RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/CTD/M/1
3 July 2002
(02-3719)
Committee on Trade and Development
First Special Session
NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 5 MARCH 2002
Chairman:  H.E. Mr. Ransford Smith (Jamaica)
A. CONFIRMATION OF THE APPOIN TMENT OF THE CHAIRM AN ....................................1
B. ADOPTION OF TH E DRAFT AGENDA .................................................................................1
C. OBSERV ERS .................................................................................................................... .........1
D. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENT IAL TREATMENT ....................................................................2
A. CONFIRMATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN
1. The meeting was opened by Ambassador Ransford Smith of Jamaica as Chairperson-
designate, following the consensus in the 15 Fe bruary 2002 General Council (GC) meeting on the
slate of names for the appointment of Chairpersons to the bodies established by the Trade
Negotiations Committee (TNC).  He proposed that the Special Session of the Committee on Trade
and Development (CTD) formally confirm his appointment as Chairperson.
2. It was so agreed.
B. ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT AGENDA
3. The Chairman said that the draft agenda for the meeting was contained in airgram
WTO/AIR/1716/Rev.1 of 28 February 2002.
4. The agenda was adopted without any amendments.
C. OBSERVERS
5. The Chairman stated that since the Special Session had not discussed the question of
observers, they could not be invited to the present meeting.  However, the issue required a decision.
The meeting went into informal mode.
6. The matter was deferred without a decision.TN/CTD/M/1
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D. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
7. The Chairman reminded delegations of the background to the papers before the Special
Session.  WTO Members had adopted the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns
at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha.  Paragraph 12.1 of that Decision instructed the CTD to
carry out a work programme on special and differential treatment.  Pursuant to that Decision, the CTDhad adopted a process for its work, which was set out in document WT/COMTD/36.  In accordance
with that agreed process, the Secretariat had been asked to produce a number of documents which
were before the Special Session.  Document  WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1, had been
prepared by the Secretariat to meet the requirement of paragraph 1 (a) of the agreed process in
WT/COMTD/36 to identify the special and differential provisions that were mandatory, and those
which were not.  A second document WT/COMTD /W/77/Rev.1/Add.2, gave an overview of the
operation of mandatory special and differential treatment provisions, to meet the requirement ofparagraph 2 (a) of WT/COMTD/36.  That document built on earlier work done in
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1.  A third document, WT /COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3, had been prepared
by the Secretariat to meet the requirement of paragraph 1 (b) of the agreed process to compile factual
information on the legal implications for the WTO Agreements of making non-mandatory special and
differential treatment provisions mandatory.  Finally, the fourth document before the Special Session,WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4, had been prepared by the Secretariat, to meet the requirement of
paragraph 2 (b) of the agreed process, to provide information on the utilisation of special and
differential treatment provisions.  The Chairman proposed that the papers, be treated as background
documents for a substantive discussion (and work) on special and differential treatment, and indicated
the proposed sequence of the Special Session's work.  The first step would be for Members to identifythose non-mandatory provisions that they considered should be made mandatory, as called for in
paragraph 1 (d) of WT/COMTD/36, and the second to provide inputs on the legal and practical
implications of making mandatory, the non-mandatory provisions, as called for in paragraph 1 (c) of
WT/COMTD/36.  He suggested that the Special Session began by looking in more depth at one of the
documents.  Mr. Peter Kuijper, Director of the Legal Affairs Division, was invited to introducedocument WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 on the legal implications for the WTO Agreements of
making non-mandatory special and differential treatment provisions mandatory.
8. The Director of the Legal Affairs Division said that the Secretariat had been instructed by the
CTD in paragraph 1 (b) of the agreed process "to compile factual information on the legal
implications for the WTO agreements of making non-mandatory special and differential treatment
provisions mandatory".  Accordingly, the Secr etariat had prepared WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3
which provided Members with analytical tools for discussing how particular non-mandatory specialand differential treatment provisions might be made mandatory.  The Note had been prepared by the
Secretariat under its own responsibility, and was not intended to affect in any way the rights and
obligations of Members.  The same comments applie d to his introductory remarks.  In preparing the
Note, the Secretariat had proceeded on the basis that, in law, a particular legal provision was either
mandatory or non-mandatory; it was not a question of degree, as it was a binary choice .  As in
previous Secretariat Notes on special and differential treatment provisions, mandatory provisions had
been distinguished from non-mandatory ones based on the language employed in those provisions.
Specifically, it had been assumed that provisions using the word "shall" were intended to be
mandatory in nature, whereas provisions using the word "should" were intended to be non-mandatory
in nature.  The interpretation of "shall" and "should" as indicating mandatory and non-mandatoryprovisions was generally recognized.  Nevertheless, the Secretariat had felt it appropriate to remind
Members that, according to the Appellate Body report on Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft , there might have been instances where even provisions using the word "should"
were intended to be mandatory in nature.  That was a question of interpreting such words within their
context in light of the objective and purpose, a familiar criterion used in the interpretation of Treatiesunder international law.  That nuance appeared relevant to Members' consideration of the legal
implications of making non-mandatory special and differential treatment provisions mandatory.TN/CTD/M/1
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9. He went on to say that precisely because the binary distinction between mandatory and non-
mandatory provisions might not have been fully satisfactory in helping Members decide what they
might want to do in order to make special and differential treatment provisions more "effective" in
practice, the Secretariat had also introduced (i) another binary legal distinction and (ii) a small nuance.
