RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/CTD/M/4
17 July 2002
(02-3964)
Committee on Trade and Development
Fourth Special Session
NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 14 JUNE 2002
Chairman:  H.E. Mr. Ransford Smith (Jamaica)
Subjects discussed:
A. A DOPTION OF THE DRAFT AGENDA ...........................................................................................1
B. S PECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT .................................................................................2
C. O THER BUSINESS ......................................................................................................................24
INTRODUCTION
1. The Chairman recalled that at the informal meeting on 10 June 2002 he reported on the
outcome of the informal consultations that had been held on a number of issues.  One issue under
consultation was that of document symbols for documents issued by the Committee on Trade and
Development (CTD) when meeting in Special Session.  In his brief to Members he recalled that
several delegations had questioned whether or not it was appropriate to attribute the TN symbol to the
submissions and other documentation presented to  or issuing from the Special Session of the CTD
since, in their view, the Special Session was not a negotiating body.  The contrary view was held by
other Members.  However, importantly all Members had indicated their commitment to the relevantDoha Ministerial mandate on Special and Differential (S&D) treatment and had likewise indicated
their willingness to pursue the work of the Special Session on the basis of the agreed Work Plan.
Against this background, the Chairman conveyed his understanding of the use of the TN symbol for
the Special Sessions' documentation.  He clarified that use of the TN symbol would not prejudice the
position of any delegation on the nature of the Special Session.
A. A
DOPTION OF THE DRAFT AGENDA
2. The Chairman indicated that the draft agenda for the meeting was contained in airgram
WTO/AIR/1821 of 3 June 2002.  He also mentioned that he intended, under "Other Business", to
bring up two matters for discussion.  First, he woul d open the floor to any comments that delegations
might have with respect to the responses received from the Chairs of the other WTO bodies to the
Committee's request to be kept informed of any issues relating to S&D treatment within their
respective bodies.  He had drawn the Committee's attention to these responses at the last meeting.
Second, since the Committee only had two more meetings until July 2002, one of which would be a
half-day meeting only, it was necessary to consider how to proceed with the work, particularly inview of the reporting requirement to the General Council.  He also indicated that two further
submissions had been received since the last informal meeting:  one from Thailand and one from
St. Lucia.  He suggested that these submissions, currently available in English only, should be
introduced at the meeting.  With these introductory remarks he proposed the agenda for adoption.TN/CTD/M/4
Page 2
3. The agenda was so adopted.
B. S PECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
4. The Chairman proposed that the business under this agenda item be conducted as follows.  He
said that Agenda Item B had two components:  B(I)  and B(II).  Agenda Item B(I) had been further
sub-divided into three components:  the identification of provisions which Members consider should
be made mandatory;  the consideration of Members' inputs on the legal and practical implications of
making non-mandatory provisions mandatory;  and the identification of how provisions might be
made more precise, effective and operational.  With respect to Agenda Item B(I) he recommended
that the submissions made by the delegations of Paraguay, Thailand, and Saint Lucia be introduced.
Members could then give their initial reactions.  He was aware that Members might, however, need
more time to study these proposals.  He also recalled that at the informal meeting held on10 June 2002 there had been an initial discussion of the proposals from the African Group and from
the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) which were contained in the expanded version of
TN/CTD/W/3 and TN/CTD/W/4 respectively.  He suggested that the Committee also continue the
discussion of these two proposals.  He would invite further reactions to them following any additional
comments that the sponsoring delegations might first wish to make.  Finally, he proposed to have afirst agreement-by-agreement and decision-by-decision discussion on the specific proposals contained
in (i) the LDC submission of TN/CTD/W/4, (ii) Paraguay's submission in TN/CTD/W/5, (iii) the
African Group submission in TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.1.  He proposed, following this discussion, to turn
then to Agenda Item B (II) - the consideration of ways, including through improved information
flows, by which developing countries, and in partic ular the LDCs, might be assisted to make the best
use of S&D treatment provisions.
5. The Chairman then invited the delegation of Paraguay to introduce its submission.
6. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation's paper had already been circulated to
Members as document TN/CTD/W/5 and that it was available both in Spanish and English.  The
paper related to the "Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and FullerParticipation of Developing Countries", more commonly known as the "Enabling Clause", coming
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994).  His delegation wished to
introduce this paper under the agenda item on the identification of how provisions might be made
more precise, effective and operational, pursuant to Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
He said that the GATT and the WTO Agreements were signed in an endeavour to achieve further
trade liberalization and greater participation of all countries in establishing fairer trade.  The need to
provide S&D treatment for developing countries had, as a result, been accepted.  Developed countries,by recognizing this fact, had declared that they believed this approach to be fair and equitable.  The
Enabling Clause was accordingly established, within that framework, as a mechanism for handling
more effectively the General System of Preferences (GSP).  He accepted that developed countries had
the right to accord facilities or privileges to developing countries on a voluntary or optional basis.
However, for S&D treatment to be fair, once adopted, it had to comply with the mandatory rules andregulations binding the provision of such special treatment.  This was the reason why the Enabling
Clause had laid down these rules in such clear and mandatory terms.  He said that, throughout the
years in which it had been in force, the "Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" had frequently been infringed.  These
infringements took the form of requests to the WTO for waivers from Article I of the GeneralAgreement in order to accord privileges or benefits  to specific developing countries to the exclusion
of others.  This had given rise to discrimination inconsistent with the objectives of the Enabling
Clause.TN/CTD/M/4
Page 3
7. He pointed out that these preferences were often made conditional upon such criteria as:
(i) competitiveness;  (ii) specialization and development indices;  (iii) sectoral and country graduation;
(iv) linking of benefits to non-trade issues such as environmental and social (labour) standards;
(v) intellectual property rights;  and (vi) the fight against drugs.  He said that all these conditionalities
were reflective of a subjective, arbitrary and unilateral position taken by certain developed countriesin administering certain preferential schemes.  He also pointed out that it was for this reason that the
most serious consequence of granting waivers was the non-compliance with the Enabling Clause
which resulted in discriminatory privileges for a few specific countries to the detriment of others.
This was particularly so given that no case could be made that agreements on concessions by certain
developed countries were covered by Article XXIV of the GATT.  He went on to say that his
delegation also considered that the establishment of agreements between blocks of countries and other
countries and/or blocks of countries, allegedly pursuant to Article XXIV and involving waivers andexceptions, gave rise to discrimination and made the system less transparent.  He said that the
Ministers at Doha had recognized that regional trading arrangements could play a major role in
encouraging trade liberalization and economic development.  His delegation was convinced of the
truth of this assertion since they themselves were members of several regional economic integration
schemes, such as the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), the Free-Trade Area of theAmericas (FTAA) and MERCOSUR, all of which were  consistent with WTO principles, disciplines
and procedures.  He said that at the Doha Ministerial Conference Members had also agreed to further
the objective of establishing a multilateral trading system based on non-discrimination, rejection of
protectionist practices, and with an emphasis on development.  But discrimination was unfortunately
very much present in the system and the ones who ended up paying for the concessions provided tosome developing countries by means of such waivers were generally the developing countries
excluded from such preferential treatment.  He said that it could be asserted that waivers of this type
generated unfair competition leading to the impoverishment of those developing countries which did
not receive such benefits.  This therefore constituted a distortion to the fundamental purpose of
multilateralism.  He said that it was these and other elements, as set forth in their document, that hadprompted his delegation to make this submission.
8. He went on to say that the Members who had signed the Marrakesh Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization had nurtured the hope and desire that international trade would be truly
multilateral and that all Members would be able to compete on an equal footing without
discrimination or benefits for some to the exclusi on of others.  A sense of relief had subsequently
accompanied the launch of the "Agenda for Development" at Doha since it involved a clear political
commitment to a multilateral trading system which sought to secure transparent, predictable and
sustainable conditions for the implementation of measures whose objective was to increase
developing countries' trade.  Moreover, this was to be done keeping in mind the interests of all
developing country Members, without distinction or exclusion, on a collective rather than an
individual basis, so as to ensure transparency and "non-discrimination" in the implementation process.
However, an ever-increasing number of people in  many developing countries were now not only
questioning the ability of the WTO to contribute to export growth, but also asking whether trade
opening and liberalization did not at times have an adverse affect on development.  He said that for
many developing countries, in particular those which had continued to support and believe in the
multilateral trading system, Doha represented a reconciliation between "free trade" and "development
with equity".  However scarcely had the Doha Conference drawn to a close when, in the midst of thepreparations on structuring the agreed negotiations , with sights set on the "developing world", the
trading system was hit by a series of unilateral restrictions imposed by the world's major trading
economies.  Citing as examples multi-million dollar domestic support and protectionist agricultural
policies, he said that such policies would destro y any confidence that Members may have had in the
political will of the leaders of such countries to construct a fair multilateral trading system.  Given theevidence of increasing protectionist measures taken by some countries, measures which distort trade
and discriminate against those countries least able to retaliate, it was of course becoming ever more
difficult to muster support for the multilateral trading system in developing countries.TN/CTD/M/4
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9. He said that establishing an open, free, competitive and multilateral trading system was both a
responsibility, a challenge, and indeed a necessity.  To guarantee such a system it would be necessary
to increase access to developed country markets as well as to eliminate barriers to trade.  The system
had to be based on sustainability, predictability and non-discrimination so that trade and development,
taken together, produced satisfactory results for all Members of the system.  He felt that these weresome of the aims pursued by developing country Members in order to ensure their more effective
participation in the multilateral trading system.  He said that it was in light of these concerns  that, as a
brief but nevertheless important contribution to the multilateral trading system, his delegation
considered that the "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation
of Developing Countries", provided for in the Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903), more
commonly known as the "Enabling Clause", should  be unconditionally implemented and that its
implementation should not give rise to any discri mination between developing countries.  Nor should
any attempt be made to circumvent its implementation requirements except, as he repeated, for the
LDCs.  Finally, he said that if these commitments were understood to be mutual then implementation
of the development objectives of developing countries would guarantee equal opportunity and
confirm that the multilateral trading system was the answer to the many problems for which people in
developing countries were hopefully and eagerly awaiting answers.
10. The Chairman then requested the delegations of  Thailand and Saint Lucia to introduce their
proposals.
11. The representative of Thailand introduced their submission relating to the Import Licencing
Agreement.  She said that Article 3.5(a) of th e Agreement on Import Licencing Procedures stipulated
that Members shall provide, upon the request of any Member having an interest in the productconcerned, all relevant information, including import statistics, with respect to the product subject to
import licencing.  Her delegation was of the view that, in providing such information to the Member
making a request, there was always a certain administrative and financial cost involved.  Developing
country Members should therefore be required to provide information, particularly import statistics,
only to the extent that this was considered necessary.  They should not be expected to engage in theprovision of information which was administratively and financially more onerous than absolutely
necessary.  However, her delegation noted that sub-item (iv) of Article 3.5(a) stated that "where
practicable, import statistics (i.e. value and/or volume) with respect to the products subject to import
licensing.  Developing country Me mbers would not be expected to take additional administrative or
financial burdens on this account".  Although there was room for flexibility for developing country
Members not to take additional administrative and financial burden, but as the word used was
"would" there was a lack of clarity about the mandatory nature of the provision.  Her delegation hadtherefore proposed that the word "would" be replaced by "shall" in the last sentence of
Article 3.5(a)(iv) so that the sentence would read:  "Developing country Members shall not be
expected to take additional administrative or financial burdens on this account".
