RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/136  
 
9 March 2020  
(20-1900) Page: 1/74 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG OF THE COUNCIL FO R TRADE IN GOODS  
14 AND 15  NOVEMBER  2019  
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR JOSE LUIS CANCELA (UR UGUAY)  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/1 5; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/7 73. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TR ADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  3 
2   ACCESSION OF THE  REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA  TO THE EURASIAN ECO NOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE XXVIII:3 OF GAT T 1994 (G/L/1110/ADD.5)  ...................  4 
3   ACCESSION OF THE  KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMI C UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE XXVIII:3 OF GAT T 1994 (G/L/1137/ADD. 4) ...................  5 
4   ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE O F THE COMMITTEE ON T RADE 
FACILITATION (G/TFA/ W/14)  ................................ ................................ ........................  6 
5   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATI ON OF EU TRQ COMMITM ENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHILE,  
CHINA, NEW  ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON, THE UNITED STATE S,  
AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  6 
6   ENLARGEMENT OF T HE EUROPEAN UNION TO  INCLUDE C ROATIA: NEGOTIATIONS  
UNDER ARTICLE XXIV:6  OF THE GATT 1994 – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON................................ ................................ ............................  10 
7   MARKET ACCESS IS SUES  ................................ ................................ ...........................  11 
7.1   Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO Schedules of Concessions – 
Collective Requests for Waiver Extensions  ................................ ................................ ............. 11 
7.1.1    Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 Changes into WTO Schedules  
of Tariff Concessions - Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/76 8) ................................ ..................... 11 
7.1.2    Introduction of Harmonized System 2007 Changes into WTO Schedules  
of Tariff Concessions - Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/ W/769)  ................................ ..................... 11 
7.1.3    Introduction of Harmonized System 2012 Changes into WTO Schedules  
of Tariff Concessions - Draft Waiver Decision ( G/C/W/770)  ................................ ..................... 12 
7.1.4    Introduction of Harmonized System 2017 Changes into WTO Schedules  
of Tariff Concessions - Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/771)  ................................ ..................... 12 
8   MEASURES TO ALLO W GRADUATED LDCS, WI TH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMEN T ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASU RES – REQUEST FROM C HAD ON BEHALF  
OF THE LDC  GROUP (WT /GC/W/742  – G/C/W/75 2) ................................ .....................  12 
9   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF N ON-TARIFF BARRIERS O N  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT S – REQUEST FROM ARG ENTINA, AUSTRALIA, B RAZIL,  
CANADA, COLOMBIA, CO STA RICA, CÔTE D'IVOIRE , DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ,  
ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, M ALAYSIA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, 
PARAGUAY, PERU, UNIT ED STATES, AND URUGU AY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  .....................  14 G/C/M/136  
 
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  10   KINGDOM OF SAUD I ARABIA, KINGDOM OF  BAHRAIN, THE UNITED  ARAB  
EMIRATES, AND OMAN – SELECTIVE TAX ON CE RTAIN IMPORTED PRODU CTS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATE S ...... 26 
11   INDONESIA'S IMP ORT AND EXPORT RESTR ICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE  EUROPEAN UNION, JAP AN, CHINESE TAIPEI, AND THE UNITED 
STATES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  28 
12   INDIA – CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON ICT PRODU CTS – REQUEST FROM C ANADA AN D  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 31 
13   PROCEDURES TO E NHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN NOTIF ICATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER W TO AGREEMENTS – UPDA TE PROVIDED BY CO -SPONSORS  
OF JOB/GC/204/REV.2  - JOB/CTG/14/REV.2  ................................ ................................  33 
14   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FO R AGRICULTURAL PRODU CTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REG ISTRATION OF CERTAIN  TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICAT IONS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, THE UNITE D STATES,  
AND URUGUA Y ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  37 
15   EGYPT - MANUFAC TURER REGISTRATION S YSTEM – REQUEST FROM   
THE EUROPEAN UNION A ND THE RUSSIAN FEDER ATION  ................................ ...............  38 
16   MONGOLIA – QUAN TITATIVE RESTRICTION S AND PROHIBITIONS O N  
IMPORTATIONS OF CERT AIN AGRICULTURAL PRO DUCTS – REQUEST FROM   
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON................................ ................................ ............................  40 
17   VIET NAM - DECR EE ON THE REGULATION  ON CONDITIONS FOR A UTOMOBILES 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEM BLING, IMPORTING, AN D AUTOMOTIVE WARRANT Y AND 
MAINTENANCE SERVICES  – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION A ND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 41 
18   CHINA – MEASURE S RESTRICTING THE IM PORT OF SCRAP MATERI ALS –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNI TED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  42 
19   INDIA – QUANTIT ATIVE RESTRICTIONS O N IMPORTS OF CERTAIN  PULSES  –  
REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA, CANADA, THE EURO PEAN UNION,  
THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATI ON, AND THE UNITED S TATES  ................................ ..................  44 
20   CHINA – CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON CERTAIN I NTEGRATED CIRCUITS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND CHINESE TAIPEI  .........................  48 
21   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING  REGULATIONS REGARDI NG  
PROTECTED DESIGNATIO NS OF ORIGIN AND GEO GRAPHICAL INDICATION S, 
TRADITIONAL TERMS, LABE LLING AND PRESENTATI ON OF  
CERTAIN WINE SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM THE UNITED STATE S ..................  49 
22   CHINA – NEW EXP ORT CONTROL LAW IN D RAFT – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  .............  50 
23   UNITED STATES – PROHIBITIVE PROPOSA L ON COMMUNICATION E QUIPMENT  
OR SERVICES RE LEASED BY THE FCC – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ...... 51 
24   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET A CCESS PROHIBITION ON   
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 51 
25   UNITED STATES - MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIB ITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUE ST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 52 
26   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEAS URES FOR ICT PRODUCT S –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 53 
27   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO. 1272/2008 (CLP REGUL ATION) –  
REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES  .........................  53 
28   UNITED STATES – MEASURES ON AVIATIO N SECURITY EQUIPMENT  –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 55 
29   THE RUSSIAN FED ERATION – TRADE REST RICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UN ION AND THE UNITED S TATES  ................................ ................  56 G/C/M/136  
 
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  30   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU) 20 17/2321 AND  
REGULATION (EU) 2018 /825 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON .................  59 
31   EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC ,  
RENEWABLE ENERGY DIR ECTIVE – REQUEST FRO M COLOMBIA AND MALAY SIA ............  60 
32   EUROPEAN UNION – MEDICAL DEVICE REG ULATION AND IN VITRO  DIAGNOSTIC 
MEDICAL DEVICES REGU LATION – REQUEST FRO M THE UNITED STATES  .......................  65 
33   ANGOLA – IMPORT  RESTRICTING PRACTIC ES – STATEMENT BY TH E RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  67 
34   BETTER FUNCTION ING OF THE COUNCIL F OR TRADE IN GOODS AN D  
SUBSIDIARY COMMITTEE S – STATEMENT BY HON G KONG, CHINA  ................................  68 
35   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMER CE ................................ ...................  73 
36   CONSIDERATION O F ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUBSID IARY BODIES OF  
THE COUNCIL FOR TRAD E IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ .............  73 
37   ADOPTION OF THE  ANNUAL REPORT OF TH E COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
TO THE GENERAL COUNC IL (TO BE ISSUED)  ................................ ................................ .. 74 
38   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 74 
 
The Chairperson  informed delegations that, under Agenda item "Other Business", he would raise  the 
matter of the date of the Council's next meeting.  The delegation of China  requested to withdraw its 
proposal of agenda item  32 on "EU  Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Systems  and on Third -Country 
Operators of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", as the TBT  teams of the European Union and China were 
still working towards a fruitful outcome.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGI ONAL TRADE AGREEMENT S 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled th at, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) , and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members' notifications of new regional 
trade a greements (RTAs).1 He informed the CTG that the following RTAs had been notified to the 
CRTA:  
(i) Free Trade Agreement Between Turkey and Jordan (WT/REG294/N/2) – Notification of 
Termination ; 
 
(ii) Free Trade Agreement Between China and Chile (WT/REG230/N/ 1/ADD.1) – Notification 
of Changes ; and  
 
(iii) Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and Israel (WT/REG31/N/1/ADD.1) – 
Notification of Changes . 
 
1.2.  The delegate of Jordan  indicated that the Jordanian Cabinet had decided to terminate the 
Jordan –Turkey Associatio n Agreement to offset its adverse impact and to afford Jordanian 
manufacturers the opportunity to mitigate the implications of the ongoing regional crisis and the 
losses incurred due to the closure of Jordan's borders with neighbouring countries and the 
deterioration of Jordan's overland trade with its main trading partners. However, Jordan and Turkey 
continued to work jointly to foster bilateral cooperation by facilitating an exchange of experiences, 
by technology  transfer , and by ensuring an attractive environment for enterprises that contribute d 
to expand ing and diversify ing trade. In this context, both countries had signed a new agreement on 
trade and economic cooperation , in October  2019, which had established a new level of mutually 
benefi cial partnership between them.  
1.3.  The delegate of Turkey  indicated that , as already stated at the C RTA on 8 November  2019, the 
Turkey –Jordan Association Agreement had been terminated by Jordan , a decision that Turkey 
 
1 See documents  WT/REG16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  respect ed. Nevertheless, Turkey strive d to deepen economic relationships with its trading partners , 
including Jordan. In this vein, and as announced by Jordan, both countries had signed a new 
agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation , in October  2019, establish ing a new platform for 
cooperation in trade and also in other areas.  
1.4.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statement s made and of the 
information provided.  
1.5.  The Council so agreed . 
2  ACCESSION OF THE REP UBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMI C UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE XXVIII:3 OF GATT 1994 (G/L/1110/ADD.5 ) 
2.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1 1 October  2019, the 
delegation of Armenia had requested the Secretariat to circulate document  G/L/1110/Add. 5, relating 
to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal  of concessions in connection with Armenia's 
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), until 2  January  2021. In this document, Armenia 
had indicated that it would not assert that Members that had submitted a claim of interest pursuant 
to Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent 
concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of GA TT 1994, because such withdrawal occurred later than 
six months after Armenia's withdrawal of concessions, provided that the claiming WTO  Member 
withdrew concessions no later than 72 months after Armenia's modification of concessions, or until 
2 January  2021. He recalled that the Council had extended the deadline on f ive occasions, namely 
at its meetings of 26  March and 10  November  2015, 17  November  2016, 10  November  2017 and 12  
and 13  November  2017. 
2.2.  The delegate of Armenia  informed Members that , following the Council's previous meeting, 
Armenia had continued to consult and exchange views with interested Members  on this issue . After 
substantive discussion with its EAEU  partners, Armenia had prepared a new compensation package 
on non -agricultural products and  agriculture. The package listed the goods that Armenia was ready 
to consider for further liberalization, including TRQs for agriculture. These had been formally 
submitted. A positive exchange of communications and discussions had taken place on the 
NAMA  package and Armenia believed that the NAMA  negotiations were now nearing their conclusion . 
2.3.  In addition , Armenia had intensified its efforts and had also allocated more resources formulate 
a mutual ly acceptable position for a compensation package on agricult ure. Armenia believed that its 
new proposal provide d grounds for substantive progress towards the finalization of negotiations on 
agriculture. Armenia had also proposed to organize a new round of bilateral negotiations at a 
convenient date , preferably by end-2019, to complete the substance of the NAMA and Agriculture 
negotiations. However, given the number of interested Members involved and the scope of the 
technical work to be completed , Armenia believed that it would be necessary to allocate additional 
time to continue its compensatory negotiations. In consequence , Armenia had indicated that it was 
desirable to provide an extension of 12  additional months, until 2  January  2021, to allow Members 
to withdraw substanti ally equivalent concessions under GATT  Article XXVIII . Armenia  requested the 
Council to agree to this proposed extension.  
2.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated that her statement would cover both this item 
on Armenia and the next on the Kyrgyz Republic's accession to the EAEU. She thanked Armenia for 
updating the Council on its Article  XXVIII compensation negotiations and indicated that, in 
April 2019, the EU had  welcomed the progress achieved in the se negotiations on tariffs for 
non-agricultural products. However, the EU remained serious ly concerned over the lack of progress 
in the negotiations on agriculture, particularly since the EU had suffered substantial re ductions in 
market access for several agricultural products. Nonetheless, to date neither Armenia nor the Kyrgyz 
Republic had offered genuine compensation. One of the reasons given for such delays had been the 
lengthy and complex procedures of the EAEU; ho wever, she noted that similar complexity existed 
within the EU 's procedures, although this had not prevent ed the EU from offering real and substantial 
compensation, in similar GATT  Article  XXIV:6  exercises, following enlargements  to the EU . 
2.5.  The EU called upon both Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic – as well as all other EAEU  member 
States – to negotiate in good faith and to offer genuine compensation on agricultural products 
without further delay. Such compensation should be permanent and should also take int o G/C/M/136  
 
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  consider ation the time that had elapsed in this matter. The EU looked forward to bilateral negotiating 
rounds.  
2.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  supported the extension requested by Armenia under 
paragraph  3 of GATT  Article  XXVIII . The Russian Feder ation had indicated that it recognized the 
crucial ly important  role that it had played in the successful conclusion of these negotiations . It would 
continue to support Armenia's negotiation process.  
2.7.  The delegate of Brazil  believed that the new request for an extension would give Members that 
had expressed their interest in the renegotiations the time to withdraw their concessions during the 
renegotiations following Armenia’s accession to the EAEU. He echoed the EU in its concerns regarding 
the renegotiation s on agriculture , which affected Brazilian exports to Armenia.  He also indicated that 
Brazil had sent a Note Verbale  to Armenia listing the products that would be affected in their bilateral 
trade and requesting the recognition of initial negotiating right s for these tariff lines, compensation , 
and also to reserve its rights for negotiations under GATT  Article  XXVIII.  
2.8.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  recalled that her delegation had also submitted a claim of 
interest to Armenia under GATT  Article  XXVIII , and that this claim was longstanding. She urged 
Armenia to conclude this renegotiation. In this regard, Chinese Taipei looked forward to engaging in 
discussion s with Armenia with a view to receiving appropriate compensation on GATT  Articles  XXIV 
and XXVIII.  
2.9.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated that Armenia was working with the EAEU and its member 
States on these issues with a view to formulating a coheren t response to Members' requests. 
Armenia, as a full member of the Eurasian Economic Commission, coordinate d its trade and economic 
policy with the other EAEU  member States; this implied, among other issues, a mutually agreed 
negotiating position. Armenia h ad intensified its consultation s with its EAEU  partners with a view to 
accelerating the process. Armenia stood ready to organize a new round of negotiations with all 
interested Members in Geneva at a mutually convenient date. Armenia had taken note of the 
statements made and would convey these to Capital . Armenia would also continue to inform the 
Council and interested Members , on a regular basis,  about the ongoing compensatory adjustment 
negotiations.  
2.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made and of Armenia’s 
communication, and that it agree to extend the deadline to withdraw substantially equivalent 
concessions under GATT  Article  XXVIII for 12  months, until 2 January  2021, as set out in 
document  G/L/1110/Add.5.  
2.11.   The Council so agreed . 
3  ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURA SIAN ECONOMIC UNION:  
PROCEDURES UNDER ART ICLE XXVIII:3 OF GAT T 1994 (G/L/11 37/ADD. 4) 
3.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 11 October  2019, the 
delegation of the Kyrgyz Republic  had requested the Secretariat to circulate 
document  G/L/11 37/Add. 4, relating to the extension of the time -period for the withdrawal of 
concessions in relation to the Kyrgyz Republic 's accession to the Eurasian Econom ic Union (EAEU), 
until 12 February  2021. In this document, the Kyrgyz Republic  had indicated that it would not assert 
that Members that had submitted a claim of interest pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of GATT  1994 were 
precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 of 
GATT  1994, because such withdrawal occurred later than six  months after the Kyrgyz Republic 's 
withdrawal of concessions, provided that the claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions no later 
than 66 months aft er Kyrgyz Republic 's modification of concessions, or until 12 Februa ry 2021. He 
recalled that the Council had extended the deadline on f our occasions, namely at its meetings of 
10 November  2015, 14  July 2016, 10  November  2017, and 12 -13 November  2018.  
3.2.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  said that his authorities were still working with other EAEU 
member States in order to scrutinize the relevant data and to make technical clarifications in relation 
to the claims submitted by interested Members. The Kyrgyz R epublic had submitted its compensation 
offer on non -agricultural and agricultural products in 2019 and would organize a negotiating round 
with interested delegations shortly . Given that the period for Members to withdraw equivalent G/C/M/136  
 
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  concessions would expire  on 12  February  2020, additional time would be required in order to 
complete the negotiations. Therefore, the Kyrgyz Republic requested a further extension to ensure 
Members' rights to withdraw concessions pending the conclusion of Article  XXVIII:3 negotiations 
after 12  months, or until 12  February  2021, as reflected in document  G/L/1137/Add.4. Thus, the 
Kyrgyz Republic would not assert that WTO  Members that had submitted a claim were precluded 
from withdrawing substantial ly equivalent concessions be cause this withdrawal occurred later than 
six months after the Kyrgyz Republic's withdrawal of concessions provided that the claiming 
WTO Member withdrew concessions no later than 66  months after the Kyrgyz Republic's modification 
of concessions.  
3.3.  His deleg ation would respond to interested Members as soon as the internal consultations had 
been finalized within the EAEU ; further information would be communicated to interested delegations 
in due course. He thanked Members for their understanding and support on  this issue.  
3.4.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed his support for the extension of the 
negotiations.  
3.5.  Under the previous agenda item , the delegate of the European Union  had indicated that the 
EU's statement applied also to this agenda item.  
3.6.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made as well as of the 
Kyrgyz Republic's communication ; he also proposed that the Council approve the extension 
requested by the Kyrgyz Republic in document  G/L/1137/Add.4, until 12  February  2021.  
3.7.  The Council so agreed . 
4  ADOPTION OF THE RULE S OF PROCEDURE OF TH E COMMITTEE ON TRADE  
FACILITATION (G/TFA/ W/14)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  reminded Members that the Committee on Trade Facilitation, at its meeting 
of 15 June 2019, and consistent with the final sentence of Article  23, paragraph  1.2 of the 
Agreement on Trade Facilitation, which called for the Committee to establish its rules of procedure, 
had adopted its rules of R ules of Procedure as contained in document  G/TFA/W/14.  
4.2.  In accordance with Article  IV:6 of the Marrakesh Agreement, the rules of procedure had been 
forwarded to the Council for Trade in Goods for its approval.  
4.3.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council approve the Rules of Procedure of the Committee 
on Trade Facili tation contained in document  G/TFA/W/14 and that the final document be circulated 
under the G/L/ – document series.2 
4.4.  The Council so agreed . 
5  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION O F EU TRQ COMMITMENTS : SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST F ROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZI L, CAN ADA, CHILE, CHINA, 
NEW  ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION, THE UNI TED STATES, AND URUGUAY  
5.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegations of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, New Zealand, the Russian Fede ration, the 
United States, and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
5.2.  The delegate of Australia  reiterated the concerns raised by his delegation and other Members 
regarding the continued uncertainty of the  future of the UK -EU trading relationship post -Brexit and 
recalled that there had been three  extensions to the UK's withdrawal date. These extensions and 
delay s had caused significant commercial disruptions for Australian businesses currently holding 
licences to export agricultural products under existing EU  WTO tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). Given the 
uncertainty around quota allocations in the event of a no -deal Brexit on 31  October  2019, many 
 
2 The Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Trade Facilitation were subsequently circulated in 
document  G/L/1342, dated 27  November  2019.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  Australian businesses had ceased exports of commercially valuable beef and sheep meat in the lead 
up to Christmas and had also been obliged to make comparably difficult commercial decisions lead ing 
up to 29  March, 30  June, and 31 October  2019, and now 31  January  2020. In addition, the differing 
methodologies for apportioning current EU -28 TRQs midway through a quota year proposed by the 
EU and the UK meant that, in some instances, the total market access under apportioned EU -27 and 
UK quotas would not add up to the current level of access under existing EU -28 quotas. Australia 
recognized the legal rights of the EU and UK to modify their concessions on goods provided that 
compensatory concessions were granted to Members affected by such modifications. However, 
Australia could not accept the EU's assertion that no co mpensation was required because there had 
been no loss in the value of the concessions granted. For Australia, the proposed modifications to 
the TRQs would lead to significant economic loss not only by removing flexibility as to where a 
product would be se nt year -to-year, but also by rendering certain TRQ allocations too small to be 
commercially viable. Australia therefore believed that both the EU and the UK had to proceed with 
compensatory adjustments that factor ed in Australia's significant commercial lo sses and that 
maintain ed a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions. Australia's aim was 
to ensure that the current level and quality of access was maintained ; it was not Australia's intention 
to seek significant market access gain s. In this vein, Australia had now submitted formal proposals 
for compensation for all TRQs recognized by the EU and UK.  
5.3.  The delegate of the United States  said that, as previously noted in this Council and other 
Committees, her delegation supported the UK 's decision to  establish itself as an independent Member 
of the WTO. However, the United States rejected the EU -UK approach to TRQs because it was an 
approach that was prejudicial to its WTO  rights and trade interests. In particular, the United States 
considered that it was an approach that would reduce market access opportunities for US  exporters 
into both markets, and for certain products, such as grape juice for the EU -27 and pizza cheese for 
the UK, for example, would result in no in -quota access in one of the markets and, for other products, 
in reduced access to the EU. The proposed approach did not address how bilateral EU -UK trade 
would be treated once the UK was no longer within the EU, particularly as that bilateral trade was 
currently not subject to  TRQs and Members had the opportunity to export full TRQ  quantities to 
either the UK or EU -27. However, if the UK and the EU -27 were subject to the same TRQs as other 
WTO Members, these Members would face a loss of access to both markets. In this vein, the  United 
States pointed to analyses showing that the volume of chilled or frozen pork that the UK currently 
imported from the EU -27 was over 26 times greater than the proposed TRQ for that pork, and that 
the volume of wine that the UK  imported from the EU -27 was over 9,000  times greater than the 
proposed TRQ. Therefore, it was difficult to imagine that there would be no loss of access to the 
UK market under current proposals, which would clearly be an unacceptable outcome for 
WTO Members. Her delegation stood ready to engage with the EU and the UK in productive 
negotiations to ensure that its trade interests were maintained.  
5.4.  The delegate of Canada  reiterated Canada's concerns over the EU -UK joint proposal to 
apportion TRQ  commitments in prepara tion for Brexit, since the proposal significantly altered the 
EU's current WTO  concessions. First, Canada observed that exporters would lose existing flexibility 
to adapt to fluctuations in demand, which would reduce market access opportunities, particular ly 
where the TRQ  volumes were low or not commercially viable. Second, the methodology resulted in 
the elimination of TRQ  volumes for a number of UK and EU  TRQs, thereby neglecting the fact that 
higher out -of-quota tariffs associated with these TRQs were pr edicated on minimum access levels. 
Third, Canada considered that the apportionment proposal was not clear about whether EU -UK trade 
would be subject to the same TRQs as other WTO  Members. Canada therefore viewed the current 
apportionment proposal to be unj ustifiable and considered that it  altered the balance of concessions 
agreed upon during the Uruguay Round. Canada encouraged the EU, as well as the UK, to continue 
to reflect on Canada's concerns , as well as to continue in their engagement with Members  on this 
issue. 
5.5.  The delegate of Brazil  considered that the fashion in which negotiations under Article  XXVIII 
were being conducted raised systemic concerns for the entire Membership and that the proposed 
splitting of the EU -28 TRQ commitments would undermine the current level of market access 
enjoyed by Brazilian companies and producers to the EU and UK  markets. With regard to the 
methodology suggested to implement the apportionment of TRQs, Brazil referred to the EU  proposal 
to reduce the volume of 130 TRQs, and to fully eliminate five of them, in the absence of appropriate 
data on trade under TRQs and a clear perspective for the EU -UK bilateral relations. On average, the 
EU would be reducing its quota volumes by one quarter. In addition, the EU seem ed to disregard 
the systemic impact on its trade resulting from the UK's new status vis-à-vis the EU; in particular, G/C/M/136  
 
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  the fact that the current level of EU -UK trade was higher than the size of a considerable number of 
EU erga omnes  TRQs could imply that onl y British exporters would use these TRQs if there were no 
EU-UK free trade agreement after Brexit. Not only those Members with large agriculture exports, 
but also those with only modest agricultural export trade would find their access to the European 
market limited or virtually impeded. Brazil also recalled that previous negotiations under 
Article  XXVIII when the EU had been expanding had been based on the net global trade of the 
Member acceding to the EU , discounting the amount traded with the EU. With re gard to the customs 
regime applicable to Northern Ireland, Brazil considered it paramount that the MFN  principle be 
preserved, and that the proposed Irish Backstop provide enough guarantees for this to occur . Finally, 
in light of the intention of the EU an d the UK unilaterally to proceed to the apportionment of each 
other 's TRQs on 1 February  2020, before conclusion of the negotiations in the WTO, Brazil observed 
that adequate compensation should be proposed, in accordance with paragraph  3 of the Guidelines  
on Procedures for Negotiations Under GATT  Article  XXVIII, to ensure that future market access 
conditions for other Members were not less favourable than those currently in place. In conclusion, 
Brazil called upon the EU and the UK to engage in a constructive discussion with the Membership, 
both bilaterally and multilaterally.  
5.6.  The delegate of Uruguay  reiterated the concerns previously expressed by his delegation both 
in the Council and other WTO  fora, including in document  RD/CTG/5 . He emphasized t he importance 
for the multilateral trading system that this matter be resolved through negotiation between the 
parties concerned, in accordance with WTO  rules, and respecting WTO  market access commitments 
and the balance of concessions previously agreed. I n particular, Uruguay drew attention to the need 
to give due consideration in the negotiations to the significant existing trade volumes between the 
UK and other EU  member States for a number of products, and the real risk of the erga omnes  TRQs 
being exha usted by EU-UK reciprocal trade, excluding other Members that currently made use of 
those quotas or could do so in the future under existing market access conditions.  
5.7.  The delegate of China  shared the concerns and views expressed by previous speakers. While  
China was willing to work with the EU to modify its TRQ  schedule, and with the UK to establish its 
own TRQ  schedule, China could not accept the proposed apportionment approach by the EU and the 
UK, which China believed would lead to a significant loss of market access opportunity and flexibility 
in future EU and UK  markets. China confirmed that its views, concerns, and requests, as expressed 
in previous meetings, remained the same.  
5.8.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  reiterated his country's concern in respect of the 
EU approach to apportioning the EU -28 TRQs in the context of Brexit, which in his view could not be 
considered WTO -consistent and could not maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous EU concessions. The Russian Federati on affirmed its position that the negotiations 
could not be concluded without an agreement on compensation for principal product suppliers , and 
to this end he urged the EU to submit its compensatory proposal.  
5.9.  The delegate of New Zealand  shared other Member s' concerns with regard to the EU and 
UK proposals to reduce their WTO  TRQ commitments in light of Brexit, which gave rise to a range of 
issues of wider systemic interest to WTO  Members. As New Zealand had noted earlier that week , in 
the Committee on Marke t Access, the "apportionment" approach that the EU and the UK had 
advanced glossed over the reality of the loss of significant existing bound market access 
opportunities for other WTO  Members, including through: (i)  the elimination (zero  quotas) proposed 
for 60 of the current 142  quotas in either market; (ii)  large-scale reductions in the levels of access 
for many more of the quotas; (iii)  the loss of flexibility for exporters and markets to respond to 
fluctuations in demand – important both for consumers i n the EU and UK, as well as for exporters, 
especially in the current uncertain international trading environment; and (iv)  the risk of a "crowding 
out" of other WTO  Members' access to the MFN  TRQs. In particular, New Zealand wished to highlight 
two of the broader systemic issues arising from these proposals. First, New Zealand referred to the 
unprecedented nature and scale of the proposed changes, namely 142  TRQ commitments covering 
nearly 400  tariff lines, with total EU  imports under these lines in 2018 of EUR 28 billion. The current 
EU proposals would see the level of access for the bulk of these products – 130 of the total 
142 quotas – reduced on average by a q uarter. Given the scale of this proposed change in 
commitments and the EU's role as the world's largest agricultural importer and exporter, the 
implications of the proposed changes went far beyond the immediate commercial concerns of the 
most directly affe cted Members, including in respect of the risk of significant trade diversion and 
potential for disruption to global markets in the products concerned. Second, at the same time as 
the EU and the UK were proposing to reduce the level of access under their q uota commitments, G/C/M/136  
 
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  they had also indicated that they expected to open up the MFN  quotas currently available to other 
WTO Members to encompass the high level of bilateral trade they currently had with each other, 
which risked wholesale "crowding out" of acce ss for other WTO  Members to their markets for these 
products.  
5.10.   To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, New Zealand compared the level of EU -UK trade 
with the existing MFN  TRQ volumes (using the 2013 -2015 period that they had used to calculate 
their own Brexit -related trade data). This demonstrated that , for nearly three  quarters of the TRQs, 
the level of EU -UK trade was greater than or equal to the existing TRQ  volumes; for almost half of 
these TRQs, UK -EU trade was ten  times or more the current TRQ  volume; and this EU -UK trade rose 
to 100  times or more than the MFN  TRQ volume for almost a fifth of the TRQs. In these 
circumstances, New Zealand found it hard to see how other WTO  Members would have a realistic 
chance of accessing these quotas, unless the qu otas were explicitly preserved at Members' existing 
levels of access, or substantially expanded to account for the large bilateral EU -UK trade in these 
products. New Zealand reiterated that the WTO  principle that any Member seeking to change its 
bound comm itments needed to propose solutions to ensure that other WTO  Members were not left 
worse off was a principle that lay at the heart of the preservation of the balance of benefits 
negotiated between WTO  Members. The separate EU and UK  proposals d id not deliv er on this crucial 
"no worse off" principle. New Zealand called upon the EU and the UK to use the further Brexit 
extension period recently agreed to redouble their efforts to engage with WTO  Members to bring 
forward new proposals capable of addressing the important concerns that Members had consistently  
raised . New Zealand stood ready to work constructively with the EU and the UK, and other concerned 
WTO Members , to this end.  
5.11.   The delegate of Mexico  reiterated Mexico's systemic concern , in the context of the  UK's 
departure  from the EU, over  the EU  proposal to apportion its TRQs as part of its Schedule of 
Concessions  . The proposed apportionment methodology was problematic and could lead to an 
elimination , or at least reduction , in Members' market access oppo rtunities. In Mexico's view, 
whereas any methodology had to strive to maintain the balance of rights and obligations that had 
been negotiated and assumed by Members, there was currently no clarity on the future obligations 
of the EU and the UK at the WTO. For example, if both the EU and the UK were to avail themselves 
of these erga omnes  rights, the rest of the Membership would face a risk of seeing their market 
access opportunities reduced. This was very concerning for his delegation. Mexico therefore call ed 
upon the EU to endeavour to find a mutually satisfactory solution for this issue that abided by 
WTO rules.  
5.12.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  joined previous speakers in expressing his delegation 's 
systemic concerns over the proposed modification of EU  TRQ commitments, in the context of which 
a number of substantive issues still remained. Although Korea had not claimed a substantial interest 
in these ongoing TRQ negotiations, it was nevertheless following them  closely because a subsequent 
modification would have significant consequences for the WTO  system. Korea therefore believed that 
the modifications negotiations should be conducted in a transparent manner.  
5.13.   The delegate of Japan  highlighted the importance of swiftly esta blishing the WTO  bound 
schedules that would be applicable to the EU and the UK following the UK's departure from the EU. 
Japan also reiterated the importance of maintaining legal stability under the WTO  Agreements, and 
of ensuring clarity concerning the EU  and the UK's application of the MFN  rates to Members in 
accordance with their bound schedules. In this regard, Japan again requested the EU to ensure a 
high level of transparency as concerned the procedures for this process.  
5.14.   The delegate of Paraguay  expre ssed Paraguay's concern regarding the apportionment of erga 
omnes  TRQs by the EU, as well as the loss of market access and market access flexibility problems 
arising from the UK's departure from the EU. Paraguay reiterated its recent statement at the Marke t 
Access Committee meeting that, in addition to the lack of clarity on the future relation between the 
EU and the UK, there was also a potential trade saturation of the TRQs due to the volume of their 
mutual trade. Paraguay also called upon the UK and the EU to take appropriate steps to avoid 
harm ing their trading partners in the event of a possible "no deal Brexit" scenario, and effectively to 
fulfil the promise that this separation would not cause other Members to lose their share of UK and 
EU markets.  
5.15.   The delegate of Argentina  aligned himself with the statements made by other delegates and 
expressed Argentina's disagreement with the principle of apportionment. At the same time, G/C/M/136  
 
- 10 - 
 
  Argentina affirmed its support for a pragmatic approach to this issue, and its  confidence that it would 
be possible to make progress in negotiating a compensation agreement acceptable to all parties.  
5.16.   The delegate of Switzerland  shared other Members' concerns over the legal uncertainty 
regarding access to EU and UK  TRQs, specifically  in the context of a hard Brexit. Switzerland also 
shared the view that the unbinding and reallocation of appropriate TRQ  quantities to the EU -27 and 
UK was highly relevant to many Members and therefore of systemic importance to the WTO. 
Switzerland hoped that the necessary processes would be completed as quickly as possible and with 
the consensus of all Members.  
5.17.   The delegate of India echoed the concerns that had been raised by other Members. India had 
already expressed its concerns both in writing and duri ng the formal consultations with the 
EU delegation . India had made it clear to the EU that the present methodology and the threshold 
years taken into account for TRQ  apportionment were affecting Members' rights relative to the 
obligations previously undert aken by the EU on those specific tariff lines. India expected the EU to 
provide reasonable opportunities to all WTO  Members, including India, to exercise their rights under 
the WTO  Agreement . India also expected the EU to take into account Members' concern s. India 
looked forward to fruitful negotiations with the EU.  
5.18.   The delegate of the European Union  appreciated WTO  Members ' well-known concerns  over 
the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the UK leaving the EU. The European Union appealed to 
WTO Members to unde rstand that traders throughout the EU, including in the UK, were also affected 
by and concerned about this uncertainty, even though this was not a reason to not do justice to the 
concerns of other WTO  Members. Th erefore , the EU and the UK had engaged joint ly, as early as 
October  2017, with other WTO  Members to discuss the approach envisaged for apportion ing 
WTO TRQ commitments in light of the key principle of maintain ing existing EU-27 and UK market 
access levels. The European Council had endorsed the revised Withdrawal Agreement agreed with 
the UK  government on 17  October  2019, after which the period provided in Article  50(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union had been extended , by European Council Decision (EU)  2019/1810 , until 
31 January  2020. Although the European Union clearly preferred an orderly withdrawal of the UK, it 
had also published detailed information on the consequences and implications for 
TRQ apportionment and management in the case of a no -deal Brexit in order to reduce the inevitable 
commercial uncertainties for operators. The European Commission would continue to manage the 
apportioned EU -27 TRQs in the same way as before . Furthermore, the European Union noted that 
negotiations under GATT  Article  XXVIII procedures were currently ongoing with the partners holding 
rights under that provision, and that it welcomed the general engagement of WTO  Members in the 
early stage of these negotiations , in good faith, and bearing in mind that these negotiations were 
only in the early stages and that th e last round had taken place in September  2019, in Geneva. The 
EU expressed its support for the rules -based multilateral trading system and noted that it had 
followed all of the relevant WTO  procedures when launching its GATT  Article  XXVIII negotiations , 
and it would continue to do so. The European Union was willing to continue to engage in negotiations 
in an open and fair manner under GATT  Article  XXVIII regardless of the scenarios for the UK's 
withdrawal. The EU recalled that it could not respond to comme nts and questions on the UK's 
proposed goods schedule and invited Members interested in that process to engage with the UK  
bilaterally  in this regard . 
5.19.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their statements and proposed that the Council 
take note of t he statements made.  
5.20.   The Council so agreed . 
6  ENLARGEMENT OF THE E UROPEAN UNION TO INC LUDE CROATIA: NEGOTI ATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6 OF THE GATT 1994 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON 
6.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November 2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
6.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  reiterated his delegation's deep concerns over the 
European Union's negotiations under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  in the framework of the EU's 
enlargement to include Croatia.  The Russian Federation had repeatedly raised this issue bilaterally, G/C/M/136  
 
