WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/MA/6/Rev.1
1 April 2003
(03-1820)
Negotiating Group on Market Access
OVERVIEW OF PROPOSALS SUBMITTED
Tariffs
Revision
Introduction
1. Paragraph 3 of the "Programme of meetings for the negotiations on market access for non-
agricultural products" adopted by the Group on 19 July 2002 foresees "a consolidated overview of
proposals to be submitted to participants at the first meeting of the Group in 2003".  Such an overview
was presented to the Negotiating Group at its m eeting of 19-21 February 2003. As agreed at that
meeting, the overview has been updated to take account of submissions made up to mid-March 2003
and circulated as TN/MA/6/Rev.1.
 2. The overview has been prepared on the basis of written submissions1 by participants which
were circulated in the TN/MA/W/- document series.  The overview has not taken into account points
made in the area of environmental goods.   In light of the rather preliminary nature of the discussion
on this subject, it was felt that an overview on this subject would be more useful at a later stage.   An
overview of proposals submitted on non-tariff barriers has been prepared and circulated in document
TN/MA/9.
3. For the purpose of this review, more than one communication from the same delegation has
been counted as one submission (this concerns th e EC, US, Japan, Korea and India).  In addition, a
submission made by a group of participants was also considered as one submission (this concerns
LDCs,  Mercosur, (Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uga nda, Zambia and Zimbabwe),  (Albania, Croatia,
Georgia, Moldova), (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinid ad and Tobago),  and (Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)2. In light of the above, 25
submissions may be considered to have been received and have been taken into account in thisoverview
3. While the "Programme of meetings…" foresees an overview of the proposals of modalities
submitted, the attention of participants is drawn to the fact that the nature of the submissions differed
considerably.  In some instances the submissions contained concrete proposals on modalities, inothers they contained views or ideas on the negotiations, in others there was a mix of both and yet in
others they took the shape of responses to the Chairman’s questions circulated in document
JOB(03)/27. No distinction was made between the various submissions and information provided in
all of them has been taken into account, if relevant to this exercise.
                                                     
1 On 18 February 2003, New Zealand submitted a written summary of its modalities proposal based on
the format of Section II of the overview paper with the request that this written summary be included in thelatter. New Zealand had made its proposal orally at the Negotiating Group’s formal meeting in November 2002.
2 India and Mauritius have already made individual submissions.  Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zimbabwe have also been part of an earlier group submission.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 2
4. The overview is structured in the following manne r.    Section I contains a listing of eighteen
issues which have been identified in the submissions.  In addition, items 19 and 20 refer to newly
acceded Members and LDCs, respectively and reflect points raised in connection with these two
categories of participants.  Each subject has been looked at from two angles: firstly an overview of the
submissions relating to each subject has been presented and secondly the special and differentialtreatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments aspect of the subject as contained in the
submissions has been provided.  Section II  sets out in a tabular form the items listed in Section I and
reproduces the specifics of the submissions pertaining to each of the items as well as any special and
differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in  reduction commitments aspect. Participants have
also been identified in this section for ease of re ference.  An annex reproducing the various formulas
proposed has been attached to the end of the document.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 3
Section I:
1. Product Coverage
Overview of submissions
Fourteen submissions were identified in which reference was made to product coverage.  Six
of them state that all non-agricultural products should be subject to negotiations. Another submission
states that in principle the entire tariff universe would be subject to negotiations. Four other
submissions speak of comprehensive or broad product coverage without a priori  exclusions. Another
submission states that all non-ag ricultural products without a priori exclusion should be taken on
board. Another submission qualifies that there should be no exceptions on product coverage fordeveloped countries.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
One submission states that developing countries should have the flexibility to not bind certain
unbound tariff lines considered highly sensitive or strategically important.  Another submission states
that the phrase  "without a priori exclusion " provides a built-in flexibility to exclude some products
arising from the special needs and interests of developing country participants.  A third submission
states that there should be flexibility for developing countries in calibrating the level of reductions for
certain sensitive bound tariff lines. In respect of unbound tariff lines, flexibility should be provided forsuch Members to continue to keep certain domestically sensitive tariff lines unbound.
2. Elimination of Tariffs
Overview of submissions
Seven submissions make a reference to the elimination of tariffs.  In one case elimination of
all duties is foreseen for 2015.  In another case, elimination of tariffs on most non-agricultural
products at least in OECD countries has been proposed.   Another submission provides that developed
Members could have as an objective to eliminate their tariffs within a certain specified period
following an initial one-off reduction at the conc lusion of the Doha Round. The fourth submission
makes a reference to expanding the scope of duty-free trade.  The fifth submission states that themodalities should provide for the elimination of tariffs on non-agricultural tariffs with the staging to
be negotiated.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
In one of the seven submissions, it is noted that, where possible, elimination of tariffs on
products of interest to developing countries should ta ke place.  In another of the seven submissions a
proposal is made for developing countries to prog ressively over a longer period of time reduce their
duties following the initial one-off reduction. In this regard, a common overall target reduction rate
may be set.  Another submission states that the economic realities and levels of development of eachMember must dictate the pace at which tariff reduction takes place.  A group of participants in one
submission expresses the view that it will be difficult for developing countries to accept the
elimination of all tariffs as an objective of thes e negotiations even in an extended time-frame.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 4
3. Core Modality
Overview of submissions
A variety of modalities are proposed.  Sevent een of the twenty-five submissions suggest the
use of a formula approach. In some of these cases no detail regarding the formula has been provided.
Among the proposals where some detail has been provided, a distinction has been made for the
purpose of this overview between formulas that apply on a line-by-line basis and formulas that foresee
a reduction in the average tariff.   It is to be noted that in one case the modality proposed uses both
approaches.  Two of the seventeen submissions foresee sectoral initiatives as being a core part of the
modality along with the formula.
Of the remaining submissions, one submission proposes giving priority consideration to
approaches of general application (formula cut and sectoral approaches), and the Swiss formula with
different coefficients has been referred to as a po ssible formula. Another submission suggests  the use
of a formula approach as an option.  Four othe r submissions propose a "cocktail approach",  a
"combination of approaches",  a sector-by-sector approach and an approach which should be simple
and user-friendly,  respectively. Another submission proposes a range of modalities which could be
envisaged to reach the goal of tariff elimination, for example accelerated reductions, formula
approaches, stepped band reduction targets, and even zero for zero arrangements.  One submission
states that the core modalities must accommodate the differences which exist amongst Members and
must not require unreasonable tariff reductions. The important variables for consideration in theformulation of the modalities include the percentage rates for tariff reductions, special and differential
treatment for sensitive products and sectors, relevant time periods for implementation in terms of the
overall negotiations, and an approach which is simple, transparent and user-friendly.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Eighteen submissions make a specific reference to special and differential treatment.  Twelve
of them state that formula-based approaches could vary the cut for developing and developed
countries. One example which is provided is through the use of different coefficients. Another
submission speaks of inter alia higher percentage reductions to be set for developed countries than for
developing countries.  The percentage reduction for the latter group of countries is also to be
determined in light of their dependence on customs revenue.  Two of the eleven submissions state thatsectors and products of substantial export interest to developing country Members should be subject
of priority reductions.  Of the remaining submissions, one submission states that Members should
agree to deeper cuts for textiles, clothing and footwear. Another submission proposes the use of a
"cocktail approach" for developing countries rather than the formula approach it has proposed for
developed countries.  Another submission states that once agreement has been reached on themodalities, Members can turn to "more precise and customised approaches" to take account of
individual development needs.  One submission speaks of adopting a broad rather than restricted
approach to the negotiations.  It provides that developing countries should be able to maintain the
same concession level for certain products or apply only minimum reductions to them. Another
submission provides that any further liberalizati on should be determined by developing country
Members and that the latter must be allowed to use measures aimed at assisting infant industries to
compete with well established enterprises in the international market.  The co-sponsors of one
submission state that the core modalities should also include a periodic assessment of the impact of
tariff reductions on the economies of developing countries and that these assessments should form the
basis of a review of commitments undertaken by developing countries with the view to making
appropriate adjustments.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 5
4. Supplementary approaches
Overview of submissions
- Harmonization and/or sectoral elimination initiatives
Fifteen submissions make a reference to sectoral initiatives. Although contained in the section
entitled" supplementary approaches", there are two submissions which view sectoral initiatives as
being part of the core modality.  Another submission states that sectoral initiatives might be a
supplementary method to a formula for sectors where a critical mass (ex. 80% of world trade) can be
achieved.  Three submissions speak of expanding existing sectoral agreements both in terms of their
membership and products, and introducing new sectoral initiatives.  Details have not always beenprovided regarding the sectors for which such initiatives are proposed.  Additionally it is not always
clear which new sector is being proposed for zero-for-zero and which for harmonization.  In one
submission the view was expressed that once a general formula was applied, an evaluation could be
undertaken and if deemed necessary, work could be undertaken at a later stage on the basis of zero-
for-zero initiatives.  Three submissions state that Members should be free to decide their participationin such initiatives on a voluntary basis.  Four submis sions indicate that recourse to sectoral initiatives
should be kept to a minimum, may be useful in exceptional circumstances or should be taken when
reductions obtained through the formula were insufficient.  One of these submissions further specifies
that the process of negotiations undertaken in the context of supplementary approaches should be
conducted in a manner which is transparent.  Another submission states that for the purpose ofeliminating tariffs, the zero-for-zero approach is supported, but should only be applied by developed
countries.  The point has also been made in one submission that supplementary approaches should be
considered only after the core modality has been finalized.
- Request/offer approachNine submissions make a specific reference to the use of the request/offer process. Five of
them indicate that such an approach can be used in certain circumstances, for example on a limited
number of products.  The sixth submission favours such an approach due to variations in tariff
structures of Members.  The seventh submission stat es that this approach should be accepted as a
supplementary method to support the formula approach. An eighth submission specifies that the use
of supplementary approaches in general should be on a voluntary basis and be kept to a minimum. Itadds that the process of negotiations undertaken in such a context should be conducted in a manner
which is transparent to all WTO Members. A ninth submission makes the point that supplementary
approaches should be considered only after the core modality has been finalized.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
- Harmonization and/or sectoral elimination initiatives
Five of the fifteen submissions make a reference to this aspect.  One of them states that
sectoral initiatives would need to incorporate higher harmonized tariff levels, greater credit for tariffreductions and longer implementation periods for developing countries.  Two submissions note that
there could be flexibility for developing countries in terms of implementation and staging periods.
