policy of limiting imports of 
Indian tyres has actually hampered market access for Indon esian tyre products to India.  
27.8.   Indonesia would like to ask for further clarification from India regarding the imposition of a 
marking fee on tyre products marked with the Indian Standard (IS)  Mark that will be exported to 
 
22 The delegation of Indonesia indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of the ir statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  third countries. Indonesia is of th e view that the imposition of the IS  Mark marking fee can burden 
tyre business actors  beyond the costs that are necessary.  
27.9.   Therefore, Indonesia urges the Indian government immediately to review its policy on limiting 
imports of tyre products to ensure the policy's compliance with India's commitment to Article  XI of 
the GATT  1994 regarding the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, as well as the 
WTO principles of transparency and non-discrimination . 
27.10.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
27.11.   Like Indonesia, Thailand would like to reiterate our concerns , which we have raised on 
numerous occasions in various WTO  bodies , regarding India's import policies on tyres.  
27.12.   In 2022, the exports of car tyres from Thailand to India declined in volume by 57% compared 
to 2021 , and fell by a staggering rate of 71% relative to 2019 , before this measure was implemented. 
The first  two months of 2023 have also seen a continuing sharp drop in the exports of tyres from 
Thailand to India,  by 54% compared to the same period in 2022 , and by 77% compared to the 
first two months of 2019. Globally, however, as a result of this restrictive import mea sure, in 2022, 
India's total imports of car tyres from around the world declined by 40% , and India's imports of 
tyres for transport vehicles and trucks fell by 32%. All these figures indicate that India's restrictive 
import policy on tyres has still consid erably affected Thailand's and those of India's other trading 
partners ' exports of the products to India, which has aggravated over time. A question to India is , 
"How far must these import figures decline before India stops implementing this measure?"  
27.13.   Also, we regret to say that we have yet to receive any response from India regarding the 
request for information that we first made in October  2022, which is a simple and straightforward 
request to which it should not take India long to respond. Nevertheless, we are going to reiterate 
our request once again on this occasion, which is that India provide the following information : (i) the 
administration of the restrictions, including the time-frame or period for processing application s; 
(ii) the import licences granted to Thailand over the recent period; and  (iii) the distribution of such 
licences among supplying countries.  
27.14.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following :23 
27.15.   The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu has consis tently 
expressed its concerns regarding India's licensing regime on the importation of pneumatic tyres 
under Notification No.  12/2015 -2020. This notification amended certain pneumatic tyre's import 
regulation from "Free" to Restricted".  
27.16.   We remain disappoin ted that India has not adjusted or revoked its existing measures, nor 
clarified its criteria for granting licences , or explained the reasons for its refusals.  
27.17.   According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India's statistics, the quantity of our 
tyre export s to India from 2020 to 2022 sharply decreased , by 50% compared to our tyre export s 
in 2019. This clearly indicates that the measure has significantly hampered our tyre products' access 
to the Indian market, resulting in substantial adverse effects  on trade.  
27.18.   We urge India to abide by the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures. This specifically requires that import licensing measures shall neither restrict nor distort 
trade, and that India publishes complete informat ion about the import licence application, ensuring 
transparency so that foreign manufacturers are able to understand the criteria for licence approval , 
and the detailed reasons for potential licence rejections.  
27.19.   It is evident that India's measures have resu lted in a quantitative restriction on tyre imports. 
We request India to provide a WTO -consistent justification for its restrictive measure. Otherwise, we 
strongly urge India to ensure that all import licence applications  that fully comply with the required  
quality standard for tyre products are granted a licence without any quota limitations at all.  
 
23 The delegation of Chinese Taipei indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of the ir 
statement would be provided for inclusion in the minutes.  G/MA/M/78  
 