12. The representative of Saint Lucia said that the availability of trade policy instruments was a
necessary adjunct to the successful liberalization of economic development - one that was considered
vital to promote sustainable economic growth and development.  Quoting the Appellate Body, she
said that permitting the use of safeguard measures was equivalent to giving a WTO Member the
possibility of resorting to an effective trade remedy in an emergency situation that, in the judgement
of that Member, made it necessary, albeit temporarily, to protect its domestic industry.  However the
less advantaged developing countries, particularly those with limited human resources, lacked theadministrative capability to take recourse to these trade remedies in accordance with WTO rules.  She
went on to say that, while almost all WTO Members, irrespective of the level of sophistication of their
economy, often advanced similar economic justification for the application of safeguard measures, a
major difference existed when it came to the application of these contingency measures by developing
countries.  These countries often lacked administrative resources to implement these measureseffectively even though the pronounced severity of the potential impact of the import surges on smallTN/CTD/M/4
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developing markets underscored the need for swift remedial action.  In this context, her delegation felt
that it was important to revisit the intent and purpose of the 1955 redrafted Article XV III of the
GATT.  Article XVIII was intended, inter alia , to provide a suitable solution to some of the problems
arising because of the special circumstances of economic development.  However, only a few
developing countries have had recourse to Article XVIII.  She pointed out that Bangladesh’sinvocation of Article XVIII was the first such attempt since the WTO Agreements came into force.
Many developing countries which faced the same import surges as other WTO Members had no
defence whatsoever while others had recourse to precisely these instruments.
13. She said that it was from this perspective that her delegation had proposed certain changes for
enhancing the effectiveness of Section(C), Article XVIII.  These included the elaboration of basic
guidelines to set out the procedures for recourse to th is Section since this would assist in clarifying the
procedural ambiguities in the text.  Similarly, there was a need to interpret "infant industries" broadly,so as to facilitate the implementation of sustainable economic development programmes in small and
vulnerable developing country Members, including in circumstances where established industries
were threatened by an absolute or relative increase in imports.  Additionally there should be a clear
reaffirmation that the duration and review of the measure must be tied to the achievement of
objectives for which the measure was imposed rather than to any arbitrary number of years.  She alsosaid that they were proposing that any right to compensation and/or retaliation should, given the
limited ability of small and vulnerable developing country Members to provide compensatory
concessions, be waived for an initial period of application.  Finally, she said that Section(C) of
Article XVIII should be reaffirmed as a new and distinct S&D trade policy instrument for inter alia
small and vulnerable developing country Members with limited administrative capacities and notmerely as a measure of last recourse.  Small and vulnerable developing country Members require
effective trade policy instruments for successful liberalization and to promote sustainable economic
growth and development.
14. The representative of the Philippines said that the issue raised in Paraguay's submission was a
very important one and struck at the very heart of the WTO system.  This was a principle which had
been held sacrosanct for a long time.  He said that the proliferation of special arrangements on market
access based on political and other non-economic issues was probably one of the biggest causes of
discriminatory treatment.  His delegation fully subscribed, therefore, to the legal and economic
reasons which had been adduced by Paraguay.  He said that the consistency of regional trading
arrangements could not often be examined because of the political need and motivation among some
Members to continue to have the flexibility to discriminate on the basis of non-economic and
non-commercial factors.  He said that he fully supported the proposal, in particular that contained inparagraph 5 of the submission, as it was important to consider ways and means to ensure against this
kind of discrimination.  He felt that this issue should be given importance in the discussions of S&D
provisions for mandatory implementation.
15. The representative of Thailand said that her delegation attached great importance to the need
to create a level playing field within the organization so that the less developed country Members
could participate effectively in the multilateral trading system.  She fully appreciated the spirit in
which Members, including the developed country Members, wanted to help less developed countries
to improve their efficiency and competitiveness in the world market by granting them preferential
tariff treatment in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences.  However as time had gone
by the spirit and objective of this approach had been eroded and altered.  The basic principle of theEnabling Clause as a generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory system of preferences had
been established to ensure that special and preferential treatment given to developing countries was
unconditional and non-discriminatory.  She pointed out, however, that some developed countries,
without fully adhering to the Enabling Clause, had used this system of preferential treatment as an
instrument to assist their own investment policies in  certain developing countries.  This in turn had
lead to discriminatory treatment of imports from other more competitive developing countries.  SheTN/CTD/M/4
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said that some developed countries had also used this as an instrument with which to impose the
adoption of their standards, such as on labour and the environment, as a pre-condition for the granting
of such preferential treatment.  She said that the Enabling Clause was mandatory and that no Member
should be allowed to deviate from its norms on providing preferential treatment uniformly to all
developing countries.  She said that her delegation therefore fully supported Paraguay's proposal.
16. The representative of Argentina began by recalling the nature of the Enabling Clause and said
that the footnote to the clause made it clear that the intention was to establish a system of generalized,
non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences be neficial to the developing countries.  There were
thus three basic elements to the Enabling Clause.  He said that when preferences were being granted
by obtaining a waiver these basic elements were unfortunately ignored because the preferences so
granted were neither generalized nor non-discriminatory.  He said that this prejudiced the interests of
countries which did not benefit from such preferences, granted on the basis of a waiver.  At timeseven the interest of the preference receiving countries was prejudiced because they did not receive
non-reciprocal preferences.  He said that the Enabling Clause had been adopted as a protection for
developing countries and felt that it would be in the interest of even preference receiving countries if
such treatment was granted within the framework of the Enabling Clause because then they, too,
would not be required to fulfill other non- reciprocal and non-commercial conditions.
17. The representative of India said that they fully endorsed and supported the proposal by
Paraguay.  He said that the Enabling Clause was introduced basically to facilitate and promote trade
from developing countries without raising barriers or creating undue difficulties for other developing
countries.  In short, it was meant to be a trade in strument that would benefit the developing countries
and not an instrument that should be used to promote the political objectives of some countries.  Hesaid that the three basic pillars of the Enabling Clause as outlined in Paragraph 2(a), which cross
referenced with the earlier decision on GSP, were:  (i) that such concessions should be generalized or
the system should be a generalized one;  (ii) that the system should be non-reciprocal;  and (iii) that
the preferences should be non-discriminatory.  He agreed with the instances given by other
delegations of how these basic conditions were being violated whenever the Enabling Clause wasinvoked.  He said that paragraph 6 of the Paraguayan submission had highlighted six conditions that
were often attached to privileges granted under the Enabling Clause:  conditions which resulted in
discrimination inconsistent with its provisions.  He said that the first three conditions, namely the
competitiveness criteria, specialization and development indices, and sectoral and country graduation
were, at least, linked to trade.  The remaining thre e conditions, namely the fulfilment of environment
and social standards, intellectual property rights, and the fight against drugs, had nothing to do with
trade.  These, in his delegation's view, should never be invoked when granting preferences under theEnabling Clause.  He added that these six conditions also resulted in the preferences granted under the
Enabling Clause being administered in a subjective, arbitrary and unilateral manner, apart from the
fact that such concessions resulted in the granting of discriminatory privileges that benefited only a
few countries to the detriment of others.  He said that this often resulted in unfair competition and
constituted a distortion of the fundamental purpose of multilateralism in a way that had not beenforeseen in the 1979 Decision on the Enabling Clause.  He said that a waiver based on any of these
conditions not only violated the principles of tr ansparency and non-discrimination but also violated
one of the basic principles of concessions provided under the Enabling Clause, namely the principle
of non-reciprocity.  He said that his country had also suffered from the selective administration of the
Enabling Clause by some developed countries.  In light of this experience his delegation did not haveany hesitation in fully endorsing the proposals contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the submission
by Paraguay.  Before concluding he also welcomed the proposals tabled by Thailand and Saint Lucia.
He said that Thailand had highlighted the administrative and financial burden that the provisions of
Article 3.5(a) of the Import Licensing Agreement imposed upon developing countries and therefore
agreed with the suggestion that the word "would" s hould be replaced with "shall" in that provision.
He said that his delegation also endorsed the proposal contained in the last section of the proposal by
Saint Lucia on Article XVIII of GATT.TN/CTD/M/4
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18. The representative of Switzerland stated that his delegation had some sympathy with the
understanding put forward concerning the objectives of the Enabling Clause, namely that they should
be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.  He said  that the Swiss GSP lived up to that spirit as it
applied to all developing countries alike and had no specific linkages or additional requirements.  He
expressed a reservation, however, about one point contained in the Paraguayan submission.  This
related to the issue of country graduation.  His delegation believed that graduation was consistent with
the Enabling Clause.  He said that Paragraph 3(c) of the Clause stated that more favourable treatment
shall be designed and if necessary modified to respond positively to the development needs of
developing countries.  He said that, irrespective of  the exact interpretation of this paragraph, it was
clear that a certain categorization amongst countries would be able to take better account of the
differences in their levels of development and would allow measures to be adopted which were better
tailored to the specific needs of the developing countries.
19. The representative of Uganda said that as an LDC they understood the spirit in which the
proposal had been presented, namely that the Enabling Clause was designed to promote trade from
developing countries and not to create a barrier or hindrance for others.  He also agreed that
preferences should not be made conditional to the fulfilment of certain criteria imposed by the
beneficiary countries.  He said that they could not, however, support Paraguay's proposal because itwould then make it very difficult for the LDCs to get preferential treatment and it would make the
system very straight-jacketed.  He also noted that a number of countries, including Paraguay, were in
the process of submitting a proposal recommending the provision of special treatment for some
land-locked developing countries.  He wondered how the present submission would tie up with the
spirit of that proposal.
20. The representative of Saint Lucia said that, while her country was not an LDC but a small and
vulnerable developing country, her views were very much in harmony with those expressed by
Uganda.  She said she agreed with the thrust of paragraph 1 of the submission that the concept of the
Enabling Clause was really to provide all developing countries with an opportunity to participate
effectively in the multilateral trading system because they were "unequals among unequals amongunequals".  The only way in which developing countries could participate effectively was by
providing  them with specially targeted preferential  treatment so as to address their particular needs
and circumstances.  Referring to the Secretariat paper WT/COMTD/W/93 she said that the analysis
given there of the GSP scheme showed that only a small subset of developing countries had actually
benefited from it.  She added that her own delegation also had reservations on some of the other issues
raised in the submission.  The very important Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, for instance,
applied directly to developed countries.  It stipulated that preferential treatment should be accorded bydeveloped contracting parties to developing contracting parties and that it should be designed and if
necessary modified to "respond positively" to the development, financial and trade needs of
developing countries.  She questioned what such a  positive response could be.  A positive response
would, in her view, mean addressing the specific needs of each country separately - something which
could not be done if preferential treatment were made generalized and non-discriminatory.  She alsosaid that to question the legality of waivers was wr ong because these were specifically allowed in the
provisions.  Referring to the history of the Enabling Clause and the GATT she said that historical
trading practices had been "grandfathered" into the latter.  If one looked at paragraph 2 of Article I, or
at Article XXIV, it would immediately be clear that  historical trading patterns had been preserved.