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  at the Committee on Market Access, and in the meetings of t his Council. The Russian Federation's 
concerns had been communicated to the European Union in writing , as well as circulated to 
WTO Members.  The Russian Federation  could  not agree with the E U's position that the  recognition 
of a WTO Member as a principal s upplier in relation to Article s XXIV:6 and XXVIII of the GATT was 
not automatic , and therefore that the Russian Federation could not obtain compensation , particularly 
given that: (i)  the procedures for negotiations under Article  XXVIII of the GATT did not oblige 
Members to indicate their principal supplier  interest in their notifications based on the import data; 
(ii) the Russian Federation had never challenged the data provided by the EU in its notification; and 
(iii) the procedures provide d for the possib ility of simultaneous transmission of import data and 
compensatory adjustment proposal. This would be possible only in case s where the Member itself 
would d etermine the negotiating rights of the other Members based on its import data. In this vein, 
the del egate of the Russian Federation indicated that, in document  G/SECRET/35/Add.4 , his 
authorities had objected to the conclusion of these negotiations and had called upon the E U to 
engage with the Russian Federation in compensatory adjustment negotiations.  
6.3.  The delegate of the European Union  reminded Members of the EU's explanations provided at 
previous meetings about the conclusion and outcome of its negotiations following Croatia's accession 
to the EU on 26  July 2018 (document  G/SECRET/35/Add.2).  The outcom e of the GATT  Article  XXIV:6 
process had been faithfully reflected in the EU -28 Schedule  CLXXV , which was currently in the 
process  of being certified . The EU had extensively and repeatedly explained, orally and in writing, 
its reasons for not having accept ed the compensation claims of the Russian Federation in the context 
of the EU's latest enlargement.  
6.4.  The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
6.5.  The Council so agreed . 
7  MARKE T ACCESS ISSUES  
7.1  Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO Schedules of Concessions 
– Collective  Requests for Waiver Extensions  
7.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, as indicated in the Airgram, the Committee on Market 
Access had forwarded fou r collective requests for waiver extensions concerning the introduction of 
Harmonized System (HS) Changes into WTO  Schedules of Concessions  for the consideration of this 
Council . 
7.1.1   Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions - Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/768)  
7.2.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/7 68, in connection with the introduction of HS2002  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/10 48 and would 
expire on 31 December  2019. The one -year extension, as provided for in the draft waiver decision , 
contained in document  G/C/W/7 68, had been the subject of consultations in the Market Access 
Committee meeting that had taken place on 11 November  2019. 
7.3.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decision contained 
in document  G/C/W/768  to the General Council for adoption . 
7.4.  The Council so agreed . 
7.1.2   Introduction of Harmonized System 2007 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tar iff 
Concessions  - Draft Waiver  Decision (G/C/W/769)  
7.5.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/769,  in connection with the introduction of HS2007  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concess ions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/1049 and would 
expire on 31  December  2019. The one -year extension, as provided for in the draft waiver decision G/C/M/136  
 
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  contained in document  G/C/W/769, had  been the subject of consultations in the M arket Access 
Committee meeting that had taken place on  11 November  2019. 
7.6.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decision , 
contained in document  G/C/W/769 , to the General Council for adoption.  
7.7.  The Council so agreed . 
7.1.3   Introduction of Harmonized System 2012 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions  - Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/770)  
7.8.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/770, in connection with the introduction of HS2012  changes into WTO  schedules 
of tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in document  WT/L/1050 and would 
expire on 31  December  2019. The one -year ex tension, as provided for in the draft waiver decision 
contained in document  G/C/W/770, had been the subject of consultations in the Market Access 
Committee meeting that had taken place on  11 November  2019.  
7.9.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council agree to  forward the draft waiver decision contained 
in document  G/C/W/770 , to the  General Council for adoption.  
7.10.   The Council so agreed . 
7.1.4   Introduction of Harmonized System 2017 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff 
Concessions - Draft Waiver Decision (G/C/W/771)  
7.11.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the collective draft waiver decision circulated in 
document  G/C/W/771 in connection with the introduction of HS2017  changes into WTO  schedules of 
tariff concessions. The current waiver decision was contained in docume nts WT/L/1051 and 
WT/L/1051/Add.1 and would expire on 31  December  2019. The one -year extension, as provided for 
in the decision annexed to document  G/C/W/771, had been the subject of consultations in the Market 
Access Committee meeting that had taken place  on 11 November  2019. 
7.12.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council agree to forward the draft waiver decision , 
contained in document  G/C/W/771 , to the General Council  for adoption.  
7.13.   The Council so agreed . 
8  MEASURES TO ALLOW GR ADUATED LDCS, WITH G NP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMEN T ON SUBSIDIES AND C OUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST  FROM CHAD ON BEHALF  OF THE LDC  GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742  – G/C/W/752)  
8.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 29 October  2019, the 
delegation of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue 
on the agenda . He also reminded Members that, at the meetings of the Council in July and 
November  2018, and in April and July of 2019, a number of delegations had requested further 
information and clarification on certain aspects of the request.  
8.2.  The representative of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC  Group , stated that the submission 
contained in document  WT/GC/W/742 –G/C/W/752 was self -explanatory and intended to correct a 
technical omission regarding the use of export subsidies under the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement , or ASCM ). Article  27.2(a) of that Agreement allowed 
a group of developing countries , listed in Annex  VII(b) , to be exempted from the general prohibition 
on export subsidies, as long as their gross national income per capita did not exceed USD  1,000. 
Bangladesh  also noted that the text of the Annex referred to gross national product (GNP)  which 
was a notion more frequently referred to now as gross national income (GNI). Annex  VII(a) extended 
the same exemption to all LDCs regardless of their GNI  per capita. The Doha Ministerial Decision on 
Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns had fur ther clarified that the USD  1,000 threshold for 
the GNI per capita should be calculated in constant 1990  dollars and should not be exceeded for G/C/M/136  
 
- 13 - 
 
  three consecutive years. That Decision  also stated that , if a Member had been excluded from the 
Annex  VII(b) lis t, it should be included in it again if its GNI  per capita fell back below USD  1,000.  
8.3.  Bangladesh noted that  Annex  VII of ASCM was not clear as to whether or not a graduated LDC 
having per capita GNI below USD  1,000 in constant 1990 -dollar terms would recei ve the same 
treatment available to developing -country Members with a GNI per capita below USD  1,000 in 
1990-dollar terms under the same Annex  VII. On the contrary, paragraph  10.1 of the Doha 
Ministerial Decision guaranteed that developing  country Members l isted in Annex  VII(b) "shall not 
leave Annex  VII(b) so long as its GNP per capita in current dollars has not reached USD  1,000 based 
upon the most recent data from the World Bank". Therefore, a graduated LDC, having the same per 
capita GNI or below, should  be allowed to exercise the same flexibility ; otherwise , the discrimination 
among Members with regard to benefitting from Article  27.2(a) flexibilities would be unjustifiable.  
8.4.  Bangladesh  recalled that , in all previous meetings, the LDC  submission had received the 
support of a significant number of Members , although some had expressed specific concerns and 
had requested additional information , including the reasons explaining why graduating LDCs would 
need to provide export subsidies. Bangladesh  clarified that the proposal did not envisage any new 
flexibility ; rather, it called for a decision for the continuation of the same flexibility in the case of a 
graduated LDC that fell back within the long-establi shed criteria agreed by Members. Moreover, this 
flexibility would not be extended to all graduated LDCs but only to those graduated LDCs  that fell 
within agreed criteria at the time of graduation. Also, it was not foreseen that graduated LDCs 
enjoying this  flexibility would automatically use the exemption. Instead, they could  resort to it only 
when really needed. This provision stated that , if an Annex  VII country reached international 
competitiveness in a particular product, as defined under Article  27.5 o f ASCM, such a Member would 
have gradually to phase out its export subsidies. This  would  alleviate any concern regarding the 
possible negative effects of allowing graduating LDCs the same flexibilities as Annex  VII(b) listed 
countries.  
8.5.  A positive recommend ation from the CTG to the General Council that would allow the 
Secretariat to calculate GNI per capita for graduated LDCs for the year after graduation during 
annual updates of Annex  VII list. This exercise should be carried out only after graduation , as it was 
not possible to calculate the anticipated GNI per capita before graduation. The LDC  Group believed 
that, in order for the CTG to reach a decision on this proposal, they needed to clarify the following 
issues: (i)  whether  there was any missing element  in Annex  VII which was not visualized earlier ; 
(ii) whether  the proposed decision would create any new flexibility for any Member ; and (iii)  whether  
a graduated LDC  Member deserved the same flexibility already available to a developing -country 
Member when  both had GNP  per capita below USD  1,000 in constant 1990 -dollar terms. Bangladesh  
urged Members to accept the LDC  submission positively . The LDC  Group looked forward to working 
with interested Members on this issue.  
8.6.  The delegate of Turkey  reiterated Turkey' s support for the proposal. Turkey believed that LDCs 
should be helped in their efforts to integrate into the multilateral trading system (MTS) . Graduated 
LDCs with GNP below USD  1,000 had to  be given the same rights as the developing co untries listed 
in Annex  VII(b) of the SCM Agreement.  
8.7.  The delegate of Brazil  supported the proposed amendment to Annex  VII of the SCM Agreement 
to allow graduated LDCs with GNP below USD  1,000 to continue to benefit from the rules under 
Article  27.2. Brazil  had supported the LDC proposal in the SCM Committee and in this Council.  
8.8.  The delegate of  Senegal  associated his delegation with the statement made by Bangladesh on 
behalf of the LDC  Group and urged Members to accept the proposal . Senegal noted that the 
comments and reluctance expressed by some delegations with respect to the proposal were based 
on the fact that currently developing Members listed in the Annex were not providing the ir 
notifications on subsidies. Senegal recalled that at previous meetings it  had indicated that Members 
had to make a distinction between the existence of a right and the use of such a right . The fact that 
one d id not use a right, d id not prejudice at all the existence of such a right per se . Therefore, 
Senegal believed that the c oncerns and reluctance expressed  by some delegations  should not 
prevent the adoption of the Decision put forward by the LDCs . Senegal reiterated its call for Members 
to adopt the proposed Decision.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  8.9.  The delegate of Switzerland  welcomed and supported the LDC proposal aimed at offsetting the 
discriminatory treatment of LDCs that, after graduation from th eir current status , still ha d a GNP 
below USD  1,000 at constant 1990  prices.  Switzerland was of the view that those countries sh ould 
benefit from the same exemptions as developing countries identified pursuant to Annex  VII(b) to 
the SCM Agreement.  
8.10.   The delegate of the  United States  again indicated that the specific need for this proposal 
remained unclear for her delegation as there seemed to be no export subsidy program mes in place 
for which an extension m ight be needed. The U S continue d to question the need to change the rules 
and remained open to continue conversations with the LDC  Group on th is issue.  
8.11.   The delegate of the European Union  stated that the EU was mindful of the challenges that 
graduating LDCs face d and appreciated the clarifications received by members of the LDC  Group . 
The EU  was supportive of constructive initiatives to better integrate LD Cs into the MTS and 
encouraged discussi on on this proposal – and on any Special and Differential Treatment proposal – 
based on an analysis that identified  specific problems . In this case , a particular fact-based discussion  
was required since Members still needed to assess the actual use of export subsidies by LDCs in 
order to establish whether a transition period was needed to allow graduated LDCs to continue using 
export or any other subsidies . This was especially necessary given that LDCs rarely submit ted 
notifications under Article  25 of the SCM  Agreement . 
8.12.   The European Union encouraged the LDC  Group to work with the Secretariat to improve the 
notifications situation by making use of the available techni cal assistance to support the preparation 
of first -time notifications. Moreover, the LDC  Group could help the debate by presenting anecdotal 
evidence of whether or not, and how , LDCs ma de use of export subsidies , and how that help ed in 
their economic devel opment. In addition, the EU suggested that the countries concerned should also 
seek assistance for reshaping any export subsidies to make them WTO -compatible. The EU st ood 
ready to engage in informal consultations with the LDC  Group on this matter.  
8.13.   The del egate of Canada  indicated that his authorities were  mindful of the challenges faced by 
LDCs and graduating LDCs. However, Canada was concerned that the questions it had raised 
regarding this proposal remain ed unanswered. Most importantly, Members did not k now which 
recently graduated LDC  countries would benefit from this proposal. Canada shared the view of the 
EU regarding the lack of notifications and encouraged the LDCs and any other  Member  facing 
difficulties to engage with the Secretariat for technical assistance, if required. Canada stood ready 
to engage with the LDC Group on these and any other questions.  
8.14.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
8.15.   The Council so agreed . 
9  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AG RICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM ARGENTINA , AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL,  CANADA, COLOMBIA, 
COSTA RICA, CÔTE D'I VOIRE, DOMINICAN REP UBLIC, ECUADOR, GUAT EMALA, 
HONDURAS, JAMAICA, MALAYSIA, NICARAGUA,  PANA MA, PARAGUAY, PERU, 
UNITED  STATES, AND U RUGUAY (G/C/W/767/RE V.1) 
9.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 31  October and 
1 November  2019, the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Ec uador, United States, Guatemala, Honduras, Malaysia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Dominican Republic, and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this item 
on the agenda of this meeting and to circulate a revised version of document  G/C/W/767.  
9.2.  The delegate of Colombia  reminded delegations that this was the second time that this issue 
had been raised at this Council and that the co -sponsors had now circulated 
document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 , which included all of the item's co-sponsor s. The WTO w as well aware 
that the EU was deploying measures that effectively prohibited the use of an increasing number of 
substances that were required for safe and sustainable agricultural production and trade. These plant 
protection products had been assessed and authorized for use by many WTO  Members. Furthermore , 
the prohibitions by the EU did not adequately reflect the findings of the Codex Alimentarius  (the G/C/M/136  
 
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  Codex)  and the Joint FAO/WHO  Meeting on Pesticide Residues. The prohibitions even overstretched, 
on occas ions, the true nature of the E uropean Food Safety Authority (EFSA)  and EMA  technical 
conclusions. Moreover, no evidence of the benefits for human health of these measures had ever 
been provided. Colombia observed that these  measures risked produc ing an adv erse impact on 
producers' livelihoods in most countries , as they had an overly restrictive impact on the trade in 
agricultural goods. These were no longer individual concerns ; rather, they amounted to an 
aggregated barrier to trade in agriculture coming fr om the world's biggest importer of agricultural 
products. A large number of Members had also raised these concerns at the Committee on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures ( SPS Committee), the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Committee ), and the CTG. However, the EU continued to lower many minimum residue levels 
(MRLs) to unacceptable trade -restrictive levels, and to reference previous statements that did not 
meaningfully address the specific concerns and questions posed by  Members. Colombia once again 
urged the EU to provide additional written information on all questions posed by Members, to 
circulate all the answers among all the interested parties, and to engage productively in future 
discussions on this important matter , and to do so in a manner consistent with the WTO  Agreements.  
9.3.  The delegate of Panama  observed that Panama continued to follow with great concern the 
measures taken by the European Union,  which went well beyond international guidelines, and which 
were without the conclusive scientific studies and evidence required under the WTO Agreements. 
Panama had already raised these concerns in the SPS and TBT  Committees ; it had  also signed the 
Buenos Aires Ministerial joint statement on MRLs in 2017, the Antigua and B arbuda Declaration of 
19 June 2019, and the document under discussion, document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1, regarding the EU's 
non-tariff barriers. Every Member was free to take the precautions necessary to ensure the safety 
of its citizens, but such measures should not affect trade more than necessary to attain that 
Member's permissible goals. For this purpose, t here were international standards , such as the Codex, 
with which most Members compl ied, in order to have similar  sanitary requirements necessary to 
safeguard  human and animal health. Panama believed that any Member wishing to apply practices 
more stringent than these standards had to  provide substantial justification for doing so, alternatives 
to such measures, and appropriate adaptation time -frames. Panama co nsidered that the results of 
the studies cited by the EU did not  fulfil th ose requirements.  
9.4.  The EU decision to take products off the market or to reduce the maximum levels of these 
active substances to 0.01, which mean t that they were essentially undetecta ble traces, was 
tantamount to prohibiting their use. In the case of Panama, m easures taken on the use of the active 
substances buprofezin, chlorothalonil, and picoxystrobin, among others, at national level , could 
disrupt trade with the EU and cause signifi cant losses to sectors , such as the banana industry . Such 
measures  would have  a negative impact on the welfare and employment of thousands of families in 
the most vulnerable sectors of Panama's  society. In 2017, Panama's agricultural exports to the 
European Union had totalled nearly 200  million dollars, with bananas constituting the bulk of those 
exports , but now these exports were threatened by the imminent entry into force of such policies.  
9.5.  Panama  was applying the levels recommended by the Codex for substances such as 
chlorothalonil , which were essential tools used in combating plant diseases , such as black sigatoka , 
which had proliferated since the onset of global warming. It was  also unclear  to Panama  why some 
of these EU  measures were not applied to citrus products, but to bananas , the skin of which is thicker 
and not consumed. The lack of phytosanitary mechanisms affording protection against the 
challenges of the tropics could lead to significant losses in food production or necessitate the clearing 
of larger areas for cultivation, thus increasing production costs and putting tropical forests and global 
biodiversity at risk.  
9.6.  As in its previous statements in other committees, Panama called upon the EU to e ngage in 
technical discussions with the Members affected, as set out in document  WT/GC/777/Rev. 4. Panama 
also asked the European Union to consider realigning itself with international standards or to present 
scientific studies with precise conclusions that  support ed and justified its decisions. At the same 
time, Panama appealed to Members that applied the same policies as the EU, such as those in the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and possibly the United Kingdom as of January  2020, to 
notify the SP S and TBT  Committees of such measures.  
9.7.  Panama  called upon EU member States  to imagine themselves in the position of a  tropical 
countr y, such as Panama,  facing these restriction s, and asked  if, in this case, they would still stop 
exporting to the E U, puttin g at risk the employment of thousands of farmers and the food security 
of millions from the loss of their productive competitiveness, or if, again, they would  clear the tropical G/C/M/136  
 
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  forests and speed up global warming, in order to maintain levels of production  and employment, in 
compensation for the losses that would be triggered by a lack of phytosanitary measures.  
9.8.  The delegate of Brazil  expressed Brazil's  concerns regarding many of the EU's measures , which 
effectively prohibit ed the use of a number of substances that were required for safe and sustainable 
agricultural production. Brazil  considered  that the EU had still to demonstrate the consistency of its 
measures with the provisions of the SPS Agreement . The EU had been withdra wing marketing 
approval of many substances using crop protection products , a decision that was  generally followed 
by a decree on the MRLs of the non -approved substances.  Such d ecrees actually amount ed to a ban 
in many cases. Many of the prohibited substanc es were used in pest control products for a wide 
range of crops in tropical agriculture, which was biodiverse in terms of pests, disease, and weeds, 
and could not  be compared with agriculture at European latitudes , in which seasonality play ed an 
important role in controlling pests. Th ose substances had been carefully studied and maximum limits 
of their residues had been scientifically established by international standard -setting organizations. 
Thus, if  the E U had decide d to divert from international standa rds because it wishe d to establish a 
higher level of protection, it had to abide  by the multilateral rules of the SPS  Agreement  that had  
checks and balances for protecting health and promoting trade. It was the science that ensure d the 
correct balance.  
9.9.  Brazil noted that Members had to  ensure that their measures were based on scientific principles 
and not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence ; in addition, SPS measures were only to be 
applied to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, so that they were 
not more trade -restrictive than necessary.  The EU's measures were based on a precautionary 
principle . Specifically, t he studies that had been undertaken to support them stated that residual 
levels could not be confirmed for plant and any other products due to lack of data.  If, in view of the 
current information gaps, it was impossible to establish criteria for acceptance or rejection of a 
substance , it was  clear that the risk had not yet been determined. In this case, before imposing a 
ban, the EU had to  request further information to fill the gaps and complete the risk assessment 
before being  able to implement SPS  measures in compliance with the SPS  Agreement . 
9.10.   Regarding the EU's statement  in the SPS  Committee that it had conducted  a risk assessment , 
Brazil noted that  a risk assessment had to  be based on data, and not on uncertainty, consumer 
preferences, or civil society perceptions, because th ose grounds were not accepted as valid 
justification s for restrictive measures.  Instead, with regard to  those factors, consumers remained  
free to choose the products that they wished to consume  and to exercise their preference s in 
supermarkets. Brazil accepted  that such p reference s could easily be driven by misinformation in 
advertising campaigns , and it was  deeply worrisome when  such preference s became actual trade 
barriers endorsed by governments.  It appeared to Brazil that, in  implementing these measures, the 
EU was attempting to impose its own domestic regulatory approach onto its trading partners , even 
if levelling the playing field was not a valid justification for SPS  measures.  
9.11.   The delegate of Ecuador  reiterate d the concern s raised regarding  the non -tariff measures 
introduced by the EU on exports from countries such as Ecuador.  The producers in countries such 
as Ecuador were concerned that the EU's  barriers would  prevent the entry into markets of a number 
of different produc ts, given that the  EU was one of their major trading partners and made  up a very 
large proportion of all agricultural exports.  Ecuador was particularly concerned by the progressive 
use of SPS  protection measures that ensure d the removal of pests and the sa fety of food reaching 
final end consumers , an issue that had been raised at SPS  Committee  meetings, as well as in 
informal consultations in Brussels and elsewhere.  These  measures were of particular concern to 
Ecuador , given the potential consequences on its agricultural economic sector and the thousands of 
families involved in that sector . Such measures would have a negative impact on the global trade of 
goods  and would also impact its sustainable nature and most small producers in developing 
countries , in particular  in LDCs, most of which were low-income farmers.  To overcome this, it was 
necessary  to show flexibility in discussions prior  to the entry into force  of such measures, as well as 
in the ir development and design,  and to  provide sufficient time -periods for their implementation. 
Ecuador  therefore urge d the EU not to adopt excessively restrictive measures without conclusive 
scientific evidence to achieve a real impact on health and to take into account the social and 
economic impact that such measu res may have in the long term on its trading partners , to respect 
internationally recogni zed standards for the protection for human, animal and plant life , as well as  
its obligations in the SPS  Agreement, thereby ensuring that all measures were based on a risk 
assessment  and did  not constitute unjustified barriers to trade . G/C/M/136  
 
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  9.12.   The delegate of Uruguay  restate d Uruguay's  economic  and system ic concerns regarding the 
EU's use of a hazard -based approach in its regulatory determinations on SPS matters . Uruguay 
reiterated that any determination, in particular when it depart ed from in ternationally  accepted 
standards and harmonization efforts in multilateral areas , such as the Codex, had to  be based on a 
full scientific risk assessment and underpinned by validated methodologies in line with the provisions 
of the relevant Agreements . This was essential for the maintenance of the effective balance between 
a Member 's right to pursue their legit imate objectives while avoid ing the creation of unnecessary 
barriers to trade.  Uruguay highlight ed the recent adoption at the Twentieth Regular Meeting of the 
Inter-American Board of Agriculture (IABA), held two  weeks before , in Costa Rica, of a Resolution  
by the Ministers of the Americas that emphasized the need to promote science -based agricultural 
regulations and risk assessment to facilitate international trade in safe food and agricultural 
products, while preventing the proliferation of non -tariff meas ures, such as MRLs, lacking sufficient 
technical and scientific justification, which ha d a considerable negative trade impact upon the 
production and productivity of safe food and agricultural products, particularly in developing 
countries.  Uruguay  underst ood that it was the special responsibility of the world's largest importers 
of agricultural products to consider the effects that their regulatory approaches and determinations 
could  have on developing and least developed countries , whose economies, includ ing the household 
economies of their citizens, were largely based on the production and trade in agricultural and 
agro-industrial products, particularly when such approaches  lacked sufficient scientific justification. 
In this regard, Uruguay made a general  appeal not to overlook the enormous contribution made by 
those industries to the provision of adequate supplies of safe food for the growing world population, 
for the benefit of food security , and in line with the provisions of Sustainable Development Goa l 2 of 
the 2030  Agenda of the United Nations.  Therefore, Uruguay  once again call ed upon the E U to 
reconsider its regulatory approach and to avoid the unjustified proliferation of obstacles to 
international trade in agricultural products in light of the ser ious social and economic consequences 
that such an approach m ight have on other Members, in particular developing and least developed 
countries, for which the European Union market was of key importance.  
9.13.   The delegate of Peru reiterated Peru's support for the trade concern , raised in 
document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 , regarding the implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural 
imports by the EU through the limitation of the use of certain products in agriculture. These measures 
had resulted in an excessively restrictive impact on trade in certain agricultural products. Members' 
measures had to be aligned with their WTO  commitments, including in the GATT, and the TBT and 
SPS Agreements. They also had to be in conformity with the relevant work carri ed out by 
international standard -setting and harmonization bodies , and to be applied in a manner that did not 
create disguised restrictions on international trade. The EU, as well as all other Members, could have 
a legitimate interest in applying measures to protect their consumers. However, these measures had 
to be based on scientific principles and a risk -based assessment, and not on a hazard -based 
assessment, as was currently the case.  
9.14.   The delegate of Côte d'Ivoire  observed that his country had been producing bananas for over 
50 years and was extremely concerned by the draft Commission Regulation amending Annexes  II 
and III to Regulation (EC)  No. 396/2005 of the European Parliament and Council regarding MRLs for 
Imazalil in or on certain products, includi ng bananas. As all producers and other stakeholders in the 
banana industry knew, Imazalil was a fungicide used by banana -producing countries as a key post -
harvest tool for preserving product quality and safety and keeping the product free from mould and 
fungus during storage, transport , and the handling period , until it became available for sale and 
before reaching consumers on the European market. All the stakeholders in this industry were 
unanimous about the fact that there was currently no phytosanitary alternative available on the 
market that could be used for bananas (nor were there other alternatives comparable in quality and 
efficacy). A ban on the use of this product for preserving crops would therefore prevent producers 
from responding to market dem and. Côte d'Ivoire noted that it had just overcome, with great 
difficulty, and at the cost of enormous economic and social sacrifice, the trade challenges caused by 
the 2009  Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas, while complying with WTO  rules. In its view,  the 
EU amendments of MRLs for Imazalil in bananas defied the very provisions of the multilateral trading 
system in this regard.  
9.15.   Since 2016 , Côte d'Ivoire had been the leading African exporter of bananas, with the EU being 
its main destination market ; its sector's turnover was CFAF 100 billion (EUR  152.5  million), 80 to 
85% of which was in foreign exchange. The banana sector accounted for approximately 3% of Côte 
d'Ivoire's GDP and almost 8% of its agricultural GDP, thereby constituting the second  largest 
employer after the State. Banana production engaged around 15,000  workers and supported a G/C/M/136  
 
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  minimum of 85,000 to 100,000  persons, considering that every worker had to feed at least seven 
other individuals. The industry also helped to tackle the challenge of r ural exodus and illegal 
immigration, and was therefore of strategic importance to the economic and social development of 
Côte d'Ivoire. From this perspective, any measure aimed at restricting development inevitably posed 
a socio -economic threat to the popu lation, particularly to those living in rural areas, who were mostly 
women and children. In this case, the threat was even more serious since it was emerging from the 
EU, which was also Côte d'Ivoire's main customer for these trading operations.  
9.16.   Côte d'Ivo ire reiterated that , even though the banana sector had almost disappeared following 
the adoption of the 2009  Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas, which had led to the elimination 
of the Banana Protocol between the EU and Banana -Producing ACP  countries, th e industry had 
rebounded strongly five years later, due to the tireless and multifaceted efforts of the Government, 
the private sector, and also, in part, to the EU. Côte d'Ivoire therefore considered that the fact that 
these efforts were being undermined by the amendment of MRLs for Imazalil by one of its support 
partners, the European Union, was doubly unacceptable.  
9.17.   While Côte d'Ivoire recognized that the EU had a legitimate right to adopt measures to protect 
the health of its population, it urged the EU to withdraw the implementation of its regulation and to 
comply with the provisions of the SPS  Agreement. Any measure adopted by the European Union had 
to be formulated in accordance with the WTO  SPS Agreement, particularly Article  2.2 (the 
SPS measure shal l be based on scientific principles), Article  5.2 (in the assessment of risks, Members 
shall take into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods, 
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods) and Article  5.3 (Mem bers shall take into account 
as relevant economic factors: the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales). Where 
applicable, transition periods for the implementation of that measure had to be examined in a light 
that differed from the gener al rule of a reasonable interval of six  months under Annex  B, paragraph  2 
of the  SPS Agreement (Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(01)/17), as farmers needed more time to adapt 
to MRL  requirements, since it took 36  months on average to develop a new phytosanitary  pest 
control product. Moreover, Article  10.2 of the SPS  Agreement provided for the granting of longer 
time-frames for compliance with SPS  measures for products of interest to developing country 
Members so as to maintain opportunities for their exports. Cô te d'Ivoire was extremely concerned 
by the measure s in question and invited the EU to cooperate and honour its commitments, so that 
bananas did not suffer the same fate as Côte d'Ivoire's now devastated pineapple sector.  
9.18.   The delegate of Argentina  thanked the EU for its communications but continued to observe 
with concern the proliferation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products in the EU, which was the 
subject of repeated discussion in the SPS and TBT  Committees.  In order to increase agricu ltural 
production in a sustainable manner, it was necessary to be able to use suitable and safe instruments , 
which posed a significant challenge for developing countries. Argentina wished to recall that all 
Members were required to base their measures on a  full scientific risk assessment, in accordance 
with the WTO  Agreements. The criteria adopted by the EU for the assessment of pesticides seemed 
to favour the application of a hazard -based approach, reducing unjustifiably the MRLs for 
phytosanitary products  that were essential for ensuring plant health and the continuity of production. 
Argentina remained concerned by the lack of certainty regarding the processing of tolerance requests 
for imports of active substances affected by the cut -off criterion and rec alled that  import tolerance 
requests were a palliative in the event of the possible non -renewal or rejection of the authorization 
of an active substance on the basis of a mere hazard identification without a full risk assessment. 
Argentina renewed its call  for the EU to take the appropriate precautions to prevent the creation of 
unnecessary barriers to international trade.  
9.19.   The representative  of Paraguay  stated that agriculture was the driving force of the Paraguayan 
economy, a sector that accounted for a si gnificant proportion of its GDP, exports , and employment. 
At the global level, according to WTO  statistics, Paraguay was the fourth largest exporter of oilseeds, 
the ninth  largest in meat exports, 10th in rice, 11th in hard grains , and 14th in wheat export s. As the 
European Union had pointed out during the last session of the SPS  Committee, the EU was a major 
trading partner and importer of agricultural products. The EU was usually among the top 
three  destinations for Paraguayan exports, with the value of P araguayan exports to the EU averaging 
just over a billion US  dollars annually over the past five  years. The EU represented 10% of 
Paraguay's trade, and received 9% of Paraguay's total exports. The 10  main goods exported from 
Paraguay to the EU were agricul tural products, which accounted for approximately 90% of 
Paraguayan exports to the EU. Therefore, any decision taken by the European Union that could affect G/C/M/136  
 
