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S/WPDR/M/77  
 
29 July 2021 
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Working Party on Domestic Regulation    
 
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 30 JUNE  2021 
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
The Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR) held a meeting on 30 June 2021  chaired by 
Ms Verónica Bogar ín Closs from Paraguay . The proposed agenda for the meeting was contained in 
document WTO/AIR/WPDR/1 5 dated 18 June 2021 . The report of the previous  meeting of the 
Working Party, held on 3 December 2019, is contained in document S/WPDR/M/7 6. 
Before  turning  to the substance  of the meeting,  the Chairperson  recalled  that following  the 
agreement  by Members  on a slate of names  for the Chairpersons  of the Council  for Trade  in Services  
(CTS)  subsidiary  bodies,  the election  of the Chairpersons  for 2020 had been conducted  through  a 
written  procedure  and had been confirmed  through  a fax dated  7 July 2020. Since  her election,  the 
Chair  had consulted  bilaterally  with several  delegations.  
 
The Chairperson  stated  that she had been informed  that the delegations  of India and South  Africa  
wished  to address  jointly  the agenda  items  A and B as contained  in the agenda  (WTO/AIR/WPDR/15).  
She therefore  suggested  to merge  the two agenda  items.  The Chairperson  also indicated  her 
intention  to make  a brief statemen t on the "appointment  of the Chairperson  for the WPDR  for 2021" 
under  "Other  Business ".  
 
With these  changes,  the agenda  was adopted . 
 
1  ITEM A  AND B : DEVELOPMENT OF DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC REGULATION THROUGH 
A REFERENCE PA PER BY THE JOINT INITIATIVE ON SERVICES DOMESTIC REGULATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY DISCIPLINES UNDER GATS ARTICLE VI:4 –
REQUESTED BY INDIA  AND SOUTH AFRICA  
The Chairperson  stated that the two substantive item s for the agenda , to be addressed jointly , 
were titled "Development of Disciplines on Domestic Regulation through a Reference Paper by the 
Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation " and "Development of Regulatory Disciplines under 
GATS Article VI:4 ". Both items  had been requested by the de legations of India and South Africa.   
The representative of India recalled that, in its opening statement at the WPDR meeting on 
3 December 2019, India had expressed concerns regarding the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic 
Regulation , which were two-fold: (a) any "additional commitments " under GATS Article XVIII by the 
Members of the Joint Initiative  could not  purport to be a fulfilment of the GATS mandate under 
Article VI:4, which had clearly envisaged only a multilateral process for which  WTO Members had 
constituted the WPDR; and (b) while each Member had a right to incorporate additional commitments 
into its Schedule, the underlying principle was that none of these additional commitments should 
directly or indirectly amount to a dil ution or amendment of any of the provisions of the GATS, and 
that any addition pertain ed to 'Specific Commitments ', not 'General Obligations and Disciplines '. 
Article XVIII only envisage d "additional commitments " pertaining to 'Specific Commitments ' 
regard ing measures affecting trade in services.  
With respect to the implications for the multilateral mandate under GATS Article VI:4, i n 
February 2021, India and South Africa  had circulated  a document 'The Legal Status of Joint 
Statement Initiatives and their Negotiated  Outcomes ' (WT/GC/W/819 ). The document inter alia had 
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice to 
the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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  highlighted how the Joint Statement Initiatives ( JSIs) were working against multilateral mandates , 
including the J oint Initiative on Services D omestic Regulation (INF/SDR/W/1/Rev.2).  
The communication  had highlighted that there was a contradiction between the JSIs and 
the fundamental principles and objectives  of the multilateral  system,  enshrined  in the  Marrakesh  
Agreement , including Article II:1 ("The WTO shall provide  the common  institutional  framework  
for the conduct  of trade  relations  among  its Members  …"); Article III:2 ("The WTO shall provide  
the forum  for negotiations  among  its Members  concerning  their multilateral  trade  relations "); 
consensus  based  decision -making,  as enshrined  in Articles III:2, IX, X, X:9; and the procedures 
for amendments  of rules as articulated  in Article X.  
More broadly, the communication  had recogni zed that there were systemic  and 
development  implications  of the JSIs and any attempt to introduce new rules resulting from the 
JSI negotiations into the WTO without          fulfilling the requirements of Articles IX and X of the 
Marrakesh Agreement  would be detrimental  to the functioning of the rule-based multilateral 
trading system . India considered that s uch a step would  erode  the integrity  of the rule-based  
multilateral  trading  system  by subverting  establishe d rules and foundational  principles  of the 
Marrakesh  Agreement , and create  a precedent  for any group  of Members  to bring  any issue  
into the WTO without  the  required  consensus ; bypass  the collective  oversight  of Members  for 
bringing  in any new rules or amendments  to  existing  rules in the  WTO; usurp  limited  WTO 
resources  available  for multilateral  negotiations ; result in Members disregarding existing 
multilateral mandates agreed  through consensus  in favor  of matters  without  multilateral  
mandates ; lead to the marginalization or exclusion of issues which were difficult but remain ed 
critical   for the multilateral trading system (such as agriculture  and development ); thereby 
undermining  balance  in agenda  setting, negotiating  processes , and outcomes , and leaving 
Members  with no option  other  than choosing  between  remaining  outside  the discussions  or 
participating on matters which  would be  inconsistent with their economic development 
priorities,  needs,  concerns , and levels  of economic  development , fragment the multilateral  
trading  system , and undermine  the multilateral  character  of the WTO.  
In an earlier submission2, India had articulated that , under GATS Art icle VI:4, the CTS  had 
been mandated to develop  "any necessary disciplines " on domestic regulation , and that the 
WPDR had been  multilaterally entrusted  to undertake this work . In their communication, India 
and South Africa had  underlined that at no time had there been a multilateral agreement to 
discontinue the mandat e of the WPDR or the mandate in  GATS Article VI:4.  
India stated that it was  concerned that new rules were being proposed. Article VI:4 on 
"Domestic Regulation " belong ed to Part II of the GATS on general  obligations  (or rules),  whilst  
Article XVIII  on "Additional  Commitments " was inserted  in Part III pertaining  to specific  
commitments in Schedules. Whilst both Article VI:4 and Article XVIII refer red to qualifications, 
licensing , and standards , the differences  between  general  rules (Article VI:4) and specific  
commitments  (Article XVIII)  could not be overlooked , and t he principle  of effectiveness  had to be 
observed . 
India asserted that the Initiative 's participants had subverted  the WPDR  multilateral  
mandate  not just by undertaking  exploratory discussions, but actually negotiating  such 
disciplines through a parallel discussion  designed  to bypass  the multilateral  process.  Further, 
the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic  Regulation,  not having  been mandated  to do so either  
by the Ministerial     Conference  or the CTS, could not  legitimately  purport  to work pursuant  to 
GATS   Article VI:4. Any o utcomes of the Initiative 's discussions could not  also directly or 
indirectly amount to a variation of  any of the provisions of the GATS, including Article V I:5. 
India was concerned that this could have  serious implications  for the rights  and obligations  of all 
Members  agreed  by consensus  during  the Uruguay  Round.  
Accordingly, in view of respect for multilateral mandates and past CTS decisions, India  had 
sought the removal of references to disciplines "pursuant to Article VI:4 of the Agreement " in the 
final version of the Reference Paper developed by the Joint Initiative.3 India noted that the  draft 
 
2 RD/SERV/154 .  
3 RD/SERV/154 . S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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  Reference Paper (contained in document INF/SDR/W/1/Rev.2, December 2020 ) still retain ed such 
reference s. India therefore  reiterate d its request for their removal.  
With respect to specific issues of concern on the disciplines on services domestic regulation 
developed by the Joint Initiative and their interface with the GATS, India had already sought 
clarifications at the WPDR meeting in 2019. In that context, India had highlighted that some of the 
disciplines  in the draft Reference Paper were not merely improvements to the Schedules of the 
Members participating in the J oint Initiative . Rather, these  disciplines change d some of the existing 
GATS rules, hence affecting all Members ' rights and obligations , including the rights and obligations 
of those Members who were not part of the Initiative . India had stated that these draft disciplines  
could not  be scheduled as "additional commitments " under GATS Article XVIII. India noted that the 
Initiative had  attempted to clarify some of the concerns raised in the Information Note on 
"Relationship between the Disciplines on Services Domestic Regulation developed by the Joint 
Initiative "4, and that  some  changes were also introduced in the draft Reference Paper . How ever, it  
wished to reiterate  its concerns , as expressed at the WPDR meeting in 2019, including on the 
following : 
a. Footnote 17 in the draft Reference Paper : India stated that the reference to  "health and 
environmental requirements " change d GATS VI :4(a). Leaving aside the underlying issues 
of "legality ", India argued that this approach implied  that GATS Article VI :4 and the  
Initiative 's Reference Paper would co -exist. In that case, India enquired whether  this 
discipline would apply  only between those who would adopt the Reference Paper ; whether 
this would lower the level of ambition multilaterally agreed to in the GATS , including by  
the Initiative 's participants ; and how Members adopting this discipline would  differentiate 
between those adopting and those no t adopting it in the application of such a new rule .  
b. Paragraph 22 (d) and Footnote 18 of the draft Reference Paper : India sought clarification 
on the meaning and ambit of the Initiative 's discipline on non -discrimination between men 
and women in  authori zation of the supply of a service.  
c. Footnote 15 of Para graph  20 of the draft Reference Paper : India sought clarification on 
the Initiative 's discipline on enquiry points and the reference to "resource constraints ".  
d. Paragraph 11 of the draft Reference Paper: India enquired about the interface between 
the Initiative 's discipline on recognition and GATS Art icle VII. 
e. Paragraph 13 of the draft Re ference Paper: India sought removal of the reference to  GATS 
Article III in the paragraph.  
Moreover, I ndia sought clarifications on the following additional questions.  
a. Fulfilment of Article IV of the GATS:  India stated that  the Initiative 's participants  had 
argued that the draft Reference Paper could be approached as  an "additional commitment " 
that fell under Part III of the GATS on specific commitments . It would be covered by the 
rules of Part IV of the GATS on progressive liberalization and negotiation of specific 
commitments. India did  not agree with this argument as this would amount  to GATS rules 
being amended (as had been noted in WT/GC/W/819 ). India argued that, even  assuming 
that the contention of the Initiative  was true, then the requirements under Article IV of 
the GATS on "increasing the participation of developing countries " would have to be 
fulfilled. India considered, h owever,  that the current draft Reference Paper limit ed the 
special considerations of developing countries to transitional periods, which did not 
address the policy and regulatory challenges that could emerge as a result of the 
disciplines of the draft Reference Paper (for example those on development of measu res 
related to authorization of supply of service or related to fees).  Transitional periods also 
did not provide developing countries with effective opportunities to increase  their 
participation in international trade and to effectively address the challen ges they face d 
with the regulatory disciplines imposed in foreign services markets, which often hinder ed 
attempts to increase participation in international trade in services. India urged the 
Initiative 's participants to explain  the approach they had under taken in their ongoing 
 