She felt that globalization had moved forward while th e existing framework of the rules had not.  And
it was for this reason that vulnerable countries that had come through the process of progressive
liberalization, like her own, were nonetheless still dependent on preferential treatment for their
development needs.  The Enabling Clause was an empowerment of these specific differences as well
as of the individual needs of such countries so as to enable them to survive in a multilateral trading
system.  It was not designed to provide adva ntages to only those who could compete on a non-
discriminatory basis.  She said that this should be kept in mind in any discussion on the Enabling
Clause.TN/CTD/M/4
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21. The representative of the European Communities stated that his comments would be
somewhat brief and limited because his delegation had requested consultations under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) on the issue of waivers.  He nevertheless thought that the issues
raised in the Paraguayan paper were very broad and would need in-depth analysis and deliberation in
future meetings.  At this stage, however, he wanted to make two or three initial comments.  Referringto the issue of an environment based incentive he said that his delegation did not view this as
discriminatory because the incentives were available to anyone.  He said that such stipulations were
also trade-related because environment standards gave rise to extra costs and these extra costs had
implications for trade.  He said that the need fo r some kind of discrimination had been foreseen: this
was why the possibility of seeking waivers had been built into the GATT.  At the same time the
intention was not to raise barriers or to create difficulties for other parties.  His delegation had a
consistent record of consulting and talking to delegations who nonetheless believed this to be the case.On the issue of graduation he said that there was no clear view of how graduation could work.  This
was because there were no established criteria either for differences in the levels of development or
differences in conditions which would, once achieved, allow countries to graduate.  For these reasons
he felt that this too was an important issue to which it would be necessary to devote more time.
22. The representative of Mauritius endorsed the co mments made by Saint Lucia.  He said that
they had only just received the Paraguayan submission which they would send on to their capital:
fuller comments would hence be made on a later occasion.  He said that although fundamental issues
had been raised about waivers it should at the same time be borne in mind that  the system of waivers
was an integral part of the Agreement.  He recalled that mention had been made of the need for a level
playing field which, like a hypothetical perfect market, could only be based on the assumption that allcountries were equal and competitive.  He said that it was therefore difficult to understand how one
could talk of differences in levels of development and yet at the same time argue for a level playing
field.  Some differential treatment would always be necessary.
23. The representative of Kenya said that it would not be appropriate to have the same set of rules
or standards for all countries, including those that  had not yet developed the national institutions and
capacities necessary to compete in the global marketplace.  He recalled that the CTD had been
mandated to make S&D treatment more effective, precise and operational.  It was therefore important
to look at the Enabling Clause, which did at least recognize differences in the levels of development
among Members, from a different perspective:  not with the intention of mutating it in other words,
but rather with the objective of enhancing it.  He observed that the Enabling Clause had been adopted
to provide enhanced S&D treatment to those who were at the lower end of economic development and
in order to help them to catch up with others who were relatively more developed.  So he said that,
while his delegation shared their concerns, they could not accept the Paraguayan proposals.  These, he
believed, would go against the need to support the less advantaged developing countries - a principle
embodied in the Doha Development Agenda.
24. The representative of Cuba said that the discussions on the Enabling Clause had clearly
demonstrated the need to monitor its implementati on as an instrument to develop appropriate trade
relationships between developed and developing countries as well as between the developing
countries themselves.  She said that the fundamental objectives of the Enabling Clause, as understood
by her delegation, were that it should be able to respond to the trading, financial and development
needs of under-developed countries.  The nature of these provisions should not therefore be violated.
Nor should their implementation be attached to conditions of any kind, including the fulfilment of
labour or environmental standards.  She also said that preferential treatment should not necessarily be
biased for political reasons.  The Enabling Clause should therefore be used as an instrument of
development and not as a means for political coercion.  She said that the debate had demonstrated the
need to strengthen S&D treatment as contained in the various agreements and decisions of the WTO.
But at the same time it must be borne in mind that there cannot be the same set of  rules for countriesat vastly different levels of development.  She al so fully supported the proposal from Saint Lucia.  SheTN/CTD/M/4
Page 9
said that strengthening of Section (C) of Article XVIII should be carried out in order to clarify its
ambiguities.  And a broader interpretation of these provisions should be made in order for them more
easily to be implemented.
25. The representative of Lesotho said that, like the delegations of Uganda, Kenya and
Saint Lucia, they too supported the understanding, at least in principle, of the objectives and
interpretation of the Enabling Clause given by Paraguay.  But his delegation did not support the links
often sought between the granting of preferential treatment under the Enabling Clause and conditions
which effectively denied potential market access to developing countries.  Like the delegation of
Uganda, however, they did agree that the Enabling Clause and the waiver approach were needed in
order to address the constraints and peculiarities that existed between different groups of developing
countries.  He believed that the differences in levels of development required special provisions and
special mechanisms that would ensure that these problems were adequately addressed.  For thisreason, his delegation felt that the use of waivers to facilitate preferential access for LDCs was a valid
instrument and was also consistent with many regional integration programmes which sought to
achieve the same objectives.  He hoped that there would be a further opportunity for more detailed
discussion of this proposal since it touched upon many critical and important issues.
26. The representative of Hungary said that the submission by Paraguay had raised a number of
important issues of which some were at the heart of S&D treatment and the provision of trade benefits
in the form of GSP based on the Enabling Clause.  He recalled that his delegation had earlier
requested for a compilation of the GSP systems of vari ous countries, including a complete list of those
countries  providing GSP benefits, who the beneficiaries were, what the product coverage was, etc.
This had been done in anticipation of exactly the kind of discussion that Members were now having.He said that the proposal to strengthen the provisions of the Enabling Clause would help to prevent
differentiation among developing countries.  The only exception to this would remain the already
legalized differentiation between developing countr ies and the LDCs.  Referring to the enumeration of
the different kinds of conditions and criteria often used by countries to differentiate among Members,
he said that he agreed with the delegation of India that the first three of these conditions were moregeneral and related to economic development, while the next three criteria were somewhat different.
He said that at this point he wished to highlight, in the context of the Paraguayan submission, was
with reference to the imposition of certain economic conditions in granting trade preferences.  He
noted that Hungary, as an example, was a countr y with a medium level of development and had a
per capita GDP of US$5,000.  Hungary had been providing and operating a GSP scheme for
developing countries and had also provided generous benefits in terms of full and free market access
to LDCs.  His country's legislation prohibited the provision of GSP benefits to countries which wereat a higher level of development than they were, that is to countries with a higher level of GDP per
capita.  But the submission from Paraguay sought to prohibit even this kind of economic
differentiation.  In this context he addressed a few questions to Paraguay.  He asked first whether their
intention was to ensure that GSP providing countries provide benefits to all developing countries,
including countries with a higher level of development, as long as such countries were deemed to bedeveloping countries within the WTO.  He pointed out that the economic and political implications of
an affirmative answer would be considerable.  Hi s country, for example, which provided GSP benefits
only to countries less developed than itself, would then in practice be required to stop entirely its
provision of GSP benefits.  In the context of the interventions made by a number of African countries,
he also observed that developing countries were a very heterogeneous group and that a "one size fitsall" approach would not work.  He said that on e consequence of Paraguay's proposal would be that
anyone wanting to assist developing countries through trade benefits would be obliged either to assist
all or none of them.  He indicated that they would follow-up their interventions with some written
questions concerning these issues.
27. The representative of the United States said that the Enabling Clause was a core element in
the concept of S&D treatment in the WTO.  However, it should be seen in the context of the balanceTN/CTD/M/4
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of rights and obligations that comprised the commitments that Members had made.  When looking at
this complex contract it was important to recognize that there could not exist a situation where one
group of Members had only rights without obligations to the system.  She said that full access to its
opportunities could only be achieved through full participation in the multilateral trading system,
which was a matter of rights as well as obligations.  At the same time it was important to have soundeconomic and governmental policies in order to operationalize and effectuate that participation.  She
said that the discussion on the Enabling Clause could be compared with the discussion concerning
transition periods:  a discussion which highlighted the question of how to address the peculiarities
existing within and among developing countries.  She also supported the point previously made by a
number of delegations that, although clearly it was important that it be implemented correctly, the
Enabling Clause did not stand on its own.  Instead  there were other provisions which had also been
designed to address the individual needs of developing countries.  Likewise the point made byHungary concerning the definition of a developing country was also, she said, very important.  In
discussing S&D provisions, for example, the possibility of a really thorough debate was hampered by
the absence of a clear WTO definition of a developing country.  She said that it was precisely because
of the differences among the developing countries that the S&D provisions were drafted in the way
that they were.  She said it was her delegation's view that, in order to accommodate the different S&Dneeds of developing countries, some of the provisions were in the nature of best endeavours.  This
was an element inherent in many of the provisions.  She also said that the African Group's paper had
rightly pointed out that some forms of S&D treatment had been more effective than others.  For this
reason she felt that an updated paper by the Secretariat on utilization would help in targeting and
making operational the S&D provisions.  Similarly the African Group's paper had also mentioned thattransition periods were somewhat arbitrary in their application.  This was largely because, rather than
being tailored to individual needs, the application of transition periods tended to be too general.  For
this reason her delegation, in every discussion on transitions period, had attempted to address the
specific needs of countries rather than adopting a "one size fits all" approach.  She said that the
discussion should not lose sight of the fundamental objectives of S&D treatment and that, whetherone talked about the Enabling Clause or other similar provisions, it must be kept in mind that the main
objective was to fully integrate all Members into th e WTO system rather than to further exaggerate a
two tier or multi tiered system.  She accepted that, because of differences in development levels, a
multi-tiered system did, at times, exist.  This was not a reason to grant such a system a permanent
status, however,  or similarly to create, within the institution, further sub-groups.  Whatever is done to
facilitate the individual needs of Members should be done within a single-tier system.  She referred
also to various studies made of trade among developing countries.  She felt that these showed that,while the role of developed country markets was important, an equal perspective on the role played by
access to developing country markets was just as important.  Data compiled by the World Bank
revealed that most of the income gained by developing countries was from liberalization of other
developing country markets.  Three-quarters of potential income gains in agriculture trade
negotiations, for example, would probably derive from the liberalization of developing countrymarkets.  It was the hope of her delegation that, during the course of further discussions, a more
structured approach to examining issues relatin g to individual developing country needs would
therefore be adopted.