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  the importation of these products would undoubtedly have a negative effect on the economy and 
devel opment of Paraguay.  
9.20.   In this context, Paraguay noted with utmost concern the lack of willingness on the part of the 
European Union to review existing regulations on the use of plant protection products, which 
establish ed MRLs far below the internationally a greed standards under the Codex Alimentarius, or 
to provide conclusive scientific evidence to justify the adoption of this greater level of protection, in 
line with its obligations under the SPS  Agreement. This lack of willingness, which had been clear 
from the statement by the delegate of the European Union at the last meeting of the SPS  Committee, 
only served to increase Paraguay's concern. On numerous occasions, whenever concern was raised 
over the harmful effects that these EU policies would have on exp orts from developing country 
Members, the European Union had reiterated that it was a major donor in international development 
cooperation. While Paraguay was well aware of the importance of the cooperation it received from 
the European Union in the crucia l areas of education, social welfare, democracy, the business climate 
and SMEs, it pointed out that the potential harm to trade that was anticipated as a consequence of 
the matter in question could threaten almost all of Paraguay's trade with the EU. The E U's lack of 
clarity on its import tolerance policy, and the fact that, apart from risk assessment, consideration 
was given to "other legitimate factors" that were not based on scientific evidence, further deepened 
Paraguay's concern.  
9.21.   Paraguay had identifie d approximately 45  plant protection products that were used daily in 
its food production, the use of which was already, or would be, de facto  prohibited as a result of the 
measures concerning MRLs adopted by the European Union. For some of these products t here was 
no viable substitute on the market, or the existing substitute was included among the substances 
covered under the measure. Many of these products were used to limit the spread of weeds and 
pests that caused costly damage , amounting to millions , to Paraguay's farmers, while others were 
indispensable for growing crops in the country's subtropical climate. The elimination of these tools 
for integrated pest management would have negative consequences on production costs and volume 
and would affect not  only the revenue earned by producers but also food production in general, with 
food security repercussions for its population.  
9.22.   Paraguay recognized a Member 's right to implement measures deemed necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, but observed that such measures had to be based on scientific 
principles, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant internationa l 
organizations, and that they should not be more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their 
objectives. To date, the European Union had not said what level of protection it was seeking and 
had not explained the real benefits in terms of health and environmental protection that the 
implementation of this policy would create. In addition, copies of statements and written replies to 
the concerns expressed in various WTO  Committees had not been distributed, in a departure from 
the usual guidelines consi dered as good practice to be adopted by all Members for the sake of 
transparency and improvement in the function ing of Committees. Paraguay once again urged the 
European Union to heed the concerns of a growing number of Members and to work jointly with 
them to find an acceptable solution to this situation that would allow the EU to achieve its objectives 
for providing protection without affecting the flow of trade and its development potential.  
9.23.   The delegate of Honduras  stated that Honduras was a co -sponsor of the document but that 
the concerns set out therein were also of public interest. In recent years, Honduras had been 
concerned over the EU's reductions of MRLs for a series of agricultural chemicals and other products, 
which were of essential use to agri cultural production, and particularly for controlling and 
quarantining pests in tropical countries. Those reductions often ran counter to the import levels set 
by the Codex and other standards and therefore interrupted trade and the obligations that were 
undertaken to ensure that multilateral trade continued . Honduras explained that agricultural 
production was one of the largest sectors for economic development in Honduras,  which also had a 
major social impact. Honduras noted with particular concern the pot ential negative trade impact on 
exports of certain products from Honduras to the EU, such as bananas, as well as coffee, cocoa, 
melon, and avocado, given the new MRL  levels introduced by the EU. The EU had to implement 
measures in line with the SPS  Agreeme nt, otherwise there would be an enormous impact on 
employment and the well -being of millions of Hondurans. Therefore, Honduras had joined the 
growing number of Members that had raised their concerns over this issue, and Honduras called 
upon the EU to take those concerns into account in its decision -making process.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  9.24.   The delegate of Nicaragua  share d the previous concerns regarding  the implementation of the 
EU's measures on agricultur al products. Th ose measures impact ed negatively up on Nicaragua's  main 
export p roducts  that were  import ed into the EU, such as bananas, coffee, cocoa, and ground nuts, 
among others. Th e measures  also undermin ed the cooperation between Members'  economies and 
had an impact o n the sustainability of many families reliant up on agriculture.  While Nicaragua  share d 
the concern of ensuring safe food, this was something that had to  be achieved in line with Members ' 
obligations, particularly the rules of the Codex as an international , science-based,  set of standard s. 
Nicaragua  therefore urge d the EU to reconsider its hazard identification approach in favour of a risk 
assessment approach , and to ensure that MRL  levels were brought in to alignment with the scientific 
evidence, respect ed Codex , did not restrict trade any  more than necessary , and ensure d fair and 
transparent trade.  
9.25.   The delegate of Canada  shared  the concerns expressed by Members thus far.  The lack of 
clarity on how an import tolerance would  be set for an active substance falling u nder the cut -off 
criteria authorization was causing a high degree of uncertainty and risk for all exporters wishing to 
maintain access to the EU -market for agricultural products.  For plant protection products that f ell 
under the hazard -based cut -off criteria, the EU need ed to provide its trading partners with 
confirmation that import tolerances w ould be established on the basis of an assessment of risks 
conducted in accordance with international guidelines and provide detailed information to clarify t he 
process that the EU would  follow.  Until a clear and predictable process for setting import tolerances 
was implemented, Canada request ed that MRLs for active substances that f ell under the EU's 
hazard -based cut -off criteria be maintained at existing leve ls in order to allow trade to continue.  
Canada  emphasized that the concerns expressed in the statement made by Members in this Council  
had to  serve as a clear indication of the importance that many WTO  Members, including Canada, 
attribute d to seeking enhan ced transparency and predictability for trade.  
9.26.   The delegate of Australia  again h ighlight ed his country's  ongoing concerns in relation to the 
direction of the European Union's agricultural chemical s regulations and policy and the potential 
negative effect o n farmers and trade. Australia ha d previously raised its concerns over the EU's risk 
assessment and import tolerance setting policies in both the TBT and SPS  Committees.  While 
Australia recogni zed the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural and other  chemicals in a 
manner that protects animal, plant , and human health and the environment, Members were also 
bound by WTO  obligations , particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments 
and ensuring that measures were not more trade -restrictive than necessary.  Australia question ed 
the EU's approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection product authorizations and import 
tolerance limits that relie d primarily on hazard -based assessment. It was unclear how the 
EU hazards -based assessment was consistent with internationally agreed risk assessment standards 
for import tolerances.  Australia s ought  clarification on how the EU determine d hazards to consumers 
of treated produce and welcome d a discussion on the risk asses sments that underpin ned 
EU decisions on import tolerances.  Australia also s ought  greater clarity on how the hazards of a 
substance were differentiated in terms of the substance use d in a production system compared with 
its presence in a consumed produce.  Wherever possible, Australia support ed alignment with 
international scientific and regulatory standards to facilitate trade and to provide greater certainty 
around the use of plant protection products.  
9.27.   The delegate of the United States , as other Members, re mained deeply concerned about the 
European Union's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products.  The EU's codification 
and subsequent implementation of a hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation was profoundly 
and adversely impacting  global agricultural production and trade, particularly in developing 
countries.  Whereas t he EU ha d claimed that its measures related to pesticides and that its MRLs 
were transparent, science - and risk -based, and non -discriminatory , those claims did not ap pear to 
comport with the EU's repeated failure to provide Members with adequate explanations regarding 
the scientific underpinnings, objectivity, and consistency in application of its measures.  
9.28.   The EU ha d acknowledged the impact of its actions on trade  and, in justifying th ose actions, 
had claimed that it could not  risk EU  lives. The United States stresse d its own commitment to 
protecting the health of consumers based on sound science and internationally accepted risk analysis 
principles  and strongly support ed the efforts of other WTO Members to do the same, including 
through collaboration in  Codex to set inter national standards on pesticide MRLs.  Unfortunately, the 
United States found  that the EU's hazard -based regulatory approach was insufficiently grounded in 
science and risk. Despite the United States'  repeated requests, the EU had not demonstrated that 
any real benefit or measurable reduction in risk was achieved through its trade -restrictive measures.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  9.29.   Earlier in 2019,  the EU had requested that Codex re -evaluate certain substances that were 
being banned in the EU, despite existing Codex  MRLs. In September  2019, the Joint 
FAO/WHO  Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) , had evaluated the EU's concern forms for several 
such substances and disagreed with the EU's findings.  On the basis of risk assessments, the JMPR  
had reaffirmed the safety of existing Codex  MRLs f or these substances.  Around the world, national 
regulators, JMPR, and Codex , were being compelled to divert limited resources to defend the 
risk-based evaluation of substances already deemed safe for agricultural use. Meanwhile, EU  efforts 
were eroding pub lic confidence in regulatory systems and casting doubt in consumers' minds about 
the safety of the food supply.  
9.30.   The United States noted that, a s conveyed at the July  2019 CTG, and as outlined in the joint 
statement found in document  G/C/W/767, farmers arou nd the world rel ied on access to the full 
range of tools and technologies available for agricultural production.  This access was critical to 
protecting crops from pests and diseases, which were estimated to cause annual losses of 20% to 
40%, and also allowed farmers to enhance yields and productivity while limiting post -harvest losses 
and reducing unnecessary food waste, thus ensuring that the resources invested in producing food 
were being managed efficiently and sustainably.  This access  also promote d an abundant supply of 
safe and affordable food to meet the growing demands of the global population, many of whom 
relied directly or indirectly on agriculture to sustain their livelihoods ; it was facilitated by well -
functioning, objective , and science -based regulatory systems , which protect ed consumers and 
establish ed the basis for fair trade.  And yet, despite the concerns expressed by a record number of 
Members in the SPS and TBT  Committees over the past four years, the EU had continue d to 
implement measu res that jeopardize d this access, without clear scientific justification, and without 
apparent regard for the potential to undermine rural livelihoods and sustainable development.  
9.31.   For the United States, i t was unconscionable that those who gr ew food had to  be at greatest 
risk of experiencing food insecurity.  Bearing in mind the imperative of supporting rural livelihoods 
and preventing food insecurity, it was critical to consider the scientific evidence suggesting that pest 
and disease pressures were likely to increase in the future due, inter alia , to changing climatic 
conditions.  More than ever before, Members  needed to be forward -looking, and to ensure that well -
functioning and objective science -based regulatory program mes continue d to ensure access to saf e 
tools and technologies that met the evolving needs of both food producers and consumers.  The 
United Sates  welcome d the views of other Members on this critically important concern.  
9.32.   The delegate of Guatemala  reiterated Guatemala's interest in and concern r egarding this 
matter, as well as its trade concern on the issue, particularly with respect to the potential impact on 
its agricultural exports to the European Union. Guatemala's main concern was the negative impact 
that the EU's measures could have on expo rts of agricultural products, which, in turn, would have 
an adverse effect on food security and rural development, two  key areas addressed in the 
cooperation discussions with the European Union. Furthermore, Guatemala considered that the 
six-month transiti on period established by the European Union did not correspond with the actual 
time-frames required by agricultural producers to adapt to the measures and to continue to fulfil the 
existing export contracts established. For the adaptation of other substanc es, the harvest time and 
seasonality of crops had to be considered. If this measure did not seek to restrict trade more than 
necessary, Guatemala considered that the European Union could determine and grant a longer 
transition period of 24 -months for the i mplementation of these measures, which would give 
agricultural producers the time necessary to carry out studies to identify alternative substances. 
Nevertheless, Guatemala continued to express its concern regarding the EU's measures , which 
lacked adequate  scientific basis and affected food security and the development of developing 
countries.  
9.33.   The delegate of Costa Rica  affirmed that Costa Rica had co-sponsored this agenda item and 
the joint statement contained in document  G/C/W/767, which had been presented previously in this 
Council and was supported by an increasing number of WTO  Members. For several years , and on 
numerous occasions, Costa Rica had expressed its concerns to the EU, at bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral level, and in the context  of a growing number of concerns raised in the SPS and 
TBT Committees. However, to date, Costa Rica had not received a ny satisfactory reply, and the EU 
has decided to pursue its current approach despite the impact that it would have on food security at 
the global level and on the most vulnerable populations in developing countries.  
9.34.   The application of the non -renewal policy and the consequent reduction of the MRLs would 
cause serious problems for the agricultural sector in tropical countries, including Costa  Rica. The G/C/M/136  
 
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  case of bananas, although not the only product affected, was particularly relevant because in Costa 
Rica alone, production generated sales worth about USD  1 billion annually, representing close to 2% 
of GDP and 38.6% of agricultural GDP. The sec tor created 40,000  direct jobs and around 
100,000  indirect jobs, mostly in underdeveloped rural areas that were highly vulnerable to climate 
change. The main export destination was precisely the European Union, where over 50% of the crop 
was sent. Regretta bly, Costa Rica's producers were already starting to feel the effects of the change 
in EU regulations , as they were limited in the substances that they could use for the control of pests, 
such as black sigatoka. It was impossible for agricultural productio n to adapt to new requirements 
and tolerance in the time -frames provided by the EU. The registration alone of new molecules had 
to undergo a complex evaluation with medium -term results.  
9.35.   Bearing all of these limitations  in mind , Costa Rica had urged the EU on several occasions to 
establish a dialogue with those countries exporting agricultural products that were most deeply 
affected by the EU's amendments to its MRLs. Cost Rica had also requested the EU to apply the 
MRLs established in the Codex Alimentarius  as the leading global reference for their standardization. 
In cases where conclusive scientific evidence existed that indicate d that tolerance for a given 
substance should be reduced, that process had to take place within the context of the Codex 
Alimenta rius, through the coordinated work of the international community, and to the benefit of 
trade harmonization and facilitation. Costa Rica had also called for a risk assessment to be conducted 
for each substance and specific product in accordance with the E U's multilateral commitments, such 
that each amendment of the MRLs would be based on conclusive scientific evidence and enable the 
application of less trade restrictive measures. Unfortunately, no significant consideration had been 
given to Costa Rica's di fficulties, which it shared with many tropical countries, or to its requests.  
9.36.   At the CTG 's previous meeting, around 90  Members, many of which were developing and least 
developed countries, had taken the floor to express their concern over the direction tha t the 
implementation of the EU's regulatory approach was taking. Costa Rica took the opportunity once 
again to urge the EU to establish an effective and comprehensive dialogue with the affected 
Members, and to consider introducing measures to limit the imp act that its new regulations would 
have on food security at the global level , and on the most vulnerable populations in developing and 
least developed countries.  
9.37.   The delegate of  the Philippines  noted that th is was the first time that the Philippines had 
engaged on this issue . Her delegation wanted  to thank the 18  co-sponsors that had jointly raised at 
the CTG the issue of evolving MRLs established by the EU in Regulation No.  396/2005. The impact 
of the uncertainty introduced by the EU  practice  was visible , as was the potentially restrictive effects 
such measure s could  force upon trade in agricultural products. It was therefore  helpful to view this 
issue in the CTG.  The Philippines'  interes t in th e issue was obvious considering that it was  an 
important partner  and a not insignificant exporter of certain agricultural products to the EU. The 
Philippines would  continue to evaluate the growing tendency of the regulation to unilaterally lower 
MRLs for an expanding list of pesticides on the basis of hazard -based assessments and not on 
scientific risk assessment. International standards  that allowed for a science -based approach to risk 
assessment already exist ed in the Codex Alimentarius  but seemed  to have been ignored.  The 
Philippines wish ed to request the EU to provide greater transparency on : (i) the substances whose 
approval may soon not be renewed, and (ii) the substances whose MRLs may probably  be adjusted 
downwards. The stakes c ould be high, so predictability was very important.  
9.38.   The delegat e of Senegal  support ed the communication submitted by the co -sponsors in 
document  G/C/W/767 /Rev.1 and believed that, in the context of a regulation with a possibly very  
damaging impact, scientific evidence was vital, and a time -period was required for adjustment . 
Therefore , measures had to be adopted in a very comprehensive way in order to ensure that 
Members could  continue to combat pests. As an example,  in West Africa,  they had legionnaires 
disease, as well as  various pests that caused terrible damage in a multitude of countries.  A number 
of initiatives for alternatives were under way, but they were not yet sufficiently developed,  in order 
to deal with a number of invas ive species, which was why these Members'  agriculture was facing  so 
many challenges with regard to food sovereignty and participating in world trade.  Given the concerns 
related to pesticides submitted to speciali zed pesticide bodies, it could  be legitimate  to restrict them  
in the case of  a genuinely proven danger to public health . However , arguments would need to be 
based on a risk assessment, rather than just a hazard -based approach , in accordance with Codex 
standards and Article  5.2 of the  SPS Agreement.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  9.39.   Senegal pointed out that this  recurring item, which had been addressed on a number of 
occasions within the SPS  Committee, was yet to receive a satisfactory response from the European 
Union with regard to evidence of scientific proof that could satisfy the criteria of  Article  2.2 of the 
SPS Agreement. Not renewing these allowances would  lead to a serious damage to trade and 
production of these products for Senegal. Exports of f resh vegetables amount ed to approximately 
70 billion CFRA  Francs, or EUR 108 million , and the EU  measures were very damaging for Senegal's  
export capacity . This fact had  to be taken into account by developed Member s, in accordance with  
the principles of the GATT, and in particular Article  XXXVI :1(b), which recogni zed the importance  of 
export incomes for Members  from the developing world. In this vein, the EU's regulation  would  
clearly have a damaging impact on African agriculture exports . Senegal therefore invited the EU to 
reconsider the measures and to provide all relevant informa tion on the procedures and on the 
time-frame of establishing MRLs of active agents in this area.  
9.40.    The delegate of the Russian Federation  considered the establishment of  pesticide MRLs to be 
an issue of great importance given that the number of applied chem ical substances grew every year.  
The Russian Federation conceded that regulatory process es sometimes slowed  down necessary 
governmental action intended to respond to the demands of food producers, exporters, and 
consumers. The Russian Federation also found consumer interests to be a key factor in establishing 
the level of MRLs and nonetheless could not  admonish the necessity to maintain trade flows.  The 
Russian Federation expressed its wish  to participate in developing MRL  rules that would  contribute 
to finding  the right balance between consumer interests and those of agriculture producers. The 
balance that needed to be found had to avoid any loss of  human, animal and plant life and health,  
and ensure ecosystem sustainability and trade development.  
9.41.   The delegate of New Zealand  expressed New Zealand's  commitment  to a rules -based trading 
system under the WTO  Agreement s and indicated its concern  over the adoption of  hazard rather 
than risk -based measures  by any Member . The EU's hazard -based approach to regul ating 
agricultural chemicals, and in particular plant protection products , posed an unnecessary barrier to 
trade. New Zealand upheld  the importance of transparent risk assessment processes based on sound 
science and conducted in line with international sta ndards.  This was particularly relevant when 
approving and renewing plant protection products and setting import tolerances and MRLs.  
9.42.   The representative of El Salvador  expressed her country's support  for the arguments of the 
co-sponsors of this agenda item  concerning the new E U policy on the MRLs of certain substances . In 
particular, she recalled  the economic effects that this policy had had and would  continue to have on 
agricultural exports , as well as the considerable impact it would also have on producers from 
developing countries. Apart from its concerns over the scientific justification for the establishment 
of these measures, El Salvador was  also concerned by the transition periods provided , which did not 
reflect the reali ties of production, or the difficulties of farmers to find substitute s for such substances . 
El Salvador affirmed that it would  continue to participate in the discussions on this item within the 
Council , as well as  in the SPS and TBT  Committees.  
9.43.   The delegat e of India shared Members' concerns over the EU's lowering of MRLs for a number 
of products , including buprofezin, to default levels, which were more trade -restrictive than necessary 
to protect against risks to human health, especially with regard to rice and grapes. India believed 
that these regulations had to be grounded in sound science and based on determinations of actual 
risk; they should take into account realistic exposure scenarios rather than a presumption of hazard. 
India also requested the EU to  consider the potential impact of these regulations on trade, as well 
as to provide its rationale for deviating from international standards set by the Codex and for not 
considering MRLs set by other Members. The EU had based its decisions on a perceived u ncertainty 
around the genotoxic potential of buprofezin. However, this chemical was also normally present in 
many raw fruits and vegetables. Finally, in addition to setting MRL  trade -restrictive default levels, 
the EU's measures had not provide d adequate t ransition time.  
9.44.   The delegat e of Sri Lanka  joined the co -sponsors in acknowledging this specific trade concern. 
Sri Lanka had made a comprehensive and elaborated statement at the Council 's previous  meeting, 
had looked at the possible trade implications of the EU  measures, if implemented, and had found 
that the trade implications were going to be very substantial in terms of Sri Lanka's total trade 
volumes, particularly of trade volumes with the EU. As many proponents had stated, the measures 
had to be based on scientific evidence rather than an arbitrary hazard assessment. Sri Lanka 
wondered why the EU was actually adopting different standards when it came to their products, as 
the proponents had sta ted and encapsulated. The same plant protection products had been G/C/M/136  
 
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  permitted in other commodities, but not in the specific commodities that were being exported by 
most of the developing countries. Sri Lanka noted that, under the SPS  Agreement, such 
discrimi nation was tantamount to a violation ; this had to be borne in mind by the EU. In this regard, 
Sri Lanka recalled that Members could not discriminate among commodities for a specific kind of 
plant protection product when they were defining their MRL  levels.  
9.45.   Sri Lanka believed that the Codex Alimentarius Commission was the appropriate body to 
decide on particular threshold levels, bearing in mind the possible risks for human health of particular 
foods and dietary intakes. In this vein, the JMPR , established w ithin the Codex , had undertaken such 
research and had produced conclusive results that had eventually become Codex standards. Instead 
of disregarding this process, Members could approach and submit a proposal to the Codex with the 
aim of creating a particu lar MRL  level standard, even though this process could be time -consuming. 
Knowing the European Union's  influence in the Codex Commission, Sri Lanka proposed that the EU 
should use this process  to establish international standards for MRL  levels. In this wa y, Members 
would know if such levels were based on scientific evidence. Sri Lanka encouraged the EU to pursue 
such a process  instead of imposing unilateral measures, and to allow developing countries to 
continue to export their products at the levels currently permitted.  
9.46.   The delegate of Chile said that there was some contrast between the Codex standards and 
the EU measures at hand. He also noted that Chile firmly believed in multilateralism and was 
convinced that the MTS would be able to respond to the curr ent situation and meet Members' 
collective needs in various fora. The WTO was a multilateral forum and Members had to respect it.  
9.47.   The delegate of Pakistan  said that document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 was still being examined in 
his Capital; however, Pakistan, as an exporter of certain agricultural products, had an interest in 
following this issue and would follow further developments closely.  
9.48.   The delegate of Jamaica  requested that Jamaica be added to the list of co -sponsors of this 
item. 
9.49.   The delegate of Mexico  noted that document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 raised systemic interest s and 
important concerns regarding the EU's establishment of MRLs. In Mexico's opinion, the EU should 
adhere to a risk -based approach when determining MRLs and ensure that scientific evidence 
determined  the conditions for establishing them, thereby avoiding affecting global agricultural trade. 
Mexico considered that it was key to maintain science -based procedures when adopting  non-tariff 
measures , in keeping with WTO  obligations. She reiterated that , when implementing the 
EU measures , transparency should be prioritized , in particular by ensuring that Members remained 
informed of draft measures and by providing Members with reasonable time -periods for their 
implementation  to allow Members time to adapt to them. In conclusion, Mexico called upon the EU 
to ensure that its measures were based on a science -based risk assessment.  
9.50.   The delegate of the Dominican Republic  said that, for his country, as for other developing 
countries, the impact of the EU's measure would be significant, specifically as it could harm the 
Dominican Republic's industries, and in particular its exports of bananas, mangoes , and avocados, 
which represented 20% of its annual exports, and whose major destination was the EU. The 
establishment of EU  measures not based on conclusive scientific evidence would affect all agricultural 
products exported from the Dominican Republic. He therefore asked the EU to meet its obligations 
under the Agreements with reference to the Codex Aliment arius.  
9.51.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated that her delegation had registered  the 
comments made in various meetings as well  as in document  G/C/W/767 and its revision. With regard 
to the latter, the EU  noted that this was a "Communication " and not a list of written questions ; 
however, it had taken the concerns very seriously . The EU had regularly provided detailed 
explanations about the rationale and necessity of its SPS  measures in the SPS  Committee. Multiple 
seminars, workshops , and bilateral meet ings on authori zation procedures and on specific substances 
had been organi zed in the past  and could be arranged upon request.  In addition, the EU was also 
working actively in other international fora where pesticides were discussed, notably the Codex 
Alimentarius and the OECD , where  the EU had provide d information on its policies and the ir rationale. 
Many issues relating  to the approval of plant protection products were also being addressed 
bilaterally.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  9.52.   The EU was an open market and  the world 's largest single market , with 500  million 
consumers . It import ed more fruit and vegetables than any other country (in 2018 , EU imports of 
fruits and vegetables amounted to 16,8  billion euros ) and did  so while maintaining a high level o f 
food safety and animal and plant health.  The EU applie d the same health and safety requirements 
for food and feed irrespective of whether these were  produced domestically or imported from 
third countries . Its import requirements on agri -food products ens ured that products placed on the 
EU market compl ied with EU  standards  and were  not more trade -restrictive than required to achieve 
the appropriate level of SPS protection. For instance , the EU alone import ed more fruit s and 
vegetables than least developed countries , than the US, China,  and Russia taken together.  
9.53.   The EU  SPS measures that raised  concerns , as expressed in document  G/C/W/767/R ev.1, 
relate d to substances that present ed significant risks for consumers ' health  and that had been found 
to be mutagenic, carcinogenic, reproductive toxicants and endocrine disruptors. For substances with 
such properties there could not  be any acceptable risk in the food chain  and c onsumers should not 
be deliberately exposed to them from the use of plan t protection products in the EU.  The legitimate 
expectation of EU citizens was that the EU would  ensure a high level of human health protection  and 
adopt appropriate measures. In doing so, the EU respect ed its international commitments and its 
legislation was in line with the SPS  Agreement.  
9.54.   The EU 's approach to the regulation of  active substances was fully science -based  and follow ed 
the advice of the E FSA, whereby a n active substance was approved only after a thorough 
science -based risk assessment conducted  jointly by EFSA and the national authorities of the 
EU member  States. Findings that active substances were carcinogenic, reprotoxic , and so on,  were 
based on scientific evidence from EFSA or the European Chemicals Agency. The EU also follow ed the 
United N ations ' Globally Harmoni zed System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals. In addition, 
the scientific criteria adopted by the EU to identify endocrine disruptors for biocides and pesticides 
were based on the relevant WHO  definitions.  
9.55.   The EU had been highly transparent about its policy objectives: the EU  Regulation on plant 
protection products had been  duly notified, adopted in 2009 , and discussed with WTO  Members  on 
numerous occasions.  In addition, trading partners had been  informed about the po ssible restrictions 
and non -approvals of active substances via WTO -TBT notifications , and about the proposed lowering 
of MRLs for such substances via the WTO -SPS notification system.  The EU  had also provide d 
sufficient transition periods to allow operators  to adapt to the new measures. In this regard, w hen 
a substance was non-renewed , or when the MRL for an active substance was lowered, a deferred 
date of applications was set (usually six months after entry into force of the legal act) , which should 
allow EU member  States, third  countries , and food business operators , to put in place adequate 
arrangements to meet the new requirements.  The EU also provide d technical assistance to 
developing countries and LDCs, if necessary, to support such a smooth transition . 
9.56.   The EU  Regulation on plant protection products was applied without discrimination to 
EU producers and exporters alike and it was enforced in a trade -friendly manner. The EU did not 
impose a zero tolerance, as some other trading partners  did, such as the US, but instead gave clear 
orientation to operators about what they must achieve.  In addition, the EU allow ed trading partners 
to request the establishment of import tolerances for all active substances, including those that were 
genotoxic, carcinogenic, r eproductive toxicants , and endocrine disruptors , that would  systematically 
undergo a risk assessment, in line with WTO  requirements. Granting import tolerances for such 
substances would  be based on an assessment of the actual risk and would  therefore be considered 
on a case -by-case basis.  
9.57.   The EU acknowledge d that other risk assessment bodies m ight arrive at different conclusions 
on the risk assessment of active substances  and considered that this might be due to a variety of 
factors, including a different database available for assessment, different methodologies in risk 
assessment, and a different protection level chosen by risk managers. In line with the 
SPS Agreement, an importing coun try had the right to set a level of SPS protection it deem ed 
appropriate in relation to the protection of human life and health within its territory  and t he 
EU reserve d the right to base its risk management measures on the evaluations carried out by its 
own risk assessment body.  While t he EU  level of protection was high, the EU  MRLs were often not 
more stringent than those applied by other countries . Furthermore, the EU had one of the highest 
levels of uptake of Codex  MRLs among major economies.  G/C/M/136  
 
- 26 - 
 
  9.58.   It was EU policy systematically to align its MRLs with Codex Alimentarius MRLs if they were 
supported by adequate data and stood  up to the necessary scientific scrutiny applicable in the EU. 
To this end, the EU  had been proactively aligning hundreds of MRLs with Code x values, without the 
need for any third  country to file an application or submit any data.  The EU had also regularly 
indicate d during Codex meetings when it would  not align its MRLs to the proposed Codex MRLs  
because an assessment of the EFSA had conclude d that the proposed Codex MRLs were not 
sufficiently protective for European consumers or not sufficiently supported by scientific data. To 
increase transparency and predictability in international trade the EU encourage d others to do 
likewise.  
9.59.   In conclusion, while ensuring a high level of health protection, the EU still remain ed one of 
the largest importers of fruits and vegetables, to the benefit of farming communities in exporting 
countries , including those partners that had express ed concerns over the EU 's trade policy. For 
example , according to Eurostat data, since 2008, EU  imports of fruit from Brazil had increased by 
23%; from Costa Rica,  by 40% ; from the Dominican Republic,  by 93% ; from Jamaica,  by 54% ; from 
Peru, fivefold; and from the USA , by 87%.  Against this background, the EU  emphasize d its 
commitment to continuing an open dialogue on its SPS  policies and measures , and the EU stood 
ready to further engage with its trading partners and to explain to them its policies. The EU  believe d 
that Members had a shared interest in tackling the issue of toxic active substances and protecting 
their citizens ' health with appropriate measures . At the same time, the EU remain ed committed to 
implement ing its  SPS measures in the least trade restrictiv e manner. Nevertheless , the health issue 
at stake was of significant concern and should be properly addressed by the EU and the 
WTO Members hip. 
9.60.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the state ments made.  
9.61.   The Council so agreed . 
10  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA , KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIR ATES, 
AND OMAN – SELECTIVE  TAX ON CERTAIN IMPO RTED PRODUCTS – REQU EST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, SWIT ZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  
10.1.   The Chairperson  informed M embers that, in communications dated 31 October and 
1 November  2019, the delegations of the European Union, Switzerland, and the United  States  had 
requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
10.2.   The delegate of Switzerland  observed that, s ince the CTG 's previous meeting , in April 2019 , 
Switzerland had  pursued its efforts in the WTO , as well as in the Capitals of the GCC  countries. 
Switzerland's  latest outreach had been  in September  2019, when Switzerland had sent a letter to 
all GCC  Ministers of Finance and to the GCC  Secretariat laying out its concerns. Switzerland expect ed 
to receive detailed answers from the GCC  countries in a timely manner.  Switzerland also recall ed 
that it  had submitted additional detailed written questions in Sep tember  2018 and had then received 
a note from the GCC  Secretariat , on behalf  of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain,  
and the United Arab Emirates. Switzerland considered that the note was not an appropriate answer 
to its detailed questions regarding the scientific basis justifying the imposition of different tax rates 
on energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks . For this reason, Switzerland was still looking forward 
to receiving a prompt answer to its questions after more than one  year. 
10.3.   Switzerland thank ed the delegation of the Kingdom of Bahrain, as the GCC  focal point for the 
bilateral exchange that had taken  place earlier that week , where the countries had  discussed the 
issue of sports drinks.  There was currently a discrimination between d ifferent sports drinks brands, 
as some were subject to a 100%  selective tax whereas other s were not subject to the tax. In 
Switzerland's view,  this was a clear breach of the MFN  principle. In May  2019, Switzerland  had 
received the assurance that this had been  a mistake and that Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,  and the United 
Arab Emirates would  remove the discrimination. Switzerland again  request ed that a harmonization 
of the tax rate for different brands of sports drinks, which were like products , take place immediately . 
10.4.   Switzerland noted , as a positive development , the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates  would, as a first reform step, expand the selective tax base to include all 
sweetened beverages , in prin ciple as of 1 December  2019. However, Switzerland's  concerns G/C/M/136  
 
- 27 - 
 
  regarding the discriminatory impact of the selective  tax against energy drinks remain ed 
unaddressed, as the higher tax rate applied to energy drinks remained unchanged and was twice as 
high as that for carbonated soft drinks. In addition, this higher rate had no scientific basis and thus 
could not  be justified.  As concerned the second  step in the reform, which, according to previous 
indications, was to take place 12  months after the extension of t he tax base, the ad valorem  selective 
tax would  be replaced by a volume -based tax. Switzerland asked the GCC Members  for advance 
information on the details of this second step reform.  
10.5.   Turning now to Oman, Switzerland regret ted that, despite its request for information at April's 
Council meeting, the situation in Oman remain ed unanswered and unclear. Switzerland still did not 
know whether the implementing legislation had been published and adopted and to which products 
exactly the selective tax a pplied in Oman. This was clearly in contradiction with GATT  Article X, as 
the key elements of the selective tax were not publicly available. Switzerland wonder ed how the tax 
could  be administered in a uniform and reasonable manner in this case and urged Oman to provide 
the requested information in a timely manner.  In addition, other foreseen measures relating to the 
selective tax on beverages in Saudi Arabia had been brought recently to Switzerland's attention. 
Switzerland had raised them bilaterally and at  the Committee on Market Access earlier that week 
and would  pursue the discussion with Saudi Arabia in order to  ensure  that the foreseen measures 
did not constitute an unnecessary barrier to trade and  to see if there were  less burdensome 
alternatives.  
10.6.   Switzerland encourage d the GCC  States to engage and work closely with  WTO Members and 
with the industry in order to modify the selective tax, so that  the tax could be  applied in a transparent 
and non -discriminatory manner while meeting  its legitimate health policy objectives . As experience 
in various countries had shown , the price increase of a product was not effective in chang ing people's 
dietary habits.  Finally, Switzerland looked  forward to receiving detailed information , on a regular 
basis, on future developments regarding  the selective tax, as well as unforeseen changes.  
10.7.   The delegate of the European Union  reiterated her country's serious concerns voiced in the 
Council for Trade in Goods, the Market Access Committee , as well as in bilateral contact s with the 
GCC countries , in relation to the GCC  "Treaty on Excise Tax " of December  2016.  As the measures 
under this Treaty had become significant barriers to trade, the EU had called upon the GCC to engage 
in modifying the regulations with interested trad ing partners and private sector stakeholders , in 
order to ensure that the regulations took into account the scientific evidence for meeting specific 
health objectives while minimizing any potential negative economic impact.  
10.8.   The EU welcome d the expansion of  the tax base to include other sweetened beverages , as of 
1 December , by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, thus no longer discriminating against 
soft drinks containing sugar. However, the EU was still concerned that GCC  countries had not 
decreased the tax for energy drinks from 100% to 50% , a decrease  that would allow them not to 
discriminate between energy drinks and other sugary drinks.  
10.9.   The EU had not yet received details about proposed modifications or timelines for revisions 
from other GCC  countries  and l ooked forward to receiving such information soon to see if the 
proposed modifications would address the EU 's concerns.  The EU also asked  the GCC  countries to 
accelerate the modification of the tax base from retail price into ingred ient/volume base, as indicated 
by the Kingdom of Bahrain at the last Market Access Committee meeting , on 28  May 2019. Finally, 
the EU  recall ed that it looked forward to receiving written replies from the GCC  countries, with the 
exception of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to letters that the EU  Trade Commissioner had sent to 
their ministers that spring.  
10.10.   The delegate of  the United States  shared the concerns raised by Switzerland and the 
European Union. The US noted that its concerns remain ed as stated in previo us CTG  meetings , and 
that they had  not yet be en addressed.  The US asked  when it could  expect to receive responses that 
address ed those concerns , including the detail ed information previously requested.  
10.11.   The delegate of Japan  remained  concerned over this issue not yet having been resolved and 
took the view that scientific evidence had to  provide the basis for identifying dangers to public health 
and the benefits that taxation w ould bring to promoting health objectives. Therefore, Japan  
request ed that the countries concerned share information on the grounds on which they based their 
decision to introduce taxation.  Japan was  especially concerned that the United Arab Emirates  was G/C/M/136  
 