One submission states that particular emphasis should be put on sectors of interest to developing
countries. One submission specifies that emphasis should be placed on goods which are considered
important exports of developing countries, and proposes that the gems and jewellery sector beincluded under this approach.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 6
- Request/offer approach
-
5. Elimination of low/nuisance duties
Overview of submissions
Fourteen submissions make a reference to the elimination of "low"/"nuisance" tariffs.  Two
submissions indicate that a definition of such duties is required.  Of which, one states that only those
"nuisance tariffs" considered to be "truly burdensome" should be eliminated.  In two other
submissions the view was expressed that the formula should incorporate a feature whereby dutiesbelow a specified level are eliminated. In another two cases a definition has been provided whereby
duties are considered low when they stand at 2.5% or less (for developed countries) or at 5% or less,
respectively.  One submission considers that an elimination of such a duty is a concession like any
other reduction or elimination of tariffs.  While three other submissions state that the elimination of
nuisance tariffs should not be considered as a concession equivalent to the reduction of higher tariffs.In another submission, a participant expressed the view that developed country Members should
eliminate all their "lowest tariffs".  One submission states that elimination of tariff below a 5% floor
level is a source of serious concern. In another submission, participants have indicated that low tariffs
were not considered nuisance tariffs and that their elimination may be undertaken on a voluntary
basis. However, such action by developed countries should not be construed as a concession.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Two submissions make a reference to this aspect. One submission specifies that all duties
beneath a floor are to be eliminated, and since such duties are mostly in developed countries, suchaction would benefit developing countries.   The second submission states that developing country
Members should be free to maintain low tariffs.
6. Tariff Peaks, Tariff Escalation and High Tariffs
Overview of submissions
Sixteen submissions make a reference to these issues.  One submission proposes a formula
which will address the question of tariff peaks and high tariffs and indicates that for the problem of
tariff escalation additional steps might need to be taken.  In three submissions, an idea is advanced to
have a cap on maximum level of tariffs. A view is expressed in one submission that tariff peaks and
tariff escalation should be rectified through zero-for-zero and harmonization sectoral approaches.  Italso states that tariff escalation should be subject of consultation. Another submission states that these
issues may be addressed through the request/offer approach.  One submission states that a definition
of these terms is not needed.  While, five submissions speak of the need to clarify the definition of
one, two or all of these terms. Of which one stat es that negotiations would need to discuss the
methodology and definitions related to tariff escalation in order to address the issue adequately. Asecond one supports the use of the national peak criteria in the negotiations.  A third one states that
following agreement on a definition of tariff peaks an average reduction of X per cent can be agreed
upon.  Another submission defines a tariff peak as a tariff rate which is three times more than the
simple average tariff level.  One submission proposes that Members should not impose a tariff on any
product in excess of three times their average tariff.  Another submission states that mechanismsshould be incorporated in the modalities to reduce or eliminate tariff peaks and tariff escalation.  One
submission stated that the core modality needed to be designed in order to effectively address these
issues, while another one stated that modalities should aim at the convergence of different tariff
structures by effectively addressing these issues.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 7
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Four of the sixteen submissions refer to this aspect. One of which states that problems of tariff
peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation on products of export interest to developing countries should be
effectively dealt with.  Some examples of products of export interest to developing countries and on
which tariff peaks are concentrated have been provided.  The second submission states that a formula
could tackle tariff peaks and high tariffs which are common to products of export interest to
developing countries. The third submission states that reducing and eliminating tariff peaks and tariff
escalation on products of export interest to developing countries need to be given maximum attention
in the development of modalities. The fourth submission calls for the reduction and elimination by
developed countries of tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high tariffs on products of export interest to
developing countries.
7. Bindings/Binding coverage
Overview of submissions
Seventeen submissions refer to the subject of  binding coverage. Nine of those submissions
call for an increase in the binding coverage, with six of them proposing the binding of all non-
agricultural products. A tenth submission indicates that only developed countries should bind all
items, while the eleventh one makes a reference  to all Members binding their tariff rates "after
reduction".  One submission states that Members should be allowed to bind all tariffs above theapplied rate
.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Seven of the seventeen submissions make a reference to this aspect.  Five submissions
indicate that developing countries should have the flexibility with respect to the scope of binding
coverage.  If bindings are to be made, one submission speaks of the flexibility for developing
countries to bind them at levels "generally above the higher of the bound rates prevailing for bound
items in a country's tariff schedule".  Another one speaks of the flexibility to bind tariffs at rates
commensurate with the level of the country's industrial development. The third one states that
reductions even above the bound level would be a valid offer. One of the remaining submissions
suggests that bindings at present applied rates would be counted as concessions from poorerdeveloping countries, while the last submission states  that longer transitional periods should be given
to developing countries.
8. Binding Overhang
Overview of submissions
Ten submissions refer to this subject.  Six speak of narrowing the gap between bound and
applied rates as an objective. The seventh speaks of an approach based on an average reduction once
tariff peaks have been defined.  Another submission states that this concept is extraneous to themandate and GATT/WTO negotiations as it would imply taking account of the applied rate in the
negotiations.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
The ninth submission states that flexibility should be given to developing countries to
determine the level of bindings of their tariff lines. More specifically on unbound lines flexibility
should be there to bind them at levels generally above the higher of bound rates prevailing in a
Member’s schedule.  The tenth submission states that the difference between applied rates and boundTN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 8
rates is the result of the autonomous liberalisation initiatives undertaken by developing countries, and
that this gap provides these countries with appropriate space for the formulation of their trade and
industrial development policies.  It further specifies that reductions even above the applied rates were
a valid offer.
9. Base rates
Overview of submissions
Twenty-one submissions refer to this point.  Seventeen of the submissions propose the use of
bound rates as the starting-point of these negotiations.  There is some question in certain instances as
to whether reference is being made to final bound rates or to current bound rates.  In two of the fourremaining submissions, a proposal has been made to use applied rates as the base rate. In one case the
applied rates which are closer to the start of the negotiations are to be used, while in the other applied
rates as of 1 January 2000 or UR final bound levels are to be used whichever is lower. Another
submission provides that developed country Members should take 2000 applied rates as base rates.
Another submission provides that for developed countries the base rates should be the target rate of10% or the bound rate, whichever is lower.   As to unbound rates, six submissions have suggested one
or the other of the following rates as base rates: applied duties in force in 2001, applied rates in force
at the launch of the Doha Round or applied rates in force in 2002.  A seventh submission makes
reference to the use of the national statutory rate as the starting-point for the negotiations for unbound
rates.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Among the twenty-one submissions, one submission proposes that for developing country
Members the simple average rate between their applied rates in 2000 and their UR final bound ratesshould be their base rate.  In another submission, it was noted that the base rate for developing
countries should be the bound rate. In two submissions it was noted that for unbound tariff lines,
developing countries should have the flexibility to bind the tariffs at levels generally above the higher
of the bound rates prevailing for bound items in a country' schedule.  One of these two submissions
also provides for the option for developing country Members to bind unbound tariff lines at the
applied rates as of a cut off date if it is higher. In exceptional cases, higher bindings are to be
permitted.
10. Base Year
Overview of submissions
Six submissions make a reference to the base/reference year. Of which three indicate that the
base year should be the one for which data are available for the majority of Members .  Two propose
2000.  The sixth proposes the year of completion of the Uruguay Round.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-
11. Nomenclature
Overview of submissions
One of the seven submissions referring to this issue states that HS2002 should be used.  Five
of the remaining six submissions state that HS96 should be used, Of which three state that the resultsTN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 9
of the negotiations should be incorporated in HS2002.  The remaining submission states that there
should be flexibility to use the nomenclature in which the Member has bound its tariffs subject to
concordance tables being provided, if necessary.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-
12. Implementation and staging
Overview of submissions
Eighteen submissions reference this issue.  Five of which propose five years as the
implementation period.  Three of them speak about linear cuts.   Of the remaining submissions, one
indicates that a short implementation period would be preferable.  Another one  notes that previous
negotiations had as norm a maximum of five equal a nnual instalments. One submission proposes that
developed Members should phase out all tariffs in five years in equal cuts, while another one statesthat longer implementation periods should be established to enable higher levels of ambition. One
submission states that longer implementation periods should be given for sensitive products.  Another
submission provides a five-year staging period for developed Members.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Twelve of the eighteen submissions refer to this aspect. Two submissions speak of giving a
longer implementation period for developing countr ies.  Another two submissions specify that the
implementation period should be seven years or extended up to ten years, respectively.  Four
submissions state that a system of differentiated staging periods was appropriate for developingcountries. Two other submissions speak of longer than five years being given to developing countries
in exchange for major cuts or deeper than average cuts, respectively. One submission states that
implementation periods are to be commensurate with developing Members’ levels of development,
size of economy, fiscal and other  strategic deve lopment needs. A five-year period would therefore
not be sufficient. Another submi ssion provides a ten-year staging period for developing Members.