The other binary legal distinction was the one between "obligations of result" and "obligations ofconduct", which could be found in WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.2.  This distinction could be
helpful to delegations insofar as they would want to consider whether an obligation in a particular
special and differential treatment provision was appropriately written in the form of an "obligation of
conduct", instead of an "obligation of result" and vice versa.  That was a rough distinction, but was
useful as an analytical tool, although there were cases in which "obligations of conduct" and
"obligations of result" were similar, as delegations would have seen with some of the provisions in
practice.  With respect to the nuance which the Secretariat had introduced, it was pertinent to recallthat special and differential treatment provisions which were legally mandatory need not, for that
reason alone, be totally effective in their operation.  This was because the obligations laid down in
legally mandatory provisions could be more or less specific or determinate.  Members should bear this
in mind as they went through the process of deciding whether to transform particular non-mandatory
special and differential treatment provisions into ma ndatory ones.  The three distinctions used in the
various Secretariat Notes on special and differential treatment provisions, namely (i) the distinction
between mandatory and non-mandatory provisions; (ii) the distinction between "obligations of result"
and "obligations of conduct"; and (iii) the distinction between more or less flexible mandatory
provisions, should not be seen as implying interpretations of the provisions concerned by the
Secretariat, as everyone knew that only the Ministerial Conference or the General Council was
mandated to make authoritative interpretations under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement.  The
distinctions in question had been presented in the Notes only as analytical tools that Members might
find helpful when they decide which special and differential treatment provisions they want to make
"mandatory" and how.  Members were given a certain number of tools, and it was their decision
whether they wanted to use them.
10. The representative of Argentina said that in the last sentence of paragraph 7 of
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3, where a reference had been made to interpretations, the fact that the
Ministerial Conference or the General Council were authorised to interpret the WTO Agreements, by
means of the procedure provided under Article IX:2 should be added.  Ministerial decisions could not
interpret the Agreement.  Interpretation could be done only under the procedure provided for under
Article IX:2, which included that there be a recommendation from the General Council.  He requested
that it be duly reflected in the last sentence of paragraph 7.  Secondly, the third sentence in thefootnote 4 on page 3 of the same document stated that "The word "should" has, for instance,
previously been interpreted by us as expressing a "duty" of panels in the context of Article 11".  He
enquired whether the word "previously" referred to other cases under the Appellate Body of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) in which "should" was interpreted in this way.
11. The representative of Venezuela noted that the texts had been drafted on the basis of a prior
selection made by the Secretariat, and also noted that the pre-Doha proposals on implementation and
the related discussions had referred not only to preambular provisions, but also to far more substantial
provisions than those  in WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3.  The entire discussion on implementation
which was held prior to the Doha decision to review the special and differential treatment provisions
in all the WTO Agreements, was intended to make these provisions effective so that they would leadto real benefits for developing countries.  The provisions were to be binding and effective.  She said
that the separation of the work into those provisions which were binding in nature and those of a
different nature, seemed to be an appropriate approach, as it facilitated work.  However, the
mechanical approach used by the Secretariat in  WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3, of taking a word in
a provision and changing it, was not useful, since it did not prove that the amended provision became
binding, and did not solve the underlying problem of the rule being ineffective.  For example, several
of the proposed texts included phrases like "should give special attention to … ", which in herTN/CTD/M/1
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delegation's view already constituted an obligation, and as such was already binding.  However, the
phrase "to give attention to …", did not involve a specific obligation, and it was therefore through the
interpretation of the provision, that they reached a given objective in a sentence of this type.  She was
aware that the discussions on mandatory and non-mandatory provisions were part of the package to be
examined by the Special Session.  The Secretariat ha d a narrow view of the range of options available
or desirable in connection with authoritative interpretation or amendment of the Agreements.  Before
Doha, Members had discussed proposals for sanitary measures, and one view had been that it would
have been possible to adopt an interpretation wh ich included longer transition times for sanitary
measures.  An appropriate period, such as 6 months, could have been specified for that process.  The
most pernicious aspect of the Secretariat's approach was that it constrained recourse to interpretation,
with its superficial reliance on mechanical verbal ch anges and highly legalistic stance.  If consensus
was reached among Members, that would prevent them from interpreting a provision in the mannerthey deemed fit, a freedom which ought to be preserved.
12. She continued by saying that the CTD's work on special and differential treatment was being
carried out in accordance with a mandate provided by paragraph 12 of the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns at the Fourth Ministerial Conference.  That and all other
implementation-related issues formed part of the negotiation process and constituted a single whole,and it was therefore implausible to argue that a negotiating mandate was required to introduce
amendments into the Agreements, since Members we re already engaged in a de facto negotiating
process.  The goal should not be to strike a balance within each individual Agreement, but in the full
set of Agreements.  The developing countries had accepted the comprehensive trade round, and in
return they anticipated that the special and differential treatment provisions of the Uruguay RoundAgreements would be truly put into practice.  They further believed that the interpretation of many of
the provisions would help the Special Session achieve the most efficient solution, provided that the
interpretation served to make the rules truly effec tive and not just mandatory.  Nevertheless, if the
interpretation mechanism proved ineffective, then the provisions which the Secretariat had put in that
category should be dealt with through other means, including through the introduction of amendmentsto the Agreements.  Many of her comments also referred to WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4.
13. The Chairman, in response to the representative of Venezuela's statement, clarified that
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 had been provided by the Secretariat under specific instructions "to
compile factual information on the legal implications for the WTO Agreements of making non-
mandatory special and differential treatment provisions mandatory".  Many of the points which she
had raised related to work to be subsequently done by the Special Session.  Indeed, the Special
Session had a mandate, and the Members themselves were to provide inputs on the legal and practicalimplications of making non-mandatory special and differential treatment provisions mandatory.  In
addition, the CTD also had a mandate to examine provisions which could be made more effective, and
the point that the representative of Venezuela had alluded to, namely that the mandatory nature of a
provision would not necessarily translate into effectiveness, was a point that other delegations might
share, and an opportunity would be provided fo r Members to advance proposals in that respect.