- 63 - 
 
  27.20.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.21.   As mentioned by other co -sponsors, this is a long -standing issue. It is very worrying that 
there has been no progress made, despite this issue being raised on multiple occasions in this and 
other WTO  Committees.  
27.22.   The European Union continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure on imports 
of tyres in to India. As in the case of Thailand, European Union exports of tyres to India have been 
decreasing since June  2020. Only a limited number of licences have been granted to EU tyre 
manufacturers. In addition, these licences are limited in terms of duration, quantity, and type of 
tyres. This is a blatant discrimination against EU tyre manufacturers.  
27.23.   The European Union continues to urge India to reconsider and eliminate any implicit or 
explicit quantitative or other restriction on the import of replacement tyres that run contrary to 
WTO requirements.  
27.24.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
Canada would like to express its continuing concerns, which have been raised on a number of 
occasions in various WTO  bodies, with India's non -automatic import licensing sy stem for tyres. 
Canada urges India to eliminate this quantitative import restriction in accordance with its 
WTO obligations.  
27.25.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
27.26.   India would like to thank Indonesia, Thailand, Chinese Taipei, the European Un ion and 
Canada for their continued interest in this issue. We would also like to refer to our response provided 
in the previous meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods, the CMA, and the Committee on Import 
Licensing.  
27.27.   My delegation would like to reiterat e that the non -automatic licensing requirements for tyres 
are administered in a manner consistent with the rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures , including with respect to the time -frames for the grant ing of import licences . 
27.28.   The procedu ral requirements on marking fee s are also compliant with the relevant provisions 
of the TBT  Agreement . 
27.29.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
28  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS (ID  62) – STATEMENTS BY 
JAPAN AND THAILAND  
28.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Japan and 
Thailand . 
28.2.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
28.3.   Japan reiterates its concerns regarding India's import ban on air conditioners , including 
refrigerants. This is a m easure that unreasonably imposes a restructuring of corporate supply chains. 
Japan is strongly concerned that this measure is likely to be inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the 
GATT and Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement . 
28.4.   With regard to the IS  Mark certification based on the Q uality Control Orders  for air 
conditioners and their related parts, we acknowledge that the scheduled implementation date has 
been extended from January  to October  2023. Nevertheless, we again  request India to ensure that 
the fa ctory testing for foreign manufacturers is conducted smoothly by the Bureau of Indian 
Standards (BIS). Otherwise, we call on India to consider introducing some alternative procedures in 
the case that its officials are facing difficulty in travel ling overse as, or else to extend the 
implementation date again.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  28.5.   We would like to recall that , at the CTG 's previous meeting, India stated that it had already 
reported to the Committee on Import Licensing , in notification document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 . In 
addition, it is unfortunate that Japan had raised this issue in the CTG and other bodies in view of the 
strong market  share of Japanese firms in India over the past three  years. However, the notification 
that India has submitted to the Committee on Import Licensing is related to the importation  of 
refrigerants themselves, not to refrigerants enclosed in air conditioning equipment, which is the 
subject of this issue ; the notification is therefore not relevant to this measure.  
28.6.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
28.7.   Thailand would like to echo Japan's concerns regarding India's import prohibition on air 
conditioners containing refrigerants. Despite our intervention s on numerous occasions , and our 
esteemed Indian delegate's statement that our concerns had been conveyed to New Delhi f or 
analysis, four  months have passed, and we have heard absolutely nothing back from India.  
28.8.   Although the ban at issue might be justified under Article  XX of the GATT  1994, we believe 
that there is no rational connection between this measure and India's obj ective of protecting the 
ozone layer, as required under Articles  XX(b) or XX(g) of the GATT  1994. India's Notification 
No. 41/2015 -2020 merely lists two  HS Codes for air  conditioners that are subject to India's import 
prohibition if they contain refrigeran ts. The Notification does not specify the types of prohibited 
refrigerants, nor, for instance, does it explain whether these are the ozone -depleting substances 
listed in the Montreal Protocol.  
28.9.   Moreover, India's Ozone Depleting Substances Regulation and Con trol Rules, read together 
with their 2014  Amendment, provide for many exceptions for India's domestic products that contain 
ozone -depleting substances, including air conditioners. This suggests that India applies its import 
ban "in a manner that constitute s a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail", within the meaning of the chapeau of Article  XX of the 
GATT  1994. In this regard, Thailand refers to its statements delivered at  previous meetings of the 
CMA and Council for Trade in Goods , where numerous examples of these exceptions were provided. 
We request India to enlighten us on its  justification for continuing to implement this restrictive 
measure.  
28.10.   Last but not least, we have also found that In dia's notification to the Committee on Import 
Licensing , in document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 , is at odds wi th this import restriction on air conditioner s 
with refrigerant. According to the notification, the importation of hydrofluorocarbons is allowed , 
given that a non -automatic import licence is granted. Ironically, if an air  conditioner  contains the 
same subs tance , the importation of this air conditioner into India will be banned. Thailand fails to 
understand why India always refer s to this notification when it in fact contradicts the ban at issue . 
Accordingly, Thailand requests India to provide an explanation  as soon as possible  of its 
self-contradictory and discriminatory action.  
28.11.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
28.12.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by Japan and Thailand regarding 
India's import restriction on  air conditioners.  Korea believes that the measure appears to be 
inconsistent with the WTO rules, particularly Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, thereby creating an 
unnecessary obstacle to trade.  Korea requests that India resolve the issue in a timely manner.  We 
stand ready to further engage with India.  
28.13.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
28.14.   India would like to thank Japan, Thailand,  and the Republic of Korea for their continued 
interest in this issue. We would also like to refer to our response provided in other WTO  bodies on 
this issue. My delegation has already shared details of these measures  with delegations , including 
as concerns their intent , and ongoing developments. The measure taken is linked to our compliance 
with the Montreal Protocol with respect to refrigerant -based cooling.  
28.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  29  INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM (ID 99) – STATEMENT BY TH E 
EUROPEAN UNION  
29.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union.  
29.2.   The representative  of the European Union  indicated the  following : 
29.3.   The European Union has commented in several WTO  bodies on Indonesia's import restrictive 
policies and practices. The European Union has repeatedly stressed its deep concerns over the 
increasing number and scope of Indonesian restrictions, w hich have  negative impacts on trade flows.  
29.4.   The European Union is particularly concerne d by the restrictive impact that the Commodity 
Balance Mechanism may have. Under the mechanism, import licences will only be granted if domestic 
demand cannot be met by domestic supply. We are concerned that the scope of application of the 
mechanism keeps expanding.  We welcome efforts to ensure a coordinated and streamlined approach 
on the management of import and export licences . But we are concerned that the mechanism might 
lead to further restrictions to trade flows , in turn raising questions about its W TO compatibility.  
29.5.   We lack clarity as to the actual implementation of the Commodity Balance  Mechanism , 
including in terms of its scope and timelines for the application to different groups of products. This 
creates additional challenges for economic operators in terms of legal certainty and predictability.  
29.6.   The European Union would therefore like to ask In donesia for its clarifications of the 
implementing measures that it intends to take , and also  urges Indonesia to ensure that the relevant 
policies and measures are compliant with Indonesia 's WTO  obligations.  
29.7.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicat ed the following:  
29.8.   The United Kingdom shares the concerns raised by the European Union. Although we do 
support Indonesia 's effort to be more transparent, it appears that Indonesian regulations related to 
commodity balance will be trade restrictive.  UK busin esses already experience procedural delays in 
entering the Indonesian market, particularly in the agricultural, food and drink sectors. We therefore 
continue to request both that Indonesia reconsider its import substitution programme , and that it 
reduce lo cal content requirements across all sectors.  
29.9.   The United Kingdom  also requests further information on the exact goods that will be covered 
by Indonesia 's commodity balance mechanism , preferably by means of specific Harmonized System 
codes.  The UK would welc ome further information from Indonesia on any future developments 
regarding this policy , and looks forward to future engagement on this subject.  
29.10.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
29.11.   The Republic of Korea shares concerns expressed by other Members regarding Indonesia 's 
Commodity Balance Mechanism.  It has been reported that our exporters are facing  challenges 
brought about by the Commodity Balance Mechanism , such as undue delays in the issuance of the 
recommendation , and limited quantity of import quarter.  
29.12.   In particular, Korea believes that Indonesia 's import restrictions, which are based on its own 
projection of domestic supply and demand, would undermine the transparency of the mechanism 
itself.  Accor dingly, Korea requests that Indonesia enhance the transparency and improve the 
functioning of the mechanism to avoid it serving  as an unnecessary obstacle to trade.  Korea stands 
ready to deepen our engagement with Indonesia to fully resolve this matter.  
29.13.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
29.14.   The United States joins the European Union in again raising concerns regarding Indonesia 's 
commodity balance policy.  
29.15.   The commodity balance policy originally appeared to apply to certain agricul tural 
commodities. For example, in 2021, the first stage stipulated that the policy would apply to rice, G/MA/M/78  
 
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  sugar, beef, salt, and fish, but the policy has since been expanded to include non -agricultural 
products, in particular consumer goods such as cell pho nes. Since the policy was implemented, 
importers have reported experiencing significant delays in obtaining import licences for certain 
agricultural products, as well as reductions in the volumes received.  
29.16.   Please explain how the Government of Indonesia is addressing these administrative delays.  
Please explain whether importers are entitled to receive a licence covering whatever volume they 
request.  And p lease explain how the Government of Indonesia determines to which products the 
policy will apply.  
29.17.   While I ndonesia has previously explained that this policy was designed to build better trade 
governance and transparency in furtherance of its goal of import substitution, we strongly urge 
Indonesia not to expand its policy to other products, and to rethink this counter -productive and 
trade -disruptive policy.  
29.18.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
29.19.   Switzerland echoes the concerns of previous speakers regarding Indonesia's  commodity 
balance mechanism. We have also made our concerns known during previous meetings  of this 
Committee , and also at the CTG.  
29.20.   Switzerland is keen to get detailed information on the implementation of this policy , including 
the products covered by the mechanism , and how Indonesia intends to ensure the consistency of 
these measures with its WTO  obligations . We urge Indonesia not to expand this policy to other 
products.  
29.21.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
29.22.   Indonesia expresses its appre ciation to the European Union , the United Kingdom, the 
Republic of Korea, the United States,  and Switzerland,  for their  interest in the issue of Indonesia's 
Commodity Balance Mechanism.  
29.23.   Indonesia intends to reiterate its statement delivered at the previous  CTG Meeting, namely 
that the Commodity Balance is aimed at building better and more orderly global trade governance. 
In addition, the Commodity Balance does not burden the existing import regime ; in fact , the aim of 
the Commodity Balance is to create and facilitate a better business environment, certainty in doing 
business , and free trade flows. In addition, the Presidential Regulation on Commodity Balances has 
not been notified to the WTO as it is still in the revision stage ; for this reason, Indonesia ha s not 
been able to provide more detailed information.  
29.24.   The Commodity Balance Mechanism is a policy evaluation tool used by the Government of 
Indonesia for policy transparency based on accurate data, which will be implemented by the relevant 
ministries  and institutions. Therefore, the Commodity Balance is not an additional burden for the 
Indonesian import regime.  Indonesia intends to once again emphasize that the Commodity Balance 
Mechanism is not a policy designed to inhibit trade  in any way ; rather, it is a policy implemented by 
Indonesia in order to provide ease and certainty , while trying to increase investment and create 
jobs. 
29.25.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
30  INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS 
(ID 42) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
30.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union and the United States.  
30.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
30.3.   We continu e to be disappointed that Indonesia has not, for the last four  years, addressed our 
concerns with respect to applying tariffs on select ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound 
tariff commitments.  We, along with other Members, have been raising thi s issue with Indonesia G/MA/M/78  
 