4 INF/SDR/W/4 . S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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  negotiations with respect to  the obligations stipulated under Article IV GATS . In India's 
view, in  its present form, the development section of the draft Reference Paper lack ed 
deeper meaningful implementation of GATS Article IV.  
b. Scope of the draft Reference Paper around "authorizations " and related implications:  India 
understood  that, according to  the draft Reference Paper, the  proposed disciplines would  
apply to "measures by Members relating to licensing requirements and procedures, 
qualification requirements and procedures, and technical standards affecting trade in 
services ". Such a  scope overlap ped to a large extent with that of the multilateral mandate 
built into GATS Article VI :4 (except for licensing procedures). It cover ed the same issues 
that had been negotiated under the WPDR. Yet, unlike the negotiations in the WPDR , the 
draft Reference Paper cover ed 'authorizations ' and structure d most of the disciplines with 
reference to authori zations to supply services. Howeve r, 'authorizations ' were already 
regulated under Article VI :3 of the GATS . Standards or criteria for the authorization were 
regulated under  GATS  Article VII on 'Recognition '. India sought clarifications on the 
following issues :  
i. Implications pertaining to Article VI :4 GATS:  India noted that c overing authorizations 
had been  a contested issue under  the WPDR, where it had been  pointed out that 
authorizations did not fall within the scope of the mandate established under 
Article  VI:4 GATS. Therefo re, India enquired,  if the Initiative 's Members continued  to 
consider and present the draft Reference Paper as "elaborating upon the provisions of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services ( "Agreement ") pursuant to paragraph 4 
of Article VI of the Agreement ", what would  the development of disciplines on 
authorizations under the Reference Paper mean in regard to the scope specified under 
Article VI :4 GATS , and whether this would  amount to a modification of its scope . 
ii. Implications regarding  Article VI :3 GATS: India asserted that GATS Article  VI:3 
provided  for due process obligations for processing applications for authorization to 
supply services. India enquired h ow far Members could go in developing procedural 
disciplines that were consider ed disciplines "pursuant to Article VI:4 ", given the final 
agreement on procedural obligations for authori zation processes as prescribed by 
Article VI:3 . India also prompted the Initiative 's participants to explain the reasons  
why the Reference Paper  was inappropriately using GATS Article  XVIII, and not the 
applicable provisions under the Marrakesh Agreement , to modify Art icles VI:3 and VII .  
iii. Implications of adopting a definition of 'authorizations ' under the draft Reference 
Paper: India noted that the  term 'authorization ' contained in GATS Article VI :3 had no 
definition. Since the Initiative 's Members propose d to bring the Reference Paper under 
the WTO unilaterally through their Schedules of specifi c commitments, India enquired 
how the adoption of a definition of 'authorizations ' under the Reference Paper would 
impact the meaning of 'authorizations ' and how these  were regulated under the GATS . 
India also asked what  provisions had been established in the  draft Reference Paper to 
ensure that the definition of the term 'authorization ' in the Reference Paper did not 
affect the meaning of 'authorization ' elsewhere in GATS . 
iv. Interaction of 'authorizations ' with qualification requireme nts, licensing requirements, 
and technical standards:  India enquired that if the Initiative 's Members  continued to 
consider and present the draft Reference Paper as "elaborating upon the provisions of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services ( "Agreement ") pursuant to paragraph 4 
of Article VI of the Agreement ", and if the scope of the measures relating to 
authorizations was broader than qualification and licensing requirements and technical 
standards , what would  the development of disciplines on  authorizations under the 
Reference Paper mean in regard to the scope specified under GATS Article VI :4. 
India noted that a dditional complications would emerg e from the interface between the  Joint 
Initiatives on Services Domestic Regulation and  on Investme nt Facilitation . Both Initiatives had 
implications for services sectors where Members had undertaken Mode 3 commitments. There were 
two propositions for definitions of the term 'authori zations ' under the JSI on Investment Facilitation. 
Both propositions were distinguished from the one proposed in the draft Reference Paper  on services 
domestic regulation . Given that the proponents of the JSI on I nvestment Facilitation  were also 
proposing to bring the outcomes of that JSI under the umbrella of the WTO, India enquired what the S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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  differences in the definitions would mean for the scope of the J oint Initiative  on Services D omestic 
Regulation . 
India also enquired about the relation ship between GATS Art icle VI:5 and the draft Reference 
Paper . GATS Article VI :5 provided for  limited disciplines of the kind foreshadowed in GATS Article 
VI:4 pending the conclusion of any "necessary negotiations ". India asked whether GATS Article VI :5 
would operate in parallel to the Reference Paper , and whether  footnote 17  to paragraph  22 of the 
draft Reference Paper would also apply  to Article VI :5, which import ed the wording  from Article V I:4, 
for those Members  who adopt ed the Reference Paper . India enquired how  that would impact  any 
non-participating Members who might  challenge reliance on elements provided for in the footnote  
by those who had adopt ed the Reference Paper . 
In conclusion , India wished to reiterate that the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic 
Regulation was  not mandated and could not  assume the role of developing  disciplines under GATS 
Article VI:4, which was a multilateral function . There were many areas in th e draft Reference Paper 
that were amending  the GATS. The negotiated outcome  in the Initiative  also pertain ed to 'General 
Obligations and Disciplines ', rather than 'Specific Commitments '. India stated that, f or these reasons, 
the Initiative 's Members need ed to follow  an amendment procedure in the WTO to bring their text 
into the multilateral framework, as required by the Marrakesh Agreement. If changes were to be 
brought through GATS Article  XVIII, appropriate textual changes and clarifications were imperati ve, 
bearing in mind that Art icle XVIII pertain ed to Members ' specific commitments and could not  be 
used to bring into the multilateral framework 'General Obligations and Disciplines '. Such additional 
commitments also could not  amend, interpret , or clarify any existing provision of the GATS.  
The representative of South Africa  supported the statement delivered by India.  South Afric a 
took issue with  the self -claimed inclusive nature of the Joint Initiative . While participants had 
repeatedly affirm ed that their negotiations were inclusive, this in reality  meant that they were  open 
only to Member s wanting to join their consensus , which undermine d the Marrakesh Agreement. 
Participants had been inflexible when it came  to considering legitimate concerns from other WTO 
Members regarding the legal implications of the Reference Paper for the GATS.  
The Initiative 's notion  was that the Reference Paper was to be implemented through 
Schedules of commitments that would  be offered on MFN basis, and therefore it require d no 
consensus to bring in new rules through such Schedule s. In South Africa 's view,  such an approach 
was at most artful , but remain ed inherently legally inconsistent with the fundamental principles and 
procedures of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
South Africa asserted that, s ince its launch , the Joint Initiative  had eclipsed the WPDR. It 
noted that a number of the Initiative 's participants had already put forward indicative draft 
Schedules. Also , some had already placed on the Committee on Specific Commitments ( CSC) agenda 
procedural and technical questions pertaining to modification and certification. South Africa wished  
to caution that there could  be no viable ambition for modification of Schedules, when the systemic 
and other specific issues of legal concerns as l aid out in the joint statement delivered by India, 
remain ed unresolved through consensus.   
South Africa urged the JSI participants to carefully read GATS Article XVIII, whose  scope of 
application to qualifications, standards and licencing was limited to sp ecific commitments pertaining 
to measures affecting trade in services . This confirm ed that negotiations on specific qualification, 
licensing, standards commitment s pursuant to GATS Article  XVIII did not include domestic regulation  
disciplines persuant to Article VI:4. In South Africa 's view, the Reference Paper erode d this 
distinction.   
South Africa enquired as to whether the Initiative 's Members were willing to engage further 
in the pursuit of inclusivity ; and to consider genuine ly and carefully the arguments raised  by India 
and South Africa , including  by Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, Tunisia , and Venezuela  at the WPDR meeting 
in December  2019. She wondered whether the Initiative 's Members were ready  to respect the 
Decision of the CTS and reconcile the ambition for domestic regulation  disciplines with the mandate 
of the WPDR . South Africa also wondered whether , if the  JSI participants were not faithful to WTO 
agreement s and decisions, they could confiden tly claim  to be negotiating  in good faith , recalling that 
the latter  was a principle of WTO law.  S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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South Africa appreciate d the Initiative 's efforts to respond to concerns raised at the WPDR 
meeting in 2019 through the "Information Note " contained in  document  INF/SDR/W/4 . However, 
South Africa considered that this Note did not adequately address all the substantive concerns 
highlighted  and it remained  to be convinced that document INF/SDR/W/4 and INF/SDR/W/1/Rev.2 
were appropriate interventions to res olve the systemic and legal challenges pertaining to the JSI. If 
anything , the Chair 's "Information Note " identifie d multiple aspects of the draft Reference Paper that 
fell within the ambit of Part II of the GATS, reaffirming South Africa 's legality concerns with respect 
to introducing new rules through Members ' Schedules. If the JSI was truly committed to inclusivity 
as claimed, then constructive deeper dialogue and converg ence with JSI non -participants was 
required on the matters pertaining to the systemic and legal challenges . For South Africa,  this would 
be in the best interest of an integrated, viable and durable multilateral trading system.  
South Africa further  recalled, as also  stated  by India , that the mandat e for negotiations on 
domestic regulation  disciplines laid with the CTS, which  had established  the WPDR to conduct 
negotiations to develop any necessary disciplines to ensure that measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements and procedures did 
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in serv ices.   
South Africa had noted that the WPDR did not meet  regularly , nor had it advanced any 
technical work on matters falling within the scope of its mandate : since its launch, the JSI ha d 
eclipsed the WPDR. The CTS Decision on domestic regulation had been undermined by the JSI. The 
WTO website itself took this further by including information on this Initiative  on the page covering 
mandated WTO negotiations on domestic regulation disciplin es. However, South Africa considered 
that nowhere had there been a  consensus decision from a legitimate decision -making body providing 
that should the WPDR multilateral negotiations not be concluded by a specified date , then Members 
were free to pursue plurilateral modalities to negotiate domestic regulation  disciplines pursuant to 
GATS Article VI :4. South Africa observed that a number of JSI participants had firm foreign policies 
condemning coup d 'états in developing countries , but saw nothing wrong with themselves seizing 
the mandate of the WPDR without consensus. South Africa urged the Initiative 's participants, in the 
run-up to MC12, to reflect further upon the mandate and future of the WPDR.  
The representative of Zimbabwe  associate d himself with the statement s delivered by India  
and South Africa.  Zimbabwe noted that GATS Article VI:4 had been  quite clear in assigning the 
development of  disciplines on  domestic regulation to the CTS . The CTS had been  equally clear when 
it established the  WPDR specifically to carry out this mandate.  
For Zimbabwe , maintaining a strong rule -based WTO system was critical for the effective 
functioning of the multilateral trading system. Zimbabwe was aware that  negotiation s on services 
domestic regulation were currently ongoing in the Joint Initiative , but it had grave concerns  
regarding the disconnect between the JSI and GATS Article VI :4. In Zimbabwe 's view, by pursuing 
this Initiative , Members were now assuming the role of the  WPDR , but without any mandate, and 
indeed running contrary to GATS Article VI:4 . 
Zimbabwe also asserted that the disciplines  proposed in the draft Reference Paper could result 
in changes to Members ' GATS obligations and rights, including for those M embers outside the 
plurilateral initiative . For example , footnote 17 could have the effect of adding further health and 
environmental -related regulatory requirements; paragraph 7 elaborated upon and amend ed GATS 
Article VI:3 ; and p aragraph 11 undermine d certain elements of GATS Article VII on "Recognition ".  
Zimbabwe noted that t he Marrakesh Agreement recognize d that amendments to WTO rules 
could  only be made through an Article X procedure. The latter required  consensus by a certain 
proportion of WTO Members before any amendments could  take effect. In Zimbabwe 's view, the 
change s proposed in the draft Reference Paper posed a  systemic challenge , namely how these 
proposed disciplines would  be incorporated into the multilateral system given that the JSI was 
plurilateral in character , and not multilateral.  
Zimbabwe re iterate d its call for the proponents of the JSI to follow agreed mandates and 
procedures, and to uphold the core principles of the WTO so as to  avoid undermining the legal 
structure, the rights and obligations of other Members, and the credibility of the multilateral trading 
system itself.  S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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The representative of Sri Lanka  echoed the interventions by  India and South Africa , and 
reiterated  its posit ion as articulated during the WPDR meeting  held in December 2019.  Sri Lanka 's 
concerns with regard to the proposed disciplines encompass ed both systemic and specific issues.  
First, the systemic concerns related to the  multilateral negotiating mandate : GAT S Article 
VI:4 clearly provide d for a multilateral negotiating mandate which read as "the Council for Trade in 
Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines ". On 
the basis of  this mandate , the WPDR had been established in 1999 to develop any necessary 
disciplines.  Sri Lanka noted the substantial progress that had  been made in the WPDR . Such progress 
had also been well recognized in the Joint Statement on Services Domestic Regulation at MC11 in 
Document WT/MIN(17)/61, which provided that : "We acknowledge the valuable work that has been 
undertaken and good progress made in discussions since the last Ministerial Conference to revive 
negotiations in the WTO Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR) . We rea ffirm our commitment to 
advancing negotiations on the basis of recent proposals as set out in WT/MIN(17)/7/Rev.2 and 
related discussions in the Working Party on Domestic Regulations and future contributions by 
Members to deliver a multilateral outcome ". For Sri Lanka, this  statement by the Initiative 's 
proponents was indeed encouraging. However, Sri Lanka  observe d that the subsequent procedures 
followed by the proponents did not align with this statement .  
Therefore, Sri Lanka sought clarifications as to wh ether, given the multilateral mandate under 
GATS Article VI:4, some WTO Members could establish a competing and parallel mechanism to 
pursue and achieve those same objectives, without the consent of the entire membership, and 
attempt to bring those negotiated outcomes back to the multilateral framework through the 
modification of their resp ective GATS Schedules.  Sri Lanka was of the view that t he Initiative would 
undermine the spirit of multilateralism and by -pass the consensus decision -making principle 
embedded in Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement. Sri Lanka was also concerned that it  would 
create a precedent by ignoring legitimate negotiating mandates.  
In addition, Sri Lanka recalled  several specific concerns with regard to the Reference Paper 
developed by the Joint Initiative , which had already been elaborated in the intervention durin g the 
WPDR meeting in 2019 and were available in document S/WPDR/M/76 (13 December 2019 ). Sri 
Lanka considered that the proponents of the JSI had not been able to address these  concerns. 
Accordingly, the expected negotiated outcomes for the Initiative cont radict ed Members ' GATS 
obligations and rights, even for those Members who were not part of the Joint Initiative.  In addition, 
Sri Lanka raised  the following arguments to depict that the changes proposed through the JSI would 
contradict provisions under the GATS:  
a. The Initiative 's outcome  was presented  as carrying the  objective of "elaborating upon " the 
provisions of the GATS , "pursuant to " Article VI:4 of the GATS . 
b. Article VI GATS fell under Part II of the GATS, which deal t with "General Obligations and 
Disciplines ". Consequently, an outcome pursuant to GATS Article VI :4 would  add new rules 
and disciplines to the GATS and require amendments to the GATS and a decision by 
consensus for the same purpose.  
c. However, Article XVIII of the GATS  that the Initiative 's proponents were proposing as basis 
to incorporate the resulting Reference Paper, fell under Part III of the GATS , which, 
instead, dealt  with specific commitments under the GATS.  
Sri Lanka welcomed further  engage ment with Members on these  matter s. 
The representative of Costa Rica  stated that, as the Coordinator of the Joint Initiative on 
Services Domestic Regulation , he had listened with interest to the questions and comments by India, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Sri Lanka. He noted that, while some of the points raised were new, 
many  of them  had already  been raised  previously. The Initiative 's participants were  flexible  in 
engaging with any Members in any forum, including bilaterally. However, he highlighted that t he 
fact that he was  respond ing in the context of a WPDR meeting should not be misunderstood as an 
acknowled gement that the disciplines developed by the Joint Initiative fell under the purview WPDR, 
or that the WPDR was the best venue to address them.     S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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The Coordinator noted that one of the concerns raised relate d to the relationship between the 
WPDR mandate, and the work that had been carried out in the Joint Initiative. This was an issue to 
which the Initiative 's participants had already responded clearly on numerous occasions . He 
reiterated that the multilateral mandate in GATS Article VI:4 remain ed for all WTO Members to fulfil 
collectively. The decision by a subset of the WTO membership to undertake additional commitments 
in the same area in accordance with GATS Article XVIII did not render the mandate ineffective. The 
additional commitments undert aken by individual Members could not  be considered as either full or 
partial fulfilment of the collective GATS mandate. Indeed, some participants were looking at the 
Initiative  as a stepping -stone towards a multilateral outcome in the future.  
He also  noted that during the WPDR discussions in 2017, South Africa had argued that the 
disciplines proposed at the time were not "necessary " as required by GATS Article VI:4. At that time, 
both India and South Africa had argued that "transparency " provisions did not fall within the mandate 
of Article VI:4. The current Initiative 's text had evolved considerably since the proposals in 2017, 
but substantively cover ed the same elements. If India and South Africa  considered that the proposals  
were not covered by the GATS Article VI:4 mandate when these  had been  discussed in the WPDR, 
he enquired  why these delegations  believe d that the disciplines covering the same substance could 
now undermine th e Article VI:4 mandate . Similarly, at the present meeting, a concern was raised 
that the disciplines covered "authorizations " which, it was argued, was not falling under the scope 
of Article VI:4. If this was the case, then there should not be any concern about any conflict with 
the Article VI:4 mandate.  
With regard to the con cerns expressed on the scheduling approach through which the 
Initiative 's disciplines would  be given legal effect, he recall ed the following points:  firstly , the 
outcome that the Initiative was seeking consisted  of a set of disciplines which would  bind exclusively  
participating Members. Secondly, to bind only participants, the outcome that was envisaged would  
be incorporated into participating Members ' GATS Schedules of specific commitments. This mean t 
that the outcome would  apply to all Members on an MFN basis: it would  hence benefit the services 
suppliers from all Members  who trade d with the participating Members , and the latter  currently 
represent ed more than 70% of world services trade. Thirdly, in substance, the discipli nes under 
negotiation cover ed precisely those types of measures that were listed in the GATS as areas for 
additional commitments, namely "qualifications, standards, and licensing matters. " The Coordinator 
emphasized the importance of this aspect, since  some delegations  had suggested that the disciplines 
developed by the Initiative constitute d some form of, not further specified, "rules", which did not fit 
under the architecture of services Schedules. Rather,  he stated that  these disciplines constitute d 
improvements of participating Members ' existing commitments.   
The scheduling approach  had been chosen by the Initiative  because domestic regulation  
proponents in the WPDR had to accept with regret in 2017 that not all Members wanted to be bound 
by an outcome on domestic regulation.  The scheduling approach recognize d that choice : it did  not 
seek to impose any obligations on non -participants,  but did at the same time extend ed the benefits 
of the disciplines to  all Members. The Coordinator assured that  this approach had been subject to 
debate among participants, because it was one that allow ed, if not encouraged , free -riding. To 
achieve a critical mass o utcome , participants indeed were advocating  that more Members join ed the 
Initiative . 
The Coordinator noted that a nother argument that had been made was that the matters 
addressed by the Initiative fell under Part II of the GATS (General obligations and dis ciplines), which 
would prevent that they could be scheduled under Part III (Specific Commitments). It was not clear 
what the legal basis for this claim was, because Article XVIII - which was contained in Part III - 
referred explicitly to the same matters as Article VI:4 – licensing, qualifications and technical 
standards. T his claim was also not borne out by the scheduling practice of more than 100 Members 
whose additional commitments typically address ed matters for which baseline provisions already 
existed in Part II of the GATS . 
It had also been argued that additional commitments could  only address individual sectors 
but could not  apply horizontally . In this regard, the Chair noted that he did not see any textual basis 
for this claim in the GATS, and indeed, the disciplines would  apply for each participant to a distinct 
set of sectors , namely those that were contained in their GATS Schedules, plus any additional sectors 
individual Members decided  to include.  S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 9 - 
 