14. The representative of India said that the documentation prepared by the Secretariat could
provide the basis for further work.  However, it was unclear what distinctions had been used to
classify a provision as "obligation of conduct" or "obligation of result" and requested the Secretariat
to give an illustrative example.  In addition, paragraph 4 of WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 stated
that "It might be worthwhile to keep in mind that some special and differential treatment provisionswhich are mandatory in the strict legal sense of the term …, are nevertheless characterized by a
considerable flexibility of the obligations laid down in these provisions.  A mandatory provision
might therefore not necessarily be effective …".  As no views had been given by the Secretariat on
that aspect of the document, he requested the Secretariat also to comment on the statement.TN/CTD/M/1
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15. The representative of Senegal in response to th e Secretariat's intervention, considered that the
purpose of the Committee's work was to make existing provisions binding and effective.  One should
avoid interpretation in the legal sphere, since one could spend years without reaching any final
decision. "Obligations of result" and "obligati ons of conduct", were both obligations, and the
distinction between the two should be about the degree of the obligation.  It was also important toensure that the countries which had such obligations respected them.  There were examples in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which spoke of the
transfer of technology for the Least-Developed Countr ies (LDCs).  This could have been an obligation
upon some countries, but in fact it depended upon their goodwill, to ensure a transfer of technology.
How was a particular obligation to be made mandatory, when one spoke of "should" and "shall"?
Perhaps the degree of binding was different, but as far as his delegation was concerned, the obligation
was there.  Could one say that an obligation was more binding in one case than in another?  Theimportant question was seeing whether the obligation was respected or not.  In those  cases where
mechanisms may seem to be less stringent, mechanisms should  be established to make them more
binding.  In the case of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, for example, there was a provision
which did not have a specific time-frame, and Members had reached an agreement to introduce a
time-frame of 6 months.  The obligation had existed, but there was no way of ensuring that theobligation was implemented.  The delegation wanted to ensure that obligations were respected and
implemented and that mechanisms were established to ensure that this was done, where they were
lacking.
16. The Chairman said that since the representative of Senegal had indicated his delegation's view
that the objective of the exercise was to make provisions binding, mandatory and effective, he would
remind delegations of the agreed process of work which had been agreed in the CTD as contained in
document WT/COMTD/36.  In some instances the time-frames in that document may have been
overtaken by events, but he was of the view that the substantive outline of the work indicated in that
document, was what had been agreed to be carried out, and the Special Session should therefore
proceed in the manner that had been agreed to.
17. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation would have preferred a more logical
approach to the work of the Special Session which would have allowed it to consider the
operationalisation of mandatory provisions first, and having agreed to some sort of effective
mechanism, could then have moved to the non-mandatory provisions.  There were a lot of non-
mandatory provisions which were drafted using the word "should" and "may", and he wondered
whether despite some of the jurisprudence which indicated that the word "should" gave rise to a duty
rather than an exhortation, this meant that the Memb er which felt that the obligation had not been met
by other Members could have recourse to remedial measures in these circumstances.  He was of the
view that unless there were clarifications to that effect, in circumstances of non-fulfilment of such
obligations, there would need to be a mechanism which would give rise to an absolute right which
could then be sought in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  Developing countries had, on several
occasions, made the point that the special and differential treatment in anti-dumping, under whichdeveloped countries committed to explore alternative measures to dumping before imposing duties on
developing countries, had not been met despite being mandatory.  He enquired whether the provision
implied that there was a duty to provide informatio n on the possible alternatives used.  Despite a
request by developing countries to provide such information, this had not been done.  The Special
Session had to look carefully at all areas, and arranged for a mechanism to be established whichensured that both the mandatory and non-mandatory provisions existing in the WTO Agreements
were operationalized.
18. The representative of Mauritania said that his delegation was of the view that neither
mandatory nor non-mandatory special and differential treatment provisions, had been effective.  Prior
to any review of the provisions, an assessment should therefore be done of the mandatory provisions,to see what results had been obtained, whether for LDCs or in the areas of technical assistance andTN/CTD/M/1
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capacity building.  It was pointless to make provisions mandatory, if they were not effective in nature.
Second, his delegation considered that it was necessary to make the contents of the provisions more
precise.  For example, what precisely did a phrase like "increase trade possibilities for developing
countries" mean?  Developing countries must be helped to strengthen their export supply.  His
delegation was of the view that the Special Session's work would be more effective through theapproach of amendments, as the option of authoritative interpretations may not be as legally sound
since they were open to a different judgement or to legal changes.  A more precise methodology
should be adopted, following which his delegation would make more specific proposals.
19. The Chairman said that the CTD had been asked to examine provisions which could be made
more effective in their operation, and Members were invited to make their inputs into the process.  He
reminded delegations that under the agreed process, Members had been tasked to identify those
provisions that they considered should be made mandatory.  Secondly, Members had been tasked toprovide inputs on the legal and practical implications of doing so.  Third, Members were tasked to
examine those provisions that could be made more effective in their operation.  He was of the view
that this could apply to both mandatory and non-mandatory provisions.  Fourth, Members were tasked
to consider ways in which developing countries, in particular LDCs, may be assisted to make the best
use of special and differential treatment provisio ns, including improved information flows.  The
Secretariat had provided some background documentation to assist in these tasks.  These four tasks
needed to be structured as this was the agreed process which the Special Session had embarked on,
and it was therefore necessary to address the work plan at some stage during the meeting to allow the
Special Session to carry out the agreed process of work.
20. The representative of the United States endorsed the reminder made by the Chairman
regarding the process of work.  Her delegation was of the view that the first meeting of the Special
Session should look at the documentation prepared by the Secretariat so they could determine what
type of tool could be provided in the course of the Special Session's work.  There may be differences
in opinion or interpretation, even with respect to  interpretations which had been prepared by the
Secretariat.  Her delegation appreciated the efforts of the Secretariat in preparing the documents andreiterated the disclaimer in paragraph 2 of WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3, that the documents were
"without prejudice to the exclusive right of Member s to adopt authoritative interpretations of their
rights and obligations under the WTO …".  In light of that, after reviewing the documents her
delegation was concerned that in some cases Members' freedom with respect to exercising the right of
interpretation might be challenged, as had been expressed by the representative of Venezuela.  It was
unclear, however, exactly what had been suggested with respect to authoritative interpretations.  Her
delegation understood that there was an Appellate Body decision with respect to the Canada Aircraftcase.  However, the delegation noted that the Appellate Body, had in one instance deemed the word
"should" to be a duty, and suggested that perhaps in certain instances, the Committee might interpret
the word "should" in the same way.  Only WT O Members had the authority to amend WTO rules
and/or create new obligations.  The Appellate Body ruling in the Canada Aircraft case, in her view,
had no relevance to the interpretation of special and differential treatment provisions included invarious WTO Agreements.  The ruling discussed only whether certain provisions of the DSU, relating
to procedural rules regarding the relations between dispute settlement panels and parties had a more
mandatory character, despite the use of the word "should".  The Appellate Body’s discussion of
certain provisions of the DSU had little, if any relevance, to the mandatory nature of other WTO
Agreements.  The task before the Special Session was to examine a number of provisions throughoutthe WTO Agreement.  Her delegation would be concerned if suddenly, in the process they needed to
get into an exercise of interpretation, following an  Appellate Body interpretation in a narrow context.