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  repeatedly across multiple WTO  Committees. We have also raised our concerns bilaterally. Indonesia 
has yet to constructively respond to our concerns.  
30.4.   We understand that US  companies have also engaged the Indonesian government directl y on 
this issue, seeking clarification on Indonesia 's application of these tariffs. Despite their efforts, they 
too have yet to receive a satisfactory response from Indonesia.  Indonesia 's tariffs not only impose 
an unfair financial burden on foreign firms,  but they also limit access for Indonesian consumers and 
firms to important high -tech products.  The issue at play here is Indonesia 's duty -free market access 
commitments for several commercially  significant products, and the tariffs that are being charged 
at the border . 
30.5.   We have unfortunately seen similar issue s occur in multiple other countries. Earlier this 
month, several dispute panels found that India 's tariff treatment of a number of ICT  products was 
inconsistent with its WTO  commitments.  We urge Indone sia to engage constructively on this issue 
and finally address these long -standing concerns to ensure the integrity of its market access 
commitments.  
30.6.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following :24 
30.7.   The European Union has made many repetitive calls for Indonesia to align the tariff treatment 
of certain ICT  products classified under subheading  8517.62 with its WTO commitments. We are 
concerned about Indonesia 's significant tariff (10%) on products clas sified under tariff 
line 8517.62.10/49/69.  
30.8.   In this particular category of products (tariff item  8517.62.49) , the European Union has 
recorded a significant drop in its exports to Indonesia. We have observed a 60% drop in value of 
EU exports in 2020 compared  to 2019, and a 21% drop in 2020 compared to 2018.  
30.9.   During the meeting of the CMA of 6 April 2022, Indonesia informed Members that, according 
to the 2022  Indonesian customs tariff book, the products concerned were listed at 0% tariff. We 
understand that the  new customs tariff book entered into force on 1  April 2022. Upon verification, 
we regret ted to see that , despite Indonesia 's statement in the C MA, the tariff lines  8517.62.10, 
8517.62.49 , and 8517.62.69 , still carry a 10%  duty. 
30.10.   We seek further clarificati on from Indonesia as to how it intends to address the matter. We 
invite Indonesia to ensure duty-free treatment in accordance with its WTO  commitments , as bound 
in it its Goods Schedule.  
30.11.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
30.12.   Japan echoes the concerns raised by the United States and the EU about customs duties on 
certain telecommunication products in Indonesia.  
30.13.   Regarding the imposition of 10%  customs duties on certain ICT  products, and as Indonesia 
has previously explained in this Committee and in the  Committee of Participants on the Expansion 
of Trade in Information Technology Products  (ITA Committee ), "certain products may have been 
affected by the splitting and merging process during the transpositio n." Indonesia has also explained 
that it "did not intend to take action beyond its commitments or obligations under the 
ITA Agreement, and the relevant products are applied duty free as its commitment under the 
Customs Tariff Book of Indonesia 2022."  
30.14.   To fa cilitate careful consideration of the facts, Japan urges Indonesia to provide further 
details on the aforementioned customs duties, including information on a possible way forward.  
However, no information has been provided so far , and the tariffs at issue continue to be levied.  
30.15.   At last month's meeting of the ITA  Committee, Indonesia stated that domestic consultations 
were being conducted to resolve this issue. On that note, Japan request s Indonesia to respond in 
 
24 The delegation of the European Union indicated at the meeting that a lo nger written version of the ir 
statement would be provided for inclusion in the minutes . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  good faith by providing more details and info rmation on its future course of action , and to do so  as 
soon as possible , to allow us to examine the facts of the matter.  
30.16.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
30.17.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by others reg arding Indonesia 's 
customs duties on certain telecommunication products.  As noted, Korea believes that ICT  products 
classified under HS  8517.62 fall within Indonesia 's ITA  commitments , and should therefore be 
granted duty -free treatment.  
30.18.   Korea requests that Indonesia resolve this issue in a timely manner by complying with its 
commitments. We stand ready to further engage with Indonesia.  
30.19.   The representative of Canada  indicated the followi ng: 
30.20.   Canada 's concerns related to Indonesia 's tariffs on ICT  products expressed in past meetings 
of this and other WTO  bodies remain.  
30.21.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
30.22.   Indonesia express es its appreciation to the European Union , the United States , Japan, the 
Republic of Korea,  and Canada,  for their continued interest in the issue of Indonesia's import duties 
on telecommunications products.  Indonesia is still conducting domestic consultations between the 
relevant ministries and instituti ons to review the imposition of import duties on certain 
telecommunications products.  
30.23.   Indonesia will continue to strive to comply with all WTO  Agreements , including its 
commitment to the WTO  ITA. 
30.24.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
31  MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE (ID  64) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED 
STATES  
31.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the United 
States.  
31.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated th e following :25 
31.3.   The United States would like to raise its continued concern with the quantitative restrictions 
that Mexico has implemented on glyphosate . 
31.4.   In particular, we are referring to the 19 March  2023 announcement by Mexico 's Federal 
Commission for the Protection Against Sanitary Risks (COFEPRIS) that the total maximum amount 
of glyphosate authorized for importation in 2023 is 4,131  tonnes  of formulated glyphosate, and 
314 tonnes  of technical glyphosate, as determined by the National Council of Science and Technology 
(CONACYT).  
31.5.   Since Mexico began setting import quotas for formulated and technical glyphosate in 2021, it 
has not provided an opportunity for public comment, submitted a notification to the WTO of these 
QRs, or provided scientific evidence for the import quotas.  
31.6.   Can Mexico explain how the 2023  quota levels were determined , and on what basis were they 
reduced from 2022  quota levels (8,263  tonnes  of formulated glyphosate a nd 628  tonnes  of technical 
glyphosate)? Did Mexico solicit and consider public input when making its determination?  
 