  
The Coordinator also noted that o ne question that some Members had raised was how 
participants intend ed to move forward with this process.  As he had e xplained at the last of his regular 
reports to the TNC, there were a handful of issues which remain ed outstanding in the Initiative 's 
negotiating process.  Upon resolution of these issues , the participants would focus on the preparation 
and exchange of revised draft schedules. For all Members ' information, the indicative draft schedules 
that participating Members had circulated so far were available on the Initiative 's webpage.  Once 
the negotiations among partic ipants were concluded, and a final set of schedules was agreed among 
them, participants would then submit their schedules with improved commitments  on services 
domestic regulation  for certification in line with the multilaterally agreed procedure in docume nt 
S/L/84.  The Coordinator noted that, as  the negotiations were still ongoing, the timing and details of 
these technical steps had not been finalized. In keeping with the transparent and open work structure 
of the discussions, all Members would  be informed  of all next steps, including o f the eventual start 
of certification procedures.  
The Coordinator stated that he had also heard suggestions that the Initiative had not 
responded  to the concerns that some Members raised. While the participants believe d that the 
appropriate forum to discuss specific drafting issues  were the Initiative 's open -ended meetings, they 
had welcomed engagement in various different contexts. Under his responsibility , he had  also issued, 
in May 2020, an Information Note contained in document INF/SDR/W/4 specifically with the objective 
to address and explain the Initiative 's view on the relationship between the Initiative 's disciplines 
and GATS obligations. The Initiative 's participants ha d also asked him, as the Coordinator , to 
approach bilaterally those delegations who had brought their concerns to the WPDR meeting in 
December 2019. And he had done so, but only just one delegation had  responded to his invitation 
for a constru ctive and open discussion.  He also noted  that the Initiative had clarified in the draft 
Reference Paper that the disciplines shall not be construed to diminish any Members ' obligations 
under the GATS. He underscored that this modification had not been made  because the Initiative 
shared the view that certain disciplines might otherwise undermine existing GATS obligations , but, 
rather, because participants had agreed that no such impression should be entertained in the first 
place. Participants were very clea r in their understanding that the disciplines add to existing 
obligations in the GATS, but did not , and indeed legally could not , diminish such obligations.  
With respect to the concerns raised on specific disciplines that the Initiative has developed , 
the Coordinator noted that s ome Members had allege d that the use of the phrase "further to Article 
III of the Agreement " in paragraph 13 of Section II of the Initiative 's draft Reference Paper 
interpret ed the scope of GATS Article III.  In this regard, the Coordinator highlighted that any existing 
obligations relating to publication of measures, as set out in GATS Article III:1, remain ed binding on 
all Members, including those participating in the Initiativ e. The phrase "further to Article III " did not 
suggest that the improved commitments that participants would undertake in the context of the 
Initiative would interpret or affect the scope of GATS Article III:1. Rather, participants would commit 
to publish and make available all the specific items of information which were extremely important 
to ensure that service suppliers can comply with the requirements and procedures for authorization.  
Furthermore, t he view had been  expressed that footnote 15 to paragr aph 20 of Section II of 
the Initiative 's draft Reference Paper - which allow ed resource constraints to be taken into account 
in determining whether mechanisms were appropriate to responding to enquiries from service 
suppliers – modifie d the obligation cont ained in GATS Article IV:2. The Initiative 's participants did 
not share this view and consider ed, instead, that the Initiative 's discipline on enquiry points for 
service suppliers was substantively different from the obligation contained in GATS Article IV :2. The 
reference to resource constraints in the Initiative 's text was not to be understood as affecting the 
obligation on developed Members to facilitate access of developing country Members ' service 
suppliers to the information  on the elements set out in  Article IV:2 (a) -(c). Indeed, the mention of 
the possibility to address enquiries made under the Initiative 's text through the contact points 
established under Article IV:2 was merely  a recognition that the commitment in paragraph 20 of the 
Initiative 's draft Reference Paper could be addressed by means of the already existing contact points , 
in addition to their already existing functions.  
In reply to the concern raised with regard to  footnote 17 to paragraph 22(a) of Section II on 
the development of meas ures, the Coordinator noted that the reference to regulatory requirements, 
such as health and environmental requirements, indicate d that these were examples of what could  
form part of "competence and the ability to supply the service " (the text indeed use d the phrasing 
"including to do so "). The footnote did not suggest that these requirements were additional or 
alternative criteria to the competence and the ability of supply a service. In any case, the text of S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 10 - 
 