She echoed the comments made by the representative of India, with respect to
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.2, as her delegation wa s not aware of any concept in the WTO that
had emerged concerning "obligations of conduct" or "obligations of result".  These concepts were notfamiliar in other contexts of work in the WTO, but if the purpose of the categorisation into
"obligations of conduct" or "obligations of result" was to help delegations to organise the provisionsTN/CTD/M/1
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in order to understand what the effectiveness of those provisions was, and how that effectiveness
could be examined – she was not clear if such an exercise was needed, and her delegation therefore
echoed the comments of the representative of Senegal.  The task at hand from the perspective of the
US delegation was to examine the provisions and to see where delegations might offer ideas and
suggestions on how the provisions might be operationalized and made more effective or precise.Engaging in the exercise, did not prejudge her delegation's position on whether they agreed to
negotiate an interpretation or an amendment of any provision.  The US delegation was there to engage
in the exercise, but this would not prejudge their position later on during the process of the work.  In
light of this, she was not sure where they stood with respect to the documents before the Special
Session.  Her delegation had further comments on specific provisions, and in particular with respect to
the utilisation document (WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/A dd.4), where they questioned some points and
had raised ideas on how that document could be made more useful.  The delegation would have likedto make specific comments on paragraphs and analyses provided by the Secretariat, for example
whether, if the word "should" was changed to "shall", this really made a provision mandatory.
However, as other delegations had indicated, even if a provision was made mandatory, its objective
may not be  achieved, and her delegation therefore thought that a constructive approach would be to
examine what information the Special Session had with respect to utilisation, and how the SpecialSession could then proceed to meet Members' concerns.
21. The representative of Egypt said that what wa s important was the effectiveness of provisions
rather than changing the language from "should" to "shall" or any other language change.  The whole
point of the exercise was to allow developing countries and LDCs to actually use the provisions,
rather than changing the language in which they were phrased.  Second, he had noticed that onpage 21 of WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4, with respec t to the utilisation of paragraph 5 of the
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-
Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing C ountries (NFIC), the Secretariat had made a
comment which was not of great value to his delegation, and his delegation would have preferred
something more substantial.  With respect to  WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add. 3, he had noticed that
the NFIC Decision was not included, and as a NFIC his delegation was of the view that the Decision
was part of the non-mandatory special and differential provisions.  He would therefore have liked the
Secretariat to include something on NFIC in WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3.
22. The representative of Belize believed that a logical approach was one that accommodated the
perspectives held by different delegations, and therefore that the ordering of the work was important,
even though this aspect was not included in WT/COMTD/36.  He was therefore flexible and open to
suggestions with respect to the best way to move the work forward, particularly as it related tostrengthening and making special and differential provisions "more precise, effective and
operational".  He welcomed the presentation by the Secretariat on
W/77/WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 and the suggestions  that were contained in the document and
felt that the work should focus on the two is sues raised in the document - namely, whether
amendment or authoritative interpretation should be the approach for making non-mandatoryprovisions, mandatory.  That however, should not preclude the Special Session identifying other
mechanisms for doing so.  This raised the issue of whether the use of the words "should" or "shall"
denoted a different level of obligation to Members, and his delegation felt that interpretational issues
would be influenced by whichever approach was adopted, and the Special Session should give
consideration to this as it deliberated on how to move forward.
23. The representative of St. Lucia said that her views on WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 were
different to other delegations, as she did not think that the Secretariat had been trying to prejudge
Members' rights to authoritatively interpret WTO Agreements, or suggest that any particular
designation definitively addressed the issue of interpretation.  She thought it was merely a support
document that had been put forward because Members with limited capacity needed discussions anddebate, in order that they could express their views,  whether or not they were views that could lead toTN/CTD/M/1
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a concensus, or views which the Appellate Body may one day not agree with.  She had been
impressed by some Members which were not benefitting from developing country status but who
repeatedly asked why developing countries were not taking advantage of existing special and
differential treatment provisions.  This suggested that developed countries did want to make the
provisions more effective, to hear what developing countries' problems were and to identify means toaddress them.  Some of these means would involv e in some cases, authoritative interpretation and
amendments, and in other cases modifications to the language would be necessary.  As a starting-
point she noted that WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 ra ised the issue of trade instruments, and had
pointed out that not only little countries like St. Lu cia had not taken advantage of these provisions, but
that no developing country had taken advantage of them, and this situation therefore raised the
question as to why this was so.
24. The representative of the European Communities saw the Secretariat documents as the
preliminary stage of the discussion, where Members had reference documents to ensure that nothing
was omitted, to have an overview of the subject, and to see how the provisions were framed.  He was
puzzled by the discussion about how appropriate th e order of work was, as there had been a long
debate on the issue and they had agreed on a work programme.  His delegation had previously made
the point that had just been made in the meeting by the representatives of Venezuela, Pakistan andEgypt, that effectiveness counted and that "ma ndatory" and "non-mandatory" was not really the
decisive criterion if one wanted to look at effectiveness.  He was further of the view that the Special
Session should really try to implement the programme which was agreed to in WT/COMTD/36 and
see how the various aspects of the discussion could be reconciled in order to make them as conducive
to progress as possible.  The real questions with respect to WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 forexample, were  what would it mean to replace "should" by "shall", and what would be the actual
implications.  This needed to come from Members.  Proposals now had to be made by Members as to
what they wished to be done.  The delegation also raised the technical point that in
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.1 and possibly some of the other papers, transition periods and some
other similar provisions such as Article XVIII (where Members could, for example, avail themselvesof certain rights to protect an infant industry) were not included in some of the lists and there may
therefore be a possibility that the Special Session may forget about these points in some of the
discussions.  The delegation was of the view that those provisions were mandatory, even though they
were not listed in WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.2.  A transition period was mandatory even though
it was the developing country's choice whether to avail themselves of the provision or not.