25 The delegation of the United States indicated at the meeting that a full version of the ir statement 
would be provided in writing for inclusion in the minutes . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  31.7.   What information has Mexico provided to traders on how the quotas are administered? The 
announcement only states , "total figures that will b e distributed equitably among importing 
companies ". What HS  codes are affected? How are the quotas allocated?  
31.8.   Under the 13 February  2023 decree by which various actions regarding glyphosate and 
genetically modified corn are established, the importation, pr oduction, distribution and use of 
glyphosate will be phased out by 31 March  2024. What scientific evidence is this phase -out based 
on? 
31.9.   How does Mexico justify these measures in light of its GATT  obligations, including Article  XI 
of the GATT  1994?  
31.10.   The repre sentative of Canada  indicated the following:  
31.11.   Canada also has continuing concerns regarding Mexico's import quota on glyphosate.  
31.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
32  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS (ID  50) – STATEMENT  BY THAILAND  
32.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of Thailand.  
32.2.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
32.3.   First of all, Thailand would like to express our appreciation for the bilateral consultation we 
have had with N epal regarding Nepal 's import ban o n caffeinated mixed energy drinks and flavo ured 
synthetic drinks from Thailand since 2019. However, we would still like to raise our concern on this 
measure once again today.  
32.4.   Having said that, Thailand would like to conve y our empathy to the people of Nepal on the 
most difficult economic hardships facing the country , which have understandably forced the 
Government of Nepal to adopt the se measures.  
32.5.   Thailand would like to remind Nepal that WTO  Members facing balance -of-payment difficulties  
may apply import restrictions subject to the provisions under Article  XII of the GATT  1994, provided 
that they do not exceed those that are necessary, that they are progressively relaxed, and that they 
are maintained only to the extent that the conditions still justify their application.  
32.6.   Thailand also takes note of Nepal 's notification of this measure in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/NPL/1  dated 11  October  2022. However, Nepal has yet to provide any 
justification and other related details of the said measure. We urge Nepal to do so as soon as 
possible.  
32.7.   Thailand would also like to remind Nepal  of the provisions in Article  6 of the Understanding 
on the Balance -of-Payments Provisions of the GATT  1994, where "[A] Member applying new 
restrictive import measures taken for Balance -of-Payments purposes shall enter into consultations 
with the Committee  on Balance -of-Payments Restrictions within four  months of the adoption of such 
measures ", and Article  9 of the Understanding , where "[A] Member shall notify to the General 
Council the introduction of or any changes in the application of restrictive import measures taken 
for Balance -of-Payments purposes ". We urge Nepal to respect and follow these provisions without 
delay.  
32.8.   The representative  of Nepal  indicated the following:  
32.9.   Nepal would like to thank Thailand for its statement and continued interest in Nepal's trade 
policy measures , and notes that this concern has also been raised in the CTG. Accordingly, Nepal 
wishes to refer to its earlier statements delivered at the meetings of the CMA held in October  2022, 
and at the CTG  meeting s held in July  2022 and April  2023, in response to the concern raised today, 
while noting that Nepal is still facing challenges in its balance of payments.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  32.10.   Nepal's export -import ratio of trade in goods was 1:2.5 in 2004/2005 ; after Nepal became 
a Member of the WTO, it widened and reached 1:15.3 in 2017/2018 ; and the export -import ratio 
was more than 1:10 in the year 2022.  
32.11.   Similarly, the trade imbalance with Thailand has also remained high. Nepal has exported 
goods worth around  NPR 47 million in the year 2022 , and has imported goods amounting to more 
than NPR 11 billion in the same year. Furthermore, Nepal 's export -import ratio with Thailand 
remained more than  1:236 in  that same year. The widened trade deficit and import surge have been 
placing a huge pressure in its balance of payment s. The Government of Nepal is assessing the 
measure periodically in light of the pressure on its balance of payment s, and the possible 
consequences in terms of its trade deficit. I will update the Committee as soon as I receive further 
information from Capital.  
32.12.   Finally, my delegation would like to thank Thailand for its constructive presence , and for 
sharing its recent views at t he bilateral meeting held on 4  April 2023. The meeting was useful in 
order more closely to understand each other 's situation. Thank you all.  
32.13.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
33  PERU – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO (ID  74) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KIN GDOM  
33.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the United 
Kingdom.  
33.2.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
33.3.   As Members of the WTO, we have all agreed to work together through forums such as this 
one, to resolve trade issues, adhere to the rules, and to work collaboratively.  While  my delegation 
wishes to convey our thanks to the Delegation of Peru for their local engagement since this item last 
appeared on the agenda, we continue to hold re al concerns about the discriminatory environment 
created by Peru 's tax exemptions for Pisco.  
33.4.   This market access barrier is causing real economic damage. Peru 's measures have resulted 
in tens of millions of pounds of harm to UK  exporters. And, as we have heard previously, it is also 
causing harm to other Members.  This is also a long -standing barrier. It has been harming UK  exports 
for over a decade. And it has been maintained even whil e the UK and Peru have deepened our trade 
relationship, and the UK has raised this bilaterally on many occasions.  
33.5.   It is therefore disappointing that , over a year since the UK raised specific concerns on this 
topic within this Committee , and six months since those concerns were reiterated again at the 
Committee's last meet ing, we have seen no substantive steps forward from Peru in terms of 
resolution.  And whil e we want to underline that we fully appreciate and understand Peru 's present 
circumstances , we would hope that our increasingly strong trading relationship would mean  that the 
UK's written questions conveyed in August  2022 would have received an answer.  
33.6.   Finally , we would like to  welcome that Peru, in their October  statement, encouraged having 
bilateral conversations on this matter. We would happily do so. However, as part of such discussions, 
we would expect Peru to engage with the detail, the data, and the questions the UK has posed 
between Capitals and here in Geneva.  
33.7.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
33.8.   The United States continues to suppo rt the United Kingdom 's intervention on Peru 's excise 
taxes for distilled spirits, specifically the "Impuesto Selectivo al Consumo ". The United States 
remains concerned with the discrepancy in the rates applied to Pisco versus all other distilled spirits.  
33.9.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.10.   The European Union would like again to join the United Kingdom in its concerns around 
Peru's tax discrimination in favour of Pisco. The existing tax regime prevents EU spirits from 
competing on a level playing field in the Peruvian market.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  33.11.   The European Union has already asked Peru at previous Committee meetings to clarify how 
the excise tax (Impuesto Selectivo al Consumo) , which is higher for spirits other than Pisco , is in 
complianc e with Peru 's international obligations.  We are ready to engage and hope to make prompt 
progress on this issue.  
33.12.   The representative of Peru indicated the following:  
33.13.   As Peru has indicated previously, in our delegation's view , the Selective Excise Tax applied  
in Peru to alcoholic beverages does not establish any distinction that would affect the United Kingdom 
or any other WTO Member. This measure is applied to all alcoholic beverages in the context of a tax 
system that does not establish a differential treatm ent based on the product's origin. Therefore, 
there is no treatment intended to afford protection to domestic production.  
33.14.   My delegation takes note of the comments made by the United Kingdom, the United States,  
and the European Union, whose statements will be duly conveyed to Capital . We also invite the se 
delegations  to pursue our coordination efforts in the relevant  bilateral forums.  
33.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
34  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS (ID  56) – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEA N UNION  
34.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union.  
34.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
34.3.   We would like to congratulate Sri  Lanka on reaching an agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund ( IMF), and to express the hope that Sri  Lanka will pursue policies that facilitate trade, 
remove protectionist measures, reduce para-tariffs , and simplify import procedures.  
34.4.   While w e acknowledge the current  circumstances of the country , we would also like to 
reiterate our serious concerns regarding the import restrictions imposed by Sri  Lanka, in various 
forms, since April  2020.  We have witnessed a flurry of measures that have created additional 
uncertaintie s in a difficult economic environment. We have not received , during these years , any 
concrete or detailed answers to our questions on timing or status of the missing WTO  notification s, 
or justification of the measures, and information on their duration , or when they will be repealed.  
34.5.   Selective import restrictions have not solved Sri  Lanka 's persistent fiscal deficit and foreign 
currency constraints, while the macro -economic situation has further deteriorated, harming at the 
same time the European Union's  interests and exports, especially those of MSMEs.  The import 
restrictions and the difficulty of opening letters of credit have curtailed supplies of imported raw 
materials, intermediate goods , and equipment, have undermined economic activity, and have also 
caused shortages in essential goods.  
34.6.   We are ready to continue working with Sri  Lanka and call for a clear timetable of progressive 
and irreversible steps to remove the import restrictions.  
34.7.   The representative of the United Kingdom indicated the following:  
34.8.   The United Kingdom thanks the European Union for placing this item on the agenda.  
Furthermore , we want to thank the Delegation of Sri Lanka for their constructive engagement with 
our delegation on this matter.  In a recent bilateral  meeting , the Delegation of Sri  Lanka provided a 
helpful explanation of the conditions underpinning the imposition of this measure, and has provided 
further details.  
34.9.   The United Kingdom stands ready to support and work with Sri  Lanka through its current 
economic situation , and towards recovery. We are very much committed to a long -term trade 
relationship with Sri  Lanka, an d given that the current economic difficulties are presenting significant 
challenges to UK  businesses exporting to Sri Lanka,  we want to work together.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  34.10.   The United Kingdom would be interested in any further information on Sri  Lanka 's pathway 
towards the lif ting of import restrictions, any potential timelines, and to what extent IMF  conditions 
will have an impact on the swift relaxation of the import restrictions.  The United Kingdom looks 
forward to continuing its engagement with Sri  Lanka on this matter , and stands ready to work with 
partners to find a solution to these issues.  
34.11.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
34.12.   The United States reiterates its concerns over the import restrictions Sri  Lanka introduced , 
in March  2022, on what it deemed to be "non-essential goods. " 
34.13.   Although we understand that Sri Lanka started relaxing the import ban on many products in 
November  2022, we note that a temporary import ban still exists on 243  item categories as of 
January  2023. Items subject to the import ban include agricultural products such as milk, cream, 
yogurt, flours , and wheat.  The regulations from March  2022 also established a licensing process by 
which the government may allow some traders to continue importing the items subject to the ban,  
which delays imports of those products. We note that 276  items are currently suspended subject to 
this licensing process.  
34.14.   The United States understands that Sri  Lanka will lift its ongoing import restrictions for 
certain goods in stages , starting in June  2023, after the country received an IMF  loan in March  2023. 
Specifically, the Sri  Lankan government is planning to remove import restrictions on 100 to 
150 products within the next three  months, under the condition that it will not negatively affect 
Sri Lanka's exchange rates, foreign reserves, or inflation.  
34.15.   Which products does Sri  Lanka plan on removing from the import ban in June  2023?  
34.16.   Does Sri  Lanka plan on reversing its licensing process on 276  items that are currently 
suspended? If so, what is the time line for that reversal?  
34.17.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
34.18.   Japan echoes previous speakers' concerns regarding the possibility of inconsistencies with 
Article  XXII:1 of the GATT  1994. Sri Lanka has stated that it is necessary to reserve fo reign currency 
in order to meet domestic demand for essential items, and that import restrictions on automobiles 
will be maintained until the economy returns to normal, the reason for which, as before, is the 
balance -of-payment (BOP)  difficulties. However,  such an import restriction due to the BOP should 
not be introduced unless it is carried out with utmost caution and due consideration for the 
substantive and procedural requirements in the WTO  Agreement.  
34.19.   Japan understands the domestic situation in Sri  Lanka, such as the economic crisis and 
political instability. Having said that, noting that the economic crisis is gradually improving,  and the 
IMF has approved the financial support programme in March  2023, we request that Sri  Lanka 
withdraw this measure at the earliest possible date.  
34.20.   The representative of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
34.21.   Sri Lanka would like to thank the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom,  
and Japan for their continued interest in Sri  Lanka's trade policy measures.  
34.22.   As my delegation stated at previous meetings of the CMA and CTG, the restrictive import 
policy measures were imposed by Sri  Lanka to curb the adverse impact of the COVID -19 pandemic 
on its economy , on a temporary basis. Sri  Lanka was planning to remove them at the earliest  
opportunity . However, due to Sri  Lanka 's depleting foreign exchange reserves, rising external debt, 
acute foreign exchange shortages, exchange rate fluctuations , and so on , the country was unable to 
remove the measures completely , as previo usly envisaged.  Critical scarcity of foreign currency 
compelled the Government to take additional care in releasing foreign currency only for the most 
essential import items , including food, medicines, and fuel.  
34.23.   As stated previously, Sri  Lanka approached t he International Monetary Fund to request its 
assistance in address ing its economic crisis , including the BOP  crisis and the Government 's budget G/MA/M/78  
 