  GATS Article VI:4(a) was not limited to "compe tence and the ability to supply the service " as the 
only criteria that would be deemed "objective and transparent ". While the Article indeed require d 
for the negotiated disciplines to ensure that requirements were based on objective and transparent 
criteri a, it did not prevent negotiators from setting additional objectives for the disciplines, and this 
was evident from the use of the wording "inter alia " in the chapeau ( " i.e. "among other things ") 
before the enumeration of the three objectives. In a similar vein, the competence and the ability to 
supply the services were specified as an illustration of what would fall under objective and 
transparent criteria , as the wording "such as " was used ther e to indicate a non -exhaustive 
explanation of the scope.  
In conclusion, t he Coordinator emphasized that the disciplines developed by the Initiative  
respond ed to long -standing needs by the international services business community. Transparency, 
legal certa inly, and predictability top ped virtually any wish -list of businesses around the globe. As 
recently as the previous week , the Global Services Summit had encouraged WTO Members to deliver 
a long due outcome on domestic regulation in services sectors by MC12 . A recent OECD policy brief 
forecast ed a 7% average reduction in trade costs in the APEC region if the disciplines were 
implemented fully across APEC economies. And other research demonstrate d a positive correlation 
between the implementation of the disci plines and virtually all indicators of economic performanc e, 
including participation in world services trade, entrepreneurship, services quality and prices. As the 
disciplines would  apply on an MFN basis, these benefits would  accrue also to services suppliers from 
non-participa ting Members . But, it was clear that the greatest benefits would  come from each 
Member implementing the disciplines at home : this was why participants of the J SI were convinced 
that the disciplines would be  beneficial to all Members, and could  play an important role in the 
context of the post COVID -19 economic recovery.  Members themselves clearly recogni zed the value 
of implement ing internally  domestic regulatio n-related  measures. Indeed, many of them  – including 
developing country Members – were already engaged in internal regulatory reform processes to 
address the demands of their business communities, and improve the business climate with a view 
to sending a p ositive signal to foreign investors looking for new markets.   
The Coordinator, therefore, urged all Members to examine the disciplines  in good faith , and 
decide whether these can be useful in furthering their domestic agendas, and contribut ing to their 
own development aspirations.   
The representative of Australia  support ed the intervention by the Coordinator of the Joint 
Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation and noted that he had already  responded to many of 
these issues previously . Australia did not agree  with the view expressed by India and South Africa  
that the development of a Reference Paper on services domestic regulation through the Joint 
Initiative , constitute d a violation of the mandate in GATS Article VI:4. Australia conside red that a 
group of Members undertaking additional commitments , pursuant to GATS Article XVIII, did not 
prevent further outcomes through the WPDR or foreclose on an outcome with the involvement of all 
Members.  
Australia noted that the GATS  had clearly env isaged a process of incremental efforts to expand 
the ambition of Members ' commitments over time, consistent with its trade liberalisation objectives, 
and this was what Members  were doing in the JSI , while leaving the GATS Article VI:4 mandate 
untouched.  Australia recalled that, while legally unnecessary , but to provide reassurance to 
Members,  the Initiative  had made explicit in the first footnote of the Reference Paper did not seek 
to fulfil the GATS Article VI:4 mandate.   
Australia also did not agree with the assessment that the disciplines developed by the JSI 
dilute d existing GATS commitments. In Australia 's view, t he disciplines cover ed precisely those types 
of measures that were listed in the GATS as areas for additional commitments under GATS Article 
XVIII, namely "qualifications, standards, and licensing matters ". Participating Members were 
committing to  these disciplines in addition to their existing market access and national treatment 
commitments under the GATS . By their very nature an d design, the disciplines buil t on, and would 
constitute improvements to, Members ' GATS commitments. Whether it was one Member, a group of 
Members , or all Members, additional commitments were also implemented on an MFN basis. As had 
been outlined by the Coordinator , Members with objections to the JSI had much to gain from 
receiving MFN treatment in relation to the outcomes of this process without any prejudice to their 
rights or obligations un der the GATS.  S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 11 - 
 