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  taxing  beverages that did not have any ingredients that could  cause hea lth problems , as well as that 
the United Arab Emirates'  definition of "energy drinks " was based not only on ingredients, but also 
on marketing and merchandi zing methods.  Japan  asked the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom 
of Bahrain,  and the United Arab E mirates,  to consider adopting a new policy mechanism to attain 
their public health objectives.  
10.12.   The delegate of Kingdom of Bahrain , on behalf of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman, thanke d the delegations of 
Switzerland, the EU , the US , and Japan, for their interest in this matter.  The GCC  member States 
had been taking these  concerns into consideration and an agreement had been  reached within the 
GCC to expand the excise tax base and its scope  to include all sweetened beverages, carbonated 
and non -carbonated, as a first  phase ; and, a s a second  phase, the GCC was currently studying 
replacing the ad valorem  tax on sweetened bevera ges with a specific tax. Bahrain had also invited  
Switzerland to discuss the sports drinks issue with the National Bureau of Revenue of Bahrain  in 
order to resolve it directly with the delegations  concerned . The GCC  member States continue d to 
work to resol ve this issue and any other pending concerns . 
10.13.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
10.14.   The Council  so agreed . 
11  INDONESIA'S IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, CHINESE TAIPEI, AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
11.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 31  October and 
1 November  2019, the delegations of the European Union, Japan, Chinese Taipei, and the U nited 
States, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
11.2.   The delegate of the European Union  recalled that th is was a long -standing agenda item  and 
noted that one of President Jokowi 's priorities under his second  term was to increase trade and 
promote economic diplomacy through concluding more free trade agreements. While the EU 
welcome d a shift towards more trade openness and a deeper integration of Indonesia in world trade , 
it also caution ed against the possible inclination to focus solely on measures to improve the country 's 
trade balance. To truly integrate in value chains , an economy  also had to be open to increasing 
imports. Currently, a range of pervasive non -tariff barriers risk ed negating the positive resul ts of 
any tariff decrease that Free Trade Agreements ( FTA)'s could bring.  
11.3.   The EU limited itself to elaborat ing only on the most recent developments  on this issue . First, 
the EU  deplore d the extension of the nickel export ban for two years ahead of the init ial plan, starting 
as from 1 January  2020. This caused confusion and uncertainty to the business  community . 
According to recent statements by the head of the Investment Agency BKPM, the nickel ban would 
even be in force already as of 1  November  2019.  In ad dition, the EU regret ted that imports of 
alcoholic beverages of EU  origin ha d de facto  been denied access to the Indonesian market since 
April 2019, without any formal notification or justification. The EU  urged the Indonesian authorities 
to restore the si tuation and once more to allow the entry of EU  alcoholic beverages.  
11.4.   The EU also  regret ted that import licences had not been issued and instead  had rather been 
rejected for export of EU  dairy products to Indonesia and , more worryingly , that Indonesian 
importers ha d been asked to find other sources. Given that dairy products were a major export item 
from the EU to Indonesia,  the EU urged Indonesia to normali ze exports procedures for EU  dairy 
products to Indonesia without any additional burdens  or restrictions. The denial of import licen ces 
to products of EU  origin only  was a blatant violation of Indonesia 's WTO  commitments . Therefore , 
the EU request ed that exports of its dairy products to Indonesia again be treated in line with 
Indonesia's offi cial regulations and WTO  commitments.  
11.5.   The EU welcome d the efforts made since the previous meeting  to lift the Avian Influenza 
import ban for poultry and poultry imports with respect to a number of EU  member  States  but 
regret ted that the ban had remain ed in place for other EU member  States, despite all of them having 
been declared free from outbreaks according to OIE  rules.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  11.6.   Finally, the EU  recalled a  point made at previous  meetings concerning the implementation of 
Halal Law  33/2014. Government Regulation No . 31 of 2019 on the Implementation of Law No. 33 of 
2014 entered into force in May  2019. An implementing Regulation setting out transition periods had 
finally  been notified to the TBT  Committee on 14  October  2019, with transition periods for food and 
beverage products already starting as from 17  October. The EU  requested  additional clarification on 
the specific products covered within the defined categories (halal and haram)  and considered that  a 
bilateral government -to-government Mutual Recognition Ag reement  required by Indonesia  as a 
precondition for the Indonesian Halal Product Assurance Agency (BPJPH) to start recogni zing 
Halal-certifying agencies in a foreign country  would  be complicated in practice and unnecessarily 
burdensome . The EU  invite d Indonesia to consider less burdensome practical solutions to continue 
recogni zing Halal -certifying institutions  and to provide further information on the technical 
implementation of the cooperation between the BPJPH and foreign Halal agencies. The EU also call ed 
upon Indonesia to keep Halal certification and halal labelling voluntary as a less trade restrictive 
measure  and not to impose non -halal labelling for products or services not claimed by the producer 
as being halal , since " non-Halal" labelling was unnec essary and create d an excessive burden for 
operators.  
11.7.   More generally, the EU  urged Indonesia to eliminate its high number of trade barriers  and to 
refrain from erecting  new trade barriers, in line with its commitments in the G20 and its 
WTO obligations.  
11.8.   The delegate of the United States  said that this Council was well aware of the breadth of 
concerns raised by her delegation with regard to Indonesia's trade and investment regime  and 
recalled that , in previous interventions in this body, her delegation had r eviewed in detail the broad 
range of its concerns, which included localization requirements, import licensing requirements, 
standards requirements, pre -shipment inspection requirements, and export restrictions, including 
taxes and prohibitions, among other s. These types of restrictions affected a broad range of sectors.  
11.9.   With regard to  Indonesia 's ongoing  use of localization requirements , the US  observed that 
Indonesia impose d local content requirements across a broad and expanding range of sectors, 
including telecommunications, mobile technology, energy, agriculture, retail, and franchising. Not 
only did these  local content requirements raise questions about consistency with I ndonesia 's trade 
obligations, they also act ed as barriers to trade that potentially divert ed investment from other 
developing countries.  The US was disappointed that , despite its engagement , to date Indonesian 
government officials at the highest levels had publicly touted the success of their local content 
requirements, and had called for their expansion to new areas, including information technology -
related "Internet of Things " products and the pharmaceutical and medical device sectors.  Only the 
month befo re, Indonesia had  issued new measures that appear ed to reinforce, and potentially 
expand, existing local content requirements for telecommunications tools and devices. The US  
believe d that such measures were a step in the wrong direction.  
11.10.   The US also noted  that, over the past year , there ha d been some progress in discussions 
with Indonesia on these  distortive local content requirement policies  and that the Government ha d 
agreed to undertake a "comprehensive " review of its local content policies.  Nevertheles s, at a 
previous CTG  meeting , the US had  requested the Indonesia n delegation to come prepared to brief 
the Committee on Trade -Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) on the status of this comprehensive 
review, but such a briefing had yet to occur.  Therefore, the US  again underscore d its hope that 
Indonesia would  conduct this review in an open and transparent manner and invite d the delegation 
of Indonesia to brief Members  on the status of the review at the next TRIMs  meeting.  The US thank ed 
the Indon esian delegation in advance for its engagement and expressed its hope that  Indonesia 
would  work to address the US  concerns and ensure that trade between them was  free and fair.  
11.11.   The delegate of Japan  said that , at this Council  and in the TRIMs  Committee mee tings, Japan, 
together with other Members, had expressed its concerns over the following Indonesian measures: 
the export restrictions imposed by the new Mining Law; the new laws on trade and industry; 
restrictions in the retail sector; and local content re quirements in the telecommunications sector, 
including for 4G  mobile phones. Japan regretted, however, that Indonesia had only replied that these 
measures were consistent with the WTO  Agreement, without providing any concrete answers.  Japan 
therefore reque sted Indonesia to clarify: (i)  how it could consider the measures to be introduced to 
be consistent with the WTO  Agreements; (ii)  to provide specific details of the approach Indonesia 
was considering adopting to promote reform; and (iii)  to update Members on the latest situation 
regarding all these measures.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  11.12.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  joined previous delegations in expressing its concern over 
this issue, particularly regarding local content requirements for 4G  mobile phones and 
telecommunications.  
11.13.   Indon esia's Halal regulation of 2014, which mandated Halal certification for circulation and 
trade in all products in Indonesia, also required foreign Halal products imported into Indonesia to 
comply with its provision. Since this law had been implemented on 17  October  2019, a number of 
Chinese Taipei's industries had requested her authorities to seek clarification from Indonesia 
regarding the specific practices required.  Chinese Taipei  therefore asked Indonesia to provide 
clarifications on: (i)  the implementati on rules of the H alal certification bureau, the BPJPH, and when 
they would be announced; (ii)  Indonesia's mandatory verifications classifications, mandatory 
products requirements, scope of the products, and regulatory organization structure; and 
(iii) Indonesia's mutual recognition of foreign Halal certification. With regard to the latter, Chinese 
Taipei asked if  these were certification procedures for mutual recognition with foreign institutions; 
what the differences were between the previous specification s and the new specifications ; if the 
already approved foreign institutions would be required to be re -approved by the BPJPH; and 
(iv) what were the practices for mutual recognition with foreign Halal certification bodies. Chinese 
Taipei requested Indonesia  to provide detailed written information on these issues.  
11.14.   The delegate of  New Zealand  echoed the concerns of other Members and said that New 
Zealand was of the view  that Indonesia's restrictions on agricultural imports undermined core 
WTO principles . New Zealand welcomed Indonesia's commitment to implement the WTO  panel  
decision on these matters and the steps that had been taken to date. However, New  Zealand was 
disappointed that full compliance had still not been achieved . New Zealand continued to have 
significant concerns over a number of Indonesia's import restrictions that affected trade across a 
range of agricultural products, in particular regarding the two -month delay in issuing Import 
Approvals for New Zealand horticulture products  earlier that year. New Zealand also remain ed 
concerned that, while the Ministry of Agriculture horticultural import regulations state d that import 
recommendations for the following y ear could be  applied for in November  2019, the application 
system at that moment remain ed closed and the previous year had only been opened on 
23 November. This risk ed an impermissible stoppage of imports.  
11.15.   Like previous delegations, New Zealand called upon Indonesia to implement its reform plans 
through WTO -consistent policies and looked forward to working with Indonesia during this 
implementation process.  
11.16.   The delegate of Thailand  shared Members' concerns regarding Indonesia's import restricting 
measures an d, in particular the import licensing and quantitative restrictions on agricultural 
products, notably horticultural products , which had substantially impacted Thailand's exports. 
Thailand encouraged Indonesia to bring all its measures into compliance with its WTO  obligations.  
11.17.   The delegate of Indonesia  thanked  the previous speakers for the ir interventions and 
continue d interest regardin g Indonesia 's import and export policies and practices, including its  
import licensing requirements, domestic component requirements , and export regulations. 
Indonesia note d that the interventions and interest of Members in this matter ha d been registered 
in the Council's meetings since 2012, where it had been  asserted that these policies had been a 
burden to traders.  In fact, during the period since 2012, Indonesia had suffer ed a trade deficit 
because of an increase in import s and,  in 2018, its trade defic it had fallen to the deepest point in its 
history , reach ing USD –8 billion. With this factual background, Indonesia did not believe that the 
said policies could have significantly affect ed import s into Indonesia.  
11.18.   Moreover, Indonesia was also facing outstanding problems as a result of its openness to 
international trade, including : (i) an increasing number of imported products flooding the Indonesian 
market with standards and quality below Indonesia's  national stand ard, which risked society 's health 
and life; (ii)  a loss of livelihood of most Indonesian s working in productive sectors; and (iii)  an 
irresponsible and destructive exploitation of Indonesia's  natural resources.  Indonesia referred to 
provisions in  the WTO Agreement that address ed development dimension issues, health and life of 
human s, animal s, and plant s, as well as environment al protection.  
11.19.   Indonesia also note d that some Members  had acknowledged Indonesia 's efforts to improve 
the business environment . In this vein, she reiterate d that Indonesia would continue its efforts , G/C/M/136  
 
- 31 - 
 
  includ ing simplifying import procedures and periodically reviewing its national policies.  With regard 
to the importation of agricultural products, Indonesia ha d issued new sets of regulat ions taking into 
account the  WTO Dispute Settlement Body's recommendations and rulings , concerns from Members,  
and inputs from all stakeholders. Regarding the H alal regulation , Indonesia ha d notified a draft 
Minister Religious Decree to the TBT  Committee that provided detail ed information on the Halal 
agency and its operation.  In addition, Indonesia had  also improve d its transparency by ensuring  that 
all regulations were publicly available on the website  of the relevant ministry or the national laws 
and regulations website . 
11.20.   In order  to address th ese issues, Indonesia remain ed open to further bilateral discussion s 
with any Member . India would  also continue to  update Members on these measures in the relevan t 
Committee s. Indonesia also ask ed Members  that had intervened at this meeting  to provide their 
written statement s; these would convey  a precise message to her C apital . 
11.21.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
11.22.   The Council so agreed . 
12  INDIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
12.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that , in communications dated 1  November  2010, the 
delegations of Canada and the United States, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include 
this issue on the agenda.  
12.2.   The delegate of the United States  found it  regrettable that it was necessary again to highlight 
the inconsistencies between India 's WTO  commitments to provide duty -free access on a range of 
information and communication technology products and the non -zero import duties – of up to 20 % 
- that India continue d to charge on imported products at its border , including commercially 
significant products from the United States.  While India had stated at the Council's previous meeting , 
and in other Committee s, that it was fully aware of its commitments, it was not yet implementing 
them. Like many other Members, t he US had provided numerous examples  ranging from cell phones 
to network equipment, such as switches, where India 's WTO  bound tariff commitment was zero and 
its applied rate was upward of 20 %. The US had  given India ample opportunity, both bilaterally and 
in the relevant committees, to address its actions and to abide by its commitments. However, tariff 
increases had persist ed and may even continue.  Once again, the US  called upon India to provide 
duty-free access for the ICT and telecommunications equipment products for which India ha d a 
WTO commitment to do so . The United States would continue to raise this issue in all the relevant 
Committee s until such access was reinstated.  
12.3.   The delegate of Canada  considered  the continued application of tariffs above India 's bound 
rates on a broad range of ICT  products to be inconsistent with India 's WTO  commitments and to run  
contrary to the objectives of multilateral tariff liberalization.  Canada d id not believe that I ndia ha d 
addressed the concerns raised by numerous WTO  Member s in this Council, the Market Access 
Committee , and the ITA  Committee.  Canada, as well as other Member s, had submitted objection 
letters in response to India 's request to unbind its commitments o n a range of ICT  products in order, 
as India had claimed, to fix errors in the transposition from HS2002 to HS2007.  However, the 
claimed Rectification and Modification Procedure was only to be used when proposed changes did 
not alter the scope of a concession.  Since Canada had no evidence to substantiate India 's claim that 
errors had been  made in the transposition from HS2002 to HS2007, it could only conclude that 
India's request had altered the scope of India 's tariff conce ssions pursuant to the 
WTO ITA Agreement.  
12.4.   Beyond these systemic concerns , Canada continue d to have commercial concerns over India's 
application of the tariffs.  This action ha d impacted annually $52.7  million of Indian imports from 
Canada from 2016 to 2018.  Canada  also regret ted that India ha d rejected Canada 's request to join 
the separate consultations requests made by the EU, Japan,  and Chinese Taipei.  Canada look ed 
forward to meeting bilaterally with India to discuss this issue further . G/C/M/136  
 
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  12.5.   The delegate of Switzerland  shared Members' systemic concerns regarding the customs 
treatment of certain ICT  products by India. As these tariff lines were subject to duty -free 
commitments in India's GATT  Schedule of Concessions, the tariff currently levied was in breach of 
India's WTO  commitments and  GATT  Article  II. Switzerland  urged India to restore its original tariff 
rates.  
12.6.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  remained deeply concerned over India's repeated raising of its 
tariffs on a number of ICT  products throu gh its union budget, subject to HS  Chapter s 70, 84, 85 , 
and 90, and the publication of other government notifications since 2014. In Chinese Taipei's view, 
the tariff on ICT  products raised by India had surpassed its zero -bound commitment in the WTO and 
had violated GATT  Article  II:1(a) and (b) with regard to tariff binding obligations. In this regard, on 
2 September  2019, Chinese Taipei had requested consultations with India pursuant to Article  4 of 
the DSU. Chinese Taipei had also requested that India abi de by its commitment by restoring the 
original tariff rate.  
12.7.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  shared the concerns previously raised by other Members 
regarding the inconsistency of the duties imposed by India with its WTO  commitments. Korea 
requested In dia to remove the tariffs on the ICT  products in question and to resolve this issue 
promptly.  
12.8.   The delegate of China  reiterated the concerns of her delegation regarding India's tariffs on 
ICT products, especially those on mobile phones and their components . China was of the view that 
these products were within the scope of ITA -1; therefore, India's current applied rates exceeded its 
WTO bound rates. China urged India immediately to return  the customs duties on the relevant 
products to their WTO  bound rates.  
12.9.   The delegate of Singapore  shared the concerns raised by the other Members and again urged 
India promptly to align its applied tariff rates on the ICT  products affected with its ITA -1 
commitments.  
12.10.   The delegate of Thailand  again registered Thailand's continu ed systemic and commercial 
interest in this issue  and echoed the concerns expressed by previous speakers.  
12.11.   The delegate of New Zealand  stated that the binding nature of market access commitments 
was one of the fundamental principles of the WTO and encourage d India to bring its measures into 
compliance.  
12.12.   The delegate of Australia  reiterated Australia's continuing interest in this matter . 
12.13.   The delegate of India thanked previous speakers for their continued interest in India's 
customs duties on certain telecommun ications and other products. On the issue of duty imposed on 
certain products, which were listed as ITA -1 products by some Members, he recalled India's previous 
statements in various Committees, including the Committee on Market Access , the ITA, and this 
Council.3 For the sake of saving time, India reiterated that it was fully aware of its obligations and 
commitments under the ITA and had been abiding by the same.  
12.14.   India had signed the ITA -1 in 1997 and had presented its Schedule of Concessions, which 
had been subsequently certified in document  WT/Let/181. India did not intend to commit what was  
there beyond the scope of its ITA -1 commitment inscribed in such document. India had also stated 
in previous meetings that Members had the rig ht to revisit any errors or mistakes committed in 
assigning bound tariffs while transposing their HS  Schedule and place the necessary rectification 
request before the committee  concerned . Accordingly, India had filed its rectification request aimed 
at corr ecting certain areas in its HS2007  Schedule. It had done so in accordance with the Procedures 
for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions contained in the Decision of 
26 March  1980, under the category " Other Rectifications".  India encouraged interested Members to 
discuss directly with India any of their views on the technical aspects of these products, as well as 
their classification.  
 
3 Document  G/C/M/135, paragraphs  11.17 -11.19.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  12.15.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take not e of the statements made.  
12.16.   The Council so agreed . 
13  PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER WTO  AGREEMENTS – UPDATE PROVIDED BY CO -SPONSORS OF 
JOB/GC/204/REV.2  - JOB/CTG/14/REV.2  
13.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that,  in communications dated 31  October and 
1 November  2019, the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the United States, 
Japan, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei, and the European Union, respectively, co -sponsoring 
document  JOB/GC/204/Rev.2 – JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2, had requested the Secretariat to include this 
issue on the agenda.  
13.2.   The delegate of the United States , speaking on behalf of the co -sponsors, took the opportunity 
to update the Council on steps taken to progress their joint notification propo sal, JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2, 
since the Council 's previous  meeting , in July  2019. Ongoing and continuous consultations with 
Member s remain ed a top priority.  Recent co -sponsor efforts had involved one -on-one Member  
consultations, meetings with small groups, as well as Ambassador -level exchanges  that had yielded 
additional, constructive suggestions to consider in respect of refinements to the proposal.  At present, 
consultations were ongoing to craft a proposal that would balance incentives with administrative 
measures while acknowledging that some Member s face d specific notification challenges, in 
particular with regard to institutional capacity.  
13.3.   The co -sponsors  commend ed those Member s that continue d to submit timely and complete 
notifications , as well as the Secretariat for its continuing efforts to support Member s and for its 
constructive and successful role in enabling Member s to submit their notifications on time.  At the 
same time , since committee meetings had resumed following the summer break, issues of 
non-compliance with notification obligations across a number of committees  had remained . It was 
clear that there were still gaps, and that concrete institutional reform was necessary to address this 
issue, which had negatively affect ed Member s – those not submitting notifications and those that 
would benefit from understanding other Member s' trading systems – and the WTO  itself. 
13.4.   The co-sponsors welcome d input from all Member s and all opportunities to meet with them 
to explain the proposal and to discuss how to address any outstanding concerns.  
13.5.   The delegate of Paraguay  reiterated Paraguay's position  that transparency was a fundamental 
element in the proper functioning of the W TO. Paraguay  saw notifications as an important source of 
trade intelligence, of especially great value to small developing -country Members that did not have 
an extensive network of representation. Therefore, Paraguay  consider ed these initiatives to be 
positive. 
13.6.   At the same time, Paraguay noted with concern that the differentiation of DS1  notifications 
on agricultural subsidies in the proposal was a major obstacle to be overcome in order for the 
proposal to meet its objectives. As discussed in the Committee on Agriculture, a significant part of 
the problem was that information on developing new agricultural disciplines and meeting reform 
objective s in this area was outdated. This posed a problem when trying to establish modalities that 
reflected the current reality of agricultural trade. Similarly, Paraguay was reluctant to bring forward 
decisions in a plan to review document  G/AG/2, given that these discuss ions were still under way in 
the Committee on Agriculture and no consensus had been reached.  Paraguay's delegation was 
prepared to continue working constructively with the co -sponsors in bilateral discussions to further 
discuss these  and other concerns ide ntified.  
13.7.   The delegate of Ukraine  acknowledged the essential role of transparency in the 
implementation process of the WTO  Agreements and considered that notifications were a key 
instrument for assessing Members' compliance with their substantive WTO  commit ments.  Ukraine 
welcomed the important initiatives stipulated in the draft document and supported an open 
discussion of potential options that could further enhance transparency compliance within the WTO . G/C/M/136  
 
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  13.8.   The delegate of Uruguay  stated that Uruguay agreed o n the importance of transparency and 
the need to improve compliance with notification requirements; nevertheless, given its importance 
for the proper functioning of the WTO , including its negotiating function, Uruguay believed that even 
greater efforts wer e needed to seek a solution that transcended the punitive approach and was 
based , instead,  on creating incentives and promoting cooperation and technical assistance, while 
considering the need to ensure full compliance with notification obligations. Simila rly, if Members 
wished to improve transparency in the Organization, particularly in matters relating to trade in 
goods, it was important to ensure consistency in the treatment of the various notifications under the 
Agreements  concerned , including DS1  notifications in agriculture, to avoid making assumptions on 
possible changes to the deadlines established in document  G/AG/2, which had to be agreed upon in 
the Committee on Agriculture.  
13.9.   The delegate of Mexico  said that enhancing transparency and notification requirements 
strengthened by all Members was particularly important for the work of the WTO. Mexico believed 
that this proposal was on the right path; however, Mexico still considered that there was room for 
improvement that would bring greater certitude t o all, particularly with regard to the different 
treatment given to DS1  agricultural subsidies notifications. Mexico believed that the WTO needed 
rules that were not too permissive and where all systems were treated equally. In conclusion, Mexico 
remained convinced of the importance of improving notification and monitoring compliance and 
stood ready to work constructively on the ideas that had been submitted.  
13.10.   The delegate of China  appreciat ed the updates  provided  and the proponents'  efforts to 
continue their consultation s with other Member s. China  recognize d that transparency was a 
fundamental element of the WTO Agreements, and that all WTO  Member s should fulfil their 
notification obligations. However, China wished to share several c omments concerning this proposal , 
as followed : (i) China reiterated that the coverage of a proposal on transparency and notification 
obligations  should include not only goods, but also services, TRIPS, and other relevant Agreements 
under the WTO framework ; (ii) China recalled that it could neither  support the punitive measures 
that would deprive countries  of their legitimate rights as WTO  Members , nor the financial punitive 
approach ; and (iii)  China believe d that the proposal should  not lead to any new obli gations on 
Member s and that the scope for counter -notification should be limited only to  those Agreement s 
already containing counter -notification provisions.  
13.11.   The delegate of Nigeria  thanked the proponents for their ongoing consultations to address 
Members' concerns and  reiterated  Nigeria's  own concerns  raised at previous Council meetings, in 
particular those regarding paragraph  9 in Rev ision 2, which had the same effect  as paragraph  5 of 
Revision 1; these concerns h ad not yet be en addressed.  Nigeria believed that there was no doubt 
as to the potential effect of this paragraph, especially as it would most certainly trigger the 
proliferation of counter -notifications to which developing Members would need to respond.  
13.12.   Nigeria had  also raised issues regarding paragraph  4, which expanded Members' Trade Policy 
Review obligations, as well as paragraphs  5 and 7, regarding the six-month notice of explanations 
of delay, and information on delays in notification due to capacity c onstraints, respectively,  which  
would further stretch the already overstretched and lean resources of developing countries . 
13.13.   In as much as Nigeria believed that transparency and notifications were issues of critical and 
fundamental importance to the effective functioning of the MTS , any provision that sought  to further 
increase the burden on developing countries and punish them unduly would not achieve the desired  
result.  Developing -country experience on trade policy formulation and implementation showed  that 
their capacity constraint was not just about a knowledge gap ; it also include d a lack of synergies 
among trade policy implementing institutions, weak inter -Agency channel s of com munication,  and 
scarce use of ICT because of lean resources. These challenges were unlikely to be effectively 
addressed by the usual WTO trade -related technical assistance  envisaged in paragraph  7 of 
Revision 2. In Nigeria's view, the punitive administrati ve measures set out in paragraphs  10 and 11 
of Revision  2 amounted to punishing developing countries for being poor . 
13.14.   Nigeria  believe d that transparency and notifications were key to the proper functioning of 
the WTO and had to be enhanced. However, Nigeria  was in favour of a more collaborative approach 
to achieving this goal . In this vein, Nigeria had co-sponsored the paper titled "An Inclusive Approach 
to Transparency and Notification Requirements in the WTO ". Nigeria  encourage d all Member s to 
support that paper so as to  achieve a win -win outcome.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  13.15.   The delegate of Brazil  expressed its interest in the topic of enhanced transparency. Brazil 
wished to further discuss the details of the proposal so that an agreement could be achieved.  
13.16.   The delega te of Bangladesh  recalled that  Members had discussed this issue in the CTG in 
July 2019; they had also exchanged opinions during numerous informal meetings with Member s. 
Bangladesh believed that transparency was an essential pillar of good governance  and a greed that 
there were many ways to ensure transparency . However, the objective of transparency would not 
be achieved  by just a few notification templates.  
13.17.   Bangladesh noted that it was not that the LDCs were unwilling to provide notification s; it 
was rather  that the notification provisions under different Agreements were diverse in nature and 
the capability of LDCs to notify was severely constrained by their lack of technical capacity and 
unique internal coordination challenges. The same was the case for the  list of Agreements and 
Understandings that the co -sponsors  had mentioned under paragraph  1 of the draft decision.  
13.18.   Bangladesh recalled that the  commitment made in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the WTO, particularly in Article  XI:2, stated that : "The least -developed countries recognized as such 
by the United Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent 
consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and 
institut ional capabilities. " Further to that unequivocal guarantee, during the Uruguay Round 
Agreement, Ministers had also reinforced the same special provisions while making a Decision on  
Measures in Favour of Least Developed Countries,  paragraph  1 of which  read:  " … notwithstanding 
their acceptance of these instruments, the least -developed countries, and for so long as they remain 
in that category, while complying with the general rules set out in the aforesaid instruments, will 
only be required to undertake comm itments and concessions to the extent consistent with their 
individual development, financial and trade needs, or their administrative and institutional 
capabilities. " The decision made  it evident that LDCs would be  require d to undertake only those 
commitm ents and concessions in relation  to which  they recognize d that they ha d the capabilit y, and 
that they were not to be forced to act beyond their capacity and limitation s. Bangladesh believed 
that paragraphs  10, 11, and 13 of the submission , which proposed a dministrative measures and 
provision s for naming and shaming for failure to provid e notification s by any Member,  including an 
LDC, would  be a clear violation of the commitments and agreed decisions made by Ministers.  
13.19.   Although the ongoing efforts of the WTO  Secretariat to provide technical support and 
customized training were deeply appreciated, the capacity constraint s of LDCs  had not been 
improved upon to the expected level , and Members had to explore why the existing technical 
assistance program mes on notification enhancement had not met expectation. Without addressing 
the capacity gaps, administrative and punitive measures  alone would  not bring any productive result.  
Bangladesh encourage d Member s to review the existing difficulties in the area of notification s, and, 
where required, to simplify  the templates and procedures.  
13.20.   The delegate of Ecuador  noted that her authorities still had concerns  in respect of this item , 
particularly  with regard to  the draft decision , which referred  to special and differ ential treatment for 
developing and least -developed countries , which would be applied through technical assistance and 
capacity -building  – one of the most important elements for achieving the transparency objectives. 
Ecuador also referred to  the way in whi ch the decision would affect Members'  rights , in particular  
the administrative measures that went beyond existing WTO  rules. Any new mechanism  had to  fall 
in line with the specific disciplines relating to notifications under each of the  WTO Agreements and 
Understandings  relating to trade in goods . Thus, th e mandate and recommendations of the Working 
Group on Notifications and Procedures had to  be in line with the current provisions on notification 
and consider the specific notification require ments in each case , such  as agriculture, trade 
facilitation, and so on . Furthermore, regarding  the possibility for Member s to request the 
Secretariat 's assistance , Ecuador considered that in such a case  the Secretariat could submit a 
notification on a Memb er's behalf ; however, such  notification would have to be considered as a draft 
and would be subject to approval by the Member concerned  prior to circulation. Although Ecuador  
recognize d the importance of transparency, given the lack of capacity and the res ource limitations 
faced by developing and least-developed  countries, Ecuador was not in a position to support any 
initiative that would lead to further transparency obligations on top of the current rulebook, and nor 
could it accept punitive measures that were intended to pressure  Members into submitting  
notifications.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  13.21.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  expressed its full support for this decision. Even though 
all Members were aware of the importance that transparency and notifications had , and despite the 
ongoing interaction among them, there was still lack of consensus on a concrete approach. 
Therefore, discussions among Members had to continue in order to bridge the remaining gaps and 
to bring about tangible progress. Korea would continue  its active participation in the discussions to 
ensure that the process was both smooth and constructive.  
13.22.   The delegate of India reiterated that India strongly believed in transparency as one of the 
pillars of the rules -based MTS as it provided information and clarity to Members on the laws and  
regulations, facts and figures, as well as measures impacting upon international trade that were 
being taken by other Members.  Many Members, including India, had significantly improved their 
notification compliance, d espite the difficulties in collecting and collating information as per 
notification requirements. However, India was disappointed to see that no major substantive 
changes  had been made in the second  version of the proposal, despite the detailed concerns 
expressed by Members at the Council's previous meeting, in April  2019.  
13.23.   India would find it difficult to agree to any proposal that provided for penalties and 
administrative actions in case of default, rather than making an effort to understand the difficulti es 
facing a large number of developing Members, given the breadth and length of notification 
requirements under the various WTO  Agreements and Members' capacity constraints.  In India's 
view, what was required was not to assume wilful default, but rather to  encourage those that had 
been able to update their notifications, despite the great difficulty in doing so, and at the same time 
to excuse those that had not been able to notify for various reasons, including capacity constraints.  
13.24.   India considered that un derstanding and empathy, rather than sanctions eroding equity and 
trust, were what was needed at present. Therefore, India strongly advocated for appropriate support 
to notify, which would encourage Members to improve upon their internal capacity to notify  on time, 
instead of administrative actions.  
13.25.   The delegate of Chile joined previous speakers in stating that transparency and notifications 
were obligations that all Members of this house had undertaken. In Chile's understanding, the 
framework of punitive s anctions was still in the proposal, despite the requests for revision. The 
difference with DS1  notifications had also been pointed out on a number of occasions and Chile did 
not see a consensus solution emerging on that issue. However, Chile reiterated tha t the text in 
general underscored a problem that WTO  Members had, namely the lack of commitment from 
Members to meet the obligations that they had undertaken. Chile recognized that there were 
capacity constraints at domestic level but considered that the W TO had the capacity to provide the 
necessary assistance for transparency and notification obligations to be met.  
13.26.   The delegate of Singapore  shared the proposal's overall aim of enhancing transparency and 
improving Members' compliance with their WTO  notifica tion obligations and stood ready to engage 
in further discussions.  
13.27.   The delegate of Switzerland  reiterat ed the importance of maintaining and promoting a high 
level of transparency in the Organization.  Accordingly, Switzerland support ed the objective of the 
proposal, aim ed at improving transparency and compliance with notification obligations.  There was 
a broad recognition that the functioning of the WTO had to be improved, including its monitoring 
function.  Therefore, there should also be a common incentive to improve compliance with notification 
obligations, which would contribute to a better  functioning of the WTO. Indeed, it was only when 
Member s scrupulously respect ed their notification obligations that the monitoring function could  be 
carried out effectively.  The question was then how to improve compliance with notification 
obligations while taking into consideration the administrative constraints faced by some Member s, 
in particular LDCs . Switzerland be lieved that t here was space for efficient solutions  but that designing 
them require d flexibility from every side. D ialogue , constructiveness, pragmatism, and compromises 
were key words in this regard . Switzerland looked  forward to actively pursuing discuss ions with the 
co-sponsors and other Member s in order  to work out and improve the proposal to strengthen the 
monitoring function of the WTO.  
13.28.   The delegate of Australia , speaking on behalf of the co-sponsors , thanked delegations for 
their further input and fe edback , which contributed to a further understanding Members' concerns. 
As co -sponsors moved forward with the proposal and refined the draft decision, they welcomed any G/C/M/136  
 
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  further input and opportunities to meet to explain the proposal and better understand t he 
outstanding concerns. The co -sponsors looked forward to engaging in further discussions.  
13.29.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
13.30.   The Council so agreed . 
14  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  
14.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communica tions dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegations of Argentina, United States, and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat 
to include this issue on the agenda.  
14.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  said that his delegation regretted having to bring this item to the 
Council's attention again and reiterated that, following a non -transparent process and despite the 
opposition of many WTO  Members, the E U had decided to register the term "Danbo" as a protected 
geographical indication for Denmark.  "Danbo" cheese had it s own Codex standard that regulated its 
production and labelling: Codex Standard  264, approved in 1966 , and updated several times, with 
the participation and acceptance of the EU itself and of its member States. Section  7 of the Codex 
Standard made it clea r that "Danbo" was a generic term used to refer to a type of cheese that could 
be produced in different locations, provided that the requirements stipulated therein were met. 
Accordingly, attempts to claim ownership of this term and limitations to its use not only affected 
trade in this product, but also set a dangerous precedent.  
14.3.   At the systemic level, it was worrying that an important WTO Member had chose n not to take 
this standard into consideration  and had question ed the multilateral efforts made in Codex to achieve 
regulatory harmonization at international level.  At the trade level, the establishment of unnecessary 
obstacles to the marketing of this type of cheese in the E U and its possible extension to third  markets 
through trade agreements was a matte r of great concern to Uruguay as a major producer and 
exporter of "Danbo" cheese worldwide.  This situation created uncertainty for US  producers , who 
were originally European immigrants and who had produced and exported quality cheese to the rest 
of the wor ld for generations.  
14.4.   Uruguay also rejected the EU  position that this was an intellectual property issue that should 
not be dealt with in this forum . Uruguay pointed out that the rule under which these rights were 
granted was correctly notified by the Europe an Union to the TBT  Committee , on 18  November  2013, 
in document  G/TBT/N/EU/139, including elements relating to labelling and relevant international 
standards.  In light of the above , Uruguay once again urged the E U to provide appropriate responses 
to Member s' concerns , to respect the generic terms established in the Codex international standards,  
and to reconsider its regulatory approach  in order to avoid the creation and proliferation of 
unnecessary restrictions on international trade in cheese and other agricultural products . 
14.5.   The representative of Argentina  reiterated that registration of the term "Danbo" as a protected 
geographical indication demonstrate d that the EU was not using Codex Standard  264 "as the basis" 
for Implementing Regulation  2017/1901. Argentina urged the EU once again to review the measure, 
not only in view of its impact on the specific trade in that type of cheese but also in view of it s impact 
upon the international harmonization work under the Codex Alimentarius.  
14.6.   The delegate of the United States  regretted that her delegation had  again to raise this issue 
in this Council.  The United States and other WTO  Member s had voiced their objecti ons to the EU 's 
proposed protection of the term Havarti as a geographical indication (GI)  during the 2014  opposition 
period , in this Council and in other WTO Committee s; insofar as Havarti ha d been established as an 
international standard under the Codex A limentarius , the EU ha d nevertheless moved forward with 
the process.  Havarti had undergone  a rigorous review to prove its use in the public domain and in 
international trade, which had been  reconfirmed by Codex member s, including the EU, in 2007, 
2008, and  2010.  The EU 's decision to move forward raise d serious questions about the views of 
Denmark and the EU  Commission regarding the legal relevance of Codex and the integrity of the 
international standards system, as well as the international trading system.  The US  remind ed the G/C/M/136  
 