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  financing. We wish to inform the Committee that Sri  Lanka 's negotiations with the IMF have been 
highly successful. Accordingly, on 20  March  2023, the IMF approved approximately USD  3 billion 
under the new Extended Fund Facility  for Sri  Lanka, the first  tranche of which has already been 
released.  
34.24.   As per the arrang ements being made with the IMF, Sri Lanka is optimistic that its economic 
condition will gradually improve , together with its external financial situation once its debt 
restructuring process is completed. Accordingly, all positive steps will be taken by Sr i Lanka 
progressively to remove its restrictive import policy measures.  Finally, my delegation wishes to 
inform the Committee that my Capital is now taking the necessary steps to notify Sri  Lanka 's import 
policy measures to the WTO.  
34.25.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
35  TÜRKIYE – DISCRIMINATORY ADDITIONAL TARIFFS ON ELECTRIC VEHICLES (ID 100)  
– STATEMENT BY CHINA  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of China.  
35.2.   The representative of China  indicated the foll owing:  
35.3.   On 3 March, without explanation, Türkiye sharply increased import tariffs on China -made 
electric vehicles . China believes this to be inconsistent with the WTO rules.  
35.4.   First, the relevant measure violates Article  II of the GATT  1994. According to Türkiye 's tariff 
commitment, the bound rate for electric vehicles is 20%. The import tariff of China -made electric 
vehicles has reached 50%, significantly exceeding Türkiye 's tariff commitment.  
35.5.   Second, the relevant measure seriously violates the WTO  MFN principle. Türkiye 's action 
targeted only China -made electric vehicles, making the treatment of Chinese products significantly 
lower than that of similar products produced by other Members, which constitutes discrimination 
against China-made electric vehicles.  
35.6.   China urges Türkiye immediately to correct its wrongdoing on China -made electric vehicles.  
35.7.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
35.8.   We would like to thank China for its interest in this issue , which is currently bein g discussed 
by our colleagues in respective Capitals . We have also taken note of the comments made here today , 
which will be duly conveyed.  
35.9.   At this point, we would like to state that , as the Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the WTO , 
we have been , and will r emain , open to any request from China for an exchange of opinion on this 
topic.  
35.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
36  UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY (ID  101) – STATEMENT  BY CHINA  
36.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of China.  
36.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following :26 
36.3.   In the name of national security, unilateral economic sanctions have become major trade 
policy tools of certain WTO  Members in recent years. Their vast areas of application, the broad scope 
of their ramifications, and the severe harm they cause to the multilateral trading system have given 
rise to concerns among many Members . Some trade disruptive and discriminatory measures have 
 