  
Moreover, Australia noted that, by participating in the Initiative , Members  could not  legally 
undermine their own  existing obligations under the GATS , which would  remain in effect and binding 
upon Members . While legally unnecessary , but to pr ovide reassurance to Members, JSI participants 
had recently added to the negotiating text a paragraph to make explicit that the disciplines shall not 
be construed to diminish any participants ' GATS obligations.   
As had also been outlined at the General Council, Australia  did not  agree with the arguments 
advanced by India and South Africa on the legal form of the JSI. There was nothing in the GATS to 
prevent, but rather the GATS specifically allow ed, Members to incorporate improvem ents to their 
GATS Schedules, whether unilaterally, or as a group of Members. This did not require the consensus 
of the whole membership , whether  in terms of a negotiating mandate or incorporation of the final 
outcomes. Australia had full confidence in the  WTO-consistency of this approach to incorporate a JSI 
outcome into the WTO legal framework.  
In conclusion, Australia emphasi zed that it remain ed a strong supporter of the multilateral 
trading system, including multilateral work on domestic regulation, as it had demonstrated over 
more than twenty  years . The membership  had worked hard in the WPDR  over many years to achieve 
a multilateral outcome on domestic regulation. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to achieve a 
result due to the opposition of some Members. Since that time, Australia and other Members had 
focused on areas where Members would  have a real chance to achieve an outcome, such as the 
disciplines in the JSI.  The Initiative did  not preclude further work on domestic regulation under GATS 
Article VI:4. Australia remain ed open to advancing  work in this context in the future , and looked 
forward to continuing work ing with the many other M embers involved in the JSI towards a successful 
outcome at MC12 . Such an outcome would assist  Members ' businesses, consumers , and 
communities to reap the benefits of services trade, support their economies in their  recover y from 
the pandemic and help the WTO reviving its much -needed rule -making function. Australia remain ed 
open to discussing with any Member any of the issues raised at the meeting .  
The representative  of the European Union  support ed the statement delivered  by the 
Coordinator of the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic regulation.  For the European Union, domestic 
regulation was one of the key areas of trade in services where further convergence amongst the 
membership was needed. The EU continue d to be a fierce  supporter of multilateral work on domestic 
regulation, as it had  demonstrated constantly over the last 20 years.  
The European Union recalled that, i n the run -up to the 11th Ministerial Conference in 2017, 
Members had  worked hard in th e WPDR to achieve a multilateral outcome in Buenos Aires. 
Unfortunately, it had  not been possible to achieve such a result due to opposition by some Members.  
Since then, a large group of Members had continued their efforts to negotiate domestic 
regulation discip lines in an open -ended format based on the Joint Statement  on Services Domestic 
Regulation (WT/MIN(17)/61), issued at Buenos Aires. As described by the Coordinator, these 
negotiations were taking place in an open and transparent manner. All the documents d iscussed at 
the meetings and the reports of all the meetings were shared with the full membership.  The 
European Union was a strong supporter of the Initiative and it was  pleased to see that many 
Members share d that view. Currently , a group of 63 WTO Member s, representing more than 70% of 
the global trade in services, was committed to bring ing this Initiative to a successful outcome.  
The European Union did not agree with India and others who saw the development of a 
Reference Paper on services domestic regu lation through the Joint Initiative as a violation of the 
mandate included in GATS  Article  VI:4. As had been explained  by the Coordinator, the development 
of a Reference Paper did not affect the mandate of GATS VI:4. In fact, the entire Article VI, including 
the mandate of VI:4, remain ed untouched.  
Moreover, GATS Article XVIII gave Members the right to negotiate additional commitments 
with respect to measures affecting trade in se rvices not subject to scheduling under GATS Articles 
XVI or XVII, including those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters , and to inscribe 
them in their Schedules. If a Member took such additional commitments by incorporating services 
dome stic regulation disciplines in its Schedule, it took these commitments in addition to its already 
existing commitments, including those under GATS Article VI.  The European Union highlighted that, 
if a Member decide d to schedule additional commitments on services domestic regulation, under no 
circumstances could  this be seen as a dilution of its existing GATS commitments. To the contrary, S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 12 - 
 
  these additional commitments were by definition additions to Members ' existing GATS commitments.  
As had also been pointed  out by  the Coordinator, the use of the scheduling approach of GATS XVIII 
would  benefit all Members who trade d with the participating Members. The European Union 
considered this aspect of great importance given that the participating Members currently 
represent ed more than 70% of world trade in services.  
As the negotiations of the Initiative 's Reference Paper were still ongoing , the European Union, 
together with the many other Members involved, would  continue efforts towards reaching a 
successful outcome by the next Ministerial Conference.  
The representative of Colombia  thanked the delegations of India and South Africa for their 
interest in discussing the systemic implications of JSIs, in particular, on matters related to services 
domestic regulation. Colombia considered  that this was a very important discussion  for the f uture of 
the WTO, since these Initiatives reflect ed the interest that many Members had in discussing and 
advancing matters of great importance for global trade  relations.  
Colombia, as a developing country Member with further potential for  economic growth, 
consider ed that the disciplines  on services domestic regulation under discussion in the Initiative  
constituted  a step  forward in the liberalization of services trade , with an enormous positive effect on 
service providers . For this reason, Colombia  fully supported  the intervention by the Initiative 's 
Coordinator  and other participants . 
Colombia stated that although it did not share the legal analysis that had been presented  by 
India and South Africa , it was willing to continue the discussion  in the most appropriate forum . In 
the past, Colombia had actively and constructively participated in the dialogue that arose around 
these same issues  when they had been  presented for the first time . As noted  by other participants , 
such dialogue had been  inconclusive due to the lack of engagement  by the opponents . 
Moving forward, Colombia wished to underline that it did not share the view that the 
discussions that were taking place affected in any way the structure of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
On the contrar y, as had been reiterated many times, the Initiative 's discussions were built on the 
different mandates established in the multilateral system, complying with all established procedures. 
Second, Colombia did not see any incompatibility between the Initiati ve's disciplines and the 
mandate established in Article VI:4. of the GATS. This relationship was clearly explained in the 
footnote to paragraph 1 of the Reference Paper : the disciplines did not aim to exhaust the mandate 
of Article VI :4, but rather built o n it. Third, Colombia did  not share the view that the participants 
were seeking to include changes to their Schedules of specific commitments  without complying with 
the consensus rule and affecting other Members ' commitments. Colombia noted that the objective 
was not to affect the rules and procedures of the WTO. Changes to Schedules were a prerogative of 
each Member , but such changes needed  to be confirmed through a procedure that involved  all 
Members so as to avoid that the existing  commitments were undermined. Such procedure would be 
followed by the participants as established under the relevant WTO documents . 
The representative of Canada  recalled  that her delegation  was a strong supporter of the 
multilateral trading system and had been participating constructively on a broad range of trade -
related issues, including domestic regulation, under the various configurations offered by the WTO 
framework.  Canada believe d that ne w GATS -plus disciplines on services domestic regulation  would 
reinforce good regulatory practices surrounding authorization of regulated services in a manner that 
would  greatly facilitate international trade,  and benefit both developed and developing count ry 
Members.  
Canada stated  that, g iven the lack of progress through the multilateral negotiations, it had  
joined the Joint Ministerial Statement together with other interested WTO Members. Based on the 
progress achieved so far, Canada believe d that the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation  
offered the best avenue for a timely outcome on domestic regulation by MC12.  
In addition, Canada fully support ed the statement by the Initiative 's Coordinator , including 
on the understanding  of the relationshi p between the GATS and the draft Reference Paper. Canada 
believe d that the work of the Initiative was not in violation with GATS Article VI:4 mandate and buil t 
on existing obligations . Canada had  welcome d the further clarifications that had been  incorporated 
in the Reference Paper to make the Initiative 's intentions clearer  and trusted that these  would help S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 13 - 
 
  advanc e the process constructively. Canada considered that t he Reference Paper  provided the  
assuranc e that GATS Article VI: 4 mandate was not fulfilled  by this Initiative , nor that it affect ed 
existing rights and obligations of non -participants.   
Canada  believe d that  the proposed Reference Paper approach offered the most pragmatic and 
transparent way to incorporate plurilateral outcomes . Canada strongly believed that plurilaterals 
constitute d an integral part of the multilateral trading system. It did not share  the concerns raised 
by India and South Africa and did not agree with some claims that an Annex 4 approach was  the 
only way forward. No multilateral mandate was required for launching any negotiations among 
interested Members. Canada highlighted that, l ooking at past WTO practices, including in the context 
of acceding Members, there were  a number of examples where Members, individually or in a 
coordinated manner, had decided to unilaterally improve their respective GATS Schedules. Any 
Member indeed had a right to improve its respective Schedule.  
Moreover, Canada was of  view that the GATS, at its core, aim ed at promoting economic 
growth including through progressive liberalization. The Agreement also recognize d that various 
configuration s could  be envisaged to achieve such goal. Canada believe d that this should  be an 
underlying objective for all WTO Members.  
The 2019 WTO World Trade Report had noted  that trade costs in services were almost double 
those in goods. It also went further by saying that trade policy barriers and regulatory difference 
explain ed a larg e part of why trade with some partners was easier than with others. Improving 
sound governance, and reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers could  support economic growth 
and recovery.  
Canada recalled that, given the Initiative 's proposed approach to  incorporat e the outcome of 
the Reference Paper in participating Members ' GATS Schedule s, the disciplines would apply on a n 
MFN basis. All WTO Members, not just the participants, would reap to some degree  the benefits  from 
this Initiative. Domestic regulat ion disciplines had the potential to facilitate services trade globally, 
including for developing country Members. In this regard , if some Members were choosing to improve 
their own commitments based on WTO procedures to the  benefit of all WTO Members and the global 
services industry, including MSMEs , it was difficult for Canada to understand what could be the  real 
concerns. Canada therefore  encourage d all WTO Members to review the  Initiative 's text, which 
include d strong development disciplines, and consider joining  the negotiations .  
Canada further noted that the negotiations had been conducted in an open and transparent 
manner  and interested Members had  and would still  have opportunities to engage. Canada noted 
that a number of non -JSI participants had participated or observed these discussions  and Canada 
had engaged constructively with them. Recognizing that this format might  be more challenging for 
some Members, Canada also  underst ood that the Initiative 's Coordinator  had made hims elf available 
to engage informally with non -JSI participants. Canada  encourage d Members with specific questions 
to use such opportunities . Canada  did not believe the WPDR was the appropriate forum to discuss 
the content of specific disciplines being negotiated under the JSI on services domestic regulation.   
With respect to future multilateral work, Canada remain ed open to consider proposals 
submitted by Members that would seek  to constructively advance under the GATS Article VI:4 
mandate and gather  a broad range of support. Until then, Canada remain ed focused on making 
progress within the JSI, and sending the signal at MC12 that the WTO remain ed a relevant 
negotiating body for meaningful trade rules.  
The representative of Hong Kong, China  supported the statement delivered by the Initiative 's 
Coordinator.  Hong Kong, China was a staunch supporter of progressive liberalization in trade in 
services and the multilateral trading system. It had  been actively engaging in the discussions on 
domestic regulation in the context of  various WTO bodies, including the WPDR, for almost two 
decades. Recogni zing the history of previous discussions at the WPDR, Hong Kong, China was  
prepared to work creatively with other like -minded Members in all formats, including  in the Joint 
Initiative.  
In Hong Kong, China 's view, the Joint Initiative would  help moderni ze and strengthen the 
multilateral trading system and fulfil the ambition for more transparent and predictable trade rules. 
This was particularly pressing in light of the  current  COVID -19 pandemic, and the need to S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 14 - 
 