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  EU that no WTO  Agreement was superior to another . Therefore , the fact that  the EU assert ed that it 
was following procedures under the TRIPS  Agreement  did not mean it could  disregard 
TBT commitments to uphold international standards. The EU had to  comply with both 
WTO Agreements.  The US  strongly encourage d the EU to uphold its WTO  TBT obligations to follow 
international standards and to consider a less trade res trictive approach to protecting Danish cheese 
producers by linking Havarti with the place of origin and protect ing only the entire compound term.  
14.7.   The delegate of New Zealand  stated that New Zealand had raised  this issue in this Council 
because it saw  a con flict in the positions taken by the EU and Denmark in standard -setting bodies 
and the actions that they had taken ex post facto  to restrict the labelling within the EU of products 
produced using those standards by producers outside of Denmark. This did not  relate solely to 
grounds for granting or denying IP  protection, but also to the importance of legal consistency, 
upholding internationally agreed standards, and not frustrating the legitimate expectations of 
business es operating within those standards.  New Zealand remain ed concerned that the European 
Commission had chosen to register the terms  "Danbo " and "Havarti " despite having previously 
agreed to a Codex standard in which the European Commission and Denmark had  both 
acknowledged  and reconfirmed  that "the country of origin statement preserves its generic nature ". 
Such actions were going negatively to affect produ cers outside of Denmark,  which had invested with 
the legitimate expectations that they could use the standard ; furthermore, it showed disregard for 
the integrity of the standards setting system that promote d reliability and consistency in 
international tra de rules, which New Zealand expect ed the EU to support  and uphold . 
14.8.   The delegate of the European Union  reiterated  that the procedure for granting protection to 
the term "Danbo" as a Geographical Indication in the EU had been finalized and that the Commissio n 
Implementing Regulation (EU)2017/1901 of 18  October  2017 was publicly available.  The 
Commission had always said that the fact that a name had a specific Codex Standard or that it was 
listed in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention did not imply that the said name had become generic. 
Generic status in the EU could only be assessed based on the perception of consumers in the 
EU territory.  
14.9.   On 21  October  2019, the Commission  had adopted Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2019/1751 entering the name "Havarti " in the register of protected geographical indications.  
Regulation  (EU)1151/2012 on geographical indications, as well as subsequent delegated and 
implementing regulations, had been notified to the WTO under the TBT  Agreement because they 
contained provisions relevant for the purposes of the TBT  Agreement and, in particular, provisions 
relating to technical standards, definitions, and labelling issues. However, even if intellectual 
property rights issues were part of the notification measures, they w ere not relevant for 
TBT purposes, particularly those elements relating to the substantive protection of geographical 
indications.  The EU considered that, concerning TBT  notifications of regulations that might include 
intellectual property issues, such as geographical indications, only those aspects relating to technical 
regulations, definitions, and labelling would be relevant for the purposes of the TBT  Agreement.  
14.10.   As the EU had stated in previous TBT  Committee meetings and in this Council, and in the 
EU TBT notifications, any issues strictly concerning intellectual property rights, such as the 
registration of names as geographical indications, had to  be discussed not under the TBT  Committee 
or through TBT  notification ch annels  but in the appropriate fora, namely  the TRIPS  Council.  
14.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.12.   The Council so agreed . 
15  EGYPT - MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDE RATION  
15.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 31  October and 
1 November  2019, the delegations of the Russian Federation and the European Union, respectively, 
had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
15.2.   The del egate of  the European Union  reiterated the EU's concerns regarding Egypt's procedures 
on compulsory registration of foreign companies and pre -shipment inspections, as established by 
three  Egyptian Ministerial Decrees (No.  991/2015, No.  43/2016, and No.  44/2019) . Egypt had G/C/M/136  
 
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  informed that , in April  2019, a special Committee had been  established in the Ministry of Trade to 
accelerate the processing of registration of companies exporting to Egypt and that , in 
November  2019, the Committee had reported that some progress in registration had been achieved.  
The EU noted that it would  welco me such progress , if confirmed , but remain ed concerned that a 
number of registrations were still pending. The EU stood ready to work with the Committee in 
question to finali ze the registration of pending applications and to work on solutions to prevent 
delays to future registrations.  
15.3.   The EU also invited Egypt to further  consider  improvements to the implementation of the 
decrees, as suggested in previous exchanges , which w ould include , in particular , setting a strict 
deadline for the decision on registration  requests ; creating a publicly accessible database of 
registered companies ; providing an opportunity of appeal to companies in case of refused 
registration ; and registering without further delay all those companies that had submitted their 
complete documen tation and were waiting for ministerial approval of the ir registration.  The EU would 
continue to engage with Egypt multilaterally and bilaterally  on this issue.  
15.4.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed deep concern over Egypt's measure , which 
appeared to be inconsistent with WTO  rules and principles  and had been discussed numerous times 
at this Council and at TBT  Committee  meetings . The Russian Federation requested Egypt to 
reconsider the measure and to align it with its WTO  obligations. It als o asked Egypt to provide a 
specific timeline for the registration of a Russian steel manufacturer that had been attempting to 
register since 2016.  
15.5.   The delegate of  Brazil  acknowledged the progress made in the recent registration of Brazilian 
companies and t hanked the Egyptian authorities for having established a new Committee, a general 
organization for import and export control, with the purpose of reviewing all pending applications to 
facilitate and speed  up the registration process. However, the registrat ion process was still pending 
for at least one  major producer of tableware products. This producer had already incurred significant 
costs for acquiring the required quality certificates but had failed to obtain registration due to the 
short validity period  of such certificates and the lengthy procedures defined in the Egyptian 
manufacturer registration system prior to the establishment of the said Committee.  
15.6.   The delegate of Turkey  joined others in emphasiz ing its  ongoing concerns over Egypt 's 
measure on the registration  of manufacturer s. Although progress  had been made , Egypt's 
implementation of the measure continued to be non-transparent. I t was also unclear  how the 
applications were evaluated and whether the completion of the process was subject to any tim e 
limits. In addition, no notification had been made to companies on the status of their application s. 
Consequently , companies were facing long delays and bore additional costs in the registration 
process. More importantly, there were many companies that had been awaiting approval since the 
entry into force of the legislation.  
15.7.   Turkey was among the top countries affected by these measures , with approximately 
1,500 Turkish companies and a total of about 3  billion dollars of Turkish exports subject to them. 
Currently , more than 160  Turkish companies that  had applied for registration were still waiting for 
their application s to be approved.  Since the entry  into force  of these measures , Turkey had  engaged 
with Egypt bilaterally and at the WTO  TBT Committee to come up with a WTO-consistent solution to 
these problems.  Turkey reiterated its request to  Egypt to review its measure in light of the 
obligations in the WTO  Agreements and to ensure its implementation in full transparency.  
15.8.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  said that the non -tariff barrier measures taken by Egypt 
had significantly undermined the free  trade system. In particular, the registration procedure, as 
stipulated in Decree No.  43/2016 , which required issuance of certificates of conformity, certification 
of inspections, and so on, had resulted in serious delays for foreign manufacturers of specific 
products. Korea urged Egypt actively to consider its trade  restrictive policies and practices and 
instead to take measures that were in line with WTO  rules. Korea also asked Egypt to provide 
information on the procedure for plant registration in a transparent manner and resolve the ongoing 
delays in granting appr oval. 
15.9.   The delegate of  Egypt  thanked  the delegations that had made  interventions , as well as those 
Member s that had requested bilateral consultations on the margins of the TBT  Committee.  Egypt 
share d with Members some positive developments following the July 2019 meeting , notably the G/C/M/136  
 
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  establishment of a new Committee within the Ministry of Foreign Trade with the purpose of reviewing 
pending applications to facilitate and speed up the finalization of the registration  process. The 
Committee had begun  its work and  had already managed to finalize 158 pending applications from 
17 of Egypt's  main trading partners  until end-September  2019.  The total number for registered 
companies from those trading partners had reached 2 ,216 by end-September  2019. Egypt  
understood  that some of its trading partners still had applications pending and believed  that the 
creation of this Committee represent ed a positive response to the request to consider improvements 
to the implementation of th e registration process under Decree No.  43/2016 . Egypt assured 
Members  that such C ommittee would  carry on with the process of revising the pending applications  
and reiterate d that the registration system could  not be more trade -restrictive than necessary 
because  its imports had continued to increase in the first  half of 2019 compared to the first half of 
2018. Egypt renewed its call for Members with specific issues or that had  been waiting for a long 
time for the final ization of registration to share this information with  it and to provide it with an 
updated list of those companies so that Egypt could convey them to the Committee  for its review . 
15.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
15.11.   The Council so agreed . 
16  MONGOLIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON IMPORTATIONS 
OF CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
16.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegati on of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
16.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  recalled that, i n 2013 , Mongolia had  established a 
quota regime for the importation of certain agricultural products, including wheat flour, wheat, milk, 
drinking water, and beef. The responsible authority had determine d the volumes of corresponding  
quotas each year  and imports outside of those quotas had been prohibited.  As part of this policy, 
Mongolia's  Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry had established an import prohibition on 
wheat flour in late 2016. In 2018, even though there had been  a decision to open quota s for wheat 
flour, Mongolia had never allocated t he quota volume among importers.  In January  2019, the said 
Ministry had issued a decree that should have opened the import of certain amounts of agricultural 
products, including wheat flour and liquid milk. However, t he decision on allocation of quota volu me 
among importers of wheat flour for 2019 quota -year had been  adopted only in late April  2019 and 
quota volume for liquid milk import s had  never been allocated among importers for the 2019 quota -
year. As a result, it was impossible to export liquid milk t o Mongolia in 2019.  
16.3.   Mongolia's imports of wheat flour and liquid milk had dropped significantly as a result of these 
measures  and stood virtually at zero in 2018 and 2019.  The Russian Federation was of the view that 
quantitative restrictions and import pro hibitions could not be applied by WTO  Member s without a 
proper justification  and that Mongolia's measures were inconsistent with its obligations under the 
WTO Agreements , in particula r GATT Article  XI and Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, as 
well as Mongolia's accession commitments under para graph  20 of the Working Party Report.  The 
Russian Federation further noted that at the previous  meeting of the Committee on Agriculture,  
Mongolia had stated that it  had begun  the necessary internal procedures to abolish the quota regime. 
The Russian Federation welcome d this step and expect ed Mongolia promptly to take all further 
necessary steps to bring its legislation and measures in to compliance with the relevant 
WTO provisions.  
16.4.   The delega te of Mongolia  thanked the Russian Federation for its question on Mongolia's import 
policy on certain agricultural products and referred to its replies provided at the meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture, held on 30  October  2019, and at the recent meet ing of the Committee 
on Market Access, held on 11 November  2019.  
16.5.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
16.6.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/136  
 
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  17  VIET NAM - DECREE ON THE REGULATION ON CONDITIONS FOR AUTOMOBILES 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEMBLING,  IMPORTING, AND AUTOMOTIVE WARRANTY AND 
MAINTENANCE SERVICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
17.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 1  November  2019, the 
United States and the Russian Federation, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this 
issue on the agenda.  
17.2.   The delegate of the United States  welcome d Viet Nam's revision o f Decree  116 and its 
implementing circular to address concerns raised by the United States and other Members. The US 
was particularly pleased that Viet Nam plan ned to eliminate the lot -by-lot testing requirements and 
that the import requirements would  specifically allow vehicles from countries that provide for 
self-certification of conformity with safety and emissions regulations.  At the same time, the US  
emphasize d that revisions to Decree  116 should not create new barriers to trade  and request ed that 
Viet Nam consult with all relevant stakeholders while finalizing the revision of the Decree and the 
implementing circular, as well as  seriously to consider all comments received.  In addition, the US  
request ed that Viet  Nam incorporate a meaningful transition p eriod for the efficient implementation 
of the revisions  in order  to allow importers sufficient time to comply with the new requirements. It 
was especially important that both the Decree and the implementing circular go into effect 
concurrently so that ther e was no uncertainty about the requirements and their compliance 
procedures.  
17.3.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  thanked Viet Nam's delegation for the bilateral 
consultations and for the news concerning the revision of the current import regime for auto mobiles . 
However, the Russian Federation express ed its deep concern over the measures applied by Viet Nam  
to restrict market access for imported new automobiles  and question ed the consistency of additional 
tests with Viet Nam's  WTO obligations. It also underscored the  extra costs suffered by exporters and 
importers with regard to each shipment due to such additional tests . The Russian Federation  
emphasize d that one shipment of Russian cars had been detained in the Haiphong port for more 
than five months due to these  procedures.  Therefore , the Russian Federation  asked Viet Nam to 
reconsider this measure as soon as possible and to align it with WTO  rules and principles.  
17.4.   The delegate of the European Union  referred to the EU's long-standing  concerns regarding  
Viet Nam's Decree  116/2017 , which impose d testing procedures and a Vehicle Type Approval 
Certificate, different from that of the UNECE. This had  created delays at customs, imposed additional 
costs to EU  exporters , and harmed their competitiveness vis -à-vis locally manufactured brands.  The 
EU regretted  that the Decree had been  notified to the TBT  Committee only after it had enter ed into 
force. In the context of Decree  116, Viet Nam had  also notified a new Circular for car parts 
(G/TBT/N/VNM/140)  that no longer allow ed for the recognition of UN  certificates and require d all 
imports to undergo local testing. The EU had sent comments to Viet Nam on 7 June 2019 and was 
still awaiting an official reply to the specific concerns raised , even though the Circular had been in 
place since 25  August  2019.  The EU invite d Viet Nam  to accept UN  certificates, markings, test -
reports , and conformity assessment reports, and to conduct checks only on the basis of a reasonable 
risk assessment system, which would take into acco unt the very low risk posed by imports conducted 
by the official importer of vehicles or component manufacturers.  
17.5.   The EU once again request ed Viet Nam  to suspend application of the Decree and the 
implementing legislation and to reconsider the comments made  by WTO  Member s in different fora. 
Furthermore, the EU urged Viet Nam  to notify to the WTO  any implementing measure when it was 
still in its draft for m and  to involve all stakeholders, including importers of foreign cars, in all 
consultations to develop le gislation.  
17.6.   The delegate of Thailand  recalled that Thailand had raised this issue at several TBT and 
CTG meetings, especially its concern on the requirement on VTA  certificates and lot -by-lot 
inspections. However, Thailand was pleased to learn that Viet Nam was in the process of revising its 
regulation for inspecting imported motor vehicles and looked forward to an expedited process to 
remove the adverse effects to international trade. Thailand also urged Viet Nam to notify its 
upcoming revision to the WT O, not only in order to provide Members with an opportunity to 
comment, but also in order for the industry and exporting countries to become acquainted with the 
revised regulation.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  17.7.   The delegate of  Viet Nam  thanked delegations for their comments and request ed them to 
refer to the statement s that it had delivered at the CTG's previous  meeting for a better understanding  
of the objectives of the regulation s and Viet Nam 's best efforts to facilitate trade , while adequately 
safeguarding public interests.  Viet Nam's  government had constantly and diligently examined 
challenges faced by businesses in the implementation of Decree  116. It was encouraging that it  was 
just a question of  time for businesses to get a cquainted and adjust successfully to Decree  116's 
requirements. The import of automobiles continue d its rising trend  while p ublic interests, such as 
consumer safety and environment al protection, were better ensured.  Meanwhile, Viet Nam took all 
comments se riously  and its government had  decided to begin a process to revise Decree  116 to 
further facilitat e trade.  In this process, Viet Nam also stood  ready to engage constructively with any 
interested Member on this issue . 
17.8.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Coun cil take note of the statements made.  
17.9.   The Council so agreed . 
18  CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STATES  
18.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
18.2.   The delegate of the United States  reiterated US  concerns over China's measures banning or 
severely limiting the import of scrap materials. On 18  July 2017, China had notified to the 
TBT Committee its notifications CHN  1211 and CHN 1212, banning the import of scrap 
post-consumer plastics, m ixed paper, and textiles, as well as setting new border inspection and 
identification rules for scrap materials that China qualified as 'waste'. China had implemented these 
measures on 31  December  2017.  
18.3.   On 15  November  2017, China had notified CHN  1224 thro ugh CHN  1234, restricting the 
import of a variety of scrap materials through revised quality parameters. The commodities affected  
included industrial plastics, paper and paperboard, non -ferrous scrap and wire, ferrous scrap and 
wire, and metal and electric al appliance scrap, among others . These new barriers had entered into 
force on 1  March  2018 and t he US remained concerned that the broad scope of these compulsory 
new quality parameters might be excessively trade restrictive.  
18.4.   In April  2018, China had annou nced an expansion of its import ban to include most plastics 
and all wood, automotive, appliance, electric motor, and vessel scrap. In response to the US  enquiry, 
China had noted that it did not intend to notify these new measures to the TBT  Committee. 
Furthermore, in May  2018, China had announced and implemented new border inspection rules 
requiring 100%  inspection and lab testing at the border for all scrap commodities. That same da y, 
China had arbitrarily halted its pre -shipment inspection in the US for a period of 30  days, leading to 
a complete halt in US  exports of recycled commodities to China. On 27  June 2018, China had issued 
a notice indicating that all scrap material imports would be restricted to a list of specified ports, 
effective January  2019. On 5 July 2019, a year after the first  revision, China had issued another 
revision of the draft Law of the People 's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes, which defined  "solid waste " to include all scrap  materials 
and expressly ban ned these imports.  In totality, these measures outrightly banned or effectively 
banned imports of scrap materials.  
18.5.   The US  clarified that  scrap materials were firstly separated from the waste stream for recycling 
as a raw materia l and secondly were saleable items traded within a distinct global marketplace 
(meaning that they had an underlying economic value). These qualities made it inaccurate to classify 
scrap materials as "waste".  
18.6.   Her delegation had observed that these barriers had entered into force without any reasonable 
interval for industry and recyclers to make the necessary adjustments to their supply chains or to 
develop new processing capacity.  
18.7.   China's vast share of the global secondary processing market, combined with it s abrupt 
implementation of these measures, had forced recyclers in the US and elsewhere that could not G/C/M/136  
 
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  locate alternative processing facilities to dispose of or incinerate otherwise valuable recyclable 
commodities. This artificial shortfall in global proce ssing capacity, which could take several years to 
develop from the ground up, had caused the decline, and in many cases, collapse, of US  municipal 
recycling programmes. As the world's largest processor of scrap materials, China's implementation 
of these me asures had had an immediate, deleterious, and potentially lasting impact upon global 
recycling networks.  
18.8.   Furthermore, these restrictions were detrimental to Members' shared environment. As a result 
of China's measures, and consequently the additional press ure on capacity in smaller, less developed 
economies, an increased volume of scrap materials was at greater risk of going into landfills or other 
less desirable waste channels and becoming marine litter.  
18.9.   While China had asserted that the solution to its im port policies laid in affected countries 
adjusting their domestic recycling processes to meet China's import parameters, the US underscore d 
that for a vast number of materials outlined in China's ban and import control standards, China had 
no mandatory com mensurate domestic standard or ban in place. The broadly trade -restrictive nature 
of the import control measures and the apparently fundamental differences between requirements 
for foreign and domestic commodities were also cause for concern.  
18.10.   China's conti nued refusal to notify its new technical measures consistent with its obligations 
under the TBT  Agreement, as well as its arbitrary and abrupt halt of pre -shipment inspection in the 
US, had heightened US  concerns over the intent ion of these actions. The US  requested China 
immediately to halt implementation of these measures and to revise them, in a manner consistent 
with existing international standards for trade in scrap materials, which provided a global framework 
for transparent and environmentally sound  trade in scrap materials.  
18.11.   The delegate of  Canada  share d once again  the concerns of the US and reiterated the 
comments on China's restrictions in respect of solid waste that it had made in earlier CTG and 
Committee meetings. Canada did not dispute China's goal of limiting the harmful environmental 
impact resulting from contaminated waste material. However, Canada noted that high quality scrap 
products were a valuable raw material for Chinese customers involved in various manufacturing 
sectors. Canada contin ued to encourage China to ensure that any trade measure it took would be 
the least trade -restrictive possible while respecting its objective to limit harmful environmental 
impact.  
18.12.   The delegate of New Zealand  said that her authorities acknowledged and supported the right 
of all WTO  Members to achieve legitimate domestic health and environmental objectives. 
Furthermore, New Zealand applauded China's stated proactive policy objectives in relation to 
sustainable devel opment and encouraged valid actions to limit harmful environmental impact from 
contaminated waste inside China's border.  
18.13.   New Zealand in no way sought to question China's right to regulate to protect its 
environment. However, New Zealand continued to have a n interest in this measure and a specific 
concern that vanadium slag was included in China's catalogue of banned imports under this measure.  
New Zealand reiterated its view that vanadium slag was a purposefully produced co -product, with a 
purposeful end -use in the production of specific forms of steel. It was not a waste product and should 
not fall under measures for solid waste. She recalled that China was the largest global producer of 
vanadium slag, with approximately 500,000  tonnes of annual production generated as a co -product 
from steel mills.  
18.14.   New Zealand would appreciate receiving clarification from China on how it had ensured that 
the rules that applied to foreign products were no less favourable than those accorded to domestic 
products. Her delegati on was also interested to hear a further explanation from China about how it 
had ensured that the import ban on vanadium slag was not more trade restrictive than necessary to 
achieve China's environmental and health protection objectives.  
18.15.   Finally, New Zeal and thanked China for the recent discussion of this issue and  looked forward 
to further constructive engagement on th e topic to better understand China' s approach to 
distinguishing between waste and non -waste materials.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  18.16.   The delegate of  the European Union  stated that, in the context of the regular EU -China 
Dialogues, the EU had submitted questions to China on a number of issues, in a communication 
dated 25  July 2018, including detailed questions on the recent Chinese measures on waste.  To date, 
China had not  responded to the questions on waste or on any other issue. The EU once again asked 
China to respond to its questions as soon as possible  and looked forward to working with China on 
addressing the issue in the most environmentally and economically efficien t way possible, and in full 
transparency . 
18.17.   The delegate of  China  stated that solid waste had inherent pollutant attributes, which 
differentiated it from other goods. The disposing process itself and the residue generated from the 
disposing process of solid waste could cause environment al pollution and  harm human s, animals , 
and plants.  
18.18.   As a solid waste importer for decades, China had suffered a lot from the pollution caused by 
the processing of solid waste , causing both extreme burden to the environment and damage to 
human, animal , and plant  health. Th erefore, China 's government, in recent years, had emphasize d 
that economic development could not  be achieved at the expense of the environment and human 
health.  
18.19.   In addition , according to the Base l Convention  and other internationally accepted principles, 
every Member was obliged to handle and properly to dispose of its domestically -produced solid 
waste. China hoped that those exporting countries could actively shoulder their international 
responsi bilities to handle and dispose of their own solid waste, rather than benefit ting at the cost of 
the environment and human health  of other countries . 
18.20.   Regarding transparency, China had  taken full consideration of all factors  in the adjustment 
process of rele vant policies , including its obligations under the WTO , as stated in previous meetings. 
Regarding notification obligations, China had notified its relevant measures to the Market Access 
and TBT  Committee s and would  further notify other measures as required  by the WTO Agreements.  
Regarding the EU's questions raised bilaterally, Capital looked forward to continuing its discussions 
through bilateral channels.  
18.21.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
18.22.   The Council so agreed . 
19  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS ON IMP ORTS OF CERTAIN PULS ES – REQUEST 
FROM AUSTRALIA, CANA DA, THE EUROPEAN UNI ON, THE  RUSSIAN  FEDE RATION, AND 
THE UNITED STATES  
19.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 31  October and 
1 November  2019, the delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russian 
Federation, and the United States, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue 
on the agenda.  
19.2.   The delegate of  Australia  observed that Australia 's long -held concerns over India's restrictive 
measures on pulses imports were well known to Member s, particularly India 's quantitative 
restrictions (QRs) on a variety of pulses. These concerns were held not just by Australia, but by 
other Member s too, including a number of developing Member s. As the world 's largest consumer of 
pulses, India 's pulses imports had a direct impact on the global pulses market.  They directly 
impact ed the planting decisio ns of farmers and the sustainability of pulses production globally and 
could  seriously and negatively impact farmers around the world. Furthermore, India had 
characteri zed the quantitative restrictions as being "temporary ", although for some varieties  they 
had been in place for more than two  years.  
19.3.   Australia had raised its  concerns with India in bilateral and plurilateral meetings , including at 
the highest level , and had explained them in every relevant Committee in Geneva over the past 
two years. Australia  remain ed seriously concerned that India was using its quantitative restrictions  
as an ongoing means to flexibly manage imports, inconsistent with its WTO obligations, and that the 
quantitative restrictions  were not a "temporary measure ". This was evident by the 3  July 2019 G/C/M/136  
 
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  announcement to increase the quantitative restrictions  on pigeon peas, which appeared to have 
respond ed to lower domestic production estimates.  
19.4.   Australia thanked  India for finally  having provid ed an explanation regarding  the WTO  basis 
for the quantitative restrictions  in the previous week of the Committee on Market Access . However, 
the explanation had only generated more questions and concerns in respect of these measures.  
India had  claimed that the quantitative restrictions  on p ulses were permitted under 
GATT  Article  XI(2)(c)(ii), which exclude d from the general prohibition of quantitative restrictions 
those import restrictions imposed on agricultural products to remove a temporary surplus of the like 
domestic product by making t he surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of 
charge or at prices below the current market level.  India had  also indicated that its quantitative 
restrictions , even if otherwise inconsistent with its obligations, could  nevertheless be  exempted 
under GATT  Article  XX(a) (necessary to protect public morals ), and Article  XX(b) (necessary to 
protect human, animal , or plant life or health ). However, Australia did not consider use of 
GATT  Article  XI:2(c)(ii) and Article  XX(a) and (b) to be appropriate or legally available in respect of 
India's import restrictions on pulses.  
19.5.   Furthermore, and without prejudice to Australia's  broader concerns on India 's entire 
regime  on pulses , Australia  also highlight ed its  concerns with the administration of the quantitative 
restrictions  themselves , as detailed in the Canadian -US counter -notification  (G/AG/W/193 , of 
12 February  2019), co-sponsored by Australia.  
19.6.   On 3 July 2019, India had announced  that it would increase the volume of the quantitative 
restrictio n on pigeon peas from 200,000 to 400,000  tonnes. While Australia  welcomed such increase, 
it was  concerned that India had administered that additional tonnage in a trade -distorting manner, 
whereby importers had had just nine  days to apply for allotments of this additional tonnage, and 
those allotments had  had to arrive  and land at Indian ports by 31  October  2019 at the latest.  On 
two occasions, as per Trade Notice s 32 and 35 of 2019 -2020, India had announced that it had 
received representations to extend the deadline of 31 October but had declined to do so. 
Furthermore, in Trade Notice  35, India had  threatened to debar importers from being allocated 
allotments in future quota periods if they had received an allotment within the additional 
200,000  tonnes but had failed to import their allotment by 31  October.  The fact that representations 
had been made, that India had rejected those representations, and  had then threatened to prevent 
those importers fr om engaging in the market in the future was seriously concerning, further 
damage d confidence  in India 's trade regime, and would  further destabil ize the global pulses industry, 
in particular in cases where  the pulses m ight already have been en  route to Indi a. 
19.7.   Therefore, Australia request ed India:  (i) to explain the "temporary" nature of the  measures , 
given  that the quantitative restrictions  had now been in place for more than two  years for some 
varieties  and were being extended into the future; (ii)  to advise how its restrictions satisf ied the 
requirements of GATT  Article  XI:2(c)(ii ); and (iii) in particular , to explain how  the surplus of 
domestically grown pulses of the types currently subject to the quantitative restrictions  provided to 
"certain groups " of domestic consumers was free of charge or at prices below the current market 
level, as well as provide details of the public notice of this.  
19.8.   Australia  also remind ed India that the WTO  Appellate Body in Indonesia – Import Licensing 
Regime  had clarified t hat GATT  Article  XI:2(c) had been effectively rendered inoperative by 
Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Appellate Body had stated that " the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions under Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture extends to  the kinds of 
quantitative import restrictions carved out from the prohibition under Article  XI:1 of GATT  1994 by 
virtue of Article  XI:2(c). As a consequence, Member s cannot maintain quantitative import 
restrictions on agricultural products that satisfy th e requirements of Article  XI:2(c) of the GATT  1994 
without violating Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. " 
19.9.   Australia was  also extremely surprised by India 's attempt to invoke GATT  Article  XX to jus tify 
its quantitative restrictions . Australia asked India the following questions: (i)  whether India could  
elaborate on what specific public morals it was trying to protect ; (ii) whether India could explain 
how the QRs were designed  to protect those public morals; (iii)  whether India could  provide any 
research, studies , or supporting information  in this regard; (iv)  what specific matter of human, 
animal or plant life or health India was trying to protect through the quantitative restrictions; (v)  how 
the quantitative restrictions were  design ed to prote ct human, animal or plant life or health, and 
whether  India could  provide any research, studies or supporting information ; (vi)  whether  India G/C/M/136  
 
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  could explain , in respect of both Article  XX(a) and (b), how the quantitative restrictions  were 
"necess ary" to protect public morals or human, animal or plant life or health ; and (vii)  what 
reasonably available less  trade -restrictive alte rnatives India had considered, given the considerable 
trade -restrictiveness of the measures; a nd why those alternatives had been rejected . 
19.10.   Since Australia had  been asking questions on these measures for more than two  years, 
Australia  asked that India provide prompt and fulsome responses bilaterally to Australia in the first 
instance, and then table those responses in the next meeting of the relevant WTO  Committee. 
Australia would  otherwise request India to  remove the measures immediately.  
19.11.   The delegate of the United States  recalled the con cerns  of the US regarding India's use of 
domestic support policies, multiple increases in tariff rates, and the application of quantitative import 
restrictions for pulses , including pigeon peas, mung beans, black gram lentils, and peas.  In addition 
to rais ing this issue at the CTG, the United States had repeatedly raised it in the Committee s on 
Market Access and Agriculture , since India had begun  implementing trade -distorting policies for 
various pulses in 2017.  However, India had not responded to the US requests for an explanation of 
how these measures compl ied with India 's WTO  commitments.  India had indicated on numerous 
occasions that the quantitative restrictions had been  intended to be temporary measures although 
they had been in place for two  years.  Therefore, the US  repeat ed its previous requests for 
information on how the measures complied  with WTO  commitments and when and how the measures 
would  be brought to an end.  
19.12.   The delegate of  Canada  noted that, as  the largest supplier of pulses to India, Canada had 
been the Member most negatively affected by India 's measures to limit the import of those products . 
While Canada had  previously expressed its views on the WTO -consistency of these measures , India 
now appeared to be using arbitrary administrative rules as a means of further reducing predictable 
access to the Indian market for pulses.  In September  2019, the Government of India had suddenly 
announced that shipments of pulses subject to the quantitative restr ictions had to  arrive at an Indian 
port by 31 October, thus shortening the time -frame to five  months for the import of dry peas.  The 
Government of Canada was disappointed that India was still finding more creative ways to restrict 
the trade of pulses.  India's restriction was an ongoing concern  and Canada and other pulse exporters 
had met regularly with India, as recently as 30 October  2019, to discuss the issue.  Canada  again 
called upon  India immediately and expeditiously to review its trade -restrictive mea sures put in place 
on pulses and to consider alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that would promote a 
predictable and transparent import regime.  
19.13.   The delegate of the European Union  express ed its deep disappointment over the lack of 
engagement shown by India so far  on this issue . The EU and other Member s had been raising their 
concerns over India 's import restrictions on peas and other pulses in the Committees on Agriculture 
and Market Access , as well as this Council , for a long time.  From one meeting to another, however, 
India had  kept postponing the replies to a more "appropriate committee " and w ritten replies to the 
written questions submitted by several Member s in the framework of the Commi ttee on Agriculture 
were still outstanding, although India had  promised to respond to them at the Committee on 
Agriculture 's meeting  of 31 October  2019. 
19.14.   At the Market Access Committee  of 11  November  2019, India had  shared some initial 
elements of a reply , which the EU  had appreciate d, but still it urged India to provide, both orally and 
in writing, and without further delay, clear responses to the questions that had been raised . In 
particular , the EU asked : (i) how India would justify the quantitative restr iction to comply with 
WTO rules; (ii) how India could  consider the measure to be temporary if it had been in place for 
more than two  years ; and (iii)  when India was going to abolish the measure . 
19.15.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  once again expressed concerns over India's policy 
on the import of yellow peas. Within the scope of that trade policy , in March  2019, India had issued 
a notification establishing a new quota of 150 ,000 metric tonnes for the period from 1 April 2019 
until 3 1 March  2020. However, according to Trade Notice No. 32/2019 -2020, after seven  months of 
this quota application , India had  completely prohibited the import of pulses to its territory from 
31 October  2019.  The Russian Federation  noted that, due to the measu res applied by India,  imports 
of yellow peas had decreased significantly over the last two  years.  G/C/M/136  
 
- 47 - 
 
  19.16.   The Russian Federation consider ed the general elimination of quantitative restrictions and 
prohibitions to be one of the core disciplines of the GATT and WTO  legal systems. Such restrictions 
could not  be applied without proper justification, which India had failed to provide. Th erefore, the 
Russian Federation request ed India to bring its measures into conformity with WTO  rules.  
19.17.   The Russian Federation also raised the issue of the social welfare surcharge , introduced by 
India in early 2018 as a means of fundraising for educational purposes. The surcharge rate had been 
set at 10% on most imported products and it was only applied to imported products. According  to 
its Schedule of Concessions, India was not allowed to apply any other duty or charge, and the 
Russian Federation requested further clarification in this regard.  
19.18.   The delegate of  Ukraine  reiterate d the concerns of other Members over  India's restrictive 
measures on certain  pulses  and urged  India to comply with its transparency obligations and the 
WTO rules.  
19.19.   The delegate of  New Zealand  echoed the systemic concerns expressed by other Members, 
particularly about the interpretation of the justification for thi s measure and highlighted that, if all 
Members were to adopt such an approach, the hard -won market access commitments and the work 
that they had done in the agricultural agreement would have been lost.  
19.20.   The delegate of  India thanked delegations for expressi ng their views on this matter and 
stated that these issues had also been raised in the recent past in the meetings of the Committees 
on Import Licensing, Market Access, and at the previous  meeting  of this Council . Some additional 
issues had also been raise d at the current meeting . 
19.21.   India recalled that it was the largest producer as well as consumer of pulses. As had been 
mentioned on earlier occasions, the decision to impose quotas had been  based on the domestic 
demand and supply situation of pulses in India . He reiterated that these measures were intended to 
alleviate the distress caused to small and marginal farmers by the influx of cheap imported pulses 
and the consequent impact on their food and livelihood security.  
19.22.   These measures were temporary and the e xtension or removal of these QRs would be based 
on the domestic demand and supply situations  as India was constantly reviewing these measures. 
At previous meetings, India had informed Members of the changes in its wholesale price index (WPI)  
on pulses.  On the issue of any additional quota for imports of peas during the financial year s 
2018-2019 and 2019 -2020, India inform ed Members that, despite the quota under the QR, 
substantial imports had been allowed on account of Court orders. Furthermore, in the present 
financial year, tariff quotas had been announced and the relevant procedure had also been laid down 
by the Directora te-General of Foreign Trade. The government had been regularly reviewing the 
market situation of pulses, owing to which the quota of pulses had been increased  from time to time.  
19.23.   Certain additional issues had been raised by Members in the recent meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture, and India had provided its responses to those queries.  Regarding the 
queries on the specific WTO  provisions under which India had imposed its temporary measures , 
India had already informed Members, in the meeting of the Commit tee on Market Access held on 
11 November  2019, that the QRs on pulses were  necessary  for the enforcement of governmental 
measures to remove any surplus of pulses, as permitted under GATT  Article  XI:2(c)(ii) and the 
protection of public morals  and human, an imal, or plant life or health  in India, as recognized under 
GATT  Article  XX(a) and (b).  
19.24.   India had noted the issues raised by Members, especially those regarding the 
WTO provisions cited by India and the social welfare surcharge . India requested those Membe rs to 
provide their additional comments in writing so that they could be sent to Capital for comment. India 
would address any further query on this issue in the appropriate Committee.  
19.25.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements ma de. 
19.26.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/136  
 