Furthermore, for the discussions on the effectivenes s of the provisions, Members would need to refer
to WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 to come back to these types of provisions and this was acomplicated way of ensuring that the Special Session had the complete picture.  The delegation was
not suggesting that everything should be re-written, but wanted to draw other delegations' attention to
the complexity and difficulty of working with the classifications in a meaningful way.  The approach
in the papers however, if one took the time to look  for the details, did give Members the necessary
background to start making the provisions more effective and conducive to developing countries'integration into the trading system.
25. The representative of Switzerland said that in the end, Members had the final say with respect
to how to interpret the WTO Agreements.  With respect to the last sentence of paragraph 6 of
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3, his delegation was of th e view that the Secretariat had gone too far
in interpreting the Agreement.  That sentence st ated "… some Members might argue that the text of
each existing agreement reflects a negotiated balance of interests …", and his delegation was of the
view that it might have been better to leave it up to each Member to decide whether it wanted to take
such a position, and he therefore proposed that the reference be deleted from the text.  His delegation
had divided the special and differential provisions into three groups.  The first one contained around
half of the special and differential provisions and allowed but did not force Members to take aparticular action (in his delegation's view the classification of "mandatory" and "non-mandatory" was
not very useful).  A second group contained provis ions which were mandatory and could be furtherTN/CTD/M/1
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divided into the sub-categories, "the obligation to act" or "the obligation to reach a result".  Finally,
there was a third group of about 25 to 30 non-mandatory provisions, as listed in
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add. 3.  A number of the provisions in the third group did not appear to be
suitable to be made mandatory, and that therefore left about 10 provisions to be considered.  At this
stage of the discussions therefore his delegation was of the view that the Special Session shouldconcentrate on these few provisions.  The issue was not whether a provision was mandatory or not, as
stated by previous delegations such as the representatives of the United States and Egypt, as both
mandatory and non-mandatory provisions could be effective.  After reflecting upon whether
provisions were effective and how they could be made more effective, what was missing was for
Members to consider the goal they wished to achiev e with the special and differential provisions.  For
example, with respect to the category of transitional time periods, was the goal to allow for a smooth
structural adjustment for the national economy, which meant that it would be a good negotiatingprogramme at the national level; was the goal to temporarily set aside implementation for an
Agreement to allow a capacity-constrained administra tion to first focus on priority issues; was the
goal to give a national administration time to build-up better know-how in order to find an optimal
way for implementation; or was the idea that a developed economy may simply not yet be in a
position to fulfil a certain obligation, and implementation was therefore waived until conditions weremore appropriate?  His delegation believed these were all valuable and legitimate goals, but noted that
depending on the result being aimed for, the suggestions to improve the effectiveness of a related
provision might be completely different.  It might therefore be useful to dedicate a session on the
objectives the Special Session wanted to reach on special and differential treatment.
26. The representative of Nicaragua was concerned that if a strategy had to be outlined in the
calendar, it was not clear what process would be followed if they were to agree on which measures
were to be amended.  Since their delegation had no prior experience on how to amend an Agreement
in the WTO, similar to the representative of Switzerland, they were of the view that there needed to be
a parallel process which would shed light on the special and differential provisions and determine how
an Agreement could be amended.  The delegation also agreed with the representative of Venezuela,when she had stated that the real problem lay in seeing to what degree the provisions could actually be
made effective.  With respect to  interpretation a nd the actual tense of the verb, the words "shall" and
"should" could lead to considerable problems.  The delegate emphasised that special and differential
treatment was given to those countries which, because of their specific situation and problems of a
given nature, required special and differential treat ment, which would enable them to benefit from the
multilateral trading system (MTS).  If this aspect was lost from sight as the Special Session's main
purpose, then the work was pointless, and they would continue going round and round in the legalisticdiscussion and speak of different types of laws rather than getting to the point.