  reinvigorate the rule -making function of the WTO to respond to the aspirations of consumers and 
business communities across the world.   
In fact, Hong Kong, China, at the General Council meetings held in March and May 2021, had 
already expressed its views on the issues raised in the comm unication from India and South Africa 
on the legal status of the JSIs  (WT/GC/W/819). Specifically with respect to the Joint Initiative  on 
services domestic regulation , Hong Kong, China had stated that the Joint Initiative buil t upon, rather 
than compet ed, with ongoing mandated work under the WPDR. The result would  deliver a n outcome 
to the benefit of all WTO Members. There was no question that an outcome of the Joint Initiative 
would in any way affect the  GATS Article VI:4  manda te. Neither  could it affect or dilute existing 
GATS  obligations of Members, including  those of  non-participants. On the contrary, Hong Kong, 
China highlighted  that the Initiative 's participants were aiming  to make additional commitments on 
top of their obligations under GATS on an MFN -basis. In the latest draft of the Reference Paper, the 
participants had  specifically clarified that the disciplines under discussion  shall not be construed as 
diminishing any  Members ' obligations under GATS.  Hong Kong, China also noted that the Initiative 's 
participants intend ed to incorporate an outcome into the WTO framework in accordance with WTO 
procedures, including the certification procedures set out in the document S/L/ 84 adopted by the 
CTS.  
Hong Kong, China stated that the Initiative 's participants were also providing constructive 
response s to developing country Members to ensure that the development angle remained  central 
in the discussions , and to facilitate the part icipation of Members at different levels of development , 
including  through technical assistance, capacity building , and transitional arrangements.   
Hong Kong, China wished to reiterate its call to interested Members to attend and provide  
their comments at  the Joint Initiative 's open-ended meetings  or in any configurations, so that their 
views could be taken into account fully and accurately. In addition , Hong Kong , China remained 
open-minded to any proposals that would  help develop  further disciplines under the GATS Article 
VI:4 mandate , and stood  ready to positively engage in the discussions.  
The representative of the Republic of Korea supported the statement delivered by the 
Initiative 's Coordinator.  Korea was a strong supporter of the multilateral trading system and the 
WTO. Like many other Members, it was in this light that Korea had joined the JSI discussions  on 
services domestic regulation , with a firm belief that the results of these negotiations  would  
supplement the existing WTO Agreements and not dilute  or undermine any provisions of the GATS 
including the GATS Article VI: 4 mandate.  Moreover, Korea noted that GATS Article XVIII allowed 
Members to implement the outcomes of the JSI discussions in their resp ective Schedules of 
commitments. This would have a legally binding effect on Members participating in the JSI and, on 
the other hand, benefit service suppliers of all WTO Members on MFN basis. It was Korea 's view that 
the JSI on services domestic regulatio n would ultimately serve to create a more transparent, 
foreseeable,  and competitive business environment in the global service sector. Kore a also 
highlighted that JSI negotiations would contribute to strengthening the credibility of the WTO, 
especially in times of the COVID -19 pandemic where countries were looking at the WTO to take 
action.  
Finally, Korea emphasized  that all Members, regardless of their level of development or the 
contrasting  views they might have, were free to take part in the JSI discussi ons. Korea was open to 
engaging with other Members on their concerns and suggestions. To advance substantial discussions 
towards achieving fruitful outcomes at MC12, Korea encourage d Members to step forward in a 
constructive and pragmatic manner.  
The repr esentative of China  thanked India, South Africa and other Members for sharing their 
assessment of the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation. China fully supported the 
statement delivered by the Initiative 's Coordinator . China stated that, s ince its very beginning, the 
services d omestic regulation negotiations in the JSI had  been strictly conducted in line with the 
principles of openness, inclusiveness , and transparency, and in consistency  with the GATS legal 
framework. Furthermore, this proc ess had never been intended to replace the work under WPDR or 
undermine the GATS Article VI:4 mandate.  According to paragraph 6 of the  Initiative 's draft 
Reference Paper, the disciplines shall not be construed as diminishing any obligations of Members 
under the Agreement. And since a JSI outcome would  be incorporated into participants ' Schedules 
as additional commitments, all WTO Members would  benefit from a result .  S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 15 - 
 
  
China attache d great importance to multilateral negotiations on domestic regulation and took 
note of  the concerns of India, South Africa and other Members. However, China  considered  that the 
WPDR and the JSI would  complement each other to establish universally applicabl e multilateral rules 
on services domestic regulation as the final goal. China was willing to constructively work with all 
Members to explore ways of better integrating a JSI outcome  on services domestic regulation  into 
the WTO framework.  
The representative  of Turkey  thank ed India and South Africa for showing interest in the JSI 
on services domestic regulation. Turkey supported the statement delivered by the Initiative 's 
Coordinator . In Turkey 's view, the disciplines in the draft Reference Paper were important, useful, 
and extremely relevant in combatting unnecessary barriers to trade in services. This was why, after 
decades of negotiations under the WPDR, Turkey  did not want to wait any longer to reali ze the 
benefits of the disciplines that had been  largely developed under th e WPDR .  
Turkey also believe d that, despite the substantive overlap of the JSI disciplines with earlier 
work in the WPDR, it was clear that the mandate in GATS Article VI:4 was separate from  and could 
not be fulfilled through the disciplines developed by the JSI.  Turkey highlighted that its participation 
in the JSI prove d its dedication to the subject, and provided  reassurance that it remain ed strongly 
committed to the multilateral m andate under Article VI:4 of the GATS.   In this context, Turkey stood  
ready to discuss any concerns about the JSI with interested Members, either bilaterally or during 
the open -ended discussions and, in order to provide comfort and clarity, consider textua l 
amendments to the draft Reference Paper.  
Turkey also invite d all non -participating Members to consider engagement in the Initiative. 
Turkey emphasized that it  would be especially helpful if LDC Members could  provide their input on 
the proposal for the a pplication of the Reference Paper disciplines to the preferences notified under 
the LDC Waiver decision , as well as the paragraph on the participation  of LDCs in the process , which 
provided that  LDCs were required to apply the disciplines only after  graduation  from LDC status.  
Lastly, Turkey reiterate d its commitment and openness to engaging constructively in the multilateral 
work under WPDR.  
The representative of Japan  fully suppor ted the statement by the Initiative 's Coordinator and 
echoed the  interventions by Australia, the European Union, and other JSI participants. Japan did  not 
agree with the assessment that the JSI on services domestic regulation  undermine d the GATS Article 
VI:4 mandate. Japan noted that the  Reference Paper itself made clear that "Members recognize that 
further disciplines may be developed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VI of the Agreement. " It 
also stipulate d that "the disciplines shall not be construed as diminishing any o bligations of Members 
under the Agreement. " Second,  Japan emphasize d that by scheduling the Reference Paper, the 
disciplines would  be applied on a n MFN basis.  As a result,  all Members would  benefit from this 
exercise. Third, Japan did not share the  argumen t that JSIs were inconsistent with the WTO 
Agreements. Japan  believed  the JSIs would  contribute to updating the WTO rulebook  and ensuring 
the continued relevance of the WTO.  Japan also recalled that a number of achievements made during  
the GATT or the WTO had been  initially taken up or discussed in plurilateral initiatives and had only  
later been merged in to the system. In Japan 's view, the JSIs were legitimate and consistent with 
the WTO.  Finally, Japan recalled that the JSI meetings were organized in an open, transparent and 
inclusive manner , and invited  all the Members who were not yet participating in the JSI on services 
domestic regulation to consider joining this process . 
The representative of Venezuela  stated  that, while the Members of the Joint Initiative could 
meet to discuss any issues, the rules of the Marrakesh Agreement had to  be respected when the 
negotiated results were to be inserted into the WTO legal framework of the WTO, including the 
requirement o f consensus. The systemic implications of this Initiative and other JSIs had been 
explained in the communication by India and South Africa contained in document WT/GC/W/819.  
Venezuela considered that if the Initiative 's participants incorporated the propos ed disciplines 
into their Schedul es of specific commitments, through Article XVIII of the GATS, and without 
multilateral consensus, they would effectively be ending the multilateral mandate contained in Article 
VI:4 of the GATS.  Venezuela recalled that the WPDR had been created by the WTO Members in 
1999, in accordance with GATS Article VI:4, which provided that "the Council for Trade in Services 
shall, through the appropriate bodies it may establish, develop the necessary discipl ines." Therefore, 
the WPDR was the multilateral body entr usted with developing the disciplines required under the 
multilateral mandate. In Venezuela 's view, there was no legal basis for a subset of WTO Members S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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  to establish a parallel, competitive process t o pursue the same objectives set under a multilateral 
mandate and, consequently, to create new rules under the GATS without meet ing the clear 
requirements set out  in the GATS and the WTO Agreement.  
Venezuela noted that the process for modifying the GATS un der the Marrakesh Agreement 
required the fulfilment of two conditions: the first one was to secure consensus or a two -thirds 
majority (in case consensus was not reached) to submit the amendment for acceptance by Members. 
Article X:1 of the Marrakesh Agreem ent established that any Member could initiate an amendment 
procedure by submitting a proposal to the WTO Ministerial Conference. If no consensus was reached 
on such a proposal, the "Ministerial Conference shall decide, by a two -thirds majority of the 
Memb ers, whether to submit the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance. " The second 
condition to be met was to ensure acceptance of the amendment according to Article X:5 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. This required the acceptance of two -thirds of the WT O Members before the 
amendment entered into force for those Members that had accepted it.  
Venezuela noted t hat "authorizations " were already regulated in Article VI:3 of the GATS, 
which stipulated  that "where authorization is required for the supply of a service for which a specific 
commitment has been made, the competent authorities of a Member shall, within a reasonable 
period of time after the submission of an application that is considered complete und er domestic 
laws and regulations, inform the applicant of the decision concerning the application. At the request 
of the applicant, the competent authorities of the Member shall provide, without undue delay, 
information on the status of the application ". The rules or criteria for authorization were regulated 
in Article VII of the GATS on "Recognition ". 
Venezuela asserted that, i f the Members participating in the Initiative were to incorporate  the 
resulting disciplines into their Schedules, they would  not be  able to join a consensus on the 
disciplines that would  be pursued under the multilateral process. If they refrain ed from participating 
in multilateral discussions, they would effectively block the possibility of seeking a multilateral 
outcome to fulfil th e mandate of GATS Article VI :4. Therefore, Venezuela  urged all Members to return 
to the WPDR  framework, especially at a time when there was a clear intention to undermine 
multilateralism .  
The representative of the United Kingdom  welcomed the opportunity t o add her delegation 's 
voice to affirming the validity and value of the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation.  The 
United Kingdom support ed the arguments put forward by the Initiative 's Coordinator , Australia, the 
European Union and other  participants . The Initiative 's negotiations complement ed and buil t on 
multilateral discussions in the WPDR, which had failed to deliver a result in 2017. The outcome of 
these negotiations would  benefit services and service suppliers of all WTO Members.  The United 
Kingdom considered that the JSIs were  breathing new life into the WTO, enabling Members to make 
progress in areas where new rules were urgently needed. This was especially important for 
developing economies, given that services account ed for around two thirds of employment and 
around half of foreign direct investment.  
The United Kingdom also noted that i ndustry was also calling on the WTO to deliver on areas 
of their interests. As mentioned by the Joint Initiative 's Coordinator, a state ment delivered by the 
Global Services Coalition had urged all WTO Members to participate in the JSI on services domestic 
regulation and highlighted  that adoption of the Initiative 's outcome should be an immediate, top 
priority MC12 deliverable.  In conclusion, t he United Kingdom encourage d interested  Members to 
attend or join the Joint Initiative negotiations and supported  open and transparent discussions to 
advance domestic regulation disc iplines constructively.   
The representative of the Russian Fe deration  support ed the statement delivered by  the 
Initiative 's Coordinator.  The Russian Federation was convinced that the draft Reference Paper on 
services domestic regulation developed under the Joint Initiative provide d for regulatory disciplines 
that would build  upon and improve on existing  GATS commitments. The draft Reference Paper 
reflec ted many useful suggestions made by non -participants.  
Moreover, the Russian Federation highlighted that the Initiative 's discussion s had always been 
and remain ed open for participation of all Members. The draft Reference Paper  provide d different 
flexibilities for developing countr y Member s. Such flexibilities  would  help Members to choose their 
own natural pace to improve their domesti c regulatory environment to facilitate trade in services. S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
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  Her delegation  would  not give up on the idea of making domestic regulation disciplines  a multilateral 
outcome. However, achieving this would require pragmatic and constructive engagement of all 
Memb ers. In addition , parallel plurilateral outcome s were viable and complementary paths  of the 
rulemaking function of the WTO.  
The representative of Switzerland  endorse d the statement made by the Initiative 's 
Coordinator.  Recogni zing the growing importance of global  services  trade and the crucial importance 
of good regulatory practice s in facilitating trade in service s, Switzerland had always supported work 
on the development of disciplines on domestic regulation in various configurations, in the WPDR or, 
as was currently the case, within the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation. The work 
under this JSI had been and would always be  conducted in an open, inclusive and transparent 
manner.   
In Switzerland 's view , the disciplines developed by the Initiative would  neither  directly nor 
indirectly negatively affect Member s' rights and obligations under the GATS or any other WTO 
Agreement . The se Agreements  remain ed untouched and could not  be diminished, interpreted , or 
diluted . Any additional co mmitment would , instead,  add to the rights of all WTO Members including 
those who would  not incorporate  the Reference Paper in their  own Schedules . Only the Members 
adopting the Reference Paper would  be supplementing their commitments  by scheduling the 
disciplines in accordance with  GATS Article XVIII. Switzerland , as well as the other Initiative 's 
participants, would  indeed apply such additional commitments on an MFN basis to the benefit of 
service suppliers of all WTO Members, promoti ng a better regulatory environment that would 
improve economic operators ' ability to supply services.  
To conclude, Switzerland reiterated  that the disciplines contained in the Reference Paper 
would  be without prejudice to further negotiations under GATS Article VI:4. This was why 
Switzerland remain ed committed to working constructively on an outcome on services domestic 
regulation at MC12 , which would  be meaningful for both participants and non -participants of the 
Joint Initiative.  
The representative of Chile endorse d the state ment delivered by the Initiative 's Coordinator, 
as well as the interventions by Australia, the European Union, and other participants of the Joint 
Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation. To what ha d already been repeatedly stated, Chile wished 
to add three  important  points : firstly, that there was no provision in WTO Agreement that required 
consensus for a group of Members to launch negotiations on topic s of interest , such as services 
domestic regulation.  Secondly , there was no provision in the WTO A greement that require d 
consensus for a Member to introduce improvements to its Schedule of specific commitments under  
the GATS.  Thirdly , Article XVIII of the GATS provided  clearly that Members were entitled to  
incorporate in their  Schedules of specific commitments the disciplines on services dome stic 
regulation as additional commitments. As a result, the Joint Initiative on Services D omestic 
Regulation and the integration  of a negotiating outcome  through GATS Schedules  of participa nts was 
fully in line of the legal framework of the WTO.  
The representative of Chinese Taipei  thank ed India and South Africa for having presented 
their views on the  Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation. Chinese Taipei  attach ed great 
importance to the multilateral trading system , and it had been a strong supporter of the system 
since its own accession  to the WTO . Chinese Taipei supported the statement s delivered by the 
Initiative 's Coordinator , and held different views from thos e expressed by  India, South Africa and 
some other Members on the issue of the  interface between  Reference Paper and  the GATS , as well 
as on the legal status of JSIs and their negotiated outcomes.  
Chinese Taipei had great interest in developing disciplines  on services domestic regulation in 
line with the ever growing role of services trade for its economic development and employment, in 
particular during a time when it was necessary to  boost services trade to weather the impact of 
COVID -19. Chinese Taipei a lso emphasized the importance of respond ing to the needs of businesses 
and consumers for a transparent, predictable , and non -discriminatory trading environment , which 
was indispensable to maintaining competitiveness and economic well -being in the 21st century.  
Chinese Taipei noted that M embers had worked  intensively in the WPDR, but unfortunately 
failed to produce tangible results. As a global rule -making organization for trade, the WTO could not  
keep on standing  still. The plurilateral negotiations u nder the JSI had provided Members  with the S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 18 - 
 