26 The d elegation of China indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of the ir statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  been subject to the WTO  dispute settlement mechanism, and the dispute settlement panels have 
made consistent rulings in this regard. In short, most trade -restrictive measures introduced in the 
name of national security have deviated from the circumstance stipulated in the WTO 's security 
exception provisions. Rather, they have constituted an abuse of national security.  
36.4.   The United  States triggered this growing trend of abusing national security exceptions. Since 
the implementation of the 232  steel and aluminium  tariffs in 2018, the US has taken several 
trade -restrictive measures in the name of national security, including the following eight  categories:  
i. Tariff measures: 232  tariff measures and tariff quotas initiated against imported steel and 
aluminium  products;  
ii. Rules of origin measures: discriminatory application of origin marking;  
iii. Direct export restrictions: extensive export  controls on commercial products exported to 
China and on Chinese commercial entities;  
iv. Extra -territorial application of export restrictions: restricting the exports of specific products 
of third  countries that do not contain any US content to China through  the so -called foreign 
direct product rules;  
v. Procurement Prohibition: prohibit federal government agencies from procuring or using 
telecommunications products and services from specific Chinese companies; federal 
government agencies will also be banned fro m purchasing or using electronic products 
containing semiconductors produced by specific Chinese companies;  
vi. Discriminatory subsidies policies: prohibit subsidized telecommunications carriers from using 
products from specific Chinese companies; require semi conductor companies receiving 
US government subsidies to abandon their expansion plans in China, and disqualify subsidies 
for electric vehicles with batteries containing components or minerals originating from China;  
vii. Market authorization prohibitions: proh ibit the provision of authorization necessary for the 
marketing of telecommunications equipment to specific Chinese companies;  
viii. ICTS transaction reviews: review of commercial transactions for a broad range of 
ICT products and services, including procurement , import, transfer, installation, deal -in, or 
use, with the possibility of imposing prohibitive measures.  
36.5.   The abuse of national security is reflected in the following aspects:  
36.6.   First, the US believes that applying the security exception provision is solely self-judging and 
is not subject to review by WTO  dispute settlement panels. However, as several dispute settlement 
panel decisions have shown, neither the GATT 's negotiating history, the GATT's text, nor the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions by man y other Members agree with the US claim. As many 
scholars have pointed out, a legal defence  on a purely self -judging basis is tantamount to a black 
hole that will make exceptions become the rule and seriously undermine the multilateral trading 
system.  
36.7.   Second, the scope of US export control measures is so broad that it goes beyond international 
practices. Moreover, the unilateral nature of US export control measures is pushed to the extreme 
through its extraterritorial application. Under the Foreign -Direct P roduct Rules (FDPR), exports of 
items produced with US software or technology are subject to US controls, even if they do not 
contain any US content. The extreme unfairness of the measure can be compared to such a case 
where a European author wrote fiction  with a US -made pen but needed US permission to publish a 
Chinese edition in China.  
36.8.   Third, the ban on market access for Chinese telecommunications equipment and the extensive 
scrutiny of ICTS  transactions go well beyond the usual areas of applications, such as government 
procurement and critical infrastructure, including all sales and imports, including commercial sales.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  36.9.   Fourth, the discriminatory nature of subsidy policies is elevated to an unprecedented level. 
Granting U S government subsi dies contingent upon the prohibition from expanding capacity in China 
artificially fragments the market. It interferes with the autonomy of commercial businesses to make 
their own business decisions. Even battery components made in China are considered a p otential 
threat to US national security and therefore get discriminatory treatment in its subsidies policy.  
36.10.   We took note of the US  view that the integrity of the WTO was undermined by WTO  dispute 
panels ' decisions on national security cases , and the comments by USTR  Ambassador Katherine Tai 
that "the WTO is getting itself on very, very thin ice ". We beg to differ. What puts the WTO on thin 
ice is the abuse of security waivers by the U nited States  itself.  Such abuses have broke n one window 
after another of the mansion of the multilateral trading regime. They would give rise to the broken 
window theory, where exceptions become the rule , and place the rule s-based multilateral trading 
regime in grave danger.  
36.11.   China believes that to strengthen the rules -based multilateral trading system , with the WTO 
at its core, it is necessary to enhance the deliberative functions on such abusive security exceptions 
within the framework of the rules and procedures of the WTO.  
36.12.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
36.13.   As we have stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Committee 
on Market Access is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
36.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
37  UNITED STATES, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS AGREEMENT ON 
CHIP EXPORT RESTRICTIONS (ID  102) – STATEMENT  BY CHINA  
37.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of China.  
37.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
37.3.   In February of this year, several media disclosed that the United States, Japan, and the 
Netherlands had agreed on export control s of semiconductor manufacturing equipm ent against 
China. The agreement was also mentioned in the statement issued by the relevant enterprises.  
37.4.   However, we have yet to see any information regarding the agreement mentioned by the 
media , or published by the relevant governments. We are deeply con cerned with this 
non-transparent practice. We want to ask the United States , Japan, and the Netherlands whether 
the agreement exists. If the answer is yes, should such a significant agreement relating to export 
restriction s not be notified to the WTO , and reviewed by the relevant Members? Is it because the 
relevant Members know that the agreement may violate the WTO rules that they withhold disclosure 
of its contents?  
37.5.   Recently, Japan announced that it would amend the relevant content in its "Foreign Exchang e 
and Foreign Trade Law " to include products that have long been deleted from the Wassenaar 
Arrangement into the control list. The Netherlands is also simultaneously promoting legislative 
revisions. Its proposed export control policy on dual -use items goes  beyond the scope permitted 
explicitly by the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is an apparent expansion of the EU 's export control 
regulations on dual -use items.  
37.6.   It is reasonable to believe that the agreement was made under the pressure of economic 
coercion from the United States , as it hurts not only the interests of Chinese enterprises , but also 
the interests of other parties, including the relevant enterprises of Japan and the Netherlands. This 
agreement contradicts the WTO principles of openness and transparency , and undermines the 
authority and effectiveness of the WTO rules.  
37.7.   We reque st the relevant Members to notify the agreement and follow -up measures to the 
WTO, and call upon all Members to strengthen the monitoring of these measures.  
37.8.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  37.9.   As an initial matter, the United S tates has previously explained why WTO  forums, such as the 
Committee on Market Access, are not appropriate to discuss issues related to national security, such 
as export controls.  Furthermore, as also noted in the CTG, the United States takes issue with th e 
agenda item description as put forward by China.  
37.10.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
37.11.   On chip export restrictions, Japan has long been conducting strict export control s based on 
the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act in a manner consi stent with the WTO  Agreement s from 
the perspective of maintaining international peace and security.  We will continue to take action in 
accordance with the above policy.  
37.12.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
37.13.   As we stated  in the C TG, the European Union takes issue with the description of the agenda 
point by China, as a factual matter. Moreover, the type of measures regulated by the GATT are those 
adopted by individual Members. The European Union's statement therefore relates to the  latter only.  
37.14.   The matter raised by China needs rephrasing: it seems to concern planned national export  
control measures relating to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment announced by the 
Dutch government on 8 March. The national regulatory process  is still ongoing, and the measure is 
expected to be published in a Ministerial order before the summer.  
37.15.   The announced measure falls under the dual -use and export control framework of the 
European Union. This framework allows European Union member States t o impose additional 
national export controls based on essential security interests.  
37.16.   Any such export restriction will be adopted, in the same way as are all existing restrictions 
of this type, in full conformity with the WTO rules. Most notably, the GATT  permits Members to take 
action which they consider necessary for the protection of their essential security interests relating 
to traffic in goods carried on directly or indirectly for supplying military forces.  
37.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
38  UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN (ID  103) – STATEMENT BY 
CHINA  
38.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the reque st of China.  
38.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following :27 
38.3.   China continues to express serious concerns about the disruptive and discriminatory measures 
taken by the United States regarding the semiconductor industry.  
38.4.   First, the US Department of Commerce recently issued a Notice of Funding Opportunity 
CHIPS  Incentive Program – Commercial Fabrication Facilities. China believes that some measures in 
this notice may violate the WTO rules and severely distort the market.  
38.5.   For example , regarding the applicable threshold for funding. The notice indicates that an 
applicant must demonstrate how the CHIPS  Incentives requested will incentivize the applicant to 
make investments in the United States that would only occur with the CHIPS  Incentives.  This gives 
us the impression that the applicant 's investment decisions may not be based on market orientation, 
commercial interests, and logic , because those investments would not occur without the 
CHIPS  Incentives.  
38.6.   Regarding the intensity of financial su pport. In terms of the total amount, direct grant funds 
total up to USD 38.22  billion, and loans and loan guarantees can support approximately 
 