27. The Director of the Legal Affairs Division said that he could not emphasize enough that the
documents were meant to provide analytical tools.   The first tool was "mandatory" versus "non-
mandatory", the second tool (which was unclear to some Members) was  "obligations of conduct" and
"obligations of result", and a third tool was the implicit recognition of the problem of effectiveness,namely that even mandatory provisions could be more or less flexible.  This was as far as the
Secretariat felt it could have gone, as the discussion of effectiveness was for the CTD.  Some of the
remarks by delegations were technical and some were general.  As far as  remarks such as those which
were made by the representative of Switzerland (who had been of the view that the last sentence of
paragraph 6 of WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 was not fully felicitous) and the remark of therepresentative of Argentina (who believed that the last sentence in paragraph 7 of
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 might have contained a reference to specific procedures of
Article IX:2, he felt that such remarks should be noted.  He further suggested that the documents
should be accepted as they were.  He accepted that it may have been better to have referred to Article
IX:2 in the procedure in the last sentence, however the last sentence in paragraph 6 was a question ofindividual taste and should not be discussed endlessly.  With respect to the other remark by the
representative of Argentina on footnote 4 of the document, which was also raised by theTN/CTD/M/1
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representative of the United States, he stated that the quote was from the Canada Aircraft Appellate
Body report and the text had clearly stated that the Appellate Body had used the interpretation of
"should" as mandatory, primarily in provisions of a procedural nature, and that was also true for
references to Article XI of the DSU where it concerned the famous sentence "accordingly a Panel
should make an objective assessment of the matter before it".  He knew of no other examples ofprovisions of a procedural nature, and that was why that particular phrase was included in the
document; it was up to delegations to decide whether it was of relevance for special and differential
treatment provisions.  With respect to the request made by the representative of India for an example
of the distinction between "obligation of conduct" and "obligation of result", this was best illustrated
by referring to an anti-dumping case that India was involved in, in which the interpretation of Article
15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stated that "it is recognised that special regard must be given by
developed country Members to the special situation of developing country Members whenconsidering the application of anti-dumping measures ….  Possibilities of constructive remedies
provided by this Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties…."  This was a
good example of a mandatory provision with words "must" and "shall" which was an "obligation of
conduct".  The remark that the distinction between "obligations of conduct" and "obligations of result"
was not one that appeared in the WTO, was true as they were universal instruments of analysis inanalysing obligations under international or nationa l law.  They may have been helpful tools in
assisting delegations to decide whether in certain situations an "obligation of conduct" (like Article 15
of the Agreement on Anti-dumping) meant that the state concerned (he thought that in that case it was
the European Communities) was obliged in its conduct of the investigation of the anti-dumping case
to consider these issues.  The Panel and the Appellate Body were of the opinion that it was anobligation which by the fact that there was a reference to it in the actual anti-dumping decision, could
be shown to have been followed.  As long as ther e was no reference to the fact that something like this
had been done in the procedure, it had to be assumed, that this obligation – which was mandatory -
had not been followed; but it was an obligation of how to conduct the procedure.  In contrast, in
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.2, a provision such as  paragraph 4 of the Decision on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net
Food-Importing Developing Countries, and specifically the provision that "Ministers further agreed to
ensure", then one had an "obligation of result", especially because of the word "ensure".  It was not
clear how Ministers should "ensure", as there wa s nothing said about the procedure of how they
should do it, but the end result was there:  they shall ensure something, a clear "obligation of result".
The Secretariat had provided Members with the analytical categories to give them a possibility to
consider whether in certain situations "obligation of result" should be replaced by "obligation ofconduct" or "obligation of conduct" should rather be "obligation of result".  He hoped that this was
helpful, but it was up to Members to decide.  In his view he had responded to the most important
questions that were raised, and in so doing had also responded to those he had mentioned explicitly.
28. With respect to the way to proceed with making  procedures mandatory or more effective, the
choice of either amendment or authoritative interpretation was up to Members.  The choice dependedon whether in the Members' judgement to have the desired result it was more useful to use
amendment or interpretation.  With respect to the technical steps of amending an Agreement these
were clearly described in Article X, which inter alia  indicated that towards the end of the process
when Members had made their political decision, if Members wanted to proceed to certain
amendments, then the Secretariat would be ready to  help Members with the technical steps necessary
to put the amendments in proper legal form and language.  The same was true for any authoritative
interpretations that Members may want to make.  There were a number of model decisions in the area
of amendments and authoritative amendments that were circulated at the beginning of his period as
Legal Advisor, as Job(00)/4868, which gave an initial idea of the technical steps which were
necessary.  With respect to the point raised by the representative of the European Communitiesregarding provisions such as Article XVIII of the GATT, he admitted that these had been left out, as
the Secretariat believed that these provisions gave a "right" to developing countries and there could be
no doubt that a "right" once it was invoked was a "right", and therefore mandatory; it was thereforeTN/CTD/M/1
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difficult to classify such provisions, but the Special Session should clearly not lose sight of the fact
that there were a number of provisions which give specific "rights" to developing countries and which
therefore could not be easily classified in the distinction of "mandatory" or "non-mandatory", but
these provisions should perhaps be kept in mind wh en considering the issue of effectiveness, during
the work programme.
29. The Chairman said that it may very well be that "mandatoriness" and effectiveness may not
be the same thing, but a mandatory effective provision and a non-mandatory effective provision may
also not be the same in jurisprudence.  It might therefore be useful to make a non-mandatory
provision both mandatory and effective.  That was another issue to make a decision on, as it was part
of the work programme agreed to on 14 December 2001, to which, he was of the opinion, the Special
Session should adhere as closely as possible.  A third element was also included in that decision, in
which Members were asked to consider ways in which developing countries may be assisted inmaking best use of special and differential provisions, with a specific reference to improved
information flows.  This required looking at specific provisions and proposals put forward by
Members, including recommendations to change, keep or make provisions more effective and the
Special Session had to start working on this aspect of the work.  There was documentation from the
Secretariat which provided a background and included some suggested categories which could beused.  He had envisaged possibly scheduling meetings on 9 April, 16 May, 14 June and 2 and 17 July
2002.  Four broad tasks faced Members.  He therefore suggested that at the March and April 2002
meetings, the Committee begin to look at the inputs from Members on the legal and practical
implications of making non-mandatory provisions mandatory, and on identifying the provisions that
Members considered should be made mandatory.  In the May and June 2002 meetings, they couldexamine the provisions which could be made more effective in their operation, and the consideration
of ways in which special and differential provisions could be made more effective in their operation
including how information flows could be improved.  At the final two meetings in July 2002, the
Special Session might therefore wish to prepare and consider formulating the recommendations to be
submitted to the General Council.  It was recogn ized that Members might wish a cross-cutting
approach to the issues, and this was not precluded, but it was mentioned that if there was no focus
about what they wished to do at each set of meetings then it might be more difficult to move forward
towards the conclusion at the end.  For the remainder of the morning, he suggested a discussion of the
document WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4.
30. The representative of the European Communities placed a reservation on the schedule of
meetings for the time being, as they needed to s ee how things were developing elsewhere in other
WTO bodies.  His delegation had been unsuccessfully trying to get a number of meetings in otherWTO bodies, and although he did not want to make linkages with the Special Session he had to
reserve his right on this issue, and there might be a need to have an informal look at this.  He also
understood that the Special Session had a deadline of July 2002 which was not comparable to some
other processes which they were looking at.
31. The representative of Belize requested that the Chairman present his proposal in writing to
allow delegations to further reflect on it and make their determinations.
32. The Chairman agreed with that request.
33. The representative of Egypt supported the proposal made by the representative of Belize, and
indicated that the delegation supported the programme of work proposed by the Chairman.