  tools to enhance their interest in services trade , as well as responding to the needs of businesses 
and consumers.  
Regarding the draft Reference Paper under  negotia tion and the additional commitments that 
Members participating in this process  would seek  to inscribe in their Schedules according to GATS 
Article XVIII,  Chinese Taipei stated  that most of the disciplines contained in the Reference Paper 
were procedural requirements in nature. Such additional commitments constitute d in essence 
improvement to participants ' existing commitments. Chinese Taipei considered that it was  Members ' 
right to add additional commitments with regard to services domestic regulation to their Schedules , 
with a view  to improv ing their existing commit ments . More importantly, these additional 
commitments would  be implemented on an MFN basis and , thereby,  benefit all Members. The 
disciplines would help enhanc e the transparency, predictability , and non -discrimination of Members ' 
services trading environment , at a time when they needed it most.  
Furthermore, Chinese Taipei  did not agree with the assessment that the disciplines contained 
in the draft Reference Paper would  undermine the relevant disciplines of the GATS. On t he contrary, 
the Reference Paper disciplines  represented  a step forward , by augmenting the core disciplines of 
the GATS  while containing a  certain degree of flexibility . This approach  was consistent with GATS  
Article XVIII and the  WPDR  mandate under Art icle VI:4 remain ed untouched. Chinese Taipei also did 
not share the view that the disciplines in the draft Reference Paper would  undermine the existing 
obligations of participating Members under the GATS. According to paragraph  6 in Section I of the 
draft Reference Paper, "the disciplines shall not be construed as diminishing any obligations of 
Members under the Agreement ". WTO Members participating in this JSI could not  legally undermine 
their existing obligations under the GATS. The GATS  core disciplines, rules and Members ' obligations 
thereunder , remain ed in effect and all WTO Members were obliged to abide by them.  
Finally, while welcoming  the opportunity to continue dialogue and discussion on issues 
relating to development of services domestic regulation  disciplines in the WPDR , Chinese Taipei  
remain ed a strong supporter and an enthusiastic participant of the JSI. Chinese Taipei  would  
continue working with other participating Members for a successful outcome before MC12. Chinese 
Taipei also wished to  call on non -participating Members to be flexible and constructive, and 
encourage d those who had not done so yet  to join the open and transpare nt process under the JSI 
on services domestic regulation . 
The representative of Brazil  stated that his delegation  was putting lot of energy on the 
drafting and implementation of modern and ambitious domestic regulati on frameworks, at the  
national, regional  and international levels. His delegation  was an active and committed participant 
of the negotiations o n a services domestic regulation Reference Paper under the JSI . Brazil thanked  
India and South Africa for their joint communication on the legal status of the JSIs (WT/GC/W/819) 
and for the opportunity to maintain an open dialogue to clarify this matter, which was a very relevant 
discussion for the future of the negotiating pillar o f the WTO.  
With respect to the Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation, Brazil  express ed its full 
support for the statement  delivered by the Initiative 's Coordinator . As it had  been noted , the 
mandate contained in GATS Article VI:4 was not affecte d by the fact that a subset of the WTO 
membership would  undertake additional commitments in accordance with GATS Article XVIII. 
Participants of the Initiative had made it clear that they would  give legal effect to the disciplines on 
services domestic regulation by incorporating them in their respective GATS Schedules, so that they 
would  be applied on an MFN basis.  In this context, Brazil reiterate d that nothing in WTO Agreements 
prevent ed a group of Members willing to improve their commitments from doing so.  
Brazil was convinced that the best way for Members to defend their interests and concerns 
was to participate on all negotiating initiatives in the WTO, multilateral or plurilateral, and invited 
non-participants to join this Initiative.  
The representative of Peru support ed the statement by the Initiative 's Coordinator. Peru 
shared the view  that the benefits of the  commitments on services domestic regulation would  be 
extended not only to those Members who undertook  them, but to every Member of the WTO. Peru 
recall ed that, when it came to  commitments on transparency and the domestic regulation of a 
particular sector , in practice it was not possible to distinguish or  discriminate . As a result, all 
Members would benefit from an outcome on services domestic regulation.  Furthermore , Peru noted S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 19 - 
 