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  20  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTI ES ON CERTAIN INTEGR ATED CIRCUITS – REQU EST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, JAPA N, AND CHINESE TAIPE I 
20.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 1 November  2019, the 
delegations of the European Union, Japan, and Chinese Taipei, respectively, had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
20.2.   The delegate of the European Union  thanked  China for having shared with other Member s an 
overview of its ta riffs on multi-component semi -conductors ( MCOs ) following the transposition  
exercise . However, t he fact that several delegations continue d to raise the issue demonstrate d that 
the information provided had not alleviated their concerns.  As follow ed from a l etter by the 
WTO Secretariat earlier that year in response to a letter by the Chairperson  of the 19th Meeting of 
the Government/Authorities Meeting on Semiconductors (GAMS), tariff lines normally had to be  
broken down to a more detailed level , so that the draft HS2017  file reflect ed fully the same level of 
concessions.  Therefore, China could have created a dditional national tariff lines to continue to apply 
a zero  duty on those products which had previously been duty-free, thereby maintaining the value 
of its concessions and respecting the spirit of the ITA  Expansion. However, t his had not been the 
case. In line with the same letter,  China ha d also to consult other Member s on the approach in 
advance.  Despite the elements provided to the GAMS, the EU  regret ted that China had not agreed  
to take any steps on the matter at the recent GAMS  meeting of Oct ober 2019. The EU  continue d to 
encourage China to rectify this situation at its earliest convenience by modifying the classification or 
else to consider eliminating the remaining duties immediately.  
20.3.   The delegate of  Japan  remained  concerned, like other Member s, over  China 's application of 
tariffs higher than the bound level in China 's Schedule.  Regarding IGBT -IPM, Japan  appreciate d 
China 's explanation of the HS  classification, although Japan  still had a different opinion over the 
classification  itself. Japan considered that its  questions ha d not yet been fully answered  and 
request ed that China swiftly withdraw the tariffs on the IGBT -IPM. Japan  continue d to monitor the 
situation closely regarding  China 's commitment to abolishing customs duties in July  2021 on all 
relevant items , in line with the staging of the ITA -II. 
20.4.   The delegate of the United States  supported the statements and questions raised by previous 
speakers and reiterated US  concerns over changes in China's applied duty rates for semiconductor 
product s. This was an issue that the United States had previously raised in this Council as well as in 
the Committee s on Market Access and the ITA. The US recalled that c ertain semiconductor products 
that had  been duty -free for over a decade were now being charge d import duties at the border . 
While China 's transposition for these products had to  be tariff -neutral, it was  not. Her delegation 
continued to assert , in line with the General Council Decision on HS  transpositions and the Guidance 
approved by th e CMA  Comm ittee, that the scope of China's concessions had changed substantially, 
and the value of the concession had been impaired . 
20.5.   The delegate of  Chinese Taipei  stated that this had been a long -standing issue and that her 
delegation had repeatedly expressed its concerns in different committees , such as the Committee 
on Market Access, as well as this Council. However, these concerns had not been addressed. Chinese  
Taipei therefore urged China to immediately eliminate the tariff on the MCO products at issue.  
20.6.   The delegate of Switzerland  shared the concerns expressed by previous speakers. In its 
ITA-II schedule, China had undertaken  a commitment to bind its duties at zero for all electronic 
integrated circuits. However, w ith the transposition of HS2012 to HS2017 , this duty -free treatment 
was no longer granted for certain kind s of integrated circuits. Switzerland recall ed that the 
HS transposition was a technical proces s, which sh ould not modify the scope of concessions granted . 
Therefore, Switzerland invite d China immediately to eliminate the duties on these  integrated circuits 
and comply with its ITA -II commitments.  
20.7.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  reiterated Kore a's concerns, also raised during the 
previous ITA  Committee and at other relevant meetings. Korea believed that to fully respect the 
spirit of the ITA, it was the responsibility of all Members to strengthen and to facilitate free trade. 
The tariff rates im posed by China on imports of the MCO  products at issue undermined both the 
spirit and the principle of the ITA, which was to increase trade in IT products and to facilitate tariff 
liberalization. In this regard, Korea encouraged China to provide further in formation on the relevant 
measures.  G/C/M/136  
 
- 49 - 
 
  20.8.   The delegate of China  noted that China had already responded to the se points and questions 
in today 's intervention s in this Council and other Committees, as well as through bilateral channels.  
China ha d no intention to delay the implementation of its ITA commitments nor to raise the tariffs 
on any products. However,  due to technical reasons, it was difficult for China to satisfy the requests 
from other Member s. China emphasized that it had  always serious ly undertaken its tariff reduction 
commitments  and that all duties on MCO products, including those product concerns raised by 
Member s, would  be eliminated by July  2021, as scheduled.  
20.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements ma de. 
20.10.   The Council so agreed . 
21  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGU LATIONS REGARDING PR OTECTED 
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIG IN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, TRADITI ONAL TERMS, 
LABELLING AND PRESEN TATION OF CERTAIN WI NE SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
THE UNITED STAT ES 
21.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
21.2.   The delegate of the United States  expressed disappointment at having again to raise 
US concerns over the EU's policies on geographical indications and traditional terms for wine, in 
particular with regard to its pending applications for traditional terms. The United States had been 
raising concerns over these policies and t he associated regulations for 20  years. In their view, the 
EU's persistent failure to provide any information left the United States no choice but to raise these 
concerns again. At several TBT  Committee meetings, in this Council , and in the EU's response s to 
US comments, the EU had said that the pending applications for traditional terms were still under 
consideration, but that the EU could not provide a precise timeline for their approval. However, the 
US failed to understand why  the EU was unable to provide an estimate of the timeline or information 
on the status of the applications. Furthermore, the US did not understand why the EU had chose n 
not to include timelines and greater transparency with regard to traditional terms as p art of its 
review and revision of the relevant measures, even though the EU had provide d some timelines and 
transparency for geographical indications in its recent revised regulations. She asked the EU why 
there was such a difference and why the EU appeare d to be making no effort to ensure that delays 
on the approval of traditional terms would discontinue. The US also asked the EU to clarify whether, 
and if so how, the processing of these applications would change following the recent 
EU parliamentary elect ions, including whether responsibility for processing applications would be 
assigned to a new agency within the European Commission. The US reiterated its request that the 
EU provide transparency on the status of other applications so that the US could see  how its own 
applications compared. In addition, she noted that the US did not understand why the EU seemed 
unable or unwilling to provide transparency regarding the applications that had been submitted, or 
to provide greater predictability through timelin es in respect of traditional terms. The United States 
once again requested the EU to move expeditiously to approve their applications so that they could 
remove this longstanding item from the Council's agenda. The US expected that, given the EU's 
proposal on improving the process for addressing concerns in WTO  Committees, it would spend 
additional time trying to address the concerns raised by its trading partners , or even to provide basic 
information relating to specific trade concerns raised against it. 
21.3.   The delegate of New Zealand  recognized that Members had the right to protect their 
consumers from deceptive practices, providing they did so in line with their obligations under the 
WTO Agreements. In this regard, New Zealand requested that the European Unio n take into 
consideration the concerns raised by Members relating to the scope and application of the system 
of traditional terms, as well as transparency, process, and the timelines relating to applications from 
third countries. New Zealand considered that, as a matter of principle, Members making reasonable 
use of common descriptors , which had a meaning not solely associated with certain geographical 
regions , should not be impeded from doing so.  
21.4.   The delegate of Argentina  reiterat ed Argentina's concerns over the fact that the terms 
"Reserva" and "Gran Reserva" could not be used on Argentine wine  labels . He recalled that Argentina 
had completed the substantive procedure to approve such terms in 2012, in accordance with EU  law. 
Argen tina once again urged the EU to approve the applications for the registration of traditional G/C/M/136  
 
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  terms submitted by third  countries, such as Argentina, which had been being blocked without legal 
justification.  
21.5.   The delegate of the European Union  took note of th e continued interest in this issue of the 
United States , New Zealand, and Argentina. She informed Members that the EU had completed the 
revision of its internal legislation on traditional terms, which had been discussed at previous 
TBT Committees, namely t he Commission Delegated Regulation  2019/33 and Commission 
Implementing Regulation  2019/34. The EU believed that its internal legislation offered a meaningful 
and transparent system of protection for traditional terms used on wine products from the EU , as 
well as on products from third  countries. The pending applications for traditional terms were still 
being processed. In the past, the EU had demonstrated its ability to address specific Members' 
concerns in this area either via its internal legislation or v ia bilateral agreements.  
21.6.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
21.7.   The Council  so agreed . 
22  CHINA – NEW EXPORT C ONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
22.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of Japan had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
22.2.   The delegate of Japan  remained concerned that China's draft law was an overly stringent 
export regulati on that went beyond the scope of the international export control regime. For 
example, Japan believed that the provisions on countermeasures should be removed as they 
appeared to constitute unilateral export control measures that did not have national secu rity as their 
objective. In this regard, he noted that the international export control regime did not envisage 
countermeasures. In addition, Japan requested China to provide information on the National 
Development and Reform Commission's export control me chanism, which was under preparation. 
Japan was concerned by the mechanism's scope, the details of the restrictions , and the relationship 
with the export control law that it would entail. Japan appreciated China's explanation , which placed 
importance on the following: (i)  establishing a fair and transparent business environment ; (ii) that 
all businesses , including foreign businesses , were to be treated fairly ; and (iii) that the purpose of 
the draft law was not to restrict normal trade activities. At the same time, Japan continued closely 
to monitor the scope and specific implementation of detailed regulations put in place by China. To 
this end, Japan requested China to provide any updates on th e situation, especially as concerned 
the timeline and any plan of modifications to the law and regulations , and to do so in a transparent 
manner and with sufficient grace period.  
22.3.   The delegate of the European Union  had submitted comments in writing during t he public 
consultation in 2017 and had been raising questions on China's draft export control law for over a 
year. While the EU acknowledged that the draft law could consolidate China's export control system, 
the EU recalled that strategic export controls derived from international obligations and 
commitments. Against this background, the EU considered that certain provisions in the draft law 
required further clarification concerning their alignment with international security standards and 
their conformity  with multilateral WTO  trade rules. The EU asked China to provide the explanations 
that had been requested at previous CTG  meetings, as well as an indication of when the draft law 
would be finalized.  
22.4.   The delegate of China  noted that this issue had been on the Council's agenda for a long time 
and that China had provided specific explanations at previous meetings. Nevertheless , she 
highlighted some key points concerning the draft export control law. First, she noted that China was 
committed to creating a non -discriminatory and transparent business environment. Second, China 
fully respected its obligations under the WTO  Agreements and believed that the measures proposed 
were consistent with WTO  rules. Third, she observed that all market entities, local companie s or 
foreign companies, would be treated fairly and equitably. She further noted that the purpose of the 
draft law was to fulfil the international obligations and to safeguard the national security, not to 
restrict normal trade. Finally, she informed Membe rs that on 1  May 2019, the State Council listed 
export control draft law to be submitted to the National Congress for review and that the following 
steps would depend on the review outcome.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  22.5.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions an d China for its response ; he 
proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
22.6.   The Council so agreed . 
23  UNITED STATES – PROH IBITIVE PROPOSAL ON COMMUNICATION EQUIPM ENT OR 
SERVICES RELEASED BY  THE FCC – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  
23.1.   The Chairperson  informed Me mbers that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
23.2.   The delegate of China  expressed disappointment that this issue had to be raised again given 
that China had not received any concrete response from the United States . China noted that the 
US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) had published an announcement on the Federal 
Register, on 2  May 2018, prohibit ing the use of Universal Service Funds (USF) from purchasing 
communication equipment and services identified as posing a national  security risk to 
US communications networks or the US supply chain. China further noted that, on 28  October  2019, 
the Chairperson of the FCC had circulated for discussion  a draft order  prohibit ing 
US telecommunication operators from using USF to purchase equipment or services from Chinese 
companies. China reiterated its deep concern s over this issue . Indeed, China believed that the 
restricting measures being considered by the US would constitute a de facto  country -based market 
access restriction, thus violating  the WTO's national treatment principle. China also believed that 
this measure would not help to protect telecommunication s security . Rather, China was of the view 
that any security measure for commercial sectors should adhere to the follow ing principles: (i)  it 
should treat technology in a non -discriminatory manner; (ii)  it should not unnecessarily limit or 
prevent normal trade opportunities for foreign suppliers of ICT  products or services; (iii)  it should 
be narrowly tailored and focused, taking into account international norms and non -discriminatory 
principles ; and (iv) it should not impose nationality -based conditions or restrictions.  
23.3.   The delegate of the United States  responded by reiterating that, as it had explained each time 
that China had placed this item on the CTG 's agenda, the issue was a matter of national security. 
The US had provided an explanation of the FCC's fully transparent rule -making process and had also 
pointed Members to the FCC's website for further updates and information. Beyond this,  the US saw 
no scope for discussing this issue in the Goods Council.  
23.4.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
23.5.   The Council  so agreed . 
24  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMI NATORY MARKET AC CESS PROHIBITION ON 5G EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
24.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegations of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
24.2.   The delegate of China  reitera ted her delegation's concern over Australia's prohibition , in a 
non-transparent, closed, and discriminatory manner,  on Chinese equipment suppliers from 
Australia's  5G rollout. China also expressed its disappointment over the scope of the measures, 
which ha d been extended from the 5G to the 4G  network. Although China had appreciated Australia's 
written responses to its questions, it regretted that Australia had failed to provide substantial and 
direct responses concerning its key measures. More specifically,  China noted that Australia had not 
confirmed in its written replies if it had excluded China's equipment suppliers from its 5G rollout. 
Therefore, China requested Australia to clarify whether or not a formal decision had been made to 
exclud e China's 5G  equipment suppliers from Australia's  5G rollout. If so, China asked Australia if 
its decision was based de facto  on the "Government Provides 5G  Security Guidance to Australian 
Carriers" document that it had published on 23  August  2018. China also noted that the 
"Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms" (TSSR) had been repeatedly mentioned in Australia's  
written replies to China. If the TSSR were the basis of the decision to exclude China's 5G  equipment 
suppliers from Australia's  5G rollout, China asked why the Chinese suppliers were informed in 
August  2018, which was earlier than when the TSSR had come into force , on 18  September  2018, G/C/M/136  
 
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  and requested  Australia to explain the legal basis of its decision. China had also raised other  concerns 
in the questionnaire, including whether or not Australia had excluded telecommunication equipment 
suppliers of other WTO  Members and , if so,  on the basis of what specific standards. However, to 
date, China had received no concrete response. China  pointed out that excluding China's equipment 
suppliers from Australia's  5G rollout would also not be helpful to Australia's cybersecurity ; nor would 
it be helpful to Australia's economic interests. She noted , too,  that the negative impact was already 
visible. According to OpenSignal statistics reviewed on 30  June 2019, Australia was the only sample 
country with a 4G speed faster than its 5G speed. In this context, China believed that only an open, 
market -based , and fully competitive environment could result in a telecommunication s 
administrative policy that would achieve its security purpose. In conclusion, China urged Australia 
to provide concrete answers to its questions and to do so as soon as possible.  
24.3.   The d elegate of Australia  took note of China's statement and noted, too, that Australia had 
previously engaged substantively with China on this issue. Australia reiterated that its position on 
5G networks was fully WTO-consistent . Australia looked forward to co ntinuing its constructive 
engage ment with China on this issue.  
24.4.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
24.5.   The Council  so agreed . 
25  UNITED STATES - MEAS URES REGARDING MARKE T ACCESS PROHIBITION F OR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  
25.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
25.2.   The delegate of China  regre tted to be  obliged to raise this issue again as China had not yet 
received any responses to its concerns from the United States . She explained that, on 15  May 2019, 
the US had issued an Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology 
and Services Supply Chain, prohibiting US  companies from buying or using telecommunications 
equipment and services provided by enterprises deemed to be national security threats. China again 
registered its deep concern over this issue and opposed the overly generalized language of security ; 
indeed, China firmly believed that national security should never be used as an excuse for trade 
protectionism . 
25.3.   The measures in question were targeting ICT  products and their related service sup ply chain , 
which China considered to have the highest share in global trade, with the longest and most 
sophisticated global value chain. According to WTO  statistics, office and telecom products , for 
example,  accounted for 15% of world exports of manufactur ed goods in 2017, and 
telecommunications, computer , and information service products accounted for 10% of world service 
exports. China also observed that the ICT value chain connected the whole world, driving technology 
innovation and promoting the digital  economy. The consequences of any improper interference on 
any link in this global value chain would be amplified across the whole chain through a butterfly 
effect, which in turn would cause uncertainty and a domino effect on the global economy and the 
security of the ICT  supply chain. China believed that , if this happened, no WTO  Member would be 
untouched by it, including the US. In China's view, this was also the reason why governments and 
business es all over the world were close ly following development s in this regard . China also 
emphasized the importance of information security, although it opposed an overly generalized 
approach to this issue. Instead, China believed that security measures on the commercial use of ICT 
should be applied based on the follo wing principles: (i)  technology should be treated in a non -
discriminatory manner; (ii)  measures in place should not constitute unnecessary restrictions on 
commercial sale opportunities for foreign suppliers of ICT  products or services; (iii)   any measure 
taken must be limited in scope and strictly follow international standards and non -discrimination 
principles; and (iv)  no conditions or restrictions for purchase, sale , or use of ICT  products or services 
should be imposed based on nationality. China asked the US to provide an update of the development 
purpose of the measures following on from the Executive Order, and reminded the US  that such 
measures  should be formulated in light of the WTO  Agreements, and especially its obligations on 
transparency, MFN  treatment, and the elimination of quantitative restrictions. China again requested 
the US to provide substantial responses to its concerns . China also invited the US to review the G/C/M/136  
 
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  history of the national security provision. China recalled that , in discussions of the security 
exceptions provision during the Geneva negotiation s in July  1947, the US  delegation had pointed 
out and recognized that : " there was a great danger of having too wide an exception that would 
permit anythi ng under the sun". China said that , if this were to happen, rules would no longer be 
rules; instead , the exceptions would become the rules.  
25.4.   The delegate of the United States  reiterated that the US did not believe that the CTG was the 
appropriate forum to d iscuss issues relating to national security.  
25.5.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
25.6.   The Council  so agreed . 
26  UNITED STATES – EXPO RT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
26.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
26.2.   The delegate of China  expressed her delegation's concern over this  measure, especially given 
that a number of  Chinese companies had been included by the US  Government on the export control 
"Entity List". China reiterated its deep concern over this issue and emphasized China's opposition to 
the abuse of export control s. Furthermore, China suspected that the measures introduced by the 
US Government violated Article  I and Article  XI of the GATT  1994. China stated that economic 
globalization made enterprise s in the global supply chain reliant upon one another; it also 
encouraged them to cooperate seamlessly ; and it allowed them to operate at high speed. High -tech 
was a field where countries shared many common interests and where there were broad prospects 
for coop eration. Therefore, countries upstream in the global value chain , which  enjoyed its greatest 
benefits, should also take seriously their responsibilities for the overall stability of that global value 
chain. In this regard, China believed that to abuse a dominant position would ultimately destroy the 
global value chain  and this would affect all countries . China urged the US to reply meaningfully to 
its concerns, which related closely to the issue of fair competition, which was an issue to which the 
US had al ways given importance , and not to respond on the grounds of a national security exception . 
26.3.   The delegate of the United States  repeated her delegation's position that the United States 
did not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in Goods was the appropria te forum to discuss issues 
relating to national security.  
26.4.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
26.5.   The Council  so agreed . 
27  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO. 1272/2008 (CLP REGUL ATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FED ERATION AND THE UNIT ED STATES  
27.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegations of the United States and of the Russian Federation, respectively, had req uested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
27.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  recalled that the European Commission had adopted 
the 14th Adaptation to Technical and Scientific Progress on 4 October  2019, which had been  
submitted to the  European Parliament and European Council for consideration as a delegated act. 
Russia considered that the document proposing that cobalt be classified as a carcinogen  I(b) for all 
routes of exposure lacked scientific data, inappropriately applied the prec autionary principle against 
the Commission's own guidelines, and was without socio -economic analysis. Russia also considered 
that the European Commission proposal would have a highly significant negative impact upon many 
industries, including the nickel, s teel, stainless steel, alloys, plating, and related manufacturing 
sectors , thereby decreasing the aggregate demand for products containing cobalt in its market ; he 
also referenced the metal sector slag, this being a secondary output product in the melting  process G/C/M/136  
 
- 54 - 
 
  that contained many traces of substances, including cobalt , which could not be technically or 
economically removed. In Russia's view, such a strict classification for cobalt would lead to a situation 
where,  rather than being able to sell the slag, recyclers would incur a prohibitive additional cost for 
its controlled disposal. Based on a figure of at least one million tonnes of slag to be disposed of 
within the EU, this would result in a total cost to the in dustry of approximately EUR  133 million per 
year. Russia also highlighted the broader social cost s linked potentially to the inappropriate 
substitution of slag in building and construction materials with natural aggregates ; this example 
illustrated the ext ensive  potential impact that this cobalt classification would have on the circular 
economy. Moreover, Russia believed that such a proposal would decrease the energy efficiency of 
the metal sector and dramatically increase related carbon dioxide emissions . Russia observed that 
copper scrap and stainless steel  scrap , containing minimal traces of cobalt and its compounds, were 
used as critical raw materials for secondary production of copper and stainless steel ; for this reason, 
such a strict cobalt classifica tion for all routes of exposure, covering also copper and stainless steel 
scrap, would make their recycling impossible, thereby decreasing the economic efficiency of steel 
manufacturing due to the increased electricity consumption. In the context of the me asure proposed 
by the European Commission, stainless steel, one of the safest materials, would be classified as a 
carcinogen because of its tiny traces of cobalt impurities. In Russia's view, the inclusion of stainless 
steel and other alloys in the list of  toxic products would not only have negative consequences for 
consumers across a wide range of industrial sectors due to the lack of direct alternative, but would 
also directly contradict the principles of sustainable growth , recognized by the global commu nity, 
which were intended to increase secondary recycling . As for stainless steel, its current recycling 
rate was estimated at approximately 70%, which was one of the highest rates among commonly 
used materials. Russia further considered that cobalt class ification as carcinogen category  I(b) for 
all routes of exposure would automatically extend this classification to nickel and copper due to the 
natural cobalt occurrence in copper -nickel ores, the removal of which was technically and 
economically impossibl e. Classification of nickel products as a highly dangerous toxin because of a 
minimal cobalt impurity would in itself have a significant negative impact upon the output and supply 
of batteries, including those for cars, pipes and tubes, water treatment and  distribution, dishes and 
cutlery, auto components, packaging for food products, and many others. According to expert 
estimates, the consequences to global nickel and stainless  steel manufacturing  would be the 
following : (i) approximately  500,000  job losse s; (ii)  added value decrease of more than 
USD 25 billion in manufacturing of nickel products; (iii)  total economic damage due to such strict 
cobalt classification was estimated at USD  5.2 billion  to the world nickel industry alone , if 
OECD  guidelines were followed. In addition, alloys containing cobalt were widely used in the 
production of medical products, including implants, prostheses, syringes, and other medical devices. 
Using medical devises,  with components containing cobalt, posed no toxicological risk for consumers, 
as had repeatedly been proven by the scientific research carried out at leading European institutions , 
including MedTech Europe. Russia requested the European Union to take its own views into 
consideration , but above all to give consideration to the data regarding the socio -economic 
consequences of the proposed cobalt classification within the framework of scrutiny planned until 
end-December  2019.  
27.3.   The delegate of the United State s continued to have concerns about the EU's process for 
harmonizing substance classifications via the Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP)  
Regulation . The United States was concerned in particular about the proposed update to the CLP, 
which had be en notified to the TBT  Committee in December  2018, and the updated classifications 
for a number of substances, including titanium dioxide and cobalt, which could have an impact 
amounting to billions of dollars on US -EU trade. The US  concerns over the EU's proposed 
classification and labelling requirements for titanium dioxide and cobalt were well known. First, the 
US had repeatedly raised questions about the timing of the EU's WTO  notifications, and had asked 
the EU to consider how it could time these notif ications to make them more relevant and frequent , 
and to align them with its actual public consultation process. Second, the US was concerned that 
the EU had misapplied the UN  Global Harmonized Standard for the Classification and Labelling of 
Chemicals to the titanium dioxide classification. Third, the US was concerned about the overly broad 
classifications of titanium dioxide and cobalt to include uses where there was no scient ific evidence 
of risk to human health, including non -nano titanium dioxide and the use of cobalt in metal alloys , 
such as stainless steel. The US had also raised concerns over the impact on downstream industries, 
such as the toy, cosmetic s, and steel indus tries. Given these concerns, the US had , on several 
occasions , asked the EU to postpone a vote on the proposed classification and labelling proposals on 
these two substances until it could meaningfully consider WTO  Member s' comments and evaluate 
less trade -disruptive alternatives  to them . Therefore, the US was disappointed that the EU appeared 
to be moving forward with these specific classifications, despite the concerns that the US and other G/C/M/136  
 
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  trading partners had raised. In conclusion, the US expected that , if the EU wanted to improve the 
process by which WTO  Members resolved their specific trade concerns raised in Committees, as it 
had claimed to do, the EU should first take steps to resolve those concerns  that had been raised 
against it , as here . 
27.4.   The deleg ate of Mexico  shared the concerns of the Russian Federation and the United States 
over the classification and process followed by the European Union, concerns that had also been 
raised in the March and June  meetings of this Council as well as at previous m eetings of the 
TBT Committee. Mexico reiterated that its paint industry was particularly concerned about the 
proposed labelling requirements. Mexico was interested in following -up on this issue and would 
appreciate any update that the EU could provide on the status of the regulation allowing public 
consultations , and on the steps that the European Commission intended to take  next. 
27.5.   The delegate of Australia  recalled that his delegation had previously raised in the 
TBT Committee its concerns about the EU's proposed CLP  regulations on titanium dioxide and cobalt 
being more trade -restrictive than necessary. Australia recognized the European Union's right to 
regulate for public and occupational health and safety . Australia also recognized that appropriate 
classification and labelling for hazardous substances and mixtures could address legitimate public 
and occupational health concerns. Australia understood tha t the proposed classifications had been 
adopted and would enter into force in late December or early January if there were no objections 
from the Council or Parliament. Nevertheless, Australia believed that the new classifications could 
potential ly create unintended downstream consequences as well as unnecessary obstacles to trade 
in products containing titanium dioxide and cobalt. For example, the classification of cobalt would 
appear to capture certain types of stainless steel , meaning that the possibilit y of this classification 
having unintended consequences affect ing trade was high. Australia urged the EU to ensure that 
any regulations intended to address concerns over possible hazards associated with titanium dioxide 
and cobalt would be no more trade re strictive than necessary.  
27.6.   The delegate of the European Union  confirmed that titanium dioxide and cobalt had been 
included in the 14th Adaptation to Technical and Scientific Progress amending the CLP  Regulation.  
Several discussions on the classification of cobalt and titanium dioxide and the classification of 
mixtures containing titanium dioxide had taken place in the expert group for REACH and CLP and in  
the regulatory committee (namely, the REACH  Committee). The amendment of the CLP had been 
adopted by the  Commission on 4  October  2019, following which the Council and European 
Parliament then had a two -month objection period. The EU stated that the proposal to classify cobalt 
as a carcinogen for all routes of exposure had been based on the scientific opinion  of the Risk 
Assessment Committee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), as well as on the 
comments received and the concerns expressed by Member States and stakeholders. In the EU's 
view, the opinion was in line with the CLP  Regulation and the UN  Globally Harmonized System of 
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals. The opinion and the background document containing all 
the relevant scientific information on which the opinion had been based were available at the 
ECHA  website. She explained that , in its scientific assessment, the Risk Assessment Committee had 
taken into account all the data available , including the information submitted during the public 
consultation period ; furthermore, a review of its opinion would only be possible if new and relevant 
scientific information became available. The EU noted that all comments from WTO Members in the 
context of the EU  TBT notification had been and would be duly taken into account by the Commission 
and Member States in the decisio n-making process. The Commission was currently finalizing a 
written reply to WTO  Members ' comments  on the TBT  notification.  
27.7.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and the European Union for 
its response and proposed that the Counci l take note of the statements made.  
27.8.   The Council  so agreed . 
28  UNITED STATES – MEAS URES ON AVIATION SEC URITY EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
28.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of China had requested t he Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  28.2.   The delegate of China  reiterated her delegation's concern s over the refusal by the 
US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of China's enterprises applications for 
TSA certification. She recalled t hat China had repeatedly raised its concerns in different WTO  fora, 
including the Goods Council, but that these concerns had not been addressed , and no r had China 
received any convincing reply. China believed that the se US measures  were inconsistent with t he 
rules of the TBT  Agreement. China noted that, to date, Chinese applicants had not received any 
formal response from the US on its refusal s, which ran contrary to the principles of Article  5.2.2 of 
the TBT  Agreement , which required the US to inform Chinese companies of the deficiencies and test 
results in a precise and complete manner ; in addition, it required the US to afford Chinese companies 
an opportunity to correct  their applications . Furthermore, China understood  that the TSA  certification 
requirements had never been notified to any WTO  body, including the TBT  Committee. China 
therefore urged the United States , as one of the proponents of the proposal on enhancing 
transparency and notification s, to play the leadin g role by fulfilling  its own obligations on 
transparency. China further noted that the United States had imposed unnecessary obstacles on 
international trade, which it suspected were in violation of Article  5.1.2 of the TBT  Agreement. In 
China's view, alth ough TSA Certification might not be a technical regulation for market access, it 
had already become a de facto  must for the market access of civil aviation security equipment. For  
countries whose airlines flew to the US, TSA  certification was a must for ci vil aviation security 
equipment , for example . Therefore, China believed that the arbitrary refusal of Members ' 
applications  for certification constituted an abuse of market influence and prevented fair competition. 
China's civil aviation security equipment  had received TSA Certification in the past and its equipment 
had been broadly accepted and valued by China's business partners all over the world ; in addition, 
clients had never raised any security concerns. As the United States had refused to accept China’s 
application for further TSA  Certification, China requested the US to provide a detailed explanation , 
as required by TBT  Agreement, of its reasons for refusing to accept China's certification applications. 
China urged the United States to tre at enterprises and products equal ly, observing national 
treatment and MFN  principles, and eliminating all technical barriers to trade as soon as possible. In 
this context , she emphasized that China was deeply concerned regarding WTO  requirements on fair 
competition, the level playing field, commercial products market access , and non -discrimination , as 
well as by the requirements of the TBT  Agreement. In China's view, these requirements could not 
be violated using the excuse of a national security exception.  
28.3.   The delegate of the United States  reiterated her delegation's position , namely  that the 
WTO Council for Trade in Goods was not the appropriate forum to discuss issues relating to national 
security.  
28.4.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interve ntions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
28.5.   The Council  so agreed . 
29  THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON – TRADE RESTRICTI NG PRACTICES – REQUE ST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND T HE UNITED STATES  
29.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communicati ons dated 31  October and 
1 November  2019, the delegations of the European Union and the United States , respectively, had 
requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
29.2.   The delegate of the European Union  expressed its appreciation over a number of positive 
recent developments, including the adoption by the Russia n Federation  of measures that aligned the 
level of excise duties set for domestic wines with those applied to imported wines. The EU would 
remain vigilant as to  whether concurrent parallel measures did not unduly disadvantage imported 
wines. At previous meetings of the CTG, the EU had reiterated its concerns regarding two Russian 
measures that applied export restrictions to hides and skins and to certain birch lo gs. At the meeting 
of the Committee on Market Access of 9 November  2019, the EU had note d Russia's statement that 
these measures had expired , that they would not be extended and , furthermore,  that Russia likewise 
did not expect to extend the export restric tions applying to metal scrap and waste recently 
introduced by Government Decree No. 1134 of 31  August  2019. At the same time, the EU had noted 
that the Russian Federation had continued to pursue a policy of import substitution and localization 
of producti on through measures that appeared to have been intend ed to disadvantage access for 
foreign products to the Russian market. According to the EU, these measures raised significant 
questions concerning their consistency with WTO  rules. The EU enquired more pa rticularly about G/C/M/136  
 
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  four issues that had already been raised at the Council's previous meeting. Regarding cement 
certification, the EU observed that , since the introduction of the mandatory certification for cement 
in March  2016 and a related mandatory standa rd requiring systematic border inspections, EU exports 
of cement had practically been blocked. The EU had welcomed the announcement by the Russian 
authorities in 2017 that the standard would be revised and the mandatory border inspections 
removed. However, the EU had noted that the amendment had not in fact taken place, even if the 
standard had recently been revised for other purposes. Th e EU believed that this measure was far 
more trade -restrictive than necessary , and therefore that it was having a significantly negative 
impact on trade ; for this reason, the EU requested that the measure be fundamental ly revised . 
Regarding the requirement  for "good manufacturing practice" (GMP) certificates for pharmaceuticals, 
the EU recalled that these had not been notified to the WTO . Furthermore, they remained an 
important obstacle to pharmaceutical imports into the Russian Federation. The EU stated th at foreign 
production sites were confronted with inspections that deviated from best international practice, 
including with regard to the absence of a procedure for the correction of non-major non -compliance , 
and in the practice of product -specific inspect ions. According to the EU, this resulted in an unusual 
rejection  rate (30-40%) for production sites otherwise approved by reference international agencies, 
which was in contrast to the much lower rejection rate for Russian manufacturing plants. The EU 
believed that the pre-application status of the Russia n Federation  in the Pharmaceutical Inspection 
Convention and Pharmaceutical Inspection Co -operation Scheme (PIC/S scheme) was important in 
this regard, and requested an update of the Russian Federation's application process and of foreseen 
related alignments with best international practice with a view to set ting a level  playing field for 
locally produced and foreign medicines. In addition, the EU remained concerned by the ban on fishery 
products from Estoni a, in place since June  2015, alleged ly for SPS reasons. The EU considered that 
the ban had not been adequately justified and that , although Russia' s statement at the CTG's 
previous meeting had referred to a resumption of trade, the EU considered that this trade remained 
in reality extremely limited. The EU requested that this unjustified ban  be lifted . The EU also 
reiterated its concern over the continued utilization of requirements for state -owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and other entities to grant preference to the purchase of domestic goods and services when 
acting with a commercial purpose, which, in the EU's view, violated GATT and GATS  national 
treatment provisions. T he EU remained unconvinced by the Russian Federation's explanations thus 
far, and believed that this was a separate issue from government procurement, where 
GATT/GATS  exceptions to the national treatment rule may indeed apply. In particular, Decree  925 
of 2015 granted a 15%  preference to domestic products and services purchased by SOEs. She 
recalled that, at the Council's previous meeting, Russia had referred to Article  8 of Decree  925, which 
read as follows : "preference is granted subject to the provisions  of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade  1994 and the Eurasian Economic Union Treaty of 24  May 2014. " However, she said that 
the EU had found and shared with Russia a number of cases where it did not seem that the 
application of this article had had any impact at all, and where the 15% advantage for Russian 
products was confirmed and not granted to products from other WTO  Members within an appeal 
process. The EU urged the Russia n Federation  comprehensively to revise its rules for procurement 
by SOEs in order to ensure that the Russian Federation maintained a clear differentiation in rules 
applicable to government procurement and to SOEs acting in a commercial capacity, and to ensure 
that the latter rules avoided any distinction between foreign and dome stic goods and services . 
29.3.   The delegate of the United States  shared the EU's concerns about Russia's GMP  certificates 
for pharmaceuticals. She acknowledged that this item had been on the agenda of multiple meetings, 
and that, while there had been some improv ement, problems remained. The United States continued 
to hear concerns from its industry over Russia's increased number of denials of GMP  certificates and 
the lack of a review process for corrective actions. At the CTG 's previous meeting, the US had urged 
Russia to improve the "Corrective and Preventative Actions process", to use a risk  management 
approach to inspector assessments, to rely on international standards, and to harmonize the 
inspection process across the Eurasian Economic Union. However, the US  had seen little to no 
progress in these areas. The US goal remained a level playing field for all market participants and 
access for Russian citizens to the full array of pharmaceutical products. The US also returned to a 
concern that had been raised at t he CTG 's previous meeting in relation to Russia's "track and trace" 
programme, which touched directly on the topic of trade in goods. It was the understanding of the 
US that the Russian Federation planned to delay, until March  2020, the date by which footw ear must 
be labelled with specific electronic data. The US asked the delegate from the Russian Federation to 
confirm that delay. And while the US appreciated this flexibility for the footwear sector, it understood 
that even this date would be difficult, if not impossible, for some manufacturers to meet. The US 
observed that the lead times from date of manufacture to delivery to retailers were significantly 
longer for imports than for domestically produced products . In addition , there were  numerous steps G/C/M/136  
 