28. The representative of Hong Kong, China, whil e thanking Paraguay for their intervention, said
that they were still examining the submission.  She pointed out that her delegation did, however,
accept the principle set out in Paragraph 17 that the Enabling Clause should be applied as an
instrument designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not as an
instrument to raise barriers or to create difficulties for other countries.
29. The representative of Haiti stated that, although Paraguay's submission had highlighted the
fact that there was a need to continue to press for the effective application of S&D, his delegation
could not accept the argument that there should be no differentiation among Members in the
application of preferential schemes.  He supported the statements made by Hungary and by UgandaTN/CTD/M/4
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on behalf of the LDCs.  He said that the LDCs had been accepted as a different category even by the
United Nations.  Paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration spoke, in fact, of the need for S&D treatment
to benefit developing countries and the least-developed countries in particular.  So as the Ministers
themselves had accepted this differentiation it was difficult to accept Paraguay's proposition.  To do
so would involve overlooking both the different levels of development and the different constraintsthat existed among developing countries.  He noted that even the developed countries had spoken
about this differentiation.  In addition several developing countries had said that they would not
accept any levelling out, not merely in respect of the Enabling Clause but also in respect of other
preferential S&D treatment  Differential treatment on the basis of different economic development
levels and financial constraints had, in any case, been accepted internationally already.  Members
should therefore strive for effective implementation of the S&D treatment provisions while at the
same time taking into account the existing differences between different developing countries.
30. The representative of Nicaragua stated that Paraguay's submission had opened the door to a
frank and sincere discussion on some of the themes with which developing countries had long been
concerned.  He said that a dichotomy clearly existed.  On the one hand there were countries which
needed additional assistance in order to participate actively and effectively in the multilateral trading
system.  But at the same time there were other countries which could participate competitively eitherbecause they had economies of scale or because they were more efficient.  He that a serious problem
was clearly created when a larger trading partner excluded another Member for political, social,
economic or geographical reasons.  Such a pr oblem could only be overcome through a clear
differentiation between Members with different levels of development as well as a clear identification
of each Member's specific limitations.
31. The representative of Barbados stated that in her delegation's view the goal of all developing
countries should be to ensure that S&D treatment, in any of its forms or manifestations, was made
affirmative, positive, and effective.  Developing  countries must aim to overcome their specific
constraints, vulnerabilities and characteristics.  They should do so with a view to increasing their
share in world trade and subsequently to achieve full participation in the multilateral trading system.Her delegation felt that the use of the Enabling  Clause, and temporary or time-bound waivers from
Article I of the GATT, were both valid means of achieving these objectives.  In conclusion, she
supported the comments made by the delegations of Saint Lucia, Mauritius, Kenya, and Haiti, among
others, as well as some of the points made by the US and the EC.  She said that her delegation looked
forward to further deliberations on this issue.
32. The representative of Nigeria said that, although his delegation sympathized with its
arguments , they nonetheless had difficulty in supporting the proposal.  The Enabling Clause was built
into GATT to assist developing countries to participate and benefit from the multilateral trading
system.  It had a further component which reflected the historical commercial relationship, in some
cases, between Members and their former colonies.  He said that Members supporting the proposal
should keep in mind the difference in the levels of development among developing countries.  He felt
that the issue merited further discussion.
33. The representative of Belize associated himself with those countries which had stated that the
implementation of the Enabling Clause should not be unnecessarily burdensome on its beneficiaries.
He also supported those delegations which had stress ed the diversity among developing countries.  He
shared the argument that different types of assistance were therefore necessary for their needs to be
accommodated.
34. The representative of Turkey, giving its prelim inary comments, said that the issue had certain
peculiarities and certain characteristic aspects.  He said that the list shown in paragraph 10 of the
submission showed how broad the issue was, especial ly since each case of S&D treatment had its own
particular aspects and practices which in some cases gave rise to a certain amount of discrimination.TN/CTD/M/4
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Because of the complexity of the issues each situation had to be assessed on a case by case basis.  He
felt that a comprehensive study was needed before any conclusions on the issue of S&D treatment
could be reached.
35. The representative of Zimbabwe observed that the WTO already recognized different levels
of development among Members and his delegation wished to associate itself with those who had
supported the need to continue to recognise such a difference between countries.  She said that her
own country had certain specific problems - as a consequence, to take but one example, of being land-
locked.  So she felt that the "one size fits all" approach was not appropriate to all situations.  She also
felt that there was a need for more discussion before a decision could be taken as to exactly what
needed to be done.  She also asked the Chair whether or not it would be possible, given that the
Members had raised such a large number of important issues, to conclude the discussions and to come
to an agreement, even if only on some of the issues, by the end of July 2002.
36. The representative of Sri Lanka stated that her comments were principally directed at the two
proposals that had been presented by Thailand, on Import Licencing, and by Saint Lucia, on GATT
Article XVIII, both of which they supported.  Her delegation supported these proposals because they
made an attempt to enhance the effectiveness of the S&D provisions.  She added that the proposal
made by St Lucia should not be limited to small and vulnerable economies but should rather beextended to encompass all developing countries sharing the same concerns.  She felt, however, that
the basic guidelines for recourse to Article XVIII should be liberalized and that, while addressing the
procedural ambiguities in the text, consistency with the overall architecture of the WTO Agreements
should be ensured.  Elaborating upon the need for such consistency she said that, while Article XVIII
allowed developing countries the flexibility to use r ecourse to certain measures provided they met the
criteria stipulated in the Article, provisions in other Articles prohibited the adoption of these very
same measures.  For instance a country may, on the one hand, enjoy the flexibility of being able to
employ certain border measures such as the imposition of quantitative restrictions, as provided for in
Article XVIII.  But if the product in question is an agricultural crop it may not enjoy this flexibility as
certain provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibit Members from taking recourse to anyborder measure other than tariffs.  This showed that, even though Article XVIII provided developing
countries with some measure of flexibility, it was a flexibility often taken away again by the
provisions of other Agreements.  She felt that this was a classical example of a situation in which the
flexibility provided for by Article XVIII had been eroded because of weaknesses in the overall
architectural design of the WTO Agreements.  She noted that there would likewise be many such
instances in the context of provisions in other Agreements where the inconsistencies in the overall
architecture eroded the flexibility apparently permitted to developing countries.  She felt that this was
an important dimension to the debate and one which the Committee should look into at greater depth.
37. The representative of Jamaica stressed that, as the delegate of Saint Lucia had pointed out,
footnote 2 in the Enabling Clause sought to al low enhanced non-reciprocal trade arrangements
between developed and developing countries through a waiver.  In the context of paragraph 18 of the
submission she made the point that Article XXV of the GATT provided a legal right for Members toseek waivers from Article I of the GATT.  This allowed for the provision of preferential treatment for
some Members.  Her delegation did not see any f undamental contradiction, therefore, between what
was provided for under Article XXV and the Enabling Clause.  These two instruments together
created an overall framework for the granting of trade preferences by developed countries to
developing countries.  In her concluding comments she underscored what had been said by Mauritius,Uganda, Saint Lucia and Kenya, namely that differences in the levels of economic development
between developing countries must be recognized in order to allow the adoption of measures
facilitating the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system.
38. The representative of Canada felt that Paraguay's submission had elicited a most interesting
debate in terms of the fundamental principles of S&D treatment.  Her delegation shared the viewTN/CTD/M/4
Page 13
expressed by several delegations that a "one size fits all" approach would not work.  She was also
supportive of the idea of graduation as put forward by a number of delegations.  Her country was very
sensitive to the need for appropriate S&D treatment, but felt that this should be done on a case by case
basis.   She suggested that Members should review S&D treatment provisions in a holistic fashion
with respect to individual Members' needs.  The Trade Policy Review Mechanism might be onemechanism with which to do that.  She felt that such an approach would facilitate a balanced
discussion incorporating various issues such as transition periods, technical assistance and other
flexibilities, domestic reforms being undertaken, and so on, all of which could then be put into a
framework of realistic but fixed time frames.  This would also allow the concerns of individual
Members to be taken into account with regard to any individual S&D provision treatment that was
being considered.
39. The representative of Japan appreciated the fact that a number of speakers had touched upon
the differences among developing countries in their respective levels of development.  They felt that
this was an important issue to be considered as part of the discussion on S&D treatment.  They said
that there was a need to discuss the various ways to respond to the different and specific needs of
individual countries, including the relation between capacity building and making S&D treatment
fully operational.
40. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago, while welcoming the thought-provoking
submission, said that they shared some of the concerns that had been expressed about the arguments
put forward by Paraguay.  Her delegation looked forward to further discussion on this issue.
41. The representative of Norway felt that Paraguay had highlighted a very fundamental issue that
had been lurking beneath the surface ever since the beginning of the Special Sessions.  He said that
part of this work had, after all, focussed on distinguishing and recognizing the differences in levels of
development between countries.  He said that for S&D provisions to be made more effective they
would need to recognize the difference  in the levels of development not only between developed and
developing countries also but between developing countries themselves.  This was an important
aspect of his country's trade policy which had attempted to give strong preferential emphasis to theLDCs.
42. The representative of Senegal felt that some differentiation was necessary in the framework of
S&D treatment because many developing countries, particularly the least-developed countries,
required such a differentiation.  He said that Paraguay's submission would create a sense of inertia in
the system because, if the Paraguayan proposals were accepted, they would then make it difficult to
provide preferential treatment to some developing countries within the overall framework of S&D
treatment.
43. The representative of Pakistan said that at this stage he would merely like to endorse the
statements made by Uganda, Saint Lucia, the EU, Mauritius, Kenya and some others, and would like
also to support the countries who had asked for recognition of the different levels of development and
special needs of individual countries.  He said that they looked forward to further discussions on this
issue at a future meeting.
44. The representative of Paraguay thanked the dele gations who had intervened and said that the
debate had demonstrated the importance of the issue which they had tabled.  It was clear that there
was a need for a more thorough discussion of the issues underlying the Enabling Clause and the
discrimination to which, in one form or another, it  was giving rise within the Organization.  He felt
that some basic conclusions were already evident, including the fact that S&D treatment was of vital
importance and that it lay at the heart of the WTO.  Moreover, he felt that S&D treatment required
clear and precise norms so that it could serve as a useful means for developing countries in an
Organization which at present recognized only three categories of countries, namely:  the developedTN/CTD/M/4
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countries;  developing countries;  and the LDCs.  Within these three categories, the only countries
clearly classified were the LDCs.  For this reason his delegation supported wholeheartedly calls to
provide them, on an exceptional basis, with preferentia l treatment.  He felt that the issue of a country
graduating from developing to developed country status  needed to be looked at further.  Similarly, he
emphasized the need for further study of the Enabling Clause because of its importance within theOrganization.  He pointed out that countries could suffer marginalization when appropriate privileges
failed to materialize so that, instead of the Enabling Clause being used to assist them in their needs, it
instead became an obstacle to their development.  He also said that, while his delegation respected the
need for balance between rights and obligations, they were against any kind of discrimination which
would prejudice the interests of some countries.  He felt that, in order to seek possible consensus on
norms that could be clearly and openly defined, and norms which at the same time did not prejudice
individual country Members, the debate should conti nue.  He said that he looked forward to further
deliberations on this issue.