13. Credit for autonomous liberalization
Overview of submissions
Nine submissions refer to this subject.  Four of which speak about giving credit for
autonomous tariff liberalization which are bound. Two submissions propose that credit should beaccorded for autonomous tariff liberalization undertaken since 1995 and the end of the Uruguay
Round respectively. Another submission speaks of negotiations being able to take account of cases in
which countries have "gone beyond the trade liberalization agreed during the UR". Another
submission indicates that this issue needs to be carefully handled as assessment methods for such
credits are difficult. The last submission states that credit should be given for all autonomous tariffliberalization undertaken by Members since the Uruguay Round and not as a result of a negotiating
process, and which has been bound in the WTO.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 10
14. Non ad valorem  duties
Overview of submissions
Nine submissions refer to this subject.  One submission proposes that all Members should
commit to converting specific duties to ad valorem  equivalents during the negotiating process.  Two
submissions foresee that only developed countrie s should make that conversion.  Two submissions
speak of the need to maximize the use of ad valorem  rates.  One submission states that Members
should consider converting to ad valorem  duties and stop using complex or mixed tariffs.  While
another submission indicates that Members should have the flexibility to maintain such ad valorem
tariffs at the end of the negotiations.  One proposal states that consensus is required on how to deal
with this issue.   Another submission states that a common methodology should be adopted for the
calculation of these rates.  Additionally during the negotiating process, Members are to commit to
converting all their specific and mixed duties into ad valorem tariffs without exception. It was not
always clear from the submissions whether the proposal to convert non ad valorem  duties to ad
valorem  equivalents was limited to the negotiating process, or whether it was to be the status quo
following conclusion of the negotiations.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Two of the nine submissions state that developing country Members should be able to retain
non ad valorem  tariffs to up to 3% of the total number of tariff lines in their national tariff
nomenclature.
15. Simplification of tariff structures
Overview of submissions
Three submissions refer to this matter.  One submission suggests harmonizing tariffs on
similar products within similar HS headings/classifications, while the other proposes the combination
of national subdivisions under HS subheadings carrying the same bound rate.  The third submission
questions the objective of such proposals and adds that this issue is not part of the mandate.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-
16. Export taxes
Overview of submissions
Three submissions refer to this subject. One submission states that export taxes should be
discussed, while the second one states that removal of export duties is required. The third submission
states that this subject is not part of the mandate of the current negotiations.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 11
17. Initial Negotiating Rights (INRs)
Overview of submissions
Three submissions refer to this subject.  Of which one indicates that modalities should see
how INRs are reflected in the final results of the negotiations.  The second submission states that any
discussion on INRs should take into account the interest and needs of suppliers from smaller sized
economies with traditional/historical access. The third submission states that this matter could be
addressed once the modality has been agreed upon.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-
18. Erosion of Preferential Margins
Overview of submissions
Four submissions have made a reference to this subject.  One submission suggests the setting
up a competitiveness fund on the basis of contributions from International Financial Institutions to
enable countries affected by any erosion in preferential market access to undertake competitive
adjustment. The second submission states that the modalities should include a procedure forestablishing measures and mechanisms to deal with  erosion of preferences, with the aim of avoiding
or offsetting this problem or compensating the affected Members. The third submission indicates that
positive measures must be found to mitigate against the negative impact of the loss of preferential
market access. The fourth submission proposes the development of appropriate mechanisms to
respond to such situations. (see point 20 on LDCs where there is also reference to this subject).
 
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-
19. Newly Acceded Members
Overview of submissions
Six submissions refer to this issue. One submission envisages that newly acceded Member
should only make contributions on their own initiative.  Two submissions provide that credit for
liberalization measures undertaken as well as longer implementation periods should be accorded tonewly acceded Members. One of the two submissions further provides that modalities should include
specific flexibilities such as the use of a request-and-offer approach, exemption of low tariffs from
further reduction commitments and lower levels of tariff reductions. Another submission provides that
reduction commitments of newly-acceded Members should be fully taken into consideration and no
further reduction required. In addition, newly-acceded Members are to take the simple average rate oftheir applied rates in 2000 and their final bound rates committed in their accession negotiations as
their base rates for the negotiations. Another submission indicates that consideration should be given
to the conditions of accession of newly acceded Members. The sixth submission supports the call by
newly acceded Members for flexibility in undertaking further commitments.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 12
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-
20. Least Developed Countries
Overview of submissions
Sixteen submissions have been made on the subject of LDCs.  Two of them foresee
exemption from tariff reduction obligations by LDCs .  One of the two submissions states that LDCs
should, however, substantially increase their binding ratios while the other one states that LDCs could
bind tariffs at higher levels than applied rates for a limited number of products or sectors or across-the-board with ceiling binding. Another submission indicates that no reciprocal tariff concessions are
required from LDC. Another proposal states that substantial reductions would in principle not be
expected. Another two submissions propose that all developed countries should implement tariff and
quota-free access for all products from LDCs, in one case the date of  31 May 2003 has been
provided.  Another proposal suggests flexibility to LDC with respect to the binding of tariffs,conversion of ad valorem   tariffs, elimination of tariff peaks and tariff escalation.  Another proposal
states that LDCs may determine the coverage of their bindings on an autonomous basis.  One proposal
provides for the designing of an individually tailored capacity-building programme.  One submission
proposes the postponement of the staging of reductions, for example by five years or spread the
staging of reductions over a period of ten years in cases where the preferential margins enjoyed byLDC exports is going to be seriously affected.   The same submission foresees developing countries
extending preferential tariff treatment on a non-reciprocal basis to products requested by LDCs, and
also proposes that LDCs get credit for autonomous reductions in tariffs.  Another submission foresees
that special and differential treatment for LDCs should be provided in the form of, among others,
different target tariff cuts, different components of the formula, different time frames forimplementation. Another submission states that developed country Members should provide improved
market access to developing country products by addressing the problems posed to the trade of these
countries as a result of existing tariff peaks and escalations and that any further liberalisation
including reduction commitment should be determined by them.  Another submission states that
participation by LDCs on commitments to reduce or eliminate non-agricultural tariffs should be on a
voluntary basis. Another submission supports the LDC calls for special treatment in these
negotiations.  The last submission states inter alia that LDCs should not be expected to undertake
tariff reduction commitments or increase binding coverage that are not commensurate with their level
of development.   Some of the suggested solutions for possible loss of market access due to erosion of
preferential margins are to be favorably considered, and that developed countries should provide duty-
free and quota free access for all the products of LDCs.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 13Section II
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
1. Product Coverage (1) Tariff reductions across-the-board for all non-agricultural products,
without excluding any sector or group of products from the initial offer.
(Norway)
(2) The proposed approach will apply to all products with the exception of
those listed in Annex I of the Agreement on Agriculture.  (EC)
(3) Broad product coverage without a priori  exclusions. (Hong Kong, China)
(4) the entire tariff universe would in principle be subject to negotiation.
(Mexico)
(5) There should be no exceptions on product coverage for developed
countries. (Oman)
(6) Product coverage shall be comprehensive and without a priori
exclusions i.e., no sector as such may be excluded from the negotiations.(India)
(7) Negotiations should aim for a comprehensive package without a priori
exclusion.  (Japan)
(8)  Formula to be used should be applied directly to all tariff headings
without exception. (Chile)
(9) A comprehensive approach with no exclusions. (US)(10) All sectors should be covered. (Chinese Taipei)
(11) All non-agricultural products, without a priori exclusion must be taken
on board. (Thailand)
(12) All non-agricultural products and sectors should be covered. (New
Zealand)
(13) Comprehensive product coverage without a  priori  exceptions. (Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda
and Zimbabwe)(1) While product coverage shall be comprehensive and
without a priori  exclusions i.e., no sector as such may be
excluded from the negotiations, developing countries shouldhave the flexibility not to bind certain unbound tariff lines still
considered domestically highly sensitive or strategically
important. (cf point 7 also) (India)
(2) The phrase  "without a priori exclusion" provides a built-in
flexibility to exclude some products arising from the special
needs and interests of developing country participants.
Such special needs and interests are determined by theeconomic, fiscal, strategic and other developmental
objectives of these countries. (Barbados, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago)
(3) There should be flexibility for developing countries in
calibrating the level of reductions for certain bound tariff linesthat are considered sensitive. In respect of currently
unbound tariff lines, while the negotiations could bring about
significant increase in the binding coverage, flexibility shouldbe provided for them to continue to keep certain domestically
sensitive tariff lines as unbound. . (Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda andZimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 14
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
2. Elimination of
Tariffs(1) Modalities should include an element that secures tariff elimination onan across-the-board basis as a supplement to a formula.  One possibilitywould be to introduce a minimum tariff rate under which rates are set at
zero.  Another might be to supplement the formula with a proportion of
trade or tariff lines governed by WTO rules that should meet zero tariffs.The goal should be the elimination of tariffs on most non-agricultural
products at least in OECD countries.   (Norway)
(2) Expand the scope of duty-free trade (Canada)
(3) Developed Members can on top of the one-off tariff reduction
implemented upon the conclusion of the DDA undertake to further reduce
tariffs by equal annual cuts until all tariffs are eliminated within a specified
period. (Hong Kong, China)
(4) Elimination of all remaining duties in the form of linear cuts from 2010 to
2015. (US)
(5) The modalities should provide for the elimination of remaining tariffs on
all non-agricultural products over an implementation period, the length of
which would be negotiated. (New Zealand)(1) Where possible elimination of tariffs on products of
interest to developing countries. (Norway)
(2) Developing Members can on top of the one-off tariff
reduction undertake a programme of continuous tariff cutsover a longer period of time by re-applying the agreed
formula or by means agreed otherwise.  To serve as
guidance for drawing up such a tariff reduction programme,a common overall target reduction rate may be set. (Hong
Kong, China)
(3) The economic realities and levels of development of each
Member must dictate the pace at which tariff reduction takes
place.  (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
(4) It will be difficult for dev eloping countries to accept the
elimination of all tariffs as the objective of these negotiationseven in an extended time frame. Elimination of tariffs would
imply significantly deeper concessions by developing
countries, which would be contradictory to the principle ofless than full reciprocity and negate the development
dimension of the Doha round. (Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda andZimbabwe)
3. Core Modality
 Formula – general (1) To ensure comprehensive coverage without a priori  exclusions, a
formula approach is required.  The formula must  include a high minimum
rate of reduction.  (Norway)
(2) Give priority consideration to approaches of general application e.g.
formula cut and sectoral approaches (refer to point 3 for more details).