27 The delegation of China  indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of the ir statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  USD 75 billion in principal  loan. CHIPS  Incentive funds are typically , at most , 35% of project capital 
expenditur es on specific projects, and eligible projects must also receive subsidies at the local 
government level. In addition, under the CHIPS  Act, eligible projects can apply for investment tax 
credits of up to 25% of the relevant investment amount. The large sca le and intensity of financial 
support for CHIPS  Incentives can easily distort the market.  
38.7.   Regarding priority areas of support , the notice sets the prioritization and selection factors for 
selecting funding applications. One of the factors is to strengthen the intent to use domestically 
produced iron, steel, and construction materials. This may result in local content subsidies 
inconsistent with the SCM  Agreement . 
38.8.   Second, the United States also recently released a draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
Regardin g CHIPS  "Guardrails ", which imposes stringent restrictions on investment, production, and 
R&D outside the US by the subsidized companies. The draft provides that a transaction amounting 
to USD 100,000 is a significant transaction, and a 5%  increase in capa city is a substantial expansion 
of capacity. The double standard is evident when comparing these figures with the US subsidy 
amount and capacity target. The US intends to safeguard its interests by excluding some Members , 
including China, from the global s upply and industrial chain , thereby restricting the development of 
China 's semiconductor industry. This is a typical Cold War mentality, a zero -sum game, and trade 
bullying.  
38.9.   Third, in addition to discriminatory industrial subsidies, the United States has c ontinued to 
tighten export controls on the semiconductor industry to China. Since this year, the US has added 
more Chinese enterprises to its entity list , and applied Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR).  
38.10.   China believes that the United States' practice of weaponizing trade policies and coercing 
other Members has broken the established layout of the global semiconductor industry chain based 
on the advantages of resource endowments , and is the biggest obstacle to global trade and 
investment liberalization and facilitation, as it not only deviate s from the objective laws of the market 
economy , and seriously disrupts the regular order of international trade and investment, but also 
impacts upon the rules -based multilateral trading syst em. 
38.11.   The United States has implemented non -market measures in an undisguised manner, 
maliciously disrupting the global semiconductor industry chain and supply chain, abusing long -arm 
jurisdiction to coerce other Members to abide by US domestic laws, and goi ng further and further 
down the road of unilateralism, being a destroyer of the multilateral trade system and a manipulator 
of double standards in industrial policy.  
38.12.   The practice of abusing market dominance and forcing the decoupling of the semiconductor 
industry among Members has hindered technological progress and the global economic recovery 
after the pandemic. China calls on the WTO to strengthen its oversight of US practices related to 
violating WTO  rules, and to work together to maintain the stability  of the semiconductors ' global 
supply and value chain stability.  
38.13.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
38.14.   The Russian Federation's  intervention under this agenda item  also applies to Agenda 
Items  38 and 39 of the revised airgra m. 
38.15.   We thank the delegation of China for putting this item on the agenda. The Russian Federation 
is deeply concerned by the protectionist course taken by the United States as concerns the 
semiconductor industry.  
38.16.   The United States is seeking to secure its own economic interests and global leadership 
position by introducing a wide range of trade restrictions on semiconductor and electrical component 
markets. As we have heard from the representative of China today , and during the CTG  meeting 
earlier this mont h, disruptive and restrictive measures introduced by the US include , in particular , 
restrictions on export s from the US of semiconductors. The measures also involve anti -competitive 
arrangement s with Japan and the Netherlands to jointly restrict advanced c hip-manufacturing 
equipment exports to China.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  38.17.   These trade restrictions are not aimed only at China. The record number of unilateral 
measures imposed against Russia , including bans on the supply of semiconductor products , leaves 
no doubt about the geopoliti cal nature of the US ' unlawful actions, which aim to put up a barrier to 
prevent access to innovative products , as well as to undermine the technological progress and 
development prospects for the economies of certain countries.  
38.18.   The unilateral imposition o f politically motivated trade restricting measures clearly 
demonstrates the new reality that no Member is safe from the same unlawful treatment.  Washington 
continues to abuse the national security exceptions stipulated under the WTO  provisions to justify 
discriminatory measures that aim to restrict fair competition. Such actions undermine the functioning 
of an open and fair multilateral trading system.  
38.19.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
38.20.   The publicly available, and published , CHIPS Act explains in detail the initiative, including 
which entities and projects are eligible to receive support, and the types of support that they are 
eligible to receive.  
38.21.   The CHIPS  program has a website dedicated to publicly sharing information at 
www.chips.gov . On this public website, the US Department of Commerce has published its initial 
implementation strategy and the first  notice of funding opportunity.  
38.22.   The CHIPS  Act consists of three distinct initiatives: ( i) large-scale investments in 
leading -edge logic and memory manufacturing clusters; ( ii) expansion of manufacturing capacity for 
mature and current -generation chips, new and specialty technologies; and ( iii) initiat ives to 
strengthen and advance US leadership in R&D.  
38.23.   As we have explained to China previously, the contemplated support is consistent with 
US law and WTO  commitments.  As detailed in the CHIPS  Act and implementing regulations, a 
successful CHIPS  program wil l respond to market signals, fill market gaps, and reduce investment 
risk to attract significant private capital.  To that end, the publicly available CHIPS  Act and notice of 
funding opportunity set forth in detail the criteria, such as economic and nationa l security objectives 
and commercial viability, that the Department of Commerce will use to evaluate applications.  
38.24.   Contrary to China 's speculation, the evaluation criteria do not contain a requirement to use 
domestically produced inputs.  In addition, the US Department of Commerce will implement certain 
restrictions to ensure that those who receive CHIPS  funds cannot compromise national security. 
Those national security -based restrictions are described in more detail in the Act and in a notice of 
proposed ru le-making published in the Federal Register on 23 March  2023, which also solicited  
comments on the proposed rule.  
38.25.   Again, this Committee is not an appropriate forum for issues related to national security.  We 
would also note that China also has a semiconductor program. In particular, the national IC  fund, 
started in 2014, has never been notified. In addition, China has numerous programs at the central 
and sub -central levels of government in the form of government guidance funds, none of which has 
been notified.  
38.26.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
39  UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA (ID  90) – 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  
39.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this  agenda item had been  included at the request of China.  
39.2.   The re presentative of China  indicated the following:  
39.3.   We are deeply concerned that the United States has imposed Section  301 tariffs on China 's 
USD 360 billion worth of goods imported to the US for more than four  consecutive years , and 
extended them again , even i f the dispute settlement panel ruled that the measures were inconsistent 
with the WTO rules.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  39.4.   The Section  301 tariffs imposed by the United States on certain goods from China not only 
seriously violate the WTO  rules; they are also not serving the interests of Chinese and American 
enterprises and people. According to the report  of the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC) , the cost of Section  301 tariffs is almost entirely borne by US importers, making it more 
expensiv e for US enterprises to purchase goods.  The Section  301 tariffs also undermine the stability 
and security of the global supply chain , and contribute to the high levels of US  inflation.  
39.5.   We urge the United States to correct its unfair practices, to remove al l Section  301 tariffs 
imposed on Chinese products as soon as possible, and to maintain the rules -based multilateral trade 
order.  
39.6.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
39.7.   China 's decision to continue to raise this matter in this and other WTO  committees has been 
a pointless waste of WTO  resources, given that China has already unilaterally imposed the only 
remedy that the WTO  Dispute Settlement Body could potentially authorize: the suspension of 
WTO concessions.  
39.8.   China has already appli ed tariff measures to imports from the United States in excess of its 
WTO commitments for the explicit purpose of retaliating against the measures for which it now seeks 
legal findings. We understand that , from July  2018 to September  2019, China imposed fo ur rounds 
of tariffs , ranging from 2.5% to 30% , in retaliation against US Section  301 tariffs, which covered 
approximately 71% of 2017  imports into China from the United States.  
39.9.   China, of course, did so without obtaining the authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding. China does not dispute the fact that it has 
already imposed retaliatory tariff measures in response to the US measures at issue. Nor does China 
dispute that these retaliatory measures remain in effect.  We urge China to be mindful of the 
Committee 's and Members ' time and resources when raising matters in Committee meetings in 
future.  
39.10.   With respect to United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China (DS543) , it is 
a matter before the Dispute Settlement Body and the United States has already provided its views 
there.  For awareness, the United States has appealed issues of law covered by the report of the 
panel , and legal interpretations developed by the panel . At this time, no division of the Appellate 
Body can be established to hear this appeal in accordance with Article  17.1 of the DSU . 
39.11.   The United States notes that its Section  301 investigation found serious concerns over 
China 's acts, policies, and practice s on forced technology transfer and intellectual property 
protection. Recent evidence suggests that China continues – or at least attempts – to force 
US companies to transfer technology in exchange for market access. Therefore, the United States 
had a stark choice: either take action to protect its citizens, innovators, and businesses against the 
serious, ongoing harm from China 's policies and practices , or simply accept that this harm will 
continue because the WTO does not provide the necessary disciplines o r remedies.  
39.12.   The view of the US Administration is clear: we will not passively accept unfair and harmful 
practices that cause real -world harm to US workers and businesses just because the WTO does not 
provide an effective remedy for those practices.  
39.13.   The Com mittee took note  of the statements made.  
40  UNITED STATES – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF STURGEON (ID  91) 
– STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
40.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union.  
40.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  40.3.   The European Union has been raising its concerns regarding US  trade prohibitions on sturgeon 
products in this Committee since 2015. This trade prohibition has been reflected in various 
US  biennial QR  notifications . 
40.4.   As a reminder regarding the facts: in 2014, the United States listed five species of sturgeon 
as "endangered" under the US Endangered Species Act (ESA). The listing as "endangered" implies 
that trade in the relevant products is prohibited.  The US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) has been 
conducting a status review on a petition to list ten  additional species of sturgeon as "endangered" 
under the Act.  
40.5.   We are concerned that the trade bans cover both wild and farmed sturgeon. As pr eviously 
explained, the European Union 's main concern is that the United States does not consider wild and 
farmed sturgeon and their products as separate categories. The US consequently applies the same 
conservation measures to both. This goes beyond the r equirements of the relevant international 
environmental legislation, namely the CITES  Convention.  In addition to raising the issue in the CMA, 
we have repeatedly conveyed our position in many bilateral contacts. Despite all our efforts, the 
US position rem ains unchanged.  
40.6.   The United States is a very important market, representing 15% of the global caviar market , 
and 23% of EU  caviar exports. In addition to the halt of EU  exports to the US, the ban risks putting 
the EU's market under pressure in case of a sudden and significant increase in imports from other 
countries that can no longer export to the US.  
40.7.   We would welcome an update from the United States , including the  latest US proposal to list 
four additional species of sturgeon . The European Union would like to explore whether less trade 
restrictive options would be available.  The EU looks forward to further engagement with the US with 
a view to finding a mutually acceptab le way forward on this issue.  
40.8.   The representative of Uruguay  indicated the following :28 
40.9.   Uruguay thanks the European Union for including this item on the agenda of this meeting , 
and wishes to take the floor to reiterate its concern regarding the regulatory proposal to list 
four species of Eurasian sturgeon as endangered species under the United States Endangered 
Species Act of 1973. The adoption of the measure would result in a b an on the importation of the 
listed species, including the Russian sturgeon ( Acipenser gueldenstaedii ), which is produced in a 
sustainable manner by Uruguayan companies that ship a significant share of their exports to the 
United States.  
40.10.   Uruguay understand s and supports the intention to protect endangered species of sturgeon 
in natural habitats. However, we believe that the proposed rule, as currently drafted, would not only 
be counterproductive for the conservation of species in the habitats in which they are found, but 
would also have a negative impact on the sustainable sturgeon -farming industry, which currently 
supports the continuity of the species with viable alternatives for captive breeding that are not 
directly connected to the degradation of the st urgeon's habitat and to poaching, which threatens the 
Ponto -Caspian species in the native states of their area of distribution.  
40.11.   We believe that this change of rule underestimates fish -farming's positive impact on the 
global industry, given that a huge volu me of world trade in Acipenser gueldenstaedii  derives from 
legally farmed production.  The sturgeon -farming industry outside the area of distribution has little 
or no influence on the results of the restoration of the Caspian Sea habitat. However, the chang e of 
rule proposed by the USFWS will be more punitive for the fish -farming industry than for the infringing 
states in the area of distribution.  
40.12.   We believe that the preservation of the Ponto -Caspian species could be ensured by 
establishing a comprehensive a pproach involving active cooperation with sustainable sturgeon fish 
farms to protect the species through continuous reproduction and regulated trade.  We would very 
much appreciate an update on the status of the proposed rule and, once again, call for a sol ution 
 