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  involved in generating and affixing labels to individual products . For these reasons, the short 
deadlines posed a greater impediment to imports. The refore, the  US encouraged the Russian 
Federation to work with industry to review and , where possible, extend the implementation deadlines 
to ensure that the new system would not raise barriers to imports that would create costly backlogs 
for importers, retailers, and the Russian authorities  themselves . For example, her delegation 
understo od that the implementation deadline for perfumery products was 1  December  2019 and 
that this deadline had not been extended. However, the US asked Russia to consider extending this 
deadline since , without an extension, they were concerned that US export ch ains would be impacted  
severely , with the greatest harm being imposed on imports. In addition, she shared other concerns 
raised by US  stakeholders, including: (i)  the risk of disclosure and/or misuse of sensitive data 
collected under this new regime; (ii)  the possibility of national treatment and trading rights issues 
stemming from different procedures for importers to obtain labels compared to domestic 
manufacturers; and (iii)  the arbitrary misuse of the system to halt sales of imports. As noted at the 
Council's previous meeting, the US understood that Russia's goal was to combat counterfeit and 
smuggled goods . Nevertheless, the US questioned why , if the primary rationale for the programme 
was to combat counterfeiting, it was necessary to apply the regime t o all products, including products 
not typically affected by counterfeiting. Even if a secondary rationale was to combat tax fraud, she 
asked Russia to explain why it applied the expensive and burdensome labelling requirement to all 
products rather than ta rgeting only those industry sectors where the problem of tax fraud occurred. 
The US requested the Russian Federation to provide a 2 -3 year transition period to ensure that the 
system worked properly and efficiently and , during that time , to work also with interested 
stakeholders from the various industries affected in order to consider less trade -restrictive 
alternatives. The US indicated that it had provided its questions to the Russian Federation in writing 
and looked forward to receiving written res ponses  to them . The US also echoed the concerns raised 
by the European Union on the issues of discriminatory excise taxes on wine and sparkling wine and 
restrictions and obligations placed on Russia's SOEs purchasing decisions, as had already been raised 
at previous meetings of the Council . Finally, the US noted that its concerns were ongoing and 
requested Russia to provide relevant updates accordingly . 
29.4.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  responded that, with regard to cement certification, 
the provision s of GOST at issue were aimed at the security safety of cement imported into the 
territory of Russia. Such cement was used in the construction of buildings and , for security reasons,  
it was very important to conduct all the necessary checks. He informed Me mbers that, on 
3 September  2019, the amendments to the GOST aimed at eliminating additional inspection 
procedures had been approved by the Russian body for standardization ; these amendments would 
be notified to the WTO in accordance with the relevant provi sions of the TBT  Agreement. As for 
GMP certification, Russia reiterated its position as already expressed at previous meetings of the 
TBT Committee and the CTG. Russia had also provided detailed information to interested Members 
in bilateral meetings. Russ ia believed that its GMP  certification was aligned with international best 
practices, including the WHO  Guidelines, PIC/S, the documents under Medicines and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Agency , and those of other international organizations. In Russia' s view, the 
measure was applied in a non -discriminatory manner and was not intended to  restrict imports of 
products essential for Russian citizens. Russia asked the EU and other interested delegations to 
specify the source of the information that they had used, and their methodology for the calculation, 
in order to understand how they had arrived at the conclusion that Russia's GMP  certification was 
discriminatory. Regarding SOE  purchases, he noted that Resolution No.  925 had established the 
priority for Russian goods, works, and services, taking into account the obligations of the Russian 
Federation in the WTO. However, Resolution  No. 925 was not to be applied to purchases of products 
with a view to commercial resale or with a  view to use in the production of goods for commercial 
sale. He clarified that only government procurements were subject to Resolution No.  925. In respect 
of the fishery ban, Russia recalled its statements made at previous meeting s of the Council. 
Regardin g the "track and trace" system, Russia stated that the measure 's intention was to combat 
counterfeited products and to ensure that taxes for each item were paid. The measure had been 
elaborated in coordination with business es, including foreign businesses , and applied to both 
domestically produced and imported goods. The rules and the algorithm of traceability had been 
designed within pilot frameworks for each category of production , in collaboration with domestic 
producers, importers, and the representativ es of foreign companies. Russia believed that the process 
was transparent and would cause neither additional costs for exporters nor a negative impact on 
cross-border trade. The timeline for introducing the system had been adopted and made public in 
April 2018; in his view , this had provided sufficient time to adapt to the new regulation. In 
conclusion, he stated that Russia remained open to engage bilaterally with interested parties on 
these issues.  G/C/M/136  
 
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  29.5.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interve ntions and the Russia n Federation  for 
its response and proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
29.6.   The Council  so agreed . 
30  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU) 2017/23 21 AND REGULATION (E U) 2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM THE R USSIAN FEDERATION  
30.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
30.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed concerns over the amendments to the basic 
regulation of the European Union on the protection against dumped imports, as adopted in 
December  2017 and June  2018. This issue had been discussed on numerous previous occasions in 
the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices and had no w been raised for the first  time at the CTG. 
Russia had systemic concerns over the EU's abuse of trade remedy instruments. In Russia' s view, 
the EU's application of anti -dumping measures had deviated from their original purpose , which was 
to tackle injury to national industry from dumped imports. Russia noted that the first  amendment, 
introduced by Regulation  2017/2321, had concerned the calculation of the normal value of a product 
under consideration in an anti -dumping investigation ; it enabled the use of data on costs acquired 
from countries other than the country of origin of the exported product. Russia believed that its 
rationale was to find the so-called "significant distortions", or a situation where, in the view of the 
EU investigators, the reported costs of the producers, including the costs of raw materials and 
energy, were not the result of free market forces because of substantial government intervention. 
Russia stated that the Regulation provided examples of "significant distortions", such as the presence 
of firms controlled, owned , or supervised by the State at the market, which gave the Commission 
considerable discretion to determine a presence of "significant distortion". Moreover, Russia stated 
that the European Commission had intended to publ ish reports on "significant distortions" in 
exporting countries, which would be used as a source of evidence to initiate an investigation and to 
calculate the normal value based on out-of-country data. A report concerning China had already 
been published a nd a second report concerning Russia had been announced. Russia was still unaware 
of when the latter report would be published and whether or not the Commission intended to make 
reports about other countries. In addition, Russia stated that the second  amen dment introduced by 
Regulation  2018/825 envisaged the right of the European Commission not to apply the lesser duty 
adequate to remove injury in a case of "distortions on raw materials with regard to the product 
concerned" in the exporting country. Russia mentioned that some examples of such "raw material 
distortions" might equally fall under the definition of "significant distortions" established in the 
first amendment; thus, the Commission could, in certain cases, decide to punish exporters twice 
over for the same reason . Russia highlighted that, based on the EU 's investigations into Russian 
imports, the European Commission did not investigate imports from each and every country with 
regard to "distortions on raw materials". Consequently, higher duties based on dumping margin may 
be applied to imports of one  Member and lower duties based on injury margin using the lesser duty 
rule to imports of another. In this context, Russia stated that its views on the WTO-inconsistency of 
the first  amendment h ad already been expressed , at the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices ; 
they would not repeat  them. As for the second  amendment, Russia was aware that the "lesser duty 
rule" was not mandatory according to WTO  rules. However, Russia was of the view that even  
discretionary rules could be applied in a manner that violate d Member 's WTO  obligations , as in the 
present case. Russia reiterated that anti -dumping investigations examined the pricing behaviour of 
exporters ; however, the European Union seemed to blur the se fundamental aims. Russia maintained 
that the European Union had attempted to punish its exporters for market circumstances that were 
beyond their influence , although neither Article  VI of the GATT  1994 nor the Anti -Dumping 
Agreement were intended to add ress Members' pricing policies. Russia was also concerned that, in 
the application of its anti -dumping methodologies, the European Union could pick and choose 
countries and limit imports from them as it saw fit. As a result, goods from one WTO  Member could  
be allowed into the European market, whereas those from another could be deprived of fair access. 
Russia considered that, by means of these methodologies, the European Union could deprive a 
WTO Member from benefits due under the principle of most-favoured -nation treatment.  
Furthermore, Russia had not found  any provisions in the Anti -Dumping Agreement or in the 
GATT  1994 enabling the use of anti -dumping measures in such a way and for such a purpose. 
Therefore, Russia called upon the European Union to cease its application of the methodologies 
introduced by the two  amendments at issue and likewise to abstain from their use in future. Russia G/C/M/136  
 
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  would continue to monitor the situation and hoped that its concerns would also be supported by 
other Members.  
30.3.   The delega te of the European Union  replied that, on 20  December  2017, through its 
Regulation  2017/2321, the EU had implemented changes to its anti -dumping and anti -subsidy 
legislation. According to the EU, the se changes fully respected WTO  rules. Furthermore, they 
ensured that the EU's trade defence system remained strong and effective in order to deal with 
dumping from countries whose economies had significant distortions because of State interference. 
The main change to the EU's anti -dumping legislation was the int roduction of an alternative anti -
dumping calculation method. The EU considered that this new methodology was country -neutral and 
would apply to all WTO  Members whose domestic prices and costs were significantly distorted 
because of State interference. The EU would use other benchmarks reflecting undistorted costs of 
production and sale if it was not appropriate to use domestic prices or costs due to these distortions . 
She informed Members that the EU  Commission was preparing reports on distortions that exis ted at 
country and sector level. These reports were technical, fact -based documents, which drew on many 
sources, including the official public records of the countries concerned. Information from 
international organizations was also included, such as that from the IMF or the OECD. She noted 
that the reports, which were Commission Staff Working Documents, were descriptive in nature and 
did not pass judgement on the economies in question. China had been selected for the first  report 
because it was the subject  of most anti -dumping activity in the EU. The second  report was currently 
under way , concerning Russia. She said that , depending on the frequency and extent of 
developments in the economies of any country concerned, the reports could be updated. In additio n, 
given that the reports would become part of the evidence on file in investigations, interested parties 
could rebut or contest the information they contained . She also explained that the legislative changes 
introduced by Regulation  2017/2321 were separat e from the modernization changes that had 
entered into force in June  2018 following the entry into force of Regulation  2018/825. More 
specifically, Regulation  2018/825 had introduced legislative amendments intended to further 
improve the EU's trade defence  instruments and to adapt them to the challenges of a globalized 
trading environment. The EU believed that the se amendments improved the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the EU's trade defence instruments for all stakeholders , without changing the scope 
of those instruments  by neither making them more liberal nor more protectionist. She noted that 
the legislative changes had consisted of a number of elements that ensured more transparency for 
both exporters and importers, including information for stakeholde rs on the imposition or otherwise 
of provisional measures three weeks in advance ; they also foresaw the reimbursement of duties 
following an expiry review without renewal of measures, a faster decision -making, and support for 
small and medium -sized enterpr ises. The EU highlighted that the amendments also allowed the 
lesser duty rule in many cases  to be adapted , taking into account raw material distortions, higher 
target profit s, and a reflection of future costs relating to R&D, investment, and environmental  
agreements such as emission s trading. The EU believed that, together with the changes introduced 
by Regulation  2017/2321, these amendments ensured that the EU's trade defence instruments  
would continue to be effective . The EU pursued a free and fair trade  agenda and such an approach 
had to be accompanied by effective tools to ensure that imports into the EU were competing on a 
fair basis.  
30.4.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
30.5.   The Council so agreed . 
31  EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIREC TIVE 2009/28/EC, REN EWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM COLOMBIA  AND MALAYSIA  
31.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegations of Colombia and Malaysia, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this 
issue on the agenda.  
31.2.   The delegate of Colombia  reiterated his delegation' s concern regarding 
EU Directive  2018/2001 , which established that, from 2021, first  generation biofuels would count as 
renewable energy in the transport sector only up to a quota level of 7%, and with the Directive's 
Delegated Act, which stated that first  generation biofuels with a high risk of causing Indirect Land 
Use Change  (ILUC) shall have their contribution to the renewable energy quota gradually reduced  
to 0% by 2030. In Colombia's view, these provisions were inconsistent with the national treatment  G/C/M/136  
 
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  and MFN  obligations of the GATT  1994 and with Articles  2.1 and 2.2 of the WTO  TBT Agreement. 
Colombia appreciated that the EU's intention was to adopt a public policy on environmental 
protection through the promotion of the use of energy from renewable so urces. However, Colombia 
believed that such a n environment al policy  should be implemented in a manner that was non -
discriminatory, not more restrictive than necessary , and that should not subsequently become an 
unnecessary obstacle and a disguised barrier to trade. Colombia drew Members' attention to the 
ILUC methodology that, according to Colombia, had no valid or internationally recognized scientific 
basis for measuring the environmental impact of productive activities. This was also the case for 
calculat ions of the expected reduction in the production of greenhouse gases. Colombia also believed 
that the Commission had not take n into account the other relevant methodologies that had been 
internationally validated and tested. With regard to the classificati on of certain biofuels as being of 
high ILUC  risk, Colombia was of the view that the considerations were not technically appropriate 
for the following reasons: (i)  deforestation was not necessarily high in all producing countries; and 
(ii) some countries, such as Colombia, had enough available land to increase the area of agricultural 
cultivation without deforestation. Furthermore, Colombia noted that certain products and activities 
that had been shown by international studies to contribute even more significantly to deforestation, 
such as soya and rapeseed cultivation and livestock farming, were not being regarded in this context 
as presenting a high ILUC  risk. Considerable concern had also been generated by the definition of 
small -scale producers as "farmers independently conducting an agricultural activity on a holding 
with an agricultural area of less than two  hectares for which they hold ownership or lease rights". 
Colombia considered this classification to be technically and scientifically baseless , and recalled that 
the classification of small -scale producers differed for each country, according to its specific 
economic and social conditions. Colombia furt her believed that this measure constituted de facto  
discrimination between like products of different foreign origins and like products of foreign and 
national origin. Colombia highlighted the competitive relationship and the extensive economic and 
technic al scope for substitution that existed with other vegetable oils , such as soya and rapeseed. 
More specifically, Colombia called Members' attention to the fact that the Directive excluded the 
prohibition of similar raw materials, many of which were produced  locally in the European territory. 
In Colombia's view, this measure also deviated from Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, which placed 
an obligation on Members not to adopt technical regulations that created unnecessary barriers to 
trade ; furthermore, it did not fulfil the requirements of the "necessity test" through which compliance 
with this Article could be assessed. Similarly, Members should consider that there were regional 
differences in the impact on deforestation of the expansion of oil palm cultiva tion . For example, 
according to the EU's own assessment, Colombia was a country in which palm oil cultivation was 
responsible for zero  deforestation, and yet it would still not be granted free access to the EU's 
renewable energy market. For these reasons,  Colombia requested the EU to conduct a thorough 
review of the delegated act in 2021, in order to adopt an approach that included sustainable palm 
oil production in the EU's goals for renewable energy. Colombia also urged the EU to create a 
permanent round  table through which Colombia and  other Members could provide reliable and 
updated information on palm oil cultivation in their countries . Colombia looked forward to receiving 
the EU's written replies.  
31.3.   The delegate of Malaysia  remained deeply concerned over the development of the Directive 
(EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council , of 11  December  2018, on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources , and the Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2019/807 , of 13  March  2019. Malaysia believed that the se development s had negatively 
impacted upon the Malaysian oil palm industry ; for example, they resulted in several countries in 
the European Union and non -European Union enforcing legislation to single out and discriminate 
against biodiesel produced from palm oil , declaring it in eligible for incentives and tax exemption 
compared to biodiesel produced from other vegetable oils. Malaysia had engaged with the European 
Union in all possible fora to provide scientific evidence, f acts, and information as well as to exchange 
views in order to find a mutually beneficial and mutually acceptable way forward that ensure d 
continued market access for Malaysian palm biodiesel. Although Malaysia had appreciated the 
European Union's willingn ess to engage in open discussion and dialogue, this ongoing engagement 
had still not resulted in a fair treatment for palm oil produced in Malaysia. For this reason , Malaysia 
urged the European Union to observe the principles of fairness, justice, openness , transparency, and 
non-discrimination, in conducting its international trade. Malaysia also urged the European Union to 
provide equitable treatment across all oil crops biofuels and bioliquids , in line with the principle of 
non-discrimination that stipula ted that a Member shall not discriminate between like products from 
different trading partners. Malaysia was committed to realizing the 2030  Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and its 17  Sustainable Development Goals. The Sustainable Development Goals were  
a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that all people enjoy ed peace G/C/M/136  
 
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  and prosperity. In this context, Malaysia argued that the oil palm industry played a very important 
role in contributing positively and constructively towards achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals. In March  2019, for example, the Government of Malaysia had adopted a policy ensuring that 
Malaysian oil palm was cultivated sustainably . The measures introduced had included cap ping oil 
palm cultivated a reas to 6.5  million hectares; stop ping the conversion of permanent forest reserved 
area; halt ing the planting of oil palm in the new peatland area ; to further strengthen regulations 
with regard to existing oil palm cultivated on peat; and to make oil palm plantation maps available 
for public access , thus demonstrating further transparency in the supply chain. Malaysia emphasized 
that the Malaysian oil palm industry was committed to producing palm oil in accordance with 
sustainable principles and criteria un der the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil certification scheme, 
which would be implemented on a mandatory basis by 31  December  2019. Malaysia had also put in 
place a policy framework and legislation to ensure sustainable development balancing environment al 
protection  and socioeconomic development through the implementation of various programmes and 
initiatives for conservation and preservation of forests and biodiversity, including, among others, 
such national forestry initiatives as the Centra l Forest Spine and Heart of Borneo, which encouraged 
reforestation through the replanting of forest tree species, the establishment of wildlife corridors, 
and the reduction of greenhouse gas emission s. She explained that the Central Forest Spine covered 
5.3 million hectares in peninsular Malaysia,  and that the Heart of Borneo was a trilateral cooperation 
between Brunei  Darussalam , Indonesia, and Malaysia,  covering an  area of over 20  million hectares, 
which helped to strengthen the world's resilience to clim ate change by conserving carbon sinks and 
creating a huge green lung for the world while at the same time protecting the livelihoods of 
forest -dependent communities. Malaysia continued to maintain 55.3% of its land area under forest 
cover, which exceeded t he commitment of Malaysia to retain at least 50% of its land area under 
forest cover as it had pledged to do at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The Malaysian Budget  2020, 
which had been tabled on 11  October  2019, had also included a strategy on promoting 
environmental sustainability. The Government of Malaysia had allocated budget ary resources  for the 
preservation of Malaysia's pristine forests and natural biodiversity , as well as protection of 
endangered species, such as the Malayan tiger and orangutan, whic h demonstrate d Malaysia's 
commitment and seriousness in taking action to address the se issues. She informed the Council that 
Malaysia would also commence a survey project to undertake a new population survey of the 
Orangutan and pygmy elephants in Sabah, w hich would bring together wildlife experts, scientists , 
and researchers , to take part in an extensive population study of the state's iconic wildlife. 
Furthermore, Malaysia had also committed to plant one  million forest tree species within the next  
10 years, particularly in degraded lands in Sabah, as well as protecting the wildlife population, and 
that these projects would be sponsored primarily by the palm oil industry. Therefore, Malaysia urged 
the European Union to acknowledge and recognize its efforts and commitment in contributing 
towards the protection and conservation of forest and biodiversity and the production of Malaysian 
palm oil in a sustainable manner . In conclusion, Malaysia remained fully committed to negotiating 
with the EU in a sin cere and constructive manner with a view to ensuring a non -discriminatory 
treatment against palm products and to prevent unnecessary barrier s to market access for palm 
products into the European Union.  Malaysia looked forward to receiving a positive respon se from the 
EU in this regard . 
31.4.   The delegate of Ecuador  questioned the ILUC  methodology used by the European Union 
because that methodology was based on historic data and did not take into account more recent 
data and scientific evidence. Ecuador believed t hat the European Union's  legislation had 
automatically considered that crops that had historically led to deforestation were of high ILUC  risk, 
without taking into account either the latest data or the implementation of appropriate measures 
and best practi ces in the countries concerned. In Ecuador's view, this regulation was having a 
two-fold effect. First, it led to an arbitrary discrimination  between similar biofuels, some of which 
came from less productive crops per hectare than palm oil, like rapeseed o r sunflower, but which 
were not considered to be of high ILUC  risk. In Ecuador's view, this appeared to be incompatible 
with Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement and with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. The measure also 
appeared to protect the use of European or iginated products, thereby going against the national 
treatment principle set out in Article  2.1 the TBT  Agreement and Article  III:4 of the GATT  1994. 
Ecuador considered  that, at present, there was no consensus among scientists on the 
ILUC methodology and that the EU should therefore avoid its unilateral adoption in the absence of a 
broader discussion at international level, which would lead to its approval at the multila teral level , 
including with the participation of developing countries that supplied these raw material s. Ecuador 
considered that there was no certainty about the assumptions used by the EU with regard to the 
production of palm oil, the estimates on the pro duction of greenhouse gases, or about the types of 
land use adopted in different countries to extend the production of palm oil. Similarly, the G/C/M/136  
 
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  calculations on deforestation that were carried out globally did not take into account the differences 
between individual cases. For example, the methodology used to calculate ILUC should recognize 
that palm oil could also be a low ILUC  risk when it was produced sustainably. In this regard, she 
emphasized that Ecuador had made significant progress in reaching its ob jectives and national 
commitments in the area of climate change  reduction , and that Ecuador was one of the leaders 
worldwide in terms of the implementation of policies, measures , and actions for the reduction of gas 
emissions and deforestation (RED+). The palm oil sector in Ecuador had also signed a voluntary 
agreement to move towards a production of palm oil that was sustainable and free of any 
deforestation , and that aimed to achieve zero deforestation. Moreover, Ecuador was the second 
country in the worl d that had met the requirements of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in order to access payment based on the reduction of carbon emissions and  
deforestation. For example , in 2015 -2016, the annual average rate of deforestation in Ecuador was 
94,300  hectares, whereas in the period 1990 -2000, it was 129,000  hectares, showing a reduction 
in deforestation of 27%, meaning a reduction of 29,000  thousand tonnes of CO 2 between 2009 and 
2014. Ecuador believed that it was es sential to take these achievements into account and that the 
method used to calculate the ILUC should incentivize instead of penalizing countries that had carried 
out great efforts to produce their palm oil more sustainably. Regarding the socio -economic ef fects 
of the EU  regulation in palm oil producing countries, Ecuador noted that the palm oil sector employed 
approximately 6,500  producers, among whom 51% were smallholder family businesses with less 
than 10  hectares ; in addition, the palm oil sector genera ted approximately USD  226,000  in revenue, 
and palm oil was Ecuador's fifth most exported product. It also created 126,000  direct and indirect 
jobs along the supply chain. Therefore, Ecuador supported the statement made by Colombia and 
urged the EU to revie w the delegated act in 2021 in order to review the ILUC  methodology and its 
implementation , which currently resulted in the individual exclusion of palm oil. Ecuador understood 
that the European Union had made commitments to reduce the effects of climate c hange; however, 
the environmental objectives of the European Union should be compatible with the multilateral 
trading system ; they should not be disguised barrier s to trade.  
31.5.   The delegate of Guatemala  stated that, as a producer of palm oil, Guatemala shared the 
concerns expressed by previous Members. Guatemala understood that this measure did not limit the 
use of palm oil . However , it discouraged its use by discriminating against the product in compari son 
with other vegetable oils and , in particular , oils produced by the European Union.  It therefore placed 
palm oil at a disadvantage. In Guatemala, the production of palm oil generated approximately 
28,000  direct jobs in rural areas and benefitted approxi mately 85,000  families in the national 
territory. Guatemala emphasized that its palm oil productive sector was making great efforts to 
generate sustainable palm oil production ; however, these efforts had not been recognized by the 
European Union. Furthermo re, Guatemala's industry was also implementing policies privately to 
reduce emissions in palm oil production ; indeed, it had set such reduction as one of its priority 
objectives. Guatemala considered it necessary to differentiate between producers in order to avoid 
condemning palm oil production globally, to the detriment of too many families in rural areas. 
Therefore, Guatemala supported Colombia's proposal to establis h a round table with the EU and 
palm oil producing countries to discuss how this regulation could be formulated in a way that would 
not restrict trade more than necessary. In conclusion, Guatemala reiterated its commitment to 
reaching the UN Sustainable Development Goals . 
31.6.   The delegate of Indonesia  shared previous Members' concerns regarding the EU's 
Amendments to Directive  2009/28/EC, Renewable Energy Directive (RED  II), as well as the 
Delegated Regulation. Indonesia had previously raised its concerns a num ber of times in the 
TBT Committee, in this Council, and in bilateral meetings both in Geneva and Brussels. Indonesia 
had appreciated the discussions with, and written explanations from the EU ; however, these had not 
address ed Indonesia's concerns and the E U had not offer ed any positive response. Indonesia 
recognized that the EU had notified EU  Directive  2009/28 (RED  I) to the TBT  Committee; however, 
the EU had not notified the RED  II and its Delegated Regulation to the TBT  Committee when it 
entered into force. Indonesia recalled that the TBT  Agreement required Members, including the EU 
and its member States, to respect the fundamental principle of non -discrimination in technical 
regulations ; in other words , the EU may not discriminate between biofuel prod ucts. Nevertheless, 
Indonesia had observed that , under RED  II, the EU treated biofuels differently by discriminating 
against palm oil biofuel , placing palm oil biofuel in a n unfavourable situation compared to that of 
other like biofuels that were produced in the EU and elsewhere . Indonesia therefore considered that 
the EU was acting inconsistently with Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement, in particular regarding the 
terms "no less favourable" and "to like products of national origin and to like products origin ating in 
any other country ". Indonesia stated that the four  food and feed oil crops covered by the EU  RED II G/C/M/136  
 
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  and the Delegated Regulation, namely rapeseed oil, sunflower oil, soybean oil, and palm oil, were 
like products used for biofuel blending as FAME ( fatty acid methyl ester) in order to produce biofuel , 
which was a type of renewable energy. Directives  2009/28 and 2018/2001 defined , in Articles  17 
and 29, respectively, the sustainability and greenhouse gas emissions saving criteria for biofuel in 
order to be counted toward the mandatory EU  renewable energy targets , and also in order to be 
eligible for financial support. Article  26 of Directive  2018/2001 had added Indirect Land Use Change 
(ILUC) emissions criteria for which there was no valid scientific b asis. Indonesia believed that these  
criteria were merely based on a model and various unsubstantiated assumptions, although it was 
widely understood that ILUC could not be measured. In Indonesia's view, the EU had used these 
arbitrary ILUC  criteria to limi t and eventually eliminate counting palm oil -based biofuels towards its 
renewable energy targets. In particular, the EU had unfairly implemented the notion of "ILUC" in 
such a way as to discriminate against palm oil -based biofuel , thus restricting its acce ss to the 
EU market. Indonesia strongly believed that the EU  measures were based neither on scientific 
evidence nor on an existing international standard (Article  2.2 and 2.4  TBT). Instead, in Indonesia's 
view, these measures were based simply on political opposition in the EU to palm oil. For these 
reasons , Indonesia urged the EU to provide an explanation of its measures based on Article  2.2 or 
2.4 of the TBT  Agreement. In addition, Indonesia assumed that the EU 's measures had been taken 
for the purpose of mitigating climate change  in the context of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement ; in this regard, Indonesia noted that it was also a party to these agreements and was 
therefore under the same obligations as the EU. Indeed, Indonesia had confirmed its pledge to go 
beyond its obligation s as a non -Annex  1 country for reducing emissions. In this context, Indonesia 
noted that, although it was not yet an industrial ized country, it had decided to reduce its emiss ions 
by 29% by 2030 and, if international support were provided, by up to 41%. In sum, Indonesia 
considered that the EU's ILUC  criteria did not serve the purpose of mitigating climate change. 
Instead, the ILUC  criteria were being used for the sole purpose of discriminating against and 
restricting importation of palm oil -based biofuel. Indonesia was also deeply concerned over the 
certification process for showing compliance with the low ILUC  risk criteria as this process did not 
seem to comply with Article  5.1 and 5.2 of the TBT Agreement. The low ILUC  risk certification 
process was discriminatory, unnecessarily restrictive, and relied upon concepts that did not conform 
to the international practices governing conformity assessment procedures. Indonesia regre tted that 
the EU had so far failed to respond constructively to its concerns . For this reason, Indonesia again 
asked the EU to offer clarity regarding its position so that Indonesia and other WTO  Members could 
properly assess whether the EU was respecting its commitments under the TBT  Agreement. 
Indonesia specified that this request included, but was not limited to, an explanation by the EU of 
its justification, within the meaning of Article  2.5 of the TBT  Agreement, for its measures in terms 
of Article  2.2 to 2.4  of the TBT  Agreement . Indonesia looked forward to receiving the EU's response 
and emphasized the need for all WTO  Members to comply with their obligations under the 
TBT Agreement.  
31.7.   The delegate of Honduras  echoed the previous concerns wit h regard to European 
Directive  2009/28/CE on Renewable Energy. Honduras respected the legitimate right of 
WTO Members to adopt public measures designed to protect the environment. However, these 
measures must be compatible with the WTO  Agreements and shoul d not restrict trade more than 
necessary. Honduras emphasized that discrimination against palm oil -based biofuels would have a 
negative effect on its economy, since, for Honduras, palm oil was an extremely important 
agro-industry that created thousands of permanent jobs and supported a large number of small -
scale farmers. In Honduras, palm oil production was controlled and carried out under conditions that 
protected its tropical rainforests. Honduras had experienced significant growth in the sector, 
althoug h the impact on the environment had been minor. Therefore, Honduras  supported the 
concerns expressed by Colombia and other Members and urged the European Union to provide in 
writing the information requested.  
31.8.   The delegate of the European Union  replied that  the revision of the Renewable Energy 
Directive had been discussed on many occasions, including in a number of bilateral meetings among 
experts. On these occasions , the EU had taken note of the positions expressed. She recalled that 
the Second  Renewable En ergy Directive (RED II) was not intended to create import restrictions but 
rather to promote sustainable renewable energies and to reduce the carbon footprint of the transport 
sector. The EU had in place an ambitious energy and climate policy framework, in  line with its 
international commitments, including the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement. 
The EU believed that such a framework was as an essential step to wards  achieving its 
decarbonization targets by 2050 ; the Second  Renewable Energy  Directive, adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council in December  2018, was an important element in this policy. The EU G/C/M/136  
 
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  stated that the revised Directive did not set a ban on any specific biofuel ; rather, it established rules 
on the calculations f or the achievement of the EU  renewable energy targets, including in the 
transport sector. The EU  market remained open to palm oil, in the biofuel sector as in other sectors . 
Furthermore, EU imports of palm oil had actually increased in volume last year, an d the EU had no 
specific restriction in place.  
31.9.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions , and the EU for its response , 
and proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
31.10.   The Council  so agreed . 
32  EUROPEAN UNION – MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATI ON AND IN VITRO DIAG NOSTIC 
MEDICAL DEVICES REGU LATION – REQUEST FRO M THE UNITED STATES  
32.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in  a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
32.2.   The delegate of the United States  expressed support for the development and enforcement 
of a well -defined medical  device regulatory system that assured the safety and performance of 
medical devices. However, the United States had serious concerns regarding the implementation of 
the EU's Medical Device Regulation (MDR) and the In -Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices Regul ation 
(IVDR ); its industry was also worried about patient access to life-saving and life-improving medical 
technologies , as well as their continued access to the EU's US  125 billion medical device market, 
USD 20 billion of which was supplied by US  products . The US noted that the implementation of these 
two regulations was critically behind schedule and that time was running out before the MDR came 
into effect in May  2020. The US stated that its industry was particularly concerned by the insufficient 
number of testing facilities (known as Notified Bodies (NBs)) to perform certification activities under 
the two  regulations, as well as by the insufficient number of the implementing acts needed to provide 
the details of how industry could ensure that their produ cts complied with the new product 
standards. The US appreciated that the Commission had previously indicated that 20  NBs might be 
designated by the end of 2019 and that these NBs would increase their capacity by 25 to 50%. The 
US pointed to the fact that t he complexity of the evaluations had also increased dramatically, with 
the number of files requiring re -certification having increased to almost ten  times the annual 
number , with each file requiring approximately six months to evaluate. Moreover, there wer e 
currently only six  approved Notified Bodies for MDR, including only an additional four since 
May 2019, so that, even if all of the Commission's projected Notified Bodies were approved by 
end-2019, there would still not be enough capacity to meet the demand or to complete the necessary 
assessments by May  2020. Furthermore, the US believed that the "grace period" allo wing products 
certified under the current Medical Device Directive to be marketed, while helpful, was insufficient 
given that whole classes of products did not meet the regulation's criteria for eligibility , and many 
companies could not find Notified Bodie s to evaluate their products under the previous Directive. 
Notified Bodies were already gearing up for the MDR and were turning companies  away. The US also 
understood that the EU was working on a corrigendum of a sub -set of Class  1 products and 
acknowledge d that this could  free up Notified Body capacity. However, in the view  of the US , this 
did not sufficiently address the capacity issue ; it would not address Class  2 and Class  3 products, 
for example, which were the most difficult and time-consuming to asse ss. Likewise, finalizing 
essential  implementing acts by the end of the year was too late given that companies needed to 
know what they had to do to comply. The US emphasized that the Commission was not providing 
sufficient lead time for companies to prepar e their documentation, let alone time for the Notified 
Bodies to evaluate the documents by the May  2020 deadline for the MDR. The US called upon the 
EU to introduce important changes so as to make the system function as it should; this need had 
also been r ecognized by other trading partners, EU  manufacturers, and some EU member States 
which had also expressed serious concern about the implementation challenges caused by the lack 
of certification capacity and the absence of many implementing acts. Given thes e concerns, the US 
urged the EU to take the necessary steps to provide more time for the MDR to be fully implemented 
in order to ensure that patients continue d to receive the medical devices that they needed.  
32.3.   The delegate of Mexico  expressed support for th e development and application of regulatory 
frameworks that were ambitious and supported product  quality . However, such measures should not 
generate unnecessary trade restrictions. Mexico shared the concern put forward by the United States 
over the implementation of a new regulatory framework of medical devices and in vitro diagnostic 
services that had been notified to the TBT Committee by  the European Union,  because the G/C/M/136  
 