  that the already  existing commitments in these areas  would not be undermined since the idea was 
to produce new additional benefit s compared to those that were  already in place .  
Peru also  wished to stress that the Initiative was open to all Members, and  that there had 
been ample opportunity to discuss the technical and specific aspects of the disciplines under 
negotiation. Based on various comments received  throughout the negotiating process , the necessary 
modifications and improvements to the draft Reference Pape r text had already been made. Indeed, 
Peru was one of the participants who had  made a number of  detailed comments and requested 
amendments, and those comments and requests had always been  listened to. Peru wished  that all 
Members  would participat e in this Initiative, or at least  could  support this process , even if they 
decide d not to take these comm itments at present.  
The representative of Sri Lanka  asserted that JSI participants were claiming that the 
Reference Paper could be approached as an "additional commitment " that fell under Part III of the 
GATS on specific commitments, and would be covered by the rules of Part IV of the GATS on 
progressive liberalization and negotiation of specific commitments. If so, then requirements under 
GATS  Article IV on "increasing the participa tion of developing countries " also had to be fulfilled. The 
latter stipulate d that: "The increasing participation of developing country Members in world trade 
shall be facilitated through negotiated specific commitments, by different Members pursuant to Parts 
III and IV of this Agreement, relating to:  (a) the strengthening of their domestic services capacity  
and its efficiency and competitiveness, inter alia through access to technology on a commercial 
basis;  (b) the improvement of their acces s to distribution channels and information networks; and  
(c) the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them… ". 
The current Reference Paper  on services domestic regulation  limited the special considerations of 
developing countr y Members  to transitional periods, which did not address the policy and regulatory 
challenges that could emerge as a result of the disciplines to be imposed under the Reference Paper, 
for example those on development of measures related to  authorization of supply of services or 
related to fees. Transitional periods also did not provide developing countr y Members with  effective 
opportunities to increase participation in international trade and to effectively address the challenges 
they face d with the regulatory disciplines imposed in foreign services markets, which often hinder ed 
attempts to increase participation in international trade in services.  Sri Lanka urged the Initiative 's 
participating Members to explain how the approach they were undertak ing in the ongoing 
negotiations related to  their obligations stipulated under GATS Article IV . 
In Sri Lanka 's view , the disciplines under negotiation were in reality  new rules , including  
generic rules on transparency which were in Article III under Part II of the GATS . Another area was 
to expand the obligations and fill certain gaps in  GATS  Article VI :3 on processing of applications.  
Sri Lanka disagreed with the view of  many JSI participa nts that these were only procedural 
adjustments. The Initiative 's participants  were moving on an uncharted track with the risk of 
derailing their final outcome , which they aim ed to achieve at the MC12. When there were still WTO 
Members who did not accept t hat those new rules could  be incorporated through the GATS Schedules 
as additional commitments , Sri Lanka enquired how could  the participants  obtain the concurrence 
of those Members , as eventually they needed  to certify their Schedule  as required by the GATS. 
Sri Lanka suggested  at this juncture  that it was more pragmatic to reassess the Initiative 's approach 
before proceeding any further .  
The representative of Ukraine  thank ed India and South Africa as well as other delegations 
who had presented their views and concerns on the Initiative. Ukraine  suppor ted the statement 
delivered  by the Coordinator of Initiative and echoed  the interventions  by Australia, the European 
Union, Canada and other participants  of the Initiative. Ukraine wishe d to stress its support  for the 
continuation of negotiations in the framework of this Initiative and  believe d that this process would 
lead Members  to an outcome beneficial for all WTO Members. Ukraine remained open to  further 
consultations with all the interested Members to discuss their possible interests and concerns on this 
topic.  
The representative of New Zealand  supported the statement by the Initiative 's Coordinator. 
New Zealand shared the view expressed by sever al delegations that t he work undertaken in the 
Joint Initiative  on Services Domestic Regulation  did not undermine, convert , or aim to replace the 
work of the WPDR. The commitments developed by the Initiative would apply on an MFN basis to all 
WTO Member s. Consequently , all Members stood  to benefit from the ir application . The disciplines  
were consistent with all WTO rules and in no way could be  seen to detract from those commitments 
already undertaken by Members, as had also  been outlined for greater certainty in the draft S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 20 - 
 
  Reference Paper itself. New Zealand looked forward to working towards a successful conclusion of 
the JSI discussions and to delivering a commercially meaningful outcome for all global service 
suppliers.  
The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  thank ed India and South Africa and other 
Members for sharing their concerns with regard to the negotiations of the Joint Initiative  on Services  
Domestic Regulation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was a strong sup porter of the multilateral trading 
system  and the WTO . It had participated actively in the discussions on domestic regulation  under 
the WPDR before 2017 and also participated in the negotiations in the JSI since  2019, without being 
a formal participant at that time. Thanks to its active participation, her delegation  had express ed its 
views and concerns , which had been  taken into account in the Initiative 's negotiating text . The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also believed that the draft Reference Paper contained the  necessary 
provisions for development and allowed  the necessary  possibilities for developing country M embers.  
In addition, the disciplines contained in the draft Reference Paper were not violating the GATS Article 
VI:4 mandate . The JSI discuss ions were transparent , inclusive , and open to all Members. Finally, 
the Initiative 's Coordinator  and several participants  had undertaken outreach consultations with non -
participants to update them regularly about the progress of the negotiations.  
The repre sentative of Mexico  support ed the statement s made by the Initiative 's Coordinator  
and other Members participating in the Initiative . With regard to the disciplines being discussed 
under this Initiative , Mexico noted that they  provide d flexibili ties to preserve  for the differences in 
WTO Members ' regulatory capacity and approaches , including  by allowing participants to implement 
certain obligations "to the extent practicable " or "encouraging Members to take certain actions ". The 
disciplines would apply t o those sectors where participants had undertaken commitments in their 
GATS Schedule for specific commitments. Mexico also highlighted that d eveloping economies 
participating in the  Initiative  could  also delay  the application of specific disciplines  in sec tors in which 
they face implementation difficulties . The use  of transitional periods would  permit  them to make the  
necessary adjustments to their domestic regulatory framework. Moreover , the disciplines would  
complement  the specific commitments under taken by participating Members in their respective 
GATS Schedules. Such disciplines  would  not affect any existing rights and obligations under the 
GATS or any other WTO Agreements . It was very important to stress  that the disciplines would  be 
binding  only for those WTO Members who inscribed them into their GATS Schedules. They would  be 
applied on an MFN basis meaning that service suppliers from all WTO Members would  be treated 
equally. Mexico remain ed open to continue dialogue to address any concerns  by Members . 
The representative of India thank ed South Africa, Zimbabwe , and  Sri Lanka for co -
sponsoring the agenda  and taking the floor to express their concerns on this very important issue.  
India also thank ed the Coordinator  of the J oint Initiative on  Services Domestic Regulation  and 
Members of the Initiative who had responded to the issue  and exchanged views bilaterally. India 
understood that  Members  needed to continue discussion s in the run -up to MC12  and request ed all 
Initiative 's participants  who had responded to the issues raised to share those responses in writing , 
so that these could be  shared in turn with respective  capitals.  
India emphasized that the issue that had been raised at the meeting was a systemic issue,  
which entaile d the  respect for WTO Agreement s, including the rules  in the Marrakesh Agreement  
and the GATS, multilateral mandates and WTO decisions taken by consensus.  In case of services 
domestic regulation , India recognized  the built -in mandate for developing multila teral disciplines on 
domestic regulation  in Article VI:4 of the GATS. The latter  had clearly assign ed that task to the CTS 
through appropriate bodies , and the CTS had constituted the WPDR  for that purpose . A lot of valuable 
work had been undertaken in the WPDR over the past 20 years . India was clear that the Joint 
Initiative  was not mandated to and could not  abuse the mandate  to develop disciplines under GATS 
Article VI:4 , which provided only a multilateral option. Secondly, while the Initiative 's Members were 
at liberty to schedule additional commitments under the GATS Article XVIII on measures affecting 
trade in services, such additional commitments could not  amend, interpret or clarify any of the 
existing provisions of the GATS.  
India urged the Initiati ve's Member s to closely examine the issues raised by India and co -
sponsors  and follow the  appropriate rules and procedures as laid down in the Marrakesh Agreement 
in its true letter and spirit.  While India was  not contesting Members ' right to schedule addi tional 
commitments, the latter was  meant for bringing into Schedules negotiated undertakings particular 
to each GATS signatory. It could  not be used for bringing  rules under general obligations and 
disciplines , as emphasi zed under GATS Art icle IV, into the  multilateral framework. Also , when GATS S/WPDR/M/7 7 
 
- 21 - 
 
  rules were being amended , this could  be done only in accordance with Article  X of the Marrakesh 
Agreement , and not through  certification procedures, whether S/L/80 or S/L/84. These were meant 
for changes to Members ' commitments contained in their respective Sc hedules.  The certification 
procedures could not  and should not render Art icle X of the M arrakesh Agreement  redundant . As 
outlined in the opening statement , India believe d that  appropriate textual changes and clarifications 
were imperative to the Initiative 's draft Reference Paper to achieve consistency with the provisions 
of the WTO Agreement s, including GATS and the Marr akesh Agreement , multilateral mandates and 
WTO consensus decision taking method.  
The Chair person  noted that  delegations held different views on the points raised at the 
meeting. She encouraged delegations to continue their discussions bilaterally, and in any other 
appropriate settings.  While all delegations were aware of the multilateral mandate to develop any 
necessary dis ciplines to ensure that licensing and qualifications requirements and procedures did 
not create unnecessary barriers to trade in services, it was clear that previous failures to finali ze 
work in the WPDR had led  to doubts as to what the WPDR would be able to achieve . Hence, Members 
held different views on the substance and timing for re -invigorating work in the WPDR . She 
suggested  that those delegations that saw scope for developing disciplines in the WPDR engage with 
other Members and identify areas where multilateral disciplines might be viable . She suggested that 
the Working Party take note of the statements made.  
It was so agreed . 
2  ITEM  C: OTHER BUSINESS  
2.1. The Chairperson  recalled that the appointment of the Chairperson of the WPDR should normally 
take place at the end of the first meeting of the year . However, since the slate of names for the 
Chairpersons of the CTS subsidiary bodies for 2021 had not been confirmed to dat e, it was not 
possible to appoint the 2021 Chair at the meeting. Once the slate of names was confirmed, Members 
would be informed, including on further arrangements concerning the hand -over.  
 
 
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