45. The Chairman, in concluding the discussion on the submission by Paraguay, said that the
debate had been most interesting and that even though differing view points had been presented these
had all been of a constructive nature.  Commenting on the remarks made by the representative of
Zimbabwe, who wondered whether or not the many systemic issues raised could be addressed beforethe deadline of July, he said that in his view this would not be possible.  This in turn raised the very
important question of the need to structure future work, not only in the context of the immediate July
deadline but also after it. This would encourage a realistic assessment as to what may, in fact, be
feasible by July.  It would also help in setting out a road map for the work remaining beyond July.
46. Moving on to the next part of the agenda, the Chairman stated that in the meeting held on
10 June 2002 there had been an initial discussion of the general proposals from the African Group and
the LDCs which were contained in the expanded version of TN/CTD/W/3 and in TN/CTD/W/4.  He
then invited firstly the representative from Kenya, on behalf of the African Group, and then secondly
the representative from Uganda, on behalf of the LDCs, to make any additional remarks, if they
wished to do so, in respect to these papers.
47. The representative of Kenya stated that at the informal Special Session of the CTD held on
10 June 2002 they had, on behalf of the Africa Group, introduced a comprehensive three-part proposal
to assist the Committee in discharging its Doha mandate on S&D treatment provisions.  At that
meeting some delegations had sought clarification on some elements of the proposal, including on the
thinking behind its principles and objectives; the working of the proposed Monitoring Mechanism;
and some background to Part III of the proposal which was the part which dealt with specific S&D
treatment provisions.  He indicated that he would like to respond to these requests for clarificationthrough his statement, which would later be circulated to Members.  He began by shedding further
light on the objectives that the African Group had had in mind when suggesting that various
provisions of S&D treatment be made fully operational.  He said that trade was not an end in itself but
something which was reflected in the objectives ag reed to by Members in setting up first the GATT
and now the WTO.  Trade should contribute to the improvement of living standards, especially indeveloping and least-developed country Members.  It had to be a welfare generating activity.  He said
that, in this context, it was recognized that spec ial measures would be necessary to assist developing
and least-developed country Members achieve a share in international trade that was commensurate
with their development needs.  He felt that this em bodiment of special treatment in the core objectives
and functions of the WTO recognized such treatment to be a basic right for developing andleast-developed country Members as part of their overall right to economic development.
48. As an illustration, he pointed out that one of the benefits of the WTO was that it provided a
market access framework for products and also recognized trade as a significant engine of economic
development and a contributor to its attainment.  However, as was well recognized, developing and
least-developed country Members faced difficulties in using the WTO framework properly in orderTN/CTD/M/4
Page 15
fully to benefit from the market access opportunities available to them.  Also, in implementing new
obligations and in complying with the many existing obligations, developing and least-developed
country Members operated under enormous financial, institutional, and human resource constraints.
He said that Members were not equal in terms of resources and capacity and hence were similarly
unequal in their participation in the WTO system , especially with regard to meeting their
implementation and compliance requirements.  He stressed that developing countries therefore needed
assistance and flexibility in implementing and comp lying with these obligations, as well as in the
ways in which they could benefit from the market access opportunities supposedly created.  He said
that it was against this background that S&D treatment had been accorded to developing and
least-developed country Members as a means of assistance and as a recognition of their development
needs.  He added that, while maintaining the primar y objective of ensuring an improvement in living
standards through trade growth and economic development, the WTO rules could also play animportant role in providing some of the market access solutions required for economic development.
He felt that, although this was unquestionably the primary objective of S&D treatment, it nonetheless
needed to be stated more clearly in terms that demonstrated its broad scope.  He stated that, in seeking
to attain these primary objectives, certain basic principles and objectives should be kept in mind.  This
was particularly important in view of the fact that  the Ministers had recognized the need to strengthen
S&D treatment provisions in order to make them more effective, precise and operational, and likewise
of the need to incorporate S&D treatment into the architecture of the WTO Agreements.  He said that
these principles provided useful parameters in the process of pursuing the basic objectives of
development and growth.  From such a perspective, the primary principles for S&D treatment should
be that they are accorded to developing and least-developed country Members in accordance withtheir developmental needs.  Only then would such S&D treatment be meaningful and relevant.  He
said that in keeping with the mandate of the work programme agreed upon in Doha, it was important
that S&D treatment provisions should be binding, resulting in mandatory obligations which Members
were required to implement.  He cited the example of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and said
that all Members should respect and treat as binding any S&D treatment provisions, such as these,which sought to provide developing and least-deve loped country Members certain special rights.  He
said that this interpretation of "binding" was also re levant to the goal of attaining coherence in global
economic policymaking, so that the rights, in the form of S&D treatment, enjoyed by Members under
the WTO Agreement, were not negated due to incoherence in global economic policy-making and
thus rendered meaningless.
49. He said that it was in order to achieve these stated objectives that the African Group had
proposed the establishment of a Monitoring Mechanism to function under the authority of the CTD.He suggested that the Secretariat should prepare a note on the basis of their proposal, also
incorporating the views expressed by others, in which the possible elements of such a mechanism
would be set out.  He said that this would expedite  and help to focus further discussion.  He also said
that the main reason for proposing a monitoring mechanism was that, while some S&D treatment
provisions were already mandatory or relatively precise, they had not been utilized or complied with,a situation demonstrated in various Members' trade policy reviews and captured in the background
note of the Secretariat (WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/A dd.4).  The Monitoring Mechanism would assist
in the further operationalization and utilization of S&D treatment provisions.  The mechanism would
likewise be a means of monitoring difficulties encountered by Members in the implementation of
these provisions.  The Monitoring Mechanism could be established under the CTD as an open endedsubsidiary body.  It would therefore function under and report to the CTD.  He suggested that the
CTD could have two Vice Chairs who, together with the Chair and the Secretary to the CTD, would
constitute a bureau responsible for ensuring that the Monitoring Mechanism expeditiously carried out
its functions, including to act as a forum to facilitate S&D treatment related consultations among
Members.
50. Elaborating upon the African Group's view, he said that the main functions of the Monitoring
Mechanism could include:  (i) a regular evaluation of the utilization and effectiveness of the S&DTN/CTD/M/4
Page 16
treatment provisions with a view to ensuring that  the provisions are fully utilized and that any
problems that may arise in connection to these provisions be effectively addressed;  (ii) provision of a
framework for initiating and considering recommendations that the CTD could make to Members on
complying with obligations under S&D treatment provisions, including on best practices for the
utilization of the provisions;  (iii) drawing on, among others, the reports of the Trade Policy ReviewMechanism and reports prepared by other international organizations on areas within their remit,
particularly UNCTAD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations
Development Programme, and proposals, statements  and reports made by Members;  the Monitoring
Mechanism could then periodically evaluate the utilization and effectiveness of S&D treatment
provisions and prepare recommendations;  (iv) the Monitoring Mechanism could regularly prepare
country profiles setting out detailed and quantified needs, as well as highlighting the available
opportunities and benefits relating to S&D treatment provisions in order to assist in their fullutilization;  (v) the CTD could hold regular dedicated sessions on the utilization and effectiveness of
S&D treatment provisions;  and (vi) the Monitoring Mechanism could be given the specific function
of examining whether proposed agreements and instruments to be adopted in the WTO framework
comply with the overall principles and objectives of S&D treatment.  He said that the CTD could also
recommend time frames for complying with its recommendations as well as introducing a requirementwhereby regular reports on steps taken to implement these recommendations are submitted to it.
51. In addition, the delegate from Kenya stated that the African Group had also proposed the
establishment, within the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund, of a facility specifically to
provide the necessary financial underpinning for the effectiveness and utilization of S&D treatment
provisions under the various Agreements.  This facility would be a standing and permanent financialarrangement for S&D treatment provisions.  Going on to Part III of the proposal, he said that this
contained specific suggestions on the meaning to be attached to S&D treatment provisions in the
existing Agreements of the WTO.  As suggested in the proposal in the section dealing with the "action
to be taken", the Special Session could, under its present mandate, prepare a Decision containing an
authoritative interpretation of the various S&D treatment provisions and recommend that the GeneralCouncil adopts this Decision.  He said that they had also proposed certain interpretations of specific
provisions.  These interpretations, if adopted, could become an intrinsic part of the provisions which
would then have to be read with reference to the interpretations.  It was his view that the CTD could
also discharge its mandate through a decision containing the rules proposed in Part II as well as the
interpretations proposed in Part III.  He concluded by saying that their intention was to strengthen the
S&D treatment provisions, to make them more effec tive, more precise and operational, and to include
them in the overall architecture of the WTO Agreements.
52. The representative of Mauritius stated that he had already made his views known on the
submissions by the African Group and the LDCs in the meeting held on 10 June 2002.  He added that
his delegation looked forward to fruitful work being done in the coming days so that some concrete
solutions could be found to the problems that had been raised.
53. The representative of the United States, while appreciating the further elaboration by Kenya
on behalf of the African Group concerning the proposal which they had earlier circulated, said that
they were in the process of studying the paper, which they believed contained a number of important
elements.  She said that the African Group paper had noted that existing S&D provisions had been the
subject of negotiations, as part of the overall settlement, which had created certain expectations on all
sides.  Coming to grips with the principles and objectives of S&D was also essential as such adiscussion would then underpin the consideration given to the large number of submitted proposals .
In the view of her delegation, S&D treatment had been recognized as an integral part of the system
and, as earlier mentioned by a number of delegates, it was to be provided consistent with an individual
country’s trade, financial and development needs.  The problem, however, concerned the
determination of what was appropriate and usin g what methodology or methodologies should such a
determination be made.  She said that this was a difficult question which had not yet beenTN/CTD/M/4
Page 17
appropriately answered.  However, what was important was that, while considering the principles and
objectives, an examination be made of the relationship between adoption of sound economic policies
and open trade policies in the context of the utilization of S&D provisions.  This would show that the
certainty and predictability of adhering to a rules-based system, combined with a thoughtful recourse
to S&D provisions, was the best way to promote long-term economic growth.  There were a number
of studies that had arisen from the work done in various WTO bodies that showed that, not
withstanding some of the concerns raised about implementation of the various WTO provisions, the
best results had been obtained where there had a been a full implementation of the respective
Agreements.  She said that they would soon be circulating a paper that would highlight these
conclusions.  As an example, however, she related that developing country Members who had chosen
to join the Information Technolo gy Agreement (ITA) had realized important benefits from opening up
their markets.  The nineteen non-OECD developi ng-country Members who had signed the ITA had a
growing trade surplus with OECD Members, total ling over $30 billion in key ITA products in 2000.