34. The representative of India said that he was comfortable with the programme of work and
schedule of meetings suggested by the Chairman and reminded Members that the Special Session of
the CTD had a stricter deadline than the Special Sessions of other bodies, and the number of meetingsTN/CTD/M/1
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proposed therefore was reasonable, although he was not sure if they would actually be able to
complete the work in the number of meetings which were being proposed.
35. The representative of Uganda said that he agreed with the Chairman's programme of work, as
it made the Special Session more focused and gave delegations time to prepare adequately for each
meeting.  He also agreed with the Chairman that it would not help the Special Session to have cross-cutting issues at each stage, but the programme ou tlined by the Chairman should hopefully help them
meet their deadline.
36. The Chairman indicated that in light of the co mments on his preliminary suggestion, he would
carry out consultations, and at the next meeting of the Special Session they could perhaps formalise
the work plan, even though at that time one meeting would have passed.  He then turned to document
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4.
37. The representative of the United States said that her delegation thought that the document
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 could be a useful tool to negotiators in the various groups, and had
suggestions that they thought could improve the quality of the document.  She proposed that the
Secretariat allow delegations to give them additional written comments by the end of the following
week for incorporation into the document.  As examples (these comments would be provided in
writing at a later stage) she indicated that the document did not fully describe the utilisation of thespecial and differential provisions and some of the benefits that developing countries were already
receiving in areas covered by the provisions discussed in the document.  They were of the view that it
should be easy to catalogue more fully the utilisation of these provisions and the benefits and
technical assistance that developing countries were already receiving in these areas.  For example, in
the area of standards which was an area of great importance to many delegations, no comment hadbeen included about the two triennial reviews which had been conducted, both of which included
discussions on technical assistance and special and differential provisions and considerable follow-up
work.  The first triennial review noted that certain Members, in particular developing country
Members, had encountered difficulties in the implementation and operation of the Agreement.
Members had been invited to exchange information concerning their national and regional technicalprogramme, while Members that required assistance had been required to inform the Committee of
any difficulties they encounter in the implementation and operation of the Agreement and the kind of
technical assistance they had needed.  As a result, in the course of the second triennial review (which
had been reported in G/TBT/9, a workshop on technical assistance and special and differential was
held in July 2000, and the final report of the revi ew included an action-plan for follow-up by the
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.  As a result of that review, technical assistance was
now a standing Committee agenda item.  More generally, the United States, other bilateral donors andmultilateral agencies were actively involved in help ing developing countries utilise some special and
differential provisions; however these contributions had not been included in the document, especially
in sections that referred to the contribution of technical and financial assistance to WTO Members.
They hoped this would be changed in a revised draft.
38. The representative of St. Lucia said that her delegation appreciated the distinction made by
the Secretariat with respect to "obligations of result" and "obligations of conduct".  In
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4, it was clearly stated that with respect to Article XVIII (1) "..
provision has not been invoked by any developing country Member since the WTO Agreement came
into force", (2) " … most developing country Members have ceased to take recourse to
Article XVIII:B", and (3) that since the WTO came into force one developing country had cited thisprovision with respect to Article XVIII:C.  The non-use of certain instruments, which could have been
of tremendous importance in the liberalisation process and eased certain difficulties that some
developing countries could have was a matter of importance and urgency.  She noted what had been
said by the representative of the United States with respect to technical cooperation.  However, it was
also important for the distinction made by the Secretariat's representative in terms of "obligation ofTN/CTD/M/1
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result" or "obligation of conduct" and "rights" which developing countries had, to be included in the
Chairman's debate on how to structure the work.
39. The Chairman said that he did not intend to hold consultations with respect to the
effectiveness of the provisions; he was however going to have consultations on the content of the
work.  He reiterated that Members were asked under the agreed process to provide their inputs onprecisely this issue, and he hoped that both written and oral inputs would be coming forward, so that
these could be shared in the meetings and discussed thoroughly, and on that basis meet the mandate to
strengthen and make more effective some of the provisions.
40. The representative of Venezuela, adding to her broad comments made earlier indicated that
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 was both interesting a nd useful, but there was a factual approach to
the problem.  It was difficult to understand why certain provisions were used and others were not.
Was it because some were unknown or could not be applied?  For example mention was made of suchprovisions on pages 3, 4 and 5.  It would be extremely important for the Special Session to understand
this in its future work.  Her delegation would foll ow the Chairman's directions and put forward their
contributions at future meetings including their interpretation as to why the provisions had not been
applied, and how they could be improved.
41. The Chairman indicated that he looked forward to the submission, as this was precisely the
response that the Committee needed to have.
42. The representative of Hungary had a quest ion regarding WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4,
which was an informative and interesting document and provided some information about the extent
to which developing countries were able to utilise in practice the special and differential provisions.  It
was not disputed that one of the most important special and differential treatment provisions was the"Enabling Clause" including the Generalised Syst em of Preferences (GSP), enjoyed by developing
countries.  His delegation noticed that in the section on the document starting on page 12 the
information provided seemed selective and chose only certain examples.  His Government also
operated GSP schemes, but these were not mentioned in the document, as were those of other
countries.  Both in looking for trade benefits and improving access of developing countries, and so asto permit the Special Session to hold meaningful discussions about the utilisation of the various
schemes benefitting developing countries, it would be useful if there was full information from the
Secretariat about these instruments as well.
43. The representative of Uganda said that provisions that put obligations on developed countries
when introducing new rules, needed to be clarified.  For example, in Section D of
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add. 4 on the Agreement on the application of SPS measures, Article 9.2
stated that "Where substantial investments are requ ired in order for an exporting developing country
Member to fulfill the sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of an importing Member, the latter shall
consider providing such technical assistance as w ill permit the developing country Member to maintain
and expand its market access opportunities for the product involved".  He hoped that the Comm ittee's
discussions would examine the experiences that so me developing countries had gone through, and
how those could in future be made more eff ective.  His delegation would be providing some
information on their experience, in this regard.