Members could also consider applying the “Swiss formula” to harmoniseand substantially reduce tariffs for non-agricultural products.  Members
could examine the effect of using various coefficients in the “Swiss formula”
in achieving tariff reductions. A coefficient that would result in deeper cutsto give meaningful and significant market access for non-agricultural
products would be favoured. (Singapore)
(3) A one-off reduction/elimination of tariffs upon the conclusion of the DDA
negotiations through the use of a formula followed by progressive
elimination and reduction of tariffs by developed and developing countries,respectively. A formula has not been specified although reference was(1) Particularly substantial reductions on products of interest
to developing countries should be undertaken.  Tariff
reductions should be undertaken by developing countries in
line with their level of development particularly through theuse of differentiated coefficients in the different elements of
the formula and the supplementary provisions such as
minimum reductions, "ceiling" and "floor" for tariff rates andrate of harmonization.  (Norway)
(2) The formula can allow different levels of tariff cut for
developing Members while ensuring a common minimum
level of reduction for each group of Members. Developing
Members can on top of the one-off tariff reduction undertakea programme of continuous tariff cuts over a longer period of
time by re-applying the agreed formula or by means agreed
otherwise.  To serve as guidance for drawing ups such atariff reduction programme, a common overall targetTN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 15Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
made to the Secretariat document TN/MA/S/3. (Hong Kong, China)
(4) The basis for negotiations should be a formula which fulfils several
criteria. No formula has been specified. (Switzerland)
(5) In favour of an approach centered on a formula, such as the Swiss one.
(Chile)
(6) One option would be to adopt a formula approach which could be
complemented with additional approaches. An alternative or
complementary option is a request and offer approach. (Mercosur)
(7) A formula approach is an appropriate solution  to achieve the
negotiating objectives as mandated by the Doha Ministerial Declaration(Thailand)reduction rate may be set (Hong Kong, China)
(3) A formula approach may be modulated to take into
account different levels of development, of trade participation
and of competiveness in international trade. (Switzerland)
 (4) Use differentiated coefficients for developing and
developed country participants.  Deeper reductioncommitments are required from developed countries than
developing countries. (Mercosur)
(5) Special and differential treatment should be provided in
the form of among others different target tariff cuts and
different components of the formula. (Thailand)
Formula – line byline(1) A compression mechanism which will reduce all tariff duties
considerably by compressing them into a flatter range Formula has been
proposed (see annex) (EC)
(2) Developed countries are to reduce all tariffs to 10% then the Swiss
formula or an equivalent harmonization formula is to be applied.  The
formula would also apply to all other rates  below 10'%. (Oman)
(3) A 40% trade-weighted average reduction is to be achieved through at
least a 20 per cent reduction for each bound non-agricultural product.  Forthose products whose current bound tariff rates are above either two times
each Member's current simple national average tariff rate or 25 percent, the
tariff rates are to be reduced by more than twenty per cent. Formulas havebeen provided for the amount of the reduction.  If the tariff reduction
through the use of the formula results in a tariff reduction which is under the
40 per cent reduction, Members will make additional tariff reduction at theirown discretion to achieve the targeted 40 per cent reduction.  (see annex)
(Korea)
(4) A simple percentage cut on bound tariffs of each Member. Members
shall not impose a tariff on any product in excess of three times their
average tariff.  The average for this purpose shall be calculated aftereffecting the tariff reduction. (cf point 6 also) (see Annex) (India)
(5) Between 2005 and 2010  tariffs above 5 per cent are to be reduced by
applying the Swiss Formula with a coefficient of eight.  (cf also point 4) (US)(1) Members agree to deeper cuts for textiles, clothing and
footwear with a view to bringing these tariffs within a narrow
common range as close to zero as possible.  (EC)
(2) Use a "cocktail approach" for developing countries.
Request/offer, formula (different from that used by
developed countries), or a combination thereof. (Oman)
(3) A higher percentage reduction is to be set for developed
countries than for developing countries. In determining thereduction to be effected by developing countries their
dependence on customs revenue has to be kept in view.
Flexibility to be available to developing countries to decideon the actual bindings of some tariff lines as a special and
differential measure while still maintaining the percentage
reduction on an average basis. The flexibility to decideindividual tariff bindings shall be on at least 15% of the
bound tariff lines of the concerned developing country
Members. (cf point 8 also)  Developing country Membersshall also have flexibility regarding the condition to not
impose a tariff on any product in excess of three times their
average tariffs. (India)
(4) Once Members have secured agreement on the
modalities, they should turn to more precise and customisedapproaches to ensure participation by developing countries
consistent with their individual development needs. (US)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 16
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(6) A uniform formula for tariff reduction. A formula has been proposed (seeannex) (China)
(7) Would support the use of the Swiss formula. (Bolivia)
(8) A linear percentage reduction is suitable for implementing the Doha
mandate. Additionally, no presently bound tariff line after tariff reduction
shall exceed three times the average of the reduced bound tariffs in aMember’s tariff schedule. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)(5) The actual reductions achieved through the formula
approach shall reflect the needs and interests of allMembers, in particular developing country Members and
shall abide by the principle of less than full reciprocity in
reduction commitments. Sectors and products of substantialexport interest to developing country Members shall be the
subject of priority reductions in the negotiations. (China)
(6) Would support the use of the Swiss formula in
accordance with Members’ level of development. Special
and differential treatment has to be taken into accountincluding through less than full reciprocity in reduction
commitments. (Bolivia)
(7) Adopt differentiated rates of reduction for developing and
developed country participants. In the linear formula, a
lower percentage average reduction set for developingcountries with minimum cuts on individual tariff lines.
Developing countries may also be given some flexibility to
decide on the level of binding of individual tariff lines, on theunderstanding that the overall percentage reduction as
stipulated for them is achieved. For unbound tariff lines,
developing country members should have the flexibility tobind them at levels generally above the highest bound rate
prevailing for bound items in a country’s current tariff
schedule or at the applied rates as of a cut off datewhichever is higher.  In exceptional cases, bindings should
be permitted above these levels also. (cf point 7 also).
Reduction commitments agreed upon would not apply totariff lines so bound.  Developing country Members shall
have some flexibility concerning the commitment that no
presently bound tariff line after tariff reduction shall exceedthree times the average of the reduced bound tariffs in a
Member’s tariff schedule. In this regard developing country
Members can undertake minimal cuts in respect of itemsconsidered sensitive by them. (Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zimbabwe)
Formula –
Average reduction(1) Each Member shall reduce its trade weighted average tariff rate by 40
per cent. with a minimum 20% cut on each  bound tariff.  (see annex)
(Korea)(1) The modalities shall take into account the current tariff
structures of Members which reflect their respective levels of
development.  (Korea)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 17Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(2) A formula which relies on an average general tariff reduction by (X percent) of the previously bound tariff for the universe of tariff headings.(Mexico)
(3) Each Member shall set a target level of a trade-weighted average tariff
rate according to a formula.   Each Member will reduce its trade weighted
average tariff rate to that level. Formula has been proposed (see annex).
Each Member may choose to include reductions in the sectoral initiativesfor the calculation of its trade weighted average target tariff rate. (cf also
point 4). Important to ensure the flexibility of each Member regarding the
level of tariffs on forest and fishery products. (Japan)
(4) A  trade weighted tariff reduction would be the more appropriate way to
proceed. (Mauritius).(2) Adopt a broad rather than restricted approach to the
negotiations.  Should not be limited to setting longer time-limits for implementation on sensitive products.  Developing
countries should be able to  maintain the same concession
levels for certain products or apply only minimum reductionsto them. (Mexico)
(3) A target level of a trade-weighted average tariff rate is set
which corresponds to the level of development of each
Member and takes into account its current trade weighted
average tariff rate.  (Japan)
Others (1)  A combination of approaches will be required including sectoral
agreements (cf also point 4), formula-based approaches and the
request/offer process. (Canada)
(2) Favours a sector-by-sector approach to the negotiations with the
possibility to use differing modalities depending on the sector.  Participationin existing zero-for-zero agreements broadened to include the critical mass
of trading partners participating in world trade for each of the sectors
involved. Special consideration to be given to the treatment of exhaustiblenatural resource sectors. (Chinese Taipei)
(3) Adopt a "cocktail approach", under which agreement could be reached
on  the different types of modalities which would be used by taking into
account the stages of development among countries. (LDCs)
(4) The modalities should, in essence, be simple and user-friendly to
negotiators, policy-makers as well as those tasked with its implementation
in the customs administrations. A complicated formulae will only burden theweaker customs administrations (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
(5) A range of modalities could be envisaged to reach the goal of tariff
elimination, for example accelerated reductions, formula approaches,
stepped band reduction targets, and even zero for zero arrangements.  Atthe least there must be a requirement for progressive liberalisation, for all
sectors, to reach the goal of tariff elimination. (New Zealand)
(6) The core modalities to be adopted must accommodate the differences
which exist amongst Members and be suited to their varied levels of(1)  With respect to formula-based approaches these should
be sensitive to the varying circumstances of Members.
(Canada)
(2) Modalities should be based on the following
considerations:- Developed country Members should provide improved
market access to developing country products by addressing
the problems posed to the trade of these countries as aresult of the existence tariff peaks and escalations).
- Any further liberalisation including reduction commitment
should be left to be determined by developing countryMembers.
- Developing country Members must be allowed to use
measures aimed at assisting infant industries to competewith well established enterprises in the international market.