She also stated that having a rules based and transparent system in the Services regime would foster
further economic growth and development in that area.
54. Referring to the statement by Kenya she said that it contained elements that could provide a
useful basis for examining the principles and objectives of S&D treatment.  It would also be importantto focus the work programme in the CTD from now unt il July and especially to consider how best this
work could contribute to the overall work prog ramme coming out of Doha.  A number of proposals
that had been submitted had provided evidence that there were parallels with the work being done in
other bodies in the Organization.  In view of this it was her delegation's view that perhaps the most
expeditious way of moving forward was for the Chair to send the proposals submitted by Members sofar to the Chairs of the other relevant Special Sessions, Negotiating Bodies, and Committees, so that
these proposals were taken into account and considered in the discussions and negotiations of these
other bodies  proceed.  She added that, in his report to the General Council, the Chairman should
acknowledge that the discussions had shown there to be a wide range of issues requiring further
exploration in the appropriate bodies.  She highlighted a few such issues, in some cases drawing fromthe African Group paper.  These included:  crafting the appropriate provisions in such a way as to
ensure the effective integration of Members into the existing Agreements now under negotiation;
ensuring appropriate flexibility in determining para meters for transitions in the Agreements given the
varied experiences and needs of Members;  taking the work on utilization into account in developing
the trade related technical assistance work plan for 2003;  and establishing an appropriate monitoring
mechanism, during the course of negotiations, to review the application of S&D.  She said that the
Annexes on technical assistance provided by the Africa Group should also be discussed further, with aview to then examining the ideas with the individual bodies before the end of the year.  Any further
discussion on the “Framework for S&D Treatment”, suggested by a Member before Doha and noted
in the Ministerial Declaration, would also require an exploration of a mechanism that would ensure
that Members no longer in need of S&D treatment relinquish such treatment in an appropriate
manner.  This would link to similar points made on graduation during earlier discussions and anyfurther discussion of principles and objectives should be carried out in this light.  She also suggested
that the CTD, working with the Sub-Committee on Le ast-Developed Countries, should further explore
the specific areas where S&D could contribute to the greater participation of the least-developed
countries in the trading system.  She felt that the Special Session should recommend to the
General Council that it would need to continue its work on objectives and principles and that theSpecial Session would then report periodically to the General Council to obtain further direction and
guidance in line with the negotiations.
55. The representative of Thailand, while thanking the African Group for their revised and
comprehensive proposal on S&D treatment, said that it was important to have a discussion and
decision on the general framework for S&D provisions.  Referring specifically to the proposals in the
African Group paper on the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, she said that it had been her
country's experience that most standards imposed by importing developed countries were not onlyTN/CTD/M/4
Page 18
financially burdensome to the exporting developing and least-developed countries but also acted as
barriers to trade due to the lack of capacity and ap propriate technology in such countries to fulfill the
requirements of the standards set.  They also fully supported the proposal on Article 3.5 of the
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.
56. The representative of India, commenting on the additional clarifications provided by Kenya,
said that there were a number of important elements in this clarification.  Kenya had correctly
identified the primary principle that should govern S&D provision, namely that these provisions
should be binding.  He added that by "binding" his delegation understood that these provisions should
be mandatory and as such should be implemented by all the Members of the Organization.  Further,
these provisions should also be made binding in the context of coherence and global economic
policy-making so that the rights enjoyed by Members in this Organization were not taken away
because of commitments undertaken in another context.  He supported the ideas and clarification putforward concerning the Monitoring Mechanism and said that his delegation looked forward to a
detailed discussion on this issue in due course.  He also hoped that the specific proposals which had
been circulated at the last meeting be tabled for a more detailed discussion at the next meeting.  In the
context of some of the remarks made by the US delegate on the structuring of future work, he said
that he would like to come back to some of these procedural issues when, as indicated by the Chair,this matter was taken up under "Other Business".
57. The representative of Djibouti said that Kenya, speaking on behalf of the African Group, had
highlighted a fundamental point not only for African countries but also for all of the developing
countries, namely:  what should these countries expect from this Organization?  He said that
essentially they expected an increase in their living standards in the context of active participation inthe work and negotiations of the WTO.  But this had not been forthcoming.  Against this background,
it seemed to his delegation that the creation of an appropriate mechanism to monitor the functioning
of the S&D treatment provisions and to see whether LDC expectations were being fulfilled was
essential. He hoped that Members would agree to this proposal.
58. The representative from Columbia, while thanking the delegations which had presented fresh
proposals in the meeting, indicated that she would be forwarding these proposals to her Government
in order to obtain specific comments.  She believ ed that the several proposals which had so far been
made presented a good basis for future work.  These proposals would, however, require detailed
technical analysis - an analysis requiring more time.  She recalled that Paragraph 44 of the Doha
Declaration had reaffirmed that provisions for S&D treatment were an integral part of the WTO
Agreements and a key element of the multilateral trading system.  For this reason, her delegation had
shown a particular interest in these discussions and was committed to engaging in the work currentlyunder way with a view to achieving the proposed objectives.  She said that some progress had already
been made - notably in the form of a series of documents which included that prepared by the
Secretariat.  Commenting on the paper by the African Group she said that it had a number of
interesting elements which would be useful for structuring future discussion.  She agreed that a series
of measures in different fields may need to be taken in order to strengthen the provisions on S&Dtreatment and to make them more operational.  She also supported the need for a surveillance
mechanism to be institutionalized within the WT O as a means of monitoring the implementation of
these provisions.  She felt that it would be advisable if the Special Session received the S&D
treatment proposals and then allocated them to the various WTO bodies.  These could in turn review
the proposals before reporting back with their recommendations.  She said that in this manner thework on S&D would remain centralized in this body while, at the same time, any duplication of effort
would be avoided and the desired objective achieved.
59. The representative of Chile said that in their view the African Group proposal could be
essentially seen in two parts.  Some general criterion, principles and objectives relating to S&D
treatment had been highlighted in the first part.  This part also contained certain elements that wouldTN/CTD/M/4
Page 19
help developing countries in obtaining better market access.  His delegation could support these
elements.  There were also some elements which were somewhat restrictive, however, and which
seemed to emphasize protectionism.  Commenting on the discussion to make non-binding S&D
provisions mandatory, he said that while engaging in such an exercise it would be important to
examine the practical effects of making a non-binding provision  binding, as well as examining theimplications of such a change on other developing countries.  It was important to ensure that any
modifications of non-binding provisions did not alter the balance of rights and obligations of
developing countries.  The second part of their paper contained specific proposals relating to the
various Agreements of which an analysis would require more time.
60. The representative of the European Communities said that the revised African Group
contribution had thrown up rather interesting new ideas, some of which may have quite far-reaching.
implications.  He said that he had already made detailed comments in the meeting on 10 June 2002, inwhich he referred to the linkages between the various S&D provisions and the work being done on
some of these issues in other WTO bodies.  There was therefore a need to step back and look at the
overall picture of S&D treatment under the various pi llars of the work programme.  He also pointed
out that the discussion had not only been complex, but diverse, and had oscillated between some very
specific proposals and other rather broad and systemic approaches to the issue taken as a whole.  Healso echoed the views expressed by some delegations that it was important to have a discussion, as
proposed under other business, on how the road map and future work should be structured.
61. The representative of Venezuela said that the submissions from the African Group and the
LDCs were seeking to create favourable development conditions for all developing countries who
were Members of this Organization.  She said that the proposals that had been made seemed to be inthis direction and that her delegation would be prepared to work constructively so as to achieve
possible conclusions to this exercise.  Commenting first on the discussion on the Enabling Clause, she
said that perhaps the most important aspect of S&D treatment was that it should offer conditions that
were favourable to all developing countries.  She felt that this idea was reflected in both the
Paraguayan submission and in paragraph 15 of the document presented by the LDCs.  She highlightedthe fact that most of the issues included in the 'Decision on Implementation' actually corresponded to
the lack of implementation of S&D provisions.  Referring to paragraph 6 of the submission by the
LDCs, she said that S&D treatment had for a long time been both a basic principle and a fundamental
practice in the multilateral trading system.  It was now important to make this approach effective and
operational, both by improving existing provisions and by incorporating new provisions where
necessary.  Though she requested for an elaboration of the ideas presented in paragraph 4 of the
submission from the LDCs, she felt that the approp riate forum for discussion on this issue would be
the Sub-Committee created for the LDCs.  In the context of the submission made by the African
Group she said that capacity building should include the possibility of helping Members negotiate
improvements in the Agreements, to create internal capacity, and to develop their ability to defend
public interest in trade-related areas.  She also referred to the Monitoring Mechanism and said that,
although some of the concerns of her delegation had been clarified by Kenya,  including the kind ofstructure being proposed for such a mechanism, they  nonetheless looked forward to further discussion
on this issue.
62. The representative of Morocco said that Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration had
given a clear mandate to the CTD which was to examine the possible ways and means of making the
S&D treatment provisions effective, precise, and operational.  He said that this exercise, which was tobe concluded by formulating recommendations to the General Council by the end of July 2002, would
help the developing countries and the least-developed countries to use the S&D provisions in a more
substantive fashion.  His delegation supported the proposal which had been submitted by Kenya on
behalf of the African Group.  The proposals contained in that document related to substantive
Agreements of the WTO and the legal framework of S&D treatment, including the suggestion forsetting up a Monitoring Mechanism to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of such provisions,TN/CTD/M/4
Page 20
something which had been lacking so far.  He said that addressing these proposals would be entirely
within the letter and the spirit of Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
63. The representative of Cuba said that in principl e, at least, they shared the criteria that Kenya
had outlined with regard to the proposed Monitoring Mechanism  His delegation accorded great
importance to the setting up of an evaluation and monitoring body which would allow Members toexamine the implementation of the S&D provisions that had been agreed upon and which would also
allow an assessment of any difficulties that arise during the implementation of these provisions.  He
said that the mechanism would also enable Members to assess whether or not the S&D provisions
were fulfilling the objectives for which they had been incorporated in the Agreements.