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  time-frame for its entry  into force could be insufficient for the adaptation of the necessary 
infrastructure within the European Union in terms of  conformity assessment , thus resulting possibly 
in a direct impact on Mexican  exporters. Mexico emphasized the importance of having updated 
information on the current status and steps being taken to ensure the good functioning of the 
infrastructure that this new regulation would implement, in particular with regard to the 
organizat ions that were in charge of the conformity assessment of medical appliances, as had been 
mentioned also in other committees.  
32.4.   The delegate of Canada  expressed the concerns of her delegation and of Canada's  medical 
device industry regarding the implementatio n of the EU  Medical Device Regulation and the In  Vitro 
Diagnostic Medical Devices Regulation. In particular, Canada was concerned that the number of 
Notified Bodies could be insufficient to carry out certification under the two  regulations. Canada 
requeste d the EU to provide additional information and clarification with regard to next steps.  
32.5.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  shared the concerns of other Members over the EU's 
Medical Devices Regulation and In Vitro Diagnostic Regulations, which were inte nded to strengthen 
the EU  medical device regulatory system. Korea understood that the purpose of the new regulations 
was to ensure the general safety and performance of medical devices. However, Korea believed that 
the implementation process had not accoun ted for the following two major issues: (i)  the lack of 
Notified Bodies for certification; and (ii)  the lack of detailed information regarding implementation. 
First, Korea considered that the limited number of Notified Bodies would cause delays in obtainin g 
the relevant certifications, this being a " de facto" non -tariff barrier that  would restrict access to the 
EU's medical market. Second, Korea considered that the absence of concrete information on the new 
regulations meant that companies were unable adequately to prepare for implementation of the EU's 
measures. Korea added that the new tightened regulations also requested low -risk medical devices 
to presen t post-market clinical follow -up, which placed a heavy burden on small medical companies. 
In conclusion, Korea urged the EU to address these concerns swift ly and also to provide additional 
information on the new regulations.  
32.6.   The delegate of the European Un ion acknowledged that the new Medical Devices Regulation 
and In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices Regulation would enter into force in March  2020 and 
May 2022, respectively. These regulations were intended to ensure  the general safety and 
performance of med ical devices and to keep up with technological progress. As indicated at the 
previous meeting of the TBT Committee, the EU was aware that meeting the deadlines of the 
regulations was challenging for all stakeholders involved , and that the timely availabili ty of an 
appropriate number of Notified Bodies was one of the major challenges. However, the EU believed 
that implementation was progressing well, and noted that the regulations foresaw transition 
mechanisms, such as the possibility for manufacturers to co ntinue to place products on the market 
under old Directive certificates until May  2024. The EU was fully committed to introducing the new 
system without delay in order to ensure a higher level of patient protection. She informed Members 
that, for the time being, seven  Notified Bodies, which were the largest and which held a significant 
share of current certificates , had been designated under the new Medical Devices Regulation ; 
two had been designated under the new In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices  Regulation . 
Furthermore, 51 additional applications had been received, covering the full scope of the 
two Regulations, and 29  joint assessments had already been performed. In addition, EU  estimates 
indicated that approximately 20  Notified Bodies might be designated under the MDR by the end of 
the year. The EU highlighted that Notified Bodies had increased their resources by an average of 
50% for the assessment of medical devices and by up to 200% for the assessment of In Vitro 
Devices, and that new bodies had also made applications for designation under the Regulations. The 
EU was committed to taking steps to encourage Notified Bodies to make use of the single audit 
reports of the Medical Device Single Audit Programme (MDSAP) in a manner that was compatible  
with EU  legislative requirements. The EU was also working on guidelines that were expected to be 
finalized early next year. The EU and the US would also cooperate to ensure the maximum possible 
alignment of electronic database specifications for Unique De vice Identifiers (a system based on a 
Unique Device Identifier code for facilitating the identification and traceability of devices). In order 
to allow the EU and the US  systems to communicate  effectively , a medical devices nomenclature 
would be visible to  operators and incorporated in the future database.  
32.7.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions , and the EU for its response , 
and proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
32.8.   The Council  so agreed . G/C/M/136  
 
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  33  ANGOLA – IMPORT REST RICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIA N 
FEDERATION  
33.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
33.2.   The delegate o f the Russian Federation  was deeply concerned about Angola's Presidential 
Decree No.  23/19, which introduced a set of measures against imports of a wide range of products, 
mainly agricultural, including pork meat, wheat flour, and poultry meat. Russia cons idered that the 
Decree prioritized domestic products over imported products, imposed a quantitative restriction on 
imports, and introduced pre -shipment inspection. In Russia's view, these measures were 
WTO-inconsistent, as they appeared to violate Articles  III and XI of the GATT  1994, as well as 
provisions of the Import Licensing Agreement and the TRIMs  Agreement. Russia urged Angola to 
bring these measures into conformity with the WTO  Agreement and to lift its import bans on 
agricultural products.  
33.3.   The dele gate of the United States  joined Russia in expressing concern over Angola's 
Presidential Decree No.  23/19, issued on 14  January  2019. The US understood that  this decree was 
intended to  restrict Angola's imports with the goal of increasing domestic economic development. 
This decree specifically targeted 54  products, mainly agricultural goods, and could potentially target 
more in the future. The decree also covered any imports that competed with goods produced in the 
Luanda -Bengo special economic zone . Since the implementation of the decree, the US had heard 
reports of confusion over how the decree was being  enforced and the goods that had faced delays 
at the border. US  agricultural exporters were particularly concerned over delays to perishable goods 
exports amidst all this uncertainty. The US was concerned that this decree was inconsistent with 
Angola's WTO  commitments to national treatment and the elimination of quantitative restrictions, 
and that these actions could discourage overseas companies fro m doing business in Angola and 
compromise Angola's relationships with its key trade partners. The US asked Angola's officials to 
explain how they planned to bring the decree and its implementation into accordance with 
WTO rules. They also urged the Angolan  government to request technical assistance from the 
WTO Secretariat , if necessary,  to notify trade measures taken under Decree  23/19 to the appropriate 
WTO Committee. Finally, the US urged the Angolan government to continue its work with the 
US Embassy in  Luanda towards developing good regulatory practices and technical standards 
cooperation. Such work would help the Angolan government to develop policies and regulations that 
took into account stakeholder concerns  and address ed strategic policy goals, whil e at the same time 
avoiding disruptive trade policies.  
33.4.   The delegate of the European Union  expressed support for Angola's objectives of diversify ing 
its economy and develop ing its domestic industry. However, the European Union also shared the 
concerns expre ssed by other Members over Decree  23/19 , which  seemed to protect the domestic 
industry in a way that was incompatible with WTO  rules,  and which might also discourage foreign 
investment in Angola. The EU encouraged Angola to reconsider the measures in quest ion and to 
ensure their compatibility with WTO  rules.  
33.5.   The delegate of Brazil  reiterated his delegation 's concern s over Angola 's policy of substituting 
imports of agricultural products under the Presidential Decree in question, and believed that Angola's 
rules for granting import licence s and for quantitative restrictions ran contrary to disciplines agreed 
upon in the GATT, the Agreement on Agriculture, and the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures. Both Brazilian exporters an d importers had indicated increasing difficulty in obtaining 
import licences, either because applications were approved late , or only partially, or because there 
had been no response at all from local authorities to licence applications. Brazil highlighted  that the 
Decree affected such important products as corn, chicken, and pork, and had negatively impacted 
upon a bilateral trade that had previously generated economic and social gains for both Brazil and 
Angola. Therefore, Brazil requested the Angolan Gov ernment to maintain a constructive engagement 
with Members affected by its import restrictions , and to respond in a timely manner to questions on 
this subject at the Committee on Agriculture.  
33.6.   The delegate of Canada , as noted during the Council 's July  2019 meeting, encouraged Angola 
to comply with its WTO  notification requirements and to notify this Decree, as well as any measures 
taken under this Decree, to the appropriate WTO  Committees. Canada also sought to clarify the 
scope of the measure and the HS cod es of the agricultural products covered. Canada encouraged G/C/M/136  
 
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  Angola to provide additional information on when and how this Decree would be enforced in order 
to ensure the predictability of agricultural trade.  
33.7.   The Chairperson  offered the floor to Angola,  but Angola being absent, he then thanked all 
delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
33.8.   The Council  so agreed . 
34  BETTER FUNCTIONING O F THE COUNCIL FOR TR ADE IN GOODS AND SUB SIDIARY 
COMMITTEES – STATEME NT B Y HONG KONG, CHINA  
34.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 1  November  2019, the 
delegation of Hong Kong, China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda. 
Likewise, Hong Kong, China had requested the Secretari at to distribute a Room Document, which 
had been made available to Members electronically ( document  RD/CTG/10).  
34.2.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  recalled that , at all three of the CTG's 2019  meetings, Hong 
Kong, China had requested the inclusion of this item on the agenda . Hong Kong, China had also 
circulated three  Room Documents. The objectives had been to draw Members' attention to this 
important area, namely improvement s to the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary committees. 
Hong Kong, China's idea was to take small steps to reduce the administrative burden of both the 
Secretariat and Members, so that all Members could focus more on the WTO's substantive work. 
Two examples of such smal l steps were mentioned in Hong Kong, China's room document discussed 
at the July meeting, namely: (i)  an Annotated Agenda for CTG meetings; and (ii)  a Year Plan of 
tentative meeting dates of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. To give Members a clearer 
understanding of what these two  suggestions  might look like practically , Hong Kong, China shared 
two mock -ups, the first was the CTG  annotated agenda (Annex  1 of the Room Document), and the 
second was a mock -up of a Year Plan of Meetings (Annex  2 of the Room D ocument). Hong Kong, 
China believed that the two documents would not require much effort to prepare, although they 
could greatly facilitate the work of Geneva  delegates  and Capital -based officials in preparation s for 
and participation in WTO  meetings. Hong  Kong, China emphasized that the mock -ups were purely 
for illustration purposes and that there was no need to agree on any template or format. Hong Kong, 
China simply asked Members if they would like to have this kind of information or document, and if 
Members believed that they could help when preparing meetings. As a small delegation, Hong Kong, 
China considered that the CTG  annotated agenda and the year plan of meetings would be useful. If 
other Members shared this view, they could encourage the Secretar iat to prepare these documents 
in 2020. Hong Kong, China believed that , in the longer term, as in all efficient organi zations, 
technology could play a role in reducing the administrative burden in a more efficient and sustainable 
way. She informed Members that the Secretariat had been making excellent efforts to develop and 
explore technical solutions and tools, such as e -portals, e -agenda s, and numerous databases, for 
individual committees. In the Room Document, Hong Kong, China had also suggested that the 
Secretariat share information and experience on the available technical solutions being developed 
and used in different WTO  bodies, so that Members could consider these options. Hong Kong, China 
reiterated that this was not a proposal, but just a reminder that Members had tools available to 
facilitate their work. What Hong Kong, China was asking for was not standardization among 
WTO bodies, nor the adoption of any document or template , but rather a sharing of good practices , 
which would provide mor e options for the CTG and the Committees to facilitate their work. Hong 
Kong, China believed that good tools and practices would naturally attract Members to try them out 
and even adopt them , gradually, synergies among the Council and Committees would then build up. 
Hong Kong, China concluded that they might not raise  this agenda item again at the next 
CTG meeting because it had already served the purpose of kindling reflection and discussion. Hong 
Kong, China hoped that the Chairperson would continue the momentum and engage Members in 
further work in this area through informal consultations . Hong Kong, China looked forward to 
continuing to work further with Members on small steps to make big differences.  
34.3.   The delegate of Paraguay  believed that Hong Kong, Chi na's initiative was practical and would 
facilitate Members' participation. Paraguay was convinced that Members should look at ways to 
improve the work of the Committees that were being carried out simultaneously in various areas of 
the Organization. Paragu ay expressed its support for the Annual Plan of meetings, which could help 
avoid meeting overlaps, which represented one of the greatest obstacles preventing developing 
countries from participating effectively in all the Organization's meetings. In this co ntext, Paraguay 
acknowledged that meetings of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies, in particular the TBT  Committee, G/C/M/136  
 
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  were taking place at the same time ; this had been a problem for many delegations. The delegation 
of Paraguay considered that it was obliged to prioritize its participation in this Council, which had 
negative consequences on its participation in the TBT  Committee, where Paraguay also had an 
interest. Paraguay emphasized that such overlap s had also occurred with meetings of other 
CTG subsidiary bodies . Therefore, Paraguay requested the Chairperson's good offices to prevent 
such overlaps from recurring. Paraguay also suggested that , under the Chairperson's coordination , 
the presidents of the subsidiary bodies of the CTG could meet, with  the inclusion of the secretaries 
of the different committees, with a view to coordinating an annual calendar of meetings of the CTG 
and its subsidiary bodies in which meeting s should not coincide and , if possible, they should be held 
in separate weeks in order to allow delegations sufficient time to prepare  for them . Paraguay also 
believed that discussions on the improvement of the work of committees would benefit from a 
centralized mechanism to improve their efficiency . For its part, Paraguay would contin ue to study 
alternative approaches to enable Members to find pragmatic solutions to the real issues facing 
delegations in their daily work. Paraguay stood ready to continue working with Hong Kong, China 
and other delegations interested in making progress o n these issues.  
34.4.   The delegate of Mexico  thanked Hong Kong, China for its efforts , for including again this item 
on the agenda , and for its presentation of the room document. In Mexico's view, the room document 
contained practical suggestions and concrete examples of how those suggestions could be 
implemented . In addition, Mexico supported the idea of pursuing informal consultations under the 
Chairperson's direction. Mexico also observed that the problems faced by some delegations over the 
previous two days could be avoided had Members followed the suggestion of Hong Kong, China to 
have an annual planning of meetings, such that larger and small er delegations alike could participate 
actively, follow discussions, and reflect efficiently on the arguments brought forward in subsidiary 
bodies. Mexico believed that on this occasion some Members had lost a valuable opportunity to 
participate in the dis cussions that had taken place in the TBT  Committee, and that five of the 
concerns on this Council's agenda were concerns that had also been discussed in that Committee , 
and where new information had been provided by Members. And if Members had been given more 
time between the se meetings, they could have carried out the ir work more efficiently and delivered 
better statements. Therefore , Mexico  requested the Chairperson to con sider Paraguay's suggestion 
to find a way to improve coordination between the CTG and its subsidiary bodies in order to avoid 
such a situation happening again.  
34.5.   The delegate of Colombia  considered that Hong Kong, China's proposals were very practical 
and that Members should implement them as soon as possible. Colombia also considered  it a shame 
when meeting s overlapped . Colombia therefore supported Paraguay's proposal  to carry out 
consultations with the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies and to review the sched ule of annual meetings . 
Colombia was likewise in favour of submitting a schedule to the Council for Trade in Goods. He 
acknowledged that this practice was already being followed by other subsidiary bodies and that it 
would help smaller delegations to bette r understand and better address all the issues on the agenda 
of these committees, especially in light of the fact that the number of issues was increasing and that 
Members were sometimes losing track  of them . Colombia thanked Hong Kong, China for initiatin g 
and pursuing this discussion on facilitating the participation of delegates in committees with practical 
solutions, like the e -agenda currently being discussed in the TBT and SPS  Committees. Colombia 
believed that all these issues should be looked at in a coordinated way across the various 
committees.  
34.6.   The delegate of Ecuador  considered that Hong Kong, China had stimulated  a very positive and 
necessary discussion . Ecuador expressed her delegation's willingness to continue discussions on this 
topic with other interested Members . Ecuador also support ed Paraguay's proposal for a better 
planning of future meetings. Ecuador encouraged Members to adopt a practice for improving th e 
organization of meetings because when meetings overlapped it hinder ed Ecuador's  and other 
Members' participation  in them . Furthermore, the issue was not only about having enough delegates 
to attend all the meetings, but also having sufficient time to pre pare the different meetings and to 
listen to the statements made by Members, which , in Ecuador's view , was the most enriching part 
of participation. In conclusion , Ecuador confirmed its availability to participate in any initiative that 
could improve the f unctioning of the committees.  
34.7.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed support for the discussion on the 
importance of improving  the operation of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. She noted that there 
had been conflict s in meetings of the CTG's su bsidiary bodies during that week in particular; this 
had resulted in an increased number of empty seats at some meetings. Russia therefore believed G/C/M/136  
 
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  that changing the approach adopted for the planning of meetings of WTO  bodies was essential to 
the effective  attendance and participation of Members. Russia was in favour of planning meetings 
for the whole year , to be revised perhaps quarterly on the basis of any changes , as needed. In 
addition , Russia noted that currently the agenda 's closing dates  were general ly announced at 
meetings but were not available in delegations' interactive calendar s. Russia suggested that such 
dates be reflected in future in the interactive calendar and requested the Secretariat to consider a 
possible solution to that end. Russia was open to further discuss improvement s in the operation of 
WTO bodies, including with regard to the modus operandi  of existing technological tools within the 
Organization.  
34.8.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  appreciated the continued contribut ion of Hong Kong, 
China to improving the regular work of the Council for Trade in Goods and its subsidiary bodies, and 
reiterate d Korea's support for enhancing the function ing of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies as this 
was essential to demonstrating the WTO's relevance. In this context, the Republic of Korea, as a 
co-sponsor, had already actively engaged in formulating the draft General Council Decision  on 
"Procedural Guidelines for WTO  Councils and Committees Addressing Trade Concerns ". Korea was 
willing  to participate in this meaningful activity with a view to transforming Members' ideas into 
action.  
34.9.   The delegate of the European Union  appreciated this opportunity for Members to continue 
their discussions on this issue. As indicated previously , the EU wel comed practical suggestions on 
how to facilitate the work of the regular committees, such as those made by Hong Kong, China on 
annotated agendas and annual calendar s of meetings. The EU believed that these were 
straightforward good practices and considered  them useful for all regular WTO  bodies. Annotated 
agendas, in particular, were already used in several committees and were helpful for preparing 
meetings. The EU considered that these suggestions went in the same direction as those made in 
the proposal fo r guidelines for WTO  bodies dealing with specific trade concerns that the EU and more 
than 15  other co -sponsors had previously circulated. On this proposal, the EU and other co -sponsors  
were continuing their consultations with a view to further refining their proposal. In addition to 
suggestions for improving Members' dialogue on trade concerns, the proposal contained several 
suggestions that would, in the EU's view, make it easier to prepare for meetings more generally, 
including  the earlier cir culation of agendas, and documents referenced in meeting agendas. 
Regarding agendas and minutes, the EU recognized the workload associated with preparing them 
and commended the Secretariat for its efforts. The EU also echoed the practical suggestion made b y 
Paraguay to avoid overlaps in meetings. The EU stood ready to participate in further informal 
consultations on this issue, as suggested by Hong Kong, China.  
34.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  fully endorsed the ideas put forward by Hong Kong, China. 
New Zealand  considered that a great deal of Committee time was already being spent on discussing 
improvements to the oversight function of regular bodies, and Hong Kong, China had identified some 
quick wins  in this regard . New Zealand believed that the WTO was  one of  the better functioning 
international organizations ; nevertheless, there remained an extreme lack of standardization across 
the different systems that existed for different committees , which needed to be addressed. New 
Zealand said that implementing Hong K ong's ideas would represent a substantive improvement to 
the user-friendly interface of the CTG 's subsidiary bodies ; it would also help Members to focus more 
on the substance of their work.  
34.11.   The delegate of Singapore  believed that the mock -ups prepared by H ong Kong, China  were 
useful. Singapore supported the two  specific suggestions, namely the annotated agenda and the 
yearly plan of meetings for the bodies under the CTG. Singapore also acknowledged that the 
meetings that week had made clear that a yearly pl an of meetings would indeed be helpful. 
Singapore highlighted that the two suggestions made by Hong Kong, China had already been 
implemented in other committees, including the TBT  Committee and, in Singapore's view, they had 
greatly helped the workflow in those Committees.  
34.12.   The delegate of Switzerland  welcomed all ideas intended to improve  the functioning of the 
CTG and its subsidiary bodies and appreciated the efforts made by Hong Kong, China in this regard . 
Switzerland believed that the ideas presented in the room document deserved careful consideration, 
in particular in light of the increasing number and length of meetings , as well as the resource 
constraints of many delegations. Accordingly, Switzerland s upported the circulation of an annotated 
agenda prior to each CTG  meeting and an annual plan of meetings for the CTG and its subsidiary 
bodies. Switzerland also supported the suggestion s made by Paraguay and the Russian Federation, G/C/M/136  
 
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  including with regard to  the proposal to include agenda closing dates. In Switzerland's view, all these 
ideas were simple, effective, and cost -free. Switzerland also supported the suggestion that  the 
Chairperson  hold informal consultations on this matter . 
34.13.   The delegate of Turkey  believed that the suggestions highlighted by Hong Kong, China for 
an annotated agenda for the CTG and an annual plan of meetings for the CTG and its subsidiary 
committees could prove highly beneficial to all Members, and especially for small delegations in 
terms of their capacity to prepare for and follow the relevant meetings. Turkey believed that an 
annotated agenda would also help small er delegations to keep track of agenda items and latest 
developments. Therefore , Turkey believed that the room document c ontained pragmatic suggestions 
that could help towards achieving a more effective functioning of the relevant Committees , together 
with the CTG itself. Turkey had also co -sponsored the proposal on procedural guidelines for the 
WTO Councils and Committees, which also contained certain similar elements regarding process , 
alongside other suggestions for underlining the deliberative function of the WTO. Turkey looked 
forward to further discussions of this proposal in upcoming meetings.  
34.14.   The delegate of Banglades h expressed interest in the room document and also looked 
forward to discuss ing it further in the upcoming meeting.  
34.15.   The delegate of the United States  thanked Hong Kong, China for its constructive 
contributions towards seeking ways to improve the functionin g of the CTG. Her delegation took note 
of the sample annotated agenda that had been formally made available earlier that week. Her Capital 
was continuing to review this document and the suggestion of an annotated agenda for the CTG. 
Her delegation was not opposed to the idea, but need ed additional time to review and assess its 
usefulness for the CTG. For these reasons , she was not currently in a position to agree to move 
forward with this approach ; that said, she looked forward to continuing the conversation on this and 
other ideas for improving the CTG's functioning. She did find the idea of a master calendar of CTG 
and subsidiary body meetings to be worthwhile. As had been mentioned by others, her deleg ation 
was also frustrated by the conflicting meetings during the course of that week, and the US requested 
that this be avoided in the future.  
34.16.   The delegate from Argentina  thanked Hong Kong, China for having placed this item on the 
agenda, as well as for th eir room document. He shared the view that some of the suggestions were 
practical steps that might prove useful , although he did not want to overlook the work currently 
being done by the Secretariat. Argentina was cognizant of the fact that his delegation was one that 
had co-sponsored agenda items immediately prior to the agenda's closing , and he thanked the 
Secretariat for managing this process.  
34.17.   The delegate of Canada  thanked Hong Kong, China for continuing to champion this work, 
which had first been initi ated by his Ambassador in his earlier role as CTG Chair. He also thanked 
the representative from Hong Kong , China for her role in the Import Licensing Committee. He 
believed that Members should be encouraged by the se ongoing efforts to improve the function ing of 
WTO bodies. In this regard, it was useful for Members in the CTG to reflect further on some of these 
elements. He considered that their role as delegates attending Committee meetings was to exchange 
information, to discuss implementation issues , and to learn from one an other. His perception based 
on discussions on this agenda topic, coupled with Members' comments at that day's meeting , as well 
as from past CTG  meetings, was that there was a real desire among delegates to find ways to create 
an enviro nment that supported their ability to engage substantively in the work of the WTO bodies. 
More broadly, Canada asked what  practical action Members could take to create such a supportive 
environment? Hong Kong, China had made several suggestions regarding how to make a practical 
difference in this regard . Canada noted that some of these steps already existed in a number of the 
CTG's subsidiary bodies , and Canada supported incorporating those steps also in the context of the 
CTG itself. 
34.18.   On how Members could approach discussion of this topic, Canada suggested that a first 
element to consider was planning, and a second was information ; these were not exclusive but 
presented at least two  ways of categorizing what Members were discussing . On the planning side, 
as mentioned by Ecuador, the idea was to provide  delegates sufficient time to prepare for meetings . 
In the S PS Committee, a reminder airgram was sent out a month before  each meeting; this 
communication included a reminder of the deadline  for agenda items as well as the inclusion of 
standing agenda items. In this regard, the yearly calendar that Hong Kong, China had mentioned 
would be helpful as a reference point ; it might also help other Committees plan the dates of their G/C/M/136  
 
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  meetings. Canada  noted that these dates were in any case indicative dates and that there were ways 
to update them. Concerning the information  element , Canada noted that annotated agendas could 
help delegations better to understand what the issues were on the agenda. Such annotated agendas 
were already provided in some Committees, notably the SPS and TBT  Committees. Again, Canada 
considered that the Council could learn from the operation of the Committees  in this regard . 
34.19.   Canada also noted that there were a number of project s that the Secretariat had undertaken 
that had already been presented in certain of the Committees , notably on the use of e-agendas , 
which allowed delegations to upload information to an agenda item and to transfer that information 
to other delegates in ad vance of a meeting. There had also been a few meetings in recent months 
where presentations had been made via videoconference. Canada considered that these had worked 
well, and noted that Members had been able to bring in their Capital -based experts via video, which 
in turn had contribute d to Members' knowledge and understanding . 
34.20.   Canada considered that a number of good ideas had emerged,  and Members' comments 
appeared to support a continuation of these discussions. He appreciated that Hong Kong, China may 
decide not to raise this issue at the Council's next meeting given that it required a lot of work and 
was time-consuming. He therefore supported Hong Kong, China's suggestion that the Chairperson 
hold informal discussions. In this way, Members could begin to dig into the issues and to see what 
the Council could do in conjunction with its subsidiary bodies.  
34.21.   The delegate of Japan  reiterated to Hong Kong, China  his delegation's appreciation . His 
deleg ation also thanked the Secretariat for its hard work to wards  further improving the functioning 
of the regular body. As stated in previous meetings, Japan considered that it would be very useful 
to have an annotated CTG  agenda ; the Council could learn from Committees that were already using 
annotated agendas and the CTG itself should begin to use them at the earliest opportunity. Japan 
also considered that an annotated agenda should be distributed in a timely manner so that Members 
would have ample time to c onsider it and to consult with their Capitals . Japan stated that Members 
should also consider including document numbers if items were currently being discussed in other 
related Committees. Japan found the suggestion to have an annual plan of meetings for the CTG 
and its subsidiary committees to be useful. Japan fully agreed that such a plan was both necessary 
and doable, and hoped that it would be implemented as soon as possible. His delegation stood ready 
to engage in further discussion in this regard, including at a possible informal meeting.  
34.22.   The delegate of Brazil  saw Hong Kong, China's proposal on the better functioning of the 
Council in a positive light and thanked them for it. He would transmit the document to Capital for 
review. For his part, he cons idered it a very good initiative.  
34.23.   The delegate of Honduras  thanked Hong Kong, China for the document , which was currently 
under review in Capital . Honduras appreciated all initiatives that contributed to the better functioning 
of this body and its subsidiary bodies. Similarly , her delegation fully supported the request made by 
Paraguay,  which would facilitate the work and participation of delegations in meetings, especially 
small delegations like her  own. 
34.24.   The delegate of Uruguay  thanked Hong Kong, China for again including this item on the 
Council's agenda, and for the work put into the room document, which illustrated a possible 
annotated CTG  agenda and annual calendar. Hong Kong, China had presented a practical idea that 
could be useful in facilitating the work of delegations without need ing to modify the current rules of 
procedure. In this regard , Uruguay believed that it would be important for Members to consider 
some additional elements at a later st age, such as an understanding that the annotated agenda did 
not replace the airgram, a discussion of the timing of the circulation of the annotated agenda, and 
an understanding that the information included in an annotated agenda be provided exclusively by 
the requesting Members and be factual and concise so as to avoid interpretation regarding a specific 
trade concern being raised. Uruguay stood ready and engaged to discuss this matter further with 
Hong Kong, China and others.  
34.25.   The delegate of Australia  joined others in recognizing that the ideas put forward in the room 
document , which proposed an annotated agenda and an annual plan of meetings , were practical 
suggestions that could enhance the Council's functioning. He noted, with regard to the annotated 
agenda, both the idea and the need for Members actively to assist in providing and completing the G/C/M/136  
 
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  annotated information in that document. Australia looked forward to part icipating in  future 
discussions of these issues.  
34.26.   The delegate of Ukraine  thanked Hong Ko ng, China for its room document. Ukraine believed 
that due attention should be given to improving the functioning of regular WTO  bodies , based on 
best practices , and stood ready to engage in discussions in this area.  
34.27.   The Chairperson  noted that a number of delegations , including Hong Kong, China,  had 
proposed that he hold consultations on this matter, to which there had been no objections. In this 
connection, he invited the delegate of Hong Kong, China,  and other delegations that had taken the 
floor, to think further about what elements should be included in these informal discussions. In 
addition to the proposal of an annotated agenda and an annual calendar of meetings, Members 
should perhaps look at the contents of such an annotated agenda, the timing of the information to 
be provided, and when t he annotated agenda should be circulated. Without question , the Council 
and its subsidiary bodies should coordinate their respective meetings  more effectively . In this regard, 
he wished to extend his apologies to delegations for the inconvenience caused by  overlapping 
meetings, and for the overlapping meetings during that week in particular. In respect of Council 
meetings, Members needed also to be mind ful of the fact  that the Council reported to the General 
Council and therefore needed to coordinate its ow n meetings in relation to those of the General 
Council. He hoped that the informal consultations would also result in a tool to facilitate and enrich 
discussions relating to the various specific trade concerns that Members brought to the Council  for 
Member s' consideration . 
34.28.   The Council took note  of the statement made and agreed  that the Chairperson pursue 
informal consultations on this matter.  
35  WORK PROGRAMME ON EL ECTRONIC COMMERCE  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that a Ministerial Decision had been adopted at MC11 
(document  WT/MIN(17)/65 ), in which Ministers had agreed to maintain the existing Work  
Programme on E -Commerce, and to endeavour to reinvigorate the WTO's work on E -Commerce. The 
Ministerial Decision had also instructed the General Council to hold periodic reviews in its sessions 
of July and December  2018, and July  2019, based on the reports submitted by the relevant bodies, 
among them the Goods Council; and to maintain the current practice of not imposing customs duties 
on electronic transmissions. Therefor e, this Council was again tasked to discuss the E -Commerce 
aspects relating to trade in goods and , in order to fulfil its mandate, the E -Commerce issue was a 
standalone agenda item. The Chairperson invited delegations to continue to express their opinions.  
35.2.   For this reason, he invited delegations to make suggestions as to how to work on the 
preparation of the periodic review to be held in the General Council at its session of December  2019. 
He also informed delegations that  to fulfil this mandate, it was his  intention to submit to the General 
Council , once again,  a factual report under his own responsibility , as his predecessors had also done . 
35.3.   The Council so agreed . 
36  CONSIDERATION OF ANN UAL REPORTS OF THE S UBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL 
FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
36.1.   The Chairperson  noted that, pursuant to the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which were adopted by the General 
Council on 15  November  1995, all bodies constituted under Agreements in An nex 1A of the 
WTO Agreement were required to submit a factual report to the Council for Trade in Goods annually, 
and the Council was to take note of these reports.  
36.2.   Such factual reports were adopted at the last meeting of each subsidiary body and submitted 
to the CTG for its consideration. In the case of the Committees on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures , Anti-Dumping, and Safeguards, the corresponding factual 
reports would be submitted to the General Council  directly . 
36.3.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the following factual annual reports: 
Agriculture (G/L/1332); Trade Related Investment Measures (G/L/1332 and G/TRIMS/9): Market G/C/M/136  
 
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  Access (G/L/1338); Import Licensing (G/L/1328); Customs Valuation (G/L/1333);  Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (G/L/1336); Information Technology Agreement (G/L/1334); Pre -Shipment 
Inspection and Independent Entity (G/L/1330); Rules of Origin (G/L/1331); Trade Facilitation 
(G/L/1329); and Working Party on State Trading Enterpris es (G/L/1335 and G/STR/23).  
36.4.   The Council so agreed . 
37  ADOPTION OF THE ANNU AL REPORT OF THE COU NCIL FOR TRADE IN GO ODS TO THE 
GENERAL COUNCIL (TO BE ISSUED)  
37.1.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the Draft Report of this Council to the General 
Council, cir culated in document  G/C/W/772. In accordance with the "Procedures for an Annual 
Overview of WTO  Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" (WT/L/105), which had been adopted 
by the General Council on 15  November  1995, it was agreed that "[T]he respective sectoral Councils 
should report in November each year to the General Council on the activities in the Council as well 
as in the subsidiary bodies" and that the reports of the sectoral Councils should be "factual in nature, 
containing an indication of actio ns and decisions taken, with cross -references to reports of 
subordinate bodies and could follow the model of the GATT  1947 Council reports to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES".  
37.2.   He noted that the draft report before Members would be updated in light of the present 
meeting.  
37.3.   He proposed that the Council adopt the report subject to its update and revision to take into 
account the work of the Council at this meeting.  
37.4.   The Council so agreed . 
38  OTHER BUSINESS  
38.1.   The Chairperson  noted that the date of the Council's next meeting w ould be conveyed in 
writing to all delegations before the end of the year. The meeting dates of the CTG were linked 
closely to those of the General Council. In this regard, 2020 presented a particular challenge as the 
Twelfth  Ministerial Meeting was to be held in early June , which shortened the time available to 
Members to prepare for the Council's meetings.  
38.2.   Regarding the closing of the agenda, he reminded delegations that, according to the Rules of 
Procedure, meetings of WTO  bodies were convened by a meeting notice issued not less than 
ten calendar days prior to the date set for the meeting. The agenda itself therefore closed one 
WTO working day prior to the circulation of the meeting notice; that is, 11  calendar days before the 
date set for the meetin g (or, if the date fell on a weekend, the previous Friday) . 
38.3.   The delegate of Paraguay  noted that , following her statement made under agenda item  35, 
she wished to point out that an SPS  meeting had already been scheduled for the week of 18 March, 
a meeting o f the Committee on Market Access for the week of 12  April, and that in March there 
would also be a meeting of the Committee on Agriculture , and possibly also the TBT  Committee.  
38.4.   The delegate of Canada  noted that the intervention from Paraguay demonstrated t hat there 
were a number of subsidiary bodies to this Council that had already set dates for next year. He 
wondered if the Chairperson could issue an informal document or fax that listed those meeting dates. 
He thought that it might be a good start to Membe rs' planning process going forward. The more 
Members were informed of what was going on across the subsidiary bodies to this Council, the better 
they could plan.  
38.5.   The Council took note  of the statements  and of the information provided regarding the next 
meeting of the Council . 
38.6.   The meeting was closed . 
__________