28 The delegation of Uruguay indicated at the meeting that a longer written version of the ir statement 
would be provided for inclusion in the minutes . G/MA/M/78  
 
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  that makes it possible to protect wild species without creating a barrier to trade for those bred in 
captivity.  
40.13.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
40.14.   We appreciate the continued interest of the European Union and Uruguay in this matter. As 
we have communicated previously, the US Endangered Species Act does not allow for captive -bred 
populations to be assigned separate legal status from their wild counterparts on the basis of their 
captive state, including through designation  as a separate distinct population. It is also not possible 
to separate out captive -bred populations for different legal status under the Act by other approaches.  
40.15.   We refer the European Union  and Uruguay to our previous interventions on this issue , and 
reiterate our offer to facilitate continued discussion among the relevant authorities on this issue.  
40.16.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
41  OTHER BUSINESS  
41.1  India – Continued Concerns with Indian Restrictions on the Imports of Certain 
Pulses  (ID 36) – Statement by Canada  
41.1.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
41.2.   Since 2018, Canada, Australia, the European Union, and the United States have raised 
concerns with India 's use of trade restrictive and domestic support measures for pulses , and th e 
significant negative impact these measures have had for our exporters.  We have called for India to 
review its trade restrictive measures on dried peas and other pulses and to implement alternative, 
WTO-consistent policy options that promote a predictable  and transparent import regime for pulses.  
41.3.   In the spirit of contributing to ongoing endeavours  to improve the discussions of S TCs in 
WTO bodies, we recognize that the constant repetition of statements on this issue is unlikely to yield 
significant progress . As such, we opted not to raise again this concern in the C MA so soon after the 
recent meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods.  
41.4.   That said, this should not be construed that India has addressed our concerns in a satisfactory 
manner. Our significant conce rns with India 's policy measures remain unchanged.  We will continue 
to monitor India 's unjustifiable policy measures closely , and to urge India to undertake and 
implement WTO -consistent measures as soon as possible.  As appropriate, we will continue to state 
the specific problems and impacts that India 's trade restrictive measures represent for our exporters.  
41.5.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
41.6.   We will convey these concerns to our Capital and would request that delegations refer to our 
statement made in the previous meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods.29 
41.7.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
41.2  Dates of next meetings  
41.8.   The Chairperson  asked the Committee to take note of the following arrangements. The next 
formal meeting of the Committee was scheduled to take place on 16 -17 October  2023.  The next 
informal meetings for the HS  multilateral review and other issues, as appropriate, were ex pected to  
take place on 13  June and 23  November  2023. The proposed dates took into account the tentative 
schedule of meetings of other CTG  subsidiary bodies, and the meeting dates of the CTG  itself, in an 
effort to avoid possible overlaps and facilitate th e work of delegates.  
41.9.   Finally, the Chairperson  reminded delegations that they  could upload the statements delivered 
at the meeting onto the eAgenda  platform . As requested by Members, the Secretariat ha d extended 
 
29 Document  G/C/M/145 , paragraphs  28.16 -28.18.  G/MA/M/78  
 
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  the time -period to upload statements in the system , or make them available to Members , until 
5 May 2023, should Members so  wish. 
41.10.   The Committee took note  of the statement . 
42  ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON  
42.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the rules of procedure for the Committee stated that a 
Chairperson shall be elected at the end of the first  meeting of the Committee every year. However, 
as Members were aware, the Chairperson of the Goods Council had been holding consultations with 
Members on a slate of names to chair the CTG's subsidiary bodie s, and a list would be considered at 
a subsequent CTG  meeting. Consequently, the appointment of a chairperson for the Committee had 
been delayed. He therefore suggested to proceed as in 202 2, namely that, as soon as there was 
consensus on a slate of names,  the Secretariat would circulate an email with the name of the 
proposed Chairperson for the CMA for 202 3. If no objection was received within the time -frame 
indicated in that email, the candidate would be deemed to have been elected by the Committee by 
acclamation. The Secretariat would send a second  email by way of confirmation.  
42.2.   The Committee took note  of the statement.  
42.3.   The meeting was adjourned . 
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