- Concept of less than full reciprocity in reduction
commitments has to be adhered to.(Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe)
(3) Less than full reciprocity" must be a key principle in the
formulation of the modalities for tariff reduction and must be
given a generous interpretation consistent with paragraph 8of Article XXXVI of GATT 1994.  The core modalities should
also include a periodic assessment of the impact of tariff
reductions on the economies of developing countries. Theoutcome of these assessments shall form the basis of a
review of commitments undertaken by developing countriesTN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 18
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
economic development and ability to offer concessions. The modalitiesmust not require unreasonable tariff reductions which result in seriouseconomic and social dislocations in small domestic markets. The important
variables for consideration in the fo rmulation of the modalities will be, inter
alia, the percentage rates for tariff reductions, special and differential
treatment for sensitive products and sectors, relevant time periods for
implementation in terms of the overall negotiations, and an approach which
is simple, transparent and user-friendly. (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidadand Tobago)with the view to making appropriate adjustments. (Barbados,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
4. Supplementary
approaches
Harmonizationand/or sectoral
elimination
initiatives(1) Sectoral agreements based on a zero-for-zero approach at a multilateral
or plurilateral level  might be a supplementary method for sectors where a
critical mass (normally representing a minimum of 80% of world trade) can
be established.  However, such an approach should not lead to anunbalanced result favouring major trading partners. (Norway)
(2) In this regard, proposals to advance discussions based on notable
sectoral initiatives accomplished in the Uruguay Round, such as the
pharmaceutical zero-for-zero, ITA, and chemical harmonisation are
supported.  Discussions could cover issues such as expanding the list ofproducts covered by the initiatives, increasing the number of participating
Members, reducing the rates of harmonised tariffs, and introducing new
sectors to be covered by zero-for-zero initiatives. (Singapore)
 (3) Broaden the membership and expand product coverage within existing
sectoral agreements.  New "zero-for-zero" sectoral agreements in areassuch as fish products, forest products, fertilizers, energy-related equipment
and non-ferrous metals should be negotiated. Additional sectors might be
of interest. (Canada)
(4) Supplemental "zero for zero" proposals are to be kept to  a minimum.
(India)
(5) Using a formula approach as a basis does not preclude the possibility of
supplementary approaches such as sectoral initiatives or harmonization proposals which may be useful in exceptional circumstances. (Hong Kong,
China)
(6) Once a general formula has been applied, the degree of liberalization
achieved by Members can be evaluated, and if deemed necessary, it would
be possible to work at a later stage on the basis of zero-for-zero initiatives.(Mexico)(1) In case of zero-for-zero or tariff harmonization
agreements are reached, implementation periods could
include some country-specific flexibility. (Canada)
(2) Higher harmonised tariff level for developing countries;
greater credit for tariff reductions by developing countries;
and longer implementation periods would need to beincorporated in sectoral initiatives. (India).
(3) Developing countries may implement zero-for-zero or
harmonization sectoral agreements in a special and different
manner  with regard to implementation period and staging.
(Japan)
(4) Particular emphasis to be put on sectors of interest to
developing countries. (Switzerland)
(5) An emphasis should be placed on goods which are
considered important exports of developing countries.  Gemsand Jewellery sector (HS 71), one of the sectors included in
the APEC ATL, is proposed for inclusion under this
approach. (Thailand)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 19Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(7)  For existing agreements on ITA and Chemicals, expand membershipand product coverage.  ITA should include consumer electrical products,optical fibres.   New sectoral initiatives are proposed for the following
sectors: consumer electrical products, bicycles, rubber and articles thereof,
glass and articles thereof, ceramic products, cameras, watches, toyselectrical machinery parts, titanium and articles thereof, motor vehicles,
textiles and clothing, machine tools, construction equipment, bearing,
certain articles or iron or steel and paper. (see TN/MA/W/15/Add.2) Nosupport for sector-specific tariff reduction, including zero-for-zero or
harmonization, in the forest products sector in addition to the general tariff
reduction formula. No support for a zero-for-zero approach in the fisherysector. (Japan)
(8) Supplement a formula based approach with new sectors or products to
zero for zero or harmonisation initiatives at a very low level. Increase the
number of participating Members in existing initiatives and expand the
coverage of such initiatives as well as reduce the rates of harmonizedtariffs on chemical products.  In this context, special consideration should
also be given to substantially lowering or eliminating tariffs on
pharmaceutical products needed to treat diseases referred to inparagraph 1 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs agreement and public
health. (Switzerland)
(9) The sectoral approach should only be used to complement the formula
approach when the reductions obtained through the chosen formula are
insufficient (Chile)
(10) As soon as possible, but no later than 2010 elimination of tariffs in the
UR zero-for-zero sectors (including agricultural equipment, constructionequipment, furniture, medical equipment, paper, pharmaceuticals, steel and
toys) in addition to tariffs covered by ITA and Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft.  As soon as possible, but no later than 2010 eliminate tariffs in thefollowing additional sectors and others as agreed by Members: wood
products, non-ferrous metals, bicycle parts, certain chemicals and allied
products including soda ash and photograph film, electronics, fish andfishery products, scientific equipment, and environmental goods. (US)
(11) Sector approach could promote the negotiations forward and
supplement the formula approach.  Members shall be free to decide their
participation in light of their own needs. (China)
(12) Zero-for-zero approach should be accepted as a voluntary method.
(Thailand)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 20
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(13) For the purpose of eliminating tariffs, the zero-for-zero approach issupported, but should only be applied by developed countries. (Bolivia)
(14) Supplementary approaches such as sectoral (`zero-for-zero') initiatives
may be used on a voluntary basis between interested trading partners.However, the use of supplementary approaches should nevertheless be
kept to a minimum and the process of negotiations conducted in a manner
which is transparent to all WTO Members
.(Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad
and Tobago)
(15) Supplementary approaches should be considered only after the core
modality has been finalized. Participation in supplementary approaches
should be on a voluntary basis.(Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia,Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)
Request/offer
approach(1) Limited use of request/offer approach, when necessary. (Korea)
(2) Using a formula approach as a basis does not preclude the possibility of
supplementary approaches such as request/offer which may be useful in
exceptional circumstances. (Hong Kong, China)
(3) Once a general formula has been applied, the degree of liberalization
achieved by Members can be evaluated, and if deemed necessary, it would
be possible to work at a later stage on the basis of request/offer methods.(Mexico)
(4) For a limited number of sensitive products, a request/offer approach
could be envisaged in parallel to a formula.  However, the use of this
approach should not have the effect of sheltering specific sectors from
concessions.  (Switzerland)
(5) The request/offer approach should only be used to complement the
formula approach when the reductions obtained through the chosen
formula are insufficient (Chile)
(6) Supports the use of a request/offer approach because of variations in
tariff structures. Such an approach can be used to address the issues of
tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation. (Chinese Taipei)
(7) Request/Offer should be accepted as a supplementary method to
support tariff reduction by the formula approach. (Thailand)
(8) The use of supplementary approaches should be on a voluntary basis
and be kept to a minimum. The process of negotiations undertaken in thisTN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 21Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
context should be conducted in a manner which is transparent to all WTOMembers. (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
(9) Supplementary approaches should be considered only after the core
modality has been finalized. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia,Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)
5. Elimination of
low/nuisance duties(1) To eliminate "nuisance" tariffs, the formula should be supplemented witha "floor" where the calculations using the formula results in all rates belowthe "floor" being set at zero. (Norway)
(2) Negotiations would need to define what constitutes nuisance tariffs, and
then they should be eliminated.  (Singapore)
(3) Favour elimination of "nuisance duties". (Canada)(4) Other features such as elimination of tariffs below a specified level may
be added to the formula (Hong Kong, China)
(5) Developed countries should eliminate duties of 2.5% or lower (Oman)(6) Low duties should also be the subject of negotiations.  However, an
elimination of such duties is a concession like any other reduction orelimination of tariffs. (Switzerland)
(7) Elimination by 2010 of tariffs on all products with tariffs at or below 5%
ad valorem . (US)
(8) Define the scope of "nuisance" tariff and eliminate only those
considered to be truly burdensome. (Chinese Taipei)
(9) Developed country Members shall eliminate all their lowest tariffs.
(China)
(10) Elimination of "nuisance tariffs" should not be considered as a
concession equivalent to reductions of higher tariffs. (Mercosur)
(11) Elimination of tariffs below the 5% floor level is a matter of serious
concern. (Albania, Croatia, Georgia and Moldova)
(12) Low tariffs were not considered to be nuisance tariffs. Elimination of
low tariffs should not be required under the modalities, but may be
undertaken on a voluntary basis should any Member so decide. However,(1) All duties beneath a specific floor – to be negotiated – to
be eliminated by all WTO Members.  This would benefitdeveloping countries comparably more since tariffs  at such
a low level are generally applied by developed countries
(EC)
(2) Developing country Members shall be free to maintain
their low tariffs. (China)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 22
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
action by developed countries to eliminate their low tariffs should not beconstrued as a concession. (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
(13) Elimination of low/nuisance tariffs should not be considered as a
concession equivalent to the reduction of higher duties.  (Egypt, India,Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zimbabwe)
6. Tariff Peaks, Tariff
Escalation and High
Tariffs(1) The definitions of the terms tariff peak, high tariffs and tariff escalation
should be clarified.  The modalities should aim at achieving convergence of
different tariff structures of Members by effectively addressing tariff peaks,
high tariffs and tariff escalation. (See annex) (Korea)
(2) The modalities should set a maximum tariff rate and generally reduce
high tariffs more than lower ones. This means that the formula needs toinclude an element of tariff harmonisation, and be supplemented by a
"ceiling" for all tariffs. (Norway)
(3) Negotiations would need to define what constitutes tariff peaks and then
they should be substantially reduced, if not eliminated.  Negotiations would
need to discuss the methodology and definitions related to tariff escalation
in order to address the issue adequately. (Singapore)
(4) Members shall not impose a tariff on any product in excess of three
times their average tariff.  The average for this purpose shall be calculated
after effecting the tariff reduction. (cf point 2 also) (India)
(5) Compression mechanism will result  in tariff peaks and high tariffs being
eliminated.  In case of tariff escalation, the mechanism shall – if necessary– be complemented by additional steps aimed at compressing disparities
between tariff headings corresponding to products at different stages of
production.   (EC)
(6) The formula to be agreed can tackle tariff peaks and high tariffs by
introducing deeper cuts for higher tariff rates.  A cap on a maximum level oftariffs might be added.(Hong Kong, China)
(7) Once a definition has been agreed on tariff peaks, an average reduction
of (X per cent) can be agreed upon.  This would assist in reducing the gap
between bound tariffs and applied tariffs.  (Mexico)
(8) Tariff peaks and tariff escalation should be rectified through "zero-for-
zero" or "harmonization" sectoral approaches. Tariff escalation would be(1) Tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high tariffs, on products
of export interest to developing countries should be
effectively dealt with. Tariff peaks often concentrated in
products that are of export interest to developing countriessuch as in textiles and clothing, leather, rubber, footwear and
travel goods; transport equipment; fish and fish products
need to be effectively dealt with. (India)
(2) Tariff peaks and high tariffs which are common in
products of export interest to developing countries can betackled with such a formula. (Hong Kong, China)
(3) Reducing and eliminating tariff peaks and tariff escalation
on products of export interest to developing countries need
to be given maximum attention in the development ofmodalities. (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe)
(4) Support calls for the reduction and elimination by
developed countries of tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high
tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries.(Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 23Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
subject to consultation although its definition and the way to measure it arenot easy. (Japan)
(9) The mechanism of a "tariff ceiling" may be a good way of dealing with
those goods which even after the formula has been applied still maintainhigh tariffs.   No need to define the terms before the choice of a modality.