44. The representative of Belize said that the document failed to identify the reasons why there
was a lack of utilisation of the provisions for special and differential treatment.  The lack of utilisation
may have stemmed from the lack of capacity within the respective developing countries or from an
understanding that some of the provisions that may have been applicable to different countries wouldneed to be non-effective or less effective.  This was of particular importance with regard to how the
entire issue of technical assistance and capacity building within the WTO was approached, especially
given the fact that 2002 was a year when the WTO was dealing a lot more with such issues.  He didTN/CTD/M/1
Page 14
not want necessarily to suggest that a linkage be created, but wanted to urge Members to see if there
could be some input from the Members' perspectives w ith respect to how a bridge could be built to fill
the gap, as his delegation believed that any technical assistance and capacity building program should
point specifically to addressing the deficits that derived from or lead to, the lack of utilisation of
special and differential treatment in developing countries.
45. The Chairman was of the view that the lack of utilisation may have a bearing on what the
Committee may wish to do in terms of improving the effectiveness of a provision and he hoped that
Members who were in a position to contribute to  understanding that matter would do so.  The
representatives of the United States and Hungary had raised the question of providing information that
would contribute to the completeness of the documen t; he assumed that there was no objection to the
provision of any factual information from all Members that related to
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add. 4, and requested that if there was any factual information thatMembers believed contributed to the completeness of the document, it should be conveyed to the
Secretariat.
46. The representative of the United States reiterated that they would circulate their detailed
comments on WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 since they had comments on almost each section of
the document, or alternatively, the contributions could be submitted in writing to the Secretariat.
Some of the comments on the document were on the interpretation of what type of information should
correspond with a particular special and differential provision.  They indicated that they would await
the Chairman's decision as to whether to circulate their delegation's written comments, and it could
then be discussed at a subsequent meeting.
47. The Chairman indicated that he thought it would be useful if the comments from the
delegation of the United States were circulated, and the Special Session could then have a discussion
on it at a subsequent meeting.
48. The representative of Hungary understood from the Chairman's remarks that he expected
Members to submit the necessary information on their GSP Schemes.  However, it was his
understanding that such information was available in  full, for example, in trade policy review (TPR)
materials and other sources and he wondered whether the Secretariat could not therefore make up the
full list on its own.  He was not sure whether country-by-country submissions were necessary on this
subject.
49. The Chairman said that the delegate was correct, and that the information did exist and had
been notified, so the Secretariat could utilise that information and taking into account the constraints
of space and time the information could be so structured to ensure that it was complete, but not
excessively lengthy.  He had suggested a possible plan of work, which still required consultations andthey had had a discussion on the documents.  In addition, he had suggested that if possible in the
remainder of the time left for the meeting, and in the next meeting of the Special Session, Members
would begin the process of considering what should be made mandatory, and provide inputs on the
legal and practical implications of the conversion.
50. The representative of Norway suggested that the Special Session should work a little more in
informal mode, and further proposed that consultations by the Chairman might be useful in that
respect.  The representative of Pakistan had suggested that they should take a step back and consider
whether the provisions that contained the word "shall" had actually worked in the past.  In addition, an
analysis on whether there was actually a problem with all the special and differential provisions, or
whether some of them were actually working in  accordance with their objective should also be
conducted.  This exercise would fall under paragraph 44 of the Ministerial Declaration as the Special
Session would agree to review the provisions, with a view to strengthening only those that needed
strengthening; possibly strengthening the language from "should" to "shall" might not help since theTN/CTD/M/1
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issue might need a different provision altogether.  It might therefore be useful for the Chairman to
consult on how to proceed from this point in the Special Session, and establish a work programme
that would avoid losing another half day on this issue.
51. The Chairman said that he was in the hands of the Members with respect to informal
consultations, and if that was the best use of the afternoon, he would do so.  The methodology that
was agreed to in December 2001 might not be the most appropriate approach, but that was the
guidance that had been agreed to.  If Members wished a new approach he was in their hands.  He had
approached the structure of the work, based on what was set out in the work process of 14 December
2001 which was the guidance he had available to him at that time.  If there was new improved
guidance, he was quite willing to follow it, and if  this would emerge through informal consultations,
then he would seek to have such consultations.
52. The representative of the United States noted that it was the first time that delegates had the
opportunity to make comments on the documents before them, and said her delegation was of the
view that Members had more or less finalized the fi rst three steps of the process outlined in document
WT/COMTD/36, dated 17 January 2002.  What remained to be done was for Members to identify
those provisions that they considered should be made mandatory, as stated in paragraph 1(d) of the
process document.  The meeting had already had its discussion on what the Secretariat had preparedin connection with this item but they should not fo reclose the ability to return at any point to some
thoughts which were raised at the meeting and some  clarifications which were sought.  She agreed
with the Chairman that it was up to Members to en gage themselves, and the process suggested by the
representative of Norway may have been useful in that respect.
53. The representative of the European Communities said that he hoped it would not be
considered heresy for a developed country delegation to say that it might not be necessary to hold a
meeting that afternoon.  It might actually be useful if  delegations digested what had been heard at the
meeting, and reported to their capitals, in order to get the process moving with respect to 1(c) and 1(d)
which had been identified by many as the most important elements.  His delegation was there to listen
to developing countries' views in particular with respect to that.
54. The representative of Uganda said that his delegation agreed with the proposal made by the
representative of the European Communities, as they needed to take stock of the discussions.  He was
not sure if having a meeting that afternoon would add any value, apart from utilising the time.  In
addition, he had a number of delegations to coordinate, and this would allow them to meet informally.
55. The Chairman said that the Special Session would forego the afternoon session.  They had
had a useful discussion, and there was a lot to digest.  What was critically important was that at the
next meeting, all delegations needed to be clear about exactly what was going to be done.  To thatend, given some nuances about how the work should be conducted in the future, he would carry out
informal consultations, and for the next meeting there would be a clear indication of what was to be
covered at that meeting, in order for there not to be any ambiguity as to the further process.  In closing
he thanked the Secretariat for the documentation and thanked Members for their contributions and the
gracious comments on his appointment to preside over the Special Session.
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