64. The representative of Nigeria said that there appeared to be a general agreement, in principle,
that S&D treatment provisions must be reviewed with the objective of strengthening them and making
them more precise, effective, and operational.  In this respect, the African Group had come up withsuggestions to make these provisions mandatory and binding, including the setting up of a Monitoring
Mechanism.  The Special Session had now to examine these proposals so as to come up with
recommendations in keeping with the mandate of Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
65. The representative of Sri Lanka, commenting on the proposals presented by a group of
developing countries on the SPS Agreement, particularly on Articles 9.2, 10.1 and 10.3 of the
Agreement, said that developing countries in their efforts to maintain the existing levels of market
access, or to increase their level of market access, or even to enter the developed country markets as
new entrants, were required to adhere to rather stringent SPS requirements stipulated by the developed
countries.  Potential access for developing country exports in developed country markets therefore
depended largely on not only the tariffs but also on the non-tariff barriers and particularly the SPS andTBT requirements.  She said that an increase in market access would only be possible if the exporter
were able to comply with the SPS standards.  Deve loping countries were not, however, able to attain
the level of standards required by the developed countries because of a number of constraints.  The
direct loss of potential export volumes due to non-compliance of SPS and TBT requirements was
enormous. Sharing her country’s experience in the spice sector, she said that the estimated averageexport volume loss as a result of non-compliance of standards was about 5,500 Mt. during 1995-2000.
This represented about 34 per cent of the total exports of spices during the same period.  The
corresponding total average value of this volume, estimated at its opportunity cost, amounted to about
6 per cent of the total export revenue during the same period.  There was evidence to suggest that
these compliance requirements resulted in both positive and negative impacts on the spice industry.  A
final assessment at the national level, however, demonstrated a net negative impact on the economy,
particularly on employment.  This was mainly due to a decrease in export volumes.  She said that thenet loss of employment was in the range of 2400 persons every year or about 4 per cent of the total
labour force involved in that sector.
66. She said that this showed that even if developing countries wanted to maintain the existing
level of market access and thereby to negate the negative consequences of loss of market share, they
still needed to take a number of steps, including:  (i) introducing improved technology;(ii) introducing improved  R&D facilities;  and (iii) becoming aware of new voluntary and mandatory
standards through training and workshops.  All these measures required financial resources.  In
addition it would also be necessary for developing countries to upgrade the relevant technology.  It
was therefore important for developed countries to provide appropriate technology to developing
countries, either free or on affordable terms, so as to improve their processing systems and the qualityof their products.  For the spice processing sector in her country, for example, it had been estimated
that the investment cost of research and development was in the range of US$8 million per annum, of
which only 3 per cent could be provided by the Government.  Similarly, the total cost of providing
training for the employees in this industry was in the range of US$1.954 million, of which only a
small part could be provided by the Government.  She said that empirical data clearly demonstratedTN/CTD/M/4
Page 21
that additional funding was needed in order for conformity with the SPS requirements to be achieved.
Finding such funds would of course be very difficult given the financial constraints of most
developing countries.  In her view this underscored the need for developed countries not only to
provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries but also to provide them with
longer time periods to implement SPS standards.  She added that there was no mechanism in theWTO, or in any other intergovernmental organisation, which could provide developing countries with
such assistance.  Assistance could at present be sought only bilaterally. and she stressed that, since the
existing Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement was not mandatory, there was no way that a developing
countries could be assured of any assistance once it had been requested.  This was why the proposals
presented by Members, including that of the African Group, suggested that the relevant provisions of
the SPS Agreement be made mandatory in order for them to become effective and operational.  She
said that her delegation therefore supported the proposal contained in document TN/CTD/W/2 that theclause "shall consider providing" be changed to "shall provide".  Her delegation also wished to
indicate its support for the proposed addition to Article 9.2 and the proposals made in respect of
Articles 10.1 & 10.3 of the SPS Agreement.  She felt that there were justifiable reasons for the
developed countries to provide compensation for the loss of export revenue resulting from the
imposition of such measures, a point also highlighted in the African Group Submission.
67. The representative of Canada said that it was important to move the discussion into the area
of the principles and objectives of S&D treatment.  In this context her delegation wished to associate
itself with the statement made by the United States .  As for the Monitoring Mechanism, she said that
while her delegation appreciated the clarifications that had been provided, it would be pertinent to
point out that they had visualized this mechanism as being much simpler.  They had imagined amechanism whereby S&D treatment would be discussed as a regular item on the agendas of the
committees.  These committees would then report to the CTD which was, she felt, the right body in
which to deal with these issues.  She also expressed support for the idea of an annual review of the
S&D provisions from the perspective of LDCs.  But the appropriate forum for such an exercise
should, in her view, be the LDC Sub-Committee.
68. The representative of Uganda stated that there were many similarities between the concerns of
the LDCs and those of the African Group.  For this reason the submission by the latter converged
substantially with that made by the LDCs.  He supported the submission by the African Group, saying
that it also included many points which the LDCs did not wish to duplicate in their own submission.
Elaborating on the need for a framework Agreement on S&D, he said that this could be built around
four elements.  First, there must be a reaffirmation and operationalization of development as the
primary goal of the WTO Agreements.  This would require the current framework, principles, rules,operations and proposals in the WTO to be assessed and improved.  He believed that the current
process addressed some aspects of this element but stressed that the strengthening of S&D treatment
should not be confined to examining only the existing provisions but should look also at the need for
additional measures, as envisaged in paragraph 12 of the Implementation Decision.  Second, there
must be a strengthening, operationalizing, and introduction of general development principles in theAgreements in the four major areas of the WTO, i.e. goods, services, intellectual property and dispute
settlement.  Third, developing countries, and particularly LDCs, should have recourse to financial
resources in order to enable them to undertake thei r obligations and to enjoy their rights, including
their rights under S&D treatment.  This would require an estimation of the necessary additional
resources that developing countries might require under each Agreement.  Fourth, supply-sideconstraints in developing countries and their need to retain the flexibility of being able to adopt pro-
development policies and options should be addressed.  This could be done in several ways including,
for example, by:  (i) by exempting developing countries, particularly least-developed countries, from
obligations when these constrain or prevent them from adopting policies or measures required for
their economic and social development;  or (ii) by making it obligatory for developed countries toassist developing countries in building their supply-side capacity in order to help them to foster
exports.  He also indicated that they were in the process of  modifying their paper and intended shortlyTN/CTD/M/4
Page 22
to submit a revised version.  He said that most of their proposals were, however, either systemic or
made with reference to specific provisions of the various Agreements.  One of such proposal related,
for example, to notification obligations.  He said that various Agreements stipulated numerous
notification requirements and that, on the basis of the reports of these bodies, many countries,
especially from the LDC group, were technically in breach of such requirements.  This was oftenbecause of a lack of capacity.  He said that it was in order to highlight these concerns that the LDCs
intended to submit a proposal on notification requirements.
69. The representative of Australia said that they recognized the importance of S&D treatment
and the work being done in this regard in this body.  The discussion had been very useful and had
given them a better sense of the issues that needed to be addressed.  However, they were still working
through the very large number of proposals which had been submitted and in this context they felt that
it would be useful to have a better idea of the structure of the future work of the Committee.
70. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation fully endorsed and supported the
elements and proposals submitted by the African Group and the LDCs, particularly regarding the
proposal to set up a Monitoring Mechanism.  Further discussion on this issue would help in clarifying
how to make such a mechanism effective.  He also  raised some questions regarding the elements and
modalities of making S&D provisions operational and mandatory.  He said that, in view of the limitedtime available, it was important urgently to discuss and clarify the elements and modalities of the
proposals introduced by Members aimed at making the provisions effective and operational.
71. The delegation of Zambia began by expressing support for the statement made by Kenya on
behalf of the African Group as well as for the proposal submitted by the LDCs, especially for a
general framework Agreement that could guide the work on the overall issue of strengthening SDT, asenvisaged in Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  Explaining why his delegation
believed that the Special Session should take a decision on the adoption of such a framework
Agreement, he said that if the work programme from the Doha Ministerial Conference was to succeed
in making development a priority, the multilateral system must decisively address the development
implications of the S&D mandate by responding to the needs of the least-developed and developingcountries.  This would mean formulating guidelines and practical measures that would improve their
terms of trade, enhance their export capacity and sustain their balance-of-payments.  He said that trade
policy must, most importantly, be seen to be contingent on the particular conditions of each country,
depending on its level of development.  S&D treatment must not merely be based on providing, or
extending, transition periods for least-developed and developing country Members.  Such an approach
would disregard the individual problems and the st ructural imbalances and distortions in developing
country economies, those factors, in other words, which undermine their productive and tradecapacities.  Such problems constrain their participation in the trading system as well as their ability to
obtain benefits from it, problems which would not be resolved by merely extending the timeframe.
For these reasons his delegation felt that it was important to have a framework Agreement on S&D
treatment.  He stressed that his delegation viewed this as an important issue and that it would take a
view on the rest of the work programme set out in the Doha Ministerial Declaration against thecontext of the results of decisions arrived at on the S&D issues.  He emphasized that the Doha
mandate must remain relevant.  It must be ensured that the issue of strengthening S&D treatment does
not remain merely a public relations exercise for the Committee.
72. In the context of the general framework approach proposed by the LDCs, he said that there
must be a reaffirmation and operationalization of development as the primary goal of the WTO.  Thiswould require that the current framework, principles, rules, operations and proposals in the WTO are
appropriately assessed and improved.  He said that the process undertaken addressed some aspects of
this element but it was important that the streng thening of S&D treatment not remain confined to
examining only existing provisions but that it should also look instead at additional measures as
envisaged in paragraph 12 of the Implementation Decision.  There should also be an introduction,TN/CTD/M/4
Page 23
strengthening, and operationalizing of general development principles within the agreements in the
four major areas of WTO work, i.e. goods, servi ces, intellectual property and dispute settlement.
Developing countries, including LDCs, should have recourse to financial resources in order to enable
them to undertake their obligations and to enjoy their rights, including their rights under S&D
treatment.  The additional resources required by each developing country under the differentAgreements would need to be estimated.  Some assurance must then be made that the financial
requirements are met. He said that supply-side constraints in developing countries and their need to
retain the flexibility of being able to adopt pro-development policies and options must also be
addressed.  The LDCs had proposed that this could be done in two ways:  first, through exemptions
from obligations for developing countries, if such obligations constrain or prevent developing
countries from adopting policies or measures required for their economic and social development;
and, second, through obligations on the part of developed countries to assist developing countries tobuild their supply-side capacity so as to foster national production and export supply capacity.  He felt
that these elements could make up the framework approach and provide much-needed guidance to the
work that was being undertaken.
73. The representative of Saint Lucia referred to the statement made by Uganda in which it had
been mentioned that the LDCs would be submitting a paper on notification requirements.  She said
that this was an issue which her delegation understood very well since the capacity constraint faced by
countries like hers limited their ability to fulfi ll the heavy regulatory administrative burden imposed
by the Uruguay Round Agreements.  She said that this issue should be addressed either in the context
of the proposal submitted by them on the use of contingency protection measures or on the basis of a
specific proposal regarding notification requirements which the LDCs had said they would besubmitting.  The work on S&D should in either case address the problem of the administrative cost
incurred by developing countries in fulfilling obligations based on rules that were written without
reference to the capacity constraints of many Members.