(Chile)
(10) Definition of these terms needs to be clarified. The definition of
"international peaks" and "national peaks" may be used as a benchmark to
clarify these definitions. Request/offer approach can be used to addressthese issues (Chinese Taipei)
(11) Tariff peak of a Member shall be defined as a tariff rate three times
more than the simple average tariff level of that Member. Supports the
reduction of tariff peaks.  Members shall take concrete measures to reduce
tariff escalation in their respective tariff regime.  (China)
(12) Modalities to be agreed must build in mechanisms to reduce or
eliminate tariff peaks and tariff escalation. (Mercosur)
(13) However, before taking further steps of negotiations the definitions of
these terms should be clarified, for the sake of enhancing mutualunderstanding among Members. Two recent studies made by the WTO
Secretariat, "Market Access: Unfinished Business" and "Formula
Approaches to Tariff Negotiations", indicate that two sets of criteria havebeen used for identifying peaks:  "International peaks" and "National
peaks".  The international peak is usually identified by using a fixed
percentage, and any tariff above that figure would be considered a peak.The national peak is based on an agreed fixed number of times of the
national bound tariff average.  Using one figure percentage i.e. international
peak, across the board would not reflect the real situation of each individualcountry development level.  Furthermore, it is difficult to justify the use of a
particular figure instead of another figure, especially when it is going to be
applied to different tariff levels.  On the other hand, using a fixed times ofthe national tariff average i.e. national peaks, would better reflect those
different needs and therefore the use of the national peak criteria in the
negotiations is supported.  (Thailand)
(14) The core modality needs to be designed so that it will be effective in
addressing these issues. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia,Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 24
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
7. Bindings/Binding
coverage(1) The modalities should include a commitment to bind all tariff lines fornon-agricultural products, at the rate resulting from the negotiations, andwhere in exceptional cases no tariff reduction takes place, as a minimum at
the present applied rate.  (Norway)
(2) Increase binding coverage. (Singapore)
(3) Reduce and bind applied tariff levels which are not yet bound (Canada)
(4) WTO Members, other than least developed countries have as close to
100 per cent bindings as possible. (EC)
(5) All countries will have to commit to binding the entire universe of tariff
headings for non-agricultural goods as from the implementation of the
results of this negotiating process.  (Mexico)
(6) Developed countries should bind all items. (Oman)
(7) Improve the binding ratio by binding as many tariff lines as possible.
(Japan)
(8) Coverage of bound tariffs must be improved with a view to having all
tariff lines bound in the schedules of all Members.  The binding level
should, in principle, be at the applied rates in 2001 with the possibility of a
binding at a higher rate.  (Switzerland)
(9) All tariff lines should be bound. (US)
(10) Members should commit to bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at
the conclusion of these negotiations. (Chinese Taipei)
(11) All Members shall bind their tariff rates after reduction. (China)
(12) Members should be allowed to bind all tariffs above the applied rate.
(Thailand)(1) Count binding of present applied rates as concessions
from poorer developing countries. (Norway)
(2) Developing countries should have the flexibility to not
bind certain unbound tariff lines considered highly sensitiveor strategically important  (cf. also point 1). For unbound
tariff lines, developing countries should have the flexibility to
bind them at levels generally above the higher of the boundrates prevailing for bound items in a country's tariff schedule.
(cf also point 8) (India).
(3) However, longer transitional periods could be given to
developing countries. (China)
(4) Developing countries which have not yet bound their
tariffs in exchange of not undertaking any reduction
commitment be given the flexibility to do so at reasonablerates which are commensurate with the level of their
industrial development. (Mauritius)
(5) The scope of coverage of bound products should be left
to each developing country Member to decide. In addition
the reduction of bound rates even above the applied rates isa valid offer, which also improves security of access and
reduces the risk of reverting to other measures such as anti-
dumping actions. (cf also point 8)  (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
(6) Modalities should provide flexibility to leave unbound
those tariff lines which are particularly sensitive to
developing countries. (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago)
(7) While calling for a significant increase in binding
coverage would be an appropriate objective, developing
country members would need to retain some flexibility to
continue to maintain certain unbound tariff lines, which aredomestically highly sensitive or strategically important, as
unbound. (cf also point 1) (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda andZimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 25Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
8. Binding overhang (1) Narrow the variance between ceiling bindings and applied rates as faras possible (Singapore).
(2) There must be a significant narrowing of the gap between some bound
and applied rates.  Reduce high bound rates and re-bind them at lowerrates. (Canada)
(3) The reduction of the gap between the bound and applied tariffs is of
high interest to many WTO Members.  Open to discussion on the minimum
level of credit which should be given practical effect in the negotiations to
assess tariff bindings and reductions, including what constitutes ameaningful rate of bindings. (EC)
(4) Important to rectify the great differences between bound tariff rates and
applied tariff rates. (Japan)
(5) Reduction of large gaps between bound and applied rates is an
objective. (Switzerland)
(6) Once a definition has been agreed on tariff peaks, an average reduction
of (X per cent) can be agreed upon.  This would assist in reducing the gap
between bound tariffs and applied tariffs.  (Mexico)
(7) The negotiations should aim to reduce the gap between bound and
applied tariffs. (Thailand)
(8) This concept is extraneous to the mandate and to GATT/WTO
negotiations as it would imply taking into account the applied rates in the
negotiations. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria,Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)(1) Flexibility to be available to developing countries to
decide on the actual bindings on some tariff lines as aspecial and differential measure while still maintaining the
percentage reduction on an average basis. For unbound
tariff lines, developing countries should have the flexibility tobind them at levels generally above the higher of the bound
rates prevailing for bound items in a country's tariff schedule.
(cf point 7 also)  (India)
(2). Applied rates are markedly lower than bound rates in
most developing countries as a result of the autonomousliberalisation initiatives undertaken by them. In addition, the
gap between the two rates provides this group of countries
with appropriate space for the formulation of their trade andindustrial development policies. The reduction of bound rates
even above the applied rates is a valid offer, which
improves security of access and reduces the risk of revertingto other measures such as Anti-Dumping actions. (Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
9. Base rates (1) The base rates for tariff reduction shall be the final bound rates agreed
at the UR negotiations.  The base rates for unbound tariff lines shall be the
applied rates for the year 2001. (Korea)
(2) The starting-point should be the bound tariff rates after theimplementation of the Uruguay Round results, and where such bound rates
do not exist, the generally applied rate at the start of the Doha Round.
(Norway)
(3) Applied rates should be used as the base rates for the negotiations.
The reference year for the base rates should be the one that is closer to thestart of the negotiations. (Singapore)(1) Base rate for developing countries should be the bound
rate. (Oman)
(2) For unbound tariff lines, developing countries should
have the flexibility to bind them at levels generally above the
higher of the bound rates prevailing for bound items in a
country’s tariff schedule. (India)
(3) Developing country Members to take the simple average
rate between their applied rates in 2000 and their UR finalbound rates. (China)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 26
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(4) Bound rates should be used as the basis for the negotiations, bearing inmind the requirement that there must be significant narrowing of the gapbetween some bound and applied rates.  In those cases where rates are
not bound, the applied rate in place at the beginning of the Round should
be the basis for negotiation. (Canada)
(5) For bound tariff lines, reductions should be undertaken only from bound
levels. (India)
(6) Final bound UR rates and other bound rates as per Members'
Schedules, or in the case of unbound duties, on a level related to theapplied duties as of 14 November 2001. (EC)
(7) Start with current WTO bound tariff levels. (Mexico)(8) For developed countries, base rates should be the target rates of 10%
or the bound rates, whichever is lower. (Oman)
(9) Basis for the negotiations should in principle be bound rates. (Japan)
(10) Bound rates at the end of the implementation period of the UR should
be used. If there is no bound rate, the applied rates in the year of the
launch of the Doha negotiations (2001) should be taken as the basis.(Switzerland)
(11) Bound rates must be the basis for the negotiations.  For unbound
rates, no tariff higher than that applied at the date of launching the DDR
should be used as the basis. (Chile)
(12) Applied rates as of 1 January 2000 or UR final bound levels, should be
used whichever is lower. (US)
(13) Bound rates to be used as the basis of the negotiations.  In case of
unbound dues, applied rates in effect in 2002 should be used in conjunction
with the standstill and non-roll-back principle. (Chinese Taipei)
(14) Developed country Members to take 2000 applied rates as base rates.
(China)
(15) Tariff cuts should be effected from the bound rates.  (Mauritius) (4) For unbound tariff lines, developing country members
should have the flexibility to bind them at levels generallyabove the highest bound rate prevailing for bound items in a
country’s current tariff schedule or at the applied rates as of
a cut off date whichever is higher.  In exceptional cases,higher bindings should be permitted.   Such newly bound
rates would not be subject to reduction commitments agreed
upon. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius,Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 27Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(16) Bound tariffs of all WTO Member whenever they are available are theonly viable starting-point for the negotiations.  (Mercosur)
(17) Negotiations should be the committed bound rate from the previous
GATT/WTO round of negotiations.  In the case of unbound items, which aregenerally more sensitive products than bound items, the national statutory
rate should be the starting-point for negotiations. (Thailand)
(18) Bound rates must be the starting point of the negotiations. (Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
(19) Bound rates where they exist should be used as the basis for the
negotiations. (New Zealand)
(20) The starting point for the negotiations should be the bound rates.
(Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
(21) Bound rates at the end of the implementation period of the UR are the
only legitimate starting points for further reductions.  (Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda andZimbabwe)
10. Base  year (1)  In principle base year should be the most recent year in which data areavailable for  the majority of Members. (Canada)
(2) The use of import data of values for the year 2000 as basic statistics is
proposed because more Members notified their data for the year 2000 than
for the year 2001. (Japan)
(3) The base period for the negotiations should, in principle, be the most
recent year for which there is up-to-date statistical information available for
the majority of Members.  (Mercosur)
(4) The base year for the negotiations should be 2000. (Bolivia)
(5) The base year should be the year of completion of the Uruguay Round.
(Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
(6) The base year should be the one for which data is available for a
majority of Members. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 28
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
11. Nomenclature (1) HS96 should be used  for the negotiations. (Korea)
(2) HS2002 should be used.  (Japan)
(3) HS96 should be used, however results of the negotiations should be
published in HS2002. (Switzerland)
(4) Flexibility to use the nomenclature in which Member has bound its
tariffs, be it HS96 or HS2002 but tariff nomenclature concordance tables
would be required. (Chinese Taipei)
(5) Tariff reduction shall be made on the basis of HS96 and final results
scheduled in HS2002. (China)
(6) HS96 should be the basis of the negotiations. (Barbados, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago)
(7) HS96 could be used in the negotiations with the understanding that the
results of the negotiations would be published in HS2002.  (Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda andZimbabwe)
12. Implementation
periods and staging(1) The implementation period for tariff reduction is five years. The cuts areto be equal annual cuts. (Korea).
(2) A short implementation period and a simple linear staging within such a
period would be preferable (Norway).
(3) It was noted that previous non-agricultural negotiations had as norm a
maximum of five equal annual instalments beginning on the date of entry
into force of the agreement (Singapore)
(4) A five-year time-frame combined with the use of linear cuts. Members
would be free to make a case for longer or shorter transition periods
depending on circumstances. (Canada)
(5) Developed Member should commit to the phasing out all tariffs on  non-
agricultural products in five years in equal annual cuts. (Hong Kong, China)
(6) Staging may be five years, in principle, with equal instalments on the
basis that implementation periods will begin in January 2005. (Japan)(1) The implementation period should be seven years.  The
cuts are to be equal annual cuts. (Korea)
(2) There should be various staging periods for non-
agricultural tariff reductions in order to enable developingcountries to be given more flexibility to make substantive
tariff commitments, and to take into consideration product
sensitivity. (Singapore)
(3) The precedent set in the Uruguay Round may be
followed and developing countries should be permitted toimplement tariff commitments over a longer period of time
than developed countries.  The duration will depend on the
extent of commitments undertaken.  For developingcountries it should extend up to a ten-year period. (India).
(4) Different timetables for the implementation of tariff
commitments depending on status of Member and level of
results (EC).TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 29Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(7) Five years as a general rule (Switzerland)
(8) Establish longer implementation periods to enable higher levels of
ambition. (Chile)
(9) Staging should be over five years, in principle commencing either from
the conclusion of their implementation periods already committed to each
Member in its schedule or from the conclusion of the negotiations,
whichever is the later. (Chinese Taipei)
(10) Stagger the liberalization process  for products that are highly
sensitive. Longer period for tariff reductions for sensitive products.
(Mauritius)
(11) A five-year staging period would be appropriate for developed
Members. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria,Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)(5) A programme of progressive reduction of tariffs for a
longer period of time is appropriate for developing countries.(Hong Kong, China)
(6) Longer than five years should be allowed for developing
countries that implement deeper than average cuts amongdeveloping countries. (Japan)
(7) Longer than five years in exchange for major cuts on
sensitive products for developing countries. (Switzerland)
(8) Longer implementation period to be given to developing
country members. (China)
(9) Modalities should include differentiated staging periods.
(Mercosur)
(10) Special and differential treatment should be provided in
the form of among others different time-frames forimplementation. (Thailand)
(11) Implementation periods are to be commensurate with
developing Members’ levels of development, size of
economy, fiscal and other strategic development needs. A
five-year period would therefore not be sufficient. In addition,the staging of the tariff reductions must be based on the
principle of `less than full reciprocity' regardless of the
modalities to be agreed upon. (Barbados, Jamaica andTrinidad and Tobago)
(12)  A ten-year staging period would be appropriate for
developing Members. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zimbabwe)
13. Credit for
autonomous
liberalization(1) The modalities need to include ways to acknowledge autonomous tariffreductions representing significant steps towards liberalising internationaltrade, to the extent that members having made such autonomous tariff
reductions as a minimum are prepared to bind tariff rates as part of their
commitments. (Norway)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 30
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(2) Credit should be given for prior autonomous liberalization which goesbeyond existing UR commitments.  This is on the understanding that creditwould be given only in those cases where changes have been bound or will
be bound as a result of the current negotiations (Canada).
(3) A number of developing countries have reduced and bound their tariffs
since the Uruguay Round, and credit for such autonomous liberalization of
tariffs should be given. (India)
(4) Ready to discuss guidelines concerning the assessment of the credit
arising from initiatives of autonomous liberalization undertaken by memberssince the end of the UR or to be undertaken during the course of the DDA
negotiations provided final rates are bound. (EC)
(5) Negotiations should be able to take account of cases in which the
countries have gone beyond the trade liberalization agreed during the
Uruguay Round. (Mexico)
(6) As to voluntary liberalization, since assessment methods for credits are
difficult and are likely to be arbitrary, careful handling is required. (Japan)
(7) Credit should be given for autonomous liberalization undertaken by
Members since 1995.  The Member States could provide information on theautonomous liberalisation undertaken by them by end of January 2003
while the Secretariat in the interim could prepare a paper on how the
autonomous liberalisation could be taken on board. (Mauritius)
(8) Credit should be given for autonomous liberalisation measures
undertaken by developing countries since the end of the Uruguay Round.The modalities for granting credit should be developed as a matter of
urgency. (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
(9) Credit should be given for all liberalization in tariffs undertaken by
Members since the Uruguay Round on an autonomous basis and not as a
result of a negotiating process, and which has been bound in the WTO.(Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zimbabwe)
14. Non ad valorem
duties(1) Non ad valorem  duties are to be reduced on the basis of their ad
valorem  equivalents. Following the reduction, Members shall have the
discretion to convert the non ad valorem  tariffs or maintain non ad valorem
tariffs. (Korea).(1) Developing country Members shall limit their number of
non ad valorem  tariffs to no more than 3% of the total
number of tariff lines in their national tariff nomenclatures.(China)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 31Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(2) Members should also consider converting to ad valorem  tariffs and
cease using complex or mixed tariffs. (Singapore)
(3) Maximize the use of ad valorem  rates (Canada).
(4) Consensus needs to be built on how to deal with the matter of use of
specific duties. (India)
(5) Developed countries should convert all specific duties to ad valorem
tariffs. (Oman)
(6) Maximize the use of ad valorem  rates. (US)
(7) Members shall convert their existing non ad valorem  tariffs into ad
valorem  form through a uniform method and use them as the basis for tariff
reductions.  Developed country Members shall eliminate all non ad valorem
tariffs on non-agricultural products. (China)
(8) Members should commit to converting their specific duties into ad
valorem  tariffs during the negotiating process. (MERCOSUR)
(9) A common agreed methodology should be adopted for the calculation of
such rates.   It would be useful if the Secretariat could prepare backgroundinformation on the possible options.  Additionally, during the negotiating
process, members shall commit to converting all their specific and mixed
duties into ad valorem tariffs without exception. (Egypt, India, Indonesia,Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)(2) Developing countries should however have the flexibility
to retain non- ad valorem  rates for upto 3% of the total tariff
lines in their national nomenclature. (Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zimbabwe)
15. Simplification of
tariff structures(1) Harmonize tariffs on similar products within similar HSheadings/classifications.  This would lessen substantially the complications
arising from levying taxes on similar products with varying tariff rates.
(Singapore)
(2) Examine the simplification of subdivisions under HS subheadings, for
example, combine national subdivisions as long as those subdivisions carrythe same bound rates (Japan)
(3) Tariff structures reflect the level of development of members and their
developmental priorities.  Hence the objective of proposals in this regard is
not very clear. Further, it is not a part of the mandate.  (Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda andZimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 32
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
16. Export taxes (1) Negotiations should address export duties. A level playing field doesrequire the removal of export restrictions, and in particular export duties,which are the flip-side to tariff escalation. (EC)
(2) Export tax should be discussed in the negotiations on market access for
non-agricultural products. (Japan)
(3)
 Export taxes and export restrictions are not a part of the mandate for
the current negotiations and as such should not be dealt with in this
negotiation. (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria,
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe)
17. INRs (1) Modalities should see how INRs are reflected in the final results of the
market access negotiations. (Switzerland)
(2) Any discussion on INRs should take into account the interest and needs
of suppliers from smaller sized economies with traditional/historical access.
(Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago)
(3) This could be addressed once the modality has been agreed upon.
(Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zimbabwe)
18. Erosion of
Preferential Margins(1)  Any erosion in preferential market access resulting from the
negotiations should be duly compensated.  Would appreciate ideas ofMembers on the possible compensation mechanism that could be set up.  It
is suggested that a competitiveness fund on the basis of contribution from
the International Financial Institutions be set up to enable them toundertake competitive adjustment.  (Mauritius)
(cf also point 20 on LDCs)
(2) The modalities should include a procedure for establishing measures
and mechanisms to deal with erosion of preferences, with the aim of
avoiding or offsetting this problem or compensating the affected Members.(Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
(3) Positive measures must be found to mitigate against the negative
impact of the loss of preferential market access. (Barbados, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago)
(4) It is crucial that the Negotiating Group explore fully this issue with a view
to developing an appropriate mechanism to respond to such situations.
(Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania,Uganda and Zimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 33Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
19. Newly Acceded
Members(1) General modalities should not apply to newly acceding countries whichmay make contributions at their initiative. (Oman)
(2) Allow newly-acceded Members a longer staging period and credit for
autonomous liberalization. (Chinese Taipei)
(3) Reduction commitments of newly-acceded Members shall be fully taken
into consideration and no further reduction required. Newly-accededMembers shall take the simple average rate of their applied rates in 2000
and their final bound rates committed in their accession negotiations as
their base rates for the negotiations. (China)
(4) Consideration should be given to the terms of accession of a number of
recently acceded Members. (Switzerland)
(5) Liberalization commitments made by newly acceded Members during
their accession should be the subject of credit for autonomousliberalization.
The modalities would include a specific flexibility provision concerning
recently acceded countries, which would:
- stipulate that these Members shall reduce their tariffs as the
result of negotiations on the basis of a request / offer approach;
while
- firstly, exempting low tariffs from further reduction commitments
of these countries;and
- secondly, providing an additional flexibility to selective reduction,
which should be the following:(i) the level of tariff reductions should be lower;
(ii) longer implementation periods;
(iii) the new commitments should not affect implementation
periods of the commitments made during the
accession negotiations;
and(iv) extension or delay of periods for the implementation of
the new commitments (i.e. some pause between the
term of expiration of the transitional period foraccession commitments and the beginning of
implementation periods for new reduction
commitments).  (Albania, Croatia,  Georgia, Moldova)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 34
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(6) Supports the call by newly acceded Members for flexibility inundertaking further commitments. (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad andTobago)
20. Least Developed
Countries(1) Least developed country Members to be exempted from the tariffreduction obligations, but are required to substantially increase their tariffbinding ratios. (Korea)
(2) No reciprocal tariff concessions are expected from least-developed
countries. As a minimum, elimination of tariffs for products of importance to
LDCs. (Norway)
(3) There should be various staging periods for non-agricultural tariff
reductions in order to enable LDCs to be given more flexibility to make
substantive tariff commitments, and to take into consideration productsensitivity. (Singapore)
(4) Developed countries should implement tariff and quota-free access for
all products from least developed countries by 31 May 2003. The most
developed of developing countries are invited to joint this initiative. All WTO
Members other than LDCs should have as close to 100% bindings as
possible. All duties beneath a specific floor – to be negotiated – to be
eliminated by all WTO Members.  This would benefit LDCs comparablymore since tariffs  at such a low level are generally applied by developed
countries (EC)
(5) The formula can allow different levels of tariff cut for least developed
Members. (Hong Kong, China)
(6) All Members are to use the trade-weighted average target tariff formula
with the exception of LDCs. GSP providers should study the possibility of
reviewing the scheme based on the enabling clause, taking into accountthe competitiveness of the products and improving market access for LDC
products. Appropriate capacity-building should be carried out. (Japan)
(7) Particular emphasis to be put on sectors of interest to LDCs.
Substantial reductions from LDCs would in principle not be expected.
(Switzerland)
(8) Once Members have secured agreement on the modalities, they should
turn to more precise and customised approaches to ensure participation byLDCs consistent with their individual development needs. (US)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 35Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(9) LDCs may determine the coverage of their binding undertakings on anautonomous basis. Design a capacity-building programme which isindividually tailored to the particular needs of each of the Member
concerned, which also contain certain milestones and assessment criteria
to show what progress a country is making internally with the capacity-building assistance already provided. (Chinese Taipei)
(10) More flexibility to least developed country Members with regard to
binding of tariffs, conversion of ad valorem  tariffs, elimination of tariff peaks
and tariff escalation. Sectors and products of substantial export interest to
LDCs shall be the subject of priority reductions in the negotiations. (China)
(11)  Adoption by all developed countries of separate arrangements under
the umbrella of their Generalized System of Preferences, which would allowimports of all products from least developed countries on duty and quote
free basis. Preferential treatment extended under the arrangements should
not be modified to the disadvantage of the least developed countries duringan agreed period of time (e.g. fifteen to twenty years).
- In order to ensure that the erosion of preferential margins do not result in
sudden disruption of trade of the preference receiving countries, the
modalities to be used by the least developed countries should provide for
the following:
• Where a least developed country considers that preferential
margins which its exports enjoy in relation to certain tariff lines or
headings are of meaningful advantage in trade terms, and thereduction or erosion of preferential margins resulting from MFN
reductions is likely to seriously affect its exports, it may request
the preference giving countries to:
- Postpone commencement of the staging of
reductions by agreed number of years (e.g. fiveyears) or
- To spread the staging of reductions over a period
of ten years instead of normal period of five yearsthat may be agreed in the negotiations.
• The preference giving countries to whom such request are made
should agree to consider such requests sympathetically and
provide reasons, in cases where it is not possible for them toagree to such requests.TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 36
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
- Developing countries should extend preferential tariff treatment on anon-reciprocal basis, on the basis of request lists to be submitted by theleast developed countries.
 Modalities should recognize that in this round of negotiations, LDCs are
not in a position to make reductions in tariffs in the context of multilateral
trade negotiations.
- LDCs could agree to bind their tariffs at levels which are higher than their
applied rates of tariffs.  The modalities should provide such bindings being
offered on limited number of products or sectors, or across the board on alltariffs by giving a “ceiling binding”.
- LDCs should get credit for reductions in tariffs which they have been
making on an autonomous basis. (LDCs)
(12) For least-developed countries, special and differential treatment should
be provided in the form of, inier alia , different target tariff cuts, different
components of the formula, different time frames for implementation.
(Thailand)
(13) - Developed country Members should provide improved market access
to least developing country products by addressing the problems posed tothe trade of these countries as a result of the existing tariffs (peaks and
escalations).
   - Any further liberalisation including reduction commitment should be leftto be determined by them.
- Applied rates are markedly lower than bound rates in most least
developing countries as a result of the autonomous liberalisation initiativesundertaken by them. In addition, the gap between the two rates provides
this group of countries with appropriate space for the formulation of their
trade and industrial development policies. (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
(14) Participation by LDCs on commitments to reduce or eliminate non-
agricultural tariffs should be on a voluntary basis. (New Zealand)
(15) Support these Members’ calls for special treatment in these
negotiations.  (Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago)
(16) LDCs should not be expected to undertake tariff reduction
commitments or increase binding coverage that are not commensurate with
their level of development.   Some of the suggested solutions for possibleTN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 37Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
loss of market access for erosion of preferential margins includingcompensatory mechanism for the export losses and easing of stringentRules of Origin to expand the exportable products basket shall be favorably
considered.  Developed countries shall provide duty-free and quota free
access for all the products of LDCs.  Capacity building programmesenvisaged in the Doha mandate shall be tailored to their specific needs.
(Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zimbabwe)TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 38
Annex
Korea (TN/MA/W/6/Add.1)
1. Korea proposes that each Member reduce its trade weighted average tariff rate by 40  percent.
Members will achieve this goal in accordance with the following tariff reduction formulae:
(a) The bound tariff rate for each non-agricultural product shall be reduced at least by 20 percent
with no exceptions.
(b) For those products whose current bound tariff rates are above either two times each Member’s
current simple national average tariff rate or 25 percent, the tariff rates shall be reduced by more than20 percent.
- The tariff rates above two times the national average, after minimum reduction of 20 percent,
shall be further subtracted by 70 percent of the difference between them and two times the
simple national average.  For example, if the national average tariff rate is 3 percent and thetariff rate for product A is 15 percent, the final tariff rate for product A shall be less than
5.7 percent.
T
1=(T 0*0.8)-0.7*(T 0-2*T a)
T1: maximum tariff rate after reduction
T0: tariff rate before reduction (above 2 times the national average)
Ta: national average tariff rate
- The tariff rates above 25 percent, after minimum reduction of 20 percent, shall be further
subtracted by 70 percent of the difference between them and 25 percent.  For example, if the
tariff rate for product B is 50 percent, the final tariff rate for product B shall be less than 22.5
percent.
T1= (T 0*0.8)-0.7*(T 0-25)
T1: maximum tariff rate after reduction
T0: tariff rate before reduction (above 25 percent)
- If a tariff rate is above two times the simple national average and at the same time above 25
percent, the final tariff rate shall be whichever is lower after the reduction as described above.
(c)  If the result of tariff reduction in accordance with the formulae as described above is under the
targeted 40 percent reduction of the trade weighted average tariff rate, Members shall make additional
tariff reduction at its own discretion to achieve the targeted 40 percent reduction.  However, if the
result of tariff reduction in accordance with the formulae as described above goes beyond the targeted
40 percent reduction, Members shall apply the result.
_______________
India (TN/MA/W/10/Add.2)
Step 1  - O F TAYT *)1001(1 −=TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 39
Step 2  - T F  = T F1  o r 3*T A   whichever is less
Where
A = less than full reciprocity’ parameter;
A = 1 for developed countries andA = 0.67 for developing countries
Y = Reduction percentage (to be negotiated)
OT = Present bound tariff on an individual tariff line
1FT = Reduced tariff after Step 1 on the individual tariff line
TA = Simple average tariff after Step 1
FT = Final bound tariff on the individual tariff line
_______________
EC (TN/MA/W/11/Add.1)
duty. initial  whereand bracket, new in the limits same as 1 and 1 and bracket, basein  limits upper  and lower  as 0 and 0with  ,
)0 0()1 1(
*)0(1)(
=/g239/g238/g239/g237/g236
−−
−+ =
xUBLBUBLBLBUBLBUBLBxLBxf
_______________
Japan (TN/MA/W/15 and Corr.1)
to  * A
tt =                     + α
to + A
to ≤ 10%, A = 10
10% < t o  ≤ 20%, A = 20
20% < t o  ≤ 30%, A = 30
30% < t o, A = 40
α = 0.3
tt : trade-weighted average target tariff rate
to : bound rate (trade-weighted average)
_______________TN/MA/6/Rev.1
Page 40
China (TN/MA/W/20)
T0 : Base rate
T1 : Final rate
A : Simple average of base rates
P :  Peak factor,  P=T 0/A
B : Adjusting coefficient, e.g. for the year 2010, B=3; for the year 2015, B=1
_______________
Swiss formula
T0 : Base tariff
T1 : New tariff
A  : Coefficient  ( US - TN/MA/W/18 : A=8 ))
__________00
1TATAT+×=020
1T)PA(T)PBA(T+ +××+=