RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/ADP/Q1/ECU/10
G/SCM/Q1/ECU/10
11 April 2001
(01-1847)
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing MeasuresOriginal:  English
NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS
UNDER ARTICLES 18.5 AND 32.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS
Questions Posed by the UNITED STATES
Regarding the Notification of ECUADOR1
The following communication, dated 9 April 2001, was received from the Permanent Mission
of the United States.
_______________
1. Article 21 of Resolution 52 states that if an applicant does not respond to a request for
information within 30 days, the applicant will be deemed to have withdrawn the application, and theapplication shall be “shelved.”  If the applicant did not intend to withdraw its application, is there a
process for reinstating the application, or is a new application required?
2. Article 26 states that COMEXI shall have 15 days from receipt of a technical report by the
administering authority to decide the level of pr ovisional antidumping or countervailing measures.
What matters will be addressed by this technical report?  Will interested parties have an opportunity
to comment on the contents of this report?
3. Article 27 states that the investigating authority will have a maximum of three months from
initiation to complete its investigation.  However Article 30 states that any request for information
will interrupt the deadline of Article 27 until the requested information is provided.  On average, how
long does an AD investigation in Ecuador usually take to complete?  Please confirm that Ecuador’s
procedures are consistent with the deadlines for investigations set forth in Article 5.10 of the AD
Agreement.
4. Will the investigating authority's procedures always provide at least thirty days for an
interested party to reply to its questionnaire, as required by Article 6.1.1?
5. Article 34 states that the investigating authority may use “best information available” if, inter
alia, an interested party does not provide necessary information within a reasonable period.  What is
meant by the term “reasonable period” in this context?
6. If the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products is so large as to make
individual determinations for each impracticable, Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement permits limiting
the examination to either a reasonable number of interested parties or products or to the largest per
centage of the volume of exports which can reasonably be investigated.  Will the investigating
authority in Ecuador limit its examination in such circumstances?
                                                     
1 G/ADP/N/1/ECU/2; G/SCM/N/1/ECU/2; G/SG/N/1/ECU/3G/ADP/Q1/ECU/10
G/SCM/Q1/ECU/10
Page 2
7. Resolution 52 of the Foreign Trade and Investment Council (COMEXI) does not provide for
the calculation of an "all others" rate as discussed in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement.  Does Ecuador
intend to calculate an “all others” rate and, if so, how will it be calculated?
8. Resolution 52 does not provide for an expedited review of new shippers, in accordance with
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement.  In what manner does Ecuador intend to implement Article 9.5?
9. Article 13 of the AD Agreement requires judicial review independent of the authorities
responsible for the determination or review in question.  Are the district administrative courts
discussed in Article 102 independent of COMEXI and MICIP?
10. The preamble to Resolution 52 refers to the Foreign Trade and Investment Law (published in
the Official Register of Ecuador on 8 July 1997) as the statutory authority for COMEXI to impose
antidumping and countervailing duties.  This law has not yet been notified to the WTO.  Will Ecuadorprovide notification of the law to the WTO?
11. Article 1 of  Resolution 52 provides that dumping, countervailing duty and/or safeguard
actions against textiles and agricultural products will be applied in a manner consistent with the
applicable provisions of the WTO Agreements on Textiles and Agriculture.  Is this provision intended
to incorporate the relevant provisions of these Ag reements in their entirety into Ecuadorian law?
12. Article 3 of Resolution 52 provides a single definition of “domestic industry” that is
applicable in both antidumping/countervailing duty investigations and safeguard proceedings.  It
defines the domestic industry as being the producers as a whole of the “like or directly competitive
products operating in Ecuador...”  Article 3 further defines the “like product” as being “[a] product
which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the imported product, or another product which,although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product,” which
is based on the definition of like product set forth in Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement and Article 15.1
(n. 46) of the SCM Agreement.  Article 3 of Resolution 52 also defines the “directly competitive
product” as a product “whose physical characterist ics and composition differ from those of the
imported product, but which fulfills the same functions, meets the same needs and is commerciallysubstitutable.”  Does the phrase “directly competitive product” have a different meaning than the
phrase “like product” as defined in Resolution 52?  If so, how does it differ?
13. Article 10 of Resolution 52 appears to require the investigating authority to cumulate imports
from several countries for purposes of its injury analysis in antidumping proceedings if each of the
countries is above the negligibility threshold and has more than a de minimis dumping margin.  To
what extent is this standard consistent with Article 3.3 of AD Agreement, which requires that
cumulation be “appropriate in light of the condi tions of competition between the imported products
and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product”?
Why is the latter standard contained in the cumulation provision for a threat analysis (Article 12 of
Resolution 52) and not in the cumulation provision for an injury analysis (Article 10)?  Will
Ecuador’s investigatory authority be authorized to cumulate imports in its injury analysis in
countervailing duty cases?
14. Article 22 of Resolution 52 authorizes the MICIP Undersecretary for Foreign Trade and
Integration to initiate a dumping investigation on his/her own accord, if the investigating authority
does not submit its initiation resolution to the Undersecretary within the required period.  The Article
does not, however, require the Undersecretary to assess whether the antidumping/countervailing duty
petition contains sufficient evidence as to the existence of dumping or subsidies and material injury byreason of imports.  To what extent is this cons istent with Articles 5.3 and 5.8 of the AD AgreementG/ADP/Q1/ECU/10
G/SCM/Q1/ECU/10
Page 3
and Articles 11.3 and 11.9 of the SCM Agreement, which require the initiating authority to make such
an assessment?
15. Article 28 of Resolution 52 provides that any interested party or person may have access to
any non-confidential information in the file of an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation but
only if the party or person demonstrates “a legitimate interest” in the investigation.  How does an
interested party demonstrate such a “legitimate interest”?  To what extent is this requirement
consistent with Article 6.4 of the AD Agreement and Article 12.3 of the SCM Agreement, which
require the investigatory authorities to provide time ly opportunities for all interested parties to have
access to all non-confidential information relevant to the presentation of their cases in an investigation
and does not require demonstration of a party’s “legitimate interest” in the proceeding?
16. Article 32 of Resolution 52 provides that the investigatory authority “may” hold hearings to
hear the arguments of the interested parties concerning the investigation.  Is this consistent with
Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement, which requires that investigatory authorities “shall”, upon request,
allow opposing parties to meet and present arguments in the investigation?
17. Article 42 of Resolution 52 requires the publication of a resolution by COMEXI setting forth,
among other things, the considerations relevant to its final injury determination.  Will COMEXI also
be required to set forth in the resolution “the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant
arguments or claims” made by exporters, importers, and member countries, as required by Article
12.2.2 of the AD Agreement and Article 22.5 of the SCM Agreement?
18. Article 45 of Resolution 52 provides that an antidumping or countervailing duty shall be
automatically eliminated five years after its imposition unless, “as determined by periodicassessments, the reasons for imposing it still exis t.”  What is meant by the phrase “periodic
assessments”?  In addition, please explain the extent to which the standard set forth in Article 45 is
consistent with the requirement in Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement and 21.3 of the SCM Agreement
that an antidumping or countervailing duty be revoked unless the investigating authorities determine
that “expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence” of dumping orsubsidization and injury?
__________