74. The representative of Japan said that in their view S&D treatment was one means by which to
respond to the specific development needs of individual developing countries in order to help them
comply with the obligations of the Agreements.  Japan was interested in discussing the principles of
S&D treatment from such a viewpoint.  Knowledge of the utilization of the existing S&D provisions
would help in this regard, since Members could then identify the problems or difficulties that
beneficiary countries may have faced in using these provisions.  In this connection he appreciated
Sri Lanka's explanatory comments.  He also said that it would be useful further to analyse the
proposed Monitoring Mechanism.  They looked forw ard to receiving a copy of the statement made by
Kenya on this matter.
75. The Chairman said that discussion of the papers by the African Group and by the LDCs had
been very constructive.  He also referred to the intention of the LDCs to submit a modified paper.  As
for the African Group paper, he said that it had made a number of specific proposals regarding
specific provisions of the various Agreements.  It had made suggestions to which Members could
return in future meetings.
76. The representative of Kenya, responding to the various interventions that had been made on
the African Group submission and the clarification pr ovided by them on some of their proposals, said
that they were happy to note that there had been no real opposition to their proposals and that in
particular the Monitoring Mechanism was something that the Special Session could agree upon and
consider further.  In response to comments from Canada, he emphasized that what they had proposedwas to have a relatively simple monitoring mechanism.  The intention was not to have anything
complicated.  He said that they were ready to enga ge in further discussions so that a mechanism could
be agreed upon that would be of benefit to the LDCs and the developing countries.TN/CTD/M/4
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77. The Chairman then gave his consideration to the second portion of agenda item B.  This
concerned various ways, including through improved information flows, by which developing
countries, in particular the least-developed countries, could be assisted to make use of the S&D
treatment provisions.  He said that there were no specific documents on this issue on the table and
simply invited Members to make any comments that they might have.
78. The representative of Venezuela stated that, while they had certain comments on proposals
relating to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, as also on the Understanding on Article VI of GATT
1994, they would limit themselves to comments on the TRIPS Agreement, as it had been made clear
that only this was on the agenda for the meeting.  They observed that the TRIPS Agreement contained
very few provisions on S&D treatment and, therefore, that the best approach might be to maintain the
flexibility of the Agreement in using only such instruments or policies that were important for
development.  They felt that norms that restricted development should not be applied.  She said that itwas also important to consider technical assistance a priority issue, especially since capacity building
should not be focused exclusively on the observance of, or compliance with, any one single
Agreement.  Countries should be able to partic ipate in the formulation of plans for technical
assistance and should be able to express their needs and priorities.  She concluded by stating that they
supported the proposal made on transition periods and reiterated that S&D provisions should not belimited in scope should rather encompass the flex ibility necessary in the context of development.
79. The representative of Saint Lucia said that that the proposal that she had introduced earlier,
clarifying the basic guidelines and setting out the procedures for recourse to the provisions of
Article XVIII (C), was one way of facilitating the effective use of S&D provisions by developing
countries.  In this context she highlighted the fact that there were ceratin provisions drafted underGATT 1947 which lacked procedural clarity and which have therefore been unable to provide to
developing countries the benefits they intended.  There was also a lot of ambiguity among Members
as to how to use a provision and, in such instances, elaborating guidelines was one of the ways by
which developing countries could be assisted to make effective use of the existing provisions.
C. O
THER BUSINESS
80. Moving on to "Other Business" the Chairman reminded Members that at the beginning of the
meeting he had indicated that due to the fact that only two more meetings were scheduled before the
July deadline there was now a need urgently to examine how best to proceed with the work.  He said
that given the volume of work, with as many as 80 or so specific proposals having been made, some
of which had been given only a first or an initial reading, Members would need to prioritize and
structure their future work.  In addition, a number of issues had been raised in the papers that had been
submitted and during the course of the discussions:  issues relating to principles and objectives;issues relating to systemic and institutional measures that might improve the implementation of S&D;
and issues relating to the overall framework and architectural elements of the S&D provisions.  He
said that with only two meetings to go, meetings that were actually scheduled to help finalize the
Special Session's recommendations to the General Council, it was clear that Members had to
prioritize what to do between now and the July m eeting.  Members could also begin to draw up a
possible road map for work after July.  He said that it was his intention to hold a series of informal
consultations in the coming weeks in an effort to structure the Special Session's work, above all to
prioritize it but also to begin to consider the contours of a road map charting the direction of future
work.  He said that some broad elements of the work schedule had emerged, including an examination
of some of the proposed systemic measures.  He mentioned the Monitoring Mechanism, for example,on which a number of delegations had spoken and on which there had been a detailed discussion in
the meeting.  He also reiterated the need to examine the large number of Agreement specific proposals
on which the discussions remained inconclusive.  In this perspective, he invited Members' views on
how they thought the Special Session should addre ss some of these issues and likewise if there wereTN/CTD/M/4
Page 25
other elements that Members wished to see addressed, either as part of the current structure of work or
to be drawn into the road map for the way ahead.
81. The representative of the European Communities ag reed that there was an urgent need to look
ahead to what would need to be done, especially in the context of the deadline for recommendations
to the General Council.  He felt that the discussions could possibly be structured around fourelements.  First, it was important to analyse the overall objectives of S&D treatment in the WTO
rules.  Such an analysis should look at both the immediate and the longer term perspectives of S&D
provisions in existing and future S&D treatment provisions.  He said that the work plan should also
include consideration of the expectations of developing countries with respect to S&D treatment
supporting their integration into the multilateral trading system.  He felt that the clear definition and
the understanding of the overall objectives of the S&D provisions could help identify those
instruments which would be most effective in reaching some of these objectives.  Attention shouldtherefore be focussed on the areas where these instruments were most needed.  Second, it would be
useful to look at the interaction between the S&D treatment instruments and their integration into the
WTO Agreements, in other words how those instruments interact and how they could be integrated
into specific agreements.  The third issue was the n eed to take into account the specific interests and
circumstances of countries.  This might lead to an examination of how account is taken of thedifferentiated needs of developing countries in relation to WTO rule making and, in this context, to
the specific needs of the LDCs.  Understanding the different needs and the interests of developing
countries in view of their specific circumstances  would allow the trading system better to address
those needs and interests in relation to specific agreements.  Fourth was the relation between the S&D
provisions and other support measures, including the relation between S&D measures and measuresthat are taken by other organizations or donors to support the development of developing countries,
notably through measures that assist their integration into the multilateral trading system and the
global economy.  The role of the WTO's trade-related technical assistance and capacity building
efforts combined with those of other donors to strengthen synergy and complementarity merited
particular consideration.  He felt that a structured discussion of these elements would help move thediscussions further forward as well as helping to achieve some satisfactory results within the next six
weeks.
82. The representative of India said that it was important to recall the mandate given to the CTD
by Ministers in Doha.  He said that paragraph 12.1(i) of the Decision on Implementation was fairly
clear:  it was to identify those S&D provisions that Members felt should be made mandatory and to
report to the General Council with clear recommendations for a decision by July 2002.  He said that
paragraph 1was equally clear.  It specified that the S&D provisions were to be examined with a viewto making them more effective and again a report was to be submitted to the General Council with
clear recommendations for a decision by July 2002.  He stressed that these were not just reports to the
General Council, as some delegations had said, but were to be reports containing clear
recommendations that would then enable the General Council to take a decision by July 2002.  He
said that, as long as these objectives were fulfilled, his delegation would be happy to leave thestructuring of the future work in the hands of the Chairman.  He stated, however, that some
delegations had made a suggestion that the Agreement specific proposals should be sent to other
WTO bodies.  He said that this was something his delegation was unable to accept since it was the
CTD Special Session that had been tasked with the responsibility of examining all the S&D
provisions with a view to making them mandatory, precise, effective and operational.  He did not seeany necessity, therefore, to refer any of the proposals to other WTO bodies.  He felt that the proposals
already on the table provided a clear indication of what might be tackled in the first stage of the work.
83. The representative of Canada said that it was a ppropriate to take stock of the progress that had
been made in fulfilling the Doha mandate.  She said that a number of proposals had been tabled
regarding S&D provisions that could be made mandatory.  The CTD had considered the legalimplications and practical implications of doing so, as mandated in the Doha Declaration.  She saidTN/CTD/M/4
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that, in the view of her delegation, any changes to the existing S&D treatment provisions must only be
made through the procedure set out for making amendments to the provisions of existing Agreements.
She said that Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement could be used to clarify the meaning of a
provision but not to change it.  She felt that the interpretation provision should not be used in a
manner that would undermine the amendment provisions.  As to the second part of the Doha mandateshe said that her delegation held the view that ma king provisions mandatory did not mean that they
would necessarily become more effective; nor did it mean that developing countries would start to
make better use of them.  She supported an approach that did not require amendments to the
agreements but was based instead upon reviewing the S&D provisions against the basic principles and
objectives of S&D treatment.  As others, she felt that the Secretariat document on utilization was the
most comprehensive analysis currently available on the use of these S&D provisions.  She looked
forward to its update by the Secretariat.  She also said that it was important to take account of thework that had already been done in other bodies and working groups, some of which have held in-
depth discussions on various S&D provisions such as, for example, the TRIPS Council.  She said that
these bodies could be asked to give their recommendations as to which S&D provisions merited
further discussion in the Special Session.  As to possible recommendations to the General Council,
she said that a pointer might be made to the su ggestion regarding the establishment of a Monitoring
Mechanism and to the need for a further review of the principles and objectives, both of which would
require further analysis.
84. The representative of the United States said that, in the context of the emphasis given by India
on the reporting obligation by July, she would like to remind delegations that in the initial
consultations held by the then Chairman of the General Council, a number of delegations had statedthat the July deadline was not necessarily very realistic in light of the amount of work that had to be
done.  Since then a very large number of proposals had been tabled which would also need time to be
examined.  She said that there were a number of elements concerning S&D treatment provisions in the
Doha Declaration and, as the delegation of Venezuela had indicated, there were also cross linkages
with the overall implementation proposals that were being examined separately.  She said that, whilethey shared concerns about the need for more time , they also wanted to affirm their commitment to
the Special Session's reporting mandate to the General Council.
85. The Chairman said that it was his intention to hold informal consultations on 18 June 2002 so
that Members could reflect on some of those issues in an informal meeting.  He noted that Members
had repeatedly stressed their commitment to the mandate during the course of the work of their
Group.  He said that in view of the time constraint and given the status of the work it would be
difficult to get to where the mandate would have required us to be in July.  He said that if the currentstatus were accepted this would help to instil a measure of realism as to how to structure the work
during the next six weeks.  He said that Members had to strive for the attainable in this period through
constructive engagement, in all good faith, and then to devise a plan of action for the work that still
remained.
86. Before concluding, the Chairman said that he wi shed to bring to the attention of Members the
responses that had been received from the other WTO bodies requested to inform the CTD Special
Session of any issues related to S&D treatment which they may have considered.  He said that these
had been circulated to Members to peruse and that Members could give their reactions to these
reactions either at once or at a later meeting.  No comments were made in this regard and so the
Chairman closed the meeting.
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